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Reformist Third Parties: The Rise and Fall
of the Progressive Party in the United States and the
Democratic Movement for Change in Israel

By
Mary (Miri) Bitton

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements
or the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University
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
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
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
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
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Abstract

**Reformist Third Parties: The Rise and Fall
of the Progressive Party in the United States and the
Democratic Movement for Change in Israel**

By
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New parties often arise in times of political discontent with an existing party system and with an existing government, and occasionally they gain some eminence. Yet, new parties rarely succeed in displacing the major established ones. Often they simply disappear or become insignificant. In contrast, established parties exhibit an impressive ability to persist and usually remain the principal contenders to lead governments. Political change, however, occurs regularly: policies, power and personalities are replaced. A key issue, then, is to elucidate processes by which parties and party systems are transformed. How is structural continuity reconciled with social and political change?

This study addresses these issues by considering the careers of two political parties, both of which were reformist third parties: the American Progressive party of 1912 (the Bull Moose), and the Israeli Democratic Movement for Change (the DMC) of 1977. In order to understand

political change in democracies and the roles of political parties, I analyze their rise, their performance and their eventual disappearance.

Both parties made very promising and unprecedented strong showings in the first elections they contested. Each was new and reformist by agenda, centrist vis-a-vis the major parties, and with leaders and supporters who were solidly middle class. The rhetoric employed by both was anti-party and anti-"politics as usual." The two parties emerged within mainstream politics in their respective systems as protest and reform movements, and their electoral successes remain unmatched: Theodore Roosevelt gained 27.4 percent of the vote; the DMC gained 11.6 percent of the vote. Nonetheless, by the time of the following election, these parties were no longer contenders.

The central argument of this study is that such reformist third parties are instrumental in maintaining the linkage between citizens and government in a democracy. When the major parties are unresponsive to new issues, or ignore the demands made by certain groups, then the emergence of an alternative party is likely. The major parties usually respond by adopting policies corresponding to those advanced by the reformist third party. Consequently, some measure of responsiveness is restored.

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**Reformist Third Parties:
The Rise and Fall of
the Progressive Party in the United States
and the Democratic Movement for Change in Israel**

Introduction

"If things are going to stay the same, there will have to be some changes made."

Giuseppe di Lampedusa, The Leopard¹

The problem: New parties often arise and gain some eminence in times of political discontent with an existing party system and with a government. Yet, new parties almost always fail to become established parties and rarely succeed in replacing the major parties in their party systems. Often, they simply disappear or become insignificant. In contrast, major established parties tend to exhibit an impressive ability to persist and customarily remain the principal contenders to lead government. Major changes may take place in a given society -- social, institutional, economic -- yet, the system of parties seems to be resilient

¹Quoted in Rose and Mackie, 1988, 533.

and survives. The problem, then, is to elucidate the dynamics of political change in a system that seems to preserve itself despite repeated challenges to it by new entities.

The appearance of basic structural continuity led Lipset and Rokkan to conclude that the European parties and party systems are practically frozen:

The party systems of the 1960's reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920's. The party alternatives, and in remarkably many cases the party organizations, are older than the majorities of the national electorates (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 50).

This conclusion, "the frozen theory" of party alternatives, led Rose and Urwin to urge researchers to look into the matter: "The first priority of social scientists concerned with the development of parties and party systems since 1945 is to explain the *absence* of change in a far from static period in political history" (Italics in the original, Rose and Urwin 1970, 295).

The absence of change in party systems presents a serious theoretical and practical problem for democracies. Political parties are the primary institutions linking governments and citizens. Therefore, if political parties are unresponsive, it would seem a natural conclusion that they would eventually undermine their own public backing and support for the democratic political process itself.

Shortly after Lipset and Rokkan reached their

conclusions about "frozen" party system, and Rose and Urwin's call to study this phenomenon, their contentions began to become increasingly irrelevant. European and the American systems witnessed a period of intense changes and electoral volatility. The attention of political scientists was shifted; the preoccupation with the absence of change was replaced by an effort to understand the meaning of new developments (Mayer 1989).

In fact, change in party systems occurs regularly despite the persistence of the structures which emerged from the old societal cleavages. Often, the organization, the labels, and the symbols continue to exist in a context far different from that in which a party originally emerged. An attempt to describe when and how such political change may take place is the concern of this thesis.

An analysis of the reasons for the emergence of reformist third parties, their popularity, their impact and eventual disappearance, provides an explanation as to how political change may take place despite the appearance of continuity of the established parties. This analysis, then, sheds light also on the nature of "traditional" political parties by showing how they react to new challenges and how they adapt to changing environments.

The Cases: We begin with an examination of two

political movements that were transformed into political parties. These are the American Progressive Movement, part of which became the "Bull Moose" party of 1912, and "Shinui"² of Israel, which later joined with other groups to form the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) in 1977. Both made very promising and unprecedented strong showings in the first elections they contested and then subsequently disappeared.

Each of these parties was new, reformist by agenda, centrist vis-a-vis the major parties in their respective political systems, and had leaders and supporters who were solidly middle class. The rhetoric employed by both was anti-party and anti-"politics as usual"; both generated an impression of civil order and righteousness. Both parties emerged from within the mainstream politics of their respective system as protest and reform movements. Their remarkable electoral successes were unmatched, before and since: Theodore Roosevelt gained 27.4 percent of the popular vote;³ the DMC gained 11.6 percent of the popular vote and 15 seats in the 120-member Israeli parliament.

Nonetheless, by the time of the following election both parties were no longer contenders. How can this be explained? Were these aberrations in both cases -- a

²"Shinui" is the Hebrew word for change.

³In 1992 Ross Perot came close to Roosevelt's performance with 22.4%.

fleeting vote of protest for a third force, "flash" parties, that quickly faded away?

Most importantly, did these parties have any long lasting impact on their political systems? If so, what was it? What conclusions can we draw from their experiences in order to better understand political parties, party systems, political change, and democracy?

I suggest that these two cases represent a specific type of a political party, one which I have been referring to as a reformist third party. When such party emerges in an existing political landscape, this event in itself is an indication of change. This type of party is the partisan expression of changes already underway in a society. For example, the emergence of progressive politics and the subsequent participation of the Bull Moose in the 1912 elections was, itself, the result of processes of change which were well developed for a long time. Furthermore, the appearance of the Bull Moose changed the party system; it interrupted the dominance of the Republican Party which began in 1894. The Progressives also had an impact on the policies enacted by Wilson and the Democrats after 1912. Following the Progressive Era, political parties were dramatically affected by a variety of changes made in the electoral laws.

Similarly, in Israel, the emergence of the DMC culminated a long process in which the Labor Party lost its

dominant position; a dominance that had lasted more than five decades. Labor's loss of power in 1977 had significant implications for the quality of Israeli democracy and its political system. The Israeli political system became more open and more inclusive. The party system was transformed from a dominant to a competitive one, and political parties were democratized.

Outline of the Dissertation: The material in this study is organized as follows: the first chapter presents the theoretical framework for the study and is divided into three parts. The first part presents a short overview of the nature of democracy, the importance of political parties in a democracy and change in party systems. The second part presents the theory of the reformist third party; how, when, and for what purpose this type of party emerges. It also explains why these parties constitute a specific category of political parties -- the reformist third party. The characteristics of the party are described and compared with those of established parties. The third part examines the various procedural and legal barriers new parties face (and which the Bull Moose and the DMC mostly overcame).

In chapters 2 and 5, I attempt to answer the first question posed by this study: what accounts for the rise of the reformist third parties? The historical background which gave rise to political discontent are described in

chapter 2 for the United States and in chapter 5 for Israel.

Chapters 3 and 6 trace the transformation of the Progressive Movement and Shinui, respectively, from political movements into political parties. These chapters describe the issues, the organization, the leadership, the membership and the relations with other parties in the system. The questions addressed here are: What were the salient issues on the public agenda during the period preceding the elections in question? What were the issues that the two new parties promoted? What were the positions of the major parties with regard to those issues?

Chapters 4 and 7 depict respectively, the actual political experience of the political parties from their foundation as political parties through their disintegration. They describe the institutionalization phase, the intra-party dynamics, the elections, the strategies and policy issues propagated during the campaigns and the results of the relevant elections. These chapters also deal with the other parties in the American and Israeli systems after 1912 and after 1977. Specifically, they look at the parties in power: the Wilson Administration and the Likud government.

Chapter 8 attempts to explain why these two parties did not become what they hoped to become: an established major party. This is important in light of the successful start these parties had in overcoming legal and procedural

barriers to new parties and the large popular support they initially gained. This chapter focuses on problems that are internal and inherent in reformist third parties, and suggests that these problems are the sources of their failure. Specific examples from the experience of the Bull Moose and of the DMC illustrate the path to failure. They also help us understand a great deal about the nature of established parties and their persistence despite the occasional assault on them from without.

Chapter 9 analyzes the impact these two parties had on their respective political systems. I suggest that the Progressive Party in the United States and the DMC in Israel stimulated change and had important impacts on their respective party systems and on some key policy issues. I will show that the introduction of certain issues by the new parties had an impact also on the long-term programs of the two major parties in subsequent periods.

The last chapter presents the general conclusions derived from this study. I argue that the reformist third party can serve, occasionally, as a "correcting mechanism" that restores political responsiveness when existing parties fail to address new issues and demands made on them by certain groups. The reformist third party can help maintain the linkage between governments and citizens which is so fundamental in a democracy.

The success of parties such as the Bull Moose and the

DMC should be measured by their impact on the political and party systems in which they emerged and with which they interacted, and by the change in policies (and other changes) that ensued despite their decline. Their success cannot be judged solely by their ability to survive as organizations.

The histories of the DMC and the Progressive party point to a certain path of change which was needed at the time. Leaders and supporters of such parties represent forces which perceive the system to be legitimate but deficient at times. They do not advance a revolutionary alternative to the democratic order, but rather, they represent a means of correction of the political system.

Methodological Note: This study is based on two cases that exhibit many similarities but which are by no means identical. In fact, these cases occurred in two political systems that are markedly different. The American and the Israeli systems of government represent two prototypes of political systems. One is a presidential system and the other is parliamentary; one is federal and the other is unitary; one is a two party system with a single member district electoral system and the other is a multiparty system with proportional representation. Both systems are usually treated in the literature as unique. As a result it is often argued that neither lends itself easily to

comparative study. Clearly, the Progressive Party and the DMC functioned in different systems with different logic in which the electoral systems had different impacts on the development of the parties. There are many examples of small parties created in multi-party systems; sometimes they endure and sometimes they fade fast. In two party-systems the fate of a third party is either to replace one of the two major parties or to disappear. Sometimes the platform is adopted by one of the major parties, sometimes not. Indeed generalizations concerning the outcomes are difficult to make.

In their book, How to Compare Nations, Dogan and Pelassy discussed the benefits of comparing two contrasting countries. They argue that, "for such a comparison to be fruitful, each country must be representative of a type, a class, a conceptualized category. This comparison is aimed at exemplifying a general reflection on a single process, a single phenomenon" (Dogan and Pelassy 1984, 144-5). In this study I seek to elucidate the process by which political change in fact takes place in a democracy, irrespective of the specific political system. Furthermore, Dogan and Pelassy argue that sometimes the binary comparison -- the choice of just two cases -- may be the preferable method.

In the best cases, it [binary comparison] can also contribute to an understanding of general phenomena. In such cases, the two countries considered are thought

of as contrasted illustrations of a broad, encompassing theoretical reflection (Dogan and Pelassy 1984, 126-7).

The choice of the two cases in this study was prompted by personal circumstances as well. Being a foreign student in the U.S. has allowed me to consider the American political system at close range, while also giving me the opportunity to reflect at more of a distance on that of my own country, Israel.

Another reason why I am interested in the questions posed by this dissertation is that I was personally involved with the Democratic Movement for Change. Early in 1977 I joined the DMC and participated in its primary elections for Knesset candidates. Following the elections and after the DMC joined the Likud government, I quit and joined the Labor Party. I was very active in Labor for almost a decade, and when I came to the U.S., in mid-1987, I was serving as a member of the party's national executive committee. This political experience led me to an ongoing interest in political parties, as practical as well as academic matters. The DMC -- promising as it appeared to be, and on target with regard to many necessary reforms -- faded quickly after its formation. Its brief experience stood in stark contrast to those of other parties in the Israeli system. Almost all parties, major as well as minor, had their roots in the prestatehood period, and they still exist in one form or

another.

The Progressive Party of 1912 in America exhibited a similar life-cycle to that of the DMC, which led to the study of these two cases.

Chapter One

Democracy, Parties and Reformist Third Parties

A. Democracy and Political Parties

This study is based on the premise that political parties have been and remain vital institutions in any democratic system. Political parties are among the necessary conditions for the emergence, well-being, and maintenance of modern representative democracies. Most theorists of democracy agree on this fundamental role parties play in a representative democracy. Schattschneider goes as far as to argue that political parties created modern representative democracy and that democracy is unthinkable except in terms of political parties (Schattschneider 1941, 1). Sartori quotes Kelsen asserting that "Modern democracy is founded entirely on political parties; the greater the application of the democratic principle the more important the parties" (Sartori 1987, 148). Some argue further that a strong democracy and good democratic performance require strong a party system (Huntington 1968; Almond and Coleman 1960; Duverger 1964; Neumann 1956; Sartori 1976; Powell 1982; Reichley 1992).

What is democracy, and what functions make political

parties so crucial to it? Democracy is a system of government in which representatives are selected through competitive elections in which a few parties organize the alternatives for voters. This definition follows Joseph Schumpeter's "another theory of democracy", that is, a definition that stresses the procedural parameters of democracy rather than those which follow the "classical theory" which defines democracy primarily by normative terms such as its source of authority and purpose ("of the people," "for the people,") (Schumpeter 1947, 269; Huntington 1993, 6-7; Sartori 1987, 153). Robert Dahl follows the procedural definition of democracy but added a list of eight institutional guarantees which provide the existence of civil rights and civil liberties, combining more explicitly the normative tenets of democracy with the procedural ones. This definition of democracy emphasizes two important dimensions: participation and contestation, which allow us to evaluate the degree to which a regime is democratic, or becoming more or less democratic. Finally, for Dahl, "a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals" (Dahl 1971, 1).

Political parties have been the major vehicle by which citizens express their content or discontent and hold government accountable. Responsiveness, as a defining

characteristic of democracy, becomes the standard by which governments are evaluated. The level of a government's responsiveness to its citizens determines also its legitimacy and stability. Since parties are primary institutions linking citizens and governments, they are, in fact, essential to the working of democratic governments. When political parties lost some of their traditional roles and were assumed to be in crisis, or weakened, many concluded that this situation raised questions with regard to the viability of democracy itself (Crozier et al. 1975).

In contemporary democracies, citizens can express their choices and policy preferences directly to governments without the intermediation of political parties. These alternative channels already exist: the bureaucracy, interest groups, media, polls, and the ultimate channel -- the cyberspace technology. But none of these channels can replace the work of political parties because none can provide the democratic linkage which is maintained through parties. Sartori asserted that modern societies cannot be left unchannelled; ". . . in a politicized society the no-party solution is, in perspective, ephemeral. The party as a channel of *expression* may be short-lived; but the party as a *channel, period*, is born to remain" (Sartori 1976, 42; McCormick 1982, 134).

Democracy is a method of government that acknowledges the differences and the conflicting needs which exist among

its politically-equal citizens. Therefore, even if citizens could convey their exact preferences at every moment to governments, there still remains the need to acknowledge, to address, to aggregate, to compromise and make policy decisions among all these needs (Lawson 1988, 36-7).

Usually, political parties are discussed in the context of party systems. A party system, simply defined, is the number of parties (the parts of the whole) in any given political system and the relationships between them. Therefore, party systems are identified as single- two- or multi-party systems. Based on the relationships between the individual parties, the system is defined as competitive, stable, dominant, consensual or fractionalized (Duverger 1964; Sartori 1976).

In democracies the party systems reflect the choices citizens make between available parties or coalitions of parties. Presumably, the party system should reflect the distribution of policy choices, ideas, and opinions of the electorate. When a large portion of the electorate is not mobilized or changes its voting pattern, it may well be an indication of change in the party system or change in the attitudes of the public toward political parties. Most researchers agree that rapid and constant change in support for parties is undesirable because it indicates citizens' dissatisfaction and it has negative implications for policy outcomes (Powell 1982).

The wave of changes in Europe as well as in the United States in the early 1970's shifted, as already mentioned, scholarly preoccupation with the persistence of the old party systems and introduced a new focus on the decline of political parties. While researchers agree that parties have lost many of their traditional functions to other non-electoral institutions, there is no agreement, however, as to the implications of party decline for the future of democracies (Mayer 1989; Berger 1980; Crozier et. al. 1975). A good illustration of this is in the United States, where political parties have always been weaker than in other western democracies. David Broder's The Party's Over (1972) was answered later by Kayden and Mahe with The Party Goes On (1985). In the same vein, Schlesinger argued that, in fact, American political parties grew even healthier and more coherent and moved from the "catchall" image of Kirchheimer (Schlesinger 1985). Frank Sorauf concluded that the consensus on decline has itself turned into a controversy (Sorauf 1988, 282).

Indeed, the basic structure of party systems still survives after more than two decades of phenomena variously identified as new politics, the post-industrialist revolution, value change, special interest-groups politics, and the like. Almost none of these experiences led to parties that replaced the major parties. This was the case with the Greens in West Germany and Austria in 1983, the

ecologist movement in France in 1974, and the Progress Party in Denmark in 1973, to mention just a few.

In all these and other cases party functions and policies, however, did change. New issues and new modes of participation were incorporated into the old party systems which reflected the old societal cleavages and which Russell Dalton called "old politics cleavage" (Dalton 1988).

B. The Reformist Third Parties

My primary concern is with the conditions that account for the emergence of reformist third parties and their impact on their respective systems. The stories of new European parties in the early 1970's and after are similar in principle to the Bull Moose and to the DMC. The emergence of such parties is essentially due to the inability of the established parties to adapt to new issues and to be responsive to pressures wielded by people who passionately care for one issue or another (Inglehart 1990; Dalton 1984, 1988; Mayer 1989; Brzezinski 1970; Wolinetz 1988; Wilson 1988; Lawson and Merkel 1988).

New parties emerge when major parties decline and when they cease to provide the type of channel some citizens expect them to provide. Major party decline is indicated by a decrease of partisan loyalty, an increase of independent

voters, proliferation of interest groups, and an abundance of candidate-centered campaigns (Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1990; Wolinetz 1988). The "major party linkage failure" is a situation in which the traditional patterns linking the state and citizens are no longer satisfactory for some members of the citizenry (Lawson 1988, 19). When the major parties in the system ignore or are slow to address new issues, feelings of discontent ferment and new groups emerge to provide alternatives to the existing parties (Lawson 1988; Mayer 1989; Rosenstone et al. 1988, 215; Mazmanian 1974). Sometimes, leaders of these groups or reform-oriented politicians within the existing parties decide to form their own party. These parties attempt to fill the linkage void in their societies. If they succeed, then it is safe to assume that a measure of responsiveness in the system was restored.

Reformist third parties, therefore, play an important role by helping to restore and maintain the democratic linkage. They articulate issues underlining political discontent and point to desired reforms. By the mere mobilization of sizable support, they induce change in the existing party systems. Usually, the major parties respond by incorporating some or all of the new parties' stances to be their own. This explains to a large degree the major parties' ability to persist. Paradoxically, this response of the established parties explains both the ability of the

new parties to fill the linkage void, and it usually means their end as an organization at the same time. Of course, not every case of an emergence of a new party in a given political system will necessarily fulfil this positive role. At times, societal change and ensuing political discontent may lead to very different results; for example, the rise of an authoritarian regime.

The definition of the reformist third party is constructed based on the experience of the two cases under study and the pertinent literature. It explains what the term "reformist third" means, what are the characteristics of this type of party and how it differs from other types of parties. The elements that constitute a political party, such as organization and leadership, are described and related to reformist third parties. Also described are the origins, motives, impacts, and dynamics that leads to their eventual disappearance.

Third parties have usually been studied and referred to in the context of two-party systems. A two-party system generally develops in countries with a particular electoral system -- one in which single-member-district and simple-plurality methods are used. The two classic examples are the United States and Great Britain. In the United States, which elects an undivided executive, the tendency toward a two-party structure is even stronger (Duverger 1964; Rae 1967; Lijphart 1984).

In this study, I use the term "third party" not only in a quantitative sense, that is, to denote the number of parties in a given system, but also qualitatively to characterize third forces in multi-party systems. In almost all western democracies, regardless of electoral system, we find two major parties or two blocs of parties which are relevant to government formation. This is the major difference between Duverger's classification of party system according to the number of parties and that of Sartori which adds the criteria of relevance and the direction of competition. Duverger divided party systems into single-, two- and multi-party systems. Sartori suggested that the numerical criteria offered by Duverger should be qualified. In defining political systems, Sartori maintained, we should count the number of relevant parties -- parties who can determine which government or coalition may be formed and can change, by their appearance, the level and direction of the competition between the parties in a given system (Duverger 1964; Sartori 1976, 121-29). A significant minor party such as the Italian Communist party may not itself have been a potential member of a government coalition, but it was extremely important in structuring competition within the system.

The reformist party is a third force which offers an alternative to either of the two major blocs in a given system. To borrow and slightly modify Leon Epstein's

definition of third party, third party is any party that breaks the two-party competitive pattern in a nation by winning or threatening to win enough votes to influence control of the government (Epstein 1980, 64). By conceptualizing third parties in this fashion, the issue of whether or not the system is two-party or multi-party is neutralized. Even though I will be using the term third party in a non-traditional way, in my study I will draw extensively on the literature of third parties.

The reformist third party presents itself as an electoral alternative in two ways: (1) as an alternative to the existing two major parties or to the main two blocs in a system; (2) as an alternative that aspires to reform the political rules. This kind of party focuses on reforms directed primarily at changing the way politics is conducted, in order to enhance democratization and popular control over government.

The reformist third party usually aspires to become a major party. However, since new parties rarely replace major ones, third parties are often treated as minor parties. The most significant exceptions to this generalization are the cases of the Republican Party in the United States and the Labor Party in Great Britain. The Republican Party replaced the Whigs and became the major party before the American Civil War. Similarly, the Labor Party in Great Britain replaced the Liberal Party and became

one of the two major parties. The latter occurred after the extension of suffrage and the removal of property prerequisites which enabled the working classes to vote.⁴

The significant difference between "reformist third" parties, as used here, and "minor" parties, is their targeted electorate. Minor parties are usually based upon, and tend to promote, limited interests. Minor parties may represent specific ideologies such as extreme left-wing or right-wing groups, or a personality, or any other single issue (ethnic, regional, religious, gender, etc.,). Minor parties manage to maintain themselves as long as whatever caused their emergence continues to exist. Such parties may even endure regardless of how many votes they get (Duverger 1964, 290-296). This is clearly the case with the Socialist Party in the United States and the Communist Party or the Arab parties in Israel, for example.

In contrast to a minor party, the reformist third party appeals to the public at large; it is not a single-issue party, nor is it class-based or oriented toward a specific ideology. The reformist third party is very much part of the mainstream of its respective system. It may embrace some specific policy issues but it tends to demand the reform of the political system in general and it wages war

⁴The fascist parties became the ruling parties in Germany and Italy and brought their young democracies to an end. These cases are also an exception but they require different analysis which is beyond the scope of this study.

against the corrupt parties and politicians. The demand for reform tends to center on the way politics is conducted, it always demands electoral reforms and other measures aimed at democratizing the decision making process and reorganizing government. Even when raising specific issues which depends on the context in which the reformist third party emerges, the underlining justification is the democratic principle. The two cases in this study illustrate this point. In the case of the Bull Moose, the Progressives sought expansion of the federal government and a deepening of its role in the marketplace. The DMC demanded that the Israeli government rationalize and liberalize the market which was highly centralized.

Often, a forerunner of the reformist movement is the intellectual strata in the society: when university professors, commentators, and experts of various occupations begin to diagnose the causes of political discontent and then became the first to offer remedies. The intellectual movement that precedes the formation of the political party is important for it reformulates public ethics and creates a new moral atmosphere in a changing environment. The leaders and members of the reformist third party usually come from the middle class and the professional strata of its society.

The reformist third party is a center party. Most often it challenges the established parties from the center of the ideological spectrum, a phenomenon counter-intuitive

to most of those expecting the challenge to come from disenfranchised groups on the "right" or the "left."

The term "center" is problematic. Theorists of political parties disagree about what a center party is as well as the role played by such parties. Sartori, for instance, argues that "The physical occupation of the center is, in and by itself, of great consequence, for it implies that the central area of the political system is out of competition." Sartori adds that center parties encourage centrifugal tendencies and extremist politics (Sartori 1976, 134-135). Duverger views the role of center parties differently. Rather than polarizing the system, center parties are a moderating factor in democracies. For Duverger there is no such thing as centrist ideology or centrist doctrine: center parties are artificial creations. Usually, they are constituted by a moderate wing which breaks away from one of the two major tendencies in the system; They are thus a center to the right or a center to the left (Duverger 1964, 215; 231). Duverger noticed that while parties formed in this fashion may be a moderating factor in their party system, they also tend to suffer from intra-party feuds.

The two cases studied here exemplify some of Duverger's observations with regard to third party creation and to intra-party feuds. The Progressive Party was born out of the more liberal and moderate wing of the Republican Party

(though, some accused the Progressive of being radical leftists). Likewise, the DMC members and leaders were overwhelmingly ex-Labor supporters and members.

The Bull Moose as well as the DMC suffered from endless bickering among members. This, I will argue, was among the important reasons for their respective demise. Even though intra-party feuds are matters of course in established parties as well, the ability of the latter to survive and overcome occasional schisms is far greater than that of a new party. Established parties are ongoing organizations which tend to become ends in themselves.

The importance of organization in the lives of political parties is so enormous that James Q. Wilson argues: "If parties are to be regarded as anything more than momentary alliances of candidates under the same label to appeal for votes in elections, it is due their organization" (Wilson 1973, 7). Similarly, Duverger argues that organization defines the parameters to evaluate a party.

The organization . . . constitutes the general setting for activity of members, the form imposed on their solidarity: it determines the machinery for the selections of leaders, and decides their power. It often explains the strength and the efficiency of certain parties, the weakness and inefficiency of others (Duverger 1964, 4).

As a matter of principle, reformers often object to the concept of parties as "organizations". They regard parties primarily as machines that elicit support through patronage

and privileges, and view them essentially as corrupt organizations.

Both the Bull Moose and the DMC, accused other political organizations of being embodiments of their political system's major faults. The organization of the established parties -- with their patronage, machines, and corruption -- were considered the principal targets of the new reformers. They, therefore, emphasized direct democracy and devised decentralized structures in an effort to control the oligarchical tendencies endemic to any organization. However, the weak organizations built by reformist third parties, and some of the methods they adopted, turn to be one of the major sources for their eventual undoing. The low level of institutionalization coupled with adherence to principles diminishes the leaders' ability to manage conflicts and broker compromises (Pinchot 1915; Barzilai and Urieli 1982). Reformist parties are soon perceived as "ephemeral" as opposed to "established parties."

In their study "Do Parties Persist or Fail?" Rose and Mackie defined operationally what an established party is: ". . . a party is judged to have become institutionalized if it fights more than three national elections. A group that fails to do this is not an established political party but an ephemeral party" (Rose and Mackie 1988, 536). Despite the sizable support in the electorate, almost all reformist third parties declined after their initial attempt

to become established parties. Daniel Mazmanian, who studied third parties in the United States, argues that the dissolution of the third party is even more predictable than its emergence. In subsequent elections no significant third party in the United States has matched its initial popular vote (Mazmanian 1974).

Often the success of the reformist third party is attributed to its leader. Reformist third parties are usually headed by charismatic and prestigious leaders who are nationally acclaimed figures and perceived of as legitimate leaders. "The greater the legitimacy of the third party candidate, the higher is the probability that voters will cast their lot with him" (Rosenstone et. al., 1984, 139). Nationally prestigious candidates tend to enjoy name recognition, have some experience, and often, have been members of major parties. The leaders of the parties looked at in this study, Theodore Roosevelt of the Bull Moose and Yigael Yadin of the DMC, were both regarded as charismatic and effective. At issue is whether these parties can be classified as a "personality" party according to Duverger's typology (Duverger 1964, 198). To what extent is the very existence, success and collapse of these parties dependent on the people who lead them?

Often third parties are described as the product of very ambitious men who were thwarted within their major parties and motivated by revenge or vindication. As we

shall see, the personal ambition of a leader is an important element in the making of a third party. The success of a third party, however, can not be attributed to the ambition and zeal of its leading candidate alone: whether it is to advance a cause or even to seek revenge, a leader, must win votes (Mazmanian 1974, 139; Rosenstone et. al., 1988, 189). The reformist third parties, examined here cannot be regarded as the "personality" type despite the tremendous impact of their leaders. The cause and the movement existed long before Roosevelt led the Bull Moose and long before, Yadin led the DMC. Furthermore, at first, both leaders were reluctant and had to be persuaded to lead their movements.

In scrutinizing the motives of emerging new parties, Downs divides such parties into two types, according to their intentions. One is the "real" party which aims primarily at winning office. The second is the "blackmail" or "influence" party which seeks support in order to exert influence over the existing parties. Almost all parties, regardless of their initial intention, become "influence" parties. This experience is typical of third parties in the United States where none has ever won a national election. While a reformist third party may seek to become the major party, a "real" party," as Downs notes. Thus far none ever has (Downs 1957, 127-28).

Unlike the typical pressure group which seeks to influence or "blackmail" the major parties on behalf of a

specific issue, or group, the scope of the reformist third parties is more comprehensive. The leaders of the reformist third parties mobilize support, participate in elections, and gain votes in order to win office. Yet, they tend to have similar effect to that of a pressure group or the "blackmail" type of party.

The impact of third parties has been studied by Rosenstone and others who conducted an extensive study in quest of a theory of third party voting in the United States. They concluded that, at best, third parties are of "influence" type. In America these parties fulfill two critical functions: they popularize ideas that the major parties would otherwise ignore; and they serve as political vehicles for citizen discontent with the policies of the major parties. As Samuel Lubell noted, third parties shed "penetrating light on the inner torments of the major parties" (Lubell 1965, 205).

Almost all theories which deal with the emergence of new parties assume that preceding change has occurred in the political or socio-economic environments. Such changes may result in the presence of available voters who are not mobilized. These previously immobilized voters may have shifted their allegiance, or are voters who have been enfranchised recently (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1979; Dalton 1988), or who have been affected by changes such as war, immigration, or depression (Duverger 1964; Lipset and Rokkan

1967; Epstein 1980; Rose and Mackie 1988). New parties may be formed in response to the changed political environment and take advantage of these opportunities. In fact, Downs suggested that: "New parties can be most successful launched immediately after some significant change in the distribution of ideological views among eligible voters" (Downs, 1957: 115).

The most common ways for new parties to emerge, however, are from mergers of two existing parties or as breakaway from existing parties (Rose and Mackie 1988). Thus, Bull Moose was largely comprised of Progressives who broke away from the Republican Party. The DMC was consciously created by non-politicians and was not the successor of any previous organization although it was later joined by professional politicians from major parties. The emergence of both parties was a response to, and was conditioned by, the behavior of the established parties in their respective political system.

Political parties have often been described by two contrasting images or models; as "adaptive" and as "constrained" organizations. Both images are correct in so far as both may exist at different times in the lives of major parties. The first image, parties as flexible and opportunistic organizations who are capable of changing their positions in order to survive, conforms with Downs' theory that parties are rational actors, that will adjust

their positions to maximize support in the electorate (Down, 1957). This image, explains why established parties usually survive, and why reformist parties find it difficult and disappear. When the second image, parties as constrained and rigid organizations, is pervasive, then the emergence of third parties is expected (Wolinetz, 1988, 304).

The second image views parties as constrained organizations who fail to adapt due to ideological and internal factional pressures, provides the setting in which new parties may emerge. In Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschman (1970) describes the options open to disaffected members of organizations, among them political parties: to voice their protest, to remain loyal, or to leave and join one of the other alternatives in the system, or else to form a new organization.

In reaction to the threat posed by third parties, the major parties explicitly seek to steal away the third party's *raison d'être*. Most often, at least one of the major parties shifts its position to adopt the third party's rhetoric, if not the core of its programs. Consequently, by the time of the next election the third party's constituency will have a choice between the third party and a major party that is now more sympathetic to its needs.

Once the major parties begin to undermine the third party's positions on one or two divisive issues, the third party's position turns to one of disadvantage. The major

parties have superior organizational resources, deep-rooted party loyalties, and access to the governmental institutions needed to deliver on campaign promises. They can also offer the promise of patronage and other rewards. In the meantime, the third party has difficulty sustaining the fervor it aroused when it entered the electoral arena and often its voters return to one of the major parties (Rosenstone et al., 1988, 221; Mazmanian 1974; Scarrow 1986; Wolinetz 1988).

In addition to external pressures exerted by the established parties, internal pressures also affect the reformist third party's ability to survive. The principal problem of reformist third parties is their own vulnerability with regard to all the dimensions that define a political party. Paradoxically, because they are new parties, they are never in a position to develop strong a organization, loyal cadres of activists and leaders, or long standing loyalties among its members; and the votes they get are conditional. Upon the departure or desertion of its leader, the reformist third party often loses its viability. The emergence of new pressing or divisive issues shifts the public attention from the issues raised by the new party and undermines its relevance.

C. The External Constraints

As a rule, the penetration of a new party into an existing party system is a difficult task. New parties face innumerable preexisting conditions such as constitutional and/or legal barriers. A new party is always at a disadvantage compared with the existing parties. Breaking into an existing system is even more difficult if the new party attempts to change both the system and the rules of the game. Established parties make the rules and those rules are normally designed to preserve the system, and are often skewed in favor of the pre-existing parties.

The Bull Moose Party emerged in a system which enhanced the development of two effective parties only. The single-member-district method of electing representatives coupled with the undivided executive in the American system has created a strong incentive for the development of a two-party system. The root for the development of the two-party system is found in the provision of Article II of the Federal Constitution, as altered by the 12th Amendment. It requires an absolute majority of the electoral college for selection of a president. This requirement has been crucial in determining that electoral competition in the United States would remain between two major competitors. Ultimately, this means that as long as the constitutional situation remains there will continue to be a powerful

incentive for parties to structure competition within the context of a two-party system (McCormick 1982, 151).

Nevertheless, this situation does not deter the occasional emergence of third parties. However, in such a system, where the "winner takes all," it is extremely difficult for new party members and leaders to stick together until the next election. "There were no loaves and fishes," Roosevelt wrote later when analyzing the radical decline of the Progressive Party, having come to realize that political parties are held together by jobs (Mowry 1971, 2164).

The federal structure of the United States and the complex filing requirements in the various states further complicates the organizational task facing a new party. Thus it becomes almost impossible for a newcomer to become a meaningful national power. As a result, most third parties in American history have had a regional or sectorial character.

Until recently, the electoral system in Israel was almost a perfect opposite to that in the United States. The near-pure proportional representation is likely to encourage the emergence of new parties. Only one percent of valid votes was needed for representation, and a relatively small number of signatures and fees were required for filing.⁵

⁵ Some changes were made in the electoral laws, which will be described in chapter 9.

But new parties' accessibility to the public is somewhat restricted. Public funding for campaign expenditures, even broadcast time itself, is allocated to the existing parties in the system in direct proportion to the size of their representation in the previous Knesset. New parties are eligible for public funding only after the election and only if they gain representation. New parties are allotted equal, but meager, air time on television and radio. Political parties cannot buy air time even if they have sufficient funds of their own, as was the case with the DMC.

As a new party, the DMC was given 10 minutes of television time, compared with 206 for Labor and 170 for Likud (Barzilai and Urieli 1982, 205-6). The DMC was forced to rely primarily on published ads in newspapers, on which it spent more money and paid for more column inches than either of the major parties. As if this disadvantage was not enough, just a few weeks before the elections the DMC had to overcome another "barrier". The major parties, holding a majority on the national elections committee, denied the DMC the privilege of having its publicly known name appear on the ballot. The DMC requested that the letters "DASH," its Hebrew acronym, be assigned to it on the ballot. The elections committee chose, instead, to assign the letters "YESH," causing the possibility of confusion among the voters.

Some of these restrictions may well be understandable

in a country where at least two dozen new parties or lists participate in each election. Nonetheless, for a new party that aspires to become the third largest party, as were the hopes of the DMC, these barriers amount to a serious disadvantage.

Both parties, the Bull Moose and the DMC, made the initial breakthrough despite these legal and procedural barriers. It is difficult, however, to weigh the impact of these barriers in terms of potential electoral-gains these parties could have had if these barriers had not been there.

In the two concluding chapters, I will refer back to these characteristics of the reformist third parties. As we shall see, these characteristics are very suggestive when coming to assess the reasons for the disintegration of these parties, and for their impact on their respective party system.

First, before we look at these parties' decline and impact, the next six chapters will relate the political histories of the Progressive Party of 1912 in the United States and of the DMC in Israel. They present, in detail, the background for the emergence of political discontent, the sources of these movements, the type of people who joined and led these parties, the type of organizations they built, methods they used and the program they had advanced.

Chapter Two

The Progressive Era: The Rise of Discontent in the United States

This chapter deals with the question posed earlier: What accounts for the rise and electoral success of the third reformist parties under consideration? It attempts to establish the argument that reformist third parties such as the "Bull Moose" and the Democratic Movement for Change will emerge in times of rapid change in the society leading to discontent with the existing political system. Accordingly, the historical and political background of the period preceding the emergence of the party is delineated. We will first look at the rise and denouement of the Progressives in America, and then examine the Israeli case of some six decades later (in chapter 5).

The "Bull Moose" Party, also known as the Progressive Party of 1912, was founded just before the presidential elections of that year. The Bull Moose was the partisan expression of a much larger movement, the Progressive Movement.

The Progressive Era: Although there is some scholarly disagreement as to the exact dates of the beginning and the

end of the Progressive era, the blossoming of new political ideas stemming from the dramatic changes taking place in America began to make itself apparent shortly before the turn of the century and lasted into its second decade. Thousands of studies and commentaries have been published describing the Progressive Era's legacy, personalities, policies and innovations, and despite some differences in interpretation, virtually all researchers agree that during these years, the modern American state and society was born. The purpose here, however, is limited to those conditions leading to the emergence of progressive politics and specifically to the emergence of the Bull Moose Party in 1912.

After the Civil War and Reconstruction in the late 19th century, life changed radically in America due to industrialization, urbanization and a sudden growth in population and immigration. Social grievances of a degree and kind unimaginable a half-century earlier became the catalyst for progressivism. In a broad sense, the Progressive Era was an impulse for reform and self-criticism felt everywhere in the country during the years around 1900. (Graham 1987; Smith 1985; Hays 1957; Wiebe 1967; Gould 1974).

Urbanization: As in Europe, industrialization brought a mass movement of the rural population in America into the

cities. In 1800 about 94 percent of all Americans lived in rural areas; by 1850 the number had sunk to 85 percent and in 1900 no more than 60 percent were left in America's small towns and farms. The cities overtook the countryside in terms of raw numbers in the decade between 1910 and 1920, by a margin of almost three million. The point can be made best by taking a somewhat longer view: In 1870 more than half of all the nation's employed citizens earned their living from agriculture, but in 1945 it was only 15 percent (Hofstadter 1955, 115). The movement toward urbanization was bound to have an affect on the political system.

Immigration: Not only were the country people flooding the towns, there was a remarkably broad stream of population growth from without the nation's borders. Between 1880 and 1910, nine million immigrants had arrived from Southern and Eastern Europe and had settled mostly in northern cities. Fifty thousand people a year applied for permits to settle in Chicago in the last decade of the 19th century. Seattle grew from a city of 80,000 to 237,000, almost tripling its population between 1900 and 1910. In that same year, New York reported that three-quarters of its residents were either foreign-born or the children of immigrants (Wiebe 1967, 54; Graham 1987, 3-4).

Although the influx enriched American society and helped create robust economic growth, there were of course

tremendous tensions as the generations-old, white-European-descended culture struggled to assimilate Italians, Irish, Poles and Jews, among others. Under chief suspicion were the millions of Catholics who, it was feared, would pay their loyalty to the Pope and not to the President. Within ethnic groups themselves there were problems as well. For instance, Jews, of German descent in particular, who had already settled in America looked with anxiety at the new Jews coming in droves from Eastern Europe, who threatened with their strange ways, clothing and ideologies to reverse all the hard-won advances of the American Jewish community until that time.

Imperialism: America became an imperialist power during the McKinley presidency (1896-1901,) acquiring Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines in the last two years of the nineteenth century. Unlike the long history of European imperialism, America was a late-comer. Indeed, as George Mowry pointed out, foreign policy emerges as an important issue on the American agenda since then.

Whatever the explanation for imperialism, the taking of some 125,000 square miles of territory populated with a wide diversity of peoples . . . was to make a profound difference to Americans and to their relations with the rest of the world (Mowry 1958, 5).

Industrialization and the Rise of the Trusts: One significant outcome of industrialization in America was the

emergence of trusts. Trusts, or combines as they were known at the time, introduced a new type of organization and control into the marketplace. The combines of the late 19th century were very similar to the holding companies of today. Trusts and anti-trusts became familiar terms in America during the Progressive Era.

Industrialization also had the effect of creating unforeseen amounts of wealth in America. However, due to the circumstances under which American democracy and capitalism were born -- in an overwhelmingly agrarian, non-technological society -- there were no legal provisions for distribution or regulation of the exploding gross national product. Those who already had the money to invest in new industries gained complete control over those industries in short order, choking off opportunity for those less favored and almost singlehandedly deciding how millions would live.

The wealth of the nation was concentrated in the hands of a few families with names still recognizable today: Rockefeller, Morgan, Carnegie, Vanderbilt and Harriman. John Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company, for example, controlled about 90 percent of the domestic oil industry by 1900, owning the means of transportation, distribution, drilling, production and refining operations and thus able to impose virtually total control over prices and profit in the industry. In 1900 John Pierpont Morgan bought out his last competitor, Andrew Carnegie, and merged several iron

and steel companies together to create U.S. Steel Corporation, the first billion-dollar company in history (Galambos and Pratt 1988, 8-10). By the end of 1901, the national railroad network had been consolidated. Later, during Roosevelt presidency, by 1907, it was estimated that 1 percent of American companies manufactured nearly 45 percent of the nation's goods (Gould 1974, 2).

The trust made a good common enemy for many classes of American society: the farmers, the small businessmen, industrialized labor of all kinds, and average city dwellers. The conventional thinking was that the objectives of the rich owners of those trusts were simple and clear; to lower wages, to raise prices, maximize profits, and to run competitors out of business (Mowry 1958, 6). The effects of fulfilling these goals on the people who were dependent on the industrialists for their livelihood seemed to be disregarded by the magnates. Even before the onset of the 20th century, mass protest and action against the corporations had become a regular feature of American political life.

The railroad industry exemplifies, more than any other at the time, both the rise of the trust and the methods it used as well as the kinds of social and political strife that followed in the wake of its development.

There were two main bursts of railway construction, one in 1879, and again in 1885. In a span of just a few years,

not only was New York connected to San Francisco, but also small and remote communities were incorporated along with larger towns and cities into a huge still web that crisscrossed the country. Indeed, the railroads were the major boon to the gross national product. But the many individual railway corporations could not finance the construction, maintenance, and fierce competition of their expanding operations. In order to deflect their difficulties, the owners of these companies cooperated by fixing prices and dividing routes among themselves -- thereby creating a de facto monopoly on the interstate transportation of goods and passengers. J. P. Morgan and other investment bankers, at first mere instruments, capable of selling the securities needed to finance these giant combines, saw the advantage of linking the railroads into trusts and thus completed the move. As mentioned before, by the end of 1901, the national railroad network had virtually been consolidated into the hands of five or six groups of operators. The public learned about the development in February 1902, when one of the muckrakers' magazines carried a double-page map outlining the newly built railroad empires of Vanderbilt, Gould, Rockefeller, Morgan, Hill and Harriman (Mowry 1958, 7; Galambos and Pratt 1988, 34).

Railway development promised many opportunities for small farmers and the merchants, as well as big businessmen. But as connections were made between different and isolated

communities, economic dependence also arrived. Soon thousands of workers on the railroads had their wages and working conditions decided by bankers in New York, and formerly self-sufficient communities in the Midwest suddenly saw their livelihoods dependent on the secret agreements made among a few railroad company owners. Farmers and merchants could neither see nor understand the rationality influencing the operation of these complex businesses (Wiebe 1967, 47-8).

The rise of these great corporations provoked an intense social and political reaction in the 1880's and 1890's. Farmers and their organizations attacked the power of the combines. Reformers began howling about breaking the trusts. Labor also began protesting the concentration of wealth and power that was taking place. Trade unions of skilled workers were, in fact, gaining strength in many industries (Galambos and Pratt 1988, 37). Congress enacted two important pieces of legislation in response to agrarian and Populist protest. In 1887 the Interstate Commerce Commission was formed to regulate the railroads industry. Three years later, in 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, a sweeping law outlawing all monopolies and providing punishment for unfair trade practices. The Antitrust Act declared illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and foreign trade and to alleviate public fears regarding the trend toward

monopoly.

However, shortly after these acts were established, the Supreme Court virtually nullified in 1895 both the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act, leaving the combines of Morgan and the others beyond the control of public authorities (Galambos and Pratt 1988, 14-1; Wiebe 1967, 52).

Industrialization in America, while producing a generally rising material standard of living, required that hundreds of thousands work under conditions that were unhealthy, demoralizing or clearly dangerous. Harsh working conditions were accompanied by extremely low pay -- four or five dollars a week for girls working 70 hours per week in textile factories, for instance. Growing cities in the East and Midwest fostered crime, crowded and unsanitary living conditions, political corruption and a sense of social atomism. The traditional ties of working people to their land, craft, family and community had been entirely disrupted. The traditional virtues of thrift, modesty, temperance, sharing and social awareness were undermined by the pursuit of material things, encouraged by the very productivity of the American economy and the newly created industry (Reichley 1992, 186; Danbom 1987).

What had been known as "island" communities -- familiar and self-reliant -- diminished as a feature of the American landscape. The urban center and its accompanying slums and

tenements expanded, quickly overrunning the capacity of traditional, community-oriented social service groups such as neighborhood churches and charitable organizations to deal with the miserable lives of the people who lived there.

The Populist Movement: The discontent with the effects of industrialization was expressed politically by the Populist movement. Just before the Progressive Era, a similar, though different, movement sprang primarily from, and relied upon, the discontented farmers and small businessmen in the midwest and the mountainous areas of the United States. The Populists colored with the innate conservatism of farmers and small businessmen, expressing fear and loathing of industrialization and the modernism that went along with it. In The Age of Reform, Richard Hofstadter described the Populist ideology;

The utopia of the Populists was in the past, not the future. According to the agrarian myth, the health of the state was proportionate to the degree of which it was dominated by the agricultural class, and this assumption pointed to the superiority of an earlier age. The Populists looked backward to . . . when the laborer had excellent prospects and the farmer had abundance, when statesmen still responded to the mood of the people and there was no such thing as the money power (Hofstadter 1955, 62).

Unlike the Progressives who offered solutions and methods to deal with the problems of the day, facing the future ahead, the Populists rejected the new reality. Thus, they were

helpless when the Supreme Court virtually nullified both the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act.

With the depression of 1893, tension burst into national turmoil. The depression gravely curtailed the progress of industry and intensified the reactions to industrialization. The long-distressed agriculture sector was hit especially hard. Thousands of businesses went bankrupt and millions of hungry, angry, unemployed people walked the streets of the big cities (Mowry 1958; Graham 1987; Hays 1958). In 1894, labor leader Eugene Debs organized the boycott of railroad Pullman cars, known as the Pullman Strike. President Grover Cleveland called out federal troops to suppress the bitter fight between the American Railway Union and the strikers. Urban workers organized a number of spectacular marches on Washington in 1894 (Wiebe 1967, 91; Hays 1958, 43). Industrial disorder in the 1890's grew as workers and unions became more radical. This was also reflected in the birth and rapid growth of the Socialist Party in 1900 (discussed later).

The Elections of 1896: The elections of 1896 were especially rancorous. There were two sharply divided camps. The Republicans, led by William McKinley, ran a relatively moderate campaign. However, the Democrats, led by the flamboyant Nebraskan, William Jennings Bryan, who had close ties with the Populists, ran an especially aggressive

campaign. The Populist Party selected Bryan, the Democrat, as their candidate and their leader, James Watson, as his vice president. When Bryan failed to gain election, the loss marked the end of the Populist Party and its incorporation into the Democratic Party.

1900: Optimism and Distress: The country was in a state of flux at the turn of the century. The Spanish-America War had ended successfully, and America entered, albeit late, into an imperialist age. Foreign policy increasingly became an issue. The economic climate took a sharp upward turn as industrial production increased steadily after 1898. National wealth nearly doubled between 1890-1900, farm prices rose, and unemployment sank to more acceptable levels.

By 1908, the average income in the United States led the world; \$227 per capita as opposed to England's \$181 and France's \$161. Moreover, taxes took only three percent of the average income in the United States as compared with nine percent in England and twelve percent in France (Graham 1987, 2-3). Dramatic change took place also in the nation's relative economic position in the world. The year, 1892, was the first year the country had an unfavorable trade balance. By 1914, Americans owned about as much as they owed abroad (Mowry 1958, 4; from The Historical Statistics of the United States 1789-1945, 1949, 242-6). However, the

income from agriculture or labor could not compare with the enormous growth in capital returns from American industry and finance. Thus, the economic figures are misleading when applied to particular sectors in American society.

A new age of technological innovations began; electric lights, X-Rays, trolleys, wireless transmitters, and, of course, automobiles, to name but a few (Graham 1987, 2).

Change was not limited to technology in 1900, it touched almost every facet of American society. The word "new" was used frequently to describe all manner of changes (i.e., the "New Theology," the "New Morality," the "New Women," the "New Immigration," and the "New South"). As the years advanced, almost all political programs carried the word "new" in their title; the "New Nationalism," "The New Republic," "New Freedom," and "The New Democracy," (Mowry 1958, 2). This emphasis on novelty partially reflected the very real alterations taking place at an amazing rate in society.

Despite the general optimism that welcomed the new century, the nation faced many difficulties. Some intellectual critics expressed their concerns about the several social problems, they believed, are potentially fatal. The growing concentration of wealth in the hands of a relatively few financiers, corporate tycoons, and rich families seemed to many Americans, including some who rejected the economic cure-all remedies of Populism, a

threat to the social foundations of democracy (Reichley 1992, 185). As we shall see later, many intellectuals were among the sources contributing to and molding the Progressive Movement.

The Political System: People were looking for the support of their government against the adverse effects of industrialism. However, wherever they turned within the political system they found the presence of big business. Political parties, Congress, and the courts consistently favored wealth and property. The Senate was called the "rich man's club" and the Supreme Court the "sword and buckler" against regulation, social welfare and leveling legislation (Mowry 1971, 2136; Wiebe 1967; Hays 1957; Mowry 1958).

Dissatisfaction with the Senate as a barrier to progress had been established since the Populist days. The Outlook, a magazine of the day (not a muckraker's kind), wrote in 1907: "If a rich man wishes to buy high office for himself, he looks first of all to the Senate. He does so because he knows that whereas a whole State may not be purchasable, a legislature may be" (Filler 1976, 340).

As public awareness was growing and more demands were pressed on the government to regulate business, businessmen reasserted their control of party activity by joining politics themselves. Corporate leaders in the late 1880's

began to participate more actively in the party machinery itself, often as party managers, but more frequently as United States Senators in their respective states. The Senate came to be representative of different economic groups rather than of the states. There were lumber senators, silver senators and several other vested economic interests represented in the U.S. Senate. Party leaders began to function as servants of the new business politicians rather than as masters. Corporate influence in party machinery reached its peak when a Cleveland steel magnate, Mark Hanna, who had twice before failed to realize his ambition of becoming a President-maker, won the Republican presidential nomination in 1896 for his candidate, William McKinley. Subsequently, Hanna, rose to the position of Republican National Chairman. From 1897 to 1904, he also served as a Republican Senator from Ohio. McKinley, a colorless and weak executive, played his role for Hanna well, until his untimely death at the hands of an assassin in 1901 (Hays 1957, 153-4).

The Supreme Court: Many of the reforms desired by reformers before and during the Progressive Era were declared unconstitutional. Reformers, in return, attacked the unchecked power exercised by the justices, especially that of judicial review. The following examples illustrate some of the decisions made by the Supreme Court before and

during the Progressive Era and are indicative of the conservative and business-oriented inclination of the Court.

The income tax, which was to supply most of the financing for social services, had been declared unconstitutional in 1895. Subsequent measures to assure its constitutionality had been repeatedly passed by the House, but, as frequently as they were passed in the House they were defeated in the Senate. It was not until 1913, when the 16th Amendment was passed, which constituted the federal income tax, that Congress included a provision that prevented its nullification by the Supreme Court, as had happened in 1895 (Mowry 1971, 2137).

The doctrine the Supreme Court used to strike down reform was derived from the 14th Amendment, ". . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Thus the Supreme Court read into the "due process clause" a new meaning protecting private business from public regulation. In 1886, in the Santa Clara Case, the Supreme Court, under the 14th Amendment, stated that a corporation became a legal person and therefore was subject to protection and as such it was at liberty to contract with others as it saw fit.

In 1895, the E.C. Knight case involved monopoly in interstate commerce, specifically sugar refining. The federal government had the constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. However, the court ruled that the

Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to production. Production was clearly not commerce and therefore was subject solely to state regulation.

In *Lochner v. New York* in 1905, the court struck down a law, limiting to ten, the daily working hours for bakers on the grounds that it infringed on the freedom to contract within the meaning of the due process clause (Hays 1957, 159-62).

Since the personal make-up of the Supreme Court had not changed dramatically during the years of the Progressive Era, some of its doctrines were maintained, as exhibited in 1918.⁶ Then, the court struck down the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916 on the grounds that it attempted to regulate production; a power reserved for the states. The Child Labor Act, which prohibited shipment through interstate commerce of goods manufactured by child labor, was one of the reforms sought by the Progressives and signed by Woodrow Wilson in 1916. By and large, the practical implication of these court rulings was that private businesses faced very few, if any, restrictions.

The Party System: The Progressive Era coincided with the evolution of the fourth party system in America (1896-

⁶This situation remained the same until the late 1930s. FDR threatened to "pack the court" with new justices in frustration over the court's decisions to strike down several New Deal policies.

1932). A new party system, basically reflected a new realignment of voters and issues around specific parties. The third party system (1860-1896), considered by many as the "Golden Age" of political parties in America, where both parties were strong, centralized, and in charge of many functions which would not last after the Progressive Era. "The third party system saw the rise of the classical, corrupt, but assimilative urban boss and machine, and brought party loyalties to a pitch of almost military fervor and discipline" (Chambers 1975, 14). Indeed, after the upheavals of the 1860's and early 1870's, the third party system, was the central institution through which political stabilization was achieved. Patronage played a pervasive role in party politics in most regions of the nation at the time (Shefter 1983, 459). The third party system witnessed many third parties, none of which achieved national scope, like the Bull Moose. Among the multitude were the "Greenback Party", which advocated currency expansion, the "Free Soil Party," which opposed the extension of slavery into territories newly gained from Mexico, and the Populist Party.

During the period of the third party system, and throughout most of the Progressive Era, the major parties, on the local level, were at the peak of patronage practice and under the influence of big business and bossism. David Graham Phillips, the famous muckraker journalist, describes

the typical machine and boss-ridden politics in New York.

The city government was, as usual, in the hands of the two bosses who owned the two political machines. One was taking the responsibility and the larger share of the spoils; the other was maintaining him in power and getting the smaller but satisfactory share. The alliance between the police and criminal vice had become so open and aggressive under this big-boss patronage that the people were aroused and indignant (Phillips, The Great God Success, 1901, 172-3).

This description of New York's politics repeated itself in all major cities, especially in the northeast. In the West, where political parties were not as strongly organized, big business simply ran politics. Before the Progressive Era, the most powerful force in California state politics was not the party organization, but rather, the Southern Pacific Railroad. The most influential political figure in California was not a party boss, but rather the head of the railroad's political bureau (Shefter 1983, 471). As we shall see later, Hiram Johnson would be elected governor of California on a campaign slogan that called for emancipating the Republican Party from the domination of the Southern Pacific.

As a result of the unresponsive and unrepresentative politics by the established political system, "pressure group" tactics became more openly used as an alternative to the traditional partisan way of politics (Hayes 1957, 88). Political reform, the democratization of the political

system, would be, almost, the sole common ground upon which different groups could agree. In many respects, this is the definition of the progressive politics and movement which soon followed.

The two decades between 1874 and 1894 were decades of political confusion. Neither party dominated the federal government for any length of time. The Democrats controlled the House of Representatives in eight of the ten congresses between 1874 and 1894 and the Senate seven times went to the Republicans. Only twice in those two decades, the Republicans in the 1889-91 Congress, and the Democrats in the 1893-95 session, did a single party control both the presidency and Congress. In 1894, the Republican Party broke through this political stalemate when it swept the Congressional election to inaugurate a continuous sixteen-year GOP reign in the national legislature. McKinley's 1896 victory began an equally long Republican stay in the White House. In fact, the Republican dominated the party system until the formation of the fifth party system in 1932. The Republican dominance was interrupted between 1912 and 1920, when the Democrat Wilson was elected (Hays 1957, 143-4).

The Muckrakers: Phillips, quoted above, was one of several important writers that, when considered together, constituted an intriguing movement in journalism called the "Muckrakers." Shortly before the turn of the century a

growing number of mass-circulating magazines began to appear. These magazines introduced a new style of investigative reporting exposing issues that, until then, were unknown to the general public. The muckraker magazines served as means of communication between the new masses and their peers; supplying information as well as light entertainment. However, the central preoccupation of muckraker journalists was with corruption at different levels of government on one hand, and describing the plight of the common people on the other. This movement in journalism gained its nickname from Theodore Roosevelt, who criticized them scathingly with it, but they adopted the mocking name proudly. Roosevelt dubbed Phillips and writers like him, "muckrakers", after the former published an article alleging corrupt misconduct by Chauncey Depew, a senator from New York (Filler 1976, 343).

The muckrakers, as we shall see from some of the examples to follow, were extremely helpful, by way of their impetus, to the type of progressive politics that followed. Their collective writings reflect both the discontent expressed by the public as well as the public's receptivity to this sensationalized style of journalism. "The muckrakers cannot be accounted for without mention of new mass audience hungry for both shock and a more personalized news" (Graham 1987, 4).

The muckrakers were especially interested in

influencing municipal reform. Though their interest was local, what they wrote had national implications. They helped stir up anger against business and the trusts and their corrupting effects on government.

The McClure, founded in 1893, was one of this era's leading magazines and a proponent of this new style of journalism. The McClure gained its prominent position thanks to its famous editor and writer, Lincoln Steffens and Ida Tarbel, respectively. Tarbel wrote a series of articles on the formation of Standard Oil, which took her three years to complete. She exposed the methods by which this giant combine was created and how people and natural resources were exploited by the Rockefellers, with the blessing of politicians. Lincoln Steffens, from his editor's chair, wrote extensively on the collusion between corporations and corrupt politicians.

Another sensational work of the day was written by Upton Sinclair The Jungle uncovered the ruthless practices in the meat-packing industry (Filler 1976, 150). This work led to passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.

Jacob Riis, who investigated conditions on New York's East Side, while reporting in both the New York Tribune and the Sun, described in shock and horror, sanitary conditions so poor as to be beyond imagining, family tragedies to pitiful to be believed, the unpalatably tragic fate of working women and children, and even the horrid treatment of

the dead victims who had succumbed to hunger and cold. Riis, an immigrant himself, fought poverty and became a journalist, publishing several books on similar issues. His books include: How the Other Half Lives (1890), Out of Mulberry Street (1898), The Battle with the Slum (1902) and Children of the Tenement (1903).

David Graham Phillips, cited trust after trust in a long series of articles to prove that the Sherman Antitrust Act was not being enforced. He called his series of articles, "Treason of the Senate", and they were published in Cosmopolitan from March to November 1906. The circulation of Cosmopolitan rose from 300,000 to 450,000 during the period that Phillips' series were published, which attests to the public's interest in the subject matter (Filler 1976, 340).

The muckrakers aroused public indignation and demand for reform. Danbom, in his book, The World of Hope, described the Christian Progressives and their critique of the changing world. Danbom believed that what was new was the growing acceptance of this critique of American public life. Suddenly, the public became receptive to reform journalists -- the muckrakers -- who focused, in a moralistic fashion, on misbehavior in government and business and blamed the public for allowing these shortcomings to exist. Soon, politicians who criticized economic or political figures in moral terms enjoyed

spreading grassroots support (Danbom 1987). Arthur Link and Richard McCormick have observed that, "the dynamics of progressivism were crucially generated by ordinary people aroused to action by particular events: a sensational muckraking article, an outrageous political scandal, an eye-opening legislative investigation, or a tragic social calamity" (Link and McCormick 1983, 8-9).

The muckrakers played an educational role also, they called upon the people to change their situation. Lincoln Steffens set out, in his tellingly titled book, The Shame of the Cities, to sound a clarion call for civic pride from an apparently shameless citizenship. The public response to this phase of muckraking was vigorous. The cities that were involved threw out their bosses, vice was attacked, franchises were municipalized, politicians were ousted, investigations were held, and reforms were carried out. Public indignation, spurred by guilt, was becoming a major social force (Danbom 1987, 82-5; Steffens 1957).

Chapter Three

The Progressives: From a Movement to the Birth of the Bull Moose Party

Introduction: This chapter deals with the Progressive Movement as it developed and reached its peak around 1912. It describes, among other things, its sources, people, accomplishments, and the events that preceded and eventually led to the break of progressive Republicans from their party to form the Bull Moose.

To be sure, the Progressive Movement was never a coherent or distinctly organized group. Rather, it was a loose network of groups and individuals who sought reform, represented different interests, supported shared ideas, and offered solutions to problems and the new realities America faced during the Progressive Era. The sources of progressivism were diverse, sometimes overlapping and sometimes in conflict. As will be described below, for some the Progressive Era is viewed as a period of major assault on established parties, for others it was a period where social justice was fought and achieved for children, mothers and the working masses. For some, it was a period

of major attacks on the growing trusts and expansion in governmental regulatory policies; for many, it was a period of introducing and applying scientific methods to public affairs. Yet, for others the emphasis was conserving natural resources. Wiebe suitably titled his book, The Search for Order, wherein he described the era of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as a search for organizing principles around which a viable social order could be constructed. The Progressives declared that they would destroy that system and, by implication, substitute a natural, individualistic democracy (Wiebe 1967, 168). When many such groups started actively pursuing similar goals it was clear to contemporaries that a national movement was underway.

Though pursuing different goals, the Progressives had in common certain assumptions and themes: government should play an active role in promoting the public good, specifically the federal; political life is best seen as a moral struggle between good and evil; public confidence requires honest elections and effective government; the existing party system is a major barrier to political reform; and government should serve the public interest rather than advancing particular interests to the exclusion of others or acting chiefly as a broker between competing special interests. Indeed, for the majority of Americans,

during the Progressive Era, the nation's problems could be reduced to the conflict between "interests" and the "People". The Progressives sought to restore opportunity by striking down monopolies through governmental regulation of business. However, the close alliance between the business corporation and politicians prevented passage of such legislation. Lincoln Steffens, described in his investigative reports how business financed both political parties, dictated the choice of candidates and lobbied to suppress bills hostile to corporations. Thus, the widespread belief of the time was that reform should precede legislation, and that the people needed to regain power before their problems could be resolved (Reichley 1992; Wiebe 1967; Gould 1974). As we shall see, the Progressive Movement drew its support and character from the variety of sources that reflect the themes described above.

Sources of Progressivism

What could we not make of the world if we employed its genius!⁷

The Intellectuals: Many prominent thinkers who would

⁷Walter Lippmann, quoted in Gable 1978, 90.

shape the views of Americans for generations to come profoundly influenced the Progressives. Some of them were directly involved in political activity, often setting the tone, offering solutions, providing ideas and values. This is evident from the way the Progressives themselves explained their efforts; they did so primarily by reference to ideals, and were proudest of the structure of ideas they produced, both by analysis and by prescription. Political action was dependent upon a determination of values and a rational plan of correction and control. "Therefore their movement," said Otis Graham, ". . . while almost entirely political in its tangible expression, left behind what was to them an equally important legacy -- a body of ideas for the guidance of like-minded men, ideas which took the form of values and the techniques to realize them (Graham 1967, 4-5).

John Dewey, for example, who became a reformer before the beginning of the century, served as a tutor to his generation. He was very appealing to those who were in a mood for reform because of his pragmatism and instrumentalism: his emphasis on the concrete, his refusal to be content with previously accepted truths, his belief in rational control of society's affairs. In fact, they seem to represent the very essence of the progressive attitudes then (Graham 1967, 133-4). This was especially true with

Progressives who were interested in reforming the education system and found Dewey to be their mentor. His ideas were translated into a movement for more efficient school administrations which in turn would provide better testing. Of greater importance was Dewey's attempt to eliminate the social conformity that rigid and unimaginative school curriculums impressed on the young. He rejected authoritarian teaching methods, regarding education in a democracy as a tool to enable the citizen to integrate his or her culture and vocation usefully. Dewey himself became an active member of the Bull Moose Party after the elections of 1912 within the education bureau of the Progressive Service (Caine 1967, 49; Gable 1978).

Progressives felt experimentalism and innovation were not only legitimate in the human and governmental affairs but should be encouraged. Thomas Edison, the inventor of the electric bulb, who also joined the Progressives, explained that without experiment no progress is possible. He said, "We have stumbled along for a while, trying to run a new civilization in old ways, and we've got to start to make this world over" (Gable 1978, 90).

Universities and experts: The Progressive Era was also responsible for the rise of the "expert." The application of scientific methods to solve social problems and refine

management of big organizations and businesses became more apparent and realized (Hofstadter 1955, 208). Universities were going through a rapid development, departmentalizing and specializing, (APSA, the American Political Science Association, for example, was formed in 1903 together with several other social sciences associations.) Institutions of higher education expanded as more and more people sought higher education to improve their position in society. Many experienced their first acquaintance with charity work, settlement houses, housing reforms, and similar efforts to cope with city problems, during their higher education. Numerous Progressives affirmed their indebtedness to college courses that moved them to devote their lives to the alleviation of society's injustices. "My life began at John Hopkins University," wrote Frederick Howe, a prominent Progressive, "I came alive, I felt a sense of responsibility, I wanted to change things" (Caine 1974, 17). The influence of university scholars grew as progressive politicians gained power. Reform-minded officeholders sought their advice and counsel, and ultimately they helped write numerous progressive statutes. "The Wisconsin Idea," was the term used to describe Robert La Follette's pioneering work with academia; eliciting the support and cooperation of academics in the management of the affairs of the state (Hofstadter 1963, 202). In fact, professors often

came to dominate regulatory commissions and other new administrative agencies. The emerging new middle class of professionals were responsible for the introduction of, what Wiebe called, the bureaucratic orientation in the management of the public domain; leading among them were individuals such as Louis Brandeis, Gifford Pinchot, and Jane Addams (Wiebe 1967, 121; 152-3).

The union of intellectuals and politicians gave progressivism great innovative strength. The highest expression of this was in the conservation policy inspired by Theodore Roosevelt and led by a group of federal scientists and technicians in his administration. Men, like Theodore Roosevelt, found the alternative to social disorder in the concept and practice of efficiency, the systematic use of resources -- human, natural, and financial -- to produce the most possible material goods for the entire nation with the least energy. The social problems could be solved not by quarreling over pieces of the pie, but by "baking a bigger pie," that is, by more efficient and greater production. Such leaders conceived of a whole society moving toward a common purpose under the guidance of the efficient ideals of science and technology (Hays 1957, 89).

Walter Weyl and Herbert Croly, leading intellectuals of the Era, published books offering a new vision for American

society and a new theory for government. Croly's, The Promise of American Life, 1909, called for the federal government to assume responsibility for the welfare of its citizens rather than leave such matters to the wavering and uncertain efforts of state and municipal reformers. Croly described the "great American drift," a tendency for Americans to believe that the nation's problems would effortlessly solve themselves. Such attitude, he argued, could lead only to social disruption, for it would permit powerful groups in society full latitude to maneuver for their private gain and leave the public interest without effective guardians. Croly's book proved to be more a plea for a strong assertion of national will to overcome disruptive tendencies in America than a blueprint for the future (Hays 1957, 88; Wiebe 1967). It was Theodore Roosevelt who would translate the book into a blueprint for governing. In fact, as we will later see, it has been claimed that Croly's book was the major source that inspired Roosevelt's New Nationalism. Roosevelt found the book to be a call for collective action, a call he could find in few others. After reading the book, which echoed many of his own ideas, Roosevelt met with author Croly and the two became friends and political allies.

The book brought Croly other friends as well. Willard Straight, a diplomat and a businessman along with his wife

Dorothy Whitney, met Croly and out of their conversations came the New Republic, whom the Straights funded. The New Republic was to be the rallying ground for all those with a new vision of American Life; Walter Lippmann, one of its editors, wrote:

We shall be socialistic in direction, but not in method, or phrase or allegiance. If there is any word to cover our ideal, I suppose it is humanistic, somewhat sharply distinguished from humanitarianism... between the noble dream and the actual limitations of life . . . (Smith 1985, 245).

The New Republic was an elitist magazine directed at intellectuals. Nonetheless, it helped influence many policies in Washington because it was widely read by bureaucrats (Filler 1976, 251).

The Social Gospel Movement: Toward the end of the 19th century, Protestant denominations, later designated "mainline," produced a body of social and political activists espousing the "Social Gospel". They believed that Christian values were compromised by the economic suffering and social corruption associated with industrialization and urbanization.

Many Social Gospellers were active in the Republican Party, the political home of most northern Protestants. Most of them felt genuine sympathy for the urban poor of all

ethnic groups. The Social Gospellers insisted that to be a Christian was to be involved in dynamic change. "The Church," wrote Walter Rauschenbush in 1893, "is both a partial realization of the new society, in which God's will is done, and also the appointed instrument for the further realization of that new society in the world about it" (Caine 1974, 14; Reichley 1992; Danbom 1987).

The Social Gospellers were convinced that society must be and could be changed by men who sought justice. Through people like Jane Addams, Samuel Jones, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, all of whom had close ties to Social Gospel leaders and principles, this notion, was transmitted to the very core of progressive spirit. The Social Gospel was a major source of the righteous indignation that made progressivism, a moral movement. It also drove many individuals to direct action on behalf of the disadvantaged. Jane Addams, considered to be the founder of the profession of social workers, in 1888, established the Hull House in Chicago. The Hull House helped to alleviate the slum conditions and became a center for social reform activities. The settlement house were secular by nature, but the volunteers who worked there were often religious. Settlement workers taught English, sponsored cultural events and opened child-care facilities. Following Addams' pioneer work in Chicago, many new settlements houses were founded

and numbered approximately 400 by 1910. Jane Addams joined the Bull Moose Party and was the lone female on its national executive committee.

Another written work that was especially influential among leading Protestant thinkers, contributing toward the process leading to the Progressive Era, was Henry George's book, Progress and Poverty, published in 1879. George focused on the seeming paradox of a country growing in wealth while at the same time poverty was found to be increasing. What made his message so striking was his determined insistence that harmony and justice could be achieved without the horror of revolution or the abandonment of capitalism. The problem of poverty could be solved if men, with God's help, brought about the needed changes.

George's pragmatic idea was to suggest a single tax for all the land. The tax would allow for innumerable social reforms and be of great assistance to the productive part of society. By 1890, more than 100 Single Tax Clubs had been formed. The depression in 1893 further increased the appeal of his message. George's book became one of the all time nonfiction bestsellers in America (Caine 1974, 11-2).

The Federalist Tradition: The majority of future Progressives came from within the Republican Party. The federalist Republicans who fully subscribed to the basic

principles of Republican ideology believed it had been corrupted by the machine and bosses like Quay and Plat. They also were critical of business-oriented politicians, like Mark Hanna, who they thought placed too much emphasis on the economic aspects of Republicanism while neglecting the moral idealism Republicans inherited from Abraham Lincoln, Charles Sumner and the reformers of the 1860's. Their numbers included Theodore Roosevelt in New York, Henry Cabot Lodge in Massachusetts, Philander Knox (McKinley's Attorney General) in Pennsylvania, and a host of young lawyers, businessmen, and journalists, like Elihu Root and Henry Stimson. Most of them supported Roosevelt during his presidency and later as a Bull Mooser (Reichley 1992).

Long before he developed his New Nationalism, Roosevelt used his popularity to fight special interests in American life. He demanded a federal approach to the country's national problems and frequently called forth the historical images of Hamilton and Lincoln, both of whom had asserted the national interest and used a vigorous federal government to enhance that interest. "He (Billy O'Neill, member of the assembly from upstate New York) admired Alexander Hamilton as much as I did, being a strong believer in a powerful national government, and we both of us differed from Alexander Hamilton in being stout adherents of Abraham Lincoln's views wherever the rights of the people were

concerned" (Roosevelt 1985, 67).

The Populists of the 19th century also attacked big business, but, they concentrated on providing more economic leverage for small farmers and merchants. The Progressive Republicans, in contrast, emphasized the threat to democratic institutions posed by unchecked business power. Roosevelt and the Progressives in essence, facilitated the orderly passage of America toward corporate capitalism, while trying to minimize the adverse affects of the process (Sklar 1988).

The Municipal Reform Movement: An important group of reformers were those who concentrated on rationalizing and cleaning up city governments. The city reformers were heavily influenced by, and closely cooperated with, the muckraker journalists. Much of the work of the muckrakers, as described earlier, revolved around municipal issues.

The spectacular growth of many eastern and midwestern cities created enormous problems; municipal governments failed to meet the needs for new schools, protection against crime, fire, public transportation, water, sewage disposal, and other public services (Reichley 1992, 188-9). Tenement houses which multiplied in the new century, led reformers to organize campaigns for public health against filth and control of certain diseases. These sporadic efforts

developed, around 1900, into integrated, city-wide programs.

City reformers came to the conclusion that first they had to drive the party machines out of power before they could proceed. They decided that the political parties, Republican as well as Democratic, were standing in the way of the application of scientific administrative techniques to city problems. Municipal reformers of the Progressive Era liked to say there was "no Republican or Democratic way to clean the streets." Many were convinced that loyalty to national parties was an obstacle to gaining control of city governments. During the late 1890's, and the first years of the new century, reform administrations took over city halls in New York, Jersey City, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, and Toledo, among other municipalities (Hays 1980, 211).

In 1909, municipal reformers in Boston, allied with Republicans in the Massachusetts legislature, made Boston one of the first major cities to adopt a nonpartisan city government. This example was soon followed by other cities, particularly in the West and South. By 1929, 26 of the nation's 36 largest cities held nonpartisan elections for local offices (Kayden and Mahe 1985, 41).

The municipal reform movement lent new credence to the view that most problems of government are technical problems of administrations; politics should not be a battle over

spoils, or a struggle between groups defined by religion or ethnicity or class, but a means for gaining public support for scientifically constructed systems of taxation, management of services, and budget control. To help formulate a scientific solution to governmental problems, city reformers and their business allies set up privately financed municipal research agencies in many large cities. The first of these was the Bureau of Municipal Research of New York City, launched in 1906 with funds supplied largely by Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller (Hays 1980, 210).

City reformers extended the scope of utility regulation and sharply limited the privileges and duration of the franchises. Tax assessments that were skewed in favor of large corporations were modernized.

Urban progressives brought about the expansion of government services and increased the number of appointive posts and were successful in reserving these positions for specialists. The experts, in turn, devised government budgets, introduced central audited purchasing, and worked to rationalize the structure of offices. New research bureaus provided data and drafted the some of the more complex ordinances (Wiebe 1967, 168). Wiebe gave an example of the methods and of cooperation among professional reformers:

When a child labor committee brought its bill before the New York legislature in 1903, for instance, an extraordinary collection of settlement workers, union officials, young lawyers, public administrators, and other professionals eagerly gathered to lobby for the measure. With some exceptions, the humanitarian progressives came to form a loose confederation, increasingly aware of the ways their special interests fitted into a common cause (Wiebe 1967, 169).

Political Reforms of State Governments: Progressives at the state level concentrated primarily on measures that extended democracy. The device of referendum, authorized first by South Dakota in 1898, enabled voters to act directly on legislation placed on the ballot or through public petition. Initiative, introduced by Oregon in 1902, empowered voters to require action on specific legislative items. Recall was introduced by Los Angeles in 1902 and at the state level by Oregon in 1908. It permitted voters to depose elected officials in special elections before the end of their terms (Reichley 1992, 207).

These tools of direct democracy were most popular in the West, where the Progressives were strongest, although a wide variety of similar tools were adopted by more than two-thirds of the states. All three devices were instituted by California, Michigan, Colorado, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington. Their political effect, in states where they were widely used, such as

California, was to strengthen special-interest groups that could mobilize resources around a particular issue and, in turn, undermine parties. The effects of these changes on the political system were profound and they continue to be felt to the present day (Hays 1957, 155-6; Shefter 1983).

The primaries -- the selection of candidates for public office through secret balloting by party members -- were a major contribution of the Progressives. Primaries existed in very few counties in the nation before the Progressive Era. For the Progressives, V.O. Key wrote,

The direct primary constituted a means by which an enlightened people might cut through the mesh of organized and privileged power and grasp control of government. They had a faith that the people, once equipped with the proper weapons, would throw from office the rascals in possession of the city halls and state houses (V.O. Key 1958, 7).

Wisconsin, under Robert La Follette's leadership, adopted a direct primary in 1903. In 1905, Wisconsin authorized the first primary for the selection of delegates to a national party convention. Oregon authorized primaries in 1910 for presidential elections. In 1912, 15 states were holding some form of presidential primary, partly as a result of efforts by backers of La Follette and Roosevelt who saw the primary as the best means for their candidate to win that year's Republican nomination. By 1916, the number of states

holding primaries for presidential elections had risen to 26. As a matter of fact, by 1912, a majority of the states had passed laws requiring primaries for nominations for at least some state offices (Reichley 1992, 205).

Campaign financing reform was another issue progressive sought in their attempts to clean up the election process and reduce spending by big businesses. Exposure by the press in 1904 of Senator Mark Hanna's methods for eliciting contributions for McKinley's campaigns from corporations in 1896 and 1900, and revelations of the huge sums being raised to support Roosevelt's reelection in 1904, strengthened the demand for such reform. Roosevelt, though himself a beneficiary of large sums of contributions from business, proposed and Congress enacted, in 1907, a law prohibiting campaign contributions by banks or corporations in elections for federal offices. In 1910, Congress passed the first law requiring disclosure of campaign contributions in federal elections, and in 1911 placed limits on the amounts that could be spent by candidates for the Senate and the House, though not for the Presidency. However, corporations easily found ways to evade the prohibitions associated with campaign spending.

Many of the progressive reforms of the electoral process were aimed at broadening democratic participation. A few were aimed at driving corruption out of the system,

even if it meant some constriction of democracy. For example, reformers often required that lists of eligible voters be compiled a considerable time before an election as a method of combating multiple voting, and other forms of election fraud being practiced by party machines.

Shortly before 1890, some states began to require that individual voters appear personally to register before a cut-off date. By 1900, except for the South, where registration was used to disenfranchise black voters, registration was required in 30 percent of the counties, and enrollment by election officials was maintained by an additional 24 percent. Twenty years later these figures had risen to 67 percent of voter registration (Kleppner 1987, 166-7).

California: The state of California serves as a good example of successful progressive politics. California provided the Progressive Movement with one of its leaders, the candidate for vice-president, Hiram Johnson. The most powerful force in state politics in the early years of this century was not the party organization, but rather the Southern Pacific Railroad. The most influential political figure in California was not a party boss, but rather the head of the railroad's political bureau (Shefter 1983, 471). The railroad's money, according to Abe Rueff, the Republican

boss of San Francisco, was the power behind almost every political throne, and behind almost every insurgent revolt. "The Southern Pacific's Political Bureau maintained a railroad political manager in every county in the state. This manager might be a Republican boss in a Republican county, or a Democratic boss in a Democratic county; in important or doubtful counties he was merely the railroad boss, with whom both party's bosses had to deal" (Mayhew 1986, 222; Bean 1952, 5).

It was in this context that the Progressive Movement emerged in California, declaring its intention to emancipate the Republican Party in California from the domination of the Political Bureau of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and its allied interests. The Progressives managed to take over the Republican Party and elect their candidate, Hiram Johnson, governor. In 1910, Hiram Johnson ran on the slogan, "Kick the Southern Pacific out of Politics," and won a sweeping victory (Shefter 1983, 472).

As governor, Johnson persuaded the legislature to establish a public utility commission that subjected the Southern Pacific and other railroads to strict regulation. Johnson's main legislative effort, however, was devoted to enacting a far-reaching program of electoral and party reform; including the introduction of the referendum, initiative, and recall. The purpose of these measures, the

Progressives believed, was to restore popular control over government.

Political parties, which were weaker in California and the west, compared with the veteran northeastern parties, were further weakened during the Progressive Era. Johnson's administration also secured the passage of the cross-filing law, which permitted candidates for state and congressional offices to enter primaries of both parties without naming their own party on the ballot. The cross-filing contributed to the development of an almost totally candidate-oriented brand of state electoral politics (Shefter 1983; Reichley 1992, 190). The anti-party measures, instituted by Hiram Johnson in California to help break the power of the Southern Pacific Railroad, epitomized many of the remedies prescribed in other states.

Who were the Progressives: The reform mayors and governors, their leading supporters, and the muckrakers were an interesting group. Considering the positions they held, they were very young. Joseph Folk was only thirty-five when elected governor, Theodore Roosevelt forty, Charles Evans Hughes and Hiram Johnson forty-four, and Robert La Follette forty-five. The average age of the important progressive leaders who overthrew the Southern Pacific Railroad machine in California was a little over thirty-eight (Mowry 1958,

87).

A surprising number of them came from very wealthy families, with names like du Pont, Crane, Spreckels, Dodge, Morgenthau, Pinchot, Perkins, McCormick, and Patterson. Many of them became upset when they heard themselves referred to as the "Millionaires' reform movement." George Mowry said that few reform movements in American history have had the support of more wealthy men. Alfred Chandler surveyed the backgrounds and careers of 260 Progressive leaders throughout the country, noting how overwhelmingly urban and middle-class they were. The Progressives were almost entirely native-born Protestants. They had an extraordinarily high representation of professional men and college graduates. The 260 leaders were distributed as follows: businessmen - 95, lawyers - 75, editors - 36, college professors, authors, social workers, and a scattering of others - 55 (Hofstadter 1955, 144-5).

But the great majority of the reformers came from the middle class. This is indicated by the fact that most of them had a college education in a day when a degree marked a person as coming from a privileged economic group. It is interesting to note that most of the women reformers and social workers had gone to college. Occupationally, the reformers came from a very narrow base in society. A statistical study of sixty of the wealthier reformers

reveals that the largest single group of twenty-one were manufacturers or merchants, ten were lawyers, six newspapers publishers, and nineteen inherited their wealth. Yet, of the sixty, only about half attended college, a figure much lower than for the entire group of reformers when considered as a whole. Of this number, just fifty percent came from three institutions, Harvard, Princeton and Yale (Mowry 1958, 86-7; Wiebe 1967, 166). An overwhelming proportion of this reform group came from old American stock with British origins. Jews were also represented among Progressives in higher proportion than their number in the general population.

Except for the women, who were predominantly Midwestern, the reformers' places of origin were scattered over the country, roughly in proportion to population densities. However, the majority of them eventually lived in northern cities, while most of those who were originally from the South left their region during their early adult years. It is clear that the intellectual and religious influence of New England was dominant (Mowry 1958, 87).

Whether Democrat or Republican, an overwhelming number of this group of twentieth-century reformers had been conservatives in the nineties. The Republicans among them, followed the ways of Theodore Roosevelt, Robert La Follette, Lincoln Steffens, and William Allen White and supported

William McKinley in 1896. And most of the progressive Democrats did not support Bryan. Individuals like Woodrow Wilson, John Johnson, and Hoke Smith had either followed the Gold Democratic ticket or had remained silent during the election of 1896. Within a few years, most of them opposed their regular party machines and led nonpartisan movements in their municipalities or states. Moreover, despite the fact that the reform movement viewed big business as its principal enemy, some prominent businessmen joined the progressives. Gabriel Kolko has identified George Perkins, partner in the Morgan Bank and close adviser to Theodore Roosevelt, as the principal middleman responsible for bringing a portion of the business elite into the Progressive Movement. "Federal regulation is feasible," Perkins told an audience of businessmen in 1909. Many businessmen were alarmed by the degree of government regulation of the economy that Roosevelt's program seemed to envision. However, some leaders of the business community, as Gabriel Kolko has shown, welcomed the New Nationalism with open arms (Kolko 1963). Kolko's book, The Triumph of Conservatism, departs from the conventional interpretation of the Progressive Era wherein he portrays the Progressives as serving the interests of the old order. His analysis is similar, in principle, to that of Charles Beard of the American Constitutions and the founding fathers.

Theodore Roosevelt and The Republican Party: Theodore Roosevelt was born in 1858 on East 20th Street in New York City. He came from one of the truly aristocratic families of New York. Teddy Roosevelt was the seventh generation to be born in Manhattan of early Dutch settlers that had arrived in New Amsterdam in 1649. He traveled extensively around the world during his childhood. Roosevelt had an amazing range of interest that included: German and French, ornithology, Greek drama, and Hungarian and Scandinavian poetry to mention just a few (Morris 1979: Roosevelt 1985). He studied at Harvard College and attended Columbia law school from 1876-1880. After graduation he published a book entitled, "The Naval War of 1812."

Upon returning to New York, Roosevelt joined the Republican party. He began attending meetings of the local Republican organization in midtown Manhattan, which he found manned by "cheap lawyers, saloon keepers, horsecar conductors . . ." When asked by friends why he was associating with such dreadful people, he replied,

. . . the people I knew did not belong to the governing class, and . . . I intended to be one of the governing class; and if they proved too hard to beat for me I supposed I would have to quit, but that I certainly would not quit until I had made the effort and found out whether I really was too weak to hold my own in the rough and tumble (Reichley 1992, 193-4; Mayhew 1986, 310).

Though a reformer from the start, Roosevelt decided to operate within the structure of the Republican Party. As a politician, he praised those who followed their principles and did not yield to the political machine and other interests. But he came to realize that politics required a certain type of give and take and flexibility of dealing with people. Being a pragmatist, Roosevelt went to Tom Platt's "Sunday School" - the sessions the boss held in New York's Fifth Avenue hotel to discuss party appointments and other political favors.

Roosevelt launched on a political career at an early age and moved quickly upward occupying interesting positions. However, as we shall see, his relations with the party organization were always tense. The party was suspicious of him and believed him to be too independent and a potentially a troublemaker. His highly evolved political intuition and sagacity helped him to maneuver and accomplish much. Wherever he went, Roosevelt was extremely popular. His vitality, energy, and vigor captured and fascinated the nation, which explains his successful career despite tense relations with his party.⁸

⁸ In a hunting trip in Mississippi in 1902 when he was offered a small bear to shoot, the President refused to kill the animal. A caricature depicting the event appeared in the newspapers, and toy makers created the Teddy Bear (Gould 1991, 104).

Roosevelt's Political Career: Roosevelt was elected to the New York State Legislature in the fall of 1881, and found himself the youngest man in that august body (Roosevelt 1985, 64). It was, however, but a short time before Roosevelt took a break from politics following the death of his first wife between 1884 to 1886. Roosevelt went into retreat and lived on a ranch in Dakota, where he invested in cattle. After spending three years and squandering his investment in the venture, he returned to the east, his years as a cowboy adding another facet to this vital and colorful man.

Upon arriving in the east, Roosevelt returned to his political activity and campaigned for Benjamin Harrison during the 1888 presidential campaign. In 1888 Roosevelt ran for mayor of New York against Abraham S. Hewitt the Democrat and Henry George, an Independent, but was defeated.

President Harrison nominated him in the Spring of 1889 to the Civil Service Commission, a position he held for six years. This federal experience exposed Roosevelt to national politics and government from the inside. "Civil Service Reform had two sides," wrote Roosevelt in his autobiography, "there was, first, the effort to secure a more efficient administration of the public service, and, second, the even more important effort to withdraw the administrative office of the Government from the domain of

spoils politics, and thereby cut out of American political life a fruitful source of corruption and degradation" (Roosevelt 1985, 132). Roosevelt was so good as a commissioner that he was not replaced when Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, was elected president in 1892. He continued for a few years under Cleveland before deciding to move on.

When Roosevelt, in 1895, returned to New York from Washington D.C. he was appointed NYC police commissioner by Mayor Strong. But, he proved "too active" in pursuing his new job. His vigorous enforcement of the state's liquor laws, which closed saloons on Sunday, led to political resistance and complaints to his party bosses (Gould 1991, 5). He occupied this post for two years.

The Republican victory of 1896 brought Roosevelt back to Washington. President McKinley nominated him Assistant Secretary of the Navy. In 1897, during the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt insisted on taking an active part in the war as a soldier. He became a commander of a regiment of volunteers that came to be known as the "Rough Riders." He returned home a hero. His name was consistently mentioned as the best Republican candidate for the approaching gubernatorial elections in New York. Tom Platt, the party boss, reluctantly backed Roosevelt's candidacy, which virtually assured a Republican victory.

As governor, Theodore Roosevelt worked closely with his

party machine, but made certain to inform the public of his actions, using almost daily press conferences; a technique Roosevelt would often use in his days as president. True to his convictions, Roosevelt continued to exhibit independence from the party machine on several appointments, conservation policies, and control of corporate powers. Roosevelt concluded that the political system was permeated by the influence of irresponsible corporate wealth. He tried to break the power that the alliance of big business and machine politicians exercised over the state legislature (Reichley 1992, 195). Complaints from business followed swiftly. Boss Platt, moving to strengthen his position, got rid of Roosevelt by providing him the post of vice president of the United States in 1900, under McKinley.

Roosevelt was nationally known by this time. When Senator Mark Hanna, the Republican Party Chairman, heard of the proposed vice presidential nomination, he was appalled. Roosevelt, Hanna believed, represented forces within the Republican Party that threatened the victory won at great cost in 1896. McKinley, however, who had Roosevelt in his cabinet just two years earlier, would do nothing to block the move. Despite Hanna's objections, Platt, with help from Quay, another boss of the Republican Party, secured Roosevelt's nomination. "Don't any of you realize," Hanna asked, "that there's only one life between that madman and

the presidency?" (Gould 1991, 8; Reichley 1992, 195). And, on September 6, 1901, an anarchist did shoot and kill President McKinley in Buffalo, New York. A few days later he died and Theodore Roosevelt became the President of the United States.

Immediately after assuming power, Theodore Roosevelt set three goals for himself: to firmly establish Theodore Roosevelt as a national figure, to establish the executive branch as the single most important branch of the federal government, and to make the national government the most important actor in national affairs (Wiebe 1967, 190). Wherever he turned he found the power of individuals or corporations and he marked them as his opponents.

The Republican Party: Between 1894 and 1910 the Republican Party controlled the federal government to a degree rarely known in American political history. Despite the fact that the future Progressive Party was to come from within the Republican Party, the party was consistently hostile to their cause. The Congress, especially the Senate, as noted earlier, was heavily skewed in favor of interests contrary to those of the reformers. Republican leaders did not respond favorably when reformers demanded railroad regulation, waterways expansion, tariff tampering, social welfare legislation or the conservation of natural

resources. To counteract these demands, the party leaders drew the reins even tighter. They appointed, to key committees, members who they knew were opposed to reforms and upon whom they could rely to block such measures immediately; they exercised an especially watchful eye on appropriations that might expand reform activities (Hays 1957, 144).

In the House, a small core of Republicans dominated the proceedings, led by the all-powerful Speaker, "Uncle Joe" Cannon. This crusty old politician exercised vast authority to institute rules of procedures and to appoint committees. Cannon's power enabled him to monitor the federal treasury and oppose every social critic and reformer.

In the Senate, an inner circle of four Republican senators ruled with just as firm a hand, and as great a hostility for change, as marked the House leadership. The four senators who were known as the "Old Guard cabal" were: Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, William Boyd Allison of Iowa, Orville Platt of Connecticut, and John Coit Spooner of Wisconsin, (Filler 1976, 341). After Mark Hanna's death in 1904, the leadership of the business-oriented Republicans in Congress passed to Senate Majority Leader Nelson Aldrich.

Roosevelt tried to work in concert with the Republican leadership in Congress to achieve passage of moderate economic reform and had some marginal success. But he had

difficulties in introducing changes because the four senators headed important committees in the Senate. The challenge was to reach citizens who could directly pressure their state legislatures and the Senate through their representatives. The call for direct election of senators became an imperative for Progressives (Filler 1976, 341). Roosevelt used his influence to break down this resistance to change. In 1902, he initiated the Northern Securities case, the first major successful prosecution of a "tight combination" under the Sherman Antitrust Act (Gould 1989, 47-53). He intervened and threatened to take over the coal industry if management was unable to reach a settlement with workers. It was the first time a President sided with organized labor.

In 1904, Theodore Roosevelt, who had succeeded to the presidency, achieved a truly massive popular vote majority of nearly 20 percentage points over the Democratic candidate. Roosevelt carried every state outside the former Confederacy except Maryland and Kentucky (Reichley 1992, 184). This victory in his own right made Roosevelt more confident and vigorous in pursuing his agenda.

President Roosevelt modernized and expanded the executive branch by creating new agencies and reforming their mode of operation. The most celebrated of the new commissions was The Committee on Department Methods, which

was established in 1905. James Garfield and Gifford Pinchot were the closest advisors to the President on those issues. Garfield himself was first nominated commissioner of corporations; a new post which followed closely the conduct of the big trusts and advised as to the desired regulations. Pinchot, as chief forester, was responsible for carrying out Roosevelt's conservation policies. During Roosevelt's first term, Pinchot doubled the acreage of national reserves, avoiding further development of land and exhaustion of natural resources.

The major legislative efforts, throughout Roosevelt's days as president, were directed at regulation of the railroad companies. In 1906, after a long struggle with the Senate, the Hepburn bill passed, which gave the Interstate Commerce Commission more power to regulate railroad fares to protect consumers. During the same year, the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act were passed (Gould 1991, 154-64). Roosevelt made it clear, to leaders of the business community, that while he aimed to eliminate what he regarded as abuses in the economic system, he did not plan to attempt fundamental change of the system itself (Reichley 1992, 196; Sklar 1988, 343).

The President's prestige increased during 1906 because he successfully negotiated a peaceful end to the Russo-Japanese War, for which he received the Nobel Prize.

Roosevelt's public popularity remained high while he remained in office, but, his relationship with his own party grew strained. The President's standing with congressional Republicans worsened as the end of his term neared.

Roosevelt became more committed to the ideas of progressivism, while his legislative adversaries retained the conservatism that many older GOP members shared (Gould 1991, 226).

During his last address to the nation as President, on January 31, 1908, Roosevelt outlined the reforms that he would advocate after leaving office. This address indicated how progressive the President had grown. His last message was very irritating to the Republicans and his relations with Capitol Hill deteriorated to mutual antipathy. "That fellow at the other end of the Avenue," said Joe Cannon, "wants everything, from the birth of Christ to the death of the devil." Roosevelt complained too: "The ruling clique in the Senate, the House, and the National Committee, seem to regard every concession to decency as merely a matter of bargain and sale with me, which I must pay for in some way or fashion" (Gould 1991, 277).

Toward the end of his second term, Roosevelt picked his Secretary of War, Howard Taft, as his successor. Roosevelt could surely have been renominated and reelected. But, he promised in 1904 that he would not run again and he was a

man of principles, as well as being committed to democratic transitions and institutions. Roosevelt was quite aware of the power of the President. He felt strongly that the efficiency of the United States government and perhaps its very existence depended upon an exceedingly strong executive. But Roosevelt also recognized dangers to a democracy in granting the executive such unqualified authority as he desired to see reside in the presidency. His solution was to make the power terminable, to follow the two-term tradition as it had been handed down to him by his predecessors in the office (Mowry 1958, 228). Taft had promised Roosevelt that he would retain his appointees and continue his policies. At the end of 1907, Taft said "I agree heartily and earnestly with the policies which have come to be known as the Roosevelt policies." "He (Taft) and I view public questions exactly alike," Roosevelt said in June of 1908 (Gould 1991, 272; 285).

Taft was elected on a campaign that promised continuity, but during the transition period, from his elections to his inauguration, Taft broke many of his promises to Roosevelt. Taft did not keep a portion of Roosevelt's secretaries in his own cabinet and seemed more cooperative with the conservative wing of the party than Theodore would have found necessary. By inauguration day, the relationship between the two men reflected the discord

that already existed within the Republican Party.

The Insurgents: During Roosevelt's second term, the congressional Old Guard was increasingly challenged by progressive Republicans like Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, elected to the Senate in 1905, and George Norris of Nebraska, elected to the House in 1902. They came to power in their own states on the strength of an anti-railroad movement, substantial tariff reform, along with other sectional economic measures. Though Roosevelt looked on the Progressives as his natural constituency, he took pains to remain on good terms with the conservative leadership. He felt close to them as a reformer and in light of their common enemy within the Republican Party. But, he did not agree with the reformers on some very important policy issues. La Follette, for example, pushed for the enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act wholeheartedly. Roosevelt did not object the size of business but thought rather, that they should be regulated and punished in cases of unfair or corrupt conduct.

By 1909, the midwestern Progressives comprised sizable opposition group within the Republican Party and were known as the insurgents. They were led by a group of senators, La Follette of Wisconsin, Cummins and Dolliver of Iowa, Clapp and Nelson of Minnesota, and Bristow of Kansas. The rebels

represented a well-organized challenge to the party leadership. Parallel to this, progressive strength among congressional Republicans continued to grow. La Follette, Beveridge, and Cummins regularly picked fights with Aldrich. In the House, a similar challenge to the established power emerged in March 1910, when George Norris led almost forty House Republicans to join the Democratic minority in a successful revolt against Cannon. The insurgent coalition changed the House rules, drastically reducing the powers of the Speaker. Cannon offered to resign, but the majority voted to keep him on in his weakened office (Hays 1957, 146; Reichley 1992, 197).

When Taft opposed the Progressives' efforts to reduce the tariff, the midwesterners sought every opportunity to embarrass the administration. In the winter of 1909-10, during the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy they sided with Pinchot and the others against Taft.

The Pinchot - Ballinger Affair: This is perhaps the most complicated political story of the era. It is worthwhile recounting the affair because it brings together several elements and personalities which were very important during the Progressive Era and eventually led to the open break within the Republican Party, which in turn, led to Theodore Roosevelt's return to politics. Gifford Pinchot, a

life-long friend of Roosevelt, was a professional forester who studied in Germany and France. Starting in 1898, he was the head of the Forestry Bureau of the Federal Government, a position he held for 12 years.

Pinchot brought many of his friends into the national government and pushed for many of the reforms carried out during Roosevelt's Presidency. This group was very much responsible for the application of scientific methods of management and bureaucratic methods in the work of the government and for the hiring of experts (Wiebe 1967; Penick 1968).

Pinchot often praised Roosevelt for his commitment to the preservation of natural resources. For Pinchot, conservation was the greatest contribution Theodore Roosevelt gave the world (Pinchot 1978). But, if there was a single person who contributed more than any other to the growth of the conservation movement and to Roosevelt's policy, then undoubtedly it was Gifford Pinchot.

Upon the departure of Roosevelt from Washington in 1908, there were fears that his successor, Taft, was not as committed to conservation, despite his pledge to keep Roosevelt's appointments in place and to maintain the conservation policies.

By the end of 1906, Roosevelt had withdrawn Alaskan coal and timber lands from further entry, and some 900

claims had been staked out. Among these hundreds of claims there was a group of 33 claims that were known as the Cunningham claims, which amounted to some five thousand acres of land.

The firm of J.P. Morgan and Co., and the Guggenheims formed the Alaska Syndicate. Among its holdings in Alaska, were copper mines, a steamship company, and a salmon-packing concern (Pinchot 1978, 134; Strum 1984, 132). The syndicate was interested in purchasing the Alaskan land.

When Richard Ballinger took charge of the General Land Office in March 1907, not a single claim had been carried to the point where a certificate of entry was issued. At about the same time, however, members of the Cunningham group suddenly paid the fees. A field worker of the National Land Office, Louis Glavis, became suspicious that the government land was about to be improperly cleared for private ownership. Glavis began investigating whether the Cunningham claims were faithfully entered, and whether there was an agreement among all 33 members of the group to cooperate after getting the clearing (the tracts of land were supposed to be sold to individuals for individual use!). Glavis was convinced that there was such an agreement before the entry, and as such the claims were illegal. Glavis informed Ballinger of his suspicions, but Ballinger dismissed them.

In 1907, Ballinger left Washington and went back home to Seattle, where he practiced law. Among his clients was the Alaska Syndicate. However, it was but a short time till Ballinger returned to Washington where, in 1909, he was appointed Interior Secretary by Taft.

Ballinger moved quickly and announced that certain coal fields in Alaska were cleared for sale. He asked Glavis to immediately submit his report on the matter. Glavis insisted that he needed more time and, in an act of desperation, he contacted Pinchot and sought his assistance as Chief Forester, reasoning that the Alaskan land was part of a national forest. Pinchot met with Glavis who presented him with the material and Pinchot referred him to the President. Taft investigated the matter, conferred with Ballinger, and instructed the Attorney General to submit a report. Wickersham, the Attorney General, concluded in a report to Taft, that "Glavis' actions appear to have been founded upon a wholly exaggerated sense of his own importance," and recommended his dismissal from government for filing a dishonest statement (Pinchot 1978, 151). Taft instructed the removal of Glavis but immediately wrote Pinchot to assure him that he was not supporting Ballinger over him. But, Pinchot remained skeptical, having long suspected that Taft would undo Roosevelt's conservation policies. Taft asked his secretary, Ballinger, to keep

Pinchot out of any public controversy because he feared that the conservationist camp would take Pinchot's side.

Ballinger and Pinchot could no longer work together and it was clear that one or the other would have to leave Taft's government. Further, Pinchot made it crystal clear to Taft that he would not resign.

The act that exacerbated the controversy was the publication of Glavis' story in the Collier's, on November 1909. The issue, in which the article appeared, along with a sensational cover, posed the question, "Are the Guggenheims in charge of the Department of Interior?" The publicity of the affair was soon followed by cries for investigation.

When Congress convened for its new session early in December 1909, it was a clear that the Ballinger-Pinchot dispute would need to be investigated. When this happened, both Glavis and Pinchot needed lawyers. It was reported, moreover, that Ballinger was proposing to sue Collier's magazine for \$1 million for libel (Pinchot 1978, 155). Norman Hapgood, the editor, and Robert Collier, owner of the magazine, joining with Glavis, hired Louis Brandeis to represent them at the congressional hearing.

A committee of twelve members, six members from the House and six from the Senate would conduct the hearing. In a dramatic skirmish, the Insurgents and the Democrats, aided

by a few regular Republicans friendly to Pinchot, pushed through an amendment providing that the six members of the investigation committee from the House should be chosen by election in the House rather than by Speaker Cannon. Since Cannon had no sympathy for Pinchot, the conservationists feared that appointments he made would be heavily weighted with Taft's supporters.

In response to a demand from the Senate, the parties to the dispute submitted statements. Pinchot attached a letter in which he attacked the firing of Glavis and argued that the issue goes beyond conservation to the honest and democratic character of the government. Taft responded by firing Pinchot (Strum 1984, 133). Republican Senator Nelson of Minnesota, the chairman of the committee, was against both Pinchot and Glavis and consistently refused Brandeis' requests for documents. After five long months of hearings, Brandeis uncovered the fact that the report prepared by the Attorney General and followed by a letter of Taft exonerating Ballinger and approving the firing of Glavis, was actually prepared by Ballinger's people in the Interior Office and not by the Attorney General. Thus, it became clear, high level officials were apparently lying.

The committee voted seven to five to exonerate the administration. Brandeis and the others were not surprised, but they kept up the fight in the public arena in the media.

The press reports had stirred such fierce public criticism of Ballinger that he subsequently resigned.

The 1910 Congressional Elections: The Pinchot-Ballinger controversy clearly did harm to Taft, to Ballinger, and the Republican Party in general. Theodore Roosevelt returned in 1910 to the U.S. after a year-long hunting trip to Africa and Europe. He was not enthusiastic about causing a rift with Taft, in fact, he cautioned Pinchot to be mild on Taft. Roosevelt felt that Taft would run in the 1912 elections, and warned Pinchot not to make his support for Taft's nomination impossible (Finchot, 1978, 192). But the break was unavoidable and eventually led to Roosevelt's return to politics. James Garfield, who was the Commissioner of Corporations and the Secretary of Interior under Roosevelt, wrote in 1912,

By 1910 the split in the Republican Party had reached such proportions taken with open hostility of President Taft toward the Progressives that the Progressives had to fight -- and fight effectively -- or die; had to forge the Progressive sentiment into an enduring political weapon or lose the advance of a decade (Gable 1974, 8).

In fact, already in 1910, Gifford Pinchot and James Garfield were talking about forming a new party, and ignoring

Roosevelt request to the contrary. Taft was too weak to prevent the open break that developed between the Old Guard and their opponents in his party. Faced with the open revolt against him, however, Taft and some of the Old Guard of the Republicans moved to purge and fight the Progressives (Wiebe 1967, 212-3). The president campaigned against progressive members of his party in the congressional elections of 1910. Theodore Roosevelt could not stay on the sideline, so he campaigned for his fellow Progressives. The Progressives fared much better than conservative Republicans. Progressives won victories in Indiana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Idaho, California, Washington, and New Hampshire. The Republicans lost 57 congressional seats, 9 state legislatures and, as a result, lost 13 senators. The Democrats, profiting from Republican division and a moderate downturn in the economy, made sweeping gains in House races; with 56 added seats, they were able to form the majority for the first time since 1894. In the Senate, the Republicans retained control but with a greatly reduced majority.

After the elections, 47 representatives declared themselves unbound by the positions of the Republican caucus, and 13 senators demanded recognition as a separate minority of the Republican Party. Prominent Progressives organized as the National Progressive Republican League (Rosenstone et. al., 1984, 83-4).

The New Nationalism: While touring the country campaigning for fellow progressives, Roosevelt's New Nationalism was articulated. The most famous speech was given on August 31, 1910 in Osawatomie, Kansas. Never before was Roosevelt so coherent, so complete, so unequivocal as he was in Osawatomie when he presented his principles and his philosophy of progressivism. He outlined his vision for American government and society, emphasized the need for federal regulation of corporations and of natural resources including the preservation of human resources, and the various methods of direct democracy, social justice and labor rights. In fact, the platform of the Bull Moose and Roosevelt's "confession of faith" at the Bull Moose's convention, (described in the next chapter) were a reiteration of the Osawatomie speech.

The term "New Nationalism" was coined by Herbert Croly in his 1909 book, The Promise of American Life. It meant the use of "Hamiltonian" means to attain "Jeffersonian" ends. It urged a strong national government to fulfill the needs of the states and the masses.

The New Nationalism reflected the evolution of the Progressive Movement from local and regional concerns, to a more comprehensive and nationalist view of American society. Roosevelt explained what should be the national priorities by quoting Lincoln:

Labor is prior to, and independent of, capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital and deserves much the higher consideration.

Realizing the seemingly radical tone and form of his message, Roosevelt explained that, "If that remark was original with me, I should be even more strongly denounced as a Communist agitator than I shall anyhow." The Boston Traveler concluded that Roosevelt's speech had roused his followers to enthusiasm and his enemies to frenzy. But the more conservative New York Commercial wrote, "His new doctrines is more and worse than rank socialism -- it is communism at the limit" (Gable 1978, 11).

Throughout 1911, there were no indications that Roosevelt would run for president. Roosevelt himself in 1910-1911 discouraged any talks of a new party. After the elections of 1910 Taft was trying to appease the Progressives before the upcoming elections of 1912, but by then the Progressives were associated with every group in the nation that the Republican leadership had thwarted over the previous decade. Progressives insisted that Taft would not be renominated. The insurgents leaders of the National Progressive Republican League, in fact, sought the defeat of Taft's bid for renomination in 1912 (Mowry 1946, 99; Rosenstone et. al., 1984, 81-3).

La Follette's Candidacy: La Follette fought his way up through the old convention system and took control of the Wisconsin Republican Party. Elected governor of Wisconsin in 1900, and then elected to the United States Senate in 1905, he became the acknowledged leader of western Progressives (Reichley 1992, 198: Strum 1984). The Republican Party, however, never truly welcomed the Progressives and La Follette. When in 1904, the duly elected Robert La Follette "progressive" delegates from Wisconsin appeared at the Republican National Convention, they were refused seats; the convention admitted a rebel "stalwart" faction instead. In 1908 the convention decisively turned down a Wisconsin-sponsored platform that would have committed the party to many of the midwestern-sponsored reforms (Hays 1957, 146).

In 1911, when La Follette formed the National Progressive Republican League, he also indicated his intention of seeking the Republican presidential nomination against Taft. Like the platform of the Wisconsin Progressives in 1897, the platform of the National Progressive Republican League concentrated on political and governmental reforms: direct election of United States senators, direct primaries for the nomination of all elected officials, adoption at the state level of initiative, referendum and recall.

The Ballinger-Pinchot affair brought Senator La Follette a close friend and ally, Louis Brandeis (Strum 1984, 138). In December 1910 La Follette advised Brandeis of the creation of the National Progressive Republican League and invited him to join them. Brandeis did not agree with the moves for direct democracy but did approve of the general philosophy and he joined others in the league (Strum 1984, 219). Brandeis, who later was very instrumental in passing progressive legislation during Wilson's administration, joined La Follette and helped him in his bid for the Republican nomination.

La Follette, exhausted physically, continued to campaign and was self-destructed. In February of 1912, after a long, rambling speech before the Periodical Publishers Association in Philadelphia, he collapsed. Roosevelt's people put out the word that La Follette suffered a nervous breakdown, which helped lead to Roosevelt's candidacy (Reichley 1992, 199; Strum 1984). La Follette refused to withdraw his candidacy despite the advice of his close friends and family. When it became clear that Theodore Roosevelt was going to run for the presidency, virtually all of La Follette's early supporters deserted him.

In a speech in Cleveland late in February, Roosevelt dramatically declared: "My hat is in the ring". The former

president was seeking the renomination of his old party. Roosevelt presented himself as a centrist in the Republican Party, between the passivity of Taft and the radicalism of La Follette.

The Republican Primaries - The Open Break: In the Republican primaries, Roosevelt won 236 delegates to 41 for La Follette (mostly from Wisconsin) and only 34 for Taft. But only 20 percent of the convention delegates were chosen through primaries which were held in 12 states. During the convention that followed it was clear that neither Taft nor Roosevelt had enough honestly selected delegates to secure nomination. There were 254 contested seats. Taft, through the control of the Republican national committee, ensured that the contested cases were decided in his favor. The committee awarded 19 to Roosevelt, giving the majority to Taft (De Witt 1968, 80; Gable 1974, 4; Pinchot 1958).

Roosevelt and his supporters were outraged and would not accept the decision; believing that the nomination was "stolen" from them. Roosevelt issued a statement which was read on the floor:

Under the direction and with the encouragement of Mr. Taft, the majority of the national committee by the so-called steam-roller methods . . . stole eighty or ninety delegates, putting on the temporary roll-call a sufficient number of fraudulent delegates to defeat the legally

expressed will of the people and to substitute a dishonest for honest majority.

Roosevelt further requested that "the men elected as Roosevelt delegates will now decline to vote on any matter before the convention" (Gable 1974, 3).

The remaining proceedings of the GOP convention were quiet and dull as the conservative platform was adopted and Taft and Sherman were renominated. The vote for Taft was 561, Roosevelt 107, La Follette 41, others 19, and 343 delegates refused to vote.

In a different hall in Chicago, the Orchestra Hall, a large crowd of people swarmed in anticipation for Roosevelt's next step. The people who gathered in the Orchestra Hall were a cross-section of the Progressive Movement. There were municipal reformers, academics, progressive senators, mayors, social workers and other professionals who served in the Roosevelt administration.

There was also US Steel Director George Perkins, who was a former partner of J.P. Morgan. Perkins was the financial manager of Roosevelt for the presidency. There was also newspaper magnate Frank Munsey. Both met with Roosevelt in his hotel room and assured him that should he run independently they would foot the bill, saying, "Colonel, we will see you through." Roosevelt announced his willingness to lead the Progressive cause.

Roosevelt took to the floor of the hall, where many were waiting to hear from him. He reviewed the Progressive principles and claimed that the contest had become one that could not be settled along the old party lines. He called upon his followers to help in building a new Progressive party, and sent them home to get organized and come back for the official Progressive convention to be held two months later in Chicago.

Chapter Four

The Political Experience of the Bull Moose

The Bull Moose Convention: The course of political events in 1912 was destined to change dramatically with the break of the Progressives from the Republican Party and the establishment of an independent party.

In early August of 1912, the Progressives held their convention in Chicago. The delegations were composed of as varied and dedicated a group of reformers as had ever met in the country. Suffragettes, social workers, urban planners, conservationists, political reformers, and idealists of all strains and colors were represented. The platform as well as the candidate were very much to their liking.

The exuberant enthusiasm of this meeting for its leader has rarely been approached in the history of American politics. Harold Ickes described the party as the outward expression of love and admiration, almost an idolatry that the overwhelming majority of the members felt toward their leader (Ickes 1941, 329). Newspaper reporters testified that they had seen nothing like it. Roosevelt's appearance before the convention excited a spontaneous standing ovation

of **fifty-two** minutes, and his closing words "We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord" brought the body to an emotional state (Pinchot 1958, 170-1; Mowry 1971, 2153).

As Roosevelt approached the floor, he declared that he entered the campaign feeling "strong as a Bull Moose" -- giving the Progressive Party its nickname, the Bull Moose Party (Reichley 1992, 200). Roosevelt's address to the party convention was called a "Confession of Faith". The tone of the speech was one of righteousness and that of an underdog. The platform Roosevelt presented, contained plans for a democratic welfare state that was not to materialize in the United States for another quarter century; during Franklin Roosevelt's years.

A more democratic state was to be achieved by an easier method of amending the constitution, by the universal use of direct primaries, by the initiative and referendum, by equal suffrage of the sexes, by popular referenda on laws declared unconstitutional by the state courts, by the curbing of judicial power and by strict regulation of electoral procedures (Mowry 1971, 2152).

Further social justice was to be attained by national prohibition of child labor, by the regulation of minimum wages and maximum hours for women, by a workmen's compensation act, and by a system of social insurance against sickness, unemployment, and old age. The small

businessman was to be protected by a strong national regulation of interstate corporations, the investor by governmental supervision of the issuance of securities, the farmer by the reestablishment of a country life commission, and the public in general by the consolidation of all existing health agencies into a "single national health service." The funds to pay for such a regulatory state was to come from an income and some inheritance taxes.

Roosevelt reiterated the *raison d'être* of the Progressives while attacking the other parties.

The old parties are husks, with no real soul within either, divided on artificial lines, boss-ridden and privilege-controlled, each a jumble of incongruous elements, and neither daring to speak out wisely and fearlessly what should be said on the vital issues of the day. This new movement is a movement of truth, sincerity, and wisdom, a movement which proposes to put at the service of all our people the collective power of the people, through their Governmental agencies, alike in the Nation and in several States.

It is wicked as well as foolish to longer refuse to face the real issues of the day. Only by so facing them can we go forward; and to do this we must break up the old party organizations and obliterate the old cleavage lines on the dead issues inherited from fifty years ago. Our fight is a fundamental fight against both of the old corrupt party machines, for both are under the dominion of the plunder league of the professional politicians who are controlled and sustained by the great beneficiaries of privilege and reaction (Mowry 1971, 2220).

Roosevelt went on and replied to the critics who argued that the Progressive ideas of direct democracy were radical

and would bring about anarchy.

The first essential in the Progressive program is the right of the people to rule. I do not mean that we shall abandon representative government; on the contrary, I mean that we shall devise methods by which our government shall become really representative. To use such measure as the initiative, referendum, and recall indiscriminately . . . in all kind of occasions would undoubtedly cause disaster; but events have shown that at present our institutions are not representative - at any rate in many states, and sometimes in the nation - and that we cannot wisely afford to let this condition of things remain longer uncorrected (Mowry 1971, 2222-3).

Finally, Roosevelt pointed to his own fitness for the job, by experience and by popular support, and his superior candidacy over Wilson and Taft.

I have not come to this way of thinking from closet study, or as a mere matter of theory; I have been forced to it by a long experience with the actual conditions of our political life. A few years ago, for instance, there was very little demand in this country for presidential primaries...In the contest which culminated six weeks ago in this city I speedily found that my chance was at minimum in any state where I could not get expression of the people themselves in the primaries. I found that if I could appeal to the rank and file of the Republican voters, I could generally win, whereas, if I had to appeal to the political caste--which includes the most noisy defenders of the old system--I generally lost (Mowry 1971, 2224).

As expected Roosevelt was nominated and Hiram Johnson, the Progressive governor of California, was nominated as his vice presidential running mate.

There were almost no problems during the convention. The only controversy erupted around one of the most important issues of the time, the antitrust plank. Roosevelt was strongly in favor of governmental regulation of trusts and distinguished between bad and good trusts. However, an important group were in favor of dissolution of trusts through the Sherman Act. Roosevelt was supported by most of the eastern Progressives, including his two financial backers Frank Munsey and George Perkins. The opposition included most of the westerners and the two Pinchot brothers, Amos and Gifford.

The Resolution Committee that prepared the platform voted to keep both sides' versions on the trust issue. However, the Sherman provision was deleted by Roosevelt and Perkins and was later reincorporated without their knowledge by their opponents. The Progressive platform was printed as the Resolutions Committee approved it, with both regulatory and the Sherman planks included. After the convention Roosevelt ordered the Sherman provision to be deleted (Pinchot 1958; Gable 1978; Mowry 1958). Ultimately, the antitrust plank issue would cause a serious rift and significant distrust between the two contending factions in the new party.

The Campaign of 1912: The 1912 Presidential elections were unique in the political history of the United States. It not only witnessed the largest third party ever but also the strongest showing by the Socialist Party. This election indicated the intense division within the country and the seriousness of the issues present.

The Socialist Party: The Progressive Era witnessed the rise of the Socialist Party, which was organized in 1901 from a number of former factions. The Socialist Party of America doubled its membership between 1904-1908 and within the next four years tripled its number to reach a peak of 117,984 members in 1912. Eugene Debs, the Socialist candidate for President, polled 897,000 votes, 6 percent of the total popular vote cast and the greatest in the history of the party. Five times between 1900 and 1920 he ran for the presidency. And in 1920, Debs' last attempt, while in federal prison for violating the sedition provisions of the Espionage Act, he polled more than 900,000 votes (Hays 1957, 151).

The Democratic Party: Wilson's nomination greatly diminished any hope Roosevelt may have had for a November victory. Because of the split within the Republican Party, all the Democrats had to do to win was to hold together most

loyal Democrats (Reichley 1984, 201).

The Republican split and the congressional victory of the Democrats in 1910 intensified the contest within the Democratic Party for the 1912 presidential elections. Four candidates and more than thirty ballots were needed to decide the nomination. Woodrow Wilson was a relative newcomer to politics. In 1902 he was selected president of Princeton University and elected governor of New Jersey in 1910. Wilson was the right man because he was attractive to both wings of the Democratic Party: as a governor, he acted as a progressive, while during the campaign he was sufficiently conservative to keep the Southern Democrats and the former Populists at home. The Democratic option became the moderate one. Taft and the Republicans were on the right while the Progressives were pushed to the left of the Democrats.

Wilson was the first candidate since the Civil War to be born and raised in the South. He was also the first Ph.D. to run for president; both a college professor and university president. Despite his achievements, Wilson was not a very impressive figure or speaker. His appeal was largely to the moral and ethical fabric of man, he often talked of visions, purposes, responsibilities and ideals. His selection by the Democrats was clearly a response to the nature of the times and to Roosevelt's candidacy. "Had the

times not been what they were; a product of progressivism's decade-long emphasis upon duty and righteousness, Wilson might never have been nominated" (Mowry 1971, 2155).

Many perceived the Democratic platform to be progressive, but it was of the Populist-Bryanite tradition, rather than the type of progressivism that emerged strongly in the urban centers and was represented by the Bull Moose Party. The progressive elements in the Democratic Party included support for the income tax, the direct elections of senators, and a promise for jury trial for contempt cases growing out of labor disputes. The latter brought Democrats the support of labor. Yet, the dominant parts were of the Populist tradition, against big business and monopolies and in favor of economic freedom for the small man. Many concluded that in the contest which people perceived to be between two progressives, Roosevelt stood little chance (Rosenstone et. al., 1984, 86).

The campaign itself was anticlimactic after the nomination process. Roosevelt was deprived of his skills as an orator because the tone of the campaign was set by his competitors. Taft was the major contributing factor, he did not campaign much and limited his activities to writing few letters for publication. Privately he described the Progressive Party as "a religious cult with a fakir at the head of it," not once in his statements did he descend to

personal acrimony against either of his opponents (Mowry 1971, 2155).

Taft's campaign suffered from lack of funds as many potential donors were pessimistic about his prospects and withdrew their support. Just a week before the elections the Vice Presidential nominee, James Sherman, had died. As a replacement, and possibly as a reinforcement, the National Committee selected Nicholas Butler, the president of Columbia University. Nonetheless, the defeat of Taft was certain. Roosevelt perceiving this, responded during the campaign when asked about Taft, "I never discuss dead issues" (Gable 1978, 112).

On the Democratic front, Wilson also refused to indulge in personalities with either Taft or Roosevelt and kept his campaign on an intellectual and dignified level. He repeatedly refused to discuss the many specific reform issues presented by the Progressives. All he was willing to do is label them, "well-intentioned but impossible of achievement." There is yet today, an ongoing debate between historians and political scientists whether or not Wilson was, in his own right, a progressive, before his elections. Regardless of the response, which will be discussed later, Wilson refused, for example, to endorse women's right to vote, although progressives had long fought for it. In a meeting where an ardent feminist demanded that he take a

position on women's suffrage, he continued answering that the question belonged to the realm of state politics, until at last the objector was escorted from the hall by guards. Interestingly, two of Wilson's daughters were active suffragettes (Heckscher 1991, 234).

Despite the dignified debate between the candidates, the program as well as the personal character were under attack during the campaign and excited violent remarks from supporters of his two opponents. Senator Sutherland (Republican) commented that the Bull Moose platform was compounded of vicious vagaries and impractical political nostrums such as had never before been collected "outside of the violent wards of a madhouse." The Times predicted that such a program would lead to a fourth term, then to dictatorship, and then to monarchy. The New York World called it a change from "English law to the Roman law which has been the inspiration of a thousand tyrants." The New York Sun did not doubt that "if the mad *Mahdi* of Oyster Bay broke into the White House again it would be his permanently."

Perhaps such wild talk was in part responsible for what happened in Milwaukee on October 14. Roosevelt was shot by a madman while on his way to make a speech. The bullet was deflected by his eyeglasses case and inflicted a shallow wound. Against medical advice, the Colonel insisted on

going through with the speech; waving with a bloody handkerchief. The incident barely incapacitated his vigorous campaign (Mowry 1971, 2157; Gable 1974, 57).

The 1912 Election's Results: As expected, Wilson and the Democrats won the elections. Roosevelt came in second bringing about Taft's bitter defeat. However, even though the Republicans were crushed, Progressives were devastated throughout the country. Wilson won the vast majority of the electoral college with 435 electors, Roosevelt received a disappointing 88 and Taft with 8. The results of the popular vote were much less dramatic: Wilson 6,293,120; Roosevelt 4,119,582; Taft 3,485,082, Debs 900,672 (Pinchot 1958, 182).

Wilson was clearly not the choice of the majority, with only 42 percent of the popular votes. Though it is common in a three-way contest to win without a majority of the popular vote, Wilson was even less popular than his party was when Bryan was the candidate. In fact in each of his three elections Bryan had polled more popular votes than Wilson.⁹ It is clear that many who preferred Bryan in 1896, 1900, and 1908, had now voted either for Roosevelt or for

⁹ 1896 - 46.7%,
1900 - 45.5%,
1908 - 43.0%, (Asher 1988, 365).

Debs.

The Democrats were also victorious in Congress and after 1912, they held solid majorities in both the Senate and the House for the first time since the Civil War. The Senate count was: 51 Democrats, 44 Republicans and 1 Progressive. In the House: 291 Democrats, 127 Republicans, 14 Progressive (Mowry 1971, 2164). The split within the Republican Party and the dynamic of a three-way contest explains much of the Democratic victory (Rosenstone et. al., 1984; Ickes 1941).

The Voters: Since polls based on scientific methods of sampling did not exist at the time the analysis is naturally incomplete. However, a few things can be inferred from the gross returns. Wilson's main strength was in the Solid South and the Border States. The Democratic candidate failed to secure a majority in any state outside the old Confederacy. Wilson's second greatest source of support came from Bryan's areas such as Iowa and Nevada.

Roosevelt's main center of strength lay along the Pacific coast and the midwestern states -- except for Wisconsin where La Follette secretly endorsed Wilson -- voted for the Democrats.

The city voters clearly favored Roosevelt, the Progressive leader polled the largest vote in the first

three, and in eight of the ten largest cities of the country. Another interesting group was the women, one million women voted in the 1912 election for the first time. Because of Roosevelt outright endorsement of women's right to vote and Wilson's refusal to take a stand on the question, it is probable, though not certain, that the Progressive candidate won a large share of the new feminine vote (Mowry 1971, 2165).

The Progressives After 1912: Despite the strong showing in the elections, Roosevelt was discouraged by his defeat. A month after the elections he wrote in a letter to an English friend,

What the future of the Progressive Party will be, nobody can say At present, however, I do not see how the party can triumph under me, but I will have to take certain interest in it until a new man of sufficient power comes along (Pinchot 1958, 182).

Roosevelt did take interest and kept very busy traveling across the country lecturing to Bull Moose's branches which seemed to be springing everywhere. He was also involved in the organizational work which began in earnest after the elections of 1912, and wrote several articles published by the Progressive Service.

The Progressive Service was the most elaborately

structured division of the national party organization. It was charged with the tasks of educating the public on the issues and assisting legislators and party leaders with information, research, and legislation. All the planks of the 1912 platform were to be translated into specific programs and bills, while the voters were to be converted to progressivism through pamphlets, lectures, and other educational techniques. The Service was divided into two bureaus and four departments. The bureau of Education and the Legislative Reference bureau. The four departments were: of Social and Industrial Justice, Conservation, Popular Government, and Cost of Living and Corporation Control. Each bureau and department, in turn, had its own committees and Divisions. Distinguished academics headed the bureaus and the committees, Professor Samuel McCune Lindsay chaired the Bureau of Education, John Dewey headed the Public Education Problems committee, Dean William Draper Lewis was the chair of the Legislative Reference bureau. Among the latter's members were: Gifford Pinchot, Jane Addams, Charles Merriam, and Walter Weyl (Gable 1978, 165-6). Frances Kellor was the chair of the general Board of the Progressive Service. By July 1913, twelve states organized state services modeled after the national model. By June of 1914, the number had grown to 21 states with such services. The idea was to unite the many separated

organizations into a single, nationalist structure. It was the ultimate expression of the desire of many; social workers and reform-minded academics who wished to move from fragmented and specialized social concerns and nonpartisan reform to partisan involvement and a comprehensive approach to the problems of society. In April of 1913, the Service's Legislative Reference bureau held a joint meeting in Washington with the Progressive Congressmen and adopted sixteen measures that were agreed upon as the "Progressive Congressional Program." Each measure was assigned to a congressman and an expert from the service worked together to write the bill. These measures had no chance of passing, but the Progressives had hoped that the path followed in many states would be followed in Washington too: the new party pointing the way for reform legislation resembling Progressive proposals (Gable 1978, 175). The Service was almost a "shadow government," and was the final innovation of the Bull Moose.

During the 1913 elections, the Bull Moose scored some victories and the overall feeling seemed to indicate the permanence of the Progressive Party, or so the Political Science Quarterly concluded after surveying the returns of the elections (Gable 1978, 180).

From the fall of 1912 on, George Perkins, the chairperson of the Progressive Party National Executive

Committee, took upon himself to reorganize the party toward the 1916 presidential election. This was to the dismay of many in the party opposed to Perkins as a consequence of his position on the trusts and for representing the interests the party was supposed to fight (Ickes 1941, 308).¹⁰ Amos and Gifford Pinchot, among others, tried to convince Roosevelt to appoint someone else as chairperson of their party executive committee. They were convinced that the party would recover financially from the withdrawal of Perkins and other "Wall Streeters". But to no avail, Roosevelt in a lengthy letter to Amos Gifford replied:

I feel that the whole assault on him has been not only unjustifiable . . . the spirit which prompts the assaults upon Perkins is the spirit which if it becomes dominant in the party means that from that moment it is an utter waste of time to expect any good from the party whatsoever, and that the party will at once sink, and deservedly sink, into an unimportant adjunct to the Debs movement (the Socialists) or some similar movement (Pinchot 1958, 198).

After much bickering within the party Perkins continued to run its affairs. Roosevelt spent most of 1913 abroad touring South America and Spain, and returned to the United States only in June 1914, just before the by-year elections.

¹⁰ Perkins, the former partner of J.P. Morgan, continued his membership on the boards two of the largest trusts at the time: International Harvester and U.S. Steel.

The 1914 Elections: During the campaign of 1914 for the House Roosevelt was very active on behalf of Progressive candidates. Roosevelt was still very popular and was asked to campaign in more places than he could attend. He delivered over 110 speeches in fifteen states. He reshaped his New Nationalism: attacked the antitrust policy of Wilson and insisted that what was needed was a strong federal trade commission to regulate trust rather than trust busting. The social issues were reiterated: prohibition of child labor, minimum wage and the improvement of working condition, direct democracy and women suffrage (Gable 1978, 220).

Throughout the campaign, Roosevelt's primary attacks were directed at Wilson and the Democrats. It was not clear whether or not it would help the Progressive, however. "Your anti-Wilson speeches will make more Republican votes than progressive votes," publisher Henry Stoddard had warned Roosevelt in July, ". . . The American people are very practical, and they will take the simplest, surest way to accomplish their purpose, that way is the Republican ticket (Gable 1978, 227).

But Wilson countervailed Roosevelt's attacks. Just weeks before the elections, the President signed two important bills that were demanded by reformers. The Federal Trade Commission bill was signed on September 26, and the Clayton Antitrust Act on October 15. Wilson was

aided by his Progressive advisor, Louis Brandeis. The bill which was written by Brandeis and George Rublee would give much more power to the Trade Commission than Wilson wanted initially. Rublee was a progressive attorney from New York and a friend of Roosevelt who worked on the platform of the Bull Moose in 1912. He was recruited by Brandeis to work on the trade bill (Strum 1984, 202).

The Clayton Antitrust Act was originally supposed to be similar to the trust-busting measures which outlawed most monopolies (the Sherman Act). When the bill came out of Congress it was close to the version of the Progressives. Samuel Gompers, the labor leader, declared the new law as their "Magna Carta." Wilson's New Freedom from 1912 became very similar to Roosevelt's New Nationalism and gravely diminished the electoral appeal of Progressives in 1914. Roosevelt urged the voters not to be fooled by insincere professions of progressivism or reform measures adopted only because of public pressure, but rather, to vote for what they knew was right and to look to their own interests.

The elections were held on November 3, 1914. The Progressives were defeated in every state but California and in many states, came in third. Roosevelt clearly failed to deliver for his fellow Progressives in 1914 (Ickes, 1941, 314).

The Democrats retained their majority in both the House

and the Senate but it was the Republicans who made a major comeback, as Stoddard had warned. The Republicans won several governorships from the Democrats, and in Congress the Democratic margin was reduced from 147 to just 29 (Pinchot 1958; Gable 1978, 223-4).

Wilson's Presidency: Wilson had earned a good reputation by supporting progressive measures, especially when early in his presidency he forced Democratic legislators, against their wishes, to approve the 17th Amendment in 1913 -- the popular election of United States senator (Hays 1957, 150).

The new President, however, did not prove to be the reforming executive which many hoped. Southern Democrats, who had contributed much to Wilson's nomination, and who lacked enthusiasm for urban-oriented reform, reinforced the cautious views of the President. The major progressive legislative achievements of the first Wilson administration - the Underwood Tariff, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Clayton Antitrust Act - were attenuated by southern sectional interests such as lower tariffs.

For Wilson, the primary function of government was to destroy roadblocks to opportunity, not to provide positive services for the American people. In that respect, Wilson was markedly different from the Progressives who sought to

expand the federal government. Facing the elections of 1916, however, Wilson approved some of these same reforms. He could not count on another Republican "family feud" to secure him another victory.

Once again, similar to what happened before the 1914 elections, the administration supported the passage of more Progressive bills, among them: a Farm-Mortgage Credit Act, the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, the Adamson Act, which granted railway operating employees the eight-hour day, and a federal workmen's compensation measure (Hays 1957, 150). Subsequently observers concluded that: "There is little doubt that he (Wilson) jumped on the progressive bandwagon because he was convinced that a democratic victory might well depend on the votes of social justice advocates" (Link and Leary 1971, 2269).

Politics did dictate many of the progressive measures enacted Wilson, but persuasion had a role too. The person many identified as responsible for the conversion of Wilson into a progressive is Louis Brandeis.

Wilson did not know Brandeis but heard of him. Shortly after his nomination he sent him a note that he was interested in Brandeis's ideas. The two men met for the first time in the summer of 1912, "and although no one realized it at the time, a new alliance and the "New Freedom" were born" (Strum 1984, 196). Brandeis became the

closest advisor of Wilson on matters such as the trust regulation, workers rights. The influence of Brandeis over Wilson was so great that many assumed Wilson to be an original progressive himself. George Mowry pointed out that, nobody in 1912 perceived Wilson as liberal, and he was no threat to the conservatives who embraced him (Mowry 1971, 2165). It was true that one of the reasons Wilson was nominated by the Democratic Party was in response to Roosevelt's candidacy. Mowry suggests that historians who usually depict Wilson's campaign as progressive do it possibly because of the liberal character of the Democratic platform, or because such writers are reading their history backward, inferring the progressive character of Wilson's campaign declarations from his later legislative achievements.

In fact, Wilson's approach to the whole industrial question was confused until he held a long conference with Brandeis in September 1912. Afterward he began to make the distinction between the regulated monopoly which was Roosevelt's idea and regulated competition which he advocated (Mowry 1971, 2162). The conversations with Brandeis and other liberals, brought Wilson to be more tolerant toward social issues. For example, he admitted that government should be more interested in protecting human more than property rights, adopting a theme in

Roosevelt's New Nationalism.

Wilson did not nominate Brandeis to any formal position in his administration, but, after 1916 he appointed him to the Supreme Court. Wilson continued to think of Brandeis as one of the few men on whom he could rely, and when he left the White House in 1920, he was convinced that the Democrats had lost because they had been untrue to progressive principles. Their cooperation lasted until Wilson's death in 1924. Wilson asked Brandeis together with others to help steer the Democratic Party toward progressivism. They put a platform together for the 1924 elections, but Wilson's death in February of 1924 cut short those plans.

The 1916 Presidential Elections: What is next? was the question among many Progressives after 1914. Roosevelt suggested that they simply should sit tight and not do much in the year to come. He urged his followers, "We should hold on to our party integrity and organization." Progressives, nonetheless, worried. Roosevelt seemed more interested in the war in Europe which began in August 1914 than in the Progressive cause. Much of Roosevelt's energy after 1914 was devoted to issues concerning the war and America's preparedness. Roosevelt was very critical of Wilson's foreign policy and he harshly criticized him on the Mexican issue and the war in Europe. In fact, foreign

policy issues provided from the start a severe challenge to the new President. In his inaugural address Wilson had not even mentioned foreign policy (Heckscher 1991, 293). The nation was divided in its feelings about the war in Europe. Many of the progressives were embarrassed by Roosevelt's belligerency and by his attack on Wilson's policy. Roosevelt referred to his opponents as less patriotic and less American (Smith 1985, 489-90).

The Progressive machinery, hamstrung by infighting and a lack of money and patronage, was decaying. Frank Munsey withdrew his backing, leaving Perkins as the only source of financial support, but also a source of controversy in the party, because of his antitrust position.

The Progressives were also split on the question of whether to convene their own nominating convention or to return to the folds of the Republican Party in order to assure an election of a more liberal candidate instead of Taft. Some were worried that if they would maintain the split, they will assure the reelection of Wilson.

In January 1916, the regular Republicans, concerned with Roosevelt's potential for making trouble again, circulated a prospective platform that was "substantially a summary of Roosevelt's politics" (Smith 1985, 490). Perkins began encouraging Roosevelt to believe that the Republicans and the Progressives ought to get together and support the

same candidate, preferably Theodore Roosevelt himself.

Many Progressives hoped that the Republicans, having been taught a lesson in 1912, might render their nomination in 1916 to Theodore Roosevelt. Some Progressives, however, did not believe that the old guard of the Republican Party will allow this to happen. The old guard leadership of the Republican Party, Boise Penrose, Murray Crane, Reed Smoot, Elihu Root, Charles Hilles, and others, would rather see Woodrow Wilson re-elected than agree to support the one man who had the surest chance to defeat him - Theodore Roosevelt (Ickes 1941, 313).

For many of Roosevelt's friends it became clear from his talks and letters that he would like to become a President again, especially in light of the war. He was sure however that the Republican would not nominate him and he did not want to run again in a three-way contest which he believed will result again in Wilson's reelection.

Roosevelt's supporters took upon themselves to speak and worked out an agreement with the Republicans. Roosevelt and the Progressives announced that they would unite with the Republicans if a candidate acceptable to both parties could be found.

The Republicans did not wait. They independently selected Charles Evans Hughes, whom they thought could be satisfactory to the Progressives. Hughes, a moderate

reformer, was the former governor of New York and was an associate justice of the Supreme Court, from which he retired after six years, just before his nomination.

The Progressive's strategy and tactic for the 1916 presidential elections proved wrong, for them, the only accepted candidate was their leader, Roosevelt. The Republicans nominated Hughes. The tactical mistake made by the Progressives however, was their decision to hold their convention exactly at the same time in the same city as the Republicans. Donald Richberg, former director of the Progressive Service, recounted the affair, ". . . The Progressive Party advertised that it would be on a certain corner at a certain time, wearing a red carnation, and that its intentions are matrimonial!" (Gable 1978, 245). A much better strategy for Progressives would have been to hold their convention first, elect their candidate and let the Republican rank and file, as well as its leadership, face the consequences.

The two conventions began in Chicago on June 7, 1916. Roosevelt remained in his house on Long Island, New York, awaiting the developments.

When Bainbridge Colby announced Roosevelt's candidacy, he later described the response of the delegates as a burst of ecstatic cheering and as a: ". . . tornado of sound that welled from the souls of the delegates and shook the rafters

of the auditorium" (Smith 1985, 493). Just a few minutes later the delegates found out that their leader sent a telegram from his home informing them of his decision to decline their nomination. "I am very grateful for the honor you confer on me by nominating me as President. I cannot accept it at this time. . . . Therefore, if you desire an immediate decision, I must decline the nomination."

William Allen White recalled the scene: "Then there was a roar of rage. It was the cry of a broken heart such as no convention ever had uttered in this land before" (Gable 1978 247). Frustrated and disoriented without their leader, many of the Progressives decided to support Hughes. Hughes, the Republican candidate, issued a statement pledging himself to preparedness and progressivism, and Roosevelt endorsed him.

The Progressive National Committee met once again in Chicago on June 26. Roosevelt sent a letter asking them to support Hughes and explained why it would be the right course to take.

It is impossible for us Progressives to abandon our convictions. but we are faced with that fact that as things actually are the Progressive national organization no longer offers the means whereby we can make these convictions effective in our national life. Under such circumstances, our duty is to do the best we can, and not to sulk because our leadership is rejected (Gable 1978, 229).

After long hours of discussion, the committee voted to support Hughes with 32 in favor, 6 against and 9 declining

to vote. The late June Chicago meeting was the last time the Bull Moosers would ever meet.

The majority of the Progressive leaders, Gifford Pinchot, James Garfield, George Perkins, Albert Beveridge, Hiram Johnson, and Harold Ickes, followed their leader back into the Republican Party. A small group remained independent and others followed Wilson who was renominated. Vance McCormick, a progressive, was nominated by Wilson as his campaign manager and made every effort to attract the former Progressives.

Progressives During the Campaign of 1916: Left without their leader, Progressives were wondering what to do. The intellectuals who identified with the Progressives and supported Roosevelt split between the two major parties. "I have come around completely to Wilson," wrote Lippmann to Graham Wallas, "Of course the campaign depends above all on what the former Progressives do. If Wilson can get 20 percent of their votes he will be reelected. . . . Wilson is by far the best leader the Democrats have ever produced." Felix Frankfurter, the future Supreme Court Justice, considered the Republican Party to be the hope for reform. Frankfurter wrote to his friend Morris Cohen that, "I have no illusion about Wilson, I still have a feeling of insecurity about him, but I do think that Hughes and the

Republican campaign have systematically underestimated the impressive achievements of Wilson" (Smith 1985, 496).

The New Republic's members were also divided between Wilson and Hughes, in fact, it was divided between Croly and Lippmann. By September 1916, Lippmann convinced Croly that Hughes is "Pro German" and that Wilson had become a nationalist of the Croly's persuasion. They were followed by other prominent progressives such as John Dewey, Jane Adams and Frederick Howe to support Wilson (Smith 1985, 497).

The 1916 Elections Results: Wilson won again. When the results turned in it became clear that Wilson had won by a narrow margin: 277 electors to Wilson and 254 to Hughes. The popular vote broke down: 9,129,606 to Wilson and 8,538,221 to Hughes. California was decisive and gave Wilson the victory by just 3,773 votes over Hughes. Hughes allied with the old machine of the Republican Party in California and against Hiram Johnson the progressive who was in control of his state and could have delivered for a Republican victory (Smith 1985, 500-1).

William Allen White commented after the elections that Wilson was reelected primarily by the votes of the Midwestern Progressives who strongly supported his policy regarding the war in Europe. By 1916 Wilson also advocated

preparedness. Again the Democratic won the election and the former Bull Moose votes seemed to give Wilson the margin needed for victory (Gable 1978, 249).

The End of the Bull Moose: After 1916 former Progressives could have been found in every camp. On December 1916, William Allen White, Chester Rowell, Gifford Pinchot, Raymond Robins, James Garfield and Harold Ickes published an announcement declaring that they were "firm in the conviction that in the existing two-party system constructive progressivism may best be achieved through the Republican Party" (Gable 1978, 250). This group represented the majority of the Bull Moosers. But Bainbridge Colby, John Parker, Ben Lindsey, Victor Murdock, and Francis Heney had joined the Democrats, believing that Wilson is the best vehicle for reform. Yet another group, which included Amos Pinchot and George Record worked to organize a new progressive party; they were known as the antifusionist. The later group merged with La Follette's Progressive Party, which launched his last attempt to run for president in 1924. La Follette had little organized party support outside Wisconsin. He won 17 percent of the popular vote and the electoral vote of his state, Wisconsin (Reichley 1992, 201).

Finally, by 1918, Theodore Roosevelt had once again

become the most prominent leader of the Republican Party and the favorite candidate for nomination in 1920. He picked a campaign manager and was drawing a new progressive platform for the Republicans. But, Roosevelt died on January 6, 1919. The remaining Progressives were divided between several candidates, among them Hiram Johnson. In a deadlocked convention the old guard managed to nominate Warren Harding which renewed the Republican control of the White House for twelve years.

By 1933, when another Roosevelt came to the White House some of the old Bull Moosers were there with him, Harold Ickes became his Secretary of Interior.

After the disintegration of 1916, the Progressives lost any cohesion they shared. From then onward, they had no common organization, no leader, and they disagreed on many issues. Individually, rather than as a group they pursued different avenues. Yet, many of them continued in politics or worked for some civic cause. Henry Allen became governor of Kansas, John Parker governor of Louisiana, Gifford Pinchot governor of Pennsylvania, and Edward Costigan, Bronson Cutting, Medill McCormick and Hiram Johnson were elected to the Senate. Hiram Johnson, the running mate of Roosevelt, remained senator until his death in 1945. Interestingly, many of the above mentioned individuals were defeated when run as Progressives in 1910, 1912, 1914

elections. Their past as progressives did not interfere with their future pursue of office.

Chapter Five

The Rise of Political Discontent in Israel

The 1977 Elections in Israel: On May 17, 1977, more than two hundred thousands of Israelis voted for the DMC and made history. Twelve percent of the popular vote gave the newly organized party 15 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, making the DMC the third largest party. This electoral success was unprecedented by any new party in a country where no major party had ever gained a majority and where even a 40 percent plurality is a rare occurrence. The only other time a third party had challenged the establishment with even marginal success was in 1965, when David Ben Gurion's political camp broke with its party to form "Rafi." "Rafi" gained 8 percent of the vote that year.

The DMC was formally born in November 1976 as a merger of several groups, from both right and left of center, that emerged in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. After its electoral success, the DMC joined the Likud-led government. Professor Yigael Yadin, its leader, was nominated Deputy and Acting Prime Minister and three other leading members were appointed to ministries. The fate of the DMC was not long-lived: in August 1978 it split into several factions, only a

few of which survived the 1981 election. By mid-1990s, only one original group ("Shinui") still remained.

But in 1977 the DMC forced a turning point in the political history of Israel, the end of the dominance of the party that had created the state. Most DMC's voters had voted for the Labor Party in the past, and Labor's removal from power indicated not only political change but also the end of the ethos that had made the Zionist movement a reality.

The mere appearance of the new political party does not explain the dramatic shift that took place in 1977. Many persuasive explanations were offered for the elections: a late reaction to the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, frustration with the economic situation and gaping social injustice, government corruption, the general security crisis, and more (Arian 1980; Galnoor 1980; Torgovnik 1980). In fact, the dissatisfaction that broke Labor's hold on power had been building for years. That discontent was fed by two main sources: ideological schism which was growing following the 1967 War and some socio-economic developments around that same period. Eventually these developments were also reflected in change in the Israeli political culture.

Ideological Transformation in Israel: The Six-Day War of 1967 generated most of the changes that took place in

Israeli society in the following decade. The outcome of that war altered immediately and dramatically Israeli society from virtually every aspect imaginable. The war ended with an astonishingly swift and complete military victory over several Arab armies. Israel seized territory quintupling the area of the country up until that point, and took control of over a million Palestinians who lived there.

Psychologically, the war transformed the self-image of Israelis as being "a nation under siege." Euphoria, pride and confidence replaced fear for the continued physical existence of the nation. The new borders allowed for "breathing space" and strategic depth for defense.

Before the war, the Israeli economy had been suffering from a deep depression (the "Mittun"). Following the war the Israeli market exploded. Huge infrastructure projects were initiated in the territories and along the new borders. American foreign aid came in massive doses, both economic and military (Safran 1981, 124). The Palestinian population in the territories quickly became dependent on the Israeli market for goods and jobs.

The political and ideological implications of the Six-Day War were significant though at first ignored in the postwar boom. The rifts they caused still exist. Three burning questions resulted from the victory: Where will the final borders of the state be drawn? What is to be done with

the Arab population under Israeli control? How should relations be conducted with neighboring Arab countries?

The official position of the government directly after the war was that the territories were guarantees for peace, and that Israel continued to wait patiently for her Arab neighbors to come and negotiate a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and put an end to the hostilities. But in what sense were the territories "guarantees"? Did they ensure peace by making it more difficult for Israel to be attacked, or were they bargaining chips? The diplomatic position was exceedingly vague on whether some, all or any of the territories would be returned to the Arabs. This vagueness may have made for a good bargaining stance for Israel in the short term, but it was open to conflicting interpretations within Israel itself.

For some, the territories were not occupied. They had been "freed." In these groups, Jewish presence in holy sites such as Jerusalem and Hebron was seen as a birthright justified by the Bible and the course of Jewish (and Western) history. For others, the acquisition of the new territories was an opportunity to "correct" the "artificial" borders imposed on Israel in 1948. These individuals were motivated by security concerns, and believed that most if not all the territories should be immediately annexed in

order to enhance the future defense capability of the state.

The questions of Israel's borders and Jewish identity had been of little or no political importance since 1949, when the armistice lines of the War of Independence created the de facto shape of the state. The major political parties, Mapai and the left parties and Herut and the Liberals, had spent the first 19 years of statehood arguing over differences on socio-economic issues that were relatively minor in comparison with the overwhelming task of nation-building. But the moral dilemmas involved in occupying such a large population and land mass reactivated controversies dating back to the prestatehood period, when neither the desired borders nor the definitive character of the hoped-for Jewish homeland were clear.

At that time, the argument over whether the United Nations or the Old Testament was a better mapmaker for the country had not yet been resolved, and the degree to which the first Jewish state in nearly two millennia would be a religious one was not entirely settled. The unasked question in 1967 was whether Israel could remain Jewish and democratic with more than a million unwilling Palestinians under her thumb, and the border issue was reopened with a vengeance.

The conflicting opinions on the correct answers to these questions did not remain theoretical, but quickly took

on ideological and partisan disposition. Matters grew even more complicated as new Jewish settlements were built in the occupied territories. Some settlements had government blessing and support; others did not. New political movements were formed, most notably the "Gush Emunim" ("The Bloc of the Faithful") and the "Movement for Greater Israel." Both groups exerted immense pressure on the government to allow the establishment of new settlements and to maintain Israeli control over the newly-acquired land.

Already-existing political parties were also realigning along the various sides of the debate. The National Religious Party, for example, gradually shifted from an otherwise moderate Zionist religious party to becoming an ardent supporter of the settlers. And 1970 Menahem Begin's Likud dropped out of the national unity government, formed on the eve of the Six-Day War, over the issue of acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242. This resolution called, among other things, for the return of the territories taken during the war. Begin declared that "not an inch" of land would be returned to the Arabs.¹¹

¹¹ Ironically, Begin as prime minister would accept 242 as the basis for the peace treaty with Egypt years later. He also agreed to a total withdrawal from Sinai and removal of all Jewish settlers.

Political Culture Transformation After the Six-Day War:

These decades-old ideological rifts were not the only pressures to come to bear on the government after 1967. The political culture of Israel was changing as relative prosperity followed the war and allowed issues other than survival to come to the fore.

In the late 60s and early 70s, a time of change throughout the Western world, Israel developed into a "normal" society. Political culture¹² began to be studied through the typical means of taking public opinion surveys and measuring various forms of political participation. Although the first empirically clear picture of Israeli political culture did not exist until the early 1970s, there is ample evidence to suggest that this culture was in a state of fundamental flux. If, as Almond and Verba maintain, "The civic culture is a participant political culture in which the political culture and the political structure are congruent" (Almond and Verba 1963, 30), then

¹²The concept of political culture, as developed by Almond and Verba, relates to the attitudes of individuals in a society towards their political system. How an individual subjectively sees his or her political system is dependent on three factors: knowledge and beliefs about the system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs (the "cognitive orientation"); feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel and performance (the "effective orientation"); and finally judgements and opinions about political objects (the "evaluational orientation").

the level of congruency in Israel was decreasing. The structure of the political system remained intact while the public's orientations toward the system were changing. This was a development to be expected, as a brief look at the history of political parties in Israel will show.

Political Parties in Israel: Political parties played a role during the prestatehood period which is in no way to be underestimated. They directed the struggle for independence and created the state. Parties provided all the services otherwise provided by governments: Housing, jobs, welfare, health, education, sport, media and the military were all either created or administered by political parties. Horowitz and Lissak describe the prestatehood period as a "polity without sovereignty" (Horowitz and Lissak, 1977). More importantly, most of these services and institutions retained their political associations after independence and the formation of a sovereign government.¹³ Almost all the Israeli political parties that exist today have their roots in the prestatehood period.

¹³Political parties operated through the WZO and the Histadrut, (the World Zionist Organization, operated basically as the government of the Jewish community during the British Mandate.) These institutions represented the majority of the Jewish community and were elected through regular elections.

The political structure that emerged with independence mirrored that of the 'Yishuv,'¹⁴ a multiparty system with a dominant party. Duverger asserts that "a party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrine, ideas, its style . . . coincide with those of the epoch Domination is a question of influence rather than of strength; it is also linked with belief. A dominant party is that which public opinion believes to be dominant" (Duverger 1964, 308). Such a party was Mapai, founded in 1930 as the merger of two Zionist movements -- Ha-Poel Ha-Tsair (1905) and Ahdut Ha-Avodah (1919) -- and later the Labor Party, formed from Mapai and other parties in 1968.

Mapai was dominant for half a century. It was the pioneer party that provided, along with the trade union organization (the Histadrut), the majority of the Jewish community under the British Mandate, with the services described above. Other parties attempted to follow suit, but Mapai exerted a powerful hold as the first to be active in the community and as the most effective force. Mapai was also in a position to reward its political supporters with as jobs and goods, as the party controlled the Jewish Agency as well.

Political parties, but especially Mapai, continued to

¹⁴'Yishuv,' the Jewish political community in Palestine during the British Mandate.

play a central role in Israeli society and politics despite David Ben Gurion's policy of "Mamlakhtiyut," or statism, a process in which the state assumed responsibility for many of the services that had been provided by the political parties, most notably the education system and the various formerly partisan paramilitary organizations (Cohen 1987). The civil service and state bureaucracy, for example, although developing independently, were heavily politicized by the continued patronage of Mapai and its coalition partners.

The machine built by Mapai mobilized and integrated the massive waves of immigration in the early years of the state, indirectly indoctrinating a huge percentage of newly-minted Israelis with the idea of its moral superiority over other parties in the system. As mentioned earlier, Mapai and its successor the Labor Party never gained the majority of the votes but surely it felt as if it had. In a 1980 article analyzing the fall of Labor, Shapiro emphasized the concept of superior authority of the dominant party, which allows this party to rule without an electoral majority. He added that "this lends legitimacy to a unique kind of democratic regime in which there is no alternative ruling party" (Shapiro 1980, 37).

Herut Party: Mapai and especially its leader David

Ben-Gurion marginalized consistently and systematically its major ideological rival, Herut. Ben-Gurion coined the term "Without Herut and Maki" making it known that every party in the system is "Kosher" as a coalitional partner but Begin's Herut to the right and Maki, the communist party to the left. In his speeches in the Knesset, Ben-Gurion, would not even mention Begin by name but referred to him as the person sitting next to MK Bader (Member of Knesset). The Herut Party was formed in 1948 and was the successor of the Revisionist movement which was formed during the 'Yishuv' period by Vladimir Jabotinsky. Herut's primary concern was with foreign policy and the territorial issue. Herut's platform since independence claimed Israel rights to all mandatory Palestine (including the east bank of the Jordan river, which is Jordan of today.) However, since 1965, Herut was going through different stages of transformation through which it became more legitimate.

After 1967 and more so after the 1973 War, the country witnessed the beginning of some serious fusions in the national consensus which also contributed to the erosion of the dominant party. The first two decades of Israeli history exhibited a high level of national consensus as to the collective goals of the society and the instruments by which those goals were to be attained. The majority of the Jewish population, including the political elite, accepted

the Zionist ideology and the political system that was created (Galnoor 1980). In spite of the heterogeneity of contemporary Israeli society and the potential to fragment that society along its countless lines of cleavage, the national consensus held the system together. The overwhelming priorities of physical security and the absorption of massive waves of immigration¹⁵ forced compromises in virtually every other area. The "status quo" agreement concerning religious matters, and the result of the debate over Israel's constitution (i.e., to do without one), are two examples of successful bargaining and conflict resolution within the political elite. And this epoch of national consensus reflected in doctrine, in style and in ideas the Mapai party.

Despite the almost unbridled dominance of Mapai in the political and ideological arena, which would perhaps lend the impression of political stagnation, Israelis in 1970 expressed a very high interest in politics. Etzioni-Halevy found that 87 percent of respondents said they understand what is going on, and 60 percent said they can trace how the government is fulfilling its task (Etzioni-Halevy 1977, 68). Voting turnouts were consistently around 80 percent,

¹⁵ Historical population of the state of Israel: October 1948: 872,700; 1958: 2,031,700; 1968: 2,841,100; 1978: 3,737,600 (Statistical Abstract 1987, 31).

comparable to that of most Western democracies.¹⁶

On the one hand, it is natural to find high interest in politics in a society such as Israel's. Political decisions have a direct and often dire impact on the daily life of every Israeli, from the big questions of war and peace to the nitty gritty of price supports and salaries. Interest in politics and being informed is also a normative issue for Israelis. Leonard Fein rightly pointed out that "In addition to the conventional association of these perceptions and behavior with democratic theory, they also flow directly from the 'Yishuv' tradition with its great emphasis on self-help, communal responsibility and the utility of personal commitment" (Fein 1967, 141). Arian suggests there is a "social desirability effect" connected to the high interest Israelis express in politics. The respondents think they are giving the right answer (Arian 1973, 24-5).

On the other hand, Israelis have long since been described as passive participants (Wolfsfeld 1988; Etzioni-Halevy 1977, 67). For most Israelis, political activity has never consisted of very much more than voting once every

¹⁶ There are no special requirements for voting in Israel; all citizens age 18 or over may vote. Arian argues that most Israelis vote and those who do not usually have technical reasons, i.e., they are living abroad. Some Arab citizens refrain from voting for political reasons.

four years and attending the occasional party meeting. This apparent paradox is reconciled when the effective orientation of Israelis is measured: In essence, the Israeli has always been a frustrated political participant. Fein found in 1962 that only 25 percent of Israelis believed they have an impact or influence on their political system. In 1970, Arian saw that number decline by 10 percent and another 21 percent thought that neither they nor people like them could have an influence.

The background for this sense of frustration is built into the Israeli party system itself, where the party (and therefore the national) leadership is almost entirely isolated from the voting public. The party structure is extremely hierarchical, with each level voting for and then answering only to the next level. In national elections, Israel's system is probably the most extreme form of proportional representation in the world: A party need only gain one percent of the vote in order to be represented in the Knesset. There is no direct election of politicians; Israeli citizens vote for parties. The list of candidate is compiled and ordered by small elected or selected committees of the respective parties. No member of the Knesset is responsible for fulfilling the needs of or even so much as representing the interests of a specific constituency in a specific area of the nation.

Why didn't the Israelis, so well-informed politically, so proud of their interest in politics and yet feeling so impotent within their system, look for alternative channels to express themselves politically? In 1967, the first year for which data is available, the answer is clear. Only 8 percent disapproved of the government's performance. That number had risen to 20 percent by 1970, but that is, by any standard, an extremely high approval rating of the politicians and policies -- though not necessarily of the political system itself. So long as the postwar euphoria lasted and the economic boom continued, there was no reason either to doubt the dominant political authority of Mapai or to question the underpinnings of the political situation that Mapai had cemented into place.¹⁷ It was therefore to be expected that when political dissatisfaction arose, not only individual elected officials but the structure itself, its Zionist ideology and the entire political elite were called to task.

And dissatisfaction certainly arose -- to a whopping 81 percent in 1977, the year Labor was voted out of power (Wolfsfeld 1988, 14). The roots of this dissatisfaction will be discussed shortly. But there were social,

¹⁷ It is important to remember here that Gahal, (Herut and the Liberal parties) was at the time partners in the national unity government formed just before the 1967 War.

nonpolitical developments as well which had an impact on the role of the parties in Israel and which hurt the dominant party in the long run.

Other Pressures: As a result of urbanization, rapid population growth, economic development, expansion of education and the introduction of mass media, political parties were no longer able to maintain the level of control and contact with the same numbers of people that they had done in the past. Nor was the general public as dependent on the parties for such usually nonpolitical functions as socialization and the provision of basic information. Now the society was, so to say, functioning more or less on its own.

This change in the role of political parties was reflected in several studies. Arian shows a drop in partisanship from 18 percent in 1969 to 8 percent in 1984. Even more suggestive: 17 percent of Israelis over the age of 50 belonged to a political party in 1984, but only two percent of those between 18 and 29 reported being members (Arian 1985, 106).

The introduction of television in 1968 was an interesting and important development. Suddenly Israelis had a window on the world and could see their own society and politics thrown into stark relief against a much greater

and more detailed background. Small political groups had the opportunity to receive mass exposure, and used that opportunity to the utmost. Watching the evening news was a new form of political participation, with estimated viewing rates of as high as 77 percent (Wolfsfeld 1988, 11; Arian 1985, 104).

Finally, Israelis were moving away from the ideology of collectivism that was so prevalent in the early years of statehood. Lissak found that the aspirations of young Israelis were changing. There was more emphasis on venues that promise better quality of life and personal mobility (Lissak 1964).

The Advent of Protest: There were two population groups that the Mapai machine had not successfully integrated politically: Native-born young Israelis and Sephardi Jews (Arian 1985). The sabras, or native-born Israelis, were too young to be grateful to Mapai for the fact of statehood and the services provided in the prestatehood period. The Sephardi Jews (Jews who came from African and Asian countries) had the perception that they had experienced economic and racial discrimination at the hands of the entirely "white" Ashkenazi (Jews of European origin) Jewish establishment. They were responsible for the only direct political action of any historical significance

to take place between the advent of statehood and the Sixties: a riot in Wadi Salib, a Haifa slum populated by North African immigrants, in 1959.

These two groups had been drifting toward the Likud anyway (Arian 1985). But the issues that moved them were too deeply-rooted and emotional for the political structure to handle. After the 1967 war, extra-parliamentary movements began to spring up. Their methods would shake the entire country, so used to the political consensus of nation-building and the ideological givens of the Mapai epoch (Sprinzak 1981).

Demonstrations had been common occurrences in the years preceding statehood, and had all but disappeared.¹⁸ One of the notable groups to emerge from the advent of extra-parliamentary political activity in the early Seventies were the "Black Panthers," a movement of Sephardi youth. The immediate trigger for their uprising in 1971 was over the absorption of Russian Jews from the Soviet Union. The protesters claimed that the newcomers were receiving favorable treatment, while their families remained in

¹⁸In fact, until the early 1970s' virtually all protest activities such as demonstrations or strikes were organized and carried out by political parties. The most violent "extra-parliamentary" demonstration in front of the Knesset was in 1952 when the government agreed to accept reparations from Germany. It was no other than Menahem Begin, the leader of Herut, who led the demonstration heading toward the institution he was a member of.

poverty. In a Robin Hood's type of moral, the Black Panthers once stole milk from the affluent neighborhood of Rechavia in Jerusalem and distributed to the more needy residence of poor neighborhoods in Jerusalem.

The other group that got started after the war was the Gush Emunim, mentioned above. Their argument was with the government's policies on Jewish settlements in the newly-occupied territories. Gush Emunim still exist in 1995, though more established, still fighting for the same cause. Gush Emunim repeatedly led its members to establish new settlements in the territories amidst the objection of the government and often clashed with the military and the Arab population in the territories.

The Gush and the Black Panthers were pioneers, but there were many similar movements, mostly revolving around political issues stemming from the war and social problems of long standing.

By 1979 protest in Israel had risen to a level five times greater than that of 1960. Wolfsfeld characterized this type of political discourse as "the politics of provocation," in which high political discontent, passionate psychological involvement and insufficient institutional efficacy combine explosively. The political discontent in Israel in the Seventies had various social, historical and ideological origins; the psychological involvement derived

from the importance of the issues being addressed by the protesters; and the closed circuit of the political system was incapable of responding to the need for fundamental change in policy so that these issues be addressed. Frustration over the perceived inability of the individual to have an impact on politics led to a belief that politicians are more likely to respond to extra-parliamentary pressure tactics than to electoral persuasion (Wolfsfeld 1988).

Protest After the Yom Kippur War and the Birth of Shinui: The most devastating blow to the Israeli political system, however, came after the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. The surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on the holiest day in the Jewish year left the military flat-footed, and for the first time in the history of the country the ability of the government to ensure the physical existence of Israel was open to doubt. The public blamed the government of Golda Meir and the defense ministry led by Moshe Dayan for failing to anticipate the attack, and the protest that erupted immediately after the war was unprecedented. The pressure groups, one of which was Shinui, arose in large part from the ranks of reservists in the Israel Defense Forces and demanded Meir's and Dayan's immediate resignation for their role in the "Mechdal" ("scandal"). A national

investigative committee was formed in early 1974 to look into the events that preceded the war.¹⁹

Supreme Court Chief Justice Shimon Agranat led the commission, which took more than a year to complete its work. Prime Minister Meir refused to resign before the commission's report was submitted. On April 1, 1974, the Agranat Commission's interim report was published. It found that the military lack of readiness was due to a mistaken theory that the Arab countries are not heading toward war in the next few years and to overconfidence in the commanders of the military. Among its few operative conclusions the commission recommended that the Chief of Staff and several other high officers be discharged. The commission, however, chose not to give an answer to the much awaited question: the personal or ministerial responsibility of the Prime Minister and that of the Minister of Defense. The commission's report stated that it found the question to be political in nature and thus beyond the scope of its mandate.

In a case unprecedented and unrepeated in Israeli history, public outrage over the "mechdal" and the Agranat

¹⁹ The 1973 elections, postponed because of the war from October to the end of December, did not reflect the public's mounting fury. The Labor Alignment gained 51 seats with no changes made in the prewar list of candidates, and formed the new government.

report forced the resignation of Golda Meir and her Cabinet. Members of protest groups demonstrated for weeks 24 hours a day in front of their offices and their homes. There was also a continuous picket line in front of Labor Party headquarters.

On June 3, 1974, Yitzhak Rabin became the new prime minister of Israel. Rabin was perceived as untainted by the mechdal, as he was a hero of both the War of Independence and the Six-Day War and had been serving as the Israeli Ambassador to the United States for five years before the Yom Kippur attack. All of the protest movements evaporated immediately except for one: Shinui.

The Israeli political system, top-heavy with the weight of decades of dominant Mapai control, was gravely overstrained. Israeli society, emerging from the nation-building phase and beginning to pay the moral price of occupation and prejudice, was no longer in the mood to give the system the tacit agreement it needed in order to maintain itself. In this environment of tremendous pressure and explosive protest, Shinui was born.

Chapter Six

Shinui -- From a Protest Movement to a Political Party

In Israel, every citizen age 18 and over goes into the army. Women have two years of compulsory duty, and men three. It is an accepted fact of life for Israeli teenagers. After the army, every Israeli male has annual reserve duty of at least one month until he is 50. In times of tension, this can lengthen to a quarter year or longer. Reserve service interferes with family, career development and university studies. With the years, as the typical Israeli begins to build a life of his own that he would rather not have continually disrupted, his feelings about the army and the politicians under whose orders the army serves sometimes begin to change.

Most importantly perhaps, the Israeli who has given three full years of his life and then sacrificed a normal degree of independence from politicians for another decade feels more acutely the necessity for those politicians to behave with the utmost care and responsibility for his good and for the good of the nation. Political figures in other countries may count on having a bit of room to maneuver when

it comes to their handling of the public trust; Israeli politicians, who deal every day with life-and-death issues, have always had to be on their toes.

It was a feeling of betrayal by the ruling politicians in the ranks of the reserves that led in part to the birth of Shinui and the other protest movements that mushroomed in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. The story of the Democratic Movement for Change's electoral success in 1977 is very much a tale of how the Israeli public's trust was won. In the three years between the establishment of Shinui and the election, the party placed its emphasis almost entirely on political integrity. And with the merger of Shinui with the Democratic Movement led by famed archeologist and former chief of staff Professor Yigael Yadin, the DMC garnered the most spotless party leader ever to enter Israeli politics.

The Protest Movement and the Idea of Reform: In its very earliest phase as a protest movement Shinui joined with other protest movements in a loose organization called "Our Israel." The group quickly distinguished itself from the other members in its prognosis of Israel's social and political ills, but they also split along generational lines. The reservists in their late 20s and 30s wanted to

remain free of the hierarchical fossilization so characteristic of Israeli political parties, but those in their 40s wanted to change the system from within. Rather than concentrating solely on the personal or ministerial responsibility of Meir and Dayan for the surprise attack on Yom Kippur, Shinui insisted that the Israeli political system itself "had lost the basic principle on which any democratic regime is based: its duty to respond to the public's expectations, for being responsible and accountable" (Rubinstein 1980, 29).

Oddly enough, formation of the party was initiated by the activity of two non-reservists: Mordechai Wirshuvski, legal counsel to the city of Tel Aviv and guest lecturer at the Tel Aviv University (TAU) law school; and Yonathan Shapiro, Professor of Sociology at TAU. Neither Wirshuvski nor Shapiro were in the reserves because of health problems, and both invested their frustrated energy during the early stages of the war into conceptualizing a political force that would prevent such a disaster from ever occurring again. By the end of November 1973, they had approached Professor Amnon Rubinstein, dean of the TAU law school, to ask him to join with them in forming a new political movement.

Amnon Rubinstein, born 1931 in Tel Aviv, in 1973 was on

the editorial board of the newspaper Ha'aretz and the moderator of "Boomerang", a popular television program debating current events. He had his degree from London University and had been writing regularly for The New York Times since 1967. The onset of the Yom Kippur War found him on a lecture tour in the U.S., and the day after the attack he met with the editors of the Times to prepare a front page story about the war. "I started my career at your newspaper with a big and dramatic story about the Six-Day War," he told them, "and I hope now to bring you a similar one," in which Israel would also be quickly victorious (Rubinstein 1982, 27). Instead, Rubinstein returned to Israel facing the grim reality. Serving in the reserve until the end of November 1973 he could see first hand the horrors of the war and listen to the growing rage.

Several of Rubinstein's friends told him they would support him financially should he decide to test the political waters. Two well-known businessmen and philanthropists, Oscar Van Leer and Abraham Rad, made good their promises and would later become the major donors and supporters of Shinui. But even such powerful backing still left open the question of whether the Israeli public at large would be willing to press actively for change.

Rubinstein had his doubts about the viability of an

entirely new party in Israel. All political parties had always either splintered from old ones or federated with other small ones -- or they were one-person or single-issue movements like the ethnic parties and the "Ha-Olam Ha-Zeh" Party of Uri Avneri (which took its name from the weekly magazine Avneri had edited since independence, and which brought him into the Knesset in 1965). An entirely new party would have no source of government funding, meager allocation of broadcasting time, and in an extremely conservative political environment would have to survive four long years before the next elections. Rubinstein feared it would be impossible to maintain the necessary level of enthusiasm among activists, believing like most others that Israelis like to complain about their political system but would do very little to change it.

On February 17, 1974, a huge demonstration was held in Jerusalem. It was only one of many which took place after the Yom Kippur War, but it was the one that convinced Wirshuvski and Rubinstein that the desire for change was serious. A few days later, a small group gathered in a room of the TAU School of Social Science to outline the principles for the new movement. The participants were almost all professors: Yonathan Shapiro, Yossef Yahav, Asher Arian, David Gilat, Yitzhak Samuel, Mordechai Eran, Ephraim

Ya'ar, Moshe Schwartz, Daniel Friedman, Uri Zamir and of course Rubinstein. The only non-faculty member was Wirshuvski, who was, as noted above, a guest lecturer at the TAU law school.

Eight principles were declared as the basis for Shinui's platform and method of operations. (These principles would also later determine the conditions of the merger with Yadin's Democratic Movement.) The principles were:

1. Shinui supports a policy of negotiations leading to peace with Israel's Arab neighbors, including the possibility of territorial concessions.
2. The current electoral system in Israel encourages negligence and lack of accountability by political representatives to their voters, and makes it virtually impossible to replace elected officials who fail. Therefore, Shinui supports electoral reform to help guarantee responsibility in government. The new movement will act to further intraparty democracy within the existing political parties.
3. Basic civil rights such as equality before the law, freedom of speech and information, freedom of association, the right to privacy, freedom of

religion and conscience, and property rights must be protected by a written constitution.²⁰

4. Government intervention in the economy should only be legally justifiable when it serves national interests such as maintenance of the welfare state and the narrowing of social gaps, and should never serve partisan or sectoral interests.
5. In the civil service, personal responsibility should be the norm. Shinui supports the merit system as the standard for promotion among all employees of the government.
6. Shinui supports an education system guaranteeing equal opportunities to all. The education system should provide instruction appropriate to a technologically developed society, and should emphasize good citizenship within a democratic social context.
7. The movement will press for narrowing of social and economic gaps within the country through improvement of the tax system and payroll policies, through demographic planning and organization of a national social service.

²⁰ As noted in Chapter Five, Israel has no written constitution, instead, a set of "Basic Laws" enacted by the Parliament and supposed to comprise the future constitution.

8. Shinui will act to effect radical change in public life and public service through education, pressure for the enforcement of existing laws and by calling for new legislation.

The above listed principles seem matter-of-fact to most citizens of developed countries -- there is little objectionable, and little of originality. But even among convinced democratic secularists with an overwhelmingly domestic agenda, there was controversy. It revolved around the first principle, the only one to acknowledge Israel's delicate foreign relations situation. Prof. Shapiro, backed by several of the others, insisted on incorporating a clear statement regarding the rights of the Palestinians. Rubinstein demurred.

"From day one, I wanted a wide movement, not a doctrinaire one, a movement that combines responsible foreign policy with extensive reform on domestic issues. I did not want to include the 'Palestinian problem' . . . because it would have weakened our power, would have determined who could join us and would have limited our options to grow" (Rubinstein 1982, 35).

Of course, Shinui's lack of a position on the most pressing issue of the day, one that only as a matter of interpretation was a foreign policy issue and not a domestic

one, sowed the seeds of a split from the very first. A dovish position on the Palestinians would most certainly have limited Shinui's options to grow -- especially in 1974 -- but on the other hand might have pruned the budding movement so that it could withstand the pressures from without that would come to bear after its electoral success. Yet the odds were so overwhelmingly against a brand new party surviving at all that Rubinstein's nod to political expediency might have been understandable. Most of the original group of academics had already left the movement before the next decision on a politically advantageous compromise would have to be taken.

The first public meeting of the new party was set for March 5, 1974, to be held at Tel Aviv University. The organizers had invited 60 people, but more than 100 arrived. Rumors about the new movement had aroused curiosity among those in the know. One example is that of industrialist Stef Wertheimer, who heard about the meeting and called Rubinstein to ask for an invitation. Wertheimer would later become one of Shinui's leaders and would be elected to the Knesset on the DMC's list. The name "Shinui" ("Change") was chosen before the next public meeting three weeks later, and more than 500 people showed up. Membership fees, branches, methods for electing representatives, etc., were all

determined at that meeting.

In spite of the change of government in June, when Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan resigned and all the other post-Yom Kippur War protest movements vanished, Rubinstein went ahead with the plans to formally found Shinui in July 1974. Fewer people attended that meeting than had done so the previous one in March, but those who did attend were serious about continuing their political activity in a hostile environment. A new council was elected, and organizational work in branches throughout the country began.

The first elections for the first council turned out to be an important lesson in practical politics and had a profound implication for the future of Shinui and the DMC. Adhering to their principles, they declared that every position in the party was open to each member and each member could vote for any elected position. Ataf Arsalan, a young Arab Christian from Nazareth, presented her candidacy for the council by sending a letter to the members of the party. To everybody's surprise, she came out fourth, right after Rubinstein and the other founders of the party. They were surprised; nobody knew Ms. Arsalan, nor did she ever attend any of Shinui's meetings in the past or the future. The candidacy of a women, an Arab from the Galilee, would be a refreshing addition to the new movement such as Shinui.

The socioeconomic profile of Shinui and its appeal at first was limited. The movement attracted primarily people from the middle class, Ashkenazi, and from the academic circles of Tel Aviv. Therefore almost everybody in Shinui voted for Arsalan, but they did not have any intention to elect her as their leader. This innocent incident alarmed this group of political amateurs that such principles may work against them. Later, they would adopt the "transferable vote" method for the primaries, instead of the simple majority system.

The Years of Shinui's Independent Development: During the two-and-a-half years of Shinui's existence before the merger with the Democratic Movement, the movement published positions on virtually every issue on the public agenda. Shapiro described their goal: "To open the clogged arteries of Israeli politics" (Shapiro 1980). Their methods were those of the protest movements -- writing open letters to officials responsible for good government, holding press conferences accusing elected representatives of corruption and mismanagement, taking out advertisements in newspapers, delivering court petitions against politicians and political institutions, demonstrating and picketing.

Shinui initiated a letter-writing campaign to the

chairman of the Knesset objecting to the long absences of some Members of Knesset (MK) who, despite their extremely poor attendance record, remained on the public payroll. The movement organized protests and demonstrated against the government-owned airline, El Al, to call attention to its practice of handing out free tickets to politicians and their families. Shinui also demanded a balanced budget and the enactment of a national health insurance (Shira 1980, 29-43).

Since Shinui's leader and most visible member, Amnon Rubinstein, was dean of the biggest law school in the country, the party could also afford to pull effective publicity acts in court. One of the most successful efforts of the party to establish its anti-corruption stance took place in May of 1975, when Shinui persuaded Israel's Supreme Court to issue an injunction against the Minister of Finance and all of the parties represented at that time in the Knesset -- who had recently voted away the debts they had incurred during the last campaign by increasing public funding for elections after the fact. Shinui was also able, through the courts, to prevent further use of the Jewish Agency Fund for political activity.

The most popular campaign for political change carried out by Shinui was called "Follow Me," which began with an

open letter to the prime minister in the closing months of 1974. As a result of the Yom Kippur War and the ensuing Arab oil embargo, Israel's economy had been severely disrupted. Israeli citizens were being called upon by their leaders to make economic sacrifices for the good of the country. Among other emergency measures, Israelis were required to choose one day in the week when they did not drive their cars, and the Israeli Lira was devalued by a quarter in one day to fight inflation.

Shinui's letter to the prime minister demanded that he and his colleagues also lower their standard of living at the public's expense. They should avoid extravagant political parties and state dinners, make fewer trips abroad, and refrain from using their cars one day a week. Shinui declared that its members would personally adopt a more modest lifestyle until the economy recovered.

One hundred thousand Israelis signed the petition to Rabin. Many of them committed themselves to buying only domestic goods or not dining in expensive restaurants. The petition invoked Winston Churchill's promise to his people not to purchase a new shirt until the war was over, and reminded Rabin that his country had followed him. It urged the Prime Minister to serve as a role model.

As a publicity stunt, "Follow Me" was rather

successful. Polls began to show support for Shinui growing (Shapiro 1980, 100; Shira 1980, 35). Of course, as political activity this sort of thing demonstrated a marked lack of professionalism, not to say naivete. It was the organizational structure and modes of operations that gave the real evidence of difference between Shinui and the parties already in government.

Every member could submit his or her candidacy for every position in the party, and those positions were filled by holding primaries. In order to allow for maximum exposure to all members of the leadership council, a rotating chairmanship was adopted. Referenda were held on all important issues. Politicians could only join the party if they resigned from their current parties, and no blocs or whole parties could join Shinui -- only individuals. (This would lead to problems once Shinui entered the Knesset, but that will be discussed later).

The Membership and its Ideals: Shinui attracted a membership not very different from the group that had founded the party. Lawyers, academics, social workers, small businessmen, and professionals of every stripe joined, made financial contributions and often volunteered to help organize further. Most of them were the second generation

of Israelis born to immigrants from Central Europe and were solidly middle class. In fact, the rise of Shinui could be described as the first insurgency of the middle class in Israel (Shapiro 1980, 100).

Although they claimed to stand for the introduction into government of the same values by which they ran their family lives and private enterprises -- rationality, honesty, fairness, dedication to work, loyalty -- they also brought with them the shortcomings of the middle class mindset: conservatism, provincialism and conventional thinking. Both the advantages and the shortcomings of the group that constituted the party in the years before the elections came into play as Shinui struggled to provide a real alternative to Labor and Likud.

Rubinstein, in an article in the first issue of "For Change" (the movement's magazine), argued that Shinui's rise was necessary to fill the gaps created by the absence of a democratically-run party, the absence of a center party, and the lack of choice in Israeli politics. On the left, said Rubinstein, Israelis have the Labor Party with dogmatic and antiquated socialist ideas but sane foreign relations. The Likud on the right was laissez-faire economically but had a world view that was detached from reality on issues of war and peace. Rubinstein concluded that Shinui was the party

to fulfill these three major needs.

Ran Kislev, a Ha'aretz columnist, ran a column in March of 1976 titled "Shinui has become a political party". He called Shinui "the most peculiar young movement on our political landscape", and commended it for "managing to outlive the romantic period after which most new political movements meet their demise." Kislev, however, believed that Shinui's vague ideological identity would likely prevent it from surviving. He echoed the doubts of many Israelis on that point. How could there be a chance for a reform party which studiously avoided the most divisive issue in the society?

The Attempts to Merge: Shinui was ready in principle to cooperate with other political bodies, under the condition that they accept Shinui's platform and democratic organization. However, initial attempts to merge with existing parties failed partly due to Rubinstein's insistence that Shinui be the cornerstone of a centrist party in Israel and to his general suspicion of getting involved with professional politicians (a feeling appropriate to, if not required of, the leader of a political party with Shinui's objectives) (Torgovnik 1980, 79).

In the early phases of development, Shinui came closest

to merging with two of the parties it had approached in order to expand the ranks of its membership and broaden its leadership. Those parties were the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) headed by Shulamit Aloni, a former member of Mapai, and a group within the Labor Party headed by a man whose outspoken views on the rights of Palestinians were more than a decade ahead of their time -- Arie Eliav.²¹

Wirshuvski and Rubinstein were opposed to merging with the CRM or Eliav's organization, mostly because of their positions on the Palestinian issue; Shapiro, Arian and Ya'ar, among others who had attended the very first meeting of Shinui at Tel Aviv University, were for it for the same reasons. A vote in the council and a referendum among the general membership resulted in a refusal of the offer to merge. It was at this point that many of the original members left the movement. The professors were having problems not only with the continued lack of a position on the Palestinians, but also with the kind of populist activities Rubinstein had been engaged in since Shinui's official founding.

²¹ Eliav, who was the General Secretary of the Labor Party broke with his party on the issue of Palestinian rights. During 1975 he joined the CRM and some former members of Shinui to form YAAD, a short-lived political framework. He reappeared in 1977 as the head of Sheli, a left wing party, but in the mid-80s returned to the Labor fold after his former organization adopted many of his views.

The Growth of Support: By 1976, the Israeli public was becoming disillusioned with Rabin's government and Shinui was gaining momentum. Rubinstein testifies that there were 100 meetings in private homes all over the country every month. Discussion of Shinui's positions was picking up, and more advertisements and explanations were placed in the daily newspapers.

Rubinstein's style may be credited with much of the progress Shinui made in this period. He was seen enthusiastically participating in virtually everything Shinui did -- from drawing placards and then carrying them at demonstrations to drafting press releases. He was able to shed the aura of intelligentsia, generating excitement among the rank and file members that helped Shinui become a more permanent feature of the Israeli political landscape.

But Rubinstein's measure of charisma was not enough to guarantee Shinui's future nationally. The leadership knew that they could not make a deep inroad into a broad segment of the electorate without "star power." "Give me one general and I will turn the country around," Rubinstein is quoted as having said (Torgovnik 1980, 77), referring to the most common source for executive and leadership recruits by political parties: the ranks of retired generals.

In fact there was "one general," one very specific general, who Rubinstein admitted that his name shadowed all

others -- Yigael Yadin. Not only was he considered a natural candidate for high political office, but many sincerely believed that he could pull the country out of its economic, political and social crisis (Rubinstein 1982, 71). Yadin himself, however, was inexperienced politically and had no organization behind him whatsoever as Rubinstein and Shinui began to show progress in their uphill struggle to survive until 1977.

Yadin, Reluctant Politician: Professor Yigael Yadin, born in 1917 in Jerusalem, was a world-famous archeologist, had served as the nation's second Chief of Staff and was the youngest commander of the Israeli military at the age of 35 during the War of Independence. He was the architect of the modern Israeli army and the designer of its reserve structure. According to some, he was being groomed by David Ben-Gurion as a political successor (Yediot Achronot, March 11, 1977; Ha'aretz, May 30, 1977; Letter from Ben-Gurion to Yadin, March 9, 1964, Ben-Gurion Archives, Tel Aviv). In 1952 he resigned as Chief of Staff in protest of defense budget cuts, and Ben-Gurion tried to tempt him back by offering him the Defense Ministry (held at that time by the prime minister) which would allow Yadin to take control of the budget. Yadin refused. Later, on the eve of the 1967 war, the same offer was made to him by than the prime

minister and minister of Defence Levi Eshkol. Yadin refused but suggested that Moshe Dayan be nominated for that office, and drafted a document outlining his ideas about the proper division of labor between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister. Ben-Gurion would offer Yadin a number of other posts, calling to Yadin's sense of civic duty. But Yadin left the military and moved into academia.

In the following years Yadin headed the excavation of some of the most famous archeological sites in modern history. Masada was a project of his, as well as Hazor and the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls. He was also the host of a popular television show called "News About Antiquities".

The only public cause he was consistently willing to serve was that of electoral reform. Yadin chaired the Society for Electoral Reform (Silberman 1993, 281). In an interview he gave in 1961 to Philip Gillon of the Jerusalem Post, he spoke of the need to streamline the Israeli party system and make the government more responsive to the public. Gillon wrote:

He talks softly but incisively, selecting his words with precision and resting on the implications of every idea before accepting it. A humanitarian in the broadest sense of the term, he is a far better symbol of the "new Jew" born in the Land of Israel than any mythical hero like Ari

Ben Canaan.²²

Nineteen Seventy-Three was a watershed year for Yadin even before the Yom Kippur War, a year in which his public activity and opinions took on a great deal more import than ever before. In the spring of that year, Yadin had a lengthy interview published in Ma'ariv in which he "reflected on the need for far-reaching social and religious reform." Silberman writes: "Looking back on the establishment of Israel and the development of its society, he emphasized that his "ideal has always been that the state would be both Jewish and democratic. And I place equal emphasis on both." On the issue of social justice: "A democratic-Jewish state can arise only when everyone has the feeling that opportunities are equal for everyone, We have not learned in the 25 years of the state to give the weaker and the disadvantaged strata of society a feeling of equal worth. This is no less important than matters of national defense."

In the summer of 1973, he presented a plan for a regional system of representation in the Knesset at a press conference, urging all the major parties to place this issue on their platforms. He insisted at the time that he would never leave academia to seek public office (Silberman 1993,

²² The hero of Leon Uris's novel, Exodus.

318).

Yadin was in every way the perfect "one general" for Shinui, from his political inexperience and yet savvy as well, to his academic background, to his commitment to enhancing democracy in Israeli politics. Therefore it is ironic that it was his service on the Agranat Commission in late 1973 -- the commission whose report spawned the protest movements and Shinui itself -- that finally catapulted him into active consideration of public life. Those considerations took almost two years to yield even the smallest of fruit.

Yadin and many of his friends, retired generals with extensive executive experience and strong feelings about the war, were also fed up with the political structures they thought had led to the surprise attack. They were all of the opinion that Labor had to be replaced, that there was no way to work from within the mighty party and that it was necessary to break its hold on power. Yadin held the first meeting of what would become a continuing "discussion group" in his home in Jerusalem on December 15, 1975. At that original meeting were:

-- Dan Tolkovski, former chief of the Israeli Air Force;

-- Prof. Yuval Neeman, physicist and former deputy of Military Intelligence as well as an advisor to

the Defense Minister (in 1981 becoming the head of the "Tchiyah" Party representing Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza and opposing the Camp David Accords);

-- Prof. Mordechai Abir, criminologist at Hebrew University in Jerusalem;

-- Haim Laskov, former Chief of Staff, the Israel Defense Forces ombudsman and a fellow member of the Agranat Commission;

-- Meir Zorea, a former general and the head of the National Land Authority; and

-- Ernest Yefet, chairman of Bank Leumi, the largest bank in the country.

Yadin, with his considerably more moderate views on the Palestinian and territorial issues than those of the others in the group, had to be careful about making a commitment despite pressure to decide. Neeman's stance was the most right-wing of all, and he soon dropped out. Zorea was the impetus behind the idea to build a political movement, believing that Labor could not be reformed and that domestic issues needed to be emphasized.

As the secret meetings continued through 1976 and a consensus began to develop among those remaining and invited to join, Yadin decided to test the political waters. He

called Eli Ayyal, a television journalist to whom Yadin had promised an exclusive interview should he ever decide to enter politics.

Yadin's performance on the nation's most popular TV interview program on May 25, 1976 would long be remembered as an alarm siren that swept through both of Israel's major political parties. His appearance on "Moked" was preceded and followed by a duet of articles by Yoel Markus, a prominent columnist at Ha'aretz, respectively titled "A Legend Named Yadin" and "Good Morning Mr. Charisma." His 30-minute interview with Ayyal showed him at ease with questions about both domestic and foreign affairs, portraying him as widely left of center on territorial issues²³ and for social reform at home. In answer to a direct question about his political intentions, he said that he was considering it but wanted to travel through the country and feel out the popular mood.²⁴

²³ In fact, Yadin's view was so radical in the current political climate he later had to retract it because of the outrage of his colleagues in the discussion group. He had said that he would even be willing to negotiate with Arafat on the territories, believing that peace and the moral character of the state were more important than maintaining control (Silberman 1993; Rubinstein 1982; Urieli and Barzilai 1982). In this, as well as in his attack on the settlements and settlers, he was to the left of Shinui.

²⁴ Two weeks later, Ayyal would leave television to become Yadin's press secretary (interview with Ayyal, Jan 29, 1993).

Rubinstein called the television building before Yadin had left it in order to congratulate him, saying he could not recall another appearance of a private individual that had attracted so much political attention. The two men agreed then and there to get together to discuss political cooperation, an obvious move considering the natural proximity of their positions (despite variances as already noted).

There were other phone calls as well as visits from political figures who could not afford to ignore the threat Yadin had suddenly posed. Rabin, worried, was quoted as calling Yadin and his colleagues "60 year-old Boy Scouts" (Urieli and Barzilai 1982, 84). Meir Amit, a former chief of Intelligence and the head of Koor, the economic concern of the Histadrut, called to congratulate Yadin but was not immediately specific about possible cooperation within the new movement. Even Ariel Sharon came by in an attempt to convince Yadin that they could sleep in the same political bed, but in that he was markedly unsuccessful.

Two days after the show, Yadin received a guest who would have a great deal of influence on the future of the DMC: Shmuel Tamir, the head of the "Free Center" and a

former member of Menahem Begin's Herut Party.²⁵ Yadin was not very enthusiastic about the visitor, but Tamir assured him that his views had moderated since the Yom Kippur War and he was now convinced that territorial compromise was inevitable.

Rubinstein and Yadin, Shinui and the Democratic

Movement: On July 18, 1976, nearly two months after Yadin's appearance on "Moked," Yadin and Rubinstein met privately for the first time to resolve an old issue between the two.²⁶ They met formally at the end of September to discuss what had already become the closest thing possible to a political fait accompli between a democratically-run organization like Shinui and a man who had spent half a lifetime saying he never intended to run for public office - the merger of Rubinstein's brainchild with Yadin's not-yet-extant political movement. They even went so far as to

²⁵Tamir was member of the 'Irgun'* and member of Herut since independence. He had challenged Begin's leadership within Herut and was forced out in 1968. Tamir, then, formed the "Free Center," and won three seats in the 1969 elections.

* The Irgun was the right-wing Zionist underground formed in 1930s, led by Menahem Begin after 1942 (Cohen 1987, 313).

²⁶ Rubinstein published an article questioning the ability and propriety of the Agranat Commission to investigate the government which nominated the commission itself. Yadin, a member of Agranat commission, had been angry with Rubinstein since. Rubinstein was told that he has to resolve that issue before any future cooperation with Yadin could be possible.

agree in principle that the merger would be based on parity until the elections of the permanent bodies of the new party. Yadin was supportive of the idea of primaries for Knesset candidates within the party, an important issue for Rubinstein. He agreed to set Shinui's merger machinery in motion.

Surprisingly, the idea was not met with unanimous enthusiasm in the executive council. Wirshuvski, for one, was vocal in his objection to the merger with Yadin's list, which would be called the Democratic Movement. He feared that Shinui would be swamped, that it would lose its independence and principles (interview with Wirshuvski, January 20, 1992).

Meanwhile, Yadin had to put his movement together quickly. The Democratic Movement officially consisted of 77 names, the first of which was Yadin's and 16 of which belonged to a group called "Oded," a special-interest group of young educated Orientals dedicated to improving social conditions and economic opportunity for Israel's North African immigrants.

A close friend of Yadin's wrote down his impressions of the founding meeting of the Democratic Movement: "There were a lot of military people, a lot of police, a lot of secret service, a lot of university people, few managers of governmental companies, almost no women, no sephardi Jews"

(Urieli and Barzilai 1982, 62) -- a not particularly democratic demography of Israeli society.

But when Yadin appeared in Jerusalem on November 22, 1976 to declare the formation of the Democratic Movement and to present its platform, he was greeted with even more enthusiasm than before. Significantly enough, the media, volunteers and new members of the DM started showing up in droves at Shinui headquarters, which became the de facto offices of the new movement known by the acronym, "Dash."

Yadin stated flatly that the purpose of the party was "to create a parliamentary majority in order to form the new government" (Urieli and Barzilai 1982, 77). He outlined the platform of the Democratic Movement:

-- The state of Israel is Jewish and its regime must be democratic, its borders secure and its capital Jerusalem.

-- In the service of real peace and for the sake of preserving both the Jewish and the democratic character of the state, the Democratic Movement would be willing to relinquish control over territory.

-- The defensible border of Israel to the east is the Jordan River.

-- The new movement will lay its emphasis on domestic issues and on changing the political

system.

The Primaries: A few days after this press conference, the "crisis of the Sabbath" brought down the Labor government. Prime Minister Rabin, after a Friday December 10, 1976 afternoon ceremony welcoming the delivery of F-15 fighter planes from America, due to a delay in the festivities had to drive home after sundown. Agudat-Israel, an ultra-orthodox party in the opposition demanded a vote of no confidence, and nine of the ten MKs of the National Religious Party (NRP), a member of every Labor coalition since statehood, abstained from voting with the government. The coalition survived the vote of no confidence but Rabin decided to punish the NRP and fired its ministers from the government. Next, Rabin resigned himself and new elections were called. The elections were scheduled for May 17, 1977, instead of November of that year as planned, more than halving the time that Yadin and Rubinstein had banked on to ready Dash for the campaign (Urieli and Barzilai 1982, 83).

The newly merged party attempted to think through, set up and carry out its primaries, plan and launch its campaign, and deal with the sudden rush of inquiries in less than three months. Yadin's announcement had set a wave of enthusiasm into motion that, by January 1977, translated into 20 - 25 percent of the popular vote or 24 - 30 mandates

in the 120-member Knesset (Urieli and Barzilai 1982, 194).

Thousands of people were joining the new party every day and hundreds expressing their will to volunteer their time. The party's workers could hardly process the massive barrage of papers and phone calls.

Zorea skillfully took over the organization and launched the campaign. Rubinstein claimed that local organizers could hardly cope with the flood of volunteers and new members. In all the excitement, the rules for the primaries were not nearly as thoroughly discussed as they should have been.

The outstanding feature of the primary by-laws was the condition that only individuals could join the DMC -- no parties or organizations -- and that all prospective members already holding political positions must resign those positions before they could join. The first rule, demanding absolute loyalty in a political system which needed a more than average degree of flexibility in order to function at all, may arguably have been necessary in order to preserve the character of a party bent on reform. But the second rule, in effect requiring professional politicians to throw their careers to the winds, evinced a level of political naivete that in the end helped prove the DMC's undoing.

At the heady beginning, however, it seemed as if Yadin's spotless integrity and Rubinstein's idealism could

actually win the day. Shmuel Tamir and Akiva Noff of the Free Center Party resigned their seats in parliament in order to join the DMC. Aharon Yariv, a former head of Army Intelligence, quit his post as Minister of Information in the Rabin government. Meir Amit and David Golomb left the Labor Party. Shmuel Toledano resigned as the Prime Minister's Advisor on Arabs. Each departed member hit the damaged Labor Party like a fresh blow under the belt, and added to the energy and belief in the possibility that the DMC just might achieve its aims. And the presence of two ex-Herut members (Tamir and Noff) only enhanced the appearance that the DMC was a truly center party.

Israel's first primaries were held on March 15, 1977, a bare two months before the May 15 general elections. Before the primaries in 1977, Rubinstein informed Yadin of what he called the "Arsalan Syndrome" and of the possible pitfalls of the system used in Shinui. Yadin agreed that a different method should be used. After consulting with several experts, the DMC adopted the "transferable vote" method for electing its candidates for the Knesset and council.

In the "transferable vote," in which the voter makes his choices and also places them in order of preference. A computation of the number of votes and the location on the list produced the final list.

According to Rubinstein, 75 percent of the DMC 33,176

members voted in the primaries (Rubinstein 1982, 161). Despite the hopes of the leadership, the primaries produced disastrous results -- the list of candidates was neither balanced nor representative. It was evident that groups got organized in advance and ranked their candidates high on the list to ensure their election.

The "transferable vote" is a system that if not fairly employed could be easily manipulated to thwart the will of the majority. The most extreme case was that of Shafik Asaad, he was placed 12th on the list getting the votes of 3,136 voters, while Eli Eyyal who received 8,912 votes was placed 20th. Had they employed the simple majority method, Asaad would have been ranked 48th and Eyyal 12th. The first became a member of the Knesset the other did not (Barzilai and Urieli 1982, 173-7).

Frustrated and disappointed leaders and members in the party tried to present the primaries as a victory for democracy. But, the DMC was different after the primaries, suspicion and distrust among the various member groups were deepening.

When the results were made public three days later, there were few surprises in the first seven names: Yadin, Rubinstein, Amit, Tamir, Zorea, Wertheimer, Toledano. Other Labor and Herut converts came next: Noff, Halevy, Yaguri, Golomb, Asa'ad, Atchi, Wirshuvski, Elgrabli, Eliyahu.

Stella Levy, a retired Lt. Colonel, (the highest military rank a woman could have reached at the time) was the first woman on the list, placed 17th.

The Campaign: The official campaign was launched on April 28, and the DMC had two tremendous disadvantages -- one endemic to any new party, and one characteristic of a reform party of disaffected Labor members. Due to the controlled system apportioning campaign-related programming on Israeli television, the DMC was allotted 10 minutes of TV time daily as opposed to 6.5 hours for Labor and Likud together (Rubinstein 1982, 102). And the Likud leadership decided on the obvious strategy of neutralizing Yadin by portraying the DMC as a Labor spinoff, citing the high number of ex-Laborites on the list and the similarities in the positions of the two parties -- especially on the Palestinians.

The DMC dealt with the first problem by buying huge newspaper ads (the party published more inches during the course of the campaign than either Labor or Likud) and by organizing dozens of grass-roots events directed locally but coordinated through Tel Aviv. The second problem was initially handled by an insistence on electoral reform as the issue that distinguished the DMC from both Labor and Likud, declaring that the DMC will only join a government

that agrees to radically change the system that elected it.

Although Yadin was portrayed in all the campaign ads as the next Prime Minister, the fact was that the DMC was trailing both Labor and Likud by a significant margin. The party employed a pollster, known popularly as "Gallup Israel," to figure out what it was doing wrong.

The first results forced a major change in strategy on the DMC leadership: 58 percent of potential DMC voters said that electoral reform was a secondary matter. When asked why they would vote for the DMC, 32 percent replied that the DMC gives hope for real change, 27 percent said that the DMC's people are new, young and fresh, and only 22 percent mentioned a greater degree of democracy for the country as a reason. Potential DMC voters were also overwhelmingly in favor of a coalition with Labor (thereby proving the substance behind the Likud campaign strategists' accusations and evidencing the lack of real belief that Yadin will become the next Prime Minister): 58 percent hoped that Labor would remain in power as opposed to just 3 percent for Likud (Urieli and Barzilai 1982, 198-9).

But what shocked the DMC leadership more than anything else was what it interpreted as the pervasive cynicism of its audience. Despite the unsullied reputation of its leader and three years of prescribing for principles in government, 38 percent of the DMC voters said in a poll

taken just one month before the election that the party would probably choose "spoils" in the form of seats and ministry appointments over its vaunted idealism.

In response to this poll, Yadin and the DMC published on May 2 their conditions for joining any future coalition.

The "Seven Principles" were:

- that the number of government departments and ministries must be significantly reduced;
 - that economic reforms should be instituted to bring inflation from 40 percent annually down to no more than 15 percent;
 - that trade union agreements must be enforced to prevent future strikes;
 - that top national priority should be given to disadvantaged groups in the society;
 - that the electoral system be reformed;
 - that the party system, including intra-party democracy, campaign financing, etc., be reformed;
- and
- that the policy of any future government on defense and security should be in accord with the DMC's platform.

The professional politicians in the group tried to stop the publishing of such rigid conditions so shortly before the elections, but Yadin insisted that something be done to

conquer the widespread belief that the DMC would compromise in order to share power with Labor (still the forerunner in the polls) and added his own signature to the ad as an indication that he saw the statement as a personal commitment. In the end, his idealistic stance proved to be a premature step by an amateur. The DMC would be fatally embarrassed by the "seven principles" in the months to come.

The Reasons Behind the DMC's Electoral Success: Third reformist parties tend to emerge in times of political discontent, as I have argued before. It was a combination of the trends in Israel's historical political development and the national circumstances as they played themselves out in 1977 that made the DMC attractive enough, and the other options open to the Israeli public unpalatable enough, to give the DMC the biggest third-party victory in Israel's history.

The DMC was not particularly original in all of or even most of its policies. The electoral reform issue, made most visible by the DMC leadership, had been raised continually since 1948 by various groups and parties. I also do not want to suggest that the DMC, had it attained power, would have been more successful in carrying out its policies than Likud or Labor was during their years of government. But the timing of the emergence of the DMC, as well as its

"personality" as revealed by its platform, organization and modes of operation, seemed to fulfill a multiplicity of needs within the Israeli body politic.

Why did voters opt for an entirely new party rather than choosing from among the many alternatives available? There were ten parties already represented in the Knesset, offering a variety of ideologies, personalities and ethnic and religious perspectives. And in 1977, voters had a choice from among 22 parties including the DMC and those already in power.

It is perhaps most important to remember that the dissatisfaction of the Israeli public was being experienced on a very deep level. They were unhappy with the political system as a whole and not just with the ruling party. The DMC was aware of this dissatisfaction -- was born of it, in fact -- and translated its awareness into an insistence on electoral reform which was probably in itself too narrow to encompass the feelings of frustration among voters. All the data presented in the previous chapter on partisanship, attitudes toward parties and the level of political discontent in Israel at the time indicate that the individual voter felt almost entirely ineffectual within his democracy.

But even if the DMC's emphasis on electoral reform could not carry the entire burden of the need for change, it

was certainly a strong breath of fresh air. And the degree of separation between the voter, his vote and what became of the government was so great, it was perceived as the root cause of the Yom Kippur War.

It is also important to consider that in spite of the seeming multiplicity of choices, there were in Israel in 1977 -- as there almost always is, regardless of whether the system itself allows for the appearance of several parties - - only two options. To all intents and purposes, the Israeli public was presented with either center-to-left-of-center Labor or center-to-right-of-center Likud, the operative differences between them being their positions on the Palestinians and their overall points of view on the economy. Consequently, those voters who accepted the more moderate Labor attitude towards Arab relations and territorial issues had to swallow its socialist economic philosophy and the concomitant taxes and bureaucracy; and those who wanted the government to set the private sector free to create wealth had to come to terms with the Likud's inflexible stance with regard to the Palestinians and its idea of "Greater Israel." For the country's growing middle class, neither the one nor the other really served their

needs.²⁷

By 1977 all that was left of the party was the free enterprise principles of the Likud bloc. Therefore, the DMC presented the only possible alternative to those who did not want to vote for Labor but could not possibly vote for Likud because of its Arab relations policies.

And there were many people who did not want to vote for Labor. Rabin's government was seen as ineffectual even before the Sabbath crisis. Rivalry between Rabin and Shimon Peres, the two leaders of the party, heated up during the campaign with disastrous results. In the months leading up to the elections, scandal wracked the party as well. Asher Yadlin, former head of the "Kupat-Holim" or "sick fund" agency from which most Israelis receive their health services, was nominated and confirmed by Labor to head the Bank of Israel. Immediately afterward he was charged and convicted of taking bribes. Housing Minister Abraham Ofer committed suicide in January 1977 when he learned that a criminal investigation against him had been opened, alleging that he had improperly raised and solicited funds for the party. Finally, Rabin himself resigned just weeks before

²⁷ Interestingly, during the Yishuv period there was a party which accommodated the middle class. The General Zionist Party, which became later the Liberal Party when in 1965 it joined Herut to form Gahal. The General Zionists represented the "civic sector" as opposed to the workers and the religious sectors. The General Zionists had even a larger slice of the electorate than Herut until 1965.

the election when his wife was indicted for holding an unauthorized foreign currency account in the United States. All of this amplified the image of Labor as a party corrupted by its seemingly endless grip on power, and central figures fled to the DMC like rats deserting a sinking ship.

The DMC, with its fresh, invigorated leadership could not have had a more distinct image from Labor's ossified political machine. Even more appealing were the differences in the methods by which the two parties operated. Labor selected candidates in secret internal meetings and relied on paid campaign work. The DMC had held the first national primaries ever, was self-funded, and virtually all of its activities were carried out by volunteers. The DMC had credibility that no other party, certainly not Labor, could hope to approach. In addition, Yadin was probably the only man in the country at the time who could have presented himself as a possible Prime Minister alongside Begin and Peres without seeming ridiculous.

Then there was also the issue of protest voting in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. Incredibly enough, the Israeli public had not been given a single opportunity in four whole years to use its franchise in order to make known its opinions about who was at fault in the war. Although the election itself had been postponed until after the war because of the state of emergency, the lists of parties and

candidates remained frozen in their prewar form. This meant that the protest had to be expressed within the confines of choices that had already been made. The Likud was among the spoilers, gaining more votes in 1973 than would eventually bring the party to power in 1977. But this limited outlet was surely not enough, and the dammed-up anger left over from the war, made stronger by the initial refusal of Meir and Dayan to resign and then the undistinguished management of the country by Rabin, badly needed expression. There was no other party that so perfectly filled this need as did the DMC, born as it was in the extra-democratic protest movements that had, until then, provided the only opportunity for Israelis to make their voices heard.

The DMC was not only an alternative to Likud and Labor. In fact, realistically seen, it was not an alternative to either of the two major parties. But it was a real alternative to the small religious parties that had always had disproportionate power in the government. No party, not even Mapai at its height, had ever gotten a clear majority in Israeli elections, and the religious parties had exacted a high price from every coalition in which they had agreed to participate. They tended to leave the questions of the economy and foreign policy alone, but demanded legislation that influenced the average Israeli's day-to-day existence - - i.e., shutting down public transportation from early Friday afternoon until Saturday night, preventing

archaeologists from digging at the sites of what might have been millennia-old Jewish graveyards, and getting exemptions from the Army for their Yeshiva students, to mention just a few of the constantly recurring themes. Most Israelis, being secular, were tired of the "blackmailing power" of the religious parties because of their always-pivotal swing vote in the coalition. A strong DMC, it was thought, could provide Israel with the first entirely nonreligious government in its history. Even better, the DMC insisted on electoral reforms that would permanently diminish the influence of small parties.

Finally, the DMC offered inclusion in political circles to individuals who were part of the other centers of power in the country: the military, the financial sector, academia and the professions (Arian 1980; Eisenschtadt 1984). In a sense, the DMC and its reformist ideals was created by a class of Israeli society which, politically speaking, believed it had everything to gain and very little to lose.

Chapter Seven

The Political Experience of the DMC

On the evening of May 17, the television news analysts had a political earthquake on their hands. Israeli citizens learned that, for the first time since statehood, a non-Labor government would lead Israel. Before the election results were officially in, Menahem Begin announced victoriously that the religious parties would be welcome in his Likud coalition and he invited all the other parties, including the reformist DMC with its unprecedented 15 mandates, to join in governing the country.

At the DMC headquarters, however, the atmosphere swung between celebratory and crestfallen. Far from becoming the pivotal party it had hoped to be, the DMC was in fact not needed for the formation of the new coalition government. Few had counted on the Likud bloc winning enough seats to form a government -- albeit with a majority of two -- with the religious parties. The DMC had worked hard to overthrow Labor's hold on power, but had not considered the most

likely alternative.

"The crypto-fascists have won," Rubinstein told Wirshuvski when the election results were announced,²⁸ although Zorea was heard saying that he had "prayed for this to happen." The DMC had won more seats than any new party in Israel ever, but it had won exactly few enough to have singlehandedly made possible a regime that ran counter to everything most of its membership -- former Laborites, and therefore cut from the same political and cultural cloth as the defeated Labor Party -- believed in. No wonder no one knew whether to cheer or mourn. There were fateful decisions to be made in the next few weeks.

The Coalition Negotiations: The leaders of the DMC were faced with a classic choice: to maximize their gains politically, explaining away their principles and sharing as much power as possible, or to join with their former enemies in the opposition, continue to build their organization and wait for the next election while attempting to influence the government from without. Either way they would have to make drastic compromises and risk losing everything they had worked for (Torgovnik 1980).

From the outset, it was clear that the party was

²⁸ Interview with Wirshuvski, Jan. 20th 1993, Tel Aviv.

divided into the camp that wanted to join the government and the camp that rejected the idea out of hand. Many of those who had been elected on the DMC list were former Labor members, used to being in power. They argued that with 15 mandates, they had a duty to the voters to at least make an attempt at executing their agenda. The others feared that they would never be able to influence the emerging government on any of the issues they had raised during the campaign -- and perhaps more importantly, the DMC's participation would legitimize a government even less amenable to the DMC's vaunted principles than the old, collapsing Labor structure had been.

There was, for instance, the issue that had plagued Shinui from the start: Palestinian rights. Just days after the election, Begin visited a new settlement in Samaria, Elon Moreh, declaring that many more settlements in the West Bank would follow during his regime. Although the DMC's platform did not reject out of hand all settlements in the occupied territories,²⁹ no one liked the idea of a sudden spate of new Jewish settlements. The DMC had no chance at all of moderating the Likud's hard line from outside the government. But could it effect change from within?

²⁹ The DMC embraced Jewish settlements only along the "defence lines" of what they viewed as the future borders of Israel (The DMC Platform, 1977, 21).

The DMC council decided they had to at least respond to Begin's invitation and join the coalition negotiations. Yadin headed the negotiation team, which was charged with upholding the party's much-publicized seven principles.

The talks broke down almost immediately. Begin focused on ministerial payoffs to the DMC, and Yadin wasn't in the least interested in ministries. He wanted ideological compromise, especially on the settlement issue, which the Likud categorically rejected. Yadin reported being told that if the DMC "wanted to insert an item in the coalition agreement that this government, in preparation for peace talks, was willing to make a territorial compromise on the West Bank, then there was nothing to talk about" (Ha'aretz, 17 June, 1977). Yadin even failed to get a clause into the coalition agreement saying that the settlements were necessary for Israel's defense, which would de facto leave them open to negotiation in exchange for peace. The Likud rejected the formulation outright.

Yadin convened the DMC council. He announced that the negotiations had reached a dead end and that the party would not join the government. Those in favor of sharing power were furious. They argued that the DMC's issues had always been the domestic ones anyway. The founders of the movement had deliberately sidestepped the problem of the Palestinians, and now was not the time to throw away all of

their hard work and success on something that had never been central to their ideology. Zorea, a member of the negotiation team, even went so far as to accuse Yadin and the pro-opposition camp of sabotaging the negotiations in order to prevent the DMC from joining the government (Yediot Achronot August 5, 1977; Ha'aretz, August 7, 1977).

Meanwhile Labor was also trying to regroup. Shimon Peres and others in the party put pressure on some of the DMC MKs, trying to talk them into joining the opposition. Labor believed that Begin's meager majority would not survive long, and was leaving no stone unturned in the attempt to prevent him from forming a secure government. The Labor Party leadership had even met with the National Religious Party (NRP), looking for a way to revive the "historical alliance" between the two.

The NRP was interested in the DMC's entrance into the government for its own reasons, however. They had participated in every Israeli government since statehood, traditionally controlling the ministries of interior and religion. In the Begin government they had also been offered the Police portfolio. However, for the first time, they were not the sole representatives of Israel's religious Jews in the government: Agudat-Israel, an ultra-orthodox, non-Zionist party that had never participated in a ruling coalition, had suddenly gained more leverage in the

government with its four MKs than the NRP had with its 12 seats. With the DMC in the opposition Agudat-Israel was the pivotal party in the government. The former, disinterested in ministerial positions, had "settled" for the chairmanship of the finance committee (the Knesset member most responsible for appropriations from the national budget, an extremely powerful position) and for the presidency of the coalition, who could through his parliamentary position promote or hinder whatever legislation he wished.

The NRP was fully aware of what Agudat-Israel intended to do with the power it had gained. It could now easily support and expand its independent school system and give its own Yeshiva students special treatment by the government. Agudat-Israel would undoubtedly also challenge the NRP on its dedication to religious issues and try to undermine its position among religious voters. The NRP would also lose patronage and other privileges it had enjoyed for decades.

Therefore it was in the NRP's interest that the DMC join the Likud-led government, depriving Agudat-Israel of its pivotal position with Begin and leaving the NRP in its old position as the representative of religious Jewry in the Israeli cabinet.

Thus the DMC was under pressure from all sides as well as from within. Labor wanted the DMC in the opposition, and

there was a powerful camp in the party, including the party leader, which was in favor of that. The NRP saw that its political benefit lay higher in getting the DMC to join the government, which many of the members of the DMC council also wanted. And Begin, although not willing to compromise the least bit on his bread and butter issues, would have been happy for the air of respectability the staunchly anti-corruption and anti-clerical DMC would give to his nationalistic, religious-party-dependent government. He was also naturally concerned about his uncomfortably slim majority, which would make it difficult to maintain coalition discipline.

As the DMC council discussed its options and its members fought among themselves in the national press, Begin was moving quickly to form a government. By the time Yadin re-entered coalition negotiations, a number of important facts on the ground had been established.

Begin's majority broke down as follows: The Likud had won 43 seats, and the 12 seats from the NRP as well as four seats from Agudat-Israel and a single seat from another small religious party made 60. Ariel Sharon's party, "Shlomzion," added two seats, bringing Begin over the minimum, and the government had the extra support of the

controversial Shmuel Flatto-Sharon.³⁰

It was a slight majority, but a strong one, as none of the parties involved had to make any ideological compromises in order to share in power. Begin was able to leave several portfolios open to tempt the DMC into joining and making his position totally secure. The ministries of welfare, transportation, communication and justice were left unmanned -- all domestic, all of secondary importance.

In a surprise move, Begin offered the ministry of Foreign Affairs to Moshe Dayan, 27th on the Labor Party list. Dayan accepted, defecting from Labor and dashing the DMC's hopes of moderating some of Begin's positions by controlling the Foreign Ministry. The ironies of the DMC's situation multiplied. A portfolio which had little to do with the party platform, jealously coveted in spite of its supposed irrelevance, had been given to the man whose immediate and unconditional resignation from government Shinui had been born to demand and, in part, was responsible for.

As time passed and negotiations continued, pressure grew and the DMC's options shrank. Some of the veteran

³⁰ Flatto-Sharon had entered the election in order to have parliamentary immunity from an impending extradition to France, where he had been indicted for fraudulent acts. He received enough votes for two seats, but was the only name on his party's list.

politicians on the council, such as Tamir and Amit, started talking unofficially with the leaders of the coalition. They had their eyes on the still-vacant ministry seats, which would not be empty forever. Begin had his own problems: ministers and MKs were asked not to leave the country when the Knesset was in session, for fear of a parliamentary ambush by the opposition. He needed a more substantial majority, and he had to fill the holes in his cabinet. In October, a few days before the ministry positions were given to MKs from other parties, the DMC resumed official talks with the government. Begin was also under pressure from his partners to fill up the vacant ministries. Shinui's people on the other hand were worried constantly and suspicious of their colleagues who never really accepted the decision not to join the government. But in October few days before the ministries that were held for the DMC were about to be given to other parties the negotiations resumed.

The Decision to Join: Tamir, a shrewd politician, was especially eager to join the government. He convinced (others argue that he manipulated) Yadin that the DMC will be better off with less than it had hoped to achieve than being left without altogether. Although Yadin was slowly being won over by the argument that the system had to be

changed from within, it was actually two more or less chance occurrences that crystallized the decision to join the government.

First, thanks to a change of government in both America and the Soviet Union, the cold war was beginning to thaw. The superpowers had agreed, in a joint announcement, to force peace talks among the various parties in the Middle East under the auspices of the Geneva Conference. Strongarming from without had always brought the normally splintered Israeli public together in a seamless solid front, and patriot Yadin suddenly had many fewer problems with lending his respectability to the Begin government.

Then there was the question of Begin's health. He was old, and had suffered a heart attack just weeks after the elections. Yadin had been offered the post of deputy prime minister in the coalition negotiations, leaving open the possibility that he would completely take over the reins of government if something happened to Begin.

Yadin approved the DMC's entrance into the government, and it took just three days for the DMC's council to accept the offer it had rejected only a month earlier (Torgovnik 1980; Rubinstein 1982; Silberman 1993; Urieli and Barzilai 1982).

The coalition agreement signed by the DMC contained the following provisions:

1. The DMC would be free from parliamentary discipline, could express its opinions as it liked and would have the right to abstain in matters concerning Judea and Samaria (as the Likud called the West Bank).
2. Decisions with regard to new settlements would be brought to the Knesset Security and Foreign Affairs committee for discussion at the request of any DMC MK, and Prof. Yadin would be free to submit his objections, if any, to the cabinet.
3. The DMC would have the freedom to vote on any and all religious matters, and would not be bound by promises or agreements made to other parties in the coalition.
4. Electoral reform would take place before the next elections, which would be held under a new system with the country divided into 10-16 districts. A committee consisting of representatives of all parties in the coalition would be formed to set up the reforms. The DMC would have the freedom to vote independently on this matter if the committee did not reach unanimous agreement on the new system.
5. The DMC would have four ministers: Prof. Yadin, deputy prime minister as well as acting prime

minister in Begin's absence and coordinator of all social and welfare ministries; Prof. Katz, minister of welfare and labor, who would also become responsible for the ministry of health after the passage of planned reforms in the national health program; Meir Amit, minister of communication and transportation; and Shmuel Tamir, minister of justice.

At the start of the coalition negotiations, the DMC had appeared to be what Neumann calls a party of principles; when the negotiations concluded seven months later, it had turned out to be a party of expediency (Neumann 1956, 400). The DMC had been a reform-minded party, and had failed to achieve a single reform. But it had guaranteed its viability through its ministerial posts and its role, albeit secondary, in policy-making -- thereby bringing visibility and a solid recruitment base (Torgovnik 1980, 95).

The DMC council debates on whether or not to sign the agreement were among the most impassioned since the movement had begun. The relegating of the DMC's most important issues to committees started alarm bells ringing in the heads of many of the original founders of Shinui, but it was the proviso that gave the DMC the right to abstain from votes concerning the West Bank that irked Rubinstein the

most. Everyone knew that all of those votes would be foregone conclusions, with or without the DMC's abstention and supposed freedom of expression on the issue, and Rubinstein insisted that the only way to be effective was to demand a veto.

Signing a coalition contract securing the right to abstain from voting in matters of life and death was scandalous, he said. Basically, it would mean that the DMC wanted an exemption from having to take a position on the most vital issue facing the country, wanted to indulge in the rewards of being in power without taking on the responsibilities that go along with power. To illustrate his argument, Rubinstein gave the example of Menahem Begin's Likud bloc, which had resigned from the national unity government of 1970 rather than accept the same offer that the DMC was now considering. At that time, the issue was accepting the "Rogers" peace initiative, which was based on U.N. Resolution 242, setting the stage for giving up land in return for peace. In bringing down the unity government, Begin had called it an insult to suggest that he would enjoy power while being released from his responsibilities (Rubinstein 1982, 245-7; Safran 1981, 177).

Rubinstein's stand on this issue, in the end, made it impossible for him to run within the party for the Justice Minister position. In accordance with the DMC's rules,

every minister had to be voted upon by the entire council. Rubinstein, as the most visible member of the party other than Yadin and as a law professor, was the only member of the founding group of Shinui who had a chance at one of the open portfolios. Although he and the others from Shinui decided in the end to stay with the party they had helped to build, as different as that party had turned out to be from their hopes and dreams, not a single original member reaped the benefits of the DMC's success. Shmuel Tamir, the experienced politician and a lawyer who had been in favor of joining the government from the start, became the Minister of Justice. The DMC had been taken over by the newcomers.

Further Compromises: The most important issues for the DMC had been electoral and structural reform. On the structure of government front, the coalition contract stated that the Ministry of Health would merge with the Ministry of Welfare, creating a super-ministry of Welfare, Labor and Health which would ultimately be controlled by Yadin. This would give the DMC the opportunity to make real changes in the social welfare system in Israel, thereby narrowing the gaps between the classes and making Israeli society generally more just and generous. More importantly it was an opportunity to do good on their promise to concentrate on domestic issues. When the DMC entered Likud-led government

on October 24, 1977, the Ministry of Health had already been given over to a Likud faction not at all anxious to let it disappear. After prolonged negotiations which Rubinstein called "a test of credibility and adherence to principles," the Likud agreed to transfer and combine the Ministry of Health into the super-ministry of Welfare. The only string attached was that the transfer will take place after a national health law is passed or at the latest within a year. Neither one passed, the ministry remained in the hands of Likud and the National Health Reform bill was passed only in 1994.

But the worst damage to the DMC's future was caused by the compromise it reached on electoral reform, because of the high priority and salience the DMC attached to it. Here the DMC was up against not only the deepest-held interests of the government of which it was a part, but also had to confront expert and time-tested negotiators who were easily able to mire the idealism of the inexperienced DMC members in complexities and side issues.

The DMC wanted direct elections by district to replace the nationwide system of proportional representation. First, in the interest of so-called realism, Begin was able to get the DMC negotiators to leave one-third of the Knesset seats under the present system. Next began the numbers game: the DMC had originally wanted 20 districts, but was

willing to go down to 16; Begin agreed to "at least fifteen." Then the NRP joined the debate, proposing no more than six districts and that voting, even within the districts, be for parties rather than for individuals.

The NRP rightly feared its demise under a district system. Its strength was demographic, not geographic. If Begin conceded to the DMC's demands, he would lose the NRP. Although the DMC had a somewhat larger share of Knesset seats than the NRP, 15 to the religious party's 12, Begin would have a heavy ideological payoff. As a compromise, he suggested there be 10 districts and gave the religious parties a veto on the ultimate number -- thereby granting his religious coalition partners the kind of effective control over their most important issues that he had refused to give the DMC on security and the West Bank.

Disintegration: Despite the setbacks, the first few weeks in the coalition were not as bad as many had feared -- thanks to a couple of important developments with which the DMC had little to do, but from which the party reaped the benefits as members of the government. The first was the short-term effect of the economic reform launched by the Likud, liberalizing foreign currency regulations and replacing the Lira with the Shekel at one-tenth the former currency's value. This gave an immediate impression that

inflation was coming under control and the economy would soon be on its way to recovery.

More important, and certainly more spectacular, was President Anwar Sadat of Egypt's visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977, to initiate talks that would lead to a peace treaty. Menahem Begin, during the campaign so uncompromising on territorial issues, had signed away the Sinai less than a year after taking office. In fact, some of Begin's closest colleagues from Likud opposed the treaty. Geula Cohen and Moshe Shamir left Begin's party and formed "Tchiyah" on the right in June of 1979, and neither Moshe Arens nor Yitzhak Shamir voted for the peace. The DMC appeared as an active partner in this process, although the treaty would have passed anyway because of the support of the Labor Party and others in the opposition.

But the degree of compromise the DMC had decided to allow, as well as the amount of time it had taken to join the government, were all too much for the idealistic hopes and dreams of the party's members. Of the 38,000 people who had joined the DMC before the elections, only 5,000 rejoined between November 1977 and May 1978 (Rubinstein 1982, 188; Urieli and Barzilai 1982, 273). Polls showed the DMC's popularity down to 2-3 percent from the 20-25 percent before the elections.

The split in the party that had begun with the offer to

join the government widened to the point where it was almost impossible to see the slightest cohesion in the DMC council. So many regional branches had closed up shop, the leadership was in the unusual situation of not knowing what to do with the funds it got from the state treasury for its presence in the Knesset. Council members decided to try to revive recruitment, publishing a new bulletin and to hold new regional elections to replace those representatives who had been so hastily voted in before the general elections. But to no avail. The DMC continued to deteriorate.

General Zorea, the man who more than anyone else had convinced Yadin to enter politics and then to join the Begin government, resigned from the Knesset in February 1978. He admitted that although he had wanted to defeat politics as usual, politics had defeated him. "A beautiful party has fallen into the hands of the unethical and hypocritical," he said, but it was rumored that he was just bitter because he had run within the party for the Ministry of Welfare and lost (Urieli and Barzilai 1982, 314).

Yadin's Denouement: Perhaps the most mysteriously tragic transformation came about in the person of Yigael Yadin. Despite the failure of the electoral reform due to the NRP's tactics, despite the inability to get a national health bill passed, and most of all despite the continual

building of new settlements in the occupied territories over Yadin's formal objections, the DMC remained in the government. In fact, as Avraham Schweitzer wrote: "Yadin has become the most stable member and the mainstay for Begin and his government. After all, neither Dayan nor Weizman, who publicly question Begin's policies with regard to the Americans and the Egyptian [peace process], were elected on a platform calling for compromise. That was Yadin" (Ha'aretz, 13 April, 1978).

Yadin was upset that just because he and his ministers were not breaking the rules of confidentiality and leaking information to the press, they were seen as being in passive agreement with the government's settlement policy. Hardly anyone, even in the DMC itself, took this explanation seriously, and pressure from within the party to do something to prevent yet more settlements from being built grew -- along with the criticism when nothing changed. But Yadin seemed to believe that it was wrong to criticize publicly the government of which he was a member, and he remained committed to this idea until the end of his career.

The tension in the party finally made itself felt in a split between Rubinstein and Yadin. Rubinstein and his fellow DMC representatives in the Knesset began to discuss a complete break with the DMC in order to withdraw from the coalition. Yadin reacted to this initial attempt with

conciliation, assuring the Rubinstein group that lines of communication and cooperation between the ministers and the MKs of the DMC would improve. Rubinstein and his friends settled down to wait for the intra-party elections before making their decision.

But the group was preempted by Prof. Uriel Reichman, who had taken over Rubinstein's old position as dean of the law school in Tel Aviv. He organized a call for the DMC to remove Yadin as head of the party and leave the government in June 1978. Activity began stirring in some of the party's dormant branches as a result of this move.

The showdown came on August 17, 1978, at the executive council meeting. It was played out with parliamentary procedure. There were two items on the agenda: the council elections and the DMC's continued participation in the government. Yadin, who had Tamir's assurance that their faction had a majority, moved to elect the new council first and postpone the issue of the DMC's future in the coalition. Rubinstein moved that the council vote on the agenda for the meeting.

Yadin exploded, threatening to walk out and convene an alternative council if he loses this vote. It was 57 to 55 with one abstention in favor of discussing the DMC's participation in the government. Yadin refused to accept the results of the voting, arguing that there was a

conspiracy of the members of Shinui against him personally.

On August 22 the "divorce" was signed, splitting equally the party's funds and property. The Democratic Movement for Change then consisted of Yadin, Tamir, Halevy, Noff, Asa'ad, Eliyahu and Elgrabli. It was a party of seven members, three of whom were ministers³¹ -- a party who initially demand a reduction in the size of government.

The Shinui faction withdrew its support from the government, and its five MKs, Rubinstein, Wertheimer, Wirshuvski, Toledano and Atchi, joined the opposition. At first Amit and Golomb, the former Labor Party members, stuck with Shinui. They later returned to the fold of their old allegiance. Assaf Yaguri, a single member faction, later joined the Likud.

Once more Yadin saved the government of which he was a member, when the furor over the Camp David Accords implementation threatened to irreparably damage the Likud.

Moshe Dayan resigned in October of 1979 and Ezer Weizman followed him in May 1980 both accused Begin of backtracking on the autonomy he had committed himself to giving the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (Rubinstein 1982, 314).

The Israeli economy was in a shambles, inflation

³¹ Professor Katz was a minister but not a member of the parliament.

climbing at two digits a month, and three different finance ministers were either replaced or resigned in short order. Subject to occasional votes of no confidence submitted by the opposition, Begin had to cave in more and more to the religious parties whose votes he so badly needed.

Yadin was in charge of "Project Renewal," aimed at revitalizing poor neighborhoods across the country. With Begin's help, Yadin raised millions of Shekels from philanthropists in Europe and America to fund the project. The plan was to have the government pay for improvement of infrastructure while the young people living in these neighborhoods were encouraged to take the lead in rebuilding their communities. But "Project Renewal" was quickly bogged down by bureaucratic inefficiency, budget cutting and Yadin's own inability to deal with human problems.

Apparently having invested more of his own sense of integrity in this project than in his objections to the settlements, Yadin threatened to leave the government when the finance minister declared "Project Renewal" a dangerously inflationary endeavor and froze all funds that had been earmarked for it. But he was too weak politically to save the plan in its entirety; the social programs were cut and only the construction contracts remained.

This left Yadin with nothing more to do. Ministries out of his control had taken over the only initiative of his

political career. His secretary, Maya Bailey, recounted later how insulting the situation had become. "At first there were constant calls and papers and problems, and slowly it diminished to practically no calls, no papers. There was nothing to do . . ." (Silberman 1993, 356).

Yadin and what was left of the DMC became among the favorite subjects of ridicule in the press. Allen E. Shapiro, a political scientist, called Yadin "not a false Messiah, but an irrelevant one" (quoted in Silberman 1993, 354).

The members of the DMC fled one by one. By the end of the government's term in 1981, only Yadin was left. After the elections in the spring of that year he returned to academia. Yigael Yadin died in 1984.

The Elections of 1981: The rampaging inflation and severe economic problems coupled with the desertion of some key figures from the government, as described earlier, were taking their toll on the government. The Likud government was losing popularity and support from mid 1980. In fact, polls taken in May 1980 showed that Likud would win 26 seats had the elections were held then, and Labor would win an absolute majority of the seats in the Knesset (Torgovnik 1986, 51). Begin's health deteriorated after a second heart attack and rumors that he is not functioning and often

depressed. But all of that changed as the campaign approached. The Likud regrouped and skillfully used the resources at its disposal as the party in power. The finance minister Yoram Aridor, the fourth one in the four years of Likud government, launched some populist programs, which many labeled "elections bribes" or "elections economics." Prices were cut down and taxes were massively reduced on some consumer goods such as colored televisions and cars.

Begin took upon the opposition and its leader personally, he successfully attacked Shimon Peres's integrity and policy, he warned the public that the return of Labor will bring about the establishment of a Palestinian State in the Judea and Samaria. The public responded favorably, Labor was gradually losing strength in the polls.

Begin's "awakening" and the rhetoric he used against Labor and against the Kibbutzim among others, resulted in the most uncivil, rude and violent campaign the country ever known. Ethnic tension between the more Sephardi Likud supporters and the more Ashkenazi Labor reached new and dangerous heights (Sprinzak 1986; Elazar 1986).

The campaign's appearances of Labor's leaders were disrupted by noisy demonstrators who were primarily Likud supporters. Often, the protection of the police was needed to escort the Labor's leaders and physical clashes between

Likud supporters and Labor became daily affairs. The Labor and its partners attacked back by labeling the Likud and its supporters as fascist and Khomeiniistic and the equation "Beginism = Fascism" was often used (Torgovnik 1986, 57).

The violence raised fear and disgust among many in Israel, and polls showed that it caused Likud was losing support. Begin called upon his followers to refrain from violence and to exhibit tolerance but had little success.

Just days before the elections, the Likud pulled what was perceived as the last stunt of the campaign. The Israeli Air Force raided the Iraqi nuclear plant in Ossirak and destroyed it. Labor condemned the use of the army for political purposes, the Likud responded that Labor's reaction is just another proof for its unpatriotic bent. The public at large, however, was pride of and endorsed the operation.

The Results: Likud gained 37.1 per cent of the votes and the Labor-Alignment 36.6 per cent which translated to 48 seats and 47 respectively. Labor recovered most of the votes it had lost to the DMC in 1977, but not enough to form a government. The Likud formed its second government.

Shinui's Development: Shinui retained its organization and became a minor party. It achieved some success passing

few parliamentary initiative. It has participated in all the elections since 1977, always gaining two or three seats. During the 1992 election campaign, Shinui formed an electoral bloc with the Civil Rights Movement and with Mapam, a socialist party. The new bloc, called "Meretz," won 12 seats and became a coalition partner. In 1994 Prof. Amnon Rubinstein was serving as the Minister of Education in Rabin's cabinet.

Chapter Eight

The Aftermath: The Bull Moose After 1912, and The DMC After 1977

The Bull Moose and the DMC parties failed to gain the limited goal they set for themselves: Roosevelt did not become the president in 1913; Yadin did not become the Prime Minister nor did the DMC become a pivotal party. The simple facts are that neither party seized enough power in the relevant elections. But, political parties do not cease to exist merely because they lose a single quest for office. Furthermore, in a democracy, by definition, we expect losers and must have an opposition.

The question, then, is why neither of these reformist third parties become established parties, and why did they eventually disintegrate? Why, despite their sizable support in the electorate, did these parties fail to sustain their newly acquired position? The Bull Moose Party was the second largest vote getter in 1912 and came closer to winning the election than any other third party in American history. The DMC emerged as Israel's third largest party in 1977 just months after its birth. Given the impact they had on their political systems the question becomes even more

intriguing.

It is impossible to identify a single cause from among the many that exhibited themselves before the end of each of these parties. The analysis of the decline of both parties focuses on the internal constraints stemming from the reformist third party's self-definition and from its subsequent deeds.

Many problems and mistakes that followed the formation of the two parties are related directly to the definition of the reformist third party as a party.

Both the Bull Moose and DMC had all the features by which Schlesinger (1965) defines a party: each had a candidate -- Roosevelt and Yadin. They had a label -- Progressive and Change. And they had successfully competed in an election. Compared with this minimal definition, Chambers's more expansive definition sheds light on a missing dimension within the two cases. For Chambers, a political party is:

a relatively durable social formation which seeks offices or power in government, exhibits a structure or organization which links leaders at the centers of government to a significant popular following in the political arena and its local enclaves, and generates in group perspectives or at least symbols of identification or loyalty (Chambers, 1975, 5).

These parties did not, after all, represent a "durable

social formation." Had these parties existed for a longer period of time, it seems plausible to assume that it would have enhanced the other elements that make up a political party. The Bull Moose and the DMC were vulnerable with regard to every dimension which defines a party -- organization, leadership, membership, and program. These two parties further exacerbated their situation with regard to each of these dimensions by their own doings.

In contrast, established parties, major or minor, are ongoing organizations which have multiple resources at their disposal: knowledge, experience, the ability to mobilize campaigns, control of public office and legislative seats, and so on. When this is taken into account, it creates a significant advantage over a new party. In an established party the organizational structure is set and many functions are routinized by members and leaders. Also, patronage and office-holding help established parties retain the loyalty of members. New parties face all these challenges with immense uncertainty (Rosenstone et. al., 1984; Mazmanian 1974; Wolinetz 1988; Lawson and Merkel 1988; Schlessinger 1982).

The Organization: The importance of organization in the definition of a party is paramount. Organization, more than any other element, defines the party as we have seen in

chapter 1 in the definitions of Wilson and Duverger. This issue presents a special challenge for reformist third parties. The reformers who formed these parties emphasized that one of their reason for being is to offer an alternative organization -- a democratic one. It seems that many of the founders of these parties accepted Michels' (1912) premise that, "he who says organization says oligarchy." To eliminate some of the adverse effects associated with most political parties, both the Bull Moose and DMC devised direct democracy methods such as the primaries and referendum, which were adopted within their own organizations and suggested for other parties. In fact, some among the Progressives thought that they could do without political parties, echoing the federalists distrust and fear of political parties. Parties of the kind that had evolved by the end of the ninetieth century, Herbert Croly claimed, were concerned chiefly with the pursuit of patronage, which produced an "enfeeblement" of government. "Overthrow of the two-party system," Croly wrote, was "indispensable to successful progressive democracy" (Croly 1914, 349; Reichley 1992).

Because of the specific circumstances of their emergence, both parties had very little time before their first national elections (this is often the case with new parties). They barely had any time to practice the very

methods they advocated for new democratic organization. As we see, whatever organizations they had subsequently built were not strong enough to outlive the departure of their leaders or some members (Hays 1957, 148; Torgovnik 1980).

In the 1912 elections, the Bull Moose had managed a full slate of candidates for the national House of Representatives in only fifteen of the forty-eight states. In fact, they were present on the ballot primarily in places where Progressives took over the Republican organizations. For instance, in California, the Republicans were even deprived of an official place on the ballot as a result of an early takeover by Progressives led by Hiram Johnson. The Progressives' effort to build a national organization began immediately after the elections of 1912. The Bull Moose set into place a most innovative structure by making good use of the high caliber of members at its disposal: the Progressive Service (described in chapter 4). Frances Kellor, the chair of the Service, described it as a "radical departure from all standard party organization," a party laboratory manned with experts (Gable 1978, 166). Deservedly or not, however, the "radical" innovation was roundly criticized. The Service's authority to prescribe solutions to politicians was questioned. It was accused of being essentially undemocratic. Further, the Service's working assumption, that there were scientific solutions to social and economic

problems which experts could agree upon, was questioned and ridiculed. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm and success of Service programs during 1913 led many to believe that the Progressive Party was about to become a permanent feature in American politics.

Initially, the educational and organizational goals of the Progressives, were complementary of each other. But, before the 1914 elections, a controversy developed within the party between those who placed higher emphasis on political organization and those social educators connected with the Progressive Service. The more experienced politicians within the party contended that the needs of the campaign placed a priority on traditional political activity and work. The political organizers argued that the approaching 1914 campaign required more funds and the party could no longer support the elaborate bureaucracy and work of the Progressive Service. In fact, they further argued, the Service was a success and had completed its work.

The Service workers, naturally, did not agree. Both sides approached Roosevelt looking for support, but he remained committed to both the Service and the political organizers. When Roosevelt was in South America, on one of his long trips early in 1914, the "politicians" among the Progressives began to dismantle the Service. The Executive Committee of the party, headed by Perkins, passed a

resolution to end some Service bureaus, and gradually cut its funds during 1914. Eventually, the Progressive Service dissociated itself from the Progressive Party and operated independently (Gable 1978, 184-6). But the funds the political organizers "freed" for the campaign, at the expense of the Service, did not yield the expected results. The 1914 elections were disastrous for Progressive candidates, they lost in nearly every region. The Bull Moose candidates received only half of the votes their leader won just two years earlier.

The DMC faced organizational problems too. When Rabin's government resigned, the national elections were rescheduled for May 1977, instead of proceeding as originally planned in October of the same year. This development reduced by half the time in which the new party, the DMC, formed in late 1976 through a merger of several groups, had to plan, organize, and prepare its campaign. Shinui was the only group that had a solid and an ongoing organization: membership records, operational branches, elected council, headquarters, etc., Because of the short time between the merger and the elections, the leaders agreed that the new party would assume the organizational structure of Shinui until after the elections. Within weeks, Shinui, a small organization of some four thousand members, had to absorb more than 35 thousand newcomers. The

multitude of problems within the new party and its subsequent disintegration left the only organized group, Shinui with its organization still intact today a living testimony to the importance of organization.

Dismissing the methods by which the old parties nominated their candidates, Shinui vowed that it would build an open and democratic organization. The new party would empower its members to elect their representatives rather than relying on nominating committees. Shinui, which was formed in 1974, had at least accumulated some experience practicing such methods before it merged with the Democratic Movement. But that short experience proved to be insufficient for the amateurs they were. The first elections of Shinui's council, as described in chapter 6, led the DMC to adopt a different method of selecting their candidates for the Knesset; the "transferable vote."

The founders of the DMC expressed so much disgust for the existing political establishment that they announced that no professional politician could join the newly born party. And in order to avoid the factional structure that Likud and Labor were made of, the DMC's leaders, declared that new members could join individually but not as a group. Subsequently, elected officials were requested to resign their positions before joining the rank and file of the new party. This act had serious implications. For example, the

members of the Knesset who were forced to resign forfeited their right to paid time on television and radio during the campaign, and lost their ongoing public funding as MKs. The DMC was also the only political party ever to return unused campaign funds to the state treasury. Remaining true to the high plane of their moral and ethical convictions, the Party returned the amount of one million liras. The DMC tried to be a pioneer and insisted on remaining a shining example for the rest of the parties to emulate (Barzilai and Urieli 1982, 287).

Principles aside, in reality the DMC was built out of various groups: Yadin's Democratic Movement, Shinui, Tamir's group, and the Amit-Golomb group. The difference between the DMC and other parties in the system in this regard was that the other parties acknowledged their factional structure by ensuring representation for each group. The DMC refused to acknowledge it in principle, yet had to deal with the implications of being, in reality, an amalgamation of groups.

The results of primaries were the first major disappointment and led to intra-party feuds within the DMC were serious and were often aired publicly. The list of candidates was not balanced and it was clear that some groups got better organized before the primaries to assure the elections of their leaders high on the list. It was not

an accident that many of the founders of the DMC found themselves out or way behind several "newcomers" who happened to be also experienced politicians. The intra-party dynamic became a negative one since the primaries as distrust and mutual accusations were made between the several factions. Yigael Yadin, the leader, found himself repeatedly having to respond to rumors or fending off accusations by one group or individual against another.

The Leadership: Often, much of the success of a reformist third party is attributed to its leader. The reformist third party aspires to become a major party, its leaders and founders are aware of the necessity to attract as large a public as possible. Therefore, it must have an outstanding leader who can be viewed as a symbol around which to rally and unite members, attracting as many voters as possible. Major parties are usually led by charismatic leaders as well, but, for a new reformist third party, it is imperative to have such leader.

Initially, the Progressive League within the Republican Party was led by Senator La Follette. However, the other option, Roosevelt, was much more exciting. Similarly, Shinui was led by Professor Rubinstein, not a particularly charismatic leader. The small organization, recognizing its need to grow, had been constantly searching for somebody

else to bolster its image. Professor Yadin, the "Myth-maker," turned out to be the leader Shinui had hoped for.

Both Roosevelt and Yadin, long national symbols in their own right before their third party bids, were leaders that provided, almost instantly, an essential ingredient to third party strategy. The parties they were willing to lead at once became a point of mass attraction for huge throngs of enthusiastic supporters. On the negative side, they also attracted a few political opportunists -- politicians of a kind that seem unable to resist any opportunity to further their own self-interests.

In retrospect, many of the founders of the Bull Moose and DMC came to assign much of the blame for their collapse to their leaders. Roosevelt and Yadin were specifically accused of betraying the cause and the people they led, respectively. Held equally culpable were the opportunistic elements who "took over" the parties: George Perkins, the financier of the Progressive Party, and Shmuel Tamir of the DMC.

When it was clear that Roosevelt had declined the presidential nomination of the Progressives in 1916, Oswald Garrison Villard telegraphed his newspaper, informing it:

On its (the Bull Moose's) tombstone history will write: created by Theodore Roosevelt for his own purposes and killed when it suited him. In all the sizable

graveyard of the third parties of our political history, there lies none done to death so cruelly and so casually (Smith 1985, 493).

"Who Killed the Progressive Party?" is an article written by Harold Ickes, a member by proxy of the National Executive Committee of the Bull Moose, which argues that Perkins was to blame. Perkins, Ickes maintains, was loyal to Roosevelt personally and interested in facilitating Roosevelt's election; but Perkins manipulated Roosevelt back into the Republican Party and implies that Perkins never really cared about the Progressive agenda or organization (Ickes 1941).

When Amos Pinchot described the people who joined the Bull Moose, he recalled the delegates to the first Bull Moose convention in Chicago 1912.

. . . large number of superior, intelligent, and deeply earnest people . . . This admirable group furnished the moral fibers of the new party, but outnumbering them was a distinct majority made up of people bent chiefly on riding to power or prestige on Roosevelt's broad back. Then there was that raft of restless sentimentalists who always clutter a new movement that may possibly satisfy their craving for good in the abstract (Pinchot 1958, 170-1).

In the epilogue to his book, Rubinstein writes that in the future, political scientists and others will struggle to understand the enigmatic DMC. They will, undoubtedly, says Rubinstein, find many reasons for the demise of such promising hope, but, for Rubinstein, all the reasons are

dwarfed in light of a single one -- the personality of Yigael Yadin (Rubinstein 1982, 332).

In interviews this writer has had with Rubinstein and Wirshuvski, the founders of Shinui, both expressed their deep disappointment with Yadin and held him personally responsible for the unhappy developments in the DMC. Yet, for both of them, Tamir and his friends of the former "Free Center" Party were the real villains in the saga. Rubinstein and Wirshuvski accused Tamir of taking over the movement. Tamir and his friends, the experienced politicians, joined the DMC just two months before the primaries. Although they joined individually and not as a group, they managed to secure three seats for their leaders, all of whom were MKs in the past. Gradually, Tamir became close to Yadin and appears to have manipulated him into joining with the Likud government, where Tamir, not Rubinstein -- the Constitutional Law Professor -- managed to gain the prestigious post of Minister of Justice.

Interestingly, all of the accounts written by members of the Bull Moose and DMC lack any admission of responsibility for the difficulties their parties faced.

Max Weber described those who are likely to succeed in politics:

Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective . . . man would not have attained the possible unless time

and again he had reached out for the impossible. But to do that a man must be a leader, and not only a leader but a hero as well, in a very sober sense of the word. And even those who are neither leaders nor heroes must arm themselves with that steadfastness of heart which can brave even the crumbling of all hopes. . . . Only he has the calling for politics who is sure that he shall not crumble when the world from his point of view is too stupid or too base for what he wants to offer. Only he who in the face of all this can say 'In spite of all!' has the calling for politics (Weber 1946, 128).

This ideal profile of a political leader rarely exists. In reformist third parties it is even more difficult to find such leaders. Roosevelt and Yadin seem wan when viewed by the light of steadfastness Weber writes about. When matters did not instantly go their way, they gave up. Their behavior starkly contrasts with their previous public image as vigorous, persistent leaders.

In retrospect, one of the most intriguing issues with regard to these leaders is to try to explain their behavior. Why did Roosevelt run and why Yadin behave as he did after becoming the leader of the DMC? Some explanations were offered but none seem me to be satisfactory.

Roosevelt had already been a president and was a good politician, and he knew the history of third parties in America. Why did he run in face of an almost sure defeat in 1912? "Probably his personal anger with Taft bulked largest in his real reasons for entering the contest, plus the fact that by the end of convention week he had publicly expressed

such moral outrage that a person as he was, he could not remain silent or inactive" (Mowry 1971, 2147).

Another possibility is that of victory. Until the Democrats nominated Wilson, it was not that clear that Roosevelt would lose. Furthermore, during the two years following the 1912 defeat Progressives were very optimistic. During 1913 and 1914, the building of national organization was intensive and the Progressives believed that their party is about to become a permanent feature within the American party system.

Yadin's personal transformation during his last career as a politician was something of a mystery to many. What happened to the courageous leader who stood up to David Ben-Gurion decades ago? How to explain his total loyalty and submission to Menachem Begin although he was the deputy prime-minister and a leader of his own party?

Shapiro provided a sociological explanation for the failure of Yadin and others in Israeli society to become leaders. Yadin was a member of a group of native-born leaders whom Shapiro called an abortive generation. The foreign-born generation led the nation to independence and shaped the world view of the young country. The native-born generation continually submitted to the authority of the old one. The successful among the native-born, all of whom had a distinguished military career, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Alon,

Yitzhak Rabin, Yigael Yadin, Meir Amit, Ezer Weizman, continued to submit to the authority of the aging politicians born abroad even when they became political leaders (Shapiro 1980, 173-5). Dayan, for example, occasionally submitted to Golda Meir even on matters of defence and security, in which he clearly had more experience (Rubinstein 1982, 337).

Silberman (1994) portrayed Yadin as an aristocrat who was detached from the daily life of Israel; someone who was unable to comprehend the criticism his actions attract. Silberman added that as an archeologist Yadin had become accustomed to treat social forces as obstructions, and therefore was unable to deal with the many inter-personal problems in his party.

The two reformist parties suffered from a similar problem in the secondary circles of their leadership. People who form this type of movement often, as if by their very nature, lack the commitment that professional politicians have. In fact, frequently they despise professional politicians. Many of the reformist leaders came from established families, had some wealth, and had independent vocations of their own. It was easier for them than for the professionals "to maintain the atmosphere of disinterestedness that they felt vital to the public service" (Hofstadter 1963, 186).

Even Roosevelt, the most experienced politician among the leaders of the Bull Moose, when describing the beginning of his political career, testified that he "did not then believe, and I do not now believe, that any man should ever attempt to make politics his only career. It is a dreadful misfortune for a man to grow to feel that his whole livelihood and whole happiness depend upon his staying in office" (Roosevelt 1985, 56). In fact, the Bull Moose leaders could not convince many of their nationally known figures to run for office.

By the same token, none of the individuals who founded Shinui and the Democratic Movement were professional politicians and most withdrew from political activity soon after organizing the movement. Rubinstein and Wirshuvski became the only survivors of the original group of professors who formed Shinui. Further, nearly all the members from the original group led by Yadin refused to take any active role in the party.

In Israel, more so than in the United States, the "typical" politician has no other career; more precisely, once he enters politics, an Israeli politician usually has no place to go back to.

For example, when Meir Zorea and Stef Wertheimer could no longer take the heat of Israeli politics, both having become wholly disenchanted with intra-party squabbles, they

resigned their seats in the Knesset. They returned the mandate they helped create and went back to their previous lives -- a step rarely taken by a politician in Israel.

At first, part of the appeal of both the Bull Moose and DMC was their ability to recruit such atypical politicians. However this seeming virtue proved later to be their undoing. Unlike the typical reformers, professional politicians have the patience and flexibility to adjust to the shifting winds of politics.

George Washington Plunkitt, the legendary figure of Tammany Hall, summarized the reasons for the collapse of reformist movements as follows:

College professors and philosophers who go up in a balloon to think are always discussin' the question: 'Why Reform Administrations Never Succeed Themselves?' The reason is plain to anybody who has learned the A.B.C. of politics. ...I can't tell just how many of these movements I've seen started in New York during my forty years in politics, but I can tell you how many have lasted more than a few years, none. There have been reform committees...that started to do up the regular political organizations. They were mornin' glories - looked lovely in the mornin' and withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went on flourishin' forever, like fine old oaks....

The fact is that a reformer can't last in politics. He can make a show for a while, but he always comes down like a rocket. Politics is as much a regular business as the grocery or the dry-goods or the drug business. You've got to be trained up to it or you're sure to fail (Riordon 1905, 17-9).

This common-sense, "matter of fact" utterance basically suggests that politics is a vocation and that political parties are a matter for professional politicians to engage in. Plunkitt was responding, on behalf of professional politicians, to attackers during the Progressive Era. Unlike the reformers, Tammany Hall leaders, Plunkitt says, ". . . are plain American citizens, of the people and near the people, and they have all the education they need to whip the dudes who part their name in the middle" (Riordon 1905, 60).

Reformist parties are founded by people who attach high value to ideals, adhere strictly to rules, and tend to be independents. For reformers, principle comes before considerations such as organization or cohesion. Roosevelt once identified such people as coming from the "lunatic fringe" of reform movements. Many reformers are the products of struggles within other party organizations, having spent their lives opposing organizations in business and politics, and hence have become intrinsically independent. The core of reformers within a party often resist the inevitable changes that occur when a reform party begins to grow and new members and ideas have to be incorporated. Intra-party feuds often result and consume a substantial part of their time and energies. Therefore, the reformist third party often finds it difficult to develop

party cohesion in terms of policy and discipline.

When the Underwood Tariff Bill (legislation designed to reduce tariffs) came to a vote in 1913, Progressives in the House could not agree among themselves how they should vote. O.K. Davis, the publicity chair of the Bull Moose along with the former Senator Beveridge advised them to vote "present" on the tariff, as a protest against the method in which the bill was framed. When the time to vote came, 4 voted for the bill, 14 voted against, and 1 "present". Davis came to believe that lack of cohesion and the stubborn independence among reformers was the central problem of the Progressive Party at the time (Gable 1978, 173).

The Pinchot brothers, Gifford and Amos, who were close personal friends of Roosevelt, never seemed to learn the meaning of practical compromise. As we have seen earlier, Gifford was belligerent and uncompromising during the Pinchot-Ballinger affair and drew Roosevelt into the controversy against the latter's wish. And Amos never ceased opposing Perkins after their dispute over the anti-trust plank during the Chicago convention. Perkins, in the eyes of the Pinchot brothers, embodied everything the Progressives fought against. Amos repeatedly demanded that Roosevelt replace Perkins as the Chairperson of the Executive Committee of the party. The exchange of letters between the two illustrates the problem. Pinchot wrote

Roosevelt:

From the very beginning of the Progressive Party, we have set a high standard and made the claim that we are going to be something a little different and better than the old parties. We have frankly stated that we are not for political victory only, but to establish social and economic justice. From the very beginning we have framed our campaign rather as a crusade than a political fight (Pinchot 1958, 184).

Roosevelt replied:

The great test of reformers always comes when they are required to work together.... Have you forgotten that Lincoln was not for the abolition of chattel slavery until he had been president for two years? Do you not know that Lincoln's fight was half the time a fight to prevent foolish extremists from ruining the anti-slavery cause and ruining the union..... His (Lincoln's) success was in large part because he declined to submit to the constant proposals to rule out the Perkinses, the Monseys...of his day.... who were in the Republican Party (Pinchot 1958, 198-199).

Roosevelt, came to realize that part of his party's problem came from the high concentration of reformers who were political amateurs. Roosevelt was acutely disappointed when most of the incumbent Republican politicians, who had been enthusiastic supporters, did not follow him into the Progressive Party. Of the eight governors who had originally asked him to run for the nomination, only one,

Hiram Johnson of California, joined him. Defection among members of the House and the Senate was similar and Robert La Follette opposed Roosevelt openly. Roosevelt believed that his own failure to attract former supporters to join him had cost him votes and further radicalized the Progressive Party. Mowry correctly points out that office-holding has a way of inducing caution in politicians; most of Roosevelt's advisers were "untainted" with this customary source of restraint. "I've been growing more radical instead of less radical" Roosevelt once told a crowd in a campaign speech in Rhode Island (Mowry 1971, 2159).

Indeed, compromise, bargaining, and accommodation are very much the essence of politics and doubly so in Israel, where no party has ever won the majority of the votes. Therefore, much of the give and take occurs after the elections, when a coalition is formed. Parties always operate within these constraints, having to compromise some of their principles in order to have a share of power. Here too, the inflexibility and inexperience of the DMC's leaders was manifested. The famous seven principles, which Yadin had insisted upon, outlined the DMC's conditions for participating in any coalition; were the grave mistake of an amateur that greatly harmed the DMC. Because, when the party finally joined the government rather a step that could have been reasonably explained, the DMC's credibility, its

most important asset, was gravely tarnished.

The program: The reformist third party is attractive to many voters because of its program; it usually gains attention in a single election by focusing on highly visible issues. Paradoxically, that program and issues often turn to be a liability or the reason it find itself irrelevant and ignored a few years later, the victim of changing circumstances. The issues it had raised often lose their saliency for two principal reasons, which may occur together or singularly: the rise of a newly salient issue which supplants the original in terms of importance, or, the adoption of some/all of the issues raised by the reformist party, by one or both of their long established opponents.

In America, between 1914 and 1916, these two reasons converged and caused the public and many party leaders to lose interest in the Progressive Party. First came the beginning of World War I in Europe, then the adoption of progressive policies by President Wilson and, in turn, by Democrats and Republicans across the nation.

Public debate shifted to foreign policy and America's possible involvement in the war. William Allen White wrote to Roosevelt: "The whole trouble with our humanitarian platform is that it hit war. You cannot get people interested in minimum wage and laws for hours of service and

equitable railroad rates in the face of the news from Verdun" (Smith 1985, 494).

White was right and even the leaders of the Progressives lost interest in their own agenda. Roosevelt was so preoccupied with the war in Europe that he led a crusade for U.S. preparedness and fiercely attacked Wilson's position against the war. Roosevelt thus alienated many leading Progressives who were against U.S. involvement. Some argued that Roosevelt became so obsessed with the war issue that the most important goal for him was the defeat of Wilson. Regardless whether this observation was true or not, Roosevelt realized that his only chance to defeat Wilson in 1916 was if he could gain the nomination of the Republicans along with that of the Bull Moose. Failing to attain his goal, Roosevelt declined his own party's nomination, contributing to the decay of a movement he had made thrive just four years before.

Besides the supplanting national preoccupation with war, an additional reason for the Progressive Party's loss of political ground was the other parties' response to the challenges posed. As is more completely described in Chapters 4 and 9, both parties, on the local and national levels were adopting many of the progressive policies.

The DMC's reform platform lost its saliency within weeks following the 1977 elections. First, because of the

DMC's relatively minor power in the system, the Likud were able to form a coalition without the DMC. More important, however, were the political developments. The surprising visit of the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, and the subsequent peace treaty between Israel and Egypt became, by far, the most important issue. The DMC's presence in the government became of little consequence in light of the historical precedent set by Sadat's visit, otherwise it would have supported the agreement from the opposition, as Labor did. Even if we ignore the other problems the DMC faced internally, it is difficult to assume that it could have been more successful in promoting its reform agenda. Public discourse was completely engulfed by the issues related to the peace treaty; the withdrawal from Sinai, the uprooting of settlements and settlers from territories that were evacuated, the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, and the autonomy negotiations.

The DMC became a victim of its own mistaken theory and strategy. The theory was that the issue of war and peace and the future of territories was in a stalemate position; in the near future it would require only "maintenance," not a solution. Therefore, the basis for the new movement should be domestic reforms. This theory was plainly expressed by Meir Zorea who said "it's an issue (peace, territories) for our grandchildren to deal with." This

position permitted both the hawks and doves of politics to join the new party. As a consequence, when the political issue became paramount, the DMC was in trouble internally, conflicted within by disparate views and unable to impose party discipline and unable to express cohesion outwardly.

Voters and Members: The votes a reformist third party gets are conditional. New parties may mobilize new voters or disaffected voters, but the voters must be satisfied or else they tend to go back to their old habits. A new party does not enjoy the loyalty of voters that an established party does. Party identification is developed over time. Voters for a new party cannot possibly develop the type of attachment acquired through years of politically astute nourishment.

Both the Bull Moose and the DMC drew its votes from an already mobilized electorate. There is no indication that either party incorporated new voters into the electorate. The total number of votes during the 1912 presidential election in the U.S. amounted to 59.0 percent, in the 1908 election 65.8 percent, and in 1916 61.8 percent. Similarly, in Israel in 1977, statistics reveal 79.2 percent turnout. In 1973 the turnout was 78.6 percent. In 1981 the vote totalled 78.5 percent. (Mackie and Rose, 1991). The Bull Moose and the DMC drew most of their votes from the

established Republican and Labor parties, respectively, which is indicated also by the losses these parties suffered during the relevant elections as reflected in the data above.

A year after the elections, William Allen White wrote a letter to Roosevelt in which he analyzed the Bull Moose's status among its voters from his perspective. Of the four million votes the Bull Moose received in 1912, White believed that two million voters remained loyal to the Progressives. In this group White felt, about a million voters were ". . . men of considerable education and much more than the average intelligence. They are the leaders of thought in the community, and they have not been fazed." The rest of the voters, White feared, would be more difficult to keep. These were the "sheep votes" and the "Teddy votes." The first group were:

. . . clerks and the small farmers and the unskilled laboring man have minds that are moved largely by two things - tradition and noise. Our noise has subsided and party tradition is pulling them . . .

The "Teddy votes" -- votes of men who had confidence in you personally without having any particular intelligent reason to give why; but who voted with the Progressives, without caring a cent for the minimum wage or the initiative and referendum. Gable 1978, 180-181).

White predicted that the "Teddy votes" would remain loyal as long as Roosevelt was the leader, but the "sheep votes" were

more difficult to keep. Roosevelt thought that White's analysis was "perfect." He hoped, however, that the party would be able to attract many more progressive Republicans and even a few Democrats into the Bull Moose fold.

Soon afterward, White's analysis materialized, fulfilling the worst expectations; the Bull Moose Party lost half of its voters during the 1914 congressional elections. Progressives foundered almost everywhere despite the two million votes they received nationwide (Gable 1978, 184).

In Israel, by March of 1977, more than 38,000 people registered as members of the DMC and the majority of them participated in the party primaries. Moreover, in the general elections, over 200,000 people voted for the DMC. Less than a year later, in June of 1978, barely 6,000 members renewed their membership. It became abundantly clear that the party had lost significant ground with the public.

Initially, Rubinstein objected to the low membership dues. He felt that low fees would compromise the quality of the party members by permitting people to join for purposes of expediency. In fact, during the primaries, the party leadership became aware and worried as they realized that a few thousands of the 38,000 registered members were fictitious. A few thousands forms of new members were cancelled; it was obvious that many of them were filled up

by the same person. People who could not read or write were registered especially among the Arab and Druse communities in the Galilee. While the whole non Jewish population in Israel amounted to 13 percent of the total population, 25 percent of the DMC members were non-Jewish (Rubinstein 1982, 155-7). The proof came after the elections. In a few localities the party received fewer votes than the number of registered members it had there (Barzilai and Urieli, 1982, 180).

The DMC became a victim of its own principles; the "raging democracy," as many called it, within the DMC, was apparently premature for an unaccustomed Israeli public. The new methods introduced by the DMC stood in sharp contrast to those by which established parties managed their affairs. As we shall see in the next chapter, the established parties moved cautiously with reforms. Long established parties develop some safety valve mechanisms to accommodate certain groups. For example, Labor's bylaws secure 20 percent in all elected bodies of the party for each of these three groups: women, youth (under 35) and Sephardi Jews. The wisdom of such accommodation is revealed by the results of the 1992 elections in Israel. After the introduction of the primaries, a woman was moved to a higher place on the party list of candidates, to the Knesset, to comply with the party's rules, but also to assure a more

representative list.

The foregoing shows that the focus on the intra-party dynamic and organization is useful: it helps us understand the forces which interact and determine the course of parties. It shows also that a party's fortune is not always decided in the ballots. The voluntary decisions made by leaders and members are of great consequence as well.

In addition to the internal pressures, the reformist third party is affected by external pressures too. Because of its sizable electoral support it draws the attention of the established parties in the system. The latter retaliate; they launch a kind of warfare against the new party on many fronts; among the voters, against its leadership, and by adopting some measure of its program, as we shall see below. Given its own weaknesses and peculiarities, a reformist third party has very little chance to thrive, much less survive.

Chapter Nine

The Impact

Looking back now more than thirty years, I can shut my eyes and see that Bull Moose convention of 1912, see their eager faces-more than a thousand of them upturned, smiling hopefully with joy beaming out that came from hearts which believed in what they were doing; its importance, its righteousness. It seems to matter so very much, that convention of zealots, cleansed of self-interest and purged of cynicism. . . . And now they are dust. . . . And I wonder if it did matter much. Or is there somewhere, in the stuff that holds humanity together, some force, some conservation of spiritual energy, that saves the core of every noble hope, and gathers all men's visions some day, some way, into the reality of progress? I do not know. But I have seen the world move, under some, maybe mystic influence, far enough to have the right to ask that question (White, 1946, 627).

When William Allen White wrote his autobiography he had good reasons to ask the questions he did. As a former Progressive, he lived to see most of the Bull Moose platform become law.

The disappearance of the reformist third parties seems to have undermined their impact in the minds of many. High hopes and high expectations accompanied the emergence of the Bull Moose and DMC into the political arena, and equally intense feelings of betrayal and frustration followed their

disintegration.

In this chapter I attempt to describe the impact these two parties had and the legacy they left for their descendants.

The Progressive Party: The Bull Moose became a political party in 1912, but its emergence was the culmination of many years of cumulative efforts by the Progressive Movement that derived much of its character from various sources. These included municipal reformers, muckrakers, intellectuals, conservationists, and politicians who had ascended and come to control their state legislatures, to obtain governorships, and to become Congressional Representatives and Senators in Washington. Yet, after 1916 the Bull Moose Party ceased to exist. Therefore, one has to keep in mind that much of what is written is attributed to Progressives in general, before and after the establishment of the Bull Moose. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of those who considered themselves progressives before 1912 became the members and supporters of Roosevelt and the Bull Moose Party (Gable 1978; Hays 1958; Wiebe 1967; Graham 1967).

The Progressive Era and the Progressive Party were very influential for American society and politics. This was due

to the convergence of many issues at that time: industrialization, capitalism, urbanization, and population change. Not least important was the decision of the Progressive leadership to deal with this broad spectrum of issues and to offer solutions. The Progressives set the foundation for the welfare state, the passage to capitalism via regulation, and the expansion and restructuring of the federal government. The concentration of many of the era's important intellectuals in the Progressive camp has provided a wealth of writing and ideas which exceeded the temporal problems and were important for decades to come (Sklar 1988; Skowronke 1982; Graham 1967; Gould 1974; Hofstadter 1955; Sarasohn 1989).

Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism incorporated both the ideological foundation and the machinery the Progressives offered. Roosevelt's radical campaign of 1912 is usually compared with those of the later reform presidents, FDR and Truman. Mowry argues that the content of political reform, in Roosevelt's campaign, outweighed those reforms proposed by either of the latter, given the time the "New Nationalism" was conceived. Anticipating the claim that unlike Theodore Roosevelt, FDR and Truman became presidents, Mowry rightfully points out:

If the campaign was a losing one, so were the efforts

of FDR and Truman if measured by the immediate enactment of their promises into statutes. Over the course of the years and judged by eventual results, the New Nationalism remains one of America's principal charters of reform (Mowry 1971, 2160-2161).

The relations between the New Deal and the Progressive Era have attracted the attention of many historians and political scientists. Students of the New Deal always return to the Progressive Era, where reform got its twentieth-century start. It was the Progressives who first struggled with the full range of modern social problems: how to limit and control private economic power, how to institute industrial justice without interfering with the emerging capitalistic order, how to keep careers open to talent, how to make the cities livable, how to preserve self-government. All are issues that the New Dealers were forced to deal with just two decades after the Progressive Era.

The question, then, as Graham Otis put it, is, "whether progressivism was by intention, in temper, in method, in social base, an early and formative version of Franklin Roosevelt's welfare state? Was the New Deal the culmination of a continuous reform movement that persisted in spirit and transcended party lines?" (Graham 1967, 5). Graham, who studied the issue closely, suggested that this question has led generally to an effort to identify and weigh the

intellectual debt of the New Dealers to the Progressives.³² Many of the specific policy issues during the New Deal Era were highly controversial and were changed over the course of Franklin Roosevelt's tenure in office. The intellectual contribution of the Progressives, however, were the guidelines for most of the New Deal's ideas.

Reference to the Progressive Era and to the New Nationalism, and reevaluation of them, have happened in waves throughout this century, whenever the issue of reforming political parties is raised, or when there is a need to reformulate more comprehensive view of American government.³³ The New Republic recently published an article entitled "A Manifesto for America's Future," and the authors, John Judis and Michael Lind, suggest that America today needs to reshape its vision. They offer a fresh version of New Nationalism, drawing heavily on Roosevelt's New Nationalism and finding many similarities between the

³²In An Encore for Reform, Otis Graham analyzed the attitudes of the 168 surviving progressives during the New Deal. Reliable information regarding political attitude in the 1930s existed for 105. Of these, 60 opposed the New Deal, 40 supported it, and 5 were aligned consistently to the left of it. Graham found that the majority of the 60 opposing the New Deal, the opposition was different than the general controversy it had raised. The old progressives were more discriminating and more accurate in their criticism (Graham 1967).

³³ see bibliographical essays in Graham 1987, Gould 1988, and Sarasohn 1989.

pervasive opinions of today and those of the past (New Republic, March 27, 1995).

The simplest way to evaluate the impact of the Bull Moose on specific policy issues is to revisit its platform of 1912. Almost all of the Bull Moose platform eventually became law -- an accomplishment very few political parties can claim. What did not materialize was the Progressive pledge to organize a national reformist party based on principles. A number of the Progressives' proposed policies, in the 1912 elections, were enacted during the two terms of Woodrow Wilson while the rest were completed during FDR's years in office.

The major progressive legislation passed during the Wilson administration were: the Underwood Tariff, the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Antitrust Act, the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, the Adamson Act (which granted railway operating employees the eight-hour day), and a federal workmen's compensation measure.

Also, on state and local levels, leaders of the old parties quickly realized that the Bull Moose challenge had to be met. In state after state, Democrats and Republicans moved to the left and passed reform legislation. For example, between 1912 and 1916, the Vermont Progressives were instrumental in the adoption of the direct primary, an important achievement for a state traditionally dominated by

one party. They also passed legislation for workmen's compensation, a state budget system, reduced working hours, and other reform measures (Gable 1978, 169).

Indirectly, the Progressive Service of the Bull Moose, and Roosevelt himself, were involved in causes such as the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union in New York, and the Women's suffrage struggle, a national level struggle.

Ironically, it was the Democrats who carried out many of the policies that the Progressives propagated and against which the Democrats often struggled. Until FDR and the New Deal Era, the basic tenet of Democratic political thinking was a fundamental distrust of concentrations of power. This view was often expressed by Wilson during his campaign in 1912, though just as often rejected by many intellectuals of the time (few of whom supported the Democratic Party). After all, the Democratic Party housed, at the time, most of the State Rights' advocates and all of the segregationist South.

Shortly after Croly, Weyl and Lippmann founded the New Republic in November of 1914, the new magazine published an editorial depicting the Democratic Party: "[it] . . . has the vitality of a low organism. It can not only subdivide without losing the continuity of its life, but it can temporarily assume almost any form, any color, and structure without ceasing to recognize itself and without any apparent

sacrifice of collective identity" (Sarasohn 1989, 156). This unflattering portrait of the Democratic Party is an expression of how suspicious the Progressives had become of Wilson and the Democrats' self image as reformers.

Wilson and the Democratic Party had undergone, apparently, a massive transformation, because by 1916, these very same intellectuals, as editors of the New Republic, turned to Wilson and supported him against Hughes, the Republican candidate, and Roosevelt's position. Thus they came full circle and actually disavowed the very man they had so ardently supported in 1912.

The transformation of Wilson was, to a large degree, the result of a single person's work -- Louis Brandeis. He was a progressive Democrat long before Wilson became the President. Brandeis gained national prominence after his involvement in the Pinchot-Ballinger affair. Brandeis even joined the Progressive League and campaigned for La Follette throughout the country until Wilson became the Democratic candidate (Strum 1984, 219).

Although Wilson did not nominate Brandeis to any formal position in his administration, Brandeis was constantly called upon for advice and to draft legislation. Only after the 1916 election brought victory did Wilson appoint Brandeis to the Supreme Court. Conversations with Brandeis and other liberals brought Wilson around to being more

tolerant toward social issues. For example, Wilson had conceded later (after the 1912 campaign) that government should be interested in protecting human more than property rights, adopting a theme of Roosevelt's New Nationalism (described in chapters 3 and 4).

In contrast to Roosevelt and La Follette, who made extensive use of experts as President and Governor, respectively, Wilson largely rejected the idea. He feared that expert who engaged in the regulation of big business would be subject to control by them. "What I fear," he said during his campaign in 1912, "is a government of experts. God forbid that in a democratic country we should resign the task of government over to experts" (Link 1956, 63). Inevitably, however, the role of experts in government grew considerably during Wilson's Administration (Hofstadter 1963, 209-10).

The Democrats' victories of 1910 in the House, and of 1912 in the White House, to a large degree, are frequently attributed to the Progressives. The growing wedge between the progressive and conservative wings of the Republican Party during the 1910 campaign, worked in favor of the Democrats. As we have seen before, the open break in 1912, clearly, contributed to Wilson's nomination and victory over Taft and Roosevelt. Gains by the Democrats interrupted the White House domination of the Republican Party for eight

years, until 1920. Republican dominance, which began in 1894 in the House, continued until the New Deal realignment in the 1932 elections, when the "fourth party system" began.

Because the Democrats dominated the political system during most of the Progressive Era, it becomes even more difficult to assess the actual impact of the Bull Moosers on the Republicans. One can infer, however, from the subsequent behavior of the Republican Party that it became more receptive to progressive ideas after 1912. The seemingly accommodating nomination of Hughes in 1916 is but one example. The return of Roosevelt himself, with the majority of his supporters, to the Republicans, is clearly open to interpretation. His motives for returning to the fold in 1916 seems to be connected more to the war in Europe and his failure to be nominated by the Republicans than to progressive ideas.

The assault on political parties as organizations, however, was a campaign strategy the Progressives launched in earnest and it was also the only issue Progressives of all sorts readily agreed upon. Political parties as target, which, if successfully "executed," could, Progressives believed, free Americans from any number of miseries and reinstate a healthier democracy. Therefore, much of the direct democratic measures enacted by Progressives, and by others during the Progressive Era, dramatically altered the

nature of American political parties.

Political parties came out the Progressive Era much weaker than any other comparable institution. Almost every change introduced into the rules of electoral law had the similar effect of weakening the parties. Such measures include the Popular Elections of Senators, the Australian Ballot, Nonpartisan Elections, Referendum, Judicial Recall, and the Primaries.

The Popular Elections of Senators: The enactment, in 1913, of the Seventeenth Amendment, provided for the direct election of Federal Senators, rather than election by state legislatures as had been done previously. Since then, in their efforts to attract mass support from the public, Senators and senatorial candidates were motivated to build personal organizations, sometimes related to state party organizations, though focused on the individual interests.

The Australian Ballot (or the long ballot): This new voting procedure had, over time, enormous effects as split ticket voting increased. The spread of nonpartisan elections for local offices further weakened the hold of parties on the voting process. Minnesota, in 1913, went even further and established nonpartisan elections for the State Legislature. Nebraska did the same in 1934. It is worth noting that Minnesota returned to partisan election for the legislature in 1973 (Reichley 1992, 204).

In places where the Judicial Recall and Referendum measures were instated (detailed in chapter 3,) substantial power was given to citizens over policy issues which enhanced their ability to hold elected officials accountable.

The one measure that had the most critical effect on parties was the introduction of the direct party primary. "The Primary system freed forces driving toward the disintegration of party organizations and facilitated the construction of faction and cliques..." (Ranney 1975, 130). Loss of control over nominations greatly reduced the ability of the party organization to control the masses of votes as was the case in the past. Also reduced was the ability to maintain a degree of harmony between branches and levels of government. If the party leadership could not punish dissidents its capacity to achieve party unity on a given issue became, at most, advisory. The particular assault on political parties, Arthur Schlesinger wrote, ". . . languished rather quickly. But the erosion of parties continues" (Schlesinger 1982, 78).

The Progressives were partially successful in driving bossism and corruption from political life. In the West the Progressives nearly eradicated state and city machines based on patronage (Reichley 1992; Shefter 1983). Despite this, in the Northeast and the lower Great Lakes region, the

machines actually increased their efficiency and power. In the South, the overwhelming dominance of the all-white Democratic Party, based on the exclusion of blacks from participation in the political system, became even more secure.

The Democratic Movement for Change: The disintegration of the DMC attracted so much criticism and anger that very few considered that any positive or long-lasting effects resulted from its appearance on the Israeli political system. On the contrary, most agreed that the impact was a negative one and future reformers were turned into political cynics because the events of 1977 made it difficult for them to work within the political system.

Despite this perception, there is not doubt the Israeli political system is different in part, at least, because of the emergence of the DMC. The impact of the DMC and the post Yom-Kippur period will undoubtedly be more fully studied in the future. Yet it seems clear that many of the changes that took place in the Israeli political system since 1977 were made possible because of the processes the DMC responded to or which the DMC initiated. These changes can be seen in the analysis of the national elections of

1992 which Labor won for the first time since 1977.³⁴

The DMC had an impact on the Israeli political system as it became more democratic, the party system was transformed from stable and dominant to competitive and more inclusive, and the major parties were democratized. Unlike the Bull Moose, the DMC hardly had any impact on specific policy issues, and if there were any, it was indirect or accidental, for reasons that will soon become clear.

The emergence of the DMC had an immediate and visible impact on Israeli democracy. Following the procedural definition of democracy (discussed in Chapter 1) the Israeli system became more democratic, because for the first time power shifted peaceably to the major opposition party. The sustained failure of the Likud to win elections, despite the existence of open and competitive elections, necessarily raised questions. Therefore, the mere shift of power enhanced Israeli democracy by adding the element of inclusiveness to already existing principles of contestation and participation -- to use Dahl's language. The termination of Labor's dominance, and the ascension of the Likud to power for the first time, was caused to a large degree by the DMC's voters, three quarters of whom had, in previous years, voted for Labor. The defection of voters to

³⁴ See Asher Arian and Michal Shamir 1995.

the DMC contributed greatly to Labor's loss of a third of its electoral strength in 1977 (Arian and Shamir 1995).

One could speculate that such a change would eventually have occurred; the Likud is likely to have eventually won an election in the future, without the DMC's emergence. An analysis of socio-demographic trends in Israel suggests that the Likud grew steadily since 1969. The Likud already had an advantage over Labor since it was drawing support from two large groups in the electorate: the young and Sephardi Jews.

The DMC hastened the process and brought about this change of power by stealing away voters from Labor and by providing a viable alternative for those who were inclined to change their vote but had been up to that time reluctant to, because of ideology, habit, or expediency. The majority of the DMC leadership came from within the Labor camp and the "establishment."³⁵ The DMC's successful recruitment of a person like Meir Amit is a good example of a central figure within the establishment who rendered legitimacy to shifting votes. Amit, a son of one of the leaders of the Labor Party, a retired general who was the head of the

³⁵ Shapiro defined establishment as: "... the highest social stratum, whose members act in common social frameworks, possess a special life-style, and are also united by the similarity of their views on the structure of society and its system of values and norms." (Shapiro 1980, 173-4).

military intelligence, also was a former head of the Israeli "Mossad," and the chairman of "Koor" -- the largest economic concern in Israel, which is owned by the Histadrut. Before he joined the DMC, Amit resigned his post in Koor, even though he held one of the most powerful positions in the Israeli market.

The vested interests that were involved in the removal of Labor from power were so overwhelming and complex that it led many to believe the task almost impossible. In fact, many have argued that even after the electoral defeat the Labor camp was still running the country, given that Labor maintained its control in the Histadrut, which was capable of shutting down the country through its control of the trade unions. A tactic Labor used several times during the Likud's term.

The vote for the DMC was viewed as legitimate and less threatening to many who were employed by the state bureaucracy. The government was the largest employer in the country, and state bureaucracy was heavily politicized and staffed with Labor loyalists. Such people did not feel that they are risking their jobs by voting to the DMC, in the case that their vote becomes public.

The change in power led also to a gradual inclusiveness of people and groups who were previously excluded by the dominant party.

. . . as soon as there is a shift in the balance of political forces - when, that is, a need is felt, that capacities different from the old should assert themselves in the management of the state, when the old capacities, therefore, lose some of their importance or changes in their distribution occur, then the manner in which the ruling class is constituted changes also. . . if a new current of ideas spreads, then, simultaneously, far-reaching dislocations occur in the ruling class.

Ruling classes decline inevitably when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to power, when they can no longer render the social services which they once rendered, or when their talents and the services they render lose in importance in the social environment in which they lived (Mosca 1939, 65-6).

Mosca was writing about political elites and not about political parties, but the principle is applicable. The dominance of the Labor camp, as we have seen, extended beyond the realm of political power. For more than half a century, the elite groups were extensions of the dominant party and included military, cultural, economic, media, sport, and academic leaders. Not only was every elite group identified with the Labor camp, individuals who identified with the opposition were excluded systematically. The social environment in which the Labor dominance emerged and thrived has changed, and a shift in the balance of power has occurred, and as Mosca asserted, a decline of the ruling class, as well as a far reaching dislocation, followed.

The composition of the political elite was changing. One of Shinui's goals, Shapiro said, was to open the "clogged arteries of Israeli politics." Indeed, the system became more accessible and were fed by more diversified sources than in the past. The most significant group that was under-represented was that of the Sephardi Jews. Since 1977, the number of representatives in the Knesset of African and Asian origin has increased steadily. While comprising almost half of the electorate, they made up only 12 percent of MKs, in 1977. By 1992 they comprised almost 50 percent of the Jewish MKs. Labor which had been overwhelmingly Ashkenazi in terms of its electorate and representatives, became by 1992 more balanced. Labor increased its Sephardi electorate from a quarter in 1977 to more than a third by 1992 (Arian and Shamir 1995, 30).

The party system underwent a major transformation from a dominant and stable system, to competitive bi-polar system. "Competition among parties, after all, is supposed to supply the corrective mechanism that takes care of most new or unsatisfied group demands as a matter of course" (Merkel 1988, 574). When the dominant party fails to satisfy the disaffected, and the major opposition is not strong enough, or is not viewed as a viable alternative, a third party is likely to emerge. Once the DMC broke the rigid structure of the dominant system that existed in

Israel, the Likud became a legitimate contender.

Despite the fact that the first Likud government suffered some severe problems of inflation, mismanagement, and constant coalition crises, Begin and his party redeemed themselves just before the next elections in 1981 and were able to form a coalition. Greilsammer (1986) noted that, despite the image and the real problems the Likud suffered from, there were some positive policy outcomes, especially in the eyes of its voters. The most outstanding example was the peace treaty signed with Egypt, but a list of accomplishments must include the steps taken toward liberalization and decentralization of the economy, the proliferation of Jewish settlements in the territories and "Project Renewal" (described in chapter 7). "Project Renewal," for example, drew massive criticism from the media and the opposition because of its cost and bureaucratic inefficiency. Nonetheless, those who directly benefited from the improvement of their poor neighborhoods tend to be Likud voters.

In the elections since 1977, Likud and Labor evidenced no clear electoral advantage over one another. At times, the parties reached almost perfect parity. Likud and Labor each won 48 seats in 1981, but Begin was in a better position to form a government with the religious and other

small parties to his right.³⁶ In 1984 election Labor won 44 seats and Likud 41, but neither was capable of forming its own government. These results led to the formation of a national unity government where Labor and Likud rotated the post of the prime minister (Peres was first for two years, followed by Shamir from 1986-1988.)

The alternative to forming a unity government was new elections; however, it was not at all certain that the electorate would shift its preferences in such a short time.

Similarly, in 1988, Labor won 39 and Likud 40. A second national unity government was formed but was headed this time by the Likud because the Likud were in a slightly better position to form a narrow coalition with its partners to the right. The second unity government lasted for two years until March 1990.

Many argue that the political system in Israel has become polarized to a point of mutual deadlock between the major parties, a situation that has grave implications for government policies (Horowitz 1988). While the DMC was not responsible for the polarization, it has been conducive in introducing competitiveness. This is in contrast to what Sartori's (1976) argument that center parties, introduce centrifugal tendencies which polarize party systems.

³⁶ The Labor Alignment won 47 seats but was joined by the single member of the Civil Right Movement party.

Israeli society became more polarized because of the growing saliency of the territories and Arab-Israeli war and peace issues. The DMC consciously avoided these issues. The withdrawal from Sinai during the second Likud government and the prospects of autonomy in the West Bank opened a wedge within the Likud camp. The war in Lebanon which began in June 1982, the first war for which there was no national consensus, created a major rift and divided the nation. Further controversy regarding the convention of the Madrid Peace conference in 1990 brought the second national unity government down and intensified the public controversy over the future of the peace process.

The 1992 elections are viewed by many as the return of Labor to power: Labor won 44 seats and Likud 32. Yet, these figures are somewhat misleading. Labor came in first, and Likud, far behind, came in second, but the distributions of seats between the left and right blocks remained similar. Labor formed a narrow coalition of 61 members, the minimum possible. Labor, with its partners, was in a position to block the emergence of an alternative government on the right. For the first time in Israeli politics the Zionist parties relied on the Communist and the Arab parties to block the other side from forming a government, an indication of the degree of polarization and the high level of competitiveness.

As we can see from electoral history since 1977, the Likud failed to dominate the political system before 1992, and Labor did not return in 1992 to its dominant position. The two major parties are now viewed as two legitimate contenders for power, providing two distinct ideological world views.

The DMC has initiated the process of party democratization. Since 1977, Likud and Labor have undergone a process of internal democratization, the most important of which is the gradual openness of the selection of candidates. The method of choice is the primaries which the DMC introduced, for the first time in 1977. The DMC used direct and closed primaries to elect its candidates to the Knesset. The DMC's leaders were well aware of the potential future importance to the rest of the system:

. . . the elections [primaries] in our movement ceased to be our own matter. What we are going to do in March 1977 will be a matter closely watched and examined by the whole public. If we succeed, the new democratic system which we are promoting will succeed. If, God forbid, we fail, this will be also the failure of the idea (of a new intra-party democracy) and a victory of the (old) nomination-committee system (Kav Hadash, no. 13, February 1977, quoted in Brichta 1986, 29).

The primaries, within the DMC, failed to produce a balanced or representative list of candidates. Nonetheless, the major parties took note of the enthusiastic thousands who

participated in the DMC primaries, and thought that the process was irreversible. Established parties, unlike the DMC, were more cautious and headed only gradually toward the expansion of the electorate for selection of their candidates. During the 1980s, the nominating power shifted slowly but inevitably from small circles of a dozen or so to larger groups that included all the members of the parties central committees, numbering in the thousands.

Already in 1977, the Likud had introduced a new system for the selection of its candidates to the Knesset. The central committee of 2100 members (in 1977) elected and ordered the party candidates to the Knesset in a "panels" system; a panel of candidates competed for seven seats in each round. The Likud panel system was praised by many as more democratic when compared with the nominating committee method used by the Labor Party at that time (Doron and Goldberg 1990, 156). During the years the Likud was in power no changes were made. Growing demands to further democratize the party and the defeat in 1992, forced the Likud to adopt state-wide primaries to include all party members before the 1996 general elections.

Oligarchic control of the nomination process within the Labor Party existed throughout the period of its dominance. Aronoff argues that one of the major contributing factors to its loss in 1977 was the breakdown of responsiveness and

lack of representation of important constituencies. Failing to make necessary reforms contributed to the second defeat in 1981 (Aronoff 1987, 258).

By 1992, Labor had reached a far larger degree of democratization than the other parties in the system possibly because of the many years spent in opposition and the demands for reform from within. The process was incremental and experimental. Primaries were first introduced in 1987 only for the election of the party's executive committee. Thirty of its one hundred members were elected in secret ballots by the central committee.

In 1988, the party candidates for the Knesset were elected using a very complex system. The party leadership (seven) were granted safe seats at the top of the list, half of the rest elected by the districts of the party and the other half by the central committee of the party. In a subsequent stage the whole list was ordered by the central committee.

In 1992, primaries were introduced. For the first time all the members of the party were able to vote and select their candidates. The primaries were expanded for the municipal and for the Histadrut elections in 1993.

The DMC was the partisan expression for the process of change in the Israeli political culture and society which began after the 1967 war. The protest which followed the

1973 war intensified the discontent with the political system in general and out of the protest movement Shinui has emerged. The DMC's contribution to the dumping of the traditionally dominant Labor Alignment has allowed Israeli voters a greater sense of efficacy. The DMC showed that a campaign in the embattled security-conscious state of Israel could be based on domestic issues.

The change in power in 1977, the first, has merit in and of itself. The fact that the major opposition party has led the government since 1977 offers a viable alternative for voters and lends respectability to the idea of change in the voters' eyes (Torgovnik 1980).

However, the polarization that followed the 1977 elections and the subsequent inability of both sides to form a strong or stable coalition frustrated many, leading to a new wave of discontent. Paradoxically, the major parties became more dependent on the small parties. The Likud and Labor insisted on including the small parties within the framework of the national unity government in order to secure the later's loyalties in forming future coalitions. For example, the formation of national unity governments in 1984 and 1988 left the Knesset with virtually no opposition. This situation has aggravated the sense of political impotency which, in turn, led to a renewed campaign for reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The results of the 1992 elections, and some reforms that were made in the electoral laws, are viewed as a response to the pressure exerted on the system from outside. Arguably, we should expect a slightly higher sense of political efficacy among voters after the 1992 elections. First, because of the increased ability to influence the selection of candidates as more people can participate in party primaries. Second, because there was an increase in instrumental voting in 1992 as noted by Tamar Herman. More people acknowledged that they did not vote in their traditional way but rather, decided to punish Likud for being corrupt and give their vote to Labor and Tzomet, both rallied on a platform of reform (Herman 1995, 276-8). In fact, Arian shows that most of the increased power of Labor in 1992 came from Likud voters (Arian 1995, 19). If this is the case, then, we should expect both greater responsiveness from the political parties and a greater sense of political efficacy.

The increase of extra-parliamentary activity aimed at reforming the government and the political system, is striking. Years after the collapse of the DMC, we can see the renewal and continuation of the same issues and even some of the personalities regarding the issue that the DMC emphasized more than anything: electoral reform.

As a reform party, the DMC stressed the need to reform

the system and the government. However, unlike the Progressive Party, it did not emphasize a multitude policy issues. The platform of the DMC, on policy issues such as education, social and economic issues, separation of state and religion and the role of religious parties, was similar, if not identical, to those of the other parties already existing in the system (Schwartz et. al. 1977). The uniqueness of the DMC's alternative in terms of policy, was in the fact that it combined the liberal foreign policies of Labor and the liberal policies of the Likud on economic issues. On the first issue, liberalizing the economic structure of Israel, the DMC had indirect impact. The victory of the Likud in 1977 led to several reforms such as privatization of government owned enterprises and liberalizing foreign currency laws. The DMC however, made the reform of the electoral system its number one priority, which, if enacted, would facilitate the rest of its platform.

The proportional representation system in Israel is seen by many to be the source of all the ills of the political system. Since the early days of statehood, efforts have been made to change the electoral system. However, at times the issue gains saliency, as happened in the mid 1970s and again in the late 1980s. During these periods, several bills were introduced offering a mixed

system of districts and proportional representation, a system similar to the German system. The proposed bills failed to pass the second and third call, which would make them a law. Nonetheless, the conscience of politicians was raised; almost across the board. The issue of electoral reform mobilized many, regardless of partisan affiliation, ethnicity, age, etc. The recent developments with regard to electoral reform indicate, I believe, that Israel is finally closer to changing its electoral reform.

Two recent movements led the struggle to promote the initiation of electoral reform, and are, in many respects, the successors of DMC's ideas. Taking a cue from DMC's bitter end as a political party, both opted to act as a protest movement and not as a political party.

During 1986, a group of professors from Tel Aviv University, led by Professor Uriel Reichman, a former DMC member and current Dean of the Law School at TAU, drafted a constitution. The proposal again included again electoral reform and a Bill of Rights. A poll taken during November 1987 found that 65.8% of the respondents were in favor of adopting a constitution (Herman 1995, 279).

In January of 1988 a new movement was formed -- The Movement for a Constitution. The organizers began a public campaign to promote their agenda. They lobbied politicians of all parties and organized mass rallies. The elections of

November 1988, which produced another national unity government, enhanced the appeal of their agenda. The Knesset responded to the pressure. Four bills were submitted and passed the preliminary vote in December of 1988. The sponsors of these bills represent the overwhelming majority of the Knesset members: Yaacobi from Labor, Linn from Likud, Zidon from Tzomet, and Amnon Rubinstein of Shinui. In addition, a bipartisan committee was formed, in March 1989, to prepare an agreed version of the electoral reform. However, the collapse of that government during the same month changed the course of events.

The breakdown of the unity government was followed by intense efforts by the major parties to form their own coalition. This meant an intense courtship and significant pay-offs by the major parties to the small and religious parties on whom they were dependent. Shimon Peres of Labor became notorious for his abortive efforts to lure some of the religious parties and other individual MKs to support his agenda. The details of the "deals" outraged many, including the members of his own Labor Party, and led to the birth of yet another protest movement; The Movement for Governance Reform. The movement started spontaneously with two members, Avi Kadish and Shachar Ben-Meir. The two began a hunger strike in front of the Knesset in protest of the

disgraceful dealings that followed the fall of the unity government in 1990. The movement was born from among the thousands of people who came to support them. In April of 1990, the new movement together with the Movement for the Constitution, and a group of prominent mayors, organized a massive rally of hundreds of thousands of participants calling for reform of the electoral system. The rally was followed by intense lobbying and other pressure group tactics, which led, in May of 1990, to a vote on electoral reform. The four proposed bills (from 1988) were combined into a single bill and passed the first call. The electoral bill moved to deliberation in the Knesset committee which usually prepares the final version for the second and third call.

Two additional changes in the electoral laws were made during the same time: a higher threshold vote needed for presentation, and the popular election of the Prime-Minister. The first measure was aimed at reducing the number of small parties in the Knesset. This minor change, raising the threshold from one percent of the votes to one and one-half percent, was enacted before the 1992 election has virtually eliminated single-member parties from the Knesset.

The direct elections of the Prime-Minister is also aimed at eliminating the power of small parties to determine

who will be the premier, and which government survives. The bill passed the first call. In July, 1991, before the second and third, or final calls, the Likud tried to delay the vote. The Movement for Governance Reform appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted a demand that the Speaker of the Knesset bring the bill up for a vote. The bill was ratified in March, 1992. The result is that the next Prime Minister of Israel is expected to be elected directly by the people.

Probably because the Labor was in the opposition before 1992, it has become more responsive to demands for reform. The Labor Party included almost all the measures suggested by the reform movements into its platform in 1992: a commitment for the direct elections of the Prime Minister, the replacement of the proportional representation to a mixed system, and the formulation of the Bill of Rights suggested by the Constitution for Israel Movement (Herman 1995, 292).

The impact of the Progressive Party and the DMC on their respective systems, as described above, could have been appreciated mostly by others. For these movements' leaders and activists, who lived to see the later developments, it was a late and bitter success. They may be proud for being the forerunners of reform and progress in their society, but, the materialization of some of their

goals by others meant their demise also.

Conclusions

This study has examined two parties that were unique in their respective systems. They were new third forces and both were exceptionally successful. Both the Bull Moose and the DMC originated in mainstream politics but as protest movements with a middle class base. They were led by nationally acclaimed, charismatic leaders and attracted the support and active participation of significant elements in the intellectual strata of their countries. These parties offered an alternative in form and in substance to the existing political parties and existing policies, generating a sense of rectitude and responsibility. When they competed for the first time in national elections, both parties gained more electoral support than any previous new party before, or since in their respective states.

Yet, in both cases, electoral achievement also marked the beginning of their end. This was principally due to reasons internal and external to the parties. First, the reformist third party's own qualities -- the same qualities that attracted backing for them in the first place -- proved to be a liability when the party entered the political arena. The reformist third party found it difficult to

adjust to the actual exercise of political power, to compromise, bargaining and decision making in government and within the party organization. There was a failure to produce coherent policies and to maintain discipline within party ranks. Because reformers had difficulties functioning as politicians they at once wanted to sustain a more democratic mode of operation while needing to maintain the party as organization. Intra-party feuds had disproportionate impact because party leaders were too inexperienced to manage such conflicts and the parties' organization was too young to outlive them.

As a result of the electoral success of the reformist third parties, the established parties were compelled to take their political threat posed by the new-comers with increasing seriousness. This, in turn, propelled the established parties to attempt to co-opt the third parties' issues, positions, and even some of the personalities. As a consequence the reformist third party's appeal and its reason for being were weakened.

Usually, reformist third parties emerge in times of political discontent with the existing parties and with governments. Among other things, political discontent with parties is indicated by the decline of major parties in a given system. And because political parties still remain a crucial major vehicle by which citizens and governments are

connected in democracies, dissatisfaction, if lasting, would result in failure of this essential linkage, threatening the viability of democratic regimes in general. Therefore, I have argued that reformist third parties serve as a corrective mechanism in a democracy.

Not every new party that emerges on the national scene necessarily fills this void of linkage, but some do. Single-issue movements may be successful in reinforcing certain patterns of linkage by pushing the major parties into adopting a specific issue. The reformist third party, however, is more likely to restore the democratic linkage. That is because it aspires to join the existing system and become one of its major parties while seeking to reformulate the rules of the political game by furthering democratization within the existing main channel -- within political parties.

The reformist third party may embrace issues that seem radical at first (i.e., judicial recall), but, these issues do not represent a fundamental threat to the existing order; in fact, addressing these issues is essential for correcting deficiencies in the existing democracies. Consequently, reformist third parties play an essential structural role in maintaining democratic systems.

In defining democracy and the functions of parties within it, we have stressed that competitive elections

permit the translation of conflicting citizens' preferences into public policies, thus securing both representation and participation within the system. In this context the reformist third party seeks to restore the important relationships between citizens and government, thereby it helps approximate an underlining ideal,

An ideal democratic government would be one whose actions were always in perfect correspondence with the preferences of all its citizens. Such responsiveness may never be achieved but it can serve as an ideal to which democratic regimes should aspire (Lijphart 1984, 1).

Democracies as a method and political parties as their means for governing will probably retain some of their inevitable shortcomings. But they also provide a way by which they can be improved -- new reformers will emerge occasionally to demand change as suggested by Michels (1912; 1978) in the closing paragraph of his book Political Parties,

democracies . . . are adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases also the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so fiercely. Now new accusers arise to denounce the traitors. . . . It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end (Michels 1978, 408).

Party systems and political parties, indeed, have exhibited

throughout this century their amazing ability to survive even under the most extra-ordinary circumstances. In the United States, for example, political parties were the last national institutions to split when sectional tension between North and South was rising in the eve of the Civil War (Schlesinger 1982, 73). Many political parties in Europe survived the rise of Fascism; the collapse of democracy; the second world war, and the ensuing changes which were of unprecedented magnitude.

Although, at times belatedly, political change does follow societal changes. Parties and party systems change. As we have seen, this may require the emergences of reforming forces to attain the goal. The survival of parties is conditioned by their ability to adapt and to be changed. This quality of parties explains how they manage to survive dramatic changes in their societies, and how they maintain the support of large number of citizens over long periods of time.

The choice of these cases, as indicated in the introduction, should not be construed to suggest that the Bull Moose's and the DMC's experiences are identical nor should it imply that the American and the Israeli political systems are easily or simplistically compared. Nonetheless, these two parties exhibited important similarities and regularities which shed light on a process of political

change in democratic systems. Of course, not all experiences of new parties will follow similar paths or have the same impact. Nevertheless, both the Progressive Party and the DMC offer support for the central argument of this thesis.

One issue that is left open in this study is whether the eventual disappearance of reformist third parties is inevitable? Based on the experiences of the Bull Moose and the DMC we saw that their organizations failed, their policies were adopted by others, and some of their major figures remained in public service and politics. The latter were incorporated into or co-opted by the established political parties and the political process. For example, Gifford Pinchot became governor of Pennsylvania and Amnon Rubinstein continued to serve as political leader and as minister in several cabinets.

Following their defeat in 1912, Progressives remained very optimistic. During 1913 and 1914, the building of national organization was intense: it seemed to them that their party might become a permanent player in the American party system. Harold Ickes wrote years later that many leading Progressives, like himself, continued to believe that it was possible to carry on despite the electoral losses in 1912, 1914 and even 1916.

Personally, I believed that even if we couldn't win the 1916, and I never fooled myself that we could in that year, we could at least help to administer another thorough licking to the reactionary Republican Party. It was my theory that that party [the Republican] could not stand more than one more such defeat. I believed that if we only would stick to our guns we would become one of the two major political parties of the country (Ickes 1941, 312).

Ickes, who later became Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of Interior, realized that, it is only by displacing a major party that a third party can become a major party in the American system. The Republicans, for example, emerged as a major party in 1856, only by replacing the Whigs.

Like Ickes, Shinui's founder, Rubinstein, had plans for his party that differed sharply from the historical developments. "I, myself, viewed Shinui -- even in its worst and most frustrating days -- as the beginning of a process that would bring us to power. I was not interested in less than that" (Rubinstein 1982, 46). He added that he conceived of this as of three phase process in which Shinui emerge as a major party.

In the first phase Shinui would enter the Knesset in significant force. Then, its parliamentarians would acquire broad public trust by sticking to principles and serving as a role model for new conduct in politics. In the last stage the public trust would be translated into electoral strength, thereby allowing Shinui to become a major party

and ascend to power. Rubinstein believed that merging with the Democratic Movement constituted the first phase. It was in the second critical phase that his party failed. The DMC barely missed a step in losing its credibility (as we have seen in chapter 7 and 8).

Neither party survived, Roosevelt and his fellow Progressives did not "stick to their guns," and the DMC did join the Likud government and compromised its principles. Therefore, we are left only to speculate as what might have happened if they had done otherwise. However, as I have argued in this dissertation, the survival of the reformist third parties is secondary to their impact on their respective political systems.

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