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How is a discourse on the self possible?

Lang, Jonathan Sanders, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1990

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HOW IS A DISCOURSE ON THE SELF POSSIBLE?

by

JONATHAN SANDERS LANG

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1990

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To those whose love has helped me to find my way -- I remain yours and this dissertation belongs to all of you. In other words, it is yours as much as mine. But the experience which the process of dissertation writing has helped to form will remain forever mine. To the extent that I have been able to resolve the problem of self-referential discourse the experience of my self has become available to me and to others. Through the struggle of learning to "write" or live in this way -- in a confessional mode not represented in this text but by this text -- I have come to express the personal within the shared space of relationship. Others may have tried to teach me this, but it was something I had to learn by and for myself.

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We

Hic Rhodus, hic salta

He stared at the silhouettes appearing behind the window curtains across the Place de Rennes. The die was cast; he had to take the jump. For ten years he had clung to his manuscript. He had set out to solve the world's problems. With no certainty save that certainties can be acquired and remain subject to dismissal, he had thought he could begin living when he answered this question: When, how, for whom can life have a meaning? ...

Hic Rhodus, hic salta. He had promised himself to write these words in his journal when he finished writing this book. He had clung to it for ten years; it had become his justification. He had discovered that when a man is incapable of living, or when life has no meaning for him, he always invents this way out for himself; to write about the nonmeaning of life, to look for an explanation, an escape, to demonstrate that all roads are blocked save one -- this demonstration itself, and the remedy it provides against the experience it contradicts. Writing had become a passion; he had purged himself of all problems; he had resolved them in the abstract. And when, after nine years, he had felt he was near the end, the beginning of the end, he had realized that the essential thing was eluding him. The essential thing: himself. He felt empty and bone-dry. He wondered if he would even suffer if his book (ten years!) were refused. 'The Essay' had slowly died as he drew near the end, had fallen outside himself; it had given him something to think about for ten years, but these ruminations had not reached him. He was the same as he had been before, with this exception: he had learned to think about life. He had not learned to endure himself. He had escaped himself by posing his problems in the abstract, and he found himself intact. Now everything had to be begun all over again; he must take a look at himself rather than at 'man in general'. He must stop believing a problem can ever be 'solved'. He must reach this certainty: A philosophy cannot dispense with life -- the question persists and you have to put up with yourself indefinitely.

-- Andre Gorz, The Traitor

-- CHAPTER 1 --

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM AND THE THESIS

. . . the work of human works . . . (is) to establish, in and by means of each one of us, an absolutely original center in which the universe reflects itself in a unique and inimitable way.

In a very ordinary sense, every act of writing presupposes an author, i.e. a self who writes, a text, and a world (whether as the text's referent, or as the world in which author and text are received, understood, or simply exist). These presuppositions are examined in the context of a specific concern with philosophical writing, i.e. with the relation between philosophers, philosophical texts, and "the" philosophical world (or worlds).

The thesis which informs my inquiry is concerned with the act of writing. Specifically, the following claim is defended: Regardless of whatever else it may be or be about, the act of writing is, whether intended or not, a mode of discourse on the self -- not simply in the sense that the text reveals or shows the author as in explicit autobiography or self-presentation, but in the creative sense that the act of writing is a construction of the authorial "self", and that philosophical writing may usefully be understood as a mode of such self-construction, and therefore (in a sense to be made clear) as confessional.

¹Pierre Teilhard De Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 261.

The question to which this dissertation is addressed and to which the thesis is an answer is: How is a discourse on the self possible? The problem posed by this question can be formulated in several ways. Three forms of the dilemma can be stated briefly as follows: One form which I believe is found in the early writing of Jean-Paul Sartre is: Is a self-referential discourse possible? Does discourse reveal, or cover up (distract from, look aside from) the self? Another form which captures the problem dealt with in the writing of Michel Foucault is: Can the "self" be reported (taken) as the object of the discourse (as what the discourse is "about") when it is the discourse which (in significant measure) constitutes the very self that it is about? And yet another form is: Is a confessional mode of discourse -- discourse about the self in this sense of self-confession -- possible? As stated, all three forms of the dilemma are concerned with the reflexive nature of the self.

In arguing for the generality of the problems addressed in my dissertation inquiry, I would claim that the reflexive nature of the self lies at the heart of human existence and is an indisputable condition of our humanity. Although the question of how self-consciousness is possible is an esoteric one contemplated by members of the philosophical community especially since the time of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind,² the problem of achieving clarity and understanding of one's

²G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (New York and Evanston: The Academy Library/Harper Torchbooks, 1967).

own particular consciousness of self is, if not an enduring concern, at least an object of serious consideration for some period of time in the intellectual life of every reflective person. Such practices more generally are inextricably tied to our concern for human identity. No doubt these are not original problems.

Although it would be instructive and interesting to trace the form in which the problem of the reflexive nature of the self has been posed by philosophers throughout the western tradition, the route of historical survey will not be taken in this dissertation. Nonetheless, I wish to acknowledge that there is a literature within the tradition of western philosophy which takes the form of confession. To name a few philosophers that come most readily to mind; the confessional writings of Saint Augustine, Pascal, and Rousseau would, by the very declaration of their writing as confessions, provide the investigator interested in taking an historical approach with much material. However, with the exception of Hegel, Kierkegaard, and a few others the early antecedents of the form of confessional writing for which my dissertation is an argument and not an example are simply explicit autobiography or self-presentation.

The difficulty in answering the question of how a discourse on the self is possible can be brought out further by considering the different political traditions which lie behind the terms "discourse" and "self." The latter term has in the past been appropriated by two different groups. The

first group consists of a selection of feminists to whom the essentiality of gender plays a strong role in their arguments against the androcentric bias within the science industry.³ The second group consists of religious conservatives whose respect for the sanctity of the human person led them to conceive of the self as a coherent and consistently rational atomistic entity which was solely responsible for the determination of the individual's personality and life. Intentions as the vehicle of the self created the character of a person's activity. Thus, speaking and writing as activities could under this conception of the self be explained in terms of intentions alone. The philosophical roots of this tradition of thought about the self grow out of the work of Rene Descartes.

Although "discourse" in its common sense meaning refers to speaking and writing, it is not so easily explained. As a term its meaning is more complicated than the meaning conveyed by the word "discourse" in its common everyday usage. The more complex sense originates in the work of Continental philosophers in France (Foucault, Lacan, Barthes, Derrida, Deleuze, Baudrillard, and Lyotard). These philosophers are believed by many on this side of the Atlantic to belong to a political movement prompted by the May 1968 event in France in which the university students precipitated a general nationwide strike by working men and women. This group of

³See Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).

intellectuals is seen by others and not by themselves as members of a philosophical movement known by the name poststructuralism.⁴ Likewise, the politics of these intellectuals is seen as falling under the rubric of postmodernism which tends to lend a unity which they would reject. Writers in the postmodern period are those who find "unity" in their common assumption that modernist forms of representation in literature and the arts have been transcended or surpassed. Not all writers are however in agreement about this.

Habermas for one thinks that modernity can only be fully understood by dispensing with the usual preoccupation with art and maintains that

The project of modernity formulated in the 18th Century by philosophers of the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic. At the same time, this project intended to release the cognitive potentials of each of these domains from their esoteric forms. The Enlightenment philosophers wanted to utilize this accumulation of specialized culture for the enrichment of everyday life -- that is to say, for the rational organization of everyday social life.

Enlightenment thinkers of the cast of mind of Condorcet still had the extravagant expectation that the arts and sciences would promote not only the control of natural forces but also understanding of the world and of the self, moral progress, the justice of institutions and even the happiness of human beings. The 20th century has shattered this optimism. The differentiation of science, morality, and art has come to mean the autonomy of the segments treated by the specialist and their separation from the hermeneutics of

⁴For this argument see Mark Poster, Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989).

everyday communication. This splitting off is the problem that has given rise to efforts to "negate" the culture of expertise. But the problem won't go away: should we try to hold on to the intentions of the Enlightenment, feeble as they may be, or should we declare the entire project of modernity a lost cause?

From Habermas' point of view, the so-called poststructuralists are neo-conservatives. If we were to agree with Habermas, my original intention to show that "discourse" and "self" are rooted in different political traditions would be subverted.

Since it is not required at this point of my introduction to engage in a dialogue (or argument) with Habermas, it should suffice to say that the marking of the word "intentions" in the Habermas text which appears above reverts back to the conservative tendency to think of the self as the origin of action and meaning. This is precisely the point of departure from modernism which is shared by the poststructuralists. Thus, from my standpoint, it is Habermas who appears to be the political conservative since he tries to conserve the enlightenment project in which modernism is rooted.

Since representations under the poststructuralist view are not transparent but ambiguous and equivocal as to their origins, a writer's intentions cannot be taken as the last word on determinations of meaning or action. This can be brought out by giving a gloss on the sense of the term "discourse." The cautiousness with which discourse may be entered into is exemplified in the inaugural lecture delivered

⁵Jurgen Habermas, "Modernity--An Incomplete Project" in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, edited by Hal Foster (Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1983), 9-10.

at the College de France on December 2, 1970 in which Michel Foucault said

Inclination speaks out: "I don't want to have to enter this risky world of discourse; I want nothing to do with it insofar as it is decisive and final; I would like to feel it all around me, calm and transparent, profound, infinitely open, with others responding to my expectations, and truth emerging, one by one. All I want is to allow myself to be borne along, within it, and by it, a happy wreck." Institutions reply: "But you have nothing to fear from launching out; we're here to show you discourse is within the established order of things, that we've waited a long time for its arrival, that a place has been set aside for it--a place which both honors and disarms it; and if it should happen to have a certain power, then it is we, and we alone, who give it that power."⁶

Foucault ventures the guess that both the inclination and the institution to which he has alluded in the above passage "are but two converse responses to the same anxiety."⁷

This anxiety is masked by the ordinariness of "the fact that people speak, and that their speech proliferates."⁸ Foucault uses the lecture as occasion to articulate the terrain in which the peril and danger of discourse is to be unmasked. His first supposition is

"that in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and

⁶Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 215-216.

⁷Ibid., 216.

⁸Ibid.

its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality.

According to Foucault, these rules of exclusion are commonly known in a society such as our own. "We know perfectly well that we are not free to say just anything, that we cannot simply speak of anything, when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, may speak of just anything."¹⁰ Such restriction falls under three categories of prohibition: (1) covering objects, (2) ritual with its surrounding circumstances, and (3) the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a particular subject.

These categories combine to reinforce today especially the prohibition of speaking of politics and sexuality. This may sound odd. We might even anticipate that the politically liberal person would take exception with Foucault's claim that both politics and sexuality are topics which are prohibited. But remember Foucault is speaking about the cultivation of expertise. Surely anyone could think about and even talk with others about sex and politics, but discussion of these topics by just anyone would lack the authoritative sanctioning of the professional speech community to which these topics belong as property of the experts. But of course Foucault does not stop with claiming that only certain people are sanctioned to speak of these things. For this deeper exclusion another principle is needed which is guided by the opposition reason/folly. Its

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

function is not to prohibit but to create division and rejection.

The third system of exclusion is a risky one. It is the opposition between the true and false. In Foucault's inaugural lecture, he speaks at greater length comparatively of this last exclusion.

"For centuries, [prohibited words and the division of madness] have continually tended toward [the will to truth] because this last has, gradually, been attempting to assimilate the other in order both to modify them and to provide them with a firm foundation. Because, if the two former are continually growing more fragile and less certain to the extent that they are now invaded by the will to truth, the latter, in contrast, daily grows in strength, in depth and implacability.

And yet we speak of it least. As though the will to truth and its vicissitudes were masked by truth itself and its necessary unfolding. The reason is perhaps this: if, since the time of the Greeks, true discourse no longer responds to desire or to that which exercises power in the will to truth, in the will to speak out in true discourse, what, then, is at work, if not desire and power? True discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power, is incapable of recognizing the will to truth which pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon us for so long, is such that the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it.¹¹

In contemporary philosophy, the will to truth is oddly the least addressed of the three systems of exclusion, but for an understanding of how a discourse on the self is possible it is paramount.

It is easy enough to see that the conception of self in which intentions are transparent is no longer tenable because representation of such intentions can no longer be thought of

¹¹Ibid., 219.

as occurring via some sort of innocent pictorial description. The powers and dangers of discourse have perhaps always been lurking off stage in the wings, but this is not quite accurate. For Foucault the dangers are not separate or external to speaking and writing, but are inherent in the modes of discourse at our disposal. We could suggest that the principle of hermeneutics which governs such activities as Freud's psychoanalysis or Marx's historical materialism permits discourse to be unmasked through a process which reveals the distortions of repression or class interest.¹² But, as we are brought to understand from Foucault's words in the above quote concerning the will to truth, the processes of uncovering or discovering knowledge are driven by desire and power. The entire apparatus which determines the opposition of the true and false is meant to disguise its purpose of deception. These conditions laid bare by the poststructuralist thought of Foucault are not unique, the same problematizing effect could be shown for each of the other poststructuralist thinkers named above parenthetically.

Lastly, it should be noted that in contesting the practice of interpreting an oeuvre according to a unity which the critics thought was put there by an author, Foucault is not rejecting the notion or existence of individuals. Witness: "Of course it would be ridiculous to deny the existence of

¹²See Paul Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970).

individuals who write, and invent."¹³ Nonetheless, Foucault explained

"What he writes and does not write, what he sketches out, even preliminary sketches for the work, and what he drops as simple mundane remarks, all this interplay of differences is prescribed by the author-function. It is from this new position, as an author, that he will fashion -- from all that he might have said, from all he says daily, at any time -- the still shaky profile of his oeuvre."¹⁴

Since the Seventeenth Century in scientific writings there has been a decline in the tendency to use an author as the index of a work's truthfulness. With the advent of "disciplines" in contrast to that of commentary and that of the author, attention has shifted even further away from the individual self who writes. This is so because

disciplines are defined by groups of objects, methods, their corpus of propositions considered to be true, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools; all these constitute a sort of anonymous system, freely available to whoever wishes, or whoever is able to make use of them, without there being any question of their meaning or their validity being derived from whoever happened to invent them. . . . For a discipline to exist, there must be the possibility of formulating -- and doing so ad infinitum -- fresh propositions."¹⁵

For Foucault, the nature of propositions is not eternal, but subject to change over time with shifts in the constructive practices of discourse. "It is always possible one could speak the truth in a void; one would only be in the true, however,

¹³Foucault, The Archaeology, 222.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., 222-23.

if one obeyed the rules of some discursive "policy" which would have to be reactivated every time one spoke."¹⁶

Thus we may begin to tease out the paradox of discourse and self within the following statements by Foucault:

disciplines constitute a system of control in the production of discourse, fixing its limits through the action of an identity taking the form of a permanent reactivation of the rules. We tend to see, in an author's fertility, in the multiplicity of commentaries and in the development of a discipline so many infinite resources available for the creation of discourse. Perhaps so, but they are nonetheless principles of constraint, and it is probably impossible to appreciate their positive, multiplicatory role without first taking into consideration their restrictive, constraining role.¹⁷

The disciplines seem to provide a double function: on the one hand, its rules which guide the formulation of propositions enable discourse to ensue and go on endlessly seemingly creating an inexhaustible freedom for the self; but on the other hand, the discipline appears to constrain and restrict the discourse of the self producing the reverse of emancipation insofar as the self can be said to be subjected to and disciplined by these rules.

In the present dissertation these problematic aspects of discourse and self manifested within the triadic relationship between writers, texts, and readers (world as audience) will be discussed within a framework of cultural studies.¹⁸ The

¹⁶Ibid., 224.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸See Stanley Aronowitz, "What is Cultural Studies?" forthcoming in Social Text for an historical analysis of the contemporary disciplinary crisis and the advent of cultural studies.

reason I am using cultural studies is that most attempts to develop a new form of discourse which is similar to if not the same as what I am calling confessional writing have been made within the frame of the study of culture.

The framing of this activity of study is made possible by a collaboration or joining of the humanities and social sciences. Contemporary philosophy has itself been prone to incorporate into its own discourse the findings of the human and social sciences. An extreme example of this tendency would be Quine's attempt to naturalize epistemology which is something of a synthesis of philosophy (epistemology) and psychology (behaviorism). According to Quine,

Epistemology still goes on, though in a new setting and a clarified status. Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded certain experimentally controlled input -- certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance -- and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reason that always prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory¹⁹ of nature transcends any available evidence.

This case will be examined thoroughly in Chapter 3.

In the Anglo-American tradition, Professors Cornel West and Richard Rorty have been strong advocates for the activity

¹⁹W. V. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 82-83.

of cultural studies as a displacement of philosophical analysis. Richard Rorty believes that philosophers have no subject matter of their own, and are destined to perform the function of cultural criticism. Rorty can be viewed to have deprivileged the voice of the philosopher in what is a grand conversation. Under

. . . this conception, "philosophy" is not the name for a discipline which confronts permanent issues, and unfortunately keeps misstating them, or attacking them with clumsy dialectical instruments. Rather, it is a cultural genre, a "voice in the conversation of mankind" (to use Michael Oakeshott's phrase), which centers on one topic rather than another at some given time not by dialectical necessity but as a result of various things happening elsewhere in the conversation (the New Science, the French Revolution, the modern novel) or of individual men of genius who think of something new (Hegel, Marx, Frege, Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger), or perhaps of the resultant of several such forces. Interesting philosophical change (we might say "philosophical progress," but this would be question-begging) occurs not when a new way is found to deal with an old problem but when a new set of problems emerges and the old ones begin to fade away.²⁰

Cornel West has dubbed Rorty's historicist and anti-reductionist perspective neopragmatism and has said of Rorty's position in regard to the ahistorical justifications of Cartesian, Kantians, and analytic philosophers:

In short, Rorty's neopragmatism has no place -- and rightly so -- for ahistorical philosophical justifications, yet his truncated historicism rests content with intellectual and homogeneous historical narratives and distrusts social and heterogeneous genealogical accounts. This truncated historicism, linked to the narrow ethical and tame political consequences of his narrative, is clearly illustrated in

²⁰Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 264.

his frequent use of an all-encompassing and undifferentiated conception of society.²¹

Rorty's narrative would, according to West, stand to benefit from a more subtle historical and sociological perspective. Lacking in the Rorty narrative is a healthy appreciation for the specificity of social practices.

For Cornel West,

The goal of a sophisticated neopragmatism is to think genealogically about specific practices in light of the best available social theories, cultural critiques, and historiographical insights and to act politically to achieve certain moral consequences²² in light of effective strategies and tactics.

Unlike Rorty's narrative which is preoccupied with transient vocabularies and discourses, West's narrative

. . . shuns any linguistic, dialogical, communicative, or conversational models and replaces them with a focus on the multileveled operations of power. This focus indeed takes seriously the power-laden character of language -- the ideological weight of certain rhetorics and the political gravity of various discourses. Yet it refuses to posit language and its distinct features as the model for understanding other, nondiscursive operations of power such as modes of production, state apparatuses, and bureaucratic institutions. Of course, such operations presuppose language and discourse, yet this presupposition in no way entails that the dynamic of power in language and discourses dictate or even emulate the dynamics of power in social structures and institutions.²³

In pointing out the materiality of sign systems both structuralists and poststructuralists, West believes, have

²¹Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 208-209.

²²Ibid., 209.

²³Ibid.

corrected the oversight of classical social theories which was to overlook the materiality of signs. The value in West's formulations is to have examined the specific practices of specific intellectuals who have written in the American grain (e.g., Emerson, Peirce, James, Dewey and lesser but still notable, Sidney Hook, C. Wright Mills, W.E.B. Du Bois, Reinhold Niebuhr to Quine, Rorty, Roberto Unger and last but not least Michel Foucault) in order to include on a grand scale the participation in academic discourse of students of color, working-class, and women.

However, much value is contained in the philosophical writings of Quine, Rorty, and West, each assumes that once access is provided no problem of expressivity should arise. This is a sore and inexcusable oversight on their parts, consequently none of these three philosophers have advocated the kind of writing which I am calling confessional.

For that reason we must look outside of the domain of Anglo-American philosophy to the fields of English and literary criticism where Derridean deconstruction has found an American home. A recent example of an attempt to map out the domain for confessional writing can be found in Gregory Ulmer's Teletheory.²⁴ Ulmer creates a neologism -- "mystory" -- for the genre in which confessional writing can be performed. The activity of constructing a mystory is called "mystoriography." The simplest gloss of Ulmer's mystory I can

²⁴Gregory Ulmer, Teletheory: Grammatology in the Age of Video (New York and London: Routledge, 1989).

provide at this moment without straying too far a field of my introduction to the problem as I have experienced it within the discipline of philosophy would be to say that as academic discourse

One purpose of teletheory is to make personal images accessible, receivable, by integrating the private and public dimensions of knowledge -- invention and justification. In the electronic age the academic apparatus may simulate the knowledge cycle that joins private, popular, and disciplinary cultural models, making explicit a situation that the dominant analytical model of pedagogy suppressed. Academic discourse in the new instauration consists of the translation or transference from one language to another. Ideology is understood in this context as the explanatory models used in both oral and literate culture to direct reasoning. The important point for teletheory is to develop a genre that brings these registers together, in which the folk models conveyed principally by oral culture are juxtaposed with the disciplinary models of schooling. The classroom is the mediating zone, of course, mixing oral and literate registers, with the instructions given to children, whether in the home or the school, being we are told, the most explicit expressions of the models of thought at work in a culture.

Only in Ulmer's writing have I found a self-conscious attempt to create a new form of discourse in which the construction of subjects brought up in the age of video can be explored. Ulmer's work is a good example of movement along an experimental axis of contested oppositions such as the rhetorical and the logical.

Although I have had to look elsewhere for help in determining the genre for the expression of confessional writing, the question of cultural studies would appear ripe for the

²⁵Ibid., 39.

asking in mainstream philosophical quarters. An important acknowledgement of the advent of cultural studies was made in the Presidential Address of Richard Bernstein delivered on December 29, 1988 before the Eighty-fourth Annual Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, DC. Professor Bernstein stated that

. . . there is another emerging phenomenon that exhibits a new intellectual mood of fluidity and breaking down of boundaries. Throughout the country in our universities and colleges there has been an explosion of study and discussion groups that cluster about new constellations of texts and themes that cut across disciplines. What distinguishes these groups from older models of "interdisciplinary" discussions is that there is no longer the presumption of a distinctive disciplinary approach to a given problem -- as if there were a unique philosophic, literary or anthropological point of view. The intermingling and overlapping is much more radical where pursuing issues in one's own field necessitates drawing upon the ways in which issues are explored in other fields of inquiry. It is almost as if there is a "counter-disciplinary" movement developing which no longer finds the disciplinary matrices that have shaped our academic departments helpful in dealing with intellectual problems. Some of us are beginning to discover that we share more intellectually in common with colleagues trained in different disciplines than with our own departmental philosophic colleagues.²⁶

The activity of cultural studies may be understood as a construction within a matrix of several "limiting" oppositions. The relevant oppositions in which the dilemma contained within the question -- How is a discourse on the self possible?, and (what is developed below as) the genre problematic can be situated are: the individual/universal; the

²⁶Richard Bernstein, "Pragmatism, Pluralism and the Healing of Wounds," in Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, Vol. 63, #3, November 1989, 14-15.

particular/general; the metaphorical/literal; the personal/impersonal; and the concrete/abstract. Cultural studies is a deconstructive activity which exposes the ideological context motivating these oppositions. As an activity it is not intended to be essentialist. It may be helpful to say that prior to our postmodern condition²⁷ the dependence of high culture on so-called low culture was suppressed by the ruling discourse which constituted philosophy and the other humanities. The hierarchy of high over low culture was fostered by excluding the personal, the particular, the metaphorical, and the concrete from high culture which sustains itself through "manifest," "authorized," or "sanctioned" discourse. The bottom-line on high culture is that it depends on the suppression of low culture for its own elevation.²⁸ The failure of high modern sensibility to sustain itself as the dominant discourse, that is to successfully uphold the hierarchical relation between high and low culture, paved the way for another line of attack to be instituted. One way in which the hierarchy was reinforced and made hegemonic was through what I should like to call "the scientization of philosophical discourse."

Although using the vocabulary of ruling discourse, high and low culture, and offensive or hegemonic metaphors may

²⁷The term postmodern condition is found in Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

²⁸Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics & Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).

suggest a familiar marxist analysis of culture according to the class struggle, I do not wish to be taken as committed to this model of analysis.²⁹ Specifically, the analysis presented in this dissertation will seek a different politics, not incompatible with traditional marxist analyses, but with refinements and elaborations such as those developed by Michel Foucault to explicate the changing knowledge/power relations found in different epochs and represented by different epistemes. Foucault's embellishment of marxist theory is necessary in order to retrieve our subjectivity.

The necessity for revising and transcending theory arises because according to the extension of marxist analysis to cultural institutions brought about by Louis Althusser,³⁰ the individual finds his or her self in the unhappy situation in which any substantive subjectivity is effaced in favor of a politics in which agency is radically modified to allow only the taking up of subject positions which are determined by the social formation. This statement needs some unpacking. First, it should be remembered that a feature of structuralist

²⁹See Michael Brown, "History and History's Problem," in Social Text, Vol. 6, #1, Winter 1986/87, 136-161, for an example of the kind of criticism which I think is needed of traditional marxist readings.

³⁰See Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)," in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127-186. Also recommended is David Silverman and Brian Torode, (Chapter 2) "Language and Ideology in Althusser," in The Material Word: Some Theories of Language and Its Limits (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 20-38.

marxism³¹ is its revival of the classical marxist project through which

Marx's "historical materialism" gives us not only elements of scientific knowledge (e.g., elements restricted to the history of "bourgeois" society, in its economic and political aspects), but, in principle, a true theoretical science, and therefore an abstract science. The concept of the "mode of production" and the concepts immediately related to it thus appear as the first abstract concepts whose validity is not as such limited to a given period or type of society, but on which, on the contrary, the concrete knowledge of this period and type depends. Hence the importance of defining them at the level of generality that they demand, i.e., in fact, the importance of posing a number of problems which the science of history has been waiting for since Marx.³²

Central to this claim of classical marxism, now revived by Althusser and Balibar, is the commitment to an interpretation of such concepts as "mode of production" and even of the levels or instances of the social formation themselves (ideology, politics, etc.) as trans-historical and cross-cultural concepts.

It would appear that this move toward extreme generality has the effect of eliminating the concreteness of individual persons. The present dissertation's rejection of this extreme move which consequently effaces the personal, the particular, the concrete, and the individual in favor of the impersonal, the general, the abstract, and the universal has an earlier antecedent in Kierkegaard. Of course, Kierkegaard reacted against the abstract character of Hegel's system of philosophy

³¹See Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1979).

³²Ibid., 201.

in order to retrieve what I have called after Kierkegaard a substantive subjectivity. Although in Kierkegaard the character of subjects is ultimately grounded in a religious conception of the soul, I am not asking my readers to replicate anything like the leap of faith of Kierkegaard. We can achieve a substantive subjectivity short of any formal religious initiation.

It is not necessary that one be an existentialist in order to be aware of the damage or distortion that concern only for the impersonal, the general, the abstract, and the universal can produce. Wittgenstein in fact had an interpretation of the source of this effacement.

Our craving for generality has another source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way that science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is "purely descriptive." (Think of such questions as "Are there sense data?" And ask: What method is there of determining this? Introspection?)

Instead of "craving for generality" I could also have said "the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case."³³

The contrast between Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and the approach noted above of Althusser and Balibar in their

³³Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations" (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965), 18.

structuralist marxism is striking. Whereas Wittgenstein offers us a cautious attitude in taking up the activity of philosophizing, Althusser and Balibar would have us fling ourselves into the fullest enchantment with the possibility of abstract science.

The sympathies of the present dissertation are clearly on the side of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. Thus, by substantive subjectivity I mean to be understood as claiming that the individual's subjective nature, or better character, is not reducible to the effect of determinations from outside sources such as the position or function within the social formation in which he or she happens to be born and reside, nor from the internal impositions of linguistic meanings in which the activities of speaking and writing of subjects are structured. It is interesting that through Althusser's theoretical maneuvers a measure of autonomy is established for the superstructures (in relation to each other and to the economic base), however, individuals are deprived of any autonomy by virtue of their being subjected to the rule of law (both political and linguistic).

According to structuralist marxism autonomy is acquired by individual sciences as a result of qualifying the economic determinism of vulgar marxism which had thought that a simple causal relation existed between the economic base and the superstructures (ideologies like religion, philosophy, science, etc.). However the autonomy which is attributed to the individual sciences is to my mind misunderstood in part

because of the effacement of the personal, the particular, the concrete, and the individual. The argument for the autonomy of the sciences and of scientific knowledge in general is misdirected if not fundamentally and unconsciously projected.³⁴ A return to the Hegelian model³⁵ of the growth of consciousness would permit the understanding of the Althusserian misdirection as a stage in the development of self-consciousness.

Briefly, Hegel's model of consciousness in three stages begins with the highly universal but empty form of consciousness as sensuous. This purely formal and empty stage must be filled out in experience. The filling out transpires through an encounter which is called the master-slave dialectic. In the latter form of relationship two consciousnesses battle with each other for each other's recognition. Only one of the two will win recognition; the other will serve the winner's need (desire) for recognition.

Consider as a paradigm for this encounter the relationship between father and son: Since only one of the two members of the dyad can achieve recognition, this dyad can be taken as exemplary of patriarchal rule. The father is a father only if he has a son and that relationship, according to Freud and others, is one of domination of the son by the father. The symbolic weapon which produces the superiority of the father

³⁴Marie-Louise von Franz, Projection and Re-Collection in Jungian Psychology, trans. William H. Kennedy (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co., 1980).

³⁵Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind

is the threat of castration. This threat leads the son to be overcome by anxiety. Actually the sur-render by the son is somewhat rational since the alternative of a battle unto death is less attractive than the surrender and enslavement of the son by the father. Thus, the father achieves permanent recognition. The subjugation of the son to the father is enforced by what Freud³⁶ called the super-ego structure (the morality of obedience to the father, the holder of the phallus) or what Lacan³⁷ called the rule of law. The latter is effected by the initiation of the child into language. The result of the latter is a permanent exile from the realm of the self and its original desire for pleasure.

Most writers of contemporary analysis forget the third stage of Hegel's system in which philosophy and art are possible. If not forgotten, it is a stage which is thought to be falsely asserted. This stage is called reconciliation. It is little discussed perhaps because it is one in which genuine community is realized. Anyone who is preoccupied with the domination mentality of the master-slave dialectic would be unable to understand the possibility of a situation in which real mutuality exists. Of course, modern feminist writers have taken up this possibility. From their standpoint epistemologies it is true to say that de-centered subjectivity permits

³⁶Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. & edited by James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1962).

³⁷Jacques Lacan, Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, trans. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968).

not a relativist philosophy but a relationally and contextually derived one.³⁸

The feminist interpretation of the cartesian epistemological construction allows us to rethink the modernist view of representations -- namely, instead of the work of art being taken as a thing-in-itself which has no use value other than its realization of the beautiful, the work of art is viewed as a cultural artifact whose symbolic connection to the artist allows us to understand that the human subject is the real subject of aesthetics. Quite simply, I mean to suggest that a long history of projection curtailed by an extreme reduction of the value of art by the commodification of the work of art has finally made it possible for reciprocation³⁹ of the artifact to return to the realm of the human subject the esteem of lived experience so that the subject himself or herself becomes the new work of art.⁴⁰

³⁸See Sandra Harding The Science Question in Feminism for an explanation of relationally based epistemologies. Relationally roughly means arising out of lived relationships which are embedded and embodied in contrast to the fantasy of the cartesian subject which is androcentric insofar as it is constructed according to the values of autonomy and independence which are predominantly of a masculine bias or outlook.

³⁹Reciprocation is the turn about expected after projection has been achieved by the worker in his or her labor. In capitalist economies, the value of labor is extracted and reserved for use by the capitalist. For an analysis of what happens when the connection between projection and reciprocation is severed see Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 256-277.

⁴⁰Taking the self as a work of art has been considered by some people as very narcissistic. But, from the standpoint of reconciliation, it is the master-slave relationship in which

It is on the basis of this last phenomenon that I have suggested above that the autonomy achieved by Althusser for the individual sciences was misdirected. Here my claim is that the creation of scientific (philosophical) theories is nothing else than the production of cultural artifacts which are themselves projections of the human subject within a specific context. By expanding this context and transforming the master-slave relationship into a relationship of mutual recognition, I believe that it is possible to understand how the need for confessional analysis arises.

The confessional form of writing has not as yet been addressed, but suffice it to say that I take this short sketch of and use of the Hegelian model to show how the need for confession arises. Confessional writing can serve to transform the situation in which we need recognition from others (at the expense of the other) into a situation of reconciliation in which true community is realized. In the case of Althusser and Balibar, their claim and realization that individual sciences have a measure of autonomy would, were they to enlarge their interpretive context to include the possibility of reconciliation, entail the realization of a measure of autonomy for the self and not only for its artifacts.

one person dominates another that is really narcissistic in that the projects of the master take priority over the projects of the slave and the slave is expected to work to fulfill the projects of the master at the expense of the slave. Applying the aesthetic attitude toward oneself does not preclude extending the same attitude toward all others, whereas the master-slave relationship requires the subjugation of the freedom of one for the sake of the other.

But, this would jeopardize the claim of objectivity which science makes for its knowledge, by contaminating the scientific text with a measure of subjectivity. Such jeopardy I should like to claim cannot be tolerated if the rule of the father is to continue. It seems to me that Freud was only partly correct in believing that maturity is achieved by reaching full genital sexuality. He was correct insofar as the notion of genital sex contains within it a modicum of reciprocity for both partners. At least we can commend Freud for having partially realized or sensed the possibility of mutuality or reconciliation in human relationships in the realm of sexuality if nowhere else.

The same cannot be said of Althusser and Balibar. Their predicament in which the individual is absorbed into the group and saddled with an identity derived from group or class membership only, is for me as unattractive as the early position of Sartre⁴¹ in which the individual was existentially situated and burdened with an unwarranted responsibility for his or her actions because of the attribution of a condition of absolute freedom. Both the structuralist⁴² (Althusserian) and the existentialist

⁴¹Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966) contains this early position which exaggerated the freedom of human beings.

⁴²"Structuralism takes its starting point from language. It derives from linguistics a framework of concepts which it seeks to extend from language to the other areas of its interests: to the literary arts, the non-literary arts and the 'customary arts.' This framework of concepts I call the 'linguistic model.' The linguistics which provides

(Sartrean) positions tend to exaggerate the condition of subjectivity through their conceptions of human agency; Sartre grants too much freedom and Althusser too little. The Sartrean self is totally self-determined, whereas the Althusserian self is completely determined by the social formation.⁴³ It is within the bounds of this problematic of subjectivity that I have raised the question: How is a discourse on the self possible?

And so when I say as I do now that the day of the "master or grand narratives" must come to an end if our culture is to claim its possibilities of individuation, I mean that the intellectual "will to knowledge or power" which masquerades in philosophical forms of writing as the craving for general-ity and explanation is responsible (because of its reduction-istic tendency) for blocking the fullest development of our human capacity for selfhood. It is only in the master narrative that

structuralism with its model is, in the broadest sense, structural linguistics. In this sense structural linguistics includes most twentieth-century theoretical linguistics. It contrasts with the older tradition of examining languages comparatively, with little theoretical guidance on what to investigate. The master of structural linguistics, at least on the structuralist reading, is Ferdinand Saussure, the Swiss linguist of the early part of the century. Structuralists have drawn on the more specialized ideas of recent linguists: Roman Jakobson for example in phonology, Noam Chomsky in grammar." Quoted from: Philip Pettit, The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Appraisal (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 1.

⁴³For a brief examination of the polemic between Sartre and Althusser see Michael Sprinker, (Chapter 7) "Politics and Theory: Althusser and Sartre," in Imaginary Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theory of Historical Materialism (London: Verso, 1987), 177-205.

patriarchal rule or domination can continue to play itself out. This play is not harmless. It presents an obstacle to the real individuation of the masters and the slaves (fathers, sons, mothers, and daughters). More specifically, we find this "will to power" manifesting itself in the threat of devaluation which the prestige of science poses for the humanities. In my estimation, the movement of structuralist marxism (with its tendencies to abstract the living situation of presently engendered selves to such a degree as to make the abstract science of historical materialism possible) is a dangerous force which philosophy as one of the literatures of the Hegelian stage of reconciliation must engage dialogically.

More generally, since philosophy is the linchpin of the humanities, it was apparent that philosophy-as-science must be reckoned with in order to rescue the possibility of a discourse on the self and ultimately achieve a context in which individuation may proceed. It is with these ideas in mind that I set out to show three things (1) that all literary discourse is, by nature of the act of writing, both subjective and political, (2) that the scientization of philosophical discourse attempts to exclude subjectivity and hence the possibility of a discourse on the self, and (3) that within the context of the discipline competing styles of doing philosophy, namely philosophy-as-science and philosophy-as-literature, have been taken as exclusionary categories, however they are not. I argue that scientific philosophy is as writing both subjective and political. Hence, it must be

taken as a form of literature, and should be treated according to its literary and rhetorical form, for within these parameters it is possible to construct a discourse on the self.

In chapter two, I show that the construction of the authorial self is accomplished in the activity of writing and that writing may be understood as confessional. All writing is a symbolic form of confession, but only confessional writing aims self-consciously to provide a confessional analysis in which the literary and rhetorical devices used in the construction of the text are made the subject of interpretation. Actually, author, text and world are simultaneous constructions which can be traced in the activity of writing via the notion of style. Since the learned essay affords an interplay of subjective and objective aspects of discourse, it is the genre of choice in which confessional writing is possible.

Chapter 3 deals with the problematic aspects of scientized discourse especially as it is found in the work of Willard van Orman Quine. Quine tries to exclude subjectivity from his philosophical texts. It is shown that this is not possible; rather it is a question of what kind of subjectivity is constructed within the parameters of scientized writing. The term I use to denote the latter construction is "the scientization of philosophical discourse"; Quine's work is taken as exemplary of this style of writing.

Chapters four, five, six, and seven develop and resolve the problematic aspects of a discourse on the self as they arise in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. As a philosopher and writer, Sartre has done more to create a marriage between philosophy and literature than any other person in the contemporary scene of writing. I use Sartre as a model for the kind of confessional writing I hope to undertake in my future writings; and explore the consequences of Sartre's existential phenomenology for the way philosophical discourse is constructed; and for determining the value of a discourse on the self for both the individual and the group. My appropriation of the work of Sartre is captured by the term "emplotment" by which I mean the construction of a narrative in which a character, namely Sartre, is situated in order to use his work, which was written earlier in a different context and was intended to address similar but not identical issues, to resolve a problem which arises in a contemporary area of philosophical discourse.

-- CHAPTER 2 --

AN ARGUMENT FOR CONFESSIONAL WRITING AND THE LEARNED ESSAY

In order to explain what is meant by understanding philosophical writing as confessional and to thereby clarify what was referred to above (in posing the third form of the dilemma -- page 2) as this sense of self-confession, it is necessary to draw on something which Nietzsche claimed:

It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of -- namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious autobiography; moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertion of a philosopher has been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: "What morality do they (or does he) aim at?"¹

Within this statement two points can be found which support my contentious interpretation of philosophical writing as confessional (or philosophical texts as confession). The first is that the writing is "a species of involuntary and unconscious autobiography." And the second is that "to understand how the abstrusest of metaphysical assertions of a philosopher has been arrived at" we should ask: what is the underlying moral purpose? In a passage which follows the one just quoted, Nietzsche rejected the idea that an impulse to knowledge is the father of philosophy, and concluded that "In the philosopher, . . . there is absolutely nothing impersonal;

¹Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), 6.

and above all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as to who he is, -- that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses of his nature stand to each other."²

If the act of writing is considered as a dynamic process which is structured according to linguistic parameters and literary conventions or figurative devices, it is possible to view the construction of the authorial self as occurring in an unconscious and involuntary manner. The constructed self would be developed and expressed in the author's style. An author's style would be constituted within the realm of tropes or figurative language, that is to say through the use of rhetoric rather than logic. It may be helpful to suggest an analogy: just as the psychoanalyst understands the analysand by "listening" with what some have called the third ear, or less metaphorically, just as the analyst interprets the imagery that the analysand expresses in his/her use of metaphors and other forms of figurative language, so I wish to claim that we can understand the construction of the authorial self as it is expressed in and by rhetorical devices. Since the self is in this sense developing in the dynamic process of writing, the task of analyzing the uses of figurative language may never end. This should come as no surprise since the authorial self is constituted "in and by" discourse whether written or spoken.

The text becomes under this model an expression of the writer. A text is in one sense intermediary of the realms of

²Ibid.

spirit and matter which are usually considered as competing forms or systems of explanation. However, in the present dissertation I am not favoring a trope (metonymic or synecdochic) in which a part of reality is substituted for the whole. Instead I am taking an approach in which metaphor and irony are used in order to bring about a fullness of reality (or meaning) rather than a reduction of reality (or meaning) which is effected by the use of either of the other tropes parenthetically presented. Thus, spirit and matter are taken as oppositions or limits framing the domain of discourse within which texts are co-constructed by author and audience.

This predicament can be explained according to the Sartrean model of consciousness. Our lived-experience is a dialectical process of interaction between the reflective consciousness and the pre-reflective consciousness. At the level of representation, the text locates our experience within the "limiting" oppositions mentioned above (page 3). Although texts are a product of our experience, they are used in turn for reflecting on experience. They are also means of communicating. As any human artifact carries within its structure or existence a multiplicity of consciously and unconsciously determined significations, so also do texts. Nonetheless, the text is not the person, nor is it to be equated with or reduced to reflective consciousness. That would violate the dialectical nature of consciousness. The materiality of texts and of language is often forgotten. To forget this is to forget the product's material relation to

the body. The act of writing in which reflective and pre-reflective consciousness interact is of course a transformation of the highest complexity.

Writing, as it is conceived here, has very strong similarities to dreaming. Both are processes which serve in the creation of texts. A text is an-artifact. By text, I mean simply an ensemble of interpretables. These processes exhibit textualization which is a form of interpretation. Theories of dream-interpretation characterize dreaming as a process contributory to the individual's self-realization. Focus on self-realization has for the most part been a feature of depth psychological approaches (Jung & Horney) and humanistic psychology (Maslow). Dreaming is privileged as a rich source of interpretations because of its pertinence in understanding the course of self-realization. But why can't all forms of human activity be taken as a text richly endowed with interpretables and very valuable for understanding self-realization? There should not be any objection to viewing writing in this way. This then is the sense in which both dreaming and writing are pregnant with meaning.³

I wish to be understood as saying that all forms of discourse permit access to the course of self-realization. Anything which can be textualized and interpreted will provide a wealth of many possible meanings. I should also claim that behavior when framed within the context of a narrative will

³See Bert O. States, The Rhetoric of Dreams (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988) for a discussion of the interpretation of tropes in dreams and poetry.

also afford the opportunity for multiple interpretations. Even behavioristic psychologies (e.g., Skinnerian behavioral analysis) have, in their analyses of individual behavior, recognized that behavior is over-determined, and hence behavior is, like dreaming and writing, pregnant with meaning.

Understanding the task of interpretation would involve a multi-dimensional analysis of social practices, far more complex than any of the linear analyses which have been provided in computational models of mental activity. The terms "social practices" and "mental activity" were underlined in the previous sentence in order to emphasize the difference between attributing meaning to social practices which govern meaning through rules serving as public standards or criteria and attributing meaning to mental states in which meaning derives from merely thinking that one has the correct usage by referring to a mental image. The following remarks will provide an interesting argument for the need for meaning to be governed according to rules which are articulations of social practices and which are not private mentalistic events.

Suppose everyone had a box with something [in it]: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. -- But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? -- If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. -- No, one can 'divide through'

by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.⁴

Wittgenstein's claim is that for a word to have a meaning it must have a use within a language-game and not refer to something private which is outside of the social practices of using the sound or mark as a gesture or move in the game. However, if meaning is only determined according to rules which we learn as members of a language community, how can we ever express something which hasn't already been authorized by that community? Rules must be transgressed in order for dream interpretations to be made or for the confessional writing to be possible; otherwise our individuality is lost -- not expressible in language or with the help of language.

This problem of using language to express our individual natures has been posed in a more general fashion under the heading of "The Paradox of Creativity." The more general problem may be understood as follows:

At the outset an investigation of creative expression is faced with paradox. In order for any gesture, or resulting artifact, to communicate significantly, a community of perceiving subjects is required -- a community subtended by a shared world whose general horizon and basic structures are held in a common understanding. The shared conception of such a world -- the common "meaning horizon," or "horizon of significance," as I shall call it, intending thereby to suggest the integration of its structure as well as the implicit character of its incorporation in a body of beliefs -- is the required ground on which a gesture or artifact may stand forth as an expressive figure, the shared context wherein it may be mutually understood. Yet in order for an expression to be

⁴Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), p. 100e, para 293.

creative, to be "gedichtet" in Nietzsche's phrase, so that something may be "gedacht," it may not simply pass along inherited meanings, even newly arranged; for its originality would then be mere difference, idiosyncrasy, or oddity, rather than genuine invention. At best it would be the first realization of a permutation already pre-figured in the total store of meanings associated with the structures of the familiar world. As creative, the expressive gesture must institute new meanings, even while making these significant in relation to the old; in doing so it will bring forth a newly integrated meaning horizon, rooted in but not prefigured by the old structure.

Hence the paradox: Expression is dependent upon a commonly understood world, or familiar meaning horizon; yet as creative it can neither remain as inherited within that world nor find its norm there. If Nietzsche is to be believed, it has the task of inventing its own world, the structure of which exhibits its own norm. Creative expression, then, must originate its own aim and establish its own context of significance; yet for such an achievement to signify at all, it must do so in relation to a pre-given horizon, which will itself be changed and given a new clarity, hence a new communal effectiveness, by virtue of having been brought to expression.⁵

From this argument, we can see why Heidegger drew a distinction between idle talk (Gerede) and originary speech (Rede). This distinction acquires support from an earlier formulation of Nietzsche's

Dionysus' ideal -- The perspective of all organic functions, all the strongest instincts of life: the force in all life that wills error; error as the precondition even of thought. Before there is "thought" there must have been "invention"; the construction of identical cases, of the appearance of sameness,⁶ is more primitive than the knowledge of sameness.

⁵Edwin Jones, Reading the Book of Nature: A Phenomenological Study of Creative Expression in Science and Painting (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 1-2.

⁶Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House/Vintage, 1967), 293.

These arguments and distinctions are intended to support my claim that for our individuality to be expressed in language we must transgress the rules which guide literal meaning. This claim is especially akin to Nietzsche's belief that metaphor precedes the concept. Of course, the understanding of how these tropological processes occur is not a simple task. However, it should suffice at this point in my argument for confessional writing to submit the above as fundamental to the expression of individuality and to turn or return to the situation of psychoanalysis as a context in which expression is thought to and expected to occur.

It is my understanding that psychoanalysis does not so much uncover particular relations of meaning as it participates in the very creation of meaning by the act of interpretation. The creation of meaning is accomplished by framing the exploration within a cultural and mythical context that dynamically alters the pre-interpretive conditions. The framing acts so as to contextualize the subject of analysis, thereby making possible certain types of understanding and consequently initiating certain corrective emotional experiences. The act of taking up one's situation and oneself for the purpose of inquiry is already a change in the level of responsibility (the change is from detachment and disregard to one of engagement and involvement). In other words, formulating a question about one's self sets a problem-solving process in motion which eventually yields a response from one's pre-reflective consciousness (unconscious).

A suppressed belief lurking beneath the surface of this discussion is that fruitful philosophical investigations will be forthcoming when the relationship of the writer to his or her work is no longer characterized as uninvolved, detached, and overly formal. This is to say that a certain subjective receptivity to the nature of the inquiry is most desirable for facilitating a response from the creative unconscious. Here the claim is that writing and dreaming are both creative activities in which self-realization or individuation should be recognized as the primary goal.

Consider the similarity between writing and dreaming just outlined: According to Carl Jung's notion of the dream process,⁷ dreaming serves to provide effective centering experiences -- a sort of compensation for exaggerated conscious attitudes. When the conscious thinking is extremely rigid and orderly, for instance, the dreaming will be chaotic and disruptive. Typically, a person whose conscious personality was extreme in its extroversion would have dreams characterized by their inclination to introversion. The reverse would be expected in an individual whose conscious personality was predominantly introverted. For Jung, being centered is an end-state in which the self would be fully realized.

⁷Carl Jung, "Dream-Analysis in Its Practical Application," in Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W.S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich/Harvest, 1933), 1-27.

Permit me to explain further Jung's notion of being centered. Jung has distinguished (four) psychological functions of thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition in addition to the dimensions of introversion and extroversion already mentioned in the illustration of the role which the dream plays in the centering process. These functions are best understood as end points along a pair of orthogonally related lines, such that thinking and feeling are at opposite ends of one line and sensation and intuition are at opposite ends of the other line. These oppositions are not intended as being taken as antithetical or contradictory. Instead, the differences are more relative.

For instance, thinking refers to the tendency to make judgements according to standards which are independent of persons (if this is at all possible, it is so by increasing detachment from human concerns of an interpersonal nature and by greater attention to so called objective criteria), whereas feeling refers to the tendency to make judgements in a context which is extremely sensitive to human issues of a personal nature. The relative difference is between the thinking type person and the feeling type person, which is to say that the person tends to be guided in his or her judgmental processes by more or less abstract or objectified standards. To illustrate the difference between the sensate function and the intuitive one, I should say that this distinction concerns the source of information and experience. On the one hand, a sensation oriented person draws on the realms of empirical

reality for information, and on the other hand, an intuitively oriented person draws on the more mysterious source of internal wisdom rather than the outer source of empirical reality.

If dreams are the prototype of internal experience, then an intuitive person because of his or her reliance on dreams might be said to be roughly in sociological terms inner-directed, and if the waking state with its realm of physical and concrete happenings is the scope of external experience, then a sensation reliant person would be considered in sociological terms as roughly outer-directed. Of course the world has its types and all of them are to my mind fairly well represented by Jung's categorizations along the two dimensions of introversion and extroversion and according to the four types of psychological functions.

After reaching the mid-life crisis in which a person who had achieved satisfaction or success in career and marriage conventionally defined finds himself or herself strangely lacking in enthusiasm for life, Jung believed that the inferior psychological functions (for example in a thinking person it would be feeling and in a sensation oriented person it would be intuition) receive a work-out so that a return to a holistic developmental pattern can be achieved. It is Jung's considered belief that all four psychological functions are instrumental in achieving mental health and a full and satisfying life. Also, Jung believed that all four functions are active in early childhood, however child rearing practices mold the child so that some functions are favored more than

others. A false way or rather a tentative way of achieving psychological harmony for an individual would be to look for a mate or sexual partner who has a different and complementary personality profile to that of his or her own. Jung claims that this is the basis for most relationships at least of the marital type. However, a relationship of maturity cannot be based solely on an unconscious connection. Since it is inevitable that what is unconscious individually and collectively will eventually come into view through later growth and developments, no relationship can be sustained on unconscious grounds.

Naturally the unfolding of unconscious grounds or potential is a life time project. But there are significant landmarks worth noting. For Jung, being alive means that a spiraling round a center is to be expected -- one moves in and out of various complexes and sub-personality systems. Because our reflective consciousness or ego is limited in its capacity for totalization (reflection and conceptual representation are always limited and synoptic of our lived-experience), dreaming must provide us with a deeper understanding of our lived-experience. Dreaming serves to move the individual toward the goal of self-realization by compensating our often one-sided intellectual understanding of reality. Likewise, engaging in the act of writing poses a problem which is to be solved by the unconscious mind.

Perhaps it is worth drawing out a little what I mean by saying that the unconscious mind serves as a source of problem

solving and that both dreaming and writing are involved in this process. In constructing an explanation of the relationship between dreaming and writing and the unconscious (mind's) capacity for solving problems, I am using a framework which has something of a romantic appeal to it. Specifically, I consider the Romantic movement (including Goethe and Wordsworth as well as others) to be signalling a call for us to return to nature. What that meant for the romantics was roughly a return to a condition in which our own nature could be tapped or utilized as a source of wisdom and impetus for development toward ideals. I should like to submit that this condition varies but for most poets and writers it is a condition of solitude.

The activity of writing (prose or poetry) is usually conducted in a situation of relative isolation (of course there is the exception of dictating one's thoughts to another). However, in addition to the requirement of writing on one's own, many creative writers (Bertrand Russell would be worth noting in this context.) have remarked on the need for a period of immersion to the point of saturation in the material relevant to one's writing assignment or project followed by a period of distraction or diversion after which an insight occurs. The diversion is often just plain sleep. Sleep, I hasten to caution, should not be thought of as devoid of thought. Rather than thinking of sleep as an escape from thought and action, recent neurophysiological evidence suggests that quite a bit of thought and visualized dramatic

action takes place during sleep "REM sleep" for instance is consistently recognized as a portion of sleep in which heavy dreaming occurs. In a rather mechanical manner of speaking, during dream-filled sleep, we use our imaginations to sort and rearrange the data we have put in our memory banks during immersion in our consciously selective material and relate this data to other stores of experience both individually and collectively acquired.

I believe that there is sufficient reason not to over-emphasize or romanticize the part played by sleep in the process of problem solving. Since it can be argued that writing and thinking on probably every subject whatsoever involves the use of imagination, we should be ready to accept the view that in normal waking consciousness when most people write their papers and poems, we are also conducting the same rearrangement and sorting of data of importance to the specific project we may be presently embarked upon, regardless of how much this is done in a symbolic and unconscious fashion. For example, the ironic dimension to writing this philosophy dissertation involves the double aspect of whether "I am saying what I mean" and whether "I am meaning what I say." In part confessional writing of the sort I am advocating would interpret this ironic envoicement.

Kierkegaard has already established precedence for this interpretive move when in his dissertation⁸ he attempted to

⁸Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony: With Constant Reference to Socrates, trans. Lee M. Capel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968).

bring about a relationship between the subjective (existential condition of the subject) and objective (the systemic description of social and public life) levels. The latter according to Kierkegaard is represented by Hegel's philosophical system. The problem with the Hegelian effacement of the subjective has been summarized by one commentator as follows:

When the particular experiences of an individual are discounted philosophically as merely of autobiographical interest, no "relation underlies the disrelation" which is introduced by the distinction between the experience the individual starts out with and philosophical principles. Thus no "relation" survives when Hegel dismisses a "subjective" starting point as referring to "some contingent idea which can be constituted differently in different subjects" or when he remarks that "with Socrates it is not so much a matter of philosophy as of the life of an individual." The subtitles Kierkegaard adds to his titles are one way he indicates that he is restoring the relation between the two levels [of the subjective and objective]. . . . He is reasserting over against Hegel the significance of the "subjective" starting point and criticizing him for constructing a philosophy which is a "splendid castle," while neglecting philosophically the "shack" he actually lives in.

There is another idiom with which Kierkegaard restores in opposition to Hegel the relation between the two levels: "The person of a abstract thinker is irrelevant to his thought. An existing thinker . . . in presenting his thought . . . sketches himself." Our Anglo-American tradition is one of abstract thinkers in which the individual is discouraged from sketching himself in presenting his thought. We assume that a philosopher must be self-effacing, for what counts philosophically is not autobiography; it has nothing to do with him as an individual but is whatever "objective" justification can be offered for whatever position he puts forward.⁹

⁹Robert Denoon Cumming, Starting Point: An Introduction to the Dialectic of Existence (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 58-59.

The need for interpretation of the ironic character of philosophical writing will be stressed below. For now the point has been made as to the possibility of such interpretation lying in the ironic structure of the relation between the subjective and objective levels. It is through the interpretation of the ironic character of our existence that we can progress along the path of individuation. The irony in our existence is one way of getting at our double natured evolution as consciously and unconsciously determined subjects. It follows from this that irony is not to be considered as some frivolous embellishment of writing style but is to be seen in its proper light as a device which transforms our individual consciousness.

This material has been introduced in a discussion of how to understand the unconscious problem solving which I have claimed is going on during the activity of writing. Since the nature of reflective consciousness is perspectival (and hence limited because it is focused on something and not on everything), the collective unconscious must supply the dynamics to create a balanced and fully satisfying life. But before we can trust an analysis of the interaction of the reflective consciousness of the individual and the collective unconscious, we must understand and resolve the problem of how to represent the idiosyncratic nature of the individual.

Although in speaking of genres in the passage to follow, Fredric Jameson did not mean to treat this more general problem which arises from the genre context, the issue of the

genre is a good way to enter into consideration of the larger problem of self-representation.

Genres are essentially literary institutions, or social contracts between a writer and a specific public, whose function is to specify the proper use of a particular cultural artifact. The speech acts of daily life are themselves marked with indications and signals (intonation, gesturality, context deictics and pragmatics) which ensure their appropriate reception. In the mediated situations of a more complicated social life -- and the emergence of writing has often been taken as paradigmatic of such situations -- perceptual signals must be replaced by conventions if the text in question is not to be abandoned to a drifting multiplicity of uses (as meanings must, according to Wittgenstein, be described). Still, as texts free themselves more and more from an immediate performance situation, it becomes ever more difficult to enforce a given generic rule on their readers. No small part of the art of writing, indeed, is absorbed by this (impossible) attempt to devise a foolproof mechanism for the automatic exclusion of undesirable responses to a given literary utterance.¹⁰

I should like to comment on several things which Fredric Jameson has articulated in the above passage concerning genres: First, genres are institutions. That means they are by nature social constructions. There can be no private institutions. Second, genres are formed or constituted in the manner of social contracts. That means, at some point agreement is reached between parties as to the nature of the exchange. Contracts in their broad sense govern the interactions of two or more parties. Jameson's claim is that genres are produced in order to govern the exchange between

¹⁰Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 106-107.

writers and their public (audience). To my mind, these claims are unexceptional.

The distinction invoked by Sartre between fiction and non-fiction or between poetry and prose can serve as an illustration of Jameson's claims. Prose-writers have a commitment to their audience to articulate realistically. According to Sartre,

. . . the prose-writer is a man who has chosen a certain method of secondary action which we may call action by disclosure. It is therefore permissible to ask him this second question: "What aspect of the world do you want to disclose? What change do you want to bring into the world by disclosure?" The "engaged" writer knows that words are action. He knows that to reveal is to change and that one can reveal only by planning to change. He has given up the impossible dream of giving an impartial picture of Society and the human condition.¹¹

Sartre concluded that prose-writers should not write in a deceitful fashion. Of course, writers produce much that is confused if not deceitful. As I have shown elsewhere, for Sartre to remain consistent in his argument; to articulate realistically must mean that prose-writers should write so as to express their perception and understanding of reality. After all, we haven't any unmediated access to reality.

Our accounts of reality are mediated by our perception and understanding, and these are structured according to our beliefs (presuppositions and expectations).¹² Our beliefs are

¹¹Jean Paul Sartre, What is Literature? (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965), 17.

¹²Even in the case of the Zen Buddhist who claims to experience reality directly or naively, the claim as an account rests within the domain of belief.

specific consistent organizational approaches to perception. It is believed that information obtained through our senses is filtered through the brain. Through the processes of generalization, distortion, and deletion, the brain then takes these electro-chemical signals and filters them into an internal representation. Thus, our internal representations and our experience of an event isn't precisely what happened but rather a personalized internal re-presentation. The conscious mind of an individual can't use all the signals being sent to it. We would probably go stark raving mad if we consciously had to make sense of thousands of stimuli ranging from the pulse of blood through our fingers to the vibration of our ear. So the brain stores the information it needs, or expects to need later, and allows the conscious mind of the individual to ignore the rest. This filtering process explains the huge range in human perception.¹³

Thus, reality is always mediated; the idea that the mind is a mirror in which nature casts its reflection has as a metaphor its own limits of application. By that I mean even if it could be taken literally, a mirror produces more or less distortion according to its own qualities and in addition a mirror reverses left/right relations. Perhaps the replication of reality, reflectively speaking, is unattainable? It would appear that for us, reality consists of our lived-experience of the actual and the ideal. Genres are the institutional

¹³Robert Ornstein and David Sobel, The Healing Brain: Breakthrough Discoveries About How the Brain Keeps Us Healthy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

formats within which such constructions of the relations of the actual and the ideal are expressed and communicated. Thus, the genre may serve as a category under which a special kind of "act" known as the act of writing and an interpretive act known as the act of reading may be subsumed. The act of writing and interpreting is more than a speech act insofar as it involves speaking, hearing, writing, and reading.

And finally with respect to Jameson's comment upon why ambiguity arises when texts free themselves from the immediacy of their performance situation (see page 49 above). His point is clear and correct, that with the elimination of intonation, gesture, and other contextual aspects vagueness occurs. Mourning of their absence can be traced back as early as Socrates' speech reported in the Phaedrus.¹⁴ The difference between spoken and written language has been responsible for the primacy given to speech in the communicative act. Jameson underscores the challenge for writers to achieve control over the act of reading -- the challenge is great because it is nearly impossible. The decreased possibility is due to the fact that texts are predominantly dependent on the internal conveyance of cues concerning context. No text is ever read in a vacuum. By that I mean to stress that every act of reading occurs within some situation. However, some of the situations in which reading transpires are less under the control of the writer. The case of greater control would

¹⁴See Plato, "The Superiority of the Spoken Word. Myth of the Invention of Writing." in Phaedrus, trans. R. Hackforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 156-164.

perhaps have its limit in a classroom or other comparable situation of instruction where reader has access to the writer as tutor or consultant for explanation or interrogation when the need for clarification arises.

Of course, these comments side-step the claim that the meaning of a text cannot be reduced to the conscious intentions of its author. With that I am in agreement. Even with the inclusion of unconscious determinations of a text's meaning, of the Derridean point of inter-textuality, and of Lacan's notion that language as "other" participates in the formation of a text, we must concede that interpretation, though never final or exhaustive, is a worthwhile human endeavor -- a fact of our existence.¹⁵

Reading a text is never complete. Another way of saying that is, a text's potential for interpretation is broad and yet constrained within limits of intelligibility and understanding. Support for this way of understanding reading

¹⁵As was stated above our perceptions are mediated by our beliefs. This mediation is interpretation itself. Every interpretation is not a precise rendering of an event because it also transforms the event into another. In addition, it's just one interpretation as filtered through specific personal beliefs, attitudes, values, and something called metaprograms. Perhaps this is why Einstein once said, "Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a judge in the field of truth and knowledge is shipwrecked by the laughter of the gods." Since we don't know how things really are, but only how we represent them to ourselves, why not represent them in a way that empowers ourselves and others, rather than creating limitations? The mark of an interpretation is always found within the realm of the psyche or the imaginal, and the validity of an interpretation is determined by a kind of psychological pragmatism, which is to say less by its truth value than by the impact or psychological consequences of believing that the interpretation is true, correct, or right.

may be found in Bakhtin who said there is no final reading of a text only a penultimate reading wherein the authorial self has the last word. In an introduction to Bakhtin's Speech Genres & Other Late Essays, Michael Holquist has made the following comments on Bakhtin's notebooks:

A common theme running throughout is the need to exceed boundaries, while still recognizing that only through awareness of the very real constraints at work in mental and social life can we do so. . . . Bakhtin's call to liberation is everywhere informed by a stern awareness of necessity's central place in the biological limits of our perception, the structure of language, and the laws of society. Our very status as the subjects of our own lives depends on the necessary presence of other subjects. Thus, when Bakhtin says "we are suffocating in the captivity of narrow and homogeneous interpretations," he is not suggesting there is some freedom beyond interpretation. All understanding is constrained by borders: freedom consists in knowing insofar as possible -- for our ability to know is controlled by contextual factors larger than mere individual intention -- what those borders are, so that they may be substituted by, translated into different borders. Speech genres provide a good example of this relative degree of freedom: the better we know possible variants of the genres that are appropriate to a given situation, the more choice we have among them. Up to a point we may play with speech genres, but we cannot avoid being generic. There is no pure spontaneity, for breaking frames depends on the existence of frames.¹⁶

Thus, the understanding of a given text will depend on a reader's ability to follow the rule-governed structure of the professed genre in which the writer wishes to be read and the readers capacity for comprehending transgressions of such rule-following. The capacity for comprehending transgressions is perhaps best characterized by the term openness. Being open

¹⁶M. M. Bakhtin, Speech Genres & Other Late Essays (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), xix.

and not closed, all human activity is to be read or understood as dialectical. The latter sense of dialectical stems from the fact that human behavior is normative and purposive -- goal-oriented. By that I mean an act is guided by some image of what is to be achieved. This refers to the cognitive component of every act even in simple motor acts in which the image is quite unconscious so as to make the act appear automatic. The interpretation of human behavior is not at all automatic except where the context has become highly normalized. Interpretation more often requires flexibility which may simply be understood as the capacity to place a given act within various contexts until the correct feel arises. The latter feel is the indication of correct intuition. For Wittgenstein, illumination was in the end the experience of "this is right I can proceed from here."

However, most people don't trust their own intuitions let alone someone else's, hence the need for a code of conduct - - ethics. American culture is primarily extroverted in attitude and as far as function goes the intuitive mode is usually inferior (less developed). Focus on the external together with an underdeveloped intuitive function places most people in the position of being outer-directed. That means few are self-reliant.¹⁷ Perhaps we can understand the need for instruction -- the need for texts which illuminate for those who have failed to brighten their own lights. But, it is

¹⁷See Carl Jung, Chapter X "General Description of the Types," in Psychological Types (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 330-407.

always possible to ask rhetorically, "What is good, and what is not good -- Need we ask anyone to tell us these things?"¹⁸ Quality is a dimension of experience which cannot be taught but can only be recognized intuitively. In other words, what is good is relative to the standards internally set by each individual's own lights.

This should not be confused with either cultural or subjective relativism in the field of ethics, because an individual's standards are co-constructed in relationships with other human beings and is best thought of as relational rather than relative. It has more to do with our inherent capacity for differentially valuing our experience. What I judge as good must have something -- I would prefer calling it quality -- which is the basis of my experiential discrimination. The differences must exist in my experience of the world. What I experience is in part a shifting gradation of value in my self in relation to others. The highest good would be represented by the realization of self. I should like to maintain that in the end it is one's own judgement of things which is most important especially when you consider that authorship for one's existence must rest with what we call the self. Who else other than yourself can say when you are correct in understanding another person's actions or your own for that matter? Certainly one is inducted

¹⁸An extensive inquiry into this question can be found in Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry Into Values (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1974).

into the canon of one's culture (we share a collective social consciousness and an unconscious biological source, but what these forces do to us or how they constellate and interact in us determines our process of individuation), but those rules are only part of the context in which interpretive activity arises -- more is needed.

A genre is, therefore, a specification which enables communicative acts to be successful. Success would be considered as the reception by readers of the meaning that the writer had wanted to be understood. However, there is potentially a problem here. Success in communicating depends on a shared set of experiences. What if I am trying to go beyond the scope of your experiences and my own? Am I unable to talk about this until some approved format -- genre -- is forthcoming? At this point I should say that something has gone wrong if we tend to think that what can be expressed is only what has been authorized by our speech communities. There must be an opening for new expressions or for the expression of new experiences. This leads me to call attention to the need for sensitivity to the individuation process.

If our educational institutions are to be more sensitive to the process of individuation less emphasis must be placed on competence in devising foolproof mechanisms which automatically exclude undesirable responses to literary utterances, and more attention to the nature of the act of writing as it pertains to the more ambiguous process of self-realization. Jung defines individuation as follows:

In general, it is the process of forming and specializing the individual nature; in particular, it is the development of the psychological individual as a differentiated being from the general, collective psychology. Individuation, therefore, is a process of differentiation, having for its goal the development of the individual personality.¹⁹

Of the individual, Jung claims that

The psychological individual is characterized by its peculiar, and in certain respects, unique psychology. The peculiar character of the individual psyche appears less in its elements than in its complex formations. The psychological individual, or individuality, has an a priori unconscious existence, but it exists consciously only insofar as a consciousness of its peculiar nature is present, i.e., insofar as there exists a conscious distinctiveness from other individuals.²⁰

In order to fulfill Jung's idea of individuation, we need to educate subjects, in the sense of helping them to become aware of the parameters of their own individuation process. But, education which embraces the fullness of possibilities which inhere in the individuation process would not only engage students in didactic orientation, but would also support them through much of the more difficult turmoil experienced in the surrender of ego-logical control when the shift toward selfhood occurs. The rigorous controls and the demands for clarity exercised, for instance, in the Anglo-American

¹⁹Carl Jung, Psychological Types (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 448.

²⁰Ibid., 447. [I should point out that the determination of the form of the self-realization process is left open. According to Rupert Sheldrake, there are several possibilities, namely the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the evolutionary. My preference is for the latter which is not transcendental but has room for a transcendent function. This is discussed in Rupert Sheldrake, The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).]

tradition of analytic philosophy may in fact represent an intellectual defence against the disruptions that the individuation process creates for the normalized social life that has dominated the current scene in academia.²¹

In addition I should like to claim that the individuation process is caught up in the Jameson discussion of the genre. The relation between writer, text, and reader is definitely problematic. The problem, as Jameson has posed it, captures only part of the problem encountered in the art of writing. It would appear that for communication to be possible, readers' responses must be constrained by literary conventions; or put the other way round, in order to be understood, writers must formulate their thoughts or experience in relation to public criteria. From a psychological perspective this problem can be understood as arising from the duality of mind and body. Specifically, mentalism and behaviorism are in contest with their respective theories of meaning. Viewed mentalistically; meanings are private or subjective events. Conceived behavioristically; meanings are public or objective events. Given the conditions that the self is something private or experience is something subjective, and the only means of communicating is a language understood as conventional and rule-governed, how is a discourse on the self possible? The dualistic picture of atomistic selves painted

²¹For a deep treatment of the hazardousness of the general pedagogical belief that clarity is the supreme aim of style see Richard A. Lanham, Style: An Anti-Textbook (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974).

by an empiricist²² philosophy of language and mind dictates that the dilemma is unresolvable: self as private and subjective leads to solipsism or the problem of whether other minds exist. From the fact that we do communicate with each other we might ask: What is actually conveyed? Can genuine intimacy ever occur in the communicative situation in which "your" experiences and "mine" are hermetically sealed in the vacuum of our respective selves. Are we doomed to act out specific performances in which subjectivity is mute because the principle of linguistic determinism is the only handle or vantage point from which specification or articulation of the self is possible?

For Jameson, the art of writing involves an attempt to establish control over the act of reading through the mechanisms of the text by freeing itself from the immediate performance situation. And of equal if not greater importance, the art of writing also attempts, in the service of high culture, to automatically exclude the intrusion of undesirable

²²The most prominent contemporary spokesperson for the empiricist position is the analytic philosopher, Willard van Orman Quine. Quine's empiricist philosophy of language and mind is contained in several articles published in From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1953) and Ontological Relativity & Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Quine's Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960) is his most thorough and complex extension of his understanding of the referentiality of language. Accessible and sympathetic introductions to Quine's philosophy are: Alex Orenstein, Willard Van Orman Quine (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1977); and Christopher Hookway, Quine: Language, Experience and Reality (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). A critical appraisal by one of Quine's students is contained in Hao Wang, Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What We Know (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).

responses into the text on the part of the writer; namely, the writer must, under positivistic styles of writing,²³ exclude the autobiographical from the text. Such exclusion is thought to be accomplished in most texts by eliding the personal and the particular in favor of the universal and the general. This is paradigmatic of the contemporary form in which philosophical writings are produced.

Although in some literary texts, i.e. biography and autobiography, the personal and the particular are possible, this is only permitted when the subject of the writing is "somebody" or when the story carries some moral purpose in the service of high culture. In scientific presentations, the enforcement of the positivistic exclusions is absolutely necessary for the proper constitution of both the texts and what the texts purport to be about. After all the task of scientific investigation is to portray the general and universal features of the world and not troublesome idiosyncrasies sometimes called anomalies. But paramountly, the scientific findings are supposed to be objective and not subjective. But how could this be? If every text is actually a construction which reveals the authorial self in its stylistic properties, then even the exclusionary practices which constitute scientific texts must be ineffectual in preventing the intrusion of the authorial self.

²³For a thorough analysis of positivistic styles of writing in the field of sociology see Ben Agger, Socio(onto)logy: A Disciplinary Reading (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1989).

Although it will become increasingly clear that an example of confessional writing is needed for purposes of illustration, it is necessary to say that I have chosen to write under the disciplinary constraint which excludes the writing of a dissertation in philosophy in a confessional mode. Such an exclusion is both broadly and narrowly determined. The exclusion of confessional writing is a general requirement of all philosophical writing which is undertaken today because philosophy has shaped itself as a discourse with universal validity. That is the reason for its broad determination. More narrowly, local determinations give the exclusion force, e.g. the department in which the dissertation is written is predominantly staffed by analytic philosophers whose preference for a high degree of abstraction (read abstraction as a process for achieving cultural disembodiedness and physical disembodiment) renders anything other than a universal discourse impossible.

Since confessional writing involves the use of explicit autobiography and self-presentation, the particularity of the discourse of a concrete individual (read as embedded and embodied) would conflict with the determination to discover truth which is valid for all and for past, present and future times. This is our inheritance from the founding fathers of philosophy -- Socrates and Plato. In fairness to Plato, the interest in eternal things was specific to values like beauty, justice, love, and the good. Scientific philosophy has somehow perverted the platonic realism and used it to designate the

pursuit of knowledge in isolation of or divorced from values. Today the preference for the universal over the particular is not an innocent one. The imposition of a universal discourse has strong and deleterious consequences. Both our moral and psychological well-being are in jeopardy.

The thesis symbolizes an attempt to resolve roughly the dichotomy between rationalism and empiricism, idealism and materialism, spirit and matter, mind and body, and subject and object. But, in preferable and more manageable terms, the thesis attempts to resolve the antagonism between philosophers who conceive of philosophy as most properly a scientific activity on the one hand, and on the other, those who conceive of philosophy as literature. The opposition represented by these two conceptions is not to be considered merely polemical. In fact, the clash of self-images is a real battle between two philosophical traditions. The image of philosophy as science is emblematic of the Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy. The constraints upon writing in the analytical school of philosophy are that it be detached, uninvolved, and formal. These are praised as the marks of objectivity. And the image of philosophy as literature belongs to the Continental tradition of philosophies like existentialism, hermeneutics, and lately post-structuralism and deconstruction.

In order to heal the split between these traditions, I have taken a pragmatic turn. Following William James' lead, I have perhaps rather boldly embraced the concept of lived-

experience. This term is theoretically speaking a primitive term which must remain somewhat vague and undefinable. This concept of lived-experience is first found in the German romantic writers; Goethe and Hegel among them. In order to avoid the reduction of matter to spirit by idealists or the reduction of mind to body by materialists, the American pragmatists, James, Dewey and Peirce sought a theory in which thought and action could co-exist on the same footing. James in particular proposed that "consciousness" be eliminated or replaced with the notion of "pure experience." The latter term was a central and founding concept of his philosophical psychology.²⁴

Desiring to escape the apparent absurdity of denying outright the existence of consciousness, James qualified his dismissal of the term as referring to an entity separate from material objects. Instead of an entity, he claimed that consciousness was a function that picked out the relation between a knower and what was known. Thus, he did not deny the existence of thoughts. He merely claimed that thoughts perform the function of reporting whatever relation there was at the moment in our experience. James explained:

My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience,' then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation toward one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its "terms"

²⁴William James, Essay in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co, Inc., 1971).

becomes subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known.²⁵

Although the reader might immediately raise some objections to James' metaphysical monism -- namely that his system gives preference or priority to identity over difference, his grounding of thought within the realm of experience opens the discourse to the possibility of diversity rather than uniformity. Hence, his empiricism is really a radical one in the sense that through it James tries to get at the root of our existence.

James' analysis has the advantage of showing the relationship between whole and parts which consequently accomplishes the resolution of the subject/object dichotomy or split. Although James did not speak about thought as a social construction, the social nature of thought is clearly available as an interpretation of his analysis. However the attractiveness which I find in using the concept of experience, is that experience is not static but is in continuous flux. Language (Saussure's la langue) understood as a set of ideal categories can then perform the function of regulating our experience. Language affects and so to speak determines our perceptions while at the same time our perceptions shape and alter our linguistic categories. Experience in the sense that I shall use it refers to a dialectical process in which language and perception are both aspects or moments. None of these terms should be reified, but

²⁵Ibid., 4-5.

should be used primarily in a reflection because they contribute to and facilitate our lived-experience. By that I mean that they make our lives fuller and not more restricted. Linguistic habits can have both a restrictive impact and an enhancing one. Which predominates depends on the degree of individuality that is welcomed into one's life.

I propose a shift from the kind of education in which people are trained in philosophical methods to what I shall argue is the correct focus of an education in the humanities -- concern for the character and style of the individual. The return of subjectivity to its rightful place within an intercorporeal domain provides an opening for the path of self-realization which motivated my earlier work in the first place. My own dilemma at the outset of writing was how to use the framework of dissertation writing to facilitate my own individuation. I shall argue that self-conscious concern for individuation ought to prevail in the minds of every candidate for a higher degree in the humanities.

There should at least be a choice as to whether one must submit to an initiation or submit to a rite of passage which demands such confinement as was just mentioned. I should not be pleased to be in the awkward position of telling others how or what they must do to individuate. The individual has privileged access to the feelings which lead along the path of individuation, and because of that must remain the highest authority in that activity. It befalls the philosophical mentor to accept the Socratic position of midwife in this very

precious of human adventures. And thus I have asked for a broadening and deepening of the scope of philosophical research so as to permit the confessional mode I have attempted to argue for in the context of my dissertation thesis.

In a democratic society the arrangement of institutions (in particular the target here is the institution of education) should function so as to promote the individuation process. If my assessment that the present constraints upon writers violate their process of individuation by obstructing their imaginative use of language and if my assessment of the consequences which follow from such obstruction (none of which have as yet been spelled out, but will be addressed elsewhere) are correct, then a complete reappraisal of philosophical writing produced under the banner of the analytic tradition and in the shadow of the image of philosophy as science is in order. More widely, a reappraisal of the genre of dissertation writing may also be called for.

Perhaps, it has already been decided that dissertation writing is a form of artistic endeavor, and hence by virtue of its form incompatible with scientific philosophy. Isn't the term "genre" used to denote an artistic category? Does this mean that anything to which the term "genre" can be applied is automatically subjective in nature? Is art always understood as subjective? I think the answer to the last question is no, because artistic endeavors can float along an interpretative continuum bounded by two poles at its extremes

-- at one end we find works which are predominantly expressive and hence subjective, and at the other end we find works which are mimetic and hence are considered as representational and more objective. Depending upon need, an artistic endeavor will reside more heavily on the side of subjectivity than objectivity. Either way, both depend upon semiosis, the process by which meaning is produced or created.

Since a genre is the determination of form, we should also keep in mind that genres arise out of formlessness. This yields another way in which genres can be understood; they constrain chaos. The poles of subjectivity and objectivity can be applied to the constraining process, then responsibility for the art-work's form can be attributed to the subjective side (which for me means the individual), or to the objective side (which means the group). This was precisely the tension within which Sartre found himself. In order to balance the needs of the individual with those of the group or simply the needs of others, some common frame of assumptions or regularities of practice had to be set up or established.

The purpose of examining the status of dissertation writing was to determine whether the proper balance exists between the needs of individual writers and the needs of the group. The group sets up the social contract between writer and public by making certain assumptions about what is good for individuals and what is supraordinately good for human beings. The existence of authoritative communities ensures the imposition of the group norms by enforcing the correct or

authorized strategy of reading a certain genre of texts. It is within this framework that the practice of dissertation writing has originated.

How can we apply the above understanding to the case of dissertation writing? First, we must assume for arguments sake that dissertation writing as a form is capable of falling within a distinct genre. But which one? What kind of text is a dissertation? Since a dissertation is defined as a treatise -- to wit: A lengthy and formal treatise or discourse, especially one written by a candidate for the doctoral degree at a university; thesis -- we can firmly place it within the category of treatise. A treatise is "a formal account in writing treating systematically of some subject."²⁶ In contrast to the treatise, we can juxtapose another form of writing called the essay. Essay, in the sense appropriate to this context, is defined according to a use ranked third among others, and it is as follows: "A short literary composition on a single subject, usually presenting the personal views of the author."²⁷ This last mentioned meaning of essay unfortunately derives from its popular use to designate the kind of writing assignment students are typically asked to produce in English composition courses required in today's college curriculum. The dictionary is less helpful with the latter term -- essay.

²⁶The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, ed. William Morris (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969).

²⁷Ibid.

It is necessary to look elsewhere for help in understanding the nature of the essay, and for help in determining whether the essay is a proper form for dissertation writing. Actually, the argument I should like to make is that the genre of essay is not an alternative equal to the treatise, but a better form in which to write because of the self-conscious acknowledgement of its form as fluctuating within the polarity of the subjective and the objective -- the space between writer and world. This allows for the widest possible (reflexive) interpretation of experience and writing.

The heart of the essay as a form is this moment of characterization, of recognition, of figuration, where the self finds a pattern in the world and the world finds a pattern in the self. This moment is not the result of applying a preconceived method, but is a spontaneous, unpredictable discovery, though often prepared by careful attention and observation. This discovery can be about the self or about the world, but is mostly about a combination of both. Self and object are configured in a mutually illuminating way.²⁸

The essay I shall argue is the sine qua non of philosophical writing. It is the only form which respects the individuation process.

It is my claim that the essay is a proper form within which individuation can be facilitated. With that in mind I should like to continue considering the nature of the essay. Graham Good claims that "the essay exists outside any organization of knowledge, whether medieval or modern."²⁹ He

²⁸Graham Good, The Observing Self: Rediscovering the Essay (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 22.

²⁹Ibid., 4.

attributes its inception as a form of writing or genre to Montaigne who by his "critical and skeptical attitude to sources [other authors] allies his writing with empirical science, with its stress on observation and proof."³⁰ Mr. Good points out in this context that Bacon too used the essay in order to promote his new science. However, Montaigne does not follow Bacon in his aspirations for a science which is cumulative and progressive. Montaigne is situated between the old and new forms of writing which Foucault has referred to as commentary and criticism respectively. Under Montaigne, "the essay does not aim at system at all; its empirical data are used in a much more limited way."³¹

In order to provide a means of contrast between the treatise and the essay, I offer the following quote from The Observing Self:

The essay offers personal experience, not disciplinary expertise. Modern "disciplines" tightly govern the content and form of individual contributions. First, the area of proper investigation is distinguished from other areas, and the borderlines carefully watched. Then, the proper method of investigation is defined in theory and practice. Finally, access to the discourse is limited: the general reader is discouraged from participating because tone and style indicate a "specialist" audience of initiates, while access to publication is normally limited to those who have the appropriate certification (such as a "doctorate") and position (a university appointment). Rules also govern the relations between contributions within the discipline. Each acceptable contribution has to take account of previous contributions on the topic, especially recent ones. The disciplinary enterprise is defined as collaborative, cumulative, and

³⁰Ibid., 3.

³¹Ibid.

progressive (though in practice it is often competitive and repetitive). Supposedly disciplines advance year to year through new work.³²

The characterization of the structure of disciplines contained in this quotation would have received a general nod of approval prior to the present time in which debate has arisen over knowledge/power relations. It was taken as a foregone conclusion that knowledge is most efficiently produced under conditions of separation and specialization in which the isolation and the autonomy of the disciplines could be sustained. However, today there is growing unrest with knowledge for knowledge's sake. For example, Mary Midgley very pointedly asks: What is knowledge for? Her response is summarized in the following:

The point of acquiring knowledge cannot be just to store it. Traditionally, its value was supposed to center on understanding -- the power to see the connections of things, to wonder at them, and so to live wisely. Today, when knowledge is pursued more vehemently and expensively than ever before, this emphasis on connection is pushed aside.³³

Mary Midgley argues against isolationism and autonomy of disciplines and calls for a greater understanding of the purpose of learning. In order to resist the futile fragmentation of knowledge, more emphasis needs to be placed on understanding, and a firmer connection must be made between theoretical and practical thinking. Science, Midgley argues, should not be isolated from other inquiries, such as the

³² Ibid., 5.

³³ Mary Midgley, Wisdom, Information, and Wonder: What Is Knowledge For? (London and New York: Routledge, 1989).

humanities, nor from other sciences. More urgently still, philosophy, which exists to make clear the connections between things, should no longer be treated as just one obscure specialty among others. Although regarding the autonomy of the disciplinary structures as suspect is no doubt contentious, it should be clear that Midgley's position and my own are congenial.

I should contend that her arguments support the idea of the essay as the proper form for philosophical writing. The essay, as I have described it, provides the latitude for discussions which are polemical and substantial. Montaigne and Bacon helped to originate the genre of the learned essay. And Mary Midgley continues to champion that form as a proper mode for philosophical writing. If we were to examine the content of Bacon's essays on scientific method, we would learn that in the best sense of the essay Bacon's writing was systematic and edifying as well. Emphasis should be placed upon why Bacon sought to expose the systematic nature of the universe, and render its lawful structures in his discourse: Bacon did these things in order to achieve edification³⁴ and expand his understanding of God, thereby strengthening his faith and contributing to the glorification of his maker. It is reasonable to ask whether philosophical writing which has been produced today according to the image of philosophy as science

³⁴An edifying text would be one in which the individuation process is promoted. I would argue that individuation requires a reflexively written text which is self-consciously reflexive not only unconsciously reflexive as all writing is.

has achieved any edifying value? It is not fair to dismiss the call for edification or its concomitant -- wisdom, by saying that science and religion are better served by separating each from the other. Even if God is a human construction residing in mythical discourse, this would not erase the power which such a belief or faith achieves within a pragmatic analysis of human activity.

From my experience of Mary Midgley's other works, I am able to say that her purpose has been quite plainly to edify the practice of philosophical writing. It is interesting to note that Professor A. J. Ayer in a review of an earlier book of Midgley's applauds her achievement of clarity of style on the one hand, and with the other he labels her contribution as one in psychology not philosophy. Does a piece of writing which manages to span theoretical and practical thinking automatically get subsumed under the heading of psychology? Doesn't this occur when we are rigid in our distinctions between theory and practice? Could Ayer have had this very distinction in mind when he made the comment reported on the back cover of Midgley's book entitled Wickedness?³⁵ It is after all common practice to separate theoretical from applied writing, especially in philosophy. Consider the distinctions between meta-ethics and applied fields such as bio-medical, legal, or business ethics. I have mentioned Ayer's comment because I think it underscores the ambivalence which philosophers have toward shedding their status as

³⁵Mary Midgley, Wickedness (New York: Routledge, 1984).

practitioners of an obscure specialty. And I have mentioned Midgley's arguments because they support my contention that the essay is the proper form for dissertation writing in particular and for philosophical writing more widely.

The strategy I have taken is to show that even so called objective writing about outer reality must by nature of the act of writing reveal something of the self of the writer. According to Mikhail Bakhtin, every human act is a text in potentia.³⁶ Even earlier than Bakhtin, the Hegelian model of how individuals come to self-consciousness is also useful in understanding how the act of writing promotes the realization of self-consciousness. It has been the aim of this inquiry to argue for the confessional mode of writing philosophy, short of actually doing confessional analysis. Part of the argument has involved showing the conditions needed for confessional writing which is, as I understand it, a mode of discourse on the self.

In order to achieve this broader and deeper experience of one's self, less constraint needs to be exercised on the context of dissertation writing. One way of achieving this is to realize that dissertation writing may also be categorized as essay production. Hence, the genre of the essay is an appropriate form for such self-realization. Quite simply, the professional identity achieved by virtue of membership in a group cannot obstruct the development of true individuality.

³⁶V.N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav and I. R. Titunik (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

In my estimation, the practice of dissertation writing is dangerously close to doing just that if left to impose the ruling image of philosophy as science. This argument loses force if it can be shown that dissertation writing can vary in the form it takes according to the subject matter of a particular investigation. However, according to the Hegelian description of the rise to self-consciousness, it is always the goal of every attempt at objectification to ultimately discover and repossess the self from which the creation originated. The emphasis of my inquiry has been on the triadic relationship between philosophers, texts, and world. With that focus, rather than a simplified model which posits the world or object as constituted by a subject in some non-dialectical fashion, we are able to acquire the kind of understanding that Nietzsche reached in Beyond Good and Evil.

It is my claim that some field of investigation needs to be set aside for the illumination of the human being, and it seems that philosophy has struggled throughout its history to achieve this goal in one form or another, thus why not recognize what has always been the underlying moral struggle within every text -- the contestation of representations. By the latter I mean to designate the moral struggle to overthrow the representations of the master/slave discourse (group hegemony of a patriarchal structuring) -- the discourse of subjugation and subjection -- in order to achieve a maximum of self-determination or individuation. Necessary for that goal to be attained is a discourse on the self; The mode of

philosophical writing which approximates this is what I have called confessional writing, and the genre best suited for the interpretation of experience is the learned essay.

Rather than end with the conclusion or point of my argument for confessional writing and the learned essay, it has been recommended that I provide the reader with an example of confessional writing. Of course, in a sense which I hope to have made clear at this point, all writing is confessional in an unconscious manner. Nonetheless, confessional writing of a more explicit kind can be found in Kierkegaard's dissertation and in Johannes Climacus.³⁷ Also, The Traitor³⁸ which is now available in its English translation is an autobiographical analysis within both psychoanalytic and marxist frameworks that promises to very closely approximate the kind of confessional writing this dissertation attempts to argue for in contemporary life.

Instead of using excerpts from any of the aforementioned writers, I shall appeal to a writing sample by a philosophical literary critic and follow that with an extended commentary of it which has been written by Professor Mary Wiseman. First, the fragment from Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes which is called "The book of the Self":

His "ideas" have some relation to modernity, i.e., with what is called the avant-garde . . . but he

³⁷Soren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, ed. & trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

³⁸Andre Gorz, The Traitor, trans. Howard Richard (London and New York: Verso, 1989).

resists his ideas; his "self" or ego, a rational concretion, ceaselessly resists them. Though consisting apparently of a series of "ideas," this book of his ideas; it is the book of the Self, the book of my resistances to my own ideas . . .

All this must be considered as if spoken by a character in a novel -- or rather by several characters. For the image-repertoire, fatal substance of the novel, and the labyrinth of levels in which anyone who speaks about himself gets lost -- the image repertoire is taken over by several masks (personae), distributed according to the depth of the stage (and yet no one . . . is behind them) . . . nothing is more a matter of the image-system, of the imaginary, than (self-)criticism. The substance of this book, ultimately, is therefore totally fictive. The intrusion, into the discourse of the essay, of the third person who nonetheless refers to no fictive creature, marks the necessity of remodeling the genres: let the essay avow itself almost a novel without proper names.³⁹

Professor Wiseman explains that,

The third person who intrudes in the guise of nameless narrators and masks that take over the image-repertoire does not stand for anyone real because the substance of the book is fictive, but neither does it stand for a fictive creature. Characters in literature, fictive creatures, cannot be referred to because they do not exist, and there is nothing to which proper names in novels can refer. "Emma Bovary" does abbreviate sets of descriptions, however; there are indefinitely many Emmas because the reader may elaborate the words on the pages of the novel in many ways, some conservative, some subversive. And although proper names in novels behave differently from names in life, we know the rules of their behaving in knowing how to read novels. "Roland Barthes," the name of the man whose story the is supposed to be, does not occur after the first five pages; it does not name the speaker who is to be considered as if several characters in a novel. Rather, "Roland Barthes" is the name whose absence makes the book "a novel without proper names." There is only the narrator, referring to his subject in pronouns. Speaking in all persons, first, second, and third, the narrator speaks in no person. He is "no one -- personne, as we say in French." Each of the two occurrences of the in-

³⁹Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 119-120.

struction that "all this" is to be considered as if spoken by a character is immediately preceded by the appearance of the first-person adjective. In the preliminary pages "my thanks to friends" is given and quoted above, no sooner is the book called the book of the Self, glossed as the book of my resistance to my ideas, than the claim of ownership or authorship implicit in "my" is withdrawn. Language is stripped of its power to assert the presence, however shadowy, of its agent, and the subject of the book is dispossessed of his ideas. For the resistance is not to the content of the ideas but to their status as "mine."⁴⁰

And in concluding her response to the fragment from "The book of the Self," Professor Wiseman summarized Barthes writerly text as follows:

Since the substance of the book of the self is fictional, so then is the self whose book it is. It is not anchored in time, not dated, not part of history; it is constructed, not natural. This autobiography is not a self-written life, but a rewritten self; for in so far as the self is constructed along lines drawn by the structural model of language, it may be said to be written. Two different operations can be performed on what is written: it can be written about, that is, commented on, or re-written. There can be a commentary that is not a rewriting just in case there is in the writing a meaning that can survive the transcription from text to commentary. If, however, one supposes neither that there are meanings independent of and different in kind from their inscriptions nor that meanings are anything more fixed than momentary assignments of values to variables, one may choose to read not for transcendental or institutionally privileged meanings. One may read instead for what words in combination can signify given the network of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations in which they are embedded and the direction and speed of the lines of force to which they subject each other. When one reads for what words can signify, one does not confront what is written as something closed, bounded, finished off, but rather as a script or a score waiting to be performed and open to such readings as are given it. Performances and readings are not about their scripts or scores: they are often of

⁴⁰Mary Bittner Wiseman, The Ecstasies of Roland Barthes (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 111.

them. When what is written is read in the writerly way, it is performed, and to presume to comment upon the writing is to cut off all that it can signify in the name of what the doxa says that it does signify. The self whose book is an "autobiography" is not written about but rewritten, where rewriting is performing and the performer dissolves in the performance of the "novel without proper names."⁴¹

This emphasis on the performative nature of texts challenges the classical theory of representation which assumes that meaning is derived referentially. The reference is to something extra-linguistic -- presumably the material realm of reality which according to empiricism is independent of the minds of speakers and writers. Although Barthes was an influential figure in the French structuralist movement, the passage from "The book of the Self" to which Professor Wiseman has responded is a fair representation of the late developments of post-structuralist theory in which the subject or self has become problematic.

"The question of how to think the subject of experience, the subject to which Barthes turned in the work of his last five years, has not been answered satisfactorily."⁴² Professor Wiseman rather pointedly summarizes the way in which the subject of experience should not be approached.

One tempting strategy, to suppose that only what can be described can be experienced, and then always to fold talk of experience into descriptions of experience's occasions or objects, or of the ways in which experience qualifies its subject, falls foul of what can be written and read, to construct the culture's underlying intelligibilities, to encode the world and its inhabitants. If everything

⁴¹Ibid., 111-112.

⁴²Ibid., 117.

is signed, that is, if language determines everything, and if its power is absolute and in the hands that hold the reins of institutions, then the possibilities of experience are in thrall to social power. To think of experiences in terms of the descriptions of them licensed by the institutions of power is, then, to think of nothing that is new or original: for the languages and the sanctioning institutions alike are products of common inheritance. Moreover, to accept socially sanctioned descriptions uncritically is to preclude the possibility of doing what Socrates and Descartes did: to reconceive the limits of the distinctively human, of the subject, self, or soul.⁴³

Professor Wiseman finds some resolution for this dilemma by drawing on the distinctions of Barthes between two types of readers -- those who are writerly readers and those who are readerly readers. The first type reads "against ordained languages and interpretation-determining theories of any sort" and the second "obey the signs that writerly readers transgress. Experiences, texts, signifying, writing: these are the repercussions of a human body as it lives a life."⁴⁴ With this thought in mind we can turn to Quine whose writings will serve as our guide in examining further some of the issues which are responsible for the effacement of the subject in contemporary philosophical writing.

⁴³Ibid., 117-118.

⁴⁴Ibid.

-- CHAPTER 3 --

THE SCIENTIZATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE

The "scientization of philosophical discourse" is an ominous sounding expression. The image which surfaced in my mind (after a period of silence and meditation) was that of a surgical operation. In this procedure, I imagined that a subject had her voice-box sterilized so that only a masterful discourse could be uttered. The tone of this fantasy harkens to the fable told in the novel 1984 by George Orwell. Perhaps for some readers, this image does not arise. It is possible that another reader's mind might have quite a different image. Instead of sterilization conjuring up my image of painful torture, another reader could foresee the result of sterilization as more literally a cleansing procedure in which the voice-box of the subject was aided in achieving the status of philosophical discourse properly speaking -- a level of universality in which partiality or bias is excluded. The latter is after all what is hoped for among the members of the contemporary Anglo-American philosophical community of subjects.

But, which is the correct image? The first in which suspicion of evil is prominent, or the second in which the extirpation of disease is promised. Although neither may quite capture the intuitions of my readers, either one is plausible and could be taken as representative of the warring

factions already discussed as rallying under the banners of "philosophy-as-literature" and "philosophy-as-science."

It is just this situation of conflicting imagery which has led some philosophers of language to try to exclude the importance of imagery from the scope of meaning. Witness the work of Gottlob Frege, and the early Wittgenstein: The work of these two philosophers has set the stage for contemporary debate over whether mental representation is necessary in the determination of linguistic meaning. The separation of linguistic meaning from psychological significance or personal association is a move which sets the stage for the scientization of philosophical discourse. A number of philosophers and linguists have attempted to create a refined language in which scientific propositions can be formulated without ambiguity. Ambiguity is thought to lack informational content (but I do not agree with that idea). It was Frege's view that meaning must be clearly specified before the truth of a thought can be determined.

I would suggest an analogy be made between "refinement of scales of measurement" and "sharpening of the articulations within a particular natural language" in understanding the need for clarity and precision of meanings. Only physical processes are supposed to be measurable. Combination of these two attitudes leads to the project of reifying language. Instead of considering it as human activity which is multi-dimensional (i.e., not just physical), in the present century the scientization of discourse in general and of philosophical

discourse in particular attempts to convert the medium of language into a thing which is independent of our activity.

The reification of language is enacted in part through establishing a rule-governed structure (e.g., transformational grammars) which specifies correct and incorrect usage of words in the context of sentences. These rules are imposed upon all language users. These structures function as explanatory of human linguistic behavior, but in addition they are seen as causal factors determining the output of speakers and writers. I prefer to think of rules as constructions which can be appealed to in guiding our behavior rather than determining it.¹

I am not proposing that we abolish the conception of linguistic behavior as rule-following, or as constrained by them; I am, however, objecting to what appears to me as the single-mindedness with which this aspect to our communicative capacity has come to dominate our understanding of speaking and writing. Communication is only one aspect to our linguistic behavior. There are others as Wittgenstein has disclosed early in the Philosophical Investigations.²

Thinking of language only in its capacity of providing us with a calculus for articulating the findings of scientific activity is very limiting. This constraint upon our discursive practices concomitantly places limits upon the subjec-

¹Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1958), 80-82.

²Ibid., 11-12.

tivity of the individual, and hence limits what I have argued earlier in the dissertation is needed for a full democratic society to be realized -- individuation. Scientization is itself a hegemonic activity which provides its own momentum for making the world according to its predominant image.

Consider Frege. Frege is given honorable mention in a recent publication in a series entitled "Advances in Semiotics."³ The editors of this particular volume introduce their selection of readings with a reference to Frege whose work is viewed by them as founding the Anglo-American tradition in philosophy of language. The importance of Frege is noted in their introduction as follows:

Modern logic and the philosophy of language which accompanied it (partly as a motivation, partly as a result) were conceived in a deep dislike for "psychologism." According to Frege, no confusion is admissible between the psychological process of thinking and the pure thought "of which mankind has a common store, transmissible from one generation to another." Logic and philosophy have no concern whatsoever with the processes actually going on in the individual mind, and in any case those processes are simply irrelevant when it comes to exploring the realm of meanings and their cognates, mathematical objects.

In this vein, the two fundamental concepts on which Frege constructed his philosophy of language, those of sense and reference, were both sharply distinguished from their mental accompaniment in the individual mind, the idea. The latter is subjective: "one man's idea is not that of another; while the sign's sense may be the common property

³Umberto Eco, Marco Santambrogio, and Patrizia Violi, eds., Meaning and Mental Representations (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988).

of many and therefore is not a part or a mode of the individual mind."⁴

Of importance to the argument of this chapter is that we create a setting or scene for current debate. The preceding quotation helps to accomplish that. Frege excluded approaches which psychologize.

Locke can be of help in understanding what Frege hoped to avoid by excluding psychologizing. In terms of a causal theory of perception like that of John Locke, all imagery is the result of previously acquired experiences. The mind may be thought of as a funnel into which representations or copies of the external world are channeled. In language acquisition we might (and in fact do) remember many peculiarities of the circumstances in which words or expressions were learned; these peculiar images are considered irrelevant to the meaning of a term. For example, we have all learned to understand the meaning of a word like "bed," even though some of us may have slept in canopy-beds, some of us in double beds, and others in bunk beds. The essential or commonness or shared aspect of "bedness" is what becomes abstracted and represented in the Lockean idiom.

To psychologize would involve enriching the concept of bed with the non-essential frills or particularity belonging to the specific bed in which one had slept and with which one had learned to acquire the word that represents it. The copy

⁴Marco Santambrogio and Patrizia Violi, "Introduction," in Meaning and Mental Representation, eds. Umberto Eco, Marco Santambrogio & Patrizia Violi, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 3-4.

or representation then is not an exact replication of our experience. It is a representation which signifies the necessary features without which the bed would not remain a bed.

There is a normative or prescriptive character to the situation in which meaning is acquired. For example, consider the following commentary on the puzzlement over meanings:

Until very recently it was assumed that a word has a determinate meaning and that careful analysis would reveal that meaning. However, when such attempts are made, all that happens is the substitution of other words for the word in question. It appears reasonably clear that what is in fact happening is not that the determinate meaning is uncovered but rather that someone determines the meaning; such discourse concludes with a prescription of what meaning ought to be found in the word, or it concludes, less frequently, with a statement that the meaning of the word is obvious and that we cannot get along without it, even though the meaning cannot be uttered. More recently, baffled by the traditional way of struggling with the question, some philosophers, led by Wittgenstein, have proposed that an unequivocal meaning can be discovered from the use of a word. This proposal seems promising until it is realized that an investigation into use involves an examination of all the factors, verbal and non-verbal, present in the situation in which the use takes place and involves further an unlimited examination of similar situations. Similarity is, and must be, determined by neglecting those factors in two situations which are judged not to be found in both. As the range of situations determining usage is extended, more factors found in the beginning situation will have to be abandoned. Eventually the only factor left will be the word itself.⁵

In the Fregean scheme of meanings, they are not considered personal or psychological as they were for Locke, nor constructed as they are in the commentary reported above. For

⁵Morse Peckham, Explanation and Power: The Control of Human Behavior (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 11.

Frege, the empiricist's and constructionist's explanations are unacceptable. The empiricist relies on the individual mind for copying or representing the object of perception.

For Frege, the concept must come first. In order for us to recognize anything, we must first be guided by something universal which will allow us to pick out an object that corresponds to the category under which it falls (or better the class in which it fits). At a cognitive level, Frege is wanting to limit the concept to the universal aspect of "bed." The essence of bed is the same in English as it is in French (le lit) and other natural languages. Meanings are abstract things. In the platonic realist's ontology, i.e. Fregean philosophy of language, meanings are independent and pre-existent of any knowing subject. Meanings have their prototype in numbers which in a Platonist interpretation are classes of classes.

For Frege, language becomes an abstract enterprise which exists regardless of whether there are or have been any speakers of it. This sounds odd; saying that there is language without there being anyone to speak or write it, or even to understand it. The Fregean tradition of philosophy of language can be counterposed to work done much earlier by Wilhelm von Humboldt who wrote

Because of the mutual dependency of thought and word, it is evident that languages are not really means of representing the truth that has already been ascertained, but far more, means of discover-

ing a truth not previously known. Their diversity is not a diversity of sounds, but of world outlook.⁶

"Languages delineate the cultural characteristics of nations, each of which has its own individuality and arouses a sense of unity in men."⁷ This approach has been revived in this century by cultural anthropologists (e.g., Whorf's hypothesis that language represents or embodies a tradition of a particular culture, of a particular people).⁸

Thus, we are to understand by the term "scientization" that not only is the individual's particular experience being excluded by the process of abstraction, but cultural experience as well. We are left with an abstraction which consists of only what is shared in human experience. Perhaps some criterion like, what is enough, or minimal, or essential for communication to be achieved determines the level to which abstraction is allowed to attain. In that way "being shared" determines whether an abstraction is acceptable. And, in a sense then Fregean philosophy of language is an attempt to set the parameters for cross-cultural understanding. This would be thought of as the widest possible consensus obtainable. It should be clear that from the very outset the direction of

⁶Howard Isham, "Wilhelm von Humboldt," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, (New York and London: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), Vol. 4, 73-73.

⁷Ibid., 73.

⁸Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought & Reality: Selected Writings, ed. John B. Carroll, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1956).

this research is prejudiced against the exploration of individuality.

The dilemma of how a discourse on the self is possible can be brought out at this moment by contrasting Locke and Frege. For Locke, individuals are responsible for their privatized meanings or representations. But, we never know if what's in my head matches what's in yours. For Frege, meanings are assumed to exist independently of any experience. We don't have them in our heads, but nonetheless we use them in some manner to comprehend the world. Platonists, like Frege, are in the habit of distinguishing questions of epistemology from questions of ontology and claiming that we can address them separately. Regardless, neither Locke's naturalized meanings or Frege's supernatural meanings are open to inspection. Both are equally out of range of examination. Perhaps we should be more distressed by Locke since his theory was supposed to answer the epistemological question whereas Frege was concerned with ontological issues only.

The difficulties which arise in the Fregean situation can be attributed to the use of a perceptual/intuitive model in which judgments are objectively made according to criteria which are universalizable. Thought for Frege is not a mental phenomenon, although perhaps our knowledge of it is made possible through our mental acquaintance.

Since induction provides no guarantee of certainty, Frege has to reverse the order of their occurrence in order to establish order. He accomplishes this by structuring the

situation so that it fits a deductive model of logic to begin with. Objectively true thoughts (the only kind worth having according to Frege) are universal and capable of instantiation in the individual mind, however the truth of these thoughts or judgments does not require the individual's experience as a support. Instead of the model relying solely on perception, it is ruled by an intuition of the universals.

To my mind truth is not the opposite of falsity, but must somehow be juxtaposed to falsity in order for either concept to make sense. At least this would seem to be so of experimentation. Absolute verification is no longer considered possible. There is no longer a naive or direct correspondence between the world and the way we represent it. Yet some still hold out for an essential copy of the world.⁹

If there is sufficient challenge to the old notion of a physical world out there which is independent of the mind of the knowing subject, we should look to explore other ways of understanding the professional discourse in which philosophers of this century have engaged. In the following paragraphs, I shall merely hint at the directions that such explorations might take.

We could assume that both Frege's and Plato's personal worlds were arranged in an orderly fashion. This assumption is plausible because experience is to a large degree controlled by ruling images. Plato must have understood the

⁹See Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 13-35.

organic nature of ruling images. His tripartite theory of the soul has enjoyed quite a lot of influence throughout the years. On first approach, Plato is often considered authoritarian, but a deeper reading dispels this impression. Since Plato's problem was maintaining the safety of the Greek polity, he must have been quite an astute psychologist when it came to understanding the controls needed to organize human behavior.

It is less clear to me what may be said of Frege's world-order. It must have been different from what it was for Plato since he seemed to be motivated by his moral responsibility to the community. It is clear from the context of Plato's philosophizing what the political intent of his discourse was, but in Frege's philosophy we do not find his thoughts on the social or political issues of his day. Without the context of Frege's life we cannot assume much about his intentions. However, we can infer a strong need to efface the confessional aspects to his discourse from his persistent exclusion of psychologizing.

In contrast to the above speculation on Frege, I would have a lot to say about what may have been Wittgenstein's reasons for effacing the subjective dimensions to his discourse. The process of conjecturing gets underway very quickly if we bring to mind the fact that he was of a homosexual orientation, lived for some time in an uptight Cambridge community with apparently, and had very little sexual freedom not only because of the community's morality,

but more importantly from the perspective of his own inhibitions and self-loathing he most likely denied himself a health sexual life. I would contend that Wittgenstein had reason enough to try to curb any desire on his part to explore publicly his own subjectivity. From the fact that he poured quite a bit of energy into his private-language speculations, together with my speculation that the concept of language-games must have carried with it much contempt for the silliness of many of the pretentious pursuits of his fellow dons, we might surmise that both of these issues have behind them a lot of material of a highly personal nature which I would expect a confessional analysis to help us to explore and understand. The exploration of the confessional aspects to Wittgenstein's discourse are reserved for another place and time.

It remains for us to quickly relate Wittgenstein's notion of language-games to the present context. Consider Wittgenstein's claim that there can be no private-languages because to be a language is to be a form of life, and a form of life is always shared by a group of individuals. Lyotard claims in The Postmodern Condition that engaging in a language-game constitutes the social bond. For him, there are two basic language-games, the denotative and the prescriptive. These language-games are actually speech acts one is descriptive (informational) and the other is directive (ordering or commanding) of action. Lyotard apparently respects the distinction between fact and value. By maintaining that the

social bond is constituted in two different types of language-games, he has imported the fact/value distinction into the foundational practices of speaking and of community-making.

I don't agree with this separation. It is a mistake to conceive of science as an outgrowth of simple activities like observation and reporting. I would argue that Lyotard has not quite extricated himself from the structuralist approach to theorizing. Although he professes that master narratives are no longer attractive to anyone in the postmodern condition, the opposition of denotative and prescriptive language-games is definitely faithful to the structuralist approach which Lyotard claims to have transcended. In a postmodern condition, description and prescription would not be set in opposition as contraries like the synchronic structure of Saussure's conception of langue in which signified and signifier (concept and sound-image) of one term is differentially valued according to its relations to all other terms. We run into difficulties when we take what is true of a simple statement and generalize from the structure of a statement to the more complex situation of conversation. Although composed of statements, language-games, narratives, and texts are higher order forms of speech.¹⁰ One language-game does not derive its meaning from its difference from another as Lyotard would have us believe.

¹⁰For an argument against the statement/text analogy, see John Sheriff, The Fate of Meaning: Charles Peirce, Structuralism, and Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), Chapter 1.

Certainly there is no need at this point to diverge into the confusions of Lyotard. It should suffice to eradicate this separation between denotative and prescriptive language-games by appealing to Karl Popper who claims that all observation is motivated by interest or aim. Our interests are laden with values; no observation is innocent, which is to say that no look is disinterested. Theoretical science must be thought of as a higher order construction; although a participant in the social bonding process, it cannot be taken as foundational of social bonding in any necessary sense.

Even if we were to consider science a derivative of the practice of magic, it is pressing it too far to take a simple act in which information is exchanged as forming of a social bond. Any act requires a social frame of reference -- a set of customs -- in order to make sense. The social bond is constantly reproduced, however it is senseless to consider a world devoid of sociality. Language is already a social phenomenon as all phenomena are just that by virtue of their arising within a social world. We haven't access to any world which lacks human beings. The world as we know it is a constructed one, made known by human beings. Professor Aronowitz claims that science has become the paradigm of truth for all other language-games. The practices of scientific

communities deserve study according to the kinds of sociality and subjectivity which they create.¹¹

Language-games, we can stipulate, are the context within which genres are produced. Genres are the rules according to which texts are interpreted. Experience is the locus of meaning. However, authoritative communities are the source of strategies for reading. Here resides the conflict between the individual and the group. Individuals are responsible for the enactment of a text, and hence the subjective experience of meaning is achieved in the act of reading. Genres are the strategic approaches to decoding a text. They are followed by authors and by readers. An author is simultaneously a writer and reader. (This was made clear above with Barthes' notion of writerly readers and readerly readers.) Genres are rules governing the interpretation and production of texts, but how can that be the case.

For a discourse on the self to be possible, rules must be applied or taken up by subjects. The rules must be used for expression -- discourse production. And yet, the content of the very discourse has a constitutional effect on the subjectivity of the speaker/writer. The discourse serves to transform the speaker and audience. This necessity is captured by Bakhtin's notion of answerability. Institutions are part of the framework in which discourse is produced. Fundamentally, subjects (authorial self or just plain self)

¹¹Stanley Aronowitz, Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

must act so as to transgress any structure of rules, otherwise an individual's discourse is nothing but the parroting of group sentiment or the reverberation of a party line.

To shape the world through the meaning of the values that my deeds articulate is not a necessity but a responsibility, since I am free to avoid making values that are my own. It is impossible to be a conscious human being and live a value-neutral life. But I can simply accept the values of my particular time and place, which is an avoidance of activity that has the effect of making my life a subfunction of a self-imposed "axiological reflex" (cennostnyi refleks, similar to Heidegger's das man). Thus, my ability to withhold meaning constitutes a responsibility: I am answerable in the sense that I am free to heed or ignore the world's call for a response.¹²

This passage supports my contention that the individual is responsible for the production of meaningful experience. It is taken from a discussion of Mikhail Bakhtin's architectonics of answerability.

The conflict between the individual writer and the authoritative community is a necessary tension. The production of a text represents a dialogical enactment between self and other (world). Production incorporates both writing and reading as two phases which vary according to whether your point of view is author or reader. In the sense in which a text is literally taken for the course of an individual life, as it is in the reflective moment of dialectical consciousness, every writer and every reader is living a life of textuality. In that sense, the myths of one's culture and one's species have their say in the determination of what is

¹²Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 76.

lived, written, read, and understood. The thrust of this dissertation is to show the need for support of the integrity of the author in the context of hegemonic authoritative communities. Such communities are not only hegemonic in a conventional sense, but are made hegemonic by our biological constraints on individuality as well.

THE GENERAL ARGUMENT AGAINST SCIENTIZATION

The argument of this chapter is that the scientization of philosophical discourse tries to eliminate the possibility of a discourse on the self, and does to the extent that it adheres to the demands for objectivity, formality, and detachment. These will exclude any discourse which is subjective in nature, properly aesthetic (which is to say that form and content are inextricably intertwined), and politically and morally engaged; in short -- any discourse which attempts to capture our uniqueness and individuality is excluded from philosophy if that field is constituted by opposing science to literature. It is, after all, the literary mode of discourse which has been able to capture our subjectivity, and not a properly scientific discourse.

I should like to consider why the scientization of philosophical discourse prima facie excludes the possibility of a discourse on the self. To that end, it is necessary to make a few introductory remarks and distinctions concerning the nature of science before addressing a specific example of scientized discourse which I shall claim is found in Quine's writings. "Science" is a term which may be used strictly or loosely. In the strict sense of experimental science, systematic and explanatory power accrue to the scientific enterprise as a result of multi-faceted observation, manipulation, and measurement under controlled conditions which are reported in protocols replicable by other reputable

scientists in comparably equipped laboratories.¹³ The loose sense of science applies to the case of a purportedly scientific philosophy. The latter use of the appellation "scientific" does not mean that philosophical knowledge has been derived from the experimental methods which are a *sine qua non* of the strict sense of science; it is perhaps only honorifically used to claim that philosophy is comprised of knowledge which is organized systematically and scrutinized rigorously.

The loose sense of science would apply to the nature of Husserl's and Althusser's philosophies. In each, we find proposals for the scientization of philosophical discourse. The strict sense only properly characterizes Quine's proposal to naturalize epistemology, because Quine proposes to continue the epistemological activities (which during the modern period of philosophy produced theory of knowledge) with a version of functional or behavioral psychology. In short, Quine scientizes philosophical discourse most plainly by transforming epistemology into empirical psychology.

Since science is the systematic investigation and explanation of the most universal and general features of objects within reality, it is perhaps a foregone conclusion that to speak of a science of particular and individual aspects of reality is a contradiction in terms. Science is after all a construction based upon the observation and

¹³Rupert Sheldrake, The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 36.

measurement of events which occur more than once (repeatedly). Knowledge cannot be acquired through the methods of experimental science unless repeated observation, manipulation and measurement of the same phenomenon is possible. Neither the demonstration of control, nor the verification of prediction would be possible in the case of a single unique event. Thus, unique events or idiosyncratic features of reality cannot be captured in the net of science. The scope of science is drawn to encompass classes of events. Single acts which enter the realm of experience, make their impression within our consciousness so as to register their occurrence and fade away into the past. Except for the trace which may be recollected by memory and elaborated by imagination, these single acts or events are gone forever, and thus remain outside the scope of science. It would seem to follow from this that science can only pertain to the abstract and not to the concrete.¹⁴

It may be instructive to consider for a moment whether a science of the concrete is possible. There have been attempts within the science of psychology to work out what would count as a science of the individual, but it would appear, from the lack of any considerable following and elaboration, that such efforts have been failures. For

¹⁴Both terms (abstract and concrete) are oppositional; neither is to be reified. Once the notion of correspondence between (theoretical) description and actual reality is given up, it is easy to see that all science is a construction. Since the universe is never in exactly the same condition at different points in space-time, no two events can be the same unless they are constructed or abstracted as such.

example, when I think of failed efforts at a scientific treatment of the individual mind I have in mind Titchener's¹⁵ structuralist psychology in which the method of introspection was applied to the consciousness of the individual. The individual was considered as the experiencing-person; its constituents were the living body, brain and nervous system. Introspection was a special awareness of the conditions (sensations) within the brain and nervous system. Titchener differentiated psychology from physics. He claimed that although both psychology and physics were sciences dependent on experience, psychology studied experience in relation to the person whereas, physics made a study of the world without reference to the experiencing-person.

Recent developments in the fields of chemistry and physics have not altered the fact that the scientist studies the general nature of reality. And, even though research on the location and speed of electrons has dictated that the framework of observation or measurement be incorporated into the parameters of investigation and theorization, physics still maintains its distance from the experiencing-person.

Titchener was not the last scientist to try his hand at treating the concrete and particular individual -- the person -- scientifically. We can look to the founder of the humanistic psychology movement, Abraham Maslow, as another example

¹⁵For a summary of Titchener's project see Edna Heidbreder Chapter 7 "Titchener and Structuralism," in Seven Psychologies, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1933), 113-151.

of failure. Perhaps it is a little unfair to condemn Maslow's work as a failure. In The Psychology of Science,¹⁶ Maslow investigates the psychological dimension to the activity of science. Putting the behavior of the scientist under the microscope as Maslow does in that book provides much fuel for thought. However it is no wonder that the book has had such little recognition among the scientific community; Maslow presents no technique or formula. Unless a paradigm is set up under which measurement and manipulation is possible in a rigorously technical fashion, the technicians of science are hard-pressed to know how to go about their production. The same explanation for failure to catch on as a paradigm would apply to the inter-behavioral psychological formulations of Jacob Kantor.¹⁷

Why is it that the concrete and particular individual resists scientific treatment? I should say that the activities of categorization and classification regardless of whether the classes be called stimuli and responses or dispositions and behaviors must necessarily alter or change, and even distort the nature of the field in which lived-experience is manifest. The use of distortion is peculiar, because there really is no way of deciding whether a representation or abstraction is a distortion since there is no way of representing the original.

¹⁶A. H. Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

¹⁷J.R. Kantor, "Feelings and Emotions as Scientific Events," in The Psychological Record, 1966, 16, 377-404; and J.R. Kantor The Aim and Progress of Psychology and Other Sciences (Chicago: The Principia Press, 1971).

This is why I have called all experience imaginal rather than trying to tease out one true reality as a standard. Our interest here shifts to the process of abstraction, however, that issue is too large to consider now. Nor should it be necessary to go traipsing through the same territory which was covered in the Sartrean analysis of the relationship between the pre-reflective and reflective consciousness. In this context of categorizing and classifying, it would be more to the point just to stress that perception is not innocently replicated in language. The relationship between the visible and invisible is far more complicated than any model in which some isomorphic mapping of the data from outside to that inside the nervous system can handle. The relation is best characterized as a dialectical function which must remain a mystery due to the limitations placed upon us by our capacities for interpretative representation. For modeling to be theoretically useful, the model must be a likeness and not a copy or exact replication. Categorization and classification which are the preliminary and ongoing duties of the scientist/technician involve perceptual and linguistic activities and serve the interests of self-consciousness. As such they create our lived-experience by virtue of being part of the process of meaningful discrimination. Every act of recognition produces a transformation in the form of life for which the term "concrete and particular individual" is only a place holder for the locus of determination. Within the realm of language, "concrete and particular individual" as a term

functions in an indexical fashion, whereas in the realm of lived-experience it is a meaningful expression which may be used referentially and reflexively.

Also, having argued that the individual by his or her use of language cannot replicate the structure of reality, because reality is constructed, structured, and understood through the imaginative use of language, it seems an unnecessary digression to dredge up that discussion at this point. Nonetheless, it is necessary to state that since the scientization of philosophical discourse has been set up as a process occurring under the rubric of the image of philosophy as science and as a process it is seen to be competing with the image of philosophy as literature, it deserves more careful attention. Specifically, we should at some point be able to determine why it has fallen to the purview of literature to work out our understanding of the self.

Although the argument that scientific practice as an abstraction from or within lived-experience produces an idealization which is not referentially connected to any concrete and particular individual (e.g. the term "average person" points to no one) is a general argument which, together with the historical fact that literature has heretofore possessed the responsibility for a discourse on the self, supports the contention that scientization excludes a discourse on the self, it still remains to be shown how the relations that Quine sets up between philosophy and science fail to meet the condition for a discourse on the self. In

other words, we must determine exactly how and why his proposal for scientization excludes the possibility of a discourse on the self. It should be acknowledged that science (scientific philosophy) is prima facie incompatible with a discourse on the self since such discourse is uttered by concrete and particular individuals.

It would appear from what was last claimed that we must choose between science (scientific philosophy) and a discourse on the self. But, it is not my intention to outlaw science, rather it is my hope to show how scientific research is a mode of discourse on the self, albeit an indirectly produced one. The Manichean tendency of setting up oppositional structures so that an exclusion of one of two dichotomous alternatives is required in order to establish harmony is strongly resisted in my dissertation inquiry. With respect to this issue of science and the possibility of a discourse on the self, the Manichean structuration would involve an opposition between science and literature, and an exclusion of one or the other as providing a satisfactory condition for a discourse on the self. This is not at all necessary, since there is another alternative which does not require a decision based on an either/or exclusionary logic, but which yields the possibility of inclusion because it is based on a both/and logic.

The way in which scientific discourse can be considered a mode of discourse on the self is as follows: The scientist is at one level of analysis engaged in a discourse about the purportedly real objects of investigation. This is an

imaginative activity in which the scientific objects as objects of study and as theories are partly created and partly discovered which is to say they are constructed. But at another level, the same scientist is whether intended or not simultaneously producing a context in which a symbolic or disguised discourse on the self is revelatory of the current state of the "authorial self." It has been argued earlier that the construction of the authorial-self brought about through the act of writing involves a stylization which is idiosyncratic of the concrete and particular individual at that very moment in time.

The metaphor of a spider spinning its web may be useful here. Consider the writer in the place of the spider. With his or her pen he or she creates, discovers, and constructs the context of writing which contains the objects of study and theories. The web stands for the realization of the imaginative activities of the authorial-self. Although the spider can leave the web behind and start over, the writer as an authorial-self has no such luxury. The writer remains caught in the web. However, this is not a tragic ending, unless the writer has been forced to construct objects or theories which are not of his or her choosing and not in the interests of his or her self-realization. The latter point about not being in the interest of self-realization would include the necessity of writing within constraints which create deviations from the individual's particular needs for creative expression.

Spinning is an appropriate analogy for the process of self-consciousness. The writer is inextricably entwined with his or her creations. It is after all in the act of writing that the authorial-self is constructed, in the sense that the author is not merely expressing his or her self in explicit autobiography or confession, but in the creative sense that the entire activity is self-actualizing, self-revealing, and self-realizing. The activity is self-actualizing in that the authorial-self is brought into being through the very act of writing. The activity is self-revealing in that the act of writing whether intended or not discloses and exposes the self in this most highly expressive activity. Lastly, the activity is self-realizing in that the self-consciousness of the writer is reflexively accomplished in the reverberation of the triangle of writer, text, and world.

In the remainder of this chapter I must show that Quine's proposal to naturalize epistemology is a proto-typical case of scientization. This involves showing how his style of scientization in particular attempts to exclude the possibility of a discourse on the self. To do this is not hard. It is easy to show how Quine's adherence to the doctrine of scientism is implicated in this exclusion. Also, his empiricist theory of meaning, which is constructed by reducing theory of meaning to theory of reference (elimination of intensional theories in favor of extensional theories), plays an equally important role in the accomplishment of an efface-

ment of the question of subjectivity from the scope of his discourse.

The remainder of this chapter is broken down into the following parts:

- THE CHARGE AGAINST QUINE FOR THE EXCLUDING
SUBJECTIVITY
- SOME NORMAL DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORICAL SITUATION
OF QUINE'S STYLE OF SCIENTIZATION AS A DISCIPLINARY
STRATEGY
- SOME ABNORMAL DISCOURSE ON SUBJECTIVITY

THE CHARGE AGAINST QUINE FOR EXCLUDING SUBJECTIVITY

Willard van Orman Quine is foremost among contemporary American academic philosophers. In the context of the present chapter on the scientization of philosophical discourse, the selection and consideration of Quine's proposal to naturalize epistemology would seem to need little justification. For years Quine has been on the cutting edge of contemporary analytic philosophy. His research program has set the agenda of problems addressed in the areas of empiricism and philosophy of language since 1950.

Quine's research is linked with the tradition of positivism or logical empiricism. The linkage is maintained first, by Quine's adherence to the doctrine of scientism in which he takes scientific knowledge as the paradigm for all knowledge especially the science of physics and to the doctrine of empiricism. Even after Quine's attack on the dogmas of empiricism, he still maintains that meaning and knowledge have their source in our sensory experience of the physical world.

One outcome of Quine's adherence to the doctrine of scientism was his early and consistent commitment to physicalism (the hypothesis that all phenomena would eventually be reduced to or explained by the laws of physics and chemistry). However, his views have not remained static by any means. For example, although Quine had originally (1948) considered phenomenalism as a viable alternative

conceptual scheme to physicalism, he later rejected it. Quine also retracted his declaration that he did not believe in abstract objects, in fact, he has come to accept such entities and furthermore has claimed that he has always believed in them. Lastly, from supposing "that in the face of recalcitrant experience, we could change our logical laws, he has apparently come to hold that there is nothing that would count as changing our logical laws."¹⁸

In a sympathetic study of Quine's work, Alex Orenstein has "sought to clarify [Quine's] position by contrasting it with more traditional views as well as those of contemporary figures such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Chomsky."¹⁹ Orenstein has, in the process of clarifying Quine's philosophy, provided his readers with "a vantage point for viewing contemporary philosophy."²⁰ Included in the scope of Orenstein's book are the following themes of Quine's philosophy:

the adaptation of the language of modern logic to formulate a criterion of ontological commitment, Quine's own ontological commitments, Duhemian empiricism and the attendant rejection of a priori knowledge, the nature and grounds of logical truth, Quine's criticisms of such notions as meaning, synonymy, analyticity, and necessity, the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, ontological relativity, innateness and behaviorism,

¹⁸Paul Edwards, editor-in-chief, Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1967), Vol. 7, 55.

¹⁹Alex Orenstein, Willard Van Orman Quine (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1977), 9.

²⁰Ibid.

epistemology construed as the psychogenesis of reference, and the continuity of science and philosophy.²¹

I should venture to say that even a slight acquaintance with Quine's work leaves a favorable impression of how deep and probing the mind of the philosopher must be to have produced such a comprehensive corpus. Professor Hao Wang has remarked that

Given the highly confusing state of philosophy at the time when Quine began his study, it is certainly a great achievement on his part to be able to select a course of work which, according to a majority of his professional influential colleagues, has yielded fundamental advances in the central part of current philosophy. The objective question of how solid these advances are, or whether they have served or will serve as steps toward more advances of "scientific" philosophy, is more debatable.²²

I suspect that no objections to relating the present dissertation inquiry to the work of Quine could arise, since Quine is by no means a marginal figure in contemporary philosophy, it would be bizarre to object to the consideration of his philosophy. Unless future research in analytic philosophy takes a drastic unforeseen turn, it would seem that Quine's research will remain a permanent stage in the work which followed from the linguistic turn taken in the Anglo-American tradition.

The case for the centrality of Quine's research in contemporary philosophy is indeed quite solid, however, it

²¹Ibid.

²²Hao Wang, Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What We Know (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press/ A Bradford Book, 1986), 205.

might be suggested that the dissertation inquiry could be tighter by confining consideration to those authors who are writing in the same tradition as Sartre -- Continental philosophy -- since the bulk of the dissertation deals with his work as it relates to the thesis. Although it is perhaps an unwritten rule that a dissertation inquiry demonstrate competence in a particular body of philosophical literature, the nature of the present thesis about the act of writing dictates that the scope of inquiry be broadened so that adequate consideration of alternative ways of doing philosophy can be achieved. I should like to stress that consideration of Quine's proposal is very pressing.

Some of the reasons for emphasizing the need to consider Quine's proposal are: Over and above the other two styles of scientization, those of Husserl and Althusser, Quine provides the most radical of the three alternatives worth considering. It is the most radical because it promises the most complete transformation of the Cartesian First Philosophy which has been the hallmark and aim of epistemology in the modern age of philosophical investigations. Also, in response to the skeptical arguments of the empiricist line of inquiry which began with Locke and Berkeley, and ended in Hume, Quine's empiricism accomplishes a radical reduction of the problems which can be legitimately considered. Whereas Husserl carries forward the search for presuppositionless knowledge in the most faithful manner to the Cartesian project (absolute certainty), Quine, rather than search for a mentalistic

foundation comprised of subjective ideation, chose to reject mentalism completely. Unlike Althusser, Quine ignores the question of subjectivity altogether. In contrast to the scientific philosophies of Husserl and Althusser, Quine's scientific philosophy is the most narrow and restrictive. These are strong reasons which call for the immediate consideration of Quine's philosophy over the other two cases of scientization which will be examined elsewhere.

With regard to the claim that Quine ignores the question of subjectivity, consider the following episodic report by one of Quine's own students:

Surprisingly, Quine agreed to respond to Mortimer Adler on the question: Has philosophy lost contact with people? His answer seems to amount to this: Yes, but this is as it should be. He wisely recommends that we assess the changing scene of philosophy by looking 'to actual endeavors and activities old and new, exoteric and esoteric, grave and frivolous, and let the word "philosophy" fall where it may.'²³

Hao Wang parenthetically interjected that, "This reminds one of the familiar idea that philosophy is what philosophers do, voiced once by Isaiah Berlin."²⁴ In the same context from which the above quote was taken, Wang cautioned:

But to achieve an instructive account of such a complex diversity of things seems to call for a survey of various traditions and the doctrines of the numerous mixtures of them, as well as the role they play in different societies of the world today. Instead, Quine limits himself to a single strand of

²³Ibid., 202.

²⁴Ibid.

'scientific philosophy,' centering on his own type of work.²⁵

After acknowledging the detection of "a familiar interplay of valuation with cognition in [Quine's] normative description of the history and the contemporary state of philosophy,"²⁶ Wang explains in more elaborate fashion than is needed here that the strand consists of eight philosophers. These are Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. Such is the lineage to which Quine aligns himself. Many great philosophers are eliminated, but the justification for doing this is: "According to Quine, the eight chosen great philosophers and others 'were scientists in search of an organized conception of reality.'"²⁷ According to Wang,

Quine ... chooses to single out one type of scientific philosophy which he considers most fruitful. He points out that what we now consider distinctly philosophical in the eight philosophers were their struggle with broader and more basic concepts and their quest for a system on a grander scale, but stresses that these efforts were integral still to the overall scientific enterprise. This leads to his thesis of continuity: 'What is pursued under the name of philosophy today, moreover, has much these same concerns when it is at what I deem its technical best.'²⁸

It is odd to find Quine at the end of a list of philosophers whose scope embraces the questions of subjectivity in some form and of human nature in general. Nevertheless it

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., 204.

²⁸Ibid.

would be pointless to try to make anything out of Quine's choice of philosophical bedfellows. Odd as the association may seem, it is his prerogative to choose those philosophers to whom he feels the greatest debt for their influence on his philosophical development.²⁹ Odd is one thing, but the view which Quine takes toward the relationship between scientific philosophy and people is quite shocking to the ordinary person. For the seasoned continental philosopher, this view

²⁹Although not wishing to lodge the following complaint against Quine, I, nonetheless, must interject here that often the greatest impact upon one's development can be attributed to those whose work has been misread. For an understanding of the need to misread and a comprehensive defense of this seemingly outrageous thesis see Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (Oxford University Press, 1973). Bloom maintains that

"Poetic history . . . is . . . indistinguishable from poetic influence, since strong poets make that history by misreading one another, so as to clear imaginative space for themselves." Bloom's "concern is only with the strong poets, major figures with the persistence to wrestle with their strong precursors, even to death. Weaker talents idealize; figures of capable imagination appropriate for themselves. But nothing is got for nothing, and self-appropriation involves the immense anxieties of indebtedness, for what strong maker desires the realization that he has failed to create himself?"[p.5]

At this point I only mean to suggest that this type of biographical analysis (i.e., Leon Edel's psychological method of intellectual biography) which involves situating an author historically within a subjective sphere of influence might be preliminary to the confessional mode of doing philosophy alluded to in the thesis about the act of writing. In particular, this kind of information would help us understand why Quine chose the road on which objectivity serves as guide, rather than "the road less travelled." The use of the latter phrase seems especially fitting for distinguishing the more difficult path upon which self-knowledge is sought. It is on that path that one is thrown back upon one's own resources in order to establish one's bearings subjectively.

carries less shock and more disappointment. For the devoutly scientific, it would seem to indicate that one is on the proper course. For Quine, the question of subjectivity would seem to hold no interest. But mitigating the shock with the casual remark that the question of subjectivity holds no interest for Quine is evasive. It is far too generous insofar as it distorts the real tragedy in Quine's approach to philosophy.

According to Quine, the age in which great discoveries of a psychological nature are forthcoming has ended. Notable figures who fit Quine's list of admirable giants in the field of psychological investigation are John Locke and David Hume. Quine is convinced that the paradigmatic and revolutionary discoveries are firmly in place. He holds no hope of any great insights into our psychological nature. Familiarity with research in the field of psychology leads to the conclusion that the image which governs research is captured by the rule that says that psychology is to proceed by piecemeal investigation of this or that parameter of the experimentally structured situation. It is possible to venture a guess as to Quine's thoughts on this matter: Could it be that since Quine regards the physicalist approach to explanation the most scientifically promising that he might assume that piecemeal exploration of the nervous system as one basis will eventually uncover all there is to know about our nature? This suggests that human nature is somewhat fixed or genetically determined and that invasive exploration of the

mechanical apparatus responsible for the emission of behavior will someday produce the understanding of this "thing we call human nature." It would appear that for Quine it is normal science which must predominate in the field of psychology. Even this attitude serves to hide the tension which his scientific philosophy produces - for the question of subjectivity.

SOME NORMAL DISCOURSE ON QUINE'S STYLE OF
SCIENTIZATION: A DISCIPLINARY STRATEGY

The tension which has been reached in my argument against Quine's style of doing scientific philosophy can serve as a marker for exploring the two elements which his approach embodies. These are the reductive and exclusionary elements. It will be helpful in understanding the strategies of reduction and exclusion if we situate Quine in relation to his immediate predecessor (Rudolph Carnap) and one of his subsequent challengers (Jerrold Katz). Although the field is more complex than just the two relationships I intend on describing, these two will suffice to clarify the nature of Quine's philosophy and why I believe it is a tragic move.

Quine's immediate predecessor was Rudolph Carnap with whom Quine, from one perspective, took exception. From another perspective, it appears that Quine only traced out the implications of Carnap's constructional system thereby bringing it to its next stage of deformation. To wit: the minor or even minuscule shifts and conflicts found among the research of Carnap, Quine, and Katz is a good illustration of how the work of normal science is carried out in the analytic school of philosophy. This snippet from the contemporary chronicle of philosophical research supports the contentious description of the disciplinary structures contained in the quotation above on page seventy-two. To understand these alternative views of Quine's relation to Carnap, we should start with a brief summary of Carnap's project.

In The Logical Structure of the World,³⁰ Carnap embarked upon an attempt to create a rational reconstruction of the conceptual systems of the empirical sciences. From his point of view, the main problem of his endeavor was "the possibility of the rational reconstruction of the concepts of all fields of knowledge on the basis of concepts that refer to the immediately given."³¹ Rational reconstruction means "the searching out of new definitions for old concepts."³² According to Carnap,

The old concepts did not ordinarily originate by way of deliberate formulation, but in a more or less unreflected and spontaneous development. The new definitions should be superior to the old in clarity and exactness, and, above all, should fit into a systematic structure of concepts. Such clarification of concepts, nowadays frequently called "explication," still seems to me one of the most important tasks of philosophy, especially if it is concerned with the main categories of human thought.³³

Note the stylistic requirements set forth by Carnap for the activity of rational reconstruction: clarity, exactness, and systematicity (logical coherence). These demands for style seem innocent within this context only if it is assumed that translation of conceptual abstraction into sensory experience is a tenable position to take. The ability to translate concepts into experience suggests that the rational

³⁰Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudo-problems in Philosophy (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1967).

³¹Ibid., v.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

reconstructive activity is an art capable of realistically representing the process of conceptual creation and elaboration in relation to its basis in sensory experience.

For the moment, I only want to bring out the manner in which style is determined by the faith (or hope or dream) that even though "unreflected and spontaneous" in its conceptual development, the reality of scientific practice is, in principle, possible of reduction to "what is given in the immediate present." I wish to highlight the faith in the capacity of language to portray the world. The representational capacity of language in this sense means to render or present. Another way of saying this would be to claim that our linguistic practices are capable of reflecting or mirroring nature. The subtle difference between these two constructions is that in the former language and world are reifications, whereas in the latter the stress is placed on activity or process.

This is not after all an unrealistic expectation. Given the nature of scientific practice as guided by the imperative that experiments must be open to replication and hence their results intersubjectively verified (or falsified), it is only reasonable that the demand for full disclosure of observations of scientific practice be possible. (It is considered a minor detail that techniques have not yet been invented for such disclosures.) If realistic representation (description or denotation) and communication of what Carnap called the "autopsychological domain" were not possible, the very heart

of rational reconstruction, not to mention science as a descriptive enterprise, would become problematic (and possibly an unrealizable fantasy).

For Carnap, his mission was to create a framework in which the traditional dispute between rationalists and empiricists could be mediated and resolved. Carnap pointed out a common assumption of rationalism and empiricism, "that all concepts and judgments result from the cooperation of experience and reason."³⁴ The difference accorded to the sides of the dispute is the relative importance placed on the two factors. It appears that in general Carnap aimed at refining the descriptions of scientific practice so as to determine how one factor interacted with the other. Such metaphysical questions as were asked by rationalists or empiricists seemed to Carnap to be useless, since there was no way of experimentally (operationally) deciding answers to these questions. This point will come back to haunt Carnap. It is argued below that for Carnap there is no way of deciding whether his system of rational reconstruction is correct or true or accurate. But first we need to unravel more rope for the hanging of Carnap by Quine to be realized.

Originally, Carnap's framework came into being by selecting a single elementary experience as its basic one upon which all other conceptual elaborations would depend. Subsequent modification of his constructional system proposed as its basis physical objects. Carnap would deny that this modified

³⁴Ibid., vi.

system involved a relinquishing of its original autopsychological domain.³⁵ Whereas the original constructional system was constituted by an act of abstraction involving the comparison of two atoms or units of experience of the self and resulting in the judgement of similarity, the modification produced "a form which contained as basic elements physical things, and as basic concepts observable properties and relations of such things."³⁶

Significant are the following comments made by Carnap concerning necessary revisions and curtailments of his original project. About the modified basis in physical objects, Carnap stated "that relative to the properties and relations of the indicated sort, there is a greater degree of intersubjective agreement."³⁷ This remark applies to the revision of the basis of the constructional system -- the shift from the autopsychological to the physical domain. Carnap fell short of his aspiration of achieving the replacement of concepts with explicit definitions (admittedly he had already introduced concepts through meaning postulates), but in spite of this curtailment Carnap surprisingly claimed that

The positivist thesis of the reducibility of thing concepts to autopsychological concepts remains valid, but the assertion that the former can be defined in terms of the latter must now be given up and hence also the assertion that all statements

³⁵Ibid., 100-107.

³⁶Ibid., vii.

³⁷Ibid., viii.

about things can be translated into statements about sense data.³⁸

In addition, Carnap's constructional system was supposed to be neutral with respect to choices between realism, idealism, and phenomenalism. For Carnap, the issue between realists and idealists as to whether the world is independent of the cognizing consciousness was metaphysical. These questions cannot be raised within his constructional system because they cannot be answered by science, hence, Carnap sought to exclude them as legitimate questions.

Carnap sought to exclude the metaphysical disputes mentioned between rationalists and empiricists and between realists, idealists and phenomenologists in an article entitled "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology."³⁹ In a decidedly positivistic doctrine the distinction between internal and external questions was invoked.

... it is above all necessary to recognize a fundamental distinction between two kinds of questions concerning the existence or reality of entities. If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question. And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Reprinted in Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), 205-221.

concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions.⁴⁰

According to this doctrine, traditional philosophical questions about what exists or is real occur outside of the defined limits of any specific linguistic framework and are therefore thoroughly devoid of theoretical significance.⁴¹

Although these distinctions provide strict delimitations for what can be considered legitimately, Carnap was admirable with respect to the tolerance he afforded to others wishing to map out new areas for investigation. Evidence for this can be found in the following statement:

The acceptance or rejection of abstract linguistic forms, just as the acceptance or rejection of any other linguistic forms in any branch of science, will finally be decided by their efficiency as instruments, the ratio of the results achieved to the amount and complexity of the efforts required. To decree dogmatic prohibitions of certain linguistic forms instead of testing them by their success or failure in practical use, is worse than futile; it is positively harmful because it may obstruct scientific progress.⁴²

The passage from which the preceding quotation was taken concludes with the following maxim: "Let us be cautious in making assertions and critical in examining them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms."⁴³ This may be viewed as Carnap's interpretation or application of the Free Speech

⁴⁰Ibid., 206.

⁴¹George D. Romanos, Quine and Analytic Philosophy: The Language of Language (Cambridge: The MIT Press/A Bradford Book, 1983) 49.

⁴²Ibid., 221.

⁴³Ibid.

Amendment to the likes of his own project of rational reconstruction of scientific practice. Although markedly tolerant, he most certainly had his limits. By limits I intend to draw attention to Carnap's reaction to metaphysical excess which was undoubtedly born within the sphere of influence of the Vienna Circle. This was not the only place on the continent where revolt was to be found. The repulsion to metaphysical disputes may be found in the Hegelian wilderness of Bradley's idealism which had spread to England as well. Such speculative writing was believed to be in need of restraint. And so the search for a system in which the propositions of scientific investigations could be formulated was undertaken originally by Russell and Wittgenstein and continued by Carnap.

Carnap was different in that he gave up on the Russellian and early Wittgensteinian approach to this problem. Whereas they sought the resolution of the problem in artificial languages such as the logical notation of the Principia Mathematica, Carnap's plan was to create a translation of all physical language statements into statements about erlebnisse (lived-experiences). It was hoped that our lived-experience could be captured by the judgments or comparisons we could make by reflecting on past experiences. These judgements took the form of sensory experience and were to become the basis for deciding which theories were correct in representing reality and which were not. This hope fizzled out. Although this period in the philosophy of science is rich and

interesting, all we need say here is that the fizzling arose because the relation between sensations and theoretical entities could not be made explicit since the physical objects were not really describable by sensations. In other words, those intermediaries called observation statements could not be satisfactorily aligned between the impressions made by the "things observed" and the theoretical statements which were supposed to explain observed phenomena.

Although Carnap's particular project -- the Aufbau -- was never fully realized, the appeal of linguistic frameworks spread in its use. According to Nelson Goodman, how we see or picture or view the world, not just metaphorically but quite literally, is as relative to conventionally derived systems of symbolization as is the way we speak about, talk about, or describe the world by means of language.⁴⁴ Quine too had a strong sense that this relativism must be accepted. Prior to his proposal to naturalize epistemology, Quine, in a paper entitled "Ontological Relativity,"⁴⁵ laid out his approach to ontological questions. The ontological question could be raised by asking: What is there? In his approach, Quine examined the ontological positions held by various philosophers in the area of mathematics. There are three such positions which are identified by the attitude taken toward the objects of philosophy of mathematics. The disputation

⁴⁴Romanos, Quine, 37.

⁴⁵W. V. Quine, "Ontological Relativity," in Ontological Relativity & Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

centers around the notion of numbers. The question ontologically speaking is: what are numbers? The three positions taken toward mathematical objects are platonism, conceptualism, and formalism (nominalism).

It would seem that Quine followed Carnap in assuming that all three were viable positions. However, Quine was committed to developing the nominalist position in which physical objects were constructions or hypothetical entities to which he accorded the status of Homer's gods. Along with Nelson Goodman, Quine chose to try his hand at developing an ontology without abstract entities.⁴⁶ Thus, they adopted and articulated a nominalist position early in their careers. I have already mentioned above by way of introductory comments that Quine shifted from this early nominalism to a position in which he utilize physical objects and classes. Classes are nonetheless abstract entities, even if they are only at an early stage in a hierarchy of abstractions. With the aid of quantificational calculus, Quine developed a way of determining what a particular theory committed one to saying existed. Thus, for Quine there was no thought of trying to compare the posited theoretical entities with some physical reality out there or wherever. It should be noted that for Carnap determination of real from non-real objects was not an initial determination, but occurred later in his constructional system. All the data from the "stream of experience"

⁴⁶W. V. Quine and Nelson Goodman, "Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism," in Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 12 (1947), 105-122.

was incorporated in his system. Distinctions between sensations, hallucinations and dreams were reserved for later.

During the first half of this century much debate took place over the relation between observation statements and theoretical entities. Thomas Kuhn's articulation of a paradigm clash was a popular way of characterizing the crisis in scientific understanding. The failure of the naive project of scientific description set the scene for a clash among adherents of the old classical mechanics and the proponents of modern relativity theory and quantum mechanics. With no common metric, abstract entities of one theory became incommensurate with those of another. It was clear that no framework could decide the issue of which theory was better. Some phenomena were explained easily by one theory and less easily by another. The simpler explanation became the one of choice, henceforth appeal to aesthetic extra-theoretical criteria was made in order to arbitrate theoretical disputes.⁴⁷

A major disappointment for all epistemologists was the failure of the myth of the given to materialize. This failure seems to have left a void. Up to this point in modern empiricist philosophy theory of knowledge was constructed upon experiential foundations. According to Richard Rorty's interpretation of philosophy without epistemology the crisis is one concerning evidence and justification. In place of the

⁴⁷For a thorough examination of these issues see Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

constructional model with its image of grounding knowledge, Rorty substitutes a legal model with its image of judicial proof of claims about true or correct beliefs. In what I consider an expansion of Rorty's views, I shall argue that the conceptualizations or products of science are idealizations which function dialectically within actuality; Up for explanation is the way in which the real is represented. Is language an isomorphic transformation of experience? If we assume that isomorphic transformation is possible, then considering that understanding is comprised of a component of experience and another of explanation, wouldn't such a transformation be highly redundant since the information of experience would be re-presented in the form of an explanation?

Don't we need to ask whether language can replicate the structure of reality? Does that mean it pictures it? How can this ever be decided? If all understanding is mediated by theories, which theory will be the correct one? Doesn't this beg the question? The theory used as the criterion of reality would itself have to be taken as the correct representation. How can this be decided? We haven't any independent access to reality other than a mediated one. We don't have any causal theory of perception which can be judged as correct either. After all we can't assume that reality determines the form or content of either representation of reality. All evaluations have to be mediated by theory. Since our only contact with reality is one which is mediated by theory we

haven't any coherent way of knowing how reality is separate from or independent of our constructions of it. Maybe the trouble can be eliminated sooner. Why do we think there is a reality which is independent of the mind in the first place?

Take a situation in which we are asked to make a choice of two theories or two representations. If each theory or representation is independent of each other, the comparison must take place in the person doing the choosing. This would require some framework in which to compare the pluses and minuses of each theory. But to what or in what frame does this ticking off take place? What standard is going to be used to decide the better theory? Again we are in the same place in the circle: lacking any way of formulating a causal theory of perception or reception which is independent of our constructions, we are lost in this project of determining correctness of representation. The alternative by default is to think of language differently. Does it fill the void in understanding to consider language as existing as a dialectical element connecting the complex formation visible/invisible -- lived experience? With totalization unobtainable, don't we have to settle for a philosophy of partial representations which never remains fixed or static, but participates in the construction of what we mean by reality? And don't we need to recognize the double sense of partial representation? Aren't all constructions necessarily tainted with the subjectivity of the agent who constructed them? Just as our imaginations are called to adjust for the missing

information in the visual field due to the blind spot, so our imaginative use of language must compensate for the partiality of representations. Actually, the partiality is not a liability; It is more like a gift. With this measure of openness, we are free to some extent to revise our constructions and achieve a reality more to our liking. Through the impact of our constructions we can mold and shape reality to suit us.

The idiom in which I have articulated the representation of the real would not be the choice Quine would make in speaking of this issue, however, as I have stated it it is in keeping with the spirit of Quine's removal of the question of what there is from any correspondence to the immediately given. Although Quine stated in Word and Object⁴⁸ that language is a social art, he has failed to develop the aesthetic, moral, and political implications of scientific theorizing in the manner which I am attempting to do in the context of the present thesis about the act of writing. As is true of all good logicians, Quine is good at divorcing form from content. This degree of abstraction is necessary for any science of arguments to be realized, since it is the combinatorial relations between atomic propositions which in accordance with the rules for logical operators determines the truth or falsity of the conclusions to arguments or of the correctness of inferences. However, since the nature of my

⁴⁸W.V. Quine, Word and Object, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1960).

investigations is to question the objectivity of scientific practice as it relates to the problem of philosophical discourse, no such scheme can be taken for granted. This is to say that the strategy of reduction and exclusion undertaken by Quine is considered as obstructive of the project of showing how a discourse on the self is possible. Although there may for some purposes be value in considering the logical form of discourse separate from its content, and hence devoid of specific meaning, it should be quite obvious that if one were to entertain the project of articulating the logic of a discourse on the self, it would have to be of a very different nature than the standard formalization which is invoked in the construction of propositional logic or the predicate calculus. I cannot pretend to have any ideas at this moment of what such a project would look like. It seemed to me necessary to point out the difference between the direction which my inquiry has taken and that which Quine's has followed.

The direction in which Quine moved in response to the collapse of any actual correspondence to the immediately given or to any independent reality (independent from discourse or theory that is) was to interpret his theory in which physical objects were posited, by contextualizing it within his background theory of quantificational logic. According to Quine this is all we can ever hope for in deciding what there is. The question of what is real is removed and in its place the question of what to call it -- what's its name or essence?

-- is substituted. Whether it is rational reconstruction or interpretation in a background theory, the weighty issue is a struggle over power. That is the concern is no longer with who decides what is real, but what to call it is linked up with who is to name it. To name something correctly means that one knows the thing's essence. This is all very medieval sounding. Although the manner of speaking has changed the issue is still the same question of authority. From the mouth of one spokesperson of the analytic tradition of philosophy, "The business of philosophy is the determination of essences. If philosophy is not about essences, it's not about anything."⁴⁹

Just as science only purports to uncover the structures responsible for determining our experience and not the actual quality of our lived-experience, so it is with logic. In support of this claim I have lifted the following passage from a section in which Carnap addresses the question of objectivity.

Since the stream of experience is different for each person, how can there be even one statement of science which is objective in this sense (i.e., which holds for every individual, even though he starts from his own individual stream of experience)? The solution to this problem lies in the fact that, even though the material of the individual streams of experience is completely different, or rather altogether incomparable, since a comparison of two sensations or two feelings of different subjects, as far as their immediately given qualities are concerned, is absurd, certain

⁴⁹After reading a paper entitled "The Disenfranchisement of Art" given as the Lionel Trilling Lecture at Columbia University in December 1988, Professor Arthur Danto made this remark during a discussion.

structural properties are analogous for all streams of experience. Now if science is to be objective, then it must restrict itself to statements about such structural properties, and, as we have seen earlier, it can restrict itself to statements about structures, since all objects of knowledge are not content, but form, and since they can be represented as structural entities.⁵⁰

This passage allows us to bring out the similarity between science and logic. Logic too claims for itself the ability of delineating the structures or forms of correct argument independently of our experience of what is real or true (Kierkegaard's existential truth), and independently from whether anyone in fact reasons according to these forms. It would seem that both science and logic are not descriptive of our actual behavior or activities, but really normative and valiative in character. They are both constructions which I should like to claim are best understood as idealizations which dialectically interact with our actual experience so as to change and transform the nature of our experience in order to bring it into conformity with the group's requirements. Idealizations are special types of abstractions. Their function is quite necessary to our form of life.

Again I should underscore that this would not be the idiom in which Quine would describe the situation; it sounds dangerously like some sort of social psychology. The idiom in which the individual can be said to be subjected to the norms of the group is most definitely found in the annals of social psychology and sociology. It also touches on the field

⁵⁰Carnap, The Logical Structure, 107.

of sociology of knowledge. With a common focus on discourse, all of these areas of research can be brought to bear on our understanding of our lived-experience. But, labeling the domain is premature at this point. All that is needed is a straight forward articulation of Quine's notion of empirical psychology.

Quine considered empirical psychology a continuation of the epistemological project begun by Descartes in the seventeenth century. However, tracing out these connections would take us too far a field. It was my intention to situate Quine in the middle of Carnap and Katz, and that is what I promised and that is what I shall deliver. The difference is easily recognized. Whereas Carnap's system of rational reconstruction had attempted but failed to deliver a complete map of all domains which were relevant to our experience of the world and adequate to the formulation of scientific practices including the autopsychological, physical, heteropsychological, and cultural domains, Quine sought to simplify his terrain by reduction which was at the same time exclusionary. For Carnap reduction meant something like intertranslation from one domain to another. The objects constituting one domain say the autopsychological could be reduced to the physical object domain and vice-versa. For Quine, reduction became a strategy of exclusion or effacement of the autopsychological domain. Quine's empirical psychology consisted of descriptions of the relations between physical stimuli which impinge on the nerve endings of an organism and

the firings of those nerve endings. Impinging and firing are nothing else than stimuli and responses. In short, Quine adopted a behavioristic method of psychological study.

It does not seem that much argument is needed to establish the accuracy of the interpretation of Quine's approach as being reductive and exolusionary. It isn't much of an interpretation anyway; it's rather more descriptive of Quine's own proclamation. As someone who believes in the doctrine of scientism, Quine quite readily accepts the postures that go along with the demand of objectivity (alternatively read as: demand for theorization devoid of the experiencing-person), those are rigor, detachment, impartiality, and formality. Quine is readily identifiable as engaging in these maneuvers. The points worth emphasizing are: That for Carnap reduction meant the realization of a translation scheme comprised of definitions or meaning postulates in which objects of one domain could be translated into objects of another domain. Thus Carnapian reduction originally meant translating physical objects into the language of sensations (autopsychological objects) presumably in order to have a basis on which to understand the connections between experience and reason. This is to be understood as working out linguistic framework in which the concept of meaning played a central role. For Quine all of Carnap's machinations reeked of mentalism. As is well known from chapter 3 in From a Logical Point of View, the problem of meaning in linguistics is so great that Quine considered

it best to avoid the importation of that concept into science or philosophy until linguistics is capable of clarifying exactly what is meant by the term.

In the interpretation of meanings as entities of which we have ideas in the mind, the determination of synonymy between an expression in one language and an expression in another becomes indeterminate. In Quine's famous case of radical translation which is a situation that can be approximated by thinking of a situation in which the speech of a native is to be translated by an anthropological linguist, unless there is a shared set of practices (between native and linguist) or an assumed set of analytic hypotheses equating the nature of the world in which the native lives and the world as experienced by the linguist there is no hope of reaching an exact understanding of the native's speech. The example which Quine used in his discussion of this example is one in which a rabbit is running across an open field and the native yells "gavagai." Quine maintains that it is not possible to determine whether the expression "gavagai" means "rabbit," "rabbit part," or "rabbit stage." The first expression refers to the rabbit as object, the second expression refers to the hind part of the rabbit, and the third expression refers to the rabbit as a young rabbit. Quine claims that this is a case which if it were to become even more strange it would produce a condition of radical translation in which meaning becomes indeterminate.

Quine's position has been to reject the notion of synonymy as a relation within natural language because he does not consider the doctrine of analytic truth upon which linguistic meaning depends as valid. Why would there be need of two different expressions which meant the same thing? And along with this rejection goes the sense that can be made of saying that one expression is equivalent in meaning with another expression. This relation of equivalence or synonymy is the corner stone of the concept of linguistic meaning. For Quine, unless a distinction can be found to reside in the conditions of reference there is no basis for attributing differences in utterances.

Quine may be taken as eliminating some rather fuzzy notions which have been the mainstay of empiricist dogma. It is easy to recognize that Quine takes exception to the Lockean doctrine of ideas as internal copies or representations of external events. A trademark or identifying characteristic of analytic philosophy has been the adulation and pride in its production of clear and unambiguous analyses. Roland Barthes⁵¹ has indicted the stylistic use of clarity and unambiguousness as a bourgeois strategy for self-perpetuation. In expanding the application of his criticism of literary practices, we could say that the tendency to separate ideology from bourgeois criticism pertains to bourgeois science as well. Mentalism as a form of intentional analysis was one

⁵¹Roland Barthes, Criticism and Truth (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

approach to subjectivity. With Quine's exclusion of mentalism, subjectivity remains outside of the picture, and so do any criticisms of objectivity's basis in ideology. Perhaps throwing out the notion of synonymy helps to sustain the goal of unambiguousness? But at this point it is hard to discern what can be meant by clarity if the notion of words standing in a representational correspondence to reality is given up and along with that the notion of synonymy is tossed out as well.

Although among the ranks of its devotees clarity and unambiguousness are taken as "good in and of themselves," I should claim that these stylistic demands have been a contributing factor in the selection of manageable problems. With respect to form and content which are normally considered distinguishable and hence to some degree independent, it is clear that if the stylistic demands for clarity and unambiguousness are considered as form and not content, then it should be clear in this instance that the style or manner in which the results of the analytic investigations are presented influences, if not determines, the content of those self-same investigations.

To this date the collusion of stylistic demands with reductive and exclusionary strategies are regarded as innocent and standard practices by professional philosophers. In the analytic tradition, there is not a little pride in the fact that the scope of the problems confronted are fairly technical. Although, perhaps some would argue that in the

field of ethics the analytic approach is less technical, the work of G.E. Moore is definitely focused on manageable issues involving comparably technical conceptual analysis of good and evil and right and wrong. Given the restrictive nature of the problems addressed in the analytic vein, it is likewise fair to say that the solutions are limited in application. It can hardly be said of Quine's research that it has application to everyday life. In his own view "philosophy does not make contact with people." From where I stand, the scientization of philosophical discourse struggles through its stylistic tyranny to sustain the hegemony of scientific philosophy, and thereby it does not make contact with people, on the contrary it attempts to remain above them in order to rule them.

When the aesthetic, moral, and political aspects to the context of philosophical investigations are ignored, that is when ideology is separated from truth, the deleteriousness of scientization remains unrecognized. When our focus is placed on the act of writing ignorance of the ideological aspects to the notion of a correspondence theory of truth and to the strategies of reduction and exclusion is less likely. When framed as subject matters, mathematics and science are considered non-ideological even by many marxists. This distinction between truth and ideology has permitted the fields of mathematics⁵² and philosophy of science⁵³ to extend these

⁵²Charles Castonguay, Meaning and Existence in Mathematics (New York & Wien: Springer-Verlag, 1972).

⁵³Daniel A. Bonevac, Reduction in the Abstract Sciences (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982).

strategies of reduction and exclusion in highly theoretical inquiries where they have taken on a still more rigorous sense within a formalization of practices which are judged as innocent because in their forms their content seems irrelevant to people. But, as forms of writing they offer the hermeneutic philosopher interesting material for interpretation from the standpoint of self-realization and individuation of the particular writer.

I should like to end this part of my discussion and criticism of Quine's reductive and exclusionary strategies -- the aspects to his style of writing -- with another critical point of view, namely that of Jerrold J. Katz. Earlier I had promised that Quine could be beneficially understood in the context of his predecessor Carnap and his successor Katz. Katz's objections to Quine are interesting because, unlike my own which are directed at the scientization of philosophical discourse, they are made within the profession in order to expand the scientization and not criticize it. In particular, Quine's rejection (exclusion) of mentalism and his conflation (reduction) of theory of meaning with theory of reference has met with sharp criticism from Katz. Although Carnap and Quine had strong revulsions toward anything metaphysical, it would be wrong to identify the entire analytic movement as anti-metaphysical. Remember in the end even positivism was seen as a doctrine based on a metaphysical view. The principle of verification which was itself the criterion of meaningfulness was empirically unverifiable. Even within the analytic camp

criticisms have been made concerning the narrowness and exclusion of particular problems for analysis, and so it is to Katz that we will turn for this criticism of Quine.

Jerrold Katz explains this phenomenon of narrowness and exclusion in a context where specifically he laments the fate of the classical problem of logical form which he describes as having fallen by the wayside over the course of the first half of the present century. Logical form, Katz claims, naturally belongs to both linguistics and logic. Katz offers a rather general explanation of this phenomenon which encompasses the general issue of exclusion of unmanageable problems. It reads as follows:

Sciences tend to shy away from problems that look too difficult and to occupy themselves with ones that seem manageable. This is undoubtedly a wise research strategy, but like anything else, it can be carried too far. This has happened in some areas of modern psychology and social science as the result of a general drift toward a high degree of professionalization.

When this otherwise sensible research strategy goes astray, the problems of a field of study come to be determined less by the inherent features of its subject than by availability of precise methods for obtaining objective solutions. The focus of research shifts to manageable problems, and those that are found "unmanageable" recede further from the attention of the scientific community. Eventually, the field comes to be defined in terms of the problems which are amenable to solution through the application of precise methods developed by generations of professionals. Problems that are central to the structure of the subject may come to seem quite peripheral or end up being defined out of the field.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Jerrold J. Katz, Semantic Theory (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), xv.

Katz later in this same book goes on to implicate Quine as shortsightedly embracing professionalization. The focal point of Katz's discussion in Semantic Theory is the notion of logical form. Katz shows that logical form became ignored because for one thing professionalization swept it off the table of consideration, and for another it was an extremely difficult notion to get a handle on. Katz wishing to highlight the despair which such elusiveness brought to the minds of philosophers quoted Wittgenstein who had stated in the Tractatus that,

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.⁵⁵

Katz concludes that "logicians and linguists alike had sufficient reason to look about for manageable problems."⁵⁶ As of these two factors weren't enough reason, Katz additionally singles out Quine as the culprit in whose work Katz identifies the third factor in the disappearance of the classical notion of logical form. This third factor was according to Katz, "the empiricist attack on the vestige of the rationalist doctrine of necessary truth found in the linguistic systems of Carnap and other positivists."⁵⁷ Katz

⁵⁵Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus, trans. by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness & intro. by Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 63.

⁵⁶Katz, Semantic Theory, xvii.

⁵⁷Ibid., xviii.

mentioned the two paths which this attack took. One was the criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and the other was the separation of the Kantian logical vocabulary into a list of logical particles including such items as "or," "and," "not," "all," "is," and an extra-logical vocabulary containing nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Both paths were tread upon by Quine. For Katz, Quine is thus doubly guilty.

From the flavor of Katz's objections it is apparent that Quine was by no means carrying on in the metaphysically neutral vein set by the tone of Carnap's constructional system. Now that we have come full circle, from Carnap to Quine to Katz and back to Carnap it should be clear that although the contentions are supposed to be over metaphysically incompatible approaches, the stakes are relatively low because the moves made among the contestants are critical but polite and in a way self-perpetuating of a piecemeal style of investigations. Some might call it subtle, but subtleness is not a virtue in-itself, I would ask, in the name of what interest or toward what end is the subtlety carried out? Perhaps it is sufficient to ask: what does this work of subtlety accomplish? But then you might say that the contestants and I are even or at a stand off, for I doubt whether any of the three contestants would agree with the subjective turn which is taken by the present dissertation inquiry. At any rate what is certain is that if the three contestants are committed to a discourse which claims to have as qualities objectivity, detachment or impartiality, and

formality, then to agree with the argument which I have constructed concerning the scientization of philosophical discourse in which the qualities of objectivity, detachment or impartiality, and formality are suspect for their collusion in effacing the subjective aspects to discourse would result in the contestants holding contradictory positions or necessitate a change in their positions.

Perhaps the most striking difference between the approach of the dissertation and the project which I shall call the scientization of philosophical discourse can be brought out by considering Katz's overarching aim. Elsewhere,⁵⁸ Katz has confessed to his principal aim as being all along "to solve the philosophical problem of whether abstract objects exist." In other words, "to determine whether there are objects whose existence is independent of mind and matter but which must count as real along with mental and material objects."⁵⁹

Although Katz provides an opening for the inclusion of a number of more interesting and difficult problems, in the interests of brevity and relevance, I do not consider it wise to take on an analysis of Katz's project and an evaluation of its accomplishments in relation to what his overarching aim has been all along at this time. I have found it helpful to use some of his ideas in a criticism of Quine and of metaphysical narrowness in general. However, from the last

⁵⁸J.J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981).

⁵⁹Ibid., 12.

statement above concerning Katz's overarching aim to establish the independent existence of abstract objects, it should be clear that that aim is incompatible with the nature of my own inquiry which sets out to establish the underlying or symbolic value which all constructions have for the life of the self.

Since one objective of the present dissertation inquiry has been to limit its scope by staying "in the literature most relevant" to the establishment of the viability of the confessional approach to philosophical discourse, I reserve the right to postpone a dialogue with the Katzian approach to discourse. After all, it was argued that our course would be to choose Quine as the philosopher of contention because his proposal to naturalize epistemology seemed the closest alternative within the sphere of scientization of philosophical discourse to the psychological nature of the confessional approach to philosophical discourse proposed in the dissertation, whereas Katz has rejected the belief that grammar are psychological theories in favor of the belief that they are abstract objects. However, this is not to say that the trend which Katz's research embodies should be ignored. Of benefit to the general project of relating analytic philosophy to the Continental tradition will be a future consideration of the approach which Edmund Husserl takes toward meaning and intentionality. The use I have made of Katz thus far is as much as is possible and still remain within the literature relevant to the dissertation. Besides to do justice to Katz's work would take us too far a field of

the present line of inquiry.

SOME ABNORMAL DISCOURSE ON SUBJECTIVITY

It should be clear that the re-interpretation of Katz and others writing in the analytic tradition is a move which Richard Rorty⁶⁰ described as a rejection of "normal systematic discourse" in order to write a hermeneutical discourse. Rorty maintains that the latter is considered an edifying discourse by those who engage in its production, and an abnormal discourse by those who hold fast to the epistemological project. In the spirit of edification; The detachment, impartiality, and formality of the scientized discourse begs for a retrieval by a subjectivity whose nature is engaged, partial, and stylistically unified. The replacement of detachment is made by a morally engaged writer. Significant political rapprochement is achieved by replacing the pretense of theory as impartiality with the realization of the partiality of all representations. And finally, the displacement of form from content which established the viability of the analytic tradition from its founding distinction between analytic and synthetic reason is mended thereby creating the focal point in the aesthetics of experience and permitting the penetration of the formality of theory in order to unmask the fact that prejudice against the particularity of style is at the heart of the universalization or scientization of philosophical discourse. The swing toward objectivity represents the domination of the group project of solidarity. The tension

⁶⁰Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 320-22.

created by the hegemony of solidarity over self-creation leads to a rupture in which Foucault breaks from the marxist analysis of power as a patriarchal relation between a ruling class and a working class, and, to my mind, Foucault then stands as a true hero of subjectivity.

The preceding characterization of the standpoint from which the criticism of scientization got underway may serve as a point of departure from the normal discourse of Quine's proposal to naturalize epistemology. A return to the contrast between Quine and Heidegger will allow us to finish our argument against Quine's proposal. To that end it will be useful to compare Quine with Heidegger on the issue of subjectivity: Heidegger has claimed that "From the perspective of Hegel and Husserl -- and not only from their perspective -- the matter of philosophy is subjectivity."⁶¹ In addition, consider the words of Merleau-Ponty: "There are some ideas which make it is impossible for us to return to a time prior to their existence, even and especially if we moved beyond them, and subjectivity is one of them."⁶² What are we to make of this contrast? The contrast serves to highlight a major difference in the subject matter of philosophy as it is defined in the Anglo-American analytic tradition and in the continental tradition. But, the issue cannot rest there. It is unacceptable

⁶¹Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking cited in Dalia Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes: The Origins of Modernity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1.

⁶²Reported in Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation, 1.

to attribute the difference to a lack of shared interest. Nor can the contrast between Quine and Heidegger be written off by saying: although for Heidegger "so large is the influence of subjectivity that he contends that it determines the character and even the future of modern metaphysics,"⁶³ Quine is perfectly within his rights to reject it; in shying away from metaphysical issues and in choosing to attack manageable philosophical problems, he is just being faithful to his positivistic heritage.

The contrast between Quine and Heidegger cannot be explained by superficial glossing. The clash which looms within the contrast cannot be escaped by moves to set up a critical space in which approaches are permitted to co-exist and compete in a kind of free-market of ideas and solutions. For instance, when the concept of style is allowed to apply to the content of thought only and not properly to both form and content, we run into even greater difficulties than if the contrast was laid out more fully and the clash between approaches was met head on.⁶⁴ What is at stake is not merely

⁶³Ibid., 3.

⁶⁴ For example, Wartofsky uses the term "style" to designate different approaches to aesthetic problems. In particular, he constructs the critical space in such a way that the Anglo-American analytic approach peacefully co-exists with the Continental approach, and presumably other styles of thinking. This charitable act of tolerance is a move to allow, in a manner of speaking, a variety of approaches to work along side of one another, thereby letting the approaches be judged according to their success or failure at problem solving. If thought could be divorced from action, this would be an acceptable move. However, since I have claimed that the manner of representation is not innocent but is strongly implicated in the determination of subjectivity, this way of

a "language-game" which can be played or not, but a "form of life."

It is necessary to frame the difference within a deeper set of distinctions. First, a distinction can be drawn between two interpretations of consciousness. The purpose in drawing this distinction is to locate Quine within a more refined set of philosophical parameters. According to Judovitz, "The Cartesian subject represents a particular interpretation of consciousness, one whose rational standing is defined according to mathematical principles."⁶⁵ This should "...not be confused with what we today call a subject: man defined as a social, psychological and moral entity."⁶⁶ Judovitz further elucidates the Cartesian interpretation by saying that "Such a strict definition of subjectivity also precludes its identification with earlier Renaissance and baroque counterparts."⁶⁷

In other words, the "Cartesian subject" is a designation for the transcendental ego which is not spatial and not temporal. In my words, it is an idealization which provides a focal point for Descartes epistemological argument for certainty; the "human subject" of today is used to refer to the

understanding style is not possible within the context of this dissertation. See Marx W. Wartofsky, "The Liveliness of Aesthetics," in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 1987, Vol. XLVI, 211-218.

⁶⁵Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation, 1.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., 1-2.

constructed person which results from the kind of statistical thinking that is produced within the discourses of the human and social sciences (all are scientized discourses); and both of these terms need to be juxtaposed to the "empirical self" which is the spatialized and temporalized being to which the various qualities of experience are attributed. The latter is consciousness of experience as it is lived. It is supposed to be the "real" self, the living being. The other two, the Cartesian subject or transcendental ego and the empirical subject are respectively the objects of reason and of empirical investigation. As such the latter two are constructed within a field of discourse. But, the "empirical self" is also a construction, although it is not readily acknowledged as one. The recognition that the Cartesian subject is constructed within an autobiographical discourse which is "voiced" by an "empirical self" is consistently effaced when the discourse is scientized.

A consequence of this Cartesian interpretation of consciousness is a change in the definition of representation. Judovitz maintains that representation

no longer means merely rendering or presenting, but rather signifies a new way of understanding the world through its reduction to a set of standards, to a prototype. It implies a new worldview defined by the theoretical priority of the subject and the reduction of the world to an object. As representation, the world takes on the character of an image, the result of the systematic projection of a mathematical perspective upon nature.⁶⁸

⁶⁸Ibid., 2.

Thus, this distinction is the basis for discerning the terms transcendental subject and empirical self. It is the basis for the two means of representation. The Cartesian mathesis is responsible for the construction of the transcendental subject. Since Kant, this distinction between the transcendental subject and the empirical self has become a familiar piece of philosophical hardware. Its use permits the separation of metaphysics from the human sciences (both behavioral and social sciences). The "empirical subject" of today is a third term which under the older sense of representation is naively thought of as a construction which corresponds to the "empirical self" which serves as the object of inquiry or experimentation of the human sciences.

All three terms, Cartesian subject, empirical subject and empirical self are actually significant, because as terms which can be thought, they also determine meaning and experience. Each is a construction of a discourse in which subjectivity will vary. Of notion of subjectivity which is characteristic of the continental tradition of philosophical discourse, Judovitz has stated the following:

Descartes' concern with subjectivity is not original; he neither invented or discovered it. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, subjectivity can best be conceived as a construct: "Subjectivity was not waiting for philosophers as an unknown America waited for its explorers in the ocean mist. They constructed it, created it in more than one way."⁶⁹

This point about the construction of subjectivity made by Judovitz is important in launching my criticism of Quine's

⁶⁹Ibid.

naturalization of epistemology. Before using it to make my criticism, I should like to comment on the approach which Judovitz takes toward Descartes in Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes. There are similarities between her project and mine which should be made clear.

The similarity between our projects is that they both "challenge the hegemony and built in bias of philosophical concepts and arguments, i.e., the very language of philosophy, by elaborating a new critical idiom that combines philosophical and literary approaches."⁷⁰ Although Judovitz and I utilize a common approach to the discourse of our respective writers -- we take an approach to the texts which is best subsumed under the rubric of cultural studies -- there is a difference in the starting points of both projects. The difference may be distinguished as follows: Judovitz begins her analysis with the notion of subjectivity as it is doubly represented in the Cartesian text. In her analysis, the distinctiveness of the classical epoch to which the Cartesian project belongs, if not by which it was initiated, is made clear by its contrast to the baroque epoch to which writers like Montaigne, D'Urfe, and Sorel belong.

The present inquiry into Quine's proposal to naturalize epistemology must begin with a very different starting point. For with Quine, the problem of the construction of subjectivity within his text has long been forgotten. Our starting point is the erasure of the knowing (transcendental) subject

⁷⁰Ibid., 3.

and the effacement (or minimizing) of the subjectivity of the writer qua scientist (whether as empirical subject or empirical self). The erasure of the knowing subject is accomplished by the institution of the meta-language practice of interpreting the truth of an object-language. This practice achieves the status of objectivity through the formalization of the empirical subject which is another construction of scientific practice instituted by the human sciences both social and behavioral. It is precisely this statistical or normalized "man" Foucault claims is dead.

In other words from my point of view, Quine carries on the Cartesian tradition by rejecting the constructed transcendental subject. It should be kept in mind that Quine's rejection of the transcendental subject is not due to his recognition of its literary status, but due to the fact that Quine undertakes to base his epistemological project upon the normalized "sensory experience of the empirical subject which is constructed within the narrative structures which report the results of the experimental investigations of the human biological sciences. Thus, Quine ignores the effacement of the autobiographical "voice" of the empirical self and the significance of the literariness of the fictional construction of the transcendental ego which under Descartes' pen or within his discourse had formed the basis for the empirical self in his text.

In its place, Quine substituted the empirical subject which is "man" defined as a social, psychological, and moral

entity. Of course, under Quine's style of scientization, the empirical subject is also ignored and the continuation of the Cartesian project is carried out without the support of any certainty on the part of a transcendental subject or a fictionalized individual. Instead of the Cartesian grounding of epistemology in reason, Quine's epistemology is articulated by a fictionalized discourse of his own in which not only is the scientist and scientist qua writer omitted, but objects of a mythologized nature are brought in to serve as referents. The omission of the agent of scientific investigation whether conceived of as manipulator or writer is accomplished by Quine's strategies of reduction of theory of meaning to theory of reference and of elimination of mentalism. I think in this case mentalism should be read as the theory of the empirical subject's inwardness. This is a necessary component of cognitive behavior theory in which intentionality functions as the "invisible" explanation of the visibly efficacious behavior. By the way, cognitive behavior theory is only the modern day rendition of the older structure of thought and action which also relied upon "the bridge of intention" for interaction. Intention of this sort is just one of a kind of interpretive devices used for understanding life's meaning.

It is something of a peculiar discourse that Quine has created. If we read common sense as theory of vision, audition, etc., then common sense is basically the theorization of statistical thinking. Both the common sense by which objects are perceived and understood and the objects

themselves are imaginary and idealized products abstracted from the lived experience or reality. Quine's naturalized epistemology is precisely a case of ignoring the only thing which deserves being called "the real"; he appropriates the ideal for the real. By "the real" I mean the dialectical relation of the actual and the ideal. Quine in his enthusiasm for scientism ruptures the continuity of this relation and ignores the cybernetic function of ideation in the production of the real. Although Quine hypothesized the mythological status of his physical objects, it would appear that he moved to "naturalize" his discourse nonetheless.

This should not surprise the reader who is familiar with Roland Barthes' account of myth. Barthes claims that the moment of naturalizing occurs in the process of formalizing a myth. According to Barthes, "Semiology has taught us that myth has the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal."⁷¹ Quite simply, to naturalize means that a contingent lived situation is de-historicized in order to reinterpret it as a completely natural event explainable within the "laws" of nature. The outcome of this procedure of naturalization is that its constructedness is occluded in order to engender the appearance of naturalness. I shall have occasion to elaborate on the process below. Suffice it to say, that naturalization is part of what I am calling the scientization of philosophi-

⁷¹Roland Barthes, Mythologies (New York: Hill and Wang Publishers, 1970), 142.

cal discourse as such it is a constraint on the act of writing and hence on the authorial self and the subjectivity of the writer. If Barthes were alive today it would be of interest to ask him whether he would agree with my interpolation of Quine's discourse on naturalizing epistemology. My claim is that Quine's discourse is representative of Barthes' understanding of myth.

Barthes defines myth as depoliticized speech. For Barthes, "One must naturally understand political in its deeper meaning, as describing the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, in their power of making the world; one must above all give value to the prefix de-: here it represents an operational movement, it permanently embodies a defaulting."⁷² The effacement of human intention or the historicity of the human act (in this case Quine's act) of constructing an idealization of the scientific situation is exactly what Barthes would say follows the process of bourgeois ideology. Again, Barthes has said, "In a word, in contemporary bourgeois society, the passage from the real to the ideological is defined as that from an anti-physis to a pseudo-physis."⁷³ In an elaboration of this shift from anti-physis to pseudo-physis, Barthes claimed the following:

What the world supplies to myth is an historical reality, defined, even if this goes back quite a while, by the way in which men have produced or used it; and what myth gives in return is a natural image of this reality. And just as bourgeois ideology is

⁷²Ibid., 143.

⁷³Ibid., 142.

defined by the abandonment of the name "bourgeois," myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made. The world enters language as a dialectical relation between activities, between human actions; it comes out of myth as a harmonious display of essences. A conjuring trick has taken place; it has turned reality inside out, it has emptied it of history and has filled it with nature, it has removed from things their human meaning so as to make them signify a human insignificance. The function of myth is to empty reality: it is, literally, a ceaseless flowing out, a hemorrhage, or perhaps an evaporation, in short a perceptible absence.⁷⁴

There should be no mistake as to what I am claiming, with respect to Quine, physical objects are not innocently on an ontological par with Homer's Gods, but are exemplary of the products of a mythologized discourse. The steps in which these physical objects are constructed by means of human labor which in this case is the act of writing are effaced in order to make them appear as natural. But Barthes' analysis instructs us to recognize that this effacement of the human context in which the construction of physical objects occurs as a lived-experience or social activity is an act of substitution (Barthes called it a "conjuring trick") whereby an anti-physis or act against our real nature of meaning production is replaced by a pseudo-physis or de-historicized and harmonious display of essences. So, we must remember that Quine's naturalized epistemology is not natural at all. By itself this might appear quite astonishing. Quine's discourse is somewhat ironic in that he parades his physical objects past his audience as having the ungrounded status of myth thus

⁷⁴Ibid., 142-143.

waving in their faces the clue which betrays the political nature of his discourse. Quine's version of the world is itself a mythology. He calls it naturalized epistemology or empirical psychology, but an examination of the manner in which it is constructed shows that the only proper way of grounding knowledge or science is in the human activity which produced it. But, to do this opens the way for the disillusionment of the enlightenment project of universalism. Before expounding on this aspect of Quine's discourse, it will be instructive to show that Quine's "conjuring trick" has its origins in an earthly predecessor, namely Descartes.

It is important for our understanding to keep in mind that Descartes originated both the transcendental subject and the empirical self through the rhetorical devices of his text. The transcendental subject is dependent upon the allegorization of the universal mathesis of nature. The archimedean point from which Descartes moves to establish the empirical self is the Cogito in which the "I" of "I think" is the transcendental subject and the "I" of "therefore I am" is the empirical self. The latter "self" is arrived at or rather is constructed within an artificial discourse which takes the form of a fictionalized autobiography. This is used by Descartes to mask his own identity as a writer. This illusion occurs when representation is conflated with thinking and the latter is then reified.

It would be useful to remind the reader at this point of the Cartesian notion of clear and distinct ideas. The

Cartesian imagery depicts the contents of the mind as trustworthy when there is clarity and distinctness. Noting the similarity between the latter qualities of ideas and the stylistic demands of the analytic tradition, it is probably safe to say there is a borrowing from Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, by the analytic tradition. But how do we reach this vantage point from which clarity and distinctness is achieved? In Descartes, the self moves to higher grounds as a kind of observer on a par with God. But this equivalence of status between human observer and god is to be sure a mythical happening. This transformation follows a path which starts with Descartes himself as writer. The philosophical and literary interpretation which Judovitz has given to Descartes' texts⁷⁵ reveals that Descartes produces a rupture within his discourse for the purpose of establishing mind and body as belonging to different orders.

Judovitz attributes the entire Cartesian spectacle which "seeks to found a new language for philosophy devoid of its representational character and thus, of illusion" to "an idealist interpretation of mathematics (one that does not recognize its material and even rhetorical nature) applied to the rest of philosophy." His "overt condemnation and fear of illusion, in the Praeambula, the Regulae and the Discours is the figure of his refusal to consider the problematic nature

⁷⁵Her reading is mainly of the Rules for the Regulation of the Mind, the Discourse, and the Meditations.

of the relation of knowledge and representation.⁷⁶ "Descartes seeks to develop the concept of science whose theoretical universality would free it from all conditions of material specificity." His "critique of the arts announces his general refusal to confront experience and the instrumental role of the body in the acquisition of knowledge."⁷⁷ The reference to the arts in this last quote is an allusion to the "arts of memory" from which, Judovitz claims, Descartes wished to distance himself. With the aid of Francis Yates' text on The Arts of Memory, Judovitz is able to position Descartes in relation to the hermetic practices of his day. Judovitz shows that Descartes' discourse is both an attempt to extend and (perhaps hurriedly) transcend those practices.⁷⁸

Descartes' break with the Scholastic tradition is here evident. Whereas Saint Thomas "recognized the mediated relation of material being and intellectual knowledge,"⁷⁹ Descartes abolishes the body as a mediating term as preliminary to founding the difference between science and art. He is able to distinguish these by virtue of their respective responsibilities for the exercise of the mind and for the exercise of the body. Thus Descartes' criticism of the

⁷⁶Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation, 20.

⁷⁷Ibid., 43.

⁷⁸But I do not mean to imply that Descartes is a scavenger with respect to these practices. I think a more rigorous feminist/ psychoanalytic reading is required in order to do justice to the nature of the rupture from experience which Descartes performs.

⁷⁹Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation, 43.

resemblance between science and art "is merely a pretext for the distinction between the sciences and the arts, leading to the production of a fundamental difference between mind and body."⁸⁰ In summary,

the basic separation of the arts and sciences has three major consequences: the separation of mind and body, the implicit exclusion of experience and the definition of reason as a purely cognitive process. Human reason will not be contaminated by the diversity of the objects it illuminates, because it derives its evidence from its own self-reflection."⁸¹

It is no longer the self for which representation and knowledge of reality are problematized as it was in the baroque period. For the baroque writers, representation was recognized as writing which is a form of mediation between self and world in which thinking is a construction within language. It is worth quoting at length a passage from Judovitz in which the contrast between Montaigne and Descartes is vividly brought out.

In Montaigne's Essais there is no foundational difference either between the self and that which it defines as knowledge or that which is within the self. Rather, for Montaigne, difference is the effect produced on the writer by representation, by his experience of self and by worldly description. The intent of the writer as subject is modified by its texts, as an object, and becomes interchangeable with it. The representation of the self is thus inseparable from its existence as both subject and object, as science and art, and as mind and body. Descartes' attempt to define a new science whose universal principles will remain consistent and independent of the objects it is applied to will involve the elaboration of a new interpretation of representation, based on a self-inscribed difference between the subject and the world, and more impor-

⁸⁰Ibid., 44.

⁸¹Ibid.

tantly, within the subject as the mind-body opposition. However, what will be missing from the new Cartesian paradigm is the kind of meta-reflection possible in Montaigne which involves a reflection on the experiential and hence, conventional character of all interpretation. Unlike Montaigne, Descartes will be unable to reflect on the material character of his new symbolic interpretation of mathematics.⁸²

The Cartesian transcendental ego or archimedean point may also be understood as universalized reflective consciousness or thought. It is what Frege called "Thought," not the subjectivized thought which exists as your idea or mine, but that which can be judged as true or false. Whatever is capable of such determination is considered objective. Descartes' achievement, if we may call it that, was attained through an effacement of the materiality of his discourse. By eliminating the representational status of writing, writers of the classical epoch like Descartes could present us with the illusion that the mind is a mirror of nature.

Descartes is not the first to claim isomorphism between thought and the realm of the natural. We can find this same equivalence in the texts of Aristotle who claims that the natural is reflected in thought, and thus speaking and writing are derived and representational of thought which is prior to them. For Aristotle, there is also a prioritizing of speaking over writing. So as to document this claim, I have quoted Aristotle in the next indented passage:

Just as all men have not the same writing so all men have not the same speech sounds, but mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the

⁸²Ibid.

same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images.⁸³

I am not equipped to explore completely the historical antecedents of the representation of thought and nature. It may be adequate for the purposes of my discussion to say that Aristotle's equivalence of thought and nature only superficially resembles Descartes'.

Clearly the nature of Aristotle's project of observation and categorization was mainly empirical with an intention of establishing practically speaking an order among things, whereas Descartes' project sought to establish an epistemological ground of absolute certainty in a fight against a deeper problem of skepticism and hence the need for a rationalistic approach. Consider the following as support for this claim of distinction between the logical order of Descartes' discourse and that of Aristotle's.

... we assert that relatively to our knowledge single things should be taken in an order different from that in which we should regard them when considered in their more real nature. Thus, for example, if we consider a body as having extension and figure, we shall indeed admit that from the point of view of the thing itself it is one and simple. For we cannot from the point of view regard it as compounded of corporeal nature, extension and figure, since these elements have never existed in isolation from each other. But relatively to our understanding we call it a compound constructed out of these three natures, because we have thought of them separately before we were able to judge that all three were found in one and the same subject. Hence here we shall treat of things only in relation to our understanding's awareness of them, and shall call those only simple, the cognition of which is

⁸³Aristotle, "De Interpretatione," in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 40.

so clear and distinct that they cannot be analyzed by the mind into others more distinctly known. Such are figure, extension, motion, etc.; all others we conceive to be in some way compounded out of these.⁸⁴

For Descartes, without any justification of the certainty of thought, the classifications of science would be as up in the air as the theological speculations of the churchmen. The certainty to which Descartes seems to cling is, however, only the illusion of self-presence. The latter is an experience which is possible because of the representational structuring of his discourse. But this materiality of his discourse must be disavowed because Descartes is himself fearful of the net of illusion which he has carefully cast over the realm of nature.

One of the major devices which Descartes uses to construct this space of self-containment -- of the mind -- is the procedure of enumeration. Judovitz draws the following conclusions:

In Rule 12, Descartes admits that enumeration, by imposing its order, implies a new concept of representation. Enumerated representation is to be distinguished from ordinary representation of an object ... Thus, when Descartes warns his reader that his order and method of knowledge involve knowing the object in another way than when we speak of its existence, he recognizes that his theory of knowledge refers solely to the order of the mind and not to that of the world.⁸⁵

⁸⁴Rene Descartes, Rules for the Regulation of the Mind, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I, trans. E. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (London: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 40-41.

⁸⁵Judovitz, Subjectivity and Representation, 67-68.

The preceding explanation of the figurations within the text of Descartes has been extensive, but necessary for thinking about the manner in which Quine's naturalized epistemology is a deviation from the masterful discourse of Descartes. The important feature of Descartes' discourse to bear in mind because it will bear on Quine's project is the constructed nature of both the transcendental ego and the empirical self, and the different orders of representation with the subsequent variations these produce for subjectivity.

Judovitz "rather than presenting a purely philosophical interpretation of the notion of subjectivity as sketched out in the continental tradition by Husserl, Heidegger and most recently by Caton and Nancy," expands her analysis "by considering subjectivity both in terms of representation and as a representation."⁸⁶ Judovitz takes both the transcendental and empirical meanings of representation into account. Thus, Judovitz begins with the notion of subjectivity as a founding construction within the text and proceeds to analyze its philosophical and literary aspects.

Judovitz justifies her approach to Descartes by appeal to the very demands of the Cartesian text itself. According to Judovitz, "the foundation of subjectivity as a philosophical construct is inseparable from its literary representation as an autobiographical, historical and narrative entity."⁸⁷ In other words;

⁸⁶Ibid., 3.

⁸⁷Ibid.

The philosophical subject is represented according to, and derives its verisimilitude from, literary conventions. The situation that the reader faces is one in which the philosophical subject also functions as an empirical, historical, and sometimes autobiographical subject. Thus two different projects coincide in the use of the "I" in Cartesian discourse, the philosophical and the literary. This problem is further compounded by the fact that the philosophical subject is itself double: it functions both as a transcendental and an empirical entity. As a transcendental subject it serves as the condition of possibility of all other subjects. But this transcendental subject is represented in the text by the same "I" that designates all other ordinary empirical subjects. Hence, the text confronts the reader with the confusion of a special subject, the transcendental one, with all other subjects. ... This conflation (or confusion) of different "subjects" in the order of Cartesian discourse demands a simultaneous consideration of subjectivity both in terms of its strictly philosophical elaboration and its literary presentation.⁸⁸

Judovitz asks next what justification is there for her method of philosophical and literary analysis. In particular, she asks, "What makes it possible to speak about the conflation of the philosophical and literary subject?" Her answer is: "This study rests on a linguistic assumption that subjectivity does not express or refer to any intrinsic context of philosophy, literature, or rhetoric. Rather, subjectivity refers to the reality of discourse." Judovitz makes an appeal to Benveniste who believes that "it is within and as language that man constitutes himself as subject."⁸⁹ Rather than thinking of language as a tool or instrument for use by a person as agent of speaking and writing, Benveniste

⁸⁸Ibid., 3-4.

⁸⁹Ibid., 4.

determines subjectivity as something like the texture of a piece of writing or of discourse.

One of the most concerted attempts to come to grips with the issue of the linguistic determination of subjectivity has been made by V. N. Volosinov/M. Bakhtin⁹⁰ in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.⁹¹ The linguistic determination of subjectivity receives treatment by Volosinov/Bakhtin in the course of a wider program of constructing a genuinely objective psychology. This "means a psychology based on socio-logical, not physiological or biological, principles."⁹² In elaboration, Volosinov/Bakhtin stated that,

As part and parcel of that task, Marxism faces the difficult problem of finding an objective -- but also subtle and flexible -- approach to the conscious, subjective human psyche over which, ordinarily,⁹³ methods of introspection claim jurisdiction.

Neither physiology or biology are equipped to handle this task because

⁹⁰The authorship of this work has been a point of controversy. Volosinov is probably a "pseudonym" for Mikhail Bakhtin. See Tzvetan Todorov, (Chapter One) "Biography," in Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle (Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1984) for a discussion of the hypothesis that Volosinov and other names were used as pseudonyms by Bakhtin. Although Todorov presents a convincing case for the hypothesis that Bakhtin used a number of his friends' names as pseudonyms, Volosinov being a case in point, I shall follow Todorov's decision to refer to such works with disputed authorship by use of both last names. In the case of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, authorship is thus designated by Volosinov/Bakhtin.

⁹¹V.N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

⁹²Ibid., 25.

⁹³Ibid.

... the conscious psyche is a socioideological fact and, as such, beyond the scope of physiological methods or the methods of any other natural sciences. The subjective psyche is not something that can be reduced to processes occurring within the confines of the natural, animalian organism. The processes that basically define the content of the psyche occur not inside but outside the individual organism, although they involve its participation.⁹⁴

Thus, Volosinov/Bakhtin claims that the psyche is just the embodiment of the signs which ideological science provides. Without the use of signs, (for Bakhtin at least) there would be no subjectivity.

Perhaps a little refinement of this understanding would be useful. Volosinov/Bakhtin clarifies the use of the term "individual." In its biological context, the term "individual" refers to the individual organism as a natural entity. That use of the term is to be distinguished from the term "individual" used to refer to the person in his or her social context. The concept of individuality is helpful in bringing out the difference between the two terms in their respective contexts. Individuality bears on the socio-ideological understanding of existence and not on the biological existence of the organism as a member of a species. Volosinov/Bakhtin relies on a distinction between the term "natural" and the term "social" in order to establish an objective psychological basis for understanding our existence.⁹⁵

Like Sartre, Volosinov/Bakhtin rejects the sense in which consciousness can be said to contain various ideologies. Con-

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid., 34-39.

sciousness is not separate from its material basis -- the body. Consciousness applies to the subjective psyche. "The reality of the inner psyche is the same reality of the sign."⁹⁶ The subjective psyche is, for Volosinov/Bakhtin, a bridge between the natural individual organism which is representative of its species and the social individual which shares an ideological community with others. What then are we to make of signs? Volosinov/Bakhtin maintains that

Every sign, ... is a construct between socially organized persons in the process of their interaction. Therefore, the forms of signs are conditioned above all by the social organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction.⁹⁷

The subjective psyche is something of an interface between the organism and the outside environment. Notice that we have working in these quotations an oppositional structure of inner and outer. Realizing that some readers are not comfortable with such a distinction, I propose that we construe this distinction in terms of interpretive context rather than metaphorically as spatialized realms or domains. In that way we can speak of an individual's inwardness or outwardness. Inwardness is meant to refer to the quality of our experience which is influenced by our organic dispositions, and outwardness is meant to refer to the quality of our experience which is influenced by our socio-ideological membership in a specific community at a particular time and place in history.

⁹⁶Ibid., 26.

⁹⁷Ibid., 21.

These are terms which designate qualitative aspects to our experience. Thus, they are internally generated according to the context of interpretation, rather than invoked as objectifiable characteristics of some independent physical reality.

It should be easy to see from this that signs are the material out of which and in which we construct our social relations. The pattern of signs reflects the connection between a group and its individuals. The latter are social beings participating in the life of the group. The group is nothing apart from this life of interactions among its members.

An important feature of the relationship between the life of the sign and the life of the group is that as the social relations (ways of organizing; its practices) change, the forms of the signs used by the group in communicating with each other and used to constitute itself also change. Volosinov/Bakhtin is faithful to the Marxist idea that the superstructure of a particular society or social formation is determined by the socioeconomic base. For him the content of the forms of signs is also determined by a valuative process related to the socioeconomic conditions. Thus, what can be formulated in the discourse is only that which has significance for the vitality of the group at that particular moment of its existence. Of this Volosinov/Bakhtin is quite decisive.

When speaking about individual choice, he has claimed that

Individual choice under these circumstances, of course, can have no meaning at all. The sign is a creation between individuals, a creation within a social milieu. Therefore the item in question must first acquire interindividual significance, and only then can it become an object for sign formation. In other words, only that which has acquired social value can enter the world of ideology, take shape, and establish itself there.⁹⁸

Although the form and content of signs is produced by an individual speaker, it is only with the authorization of the group that a particular ideological theme may be uttered.

For Volosinov/Bakhtin, the existence of signs is not a mere reflection of the social organization of the community of speakers; it is also a refraction. This is so because the sign community is not co-extensive with one homogeneously conditioned group. The class conflict is an important factor in the struggle over signs. The thematic content of signs will be multi-accentual.

The content will show the contradictions produced by the class struggle which is in the end a clash over valuations. Not every class sees itself in the same way. Not every class will reflect the same social organization because its basis socio-economically speaking is different. It would seem valid to say that for Volosinov/Bakhtin any existing antagonisms between groups in the sense of economic classes will not only manifest in the non-verbal sphere but also in the verbal as well. This is a fundamental tenet of my own set of assumptions -- that linguistic activity serves to express the lived-experience of the speaker/writer.

⁹⁸Ibid., 22.

An important corollary to this assumption is the belief that differences in lived-experience must be articulated in a manner which is faithful to or authorized by the group to which the individual is a member. Since individuals are complex and composite of multiple subject-positions, the reflection of this complexity will also be complex and not always easily decipherable. Nonetheless there will be signs of refractions in the discourse as well.

Within the logic of Volosinov/Bakhtin's discourse, that all seems to follow neatly. But a difficulty arises from the fact that the ruling class tries to elide the differences in conditions which produce the speaking behavior of individuals who are not members of or who do not share the class interests of the rulers. The tactic of the rulers is to impose conformity on speaking and writing -- to coerce the speaker or writer to say only what is acceptable to those in power. (Read "those in power" as the controllers of the means of communication, like television, video, or print media.) This is the source of the refractions within the sign community's productions.

In addition to those fairly obvious barriers to free expression, it should be noted that a writer may also be fearful of expressing his or her views in a direct and completely honest fashion when there is reason to believe that punishment for breach of tacit or explicit guidelines of

censorship would be forthcoming.⁹⁹ Of course, it would be natural to wonder about this influence in the formation of the views of Volosinov/Bakhtin. Such speculation would take us too far a field at this moment, and we have already raised the point about disguised authorship in the case of Mikhail Bakhtin. Suffice it to say that the confessional form of analysis which I am advocating in this dissertation as a mode of reading or interpretation of philosophical writing would be applicable to the writings of Volosinov/Bakhtin in an obvious way.

We must take up again the notion that the sphere of psychic experience is somewhere between the organism and the outside world. Since it appears that the natural/social distinction is a founding one for Volosinov/Bakhtin, it behooves us to press this distinction for the possibility of a contradiction. Specifically, it may pay off looking into the ideological roots of this distinction. A way of approaching this problem is to ask about the authorization of this distinction. Upon what social organization does this sign formation rest or depend? And, what is the nature of the situation in which this distinction is made? Only partial answers are: It is part of a scientific situation. One in which the world is being theorized. For Volosinov/Bakhtin it makes sense to ask by whom is it being theorized. Whose

⁹⁹For a theory which postulates the political persecution of writers as a deterrent to full disclosure see Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).

interests does this distinction serve or whose vitality does this distinction reflect? Keeping in mind the goal of answering these questions, we should examine a couple of forms which the distinction between the natural and the social has taken.

One way of explaining the distinction between natural objects and social objects from the point of view of science would be to say that; although some sort of causal analysis can be attempted of both types of objects, human intentions will only count among the causal determinants of social objects and not of natural objects. In a recent study of structuralism,¹⁰⁰ human intentions are considered the main factor that permits us to distinguish the human (and social) sciences from the natural sciences. In addressing the reality of the objects of study of the human sciences, Professor Caws maintains that it "is relational rather than substantial."¹⁰¹

Structuralism generates a critical method that consists of inquiring into and specifying the sets of relations (or structures) that constitute these objects or into which they enter, and of identifying and analyzing groups of such objects whose members are structural transformations of one another. These groups jointly constitute the domains of the respective sciences.¹⁰²

To be sure, "Objects whose causal antecedents do include intentions continue to be governed by natural laws: social

¹⁰⁰Peter Caws, Structuralism: The Art of the Intelligible (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Humanities International Press, 1988).

¹⁰¹Ibid., 1.

¹⁰²Ibid.

objects are embodied in physical objects."¹⁰³ Since social objects are produced according to some plan enacted by human beings, these structures of intentional relations between the human agent and the object created or appropriated carry significance for those agents. As such the structures dealt with by the social sciences are called signiferous or meaning-bearing. For natural scientific purposes the intentional origins of social objects can apparently be ignored. But why should these be ignored?

As I have tried to show above, any attempt to separate the real things from our ways of representing them is hopeless. Our knowledge of the world is always and in every case mediated by the forms of symbolism which comprise the object-language in which the representations are expressed. Knowledge is always bound to a particular discourse. Scientists who embrace a naive realist position metaphysically think of themselves as interacting with real things. Under this view, we are led to believe that scientists working in laboratories or in the fields are actually in a manner of speaking getting their hands dirty.

But, we are not supposed to ask whether some of the dirt actually remains on their hands in a manner of speaking. To raise that question in the context of the metaphor of digging around or to speak from an archaeological figure may seem somewhat muddled. But, I think it is worth exploring. Any one familiar with archaeological digging knows that in the

¹⁰³Ibid.

case of searching for bones or carcasses of extinct species it makes all the difference in the world how careful one is in exhuming the remains from the surrounding area. Of course, you might say there is nonetheless a real skeleton in the ground, but what it looks like in the ground is not something we can have access to. We must remove it from the ground and in this process of removal the parts get rearranged and also something can get lost between the time of exhuming and the time of reassembling of the pieces.

I have tried to bring out (rather crudely I am afraid) with this example the idea that the method of investigation has an impact on what is found. But, in general most scientists don't like to think about the fact that their method of discovery or of inquiry has an impact on what is found. For the most part, in the physical sciences the intentions of the investigator is assumed to have little or no influence on the outcome of the research. But, I should like to submit that it is quite another thing in the social sciences where we are not dealing with anything quite as independent of our individual and subjective impressions as perhaps the physical objects of the natural sciences. If, however, you wish to stubbornly claim the same independence for intentional objects, this would mean that in uncovering the structures of human intentions, or as they are called -intentional objects, we are somehow making an exact copy of

these relations. But I do not agree with this way of understanding the activity of the social scientist.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴The following is an interesting anecdote which was written by Richard Bandler who is a mathematician and computer scientist and together with John Grinder is responsible for creating the technology for change known as Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP). I could not resist inserting it here because of its relevance to the present discussion. Despite its irreverent tone, and perhaps because of its humor, it is instructive. While addressing an audience of therapists in a training workshop in NLP Bandler said,

Most people's experience is not about reality, it's about shared reality. There are people who come to my door and give me religious comic books, and tell me the world is going to end in two weeks. They talk to angels, and they talk to God, but they're not considered crazy. But if a single person is caught talking to an angel, he is called crazy, taken to a mental hospital and stuffed full of drugs. When you make up a new reality, you'd better be sure that you get some friends to share it, or you may be in big trouble. That's one reason I teach NLP. I want to have at least a few others who share this reality, so the men in white coats don't take me away.

Physicists also have a shared reality. Other than that, there isn't really a lot of difference between being a physicist and being a schizophrenic. Physicists also talk about things you can't see. How many of you have seen an atom, let alone a sub-atomic particle? There is a difference: physicists are usually tentative about their hallucinations, which they call "models" or "theories." When one of their hallucinations is challenged by new data, physicists are a tiny bit more willing to give up their old ideas.

Most of you learned a model of the atom that said there is a nucleus made up of protons and neutrons, with electrons flying around the outside like little planets. Niels Bohr got the Nobel prize for that description back in the 1920's. Over a period of about 50 years that model was the basis for an immense number of discoveries and inventions, such as the plastic in those naugahyde chairs you're sitting on.

Fairly recently, physicists decided that Bohr's description of the atom is wrong. I wondered if they were going to take back his Nobel prize, but then I found out Bohr is dead, and he already spent the money. The really amazing thing is that all

In order to remain relevant to my criticism of Quine, let me say that the above description of structuralism, although not exactly burdened by the positivistic or behavioristic requirements to which Quine seems to want to remain faithful, is admittedly open to and comfortable with an eventual reduction to an explanation of the hard wiring of the nervous system. Included in the neurophysiological explanation is the possible embodiment of the structure of subjectivity as well. Thus, ultimate reduction to physical correlates, although not necessary for the life of structuralism, is very much compatible with it. The physicalism of Quine is then a possible stage at which the connections between the various levels of transformations may terminate. And so, we can use

the discoveries that were made by using a "wrong" model are still here. The Naugahyde chairs didn't disappear when physicists changed their minds. Physics is usually presented as a very "objective" science, but I notice that physics changes and the world stays the same, so there must be something subjective about physics.

Einstein was one of my childhood heroes. He reduced physics to what psychologists called a "guided fantasy," but which Einstein referred to as a "thought experiment." He visualized what it would be like to ride on the end of a beam of light. And people say that he was academic and objective! One of the results of this particular thought experiment was his famous theory of relativity.

NLP differs only in that we deliberately make up lies, in order to try to understand the subjective experience of a human being. When you study subjectivity, there's no use trying to be objective.

From Richard Bandler, Using Your Brain for a Change, ed. by Connirae Andreas & Steve Andreas, (Moab, UT: The Real People Press, 1985), 18-19.

the discourse of structuralism as a valid framework within which we can correlate the work of social scientists and of physical scientists.

Under the interpretation of structuralism which we have assumed in this section, the only difference between the goals of the social and physical scientists is that the explanation of the structural transformations of the social scientists will be relational rather than substantial. That is because the intentional objects of social scientific study are signiferous, whereas the physical objects are non-signiferous.

We can see that a fundamental distinction operating in these theoretical domains, or perhaps I should say a distinction responsible for the existence of the domains of physicality and sociality in our discourse, is one which enacts an opposition between the linguistic and non-linguistic. The linguistic is elaborated as social, and the non-linguistic is elaborated as natural. It would follow that semiosis is a process which generates the structures of intentional objects (social relations), but not one which generates the substantial objects of physical reality. Although the semiotic process would determine the alterations in physical objects once the human being crafted and transformed these natural or pre-existing social things into objects for social use, the physical things are somewhat freer or independent of the intentions. As the author of the work from which this view of structuralism has said, "... for natural scientific purposes

their intentional origins can be ignored."¹⁰⁵ I think that ignoring these intentional origins is not innocent.

* * * * *

Earlier I set up the essay as the prime candidate for philosophical writing. The parameters of the essay included the poles of subjectivity and objectivity; both are needed in order to understand and locate the various approach-es to writing. Quine winds up on this spectrum nearest the pole of objectivity. The purpose for which Quine undertakes his discourse is to establish an objective framework in which ontological disputes may be resolved. The logical calculus is the framework Quine develops and uses in achieving this end. He attempts to set up an independent, unbiased method for deciding what ontological commitments a theory requires one to accept.

For Quine, the vantage point is no longer some metaphysical border which is extruded by the textualization of the world as it was for Descartes, but is instead a point from which to determine or found truth in the arena of intersubjectivity. The latter arena is elaborated as the theoretical position of common sense in which truth is what we can agree on. Superficially, there would seem to be no objection to this way of construing things. However, in sticking to a description of the roots of reference -- how a speaker of a language acquires his capacity to express things in words -- Quine runs into trouble. The difficulty is that he rejects

¹⁰⁵Caws, Structuralism, 1.

the subjective study of the psyche and specializes in what Volosinov/Bakhtin have called ideological science.

There are four planes along which this conception of philosophical and scientific practice could be attacked: One is to criticize the stimulus-response analysis of intentional structures. This would involve showing that the definition of the response (parameters of measurement of the targeted response class) is not really the same as the activity which is happening in the experimental situation. A second plane of criticism would involve showing that Quine deviates from Dewey's conception of the situation of inquiry is similar to the first. This is the criticism made by Stanley Aronowitz of Quine and analytic philosophy of science.¹⁰⁶ The third plane of attack would be to show that there is not a causal connection between the speaker's utterance and the receiver's understanding. It is incorrect to think that some physical transformation is taking place from the mouth of the speaker to the ear and brain of the listener. This is the criticism of analytic philosophy's theory of meaning which is made by Morse Peckham.¹⁰⁷ It is not really causal, but normative. The meaning of an utterance is the response which a listener makes in relation to it. The fourth criticism would involve showing that Quine's approach falls within either of the two trends which Volosinov/ Bakhtin used to characterized investigations in philosophy of language. The first is called individualis-

¹⁰⁶Aronowitz, Science as Power, 244-271.

¹⁰⁷Peckham, Explanation and Power, 1-87.

tic subjectivism and the second is called abstract objectivism. According to Volosinov/Bakhtin neither of these trends is adequate for a philosophy of language. The kind of thinking which Quine's philosophy of language exhibits would fall within the second category.

However my strongest criticism of Quine which I have developed in the course of this lengthy chapter is that his scientization of philosophical discourse ignores the manner in which the act of writing constructs subjectivity. The image to keep clearly in mind is: As the act of writing unfolds, the triangle of relations between philosopher, text and world is being constructed holistically. This is to say that the context of inquiry is comprised of three elements - - philosopher, text, and world. The three elements are not to be understood separately, but as completely interdependent. If a change occurs in one element, the entire arrangement of relations is "redetermined." The Wittgensteinian notion of "states of affairs" is definitely ruled out in this context because the elements are conceived of as interdependent and not as is the case with a "state of affairs" conception as independent facts. Under the positivistic Wittgensteinian construal, the self, the text, and the world would be given independent descriptions corresponding to independent states that each might be said to be in at any given time. Or in other words, a change in the truth conditions pertaining to one state of affairs would not alter the truth conditions of either of the other two states of affairs. The world in which

the philosopher lives and writes is not a world independent of his subjective composition. It is a world perceived, and as such it is a world which is imaginatively constructed. The text is a central point or intermediary between philosopher and world. The act of writing may be conceived of as a textualization of the subjective and objective elements. The former element is the philosopher who writes, and the latter element is the world in which the text is created, received, and understood.

In Quine's determination to persuade his readers that philosophy and science are continuous, he in effect shifts our focus away from the construction of the entire field of discourse. It should be recognized that Quine only joins the field of experience and the field of theorization at the margins of theoretical discourse. The line of connection within the field of discourse is along the trenches of observation sentences. Having rejected the empiricist dogma of an isomorphic representation of perceptions in language, Quine is free to construct his physical objects and classes of such constructions in the same manner that Homer created his gods. Quine rejects the myth of the given, but embraces his own myth of physical objects. He feels justified in this move because theoretically speaking his ontology meets the criterion of simplicity. Thus, although Quine still pays homage to the notion of experience, (falling neatly into the division between physics and psychology, just as Titchener had carried over from Mach), he prefers to embark on a journey of

discovery in which physics is the ultimate judge of the things which can be noticed and legitimately treated.

Under Quine's slight of hand, common sense becomes a theoretical construction just as the objects of physical science proper are constructions.¹⁰⁸ In this respect, Quine has transformed the field of investigation into one of pure discourse. However, the pragmatic aspects of discourse -- its practical nature -- is ignored. The entire concept of agency is erased from the field of discourse. It is not people as scientists who utter the myths, but the mythological itself which constitutes the practices of scientific philosophy and of science itself. The way in which this is accomplished is the theorization of common sense.

By erasing the subjective nature of experience, Quine reduces the field of inquiry to include only those objects which can be intersubjectively agreed upon. Thus, common sense begins to act in a hegemonic fashion as the masterful discourse spoken by no one but dominating the subjectivity of every member of the group. A scientific frame in which things are reported according to their factual nature, independently of the experiencing-person, is accomplished at the expense of subjectivity. Odd it is, since the entire field of discourse was constructed on the basis of those very subjects which in the end have been conveniently erased.

¹⁰⁸For an analysis of the constructed status of the scientific object see Marx W. Wartofsky, "Three Stages of Constitution: Historical Changes in the Ontological Status of the Scientific Object," unpublished paper read at the Boston University Colloquium on the Philosophy of Science in 1989.

But, it is foolish to think that subjectivity could really be erased. Consider the historical way in which science came into being. Although origins is not always significant in producing understanding of phenomena because the birth of a phenomenon is not the whole story of its existence, in the case being examined here, it is significant. By way of brief reminder, before the invention of science with its experimental method, truth was understood as revealed to human beings by God.

It is instructive to reflect on the days before the establishment of juridical proceedings. Decisions about guilt or innocence were derived from interpreting the outcome of a duel. The concerned parties of a dispute were asked to engage in combat in order to determine by divine revelation which was guilty and which innocent. The party who was guilty would be cast down in the duel by virtue of being unprotected by God. God in his benevolence would not allow the innocent to suffer in this contest of right and wrong or good and evil.

With the change from truth as revelation to truth as discovered by reason which occurred during the Renaissance, two other significant changes also happened. (1) The judicial process was transformed to the court-type arrangement in which a judge had to decide based upon testimony and evidence who was guilty. (2) The scientific method was created and canonically entombed. The turn from truth by revelation to truth by reason was a great transformation of group life which began and continued throughout the middle-ages approximately

during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The formation of the scientific canon can be seen as a culmination of the shift from group conformity to subjectivized existence.

Most medievalists attribute or rather mark the inception of subjectivity within discourse to the shift in referentiality of the indexical pronoun "I" found in poetry.

In his excellent study Medieval French Literature and Law, the American medievalist Howard Bloch observes that the recognition of subjectivity begins in the twelfth century and manifests itself over a large spectrum of areas of activity: "the writings of monastic reformers; the revival of Classical Studies; renewed interest in letter writing and autobiography; the personalization of portraiture and sculpture; altered notions of intention, sin, and penance; the popularity of personal (mystical) religious experience; the appearance of the singular heroes of late epic and satirical forms;...the valorization of the individual within the courtly novel and lyric."¹⁰⁹

It is significant that what started out as a reform to eliminate the religious domination of one group over the individual should turn out in recent times to again serve the interests of hegemony. Quine's proposal to naturalize epistemology is a fitting example of a secular approach turned hegemonic.

A corollary of the claim that subjectivity is determined by the very process of writing is the idea that writing within the constraints of different genres produces different kinds of subjects. Adherence to the canonical dictates of science will no doubt create a particular kind of experience for the writer. It will determine to a large extent the philosopher's

¹⁰⁹Cited in Luiz Costa Lima, The Control of the Imaginary: Reason and Imagination in Modern Times (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 5.

subjectivity. By erasing the subject in relation to the production of scientific discourse, the effects of this kind of determination can be ignored, although I think not without deleterious consequences for the subjectivity of both readers and writers.

-- Chapter 4 --

THE EMPLOTMENT OF SARTRE IN THE CONTEMPORARY
SCENE OF WRITING PHILOSOPHY

Situating Sartre in the contemporary scene of writing philosophy may seem like an odd thing to do; after all his life spanned the better part of this century (from June 21, 1905 the date of his birth until March 1980 when he died). What need could there be for inserting a contemporary figure within the current frame of philosophical history? Considering the fact that academic philosophers have for the most part ignored him, it becomes something of a dramatic event to call upon Sartre to perform the heroic task of rescuing contemporary academic philosophy from its own "self-mutilation." Although the latter term is definitely strong, it is not an exaggeration from where I stand.

In a recent publication of the first authorized biography of Sartre, John Gerassi¹ notes that Sartre was not entirely popular in his own homeland. Although Sartre was attacked viciously for the critical positions he had taken with respect to religious issues and political events in France, "none of these attacks stopped French students from reading Sartre, and as they did, his reputation and influence grew."² Unfortunately, this was not the case in the Anglo-Saxon world, where "His

¹John Gerassi, Jean-Paul Sartre: Hated Conscience of His Century, Vol. 1 Protestant or Protester? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

²Ibid., 33.

plays were rarely performed, his novels scarcely read, his philosophy almost totally ignored."³ According to Gerassi, the reason for this was,

Dominated by logical positivists and empiricists, Anglo-Saxon university philosophy departments have long been reluctant to take seriously any epistemology or ontology, much less Sartre's, which is based on phenomenological descriptions of reality. A.J. Ayer, for example, dismissed all of existentialism as "an exercise in the art of misusing the verb to be." But then Ayer, like his analytical colleagues, limited the task of philosophy to analyzing the language of propositions and held that it "must be content to record the facts of scientific procedure." ... Similarly, both Iris Murdoch and Mary Warnock belittle Sartre for not playing the game the way they do, that is, for not using logic as a philosophical method relying instead on meticulous descriptions of events, states, conditions, and relations. Warnock, who dismissed Sartre as "not an original thinker," objected to what was a proof for Sartre, namely "a description so clear and vivid that, when I think of this description and fit it to my own case, I cannot fail to see its application."⁴

But that was not all or the end of the criticism:

What bothered Ayer, Nagel, Russell, Murdoch, Warnock, and others about Sartre's approach -- indeed about any approach which began with the "I" situated in the world -- is that it risked defining truth according to its human relevance, which is precisely how Sartre defined it. In other words, the approach transformed the so-called dichotomy between object and subject into a dialectic in which each had its own being, yet the two were inseparable -- exactly what Sartre hoped to show (not prove) through phenomenological descriptions. For Anglo-Saxons who want to uphold the purity of "objectivity," this method is very dangerous because it may lead to interpreting speeches, events, indeed all of history, according to class interest. The conclusion may well be -- and Sartre emphatically thought so -- that for all their liberal, even perhaps socialist pronouncements, such intellectuals as Ayer, Warnock, and others are part and parcel of

³Ibid., 32.

⁴Ibid., 32.

the bourgeois state and their work ultimately defends that state.⁵

For now, I shall leave it up to the reader to decide where her or his sympathies lie. I don't think that anything additional needs to be said about the antagonism toward Sartre's work by Anglo-Saxon philosophers.

Because of the lack of reception of Sartre by Anglo-Saxon philosophy departments, I have devoted a lot of pages in the present dissertation to considering the relevance of Sartre to the dissertation problematic. In fact, the argumentation concerning the problem of a discourse on the self is strategic in demanding the work of Sartre as a condition of satisfactorily answering the question: How is a discourse on the self possible? In other words, a plausible defence of the thesis about the act of writing necessitates the "emplotment" of Sartre in the contemporary scene of writing philosophy.

Besides that, other reasons for the emplotment of Sartre in this scene were: (1) that Sartre above all else embraced the thematic of the relation between the individual and the collective consistently in his life's writings; (2) that Sartre has light to shed upon the function of the writer in society; and (3) that he considers the writer's relation to language. These reasons will be clarified and applied to the problem of self-discourse below.

It was suggested above that Sartre can be a hero to us now. The reason Sartre can serve as a hero is that he did not

⁵Ibid., 32-33.

write within the confines of the professionalized discourse of which the journal article is the example par excellence. The high regard for the journal article stems from the scientific canon which governs the disciplined discourse of academic philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition.

Sartre can be used to criticize the latter philosophical project which attempts to scientize our subjectivity out of its realm. The scientific project of contemporary philosophy and in particular the structuralist program as an offshoot of that project (whose basic ideal is representing the structure of the world in mathematically rigorous language) is a bankrupt proposal. Continuation in the structuralist train of thought prevents the attainment of real intellectual status as Sartre has defined it. According to Sartre, the philosopher qua scientist who ignores the self-conscious examination of his own style and consequently the motivational structure of his own psyche, is merely a theoretician of practical knowledge. S/he is not a true intellectual, even though s/he uses her or his intellect.

Sartre as a champion of the cause of freedom is the only major philosophical figure who has written today with the awareness of his vocation's responsibility. This is why I have suggested that we turn to Sartre now. It is to Sartre that we must turn in order to extricate ourselves from the form of life which perpetuates narrow self-interest which as I understand it isn't even in our own best interests. By best interests, I mean those which promote our individuation and preserve our integrity.

In the introduction (chapter 1), the problematic which is posed by the question to which this dissertation is addressed was articulated in three different ways. The first form of the dilemma was stated as follows: Is a self-referential discourse possible? Does discourse reveal, or cover up (distract from, look aside from) the self? This form of the dilemma is essentially the same as the problem that Jean-Paul Sartre took up in his philosophical novel La Nausee.⁶ Rhiannon Goldthorpe succinctly captures the Sartrean form of the problem in a section of her Sartre: Literature & Theory⁷ where she discusses writing and meaning. She maintains that,

La Nausee dramatizes "la plus concrete des experiences" -- whether the experience is of the "absolu non-substantial" of consciousness, or of its "relative" dependence on the en-soi. But thematically there is much to suggest that such experiences and their ambiguity escape not only translation into analytic modes of language but writing itself. Paraphrase, or exegesis in terms of a theoretical equivalent, leaves a central question: does the act of writing, whether theoretical or fictional and metaphorical, modify rather than formulate the original experience, and, if so, by what yardstick can the modification be measured? Can the experience, and a fortiori its meaning, ever be fully recoverable, or does the written word, like Roquentin's Jardin public, simply point towards an inaccessible "drole de petit sens"? Experience and meaning may be doomed to remain respectively en deca and au dela, outside the reach of writing's unhappy medium.⁸

If the dilemma is taken in the form which Ms. Goldthorpe

⁶Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions, 1959).

⁷Rhiannon Goldthorpe, Sartre: Literature & Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

⁸Ibid., 38.

describes it, I am afraid it is unresolvable. The ontological relationship between subject and object is collapsed into a relation of consciousness and its contents.

According to Sartre (and Brentano and Husserl), consciousness is always of something. The ontological quality of objects or things is that of Being and the quality of subjectivity or consciousness is that of Nothingness or Non-Being. The contents of consciousness are said to be objects in the world. The consciousness of the subject is always a reflection of the world through the mediation of the body.

If we are to take our understanding of Sartre from Ms. Goldthorpe, then the model of the mind as the relationship between consciousness and its contents is basically a Cartesian one in which the mind is a thinking thing "made" of mental substance which is problematically related to the body and other physical objects which are made of matter, a different kind of substance from the mental.

This model of the mind is elaborated and discussed in "The Subject in Sartre and Elsewhere,"⁹ in which Peter Caws claims that the mind has the additional power or operation of being able to alter the arrangement of the contents which are direct reflections of the world. The world functions as the standard of reality. Truth is, in this sense, correspondence between the contents which are state descriptions of a particular matrix of thought and the state of affairs which exists

⁹Peter Caws, "The Subject in Sartre and Elsewhere," in Descriptions, ed. Don Ihde & Hugh Silverman, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1985), 141-151.

among things in the material world. The added operation mind possesses under Mr. Caws interpretation is imagination.

It's as if the contents of consciousness are parts of a puzzle which can be re-arranged into variations on the state of affairs that are derived by some sensory act and exist in the world. According to this model, perception is a derivative function of the interaction of the immediately given sensory input and the work of the imagination. This model of mind is quite compatible with the work being done in the field of artificial intelligence.

The field of artificial intelligence is part of a larger movement to institute a program of research known as cognitive science. Today this branch of science threatens to divert the attention of talented individuals into the working out of the technical details to the metaphor of the mind as machine, specifically a computer. To my sensibility this is a danger because the capitalist program seems to want to fully automatize all productive operations. And so, I think that a good dose of Sartre's existentialism would be proper for restoring a more sober image of what it means to be human. This is my reason for restoring Sartre to the contemporary scene of writing philosophy.

The work of Sartre is important on two counts. The first is that a major and central Sartrean theme is the relationship between the individual and society (the group or collective). The antinomy between the individual and the collective has bearing upon the question to which this dissertation is addressed. The problem of diverging from group orthodoxy was

especially powerful in Sartre's experience. In asking, "How is a discourse on the self possible?" we are raising the question as to the control or power which the group has or may exercise over the individual's capacity for self-expression. The second reason for considering Sartre's work is that he dealt rather self-consciously with two themes: (1) the function of the writer in society and (2) the writer's relationship to language.

As a writer of plays, novels, intellectual or existential psycho-analytic biographies of other writers, (personal) journals, and philosophical treatises, Sartre has had ample opportunity to reflect upon his craft as a writer. Throughout the entire course of his life which spanned some eighty years he entertained the question of the writer's function in society. In addition to his published works, there are transcripts¹⁰ of interviews in which Sartre has discussed that function. Although these were by no means as constant a pre-occupation of Sartre as the relationship between the individual and society, both of these more narrow and related themes most certainly capture the specific way in which Sartre's existed as an individual in his society. In addition they are pertinent to the understanding and defence of the thesis about the act of writing philosophy as a mode of discourse on the self and as confessional.

It would be fair to say that we find in Sartre a consis-

¹⁰These interviews were conducted by John Gerassi and serve as the basis for the authorized biography entitled, Jean-Paul Sartre: Hated Conscience of His Century Vol. 1 Protestant or Protester? (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989).

tent attitude toward the role of the writer. That attitude was expressed by Sartre in What is Literature?¹¹ and in an interview with Pierre Verstraeten.¹² In the early book and in the late interview, Sartre took a reflective and critical stance toward his own vocation as a writer. No one could deny that writing was his predominant form of self-expression. Even during his last years, which he lived in total blindness, Sartre continued to write with the help of a collaborator. This brief discussion of the centrality of writing to the life of Sartre should serve to underscore the second reason for concerning ourselves with Sartre's work. On that count, the themes of (1) the function of the writer in society, and (2) the writer's relationship to language are directly on target with respect to the issues raised by the thesis about the act of writing.

From these remarks alone, it may not be obvious how extremely relevant the work of Sartre is to the problematic and the thesis of the present dissertation. To the unconvinced or uninitiated (that is to say, to those whose interests lie elsewhere than in the Continental tradition of philosophy) a more convincing case should be made. A reader of (if not a believer in) the Continental tradition of philosophy to which Sartre's work belongs would find sufficient reason for considering his work. However, in defending a thesis the argument

¹¹(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965).

¹²Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Writer and his Language (An interview with Pierre Verstraeten)," in Politics and Literature, trans. J.A. Underwood & John Calder (London: Calder & Boyars, 1973), 77-125.

should be directed at the most difficult audience -- the least convinced.

The reader may recall William James has distinguished among philosophers and thinkers two types of temperament: one "tough-minded" and the other "tender-minded." For James the differences between these two types explained (or perhaps elaborated from another perspective) the clash over the status of universals among philosophers who were either realists or nominalists. I don't think that James' categories are particularly helpful in understanding the divisiveness and antagonism which exists among philosophers from different traditions. A deeper examination needs to be made in order to understand the separation between the Anglo-American and Continental traditions in contemporary philosophy.

WHY THE EARLY SARTRE?

It may be apparent to the reader why Sartre is my starting point. Nevertheless there is a pressing reason for trying to limit how much of Sartre's writing must be considered relevant to the defence of the thesis about the act of writing. It is not a comforting thought to anticipate having to comb through the entire corpus of his writings. No matter how fond of his work the researcher might be, such a task is indeed daunting. Besides, the sheer voluminousness of his writings prohibits their full consideration for a dissertation undertaking, especially when the thesis problem and its scope are already broad and complex. Thus, it is deemed desirable to select a few texts for study.

I should hasten to add that even if we were to use the entire published writings of Sartre, we should not find all that is needed by way of argument for the defence of the thesis. Nonetheless, Sartre is a better starting point than any other. Part of the defence of the thesis it should be recalled involves showing that the nature of the act of writing is both subjective and political (All writing is by nature subjective and political). In Sartre's work we find (1) great pessimism concerning the possibility of a discourse on the self, and (2) much support for thinking of the philosopher and writer of prose as necessarily an engaged or committed activist. In determining that the act of writing is subjective, Sartre will be of great help because as a writer he explored this aspect of existence. Sartre almost to an obsession explored the

question of the significance of writing as an activity in La Nausee. The main character, Roquentin, reaches and resolves an existential crisis over the meaningfulness of his activity of biography construction in that philosophical novel. Also, in resolving the personal crisis Roquentin shows the reader that writing is political as well as subjective. It is political not just in the sense that all actions have consequences for how power gets distributed among individuals, but in the sense that an act which is freeing or liberating of one's consciousness also empowers that individual so s/he has more potential for future actions.

Additionally by considering Sartre's work, we gain a chance to explore the dilemma in its most negative form. Except perhaps for David Hume, I should venture to say that no other philosopher was as tough-minded about the view taken toward the self as Sartre. We gain as well an opportunity to discuss the political nature of philosophical writing. These concerns about the subjective and political nature of the act of writing supply us with a way of circumscribing Sartre's texts such that a manageable portion of his corpus becomes available for consideration.

We may confine ourselves to consideration of the early work of Jean-Paul Sartre for a reason which was already mentioned above--the prohibitive nature of the voluminousness of his writings. Another reason for limiting our study to the early work is that with regard to Sartre's attitude toward the craft of a writer, a consistency is found throughout the early and late work. A statement of that attitude is found in What

is Literature? and we will have occasion to consider it carefully in chapter 6. But, in addition to what has already been mentioned, something needs to be said about why the early work is sufficient for dealing with the problematic relationship of the individual and society.

Sartre's work contains much material that has bearing upon the question to which this dissertation is addressed and the thesis which is defended as an answer to that question. Perhaps that is obvious, since the problematic which runs like a seam through the fabric of Sartre's work, both early and late, is his concern with the relationship between the individual and society. Since only the early period will be used in our study, something should be said about why I have chosen to ignore the late period which includes Critique of Dialectical Reason¹³ and a number of other existential biographical analyses of bourgeois literary figures. In the following paragraphs a rationale for this is offered.

In attempting to justify the appeal to the early work, it should be made clear at what point Sartre's work has been divided. It has perhaps become customary for warring philosophical factions to divide an opus into early and late periods when the character of only part of an author's writing suits the inclinations or purposes of the claiming faction. Although there is no contention over anything within Sartre's philosophy, the aspect about warring factions also applies to

¹³Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, "I: Theory of Practical Ensembles," trans. Alan Sheridan and ed. Jonathan Ree (New York and London: Verso, 1982).

the present conditions in which the dissertation was written. There is a combatant attitude which prevails between the Anglo-Saxon tradition and the Continental tradition. But, as it was noted above in chapter 3, Sartre is no brethren of the Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophical school.

However, the customary division between early and late can be applied in the present situation because in the early work we find sufficient material to confront the two issues mentioned above -- (1) the problematic or dilemma in its Sartrean form concerning subjectivity, and (2) the political nature of philosophical writing. In so far as justifying the split between an early and a late period according to warring factions within the interpretation or understanding of Sartrean philosophy, we find no such divisiveness with Sartrean sympathizers.

We need not look for warring factions; Sartre himself has acknowledged a change in the character of his work. He has set this point at the age of 40 and roughly after the Second World War. The mid-point at which Sartre's work has been divided into early and late periods corresponds roughly with the writing of Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr.¹⁴ This text is considered a product of a transition period between the early and late writings. It is also a text of major importance in understanding the gay perspective on the problematic of a discourse on the self. When it is time I shall introduce the case of Jean Genet as an example of a concrete individual

¹⁴Jean-Paul Sartre, Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr, trans. George Braziller (New York: New American Library, 1971).

faced with alienation from the society in which his authorial self was shaped. As a part of Sartre's opus and specifically as a transitional work, I shall show how we can understand the impact of Genet's case on Sartre's own development as a writer and individual in society. But before we can address any of these aforementioned issues, we should return to the problem at hand which was to justify the use of the early period and to explain the rationale for dividing Sartre's writing and life into an early and late period. So far we have seen that Sartre himself admits a change in the character of his work.

What realization did Sartre have which could explain the division of his work? Professor Caws supplies us with an answer to this question; he has remarked that after the age of forty Sartre realized that he was "just anybody." This realization was preceded by Sartre's discovery that one is an object for another subject. A consequence of such a discovery is that "one's own subjectivity makes no contribution whatever to the character of that object; as far as the other is concerned, one might be just anybody, even a robot or a mannequin."¹⁵ Sartre's realization and acceptance of this consequence "represents the emergence of the existential subject from its quasi-solipsistic isolation."¹⁶ This is the turning point which marks the early and late Sartre. If you like, early and late can be dubbed existentialist and Marxist respectively. In Sartre's words, "It was then . . . that I

¹⁵Ibid., 97.

¹⁶Ibid.

abandoned my prewar individualism and the idea of the pure individual and adopted the social individual and socialism."¹⁷ It cannot be said that with the advent of this turning point Sartre has provided a better refutation of solipsism. Sartre did not want a proof of the existence of the other. According to Professor Caws,

... solipsism is to be rejected not because its absurdity or impossibility can be demonstrated, but because the Other has his own grounding in his own being, an independent cogito.¹⁸

For Sartre, it is not a problem of finding reasons for the existence of others, "but of the Other himself as not being me."

In the Sartrean ontology of the individual, consciousness has a component which Sartre calls "for-others." This component is reflective of the attitude that we can take up with respect to others. In Sartre's play, "No Exit," there is a line in which Garcin says that "Hell is other people." This line pretty much characterizes Sartre's concern to defend subjectivity in his early work. Subjectivity is the condition of consciousness of the pure individual as totally free; we are free because we are undetermined. Consciousness was free of any particular facticity.

This was not true for "things" which Sartre claimed inhabited the realm of Being. Attributed to consciousness was a quality of "nothingness," and hence it was assigned to the realm of Non-Being. Even in the early Sartre emphasis is

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Caws, Sartre, 98.

placed upon the materiality of the world. The materiality of the world necessitates the taking up of a particular facticity by consciousness. In the early period, consciousness must choose a past as part of its present situation.

The irony in consciousness's freedom is that it is condemned to choose. If an individual refuses to act, he is in his refusal choosing a particular facticity. We are never so free as being capable of escaping the consequences of our actions, whether we change or remain static in our activity. This necessity is what Sartre means by facticity. The facticity of our consciousness is that we can actively change the materiality of our present situation, however, we can never escape materiality. There will always be a something of which consciousness is aware; it is up to us to choose what the something will be for us -- what it means in relation the major projects. In the end Sartre is Kantian in that, both consciousness as "in-itself" and the material world as "in-itself" are unknowable.

The "for-others," mentioned above, which was the attitude of consciousness to other people may be thought of in Jungian terms as the "persona" or mask. In Jungian analytical psychology, the persona is the collectively determined facade which we present to others. The "persona" or the Sartrean "for-others" would be the roles in which we are socially conditioned to become absorbed. It may be considered as an individual's social identity.

Although this comparison to Jung is helpful in understanding the collectively determined nature of our conscious-

ness as Sartre intended it, it is misleading or false to suggest that Sartre's "for-others" is the same as Jung's mask or persona. In the full Jungian sense, they are not identical. For Jung, the psyche has an objective reality just as the material world has. In Jung there is a dualism of psyche and physical world. The psyche has a subjective and an objective component which Jung called respectively a personal unconscious and a collective unconscious. The latter is impersonal and transpersonal, meaning it is a component common to the psyche of all individuals. In Sartre consciousness has no contents; It is empty; it contains nothing; It is very much like a window on the world.

The attitudes which consciousness takes up toward the world can be understood as variations on what is assumed about the character of the situation we choose for our selves. Although Sartre has a materialist focus throughout his entire career as a writer he never claims that we experience the physical world as such -- as material. It is just an hypothesis which assumes some sort of framework in which to construct the human situation. I don't think we can ever prove the materialist assumption as correct. To my mind all the genuflecting in front of a physical world is a substitute for the belief in God. The material world serves as a standard of truth which God served for the faithful. An example of this use of God to justify other beliefs about our bodies, material objects, and the sciences is, of course, Descartes's philosophy. In place of God the atheist or agnostic must turn to a substitute guarantor of truth. When

not justified by the existence of God, truth becomes a relation of correspondence between belief and an external and mind-independent physical reality. In the case of Sartre, everything about his world is a world touched by human assumptions; it is never experienced as a pure "thing" but always as something for us; consciousness is always of something.

In the early work of Sartre we find material about consciousness and subjectivity which is useful in the defense of my thesis which requires that an approach be taken toward philosophy which is more psychological than usual for contemporary philosophical writers. It is in the early Sartre that we find a conception of philosophy which is synonymous with psychology. Some of the early works that we shall draw from are: The Psychology of Imagination; The Transcendence of the Ego; and Being and Nothingness.¹⁹ In the last work mentioned, we find a discussion and defense of Sartre's own method of analysis -- namely, Existential Psychoanalysis. Sartre defends his form of analysis as a method for studying "Man." This method constructs and uses psychological categories.

For Sartre, philosophy must be a discourse which creates and destroys concepts in order to constantly address or re-address the problem of what man is. From this, it is implied that of man there can be no knowledge. Man is a form of life

¹⁹Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination (Secaucus, NJ: The Citadel Press, 1972); The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: The Noonday Press, 1957); Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966).

which can constantly renew himself. For Sartre, man cannot be an object of scientific study. His reason is that it is wrong (to try) to objectify man. Science objectifies the things that it studies in order to produce knowledge in the form of essences. Man according to one of the themes of existentialism is a non-being whose existence precedes his essence. As perhaps one of the fundamental tenets of Sartre's existentialism, it is a violation of man to objectify him. It would seem that this must be a moral wrong rather than a conceptual wrong, unless Sartre is arguing that man's essence is one of plasticity and non-objectness. In light of Sartre's definition of consciousness as a reflective or perspectival directedness toward the world, in itself empty of any contents in order for it to be free to view the world as it truly is, we would not expect to find any attribution of essence to consciousness. Any contents would probably disguise the world, or as it were cloud up the window which consciousness is supposed to provide us with respect to the world. Even language is supposed to be transparent. At least it is in the writing of prose. More will be said on this later.

In following up this line of thought about the emptiness of consciousness, we can understand Sartre's choice of existential psychoanalysis over Freudian psychoanalysis in the study of man. Freud's approach is deterministic. Freud as a trained neurologist used what methods he had most ready to hand. Those methods are scientific or at least derivatively so. Freud always adheres to a biological definition of man as an animal. Man is nothing more than a biologically determined

animal. Freud chose to analyze man in terms of his instincts -- forces that spring into our psychic life because of our biological predispositions.

Sartre denies the applicability of such deterministic analysis. In Sartre's view man is essentially free to choose his own existence. Given the conditions of war time France, I wonder whether Sartre had much freedom with respect to his existence. It is more likely that Sartre's extreme individualism was a revolt against the condition of the world in which he found his consciousness thrown. In fact, I wonder why Sartre didn't himself draw such an inference. It is completely in keeping with his notion that consciousness is always of something, and whatever that something is, it serves as a facticity to condition the consciousness of an individual. I shall argue later that in Sartre we find an example of a consciousness whose force is a Nietzschean will to power struggling to assert itself in the midst of the overbearing group or collective unconscious. But before doing that we must lay some preparatory ground on which to place those ideas. Toward that end I turn to a discussion of the function of the writer in society.

-- Chapter 5 --

WRITING THE DISCIPLINE AND DISCIPLINING THE WRITER

In our present age of academic philosophy, it has become increasingly difficult to find a person who deserves the honorific title of Renaissance scholar. In the past, when the literature in philosophy was not so bountiful, it was possible to find individuals who had read everything. The rarity of such individuals today may be attributed to the unwieldy reams of pages which are printed and published as books and journals by the many specialists in the numerous sub-fields of philosophy. It is nearly impossible for any individual to achieve competence in the broad sense of being a Renaissance scholar. I should venture to say that many philosophers find it hard keeping abreast of the output in their own specialization.

Tremendous strides have seemingly been made in the area of knowledge gathering; so much so that our age has become obsessed with the image of philosophy as an activity of discovering knowledge and with the image of the philosopher qua scientist. In an age convinced of the necessity of specialization, it is nearly impossible to attract the attention, let alone to seduce the interests, of those whose specialty seemingly does not touch upon the borders of the fields in which your ideas are cultivated. In short where there is no overlap between subject matters, how can demands for attention, or claims upon the time of another, be made

without sounding self-inflated about the importance of one's own ideas? This question was one with which Sartre wrestled in a section of What is Literature? entitled "For whom does one write." More on his answer later.

Oddly in an age when cultural relativism is constantly shot down for its self-refuting flaw, some philosophers continue to justify their intellectual myopia by appeals to expediency. The oddity, as I understand it, is that the criticism of relativism for its threat to universality and generality which philosophers have grown accustomed to might as well be applied to the critics themselves for their own narrow interests and scope of competence.

Just short of outright dismissal with words like, "I'm not into that," specialists continue to bury themselves in a literature which is narrow, eccentric, and devoid of any application to the real world. In claiming that specialists need to pay more attention to the real world, I am responding to the difference between the way people sort their priorities -- some sort according to themselves and others according to other people's interests. Perhaps more balance between self and other would create a healthier concern for what others find interesting and relevant to life. Since it is not my desire to be dictatorial in making claims upon another's time, in order to make a philosophical investigation appealing to those of the opposite camp from one's own, one must become master in both areas in order to play the parts of defender and skeptic alike.

In order to apply these general remarks upon the condition of specialization within the philosophical community (or communities) to the need for justifying my own choice of project, I should say that: In a general sense, it is easy to argue for the type of investigation I have chosen to conduct in the present dissertation. To those who have asked (with or without malice), "Why should anyone be interested in reading a confession by someone like yourself?" (The "your-self" referring to me, the writer) I should have answered: "To the extent that any confession illuminates the condition of the individual in society, it is of value." By the writer/philosopher qua confessor articulating the specificity of her or his particular situation, s/he also sheds light upon the universal nature of the human condition.

In this respect, I agree with Sartre's proposal of conceiving of the individual as "universal singular." Lying behind this concept is the ethical notion that when an individual chooses to act in a particular way, s/he is by that choice determining the possibility for others to act in the same way. For Sartre, in choosing we automatically choose this or that as an option for all. Ethical theory handles this aspect of moral choice under the term "universalizability." In addition, the concept also carries with it the influence of past generations which have determined the cultural milieu in which the present individual chooses to act. This influence of our ancestors is called the

practico-inert. There will be occasion to return to this notion later.

In order to provide support for and elaboration of my comment that confession may be more or less valued according to how much the articulation of an individual's situation furthers our understanding of the universal nature of the human condition, I submit the following passage from a chapter entitled "Schiller's Ideas on the Type Problem" in which the relationship between the personal problems of the individual and the general condition of that individual's society is clearly stated.

... for it often happens that, when a problem which is at bottom personal, and therefore apparently subjective, coincides with the external events that contain the same psychological elements as the personal conflict, it is suddenly transformed into a general question embracing the whole of society. In this way the personal problem acquires a dignity it lacked hitherto, since the inner discord always has something humiliating and degrading about it, so that one sinks into an ignominious condition both within and without, like a state dishonored by civil war. It is this that makes one shrink from displaying before the public a purely personal conflict, provided of course that one does not suffer from an overdose of self-esteem. But if the connection between the personal problem and the larger contemporary events is discerned and understood, it brings a release from the loneliness of the purely personal, and the subjective problem is magnified into a general question of society. This is no small gain as regards the possibility of a solution. For whereas only the meager energies of one's conscious interest in one's own person were at the disposal of the personal problem, there are now assembled the combined forces of collective instinct, which flow in and unite with the interests of the ego; thus a new situation is brought about which offers new possibilities of a solution. For what would never have been possible to the personal power of the will or to courage is made possible by the force of collective instinct;

it carries a man over obstacles which his own personal energy could never overcome.

This quote was in a context in which Jung was discussing how Schiller was actually serving the group by exposing himself with respect to what he felt as a personal conflict between the demands of the group and his own need for the fuller development and expression of his inferior psychological function. In articulating this personal conflict which he actually shared with the other members of the group, he enabled himself and others to develop their individuality.

Whereas in Schiller the problem was conscious, in the others it was unconscious. Thus, we find in this situation a case in which the unconscious collective constraints which were borne by the group were loosened by Schiller's conscious handling and resolving of the conflict in himself. This may be understood in the Sartrean sense mentioned above whereby individual choice opens the way for the same choice in others.

My emplotment of Sartre in the contemporary scene of writing philosophy aims to retrieve the philosopher from his or her condition of alienation and addiction to the professionalized form of life. The addiction is psychologically understood as adherence to the streamlining in personality development which was discussed earlier. Recall that, according to Jung, most individuals have an inferior function which needs developing in order for individuation to proceed. The scientist and the poet may be addicted in this

¹Carl Jung, Psychological Types (Princeton: Princeton University, 1976), 80-81.

sense. Nonetheless, the addiction to which I am referring in this passage is that of the professional philosopher who has tended to exercise disproportionately his or her thinking function rather than feeling function and his or her sensation function rather than intuitive function. The emplotment of Sartre can help by providing a narrative in which the discipline's tragedy can be ended with the help of a hero. The effect of the hero is to set up a model of successful integration of the four psychological functions and of balance between inner-directedness and other-directedness (or of attending to self and attending to others).

The choice of a hero is somewhat limited by the options. Sartre and Foucault would be good candidates because they have championed the life of the individual. Of course, the history of philosophy has many more writers whose work in its reflective capacity is timely in illuminating the human condition. Philosophers of the kind which have survived and have come to populate the literature of the tradition may be thought of as the heroes of the West. It is from this tradition that present day philosophy in its professionalization has sprung, but in its self-obsession with its image as science, I am afraid it has chosen a destructive path in the sense of loss of individuality because the tendency in scientific theorizing is to abstract from the lived-experience (this has been discussed in the chapter on the scientization of philosophical discourse). Perhaps enthusiasm for scientific progress with its promise of a better life has helped the scientism of our

day to forget its mythological context and to cover up the underlying addiction which is operating in many individuals.²

In the dialectic of the individual and society, there are shifts in emphasis. Often the shift in the pendulum results in the exclusion of either the collective or the individual. This can be explained according to which psychological function needs developing. The lesson I have learned is that the individual is nothing when cut off from the group and its source in the collective unconscious. Achieving balance or individuation has yet to be fully realized. This is the problem which is at the heart of the problematic of the self to which this dissertation is addressed.

I have been trying to deal with the problem of appealing to readers of a philosophical literature different from that in which the present problematic arose. It is clear that my own dissertation project has been shaped and motivated by reading Sartre. But, in asking for the attention of philosophers from a different tradition and in demanding their attention, I shall argue from an extreme vantage point that of visitors from another planet: What would be considered most informative and useful for understanding the kinds of creatures we human being are, the writings which make up the standard discourse of professional philosophy or the confessional writing for which I am trying to argue? This

²See Paul Feyerabend, "How to Defend Society Against Science," in Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. E.D. Klemke, Robert Hollinger & A. David Kline (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1988), 33-44.

case of extraterrestrial visitors may be called the anthropological context.

Sartre's work has been placed within the scope of a philosophical anthropology as well as having to do with ontology and ethics. Any philosophy which desires to build an anthropology must consider the work of Sartre. If there is any question of the importance of Sartre to our understanding of ourselves as writers and philosophers, I refer the reader to the commendation of Peter Caws.

In "Language and its Uses: Philosophy and Literature"³ Mr. Caws cautioned the reader that Sartre's stature as a writer "need not detract from his status as a philosopher: 'writer' is generic, 'philosopher' is specific; writing is a mode of being, philosophy a mode of action."⁴ This caution was expressed in a passage which opened with the following remarks:

That philosophy is chiefly a linguistic activity has come to be generally recognized in this century. Whether or not the realities it deals with are taken to transcend language, the facts that its arguments are always conducted in some language, and that the structure and history of that language will have an effect on those arguments, seem inescapable. The consequences of this view for the philosopher's conception of his own activity have commanded less attention. He may think of himself as a thinker, but his thought will be barren (apart from any private benefits it may confer) if he is not also a talker or a writer. For the most part talking and writing are natural activities and no great fuss need be made about them. The question is worth raising, however, as to the relation

³Peter Caws, Sartre (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), chapter 2.

⁴Ibid., 19.

between thought and its verbal expression -- whether the latter is, utilitarian considerations apart, merely a transcription of the former, or whether the former can be said to have an antecedent and independent status at all.⁵

The point of Caws' remarks is to show the interesting consequences of considering the relation of writer to philosopher in that order. "But putting things in this order does suggest a relation between thought and language quite different from that which is characteristic of most English-speaking philosophers."⁶

Mr. Caws further enhances the contrast between Sartre and other English-speaking philosophers by pointing out how little Sartre was concerned with the nature of his linguistic activity. That is to say, compared to philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition and considering Sartre's dependence on language for the expression of his thought, he ignored the linguistic nature of his activity. This is quite in keeping with Sartre's rejection of science as a mode of philosophizing. Philosophers in the tradition to which Sartre is contrasted have focused primarily upon the nature of language as a constrainer of expression. Language has been a major theoretical concern for its deterministic quality.

I wish to provide a simple argument for those who are ready at this point to dismiss the criticism of group life which the professionalization of the discipline has brought into existence. Although it may have little impact upon an

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

individual whose alienation is such that he fails to realize the benefits for self in the proposal I am making, I nonetheless must raise the rhetorical question: if an extra-terrestrial being were to land on earth after the extinction of our human species, in addition to artifacts which had been created by human beings in order to reproduce the conditions that had permitted survival of our kind, what writings or what literature would be most informative about the nature of the form of life which man represented? This question regarding an extra-terrestrial visitor invokes the opposite stance to the anthropologist who is faced with the task of investigating the archeological findings left by a primitive and extinct species.

In the case I am proposing, the reader is asked to think from the point of view of an alien but intelligent being. Would it be the professional journal article, or confessional writing in which the subjective and objective components had been dialectically counterposed? I think that without the kind of contextualization which confessional writing is capable of providing, the journal article would have little value to extra-terrestrials.

I should like to claim that the writing found in the professional journal article has been produced in order to gain acceptance into the dominant group, and that this has been detrimental to the individual's growth as a person to the extent that streamlining of the personality and curtailment of individuation have been allowed to prevail. Resistance to the

confessional style of writing would most likely come from the philosopher whose canon of writing is exemplified by the professional journal article. Forthcoming in the next section is an extended set of quotes from Arthur Danto's Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association in 1983. These quotes together with my discussion of them will make perfectly clear what the extant form of life is like for the academic philosopher. Sartre's conception of philosophy and his style of writing provide an interesting contrast with the style which dominates the professional journal article.

DANTO'S FEAR OF CONFESSIONAL WRITING

After presentation of Danto's synopsis of the scene of contemporary philosophical writing, I shall introduce an argument about style. In Danto's address, we obtain a careful statement of the form of life that philosophers have inhabited since the professionalization of the discipline. This is needed in order to understand how professionalization can be hazardous to our well-being. My intention has been to correct the deleterious effects of professionalization by appealing to Sartre. It is in Sartre that we find a mode of writing which is attentive to the aspects of style, and in attending to style it becomes possible to address the distortions and disturbances in individuation which professionalization helps to bring about. This attentiveness is the opposite of what is the case with contemporary journal article writing. The suppression of style or at least its relegation to a secondary status is important in understanding how the present canon of writing philosophy as a form of discourse subjects the individual to constraints that violate his or her integrity. It is toward making these aspects of our contemporary life apparent that we turn now to Danto. It is in Danto that we will find a clear statement of what is at risk in regarding philosophy as literature rather than as science.

In his Presidential address which was delivered in Boston on December 28, 1983 before the Eightieth Annual Eastern Meet-

ing of the American Philosophical Association. Arthur Danto opened with the remark that

Our discipline seems so singular a crossbreed of art and science that it is somewhat surprising that only lately has it seemed imperative to some that philo-sophy be viewed as literature -- surprising and somewhat alarming.

Danto's surprise at their now being an imperative to view philosophy as literature stems from the fact that heretofore philosophical texts have often been cited for their high degree of literary merit.

Danto finds this imperative surprising because he had considered a widely accepted view that philosophical texts are literary. In his address he commended the prose of Strawson, Ryle, and Quine, let alone Santayana, Russell, and James as distinguished. He even suggested that philosophers would "regard as astute a teacher of English who took pages from any of these as compositional paradigms."⁸ Although his praise was laudatory, he regarded the literary merit of a philosophical text as secondary in its importance.

The secondary importance is stressed in his comment that,

... Still, our tendency is to regard style, save to the degree that it enhances perspicuity, as adventitious and superfluous to that for the sake of which we finally address these texts: as mere Farbung to use Frege's dismissive term. So to rotate these texts in such a way that the secondary facets catch the light of intellectual concerns puts what we regard as the primary facets in shadow; and to acquiesce in the concept of philosophy-as-

⁷Arthur Danto, "Philosophy and/as/of Literature," in Post-Analytic Philosophy, ed. John Rajchman and Cornel West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 63.

⁸Ibid.

literature just now seems tacitly to acquiesce in the view that the austere imperatives⁹ of philosophy-as-science have lost their energy.

It is not quite clear what is threatened by the movement to embrace "philosophy-as-literature." Further elaboration of Danto's remark about style is needed. In the first sentence of the above quote, a statement is made which in effect diminishes the importance of style in philosophical writing. Style is important to the extent that it contributes to the perspicuous articulation of philosophical truth or reality; to the extent that style does not further the project of bringing into focus philosophical reality, it is deemed adventitious and superfluous. Style, in light of the project of philosophical truth is a secondary characteristic of the form of philosophical expression which is used to project philosophical truth. The form of philosophical expression which is linked with the project of articulating philosophical truth is the journal article which is roughly ten to fifteen pages in length and which is published in the professional philosophical journals. The style of such articles is according to Danto's judgement, highly impersonal.

Danto has linked these two 'things' -- philosophical expression and philosophical truth -- with the imperative to view philosophy as science. It seems reasonable to say that, in linking these particular 'things' Danto has assumed that the relationship between form and content is one of interdependence. At least this would seem to apply in this speci-

⁹Ibid., 64.

fic case of discussing the form of philosophical expression which characterizes the journal article.

Danto has, in his address, acknowledged the possibility that different forms of philosophical expression -- different ways of writing may be linked consequently to different conceptions of philosophical truth. The conception of philosophical truth operating within the journal article is borrowed from the scientific project which purports to reveal or describe reality without bias or prejudice. The scientific establishment may be the most recent to tender the conception of truth as approximate description of reality, but it is a conception which is easily traced back to the philosophy of Plato whose allegory of the cave was meant to distinguish the difference between illusion or appearance and reality.

The second sentence of Danto's quote suggests why he experienced the imperative to view philosophy-as-literature as somewhat alarming. The reason for his alarm is that "the austere imperatives of philosophy-as-science have lost their energy." Couldn't this be construed as a form of impotence, as a loss of power? In his comment, "Considering what has been happening to texts when treated in recent times, our canon seems suddenly fragile, and it pains the heart to think of them enduring the frivolous sadism of the deconstructionist,"¹⁰ Danto has revealed the villainous force which has triggered alarm in himself and presumably in many of those to whom his Presidential address was delivered.

¹⁰Ibid., 64.

It is my guess that the alarm had signaled the recognition of a paradigm clash within the discipline of philosophy. The strength of the assault, however, has not originated from a large constituency within the rank and file of the American Philosophical Association. The strongest challenge to philosophy-as-science has not come from an American. The source is French. We can focus the blame or credit on the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida. He has infiltrated the American scene of philosophy through a covert action into the realm of American literary theory and criticism. The choice between blame or credit as the reaction to this challenge depends upon whether the challenge to philosophy-as-science is viewed as malevolent destruction or justifiable criticism.

Apparently, even after taking into account Danto's dread of the destructive nature of deconstructionist criticism we have not fully understood the dimensions of "the pain that permeates the heart upon contemplation of the prized canons of the profession having to endure the frivolous sadism of the deconstructionist." Evidence for the incompleteness of our understanding may be extracted from Danto's remark that, "But the perspective of philosophy-as-literature is an uncomfortable one for us to occupy, quite apart from these unedifying violations."

A few remarks about deconstructionist criticism need to be made before addressing ourselves to the crux of the matter in the clash between philosophy-as-science and philosophy-as-literature as Danto has articulated it. Although Danto did

not name anyone specifically in the passage in which the longer quotation was found, we might assume that in his allusion to deconstructionist criticism, he had in mind the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida.

This is a reasonably good guess, since Derrida was the founder of the deconstructionist "strategy" of reading and interpreting philosophical texts. The word 'strategy' is an appropriate choice for referring to the way the deconstructionist reads and interprets philosophical texts. It is a better term than 'method' because Derrida has himself denied having founded anything like what generally falls under the scope of method.

It would be even more correct and faithful to Derrida to say that what he does -- his strategy -- is captured by the word 'approach.' The latter is a sufficiently vague term which allows within its scope the kind of reading that Derrida claims to have given to a particular text. Derrida wants to be understood as having rendered an internal reading. This is to be contrasted with a reading which applies some preconceived set of categories to a text. In contrast to the previously mentioned "forced" reading of a text, Derrida's strategy of reading is not properly called a method. By method then I mean an external and independently conceived set of categories which when applied yield criticisms that may not be acceptable to the internal demands of the text. In contrast to methodical reading, Derrida's approach is one in which a reading is given according to the particular literary

devices which have determined the internal structure of the text. The difference between method and Derridean deconstruction closely approximates the Marxist distinction between internal and external criticism.

Having made these remarks and brought in the distinction between internal and external criticism, how are they to be related to the alarm which Danto has sounded? The link can be made very simply and clearly by saying that Danto and others are alarmed at the consequences of an internal criticism of philosophical texts for their profession. An internal criticism such as that potentially available to the deconstructionist would in effect show for one thing that these texts are internally contradictory. The nature of this internal contradiction is such that although the canons of philosophy-as-science guided the writing of philosophical texts and hence the texts are assumed to perform a referential function -- supposedly there is a relation of correspondence between the content or meaning of the text and the states of affairs which exist in the world objectively speaking -- as texts they are more properly considered as literature because the function of the form of the text is not one of referential correspondence but of imaginative world projection. Withstanding the imperative that these texts be viewed primarily as science, is the counter claim that they are mediations among the social practices of the two communities. In the clash between philosophy-as-science and philosophy-as-literature proponents of each view assume the antithetical

natures of science and literature; whereas my own view attempts to broaden the notion of literature by bringing out the confessional nature of all writing, so that scientific texts can be subsumed under the new conception of literature, and thus texts of both traditions can be treated according to their rhetorical and literary form.

To link up these remarks with Danto's alarm we need to consider what is at risk for Danto. At risk are the canons under which philosophy has recently attained professionalization. One of these canons is contained in the following quote from Danto's article: "That plain prose has a better chance of being received true is a stylistic maxim not unknown in adopting a philosophical diction -- think Moore -- but my point is only that there is a profound contrast between taking the Bible as literature and viewing it as the Word."¹¹ Danto has turned to the Bible as an example of literature in order to contrast texts of that sort whose truths are "revealed" with philosophical texts which purport to "express" philosophical truths. The Bible reveals truth by allegory, but then so do Plato's Dialogues. The abstruse nature of the Bible's parables must be rendered tame by interpreting their allegorical meaning. Danto in mentioning the Bible has acknowledged the view that the truth in the Bible is contained in the Word of God. But the Word of God must be deciphered in the words of men.

¹¹Ibid., 65.

In contrast to this kind of truth, is the philosophical variety. Danto claims that philosophical truth is connected with the specifically philosophical forms of expression. The form of expression for philosophy-as-science is dictated most recently by the philosophical canon. Danto applies a logic of the survival of the fittest to the fact that we have a form of expression according to which philosophical truth has been preserved because it also preserves the species. Danto wants us to assume that the present form of writing philosophy has survived according to some sort of Darwinian test. That is, the present day form of journal article writing has survived as the form for presenting philosophical truth because it has managed to preserve truth better than any other form of philosophical expression.

It would appear that what is most alarming to Danto is the possibility that deconstructionist criticism might find some way of providing us with an internal criticism of the prized form of journal writing. In understanding what is threatened by Derridean criticism we must consider the following lengthy quote from Danto in which he describes the form of life which has evolved with the professionalization of philosophy. Danto maintains that,

... the canonical literary format has been the professional philosophy paper. Our practice as philosophers consists in reading and in writing such papers, in training our students to read and write them, in inviting others to come read us a paper, to which we respond by posing questions which in effect are editorial recommendations, typically incorporated and acknowledged in the first or last footnote of the paper, in which we are exempted from such errors and infelicities as

may remain, and thanked for our helpful suggestions. The journals in which these papers finally are printed, whatever incidental features useful to the profession at large they may carry, are not otherwise terribly distinct from one another, any more than the papers themselves characteristically are. If, under the constraints of blind review, we black out name and institution affiliation, there will be no internal evidence of authorial presence, but only a unit of pure philosophy, to the presentation of which the author will have sacrificed all identity. This implies a noble vision of ourselves as vehicles for the transmission of an utterly impersonal philosophical truth, and it implies a vision of philosophical reality as constituted of insolvable, difficult, but not finally intractable problems, which if not altogether soluble in fifteen pages more or less, can be brought closer to resolution in that many pages. The paper is then an impersonal report of limited results for a severely restricted readership, consisting of those who have some use for that result since they are engaged with the writers of the papers in a collaborative enterprise, building the edifice of philosophical knowledge. It is perfectly clear that the implied vision of philosophical reality, as well as of the form of life evolved to discover it and the form of literature in which it is suitable to represent it, are closely modeled on the view of reality, life, and literature which compose what Thomas Kuhn has instructed us to think of as normal science. Mastery of the literary form is the key to success in the form of life, bringing tenure and the kind of recognition which consists in being invited to read papers widely and perhaps the presidency of one or another division of the American Philosophical Association. These practical benefits aside, no one could conceivably be interested in participating in the form of life defined by the literary form in use, were it not believed that this is the avenue to philosophical truth. It is obviously a matter of agreement that philosophical truth is defined¹² by this being believed to be the way to find it.

Danto has thus presented us with the form of life which he believes is threatened by deconstructionist criticism in particular. It should be clear what is at stake and what will

¹²Ibid., 65-66.

be lost if deconstruction is successful in its critique of the form of life which constitutes the profession and discipline of philosophy.

Deconstruction although seemingly lacking in any positive proposal for what exactly should replace the attacked form of the profession, is quite forcefully challenging the discipline's form of writing which it takes to be paradigmatic. In order to understand the deconstructionist assault, it will be necessary to back up a bit and present some of the central issues which have become hegemonic.

The purpose of this dissertation is to add to the weight of the deconstructionist critique of the discipline of philosophy, but the major thrust of these post-structuralist themes will be evaluated elsewhere. Derrida was a student of Foucault. In mentioning this I do not mean to suggest that Derrida is a lesser figure than his teacher. I stress the lineage because I believe that historically there is a kind of Socratic dialectic between philosophers. This is much the same belief that Hegel articulated in his philosophy. To be a part of a tradition means that you have taken up the issues and problems which exist at the time of your entry into the tradition usually with the intent of transforming or resolving them.

Since I consider the lineage important, I will now back up as I said I would and provide the manner in which Sartre set the scene for the writing of contemporary philosophy. Sartre as a writer and philosopher is above all a radical

critic of bourgeois culture. In an interview by Jean-Claude Garot which was published as "Revolution and the Intellectual" in *Politics and Literature*. Sartre position with respect to who is an intellectual is clearly stated:

First of all, I don't think you can have an intellectual without his being 'left-wing'. There are of course people who write books and essays and so on and who belong to the Right. As far as I am concerned, though, simply using one's intellect is not enough to make one an intellectual. . . . What you have to do in fact is define the intellectual on the basis of the function which society begins by assigning to him. The man I call an 'intellectual' is recruited from a socioprofessional group made up of what one might call the 'theoreticians of practical knowledge'. This definition stems from the fact that we now know all knowledge to be practical. A hundred years ago it was possible to regard scientific research as being disinterested; that was the bourgeois concept. Today this is an outdated ideology. We know that science sooner or later implies practical application. Consequently, it is impossible to find any kind of knowledge which is, strictly speaking, non-practical.

For Sartre, doctors, engineers, researchers, and sociologists all may qualify as theoreticians of practical knowledge. As soon as one of these people begins to operate on the basis of knowledge, they are practitioners. The sociologists in the United States study "how to improve relations between bosses and workers in such a way as to cover up the class struggle."¹⁴ But, if they try, in their practice, to obtain further knowledge without the immediate intent of applying

¹³Jean-Paul Sartre, "Revolution and the Intellectual (An interview with Jean-Claude Garot)," in Politics and Literature, trans. J.A. Underwood and John Calder (London: Calder & Boyars, Ltd., 1965), 13-14.

¹⁴Ibid., 14.

this newly acquired knowledge, then Sartre would define that person as a theoretician of practical knowledge. These, however, are not yet intellectuals according to Sartre.

An intellectual in our society is defined by the "deep-seated contradiction between the universality which bourgeois society is obliged to grant his knowledge and the particular ideological and political framework within which he is forced to apply it."¹⁵ In the case of the doctor, Sartre explained that the doctor in studying blood is studying blood in its universality in so far as blood is assumed to be uniform in blood groups everywhere. This practice is a denunciation of racialism, and yet it is in the service of bourgeois society. Although the doctor is not measurably enhancing the society's capital-producing value, it is nonetheless of value to that society in that the doctor's activities are helping the members of that society to survive. Their survival is needed in order to reproduce the particular form of bourgeois life. Thus for Sartre, although the Intellectual-to-be has received a universal education, s/he is forced to follow the particular ideology of the society in which s/he was raised. It is this particularity which is in contradiction to the universalism of his social activity.

We can apply this same type of analysis to the philosopher. How many individuals would survive such scrutiny and warrant the label of intellectual in the stringent sense that

¹⁵Ibid., 14.

Sartre means to apply it? Consider the description which Danto has provided of the academic form of life:

Philosophers are invited to come to read papers. The questions and comments of the audience are offered as editorial recommendations. These are graciously received by the speaker and are usually incorporated into the final version of the paper which is published as an article in one of the professional journals.¹⁶

Such publication follows upon a procedure of "blind" reading by an editorial board which is supposed to insure impartiality. The success of the philosopher is measured to a large extent by the number of papers published in the refereed journals recognized by the profession; his or her promotion and tenure is contingent upon the movement up the ladder. Such movement depends on the publication record.

I think that Danto implies that the relegation of style to the status of secondary importance is necessary in order to assure impartiality in the paper reviewing procedure. I should think that it is likely that once a person has read a paper before several audiences, the word must get around about what the character of that individual's research is -- its content must be known. And if the procedure should exclude such familiarity, the paper will still contain the imprinting of the person's style of writing and thinking about the particular topic. Style is by no means an easy thing to detect when papers have been constrained to exclude any reference of a personal nature -- any confessional statements

¹⁶Danto, "Philosophy As/And/Of Literature," 64.

which would make ready identification of the author possible with a high degree of accuracy.

In order to expand upon this claim that I have just made concerning style, we should examine with some attention to detail what exactly style is. For this I should like to draw upon material from a small but important book Language and Style.¹⁷ Although style is often regarded as a comparatively trivial matter, Mr. Epstein defends its importance and essential nature.

Style is sometimes regarded as ... an ornamental excrescence on a meretricious work. Yet style is less a fact of the history of culture than of the history of psychology; it is an indispensable element in communication between one human being and another. As I try to show, the world is impossible to interpret without the phenomenon of style. In a sense, the apprehension of style may be the only function of the human mind. Of the various bearers of style in the arts, the subtle styles of literature are in some ways the most useful to study, as an approach to general style.¹⁸

Mr. Epstein offers a convenient, in its brevity and succinctness, definition of style: "Style is the regard that what pays to how."¹⁹ In a world which is filled with orders -- human beings are constantly told and commanded what to do -- there is still much room for freedom with respect to the how we do what we have been told to do. Mr. Epstein is thus claiming that within the boundaries of necessity -- the

¹⁷ Edmund Epstein, Language and Style, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1978).

¹⁸ Ibid., xi.

¹⁹ Ibid., 1.

culturally or socially and biologically determined needs that we must fulfill in order to survive physically and with self-respect and esteem -- there is plenty of room for flexibility in regards to how we act. After the initial meeting of the demands which constrain our existence, Mr. Epstein believes that the amount of freedom outside these commands of nature and society is immense.

He further speculates that, "Each of the billions of humans on the earth is distinguishable from the others. Each has a different way of obeying life's commands, a distinctive how in respect of the what that life consists of, that marks him or her as an individual to fellow humans and to himself or herself."²⁰

Epstein does quite a lot in the short span of this valuable book. Terence Hawkes has summarized Epstein's approach as follows:

The basic act of making sense out of the what which nature presents to our senses involves the how of style. If style is the man, it is also the world he first constructs and then inhabits. Within this conceptual framework, Professor Epstein distinguishes two aspects of style in literature, described here as public and private styles. In the public literature game, the facts of language are mobilized to reveal anything in the universe except the private depths of the speaker; in the private game the aims are precisely the reverse. Using the tools of linguistic analysis, the author considers such things as genre and period styles, the psychology of stylistic choice, word choice and diction. Detailed examples from Donne, Pope, Blake, Tennyson, Yeats, and Lowell show how the general manipulation of language meets the needs of the poems themselves and of the body of Western literature, and reveal the way in which the

²⁰Ibid.

individualized use of that language allows a portrait of the artist to be drawn from his work.²¹

In thinking about the possibility of detecting the style of the author of the blindly refereed journal article, the reader might object that the style although potentially available is by no means an easy thing to grasp. This objection may forestall the impact of my implied criticism of the so-called impartiality criterion which the profession invokes in order to uphold its standards of good philosophizing, but that was not the major thrust of what I am claiming.

In addition to my desire to shed doubt upon the reason for relegating style to a secondary status, my point was more to question the impersonality and objectivity of the act of writing philosophy itself. Danto does not address this point. But he does make the link between the form of expression and the form of life which it means to support. The form of life which Danto claims is supported by adhering to the canon of scientific writing is the truth seeking mission of the knowledge discovering enterprise which philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have embraced in this century.

To want to doubt the credibility of the refereeing procedure is only to show that perhaps it is not as efficient as was hoped in contributing to the ideals which the community embraces. Granted, the procedure may not be the best, but that is surely a practical and minor consideration. The value

²¹Ibid., 94.

of an ideal cannot be measured by the degree to which we have found a way of implementing it. I can agree with that type of reasoning. But the thrust of the thesis is to make a claim about what the act of writing philosophy should be. That again was to facilitate the self-realization of the individual writer -- to allow for freedom of expression and actualization of one's potentials.

My criticism of the relegation of style to secondary status is that it makes the project of self-realization difficult if not impossible. No matter what the justification of writing scientifically, in its canonized form writing about universal nature, regardless of the topic under discussion, misses the point or rather covers up the way in which the individual may in fact be acting out of an ideological position. This was made clear by Sartre for the case of American sociologists. In the quote above about the intellectual, Sartre claimed that in the United States the sociologist studies how to improve relations between bosses and workers but covers up the conflict between the classes.

For a more detailed analysis and discussion of the training which is predominantly endured by students in the graduate schools of America, I would recommend to the reader Richard Rorty's article entitled "Philosophy in America Today," in his Consequences of Pragmatism. In that article, Rorty states:

... there is something dubious about the current self-image of analytic philosophy. I can perhaps bring it out by saying that we are in bad faith insofar as we tend to take credit for being wise as well as clever. We are not entitled to this double dollop of self-esteem. Philosophy professors were

traditionally thought of as wise because they were believed to have read and experienced much, traveled far in the realms of thought, pondered the great problems which have always troubled the human spirit. This image was more or less plausible as long as the study of philosophy centered around the study of the history of philosophy (as it did before 1950 in American philosophy departments, and still does in, e.g., France and Germany). The positivist revolution, however, changed the image of the philosopher from scholar to scientist. It suggested that the best philosophy student would not be the sort who might have gone into intellectual history, but rather the sort who might have gone into mathematics or physics. In the course of the transition to post-analytic philosophy, the image of the scientist has been replaced by another, though it is not quite clear what. Perhaps the most appropriate model for the analytic philosopher is now the lawyer, rather than either the scholar or the scientist. The ability to construct a good brief, or conduct a devastating cross-examination, or find relevant precedents, is pretty much the ability which analytic philosophers think of as "distinctively philosophical." It is sufficient to be a good lawyer or to be a good analytic philosopher that you be able to see at a glance the inferential relationships between all the members²² of a bewilderingly large set of propositions.

He also says:

... the reason why philosophers are still inclined to credit themselves with wisdom is that contemporary analytic philosophy inherits from logical positivism of thirty years ago the pretension to possess a secure matrix of heuristic concepts -- categories which permit it to classify, comprehend, and criticize the rest of culture.²³

Rorty outright and flatly denies that philosophers have any such set of concepts and therefore have no warrant for acting with condescension toward other disciplines. According to

²²Richard Rorty, "Philosophy in America Today," in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 221.

²³Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 221.

Rorty, philosophers with the argumentative skills for analysis are nonetheless a precious cultural resource, and considers that "the nation would do well to have analytic philosophers advise on public projects." I agree with the sentiment of Rorty's criticism of analytic philosophers for lacking wisdom, but I am disinclined to laud them for their cleverness. Cleverness becomes a value in its own right only as a result of the bankruptcy of philosophy as a legitimate subject matter.

Earlier in these same articles, Rorty brings out the contrast between what the claim 'Philosophy has now become scientific rather than speculative' means for contemporary analytic philosophy. It means something very different from what it meant for Reichenbach.²⁴ Rorty explains the contrast as follows:

"Scientific" now means something like "argumentative." The contrast between old and new is no longer a contrast between an immature pre-scientific and a mature scientific stage of discussion of a common set of problems, but a contrast between styles -- the "scientific" style and the "literary" style. The former style asks that premises be explicitly spelled out rather than guessed at, that terms be introduced by definitions rather than by allusion. The latter style may involve argumentation, but that is not essential; what is essential is telling a new story, suggesting a new language-game, in the hope of a new form of intellectual life.²⁵

²⁴Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951).

²⁵Rorty, Consequences, 220.

Rorty concludes that the criterion shift from subject to style has been reached with the transition from logical positivism to contemporary analytic philosophy. By "criterion shift," he means that the discipline of philosophy is no longer structured along the model of the traditional discipline which has a history because it has an essence or a particular mission on which it is founded. Rorty thinks that philosophers are guided in their pursuits neither by any essence nor mission. He draws out the inference that, "If a discipline has no well-defined subject matter, and no inter-university achievement, then it will have to have stylistic paradigms." This is what Rorty believes has happened to analytic philosophy in the last thirty years. He declares that in no way does he consider this shift to be denigrating; nor is he saying that the analytic movement has somehow wandered off the true path:

Philosophy, in the narrow and professional sense, is just whatever we philosophy professors do. Having a common style, and a niche in the normal table of organization of academic departments, is quite enough to make our discipline as identifiable and respectable as any other.²⁶

Rorty may find nothing disturbing about the shift from subject to style, but I do. And I also think that the resultant loss of wisdom from the self-image of philosophers is lamentable. I do not think it laudable for philosophers to think of themselves as clever. To my mind, to be considered clever is a form of derogation. Cleverness is to the

²⁶Ibid.

philosopher as cunningness or slyness is to the fox. The difficulty arises with the loss of wisdom.

Wisdom is very much a part of the tradition of philosophy. I maintain that there is, perhaps although not quite an essence in the Scholastic sense or Platonic sense to philosophy, still very much a subject-matter. The criterion shift is not unsalvageable. What needs to be recognized is that when style has taken center stage, the drama or story which then unfolds is one in which the central figure is style. Style has always been the subject of philosophy. The whole thrust of this dissertation has been to argue for the revision of philosophy's mission of self-creation. The role which philosophy can play within the inter-university structures of organization is to provide a coordinating perspective upon what all the other disciplines mean.

During the American Philosophical Association Meeting in New York City during the winter of 1987, philosophers were still crossing swords: on one side science and on the other, literature. Analytic philosophy, according to such spokespersons as Quine and Markus, is still best thought of as the logical analysis of fairly focused problems. According to Quine, philosophy is definitely not about people, and should be pursued as any other specialized scientific discipline.²⁷

Against these strong voices are the statements by people like Charles Sheroover, who claim that the discipline of

²⁷Hao Wang, Beyond Analytic Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986), 206.

philosophy has, by means of its selection of graduate students with a talent for logic and mathematical analysis, actually filtered out those who really have a true talent for philosophical inquiry. In fact, members of this group for philosophy-as-literature have boldly claimed that if one is a member of the profession of philosophy today, that indicates that one lacks philosophical ability. Sherover claims that philosophy in its penchant for scientific methodology has shifted its focus so that the perennial problems of philosophers no longer are raised. Wang, a student of Quine, actually disagrees with Quine's restriction on the scope of philosophy. It should be noted that Wang is a logician, but maintains his interest in cultural analysis and thereby asserts that philosophy purports to provide an organized conception of reality in a much broader sense than Quine allows.

More recently, Professor Bernstein described in his presidential address the current condition in the profession of philosophy:

What then is our situation in philosophy today? Perhaps the simplest and most direct answer is Babel, a confusion of tongues. But Babel itself is not so simple. We cannot escape the fact that there has been a decentering of philosophy itself. There has been a radical pluralization of different vocabularies, research programs, voices demanding to be heard. I sometimes think that a primary reason why there has been so much concern with problems of incommensurability and relativism is because this is the condition that we find ourselves in as philosophers, where we speak such radically different tongues that we are unable to understand what even our closest neighbors are saying -- as if we were becoming like windowless

monads. There are dangers and challenges in this situation.²⁸

Without the possibility of confessional writing in which the style of the author is self-consciously explored and the constraints of the canonically oppressive dicta are exposed, we cannot begin to make headway through the mass of confusion alluded to by Bernstein or approach the self-professed ideal of uncovering philosophical truth which people in the profession like Danto claim to want to realize. Unless the issue of style is explored, we cannot uncover the real nature of the act of writing philosophy. Barring the investigation of such a topic is just not fair -- to the individual or to the collective.

²⁸Bernstein, "Pragmatism, Pluralism and the Healing of Wounds," 15.

SARTRE'S WAY OF WRITING DIFFERENTLY: THE QUESTION
OF PROSE STYLE AND ITS FUNCTION

In all social groups, it is customary to share the responsibility for reproduction of the conditions for survival among its members. In societies with capitalist economies, we find a division of labor within various sectors of the society which is usually non-overlapping. The justification for rigid assignment of tasks or labor is that specialization results in efficiency of production. This principle seems to have been applied to the academic pursuit of knowledge as well as to the assembly-line of the automobile plant or any number of other businesses and manufacturing operations. The present division of labor has not always been the case. According to Sohn-Rethel,

Medieval handicraft began with the personal unity of head and hand; Galilean science established their clear-cut division. . . . we are concerned with the transition from artisanry to science from this viewpoint. The causes of the transformation can be found in the change from the one-man production to production on an ever-increasing social scale. This occurred . . .²⁹ mainly as a result of the commercial revolution.

In the academic and cultural sectors of society today, there are few exceptions to the division of labor. We would expect academicians and cultural workers to be subject to the same alienating influences of specialization as the manual laborer.

²⁹ Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labor (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1928), 111.

Of course, you might object that cultural workers are not uninformed about the larger arena in which their activities unfold. It would not be expected that theoretically knowledgeable cultural workers would be ignorant of the uses to which their labors will be put. Hence, the cultural worker would have no excuse (based on ignorance) for any harm brought to others as a result of the application of their labor. Whereas, manual laborers cannot be held responsible for the harm done to others by jet fighters or tanks because they didn't know that the electronic components which they manufacture are used in the guidance systems of the air-to-land or land-to-air missiles.

As a consequence of the specialization among cultural workers, those who write must express themselves in different genres and codes which are prescribed by their professions. Any division of labor requires some set of distinctions or criteria to make the division operative. The problem of division manifests itself in contemporary academic life in what might be called the professionalization of the disciplines. The demand for conformity to a profession's forms of writing, though to some a minimal compromise of autonomy, is nonetheless a determination which has an effect on the subjective experience of the writer. My point is that the forms of writing affect both individuation and integrity.

Sartre makes an excellent case study for assessing the responsibilities of the "less-bourgeois" intellectual. It would be nice if we could say that Sartre was not bourgeois,

but he of all writers acknowledged this as an impossibility. Not only is Sartre important in the defense of the present thesis because his early work represents a revolt against the bourgeois group and an attempt to assert his individuality, but also because as part of that struggle he chose to write outside the constraints of the disciplinary matrices that constitute the academy. Despite his courageous fight and rejection of bourgeois standards, we still find distinctions between philosophy and science which might be less troublesome than distinctions between philosophy and literature. Having demolished the bourgeois elevation of science over philosophy, we might expect to find Sartre more egalitarian on the difference between philosophy and literature. But, Sartre's elevation of philosophy over literature and maintenance of the distinction between them stands as a disappointment.

The divisions between the areas of philosophy, science and literature can be explored in the work of Sartre to our advantage. Of course, the more recent work of Foucault is even more critical than Sartre on the nature of discourse and the disciplinary matrix. In fact, Foucault criticized Sartre's definition of an intellectual on the grounds that it was still as a concept too abstract and general.³⁰ In its place, Foucault proposed the conception of a specific intellectual -- someone who doesn't pretend to represent the views of the oppressed and exploited, but instead he or she

³⁰See Mark Poster, "Sartre's Concept of the Intellectual," in Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of A Context (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 34-52.

functions as an intellectual geographer, making maps of the political terrain rather than constructing political strategies. The radical nature of Foucault's position is that in the case of intellectual's he would also expect them to act in the situation in which they find themselves. Rather than telling others what they should do, Foucault expected us to act in a fashion which would create change right where we stand. I think that Sartre's position is difficult enough for most philosophers with conservative political leanings and that Foucault's is far too radical for them to respond to constructively; though I could be mistaken on this.

One way of thinking of the difference between Sartre and Foucault with respect to the writer is to classify Sartre as pre-structuralist and Foucault as post-structuralist, though "existentialist" rather than "pre-structuralist" is a more fitting label for the early Sartre. He is deserving of the label "structuralist" in only a modest sense. It can be said of Sartre that he approximates the structuralist position with his notion of the de-totalized totality. The totality or complete picture of reality is only something which is approached as a kind of limit or ideal. The partial and incomplete perspective of individuals added together form a composite picture of reality or the totality. It is in this sense that we find in Sartre an existentialist's approximation of structuralism.

The swing in emphasis from the pure individual in the early Sartre to the later marxist view of the social world

reveals an attempt to speak from the limit of totality rather than from the origin of totality -- from the mouths or perspectives of concrete individuals. To the extent that the totality is never an experienced thing it can be said to lack genuine status as a reality. But then again it is for Sartre the closest we can ever come to the whole of reality. This is what I would call the idealization of reality -- a product of the work of imagination.

The present dissertation is sympathetic to the existentialist program of retrieving the subject from the field of objectifications. This involves the rescuing of the subject from the scientific manipulations and analytic determinations which produce undesirable docile and subservient persons who sustain through their maintenance a system of inequities.³¹

In the section above where the intellectual is described as a person on the extreme left in their critical attitude toward the contradictions that exist within the theoreticians of practical knowledge, we have understood Sartre to oppose the kind of analysis that, for instance, the American sociologists perform in order to, cover up the intrinsic class conflict between workers and their bosses. Sartre's ignoring of the scientific enterprise may generally be taken as a repudiation of the form of analysis that is motivated to promote the interests of a ruling elite.

³¹ Michel Foucault, "Docile Bodies," in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 135-169.

The vanguard of social scientists are the foot-soldiers of this elite class in so far as they construct experiments and tools for surveying the population for the unexpressed purpose of exploitation. This disguised intent masquerades under the banner of science as the goal of prediction and control. Supposedly these goals are to move mankind forward in its conquest and exploitation of nature. Instead the prediction and control works to objectify individuals.³²

The objectification is according to Sartre not in the least bit innocent. The covert operation that science facilitates is a mass act of bad faith. This notion of bad faith is what Sartre called the human potential for self-deception. Given this view of science, it is easy to embrace Sartre's intentions of distinguishing philosophy from science. But less acceptable are his reasons for distinguishing philosophy from literature.

To resolve this lack of understanding we shall have occasion to examine his conception of language. Focal to Sartre's justification for distinguishing philosophy from literature will be the difference between the use of language to articulate acts of perception and acts of imagination. One of the questions we must answer is: Are there imaginary uses of language that only apply to the creation of literature? Another question we must address is: Is science free from the imaginary uses of language?

³²Stanley Aronowitz, Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1988).

It would be a good idea for the reader to keep in mind the conspiracy in which the present dissertation's thesis leads us. The consequence of accepting the dual nature of discourse as having both an objective (public) and a subjective (private) level is to make indistinct the boundaries between philosophy, science, and literature.

In order to begin making headway into the labyrinth of the relation between the disciplines of philosophy, science, and literature, we must ask first, what was Sartre's conception of the project of literature? The Sartrean response to this question can be put very simply: it was to promote the cause of freedom. The project of literature is a direct consequence of the way in which the situation of the writer is structured. To understand this situation we must look at it phenomenologically.

The writer and reader are interdependent in several senses. The first is that they share a material world. A second sense of their interdependence is that the intentions of the writer always refer implicitly to the sharing of a common language and whatever experiences that are common to the learners of the same language.

The analysis of the relationship between the writer and reader is roughly as follows: Just as the writer in the act of writing is exercising his own freedom, the writer calls upon the reader to exercise his freedom in the act of reading. How are we to understand this "pas des deux" between the writer and reader? Is the imagination part of the way in which the

reader uses his freedom? For an answer to this question we must look to Sartre's analysis of consciousness. It is there that we shall find reasons for the distinguishing of literary acts from philosophical acts.

It is, however, a central aim of this dissertation to show that such a distinction between philosophy and literature is untenable. And so we shall have to raise a concern over the political intent behind the act of writing literary discourse and the act of writing philosophy. In other words, if the literary act is political for Sartre, why isn't the philosophical one also political? What made Sartre hold back from drawing this conclusion, from applying the idea of engagement which Sartre wants to dominate the act of writing prose to the act of writing philosophy as well? Perhaps it is a difference in the intentionality of the author. If the writer's intention structures the possibilities that are open to the reader of the text, then the difference in character between philosophy and literature shall consist in the impact that such texts which are differently structured shall have upon the reader.

In Literary Meaning³³ by William Ray, we find a discussion of Sartre's understanding of the act of reading. It is explained that reading is an act of liberation in which the reader through his own intention allows the work to come into existence. While it is in the form of being unread,

³³William Ray, Literary Meaning: From Phenomenology to Deconstruction (New York & Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).

without a consciousness or an intention to animate it, it is only a book.

But for Sartre this meaning is not the opaque non-referential thing Blanchot envisions. Rather, literary prose consists entirely of significations, which function precisely to the extent that they lead the language user back to a concept or entity predating the language act: "words are not first and foremost objects but designations of objects. The first question is not whether they are pleasing in and of themselves, but whether they indicate correctly a certain thing in the world or a certain notion" (Litterature, p. 26). In a sense, the literary work cannot fail this test of reference: because the reader can only bring into being a fictional world consonant with his experience of reality, can only bring into being "a world at once his world and the external world" (Litterature, p. 76), all of the meanings a reader intends will appear to refer to his world.³⁴

The Sartre world is not only humanized, it is personalized: I have the kind of world which corresponds to the person I am. The perspective of consciousness is unique. To the extent that it was possible for two individuals to share the very same sequence of conscious acts, we could say that they were identical. This is however contingently never the case.

For Sartre, the individual is unique. In particular, the individual's perception is unique because the world is humanized and personalized by the animating intentions of the consciousness that one has. By setting up an opposition between things and non-things, with the latter having intentions which bring things into focus and hence into life, and by giving a status of uniqueness and unanalyzability to consciousness (which is another name for the perspective which is taken

³⁴Ibid., 13.

toward the world), Sartre and others invent or create the problematic which is posed by the question: how is a discourse on the self possible? It is certainly paradoxical that the very positing of a unique consciousness should lead to the problem of how it is possible to talk about this uniqueness.

For Sartre, the writer deals with significations. Signification is the act of referring. Words are signs whose purpose is to refer to or pick out the things to which they are directed. It is in this quality of directedness, or in their having an end or destination to reach that signs have meaning. Without a material screen upon which to shoot our intentions, and a consciousness that can freely direct itself toward the screen we would, according to Sartre, have no world. In Sartre subject and object poles of this relationship between consciousness and that of which it is conscious are united. The subject is nothing in-itself; it is only the searching light which falls upon and illuminates the material world. Sartre's consciousness is very much like the concept of experience of William James which was introduced earlier in chapter two.

Sartre, however, in claiming that the empire of signs is prose, constructs a distinction between prose and poetry. The mark which distinguishes the one from the other is that one is transparent and the other is opaque. In the end, Sartre's ontology may reduce to those two qualities only. Transparency applies to consciousness and certain prosaic uses of language and the latter applies to things and to poetic uses of lan-

guage. Poetry is as an art which gets placed in a class with painting, sculpture, and music because the poet does not utilize language to refer. Common to these four art forms is non-referentiality. The colors of a painting, the form of a sculpture, and the notes of a musical piece refer to nothing external to themselves. For Sartre, poetry is, like these other art forms, self-contained.

He admits the possibility of conferring the value of signs upon the objects in a painting. For example, by convention we could talk about the language of flowers. He claims a white rose might mean "fidelity." To engage in this is, however, not to behave as an artist. An artist is someone whose interest is in capturing the quality of a "things" color or form and transposing it into his work. The only transformation in painting is from the real to the imaginary.

This distinction is of central importance in Sartre's theory of literature. Although a painting may reflect the artist's emotions, motives, and tendencies, it cannot be said to express them as is the case with words or the impressions of the face which expresses his anger, anguish, or joy. For instance, in a painting "nobody can quite recognize them."³⁵ In these words, Sartre is saying that the painter has feelings and motives which lead him to paint a particular painting, but after the painting is completed, it is a transformation of those original feelings and motives. So although the painting contains an 'engram' of the milieu under which it was painted,

³⁵Sartre, What is Literature?, 3.

Sartre is claiming that the real subject of the painting is what has resulted from the transposition of all that comprised the original situation in which the painting was created, including the intentions, feelings, and emotions of the artist.

The transformation of the original situation into an opaqueness renders the work of art into permanence. We may very well be able to read back into the painting the motives and emotions of the artist, but those are purely peripheral and idiosyncratic. The work of art as such is permanent to the extent that it captures something of the universal. Without claiming that Sartre would go along with my interpretation, I should point out that participation in the universal is the Platonic ideal of intuiting the form of beauty. What we perhaps have warrant to say is that Sartre makes room for the sublime as it is embodied in poetry and the arts, but his central concern as a writer is with the pragmatic and utilitarian use of prose in furthering the human end of freedom.

With regard to the reader of a text Sartre's analysis of art and prose can be applied. In the act of reading prose, the reader is thrown into the field of things and situations to which the writing refers and in which the writer and reader find themselves -- to the real world of the writer and reader. In contrasting the function of the word in prose and poetry, Sartre has said, "For the word, which tears the writer of prose away from himself and throws him into the midst of the

world, sends back to the poet his own image, like a mirror."³⁶

In the same source as the last quote, we find that Sartre has concluded that even if the poet is forbidden to engage herself or himself -- that is to take up a position toward reality, politically speaking -- this exemption from responsibility cannot be transferred or extended to the writer of prose. The writer of prose must categorically be engaged.

Sartre makes the distance between the poet and prose-writer very clear in the following passage:

... It is true that the prosewriter and the poet both write. But there is nothing in common between these two acts of writing except the movement of the hand which traces the letters. Otherwise, their universes are incommunicable, and what is good for one is not good for the other. Prose is, in essence, utilitarian. I would readily define the prosewriter as a man who makes use of words. M. Jourdan made prose to ask for his slippers, and Hitler to declare war on Poland. The writer is a speaker; he designates, demonstrates, orders, refuses, interpolates, begs, insults, persuades, insinuates. If he does so without any effect, he does not therefore become a poet; he is a writer who is talking and saying nothing. We have seen enough of language inside³⁷ out; it is now time to look at it right side out.

We may grant that the poet and the writer of prose have nothing in common. But what about the writer of novels and the writer of science? If his analysis of the writing of prose is correct, how then is literature different from science? Isn't literary prose subsumed under a genre which functions mimetically? If mimesis is the representation of

³⁶Ibid., 9.

³⁷Ibid., 13-14.

reality in literature, then isn't the descriptive writing which science produces at the stage of reporting on observations before and after manipulations of the parameters of the experimental situation under consideration, the same sort of mimesis?

It would seem that both the literary enterprise of writing prose and the scientific enterprise of writing observation protocols purport to describe reality. At least this would follow from Sartre understanding of prose writing. But then if that identity holds it would seem that Sartre was mistaken in drawing his distinction between science and philosophy after all? Must we turn to and cling to a distinction in which the novelist writes to capture the reality of human subjectivity and the scientist writes in order to convey his or her understanding of the events which s/he has investigated objectively?

If literature is prose used as an instrument with which to capture the relations between human beings, then language is a tool which throw us into the midst of the lives of imaginary characters. As a tool, it is mostly used to transport us to the realm of the living, especially into the murk and mire of the characters' inner lives. In the novel we are privileged to feel the invisible fabric which links and joins the characters, and which might even strangle them by choking off their freedom or tear them apart and fling them into a private space of isolation. Whatever the nature of the plot, the novel offers the reader an opportunity to expand his

or her own boundaries in taking up an intimate connection with the landscape of relationships contained within the text.

Certainly this richness of inner life or subjective experience is not to be found in scientific writing. But other than this obvious difference of subject matter, what is it about literary prose that makes it different from scientific prose? And what is the difference between philosophical prose and these others forms of writing? Perhaps the difference is between the intentional structures that have been imprinted in the text? If it is, then Sartre must explain how we are able to take up these links to the text as readers. It is to that explanation that we shall now turn.

-- CHAPTER 6 --

THE WRITER'S RELATION TO LANGUAGE

To enhance our understanding of how a reader can inhabit the text of a writer -- or of how communication between the writer and reader is accomplished -- we should look more closely at what Sartre considers language to be. In the following lengthy passage, Sartre informs us of just that.

The art of prose is employed in discourse; its substance is by nature significative; that is, the words are first of all not objects but designations for objects; it is not first of all a matter of knowing whether they please or displease in themselves, but whether they correctly indicate a certain thing or a certain notion. Thus, it often happens that we find ourselves possessing a certain idea that someone has taught us by means of words without being able to recall a single one of the words which have transmitted it to us.

Prose is first of all an attitude of mind. As Valery would say, there is prose when the word passes across our gaze as the glass across the sun. When one is in danger or in difficulty he grabs any instrument. When the danger is past, he does not even remember whether it was a hammer or a stick; moreover, he never knew; all he needed was a prolongation of his body, a means of extending his hand to the highest branch. It was a sixth finger, a third leg, in short, a pure function which he assimilated. Thus, regarding language, it is our shell and our antennae; it protects us against others and informs us about them; it is a prolongation of our senses, a third eye which is going to look into our neighbor's heart. We are within language as within our body. We feel it spontaneously while going beyond it toward other ends, as we feel our hands and our feet; we perceive it when it is the other who is using it, as we perceive the limbs of others. There is the word which is lived and the word which is met. But in both cases it is in the course of an undertaking, either of me acting upon others, or the other upon me. The word is a certain particular moment of action and has no meaning outside of it. In certain cases of aphasia the possibilities of acting, of

understanding situations, and of having normal relations with the other sex, are lost.¹

A few explanatory comments are required at this point. The three terms, signification, signifier, and signified are used by Sartre differently from the way a linguist within the tradition of Saussure would use them. To delimit this difference, first we should consider how the linguist uses those terms. The linguist following Saussure distinguishes between language (la langue) and speech (la parole). The former is what we would call an abstract object.

This system is one which is purely differentiated; it is comprised of differences. In the case of semantic relations, words are delimited within a metaphorical space of concepts. More properly speaking, the relationship between concepts is modeled after the phonological relation between lexical units—phonemes. Sounds are in themselves nothing, but when they are juxtaposed and contrasted with other sounds, they acquire value by their differentiation. Recognition of sound patterns is accomplished because we are able to discriminate differences. Likewise, the differences between concepts determines the meanings of words. In the Saussurean terminology, words are the signifiers; and concepts are what are signified.

Signification refers to the entire procedure by which the synchronic or state-like (frozen in time; abstracted and idealized) system of differential concepts is transformed into speech. The latter is called a diachronic process. Shifts or

¹J.P. Sartre What is Literature?, 14-15.

transformations in word usage bring about alterations in their meanings with a language system. To study speech is to study the historical process by which language sediments itself. The synchronic view of language is what distinguishes Saussure's linguistic system as a science. It is a structure and a systematic one at that. It is a system abstracted from any personal usage or relation to individual speakers, and therefore deserves to fall under the title of structuralism.

Sartre on the other hand is not the least bit concerned with what science may have to offer to an understanding of the individual. For him, the signifier is the person, the speaker, or even the conscious subject. The signified is the object of reference or that to which the intentionality of the intending consciousness is directed. The manifestation of intentionality is what Sartre calls signification. Although in Sartre's later writings, he defines language and other cultural artifacts as the practico-inert, in his early writing he renders a purely metaphorical perspective upon the notion of language and discourse.

The above quoted passage contains this metaphorical understanding of discourse and language. In Sartre we can see from the first paragraph in the quote that his use of the term signification is actually the same as the meaning that others have attributed to signs. Signs serve to direct us toward a particular destination. When words or prose are used in this same way, they are likewise signs directing the readers consciousness toward the things or objects that they are meant to designate.

Sartre's counterpoised term to sign is symbol which would be what the poet creates. Symbols are created in the likeness of the thing against which it is compared or for which it is a linguistic substitute. This can be inferred from the fact that Sartre defines poetry as opaque and prose as transparent. Language then for Sartre is the medium in which we point and call things to the attention of others. Although I am not sympathetic to the structuralist's program of eliminating the subject, Sartre's linguistic terminology is inadequate for understanding human communication because of the impoverishment of its distinctions. How are we to diagnose this problem of inadequacy?

In order to understand the problem with Sartre's system of concepts with which he maps out the space of language or describes our linguistic behavior as it originates in the art of prose, we must turn to the basis of his ontology. Sartre's ontology is from the start thoroughly social. We have already noted above in an earlier section that although Sartre is a quasi-materialist, that is he assumes that the framework within which our lives transpire is one fundamentally composed of matter. Matter is nothing without the assumed characteristics that human consciousness attributes to it.

I should be more careful in explaining this. I think that Sartre would agree with Berkeley that if a tree fell in the forest and no one was there to experience the relational changes that occurred in that situation there would indeed be no noise or sound. Sound is a purely human phenomena. Despite the fact that we have devised measuring instruments to serve

in our absence as recorders of such happenings, we must recognize that these instrument readings are nothing if not transformed by humans into a human system of meaning. Sound is not a pure physical event. Physicality as such is nothing. Even the notion of the physical is one which has its origins within a human world of assumptions. The physicality of an object is what it is because we as conscious human subjects have the potential for experiencing whatever properties we subsume under that concept. In other words, a human subject is capable of directing his or her attention to the object in such a manner that a distinction arises which we call physical. Attention is not a purely physical reaction either. It is a motivated act within a lived situation, thus attention would count as a form of intentionality. In Sartre, we find a carry over from the Husserlian and Hegelian phenomenologies. Both of these philosophers have influenced Sartre's early work. We shall turn to them now.

First we shall look at the influence of Hegel. Sartre almost directly imports the two fundamental categories of Hegel's science of mind. From Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Sartre borrows the categories of subject and substance. Of course, Hegel's philosophy was influenced in turn by Kant, Fichte and Schelling. It is in the tradition of German Idealism. Characteristic of this form of philosophical idealism is that only the mind is real. By this Hegel did not mean to deny the existence of material things, but rather to affirm that Mind/Spirit was only capable of realizing itself.

Mind/Spirit was not, in Hegel's view, a plurality of immaterial substances but a system of individuals actively developing their potentialities by embodying them in increasingly complex forms. A fundamental feature of Mind/Spirit, according to Hegel, is freedom. Nothing partial or finite can be wholly free. Mind/Spirit is the only reality and it is infinite. Human beings serve as the self-conscious aspect of Mind/Spirit. Accordingly no human being is free unless s/he is conscious of what s/he is doing, and infinite Mind/Spirit is therefore conscious of itself to the extent that human beings are self-conscious.²

Under Kojève's reinterpretation of Hegel the Subject is Mind/Spirit. The Subject of History is a collective phenomenon comprised of a system of individuals. The course of History is for Hegel the collective's realization of its infinite self-consciousness. The realization of this stance by the philosopher was for Hegel the attainment of absolute knowledge. Reaching this was achieving the point at which history is over. Individuals are determined to the extent that they lacking full self-consciousness.³

If I may be permitted to speculate on the effect that Napoleon's attack on Prussian territory must have had on Hegel who was in that territory not far from Jena when he wrote his

²The Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Paul Edwards (New York & London: Macmillan Publishing Co, Inc. & The Free Press, 1967), 436.

³Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. and ed. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

Phenomenology. I could say that Hegel was indeed quite close to "the end of history" insofar as the Napoleonic destruction could have brought about his own death. What other way would such a turn of events have affected Hegel. I should contend that the invasion and threat of death forced such grandiose thoughts as having reached the end of history to rise to the surface in Hegel's mind in order to ward off the anxiety which a threat to one's life must have caused. What is of lasting value in Hegel's conception of having reached the end of history is that we can only expect the philosopher to be at the crest of the wave of his own time. In the march of history today, it may rightly be said that few philosophers are as current in their own time as Hegel thought he was in his. Rather than criticizing Hegel further, we should see in what ways Sartre took over some of Hegel's ideas.

The subject in Sartre becomes the individual who is conscious. If anything of Hegel's collective or group Mind/Spirit remains in Sartre, it remains as the practico-inert, as the sedimented formation of group practices. In the early Sartre, we find the carryover from Hegel of the idea of the subject being free, but not to the extent that one approaches the self-conscious ideal of absolute knowledge. In Sartre, these categories of subject and substance are imported into the work entitled, Being and Nothingness as two qualities - -'in-itself' and 'for-itself'. The former is the Hegelian term for substance which in Sartre is synonymous with Being; the latter is the Hegelian term for Subject which in Sartre is synonymous with Nothingness.

These terms were discussed (in chapter 5) in connection with Sartre's realization that he was "just anybody." The break in the early and late Sartre is marked by a withdrawal of the claim that the individual is unique. The early Sartre was working out a problematic that dealt with the individual as pure subjectivity. Although Sartre always recognized the importance of matter or substance as the framework for our lives, it is not until the later work that he surrenders the plight of the individual as unique and utterly free. The difference between the position taken by the early Sartre and Hegel's view of freedom is that there is an unbridled freedom which is not demonstrated but merely asserted. Again, we might conjecture that in Sartre the World Wars must have acted as a force which became realized as an absolute freedom from the utter terror and disillusionment which the catastrophe of war must have rained upon Sartre's spirit.

In Sartre then we find some ingredients from Hegel's Phenomenology but somewhat changed. Isn't this the way all writers work their allegiance to their predecessors? For a psychological explanation of this phenomenon of borrowing from the masters, I should direct the reader to Harold Bloom's Freudian interpretation of the position of a minor poet in relation to a major poet which is found in his The Anxiety of Influence⁴. The same phenomenon may occur among philosophers. According to Bloom, the master's work is misread in order for the minor poet to cope with the anxiety created by the stature

⁴Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

and influence that the master's work forces upon the fledgling follower. Of course, even more radically Freud believed that collaborative work among men was a sublimation of homosexual interest.⁵

A non-Freudian interpretation of the relation between poet/writers would be to say that the follower is in a position to synthesize the works of several predecessors. Here I am not interested in defending either approach to understanding how things are preserved, transformed, or rejected by a follower, rather I am interested in laying out the lines of influence from Hegel and Husserl to Sartre. Later I shall defend the view that what is borrowed is borrowed because of its expressive value to the particular psychic issues with which the borrower's mind is concerned.

For now we can follow up the second line of influence from Husserl to Sartre. In Husserl, consciousness is always consciousness of something. Sartre in borrowing this understanding of the relation of the subject to substance from Husserl is firming up his particularization of the Hegelian notion of the Mind/Spirit. Perhaps in Sartre we find a more healthy response to the anxiety and threat of war than was found in Hegel. In Hegel I suggest that we have a reaction of intellectualization to the threat of death. This movement from the particular to the general and abstract is a characteristic

⁵See Wayne Koestenbaum, Double Talk: The Erotics of Male Literary Collaboration (New York and London: Routledge, 1989).

or typical defense of intellectuals when faced with danger or anxiety.⁶

Ironically this defensive movement is really an obliteration of the individual's particular experience of his or her situation. The experience of particularity or specificity would be a more healthy option. That is to say, staying with one's real situation would afford the possibility of achieving a real resolution of the impending danger, whereas the escape into intellectualization is to opt for avoidance. Unless we suppose that some sort of unconscious symbolic problem solving is occurring under the flight to abstract levels of description, avoidance would be a bad thing because the energy used to avoid or repress is taken out of service.

These issues to the side, in Sartre the existentialist call to specifics and pure individuality is bolstered by the borrowing from Husserl of a strict relational understanding of consciousness and its object. Where Sartre strays from Husserl is exactly at the point of Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological reduction. This reduction is necessary in order to begin to do phenomenology at all. It is a methodological device which remained problematic for Husserl and others.

Husserl continued the Cartesian program of attempting to achieve certainty. The reduction was meant to reach an archi-median point from which the program of phenomenological analy-

⁶Marie von Franz, "Projection and Scientific Hypothesis," in Projection and Recollection in Jungian Psychology: Reflections of the Soul (La Salle and London: Open Court, 1985), 53-76.

sis could proceed. The point which was supposed to be achieved is the awareness of what Husserl called the transcendental ego. This ego is distinguished from the empirical ego which psychology describes. Rather it is the ground of all experience; it is pure consciousness. This pure consciousness was independent of the lived world and was supposed to last even after death or destruction of the material world. Taken either way the subject as empirical consciousness is no longer operative.

In The Transcendence of the Ego,⁷ Sartre rejected the possibility of a reduction such as Husserl had proposed. We might attribute this opposition to Husserl's notion of pure consciousness as due to the influence of Heidegger. We must not forget that Sartre had studied with both Husserl and Heidegger in his stay in Berlin in 1933 and 1934. The strict relation that consciousness has toward the world in Sartre's philosophy is reinforced by Heidegger's attitude that Dasein exists in a condition of "thrownness." That is to say, the primitive state in which we find ourselves in the world is a sort of projection which is directed at the world.

In Sartre, this understanding is captured in his definition of the concept of nothingness. After analysis of the 'Cogito' as it was formulated by Descartes, and modified by Husserl, Sartre declares that

non-thetic self-consciousness ... must necessarily
be what it is not and not be what it is. The being

⁷Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: The Noonday Press, 1957).

of consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question. This means that the being of consciousness does not coincide with itself in a full equivalence. Such equivalence, which is that of the in-itself, is expressed by this simple formula: being is what it is.⁸

Although there is always a gap or non-equivalence between consciousness and its object, Sartre rejected an independent thinking substance. For him, there was no basis for two substances. His task was to reject the instantaneousness which the Cartesian Cogito supposedly possessed and to move toward the world in its totality. That is to move toward everything that consciousness is capable of experiencing. The world does not contain anything of which it can be said it has the quality of nothingness. There is no in-itself which qualifies as nothingness. Here Sartre adheres to the distinction of Hegel's between subject and substance, except that in Sartre the subject has no essence.

In Hegel's metaphysics, the human subject is structured by the spirit of its nation and culture. For Hegel,

The individual is grounded and gains his meaning through participation in the substantial life of the nation. Apart from this, the individual is accidental. ...the general work and labor, which is the substantial life of a people, is particularized in professions, social institutions, and political differentiations. ... To fulfill one's station in social life is doing one's duty, by which virtue or excellence is acquired.⁹

⁸Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), 120.

⁹G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, trans. G.E. Mueller (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), 245-247.

In strong contrast to the sentiment expressed by Hegel is Kierkegaard who answers the question of what is spirit by saying that

Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation [which accounts for] that the relation relates itself to its own self: the self is not the relation but [consists in the fact] that the relation relates itself to its own self. Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and eternal, of ... freedom and necessity, in short it is a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two factors. So regarded, man is not yet a self.

In relation between the two, the relation is the third term as negative unity, and the two relate themselves to the relation. ... If on the contrary the relation relates itself to its own self, the relation is then a positive third term, and this is the self.¹⁰

This conception of spirit is quite different from Hegel's, it is filled with rejection of the bourgeois life to which Hegel expected people to conform. For Hegel, the access which the bourgeois individual has to the realm of freedom is not through the self as it would be for Kierkegaard, but through relinquishing the privacy of bourgeois life for a commitment to the State.

I hasten to append the following passage from Kierkegaard lest the reader get the wrong impression that Kierkegaard shares more than he does with Sartre's existentialism and its conception of there being an excessive freedom available to the individual. For Kierkegaard,

The individual has his teleology in himself.

¹⁰Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Sickness Unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 146.

... His self is the goal toward which he strives.
 ... [However] In the movement toward himself the individual cannot relate himself negatively toward his environment. . . . His self must be open in due relation to his entire concretion.¹¹

To choose oneself does not mean to create oneself, at least not for Kierkegaard. On the contrary, "Self-choice means self-acceptance." The view that one creates oneself is referred to by Kierkegaard as the despair of defiance.¹² This is familiar to us because it was characteristic of Sartre's temperament.

In Sartre, a truly existentialist position is taken up.¹³ From a philosophical standpoint, existentialism gives primacy or priority in significance to existence, in the sense of my existence as a conscious subject, rather than any essence that may be assigned to me, any definition of me, any explanation of me by science, philosophy, religion or politics.¹⁴ This belief in the subject as coming before all else leads Sartre to a quasi-definition of consciousness as nothingness. Nothingness is the negation which consciousness brings into the world. Negation is the ever renewable possibility that consciousness has of transcending itself. For Sartre and Heidegger, Man is a being who is knowable according to the

¹¹Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Vol. 2, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 279.

¹²Ibid.

¹³For a discussion of the relationship between Kierkegaard and existentialism see Robert Denoon Cumming, Starting Point, 27-30.

¹⁴T.Z. Lavine, From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), 328.

projects that he constructs. In a non-trivial sense life is what you make it. Even though you may find yourself thrown into a situation of poverty, Sartre would maintain that it is always possible -- there is always a chance -- to go beyond one's present condition. Negation then is understood as the possibility of changing the material terms of one's existence by altering or abandoning the projects that have served to animate one's life -- to give it meaning.

In addition to borrowing from Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, Sartre also "took from" Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. It is possible to find the lines of the original philosophers throughout the Sartrean material. Sartre was a philosopher whose project was to synthesize. His originality lies in his re-interpreting, revising, and reworking these materials into a bold new integration which became the center of French existentialism, in the form of philosophical treatises, novels, plays, and literary and political essays.¹⁵

Although Sartre maintained a strict difference between the prose of philosophy and those of literature, it is in Sartre's literary work that we find perhaps the best elucidation of his philosophical beliefs. It is in these works, and especially in his novel Nausea that we encounter in a language alive with a consciousness that is self-interrogating a sense of excitement and fear toward the irrationality of existence.

¹⁵Ibid., 341.

Sartre appeals to his audience through the medium of literary works because,

... to Sartre, as to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche before him, philosophies are not merely intellectual constructions or games, as they have come to be regarded by some types of contemporary philosophy. Philosophies are thing we live by; they exercise a powerful effect upon human psychology and are a matter of life or death for the human spirit. And if it is true, contrary to the teaching of traditional philosophy, that nature has no rationality, and no order, is governed by no scientific laws and structured by no philosophic essences, then anything can happen in such a universe. A world in which essences do not fit existence and in which there are no necessary cause-effect relations is a world without any structure - it falls apart and dissolves, and I myself dissolve along with it.¹⁶

This quote contains in it the kernel of the dilemma as I understand it and formulated it within the problematic of this dissertation.

Let me explain: In the introduction I posed the problem as it arises in Sartre's philosophy. The dilemma is the one in which the character, Roquentin, of Nausea is caught. After days of thinking Roquentin realizes that there is no rational order in the world. Things and their names are utterly separate. Existence is brute fact; it is there. The names which we try to impose on the things around us slip continually from the surface of those things that our words are meant to capture.

Roquentin sinks into absolute despair over the possibility of completing his project of writing a biography of some person in history and of the possibility of this

¹⁶Ibid., 345.

project bringing meaning to his own life. He asks himself how he can use words to interpret the life of another. Is Sartre depicting the despair at never being privy to the inner life of another? Or is he just satisfied to flaunt in our faces the realization that words are a poor substitute for the experience of living? A person who chooses to write about the life of another is certainly a person who is timid in that s/he stands on the outskirts of existence, happy to describe another's adventures. The biographer is the one who is content to live vicariously. And yet there is a deeper philosophical despair which Sartre is posing for us in the life of Roquentin -- the despair over being incapable of ever producing a scenario of life itself.

To try to capture life in words is to engage in a echoic discourse. By this I mean that words must always, if they are taken according to the paradigm of names, follow the events that they attempt to describe. I think that in this novel and in the main character we can find the ruminations of Sartre, the writer/philosopher. Imagine the torment he must have experienced in Germany when he studied with Husserl and Heidegger. Remember Husserl was a Jew and was badly treated by the Nazis in Germany. Even though Sartre was not yet a political person, while he was at the French Institute in Berlin he was an intensely curious and empathetic person, interested as he was in the inner lives -- the subjectivity of others. He must have experienced tremendous impotence at the oppression which anti-semitism showered upon the Jews who were defined as outsiders.

Although I have not conducted a systematic study of the phenomenon of confessional writing, from what I have seen very few writers are ever allowed to write in a confessional mode. At least this seems true of writers in the academic sector. Nonetheless, in the case of writers of biographies I have found that the biographer is often attempting a disguised presentation of their own life. For instance, a writer will take up the task of writing a biography of an oppressed person. For Sartre it was Jean Genet. For Martin Duberman (a homosexual and a distinguished professor of history) it was Paul Robeson.

I should claim that the prohibition on confessional writing leads people to struggle with their own search for freedom through the lives of others. Sartre was self-avowedly angry and rebellious at the bourgeois upbringing he was forced to undergo. We could turn to his autobiography¹⁷ for support of this claim. Few writers have the guts or courage to write or to speak of their own oppression. It is likely that the ruling class is the culprit. After all it determines the budget and economy of the academy and thereby sets the limits upon the criticisms which may be launched from that sector against other areas of society. Even liberal discourse speaks for others rather than for one's self. Isn't our beloved democracy really a republican form of government? Doesn't the representation by congressional members mean that someone else is assigned the right to speak for us? Isn't our

¹⁷Jean-Paul Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman (Greenwich, CN: Fawcett Premier Books, 1964).

participation in the elective process really a surrender of our right to be heard -- to testify on our own behalf?

It isn't very hard to find antecedents for the practice of having someone else speak for us. We can look to the Bible in which what is taken as truth is never the spoken word of the person in question. In biblical times, testimony of at least two other persons was required in order to substantiate the deeds of a person. Consider the story of Christ. The truth about Christ is always revealed in the testimony of others. It is never the case that Christ is allowed to declare himself the son of God. At least Christ was not allowed to do this without punishment. In early antiquity, the custom was to have at least two persons other than one's self provide testimony about one's deeds. Then and only then, when one's deeds were witnessed was the account of those deeds taken as the truth. Is it possible that the ban on confessional writing is a carry over from the early days of oral history?

It is fashionable to attack the ruling class for being the agents of oppression, but I for one have never believed that they were really better off than those who suffer under their rule, except in extreme tyrannical circumstances. It seems to me that a clear line cannot be drawn between the oppressed and the oppressors. I disagree with the marxist line that the ruling class are the oppressors and hence are themselves free from oppression. It may be true to say that the ruling class are better off economically, and that they exploit the workers.

To my mind, machinery is not worth a thing unless human labor brings value to it by hands-on-operation, or unless humans can service the automated equipment and oversee it when production is in process. But placing those issues to the side, to be human and alive is to be oppressed by the conditions of our existence, by uncertainty and insecurity, by our own ignorance, and finally by the inevitability of our own demise in death.

Putting it that way is rather like saying of the glass that it is half empty instead of half full. More optimistically, life offers all humans a series of challenges. Without the stimulation of challenge, I suspect that we should die. This is definitely true of young children who have been deprived of enrichment at critical stages in their maturation and learning.

Issues like anxiety in the face of death, and nausea in the wake of the non-essentiality of our consciousness are common enough to the reader of Sartre's brand of existentialism and existentialism more generally. The feelings or experiences and the consequent beliefs that they engender are I suspect ones to which most thoughtful individuals can relate at one time or another. In particular the two experiences, anxiety and nausea are ones which an individual might have at a time when s/he takes time out from the movement of his or her daily activity. I am suggesting that those experiences are not common everyday ones but rather ones which result when an individual reflects on his or her condition. When reflection up-roots an individual from his

or her condition of "thrownness", s/he experiences anxiety or nausea. I should think that anxiety is the commoner of the two. We can think of anxiety as a familiar experience, whereas nausea may be reserved for the more intellectually minded individual who has come to rely more heavily on the use of words to structure his or her sense of reality and identity.

Anxiety is described by psychologists as the subjective experience which occurs as a result of holding one's breath. Try it. What happens? My experience "tells" me that if I consciously hold my breath, I do not experience anxiety. Evidently the holding of one's breath must be a sort of involuntary or unconscious concomitant of feeling afraid in order for the subjective experience of anxiety to follow. Upon discovery of what one is actually doing -- holding one's breath -- in a situation in which the individual has been overwhelmed by fear, then and only then is the analysis of a causal connection between holding one's breath and experiencing the subjective feeling of anxiety well founded. But we should pause for we have certainly diverged from the attitude which Sartre would take toward these experiences.

For Sartre, anxiety and nausea are two basic and foundational experiences of consciousness as nothingness. The reflective attitude is described phenomenologically by Sartre as the relation between the two "domains" of consciousness. Those domains are the Hegelian notions of the "for-itself" and the "in-itself." Reflection "occurs" when the for-itself relates to the body which is the in-itself of the conscious

subject. Oddly, in Sartre there is never any substantial basis for the for-itself. Nothingness is the term he used to refer to the origin of reflection. In Sartre we find just two states or conditions which he has referred to as domains of consciousness, (1) subjects that are conscious and that which directs or through awareness "acts" upon the world, and (2) things that are not conscious and that toward which "acts" of awareness are directed. In short we have the domain of the subject and the domain of objects.

The relation between consciousness and things is one which fits the metaphor of a point and plane where the space between the point and plane are connected by a line. The point represents consciousness which is positional but not spatially extended, and the plane represents the world of things which are spatially extended. The line connecting the point and plane would correspond to intentionality. This diagram which could be drawn on paper with pen or pencil is something which is meant to be used metaphorically and not to be taken literally. At least that is true in Sartre's phenomenology.

This diagram's status is somewhat problematic. Sartre had as I have already mentioned rejected the Husserlian notion of a pure consciousness or transcendental ego which realistically can be experienced upon the performance of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. For Sartre, there was no such experience. Sartre considered in the first chapter of The Psychology of the Imagination what he called the fallacy of immanence. By that he meant mistake of taking

the metaphor of containment to apply literally to consciousness. Things are not in consciousness and neither are the perceptual or thought images in consciousness.

What I am trying to approach is the problematic nature of the diagram described above. Presumably the diagram helps to illuminate or articulate what the relation between consciousness and the world is like. But in saying what it is like, we are considering a metaphor or simile. We are constructing some sort of analogy or model. Where has such a diagram come from? We might ask who first offered it as part of an analysis of consciousness and intentionality. Perhaps it was Brentano? It really doesn't matter who is given credit for it; what matters is how it is to be understood. In what process does it function? We might take a stab at answering that and say that it is in thinking that the diagram finds its place or function. But did the diagram get drawn first or was it derived by rendering of thought (image of it) into a picture? Reflect for a moment on how the diagram enters your own experience.

According to Sartre, there is no thought without language. To borrow Wittgenstein's analogy, clothes are to the body as language or words are to thought. Thoughts might exist independently of language, but unless they are manifested or expressed in words we cannot know them. For Sartre, languages differ in their expressive capacity. In an interview with Pierre Verstraeten published under the title, "The Writer and his Language." Sartre discussed his view that transporting terms which were originally part of the

philosophy of Hegel diminishes the meaning of those very terms once translated from the German into French. How can this be understood? Could it be that the Spirit of the German culture is different because the distinct set of experiences and beliefs that comprise that culture are different from the culture of the French people? Does the framework or background of culture determine the significance of philosophies? Apparently for Sartre as for Hegel it does.

But isn't it possible that the different languages are responsible for the difference in significance? For Sartre, language is not really a thing, it is a medium in which we find ourselves. It would be correct to say that for Sartre, language is a cultural artifact, not an abstract object in a Platonic sense.¹⁸

To follow out or expand upon the metaphor of medium, the language of a writer or speaker is like a liquid; if the language is German it possesses one viscosity, and if French another. If we may be permitted to allow our imaginations to run through these ideas, thoughts would have to be conceived

¹⁸In contemporary linguistic philosophy, Jerrold Katz defends language as an abstract object. For Katz, language has, in addition to the apparatus attributed to it by Noam Chomsky's Theory of Transformational Grammar, a semantic component. The semantic component is on a par with the syntactic component and is distinct with respect to the meanings that it contains. The semantic units are different from the general knowledge that a speaker acquires from his or her culture. In Chomsky, the semantic component has not been distinguished from the general knowledge that a speaker acquires from his or her culture. See J.J. Katz, Language and Other Abstract Objects (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); and Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1965).

of as being formed within the medium and hence would have an impact according to the stuff with which the thoughts were shaped.

In following out the implications of these ideas, I had in mind the possibility of determining something of the nature of what an image is, especially what status the diagram has which was put forth to aid us in our understanding of what consciousness is. What I have realized is that in constructing a model of consciousness we have not captured the essence of it, but rather have through analogy replicated the slippage or gap which was claimed to exist between consciousness and the world. That is to say that the so-called "gap" between nothingness and things was replicated as a "gap" or disparity in the model or image we proposed as having a likeness to the original relation we were trying to depict.

Each time we tried to render our thoughts about it into words we could never quite capture or represent it. We wound up merely replicating the same lack of correspondence. Let me explain: In Sartre, there is a distinction between image and percept. In this respect, Sartre is faithful to Hume. Sartre claimed that an image was something which derived its status as a representational object from its relation to the thing of which it is a copy.

This will be clearer if we note the similarity and difference with Hume's theory of perception. For Hume, we never have direct experience of the world 'out there'. The line of empiricists starting with Locke and ending with Hume, tacitly assume a clear distinction between an inner and outer

world. It seems at least that in Locke this distinction between inner/outer is conflated with another distinction between private/public. The conflation of these distinctions bolsters the difference between the mental and the physical.

Ideas were carried over from the Cartesian system by Locke. Ideas were the very stuff of which the mental was made. Remember in Descartes, ideas were anything one is conscious of including feelings, sense perceptions, recollections or memories, and thoughts of the intellect or reason (scientific, mathematical, or philosophical statements). Descartes believed that cause was an innate idea, along with God, substance, logic, and mathematics. Descartes claimed that everyone was born with these ideas in the mind.

Locke, however, criticized the notion that ideas were innate. In so doing, Locke rejected the innateness of ideas because the hypothesis that everyone had them was empirically unsubstantiated. The difference between Descartes and Locke may be put down to the varying assumptions each made. Descartes assumed only what he needed for his proofs; he put into the mind only what was needed to justify his other beliefs about God's existence and his own. After all, it is quite obvious that if Descartes lacked ideas entirely he would not have had any thoughts upon which to base his existence or against which to turn his doubt.

For instance, we are familiar with the move that he made in claiming that God exists, because a perfect, omnipotent, and omniscient being whose perfection includes the property

of existing would never have put the idea of God in Descartes's mind if it were not a true idea. Such circular reasoning may be all we can hope for in proving God's existence. But without God, the empiricists had to turn to something else in order to bolster their truth claims. In rejecting God, what else was there? For an empiricist like Locke, there was the physical world from which our ideas were derived.

To continue a little along the line of British empiricism: after Locke rejected innate ideas, Bishop Berkeley took to task Descartes's concept of substance. With the removal of substance there was nothing left to guarantee ideas their existence except the mind of God which gave our ideas and minds some sort of coherence. If not for our knowing better, we might wonder what Hume could have found to destroy, but as we know he found plenty. Hume carried out a further deconstruction of the Cartesian rationalism by criticizing the concept of cause.

Whereas Descartes had tried to keep his double allegiance to God and to science, Hume apparently had allegiance to no one but himself. And, his disputation over any self at all leaves me wondering about that as well. Even though the distinction between inner and outer worlds remains in Hume's philosophy, the only basis for maintaining the distinction is the subjective difference we experience of the impression that images versus perceptions make upon our minds. According to Hume, vividness and clarity are stronger in the case of perceptions, and weaker in the case of images. The latter are

representations or copies of perceptions. Images then are copies twice removed from the physical world.

We have arrived at the place in which the difference between the real and the imaginary are distinguished on the basis of a subjectively experienced quality or qualities. This space of experience is none other than the domain of phenomenology. In Sartre, we find a hybrid theory of the human subject. His return to the subjectively experienced difference between the real and the imaginary produces a repetition of the Cartesian reduction to thought. The difference between Descartes and Sartre is that Sartre maintains an anchor in the domain of the real at the same time that he returns to the subjectivity of the conscious subject. Also in Sartre we do not find the sharp split between subject and object, instead Sartre presents a picture of consciousness as a dialectical relation between nothingness and being, between the for-itself and the in-itself.

Sartre tried to explain what consciousness is, but in so doing he was bound to fail. The reason for failure was that consciousness is not a thing. It has no concreteness about it. There is no essence which can be captured by language. In writing about the human subject, Sartre is offering us an analysis of consciousness which is diagrammatic and spatial. The problem with trying to depict consciousness in a diagram is, as I concluded above, that we never actually "see" this relation. It is one which is constructed. It is purely imaginary.

If images are to be considered in the likeness of Humean sense perceptions (that is drawn from the material world), we must challenge Sartre to explain of what the diagrammatic-image of the relation of consciousness to the world is a copy. In the empiricist vein, we must challenge Sartre to show us how this diagrammatic-image of intentionality is derived. How does Sartre know that this diagram depicts or copies the intentionality of the subject/object relation correctly? I am afraid that there can be no positive answer to this question.

According to Sartre's definition of consciousness as nothingness, there can be no essential quality of relatedness to which the diagrammatic-image can be shown to correspond. If Sartre carries his project of representing consciousness too far, he is I should say guilty of committing an act of bad faith, a charge which he made against others that is not the least bit flattering. Bad faith remember is what a person falls into when s/he tries to establish for his or her self a concreteness and essentialness which can only be attributed to things or objects in the world.

Even the human body cannot provide a home for consciousness. Properly speaking the diagrammatic relation which I suggested above as a representation of the relation between consciousness and the world, is really a relation between the mind and body. Here mind is a substitute term for consciousness and body is a substitute term for world. The relationship between mind and body is one of intentionality. The mind is in its transparency and capacity of reflection a

Sartrean for-itself, and the body is in its materiality and opaqueness a Sartrean in-itself. The mind can animate the body through the relation of intention.

This image of the relationship between mind and body is an imaginal one. Of course in saying that we have really said nothing. An image is by its nature imaginal. The question may be pushed further, but I am afraid to no avail. The origin of consciousness cannot be ascertained, at least not in Sartre's system of thought without falling into bad faith. For instance, if the origin is sought in brain chemistry as some neuro-physiologists have tried to prove, we commit an act of bad faith because in trying to explain consciousness as a product or epi-phenomenon of brain chemistry we are reducing consciousness to materiality. This is a mistake according to Sartre. Consciousness is not a thing. It has no properties.

In trying to prove that conscious experience is only possible with certain chemicals in the brain tissue we run a ground in the following way. Think of an experiment in which it were possible to extract certain chemicals from the human brain. Disregard whether we might ethically be allowed to conduct such an experiment. Although that is no minor objection to the type of research I am suggesting, it doesn't need to be a consideration here. If we could conduct such an experimental analysis of human brain chemistry in order to determine what the necessary ingredients are for conscious experience to occur, we could not conclude with certainty that such and such chemicals produced consciousness even if we had

discovered the conditions under which a person did and then did not experience any awareness.

You can think of the experiment along the lines of a psycho-physical experiment in which thresholds of awareness are determined. That is easy enough, the subject sits in the dark and determines when they see a light and when they don't. The consciousness experiment would be somewhat parallel, except instead of now I see it now I don't, the subject would say now I experience and now . . . Now the subject has died! Such experimentation would not be possible because although we might eliminate consciousness, it is debatable and doubtful whether we could be able to bring someone back to life.

What is the criteria for consciousness anyway? In Sartre's philosophy consciousness is the only state possible. Unconsciousness is not a state which can be verified. For Sartre, anything which is unconscious is unknown and unknowable. Either something is known or it is not. Basically, it is black or white. The white represents what we can be aware of and the black is what we can know nothing about. Sartre rejected the Freudian notion of an unconscious region of experience. What cannot be experienced directly and immediately cannot be an object of knowledge or awareness. Sartre does not admit the possibility of states or different degrees of consciousness. Either something is an in-itself or a for-itself.

In the experiment I suggested above, it is possible, granting that the subject doesn't die and is brought back to a condition in which s/he is able to say I am conscious, that

the subject had left the state of consciousness in which the capacity for articulating one's experience in words is possible, and entered another state in which experience still occurs but s/he lacks the capacity to describe the experience or our awareness of what is happening in words. I want to claim that it is logically possible that a person may be conscious under conditions where it is not possible to capture what is happening in words. It isn't hard to think of such experiences. People commonly have them and call them mystical or drug induced experiences. For the skeptic, an out-of-body experience is just a vivid hallucination. If the reader has ever had an out-of-body experience, then s/he knows what I am talking about. But to a reader who has never had such an experience, such talk will seem vague and fanciful.

Philosophers generally and Sartre in particular have ignored the bizarre and stuck to describing the common place or everyday experience (Although in fairness to Sartre, some of his episodes involve the description of life on the edge). I think that this has been a mistake and our philosophies of perception are limited because of such exclusions. To the reader who has had mystical experiences it is easy to imagine having further experiences which may be beyond the capacity of description.

What I am claiming is that in Sartre, there are only two states of consciousness, the reflective and the prereflective. What distinguishes these two states is that in the prereflective condition of consciousness experience is possible but it is at the moment unarticulated. In the reflective state

articulations of experience are made. Self-consciousness seems to be tied up with language. Perhaps it is the grammaticality of language which produces the experience of self-consciousness. If this were true then discourse is what produces the subject after all.

We have just concluded with a belief that self-consciousness is a product of language. This is what might be called a strong sense of linguistic determinism. Some might object and say that we have not shown that as yet. I should agree because it is at this point still possible to claim that rather than language it is some sort of conceptual scheme which language itself presupposes that is responsible for self-consciousness. Discussion of this problem must be postponed until the issue of language and meaning is taken up directly. For the present our focus is on the question of what consciousness is. To reiterate: In Sartre there are only two states of consciousness. One is referred to as the pre-reflective awareness. This is best exemplified by pure and uninterrupted sense experience. The act of seeing or of hearing or of touching or of tasting or of smelling would fall under the concept of pre-reflective experience. This is Sartre's prototype of the relation of consciousness to the world. These acts are if you like the avenues along which we have access to the world of material things.

These avenues provide us with the content of our consciousness, although we must keep in mind that for Sartre it is a mistake to consider these so-called "contents" as really being contained in the mind or in consciousness.

Consciousness is not to be spatialized; it is not a container in which things like sense data are held until they can be inspected by reflective consciousness. What is problematic in Sartre is what status we are to give to the image in general and of consciousness in particular. Perhaps we should think that what Sartre has provided us with is a model of consciousness. But as I have pointed out above, it is not clear how we can judge the correctness of such a model even if we are to assume that images are in general models of those things which we experience in the pre-reflective state.

I have claimed that on Sartrean grounds alone it would be an act of bad faith to try to concretize this model of consciousness. By concretize I mean to give it a status as a realistic object. Consciousness and its relation to the world are in the world but not of it. By this I mean to suggest that although Sartre grants the status of reality to consciousness -- naturally because it is the source of reality for us -- it is rightly said of it that it is in the world, but it cannot be said that consciousness is of the world in any material sense like that which can be said of things. The sense which is perhaps too subtle in which consciousness is of the world is that its contents are nothing but those objects which our intentionality assumes to be there as we gaze or survey the landscape of the world as it exists or appears to us.

The model of consciousness with which Sartre provides us is something like the metaphysical self which is the subject of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein following in the

Kantian tradition upholds a distinction between the metaphysical self and the empirical self. The latter is thought to be the proper subject of investigations by psychologists. The former is the proper subject of philosophical speculation.

There can be no question of the empirical status of the metaphysical self. It is the limit or opening upon the world. Kant's notion of the metaphysical self would be as an in-itself something which through its acts of synthesis provides us with a world of experience. It is not then a thing in any sense but a logical condition which is required for any experience at all, and anything rightly considered knowledge as well. Where does Sartre fall within these traditions?

Certainly, Sartre is to be considered or judged as providing us with a synthetic model of consciousness. The way we have described the relation between materiality and the assumed relation that is immediately a corequisite of the conscious relation between nothingness and being or the for-itself and in-itself should leave little doubt that Sartre is not a naive realist.

Sartre is not philosophically speaking a descendant of Hume, no matter how similar Sartre's views are to his. It is correct to say of Sartre that he provides us in his phenomenological investigations with a hybrid of cartesian rationalism and Humean empiricism. This hybrid is I should like to claim the Continental counterpart to American pragmatism. As it is with any metaphysical system, there are no ultimate empirical tests to which the system can be

submitted in order to render the system true. I have argued elsewhere that any reduction to a monistic system is logically impossible and incoherent. It was considered incoherent because the reduction to a single element can only be understood if it is conceptually contrasted with some element against which the reduction is carried out. Perhaps theoretically we must always have a sort of dualism. Aren't there always a set of primitive terms which are undefinable but needed in the definition of the concepts out of which the rest of the theory is constructed?

I should say that the problem with monism falls within the scope of what deconstructionist criticism has made problematic of philosophy in the western tradition. Deconstructionist criticism has shown that every set of concepts depends upon what it purports to reject. Specifically, any literalist interpretation of reality depends upon a metaphorical or fig-urative model which through its own terms of analysis has set out to reject. Philosophers of a scientistic persuasion (prejudice) have stubbornly refused to see that only a dialectical perspective on reality is possible.

In Sartre we have just that -- a dialectical model of consciousness. Recall Sartre's definition of consciousness is that it is what it is not and it is not what it is. The characteristics of consciousness do not reside in an essential property contained within itself. Consciousness is for Sartre ultimately a double reflection. The pre-reflective state is a reflection of the world and self-consciousness is a second

reflection upon the pre-reflective state. In terms of "I" and "me" distinctions, the pre-reflective state is the "me" or bodily state which the for-itself assumes as its materiality, and the capacity for reflection on this pre-reflective state that is for comparison of the present state with past or future states or the contrast between the real and the imaginary is the thinking subject.

This thinking subject is forever free and indeterminate. For Sartre, although our bodies determine or present us with a facticity, we are perpetually free to choose what relation or perspective to take with respect to such facticity. The "I" is equivalent to the initiating condition for those ways in which we take up meaning in the world, they are our projects. In the case of Roquentin, he was committed originally to the writing of a biography of an adventurous man; it was that project of writing which gave meaning to Roquentin's world. It colored his every day existence; it gave substance to his life.

Even though a writer must acquire discipline in order to sustain his craft, the habits which might be said to comprise the craft of writing are always open to collapse or disruption. I should think that for Sartre, it is the look of another which contains the "force" which sustains consistency within a person's projects. What may have grown stale in a person's life can not easily be surrendered. Because others engage in bad faith they wish to treat the person who has grown tired of writing -- as is the case with

Roquentin -- as a thing also. How easily we forget that we are all children pretending to be what we are not.

For Sartre this is how it is: we are like Camus' Sisyphus, but instead of constantly having to roll a boulder up hill only to see it roll down again, we are perpetually trying to make ourselves into the thing which our given roles would like to determine us to be. In the case of Roquentin, he is doomed by others who live lives of bad faith to reenact the role of the writer even after it has become stale. Sartre too was condemned to write. Having grown up in a bourgeois family in which his early years were spent reading and then writing, Sartre lived an imaginary existence. In later years Sartre realized that to change the world one had to act, writing was not enough. At least it wasn't enough to affect the consciousness of others who had originally accepted their project of treating themselves and each other as material possessions. These others tried to amass wealth in the form of things and also constantly engaged in bad faith, trying to make themselves into the things which the various roles as entrepreneur or manufacturer demanded of them. Few people live on the edge as an authentic existentialist would be expected to live. Perhaps only Genet warranted this honorific label?

To realize what Sartre has claimed is true of us we must act so as to change the world -- to change the kind of social relations which make people into things. I am fond of reminding people to use things and not each other. But as Sartre's analysis of sex has brought to light, even the act of intimacy

is colored by the need to escape from our freedom. In the act of love-making, Sartre believed that a person used his or her beloved to get them to make an object out of themselves. The act of making-love is an act in which a person treats the other as flesh to be manipulated and to carry the lover to the state of fulfillment which is to likewise become an object for the loved one's lust.

I must say that this sounds utterly unappealing. Sartre may have been unhappy in his own sexual relations, but it seems hardly correct to say that all sex is an act in which each person tries to turn the other into a thing or object. We could call Sartre on this one by asking him if he was not himself guilty of reducing sex to some biological drive. It would appear that his mechanical explanation of the sex act fits the Freudian jargon of desire, but surely love is not the same as sex. Even if sex could be explained as a sort of bodily reflex, love is not reducible to that.¹⁹

I should like to take this moment to recapitulate what has so far been discussed. In this chapter on "the Writer and his or her Language," we have seen that Sartre takes a Hegelian and relativistic approach to language in that language is a cultural medium in which thoughts are expressed and thereby are affected by the particular linguistic structures that a given language has acquired in the course of the history of its people. However, we may also consider the direction of

¹⁹ For a full analysis of the non-equivalence and yet overlapping nature of sex and love see Ilman Dilman, Freud and Human Nature (New York and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

influence to be bi-directional. Not only does language affect the form which thinking can take, but also a people's pre-reflective experiences shape the thought that on the reflective level finds its way into the garments which the language provides. Since language is considered as part of the prático-inert which for Sartre is a culture's memory of its history, it is both producer of culture and shaper of future forms which the culture may develop.

Language is also the medium in which a writer writes. The words and expressive capacity which they possess have been determined by the materiality or facticity to which conscious subjects have addressed themselves. For Sartre there is no question that language and facticity shape consciousness. The issue is not whether Sartre accepts the empiricist theory of perception and meaning, but whether he believed that the empiricist's account could adequately explain the entirety of consciousness.

I think that Sartre would not have accepted as a label for himself that of an empirically minded philosopher. Even with the emphasis which he placed upon material conditions in his later marxist theory of social existence, Sartre was never innocent of cartesian influence. In a book which addresses the cartesian influence on Sartre, Iris Murdoch concludes that Sartre was a rationalist. His existentialist theory of consciousness and of mankind is evidence of his rationalism.

The crude case for someone being a rationalist can be made if the person believes that ideas are not solely derived from experience, but are originally determined by some

programming which the mind brings to the world. A person could be a rationalist and not an individualist. The former would only have to claim that mind in general, such as the mind of a species, determines the shape of the world according to the categories or sensory dispositions which the species' mind brings to the world. The latter would have to claim more than that mind in general possess such an influence. In addition the individualist would have to claim that every individual's mind is unique and responsible for the creation of its own world. I think that Sartre is not a rationalist in the first sense, since he has outright rejected any essential human nature which I take to mean that no pre-existent ideas exist in any group mind. Sartre is, however, a rationalist whose rationalism is at least in his early period through and through a rationalism of the individualist variety. This is a consequence of Sartre's rejection of all authority in order to assert the extreme individuality of each and every consciousness.

This was exactly the point at which the question, How is a discourse on the self possible? became problematic for Sartre. If each and every consciousness is uniquely in the position of creating the world anew or freshly with no assistance from the group or collective mind, then how exactly is communication of any sort possible? This question of communication is double edged. By that I mean that if each individual is faced with creating his or her own ideas or meaning to the utterances s/he makes, not only is it impossible to know whether the speaker and listener are ever

properly understanding each other, but it is impossible to know whether a speaker is using words correctly at all, even when he (or she) is thinking to himself (or herself).

This is so because without any standards against which to judge the correctness of usage, that is for the shared meanings of words, we have no possibility of communicating with each other or ourselves. Language must have some set of referents no matter how few. Language must have something to which it refers and this something must be in public view for all speakers to consider, otherwise there is no way of checking the truth values of any speaker's utterances. You might think that it is enough if all speakers carry the same set of meanings around in their heads as if each person has a pocket dictionary in their purse.

For Sartre this is not an option. A mentalist or conceptualist theory of language such as Chomsky's is not available to Sartre. If consciousness is not a container, then neither can the mind be one. I am not here defending or accepting Sartre's position. I am merely saying what is and is not available to us as thinkers in the Sartrean vein. Language is as practico-inert a materiality and facticity of our cultural life. It is something we share. But how this sharing is possible or how each individual consciousness gains access to language is problematic for Sartre.

-- CHAPTER 7 --

SELF-REFERENTIAL DISCOURSE IN SARTRE

I must address the contrast which Sartre wants to assert is valid between philosophical writing and literary writing and resolve the dilemma of self-referential discourse as it is found in Sartre. At this point it would be wise to restate the form which the dilemma has taken in Sartre. The relationship of the individual to the group becomes problematic in Sartre when the position, commitment, and responsibility of the writer is considered. In Sartre's conception of the writer who is committed, the writer incurs a responsibility to society to communicate the exact nature of reality with the highest degree of truth and honesty possible. The writer of prose incurs this responsibility by the very nature of his/her trade as writer.

The writer of prose must write truthfully because in taking up the task of writing prose and not poetry, the writer has declared to his/her readers that s/he as a writer is not intending to speak of the fanciful or unreal, but has led his/her readers to expect a presentation which claims a factual status in the realm of discourse. It would be deceitful to write prose in any other fashion -- at least this has been the claim which Sartre has made.

This deceit might be expected to fall under the category of bad faith. This concept, if applied in the case of the writer, conflicts with the degree of sincerity which Sartre

expects of the writer. Bad faith is the "atheist's sin" which involves a conscious subject's failing to recognize that s/he is not in fact the role which s/he is playing. Bad faith is a failure to realize that one is only playing, that one is never ontologically the thing which the role enacts. In the case of a writer, Sartre wants to claim that the writer is a conscious subject who is enacting the role of writer. In other words, I am claiming that Sartre, in demanding that the writer depict reality truthfully, is forgetting that the writer can only ever render a picture of reality which is not a representation, but rather a creative product of the writer's imagination.

Sartre has argued that the role of the writer in society is that of a person who must present whatever subject-matter s/he decides to write about in a truthful way. A writer of prose must, by the trust that his/her audience has invested in him/her, write only realistically. Thus we have a description of the responsibility of the writer in which s/he is committed to revealing some portion of reality in as accurate and careful a manner as s/he is capable. I have qualified this responsibility by mentioning that the writer must meet this within the constraints that s/he bears according to his/her self-consciousness of his/her own participation in the universality of the role as writer.

Sartre wanted to claim that the prose writer and the intellectual were one and the same. Certainly we should like to leave more room in the category of prose writer for a

writer of fiction -- for the realm of the dreamer, the romantic and the science-fiction writer. I suspect that Sartre may have had in mind in his earlier writings a rough approximation of the notion of the intellectual which he later defined in the interview I discussed above.

Sartre is hard pressed to work within and work his way out of the Cartesian distinction between subject and object (world). On the one hand Sartre seems to be saddled with the dichotomy between subject and object insofar as he wanted to claim for the prose writer the realistic status and possibility of capturing the world or object in a representation. The writing and the language of the writer is the medium in which such representation is possible. The status of language is that of the material realm. As a good Cartesian, Sartre must maintain a separation between consciousness and the things of which it is conscious. The violation of the freedom or slippage between the conscious subject which includes the subject's reflective capacity -- and possibly also the pre-reflective awareness as well -- is an act of bad faith.

On this we must be clear. Whenever a subject as consciousness forgets or claims the status of thingness -- the role which is playfully enacted -- s/he commits an act in bad faith. Can we say that the prose writer in playing at capturing reality commits an act in bad faith when s/he loses the spirit of play and identifies him/herself as a mirror -- a mirror in which reality is re-presented? I think so. Although Sartre was not in step with the science of his time, he

did try to claim that the philosopher as a prose writer has the responsibility of performing the act of mirroring or reflecting by communicating a representational view of reality. Sartre's failure to realize his own paradox may be explained by his own condition of writing as an intellectual who, with the limits of his own class background, was pretending too strongly to be able to enact the role of writer as mirror. Perhaps the American sociologist is not the only one at whom Sartre should be pointing his accusing finger. Perhaps he himself deserves indictment.

Sartre receives indictment in this dissertation by means of the revelation of the paradox: he is inconsistent in living up to the requirements of his own confession. This is where the dilemma comes in. It is not only Roquentin who is in the paradoxical position of realizing that language cannot serve to replicate the structure of the world: Sartre is there as well. And he is there as a philosopher, too.

We would all like to agree with Sartre that the philosopher must depict reality truthfully in his/her writing and speaking, in his/her discourse; unfortunately, the distinction between the real and the imaginary has been blurred. That is, the distinction has been asserted more out of hope and out of need than from experience. Here I am claiming that experience is the continuum in which distinctions between real and imaginary are asserted, but that they are never ultimately proved in the sense that Sartre and others would like to be able to do.

I find it amusing that Sartre, as hard pressed as he was to draw a distinction between intellectuals and technicians, failed to realize that the intellectual just as surely as the true scientist (as contrasted to the technician who applies the creative research or refines the calculations of the scientist) will in principle never discover the true nature of reality. My claim is that we can never dissect the universe and examine its parts piece by piece to check out our theories or representations of the real structure of the universe. Einstein, one of the greatest physicists of all, realized this:

Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of a mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison.

I have included this quote from Einstein because I think that we must realize that what Sartre had hoped could be captured by the writer is in fact beyond the grasp of writers no matter what the subject-matter of their discourse. According to Einstein, revealing the exact nature of the mechanism to

¹Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics: From Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1938), 27.

which our physical concepts are addressed is in principle unrealizable.

What then happens to Sartre's conception of the writer's responsibility to his/her audience? What happens to Sartre's campaign for promoting the conception of writing prose and of philosophers communicating the exact nature of material reality? I should say here that both Sartre's ethics of responsibility and his poetics of writing (in which communicating is distinct from literary conception) are imaginary products of Sartre's consciousness. The reader should not mistake me as saying that what Sartre tried to do was or is not of value.

If experience and discourse are given center stage in our philosophical musings, Sartre's energy can be redirected into a project which is still compatible with his own intentions. Assume that there is no definitive reality "out there" against which our theories can be measured. This claim is a reason why language cannot serve to represent the structure of the world. The structure of the world is presumably made of matter. That is what we assume when we declare that reality is material. But as this century's physicists have discovered -- or perhaps we should say 'have created and imagined' -- the nature of matter is not directly observable. There is no answer to the question of the nature of matter. Today we are no further along in this search for a proper answer than were the early pre-socratic philosophers who hypothesized that matter consisted of some variation on a set of basic elements including earth, air, water and fire.

My attitude toward this seeming lack of progress is one of amusement. I do not wish to gloat over this condition. It is hard, though, to contain my astonishment at all the energy directed into the so-called external exploration of human reality. I cannot help compare the human race -- or more specifically human scientists (technicians) -- to a colony of ants, constantly tearing down the leaves of trees in order to create the mulch taken underground for cultivating their dietary fungus. Perhaps the comparison is unfair. If so, it is unfair to the ants, which at least direct their endless, repetitive labor toward survival. Can the same be said for scientists? I think not, at least insofar as scientists make themselves busy with their inquiries. I should make clear that I intend to deprecate the labor of the technician, and not the real scientist who is, to my mind, indiscernible from the true philosopher. Both are engaged and thoroughly committed to the exploration of life. They are the group with spirit. They are a breed not lacking in imagination.

In determining the difference between the true intellectual and the technician, or the true scientist and the technician, or the true philosopher and the technician, or finally the difference between the true writer and the technician, we have relied on an unexamined notion of there being no difference between reality as such and reality as we imagine it to be. The problem of elevating perception to a higher status or plane than imagination is a topic which arises in the discussion of Sartre's writing.

Sartre is perhaps not unlike Kant: neither was abreast of the current thought about physical reality. Sartre was not informed on quantum mechanics: his ignorance of modern physical theory was due to a stubborn existentialist refusal to consider the musings of the scientists of his day. Obviously Kant is not here faulted with ignoring developments in the construction of non-euclidean geometries which arose only after his death. My point is that information about developments in physics and mathematical theory would have required different approaches to Sartre's and Kant's subject matters; and they would have experienced themselves and their worlds differently. The discourse which comprises their philosophical writings would consequently have been different, as well.

With respect to Sartre, my speculation as to what he would have thought or written had he known what was happening in modern physical theory is an exercise in fantasy. It is a fantasy which may, however, be considered more reasonable than the parallel fantasy of what Kant might have thought or written had he known of non-euclidean geometries. As ephemeral fantasy, there is no requirement to ground such speculation. On the other hand, inferences about a writer's motivations and intentions, valuable as evidence or support for any argument about his/her work, are very much to the point. Good writing or speaking makes such intentions explicit. To suggest that given additional information Sartre would have

said and written differently is a direct inference gleaned from what Sartre had to say about consciousness in general.

I would like to explain how this inference is possible. Consider what Sartre claimed about the relationship between the conscious subject and that of which s/he is conscious. Consciousness is for Sartre most definitely awareness, but most often an intellectual awareness which is called reflection. The separation between the knowing mind and the body of which the mind has different states of awareness was of course the Cartesian inheritance for which Sartre and other French thinkers -- if not all of modern philosophy -- are both grateful and bewitched. The gratitude results from the establishment of subjectivity as the ground for certainty.

What we can rightfully infer about what Sartre might have thought if he had been privy to the kind of thinking about the material world which modern physicists (i.e., quantum theorists) have put forward as explanations of matter is that Sartre would have had different views of reality had he known the reality claims of quantum theory. We can be sure of this because for Sartre, consciousness is above all else reflexive. It is influenced by language. His consciousness would have been shaped differently if he had been exposed to the writings of those whose interests led to the development of modern physics. How can we be certain? If Sartre was saying anything, he was saying that consciousness (mind) and world (body/matter) are interdependent; one shapes the other while being shaped by it. However, there is one rather large quali-

fication: the mind or consciousness, although always conditioned, still has the possibility of going beyond its present conditions. That is, the mind has some factor of freedom with which it can transcend its own situation.

Sartre must, if he is to be consistent, apply this same analysis to himself. So if he were to have had modern physical theory as part of the conditions which influenced his reflective consciousness, that consciousness would have arisen or developed out of a different ground. But the problem for Sartre -- that is, the reason why he ignored or had to ignore the findings and theorizings of modern physical theory -- is that he had rejected the possibility of one's thoughts being affected by anything of which the subject was not conscious. Situations, although conditioned by materiality, were not determined in a causal manner. The old split between subject and object was still reserved for the purpose of asserting the existential freedom of the subject.

The model of consciousness which Sartre claimed was correct included a reflective relationship to material reality which guaranteed truth (as correspondence between the mind and material realms) and a dialectical relationship in which the mind could, through its imaginative function, exercise choice from among possibilities which were imagined as variations upon the material domain. This second element in Sartre's model of consciousness is a faculty which may rightfully be called a hangover from Sartre's Cartesian legacy: the transcendental subject. Admittedly, Sartre tried to dissolve this

connection to Descartes, but was not completely successful. The residue of Descartes' transcendental subject remained in Sartre's notion of a dialectical relationship between subject and object. It remained as the phenomenological subject, capable of reflection of an imaginative and representational kind, and thus could be proclaimed as the maker of history. Although Sartre needed the tie to material reality in order to guarantee truth of the correspondence variety, he wanted to reserve the independence of the subject to the highest extent possible.

The other perspective from which the issue just discussed can be approached is that of Sartre's rejection of the Freudian unconscious. As shown in earlier discussion and contrast with Freudian determinism, Sartre claimed that consciousness was equated with awareness. Thinking, though conditioned, was not determined. This is the rationalist strain which was carried over from the Cartesian tradition.

Although Sartre improved upon the Freudian blunder of positing a repressive mechanism and censor, he also is caught up in the difficulties of a representation theory of perception. Sartre's improvements upon Freud lie in his explanation of discrepancies, which he called bad faith. Sartre is confronted with difficulties largely because he holds perception as antithetical to dreaming, and ultimately he opposed imagination to reality. Perception is our only route to reality; dreaming is the source of, if not the paradigm of, imagination.

The ultimate difficulty which Sartre faced is due to his use of analytic categories, that type of category defined by boundaries that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Analytic categories derive from Aristotelian logic in which if A represents a certain state of affairs, one cannot assert both that A is and is not the case. The law of excluded middle is applied as an explanation if not a prescription for how we can characterize reality. Something cannot be and not-be at the same time.

This law of excluded middle is thought to be a general law of logic and of thought, but it is to my mind only a generality which holds if space and time are thought of in terms of Newtonian physics. Common sense tells us that according to our normal states of perception, an object cannot be present and not present to our view at the same time. This view of perception works, however, only if the notion of real time is accepted. By that I mean if we think of the mind as a representation of the actual field of objects "out there," then the dimension of contact between the inner and outer arises. Visual perception may be either offering us continuous contact between the inner and outer or it may be interrupted in such a fashion that the relation between inner and outer is one of sampling the field (field of objects). If there is no real world out there which is perceived by us, how are we to judge writing as authentic? Even if we reject as Sartre did the Freudian notion of repression and the unconscious as a store of individual memories, surely authenticity

is merely the beating of one's breast in exclamation that one is telling the truth.

Of course the question of authenticity must be raised because it is just this which Sartre has claimed to be at issue. A writer is authentic when s/he is communicating sincerely and truthfully. In Sartre's sense, that means describing and depicting reality -- showing how things are. In that sense, Sartre's project (and our own, if it pretends to follow in the spirit of Sartre) must be considered ontological. To be more precise, reality is not the realm of nature but of social reality -- "the situation," as Sartre calls it. In the Sartrean shadow, what I am trying to do now is what Sartre did in 1947 when he wrote about the situation of the writer in that year. I have chosen to be reflexive about the writing of a dissertation some forty years later.

I do not agree with the notion of authentic which Sartre has provided me: as a notion it is not well spelled out and it is with that incompleteness that I am dissatisfied. Sartre's sense of authenticity is that as a writer one must write politically. From that perspective, the writer in post-war France of 1947 had an opportunity to continue the movement of the Resistance against the tide of dictatorship and totalitarian government. There is a sense in which totalitarian governments all share a perverse tendency to enfold the individuals in their society in the mantle of conformity. I am claiming that the profession of philosophy has moved in that

same direction -- the direction of conformity to the extent that the individual voice is muffled and distorted.

In Sartre I find hope of returning to a philosophy which is about people. And, I might add, about people as they find themselves, not as they are taught to see themselves by an invidious establishment bent on profiting from an economy of war and destruction. It is within the dialogue with Sartre that my aim or project of self-construction can be most readily attempted; though I think that Quine has also provided possibilities which could not be found in Sartre alone.

Actually, the proper delineation of the dissertation should fulfill the promise of writing philosophy in such a way that the subjective and objective approaches are dialectically counterposed. By this I mean philosophy as confessional. Not merely confession as the self-expression or autobiographical exposition of the writer, but where confession is a dialectic between the subjective and objective. In appealing to the Hegelian terminology taken up by Sartre -- and used as the analytic categories which constituted his basic or social ontology and about which Sartre never took a critical stand either appreciatively or justificatorily in any written work -- we can explain that the dialectical counterposing of the subjective and objective approaches are parallel to the method which Hegel took up in his Phenomenology of Mind.

Hegel considered the critical idealism of Schelling as inadequate because, although Schelling had related the critical philosophies of Kant and Fichte to the goal of Absolute

Knowledge, according to Hegel he did not do this in a way in which the subjectivism of Kant and Fichte was dialectically related to the Absolute Knowledge of Science. The correct way to accomplish the interrelation of subjectivism and objectivism is to counterpose them dialectically -- which in point of fact turns out to be, for Hegel and for myself, creating a phenomenology with the subject or natural consciousness as the starting point. Thus the categories of subject and substance which Hegel assumed as the basic categories for a logic of existence were to be the components of the finished project of phenomenologically arriving at the end goal of Absolute Knowledge.

The route that my own project of defending the conception of philosophy as confession has taken is an interpretation of Hegel -- or perhaps an unconscious use of Hegel -- to achieve an integration of subject and substance. If the reader has been following my exposition thus far, it will be clear that the choice of Sartre's existentialism was for the purpose of imitating the return to subjectivity which is paralleled in Hegel's introduction to Phenomenology of Mind in which he starts by considering the natural consciousness of the subject. Of course in Hegel this return to subjectivity begins with a return to the sensory. But,

This return to the sensory is not paralleled in science, which remains with its general laws or, perhaps, seeks new applications for them, or in religion, which remains focused on the depths of the heart. ...This return is for Hegel required by the nature of the aesthetic universal itself. Unlike an animal species or a natural characteristic such as the speed of light, the aesthetic

universal is not one and the same for a number of different phenomena. It is itself defined by just those individual phenomena it structures in the work and cannot be understood independently of them. It follows that an aesthetic universal, though possessed of a kind of rationality, does not belong wholly to thought in the way that general laws of science do. It rather stands "midway" between the sensory and intellectual.²

Accordingly, by making

...recurrent reference to the sensory material of the work of art ...[an individual] reaffirms the work itself as a concrete, sensory individual phenomenon, and ... affirms as well his own original sensory and affective experiences with regard to it. The encounter with an art object thus "liberates" the spectator, in a sense beyond both theoretical and practical exercises of mind, in that, the work of art reconciles him with himself.³

In Hegel's words,

the self in relation to the [art] object ... ceases to be the abstraction of both noticing -- sensuously perceiving and observing, and also of dissolving individual perceptions and observations into abstract thoughts. In this [beautiful] object the self becomes concrete in itself, since it makes explicit ... the unification, in their concreteness, of the aspects hitherto separated, and therefore abstract, in the self and its object.⁴

This passage from Hegel provides us with an understanding of the kind of liberation which is thought to be achieved in aesthetic experience. It is precisely this experience which I am after in pursuing the conception of confessional writing with which this dissertation is concerned. And, there is

²John McCumber, Poetic Interaction: Language, Freedom, Reason (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 84.

³Ibid.

⁴G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 114.

perhaps no better or fuller way of achieving liberation than through making of oneself a work of art. We can approach in this manner an understanding of what is involved in taking, as some have claimed Nietzsche did, life as literature.⁵

But perhaps even more than in (what I have quoted from) Hegel, it is in Kierkegaard that we can find a discussion of what it means to use writing to counterpose subjective and objective thinking.

Objective thinking is wholly indifferent to subjectivity, and hence also to inwardness and appropriation; its mode of communication is therefore direct. It goes without saying that it need not on that account be at all easy. But it is direct, and lacks the elusiveness and the art of a double reflection, the godly and humane solicitude in communicating itself, which belongs to subjective thinking. It can be understood directly and be recited by rote. Objective thinking is hence conscious only of itself, and is not in the strict sense of the word a form of communication at all, at least not an artistic form, insofar as artistry would always demand a reflection within the recipient, and an awareness of the form of communication in relation to the recipient's possible misunderstanding. Objective thinking is, like most human beings, so touchingly kind and communicative. It imparts itself without further ado, and, at the most, takes refuge in assurances respecting its own truth, in recommendations as to its trustworthiness, and in promises that all men will some time accept it -- it is so certain. Or perhaps rather so uncertain; for the assurances and the recommendations and the promises, which are presumably for the sake of the others who are asked to accept it, may also be for the sake of the teacher, who feels the need of the security and dependability afforded by being in a majority. If his contemporaries deprive him of this consolation, he makes a draft on the future -- so certain is he. This type of certainty has something in common with that independence, which in independence of the world

⁵For example see Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

needs the world as witness to its independence, to feel sure that it really is independent.

The form of a communication must be distinguished from its expression. When the thought has found its suitable expression in the word, which is realized by means of a first reflection, there follows a second reflection, concerned with the relation between the communication and the author of it, and reflecting the author's own existential relationship to the Idea. Let us yet again cite a few examples; for we have plenty of time, since what I write is not the expected last paragraph which will complete the System. Suppose that someone wished to communicate the following conviction: Truth is inwardness; there is no objective truth, but the truth consists in personal appropriation. Suppose him to display great zeal and enthusiasm for the propagation of this truth, since if people could only be made to listen to it they would of course be saved; suppose he announced it on all possible occasions, and succeeded in moving not only those who perspire easily, but also the hard-boiled temperaments: what then? Why then, there would doubtless be found a few laborers, who had hitherto stood idle in the market-place, and only after hearing this call went to work in the vineyard -- engaging themselves to proclaim this doctrine to all. And then what? Then he would have contradicted himself still further, as he had contradicted himself from the beginning; for the zeal and enthusiasm which he directed toward the end of getting it said and heard, was in itself a misunderstanding. The matter of prime importance was, of course, that he should be understood; the inwardness of the understanding would consist precisely in each individual coming to understand it by himself. Now he had even succeeded in obtaining town criers of inwardness, and a town crier of inwardness is quite a remarkable species of animal. Really to communicate such a conviction would require both art and self-control: self-control to understand inwardly that the God-relationship of the individual man is the thing of prime importance, and that the busy intermeddling of third parties constitutes lack of inwardness, and even an excess of amiable stupidity; art enough to vary inexhaustibly the doubly reflected form of the communication, just as the inwardness itself is inexhaustible. The greater the artistry, the greater the inwardness. If the author of the communication had much art, he could even afford to say that he was using art, certain of being able in the next moment to insure the inwardness of his communication, because he was infinitely concerned

for the preservation of his own inwardness; it is this concern which saves the individual from every form of slovenly positivity. ... Ordinary communication, like objective thinking in general, has no secrets; only a doubly reflected subjective thinking has them. That is to say, the entire essential content of subjective thought is essentially secret, because it cannot be directly communicated. This is the meaning of the secrecy. The fact that the knowledge in question does not lend itself to direct utterance, because its essential feature consists of the appropriation, makes it a secret for everyone who is not in the same way doubly reflected within himself. And the fact that this is the essential form of such truth, makes it impossible to express it in any other manner.

But I am afraid that for all the good conveyed in this lengthy passage the Self of Kierkegaard is problematic for its essential nature and the author is incapable of finding a way to truthfully communicate inwardness and thus Kierkegaard is not helpful to us in resolving the problem of communication between individuals about the nature of the self; whereas in Sartre, I have found the unity of subject and substance posited in his concept of subjectivity to be, not an isolated Cartesian subject, but rather a subjectivity which is a communion of the categories of subject and substance in the rendering of consciousness, which for Sartre is a relation of the for-itself and the in-itself. In fairness to Kierkegaard, I must say that in dealing with the relationship between the subject and the soul he took on an infinitely more difficult task than Sartre was prepared for. The difference between Kierkegaard and Sartre in this context is that whereas the

⁶Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 70-73.

former took on the subject/soul relation, the latter took on the subject/body relation which was no small task either.

The necessity for taking up the early work of Sartre was dictated by my own reading of the current refusal by Anglo-American philosophy, especially the "style" of the tradition which parades under the banner of analytic philosophy, to admit the necessity of the subject in a dialectical counterposing of subjective and objective approaches to the writing of philosophy. The dualities which represent this antagonism between subjective and objective have been variously taken up (to my mind) as that between idealism and materialism, rationalism and empiricism, philosophy-as-literature and philosophy-as-science.

My diagnosis of the ailments which have created the current state of isolation between the Anglo-American tradition and the Continental tradition (if not outright arrogant dismissal) is one which has tried to show that the refusal to communicate on these matters is a refusal to take up the Hegelian problematic. In making the diagnosis I have attacked the self-images of both traditions, although admittedly I have found myself in greater sympathy with the Continental tradition, which of course claims Hegel as a significant member -- at least if I am correct in my account of the clashing between the respective images of the two traditions. Perhaps the clash between philosophy-as-literature and philosophy-as-science is only an apparent clash caused by limited self understanding of the Anglo-American tradition.

In taking up my iconoclastic banner, I have set as my task the reconciliation of these oppositions, real or illusory.

In order to understand the way in which a clash of self-images operates, it may be helpful to turn to the situation of two lovers. It may be clearest in the case of two fighting lovers, that when each has an image of his/her respective self and of each other, the flow of the relationship may be in discord, but not of their own doing. By that I mean that self-image cannot be held accountable for the complete determination of the relationship because self-image is only a partial representation of the reality of the respective selves. Although we would prefer to think that our actions are made in the balance of a cognitive reflection on our situation and what we take to be our self-interest, this is hardly the case. It is a simplification. Our interactions are often occurring at an unconscious level, at the level of the body which has its own logic when it comes to feelings and emotions. I have in mind the operation of ambivalence in human communication. What some have studied as the "double bind" situation is definitely a case in which moves toward self-interest are in conflict with moves that are self-destructive.

In any event, the point I wish to stress is that we cannot place the credit or blame for all our actions at the feet of our self-images, since many ways of emotionally relating to others are conditioned as habits which remain outside of conscious reflection. Any psychology of interpersonal relating must consider both these levels in an

analysis of a dyadic relation. Besides this, we also have disparities between one person's self-image and the other's image of him/her. This all makes for extremely complex computations in trying to lay out the possibilities for outcomes to any conflict. When you then try to think out what it means for two groups to clash according to their respective, collective "self-images," the resulting conflict can truly boggle the mind, as does the current case between the Anglo-American philosophers and the Continental Tradition.

The self which is assumed as agent in liberal conception of what it means to be an individual is patently false. The self is not an isolated and independent entity. The liberal conception of the self is but a moment in the analysis of the flux of interdependent relations. In order to avoid digression at this point I shall only say that the factionalism in the philosophical communities which has been constituted under the self-images of philosophy-as-literature and philosophy-as-science is analogous to the disputes that occur in relations of greater intimacy (at least they are defined as more intimate) where two lovers have self-images and images of each other that do not coincide. The clash of images is eliminated if we achieve a higher state of self-consciousness.

The state of consciousness in which self-images prevail and dictate confusion and unhappiness has been variously dubbed by Hegel as unhappy consciousness and by Sartre as mauvaise foi. The transcendence of this condition is reached in the process of achieving a dialectical counterposing of subjective

and objective approaches to philosophy. That can only be understood by a being who has reached authenticity (Echoes from Kierkegaard above); and this must be the proper way of understanding what can be meant and what Sartre must have meant by achieving authenticity in one's own writing and hence too in one's life. These are the purposes to which self-referential discourse should be directed.

THE PROBLEM CONSIDERED AND RESOLVED

My suggested resolution of the conflict between philosophy-as-science and philosophy-as-literature includes a scenario which is something like the following: when individuals begin to question their so-called identities (up to now constituted along (highly masculine and gender-distorted lines) as separate and independent), they will realize that their individuality was falsely won by membership in a professional group. People who have been marginalized so that the dominant group can maintain a temporary psychic equilibrium know best what it feels like to have a rupture of one's consensus consciousness, and know also that the group's identity and all the hardware of science contribute to this experience of reality. Once a person begins to feel the impact of alienation from the group life by virtue of being used by the group to establish and maintain its own psychic balance, and begins to understand that this marginalization is actually an invitation to spiritual awakening, s/he can begin to negotiate with the group based on a new comprehension of what is really involved in the process of individuation. Jung understood this process better than Freud. In fact, it was banishment from Freud's inner circle of disciples that afforded Jung, in the experience of marginalization, the chance to become individuated.

It is as a gay iconoclast that I assume my place in this process of individuation and, in this dissertation, try to

negotiate an opportunity to move the life of the self deeper into its own territory, the mythic realm. It is with that end in sight that I make the case against resting with the science of our day and with the consensus consciousness which has been its product. Or to borrow prematurely on a quote from Nietzsche,

"Reason" is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, change, they do not lie...but Heraclitus will remain eternally right, that being is an empty fiction. The "apparent" world is the only one: the "true world" is merely added by a lie... The true world we have abolished: what world has remained? the apparent one perhaps?... But no! with the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.

Embodied in these remarks by Nietzsche is his understanding that the true world which is constructed (and which I submit is the scientific one) is really a kind of lie in that it is imaginary. In the sense that it is imaginary, it is an idealization. We do not have to look very far to find such fictions: take, for instance, Chomsky's idealization of the grammar of an idealized speaker of a linguistic community. Much of analytic philosophy's linguistic analysis is based upon just such legitimization device as Chomsky's. It is the portrayal of linguistics as a science within the fold of psychology that I find interesting. Again, to relate this to Nietzsche, what Chomsky has created is imaginary. His idealizations may in fact fit no one. And how do we decide upon the fit? The so-called apparent world in which Chomsky's ob-

⁷Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 36.

servation of performance is supposed to occur is only brought into existence at the same moment that the lie is told, the same moment the idealization is created, or more specifically when the assessment of competence is made. Of course for Nietzsche, the demise of the world also brings with it the shattering of the self. I shall show below how this self/world dichotomy can be understood.

In Sartre, the concept of authenticity achieved an honorific status. He used the term in commending writers who, when engaged in depicting reality, were also committed to articulating the relationship between the particular and the universal. In the interpretation which has focused our attention so far in the dissertation, the particular and universal have taken the form of the individual and group respectively. For Sartre, the individual qua writer has a responsibility to the group to portray reality accurately. It has been Sartre's contention that the bourgeois intellectual is not an intellectual if there exists within him/her a conflict between the way in which the universal has been instantiated and that particular individual.

The example Sartre chose was the sociologist in America, existing in a conflictual situation because this so-called intellectual (relabelled a "technician" by Sartre) was a theoretician charged with the responsibility of addressing issues in his/her domain -- the sociologist's domain being "society" -- in order to facilitate the actualization of an individual in whom the universal nature, the nature of the

group as a collective, was to become instantiated. The outcome of the process just alluded to would be what Sartre called a "universal singular." This is a difficult concept and needs some expanding at this point. As I understand the concept "universal singular," it means a person who as an individual acts in particular situations in ways which symbolically relate to the universal condition of the world. Here the world may variously be the group, society, culture, or universe. "Symbolically related" is a loaded term. The difference between an arbitrary and a symbolic relationship depends on the way in which we construe language.

The contemporary view toward meaning is that the correlation between sounds and meanings is an arbitrary one. This is assumed in order to account for the differences in sounds which constitute the utterances of different languages. Roughly, English and French, for example, are considered to be capable of translation. Although the sounds in each language are different (i.e., "cold" and "froid") they are both taken to be equivalent in respect to their meanings. In order to corroborate the view that all human beings are capable of mutual understanding, it is assumed that different languages must share some connection with a common set of meanings, or possibly of concepts. In Sassurean linguistics, these concepts correlate with sound patterns. Since there are many languages, it is assumed that the different sound patterns are used in arbitrary ways to refer to specific concepts. Each language will have a specifiable semantic/syntactic/phono-

logical set of rules for mapping the common set of meanings or concepts onto the specific phonological patterns which count as words and word orders.

In order to translate between two different languages, we employ an assumption about the basic similarity of experiences that native speakers of both these languages are capable of having. This is also the understanding that Quine has reached in his analysis of the situation of radical translation. Very simply, the experiences of the English speakers in our example must be the same as the experiences of the French speakers. In the illustration we are considering, the experience of cold, perhaps identifiable as a drop in body temperature below 98.6-degree-F must be roughly the same for English and French speakers.

The determination of equivalence between the experiences of both speakers depends upon some method of objectifying the presence of a cold condition. We rely on science for that. The psychophysicist is the person who has taken care to determine human thresholds for cold, heat, pain, etc. The experience is considered as subjective or private, yet is related to or identifiable with external or publicly-verifiable conditions. The latter may also be known as intersubjectivity. This explanation has been needed in order to show what kind of shared experience assumption underlies even translation of the concept of cold from one language into another, and it is precisely this assumption I wish to examine in the following paragraphs.

The model of language and of understanding which is embodied in the contemporary linguistic perspective sketched above depends upon a very basic conception which it has been the project of this dissertation to criticize -- the liberal conception of what it means to be an individual. This view is itself an idealization which, as a lie in the Nietzschean sense, threatens the process of individuation, which I see as the task at hand for a philosophy worthy of that name. For those in the liberal political tradition, an individual is such only if s/he is independent from other persons, who may be similar in many respects except that the identities of these individuals are protected by the condition of existing separately in space and time. The condition of separation may be exaggerated further by claiming that the individual has a private and a public dimension. This corresponds to the distinction between inner and outer. The "inner" of an individual is perhaps most personal, and a particular view of one's separateness may be experienced as a form of isolation.

It is my contention that the assumption of individuality in its liberal form is responsible for the problem which I have found in Sartre and others as to whether a discourse on the self is possible. To understand this, I must explain that this way of conceiving of individuals is due to the constriction of experience to the sensory mode. I suggest that we can better account for our humanness if we consider ourselves as having available to us four modes of being: the sensory, the

clairvoyant, the transpsychic, and the mythic.⁸ These four modes are ways in which the Hegelian categories of subject and substance can be understood. The mythic mode of being may in fact be argued as equivalent to the stage in Hegel's system called Absolute Knowledge.

My argument is this: if science is an imaginary production, why permit ourselves to be dominated by someone else's fantasies? Why not indulge our own imaginations in order to learn about a world of our own making, instead of inheriting the burdens of a world dictated to and for us? Behavioral psychologists of this century have, for the most part, been obsessed with prediction and control of nature. Today's science of human behavior constitutes a reality which is their nightmare rather than my own dream. Why am I obligated to accept their ruminations over control? Why should I accept their demonstrations in the form of experiments as proof of a world in which causality is the operative principle dominating human mentality? I insist that we force these issues into the open, returning to the original questioning that earlier philosophers pondered. My choice would be to live in a world of wonder rather than a someone else's mechanized fantasy.

LeShan's four modes of being (or some other expanded terminology of the same variety) would be useful because in our discussion of Sartre's writings on consciousness, it has appeared that there is only one "state" of consciousness --

⁸Lawrence LeShan and Henry Margenau, Einstein's Space and Van Gogh's Sky: Physical Reality and Beyond (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1982).

"state" in quotes because I do not think Sartre would agree to such a term. His phenomenological analysis of conscious-ness did not include a dissection of consciousness into states; however, he did explore various relations that we have toward our body and toward others in Being and Nothingness. Sartre borrowed the categories of 'in-itself' and 'for-itself' from Hegel. It is important to keep in mind that Sartre's phenomenology had as its aim the discovery of the ontological ground of existence, which is to say that Sartre was most properly engaged in a project to write the fundamental and irreducible categories by which existence could be thought. As mentioned before, his project was faithful in this respect to its Cartesian roots.

Ontologically speaking, Sartre still sought the ultimate and eternal categories by which we can think about our own existence. Even though he can be read as saying that existence precedes essence, I think this is misleading: his real interest or emphasis involves what can be said or reflected in conceptual thought. Reflective consciousness is his primary concern. Considering the dialectic between conscious-ness and that of which it is a reflection, Sartre should have distinguished more carefully between what Wilden calls the digital and the analog.⁹ Therein lies the question of how a discourse on the self is possible. I have said that for

⁹Anthony Wilden, "Analog and Digital Communication: On Negation, Signification, and Meaning," in System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange (New York and London: Tavistock Publications, 1984), 155-190.

Sartre it takes this form: Is a self-referential discourse possible? Does discourse reveal or cover up (distract from, look aside from) the self?

As I mentioned earlier, this dilemma is seen most clearly in Sartre's novel, Nausea. Roquentin (plausibly a literary charter presenting Sartre's own dilemma as a writer) sinks in an existential sandpit when he realizes that his writing keeps him from living his own life, keeps him removed from his own first-hand experience. Furthermore, the attempt to capture in words what one has experienced is not only a detachment or distancing from that very process of experience which in Sartre is referred to as pre-reflective, but also, in attempting to reflect on this level of the pre-reflective, one must analyze a continuous flow into discrete parts in order to categorize the nature of these discrete units of experience, which is in the beginning nothing of the sort. Not in Sartre's terminology but in Wilden's, what Sartre is concerned to describe is an analog process of communication. This can only be thought by first admitting the continuous flow of experience, which is alluded to with metaphors like flow and continuity, into a digital form.¹⁰

It may be instructive to think of self according to the model of a hologram. In such a model, every individual is interrelated in a way similar to that in which parts of a holographic subject (i.e., a flower or person's head) are found within every sector of the hologram. That is, if you

¹⁰Ibid.

were to tear up a hologram, you would still be able to project the entire three-dimensional image of the original subject from any one of the pieces. That is the wonderful trait of holograms: any piece contains all the visual information needed to project the whole image. The waves, when focused to a standard laser beam as referent, allow for information storage of an extremely unusual kind, as though every part of the hologram inter-penetrates every other part. I am suggesting that the hologram allows us to represent ourselves differently. The model of holographic information storage, when applied to the self, allows for representation as interdependent and interrelated selves rather than individual, independent, separate selves. And the composite of all selves in their so-called past, present and future is "contained" in this analog form which we can call the universe.¹¹

The way we can use this model to rethink Sartre's problem is to claim that selves are communicating in analog fashion on a continuous basis. By that I mean to claim that we are always experiencing at the pre-reflective level of consciousness. All stances -- and the situations in which we take them or make them -- are meaningful. There is no such thing as not behaving. As Sartre had claimed, whatever we do is an act. It is not possible to get one's self outside of the arena of action. When we remain still, we are either resting, sleeping, or dead. There is always meaning to our stances. Ex-

¹¹Karl H. Pribram, "Holograms," in Languages of the Brain: Experimental Paradoxes and Principles in Neuropsychology Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), 140-166.

perience at the pre-reflective level is continuous and always meaningful. It is the nature of experience that is meaningful, and different experiences are qualitatively variations of meaning.

Against this "stream of consciousness," to make a hybrid term which borrows from William James' term "stream of thought,"¹² we can consider our reflections as articulate overlays. The conceptualization of experience is an activity which forms our experience by a kind of intrusion. Think of words as interferences with the primary level of experience or medium of meaning. Our reflections are not mere innocent pictures; they are intrusions which serve to shape and mold our pre-reflective consciousness. Words affect our bodies. When someone says "I love you" our bodies, by their capacity to carry significance, are in fact implicated in the realization of this phrase, which can carry with it a commitment. In Sartre's terminology, we can think of the utterance of such a phrase as the initiation of a new project. As a project it is an activity which bears a certain amount of risk, and thus it is the importation of value in our lives. To tell someone "I love you" is an act in which one pledges to the other a right to make claims on one's freedom. Is it not when in love that our lives are expanded? The scope of our experience swells to encompass what was private, both of our own and of the other.

¹²William James, Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, 1980).

Something like this must be involved in commitments of that type.

The truly awakened one, the mystic for example, realizes that we are all in this condition with respect to each other, regardless of whether we say the words and consciously reflect the commitment. By this I mean that in the mystical mode of being, all things are as they can be thought within a holographic model of selves -- selves not separate but one. The expansion of consciousness is the way in which these realizations are brought about. Our thinking can certainly influence us to come to these conclusions: there are several ways or paths along which the heart and mind can unite.

It has been the group activity which has set the parameters thus far for social interaction. I am calling for attention to the process of individuation in which selves can constellate themselves so that the "ego" or intellectual consciousness does not continue to interfere in the process toward which we become integrated. The way that the "ego" interferes is to try to dominate and form the pre-reflective consciousness to act according to reason (with a small "r"). Reason in that sense is what the bourgeois person thinks is the ultimate. This includes the idea that experience can be bifurcated into public and private. The establishment of a domain of privacy is nothing but a rationalization of greed and selfishness. It is an attempt to delineate boundaries where no boundaries can exist. The world is as Heraclitus saw it -- in flux. The world may very well be all that is the

case, but in being that it is always a world of experience first and one of things and selves second. Wholeness is required before any dissection or analysis can be undertaken. The search for the given or immediacy in this century has failed. That may be because the given is not specifiable except to assume that all is interrelated to all. The given is the whole of what there is, was, and shall be. What a tall order, to put that into words!

In working with a process conception of the self, I have been trying to articulate -- that is, to represent -- this process by articulating a model of how we might think of ourselves. But in this activity of representing, I am not claiming any separate reality "out there" as corroboration for my story or imaginative version of the world. The best I can do is appeal to an evaluation of the consequences for us of thinking ourselves in this way. This is the pragmatic dimension which James and Dewey tried to explore. At another time I shall have occasion to think through the consequences of this imaginative version for what we have believed about truth. Suffice it now to say that correspondence as it has been understood must fall by the wayside. No structure can be used to judge whether our versions have represented or pictured exactly how things are. Structure is brought into existence with the dialectic of reflective and pre-reflective consciousness.

Part of what I mean to suggest to scientific-minded individuals is that they look for themselves in their work.

By that I mean that in the picture which was created of a world in which self and things are separate (and here "things" can include other selves as well), we must decipher or decode what is being expressed rather than what is being described. Description, in the context of thinking that self and things are separate and independent, is a use of words to do what one uses pictures or photographs to do; that is, to capture a likeness of the subject. Describing along these lines is modelled after realistic painting: the writer is an artist who tries to paint the world in words.

It has been Man's dream to crack the cosmic code and lay bare the secrets of the universe, thereby discovering secrets about himself. Well, if the code can be cracked it must be in the sense that I have alluded to here. We must learn to see our selves in our work. We cannot afford any longer to remain hidden in the process of creating our world. The dictates of professionalism -- objectivity, detachment and formalization -- cannot be upheld.¹³

We can only hope to deconstruct what we have constructed. As Vico understood, knowledge is possible of what we have ourselves made, not what God has made.¹⁴ Knowledge is itself the result of intrusions into our pre-reflective consciousness. It may be our lot only to be able to realize what we

¹³Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

¹⁴Giambattista Vico, The New Science, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968).

have ourselves created. A modicum of surrender of our egocentricity is, after all, involved in the process of individuation. Reflective consciousness has its place in the process of self-development and of world-making, but it cannot be the dominant factor. We must, so to speak, sit back and let things happen if anything is to get underway.

Luckily for us, it would seem that individuation is in some good sense self-correcting. But then we shall never know absolutely, since no blueprints or maintenance manuals came with our bodies. We are of necessity in this process from the ground up.

It is my choice to pursue the path of knowledge which leads to the self. In part, Sartre has been a necessary jumping-off point because in his writing we could sustain an interrogation of the self without being quickly shunted from this task by analytic philosophy's imposed delineations between speakers, language and world. [See my discussion of Blackburn below.] The larger aim of my argument is to focus the field of philosophy by using the question of how a discourse on the self is possible. This requires a reorienting of values. Sartre is an ally in allowing us to discuss the connections between morality, aesthetics, and politics.

Perhaps Hegel was questing after the same goal in his attempt to articulate a larger capacity for Reason. The latter Reason is a rationality which is not contained in some faculty within the human brain, but when articulated is a reflection of a world order in which organicity, historicity

and wholeness prevail. What I am claiming is that the problem of how a discourse on the self is possible arises at the point at which we try to transform what is most basically an unending process being carried on between the organism and the environment, or between the subject and the object.

The first step in digitalizing the continuous process is to discriminate between "in here" and "out there."¹⁵ It would seem that in our culture this line of distinction comes to rest at the level of the skin: what lies under the skin is subject; what lies outside is object. In Sartre, however, the line does not fall exactly there. The distinction between subject and object is a boundary between subject as spirit and object as matter. Sartre was apparently more comfortable accepting the Hegelian categories rather than conceptualizing the subject as a form of matter. The latter way of substantiating the subject or grounding it within the body was not the proper way, according to Sartre, who was following in the Cartesian tradition and modelling consciousness after the perceptual model of perceiver and perceived. Whatever sheds light upon the activity in our bodies or in the surrounding environment is what Sartre means by consciousness. It is not something, it is rather a nothing without the body or surrounding environment. The environment and the body are nothing except what has been socially attributed to them. There is no untainted set of categories which is more natural

¹⁵See Karl H. Pribram, "Feelings," in The Languages of the Brain, 167-183 for a careful explanation of this distinction.

or primitive than any other. If that is not our understanding, then we have failed to appreciate Sartre's social ontology. Or perhaps I should call it a socialized ontology.

The use of categories to describe things like "body" and "environment" must be seen as involving a social history. This can be seen especially with the term "environment," which has only a recent usage since the advent of social awareness and conscience concerning the way we treat our surroundings. The use of "environment" carries with it an ecological conception of our bodies connected to an ecosystem.¹⁶

To think that I have explained the move from analog to digital communication by addressing these ways of speaking is to fall into error. The very change which has occurred in our consciousness by which we now think of ourselves as part of an ecosystem is a transformation of the self that we are trying to capture in our understanding. The problem for Sartre and for us is that we learn much through analog communication (non-verbally) and yet in theorizing or reflecting on ourselves we alter the very continuity we have experienced at the analog level. It is along the analog dimension that a change in awareness has been achieved, but we are not satisfied with that level of appreciation. We attempt to go

¹⁶See Donald Lowe, History of Bourgeois Perception (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982); Missia Landau, "Human Evolution as Narrative," in American Scientist Vol. 72; David Michael Levin, The Body's Recollection of Being (New York: Routledge, 1985); and David Armstrong, The Political Anatomy of the Body (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

further in that we try to digitalize these non-verbal experiences and put them into words.

The Hegelian categories were taken as analytic (logically exhaustive) and as oppositional (logically exclusive). Wilden refers to such categories as 'either/or' and claims that they are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. He argues in System and Structure that such categories are misleading because it is assumed that the systems to which they apply are closed systems. Wilden states that such oppositions are really imaginary. When the system that includes human beings is properly considered, Wilden claims that it is apparent that the system is not closed but open. As an open system, the categories are really better understood as having a 'both/and' relation. The Hegelian dialectic between subject and substance is, in Wilden's view, entirely imaginary.¹⁷

I can agree with him there, but I do not go along with him when he imports the category of the real, to which the category of the imaginary is juxtaposed. Wilden affirms his allegiance to Marx rather than Hegel. This is not offensive to me because some of the political positions which Wilden takes up his writings are actually quite admirable. My disagreement arises when he retreats to the honorific application of the real in order to stand on firm ground, whereas we must settle for matters of human construction and social convention.

¹⁷Wilden, System and Structure, 356-361.

Building upon the writing of Sartre, I claim that a different context is needed in order to solve the problem of a discourse on the self or, as it was for Sartre, the problem of self-referential discourse. If language is part of the practico-inert as Sartre claimed -- that is, in the domain of matter -- how is it possible to use words to communicate the self-organizational structure of reflective and pre-reflective consciousness? Remember that for Sartre, reflective consciousness is our window on the world, whereas pre-reflective consciousness winds up being in the world as body and matter. The former reflective capacity is what it is because Sartre chose to follow in the Cartesian tradition of assuming that the subject was best denoted as this capacity of reflecting. Although Descartes claimed that this essence of thinking was the foundation for proving our own existence and thus for him essence preceded existence, I think it is possible to understand Descartes as having claimed that, at the very moment we think, we are also assured of our own existence. There is also a strain of pragmatism looming within his Cogito, because the content of thinking also determines our existence.

Sartre understood this, and cast that understanding in his own existential theory of consciousness by claiming that ultimately every subject is free to alter his or her own projects. For Sartre, our commitments were only good for as long as we desired to sustain them. That is easily seen in his novel Nausea, in which Roquentin decides one day to remove his energy from the project of writing a biography of an his-

torical figure so he can live out his own adventure by taking up a more active life, one not of writing and reflecting but of action in the arena of lived experience.

We can read Sartre in two ways here: first, writing is an activity which attempts to represent the art of reflection. In the case of Roquentin it is Sartre writing about the act of writing about lived experiences in another time or epoch. We can think of the writing as thinking about thinking. Secondly, we can also understand Sartre's character as going through another change, a change in sociality, a change in politics, and in a symbolic sense of writing as a metaphor for living, a change in his aesthetics.

The first level of change is a change in values. Our projects -- here compare writing about others and action with others -- are the ways in which we inject ourselves in the world and hence, as praxis, carry valuation with them. Our commitments (projects) are manifestations of value: what we risk is determined by its value for us. In this sense it can be said that some people choose to live out a life of great value. They choose to invest life with value by taking great risks. In Sartre's eyes, engaging in the resistance against the Germans would be a high-risk and highly-valued act. Writing a biography, on the other hand, would not be highly valued since it requires little risk. Since freedom is the supreme value which can be "cashed in" by living one's life in a particular way, Sartre as a bourgeoisie eventually reached the understanding that writing was not a highly valued

activity. It is unfair to say this categorically. While it is true in a modified sense that Sartre believed that action was better than writing, he also held that some ways or forms of writing were more valuable and more respectable than others. This was the persuasion he declaimed in What is Literature?

In referring to writing as a metaphor for how one chooses to live one's life, the second sense I mentioned above, we must think of living as a kind of writing (narrative in form) and we must think of the world as a text. As participants in a social community we are in this second sense all creating the projects in which we invest our time, and thus are constructing the selves that we become. It is in this sense that writing is symbolic and representational of the lives we lead.

Sartre understood that his theorizing about the relation of language to reflective and pre-reflective consciousness was of great importance in terms of politics. Here as elsewhere in this dissertation I mean by "politics" the distribution of power. Although Sartre in his early musings about writing was decidedly unhappy about the ways in which writing could influence the world, he later used what he understood about the individual's consciousness to influence the individual's relation to the group. By thinking of writing in the second and symbolic sense, we are able to bring what was of a more private nature (concerning the individual's consciousness) into the public arena of the world, transforming the social relations and hence the world. Subjectivity must always

retain this power to transcend itself. Sartre does, and shows us that there are no restrictions in boundaries between values, aesthetics and politics. These are only separate if we assume the separateness and independence of the individual. To assume that is to open the doors to bourgeois theory.

In building upon Sartre's philosophy, especially his understanding of the relationship of reflective consciousness, pre-reflective consciousness, and language (practico-inert), I must preface the specific articulation of the conceptual scheme containing a structured relation between consciousness and unconsciousness (which I think allows us to resolve the question of whether a self-referential discourse is possible) with some more general remarks about context, subjects, and texts. This is necessary because it is only within a particular context that the relation between subject and structure becomes problematic. In our case, the subject is defined as consciousness and the structure is language or more generally, the practico-inert.

The dilemma for Sartre is that if the subject is not conceived as supremely responsible for making history --which is what the world turns out to be for him -- then there can be no subject at all. If there is only structure in which classes of rulers and ruled are the determinants of history, the individual becomes whatever those productive forces render him to be, as Althusser claimed. The clash between Sartre's Existential Marxist position and Althusser's Structuralist Marxism is focused exactly on this point of contention. In

Althusser's zeal for founding a science of history (historical materialism) as an empirical discipline, he does not merely supplement the subject with structure; structure in fact replaces and dominates the subject. It has been my contention that neither Sartre's view nor Althusser's is correct. Either we have individuals as subjects or we have structure as a collective subject with no individuals. We cannot have individuals in the latter case because the concept of agency has been reduced to another level of explanation. The will is explained away as an epi-phenomenon. However, we can avoid these pitfalls by introducing a few useful distinctions. These are:

Texts:

The notion of a "text" will be useful because it is, after all, the form which language is given. Texts can serve as metaphors for the world. When taken in that way, the relation of the group and individual subject can be considered dialectically rather than determinate. Text becomes the context in which subjects relate to the structure which the group (class) provides. For authors, the structure provided by the group is named according to its genre. The genre is a specification of the form which writing can take. It sets up a particular relation between author and audience. The latter is the instantiation of a special case of subject/ structure or individual/group relationship. I shall begin with a discussion of the basis of our understanding of context.

Context of perception:

Any act of looking for something presupposes a field in which things are noticeable, which is to say that acts of perception (discriminations) presuppose a field in which there is minimally a distinction between figure and background. The thing which we may set out to look for is assumed as a possible object because it is something which can be detected by us. In perceptual terms, this thing will, on the moment of being found, be called the figure. Everything else to which it can be compared or against which it can be contrasted, or from which it can be distinguished, is called the background.

Subject/world or self/world as figure/ground:

The distinction between self and world is actually another way of instituting the figure/background relation. The context of analysis arises when we abstract from the perceptual situation the figure/ground relation and apply it reflexively. Merleau-Ponty was correct in asserting that perception is primary. Derivatively and reflexively, the self comes into existence as an object of analysis by applying the figure/ground distinction to the field in which self and world can be thought. I am not claiming that this is the way things really are; I am assuming that this is one way in which we can organize our experience.

To my mind, a partial test of the truth of a conceptualization like the one I am putting forth concerning the context of perception and the context of analysis is whether the idea is useful. Usefulness is, of course, a pragmatic notion. This is one of the conditions we use to test out our ideas.

We see how they affect us. That is, we determine the consequences in lived experience. It may very well be that we decide in the balance to accept ideas which have happy consequences, as William James said. Other criteria used to judge conceptualizations are coherence and correspondence -- although what I have in mind for the latter two is quite different from what has been said under theories of truth which bear those same names.

In all contexts of perception, whether visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, etc., all states of consciousness or all possible contexts for experience are disposed to conform to a perspectival geometry. This must be so because contexts of experience are spatialized. Our conception of context is one which is generated by an expansion of our basic intuition of space: talk about contexts depends upon our capacity to discriminate between figure and ground located along a dimension of depth, and hence of space.

The notion of containment is necessary for us to think about contexts. I point out that as an intuition, containment is understood experientially. The lived experience of being a body is everyone's situation. We are, each of us, spirit in matter. It is up to each person to decide whether embodiment is experienced as a trap or prison, thus limiting, or whether embodiment is experienced as a privilege or freedom, thus enabling. In either event, our embodiment is the condition which allows us to intuitively grasp what it means for one thing to contain another, or for a thing to be contained

within another. The constant learning which we do as embodied spirits provides us with the background against which to thrash out a context of analysis for these concepts.

Kant must have had something like this in mind when he spoke of the relation between subject and predicate. His analysis of this relation assumed that the predicate was contained in the subject. If that is first considered as an analysis of a sentence and its grammar, then derivatively and reflexively we can interpret the sentential subject/predicate relation as a special case which stems from our own experience of containment within our body. For example, Kant tried to explain the predication represented in the sentence "All bodies are extended." What he wanted to analyze is the connection between bodies and being extended. To my mind, we can make this comprehensible because we have the understanding of what it means to be extended ourselves.

My experience as an embodied spirit is the ground against which the sentential subject/predicate relation is intelligible. By the latter, I mean that the meaning of linguistic or grammatical relations is founded upon a pre-reflective experience. Grammatical, linguistic, and logical form are perhaps collectively figures of speech which derive their meaningfulness from our bedrock of experience. I think that is what Wittgenstein had in mind when he claimed that 'forms of life' were the bedrock upon which 'language games' could be erected. Ultimately, I think that the proper grounding for this intuition of containment and of space is the mystical

experience of cosmic consciousness. This latter experience is one which might happen in a flash or may be approached gradually in the exercise of meditation. The latter process is one in which the subject/world or self/world split is dissolved into the ground of all being.¹⁸

Unless and until an individual has reached the understanding which is brought about by such a mystical experience, s/he is doomed to wander about in the labyrinth of language or false conceptions. By false conceptions, I mean taking as real whatever distinctions can be made in language. Language does indeed affect our consciousness as Sartre understood, but language and reflective consciousness itself was and is a troublesome split in which our experience seems to be one of self-consciousness.

Language is a condition of reflexivity. It no doubt provides the limits of the world. We limit the world by digitalizing our experiences. This latter form of intrusion into our consciousness dialectically transforms our experience into something other than what it was in our particular representation. Wanting to represent the structure of the world is a hopeless cause. Given the nature of reflection, we can only hope to move things along in directions that are desirable. Reflective consciousness cannot fully capture the world because it is a derivative and reflexive happening. By limiting the world we do, however, transcend it.

¹⁸Arthur Danto, Mysticism and Morality: Oriental Thought and Moral Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

Sartre's philosophy is basic in reaching this sort of understanding of ourselves and our world. In his earliest papers he argued against Husserl's notion of a transcendental ego. Consciousness is not a thing, nor is language a thing: they are elements in a context of analysis. In Sartre, we find much that supports this framework. But by importing and conflating the bourgeois distinctions between inner and outer and between private and public, he set up barriers among selves. No doubt, lines must be drawn in order for responsibilities to be determined.

Ironically, Sartre's weakness lies in not doing it all for us. His theory is a totalization without a totalizer. He attempted a God's-eye-view but without a God. The strength of Sartre's philosophy is its reassertion of the importance of personal responsibility.¹⁹ In *Roquentin*, we have the portrayal of this reckoning within the subject of the issue of personal responsibility for one's life -- for the way we choose to live out our existence. Language was deemed responsible for the distinctions which we experience. Those distinctions most generally were between self and world or things as consciousness and things as objects. These distinctions as they were handed down to *Roquentin* and to

¹⁹In Marxist class analyses of history there is a tendency to defuse the importance of personal acts. Some happy medium must be reached in which responsibilities are determinable and credit and excuse are possible. This must be so even for Marx, because his entire economics is founded on a labor theory of value. Marx claims that it is possible to determine whose labor is to bear the fruit of production.

Sartre were part of the practico-inert of the bourgeois world into which both were born.

Sartre's plight -- and therefore Roquentin's -- was to come to terms with what the world was when they first came upon the scene. But it is not quite precise enough to say that, either. What I mean is that language and the practico-inert are the hand-me-downs of our society through which we are inducted into group life for its and our benefit. Perhaps the experience of "losing it" is best found in the experiences that Roquentin had on the park bench when he realized the slippage of linguistic terms upon the very canvas of his perceptual ground. The mistake we can make in interpreting this is to think that when this experience happens we have gone wrong.

We have not gone wrong. The experience is best thought of as the birth of individuation. It is a turning point in which authority is won back from the group. We must, I would urge, question the values which the group has conditioned us to live by in order to become responsible for our actions. Of course, no one ever reaches a complete state of considered judgment. No one ever gets to rethink everything. There cannot be a state of presuppositionless experiencing. Our conceptual scheme is always incomplete. And incomplete it must always be: Language cannot serve to replicate the structure of the world because the world has no structure, at least not one which is fixed and unchanging. Without the possibility of transcendence, our worlds would at least lack

excitement. At most, perhaps there would be no world and no us.

Text as context of self/world:

Where does the notion of a text enter our discussion? Between writers and worlds is a third term -- text. How does a text serve to provide us with a discourse on the self? How is a self-referential discourse possible? Wasn't the latter the problematic situation? For Sartre, the group, through language, distracts us from or covers up the self. It does this paradoxically by fooling us into thinking that there is a fixed self and a fixed world, each independent of the other. By maintaining the illusion that there is a world against which we can compare our versions, we are constantly held in the power of the group's authority to legitimize our versions. The normalization of versions and of subjects is the result of knowledge/power of which the group is constituted.

Until someone had the confidence to say the emperor had no clothes, everyone acted as if he had. A similar farce or hoax is being perpetrated on us. Schooling must continue to cover this up so as to sustain the interests of the group --in this case, the ruling class. Sartre undertook to free himself from the ruling ideas in which his childhood was clothed. Each of us can spend our lives trying to free ourselves from the social conditioning inflicted upon us. To think that we can ever totally transcend these conditions is optimistic, but I will not say it is impossible. There may be something of a limit in the very nature of transcendence. Since transcending

is a process which goes from here to there, the going is always a transition in which some of the old is always addressed in bringing in the new. In terms of figure/ground relations, the ground of our existence is what has sedimented into habits. These are used to construct new ways of experiencing which form in relation to older forms. Our reflections or older models are thus necessary to the creation of new ones.

All discourses, if they are conceived of as a process in which subjects and worlds come into existence, must be imaginary. The use of the term "real" enters into situations where authority is being invoked. After all, it is when disagreement arises that we find people arguing over what is really "real."²⁰ Under conditions of scarcity, Sartre said that we would act according to the master/slave relation. The latter refers to dyads as well as different groups of rulers and ruled. But there are no individuals without simultaneously there also being groups to which they can belong. We are social animals through and through. Within language or a shared form of life, we gain existence as individuals. Each of us must muster our forces so as to discover to which camp we shall or may belong. These are the myths which structure our lives: without myths, no lives.

Since there is no reality apart from this context for interaction, we can say that the domain in which a discourse

²⁰Paul Watzlawick, How Real Is Real: Confusion, Disinformation, Communication (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).

on the self is possible is an imaginary one. Imaginary domains are always constituted by the juxtaposition of differing models. The motto is choose your model and come out fighting. This is exactly what I think we are left with. Rather than playing the unresolvable language-game of reduction from Spirit to Matter or Mind to Body or however one wishes to frame the opposition, we can place these oppositions within an imaginary framework, precisely such frame as I had promised to build in the passage above.

By calling this framework imaginary, I do not mean to devalue the oppositions. I merely say that we need both Spirit and Matter as concepts in order for the language-game to be playable. It is like a game of hockey: without two end-zones, the opposing teams cannot score points off each other. It is the same with the philosophical game of defending mind over matter or vice-versa. What my version of the world does is place Spirit and Matter within a context which I call imaginary. This is the context of percepts (visible) and concepts (invisible), both of which are images. It is possible to say that Spirit is the paradigm for invisibility and matter is the paradigm for visibility; however, this depends on the context of discourse.

Discourse is a domain which relates to the imaginary. Discourse is a practice of articulating the imaginary, which practice involves taking things symbolically. This must be so because all our behaviors or communications are overdetermined. Each utterance or articulation is an expression which

carries with it the possibility of several levels of meaning depending on the contexts in which it can be placed. Science has not liked this. Rather, the dominant group's way of making versions is such that language was claimed to have a representation capacity for picturing the way the "real world" is.

All discourse is, however, a projection of some value. For scientific discourse, the values which motivate the project are those of the members of the dominant group who hold the authority for normalizing subjects. In fact, the human and social sciences are nothing if they are not this practice of normalizing subjects according to statistical models of what man should be. The working of science is to find a world which is real. But I insist that these sciences must fail at representation because the structure of the world is an imaginary creation.

The discourse is structured by idealizations. Those are what is claimed as real. For example, Chomsky's idealization of a speaker who has internalized the grammar of his/her language is a well-respected linguistic maneuver. Jerrold Katz argues that we should raise the level of idealization to a height at which language becomes an abstract object. The latter is considered real in the Platonic sense of the Forms being real. There are problems with the latter construction in that it forgets that it is imaginary. Katz parades his construction as a real thing which can be studied independent of anything we might want to say about himself or his

allegiance to the dominant group. We have had occasion to address these issues in the chapter on the scientization of philosophical discourse.

By placing these oppositions and language in general within the context of the imaginary, we can begin to understand the relativist position that there is no world structure against which all our versions can be measured and judged as true. There are only versions which can be infinitely generated and infinitely compared with each other.²¹ I propose that in this imaginary space we can think of texts as standing in a figure/ground relation. Depending on who is speaking or writing, we can determine which version is the figure and which is the ground. Writers must always write within a tradition, and this necessitates that s/he speaks with a particular tongue and writes against a library of other texts.

The position which is acceptable within my present writing is the one in which all writing is generalized as a metaphor for our lives. With metaphor's characteristic of "standing for," in this particular case of writing or text related to living or life, the text becomes a metaphor for life and writing has the same relation to living. In other words, in order to avoid the unacceptable situation in which only writers are said to have or be a self, we must treat the concept of writing more abstractly than Sartre did.

²¹Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis and London: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978).

By employing the term "metaphor" at this point, I do not mean to say that all we have is metaphor. Again we are plagued with our concept of opposition, which requires that the metaphorical must be contrasted with something which is literal. Within language we are perpetually shifting from term to term. If language is thought of as a dictionary of sorts, then it is clear that we can spend our lives roaming from term to term because each word is defined in terms of others. Language, like its dictionary, constitutes a continuous parade from discontinuity to discontinuity. Words are juxtaposed within a matrix of other words and also embedded in the sounds of silence.²² This is not as strange as it may sound. It is nonetheless in marked contrast to what the analytic philosopher would find comfortable.

The position which we must take with respect to Sartre and whether a self-referential discourse is possible is as follows: the problem of self-discourse arises because Sartre wishes to keep alive "the one-dimensional phenomenological prejudice that identifies truth with immediacy to the 'things themselves,' pre-reflective consciousness, and the lived."²³

In Sartre's commitment to the myth of self-genesis and total freedom, he maintains a reluctance to take up a more interesting notion of institution. Language, as practico-inert, is

²²Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," in Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 39-83.

²³Dominick LaCapra, A Preface to Sartre (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 167.

only conceived of as limiting the freedom of the individual. He fails to consider a "more creative repetition in institutional life that limits historical change by playing with and, within limits, playing out excess."²⁴ As an institution, language is perhaps best thought of as being of the latter type.

Sartre remains blind to these possibilities. In his obsession with freedom, he continues to embrace a more formal version of the myth of self-genesis in methodological individualism. Rather than prove that the individual is free from the group life and from institutional constraints, Sartre dogmatically asserts such freedom in the form of a possibility of continual retreat from and renewal from one's projects. In this respect, he would claim that fundamental to consciousness is its power to negate. This is quite faithful to Sartre's Hegelian roots. Negation is perhaps a linguistic operation anyway, although in Sartre it appears as a capacity of consciousness. It is nonetheless accomplished because we sediment our reflections in language and then reject them.

Although we are apparently able to change or alter the course of our own development, we are not necessarily free to take up absolutely anything. To be able to do the latter, we should certainly have to be Gods. As humans, we are confined to plodding and piddling along. Only in our imaginations are we seemingly capable of anything and everything. Remember, in the early Sartre, writing and reading were escapist. They

²⁴Ibid.

were pure acts of imagination. In his middle period, Sartre changed his notion of the pen as magic wand to the pen as sword. In that period, best exemplified by What is Literature?, he demands that the writer be committed in his activity. Perhaps Sartre's witness to the lack of response to his words in the face of war and his participation in the Resistance made him change his petty-bourgeois faith in the effectiveness of writing. Sartre evidences a change of heart and mind in later years, when he was aligned with more overtly active and revolutionary groups. Before this happened, we can interpret Sartre's writings as a denial of the coercive power of collective consciousness over the freedom of individuals.

I claim that the nature of the self is such that the self is constructed as we go along, and it is burdened in every case with the situation into which we arrive or find ourselves. This situation is always a social one in which language and other institutional arrangements set the parameters within which we commit ourselves to projects which are themselves activities in which repetition and change are the choices. That is, we can choose to repeat the structures in which we live or we can try to alter them. This is in keeping with the sense that Sartre imparted to consciousness. Perhaps in his zealotry and out of his sense of danger, Sartre only pursued a path of complete self-genesis and total freedom until he began to alter the real roots of his oppression, which stemmed from his family relations.

To determine whether this is true, we must look to his writings on Baudelaire, Genet, Flaubert, and his autobiographical piece. During Sartre's middle period, he wrote Genet. Of that book, he had the following to say:

I have tried to do the following: to indicate the limit of psychoanalytical interpretation and Marxist explanation and to demonstrate that freedom alone can account for a person in his totality; to show this freedom at grips with destiny, crushed at first by its fatalities, then returning upon them to digest them little by little; to prove that genius is not a gift but the way out that one invents in desperate cases; to find again the choice that a writer makes of himself, of his life, and of the meaning of the universe, including even the formal characteristics of his style and composition, even the structure of his images and of the particularity of his tastes; to review in detail the history of his liberation.²⁵ It is for the reader to say whether I have succeeded.

Ironically, although Sartre had attempted to report the course of Jean Genet's liberation, Genet's reading of the book served to paralyze him. Surely this would serve as an instance to reinforce Sartre's confidence in his ability as a writer to affect another's life: apparently Genet was so thoroughly shaken by the depth of Sartre's analysis (which included a depiction of Genet's original choice) that he needed six years to recover his own grasp on what course his writing should take. He was aware that he could continue to turn out a certain mechanical pornographic novel, but he was not content to do that.

Sartre praised Genet's writing for its capacity to make homosexual desire comprehensible to heterosexuals. In his psychoanalytic interpretation, Sartre concluded that as a boy,

²⁵Jean-Paul Sartre, Genet: Actor and Martyr, 645.

Genet took up the categories which his step-parents had applied to him. First he objectified himself as a thief, then as a homosexual, and finally as a writer. It was only as a writer that Genet began to realize the extent to which his original choice (to accept the categories of the other as his own) had determined the course of his life.

From this case study, we can understand the dialectical nature between the lived experience and the effect which our linguistic assessments have upon it. The lived experience for Sartre is to be taken as Henri Bergson had meant his notion of duree.²⁶ It is as if our lives are composed of a continuous analogical formation which can be diverted or changed according to the interspersing of discourse. The relation between these two poles is thoroughly dialectical: the form of our experience is determined by its content which is discourse, and the content is also determined by the nature of its form or lived experience. The best notion I have found to capture this dialectic is the concept of style.

Style seems to carry with it an interrelatedness between form and content which other notions fail to embody. It is important to underscore the usefulness of this concept to an analysis of self, whether that self is author, husband, wife, child, etc. But in asserting our uniqueness as an embodiment of style, we must remember that we are first part of the group or whole, from which we each in our own way determine our

²⁶Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F.L. Pogson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1960).

individuation. An individual will always strive to assert a modicum of freedom in the choices that s/he makes, but it is again necessary to maintain that choices are always contextualized. An act is always one of a set of possibilities. It is in contrast to the other choices that we can understand and assess the extent to which we have expanded our freedom. Freedom is a value and, as such, contributes to an ethic or morality. Morality is always a context in which two or more persons are contextualized and governed by rules of conduct. These rules are themselves restraints upon choice so as to maintain the possibility of freedom for each participant. In the blaze of individualism, this is often forgotten.

I reiterate that individuals are politically determined. This means that what an individual is taken to be will be determined within the context of the group. I should also hasten to say that I think that Sartre at times forgot that he, too, was playing the game of loser wins: by the nature of original choice a person continues on his or her path as if s/he was a winner.

This was possible through the use of fiction, especially in the case of the writer. Sartre found this to be true of all the biographies he wrote. For him, every person has the original choice of (1) assimilating the nature of the response of others to him/herself or (2) rebelling and trying to negate the initial impact of the discourse of others. In discourse, we surrender in order to find ourselves. This is accomplished

by learning to speak a language. That very complex act has far-reaching consequences.

There is no real self apart from our participation in group life. Surprisingly, many deny this. Sartre seemed to do that himself for long periods. But what other choice did he have? When the group labels a person with categories that impose a self-assessment of evil, how else can one react? Take, for instance, Jean Genet: what could the boy do against the imposition of categories by his elders? He accepted their assessment, in which case he was still in some fashion related to the group, serving to function as the shadow for those group members who themselves were not marginalized. Those who dominated Genet were themselves not individuals: their psychic life was necessarily tied to Genet, who served as scapegoat for their own self-condemnation. Genet was quite simply the target upon which the group focused its own evilness.

To the extent that group consciousness dominates the scene, we are imperiled as a society. The lesson we are in the process of learning from the feminist, gay and black liberation movements is to understand the group processes by which some of its members are marginalized in order to sustain a false equilibrium for the group. We are, as Sartre was, absolutely right to fear the oppressive character of institutional life. We must learn to individuate. Yet we cannot turn on the group, either.

The latest movement for rights has been on the part of homosexuals. At its crudest, anti-homosexual sentiment serves to crush the spirits of the latest people to be marginalized (perhaps the last such group if in fact our collective unconsciousness is in the process of expanding tolerance and hence freedom). In order for the archetype of the self to emerge into conscious life, we must learn to accept our own androgyny. Explanation of the suppression of this potential is a digression I forego at this point. I do, however, wish to leave the reader with the need for a dialectic between the collective and the individual.

The gay and feminist and black movements are commonly moves to integrate the human family. The expansion of consciousness serves, in turn, to modify the unconscious life. Genet may have served to instill understanding of homosexuality in the heterosexual, as Sartre claimed, but I disagree with the nature of the understanding. Sartre believed that it was inherent in the dialectic between self and other that a sort of Hegelian master/slave relationship had to ensue upon meeting another's gaze. This he claimed was necessary or inevitable because we live in conditions of scarcity. I suggest that there is no necessity that every such meeting be confrontational and a battle until death. This occurs only so long as there is not a full state of individuation -- the failure of which requires that we project onto others what really belongs to ourselves. Eliminating this need by accomplishing full individuation is perhaps an ideal and

therefore a fiction. But as a fiction it serves to structure the imaginary realms in which the self creates itself.

Returning to the question which set us upon this discussion of the writing of Genet, we must answer whether Sartre would have engaged in such lengthy writings if he had thought there was a serious problem with writing a discourse on the self. From the fact that Sartre took up the project of reporting an analysis of Genet's life, bracketed temporally by his previous writing on Baudelaire and subsequent 2800-page work on Flaubert, we must conclude that Sartre did not feel that a discourse on the self was impossible.

CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC REMARKS

From Sartre, we have learned that writing a discourse on the self is possible if the following conditions are met: (1) that consciousness is reflexive as in the reflective and pre-reflective opposition in which consciousness is analyzed; (2) that neither the Cartesian subject as Sartre's reflective consciousness, nor the object as Sartre's pre-reflective consciousness, is alone to be taken as the self; (3) that both reflective and pre-reflective consciousness are dialectically constitutive of the self; (4) that language conditions our self-consciousness insofar as it is a kind of digital intrusion upon experience at the pre-reflective level; (5) that language cannot be conceived of as an instrument of consciousness, especially in an arbitrary sense; furthermore, (6) language is symbolically related to consciousness in that it is expressive of both the reflective and pre-reflective levels of experience; and (7) language (as speaking and writing) is expressive of an ongoing stream of meaningful experience.

Language is a condition of reflexivity; however, it is not the only kind of symbolic feedback which the self generates within its dialectical process of creativity. It is nonetheless an important way in which imaginal forms (representations) are produced in the complex activity of the embodiment of spirit in matter. The opposition between Spirit and Matter is an image which instantiates the universal project of wholeness in every locus of consciousness which I

call the body. The body is the symbolic field in which a discourse on the self is realizable. It is also a context in which the imaginal unfolds itself as discourse. Discourse, spoken and written, is expressive of the body. It is necessary for the self-organization of the latter in its reproduction and actualization of its potential.

The second question as to whether a self-referential discourse is possible is also answered positively. The evidence for this is Sartre's autobiographical work, Words. Would he have engaged in these writing projects -- formidable ones, at that -- if he believed that they were distortions of the lived reality of the characters his words portrayed? The answer must be no. But then what are we to make of the dilemma which I have claimed was to be found in the early Sartre (especially in the novel Nausea and his early writings of a phenomenological bent like, The Psychology of the Imagination)? I suggest as explanation of this dilemma that Sartre in his early period lacked confidence in his ability to find his own voice and to make himself heard by others. We must, as Sartre himself did in the autobiographical piece, turn to a psychoanalytical interpretation for an explanation of his incapacity to write in such a way that his writing served to interact with his life so as to change it.

Recall that the dialectical nature of consciousness (with subject and object as reflective and pre-reflective consciousness) becomes problematic when language is assumed as practico-inert or something which exists in itself out there

in the world. In that sense, language is an instrument which operates in the medium of open space between subjects as Lockean-type individuals. Sartre's ambivalence is seen in that he realized that reflection is to be sustained by imagery, but not "in" consciousness as a content. Instead of inside, Sartre chose to put language outside. I maintain that he was still caught up in the opposition of the analytic categories of spirit and matter as poles of existence, with one pole more real than the other. In fact, matter is paradigmatically taken as the real, with spirit rendered as the imaginary, fictional, or fake.

What I have proposed is that both spirit and matter are constructions of human making, neither found inside or outside, yet somehow providing or constituting the field within an imaginal context. What then are we to say of the real? I think we should consider the real as an honorific declaration concerning certain types of understanding. That is, something is called "real" when it coincides roughly with what we consider as ideal in nature. In terms of the self, which is itself an imaginary figure unfolding in a dialectical counterposing of subjective and objective writing (narratively structured), the field in which the articulation of discourse arises is that of the body. The body is thus not a real object or thing-in-itself, but rather an in-itself-for-itself, as Sartre claimed.

Language is not then an instrument which is separate from our bodies; it is a symbolic context in which the body is

created and self-creating or self-reproducing. How else are we to be able to use words to refer to ourselves? If words are arbitrarily associated to meanings, how does this system ever get hooked up with what the meanings supposedly refer to in the world? The subject cannot be outside the world or even dimensionally inside the head (which would resemble the Cartesian subject held to be synonymous with its thoughts or thinking process).

Logically speaking, since we don't have Descartes' God to keep things together, we need to assume the interrelated-ness of the world from the very beginning. Consider Locke's notion of perceiving subjects: if we are separate and independent individuals, then we must rely on language as the common denominator which can link us up with each other. If the world is composed of fragments, then it is within language that things become whole. The problem is one of trying to synthesize parts into a whole. I maintain that you cannot synthesize first. First you analyze the whole by separating or perceiving its parts, then you synthesize those parts in a recombined fashion. How else is communication possible?

Assuming that language is the medium in which things get connected or related, we still cannot know that your ideas and my ideas are the same unless we further assume that our brains are identical, processing incoming communications correctly by nature of the same translation programs in both my head and yours. We get stuck with another assumption of commonality in the form of a 'language of thought' as in Jerry Fodor's

explanation of meanings.²⁷ Even as Fodor poses the problem's solution, it still comes down to saying that Spirit is somehow connecting up with Matter. For Fodor, Spirit is materialistically interpreted as some universal language of thought. It is still the representation problem and the embodiment problem of Plato: how do the forms or ideas manifest themselves in matter; how do we link the natural with the supernatural?

Because the ideas-language-things way of representing the structure of the world assumes some independent way of determining the correspondence between our ideas and the way things really are, we run into difficulties. Just what are these independent things and how do we relate to them without the aid of language as the medium? The problem is worse if we use Jerrold Katz's hypothesis that language is itself an abstract object which gives form to our verbal squeaks and squeals or our written clawing and scratching. Language is still some object that provides the source of meaning in which to represent our ideas or feelings or sensations. How can we ever know if we have represented them correctly when our only access to the world of things is through the linguistic pipeline of communication? How can we ever use language correctly to encode our feelings and then transmit them to each other with some guarantee of mutual understanding? Solipsism reigns in this kingdom of representational knowledge.

²⁷Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).

The view of language as an instrument is to be rejected. It assumes that individuals are separate and independent, and is modelled after our use of hammers and chisels. Language is not so simple a device, if it is a device at all. Language-as-tool is wrong in the sense that it is culpable for throwing us into the dilemma of whether a discourse on the self is possible. It is the linchpin of the dilemma of a discourse on the self. The world is to be thought of as all there is, was and shall be. We have something of this as a parameter to our experience when we mystically understand the interdependence of all "things." Conceptually speaking, this whole can be divided or analyzed only if it is first taken as a whole.

The ground for consciousness is best thought of as emptiness. Hegel defined the concept in that way. This is also the ground to which the Buddhist refers after years of disciplined concentration on meditation practice. The experience of unity is one in which similarity and difference are immediately given as discriminations. The potential for discriminations arises in this imaginary context of spirit and matter in which the dialectic of analog (continuous) and digital (discontinuous) are counterposed.

At the level of the subject as individual, we are members of the group and part of the world first. Only derivatively can we achieve individuation. We must all share in the realm of experience which is just the world as it unfolds. The world of experience must already be meaningful for language to express some of these meanings reflexively. Experience is the

referent of language. Language is a symbolic expression of the body which is already the field in which experience unfolds. The coinage of linguistic meanings must be as imaginal as all else, in order for transcendence of solipsistic selves to be possible.

Think of the Lockean way of conceiving of subjects as separate and independent. In that sense, we are inside a kind of capsule within the body. Between bodies exists some sort of space, both physical and linguistic. Language is the medium in which we send our messages to each other. Words and meanings must have some meaningful connection to the things to which they refer or for which they stand. The things "out there" are converted into words. Presumably words and things have some sort of literal connection in this Lockean arrangement. Recall how opposed to figurative and metaphorical language both Locke and Hobbes were.

The pattern for the connections between words and things is said to be arbitrary, but nonetheless the patterns are also conveniently located inside our heads. Sensorially, we hear sounds against a random pattern of noise. The idea here is that the world is a place in which patterns can be discriminated. Thus, noise must be out there, and we discriminate what is meaningful for us. Some noises are special, so we can pick them out and understand what they refer to or stand for. Ideas or representations are the coinage with which our minds deal with these outside states or

patterns of things. Words convey propositionally the condition of the world.

Once inside, our minds must re-project the information that entered in digital form. Somehow we must use the digital to remake an analog of the world. Perhaps this is what we mean when we say that we are thinking analogously. I doubt that neurological evidence supports the notion of an internal projection of what has been digitally transformed from outside. In this arrangement, either God had to be good to us in creating the proper circuits now to be found in our brains, or we must be lucky in coincidentally coming up with the correct or approximately correct representation of what is out there.

We can sidestep this problem by not assuming that the representations are copies of the real world out there. The notion of images and their relation to the real must be rethought. This is what I have been proposing we do. The standards against which we compare our understandings must be collectively generated. We and the world cannot be separate or independent. As indicated above, I think this was Locke's way of wrenching more freedom for a rising class of people. In arguing that this is the way things really are, he used the ontological claims about perception and the apparent physical separateness of bodies as a model for his political theory. This brings us to the point in my argument where the consequences of our investigations for analytic philosophy must be considered.

Analytic philosophy, if it is anything at all, must be an approach which asserts that there are real differences between things. This stance derives from its roots in the positivistic philosophy of the Vienna school and of philosophers like Reichenbach. Reichenbach and also Carnap were caught up in the enthusiasm that philosophy could found itself on the work of science, thus achieving objective status. The specific role of philosophers was to work out an ideal language in which science could frame its findings. The notion of an ideal language was prompted by the logical calculus of Russell and Whitehead. Analytic philosophers still persist in thinking of themselves as doing very careful work analyzing and cutting up the world into some logically determined terrain.

The myth that language provides such a correspondence to the world has long since been shown to be unrealizable; however, the habit of posing as the servant of science remains strong in Anglo-American philosophy. Witness Quine's insistence that philosophy is epistemologically destined to proceed as a psychological and empirical investigation of how language speakers come to obtain knowledge of their world. Oddly, when asked if philosophy was about people, Quine said no. What then could this psychological and empirical investigation of the language speaker's achievement of knowledge be about? In its imitation of science as idealization or abstraction, it takes on more of the expressive character of its creator than it reflects the reality of the world and real people. This is

so because science does not replicate the structure of the world. It creates models or images with which to interact and which, in their course, express our selves and interactively determine who we shall become.

My contention is that human and social science are laden with values and that its idealizations are merely that -- ideals. They represent no one and yet are claimed as generalities that in some essential respects capture everyone. This is a blatant imposition of regulative mechanisms upon the consciousness and experience of us all. In its identification with science, analytic philosophy has perhaps hoped to shade its ideological identification with the dominant or ruling class, which benefits from having people structure their behavior according to models which serve the interests of the rulers.

Analytic philosophy has never been able to embrace the genius of Hegel. For him, the history of philosophy was a process in which self-consciousness unfolded. In the analytic tradition, where empiricism and rationalism have failed to find themselves a pragmatic framework, we have stagnated in a false objectivity.²⁸ True self-consciousness can only arise once we begin to take the subjective turn that I am recommending.

What then can be said of analytic philosophy? To say that it perpetrates an illusion is not necessarily a denigra-

²⁸Susan Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism & Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).

tion. All is imaginal anyway. But we must be able to note how the images that analytic philosophers put forth are used. Do they promote self-consciousness or delay it? Is analysis self-consciously discovering/inventing the world or is it merely reproducing it? And if the latter only, then we must ask: whose interests are served by doing that? The pride of analytic philosophers is that their writing is clear and precise. The sharpness of their pens and their articulations are used against people like Hegel and others in the Continental Tradition to whom literary writing as part of the philosophical enterprise is considerably more than the presentation of arguments.

Plato knew that philosophy could not maintain a purely argumentative stance. Allegory was needed, as well. All good writing should aspire to be clear and precise -- as precise as is possible in a world which does not afford independent measurements by which our writing (representations) can be judged. Perhaps in rejecting Hegel, analytic philosophers were caught up in thinking that Spirit and Matter were really mutually exclusive categories. Maybe subjective and objective have likewise been misconstrued.

If Locke was wrong to claim that individuals are separate and independent, then we must rethink the philosophies of language which have been built on this foundation. Common to most of these philosophies is the supposition of speakers as separate and independent from the world. This supposition is responsible for the formulation of three theories: (1) theory

of meaning -- to explain the speaker/language connection; (2) theory of knowledge -- to explain the speaker/world connection; and (3) theory of reference -- to explain the language/world connection.

During contemporary philosophical debates, the focus has been on the language/world connection. Speakers have taken a back seat; of necessity, so has psychology. This has been possible by placing the speakers in a context of idealization. Language is then presumed to be representational with respect to the world. Theories of truth have been largely of the correspondence kind, in which mapping of language onto the world is the main preoccupation of philosophers and linguists alike.

My argument is that these distinctions are imposed. There is no substance to the matter which could decide that such division is justified by how things really are "out there." If anything, what we understand about ourselves should deter us from accepting assumptions that these divisions can be made objectively. The evidence to refute such a division with its assumption of separateness is simply the overdetermined nature of all of our behaviors. Every act is multiply determined -- that is, we can submit our acts to interrogation within many different contexts. Each context is valid and none seems to take priority over the others. Here it is useful to consider Sartre's contention that every act of prose writing is to be viewed within a context where morality (values), aesthetics, and politics are not separate. It is

not legitimate to relegate psychology to a back burner in order to bolster the self-image of philosophy as an objective enterprise on a footing with all other science. The attempt to establish linguistics on a par with science is likewise illegitimate. It is an obvious lie to claim that philosophers who have made these moves are impartial and detached from the subject-matter they are engaged in writing. Chomsky at least mindfully says that linguistics is part of psychology, which in his opinion ultimately falls within a biology of our species.²⁹ This is, despite its apparent honesty, an attempt to naturalize what is actually an imaginal creation.

Analytic philosophers have conveniently forgotten their motives for separating these domains in precisely these ways. Language, although of the world, is not really in it; rather, it is a kind of space which facilitates communication. But the model of communication it portrays is that of a telephone or telegraph. We have available to us more sophisticated models, particularly the hologram discussed above. Linguists like Chomsky have tried to put language in the mind of speakers, claiming a foundation for their science in rationalism. Quine tries to put language in the world in a sophisticated form of behaviorism and claims to follow in the empiricist tradition, although he also has pragmatist leanings. Sartre has put language in the practico-inert, hoping to remain faithful as a materialist. Jerrold Katz in a late move has

²⁹Noam Chomsky, "On the Biological Basis of Language Capacities," in Rules and Representations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 185-216.

argued that language is an abstract object and hence is as real as the world and speakers. All these theorists are claiming that speakers, language, and world are real. I counter that they are imaginal, thus placing myself within the irrealist camp which has Goodman and Nietzsche as members.

To assume that these partitions are useful is to make a different claim than to say that they are real. Ideally speaking, we would prefer to be independent and separate if that makes us free, but there is cause to doubt that this is so. How we see or conceive of ourselves is of paramount importance for how the world will, in fact, be. This is the pragmatic dimension to reality. Another way of framing that is to say that energy follows thought. This is the connection between information and matter/energy which Anthony Wilden has articulated. Instead of assuming that people's minds are singular and hence private spaces in which they are free to entertain all kinds of thought-experiments, we should be examining the work of parapsychologists to determine the ways that thought and action interact.

If reality is not out there, then where is it? How does it arise? Since I have rejected the possibility of representing reality in total, I cannot be expected to provide that type of answer. If, on the other hand, we do partially construct reality rather than discover it out there, then we construct reality from what is already familiar to us -- literally, from part of us. That way, we might be said to construct reality from our experience. That is only half

right. As I mentioned earlier in this section, neither the inside nor the outside can be assumed or proved as the major determinant of our experience; both must be taken as components to the equation which determines our experience. Calling these aspects subjective and objective dimensions to reality is acceptable but does not change the relationship: both are essential to understanding our selves and our world.

Where does Sartre fall within this conceptual space? As a Marxist, he has tended to lean toward the hypothesis of materiality. Language is then conceived of as an instrument, itself a condition of material existence, and as such it is something to be manipulated by a subject (or individual, or person) in order to communicate with other subjects (the group). Language is thus a medium in which the condition of reality -- or of the situation, in more Sartrean terms -- is represented. I think we must avoid the mentalistic interpretation of Husserl (which Sartre rejected early in his career as a philosopher) and construe representation as a purely textual notion. Then for Sartre a representation of reality is to be understood as a model of that to which it refers and purports to represent. These models are our linguistic behaviors which convey their meanings in the medium of language, becoming sedimented in the cultural repository of the practico-inert (institutions of all kinds, no matter whether language is a part of them or not, e.g., dance rituals).

The communications which we relate to each other in our language are the results of acts of writing which are best understood as relations between writer, text and world (as audience or referent). These acts of writing are symbolic expressions of the body. They are themselves the imaginal forms that the body becomes. This is a compatible construal, although there may be other interpretations which remain faithful to Sartre's philosophy. It is safe to say that any claim that representations exist in the space of consciousness must be rejected because, for Sartre, consciousness is a relation, not a container or thing in which other things like representations may be contained.

Sartre had tried to present a coherent materialist analysis of reality that was faithful to our lived experience. Faced with the choice of alternatives inherited from Hegel through the lectures of Jean Hypolite, Sartre chose matter and not spirit as the dominating term. Consciousness became but a reflection. If we must think that reflectedness involves "images," then I suppose we can appeal to the story of Narcissus, who tried to embrace his reflection on the surface of the water: each time he reached for the image he disturbed the quiet pond and destroyed the image of his self. The image is a source of problems for Sartre. It is worth exploring in just what way this is so.

Sartre finds objectionable the Freudian notion of the unconscious as a depository or memory store in which images are filed. The idea that there is a censor controlling which

images or memories are retrieved is likewise repugnant to him. We must therefore accept another notion of unconscious; otherwise Sartre's writing will remain unintelligible and incoherent. In these remaining paragraphs I discuss the problem of images and relate it to the Sartrean rejection of an unconscious.

It is clear that Sartre's early writing about the imagination adopts the distinctions David Hume drew between impressions and images.³⁰ Whatever impinged upon the sensory apparatus very simply made an impression, considered to be the standard of reality and the most vivid and lively event we experience mentally. Secondary to these were images, thought of as copies of impressions. The exercise of memory brought about a reacquaintance with past impressions through the intermediary function of images. Since the impressions were the "original," images as "copies" were consequently fainter, more lethargic. At least this has been the consensus from Hume's day to our own.³¹ It is a rare person who would admit to having more vivid and lively images than their first-hand experiences had presented -- though for some imaginary romance is more lively and impressive than real ones.

Vividness and liveliness are hardly the sine qua non of our experience of reality. Some people's fantasies or imaginary reconstructions of events are far more vivid and

³⁰David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 7-10.

³¹Mary Warnock, Imagination (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978).

lively, to the extent that the events and actions of the participant are meaningfully projected. I am suggesting that a gradation of experience is conceivable in terms of meaningfulness, relevance, and importance to the self (associated and disassociated), which is at one and the same time experiencer and experienced.

In the process of transcendence, it is possible to evaluate imaginary happenings in these ways, along those dimensions. Assuming that impressions and images are hierarchically related according to vividness and liveliness already incorporates the structure of representation into the valuative process. I offer, as counterexample to the Humean organization of impressions and images, the "fact" that quite often dreaming is experienced as more real than life itself. Included within that realm are illusions and hallucinations: illusions are perhaps images and sequences that the group can readily experience, whereas hallucinations carry a more selective sense of belonging to the mad or insane. Of particular relevance here are the psychedelic happenings reported after taking LSD, peyote, etc. It may take such chemicals to initiate a disruption in perceptual normalcy (which is companion to consensus consciousness) for a person to begin to question the standard of a world "out there" and a self "in here."

In any event, perhaps Hume was partly right in asserting that all we can know is the workings of our own minds. The so-called workings are, for Hume, best thought of as habits.

I have no objection to that term if we can apply it to the whole area of experience which falls within the sensory mode of being.

Sartre too may have reached an understanding of the self/world relation, not with the help of drugs but through a process of meditation which Buddhists call the way of knowledge. Evidence for his enlightenment would be the scenes in which Roquentin experiences the nausea of words and things seemingly slipping and dissolving. Certainly Sartre would want to claim a vividness and liveliness in that experience, unless it was totally invented as a "fiction" for the novel alone. Although Sartre had hoped to maintain the distinction between impressions and images drawn by Hume, that hierarchy was not consistently maintained despite Sartre's privileging of the real over the imaginary and perceiving over dreaming. That is how I have come to think of the distinctions which have been drawn throughout the history of the Western philosophical tradition.

Since Plato, dreaming and imaginary events have been relegated to secondary status in contrast to perception, which alone was thought to bring forth knowledge of the real.³² Of course, the real for Plato is quite possibly what I mean by dreaming. Perhaps he had some more esoteric teachings, since lost, which would decode for us the language of our dreams so

³²An exception among philosophers is to be found in Gregor Sebba, The Dream of Descartes, ed. Richard A. Watson (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987).

that all of us could become fully recollected and hence completely re-membered in the heavenly cosmology. As it is, only some people's dreams (e.g., Einstein's, Bernule's) are considered creative and accessing another mode of being. That "other mode" I equate with the clairvoyant, transpsychic, and mythic modes of being which LeShan has articulated.

Plato called this realm the supernatural so as to differentiate it from the natural, itself troublesome to him because it was a process world in which all seemed to be in constant flux. In the supernatural he found a godsend: Ideal Forms were stabilizing forces in a potentially chaotic world. We tend to forget in teaching about the Platonic brand of Idealism that Plato's deprecation of matter was in fact aimed at forcing the citizens to focus on the values of their society and culture. Plato's metaphysics is, above all else, a social philosophy insofar as it served to organize society for its own preservation against the Spartans. The "good" as Plato envisioned it was not to be realized in his time, but we pay tribute to his genius by continuing to pursue it in our own.

All great philosophies are a blend of morality, aesthetics and politics. This is what Nietzsche had tried to capture in the description I quote in the introductory chapter. He said it is wise to ask, "What morality does the philosopher aim at?" At the bottom of the most abstruse metaphysical assertions, Nietzsche believed we would find the impetus or germ of a moral or value.

In Sartre, there can be no question that his system of consciousness and language is predicated on the belief that freedom is humanity's highest value.³³ From it all else can be said to derive. Freedom is Sartre's necessity: to be fettered with a memory store as Freud had tried to argue, at least in his neurological writings (Lacan provides a different reading of Freud), would be for Sartre an intolerable device. The price of such device would be freedom. This is seen in the lives of obsessional neurotics who ruminate endlessly over what course of action to take because they are authoritarian-bound and fear doing the wrong thing. The result of that conservativeness is paralysis.

Sartre did not follow through with his purge of the representational theory of perception. Or at least he did not pursue his inclinations far enough to dissolve the oppositional structuring of experience by the imaginary and the real, or between perceiving and dreaming. Instead, he held up to view the relational system between the conscious and unconscious, which is but the latest figure/ground relationship with which philosophy must deal; and for this we must be grateful.

³³David Detmer, Freedom As A Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1988).

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