INFORMATION TO USERS

This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our Dissertations Customer Services Department.

5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we have filmed the best available copy.

University
Microfilms
International

300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND

8103939

KOUBEK, RICHARD FRANCIS

THE INTRA-PARTY USES AND INFLUENCES OF PERSONAL RESOURCES DISTRIBUTED BY SUBURBAN PARTY ELITES

City University of New York PH.D. 1980

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Copyright 1980

by

Koubek, Richard Francis

All Rights Reserved

THE INTRA-PARTY USES AND INFLUENCES OF PERSONAL RESOURCES DISTRIBUTED BY SUBURBAN PARTY ELITES

by

RICHARD F. KOUBEK

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1980

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

7/11/80
date

Chairman of Examining Committee

7/14/80
date

Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

PREFACE

Local party activists, especially those who serve at the base of the hierarchy, are the life-blood of the organization. Their goals and political style lend definition to the American party system. Why do individuals become active in local political parties? Why do they remain active? What factors shape their behavior within party organizations? Given the declining health of American political parties, questions such as these, which probe the motives and style of local party activists, have occupied considerable attention in the literature since the early 1960's.

Scholarly analyses of partisan participation have been dominated by a dichotomous model of party activism. One style, commonly called professional, embodies the goals, attitudes and behavioral patterns typically associated with urban party machines. Linked to the needs of their lower or working-class constituencies, the professional organization is often represented in the literature as a hierarchical structure bound together by personal, material rewards and sanctions which are used by elites to maintain discipline among both activists and constituents. In this milieu of satisfaction based squarely on self-interest, electoral

success is the dominant organizational goal, subsuming all other objectives including party issue positions and public policy formation.

The other style of partisan activism is usually referred to as amateur. The amateurs are most frequently depicted as the reformers whose central objective is to correct the abuses of the professional politicians. Scholarly discussions of the amateur-professional styles frequently treat, either implicitly or explicitly, the professional model pejoratively and the amateur model as the desired pattern of local party organization.

The incentives and style of amateur activists and organizations often reflect the values and behavioral patterns typically associated with middle-class constituencies, particularly the middle-class reform groups of America's Progressive Era. Amateurs are depicted as eschewing personal satisfactions - especially patronage rewards. Their incentive structures stress purposive, non-particularist goals such as community service, issue and ideological positions, maintenance of intra-party democracy and public policy formation. For the amateur, the intrinsic benefits of public service, not personal gain or electoral victory, are the cement that keep their organizations intact.

Numerous studies of activism have sought to associate middle-class status and values with the existence of the

amateur organizations that stress impersonal, non-material incentives, intra-party democracy and programmatic positions. Drawing heavily from the incentive and human relations theories of organization, many researchers have postulated that middle-class activists will bring amateur incentive goals to politics which, in turn, will shape and transform the style of local party organizations to reflect their own universalist, participatory values.

This study, conducted among middle-class activists in two suburban Long Island townships, Babylon and Huntington, challenges the theoretical assumptions and methods employed by those researchers who have correlated class and incentives with political style. Hypothesizing elite uses of personal rewards and sanctions, rather than activists' class status or incentive goals, as the independent variable affecting political style, the study also questions the dichotomous nature of the amateur-professional model.

Specifically, the study analyzes the distribution by elites of personal resources (patronage, nominations, and campaign assistance) to determine the degree to which such rewards and sanctions influence, or are perceived to influence, the behavior of activists. The complex motivational portrait which emerges from the data challenges, not only the conclusions of previous research studies, but the validity of the incentive and human relations organizational

theories upon which much of this research was based.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE iii

Chapter

I. "AMATEURS" AND "PROFESSIONALS" IN THE LITERATURE 1

The Amateur and Professional Models 1
Incentive and Organizational Behavior 6
Incentive Reorientation 7
Incentive and Social Class 10
Leaders and Material Rewards 15
Incentives, Power and Participation 18
Summary 23

II. THE RESEARCH DESIGN 29

Problem to be Examined 29
The Concepts Re-examined 30
Research Objectives 32
Research Design 37
The Questionnaire 42
The Sample 48
Summary 50

III. THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 53

A Demographic Profile of the Townships 53
The Babylon Parties: Structure and History . . 59
The Huntington Parties: Structure and History 65
Party Styles: A Retrospective 72
Summary 76

IV. THE PROFESSIONAL SUBURBAN ORGANIZATION: NON-PROGRAMMATIC 81

The Importance of Issues 81
Leaders' Goals 87
Summary and Discussion 95

Chapter

V. THE "PROFESSIONAL" SUBURBAN ORGANIZATION: NON-DEMOCRATIC 99

Decision-Making Procedures 99
Decision-Making Influence-Freedom 108
Summary and Discussion 122

VI. THE "PROFESSIONAL" SUBURBAN ORGANIZATION: ROLES, REWARDS AND DISCIPLINE 130

Roles and Discipline 131
Party Reward Structures 140
The Legitimacy of Patronage 150
Summary and Discussion 156

VII. THE "PROFESSIONAL" SUBURBAN ORGANIZATION: INCENTIVES AND SATISFACTIONS 166

Initial Incentives 167
Sustaining Incentives 172
Incentives and Rewards 181
Summary and Discussion 186

VIII. THE "PROFESSIONAL IDEALISTS" 194

Social Variables 196
Activists' Satisfactions 201
Levels of Activism 205
Roles and Rewards 210
Party Decision Making 214
Summary and Discussion 219

IX. INCENTIVES AND PARTY ACTIVISM: A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE 227

Incentives, Satisfactions and Rewards 227
Incentives and Organizational Theory 241
The Amateur Model and Democratic Theory 253
The Amateur Model Re-examined 270

APPENDIX A 289

APPENDIX B 297

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 305

LIST OF TABLES

1. Estimates of Patronage Recipients and the Patronage Sample 49

2. Land Use Acreage, 1966 54

3. Housing by Type of Structure, 1970 54

4. Median Value of Homes by Incorporated and Unincorporated Villages, 1970 56

5. Occupations, 1970 57

6. Frequency of Content of Major Town Board Enactments, 1978 75

7. Education and Family Incomes of Committee People in the Sample 77

8. Activists Who Perceived Selected Issues as "Not Important" or "Very Important" to Their Party Organizations 83

9. Importance of Party Issue Positions to Maintaining Activism 85

10. The Nature of Intra-Party Factional Disputes . . . 86

11. Activists' Perceptions of Goals Most Important to Party Elites 89

12. Activists' Perceptions of Goals That Should Be Most Important to Party Elites 91

13. Committee People Who Expressed Dissatisfaction with Leaders' Goals and Percent Who Perceived Leaders as More Concerned with Their Own Power than with Attaining Goals . . . 94

14. Committee Persons' Perceived Influence in Party Decision Making 109

15. Activists' Perceptions of Overall "Say" Committee People Have in Local Party 113

16. Committee Persons' Perceived Freedom in Party Decision Making 115

17. Committee Persons' Perceptions of Influence Elites Should Have in Party Organizations 117

18. Gamma Scores for Committee Persons' Perceptions of Influence and Freedom in Selected Decision-Making Areas 119

19. Committee Persons' Perceptions of Activities Expected of Them by Party Elites 133

20. Party Activities Performed by Activists During and Between Recent Election Campaigns 135

21. Perceived Content of Discussions by Committee Persons Who Indicated Frequent Contact with Elites 138

22. Activists Who Perceived Personal Resources Used as Rewards or Punishments by Party Elites 141

23. Activists' Perceptions of Criteria Used by Elites to Award or Deny Nominations 143

24. Activists' Perceptions of Criteria Used by Elites to Award or Deny Patronage 145

25. Activists' Knowledge of Specific Rewards and Punishments Used by Party Elites 147

26. Participation of Committee People in Patronage Reward System 150

27. Initial Incentives of Activists 168

28. Selected Incentives Ranked as "Very Important" for Activists' Initial Entry into Politics . . . 169

29. Initial Incentives by Party Hierarchical Status . . 170

30. Current Incentives by Party Hierarchical Status . . 173

31. Incentive Reorientation by Party Hierarchical Status 175

32. Activists' Current Satisfactions Obtained from Party Work 176

33. Changes in Activists' Attitudes About Local Politics 179

34. Activists' Occupational Status 183

35. Committee Persons' Perceptions of the Incentives Currently Most Important to Other Committee People 184

36. Material Incentives Ranked as "Very Important" for Committee Persons' Current Activism 185

37. Age, Income and Education of Activists by Current Incentive Orientation 199

38. Satisfactions Obtained from Party Work by Activists' Current Incentive Orientation 202

39. Changes in Attitudes about Local Politics by Activists' Current Incentive Orientation 203

40. Activists' Plans for Future Party Work and Upward Mobility by Current Incentive Orientation 206

41. Frequency and Nature of Committee Persons' Contacts with Elites by Current Incentive Orientation 208

42. Activists' Party Activities by Current Incentive Orientation 210

43. Activists' Participation in Patronage by Current Incentive Orientation 213

44. Committee Persons by Current Incentive Orientation Who Perceived Themselves with "Some-A Great Deal" of Decision-Making Influence 215

45. Committee Persons by Current Incentive Orientation Who Perceived Themselves with "A Great Deal" of Decision-Making Freedom . . .217

CHAPTER ONE

"AMATEURS" AND "PROFESSIONALS" IN THE LITERATURE

The Amateur and Professional Models

The emergence of "amateur-oriented" political organizations in certain areas of local politics generated considerable interest in the incentive systems of local party groups. In Wilson's seminal study, The Amateur Democrat, the amateur politician stands in sharp contrast to the "professional" as:

> One who finds politics intrinsically interesting because it expresses a conception of the public interest. The amateur politician sees the political world more in terms of ideas and principles than in terms of persons. Politics is the determination of public policy, and public policy ought to be set deliberately rather than as an accidental by-product of a struggle for personal and party advantages ...[1]

A major hypothesis of this study is that the suburban party elites and lower strata activists, who were the subjects of the research, conform more closely to Wilson's notion of the professional party activist:

> The professional...is preoccupied with the outcomes of politics in terms of winning or losing. Politics, to him, consists of concrete questions and specific persons who must be dealt with in a manner that will "keep everybody happy" and thus minimize the possibility of defeat in the next election. The professional politician rarely broods about his function in society, the larger significance of the issues with which he deals, or the consistency of his procedures with

> some pre-worked out theory of democracy. Although he is not oblivious to the ends implied by political outcomes, he sees...the good of society as the by-product of efforts that are aimed, not at producing the good of society, but at gaining power and place for one's self and one's party.[2]

A considerable body of data exists that describes the attitudes and behavioral traits of the amateur and professional activists and their concomitant organizational structures.[3] The professional activist is typically, though not exclusively, associated in the literature with hierarchical, centralized, machine-style party structures. The professional activist is motivated by a desire for material or tangible rewards that benefit his or her personal or political fortunes. Ideology and public policy formation do not significantly influence their political behavior which is oriented primarily toward organizational loyalty and electoral success. The amateur structure, on the other hand, is typically viewed as a decentralized organization with diffuse power relationships. Amateur activists generally eschew material rewards and are motivated by a concern for particular issues and policies which take precedence over personal and organizational power considerations.

Local party activists are thus seen as belonging to political organizations that manifest the dichotomous political styles of either the amateur or professional ideal type. According to Wilson, in the professional organization:

> Winning is essential, although sometimes electoral victory must be subordinated to maintaining party organization. Candidates will be selected on the basis of their electoral appeal...Issues will be avoided except in the most general terms or if the party is confident that a majority supports its position...Votes will be mobilized not only by such [issue] appeals but also by personal contacts through precinct captains. These workers will appeal to the voter on the basis of party loyalty and personal friendship; sometimes material inducements (money, favors, jobs) will be offered.[4]

Conversely, Wilson described the political style of the amateur as one wherein:

> Voters would be mobilized by appeals to some set of principles or goals. The party would be held together and linked to the voter by a shared conception of the public interest. A politics of principle would necessarily attach little value to-and indeed would criticize-appeals to private, group or sectional interests. Private interests, which for the professional are the motive force of politics, the amateur would consider irrelevant, irrational, or immoral...Instead of serving as neutral agents which mobilize majorities for whatever candidates and programs seem best suited to capturing public fancy, the parties would become the sources of program and the agents of social change. They would control the behavior of public officials by internalized convictions rather than external threats and for the purpose of realizing certain social policies rather than enhancing the party's prospects for retaining power in the next election.[5]

Noting that the amateurs seek to "alter fundamentally the way in which the functions of parties are carried out",[6] Wilson summarized the organizational attributes of the amateur model of political parties as "programmatic, internally democratic, and largely free of a reliance on material incentives such as patronage."[7] Amateur activists and organizations thus stand in sharp contrast to professional activists and organizations which are frequently the

targets of their reform efforts. In both the scholarly literature and popular press, amateurs are often treated as presenting a morally superior and desirable political style that will and/or should redress and ultimately replace the corruptive abuses of the hierarchical, professional, urban party machines.[8]

Much of the literature on the amateur and professional models of party activism has focused on incentives. In their seminal theoretical analysis of party incentives, Clark and Wilson distinguished three broad categories of incentive rewards that attract and sustain organizational activists: material, solidary and purposive. Material incentives are tangible rewards, that is, rewards that have a monetary value or can easily be translated into ones that have. Solidary rewards are intangible and derive in the main from the act of associating with others in the organization. Purposive incentives are also intangible, but they derive in the main from the stated end of the organization.[9]

Material and solidary incentives are sometimes referred to in the literature of political party activism as personal rewards. Conway and Feigert define personal rewards as those which contribute to an individual's "desire to build a personal position in politics, business contacts, and politics as part of [his/her] way of life..."[10] This definition is roughly equivalent to Wilson's concept of material-tangible inducements sought

and distributed by adherents of the professional model: "jobs, pay-offs and political income."[11]

Personal incentives also include intangible rewards which Wilson defined as "the prestige, sociability and personal loyalties which politics can provide; being a 'big man' to one's neighbors, placing voters under obligations to one's self...taking pride in the congratulations from the leader...or simply being able to meet regularly with one's neighbors."[12] This concept is derived from Clark and Wilson's notion of solidary rewards - the prestige, status or approval one obtains from political participation.[13] In turn, solidary rewards are roughly equivalent to Conway and Feigert's social contact category or ego-satisfying incentives which include the "desire to be close to people doing important things, friendship for a candidate, community recognition, enjoyment of campaign excitement and enjoyment of social contacts."[14]

Purposive incentives, on the other hand, are frequently referred to in the literature as the impersonal rewards that attract and/or sustain party activists. Eldersveld defined impersonal incentives as those that satisfy an activist's desire for "'group realization', in order to 'do a job' as a citizen or as a loyal group supporter."[15] Gluck referred to impersonal rewards as "other-oriented" incentives, including tangible ones such as neighborhood improvement, and intangible ones such as influencing policies and issues, changing the party

structure and procedures, and serving a perceived civic and community obligation."[16]

Incentives and Organizational Behavior

Much of the literature on the amateur and professional models has focused on the relationships that obtain between activists' incentives and organizational behavior. Ideally, the amateur-purist is recruited and sustained in party work solely by impersonal or purposive incentives whereas the professional purist is recruited and sustained solely by personal, material incentives. The amateur-purposive, professional-material dichotomy is, however, more an analytical distinction than a reflection of empirical reality. Solidary rewards were important as both initial and sustaining incentives within certain amateur organizations in many studies.

Clark and Wilson argued that "the incentive system may be regarded as the principal variable affecting organizational behavior" and that "the incentive system is altered (largely by the organization's executive) in response to changes in the apparent motives of contributors, or potential contributors, to the organization."[17]

Recognizing the complexity and multiplicity of activist incentives within any organization, Clark and Wilson argued that, "nonetheless, many organizations may be distinguished by the incentives upon which they primarily rely." Clark and Wilson categorized organizations into three types that correspond to their incentive types:

utilitarian organizations which rely largely upon material incentives; solidary organizations which rely on solidary incentives; purposive organizations which rely almost exclusively upon their stated purposes to attract and hold contributors. Political machines, ("professional" party organizations), they noted, are utilitarian whereas reform political groups ("amateur" groups) tend to be initially purposive but are later transformed into solidary organizations.[18]

Incentive Reorientation

Thus, Clark and Wilson viewed activists' motives or incentives as an independent variable that shapes the character of organizations. Changes in activists' incentives, consequently, result in important changes in the organization. "Executives modify incentive systems in response to changes in organizational environments and in response to resulting changes in contributors' motives. The basic proposition is that incentive systems are modified in such a way as to bring supplies of available incentives into balance with demands for incentives."[19] Thus, they noted, political reform groups may originate as purposive organizations in response to the purposive incentives of their members. In time, as the frustrations of political reform become apparent, activists may shift toward solidary incentives, forcing the organization's leaders to adjust their rewards from purposive to solidary.

The degree to which activists retain their incentive

orientation over time has been an important focus of the literature on party activism. Eldersveld's seminal empirical study of party activism found "for the most part,....motivations were diverse, multiple and represented a synthesis of personal and impersonal interests."[20] While party elites indicated initial personal motives which were sustained over time, lower echelon precinct workers began with impersonal motives but "soon took on personalized motivational perspectives."[21]

This resocialization of amateur activists toward professional incentives was also reported by Conway and Feigert,[22] particularly in an affluent suburban county. Gluck similarly noted that the suburbs provided the least opportunities for maintaining the amateur style over time.[23] Wilson also observed that "the amateur spirit cannot endure permanently. Eventually, the amateur either loses interest or becomes a professional and plays the game by professional rules."[24]

Other studies have concluded, however, that amateur incentives are retained over time. Browder and Ippolito observed that:

> The amateur organization appears to be multi-purpose. It provides many traditional or personally instrumental incentives, but these appear to be the most important attraction for few activists. The middle-class suburb is an appropriate environment for the establishment of amateur organizations, and it does not appear that amateurism is, by its nature, transitory. To the extent that this is in fact the case, one can expect an increasing movement of local party organizations toward this type of orientation.

> And the impact which this has upon the party system may, after all, be quite positive.[25]

Similarly, Ippolito's study of party leaders in Nassau County, Long Island, New York, concluded "that the perceived motivation incentives for the suburban political activist tend to deal, in the main, with the substance of politics rather than with politics as a mere channel for personal gain."[26] He concluded of Nassau activists "that a substantial number...in both parties can be characterized as 'amateurs' in terms of both initial and maintaining incentives...Previous conclusions relating to the transience of amateur activism might be overdrawn."[27] Lastly, Sullivan, et. al., studied delegates to the 1972 Democratic Convention and concluded that amateur purists, contrary to their hypotheses, did not become more pragmatic or professional as their status in the party changed from insurgents to convention leadership., i.e., amateur insurgents in power did not adopt a professional style.[28]

Thus, although the literature contains wide agreement on the nature of the amateur and professional styles, conflicting conclusions were reported as to whether the amateur incentive orientation persists over time. Also, studies of the amateur-professional model provided little evidence to explain the environmental or personal variables that might contribute to the existence and persistence of the amateur or professional organizational model. These ambiguities are the subject of this research.

Incentives and Social Class

Although Wilson's seminal analysis noted that the rise of the amateur model in certain areas was due to "largely fortuitous reasons" he did observe that, "for the most part they are young, well educated professional people...In style of life, they are distinctly middle class...."[29] This association of middle-class status and values with the amateur incentive system is widespread in the literature, with some studies vaguely treating social class (income and education) alone, or social class and middle-class values and the amateur incentive model as independent variables affecting entry into and maintenance of political activism styles. These propositions have important relevance to this study of political activism in a local suburban party organization.

Ippolito, for example, included this general proposition "drawn from the literature on local party activists" as part of a "general framework" for his study of the political perspectives of party leaders in Nassau County, New York:

> The political party offers a number of incentives to its activists. Group and society related incentives, however, are becoming increasingly relevant to the contemporary activist.[30]

Similarly, Gans' seminal study of suburbia observed that the norm of altruistic democracy strongly influences the nature of suburban politics:

> According to this norm...citizens enter government to serve their fellows and the public interest.

> They are to be impartial, altruistic servants of the citizenry, sure of how the public interest is to be defined, who make morally proper decisions without concern for interest groups, for voter blocs, or for their own party's political future.[31]

The assumed correlation between social class, middle-class values and the acceptance of the amateur incentive system has received wide support in the literature. Sorauf, for example, concluded, "What is emerging...is a system of political organization more compatible with the middle-class values of suburbia than those of the ethnic or racial neighborhood of the urban center." The organization he proceeded to describe conformed to the amateur model.[32] Similarly, in another seminal analysis of suburban politics, Wood observed:

> With the traditional function of the party leader as dispenser of favors absent from the suburban environment, other community characteristics make the development of effective party control more difficult. In the residential suburbs it is harder to put together an effective ward organization...As far as votes are concerned, patronage no longer has substantial appeal, access to the welfare rolls is not a major aim of the middle class residents, and fewer suburbanites are likely to be engaged in illicit enterprises that require connivance of the local police for their existence.[33]

What emerges in much of the literature on suburbia and local party organization is an image of a professional organization significantly atrophied by such middle-class values as honesty, impartiality and efficiency in government. Elsewhere Sorauf observed, for example, that "party inputs have changed. The new party activists are generally better

educated and carry a higher socio-economic status than their predecessors. They come to party work, not so much in search of a patronage job or some other form of political preference, but out of a combination of ideological and social purposes."[34] Perhaps the strongest argument for a relationship between social class and the amateur incentive model has been made by Banfield and Wilson:

> Only those who are the least competent to cope with the conditions of modern life, those who are culturally or personally incapacitated in one way or another, still value the "favors" of the machine [i.e., the professional model]. They are, of course, the poorest of the poor.
>
> Except in the inner parts of the larger central cities, the proportion of middle class people is greater than it was. Machine-style [i.e., professional] politics has rarely worked in predominantly middle class districts.
>
> There remain enclaves that are heavily lower class in all central cities and many of the older suburbs. In these, machine-style politics is as popular as ever. It does not flourish as of old, however, because of restraints and impediments imposed by the middle class....The assimilation of lower class people into the middle class has, of course, entailed their assimilation to the political ethos of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite, the central idea of which is that politics should be based on public rather than private motives and, accordingly, should stress the virtues of honesty, impartiality and efficiency.[35]

Supporters of this assumed middle-class predisposition to the amateur model generally offer the decline of urban machines as empirical evidence. Again Sorauf concluded, "The classic 'machine' form of party organization is yielding in considerable measure to a more relaxed, middle-class form of party organization. Only in a few

urban centers does the machine, with its omnipotent 'boss' and its army of local precinct workers continue to have vitality."[36]

Similarly, Greenstein observed:

> An impressionist survey of the scattered evidence suggests, as might be expected, that the older [professional] pattern continues in those localities which most resemble the situations which originally spawned strong local parties in the nineteenth century. Eastern industrial cities such as New Haven, Philadelphia and many of the New Jersey cities, have sizable low income groups in need of traditional party services.[37]

The existence of the machine is thus premised on a lower class constituency. Again Wilson noted:

> Today, powerful, city-wide machines of the old style are hard to find....But the ethic of the machine persists, in modified form, in the habits of the professional politician for whom the value of organization and leadership are indisputable, personal loyalties and commitments remain indispensable and the lower class basis of the big city electorate is unchanging.[38]

Wilson, while accepting the assumed causal relationship between a lower class constituency and the existence of the professional model, also distinguishes between machine or professional politics and a machine structure. This is an important distinction. "Machine politics" Wolfinger observed, "is the manipulation of certain incentives to partisan political participation: favoritism based on political criteria in personnel decisions, contracting and the administration of laws." A political machine, on the other hand, is "an organization that produces machine politics." It can also refer to "the

centralization of power in a united hierarchical party organization." Perhaps most important, however, is Wolfinger's conclusion that "machine politics need not produce centralized organization...."[39]

The decline of urban machines - i.e., hierarchically organized, disciplined, "boss-run" centralized structures - does not necessarily spell the decline of machine, i.e., professional, politics. The personal rewards distributed by professional politicians are, in effect, sources of political influence to their recipients. Hence, Wolfinger cogently argued:

> There is no reason why the advantages of political influence appeal only to the poor. In places where the political culture supports expectations that official discretion will be exercised in accordance with political considerations, the constituency for machine politics extends across the socio-economic spectrum.[40]

Thus, the rewards of machine or professional politics can be as appealing to the middle class as they are to the lower class.

Assumptions regarding the positive relationship between social class and the amateur model have, nevertheless, been carried over to studies of local party incentive systems. Studies by Ippolito, Browder and Ippolito, Conway and Feigert, Eldersveld, Hitlin and Jackson, Gluck, Wilson and Sullivan, Pressman, Page and Lyons did demonstrate some degree of correlation between middle-class backgrounds and the initial amateur orientation of local party activists. As noted above, however, the data were not clear about

whether these amateur motivations persist over time.[41]

In addition to testing the persistence of incentive orientation over time, therefore, the assumed positive causal relationship between middle-class status and values and amateur incentives and organizations in local, suburban politics will be examined in this study. Preliminary observations of both the Democratic and Republican Parties in Suffolk County confirmed Wolfinger's hypothesis in that machine politics or the professional model seemed to be flourishing in this largely middle-class suburb.

Leaders and Material Rewards

The passing of the party "boss" has been much heralded in both the popular and academic literature. The decline of urban machine structures, along with the association of middle-class backgrounds with activists' initial amateur orientations, has led some researchers to conclude that professional politics are on the wane among middle-class party activists. Wood, for example, observed:

> By and large...the party leader represents an additional dimension to suburban politics, standing beside but to quite a degree apart from local government....Operating primarily within the party framework, supplying occasional assistance in local affairs but more generally state oriented, he is able to receive credit both for the good government he does not control and the big majorities he does not produce.
>
> In the final analysis, the specter of a dominant political personality is not a particularly realistic one in suburbia. Outlooks, institutions and election habits work against this sort of development, with the party leader tolerated only within his own back yard, or, if accepted, cleverly restrained in the demands he can make on the

> locality....In place of the outright politician who works full time at his job, residents look to "wheels" to spark civic affairs - men and women who engage in politics as their avocation...The amateur dabblers in public affairs shape local policy.[42]

Though such analyses may be correct in observing severe environmental constraints on suburban party leaders, they overlook the fact that "within his own back yard" the leader may have enormous influence on the organization and operation of the local party structure.

The intra-party power of suburban political elites is sustained by the fragmented nature of local government and politics. This fragmentation has been widely reported in the literature.[43] In such an environment, the influence of the local party leader may be enhanced. This point was cogently made by Merton who observed, "The key structural function of the Boss is to organize, centralize and maintain the good working condition of 'the scattered fragments of power' which are at present dispersed through our political organization."[44] As Wolfinger noted, if Merton was correct, "one would expect to find a positive relation between the prevalence of machine politics and municipal institutions that maximize fragmentation." Though systematic evidence is somewhat lacking, Wolfinger concluded, "what data there are do support the propositions."[45]

Despite the passing of most centralized, hierarchical machine structures, therefore, party leaders continue to play powerful roles in local politics. Sayre and Kaufman,

for example, pointed out that urban party leaders dominate the process of candidate selection.

> The nominations of party candidates for elective public office made by conventions and committees are almost completely in the hands...of inner-party circles. Direct nominations by party members through the primary did not shatter the hold of these inner circles; indirect nominations through delegates and representatives certainly could not do so.[46]

Preliminary observations confirmed a similar pattern within the Democratic and Republican Parties of Suffolk County. This study will explore nominations for public office as one of the resources distributed by local party elites.

Patronage is yet another area of influence dominated by party leaders. As with the professional model in general, much of the literature holds that patronage is largely waning among the middle classes. Sorauf, for example, noted:

> Patronage is not...a universal concomitant of the political process. It is rooted deeply in a particular set of social conditions and traditions. The implication that party loyalties and activity rest on so slender a reed as the promise of political spoils is at least open to question.... A generation or two ago patronage flourished among the uprooted, illiterate and unassimilated groups in the urban centers of America....Rather than universalize the importance of patronage to party, however, one might suggest that its role is declining and that it survives in many places as a mere shadow of itself. The politics of Messrs. Plunkitt and Dooley have been curtailed by the political education and assimilation of migrant and foreign-born populations.[47]

Elsewhere Sorauf argued that patronage has fallen into disfavor with the public for "appearing to approve an outright political payoff", a practice at variance with the mores of the "middle class and the image of civic virtue

instilled by public education." In addition, he noted, "the vast majority of patronage positions available are poorly paid and generally unappealing to the men and women of skills and achievement the parties would like to enlist."[48]

Although Sorauf may have been correct in his assertion that patronage is no longer as important to parties as it was during the era of powerful urban machines, one would be mistaken to conclude that patronage is an obsolete form of intra-party influence. In their comprehensive - though largely undocumented - analysis of contemporary politics, Tolchin and Tolchin found patronage to be a vital element in local party politics.[49] Similarly, preliminary observations of the Democratic and Republican Parties in Suffolk County confirmed the continued use of patronage by party elites as a means of attaining their objectives. A further testing of this hypothesis, of course, constitutes a major portion of this research study.

Incentives, Power and Participation

In addition to their incentive components, the amateur-professional models are also premised on differing notions of activists' roles in intra-party democracy. Wilson, for example, noted:

> Mass participation and intra-party democracy are crucial to the nature of amateur politics... A man's right to press his views in a political organization...ought not to depend on his power or position in that organization, but on his ability and knowledge. Hierarchy and ex-officio authority, the foundation stones of professional

> political organization, must be destroyed or severely limited...Almost all active [amateur] club members speak of the importance to them of sharing in party decisions particularly the selection of candidates and the shaping of issues.[50]

The literature contained little data building on Wilson's formulations regarding this proclivity of amateur activists for intra-party democracy. As noted above, Sullivan, et. al., tested whether insurgents demand policy making arenas where rational discussion and open debate predominate because they are a "middle-class insurgent group" seeking greater weight in policy making. "If style is partially a response to one's fortunes in the organization, a reversal of roles might be expected as purists approach positions of leadership responsibility and regulars are displaced....Yesterday's purist is today's professional worried about organizational unity, incentives and winning elections." The data did not support this hypothesis; McGovern delegates were willing to accept the discipline required to secure their candidate's nomination but were "unwilling to follow the lead of McGovern in extending those same notions to party unity."[51] Similarly, Hitlin and Jackson's study of delegates to the 1974 Democratic Mid-Term Conference found that "'amateurs' have moved into positions of party and public power while still retaining the amateur outlook."[52]

Both the Sullivan and Hitlin studies probed the attitudes of activists in convention settings over short

periods of time. This study explores the degree to which activists maintained long term, on-going commitments to the amateur ideal of democratic decision-making within their local party organizations.

The relationship between activists' participation and their incentives was also treated in the literature. With respect to the persistence of activism, Bowman, Ippolito and Donaldson, for example, found that discontinuity in party activism was not related to one's material, solidary or purposive incentive system. They concluded:

> The maintenance of activism requires, to some extent, the eventual positive orientation of the activist toward the party as a group and toward his position in the party. Where material incentives are either unavailable or largely irrelevant and where the party's ability to pay off in terms of purposive incentives is restricted, the importance of solidary incentives...becomes clear.[53]

The persistence of activism is thus related to the personal value the party official finds in his position; a conclusion which adds weight to those studies that observed a resocialization of amateurs toward the professional model over time. This study further explores the relationship between incentives and the persistence of activism.

As to the party roles which activists fulfill, Eldersveld found that among activists there was considerable inconsistency between the perception of roles as purposive and the satisfactions obtained from party activities. Less than one fifth of the activists who defined their roles ideologically seemed motivated and satisfied by ideological

or philosophical interests. Thus, Eldersveld concluded:

> The particular content of a person's ideological position, or conception of what the party should be fighting for, or his own role in the party structure, was not necessarily related to the satisfaction he derived from party work. Goal, role and ideology might be in one compartment, motivation in another...The majority of individual leaders were striving for social gratifications and personal status.[54]

Conway and Feigert, on the other hand, hypothesized that activists motivated by material or social incentives, as contrasted with those motivated by ideological or other impersonal incentives, would maintain higher levels of party activism in the performance of their roles. Their data revealed that:

> Those purposively sustained "were less likely to report precinct activities occurring in their districts...Furthermore,...the purposively sustained tended to be less likely to plan a greater devotion of time to future party activity than did activists sustained by other incentives. Turning to the actual performance of party tasks during election time, those individuals purposively sustained reported performing both organizational and voter polling and registration tasks at a higher rate than activists of other motivational types.[55]

Hence, they concluded, the assumed positive correlation between material rewards and the superior task performance of activists received limited refutation in that those purposively sustained are somewhat less active on a continued basis but "do tend to perform their tasks at election time, which, it can be argued, is the crucial period of party activity."[56] The relationships between incentives, the persistence of activism, role expectations

and the performance of party tasks will be further explored in this study.

By examining the relationship between incentives, roles, the persistence of activism and lower strata participation in decision making, this study probes the relevance of the human relations or participation theories to local party organizations. According to one branch of the human relations-participation theories, democratic leadership concerned with human relations rather than productivity or bureaucratic rules will yield high morale and, consequently, increased membership productivity.[57]

Another facet of the human relations-participation theories stresses that the expansion of opportunities for participation of lower strata activists in decision making "has an integrative effect and that it aids the acceptance of collective decisions."[58] Yet another branch of the human relations-participation theories focuses on the personal benefits to be gained from increasing participation in decision making. Bachrach summarized this latter point:

> I believe that a theory of democracy should be based upon the following assumptions....: the majority of individuals stand to gain in self-esteem and growth toward a fuller affirmation of their personalities by participating more actively in meaningful community decisions....[59]

As noted earlier, the amateur model of party organizations emphasizes participation by lower strata activists in party decision making - a central concept of the human relations-participation theories. According to Perrow,

human relations theorists have generated "the most voluminous and substantial part of the literature on organizations." Yet, after having closely examined that literature, he concluded, "there is little empirical support for the human relations theory...."[60] This study explores the applicability of human relations-participatory concepts to middle-class, suburban party organizations.

Summary

Much of the literature on local party activism is premised on the normative judgment that the amateur incentive system and organizational model is preferable to the professional model. In those studies which have sought to link activist incentives with organizational behavior there have been mixed findings. The data on whether or not activists' amateur values persist over time were inconclusive. Similarly, the assumed middle-class predisposition to the amateur model found in much of the literature has resulted in considerable ambiguity.

Likewise, though some researchers have assumed a tendency for suburban party activists to adopt the amateur style and organizations, the data supporting such conclusions have been sparse and confusing. Last, the literature has not provided a clear picture about the relationship between incentives, the persistence of activism and activists' role definitions and task performance. Consequently, the need for additional research, particularly in middle-class, suburban party structures, seems apparent.

CHAPTER ONE

FOOTNOTES

[1]James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p.4.

[2]Ibid., pp.3-4.

[3]See Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics, (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); Lewis Bowman, Dennis Ippolito, William Donaldson, "Incentives for the Maintenance of Grassroots Political Activism", Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13 (February, 1969): 126-139, 1969; Glen Browder and Dennis Ippolito, "The Suburban Party Activist: The Case of the Southern Amateurs", Social Science Quarterly, 53(June, 1972): 168-175; M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, "Motivation, Incentive Systems and the Political Party Organization", American Political Science Review, 62 (December, 1963): 1159-1173; Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Approach, (New York: Rand McNally, 1964); Sonya Forthal, Cogwheels of Democracy: A Study of the Precinct Captain, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1946); Peter R. Gluck, "Research Note: Incentives and the Maintenance of Political Styles in Different Locales", Western Political Quarterly, 25 (December, 1972): 753-760; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics" in Phillip B. Coulter, ed., Politics of Metropolitan Areas, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1967), pp. 62-77; Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (New York: AMS Press, 1937); Robert Hitlin, "On Amateur and Professional Politicians", The Journal of Politics, 39 (August, 1977): 786-793; Dennis Ippolito, "Political Perspectives of Suburban Party Leaders", Social Science Quarterly, 49 (March, 1969): 800-814; Dennis Ippolito, "Motivational Reorientation and Change Among Party Activists", Journal of Politics, 31 (November, 1969): 1098-1101; John S. Jackson, Jesse C. Brown, Barbara L. Brown, "Recruitment, Representation and Political Values - The 1976 Democratic National Convention Delegates", American Politics Quarterly 6 (April, 1978): 187-217; Thomas R. Marshall," Party Responsibility Revisted: A Case of Policy Discussion at the Grass Roots", Western Political Quarterly, 32 (March, 1979): 70-78; Dan Nimmo, Robert L. Savage, "The Amateur Revisited", Polity, 2 (Winter, 1972): 268-276; James A.

Riedel, "City Bosses and Political Machines" in Boss and Faction, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 353 (May, 1964): 14-26; Thomas Roback, H., "Amateur and Professionals: Delegates to the 1972 Republican National Convention", Journal of Politics 37 (1975): 436-465; Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago, (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1971); Robert H. Salisbury, "The Urban Party Organization Member", Public Opinion Quarterly, 29 (1965): 550-564; John W. Soule and James W. Clarke "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention", American Political Science Review, 64:880-898, Dennis G. Sullivan, Jeffrey L. Pressman, Benjamin I. Page, John J. Lyons, "Purists and Professionals in Party Politics" in David W. Abbott, Edward T. Rogowsky, ed., Political Parties, (New York: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1978); James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat, op. cit.

[4]Wilson, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

[5]Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid., p. 340.

[8]See, for example, Greenstein, op. cit.

[9]Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization", Administrative Science Quarterly, 6(September, 1961): 129-166.

[10]Conway, Feigert, op. cit., p. 1165.

[11]Wilson, op. cit., p. 9.

[12]Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[13]Clark and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 134-137.

[14]Conway and Feigert, op. cit.

[15]Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 275.

[16]Gluck, op. cit., p. 754.

[17]Clark and Wilson, op. cit., p. 130.

[18]Ibid., pp. 137-147.

[19]Ibid., pp. 150-151.

[20]Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 134.

[21]Ibid., pp. 286-287.

[22]Conway and Feigert, op. cit., p. 1168.

[23]Gluck, op. cit., p. 758.

[24]Wilson, op. cit., p. 5.

[25]Browder and Ippolito, op. cit., p. 175.

[26]Ippolito, "Political Perspectives of Suburban Party Leaders", op. cit., p. 814.

[27]Ippolito, "Motivational Reorientation and Change Among Party Activists", op. cit., pp. 1099-1100.

[28]Sullivan, et. al., op. cit., pp. 49-50.

[29]Wilson, op. cit., pp. 6, 13.

[30]Ippolito, "Political Perspectives of Suburban Party Leaders", op. cit., p. 801.

[31]Herbert J. Gans, The Levittowners: How People Live and Politic in Suburbia, (New York: Random House, 1967), 308.

[32]Frank J. Sorauf, "The Silent Revolution in Patronage", Public Administration Quarterly, 20 (Winter, 1960): 31.

[33]Robert Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin o., 1967), p. 168.

[34]Frank J. Sorauf, "Patronage and Party" in Charles G. Mayo, Beryl L. Crow, eds., American Political Parties: A Systematic Perspective, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 442.

[35]Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 121-123.

[36]Sorauf, "Patronage and Party", op. cit., p. 441.

[37]Greenstein, op. cit., p. 73.

[38]Wilson, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

[39]Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away", Journal of Politics, 34 (May,1972:374-375

[40]Ibid., p. 389.

[41]Cf. ante. pp. 7-9.

[42]Wood, op. cit., pp. 174-175.

[43]See Gans, Wood, op. cit.; Charles E. Gilbert, Governing the Suburbs, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1967); Frederick C. Wirt, Benjamin Walter, Francine Rabinowitz, Deborah Hensler, On the City's Rim: Politics and Policy in Suburbia, (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co., 1972).

[44]Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (New York: The Free Press, 1957), p. 72.

[45]Wolfinger, op. cit., p. 391.

[46]Wallace Sayre, Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City, (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1960), p. 150.

[47]Sorauf, "Patronage and Party", op. cit., p. 443.

[48]Frank J. Sorauf, "The Silent Revolution in Patronage", Public Administration Review, 20 (Winter, 1960): pp. 30, 32.

[49]Martin Tolchin, Susan Tolchin, To The Victor: Political Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House (New York: Vintage Books, 1972).

[50]Wilson, op. cit., pp. 185-186.

[51]Sullivan, et. al., op. cit., pp. 46, 50.

[52]Hitlin, Jackson, op. cit.

[53]Bowman, Ippolito, Donaldson, op. cit., pp. 138-139.

[54]Eldersveld, op. cit., pp. 293, 295.

[55]M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, "Incentives and Task Performance Among Party Precinct Workers", Western Political Quarterly, 27 (December, 1974): 708-709.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, (Glenview: Scott Foresman and Company, 1972), pp. 97-98.

[58]Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 43.

[59]Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967), p. 101.

[60]Perrow, op. cit., p. 153.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Problem to be Examined

The literature on amateur and professional incentives and political styles provided a less than clear picture of local party organization. This was particularly obvious with regard to party structures in middle-class suburbs about which there exist few empirical studies.

A careful review of the literature yields several questions about local party incentives and organizations that require additional research:

1. Are activists' incentives independent variables that affect organizational behavior, dependent variables that are affected by organizational behavior, or is the relationship between activists' incentives and organizational behavior interactive?
2. Do amateur incentives persist over time or are amateurs reoriented or resocialized toward professional incentives?
3. What is the relationship between middle-class status and values and activists' incentives and political style?

4. What influence do the amateur values of non-personal, purposive incentives, intra-party democracy and a programmatic, issue-oriented political style have on the internal operations of middle-class suburban party structures?
5. What relationship obtains between activist incentives, the persistence of activism and activist role definitions and task performance?

The Concepts Re-examined

As noted above, much of the literature on local party activism treated the amateur and professional incentive systems as independent variables affecting activists' organizational style. However, some doubts have been cast on the theoretical usefulness of the amateur and professional concepts when used in this fashion.

Hofstetter, for example, developed procedural and issue-participation dimensions of the amateur-professional concepts and concluded that "support has been adduced for the validity of the...measures...Yet, interpretation of the results are somewhat problematic." These ambiguities resulted, in part, because "it is unclear in Wilson's work...exactly what characteristics are attributed to amateurs and professionals by definition (and hence, form tautological statements), and what properties are hypothesized to be related to the amateur phenomenon (and hence, are amenable to empirical test.)" When criteria of

institutional membership alone are used to define amateurs and professionals, he argued, "the theoretical usefulness and precise measurement of the concepts are curtailed..."[1]

In a further study of the amateur-professional models, Hofstetter questioned the usefulness of the concepts, noting deficiencies in studies of the amateur-professional models as having utilized, "techniques of analysis...largely bivariate in character...and consequently...inadequate to assess the relative complexity of many theoretical models."[2]

In an elaborate path analysis applied to variables hypothesized to distinguish memberships between amateur and professional organizations, his study "demonstrated that purposive, solidary and material initiating and sustaining motives do not distinguish between amateur and professional organizations." Rather, he concluded:

> A six variable model - comprised of ideology, procedural and issue-participation role perspectives, social integration, age, and socio-economic status explains over 62% of the variance in organizational membership...It was concluded from the analysis that amateur or professional membership is due to a particular combination of social characteristics and role and ideological dispositions.[3]

Hofstetter thus sharply challenged the assumption, widespread in the literature, that activists' amateur or professional incentive systems act as independent variables determining their membership in amateur or professional organizations. He did, however, note that "purposive, solidary, and material motives...fail to discriminate

between professionals and amateurs only in this political system [Columbus, Ohio]...Only further research...can answer these kinds of questions."[4] Hofstetter also defined professionals as committee people and amateurs as members of an insurgent political club outside the party structure.[5] Thus, his research avoided the problem of incentive reorientation within a party structure. Nevertheless, his questioning of the usefulness of amateur-professional incentives as independent variables was instructive.

Research Objectives

The present study follows Hofstetter's suggestion that activism in amateur or professional party organizations may be explained by variables other than acceptance of material, solidary or purposive incentives and his suggestions for further research. In addition it challenges the assumption, widespread in the literature, that the amateur incentive system and amateur organizations are closely related to middle-class status. Despite differences in the literature regarding the persistence of the amateur incentive system over time, the middle-class backgrounds of many of the amateur activists reported in various studies led some researchers to accept a forced and somewhat artificial dichotomy: the middle-class amateur model vs. the lower-class professional model of party activism. As noted in Chapter One, either directly or by implication

some researchers have assumed that the attributes of social class (middle and upper middle-class incomes and education) result in a middle-class value structure (public-regarding political values) which predispose party activists to the amateur incentive model.

These social class interpretations of party activism have assumed middle-class values to be nearly synonymous with the amateur model. Consequently, they treat the combined factors of social class, middle-class values and the amateur incentive model as the major independent variables for explaining entry into and maintenance of party activism by amateur-oriented workers. Conversely, lower-class values (typically viewed as the desire for material rewards and private gain) are interpreted as independent variables affecting activism among machine-style professional activists.

Thus social class (income and education) alone, or social class and middle-class values or social class, middle-class values and amateur incentives are vaguely treated as independent variables affecting entry into and maintenance of political activism, which are viewed as the dependent variables. Such ambiguities tend to obfuscate the relationships between social class, values and party incentive systems. In addition, none of these interpretations adequately addresses the conditions that influence the persistence, over time, of a local party incentive system.

Conflicting data concerning the persistence of the amateur incentive model led to additional speculation regarding the intra-party elements which contribute to the existence of incentive systems over time. Several studies pointed to elite behavior and perceptions of elite behavior by lower strata activists, as possibly key independent variables in explaining the persistence of a particular incentive model. Conway and Feigert, for example, concluded that "the nature of the party's top leadership may... contribute to the relative degree to which purposive [amateur] satisfactions sustain precinct leaders' political activity."[7] Similarly, Ippolito suggested:

> It would appear necessary to examine inter-hierarchical orientations in order to determine the potential impact of amateur orientations at the local level...Leadership orientations... could be important factors in assessing the impact of amateur activists at the local level.[7]

Following these suggestions for needed research, this study focused on the attitudes and behavior of party elites in order to determine the extent to which the local party leadership contributed to the persistence of the professional model in middle-class, suburban party structures. The organizations studied were the Democratic Party and the Republican Party in the largely working-class,lower middle-class township of Babylon and the largely middle-upper middle-class township of Huntington, Suffolk County, Long Island, New York.

Rather than viewing social class, middle-class

values, political incentive systems, or a combination of the three as independent variables, this analysis treated activists' incentives and local organizational style - over time - as dependent variables. The values and behavior of the leaders of the Suffolk, Babylon and Huntington Democratic and Republican Party organizations were designated the major independent variables to explain the persistence of the professional incentive model among suburban party activists. A central purpose of the study was to test the assumed correlation of middle-class backgrounds and/or values with the maintenance of amateur values by local party activists.

Specifically, the study explored the nature of the personal reward system distributed by county and town elites within the party structure. The goal of the research was to demonstrate how the personal material rewards (defined as nominations, patronage, and campaign assistance) distributed by local party leaders in Babylon and Huntington Towns contributed to the persistence of the professional incentive model in these largely middle-class local party organizations. The central hypothesis of the study was that local elites distributed or withheld personal material resources as rewards and punishments in such a manner as to, either directly or indirectly, produce attitudes and behavior among lower strata activists which conform to the professional model. The net result is that lower strata activists are induced to belong to and maintain their

membership in the party through the promise of personal material rewards.

Unlike previous studies which explained the existence and persistence of party incentive models in terms of the social class or the incentive-value systems of the activists, this study relates the reward orientations and behavior of party elites to the persistence of lower strata activists' incentive systems. The focus is thus on power relationships and activists' behavior within the party organization. This approach is markedly different from most other studies which based their conclusions almost exclusively on activists' self-perceptions of their incentive systems. Specifically, the following hypotheses were tested:

1. Party elites (executive board members) maintain a professional goal structure which includes:
   a. Electoral success.
   b. Sustaining the power position of the party leaders.
   c. Maintaining intra-party discipline.
   d. Satisfying the demands of factions and sub-groups.

   Consequently, within these party organizations, amateur-purposive goals such as issue formation and full participation in intra-party decision making and public policy formulation are secondary to the elites' professional goals.

2. Elites systematically distribute or withhold personal material resources (defined as nominations, patronage and campaign assistance) in a manner which causes most lower strata activists (committee people) to:
   a. Maintain their participation in the local party organization.
   b. Adopt a professional-personal rather than an amateur-purposive incentive goal structure.
   c. Define their party roles and perform their tasks (voting with elites on major intra-party questions and engaging in electoral, organization maintenance activities) thus enabling the elites to attain their professional goals.
3. The distribution of personal material rewards by party elites tends to favor party loyalists who share the professional values of the elites.
4. Both the top echelon elites and lower strata activists generally perceive the distribution of personal material resources to reward or punish lower strata activists' behavior as a legitimate exercise of party power.

Research Design

The organizations analyzed in this study were the Democratic and Republican parties of Babylon and Huntington

Townships in Suffolk County, Long Island, New York. These organizations were selected because:

1. The Democratic Party is the minority party in Suffolk County. As such, it allowed the researcher an opportunity to observe the behavior of party elites who must maintain the party's organizational integrity in an electoral environment that has shifted from one-party domination to two-party competition within the past five years. Consequently, it permitted further testing of those studies which found that minority parties are predisposed to goals that stress electoral success (e.g., candidate selection, campaigning) rather than maintaining the party's organizational integrity (e.g., loyalty to the leadership, discipline).[8]
2. Despite its minority status, the Democratic Party held a majority of the County Legislature as well as the Babylon and Huntington Town Supervisors' Offices between 1975-1977. In addition, New York State Democratic Chairman Dominick Barinello serves as Suffolk County Democratic Chairman. Hence, the leadership controlled a substantial number of personal rewards for distribution within the party.
3. The influence of class on the distribution of party resources is a major concern of this study.

Huntington is largely a white collar, middle-class town, while Babylon is generally less affluent, blue collar in socio-economic makeup. Thus, assumptions regarding the alleged amateur orientation of more affluent activists and communities could be cross-checked.

4. Study of the Democratic Party in a suburban setting permits further testing of Wilson's observations regarding the behavior of amateur Democrats.
5. The author has worked within the Democratic Party and has had access to a number of party leaders who facilitated collection of data.
6. The Republican Party has always been the majority party in Suffolk County. Analysis of the Republican organization will permit a study of elite-lower strata activists' attitudes and behavior in an established, dominant party structure.

Data were obtained by interviewing 103 activists in the Babylon and Huntington Democratic and Republican Parties between September 1978 and March 1979. The interviews, which lasted on the average, two hours, utilized an oral questionnaire and written instrument. The subjects included town party elites (executive board members such as the town leaders, co-town leaders, area or zone leaders and club presidents), and lower strata activists (selected election

district leaders or committee people). The sample included patronage recipients, Democratic and Republican nominees for public office or people who have sought nomination, and elected officials. Questions, which were both open-and closed-ended, focused on attitudes and behavior of the subjects regarding personal rewards in order to ascertain:

1. Whether the subject had an amateur or professional orientation when he or she entered politics. Browder and Ippolito's indicators of party incentives were used to assess the amateur or professional orientation of the activists.[9] These indicators included:
   a. Amateur-Impersonal Incentives
      - To satisfy one's sense of civic duty.
      - To affect party policy.
      - To build a two-party system.
      - To help or oppose a candidate.
      - To affect government policy.
   b. Professional-Personal Incentives
      - To obtain political power.
      - To further one's political career.
      - To engage in social activities.
      - To help a friend's campaign.
      - To participate in the excitement of politics.
      - To obtain business contacts.

2. Whether the subject currently had an amateur or professional orientation.
3. If the town party leaders perceived the lower strata activists as having amateur or professional orientations.
4. If the lower strata activists perceived the county and town leaders as having amateur or professional orientations.
5. What criteria were perceived to have been used by the town leaders in the distribution of personal resources.
6. What perceptions the upper and lower strata of the party had regarding the criteria used for the distribution of personal resources.
7. Whether the subject perceived the distribution and/or receipt of personal rewards as a legitimate party activity.
8. How the distribution of personal resources by party elites affected the political attitudes and behavior of lower strata activists, particularly activists' orientations toward the amateur or professional party incentive model.

Eldersveld noted that the local parties should not be viewed as "a mammoth county hierarchy, but as a series of fairly autonomous districts and precincts."[10] In keeping with this suggestion, each town party organization was treated in this study as a "fairly autonomous" structure

with an incentive system and organizational style peculiar to the elites and lower strata activists of that organization.

The Questionnaire

The instrument used in this study consisted of a two-hour personal interview composed of a twenty seven item, open-ended, oral questionnaire and a seven item, closed, written instrument.[11] The oral and written portions of the interview operationalized the concepts related to the amateur-professional models of party activism as outlined below.

Incentives

Eldersveld's psychological model of activists' motivational structures was used to operationalize Wilson's concepts of "material, solidary and purposive" incentives:

> Our investigation proceeds on the assumption that motivation is a "three-layer phenomenon." We believe, first, that every individual has deeply imbedded "needs" which he feels, with greatly varying intensity, must be fulfilled - prestige, power over others, feelings of contributing to some social goal, economic status, social interraction, etc. These "needs" lead to "drives" or determinations to satisfy these "needs" though again with varying urgency. The consequence of the activation of these "drives" over time is a resultant feeling of some degree of fulfillment (or nonfulfillment) of needs, or "satisfaction" (dissatisfaction).[12]

As operationalized in this study, incentives were viewed as an activists' underlying needs and drives or goals sought through entry into and maintenance of local party activism. Satisfactions, on the other hand, were defined

as the goals (needs and drives) actually fulfilled (or not fulfilled) by party activism.

Activists' goals were measured in several items. An eleven-item written check list (#33) conforming to Eldersveld's checklist asked respondents to evaluate the importance of each incentive and indicate which "one" of these reasons "best explains" why they "originally became active" and "remain active" in politics. These incentive goals were categorized according to Clark and Wilson's and Eldersveld's material, solidary and purposive incentive types as follows:[13]

1. Personal-Material Incentives
    a. "I am trying to build a personal position in politics."
    b. "Party work helps me to make business contacts."
2. Personal-Solidary Incentives
    a. "I had/have a friendship for a candidate."
    b. "I enjoy the friendship and contacts I have with other workers."
    c. "I like the fun and excitement of the campaign."
    d. "I like the feeling of being close to people who are doing important things."
    e. "Party work gives me a feeling of recognition in my community."

f. "I am strongly attached to my political party."

3. Impersonal-Purposive Incentives

a. "I see party work as a way of influencing the policies of government."

b. "Party work helps me to fulfill my sense of community obligation."

c. "Political work is part of my way of life."[14]

The written incentive checklist was complemented by an open-ended oral question (#32) which asked subjects "what first led" them to become active.

Satisfactions with party work were measured by two open-ended questions. One again utilized Eldersveld's measure of satisfactions by asking subjects what they would "miss the most" if they dropped "out of political activity tomorrow "[15](#19). In addition, subjects were asked to describe how their "ideas or attitudes about politics changed" since they first became active (#27). These items were also used to evaluate subjects' incentive reorientations over time.

Satisfactions with party work were also measured by asking respondents several open-ended questions related to their perceived alienation from the party: what plans they had for future work (#17) and their willingness to accept a more responsible party position (#18).

Amateur Incentives, Professional Norms

The resocialization of amateur activists was also

measured by probing subjects' evaluation of and participation in the party's personal reward system. Respondents were asked if they ever desired, for themselves or someone else, support from the party leaders for a nomination, patronage position or campaign help (#21). Also, subjects were asked if they would support "the complete abolition" of patronage (#25a).

Activists' perceptions of the degree to which personal rewards permeate the local party structure were measured by several items. One asked subjects if they were ever awarded or denied, or knew of anyone awarded or denied, a nomination, patronage position or campaign assistance because of their standing with the party leaders (#22) (A similar question was asked of party elites (#23, 24). Subjects were also asked to identify the criteria used by party elites in awarding or denying nominations, patronage and campaign assistance (#9, 10, 11, 12). In addition, subjects were asked to cite specific examples where party elites used personal rewards to motivate committee people (#12). Perceptions of the amount of patronage extant within the party were measured by asking subjects to estimate the percent of committee people who hold or are seeking patronage and the percent who are motivated by non-material incentives (#13). Lastly, subjects were asked to describe the effects on the party if leaders could no longer dispense personal rewards (#25b).

Leaders' Goals, Activists' Roles

Subjects' perceptions of the town party elites' goals were measured by an eleven-item, written checklist (#4) which categorized party goals as follows:

1. Campaign Goals
    a. Winning elections
    b. Providing campaign assistance
    c. Selecting nominees
2. Organizational Maintenance Goals
    a. Providing patronage appointments
    b. Making party appointees
    c. Rewarding party workers
    d. Recruiting new workers
    e. Resolving conflicts
    f. Securing the leaders' power
3. Purposive Goals
    a. Influencing the party's stand on issues

Both committee people and elites were asked to evaluate the importance of each goal to the party's leaders, select the five most important goals and identify those goals that "should be most important...but currently are not."

The committee persons' perceptions of the leaders' role expectations were evaluated by asking subjects to identify the activities they thought the leaders expected of them (#20) and their participation in fund raisers (#16). Subjects' role definitions and task performance were evaluated by asking them to describe their party activities

during and between recent campaigns (#3 and #4).

Intra-Party Democracy

The amateur norm of intra-party democracy was measured by asking subjects to evaluate on written checklists (#1, 2) their perceived influence and freedom in selected decision-making areas. Subjects were also asked to specify the amount of "say" committee people and elites have and should have in the running of the party (#8, 14, 15) and the process by which decisions are made regarding nominations, patronage and campaign assistance (#9, 10, 11). The final measure of intra-party democracy asked subjects to evaluate the frequency and nature of their contact with party leaders (#5). All the above items were also used to analyze the degree to which committee people are responsive to the rewards distributed by town party elites.

Issue Salience

The amateur value of an issue-oriented, programmatic party were evaluated with several items. A fifteen-item written checklist (#5) asked subjects to evaluate the importance of selected local, state and national issues to the internal operations of the party. Two written continuum items (#6, 7) asked subjects to evaluate the importance that the local and national party's stand on issues had on their decision to remain active in local party politics. Subjects were also asked to describe the nature of party's factional disputes (#26). Finally, perceptions of issues

were contained in responses to issue-related incentive, leadership goals and decision-making questions outlined above.

The Sample

The 103 subjects were obtained by using a non-probability quota sample drawn from current lists of committee people in the four party organizations. The response rate was 83.5 percent. Contacts were made by telephone calls to committee people, representing a cross-section of geographic areas, who had been categorized as follows:

1. Members of the town party executive board
2. Committee people who hold patronage positions
3. Committee people who are members of an organized insurgent group (Babylon Democrats only)
4. Committee people with no distinguishable characteristics

The 103 subjects represented approximately a 10 percent sample of each full town committees.

A non-probability quota sample was utilized for several important reasons. First, the Babylon Democrats contain a powerful insurgent group who represent about 40 percent of the full town committee. An informant was used to identify members of this group in order to avoid biasing the sample with an over representation of insurgents, since this "out group" was, in fact, more accessible to the researcher than were the party regulars. The insurgents

made up 40 percent of the Babylon Democratic sample which conformed to the percent of committee positions they hold.

A second reason for use of the non-probability quota sample related to the presence of patronage holders in the sample. None of the parties had, or would reveal, a list of patronage recipients. Neither do local government personnel agencies have, or make accessible, lists of patronage recipients. Thus, the number of patronage recipients in each party had to be determined exclusively by asking subjects to estimate the number of activists in their party who hold patronage positions. Again using informants to identify patronage recipients, the sample was adjusted in each party to conform to the subjects' estimates of the total average percent of activists who held part-time or full-time patronage positions. The patronage composition of the sample is reported in Table 1.

Table 1

Estimates of Patronage Recipients and the Patronage Sample

Party	Subjects' average % estimate of activists with patronage	Percent of sample with patronage
Babylon Democrats	28%	32%
Babylon Republicans	47	48
Huntington Democrats	36	33
Huntington Republicans	34	32

Summary

This study was designed to explore the criteria used by party elites in the distribution of personal resources, as well as upper and lower strata perceptions of the distribution system. It also examines the influence of the personal reward system used by party elites on the party's organizational arrangements and activist incentive systems. In so doing, the analysis:

1. Tests the assumption that the amateur party incentive model is most frequently found among middle and upper middle-class groups.
2. Analyzes the degree to which urban-style professional politics exist in a middle-class party structure.
3. Analyzes the goals and criteria used by party elites in the distribution of personal rewards.
4. Examines the degree to which the attitudes and behavior of upper echelon party leaders contribute to the persistence of the professional incentive model among lower strata activists.
5. Analyzes intra-party networks of communication, power and reciprocity relationships, and decision-making processes in middle-class, suburban party organizations.

CHAPTER TWO

FOOTNOTES

[1]C. Richard Hofstetter, "The Amateur Politician: A Problem in Construct Validation", Midwest Journal of Political Science, 15 (February, 1971):54-55.

[2]C. Richard Hofstetter, "Organizational Activists: The Bases of Participation in Amateur and Professional Groups", American Political Quarterly, 6(April, 1973):245.

[3]Ibid., pp. 273-274.

[4]Ibid., p. 271.

[5]Ibid., p. 248.

[6]M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, "Motivation, Incentive Systems and the Political Party Organizations", American Political Science Review, 62(December, 1968):1173.

[7]Dennis Ippolito, "Motivational Reorientation and Change Among Party Activists", Journal of Politics, 31 (November, 1969):1101.

[8]See Phillip Althoff and Samuel C. Patterson, "Political Activism in a Rural County", Midwest Journal of Political Science, 10:46-50; Lewis Bowman and G. H. Boynton, "Activities and Role Definitions of Grassroots Party Officials", Journal of Politics, 28(February, 1969):126-149; Samuel Patterson, "Characteristics of Party Leaders", Western Political Quarterly, 16(June, 1963):335-348.

[9]Glen Browder and Dennis Ippolito, "The Suburban Party Activist: The Case of the Southern Amateurs", Social Science Quarterly, 53(June, 1972):173.

[10]Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Approach, (New York: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 298.

[11]See Appendix A, B.

[12]Eldersveld, op. cit., pp. 276-277.

[13]Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization", Administrative Science Quarterly, 6(September, 1961):133-137; Eldersveld, op. cit., Chapter 11.

[14]The literature contained some ambiguity as to the nature of the last item. Hofstetter ("Organizational Activists: The Bases of Participation in Amateur and Professional Groups", op. cit., p. 274) categorized the "way of life" item as a material incentive. Eldersveld (op. cit., p. 290), on the other hand, categorized this item as an impersonal, philosophical incentive. This study utilized Eldersveld's categorization, viewing the item as a reflection of an impersonal or purposive political weltansecht.

[15]Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 277.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

A Demographic Profile of the Townships

Babylon and Huntington are contiguous townships of 53 and 94 square miles, respectively, that comprise the westernmost portion of Suffolk County, Long Island, New York. Babylon, with 220,497 people in 1978, was the third most populous township in Suffolk; Huntington's 1978 population was 217,634, making it the fourth most populous town in the county.[1]

Babylon and Huntington, like much of mid-Long Island, experienced a rapid increase in population between 1960-1970. Babylon's population increased by 31 percent, Huntington's rose 37 percent, during this period. Since 1970, the growth in both townships has leveled off, with Babylon increasing 7.7 percent, and Huntington rising 8 percent, 1970-1978.[2]

Table 2 summarizes the land use patterns of each township in 1966, when population growth was about to level off.

Table 2

Lane Use Acreage
1966
(in percents)

Usage Pattern	Babylon (n=45,380)	Huntington (n=60,110)
Residential	18.5	29.2
Commercial	1.5	1.5
Industrial	2.4	1.5
Transportation, utilities	1.9	1.2
Institutional	3.4	5.3
Recreational	12.1	8.4
Agricultural	0.1	7.0
Roadways	10.2	9.8
Water	29.5	0.1
Vacant	19.4	35.6

Residential usage comprised a major proportion of each town's land use pattern. Both Babylon and Huntington are typical of the single-family dwelling, residential suburban communities that ring New York City (each town is located approximately 35 miles from the New York City border). As indicated in Table 3, the largest portion of each town's housing comprised single family dwellings in 1970.

Table 3

Housing By Type of Structure
1970
(in percents)

Structural Type	Babylon	Huntington
Percent single family	84.0	90.3
Percent multi family	15.2	9.6
Percent mobile home	0.8	0.5

The population density in Babylon in 1970 was 5.8 people per acre as compared with 3.4 people per acre in Huntington.[5]

The population of each township is largely white, middle class with Babylon comprised mostly of middle to lower middle-class residents and Huntington containing more middle to upper middle-class residents. The national median family income in 1970 was $9,590. With a family median of $12,084, Suffolk ranked 35th out of the nation's top 50 counties in median family income in 1970, when the last detailed demographic profile of the area was provided by the United States Census Bureau. Babylon's median family income in 1970 was $11,748, slightly below the county average. Huntington's family median, on the other hand, was $14,934. Of Long Island's 15 townships, Babylon ranked ninth and Huntington second in median family income.[6]

The more affluent composition of Huntington is evidenced in the home values data summarized in Table 4.

Table 4[7]

Median Value of Homes by Incorporated and Unincorporated Villages 1970

New York State Median Home Value	$22,500
Suffolk County Median Home Value	not available
Babylon Town	
Amityville	24,905
Babylon	23,570
Copiague(U)	20,980
Deer Park (U)	24,380
Lindenhurst	21,175
North Amityville (U)	19,835
North Babylon (U)	22,955
North Lindenhurst (U)	21,320
West Babylon (U)	21,730
Wyandanch (U)	21,150
Huntington Town	
Ashroken	50,000+
Cold Spring Harbor (U)	42,400
Commack (U)	30,400
Dix Hills (U)	39,710
East Half Hollow Hills (U)	41,070
East Neck	37,330
Elwood (U)	31,190
Greenlawn (U)	30,570
Half Hollow Hills (U)	50,000+
Huntington (U)	31,000
Huntington Bay	50,000+
Huntington Station (U)	26,965
Lloyd Harbor	50,000+
Melville (U)	31,385
Northport	28,715
South Huntington (U)	26,385
Vernon Valley (U)	24,905

Thus, while four of Babylon's ten incorporated or unincorporated villages had median home values in excess of the New York State median, all 17 of Huntington's communities were in excess of the New York State home value median.

By occupational status, Huntington again evidenced a higher middle-class status than did Babylon, as summarized in Table 5.

Table 5[8]

Occupations
1970

Occupation	Babylon N	Babylon %	Huntington N	Huntington %
White Collar				
Professional, technical	9,300	12.5%	17,716	24.8%
Non-farm managers, administrators	5,829	7.8	9,942	13.9
Sales	5,276	7.1	7,334	10.3
Clerical	14,824	19.9	12,240	17.1
Total White Collar	35,229	47.2	47,232	66.1
Blue Collar				
Craftsmen, foremen	12,762	17.1	8,880	12.4
Operatives	13,425	18.0	5,816	8.1
Non-farm laborers	3,451	4.6	1,928	2.7
	29,638	39.7	16,624	23.3
Farm	183	0.2	251	0.4
Service	9,584	12.8	7,303	10.2
Town Total	74,634	100.%	71,410	100%

While Babylon's population was slightly less than half white collar, two thirds of Huntington's population held

white collar occupational status.

Similarly, three of Babylon's ten school districts occupied the middle to upper fifth of Long Island's districts by median school years completed by residents, as compared with all 12 of Huntington's school districts in these categories. On the other hand, seven of Babylon's districts were ranked below average to the bottom fifth by median school years completed by residents.[9]

Lastly, while both towns were overwhelmingly white (Babylon, 88.6%, Huntington, 97.0%), Babylon contained an 11.1 percent Negro population as compared with Huntington's 2.5 percent Negro population in 1970.[10] In 1969, 5.3 percent of Babylon families lived below the poverty level as compared with 3.1 percent in Huntington. On the other hand, 27.8 percent of Babylon families earning more than $15,000 in 1969 as compared with 49.6 percent of the Huntington population in this income category.[11]

In sum, Babylon and Huntington are largely white, middle-class suburban towns of comparable geographic and population size. The growth rate in each township has stabilized since the 1970 Census provided the last detailed demographic profile of the area. While Huntington contains a larger white collar, upper middle-class, better educated population, Babylon's population is more blue collar, middle to lower middle-class in income, education and occupational status.

The Babylon Parties: Structure and History

Babylon town politics, like Suffolk County politics, moved since the late 1960's from one party Republican dominance to a more competitive two-party system. The current Babylon party enrollments are:

Democrats	20,000
Republicans	34,081
Conservatives	2,013
Liberals	456
Independents	9,267

Although Republicans continue to win most Babylon town elections, there have been several important Democratic victories since the late 1960's. In 1967, the Democrats formed a coalition with the Babylon Conservative Party and elected Joseph Stabile Town Supervisor. Also elected on the Stabile ticket was Democratic Councilwoman Sondra Bachety who has remained on the Town Board since 1967 and has been the Democrats' most successful town candidate. Ms. Bachety lost her 7th bid for reelection in 1979. Ms. Bachety, despite her popularity, has been at the center of a long standing, bitter internecine conflict within the Babylon Democratic Party.

The Babylon Democratic and Republican Parties each contain 130 election districts with two committee people (precinct workers) each. The Town Committee in each party has a varying number of vacancies at different times. The election districts are, in turn, organized geographically into larger areas (the Democratic Party has 10 areas, the Republican Party has 9 areas). Each area is coordinated

by an Area Chairman who is responsible for intra-party communication between voters, committee people, town party elites and elected officials within his or her area. The Area Chairman serves on the town party Executive Board along with the Town Chairman, Co-Town Chairman, Secretaries, Treasurer and State Committeemen. Area Chairmen are also technically responsible for mobilizing the committee people during campaigns and for maintaining party discipline within their areas.

Babylon Democratic party politics have been stormy and fractured since the Stabile-Bachety victory of 1967, this despite several additional Democratic legislative victories at the county level. In January of 1969, for example, Stabile resigned as Supervisor, allegedly to accept a Republican judicial appointment.[13] His decision shocked many Democrats and precipitated a primary fight in June for that judgeship, which Stabile lost. In November, the Republicans recaptured Town Hall when Aaron Barnett defeated the Democratic supervisory candidate Harvey Sherman, 20,461 - 16,185. Using a Republican-Conservative cross-endorsement, the Republicans also elected two town councilmen. Ms. Bachety was reelected the sole Democrat on the Town Board.

During her first two councilmanic terms, Ms. Bachety earned a reputation as the Democratic "watchdog" on the Town Board - a respected reputation she enjoyed until January, 1980. She wrote a weekly column in the local

Babylon newspaper, The Babylon Beacon, and articulated popular positions on a number of key local issues such as opposition to the proposed construction of a multi-story building, increased town recreation fees and local taxes. In 1971, Ms. Bachety ran her own fund raisers and conducted a successful campaign for reelection using the slogan, "She's really different!". The rest of the Democratic candidates were defeated as Republican Aaron Barnett won reelection by defeating his Democratic rival, Paul D'Amaro, 28,600 - 26,400.

Despite her victory, Ms. Bachety emerged from the 1971 councilmanic campaign at the center of a political controversy. In a letter to the Babylon Beacon shortly after the election, defeated Democratic supervisory candidate D'Amaro accused Bachety of "scuttling ... the entire Democratic team." He cited her slogan, "She's really different!" as a pejorative innuendo which suggested that "the rest of the team were just hacks". D'Amaro also accused Bachety of not sharing campaign funds with the other Democratic candidates and of not assisting her running mates with literature distributions and public appearances.[14] Although Bachety campaign officials denied most of these specific charges, an irreparable party split had occurred.

Ms. Bachety was now the most powerful Democrat in Babylon due to her popular, good government public record. Her electoral appeal was clearly established. Yet, within her party she was viewed as a disloyal maverick who had

abandoned the Democratic candidates to run an independent campaign that fostered her own image as a "reformer" who refused to take orders from the "bosses".

According to one Bachety confidant, the substance of D'Amaro's charges were largely correct. Ms. Bachety, he noted, was aware of the fact that she ran far ahead of the party and that she commanded more campaign resources (funds and personnel) than did the party, largely because she projected an image as a Democratic renigade. Hence, she felt that associating too closely with her own party would undermine her electoral appeal as an independent.

By 1971, the pro-Bachety Democrats had formed an insurgent organization, the Robert F. Kennedy Democratic Club. Within this club, and around Ms. Bachety, coalesced a group of dissident Democrats who eventually captured approximately 30-40 percent of the Babylon Democratic Committee. From the R.F.K. Club, annual, hard-fought primary challenges were waged, some successfully, against the regulars to capture nominations, area chairmanships, committee persons' positions and most recently, the Democratic Town Chairmanship, for which the R.F.K. candidate, Ben Funt, commanded about 30 percent of the committee peoples' votes in October, 1978.

In 1972, Ms. Bachety defeated the regular party candidate in a primary election for the Town Supervisor's position. She was, nevertheless, defeated in the November

election by Republican Aaron Barnett, 25,971 - 16,760. This loss was in part a public reaction to her support for an unpopular Urban Development Corporation public housing plan for the black community of Wyandanch and, in part, because many regular committee people withheld support from her candidacy and that of the Democratic presidential candidate, George McGovern.

In 1973, John Braslow became Babylon Democratic Chairman, allegedly in an effort to heal the organization-Bachety split. The bitter factionalism persisted however and, to date, the Babylon Democrats remain a deeply divided party with the town leadership isolated from more than one third of the committee people and the party's main vote-getter isolated from two thirds of the Town Committee and the party elites.

The Babylon Republican Party, on the other hand, weathered its own internal disputes since the late 1960's with considerably more cohesion. In 1970, Babylon Republican Chairman Fred Fellman resigned following his indictment on "kickback" charges to which he later pleaded guilty. Fellman was replaced by Gil Hanse who, in 1977, became Suffolk County Republican Chairman. His successor as the Babylon town leader was Syd Askoff, President of the patronage-rich Suffolk County Off Track Betting Corporation.

Like the Democrats, Babylon Republicans had a number of factional disputes. The most serious, in 1975, resulted in a Republican defeat for the Town Supervisor's position

and the election of a Democrat, Thomas Fallon. Unlike the Democrats, however, the Republicans managed to heal their differences. In 1977, Republican Raymond Allmendinger defeated incumbent Democratic Supervisor Fallon 22,911-16,919, and the Republicans again controlled Town Hall with Ms. Bachety remaining the sole elected Democrat in Babylon town government.

Askoff's leadership of the Republican Party has been credited with the 1977 supervisory victory and with restoring discipline to the Town Committee. Viewed by many as an "abrasive" leader, Askoff nevertheless demanded considerable effort from his committee people. He instituted, for example, and unprecedented grading system by which committee people were color-coded according to the quality of their party work. This list was distributed to the entire Town Committee. Askoff, as Suffolk O.T.B. President, is also viewed as a powerful patronage dispenser, an image he allegedly has used to maintain party discipline. Similarly, he has strengthened the influence of area chairman because, according to one observer, this system "worked for [Nassau County's powerful Republican Chairman Joseph] Margiotta" and he made it clear that non-working committee people would not receive patronage rewards and would face primary challenges. According to several committee people, Askoff's goal was to build the Republicans into a powerful "machine" modeled after Joseph Margiotta's Nassau organization.

The chief result of Askoff's efforts was a party in which internal factional disputes have been displaced or repressed and committee people successfully mobilized to recapture Town Hall from the Democrats. Askoff, while personally unpopular, appeared to command considerable respect and discipline within his party, a sharp contrast to his Democratic counterpart who appeared to be an isolated leader under siege. In August, 1979, Askoff announced his retirement as Town Chairman for reasons of ill-health.[15]

The Huntington Parties: Structure and History

As in Babylon, the Republican registration runs ahead of Democratic registration in Huntington:[16]

Democrats	26,843
Republicans	34,034
Conservatives	2,356
Liberals	140
Independents	14,416

Structurally, the Huntington parties are similar to the Babylon parties, though somewhat larger. Each has 145 election districts with a total town committee of 290 (including vacancies). The Democrats organized their election districts into 12 geographic zones; the Republicans have 11 zones. Each Zone Leader (equivalent to Babylon's Area Chairmen) sits on the town party Executive Board, along with town party officers, political club presidents, state committee people, special chairmen and other appointees. The Executive Board of the Huntington Democratic Party numbers approximately 30 people, the Republican Executive Board approximately 25. Both are

considerably larger than their Babylon counterparts which numbered about 15 each.

Despite its minority registration status, the Huntington Democratic Party has held control of Town Hall since 1967. As in Babylon, the Democrats first won election by forming a coalition, in 1959, with the independent Huntington Fusion-Economy Party. This coalition controlled Town Hall until the Republican victory of John Kane in 1965. Kane resigned his office in July of 1967 to accept a patronage position, thus allowing the Republican dominated Town Board to appoint the Republican supervisory candidate Quentin Sammis, to complete his term. This unpopular decision apparently cleared the way for a Democratic victory in November when Jerome Ambro defeated Sammis for Supervisor, 21,935-21,600.

Ambro's victory brought the first fully Democratic administration to Town Hall in 35 years. Between 1967 - 1979 the Democrats controlled both the administration and a majority of the Town Board. The Democrats lost their Council majority in 1979. Their campaign victories have, nevertheless, been accompanied by internecine disputes; unlike their Babylon counterparts however, the Huntington Democrats appear to have healed their factional rifts.

One potentially divisive force arose in the late 1960's as an outgrowth of the Vietnam protest movement. In the fall of 1967, a chapter of the New Democratic Coalition was formed in Huntington, according to one founder,

to "support an anti-Johnson presidential candidate". In the 1968 presidential primary, the N.D.C. McCarthy slate defeated the party organization's Humphrey delegates. The following year, the N.D.C. ran an unsuccessful Democratic primary campaign for a councilmanic nomination.

Though many of the N.D.C. McCarthyites left local politics following Humphrey's nomination in 1968, others launched local party careers. Thus, when the Democrats were considering a cross-party endorsement with the Conservative Party in 1969, the N.D.C. committee people claimed some credit for forcing the party elites to abandon the plan.

In April, 1969, Huntington Democratic Chairman Leon Lazer was replaced by former Suffolk County Democratic Chairman Lawrence Delaney. Delaney set out to recruit and mobilize N.D.C. members. In May he announced the appointment of McCarthy delegate Peter Hopf as a committee person, calling this decision "a new era for the Democratic Party in Huntington.... He is the first of a large group whom we intend to bring into the regular party."[17]

Following the reelection of Supervisor Jerome Ambro in November, 1969, Delaney began a reorganization of the Town Committee. The following June he announced the selection of 103 new committee people, including Donald Archer, the unsuccessful N.D.C. councilmanic candidate in the 1969 primary, and other N.D.C. members. One month later he appointed a prominent N.D.C. member, Stuart

Goldblat, as Huntington Democratic Registration Chairman. Praising the N.D.C., Delaney said, "They do get people involved."[18]

The N.D.C. again mobilized a large number of activists in the McGovern primary and election campaign of 1972. Following McGovern's defeat and the subsequent end of the war, however, one N.D.C. activist noted that the movement faded:

> We won in 1968 and in '72 because we got many people involved who were amateurs and anti-war. However, we didn't get them to work for our town councilman candidate....We never emerged as "party reformers" out to change the local party.... Our main drive was national. After '68, many withdrew, returned in '72, then withdrew again. Many who stayed were disillusioned and quit.

Those who remained active in the party have largely been absorbed into the party hierarchy. The current Town Chairman, Frank Grimes, for example, is a former N.D.C. activist, as is Zone Leader Stuart Goldblat. Grimes, who became Chairman in 1978, was endorsed by outgoing town leader Delaney but opposed by some committee people because of his past association with the liberal, N.D.C. wing of the party. Thus, the N.D.C. members were integrated into the regular party apparatus and the N.D.C., after 1975, ceased to function as an autonomous political club.

Another factional dispute created more serious problems for the Democrats. In May, 1974, Supervisor Ambro was nominated to run for Republican Angelo Roncallo's 1st Congressional District seat. Following Ambro's victory in

November, the Democratic Town Committee nominated Councilman Joseph Clemente to fill out Ambro's supervisory term. Despite his overwhelming party endorsement (21,552 votes to 1,922 for his opponent, Ann Hurley), the Democratic controlled Town Board refused to designate Clemente. Blocking his nomination were Democratic Councilmen Leonard Horn and Thomas Casey whom, it was alleged, "both wanted the position".[19] Instead, the Town Board voted Democratic Town Attorney Kenneth Butterfield to succeed Ambro in open defiance of the Town Democratic Committee and leadership.

The following June, the Town Committee retaliated by not renominating Casey for his councilmanic position. He, along with Horn, challenged the regular party nominees in a successful primary. Casey and Horn, along with Butterfield, were elected in November.

As in Babylon, the Democratic Party was again alienated from popular, elected officeholders. In Huntington, however, the party insurgents controlled the Town administration. Subsequently, charges were made that Casey and Horn had cut their party off from town patronage - particularly summer positions - in retaliation for the Town Committee's refusal to endorse their renomination.

These events coincided with the election of former N.D.C. activist Frank Grimes as Town Chairman in 1978. The result was an unusual mix of political styles within the Democratic Party. Grimes, distrusted by some party regulars as an "amateur", liberal reformer, assumed control

of a party apparatus that allegedly had been cut off from such desired professional rewards as summer patronage by two incumbent councilmen who won reelection largely because the public viewed them as good government, non-party independents. Efforts have been made to heal this split and, in 1979, Casey and Horn, along with Butterfield, were endorsed by the town party leaders for reelection. Although Butterfield was reelected in November, 1979, Casey and Horn were voted out of office.

The Republican Party, although enjoying a considerable registration edge over the Democrats, has been unsuccessful in all but two town races since 1967, that of councilmanic candidate Clair Kroft in 1977 and their unsuccessful 1979 bid for the Casey-Horn councilmanic seats. The current Town Chairman is Alexander Brandshaft who defeated John Flanagan for that post in 1970 and has held it since, despite numerous internal controversies.

In 1973, the Republican Town Committee refused to nominate insurgent John Mara (who, in 1969 had endorsed Democrat Ambro) for the supervisor's candidacy. The subsequent primary struggle prompted the Huntington local newspaper, The Long Islander, to note, "The Democrats always seem to get involved in bloody battles, but when election time rolls around they forget their differences and band together for the fight. Not so, the Republicans."[20]

Following numerous electoral defeats, a major challenge to Brandshaft's leadership was launched in 1976

when a number of dissidents, calling themselves the Rough Riders, attempted to seize control of the party through a series of primary challenges for committee persons' positions. Despite 45 Rough Rider challenges in the June primary, most pro-Brandshaft regulars were reelected and, in September, 1976, Brandshaft won unanimous reelection as Chairman of the Town Committee.

Numerous analyses have been offered to explain the primary defeat of the Rough Riders. Some committee people felt that the Rough Riders' leaders (many of whom were elected legislators) withdrew support from the movement. Others claimed that the insurgents were indiscriminate in their primary races, challenging some well known, respected committee people. Some felt that the Rough Riders were anti-Republican, attempting, as one activist noted, "to contravene all party customs and traditions." Still others felt that the insurgents were largely representative of the affluent, North Shore wing of the party and were simply not in touch with the committee people.

Whatever the reasons for their defeat, this anti-Brandshaft faction dissipated amid charges and countercharges of recrimination that still persist. To date, Brandshaft maintains control of the party although considerable opposition to his leadership style and abilities was expressed by committee people. Some felt he remains in office with the support of a small but committed bloc of patronage recipients. Others argued that he remains as town leader simply because

no one else wants the position. The result is a party which appeared to be suffering a leadership malaise and disaffection but without an organized opposition to that leadership.

Party Styles: A Retrospective

Viewed in an historical perspective, the Babylon and Huntington parties represented a mix of amateur and professional norms. The press, for example, has given considerable attention to the alleged "bossism" rampant in Suffolk County. In a July 3, 1979 editorial commenting on the growing Southwest Sewer District scandals, for example, Newsday observed:

> The issues Republicans in Suffolk have to address are fundamental: How can the party end the dreary and regular procession of political scandals? How does a county organization strive for reform when the real power is contained in Suffolk's 10 G.O.P. town organizations? The party's town leaders are like feudal barons, jealous of their power, suspicious of change and hard to watch.[22]

Amateurism, on the other hand, seemed to hold sway, at least in campaign styles. Thus, Democratic Councilwoman Sondra Bachety enjoyed considerable electoral appeal because she has successfully blended a good government public record with her image as a party renigade who refuses to take direction from the party "bosses".

Similarly, Huntington Democratic Councilmen Thomas Casey and Leonard Horn and Supervisor Kenneth Butterfield have maintained a considerable degree of independence from the party organization. Acknowledging that this apparent

independence has been essential to the Democrats' town electoral victories since 1967, for example, one ranking member of the Executive Board noted:

> We are caught in a dilemma. If I try to influence too many patronage decisions then the public would say, "How are we different from the Republicans?" So we must be restrained through this makes my job difficult because I want to build a strong party and need jobs to do this.
>
> We're schizophrenic in Huntington. While I like politics and campaigns I don't want...a situation where the party could run the government.

Likewise, a Babylon Republican observed, party leaders have "too little say in that candidates are too independent because they raise their own funds...threaten primaries and cause disruption." A Babylon Republican Area Chairman noted that his was really a two party system, one composed of the party organization, the other of elected officials over whom "the party has little influence."

Despite the anti-party, independent postures of some successful candidates, professional norms appeared to dominate intra-party politics. The New York Times observed on August 5, 1979, that "jobs are the lifeline of the party." In an era when candidates and elected officials increasingly divorce themselves from party leaders, the Times noted, the Nassau-Suffolk parties stand out "as unusual in ... meshing ... government [appointees] and party officials."[23]

Likewise, in an April 5, 1979 editorial, Newsday charged that Suffolk County Labor Commissioner Lou Tempera

was channeling patronage appointees into the C.E.T.A. program.[24] Similarly, following an in-depth series on the Off Track Betting Corporation in Suffolk, in February, 1979, Newsday charged that "about 40 percent of its employees are politically well connected."[25] And, a March 11, 1979 New York Times article charges that insurance contracts were "the hidden patronage" on Long Island.[26]

Finally, the Suffolk County Republicans engaged in an intense 1979 primary fight for the County Executive nomination in part, due to charges of kickback scandals associated with the Southwest Sewer District. Another issue in this primary were insurance kickback charges leveled against incumbent County Executive John Klein's political mentor, the former Republican town leader of Smithtown, Nicholas Barbato.[27] In this election, Islip Town Supervisor Peter Cohalan defeated Klein, whom he accused of being a tool of the "bosses". In November, Cohalan overwhelmed his Democratic opponent, Martin Feldman, for County Executive.

In terms of partisan issue content, Suffolk politics appeared to be decidedly neutral on most philosophical questions. For example, Table 6 summarizes the issue content of Huntington's 1978 Town Board enactments.

Table 6[28]

Frequency of Content of Major Huntington Town Board Enactments 1978

Content of Enactments	Frequency*
Public works	18
Land purchases, zoning	10
Personnel	9
Traffic ordinances	9
Waste disposal	8
Fiscal matters	7
Public health	5
Public transportation	3
Fire safety	3
Equipment sales, purchases	3
Recreation	2

*Number of Town Board meetings at which one or more enactments of each category were adopted.

The Huntington Town Board, like its Babylon counterpart, is thus occupied almost exclusively with non-ideological matters of public administration.

Reflecting the non-ideological nature of town government, campaigns also generally eschew philosophical issues. One exception was the U.D.C. controversy in Babylon that was partly credited with the defeat of Democrat Sondra Bachety for Town Supervisor in 1973. Yet, although Ms. Bachety took what some considered a "liberal", pro-black position on this question, her independent campaigns have attracted both Republicans and Conservatives, as well as numerous independents and she has described, on occasion, her own political philosophy as "conservative".

Another example of the non-ideological nature of local campaigns was observed in the 1974 state senatorial campaign of Democrat Hillard Boss against Republican incumbent Owen Johnson. Boss, a prominent liberal active in Babylon civil rights and anti-Vietnam activities and a founder of the insurgent R.F.K. Club, did not differ from his conservative Republican opponent on two key campaign issues - opposition to "forced busing" and to the U.D.C. Wyandanch proposal. The major campaign issues upon which they differed were Johnson's alleged insurance connections, the time he devoted to his insurance business and a controversial town dog spaying proposal which Boss supported and Johnson attacked as a form of "socialized medicine".[29]

Similarly, an item analysis of the issue content of the 1977 Supervisor's race in Huntington revealed the following salient campaign issues covered in the local newspaper:[30]

1. Mass transit
2. Taxes
3. Urban renewal
4. Government efficiency
5. Senior citizens programs
6. Waste disposal
7. Commuter parking
8. Proposal for a new town hall

Again, the absence of all but administrative, town "housekeeping" issues was obvious.

Summary

This study of party activism was conducted in the largely white, middle to upper middle-class suburban

townships of Babylon and Huntington, Long Island, New York. A review of the data in Table 7 reveals that the subjects for the study reflected the income and educational status of their largely middle-class towns.

Table 7

Education and Family Incomes of Committee People in the Sample

	Babylon Democrats		Babylon Republicans		Huntington Democrats		Huntington Republicans	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Subjects with Family Incomes* Greater than $20,000	17	68	16	64	26	96	24	92
Subjects with College Degrees	13	52	11	44	20	74	17	65
Sample Total	25		25		27		26	

*A Newsday analysis reported that a Long Island family of four required an annual income of $23,000 in 1979 to live a comfortable, middle-class life style.[31]

A review of the structure and history of the Babylon Huntington Democratic and Republican parties revealed a number of factional disputes that appeared to be largely non-ideological in content. In addition, despite what seemed to be a strong partisan endorsement of patronage and other material incentives and a county political history of repeated scandals, electoral success, particularly for the minority Democrats, seemed to rest on anti-party organization, good government postures by candidates. Finally, item

analyses of campaigns and town board enactments revealed a local electoral and governmental system dominated by non-ideological, public administration issues.

The degree to which amateur or professional norms affected the attitudes and behavior of committee people and party elites within the town party structures is the focus of this study, the results of which are reported in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Babylon, 1978-1979", Long Island Business Review, (New York: L.I. Commercial Review, 1978), p.3: "Huntington, 1978-1979), Long Island Business Review, (L.I. Commercial Review, 1978), p.3: Population Survey, Long Island Lighting Company, 1978, p.2.

[2]Population Survey, op. cit., p. 2.

[3]The Suffolk County Catalog, The Suffolk County Planning Commission, 1975, p. 305.

[4]"Housing Inventory", U.S. Census, '70, V. 4, The Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1972, p. 68.

[5]The Suffolk County Catalog, op. cit., pp. 309-310.

[6]"Income", U.S. Census '70, V. 6, The Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1973, pp. 67-68.

[7]Newsday, February 18, 1972.

[8]"A Profile of the Nassau-Suffolk Labor Force", Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1973, pp. 68-71

[9]Newsday, July 18, 1972.

[10]"Color and Race", U.S. Census '70, V. 2, Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1972, pp. 28-29.

[11]"Income", op. cit., pp. 52, 61.

[12]Suffolk County Board of Elections.

[13]The Babylon Beacon, January 27, 1969.

[14]Ibid., November 18, 1971.

[15]Newsday, August 11, 1979.

[16]Suffolk County Board of Elections.

[17]The Long Islander, May 8, 1969.

[18]Ibid., July 2, 1970.

[19]Ibid., June 12, 1975.

[20]Ibid., March 22, 1973.

[21]Ibid., June 11, 1976.

[22]Newsday, July 3, 1979.

[23]The New York Times, August 5, 1979.

[24]Newsday, April 5, 1979.

[25]Ibid., March 2, 1979.

[26]The New York Times, March 11, 1979.

[27]Newsday, March 22, 1979.

[28]The Long Islander, January-December, 1978.

[29]The Babylon Beacon, October 10, 17, 24, 1974.

[30]The Long Islander, October 6, 27, November 3, 1977.

[31]Newsday, January 28, 1979.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE "PROFESSIONAL" SUBURBAN ORGANIZATION: NON-PROGRAMMATIC

Wilson, as noted in Chapter One, identified three attributes that characterize the amateur activist and organization: (1) a programmatic, issue orientation; (2) support for intra-party democracy; and (3) a non-material incentive system. This chapter focuses on committee persons' and elites' perceptions of their party's issue orientation and goal structure. Specifically, Hypotheses 1 is examined which postulated that within these party organizations amateur-purposive goals such as issue formation and public policy formulation are secondary to the elites' professional goals, including: electoral success, maintaining the power position of the leaders, and satisfying the demands of factions and sub-groups.

The Importance of Issues

The historical survey of the Babylon and Huntington parties reported in Chapter Three noted the non-ideological character of most issues dealt with in town government proceedings and campaigns. The chief focus of town government and political campaigns was pragmatic, administrative, town "housekeeping" issues. In addition intra-party factionalism appeared to grow out of personality and

power disputes rather than ideological or issue differences. These historical observations are supported by the data which show that activists perceived issues as playing a minimal role in the internal operations of the town parties.

Activists were asked to indicate on a four point scale the importance of 15 specific issues to the internal operations of their party; i.e., the degree to which each issue was discussed at party meetings and was a consideration in the selection of party officers and the nomination of candidates. The data in Table 8 report those respondents who evaluated selected issues as "not important" or "very important" to their party organizations; the data for those who rated these issues as "somewhat important" are not included in the table.

Table 8

Activists Who Perceived Selected Issues as "Not Important" or "Very Important" to Their Party Organizations (in percents)

Issues	Babylon Democrats (n=18)		Babylon Republicans (n=20)		Huntington Democrats (n=27)		Huntington Republicans (n=25)	
	Not Imp't	Very Imp't	Not Imp't	Very Imp't	Not Imp't	Very Imp't	Not Imp't	Very Imp't
National Economic								
Energy	55	0	45	10	59	7	60	4
Taxing-spending	33	28	10	50	11	15	24	32
Social security	28	22	10	35	30	7	32	12
National Social								
Racial quotas	22	11	25	0	30	0	28	20
Equal Rights Amend.	39	17	25	0	11	0	28	4
State Social								
Death penalty	11	33	25	40	19	11	36	28
Welfare	17	22	20	35	15	22	20	40
Abortion	22	11	10	15	4	22	24	20
Medicaid	17	17	30	25	15	11	28	16
Local Economic								
Zoning	33	28	10	50	7	44	20	20
Proposition 13	17	22	5	25	7	33	12	36
Initiative-Referenda	22	22	15	45	0	26	16	32
Local Social								
Race discrimination	22	17	25	10	22	15	28	12
Crime	17	33	10	50	19	19	8	40
Preserving Suffolk's suburban character	5	33	10	60	0	48	20	48

Since most candidates maintain separate campaign staffs and run campaigns that are generally independent of the party organization, subjects were asked to exclude

from their assessments the importance of each issue to the conduct of campaigns. Regarding the internal operations of the party organization however, the data are instructive.

No single issue was viewed as "very important" to the party organization by more than 40 percent of the activists in any of the four parties. One issue, preserving Suffolk's suburban character, was perceived as "very important" by more than 40 percent in three of four parties and two issues, crime and zoning, were viewed thus in two parties. In all other cases, 60 percent of the activists in two or more parties viewed the issues either as not important or somewhat important to the internal operations of their party organizations. On the other hand, no issue was viewed as "not important", except for national energy, by more than 40 percent of the activists in any of the four parties.

Local and state issues were seen as more important than national issues. The issues which had the largest number of activists perceiving them as "very important" were federal taxing-spending, the death penalty, welfare, zoning, initiative-referenda, crime and preserving Suffolk's suburban character. These data indicate, therefore, that in the few instances where issues were perceived as "very important" to the internal operations of the party organizations, they were issues concerned primarily with the financial burdens and quality of suburban life-issues that are related more to administrative than ideological

questions.

Activists were also asked to indicate the importance that the local and national party's stand on issues have had on their decision to remain active in local politics. The results are reported in Table 9.

Table 9

Importance of Party Issue Positions to Maintaining Activism (in percents)

	Babylon Democrats (n=18)		Babylon Republicans (n=20)		Huntington Democrats (n=27)		Huntington Republicans (n=25)	
	Local Party	Nat. Party	Local Party	Nat. Party	Local Party	Nat. Party	Local Party	Nat. Party
Not Very important	50	39	30	15	22	26	56	44
Somewhat important	33	16	35	50	48	33	16	28
Very important	16	44	35	35	30	41	28	28

The data again confirm activists' perceptions that their local parties do not have a strong programmatic orientation. In no party did more than 35 percent of the activists indicate that the local party's stand on issues had been a "very important" factor in their decision to remain active. Over half the activists in the two minority parties, Babylon Democrats and Huntington Republicans, indicated that the local party's issue positions were not very important in their maintaining activism. In three of four parties, however, more than one third of the activists indicated that the national party's stand on

the issues had been "very important" to maintaining their activism.

One can infer from these data that the local party's issue positions either were not salient to activists and/or were not perceived as influential to activists' decisions to maintain their involvement in local party politics. One might also infer that the activists themselves may not have had a strong issue orientation and therefore were not influenced by the party's issue positions, although this interpretation is modified somewhat by the fact that national party issue positions did influence a significant number of activists' decisions to continue their participation in local politics.

The non-programmatic orientation of the town party organizations is reaffirmed in the data on the nature of intra-party factionalism reported in Table 10.

Table 10

The Nature of Intra-Party Factional Disputes (in percents)

Major Content of Factional Disputes	Babylon Democrats (n=21)	Babylon Republicans (n=20)	Huntington Democrats (n=23)	Huntington Republicans (n=24)
Personality, power conflicts	86	70	70	92
Issue, ideological conflicts	10	5	26	0
Both	4	10	4	8
Don't Know	0	15	0	0

Activists' perceptions of intra-party factionalism support the historical evidence reported in Chapter Three which indicated that intra-party factional disputes were essentially non-ideological, personality-power conflicts. Similarly, the more intense, unresolved factionalism observed in the minority Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican parties is confirmed by the significantly larger proportion of activists in these parties (86 and 92 percent respectively) who perceived factionalism as being primarily the outgrowth of personality-power disputes.

These data thus confirm the non-programmatic orientation of the Babylon-Huntington parties. The few issues that were rated very important to the internal operations of the local party organization were largely non-ideological, pragmatic administrative questions related to the financial burdens and quality of suburban life. Similarly, more than two thirds of the activists did not perceive the local party's issue positions as very important to their decision to maintain activism and more than 70 percent in each of the four parties perceived internal factional disputes as non-ideological, personality-power conflicts.

Leaders' Goals

It will be recalled that Hypothesis 1 of this study postulated that party elites influence the attitudes and behavior of lower strata activists by distributing personal resources in such a way that amateur, purposive goals such as issue formation and the formulation of public policy are

secondary to the professional, electoral-organizational goals of the elites. How lower strata activists and elites perceive the goals of party elites will help provide additional insight regarding the importance of issue or programmatic concerns to the party elites.

Activists were provided a checklist of eleven party goals and were asked to indicate the five most important goals to party leaders and those goals which should be most important to the leaders but currently were not. The results regarding the five most important goals are reported in Table 11.

Table 11

Activists' Perceptions of Goals
"Most Important" to Party Elites
(in percents)

	Babylon Democrats		Babylon Republicans		Huntington Democrats		Huntington Republicans	
	Elites (n=6)	Comm. People (n=19)	Elites (n=5)	Comm. People (n=19)	Elites (n=11)	Comm. People (n=16)	Elites (n=6)	Comm. People (n=19)
Campaign Goals								
Winning Elections	83(5)	63	100(5)	86	100(11)	100	83(5)	74
Campaign Help	17(1)	11	60(3)	26	27(3)	19	33(2)	16
Nominations	17(1)	47	80(4)	63	73(8)	37	33(2)	79
Organizational Maintenance								
Patronage	83(5)	63	80(4)	63	67(7)	69	83(5)	84
Party appointees	67(4)	47	20(1)	74	46(5)	63	50(3)	68
Rewarding activists	33(2)	47	20(1)	42	55(6)	25	50(3)	42
Recruiting workers	17(1)	16	20(1)	21	9(1)	31	33(2)	0
Conflict resolution	33(2)	21	40(2)	16	18(2)	38	17(1)	11
Balancing factions	33(2)	11	40(2)	37	27(3)	44	17(1)	21
Securing leaders' power	83(5)	74	20(1)	37	46(5)	50	17(1)	63
Purposive Goals (issues)	33(2)	21	0	32	36(4)	25	83(5)	32

At least 37 percent of lower strata activists in three parties ranked the following goals to be among the five "most important" to town party elites: (1) winning elections; (2) patronage; (3) party appointees; (4) nominations; (5) securing the leaders' power. Among party elites, only three goals ranked as"most important" in at least three parties; these were: (1) winning elections; (2) patronage; (3) party appointees. The elites did not view nominations and securing their own power as among their most important goals to the same degree that committee people did.

The goals perceived as most important to party elites by both committee people and leaders were thus professional, electoral - organizational maintenance goals. Table 12 reports the data on the goals which activists felt should be, but currently were not, most important to local party elites.

Table 12

Activists' Perceptions of Goals That Should Be Most Important to Party Elites (in percents)

	Babylon Democrats		Babylon Republicans		Huntington Democrats		Huntington Republicans	
	Elites (n=6)	Comm. People (n=19)	Elites (n=5)	Comm. People (n=19)	Elites (n=11)	Comm. People (n=16)	Elites (n=6)	Comm. People (n=19)
Campaign Goals								
Winning elections	17(1)	37	0	11	9(1)	6	17(1)	37
Campaign help	67(4)	47	20(1)	21	27(3)	37	33(2)	37
Nominations	17(1)	16	0	0	18(2)	0	17(1)	5
Organizational Maintenance								
Patronage	0	5	0	5	18(2)	0	17(1)	0
Party appointees	17(1)	0	20(1)	21	18(2)	13	0	11
Rewarding activists	67(4)	5	0	21	9(1)	31	0	32
Recruiting workers	50(3)	37	60(3)	16	27(3)	25	17(1)	63
Conflict resolution	67(4)	26	20(1)	26	27(3)	38	17(1)	37
Balancing factions	33(2)	42	20(1)	21	18(2)	25	50(3)	47
Securing leaders' power	0	0	0	5	0	13	17(1)	0
Purposive Goals (issues)	33(2)	53	40(2)	26	36(4)	63	50(3)	58
None	-	11	-	42	-	6	-	11

The goals which one third or more of the committee people in at least three parties felt should be most important, but currently were not important were: (1) issues; (2) campaign help; (3) balancing factions. Among elites, only issues were identified by one third of the leaders in at least three parties as a goal that should be stressed. Thus, both elites and committee people agreed that the town party leaders were not, but should be, stressing purposive, issue-oriented goals. In addition, committee people felt that elites should place greater emphasis on conflict resolution and campaign assistance goals.

A number of differences in goal perceptions were ascertained between party organizations. Babylon Republicans had the greatest congruence between elites' and committee persons' goal perceptions. In addition, 42 percent of Babylon Republican committee people expressed no dissatisfaction with elite goals. These data lend support to the historical observations in Chapter Three in which it was observed that Babylon Republicans maintained the most internally cohesive party organization.

Committee persons' dissatisfaction with leaders' goals, on the other hand, were greatest in the minority Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican parties. Here, one third or more of the committee people felt that leaders should be stressing winning elections, providing campaign assistance, recruiting party activists, balancing

factions and influencing party issue positions. Thus, the date further corroborate the historical evidence, reported in Chapter Three, of leadership dissatisfaction and the persistent, unresolved factionalism in these party organizations.

Those committee people who expressed dissatisfaction with the leaders' goals were asked to specify the reasons why leaders were not stressing these goals. Among the most frequently cited reasons were perceptions of the leaders as lazy or apathetic or lacking sufficient power to act on the goal. Also the goal itself was sometimes cited as not being important to the winning of elections and therefore, not a priority for town elites. The most frequently cited reason elites were perceived as not stressing certain goals was the committee persons' belief that elites were more concerned with securing their own power than with attaining the goal in question. These data are reported in Table 13.

Table 13

Committee People Who Expressed Dissatisfaction with Leaders' Goals and Percent Who Perceived Leaders as More Concerned with Their Own Power than with Attaining Goals

	Babylon Democrats		Babylon Republicans		Huntington Democrats		Huntington Republicans	
	n Citing Goal	% Citing Power	n Citing Goal	% Citing Power	n Citing Goal	% Citing Power	n Citing Goal	% Citing Power
Goals								
Campaign help	8	25	4	0	6	0	7	43
Recruiting workers	7	71	4	33	4	25	12	75
Conflict resolution	5	80	5	60	6	33	7	100
Balancing factions	8	88	4	50	4	0	9	77
Purposive goals	10	50	5	50	10	10	11	18

These data again provide further evidence for the observation that factional disputes in the Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican parties have persisted over time. Here, however, the dissatisfaction of committee people with their leaders was also evident; 70 percent of the lower strata activists who expressed dissatisfaction with the leaders not attaining conflict resolution, factional balancing and recruitment goals, also viewed the elites' concern with securing their own power as the chief reason for not attaining these goals. One third or more of the committee people in the Babylon Republican party who expressed dissatisfaction with the leaders' conflict resolution, factional balancing and recruitment goal

attainment also cited the elites' concern with securing their own power as the chief reason. The leaders' power position thus appeared to be an elite priority in the faction-ridden minority parties and in the more disciplined Babylon Republican Party.

In the Huntington Democratic Party, on the other hand, only the goal of conflict resolution was cited by more than one third of the dissatisfied committee people as having been frustrated by the leaders' concern for their power. These perceptions may have been due to the relative short tenure of Huntington Democratic Chairman Frank Grimes or to his association with the former N.D.C., amateur-oriented wing of the party. Numerous committee people, for example, noted that Grimes had not yet built a strong power base in the party.

Summary and Discussion

Wilson identified an issue-programmatic orientation as one of the defining characteristics of amateur activists and organizations. The data reported in this chapter, however, show that as postulated in Hypothesis 1, the Babylon and Huntington party organizations maintain strong professional, non-programmatic orientations.

No single issue was perceived by more than one third of the activists as very important to the internal operations of all four parties. Similarly, 65 percent or more of the activists in each of the four parties did not perceive the local party's issue positions as very important

to their decision to maintain activism. Finally, 70 percent or more of activists in each of the four parties felt that their party's internal factional disputes were non-ideological, non-programmatic personality, power conflicts.

When asked to assess the local party elites' goals, both committee people and elites ranked professional, electoral-organizational maintenance goals as most important and purposive (issue) goals as those which should be, but were not, most important. Similarly, committee people most often cited the leaders' concern with securing their own power as the chief reason why certain goals were not attained.

Thus, among activists in all four parties, the elites were clearly perceived as most oriented toward professional, power objectives-particularly winning elections and securing their own power. Some differences in perceptions of elites' goals were related to internal party politics and confirmed certain historical observations reported in Chapter Three. The persistence of factional disputes and leadership disaffection in the minority parties, the recent ascendancy of a town leader from the "amateur" wing of the Huntington Democrats who may not have yet secured his power base and considerable internal cohesion in the Babylon Republican Party were confirmed by committee persons' and elites' goal perceptions and orientations.

These data therefore support Hypothesis 1 which postulated that amateur-purposive goals such as issue formation and public policy formulation are secondary to the elites' professional, electoral-organizational maintenance goals. Specifically, both committee people and elites most frequently perceived electoral victory, patronage and party appointees as the most important elite goals. In addition, committee people, but not elites, ranked nominations and securing the leaders' power as important elite goals. This latter incongruity could be explained by the fact that elites may have been uncomfortable admitting that the securing of their own power was an important party goal.

Lower strata activists, but not elites, felt that two professional goals should receive even greater stress: campaign help and balancing factions. This lack of perceptual congruity might be explained by the elites' unwillingness to admit that they failed to achieve these important party goals. Nevertheless, in keeping with Hypothesis 1, the data show that these middle-class activists, regardless of their position in the party hierarchy, generally shared a strong desire for their parties to win elections and to satisfy the demands of factions and sub-groups. Committee persons, in fact, seemed as concerned, or more concerned, than did elites, with maintaining intra-party cohesion, particularly in the faction-ridden minority parties.

Committee people and elites, as noted above, also shared the perception that purposive, issue goals required greater emphasis in their parties. The data thus suggest that the Babylon-Huntington activists were somewhat dissatisfied with the preponderance of professional goals and the lack of stress on purposive, issue goals in their parties. Although these activists had clearly adopted, or adapted to professional values, they also appeared to value the amateur "ideal" of treating issues as a party priority. In sum, they maintained both amateur and professional values in contrast with those researchers who suggested that activists' attitudes conformed either to the professional or the amateur model. Although professional goals dominated the Babylon-Huntington parties, these activists also evidenced a belief in amateur goals. This blending of political attitudes and styles will be discussed further in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE "PROFESSIONAL" SUBURBAN ORGANIZATION: NON-DEMOCRATIC

The concept of intra-party democracy is fundamental to the amateur political style. Active participation of the committee people in party decision making, particularly the selection of candidates, is critical to the amateurs' incentives and to their party goals. "The big thing that keeps them active," Wilson quotes one amateur, "is the feeling of participation they get, shaping the Democratic Party and selecting the candidates of the party.... It is my firm confiction that you can't get people to work on a volunteer basis unless they feel they've had a part in making the decisions which lead to that work."[1] This chapter examines activists' perceptions of intra-party decision-making procedures to test that portion of Hypothesis 1 which postulates that the amateur goal of full participation in decision making is secondary to the elites' professional goals.

Decision-Making Procedures

Activists were asked to describe their party's procedures for nominating candidates, distributing patronage and providing campaign assistance. From their response, a composite picture of decision making in these three areas

was drawn that applies to all four party organizations.

Nominating candidates was generally described as a process that can occasionally bubble up from the committee people although the more frequent pattern was for such decisions to filter down from the executive board. Activists in each party noted that the party, particularly the minority parties, often had difficulty obtaining nominees and that leaders frequently had to canvass for and "draft" candidates. On the other hand, some elective positions were considered desirable, particularly certain town-wide offices, county and state legislative positions.

Theoretically, individuals desiring a town elected position approach their zone or area leader who then submits his or her name to town party officials. Some committee people described their active participation at this level as similar to the process outlined by this Amityville Republican:

> We have an area chairman who comes to us about everything. We get around a table and discuss all topics. For example, when the town leader was selected, we met almost every Saturday. Every candidate was invited to the area to be interviewed.
>
> We were the first committee people ever to talk to candidates. It blew [Town leader Syd] Askoff's mind. But he accpted it. We decide who we want. The area chairman tends to follow what we want. He goes into the Executive Board following our will.

This degree of local participation was, nevertheless, the exception. Even the Amityville Republican quoted above noted that "most [committee people] don't have this

influence. I see in other districts the committee people waiting for their area chairmen to give them direction." More often lower strata activists were described as reacting to and ratifying candidates who had been screened by town leaders.

The leadership style of individual area or zone leaders was frequently cited as a critical variable determining the level of participation by committee people in decision making. Although certain area-zone leaders in each party were identified as being open to lower strata involvement in nominations and other decisions, other area-zone leaders were described in authoritarian, non-democratic terms. Thus, a Huntington Democratic zone leader observed:

> Some zone leaders are bosses. They tell people "vote my way because you got a job through me." I never do this. In other zones, there is fear. Sometimes it's false fear....It's not common, but it happens.

Each town party utilizes a screening committee composed of area-zone leaders, some town party officials and, occasionally, selected appointees named by the town leader. Candidates for county and state offices must submit to a county party screening process. When incumbents are seeking reelection and there is no challenge, the screening committee is not utilized.

Persons seeking a nomination are queried by this screening committee on such subjects as their issue positions, experience and qualifications, service to the party and the

kind of relationship they will maintain with the party organization should they be elected. The screening committee reports its recommendations to the executive board (occasionally these two bodies are composed of the same individuals). The executive board next recommends one candidate, or submits several names to the full town committee for final approval.

In most instances, the town committee accepts the board's recommendations. Occasional floor fights were mentioned in each party as were occasional primaries. Activists in all four parties noted that primary challenges have increased over the past ten years, although the common perception was that both committee people and elites sought to avoid them. As one Huntington Democratic zone leader noted, the committee people generally adhere to the maxim, "Were all in canoes out in the lake. Don't make waves." Primary challenges were observed with the greatest frequency in the Babylon Democratic party where, as noted in Chapter Three, an organized insurgent group exists.

The town leader and executive board (including area-zone leaders) thus play a critical role in the nomination procedure. In some instances, the area-zone leaders were depicted as rival elites who traded and bartered candidates to placate their constituencies, maintain factional balance or repay favors. Others described the area-zone leaders as passive participants in the nomination process who

generally submit to the town leader's wishes. One town chairman candidly summarized the screening committee process as:

> a charade. They know before hand who they [the area-zone leaders] want. We go through the motions of interviewing all these people. But we know beforehand. It's all laid out...It is not a process open to the town committee.

If committee peoples' involvement is limited in the nomination process, they have almost no input in decisions about patronage and campaign assistance. Activists in all four parties clearly described these decisions as almost exclusively the province of the town leader and, if he wishes to share them, the executive board as well. Participation in patronage decision making, when it existed, was described in terms of committee people being informed of the availability of patronage positions as opposed to a process in which these positions were filled solely at the discretion of the town leader without his having promulgated a notice that the positions were available.

Typically, in those cases in which committee people were made aware of a patronage opening, the process was described in filter-down terms with the town leader serving as the primary conduit for patronage information and decisions. The town leader normally is the first to learn of patronage openings from the appropriate town, county or state administrative agency. He then communicates this information to the area-zone leaders who pass it on to

their committee people. The committee people either submit their own name or that of a relative or constituent to the area-zone leader. Applicants are then submitted to the town leader. In cases of the better-paying administrative positions, applicants are asked to submit resumes. The decision to hire is made almost exclusively by the town leader, usually in consultation with a few key aides and, where appropriate, the administrative agencies in which the job opening exists.

In some cases, particularly with part time or temporary secretarial or laborer's positions, the town leader must make a patronage decision within a 24-48 hour period. In such cases, decisions are made with extreme haste, usually through telephone calls to selected area-zone leaders or committee people. On other occasions, the town leader alone makes the decision without even informing area-zone leaders that the patronage position had been available.

As noted in Chapter Three, elected officials occasionally do not cooperate with party leaders on patronage decisions. This was particularly true in Huntington where Supervisor, Kenneth Butterfield and Councilmen, Thomas Casey and Leonard Horn maintained considerable distance and independence from the party organization. As one Huntington Democratic Executive Board Member observed:

> The [town board members] don't pay much attention to what the Party wants in the way of jobs.... The Party proposes names but the Town Board splits jobs among the Democrats, Republicans and independents. The party probably gets the greatest share....But, there is not a week that goes along where the Town Board doesn't reject some patronage recommendation of the town leader....The Party has the greatest influence on sanitation jobs - not major influence on commissioners and policy-making jobs.

This independence was ascribed, in part, to the internecine dispute that arose in 1975 between the Democratic Town Board members and the party elites and, in part, to the successful electoral style of Huntington Democratic officials, a style premised on independence from the party.

In the minority Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican parties, in which fewer patronage positions were available, the decision-making process was described as more closed than in the majority parties. A prominent Babylon Democratic insurgent, for example, observed that patronage decision making:

> is a poor system. The ones who pressure [the town leader] the most get the jobs. The decisions are made [by two executive board members and the town leader]. These three people determine full-time positions. The smaller positions, e.g., summer jobs, are handed down to area chairmen. Some areas don't get anything because they don't support [the town leader].

Whatever criteria are used, the consensus on patronage decision making was that committee people had little or no input. The same was true of decisions to provide campaign assistance (funds or personnel) to candidates. This process was so clouded that few committee people had sufficient

knowledge to even describe it in detail. The consensus was that the town leader and executive board dispense campaign assistance to candidates based on such criteria as need, possibility of electoral success and, in some cases, past party service and loyalty to the leaders. Activists in all four parties, however, clearly indicated that committee people had almost no involvement in the process.

When there is an infrequent floor fight, particularly regarding selection of nominees, a committee person's vote in the full town committee (weighted according to the results of the previous gubernatorial election in his or her election district) can increase that person's influence on the outcome of the decision. In such cases, certain committee people-particularly those desiring or holding a patronage position-were described as subject to pressure or manipulation by the elites. These individuals, however, appeared to be a minority. Also, perceptions of elites exercising control, through the use of personal resources, were ambiguous and varied with the political styles of individual town, area-zone leaders. The norm regarding how committee people cast their votes for the party's nominees (and issue positions and town leader selection) appeared to be a general acquiescence to or ratification of decisions made by town elites-typically the town leader and certain close associates on the executive board. Only

in atypical instances of floor challenges were elites perceived as attempting to influence certain committee persons' votes with personal rewards or sanctions or appeals to personal or party loyalty.

Power linkages between elites and most committee people appeared to be generally weak. Most committee people did not seem accountable to elites either on how they voted or how they fulfilled their campaign responsibilities. Although perceptions of elites' ability to use personal resources to reward and punish activists for their loyalty or party service were widespread, most activists described their parties as undisciplined, loose associations which conform to the stratarchical organizational model referred to by Eldersveld and others:

> The general characteristics of stratarchy are the proliferation of the ruling group and the diffusion of power prerogatives and power exercise. Rather than centralized "unity of command", general dilution of power throughout the structure, "strata commands" exist which operate with varying, but considerable degree of independence.... The party develops its own hierarchical pattern of stratified devolution of responsibility for the settlement of conflict....Further, the party must cope with widely varying milieu, traditions and social structures and this encourages the recognition and acceptance of local leadership, local strategy and local power. Thus, a kind of "balkanization" of power relationships occurs.[2]

A more detailed discussion of intra-party power can be found in the sections on decision-making influence-freedom which follow, and in Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine.

Decision-Making Influence-Freedom

Based on activists' descriptions of nominations, patronage and campaign assistance decision-making processes, the four party organizations appeared to provide minimal participation for committee people. The committee person's vote for nominees was cited by some activists as an important role in the nominating process. The consensus, however, was that nominations normally filtered down from the party elites with few floor challenges or primaries and committee people typically acquiescing to or endorsing the candidate choices of their leaders. Regarding patronage and campaign assistance, there was near unanimity among activists that committee people had very little decision-making influence.

These general descriptions of party decision making are corroborated by the specific perceptual data reported below. Activists were asked to indicate on a scale ranging from 1-6 the degree of influence they felt they had in specific decision-making areas. The results are reported in Table 14.

Table 14

Committee Persons' Perceived Influence in Party Decision Making (in percents)

Decision-Making Area	Babylon Democrats (n=19)			Babylon Republicans (n=19)			Huntington Democrats (n=16)			Huntington Republicans (n=19)		
	Little or None	Some	Gt. Deal	Little or None	Some	Gt. Deal	Little or None	Some	Gt. Deal	Little or None	Some	Gt. Deal
Conduct of campaigns	5	48	48	21	21	58	19	56	26	26	26	47
Nominations	31	53	16	44	39	17	25	63	13	68	27	5
Patronage	69	26	5	45	28	28	82	19	0	89	10	0
Selection of party officials	58	26	16	6	50	44	47	47	7	53	47	0
Party's issue positions	35	47	18	46	38	15	33	66	0	77	22	0
Party's internal procedures	39	44	17	54	17	28	42	50	8	77	17	5

Only in the area of conducting campaigns within election districts did more than half the committee people in at least three parties indicate that they had "a great deal" of influence. These data reinforce perceptions of the stratarchical nature of the parties; elites gave committee people considerable autonomy to conduct campaigns in their election districts. On the other hand, 69 percent or more of the committee people in all but the Babylon Republican Party felt they had "little or no" influence in patronage

decisions. Regarding the parties' issue positions, selection of nominees, selection of party officials and internal procedures, from 25-89 percent of committee people in the Babylon Democratic, Huntington Democratic and Huntington Republican Parties perceived themselves as having "little or no" decision-making influence.

There were some variations, between parties, in committee persons' perceptions of their influence. Babylon Republicans, for example, had the largest percent (15-58) who perceived "a great deal" of influence in all decision-making areas, a pattern which may reflect the greater internal cohesion of this party reported earlier. These data suggest that some committee people in a more disciplined party may perceive themselves to be influential even if that influence, in fact, involves the endorsement or implementation of elite decisions rather than, in accordance with the amateur model of participation, the initiation and formulation of policy. Huntington Republicans, conversely, reported the largest percent of committee people (26-89) who perceived "little or no" influence in all decision-making areas, thus reflecting the existence of a considerable degree of leadership alienation and intra-party factionalism reported above.

Babylon Democrats, despite their minority status, had larger percentages (69, 61, 65 percent respectively) than did the Babylon and Huntington Republicans, who expressed "some" or "a great deal" of influence in nominations,

internal party procedures and issue positions, a pattern which may be explained by the existence of an organized insurgency group which comprises 40 percent of the committee people and has captured some significant primary victories, as was noted in Chapter Three. Here the data suggest, insurgents used existing decision-making procedures, such as primaries, to channel their dissent. Consequently, many perceived themselves to have more influence than committee people in the Babylon and Huntington Republican Parties.

Huntington Democrats, who recently elected a former N.D.C. member their town leader and who was described as representing the "amateur"-oriented wing of the party, expressed an influence pattern in nominations, internal party procedures and issue positions that closely resembled the Babylon Democrats (76, 58, 66 percent respectively indicated "some" or "a great deal" of influence in these areas). These data support the impressionistic observations, made by the researcher, that the Huntington Democratic Party had the most diffuse power relationships of the four party organizations. Also, the Huntington Democratic town leader and certain zone leaders appeared to encourage and support the concept of lower strata participation in decision making, although the degree to which the concept was implemented throughout the party organization could not be fully ascertained. Babylon Republicans, on the other hand, expressed the greatest influence in the potentially divisive

areas of patronage and leadership selection (56 and 94 percent respectively perceived themselves to have "some" or "a great deal" of influence in these areas), again reflecting the internal cohesion of this party.

Intra-party power arrangements, factionalism and the elites' personalities and leadership styles thus accounted for some of the variations, between parties, in perceptions of influence. The general pattern, however, was for most committee people to perceive themselves as not having a great deal of influence in party decision making. These perceptions are further confirmed by the data in Table 15, based on an open-ended question which asked activists to assess the overall "say" that committee people have in running the town party organization.

Table 15

Activists' Perceptions of Overall "Say" Committee People Have in Local Party
(in percents)

Amount of Say	Babylon Democrats Elites (n=6)	Babylon Democrats Comm. Person (n=19)	Babylon Republicans Elites (n=5)	Babylon Republicans Comm. Person (n=20)	Huntington Democrats Elites (n=9)	Huntington Democrats Comm. Person (n=16)	Huntington Republicans Elites (n=7)	Huntington Republicans Comm. Person (n=19)
Very Little	17(1)	47	20(1)	50	11(1)	19	29(2)	74
Some	83(5)	47	60(3)	10	22(2)	63	29(2)	16
A Fair Amount	0	5	0	30	66(6)	19	14(1)	11
A Great Deal	0	0	20(1)	10	0	0	29(2)	0

Within all party organizations except the Huntington Democrats, the elites' assessments of committee people as having "very little" or "some" overall influence ranged from 58-100 percent. In all four party organizations, committee persons' estimates of their own influence as being "very little" or some", ranged from 60-94 percent.

Within two parties, the Babylon Democrats and Republicans, committee people perceived themselves as having more "say" than they were perceived to have by the party elites. In the Huntington Democratic and Republican Parties, on the other hand, committee people perceived themselves as having less say, to a significant degree, than party elites perceived them to have. No clear reasons for these perceptual differences between Babylon and Huntington activists could be ascertained. Nevertheless,

the overall assessments of lower strata activists' influence in all four parties was, as noted above, that of only "very little" or "some" influence. These data are confirmed by committee persons' assessments of the amount of "say" they should have in the local party, with the percent indicating "more say" ranging from 63 to 76 percent in all four parties.

The degree to which elites dominated decision making was further evaluated by asking committee people to indicate on a six point scale the amount of freedom they had in seven decision-making areas. The results are reported in Table 16.

Table 16

Committee Persons' Perceived Freedom in Party Decision Making (in percents)

Decision-Making Area	Babylon Democrats (n=19)			Babylon Republicans (n=19)			Huntington Democrats (n=16)			Huntington Republicans (n=19)		
	Little or None	Some	A Grt. Deal	Little or None	Some	A Grt. Deal	Little or None	Some	A Grt. Deal	Little or None	Some	A Grt. Deal
Conduct of campaigns	5	37	58	6	31	64	6	32	63	5	42	52
Vote for nominees	0	26	74	0	28	72	13	13	75	0	16	84
Vote for party leaders	5	16	79	0	31	63	13	13	73	5	16	79
Vote for area leaders	6	12	82	11	17	72	13	20	66	5	5	89
Vote for state committee persons	0	25	75	0	40	60	13	26	60	22	6	72
Vote on issues	0	29	71	8	31	62	8	41	50	11	11	78
Vote on internal procedures	0	22	77	21	26	47	33	25	42	11	11	74

Over half the committee persons in all four parties perceived themselves as having "a great deal" of freedom in all decision-making areas except votes on the party's internal procedures. Further, in casting their votes for the party's nominees, party leaders, area-zone leaders, and state committee persons, approximately two thirds of committee people in all four parties perceived "a great

deal" of freedom.

Differences were observed on the votes for town party leaders, area leaders, state committee persons, party issue positions and internal procedures in that more majority party activists expressed less freedom than did minority party activists. Although the differences were not signifi-cnat, these data suggest that demands for internal party cohesion and discipline may be somewhat greater in the electorally successful party organizations. Nevertheless, the overall assessment of decision-making freedom indicates that most committee people did not feel constrained by elites, or other factors, when casting their votes on major party questions.

Alienation of lower strata activists from the power structure of their party organization was measured by asking committee persons how much "say" party elites should have in running the party. The data, reported in Table 17, indicate overall support for extant power arrangements.

Table 17

Committee Persons' Perceptions of Influence Elites Should Have in Party Organizations (in percents)

"Say" Leaders Should Have	Babylon Democrats (n=19)	Babylon Republicans (n=20)	Huntington Democrats (n=17)	Huntington Republicans (n=19)
More	0	15	12	5
Less	21	30	12	42
Same	79	55	76	53

Thus, although 63 percent or more of lower strata activists, as noted earlier, felt that committee people should have "more say" in running the party, from 53-79 percent felt that the leaders "say" should remain the same. The fact that Babylon Democrats, despite the presence of a powerful insurgency group, had a very high percent (79) of committee people satisfied with the leaders' power reinforces the perception noted earlier that factional disputes are largely personality-power disputes. One may infer from these data that the Babylon Democratic insurgents sought to displace the leaders currently in office, rather than restructure or democratize the party's power arrangements. Within the Huntington Democratic Party, with their relatively new town leader who evidenced a loose, open, "amateur" leadership style, activists were most satisfied with the existing power structure when compared to the

other three parties.

Babylon and Huntington Republicans, on the other hand, expressed the greatest dissatisfaction with the leaders' power; 30 and 42 percent respectively wanted elites to have "less say". These data suggest that in the more disciplined Babylon Republican Party, certain committee people may have been more willing to reorder existing power arrangements, perhaps because, as noted in Chapter Three, elites scrutinized and evaluated their task performance to a greater extent in this party. Conversely, the data suggest that in the loosely structured Huntington Republican Party, committee people who were dissatisfied with the leaders yet not organized into an insurgency group, may also have been more willing to reorder existing power arrangements. When these attitudes are compared with the Babylon Democrats, they suggest that leadership dissatisfaction, when channeled into an organized intra-party insurgency, increases or sustains the legitimacy of the existing power structure.

The data on activists' perceptions of their decision-making influence and freedom are, nevertheless, ambiguous. Committee people, while generally not perceiving themselves as having a great deal of decision-making influence, and desiring more, did not feel themselves constrained by party elites. Committee people perceived themselves to have a great deal of freedom in almost all decision-making

areas. Neither did most committee people express the need to reorder the current party power structure; although they desired greater decision-making influence, they generally did not see the need to restrict the power of elites.

To further assess power linkages between elites and committee people, Gamma scores were obtained to determine the degree of association between committee persons' perceptions of their decision-making influence and freedom. The results are reported in Table 18.

Table 18

Gamma Scores for Committee Persons' Perceptions of Influence and Freedom in Selected Decision-Making Areas

Decision-Making Area	Babylon Democrats (n=19)	Babylon Republicans (n=19)	Huntington Democrats (n=16)	Huntington Republicans (n=19)
Conduct of campaigns in election district	+.9130	+.2272	-.0909	+.5000
Vote on nominees	-.6363	-.7777	+.5000	-.8333
Vote on town leader	-.8000	+.2000	-.3000	-1.000
Vote on issues	-.3333	-.4000	0.0	-.7857
Vote on internal procedures	-.2500	-.2000	+.8529	-.1000

Regarding the conduct of campaigns within election districts, the Gamma scores reveal a strong positive association between influence and freedom in the minority parties. Here, committee people with influence also tended to perceive themselves as having freedom. The influence-freedom association on the conduct of campaigns in election districts was weak in the majority parties. These data thus suggest, in keeping with the stratarchical organizational pattern noted above, that in the divided minority parties and, to a lesser extent in the somewhat more disciplined majority parties, committee people perceived themselves generally free to run their own campaign activities within election districts with little interference from party elites. Party elites did not generally scrutinize the manner or extent to which most committee people fulfilled their electoral responsibilities.

In the faction-ridden minority parties, the Gamma scores reveal a number of strong negative associations - particularly on the sensitive votes for nominees and town leaders - indicating that committee people who perceived themselves with decision-making influence did not also perceive themselves to have freedom. These data suggest that in the Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican Parties, in which elites are isolated from hostile factions of committee people, the town leaders may be more demanding of their "loyalists". Here (and in the more disciplined

Babylon Republican Party in which records were allegedly kept that related committee persons' performance and loyalty to personal rewards and punishments) the Gamma scores indicate that certain lower strata activists who saw themselves as having influence may have been subject to pressure from elites and, consequently, felt less free when voting on certain intra-party matters. A profile of the activists predisposed to elite uses of personal resources to maintain discipline is found in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.

Otherwise, the Gamma scores reveal a generally positive association between perceived influence and freedom, corroborating the existence of diffuse, stratarchical intra-party power relationships. As noted above, activists described decision-making processes as typically dominated by a small group of elites close to the town leader. Most committee people were somewhat dissatisfied - at least intellectually - with this pattern but were unwilling to alter the extant structural relationships that minimized their influence. This reluctance appeared to derive, not from a fear of patronage rewards or punishments (see Chapters Six, Seven), but from an apparent unwillingness to assume the responsibilities and/or attendant risks associated with greater decision-making influence (see Chapter Nine).

Conversely, because elites dominated most major decisions, due to the acquiescence of committee people, the leaders appeared to maintain minimum control over lower strata activists. The parties were most frequently described

as internally undisciplined organizations. With the exception of the Babylon Republicans, elites did not closely monitor how most committee people fulfilled their campaign responsibilities. Also, as will be discussed in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, there was little evidence that the leaders sought to control, through the use of personal rewards and punishments, how most committee people cast their votes on such important matters as candidate and town leader selection. The data do suggest that certain committee people may have been predisposed to these personal resources. However, most committee people perceived themselves to be generally free from elite constraints when casting their intra-party votes or carrying out their campaign responsibilities.

Summary and Discussion

The descriptive and statistical data on the party's decision-making processes suggest what Eldersveld and others have described as a stratarchical local party structure. Power linkages were perceived to be generally loose with little evidence of a "unity of command"; most committee people saw themselves to be relatively free from elite constraints. Committee people, for example, appeared to be fairly autonomous regarding how campaigns were conducted within their election districts. Certain town and area-zone leaders were perceived as demanding more loyalty and service than others; the more common view, however, was of the town parties as undisciplined structures. As will be

discussed in Chapter Six, most committee people did not seem to be accountable to elites regarding either their loyalty or party service.

Although party leaders were clearly perceived to dominate decision making, perceptions of committee persons' influence did vary among the party organizations. Over two thirds of Babylon Democratic committee people expressed "some" or "a great deal" of influence in candidate selection and party issue positions-a reflection of the influence of this party's organized insurgents. Conversely, when the association between influence and freedom was measured, Babylon Democrats revealed rather strong negative Gamma scores, as did the Huntington Republicans, thus indicating that, in these divided minority parties, greater controls may have been exercised by elites over their "loyal" supporters.

Over two thirds of the Huntington Democrats, on the other hand, expressed "some" or a "great deal" of influence in candidate selection and party issue positions. This party also had generally positive Gamma scores - a reflection of the casual leadership style of the newly elected, former N.D.C. town chairman. On the other hand, when compared to the other three parties, twice as many Babylon Republicans expressed "some" or "a great deal" of influence regarding the potentially divisive questions of town leadership selection and patronage-reflecting this party's greater internal cohesion.

Despite these variations, overall assessments of the degree of lower strata activists' influence in party decision making were low. The data thus support that portion of Hypothesis 1 which postulated that these parties do not stress the amateur goal of full participation in intra-party decision making. Yet, overall assessments of committee persons' decision-making freedom were high. This general pattern of low influence and high freedom might be explained by the fact that elites dominated decision making so thoroughly that they felt no need to restrict the freedom of most committee people. The data also suggest, however, that the party structures are loosely organized and, unlike urban, hierarchical machines, demand minimal discipline of most committee people. A more detailed analysis of the power relationships between elites and committee people appears in Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine.

Finally, although two thirds of the committee people in each of the four party organizations expressed the desire for greater influence, one half to three fourths also felt that the elites did not have too much influence. Thus, if the committee people desired more influence, they did not perceive implementation of this desire as a zero sum situation that required a reduction of elite power. Despite their general perception of minimal influence in party decision making, few committee people expressed a desire to fundamentally alter the existing power structure - a structure that did not conform to amateur norms of

intra-party democracy.

The committee persons' ambiguous perceptions regarding their decision-making influence and freedom again reveal their support for both amateur and professional values. Most lower strata activists were dissatisfied with their lack of influence and desired the amateur ideal of greater participation in decision making. Yet, they were also unwilling to alter existing power arrangements; most committee people were aware that their parties conformed to the professional norm of elite domination of decision making but were also unwilling to abandon or significantly alter that norm.

The data on committee persons' influence and freedom also suggest a number of variables that affect perceptions of intra-party power as well as the actual power structure within the party organizations. To begin, elite leadership styles affect participation in decision making; committee people perceived themselves to have greater influence and freedom when elites appeared to support the concept of democratic involvement. Committee people in these situations also seemed more satisfied with the party's power structure.

Conversely, where elites appeared to minimize participation and to maintain discipline by scrutinizing the task performance and loyalty of lower strata activists, committee people were somewhat more dissatisfied with the

existing power structure and more willing to limit the power of elites. These attitudes may be due to the fact that some committee people resented being held accountable for their intra-party behavior. Many committee people in this same situation, however, also perceived themselves to be somewhat more influential when compared to less disciplined parties, even though their participation was largely limited to endorsing and/or implementing decisions made by elites. This latter perceptual pattern conforms to Townsend's definition of political participation:

> The individual who becomes involved in the execution of a policy with the understanding that he is thereby committing himself to one political viewpoint in opposition to another is engaged in political participation even though he may have no part in the original decision.[3]

Admitting that his definition "runs counter to the traditional democratic concept of participation"[4], Townsend's concept is nevertheless instructive when applied to those committee people in the more disciplined Babylon Republican Party who may have shared elite goals and perceived themselves to be held accountable and rewarded by elites for their service and loyalty. Although denied participation in the amateur sense, i.e., provided with opportunities for initiating and formulating policy, these committee people may have believed that, by executing or ratifying the decisions of the leaders, they in fact, were fully participating in their party's decision-making processes. This hypothesis requires additional research.

Intra-party factionalism is another variable affecting perceptions of decision-making influence. Factional disputes were most pronounced in the minority parties, perhaps because such disputes were resolved or repressed in the majority parties where it was feared they would interfere with the parties' electoral success. Within the divided minority Babylon Democratic Party, however, the data suggest that perceptions of decision-making influence and of the legitimacy of existing power arrangements were quite strong. This may be due to the existence of an organized insurgency group which used the party's decision-making procedures to channel their dissent. Conversely, the data suggest that within both faction-ridden parties, the minority of committee people who were close to the elites, thereby perceiving themselves to have influence, also perceived themselves with less freedom than other activists. These perceptions may be due to the fact that elites in divided parties hold their "loyalists" more accountable, particularly on sensitive votes such as nominee and party leadership selection.

In sum, most Babylon-Huntington committee people, although largely denied influence, and desiring greater influence, did not generally appear interested in democratizing the existing power structure so as to actually increase their "say" in party matters. This attitudinal pattern questions those supporters of the amateur model who believe that, in the absence of the material reward structure that

once dominated urban machines, middle-class activists will demand greater decision-making influence and will not maintain their participation in local parties if denied such influence. The manner in which Babylon-Huntington activists defined their party roles and fulfilled their party tasks is analyzed in Chapter Six. A full theoretical analysis of activists' contradictory influence-power perceptions appears in Chapter Nine.

CHAPTER FIVE

FOOTNOTES

[1]James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 182.

[2]Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Approach, (New York: Rnad McNally, 1964), p.9.

[3]James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1969), P. 5.

[4]Ibid., p. 6

CHAPTER SIX

THE "PROFESSIONAL" SUBURBAN ORGANIZATION: ROLES, REWARDS AND DISCIPLINE

The descriptive and perceptual data reported in Chapters Three, Four and Five reveal that the Babylon-Huntington party organizations manifested two important professional attributes: none of the party organizations had a strong issue-programmatic orientation; none opened decision making to a great deal of participation by lower strata activists in any of the party organizations. The data also suggest a loosely disciplined stratarchical power structure with diffuse power relationships. This chapter further explores the party power structures by examining the system of rewards and punishments used by elites to further their intra-party objectives.

The data reported in Chapters Four and Five demonstrate, in keeping with Hypothesis 1 of this study, that party elites were perceived by committee people as maintaining a professional goal structure which stressed: (a) electoral success; (b) sustaining the power position of the party leadership. The data were less clear as to whether elites stressed two additional goals identified in the Hypothesis: (c) maintaining party discipline; (d) satisfying the demands of factions and sub-groups.

Particularly in the minority Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican Parties, for example, 40 and 47 percent respectively of committee people felt that elites did not stress the goals of intra-party factional balancing.

This Chapter analyzes the manner and degree to which elites pursued the goal of intra-party discipline. Specifically, that portion of Hypothesis 2 is tested which postulated that elites systematically distribute or withhold personal material resources (nominations, patronage and campaign assistance) in a manner which causes lower strata activists to define their party roles and perform their tasks (voting with elites on major intra-party questions and engaging in electoral-organizational maintenance activities) thus enabling the elites to attain their professional goals. In addition, Hypothesis 4 is tested which postulated that the top echelon elites and lower strata activists generally perceive the distribution of personal material resources as rewards and punishments to be a legitimate exercise of party power.

Roles and Discipline

The goal of maintaining intra-party discipline proved the most elusive to measure because of the amorphous nature of the concept. The general perception conveyed by most committee people was that their party organizations were not very disciplined (although definitions of the concept varied among the subjects). These observations were confirmed somewhat by the data in Chapter Five which report that

committee people did not feel inhibited by elites in most major decision making areas; i.e., most lower strata activists in all four parties perceived a considerable degree of decision-making freedom.

Thus, if intra-party discipline is defined as obedience or subservience of committee people to the wishes of the party elites in decision making, most of the Babylon-Huntington activists perceived themselves to be largely free from elite constraints. Another element of intra-party discipline is the manner in which committee people fulfilled the roles expected of them by party elites. The data below explore the perceived role expectations of lower strata activists.

Committee people were asked, in an open-ended question, to identify the party activities expected of them by elites. The data, reported in Table 19, again confirm the professional orientation of the party organization.

Table 19

Committee Persons' Perceptions of Activities Expected of Them by Party Elites (in percents)

	Babylon Democrats (n=18)	Babylon Republicans (n=19)	Huntington Democrats (n=11)	Huntington Republicans (n=12)
Activities				
Campaign work	89	100	100	75
Loyalty to leaders	72	74	55	75
Financial contributions	50	37	27	8
Registering new voters	17	16	0	8
Attending meetings	6	32	36	0
Keeping informed on issues	0	0	9	0

Campaign work and loyalty to leaders (defined as support for the elites' reelection, nominees and programs) were thus perceived as the tasks expected by the largest percent of committee people in all four parties. In the minority Babylon Democratic and Hunting Republican Parties, each of which has lost most town elections since 1967, fewer activists mentioned campaign work as a task expected by elites, thus reinforcing the data in Chapter Four which indicate that these two parties had the largest number of committee people who felt that electoral success was not among the elites' most important goals.

One interesting perceptual observation relates to

the large percent of committee people in all four parties (55-75) who perceived loyalty to the leaders as an activity expected by elites, although, as was noted in Chapter Five, an even larger percent (66-89) in all four parties indicated a great deal of freedom in casting their votes for the selection of town party leaders, area-zone leaders, and nominees for public office. These data thus confirm the diffuse nature of the parties' power structures in that lower strata activists, although perceiving their support as expected by elites in their votes for party leaders and nominees, nevertheless perceived themselves to have a great deal of freedom in these important decision-making areas.

Additional insight regarding the role definitions of activists was obtained by asking subjects to specify, in an open-ended question, the party tasks they fulfilled during and between recent election campaigns. The results are reported in Table 20.

Table 20

Party Activities Peformed by Activists During and Between Recent Election Campaigns (in percents)

	Babylon Democrats (n=25)	Babylon Republicans (n=22)	Huntington Democrats (n-25)	Huntington Republicans (n=25)
Activities				
Campaign work	92	100	100	81
Attendance at fund raisers	60	77	80	80
Constituent services	24	35	26	23
Political club membership	60	77	80	76
Candidate for public office	44	5	20	4
Convention delegate	25	23	0	20

Again the professional orientation of activists was obvious in the strong electoral orientation of the party tasks they performed; campaign work and fundraising were the two most frequently cited tasks. The minority Babylon Democrats and Huntington Republicans had fewer activists mentioning campaign work, as these parties also had fewer activists who perceived campaign work to be a task expected by elites and electoral success a goal stressed by elites. In all four parties, however, committee people indicated heavy participation in professional, electoral-organizational activities in keeping with their perceptions of elite role expectations.

Constituent services such as local community problem solving and patronage services, were not mentioned by more than 35 percent of activists in any of the four parties. One might infer from these data that the party organizations did not maintain frequent contact with constituents between election campaigns and/or that constituents did not generally seek out party activists for assistance or governmental services.

A large percent of activists (60-80) in all four parties indicated membership in a political club as an on-going party activity. Aside from the one insurgent club, the Babylon Democratic R.F.K. Club, however, no clear picture emerged from the interviews regarding the nature or function of these clubs.

Approximately one fourth of the activists in three parties indicated that they had served as delegates to a convention-a position viewed by many as honorific. No reason could be discerned for the complete absence of this activity from activists in the Huntington Democratic Party. Similarly, no reason could be ascertained to explain why significantly more Democrats than Republicans in both towns were candidates for public office. The existence of an active insurgent club in the Babylon Democratic Party, on the other hand, explains why this party had the largest percentage of activists who had been candidates for public office; Babylon insurgents ran frequent primary challenges

against the candidates nominated by the regular party organization.

Another facet of activists' task performance was obtained by asking committee people to specify the frequency of their contacts with party elites. Lower strata activists in the majority Babylon Republican and Huntington Democratic Parties had the largest percentages (88 and 81 respectively) who indicated that they contacted party elites "often" or "frequently". These data compared with the minority Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican Party activists, 53 and 58 percent respectively, who indicated that they contacted their leaders "often" or "frequently". These data again confirm earlier observations of a somewhat alienated, isolated leadership in the minority parties and of greater internal cohesion in the majority parties.

When committee people who indicated that their contact with elites was "often" or "frequent" were asked to describe the content of their discussions, their perceptions again evidenced the strong professional orientation of their activism. The results are reported in Table 21.

Table 21

Perceived Content of Discussion by Committee Persons Who Indicated Frequent Contact with Elites (in percents)

Content of Discussions	Babylon Democrats (n=10)	Babylon Republicans (n=16)	Huntington Democrats (n=13)	Huntington Republicans (n=11)
Campaign Work				
Fund raising	10	6	38	45
Nominations	10	38	38	45
Campaigning	40	50	62	27
Organizational Maintenance				
Patronage	50	75	62	45
Recruitment of workers	0	6	8	0
Conflict resolution	10	0	15	0
Other	10	13	8	9
Purposive Topics				
Community problems	30	31	8	9
Issues	10	0	8	27

Campaigning, patronage and nominations were identified as part of the content of the discussions by 38 percent or more of committee people who had frequent contact with the leaders in at least three parties. Purposive topics, on the other hand, were specified by no more than 31 percent of these committee people in all four parties.

Some patterns regarding the nature of elite-committee persons' contact may be explained by party difference. Patronage, for example, was discussed more frequenty in the majority parties due, in part, to its greater availability

in these organizations. Fundraising, on the other hand, was cited as a topic to a greater extent in the more affluent Huntington parties, as was participation in fund-raising activities reported in Table 20. Finally, community problem-solving was cited with greater frequency in the Babylon parties, perhaps reflecting the less affluent socio-economic status of this town and the greater need, by constituents, for party services. These data also suggest that among certain of the less affluent Babylon constituents, community services may have been used to reinforce party loyalty.

In sum, committee people in all four organizations perceived their party leaders as expecting professional, electoral-organizational tasks of them. Most activists also performed largely professional, electoral-organizational tasks in the fulfillment of their party roles. Likewise, the contact of committee people with elites was dominated largely by professional, electoral-organizational topics.

Despite the congruence of elite-committee persons' professional role orientations, however, the data were ambiguous as to the degree of discipline within the parties. Despite perceptions of expected loyalty to leaders, for example, most committee people perceived themselves to be free to vote as they wished in major decision-making areas. Further, when asked to estimate the people who were not performing any party tasks, activists in the Babylon Democratic, Huntington Democratic and Huntington Republican

Parties indicated an average 26, 26, 29 percent respectively, who fit this category. The exception was the Babylon Republicans who again revealed their internal cohesion by specifying an average of 16 percent of activists in this category. Hence, although campaign activities were clearly a major elite goal in three of the parties, the leaders were unable to motivate one fourth of the committee people to do any campaign work.

Thus, committee persons' general impressions of their parties as lacking internal discipline were further confirmed by their estimate of party organizations with approximately one fourth of the membership inactive. The degree to which activists with differing incentive structures perceived and fulfilled their party role expectations is explored in Chapters Seven and Eight. Next, however, the parties' reward system is examined.

Party Reward Structure

An understanding of the rewards and sanctions utilized by party elites is a central concern of this study which hypothesizes a personal reward system (nominations, patronage and campaign assistance) systematically distributed or withheld by elites to further their professional party goals. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the degree to which the party elites were perceived by activists as maintaining such a personal reward system.

In order to ascertain whether personal rewards were

utilized by party elites, activists were asked to specify whether they were awarded or denied, or knew anyone awarded or denied, a nomination, patronage or campaign assistance based on the individual's standing with party elites. The results are reported in Table 22.

Table 22

Activists Who Perceived Personal Resources Used as Rewards or Punishments by Party Elites (in percents)

Personal Resources	Babylon Democrats Elites (n=6)	Babylon Democrats Comm. People (n=19)	Babylon Republicans Elites (n=5)	Babylon Republicans Comm. People (n=20)	Huntington Democrats Elites (n=11)	Huntington Democrats Comm. People (n=16)	Huntington Republicans Elites (n=7)	Huntington Republicans Comm. People (n=19)
Nominations	66(4)	53	60(3)	50	64(7)	63	86(6)	79
Patronage	100(6)	95	100(5)	80	91(10)	81	86(6)	79
Campaign assistance	80(5)	95	60(3)	31	55(6)	56	20(1)	58

Patronage was clearly the personal resource perceived by the most activists in all four parties as a reward utilized by the elites. Among party elites, 80-100 percent knew of cases where patronage was awarded or denied to committee people based on their standing with the leaders. Committee people who knew of patronage distributed or withheld as a reward ranged from 79-95 percent in each of the four parties.

Except for the Huntington Republicans, fewer elites and committee people knew of nominations used as a reward or punishment, although 50-66 percent of activists did

specify knowledge of cases where committee people received or were denied nominations because of their standing with party elites. Campaign assistance, on the other hand, was perceived as a reward or punishment by an overwhelming percentage of activists only in the Babylon Democratic Party, perhaps due to the decisions, reported in Chapter Three, of party regulars to withhold assistance from candidates whose nominations emerged from the insurgent wing of the party.

Perceptions of the criteria used by elites to award or deny nominations were ascertained from an open-ended question on nominations' criteria, the results of which are reported in Table 23.

Table 23

Activists' Perceptions of Criteria Used by Elites to Award or Deny Nominations (in percents)

Criteria	Babylon Democrats Elites (n=5)	Babylon Democrats Comm. People (n=18)	Babylon Republicans Elites (n=4)	Babylon Republicans Comm. People (n=17)	Huntington Democrats Elites (n=11)	Huntington Democrats Comm. People (n=14)	Huntington Republicans Elites (n=7)	Huntington Republicans Comm. People (n=19)
Electability	40(2)	44	75(3)	24	91(10)	86	86(6)	53
Party service	0	28	25(1)	18	55(6)	50	57(4)	63
Loyalty to leaders	60(3)	94	50(2)	59	91(10)	86	43(3)	90
Ethnicity, race, sex	20(1)	5	50(2)	6	18(2)	14	0	5
Qualifications (education, employment, community service record)	60(3)	50	75(3)	47	18(2)	36	57(4)	21
Geography	40(2)	17	25(1)	35	0	0	0	5
Philosophy or issue position	20(1)	0	0	0	10(1)	7	14(1)	5
Funds	0	50	25(1)	12	36(4)	64	43(3)	84
Other	0	11	25(1)	6	0	0	0	5

Loyalty to the leaders was perceived as a nomination criterion used by leaders by 43-91 percent of the elites in all four parties. Committee people also viewed loyalty this way, with the percentages ranging from 59-94 percent in all four parties. Significantly more committee people than elites perceived this criterion used in nominations in the Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican parties; elite-lower strata perceptions of this criterion were more congruent in the majority parties. Thus, lower strata disaffection from the party elites in the minority parties

was again confirmed.

Service to the party, on the other hand, was viewed as a criterion for nomination by a majority of activists (50-63 percent) in the Huntington parties only. No explanation for this perceptual pattern could be inferred from the data. Likewise, the candidate's access to funds was viewed as a criterion more frequently by committee people in the Huntington parties, again reflecting the preoccupation of these more affluent activists with party fund raising.

Three fourths or more of the elites in all but the Babylon Democratic Party identified the candidate's electability as a criterion for nomination. That only 40 percent of Babylon Democratic leaders cited electability may be due to the long-standing factional dispute in this party which, as was noted in Chapter Three, has raised charges on both sides of the party that the regulars or insurgents would prefer to sacrifice an election victory rather than permit the opposition to capture the nomination and election. Notably, in all but the Huntington Democratic Party, committee people viewed leadership loyalty more frequently than electability as nominating criteria used by elites.

Ethnicity and geography were not perceived as criteria by a substantial number of activists. Qualifications, on the other hand, were cited by 57-75 percent of elites (but many fewer committee people) in all but the Huntington Democratic Party. No reasons could be inferred from the data as to why Huntington Democratic elites and committee people and

Huntington Republican elites did not view qualifications as a criterion used by leaders in the nominations process. Finally, no more than 20 percent of either elites or committee people identified political philosophy or issue positions as nominations criteria, thus confirming once again the non-programmatic orientation of these party organizations.

Hence, loyalty to leaders was perceived as a criterion used by elites in the nomination process by a substantial number of activists in all four parties, although party services was not. A clearer picture of rewards and punishments was obtained when activists were asked to identify the leaders' criteria used to distribute patronage. The results are reported in Table 24.

Table 24

Activists' Perceptions of Criteria Used by Elites to Award or Deny Patronage (in percents)

	Babylon Democrats		Babylon Republicans		Huntington Democrats		Huntington Republicans	
	Elites (n=6)	Comm. People (n=18)	Elites (n=5)	Comm. People (n=18)	Elites (n=11)	Comm. People (n=14)	Elites (n=7)	Comm. People (n=19)
Criteria								
Loyalty to leaders	100(6)	89	60(3)	89	46(5)	71	57(4)	90
Service to party	50(3)	39	100(5)	61	91(10)	86	32(2)	68
Qualifications	67(4)	33	80(4)	78	64(7)	50	57(4)	16
Need	33(2)	33	20(1)	17	36(4)	14	29(3)	0
Other	17(1)	17	20(1)	34	36(4)	21	14(1)	0

Among elites in all four parties, 46-100 percent viewed loyalty to leaders as a criterion in the distribution of patronage; among committee people the range was 71-90 percent. At least two thirds of both elites and committee people in the majority parties viewed service to the party as a criterion for receipt of a patronage position while less than two thirds of activists in the minority parties viewed it thus. These data again suggest that greater demands for internal discipline, defined as party service were made in the majority parties.

More elites perceived qualifications as a patronage criterion than did committee people in all four parties, with the least congruence in elites'-committee persons' perceptions again being in the minority parties. Significantly more committee people in all four parties on the other hand, perceived loyalty to the leaders to be a criterion in patronage decisions as compared with those who identified qualifications as a criterion.

Thus, patronage and, to a lesser extent, nominations, were perceived as rewards used by party elites with loyalty to leaders and party service figuring most prominently in the perceived criteria. These perceptions were further reinforced by a number of activists who were able to cite examples in which leaders used rewards or punishments to achieve specific goals. The data are reported in Table 25.

Table 25

Activists' Knowledge of Specific Rewards and Punishments Used by Party Elites (in percents)

	Babylon Democrats		Babylon Republicans		Huntington Democrats		Huntington Republicans	
	Party Elites (n=6)	Comm. People (n=19)	Party Elites (n=5)	Comm. People (n=20)	Party Elites (n=11)	Comm. People (n=16)	Party Elites (n=7)	Comm. People (n=19)
Rewards								
Patronage granted for loyalty to leaders	83(5)	90	20(1)	25	0*	50*	0	47
Patronage granted for party service	33(2)	11	100(5)	30	36(4)	50	29(2)	11
Nominations granted for loyalty to leaders	0	0	20(1)	5	0	0	0	11
Nominations granted for party service	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0
Patronage or nomination granted to quiet dissidents	17(1)	11	20(1)	5	0	0	29(2)	11
Recognition granted by leaders	0	0	20(1)	0	0	0	0	11
Punishments								
Patronage denied for disloyalty to leaders	50(3)	74	75(3)	40	27*(3)	38*	43(3)	42
Patronage denied for lack of party service	0	0	20(1)	0	9(1)	13	0	0
Nomination denied for disloyalty to leader	0	5	0	10	0	6	0	32
Nomination denied for lack of party service	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Recognition and influence denied to dissidents	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dissidents fired from patronage position	0	0	40(2)	30	0	0	29(2)	21
Withhold campaign help from dissidents	33(2)	26	20(1)	5	0	13	14(1)	21
Committee person challenged in primary	0	0	20(1)	20	18(2)	13	0	0

*Does not include Town Board members as party elites

When asked to cite examples in which they personally knew of elites using rewards and punishments to attain specific goals, fewer activists in all four parties identified nominations than patronage as part of the party's reward structure. This may be due to the fact that few activists were familiar with the actual criteria used by leaders in granting nominations or because nominations were not an important element in the party's reward structure. The data were not sufficient to resolve this ambiguity.

Patronage, on the other hand, was most frequently cited as a reward or punishment by elites and committee people in all four parties. Examples of patronage used as a reward for leadership loyalty were cited most frequently in the faction-ridden Babylon Democratic Party. Conversely, patronage as a reward for party service was most frequently cited in the internally cohesive Babylon Republican Party. The denial of patronage for disloyalty to party leaders was cited by 40-74 percent of activists in all but the Huntington Democratic Party. In the latter case, as noted above, the town leader was observed by a number of activists as being "uncomfortable" with the patronage system.

Examples of campaign assistance being withheld from dissidents were again most frequently cited in the divided Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican parties. Primary challenges to either dissident or non-working committee people, on the other hand, were most frequently

cited in the more cohesive majority parties.

The impact of the patronage system on the behavior of committee people was perceived, by activists, to be significant. For example, activists were asked, in an open-ended question, why committee people did not demand greater influence. The percent of activists who identified committee persons' desire for a patronage reward or fear that patronage might be denied as a reason why committee people do not demand a greater amount of influence in party decision making were 70, 81, 47, 86 percent in the Babylon Democratic, Babylon Republican, Huntington Democratic and Huntington Republican Parties respectively. No other reason to explain the lack of lower strata activists' influence was identified by more than one third of the activists in each of the four parties. Hence, although activists perceived themselves as having a significant amount of freedom in party decision making, as was reported in Chapter Five, they overwhelmingly perceived other committee people as being constrained in seeking greater influence by their desire for or fear of patronage rewards or punishments.

Only in the Huntington Democratic Party did less than half the activists perceive patronage as a major constraint on committee people; data which again support those observations of the new Huntington Democratic town leader as either not yet established with a power base and/or reluctant to use patronage to reward or punish

committee people. As one Huntington Democratic Zone leader observed:

> Frank Grimes is an amateur town leader who is running the party as a professional....We have the amateurs in power (but) Frank is becoming more professional. He will have to emphasize elections and patronage. This is an organization, not a club. Where he may have been uncomfortable with patronage two years ago, he now clearly emphasizes that patronage is a major concern of the party.

The Legitimacy of Patronage

Patronage thus was perceived as the most important element in the parties' reward structure. This perception was reinforced by the number of activists able to cite actual cases where patronage was used as a reward or punishment and, as reported in Table 26, the number of lower strata activists who sought a patronage position for themselves, a relative or constituent.

Table 26

Participation of Committee People in Patronage Reward System (in percents)

Participation	Babylon Democrats (n=19)	Babylon Republicans (n=18)	Huntington Democrats (n=16)	Huntington Republicans (n=19)
Sought patronage appointment	83	94	68	63
For self	53	44	38	26
For others	12	83	63	37
Personally rewarded with patronage	26	22	31	16
Personally furnished with patronage	21	5	6	5

Two thirds or more of committee people in all four parties thus indicated that they had sought a patronage appointment for themselves or someone else. Significantly more committee people in the less affluent township of Babylon sought patronage appointments, although clearly two thirds of the more affluent committee people in Huntington had also done so. Thus, a significant number of middle-class committee people had, contrary to the observation of Sorauf and others, desired patronage rewards, either for themselves or others. Many activists, for example, attached great importance to summer patronage positions for the children of activists. As one key Huntington Democrat observed:

> Summer jobs are the name of the game in Huntington. When town leader Frank Grimes was feuding with Councilmen Casey and Horn, I knew people whose kids didn't get jobs who were livid. They threatened to quit [party activism]. They didn't need these jobs but this was their reward for being committee people....A lot of these affluent people deny it because they wouldn's want to seem to be stooping. But, I had quite a few calling me during the Casey-Horn dispute looking for jobs.

Significantly, about one fourth to one half the committee people in all four parties indicated that they had sought a patronage position for themselves. Again, the Babylon parties had more committee people in this category. However, one third or less of the committee people in all parties perceived themselves as having received a patronage reward from the party elites. Less than 6 percent of committee people indicated that they personally had received

a patronage punishment (denial of a patronage appointment or firing from a patronage position) from elites in all but the Babylon Democratic Party where 21 percent indicated a patronage sanction. The higher incidence of perceived patronage punishments in the Babylon Democratic Party can probably be explained by the existence of the organized insurgency group within the party which has been, or perceived itself as having been, denied party resources.

Thus, a significant number of committee people had personally participated in the patronage system. Yet, as noted earlier, although patronage was widely perceived as the most important resource used by elites to reward and punish committee people, less than one third of the committee people indicated that they had personally been rewarded with patronage and, except for Babylon Democrats, only about 5 percent felt that they had been punished with patronage. Thus, the frequency with which committee people perceived others as having been affected by the patronage reward system was significantly greater than the frequency with which they perceived themselves as having been rewarded or punished with patronage. These perceptual incongruities will be further discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.

As noted in Chapter Two, none of the parties would make available patronage lists. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the actual number of committee people who held patronage positions. Activists' estimates of patronage in their town committees, however, ranged from

averages of 28-47 percent of committee people with full- or part-time positions.[1]

Efforts to obtain data on the number of patronage appointments within government agencies proved ineffective. However, analysis of the Babylon Town government and the Suffolk Off Track Betting Corporation by informants proved instructive. In the case of Babylon, 28 positions or 52 percent of the town's full-time or part-time positions (excluding laborers and summer positions) were occupied by Republican committee people.[2]

Suffolk County Off Track Betting Corporation was the subject of an in-depth Newsday analysis. In their report, Newsday observed:

> More than 40 percent of Suffolk O.T.B. employees have political ties. Of the 426 people working for the corporation, 165 are members of the Republican or Democratic committees, relatives of committee members or politicians who have lost their elective or appointive office.
>
> A comparison of the Suffolk O.T.B. payroll and major party lists showed that the O.T.B. employs 79 Democratic committee members. There were also 20 relatives of Democratic committee members and 22 relatives of Republican committee members....[3]

The Suffolk County parties have agreed to divide O.T.B. jobs 50-50 to town committee members, their relatives, friends or constituents. As noted in Chapter Two, the President of Suffolk O.T.B. is former Babylon Republican Chairman Syd Askoff; its Vice President is Huntington Democratic Co-chairman Martin Feeney,whose wife, Irene Feeney, is a zone leader. In an interview with Newsday

reporter Rick Brand, who obtained his O.T.B. personnel list from an "unnamed source", it was learned that the O.T.B. employs the following number of Babylon and Huntington committee people:[4]

Babylon Democrats	13
Babylon Republicans	12
Huntington Democrats	9
Huntington Republicans	19

An interview with the Personnel Director of the Town of Babylon revealed the following breakdown of town employees:[5]

	Percent of Employees
Non-competitive positions: Basically blue collar positions that are obtained as political appointments but eventually are protected by union and civil service regulations.	40%
Competitive Positions: Civil service positions requiring examinations, that are protected by civil service regulations.	30%
Exempt Positions: Political appointments or elected officials who are exempt from civil service hiring and firing regulations.	30%

Hence, 70 percent of the Town's employees are open to political appointment and 30 percent are patronage positions largely exempt from the appointment and dismissal regulations of the civil service system.

Interviews with activists in the Babylon and Huntington parties reveal numerous additional sources of patronage employment, including county and state administrative agencies, aides to county and state legislators, court

Referrals for attorneys (the fees for which average $250), and, as noted earlier, numerous part-time and temporary positions. Several activists, for example, noted that teachers find the summer positions or part-time Zoning Board of Appeals or Planning Board positions desirable because they pay, usually in excess of $1,500, and supplement teacher incomes during the summer months. Also, summer positions, as noted above, were perceived by some activists as very desirable for the children of committee people.

Thus, although patronage lists were not available, it was clear from the perceptual and personnel data that patronage remains an important political resource among the middle-class activists of the Babylon-Huntington parties. When asked if they would support the complete abolition of patronage, for example, from 87-96 percent of the activists in all four parties responded negatively. When asked why they supported patronage, 78-92 percent responded that patronage is needed to motivate committee people to work for the party.

Contrary to Sorauf and others who observed that patronage is declining because it holds no appeal for the middle class, since patronage politics "have been curtailed by the political education and assimilation of migrant and foreign-born populations"[6], patronage remained the most important perceived political resource within these middle-class party structures. Today's middle-class activists may not need patronage employment to the same degree as did the

immigrants.[7] However, the data clearly indicate that patronage continues to be viewed as a desirable political reward by many middle-class activists. As a Babylon Republican committee man observed:

> Patronage is flourishing. With government more involved than ever, jobs are increasing. Anyone who says otherwise is crazy. Under proper leadership, there is nothing wrong with patronage. Good leaders pick qualified people-not hacks.

Summary and Discussion

This chapter explored the relationship between activists' perceived role expectations, their task performance and the system of rewards and punishments utilized by party elites to achieve their goals. In keeping with Hypothesis 2, the data reveal that the overwhelming majority of committee people perceived elites as expecting them to fulfill professional roles. Campaign activities and leadership loyalty on intra-party votes, such as nominees and leadership selection, were particularly important among the perceived role expectations of most committee people. As noted in Chapter Four, elites and committee people shared a strong perception that electoral success is an important party goal. These electoral goals, and their attendant electoral-organizational role expectations, influenced the behavior of many activists since campaign-activities were the tasks most frequently performed by activists in each of the parties.

Party elites were clearly perceived by activists as

maintaining a personal-material reward system. Patronage, and to a lesser extent, nominations, were viewed as rewards and punishments used by elites to achieve their goals. Only in the Babylon Democratic Party did a significant number of activists cite campaign assistance as part of the reward structure. Loyalty to leaders was perceived as a criterion for nominations and, more clearly, for patronage. Party service, however, was cited by a significant number of activists as a criterion for patronage but not for nominations.

When asked to cite specific examples of intra-party rewards and punishments the largest number of activists cited patronage as a reward used by elites to achieve two goals - service to the party and loyalty to leaders. The data on nominations are somewhat ambiguous, however, in that significantly fewer activists were able to cite specific examples of elites awarding or denying nominations to achieve these objectives.

These data, however, do not confirm that portion of Hypothesis 2 which postulated that elites systematically distribute personal material resources as rewards and punishments in a manner which causes lower strata activists to define their party roles and perform their tasks so as to enable elites to attain their professional goals. Although most committee people clearly perceived elites as maintaining such a reward structure and perceived most other lower strata activists as being influenced by the desire for personal-

material resources-particularly patronage- the data suggest that few committee people defined their roles or performed their tasks because they personally desired or feared a material reward or sanction.

Although patronage lists were unavailable, research revealed numerous town, county and state full- and part-time positions open to patronage appointment. Many activists seemed especially interested in part-time or summer employment for themselves, relatives, friends or constituents. An average of 77 percent of these committee people had sought patronage for themselves or someone else; an average of 40 percent had sought a position for themselves. In keeping with Hypothesis 4, the data reveal that almost all activists supported patronage as a necessary motivation for party activism and a legitimate exercise of party power. The data thus sharply challenge the position of Sorauf and others who have argued that patronage appointments would be of little or no interest to middle-class activists.

Nevertheless, one would be mistaken to assume that patronage shaped the attitudes and behavior of most of these middle-class activists as it was widely perceived to have done among the immigrant and poor constituencies and activists in the urban machines. The data on the intra-party influences of personal material resources are ambiguous. For example, although more than three fourths of the committee people had sought patronage for themselves or someone else,

an average of only 23 percent of activists perceived themselves actually to have been rewarded or punished with patronage. Also, as noted above, patronage was clearly perceived as the mainstay of the elites' reward system for motivating both leadership loyalty and party service. In addition, patronage was perceived as a major influence on the behavior of other activists; an average of 71 percent of activists identified patronage as the reason why other lower strata activists were constrained from seeking greater intra-party influence. Yet, these perceptions contrast sharply with the large number of committee people (an average of 70 percent) reported in Chapter Five who perceived themselves to have a great deal of freedom in key decision-making votes.

While perceiving others to be constrained by their desire for patronage, most activists viewed themselves as largely free from such constraints. This incongruity between activists' perceptions of the impact that patronage had on themselves and others can be partially explained by the observations of numerous activists who noted that the actual administration of intra-party rewards appeared to be haphazard rather than the systematic network postulated in Hypothesis 2. Except for the Babylon Republicans, for example, no detailed system of record keeping or reporting was identified for the administration of the reward system. Rather, patronage decisions were described as the province of the town leader who often acted hastily, arbitrarily and

unilaterally.

Rather than maintaining a highly systematized, rational system of rewards and punishments tied directly to committee persons' leadership loyalty and party service, town leaders were frequently described as encouraging or acquiescing to a vague "climate of intimidation". In this climate, committee people were described as being led to believe that personal rewards and punishments would be the consequence of their service or loyalty - even if this was not always the case. These impressions are given additional support by the data which indicate significantly fewer committee people (an average of 23 percent) who perceived themselves as having been rewarded or punished with patronage, as compared with the average 84 percent who perceived others to have been so rewarded or punished.

In addition, significantly fewer activists were able to cite specific cases of patronage used as a reward or punishment than believed it to be a personal resource. Similarly, few activists were able to cite examples of committee people being fired from patronage positions for political reasons. Conversely, numerous activists expressed their concern about a vague patronage retribution in which other committee people might be denied a patronage reward by elites. While some leaders were perceived as encouraging these fears, others appeared to do little to dispel them, even if the fears were somewhat exaggerated.

Also, many activists perceived their parties as lacking internal discipline. Despite the importance of campaign-related activities, activists' perceptions of the number of inactive committee people, for example, averaged 25 percent in three of the parties. Similarly, although leadership loyalty ranked very high as a perceived criterion for the receipt of desired personal material rewards, the overwhelming majority of committee people, as noted above, felt free from elite constraints when voting on key intra-party decisions. Hence, committee people perceived elites as fostering the acceptance of the professional values along with professional behavior patterns such as campaign work and leadership loyalty through the systematic distribution of patronage and, to a lesser extent, nominations, even though the actual administration of these rewards may have been somewhat random, capricious, and ineffectual in shaping the behavior of most activists.

Certain town leaders, particularly Babylon Republican leader Syd Askoff, were perceived as more efficient in their administration of patronage rewards than were other leaders, particularly Huntington Democrat Frank Grimes. Similarly, certain area-zone leaders, as noted in Chapters Three and Five, maintained a leadership style that relied heavily on the use of patronage rewards and punishments. Other area-zone leaders, however, relied much less on personal rewards to maintain discipline among committee people.

These ambiguities were most suggestive in the faction-ridden Babylon Democratic Party. Despite frequent charges of recrimination and retribution, for example, with patronage cited as a major reward and punishment for leadership loyalty, one activist noted:

> I've encouraged [town leader Jack] Braslow to use jobs to make committee people grateful for their jobs. My suggestion fell on deaf dears. Braslow ... won't use the power of his office to motivate committeemen.

A Babylon Democratic area leader who is a known Braslow supporter observed:

> There is a prevailing mood - a vague ... fear that [committee people] will be held back [from patronage]. But Jack is very easy going, mild mannered, compassionate. He promises everybody something. He's also rather lazy....I think the fear that committee people have is paranoia.

Similarly, a prominent Democratic insurgent said that Braslow maintained discipline:

> Through patronage and social pressure of those who want the approval of the leaders. The perception that the town leader used patronage as punishment and reward is more real than his actual use of these rewards. This perception keeps the committee people in line. He doesn't so much encourage as he doesn't discourage continuation of this perception.

Thus, although cases were cited in all four parties of elites having rewarded or punished committee people with patronage, none of the parties, except the Babylon Republicans, appeared to maintain a highly structured, bureaucratized reward system that actually affected large numbers of committee people. Also, although personal resources were considered an important element in the parties' reward system,

as will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight, such rewards were a major incentive affecting the intra-party behavior of some, but not most, activists.

Patronage thus figured very prominently in the perceived reward structure of the parties. Yet, these data indicate, although most committee people were quite certain that other activists' behavior was shaped by the desire for patronage, they themselves felt largely free to vote as they wished on major party questions and, as noted in Chapter 5, relatively autonomous in conducting campaigns within their election districts. The party power structures, as outlined in Chapters Three and Five, were stratarchical; since elites did not closely scrutinize how must committee people performed their tasks, including votes on important intra-party questions, and campaign responsibilities, they could not maintain a reward structure tied closely to activists' loyalty and party service.

The data do not, therefore, support the assumed correlation in Hypothesis 2 between elites' distribution of personal material resources and the professional behavior of most lower strata activists. Most committee people did, indeed, define their roles and perform their tasks in accordance with goals and norms that conform to the professional model - particularly those related to electoral success. The reason they did so however, was not because of their desire for or fear of a patronage (or other material) reward or sanction.

Rather, the data suggest, most committee people behaved in a professional manner because they shared professional goals with the elites. Similarly, the incongruous, yet widespread belief, that a personal material reward structure - in the style of the boss-dominated, urban machines - was fully operational in these suburban parties, when most activists felt free from the constraints typically associated with hierarchical machines, illustrates the powerful influence that professional norms had on activists' perceptions. In sum, most committee people assumed professional values and norms to be the premises underlying their parties' decision-making processes and motivational system, even though such norms may not have been fully operational. A detailed theoretical discussion of the impact that underlying premises have on organizations appears in Chapter Nine.

CHAPTER SIX

FOOTNOTES

[1]Cf. ante., p. 49.

[2]Data provided by Babylon Town Councilwoman Sondra Bachety.

[3]Newsday, February 11, 1979.

[4]Interview with Newsday reported Rick Brand, March 1, 1979.

[5]Interview with Robert Scarito, Personnel Director, Town of Babylon, December 6, 1978.

[6]Frank Sorauf, "Patronage and Party" in Charles G. Mayo, Beryl Crow, eds., American Political Parties: A Systematic Perspective, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 443.

[7]Cf. post., p. 183.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE "PROFESSIONAL" SUBURBAN ORGANIZATION: INCENTIVES AND SATISFACTIONS

Wilson's third defining attribute of the amateur activist and organization is a non-material incentive system. As noted in Chapter One, much of the literature on amateur and professional activists has focused on incentive systems, usually treated as independent variables that affect activism and organizational style. This study, as discussed in Chapter Two, hypothesized the incentive system as a dependent variable affected by the elites' distribution of personal resources which, either directly or indirectly, produces attitudes and behavior among lower strata activists which conform to the professional model.

This chapter examines the incentive structures of activists both currently and at the time of their initial entry into politics. Specifically, that portion of Hypothesis 2 is examined which postulated that the elites' distribution of personal resources causes most lower strata activists to adopt a professional-personal rather than an amateur-purposive incentive goal structure. As noted in Chapter Two, incentives were defined as "activists' underlying needs and drives, or their goals", sought through party activism. Also examined here will be the satisfactions

activists have obtained from party work, i.e., "the goals (needs and drives) actually fulfilled (or not fulfilled) by party activism".

The data reported in Chapters Three-Six reveal party organizations wherein both elites and lower strata activists maintained essentially non-programmatic, professional, electoral-organizational party goals, role definitions and task performance patterns. The democratic norm of mass involvement by committee people in decision making, although considered a desirable party objective (as was a greater party issue orientation) was, nevertheless, not perceived to be a widespread practice by most committee people. Personal material resources, particularly patronage, were perceived to be the mainstay of the elites' reward system although perceptions of the parties as lacking internal discipline were also widespread. Thus, the data raised questions as to whether, in fact, most activists placed a great deal of personal value on the material rewards which they clearly viewed as important to their party organizations. An analysis of the incentives sought and satisfactions obtained from party activism will thus provide greater insight into the use of rewards by party elites.

Initial Incentives

Numerous studies of party activism reported in Chapter One compared activists' incentives at the time of their initial entry into politics with their current incentives.[1] This study examined initial incentives by asking

subjects to select from Eldersveld's checklist of 11 items the most important reason for their initial entry into politics. The results are reported in Table 27.

Table 27

Initial Incentives of Activists
(in percents)

Incentives	Babylon Democrats (n=25)	Babylon Republicans (n=23)	Huntington Democrats (n=24)	Huntington Republicans (n=25)
Material				
Personal position	8	0	0	0
Business contacts	0	4	0	12
Sub total	8	4	0	12
Solidary				
Social contacts	36	30	33	24
Status	4	9	4	4
Party loyalty	8	9	4	8
Sub total	48	48	41	36
Purposive				
Gov't. policy	16	13	21	20
Community obligation	20	26	29	24
Way of life	8	9	8	8
Sub total	44	48	58	52

These data reveal that material incentives were not an important goal for entry into activism in any of the party organizations. Solidary incentives, particularly social contacts, and purposive incentives, particularly community obligations, were of near equal importance in attracting activists to party work. In the Huntington parties, where income and educational levels were somewhat higher, purposive were more important than solidary goals as initial incentives.

The above data indicate the incentives ranked as "the most important" to initial party activism. In order to ascertain whether material and solidary incentives were considered "very important", if not "the most important" goals, activists were also asked to indicate on a scale of 1-3 the importance of each item. The results for selected incentives are reported in Table 28.

Table 28

Selected Incentives Ranked as "Very Important" for Activists' Initial Entry into Politics (in percents)

Incentives	Babylon Democrats (n=25)	Babylon Republicans (n=25)	Huntington Democrats (n=25)	Huntington Republicans (n=24)
Social contacts	40(10)	52(13)	38(9)	52(12)
Personal position	36(9)	16(4)	17(4)	13(3)
Business contacts	16(4)	4(1)	0	13(3)
Status	36(9)	28(7)	21(5)	13(3)

Here, the number of activists who ranked social contacts, personal position and status as "very important" initial incentives increased significantly over those who rated these as "the most important" initial incentives. Business contacts, however, remained an important initial incentive for no more than 16 percent of the activists in all four parties.

A comparison of initial incentives most important to party elites and committee people is reported in Table 29.

Table 29

Initial Incentives by Party Hierarchical Status (in percents)

Incentives	Babylon Democrats Elites (n=6)	Babylon Democrats Comm. People (n=19)	Babylon Republicans Elites (n=5)	Babylon Republicans Comm. People (n=18)	Huntington Democrats Elites (n=9)	Huntington Democrats Comm. People (n=15)	Huntington Republicans Elites (n=6)	Huntington Republicans Comm. People (n=19)
Material								
Personal position	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
Business contacts	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	16
Sub total	0	11	0	5	0	0	0	16
Solidary								
Social contacts	50(3)	32	80(4)	17	11(1)	47	33(2)	21
Status	0	5	20(1)	5	0	7	0	5
Party loyalty	17(1)	5	0	11	11(1)	0	0	11
Sub total	67	42	100	33	22	54	33	37
Purposive								
Government policy	17(1)	21	0	17	11(1)	27	33(2)	16
Community obligation	17(1)	16	0	33	44(4)	20	33(2)	21
Way of life	0	11	0	11	22(2)	0	0	11
Sub total	34	48	0	61	77	47	66	48

Again, material incentives were not identified by more than 16 percent of elites or committee people in each of the four parties. Elites in the Babylon parties, however, were significantly more oriented toward solidary incentives than were committee people. Conversely, in the Huntington parties, elites were significantly more oriented toward purposive incentives than were committee people. The data reveal

no explanations for these initial incentive orientations.

Hence, both personal solidary and impersonal purposive incentives were important, at the time of initial entry into politics, for significant numbers of both elites and committee people in all four parties. Activists' initial incentives in the Babylon and Huntington parties thus supported Eldersveld's conclusion that simple explanations of career motivations are inappropriate; most party activists' motivations are diverse, multiple and represent a synthesis of personal and impersonal interests.[2]

Babylon and Huntington activists differed significantly in their initial incentives when compared with suburban activists in two other studies. Browder and Ippolito, for example, found 74 percent of Democratic precinct leaders and 90 percent of Republican precinct leaders indicating impersonal-purposive incentives as their most important reason for initial entry into political activism.[3] Similarly, Conway and Feigert found that 80 percent of suburban Republican precinct leaders and 88 percent of suburban Democratic precinct leaders indicated impersonal motives as their most important initial incentives.[4] Ippolito's study of suburban Nassau County, New York county executive board members, on the other hand, revealed initial incentive patterns closer to those of Babylon-Huntington activists in neighboring Suffolk County, in that 58 percent of Democratic elites and 44 percent of Republican elites indicated impersonal ideological, philosophical, issue or community obligation

concerns as their most important reason for initial entry into political activity.[5]

Sustaining Incentives

Babylon and Huntington activists lent support to the motivational pluralism interpretation of initial incentives offered by Eldersveld rather than to those studies which, like Gluck, noted that "in... suburban party organizations the [recruitment] incentives which support the amateur style of politics are mentioned considerably more often than those which support the professional style."[6] Babylon and Huntington activists did not begin their political work with the strong amateur orientation manifested by some of the suburban activists reported in the literature.

A central question discussed in much of the literature is the degree to which activists maintain their incentive orientations over time. As was noted in Chapter One, the data have been somewhat ambiguous, with some studies indicating a significant resocialization of amateur activists from impersonal to personal-professional incentives and others indicating that activists retain their initial amateur incentives over time.[7] Table 30 contains data on the incentives ranked as "the most important" reason for remaining active by Babylon and Huntington elites and committee people.

Table 30

Current Incentives by Party
Hierarchical Status
(in percents)

Incentives	Babylon Democrats Elites (n=6)	Babylon Democrats Comm. People (n=19)	Babylon Republicans Elites (n=4)	Babylon Republicans Comm. People (n=18)	Huntington Democrats Elites (n=9)	Huntington Democrats Comm. People (n=15)	Huntington Republicans Elites (n=6)	Huntington Republicans Comm. People (n=19)
Material								
Personal position	17(1)	21	25(1)	0	33(3)	7	17(1)	0
Business contacts	17(1)	0	0	11	0	0	0	16
Sub total	33	21	25	11	33	7	17	16
Solidary								
Social contacts	0	5	75(4)	5	11(1)	27	17(1)	16
Status	17(1)	0	0	5	0	13	0	0
Party loyalty	17(1)	5	0	5	11(1)	0	0	0
Sub total	33	10	75	15	22	40	17	16
Purposive								
Government policy	0	26	0	17	22(2)	27	50(3)	32
Community obligation	17(1)	21	0	33	22(2)	20	17(1)	21
Way of life	17(1)	21	0	22	0	7	0	16
Sub total	33	68	0	72	44	54	67	69

When compared with the initial incentives reported in Table 27, the data reveal some interesting motivational changes over time. Among elites in all four parties, purposive incentives either remained the same or declined significantly in importance. Solidary incentives also either retained the same frequency of importance or declined significantly while material incentives increased substantially

to explain the current activism of 17-33 percent of the elites in all four parties.

Conversely, lower strata activists revealed a significant increase in the frequency with which they cited purposive incentives as "the most important" motives for maintaining their activism in each of the four parties. Hence, elites in both Babylon parties exhibited strong initial solidary incentives which they retained over time while Huntington Democratic elites had greater initial purposive incentives which they reoriented toward solidary-material motivations. A large percentage of Huntington Republican elites retained purposive incentives, although the number with material incentives increased significantly over time.

Committee people in all four parties, on the other hand, exhibited a significant reorientation over time toward purposive incentives, with solidary incentives declining somewhat and material incentives increasing somewhat. Table 31 contains a more detailed analysis of activists' incentive reorientations.

Table 31

Incentive Reorientation by Party Hierarchical Status (in percents)

Incentive Reorientation	Babylon Democrats Elites (n=6)	Babylon Democrats Comm. People (n=19)	Babylon Republicans Elites (n=4)	Babylon Republicans Comm. People (n=18)	Huntington Democrats Elites (n=9)	Huntington Democrats Comm. People (n=15)	Huntington Republicans Elites (n=6)	Huntington Republicans Comm. People (n=19)
Began Personal	67(4)	53	100(4)	39	22(2)	53	33(2)	53
Remained unchanged	100(6)	50	100(4)	29	100(9)	75	50(3)	50
Reoriented impersonal	0	50	0	71	0	25	50(3)	50
Began Impersonal	33(2)	47	0	61	77(7)	47	66(4)	47
Remained unchanged	100(6)	88	0	73	55(5)	86	100(6)	77
Reoriented personal	0	11	0	27	44(4)	14	0	22

Here the incentive reorientations are striking. Among committee people in all but the Huntington Democratic Party who began with personal incentive orientations, from 50-71 percent currently ranked impersonal-purposive incentives as the most important reasons for maintaining their activism. This represents a significant reorientation of lower strata activists toward amateur-impersonal goals. On the other hand, a significantly larger percent of elites retained their initial incentive orientations.

These data suggest that a significant number of committee people, and to a lesser extent elites, believed that achieving amateur-purposive goals were the most important reason for their remaining active in local politics.

However, different responses were indicated when activists were asked, in an open-ended question, about the satisfactions (the goals which the party organization actually satisfied) they would miss the most if they dropped out of politics. The results are reported in Table 32.

Table 32

Activists' Current Satisfactions Obtained from Party Work (in percents)

Satisfactions	Babylon Democrats (n=24)	Babylon Republicans (n=20)	Huntington Democrats (n=23)	Huntington Republicans (n=24)
Material				
Chance to run for office	0	0	0	4
Solidary Status				
Being close to important people	8	20	39	21
Recognition	13	5	4	4
Sub total	21	25	43	25
Solidary Social				
Excitement-fun	33	30	9	8
Social contacts	29	25	30	50
Sub total	62	55	39	58
Purposive				
Community obligation, gov't. policy	13	10	17	4
None	4	10	0	8

The data thus reveal an overwhelmingly professional response in terms of the satisfactions activists currently obtained from their party organizations. If, indeed, most activists remain in local politics because they wish to

achieve purposive goals, as was indicated in Table 30, the party organizations were perceived as satisfying primarily personal-solidary needs and drives - with social benefits (excitement-fun and social contacts) clearly the most important. From 21 to 43 percent of activists in all four parties indicated solidary status satisfactions while one third to two thirds indicated that they would miss the social benefits they derive from party work. Conversely, no more than 17 percent indicated purposive satisfactions and, at most, 4 percent indicated material satisfactions.

The party organizations, with their largely non-programmatic elite goals, role expectations and task performances oriented toward professional objectives and a reward system perceived to be comprised essentially of personal-material resources, not suprisingly, provided activists with professional satisfactions. Given the non-ideological, non-programmatic orientation of these local parties and the limited degree to which committee people were provided opportunities to participate in decision making, one can conclude with Gluck and others that suburban organizations may provide limited "opportunity for maintenance of [the amateur] style over time."[8]

The data in this study reveal that activists may have retained or were reoriented toward the belief that amateur-purposive goals are the central motivation for continuing their activism, but the satisfactions they derived from

party work in these suburban professional organizations were clearly professional-solidary in nature. These data thus support Eldersveld, Conway and Feigert and others who reported a professional reorientation, over time, of amateur activists.

An exception in the literature was Ippolito's study of Nassau activists which concluded that "amateur activists maintain their motivational orientations over time."[9] Ippolito's study, unlike Eldersveld, Conway and Feigert and others, asked subjects for the "most important reason" for doing party work as opposed to the satisfactions they would "miss the most" if they quit party work.[10] Hence, Ippolito's subjects, like the Babylon-Huntington activists, reported a strong belief in amateur-purposive goals which he, perhaps incorrectly, equated with an amateur political style. As noted above, acceptance of amateur-purposive goals does not necessarily preclude activists from obtaining professional-solidary satisfactions from their party work.

The professional reorientation or resocialization of activists was further confirmed by their responses to an open-ended question which asked them to describe how their feelings and attitudes about local politics had changed since they first became active. The results are reported in Table 33.

Table 33

Changes in Activists' Attitudes
About Local Politics
(in percents)

Attitudinal Changes	Babylon Democrats (n=22)	Babylon Republicans (n=23)	Huntington Democrats (n=26)	Huntington Republicans (n=25
Professional Responses				
More accepting of a hierarchical party	14	4	0	4
More realistic about others' material concerns	5	0	12	24
More cynical about the unpleasant aspects of politics	36	30	8	28
Better understanding of power	9	26	31	12
Less idealistic, more willing to compromise	13	13	27	8
Sub total	77	73	78	76
Amateur Responses				
Philosophical changes	5	4	4	4
Continuing desire to help the community	9	9	4	0
Sub total	14	13	8	4
No Change	9	13	15	20

The data clearly reflect activists' adaptation to their professional party organizations. Approximately three fourths or more of the activists in all four parties indicated that they had experienced attitudinal changes which, in effect, provided them with either greater understanding or acceptance of what Wolfinger termed, "machine politics" or a "machine structure".[11] Conversely, 14 percent or less of activists in each of the four parties experienced amateur-

purposive attitudinal changes.

Thus, while many activists, particularly lower strata committee people, retained or were reoriented over time toward a belief in amateur-purposive goals to explain their party activism, they also came to terms with their professional party structures which provided few opportunities for realizing these purposive ideals. Some activists reacted negatively and became cynical regarding the power and personal-material concerns they perceived in their parties. Others seemed satisfied with their own increased understanding of local political power while still others became more accepting of the compromises and discipline required to maintain a structured professional party organization. The data thus support those studies which observed a resocialization of activists, what Soule and Clarke termed:

> a conversion process ... in which amateurs are re-socialized as a result of their involvement in ... party politics. That is, they lose some of their idealism and become political "realists" who learn to compromise and accept the professionals' view that the overriding goal of the party is to win elections.[12]

While activists may have lost some of their idealism in this adaptation process, they also retained some idealism as evidenced by the large percent who indicated amateur-purposive goals as their most important reason for maintaining activism. The dichotomous treatment found in much of the literature of amateur-professional incentives led some researchers to give the impression that activists either

slipped from one motivational extreme to the other or retained their initial motivational orientation.[13] The data herein, however, suggest a motivational continuum rather than a dichotomous either/or incentive structure. On this continuum, activists did experience a professional resocialization, particularly regarding the norms of electoral success and organizational maintenance that were discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six. However, they also experienced a simultaneous reorientation or retention of amateur-purposive ideals to justify their continued activism. How this phenomena was manifested in the attitudes, perceptions and behavior of activists is explored in Chapter Eight.

Incentives and Rewards

The incentive portrait which emerged from the data indicated that, particularly among lower strata activists, amateur-purposive goals retained or increased their importance over time while major accommodations and adaptations were made to the norms of professional politics. In this resocialization, activists particularly stressed the personal solidary satisfactions they obtained from their party organizations which, as was observed in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, provided few opportunities for the actualization of amateur-purposive ideals.

Personal-material rewards, on the other hand, did not figure prominently in the incentive goals or satisfactions of most activists. As reported in Chapter Six, for example,

patronage was perceived to be an important party resource. Yet, although more than two thirds of the activists (both elites and lower strata activists) had sought patronage for themselves or others, only 32-48 percent actually obtained full-time or part-time patronage for themselves. Of this latter group, only 19-28 percent in all four parties received full-time patronage positions. Similarly, as was noted in Chapter Six, the number of committee people who perceived their patronage position as a reward only ranged from 16-26 percent in all four parties.

These data thus raised questions regarding the importance of full-time patronage as an occupational need or choice for most Babylon-Huntington activists. The data in Table 34 reveal the occupational breakdown of the activists.

TABLE 34

Activists' Occupational Status
(in percents)

Occupational Status	Babylon Democrats (n=25)	Babylon Republicans (n=25)	Huntington Democrats (n=27)	Huntington Republicans (n=26)
Patronage				
White collar:professional,managerial, technical	16	24	15	15
White collar clerical	12	0	7	4
Blue collar: craftsmen, foremen,operatives	0	0	0	0
Sub total	28	24	22	19
Non-Patronage				
White collar: professional, managerial, technical, sales	40	36	66	62
White collar clerical	4	0	0	0
Blue collar: craftsmen, foremen, operatives	16	12	0	12
Housewife	8	4	4	4
Student	0	4	0	0
Elected official	4	0	4	0
Retired	0	20	4	4
Sub total	72	76	78	82

No more than 28 percent of the activists relied on patronage as their chief or sole income source. Conversely, approximately 40 percent of the Babylon activists and 60 percent of the Huntington activists had non-patronage, white collar professional occupations. In addition, as reported in Chapter Three, two thirds or more of the activists reported family income in excess of $20,000. One may infer from these data that patronage was not relied upon by more than a minority as the primary source of the incomes.

Nevertheless, as reported in Chapter Six, patronage-particularly part-time and summer positions-was viewed as an important party perquisite, although not necessarily an important initial or sustaining incentive or satisfaction.

The data in Chapter Six, however, indicated that many subjects perceived other activists as constrained by the desire for or fear of a patronage reward or retribution. These perceptions of other committee people as having a strong personal-material orientation were also manifested when committee people were asked to indicate, from a twelve-item checklist, the five "most important" current incentives for other committee people. The results are reported in Table 35.

Table 35

Committee Persons' Perceptions of the Incentives Currently Most Important to Other Committee People (in percents)

Incentives	Babylon Democrats (n=19)	Babylon Republicans (n=19)	Huntington Democrats (n=16)	Huntington Republicans (n=19)
Material				
Personal position	68	63	63	68
Business contacts	0	63	56	58
Solidary				
Social contacts	58	0	0	42
Status	58	47	81	89
Party loyalty	53	47	69	0
Purposive				
Government policy	0	53	50	68
Community obligation	0	0	0	0
Way of life	0	63	50	58

Although purposive and/or solidary incentives were perceived by significant numbers of committee people to be important to other lower strata activists, the data also revealed a striking increase in the frequency with which material incentives were cited as important to others. Conversely, as noted in Table 30, no more than 33 percent of the committee people in all four parties indicated that material incentives were "the most important" reason for their own activism. Similarly, when asked to rank the importance of personal-material incentives to their own current activism, the committee people responded as reported in Table 36.

Table 36

Material Incentives Ranked as "Very Important" for Committee Persons' Current Activism (in percents)

Incentives	Babylon Democrats (n=19)	Babylon Republicans (n=19)	Huntington Democrats (n=16)	Huntington Republicans (n=17)
Personal position	42	16	13	18
Business contacts	16	21	0	12

Thus, there was considerable incongruity between the perceptions committee people had of their own and of other committee persons' material incentives. While personal-material incentives were not ranked as very important to their own goals by more than a small minority in all but the Babylon Democratic Party, they were ranked as very important

by 56-68 percent of committee people in all four parties to the incentive structures of other committee people. These perceptions - or misperceptions - might help explain why, in Chapter Six, it was noted that many activists viewed themselves as relatively free in decision making while they viewed other committee people to be constrained by the desire for patronage. Once again, the perceptions of a strong personal-material reward system, particularly patronage, permeating the parties may have been much greater than justified by the realities of that system.

Summary and Discussion

Activists in the Babylon-Huntington parties revealed a diverse incentive structure both currently and at the time of their initial entry into politics. Personal solidary and impersonal purposive incentives were rated as important initial and current goals by the largest number of activists in all four parties. Personal material incentives did not figure prominently in the initial or current incentive structures of more than a small minority of activists.

Although party elites manifested minimal incentive reorientations over time, a significant number of committee people were reoriented from personal to purposive incentive goals over time. However, when activists' satisfactions and attitudinal changes were evaluated, the data reveal a significant resocialization toward professional norms. Thus many of these middle-class activists retained or adopted purposive incentive goals as the major rationale to explain their

participation in local politics. Simultaneously, however, as was discussed in Chapters Four-Six, they adapted to the electoral-organizational norms of their professional party elites and organizations which provided them with few opportunities to actualize their purposive goals.

The dichotomous treatment of activists as either amateur or professional in their attitudes and behavior, found in much of the literature, was not supported in this study. Rather than slipping from an amateur to a professional style over time, the data reveal many activists who retained or adopted amateur incentive goals over time while they adapted to professional norms. The degree to which these "professional idealists" were differentiated in their attitudes and political styles is detailed in Chapter Eight.

Solidary social satisfactions, particularly the fun and excitement of electoral politics and the social contacts, emerged as the primary satisfactions for the largest number of activists. Material satisfactions, like material incentive goals, on the other hand, were cited as important by few activists. The Babylon-Huntington activists thus supported Eldersveld's conclusion:

> A party is a social group, and the personal motivational relationship is basically the same, apparently, as in other social groups. Social friendships, rewards and other personally instrumental satisfactions were most salient in the minds of the ... activist.... Party work was "voluntarist" since there were few real patronage jobs to dispense. The vast majority ... sought some personalized satisfaction - whether good fellowship, excitement, social recognition, prestige, money or friendship. In a

broader sense, this is the "patronage" they expected.[14]

In these party organizations where a large majority of activists maintained purposive incentive goals while adapting to professional, electoral-organizational norms, how important were the personal material resources which they perceived to be the mainstay of the party's reward system? As noted in Chapter Six, two thirds or more of the activists had sought part or full-time patronage positions for themselves or others. Yet, only 16-31 percent indicated or were willing to admit that they had received a patronage reward for themselves. In addition, only about one fourth or less indicated full-time patronage as the chief source of their incomes. Conversely, 40-60 percent of the activists held non-patronage, white collar professional positions in the private sector.

Thus, the data suggest Sorauf's conclusion - that the "patronage positions available are ... generally unappealing" to middle class activists.[15] Unlike their immigrant counterparts in the urban machines, the majority of middle-class suburban activists did not require nor desire full-time patronage as an occupational career choice. However, as noted in Chapter Six, many middle-class activists did view patronage as an important party perquisite. This seemed particularly true regarding part-time and summer patronage positions. If political patronage was not a major career goal or party incentive for suburban activists, it appeared to be either an important income supplement and/or

a desired reward for party service to many activists.

A considerable degree of perceptual confusion emerged from these data. For example, most activists indicated the social aspects of their party work to be the most important satisfactions they derived from their activism. In addition, while most activists rated solidary social or purposive goals as the incentives most important to themselves, they perceived personal material incentive goals as very important to others.

Also, although few activists needed or desired political patronage on a full-time, career basis, patronage was viewed as the primary resource used by elites to reward and punish other committee people. As noted in Chapter Six, many activists were able to cite cases in which one or more committee people were perceived to have been awarded or denied patronage because of their party service or leadership loyalty. Also, as noted in Chapter Five, the desire for or fear of patronage rewards or punishments were perceived as the chief reason why other activists did not demand or seek greater decision-making influence within their party organizations. Yet, the overwhelming majority of activists perceived themselves to be free of such constraints.

The intra-party system for administering patronage, as noted in Chapters Three and Six, evidenced signs of disorganization and arbitrariness, despite the few salient examples cited in each party of committee people having been rewarded

or punished with patronage. Nevertheless, activists' commitment to the legitimacy of patronage as an important reward for party activism along with their widespread belief that patronage was an important, desirable party perquisite, solidified patronage as the most important perceived resource in the parties' reward structure. Yet, although many activists had sought patronage for themselves or others, few required it as a main source of income and fewer actually received a patronage reward or punishment.

Hence, committee people may have ascribed greater importance to the parties' material reward system than the realities of that system justified. Although patronage was perceived as the mainstay of the elites' reward structure, the data were ambiguous regarding the degree to which committee people were personally touched by the material rewards allegedly distributed or withheld by elites. This ambiguity may have been caused by the general misperception committee people had of other activists' desires to obtain patronage and/or the disorganized system for administering patronage rewards and punishments within the parties and/or the unavailablity of enough part or full-time patronage positions to meet committee persons' demands.

Whatever the reasons for the confused patronage picture that many activists had of their party organizations, the data confirmed the fact that it was the fun, excitement and social contacts of party work - not the material rewards - that were the most important satisfactions sustaining the

largest number of activists. In addition, many activists, despite their acceptance of professional norms, maintained a belief in impersonal-purposive ideals as the chief rationale for their party activism. Chapter Eight will probe the degree to which this latter group of "professional idealists" exhibited distinctive attitudes and behavior patterns.

These data do not, therefore, support that portion of Hypothesis 2 which postulated that the elites' distribution of personal resources causes most lower strata activists to adopt a professional-personal rather than an amateur-purposive incentive goal structure. Activists did not adopt either a professional or an amateur incentive goal structure. Rather, most activists blended both amateur and professional incentive goals, satisfactions and behavioral norms. Also, the data do not support the relationship, assumed in the Hypothesis, between elites' distribution of material resources and either the incentive goals or satisfactions of most activists. The desire for patronage or some other personal material reward was not an important goal or satisfaction for any but a small minority of activists.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FOOTNOTES

[1]Cf. ante., pp. 7-9.

[2]Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964), p. 134.

[3]Glen Browder and Dennis Ippolito, "The Suburban Party Activist: The Case of Southern Amateurs", Social Science Quarterly, 53(June, 1972): 171.

[4]M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, "Motivation, Incentive Systems and the Political Party Organization", American Political Science Review, 62(December, 1968):1164.

[5]Dennis Ippolito, "Political Perspectives of Suburban Party Leaders", Social Science Quarterly, 49 (March, 1969): 808.

[6]Peter Gluck, "Research Note: Incentives and the Maintenance of Political Styles in Different Locales", Western Political Quarterly, 49 (December, 1972):755.

[7]Cf. ante., pp. 7-9.

[8]Gluck, op. cit., p. 760.

[9]Cf. ante., pp. 7-9.

[10]Dennis Ippolito, "Motivational Reorientation and Change Among Party Activists", Journal of Politics, 31 (November, 1969):1099.

[11]Cf. ante., pp. 13-14.

[12]John W. Soule and James Clark, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention", American Political Science Review, 64 (September, 1970):893.

[13]Cf. ante., pp. 7-9.

[14]Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 303.

[15]Frank J. Sorauf, "The Silent Revolution in Patronage", Public Administration Quarterly, 20(Winter, 1960):30-32.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE "PROFESSIONAL IDEALISTS"

When Wilson's three criteria of the amateur political style - an issue orientation, intra-party democracy and a non-material incentive system - were applied to the Babylon-Huntington parties, the activists and their organizations evidenced numerous professional attributes. However, the data on the activists' incentive systems, particularly their attitudes and behavior regarding material rewards, are ambiguous.

Many activists, as noted in Chapter Seven, retained or adopted over time purposive incentive goals to explain why they remained active in local politics. Simultaneously, however, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, the overwhelming majority of activists adopted professional electoral and organizational norms. Patronage, for example, was viewed as a legitimate and important party resource for motivating activists, even though few activists perceived themselves as ever having been personally rewarded or punished with patronage.

An incentive portrait emerged from the data which revealed a significant number of activists who: (1) believed in purposive incentive goals yet accepted the legitimacy of

material rewards; (2) perceived material rewards to be important incentive goals for others, but not themselves; (3) consequently perceived other committee people, but not themselves, to be inhibited from seeking greater influence by their desire for material rewards; (4) perceived social benefits as the major satisfactions derived from their own party activism. As noted earlier, there was considerable incongruity between activists' perceptions of their own and other activists' incentive goals and between their perceptions of the pervasiveness and importance of material rewards and the actual distribution of these rewards among party workers.

The coexistence of purposive incentives, personal satisfactions and professional norms challenged the validity of the dichotomous, amateur-professional incentive model found in much of the literature. The data indicate that many local party activists could retain purposive ideals or goals to justify their activism while they adopted, or adapted to, professional norms of political behavior. The question remained, however, as to whether those activists - the "professional idealists" - who indicated purposive goals to be the most important reason for their maintaining activism were differentiated in attitudes, perceptions and behavior from those who cited personal goals to explain their current activism.

This chapter probes the degree to which the political style of these "professional idealists" was affected by and

related to their purposive incentive goals within what clearly were professional party organizations. In so doing, it further explores that portion of Hypothesis 2 which postulated that the elites' distribution of personal material resources causes most elites to: (a) maintain their participation in the local political organization, and (b) adopt a professional-personal rather than amateur-purposive goal structure. This chapter also analyzes Hypothesis 3 which postulated that in the distribution of personal material rewards, elites tend to favor party loyalists who share the professional values of the elites.

Social Variables

Numerous studies of amateur and professional activists and organizations identified middle-class values and status as important variables affecting incentive orientations and political styles.[1] Gluck, for example, noted that amateur activists "are largely unconcerned with the kinds of incentives which appeal to the professional ... in lart part [because] ... amateurs tend to rank higher than professionals on such socioeconomic attributes as education, occupational status and income."[2] Similarly, Conway and Feigert concluded "that the affluent community is more likely in both socio-economic characteristics and initial motivational patterns to approximate the amateur model" although they observed considerable reorientation toward the professional model by these activists over time.[3]

Hofstetter identified a six variable model to explain membership in amateur and professional organizations that included ideology, procedural and issue participation role perceptions, social integration, age, and socioeconomic status. Regarding age and affluence, he concluded:

> Relatively high levels of social integration in the community and low levels of affluence lead to more professionally oriented role perceptions. Older age leads to an increasingly professional set of procedural role perceptions....Social variables play an extremely important role in explaining organizational membership.[4]

Hitlin and Jackson's study of delegates to the 1974 Mid-Term Democratic Conference concluded:

> The clearest demographic relationship is with age. The conventional stereotype of the youthful reform-oriented activist of the past few years is supported by the data. Almost two thirds of the professionals are over 40. A consistent association with education also exists, although the relationship ... is slightly weaker than it is with age. Professionals are more likely to have a high school education or less ... and amateurs are more likely to be college graduates or holders of advanced degrees.[5]

Thus, a number of studies corroborated Wilson's observation that amateurs tend to be "young, well-educated, professional people....In style of life, they are distinctly middle and upper middle class."[6] Soule and Clark, on the other hand, noted that no positive relationship between amateurism and level of education was found among the delegates to the 1968 Democratic Convention whom they studied. They further observed:

> When income level was cross tabulated with amateurism, we found 52 percent of the amateurs earn more than $20,000 per year compared to

> 33 percent of the semiprofessionals and 38 percent of the professionals. The overall correlation indicated that amateurs tended to have higher annual incomes but that the relationship was very weak and insignificant.[7]

The correlation of income with political style was also weak in Eldersveld's study:

> The ideologically motivated leaders came from different social sectors for both parties. For the Democrats the highest percentages were found among the lower income brackets and the college educated, but they were only one fifth in each demographic category. The Republicans with ideological motivation were distributed in a less discernible pattern of regularities.[8]

To what extent did those Babylon-Huntington "professional idealists" - i.e., those who cited a current purposive incentive orientation - exhibit the youthful, affluent, well-educated attributes observed among the amateur-oriented activists by Wilson and others? The data are reported in Table 37.

Table 37

Age, Income and Education of Activists by Current Incentive Orientation (in percents)

Socioeconomic Attributes	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=10)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=15)	Babylon Republicans Pers'l. (n=8)	Babylon Republicans Purpos. (n=14)	Huntington Democrats Pers'l. (n=12)	Huntington Democrats Purpos (n=12)	Huntington Republicans Pers'l. (n=8)	Huntington Republicans Purpos. (n=17)
Age								
Under 30	50(5)	13(2)	0	7(1)	8(1)	8(1)	0	6(1)
31-49	40(4)	47(7)	50(4)	36(5)	50(6)	42(5)	50(4)	35(6)
Over 50	10(1)	40(6)	50(4)	57(8)	42(5)	50(6)	50(4)	59(10)
Income								
Under $15,000	30(3)	27(4)	13(1)	14(2)	0	0	0	6(1)
$15,000-24,999	50(5)	33(5)	50(4)	50(7)	25(3)	33(4)	13(1)	18(3)
Over $25,000	20(2)	40(6)	38(3)	36(5)	75(9)	66(8)	87(7)	76(13)
Education								
High school or less	30(3)	13(2)	25(2)	36(5)	8(1)	8(1)	0	0
Some college	10(1)	40(6)	25(2)	29(4)	8(1)	17(2)	25(2)	29(5)
College degree	30(3)	27(4)	25(2)	14(2)	25(3)	25(3)	25(2)	41(7)
Graduate degree	30(3)	20(3)	25(2)	21(3)	58(7)	50(6)	50(4)	29(5)

When current purposive incentives were used to define the amateur style, activists with this incentive orientation were not differentiated by age, income or education from those who professed a current personal incentive orientation. Among Babylon Democrats, a greater percentage of youthful activists had personal incentive orientations and, among Babylon Republicans, a greater percentage of the less educated activists had a purposive orientation; both groups reversed the conventional view of the relationship between age, education and incentive orientation. Similarly, Babylon activists earning less than $20,000 evidenced a

greater purposive orientation than Huntington activists in this category. In all other cases, age, income and education did not significantly differentiate activists with current personal and purposive incentives.

When two measures of an amateur orientation were utilized - current purposive incentive goals along with purposive satisfactions derived from party work - amateur activists were again not differentiated from other activists by age, income and education. Only nine subjects (9 percent of the total sample) evidenced both purposive incentives and satisfactions. Of these, 6 were over 50 years old, 5 earned over $25,000 and 7 had a college or graduate degree. Except for a slightly greater tendency to be over 50 years old and to earn in excess of $25,000, this group did not differ significantly from the purposive or personal oriented activists reported in Table 37.

The datas' failure to correlate youth, middle-class income and educational status with an amateur orientation corresponds to the absence of clear patterns in the literature. If, in certain locales, these variables differentiated activists with amateur and professional incentive orientations, they did not do so in Babylon-Huntington. Here, generally affluent, well-educated, non-youthful activists exhibited both amateur and professional characteristics without any discernible pattern of regularity. Although there was a somewhat greater tendency for the more affluent Huntington activists, as noted in Chapter Seven, to exhibit an initial

purposive incentive orientation[9], this tendency did not persist over time. In the final analysis, the more amateur-purposive oriented Babylon-Huntington activists, like those found in studies by Soule and Clark and Eldersveld, could not be distinguished by socioeconomic variables from activists who had more professional-personal incentive orientations.

Activists' Satisfactions

If the "professional idealists" - activists with current-purposive goals who also ascribed to professional norms - were not a distinct demographic group, they did exhibit a number of subtle attitudinal patterns that differentiated them from activists with current-personal incentive goals. This was particularly evident regarding the satisfactions they obtained from party work and their attitudes toward local party politics.

As noted above, only nine activists cited both current purposive incentives and satisfactions obtained from their party work. Almost all activists, on the other hand, cited solidary satisfactions in describing what they would miss most if they quit politics. The data in Table 38 compare the satisfactions of activists with current purposive and personal incentive orientations.

Table 38

Satisfactions Obtained from Party Work by Activists' Current Incentive Orientation (in percents)

Satisfactions	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=9)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=15)	Babylon Republicans Pers'l. (n=6)	Babylon Republicans Purpos. (n=14)	Huntington Democrats Pers'l. (n=12)	Huntington Democrats Purpos. (n=11)	Huntington Republicans Pers'l. (n=8)	Huntington Republicans Purpos. (n=16)
Material								
Chance to run for office	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6(1)
Solidary Status								
Being close to important people	11(1)	7(1)	33(2)	14(2)	58(7)	18(2)	25(2)	19(3)
Recognition	22(2)	7(1)	17(1)	0	0	9(1)	0	6(1)
Sub total	33	14	50	14	58	27	25	25
Solidary Social								
Excitement-fun	33(3)	33(5)	17(1)	36(5)	0	18(2)	13(1)	6(1)
Social contacts	22(2)	33(5)	33(2)	21(3)	33(4)	18(2)	50(4)	50(8)
Sub total	55	66	50	57	33	36	63	56
Purposive								
Community obligation, gov't. policy	11(1)	13(2)	0	14(2)	8(1)	36(4)	0	6(1)
None	0	7(1)	0	14(2)	0	0	13(1)	6(1)

In all but the Huntington Republican Party, activists with current personal incentive goals cited solidary-status satisfactions with greater frequency than did activists with current purposive incentive goals. The latter group - the "professional idealists" - on the other hand, cited solidary-social or purposive satisfactions more frequently. Thus, the "professional idealists" in three of the parties derived social or purposive satisfactions from their party work to a

greater degree than their personal-oriented counterparts who were more satisfied by the opportunities for ego-satisfying status and recognition provided by their activism.

Activists' attitudinal changes regarding local politics were also differentiated by their current incentive goal orientation, as reported in Table 39.

Table 39

Changes in Attitudes about Local Politics by Activists' Current Incentive Orientation (in percents)

Attitudinal Changes	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=10)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=12)	Babylon Republicans Pers'l. (n=7)	Babylon Republicans Purpos. (n=14)	Huntington Democrats Pers'l. (n=12)	Huntington Democrats Purpos. (n=12)	Huntington Republicans Pers'l. (n=8)	Huntington Republicans Purpos. (n=17)
Professional Responses								
Negative Changes (Greater cynicism)	20(2)	58(7)	14(1)	43(6)	25(4)	8(1)	75(6)	41(7)
Positive Changes (Greater understanding of power	60(6)	16(2)	57(4)	35(5)	42(3)	84(10)	13(2)	29(5)
Purposive Responses	0	25(3)	14(1)	14(2)	8(1)	8(1)	0	6(1)
No Change	20(2)	0	14(1)	7(1)	25(4)	0	13(2)	24(4)

When attitudinal changes were grouped in terms of negative and positive professional responses, those activists with current purposive incentive goals in the Babylon parties cited negative changes significantly more than did activists with current personal incentive goals. Conversely, the

latter group cited positive responses more frequently, particularly regarding their increased understanding of intra-party power relationships, than did the "professional idealists". Activists in all four parties with current purposive incentives also cited purposive attitudinal changes with the same or greater frequency than did those with current personal incentives while the latter group had more activists who experienced no attitudinal changes.

In the Babylon parties, the "professional idealists" thus experienced either more negative attitudinal changes or more purposive changes than did activists with personal incentives. In the Huntington Republican Party, on the other hand, the largest number of activists with either personal or purposive incentives experienced no attitudinal changes or negative attitudinal reorientations. Thus, among the Babylon Democrats and Huntington Republicans, with their internecine conflicts and leadership alientation, and the Babylon Republicans with their more structured reward system and greater demands for internal cohesion and leadership loyalty there was more of a tendency for activists, particularly the "professional idealists", to have undergone negative attitudinal changes. Huntington Democrats, particularly the "professional idealists", on the other hand, with their more open organizational structures and somewhat untested "amateur" town leader, were more likely to have experienced positive attitudinal changes.

Thus, the data suggest that leadership style and the nature of intra-party politics and power relationships had a significant impact on activists' attitudinal changes toward politics with the "professional idealists" somewhat more likely to have experienced negative or purposive reorientations in the parties with the greatest internal dissention or intra-party discipline. Particularly in Babylon, the "professional idealists" appeared to be more uncomfortable with the norms of their professional party organizations. Conversely, in the Huntington Democratic Party, with an amateur-oriented town leader in power, the "professional idealists" generally experienced positive attitudinal changes regarding intra-party power and politics.

Levels of Activism

The "professional idealists" were thus differentiated by the greater frequency with which they cited social or purposive rather than status satisfactions obtained from party work and, to a lesser extent, by their tendency to feel negative about party politics in those organizations that were more disciplined and/or internally polarized. Did these attitudes and perceptions affect the nature of their party activism? Table 40 reports activists' plans for future party work and their desire for upward mobility within the party organizations.

Table 40

Activists' Plans for Future Party Work and Upward Mobility by Current Incentive Orientation

(in percents)

Future Activism	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=9)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=15)	Babylon Republicans Pers'l. (n=7)	Babylon Republicans Purpos (n=14)	Huntington Democrats Pers'l. (n=12)	Huntington Democrats Purpos (n=11)	Huntington Republicans Pers'l. (n=8)	Huntington Republicans Purpos. (n=17)
More active	66(6)	40(6)	57(4)	14(2)	42(5)	27(3)	13(1)	18(3)
Same	22(2)	46(7)	14(1)	71(10)	58(7)	73(8)	25(2)	35(6)
Less active	11(1)	13(2)	29(2)	14(2)	0	0	63(5)	47(8)
Upward Mobility	(n=8)	(n=15)	(n=7)	(n=14)	(n=12)	(n=11)	(n=8)	(n=17)
Accept more responsible position	75(6)	73(11)	57(4)	36(5)	58(7)	73(8)	38(3)	59(9)
Refuse more responsible position	25(2)	26(4)	42(3)	64(9)	42(5)	27(3)	63(5)	41(7)

Activists with current personal incentive goals were significantly more inclined to increase their activism than were the "professional idealists" in all but the Huntington Republican Party where they were more inclined to be less active. On the other hand, 85 percent or more of the "professional idealists" in all but the Huntington Republican Party indicated that they would be as active or more active in the future. These data thus suggest that the activists with current purposive incentive goals, although somewhat more negative in their attitudes about local politics, would, nevertheless, maintain their activism.

When asked if they would accept a more responsible party position, the "professional idealists" did not differ

significantly in their responses from those activists with current personal incentive goals; 59-73 percent of the "professional idealists" in the Babylon Democratic and Huntington Democratic and Republican Parties indicated their willingness to accept intra-party upward mobility. Only the Babylon Republican Party had a significant number of activists with current purposive incentive goals who would not accept a more responsible party position; 88 percent of this group indicated lack of time or ill health - not political factors - as the reasons why they would not do so. Thus the "professional idealists" again did not evidence significant alienation from their party organizations.

The tendency toward acceptance of and adaptation to their party elites' professional norms was further evidenced by the fact that the "professional idealist" committee people did not differ from other committee people regarding their dissatisfaction with elite goals. Like committee people with current personal incentive goals, the "professional idealists" most often ranked issues, campaign assistance, intra-party factionalism and conflict resolution as the goals that elites were not, but should be stressing, although the former incentive group evidenced a slightly greater concern with the elites not stressing rewards for party workers. Neither were the "professional idealists" differentiated by the roles they perceived as expected of them by elites in that the overwhelming majority of committee people in both incentive groups most frequently cited

campaign work and leadership loyalty as their expected roles.

The "professional idealists" as a group were thus not alienated from party elites or party activism. This behavior pattern was further evidenced by the data in Table 41 which is based on committee persons' perceptions of the nature and frequency of their contact with elites.

Table 41

Frequency and Nature of Committee Persons' Contacts with Elites by Current Incentive Orientation (in percents)

Frequency of Contact	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=6)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=13)	Babylon Republicans Pers'l. (n=4)	Babylon Republicans Purpos. (n=14)	Huntington Democrats Pers'l. (n=7)	Huntington Democrats Purpos. (n=9)	Huntington Republicans Pers'l. (n=6)	Huntington Republicans Purpos. (n=13)
Often	33(2)	31(4)	25(1)	71(10)	57(4)	77(7)	33(2)	38(5)
Frequently	50(3)	8(1)	75(3)	14(2)	0	23(2)	0	31(4)
Rarely	17(1)	38(5)	0	7(1)	0	0	50(3)	23(3)
Never	0	23(3)	0	7(1)	43(3)	0	17(1)	8(1)
Nature of Contact (If "often"/ frequently")	(n=5)	(n=5)	(n=4)	(n=12)	(n=4)	(n=9)	(n=2)	(n=9)
Fundraising	0	20(1)	0	8(1)	25(1)	44(4)	0	55(5)
Nominations	20(1)	0	25(1)	42(5)	50(2)	33(3)	50(1)	44(4)
Campaigning	40(2)	40(2)	25(1)	58(7)	25(1)	77(7)	50(1)	22(2)
Patronage	80(4)	20(1)	50(2)	83(10)	50(2)	66(6)	100(2)	33(3)
Community problems	0	63(3)	50(2)	25(3)	0	11(1)	0	11(1)
Issues	0	20(1)	0	0	0	11(1)	0	33(3)

As with attitudinal changes and intra-party mobility, committee persons' contact with party elites was more a function of organizational leadership styles and intra-party

politics than it was a derivative of current incentive orientation. The lower strata "professional idealists" in the majority parties indicated as much or greater elite contact as did those committee people with personal incentive orientations. Conversely, in the faction-ridden minority parties, a larger number of both personal and purposive-oriented committee people indicated less elite contact. Nevertheless, in three of the four parties, from 69-100 percent of the "professional idealists" indicated that they contacted their party elites "often" or "frequently"; the divided Babylon Democrats had the least frequency of contact with only 39 percent indicating "often" or "frequent" elite contact.

The nature of committee persons'-elites' contact was also determined more by intra-party conditions than activists' incentives. Although the "professional idealists" cited purposive subjects as part of their elite contacts somewhat more frequently than did committee people with personal incentive goals, no other contact patterns differentiated the two incentive groups. Inexplicably, the "professional idealist" committee people in the majority parties cited campaigning and patronage as part of their elite contacts with greater frequency than did the personal oriented incentive group. The data thus suggest that lower strata "professional idealists" generally maintained similar patterns of party activism as did personal oriented committee people.

Roles and Rewards

Committee people with current purposive and current personal incentive goals were not differentiated in terms of their perceived role expectations; both groups most frequently cited campaigning and leadership loyalty as the tasks expected of them by elites. The data in Table 42 reports their responses to an open-ended question which asked activists to describe how they fulfilled their party roles.

Table 42

Activists' Party Activities by Current Incentive Orientation (in percents)

Activities	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=10)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=15)	Babylon Republicans Pers'l. (n=8)	Babylon Republicans Purpos. (n=14)	Huntington Democrats Pers'l. (n=13)	Huntington Democrats Purpos. (n=12)	Huntington Republicans Pers'l. (n=8)	Huntington Republicans Purpos. (n=17)
Status Activities								
Executive Board	70(7)	40(6)	50(4)	0	46(6)	25(3)	50(4)	29(5)
Candidate	40(4)	47(7)	0	7(1)	31(4)	8(1)	13(1)	0
Convention delegate	30(3)	20(3)	0	36(5)	0	0	50(4)	6(1)
Electoral Activities								
Campaigning	100(10)	87(13)	100(8)	100(14)	100(13)	100(12)	75(6)	88(15)
Fundraising	60(6)	60(9)	100(8)	64(9)	92(12)	67(8)	88(7)	76(13)
Constituent Services	30(3)	20(3)	25(2)	50(7)	31(4)	17(2)	25(2)	24(4)
Political Clubs								
Member	50(5)	67(10)	75(6)	79(11)	85(11)	75(9)	63(5)	82(14)
Officer	20(2)	60(9)	25(2)	36(5)	62(8)	33(4)	50(4)	53(9)

The "professional idealists" were as likely as those activists with current personal incentive goals to cite campaign-related activities. However, significantly fewer "professional idealists" cited membership on the party's executive board and, except for the Babylon Democrats, fund-raising activities. The near-equal propensity of both incentive groups to cite fundraising and candidacy for public office in the Babylon Democratic Party was probably due to the fact that, as noted in Chapter Three, both regulars and insurgents financed and conducted frequent primary and general election campaigns with separate fund-raisers. No other distinctive activity pattern could be generalized for either incentive group, although the "professional idealists" were somewhat less likely to be convention delegates (an honorific perquisite) in the minority parties.

Activists with current purposive goals generally cited constituent services and political club membership with as much or greater frequency as did activists with current personal goals; inexplicably, the Huntington Democratic Party was the exception to this pattern. Thus, the "professional idealists" were as likely as their personal oriented counterparts to engage in continuous party activism.

The data in Chapter Seven reveal that very few activists exhibited either a material incentive goal structure or material satisfaction pattern. In addition, the data in Chapters Five and Six indicate that material rewards and sanctions appeared to affect the behavior of only a minority

of activists. In addition, the data reported above show that activists with personal and purposive incentive goals were as likely to maintain their activism. Consequently, that portion of Hypothesis 2 which postulated that the elites' distribution of personal resources would cause most activists to maintain their participation in the local party is not supported. Given the importance of solidary social satisfactions to most of these activists, one may conclude with Conway and Feigert that the social benefits of party work are a powerful force in sustaining membership in the organization.[10]

The data did reveal one differentiation: activists with current personal incentive orientations were significantly more likely to have attained an elite position in the party hierarchy. As noted in Table 38 above, this group also cited solidary status satisfactions rather than solidary social satisfactions obtained from their party work with greater frequency than did the "professional idealists". These data thus suggest that the activists with personal incentive goals were more oriented toward the power-status satisfactions provided by their professional party organizations than were the "professional idealists" who, although maintaining their activism, were more inclined toward the social or purposive benefits derived from party work.

The data in Table 43 further corroborate the more professional orientation of those activists with current personal incentive goals.

Table 43

Activists' Participation in Patronage
by Current Incentive Orientation
(in percents)

Participation	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=10)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=15)	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=8)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=14)	Huntington Democrats Pers'l. (n=13)	Huntington Democrats Purpos. (n=12)	Huntington Republicans Pers'l. (n=8)	Huntington Republicans Purpos. (n=17)
Sought Patronage	100(10)	80(12)	100(8)	93(13)	69(9)	83(10)	63(5)	71(12)
Holds Patronage (part or full time)	50(5)	20(3)	38(3)	47(6)	46(6)	17(2)	50(4)	24(4)

Thus, 71 percent or more of the "professional idealists" in all four parties had sought a patronage position for themselves or someone else. Except in the Babylon Republican Party, however, significantly fewer of this group actually held a patronage position as compared to those activists with personal incentive goals. As noted in Chapter Six, patronage clearly was perceived as the most important perquisite used by elites to reward committee people for loyalty and party service. Although, as observed in Chapters Six and Seven, the actual administration of this reward system may have been somewhat arbitrary and disorganized, these data clearly indicated, in keeping with Hypothesis 3, that the activists with personal incentive goals were more likely to have received and/or been rewarded with patronage than were the "professional idealists".

The percentage of executive board members who held patronage positions was 38, 80, 45 and 86 percent in the Babylon Democratic, Babylon Republican, Huntington Democratic and Huntington Republican parties respectively - percentages significantly greater than both the activists' estimates of patronage recipients and the patronage sample in each party.[11] Thus, a composite portrait emerged of the party elites as being more professional-personal in their satisfactions, task performance patterns and rewards received than were either committee people in general or the "professional idealists" in particular. These data thus confirm Eldersveld's conclusion that "career status differences may determine one's motivational emphasis, and, further, that generally only certain types of individuals with particular drives will succeed to top party career positions".[12]

Party Decision Making

Activists with current purposive incentive goals were differentiated from activists with current personal incentive goals in their satisfactions obtained from party work, task performance and receipt of party perquisits - particularly patronage. Nevertheless, the "professional idealists" appeared to be active participants in their party organizations and to have adapted to the professional norms of their parties. Whether committee people with current purposive incentive goals were also differentiated by their perceptions of intra-party decision-making influence and freedom is explored next.

Table 44 reports the committee people, by current incentive orientation, who perceived themselves to have "some" or "a great deal" of influence (as opposed to "little or no" influence) in selected decision-making areas.

Table 44

Committee Persons, by Current Incentive Orientation Who Perceived Themselves with "Some-A Great Deal" of Decision-Making Influence

(in percents)

Decision-Making Area	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=6)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=13)	Babylon Republicans Pers'l. (n=4)	Babylon Republicans Purpos. (n=14)	Huntington Democrats Pers'l. (n=7)	Huntington Democrats Purpos. (n=8)	Huntington Republicans Pers'l. (n=6)	Huntington Republicans Purpos. (n=13)
Conduct of campaigns	100(6)	92(12)	75(3)	85(12)	86(6)	100(8)	66(4)	84(11)
Nominations	67(4)	69(9)	25(1)	57(8)	71(5)	88(7)	33(2)	46(6)
Patronage	33(2)	31(4)	50(2)	50(7)	33(2)	12(1)	0	15(2)
Selecting party officials	67(4)	53(7)	50(2)	100(14)	71(5)	75(5)	33(2)	54(7)
Party's issue positions	50(3)	59(8)	25(1)	46(6)	50(4)	88(7)	0	31(4)
Party's internal procedures	84(5)	42(5)	25(1)	46(6)	50(4)	75(5)	17(1)	23(3)

Lower strata activists with current purposive incentive goals in all four parties perceived themselves as having significantly more influence than did committee people with current personal incentive goals in two decision-making areas: nominations and the party's issue positions. In all but the Babylon Democratic Party, the "professional idealists" also perceived themselves to have as much or greater influence in the selection of party officials and the party's internal procedures. Conversely, except for the Huntington Republicans,

committee people with current personal incentives perceived themselves to have much more influence in patronage decisions.

Thus, in two decision-making areas which Wilson considered critical to the amateur activist, nominations and issues, the "professional idealists" perceived themselves to have more influence. In three of the parties, this perceived influence pattern also obtained in another decision-making area considered important to amateurs - the selection of party leaders. On the other hand, the more professionally oriented committee people with current personal incentive goals perceived themselves to have as much or greater influence than did the "professional idealists" in the more critical decision-making area for anyone interested in personal rewards - patronage. As noted in Chapter Five, few activists, regardless of incentive orientation, perceived themselves as having "a great deal" of influence in most decision-making areas.

Perceptions of committee persons' decision-making freedom, by current incentives, are reported in Table 45.

Table 45

Committee Persons, by Current Incentive Orientation, Who Perceived Themselves with "A Great Deal" of Decision-Making Freedom

(in percents)

Decision-Making Area	Babylon Democrats Pers'l. (n=6)	Babylon Democrats Purpos. (n=13)	Babylon Republicans Pers'l. (n=4)	Babylon Republicans Purpos. (n=14)	Huntington Democrats Pers'l. (n=7)	Huntington Democrats Purpos. (n=8)	Huntington Republicans Pers'l. (n=6)	Huntington Republicans Purpos. (n=13)
Conduct of campaigns	83(5)	62(8)	50(2)	71(10)	43(3)	88(7)	50(3)	54(7)
Vote for nominees	67(4)	85(11)	100(4)	71(10)	57(4)	88(7)	83(5)	92(12)
Vote for party leaders	83(5)	62(8)	25(1)	71(10)	66(5)	88(7)	50(3)	85(11)
Vote for area leaders	83(5)	85(11)	75(3)	79(11)	57(4)	88(7)	83(5)	85(11)
Vote for state committee persons	67(4)	85(11)	75(3)	60(8)	57(4)	75(6)	67(4)	77(10)
Vote on issues	67(4)	75(10)	50(2)	60(8)	43(3)	71(6)	67(4)	85(11)
Vote on internal procedures	83(5)	69(9)	25(1)	50(7)	57(4)	67(5)	67(4)	77(10)

As discussed in Chapter Five, the overwhelming majority of committee people in all four parties perceived themselves to have a great deal of freedom in almost all decision-making areas. There were, however, a number of perceptual patterns that differentiated the "professional idealists". In casting their votes for area leaders and the party's issue positions, "professional idealists" in all four parties perceived themselves with as much or significantly more freedom. Except for the Babylon Democrats, significantly more "professional idealists" also perceived themselves as having "a great deal" of freedom when voting

for party leaders and the party's internal procedures. The data yielded no explanation for the fewer number of "professional idealists" in the Babylon Democratic Party who perceived themselves as having a great deal of freedom in these decision-making areas.

These data thus indicate that committee people with current purposive incentive goals generally perceived themselves to have more decision-making freedom than did committee people with current personal incentive goals. Given the status satisfactions of this latter group, their greater propensity to participate in party fundraising and to obtain executive board positions and patronage rewards, one could infer that committee people with personal incentives were more likely to feel constrained by the perquisites allegedly used by party elites to maintain discipline and service.

Conversely, although the "professional idealists", as noted earlier, maintained their activism and participated in the party's reward system, these data suggest that they may have attached less importance to the status and other personal rewards used by elites. As discussed above, the satisfactions which the "professional idealists" derived from their party work generally were social contacts, fun and excitement - not the prestige, status or material rewards which party elites were perceived to distribute in return for loyalty or service. Hence, in certain key decision-making areas, the "professional idealists" perceived themselves to

have greater freedom, i.e., fewer elite constraints, than those activists who sought status or material rewards from their activism.

Summary and Discussion

Activists who justified their current activism with purposive incentive goals emerged as a distinct party subgroup from those who cited personal incentive goals to explain their activism. These "professional idealists" were satisfied by the solidary social benefits derived from party work - the fun, excitement and social contacts - rather than by the status and recognition attendant to party work. They also evidenced greater cynicism and disappointment - particularly in the divided or disciplined parties - when queried about their attitudinal changes toward politics.

Despite their greater propensity to feel negative about politics, the "professional idealists" had adapted to the professional norms of their elites, peers and organizations. As noted in Chapter Six, for example, almost all activists accepted the legitimacy and need for patronage rewards. In addition, the "professional idealists" were not differentiated from other committee people by a greater dissatisfaction with their party leaders' professional goals. Similarly, they were as likely as other activists to define their roles in professional terms, with campaign work and leadership loyalty the two most frequently cited perceived role expectations.

Activists with current personal goals, on the other hand, did evidence a greater desire to be more active in party work. However, most "professional idealists" were willing to continue their activism - at least at their current level - and from 59-73 percent were willing to accept a more responsible party position. In addition, from 69-100 percent revealed that they contacted party elites "frequently" or "often". Thus the data suggest that the "professional idealists" were not alienated from participating in their party organizations and that they were willing to maintain their activism.

The "professional idealists" did evidence some differences from personal oriented activists in terms of their task performance patterns. They were, for example, somewhat less likely to engage in party fundraising activities and to serve on the party's executive board. On the other hand, they were as likely to engage in continuous, inter-election party activities including club membership and providing constituent services. Thus the data do not support the conventional view that amateur-oriented activists will either not sustain their activism or will generally be active only during election campaigns.

"Professional idealists" were also differentiated by perceptions of their participation in party decision making. They were, for example, more likely to see themselves as having greater influence in several decision-making areas

considered important to amateur activists: issues, nominations, the selection of party elites and the party's internal procedures. Conversely, those with personal incentive goals perceived themselves as more influential in patronage decisions. Given the descriptive and perceptual data on the lack of committee persons' overall influence in party decision making reported in Chapters Three and Five, these data suggest that activists' incentive goals tended to encourage selective perception of their influence; purposive or personal incentive goals may have caused activists to perceive influence in purposive or personal decision-making areas that was not justified by the realities of the party's decision-making processes.

Similarly, the "professional idealists" evidenced perceptions of decision-making freedom - again in such amateur-related areas as issues and leadership selection - that were greater than other committee people. Here, the data suggest an explanation related, at least in part, to the party's reward system and power structure. Although the "professional idealists" were as likely to have sought a patronage position for themselves or someone else, as were activists with current personal incentive goals, they were significantly less likely to have received patronage for themselves. Similarly, the "professional idealists" were much less likely to have served on the party's executive board. Thus, the "professional idealists", sustained by the

social benefits of party activism rather than a desire for status or material rewards, appeared less likely to feel inhibited by perceptions - or misperceptions - of a party elite that rewarded and punished committee people with status and material resources.

The Babylon and Huntington parties thus revealed two distinct incentive groups - the "professional idealists" who justified their current activism in terms of purposive incentive goals and those activists who cited personal incentives to explain their current activism. Applying Hofstetter's procedural dimension to the amateur-professional role definitions - "norms about party procedures - accountability to the organization, nomination of candidates, patronage and discipline"[13] - the two incentive groups were quite similar. Both groups were committed to the professional, electoral-organizational goals of the elites, defined and performed their roles in professional terms and recognized the legitimacy and need for patronage rewards to maintain party discipline.

The "professional idealists" were, however, differentiated procedurally in that they had undergone more negative attitudinal changes regarding these norms. In addition, they cited, with greater frequency, social-purposive rather than status-material satisfactions obtained from their party work and had personally not received material rewards to the same degree as those activists with current personal incentive goals. Similarly, when Hofstetter's issue-participation role dimension was applied to activists - "norms about commitment

to issues, discussion of issues, participation, the role of the formal party organization in nominations"[14] - the "professional idealists" evidenced a greater sensitivity to issues and greater perceptions of their own decision-making influence and freedom in these amateur, "issue-participation" topics.

Again, the data do not support the assumed correlation in Hypothesis 2 between the elites' distribution of personal material resources and the adoption of a professional-personal goal structure or maintenance of participation by most activists. The incentive goals, satisfactions, participation and intra-party behavior of most activists were not affected, in any significant manner, by either their desire for, or the elites' distribution of, personal material resources. The largest incentive sub-group, the "professional idealists", were indeed resocialized toward professional norms. Yet, they retained amateur values and, to some degree, behavioral patterns which caused them to appear simultaneously committed to, yet removed from, the personal material resources which they perceived as sustaining their professional party organizations. In the final analysis, their participation in the local parties was sustained primarily by solidary social satisfactions - the fun, excitement and social contacts derived from their party work.

Conversely, the data do suggest Hypothesis 3 which postulated that elites, in their distribution of personal

material resources, tend to favor party loyalists who share their professional values. Activists with personal incentive goals were more likely to be satisfied by the status and recognition they obtained from their party work. This minority of activists was also more likely to engage in fundraising, perceive themselves to have less decision-making freedom, receive patronage and, ultimately, attain a position on the party's executive board. Consequently, the data indicate that some, but not most, activists appeared predisposed to the receipt of, and constrained by the desire for, personal material resources. The practical and theoretical implications of these phenomena are discussed in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FOOTNOTES

[1]Cf. ante, pp. 10-15 20-32.

[2]Peter R. Gluck, "Research Note: Incentives and the Maintenance of Policial Styles in Different Locales", Western Political Quarterly, 25 (December, 1972): 754.

[3]M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, "Motivation, Incentive Systems and the Political Party Organization", American Political Science Review, 62 (December, 1971): 1171.

[4]C. Richard Hofstetter, "Organizational Activists: The Bases of Participation in Amateur and Professional Groups", American Politics Quarterly, 6 (April, 1973): 273.

[5]Robert A. Hitlin, John S. Jackson, "On Amateur and Professional Politicians", Journal of Politics, 39(August, 1977): 788-789.

[6]James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) p. 13.

[7]John W. Soule and James W. Clark, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention", American Political Science Review, 64 (September, 1970): 891.

[8]Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964), p. 295.

[9]Cf. ante., p. 168.

[10]M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, "Incentives and Task Performance Among Party Precinct Workers", Western Political Quarterly, 27 (December, 1974): 709.

[11]Cf. ante. p. 49.

[12]Eldersveld, op. cit., p.286.

[13]C. Richard Hofstetter, "The Amateur Politician: A Problem in Construct Validation", Midwest Journal of Political Science, 31 (February, 1971): 41.

[14]Ibid.

CHAPTER NINE

INCENTIVES AND PARTY ACTIVISM: A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE

Incentives, Satisfactions and Rewards

This study of the attitudes and organizational behavior of middle-class, suburban party activists revealed a complex motivational portrait. The central goal of the research was to demonstrate that the personal material resources (nominations, patronage and campaign assistance) distributed by local party elites contributed to the persistence of the professional model in these party organizations. Assuming the predominance of a professional goal structure - with personal material incentives having a powerful influence on the behavior of activists - this study postulated that elites used material rewards and punishments to achieve their professional goals.

Specifically, these hypotheses were tested:

1. Party elites maintain a professional goal structure which includes:
    a. Electoral success.
    b. Sustaining the power position of party leaders.
    c. Maintaining intra-party discipline.
    d. Satisfying the demands of factions and sub-groups. Consequently, within these party

organizations amateur-purposive goals such as issue formation and full participation in intra-party decision making and public policy formulation are secondary to the elites' professional goals.

2. Elites systematically distribute or withhold personal material resources (defined as nominations, patronage and campaign assistance) in a manner which causes most lower strata activists (committee people) to:
   a. Maintain their participation in the local party organization.
   b. Adopt a professional-personal rather than an amateur-purposive incentive goal structure.
   c. Define their party roles and perform their tasks (voting with elites on major intra-party questions and engaging in electoral-organizational maintenance activities) thus enabling elites to attain their professional goals.
3. The distribution of personal material rewards by party elites tends to favor party loyalists who share the professional values of the elites.
4. Both the top echelon elites and lower strata activists generally perceive the distribution of personal material resources to reward and punish lower strata activists' behavior as a legitimate

exercise of party power.

The data in this study indicate that the elites' distribution of personal resources does not always determine, affect or change the incentive orientation, participation or intra-party behavior of middle-class, suburban activists.

Activists' incentive orientations, over time, were found to be multiple rather than the "pure" amateur-professional dichotomy found in much of the literature. The data reveal, for example, that an average of 66 percent of lower strata activists in all four parties cited purposive goals as their most important sustaining incentives as compared with an average of 51 percent who cited such goals to explain their initial entry into politics. This amateur-purposive goal reorientation, however, was modified by the fact that elites and lower strata activists overwhelmingly cited solidary satisfactions as the aspects of politics they would miss the most if they quit their party work. The social aspects of the party were clearly the most powerful incentives for remaining active.

The data on the incentive structure of the Babylon-Huntington activists support Eldersveld's conclusion that activists' "motivations were diverse, multiple and represented a synthesis of personal and impersonal interests."[1] The incentive portrait which emerged from the data was quite complex. Although a significant number of activists used amateur-purposive goals to explain their current activism,

they also showed evidence of considerable "resocialization" (or adaptation) to professional party norms. For example, most committee people perceived themselves as having little decision-making influence, and many indicated a desire for the amateur value of greater influence, yet few wanted to increase their influence by altering existing power relationships within the party.

The pervasive influence of professional party norms was also evidenced by the high congruence between rank and file committee persons and elites about the importance and legitimacy of patronage rewards. The same congruence was found regarding the importance of professional, electoral-organizational maintenance goals. These data thus confirm that portion of Hypothesis 1 which postulated that in these party organizations, amateur-purposive goals are secondary to the professional goals of elites.

This variegated incentive portrait was further complicated by the fact that the activists who cited purposive goals as their most important sustaining incentives emerged as a distinct party sub-group in terms of their attitudes and organizational behavior. These "professional idealists" (the largest incentive sub-group) were more cynical and disappointed with the professional,or "machine", aspects of their party organizations. In addition, their solidary satisfactions were oriented more toward the social contacts, fun and excitement than toward the status-recognition benefits derived from their activism. Consequently, they were less

disposed to receive patronage rewards or to obtain elite positions within the party. Finally, the "professional idealists" showed greater intra-party decision-making freedom and influence, especially in such amateur-oriented areas as leadership selection, nominations and party issue positions.

The data do not, therefore, support Hypothesis 2 which postulated that within these suburban parties dominated by professional norms, most activists would adopt a professional-personal rather than amateur-purposive incentive structure. Instead of exhibiting either a professional or an amateur incentive system and political style, these activists have traits associated with both models. This was most obvious among the "professional idealists" who maintained a simultaneous commitment to amateur goals and a fairly high level of participation in their professional party organizations. Nevertheless, this distinct party sub-group was neither comfortable with nor very desirous of the status, recognition and material rewards that are typically available in professional party structures. They were satisfied by the social contacts provided by their parties, along with a vague sense that through their activism they were contributing to the common good.

The data thus partially support Eldersveld[2], Conway and Feigert[3], Gluck[4] and Wilson[5] who observed a resocialization, over time, of amateur activists toward the professional model. As Wilson summarized this phenomenum, "the amateur spirit cannot endure permanently. Eventually, the amateur either

loses interest or becomes a professional and plays the game by professional rules.[6] Although the Babylon-Huntington activists clearly played "the game by professional rules", the "professional idealists" among them also maintained a commitment to amateur goals - a commitment which affected the behavior of this large party sub-group.

The data, on the other hand, do not support Browder and Ippolito[7], Sullivan, et al.[8], Hitlin and Jackson[9], and Ippolito[10] who concluded that amateur incentive orientations persist over time. Part of the reason for these divergent findings was the fact that Browder and Ippolito relied almost exclusively on activists' perceptions of their own incentive goal structures which were not related directly to their behavior within party organizations. Hence they found that activists maintained or increased their commitment to purposive incentive goals over time - a pattern which they equated with a commitment to the amateur political style. The Babylon-Huntington subjects of this study, however, indicated a similar long-term commitment to purposive incentives even while they adopted, or adapted to, the norms of "machine politics" associated with the professional model.

Sulivan, et. al., and Hitlin and Jackson studied both the incentives and behavior of delegates at the 1972 Democratic Convention and the 1974 Democratic Mid Term Conference respectively. However, because these studies probed delegate behavior in short-term, intense convention settings, their findings regarding the persistence of the

amateur style cannot be applied to the long-term behavior of activists in local organizations such as the Babylon-Huntington parties. Here, in the absence of the glamour, excitement and pressures of a convention, the on-going behavior of most activists blended aspects of both the amateur and professional models. Particularly among the "professional idealists", a belief in amateur-purposive goals clearly coexisted with professional behavior that stressed electoral-organizational maintenance objectives.

The multiple incentive structure and style of most activists interacted with the material resource structures of the Babylon-Huntington parties. As noted above, a central thrust of this study was to demonstrate that elites use personal material rewards and punishments to perpetuate professional values and a professional party structure. As with the general incentive portrait, activists' attitudes and behavior regarding personal material rewards and sanctions were variegated. The data suggest that elite uses of material resources to achieve their party goals may influence the behavior of only a minority of activists.

To begin, material incentives were not prominent in activists' incentive structures in any of the four parties. Nonetheless, material resources, especially patronage, were viewed as the mainstay of the parties' reward structure. Although few activists perceived material resources as important to their own participation, such rewards were most frequently cited by them in their explanations of the

activism of others. Almost all activists accepted the legitimacy of patronage as a reward for party service; the vast majority, in fact, believed that without patronage most activists would not be willing to participate in local party politics.

Activists thus perceived patronage to be far more important to others' incentive structures than to their own. Hence, although leadership loyalty and party service were widely perceived as the criteria used by elites in granting or withholding patronage, as well as tasks expected of committee people, an average of only 23 percent of activists perceived themselves as having been personally rewarded or punished with a patronage position. Similarly, the fear of a patronage retribution or the desire for a patronage reward were most frequently cited as the reasons why other committee people did not seek a greater voice in party decision making. Yet, when queried about their own freedom to vote on key decision-making questions, most committee people perceived themselves to be free of such elite constraints.

This incongruity between activists' perceptions of the importance of material rewards to themselves and others was compounded by the general absence of a rational, bureaucratized patronage administration system. Only the Babylon Republican elites, for example, maintained and published records of committee persons' party service and electoral performance which were allegedly related to the

party's patronage reward system. In the other three parties, the distribution of patronage rewards appeared to be a random, arbitrary process which personally affected few activists. Rather, activists frequently described a "vague climate of intimidation" in which elites, in certain circumstances, were perceived as granting or withholding patronage based on party service or leadership loyalty. Such instances, however, were perceived by committee people to be far more widespread than justified by the realities of the patronage distribution system.

These data thus support Hypothesis 4, which postulated that both elites and lower strata activists generally perceive the distribution of personal material resources to reward and punish lower strata activists' behavior to be a legitimate exercise of party power. Nevertheless the data do not support Hypothesis 2, which postulated that elites systematically distribute material resources in a manner that causes most committee people to maintain their participation, adopt a professional incentive goal structure, and define their party roles and perform their tasks so that elites can achieve their professional goals.

Elites, therefore, successfully maintained the impression that they systematically distributed personal rewards and punishments to motivate committee people to participate and to maintain intra-party discipline. Yet, most committee people, while accepting this impression as

a realistic, necessary and legitimate party norm, saw themselves to be somewhat removed from the material reward system. Part-time and summer patronage positions arranged through the party, although somewhat limited in number, were sought at certain points in time, such as the spring when college age children seek employment. Still, most activists behaved as if they were personally free from the elite constraints typically associated with a material reward structure.

A partial explanation for the failure of the "professional idealists" to fully participate in the party's material reward structure relates to power relationships within the parties. In addition to the fact that the actual administration of personal rewards appeared to be a random, arbitrary process, the data reveal fairly loose power linkages between committee people and elites. Decisions, for example, tended to be dominated by a small group of elites close to the town leader. Although most committee people were somewhat dissatisfied with this pattern - at least intellectually - they seemed reluctant to assume either the responsibilities or risks attendant to greater decision-making influence.

Conversely, the elites appeared to maintain minimum control over most committee people; they did not closely monitor how committee people fulfilled their responsibilities or how they voted on major issues. Thus, although leadership loyalty was perceived as expected by elites, most committee

people felt free to vote as they wished on major party questions. Likewise, while elites were perceived as expecting service to the party, few committee people indicated that elites either were aware of, or cared how, they carried out their responsibilities.

Only in the minority parties (and to some extent with selected area/zone or town leaders in the majority parties) was there evidence of greater elite control over committee people. This was particularly obvious in the minority Babylon Democratic and Huntington Republican parties. The elites in those parties were isolated from hostile factions of committee people and consequently demanded greater discipline of their "loyalists". Within these conditions, committee people with some influence tended to perceive themselves as having less freedom - particularly when voting on the sensitive questions of nominee selection and town leader selection. In general, however, the Babylon-Huntington parties were fairly undisciplined, stratarchical organizations.

The data do reveal that the minority of activists with material incentive goals and/or material or solidary-status satisfactions similar to the elites' was more likely to receive patronage than the "professional idealists" who were sustained by purposive and/or solidary social incentive goals or satisfactions. This minority, predisposed to the receipt of personal material rewards, were also those more likely to engage in party fundraising, obtain executive board

positions, and, the data suggest, vote with the leaders on sensitive questions and devote more of their time and energy to party service. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, however, this reward system did not shape, determine or change the decision to participate incentive goals, role definitions and task performance patterns of most activists.

These data, on the other hand, support Hypothesis 3 which stated that in the distribution of personal material rewards, elites tend to favor party loyalists who share their professional values. Far from conclusive, the findings suggest that elites occasionally, although not consistently, use material resources as disciplinary tools to reward a minority of loyal or dedicated committee people whose incentive goals and satisfactions may predispose them to such rewards. Whether this minority would increase in number if the party elites had more patronage to distribute is problematic. A more thorough assessment of the manner and degree to which elites use these rewards to shape the behavior of the minority predisposed to such resources remains the subject of future research studies.

The data do not support the central assumption of this study which was that lower strata activists are induced to belong to and maintain their membership in the party through the promise of personal material rewards. Rather, most activists maintained their membership because of the social benefits they derived from their party activism, along with ill-defined notions of civic responsibility which

their political participation helped them achieve.

Neither do the data demonstrate that material resources were used by elites to produce attitudes and behavior among most lower strata activists that conform to the professional model. Given the existence of the "professional idealists" who were somewhat removed from the elites' material rewards yet who generally shared their professional goals, one cannot conclude that support for these goals was obtained with material rewards or sanctions.

If the persistence of professional norms was not an outgrowth of the elites' use of personal resources, neither was it a function of class status or incentive structures. Acceptance of the legitimacy and necessity of patronage, for example, was as great in the affluent Huntington parties, where the median income was $33,000, as it was in the Babylon parties with their median income of $23,000. Similarly, the support for patronage was nearly unanimous, crossing all incentive groups, including those sustained by amateur-purposive goals.

Although material rewards may not have been elite tools for obtaining either the loyalty or service of most of the middle-class committee people in this study, patronage was viewed as an important party resource by almost all activists. These data thus question those studies which concluded that middle-class activists are averse to material rewards or that patronage is declining as a party resource among middle-class activists.

Sorauf, for example, argued that patronage had fallen into disfavor because it was at variance with middle-class values. Yet, as these data indicate, the majority of middle-class activists in Babylon and Huntington, while maintaining a commitment to what Sorauf termed "the image of civic virtue instilled in public education"[11] - i.e., impersonal, purposive values - nevertheless fully accepted the legitimacy of patronage as a party resource.

Sorauf also argued that patronage would decline in importance because middle-class activists would not desire the "poorly paid and generally unappealing" positions available. Again, both the working-class and upper middle-class activists in Babylon-Huntington challenged this position. For most of these activists, their participation in local politics was neither motivated nor controlled by a persistent desire for patronage rewards. Although many appeared to be somewhat uncomfortable with what Sorauf termed the "outright political payoff"[12] aspects of patronage - almost all accepted the legitimacy of patronage and most had sought patronage at one time for themselves, a relative or friend. In addition, the lower paid, unappealing patronage positions were occasionally desired as part-time or summer positions, particularly for activists' relatives.

In sum, the middle-class Babylon-Huntington activists supported Wolfinger's assertion that "the constituency for machine politics extends across the socio-economic spectrum."[13] Although these parties were not hierarchical, disciplined

machines in the classic sense, where the desire for material rewards governed much, if not most, intra-party behavior, neither had they abandoned material resources for a purposive incentive structure. Thus, these middle-class activists, and their party organizations, sharply challenged the alleged middle-class predisposition for purely or predominately amateur-purposive incentives and organizations found in studies by Wilson[14], Gans[15], Wood[16], Sorauf[17], Banfield and Wilson[18], Browder and Ippolito[19], and Ippolito[20].

The persistence of professional party norms among the middle-class Babylon-Huntington activists appeared to result from the widespread belief among activists that "machine politics" are an inherent, albeit somewhat distasteful aspect of local politics rather than from the manipulation of personal resources by elites. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed next.

Incentives and Organizational Theory

As discussed in Chapter One, much of the literature on local party organizations has been dominated by the "amateur" and "professional" ideal types. These concepts received wide attention following publication of Wilson's seminal work, The Amateur Democrat, in 1962.[21] Wilson's dichotomous models were drawn from the incentive theory of organizations put forth in another important work he co-authored with Clark in 1961, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization". According to this theory, "the incentive

system may be regarded as the principal variable affecting organizational behavior." The incentive system is "altered (largely by the organization's executive) in response to changes in the apparent motives of contributors, or potential contributors, to the organization."[22]

The amateur-professional dichotomy, and its attendant incentive theory, generated numerous studies of local party activists and organizations. Central to many of these analyses was the question of the degree to which amateur-purposive incentives sustained party activists over time. As noted in Chapter One, the data on this subject were inclusive.

Much of the literature on the amateur-professional models assumed, in accordance with incentive theory, that activists with a commitment to purposive incentive goals would adopt an amateur political style and consequently, local parties would reflect their amateur goals and norms. Yet, Eldersveld's seminal work on local party activism concluded that an activist's goals, role and ideology were "not necessarily related to the satisfaction he derived from party work." Eldersveld's observation was clearly supported by the data in this study which suggest that activists could maintain or adopt purposive goals to justify their participation in local politics while they concurrently were satisfied by solidary benefits and engaged in primarily professional, electoral-organizational maintenance activities. As Eldersveld noted, goals and motivation may, in fact, be

separate compartments.[23]

When motivations (defined in this study as satisfactions)[24] and incentive goals are related to activists' organizational behavior (political style), an extremely complex membership portrait emerges. Rather than adopting either an amateur or professional style, for example, the largest incentive sub-group among the Babylon-Huntington activists, the "professional idealists", blended purposive goals with personal solidary satisfactions in their political styles. In addition, there was some evidence that their incentive goals and desired satisfactions were in constant flux and that individuals could pursue several goals simultaneously. Material rewards, for example, might be of little consequence to a wealthy Huntington party worker until that point when his or her college age child desired a summer position. Then, years of service to the party and/or its leaders were expected to be rewarded with a patronage position - even if that activist's primary, on-going incentive goal was service to the community or some other purposive objective.

An underlying flaw in the incentive theory of organizations is its assumption that activists will understand their own goals and that their attitudes regarding proper individual and organizational behavior, once understood, will shape their behavior. Yet, as Perrow pointed out in his succinct and probing survey of organizational theory, the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between

attitudes and behavior is ambiguous:

> Researchers have tried to specify ever more narrowly the circumstances under which people's attitudes will predict their behavior. The circumstances are surprisingly few in number.[25]

Much of the research on amateur-professional incentive systems is postulated on this assumed correlation between activists' goals and their political style. Yet, Perrow pointed out:

> If our thoughts arise from our behavior, then what we take to be statements of organizational or group goals may merely be interpretations of where we have been, not where we particularly intended to go. Statements of goals, by individuals or organizations, serve to give meaning to what is probably a more random, disconnected, accidental and stumbling process than we have thought. We cannot even state our goals clearly, or order them from the most important to the least important in any stable way.[26]

The typical "professional idealist" may believe, in a vaguely defined sense, that he is active in politics for some purposive goal and that his party activism results in a positive contribution to the common good. In the same way, he may understand that his primary sustaining satisfactions are the fun, excitement and social contacts obtained from party work. Yet, always present, though not fully operational, is a powerful uncashed check - the notion that his service to leader and party may someday be rewarded should he desire a patronage position for himself, a relative or friend.

In his on-going political behavior, the "professional idealist" may carry with him an ill-defined commitment to

the ideal norms of the amateur politician. Yet, one would be mistaken to assume that his organizational behavior is determined by this ideal. Rather, his continuous involvement in local politics produces a political style which develops, not from a rational effort to maximize a conscious, well-ordered set of purposive goals, but from a series of responses to the accepted routines of party organizations.

Incentive theorists, such as Clark and Wilson, have placed too great an emphasis on the rationality of party activists. In their view, the individual is able to make rational decisions once he has decided on his goal priorities. The aggregate goals of organizational members, in turn, influence the behavior of elites who, also acting in a rational manner, adjust the distribution of resources (purposive, solidary or material) to meet the demands of members.

March and Simon, organizational theorists who re-evaluated the Weberian model, presented a more accurate view of the individual's behavior in organizations. In the March and Simon model, the organization member is only "intendedly rational". His attempts to be rational are limited by his capacities and the limited capacities of the organization which prevent complete rationality. To begin, he lacks complete knowledge about the consequences of his actions, particularly unanticipated and unintended consequences. He also does not have complete knowledge about alternative courses of action available to him. Consequently, he

simplifies the alternatives available, usually opting for the first available one. Even when he has several alternatives, he cannot accurately rank which is the most desirable and which is the least desirable. In most cases, the individual's decisions are shaped by the organization's division of labor, standard practices, authority system, channels of communication, training and indoctrination.[27]

The typical party activist, according to March and Simon, when confronted with a choice situation, does not examine all the alternatives in order to "optimize" the alternative most in keeping with his incentive goals. Rather, he responds to the routines of the party organization, especially the electoral-organizational maintenance norms, invoking solutions he has used before, and choosing the most satisfactory rather than the optimal alternative. As March and Simon describe this process of "satisficing":

> Finding the optimal alternative is a radically different problem from finding a satisfactory alternative. An alternative is optimal if: (1) there exists a set of criteria that permits all alternatives to be compared, and (2) the alternative in question is preferred, by these criteria, to all alternatives. An alternative is satisfactory if: (1) there exists a set of criteria that describes minimally satisfactory alternatives, and (2) the alternative in question meets or exceeds all these criteria.
>
> Most human decision making ... is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives.[28]

In the March and Simon organizational model, even the most impassioned amateur activist, will, in time, succumb to

the routines of the professional party organization. Patronage, for example, will become for him an accepted party reward. Thus, although certain Huntington Democrats who had entered the party via the amateur-oriented New Democratic Coalition expressed their distaste for patronage, none advocated its abolition. None, in fact, could even conceive of an alternative for patronage and several had "satisficed" in their own decision making by participating, however reluctantly, in the patronage system. They did not have the time, knowledge or willingness to "optimize" their own values by identifying an alternative to patronage. Rather, they acquisced to the established and familiar routines of the party.

Elites, in the March and Simon model, play a central role in the behavior of lower strata activists.

> The superior has the power or tools to structure the environment and perceptions of the subordinate in such a way that he sees the proper things and in the proper light. The superior actually appears to give few orders. Instead, he sets priorities ... and alters the flow of inputs and stimuli.[29]

According to Perrow, the most powerful influence of organizational elites is not derived from "obtrusive" controls such as their ability to establish and enforce rules or to manipulate the bureaucracy by controlling the organization's patterns of specialization and hierarchy. The most effective forms of elite control are the "unobtrusive" ones, namely the control of the cognitive premises underlying

action. These premises can be found in the structural aspects of the organization such as the vocabulary, structure of communications, rules and regulations, selection criteria for personnel or standard programs. Expanding on the March and Simon model, Perrow noted that through elite control of premises:

> The subordinate voluntarily restricts the range of stimuli that will be attended to ("Those sorts of things are irrelevant", or "What has this got to do with the matter?") and the range of alternatives that would be considered ("It would never occur to me to do that"). Direct sanctions operate in [the control of rules and regulations]; remote controls operate in [bureaucratic types of control]- one is simply assigned to a kind of job with more or less standard inputs, methods and expected outcomes; internalized premises for behavior are operating in [the fully unobtrusive control of premises].[30]

Returning to the central hypothesis of this study, March and Simon's model, as modified by Perrow, helps explain why the Babylon-Huntington activists who had little need or desire for patronage maintained so strong a commitment to the patronage system. It was not, as stated in the hypothesis, the fact that elites used patronage rewards and punishments to encourage acceptance of the professional model, for this assumes the existence of an organized system of rewards and punishments affecting substantial numbers of activists. Yet the data reveal little evidence of a highly structured network of personal rewards and sanctions affecting large numbers of activists or of a persistent commitment to material incentive goals by most activists. Rather, it was the elites' ability to control the internalized premises of local party decision

making - to convince most committee people that patronage rewards and sanctions are necessary to the party's survival, even if in fact they may not be - which insured the persistence of this and other professional norms.

To cite the Babylon insurgent quoted in Chapter Six, committee people perceive elites using more patronage rewards and sanctions than, in actuality, they do. The party leader "doesn't so much encourage as he doesn't discourage continuation of this perception."[34] Most activists have come to accept as an underlying premise of the local party organization the fact that elites reward and punish committee people based on their leadership loyalty and party service. Similarly, most committee people perceive other activists as desirous or fearful of such rewards and sanctions. That these perceptions may be distorted is quite irrelevant for they confirm a fundamental premise of the local party organization.

The data in this study do not explicitly identify the methods used by elites to foster activists' expectations and/or perceptions regarding the party's reward system. Implicit in the observations of some activists, however, was the fact that the elites simply had to convey a "vague climate of intimidation" to persuade committee people that material resources were, in fact, still of vital importance to the party's survival. For others, it was their perception of incidents (however isolated) of individuals who were perceived to have been rewarded or punished with

patronage which convinced them that "machine style" resources were used by elites to control committee people. For most activists, however, empirical evidence was not very important because they simply assumed that a complex network of personal rewards and punishments were the cement that held the party organization together.

The data comparing elite-committee persons' goals and role expectations reveal considerable congruity regarding the professional, electoral-organizational premises of local party organizations. As with the patronage system, there appeared to be little questioning of the "routines" of the party organization - including elite domination of decision making. This wide acceptance of professional organizational premises even held for the "professional idealists" who articulated purposive goals to explain their current activism. Though distinguished by their dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the party's "machine style", this sub-group neither saw nor sought an alternative to the professional goals desired by their elites.

This process of premise control is very subtle and, according to Perrow:

> extremely difficult to measure. We are content to speak of socialization, or culture, or community norms thus making it sanitary.... But we could just as well label premise setting as indoctrination, brainwashing, manipulation, or false consciousness.[32]

Whatever its label, premise setting - not personal rewards and punishments - appeared to be the most powerful form of

control exercised by elites over lower strata activists - as well as the primary reason for the persistence of professional norms among even the more idealistic and affluent committee persons.

To alter this deeply entrenched perception would require changing the premises underlying the fundamental decisions of local parties. This would, in turn, require a change in the perspectives of elites. But as Perrow pointed out:

> To change the perspectives of the individual leaders themselves is ... extremely difficult. In large organizations it is often difficult to merely replace them since those with sufficient experience and knowledge of the organization at the next level are likely to share the very perspectives one wishes to change. Going outside the organization for top management personnel also has its difficulties.[33]

Thus, local parties will probably continue to produce elites whose acceptance of the routines of professional party politics will foster acceptance of these premises by lower strata activists. This is true even for those activists who espouse purposive incentive goals yet, for a myriad of personal reasons, have neither the time nor inclincation to seek alternatives to the professional norms that govern their local party organizations.

Clark and Wilson built their theory of local party organizations on the concept of incentives which they vaguely defined as "the apparent motives of contributors, or potential contributors, to the organization."[24] Incentives,

in turn, were viewed in much of the literature as independent variables which determine activists' political styles; i.e., a pattern of political behavior based on a mutually supportive set of attitudes about the principles, procedures and goals of partisan activity. As discussed earlier, however, these incentive theorists overemphasized the degree to which incentives influence behavior. In addition, the concept of incentives lacked definitional clarity in much of the literature on amateur and professional organizations.

Thomas H. Roback sought to clarify the nature of incentives by distinguishing attitudes from motives. According to Roback:

> An attitude is defined as a learned set of cognitive beliefs, facts and positive or negative affective evaluations about some object which tends to result in a readiness to produce certain behavior. A motive is defined as a mental state in which a state of energy mobilization and a goal are joined to produce particular behavior.[35]

Roback's distinction is instructive when analyzing the behavior of Babylon-Huntington activists. The "professional idealists", for example, maintained attitudes that synthesized amateur and professional goals with a somewhat negative "affective evaluation" of the perceived realities of "machine politics". Consequently, the "professional idealists", in the process of satisfying their purposive goals, may have maintained a "readiness" to accept the solidary social satisfactions derived from their party work. Conversely, those activists with personal incentive goals

and a more positive "affective evaluation" of their party's professional norms, maintained a greater "readiness" to accept personal status, recognition and material rewards and to achieve elite status within their party hierarchies.

Incentive goals thus produced a "readiness" for particular types of behavior. In terms of their actual motives, the "professional idealists" were predisposed to a "state of energy mobilization" and "goal definitions" that produced participation geared toward the fun,excitement and social contacts derived from their activism. Activists with personal incentive goals, on the other hand, were predisposed to actual behavior that was more ego satisfying. Such predispositions, on the other hand, cannot be equated with a set of conscious incentive goals that, through a process of rational assessment and optimization, determine political behavior. Despite such predispositions, the political style of local party activists was governed more by their routine acceptance of the underlying premises of professional politics than by a rational process of goal optimization.

The Amateur Model and Democratic Theory

The data in this study thus failed to show, in keeping with incentive theory, that the acceptance of amateur-purposive goals by a majority of activists would produce amateur organizations. Another assumption underlying the amateur model is that party organizations which maximize

activists' decision-making opportunities will maintain high levels of participation. The democratic values inherent in the amateur model are founded on human relations organizational theory which was popular during the 1950's and 1960's.

Human relations theorists, according to Perrow, have generated "the most voluminous and substantial part of the literature on organization." One branch of human relations theory, the leadership-productivity model, hypothesizes that democratic, employee-centered leadership concerned with human relations rather than productivity or bureaucratic rules, will lead to high morale and, subsequently, high membership productivity. Yet, Perrow concluded, "The history of research in this area is one of progressive disenchantment with the above theses."[36]

A second branch of the human relations school also stresses the importance of leadership but is more concerned with the total organizational climate rather than the practices of individual leaders. According to this branch, individuals desire to participate fully in organizations to achieve what Maslow termed their self-actualizing "higher needs" such as feelings of personal autonomy, through identification with the goals of the organization. They will do so if the leadership and organizational structure permit it. Despite the popularity of this theory however, Perrow observed a "lack of solid evidence from research (possibly because vague needs cannot be measured) and the existence of circumstantial evidence that there is no clear hierarchical ordering

of needs." In sum, Perrow argued, after having closely examined the literature, "there is little empirical support for the human relations theory or theories...."[38]

Despite this absence of empirical support, the human relations theory has figured prominently in studies of local party organizations. The proponents of the amateur model, for example, argued that democratic involvement by lower strata activists in intra-party decision making would result in greater levels of participation.[39] Yet, the data in this study indicated that while most committee people are generally supportive of this democratic ideal, they may, in reality, have avoided opportunities to actually increase their decision-making influence. In addition, perceptions about their general lack of influence did not significantly alienate committee people from either the leadership or from participation in the party organization.

Conversely, committee people expressed considerable decision-making freedom, a phenomenom that may be explained in part by the loose organizational structures of these parties in which lower strata activists abdicated major decision-making influence in return for what they perceived to be minimum elite control over their (although not others') behavior. Freed from major institutional demands, most committee people were able to concentrate on and enjoy the social benefits derived from their party work. All four parties appeared to be generally undisciplined, with committee

persons' electoral and other responsibilities often fulfilled in a rather perfunctory manner and shaped more by personal ideals, party routine, and, perhaps peer pressure, than by elite sanctions and rewards.

These data are similar to Styskal's who found that many lower strata activists in the City University of New York's "Training of Teacher Trainers" (Triple T) Program supported the "ideal" of greater participation, yet "were relatively satisfied with the traditional hierarchy of authority in which their influence ... carried the least weight in decision making."[40]

Styskal offered this explanation for the incongruity between lower strata activists' desire for greater participation and their unwillingness to alter existing power relationships:

> Just as a person may support the broad goals of an organization but on a personal level question or reject their specific application... so s/he may support goals that increase the subunit's power although shunning the individual responsibility that accrues from increased personal power.[41]

Styskal's Triple T lower strata activists, like the Babylon-Huntington committee people in this study, appeared reluctant to actively pursue the ideal of greater participation in decision making - a goal which they, at least intellectually, supported. Styskal attributed this reluctance to an eschewal of responsibility by lower strata activists.

Bachrach, a participation thorist who espouses what Perrow described as human relations theory, offered a

different interpretation of why lower strata activists often do not seek greater decision-making influence. Bachrach argued for "a dual concept of political interest, which recognizes that not all expressed wants reflect real needs." In so doing, he attacked the position of liberal or pluralist theorists (sometimes referred to as democratic elitists) such as Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Robert Dahl, who argue that the political system can and/or should only respond to "articulated preferences". According to Bachrach, individuals do not always know nor can they articulate their unconscious interests. The process of political participation "is itself an essential means for the individual to discover his real needs through the intervening discovery of himself as a social human being."[42]

Elsewhere, Bachrach elaborated on the concept of "real needs" when he observed that "the majority of individuals stand to gain in self-esteem and growth toward a full affirmation of their personalities by participating more actively in meaningful community decisions."[43] He defined "meaningful", democratic participation as "a process in which persons formulate, discuss and decide public issues that are important to them and directly affect their lives. It is a process that is more or less continuous, conducted on a face to face basis in which participants have roughly an equal say in all stages, from formulation of issues to the determination of policies."[44]

In Bachrach's view, since most organizational activist lack such opportunities for full participation:

> It is doubtful that in the political exercises in which they do participate their articulated preferences actually reflect their more deep-seated concerns. It is my contention that these concerns would emerge and become focused if [individuals] were to participate actively in shaping policy within their [organizations].[45]

This educative function of participation was also noted by Pateman:

> The major function of participation ... is ... educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures.... Participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals participate the better able they become to do so. Subsidiary hypotheses about participation are that it has an integrative effect and that it aids the acceptance of collective decisions.[46]

Participatory theorists thus explain the failure of lower strata activists to seek greater participation in organizational decision making as a function of the very absence of real participatory opportunities - not as a lack of responsibility on their part. If elites in local parties, for example, provided committee people with on-going decision-making opportunities based on equality of power, they argue, the rank and file would engage in what Pateman termed "social training". Through this process, activists would eventually enhance their self esteem, crystallize their unstated needs, acquire the needed decision-making skills, enhance their feelings of political efficacy and increase both their commitment to the party's decisions and their participation

in its activities. Denied such opportunities, committee people are unaware of the personal gains (including feelings of personal autonomy) that might accrue from greater participation. Lacking confidence and perceiving themselves to also lack the necessary skills, lower strata activists learn to accept roles in organizations that are inefficacious.

Do rank and file activists learn inefficacious roles? Styskal observed:

> This argument is difficult to answer. However, the fact that community participants [lower strata activists in Triple T] thought they had more power than others accorded them while they supported the "narrowing" of differences in influence between themselves and project directors yet indicated no desire to disrupt the prevailing hierarchical distribution of subunits, implies that their perceptions and attitudes about their role in the organization were more intricate and subtle than the learning hypothesis suggests.[47]

Styskal's data are instructive since the Triple T structure he studied had, as a stated institutional goal, decision-making parity, i.e., that no one alone knew enough about or had the expertise to make key decisions.[48] Even in this structure, lower strata activists were reluctant to alter hierarchical arrangements; they were satisfied with power positions in which they carried the least weight compared with other subunits.

Despite the subtlety of the Triple T respondents' ambiguous attitudes about their influence, they do not contravene the learning hypothesis. A partial explanation for these attitudes, and similar ambiguities among the Babylon-

Huntington activists in this study, can be found in Perrow's concept of the elites' unobtrusive control of an organization's cognitive premises. If most institutions are indeed hierarchically organized, with minimum opportunities for full democratic participation, as the participatory theorists argue, then individuals may simply learn to adjust their sights to minimum participation - even when such opportunities are, at least structurally, provided as they were in the Triple T Program.

Minimum participation in organizational decision making may, in fact, be a premise underlying all, or most, institutions in America; a premise which children are socialized at a young age to accept in their families and schools; a premise that is deeply ingrained in America's civic culture. Noting that the societal goal of achieving full participation is "reaching for the impossible", Bachrach recognized the pervasive nature of these non-participatory premises when he cautioned that "the theorist ... must fully recognize the elite-mass nature of modern industrial society and the implications of this fact for democratic theory."[49]

Bachrach's caveat is particularly evident in local political parties which, historically, were disciplined, hierarchical structures. Although the contemporary suburban party is hardly a disciplined "machine", one cannot discount the persistence, among suburban activists, of such "machine" premises as loyalty to the leader, obedience, reciprocity

and favoritism, material rewards and minimum rank and file influence. Even though these modern parties are loosely organized, largely undisciplined stratarchies, the data suggest that activists perceive them to resemble the boss-dominated urban machines that were the prototype of the professional model. Hence, their unquestioning acceptance of professional premises may discourage or deter even the "professional idealists" from assuming that they can have greater influence - despite the fact that they also subscribe to the amateur "ideal" of a party organization which maximizes participation.

Organizational premises may be so deeply rooted that they are unconsciously accepted even when they no longer are fully reflected in the organization's structure. As noted above, the manner by which elites encourage acceptance of professional, non-participatory premises among committee people require additional study. These techniques, if in fact they are overt techniques, may prove quite complex, for an Walker observed:

> Political apathy has many sources. It may stem from feelings of personal inadequacy, from a fear of endangering important personal relationships, or from a lack of interest in the issues; but it may also have its roots in the society's institutional structure, in the weakness or absence of group stimulation or support, in the positive opposition of elements within the political system to wider participation; in the absence, in other words, of appropriate spurs to actions or the presence of tangible deterrents.[50]

The data on the Babylon-Huntington parties suggest all of the above factors. For the minority of activists with

material or solidary-status incentive goals or satisfactions, for example, the desire for or fear of a patronage reward or sanction may be a powerful "tangible deterrent" to greater decision-making influence. In addition, the institutional structure of the wider society, as discussed above, may preclude "appropriate spurs" to increased participation by most of the rank and file, including those with amateur incentive goals.

The data in this study suggest yet another hypothesis; for many activists the "fear of endangering important personal relationships" may deter greater participation. Many of the Babylon-Huntington activists, particularly the "professional idealists", were satisfied by the solidary-social benefits of their party work. These included the friendships they cultivated and maintained within the parties. Friendship, Mansbridge noted, is a central concept among participation theorists:

> The participatory vision seeks to extend the mode of friendship to larger groups.... In constant tension between the informal intimacy of a friendship and the formal, public nature of a government, ... small democracies must face the related tension between their members' conflicting desire for a life in common and for individual autonomy. They handle these tensions by making the same formula - political equality, unanimity, direct democracy - carry two contrary burdens. Each ... must ... create a community in which an individual is one with others and protect the same individual against the others in that community.[51]

In order to preserve the qualities of friendship and maximize participation within public institutions, Mansbridge argued, specific structural arrangements must be created.

The ideal of equality which friends share must become an "exact equality of power." The ideal of unanimity, which friends have in common, must become an institutionalized veto which each member can exercise against the actions of the majority. Last, the face to face contact of friendships must become, in public groups, "the insistence that no decision escapes each individual's scrutiny." She conluded, "In order to achieve these goals ... participatory democracies must stay small, stable and voluntary enough to remain real groups of friends."[52]

Friendship, for many, if not most, Babylon-Huntington party activists was the most powerful motivation sustaining their participation in local politics. Consequently, one may hypothesize, these activists avoid situations that might undermine their friendships. One such situation is greater participation in intra-party decision making, especially in the absence of Mansbridge's formula for preserving the qualities of friendship in small democracies: equality of power, unanimity and frequent face to face contact.

Currently, most Babylon-Huntington committee people exercise their influence principally by casting votes at full town committee meetings on such matters as the selection of party nominees for public office, party leadership selection, and to a limited extent, formation of the party's positions on issues. Yet, the data reveal that these votes are most frequently passive, rank-and-file ratifications of decisions

already made by elites. In addition, patronage decisions are almost never voted on by lower strata activists. Although most committee people were dissatisfied with this arrangement and expressed a desire for greater influence, few wanted to increase their influence by decreasing the power of elites.

In order to increase the influence that committee people exercise in decision making, new intra-party power arrangements would have to be created. Area/zone meetings, for example, would have to be held more frequently since the town committees each contain almost 260 people and are, therefore, too large to allow for full discussion of issues. Using Mansbridge's criteria, the town committees are not suited to achieving unanimity, equality of power and face to face discussion.

The area/zones, which have about 25 committee people each, might provide an adequate forum for greater participation by committee people in the selection of party nominees, party leaders, party issue positions and perhaps even patronage appointments. Even so, Mansbridge cautioned, participatory concepts can be counterproductive:

> The principle of equal power can paralyze the organization, hide the real dynamics of decision making, drive competent people out, and promote a sense of lassitude and irresponsibility. The principle of unanimity can intimidate the non-verbal and the insecure, and produce immobility. The principle of direct, face to face democracy can work to benefit those with the time for meetings ... and the self confidence to speak in them.[50]

In addition, implementing the principle of unanimity and face to face contact in area/zone decision making would require a major increase in the amount of time committee people devote to their parties. But, as Dahl pointed out, time is a "valuable and scarce resource" the use of which costs "each member in that the time might be used in doing something else - often, in fact, something a great deal more interesting and important than going to a meeting."[54] Whether Babylon-Huntington committee people are willing to commit additional time to the parties is problematic.

Assuming a willingness on the part of committee people to attend area/zone meetings more frequently (the current pattern is for such meetings to be convened 6-8 times a year), what kinds of decisions would they be involved in? Within the current electoral environment, the data reveal that most public policy issues are pragmatic, town "housekeeping" questions such as road repairs, drainage, transportation, etc. Such matters frequently emanate from the parochial, competing demands or needs of divergent residential neighborhoods or special interest groups and, consequently, do not lend themselves to the principle of unanimity inherent in Mansbridge's participatory model. Also, the authority in such matters usually rests with town or county administrative agencies in which the local party has only minimal influence.

The other major area of decision making within present party arrangements is personnel matters: nominations, patronage appointments and leadership selection. Achieving unanimity

on such matters is very difficult. Also, personnel questions can be extremely sensitive and volatile. The process of nominating candidates for public office, for example, can lay bare fragile egos and years of repressed enmity between factions and individuals. Patronage appointments, which are somewhat limited in number, can provoke bitter conflict.

The major policy questions upon which committee people might increase their influence do not, therefore, lend themselves to an important principle of participatory democracy-unanimity. In addition, the nature of the personnel questions, should they be openly discussed and decided by the rank and file, could provoke anxieties, competition and conflict which might undermine the network of friendships so clearly important to these activists. Hence, the data suggest that the Babylon-Huntington committee people prefer to avoid the risks of conflict attendant with greater decision-making influence, thereby protecting the friendships which, for many, are among the chief satisfactions they derive from party work.

The impracticality of applying participatory norms to local party organizations is made even more obvious in this observation by Mansbridge:

> In the 1970's ... most groups that operate on a participatory basis have a membership self-selected from a small group of friends, or potential friends, similar in age, life style and aspiration. Most actual neighborhoods and jobs, however, attract individuals who have no such prior attachment to common goals.... A unitary community may not be what they want or need.[55]

The area/zones of the Babylon-Huntington parties currently contain committee people who may live several miles from one another (sometimes in different villages and school districts) and who therefore have little or no on-going, non-political contact. Other than sharing the goal of electing party members to public office, there was little evidence that these activists shared a "prior attachment to common goals" on which Mansbridge posited a small, participatory democracy. To attain a "unitary community" which she identified as an important requisite for participatory democracy, would require a complete, if not impossible, restructuring of these parties which presently reflect the dispersed, fragmented and isolative qualities of their suburban communities.

In addition, for greater participation to be effective in local parties, committee people would have to be re-educated to values and norms that emphasize cooperation rather than competition. As Lipset noted of America's civic culture, the "emphasis on equalitarianism as a dominant value is significant in determining ... three closely related processes: competition, status uncertainty, and conformity."[56] None of these values is conducive to participatory democracy. Perhaps, therefore, committee people avoided greater participation in decision making because they had an intuitive sense that their competitive temperaments and status uncertainties, in adversary, decision-making situations, would threaten the

intra-party friendships which they valued more than the ideal of greater influence. This hypothesis, of course, requires additional testing.

Finally, as discussed above,[57] the participation-human relations theorists rely heavily on Maslow's hierarchy of needs. But, Strauss noted that Maslow's self-actualizing concept of autonomy may be a value desired, not universally, but by specific individuals in certain circumstances.

> With its strong emphasis on individual dignity, creative freedom, and self development, this hypothesis bears all the earmarks of its academic origin.
>
> Professors place high value on autonomy, inner direction, and the quest for maximum self-development .... And yet there are many ... who do not share the professors' values.... It is questionable whether these values are equally functional in other lines of work - where creativity is not required to get the job done, but only the ability to follow orders.[58]

The Babylon-Huntington parties were perceived by their members to be primarily structured for electoral success - a goal that traditionally has been viewed as requiring hierarchical discipline. Activists' role definitions and task performance patterns clearly reflected this central electoral goal. Hence, it may be further hypothesized that committee people, by accepting hierarchy as an underlying party premise, may be more comfortable following orders rather than achieving autonomy through greater influence. This point is especially significant since, in these loosely disciplined parties, elites appeared to give few actual orders, thus allowing committee people wide lattitude to

enjoy the solidary-social benefits of their participation with minimum accountability for the quantity and quality of their party work. This hypothesis also requires additional research.

In sum, to increase real (as opposed to apparent) opportunities for participation in local politics presupposes a participatory ethos which is largely absent from both the political parties and the larger society. Specifically, new elites would be needed to change the non-participatory, professional premises which underlie local parties. In addition, the parties would have to attract or re-educate activists to believe in and be willing to devote the time to full participation. Decision-making norms would also have to be altered to reduce their adversary, competitive, conflict-prone qualities that could endanger the network of friendships which are highly valued by party activists. The parties would also have to change their hierarchical premises and structures to equalize power between elites and the rank and file. Finally, the parties would have to expand the scope of their activities to stress goals such as issues and public policy formation or constituent services. None of the above can be accomplished without a major transformation of American politics and culture.

Participatory theory represents an admirable and intriguing effort to correct the problems of alienation that flow from the lack of power and self esteem which individuals

frequently experience in modern institutions. Nevertheless, implementing participatory concepts would require so profound an individual, party and societal restructuring of values, norms and power relationships that the theory provides an unrealistic, and largely unsubstantiated, alternative to the professional party organizations examined in this study.

The Amateur Model Re-examined

Much of the literature on local party activism has thus relied too heavily on the incentive and participation or human relations theories. Incentive theory, it was noted, is at variance with a large body of organizational theory because it posits an excessively rational process of goal optimization by activists. The data in this study, however, support March and Simon's model of goal satisficing, thus reducing but not dismissing, the usefulness of the incentive concept. The participation or human relations theories, on the other hand, appear to lack empirical support and pragmatic relevance for local party organizations.

In addition, the widespread assumption in the literature that middle-class activists with amateur incentive goals would transform parties into amateur, purposive-participatory structures, has proven specious. Also, the data in this study reveal that the professional-amateur distinction found in many studies is a forced dichotomy. Wilson's original description of the amateur-professional types was, in his view, "a distinction ... somewhat overdrawn" with an applicability that tends "to vary with the rank of the politician".

Noting that amateurs eventually become professionals, he pointed out that "in the long run ... it may well be that nothing keeps them apart."[59] Nevertheless, many researchers treated the concepts as enduring, dichotomous political styles.

Wilson's amateur-professional distinction conformed closely to Max Weber's typology of the "occasional" and "professional" politician:

> Politics, just as economic pursuits, may be a man's avocation or his vocation. One may engage in politics ... as an 'occasional' politician. We are all 'occasional' politicians when we cast our ballot.... Politics as an avocation is today practiced by all those party agents and heads of voluntary political associations who, as a rule, are politically active only in case of need and for whom politics is, neither materially nor ideally, their life in the first place.
>
> There are two ways of making politics one's vocation: Either one lives 'for' politics or one lives 'off' politics. By no means is the contrast an exclusive one. The rule is rather, that man does both.... He who lives 'for' politics ...either... enjoys the naked possession of power he exerts, or he nourishes his inner balance of self feeling by the consciousness that his life has meaning in the service of a cause....He who strives to make politics a permanent source of income lives 'off' politics as a vocation.[60]

Weber's distinctions, like Wilson's concepts, were clearly intended as ideal types since he argued that most "professional" politicians live both "for" and "off" politics. Nevertheless, the notion that some people are politically active because of the intrinsic benefits derived from "service of a cause" while others strive to "make politics a permanent source of income" has colored much of

the literature on amateur and professional activists - as has Weber's dichotomy between "occasional" and "professional" politicians.

This dichotomous Weberian typology, according to Gunlick, was itself based on a translation error in the Gerth and Mills collection of Weber's essays. According to Gunlick:

> It appeared strange that such a perceptive observer of politicians as Weber would propose a dichotomous either/or typology that would ignore a middle type, a part time politician, who was neither a professional nor an occasional politician.
>
> In turning to the original German, it was discovered that Weber had indeed suggested a third type of politician.... My translation of the [key] passage is: "One can engage in politics ... as an 'occasional' politician, a part-time politician, or a 'professional' politician...." Neither here nor in the following sentences ... do Gerth and Mills make any reference to part-time politicians.
>
> Not only do Gerth and Mills ignore the part-time politician as one of Weber's three types, they also insist on translating Weber's reference to him as "avocation".[61]

The consequence of this translation error for political research, according to Gunlick, has been to encourage the dichotomous treatment of activists as either "devoted professionals" or "inspired amateurs" rather than to explore the "obvious and important third [mixed] type of politician."[67] Thus neither Weber nor Wilson intended their concepts to be dichotomous. This was either ignored or misunderstood by those researchers who failed to note that activists are generally neither purely professional nor purely amateur but

manifest values and a political style on a continuum somewhere between both ideals.

In addition to the fact that the dichotomous treatment of the amateur-professional models was framed by a translation error, studies of the concepts may also have been biased by the historical period in which they were conducted. Many of these studies were carried out between 1965-1975, a period of intense political conflict, particularly within the Democratic Party which was the site of much of the research. The 1968 Chicago debacle, the anti-war movement, college and civil rights disturbances, demands by women, minorities and youth for greater influence, Watergate - all were symptomatic of this turbulent period. In addition, within this environment of political polarization, issues and ideology played uncharacteristically important roles in national and local politics. Thus, both the researchers and their subjects, during these tumultuous years, may have been predisposed to the democratic, purposive norms of the amateur model-a predisposition that may not have survived into the quiescent period that followed elimination of the Vietnam and Watergate issues from the national agenda.

It was noted in Chapter One that some researchers normatively treated the amateur model as the preferred political style which they believed would correct the alleged oligarchic and materially corrupt tendencies of the professional model. In so doing, they may have tapped deeply into the anti-party reformist American political tradition. As Ranney

summarized this tradition:

> In the long convoluted epic that is the story of party reform in America, one lietmotiv appears more than any other. This is the tendency of Americans to deal uneasily with the necessities of partisan political organization because of their widespread belief that political parties are, at best, unavoidable evils whose propensities for divisiveness, oligarchy and corruption must be closely watched and sternly controlled.[63]

The reform tradition for democratizing parties and thereby "controlling the mischiefs of faction" reached a zenith during the Progressive Era when, according to McConnell, reforms such as the direct primary, contributed to the emasculation of political parties.[64] Among the many historians and political scientists who have commented on this trend, Burnham's analysis of the System of 1896 is among the most cogent.[65] According to Burnham, the System of 1896, based on high levels of partisan activity, partisan mobilization of the electorate and patronage rewards resulted in strong, viable party organizations. The breakdown of this system, growing from such Progressive reforms as the Australian ballot, civil service, non-partisan local elections, and the direct primary, led to the disaggregation of parties and the electorate that has continued into the present. The historical result, Burnham argued, has been the attenuation of traditional party functions such as aggregating and articulating interests and the rise of special interest politics; parties, in effect, have become mere mass media machines for winning elections.

Partly in response to these tendencies, numerous academic notables, including Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, E. E. Schattschneider, Stephen Bailey, James MacGregor Burns and the members of the American Political Science Association's 1950 Committee on Political Parties advocated what Ranney called "the responsible party government" school of reform. In this scheme, closely modeled after the British system, parties would:

> (1) make policy commitments to the electorate, (2) [be] willing and able to carry them out when in office, (3) develop alternatives to government policy when out of office, and (4) differ sufficiently between themselves to "provide the electorate with a proper range of choice between alternatives of action."[66]

This school is quite different from what Ranney described as the "representative party structures" school which argued that "the parties' greatest need is not more centralization or cohesion but more accurate representation of their rank-and-file members."[67]

Advocates of the amateur model synthesized the latter school's emphasis on internal party democracy with the "responsible party" school's stress on policy programs. In addition, supporters of the amateur model relied on anti-party and middle-class Progressive values that emphasized purposive, non-personal government service with the universalist rather than particularist values typically associated with the civil service system. In so doing, they failed to reconcile the obvious contradiction between an open, democratic party structure and the discipline required for

British-style programmatic parties, while they also ignored or discounted the persistence of personal motivations - including the desire for patronage - among even affluent middle-class party workers.

Due to the theoretical and empirical weaknesses of much of the literature on local party organizations, future research in this field must begin to reflect recent developments in general organizational theory. In particular, such research should be directed away from the theoretically unsound, unrealistic and generally unsupported incentive and human relations theories.

Without condoning a return to the abuses of boss-run, hierarchical machines, political researchers must accept the realities of what have too often been pejoratively referred to as "professional" or machine politics. Given the current state of electoral and partisan politics in America, it is not likely that the political parties will assume the ideological and issue-programmatic values of the amateur style. As Epstein noted:

> American national parties manage to channel the opinions of a large and diverse nation.... The two parties must be loose and accommodating rather than strictly doctrinal in every issue. Thus, with each party containing many adherents who, on certain issues agree with the other party, the parties are unlikely to present clear policy alternatives.[68]

Similarly, there is little prospect that the American parties, local or national, will become major policy-making institutions as envisioned by supporters of the amateur

style. Again, Epstein observed:

> The Democratic and Republican parties have almost never been regarded as policymakers. In fact, they have often been criticized for not having policies (except ad hoc ones). The criticism has been part and parcel of a broader attack on American parties as nonprogrammatic...Yet it can be countered that American parties have been highly successful, as judged not only by the criteria of longevity and stability. Their very success in these respects may owe something to their nonprogrammatic character and the consequent absence of coherent policy-making.[69]

Hence, political parties will continue to be pragmatic structures that emphasize electoral-organizational goals rather than issue- programmatic and/or participatory goals. In addition, the data in this, and other studies, reveal that individuals within local organizations reflect these pragmatic or professional norms. Most activists, for example, are motivated by a complex and subtle "intendedly rational" pursuit of purposive, solidary and material incentives rather than the dichotomous purposive-personal values associated with the amateur-professional models. Finally, these data suggest that lower strata activists articulate a belief in greater decision-making influence while they eschew an organizational restructuring that would, in fact, increase their power and responsibilities.

Participation in local party organizations is affected by a rich and varied constellation of individual and organizational influences. Rather than evaluating activists and organizations as either amateurs or professionals, future studies of local parties would be better served by a more

careful appraisal of the internal and environmental conditions that effect purposive, solidary or materially oriented behavior by activists-conditions that might transform "readiness" or predisposition into an actual behavior pattern.

For example, the data in this study supported a "modified tool" view of organizations. As Perrow summarized this view:

> This is not to say that leaders are all powerful; there are many constraints on their ability to freely use the organization as tool.... But it does not suggest that for all, or even most organizations, that their leaders are not in a position to transform a neutral body of men into a polity committed to what the leaders believe to be important, rather than to what the individual members... think is important. Organizations are imperfect tools but...leadership is decisive.[70]

Of particular importance in current organizational theory is the leader's ability to control the premises of decision making. Yet, much is still not understood about the techniques used by local party elites to maintain these unobtrusive controls. The data in this study suggest that at the lowest levels of the party hierarchy, fully obtrusive controls such as giving orders, direct surveillance, rules and regulations and bureaucratic specialization (all involving direct rewards and sanctions) do not appear to significantly influence the behavior of committee people.

Why and how, therefore, are the unobtrusive controls of organizational premises effective? Do leaders manipulate these premises by deliberately controlling the organization's

vocabulary, lines of communication, rules and regulations, criteria for personnel selection or patterns of bureaucratic specialization? Do these premises persist because leaders encourage or acquiesce to misperceptions regarding their importance? Or, do professional premises persist, not because of elite behavior, but rather because they have historically evolved, and are viewed by activists, as an inherent aspect of American partisan behavior?

Drawing from the institutional school of organizational theory[71], in-depth case studies of local party decision making would shed light on these questions. To what degree are local party decisions, for example, the result of random or accidental behavior? How rational, intendedly rational or non-rational is the behavior of elites and lower strata activists in party decision making? Is intra-party change orderly, continuous and progressive or disorderly, discontinuous and random?

Future studies of local party structures might also draw from the environmental school of organizational theory that has achieved major theoretical breakthroughs in recent years.[72] To what extent, for example, is the behavior of elites in town party structures related to the behavior of elites in the county and state party organizations? Are the town parties dependent on or independent from the party units above them? What relationships exist between party structures and the general network of local governmental organizations: elected officials, the bureaucracy, the media and

special interests? Is the basic form of interaction among these units cooperation, conflict or superficial contact and adjustment?

The interaction of community and party values must also be studied further. Do personal or purposive values predominate in certain community settings? This study demonstrated that social characteristics, such as income and education, do not correlate, as widely assumed, with a strong commitment to purposive values. Under what circumstances, if any, does a community emphasize non-self regarding values? Most importantly, to what extent do community values and norms penetrate intra-party decision making, and vice versa?

Last, local party researchers must look more carefully at the behavior of individuals within these environmental settings. Individual goals, as noted earlier, may predispose activists to a "state of energy mobilization" (i.e., behavior). In addition, these incentive goals can be mixed and fluctuate with changing conditions. In the process of satisficing their goals, activists may simultaneously pursue several types of incentives in an intendedly rational process which they may not fully comprehend. Within this clouded motivational network, researchers should attempt to identify the personal and environmental conditions that encourage or trigger an activist to stress purposive, solidary or material incentives. Under what circumstances, for example, do lower strata activists desire greater decision

making influence and party responsibility? What factors will stimulate, if even temporarily, a purposive orientation or a desire for material rewards? How does the temporary pursuit of material resources affect an activist's commitment to purposive goals? To what extent do elites influence this complex process of goal satisficing? In the final analysis, to what extent is an activist's behavior a response to conditioning, learning, sentiments, norms or traditions?

The data in this study suggest that the professional style will continue to dominate local parties because this style is suited to the central objective of American parties - electoral success. Personal material incentives will continue to influence, at varying times and in varying degrees, the behavior of many local activists. Similarly, the desire for solidary-social satisfactions, particularly friendships, will continue as the most powerful motives for sustaining and perhaps shaping the participation of most activists. Although they may contribute to the persistence of professional norms, such institutional patterns do not preclude purposive, public-regarding behavior by either elites or committee people.

The middle-class, suburban party organizations in Babylon and Huntington have thus blended aspects of both the professional and amateur ideal types. Although material rewards are no longer the dominant resource they were in the urban machines, they continue to influence individual and organizational behavior. Yet, the data suggest, purposive

and solidary motives also shape the political style of these activists. Thus, Epstein may have been reflecting the literature's excessive dependence on dichotomous models when he observed:

> The party organizations based on patronage were strong.... Material rewards, as long as they existed, made for a durable party organization. In the United States at least, it is not clear that an equally useful substitute has been found. The alternative to a patronage organization may be almost no American organizational membership at all.[73]

The suburban parties, though hardly "based on patronage", remain "durable" partisan organizations that have achieved a significant degree of electoral success and internal stability. Future studies in this area would therefore best be served by accepting the realities of personal motivation and undertaking research that will yield a greater understanding of the factors that are condusive to both purposive and personal behavior in local politics.

Amateur activists and organizations have been elusive in the literature because the amateur model itself is somewhat illusory. Given the pervasive degree to which self interest permeates the American civic culture, a careful weighing of the role self interest plays in local politics is in order. To assume, as does much of the literature on amateur organizations, that political parties can, and should, rise above this ethic is to invite simplistic interpretations of local party activism. In the long run, such unrealistic perceptions have, and will continue, to

erode the credibility and effectiveness of political parties.

The pragmatic implications of this erosion were captured in a New York Times editorial commenting on the Supreme Court's Branti v. Finkel decision (No. 78-1654, March 31, 1980) which ruled that public employees cannot ordinarily be dismissed solely on the basis of their party affiliation.

> What fun it is to ridicule political parties. We pick on them when they don't deliver the Government we think we deserve, and also when they do. When strong, we call them boss-ridden; when weak, we say they lack discipline. More and more, the voters declare themselves indifferent to party labels and ask to vote in whichever party's primary they choose. Now the Supreme Court has joined the sport, heaping more woe on the clubhouses. It has decided, 6 to 3, that party affiliation should not have much to do with a Government job.
>
> The Constitution does not mention, much less enshrine, political parties. In other cases, the Court has been accused of protecting the major parties too much by making it hard to run independent races. But Mr. Dooley said the Court follows the election returns. If so, perhaps this party-weakening decision not only foreshadows but also reflects the decline of a once valuable institution.[73]

In the absence of viable political parties, one may safely speculate, America's already fragmented political system will be even more open to domination by powerful, single issue interest groups that historically have displayed little, or no, concern for the public-regarding values championed by supporters of the amateur model.

CHAPTER NINE

FOOTNOTES

[1]Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, (New York: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 134

[2]Ibid., pp. 286-287.

[3]M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert, "Motivation, Incentive Systems and the Political Party Organization", American Political Science Review, 62 (December, 1963): 1168.

[4]Peter R. Gluck, "Research Note: Incentives and the Maintenance of Political Styles in Different Locales", Western Political Quarterly, 25 (December, 1972): 758.

[5]James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 5.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Glen Browder and Dennis Ippolito, "The Suburban Party Activist: The Case of the Southern Amateurs", Social Science Quarterly, 53 (June, 1972):175.

[8]Dennis G. Sullivan, Jeffrey L. Pressman, Benjamin I. Page, John J. Lyons, "Purists and Professionals in Party Politics", in Political Parties, edited by David W. Abbott and Edward T. Rogonsky, (New York: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 49-50.

[9]Robert Hitlin and John S. Jackson, "On Amateur and Professional Politicians", The Journal of Politics, 39 (August, 1977): 786-793.

[10]Dennis Ippolito, "Motivational Reorientation and Change Among Party Activists", Journal of Politics, 31 (November, 1969): 1099-1100.

[11]Frank J. Sorauf, "The Silent Revolution in Patronage", Public Administration Review, 20 (Winter, 1960): 30-32.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Why Machine Politics Have Not Withered Away", Journal of Politics, 34 (May, 1972): 389.

[14]Wilson, op. cit.

[15]Herbert J. Gans, The Levittowners: How People Live and Politic in Suburbia, (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 308.

[16]Robert Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 168.

[17]Sorauf, op. cit.

[18]Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics, (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 121-123.

[19]Browder and Ippolito, Loc. Cit.

[20]Ippolito, loc. cit.

[21]Wilson, op. cit.

[22]Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization", Administrative Science Quarterly, 6: (September, 1961): 129-166.

[23]Eldersveld, op. cit., pp. 293, 295.

[24]Cf. ante., p. 42.

[25]Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, (Glenview; Scott Foresman and Company, 1972), p. 134.

[26]Ibid., p. 136.

[27]James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 138-140.

[28]Ibid., pp. 140-141.

[29]Perrow, op. cit., p. 145.

[30]Ibid., pp. 150-151.

[31]Cf. ante., p. 162.

[32]Perrow, op. cit., p. 152.

[33]Ibid., p. 148.

[34]Clark and Wilson, op. cit., p. 130.

[35] Thomas H. Roback, "Amateurs and Professionals: Delegates to the 1972 Republican National Convention", Journal of Politics, 37 (1975): 439.

[36] Perrow, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

[37] Ibid., p. 113.

[38] Ibid., p. 153.

[39] Wilson, op. cit., pp. 129-133.

[40] Richard A. Styskal, "Power and Commitment in Organizations: A Test of the Participation Thesis", Social Forces 58 (March, 1980), p. 937.

[41] Ibid., p. 940.

[42] Peter Bachrach, "Interest, Participation and Democratic Theory", in Participation in Politics, edited by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1975), p. 40.

[43] Peter Bachrach, ed., Political Elites in a Democracy, (New York: Atherton Press, 1971), p. 101.

[44] Bachrach, "Interest, Participation and Democratic Theory", op. cit., p. 40.

[45] Ibid., p. 48.

[46] Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 43.

[47] Styskal, op. cit., p. 941.

[48] Ibid., p. 928.

[49] Bachrach, Political Elites in a Democracy, op. cit., p. 7.

[50] Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy" in Political Elites in a Democracy, edited by Bachrach, op. cit., p. 78.

[51] Jane J. Mansbridge, "The Limits of Friendship", in Participation in Politics, edited by Pennock, op. cit., p. 247.

[52] Ibid., p. 248.

[53] Ibid., p. 265.

[54]Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 43, 44.

[55]Mansbridge, op. cit., p. 264.

[56]Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation, (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 127.

[57]Cf. ante., p. 255.

[58]George Strauss, "Some Notes on Power Equalization", in The Social Science of Organizations: Four Perspectives edited by Harold J. Leavitt, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 48.

[59]Wilson, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[60]Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 83-84.

[61]Arthur B. Gunlick, "Max Weber's Typology of Politicians: A Reexamination", Journal of Politics, 40 (May, 1978): 499-500.

[62]Ibid., p. 501.

[63]Austin Ranney, Curing the Mischeafs of Faction: Party Reform in America, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1975), p. 22.

[64]Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, (New York: Vintage Press, 1966).

[65]Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics, (New York: Norton, 1970).

[66]Ranney, op. cit., p. 43.

[67]Ibid., p. 45.

[68]Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 58.

[69]Ibid., p. 265.

[70]Perrow, op. cit., p. 197.

[71]Ibid., Chapter 5.

[72]Ibid., Chapter 6.

[73]Epstein, op. cit., p. 111.

[74]New York Times, April 5, 1980.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

To be administered to: (1) Lower strata activists - comittee persons (election district leaders).
(2) Party elites - area chairmen/ zone leaders, town leaders, other executive board members.

1. Let's start with some questions about your background in politics. What was the first campaign in which you were a party worker?

_____

(IF NOT LAST CAMPAIGN) 1.a. Have you worked fairly continuously since then?

1. Yes 2. No

(If No) 1.b. Between what years have you not been working for the party?

_____ to _____

2. What first led you to become active as a party worker?

_____

_____

_____

_____

3. Here is a list of different party positions. Which of these have you held?

a. Committee person
b. Area leader/zone leader
c. Town party official
d. County party official
e. State party official
f. Delegate or alternate to national convention
g. Others
SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT/PARTY POSITIONS_____

_____

4. What first attracted you to the position of committee person?_____

_____

_____

_____

5. What kinds of party work did you do in your district during the last campaign? Describe the kinds of party work you do in-between campaigns?_____

_____

_____

_____

6. What generally are your party activities in-between election campaigns?_____

_____

_____

_____

7a. (For committee people) In connection with party work, how much direct contact have you had with your party's leaders.

1. Often 2. Frequently 3. Rarely 4. Never

1. Often - throughout the year
2. Frequently - during the campaign, but rarely at other times
3. Rarely - at conventions, party meetings, etc.
4. Never

7b. (If "Often" or "Frequently") What topics did you discuss?

_____

_____

_____

7c. (For party elites) What topics do you discuss at executive board meetings?_____

_____

_____

8. If you were to name your party's one or two most powerful leaders in Suffolk County, who would you name? In what ways is each powerful? (i.e. What are his or her political resources?)_____

9. If you were to name your party's most influential leaders in Babylon/Huntington Town, who would you name? In what ways is each powerful? (i.e. What are his or her political resources?)_____

10. How much say do you believe committee persons generally have in running your party's organization: very little... some...a fair amount...a great deal? Why?_____

11a. Selecting nominees for elected office is an important party decision. Describe the process by which your party chooses candidates._____

11b. How often do the committee people accept the executive board's recommendations on candidates? Why?_____

_____

_____

_____

11c. What criteria are most important to the executive board when they select candidates?_____

_____

12a. Describe the process by which your party makes patronage appointments._____

_____

12b. What criteria are most important to party leaders when they make patronage appointments?_____

_____

13a. Providing campaign assistance to candidates is another important area of party decision making. Describe the process by which money, workers and other help are provided to the candidates._____

_____

_____

13b. What criteria are most important to party leaders when they provide campaign assistance?_____

_____

_____

14a. Every organization requires internal discipline. Do you know of specific cases where the party leaders used rewards and punishments to motivate committee people and maintain discipline within the party?_____

_____

_____

14b. Would you describe your party as disciplined?_____

_____

_____

15. Some people have observed that committee people fall into the categories listed below. Do you agree? What percent of committee persons would you guess for each category. (Note: the categories can overlap.)

%

____ Committee persons holding full-time or part-time patronage positions.

____ Committee persons seeking full time or part time patronage positions for themselves or members of their family.

____ Active committee people who are not interested in patronage.

____ Inactive (paper) committee people.

16. Do you think committee persons should have more say than they do now in running the party organization...is it about right now...or should they have less say? Why?

_____

_____

_____

_____

17. Do you think town leaders should have more say than they do now in running the party organization...is it about right now...or should they have less say? Why?_____

_____

_____

_____

18a. Do you attend party fund raisers? Yes____ No____

18b. How do you decide which fund raisers you will attend?

_____

_____

19. What are your plans for future party work? That is, will you probably be more active, continue about the same, or be less active? Why?_____

_____

_____

20a. If you had the opportunity to take a more responsible postion in the party or government than you have now, what would it be?_____

_____

_____

20b. Why would you take or reject it?_____

_____

21. If you had to drop out of political activity tomorrow, what things would you miss the most from such work?

_____

_____

_____

22. (If committee person) What kinds of party activities do you think the party leaders expect of you?_____

_____

_____

_____

23. (If committee person) Have you ever desired (for yourself or someone else) support from the party leadership for:

_____nomination for public office. (Specify.)

_____appointment to a government position. (Specify.)

_____assistance in running a campaign. (Specify.)

24a. Have you ever been awarded or denied (or know anyone who has been awarded or denied) any of the following because of his/her standing with the party's leaders.

_____nomination for public office.

_____appointment to a government position.

_____assistance in running a campaign.

24b. Specify the reasons why each of the above was awarded or denied._____

_____

_____

_____

_____

25a. (If party elite) Have you ever assisted a party worker or know a party worker assisted in obtaining any of the following because of his/her party activities?

_____nomination for public office.

_____appointment to a government position.

_____assistance in running a campaign.

25b. (If yes) Why was assistance provided?_____

_____

_____

26a. (If party elite) Have you ever prevented a party worker or know a party worker prevented from obtaining any of the following because of his/her party activities?

_____nomination for public office.

_____appointment to a government position.

_____assistance in running a campaign.

26b. (If yes) Why?_____

_____

_____

_____

27a. Would you support the complete abolition of the patronage system in Suffolk County? Why?_____

_____

_____

27b. What would be the effect on the party if the leaders could no longer use patronage or nominations as rewards and punishments?_____

_____

_____

28a. What role do issues, political philosophy or ideology play in the party?_____

_____

28b. Are the party factions based on issues or philosophy, or personality-power differences?_____

_____

29. How have your ideas or attitudes about politics changed since you first became active?_____

_____

_____

APPENDIX B

WRITTEN QUESTIONNAIRE

We are interested in your opinion about your interests, influence and goals within the party organization. Please complete each of the items below.

1. We would like to know how much influence you have within your party. By influence we mean the amount of control you feel you have over activities within the party. Below is a point scale that goes from (1) no influence to (6) a great deal of influence. Please circle the number that comes closest to the amount of influence you have in each of these policy areas:

   a. Influence over how campaigns are conducted in your district.

   No Influence — A Great Deal Of Influence

   1 2 3 4 5 6

   Does Not Apply ____

   b. Influence affecting the nomination of party candidates for public office.

   No Influence — A Great Deal Of Influence

   1 2 3 4 5 6

   Does Not Apply ____

   c. Influence affecting the selection of appointees to government positions.

   No Influence — A Great Deal Of Influence

   1 2 3 4 5 6

   Does Not Apply ____

   d. Influence affecting the selection of party officials.

   No Influence — A Great Deal Of Influence

   1 2 3 4 5 6

   Does Not Apply ____

e. Influence affecting the party's stand (platform) on local, state and national issues.

No Influence					A Great Deal Of Influence
1	2	3	4	5	6

Does Not Apply ____

f. Influence affecting the party's internal procedure (constitution, by-laws, rules, etc.).

No Influence					A Great Deal Of Influence
1	2	3	4	5	6

Does Not Apply ____

2. We would like to know how much freedom you have to make decisions. Below is a six point scale that goes from (1) no freedom to (6) complete freedom. Please circle the number that comes closest to the amount of freedom you have regarding these decisions:

a. How campaigns are conducted in your district.

No Freedom		A Moderate Degree Of Freedom			Complete Freedom
1	2	3	4	5	6

Does Not Apply ____

b. How you cast your vote at party conventions or caucuses for the party's nominees for public office.

No Freedom		A Moderate Degree Of Freedom			Complete Freedom
1	2	3	4	5	6

Does Not Apply ____

c. How you cast your vote at party conventions or caucuses for candidates for the party's county or town leadership.

No Freedom		A Moderate Degree Of Freedom			Complete Freedom
1	2	3	4	5	6

Does Not Apply ____

d. How you cast your vote at party conventions or caucuses for candidates for party area leaders.

No Freedom		A Moderate Degree Of Freedom		Complete Freedom	
1	2	3	4	5	6

Does Not Apply ____

e. How you cast your vote at party conventions or caucuses for candidates for state committee persons.

No Freedom		A Moderate Degree Of Freedom		Complete Freedom	
1	2	3	4	5	6

Does Not Apply ____

f. How you cast your vote at party conventions or caucuses regarding the party's stand on local, state and national issues.

No Freedom		A Moderate Degree Of Freedom		Complete Freedom	
1	2	3	4	5	6

Does Not Apply ____

g. How you cast your vote at party conventions or caucuses regarding the party's internal procedures (constitution, by-laws, rules, etc.).

No Freedom		A Moderate Degree Of Freedom		Complete Freedom	
1	2	3	4	5	6

Does Not Apply ____

3. Here are a number of reasons that are often given for why people are active in party work. Taking each reason separately in explaining why you originally became active and now remain active, would you say that it is (1) very important, (2) somewhat important, or (3) not very important?

	RATING	
	BECAME ACTIVE	REMAIN ACTIVE
a. I had/have a friendship for a candidate.	____	____
b. Political work is part of my way of life.	____	____

		RATING	
		BECAME ACTIVE	REMAIN ACTIVE
c.	I am strongly attached to my political party.	_____	_____
d.	I enjoy the friendship and social contacts I have with other workers	_____	_____
e.	I like the fun and excitement of the campaign.	_____	_____
f.	I am trying to build a personal position in politics.	_____	_____
g.	I see party work as a way of influencing the policies of government.	_____	_____
h.	I like the feeling of being close to people who are doing important things.	_____	_____
i.	Party work helps me to make business contacts.	_____	_____
j.	Party work helps me to fulfill my sense of community obligation.	_____	_____
k.	Party work gives me a feeling of recognition in my community.	_____	_____

a. Which one of these reasons do you think best explains why you originally became active in politics?

_____

b. Which one of these reasons do you think best explains why you now remain active in politics?

_____

c. (If committee person)
Select the five reasons you think best explain why other committee persons/assembly district leaders remain active in politics.

_____

_____

d. (If committee person)
Select the five reasons you think best explain why town/county party leaders remain active in politics.

_____

_____

4. Here are a number of goals that are often desired by party leaders. Taking each goal separately in describing the priorities of the town/county leaders, would you say that it is (1) very important, (2) somewhat important, or (3) not very important?

		RATING
a.	Winning elections.	_____
b.	Selecting appointees to government positions.	_____
c.	Selecting appointees to party positions.	_____
d.	Providing campaign assistance.	_____
e.	Rewarding loyal party workers.	_____
f.	Influencing the party's positions on issues.	_____
g.	Selecting nominees for public office.	_____
h.	Securing new party workers.	_____
i.	Settling conflicts within the party.	_____
j.	Maintaining a balance among factions within the party.	_____
k.	Securing the power of the leaders.	_____

a. Select the five goals you think are most important to the town/county leaders.

_____

_____

_____

b. Select the goals which you think should be most important to the town/county leaders <u>but currently are not</u>.

_____

_____

_____

f. Allowing the public to vote on initiatives and referenda.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

g. Abortion.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

h. Medicaid benefits.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

i. Enacting a "Proposition 13" type tax cut.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

j. Quota systems for minority hiring.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

k. Medicare-Social Security benefits.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

l. The Equal Rights Amendment.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

m. Racial discrimination in housing and employment.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

n. Tougher anti-crime laws.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

c. (Do not write)
If you think your party goals are different from those desired by most of the town/county leaders, explain why.

_____

_____

_____

5. Some people feel that issues play an important role in local party politics. Other people feel that local parties are primarily interested in maintaining their party's strength. How important do you think each of the issues below is in the running of your party organization in Suffolk County? That is, to what extent do you feel these issues affect your Suffolk party regarding: (a) selection of candidates; (b) selection of party leaders, (c) the degree to which these issues are discussed at zone and town committee meetings.

a. President Carter's energy plan.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

b. Zoning changes for new housing construction.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

c. The death penalty.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

d. Welfare benefits.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

e. Federal taxing-spending policies (anti-inflation programs).

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

o. Preserving the suburban character of Suffolk County.

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

p. Other_____

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

q. Other_____

1	2	3	4
Not at All Important	Not Very Important	Somewhat Important	Very Important

6. How much influence has your local party's stand on major issues had, over the past six years, on your decision to remain active in politics? We are interested in the Suffolk Party.

The party's stand on issues has had no influence on my decision to remain active.

The party's stand on issues has had a great influence on my decision to remain active.

1 2 3 4 5 6

My local party organization takes no stand on issues._____

7. How much influence has your national party's stand on major issues had, over the past six years, on your decision to remain active in politics?

The party's stand on issues has had no influence on my decision to remain active.

The party's stand on issues has had a great influence on my decision to remain active.

1 2 3 4 5 6

My local party organization takes no stand on issues._____

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1963.

Bachrach, Peter, ed. Political Elites in a Democracy. New York: Atherton Press, 1971.
The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967.

Bailey, Stephen Kemp. Congress Makes a Law. New York: Vintage Books, 1950.

Banfield, Edward C., and James Q. Wilson. City Politics. New York: Vintage Books, 1963.

Broder, David S. The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Burnham, Walter Jean. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Norton and Company, 1970.

Burns, James MacGregor. The Deadlock of Democracy: Four Party Politics in America. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967.

Caraley, Demetrios, ed. American Political Institutions in the 1970's. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.

Cole, Richard L. Citizen Participation and the Urban Policy Process. New York: D. C. Heath, 1974.

Dahl, Robert A. After the Revolution? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.
Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

Eldersveld, Samuel J. Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis. New York: Rand McNally Company, 1964.

Epstein, Leon D. Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.

Flinn, Thomas. Local Government and Politics. Glenview: Scott Foresman, 1970.

Forthal, Sonya. Cogwheels of Democracy: A Study of the Precinct Captain. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1946.

Gans, Herbert J. The Levittowners: How People Live and Politic in Suburbia. New York: Random House, 1967.

Gilbert, Charles E. Governing the Suburbs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967.

Goodnow, Frank. Politics and Administration: A Study in Government. New York: Russell and Russell, 1967.

Gosnell, Harold F. Machine Politics: Chicago Model. New York: A.M.S. Press, 1937.

Greenstein, Fred I. "The Changing Patterns of Urban Politics." In Politics of Metropolitan Areas, pp. 62-77. Edited by Phillip B. Coulter, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967.

Handlin, Oscar. Al Smith and His America. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1958.

Keech, William R. "Some Conditions of Negro Influence Over Public Policy Through Voting." In Political Parties and Political Behavior, pp. 534-548. Edited by William J. Critty, Donald M. Freeman and Douglas S. Gattlin. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966.

Key, V. O. Political Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964.

Ladd, Everett Carl, Jr. American Political Parties: Social Change and Political Response. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1970.

Lane, Robert E. Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does. New York: The Free Press, 1962.

Likert, Rensis. The Human Organization: Its Management and Value. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1967.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. The First New Nation. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1963.
Political Man. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1960.

Lowi, Theodore. The End of Liberalism. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969.

March, James G., and Herbert A. Simon. Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958.

McConnell, Grant. Private Power and American Democracy. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.

Merriam, Charles. Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929.

Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press, 1957.

Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949.

Murphy, Thomas and John Rehfuss. Urban Politics in the Suburban Era. Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1976.

Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Pennock, Roland and John W. Chapman, eds. Participation in Politics. New York: Lieber-Aterton, Incorporated, 1975.

Perrow, Charles. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. Glenview: Scott Foresman and Company, 1972.

Ranney, Austin. Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America. Berkley: University of California Press, 1975.

Rossiter, Clinton. Parties and Politics in America. New York: The New American Library, 1960.

Royko, Mike. Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971.

Sayre, Wallace and Herbert Kaufman. Governing New York City. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960.

Schattschneider, E. E. Party Government. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1960.

Schlesinger, Joseph A. "Political Party Organization." In Handbook of Organizations, pp. 764-801. Edited by James G. March. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965.

Scott, James C. Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972.

Scott, Thomas M. "Suburban Governmental Structures." In The Urbanization of the Suburbs, pp. 213-238. Edited by Louis Masotti and Jeffrey Hadden. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973.

Sorauf, Frank J. "Patronage and Party." In American Political Parties: A Systematic Perspective, pp. 440-452. Edited by Charles G. Mayo and Beryl L. Crow. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.

"Political Parties and Political Analysis." In The American Party System: Stages of Political Development, pp. 33-55. Edited by William Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Strauss, George. "Some Notes on Power Equalization." In The Social Science of Organizations: Four Perspectives. Edited by Harold J. Leavitt. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963.

Sullivan, Dennis, Jeffrey L. Pressman, Benjamin I. Page and John J. Lyons. "Purists and Professionals in Party Politics." In Political Parties. Edited by David W. Abbott and Edward T. Rogowsky. New York: Rand McNally College Publishing, 1978.

Tolchin, Martin and Susan Tolchin. To The Victor: Political Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House. New York: Vintage Books, 1972.

Townsend, James R. Political Participation in Communist China. Berkley: University of California Press, 1969.

Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie. Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Verba, Sidney. Small Groups and Political Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Weber, Max. "Politics as a Vocation." In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 77-128. Edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958.

Wilson, James Q. The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Wilson, Woodrow. Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. New York: Merridian Books, 1956.

Wirt, Frederick, Walter Benjamin, Francine Rabinowitz and Deborah Hensler. On The City's Rim: Politics and Policy in Suburbia. Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1972.

Wood, Robert. Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Alford, Robert R. and Harry M. Scoble. "Sources of Local Political Involvement." American Political Science Review 62 (1968): 1192-1206.

Althoff, Phillip and Samuel C. Patterson. "Political Activism in a Rural County." Midwest Journal of Political Science 10:46-50.

Blumberg, Leonard and Michael Lalli. "Little Ghettoes: A Study of Negroes in the Suburbs." Phylon 27 (Summer 1966): 117-131.

Bowman, Lewis and G. R. Boynton. "Activities and Role Definitions of Grassroots Party Officials." The Journal of Politics 28 (February 1966): 121-143.
"Recruitment Patterns Among Local Party Officials: A Model and Some Preliminary Findings in Selected Locales." American Political Science Review 60 (September 1966): 667-676.

Bowman, Lewis, Dennis Ippolito and William Donaldson. "Incentives for the Maintenance of Grassroots Political Activism." Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (February 1969): 120-139.

Browder, Glen and Dennis Ippolito. "The Suburban Party Activist: The Case of the Southern Amateurs." Social Science Quarterly 53 (June 1972): 168-175.

Clark, Peter B. and James Q. Wilson. "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 6 (September 1961): 129-166.

Conway, M. Margaret and Frank B. Feigert. "Incentives and Task Performance Among Party Precinct Workers." Western Political Quarterly 27 (December 1974): 693-709.
"Motivation, Incentive Systems and the Political Party Organization." American Political Science Review 62 (December 1968): 1159-1173.

Cutright, Phillip. "Activities of Precinct Committeemen in Partisan and Nonpartisan Committees." Western Political Quarterly 17 (March 1964): 93-108.

Gluck, Peter R. "Research Note: Incentives and the Maintenance of Political Styles in Different Locales." Western Political Quarterly 25 (December 1972): 753-760.

Gunlicks, Arthur B. "Max Weber's Typology of Politicians Reexamined." The Journal of Politics 40 (May 1978): 490-502.

Hitlin, Robert and John S. Jackson III. "On Amateur and Professional Politicians." The Journal of Politics 39 (August 1977): 786-793.

Hoffstetter, C. Richard. "The Amateur Politician: A Problem of Construct Validation." Midwest Journal of Political Science 15 (February 1971): 31-56.
"Organizational Activists: The Bases of Participation in Amateur and Professional Groups." American Politics Quarterly 6 (April 1973): 244-276.

Ippolito, Dennis. "Motivational Reorientation and Change Among Party Activists." Journal of Politics 31 (November 1969): 1098-1101.
"Political Perspectives of Suburban Party Leaders." Social Science Quarterly 49 (March 1969): 800-814.

Jackson, John S., Jesse C. Brown and Barbara L. Brown. "Recruitment, Representation and Political Values: The 1976 Democratic National Convention Delegates." American Politics Quarterly 6 (April 1978): 187-212.

Marshall, Thomas. "Party Responsibility Revisited: A Case of Policy Discussion at the Grass Roots." Western Political Quarterly 32 (March 1979): 70-78.

Medding, Peter Y. "A Framework for the Analysis of Power in Political Parties." Political Studies 18 (1970): 1-17.

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick and James Q. Wilson. "Patronage in New York State, 1955-1959." American Political Science Quarterly 58 (July 1964): 286-301.

Nimmo, Dan and Robert L. Savage. "The Amateur Revisited." Polity 2 (Winter 1972): 268-276.

Payne, James and Oliver Woshinsky. "Incentives for Political Participation." World Politics 24 (July 1972): 518-546.

Pomper, Gerald M. "The Decline of the Party in American Elections." Political Science Quarterly 92 (Spring 1977): 21-41.

Protess, David L. "Banfield's Chicago Revisited: The Conditions For and Social Policy Implications of the Transformation of a Political Machine." Social Science Review 48 (July 1974): 184-202.

Riedel, James A. "Boss and Faction." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 353 (May 1964): 14-26.

Roback, Thomas H. "Amateurs and Professionals: Delegates to the 1972 Republican National Convention." Journal of Politics 37 (1975): 436-465.

Salisbury, Robert H. "The Urban Party Organization Member." Public Opinion Quarterly 29 (1965): 550-564.

Scarrow, Harold. "The Function of Political Parties: A Critique of the Literature." Journal of Politics 29 (November 1967): 770-779.

Schlesinger, Joseph A. "The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory." American Political Science Review 69 (September 1975): 840-849.

Scott, James C. "Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change." American Political Science Review 63 (December 1969): 1142-1158.

Seligman, Lester G. "Political Recruitment and Party Structure: A Case Study." American Political Science Review 55 (March 1961): 77-86.

Sorauf, Frank J. "The Silent Revolution in Patronage." Public Administration Review 20 (Winter 1960): 28-34.

Soule, John W. and James W. Clarke. "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention." American Political Science Review 44 (September 1970): 888-898.

Styskal, Richard A. "Power and Commitment in Organizations." Social Forces 58 (March 1980): 925-943.

"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association." American Political Science Review 44 (September 1950 supplement).

Tucker, Joseph. "The Administration of a State Patronage System: The Democratic Party in Illinois." Western Political Quarterly 22 (March 1969): 79-84.

Weingrod, Alex. "Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties." Comparative Studies in Society and History 10 (July 1968): 377-400.

Wilson, James Q. "The Economy of Patronage." Journal of Political Economy 69 (August 1961): 369-380.

Wolfinger, Raymond E. "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away." Journal of Politics 34 (May 1972): 365-398.

Zickmund, Joseph. "A Theoretical Structure for the Study of Suburban Politics." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 422 (November 1975): 45-60.

REPORTS

"Babylon, 1978-1979." Long Island Business Review 1978.

"Color and Race." U.S. Census '70. Volume 2. Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1972.

"Housing Inventory." U.S. Census '70. Volume 4. Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1972.

"Huntinton, 1978-1979." Long Island Business Review, 1978.

"Income." U.S. Census '70. Volume 2. Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1973.

Population Survey. Long Island Lighting Company, 1978.

A Profile of the Nassau-Suffolk Labor Force. Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, 1973.

The Suffolk County Catalogue. The Suffolk County Planning Commission, 1972.

NEWSPAPERS

Babylon Beacon, 27 January 1969; 18 November 1971; 10, 17, 24 October 1974.

The Long Islander, 8 May 1969; 2 July 1970; 12 June 1975; 6 October; 3 November 1977; January-December 1978.

Newsday, 18 February; 18 July 1972; 28 January; 2, 22 March; 5 April; 3 July; 11 August 1979.

The New York Times, 28 January; 11, 22 March; 5 August 1979; 1, 5 April, 1980.