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Count Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, 1803†



Taken from *Ministra Inostrannykh Del. Ocherk istorii ministerstva inostrannykh del, 1802-1902.* SPb.: R. Golits i A. Vilborg, 1902.  
Portrait facing p. 70.

**ALEXANDER ROMANOVICH VORONTSOV**  
**EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENLIGHTENED RUSSIAN STATESMAN, 1741 - 1805**

by

**JULES S. ZIMMERMAN**

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate  
Faculty in History in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor  
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**1975**

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in History in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

April 17, 1975  
date

Allen Melman  
Chairman of Examining Committee

5/13/75  
date

John H. H. H.  
Executive Officer

Stanley Pipe (Apr 22, 75)  
Henry R. H. H. H. (May 8, '75)  
Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

**ABSTRACT**

**ALEXANDER ROMANOVICH VORONTSOV**

**EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENLIGHTENED RUSSIAN STATESMAN, 1741 - 1805**

**by**

**JULES S. ZIMMERMAN**

**Adviser: Professor Allen McConnell**

Count Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was the most outstanding representative of one of the most distinguished families in imperial Russia. Best known for his financial and moral support of the disgraced Radishchev, the humane statesman has varied claims upon the historian's attention, both as a typical enlightened dignitary, and as a creative high level bureaucrat and entrepreneur.

A. R. Vorontsov entered service at the age of four. By the time he was twenty-one, he had studied law in Russia, lived and studied in France, traveled through most of western Europe, and served as a diplomatic representative in both the Hague and London. Moreover, he had by that time written for and been published in at least one of the leading Russian journals of his day, and had formulated his own free trade philosophy. Most notable among his foreign acquaintances was Voltaire, with whom he shared a brief but warm correspondence. Vorontsov's proficiency in both French and Russian, and the internationally known library he built mark him as a representative of the enlightenment. Despite his proud manner and the fact that he was not well liked by the Russian rulers under whom he lived,

he rose to the highest appointive position that could be achieved by a Russian of his day. Among other distinctions, Vorontsov served for two decades as President of the Commerce College under Catherine II and, under Alexander I, held concurrently the titles of Foreign Minister and Chancellor.

Vorontsov's accomplishments in public office include stabilization of the ruble for more than a decade, development of a system of consuls in foreign nations, promotion of free trade within Russia, achievement of a moderate protectionism against foreign nations, and the formation of the Third Coalition against Napoleon. In private affairs, he succeeded in remaining solvent while most other Russian landowners fell increasingly into debt.

As Vorontsov never married, he may be described as a family man without a family of his own. Yet, he served as the link between the Vorontsov generations. Similarly, his proposed 1801 "Charter of the Russian People" represents one of the noble but futile pre-revolutionary efforts to modernize Russian government and society.

## PREFACE

When I began this study, I knew little more about Count Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov than that he was the patron and protector of Alexander Radishchev. When it was suggested to me by Professor Allen McConnell that I attempt to write a biography of Count Vorontsov, I agreed such an effort would be worthwhile. Moreover, I thought it would be relatively simple. Unfortunately, more questions appear to have been left unanswered than have been resolved. For example, although A. R. Vorontsov emerges as the most outstanding representative of the Vorontsov family and as its central figure, we still know next to nothing about his private life and personal affairs. For example, A. R. Vorontsov remained a bachelor all his life, and there is no published evidence of any loves in his life -- in a time and place known for its profligacy. Whether this condition represented simply one element of Vorontsov's asceticism is one of the questions which awaits further study in the far-flung, uncatalogued Vorontsov archives.

In this biographical study, the reader must judge whether I have properly balanced "the life" and "the times." The chronological method is paramount, although occasionally the topical has been utilized. Moreover, just as biography has been rightly called the "preoccupation and solace of doubt," because of the limitations which thrust themselves upon the craftsman doing his research in libraries I have also used some techniques of psychological inquiry, occasionally bordering on that kind of intuitive inference which has been described as the nucleus of the art of biography. Hopefully, none of these means has been employed in the extreme.

I could not have completed even this step towards A. R. Vorontsov's biography without the path-breaking study of the Vorontsov family by Lester J. Humphreys. The leads he provided, together with the helpful insights

of James W. Marcum's study of Semen Vorontsov, were indispensable to my work. Although the list of valuable studies, in addition to the published Vorontsov archives, is too numerous to detail, I would be remiss if I did not note some of the scholars whose works, cited throughout the text, were most useful. Perhaps chief among the Russian and Soviet authors, the writings of E. I. Indova, N. Kaidanov, and A. I. Zaozerskii were basic references. Similarly, the works of Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, Allen McConnell and Marc Raeff were sources of inspiration and provided me with direction.

With respect to transliteration from Russian, since there is no universally accepted method, I have attempted to follow a modified version of the Library of Congress method. In this connection, neither the hard sign nor the soft sign is rendered. No distinction was made for the various sounds permitted by the Russian "e." In this regard, I have written "krepost" rather than "krieport" and "Semen" rather than "Semion" or "Semyon." The "yerih" (ѣ) has generally been rendered as "y"; the Russian "x" as "kh"; the "u" as "ts"; and the "ю" as "iu." There are exceptions to these rules, as when usage has modified their application, e.g., Czartoryski, Florinsky, Kluchevsky, Lyashchenko, Vernadsky, etc.; and when references cited by other writers were noted. In footnotes and bibliography, apart from the exceptions noted above, I have endeavored to transliterate exactly. In the text, however, where two parties referred to have the same first name, I occasionally differentiated, e.g., Elizabeth Petrovna and Elizaveta Romanovna Vorontsova; and Catherine II as compared with Ekaterina Romanovna Vorontsova Dashkova. The latter is also referred to alternately as Princess Dashkov and, simply, Dashkova. With regard to the patronymic, I elected Illarionovich rather than Larionovich because the former is more frequently

used both in the sources and in subsequent literature, and because A. R. Vorontsov's grandfather apparently was named Illarion Gavrilovich.

As for dates, I have given most dates in accordance with both the Old Style Julian and the New Style Gregorian calendars. In the eighteenth century, the Julian calendar was eleven days behind the Gregorian; in the nineteenth, the spread increased to twelve days. Where exceptions are made, the abbreviations "O.S." and "N.S." are used, generally in parentheses. Where a date is not given, the abbreviation "n.d." is used; and when unclear, a question mark appears.

Citations in footnotes have been given in accordance with "Method B" of the fourth edition of Kate L. Turabian's A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations published by the University of Chicago Press in 1973 (pp. 121-123). Measures referred to in the text are explained in related footnotes.

My sincerest thanks to Professor Allen McConnell, who read, criticized and helped edit the manuscript and typescript four times during its preparation, for his help, guidance and direction. His knowledge of the period saved me from many errors, corrected many I had made, and continually steered me in the right direction. Similarly, I wish to express my gratitude for the constructive criticisms of Professors Henry Huttenbach, Stanley Page and Marc Raeff who read the manuscript before the final draft. Certainly a word of appreciation is due to the librarians at the CUNY Graduate Center for their aid, particularly with inter-library loans and for making arrangements for my use of the facilities of Columbia University. Thanks also to the librarians at the latter institution and the various divisions of the New York Public Library for their consideration. A word of thanks also to Nina Hoffman for verifying a translation from the French, and to both Harold

Meyer and John Garvey for technical assistance. My deep appreciation is also extended to those who did the typing: Jeffrey Krupen who, while still a high school student, performed the monumental task of typing the first draft from my handwritten manuscript; Peggy Coburn, a colleague, who helped in a desperate moment by typing the better part of a chapter; and Gerald Tarrent for meticulously typing the final draft.

Last, but perhaps most important, I must thank the members of my family -- especially my wife, Ruth -- for confidence and patience during the years in which I labored at completion of this task.

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List of Abbreviations and Shortened Titles

Without Author Citation

AGS - Arkhiv gosudarstvennogo soveta, 1768-1826. 5 vols. in 9 bks. SPb.: V tipografiia vtorogo otdelenii sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantselerii, 1869-1904.

AHR - American Historical Review.

AKV - Arkhiv kniazia Vorontsova. 40 books in 32 vols. M.: Various publishers, 1870-1905.

ASER - American Slavic and East European Review.

Chtenia - Chtenia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnosti Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom Universitete. M.: E. V. Barsova, 1866. CXXXVII.

IZ - Istoricheskie zapiski.

Kommerts Kollegia - N. Kaidanov. Sistematicheskii katalog delam gosudarstvennoi kommerts kollegii. SPb.: V. Kirschbaum, 1884.

Kommerts Komissia - N. Kaidanov. Sistematicheskii katalog delam komissii o kommertsii i o poshlinakh, khraniaschimsia v Arkhive Departamenta Tamozhennykh Sborov. SPb.: V. Kirschbaum, 1887.

L. - Leningrad.

M. - Moscow.

Ocherk Min.Inos.Del, 1802-1902 - Ministra Inostrannykh Del. Ocherk istorii ministerstva inostrannykh del, 1802-1902. SPb.: R. Golike i A Vilborg, 1902.

Osmnadsatyi Vek - Petr Bartenev. ed. Osmnadsatyi vek. Istoricheski sbornik. 2nd tischeniem. 4 vols. M.: Tip. Gracheva i komp., 1869. Photocopy. Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1965.

P. A. Stroganov - Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich. Graf Pavel Aleksandro-vich Stroganov (1774-1817). 3 vols. SPb.: Expeditsiia zagotovleniia gosudarstvennykh bunag, 1903.

Portraits Russes - Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich. Portraits Russes des XVIII<sup>e</sup> et XIX<sup>e</sup> siecles. 5 vols. in 10 pts., plus index. SPb.: Manufacture des papiers de l'etat, 1906.

PSS - A. N. Radishchev. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. Edited by G. Gukovskii. 3 vols. M. and L.: Akademiia Nauk, 1938-1952.

PSSZ - Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii s 1649 goda. Pervaiia seriia, 1649-1825. 46 vols. in 48 plus 3 appendices. SPb.: Pechetano v tipografii II otdeleniia sobstvennoi ego imperatorskago velichestva kantseliarii, 1830.

RA - Russkii Arkhiv.

Rospis KV - Petr Bartenev. "Rodoslovie dvorian, grafov kniazei Vorontsovykh; grafov Vorontsovykh - Dashkovykh." Rospis soroka knigam Arkhiva kniazia Vorontsova. Moscow University Publishers, Strastnoi Boulevard, 1897.

RS - Russkaia Starina.

SEER - Slavonic and East European Review.

Senatskii Arkhiv - Pravitelstvuuiushchii Senat. Senatskii Arkhiv. 15 vols. SPb.: Senatskaia Tip., 1888-1913.

Sibirskii prikaz - N. Kaidanov. Sistemicheskii katalog delam Sibirskago prikaza, Moskovskago komissarstva i drugikh byvshikh. Uchrezhdenii po chasti promyshlennosti i torgovli, khraniaschimsia vo Arkhive Departamenta Tamozhennykh Sborov. Tut zhe: dopolneniia k katalogu delam departamenta vneshnei torgovli izdannomu v 1877 godu. SPb.: V. Kirschbaum, 1888.

SIRIO - Russkoe Istericheskoe Obshchestvo. Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva. 148 vols. in 127 bks. SPb.: Various publishers, 1867-1916.

SPb. - St. Petersburg.

SR - Slavic Review.

"UNS" - "Ukaz nashemu Senatu," in Senatskii Arkhiv.

**PART I: INTRODUCTION**

CHAPTER I  
THE MAN AND HIS TIME

Count Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was born in St. Petersburg on September 4/15, 1741.<sup>1</sup> At the time of his death on his country estate at Andreevskoe on December 2/14, 1805 he occupied two offices of great distinction. One was the post of Chancellor, the highest appointive position to which a Russian of his day could be named. The other, held concurrently, was that of Minister of Foreign Affairs, a title newly created by Tsar Alexander I in his reorganization of the Russian government in September, 1802. Yet little is known about Count Vorontsov despite these and other significant achievements during his lifetime. It is puzzling that Vorontsov has not received more attention, perhaps only because Russians write few biographies.

Hopefully, this study will help provide some of the necessary perspective to redress the historical balance and, ultimately, restore Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov to his rightful and proper place in history.

A. The Unrecognized Count Vorontsov

The lifetime of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov spans the reigns of four Russian rulers: Elisabeth, Peter III, Catherine II and Paul. The achievements of A. R. Vorontsov throughout his career are even more remarkable when one takes into account the fact that both contemporaries and later scholars believed he was feared and despised by Catherine II,<sup>2</sup> and

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<sup>1</sup>Petr Bartenev, ed. n., Arkhiv Kniazia Vorontsova (hereafter cited as AKV) (40 books in 32 vols.; M.: Various publishers, 1870-1905), V, 5.

<sup>2</sup>P. Bartenev (ed.), AKV, XII, 103, n. 98, and ed. n., ibid., p. 370. See also, e.g., D. D. Riabinin, "Biografiia Semena Romanovicha Vorontsova," Russkii Arkhiv /hereafter cited as RA/ (1879), No. 1, p. 67.

"disliked" by both Paul<sup>3</sup> and Alexander I.<sup>4</sup>

At the age of sixteen, in early 1758, Alexander Romanovich was sent by Elizabeth Petrovna to France to study and, toward the end of that year, at the direction of Empress Elizabeth, began a series of missions to Spain, Portugal and what is now Italy.<sup>5</sup> In 1761 he was designated minister to Holland and, in the following year, was appointed by Peter III to the same position in England. Vorontsov remained there until 1764 when Catherine II returned him to the same post at the Hague, where he remained until his return to Russia in 1768. For the next five years he served at the Russian

---

<sup>3</sup>S. R. Vorontsov to Paul, October 9, 1798 (N. S.), and to A. R. Vorontsov, June 3/14, 1799, AKV, X, 326 and 49, respectively. See also, Norman E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 134.

<sup>4</sup>Adam [Jerzy] Czartoryski, Memoirs [of] Prince Adam Czartoryski and his Correspondence with Alexander I (Edited by Adam Gielgud; 2 vols. in 1; Orono, Maine: Academic International, 1968) [Reprinted from the 1888 edition], I, 333. See also, Alexander Kornilov, Modern Russian History from the Age of Catherine the Great to the End of the Nineteenth Century (Trans. Alexander S. Kaun, 2 vols. in 1; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943), I, 16.

<sup>5</sup>The biographical sketch which follows in the text is a composite gleaned chiefly from the sources and other references listed below: D. N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, Slovar dostopamiatnykh liudei Russkoi zemli [hereafter cited as Bantysh, Slovar] (5 vols.; M.: Alexander Shiriaiev, 1836), I, 350; and, by the same author, Istoricheskoe sobranie spisokov kavaleram chetyrekh rossiskikh imperatorskikh ordenov.... (M.: V. Tip. N. S. Vsevolozhskago, 1814?), p. 229; "Avtobiografiia pokazaniia grafa Aleksandra Romanovicha Vorontsova" [hereafter cited as "Avtobiografiia A. R. Vorontsova"], A. R. Vorontsov to Dashkova, October 28/November 10, 1805, AKV, V, 2-5; A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice sur sa vie et les événements différents qui se sont passés tant en Russie qu'en Europe pendant ce tems-là" [hereafter cited as A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice"], AKV, V, 30-31; "Aleksandr Romanovich Vorontsov" [hereafter cited as "A. R. Vorontsov"], Chtenia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnosti Rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom Universitete [hereafter cited as Chtenia] (M.: E. V. Bersova, April-June, 1886), CXXXVII, kn. 2, pp. 57-62; A. I. Zaocerskii, "Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov," Istoricheskie Zapiski [hereafter cited as IZ] (1947), kn. 23, pp. 106-107, 116-122; and V. V. Ogarkov, Vorontsovy: ikh zhizn i obshchestvennaia deiatelnost (SPb.: V. A. Stein-Obshchestvennaia Polsa, 1892), p. 35.

Court and, among other pursuits, was a member of the Freemasons.

In the following decade his star shone brightly as witnessed by the number and variety of government positions held and awards received by him. For example, in 1773 he was appointed to the State Council and, later, was named President of the Commerce College, a post he occupied for the next twenty years. In 1774, he was appointed to the Commerce Commission, a semi-autonomous agency not to be confused with the Commerce College. Three years later, in 1777, he was charged with the responsibility of attracting foreign immigrants to Russia. On January 1/12, 1779, he was raised to the position of Senator and named President of the Commerce Commission as well. In 1784 and again in 1787 he was reappointed to the State Council.

For his services he received many awards. In 1781 he was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevskii. In the following year, after succeeding in the preparation of a general tariff, Catherine II rewarded him with a gold snuff box and 20,000 rubles. In 1783 he participated on a commission to propose measures for the improvement of national commerce for which his salary was increased by the sum of 300 additional rubles per month for a total of almost 23,000 rubles per year. In the same year he was presented with the Order of St. Vladimir and, before the year was out, he had been appointed to a special commission on the postal service. In 1786, for service on various commissions, including one on banking, he was rewarded with a diamond-studded cross and fifty thousand rubles, a bonus of more than two years salary. At the Swedish peace celebrations in 1790 he received a rich snuff box with a portrait of Catherine II and, at the end of the Second Turkish War in 1792, he was rewarded with a diamond signet ring.

After his retirement from service, approved in early 1794, he continued his voluminous correspondence with the widest variety of personages. In keeping with his reputation as a well-known bibliophile, he continued

gathering books until he amassed an internationally known book collection.<sup>6</sup> Equally well-known as the patron and protector of Alexander Radishchev, who has been called the first Russian radical,<sup>7</sup> Vorontsov aided Radishchev and his family financially and otherwise throughout the latter's exile during the 1790's.<sup>8</sup> In addition, as will be shown, the evidence suggests that Alexander Romanovich successfully managed the family estates at a time when most Russian landowners found themselves increasingly overburdened by mounting debts.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, Vorontsov's frugality and self-denial, characteristics which bordered on the ascetic, mark him as a Russian counterpart of the Weberian entrepreneur motivated by the Protestant ethic in relation to the spirit and practice of capitalism. Finally, in addition to holding the posts of Chancellor and Foreign Minister during the early days of the reign of Tsar Alexander I, Vorontsov has been credited with "the thinking" reflected in the

---

<sup>6</sup>"Count A. R. Vorontsov had collected... by 1789... a large collection of French publications and, by the end of the 1790's, possessed one of the best collections of books, pamphlets and journals from the era of the French revolution," M. M. Shtrange, Russkoe obshchestvo i frantsuzskaia revoliutsii, 1789-1794 (M.: Akademiia Nauk, 1967), p. 67. For some details on the beginnings of the library see, for example, five letters of S. R. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov sent between 1765 and 1769: September 2/13, 1765; June 9/20, 1767; June 17/28, 1767; November 22/December 3, 1767; and January 23/February 3, 1769, AKV, XXXIII, 90, 101, 102-103, 114 and 121 respectively. For two brief sketches outlining the later history of the library, see P. Bartenev, "Vorontsovskaya biblioteka," RA (1896), No. 8, p. 598 and M. P. Alekseev (ed.), "Pushkin i biblioteka Vorontsovykh," Pushkin: stati i materialy (2 vols.; Odessa: Odesskii dom uchenikh; Pushkinskaiakomissia, 1926), II, 92-98.

<sup>7</sup>David Marshall Lang, The First Russian Radical: Alexander Radishchev 1749-1802 [hereafter cited as Lang, Radical] (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959).

<sup>8</sup>See, for example, Allen McConnell, A Russian Philosopher: Alexander Radishchev, 1749-1802 [hereafter cited as McConnell, Philosopher] (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 123-127, 130-131, 139-144, 163, 165.

<sup>9</sup>E. I. Indova, Krepostnoe khoziaistvo v nachale XIX veka [hereafter cited as Indova, Krepostnoe] (M.: Akademiia Nauk, 1955), pp. 26-33, 39-47; Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 370, 379-380.

never-to-be-approved 1801 Charter of the Russian People.<sup>10</sup> Characteristically, no matter what office Vorontsov occupied, no matter what official authority he exercised, no matter what personal, intellectual, familial or financial influence he was able to wield at one time or another - like all other Russian subjects, he was subject to the will of whoever happened to be at the time Russia's autocratic ruler in whom all power was centered.

Consequently, perhaps one of the chief reasons for Vorontsov's relative obscurity<sup>11</sup> may be the result of a distortion of focus. That is, most of what we know about him is in relation to other contemporaries who excited greater popular interest. Among these figures are Alexander Radishchev, Semen Romanovich Vorontsov, Princess Ekaterina Romanovna (Vorontsova) Dashkova, Adam Czartoryski, Catherine II and Alexander I. Radishchev's plight was more of a central issue, particularly to foreign observers who referred

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<sup>10</sup>Marc Raeff, Plans for Political Reform in Imperial Russia, 1730-1905 [hereafter cited as Raeff, Plans] (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966) (Paper), p. 76.

<sup>11</sup>There is no full length biographical treatment of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov in either Russian or English. Apart from two autobiographical fragments located in AKV, V, 1-67, and a chronological description of his life and activities found in Otchenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, pp. 54-67, there is only the brief biographical sketch by A. I. Zaevskii, pp. 105-136. (For full citation of each of these references, see note 5 above). Moreover, despite the fact that there exist forty volumes of the published papers and correspondence of members of the Vorontsov family, the family name is not to be found in such works as Michael T. Florinsky (ed.), Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961) or Jesse D. Clarkson, A History of Russia (New York: Random House, 1964). Indeed, not until 1967 was there listed in English any attempt to evaluate the activities of any member of the Vorontsov family. In this connection, there were listed at that time in the American Historical Association's List of Dissertations in Progress three proposed studies of which the first two cited were completed in 1969 as unpublished Ph.D. dissertations that were very helpful to me and which I used intensively. They are: Lester J. Humphreys, "The Vorontsov Family: Russian Nobility in a Century of Change, 1725-1825," (Pennsylvania University, 1969); James W. Marcus, "Semen R. Vorontsov and Russian English Relations at the End of the Eighteenth Century" (University of North Carolina, 1969); and Kenneth C. Taylor, "Prince M. S. Vorontsov, 1782-1856" (Princeton University).

to Vorontsov peripherally. Similarly, Alexander Romanovich's brother Semen, who lived abroad for the last forty years of his life and who was for the better part of two decades the Russian ambassador to London, also generated greater interest.<sup>12</sup> In like manner, Princess Dashkov, who may be described as the third most famous Russian woman of the eighteenth century (only Catherine II and Empress Elizabeth were better known) gained great notoriety during her lifetime. Her memoirs, like those of Csartoryski, remained a principal source for many years.<sup>13</sup> In addition, as has been established, both the nature of the sources and their inaccessibility or unavailability<sup>14</sup> impede the completion of a first rate biography.

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<sup>12</sup>Pictures of Semen may be found in various places. Among them are Ministra Inostrannykh Del, Ocherk istorii ministerstva inostrannykh del, 1802-1902 [hereafter cited as Ocherk Min. Inos. Del., 1802-1902] (SPb.: Ministra Inostrannykh Del, Ocherk istorii ministerstva inostrannykh del, s. 1802-1902 [hereafter cited as Ocherk Min. Inos. Del., 1802-1902] (SPb.: sfa R. Golike i A. Vilborg, 1902), opposite p. 62 and AKV, XII, "Frontispiece." "to-biografiia"/, AKV, VIII, 1-36; also in RA (1876), kn. 1, pp. 33-58. For a Russian biography, see Riabinin, RA (1879), I, 58-82; II, 168-196; III, 305-345; IV, 444-502. Portions of Semen's published correspondence may be found in ibid. (1874), I, 79-120; II, 206-222; III, 65-103; IV, 395-415; V, 81-90; (1879), I, 83-111; II, 145-167; III, 197-205; IV, 345-354. For an arrangement of the well over 2,000 letters and other papers in the published AKV, see "Arkhiv grafa Semena Romanovicha Vorontsova," AKV, XI, 51-58; and for the volumes devoted extensively to Semen, see VIII-XI, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, XXVII, XXVIII, XXX-XXXII, XXXIV. In addition, there is the article by Gleb Struve, "John Paradise - Friend of Doctor Johnson, American Citizen and Russian Agent: An Episode in Anglo-Russian Relations," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, XVII (October, 1949), pp. 355-375 which treats the early period of Semen Romanovich's stay in England. See also, Marcum, and Bantysch, Slovar, I, 363-365.

<sup>13</sup>For a published copy of the original text of her memoirs, see Ekaterina Romanovna (Vorontsova) Dashkova, "Mémoires de la princesse Dashkav (d'après le manuscrit)" [hereafter cited as Dashkova, "Memoires"/, AKV, XXI, 5-365. For the most readily available English translation, see Kyril Fitzlyon (Trans. and ed.), The Memoirs of Princess Dashkov (London: John Calder, 1958). Other editions of her memoirs are cited in Humphreys, pp. 114-115, n. 125.

<sup>14</sup>See Marc Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth Century Nobility [hereafter cited as Raeff, Origins] (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 4-8. Among the chief archives containing additional Vorontsov papers are: TsGADA (Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh

Nevertheless, contemporaries' and scholars' conflicting opinions of A. R. Vorontsov suggest the need for the attempt. Although these opinions will be referred to in appropriate context throughout this study, grouping some of them at this juncture may serve to highlight aspects of his character and dramatize the elusiveness of this exceptional Enlightenment personality. E. I. Indova, a Soviet scholar, has called A. R. Vorontsov one of the most "colorful" figures of the period in which he lived.<sup>15</sup> Another Soviet scholar, A. I. Zaizerskii, has referred to Vorontsov as one of the most "significant" personages of his time.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, although most Soviet scholars were for a time at great pains to prove that Alexander Radishchev was the author of the 1801 Charter of the Russian People, some Soviet scholars, Russian scholars living abroad and most western historians lean to the view that the Charter was basically and intrinsically A. R.

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Aktov) in Moscow; OIRA (Otdel Drevnikh Rukopisi i Aktov) in Leningrad's Historical Institute of the Akademia Nauk; and GIM-OPI (Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Muzei-Otdel Pismennykh Istochnikov), according to Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 16-17, 19-20. Although these archives contain much information on the economic activities of the Vorontsovs, the plan for publication of the AKV excluded material of economic significance, ibid., pp. 10-11. An American scholar attempting to use some of the unpublished papers in the archives recently wrote: "Unfortunately, there is no published study of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov....it is difficult to reconstruct Vorontsov's views during his ministry because many of his papers and crucial parts of his correspondence are not available and could not be found among the manuscript papers in TsGada and LOII [what Indova calls OIRA]; neither could it be determined whether important papers relating to his ministry were to be found in AVFR [Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossii]." See Grimsted, Foreign Ministers, pp. 339-340. For additional difficulties facing the American scholar in Russia, see ibid., pp. 309-313; and, by the same author, an article entitled "Soviet Archives and Manuscript Collections: A Bibliographical Introduction," Slavic Review [hereafter cited as SR], XXIV, No. 1 (March, 1956), pp. 105-120; and, by the same author, her unpublished Ph.D. dissertation which, although it was the basis for her book on the foreign ministers of Alexander I, contains some additional material not contained in the published work. See, e.g., "Diplomatic Spokesmen and the Tsar-Diplomat: The Russian Foreign Ministers During the Reign of Alexander I, 1801-1825" [hereafter cited as Grimsted, "Diplomatic Spokesmen"] (Berkeley: University of California, 1964), p. 437.

<sup>15</sup>Indova, Krepostnoe, p. 30.

<sup>16</sup>Zaizerskii, p. 105.

Vorontsov's creation.<sup>17</sup> Roderick P. Thaler, an authority on Radishchev called Vorontsov a truly "noble man,"<sup>18</sup> whereas Lester J. Rumphreys, a recent student of the Vorontsovs has described Alexander Romanovich as a "sycophantic courtier" who only paid lip-service to the "verbiage of liberalism."<sup>19</sup> In this connection, one of Radishchev's biographers, Allen McConnell, considers Vorontsov "far from democratic,"<sup>20</sup> whereas Alexander Kornilov classified Vorontsov as a "democrat" who was often more liberal than the young friends of Alexander I.<sup>21</sup> Paul Dukes suggested that Radishchev may have been considered Vorontsov's weapon in a struggle against Potemkin.<sup>22</sup> Finally, perhaps the most striking statement is that of James W. Marcum who noted his feeling that in the 1780's Count Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was the only man capable of opposing Catherine II.<sup>23</sup>

Opinions of Vorontsov by his contemporaries were no less striking. For example, A. R. Vorontsov's distinguished brother Semen, for twenty years

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<sup>17</sup>See below, Chapter IX, for an evaluation of views.

<sup>18</sup>Roderick P. Thaler (ed.), A. N. Radishchev's Journey From St. Petersburg to Moscow [hereafter cited as Radishchev, Journey] (Trans. Leo Wiener; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 13. For a similar statement, see P. G. Liubomirov, "Rod Radishchevykh," in A. N. Radishchev, Materialy i issledovaniia [hereafter cited as Radishchev, Materialy] (Edited by A. S. Orlov; Moscow: Literaturnyi arkhiv Akademii Nauk, 1936), p. 334.

<sup>19</sup>Rumphreys, pp. 122-123, 244-245.

<sup>20</sup>McConnell, Philosophe, p. 63.

<sup>21</sup>Kornilov, I, 85, 87.

<sup>22</sup>"The harsh treatment meted out to Radishchev was perhaps prompted to some extent by the fact that his patron, Count A. R. Vorontsov was an opponent of Potemkin," Paul Dukes, Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility. A Study Based on the Materials of the Legislative Commission of 1787 (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1987), p. 240.

<sup>23</sup>Marcum, p. 248, n. 7. For Marcum's phraseology, see below, beginning of Chapter V.

minister to the Court of St. James, credited his elder brother with having helped him in various ways, including personal finances, good advice and teaching him how to write.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, Princess Dashkov, their youngest sister, attributed her ability to write to Alexander Romanovich, thanked him for good advice and fraternal intercession on her behalf when she wished to marry and noted that he was the only member of the family with whom she never quarrelled.<sup>25</sup> Dairi Buturlin, A. R. Vorontsov's nephew and Russian bibliophile whose enormous library was burned in the Moscow fire of 1812, referred to his uncle as his tutor and his inspiration who was like "a father and a friend."<sup>26</sup> Alexander Radishchev, writing to Vorontsov to thank him for the latter's aid called his mentor "the man who made me love life."<sup>27</sup> Pavel Radishchev, a son of Vorontsov's protégé, referred to the count as the inspiration of Alexander Radishchev.<sup>28</sup> Victor Pavlovich Kochubei, nephew of A. A. Bezborodko who had been Catherine II's principal foreign policy advisor for many years, likened A. R. Vorontsov to a "democrat."<sup>29</sup> Indeed, when Kochubei, one of the young friends of Alexander I,

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<sup>24</sup>See, for example, S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, November 8/19, 1774, AKV, XXXII, 188-189; January 7/19, 1801, *ibid.*, X, 85-87; to M. S. Vorontsov, June 2, 1798 (M. S.), *ibid.*, XVII, 3; A. R. to S. R. Vorontsov, May 4/15, 1784, *ibid.*, XXI, 134; S. R. Vorontsov, "Avtobiografiia," RA (1876), I, 57; and Riabinin, RA (1879), III, 334.

<sup>25</sup>Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 7-9, 11, 120, 157-158; Fitzlyon, pp. 28-29, 110.

<sup>26</sup>D. P. Buturlin, "A l'ombre d'un ami," December, 1805, AKV, XXXII, 424-425.

<sup>27</sup>Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, April 4/15, 1795, Aleksandr Nikolaevich Radishchev, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii [hereafter cited as PSS] (Edited by G. Gukovskii; 3 vols.; M., L.: Akademia Nauk, 1938-1952), III, 437.

<sup>28</sup>P. A. Radishchev, "Alexander Nikolaevich Radishchev; Bibliograficheskie dopolnenii M. N. Longinova," Russkii Vestnik, t. 18, Dekabr, kn. 1 (1858), p. 406.

<sup>29</sup>Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Graf Pavel Aleksandrovich Stroganov

was serving the new tsar as head of foreign affairs, it was observed by the Austrian diplomat Sauvau that Kochubei would not make a move without consulting A. R. Vorontsov.<sup>30</sup> Others were also aware of Vorontsov's interest in foreign affairs for many years. For example according to Mikhail Garnovskii, a contemporary court figure in the 1780's, Vorontsov directed many foreign policy matters from behind the scenes.<sup>31</sup> Perhaps this observation helps explain the general antipathy toward and many unkind words written about Vorontsov by Count Ségur,<sup>32</sup> then French ambassador to St. Petersburg, whose view apparently was not shared by Citizen Edmond Génêt, Ségur's successor, who called Vorontsov the only man of talent in the Russian government.<sup>33</sup>

Consequently, the aim of this study is to try to reconstruct the life and activities of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov with him as the central focal point in his relationships with members of his family, friends and

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(1774-1817) [hereafter cited as P. A. Stroganov] (3 vols.; SPb.: Expeditsiia zagotovleniia gosudarstvennykh bumag, 1903), II, 33 and n.

<sup>30</sup>Sauvau to Stahrenburg, October 5/17, 1801 (N. S.), cited by Alexander Trachevskii, Diplomaticheskiia snosheniia Rossii s Frantsiei v epokhu Napoleona I (Part I, 1801-1802), in Russkoe Istoricheskoe Obshchestvo, Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva [hereafter cited as SIRIO] (148 vols. in 127 bks.; SPb.: Various publishers, 1867-1916), LXX, 702. See also Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, November 5, 1801 (N. S.) and Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, May 1/13, 1801, AKV, XIV, 163 and 239, respectively. See also, Grimsted, "Diplomatic Spokesmen," p. 126, n. 72.

<sup>31</sup>Garnovskii was brought to the Russian Court by Potemkin for whom he worked, Mikhail Garnovskii, "Zapiski Mikhaila Garnovskago, 1786-1790," Russkaia Starina [hereafter cited as RS], XV (1876), pp. 9, 691.

<sup>32</sup>Count Louis Philippe de Ségur, Mémoires ou souvenirs et anecdotes (3 vols.; 2nd ed.; Paris: Alexis Rymery, 1824-1826), II, 256, 258, 275, 305, 375-376, 396-397, 399.

<sup>33</sup>Quai d'Orsay archives, Paris, Russie, vol. 132, No. 65 of August 27, 1790, postscript (original in cypher), cited in Lang, Radical, pp. 194-195.

colleagues and, among them, particularly his relationship with Alexander Radishchev. Moreover, although based chiefly on published material, including especially the forty volumes of the Vorontsov family papers,<sup>34</sup> it is hoped that his life story will help illumine some events of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Russia.

### B. The Eighteenth Century: The Time and the Heritage

Although eighteenth century Russia was, perhaps, the most autocratic European nation of the period, there were underlying divisions in Russian society which frequently brought segments of the nobility into conflict with each other and sometimes with the throne.<sup>35</sup> Sometimes these conflicts resulted in demands for rights and manifestoes proclaiming certain liberties, as in 1762 and 1785; sometimes they resulted in "palace revolutions," as in 1741, 1762 and 1801. At a time when both serfdom and absolute monarchy were being successfully challenged in western Europe, Russian rulers from Peter the Great through Catherine the Great codified and institutionalized serfdom as the base of autocratic power. Although Russia was said to lag two centuries behind western Europe, partly because Russia had experienced neither the Renaissance nor the Reformation, evidence that this gap was being bridged exists in the period's Francophilism, growth of Freemasonry,

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<sup>34</sup>Description of some of the unpublished Russian archival materials, as well as varying degrees of commentary and critical evaluation of the unpublished AKV may be found in the following: Marc Bouloiseau, "Les archives Vorontsov," Nevus historique, CCXXX (July-September, 1963), pp. 121-130; V. Z. Dzhincharadze, "Obzor fonda Vorontsovykh khraniashchegosia v TsGADA," IE, No. 32 (1950), pp. 242-268; V. A. Petrov, "Obzor sobrania Vorontsovykh khraniashchegosia v arkhiv Leningradskogo otdela Instituta istorii Akademii nauk SSSR," Problemy istochnikovedeniia, V (M., 1956), pp. 102-145; A. I. Andreev, et. al. (eds.), Putevoditel po arkhivu Leningradskogo otdeleniia Instituta istorii (L.: Akademiia nauk, 1958), pp. 264-265; and I. Trotskii, "Obzor. Arkhiv Vorontsovykh," Literaturnoe Nasledstvo (1933), No. 9-10, pp. 397-420.

<sup>35</sup>Raeff, Origins, pp. 102-111.

and the stirrings of Russian national consciousness.<sup>36</sup>

The cleavage in Russian society occasionally led to direct conflict on the part of the peasantry as in the Pugachev Rebellion (1773-1775). Although the Russian state more than doubled in area and nearly tripled in population between the death of Peter I and the death of Catherine the Great,<sup>37</sup> the nation's commerce and industry was underdeveloped. Economic stresses were intensified by the frequent ravages of famine and disease, the desolation in the wake of constant wars, the strain on the peasant's pocketbook because of the heavy taxes levied against him, the extravagance of the Russian court which aggravated the drain on the treasury, and the general economic deterioration of the Russian state, particularly as inflation took its heavy toll beginning in 1786.

As the autocrat became more powerful, the influence of the nobility as a class began to wane. On the other hand, the influence of some nobles seems to have been magnified, either because they were members of the burgeoning bureaucracy which was developing out of that "new class of career officials (many of whom were non-noble by birth),"<sup>38</sup> or because they belonged to that group of provincial nobles which became increasingly important to the Russian government after 1762 as a result of "the state's inability to govern the countryside without the help of the serf owners."<sup>39</sup>

The Verontsovs fit into both of these categories. The precise founding

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<sup>36</sup>See, for example, Hans Rogger, National Consciousness in Eighteenth Century Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 6-8.

<sup>37</sup>Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 278.

<sup>38</sup>Raeff, Origins, p. 107.

<sup>39</sup>Robert E. Jones, The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762-1785 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 299.

of the Vorontsov line is difficult to determine exactly. Although it has been suggested that the Vorontsovs are of ancient lineage, dating their family tree to 1027,<sup>40</sup> E. I. Indova has pointed out that, despite exhaustive search in the archives and in legal records that was ordered by Prince Mikhail Semenovich Vorontsov (nephew of A. R. Vorontsov), the ancient lineage of the family has not been demonstrated.<sup>41</sup> The chief problem in this connection is whether one Fedor Vorontsov, who lived in the beginning of the seventeenth century is the same person as Fedor Vasileevich Vorontsov who, it has been suggested, begins the family tree; and, regardless of the answer to that question, whether the Fedor who actually begins the Vorontsov family tree is descended from one Vasili Fedorovich Vorontsov who died in 1578 and may be the "missing link" if the Vorontsovs actually do date back beyond the seventeenth century.<sup>42</sup> For our purposes, however, the family line begins as it does for Ogarkov with Illarion Gavrilovich Vorontsov, "Rostovski voevoda," grandfather of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Bartysh, Slovar, I, 348.

<sup>41</sup>Indova, Krepostnoe, p. 21, n.

<sup>42</sup>For the only treatment of this question in English, with historiographical evaluation and explanatory charts, see Humphreys, pp. 17-27.

<sup>43</sup>See the genealogical chart facing the table of contents in Ogarkov.

**PART II: THE EARLY YEARS, 1741-1762**

## CHAPTER II

## CURRENTS AND UNDERCURRENTS, 1741-1762

Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, in his later years, described the clouds of fear and suspicion which hung over his household at the time of his birth. In writing of the close relationship between his mother, Martha Ivanovna<sup>1</sup> and then Princess Elizabeth Petrovna, he described the following mood:

My mother had been strongly tied to this princess, before she became Empress. She came often to our home, from which she would depart only because she did not want to embarrass our family in a reign as cruel and strict as that which existed under Empress Anna, who was filled with suspicion of and malevolence toward Princess Elizabeth.<sup>2</sup>

A. Accession of Elizabeth and Early Years of A. R. Vorontsov

When one considers that, in less than three months after A. R.

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<sup>1</sup>A. R. Vorontsov's mother, Martha (1718-1745), was the daughter of a very rich grain merchant, Ivan Suruin, who has been described as "rascally" by Kyril Fitalyon. Martha's first husband, Prince George Dolgoruki, was of noble station, but the marriage was short-lived, lasting only a few years because the Prince was banished together with the rest of the Dolgoruki clan to Siberia for political reasons. Martha, unlike the heroines in later day Russia, decided not to follow him. She prudently petitioned the Empress Anna for a divorce. Shortly after she obtained it, she married Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov. Besides bearing him five children, she gave a good deal of financial help to the Grand Duchess (later Empress) Elizabeth Petrovna, thereby helping to link her own family's fate to that monarch's destiny, Fitalyon, pp. 23, 24, 88, 138, 321. Martha's portrait, which shows her to be a dumpy, dowager type may be found in Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Portraits Russes des XVIII<sup>e</sup> et XIX<sup>e</sup> siècles [hereafter cited as Portraits Russes / (5 vols. in 10 pts., plus index; SPb.: Manufacture des papiers de l'etat, 1906), IV, 72, plate 69. See also AKV, XXXI, 3, for the year of her death.

<sup>2</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, p. 9.

Vorontsov's birth Elizabeth Petrovna replaced Anna Leopoldovna as ruler of Russia by means of a successful palace revolution, there appear to have been sound grounds for the suspicion that existed. Indeed, although Elizabeth Petrovna may have visited Martha Ivanovna Vorontsova as any woman visits a pregnant friend or one who has recently given birth, it is also conceivable that discussions relating to the forthcoming coup had taken place there. Indeed, Alexander Romanovich says that his father, Roman, had told him that, "at this time...an officer of the guards in the Ismailovskii regiment in which one of the friends of the Duke of Courland was a lieutenant-colonel...recommended to the Duke...that he watch over his sovereign closely."<sup>3</sup>

In any event, on November 25, 1741 (O. S.), Elizabeth Petrovna, with the help of Alexander's uncle, Mikhail Illarionovich, mounted the throne of her father.<sup>4</sup>

Immediately, she dispatched Alexander's father, Roman Illarionovich, to Riga to guard Princess Anne of Mecklenburg together with all her family, including Prince Ivan, who had been dethroned. When Roman returned from Riga, he was made a gentleman of the chamber, which meant that he was now one of those who "formed the social group of Empress Elizabeth." This was a great honor, as there were at the time "only five or six gentlemen of the chamber and seven or eight chamberlains" who were so honored.<sup>5</sup> According

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<sup>3</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 9. It is not clear whether "this time" refers to the period before or after A. R. Vorontsov's birth.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 8-9.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 9. Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov (1707-1783), who was the father of A. R. Vorontsov and elder brother of Mikhail, sometime Grand Chancellor of Empress Elizabeth, has been described as a "horse thief," Pitalyon, p. 321. Under Elizabeth, Roman rose to the position of Senator. After Catherine II ascended the throne, because of his opposition to her, he was briefly eclipsed and fell into partial disgrace for a time. He re-

to Alexander Romanovich, not only his father but "all my family were shown many kindnesses and marks of confidence and liberties by [Empress Elizabeth]. My mother above all then enjoyed her favor to the point of giving offense to Madam Shuvalova who resided at the court and enjoyed greater favor...." But Empress Elizabeth is said to have paid no heed to the intrigues hatched by Madam Shuvalova to discredit and to harm Martha Ivanovna Vorontsova who, "until her death preserved her close relations with the Empress."<sup>6</sup>

Elizabeth Petrovna also showered great favor upon Alexander's uncle Mikhail (1714-1767) who rose to Chancellor under her. Noting her "confidence" and "friendship" for Mikhail as an example of the "benevolence" of Empress Elizabeth towards the Vorontsov family, A. R. Vorontsov, writing of the last years of her reign, stated:

...my uncle was almost always indisposed [in 1756 and 1757], without being able to leave the house except very rarely. The Empress came every fifteen days to have supper with him without any fuss, and I had the occasion to see how this princess showed him kindness. She had much natural spirit, a sound mind, and much grace and beauty.<sup>7</sup>

Of the first few years of the life of Alexander Romanovich, unfortunately, we know very little. The year 1745, however, marked a change in the personal

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emerged as Governor-General of Vladimir, Penza and Tambov in the 1770's. According to Fitalyon, p. 321, by means of bribery and misappropriation of funds on a monumental scale, Roman succeeded in ruining economically all three provinces. For his efforts, he was rewarded by Catherine II with an empty purse. In this connection, Roman bore the appellation "bolshoi karman," or "big pockets," Ogarkov, p. 33. In any event, the marriage of Martha Surmin to Roman Vorontsov in 1736 made Roman one of the richest Russians of his time, Indova, Krepostnoe, p. 22. Roman was a landowning merchant-manufacturer, speculator and money lender. In addition to his reputation as a money grabber, he has been described as the most unorthodox, enigmatic member of the family, and a "carefree lover and libertine," Fitalyon, p. 321; Indova, Krepostnoe, p. 23; Humphreys, pp. 135, 137.

<sup>6</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 9-10. As to the question of which Madam Shuvalova Vorontsov mentioned, it is probably the wife of Chancellor Bestuzhev.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

lives of the Vorontsovs resulting from the death of Alexander's mother, an event which may have at least partly affected their political fortunes as well. Alexander Romanovich described the circumstances, in part, as follows:

My mother, at the age of twenty seven or twenty eight died of a high fever in 1745, leaving her children at a tender age. My eldest sister [Maria] was only six; my other sister [Elizaveta] five; I was three and several months, my sister Princess Dashkova almost three, and my brother [Semen] born only a few months before the death of my mother. My father, still a young man, was overcome by her death. My uncle the chancellor [Mikhail] took all the children of my father to his home. My aunt [Anna Karlovna Skavronskaja] took particularly good care of us and we remained there until the month of September of the same year.

Maria Romanovna (1737-17??), the eldest of the five, is said to have had a colorless personality. She married Peter Buturlin, son of the well-known Field Marshall Alexander Buturlin, Empress Elizabeth's first lover. Maria's son, Dmitri, became a famous bibliophile and man of encyclopedic knowledge, who credited these attributes to the tutelage of his uncle, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov.<sup>9</sup> Dmitri's library, one of the greatest in Russia, was entirely destroyed during the 1812 fire in Moscow. Undaunted, he formed a second library which, after his death, was dispersed at an auction sale in Paris.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 11. See also, "A. R. Vorontsov," *Chtenia*, CXXXVII, kn. 2, p. 55. Dashkova was born in Siberia on March 17/28, 1743, according to P. Bartenev, *AKV*, V, 159, n. She and Semen have been mentioned already and will be referred to throughout this study. Of the others, perhaps the least known of Alexander's brothers and sisters is his half-brother, Ivan Romanovich, referred to by Princess Dashkova in her memoirs as "cousin," Dashkova, "Memoires," *ibid.*, XXI, 129, 131, 150, 152. Ivan is said to have been an illegitimate son of Roman Illarionovich, *Fitalyon*, p. 320, and is not included in the grouping in the text above. For the statement that Roman "maintained a second and illegitimate family," see Marcum, p. 6 and n. 10. See also Semen's reference to the arrival of Ivan Romanovich, S. R. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov, June 25, 1771 (O. S.), *AKV*, XXXII, 147.

<sup>9</sup>D. P. Buturlin, "A l'ombre d'un ami," December, 1805, *ibid.*, XXXII, 423.

<sup>10</sup>Dashkova, "Memoires," *ibid.*, XXI, 6, 39, 41; *Fitalyon*, pp. 24, 48, 295.

Elizaveta Romanovna (1739-1792) was the second eldest of the five children. Perhaps her greatest distinction is that she became the mistress of Peter III and, had circumstances taken a different turn, might have become Empress of Russia. She has been described by many as exceptionally dull-witted, small, squat, fat and startlingly ugly, with a dark, sallow complexion, a pock-marked puffy face, a very noticeable squint, and an irritating habit of spitting, using obscene language and starting brawls especially when drunk. It seems, nevertheless, that she was deeply loved by Peter III, who apparently had the intention of marrying her and proclaiming her Empress after divorcing Catherine. The latter, on her part, after establishing herself on the throne, bought a house for Elizaveta in Moscow. Three years after the assassination of Peter III, Elizaveta married Colonel Alexander Polianski by whom she had a son, Alexander, and a daughter, Anna. Catherine II was godmother to Elizaveta's children, and made Anna her maid-of-honor. Anna later married Baron d'Hogguer, sometime Dutch minister to the Russian Court.<sup>11</sup>

A. R. Vorontsov, in relating the events, is at great pains to assure his reader that the relationship between his sister, Elizaveta Romanovna and Peter III was platonic, while at the same time affirming that either the nature of the relationship, or the view of members of the court concerning the relationship, caused great consternation to uncle Mikhail Illarionovich, Grand Chancellor who considered his niece a "blemish" on the family. The whole incident is described as "disagreeable to my family" by the author. Perhaps the author doth protest too much.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>See, for example, Roepis AKV, p. 237, and Pitalyon, p. 312. Elizaveta's portrait may be found in Portraits Russes, II, pt. 2, plate 54.

<sup>12</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notices," AKV, V, 13, 21-22.

In any event, in the same year that A. R. Vorontsov's mother died and that her children went to live with uncle Mikhail, the latter went abroad for a year, not to return until late in 1746. According to Alexander Romanovich, the voyage had a two-fold purpose, it being "for his health, and also for his instruction."<sup>13</sup>

During Mikhail's absence, Chancellor Bestuzhev is said to have attempted to raise questions about the character of Vice-Chancellor M. I. Vorontsov. Apparently, he succeeded for a time in causing Empress Elizabeth to question Mikhail's loyalty. Bestuzhev's obvious attempt to ingratiate himself ultimately backfired when, by 1758, he himself was deposed. In 1743 he had barely missed exile, permanent disfigurement, or death along with other members of his family who were implicated in the Botta conspiracy, an alleged plot to restore Ivan VI to the throne. In retaliation, Bestuzhev promoted the investigation known as the Lestocq affair.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, one of the factors which may have contributed to Mikhail's easy escape from the web of suspicion

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 11. See also, "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, p. 55.

<sup>14</sup>During Elizabeth's reign, the most difficult time for the Vorontsovs in general and M. I. Vorontsov in particular occurred in the mid-1740's and may be referred to as the Lestocq affair. Armand Lestocq had been Elizabeth Petrovna's physician prior to her ascending the throne in 1741. He was one of those instrumental in her successful coup d'etat. Lestocq, who favored Russian alliances with France and Prussia, is said to have manufactured the "Botta Conspiracy" in an effort to discredit Bestuzhev. Although Natalia Lopukhina and Bestuzhev's sister-in-law were publicly flogged and had their tongues cut out or branded, and other members of Bestuzhev's family were exiled to Siberia, Bestuzhev was not incriminated and he lost no influence. In his turn, he uncovered information incriminating Lestocq, the French minister La Chétardie, Elizabeth Johanna of Anhalt-Zerbst (mother of Catherine II), and others in a plot to give Prussian interests the ascendancy over Russia. La Chétardie was ordered to leave the capital within twenty-four hours; Elizabeth Johanna left Russia in 1745; and Lestocq was exiled to Uglich in 1748 after he was formally accused of carrying on relations with enemies of the state. See, for example, Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation [hereafter cited as Florinsky, Russia] (2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1953, 1955), I, 453-470; and Tamara Talbot Rice, Elizabeth: Empress of Russia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 80-81.

was his "well known modesty and moderation [which] caused him never to put himself first, whereas Lestocq immediately began to enjoy a great role and influence in all affairs."<sup>15</sup>

In this connection, one cannot fail to note that M. I. Vorontsov was the only one of those directly involved in bringing Elizabeth to power who was spared and who ever rose to a position of great influence.

Although Roman's children were returned to his home in September, 1745, uncle Mikhail and his wife, Anna Karlovna, continued to supervise the education of their nieces and nephews. Although Alexander Romanovich credits his father, Roman, with taking "care to give us as good an education as one could have in those times," the son noted the "youth" of his father and the "life of dissipation that he led at the court and in the larger world...." Moreover, he pointed out that Mikhail, his uncle "sent to Berlin for a governess for us who had enjoyed a great reputation and who was, according to those [who spoke] of it, the best one could possibly have."<sup>16</sup> This woman, called Madame de Ruinau, had replaced a Madame Berger. Madam de Ruinau efficiently saw to it that they all occupied their time well, and taught them the French language "painlessly." At the age of five or six, it was noted that Alexander Romanovich "had a decided penchant for reading" the French language. In a brief comparison of his own education with that offered at the turn of the nineteenth century in Russia, Alexander Romanovich stated:

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<sup>15</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 10-11.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 11-12. Raeff, Origins, pp. 122, 218 pointed out that it "was not unusual, at least during the first years of his life, for the noble youngster to grow up without direct parental supervision." The Vorontsovs were among the first Russians to have French tutors as noted in Emile Haumant, La culture française en Russie, 1700-1900 (2nd ed.; Paris: Hachette, 1913), p. 86.

I must say that this education that he [Roman] gave us and which neither possessed brilliance nor gave rise to the great costs which one pays at present, is still right and proper. In the first place, he [Roman] did not neglect our learning the Russian language which no longer enters into the education plan at present. One might say that Russia is the only country where one disdains to learn his own language and all that has bearing on the country where he was born. The present generation understands. The people of Petersburg and Moscow pretending to enlightenment take care to make their children learn French; the circle of foreigners provide them at great cost with teachers of dance and music, and do not make them learn their paternal language, so that this fashionable education, besides being expensive, leads one to a perfect ignorance of his own country; an indifference, perhaps, which in turn leads one to disdain for the country from which he has obtained his existence; and an attachment for all that which is deemed to be the manners, customs, and morals of foreign countries and, above all, for France.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to proficiency in both French and Russian, Alexander and his brother and sisters were placed by their father in a loge twice a week at the Court Theatre where a French comedy was regularly performed. Alexander Romanovich made "mention of this circumstance because it contribute[d] greatly to having given us in our tender childhood a decided penchant for reading and literature."<sup>18</sup>

Moreover, Roman procured for his children a "rather well chosen" library which included works by the best French authors and poets and some historical works so that A. R. Vorontsov could write: "at twelve years old I was familiar with Voltaire, Racine, Corneille, Boileau" and many other French authors.<sup>19</sup> The most significant collection, in Alexander

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<sup>17</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 12; "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, pp. 55-56.

<sup>18</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 12. See also, "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, p. 56.

<sup>19</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 12-13. For details on collection and distribution of books in the library, see Marcum, pp. 5-6, 27. On this matter, see also five letters of S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov from 1765 to 1769: September 2/13, 1765; June 9/20, 1767; June 17/28, 1767; November 22/December 3, 1767; January 23/February 3, 1769 in AKV, XXXII, 90, 101, 102-103, 114, 121, respectively.

Romanovich's own words, was a multi-volume politico-historical series.

He wrote as follows:

Among these books there was a collection of almost one hundred volumes of a journal entitled: Key to Some Cabinets of Some Princes of Europe which had begun in the year 1700. I make mention of this collection because it is from it that I learned all that which had occurred in Russia of great interest and outstanding value since the year 1700. This work has possibly been more of an influence than I would have at that time believed it could be on the leaning I have had for history and politics, because it made me curious about all that which had caused these things, above all those which concerned Russia.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, by 1753, Alexander Romanovich was not only fluent in French and Russian, but had developed a liking for literature, theatre and -- perhaps most significant -- a lasting interest in politics and history. Undoubtedly, these characteristics were enhanced by his favorable reception at appropriate court functions. In this connection, as was her wont, Empress Elizabeth sometimes occupied herself with some of the children of those who composed her court. In this manner, she is said to have preserved many of those elements of old Russian customs which greatly resembled ancient patriarchal ceremonies. For example, she encouraged the children to come to court, and partake of the "joy of the circle, several times giving a ball in her interior apartments for the children of both sexes of those who composed her court."<sup>21</sup> One instance is described by Alexander Romanovich as follows:

I recall that at one of these parties there had been assembled some sixty to eighty children. She made us eat supper together, the governors and governesses who accompanied us having a separate table. The Empress kept herself very busy watching us dance and eat supper, and she herself ate afterwards with the fathers and mothers. This habit of watching over the court made

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<sup>20</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 13; "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, p. 56.

<sup>21</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 13.

us indifferent to the world at large and to society without us even thinking much about it. There had been, besides, a practice which greatly contributed to our conviviality; it is that the children of the fathers and mothers who composed the court of the Empress visited one another on holidays and Sundays. We had had some parties always supervised by governors and governesses. It is from this period that I date the contacts that I have had with Count Shuvalov and Count Stroganov.<sup>22</sup>

In 1753, Alexander's eldest sister, Maria, was brought by Empress Elizabeth Petrovna to live at court as a lady of honor within her circle; and Elizaveta Romanovna, also older than Alexander, was "given to the Grand Duchess" also as a lady of honor. The youngest sister, Ekaterina (later Dashkova) went to live at uncle Mikhail's home where she stayed until she was married in 1759.<sup>23</sup>

Alexander and Semen remained at their father's home for a short time, under the guidance of a governor until, in 1754, Empress Elizabeth Petrovna "counseled" Roman Illarionovich "to place us [Alexander and Semen] in the boarding school of M. Straube professor of jurisprudence at the Academy of Sciences." Straube was a member of a commission established for the making of laws. The head of the commission, described as a "man of great merit" was the Senator, Count Peter Shuvalov.<sup>24</sup>

The education of Alexander Romanovich and his siblings, therefore, although structurally similar to that received by others of his family's station in life, was qualitatively superior to that received by the vast majority of nobles in the eighteenth century.<sup>25</sup> In this latter sense they

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid. See also P. A. Stroganov, I, 8.

<sup>23</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 14. See also Dashkova to A. R. Vorontsov, No. 32 and especially the note which assigns February, 1759 as the month and year of her marriage, July 20/31, 1758, *ibid.*, pp. 157-158 and 158, n.

<sup>24</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, writing in French, designated the spelling of the head of the boarding school as "Straube," A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 14-15. In "A. R. Vorontsov," Chteniia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, p. 56, the Russian spelling would be transliterated into English as "Shtrube." Evidently, the references are to Strube-de-Pirmon (1704-1790), professor of law, academician, and writer who served with Shuvalov in 1754 on Elizabeth Petrovna's commission for the creation of a new code of laws.

<sup>25</sup>See Raeff's comment: "Many a young nobleman was to come to service

were atypical of their class. They were taught that education and learning were valuable for their own sake, especially as part of the development of the individual,<sup>26</sup> not only for service to the state. Finally, the character of the education has been said to have had a psychological effect on nobles which sometimes lasted a lifetime. In the words of Marc Raeff this feeling separated home and family from considerations of state and service. He described it as a feeling of "rootlessness":

...Being sent to boarding school at an early age also induced a keen feeling of rootlessness in young noblemen and the impact sometimes lasted for life. These youngsters felt the absence of strong ties to a specific locality, the feeling that their human environment was unstable and shifting. The great contrast between school and home life was bound to impress the youngsters with the idea that state service and separation from home life were fatefully connected. The psychological allegiance of many youngsters shifted dramatically from home and birthplace to school and impersonal service organization.<sup>27</sup>

For Alexander Romanovich, however, the break does not seem to have been so dramatic; perhaps largely because home and family were so intimately connected with education and service.

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examinations and inspections (smotry) utterly ignorant of even the basic rudiments, and even almost illiterate," Raeff, Origins, p. 120.

<sup>26</sup>Compare, for example, the attitude cited by Paul Miliukov, that in the seventeenth century education and learning were considered instruments of the devil because they encouraged haughtiness, Paul Miliukov, Outlines of Russian Culture [hereafter cited as Miliukov, Outlines] (3 vols.; Edited by Michael Karpovich; Trans. Valentine Ughet and Eleanor Davis; New York: A. S. Barnes and Co., 1960), I, 5-7, with the change noted by Raeff, that "education as an element of civilization and culture did not become accepted among the provincial nobility before the last two decades of the eighteenth century," Raeff, Origins, p. 127.

<sup>27</sup>Raeff began his evaluation as follows: "For a good number of noble children, especially during the first three quarters of the eighteenth century, schooling entailed being sent to some institution in the city. As a rule it was a boarding school, for few were lucky enough to have relatives or friends with whom they could live. For many youngsters the experience of living away from home, and being more or less on their own, started very early indeed, sometimes at the age of six or eight...", *ibid.*, pp. 127-129.

### B. Early Service under Elizabeth and Peter III

Indeed, Alexander Romanovich technically began his service to the state near the tender age of four in 1745, the year in which his mother died. At that time, Empress Elizabeth Petrovna made him enlist in the guards, first assigning him the rank of corporal and soon after raising him to sergeant in the household troops of the Izmailovskii regiment. In 1755, at the same time that Semen Romanovich was placed as a page in court, A. R. Vorontsov was made an officer of the guards in the Izmailovskii regiment when Empress Elizabeth Petrovna awarded him the rank of ensign.<sup>28</sup>

In 1756, immediately prior to his fifteenth birthday, as was customary among the youths of noble families, Alexander Romanovich began to perform his service as an officer.<sup>29</sup> Apparently, a good part of this service involved making contacts with wealthy, prestigious, and powerful families, both Russian and foreign. In his own words, Alexander Romanovich recalled that time as follows:

...I began to frequent more often both the Court and the world-at-large, going into the best homes, like that of Hetman Count Razumovskii, strongly bound to our family, the Procurator-General Prince Trubetskoi, [and] Grand Chamberlain Count Sheremetev, without counting the home of my uncle where I went habitually, who placed me beside him not only to accustom me to the workings of the laws of society, but also to habituate me to learn to speak of affairs -- and I acknowledge that even though I have an amazing ardor for affairs and work. I had occasion to see in the home of my uncle foreign ministers, several of whom invited me to dine at their houses and frequent

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<sup>28</sup>A. R. Vorontsov noted that Empress Elizabeth Petrovna "had a thousand kindnesses for him [Semen]. In 1760, she made him page of the chamber, and he remained in this manner close to her until her death," A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 15. See also A. R. Vorontsov to Dashkova, October 28, 1805 (O. S.), *ibid.*, p. 3; and "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, p. 57.

<sup>29</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 15; Raeff, Origins, pp. 43, 70.

their homes, something my uncle allowed me despite the fact that there was at the time a kind of prohibition against association with foreign ministers.<sup>30</sup>

The suspicion of foreign contacts referred to had existed for more than a decade and was the result of foreign intrigues designed to woo Russia now to this nation, now to that -- and involved France, England, Prussia and Austria. The contacts made by Alexander Romanovich during 1756 and 1757 were therefore to prove to have a decided bearing on his career. A striking case in point is that on February 14, 1758 (O. S.) Chancellor Bestuzhev was removed from office; and Empress Elizabeth Petrovna appointed as his successor the former Vice-Chancellor, M. I. Vorontsov. Within two weeks, by February 28, 1758 (O. S.), A. R. Vorontsov was dispatched to Paris.<sup>31</sup>

According to his own account, Alexander Romanovich was sent to France by Empress Elizabeth Petrovna to the Chevaux Legers where he studied, trained and served for one and one-half years. According to the account of the historian Rambaud, Alexander Romanovich "entered the service of Louis the Fifteenth, and in the uniform of the light cavalry stood guard at the galleries of Versailles."<sup>32</sup>

As Alexander Romanovich pointed out, it was his uncle Mikhail

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<sup>30</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 15.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 28-36 described his contacts with the Marquis de L'Hopital who had embarked for Russia on a mission from France in 1756, a circumstance which led to consideration of Alexander Romanovich going to France prior to the fall of Bestuzhev, who, incidentally, was not favorably disposed to the mission of the Marquis. See also "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXCVII, kn. 2, p. 57.

<sup>32</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 30-31; M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, May 7/18, 1759, ibid., XXXI, 89-90; A. R. Vorontsov to Dashkova, October 28, 1805 (O. S.), AKV, V, 3; "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXCVII, kn. 2, p. 57; Ogarkov, p. 35; Zaevskii, pp. 106-107; Alfred Rambaud, History of Russia. From the Earliest Times to 1882 (Trans. L. Lang, 3 vols.; Boston: Dana Estes and Co., 1886-18??), II, 172.

Illarionovich who obtained permission from Empress Elizabeth Petrovna to send his elder nephew as envoy to France. Indeed, of this period in his life, Alexander Romanovich wrote:

My uncle was thoroughly occupied with me and all that concerned my education, and I can say I had in him a veritable father.<sup>33</sup>

In this connection, one should recall that uncle Mikhail was generally, even in his own time, recognized as an ardent Francophile: one who favored an alliance with France as the pivot of Russia's foreign policy; one who helped Frenchify the Russian court; the one who was in 1745 among the earliest visitors to France to be well received by Louis XV at Versailles; one whose mansion, which had been completed in the year previous to Alexander Romanovich's departure, is said to have been furnished with French furniture; and who was implicated in intrigues with France and other nations during the 1740's and 1750's.<sup>34</sup>

One cannot help but wonder whether the mission of Alexander Romanovich, therefore, was in some way also to be connected with the augmentation of the Vorontsov wealth. Certainly, however, it can at least be said that, for Alexander Romanovich, as for some other nobles, service provided an opportunity for travel in foreign lands. And, as for most, service became a pathway to education and westernisation of the individual. Indeed, as Marc Raeff put it: "Education in Russia was therefore an intrinsic part

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<sup>33</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 31. Zaoverskii erroneously cites ibid., XXXI, p. 31 as his source for the same statement from A. R. Vorontsov's autobiography, Zaoverskii, p. 113. Marcus stated, moreover, that: "Mikhail was in many ways more of a father than Roman to Semen," Marcus, p. 6 and n. 10.

<sup>34</sup>The characteristic feature of the reign of Elizabeth is the establishment of direct relations with France," according to Rambaud, II, 171. See also D. S. von Mohrenschildt, Russia in the Intellectual Life of Eighteenth Century France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936) pp. 29-35; Rice, p. 109; Florinsky, Russia, I, 471-474.

of service, and for the average nobleman school was the first form of service. In the eighteenth century, the obligation to serve also implied the obligation to be educated."<sup>35</sup>

Without a doubt, therefore, in connection with the relationship between service and education in Russia, Alexander Romanovich was an exemplary eighteenth century Russian nobleman. Moreover, when one considers that, at the age of fifteen, in 1756, Alexander Romanovich also contributed some articles for inclusion in G. F. Muller's journal, Ezhemesiachnyia Sochinenia..., and later wrote a brief essay intended as a preliminary history of the Russian theater which was not made public until the publication of the family archives, one may conclude that he was intellectually a representative of the enlightenment in Russia.<sup>36</sup>

After spending one and one half years in France, in 1759 he was promoted to second-lieutenant in the Izmailovskii regiment, and was sent by Elizabeth Petrovna on missions to Spain, Portugal and Italian ports. During

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<sup>35</sup>Raeff, Origins, pp. 71-73, 130, 131. Interestingly enough, Raeff also points out that the role of the state was much greater in education and cultural life during the eighteenth century than was its impact "in the sphere of economic activity."

<sup>36</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Rassuzhdenie o priiatnostiakh scobahchestva," perevod Aleksandra V [orontsova]," in G. F. Muller (ed.), Ezhemesiachnyia sochinenia ek polze: i uvveseleniiu sluzhashchiiia, Imperatorskaia Akademia Nauk, 1755-1757 (and under other titles, through 1764), III (February, 1756), pp. 153-179; and, by the same author, "Nemnoz shelaiushii byt sovershenno razumnym per. A. V. [orontsova]," ibid., III (April, 1756), pp. 330-338; and, by the same author, "Soderzhanie pisma drugomu v otvet: mozhet li chest sravnitela s Slavoiu." (Mysl). A. V. [orontsova]," ibid., IV (August, 1756), pp. 204-211. See also, Aleksandr Nikolaevich Neustroev, Istoricheskoe rozyskanie o russkikh sovremennykh izdanniakh i sbornikakh za 1703-1802 gg. (SPb.: "Obshchestvennaia Polza," 1874), pp. 53-54. The journal, published between 1755 and 1764, is described as Russia's first scientific and literary journal, and is said to have originated from a request of M. V. Lomonosov who had as one of his patrons, M. I. Vorontsov, S. L. Peshtich, Russkaia istoriografiia XVIII veka (Chast II; L.: Leningrad University, 1865), p. 164. For the essay entitled "K istorii russkago teatra," see AKV, XXX, 341-370.

the course of his travels, he became acquainted with some of the leading figures of his age, such as, for example, Voltaire, Diderot and the Elder Pitt. Princess Dashkov, A. R. Vorontsov's sister, wrote to him of Voltaire's high regard for her brother in the following words:

I have seen Voltaire, who holds you in great esteem, as do all who have met you, and I can spend no time with him without hearing him intone your praise.<sup>37</sup>

Apparently, A. R. Vorontsov exhibited character traits admirable in any person; but, more importantly, they also reflect those personal attributes which one would associate with an enlightenment figure, e.g., cultivation, wisdom, good judgment and hospitality, as shown in letters of contemporaries.<sup>38</sup>

In October 1761, Alexander Romanovich was appointed to the consular staff of the newly organized delegation to the Viennese Court and designated minister plenipotentiary to Holland. Since Empress Elizabeth Petrovna had died before she could sign the ukaz confirming this assignment, it waited for Peter III to do so. He did; and in February, 1762, appointed Alexander Romanovich to the more important position of minister plenipotentiary to

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<sup>37</sup>Dashkova to A. R. Vorontsov, June 7, 1768?, *ibid.*, V, 180-181. Other references to A. R. Vorontsov's contacts with Voltaire may be found in *ibid.*, V, 62-63; XXXII, 101-105; and SIRIO, X, 181-182. For Voltaire's letters to A. R. Vorontsov, see *AKV*, V, 445-457; and for the only published letter of Vorontsov to Voltaire, *ibid.*, pp. 433-434. A. R. Vorontsov's acquaintance with Pitt the Elder is discussed as benefitting Semen when the latter arrived in England, S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, June 13/24, 1785, *ibid.*, IX, 40. The meeting with Diderot in late 1773 or 1774 is described by Humphreys, p. 73, who also characterized Alexander Romanovich as the most distinguished male member of the Vorontsov family, *ibid.*, p. 35, n. 43.

<sup>38</sup>For example, Princess Dashkov wrote that she admired his cultivation and wisdom at so young an age (thirty-one), Dashkova to A. R. Vorontsov, January 5/16, 1772, *AKV*, VII, 655-658. Similarly, the mother of Catherine II wrote that she admired A. R. Vorontsov's judgment and spirit in a letter to M. I. Vorontsov, September 26/October 7, 1761, *ibid.*, VI, 262-263. Semen reminded his son, Mikhail Semenovich, of all that A. R. Vorontsov had sacrificed for both of them and for Semen's daughter, Mikhail Semenovich's sister, and warned his son "not to abuse in any manner" A. R. Vorontsov's hospitality, S. R. Vorontsov to M. S. Vorontsov, July 6/18, 1801, *ibid.*, XVII, 28-33.

England, in which post he remained until 1764.<sup>39</sup>

It should be noted he was only twenty years of age when he received his commission to Holland from Empress Elizabeth and later was sent to England by Peter III. Both must have had high regard for him, as well as for his uncle Mikhail, the Great Chancellor, just as the Vorontsovs had for their sovereigns.

Perhaps even more striking is an interesting letter to Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov from his daughter, the Baroness Anna Mikhailovna Stroganova. In it she reminded her father of how much he was loved by Alexander Romanovich. Twice she emphasized that her cousin went abroad for so long only because of his love for his uncle, her father, Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov.<sup>40</sup>

For the Vorontsovs, then, this represents another example of the close connection for them between family obligation and service to the state. And for the rulers of Russia, the Vorontsovs in general and Alexander Romanovich in particular, it personified outstanding service to the state and loyalty and devotion to the sovereign.

Although E. I. Indova correctly stated that the published documents on the Vorontsovs have little economic significance,<sup>41</sup> other scholars suggest that the Vorontsovs had helped initiate and administer some of the economic measures instituted during Elizabeth Petrovna's reign, and that they benefited politically and socially as well as financially from many of the

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<sup>39</sup>"Avtobiografiia A. R. Vorontsova," AKV, V, 3-4; "A. R. Vorontsov," Chteniia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, pp. 59-60; Zaozerskii, p. 122.

<sup>40</sup>Anna Mikhailovna Stroganova to M. I. Vorontsov, May 15/26, 1761, AKV, IV, 468.

<sup>41</sup>Indova, Krepostnoe, p. 11.

practices.<sup>42</sup> In this connection, it has been said that a grant for 2,412 male serfs to M. I. Vorontsov when he was still only a lieutenant in the Guards in 1743 marks the "beginning of the Vorontsov wealth."<sup>43</sup> From this impressive beginning, he went on to amass an innumerable number of serfs in almost a dozen regions on estates which included iron and copper mines, forests and arable land, factories, workers, and peasants -- and was involved in the sable trade and the gold trade.<sup>44</sup> Certainly, his swift rise to prominence positively influenced the material well-being and social standing of the family. For example, during the eighteenth century, the Vorontsovs received their share of Imperial Orders, with at least eleven members of the Vorontsov family obtaining a minimum of nineteen Imperial Orders.<sup>45</sup>

Apparently, however, Mikhail Illarionovich took little interest in

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<sup>42</sup>Sergi M. Troitskii, Finansovaiia politika russkogo absolutizma v XVIII veke (M.: Akademia Nauk, 1966), pp. 75-88 discusses how Roman and Mikhail Vorontsov collaborated in proposing reforms to improve Russia's financial situation. Roman's participation on Elizabeth Petrovna's commission for revision of the ulozhenie in 1760-1761 is discussed by Paul Miliukov, Charles Seignobos and L. Eisenmann, History of Russia, vol. II, The Successors of Peter the Great [hereafter cited as Miliukov, Successors] (Trans. Charles Ian Markmann; New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), p. 42. The fortunes accumulated by the Vorontsovs and others because of the favoritism of Empress Elizabeth is mentioned by Peter I. Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution (Trans. L. M. Herman; New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), pp. 408-410. Allusion to abuses perpetrated by M. I. Vorontsov, among other high officials who mismanaged their trusts, is found in Florinsky, Russia, I, 490.

<sup>43</sup>E. I. Indova, Dvortsovoe khoziaistvo v Rossii pervaiia polovina XVIII veka [hereafter cited as Indova, Dvortsovoe] (M.: "Nauka," 1964), p. 78. Compare with the same author's statement that Roman's marriage to Martha Suruin made him one of the richest Russians of his time, Indova, Krepostnoe, p. 22. See also, above, this chapter, n. 5.

<sup>44</sup>Indova, Dvortsovoe, p. 78. See also, "Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov" [hereafter cited as "M. I. Vorontsov"], Chtenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, pp. 31-49. Four large metal works owned by M. I. Vorontsov and worth almost 180,000 rubles in 1759 are referred to by Nikolai I. Pavlenko, Istoriia Metallurgi v Rossii XVIII veka (M.: Akademia Nauk, 1962), pp. 349, 473. Fluctuations in M. I. Vorontsov's financial status are discussed by Evgenii Petrovich Karnovich, Zamechatelnyia bogatstva chastnykh lits v Rossii. Ekonomicheskoe-istoricheskoe issledovanie [hereafter cited as Karnovich, Bogatstva] (SPb.: A. S. Suvorin, 1885), pp. 216-220, 258-262.

<sup>45</sup>Rumphreys, pp. 15-16.

the management of his properties and left such activities completely in the hands of his brother, Roman. The latter, meanwhile, was occupied amassing an economic empire of his own. Undoubtedly, his associations at court as well as the contacts he made as one of the earliest native Russian Masons, in which order he rose to the rank of Master in the 1750's, were helpful for business.<sup>46</sup> Indeed, soon after he became active in the masonic movement, his business acumen became more widely recognized. By 1760, he had his own vodka distilleries, timber holdings, metallurgical and mining enterprises and a monopoly on the linen trade through Archangel. Moreover, in 1758, he was granted a charter for trading privileges for a company which, in 1760, extended its operations into the Caspian Sea. He also had interests in a trading company which was involved in the Persian trade.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Besides a Francophilism on the part of the privileged groups in Russian society, there was an attraction to Freemasonry during the mid-eighteenth century. See, e.g., George Vernadsky, Russkoe masonstvo v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II [hereafter cited as Vernadsky, Masonstvo] (Petrograd: Tip. Aktsionera obshchestva tipogr. dela, 1917), pp. 6, 215, 83-90; Stuart Ramsay Tompkins, The Russian Mind From Peter the Great Through the Enlightenment (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 53-75; and James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretation of Russian Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 242-259. See also, T. A. Bakunin, Le Répertoire biographique des francs-maçons russe, XVIII<sup>e</sup> et XIX<sup>e</sup> siècles [hereafter cited as Bakunin, Répertoire] (Brussels: Les Editions Petropolis, n.d., 1940?), pp. 114, 320-321, 472, 592-593; A. N. Pypin, Russkoe masonstvo XVIII i pervaya chetvert XIX v. [hereafter cited as Pypin, Masonstvo] (Petrograd: "ODMI," 1916), pp. 92-93; Catherine II, Memoirs, p. 184; and S. P. Melgunov and N. P. Siderov (eds.), Masonstvo v ego proshlom i nastyashchem (2 vols.; No location: Published privately by N. P. Nekrasov, n.d. Copy located in Harvard University Library), cited by In-Ho Lee Ryu, "Freemasonry Under Catherine the Great: A Reinterpretation" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1967), p. 119.

<sup>47</sup>Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii s 1649 goda [hereafter cited as PSZ] (Pervaiia seriia, 1649-1825; 46 vols. in 48 plus 3 appendices; SPb.: Pechatano v tipografii II otdeleniia sobstvennoi ego imperatorskago velichestva kantseliarii, 1830) XV, No. 10.848, June 15, 1758, pp. 216-255; No. 11.046, March 30, 1760, p. 455; No. 11.428, January 31, 1762, pp. 904-905; Pavlenko, pp. 346-348, 352, 381-385; 113 letters of S. R. to R. I. Vorontsov, AKV, XVI, 3-41; XXXII, 79-80; Kazimiere Waliszewski, La Russie au temps d'Elisabeth I<sup>ère</sup>, dernière des Romanov (new ed.; Paris, Plon, n.d.) p. 136; V. N. Yakovetskii, Kupcheskii kapital v feodalno - krepostnicheskoi Rossii (M.: Akademia Nauk, 1953), pp. 156, 161.

Roman earned huge profits from many of his ventures, a tribute to his physiocratic ideas and his application of the principles of free trade. His successes by 1760 had won him a place both in the Senate and on Elizabeth Petrovna's commission for revision of the ulozhenie; but his inclination toward high living kept him constantly in debt. Occasionally one or more of his properties had to be sold to satisfy his creditors.<sup>48</sup>

Not surprisingly, in his travels, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov forwarded information to both his uncle and his father on economic matters abroad.<sup>49</sup> For example, Alexander Romanovich was asked to obtain information on domestic and foreign trade, manufacturing, rates of exchange, credit and the cost of various Spanish wines.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, as A. I. Zaoserskii has put it, "in the center of the practical interests of Alexander Romanovich there always remained new thoughts -- about the necessity for strong measures for the development of Russian trade and industry."<sup>51</sup> Citing examples from the unpublished materials contained in the Vorontsov Collection in Russia, he noted the surprise of Alexander Romanovich at the fact that Russia did not surpass her neighbors in all respects and his dismay at

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<sup>48</sup>Marcus, p. 3; Humphreys, pp. 143-144, 226; Miliukov, Successors, p. 42.

<sup>49</sup>The early letters of Alexander Romanovich to his father and uncle unfortunately do not appear in the published papers of the Vorontsov family. However, their letters to him suggest the kind of information he sent them. For M. I. Vorontsov's letters to A. R. Vorontsov from 1758-1766, of which there are 292, see AKV, V, 88-152; XXXI, 84-405; for Roman's letters to his son A. R. Vorontsov for the period 1758-1783, see *ibid.*, XXXI, 27-77. Five letters of A. R. Vorontsov to his uncle Mikhail may be found in *ibid.*, XXIX, 371 ff; and thirteen letters of Alexander Romanovich to his father Roman for the period 1767-1780 are located in *ibid.*, V, 394 and XXXI, 409-425.

<sup>50</sup>See, for example, M. I. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov, January 11/22, 1760, AKV, XXXI, 98-101; n.d., 1760, *ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>51</sup>Zaoserskii, p. 128.

finding almost no Russian merchants competing in many foreign market-places. Although Russian wares could be found everywhere, he wrote from Seville and Cadiz, nowhere did Russia have a trade advantage. Although the same conditions existed in most Spanish and Portuguese ports, he noted that there was a great demand for Russian grain, timber "and even 'groceries,'" a condition which the English turned to their advantage because of their control of the gold and silver exchange rates. For example, he pointed out in April, 1760 "'that a thaler, which costs 100 kopecks in Spain, costs us 125 kopecks.'"<sup>52</sup>

In other letters, he discussed the exchange rates in France, the French method of establishing new factories -- particularly in Paris, the need for Russia to modernize its trade along the lines of the English who commanded a position superior to all nations, and expressed the following philosophy which he claimed to have acquired from discussions with many people knowledgeable about trade: "The first principle of commerce" which he described as "sound, inviolable and correct" was to permit "freedom to sell to and buy from whomever one wishes."<sup>53</sup>

In the course of his travels in France he did much sightseeing as might any tourist. But in the spring of 1759, he remarked that in order to know a country it was not enough to know its sights and roads, but it was necessary "'to know all its commerce.'" Consequently, he regularly sent home

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<sup>52</sup>"Vorontsov sobranie," No. 1020 (8/19 June, 1759) and (28 October/8 November 1759); No. 410 (1/12 April, 1760). It is not clear whether this collection is in Moscow, Leningrad, or elsewhere; or whether it may be found in TsGADA, GIM-OPI or ODRA (LOII), cited in Zaoserskii, p. 128.

<sup>53</sup>"Vorontsov sobranie," No. 1020 (May, 1759); (22 January/2 February 1759); and (28 October/8 November 1759). The quotation taken from the last reference reads literally "freedom to sell to and take from whom one wishes" ("volnost prodavat i brat u kogo khochesh"), cited in Zaoserskii, p. 129.

to his uncle a wide variety of books, pamphlets and journals, including the monthly Journal d'economique in the hope of providing the most detailed information on the economies of Holland, England, France, Portugal and Spain. This information, Alexander Romanovich believed, could "bring great advantage to Russia, 'if we take her in our own hands.'"<sup>54</sup>

By the age of eighteen, then, in the year 1759, Alexander Romanovich had become convinced that commerce was the key to a nation's status, that free trade was the principle that could best help a nation prosper, and that he and his family had a special role to play in the economic development of Russia. To turn a phrase, it might be said that he believed that as the Vorontsovs prospered, so the Russian state might prosper; and that any economic benefits his family derived from the information he provided would ultimately operate for the good of all Russia.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>"Vorontsov sobranie," No. 1020 (20 April/1 May 1759), cited in Zaoserskii, pp. 129-130.

<sup>55</sup>Perhaps, on another level, A. R. Vorontsov represents an example of "homo oeconomicus," i.e., "man the manipulator of nature, the striver for wealth, the conscious rationalizer of the production of goods," a type of person emerging during the enlightenment, according to Wilson Robert Augustine, "The Economic Attitudes and Opinions Expressed by the Russian Nobility in the Great Commission of 1767" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1969), p. 1.

## CHAPTER III

THE COUP D'ETAT OF 1762: ECLIPSE AND AFTERMATH

At two o'clock on the afternoon of Christmas day in 1761 Empress Elizabeth had passed away. Two hours later Prince Nikita Trubetskoi had announced to those assembled that Elizabeth Petrovna was dead and that the reign of a new Emperor, Peter III, had begun. A few days more than six months later, on July 28, 1762, death -- by assassination -- had claimed Peter III.<sup>1</sup>

The overthrow of Peter III signaled the eclipse of the Vorontsovs' rising political star. In the aftermath of the coup, not one was to emerge without some mark of diminution or some cause for dissatisfaction. The lines had been drawn for some time in court circles, with the most notable example being that the Shuvalovs favored Paul as tsar; another that Count Nikita Panin and Princess Dashkov approved of that plan with Catherine as regent; whereas the Vorontsovs (excepting Dashkova) favored Peter III. According to Catherine herself, in a letter to Stanislas Poniatowski on August 2, 1762 (O. S.), her "advent to the throne had been planned for the last six months."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Catherine II, The Memoirs of Catherine the Great [hereafter cited as Catherine II, Memoirs] (Edited by Dominique Maroger; Trans. Moura Budberg; New York: Collier Books, 1961) (Paper), pp. 250-251; Zof Oldenbourg, Catherine the Great (Trans. Anne Carter; New York: Bantam Books, 1966) (Paper), pp. 202-203, 231. Dates in above text are O. S.

<sup>2</sup>Catherine II to Poniatowski, August 2/13, 1762, Catherine II, Memoirs, p. 271; and her account of the events immediately prior to the death of Empress Elizabeth, *ibid.*, p. 262; Oldenbourg, p. 197; Gladys Scott Thomson, Catherine the Great and the Expansion of Russia (New York: Collier Books, 1962) (Paper), p. 63.

Thus, from the moment Peter III began to rule, there ensued a struggle for the throne of Russia.<sup>3</sup>

A. The Role of the Nobility: Freedom by Decree

Peter reigned for little more than half a year. Soon after he ascended the throne, he announced to the Senate (in January 1762) that he intended to free the nobility from compulsory service to the state. On February 18, 1762 (O. S.), Peter III declared that the service of the nobility was from

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<sup>3</sup>Exactly to what extent his practices and policies alienated both the general populace and large segments of the nobility is difficult to assess. Certainly large numbers of Russians, commoner and noble alike were thunderstruck by Peter's abrupt ending of the Prussian War as his first official act. Certainly the Russian people were opposed to that provision of the Manifesto of February 18/March 1, 1762 which exempted the gentry from military service, and they grumbled about Peter's campaign against Denmark. Rank and file soldiers were angered by the introduction of new Prussian style uniforms and drill tactics; and officers disliked Peter's excesses in humiliating them publicly. Unquestionably, church officials were horrified by Peter's confiscation and secularization of church lands, as well as his leniency toward the "Old Believers," Florinsky, *Russia*, I, 496-500; Oldenbourg, pp. 203-210; S. F. Platonov, *History of Russia* (Trans. E. Aronsberg; edited by F. A. Golder; New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), pp. 264-266; Marc Raeff, *Imperial Russia, 1689-1725* [hereafter cited as Raeff, *Russia*] (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 47, 78-79, 93, 107, 115.

On the other hand, many applauded Peter's beneficence to the Raskolniki; the manifesto which freed the gentry from service obligation; his abolition of the Secret Chancery; and his pardon of all those who had been exiled (including Lestocq) by Empress Elizabeth as suggestions of the possibility that greater freedom might be in store for all Russians, Platonov, p. 264; V. O. Kluchevsky, *History of Russia* (Trans. C. J. Hogarth, 5 vols.; New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), IV, 357-365; Lestocq to M. I. Vorontsov, January 10/21, 1762, and M. I. Vorontsov to Lestocq, January 20/31, 1762, AKV, IV, 171-174.

On balance, however, the brief, perceptive analysis offered by Marc Raeff suggests that it was Peter's domestic policies which were the source of his undoing. First, he demoted the Senate. In addition, Peter III failed to make accommodation for the service role of the nobles as against their private interests. Thus, the needed modus operandi between landed nobility and autocracy failed to meet the demands of changing circumstances. Not only, therefore, did Peter III dramatically reverse Elizabeth's reign, but his experience presaged the problems after 1861, Marc Raeff, "The Domestic Policies of Peter III and His Overthrow" [hereafter cited as Raeff, "Peter III"] AMR, LXXV, No. 5 (June, 1970), pp. 1289-1310.

that time on to be on a voluntary basis, gave them the right to resign from service at any time with the exception that this right was to be suspended for military officers actively engaged in a campaign in time of war, and granted nobles permission to travel freely abroad and also to enter the service of foreign nations.<sup>4</sup>

According to some accounts, Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov is given the credit for the spirit and the content of this declaration.<sup>5</sup> For example, P. Miliukov stated:

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<sup>4</sup>For the manifesto, see William Tooke, The Life of Catherine II, Empress of all the Russians (3 vols.; London: T. H. Longmans and O. Rees, 1799), I, 534-536; and FBZ, XV, No. 11.444, February 18, 1762 (O. S.), p. 912. In 1682, the vestnichestvo system which had helped the members of the hereditary nobility safeguard their relative positions on the social ladder of Russian aristocracy was formally abolished. In 1722 Peter the Great's creation of the Table of Ranks opened the gates to hereditary nobility and ownership of hereditary estates (votchina) to those who had formerly been relegated to service nobility and limited to owning estates held only during service tenure (pomestie), which would revert to the sovereign after service had been completed. Thus, after 1722, not only was there no legal distinction among nobles, but all property not held by church or crown was hereditary. The abortive attempt by D. M. Golitsyn to "constitutionally" limit Anna Ivanovna in 1730 was one example of how "westernization" was making the Russian nobleman conscious of his nobility. The death of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna and the assumption of power by Peter III in 1761 provided another opportunity for them. For some evaluations of these instances, see, for example, Kluchevsky, III, 4, 69-73, 366; Florinsky, Russia, I, 279-280, 420-421, 496-497; and Raeff, Plans, pp. 22-24.

<sup>5</sup>For the view that Roman Vorontsov originated the concept of an imperial manifesto freeing the nobility from service and elevating noble status and increasing opportunities for political influence and economic aggrandizement, see G. V. Vernadsky, "Manifest Petra III o volnosti dvorian-skoi i zakonodatelnaia komissia 1754-1766 gg.," Istoricheskoe Obozrenie, XX (1915), pp. 51-59. For the view that the manifesto was the product of D. V. Volkhov and A. I. Glebov, who were on the side of the Shuvalovs and opposed to the Vorontsovs, see N. L. Rubinshtein, "Ulozheniia komissia 1754-1766 gg. i ee proekt novogo ulozheniia 'o sostoianii poddannyykh vobshche,'" IZ, t. 38 (1951), p. 239. For the view that the Russian government no longer needed the nobles, as a class, for service and, therefore, that the manifesto of 1762 represented the state's "declaration of 'independence' from the service of the nobility," see Raeff, Origins, pp. 108-109. See also, Raeff, "Peter III," AHR, LXXV, No. 5 (June, 1970), pp. 1291-1294. For increasing acceptance of Raeff's view, see e.g., Robert E. James, The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762-1785 (Princeton, N. J.:

Vorontsov...declared himself without qualification for total elimination of compulsory service; he wanted the nobleman, having become a privileged landowner to the full, to be able to own serfs and land without the corresponding duty of any obligation toward the state. Less powerful than the Shuvalovs, he had not been able to make his opinions prevail [on the Empress Elizabeth]; but, relying on the future, he had striven to inculcate it in the heir to the throne.<sup>6</sup>

Marc Raeff concurs in this assessment. He stated:

Indeed, as far as can be ascertained, the act of 1762 was "hatched" and prepared by men like the Vorontsovs who wished to see in Russia an aristocracy, an estate of privileged individuals whose main source of power, influence, and status in society would derive from their role as owners of land and serfs. The service nobility was to become independent of state service and to be transformed (on the English model) into an economically active and enterprising landowning "gentry" with a dominant role in local self-government.<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, neither conceiving of the idea of such a manifesto, nor pressing for its promulgation guaranteed the nature of the decree which was ultimately proclaimed. Indeed, recent research and carefully reasoned scholarly opinion strongly suggests that the manifesto of 1762 was not forced upon Peter III by the Vorontsovs or by the Shuvalovs or by any segment of the nobility. On the contrary, in the belief that the government no longer needed or considered desirable the compulsory service of the

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Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 34-38. For a brief review and critical evaluation of the historiography on the manifesto of 1762, see Jones, pp. 27-34.

<sup>6</sup> Miliukov makes the reference to Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, but since Alexander Romanovich had been abroad since 1758, it is clear that another Vorontsov, most likely Roman Illarionovich, was the person referred to, Miliukov, *Successors*, p. 45. In this connection, Raeff, *Origins*, pp. 55, 102-103 seems to follow Miliukov. See also, the statement of Catherine II: "Roman Worontsov had imagined he was doing a great deed in begging the Emperor to grant freedom to the nobles," *Memoirs*, pp. 267-268. For an anecdote suggesting that Volkhov framed the manifesto on the night before its proclamation based on his recollection of a "memorandum by Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov on some suggested rights for the nobility," while he was locked in a room with the dog of Peter III when the tsar was out for an amorous evening, see Humphreys, p. 107, who cites Kluchevsky, *Sochineniia*, IV, 403, and Alexander Romanovich-Slavatinsky, *Dvorianstvo v Rossii* (Kiev, 1912), pp. 196-198.

<sup>7</sup> Raeff, *Plans*, pp. 24-25.

nobility, Peter III freed the nobility from compulsory service believing there would always be enough noblemen of high quality who were desirous of serving, thereby boosting morale and improving efficiency. Moreover, Peter III did not consent to such key demands of the nobility as freedom from corporal punishment or agreement by the sovereign to give up his right to confiscate hereditary estates. In this manner, the ruler of Russia maintained his power over the nobles at the same time that the structural unity between state and nobility was severed. Consequently, as Raeff demonstrates, the Russian state freed itself from the nobility just as much as the nobility was freed from service to the state.<sup>8</sup> As put by Robert E. Jones:

...Raeff's argument that the Manifesto was aimed at reorganizing the state service along bureaucratic lines and replacing the service gentry with a professional meritocracy is persuasive. In that connection, the word "emancipation" to describe the effect of the Manifesto would acquire a double significance, for at the same time that the state was emancipating the nobles from compulsory service, it was, as Raeff points out, "emancipating itself from dependence on the nobility as a class."<sup>9</sup>

In a sense, the Vorontsovs reflected the soundness of the tsar's belief. They did not lessen their inclination toward service to the state. If anything, aware of the intimate relationship between service, wealth, status, influence, authority and power, they wished to perform still more service. But perhaps the most important feature of the Manifesto of 1762 and the role of Roman Illarionovich in its preparation was that it may have provided part of the skeletal outline for the 1801 Charter of the Russian People on which Alexander Romanovich was to work so diligently at a later date.

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<sup>8</sup>Raeff, Origins, pp. 108-109; Raeff, "Peter III," AHR, LXXV, No. 5, pp. 1291-1294.

<sup>9</sup>Jones, p. 34.

## B. The Coup of 1762

It must not be forgotten that the question of who would rule by the side of Peter III was ever present and in the minds of all who were close to the throne. When Peter ordered that Catherine be arrested on June 14, 1762 (despite the fact that the order was rescinded); and on June 22, 1762 when Peter ordered his wife to pin the medal of St. Ekaterina on the breast of Elizaveta Vorontsova -- then Catherine knew there was no time to lose.<sup>10</sup>

The rest is well known. At six o'clock on the morning of June 28 Catherine was awakened by Alexei Orlov, brother of her latest lover, Gregory, who joined them on route. They were successively joined by the Izmailovskii, Semenovskii and Preobrazhenskii regiments whose soldiers hailed her as they had Elizabeth Petrovna two decades earlier. Joined by the Horse Guards, they proceeded to the Winter Palace where the Senate and Holy Synod were gathered. A manifesto announcing the seizure of the throne was prepared and Catherine took the oath as Empress. On June 29, Peter abdicated, and was dispatched to Ropsha, fifteen miles from St. Petersburg. Peter wrote at least three letters to Catherine requesting privacy, mercy, safe passage to Germany, and consolation from her. In one of the letters he wrote:

If you do not wish to kill a man already sufficiently miserable, have pity on me and give me my only consolation which is Elizaveta Romanovna....

Peter died on July 7, 1762 (O. S.), and on July 12 Catherine personally tore off the medal of St. Ekaterina from the breast of Elizaveta Romanovna

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<sup>10</sup>Catherine II, Memoirs, pp. 247-248; "Epilogue," pp. 250-253; "Last Thoughts of Her Imperial Majesty Elizabeth Petrovna," pp. 261-262; and Catherine II to Poniatowski August 2/13, 1762, *ibid.*, p. 271; Oldenbourg, pp. 178-187, 280; Rambaud, II, 176. For many anecdotes concerning events of the year see Perevorot 1762 goda, Sochineniia i perepiska uchastnikov i sovremennikov (M.: "obrazovanie," 1910), passim. Dates in above text are O. S.

Vorontsova.<sup>11</sup>

C. Eclipse

Even before this event, the eclipse of the Vorontsovs had begun. On June 28, 1762 (O. S.), when Chancellor M. I. Vorontsov heard of Catherine's coup d'etat, he arrived, in Catherine's own words, "loaded with reproaches."<sup>12</sup> On July 7, 1762 his worst fears seemed to be in the process of being realized when he wrote to Alexander Romanovich that Peter III had been killed by his enemies.<sup>13</sup>

M. I. Vorontsov had been persuaded by his niece, Ekaterina Romanovna Dashkova that he need not fear for his life, the lives of the members of his family, or the fortune the family had amassed. Dashkova and her husband

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<sup>11</sup>Catherine II to Poniatowski August 2/13, 1762, Catherine II, Memoirs, pp. 271-272. For Peter's letters, see *ibid.*, pp. 274-275. Details on the progress of Peter's dethronement also may be found in Catherine II to Poniatowski, August 2/13, 1762, AKV, XXV, 414-425 as e.g., the joy of the Semenovskii Regiment and the appearance of the Preobrazhenskii Guards (p. 417), and Peter's dispatch to Ropsha where he was to stay until sent to Schlüsselberg (p. 419). As for Peter's death, Catherine II, Memoirs, p. 274, claimed he died of colic; Platonov, p. 266, suggested he probably died in a drunken brawl; Florinsky, Russia, I, 502, asserted that he was assassinated by his guards, headed by Alexei Orlov. See also, Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 93-94. For Catherine's Manifesto see PEZ, XVI, No. 11582, June 20, 1762 (O. S.), pp. 1-2.

<sup>12</sup>Catherine II to Poniatowski, August 2/13, 1762, Catherine II, Memoirs, p. 273; Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 105-106; N. K. Schilder, Imperator Pavel Pervyi: Istoriko - Biograficheskii Ocherk (SPb.: A. S. Suvorin, 1901) (Two-page reprint, Micro Photo Inc.; Cleveland, Ohio: n.d.), p. 516.

<sup>13</sup>M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, July 7, 1762 (O. S.), AKV, V, 101-102. The dating of the letter may be inaccurate. In it M. I. Vorontsov stated that Peter III had been killed the day before, on July 6: "Tak naprotiv tego byvshii i vehera umershii Imperator ot naroda nenavidia byl." Otherwise, he may have had other sources who provided him with information faster than Catherine II. For her reference to M. I. Vorontsov being a hypocrite, see Catherine II, Memoirs, p. 247. See also, 17 letters of M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, June 8/19, 1762 to August 27/September 7, 1762, AKV, XXXI, 164-185.

had been among Catherine's chief supporters for months before the coup took place. Even before Empress Elizabeth Petrovna died they had offered to lead a revolution to put Catherine on the throne in place of Peter. When the coup finally occurred, Dashkova rode beside the Empress during a good part of the journey. For the moment, it seemed as if Dashkova might be the only Vorontsov left with any influence.<sup>14</sup>

That moment passed quickly as temporary arrests were turned into indefinite exile, and the "exodus" of the Vorontsovs began. On June 28, the day of the coup, Alexander's younger brother, Semen Romanovich was one of a group of officers in the Preobrazhenskii regiment who, remaining loyal to Peter III, refused to join the multitudes swarming to Catherine's support. Semen was arrested immediately. When he was released, ten or twelve days later, he applied for and received permission to go abroad. Catherine II considered Semen to be "particularly dangerous," and it may be that Semen's exile was part of an agreement reached whereby his uncle Mikhail would retain the office of Chancellor and no stringent measures would be taken against the Vorontsov family.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile, M. I. Vorontsov had been placed under house arrest; and upon being given leave to go about as he pleased, retaining the title of Chancellor, he also began to make preparations for a journey abroad which lasted for two years. Both Semen and Roman Illarionovich, his father, lost lands and sources of revenue.

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<sup>14</sup>Catherine II to Poniatowski, August 2/13, 1762, Catherine II, Memoirs, p. 262; Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 68-78, 88; Pitalyon, p. 12; Keith to Grenville, July 1/12, 1762, SIRIO, XIX, 7; C. Ruhlère, Histoire de l'Anarchie de Pologne ou du démembrément de cette République suivie des anecdotes sur la révolution de Russie en 1762 (Paris: E. Nicolle, 1807), IV, 352-361.

<sup>15</sup>Humphreys, pp. 80, 217-218; Marcum, pp. 11-12; S. R. Vorontsov, "Avtobiografiia," RA (1876), I, 34-38, 56-57; Riabinin, RA (1879), I, 65, 67. See also, below, n. 16.

The latter was banished to his estate near Moscow; and Elizaveta Romanovna, who had been the mistress of Peter III, was ordered to remain also on one of Roman's estates in the provinces.<sup>16</sup>

When, in the summer of 1762, Peter III was overthrown and Catherine II held sway as Empress of all the Russias, whatever thoughts Roman might have had for becoming a member of the royal family were dashed to smithereens. He and his brother Mikhail, the Grand Chancellor, were temporarily placed under house arrest.<sup>17</sup> Catherine II feared the Vorontsovs and, by her own testimony, considered them dangerous, Roman more so than the others. She wrote:

The Vorontsovs' father, Roman, was the most dangerous of the lot because of his unstable and prevaricating nature. He did not like Princess Dashkov.<sup>18</sup>

As for Ekaterina Romanovna, she was catapulted to prominence when, at the age of nineteen, she participated in the coup that placed Catherine II on the Russian throne. Whether the extent of her participation was as great as she claims, or as small as suggested by Catherine II<sup>19</sup>-- or somewhere midway between the two versions -- the fact of her participation undoubtedly accounts, at least to some extent, for the clemency shown the members

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<sup>16</sup>"Ukaz Ekateriny II ob ovolnenii za granitsu kantelera grafa M. Vorontsova; o rokirke a nego doma v kasni," August 4/15, 1763, *SIRIO*, VII, 310-312; M. Mérenger to Choiseul, July 2/13, 1762, *ibid.*, CXL, 8; Catherine II to M. I. Vorontsov, July 30/August 10, 1762, *AKV*, XXV, 334-339. "Kratkii ocherk...S. R. Vorontsova," *ibid.*, XXXII, 73-74; Ogarkov, pp. 31-32.

<sup>17</sup>S. R. Vorontsov, "Avtobiografiia," *RA* (1876), I, 56; Dashkova, "Memoires," *AKV*, XXI, 84-85.

<sup>18</sup>Catherine II, *Memoirs*, p. 262.

<sup>19</sup>Compare Dashkova, "Memoires," *AKV*, XXI, 68-93, with Catherine II to Poniatovski, August 2/13, 1762, Catherine II, *Memoirs*, p. 276. See also, Fitzgerald Molloy, *The Russian Court in the Eighteenth Century* (3rd ed., 2 vols.; London: Hutchinson and Co., 1906), I, 259, 268, 286; and Oldenbourg, pp. 214, 218, 230-231.

of her family, most of whom favored Peter III over Catherine II.<sup>20</sup> Certainly, had she wavered once, and confided in some member of her family that there was a conspiracy to dethrone Peter III in favor of then Grand Duchess Catherine, all could have been lost and the coup foiled. In this regard alone, Dashkova's services were of inestimable value, for she did not waver and she did not inform.

A serious strain in the otherwise generally good relationship between Dashkova and Alexander Romanovich occurred soon after the coup. Approximately four weeks thereafter, Alexander Romanovich wrote to her expressing concern over the fate of Elizaveta, their sister and Peter's former mistress.<sup>21</sup> Before the month was out, he asked Dashkova to show an interest in the fate of Elizaveta.<sup>22</sup> In October, 1762 Dashkova responded, reassuring her brother that Elizaveta was faring well, and living with their father Roman.<sup>23</sup> Near the close of the year, Alexander Romanovich wrote of his responsibilities, referred to Dashkova as "madame," and noted his surprise at Dashkova's indifference toward their sister, Elizaveta.<sup>24</sup> On Dashkova's part, she expressed dismay at her brother's change of tone toward her, and defended her actions in the coup that brought Catherine II to the throne. She concluded with the hope that her brother could judge her without bias.<sup>25</sup> On his part, he replied reassuring her of his "perfect friendship," and

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 218; Molloy, I, 259, 296; Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 92-93.

<sup>21</sup>A. R. Vorontsov to Dashkova, August 6/17, 1762, AKV, V, 159-160.

<sup>22</sup>A. R. Vorontsov to Dashkova, August 30/September 10, 1762, *ibid.*, pp. 160-162.

<sup>23</sup>Dashkova to A. R. Vorontsov, October 1, 1762, *ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>24</sup>A. R. Vorontsov to Dashkova, December 9, 1762, N. S.?, *ibid.*, pp. 165-168.

<sup>25</sup>Dashkova to A. R. Vorontsov, March 13/24, 1763, *ibid.*, pp. 168-170.

emphasized that his previous letters merely referred to familial obligations and concerns he had just as she had her own. Finally, he noted that he would not judge her conduct by a written letter, but by the facts.<sup>26</sup> In the concluding letter of this series, written in October, 1763, Dashkova thanked her brother for his "dear letter" and expressed her joy at their continued good fellowship.<sup>27</sup>

Near the outset of the correspondence between A. R. Vorontsov and Dashkova described above, Alexander Romanovich received an interesting letter from Catherine II. She wrote:

...Do not be misled into believing that I have changed my sentiments toward you. I review with pleasure your contacts and I hope that you will continue [to demonstrate] that praiseworthy conduct which you have shown till now. You should rest assured about the fate of your family on which I have anticipated all your anxieties. I am dismayed to have to be obliged to you to look after them. I shall change for the better the situation of your sister the Countess Elizaveta as soon as possible.<sup>28</sup>

Careful analysis of the contents of this letter suggests that, along with the kind wishes expressed, the Empress herein issued a warning to Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov. After all, of all the Vorontsovs, Catherine II was least familiar with Alexander Romanovich. His oldest sister, Maria, was married to Peter Buturlin, son of Field Marshall Alexander Buturlin,

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<sup>27</sup>Dashkova to A. R. Vorontsov, October 19/30, 1763, *ibid.*, p. 173.

<sup>28</sup>Catherine II to A. R. Vorontsov, August 13/24, 1762, AKV, V, 145. A transliteration into English of this letter may be found in J. W. Willis Bund, "Russian Revolution of 1762," *The Academy* (April 3, 1875), No. 152, pp. 349-350. According to the author, the letter and a description of the events of July 9, 1762 (N. S.), were found among the papers of Theodore von Liders who had been Russian chargé d'affaires at the English Court during the reigns of Peter III and Catherine II. These papers, in turn, were written in Spanish (apart from Catherine's letter), and apparently belonged to an unnamed Spanish diplomat who had been in Russia at the time Catherine II seized the throne. He had had a perfect vantage point to observe some of the events first hand, as he lived near the Nevskii Prospekt not far from the Kazan Cathedral. See also for reference to this article, *RA* (1879), I, 299.

who had been Empress Elizabeth Petrovna's first lover. Maria apparently presented no threat and most likely was considered a Buturlin by Catherine II. As for the others, Elizaveta and Roman had been exiled to the provinces, Semen had left Russia, and Mikhail was preparing to do the same. Dashkova already had incurred the displeasure of Catherine II, was soon to be forbidden at Court functions and, in the spring of 1765, after repeated criticism of Catherine II, left St. Petersburg for Moscow -- as George Macartney, British minister to Russia put it, to the relief of everybody.<sup>29</sup>

Conceivably, then, by putting Alexander Romanovich in charge, so to speak, of his family, Catherine II tied his future to the activities of the other members of the family and may well have hoped his ambition would be able to harness the dangerous tendencies of the Vorontsovs.

As stated earlier, even before the coup of 1762, Catherine II had feared Semen, and referred to him as "a dangerous character...whom both Elizabeth Vorontsov and Peter III liked very much."<sup>30</sup> According to Peter Bartenev, editor-in-chief of the project which produced the Arkhir Kniazia Vorontsova, Alexander Nikolaevich Stroganov is said to have expressed the following thought to S. G. Stroganov: "If Count [Semen] Vorontsov had been

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<sup>29</sup>Macartney to Lord Sandwich (n. d., 1765?), "Stowe Manuscripts," cited in Helen M. Robbins, Our First Ambassador to China. An Account of the Life of George, Earl of Macartney with Extracts from His Letters...as Told by Himself, 1737-1806 (London: John Murray, 1908), p. 19. After Dashkova's husband died and she was down and out financially because of her husband's debts, at a time when the rest of her family had little to do with her and her beloved brother Alexander was serving in Holland, she remained on good terms with him, Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 120 and n. In later years, when she was ill, or out of sorts, or having family problems, or during her exile in Paul's reign, she found solace in her brother's company and letters. She began working on her memoirs in earnest only when her brother was obviously near death, *ibid.*, pp. 158-159, 252, 334-335. See also, Fitalyon, pp. 110, 137, 152. For twelve letters to her brother (1775-1803), see AKV, XXI, 433-449; and for approximately seventy-nine letters (including some replies from A. R. Vorontsov) spanning the years 1758-1801, see *ibid.*, V, 157-282.

<sup>30</sup>Catherine II, Memoirs, p. 262.

older, Peter III would still be sitting on the throne."<sup>31</sup>

Soon after the coup, Semen went abroad, travelling in 1763 and 1764 to Vienna, Florence, Pisa, Milan, Bremen, and Berlin. By May 1, 1765, he had returned to Russia, travelling from Riga to Moscow where he lived for a time with members of the Chernyshev family. After the death of his uncle, Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov, the Great Chancellor, he returned to St. Petersburg in 1767 where he stayed with various relatives and close friends. Indeed, it may be that his temporary exile was one of the conditions Catherine II exacted in return for her assurances that no more stringent measures be taken against his family.<sup>32</sup>

Count Semen Vorontsov, born on June 2, 1744, was the youngest of the siblings and Alexander's only brother. After occupying diplomatic posts in Vienna and Venice, he was in 1784 appointed minister plenipotentiary (ambassador between 1796 and 1802) to the Court of St. James. He finally retired in 1806, but remained in England as a private individual till his death more than a quarter of a century later on June 9, 1832. Passionately devoted to the idea of an Anglo-Russian alliance, he became thoroughly converted to the English way of life. Partly for this reason, although probably more for fear of Paul, he refused the Chancellorship of the Empire when offered him by the son of Catherine II. Indeed, during his fifty year stay in England, he rarely returned to Russia. The street where he had his

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<sup>31</sup>p. Bartenev, AKV, XXXII, n. 73. See also, Gina Kaus, Catherine: The Portrait of an Empress (Trans. June Head; New York: The Literary Guild, 1935), p. 218.

<sup>32</sup>AKV, XVI, 42-87, contains thirty eight of S. R. Vorontsov's letters to his father during this period of exile which may have been part of the agreement reached between Catherine II and the Vorontsovs so that Mikhail Illarionovich would retain his position and no other measures be taken against the family, S. R. Vorontsov, "Avtobiografiia," RA (1876), I, 39. Dates in text above and following paragraph are O. S.

house in St. John's Wood was later named after him (Woronzow Road). His daughter, Catherine, married the eleventh Earl of Pembroke and was the mother of Sydney Herbert, the British War Secretary during the Crimean War. Semen's son, Michael, distinguished himself on the side of Russia during the Napoleonic wars, and was held in high esteem by his uncle, Alexander Romanovich.

Semen has had more written about him than is written about his elder brother, Alexander Romanovich and, perhaps, next to their sister, Princess Dashkov, is the best known of the five children.<sup>33</sup> Although this is understandable, partly because of his long sojourn in England and his direct participation in the international relations between England and Russia, Semen would probably be among the first to acknowledge the generosity of his brother, Alexander Romanovich. For example, Semen was in constant need of funds to make ends meet while living abroad and frequently depended on his brother Alexander to send him money.<sup>34</sup>

As for A. R. Vorontsov, in contrast to Semen, he was not affected directly by the events of 1762 since he was at the time out of the country serving as Russian minister in London. Nevertheless, Alexander Romanovich also felt the sting of his sovereign's sceptre. Within two years -- when he was removed from the Court of St. James and returned to the Hague -- it became quite clear that his standing in the diplomatic corps had been diminished and that he was in the process of being phased out of the

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<sup>33</sup>See above, introduction, n. 12.

<sup>34</sup>S. R. Vorontsov, "Avtobiografiia," *RA* (1876), I, 57; Riabinin, *ibid.*, (1879), III, 334; S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, January 7/19, 1801, *AKV*, X, 85-87; S. R. to R. I. Vorontsov, December 29, 1764 (N. S.), *ibid.*, XVI, 84-85, where reference is also made to Roman paying a debt incurred by his son; Marcum, pp. 35-37, 237.

foreign service which he finally left in 1768.<sup>35</sup>

This conclusion seems warranted not only by his rapid rise in the service to the position of minister to London at the age of twenty-one, but even more so by the comment of Peter Bartenev that "to all eyes" his high rank was not chiefly because of his uncle's influence, but was a distinction based on Alexander's "own personal merit."<sup>36</sup>

Alexander Romanovich, like his uncle M. I. Vorontsov and the Austrian minister, Kaunitz, favored a Franco-Russo-Austrian coalition. He was, therefore, faced with a conflict when Peter III, whose claims to the throne he favored if for no other reason than that it would benefit the Vorontsovs, linked Russia with Prussia in the spring of 1762. When Catherine II, who felt an antagonism for the Vorontsovs which was reciprocated by them, assigned A. R. Vorontsov to the Hague, it might have been considered appropriate because of the Vorontsov closeness with the Hapsburgs and their dominions. For the moment, however, political considerations were secondary. Catherine feared that her position on the throne was not fully secure, and she continually suspected that the Vorontsovs, among others, might try to undermine her. The Vorontsovs on their part held on to the belief that Catherine might soon die, or that they would outlive her.<sup>37</sup>

Catherine might have been more harsh with the Vorontsovs. On the

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<sup>35</sup>Catherine II to A. R. Vorontsov, August 13/24, 1762, and A. R. Vorontsov to Catherine II, September 17/28, 1762, as contained in A. R. to M. I. Vorontsov, September 19/30, 1762, and October 8/19, 1762, AKV, V, 143-152. See also, "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, p. 60.

<sup>36</sup>AKV, XXXI, 153, n. See also six letters from M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, December 1/12, 1760 - December 28, 1761 (O. S.), AKV, V, 88-97; M. I. Vorontsov to Elisabeth Petrovna, September 28f, 1761 (O. S.) ibid., VI, 262-263.

<sup>37</sup>Molloy, pp. 338, 384-386; S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, January 4/15, 1790, and May 31/June 11, 1790, AKV, IX, 162-166 and 171-173 respectively; Humphreys, p. 172.

other hand, because she believed it necessary to gain the support of as many as possible, and because she did not wish to alienate any who might fear for themselves were she particularly harsh to any of her enemies, she contented herself with sending Alexander Romanovich to the Hague. Although some might have considered this as a sign of fairness and benevolence, it was clearly a sign of disfavor when one considers that Alexander Romanovich in 1764 was succeeded in England by his former superior, minister Gross, who went at the time from the Hague to London.<sup>38</sup>

#### D. Aftermath

Fully aware, however, that they had entered into what Lester Jay Humphreys called their "political hiatus,"<sup>39</sup> Mikhail Illarionovich, Alexander Romanovich and Semen Romanovich continued to build the Vorontsov family fortune abroad. Mikhail Illarionovich left Russia in August, 1763 and did not return until February, 1765. On the surface, his journey had a twofold purpose as recorded in a Senate ukaz of August 4, 1763 (O. S.), namely to restore his health and to negotiate business for the Russian State Copper Bank which he had helped to found under Empress Elizabeth Petrovna and to which he owed money.<sup>40</sup>

His journey took him north in the winter and south in the summer which is curious from the viewpoint of his health needs. He visited the leading ports, major cities, and important capitals of continental Europe. From

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<sup>38</sup>M. I. Vorontsov to Peter III, December 27, 1761 (O. S.), AKV, VII, 527-532; S. Saltykov to Catherine II, April 4/15, 1764, SIRIO, VII, 354-355, and p. 355, n.

<sup>39</sup>Humphreys, pp. 206-207.

<sup>40</sup>"Ukaz Nashemu Senatu," August 4, 1763 (O. S.), in a letter of M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, August 5, 1763 (O. S.), AKV, XXXI, 239-240.

Riga he traveled to Memel, Danzig, Berlin, Vienna, Venice, Florence, Pisa, Milan and back to Vienna in May, 1764. He left Vienna in June and proceeded to Munich, Paris, Hamburg, and back to Paris in August, 1764. From Paris, he proceeded to Brussels in September, then to Bremen, Hamburg again, Lubeck, Berlin again, Danzig, Koenigsberg, Lvov, Riga and St. Petersburg. His constant flow of letters to Alexander Romanovich provide a record for this trip.<sup>41</sup>

At the outset of M. I. Vorontsov's travels, Alexander Romanovich was stationed in London; by the time uncle Mikhail arrived in Brussels in September, 1764, A. R. Vorontsov had assumed his post as minister to the Hague. Earlier, by August, 1762 Semen Romanovich was in Vienna, and M. I. Vorontsov visited him in October, 1763.<sup>42</sup> The Chancellor's letters to Alexander, his elder nephew, are filled with advice on how to live inexpensively in the Hague, news concerning members of the family, details of all sorts of financial negotiations and transactions, references to people who have been contacted and who should be contacted, debts that have been paid and debts that must be paid. Although it is not always clear whether the references are to government business or to the business of the Vorontsov family, occasionally there occurs a reference which is unquestionably related to the economic activities of the Vorontsovs. In one of those instances M. I. Vorontsov asked Alexander Romanovich to send his father, Roman Illarionovich, the following items: two cherry trees, two fig trees, two plum trees, ten or twenty pounds of clover, twenty pounds

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<sup>41</sup>Eighty letters of M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, August 17/28, 1763 - February 12/22, 1765, *ibid.*, pp. 241-344.

<sup>42</sup>M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, October 20/31, 1763, *ibid.*, pp. 248-250. Apparently Semen and Mikhail traveled together some of the time, and occasionally met as in Hamburg in September, 1764, as indicated in M. I. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov, n.d., *ibid.*, p. 297.

of alfalfa and various other agricultural materials.<sup>43</sup>

Thus, Alexander's position in the Hague helped M. I. Vorontsov pay his financial debt to the Russian government. Moreover, his service abroad provided him with contacts that were to prove helpful in the future, not only to him but also for his brother Semen Romanovich who later became ambassador to London. The eclipse of the Vorontsovs subsequent to the reign of Peter III was to prove to be only temporary. The immediate aftermath was superseded by two decades which moved from the watershed to the high tide of the Vorontsov fortunes.

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<sup>43</sup>M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, September 11/22, 1764, *ibid.*, pp. 302-303.

**PART III. THE TIDES OF FORTUNE, 1763-1789**

## CHAPTER IV

## FROM WATERSHED TO HIGHTIDE, 1763-1783

At the outset it might well be stated that it seems as though the years 1767 and 1783 represent two key years in the return of the brothers Alexander and Semen Romanovich to the good graces, however limited, of Empress Catherine II. Mikhail Illarionovich died on February 15, 1767 (O. S.), and in 1768 both Alexander and Semen Romanovich were settled in Russia. Catherine was still suspicious of the Vorontsovs, and it was not until after Semen's father, Roman, had passed away on November 30, 1783 (O. S.) that she agreed to offer S. R. Vorontsov the important position of minister to England.<sup>1</sup>

A. The Watershed: A Return to Favor, 1763-1773

Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, meanwhile, had been earning 6,000 rubles a year since Peter III had appointed him minister to the Hague on December 27, 1761, and, on the next day, a second rank functional chamberlain of the Russian Imperial Court. On that day, A. R. Vorontsov was provided 5,000 rubles to travel from Vienna to the Hague. When he was transferred from the Hague to London on March 8/19, 1762 he was given 5,495 rubles for his trip to England. In 1764, he was sent back to the Hague and

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<sup>1</sup>R. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, May 1/12, 1767, AKV, XXXI, 55-56; *ibid.*, p. 406, n.; Zavadovskii to S. R. Vorontsov, February 6/17, 1784, *ibid.*, XII, 28, and n. 36; A. R. to S. R. Vorontsov, May 4/15, 1784, *ibid.*, XXXI, 434-436.

four years later returned to Russia.<sup>2</sup>

From 1768 to 1773 Alexander Romanovich served at Court. It has been said that he came to the Court "renowned for his ability and knowledge."

The account continued:

He presented himself as one who had occupied a prominent position even before the reign of Empress Catherine. But the Empress, not pleased with his stubborn, unyielding, serious and measured dignity, became convinced that he harbored hostility towards her, although she did not deny him her courtesy.<sup>3</sup>

By 1773, perhaps Catherine II was less suspicious of Alexander Romanovich. The next few years were to see many honors conferred upon him.<sup>4</sup> Suffice it to say at this point that Catherine II had apparently overcome her distrust in him. Why?

What factors other than her relative security on the throne and the death of M. I. Vorontsov in 1767 made the Empress less suspicious of Alexander Romanovich than, let us say, of his brother, Semen? Or, is it possible that she decided to use his talents and abilities, despite her fears, because she needed what he had to offer? Then again, how did he develop his "economic know-how" which appears to have been superior to that of any Russian of his day? Had his travels in any way aided his improved standing? And, finally, how did the Vorontsov family fortune benefit from his position?

On his own part, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was busy making

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<sup>2</sup>AKV, VII, 529; "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, pp. 59-60. It is interesting to note that there is no mention of A. R. Vorontsov in Ekaterina II v perepisk s Grimmom (Edited by Ia. K. Grot; SPb.: Akademi Nauk, Eggersa i komp., 1879).

<sup>3</sup>Riabinin, RA, I, 67. See also, "A. R. Vorontsov," Chtenia, CXXXVII, kn. 2, p. 60.

<sup>4</sup>See, above, introduction, n. 5 and related text, and esp. "Avto-biografii A. R. Vorontsova," AKV, V, 2-5.

contacts and developing relationships which could only prove beneficial for him and his family. Before he returned to Russia, he had become acquainted with a number of foreign celebrities. Perhaps most notable among them were Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, James Harris (the Earl of Malmesbury), and Pitt the Elder. Indeed, when Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov was abroad on a fund-raising and diplomatic mission in 1763 and 1764, he asked his nephew to please contact Pitt on a number of matters relative to the Russian Chancellor's mission.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, when Semen arrived in London as Russian minister to England in 1785, he made use of Alexander's previous contacts with Pitt and his friends.<sup>6</sup> When James Harris, prior to his entry into the diplomatic service, was in the Hague studying at the University of Leyden in 1765, he became acquainted with Alexander Romanovich and they met at least three times.<sup>7</sup> Diderot, when he was in St. Petersburg in late 1773 and early 1774, wrote that he spent some time with Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov and sent regards to Dashkova with whom the Frenchman was unable to visit.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, October 22, 1763 (O. S.), *AKV*, XXXI, 251; April 13/24, 1764, *ibid.*, p. 276; September 2/13, 1764, *ibid.*, p. 297; November 9/20, 1764, *ibid.*, pp. 321-322.

<sup>6</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, June 13/24, 1785, *AKV*, IX, 39-40; July 24/August 4, 1785, *ibid.*, pp. 423-425. See also, Marcum, pp. 62-63 and n. 2.

<sup>7</sup>Mr. [James] Harris to his Father (September 10, 1764 [N. S.], September 23, 1765 [N. S.], and November 5, 1765 [N. S.]), in James Harris, A Series of Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury, His Family and Friends from 1745 to 1820 (Edited by his Grandson, 2 vols.; London: Richard Bentley, 1870), respectively discuss how Harris: brought letters, including "a packet from Dr. Moreton" to Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, who was "obliging and civil," to the British student; "had many civilities from the Russian Count Woronzov," then Russian minister to the Hague; was pleasantly surprised when Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov "called to see me [Harris] since I have been at Leyden," I, 129, 131, 137.

<sup>8</sup>Diderot to Dashkova, January 25, 1774 (N. S.), Denis Diderot, Oeuvres Complètes de Diderot (20 vols.; Edited by J. Assézat and Maurice Tourneux; Paris: Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, 1875-1877), XX, 44. See also

As for the relationship between Voltaire and Alexander Romanovich, Lester Jay Humphreys has stated that Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was a "transmitting agent" between Voltaire and Catherine II. This view is based chiefly on a letter from Voltaire to Alexander Romanovich in which the Frenchman wrote: "I idolize three things: liberty, tolerance and your Empress," which it is said that Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov transmitted to Catherine II, with a copy to Semen Romanovich who was impressed by it.<sup>9</sup> The view that Alexander Romanovich was a "transmitting agent" is substantiated by another letter received by him from D'Alembert. In it, D'Alembert apologized for being unable to undertake the education of the son of Catherine II.<sup>10</sup>

As a matter of course, one might expect that a Russian minister to a foreign court would be a "transmitting agent" between his sovereign and individuals living abroad. One of the most pleasant of such contacts abroad was A. R. Vorontsov's association with Voltaire. Such friendship with the most influential of her admirers could only have enhanced A. R. Vorontsov's value to Catherine. Her chief foreign policy advisor at this time, Count N. I. Panin, also befriended the Vorontsovs. Although Catherine never fully trusted Panin, since he had favored Paul as tsar with Catherine as regent, she needed him; and Panin, perhaps at least partly because of the affair he was having with Anna Mikhailovna Vorontsova, daughter of the

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Humphreys, p. 73. For Dashkova's description of her relationship with Diderot, see Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 135-140, 142, 144-145, 187-190.

<sup>9</sup>Voltaire to A. R. Vorontsov, August 25, 1767 (N. S.), AKV, V, 452; Humphreys, pp. 66-67. For their correspondence see AKV, V, 445-457; XXIX, 433-434.

<sup>10</sup>D'Alembert to A. R. Vorontsov, September 21, 1763 (N. S.), AKV, XXXIV, 309-310.

Chancellor, never wavered in his support of the Vorontsovs. Indeed, an example of the kindness of Catherine II to the Vorontsovs, despite Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov's opposition to Poniatowski's placement on the Polish throne, was shown when the Empress agreed to the annulment of the marriage between Anna Mikhailovna Vorontsova and Count A. S. Stroganov -- again, a kindness connected to Panin's influence.<sup>11</sup>

A significant factor in the Vorontsovs, particularly Roman's and Alexander's, return to some prominence and, later, to positions of influence, seems to have been the death of Chancellor Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov on February 15, 1767 (O. S.). Not until then did Semen Romanovich

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<sup>11</sup>The approval by Catherine II to the annulment may be found in a letter to M. I. Vorontsov, December 21, 1764 (O. S.), in SIRIO, VII, 395-396 and AKV, XXXIV, 349. See also P. A. Stroganov, I, 12-14 for a brief discussion of the situation which is also mentioned in A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 16. Molloy refers to Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov's opposition to Poniatowski on the throne of Poland because Vorontsov "thought that it would be to the interest of Russia to support Saxony on the Polish throne, and so preserve an equalisation of power," Molloy, II, 333. See also Cathcart to Earl of Rochford, July 23/August 3, 1770, SIRIO, XIX, 65-66. On Panin's aid to the Vorontsovs, see Dashkova to A. R. Vorontsov, August 15/26, 1762, AKV, V, 163; E. P. Karnovich, "Kniaz A. A. Bezborodko," Zamechatelnyia zagodochnyia lichnost: XVIII i XIX stoletii [hereafter cited as Karnovich, Lichnosti] (SPb.: A. S. Suvorin, 1884), pp. 230-231. According to David M. Griffiths, "Panin's authority, however, began to wane in the late 1770's," David M. Griffiths, "Mikita Panin, Russian Diplomacy, and the American Revolution" [hereafter cited as Griffiths, "Panin,"] SR, XXVIII, No. 1 (March, 1969), p. 18. Apparently, Panin's influence began to decline in 1779 and had totally disappeared by 1781, according to David M. Griffiths, "American Commercial Diplomacy in Russia, 1780-1783," William and Mary Quarterly [hereafter cited as Griffiths, "Commercial Diplomacy"], XXVIII, No. 3 (July, 1970), pp. 394, 400. In this connection, Griffiths links the decline of Panin's influence to increasing divergence between Panin's desire for general peace as increasingly in opposition with Catherine II's genuine aggressive designs in the Crimea particularly, *ibid.*, pp. 400, 410. Panin had been in sole charge of foreign affairs from 1763 to the beginning of the first Turkish War when Crimean affairs began to be conducted by Catherine II, i.e., after 1774. Panin, however, continued to conduct most of Russia's foreign affairs to 1779 when both he and his system "were in severe trouble." David M. Griffiths, "The Rise and Fall of the Northern System: Court Politics and Foreign Policy in the First Half of Catherine II's Reign" [hereafter cited as Griffiths, "Rise"], Canadian Slavic Studies, IV, No. 3 (Fall, 1970), pp. 550, 554, 557.

return to St. Petersburg (1767). Not until after that event did Alexander Romanovich return to Russia (1768).

Their father had earlier received marks of returning favor. Roman Illarionovich had been permitted to retain the title of Senator when he had been banished to his estates near Moscow in 1762. Four years later, in 1766, he was made head of the Revision College. In the following year, 1767, to the surprise of few, he was elected representative of the Schlüsselberg Uezd to the revived Ulozhenie (legislative) Commission which received the Nakaz (Instruction) of Catherine II. At various sessions he presented the physiocratic view that natural resources, and not gold, silver or taxes were the true source of all value and measure of wealth of a nation or region. Moreover, he argued in favor of freer trade within the borders of Russia; and in November, 1767, spoke in favor of a motion which, although defeated by a vote of 16 to 11, almost succeeded in having published in both Russian and French that essay supporting freedom of the peasantry which won the contest sponsored by the Free Economic Society in the previous year. Then in 1778, he was made Governor-General of the newly created gubernias of Vladimir and Tambov; and in 1779, Governor-General of Penza.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>PSZ, XVII, No. 12.625, April 17, 1766 (O. S.), pp. 665-667; XX, No. 14.714 March 2, 1778 (O. S.) and No. 14.917, September 16, 1779 (O. S.), pp. 598, 866-867 respectively; A. A. Bezborodko to R. I. Vorontsov, April 27, 1778 (O. S.), and October 11/22, 1779, AKV, XIII, 6-8 and 13 respectively offers congratulations, information and suggestions relating to the administration and economy of the regions; "Vyborgy gorodskago golovy i deputata ot shitelei Moskvy," SIRIO, IV, 21 lists Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov as a member of the "project group" for the code of Ulozhenie, and "Vosmoie zasiedanie 20 Avgusta," *ibid.*, pp. 68-75 for some of Roman's ideas. See also, Michael Confino, Domaines et Seigneurs en Russie vers la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle (hereafter cited as Confino, Domaines / (Paris: Institut d'études slaves de l'université de Paris, 1953), pp. 24-25; Rambaud, II, 206; and Humphreys, pp. 222, 226 who called Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov the most "unorthodox" and "enigmatic" member of the family. Sergei M. Solovev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen (2nd ed., SPb.: Obshchestvennaia Palza, n.d.), XXVII, 380 discussed Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov's argument in favor of printing the essay supporting freedom of the peasantry.

Apparently these last mentioned honors were awarded to Roman for his loyalty and aid during the Pugachev uprising in 1773-1774, a fact well demonstrated by Soviet scholars. For example, A. P. Pronshtein described how Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov labored to win the Don peasants to the support of Catherine II prior to and during the rebellion.<sup>13</sup> In addition, V. N. Vitevskii mentioned the joint efforts of Roman and his son Alexander Romanovich, who, together with Count Orlov, attempted to quell local uprisings in the Don region in 1773.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, A. I. Andrushchenko dramatized the significant role played by Roman in helping to maintain the hegemony of Catherine, particularly with respect to winning over, not only his own, but also the peasants of other nobles to the side of the Empress.<sup>15</sup>

Even before Roman was rewarded for his loyalty, Alexander Romanovich in September, 1773, had been appointed President of the Commerce College. When one considers that Roman had been head of the Commission on Commerce under Elizabeth and Peter III, the appointment of his son to head the College may have seemed fitting. Perhaps a greater consideration, however, was that even during the period of Roman's disfavor, his economic activities continued to be successful. During the period 1767-1783, Roman was preparing Alexander Romanovich for management of the Vorontsov estates and fortune and introducing him to influential business contacts in and out of

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<sup>13</sup>A. P. Pronshtein, Zemlia Donskaia v XVIII v. (Rostov-na-Donu; n.p., 1961), pp. 295-307.

<sup>14</sup>V. N. Vitevskii, "Iaitskoe voisko do poiavleniia Pugacheva" (Glava IX), RA (1879), No. 12, p. 436.

<sup>15</sup>A. I. Andrushchenko, Krestianskaia voina 1773-1775 gg.: na iaike, v priurale, na urale, i v sibirii (M.: Izdatelstvo "Nauka," 1969), pp. 21, 276, 281, 285-287. For conditions in Vladimir and Tambov see I. G. Rozner, Kazachestvo v Krestianskoi voine 1773-1775 gg. (Lvov: Izdatelstvo Lvovskogo Universiteta, 1966), pp. 166-176.

the Masonic lodges.<sup>16</sup>

Nor did the latter fail on occasion to open his heart to his son. Perhaps the most interesting of these letters was written by Roman to Alexander on February 18/March 1, 1781.<sup>17</sup> In it Roman discussed the great "pain" he felt at the "slipping of justice and sensitivity" in Russia, for which he expressed sorrow. He acknowledged the fact that, referring to himself, "even I am not kind," but softened this self-criticism with the generalization that changes like "this must happen, [but] I by no means deserved" the abuse being heaped upon him, both by Catherine II and by his peasants. Nostalgically, he recalled his service on various commissions and "all my work, for which I employed people [whom] I made every effort to care for, having almost never a day or night of rest." Now, he continued, "I fall prey to the people, to their common slanders, according to their moods."

Roman had been accused of mismanaging funds given him for the administration of the provinces under his jurisdiction. Apparently, the poor regard in which he was then held by Catherine II was known to the general populace as well. In a tone of self-pity, Roman continued, questioning the value of his whole life and his career in government service. He wrote:

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<sup>16</sup>According to P. Bartenev, the letters of R. I. to A. R. Vorontsov for the period January, 1762 to January, 1767 were not found. For the letters through March 7/18, 1767, see AKV, XXXI, 55-78; and for Alexander's letters to Roman from February 27, 1767 (N. S.) to July 24, 1767 (N. S.), see *ibid.*, pp. 409-425. An additional letter from Alexander Romanovich to his father asking Roman to send Alexander's regards to Radishchev's parents is in *ibid.*, V, 394. It is interesting to note that in January, 1767, Roman wrote to Alexander Romanovich about the painstaking translation by Andrei Larionovich of Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* (Razum Zakonov), R. I. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov, January 2/13, 1767, AKV, XXXI, 55. Perhaps Roman was preparing for the Legislative Commission. It is not clear who Andrei Larionovich is except that it might be a Frenchification of the name of Roman's brother, Ivan.

<sup>17</sup>R. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, February 18/March 1, 1781, *ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

"And how much I earlier wished to serve, and how much now this same service is a burden, but...I wish I could remain in service, attended by a sense of duty, living in peace, rather than in vain endure hardships like those reproaches...." He went on to defend his administration, stating that he "order[ed] each law to be followed" and, with respect to his acquisition of peasants maintained that "all those I do not appropriate, I take as bounties from our most gracious Sovereign, explaining to each that Her Eminence has introduced new regulations, caring only about their well-being and serenity; and even to some poor folk I myself give pleasure by taking all of them in the glorious name of Her Majesty."

This last section of the letter is reminiscent of the pro-slavery argument as developed in the United States during the mid-nineteenth century. His agitation is clearly demonstrated by his defense of his policies and practices in the face of the lack of appreciation on the part of the peasantry and the scorn of Catherine II. His sons, aware of his anxieties, urged him to try to relax.<sup>18</sup>

**B. Hightide: Economic Attitudes and Policies as President of the Commerce College, 1773-1794**

On September 22/October 3, 1773, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was appointed President of the Commerce College.<sup>19</sup> His thirty-second birthday

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<sup>18</sup> Apparently Roman was agitated for the rest of the year. In November, 1781, Semen wrote to him on behalf of both sons, Semen and Alexander, asking Roman to "do us a favor; go to Petersburg, stay in our house, where you will have some peace," S. R. to R. I. Vorontsov, November 6/17, 1781, *ibid.*, XVI, 139.

<sup>19</sup> "A. R. Vorontsov," *Chteniia*, CXXXVII, kn. 2, p. 60. A listing of the nineteen Presidents of the Commerce College from 1716 through 1807 may be found in N. Kaidanov, *Sistematicheskii katalog delam gosudarstvennoi komerts kollegii* [hereafter cited as *Komerts Kollegiia*, / (SPb.: V. Kirschbaum, 1884), p. 3. Apparently Kaidanov was an official of the Department of

had occurred less than three weeks before, but he seemed older than the calendar revealed. He cut a solitary figure in society, frequently complained of illness or some type of indisposition, spent a great deal of time with his books and, in general, tried to lead a "better life." In a revealing letter to him from his sister, Princess Dashkov, written in the previous year, she tried to persuade Alexander to change his habits and told him quite frankly that she did not accept verbatim everything he told her about himself. She wrote:

Although I concur perfectly well in the reasons that you have for your aversion for the world, I am not nevertheless of the opinion that you [should] cultivate this tendency: it is impossible that at your age you can already vanish from it. But [as to] this comedy of hypochondria that you have taken to in your solitude [whereby] you plan to quit the good life, when you will have returned to the hustle and bustle which awaits you and in which, despite the philosophy you affect, you will be able to manage as before.<sup>20</sup>

Although the private life of Alexander Romanovich may have remained essentially the same, the vigor with which he pursued his duties as head of the Commerce College more than justified Bashkova's prediction. Immediately upon entering the office, and for approximately a decade thereafter, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov set about improving Russia's trade in regions with which he was personally familiar, expanding trade in goods which were produced and distributed by the Vorontsovs as well as others, and utilizing new methods, wherever practicable, to achieve his goal of improving the economic and financial condition of Russia.

For example, one of the first acts upon entering office was the develop-

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Tamozhennykh Sborov (Customs House), and his job was to compile systematic catalogs of the various components of which the Department of Customs had been formerly composed and from which, in part, it had been created.

<sup>20</sup>Dashkova to A. R. Vorontsov, January 5/16, 1772, AKV, VII, pp. 655-658.

ment of a consular system for the nationals in their own country as local economic agents serving Russia from abroad. In this connection, Alexander Baxter became the first local consul, in London, in 1773. Twelve years later, in 1785, when Semen Romanovich Vorontsov became minister to England, John Newman was named consul to Hull; and, in the following year, 1786, Andrew Lindegren was appointed to Portsmouth from where he was later transferred to the Isle of Wight. The Commerce College provided them with details and instructions about relevant commercial matters, and the consuls sent to the Commerce College information about the type and price of Russian wares, local tariffs, trade regulations, and the like.<sup>21</sup>

Alexander Romanovich, as early as 1762, had been written to by his uncle, Mikhail Illarionovich urging that Alexander support the establishment of a consular system employing local nationals to serve alongside diplomatic agents so that in the event a diplomat missed a particular opportunity, the consul might be able to rectify it and provide another similar opportunity, largely because the consul generally held a respectable position in society.<sup>22</sup> As no action had been taken on this proposal for more than a decade, soon after learning that he was being considered for the position of President of the Commerce College, Alexander Romanovich lost no time in starting the ball rolling. Indeed, in an interesting rescript of October 31/November 11, 1774, signed by Count N. [I.] Panin and Prince A. Golitsyn and addressed to Prince Musin-Pushkin, reference is made to the training

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<sup>21</sup>Vladimir A. Ulianitskii, Russkii Konsulstva za granitsei v XVIII veke (2 vols.; M.: G. Lissner i A. Geshella, 1899), I, 397-398, 637-655. See also, Marcum, pp. 114-115.

<sup>22</sup>M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, April 16/27, 1762, AKV, XXXI, 154-157. This document, also published by V. N. Aleksandrenko (see n. 23, below), was primarily concerned with the cost of such training which exceeded 1490 pounds sterling.

of a consul at Oxford as early as October, 1772.<sup>23</sup>

On July 8/19, 1774, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, writing as President of the Commerce College, sent the following note to Prince Musin-Pushkin. In it, he thanked the Prince for his help and requested continued support for Baxter, serving as Russian consul in London. Vorontsov wrote:

I commend You [sic] for all your actions on behalf of our consul (that is, Baxter), in particular your patronage of him. I ask you, in case I need the help of his counsel, not to abandon him [something] about which I think should be written to him by You [his] and the college of foreign affairs.<sup>24</sup>

From the offices of the Commerce College, located in Moscow and Archangel,<sup>25</sup> in both of which, we should remember, the Vorontsovs also had a variety of properties and interests, Alexander Romanovich continued to perform his labors so well that by 1779, he was earning 19,000 rubles per year in that position alone.<sup>26</sup> His success, in large part, was the result of close cooperation with the College of Foreign Affairs headed in the 1770's by Count N. I. Panin, and their effective use of consuls, particularly in lands with which Alexander Romanovich was familiar.

Thus, for example, in 1773, the Russian consul Wittfooth in Bordeaux,

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<sup>23</sup>V. N. Aleksandrenko, Russkie diplomaticheskie agenty v London v XVIII v. (2 vols.; Warsaw: Varshavskago Uchebnago Okruga, 1897), II, 185-186. See also, I, 407 for reference to the letter of M. I. to A. R. Vorontsov of April 16/27, 1762 cited in n. 22, above.

<sup>24</sup>A. R. Vorontsov to Prince Musin-Pushkin, July 8/19, 1774, *ibid.*, II, 185. Aleksandrenko cites no specific source, and the letter is not to be found in the AKV. Although the remainder of the note is unclear, it is quite possible that they concerned the need for confidentiality in the activities of consuls of the Commerce College, the copy being sent to confirm or clarify whatever Baxter might have heard.

<sup>25</sup>Kommerts Kollegiia, p. 4.

<sup>26</sup>On January 28/February 8, 1779, the presidents of all colleges received an increase from 14,000 to 19,000 rubles per annum. Vice-presidents were raised to 12,000 rubles per year, Ocherk Min. Inos. Del., 1802-1902, p. 67.

France was involved in discussions for broadening trade between France and Russia which, in 1774, centered especially on the trade in tobacco leaves.<sup>27</sup> Although Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's attempts in 1776 to more formally negotiate a trade agreement between France and Russia with Corberon, French minister to St. Petersburg were unsuccessful, he later succeeded. In 1778 and again in 1780, the Russian consul for Sweden, Abraham Peshier, then residing in Marseilles, received instructions which, although undisclosed, seem to have been related to further expansion of trade relations between France and Russia.<sup>28</sup> In any event, in 1779 and 1782 Wittfooth, the Russian consul in France, arranged for "sending Russian iron to him for testing."<sup>29</sup> And in 1781, "at the request of the President of the Commerce College concerning the trading in France by Russian merchants," it was demanded "that Russian vessels [sudna] in France be freed" from paying tonnage taxes [lastovykh].<sup>30</sup>

Relations with Spain also involved the use of consuls. After the College of Commerce had been instrumental in the establishment of a merchant's bureau for Spanish merchants in St. Petersburg in 1775, the Russian consul Lidze-Buda was active for the next two years (1775-1777) discussing

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<sup>27</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, No. 394, 1773, No. 395, 1774, p. 67. Arvid Wittfooth was a Swedish-born Russian consul at Bordeaux, France who favored trade with the United States and who acted as a middleman in Russo-American trade in such items as iron, hemp, sailcloth, planks, tallow and salted meat during the late 1770's and early 1780's, according to information obtained in the Russian archives by David M. Griffiths, "Commercial Diplomacy," William and Mary Quaterly, pp. 393-394.

<sup>28</sup>Kommerts Kollegia No. 396, 1778 and 1780, p. 67; Marie Daniel Bourée Corberon, Un diplomate Français à la cour de Catherine II, 1775-1780. Journal intime du Chevalier de Corberon (Edited by L. H. Labaude; 2 vols.; Paris: Librairie Plon, 1901), II, 312, 340-342.

<sup>29</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, No. 397, p. 67.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., No. 398, p. 67.

commercial possibilities between Spain and Russia from his vantage point on the Isle of Gibraltar.<sup>31</sup> His activities were, apparently, sufficiently fruitful so that in 1776, the Spanish minister, Count Lassi was involved in formal discussions of trade on a broad scale with Russia; and, for the next two years, the whole question of trade in the Mediterranean between Russia and Italy as well as with Spain was being reevaluated.<sup>32</sup>

Moreover, in 1775, with the agreement of the College of Foreign Affairs, a consul was established in Lisbon and it was decided to continue maintaining one in London. In 1777 and 1778, Friedrich Sentpol was given instructions to serve as Russian consul for Hamburg, Lubeck and Bremen.<sup>33</sup> In Turkey, from 1776 to 1778, a number of agents served under the direction of the Russian's official general consul, lieutenant-colonel Count Ivan Voinovich.<sup>34</sup> In Persia, there were various consuls serving in a variety of official and unofficial capacities not always clearly distinguishable. Working out of Astrakhan, they were responsible for most of the trade in the Near East (apart from the Ottoman Empire), particularly the trade in salt and wine.<sup>35</sup>

Although there is no available evidence that the College of Commerce used any consuls in China, at least four trade expeditions were financed in the '70's, and a similar number in the 1780's. When Alexander Romanovich took office in 1773, he undoubtedly learned that Bril, the Governor of Irkutsk, had recently concluded the second of two expeditions to set up

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., Nos. 330, 331, p. 59.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., No. 332, p. 59 and No. 367, p. 64.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., Nos. 451 and 452, respectively p. 74.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., No. 377, p. 65.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., No. 649, p. 98.

outposts near the Kiakhta border.<sup>36</sup> Immediately, in 1773, Brill was instructed to develop a trade in Kiakhta's silver as well as her other resources.<sup>37</sup> In 1775, Catherine II authorized the sum of 20,432 rubles and 99 1/4 kopecks for the purchase of Chinese goods over the next four years, at the end of which period, in 1779, the Empress of Russia issued a decree "informing merchants of the opening in Kiakhta of trade with China."<sup>38</sup> Trade was financed for the better part of a decade in items which included clothing, Chinese gold and silver.<sup>39</sup>

Trade with China in the eighteenth century sometimes fell under the aegis of the Siberian Department (Prikaz) of the Moscow Commissariat for the development of industry and trade. Whether its activities were linked with those of the Commerce College and, if so, to what extent is not clear. As its main office was also located in Moscow it is quite probable that Alexander Romanovich was familiar with its operation. The records of this agency also make note of the opening of trade with China, and give the date for the ukaz of Catherine II to that effect as September 30, 1779 (O. S.).<sup>40</sup> It is also unfortunately unclear as to whether its activities in the 1770's

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., No. 489, p. 78.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., No. 490, pp. 78-79.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., Nos. 491 and 492, respectively, p. 79. See also N. Kaidanov, Sistematicheskii katalog delam komissii o komertsii i o poshlinakh, khраниashchimsia v Arkhiv Departamenta Tamozhennykh Sborov /hereafter cited as Komerts Komissia / (SPb.: V. Kirschbaum, 1887), No. 312, p. 38. It should be remembered that Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was appointed to the Commerce Commission on February 19/March 2, 1774. Frequently, therefore, there was a correlation between the activities of both bodies.

<sup>39</sup>Komerts Kollegia, Nos. 492, 1779; 493, 1780; 494, 1783; 496, 1787, p. 79.

<sup>40</sup>N. Kaidanov, Sistematicheskii katalog delam Sibirskago prikaza, Moskovskago Komissarstva i drugih byvshikh Uchrenshdenii po chasti promyshlennosti i torgovli, khраниashchimsia vo Arkhive Departamenta Tamozhennykh Sborov. Tut she: dopolneniia k katalogu delam departamenta vneshnei torgovli, izdannomu v 1877 godu /hereafter cited as Sibirskii prikaz / (SPb.: V. Kirschbaum, 1888), No. 5519, kn. 55, l.20, p. 72. See also, where it is shown that the Chinese trade was restricted by a Siberian tariff in 1780, Komerts Komissia, No. 312, p. 38.

with respect to trade in various goods including tobacco, or its regulations concerning the prohibition of traffic in contraband were in any way related to the activities of the Commerce College or the wealth of the Vorontsovs.<sup>41</sup>

Of the commodities which accounted for large portions of Russia's foreign commerce during the 1770's, the Commerce College promoted trade in spirits (wine, vodka and rum, in particular);<sup>42</sup> iron ore, steel and cast-iron;<sup>43</sup> potash;<sup>44</sup> rhubarb;<sup>45</sup> salt;<sup>46</sup> linseed;<sup>47</sup> tobacco;<sup>48</sup> grain;<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>Sibirskii prikaz, No. 5536, kn. 429, l. 469 (April 11/22, 1774); kn. 430, l. 509 (January 24/February 4, 1777); kn. 431, l. 517 (February 10/21, 1778), on tobacco; kn. 432, l. 549 (July 25/August 5, 1779), p. 118; No. 5519, kn. 54, l. 18 (July 25/August 5, 1779); kn. 56, l. 21 (November 5/16, 1779), p. 72.

<sup>42</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, Nos. 727, 728, 729, p. 108. See also No. 43, 1775-1776, p. 6; No. 91, p. 12. For the nature of the Vorontsov interests in most of the items listed in the text above, see below, Chapter VII.

<sup>43</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, Nos. 780-782, p. 114. See also, Kommerts Komissia, No. 159, p. 21.

<sup>44</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, Nos. 1131-1132.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., Nos. 1169-1174, pp. 161-162. Irkutsk was a center for the trade in rhubarb. In 1772, Brill, the Governor of Irkutsk, had apparently established a "rhubarb commission" which lasted for at least seven years and reported on the trade in rhubarb with China through Kiakhta, some of it involving English merchants called Reksu and Safri (No. 1171).

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., No. 1281, 1781, p. 174. Curiously, little traffic in salt seems to have occurred under the aegis of either the Commerce College or the Commerce Commission during Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's tenure in office, although the trade was ample before and after Vorontsov served as chief of the Russian economy. It may be that the Stroganovs found other means of trading their salt because 1) they had sufficient influence to do so, and 2) they were still chagrined that Alexander Romanovich's cousin, Anna Mikhailovna, had divorced A. S. Stroganov.

<sup>47</sup>Riga and Archangel were centers for the trade in linseed, ibid., No. 1322, 1777, p. 179.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., Nos. 1334, 1335 (1778-1779), p. 131. No. 1334 noted that American tobacco was being imported. No. 1335 noted that St. Petersburg was a center for the tobacco trade. A merchant called Rembert was involved in the trade at this time, Kommerts Komissia, No. 184, p. 240. Indeed, when Corberon was about to leave Russia in October, 1780, after exchanging pleasantries with A. R. Vorontsov, both discussed arrangements for the mutual exchange of tobacco and tea, entry for October 11, 1780 N. S., Corberon, II, 341.

<sup>49</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, Nos. 1411-1415, 1774-1778, p. 190. See also

and flax and skins.<sup>50</sup>

In addition, there was some trade in money, both Russian and foreign currency, including gold, silver and copper coins. In fact, from 1769 to 1773, the value of the ruble had been declining, its rate of decline being approximately one per cent a year from 1770 through 1772. In 1773, the value of the ruble was increased by one per cent; and in 1774, it had been restored to its full value. Although its value declined by one per cent in 1775, it remained stable at that level through the end of the seventies and, indeed, through 1783.<sup>51</sup>

Stabilization of the ruble in a period of widespread spiraling inflation was no mean achievement. War, the threat of war, the extravagance of European Courts (particularly in France and Russia), and financial policies based on extracting as much as possible from those least able to afford it, helped in part to cause and in part to exacerbate recurrent financial crises. Nevertheless, throughout Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's tenure as President of the Commerce College, the Russian ruble was equal in value to approximately four francs.<sup>52</sup> In part, this was achieved by slowing the rate of increase

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Kommerts Komissia, No. 60, 1779, Riga, p. 8; and No. 189, 1779, Narva, p. 24.

<sup>50</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, No. 987, 1774, p. 140; Kommerts Komissia, No. 48, 1777, p. 7.

<sup>51</sup>In 1769 the value of the silver ruble was 101 kopecks; in 1770, 101; in 1771, 102; in 1772, 103; in 1773, 102; in 1774, 100; and from 1775 through 1783, 101. The value of the ruble declined slightly to 102 from 1784 to 1786 and to 103 in 1787. In 1788, a sharp drop occurred from which it has never recovered. Thus the value of the ruble dropped to 108 in 1788; 109 in 1789; 115 in 1790; 123 in 1791; 126 in 1792; 135 in 1793; 141 in 1794 and 146 in 1795. It stood at 153 in 1800; 388 in 1812; and, at its lowest point, 404 in 1816. By 1840, its value had improved to 350 kopecks, Ph. Van Rege-morter, "Le commerce extérieur de la Russie (1762-1835)," L'Empire Russe de 1762 à 1855, "Tableau No. 10 - Devaluation de l'assignat," p. 332.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 325. See also, A. R. Vorontsov, "O privedenii Assignatsionnogo Banka v luchshee sostoianie," AKV, XXVI, 249 ff. and "Zapiska grafa A. R. Vorontsova k grafu A. A. Bezborodko o Russkikh finantsakh," ibid., IX, 504-507.

of total value of recorded foreign commerce, although maintaining an increase in total volume of both imports and exports, as well as maintenance of a favorable balance of trade in general and with Britain in particular.<sup>53</sup>

The qualification "recorded foreign commerce" is necessary because the records for financial and commercial activity, particularly in the first part of the reign of Catherine II are sketchy and incomplete.<sup>54</sup> The fragments that we have, however, do suggest less trade with western Europe and greater trade with China,<sup>55</sup> less trade in heavy industrial materials, such as iron,<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Van Regemorter, "Tableau No. 1: Commerce Extérieur de la Russie de 1760 à 1853, (en milliers de roubles-argent)," shows that from 1765 to 1769 the total value of Russia's foreign commerce was 22,722,000 rubles with 9,961,000 r. in imports and 12,761,000 r. in exports, p. 352. For the years 1770-1774 there was an increase of approximately thirty percent to a total value of 29,674,000 rubles, with similar increases in imports which rose to 12,966,000 r. and exports which climbed to 16,708,000 r. For the period 1775-1779, however, the rate of increase had dropped to just under ten percent, the total volume recorded being 32,434,000 r. with 13,439,000 r. in imports and 18,995,000 r. in exports. In this connection, England was both Russia's biggest customer and largest supplier, particularly during the "boom" in trade during the seventies and eighties, as described by John Ehrman, The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Europe, 1783-1793 (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1962), pp. 93-94, 98-99, 125. For the argument that Russia exported more to France than to Prussia or Sweden, and that France imported more from Russia than from any other continental country, see E. V. Tarle, "Byla li ekaterininskaia Rossiia ekonomicheskoi otstaloi stranoiu," Zapad i Rossiia: Stati i dokumenty iz istorii XVIII-XX vv. (Petrograd: Byloe, 1918), pp. 122-149.

<sup>54</sup>N. D. Chechulin, in his Ocherki po istorii Russkikh finansov v tsarstvovanii Ekateriny II (SPb.: Senatskii Tipografii, 1906), passim, draws conclusions based on estimates between the years 1768-1769 and 1781-1783 for which he had more information. Ehrman noted his failure to "construct a satisfactory table" for so late a period as 1783-1786, as noted by Ehrman, p. 98, n. 4.

<sup>55</sup>Clifford M. Foust, in his Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia's Trade with China and Its Setting, 1727-1805 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), states that this trade brought 6,000,000 rubles into the state treasury annually, except for 1785-1792 when trade had been officially stopped because of a border incident, pp. 308-315.

<sup>56</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, August 20/31, 1787, AKV, IX, 102-106; May 12/23, 1788, ibid., pp. 125-127. See also Van Regemorter, Table No. 4, p. 327 and Table No. 10, p. 332. Although exports of iron increased in the eighties, the increase in trade with Western Europe was also coincidental

greater trade in consumer items, such as seed oils, textiles, hemp, linen and other cloth materials, and naval stores.<sup>57</sup>

Moreover, the trade in items described as "contraband" by foreign governments, such as the British, and the unrecorded border trade between Siberian points and China, as well as between the steppe lands and Central Asia is difficult to include in any statistics and all estimates thereof are highly problematical. However, it is known that in February, 1786, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was pursuing a project to exempt some items from the British list of contraband, this action being part of a more ambitious project of the late eighties and early nineties.<sup>58</sup>

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with a decline in the value of the ruble. Although the nineties show a drop in trade with Western Europe, by then it seems nothing could stop the rapid inflationary spiral of the ruble, p. 332. Ehrman, following S. R. Vorontsov, suggested that the decline of the ruble from 1788 on was the result of the mushrooming of contraband trade, the costs of the Turkish and Swedish wars and the disadvantages of "Armed Neutrality," Ehrman, pp. 125-126.

<sup>57</sup> Van Regemorter, Tables Nos. 6 and 7, pp. 328-329. With respect to these articles, there are few figures for the period 1770-1792; however the great increase in volume of these goods traded, as shown in the figures for 1769 and 1793, strongly suggests a gradual and general increase throughout the period. Thus, for example, 11,322 tons of flax were exported in a four year period from 1758-1762 whereas the amount had almost quadrupled by 1795 because for the two year period of 1793-1795 20,620 tons were exported. Similar results are shown for exports of tallow, hemp and hemp products and seed oils. There are no figures for the exports of raw wool or cotton or finished textiles for the period; and although imports of these commodities increased in similar proportions, their total value in percent of total imports remained approximately the same, rising only from an already high fifty-one percent in the period 1778-1780 to fifty-six percent by 1790-1792. Ehrman, p. 95, stated that timber, hemp, iron, flax, tallow, hardware, and woolen and cotton goods were the chief items in the Anglo-Russian trade of the seventies and eighties. Alfred W. Crosby Jr., in his America, Russia, Hemp and Napoleon: American Trade with Russia and the Baltic, 1783-1812 (No city: Ohio State University Press, 1965), described his book as "something of a hymn of praise to Russia's iron, hemp, and flax," p. 6. The Vorontsovs had interests in most of these commodities as shown below in Chapter VII.

<sup>58</sup> Fitzherbert to Carmarthen, No. 12 (March 18, 1785) (F. O. 65/13) and Frank Spencer, "Lord Sandwich, Russian Masts and American Independence," The Mariner's Mirror, vol. 44, No. 2 (May, 1958), pp. 118-123, cited in Ehrman, p. 100. The more ambitious project of the eighties resulted in the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty of 1793. On the question of contraband

In addition, the favorable balance of trade maintained by Russia was in large part the result of the great volume of goods traded between it and the poorer regions of Central Asia and China which to some measure offset the high prices Russians had to pay for European goods. In order to maintain this precarious balance, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, as President of the Commerce College and member of the Commerce Commission, pursued two courses of action. First, he encouraged the development of manufacturing and freer trade within the borders of Russia, and sought government subsidies for many of these projects. For example, in 1779, soon after Alexander Romanovich was appointed to the Senate, the Commerce College succeeded in obtaining Senate approval for the abolition of taxes on machine factories as well as subsidies for the creation of additional machine factories.<sup>59</sup> Earlier, in 1776, the Commission on Commerce approved the request of a merchant named Geidefogel to continue for ten years the operations of his starch and powder factories.<sup>60</sup> Similarly, in 1779, the Tula merchants, Mikhail Pastukhov and Moise Orekhov, were granted the right to pursue their mercantile activities "as their consciences dictated."<sup>61</sup>

With respect to the lumber industry, one of the chief sources of the Vorontsov wealth, both the Commerce College and the Commerce Commission showed continued interest in its development. For example, in 1773 and again in 1775, the Commerce College considered the requests of Professor Iakov Ursiniusia to ship lumber by water directly from his own forests to his own mills. Although it is not clear where his properties were, it should

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in 1777, see Kommerts Komissia, No. 600, p. 71.

<sup>59</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, No. 1727, p. 320.

<sup>60</sup>Kommerts Komissia, No. 517, p. 61

<sup>61</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, No. 1763, p. 235.

be remembered that in 1763 the Shuvalov family had obtained a monopoly on both the felling of lumber in and the shipping of lumber from the gubernia of Archangel. Consequently, Professor Ursinuisia's request may have been one of the first attempts to break the stranglehold of the Shuvalov family on the lumber industry, in part by developing new routes. In this connection, in 1776 and 1782, use of the Dvina river and the port of Riga were considered. In addition, in 1781 and 1782, the practices of two English merchants who had lumber mills in the gubernia of Novgorod were reviewed.<sup>62</sup> Earlier, in 1777 and again in 1778, the Commerce Commission reviewed the business practices of the merchant Gou, as applied to his lumber trade. In 1778 and 1780, there was discussed the importance of exports directly from the forest region. In 1779 and 1780, the commission reviewed the observations of the peasant Makovkin and the Vyborg merchant Ianysh from the region of Kekskola on the northwest shore of Lake Ladoga, concerning the shipment of lumber by water from there to Vyborg, Friedrichsham and St. Petersburg. Later, in 1780, the whole matter of the lumber trade in those cities was discussed. In 1781, the members of the Commerce Commission considered the value of importing lumber through St. Petersburg; and, in the following year, considered the possibility of opening all Russian ports to the lumber trade. After the Tariff of 1782 was passed, however, the commission was forced to consider the negative response of Riga, which threatened to close its port to Russia for a time; and, in 1784, von Engelgardt, Governor of Vyborg, informed the Commerce Commission that the Vyborg customs office was responding by placing a new tariff on lumber passing through Finland's ports.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>Kommerts Kollegiia, No. 2101, 1773 and 1775; No. 2097, 1763; No. 2102, 1776 and 1782; No. 2103, 1781 and 1782, p. 283.

<sup>63</sup>Kommerts Komissia, No. 206, 1777 and 1778; No. 207, 1778 and 1780;

As disposed as A. R. Vorontsov was to freer trade within the borders of Russia, in order thereby to promote the development of Russian industry, Alexander Romanovich favored protective tariffs against the products of nations which were more highly developed industrially, a position which has led David Marshall Lang erroneously to classify A. R. Vorontsov as an "avowed protectionist."<sup>64</sup> To support this opinion, the British historian cited the words of Ségur, the French minister to St. Petersburg who, at one point, described Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov as: "capable but thrifty and self-opinionated -- austere and opposed to luxury; he [Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov] would have had the Russians drink nothing but hydromel, and dress themselves exclusively in home-produced fabrics."<sup>65</sup>

The true significance of this remark is that Vorontsov, having been abroad, was very much aware of the disparity between life in foreign nations and life in Russia. One of the chief elements he found lacking in Russia was a bourgeoisie. At one time he wrote that:

...every power that does not have a third estate is not complete, however strong it is...the third estate is the school of great individuals...whom the sovereign finds at need with all their capacities.<sup>66</sup>

Not only because he believed that free trade carried with it its own economic benefits, but also because Alexander Romanovich wanted Russia to

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No. 208, 1779 and 1780; No. 209, 1780; No. 210, 1781; No. 211, 1782; No. 212, 1782-1783; No. 213, 1784. These developments may have served to help move both France and Russia toward the Franco-Russian commercial agreement of 1786, because the French government needed lumber and other naval stores, the shortage of which worried French leaders throughout the eighteenth century, Paul W. Bamford, Forests and French Sea Power, 1660-1789 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956), passim.

<sup>64</sup>Lang, Radical, p. 92.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 92. For Ségur's comment, see Ségur, II, 396.

<sup>66</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Kratkoe iziasnenie o volnosti frantsuzskago dvorianstva i o polse tretego china," AKV, XXVI, 322.

be strong enough to carry its own weight among the family of nations, he helped lift government restrictions on the economy. To achieve this goal, however, it is reasonable to suggest the possibility that for A. R. Vorontsov free trade was to be limited primarily to trade within Russian borders, for industry and commerce still needed building; and, it may be inferred that until a substantial independent middle-class had been built, protectionism was a necessary policy. To this end, as E. Prikazchikova put it:

Count Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov as president of the Commerce College wrote theoretical and practical surveys on questions of exchange rates, and concerning the means and methods of increasing the production of iron...etc.<sup>67</sup>

It is in this light, then, that Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's policies ought to be viewed. That is, he was a "protectionist" and, as Lang continued "an advocate of balanced budgets and sound orthodox finance, so unfashionable in the inflationary era of Catherine the Great,"<sup>68</sup> but only in the pragmatic sense. If his policies worked, they were good. And in the seventies and for most of the eighties Vorontsov was successful. For this reason, even his tariff policies must be considered as representing a temporary measure to improve Russia's economy. And even at that, as pointed out by Florinsky, protectionism during Alexander Romanovich

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<sup>67</sup>E. Prikazchikova, Ekonomicheskie Vzgliady A. N. Radishcheva (M., L.: Akademiia Nauk, 1947), p. 56.

<sup>68</sup>The following are among A. R. Vorontsov's written statements on economics, some of which have already been cited and most of which are found in AKV, XXVI: "Ob ograshdani vesma nuzhospasitelnoi dvorianskikh rodov ot promyshlennogo otnatiia u nikh zemel i dereven iz spokojnogo ikh vladeniia," pp. 225-236; "Mnenie grafa Minikha o Russkoi torgovle s Prussiei," pp. 237-240; "Zapiska o raznykh sposobakh; kak vvoziuye siuda tovary izvegaiut platesha polozhennykh poshlin," pp. 241-248; "O privedenii Assignatsionnogo Banka v luchsee sostoianie," pp. 249-250. See also his "Zapiska o sakharnoi fabrik v Rossii," *ibid.*, XIII, 475-476. For Lang's characterization, see Lang, Radical, p. 92.

Vorontsov's term as President of the Commerce College was moderate.<sup>69</sup> Thus, for example, Catherine's Manifesto of March 17/28, 1775 had provided that anyone could establish, own and operate any industrial enterprise without a special permit. And soon after Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov became a Senator, the Department of Manufactures, which had been in charge of various regulations and permits was closed down, on November 22, 1779 (O. S.), and absorbed by the College of Commerce. Moreover, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov had participated since 1763 in attempts to attract foreign nationals with industrial and commercial skills to Russia so as to facilitate his motherland's commercial and industrial development. Finally, by 1782, the Russian government had raised the rates on most manufactured goods to a level which provided a reasonable "degree of protection [which] was not... excessive."<sup>70</sup>

On balance, then, by 1782, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov had accomplished most of what he had set out to do. Although it may be only coincidental, the course followed by the Russian economy from 1773 through 1782, and the major economic policies implemented by Catherine II reflected his thinking and that of his father.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>Florinsky, Russia, I, 560-561. See also, reference to the Commerce Commission's deliberations on tariff questions between 1777 and 1782, Kommerts Komissia, Nos. 397-402, pp. 47-48; and A. R. Vorontsov, "Zapiska o raznykh sposobakh kak vvoziayye siuda tovary izvegaiut platzhe polozhennikh poshlin," AKV, XXVI, 241-248.

<sup>70</sup>Florinsky, Russia, I, 560-561. For A. R. Vorontsov's participation in attraction of foreign nationals to Russia since 1763 see, for example, "Spisok s ukaza Ekateriny II v inostrannuiu kallegiiu o posyike Fullertona v Angliiu dlia priglasheniia (Sekretno)," SIRIO, VII, 309-310.

<sup>71</sup>In this connection, we should consider the following statement by Clifford Foust, with special reference to the China trade, but also phrased more generally: "...it must always be remembered that some of the measures commonly associated with Catherine's reign and leadership come not so much from experiences accumulated in the decades before Catherine came to the throne. Her idea of free trade is one of these..." Foust, p. 273. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 159, 274-279. The question we must ask is, from where did Catherine get her ideas of free trade if not from the Vorontsovs, the Shuvalovs, and others like them?

## CHAPTER V

## RIDING THE CREST IN THE EIGHTIES

A. Opposition to Potemkin and Exclusion From Court

James W. Marcum, who recently concluded a study of the activities of Semen Romanovich Vorontsov when Alexander's younger brother was minister to England from 1785 to 1796, made a remarkable observation. He noted:

Although the notion is hypothetical, one thought has repeatedly presented itself in the course of this study. Alexander Vorontsov was the one man with the strength of will to oppose Potemkin during the 1780's. The Vorontsov-Bezborodko coalition was often at odds with Potemkin on issues. It would be entirely in keeping with the character and style of Catherine to suggest that she perhaps kept Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov close as a guarantee of her freedom of action. She could count on him to do something she was incapable of: to tell Potemkin no, and to check his unlimited ambition. It is consistent with this to note that the disgrace of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov and the displacement of Bezborodko followed soon after the demise of Potemkin in 1791. With Potemkin gone their power and influence became the threat that they had so long served to check. She then turned to a circle of younger men, i.e. Zubov; which she could dominate herself. As the Austrian minister observed, Zubov and Markov only executed the will of the Empress, who "feels less and less the need to consult her ministers."<sup>1</sup>

The friction which existed between Potemkin and members of the gentry

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<sup>1</sup>Marcum, p. 248, n. 7. He cites Alfred von Vivenot (ed.), Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs während der französischen revolutionskriege, 1790-1801 (5 vols.; III and IV edited by Heinrich Ritter von Zeissberg; Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1873-1890), III, 94, for the quotation in the last line. I cite this statement by Marcum because it offers a modus operandi for the remainder of this chapter in that it provides some ground for establishing A. R. Vorontsov's importance in foreign affairs as well as perspective for reevaluation of the relationship between A. R. Vorontsov and A. N. Radishchev. For an implication similar to the view expressed by Marcum, see Johann von Goerts, Mémoire sur la Russie (1786) (Edited by Wolfgang Stibrieny; Weisbaden: Otto Harassowitz, 1969), pp. 46-47.

such as the Vorontsovs and the Stroganovs is well-known. This mutual antagonism was further complicated by rifts among the members of the gentry themselves, as for example the persistence of the rivalry between the Vorontsovs and the Stroganovs.<sup>2</sup> It was further complicated by the proliferation of favorites which Catherine II took unto herself, a situation which led Dashkova to attempt to place her own son at Court as one of Catherine's paramours.<sup>3</sup>

Alexander Romanovich, as Lang noted, "had no time for boudoir politics." His estrangement from Court was largely because Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was:

a rich bachelor of independent character [who] disdained to pay homage to the Empress's reigning favourites and so was usually under a faint cloud of suspicion, as being a 'superior person' not quite in sympathy with prevailing trends in public affairs.<sup>4</sup>

It should also be remembered that Alexander Romanovich was away from the Court which was located in St. Petersburg whereas the duties of President of the Commerce College physically kept him at his offices in Moscow and Archangel. Whether this was designed by Catherine II to keep him from Court is as yet difficult to say with certainty. It is certain, however, that Vorontsov's official duties apart from any other considerations, caused him to look with disdain on the extravagances of the Russian Court, particularly those of Potemkin, which only served to weaken Russia and make

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<sup>2</sup>George Soloveyitchik, Potemkin: A Picture of Catherine's Russia (New York: W. W. Norton, 1947), p. 188.

<sup>3</sup>P. V. Zavadovskii had been a favorite of Catherine's during the 1770's. It is interesting to note that A. R. Vorontsov befriended many of Catherine's former favorites in the eighties and early nineties. In addition to Zavadovskii, among them were Gregorly Orlov, A. I. Morkov and Ermolov.

<sup>4</sup>Lang, Radical, p. 91.

Vorontsov's job much more difficult in a period of financial crisis.<sup>5</sup>

## B. Foreign Policies and Problems

Perhaps that is one of the reasons Alexander Romanovich sought to enter the realm of foreign affairs, albeit indirectly. Thus, although Semen Romanovich, after his appointment as minister to London in 1784 devoted little time to commercial affairs,<sup>6</sup> Alexander Romanovich became increasingly involved in Russian diplomacy. Indeed, as Mikhail Garnovskii, a contemporary court figure brought into service by Potemkin, put it in 1787:

...the old system can be observed in the direction of many affairs. Count [Alexander Romanovich] Vorontsov dictates; Count Bezborodko writes and carries [papers] to be signed.<sup>7</sup>

Alexander Romanovich had not only, by 1782, stabilized the ruble, promoted freer trade within the borders of Russia, and aided the development of industry in many ways (including the preparation of the tariff of 1782), but had developed a system of consuls as commercial agents of the Commerce College who might also be useful instruments in diplomatic affairs. Between 1781 and 1783, even while he was away from the Court in St. Petersburg, he worked together with A. A. Bezborodko, P. V. Zavadovskii and, later, Alexander's brother, Semen Romanovich. Together they constituted an "Austrian Party" which abandoned the "Northern System" of Count N. I. Panin in favor of what seems to have resembled somewhat the policy of Mikhail

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 96-97; Ségur, II, 397.

<sup>6</sup>Marcum, p. 114.

<sup>7</sup>Garnovskii, RS (1876) XV, 691. Compare with Griffith's view that Vorontsov "wielded no effective power during Catherine's reign," Griffiths, "Rise," Canadian Slavic Studies (1970), p. 568. One might ask what is meant by the implied distinction between "effective" versus "ineffective" power, the latter being a concept some might describe as a non-sequiters.

Illarionovich Vorontsov. Indeed, as early as 1781, it appeared as though Bezborodko was on the surface the central figure in the group because he was in charge of the detailed administration of foreign affairs and thereby had contact with Catherine II.<sup>8</sup>

Even within the "Austrian Party" there were differences. For example, although all viewed Austria as the pivot of their policy which was based on a Russo-Austrian defensive alliance, Semen considered it necessary for this alliance to be supported by England because, in his view, English trade was essential to Russia, and France and Prussia both represented dangerous threats to his motherland.<sup>9</sup> Semen, moreover, felt this way even before the outbreak of the French Revolution, and even in spite of his awareness that the English were working behind the scenes to undermine Russian interests. Thus, on August 19/30, 1788 he stated that both England and Prussia were "underhandedly against us." Later, he complained, "we have lost England; but for all that, have we gained France?" The only possibility that France would ally herself with Russia and Austria was "if England makes overtures to Prussia," Semen wrote, but although England had already done so, France was still reluctant because of "bad will" based on the Turkish situation at the time. On August 30/September 10, Semen was still trying to convince Alexander Romanovich of the inadvisability of forging a Russian link with France. Semen wrote:

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<sup>8</sup>Nikolai I. Grigorovich, "Kantsler kniaz Aleksandr Bezborodko v sriazi s sobytiami ego vremeni, Chast I, 1747-1787 gg.," SIRIO, XXVI, 72-85. Griffiths wrote as follows: "By 1779 [James] Harris considered Panin his antagonist and expended great effort to have him supplanted by the apparently more pliable Prince Potemkin," Griffiths, "Panin," SR, XXVIII, 11.

<sup>9</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, June 2, 1789 (N. S.), AKV, IX, 143-144; February 2/13, 1790, *ibid.*, pp. 166-167; December 2/13, 1791, *ibid.*, pp. 225-229.

This nation is actually more foolish than ever. The king is an imbecile...without talent and without resolution.... He speaks of liberty, of a constitution, of finances, without understanding. It will all end in general confusion and perhaps by a civil war.<sup>10</sup>

Still trying to convince Alexander Romanovich that a French alliance would be disadvantageous, Semen wrote on September 2/13 that "in spite of all their [the French] pretenses of friendship and all their beautiful phrases [designed] to captivate us, she is and always will be against us...." Later, he compared the value to Russia of England and France, and concluded, "I am convinced that this country [England] has more natural rapport with us than [does] France."<sup>11</sup>

Although we have none of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's letters to Semen for this period, the force with which the minister to England was writing to his older brother suggests that Alexander Romanovich, as late as 1788 was still strongly considering a French alliance. Earlier, in 1784, Alexander Romanovich had alluded to this possibility when, in a letter to Semen, the President of the Commerce College had warned his younger brother that England often sacrificed its European allies, and categorically stated that it would be "disadvantageous to be committed to England." Emphasizing the importance of the Austrian alliance, he noted that an Anglo-Russian detente would only irritate France and make matters worse for Austria. "Our situation is such," he wrote, "by our friendship with the Court of Vienna, that we both would only weaken that tie by seeking other allies.... It is true that there is much aversion to France here...but for all that [the Empress] is determined that we will not be driven close to England."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, August 19/30, 1788, August 30/September 10, 1788, *ibid.*, pp. 133-138.

<sup>11</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, September 2/13, 1788, *ibid.*, pp. 138-140.

<sup>12</sup>A. R. to S. R. Vorontsov, June 3/14, 1784, *ibid.*, XXXI, 438-441.

The allegiance of Alexander Romanovich to the Franco-Austro-Russian system of his uncle was apparently so well known that, in 1788, when frictions at the Russian Court developed between Potemkin and his followers in opposition to the "Austrian Party," it was rumored that Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov wished to give up the presidency of the Commerce College and instead be appointed as minister to France.<sup>13</sup>

It was the French Revolution, however, which led Alexander Romanovich to abandon dreams of closer ties between France and Russia. For just as an alliance with France was based on the notion that Prussia, or England -- or both, represented a threat; so, if France became a threat, then an alliance with Prussia, or England -- or both, became advisable. Consequently, it has been said that the Prussian minister to St. Petersburg, Goltz, reported to his government on September 21/October 2, 1789 that "even Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, who was at 'the head of the Austrian party' was convinced that Russia should return to the Prussian alliance, and had so warned his brother in London."<sup>14</sup>

On his part, as early as September, 1789, Semen expressed his opposition to the French Revolution. In November, 1792, he suggested a coalition against France consisting of Prussia, Russia, and England; and in August of that year he had referred to "the horrors committed by this abominable French nation." In January, 1793, he bemoaned the fate of Louis XVI,

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<sup>13</sup>Garnovskii, *RS* (1876), XV, 488; XVI, 231. Potemkin's expansionist designs included efforts to modernize and fortify the Crimea, which were distrusted by Austria. Consequently, the Vorontsovs, including Semen, opposed Potemkin's efforts to colonize the Crimea with convicts, build towns and cities there and improve the region's agriculture and industry, Soloveytchik, p. 186.

<sup>14</sup>Bronislaw Dembinski (ed.), Documents relatifs à l'histoire du deuxième et troisième partage de la Pologne, Vol. I (only volume published), 1788-1791 (Leopol: Société de Propagation des Travaux Scientifiques, 1902), pp. 245-246, cited in Marcum, pp. 156-157, and n.

referring to him as "this unfortunate prince." In August, 1793, he stated his desire to reestablish monarchy in France as the only way to end the anarchy that exists there, and referred to the French people as "a nation that has neither morals nor religion." In April, 1797, he favorably compared the France of Charlemagne with that of Louis XVI -- and called the French Revolution "a fatal example for all governments that give way to rebels."<sup>15</sup> Prussia's immediate response to the French Revolution, however, put a damper on any contemplated friendly moves on the part of Russia toward its German neighbor. As Bezborodko observed, Prussia's enemies, Sweden, Turkey, and Poland, drove Russia, slowly but surely, into the English camp.<sup>16</sup>

Indeed, by 1791, England loomed on the horizon as Russia's most desirable ally against France. As Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov wrote to Bezborodko in a memorandum on the French Revolution, "only England...gazes indifferently" on the events in France. Because England was "the policeman of the French sea" she could afford herself relative tranquility when compared to the concern in other European Courts. As for France, Vorontsov stated his belief that unless the French National Assembly saw to it that Louis XVI, his wife and family were freed, European courts should not and would not establish formal relations with the new French government.<sup>17</sup>

In this way, Alexander Romanovich, who was at first disposed towards the system of his uncle, began to move toward that which had been espoused

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<sup>15</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, September 29/October 10, 1789, AKV, IX, 156-160; November 7/18, 1792, *ibid.*, pp. 269-272; August 31/September 11, 1792, *ibid.*, pp. 258-261; January 10/21, 1793, *ibid.*, pp. 293-294; August 19/30, 1793, *ibid.*, pp. 317-321; April 10/21, 1797, *ibid.*, X, 10-11.

<sup>16</sup>Grigorovich, SIRIO, XXVI, 416-420.

<sup>17</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Zapiska grafa A. R. Vorontsov k grafu A. A. Bezborodke po povodu Frantsuzskoi revoliutsii" (1791), AKV, IX, 501-503.

by Chancellor Bestuzhev in the 1740's, this shift being engendered by the pressure of events over which Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov had no control. As pragmatic in foreign policy as he was in economic matters, he saw no conflict in achieving a detente with England if France was the enemy. But relations with the major powers of Europe were secondary considerations throughout the reign of Catherine II, and represented necessary corollaries to the chief foreign concerns of Russia in the second half of the eighteenth century namely, Poland, Turkey and Sweden. The physical position of Austria made that Court a natural rival and desirable ally in Russia's two Turkish wars (1768-1774 and 1787-1792), and in three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793 and 1795). To this end, a secret Austro-Russian Alliance had been signed in May, 1781.<sup>18</sup> This alliance was preceded by discussions in the Commerce Commission about trade with Trieste in 1780; and was followed in 1782 by conclusion of a trade agreement with Rome.<sup>19</sup>

Prussia's location afforded her a similar role in Russia's Polish and Swedish policies. Despite a Russo-Prussian Alliance from 1768-1788, however, relations between the two powers had steadily deteriorated. The straw that broke the camel's back was Prussia's support, however meagre, of Sweden in the Russo-Swedish War of 1788-1790.<sup>20</sup>

Just as Austria and Prussia were continental rivals, France and England were world-wide competitors during the eighteenth century. Consistent

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<sup>18</sup> Florinsky, Russia, I, 528. For the terms of the treaty which was designed to maintain the status quo in Poland, to weaken Turkey, and precipitated Catherine's "Greek Project," see Fedor Fedorovich Martens (ed.), Sobranie traktatov i konventsii zakliuchennykh Rossieiu s inostrannymi derzhavami (15 vols.; SPb.: Tip. Ministerstva putel soobshcheniia [A. Banks], 1874-1909), II, 240-245.

<sup>19</sup> Kommersts Komissia, Nos. 257, 258, p. 32.

<sup>20</sup> Florinsky, Russia, I, 514-532.

French support of the Turks against the Russians, except for the brief Franco-Russian rapprochement during the 1750's when the Turkish front was quiet, operated against any serious consideration of France as a permanent ally of Russia. Nevertheless, on January 11, 1787 (N. S.), Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov had succeeded in concluding a commercial agreement with France.<sup>21</sup>

The British government was, at that time, in the process of discussing renewal of its commercial treaty of 1766 with Russia and was, therefore, irritated by this apparent Franco-Russian rapport. Negotiations proceeded slowly also because of mutual distrust. The Russian government was suspicious of Britain's signs of friendship to, among others, Prussia and Sweden in the late 1780's. And the British government on its part had been opposed to such notions as Panin's abortive plan for a "Northern System" in the late 1760's; the fruition of Potemkin's project for an "Armed Neutrality" in 1780; and Catherine II's "chimerical" Greek Project of the 1780's.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 530. Trade relations had proceeded on a fragmentary level with France since 1773, as shown in Kommerts Kollegia, Nos. 394-398, p. 67; and inquiries about the possibility of a commercial agreement dated back to 1784, Kommerts Komissia, No. 298, p. 37. See also Ehrman, pp. 108-109.

<sup>22</sup>Panin's plan, originated in 1764 by Russia's minister to Denmark, Baron Korf, was to include Russia, Prussia, Denmark, England, Poland and Sweden in a defensive alliance against France and Austria, according to Florinsky, Russia, I, 515-516, 526, who called it an "academic scheme" as it never got off the ground. For a more recent view, see the following analysis: "The Northern System had been predicated on peace and maintenance of the status quo, but Catherine's new expansionist plans, adopted late in 1780 and early 1781, called for a military equilibrium rather than a general peace," Griffiths, "Panin," SR (1969), p. 24. For a recent study on the "Armed Neutrality" and the significance of Russia's declaration, directed primarily against England, that a neutral flag offered protection to enemy cargoes on the seas, see Isabel de Madariaga, Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). For the "Greek Project" designed to drive Turkey from Europe and to create a kingdom of "Dacia" out of Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia under the rule of Potemkin until Catherine's grandson Constantine was old enough to rule, see, e.g., Florinsky, Russia, I, 527-528, 534, 541. This has been challenged as a project filled with "illusions and phantoms" which "never

A number of factors operated to speed the progress of these negotiations after 1789. First and perhaps foremost was the violent course of the French Revolution from 1789 to 1793. Another significant influence was the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War in 1792 with Russia's annexation of Ochakov as part of the settlement, an event which alarmed Europeans who feared Russian entry into the Mediterranean Sea. Perhaps the final blow was the second partition of Poland which was affected by the Russo-Prussian agreement of March 1793. These factors coupled with the "Regency Crisis" in London led to the conclusion in that same month of a preliminary Anglo-Russian commercial treaty renewing the agreement of 1766 which was to be followed in 1795 by a military convention which, in the opinion of P. V. Zavadovskii, would help speed up the third partition of Poland.<sup>23</sup>

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existed in reality" by E. Hösch, "Das sogenannte 'griechische Projekt' Katharinas II," Jahrbücher f. Geschichte Osteuropas N. F. XII (July, 1964), p. 169 and by O. P. Markova, "O proiskhozhdenii tak nazyvaemogo grecheskogo proekta 80-e gody XVIII v.," Istoriia SSSR, No. 4 (July-August, 1958), pp. 52-78. Markova bases her view on correspondence between Catherine II and Joseph of Austria. Compare with Griffiths, "Panin," SR (1969), p. 24 and, by the same author, "Commercial Diplomacy," William and Mary Quarterly (1970), pp. 400, 410 who rests his case for Panin's downfall between 1779 and 1781 on Catherine's expansionist plans in the Crimea. A. R. Vorontsov apparently was aware that Catherine II's Greek Project was a "chimerical" plan, according to A. M. Stanislavskaja, Russko-Angliiskie otnosheniia i problemy Sredizemnomoria (1798-1801) (M.: Akademiia Nauk, 1962), p. 55 and n.

<sup>23</sup>The Russian government kept the President of the Commerce College informed on the progress of the Second Turkish War as described in Arkhiv Gosudarstvennago Soveta (1768-1826) [hereafter cited as AGS] (5 vols. in 9 books; St. Petersburg: V tipografia vtorago otdeleniia sobstvennoi E. I. V. Kantseliaria, 1869-1904), I, pt. 1, August 31/September 11, 1787, p. 459; November 8/19, 1787, p. 493; December 14-16/25-27, 1788, p. 640; and January 2/13, 1789, p. 657 in which Zavadovskii, Bezborodko and A. R. Vorontsov weigh the significance of the Ochakov situation. Semen Romanovich in a series of letters attempted to use the Ochakov situation as a means of facilitating closer relations with England, one of his chief goals since 1786, S. R. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov, August 16/27, 1786, AKV, IX, 69-70; August 19/30, 1788, pp. 133-137; March 18/29, 1791, pp. 189-190; April 15/26, 1791, pp. 193-197; July 2/13, 1791, p. 202; September 19/30, 1791, pp. 212-213. By obtaining the fortress of Ochakov on the shores of the Black Sea, Russia stabilized her Turkish border at the expense of Turkey whose government now recognized Russian annexation of the Crimea; but Russia's

A. R. Vorontsov's support of both the second and third partitions of Poland may be attributed to his fear of the spreading of the excesses of the French Revolution. Poland in the eighteenth century was like an eleventh century state.<sup>24</sup> Its weaknesses (economic, political and social) partly because it had no strong central authority and partly because there was no indigenous middle class of which to speak,<sup>25</sup> made it seem necessary to shore it up as a buffer against the ideological and potential military onslaught of the ongoing French Revolution. In 1763, rather than desiring partition of Poland, Panin and Catherine merely wished to keep Poland a vassal in the "Northern System" but, acceding to Austrian demands and later Prussian fears, the first partition occurred in 1773.<sup>26</sup> In a lengthy memorandum of 1787, A. I. Morkov of the diplomatic corps informed A. R. Vorontsov of French attempts to install agents in Poland.<sup>27</sup> By 1792, largely because of the French Revolution, it seemed advantageous to obtain more of Poland to serve

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boundary on the Black Sea directed English support to Turkey for the next century and more. For Zavadovskii's comment, see P. V. Zavadovskii to A. R. Vorontsov January 6/17, 1795, AKV, XII, 144-145. He wrote: "We have signed the alliance with England, helping our fleet in the spring, [on which] our land troops will be depending for help in order to conclude Polish affairs." Curiously, Marcum, p. 330, refers to a letter from Zavadovskii to A. R. Vorontsov dated February 7/18, 1795 in which the former stated a totally different view, as follows: "The alliance with England is ratified and your brother is immensely pleased. In the future [it] will be useful to us, but not now; in the present situation it is advantageous only to England and is a present to the ministry," AKV, XII, 153. I have been unable to locate the letter, as there is none of that date, or with that sentiment in any other. For A. R. Vorontsov's views in May, 1794, see "Zapiska grafa A. R. Vorontsova k grafu A. A. Bezborodke o nashikh delakh v Polshu," AKV, IX, 508-511.

<sup>24</sup>Rambeau, II, 186-187.

<sup>25</sup>Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 182.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>27</sup>Morkov to A. R. Vorontsov, February 17/28, 1787, AKV, XIV, 242.

as a buffer against any foreign attack from the west. According to V. P. Kochubei, nephew of A. A. Bezborodko, at that time Catherine II wished to free her hands for action in Poland.<sup>28</sup> Soon afterward, Bezborodko, Zavadovskii, Morkov and A. R. Vorontsov communicated on this matter. By August, 1793, Morkov informed S. R. Vorontsov of A. R. Vorontsov's approval of the second partition of Poland.<sup>29</sup> By that time, Catherine II is said to have secretly been pleased at the prospect of partition, but "she hesitated to express clearly her opinion."<sup>30</sup> By May, 1794, after the second partition had been effectuated, and soon after A. R. Vorontsov's retirement from official state service had been approved, he clearly expressed his support of a third partition because of his fear that the French Revolution could spread to Russia via Poland.<sup>31</sup>

A. R. Vorontsov's influence in these policy matters, however, is not clear. Although Bezborodko, who succeeded Panin, has been characterized as "a tool in the hands of Potemkin,"<sup>32</sup> there is every reason to believe that

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<sup>28</sup>Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, Autumn?, 1792, *ibid.*, XVIII, 57-58.

<sup>29</sup>Morkov to S. R. Vorontsov, July 27/August 7, 1793, *ibid.*, XX, 48. For the correspondence of Bezborodko, Zavadovskii, Morkov and A. R. Vorontsov noted above, see *ibid.*, IX, 235, 242, 246.

<sup>30</sup>Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1915), p. 377.

<sup>31</sup>"Zapiska grafa A. R. Vorontsova k grafu A. A. Bezborodke o nashikh delakh v Polshu," AKV, IX, 510. See also, Stanislavskaja, pp. 91-93.

<sup>32</sup>Florinsky, Russia, I, 514. See also, Griffiths, "Panin," SR (1969), pp. 11, 24; and Griffiths, "Commercial Diplomacy," William and Mary Quarterly (1970), pp. 400, 410. Although Panin's influence began to wane in 1772, with the partition of Poland and the restoration of the pro-French king in Sweden, which Panin's system had failed to block, he wielded influence until 1779. His decline was hastened by movement towards the Austrian alliance of 1781, Griffiths, "Rise," Canadian Slavic Studies (Fall, 1970), pp. 550, 554, 557: Although A. R. Vorontsov and Panin may have disagreed on certain substantive matters, e.g., Vorontsov favored an Austrian alliance which Panin opposed, Alexander Romanovich has been considered a protégé of Panin's partly because of family relationships, and partly because he served under the latter in the 1760's and learned from him, Karnovich, Lichnosti, pp. 230-231.

Panin's successor worked closely with Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov. Indeed, Mikhail Garnovskii, a contemporary court figure described Vorontsov and Bezborodko as close friends who had confidence in one another and depended on each other for advice and assistance in the late 1780's.<sup>33</sup> In keeping with this view, a biographical sketch of Platon Zubov, Catherine's last youthful lover, contains the following statement concerning the years 1789-1791: "At the head of the diplomatic corps was found then a strong triumvirate: A. A. Bezborodko, gr. A. R. Vorontsov and P. V. Zavadovskii."<sup>34</sup>

Almost a decade before, in 1783, there occurred two events which seem to have represented a critical moment in the personal life and professional career of A. R. Vorontsov. As Panin passed away in that year, A. R. Vorontsov may have felt freer to attempt to use his influence more actively. At the end of the same year, there occurred the death of Alexander's father, Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov. Consequently, Alexander Romanovich had to settle Roman's affairs and devote a good deal of time and effort to management of the Vorontsov properties. Moreover, Roman's death may have resulted in assuaging whatever fears Catherine II might still have harbored that the Vorontsovs might lead a movement to have her overthrown. Earlier, with Roman's death imminent, in the spring of 1783, Alexander Romanovich was appointed to a commission for the improvement of state finances.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Garnovskii, RS (1876), XV, 691, 488; XVI, 231. See also, above, this chapter, n. 7 and related text, and Goertz, pp. 46-47.

<sup>34</sup>P. P.(?) "Kniaz Platon Aleksandrovich Zubov, 1767-1822," RS (1876), XVI, 600. Zavadovskii noted the displacement of the triumvirate by Zubov and Morkov, Zavadovskii to S. R. Vorontsov, January 27/February 7, 1792, AKV, XII, 75, 78.

<sup>35</sup>Other members of the commission were Procurator-General A. A. Viazemskii, A. P. Shuvalov and A. A. Bezborodko. They completed their work in "less than four weeks," and presented their measures to combat inflation by May 1/12, 1783, Chechulin, p. 333.

Soon after, in June of 1783, a lucrative Russo-American trade was begun. Indirect trading in tobacco based on merchant contacts and with England as an entrepot had begun in 1697 or soon thereafter.<sup>36</sup> Although the tobacco trade died down after 1700, by 1775 a rich trade developed, bringing American furs to Russia and Russian "iron, hemp, cordage, sailcloth and other fine linens" to the colonies. Indeed, "without Russia's hempen hawsers and rope, her flax sails and fittings and fastenings made from her iron, our sailing vessels would have been immobile piles of lumber."<sup>37</sup> This trade, too, provided a balance of trade favorable to Russia.<sup>38</sup> No wonder, then, that A. R. Vorontsov in October, 1803, in an interview with Levett Harris, U. S. Consul in St. Petersburg "voiced satisfaction at the rising state of the commerce with America."<sup>39</sup>

When one compares the hostility of Catherine the Great toward the newly established United States of America<sup>40</sup> with the highly developed trade that existed in the seventies and eighties, one cannot help suspecting that A. R. Vorontsov favored and helped promote either the private or the formal trade between Russia and the United States, which began when Captain Daniel McNeill entered the Port of Riga in June, 1783.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Crosby, p. 5.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., pp. 14-15.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>39</sup>Letters to Secretary of State (25 October, 27 October, 5/17 November, 1803). Philadelphia: National Archives, Consular Dispatches - St. Petersburg, Vol. 1, cited in Crosby, p. 94.

<sup>40</sup>Florinsky, Russia, I, 530; Ehrman, p. 95.

<sup>41</sup>David M. Griffiths, "An American Contribution to the Armed Neutrality of 1780" [hereafter cited as Griffiths, "Neutrality"], Russian Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 (April, 1971), p. 172. As early as May 17, 1781 (N. S.), Francis Dana speculated that Russia was "favorably disposed towards us, at present, tho' upon this point I shall be better able to form a judgment, when I am

In the same year, Semen Romanovich Vorontsov was appointed to Venice, in connection with preparing the way for the "Greek Project" of Catherine II.<sup>42</sup> In the following year, 1784, after Roman's death, Alexander Romanovich succeeded in having Semen transferred to London as minister to England, this goal being accomplished by the intermediation of Bezborodko who gained the

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upon the ground," Francis Dana to Arthur Lee, May 17, 1781 (N. S.), Dana Papers, EM503, MSS. Div., N.Y.P.L. Dana was the accredited but unrecognized American Minister to Russia from 1781 to 1783. Panin and Arvid Wittfooth, Swedish born Russian consul in Bordeaux, favored Russo-American trade, but others opposed it, fearing competition. A. R. Vorontsov's view at the time is not yet known; but it is known that in a document one of whose signers was A. N. Radishchev, the Commerce College declined to pass judgment on the question, Griffiths, "Commercial Diplomacy," William and Mary Quarterly (1970), pp. 394-402. The catalogued records of the activities of the Commerce College show little evidence of interest.

<sup>42</sup>Semen Romanovich had participated in the signing of the Treaty of Kiuchuk-Kainardzhii which had ended the First Russo-Turkish War, as stated by Elena I. Drushinina, Kiuchuk-Kainardzhinski mir, 1774 goda: Ego podgotovka i zakliuchenie (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1955), p. 270. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the year in which Semen received this honor, which some might consider a kind of restoration to favor, was the year following Alexander's appointment to the Presidency of the Commerce College. From 1776 to 1782, after a brief return to a military career, Semen retired to private life, according to Marcus, pp. 15-37. Moreover, in 1782, because "Catherine II needed [Semen] Vorontsov [she] took some pains to carefully woo him to her service" so that she could use his knowledge of the Italian language and knowledge of Greco-Turkish affairs in connection with the promotion of Greek uprisings in the event of war with Turkey in 1783-1784, a task for which she offered Semen 10,000 rubles per year (pp. 22, 31, 34-35, 37-41). Moreover, P. V. Zavadovskii and A. A. Bezborodko kept Semen informed on the possibility of war with Turkey in late 1783 and early 1784, as shown in Zavadovskii to S. R. Vorontsov, September 19/30, 1783 and February 6/17, 1784, AKV, XIII, 23, 28 respectively, and Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, August 22/September 2, 1783 and February 7/18, 1784, *ibid.*, XIII, 40-41, 45-46 respectively. It must be remembered that, whether the "Greek Project" was genuinely expansionist or merely a "bluff," it did succeed in arousing British concern, which had existed since 1774, Saul, pp. 8-9; Drushinina, pp. 278-307; Stanislavskaja, pp. 23-24. Other considerations, however, operated against Russian expansion in the Black Sea area during most of the 1780's. Among these were: fear that foreign aggression might weaken the internal position of tsarism; harm to the serf economy because of the need for recruits and increased taxes; a pro-Baltic orientation on the part of many, e.g. S. R. Vorontsov; and a reluctance to interrupt Turkish trade, *ibid.*, pp. 50-51, 56-57, 59-63, 70-76.

consent of the Empress for the proposal.<sup>43</sup>

Throughout Semen's stay in England the influence of Alexander Romanovich was beneficial. Almost immediately upon Semen's arrival in London he contacted James Harris, former ambassador to Russia, who promised to show him around the city before the Englishman had to depart on a journey.<sup>44</sup> A few days later he was contacted by Mr. Baxter the consul in London for the Commerce College.<sup>45</sup> Before two weeks had passed he had been introduced to William Pitt the Younger, who noted that his (Pitt's) father had been very good friends with Alexander Romanovich who was held in "very high esteem"; to "Lord Sydney, who in your time was called Townson [Townshend] and is related to Charles Townshend" who remembered Alexander well; and to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Lord Shelbourne. These contacts "and all others" were a result of "being your brother and your being the friend of [James] Harris."<sup>46</sup> Semen wrote to Bezborodko that in July he had been invited to

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<sup>43</sup>The published papers of the Vorontsovs are rich in connection with Semen's transfer from Venice to London which was occasioned by the peaceful conclusion of Russo-Turkish discussions in 1784. As Bezborodko put it to Semen, Alexander "writes to you of every detail," Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, February 7/18, 1784, *ibid.*, XIII, 45. After Semen's wife died in early 1784, P. V. Zavadovskii urged him to return to Russia, Zavadovskii to S. R. Vorontsov, August 6/17, 1785, *ibid.*, XII, 30-31. Earlier, in March, 1784, Bezborodko had offered Semen the position of minister to the Court of St. James, a post to which Catherine had agreed to send Semen on March 14/25, 1784, Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, March 15/26, 1784, *ibid.*, XIII, 47-48. Semen chose to follow his brother's advice, although it took him a year until April, 1785 to depart for London. See for example, A. R. to S. R. Vorontsov, May 4/15, 1784 and September 14/25, 1784, *ibid.*, XXXI, 434-436 and 452-453, respectively; and S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, September 5/16, 1784 and March 17/28, 1785, *ibid.*, IX, 8 and 30-31 respectively.

<sup>44</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, June 10, 1785 (N. S.), *ibid.*, p. 39, wrote, "I have been here for three days...Mr. Harris remains here for eight days, and he will...show me the sights in this city."

<sup>45</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, June 3/14, 1785, *ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>46</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, June 13/24, 1785, *ibid.*, pp. 39-40. Sir James Harris, Earl of Malmesbury had met Alexander Romanovich when Vorontsov was minister to the Hague in 1765. Harris was British minister to St. Peters-

a small dinner party at the home of Lord Carmarthen, with Pitt and James Harris, who had returned to London, the only other guests. All seemed to favor an Anglo-Russian alliance, the conclusion of which they agreed would be difficult because of Austria.<sup>47</sup>

James Harris disagreed with Semen's evaluation of their meeting of the minds. One month later, writing to Lord Carmarthen from the Hague, Harris expressed incredulity at Semen's steadfast position, and urged Carmarthen to be cautious. Harris wrote:

I am dissatisfied with [Semen] Woronzow. Why, if so well inclined as he professes himself, such a manifest predilection for Austria? Why cannot a good Russian be English as well as Austrian? I wish the whole of his conduct be not part of a very dangerous plan, - a League, indeed, between the two Imperial Courts and France.

Russia is the first dupe in this plan; Austria, the second; and France has the lion's share. At all events, we cannot move with too much precaution.<sup>48</sup>

Although Semen was not accepted unqualifiedly by the British, nor was he as yet any match for the keen and seasoned Harris, the Russian minister could learn. Indeed, throughout his sojourn in England he learned from and was instructed by his older brother, Alexander Romanovich. This was true with regard to political and diplomatic posture as well as on technical

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burg from 1776 to 1783. Curiously, there is little reference to Vorontsov, apart from noting that the Vorontsovs were opposed to Potemkin who was very good friends with Harris, e.g., Harris to Lord Grantham, November 8/19, 1782, in James Harris, Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury [hereafter cited as Harris, Diaries] (Edited by his Grandson, 2 vols.; London: Richard Bentley, 1844), II, 13.

<sup>47</sup>S. R. Vorontsov to Bezborodko, July 21/August 1, 1785, AKV, IX 423-425.

<sup>48</sup>James Harris to Lord Carmarthen, August 9, 1785 (N. S.), in Harris, Diaries, II, 132. See also Harris to Carmarthen, November 8, 1785 (N. S.), where Harris wrote: "[Semen] Woronzow cannot be such a fool as to believe what he says, or think us such fools as not to see that Russia wants to change her system, and fix on England the charge of mutability....Woronzow believe[s] everything but the truth," *ibid.*, p. 166

matters; and, in addition, Semen sent his brother information helpful to the Commerce College.<sup>49</sup>

### C. Anglo-Russian Commercial Negotiations

The estimate made by Harris of the "dangerous plan" in which Semen was a participant was undoubtedly the result of his earlier contacts with Alexander Romanovich who, as noted earlier, favored such a union of Russia, France and Austria. But this was only one possibility that presented itself to Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov; and one that he knew would be difficult to achieve. At the same time, then, that Alexander Romanovich worked for closer diplomatic ties with France, his major task as President of the Commerce College in the 1780's was to negotiate a commercial treaty with England which contained more favorable conditions for Russia than those existing in the commercial treaty of 1766. Indeed, as Alleyne Fitzherbert, who succeeded Harris as British minister to St. Petersburg, wrote to Carmarthen in January, 1787, it was not so much that Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was hostile to Britain. It was that Alexander Romanovich was "determined to redress" the terms of the treaty of 1766, a goal which, for some time, he believed himself "'bound in Honor'" to try to achieve.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Even before Semen's arrival in London, he had asked Alexander Romanovich for information concerning the Anglo-Russian commercial agreement of 1766, e.g., S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, January 13/24, 1785 and March 14/25, 1785, AKV, IX, 22-23 and 29, respectively. In another letter (undated, 1785), *ibid.*, p. 31, Semen discussed the role of Baxter, the Russian consul in London and noted that James Harris had already contacted him from the Hague and had indicated a desire to see him. Before Semen left Pisa for London he noted that he had met with an Italian named Ferrieri whose brother had been a Russian consul on the Italian Peninsula, and who had made a commercial agreement with David W. Sutherland, a British speculator and adventurer, S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, April 2/13, 1785, *ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>50</sup> Fitzherbert to Carmarthen, No. 5, January 13, 1787, F. O. 65/15, cited in Ehrman, p. 110, n. 3.

Russia had signed its first commercial treaty with any foreign nation in 1734 with England. Although England had remained Russia's biggest customer for the next half-century, and notwithstanding Russia's favorable balance of trade, Alexander Vorontsov had long been chagrined by the fact that British merchants had been granted special trading rights in Russia whereas Russian merchants in England received no specific privileges and were bound by the laws of the land including the Navigation Acts.<sup>51</sup>

Even before the terms of the commercial agreement were renewed by the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty of 1766 which contained essentially the same provisions,<sup>52</sup> the Elder Pitt had approached Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, in 1764, about a union of Prussia, Russia, and England, "the asylum of Europe against the united ambitions of the Bourbon and Austrian houses." But, as Pitt's biographer pointed out, the "bait" was not taken.<sup>53</sup> This overture was based on the belief that "in diplomacy as in trade the

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<sup>51</sup>For the text of the treaty, see Douglas K. Reading, The Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), "Appendix". For a brief discussion of the implications of the terms of this treaty for the negotiations of the 1780's, see Ehrman, pp. 97-100. A. R. Vorontsov had been chagrined by the position of Russian merchants abroad since 1759, Zaozerskii, pp. 128-129.

<sup>52</sup>The treaty of 1766 had been negotiated by George Macartney who came to St. Petersburg in 1764 for that purpose, George Macartney, The Private Correspondence of Lord Macartney (Edited by C. Collins Davies, vol. LXXVII of the Camden Third Series; London: Royal Historical Society, 1950), p. vii. For an evaluation, see Ehrman, p. 98. For the view that England needed Russia more than Russia needed England - but that Russia did not know it, see Knud Rahbek-Schmidt, "The Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Russia, 1776. A Study on the development of Count Panin's Northern System," Scandinavica (1954), pp. 133, 134. It is interesting to note the author's view that Buckingham blundered badly in his dealings with M. I. Vorontsov in 1763, whereafter A. R. Vorontsov was sent to England as a messenger in the negotiations which ultimately brought Macartney back to Russia in 1764, *ibid.*, pp. 127, 133.

<sup>53</sup>"Chatham MSS, 6, draft of a letter in French," cited in Basil Williams, The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), II, 226.

two countries were complementary," an assumption which "survived -- even flourished in -- the uncertain currents of European politics for the best part of fifty years." Although this view had been "disturbed" by Russian expansionism in the seventies, it had not been "shaken" until the "Armed Neutrality of 1780 shocked and impressed British opinion, to a point where the almost instinctive, if vague, feelings of friendship for Russia could no longer be taken for granted."<sup>54</sup>

British suspicions were further aroused when, as James Harris noted in June of 1783, Potemkin had entered the Crimea, and, as part of Catherine's "Greek Project" planned to seize Ochakov and provoke a war with Turkey. In July, Harris noted that Catherine II was "exceedingly angry" when Louis XVI of France opposed her course of action, arguing that the success of such a war was at best uncertain and might produce "serious and 'incalculable' consequences."<sup>55</sup> Bezborodko and Semen Romanovich (who it will be remembered is said to have been sent by Catherine II to Venice in 1783 to promote local uprisings in connection with her "Greek Project" in the event of war with Turkey)<sup>56</sup> were all overjoyed at the peaceful conclusion of the matter. In February, 1784, Bezborodko wrote to Semen Romanovich as follows:

I have recently been informed, my dear sir, that Count Alexander Romanovich writes to you in all particulars. I will not stop you from expressing either your joy, which is occasioned by our peaceful conclusion of our affairs with the Porte, or [from expressing] your gratitude for how the

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<sup>54</sup>Khrnan, p. 95. See also, Matthew S. Anderson, Britain's Discovery of Russia, 1553-1815 (London: MacMillan and Co., 1958), chapters 4-5.

<sup>55</sup>Harris to Fox, May 26/June 6, 1783 and June 30/July 11, 1783, in Harris, Diaries, II, 46-47 and 48-49, respectively. Even if the "Greek Project" was a "ploy" (see above, this chapter, n. 22), it obviously was believed by some at the time.

<sup>56</sup>See above, this chapter, n. 42.

Empress [and I] permitted you to participate  
in this affair....<sup>57</sup>

Since Bezborodko and Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov were working at cross-purposes to those of the Empress who failed to achieve her goal, the evidence suggests that the "Austrian Party" had its own plans and program for the course of Russian foreign policy. In addition to a coalition of Russia, Austria and France, it seems to have desired peace and commerce with all nations. Until the 1780's Russia's only commercial treaties had been with Britain (1734 and 1766). In order to break the British stranglehold on Russian commerce, and in an effort to obtain more advantageous terms when the time for renewal of the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty arrived in 1786, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov had been busy seeking to negotiate commercial treaties with other nations. Thus, while Potemkin and Catherine II sought to foment a Turkish War in 1783 but had succeeded only in annexing the Crimea, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, as President of the Commerce College, pressed to a successful conclusion commercial treaties with Denmark (1782) and Turkey (1783). In 1785 another commercial treaty was signed, this time with Austria. When, in 1786, the British were still reluctant to give in on significant changes in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1766, Vorontsov continued to press forward; and in 1787 Russia concluded commercial agreements, not only with France, but also with Portugal and the Kingdom of Naples.<sup>58</sup>

If this evaluation is correct, then it may be concluded that one of the chief ways in which Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was valuable to

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<sup>57</sup>Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, February 7/18, 1784, AKV, XIII, 45.

<sup>58</sup>For a brief statement of the facts, see Florinsky, Russia, I, 530, 563 and n. 10, 564 and n. 11.

Catherine II was his vigorous prosecution of a policy to obtain commercial benefits from a new agreement with England. If this argument is carried further, the sooner this goal was achieved, the sooner Vorontsov would be of less value to Catherine. As it happened, he retired soon after the conclusion of such an agreement in 1793.<sup>59</sup>

Moreover, there is evidence that Alexander Romanovich believed so strongly in the need for revision of the terms of the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty that he would have been willing to minimize or eliminate the role of the Commerce College in deciding British claims if Britain met Russia's other terms.<sup>60</sup>

The otherwise astute French minister to Russia, Count Louis Philippe de Ségur, fully aware of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's preoccupation with English commerce, was misled into believing that Alexander Romanovich was an Anglophile.<sup>61</sup> In part, this may have been because of the distaste he developed for most of the Russian ministers whom he described as "incommunicative, taciturn, yet polished, but serious and cold...."<sup>62</sup> Ségur believed he could deal best with Bezborodko but, like Garnovskii, noted that Bezborodko

cannot resist either the artifices of Bakunin or the decisive temperament of [A. R.] Vorontsov, whose stead-

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<sup>59</sup>The preliminary Anglo-Russian commercial treaty was signed on March 12, 1793. A. R. Vorontsov was replaced on the Commerce Commission by State Councilor Konavalev in the same year, in Kommerts Komissia, p. 87; and in the following year he was replaced by Privy Councilor Derzhavin as President of the Commerce College, in Kommerts Kollegia, p. 3.

<sup>60</sup>Ehrman noted that in a Russian proposal presented in 1785, Article 29 made that concession, Ehrman, pp. 105-106.

<sup>61</sup>Séгур noted A. R. Vorontsov's fear "of the stagnation of commerce," Ségur, II, 305. He concluded that "Bezborodko, Osterman and Vorontsov do not conceal their penchant for the English," *ibid.*, p. 275.

<sup>62</sup>Séгур used these words to describe "Rumiantsev, Razumovskii, Stroganoff, Shuvalov, Vorontsov, Kurakin, Galitsin, Dolgoruki, etc.," *ibid.*, p. 256.

fast will is incessantly strained to diminish, by prohibitions and by taxes, the products of all foreign industry.<sup>63</sup>

Thus, although Ségur had high regard for Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's administrative ability,<sup>64</sup> he took a dislike to Alexander Romanovich because of his intractability. This was particularly evident from Ségur's description of the conferences he had concerning a Franco-Russian rapprochement with Bezborodko, Ostermann, Bakunin and Vorontsov. At one time, according to Ségur:

Vorontsov broke off the conference and promised me his ultimatum...<sup>65</sup>

Then suddenly, in the midst of the negotiations for commercial agreements with Portugal and the Kingdom of Naples as well as with France, Ségur described a dramatic change in the attitude towards him on the part of the Russians, a turnabout for which he erroneously believed he could account. Bezborodko, Ségur stated, was more anxious to conclude an agreement; Ostermann was "less cold"; only Morkov, who had replaced Bakunin offered any resistance. Perhaps the most critical change was the different attitude displayed by Alexander Romanovich. As Ségur stated:

It was not difficult for me to perceive the secret and powerful motive which changed the disposition of the plenipotentiaries: Vorontsov was less stubborn...<sup>66</sup>

Although Ségur was correct in noting that Anglo-Russian relations had cooled, and that Russia desired more favorable trading privileges than England had offered, and he knew that the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty had expired, it is questionable that he believed at the time that the Franco-Russian

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 397.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 258, 396.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 425. See also pp. 375-376, 399.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp. 427-428.

commercial agreement may have been primarily a political and diplomatic maneuver to force England to agree to Russian terms.<sup>67</sup>

Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov pressed forward in his efforts to achieve a revision in the Anglo-Russian commercial agreement despite the fact that during the years 1783 to 1788 he was operating under such great strain that by 1788 his friendship with Bezborodko was in danger of being rent asunder.<sup>68</sup> Since Roman's death Alexander had been managing the Vorontsov estates, a man-sized job in itself and, when the Empress set off on her tour to the Crimea in January, 1787, immediately prior to the Second Turkish War, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov set off on his own journey<sup>69</sup> which had the two-fold purpose of observing general conditions of the Russian economy and, in particular, the state of the Vorontsov properties. Indeed, Alexander Romanovich had been corresponding from 1784 to 1786 with Gavril Derzhavin, who had succeeded Roman Illarionovich as Governor of Tambov in 1784, about conditions in that gubernia.<sup>70</sup> And in February, 1787 he had

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<sup>67</sup>Although Ségur thought highly of A. R. Vorontsov's administrative ability, the French minister gave all the credit for diplomatic skill to Semen Romanovich, *ibid.*, p. 258. Compare with the view that Semen owed his improved diplomatic skill to his older brother, e.g., Marcum, pp. 114, 246. See also, above, this chapter, nn. 44, 49 and related text.

<sup>68</sup>Garnovskii, *RS*, XV, 488; XVI, 231.

<sup>69</sup>Charles to William Fraser, January 26, 1787, F.O. 65/15, cited in Ehrman, p. 110, n. 2.

<sup>70</sup>The correspondence between Derzhavin and A. R. Vorontsov began on October 10/21, 1784 and ended abruptly on January 8/19, 1789, a period which roughly corresponds with Derzhavin's tenure as Governor of Tambov, Gavril Derzhavin, *Sochineniia Derzhavina* (Edited by Ia. Grot; 2nd ed.; St. Petersburg: Tip. Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1876), V, (*Perepiska, 1773-1793*), pp. 391, 771 respectively. In their correspondence, which consisted of at least thirty-eight published letters (the last of which is from Siberia in 1789, p. 771), they discussed the condition of the peasants, the state of commerce and industry, the conditions of roads, the quality of local officials, and so on. In a number of letters, Derzhavin referred to intrigues against A. R. Vorontsov by Vice-Governor Ushakov, June 7/18, 1787, p. 691; March 29/April 9, 1788, p. 725; and July 3/14, 1788, p. 740. Derzhavin's

written to Semen Romanovich that the estates at Alabukha and Vorontsovka were "flourishing, and the peasants comfortable."<sup>71</sup>

When the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty was not renewed, the Commerce College lost some of its influence. Although not being closed down, it lost power and eventually was absorbed into and made a bureau in the Department of Internal Trade in 1811.<sup>72</sup> Not only had the treaty not been renewed, but the value of the ruble fell and Russia immediately began to lose revenue because of the great illegal trade which resulted from the continuance of a similar volume of commerce which, henceforth, was not regulated.<sup>73</sup> Indeed, the whole question of whether the existing statistics produced a true picture

letters total twenty-eight; Vorontsov's ten. None of their correspondence is to be found in the published AKV.

<sup>71</sup>Semen thanked his older brother for arranging affairs so well and seeing to it that their revenues were increased without inconvenience to their "vassals," S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, March 19/30, 1787, AKV, IX, 96.

<sup>72</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, p. 2. Florinsky, Russia, I, 554, stated that the Commerce College "was closed in 1786, after its functions had been taken over by the provincial financial boards (kazennaia palata). Only three central departments - the colleges of foreign affairs, army, and the admiralty - retained their position unimpaired." In this connection, Florinsky overemphasizes the "decree of October 24, 1780 ordering... liquidation" of the Colleges. The Commerce College had decentralized itself, but its records show that there still remained some, though less, central direction. Its influence was, however, reduced after 1786. For what may be the source of Florinsky's confusion, see below, Appendix F, which shows clearly that the Commerce College continued to function, as also indicated by its records, until 1811. What ceased to function in 1786 was the Economic Department located in St. Petersburg. See also, Ocherk Istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma Rossia vo vtoroi polovine xviii v. (Edited by A. N. Baronovich and B. B. Kafengauz; 7 vols. in 9 pts.; M.: Akademia Nauk, 1956), VII, 287, 289, 291.

<sup>73</sup>The British suffered little from the lapse of the Anglo-Russian treaty. And the volume of trade between England and Russia actually rose because of the flourishing illegal trade, a commerce no longer bound by various regulations, according to P.R.O. Customs 17/10-11, cited in Ehrman, p. 125, n. 6. See also S. R. Vorontsov's complaints about the increase in contraband trade in S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, August 20/31, 1787, AKV, IX, 103.

or whether undervaluation of goods for customs purposes provided a false picture of the value of commodities traded is still undecided.<sup>74</sup> This question, of course, is of paramount importance in helping to determine whether Russia had ample capital to develop her home industries. On the other hand, it may be argued strongly, that even if Russia's trade balance was favorable, there was still insufficient capital for the development of home industry. First, because the amount of capital was insufficient; and, secondly, because court extravagance and waste used it up. As Ségur noted, "Potemkin, the enemy of budgets, seeing commerce is great, declaims angrily to me against Vorontsov, whose credit he injures and destroys."<sup>75</sup>

The efforts at conclusion of a revised commercial treaty had failed in 1786 because of the insistence of Catherine II on maintenance of the principle of "armed neutrality." Despite Pitt's efforts to have Semen urge Alexander Romanovich to convince Catherine II to abandon the "armed neutrality,"<sup>76</sup> and despite Lord Cathcart's visit to St. Petersburg in 1786

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<sup>74</sup>Florinsky refers to the results of an investigation held by the department of commerce in 1794 in which it was stated that "dutiable imports had been systematically undervalued for customs purposes with the result that the actual balance of trade was in all probability adverse, and not favorable to Russia, as it had been made to appear by official statistics," Florinsky, Russia, I, 564, and n. 12. What is more significant, perhaps, about this remark is that it suggests a method whereby A. R. Vorontsov's protectionism may have been further modified by technical manipulation, thereby permitting freer trade. Compare with the statistics given by Van Regenorter, whose figures show a balance favorable to Russia, p. 325. Apparently such undervaluation of customs was widespread if not customary throughout eighteenth century Europe, according to Lucy S. Sutherland, A London Merchant, 1695-1774 (Oxford, Eng.: Frank Cass, 1933) (1962 Reprint), pp. 136-140, "Appendix IV."

<sup>75</sup>Séгур, II, 397.

<sup>76</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, October 31/November 11, 1786, AKV, IX, 75-76, 78. See also Semen's letter to his brother, August 30/September 10, 1788, where he stated that the "armed neutrality" was the only cause for British "hatred" of Russia, *ibid.*, p. 137.

for the same purpose,<sup>77</sup> Catherine remained firm in her position. The proposed "Mediterranean expedition" of 1787 under the command of Admiral Samuel Karlovich Grieg, whom Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov had brought into the Russian service more than twenty years before,<sup>78</sup> was another attempt to "outface" the English, and force them to accept the Russian demands.<sup>79</sup>

But the British had the advantage of being able to wait longer. Not until the French Revolution had made both nations reevaluate their relative postures, and not until the British government was in danger of toppling

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<sup>77</sup>Ségur, II, 421.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., referred to the "English Admiral, Grieg," (a Scot) who commanded the Russian fleet and noted that "the stubbornness of Vorontsov is prolonging" the conclusion of the Franco-Russian commercial agreement. It is possible that Ségur apparently did not know either that Vorontsov had brought Grieg into the Russian service, or suspect that Vorontsov may have been using the threat of a Franco-Russian commercial agreement as a weapon to help conclude a more favorable Anglo-Russian commercial treaty. See also, AKV, XIX, 338, 346-347 for Grieg's entry into the Russian service and his career through 1787.

<sup>79</sup>Ehrman described in great detail the negotiations beginning in March, 1785 in which Alexander Vorontsov played a prominent part, Ehrman, pp. 96-111. Ehrman attributed much of the Russian firmness to Vorontsov's attitude, and noted that in December, 1785 Alexander Romanovich was appointed to a special commission to negotiate the renewal of the Anglo-Russian commercial agreement. The other members of the committee were Bezborodko, Ostermann and Bakunin who was replaced by Morkov after Bakunin died in the summer of 1786 (p. 97). This was the same committee that negotiated with Ségur, who also noted Vorontsov's preeminence among the members of the commission. It was to Vorontsov that the British minister Fitzherbert handed the British proposals in February, 1786 (p. 100). The Russian proposals, submitted to Fitzherbert shortly thereafter; were "full of distasteful features" (p. 101). In particular, the British resented, not so much the demands, but "the uncompromising way in which they were put, and in which the detailed implications were made explicit...." (p. 100). Some of the provisions noxious to the British were, Article 27, whereby Russian ships were [only] those owned by Russian subjects...sailed under the Russian flag by crews of whom at least half were Russian subjects;" Articles 19-26 which demanded free navigation of the seas and equal treatment of Russian ships in times of hostilities; Article 18, which "repeated the...provisions of the Armed Neutrality;" and Article 3, which demanded reciprocal trading rights of nationals trading in the other country. Such was the tone and content of the "Russian Project," (pp. 102-105).

and the Russian government was absorbed in the Turkish and Polish problems of the early 1790's, did both Russia and England modify their demands. As a result, the British government retained most of the benefits it had had from the treaties of 1734 and 1766. Moreover, because since 1786 it no longer had to fear the heavy hand of the Commerce College, it was specifically stated that British subjects would no longer fall under the jurisdiction of the Commerce College. In addition, by the terms of the military convention of 1795, Russia gave up the principle of "armed neutrality." Finally, English privileges were to be extended to all Russian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.<sup>80</sup>

This apparent defeat for Catherine was not a victory for Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov. Just as England was a secondary consideration to the Empress who by herself directed her foreign policy chiefly in the Turkish and Polish arenas, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's administrative ability and diplomatic skill were expendable to her. Although he had labored strenuously to conclude a more favorable agreement with England, those efforts failed just as had his initial successes with the Russian economy ultimately gone sour. Nevertheless, he continued to work for the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement from the side lines. Indeed, his intransigence of 1786 had softened by 1792 when Alexander Romanovich informed Semen of the progress being achieved towards an Anglo-Russian commercial rapprochement.<sup>81</sup>

When Alexander Romanovich learned of the terms of the agreement he was fit to be tied. Although already in disfavor on a number of counts, he told

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<sup>80</sup>Ibid., pp. 129-136; Marcum, pp. 268, 329-330.

<sup>81</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, May 7/18, 1792, AKV, IX, 234-236. See also, Ehrman, pp. 134-135, and Marcum, pp. 257-262.

the Empress about his reservations and objections in no uncertain terms.<sup>82</sup>

It was too late, however, for anything to be done. The die was cast; and Alexander Romanovich retired from service in 1794 to devote himself primarily to the management of the Vorontsov estates until the turn of the century swept him back into the arena of international diplomacy.

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<sup>82</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, February 4, 1794 (N. S.), begins as follows: "I have received the copy of the letter that you have written to the Empress in which you request total retirement. It is superbly well written. . . ." and later commented "it is a consolation...that...you have served your country well," AKV, IX, 323.

**PART IV. ON THE PERIPHERY, THE NINETIES**

## CHAPTER VI

A. R. VORONTSOV AND A. N. RADISHCHEV:

## TUTOR AND PROTÉGÉ

Until now, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's chief claim to fame, despite his many other and varied accomplishments, lies in his patronage of Alexander Nikolaevich Radishchev, who has been described as the "founder of the [Russian] intelligentsia [and a] forerunner of socialism," as a "Russian philosophe," and as the "first Russian radical," to mention but a few of the accolades heaped upon the latter. Indeed, A. R. Vorontsov's retirement in 1794 has frequently been ascribed in large part to his protection and patronage of Radishchev after the author of A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow was arrested and sent into exile in 1790. According to this view, Vorontsov's disfavor increased proportionally with his aid to Radishchev.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Nicolas Berdyaev, The Russian Idea (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962) (Paper), pp. 28-29, 99, who described Radishchev as the "founder of the intelligentsia" and as a "forerunner of socialism." See also, as previously cited, McConnell, A Russian Philosophe and Lang, The First Russian Radical, for titles that characterize Radishchev, and the latter, for the development of the theme that Radishchev's Journey was responsible for the retirement of both A. R. Vorontsov and his sister Princess Dashkov, Lang, pp. 194-199. Lang cited the memoirs of the German diplomat, G. A. W. von Helbig, Russische Gunstlinge (new ed., Stuttgart, 1883), p. 304, as follows: "'this incident [publication of the Journey and the arrest of Radishchev] also had some effect on Radishchev's protectors, Count [A. R.] Vorontsov and Princess Dashkov. Their connection with this man was known. They were accused of having collaborated in the book and had to justify themselves before the Secret Inquisition. They were not punished, but they lost their favour with the Empress and were forced little by little to retire from the Court and from public affairs,'" cited in Lang, p. 197. According to Dashkova, not only was she not a friend and protector of Radishchev, but she had for some time been concerned that the friendship between her brother, Alexander Romanovich and his protégé Radishchev would

Moreover, it has been suggested that A. N. Radishchev helped prepare many of the commercial treaties Russia concluded in the 1780's and has also been given credit for participation in the preparation of the Tariff of 1782.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, it has also been strongly argued that the 1801 Charter for the Russian People was really the work of Radishchev and not that of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov who was originally credited with its preparation.<sup>3</sup>

The evidence suggests that such an approach unjustly slights A. R.

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ultimately harm Vorontsov because of Radishchev's "itch to write... thoughts or expressions...dangerous in the times in which we lived," Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXXI, 298-300. For the English translation, which I have followed, see Fitzlyon, pp. 240-242. If Dashkova's account can be accepted at face value, then Helbig erred in calling her a "protector" of Radishchev. Similarly, he may have erred in ascribing too much significance to the effect of the publication of the Journey and Vorontsov's relationship with Radishchev as factors resulting in A. R. Vorontsov's retirement, although rumor among the less well informed may have so had it at the time.

<sup>2</sup>Prikazchikova, reasoning chiefly by implication, noted Radishchev's participation in preparing the Tariff of 1782, Prikazchikova, p. 117, and referred to a report submitted by Radishchev to Vorontsov in 1786 prior to conclusion of the Franco-Russian commercial agreement of 1787, *ibid.*, pp. 117-118. In part, Prikazchikova drew this conclusion from the mere fact of Radishchev's employment in the Commerce College since 1777; and in part the author was making a case for Radishchev as a strong opponent of free trade and "supporter of protectionism," *ibid.*, p. 116. Lang stated his agreement with Prikazchikova, Lang, Radical, p. 210, and offered this suggestive statement: "During the twelve years Radishchev served under [A. R.] Vorontsov, the ports of St. Petersburg [where Radishchev served primarily] and Kronstadt gained increasing importance as centers of international trade," *ibid.*, pp. 92-93. One is almost led to conclude that Radishchev had a directing hand in the increasing importance of the two cities but one becomes aware that no causal connection was explicitly stated. Similarly, one must question Lang's contention that Radishchev was "the brains behind his chief at the Board of Trade...for whom he drafted a number of commercial statutes," *ibid.*, p. 118.

<sup>3</sup>Detailed treatment of the "Charter for the Russian People," and the question of its authorship, may be found below in the ninth chapter. For a brief discussion of some aspects of the controversy over authorship of the "Charter," and the opposing positions of some of the scholars on that matter, suffice it at this point to mention, e.g., S. A. Pokrovskii, Gosudarstvenno-pravovye vzgliady Radishcheva (M.: Gosudarstvennoe Iuridicheskoi literatury, 1956), pp. 31-40.

Vorontsov's political liberalism. In part the distortion which I believe has occurred may perhaps be placed at the door of the tsarist censorship which repressed Radishchev's Journey, preventing it from publication until 1905, thereby helping to make Radishchev a legend in the nineteenth century. In addition, the Bolshevik seizure of power and Lenin's emphasis on the role of Radishchev in paving the way for the October Revolution helped relegate to relative oblivion most of Radishchev's non-literary or at least unpublished contemporaries.

For these reasons alone, a re-evaluation of the nature of the relationship between A. R. Vorontsov and A. N. Radishchev seems in order. In fact, as the previous chapters have indicated, in some places implicitly and, in others, more explicitly, Vorontsov was well equipped to perform all the tasks Radishchev carried out with respect to commercial agreements and tariffs. Moreover, Vorontsov had training in the law early in his life and his father, Roman, may have had a hand in the drafting of the manifesto freeing the nobles from service in 1762.

In this problem of the relative importance of their respective contributions, the question of the China trade looms before us as of paramount importance. Indeed, it serves as the thread which seems to tie together many loose ends. In this sense, the China trade may be the basis of A. R. Vorontsov's strategy for his protection of Radishchev, while simultaneously a means to augment the wealth of the Vorontsovs, and a tool to be used to return to the center of the political arena.

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<sup>4</sup>See below, the last portion of this chapter, and the next chapter, passim.

A. Fragments Towards a Reevaluation: The Early Years

When A. R. Vorontsov and A. N. Radishchev met in 1777 or 1778, Vorontsov was thirty-five or thirty-six, approximately eight years older than Radishchev who was twenty-seven or twenty-eight. Vorontsov was at the time President of the Commerce College and Radishchev was a clerk (official) working in one of the offices. Following Pavlov-Silvanskii, Radishchev's biographers place great weight on the manner in which the two met. It seems that, in December, 1778, another official had been convicted of mismanagement; but Radishchev, believing his colleague to be innocent, pleaded that the case be reopened. Vorontsov agreed; the official was exonerated; and Vorontsov and Radishchev, based on a feeling of mutual respect and admiration, formed a close and lasting personal friendship.<sup>5</sup>

It should not be forgotten, however, that although the two were only eight years apart in age, Vorontsov was near the peak of his powers and had for a long time demonstrated his ability on many levels, whereas Radishchev had not yet begun to write. Vorontsov, it will be remembered, had translated an essay of Voltaire's which was published when Alexander Romanovich was fifteen, was studying at the Chevaux-Légers in 1758 at the age of seventeen, and when only twenty years old had already been raised to the second rank and appointed minister to the Hague. Moreover, Alexander Romanovich had formulated a free trade philosophy of his own, was determined to improve Russia's economy, apparently was aware that he and his family were a stone's throw from taking Russia in their own hands, and had savored the freedom

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<sup>5</sup>N. P. Pavlov - Silvanskii, "Zhizn Radishcheva," in the author's Sochineniia. Tom II. Ocherki po Russkoi Istorii XVIII - XIX vv. (SPb., 1910; being vol. XXI, pt. 2 of the Russian Reprint Series edited by Alexander V. Soloviev; Europe Printing; The Hague, 1966), pp. 111-113.

of living abroad. Radishchev was, at this time, in 1761, only twelve years old.

Thus, A. R. Vorontsov was not only Radishchev's senior in age but also in experience. His priority in social thought is less certain. Nevertheless Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, on his tours of the Vorontsov properties, must have known at first hand what the lot of the Russian serf was. Not only was Alexander Romanovich aware at first hand of the social problems of the mass of Russians, he already had felt at first hand the sting of political retaliation directed by the Empress against himself and his family.<sup>6</sup> But his views on both autocracy and serfdom are not sufficiently clear, or easily discernible. Perhaps after 1762 he was reluctant to put on paper his views on these matters.<sup>7</sup> As Lester Jay Humphreys has noted, the Vorontsovs wrote much, but have "published little."<sup>8</sup> Even as innocent a document as A. R. Vorontsov's autobiographical sketch includes at the outset the statement that it is being prepared solely for the instruction of his nephew, Mikhail Semenovich, with the intention that it never be published.<sup>9</sup>

But this cautiousness in publishing did not mean A. R. Vorontsov would not take risks for his principles and for his friends as shown in the case of Radishchev. Similarly, members of his family bore witness to his acts

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<sup>6</sup>After the death of Mikhail Illarionovich in 1767, Alexander Romanovich, who was at the time serving as minister to the Hague, apparently had resolved soon thereafter that he would return to Russia. Although we do not have his letter to Semen, the younger Vorontsov urged Alexander not to come home, S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, November 22/December 2, 1767, AKV, XXXII, 114.

<sup>7</sup>Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 10-11; Humphreys, pp. 125-126. See also, below, this chapter, n. 45 and related text.

<sup>8</sup>Humphreys, pp. 111-112.

<sup>9</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," AKV, V, 6.

of kindness which modesty prevented him from recording. His kindnesses extended beyond the boundaries of family and, moreover, not only to close friends like Radishchev. For example, after Voltaire's death, the French philosopher's secretary, Wagner, thanked Alexander Romanovich for interceding with Catherine II on behalf of the aging French pensioner so that he could receive what was due to him. In addition, Wagner thanked Vorontsov for acting on behalf of a friend visiting Russia who needed employment.<sup>10</sup> Interestingly enough, A. R. Vorontsov apparently extended credit to many of those dismissed by Catherine. Among them are Lieutenant Petr Bogdanovich Passek who was a key figure in the coup of 1762;<sup>11</sup> Gregory Orlov, who was Catherine's lover in the 1760's;<sup>12</sup> Platon Zubov, who needed funds near the time of and after Catherine's death;<sup>13</sup> Arkadii Ivanovich Morkov, one of her

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<sup>10</sup>Wagner to A. R. Vorontsov, October 20/31, 1780 and April 20/May 2, 1803, *AKV*, V, 464, 469, respectively. See also, for Wagner's notes of introduction for some of his friends, among whom are the Marquis de Florian and a Mr. du Savigny, *ibid.*, pp. 461-469.

<sup>11</sup>A. R. Vorontsov kept himself informed of Passek's credit standing towards the end of Catherine's reign, as shown in, e.g., Dashkova to A. R. Vorontsov, n.d., 1793?, *ibid.*, pp. 208-209; and Dmitri P. Tatishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, February 4/15, 1796, *ibid.*, XVIII, 308-309. Vorontsov's interest in Passek's whereabouts and circumstances is also seen in Zavadovskii to A. R. Vorontsov, June 30/July 11, 1795, *ibid.*, XII, 155; and D. P. Troshchinskii to A. R. Vorontsov, January 22/February 2, 1798, *ibid.*, p. 401.

<sup>12</sup>For one reference to the debts of Orlov and his son, Bobrinskii (by Catherine II), see, e.g., Zavadovskii to S. R. Vorontsov, January 4/15, 1788, *ibid.*, p. 152. See also, for the nature of the relationship between A. R. Vorontsov and Prince Gregory Orlov, e.g., Vorontsov's request that Orlov intercede on the Vorontsov family's behalf, A. R. Vorontsov to Gregory Orlov, February 10/21, 1765, *ibid.*, XXXIV, 353; and S. R. Vorontsov's assurances to Alexander Romanovich that Gregory "has friendship for you," S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, September 7/18, 1773, *ibid.*, XXXII, 166-167.

<sup>13</sup>As for Zubov's debts and extension of credit to him, see, e.g., N. P. Rumiantsov to S. R. Vorontsov, December 12/23, 1793, *ibid.*, XXVII, 175; Zavadovskii to S. R. Vorontsov, August 27/September 7, 1797; April 11/23, 1803, *ibid.*, XII, 185 and 273, respectively. A. R. Vorontsov was kept informed about the whereabouts and activities of Zubov, I. V. Strakhov to A. R. Vorontsov, December 6/18, 1800, and A. I. Viazemskii to A. R. Vorontsov, November 2/14, 1803, *ibid.*, XIV, 509 and 433, respectively.

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favorites in the mid-1780's;<sup>14</sup> and P. V. Zavadovskii, Catherine's favorite in 1776-1777, who has been described as an "excellent financier," but one who lost Catherine's favor because he "made friends with those who abused Potemkin." Zavadovskii was appointed Director of the State Bank and in 1786 was placed in charge of the Chancery. His two "most intimate friends were the two brothers Vorontsov, Simon and Alexander."<sup>15</sup>

Less well known figures were also devoted to Alexander Romanovich.

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<sup>14</sup>During the negotiations for the Franco-Russian commercial agreement of 1786-7, Morkov was the favorite of Catherine II, Segur, II, 427-428. Concern over Besborodko's comment that "Morkov's credit has diminished" is shown in D. P. Buturlin to A. R. Vorontsov, May 3/14, 1794, AKV, XXXII, 232. Approximately seventy interesting letters from Morkov to A. R. Vorontsov from 1782 through 1805 may be found in *ibid.*, XIV, 209-346. These letters are suggestive in that they show Morkov's attachment to Alexander Romanovich and, e.g., thank the latter for his "constant benevolence" to their author, May 20/31, 1785, p. 237. In that same letter Morkov asked A. R. Vorontsov's help in being reassigned from Copenhagen, a request which was apparently fulfilled as Morkov was in St. Petersburg in 1786 as no less than Catherine's favorite. Although it is not clear whether A. R. Vorontsov played some role in seeing to it that Morkov was Catherine's favorite, any evidence to that conclusion would certainly cause us to question Zavadovskii's view that both Morkov and Zubov displaced Besborodko, Zavadovskii and A. R. Vorontsov at the head of the diplomatic corps in 1792, Zavadovskii to S. R. Vorontsov, January 27/February 7, 1792, *ibid.*, XII, 75, 78; and also, the preceding chapter, n. 34. Indeed, such evidence would suggest that Vorontsov sought to maintain influence over foreign affairs direction by any means possible. Morkov sought and purchased books for A. R. Vorontsov, as for example, The Key to the Cabinets of Europe, August 16/27, 1782, *ibid.*, XIV, p. 215; issues of a publication appearing periodically under the title of Correspondance politique, civile, et littéraire pour servir à l'histoire du siècle, November 11/22, 1782, p. 220; other "new works," December 14/25, 1782, p. 223; some works of Mirabeau, January 2, 1783 (N. S.), p. 224; two works entitled Jeanne de Naples and The King of Hungary, n.d., 1783, p. 228; the memoirs of Tott on the Turks, May 20/31, 1785, p. 238; and various works of Voltaire, Bouffon and d'Alembert, n.d., 1802, p. 283. Perhaps the most interesting references in these letters deal with messages sent by A. R. Vorontsov to Baxter, the Commerce College's consul in London via Morkov, November 5, 1782 (N. S.), p. 217; references to the business and financial dealings with and discomfort of Sutherland, February 17/28, 1787, pp. 246-247; and, in the last letter cited, a lengthy discussion of the negotiations for the Anglo-Russian and Franco-Russian commercial treaties, with comments on the reactions of Segur, Fitzherbert and Herzberg, pp. 239-243.

<sup>15</sup>Alexander Polovtsoff, The Favorites of Catherine the Great (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1940), pp. 158-161. See also P. V. Zavadovskii's statement: "I happily bow and pay my compliments to my tutor Alexander Romanovich," according to Zaoserskii, p. 133.

As early as 1758, Alexander's father Roman had written to his son in Paris of the esteem in which the younger Vorontsov was held by a serf, Timothy Orlov, and a free peasant, Iagan Reikh. Roman urged Alexander to return their affection and to accept their gifts with the words "love these people and take from them [their] presentations."<sup>16</sup> During his first month in Paris, Alexander had sent each of them a kaftan, the total cost of which equalled what it would cost him to hire lackeys for a year.<sup>17</sup> During the next fifteen months Alexander Romanovich gave Orlov and Reikh funds in an amount equal to ten percent of his budget.<sup>18</sup> And in 1760, A. R. Vorontsov helped Iagan Reikh in connection with his marriage to a Frenchwoman living in Paris.<sup>19</sup>

Without going into greater detail, let us pause for a moment and consider the financial aspect of A. R. Vorontsov's relations with A. A. Bezborodko and his family. After A. A. Bezborodko's death in 1799, Alexander Romanovich helped settle the affairs of the estate, according to two letters from Vorontsov to I. A. Bezborodko, son of Alexander's deceased colleague.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, it seems that Victor Pavlovich Kochubei, who was Prince A. A. Bezborodko's nephew, was involved in some financial problems related to the settling of the estate. Although he noted that he had "handled many affairs," he

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<sup>16</sup>R. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, October 6/17?, 1758, AKV, XXXI, 29; Zaozerskii, p. 107.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 135.

<sup>18</sup>According to his itemized budget, he spent 15,000 livres between July 15/26, 1758 and September 1/12, 1759, with 1,500 going to Orlov and Reikh, *ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 133; Mikhail Deev to A. R. Vorontsov, July 18/29, 1760, AKV, XXXI, 45.

<sup>20</sup>A. R. Vorontsov to I. A. Bezborodko (May ?, 1799 and June ?, 1799), AKV, XIII, 425-436.

appealed to Alexander Romanovich for help in the early part of 1800. In one letter, after noting "the constancy with which...you are occupied by my [best] interests," Prince Kochubei asked Vorontsov to respect his "confidence" because he truly "fear[ed]...every other person."<sup>21</sup>

The most striking example of A. R. Vorontsov's kindness was, of course, his financial and psychological aid to Radishchev, the famous martyr of the eighteenth century who, in 1795, wrote to Vorontsov, "You are the man who made me love life."<sup>22</sup>

What emerges from these fragments is a totally different picture of A. R. Vorontsov than that which has existed because too much reliance has been placed on the memoirs of officials of other governments who either did not know much about the affairs of Alexander Romanovich, or who were misinformed about him or, as in the case of the French minister to St. Petersburg, Louis Philippe de Ségur, had developed a dislike for A. R. Vorontsov. For example, Ségur, when he described Catherine's ministers, classified all of them, including Vorontsov, as "strangers to all that which exists outside of their country."<sup>23</sup> Ségur's description of Vorontsov's stubbornness has already been noted,<sup>24</sup> as has D. M. Lang's acceptance of Ségur's exaggerated

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<sup>21</sup>Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, February 4/16, March 3/15, May 27/June 8, November 16/28, 1800, *ibid.*, XII, 126, 130, 134, 139 respectively. For the quotation see the letter of March 3/15, p. 130. It is interesting to note, in reading Kochubei's correspondence with A. R. Vorontsov (1792-1804, *ibid.*, pp. 3-187), a correspondence that dated back to at least 1792, one gets the distinct feeling that Kochubei is reporting to Vorontsov, on diplomatic situations, on economic conditions, on mutually held properties, e.g. Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov October 5, 1793 (N. S.), *ibid.*, pp. 19-20; and that Kochubei felt a personal allegiance to him as well, Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov, November 5/16, 1793, *ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>22</sup>Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, April 4/15, 1795, *PBB*, III, 437.

<sup>23</sup>Séгур, II, 256. Compare, e.g., with Voltaire's comments on A. R. Vorontsov's "appreciation of the fine arts [and] perfect knowledge of the French language," Voltaire to A. R. Vorontsov, December 11, 1761 (N. S.), *AKV*, V, 450.

<sup>24</sup>See above, Chapter V, n. 65 and related text. See also, Ségur, II,

view of Vorontsov's protectionism.<sup>25</sup> To this may be added the following curious reference to a comment, also cited by Lang, which was made by Citizen Edmond Génêt, the French chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg from the time Ségur was recalled until mid-1791. Lang quoted Génêt as expressing concern for the fate of A. R. Vorontsov in August, 1790 because the latter had been "'implicated in the Raditcheff [*sic*] affair.'" Génêt concluded as follows:

I sincerely hope that he [A. R. Vorontsov] will vindicate himself; he is the only man of talent I know in the Russian Government. What is more, he favors our interests since Monsieur de Ségur converted him.<sup>26</sup>

Although Génêt may have generalized too broadly, he was obviously aware of A. R. Vorontsov's abilities. The emphasis on the last sentence is inaccurate, however, since it was after the French Revolution that Alexander Romanovich began to reevaluate his pro-French attitude of the previous decades, and began to conceive of conditions to which the revolutionary French government would have to adhere if it wished to remain a player in the game of diplomacy.<sup>27</sup>

These few examples,<sup>28</sup> hopefully, will demonstrate that for the better

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425, 375-376, 399; and Goertz, pp. 46-47.

<sup>25</sup>Lang, Radical, p. 210.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 194-195. See also, for the reasons Génêt left Russia in 1791, Frederick A. Schminke, Génêt: The Origins of His Mission to America (Thèse pour le doctorat de l'université de Toulouse; Toulouse: Imprimerie Toulousaine Lion et fils, 1939), pp. 15, 16, 65.

<sup>27</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Zapiska grafa A. R. Vorontsova k grafu A. A. Bezborodke po povodu frantsuzskoi revoliutsii," Summer, 1791, AKV, IX, 501-503. What may be of greater interest is that Génêt's belief that Vorontsov favored France in 1790 suggests a modification of the thesis of A. R. Vorontsov's Anglophilism.

<sup>28</sup>The pages of the AKV are filled with evidence of indebtedness to A. R. Vorontsov, in one way or another, on the part of almost all who knew him.

part of half-a-century A. R. Vorontsov aided people who felt indebted to him. What emerges is the image of a man who was loved by peasants, whether serf or free; a man who was revered by both family and friends; a man who willingly and capably helped all those within his purview who were in distress; a man who was looked to for instruction on various levels and in various matters by others above his station in life as well as by those on a similar social level or socially below him; a man on whom people could and did rely and in whom confidence was never betrayed; a man who could get along with the lovers of his foe, the Empress, and who continued to get along with them even after she had died and could, therefore, no longer help him or hurt him; a man about whom people were not ashamed to express their gratitude and their indebtedness -- in short, as Roderick Page Thaler has put it, a "nobleman who was in very truth a noble man."<sup>29</sup>

#### B. Fragments Towards a Reevaluation: The Later Years

Yet, Alexander Romanovich was secretive, perhaps even furtive about many of his activities. As long as he was hated by Potemkin, feared by Catherine II, disliked by both Paul and Alexander I,<sup>30</sup> it undoubtedly occurred to him that wisdom -- in this case, the wisdom to remain behind the scenes as much as possible<sup>31</sup> -- was the better part of valor. Although

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<sup>29</sup>Radishchev, Journey, p. 13.

<sup>30</sup>For Catherine II's continued dislike of A. R. Vorontsov see, e.g., her statement to Zavadovskii in 1794 (AKV, XII, 103), as well as evidence of earlier similar feelings as described by Ségur, Zapiski, p. 111, cited by Riabinin, RA (1879), I, 67, and AKV, XII, 370, ed. n. For the Emperor Paul's dislike of Alexander Romanovich, see, e.g. S. R. Vorontsov to Paul, October 9, 1798 (N. S.), and to A. R. Vorontsov, June 3/14, 1799, *ibid.*, X, 326 and 49, respectively, and Saul, p. 134 and n. 27. For the antipathy of Alexander I, see Czartoryski, I, 333.

<sup>31</sup>Garnovskii raised the question in November, 1787 of whether Alexander Romanovich was pulling the diplomatic strings in "some kind of intrigue" with his brother in London, Garnovskii, RS (1876), XV, 483. In this connection, see Morkov's correspondence with A. R. Vorontsov, as previously indicated (this chapter) n. 14, above, esp. his letter of February 17/28, 1787, AKV, XIV, pp. 246-247. See also Ségur, II, 396-397; P. B. [Petr Bartenev], "Graf Petr Vasilevich Zavadovskii," RA (1883), XXI, Pt. II, pp. 101 ff; and Goertz, pp. 46-47.

Alexander Romanovich did not push himself forward, no one could accuse A. R. Vorontsov of being timid, meek, incompetent or fawning. To the contrary, he was well aware of his own worth; and what may have been to him expressions of personal dignity and a belief in the worth of the individual, were taken by many as manifestations of an indifferent, haughty, arrogant, snobbish, conceited aristocrat.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, since most of what diplomats and scholars have written about Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov has been written about that period of his life beginning with publication of Radishchev's Journey, Vorontsov is frequently referred to as an Anglophile whereas actually it was the French Revolution of 1789 which turned him from a proponent of closer relations with France to an advocate of an Anglo-Russian alliance.<sup>33</sup>

Perhaps that is why Lester Jay Humphreys was misled into drawing what is, in this author's view, the following inaccurate conclusion:

The role of Aleksandr [sic] Romanovich with regards to the development of the reputation of Radishchev should not be overstated. Certainly the works of Radishchev provide independent testimony to the critical acumen of the man who wrote them. Vorontsov merely provided propitious circumstances for Radishchev's intellectual growth. As patron and protector, Vorontsov was one of the enabling causes of Radishchev's prominence.<sup>34</sup>

Yet examination of several concrete instances shows A. R. Vorontsov to

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<sup>32</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," pp. 10-11. Garnovskii, noted that Alexander Romanovich was the kind of man who had to have his way, and about whom people would "gossip" and "criticize," Garnovskii, RS (1876), XV, 483. See also Lang, who observed that A. R. Vorontsov "was usually under a faint cloud of suspicion, as being a 'superior person' not quite in sympathy with prevailing trends in public affairs," Lang, Radical, p. 91.

<sup>33</sup>For some of the references to the Anglophilism of A. R. Vorontsov, see, e.g., Thaler's comment in Radishchev, Journey, p. 18; Lang, Radical, p. 91; and Ségur, II, 275. For Vorontsov's changes of view, see above, chapter V, notes 8-99, and related text.

<sup>34</sup>Humphreys, p. 21.

have played more than this modest role.

For example, there is general agreement that Vorontsov was responsible for Radishchev's "Letter on the Chinese Trade."<sup>35</sup> P. A. Radishchev also insisted that Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov "inspired" A. N. Radishchev's Journey.<sup>36</sup>

Let us re-examine what we already know of their relationship, and add to it, as we continue, new insights based on old information reconsidered anew. By 1780, Radishchev was serving as an official in the customs house at St. Petersburg, a position he received on the recommendation of A. R. Vorontsov. Alexander Romanovich, as President of the Commerce College had his main offices in Moscow and Archangel. Moreover, Vorontsov probably anticipated Radishchev's ultimate promotion, which occurred in 1789, to chief of the St. Petersburg customs office.<sup>37</sup>

In 1784, A. R. Vorontsov was a family man without a family. Roman Illarionovich had died in 1783; Semen was abroad, and his wife died in the spring of 1784. Semen's son, Mikhail, was left motherless much in the same position that both Alexander and Semen had been when their mother Martha Ivanovna had died in 1745. Alexander sent Semen money, commiserated with him by mail, and gave him good advice, of which Semen duly noted his appreciation.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>See, e.g., Thaler's comment in Radishchev, Journey, p. 14, and McConnell, Philosophe, p. 144.

<sup>36</sup>P. A. Radishchev, p. 406.

<sup>37</sup>Lang, Radical, p. 92; McConnell, Philosophe, p. 63; PSS, III, 481. Florinsky referred to undervaluation of goods for customs purposes during the 1780's and early 1790's, Florinsky, Russia, I, 564-565. Unfortunately for him, even if Vorontsov had anticipated Dahl's retirement or death, he could not have known exactly when it could take place, nor could he have foreseen its coincidence with either the revolution in France or the preparation of Radishchev's journey. For the twelve letters of Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov from 1782 to 1787, see AKV, XII, 411-425.

<sup>38</sup>See, for example, the letters of S. R. to M. S. Vorontsov, June 9/20, 1798, AKV, XVII, 3; to A. R. Vorontsov, January 3/14, 1784 and September 5/16, 1784, ibid., IX, 2, 8, respectively, May 30/June 10, 1785, and January 7/19, 1801, ibid., X, 85-87.

But Semen was far away. And A. N. Radishchev's wife had also died in 1783, leaving her husband with four young, motherless children. Radishchev was a close and dear friend; a colleague and co-worker; of similar mind in some respects; and only four years younger than Semen. Moreover, Radishchev's distress was more pronounced in that Radishchev had many motherless children. In addition, Radishchev was in Russia, and needed help. What would a compassionate man like Vorontsov do? Just as he supplied Radishchev with financial help, it seems only natural that he would spend some time with him; talk with him in Radishchev's hour of sorrow, and try to soften the pain and minimize the sensitive author's anguish. Indeed, it is after this moment of tragedy in Radishchev's life and after the emotional stress he endured that his writing increased in quantity and his written ideas developed rapidly.

In this connection, it may be significant to recall that Radishchev's son said that Vorontsov inspired the Journey.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, although Vorontsov has been described as more moderate and "conservative" than Radishchev,<sup>40</sup> both have been described as liberal "reformers," and "not revolutionaries;"<sup>41</sup> who "loved Russia;"<sup>42</sup> who had a "hatred of autocracy so similar;"<sup>43</sup> and who were both opposed to serfdom. Indeed, according to A. I. Zaokerskii, Alexander

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<sup>39</sup>P. A. Radishchev, p. 406.

<sup>40</sup>McConnell, Philosophe, p. 63; Humphreys, p. 233.

<sup>41</sup>For Radishchev's liberal reformism, see Thaler's view in Radishchev, Journey, pp. 7-8; for Vorontsov's, see Humphreys, p. 123.

<sup>42</sup>It seems that the following comment by Thaler also fits Vorontsov. Thaler wrote: "It is worth noting that Radishchev deeply loved his country, knew its history well, and was proud of what was good and honorable in it. He loved Russia enough to recognize her faults, point them out, and try to correct them," Radishchev, Journey, p. 8.

<sup>43</sup>McConnell, Philosophe, p. 63.

Romanovich Vorontsov is known to have "put forth the moral side of things" on that matter some thirty years before Radishchev openly expressed his own antipathy to serfdom,<sup>44</sup> when, in a letter to his friend Mikhail Deev in 1759, A. R. Vorontsov, writing from abroad, made the following comment: "'Ultimately what is still better [is] freedom...from the tyrannical hand of [another] person and without any interest."<sup>45</sup>

It is, therefore, conceivable that one of the significant influences in Radishchev's growth and development, intellectually and ethically, was the life and thought of A. R. Vorontsov. The two may well have seen in one another that unity of belief that rarely occurs for most people. Although they differed with respect to rank, station in life, and wealth, it was probable that a similar compassionate Weltaumschaungen which mutually drew those two stubborn, proud, humanitarian reformers to one another had led them to share their views in private. What Vorontsov was probably unaware of, however, was that this sensitive, creative friend had installed a printing press in his home which he might use to publicize their commonly shared beliefs.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 78-80. For the scope of Radishchev's attack on serfdom, which occurs throughout his magnum opus, see Radishchev, Journey, pp. 94-104, 134-135, 143-147, 154-156.

<sup>45</sup>A. R. Vorontsov to M. Deev, May 14/25, 1760, "Voronts. Sobr.," No. 410, cited in Zaoverskii, pp. 119-120. Zaoverskii, who has searched the unpublished materials in Russia, also stated that Alexander Romanovich, who was eighteen at the time, wrote a few letters advocating emancipation of the serfs to his father at that time, *ibid.* With regard to Radishchev, even if we accept the view that he began working on the Journey in 1780 (e.g., McConnell, Philosophe, p. 76), Radishchev was already thirty years old, had known Vorontsov for a few years, and did not express his antipathy for serfdom until 1790. Moreover, according to McConnell, Radishchev "does not seem to have taken any interest in serfdom until he began the Journey in the early 1780's," Allen McConnell, "The Autocrat and the Open Critic" /hereafter cited as McConnell, "Critic"/, in Marc Raeff (ed.), Catherine the Great; A Profile /hereafter cited as Raeff, Catherine / (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 168.

<sup>46</sup>Lang, Radical, p. 126 gives the date for the printing press as 1783; McConnell, Philosophe, p. 106, as 1789. For the quotation, see the latter, p. 2.

It seems that this approach may more satisfactorily explain a number of events about which lack of evidence and different approaches have resulted in certain conclusions which are, at best, tenuous. Perhaps a brief statement of an alternative view would be both appropriate and helpful at this time. In the 1780's Radishchev traveled in, among others, the circle of A. R. Vorontsov, his sister Dashkova, and their friends.<sup>47</sup> Radishchev had probably been influenced by the ideas of Alexander Romanovich, who shared his innermost feelings with very few, and who was reluctant to make public his own private antipathy towards autocracy and serfdom since the assumption of power by Catherine II in 1762. This reluctance was based partly on an awareness of how vindictive the autocrat could be, partly on the fear that her power might be used against him and his family of whom he was the guardian, and partly on the lingering hope that soon there might be a new sovereign on the throne of Russia, hopefully in the lifetime of Alexander Romanovich. Radishchev, in his duties as an official in the Commerce College and the customs house in St. Petersburg, knew at first-hand how A. R. Vorontsov was working to promote peace and prosperity in Russia, primarily

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<sup>47</sup>Among Radishchev's social and literary acquaintances during the 1780's in addition to A. R. Vorontsov and Princess Dashkov, were Radishchev's college chums, Alexei Kutuzov and Andrei K. Rubanovskii, M. I. Novikov, G. Derzhavin, A. A. Bezborodko, A. V. Khrapovitskii and, perhaps, some of the following members of the "Society of Friends of Literary Science," e.g., M. Antonovskii, P. Radkevich, P. I. Kosov, P. Lvov, S. Speshnitskii, N. Muravev, N. Novosiltsev, Egor Riabinin, and Sergei Tschkov who claimed that Radishchev was a member and recalled his activities. See V. P. Semennikov, "Literaturno-obshchestvennyi krug Radishcheva," in A. N. Radishchev, Materialy i issledovaniia [hereafter cited as Radishchev, Materialy] (Edited by A. S. Orlov; M.: Literaturnyi arkhiv Akademiia Nauka, 1936), pp. 215-220, 223, 226-233, 238ff. See also, V. P. Semennikov, "Radishchev i gr. A. R. Vorontsov," in his Radishchev: ocherki i issledovaniia [hereafter cited as Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki] (M.: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1923), p. 128; I. M. Trotskii, "Vokrug Radishcheva," in Radishchev, Materialy, pp. ix, x; G. Gukovskii, "Radishchev kak pisatel," in ibid., pp. 170, 182-190; and Babkin, who referred to the "Society of Friends of Literary Science," pp. 32, 134-137, 306.

in the latter's vigorous efforts to maintain economic stability in the face of skyrocketing inflation. Moreover, just as he knew that Potemkin's extravagance was a drain on the resources of Russia, Radishchev must have at least suspected that A. R. Vorontsov opposed Potemkin's thirst for conquest on the diplomatic level as well.<sup>48</sup>

Added to Radishchev's respect and admiration for Vorontsov was a kind of reverence for the man who befriended the grief-stricken author and who gave him good advice and, perhaps occasionally, financial aid. Thus, A. N. Radishchev was probably happy to serve as Vorontsov's agent in St. Petersburg, just as Moses Radishchev in 1790 probably replaced his brother in a somewhat less noticeable city when he became Vorontsov's agent in the second most important office of the Commerce College, an office located in Archangel.<sup>49</sup>

Disconsolate after the loss of his wife, Anna, A. N. Radishchev spent much of his time after 1783 in writing. Among his publications was a work, the Life of Theodore Vasilevich Ushakov (1788) which, according to Dashkova, presaged that Radishchev would be detrimental to the Vorontsovs, a matter about which she warned Alexander Romanovich at this time.<sup>50</sup> A. R. Vorontsov

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<sup>48</sup>P. A. Radishchev, for example, noted that when his father worked for Dahl, A. N. Radishchev could be found every evening either at the home of Dahl, or at one of the "literary soirees" given by A. R. Vorontsov or his sister, Dashkova, who were both permitted at Court because of their "talent" and their "knowledge," cited in Babkin, p. 32, and n. 55. See also, for the view that "Radishchev's intimacy with the Vorontsovs helped to confirm him in his critical attitude towards Potemkin's policies," Lang, Radical, p. 97.

<sup>49</sup>For the observation that Moses Radishchev became a customs official in Archangel in 1790, see P. G. Liubomirov, p. 334. See also the statement that A. R. Vorontsov had Moses placed in Archangel in 1784 for a purpose connected with the next revisia, AKV, XII, 412, n. 1; A. R. Vorontsov to M. Radishchev, August 25/September 6, 1790, and M. Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, May 17/29, 1791, *ibid.*, V, 395-396 and 402, respectively. For the location of the two main offices of the Commerce College in Moscow and Archangel, see Komerts Kollegia, p. 4.

<sup>50</sup>Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 298-300; Fitzlyon, pp. 240-242.

is reported to have commented that he saw nothing "remarkable" about it, and never faltered in his friendship to Radishchev, who frequently supplied his mentor with detailed information on economic matters in letters written in tones of warm friendship.<sup>51</sup>

Radishchev, however, must also have been aware of the difficulties Vorontsov was facing after the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty had not been renewed by early 1787.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, as the value of the ruble declined and contraband trade increased, and as Potemkin held increasingly greater sway over the *Empress* in 1788 and 1789, Radishchev did not wish to do harm to his benefactor; and yet, he may have hoped that publication of his Journey might bring the *Empress* around to a more humane domestic and foreign policy. Perhaps he believed if the ideas he and Vorontsov shared came from a source other than Alexander Romanovich, then the *Empress* might listen more seriously. If not, he may have reasoned, what did he have to lose now that his wife was gone? These factors may help explain why he was considered by some to be a "tool" of and "mouthpiece" for the more dangerous Vorontsov faction.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>For Vorontsov's comments, see Fitzlyon, pp. 240-242. As for Radishchev's letters during the 1780's, they provided Vorontsov with information necessary to both the activities of the Commerce College in its efforts to manipulate the Russian economy, and to the most efficient management of the Vorontsov fortune. For example, there are twelve published letters of Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov in AKV, XII, 411-425, during the period 1782-1787, five in 1787, five in 1785, and one in each 1784 and 1782, the last mentioned also published with an additional paragraph in *ibid.*, V, 284. In these letters, Radishchev dealt chiefly with matters related to customs items, providing statistics which one would have imagined Vorontsov could have obtained through official channels, unless these were not sufficiently open for him.

<sup>52</sup>Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, ?, 1787, *ibid.*, pp. 424-425.

<sup>53</sup>For the use of the word "tool," see Génêt to Montmorin, August 13/24, 1790, Quai d'Orsay archives, Paris, Russie, vol. 132, No. 64 of August 24, 1790, p. 357, postscript (Original in cypher), cited in Lang, Radical, p. 194, who himself uses the term "mouthpiece," *ibid.*, p. 97. For allusions to the possibility that Radishchev was condemned as a warning to the more dangerous Vorontsov faction, see A. V. Khrapovitskii, who wrote that Catherine

Radishchev, however, was aware of Vorontsov's behind-the-scenes approach. Although both men had a singleness of purpose, Vorontsov's program was failing. Above all else, Radishchev did not wish to harm Vorontsov in the slightest. Therefore, he probably wanted there to be no link between the Journey and Vorontsov. Radishchev, therefore, undoubtedly not only refrained from informing Vorontsov of plans to publish the Journey, but also he probably kept its preparation a secret from the Count. A copy was sent to Alexei Kutuzov, to whom the book was dedicated. Another copy was sent to the poet-politician Gavril Derzhavin to show the latter that, contrary to his opinion, Radishchev did have talent. There is no indication that Vorontsov received a complimentary copy of the book, or was even aware of its publication until Bezborodko, on June 27/July 8, 1790, asked A. R. Vorontsov if the latter knew whether Radishchev was the author of the Journey.<sup>54</sup>

On his part, Alexander Romanovich may have felt largely responsible for the ideas he had helped implant or develop in the sensitive, creative Radishchev. For this reason, he probably vowed to himself to support and

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II "feared the extension of Vorontsov's power," entry for April 27, 1788 (O. S.), p. 78; and Dukes, who suggested that Radishchev's "harsh treatment" was partly because "his patron, Count A. R. Vorontsov, was an opponent of Potemkin," Dukes, p. 240. As an ironic twist, Catherine had A. A. Bezborodko, P. V. Zavadovskii, and Radishchev's former colleague and superior, Bruce, pass judgment on the author on August 19, 1790, Lang, Radical, p. 193. For the proceedings, see "Voprosnye punkty kollezhskomu sovetniku. Kavaleru Radishchevu i otvety ego," AKV, V, 430-444. For the view that the chapter called "Spasskaia Polest" in Radishchev's Journey was hardly designed to make Catherine more humane, see McConnell, "Autocrat and Critic," Ræff, Catherine, pp. 169-170.

<sup>54</sup>Bezborodko to A. R. Vorontsov, June 27/July 8, 1790, AKV, XII, 199-200. In a letter written later the same day, Bezborodko informed Vorontsov that Radishchev had already been arrested (p. 201). Kutuzov, whose political and social outlook was moderate, had been a college chum of Radishchev's, Ryu, pp. 330ff.

protect his protégé to the fullest extent of his influence. Therefore, unlike those "friends" who declaimed against Novikov when he was accused of subversion,<sup>55</sup> and unlike those who now would have preferred never to have known Radishchev,<sup>56</sup> Alexander Romanovich never faltered in his aid to A. N. Radishchev. Vorontsov succeeded in having the death sentence commuted; and, while Radishchev was in exile, the Court provided funds, clothing, books, materials, and even a woman to the unfortunate exile; and Vorontsov helped educate those children who stayed behind with brother Moses.<sup>57</sup>

A. R. Vorontsov was implicated in the publication of the Journey and the ideas contained therein. But no evidence was found to prove that

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<sup>55</sup>Ryu has described in detail Novikov's arrest and the Russian government's investigation of sedition and subversion, Ryu, pp. 294-355, a subject on which Radishchev, too, was queried while under arrest, "Voprosnye punkty Kollezhskomu sovetniku. Kavaleru Radishchevu i otvety ego," AKV, V, 432. See also Babkin, pp. 146-162.

<sup>56</sup>For example, Alexei Kutuzov had already disavowed Radishchev when the latter's Life of Ushakov had been published. Kutuzov is said to have written the following to a friend, soon after publication of Radishchev's Journey: "'I confess that I found the majority of his propositions concerning religion and Government completely opposed to my own system...'" in Radishchev, Sochinenia (Edited by V. V. Kallash; M.: 1907), II, 480-481, cited in Lang, Radical, pp. 125, 200. Similar feelings were shown by Dashkova and Derzhavin, Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 298-300. But perhaps the cruelest comments of all were made by the Rosicrusians, Prince Trubetskoi and Lopukhin in 1790 and 1791. Trubetskoi wrote of Radishchev: "'That my friend is where his giddy and proud head led [him], and that is the usual consequence of shallow reason not founded on Christian principles.'" According to Lopukhin, (This cruel bodily state in which he now finds himself may be beneficial for his soul, and may enable him to see his errors, to return to the Christian path. Standing upon this path it is not possible to commit things such as those for which he is now suffering.) In condemning Radishchev...Lopukhin...knew that his letters were being censored..." Ia. L. Barskov, Perepiska Moskovskikh masonov 18 veka, 1780-1792 gg. (Petrograd: Imperatorskii Akademii Nauk, 1915), pp. 28ff. I have used the translation of Ryu, pp. 332-333.

<sup>57</sup>For Vorontsov's support of Radishchev, see McConnell, Philosophes, pp. 123-127, 130-131. See also, Lang, Radical, pp. 214-215, 225-226.

he had had anything directly to do with the book. Vorontsov, moreover, probably bore Radishchev no ill-will for publishing the book because the Count was well aware that his own policies were failing and that he was increasingly in disfavor, particularly since 1789. Indeed, if Radishchev's book had been published two years earlier, he might not have been dealt with so severely; but Vorontsov most likely would have continued to drift to the periphery of the Russian government, surely, if perhaps more slowly. On the other hand, had the French Revolution not occurred, both his story and that of Radishchev might well have been different. Such speculation, however interesting, serves only to remind us of what did happen. In this connection, just as Vorontsov held no grudge toward Radishchev, Alexander Romanovich urged his friend in exile to repent and to recant the ideas expressed in the Journey.<sup>58</sup>

Radishchev's refusal to modify his views, it seems, reflects the response of one strong-willed man to another more than it does the answer of a more radical or liberal person to a more moderate or conservative individual.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, Radishchev may have viewed his punishment as justified because of a feeling he may have had that he was somehow to blame, at least in part, for his wife's death and, at that time, to some extent, for the difficulties Vorontsov was facing. Therefore, Radishchev

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<sup>58</sup>Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, February 6/17, 1792, PSS, III, 417.

<sup>59</sup>Vorontsov probably urged repentance again because he thought that a changed political situation might help mitigate Radishchev's sentence, and minimize the latter's suffering for which the Count could see no significant purpose. Radishchev's stubborn and proud reply, moreover, suggests that he, in turn, may have seen no useful purpose in discussing "matters of politics and social philosophy" on which both agreed, and that that is why he maintained a "respectful reserve" thereon, McConnell, Philosophe, p. 2. The request for and refusal of repentance, in this regard, becomes not a goal but a method on which they disagreed. What is perhaps most significant is that the proud and stubborn Radishchev accepted any aid at all, Lang, Radical, pp. 225-226.

agreed to supply Alexander Romanovich with whatever information Vorontsov needed.<sup>60</sup>

Herein, in fact, lies a significant element in their relationship which has apparently been overlooked. Radishchev's letters to Vorontsov while the former was in exile have been defined as "straight reporting," and letters which show his many and varied interests.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, it has been said that the details provided were "helpful" to Vorontsov in his duties as President of the Commerce College.<sup>62</sup> Unquestionably, these evaluations are correct. But since the information contained in these letters and, obviously, requests for such information extend well beyond Vorontsov's retirement from service in early 1794, there must have been a purpose other than to merely "help keep him busy in Siberia, and make him feel he was doing something useful."<sup>63</sup>

Indeed, although Radishchev may not have been fully prepared for the punishment that had been meted out to him,<sup>64</sup> Vorontsov could not have been too surprised. Alexander Romanovich also may have suspected the possibility that his initial defense of Radishchev, and Vorontsov's continued support of his friend while the writer was in exile, were factors which may have placed himself and other members of his family in danger<sup>65</sup> and

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<sup>60</sup>Vorontsov asked Radishchev for details on the territories that he crossed, which Radishchev responded he "would try to do" at his first opportunity, Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, between February 6/17 and April 10/27, 1792, AKV, V, 4-35.

<sup>61</sup>McConnell, Philosophe, p. 129.

<sup>62</sup>Lang, Radical, p. 209.

<sup>63</sup>Thaler's comment in Radishchev, Journey, p. 14.

<sup>64</sup>Lang, Radical, p. 184.

<sup>65</sup>This is a conclusion to which Humphreys was led, Humphreys, pp. 90-91. See also Lang, Radical, p. 224.

jeopardized the Vorontsov fortune acquired from the estates which he so skillfully managed. For however long Radishchev would remain in Siberia, Vorontsov must have reasoned while he was still President of the Commerce College, Radishchev could supply valuable information which might help restore stability to the Russian economy. If, for example, the lucrative trade with China, which had been terminated because of a border incident in 1785, could be renewed, perhaps then Russian finances would improve and Vorontsov could win back some political influence.<sup>66</sup>

Even when this prospect no longer seemed real, after Vorontsov's retirement, Radishchev's letters continued to provide information helpful to the augmentation of the Vorontsov wealth, a use to which it now was put almost solely as Alexander Romanovich devoted himself more to the task of management of the estates. In this connection, we may find the reason that Pil and the other Siberian governors were willing to befriend Radishchev. That is, not only had they worked with and for Count Vorontsov when Alexander Romanovich was President of the Commerce College, but they must have serviced the Vorontsov trading expeditions and other enterprises for which he undoubtedly amply rewarded them. Far from the sceptre of the Russian sovereign they could afford to be more independent and were susceptible to outside influences, particularly financial gain. Radishchev was probably also aware of these conditions; and for this reason, as well as for his still being alive, when he received news of the mitigation of his sentence in January, 1797, he thanked Vorontsov effusively with the words:

I know not to whom I owe this. But I like to attribute  
all the good fortune which befalls me to that same person

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<sup>66</sup>Below, Chapter VII, suggests that the China trade seemed to be at the time the last possibility for realization of these hopes. For the more traditional view, see e.g., Lang, Radical, p. 209.

who has showered me with kindness for so much of my life. When I return home, I hope to be able to throw myself at your feet, to press you to my heart. Oh! find me words to express all that I feel at this instant and the full extent of my gratitude! I await that moment with boundless impatience, and that minute will be one of the finest in my whole life.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, January 26/February 6, 1797, AKV, V, 360. I have used the translation of Lang, Radical, p. 228. As for payment to the governors for their aid to Radishchev, we may ask why Vorontsov did not send money and necessities directly to Radishchev without use of the Siberian governors as intermediaries, e.g., Rebinder, Volkov, Pil, and Osipov, if they were not to take some payment from it, e.g., A. R. Vorontsov to G. M. Osipov, September 12/23, 1790 and October 2/13, 1790, AKV, V, 397-400; and McConnell, Philosophe, pp. 123-124.

## CHAPTER VII

## RETIREMENT: MANAGEMENT OF THE ESTATES AND THE CHINESE TRADE

In 1783, the year that Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov died, the Vorontsov properties included 119 estates in thirteen different gubernias.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>A gubernia is a province; an uezd, a district, or chief town of a district; and a desiatin equals 2.70 acres. Approximately forty percent of the land was arable, most of the agricultural land in Saratov and Voronezh; just under thirty percent was forest land, the largest of these holdings also in Saratov; and the remaining thirty one percent or so, meadowland. For location of most of these properties, see below, appendices B, C and D, and Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 24-25 (Chart) and 186-187 (Chart).

Novgorod on the Volkhov River sent goods via St. Petersburg into the Baltic Sea and, together with Vyborg, permitted all year trading by water; also from Novgorod, via the Msta tributary of the Volga, Tobolsk could be linked with Vyborg. A. R. Vorontsov used this and other river systems as a chief means of transportation with the Volga as the key waterway linking all of European Russia with the western edge of Siberia.

Perm is a central point in eastward movement connecting the Volga with the Ob River via Tobolsk, and permitting the transport of goods from Saratov and Simbirsk via the Kama River to Perm and via the Iset River to the Tobol River, thence past Tobolsk to the Irtysh River and the Ob River. In reverse, the system empties into the Caspian Sea.

Georgievsk located on the banks of the Kuma River which flows from the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea could serve as a midpoint in the transport of goods from the highlands to all shores of the Caspian Sea, including Astrakhan, and thence to the Volga. Perhaps that is why it was acquired later (see below, n. 2).

Yaroslavl and Kostroma are on the Western Volga, which drains the interior of European Russia towards Nizhegorod situated at a junction of the Volga tributaries known as the Unzha River and the Oka River. Tambov, situated at the Tsna River serves as a depot for sending goods to the point where the Oka and Volga join, to Nizhe Novgorod, thence to Perm, and so on.

Vladimir, east of Moscow on the Volga, sent goods also to Nizhegorod and vice-versa. Voronezh, situated on the banks of the Don River was an entrepot en route to the Black Sea. Vologda is situated at the western edge of the Sukhona River, near its lake source, which flows into the Northern Dvina with its mouth at Archangel. From Rahev, via Tver, goods could be exchanged via the Msta River, thence to Novgorod and so on to the Baltic; or, instead, goods could be sent along the Volga to Yaroslavl or Kostroma, or both, in the direction of Perm or the Caspian Sea. See, e.g., W. H. Parker, An Historical Geography of Russia (Chicago: Aldine

Moreover, their male serfs numbered 18,522. Under the management of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, from 1783 to 1801 they acquired 113 new landholdings and an additional 8,063 male serfs. All told, in this period, the Vorontsov assets increased from approximately 146,000 desiatins of land to more than 271,000 desiatins extending over sixteen gubernias. Thus under the administration of A. R. Vorontsov the family fortune was almost doubled, with respect to wealth in land, and increased by half in serfs, at a time when almost all other members of the nobility were falling into debt and being forced to sell their land in order to pay their creditors.<sup>2</sup>

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Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 154-191.

One center of the Vorontsov forest industry was in Tambov; fishing was a major occupation in Voronezh and Simbirsk; gold in Saratov; and furs in Novgorod, Indova, Dvortsovoe, pp. 3-4, 7-8, 50, 64, 101, 251, 265, 319, 331; Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 21-26, 140. Moreover, the Vorontsovs used this river system and road systems as well and built trading posts at appropriate junctions, *ibid.*, pp. 178, 181. Flax was produced at Novgorod, Vologda, Yaroslavl and Kostroma, where manufacturing of flax into cloth was also concentrated, Crosby, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup>It has been estimated that the total number of "souls" over which the Vorontsovs had control was 54,703 spread over 43 uезды. Among the additional landholdings obtained from 1783 to 1801 were the newly acquired Meshchovsk and Mosalsk districts in the added gubernia of Kaluga which is noted for its mineral resources of lignite, peat and quartz. Almost a quarter of the land is forest area, chiefly of pine, oak, birch and aspen. Among its chief crops is hemp; and some of its leading industries are machine building, paper mills and food processing. Similarly, there were two newly acquired districts, Kronenburg and Iakimvar, in the added gubernia of Vyborg, noted for its food processing and metal working industries. The mineral resources of the newly acquired Georgievski district in the added Kavkaz gubernia has long had mineral resources used chiefly, although not solely, for health resorts. In addition, there were newly acquired districts in gubernias already penetrated, such as, the Vuaznikovsk and Gorokhovsk districts of Vladimir; the Vytegorsk and Luzhesk districts of Novgorod; and the Balashovsk and Serdobsk districts in the gubernia of Saratov, Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 27, 47, 186-187. See also E. I. Indeva, "Krestianstvo tsentralno-promyshlennykh vetchin Vorontsovykh v pervoi polovine XIX v.," [hereafter cited as Indeva, "Krestianstvo,"] IX (1951), t. 38, p. 176. See, for locations of many of these properties, the maps below in appendices B, C and D.

## A. Retirement from Service

Although Alexander Romanovich did a creditable job in managing the Vorontsov estates beginning in 1783, he devoted himself more fully to this task after beginning his leave of absence from service which he received in December, 1791; and became still more dedicated to it after formally retiring from service in 1794.<sup>3</sup> The augmentation of the Vorontsov wealth was no mean achievement when one considers that there was no love lost between Catherine II and A. R. Vorontsov. Just as he had for decades nurtured the hope that she might soon be replaced, or at least that he would outlive her,<sup>4</sup> she expressed her distaste for Vorontsov and her relief at his departure from service in a letter sent immediately prior to his retirement to P. V. Zavadovskii. She wrote:

Prepare a decree concerning [A. R.] Vorontsov's retirement. I do not dispute that he is dear to you and that he is talented; [but] I have always known, and now more than ever, that his talents are not designed for my service, and that he is no servant of mine. [One's] heart cannot be coerced, and I have no right to demand compulsory devotion from those who do not wish it. Estranged and separated shall we ever be. (Devil take him!).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Pleading illness, Vorontsov applied for a leave in December, 1791 upon receipt of which he went to his Andreevskoe estate where he remained for the most part during the next two years until his retirement was made official in January, 1794, Zavadovskii to S. R. Vorontsov, January 27/February 7, 1792, AKV, XII, 76; Dashkova, "Memoires," *ibid.*, XXI, 300; Fitzlyon, p. 242. Curiously, either he forgot the year in which he requested his leave, or asked for an extension in December, 1792, "Avtobiografiiia A. R. Vorontsova," A. R. Vorontsov to Dashkova, October 28/November 9, 1805, AKV, V, 2.

<sup>4</sup>Aleksandr A. Kizevetter, "The Legislator in Her Debut" [a translation of "Pervoe Piatiletie Pravlennia Ekateriny II," from Istoricheskie siluety - Liudy i sobytiia (Berlin: Parabola, 1931), pp. 29-54. Translated by Mary Mackler/, in Raeff, Catherine, p. 250; For Catherine II's continued feelings of insecurity, see, e.g., Molloy, II, 338, 384-386; Khrapovitskii, p. 78. For the Vorontsov's hopes that either Catherine might soon die, or that at least they might outlive her, see, e.g., S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, January 4/15, 1790, AKV, IX, 165.

<sup>5</sup>Although the letter, which may be found in AKV, XII, 103, n. 98 was found in the Vorontsov archives with no designated recipient according

Catherine II concluded the memorandum with the following observations: "In preparing the ukaz," she continued:

I free him [A. R. Vorontsov] from coming here if he is sick. Nevertheless, justice requires of him who is haughty that he taste, according to his own convictions, the dis-  
paragement [deserved by] everyone who is out of place here.<sup>6</sup>

Vorontsov apparently believed at the time that Catherine was trying to "humiliate" him, as he wrote to his sister just before his death in October, 1805. Writing more than a decade later, after both Catherine and her son, Paul, had passed away, it may have seemed as though at long last Vorontsov's dreams had been realized. He recalled his feelings with the following words: "As for the manner in which she [Catherine II] dismissed me, if she had believed she would humiliate me by it, she was very much mistaken. Being convinced in my heart that I had served that State and Her with zeal, integrity and, perhaps, even with some success...." and continued by discussing some highlights of his career. He concluded on a note which reflected a lifelong belief in the unique qualities and distinctive worth of every human being in these words:

I have always believed that the individual has a certain intrinsic value of which no despot has the power to rob him.<sup>7</sup>

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to P. Bartenev, he apparently believed it was sent to Zavadovskii. Consequently, V. A. Bilbasov, who edited the Arkhiv Grafov Mordvinovykh, also stated that it was sent to P. V. Zavadovskii, I, 16-17 and n. 2. In assigning it as designated for Zavadovskii, I have differed with Lang, Radical, p. 225 and Marcum, p. 246, both of whom stated that the memorandum was sent to Bezborodko. For the mutual dislike shared by A. R. Vorontsov and Catherine II, see, e.g., P. Bartenev's comment on her dislike of all the Vorontsovs, AKV, XII, 108, n. 105 and, in the same vein Zozerskii, p. 105; and for A. R. Vorontsov's awareness of this feeling and an allusion to his reciprocal sentiment, A. R. Vorontsov, "Avtobiografiia A. R. Vorontsova," *ibid.*, V, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup>"Vse zhe za spravedlivost koia trebovana s gordostiu i otdana po ubezheniiu, poklon vsiakoi neumesten," Catherine to Zavadovskii?, December ?, 1793, *ibid.*, XII, 103.

<sup>7</sup>"Avtobiografiia A. R. Vorontsova," *ibid.*, V, 2-3.

Freed from the obligation of a self-imposed government service which had become both distasteful and extremely tenuous, he continued to build his fortunes so as to prepare for a more auspicious return to the service of his homeland.

#### B. The Law on Entail: Operation in the Breach

Exactly how and why Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov became the manager of the Vorontsov fortune is not clear. It is quite likely, however, that he was so designated quite early, probably before his twenty-fifth birthday, in 1767, the year in which his uncle, Mikhail Illarionovich Vorontsov, had passed away. Moreover, this choice was undoubtedly prompted by an awareness on the part of both M. I. Vorontsov and Roman Illarionovich, the father of Alexander Romanovich, of the changes in the laws of inheritance since March, 1714 when Peter I had issued his decree on entail.<sup>8</sup>

Although this act was possibly the least permanent of Peter's reforms because it was repealed by Empress Anna,<sup>9</sup> it set a precedent which was to become significant in the Russian practice of distribution of land acquired by inheritance<sup>10</sup> for the remainder of the eighteenth century and at least up to the "emancipation" of the serfs in 1861.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Noting that it was decreed on March 18/29, 1714, Miliukov also stated it was "Saltykov who had given Peter the inspiration for the celebrated ukase ...," Miliukov, History, I, 306. The date is given as March 23 by Florinsky, Russia, I, 422, and Blum, p. 377. PSZ, V, 91-94, No. 2789 gives the date as March 23, but notes at the bottom, "Sostoiania March 18." For a readily available condensed English translation, see Basil Dmytryshyn (ed.), Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 16-18. See also, Raeff, Russia, pp. 9-10.

<sup>9</sup>L. Jay Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great [hereafter cited as Oliva, Peter] (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 106-107; Florinsky, Russia, I, 421-423.

<sup>10</sup>Oliva, Peter, p. 107.

<sup>11</sup>Blum, pp. 378-379.

Despite the law on entail's brief period in force, many members of the nobility had become aware of the advantages of centralized management of their estates. Although they wished to continue the practice of dividing up the estates among all [male] heirs, they demanded that in any family with more than one son, one be relieved of the obligation of state service and be permitted to remain "at home" and manage the estates. Consequently, on December 31, 1736 (O. S.), in a decree granting the demand which reduced the term of service required of the members of the gentry to twenty-five years, Empress Anna also agreed to the principle of centralized management of a family's estates as a kind of state service.<sup>12</sup> The abolition of the law of entail in 1731 and the subsequent balance achieved by the modification of the entail principle in the law of 1736 set the tone for the practice of inheritance for at least the next one and one-quarter centuries.

These laws and customs influenced the decisions made by the Vorontsovs concerning the management of their estates. Although it was M. I. Vorontsov who, as vice-chancellor under Empress Elizabeth and Chancellor of the Russian Empire under Elizabeth, Peter III, and Catherine II, received the largest amount of land and serfs, he had neither the time nor the inclination to oversee his properties. Instead, he gave them over to his brother, Roman, who was wealthy in his own right and well known as an enterprising businessman. By the time Mikhail died in 1767, both he and Roman apparently had decided already that Alexander Romanovich would be better suited than his brother Semen Romanovich for the task of managing the Vorontsov estates. Perhaps that is why, at least in part, Semen strongly urged his brother Alexander not to return home after his uncle's death. Semen was, after all, the younger of Roman's sons. More than that, however, it seems he was

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<sup>12</sup>PSZ, IX, No. 7142, December 31, 1736 (O. S.), p. 1022.

almost always in debt, a factor which probably operated against his being selected to manage the estates in spite of the fact that Semen was in Russia and Alexander Romanovich was abroad. Semen was aware of the burdens that would fall to his brother. Toward the end of 1767, therefore, Semen wrote to Alexander Romanovich:

When I think of you and me and of our domestic affairs, and then when I think of what spiritual and physical suffering we here have endured, I cannot conceive, dear friend, of the unpardonable idea that torments you of returning to our home. In the name of God, think no more of it unless you wish to create unhappiness and [unless] you no longer have confidence in all those you love sincerely. I am convinced, my dear [brother], that such pain as you have had or that you [now] have, it will be a hundred times greater here.<sup>13</sup>

Clearly, giving up the life he had led abroad for almost a decade was no easy decision for Alexander Romanovich to make. Moreover, his family at the time was in comparative disfavor compared to its high standing when he had gone abroad in 1758. Although at that time he was reluctant to leave Russia for too long, he must have in the interim become accustomed to a different style of life, particularly with respect to freedom of thought and action which he must have known would be diminished if he returned to Russia. Nevertheless, undoubtedly permeated by a sense of family obligation and perhaps, even prepared for such an eventuality even before he had left Russia, he returned in 1768. For the next few years he was trained by Roman in the business-like, day-to-day tasks required of the manager of Vorontsov estates since, as M. I. Vorontsov had died without a male heir, it was the latter's elder brother, Roman, who had managed the estates for decades and who, in 1767, inherited Mikhail's holdings.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, November 22/December 2, 1767, AKV, XXXII, 114.

<sup>14</sup>Humphreys, p. 136.

Alexander Romanovich, like his father before him, did not choose to merely manage estates, but rather sought some form of state service to complement his managerial functions. Semen, soon afterward, returned to military service in the First Turkish War, retired from service again and, as we have seen, eventually became minister to the Court of St. James, a post which could prove very lucrative for an enterprising individual. After Roman's death in 1783, his holdings together with those formally held by Mikhail were inherited by Semen and Alexander Romanovich.<sup>15</sup>

Immediately prior to Roman's death, Semen left Russia, only once briefly to return. Meanwhile, A. R. Vorontsov secured and enlarged the family fortune; partly by good managerial practice and partly, together with his good friend P. V. Zavadovskii, who avowed he had been taught by Alexander Romanovich,<sup>16</sup> by means of sound investments and shrewd financial practice. According to E. I. Indova, in the year 1800 alone, the total income from the Vorontsov holdings amounted to 148,455 rubles.<sup>17</sup>

According to E. I. Indova, by 1830, total income from the Vorontsov holdings had increased to 768,833 rubles for that year alone. When compared with the year 1800 this figure represented a value increase of 250 percent in constant silver rubles.<sup>18</sup>

Semen had reason to be proud. His brother Alexander Romanovich,

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Zaozerskii, p. 133.

<sup>17</sup>Indova, Krepostnoe, p. 30. An 1800 ruble was valued at 153 kopecks which means that even if compared to the stable year of 1774 when a ruble equaled 100 kopecks, the value of the Vorontsov's income in the year 1800 was just under 100,000 rubles or 400,000 francs, Van Regemorter, pp. 325, 332.

<sup>18</sup>Indova, Krepostnoe, p. 30.

the link between the Vorontsov generations, had done his job well.<sup>19</sup>

### C. One of a Handful

As noted by Jerome Blum, the Vorontsovs were one of "a handful."<sup>20</sup> Although Count N. P. Sheremetev was far and away the largest landowner and serfowner in Russia at the turn of the century, he was also the most heavily indebted, owning more than 2,000,000 rubles in the year 1800.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, as the debts of all Russian serf owners combined climbed from 110 million assignat rubles in 1820 to 425 million "credit rubles" in 1859, the Vorontsovs -- one of the wealthiest Russian families, remained solvent.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>One of the chief reasons for lack of documentation of the pattern of Vorontsov inheritance as suggested in the text above is thoroughly described by Blum. He noted that although some wealthy proprietors had awakened, by the 1760's and 1770's, to the dangers of equal inheritance, i.e., diminution of family holdings, waste, inefficiency, high cost of management, duplication of effort, etc., they were required to obtain permission from the sovereign to "protect their patrimonies by entailing them and passing them on by primogeniture." Prior to 1825, "only two men, General-Field Marshal Count Chernyshev in 1774 and Count Stroganov in 1814, had succeeded in gaining the imperial assent," Blum, pp. 378-379.

Actually, the Vorontsovs were too rich to qualify as shown by the figures cited by Indova in the text above. Consequently, it may be inferred that even if the Vorontsovs had applied for entail under Catherine II or Paul, these rulers might not have given formal approval since they would not have wished to aid any increase in the power of the Vorontsovs. After the turn of the century, the government policy that developed seemed to be aimed at maintaining the integral unity of moderately wealthy aristocracy, but opposed to aiding the "very rich."

<sup>20</sup>He stated: "Of the proprietors who owned over 1900 males, a handful counted their serfs in the tens of thousands...Count N. P. Sheremetev owned 186,610 male and female serfs and 990,793 desiatins of land in the last part of the eighteenth century...The Vorontsovs, Iusopovs, Stroganovs, Orlovs, and the Golitsins were other great proprietors, though they owned far fewer people than the Sheremetevs. Count Vorontsov owned 54,703 serfs of both sexes and 271,363 desiatins of land at the end of the eighteenth century, and in 1851 his successor owned 37,702 male souls alone...", Blum, p. 370. See also, Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 39-47, 119.

<sup>21</sup>His heir, D. N. Sheremetev, was 6,000,000 rubles in debt by 1859, Blum, p. 379.

<sup>22</sup>Iusopov had owed 100,000 rubles in 1798 and 693,630 rubles in 1818.

Service provided the Vorontsovs with their primary sources of income. These were in the form of salaries, pensions, grants of land and serfs, and "bonus" payments for services rendered to the Russian government and, in some cases, to foreign governments as well.<sup>23</sup> In addition, to farming, for example, for grain, they were engaged in the lumber, paper and furniture industries which were developed from their vast forest preserves; the cattle raising and leather industries which were built on their massive stretches of meadowland; the trade in hunting and trapping business; the mining industry, of copper and iron in particular; the fishing industry; and the gold trade.<sup>24</sup>

Perhaps more important than the fact they held land and serfs is the way in which they utilized the material and human resources available to them. E. I. Indova, a Soviet scholar who has searched the unpublished materials in the Vorontsov archives in the U.S.S.R., although constrained to

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Moreover, as early as 1764 B. A. Kurakin had been 207,032 rubles in debt. In the nineteenth century, the total debt of all Russian serfowners had climbed to 950 million assignat rubles by 1833. The assignat rubles (paper bank notes) had been widely circulated since 1768 and had spurred on the inflationary spiral.

<sup>23</sup>Humphreys, pp. 152-153, 249. A. R. Vorontsov, in his autobiographical letter to Dashkova, noted some of the gifts he had received from Catherine II in recognition of his outstanding service. For example, in 1782, upon completion of the general tariff law, he was presented with a snuff box and a bonus of 20,000 rubles; in 1783, his salary was increased by 300 rubles per month; in 1786, for outstanding service on, among others, the banking commission, he received the diamond-studded cross of the Order of St. Alexander Nevskii and a bonus of 50,000 rubles; in 1790, to commemorate the peace with Sweden, Catherine II presented him with an expensive snuff box and, in 1792, to commemorate the Turkish peace, a diamond signet ring, AKV, V, 4-5. See also, the view that the granting of 2,412 male serfs in the uezd of Keksgola marked the beginning of the Vorontsov wealth, Indova, Dvortsove, pp. 78-79.

<sup>24</sup>One center of their forest industry was in Tambov; for fishing, Voronezh and Simbirsk; gold in Saratov; and furs in Novgorod, *ibid.*, pp. 3-4, 7-8, 50, 64, 101, 251, 265, 319, 331; Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 21-26, 140, 179, 181.

place the Vorontsovs in the "feudal-serf economy" of eighteenth century Russia, has correctly demonstrated that the Vorontsovs in general, and Alexander Romanovich in particular, were successful enterprising individual entrepreneurs. For example, although Indova insisted that the chief method by which the Vorontsovs "exploited" their peasants was by requiring payment in obrok (cash) rather than by barshchina (payment in goods, kind, or work), the fact remains, as Indova also demonstrated, but in so doing refused to make the connection, that obrok represented a bourgeois capitalist, or mercantile method of providing incentive to increase production and improve quality.<sup>25</sup>

In addition, the Vorontsovs rented tillage sections to their peasants, many of whom were rich, occasionally buying their land and paying off a mortgage over a given period of time. Moreover, the Vorontsovs built mills, especially grain and paper mills; granaries and other kinds of warehouses; rock quarries; wine distilleries; iron foundries and various kinds of factories which they also rented to peasants on their lands. Obviously, in order to pay their rent (arenda), the peasants had to produce; and in this way, obrok was transformed into, in many cases, arenda. Indeed, occasionally on the Vorontsov lands one encountered "peasant pomeshchiki" (landowners), small entrepreneurs in their own right who, in turn, although on a smaller scale, also rented land to others and hired others to work for them.<sup>26</sup>

Moreover, as also demonstrated by Indova, the Vorontsovs built and

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 140, 178-179; Indova, Dvortsy, pp. 50, 261. For a map study of barshchina and obrok in eighteenth century Russia, see Appendix E below.

<sup>26</sup>Indova mentioned that they introduced large scale agricultural methods; she also stated that most of the "peasant pomeshchiki" could be found on the Vorontsov lands in and near St. Petersburg, Moscow and Odessa, Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 140, 179-181.

rented trading posts, which included shops, stores, restaurants and overnight inns. Moreover, at these places and elsewhere, they were engaged in the money trade, exchanging one kind of Russian currency for another as values changed from day to day, and exchanging Russian currency for foreign currency with merchants from other countries who passed through or stopped over.<sup>27</sup> In this connection, N. D. Chechulin, who wrote about the "ineptness of the financial administration, the flagrant inability of the ruling group to deal with current problems, [and] the absence of skilled financiers among the members of the government," apparently was aware of A. R. Vorontsov's financial ability.<sup>28</sup>

Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was responsible for the solvency of the Vorontsov fortune at a time when almost every other landlord in Russia was falling more heavily into debt because of skyrocketing inflation. As President of the Commerce College, he had succeeded in manipulating not only his own family's fortune so that it would grow, but also maintained the stability of the ruble for more than a dozen years in the face of costly wars and extravagant court expenditures notably by, among others, Prince Potemkin, and in spite of the wasted wealth lavished by Catherine II on her incessant flow of paramours. Finally by 1787 the bubble had burst in the face of the failure to renew an Anglo-Russian commercial agreement; preparation for two wars, one against Turkey, the other with Sweden; and the financial drain resulting from the strain placed upon the resources of all European nations by the initial shock and continued challenge posed by the

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. 179, 181.

<sup>28</sup>Chechulin, pp. 365-366. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 67-92, 255-259, 374-380. In trade and financial matters, "A. R. Vorontsov...always won the council to his side" ("...gr. A. R. Vorontsov, kotorii i sklonial vseгда Sovet na svoju storonu."), p. 366.

French revolution of 1789. Already in disfavor, Alexander Romanovich took a leave of absence from service in 1791 after the Radishchev affair had quieted down somewhat, and finally retired after the signing of an Anglo-Russian commercial treaty which was far from his liking because it did not provide sufficient financial advantage for the Russian government or its nationals, a goal he had been striving to achieve for more than two decades. Finally, he handled the financial affairs not only of his family, but also of many friends like A. A. Bezborodko and V. P. Kochubei, particularly when they found themselves increasingly immersed in debts from which they, and in the case of the former, their heirs had difficulty in extracting themselves. Indeed, there were capable financiers like Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov and P. V. Zavadovskii available to the Russian Government and its leaders. It is not their fault that the government did not make the best use of their talents.<sup>29</sup>

Perhaps more data has been uncovered about the Vorontsov mining interests than about any of their other economic affairs.<sup>30</sup> Most of their mines seem to have been centered in the gubernia of Perm. The story of their growth and development may provide some insight into A. R. Vorontsov's business practices. In 1759, during the reign of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, M. I. Vorontsov had received some copper smelting works near Perm in the districts of Iagoshikhinsk, Motovilikhinsk, Visimsk and Pyskorsk. Having no desire to work them, he had given them to his brother, Roman. At about the same time, Roman received the works at Verkh-Isetsk which were sold to Ivan Iakovlev after Roman's death at a profit of 600 percent and were used to pay some of his debts. Similarly, in 1787 Alexander Romanovich sold the

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<sup>29</sup>Polovtsoff, p. 161; Zaozerskii, p. 133.

<sup>30</sup>Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 10-11, 17; Humphreys, pp. 143-144.

copper works at Perm which had been transferred by Mikhail to Roman. A. R. Vorontsov received 100,000 rubles in the transaction, also used to pay Roman's debts.<sup>31</sup>

The mines at Verkh-Isetsk had been opened in 1726 in the Perm gubernia on government land near the Isete river. Roman is said to have tried to modernize them in 1758 and 1764 in order to increase their production. By 1797 these mines were reported to have had "approximately seventy-nine active mining pits worked by 160 masters and skilled workers and supported by 8,813 peasants."<sup>32</sup> The mines at Motovilikhinsk were located about forty versts (close to twenty-six miles) from Perm. They had been opened in 1736; and in 1797 employed 452 masters and skilled workers, thirty-one managers, 9,882 peasants who worked fifteen active pits, another sixty-seven pits remaining inactive. As for those at Pyskorsk, they had been opened originally in 1640. Located on the lands of the Pyskorskii monastery near the Kangorok river, they had been closed in 1660, then reopened in 1723. In 1797, they were still functioning, although only six pits of a total of 317 were active. They were worked by 123 masters and skilled workers, thirteen managers and 6,619 peasants.<sup>33</sup>

Although the number of workers in the Vorontsov mines was, in general, fewer than the average for other copper works in the area, one should not conclude that this condition was a function of either the age of the mines

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<sup>31</sup>Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 21-23; Pavlenko, pp. 346-347.

<sup>32</sup>A. N. Efimov (ed.), Gornozavodskaya promyshlennost' urala na rubezhe XVIII-XIX vv. (Sverdlovsk; 1956), p. 76, cited in Humphreys, p. 150.

<sup>33</sup>A verst equals 3,500 feet or almost six tenths of a mile. The facts and figures are provided by Efimov, pp. 23-24, cited in Humphreys, pp. 144, 150. Pavlenko noted that the accuracy of the lists on which he based his view is questionable, Pavlenko, pp. 346-347.

(they were older than most), or that they were becoming less profitable.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the works were sold not necessarily because they were becoming less profitable, but probably because at the time of sale the amount received represented a substantial profit. In addition, the fact that these mines and other Vorontsov holdings were less significant in size and total production when compared with the properties of other mining families (such as Demidov, Iakovlev, Pashkov and Stroganov) is secondary to a consideration of relative costs of production as related to net profit. That is, although there has been no study of this question, it is quite possible that the Vorontsov use of obrok instead of barshchina resulted in more efficient units of production and, hence, greater net profit.<sup>35</sup>

One of, if not the best explanation of this phenomenon has been presented by Jerome Blum. It is cited here at length because it seems to reflect the economic thinking and activities of both Roman Illarionovich and Alexander Romanovich and also suggests the impact they had on the Russian economy. Essentially, as Blum demonstrated, as the use of obrok became more widespread, the growth of the "exchange-money economy" was accelerated, and the number of serfs or peasants working for a landlord became less important than the amount produced by each "worker," and how efficiently it was produced. Blum wrote:

It has been suggested that owners of large complexes withdrew from direct production because they were loathe to spend the time and money needed to operate their holdings on barshchina, especially on those of their properties that lay far from their

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<sup>34</sup>These conclusions are drawn by Humphreys, p. 150.

<sup>35</sup>This view is presented in opposition to the view of Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 29-30, and Humphreys, p. 150. Apparently, after Catherine's Nakaz attacked the use of obrok, there was a resurgence of barshchina in the late eighteenth century, and with freedom from service the nobility turned more to agricultural pursuits in keeping with the "Theory of the Gentleman," Augustine, pp. 168-169, 174, 178.

central managerial headquarters. Obrok was a much simpler obligation to collect, and required a minimal operating overlay on the part of the proprietor.<sup>36</sup>

Blum rightly attacked this simplistic view which, although it may have been true in some individual cases, offends the common sense necessary to try to establish a general pattern. Writing about the late 1700's and early 1800's, Blum continued:

This rationale, however, disregards the fact that in the eighteenth century the difficulties of supervision of an estate on barshchina could have been no less troublesome and expensive, yet barshchina had apparently been more frequently demanded then by great proprietors than it was later.<sup>37</sup>

Blum concluded his analysis with a suggestion that fits Alexander Romanovich very closely. Blum stated:

It seems to me that the growth of the exchange-money economy provides a more convincing explanation. It became progressively easier for serfs to accumulate cash. As a result, lords who owned many serfs decided that it was easier to increase their own money incomes by putting their peasants on cash obrok, then by engaging in production for the market.<sup>38</sup>

Although the landlord may not have produced directly for the market, according to this view, the serfs and peasants did. For this opportunity they paid rent, paid for the use of the mill, paid for tools, etc. In this way, those who performed the labor, wanting to earn as much for it as

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<sup>36</sup>Blum, pp. 399-400. He disagreed with I. Ignatovich, "Pomeshchichi Krestiane nakanune osvobozhdeniia," Russkoe bogatstvo, 1900, no. 9, p. 50, who emphasized the growth of the "armchair gentry" who followed the "theory of the gentlemen" of the Renaissance days and the later southern aristocracy in the United States.

<sup>37</sup>Compare Blum, pp. 399-400 with the opposing views of Indova, Krepostnoe, pp. 29-30 and Humphreys, p. 150, as described in notes 34-36 above, and the related text.

<sup>38</sup>Compare Blum, p. 400, with Kluchevsky, V, 77-85 who noted that after 1775 obrok began replacing barshchina, but erroneously concluded that serf-right combined with obrok led to a deterioration of the land which, when added to the reluctance of the pomeshchik to work, produced an inefficient economy.

possible, produced as much as they could and of the highest quality of which they were capable. Indeed, as early as 1787, in one of the few references to peasant life in the correspondence between Semen and Alexander Romanovich, the former alluded to such a situation on the Vorontsov estates. In his letter, Semen voiced his pleasure that on a tour of the estates in the early part of 1787, Alexander Romanovich had found "that the estates at Alabukha and Vorontsovka" were:

flourishing, and the peasants in plenty (l'aisance); that you have arranged the affairs concerning land-surveying (mezhavanie); and that you have made arrangements to have our revenues increased without burdening our vassals.<sup>39</sup>

When one considers, however, the amount of money spent by Alexander Romanovich, his uncle, Mikhail, his father Roman, and his brother Semen, one must look beyond the income from the estates; particularly because, despite the lavish life style of Alexander Romanovich, there were no mortgages or arrears to speak of on his properties, and he was not in debt. It is doubtful that an income of 100,000 rubles, which must have represented estates valued at close to one million rubles, could have easily provided for all those to whom he was so generous (e.g., Semen and his family and Radishchev and his family), and at the same time permit Alexander Romanovich to maintain two homes in St. Petersburg with all their "luxurious advantages," and also to maintain his large estate in the guberniia of Vladimir which was named Andreevskoe "where all was organized for gracious manor living."<sup>40</sup>

To attempt to solve this problem we must inquire into Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's activities as a financier, a subject about which the data, if anything, is less than clear.

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<sup>39</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, March 8/19, 1787, AKV, IX, 96.

<sup>40</sup>Indova, Krepostnce, pp. 31, 141.

D. Speculation about some Speculators, Diplomats and Friends

Toward the end of the year 1782 Semen Romanovich Vorontsov, prior to his acceptance of a diplomatic post in the following year, was in Siberia communicating with both his brother, Alexander, and their father, Roman on conditions in the region.<sup>41</sup> Although it is not clear from their published letters, one of Semen's tasks may have been to check on the stone barricades recently completed at Irkutsk, after seven years in the making, as the Commerce College had recently been informed by Brill, the governor of Irkutsk.<sup>42</sup>

After Roman died the following winter, Alexander Romanovich became involved in the grueling work of settling Roman's estates, a task which took at least two years.<sup>43</sup> At the same time that he was involved in settling Roman's financial affairs, he consulted with Gavril Derzhavin, who had succeeded Roman as Governor of Tambov, on economic conditions in that region. As suggested by the wide variety of matters discussed in these letters, Alexander Romanovich was, so to speak, killing two birds with one stone; that is, the information he obtained was useful to him both in his capacity as President of the Commerce College, and in his role as manager of the Vorontsov estates.

Indeed, it seems as though from this time forth, if not before as well,

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<sup>41</sup>See, e.g., S. R. to R. I. Vorontsov, November 28/December 9, 1782, AKV, XVI, 145-146; R. I. to A. R. Vorontsov, January 7/18, 1783, *ibid.*, XXXI, 75-77.

<sup>42</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, No. 1537, 1775-1782, p. 207.

<sup>43</sup>See, e.g., A. R. Vorontsov's letters to S. R. Vorontsov in which he explained some steps he was taking to settle Roman's estate, December 15/26, 1783; April 17/28, 1784; May 4/15, 1784, AKV, XXXI, 430-436; January 17/28, 1785, *ibid.*, pp. 483-484. Roman died on November 30/December 11, 1783, Rospis AKV, p. 236.

all of A. R. Vorontsov's economic activities were guided by these dual considerations. Consequently, when in his capacity as Senator he traveled to survey the operations of various government bureaus and offices, we find that he frequently toured the areas in which there were Vorontsov properties. For example, in 1784 together with Prince M. V. Dolgorukii he inspected government offices in the Riga and Revel gubernias. In 1785, together with [A. V.?] Maryshkin, Alexander Romanovich toured the Vyborg, Olonets, Arkhangel and Saratov gubernias. And in 1787, again with Maryshkin, A. R. Vorontsov went on an inspection tour of the gubernias of Riazan and Tambov.<sup>44</sup>

Alexander Romanovich may not have been sure that he was receiving from official sources all the information necessary to making the best decisions either for the Russian economy in general or the Vorontsov interests in particular. Perhaps for this reason, as noted by Petr Bartenev, A. A. Bezborodko and Dmitri Prokofievich Troshchinskii (who interestingly enough was thirteen years younger than Count A. R. Vorontsov) wrote to Alexander Romanovich to keep him informed of conditions because the "Empress disliked Vorontsov."<sup>45</sup>

As Troshchinskii's published letters to Vorontsov extend through the reign of Emperor Paul, we may say that under Paul as well, particularly because Alexander Romanovich held no official position, he had to depend on

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<sup>44</sup>Istoriia Pravitelstvuiushchago Senata za dvesti let, 1711-1911 gg. (Edited by K. I. Sharskii; 4 vols.; St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvenno Izdatel'stvo, 1911), II, 596-597. Most writers seem to have omitted reference to the significance of A. R. Vorontsov's role as manager of the Vorontsov fortune. See nn. 1 and 2 at the beginning of this chapter for the Vorontsov interests in Tambov, Saratov, Vyborg and Archangel.

<sup>45</sup>AKV, XII, 370. A. R. Vorontsov's awareness of the fact that the Empress disliked him is another bit of evidence that suggests he sought secrecy concerning certain affairs.

others to inform him of actually existing conditions.<sup>46</sup> Just as Troshchinskii's letters provided inside information which Vorontsov might not have been able to otherwise obtain, so did (as we have seen earlier) the letters of Arkadii Morkov, V. P. Kochubei, Semen Vorontsov and A. N. Radishchev.<sup>47</sup> These letters, it is here suggested, should be viewed in the same light as Petr Bartenev cast the letters of D. P. Troshchinskii, namely that because the Empress disliked Vorontsov he had to get as much reliable information on as wide a variety of subjects as possible. When one adds to this list of correspondents A. A. Bezborodko<sup>48</sup> and P. V.

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<sup>46</sup> There are forty-one letters of Troshchinskii to Vorontsov covering a wide range of subjects, economic, political and diplomatic as well as some of a more personal and social nature. The letters begin in June of 1785 and end sometime in May or soon thereafter in the year 1802, not long after Alexander I ascended to the throne, AKV, XII, 371-408. It is interesting to note that the first of these letters refers to the Chinese trade, June 23/July 4, 1785, p. 371 which was suspended from 1785 to 1792. Other economic information supplied by Troshchinskii included information on the grain trade, July 4/15, 1787, pp. 376-377; the vodka trade April 26/May 7, 1796, p. 391; effects of the tariff, October 24/November 4, 1796, p. 394; and news about banking and financial matters, January 8/19, January 29/February 9, and June 24/July 5, 1796, pp. 387, 388 and 392-393, respectively. Among the diplomatic matters on which Troshchinskii reported were the way in which Bezborodko was handling the negotiations for the Peace of Jassy which ended the Second Turkish War of Catherine's reign, December 19/30, 1791, p. 378; and conditions in Poland between the second and third partitions, May 16/27, and August 11/18, 1794 and March 9/20, 1795, pp. 382-384. Without detailing the remainder of the correspondence, it seems also worthy of note that in July of 1787 Troshchinskii informed Vorontsov (who had gone on a tour of his own when Catherine II at the beginning of the year made a journey to the Crimea), that the Empress was returning from the Crimea, whereupon A. R. Vorontsov hurried back from his own journey, July 4/15, 1787, pp. 375-378.

<sup>47</sup> See e.g., above, Chapter VI, nn. 14, 21, and 51.

<sup>48</sup> Bezborodko's letters to A. R. Vorontsov are interwoven among letters to Semen and Roman as well, from 1778 through 1799 and may be found in AKV, XIII, 1-417. In the same volume, pp. 425-436, 459-470 are six letters from A. R. Vorontsov to Bezborodko on, among other matters, Polish affairs in 1794 (460-468); one letter of 1787 on stone quarries, XXXII, 493-496; and one letter giving Vorontsov's views on various political affairs in 1794, XXXIV, 475-480.

Zavadovskii<sup>49</sup> not only do the implications of Vorontsov's behind the scenes diplomacy and financial manipulation become more discernible, but the incredible network of collaborators he built begins to give substance to the nature of that power and influence, often referred to but rarely described, about which Catherine II was so concerned.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, in the late 1880's, according to Mikhail Garnovskii, who noted some areas of Vorontsov's influence, Alexander Romanovich was likened to "Macchiavelli,"<sup>51</sup> an appropriate

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<sup>49</sup>Zavadovskii's letters to A. R. Vorontsov and S. R. Vorontsov are located in AKV, XII, 1-315, and extend from 1770 through 1807. I have been unable to find any of A. R. Vorontsov's letters to Zavadovskii.

<sup>50</sup>On April 27/May 8, 1788 Khrapovitskii noted Catherine's concern that A. R. Vorontsov was "spreading far and wide the plans for his gain." Khrapovitskii's words are: "Gr. A. R. Vor [graf Aleksandr Romanovich Vorontsov] rasprostraniat dalmie vidy dlia svoikh pribytkov," entry for April 27, 1788, O. S., Khrapovitskii, p. 78. The next year, Khrapovitskii noted that Catherine compared A. R. Vorontsov to his father, Roman, in connection with R. I. Vorontsov's allegedly substituting money as bribes instead of sending recruits from Vladimir. Catherine's observation about "Gr. Aleks. Roman" is that "he is exactly the same," entry for December 15/26, 1789, *ibid.*, p. 320. We should keep in mind that Catherine once called Roman "the most dangerous of the lot," Catherine II, Memoirs, p. 262. Years before, in 1783, Catherine II had appointed Peter Bogdanovich Passek a customs official in Byelorussia. This is the same Passek whose arrest precipitated the timing of the coup of 1762, as he was among those who supported Catherine II, *ibid.*, p. 253. Bezborodko prepared the memoranda notifying both Passek and A. R. Vorontsov of the assignment, Bezborodko to A. R. Vorontsov, November 14/25, 1783, AKV, XIII, 42-45. Certainly we must ask whether Passek was merely to serve as a customs official or was also to spy on the activities of the Commerce College in general and A. R. Vorontsov in particular. Even after his retirement, Vorontsov kept informed of Passek's whereabouts, Zavadovskii to A. R. Vorontsov, June 30/July 11, 1795, *ibid.*, XII, 155; Troshchinskii to A. R. Vorontsov, January 22/February 2, 1798, *ibid.*, p. 401.

<sup>51</sup>Dmitri Mamonov is quoted as likening A. R. Vorontsov to Macchiavelli in October, 1788, Garnovskii, RS (1876), XVI, 227. On July 19/30, 1788, Garnovskii had noted A. R. Vorontsov's leadership in the State Council, *ibid.*, pp. 28-29. On September 2/13, 1788, attention was given to Vorontsov's efforts to conclude a commercial treaty with England, *ibid.*, pp. 214-216, 226. And, in general, from July through October, 1788, Garnovskii described A. R. Vorontsov's leadership in the State Council on such matters as Grieg's Mediterranean expedition, negotiations with England, the Ochakov situation, relations with Prussia, and the Polish question, *ibid.*, pp. 220-222, 226-227. Vorontsov's influence with the nobility under Catherine II was also noted by A. A. Chumikov, "Otzeiskoe dvorianstvo i dvorianskaia shalovannaia gramota," *ibid.*, XLVI (April, 1885), pp. 197-199.

appellation when one takes into consideration that, in 1797, three years after approval of Vorontsov's retirement and shortly after the death of Catherine II, as observed by E. P. Karnovich writing in 1884, A. R. Vorontsov still had his "finger in the pie of foreign affairs directions"<sup>52</sup>

The evidence suggests that one of the reasons each of these individuals cooperated with A. R. Vorontsov was because each had great respect and admiration for his knowledge, his ability and his humane compassion. Moreover, he handled the finances of many of them, as has been seen with reference to Bezborodko and Kochubei as well as Semen Romanovich and Radishchev. In this connection, he undoubtedly either gave them loans or invested their money for them (or told them how best to invest their money), or some combination thereof as well. As an additional example of a collaborator who aided Vorontsov out of affection and respect, we find that Ivan Varfolomeevich Strakhov, sometime Privy Councilor and vice-governor of Kostroma when Roman Illarionovich was Viceroy of the area, is said to have been "good to Count [A. R.] Vorontsov [during] the last years of Catherine II and the reign of Paul I."<sup>53</sup> As a member of the College of Manufactures, which had been absorbed by the Commerce College in 1780, Strakhov helped Vorontsov develop Russian industry, particularly with respect to glass blowing, in which Strakhov had his own plants. In more than forty published letters from 1785 to 1801, Strakhov, like Troshchinskii and the others, reported to Vorontsov on the widest variety of matters.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>Karnovich, Lichnosti, p. 293. Vorontsov's "brilliance, especially (osobливо) in foreign affairs..." was also noted by A. S. Lappo-Danilevski, Otkryv o Sochinenii N. D. Chechulina: "Ocherki po istorii russkikh finansov v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II" (SPb.: Tip. Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1910), p. 139. See also, Goertz, pp. 46-47.

<sup>53</sup>P. Bartenev, ed. n., AKV, XIV, 470.

<sup>54</sup>The letters of Strakhov to A. R. Vorontsov are found in AKV, XIV, 471-

Similarly, State Councilor and author Pavel Artemeevich Levashov sent similar information to A. R. Vorontsov. The more one reads these letters, the more one gets the feeling that Vorontsov's brain operated like a modern computer which is fed all sorts of information and then, after having digested it, gives accurate feedback. It is interesting to note about Levashov, that although he wrote to Vorontsov as though he [Levashov] were a diplomatic representative, Petr Bartenev reported that "he [Levashov] never served according to the records of the College of Foreign Affairs" at Tsarskoe Selo from where most of his letters came.<sup>55</sup>

Just as many of these letters were received by A. R. Vorontsov, probably many of them in response to specific questions, after his leave of absence in 1791 which may be said to have begun his unofficial retirement, his reasons for wanting this information had to be something other than for official government purposes. Indeed, just as he continued to receive information and dispatch suggestions on economic matters and diplomacy for many years after his retirement from service, he also seems to have increased

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512, beginning with June 21/July 1, 1785 (p. 471) and concluding with some-time in or after January, 1801 (pp. 511-512). In an interesting letter of February 12/23, 1787 Strakhov described what St. Petersburg was like without Catherine there, p. 473. On four occasions Strakhov informed Vorontsov about Platon Zubov's whereabouts and circumstances, July 18/29, 1796; April 27/May 8, 1799; May 18/29, 1799; and the undated letter of 1801, pp. 481, 496, 498, and 511-512, respectively. Perhaps more significant was the information he provided Vorontsov on the condition of the assignats, and other money matters, February 19/March 2, 1787; February 9/20, 1793; May 24/June 4, 1796, pp. 475, 476, and 479-480, respectively.

<sup>55</sup>P. Bartenev, ed. n., *AKV*, XIV, 442. Levashov was uncle to A. P. Ermolov, favorite of Catherine II in 1785-1786, whereafter S. R. Vorontsov played host to Ermolov in London. Levashov's letters number eighteen from February 10/21, 1786 (p. 443) to August 8/19, 1791 (pp. 467-468). His letters, primarily concerned with diplomatic events, such as the Turkish War, December 12/23, 1787; May 25/June 5, 1788, pp. 452, 454, respectively; the Swedish conflict, August 8/19, 1790, pp. 462-463; and Polish affairs, July 5/16, 1786; May 27/June 7, 1789; August 8/19, 1791, pp. 448, 459, and 467-468, respectively, also note the sad state of Russian finances, March 17/28, 1788, pp. 453-454.

his activities as a financier.

For example David Sutherland was known to Catherine II who may have subsidized some of his ventures,<sup>56</sup> was mentioned in Bezborodko's letters to Semen Romanovich,<sup>57</sup> and as early as 1785 was a courier between A. R. Vorontsov and S. R. Vorontsov transmitting and, apparently, converting currency for them in regard to their personal and family financial affairs,<sup>58</sup> a function it seems he was still performing in the early 1790's.<sup>59</sup> In fact, in 1789, Semen noted in a letter to Alexander Romanovich that Sutherland was involved in a deal to turn 400 thousand rubles into 700 thousand rubles.<sup>60</sup> More interesting, perhaps, is that Sutherland, who was described in 1791 by Semen as an agent of the British Russia Company whose interests were opposed to those of Russia,<sup>61</sup> was mentioned in a letter of the following year with respect to the China trade and the Macartney mission from England to improve

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<sup>56</sup>David Sutherland, A Tour up the Straits, from Gibraltar to Constantinople: With the leading events in the present war between the Austrians, Russians and Turks, to the commencement of the year 1789 (London: J. Johnson, 1790). See also, Lucy S. Sutherland, A London Merchant, 1695-1774 (Frank Cass: Oxford University Press, 1933 [1962 reprint]) and, by the same author, The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1952) both of which had nothing of significance for us in this connection except to wonder whether Lucy is a descendant of our Sutherland. See also, above, S. R. Vorontsov's concern about the involvement between one of the consuls of the Commerce College, Ferrieri, and "Sutherland" in the year 1785, S. R. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov, April 2/13, 1785, AKV, IX, 32-33; Catherine II to S. R. Vorontsov, October 6/17, 1789, AKV, XXVIII, 102-104.

<sup>57</sup>See, e.g., Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, October 24/November 4, 1785; October 28/November 8, 1785; July 5/16, 1789; October 10/21, 1791, AKV, XIII, 98, 102, 160 and 210, respectively.

<sup>58</sup>A. R. to S. R. Vorontsov, February 3/14, 1785, *ibid.*, XXXI, 485-486.

<sup>59</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Pismo grafa A. R. Vorontsova vo Frantsiiu vo vremia revoliutsii" (undated with no designee), *ibid.*, XIII, 481.

<sup>60</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, December 14/25, 1789, *ibid.*, IX, 156.

<sup>61</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, March 18/29, 1791, *ibid.*, p. 187.

Anglo-Chinese trade relations.<sup>62</sup> In this letter, Semen suggested to Alexander Romanovich that A. N. Radishchev might be able to reap some benefit from the situation which existed if he played his cards right. Semen suggested:

It seems to me that this will be a good occasion to put an end to the disgrace of poor Radishchev in associating him with this mission for all that he knows about commerce, as a man who himself understands it perfectly.<sup>63</sup>

E. The China Trade: Radishchev, Shelekhov, Rezanov, Laksmann and other Agents in the Vanguard

Alexander Romanovich apparently already had attempted to enlist Radishchev in such an enterprise. Vorontsov had been striving since 1785 to reopen the lucrative Russo-Chinese trade which brought into the Russian state treasury an estimated 600,000 rubles per year.<sup>64</sup> Semen, who was aware of the value of this trade and British hope of capturing it, had written to his elder brother in 1790 asking for more detailed information about the

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<sup>62</sup>There seems to be nothing of significance in relation to this analysis in the published material about George Macartney and his mission to China in 1793. See, for example, Anonymous?, A Complete View of the Chinese Empire Exhibited in a...Genuine and Copious Account of Earl Macartney's Embassy...the Emperor of China (London: C. Cawthorn, 1798); George Macartney, The Private Correspondence of Lord Macartney, Governor of Madras (1761-85) (Edited by C. Collin Davies; London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society (vol. 77), 1950); George Macartney, Correspondence Between Lord Macartney and Major-General Stuart, Since Lord Macartney's Arrival in England from 10th January to 8th June, 1786 (Dublin: P. Byrne, 1786); Sir George Staunton, An Abridged Account of the Embassy to the Emperor of China...Taken Principally from the Papers of Earl Macartney... (London: John Stockdale, 1797); and Helen H. Robbins, Our First Ambassador to China. An Account of the Life of George, Earl of Macartney with Extracts from His Letters...as Told by Himself, 1737-1806. From Hitherto Unpublished Correspondence and Documents (London: John Murray, 1908).

<sup>63</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, January 13/24, 1792, AKV, IX, 231. Ségur's awareness of Vorontsov's interest in China in the late 1780's is shown by his comment that Vorontsov's actions in this regard delayed Franco-Russian commercial negotiations for approximately one year, Ségur, II, 392.

<sup>64</sup>AGS, I, pt. 2, p. 313.

Chinese trade.<sup>65</sup> Alexander Romanovich must have asked Radishchev to provide as much information as possible on Siberian routes and on the Chinese trade in one of his letters to the unfortunate exile. That is why Radishchev's early letters "foreshadowed" his "Letter on the China Trade"<sup>66</sup> which was probably written sometime in 1792.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup>S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, January 4/15, 1790; January 13/24, 1792, AKV, IX, 163 and 229, respectively.

<sup>66</sup>McConnell, Philosophe, p. 152. It is interesting to note in this connection that the vast majority of the published letters from Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov while the former was in exile were written from September 1790 through September 1792, a total of thirty-four, with twenty-three letters written in 1791 alone, September 21/October 2, 1790-September 14/25, 1792, PSS, III, 344-446. Assuming that there were no letters written to Vorontsov other than those published, the number written in these two years represent more than half the letters written to him by Radishchev while the latter was in exile, and almost forty percent of the letters written by Radishchev to Vorontsov in almost two decades from 1782 to 1800. This is based on the belief that there are eighty-nine clearly identifiable letters from 1782 through 1800, with the following frequency distributions: 1782 (1), 1784 (2), 1793 (3), 1794 (4), 1795 (3), 1796 (2), 1797 (7), 1798 (7), 1799 (3), and 1800 (1), PSS, III, 307-536. See also, for about seventy-five of these letters, some printed in each of both of the following volumes, AKV, V, 284-393; XII, 411-446.

Perhaps one of the reasons the letters slowed after 1792 is that in that year the Russian trade with China, which had been officially closed since 1785 because of a border incident, had finally been reopened.

<sup>67</sup>For the "Letter on the China Trade," see PSS, II, 5-35; for determination of its date, *ibid.*, p. 360. It seems, then, that long before Semen wrote to A. R. Vorontsov in January 1792 (see above, n. 63), in which it was suggested that Alexander Romanovich involve Radishchev in some plans or expeditions which, if successful, might speed a pardon his way, A. R. Vorontsov already had done so. When Russia's China trade was formally reopened in February, 1792, Foust, p. 314, it may have seemed to Vorontsov that such a plan for Radishchev's pardon was no longer feasible just as Vorontsov's own hopes for a return to the center of government politics had also thereby been diminished. Consequently, he may have written Radishchev that the original plan for pardon was now a missed opportunity and that Radishchev's only hope for pardon lay in his repentance and recantation, a course of action Radishchev refused to take. Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, February 6/17, 1792, PSS, III, 417. If this reasoning is correct, Radishchev probably began his "Letter on the China Trade" sometime in 1791 and completed it in 1792, whereafter he sent it on to Vorontsov who was still able to use it in relation to his own opportunities for investment. Indeed, the usefulness of the information provided by Radishchev is suggested by Foust, who thoroughly demonstrated the importance of the China trade for Russia, Foust, pp. 102, 211-212, 291, 309-310, 337, 352.

Before briefly discussing the content of the "Letter on the China Trade" and its significance, it would help to make note of some other items worthy of mention if for no other reason than that they may provide a more proper perspective for evaluation of the "Letter." For example, according to A. I. Zaozerskii, the interest in China as a market on the part of A. R. Vorontsov dates back to at least 1759.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, as President of the Commerce College, there is evidence that Alexander Romanovich was attempting to broaden his system of Commerce College consuls to extend into such outlying regions as China and Dubrovnik.<sup>69</sup> In addition, Vorontsov had shown

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<sup>68</sup>Zaozerskii, p. 117.

<sup>69</sup>Dubrovnik, an independent republic akin to the Renaissance Italian city-states, in 1775 accepted a Russian consul who would have equal status with those of France and Austria. In 1783 the Dubrovnik government was using the good offices of the Austrian Embassy in St. Petersburg and had gained the favor of Prince Galitzin. In 1788, Graf Anton Ghicca became the Russian consul in Dubrovnik, and was there succeeded by [Petr?] "Fonton" (who was frequently mentioned in the correspondence between Prince Mikhail Semenovich Vorontsov with A. X. Benckendorf from 1803-1853, AKV, XXXV, 1-396). In 1803, moreover, Giovanni Antonio Benvenuti, "the agent of Dubrovnik in St. Petersburg," and Roman diplomats had an interview with the then Chancellor, Count A. R. Vorontsov, as described in Dr. Bogdan Krizman, Diplomati i konzuli u starom dubrovniku (Zagreb: Poduzeca za izdavanje prodaju i distribuciju knjiga, 1957), pp. 200-202, 376, n. 163.

A. R. Vorontsov's development of the system of consuls serving the Commerce College has been dealt with at length, see above, Chapter IV. Some references to the application of this system omitted therefrom, and added here, are regarding consul Brandenburg in Spain and the trade in wine and timber products, Kommerts Kollegia, Nos. 333-337, 1782-1796, pp. 59-60; in Turkey, consul Ivan Khevnitser, *ibid.*, No. 378, 1782, p. 65; in the Republic of Ragusa, consul Anton Dzhak, and in Copenhagen, agent John Koenig, with reference to the Mediterranean trade, *ibid.*, No. 368, 1788-1794, p. 64. Indeed, in 1783, it was "at the request of the President of the Commerce College," then Count A. R. Vorontsov, that for the next twelve years at least, the Russian government agreed that the Commerce College might obtain a "supply of consuls, appointed to various places, [with] instructions on appropriate subjects concerning commerce," *ibid.*, No. 122, 1783-1795, p. 32. In addition, in the spring of 1792, and "in accordance with...the decree of March 27, 1792," approximately one month after the China trade had reopened, the Commerce College was given permission to establish "consular positions...in various parts of Europe and Asia..." *ibid.*, No. 123, 1792-1800, p. 32.

interest in the trade with America and, when Chancellor of the Russian Empire under Tsar Alexander I, helped promote an expedition to open up Japan to Russian commerce.<sup>70</sup> In many of these ventures it seems that he preferred to work through the Moscow office of the Siberian Department.<sup>71</sup>

Some events of the years 1787 and 1788 may also have special bearing

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<sup>70</sup>In 1803, when Vorontsov was Chancellor under Alexander I, Alexander Romanovich strongly supported the expedition of Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov who had hoped to open up Japan to Russian trade, Kochubei to S. R. Vorontsov, n.d., 1803?, AKV, XVIII, 203; D. P. Tatishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, December 20, 1804/January 1, 1805, *ibid.*, pp. 396-397; and A. R. Vorontsov to "His Tenjin-Kubo Majesty, the Autocratic Potentate of the Japanese Empire," June 30/July 12, 1803, as translated in George Alexander Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 145-146.

Rezanov was the son-in-law of Gregory Ivanovich Shelekhov, a successful Russian trader. Both were involved in the founding of the Russian-American Company, Foust, p. 318. Indeed, it is conceivable that beginning at least in 1791, A. R. Vorontsov may have been one of the financiers of the Adam Laksman expedition which at that time also unsuccessfully attempted to open up Japan to Russian commerce, *ibid.*, pp. 311, 318. While Radishchev was in Siberia, moreover, he referred to a letter which he had not received, and noted that "probably it is the one which Mr. Laksman had carried," Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, n.d. 1792?, AKV, V, 338; dated February 6/17, 1792 in PSS, III, 414. Eleven days later, he noted he still had not seen Laksman, February 17/28, 1792, *ibid.*, p. 425; and more than four years later, wrote to Vorontsov, "Mr. Laksman, as Your Excellency must know it is dead," June 9/20, 1796, *ibid.*, p. 484. For other references to Laksman, see AKV, XXIV, 210-407, and esp. Laksman to A. R. Vorontsov, 1791?, *ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>71</sup>For example, in 1781 the Moscow office of the Siberian Department was issuing instructions to the consuls in Koenigsberg, Leipzig, Lubeck and Kiel, Sibirskii prikaz, p. 73, No. 5519, kn. 64x, l. 70, September 20/October 11, 1781; and in 1783 was discussing appropriations for the "full-dress clothing" of Russian consuls, *ibid.*, No. 5519, kn. 65, l. 111, December 1/12, 1783, p. 73. In addition, among many other examples, it responded quickly to a direction transmitted to it by the Commerce Commission via the Commerce College on July 23/August 3, 1784 on the disposition of defective Russian masts, *ibid.*, kn. 66, l. 113, p. 73; earlier on October 4/15, 1781, had undertaken a project in relation to the timber trade, *ibid.*, No. 5536, kn. 436, l. 572, p. 118; before that, on May 8/19, 1780, had reported on the commodities, including arms and ammunition, brought in by English merchants through the port of Archangel, *ibid.*, No. 5519, kn. 58x, l. 30, p. 72; had reported on the activities of merchants in the regions of the Black and Caspian seas, *ibid.*, No. 5536, kn. 433, l. 554, February 19, 1780 (O. S.), p. 118; and discussed the condition of the rhubarb trade between February, 1788 and February, 1793, *ibid.*, No. 5536, kn. 446, l. 630, p. 119.

on Vorontsov's interest and activities with regard to Siberian commerce and Chinese trade. After Catherine had set out on her journey to the Crimea in January, 1787, but before Vorontsov set out on his dual purpose "extensive provincial tour,"<sup>72</sup> as noted by Mikhail Garnovskii, Alexander Romanovich presented Sutherland to members of the St. Petersburg court as someone knowledgeable and experienced in commercial and financial matters.<sup>73</sup>

Approximately one year later, on February 21, 1788 (O. S.), the Moscow office of the Siberian department, at Vorontsov's instigation discussed whether it should grant a large subsidy to the Golikov-Shelekhov Company for the exploration of trade possibilities via Siberia with China and America.<sup>74</sup> Catherine rewarded the members of the company for their activities to that date but, although the Commerce Commission had in March, 1788 approved Shelekhov's request for a monopoly in the areas he had explored, Catherine II refused to grant it to them or, for that matter, any of their other requests except for the rewards given them.<sup>75</sup> S. B. Okun, moreover, who described how this company eventually merged with another to become the Russian-American Company in the 1790's,<sup>76</sup> also noted his difficulty in

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<sup>72</sup>Charles to William Fraser, January 26/February 6, 1787, No. 5, January 13, 1787; F. O. 65/15, cited in Ehrman, p. 110, n. 3.

<sup>73</sup>Entry for February 11/22, 1787, Garnovskii, RS, XV, 700-701.

<sup>74</sup>Sibirskii prikaz, No. 5536, kn. 445, l. 624 (February 21, 1788 [O. S.]), p. 119.

<sup>75</sup>S. B. Okun, The Russian-American Company (Edited by B. D. Grekov; trans. by Carl Ginsburg; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 22-23, stated that even the request for 200,000 rubles was denied. See also, Kommersts Komissia, No. 337, p. 41.

<sup>76</sup>Okun, pp. 30-38. Curiously, Okun stated that Macartney's mission to China was in 1792, and that trade between Russia and China was not "officially reestablished" until 1794 (p. 16); and also that Rezanov, who was a "correspondent" (or member of the Board of Directors) of the Russian-American Company and its predecessors as well, was Shelekhov's "brother-in-law." Compare with Foust, pp. 314 and 318, respectively.

finding a satisfactory explanation for Catherine's refusal to grant Shelekhov a monopoly in 1788. Although he laid it at the door of the threats of war with Turkey and Sweden at the time, an equally plausible explanation is that she believed that A. R. Vorontsov, who supported Shelekhov, was one of the latter's backers and she did not wish to do anything that might extend Vorontsov's power.<sup>77</sup>

Only two years before, however, according to S. B. Okun, Catherine II had endorsed a strong program of commercial expansion with political overtones which A. R. Vorontsov and A. A. Bezborodko had advanced in a memorandum prompted by the desire to oppose the English domination of the Pacific Ocean on the one hand and, on the other, to help press to a successful conclusion then current negotiations to renew the Anglo-Russian commercial agreement of 1766 which was about to lapse. On December 22, 1786 (O. S.), Catherine II is said to have ordered the execution of the Vorontsov program "on account of the encroachment on the part of English traders on trade and hunting in the Eastern Sea." Although Okun noted that this was, on the part of Catherine II, "a little saber rattling," he described the measure as

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<sup>77</sup>Khrapovitskii, p. 78; McConnell, Philosophe, p. 136. Unfortunately, "the greater part of the archives of the Main Office of the Russian-American Company is...lost...and... the personal archives of the individual promoters of the Company...are widely scattered and, to a considerable extent, irretrievably lost," Okun, p. 3. A good part of Shelekhov's archives have been found, however, and are preserved. The following sketch of his life and rise to influence has suggestive overtones: "In the later 1770's there appears a new name among the names of the Russian traders operating in the Pacific Sea, that of Grigory Ivanovich Shelekhov, Honorary Citizen of the town of Rylsk. Shelekhov, who, in the course of two decades became one of the wealthiest merchants of Siberia, had started his business career with almost no means at his disposal. F. F. Veselago makes the conjecture that it was the capital which Natalya Shelekhov brought her husband that enabled him to open up his operations in America (31 prisuzhdenie uchrezhdennykh N. N. Demidovym nagrad /Thirty-one awards of prizes established by N. N. Demidov, St. Petersburg, 1882/, p. 67. Analysis of P. Tikhmenev's Istoricheskoe obozrenie obrazovaniia Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii Cf. note 1, Chapter 1)," cited in Okun, p. 3.

follows:

In their representation Vorontsov and Bezborodko took as their point of departure the consideration that "to Russia must indisputably belong the following: 1) the American coast from 55° 21' latitude extending northward, skirted by Captain Bering, Chirikov, and other Russian navigators; 2) all the islands situated near the mainland and near the Alaska Peninsula that were discovered by Bering and Cook, called Montague, St. Stephen, Dalmatius, the Shumagin Islands, and others located between the course of those navigators and the mainland; 3) all the islands extending thence westward in a chain, called the Fox Islands and the Aleutians, and others stretching northward, that are visited annually by Russian fur-hunters; 4) the Kurile chain of Japan, discovered by Captain Spanberg and Walton."<sup>78</sup>

But the war with Turkey, and soon with Sweden, and the failure of the attempts favorably to renew the Anglo-Russian commercial agreement had operated against pursuit not only of this project but also the "Russian Columbus" Shelekhov's request for a "monopoly of the Pacific Ocean" in 1788. Nevertheless, Shelekhov continued his explorations and commercial activities. A. N. Radishchev met Shelekhov in 1791, and commented on these meetings in

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<sup>78</sup>The program, as described by Okun, continued in this way: "Vorontsov and Bezborodko, considering, therefore, that the discoveries made by Cook had no 'validity,' insisted on the necessity of informing all the maritime powers that the territories above delineated belong to Russia. At the same time they considered it necessary to inform the same powers that Russia could not allow foreign vessels to touch at any of the enumerated harbors. Since, however, a declaration of this kind would, without being sustained by main [sic] force 'be hardly sufficient, and might jeopardize in some way the dignity of the Court,' the authors of the memorandum affirmed that it was indispensable to maintain a Russian naval squadron in the Pacific waters.

"According to this plan, Captain Mulovsky's squadron, consisting of four naval vessels, was designated to be dispatched from the Baltic. Upon arriving in the Eastern Sea, it was to be divided into two forces, with two of the vessels proceeding to the American coast and the other two to the Kuriles," N. P. Rezanov, correspondent of the Russian-American Company to P. Kh. Obolianinov, Procurator-General of the Senate (dated October 1, 1800), in Arkhiv vnutrennei politiki, kultury i byta (Leningrad: fond Nepremennovo soveta, 1800), file no. 2402; II, 13-24, as cited in Okun, pp. 16-17, 277-278. I have been unable to locate this material in the AKV, although there are two other communications from Catherine II to A. R. Vorontsov on the same date, December 22, 1786 (O. S.) in response to two memoranda signed by Bezborodko in AKV, XXXIV, 451-458.

his letters to A. R. Vorontsov.<sup>79</sup> Radishchev's discussion with Shelekhov undoubtedly provided information and perspective which the sensitive intellectual incorporated into the information he provided Vorontsov on Siberian commerce and the China trade. Indeed, if the view here presented is correct, and Radishchev can be called an "agent in the vanguard" of the Vorontsov interests as they marched eastward, then the amount of money Vorontsov supplied him<sup>80</sup> represented only a fraction of what Vorontsov may well have earned from sound investments based at least in part on Radishchev's information. Indeed, the sum total of the aid provided by Vorontsov to Radishchev's whole family<sup>81</sup> for a decade might then (at least in part) be

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<sup>79</sup>Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, May 8/19, 1791, in which the China trade is also discussed; November 14/25, 1791, in which the Kiakhta trade is mentioned; and June 9/20, 1796, in which Radishchev commented on Shelekhov's death, PSS, III, 374, 400 and 485, respectively.

<sup>80</sup>Immediately after Radishchev was arrested on June 30/July 11, 1790, Alexander Romanovich sent Radishchev 300 rubles which, however, he did not receive until he was transferred from the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul. While Radishchev was in exile he received from Vorontsov an annual allowance which rose from 500 rubles to 800 rubles and then to 1000 rubles. In spite of the fact that Radishchev had actually been able to save 1500 rubles ("toute fois de l'argent que j'ai reçu de Votre Excellence et du peu que ma soeur a pu apporter, nous avons pu mettre de cote 1500 r," Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, n.d., 1792? [between December 1791 and April, 1792], AKV, V, 339, Letter no. 26), there are at least seven instances in which he appealed for more money, on the grounds that what he received was not enough, although he remained ever grateful for the favors Vorontsov granted him, Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, n.d., 1790?, and April 17/28, 1799, *ibid.*, XII, 426 and 445-446, respectively; May 2/13, 1791; n.d., 1792?; January 1/12, 1795; January ?, 1797; February 3/14, 1797; *ibid.*, V, 306, 339, 355, 359 and 360, respectively; A. R. Vorontsov to G. M. Osipov, September 12/23, 1790, *ibid.*, p. 398; P. A. Radishchev, pp. 409-423.

<sup>81</sup>For example, not only did Vorontsov send money to Radishchev, but he also made attempts to have restored property that had been sequestered to pay some of Radishchev's debts, arranged for generous allowances for Radishchev's children after the latter's death in 1801, interceded on behalf of Moses Radishchev, when the brother of the exile lost his job, and may have sent Alexander Nikolaevich many materials, e.g., a barometer and a mercury thermometer (the use of which might be helpful to commercial activity), and a veritable flood of books and pamphlets by various European writers, notable among them Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, October 20/31, 1790; December 7/18, 1793; June 3/14, 1796,

viewed, and Vorontsov may have viewed it that way, as Radishchev's share of the profits from the investments Vorontsov made. Even if this is true, however, it should not minimize the sincere deep feelings held for Radishchev by both Semen and Alexander Romanovich in their correspondence.<sup>82</sup>

To the contrary, the foregoing analysis should be viewed as one more example of the pragmatic bent of a practical, hard-headed businessman who always finds it difficult not to try, so to speak, to "kill two birds with one stone." Perhaps that is why Alexander Romanovich paid little heed to Radishchev's failure to appreciate the true significance of the Chinese trade's value to Russia and the Vorontsovs.<sup>83</sup>

Radishchev, like Vorontsov, correctly favored the freest possible domestic trade.<sup>84</sup> Foreign trade was viewed as a source of revenue particu-

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PSS, III, 346, 456, 476 respectively; April 5/16, 1791; May 2/13, 1791; November 5/16, 1791; November 26/December 7, 1791; February 6/17, 1792, AKV, V, 297-298, 307-309, 328, 332, 341 respectively; February 17/28, 1792), ibid., XII, 429-431; A. R. Vorontsov to Moses Radishchev August 25/September 5, 1790, ibid., V, 395-396; N. N. Novosiltsev to A. R. Vorontsov October 8/19, 1802, ibid., pp. 405-406.

<sup>82</sup>For example, in 1784 Alexander Romanovich already showed evidence of his affection when he wrote to his brother Semen that "at his [Alexander's] recommendation," Radishchev would receive a "fourth class sash for one of the orders," A. R. to S. R. Vorontsov, September 22/October 3, 1784, AKV, XXXI, 459-460; and as early as 1780 Alexander Romanovich had asked his own father, Roman, to bring greetings to Radishchev's father when Roman went on a tour of the province of Penza, where Radishchev's parents lived under the Governorship of Roman, A. R. to R. I. Vorontsov, July 3/14, 1780, ibid., V, 395. Semen shared the compassion of Alexander Romanovich for Radishchev in a moving letter expressing his shock at so harsh a punishment for so relatively minor a transgression, and in which he expressed special concern for the fate of the children of "poor Radishchev," S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, October 1/12, 1790, ibid., IX, 181; and in 1797 expressed his pleasure at Radishchev's pardon, S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, January 9/20, 1797, ibid., X, 5. See also, S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, June 27/July 8, 1790, ibid., XIII, 199-200.

<sup>83</sup>Perhaps the better discussion in English of Radishchev's "Letter on the China Trade," may be found in McConnell, Philosophy, pp. 140, 144-146. As noted earlier, the text may be found in PSS, III, 5-35, with additional commentary in ibid., pp. 360-362.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., pp. 5-6.

larly because, as later demonstrated by Chechulin, no new sources of revenue had been created during the reign of Catherine II.<sup>85</sup> Therefore, Radishchev like Vorontsov believed that a high protective tariff was necessary to stimulate the growth and development of home industry.<sup>86</sup> When, in his argument, Radishchev stated that the "prohibition of foreign manufactured goods inevitably creates domestic manufacturing," it is necessary to point out his failure to consider such requirements as appropriate resources, special skills, the availability of commercial capital, and the like. Similarly, Radishchev erroneously believed that, despite the advantages of the China trade, it was not necessary to Russia.<sup>87</sup> In this connection, Radishchev expressed the incorrect belief that the China trade was useful only to a limited portion of Siberia, east of the Enisei River, especially in the regions of Irkutsk and Kiakhta; and also stated the uninformed estimate that the China trade constituted little more than approximately one percent of the total trade of Russia.<sup>88</sup>

To the contrary, as demonstrated by Clifford Foust in his study of Russo-Chinese relations:

the central fact remains that this avenue of Russian trade (the China trade) grew many times over in the Catherinian period. It kept pace with Russia's total foreign trade and returned regularly to the Treasury a major portion of the Treasury's revenues.<sup>89</sup>

Moreover, the Chinese trade, after it was reopened in 1792, "hovered around five million rubles annually," and had been greater in "the peak year of

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<sup>85</sup>Chechulin, pp. 117-152; Lappo-Danilevsky, p. 109.

<sup>86</sup>ISS, III, 7-33.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., pp. 16, 19, 21, 25.

<sup>89</sup>Foust, p. 329.

1781."<sup>90</sup> As the total recorded annual average foreign trade of Russia for the years 1795-1797 was approximately 70,000,000 rubles, the China trade represented about seven percent of the total at that time. Although this represented a decline from approximately twelve percent of the total trade for 1781 (approximately forty million rubles)<sup>91</sup> which was in part because of the slow resumption of trade after its reopening in 1792, a greater proportion of the receipts from the China trade found their way into the Russian treasury.<sup>92</sup>

A. R. Vorontsov did not need to be told that he was right about what he knew he understood correctly, nor could he easily be misled by an incorrect view into scrapping what he knew to be sound in favor of ideas he found lacking in substance. What he wanted, and what he got was information on the condition of roads, the character of the people, prices, possibilities for trade in general and for specific items in particular (such as furs and leather goods), and an estimation of the impact that might be made on both state revenues and the circulation of money.<sup>93</sup>

Vorontsov must have known of the importance of the China trade to

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<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 317.

<sup>91</sup>Van Regemorter, p. 325.

<sup>92</sup>Foust, p. 329. All figures discussed in the text above reflect, of course, only the recorded trade.

<sup>93</sup>Radishchev supplied Vorontsov with information on the riches of Siberia in a letter from Tobolsk, July 24/August 4, 1791, PSS, III, 386; and discussed in detail the prospects for trade and agriculture in Tobolsk, ibid., pp. 133-142. In his "Letter on the China Trade," he discussed some of the advantages of trade with China, and noted that it would "increase state revenue, put more money into circulation, raise the price of furs, provide a market for leather goods, give employment to Lake Baikal shippers, to innkeepers and merchants, and provide the peasant with cheaper clothing materials than [from] Europe," PSS, II, 5-35.

Russia's financial condition, partly from his own official position, and partly from his relations with Prince A. Viazemskii, then in charge of the State Treasury and with whose family the Vorontsovs had long had business connections and been involved in mutual financial transactions.<sup>94</sup>

But if Vorontsov had hoped in 1791 that if he could be credited with helping to reopen the China trade it might restore him to political favor, that hope was soon dispelled because the trade was reopened in 1792,<sup>95</sup> before he could put to official use any of the information provided in Radishchev's Letter on the Chinese Trade. Even at that, although it was beneficial to the Russian economy, the Chinese Trade could not perform miracles, and the inflationary spiral continued to destroy the value of the Russian ruble.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup>Although gross receipts quadrupled during Catherine's reign, increasing from fourteen and one-half million rubles in 1763 to 55,400,000 rubles in 1796, government expenditures in the same period increased at the more rapid rate of 450 percent, climbing from just over seventeen million to a little more than seventy-eight million rubles, Florinsky, Russia, I, 566-568.

<sup>95</sup>Foust, p. 314.

<sup>96</sup>Van Regemorter, p. 332. Nevertheless, by 1821, if not earlier, the China trade proceeded along the "Vorontsov Route" discussed above, this chapter, n. 1. "[British] woolens were being landed at St. Petersburg, then carried to Moscow to Tobolsk to Irkutsk to Kiakhta, and exchanged there for Chinese tea, which travelled to St. Petersburg by the same route," in "Report Relative to the Trade with the East Indies and China from the Select Committee of the House of Lords appointed to Inquire into the Means of Extending and Securing the Foreign Trade of the Country...", Parliamentary Papers: 1821, VII, 86, cited in Crosby, pp. 32, 38.

**PART V. THE TURN OF THE CENTURY:  
IN AND OUT OF THE MAINSTREAM AGAIN**

## CHAPTER VIII

## FROM TWILIGHT TO A NEW DAWN, PAUL AND ALEXANDER I

A. Twilight Again. The Emperor Paul (1796-1801): Renunciation, Confiscation and Preparation

On November 6/17, 1796, Catherine II at long last was dead. She had died suddenly in her sixty-seventh year following a stroke of apoplexy. Between the time her son, Paul, mounted the throne until his own assassination on March 11/23, 1801 the Vorontsovs were to know no peace at the hands of the unhappy tsar. For example, at first it seemed that Paul was most favorably disposed to Semen Romanovich Vorontsov. At the time he was probably guided by the memory of how Semen had attempted to hold the Preobrazhenskii Guards loyal to Peter III in 1762. Consequently, when it was obvious that the position of Chancellor of the Russian Empire would soon become vacant because of then Chancellor A. A. Bezborodko's illness, Paul wrote to Semen and entreated him to return home to Russia, in March of 1799, and begged him to serve as Chancellor.<sup>1</sup>

Earlier, Paul had dismissed Princess Dashkov from her position as

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<sup>1</sup>Bezborodko had functioned as Chancellor since January, 1797, Bezborodko to S. R. Vorontsov, January 13/24, 1797, AKV, XII, 369-370. Even before Bezborodko's death, which occurred in April, 1799, Paul had asked S. R. Vorontsov to take the ailing Bezborodko's place. After noting that Bezborodko's illness had already incapacitated him, Paul pleaded: "I ask you, not only for me, but also for our nation and for all of Europe, to take upon yourself my summons....," Paul to S. R. Vorontsov, March 2/13, 1799, *ibid.*, XXVIII, 201. Noting Semen's refusal, Paul made a second request, Paul to S. R. Vorontsov, April 20/May 1, 1799, *ibid.*, p. 202, which was also refused. See also, SIRIO, XXIX, 423. Semen's attempt to keep the Preobrazhenskii soldiers loyal to Peter is mentioned in Kaus, p. 218.

Director of the Academy of Sciences and exiled her from St. Petersburg to her estates at Troitskoe. In her memoirs, she recalled that Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, her "favorite" brother had vainly hoped that Paul would change after his coronation. According to Dashkova, who had supported Catherine in 1762, Alexander told his sister that Paul's behavior toward her "was dictated by what he thought he owed to his father's memory, but that at his coronation he would change our fate."<sup>2</sup>

With the benefit of hindsight, she referred to her response to her brother "as one of the many prophecies I have made which have come true."

In her reply, she stated:

You tell me, my friend that after his coronation Paul will leave me alone. You do not know him then. Once a tyrant begins to strike he continues to strike until the victim is totally destroyed. I am expecting persecution to continue unabated, and I resign myself to it in the full submission of a creature to its creator. The conviction of my own innocence and lack of bitterness or indignation at his treatment of me personally will, I trust, serve me in place of courage. Come what may, and provided he is not actively malevolent to you and to those near and dear to me, I shall do or say nothing that will lower me in my own eyes.<sup>3</sup>

Paul became angry at Semen as well because the latter had refused the Chancellorship. Consequently, in February, 1800 Paul ordered the Russian minister to England to take a vacation on the continent. Instead, Semen preferred to resign from the Russian diplomatic corps and, with Paul's per-

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<sup>2</sup>Princess Dashkov rightly feared and disliked Paul whom she considered to be a "suspicious poltroon," who "peremptorily" relieved Dashkova of her post as Director of the Academy of Sciences and "ordered" her "to take up residence on one of her son's estates in the northern part of Novogorod where, it was added, she would have ample time to reflect on the events of 1762, while awaiting the further pleasure of his majesty," Molloy, II, 554-555, 575. By her own account, she immediately "communicated with her brother Count Alexander" expressing her "fear," Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 316, 320-321, 333; Fitzlyon, p. 257.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.; Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 320-321.

mission, remained in England.<sup>4</sup> In addition, it seems that at least since October, 1798, Paul held a personal dislike for Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov.<sup>5</sup> Until that time, A. R. Vorontsov may have believed that matters could not become worse than they had been under Paul's mother, Catherine II. When Alexander Romanovich began to perceive that he was in error, he also resigned himself to the seclusion of his estates at Andreevskoe, occasionally visiting with his sister at Troitskoe as she, Dashkova, visited him on his estates.<sup>6</sup>

It is difficult to say with precision exactly why Paul disliked A. R. Vorontsov whom, to all intents and purposes, the Russian Emperor should have favored simply because of the animosity between Catherine II and Alexander Romanovich. Such a consideration, however, was not the only one which motivated Paul. For example, although Paul freed Novikov and permitted Radishchev to return from Siberia to his estates, the Emperor continued in office some of Catherine's advisors such as A. A. Bezborodko and D. P. Troshchinskii.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>S. R. Vorontsov to Rostopchin, March 9, 1800 (N. S.), AKV, VIII, 515; to Paul, May 8 (N. S.) and June 14/26, 1800, ibid., X, 335, 352 respectively.

<sup>5</sup>S. R. Vorontsov to Paul, October 9, 1798 (N. S.), and to A. R. Vorontsov, June 3/14, 1799, AKV, X, 326, 49 respectively.

<sup>6</sup>Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 312-314; Fitzlyon, p. 252.

<sup>7</sup>Troshchinskii was later banished to his estates and Bezborodko died in 1799. A. R. Vorontsov, through Bezborodko, had succeeded in obtaining Paul's consent, in a decree of November 23/December 4, 1796 to permit Radishchev to return to his estates in European Russia. Radishchev remained at his estates in Nentsovo until 1801 where his "conduct and correspondence" were to be "under observation" by the governor of the province. Although it is true that Paul, like Peter III, freed those who had been political prisoners of his predecessor, Paul also reestablished the political police, again as Peter had done. See, for example, Radishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, January 1, 1797 and January 26/February 6, 1797, PSS, III, 488-491.

The Senate Archives provide a profile of the change in Paul's attitude toward the Vorontsov brothers. For example, on April 5/16, 1797 the Senate issued three decrees which suggested a positive attitude toward both of them on the part of Paul. In the first of these, the following were raised "from Counts of the Rimskoi empire...to Counts of the Russian Empire" along with all of their descendants. Those so designated were: Counts Vorontsov, Counts Bezborodko, Counts Zavadovskii, Count Daitriev-Mamonov, and... Prussian Count Buksgevden.<sup>8</sup> In the second of these decrees, "Count Vorontsov" was granted some land in the province of Viborsk together with "500 souls taken from Councilor Count Skavorskii."<sup>9</sup> The third referred to the "granting of an estate to the minister at the English Court."<sup>10</sup>

In June, soon after he received this grant of land, Semen wrote to a friend, K. S. Ryndin, and told Ryndin that Alexander Romanovich had written to Semen urging Semen to ask Ryndin to operate any estates given to Semen by Emperor Paul.<sup>11</sup> Shortly thereafter, Semen wrote to Ryndin again informing the latter that Alexander Romanovich had written to Semen and told him that Ryndin had been introduced to A. A. Bezborodko, D. P. Troshchinskii, and P. V. Zavadovskii; and that soon Ryndin would meet F. V. Rostopchin, who was becoming increasingly influential in the formation of foreign policy.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>"Ukaz Nashemu Senatu" [hereafter cited as "UNS"], April 5/16, 1797, kop. 191, l. 38, Senatskii Arkhiv, I, 142.

<sup>9</sup>"UNS," April 5/16, 1797, kop. 191, l. 76, *Ibid.*, I, 153. It is actually not clear whether the grant is to Semen or Alexander Romanovich as the reference is merely to "Count Vorontsov." This may have been for Alexander Romanovich, as Semen is specified in the next ukaz.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>S. R. Vorontsov to K. S. Ryndin, June ?, 1797, AKV, XVI, 310-312.

<sup>12</sup>S. R. Vorontsov to K. S. Ryndin, n.d., 1797?, *ibid.*, pp. 312-313.

Alexander Romanovich, on his part, refused to serve under Paul, and refused even to attend meetings of the Senate when he was asked to do so. Perhaps his refusal was in part based on his early awareness that, as he later wrote about the reign of Paul, "one can say it was absolute chaos."<sup>13</sup> Indeed, in his own autobiographical sketch, written in 1805, Alexander Romanovich referred to the birth of Paul in 1754 as follows: "Who would have believed at that time, while all were rejoicing at the birth of Paul, that here is a tyrant born for Russia?"<sup>14</sup>

Because A. R. Vorontsov pleaded ill health as a reason for his inability to attend governmental functions, on September 9/20, 1798 Paul freed Alexander Romanovich from any further obligations. In the Senate's ukaz prepared for that purpose it was noted that Vorontsov's "age and ill-health" prevented him from performing any activity as a state councilor, and in "recognition of the length of his service" he was to receive an additional, although undisclosed sum, as a pension "until his death."<sup>15</sup> In the following month, on October 28/November 8, 1798, a decree of the Senate listed as Privy Councilors and Senators a number of men who, like Vorontsov, apparently refused to cooperate with Paul. Described as individuals who "graciously granted us their activities as Privy Councilors," they were listed as follows: Vorontsov, Kvashnin-Samarin, Rzhevskii, Prince I. Viazemskii, Osipov, Spiridov, Solimonov, Saburov, Kokoktsov, and Protasov.<sup>16</sup> To this group was

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<sup>13</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Zapiska grafa A. R. Vorontsova o Rossii v nachale nyneshniago veka, predstavlennaia imperatory Aleksandru I v noiabre 1801 goda," *ibid.*, XXIX, 460.

<sup>14</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Notice," *ibid.*, V, 18.

<sup>15</sup>"УПС" September 9/20, 1798, kop. 207, l. 102, Senatskii Arkhiv, I, 436-437.

<sup>16</sup>"УПС" October 28/November 8, 1798, kop. 208, I. 266, *ibid.*, I, 455.

added Baron Vasilev and Prince Gagarin when, in the following month, Paul criticized them and railed against them for not performing their duties since the time he had appointed them and for which they were receiving four thousand rubles annually. Still claiming not to be vindictive toward them, he concluded: "We are, nevertheless, favorably disposed toward you."<sup>17</sup>

All efforts failing, and with domestic and foreign problems increasing, by July 20/August 1, 1800, Paul had decided to take more drastic action in trying to force the recalcitrant members of the nobility to knuckle under to him. Consequently, he signed a decree whereby 880 desiatins and 756 sazhen of land in the village of Svinukh in the guberniia of Saratov were "to be taken...from the possession of Count Vorontsov" as these lands "from now on do not belong to him."<sup>18</sup> Apparently, this tactic did not work either; for on September 4/16, 1800, Paul once again discharged from service, with an undisclosed pension for life, the following Senators and members of the Privy Council: Strekalov, Prince Shcherbatov, Prince Volkenskii, Grushetskii, Prince Trubetskoi, Rzhevskii I, Kvashnin-Samarin, Rzhevskii II, Prince [I.] Viazemskii, Count Vorontsov, Ushakov, and Naryshkin I.<sup>19</sup>

Semen, it will be recalled, had been relieved of his duties in February, 1800 and, soon after that, had resigned from the diplomatic corps. He, along with those finally freed in September, 1800, from a service they found

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<sup>17</sup>"URS" November 6/17, 1798, kop. 209, l. 46, *ibid.*, I, 459.

<sup>18</sup>"URS" July 20/August 1, 1800, kop. 228, l. 273, *ibid.*, I, 639. See also, P. Bartenev, *AKV*, XXXII, 294, n. 1, who stated that by March of 1801 "all of the estates of S. R. Vorontsov" had been confiscated. A sazhen is equal to 7 feet and 213 centimeters.

<sup>19</sup>"URS" September 4/16, 1800, kop. 230, l. 47, *Senatskii Arkhiv*, I, 659. The undisclosed pension for life may have been either no additional pension or, in some cases, may have meant no pension at all. The number of senators had been doubled in 1797, adding "to the efficiency" of the Senate, Florinsky, *Russia*, I, 614. Their reduction in 1800 suggests a divergence between Paul and at least some senators.

onerous remained alienated from the official policies of the Russian government for the remainder of Paul's reign. One of those whose names appeared on the list of 1798 but was omitted from the list of 1800 is Alexander Iakovlevich Protasov, who had died on April 27/May 7, 1799.<sup>20</sup>

A. Ia. Protasov was a close contemporary of Alexander Romanovich. Protasov, who was born on September 10/21, 1742 was almost to the day only one year younger than A. R. Vorontsov. In fact, he was the cousin of Alexander Romanovich, as a result of the marriage of Roman's sister, Daria Ilarionovich, to Iakov Iakovlevich Protasov. According to P. Bartenev, Alexander Iakovlevich Protasov "received an excellent education, and judging by his character belonged to the better people of his time."<sup>21</sup>

Soon after the Senate ukaz of October 28/November 8, 1798, Protasov wrote to Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov in an apparent effort to relieve the latter of any feeling of guilt concerning Paul's hostility to Protasov. In his letter, dated November 17/28, 1798, Protasov began by reassuring Alexander Romanovich as follows:

I am thoroughly persuaded that you have played a genuine [sincere] role in my advancement, and that it cannot be otherwise, since it is now evident, that it was for me you strained [relations with Prince A. A. Bezborodko (ed. note) by taking advantage of] his friendship for you...<sup>22</sup>

Protasov, later on in the same letter, noted that he had at home "an ukaz from the Emperor," and commented that it "clearly proves that he cannot pretend to any progress by virtue of his kindness."<sup>23</sup>

Protasov, like so many others including D. P. Troshchinskii, who re-

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<sup>20</sup>P. Bartenev, ed. n., AKV, XV, viii.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, November 17/28, 1798, *ibid.*, p. 146.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 147.

mained for a time in the good graces of Paul, wrote to Alexander Romanovich in order to keep him informed about what was happening at the nerve centers of the Russian government, and to serve as intermediary for him when necessary or desirable. The published papers of the Vorontsovs contain more than eighty letters from Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov during the latter's retirement. These letters, extending from May 24/June 4, 1793 through November 17/28, 1798 (quoted from above, and the last published letter prior to Protasov's death on April 27/May 8, 1799) are chiefly concerned with matters pertaining to the court, although there is interwoven therein items of political, diplomatic, financial and economic import.<sup>24</sup>

Of special interest, perhaps, is a letter from Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov that had been written ten years earlier, in June of 1783, in which Vorontsov's cousin referred to a peasant revolt which had recently occurred on the property of the pomeshchik P. Ia. Tolstoi in Novogorod, a gubernia in which the Vorontsovs were notable proprietors, and of which the Governor was Count Iakov A. Bruce, who had been A. N. Radishchev's superior in the mid 1770's.<sup>25</sup> In his letter to Alexander Romanovich, Protasov had written:

I am eager, my dear count, to send you, in confidence all the papers regarding the affair of the revolt of the peasants of Mr. Tolstoi. You must read them. Not wanting to rely on anyone [else], I have written two rather long letters, one to him and one to my governor-general, with a copy [of each] for you. I pray you will give me your views on whether I have acted properly and...that you have received them.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>AKV, XV, viii, 6-148.

<sup>25</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, June 24/July 5, 1783; to P. Ia. Tolstoi, June 21/July 2, 1783; and to Ia. A. Bruce, June 24/July 5, 1783, *ibid.*, pp. 1-6.

<sup>26</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, June 24/July 5, 1783, *ibid.*, p. 1.

Protasov, who was on his way to pacify the peasants in an effort to quell the uprising, noted that he considered his task as one "not to be envied." Exactly what papers and precisely why they were sent in confidence is also not clear. Unfortunately, moreover, we do not have Vorontsov's reply to Protasov and, therefore, do not know what Alexander Romanovich thought of his cousin's views or whether he approved of Protasov's actions. We do know, however, that after a short time as Governor of Novgorod, A. Ia. Protasov became a courtier in the retinue "of the sixteen year old Alexander Pavlovich."<sup>27</sup>

The future tsar retained Protasov as a member of his court until his death in 1799, and it is from the vantage point of the court that the cousin of Alexander Romanovich provided the latter with information. At first, the letters described chiefly social events and personal intrigues; and in that vein, on May 4/15, 1794, Protasov noted that "Derzhavin believes that you will be invited to come here," i.e., to Grand Duke Alexander's court at the "Palais Taurique," and mentioned also that Troshchinskii would be writing to Vorontsov soon.<sup>28</sup> On November 28/December 9, Protasov described at length how Dashkova had taken the court by storm,<sup>29</sup> and two days later suggested that Grand Duke Alexander's tutor, La Harpe, was a hypocrite because, as Protasov put it, La Harpe's desire for wealth and titles did not agree with "the philosophy of the rights of man."<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>P. Bartenev, ed. n., *ibid.*, p. 6. Protasov also has been described as a "tutor" of Alexander I, particularly for manners, Kornilov, I, 69.

<sup>28</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, May 4/15, 1794, *AKV*, XV, 18.

<sup>29</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, November 28/December 9, 1794, *ibid.*, pp. 31-35.

<sup>30</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, November 30/December 11, 1794, *ibid.*, p. 364.

On a number of occasions Protasov discussed financial matters of personal friends, such as the debts of Troshchinskii,<sup>31</sup> the sources of Protasov's own income,<sup>32</sup> and Prince Gavril Gagarin's financial resources for a trip he was about to undertake.<sup>33</sup> Occasionally, these reports were broadened into a discussion of governmental finances and opportunities for investment, as for example in 1796, with respect to some proposals of Gavril Derzhavin, then President of the Commerce College, and P. V. Zavadovskii, then director of the Bank of the Nobility, concerning investment possibilities.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, on April 28/May 9, 1798, Protasov informed Alexander Romanovich concerning a proposal by the latter to invest some 300,000 rubles in a government venture, for which, in Protasov's words: "Your capital has been accepted."<sup>35</sup>

When one takes into account that in 1800, income from the Vorontsov properties was only 148,455 rubles,<sup>36</sup> it stands to reason that there were other sources of income for Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov. Perhaps he was still connected with the Bank of the Nobility, of which the Commerce College Bank was a subsidiary, and was now back in full operation since Paul had returned the Commerce College to its 1783 status soon after his coronation.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, April 10/21, 1795, *ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>32</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, October 6/17, 1795, *ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

<sup>33</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, August 18/29, 1798, *ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>34</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, January 14/25, 1796; February 4/15, 1796, *ibid.*, pp. 69, 76, respectively. It seems that Zavadovskii's capital resources may have been dwindling.

<sup>35</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, April 28/May 9, 1798, *ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>36</sup>Indova, Krepostnoe, p. 30.

<sup>37</sup>Kommerts Kollegia, No. 45, pp. 2, 9. See also, Florinsky, Russia, I, 615.

Moreover, on more than two occasions, Protasov discussed foreign affairs with Vorontsov. One had been concerned with various views related to the third partition of Poland,<sup>38</sup> and the second with the results of the Macartney expeditions to China.<sup>39</sup> Although each of the instances above occurred during the reign of Catherine, there is evidence that Alexander continued his interest and his activity in the political and diplomatic arena during the reign of Paul as well. As noted by E. P. Karnovich, A. R. Vorontsov seemed to have his finger in every diplomatic pie, and it was believed by some at that time as well that Alexander Romanovich still had a great influence on the direction of the course of Russian foreign affairs because of his influence over Bezborodko, who officially occupied "first place" in the control of foreign policy.<sup>40</sup>

There was, however, one area at least in which Bezborodko and A. R. Vorontsov seem to have differed from 1796-1798. Vorontsov desired a second coalition against France. He was joined in this desire by I. A. Ostermann, N. P. Panin, A. K. Razumovskii and F. V. Rostopchin. They were opposed by the so-called peace party of A. A. Bezborodko, who believed that the only way to stop the spread of the French Revolution to Russia was by peace with France; Bezborodko's nephew, V. P. Kochubei, who desired peace as a means to ameliorating Russia's financial crisis; P. V. Zavadovskii, who believed France was not a real threat to Russia; and A. V. Kurakin.<sup>41</sup>

By 1799, however, Bezborodko had passed away and was replaced by

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<sup>38</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, April 30/May 11, 1795, AKV, XV, 56-58.

<sup>39</sup>Protasov to A. R. Vorontsov, May 15/26, 1795, ibid., pp. 63-64.

<sup>40</sup>Karnovich, Lichnosti, p. 393.

<sup>41</sup>Stanislavskaja, pp. 85-89.

Rostopchin in August of 1799 with Panin replacing Kochubei as Vice-Chancellor in the following month.<sup>42</sup> For the following year, supervision of foreign affairs technically rested in the hands of Rostopchin, Panin, and Dmitri Tatishchev, A. R. Vorontsov's nephew.<sup>43</sup> Curiously, when the "peace party" was in power, Paul was a member of the second coalition, however reluctantly. Soon after the "hawks" gained control, he left the coalition.<sup>44</sup>

Such were some of the activities with which A. R. Vorontsov occupied himself during his retirement which, according to those who believed his claims of old age and ill health, was one of quiet seclusion. Perhaps, on the social level, that was true; but he had shown his preference for keeping his own counsel as far back as 1772.<sup>45</sup> What is, perhaps, more likely, is that, in keeping with the oft-quoted cliché, "Where there is life, there is hope," Vorontsov continued to plan for the possibility that Alexander Pavlovich might succeed Emperor Paul within the lifetime of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov. More, because he knew of the education which Alexander Pavlovich had received, an education filled with liberal ideas, it is highly probable that Vorontsov in these years away from the center of the political

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<sup>42</sup>Saul, pp. 135-136.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>44</sup>Ancona is a strategic port on the upper Adriatic coast of Italy held by France in late 1799. Russian warships laid seige to it in December, 1799, but an Austrian army, ostensibly in support of the Russian attack, negotiated a separate peace. Not only was the Russian contingent not permitted to participate in the surrender, but the naval force was also in other ways humiliated. According to Saul, the Ancona Affair of December, 1799 led Paul, distrustful of Austria, to take Russia out of the second coalition, *ibid.*, pp. 138-139, 226. However, Stanislavskaja states that on October 11/22, 1799, Paul had already notified Napoleon I of the end of the Austro-Russian alliance, *Stanislavskaja*, p. 119. This suggests that Paul's plan to withdraw from the coalition may have led to the Ancona affair. See also D. Tatishchev to A. R. Vorontsov, December 5/16, 1799, *AKV*, XVIII, 336-339.

arena, in comparative leisure, devoted a good deal of time writing, re-thinking and rewriting material which he eventually presented as the Charter for the Russian People in 1802.<sup>46</sup>

B. A New Dawn: Chancellor of the Realm and Foreign Minister under Alexander I (1801-1805)

"The joy of the new reign is universal." So wrote Dmitri Buturlin to his uncle Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov in March, 1801.<sup>47</sup> According to Princess Dashkov, she had earlier had a premonition and made the "prophecy" to her brother Alexander Romanovich that "in the year 1801... Paul would cease to live."<sup>48</sup> Undoubtedly part of the joy noted by Buturlin was simply an expression of relief on the part of those who either had been the victims of Paul or who believed that his policies were bringing ruin to Russia.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>See below, Chapter IX.

<sup>47</sup>Buturlin to A. R. Vorontsov, March 20/April 1, 1801, AKV, XXXII, 296. See also, a letter sent five days earlier, one hour after Buturlin had been informed of Paul's death, the date of which Buturlin gave as "Lundi 10 courant" or March 10, rather than March 11/23, 1801, Buturlin to A. R. Vorontsov, March 15/27, 1801, *ibid.*

<sup>48</sup>The date of Paul's death is given as March 12, 1801 (O. S.), in Dashkova, "Memoires," *ibid.*, XXI, 354-357; Fitzlyon, pp. 282-283.

<sup>49</sup>One of the strongest and briefest expressions of the "victims" is Princess Dashkov's view, which is as follows: "My brother [Alexander Romanovich] and I spent hours alone together, and the subject of our conversation was always something which affected us both deeply -- the misfortunes of our country and of almost every single individual; for whoever was not personally a victim of Paul I's despotic tyranny had the fate of a friend, a relation, of someone near and dear to bewail," *ibid.*, p. 282; Dashkova, "Memoires," AKV, XXI, 354-355. A more sympathetic view is offered by a relatively disinterested observer who agreed that the populace in general was restive because of both Paul's foreign involvements and domestic programs, and it is Count Pahlen (who assassinated Paul) that is cast as the vicious, evil villain. According to this interpretation, Paul is shown as a distraught monarch, living under the shadow of fear, which caused him to alienate not only his subjects, but chiefly among them those whom he believed to be seeking his crown, as described in Madame la Comtesse de

Others hoped that Alexander I would not only restore stability and peace, but also -- partly because of his liberal education and in part because of his relationship with his youthful, enlightened friends -- erroneously hoped that Alexander I would promote and extend freedom within Russia.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, some of the young friends of Alexander Pavlovich, Emperor of Russia, may have been "old friends"<sup>51</sup> of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov,

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Choiseul-Gouffier, Historical Memoirs of the Emperor Alexander I and The Court of Russia (Translated from the French by Mary Berenice Patterson; Chicago: A. C. McClung and Co., 1900), pp. x, xiii, 23-47.

Paul confiscated estates, reestablished the political police, punished ordinary citizens and military personnel alike because of their manners and the way they dressed, limited serf labor to three days per week for the landlord and prohibited the sale of serfs without land. In foreign affairs, he left the second coalition of England, Austria, Prussia and Russia which was opposed to France, and joined Prussia and Holland in an attempt to punish England and Austria, while at the same time he made common cause with France in an abortive venture to send Cossacks into India as another threat to England. See, for example, Florinsky, Russia, I, 607-628.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., II, 693-695. Compare with Allen McConnell, Tsar Alexander I: Paternalistic Reformer [hereafter cited as McConnell, Alexander] (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1970), v, who correctly states that Alexander I "was...weak, indecisive, and frightened...for a few months after his father's murder. But never again." See also, by the same author, "Alexander I's Hundred Days: The Politics of a Paternalistic Reformer" [hereafter cited as McConnell, "Hundred Days"], SR, XXVIII, No. 3 (September, 1969), pp. 373-393.

<sup>51</sup>Many prominent Russians, when in London, stayed with Semen Vorontsov. Among them were, at one time or another, the four "young friends" of Alexander I. In at least one instance it has been noted that one visitor received special treatment at A. R. Vorontsov's request. Thus, in 1788, Nesselrode stayed with Semen, Grimsted, "Diplomatic Spokesmen," p. 210, and Marcum, p. 122. In the same year, Alexander Pavlovich Ermolov who, having lost his position as the favorite of Catherine II, also received special treatment from S. R. Vorontsov because Ermolov is said to have come as a highly recommended friend of A. R. Vorontsov, *ibid.*, p. 123. V. P. Kochubei was in London "under the guidance of S. R. Vorontsov" in 1788-1789, Grimsted, "Diplomatic Spokesmen," p. 119. At about the same time, Karamzin stayed with Semen, Nikolai M. Karamzin, Letters of A Russian Traveler (Trans. Florence Jonas; New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 277-278. P. A. Stroganov and Novosiltsev were with Semen sometime during the reign of Paul (1796-1801), Czartoryski, I, 289; and Novosiltsev stayed there again in 1805, *ibid.*, II, 6 and P. A. Stroganov, II, 347.

whom Tsar Alexander I selected to become Chancellor of the Russian Empire and, later, the first Foreign Minister of Russia after the governmental reorganization had taken place.<sup>52</sup>

Moreover, as Alexander Kornilov has observed, another one of the "old friends" of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, D. P. Troshchinskii, helped the inexperienced young sovereign, Alexander I, in his first days on the throne of Russia. Kornilov wrote:

Alexander [I] was very glad...when on the very night of the overthrow there came to his call one of the "old servers," D. P. Troshchinsky, whom he had known as a man honest and experienced in affairs...

.....  
 ...On the same night, Troshchinsky formed a hasty, but happy project for the Manifesto of Accession, in which Alexander solemnly promised to govern the people "after the laws and heart of his grandmother, Catherine the Great."<sup>53</sup>

According to Kornilov, the "reference to Catherine was very clever, as it signified in the eyes of contemporaries the promise to annul all that had been decreed by Paul and a return to the age of Catherine, which appeared then to all in rosy colours." By contrast, Allen McConnell contends that Alexander I "must have felt revulsion at this" reference to Catherine.<sup>54</sup>

What better assurance could there be that the Vorontsov properties which Paul had confiscated would be returned to them? As for the reference to the "rosy colours" of Catherine's reign, it must be remembered that, despite the fear and antagonism which existed between her and the Vorontsovs, under her they had risen high in the service, had exercised great influence

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<sup>52</sup>Kornilov, I, 77.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>54</sup>Compare *ibid.*, with McConnell, "Hundred Days," *SR*, XXVIII, No. 3, p. 380. Unfortunately, there is only one letter, simply dated 1801 from Troshchinskii to A. R. Vorontsov, *AKV*, XII, 405.

in affairs and, moreover, they had prospered economically. There is evidence, however, that Alexander Romanovich hoped for many changes because he still poignantly recalled the stings of her sceptre.<sup>55</sup>

Traditional historiography suggests Alexander I may have been influenced strongly by the liberal views of his "young friends" in his intimate group known as the "secret committee" composed of P. A. Stroganov, N. N. Novosiltsev, V. P. Kochubei and Adam Czartoryski. If so, then it may be suggested also that, whether with respect to domestic programs or foreign affairs, perhaps the one person who exercised the greatest influence in policy decisions at the beginning of Alexander I's reign was Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, who has been characterized by Gavril Derzhavin as the "chieftain" or leader of Alexander's youthful entourage. Speaking about the situation which existed in 1803, Derzhavin wrote:

At that time the spirit of the French and Polish constitutions filled the whole circle of the sovereign's friends [gosudaria]: Prince Czartoryskii, Novosiltsev, Count Kochubei, Stroganov, and above all, their chieftain [ataman] -- Count A. R. Vorontsov.<sup>56</sup>

Vorontsov's leadership did not come from nowhere; nor was it simply a function of his protection of Radishchev that Alexander Romanovich was likened to a "democrat" by Kochubei,<sup>57</sup> after Vorontsov already had been

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<sup>55</sup>Dashkova, "Memoires," *ibid.*, XXI, 361-362; Fitzlyon, pp. 286-287. The changes hoped for are evident in Vorontsov's proposed "Charter for the Russian People," as described in the following chapter.

<sup>56</sup>Derzhavin, VI, 787. See also, P. A. Stroganov, I, 118. Derzhavin referred to the "secret committee" as a band of "Jacobins," Kornilov, I, 94; and the Russian biographer of Semen noted the "sagacious observations of Count [A. R.] Vorontsov," Riabini, RA (1879), IV, 450.

<sup>57</sup>Apparently Kochubei used Vorontsov's protection of Radishchev as an argument to prove Vorontsov's liberalism. At the time, it seems that Kochubei was successful in winning Stroganov's consent to Vorontsov's consultation by the "secret committee" during its deliberation on various reform measures, one of which, as is maintained in the next chapter of this study, was prepared by Vorontsov. Stroganov commented that it seemed

selected for the highest Russian governmental office by Alexander I less than three weeks after the latter had assumed the throne.<sup>58</sup>

Alexander I by then had already issued a number of decrees which, when measured by one standard, may be called proof of the new tsar's liberality or, using another yardstick, may have been primarily (if not merely) an expression of distaste for the policies of his late father, marking him as hypocritically liberal. These views have been challenged by Allen McConnell who argues that until June 17/29, 1801 when the tsar dismissed Pahlen, the reforms promulgated represent the minimum demands Alexander I believed he could grant without agreeing to the constitutional proposals urged on him by the conspirators who had assassinated his father, Paul. That is, he granted, for the most part, measures which he could "go back on, ignore, or postpone indefinitely" until he felt sufficiently secure to stand up to Pahlen and remove him and, subsequently, the other conspirators from official government positions.<sup>59</sup>

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that Vorontsov's participation "would be agreeable" because, as Kochubei assured Stroganov, Vorontsov was opposed to the use of "arbitrary power," in "Resultat d'une conference avec le comte Kotchubey du 9 Mai 1801," P. A. Stroganov, II, 33. See also the comment by Kornilov: "The Committee insistently counseled Alexander to ask the opinion of old experienced diplomats on [Anglo-Russian relations], and they pointed out Count A. R. Vorontsov [sic]," in Kornilov, I, 85.

<sup>58</sup>Alexander I to A. R. Vorontsov, March 28/April 9, 1801, AKV, XXVIII, 377. Although Vorontsov was consulted by the "secret committee," Vorontsov "did not attend their meetings," in McConnell, Alexander I, p. 31.

<sup>59</sup>McConnell, Alexander I, pp. 25-31, and for the words quoted, p. 30; and McConnell, "Hundred Days," SR, XXVIII, No. 3, pp. 373-380. For various interpretations of the reign of Alexander I, in addition to the works already cited, see, e.g., N. K. Schilder, Imperator Aleksandr Pervyi, ego zhizn i tsarstvovanie [hereafter cited as Schilder, Alexander] (3 vols.; SPb.: A. S. Suvorin, 1897); Aleksandr E. Presniakov, Alexander I (Petrograd: Brokgauz - Efron, 1924); Kasimir Waliszewski, La Russie il y a cent ans: le regne d'Alexandre I<sup>er</sup>. Vol. I. La Bastille russe et la revolution en marche (1801-1812) (Paris: Plon, 1923; E. M. Almedingen, The Emperor Alexander I (London: The Bodley Head, 1964); and the thorough annotated bibliographical treatment in Grimsted, Foreign Ministers, pp. 329-338, and McConnell, Alexander I, pp. 212-224.

As the "young friends" of Alexander I were abroad at the time of his succession to the throne, the new tsar was helped in the preparation of many of his first acts by D. P. Troshchinskii Chief of the [Permanent] Council's Chancery early in 1801.<sup>60</sup> Among the first measures enacted by Alexander I during his first two weeks as tsar were the traditional release of victims of the previous tsar from prison and permission for those in exile to return; dismissal from office of Paul's Procurator-General, Obolianinov, and several other of his officials; annulment of decrees by which Paul had discharged more than twelve-thousand government clerks and other officials; amnesty for all fugitives (except murderers); granting of certain rights of due process to persons accused of crimes; removal of the prohibition against the sale of foreign books; reopening of private printing houses; granting of permission for Russians to travel abroad; restoration of Catherine II's charters of the nobility and for the cities; removal of the embargo; a return to the more moderate tariff of 1797; and steps being taken against the sale of serfs without land. Finally, according to a plan worked out by Troshchinskii, the Court Council was dismissed on March 26 (O. S.) and on March 30 (O. S.), 1801, two days after Alexander I had invited A. R. Vorontsov to serve as Chancellor, a Permanent Council was created with Troshchinskii at its head. By June 5/17, 1801, another of those who looked up to A. R. Vorontsov as a "tutor," his old friend and colleague, P. V. Zavadovskii was appointed the head of a commission for the Constitution of Laws, which had as its task the codification of already existing laws.<sup>61</sup> Finally, on September 8/20, 1802, the formalization of the ministries took place when, by decree, Alexander I permanently replaced Peter's colleges

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<sup>60</sup>P. A. Stroganov, II, 6, 34; Kornilov, I, 80-81.

<sup>61</sup>P. A. Stroganov, II, 7, 34; Kornilov, I, 81-82.

with his own ministries which remained in effect until the Revolution of 1917. Thus, on September 8/20, 1802, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, in addition to being Chancellor, and a member of the Privy Council, became the first to hold the title Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>62</sup>

It should be emphasized, however, that if McConnell's view is sustained, i.e., if all or most of the liberal acts performed during the tsar's first three months were reluctantly agreed to whereafter he pursued his own course autocratically, then many of his appointments must have been merely symbolic gestures, and many of his publicly expressed wishes merely ploys.

### 1. Of Ministers and Ministries

It should be stated at the outset that after his first few months as tsar, Alexander I seems to have been as much his own man, so to speak, in foreign affairs as well as with respect to domestic policies. That is, he apparently picked and chose influences towards which he had a predisposition, and frequently ignored those which were unpalatable, occasionally discarding them. Therefore, although the precise influence of A. R. Vorontsov on Russian foreign policy is difficult to establish, it seems clear that Vorontsov wished to exercise greater influence, if not control over foreign

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<sup>62</sup>The ministerial reform replaced Peter's Colleges with eight ministries. In addition to the ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Vorontsov whose first assistant was Czartoryski, the other seven ministers were: Minister of the Interior, Kochubei, who was assisted by Stroganov; Minister of Justice, Derzhavin, whose deputies were Novosiltsev and Lopukhin; Minister of Commerce, N. P. Rumiantsev; Minister of Finance, Vasileev, assisted by Gureev; Minister of War, General Viasmitinov; Minister of the Navy, Admiral N. S. Mordvinov; and Minister of Education, P. V. Zavadovskii, assisted by M. N. Muraviev. In addition, Golubtsov was named Treasurer of the Russian State; "Ukaz of September 8, 1802," in Bilbasov, Arkhiv Grafov Mordvihovykh III, 16-19, No. 669. For details of the transition to the creation of these ministries from the "permanent council" which had been created on March 30, 1801 (O. S.), see, for example, P. A. Stroganov, I, 99-100; and Kornilov, I, 86-90.

affairs direction.<sup>63</sup> What follows suggests the lines which it appears Vorontsov wished to see Russian foreign policy follow, although one cannot say for certain that similarities between his desires and actual policy were more than coincidental. For example, the fact that A. R. Vorontsov held the offices of both Chancellor and Foreign Minister simultaneously represented a situation no different than that which had existed in the reigns of Elizabeth Petrovna and the early years of Catherine II when Bestuzhev and M. I. Vorontsov were successively, as Great Chancellor, also responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs.<sup>64</sup> On the other hand, as has been shown, both Elizabeth and Catherine II, like other Russian autocrats, assumed direction of the course of those aspects of Russian foreign affairs which were considered by them to be central to their respective policies.

Why then, did Alexander I select A. R. Vorontsov to serve as his first Foreign Minister? The answer to this question is less than clear. If McConnell is correct and Alexander I had by that time consciously embarked on an unwavering autocratic course, then the choice of Vorontsov could have been little more than a symbolic gesture, although he may have wanted an experienced and capable person on the job on a daily basis. It is correct, as Czartoryski contended, that Vorontsov's activities as Minister

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<sup>63</sup>Vorontsov's ambition to direct both domestic affairs and foreign policy was noted by P. G. Divov, who observed that, under Tsar Alexander I, Vorontsov was "hoping to be in charge of all the affairs of state," "Zapiska P. G. Divova: Povestvovanie o tsarstvovanii Aleksandra I, dlia nego odnogo pisannoe," RS, C (October-December, 1899), p. 83.

<sup>64</sup>Grimsted, "Diplomatic Spokesmen," pp. 103-104, also classified Ostermann, Panin, and Bezborodko in this category, although Panin never was Chancellor, and Bezborodko was Chancellor only under Paul. As for Ostermann, the reference must have been to the Ostermann of the time of Anna, because Catherine II's Ostermann rose only as high as Vice-Chancellor, since Catherine II appointed no new Chancellor after the death of M. I. Vorontsov.

of Foreign Affairs did not significantly alter the conduct of foreign policy as it had been practiced from March, 1801 until September, 1802.<sup>65</sup> It has been said of Kochubei, who was Vorontsov's immediate predecessor in direction of foreign policy, in function if not in title, that the former did not make a move "without consulting" Alexander Romanovich.<sup>66</sup>

Such a comment is not surprising in the light of two factors. In the first place, Kochubei had a great deal of respect for Alexander Romanovich, partly because of the latter's friendship with A. A. Bezborodko, Kochubei's late uncle; and Vorontsov had helped both Bezborodko and Kochubei with respect to their financial problems. Moreover, it seems as though Kochubei had been supplying A. R. Vorontsov with information on foreign affairs for more than a decade. Indeed, it may be that throughout the reign of Catherine II, A. R. Vorontsov was attempting to influence Russian diplomacy along lines he believed to be best both for the interests of Russia and for the Vorontsov fortune.<sup>67</sup> According to this line of reasoning, A. R. Vorontsov was selected by Alexander I to become the first Foreign Minister to hold that title because he was considered to be the most experienced and capable statesmen in the Russia of his time.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup>Czartoryski, I, 314; II, 6, 7.

<sup>66</sup>Alexander's lack of confidence in his ability to make decisions at the outset of his reign is mentioned by Grimsted, Foreign Ministers, p. 75. This view is challenged by McConnell who attributes Alexander's vacillation to fear of Pahlen who fell on June 17/29, 1801 McConnell, Alexander I, pp. 28-31, and by the same author, "Hundred Days," SR, XXVIII, No. 3, pp. 382-383. For the comment by Sauvau, the Austrian diplomat who stated that Kochubei "does nothing without consulting Count Vorontsov" see above, introduction, n. 30. For fourteen letters from Kochubei to A. R. Vorontsov from October, 1801 through August, 1802 in which Kochubei asked Vorontsov for advice on various matters, see AKV, XIV, 157-182.

<sup>67</sup>Garnovskii, RS, XV (1876), p. 691; P. P., "Zubov," ibid., XVI (1876), p. 600; Karnovich, Lichnosti, p. 293; Marcum, p. 248, n. 7.

<sup>68</sup>Czartoryski, I, 286.

Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov for the better part of thirty years, and most clearly in the 1780's, had favored an alliance with France joined to an Austro-Russian nucleus, in order to counterbalance the growing powers of England. With the advent of the violent stage of the French Revolution he leaned strongly on improved relations with England as a countervailing force against French expansionism. As relations with France and England became more central to the conduct of Russian diplomacy in the 1790's and thereafter, relations with Turkey, Sweden, Poland and Prussia had to be stabilized. In this connection the war with Sweden was concluded in 1790; and Vorontsov was in direct communication with Bezborodko who was sent to conclude the Peace of Jassy which ended the second Turkish War of Catherine's reign in 1792, a treaty whereby Russia gained Ochakov and, for a time, stabilized her Turkish border.<sup>69</sup>

Finally, in 1793 and 1795 the second and third partitions of Poland seemed to stabilize relations among Russia, Austria and Prussia, which at least temporarily provided a solution to the Polish question by apparently doing away with Poland. In this regard, Vorontsov favored the partition of Poland.<sup>70</sup> By the time A. R. Vorontsov entered the office of foreign minister, he had been committed for more than a decade to improving relations with England, thereby forming a Russo-Austro-English coalition against France. Austria was to remain the pivot of Vorontsov's foreign policy for Russia. Vorontsov's pro-English anti-French posture which was in turn based on an alliance with Austria seems to have been a central feature in

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<sup>69</sup>The Ochakov crisis of 1791 was the "first serious attempt by England to support Turkey against her Balkan 'enemies.' The history of the next [115] years" is, in part, a consequence of this support, Humphreys, p. 185.

<sup>70</sup>Marcum, pp. 255-256.

his political conflict with Panin, whom it has been said, Alexander I "sacrificed to the Vorontsov influence," an assertion which has been challenged by McConnell who contends that Panin was ousted soon after Fahlen as part of the strategy of the tsar to rid himself of the clique who killed his father.<sup>71</sup>

In 1800, Panin had expressed his hostility to the "cupidity" of the Court of Vienna. In addition, he was opposed to a coalition against France because, he argued, if Austria were attacked, she would "necessarily succumb" to France, leaving Russia alone against France, with Prussia being too weak to help Russia as had been shown by the insurrection in Prussian Poland.<sup>72</sup> Within the year, he had changed his position to one of advocating union between Russia, England, Austria and Prussia.<sup>73</sup> At this time, P. V. Zavadovskii feared British control of the seas.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, A. R. Vorontsov believed that an active foreign policy was impossible because of the domestic pressures on the Russian government, as he stated in a memoir in 1801.<sup>75</sup>

Indeed, upon assuming the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. R. Vorontsov at first continued to pursue the neutrality policy associated with V. P. Kochubei.<sup>76</sup> Later, in 1803, he indicated in a memoir to Panin

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<sup>71</sup>Compare Grimsted, Foreign Ministers, p. 76 and n. 22 with McConnell, Alexander I, pp. 29, 36, and McConnell, "Hundred Days," SR, XXVIII, No. 3, pp. 383-384.

<sup>72</sup>"Zapiska Panina," September 11/23, 1800, SIRIO, LXX, 658-659.

<sup>73</sup>N. P. Panin, "Du systeme politique de la Russie, (1801)," A. Briker (ed.), Materialy dlia zhizneopisaniia grafa Nikity Petrovicha Panina (1770-1837) (7 vols.; SPb.: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1892), VI, 17-25.

<sup>74</sup>p. V. Zavadovskii to A. R. Vorontsov, May 20/31, 1800, AKV, XII, 247.

<sup>75</sup>A. R. Vorontsov, "Zapiska grafa A. R. Vorontsova," August 12/26, 1801, [to Alexander I], RA (1908), t. 6, pp. 5-7.

<sup>76</sup>Stanislavskaja, p. 197; Czartoryski, I, 314.

that he, Vorontsov, was opposed to France and a policy of neutrality toward that country.<sup>77</sup>

Nevertheless, there is strong inferential evidence that A. R. Vorontsov exerted great influence from the viewpoint that, although both Paul and Alexander I were reluctant to oppose France in the Second and Third Coalitions, A. R. Vorontsov favored both -- and both were effected.<sup>78</sup>

Although much has been made of Vorontsov's illness as the reason for his return to his estates in late 1803, perhaps a more important factor was an increasing divergence of view between Alexander I and his foreign minister concerning Russia's relations with Austria and France. Indeed, it has been said that A. R. Vorontsov "was the direct cause of the rupture with Napoleon in 1803."<sup>79</sup>

Almost immediately thereafter, Vorontsov returned to Andreevskoe and Czartoryski, without the title, acted as Alexander's foreign minister pursuing a policy similar to that of Vorontsov's, until Alexander I finally

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<sup>77</sup>AVPR, f. Kantseliaria, 1801g., d. 6743, ll. 32-36 ob., cited in Stanislavskaja, p. 176.

<sup>78</sup>Despite his inclinations toward Britain, "Alexander was reluctant to enter the conflict [vs. France], and even after the Third Coalition had been formed, he participated in it with less enthusiasm than Paul had shown for the Second Coalition," Saul, p. 226. By contrast, it has been argued that "Paul I...was the soul of the 'second' coalition," Trachevskii, SIRIO, LXX, xiii and that what A. R. Vorontsov really was the first to suggest was the First Coalition of 1791, *ibid.*, ii.

<sup>79</sup>Wilmot, p. 135, n. Compare with the view that "the sole cause of the rupture was the violation of international law," Czartoryski, II, 28. See also the British view that A. R. Vorontsov was the first to call for the Third Coalition, H. Beeley, "A Project of Alliance with Russia, 1802," English Historical Review, XLIX (1934), pp. 497-502; and one Soviet historian's agreement that A. R. Vorontsov took the first step toward the Third Coalition, Stanislavskaja, p. 339 and nn. 80, 81. Indeed, Hedouville predicted that there might be a change from Kechubei's policy as early as September, 1802 and that, if so, it would probably be a result of A. R. Vorontsov's view because of his elevation, SIRIO, LXX, 511-512.

removed Czartoryski from office in July, 1806 and effectuated a Franco-Russian rapprochement in 1807. For the moment, however, in 1803 Vorontsov's formal attachment to Austria was at least as great as had been his less influential affinity a decade earlier. For example, when Alexander Romanovich was in disfavor in 1793, Ludwig Cobenzl had "complained that Austria had lost in A. R. Vorontsov" a minister who would be "'difficult to replace'" because of his friendship toward Austria.<sup>80</sup> By 1803, this friendship was openly directed against France "when the Russian chargé d'affaires in Vienna, Anstett, was instructed on October 6 by the Chancellor, Count Vorontsov, to open negotiations for the purpose of joint action against Napoleon."<sup>81</sup>

Grimsted's view is that Czartoryski's influence predominated in the foreign ministry since the time he began his apprenticeship under A. R. Vorontsov in September, 1802.<sup>82</sup> Several months later, as late as July 12/24, 1804, the newly appointed French minister Reneval stated:

The E-r himself, despite his attachment for Prince Czartoryskii, is believed to want the advice of Count Vorontsov and has asked him, it is said, to return to the Court.<sup>83</sup>

Vorontsov was unable to return to Court because his health was poor. Moreover, he had the utmost confidence in Czartoryski's ability to carry

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<sup>80</sup>Marcum, p. 249.

<sup>81</sup>Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968) (Reprint), pp. 88-89.

<sup>82</sup>Grimsted, Foreign Ministers, p. 111. For the view that Czartoryski became Foreign Minister in 1802 after Vorontsov became Chancellor, see Serge Tatistcheff, Alexander I<sup>er</sup> et Napoléon d'après leur correspondance inédite, 1801-1812 (Paris: Librairie Académique Didier, 1891), p. 41. Czartoryski's statement, "I accepted the post of Foreign Minister," dates only to 1804, Czartoryski, II, 3.

<sup>83</sup>Reneval to Talleyrand, July 12/24, 1804, SIRIO, LXXVII, pp. 679-680. See also, Czartoryski, II, 2-3.

out the policies Vorontsov had inaugurated in the best interests of the Russian nation, a conviction Vorontsov had expressed to Prince Adam when the former had begun his leave in February, 1804.<sup>84</sup>

Preoccupation with Russia's relations with the then major powers of France, Britain and Austria did not preclude Vorontsov's continued interest in other matters. Thus, in the summer of 1803, during the height of Franco-Russian tension Vorontsov dispatched an expedition to Japan under the direction of Rezanov who had been one of the founders of the Russian American Company and was a relative of the late Gregory Shelekhov.<sup>85</sup>

## 2. Minister in absentia: The Role of Czartoryski

To date, most scholars seem to have accepted the memoirs of Czartoryski almost at face value with respect to evaluating the relative insignificance of A. R. Vorontsov as foreign minister when compared to the influence of Czartoryski. Indeed, the student of the period almost invariably finds repeated Czartoryski's view that the Emperor had full confidence in him; that Alexander I preferred to work with Czartoryski rather than with Vorontsov; and that after Vorontsov's retirement, Czartoryski had little time to spare in responding to Vorontsov's communications.<sup>86</sup> Indeed, such bland acceptance has led at least one author to the erroneous conclusion that, "in January 1804, he [Czartoryski] was given the full control of this department [the foreign ministry] with the rank of minister."<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-2.

<sup>85</sup>Lensen, pp. 145-146; Foust, pp. 311, 319, 324.

<sup>86</sup>Czartoryski, I, 332-333; II, 1-3.

<sup>87</sup>Marion Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770-1861, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 26 offers no citation.

Czartoryski's own evaluation is that his own policy during Vorontsov's illness and, indeed, after the latter's death, represents essentially a continuation and elaboration of the foreign policy pursued by Alexander Romanovich. In this regard, Czartoryski's evaluation may be useful as a tool for appreciating Vorontsov's desire to maintain domestic tranquility and international peace for three decades. Czartoryski stated:

My ministry was in some degree a continuation of the preceding one, though it was difficult to maintain the passive system of peace and tranquility that had been adopted by Kochubei and pursued with more self-assurance and dignity by the Chancellor [A. R. Vorontsov].<sup>88</sup>

Czartoryski had the greatest respect for Alexander Romanovich, not only for his ability but also for his wisdom. In addition, the cautious Polish nobleman astutely avoided accepting simple explanations for Vorontsov's retirement from service under Catherine II. For example, Czartoryski flatly stated: "I do not know what induced Count Vorontsov to withdraw from public affairs during the reign of Catherine."<sup>89</sup> On the other hand, Czartoryski was well aware of the close relationship between Vorontsov, A. A. Bezborodko and P. V. Zavadovskii.<sup>90</sup> Like Mikhail Garnovskii, Czar-

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Probably, Kukiel, like Tatistcheff, p. 41, accepted uncritically Czartoryski's own statement of the matter. After describing how the post of Foreign Minister was pushed upon him by Alexander I with A. R. Vorontsov's concurrence despite Czartoryski's fervent soul searching and protestations to the contrary, Czartoryski wrote: "I accepted the post of Foreign Minister, and the Emperor was glad as a child," and, a paragraph later, wrote again "...when I was appointed Foreign Minister..." Czartoryski, II, 3. Although Czartoryski performed many of the duties of foreign minister, both before and after Vorontsov's demise, and although he strongly influenced Alexander I on foreign policy matters for a while, Czartoryski never held the post of foreign minister, Grimsted, Foreign Ministers, p. 111, n. 8.

<sup>88</sup>Czartoryski, II, 6-7. Vorontsov, as shown earlier in this chapter, at first pursued a passive policy, but in 1803 desired active opposition to France.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., I, 286-287.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 286.

toryski recalled that Vorontsov occasionally gave way to "fits of bad temper," and also, as Garnovskii had earlier implied -- Czartoryski noted that Vorontsov's "ambition was not easily satisfied" and that his appointment as Chancellor represented the fruition of a goal "of which he had long been ambitious."<sup>91</sup> Czartoryski emphasized Vorontsov's wisdom in remaining "so long...in retirement," despite the latter's ambition.<sup>92</sup>

Reasoning from hindsight, almost as if to imply that when Alexander Romanovich formally retired from service in 1794 he knew for a certainty that approximately a decade later he would return in greater glory, Czartoryski transformed Vorontsov's hope into an inevitable and incontrovertible fact. That is, the Polish nobleman believed that Vorontsov remained in some kind of secluded retirement until returned to prominence by Alexander I, a belief which seems to have been followed by most scholars. Instead, as earlier suggested herein, Vorontsov continued to operate behind the scenes as indicated by his letters to, among others, Semen Romanovich, P. V. Zavadovskii, A. I. Morkov, V. P. Kochubei, D. P. Troshchinskii, and A. Ia. Protasov. In this way, although officially in retirement, Vorontsov kept his fingers in the diplomatic, economic, financial and political pies.

This explanation seems more plausible when one considers that soon after Alexander's accession to the throne, A. R. Vorontsov became the highest ranking official in the Russian government. Indeed, when one considers "the task" Vorontsov undertook, as described by Czartoryski, and the success Czartoryski suggested Vorontsov had at first, the view expressed carries even greater weight. Essentially, in Czartoryski's view, Vorontsov was a person generally acknowledged to be superior to most in

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<sup>91</sup>Ibid., pp. 287, 299. See also, Garnovskii, RS, XV, 483.

<sup>92</sup>Czartoryski, I, 287.

both knowledge and judgment, and who sided with the tsar's young friends on two grounds: first, to be better able to mold the ideas and actions of the new tsar; and, secondly, to gain the "first place" in the new Russian government. Czartoryski expressed it in the following way:

It was only at the time of the new Emperor's accession that Vorontzoff reappeared at St. Petersburg, with the reputation he had enjoyed during the reign of Catherine still further increased by his having so long and so wisely remained in retirement. He did not join the old Ministers, most of whom were inferior to him in knowledge and judgment, and whom it would have been necessary to dismiss in order to find a place for him. The position he assumed was a more elevated one; he undertook the task of reconciling the Emperor's ideas with those of the old Russian routine, of moderating the changes which he foresaw might arise from Alexander's inclinations. It was easy to adopt and at the same time to guide them, and thereby to gain favour [sic] and power. Vorontzoff accordingly entered the 'young men's party' feeling that in order to rise it was necessary to free one's self from the old traditions, and that in any new arrangement the first place would be secured to him.<sup>93</sup>

Although Czartoryski suggested herein that Vorontsov was influenced by the "liberal" ideas of the tsar's young friends, it has been stated that Vorontsov was, at least on occasion, more liberal than they.<sup>94</sup> Similarly, Czartoryski erroneously ascribed some of the liberal sentiments of Count Alexander to the influence of the latter's brother, Semen Romanovich.<sup>95</sup> Yet, according to Czartoryski, Semen considered his brother "the ablest and most virtuous man in Russia, and his decisions were to him oracles."<sup>96</sup>

Because Semen had a loose tongue, and expressed his ideas openly, publicly and frequently, he has often been referred to as an Anglophile

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<sup>93</sup>Ibid., I, 288; II, 5.

<sup>94</sup>Kornilov, I, 87. Reference here is to the "Charter of the Russian People" which will be treated in the following chapter.

<sup>95</sup>Czartoryski, I, 289.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., I, 288; II, 5.

and as a liberal. Similarly, because of the close brotherly affection between Semen and Alexander Romanovich, many apparently believed that both thought in the same way, and -- contrary to the actual fact -- that the ambassador to England influenced the Chancellor, when the reverse seems actually to have been the case, and had been so for decades. After all, in the kind of relationship described by Czartoryski, apart from other evidence cited earlier, could one expect the oracle to be directed by the supplicant?

As for Czartoryski, he noted that his position as A. R. Vorontsov's assistant in the ministry of foreign affairs rested not only on the wish of Alexander I but also on Vorontsov's consent, which was readily given.<sup>97</sup> Although Czartoryski was critical of the way in which Vorontsov handled problems with Sweden, the Polish nobleman was aware that "Vorontsoff knew Russia," and although curious to this student, according to Czartoryski had hoped in vain to gain international stature for Russia by humiliation of her weaker neighbor.<sup>98</sup>

Although the description of Vorontsov's overbearing treatment of Sweden is curious because of Czartoryski's emphatic positive view of Vorontsov's generally good judgment, which in the Swedish case backfired, Czartoryski's discussion of the matter may have been designed, at least in part, to disclaim any personal responsibility for the treatment of the Swedes, of which the public disapproved. On some matters, however, Czartoryski admitted that, at least until January, 1804 "there was an understanding between the Chancellor [A. R. Vorontsov] and myself to refer matters from one to the other...."<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup>Ibid., I, 304-305.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., pp. 314-317.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., p. 332. In this connection, reference was in the context

After that time Czartoryski would have us believe that Tsar Alexander I openly showed his "invincible dislike" for Vorontsov and not only preferred working with Czartoryski, but also ridiculed Vorontsov whom the tsar encouraged to take an extended leave for rest and no longer desired the advice of the elder statesman.<sup>100</sup> This view is not, however, in accordance with the views of the French ministers Hedouville and Reneval, who believed Vorontsov was not ill and that Alexander I continued to seek his counsel.<sup>101</sup> Moreover, a letter from Czartoryski to Vorontsov dated May 29/June 10, 1804 suggests that at that time Alexander I may still have desired the counsel of A. R. Vorontsov.<sup>102</sup> Consequently, although Czartoryski apparently desired the credit for the activities of the Russian foreign ministry during 1804 and 1805, and despite his claim that he "foresaw a rupture with France"<sup>103</sup> the evidence suggests that it is equally plausible that Vorontsov continued to try to direct Russian foreign policy as long as he was able to do so even from his sick bed.<sup>104</sup>

Such a view is entirely consistent with Czartoryski's recollection that, when suffering from a high fever near the end of 1803, Vorontsov is said to have exclaimed more than once:

These young men wish to govern everything, but I will not allow it; I alone will remain at the head of affairs.<sup>105</sup>

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of fobbing off the jingoist Dolgorukii.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., I, 333; II, 1.

<sup>101</sup>Hedouville to Talleyrand, February 11/23, 1804, *SIRIO*, LXXVII, 479-482; Reneval to Talleyrand, July 12/24, 1804, *ibid.*, pp. 679-680.

<sup>102</sup>Czartoryski to A. R. Vorontsov, May 29/June 10, 1804, in Czartoryski, II, 31-34.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., II, 2.

<sup>104</sup>A. R. Vorontsov to Czartoryski, January, 1805, *AKV*, XII, 463-471. See also the view that Czartoryski adopted an approach defensive of his policies in a desire for notoriety as suggested, above, this chapter, n. 96.

<sup>105</sup>Czartoryski, I, 332.

Perhaps this is why the tsar disliked A. R. Vorontsov; that is, because Vorontsov was beginning to act as though he was in charge, as though he was the Emperor of all the Russias. Indeed, according to Czartoryski, Alexander I disliked Vorontsov's "old-fashioned manners, his voice, his deliberate way of speaking, even his gestures...."<sup>106</sup>

If, however, McConnell's contention is borne out that by June 17/29 Alexander I had decided to rule autocratically, then it follows that both Vorontsov and Czartoryski were deceived by or at least unaware of the tsar's true intentions. In that event, much of what Czartoryski believed and wrote will have to be analyzed in a new light. Similarly, Vorontsov's role and his conception of his role will have to be modified by the fact of the tsar's early bent to absolutism.

### C. The Death of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov

On Vorontsov's part, however, when he retired to the country in 1804, it was with every intention of returning to his post.<sup>107</sup> As Vorontsov's illness became worse, however, it soon became evident that he would not be able to return to service. A. I. Morkov, who had so faithfully served Vorontsov for two decades, was thereupon "more determined than ever to quit the diplomatic career."<sup>108</sup> Catherine Wilmot, an Englishwoman who spent some time with Dashkova, wrote on December 15/27, 1805 that the Princess

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<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 333. It might be said that Czartoryski's description pictured A. R. Vorontsov as imperious and overbearing.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., II, 2.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

had just learned "that her favorite brother the Grand Chancellor is not expected to live...This is a dreadful shock!"<sup>109</sup> While writing his memoirs, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov passed away on December 2/14, 1805. In the following year, his brother Semen retired from service, thus bringing to an end three decades of Vorontsov domination of those foreign policy matters not handled personally by the ruler of Russia.

The eulogy of A. R. Vorontsov's nephew, Dmitri Buturlin, written in the form of a lyric poem entitled "To the Ghost of a Friend"<sup>110</sup> although at times drifting into a gushing sentimentality, described the sentiments many must have felt, although few expressed, possibly because they may have felt it impolitic after considering the fact that Alexander I had developed a dislike for the elder Count Vorontsov.<sup>111</sup> Buturlin began his poem by evoking the image of Vorontsov's soul at peace in the Elysian fields. Expressing disbelief that Vorontsov could no longer hear him, Buturlin was saddened by his realization that it was his "tears" that gave substance to Vorontsov's memory, to which, together with his uncle's "constant kindness," Buturlin gave credit for his own success with the words that they "fed my soul and from which I made my glory."<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>109</sup>Wilmot, pp. 211-212.

<sup>110</sup>D. P. Buturlin, "A l'ombre d'un ami," AKV, XXXII, 423-427.

<sup>111</sup>Czartoryski, I, 333.

<sup>112</sup>Buturlin compared Vorontsov to a "pure, unsullied beam of light emanating from God" and, again expressing disbelief that Vorontsov could no longer hear and understand him, asserted that "our friendship survives and will never be extinguished." Indeed, in the same vein as Radishchev had written a decade earlier, Buturlin referred to A. R. Vorontsov "as a father, a certain friend," and indicated that he had worked with and for his uncle for two decades, approximately since 1785. Buturlin wrote:

Oh you that I have lost,  
                   you for whom I cry again,  
 You know how I loved you  
                   with a heart sincere and pure.

Czartoryski's characterization of A. R. Vorontsov's noble qualities, however brief, is even more warm and moving. Czartoryski wrote:

I am convinced...that he never distrusted me, or listened to the insinuations which people made against me. The extreme and entire confidence which he showed me lasted to the end of his life, which is surprising, as so many people had an interest in making us quarrel. He gave his confidence and friendship to very few people; his sentiments were delicate and noble, and although they were not based on strict principle, they showed that he was kind-hearted and sensitive. Always inclined to render a service, he judged others with great indulgence, and even at times when he spoke his mind most freely, I have never detected in him any feeling of hatred or desire for revenge.<sup>113</sup>

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He continued: "For twenty years I looked upon you as a father, a certain friend, and for twenty I shared your pleasure and your pain." Finally, Buturlin criticized those who followed and supported A. R. Vorontsov simply because of their vulgar "ambition" and because they saw "in their love for you the route to fortune." Without naming names, Buturlin accused many of those who supported Vorontsov of showing a "false zeal" which "masked their passion." Yet, "none of them abused" Vorontsov, because he "cleared up their affairs." In fact, Buturlin suspected that Vorontsov was well aware of the true feelings of all those with whom the elder statesman worked. Noting his uncle's "immense erudition" which existed side by side with Vorontsov's "modest virtues," Buturlin emphasized his uncle's ability to distinguish between appearances and reality. Indeed, he credited Alexander Romanovich with not letting personal feelings interfere with the performance of duty, noting that the elder Count Vorontsov served all his colleagues well, in spite of the fact that, in many cases, his "penetrating glance pierced the depths of their dark intrigues," Buturlin, "A l'ombre d'un ami," AKV, XXXII, 423-425.

<sup>113</sup>Czartoryski, I, 333.

CHAPTER IX  
 THE CHARTER OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE:  
 EXERCISE IN FUTILITY

A. The Setting.

For Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, preparation of the "Charter of the Russian People"<sup>1</sup> must have been the culmination of a lifelong dream. Although one cannot say with certainty that Vorontsov had worked on any preliminary drafts of any of the twenty-six articles prior to Tsar Alexander's express wish that some such document be prepared,<sup>2</sup> the principles contained in the "Charter of the Russian People" reflected the steadfast convictions and life-long practices of Alexander Romanovich. Moreover, the opportunity to prepare such a charter represented Vorontsov's last chance to extend the principles contained in Peter III's 1762 manifesto

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<sup>1</sup>The English translation, which I have followed for the most part, is presented as the "Project for a Most Graciously Granted Charter to the Russian People (1801)" [hereafter cited as "Project"], and may be found in Raëff, *Plans*, pp. 76-84. For the Russian text, see "Gramota Rossiiskomu narodu," [hereafter cited as "Gramota"] in Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, pp. 180-194. These published versions of the second draft of the "Charter" may be compared with the original draft of the document as presented in the appendix to an analysis of the "Charter" by I. M. Trotskii. Containing only twenty articles, it is described as "pervonachal'naiia redaktsiia gramoty Rossiiskomu narodu" [hereafter cited as Trotskii, "Pervonachal'naiia ...gramoty"], in Radishchev, Materialy, pp. 77-81.

<sup>2</sup>Alexander I had shown an interest in some sort of reform of Russian government soon after his accession to the throne as described in conversations with E. A. Stroganov and the early sessions of the meetings of his "secret committee" as shown, for example in P. A. Stroganov, II, 5-57, especially since April 23/May 5, 1801, pp. 5-9, with elaboration of the suggestions for reform described at the meeting of May 9/21, 1801, as described in a series of separate commentaries, pp. 15-32.

which freed the nobility from service, a document which Count Alexander's father, Roman, may have helped prepare.<sup>3</sup> In this connection, the "Charter of the Russian People" may be considered a bold attempt to implant western notions and practices, however modified to suit Russian conditions, in a Russia that could not peacefully be transformed into a nation based on principles more liberal than those presented in the document. Yet, even the modified liberalism of the "Charter of the Russian People" was considered too radical to be signed into law.<sup>4</sup>

The "Charter of the Russian People" may have been intended to be merely a statement of policy which was to be further elaborated in detail by the Commission on the Laws which was headed by Count P. V. Zavadovskii and had as a member Alexander Nikolaevich Radishchev, both of whom paid homage to A. R. Vorontsov as having been their "tutor" and "mentor."<sup>5</sup>

It is possible that the law commission (and hence the work of Zavadovskii, Radishchev and Speransky) may have been originally designed, at least in part, to explicate the principles espoused in Vorontsov's "Charter." Evidence to suggest the accuracy of this view is Ilinskii's comment that A. R. Vorontsov was responsible for beginning the collection of laws relating to the economy of Russia.<sup>6</sup> The relationship between the "Charter" and the law commission was also alluded to in the first article of the "Charter"

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<sup>3</sup>Compare Catherine II, Memoirs, pp. 267-268 and G. V. Vernadsky, "Manifest Petra III o volnosti dvorianskoi i zakonodatelnaia komissia 1754-1766 gg.," Istoricheskoe Obozrenie, XX (1915), pp. 51-59, with Raeff, Plans, pp. 24-25 and Jones, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup>Kornilov, pp. 86-87. The strongest opposition was that of Novosiltsev, P. A. Stroganov, II, August 5/17, 1801, pp. 84-89.

<sup>5</sup>For the establishment of the commission, see PSZ, XXVI, No. 19989, August 25/September 6, 1801, pp. 759-760.

<sup>6</sup>N. S. Ilinskii, "Iz zapisok Nikolai Stepanovicha Ilinskago," RA (1879), No. 12, p. 409.

which began with the following statement:

1. Recognizing the extent of the inadequacy of existing laws, to the improvement of which our predecessors have already given thought we consider it to be our duty to direct our particular attention to this important subject. To this end we have already established a special commission....<sup>7</sup>

The reluctance of Alexander I, therefore, to limit autocracy or to expand in any significant manner the freedom of Russians, whether noble, commoner or serf was well demonstrated by his rejection of Vorontsov's "Charter" within the first few months after the new tsar's accession to the throne. Vorontsov's disappointment, great as it must have been, was however far surpassed by the tragic suicide of the broken-spirited Radishchev.<sup>8</sup>

Had the Charter of the Russian People been approved, the Senate would have been elevated to a position of real power. In this connection, it is difficult to separate A. R. Vorontsov's view of the role of the Senate as he believed it ought to be from the role it would have played had the Charter been approved. For example, the twenty-second article of the Charter granted the Senate "the right to levy taxes...exclusively."<sup>9</sup> Moreover, Article 21 attempted to include provision for amendment of the law in accordance with a clearly defined procedure whereby the Governing Senate would act as a quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial administrative body,

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<sup>7</sup>"Project," Raëff, Plans, p. 77; "Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, p. 181. This article was not contained in the original draft, but was added later as shown by I. M. Trotskii, "Zakonodatelnye proekty A. N. Radishcheva" [hereafter cited as "Zakonodatelnye proekty"] in Radishchev, Materialy, p. 46.

<sup>8</sup>McConnell, Philosophie, pp. 190-191; Ilinskii, RA (1879), No. 12, p. 416.

<sup>9</sup>The provision included the requirement that the taxes be levied according to the will of the monarch, but nevertheless provided some check on the monarch's action. For the provision, see "Project," Raëff, Plans, p. 82.

establishing the new law only after careful review and extensive deliberation, whereupon a new statute would be prepared -- whereas "everything enacted in a different way shall be legally invalid."<sup>10</sup>

The Secret Committee discussed Vorontsov's proposal as one of five projects submitted to Alexander I. As the situation is analyzed by O. A. Narkiewicz:

The first project to be discussed was Aleksandr Vorontsov's memorandum. He suggested that the Senate should have powers by which it could oppose the arbitrary rule of a despot. The project was criticized by Alexander who contended that (a) Vorontsov wanted to concentrate all powers in the Senate, instead of treating it as a purely judiciary body and (b) his suggestions were not precise enough.... It seems certain that [Tsar] Alexander expressed the belief that the Monarch's sovereign power would simply be exchanged for the Senate's sovereign power.<sup>11</sup>

By contrast, and perhaps most appropriate to mention in this connection, Semen Vorontsov clearly differed with his elder brother on this matter. In June, 1801, Semen wrote a letter to his brother, Alexander Romanovich, in which the younger Vorontsov defended autocracy; and in 1802 and 1803, respectively, he prepared two memoranda defending in detail the principle and the practices of autocracy which, even in its backwardness, he considered beneficial to Russia. The first was entitled "On the Establishment of an Academy for Diplomacy," sent -- at the beginning

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>11</sup>O. A. Narkiewicz, "Alexander I and the Senate Reform," SEER, XLVII, No. 108 (January, 1969), pp. 122-123. See also, for discussion of Vorontsov's proposal, P. A. Stroganov, II, August 5/16, 1801, pp. 84-88. Certainly, the evaluation by Narkiewicz supports the thesis that Tsar Alexander made his own decisions. Of course the project was not approved. As Czartoryski later recalled, he did not believe the strengthening of the Senate could solve Russia's problems, Czartoryski, I, 293. For the view of S. R. Vorontsov, who expressed a belief in the usefulness of the Senate under a direct and benevolent autocracy, see S. R. Vorontsov to Kochubei (1803), AKV, 441-452. For the statement that Stroganov and Novosiltsev followed Bezborodko's belief in autocracy, with which Alexander I agreed, see P. A. Stroganov, I, 101-102

of November 1802 -- directly to Alexander Romanovich who had recently been installed as Chancellor of the Russian Empire and Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the latter was called "On Internal Government In Russia" which was sent in 1803 to V. P. Kochubei who was at the time serving as Minister of Internal Affairs. In the former, he offers as a chief rationale for the need for the kind of training he suggests, the grounds that "the Emperor is dedicated to the good of the state and seeks only to repair the evils and abuses that have been introduced" into the different branches of government, "a task which would be aided, particularly in the government of so vast an empire, by the development of well-trained and capable officials." In the second, written in response to two letters by Kochubei outlining his ministerial plans, he points out the usefulness of the Senate, notes his fear of the abuse of ministerial power -- which he suggests is a chimère and, without referring to the need or benefits of any kind of legislative assembly, implies a preference for direct and immediate benevolent autocracy.<sup>12</sup>

Semen's view is in keeping with his legitimist actions since 1762. At that time, he supported Peter III, who was overthrown. Similarly, in 1788 and thereafter, he supported Louis XVI and opposed not only the practices of but also the principles of the French Revolution. Now, in 1801, Semen was true to form in these letters supporting benevolent, autocratic rule. How then do we account for Semen's characterization as an

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<sup>12</sup>S. R. Vorontsov to A. R. Vorontsov, June 14/26, 1801, AKV, X, 98-102; "O zavedenii diplomaticheskago uchilishcha," October 30/November 11, 1802, *ibid.*, XV, 431-440; to Kochubei, "O vnutrennem upravlenii v Rossii" (1803), *ibid.*, pp. 441-452. It is almost as if Semen was trying to dissuade Alexander Romanovich from his more liberal sentiments, a process which may have dated back to at least as far as the French Revolution of 1789. Considering the duration of Semen's preference for Russian autocracy, it may be that he is improperly associated with the Senatorial Party.

advocate of greater power for the Senate as described by Czartoryski?<sup>13</sup> Is it possible that the latter somehow erred and, writing his memoirs years later, placed the words of A. R. Vorontsov in the mouth of Semen? Or is it equally possible that Semen, during his brief visit, was sufficiently convinced by Alexander Romanovich of the need for a strong Senate, that Semen actually spoke in favor of the notion. Either of these suggestions seems more plausible than the notion that Semen truly supported the notion of a powerful Senate for any length of time. Indeed, if he were credited with greater capacity for good judgment, one might wish to investigate the suggestion that he was playing "devil's advocate," so to speak, in an effort to assess the tsar's true feelings on the matter.

It is, perhaps, less difficult to explain A. R. Vorontsov's shift from his urgings to Alexander I that the new tsar retain his autocratic powers, to Vorontsov's arguments for a powerful Senate and his preparation of the Charter for the Russian People. In the very early days of the reign of Alexander I, Vorontsov urged the tsar not to give up his powers because Vorontsov also was concerned about preventing the Pahlen-Panin clique from gaining too much power. After Pahlen's fall, Vorontsov hoped for more power for himself under a rule of law which could be provided by the proclamation of The Charter for the Russian People and a stronger Senate. If this reasoning is so, it bears out McConnell's contention about Pahlen's fall, and sharpens his thesis about the astuteness of Alexander I who apparently was able to play-off the sincere reformatory wishes of one group against another, e.g., that of Pahlen and Panin against the Vorontsovs, at the same time making it seem as though the tsar was mediating between them while he actually was strengthening his own power

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<sup>13</sup>Czartoryski, I, 289-290.

as an autocrat -- beneath the unseeing eyes of his young friends on the Secret Committee, even including Czartoryski.

As for his uni-cameralism, A. R. Vorontsov may have believed that a two-house legislature was simply too advanced for a Russia which, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, had had no significant experience with an independent legislative body and, therefore, he chose to rely for the moment on a structure paralleling the Great Council of thirteenth century England until a more broadly representative legislative body could at a later date be created.<sup>14</sup>

#### B. The Question of Authorship of the "Charter"

Marc Raeff recently noted, the "exact authorship of the Charter has not been determined."<sup>15</sup>

Soviet scholars for a long time seem to have been obliged to prove that the "Charter" was Radishchev's when Radishchev was classified as an opponent of serfdom who was a forerunner of the Bolsheviks.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, per-

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<sup>14</sup>An argument may be made for the notion that Vorontsov's proposals envisioned an aristocratic constitution with a consequent strengthening of both the Senate and the State Council, Stanislavskaja, p. 183. See also the view of Czartoryski, I, 300-303, for Czartoryski's account of how Vorontsov once had longed to be like an ancient Polish grand seigneur; and A. R. Vorontsov, "Zapiski grafa A. R. Vorontsova o Rossii, imperatoru Aleksandru I-mu (1801)," AKV, XXIX, 451-470. Regarding a two-house legislature, i.e., a two house Senate with the upper house appointed by the tsar "for life and posterity," such a suggestion had first been made by Stroganov in 1802, but was a "provision even the Anglophile Count Alexander Vorontsov had feared was too advanced for Russia," McConnell, Alexander, p. 76. For Vorontsov's continued activities to win support for his position, see his "Opinions on the Rights of the Senate," May 3/15, 1802, AGS, III, pt. 1, 39-46. It should be noted, that by this time, Alexander's Secret Committee had almost lost whatever influence it may have ever had. After its meeting of May 23/June 4, 1802 it did not meet again until November 7/19, 1803, P. A. Stroganov, I, xxxi, 229-230.

<sup>15</sup>Raeff, "Project," Plans, pp. 75-76.

<sup>16</sup>See above, Chapter VI, n. 1 and G. Gukovskii's comments.

haps such a consideration was among those which in 1940, led the leading Soviet historian M. V. Mechkina to support the view that the "Charter" was created by A. N. Radishchev.<sup>17</sup> Earlier, in 1923, V. P. Semennikov had attempted to prove that, if Radishchev was not the author of the "Charter," he must have had a large share in its preparation.<sup>18</sup> This view apparently was based on the fact that the draft for the "Charter" was prepared in Radishchev's hand, in a manner similar to the notion that Michael Speransky was one of the authors of the document because "the final text is in Speransky's hand."<sup>19</sup>

M. A. Korf, in his biography of Michael Speransky, published in 1861, had decided that the "Charter" was created by D. P. Troschinskii who was aided by Speransky.<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, A. N. Pypin and N. K. Schilder:

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in PSS, I, iii; Makogonenko, pp. 3-4; and Berdyaev, pp. 28-29, 99. For the similar view of a western scholar, see Clardy, p. 9.

<sup>17</sup>M. V. Mechkina, Rossia v XIX veke (M.: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1949), p. 46 and, in the 1954 edition, p. 45. S. A. Pokrovskii was critical of Mechkina for linking Radishchev's authorship of the draft of the charter to the latter's work on the Law Commission of which Zavadovskii was the head because, S. A. Pokrovskii argued, Radishchev was not named to the commission until August 13/25, 1801, one day after the last day it was brought up at a meeting of the unofficial committee, S. A. Pokrovskii, p. 39, n. 2. According to McConnell, Radishchev was named to the commission a week earlier, on August 6/18, 1801, McConnell, Philosophes, p. 177. In any event, his work on a draft of the "Charter" may have been linked to his position on the commission, conceivably as a preliminary or first activity.

<sup>18</sup>Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, pp. 133-135. See also, pp. 177, 430-433.

<sup>19</sup>Marc Raeff, Michael Speransky, Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772-1839 [hereafter cited as Raeff, Speransky (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957)], p. 23, n. 2. Raeff went on to say that "Speransky opposed the idea of the Charter" and "did not participate in the drafting of the document." His part was "limited to some stylistic improvements added after the Charter had been [discussed by] the unofficial committee," *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup>M. A. Korf, Zhizn grafa Speranskogo (2 vols. in 1; SPb.: izdanie ispravleno, 1861), I, 92. This conclusion was based on the nature of the official duties of Speransky who was to help prepare all laws and manifestoes.

argued that the "Charter" was the creation of A. R. Vorontsov.<sup>21</sup> V. P. Semennikov dismissed both Troshchinskii and Vorontsov as authors of the document largely on the basis of Semennikov's belief that neither of these two knew enough about the laws of the Russian Empire for either to be able to conceive of many specific elements of the document. Moreover, he argued, Vorontsov wrote in French better than he did in Russian. For Semennikov, then, Radishchev was the likely author because he not only was a well known Russian writer, but also because he was thoroughly familiar with Russian law. In addition, Semennikov noted some church-slavonic elements of the document which he believed similar in style to elements of Radishchev's writings. Finally, Semennikov argued that Vorontsov's preoccupation with the details of government affairs left him little time for such a work and, consequently, even if Vorontsov deserved credit for conception of the "Charter," Radishchev's role in its nature, scope and preparation was very large.<sup>22</sup>

In any event, there are at present known to be three drafts of the "Charter." The first, consisting of twenty articles, was published in French in 1908 in the pages of the Russkii Arkhiv, and in Russian in 1936 by I. M. Trotskii in his study of Radishchev.<sup>23</sup> The second draft, consis-

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<sup>21</sup>Shilder, Alexander, II, 78; A. N. Pypin, Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii pri Aleksandra I (SPb., 1897), cited in Babkin, p. 226.

<sup>22</sup>Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, pp. 149-151, 171-173. See also, Babkin, pp. 226-227.

<sup>23</sup>The text of the first draft of the proposed "Charter" was printed in French under the heading "Articles ou mat6riels qui peuvent servir 6 la confection d'un 6dit ou manifeste de privil6ges, franchises, etc." in RA (1908), t. 6, pp. 7-18, and contained in a larger article entitled "Zapiska grafa A. R. Vorontsova o milostivom manifeste na koronatsiiu imperatora Aleksandra pervago. C materialami dlia sego manifesta," *ibid.*, pp. 4-20. See also, A. V. Predtechenskii, Ocherki obshchestvenno-politicheskoi istorii Rossii v pervoi chetverti xix veka (M.: Akademiia nauk, 1957), p. 185, n. 18. The Russian version of the first draft may be

ting of twenty-six articles, was discovered by Semennikov and published in his work on Radishchev in 1923.<sup>24</sup> The third draft, also found by Semennikov, contained a total of twenty-eight articles, including three new or additional articles.<sup>25</sup>

Following Semennikov, I. M. Trotskii argued that of the first two drafts which represent clearly different versions of the "Charter," the first was Vorontsov's; the second, a so-called "charter for the future," composed by Radishchev. Trotskii saw Radishchev's version as the culmination of Radishchev's vision of freedom for the serfs as presaged by the latter's Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow.<sup>26</sup> Although, therefore, Vorontsov and Radishchev may be considered co-authors,<sup>27</sup> Radishchev's contribution was judged to be the more radical variation.<sup>28</sup>

As D. S. Babkin observed, Trotskii's opinion of the authorship of the "Charter" conflicts with the views of others on the subject. For

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found in Trotskii, "Pervonachalnaia gramoty," in Radishchev, Materialy, pp. 77-81. The question of which language was the original, and which the translation (or a second copy in the other language, I might add), remains open, according to Predtechenskii, p. 191.

<sup>24</sup>"Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, pp. 180-194; for the English translation, see "Project," Raëff, Plans, pp. 76-84.

<sup>25</sup>It is not clear precisely where each of the drafts was found. For example, Semennikov states he found the second draft in the Vorontsov archives in Leningrad, Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, p. 431. Predtechenskii states that Semennikov found the second draft in the library of Saltykov-Shchedrin, and the third variation in the Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Institut Istorii Akademii Nauk Leningrada (TSGIAL), Predtechenskii, pp. 191-192, and n. 92. See also, Babkin, pp. 233-234, and notes 91, 93. Compare with Raëff, Speransky, p. 23, n. 2.

<sup>26</sup>"Zakonodatelnye proekty," Radishchev, Materialy, pp. 42-43.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

example, V. S. Pokrovskii accused Semennikov of operating under the influence of "bourgeois liberal conceptions" in ascribing authorship of the document to Radishchev, and which led him to the "lie" which he put forth.<sup>29</sup> In addition, in the opinion of G. P. Makogonenko, Radishchev's role was limited to editing the "Charter," sometime in May and June of 1801.<sup>30</sup> These more recent views ascribing authorship to Vorontsov were given force by the work of P. K. Bontash, who ascribed the "Charter" to Vorontsov, who was aided by Kochubei and, more particularly, by Novosiltsev in preparing the final draft.<sup>31</sup>

Bontash accused Semennikov of having "falsified" his political views in this matter, and of having continued in the bourgeois liberal tradition of such historians as Bilbasov, Pypin, Pavlov-Silvanskii, Miliukov, Kizevetter and others.<sup>32</sup> For one thing, only one article in the "Charter" (article nine in the first draft, article twelve in the second) deals with the chief concern of Radishchev, i.e., the question of "serf-right."<sup>33</sup> Consequently, as in the view of S. A. Pokrovskii, the "Charter" reflects more the notions of freedom contained in the demands of the nobility under Peter III and Catherine II.<sup>34</sup> Along with Pokrovskii, Bontash concluded that "not one" of the guiding principles of Radishchev's life -- as a youth or in his

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<sup>29</sup>V. S. Pokrovskii, Obshchestvenno-politicheskie i pravovye vzgliady A. N. Radishcheva (Kiev: Izd. kievskogo Universiteta, 1952), pp. 157-162, cited in S. A. Pokrovskii, p. 30, nn. 3 and 4; and Babkin, p. 228.

<sup>30</sup>G. P. Makogonenko, Radishchev i ego vremia (M.: Gosudarstvennoe literaturnoe izdatelstvo, 1956), p. 586, cited in Babkin, p. 228.

<sup>31</sup>P. K. Bontash, "Radishchev i vopros ob avtorstve Gramoty rossiiskomu narodu," Iuridicheski sbornik Kievskogo universiteta, No. 6 (1953), p. 122, cited in Babkin, p. 228.

<sup>32</sup>Bontash, pp. 138, 110, cited in Babkin, p. 229.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 230.

<sup>34</sup>S. A. Pokrovskii, pp. 30-31.

last days -- is contained in the "Charter."<sup>35</sup> Bontash argued further that the third draft, as suggested in the August 12, 1801 (O. S.) "Zapiska" (published in the *Russkii Arkhiv* in 1908, and also contained in the Vorontsov archives in Leningrad, and which was signed by Vorontsov, Kochubei and Novosiltsev)<sup>36</sup> was clearly the work of those three men, and represents an introduction to the tsar of the August 13, 1801 (O. S.) version which was to have been discussed by the "unofficial committee" on the latter date.<sup>37</sup> With regard to the question of why Semennikov and Trotskii did not refer to and evaluate this "Zapiska" in their analyses and conclusions, according to D. S. Babkin, they claimed "...they did not know of its existence."<sup>38</sup> Ultimately, Babkin also concluded that "Radishchev had no part whatsoever in the preparation of the...charter."<sup>39</sup>

Predtechenskii, basing his conclusions on archival sources and contemporary published materials supported by the views of similarly inclined scholars, took the position that the "Charter" is indisputably Vorontsov's.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Bontash, p. 140, cited in Babkin, pp. 230-231.

<sup>36</sup>"Vsepoddanneishais zapiska grafa Vorontsova," *RA* (1908), t. 6, pp. 4-5.

<sup>37</sup>The draft of the "Charter" discussed by the "unofficial committee" at its meetings of July 15 and 23, 1801 (O. S.) apparently was the second draft, Predtechenskii, p. 193. The chief opponent of promulgating the "Charter" on July 15 (O. S.) was Novosiltsev, *P. A. Stroganov*, II, 72-75; and the tsar put him in charge of revising it on July 23 (O. S.), *ibid.*, pp. 76-79. From the minutes of their meetings, it apparently was to be discussed again on August 13 (O. S.), *ibid.*, pp. 90, 92, 94. For his arguments against Vorontsov's proposal, see, e.g., *Martkiewicz*, pp. 122-123.

<sup>38</sup>Babkin, p. 233.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 238.

<sup>40</sup>Predtechenskii, pp. 190-199. For similar views, see also, e.g., Georg Sacke, *Graf A. Vorontsov, A. N. Radishchev und der "Gnadenbrief für das Russische Volk"* (Ersdetten: H. J. Lechte, 1938), *passim.*; *Derzhavin*, VI, 787, 812; *P. A. Stroganov*, I, 106.

Essentially, his view is that, as Bontash showed, Radishchev took no part in preparation of the document. Vorontsov authored both the first and second drafts, the latter of which was revised -- although not significantly -- by Novosiltsev and Kochubei, ostensibly for the purpose of presenting it to Alexander I on August 13, 1801 (O. S.).<sup>41</sup> Novosiltsev's participation on some level seems to be substantiated by such external evidence as the fact that, in 1819, he prepared a draft for the Polish Constitution of 1820 which reflects substantially the 1801 "Charter of the Russian People."<sup>42</sup>

Novosiltsev's role in the events related to the charter is less than clear.<sup>43</sup> As has been shown, he was a leading opponent of promulgation of the "Charter" in July, 1801. Charged with the responsibility of revising it for later presentation, he apparently participated in preparation of a third draft for the tsar's consideration, and one day before it was apparently to be discussed at a meeting of the "unofficial committee" he joined with Kochubei and A. R. Vorontsov in signing a note to that effect which was to be submitted to the tsar.<sup>44</sup> Yet, on August 13, 1801 (O. S.), despite the fact that he must have known the matter of promulgation of the "Charter"

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<sup>41</sup>Predtechenskii, pp. 192-193, 195-199; P. A. Stroganov, II, 92, 94.

<sup>42</sup>[Nikolai Nikolaevich Novosiltsev], Gosudarstvennaia ustavnaia Gramota Rossiiskoi Imperii (Trans. as La Charte Constitutionnelle de l'Empire de Russie; from the original in the archives in St. Petersburg; preface by M. Theodore Schieman; Berlin: Friedrich Gottheiner, 1903), passim. See also, George Vernadsky, La Charte Constitutionnelle de l'Empire Russe de l'an 1820 [hereafter cited as Vernadsky, Charte / (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1933), passim.

<sup>43</sup>So much about Novosiltsev is unclear that it seems appropriate to note the need for a biographical study of someone who was involved in so many capacities in so many events for the first two decades of the nineteenth century.

<sup>44</sup>P. A. Stroganov, II, 72-79; RA (1906), t. 6, pp. 4-5.

was to come up, according to the minutes of the "unofficial committee," Novosiltsev excused himself immediately after dinner, complaining he did not feel well, and apparently retired to his room for the remainder of the evening.<sup>45</sup> Kochubei, during the course of the meeting, told the tsar that Vorontsov had submitted the "Charter" to the Emperor with the suggestion that it be promulgated at the coronation, but Alexander I seems to have ignored the remark, and the matter apparently was dropped.<sup>46</sup>

On balance, the weight of historical evidence, opinions of contemporaries and the judgment of modern scholars strongly support the contention that Count Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was responsible for the conception, creation and preparation of all three drafts of the "Charter for the Russian People." Whether or not A. R. Vorontsov was responsible for every word in each draft, it certainly seems as though it was his ideas and his spirit which served as the motive force which guided the pens of Radishchev and Speransky on the one hand and, on the other, resulted in Kochubei and Novosiltsev collaborating with him, albeit briefly and to no avail. Moreover, contrary to Semennikov's arguments, Vorontsov apparently was thoroughly familiar with the law, having studied it beginning at an early age, and applying it during his life as a government official. Moreover, the evidence suggests that if he wrote in French better than in Russian, his ability in the latter was also superior. He may even have prepared the first draft -- or had it prepared -- in both languages. In the opinion of Lester J. Humphreys, "...had it been adopted, [it] would probably have revolutionized Russian jurisprudence and politics."<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> P. A. Stroganov, II, 90.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>47</sup> Humphreys, p. 233.

But it was not adopted. Although it particularly "reflected the thinking of Count Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov,"<sup>48</sup> it ultimately was little more than another futile exercise in the efforts to bring the Russian people and their government closer together. Nevertheless, Vorontsov's vision may be best characterized, perhaps, by Czartoryski's view of progress, as stated in his "Memorandum of 1803." Czartoryski observed:

In order to progress, one must have a goal which has not been attained; and to always be in progress, one must be able to conceive of a goal which will never be attained.<sup>49</sup>

Perhaps the "Charter of the Russian People" was the expression of just such a goal for Count Vorontsov.

#### C. Analysis of the Contents. An Evaluation and Some Speculation.

The "Charter of the Russian People" is an eclectic document and, perhaps, it may be useful to evaluate it as if it might have been an amalgam of the ideas of John Locke and Adam Smith coupled with the libertarian principles of both the English Magna Carta and the American Bill of Rights as modified by the then current archaic structure of Russian government and society onto which Vorontsov hoped to graft enlightenment principles and liberal practices. At the foundation of the document is the sanctity of private property which is referred to in almost half of the articles of

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<sup>48</sup>Raeff, Plans, pp. 75-76.

<sup>49</sup>Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, "Sur le Systeme politique que devoit suivre le Russie presente et lu la meme annee a l'Empereur Alexandre (1803)," in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, "Czartoryski's System for Russian Foreign Policy, 1803: A Memorandum, Edited with Introduction and Analysis," California Slavic Studies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), V, 42, folio 25. Compare with the same author's citation of the passage where she gives the paragraph as fol. 24, in her Foreign Ministers, pp. 113-114 and n. 14.

which the "Charter" is composed, by this writer's count in at least eleven of the twenty-six articles of the second draft.<sup>50</sup>

The first article declared the need for adequate and clear laws "so that everybody's personal security and property is protected."<sup>51</sup> The third guaranteed Russians travelling abroad that "Their estates...will remain under the protection of the laws safeguarding property."<sup>52</sup> The fourth protected the right of noblemen "to elect and be elected to the offices which depend on election by the nobility" as "rights which naturally belong to every nobleman who possesses real estate...."<sup>53</sup> The fifth article shows the importance Vorontsov attached to the "rights of inheritance" which, he declared, "shall remain unshakeable and inviolate under the laws of the Russian Empire," except that "every Russian subject...may give away or freely will his acquired property [as distinct from his "patrimonial or inherited estate"] as he sees fit."<sup>54</sup> The sixth article guarantees that any person on whose property valuable resources were found "shall have the right to process them for his own benefit" and limited the government's right only

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<sup>50</sup>See Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 23, 24 and 25 in "Project," Raëff, Plans, pp. 77-84 and "Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, pp. 180-186, 191-194. Of these, only Articles 1, 7, part of 23 and all of 25 were not contained in the original draft of the "Charter" whereas there were "analogous" versions of Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 12 and 24 as a whole or in part, as shown by Trotskii, "Zakonodatelnye proekty Radishcheva," Radishchev, Materialy, pp. 46-50. Consequently, even according to Trotskii, Article 9 was completely Vorontsov's and six others represented Vorontsov's thinking. It is therefore equally conceivable that Vorontsov spoke to Radishchev and asked him to make necessary revisions and add other elements which Vorontsov described to his protégé as appropriate elaborations of the general theme contained in these articles.

<sup>51</sup>"Project," Raëff, Plans, p. 77; "Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, p. 181.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 182; "Project," Raëff, Plans, p. 77.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 78; "Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, p. 182.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 183; "Project," Raëff, Plans, p. 78.

to lawful taxation with "no other claims whatsoever."<sup>55</sup> The ninth article, although on the surface merely reaffirming the "right of civil prescription regarding ownership or possession of movable or real property...", that is, for example, possession for ten years would result in "unchallenged ownership,"<sup>56</sup> becomes more significant when joined with the twelfth article. The latter provided that, in any settlement of a claim against a peasant, none of the peasant's tools, animals, granary or other agricultural buildings might be taken from him, because the "property on which the peasant's condition is based cannot be violated under any guise or pretext.... For, deprived of it, the peasant is deprived of his way of life."<sup>57</sup> If the ninth article, too, was applied to peasants (and there was within it no exclusion of the peasantry), then it represented an extension of freedom to a large segment of the Russian population, one which was growing at the time, and one which may have represented to Vorontsov the nucleus for the development of an independent and strong petty bourgeoisie something like that which developed out of the English yeoman farmers.

The twenty-third article, noting that it is "unnatural" for government to profit from punishment of a criminal since the purpose of punishment is either rehabilitation or to deter crimes, declared that in criminal cases

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 79; "Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, pp. 183-184.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 185; "Project," Raeff, Plans, pp. 79-80. See also Article 4 of the Manifesto of June 28/July 9, 1787 in PSZ, No. 16551.

<sup>57</sup>"Project," Raeff, Plans, p. 80; "Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, p. 186. This article is the same as Article 9 in the original draft, as shown in Trotskii, "Pervonachalnaia...", Radishchev, Materialy, p. 79 and, by the same author, "Zakonodatelnye proekty Radishcheva," ibid., p. 48. In this student's estimation, the revision did not make the proposition more radical but rather merely polished the article and provided a literary and sensitive flair in the last sentence, as quoted in the text above, and as represented the belief of both.

there "ought to be no fines or deprivations of property for the benefit of the Treasury" except that a convicted criminal's property may be used to pay debts demanded by his creditors. Moreover, in the event the death penalty was employed, the guilty party's property was to "be given to his lawful heirs."<sup>58</sup> More encompassing in scope, the twenty-fourth article declared that in all court cases, "property and person have to be distinguished and separated." The purpose of this provision seems to have been the desire to create an unalterable procedural protection for every individual regardless of rank whereby there would have been created an orderly method in a type of generally recognized unlimited liability situation. That is, in the event an individual failed to keep a contractual promise or fulfill an obligation, that person was not to be placed on trial or incarcerated. Instead, that party's property was to be garnished, so to speak, to the extent that was necessary to fulfill the obligation; and if the property was insufficient to meet the claims, then the person in question was to be given an opportunity to "make up for" the lack of property in satisfaction of the claim.<sup>59</sup> Finally the twenty-fifth article, expressing the desire "to consolidate the right of private property in all its respects and forms...relinquish[ed] the Treasury's claims to the property of the last member of a family," and would have permitted such individuals "to dispose of it [their property] in any lawful manner," with the government entitled only to those items for which the owner had made no disposition.<sup>60</sup>

Verontsov's discussion of property shows an awareness of and an apprecia-

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<sup>58</sup>"Project," Raëff, Plans, pp. 82-83; "Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, pp. 191-192.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 192; "Project," Raëff, Plans, p. 83.

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 83; "Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, p. 193.

tion for the Lockean trinity of life, liberty and property. Moreover, again like Locke, although the sanctity of private property is considered the basis of life, livelihood and liberty, it is personal security and individual freedom that emerge as the highest considerations, with the distinction between property and person designed to enhance and expand individual freedom by means of safeguarding private property. In addition, one finds a reflection of enlightenment thinking in Vorontsov's use of the notion of natural rights, as in the fourth article with respect to the rights of the nobility, in the seventh concerning personal security and in the twenty-third with regard to his logical proof that it is "unnatural" that the government make a profit from punishment of criminals.<sup>61</sup> It should, perhaps, be mentioned in this connection that Vorontsov was not opposed to punishment of criminals, but rather believed that the punishment should fit the crime.<sup>62</sup>

On the other hand, Vorontsov sought -- perhaps with Radishchev's help, but probably more because of what the Vorontsovs themselves had suffered during the first and last years of the reign of Catherine II as well as under Paul -- not only to protect the rights of property and inheritance by limiting the prerogatives of any future Russian ruler in that regard, but also Vorontsov seems to have desired to substitute the rule of law for the whim of the autocrat by creating democratic safeguards, if you will, beyond the bounds of which even a tsar or tsarina would be prohibited from straying. This attitude, together with the notion of the general welfare is included in what may be called the preamble to the "Charter," which contained the

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid., pp. 182-184, 191-192, respectively; "Project," Raeff, Plans, pp. 78, 79, 82 respectively.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 77, Article 1.

following statement:

For ourselves, we take as a rule the truth that it is not the people who have been made for the Monarchs, but it is the Monarchs who have been established by Divine Providence for the benefit and welfare of the peoples living under their rule.<sup>63</sup>

As demonstrated so well by Carl Becker, the ideas of natural and inalienable rights and rule by the consent of the governed in their own interest for the purpose of firmly establishing and codifying these human rights into national law represented the pervasive mood of enlightenment thinking throughout the eighteenth century.<sup>64</sup> Vorontsov's concern with "natural rights" in the fourth, seventh and twenty-third articles; his expressed concern for the "benefit and welfare" of the people in the preamble; and his concern for "due process" -- both in relation to personal liberty and the property of the individual as declared in the first article and thereafter elaborated throughout the "Charter" -- all these are elements which reflect enlightenment concepts interpolated for the Russian situation.

The twenty-second article represented the attempt to provide for a uniform system of taxation on the one hand and, on the other, reflected the effort to limit the power of the Russian autocrat to tax according to whim or caprice. This article, designed in part to do away with the spider web of local, provincial and other taxes that were strangling all segments of the Russian populace, announced that: "From now on there shall be no tax, duty, collection of monies or anything else, nor any requisition without an imperial decree to that effect," and specifically went on to "abolish all private exactions or taxes levied by any authorities such as town adminis-

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>64</sup>Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922), chapters 3 and 4.

trations, magistracies, ratushas [town police and tax courts], guild boards, assemblies, or marshals of the nobility, or by others." Moreover, although it is unclear how the limitation on the Russian autocrat was to be implemented, this article granted to the Senate the final authority over taxation with the following words: "The power and right to levy taxes in accordance with His Imperial Majesty's will shall belong exclusively to the Governing Senate."<sup>65</sup>

Vorontsov sought bloodless change within Russia; and in the spirit of his reformism hoped to achieve a gradual, non-violent transformation of Russian law, government and society. Moreover, not only did the aging Chancellor have to face directly the Russian ruler for whom he was working but, unlike his foreign counterparts who had the good fortune of working in close concert with other like-minded individuals of the same station in life, for all intensive purposes Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, despite all the help he received from those who worked for him, was alone.<sup>66</sup>

As a result, Vorontsov apparently persisted in the belief that the most essential protections for property and personal liberty could be implanted in the least modern monarchic form of government, a form to which even the most reactionary could point with pride in Russian tradition. On the matter of substance, however, Vorontsov characteristically seemed unwilling to compromise. Perhaps heartened by the early decrees of Alexander I to permit greater freedom of expression within Russia, Vorontsov pressed

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<sup>65</sup>"Project," Raeff, Plans, p. 82; "Gramota," Semennikov, Radishchev: ocherki, pp. 190-191. The essential features of this article were in the original version of the "Charter," Trotskii, "Pervonachalnaia...", Radishchev, Materialy, shown as article 17 of the original version, p. 80.

<sup>66</sup>Reference is here made to such events as the Glorious, French, and American Revolutions as well as movements like those which produced, for example, the Petition of Right in 1619, all of which are generally well known.

forward in the "Charter" with the attempt to make these liberties, and others, matters of law and not simply temporary blessings dependent on the whim of whoever happened to be the Russian autocrat at any given moment. For example, in words reminiscent of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, there is written into the eighth article of the Russian "Charter" similar guarantees limited only by the rule of law and the concept expressed more than half-a-century later by John Stuart Mill, namely that no one has the right to do harm to anyone else.<sup>67</sup> The words of the eighth article are as follows:

Every Russian subject shall enjoy unhindered freedom of thought, creed or religion, speech, writing, and action, to the extent that these are not contrary to the laws of the state and not damaging to anyone else.<sup>68</sup>

Similarly, a number of articles in the Russian "Charter" when joined together, provide many of the protections contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In this connection, the thirteenth article of the Russian "Charter" declared that an accused person is to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; articles twelve and twenty-three established the principle of "eminent domain" by prohibiting state confiscation of the property of the individual; and the twentieth article stated that no Russian shall be placed in double jeopardy.<sup>69</sup> In addition, the seventeenth

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<sup>67</sup>"Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual," in John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" as excerpted in Saxe Commins and Robert M. Linscott (eds.), The Political Philosophers (New York: Random House, 1947), pp. 213-214.

<sup>68</sup>"Project," Raeff, Plans, p. 79. Although this article did not appear in the first draft, it not only reflected Verentsov's thinking, but also required his approval before submission to Alexander I. For references to the United States Constitution see, for example, Broadus and Louise Mitchell, A Biography of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 364.

<sup>69</sup>"Project," Raeff, Plans, pp. 80-82. The substance of these articles were in the original draft of the "Charter," according to Trotskii,

article and the last paragraph of the eighteenth article of the "Charter" provided redress in the courts for any Russian who, among other things, was taken into custody improperly which, although admittedly a few steps removed, suggests the desire to have included a protection like that in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, namely against unreasonable searches and seizures. But the more important aspect of the eighteenth article is the thoroughly detailed right of habeas corpus, more explicitly spelled out than in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. Indeed, the Russian statement does not even contain the limitations found in the American document.<sup>70</sup>

As the right of habeas corpus may be considered part of the notion of due process, it is implicitly incorporated as well into the spirit which prompted the inclusion of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Other articles of the Russian "Charter" providing guarantees similar to those in the Sixth Amendment are the fourteenth article which contained the right to a trial by one's peers; the fifteenth article which provided the right of counsel to the accused; and the sixteenth article which permitted the accused to question the competence of his judges -- a privilege which, it seems to this student, extends beyond the right of an American to confront his accusers.<sup>71</sup> Finally, the seventeenth and nineteenth articles

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"Zakonodatelnye proekty Radishcheva," Radishchev, Materialy, pp. 48-50. For the reference to the Fifth Amendment, see Mitchell, p. 365.

<sup>70</sup>Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 stated: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it," Mitchell, p. 357. There is no limitation in Article 18 of the Russian "Charter," as shown in "Project," Raef, Plans, p. 81. There was an abbreviated analogous text in the original draft (Article 13) as shown by Trotskii, "Pervonachalnaia gramoty," p. 79. For a recent view of the significance of this provision, see McConnell, Alexander I, p. 150. For reference to Novosiltsev's draft statute of 1819, see also, above, this chapter, n. 42, and Vernadsky, Charte, passim.

<sup>71</sup>"Project," Raef, Plans, p. 81; Mitchell, p. 365.

of the "Charter" provide protections similar to those guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, namely, protection against excessive bail, and against harsh, cruel or unusual punishments.<sup>72</sup>

To us, these rights seem undeniably necessary. Vorontsov was wrong in believing he was dealing with men sufficiently and strongly enough motivated by reason and dictates of conscience. The failure to follow his lead represents another significant step in the series of tragedies that led to the Russian Revolution of 1917, the kind of event Vorontsov undoubtedly hoped his "Charter" could prevent.<sup>73</sup>

Similarly, Vorontsov's attempt to codify in Russian law what he must have considered to be the most essential elements of the principles contained in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, however moderate they may have seemed to him, apparently represented too great a formal departure from the Russian economic situation of his day, and, consequently, were unacceptable to his contemporaries. The chief elements of Smith's notion of laissez faire were a protest against the mercantilism generally practiced by the leading nations of eighteenth century Europe. Smith believed government regulation to be economically inefficient in an era of abundance, one which the agricultural revolution of the early eighteenth century had made conceivable and the incipient industrial revolution of the third quarter of that century was making possible. Greater efficiency could be achieved in a free, competitive marketplace and, as Smith believed, economic abundance could produce the "greatest good for the greatest number" socially and politically as well -- even more so without government regulation than as a result of government interference. Smith, therefore, urged that governments

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<sup>72</sup>"Project," Raeff, Plans, p. 81; Mitchell, p. 366.

<sup>73</sup>For example, the "Charter" does not contain the "right of revolt."

rely on individual initiative, competition, the profit motive and freedom from government intervention as the soundest means to achieve the greatest quantity and the highest quality -- in short, the "general good." Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov had for a long time been familiar with the ideas of Adam Smith.

Moreover as this study has attempted to demonstrate, the better part of A. R. Vorontsov's life represented the attempt to apply many of these principles, beginning at a time even before Smith's work was published.

The "Charter" itself suggests the dimension of the problem and the enormity of the task Vorontsov faced during not only preparation of the document but also during his twenty years as President of the Commerce College. Essentially, the question was how to follow the principles of laissez-faire in a country where the government traditionally regulated all sectors of life and in which the ruler at any time could, at will, confiscate property or expropriate any business or industry. For Smith, who wrote about the English situation, the sanctity of private property, the belief that a man's labor was his own to dispose of as he wished, and legal limitations on the power of a monarch -- all these were accepted as a matter of course. Such ideas had helped promote a revolution in France only a short time before; and in an autocratic state such as Russia, where there was no legal limitation on the power of the sovereign and in which the economy was based on the enforced servility of the serf population, Smith's ideas ought to have been considered anathema. And yet, soon after Vorontsov assumed the post of Chancellor, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations was translated into Russian and published by the new government.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>74</sup>Edward C. Thaden, Russia since 1801. The Making of a New Society (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p. 34.

The manner of achieving some sort of acceptable balance between the freedom of Smith and the order of Russia was to be at least as difficult during the reign of Alexander I as it had been before and, as it happens, so it continued to be for a long time thereafter. Vorontsov's efforts to establish the principle of the sanctity of private property have been demonstrated earlier in this chapter.<sup>75</sup> More specific references to the relationship between business and industry in their contacts with government suggest the tortuous turnings of the Chancellor as he tried to establish the beginnings of a legal foundation for the growth and development of the productive forces abounding in the Russian economy. Aware, however, that Russia was still far behind its British competitor, both in business acumen and industrial development, he could not abandon the principles of mercantilism until Russia had proceeded to a more highly advanced stage of economic development. For the moment, then, he believed it necessary that the government protect and promote the productive capacity and both the domestic and foreign trade of Russia. In so doing, Vorontsov demanded that any individual entrepreneur reap the profit of every useful contribution to the Russian economy. These views are forcefully presented in the sixth article of the "Charter" which, because of its significance, is here quoted in full as follows:

6. The domestic and foreign trade of the Russian Empire shall always and at all times enjoy the special protection of the government; [the latter] shall give its unstinted attention to increasing the production of natural and manufactured articles in the state; and incentive shall be given to the prospecting of all useful items, such as iron ores, minerals, salt, and other products of the soil.

Any owner who has acquired and found on his property the aforementioned products of the soil that are so useful to the state and to the expansion of trade shall have

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<sup>75</sup>See above, this chapter, nn. 49-60.

permanent and unquestionable title to them, wherever these products may have been found -- on the surface or in the earth's bowels, in forests, water, or anywhere on his property; and he shall have the right to process them for his own benefit; and except for taxes set by law, the Treasury shall have no other claims whatsoever.

It is the duty of the government to see to it that everywhere in the realm there shall be available all the means possible for the transportation and carting of any natural or manufactured products; it shall protect and give every possible assistance in the exchange and production of goods; and no one shall ever have to fear that a barrier might be put to this internal circulation under any pretext whatever, or that it might be hamstrung by any regulation or legislation which would preclude or impede the general good in such an important area. And any statutes presently in force, or which possibly might come into existence at some future time, shall be invalid if they are barriers to the attainment of this goal that is so useful for the welfare of the people.<sup>76</sup>

In this fashion, Vorontsov hoped to achieve the "general good" and the "welfare of the people" by requiring the government to promote domestic free trade and develop home industry while at the same time prohibiting any future government from ever acting in a manner which might restrain trade or deny any individual the right to reap the fruits of his labor; and at the same time suggested a procedure for review of future laws, something like a judicial review to decide whether any laws are interfering at any time with the purposes for which the "Charter" had been prepared. Moreover, Vorontsov not only hoped to establish the principle that "all persons are equally subject to the law,"<sup>77</sup> but he also attempted to include provision for amendments to the law according to a clearly defined procedure whereby the Governing Senate would act as a quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial administrative body, establishing the new law only after careful review and extensive consideration and deliberation, whereupon a new statute

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<sup>76</sup>"Project," Raëff, Plans, pp. 78-79.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., Article 21, p. 82.

would be prepared -- whereas "everything enacted in a different way shall be legally invalid."<sup>78</sup>

Consequently, although it is true that A. R. Vorontsov should be associated with the so-called "Senatorial Party," the evidence suggests that his bias in favor of the Senate was limited to a pragmatic evaluation of the most that could be expected to succeed in the Russia of his time. That is, the fact that Vorontsov favored the strengthening of the Senate in 1802 should not be interpreted as proof that he was conservative, reactionary, anti-liberal, a traditionalist or simply one who desired to recreate the period of the ascendancy of the nobility as it existed during the short-lived reign of Peter III as merely an end in itself. On the contrary, the attempts in the "Charter" to extend freedom to all segments of the Russian populace alone should suggest Vorontsov's liberalism, if not his democratic vision. Indeed, his awareness that the ministries of Alexander I functioned essentially like the colleges of Catherine II and the prikazy of Peter I probably dampened his deepseated desire for reform. Therefore, his dependence on the creation of a powerful Senate may well have reflected a desire on the part of A. R. Vorontsov to begin at the beginning, so to speak, and build freedom and democracy gradually as had been done in England and America.

In any event, many of the principles of Vorontsov's "Charter," although not adopted by Alexander I for Russia, were enacted into law for the Polish people in the democratic constitution granted them by the Russian tsar in 1820.<sup>79</sup> One significant question which comes to mind in this regard

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<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

<sup>79</sup>McConnell, Alexander I, p. 150; Dwytryshyn, Russia, pp. 145-159; Vernadsky, Charte, passim.

is: Would the course of Russian history have been any different if Alexander I had adopted the "Charter of the Russian People" in 1801? In this connection, one cannot help recalling some analogous reasoning. For example, W. E. Mosse, in his study of Alexander II argued that if Loris Melikov's project for constitutional reform had been offered a decade earlier, the Russian Revolution of 1917 might not have occurred.<sup>80</sup>

Certainly, then, it seems reasonable to wonder whether, had Vorontsov's "Charter" been adopted, might it not have served to prevent, if not the Russian Revolution of 1917, at least the Decembrist uprising of 1825? If so, then, perhaps, many other violent turns in the paths followed by events in Russia might well have been averted or at least diverted. If for no other reason, had Vorontsov succeeded in his efforts to create a solidly grounded bourgeoisie, a direction indicated in the "Charter," then perhaps Russia and the world might have been more readily adaptable and conciliatory in times of stress.

Although few listened and no one followed, it seems clear that A. R. Vorontsov was one of those about whom it could be said, as Dmitri Buturlin wrote: "You have showed the way."<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup>W. E. Mosse, Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia (London: English Universities Press, 1958), p. 3.

<sup>81</sup>Buturlin, "A l'ombre d'un ami," AKV, XXXII, 424.

**PART VI: CONCLUSION**

## CHAPTER X

## A MAN AHEAD OF HIS TIME

Although A. R. Vorontsov's power and influence was less than he wished -- because so it had to be under the rulers he served -- perhaps the chief significance of his life will ultimately be proved to be that eighteenth century Russia could produce so genuinely cultured a gentleman who became the shrewd entrepreneur and enlightened statesman he was.

In many instances, as has been shown, A. R. Vorontsov had "showed the way." Unfortunately, too frequently, those in ultimate power turned in other directions. Under Catherine II Vorontsov's economic know-how, financial acumen, administrative skill and diplomatic ingenuity had thrived, only to be dissipated in the last years of her reign. During Paul's hegemony, Vorontsov's business sense and managerial ability maintained and enhanced the Vorontsov fortune while he continued to dabble in diplomacy and prepare, hopefully, for a new regime. Under Alexander I, the elder Count Vorontsov wished to direct the diplomacy of the Russian empire at the outset, even after the new tsar had declined to promulgate what may well have been the project closest to Vorontsov's heart -- the "Charter of the Russian People." Yet, the dimension of an individual is multifoliate. Born under the sign of Virgo, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov never married. Unlike his father and his uncle, Roman Illarionovich and Mikhail Illarionovich respectively, who saw marriage as a way to stabilizing position, increasing influence, and insuring the transmission of their newly acquired wealth to their descendants, he remained a bachelor all his life. Not only that, there is no clear indication that he was ever in love, had a mistress, or fathered any

illegitimate children. What did he do with his nights? Was there a woman in his life, any love of his life? These are some of the questions to which future investigators may discover answers. There is no breath of scandal in any references to him either in the Vorontsov Archives or in the published memoirs of his contemporaries. In the absence of any such references, one cannot help being drawn to the conclusion that his notions of honor, dignity, and integrity, certainly stamp him as a child of the enlightenment. Indeed, when one considers the abundance of references to the lax morality in Russian society in general, the Russian court in particular, and the profligacy of his father and looseness of at least two of his sisters, the absence of any such reference to Alexander Romanovich suggests that he believed in the nobility of the human spirit and lived according to his beliefs which reflected not only the spirit but also the letter of the enlightenment.

The Vorontsovs were members of the gentry who in western European terms would have been described as the bourgeois nouveau-riche. They profited from Peter the Great's introduction of the Table of Ranks. Service enabled them to augment their wealth as they rose to the highest ranks. In a sense, one might argue that the Vorontsov family as a whole, and Alexander Romanovich in particular, represent the epitome of the system envisioned by Peter the Great - - the fruition of his dream. They were tied to the past created by Peter I as much as they paved the way and were part of the processes of the development of national identity and the growth of westernization or modernization. If Peter, for example, had not attempted to institute a system of primogeniture on a permanent basis, Alexander Romanovich might not have been trained to manage the family estates. Had Peter not created his system of Colleges, Alexander Romanovich would not have been President of the Commerce College for twenty years. Had Peter I not

created a Senate, Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov would not have been a Senator. Were the Table of Ranks not created by Peter and the spirit of service not instilled in Alexander Romanovich, he might not have spent all but seven years of his adult life in service to the state -- a period more than forty years, more than double the time required, extending well beyond the time when, by law, he could have retired to the country to live as a gentleman.

A. R. Vorontsov was considered a Francophile in the late 1750's and early 1760's partly because, like his uncle Mikhail Illarionovich before him, he supported the notion that an alliance with France should be the pivot of Russia's foreign relations. Alexander Romanovich, consequently, opposed Peter III's affection for Prussia, but probably favored Peter III over Catherine II as ruler of Russia. Nevertheless, he was among the first to seriously lean in the direction of Anglo-Russian cooperation, partly at his brother's urging during the terror of the French Revolution, but more profoundly after Napoleon's rise to power. Thus, after almost forty years of continuous support for a Franco-Russian coalition, he began to move away from that position at the time when Paul made it the cornerstone of his foreign policy. Finally, under Alexander I, he urged Anglo-Russian cooperation as the basis of Russian security and prosperity, and is said to have been the first to call for both the First and Third Coalitions against revolutionary France.

Although during the second half of the eighteenth century a Franco-Russian alliance represented to him the diplomatic and military basis of Russian national security, England always exemplified the best model for domestic economic and political institutions. His leadership in the development of trade demonstrated an awareness of the ideas expounded by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations even before it was published. The demands

for political reform made by his father, Roman, in 1762 and by himself forty years later reflected a desire for the increase in the rights of the individual and the power of the nobility. Although his ideas at one time or another indicated a questioning of the desirability of the absolute power of the autocrat and a questioning of the rectitude of serfdom, he never openly and outspokenly opposed either the institution of serfdom or the nature of autocracy. Although he was a humanitarian, he was not alone in the belief that Russia was different from other European nations and that autocracy and serfdom were not inappropriate for Russia at the time. After all, the entrenchment of these institutions were also part of the reforms of Peter the Great. What Alexander Romanovich and most others like him hoped for were "good" autocrats, with certain limitations imposed by the nobility on the power of the autocrat, and humanitarian serf-owners who would be held responsible by a clear set of rules and regulations, laws if you will, imposed by the autocrat with the advice and consent of the nobility, through the Senate.

Although from the point of view of an American living in the twentieth century Vorontsov may have been a conservative, judged by the standards of the time in which he lived he was a classical economic liberal, a political reformer with great courage but greater wisdom. Had he lived in the last quarter of the nineteenth century he might well have been a railroad magnate, and his activities may well have been compared with the "rugged individualism" of the American "Robber Barons" of the period. As a classic example of a nineteenth century economic liberal, he was a merchant from a family of merchants, espousing the ideas of free trade which made him one of the most successful merchants of his day, attempting to extend the principle of free trade vis-a-vis his official position as President of the Commerce College for twenty years into the fabric of the Russian

economy. Politically, he wished to extend the principle of freedom in the Russia of his day so that a larger number of people had more, and clearly-defined rights, as evidenced from his preparation of the Charter for the Russian People. Had it been promulgated, some later conflagrations in Russian history might have either been averted or at least modified in character.

The payments made by the Vorontsov serfs in the form of obrok may be likened to rent -- rent for land to work, rent for dwelling places, and cost -- cost of transportation, cost of refining, cost of finishing. What the various serfs paid in obrok was a portion of what they received from sales in various stages of the process of production and distribution of commodities. The more they produced or distributed, the more they could keep. What greater incentive can a man have? To the extent that Vorontsov appreciated this human motivation, to that extent he must have asked himself, as did his father, Roman: How would my serfs benefit more if they were free? They might fall prey to less honest traders or speculators. They might fall into bondage to less humane serf-owners. Not only might they be harmed by greater freedom which, if given to them alone might throw them into harsher bondage, but the Vorontsov family might suffer economic distress if he, Alexander Romanovich, could not find free workers as good as the serfs had been (if, for example, those he freed migrated). Then, not only the Vorontsovs would suffer, but all of Russia would feel the economic pain. Consequently, he probably reasoned, they are better off as my serfs.

Unfortunately, the exact nature and sources of his power and influence are not sufficiently clear. Yet, it seems that his power and influence were directly linked to his managerial ability and his manipulation of his fortune. By helping others in financially poorer and economically more dire straits, he bound them to him. He was a hard-nosed businessman.

He was like a mini-tsar, something like the American political "boss" or district leader, wheeling and dealing -- but doing so honestly and for noble purposes -- with untold numbers of supporters and adherents.

It is very likely that Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov may have recognized the importance of relative anonymity and obscurity with respect to his ability to maintain (and obtain) political power and personal influence in an autocracy where all authority resided by law and custom in the sovereign. Perhaps, then, just as we know next to nothing about his private life, we know little about his development of power. But power and influence he did have -- enough for Catherine II to feel it was a threat to her; enough for Paul to confiscate land and serfs because of Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov's refusal to serve under him. And, under Alexander I, he wielded as much influence as one could wield as a member of the government. Indeed, it could be said that no one wielded more influence, given the predisposition of Russian rulers to dismiss that which did not fit their desires.

Perhaps Vorontsov's chief problem was to put everything in its proper place. For example, we can extrapolate the following ladder of allegiance from his life. Like his uncle, Mikhail Illarionovich, Alexander Romanovich placed his family first -- for without maintenance of the family fortune, he knew he could achieve little else of significance. In his management of the estates, and in social relations in general, he placed honor, dignity, and personal integrity uppermost. In this he represented the epitome of the humanist Renaissance at its zenith -- the Enlightenment. Service to his motherland was third -- for without service, there would be no family fortune, and without family fortune, no opportunity for high-ranking service. Finally, he sought justice in all he did. When his values came into conflict, he attempted to re-unite them as, for example, in his relationship with Radishchev. When he risked family reputation, fortune, power,

prestige, influence -- everything for Radishchev, he did it for the love of justice, but not solely for that reason. At the same time Radishchev served as a front-runner, so to speak, as an agent for Vorontsov trade and speculation in the Siberian plains and with China. After all, Radishchev happened to be in Siberia. He had been a minor official in the Commerce College. He could supply information helpful to the Russian government in their development of the area. And he could help pave the way for Vorontsov trade and speculation.

In this connection, although Mikhail Illarionovich and Semen Romanovich might have been enamored of the "Theory of the Gentlemen," and been prototypes of the "armchair gentry," neither Roman Illarionovich nor Alexander Romanovich fit into the caricature known as "Oblomovism." Alexander Romanovich was a hard-headed entrepreneur who was chosen by his uncle Mikhail and his father Roman to manage the family fortune, a task for which he was trained by his father. In turn, he prepared his nephew, Mikhail Semenovich, for the task. Neither uncle Mikhail nor brother Semen had the interest, inclination or patience for the task -- and, apparently, no member of the family was better suited for it than A. R. Vorontsov.

Alexander Romanovich had been chosen to manage the family fortune for a number of reasons. First, he was the oldest son of Roman, and Mikhail's only son had died at an early age. Secondly, Semen, Alexander's brother showed little interest or aptitude for the task. Third, although the law of primogeniture (entail) instituted by Peter I had been repealed, the law of 1736 permitted the selection of one person to manage the family estates in order to prevent their decimation and promote economic progress. Indeed, the task of management could permit the person so assigned to be excused from any other civilian or military service. Wisely, the Vorontsovs used service as a means of expanding their fortune, and used their fortune as a

means of rising in service and in the social hierarchy in general.

From 1783 to 1801, during the heyday of the management of the estates by Alexander Vorontsov, the Vorontsov fortune increased more than most, if not all, fortunes of other wealthy families in Russia. Indeed, at a time when almost every wealthy family was falling more and more into debt, the Vorontsov books showed that they were in the black. Although both Mikhail Illarionovich and Roman Illarionovich and Alexander Romanovich have been accused of extravagance in their spending, they did not -- as did many others -- spend more than they could afford.

He seems to have been the pivot in many relationships -- within and without the family. Why else did so many send to him copies of letters sent to other parties? Whether this pivotal point he occupied was merely a function of the desire on the part of others to merely apprise a judicious man of personal matters on which they might be seeking advice, or simply a function of letting the businessman know what was going on so that he could take advantage of another opportunity from which all might financially benefit -- or whether there were greater political implications involved is too difficult to determine based on the available material. If the latter suggestion is true, individuals bound to Alexander Romanovich economically and financially might also have been bound to secrecy on sensitive political matters.

Indeed, perhaps Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was embarrassing to various tsarist governments because his ideas were too liberal for so highly placed an official seventy years before the publication of the forty volumes of the family archives -- particularly at a time when reaction was setting in in Russia. Perhaps Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov was even more embarrassing to the Soviets because he does not fit into their conception of history. Since they cannot erase him from history, as he

was the protector of their hero, Radishchev, it may be better from their point of view to remember Vorontsov as a sentimental patron of the forerunner of the Bolsheviks rather than as one of the wealthiest Russians of his time, a successful bourgeois commercial capitalist, an economic liberal, a pragmatic political liberal-reformer and a humanitarian representative of the enlightenment.

**APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX A**

**Count A. R. Vorontsov, 1784?  
Portrait by Schmidt**




Taken from Istorija  
Pravitelstvuiushchago  
Senata za dvesti let.  
1711-1911gg. Edited by  
K. I. Sharskii. 4 vols.  
SPb.: Senatskii Tip. 7,  
1911. II, 596.

Гр. А. Р. Воронцовъ.

**Count M. I. Vorontsov, 1758? Portrait by Schmidt.**



Taken from Ministra Inostrannykh Del. Ocherk istorii ministerstva  
inostrannykh del, 1802-1902. SPb.: R. Golike i A. Vilborg, 1902.  
Portrait facing p. 51.



**APPENDIX B. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, 1689-1725.**

Taken from Peter I. Lyashchenko. History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution. Trans. L. M. Herman. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949, insert facing p. 268.

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE 1689-1725






MAP OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN 1871

- MILLS AND FACTORIES**
- ▲ Linn
  - △ Silk and ribbon cloth
  - Wool cloth and serge
  - Cotton cloth and serge
  - ⊠ Linen
  - Paper
  - Glass and mirrors
  - Paper, explosives, alum, sulphur, and
  - ⊠ Tobacco
  - △ Salt



## APPENDIX C. NOBLE LANDHOLDINGS IN VARIOUS GUBERNIIA, 1750.



Taken from E. I. Indova, Dvortsovoe khoziaistvo v Rossii pervaiia polovina XVIII veka. M.: "Nauka," 1964, p. 43.

РАЗМЕЩЕНИЕ ДВОРЦОВЫХ ЗАСТЕЖЕК В 1780 г.

Согласно плану, составленному в 1780 г. архитектором И. И. Боровиным, дворцовые застёжки должны были быть расположены в следующих местах:

- 1. В центре города, в районе нынешней площади Дворцовых Застёжек.
- 2. Вдоль главной улицы, в районе нынешней улицы Дворцовых Застёжек.
- 3. Вдоль набережной, в районе нынешней набережной Дворцовых Застёжек.
- 4. Вдоль реки, в районе нынешней реки Дворцовых Застёжек.

На карте отмечены дворцовые застёжки, существовавшие в 1780 г. и застроенные в последующие годы. Дворцовые застёжки, существовавшие в 1780 г. и застроенные в последующие годы, отмечены на карте.

На карте отмечены дворцовые застёжки, существовавшие в 1780 г. и застроенные в последующие годы. Дворцовые застёжки, существовавшие в 1780 г. и застроенные в последующие годы, отмечены на карте.


100 0 100 200 300 400 500



Полковная таблица

Войска	Берега
Кавказ	Кавказская
Восточная Сибирь	Восточная Сибирь
Западная Сибирь	Западная Сибирь
Туркестан	Туркестан




**APPENDIX D. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.**

Taken from Peter I. Lyashchenko. History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution. Trans. L. M. Herman. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949, insert facing p. 269.





**APPENDIX E. OBROK AND BARSCHINA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.**



Taken from *Oscherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma Rossiia vo vtoroi polovine XVIII v.* Edited by A. N. Baronovich and B. B. Kafenguan. M.: Akademia Nauk, 1956. Vol. VII. Insert back pocket.





Губерния	Число крепостей	% крепостных в отношении к числу городов в губернии	Площадь в кв. верстах	
			общая	крестьянская
Оложденская	0.093	0	2.940	1.510
Петербургская	114.050	73	22.071	21.014
Псковская	201.840	72	38.312	140.765
Новгородская	140.030	55	00.424	03.550
Смоленская	340.454	80	70.708	107.702
Тверская	270.000	04	07.451	110.790
Ярославская	240.810	70	140.530	08.300
Костромская	278.313	72	194.751	54.057
Владимирская	09.805	34	04.105	13.010
Вятская	243.723	07	104.318	109.030
Минусинская	201.211	00	78.864	142.401
Калужская	302.278	83	149.056	102.375
Польовгородская	270.717	09	104.470	42.754
<b>Итого</b>	<b>2.891.290</b>		<b>1.228.133</b>	<b>1.000.290</b>
Орловская	302.444	10	07.007	130.840
Тульская	360.405	80	18.545	211.245
Рязанская	012.413	75	10.784	170.313
Пензенская	187.241	51	54.025	51.310
Тамбовская	040.951	45	21.042	54.055
Нурганская	200.185	17	0.040	100.000
Воронежская	160.011	37	60.402	231.070
<b>Итого</b>	<b>1.078.065</b>		<b>274.720</b>	<b>701.070</b>
<b>Итого</b>	<b>3.969.355</b>		<b>1.502.853</b>	<b>1.701.360</b>

XUM

КОЛИЧЕСТВО КРЕПОСТНЫХ ПОЛКОВ ПРИЗАНН (1782 г.)

Губерния	Число крепостных полков	% крепостных полков от числа полков в губернии	Измещенное число			На стою при:	
			обращенных	призывных	итого тех в дружины	апрельские	сентябрьские
Одесская	0,093	0	2,940	1,515	4,401	00	1,100
Петербургская	114,930	73	22,071	21,914	43,385	51	40
Новгородская	207,840	72	38,302	146,703	185,157	21	70
Смоленская	146,930	55	60,424	63,350	123,090	40	51
Сибирская	340,458	80	70,706	107,702	230,358	30	70
Тверская	276,006	04	97,451	115,709	213,250	46	54
Царскосинская	238,800	70	148,530	43,388	190,918	70	22
Восточная	278,313	72	194,751	94,957	220,708	40	15
Владимирская	89,803	34	66,564	13,010	78,174	43	47
Вологодская	243,723	07	104,918	109,030	213,948	50	50
Московская	261,211	06	78,804	142,401	221,205	30	04
Калужская	302,278	83	140,056	107,375	257,331	54	42
Псковская	270,717	00	194,470	42,784	237,224	42	14
<b>Итого</b>	<b>2,891,290</b>		<b>1,228,133</b>	<b>1,009,226</b>	<b>2,237,359</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>45</b>
Орловская	302,444	04	67,987	130,840	198,813	34	00
Тульская	347,403	80	18,343	211,293	229,636	8	92
Рязанская	307,413	75	40,784	170,753	211,537	19	81
Пензенская	187,200	51	64,635	51,144	105,943	12	40
Тамбовская	190,951	45	20,002	94,002	121,204	20	78
Нарвская	209,185	77	0,440	113,704	114,144	00	100
Воронежская	140,011	57	50,463	34,870	95,333	04	30
<b>Итого</b>	<b>1,670,565</b>		<b>274,720</b>	<b>789,022</b>	<b>1,010,863</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Всего</b>	<b>4,561,855</b>		<b>1,502,853</b>	<b>1,798,248</b>	<b>3,248,222</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>20</b>




Схема  
Центральные органы управления 60—70 гг. XVIII в.

APPENDIX F1. ORGANIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IN THE 1760S AND 1770S.

Taken from Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma Rossia vo vtoroi polovine XVIII v. Edited by A. N. Baronovich and B. B. Kafengauz. M.: Akademiia Nauk, 1956. Vol. VII. Page 287.

Из истории управления в царствование императора Павла I




Схема  
 Центральные органы управления 80-90-х годов XVIII в. (до 1796 г.)

APPENDIX F2. ORGANIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IN THE 1780S AND 1790S.

Taken from *Ocherki istorii SSSR. Period feodalizma Rossiia vo vtoroi polovine XVIII v.* Edited by A. N. Baronovich and B. B. Kafengauz. M.: Akademia Nauk, 1956. Vol. VII. Page 289.

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