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Exploration of dialogical constructions of meaning: Some teachers and children talking

Arieux, Marianne, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1993

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EXPLORATION OF DIALOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MEANING: SOME TEACHERS AND CHILDREN TALKING

by

MARIANNE ARIEUX

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

1993

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

EXPLORATION OF DIALOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MEANING: SOME TEACHERS AND CHILDREN TALKING

by

Marianne Arieux

Adviser: Joseph Glick

School age children's communicative meaning development was explored in a quasi-experimental, cross-sectional study. Vgotsky's (1987) insights into development, Werner and Kaplan's (1984) model of symbol development and Bakhtin's (1984, 1986) semiotic analysis of speech were woven into an argument for examining communicative meaning as a dialogical process. Children's verbal interactions in two discourse contexts, talk with a good friend and with their teachers, were studied. The interaction of discourses from two disparate contexts was expected to effect change in meanings with children's appropriation of the authorial voice of the teacher measured by double voicing, *heteroglossia*.

The sample consisted of 31 same gender 3rd and 4th grade dyads with their 2nd and 5th grade classroom peers (i.e., bridge classes) from 5 classes in two inner city public schools. The majority of the children were African-american and/or Latino (71%). Children's dialogical meanings were elicited as talk about a video text in three

sequential discourse phases: two dyadic phases of talk for 15 minutes with a good friend before and after an intervening phase, talk with their teachers in a classroom activity. The final (post intervention) dyadic discourse phase was transformed into a carnivalized version of the initial dyadic phase by giving children props with instructions to be funny in order to provide maximum contextual support for double-voiced discourse.

Talk was examined for amount of time, mode of talking (dialogue genres), interpretations of the skits, and intertextual referencing of the teacher's talk. In the dyadic phases, children were found to construct rich dialogues; variations of children's friendship talk genre were uncovered. Talk in the class activities met the criteria for classroom discussion genre. Dialogical meaning development was exhibited by children's new interpretations (68%) embedded in dialogue genre changes; and evidence of intertextuality in the final dyadic talk of 17 dyads. A developmental trend was observed for the level of complexity in intertextuality: 2nd-3rd graders mostly **imported**, 4th graders **transformed**, and 5th graders were observed to **caricature** their teacher's discourse. Within grade class differences for the younger grades only and gender differences are discussed. Hypotheses for future study of children's appropriation of the voice of the adult were generated.

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One does not come to a dissertation at this time of life without the help of many, many who would be deemed insignificant by most, but crucial to the process both intellectually and socially. First and foremost I must thank my son, Lome. For more of his life than not, I have been a graduate student. Had he not been the child he was and now the young man that he is, I would not have had the freedom to pursue this work.

Much is owed to my unrelenting muse who I supposed was formulated sometime very long ago by parents, relatives, friends, and a host of New Orleanians and Southerners. Small towns and minuscule French neighborhoods within large cities provide many moments of intimate contact. The unrelenting aspect of this muse I can only lay at my mother's feet. What else could be expected from the oldest daughter of a woman who against one and all decided that she was born to have eleven children and promptly did so with grace and abandonment?

The intellectual aspect of this muse was fashioned by the late Dr. John Tice, my first mentor, who insisted that yes graduate school was where I should be. I have him to thank for those first footsteps.

From those footsteps to these there were many who assisted with their time, understanding and support along the various pathways to the culmination of this degree.

Chief among these were Charles Smith, Sanford Schreiber and Barbara Brooks, whose tireless efforts in my behalf were more crucial than they perhaps knew. In a different but just as quiet way, Ray McDermott provided inspiration.

The current constituencies in my life which underpin this effort emanate from several arenas. From Medgar Evers College, the health sciences faculty, in particular Bertie Gilmore, whose consistent understanding and pleasure at my accomplishments helped smooth the rougher spots. I also want to thank my students over the years--they provided many moments of joy in the classroom and permitted me to explore new and better ways to teach.

On a more personal level, my long time friends, Susan and Libby and my sister, Colette, have given support, shared wisdom and soothed anxieties from the inception of this endeavor. Newer friends have been just as invaluable in nurturing the finishing touches. Special thanks here goes to Howard, for being the consummate prop man. From Jonathan, the myriad phone calls replete with intellectual sustenance and gifts of laughter are greatly appreciated.

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The intellectual atmosphere created by students and faculty of the Program in Developmental Psychology and the

Graduate Center of the City University of New York beginning in 1981 was integral to the combination of intellectual and researcher that I have become. Katherine Nelson, Harry Beilin, Joseph Glick, and the late Sylvia Scribner were the professorial staff. While not a resident of the 5th Floor, Lindsey Churchill was more than a mentor in my early struggle to understand a very different research world than the one I thought I had come to study. The host of students, many long gone, created a stimulating atmosphere, more precious now that it seems of a time and place no longer possible. I would meet Robin Fivush in the hallways, kindly asking how I was doing. Rhianon Allen was notable by her absence and the fact that her desk was inviolate. Off writing a dissertation her surfaces were sacrosanct, guarded from any unknowing newly arrived graduate students. My office mates, Jason Schwartzman, David Kritt, and Iris Sroka, in addition to becoming friends, created an unusual oasis. Our office was known for untasteful literature on its walls and colorful speech befitting the popular culture idolists who inhabited it. Companionable talks with June Hampson were memorable. The colloquium committee, composed entirely of students, met regularly to entice various developmental psychologists to come and speak. That first year I walked into Harry's research methods class to study philosophy of science and life span development. In Joe's introduction to developmental psychology we read

Voloshinov. Upstairs with Lindsey, we contemplated the ethnomethodologists. I thought--I finally found the education which had eluded me!

Later I would meet Dalton Miller-Jones, and discuss how to study cultural differences of the inferiorized without evoking deficiency. I would talk at length both to Joe Becker and Julie Gearhardt. My feminist practices would be re-awakened with new courses in Women's Studies. Finally I would have to take from all of these and many others who enriched that beginning educational experience and produce this work. To those more directly involved in this project, I must especially thank Joseph Glick, the person who initiated my entrance into this program and guided my dissertation. As I came around that last corner and unaccountably began looking to scholars of Clarke University for answers, I knew that part of what I study and how I study it could only have happened because of Joe. Thanks also to my committee members, Katherine and Dalton, whose support both of this project and over the years has been invaluable. Helpful suggestions over the years from Lindsey and newly from Buzzy Chanowitz as outside readers made the final lap possible. The careful reading and elucidating commentary of this document by committee members and readers was greatly appreciated. Lastly, I would like to dedicate this work to Sylvia Scribner, in memory of her generous offer of time and talk befitting the role model she was.

Whimsical Sylvia--A Remembrance

Many have written of Sylvia's intellectual prowess. As neither her student nor her colleague, my interaction with Sylvia was different from those who have written. It took place at the Graduate Center, but outside of work spaces. Sylvia's special gift as a role model became known to me first in the lavatory. In the midst of 1st Doctoral Exams, I must have looked harried. Sylvia, whom I hardly knew, calmed my disconcerting fears when she said "it's always difficult, don't let anyone tell you that they had it easy." Sometime the next year in the departmental mailroom, Sylvia turned to me and said with warmth about those same exams, "I liked what you said", the only feedback of my performance.

Our relationship developed into her friendly support of me. I was, as she had been, a student coming late into the field. We talked in the hallway about clothes, discussing colors and styles for a wardrobe which would travel well and sit upon her with ease. We laughed conspiratorially imagining what others would think of these non-academic conversations. As a single parent, on Saturdays I would drop my son off at music school and spend the day at the computer in the small room off the large Developmental office. Sylvia and I were often the only ones around. We would chat briefly, crossing paths before she scurried back to her typewriter. Once she stopped to talk longer. She told me she was about to become a grandmother. In plotting

ways to elicit her future grandchild's devotion, we laughed over the imaginary things she would say to this infant about his specialness to insure their relationship.

Shortly after her grandson was born, Sylvia was telling me about dancing around the room with him, whispering nonsensical (to him) things, assuring him of godlikeness. Abruptly she got a twinkle in her eye and said something about how only with kids certain parts of ourselves come out. She recounted a story about once confiding to Abby, now the daughter who had given Sylvia her first grandchild, that she was a Mid Eastern Princess. She laughing recalled telling Abby not to tell anyone--they might not understand.

I also remember Sylvia as the others have depicted her so well, intent about her work, determined to bring it to fruition. She was a formidable thinker. But I especially remember Sylvia, in all her whimsy, telling Abby about being a princess, making her feel special and keeping it a secret between them. Her interactions made me feel a little more special, quelling insecurities of an atypical student. Her "inconsequential" talk revealed an acute sensitivity to the vagaries of being human. I believed that experience could enrich my work as it obviously had hers. Sylvia's whimsies made her an engaging if unknowing role model--inspiring confidence by portraying herself in the most unadorned ways and places as always intimate with the struggle.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> **...any locution actually said aloud or written down for intelligible communication** (i.e., anything but words merely reposing in a dictionary) **is the expression and product of the social interaction of three participants: the speaker (author), the listener (reader) and the topic** (the who and what) **of speech...**
>
> (Voloshinov as cited by Wertsch, 1987, p. xii)

An utterance is like a scholarly work. The work is no longer the sole property of its author once the title is announced, but is cast, willy nilly, into an interaction with its audience. Similarly, an utterance is subject to its interlocutors. The meaning is only partly constructed by the speaker or writer. An utterance must be conveyed or communicated, and that requires the entering into of a pact, or transaction between the creator and her audience regarding the implicit beliefs, rules and conventions for displaying her intentions within a particular speech community. This aspect of linguistic meaning, that we speak in ways partly determined by the community we address, confronts even the most primitive speaker, the child acquiring first words. This is most convincingly displayed in Shirley Brice Heath's (1985) report of language acquisition and use in three communities in the Piedmont Carolinas. Heath found that each community had significant differences in their "ways with words" (hence her title). These differences result from diverse cultural and

philosophical beliefs expressed in such entities as maxims of development (1985, p. 146). They influence not only word use, but story telling and other sorts of linguistic phenomena. An example of these differences is evidenced in the varied responses of adult members of each community to first word utterances.

When infants in the Black working class home in Trackton say "ba" the adults interpret this as noise and therefore noise it is (p. 75). The same sound is interpreted as meaning 'bottle' in the nearby White working class and mainstream homes. Therefore whether the saying of the same sound, potentially in the same way, constitutes speech (a word, in this case) or music ("noise") depends on all the participants in the meaning situation. Among other things, participants determine the status accorded to the speaker by the community. In this case, whether s/he was a meaner or not, i.e., "knows what she is saying". When an infant utters "ba", it is not only the supposed referent, the bottle, nor his (perhaps) communicated intention of wanting a bottle that gives meaning to the utterance. In the mainstream homes of Heath's 1985 reporting, attention and communicative status are accorded the speaker. In the Black working class community attention is accorded the infant, but the status of communicative partner, of participant in determining meaning, comes later with the display of "skilled speech"--a conventional string of words

determined by the community to be evidence of the child's ability to mean/communicate (1985, p. 76).

Heath's work supports the notion that meaning is an activity of joint participation. Whether it is on syntactic (the well-formedness of the sounds for example), semantic (meaning in a recognizable fashion) or pragmatic grounds (among others, status of the communicator), the act of communicative meaning is interactive, incomplete without the other, and dependent upon the other. Moreover, this completeness is contingent. That is, it is a cultural construction, not based on logic, accuracy, etc., but on the unspoken regularities governing the meaning situation in the speech community. In the example above, this is displayed in what is determined to be an indication of the child's becoming a meaner. It is not clear that either group has got it right: one group simply attributes meaning to the child's vocalizations; the other sees the utterance as a child's play with sounds.

In a second study, this interdependence and potential incompleteness of a meaning situation is exhibited in another form, in the form of what counts as meaning in words for the older child. James Wertsch and Norris Minick (1987) report discourse between a teacher and several students in her classroom as they complete a workbook classification exercise. The teacher is attempting to upgrade the children's understanding of classes, using superordinate and

subordinate relations to label/identify groups of pictured objects. Although the children give both speedy and correct responses, these are not the answers desired by the teacher who provides the corrected terms whenever she can. Note the different words applied to the categories of pictured objects by the children (C) and the teacher (T).

(1) T: OK. Let's turn over...This is fun. There's one picture in every row that does **not** belong. (episode 1 begins) Which one doesn't belong in the first one? John, what doesn't belong?

(2) C: Key.

(3) T: Key. Put an X on the key. Why doesn't the key belong, Mikey?

(4) C: Umm...They can't open doors. (referring to the other objects in the row].

(5) T: Oh...That's not a good answer. Why doesn't the key belong with the ham and a tomato and a banana Mikey?

(6) C: Because the key isn't fruit.

(7) T: Well, a ham isn't a fruit. What are all those things? Things you can...

(8) C: Eat.

(9) T: Eat. Things you can eat. You can eat a ham. You can eat a tomato. You can eat a banana. Can you eat a key?

(10) C: No.

(11) T: No. So cross it off. (episode 2 begins) OK, now do the next one. Let's take a look. Which one are we going to put an X on, Jessica?

(12) C: The plant.

(13) T: The plant. Why? Annie.

(14) C: Because it's not clothes.

(19) T: ...Patrick, which one are you going to **eliminate** in the last one?

(20) C: Umm... The goose.

(21) T: Why

(22) C: Because it is not something you can sit on or sleep on.

(23) T: Very good. It's not furniture, right? We can call that furniture.

(Wertsch & Minick, 1987, p. 11)

Wertsch and Minick argue that the differences in classification between the teacher and the children are based on two different ways of grouping objects. The children defined the objects in terms of interaction with them and the teacher on "text based reality grounded in sense relations" (1987, p. 12). While John (4) is correct in saying keys differ from the other objects in that none can open doors, this is not an acceptable answer in this setting. This is similar to the baby uttering "ba." In one community this means bottle while in the other the baby is considered not to be able yet to mean. The school age children clearly understand that keys and geese are different from things to eat and things to sit or sleep on, hence seemingly could operate quite satisfactorily in a world of these objects. Yet in school these identifications do not suffice. Along with providing the children with a different, arguably upgraded, classification system, the

teacher is inculcating a different meaning system into their everyday patterns of discourse.

In the two examples offered by these researchers, meaning is seen in process, as an interaction between at least two (potentially) interpreting actors, who do not necessarily agree--although neither partner is necessarily wrong. Part of what is critical however is **the right way to say it.** Part of what meaning is, is saying the right thing at the right time. If we had a really clever and parsimonious Carolina baby, she would say "ba" in the mainstream home if she wanted a bottle, for example, and some vocal string including "ba" in the Black working class home.

Theorists who provide contextual accounts of language acquisition such as Nelson (1985) and Bruner (1983) agree that ultimately coming to mean rests on the child's acquiring the cultural meanings--figuring out what words to use in what context in order to express oneself. But the challenge posed by Heath's and Wertsch & Minick's descriptions of some everyday meaning experiences warrants direct attention to a crucial aspect of the development of cultural meanings: that a good part of coming to mean is not wholly a process of acquisition as it is most often characterized, but is a process of conventionalization. In the examples above, meaning is a compromise. It is a compromise both linguistically, (finding the right words to

express--our intentions) and psychologically (as above), dependent upon to whom, what, and where we are doing the expressing. This suggests that meaning can be considered a phenomenon characterized by fluidity and multiplicity. Meaning is **fluid** in the sense that meanings can change according to context and sometimes within the same speaking situation (although that will not be explored here), and therefore, **multiple**, in that more than one meaning may be expected to be exhibited by an individual. The argument simply put is this: meanings are only partly the property of the individual meaner; they are as much an artifact of the tools used to convey them, the sign system, and the audience being addressed. Meaning is always a compromise, between the individual's intention and that of the speech community's requirements for comprehension. Words precede us, waiting to be newly employed: they can neither be a private language (Luria and Yudovich, 1959; Taylor, 1985) nor the non-reflective imitation, or mirroring of the other. The task for the meaner is the taking in of an objectified discourse (von Humboldt, 1836 as cited by Werner & Kaplan, 1984) or another's words (Bakhtin, 1981; 1984b) and making them her own.

In this research three elements of communicative meaning will be explored: a) the effect of the audience; b) the development/change in meaning as an intersection/ interaction of individual meanings with more "expert"

cultural meaning (as both interpretive and semiotic achievements); and c) the construction of multiple meanings as evidenced by multiple signifying speech: speech used to simultaneously reference more than one meaning, i.e., the individual's meaning and that expected of the discourse situation. Since the research being proposed is exploratory, elements of related theoretical and empirical perspectives will be presented as arguments for the three aspects of the communicative meaning situation under study. This will be preceded by a brief discussion laying out the nature of meaning and language which underlies the current study. Lyons (1977) posits that the meaning of 'meaning' is often theoretically bound. The necessary digression will situate the current work within the larger body of investigations on meaning, thus preventing misconceptions.

Meaning and speech

Benny: There was a episode right, that I had saw where uhm Bert and uhm Ernie were both smart. They had both two pictures but, they wasn't pictures, they was pictures just of the face, they had t' connect themselves, so you know, it was between dumb .. okay, here's dumb, okay? [puts right hand out] and here's smart [puts left hand out] so, what do you get when you put dumb and smart t'gether? [puts hands together]
Julian: Lem-me see, uhhh .. Special Ed?
Benny: N-no, but you can get weird...when you put dumb and uhm ya know
Julian: smart
Benny: smart together
Julian: you get weird, and weird is a combination of dumb and smart, right? ...

(Excerpt, 3rd grade boys' talk)

Research into meaning is undergirded by a conception of the medium in which meaning is done, language. In the past few decades many researchers and investigators have, often implicitly, concurred with a conception of language driven by Saussure's (1959) theory of language as **la langue**, the truth-valued, hence rule governed aspect of language, as opposed to **la parole**, the totally free non-rule governed aspect of language (Lee, 1985, p. 113), often referred to as **speech**. This is a dichotomy without a continuum, as Ricoeur (1984) notes, "For de Saussure, the gap between **language** and **speech** makes of language a completely homogeneous object contained within a single science, with the two faces of the sign--signifier and signified--falling on the same side of the gap" (p. 120)[1]. Saussure considered parole a lesser form of language, i.e., an

approximation of the proper form, not consistent, arbitrary, a deviant form, correct only when replicating **la langue** (Voloshinov, 1973, pp. 59-61; see also de Saussure, 1966, pp. 14-17).

Under revival in the past decade has been a "new" (originating with Humboldt, 1856) view of language which throws Saussure's distinctions into question. Although there are many proponents of this move, Charles Taylor's (1985) analysis is particularly cogent. He argues that there are differences in the two kinds of meaning afforded by language, designative and expressive. Designative meanings of words or sentences are explained by relation to things or states of affairs in the world. This relation is either a signification, or a set of correlations between words and things, for example, between sentences and their truth conditions. Expressive meanings on the other hand differ, since they can not be separated from, but only manifested in the medium. Additionally, the meaning of an expression can be explained only by another expression, not by some external object to which it is related. Taylor builds on Humboldt's (1856) argument that the language capacity must be thought of as speech, and therefore, is open to being continuously recreated, extended, altered, etc. Language is a pattern of activity by which we express or realize a certain way of being in the world; a pattern deployed against a background which we can never fully

dominate nor be dominated by because we are constantly reshaping it. Since we are not privileged to see it as we are meddling with it, language, for Humboldt (according to Taylor) is developed without knowing what we are fully making it into; thus there is a constant sense of mystery in dialogue. Taylor proposes that the primary function of language is expressive (1985, pp. 248-292); hence language is primarily constitutive. Expression permits a new kind of awareness, not only of things, but also of feelings. For example, the expression of feelings provides a reflective dimension which transforms them. Taylor claims that language can no longer only be confined to its designative function, to be "about" something. Instead language also "is": it constitutes that which it expresses. In arguing that the primary function of language is expressive, hence creative, Taylor privileges what Saussure depreciated: **la langue**, the designative aspect of meaning is derived from speech, **la parole**, rather than the other way round. In addition, language is always in the process of constituting, and hence can not be considered a static system of symbols to be employed by users. Taylor's depiction suggests several interesting characteristics of language. First, once freed from a necessary relation to truth, language becomes a variable medium. Words can mean more than one thing. Secondly, since language is always in the process of

constituting only a somewhat known world, meaning becomes context dependent.

Rommetveit (1984), as a psychologist concerned with the linguistic structuring of experience, is sympathetic to Taylor's philosophical analysis of language, but attributes the contemporary overthrow of the positivist view of language to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein (1953) demonstrated that ordinary language (or language-in-use) was, in fact, incomplete and ambiguous, reflecting an imperfect knowledge of world. He claimed that linguistic communication is embedded in patterns of human interaction called "language games." Wittgenstein's analysis of language threw into dispute the notion that language was a symbolic system representative of propositional knowledge whose truth was logically verifiable. His analysis was augmented by Austin's (1962) ground-breaking identification of performatives, words whose understanding goes beyond a symbolic analysis. Performatives are words that do things, or rather words we do things with, i.e., we **excuse** (1970) and **promise** (1962). Austin's work, in turn, led to Searle's (1985) speech act theory; an attempt to locate within the universe of **parole** the orderliness and rules which Saussure's claim precluded. Wittgenstein's theory of language is a base for the revolution in semiotics[2] as well as an usually unheralded progenitor of theories of contextual meaning. Under this view, words are more (or

less) than symbolic stand-ins for mental contents (Ogden & Richards, 1956). There is no "essence" (Wittgenstein, 1953) which indicates, for example, deceit. Instead, words' meaning or understanding is context dependent. Voloshinov[3] (1973) goes a step further by proposing a view of the nature of that "context." He strengthens the relatedness and dependency of context and word by arguing that **"the sign and its social situation are inextricably fused together"** (p. 37). Words do not sit apart from the context. Instead, for Voloshinov, as for the others, language is a sign system which both is imbued with and imbues the social situation in which it arises.

These tenets, from Humboldt's 1856 analysis of language as speech, Taylor's argument for language as constitutive, Wittgenstein's notion of language as a game as "forms of life", to Voloshinov's claim of the dialectical property of language, argue for a conception of language-in-use as essentially dynamic rather than static, and consequently somewhat **arbitrary** in the sense of admitting possibilities of modification not explainable by appeal to its logical (symbolic) properties (cf: Derrida's (1973) claim that meaning is play with signifiers). In contrast to a notion of meaning as decontexted, lexical, meanings may vary according to the speech community. This view privileges Peirce's (1947) concept of a sign, a material index embedded in context, as opposed to the symbol, the decontexted

meaning (e.g., Mertz, 1985, p. 6). The inherent arbitrary nature of language overturns over the hierarchy of acquisition mechanisms also. As Nelson (1985) would have it, decontexted meaning follows upon contexted meanings, rather than the other way round. Meaning acquisition becomes a process and product of the conventional aspect of meaning, the acquisition of signs, and not the acquisition of symbols. Hence language acquisition and, by extension, meaning development is necessarily social in nature.

The view of the linguistic medium in these not so "new clothes" casts the conception of meaning including the process, product and actors in a different light. The process is social, there being no other way to acquire or even construct an arbitrary[4] system other than by being inducted into it. The product is an outcome of interaction. The young meaner then instead of "breaking the code" or individually constructing meaning by operating on objects--even of cognition--has a different task. Speech, as the instrument for meaning, is both arbitrary and fixed by the particular system (e.g. the example from Heath, 1985). Moreover, its "rightness" may be more the pronouncement of power than logic (cf: Foucault, 1973; de Lauretis, 1987), i.e., there may be different ways to go about "saying the same thing" as Wertsch and Minick's teacher and students illustrate. But it is the system, or rather, the various systems of meaning the child must come to master.

Whether this view challenges or provides an alternative to the traditional conception of meaning and language depends ultimately on one's perspective, i.e., whether it is about language proper (as Derrida and others would argue) or represents one aspect of language. For our purposes here it suffices to recognize that this view of language is currently given much weight because of the insights into human nature it has provided in other fields of study (e.g., the current revolution in semiotics in literary criticism, philosophy, anthropology, and etc., Culler, 1981). The question becomes how does one come to mean in such a system, a system of the spoken word, therefore with rules which are to some extent dependent on the will of the community (e.g., Vygotsky's (1987) analysis of the zones of meaning)?

This view of language and meaning underlies the proposed study. Meaning is examined as a property of speech. A traditional conception of meaning is that first we learn what the word designates, called the semantic meaning by Bakhtin (1984b) and Vygotsky (1987); then we imbue that symbol with our own intentions, sometimes called sense, the variable, changeable aspect of "semantic meaning" (see below). In contrast, in a view which valorizes speech instead of language, the path to meaning is quite different. The word comes with a past: it is used with feeling as it is spoken; it refers not just to perhaps, a designated object, but the particular social values, history, etc. in which

that particular speech community perceives the object. Similar to Glick's (1986) renovation of the Piagetian pendulum, the word becomes a cultural object. Although this view of meaning is sometimes given the label, "cultural meaning," such an identification wrongly denotes a 19th century concept of linguistic relativity (Humboldt, 1856) implying that there is one system of meaning per culture per language. The updated version suggests that meaning is much more relativized, i.e., within a given culture there are varying systems of meaning. For example, there are the micro-cultural meanings of the family system, of school, of the work place, of the street corner, all with particular forms of life Wittgenstein (1953) calls them; or discourses (Foucault, 1973) or genres (Bakhtin, 1986). These systems of cultural meanings must be acquired by the child. If the first step in such a system is to gain entry into the system, then the subsequent and developing steps require the meaner to incorporate new and potentially different meanings into her already existing accounts.

The following arguments outline the three elements of communicative meaning acquisition which will be explored in this research. The first element to be explored in the child's task of acquiring communicative meaning is the effect of the audience.

The effect of the audience

Michelle: [laughing] You better stop Charlotte... You talk about th' rest of th' Bert an' Ernie show.
Charlotte: So?
Michelle: So, how's you feel about it?
Charlotte: It was funny dough.
Michelle: That's true .. a little. But it's .. very corny .. corny corny.
Charlotte: It was funny, that show was corny, corny . corny. I liked it.
Michelle: It's not corny (repeated with same intonation used by Charlotte), it's corny (pronounces differently]. it's corn-ee . you know, like Carny Hall.

(Excerpt, 4th grade girls' talk)

Speech is always addressed to someone, even speech that is directed to the self or indirect (e.g., "non-addressed speech"). The notion of the **other** has been one way of conceptualizing the effect of the audience on the speaker/meaner (speaker=meaner). Unfortunately, the concept of the **other** in most theories of meaning and discourse raises as many problems as it is intended to solve. The most critical problem being that it is used as if there is a single referent, a ready made concept on the part of the reader which immediately explicates the phenomenon. In fact, who and what constitutes the **other** is often theoretically bound to the work at hand. In a rather unexpected way the problem is similar empirically. In verbal interchanges, **who** is being addressed is often not the most common sense expectation, the person being spoken to. For example, in political speech making, the gathered supporters at the rally may be the direct receivers of the

communication, but the "other addressee" is the politician's opponent. Thus, soon there will be a response from the opponent's camp in some media form or another regarding the original communication. A second example of this, is the student in the class room who directs an inquiry or response to the teacher, but is actually addressing his or her peers. This practice seems to be universally acquired by all students, usually acknowledged by a laugh or some such evidence of having "got the teacher." Even in the more typically studied limited (e.g., dyadic) communication, only sometimes is the **other** the actual communicative partner, the addressee. Schegloff and Sacks' (1973) analysis of telephone conversations is possibly the most clear cut instance in the literature of this form of directed speech. An exception might be the telephone speaker who engages in what Ervin-Tripp (1964) has called an "expressive monologue", (e.g., "Expressions of joy. sorrow, anger;... The sender reacts to an external stimulus, a feeling or a problem without attending to the hearer's comments, which may be minimal or absent" (p. 89). Recently, the notion of the **other** as an internalized discourse, vestigial of the intensities of early mother-daughter interactions has been explored by the French Psychologist--Psychoanalyst, Luce Irigaray (1981).

The origin of the psychological concept of the **other** is attributed to George Mead's (1934) groundbreaking and oft

referred to analysis of the social construction of meaning. Mead defined and developed his theory of the other's role in the construction of meaning in his argument against Wundt's theory of parallelism. He writes of the construction of the "significant symbol":

> ...in the present case we have a symbol which answers to a meaning in the experience of the first individual and which also calls out that meaning in the second individual. When the gesture reaches that situation it has become what we call "language". It is now a significant symbol and it signifies a certain meaning. ...Gestures become significant symbols when they implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are **addressed**; and in all conversations of gesture within the social process whether external (between different individuals) or internal (between a given individual and himself), the individual's consciousness of content and flow of meaning involved depends on his thus taking the attitude of the other toward his own gestures. In this way every gesture comes within a given social group or community to stand for a particular act or response, namely, the act or response which it calls forth explicitly in the individual to whom it is addressed, and implicitly in

> the individual who makes it; and this particular act or response for which it stands is its meaning as a significant symbol.
>
> (p. 45-47, emphasis mine)

Mead's work led the way for what might be referred to as a paradigm for exploring **shared meaning.** In developmental psychology, that baton has been taken up and wielded most perspicaciously by two theoretical conceptualizations/ analyses of the social interactive process of meaning, the Wernerian and Vygotskian. Both of these approaches conceptualize the co-construction of meaning similarly, but focus their attention on different aspects of the meaning situation. Werner and Kaplan (1984) propose a phenomenological conception of the child developing meaning, and Vygotsky (1978, 1987) analyzes the social interaction between the child and adult meaning participants. In so doing, Werner and Kaplan offer a structural developmental model of the development of meaning, and Vygotsky's thesis provides the functional missing piece.

Werner and Kaplan's model

In brief, Werner and Kaplan (1984) propose that symbolic activity takes place within a generic four component system: two persons, the addressor and addressee(s), the object of reference or referent, and the symbolic vehicle employed in referential representation (p. 40). Development occurs as a result of **distancing** or

polarization between all generic components. Significantly, distancing arises from early forms of interaction which have the character of **sharing** rather than **communicating.** The earliest form of the sharing situation is the **primordial sharing situation** involving the mother, child and object (pp. 42,49). This situation is described as

> ...one in which the distancing between the components has hardly begun to form; it is a pre-symbolic situation in which there is little differentiation in the child's experience between himself, the Other (typically the mother), and the referential object.
>
> (Werner & Kaplan, 1984, p. 42)

In this primordial nexus, reference in its most primitive form arises. As the child and mother contemplate objects, the act of referencing is initially nonrepresentational--the objects only minimally detached from the child's locus of child-mother-object as an undifferentiated amorphous first experience of the world. Thus, the authors write, the "act of reference emerges not as an individual act, but as a social one" (p. 43). The concrete object is shared by both persons in this primordial sharing situation, but not explicitly delineated. The pointing-at an object constitutes its positioning within the situation, the taking of the thing into the interpersonal fusion of the mother and child. Eventually, this is replaced by a sharing of contemplated objects through verbal symbols. But this

occurs, argue Werner and Kaplan (1984, pp. 43-50), through the process of **distancing** between all four generic components: between the person and the object, the person and the symbolic vehicle, the symbolic vehicle and the referential object, the addressor and addressee. The latter ontogenetic development concerns us here.

Werner and Kaplan propose that as the child moves from the condition of minimal differentiation between the self, mother and object, the interactive situation changes from a primordial sharing to one of interindividual communication. With distancing, the concomitant formation of language provides the means for this interindividual communication (pp. 49-50). This move of the child from a situation of **sharing** to one of **communication** ushers in two aspects relevant to this project: the task of taking language as the "objective" medium, and making it a "subjective" phenomenon and the newly accorded effect of the differentiated addressee.

Although these are two distinct aspects of the communicative meaning, they bear upon each other. Language must be "transpersonal", i.e., "must follow the rules of usage and hold in relative abeyance or subordination any personal idiosyncracies in manipulating the instrument of speech" (Werner & Kaplan, 1984, p. 50). The subjective rendering of meaning in the expression of speech is occasioned by one's audience, whether immediate or distant.

Hence in the examples offered earlier of two everyday situations of children's meaning activities, the audience affects the "way to say it," the rules or conventions of use, etc.: the objectified speech with the variation permissible within the confines of the lexical definition of the word.

The second issue, the direct role of the audience in the construction of meaning is illustrated by Werner and Kaplan's contrast between speech for two audiences, speech for the self [inner speech] and speech for others [external speech]. E. Kaplan's study (as cited in Werner & Kaplan, 1984) provides empirical evidence of these differences. Kaplan asked subjects to describe three different kinds of stimuli: a visually articulated configuration, a visually diffuse configuration and a relatively unfamiliar odor, for two different audiences, the self and a stranger. She found descriptions of the stimuli differed on explicitness of expression as measured by the number of words comprising a sentence. As expected, the number of words used in describing the stimulus for oneself was significantly less than when describing for another person for all three stimuli. Although the audience had a greater affect, stimulus type was influential: speech for the other differed most markedly from speech for the self when the material was visual. Secondly, differences in kinds of generic referents, i.e., communal or idiomatic, used to characterize

the stimuli material were found. Communal referents were terms which referred to conventional and transpersonal properties of objects: location, geometric shape, size, quantity. Idiomatic referents were terms rooted in similes or analogies, evaluative, physiognomic, assimilated to personal experiences, etc. (1984, p. 289). A distribution of types of referent, and effect of stimulus material revealed a higher frequency of communal referents in external speech than in inner speech regardless of stimulus materials. Kaplan's findings provide evidence that the audience one addresses affects the sort of speech one uses. A similar finding was reported by Susan Ervin-Tripp (1964) in her study of bilingual Japanese war brides. She used choice of language to examine the correlation of topic, i.e., object talked about, audience and language. The findings vary slightly from Kaplan's study, in that both topic and audience were found to affect speech rather than either alone.

Effect of addressee has also been examined as a factor in the well known studies of Motherese. Because the literature is so extensive (see Bates, 1982, for a more complete treatment), only a few instances will be cited. Williams (1979, as reported by Bates, 1982) found that Spanish, English and Chinese mothers tend to exaggerate precisely those phonological distinctions in their respective languages that prove in spectrographic analysis

to be the most difficult to discriminate. Mandarin is a tone language, which uses the pitch or tone level of a word to make semantic distinctions. Mothers speaking Mandarin were observed to emphasize the most difficult tone distinctions for their children. The semantic use of tones is a relatively rare feature in human langauge, thus this performance by the Chinese mothers is based on a powerful and pervasive tendency that is applicable to any feature of language that might pose problems for the child (Bates, 1982, p. 35). "Motherese" has also been observed spoken by fathers, strangers and even 4-year olds interacting with 2-year olds (Shatz and Gelman, 1973) and 4-year olds pretending to interact with 2-year olds (Sachs and Devin, 1982). The apparent potential ubiquitous property of "motherese" led Ferguson (1982) to argue that simplifications, repetitions and exaggerations occur in the speech of adults to **any** listener whose ability to comprehend is in question. The purpose of the adjustments being to become understood.

Although the findings of studies of Motherese have met with debate regarding the direction of effect in a causally based analysis, Bates (1982) argues that there is sufficient evidence for child effects on caretakers to formulate **"the hypothesis that human children seize and create for themselves some minimal amount of communicative interaction"** (p. 62). Her conclusion permits two possible understandings

of the data. First, that adjusting one's speech to accommodate the listener is an individual achievement. Secondly, that such a feat possibly reflects a dialogical relation between interlocutors even if one is a less competent speaker. These two interpretations, while not contradictory, indicate differences in the focus of study. The former view is exemplified in Werner and Kaplan's model of symbol development, and the latter in a Vygotsky dialogical account of social interaction. Werner and Kaplan discuss the capacity to change speech according to one's audience as a developmental acquisition. They examine this as the construction of different modes of speech: speech for oneself (inner speech) and speech for the other (external speech). From a primordial stage of speech without differentiation between communication for the self and communication for others, Werner and Kaplan (1984) argue that speech develops in two interdependent and correlative directions: one towards communication for oneself, inner speech; the other, towards communication for others, external speech.

> Thus, we see the development of communicative speech as polar; **internalization**, on the one hand, and **externalization**, on the other. ...inner speech and external speech serve distinctive functions--inner speech serving thought, external speech serving social communication... (pp. 317-318)

Evidence to support their analysis is found in Luria and Yudovich's (1959) experimental study of the effects of speech on the certain aspects of cognitive development. In this monograph, Luria and Yudovich report on five year old twins who had a private language between themselves. Their external speech was markedly characteristic of inner speech (Vygotsky, 1987) or undifferentiated communicative speech, i.e., was linguistically unarticulated, condensed, laconic, holophrastic, and idiomatic (Werner and Kaplan, 1984, p. 318). While the twins communicated with themselves, their speech forms were so idiosyncratic as to exclude others from communicating with them. Luria and Yudovich instigated an experiment designed to improve the twins' speech. First, the children were separated. This intervention was combined for one of the twins with special language coaching. In a remarkably short time (10 months), both children had dropped most of their unique speech formations and were able to communicate with others . The twin with additional coaching improved slightly faster than the other. Jespersen (1922) also observed twins whose speech forms were similar to those observed by Luria and Yudovich. Again, placement in a setting where the addressees were changed produced rapid acquisition of speech forms capable of being understood by others.

Werner and Kaplan argue that these two examples show that distancing facilitates the development of proper speech

forms, but agree with Vygotsky's (1967, p. 139 ff) caution that the presence of different addressees is not sufficient to explain the development of speech forms in these observations. Development depends upon the child's **awareness** of a different addressee than one from his linguistic community. This speaks to the interaction between interlocutors, a focal point of Vygotsky's work.

Vygotsky's account

Vygotsky's (1987) concept of inner speech as a unique and therefore different speech form does not depart from Werner and Kaplan's in the main, but shifts attention from within the child to the social processes which affect development. Although Vygotsky did not directly address meaning development, his general insights into psychological development and his construct of inner speech are applicable. Vygotsky's general thesis of the dialectical relationship between language and thought (e.g., language **completes** thought (1987, p. 346)) is exemplified in his concept of inner speech. Inner speech is the plane between thinking and semantics. It is the result of an internal process between the thought and the semantically viable expression. Vygotsky identifies this "semantically viable expression" as the word's **meaning** in contrast to its **sense**. He relies on Polan's definition of sense, as the "aggregate of all the psychological facts which arise in consciousness as a result of the word, ...a dynamic fluid and complex

formation having several zones which vary in their stability" (1987, p. 390). Meaning is only one of the zones of the "sense of the word" that the word can acquire in context, but it is the most stable, unified and precise zone. Meaning, for Vygotsky, is the symbolic, or lexical, or decontextualized meaning as distinct from sense, the "zone of meaning" that changes according to the context. This contrast between "semantic meaning" and "sense" is also made by Bakhtin (1984b). Vygotsky (1987) writes

> Change in the word's sense is a basic factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the word is inconstant. ...Isolated in the lexicon, the word has only one meaning, which however is nothing more than a potential which can only be realized through living speech and in living speech, meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of sense.
>
> (p. 391)

Words can change their sense, but senses can also change their words. Sense can be isolated from words (e.g., "How are you doing?"), but remain connected with the word as a whole, or the phrase as a whole. Using Polan's analysis of zones of meaning, Vygotsky isolates a dimension of oral speech in inner speech. In oral speech meaning moves from the more stable and constant element (meaning) to the more fluid (sense). In inner speech, sense predominates over meaning in Vygotsky's model, i.e., "The prevalence of sense

over meaning, of the phrase over the word, of the whole context over the phrase, is the rule rather than the exception in inner speech" (p. 393). Since sense is the basic element of inner speech and inner speech mediates verbal speech, then that meaning-as-sense is an activity of speech. As an activity of speech, then, inner thoughts are social in origin.

This construction places Vygotsky at variance with a formalist construction of meaning as a symbol (system) representing mental contents, instead providing an account of **speech**, not language (in Saussure's model) creating **thoughts**. Inner speech is a dialogical representation of the **internal process of meaning**. Since inner speech mediates verbal speech, "external" meaning is also **dialogic**, arising from the internal dialogue between the inner speech and the semantic plane of external speech. Hence it, too, is social in origin. These tenets bring Vygotsky, whether intended or not, into the current debate over the nature of the linguistic medium as briefly summarized above. But more importantly, Vygotsky gives a psychological accounting of the social construction of meaning by identifying the instrument through which that is accomplished as **speech**, the socially constructed system of linguistic signs.

Although Vygotsky identified the dialogic property of meaning, his analysis, like Werner and Kaplan's, focused upon the contrast between two types of speech, inner and

external. However, according to Wertsch (1985a), he was partial to the functional diversity of speech originally identified by Humboldt, and later given 20th century voice in Jakobson's (1956) analysis of language. Vygotsky writes in the final chapter in Thinking and Speech:

> In recent times the problem of the functional diversity of speech has emerged as one of the major issues in linguistics. It turns out that even from the point of view of the linguist, language is not a single form of speech activity, but an aggregate of speech functions... The functional diversity of speech has already been clearly recognized by Humboldt in connection with languages of poetry and of prose, which are distinguished from one another in their orientation and means... Thus Humboldt's idea was that each of the various forms of speech, distinguished by functional assignment, has its own lexicon, its own grammar, and its own syntax. This is an extremely important idea. (1934a, p. 297 as cited by Wertsch, 1985a, p. 85).

Vygotsky recognized that the functions determined by Humboldt were too limited and expanded these functions to include the following (as contrasted by Wertsch, 1985a): signaling versus signification, social versus individual, communicative versus intellectual and indicative versus symbolic. These distinctions reflect the dichotomous

tendencies of language to be used for abstract decontextualized thinking versus contextualized linguistic usage. Bakhtin's (1986) semiotic analysis of speech takes these functional distinctions a step further. Utilizing the concept of **genre** from literature, Bakhtin specifies types of **contextualized** linguistic use, and perhaps even overthrows the concept of language as a tool for abstract decontextualized thinking (--but while that is a critical issue underlying his semiotic insights into language in use, it is not relevant for this project).

Following in the foot prints of Sapir (1921) and Whorf (1956), Bakhtin extends the notion of linguistic relativity, which he attributes as originating with Humboldt (1856), from **between** languages to **within** languages. He argues that

> ...(functional) styles are nothing other than generic styles for certain spheres of human activity and communication. Each sphere has and applies its own genre which corresponds to its specific function. ... A particular function (scientific, technical, business, everyday) and the particular conditions of speech communication for that sphere give rise to particular genres. Style is inseparably linked to particular thematic unities--to particular types of construction of the whole, types of its completion and types of relationships between the speaker and other participants. (1986, p. 64)

Bakhtin further classifies genres as primary or secondary. Primary genres are certain types of oral dialogue, i.e., "of the salon, of one's circle, familiar, family-everyday., socio-political, philosophical. Secondary genres are commentarial, literary and scientific (1986, p. 65).

Bakhtin presents us with an embodied linguistic rendering of the "forms of life" of Wittgenstein's analysis of language. In so doing he proposes a pluralistic view of language, with what is pluralistic being worlds of function and discourse. His analysis is semiotic, but he argues (above) clearly that the social and semiotic are reflective of each other (Voloshinov, 1973)[5]. The notion of pluralistic worlds, while deriving semiotic verification from Bakhtin's analysis, is not new (e.g., James, 1962; Karttunen, 1974; McCawley, 1978; Rommetveit, 1984). However in keeping with the late 20th century interest in signs (Culler, 1984; Taylor, 1985), Bakhtin's offers another way of analyzing pluralistic worlds through a feature of discourse. His reinterpretation of "genre" as a way of describing the multiple social-semiotic realities created by people in their ongoing construction of the world extends Vygotsky's insights. Bakhtin's adapted construct of genre captures the micro-worlds in which we live and talk, and incidently, extends the notion of speech formulated for two audiences: speech for the self and speech for others. If speech/meaning is affected by the audience one is addressing

as proposed both by Werner and Kaplan and Vygotsky, as well as Bakhtin (e.g. Wertsch 1991, pp. 52-53) then the variants of that audience should create even more variants in meanings constructed. Glick (personal communication, March, 1987) has argued that there are unique socially constrained systems of meaning with their own mechanisms for acquisition and development. Bakhtin has identified those as displayed in the ways we talk, functionally distinguished with particular meanings arising from these speech delineated worlds. Meaning development arises from the child's verbal encounters within these microcosms. Work in bi-lingual (e.g., Zentella, 1985) and bi-dialect investigations, in particular Ferguson's (1984) identification of **diglossia**, although not identical to Bakhtin's notion of genre, provide indirect support for this thesis.

How, then, is this accomplished, to develop more than one meaning as an effect of speaking with others? In particular, how does the child acquire meaning as a function of speech, by interaction with the discourse which is socially instituted in the form of a more expert acculturizing agent, an adult? The second element in the formation of communicative meaning to be examined in this research is the construction of meaning as a process of interaction of the child with an acculturating adult.

Interaction in the communicative meaning situation

Teacher: Do you think? sometimes there are some people who are good at tricking and some people who always get ... tricked. So we don't know? Maybe? (if Bert would fall for Ernie's trick again)
Patricia: You should share with one another, share with one another. If you're a friend, you would share with one another.
Teacher: And if you can't share, what should you do Maria?
Maria: You should . ah-, try to find a nice way to say 'no' to them.
Teacher: Yeah, find a nice way of saying no to them.
Evan: I can't.
Teacher: Well Evan, (laughing) that's your special problem. So when people go "errgh" to you, you'll (still laughing) know why. Okay, 's-anyone else would like to say anything?

(Excerpt, 3rd grade class talk)

How meaning occurs between communicative participants has yet to be fully understood. In the psychological literature, the major paradigm for exploring communicative meaning has arisen from Mead's (1934) description of **shared meaning**. Nelson (1985) offers an updated version:

> For every utterance used in a given context, each speaker and each listener establishes a **subjective meaning** through their respective interpretive meaning systems. Together they come to understand a shared meaning, consisting of those parts of their subjective meanings that coincide. (p. 10)

This depiction suggests a matching of individual ideas, a synchrony between participants. It also implies an equity of interlocutors. These criteria, although widely

accepted[6], are too constraining for many occasions of socially constructed meaning, occasions when the interactive parties hold discordant views for example, or the rather typical occasion of meaning situations between an adult, a more expert interlocutor, and a child. In addition, most theorists and investigators of shared meaning examine the interaction as a dyadic accomplishment. Yet, many if not most, child-adult shared meaning situations are characterized by a) different views (often attributed to a lack of or incomplete meaning on the child's part); b) an inequity of partners with the adult being the acknowledged more expert interlocutor; and c) a non-dyadic context, i.e., one adult to more than one child.

Werner and Kaplan (1984), cognizant of the features of adult-child meaning situations, characterize the interaction differently. They approvingly quote von Humboldt's (1936, p. 169) conception of the communicative meaning situation, suggesting that the tie that connects may not be so strong--

> Men do not understand one another by causing one another to produce exactly the same concept but by touching the same link in each other's sense perceptions and concepts, by striking the same key in each other's individual instrument whereupon corresponding, but not identical concepts arise in each of them...
>
> (as cited by Werner and Kaplan 1984, pp. 50-51)

While **resonance** has yet to be defined, Werner and Kaplan's conception suggests shared meaning is possible even under less synchronous conditions. Sidestepping for the moment the alternative view that meaning is not a melding or even resonance between individual participants, but is constructed between individuals (see below), we can turn to several candidates for fleshing out the resonance referred to by Werner and Kaplan.

Foremost is Vygotsky's (1978) thesis of the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD). Agreeing in the main with Mead (Wertsch 1985a, p. 59), Vygotsky (1978) honed in on the differences between adults and children within the paradigm of shared meaning with his construct of the ZPD. The ZPD was posited to capture developmental changes (Cole, 1985) arising from social communicative interactions between adults and children and is arguably incomplete (Wertsch, 1985a, p. 73). However, it provides a nascent account of the how meaning develops from a social interactive genesis marked by an inequity between communicative partners.

Researchers have attempted to flesh out the interpsychological process of the ZPD through which development occurs, often referred to as **intersubjectivity**. How this intersubjectivity between inequitable partners is accomplished motivates the work of Griffin & Cole (1984), Saxe, Gearhart, & Guberman (1984), Valsiner, 1984) and leads Wertsch (1984) to propose a conceptual explication of the

ZPD. He describes the process whereby the inequity between adults and children becomes minimalized as mothers' re-define the situation to accommodate their offspring's assumed level of knowledge. This is accomplished by a dual **situation defining** process wherein mothers retain their own meaning, but hold it in abeyance in order to facilitate their child's learning. As described by Wertsch, this process implies an interaction of at least **two views.** Intersubjectivity comes about when the adult, or more expert interlocutor, accommodates the younger, more primitive participant. This earlier depiction of the ZPD by Wertsch, in the spirit of Vygotsky's original intent, was directed at delineating the cognitive inequities between the adult acculturizing agent and the child. In more recent work Wertsch and Minick (1987) extend that conception to include the linguistic notion of **sense**, implying that the inequity is both cognitive and communicative.

Rommetveit (1974, 1979, 1980, 1984) takes a related but slightly different tack by focusing on the communicative aspect of intersubjectivity between unequal interlocutors without denying the cognitive. He argues that intersubjectivity can occur even between disparate interlocutors and hence meaning can be shared, if one of the partners agrees to the meaning of the other. Rommetveit (1984) depicts the interaction between adult and child as **dyadic communication.** His concern is to determine what kind

of shared social reality can be established in an encounter between two different private worlds? He claims that the dyadic constellation must be temporarily transformed into a state of intersubjectivity, which leads to the issue of social control. This intersubjective state requires that the participants are jointly committed to a "shared here-and-now, established and continually modified by their acts of communication" (1980, p. 126). This state is achieved by reciprocal role taking in which each of the participants attempt to make sense of what the other is saying by adopting what s/he assumes to be the other's point of view (1984, p. 345; cf: Garfinkel 1972; Schutz 1945). For Rommetveit, however, this does not imply that there is joint/equal responsibility for what is being meant by what is being said among participants (1984, p. 190). He argues against Habermas (1970) who like Searle (1985) and Labov (1972b) assume that communicated meanings are identical for all members of the same speech community. Rommeveit (1984) focuses on the inequity of speakers, arguing that control of meanings must be considered in drawing conclusions about discourse interactions. He claims to demonstrate that a state of intersubjectivity can be obtained other than that of a perfectly shared social reality if either of the participant's world view becomes accepted. For Rommetveit the issue for communication control becomes WHOSE private world is publicly valid.

While the ZPD and Rommetveit's conceptualizations of intersubjectivity between unequal discourse participants begin to map out what the resonance suggested by Humboldt might be, Dan Stern's (1985) depiction permits even more of a minimalizing of the synchronic bond between an adult and a child in their construction of meaning:

> Meaning results from interpersonal negotiations involving what can be agreed upon as shared... This view leaves a great deal of room for the emergence of meanings that are unique to the dyad or to the individual. (p. 170)

All of these conceptions of the interpsychological processes occurring between dyadic partners of unequal locutionary status in a meaning situation are unified in their (albeit different degree of) need for agreement between dialogue participants. But what occurs when, in addition to inequity of interlocutors, there is a disparity between meanings, as so often happens between adults and children? In particular what occurs when the adult member disagrees in a particular way with the child, i.e., acts as a representative for the social institution in acculturating the youngsters either in the family or in school? How can the meaning of one be accepted when there is a difference in interpretations as well as differences in cognitive and communicative competence?

Differences in meaning

The suggestion of disparity either between interpretation or ways of talking assumes, at the least, the role of the child as interpreter, albeit a novice. Bates (1982) hypothesized that even the very young child influences the discourse of the adult to some extent. Wittgenstein's (1953) depiction of language as ambiguous, reciprocal, and unfinished, provides linguistic evidence for McDermott's (personal communication, March, 1984) argument that meanings are not known or only hesitantly known prior to the interactive moment. McDermott's analysis consciously arises from the work of the ethnomethodologists regarding the social grounds of the construction of meaning (see also McDermott & Tylbor, 1983). They have argued persuasively that meaning is **situated**, i.e., constructed in specific contexts by actors who must actively interpret what they hear for it to make sense (Garfinkel, 1972), and mediated and sometimes transformed by rules of speaking which reflect speakers' attitudes to each other, and to their topics (Sacks, 1972). This suggests that meanings are consequently often negotiated between dialogue partners in the act of communicating. Many scholars and investigators (e.g., Labov, 1972a; Dore, 1984; from linguistics; Garfinkel, 1969; and Sacks, 1972 from ethnomethdology; McDermott, 1976; Rommetveit, 1985 from the other social sciences; and philosophically, Wittgenstein, 1953; Taylor 1984) are

concerned to show that just as language completes thought, meaning between participants is completed in the interaction. The contention here is that meaning is more than an individual construct, matching or not. Others, such as Vygotsky, have argued persuasively that individual meaning arises from social origins, thereby negating either a strong individualist or a strong social interactionist position. Vygotsky (1978) bridges the gap between individualist and social interactive accounts by claiming that development proceeds from the interpersonal to the intrapersonal. This account preserves the individual perspective while focusing on the social interaction from which children's individual acquisitions develop.

Whether meaning occurs in the interaction, or internalized for the individual from the interpersonal interaction, the question remains, does this hold true for participants when they are adults and children, either parent and child or teacher and students? We can assume that the child-child interactions may function under this framework, but what occurs when the adults' task in these meaning interactions includes, in addition to the cognitive and communicative improvements (i.e., Wertsch & Minick's teacher-student example) the acculturation of the child (i.e., in addition to the Heath example above, see also pp. 79-86). Children are often being "taught" how to do things, the right ways to behave, the "right ways" to say things,

the proper meanings, etc.. Corsaro (1979) has described how language directed to children by adults has the effect, if not always the intention of negotiating a shared meaning--but one that brings the child's meaning more into line with the adult's:

> How adults use language to structure interaction events with young children is an important aspect of childhood socialization. The child not only gradually acquires the language and interactive skills necessary to carry on competent social interaction, but he is also continually exposed to the adult's perspective on the normative order. (p. 379)

This perspective on the normative order in linguistic terms can be seen, in part, as evidenced in the speech used and demanded by the adult, i.e., in Bakhtin's language, a genre. It is partly the adult's task to assist the child in incorporating these conventionalized depictions of meaning.

The usual way of depicting the child's task of meaning captures the cognitive and to a lesser extent the communicative disparities in meaning situations between adults and children, but fails to consider the third dimension, i.e., the interactive possibility, that children see and speak of things differently from their adult interlocutors as an affective or conventional difference. The child's task has traditionally been captured as a deficit, or lack of complete understanding. In concert, the

adult's role has been conceptualized as filling that gap. This creates a halcyon construction of meaning in the literature, and unfortunately also in the empirical data, which depicts meaning making as a shared and agreed upon interaction. As Kessen (1979) has noted, somehow our reporting manages to construct an angelic or "good child"--and we might add, angelic parents also. It is generally suggested that the child acquiesces in her lack of something, which is then provided by the accommodating adult. There is a dearth of examples of interactions in the literature in which the child instead thinks she has the correct or complete information or opinion and the uncompromising adult who disagrees with the child, possibly based on having more and better information or perhaps on different preferences. The deficiency necessitates reliance on fewer pieces of data and anecdotes. In everyday situations where the adult's view and the child's view do not match and the adult does not adjust the inequity, it may become the child's task to overcome the potential disagreement by accepting the more knowledgeable partner's meaning as Rommetveit suggests (see also Garfinkel, 1967; and Dore 1983). Bruner (1983) captures this disparity and attendant resolution in his depiction of the mother's role as a **scaffolder** in the child's language development. For Bruner this is a cognitive as well as communicative endeavor. The mother's goal is to enhance her offspring's

acquisition of language, to hold her child increasingly accountable for the adult use of language/ meanings. The interaction which ensues is considered a **negotiation** (1983, p. 86). Bruner's account of this interaction is enhanced when viewed from the dialogical perspective of Bakhtin's (1984a, 1984b) analysis of the dynamics of meaning between disparate partners.

Bakhtin, while not attending to the dynamics of meaning between adult and child, marks the difference in meanings between the disparate partners, i.e., between the individual and the social institution, as an **opposition.** He describes the interaction of opposing meanings as a semiotic clash. Bakhtin is concerned with depicting how the speech of the ordinary man reflects the incorporation of the "authorial cultural voice" as well as the individual's. The "carnival genre" of the middle ages exemplifies the opposition between (in contemporary parlance) the culture of the masses and the culture of the authorities. This opposition is enacted in the form of a "struggle", a struggle which is represented in the speech and other productions of the common man. For example, the struggle between the hierarchial relationships of the monarchy and the peasants understanding of these were represented with the popular culture's "voice" in the carnival's "**king** of fools"--at once an acknowledgment of the hierarchial relationships of the rulers and a mockery of that monarchial superiority. Bakhtin (1981, 1984b) claims

this dialogical relation between the individual's meaning and that of the authority/social institution are represented in the dialogic character of spoken language (a point which is considered below).

While Bakhtin's analysis arose from examination of literary texts, the notion of opposition and attendant struggle in the incorporation of cultural meanings by individual meaners can be useful as a depiction of the dynamics of meaning construction between inequitable partners. This is not far from Bruner's notion of a negotiation but expands our understanding of the situation by focusing attention to the lesser interlocutor, the child's position in the interaction. While Bruner conceives of the interpersonal interaction between an acculturating adult (authoritative) and child as a **negotiation**, under Bakhtin's umbrella this is depicted as **dialogical encounter** between the institutional (authorial) (cf: Bakhtin 1984b) voice of the adult and the voice of child. With this in mind, consider Bruner's (1983) reported dialogue between a mother and her son as evidence for the negotiation of meaning as the two develop formats for language acquisition, in particular reference development.

Bruner notes that Richard's mother began changing her permissive attitude to Richard's vocalizations at 1.2 years when she began to treat his sounds as if they were words, had **meaning** or should have meaning. She began to be firmer

in her request for clarity, for Richard to display the adult/correct meaning. In the following sample of dialogue, Richard at twenty-two months and his mother are examining an English penny. They start out with different notions about what is on the penny.

(1) R: Nanny, nanny (pointing to the picture of the Queen on the coin).

(2) M: What? That's not Granny. It's a lady, yes. Nini is a lady, isn't it?

(3) R: Nanny, nanny (pointing to the coin again).

(4) M: You think that's Granny? Oh well, I don't think she'd mind too much.

(4) R: Layly (with a smile to mother).

(5) M: Queen.

(6) R: Nanny, nanny.

(7) M: It's **not**.

(8) R: Nini (smiles and nods).

(9) M: Yes.

(10) R: (Points and says) Nini.

(11) M: Have they all got ladies on?

(12) R: Nanny, nanny (pointing).

(13) M: No, it isn't.

(14) R: Nini.

(Bruner 1983, p. 87, word emphasis and numbers mine)

Bruner writes about this example of Richard and his mother's dialogue as a negotiation with a history. He

suggests that Richard may be on his way to distinguishing Granny from the Queen, and both from generic ladies, but at eighteen months, **nini** and **nanny** both indicated juice, and at the time of this interaction, **nani** may be money and **nini** lady. By twenty-three months **nini** disappears. At twenty-four months, Richard says "there's a lady" (1983, p. 88). Bruner uses these and other examples to demonstrate that mothers up the ante with their children in the language acquisition game. He argues that linguistic referencing is conventionalized, hence arrived at in social interactions with adults which are characterized by demands for younger members of the community to acquire the proper/cultural ways and speech for communication. Bruner's depiction of mother-child interaction departs from the usual dialogue of adult acceptance or accommodation, at least in front of the researcher's camera or tape recorder. The mother is seen as holding her child increasingly more accountable for producing adult/social forms of, in this case, communicative speech.

Bruner has viewed this from the perspective of the mother, or of the child acquiring adult forms of speech. While this may adequately capture the cognitive-communicative aspect of this interactive situation, consider this sample of dialogue from a dialogical encounter perspective suggested by Bakhtin's analysis. Hold at bay the notion of a maternal helping role in children's

developing acquisition of language and communication skills and the conception of developmental acquisition as the lack of. Place a dialogical analysis in its stead: that is, see the interaction not in terms of an absence of something in the child, but as the child having a different viewpoint. Under these interpretive conditions, Bruner's account might go something like this.

Richard and his mother are looking at an English coin. The picture of the Queen reminds Richard of his grandmother. His mother doesn't think so, and also thinks that Richard hasn't gotten it right, i.e., that Richard thinks it is a picture of his grandmother, instead of a picture of the queen, who, like his grandmother, is a lady. So she uses a made-up word, **nini**, which according to the previous data, may stand for the harder to say 1-word **lady**, which Richard does, in fact, say. Whether Richard actually thinks this is hard to determine, but what his mother does know is that Richard hasn't got the proper linguistic forms for signifying that the picture **reminds** him of his grandmother. So his mother attacks this problem by trying to get Richard to give her an account of the fact that the picture is actually that of the queen. His mother even entertains briefly the notion that the picture reminds Richard of his granny (utterance #4). Ultimately she dismisses this possibility, and insists (#8) that Richard recognize the queen in the picture. Richard tells his mother that he sees

the layly, and Mother introduces the word **Queen** into the dialogue, at which point Richard again tries to call the picture **Nanny**. But Mother will have nothing of this and insists that Richard has got it wrong. At this Richard agrees to refer to the picture with the made up word, **nini**, until Mother again refers to **ladies** (#11). At this point he puts in what we must assume is his last bid for his grandmother (#12), finally acquiescing to (at least part way) his mother's okay of **nini** (#13).

Bruner's contribution to the information on language acquisition may have correctly recognized the mother's role in the child's acquisition of referencing. His analysis, although one of interaction, necessitates that the child's input be reduced to a guide for the maternal intervention. This concurs with Ferguson's (1977) analysis of motherese. Considering, the "other half" of the dialogical duo from the insights into language and the acquisition of cultural meanings arrived at from Bakhtin's rereading of classical tracts, the meaning situation is recast as one between partners or co-constructors. This changes the possibilities of how meaning becomes constructed. In Bruner's analysis, the child is accurately conceived of as a lesser interlocutor, with emphasis on **lesser** rather than **interlocutor**. The child's contribution as interpreter and player is given little weight. Secondly, the struggle aspect of the interaction is minimized. While Bruner calls

this a negotiation, the child's argument is seen only as a signal for the mother's rebuttal rather than as another viewpoint. From the dialogical perspective offered by Bakhtin's theorizing and concomitant with Vygotsky's insights, the meaning situation is interpreted somewhat differently--as an interaction between meaning making communicators. For Bakhtin, speech not language, is the primary form of linguistic production, thus expression of meaning. The dialogical interaction between two meaners is conceived of as two equally valid discourses on some topic (1984b, p. 189).

What constitutes the incorporation of one point of view, one "genre" in place of the other, Bakhtin does not say. Instead he suggests that the situation which is dialogical is represented in speech which is dialogical. The alternative depiction, that the more adequate cognitive or communicative account would be acceptable to the child, undervalues the fact that the instrument of meaning is speech. Why one discourse is accepted rather than another, one speech embodied meaning rather another, has been the topic of investigations in companion disciplines. Foucault (1973) has argued that power not adequacy is the instrument of authority; DeLauretis (1987) proposes that rhetorical persuasiveness may govern the acceptance of discourse. Bakhtin (1968) contends that the dialogical intersection of two discourses can be displayed in just that manner because

of the dual or multiple representative nature of speech. The dual, and ofttimes, dueling, points of view are represented in the dual character of speech. Wertsch (1984) has suggested that in the ZPD the adult performs just such a feat, holding in abeyance one meaning in order to interact with the child's meanings. Turning this around, we could suppose that the child is capable of holding her own meaning and that of the social institution as voiced by the adult. How this might be displayed in speech is the third element in the formation of communicative meanings to be examined in this research.

Forms of multiple meanings.

> Dian: An' then I told her maybe but . den she gonna tell me that I tole her dat I said she could have .. a quarter but I told her 'No I didn't say that.' [changes tone of voice] Dat's just th' way . that's just a figure . figure of speech because that's how people are sometimes, you give them sum'thin' an' they just wanna . they just keep on askin' for you so, they they, like back . back stabbers-s. [smiles at discourse partner] They smile in your face an' they always would take your place.
>
> (Excerpt, 3rd grade girls' talk)

Werner and Kaplan, and Vygotsky have suggested that multiple systems of meaning develop as different discourse forms: speech for the self and speech for others. Bakhtin has augmented their proposal by arguing that the worlds of discourse may be multiplied and identified even further. This conception of multiple meaning arising from their work builds upon older, less functionally derived depictions. Polysemy, metaphor, ambiguity are all recognized linguistic forms for representing more than one meaning in a singular expression. Also far from new is the psychological counterpart to these linguistic constructions of multiple meanings. Aristotle (1962) identified the dual/ contradictory actions in human behavior as the problem of **incontinence**[7]: persons' judging that one action was in their best interest and doing the other. He explained this behavior as a problem of domain conflict, the appetitive domain overcoming the logical. But Freud's (1900/1965)

thesis of manifest and latent content has probably been the most influential psychological description of multiple or ambiguous meanings. Originally devised to explain dreams, the construct has a peculiarly contradictory or trickster character of the conscious being fooled by the unconscious. However both Freud's and Aristotle's depictions portray contradictory human behavior as foibles. Manifest content hides the inner workings of the psyche, and the incontinent act overrides the person's judged action in his own best interest.

Werner and Kaplan's and Vygotsky's proposals differ from these older linguistic and psychological depictions. Multiple meanings are not considered dysfunctional. One meaning neither cloaks nor distorts the other; there is no subterfuge. Secondly, there are not differing types of meaning such as literal and figurative. Instead, Vygotsky's construct of inner speech indicates how the individual could maintain his or her meaning in the face of the social institutional meaning (Werner and Kaplan, 1984; Glick, 1986). And both Vygotsky (1987) and Werner and Kaplan (1984) concur that with the advent of inner speech, even young children display more than one meaning in different speech forms. One meaning is not distorted by the other. Speech for the self and speech for others are available according to the contextual elements [addressee] of the meaning situation (Werner & Kaplan, 1984).

Vygotsky's thesis along with Werner and Kaplan's enhance our understanding of meaning, yet neither is complete. This deficit is not a problem of extension (cf: the earlier discussion of Bakhtin's (1986) conception of genres extending the notion of audiences). Instead, both Vygotsky and Werner and Kaplan leave open the question of how multiple meanings coexist, or are unified. Werner and Kaplan (1984) posit a necessary "interconnection" (p. 327) between speech for the self and speech for others. Vygotsky (1987) stops at identifying it as a dialogical construction (pp. 334-407). Wertsch (1985) has proposed that Bakhtin's construct of **heteroglossia** provides a mechanism which explicates the process implied by Vygotsky. He argues that heteroglossia broadens Vygotsky's account of inner speech by permitting the incorporation of social institutional meanings into the individual's own system. But it seems more likely that heteroglossia has a function extended even further than Wertsch's suggests and is also a **form** of multiple meanings. While heteroglossia is arguably a mechanism for explaining the incorporation and representation of others' dissimilar meanings into our own, it is also a semiotic description of the surface manifestation of more-than-one meaning. This fills the gap in both Vygotsky's and Werner & Kaplan's theses, but is particularly germane to Werner and Kaplan's (1984) question of the "interconnection" between the speech of the other and

speech of the self. This recommended broadened interpretation of the function of heteroglossia may seem initially overextended, but it is in keeping with Bakhtin's principle of the inextricability of the social and the semiotic. Heteroglossia, as a **semiotic mechanism**, is both a linguistic form and a psychological mechanism for communicative meaning construction.

Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia

For Bakhtin (1981, 1984b) all speech is dialogized: it is the result of the speaker's investing already meaningful words with her own intentions (1981, p.293). Words are not neutral objects. Instead, they come with a socio-historical past, a previous spoken-ness which then must be infused with the individual's meaningfulness. **Heteroglossia** is the intermingling of more than one meaning in the form of discourses; the interanimation of at least two meanings in the same word or phrase. This intermingling is constructed out of two or more "voices" or verbally represented ideological perspectives: ideological in the sense of representative of certain values, beliefs, etc. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 334). Moreover, for Bakhtin, heteroglossia arises out of opposition. The words come to the individual as socio-institutional objects, already historicized by others or, more globally, the cultural past. In the earlier example, the teacher's words, in addition to designating superordinate or subordinate classes, also present a mode of

speaking, a culture of school talk. It is the child's task to struggle to infuse her individual intentions, to "own" these words by appropriating them for her uses. For Bakhtin, this task has the character of a **struggle** as the individual appropriates the "voices" of others. The struggle is both represented in and constructed by language, for Bakhtin, because spoken language is a multiple signifying form, heteroglossic in character. This dual form represents the dueling of meaning. What is referenced, however, is other's words, other's discourse (cf: Vygotsky's concept of inner speech). We **index** (see discussion on reference below) another's utterances in our own. Clearly, this is Humboldt's (1856/1971) depiction of the problem of meaning, but with a twist. Instead of the object of meaning, language, or discourse being objectified; for Bakhtin it is subjectified, belonging to the speaking others, whether contemporary or ancestral. This formulation is so subtle as to go unnoticed, i.e., only under conditions of distinct opposition are the intermingling of differing discourses observable. Bakhtin identifies this feature of speech in literature. His analysis of Dostoevsky's Poetics (1984b) includes methods by which heteroglossia can be constructed in a literary text, but it is in his reading of Rabelais (1984a) that the dynamics of the intermingling of the individual's meaning with that of the socio-institutional is best illustrated. Bakhtin claims that the heteroglossic

character of speech is most evident in the serio-comic genres, the carnival genre of the middle ages being an exemplar. As mentioned earlier, the carnival's "king of fools" represents the incorporation of the monarchial hierarchy in the peasants' mocking response, thereby expressing the intermingling of two meanings, that of the individual and the authority. The "rules" of the carnival permit multiple contradictory meanings to be candidly expressed.

Although Bakhtin (1984b) identifies heteroglossia as the fundamental principle of semiotic organization of novelistic discourse, he argues that it emerges as a sociolinguistic phenomenon in the general speech community (1984a, 1986). Heteroglossia is, of course, a linguistic depiction of the dual representation, not a psychological description of how that might occur. The dialogical character of speech enables meaning for the individual to be a multiple construction. According to Bakhtin, what we do when we mean, is to display other's accounts, their "voices" as more than a metaphor (Bakhtin, 1984b, and Dore, 1987), **spoken over** with our own. In Bakhtin's analysis, communicative meaning is both a semiotic and pragmatic accomplishment, a function of signs in use.

Bakhtin's conception of the dialogical character of spoken language contrasts with other linguistic forms for displaying multiple meanings, such as metaphor, when one

meaning has a different status than that of the other, i.e., one is figurative, the other is literal. Yet there is support for his analysis from those writing about metaphor and polysemy (e.g., Benveniste and Ullman as cited by Ricoeur, 1984)[8]. Further, the heteroglossic character of spoken language is related but differs from traditional polysemantic forms. This is not a structural thesis. Words are not polysemic, i.e., have different semantic meanings. Instead, Bakhtin posits a functional polysemy. All words are dialogized for Bakhtin [unless the discourse has become objectified (1984b, p. 185)]. It is simply the nature of all spoken language that it is heteroglossic.

Heteroglossia as a form of multiple contexted meanings.

Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia, although newly construed, is a form of contextualized meaning (cf: Stewart, 1986 on the inextricability hypothesis). A child has "caught onto" contextualized meaning when she realizes that the same word(s) can be used to refer to different things in different contexts (e.g., Bloom's (1970) "Mommy sock" example). In **heteroglossia** or multiple signifying discourse, the same word(s) refer to at least two different [contexted] meanings simultaneously. That is, in the same speaking context at least two context-bound meanings are expressed. Moreover, what is referenced is **speech** of the other, replete with meanings of the other[9]. The diagram below will be helpful in contrasting these two types of

contextualized meaning. For heuristic purposes, context is subdivided into context of meaning (context-m) and context of utterance (context-u). Context of meaning refers to the context from which meaning is derived, as opposed to the context of utterance, which is the context in which the word is used. Context-u refers to the speaking situation.

Figure 1

Diagram contrasting typical construction of contexted meanings with heteroglossic constructions

I. Typical contextualized meaning



II. Heteroglossia



Note: Read ^^^ as 'is embedded in'.

In the usual depiction of contextualized meanings, the word derives meaning from the context--both extra- and intra-linguistic--in which the word is used. Reading the diagram from the top down, we see that the word is embedded in the meaning which is ultimately embedded in the context

of its utterance. The same word, then, means different things according to the context in which meaning/uttering is done. In a heteroglossic depiction, the same word uttered in one context-u derives its meanings from two contexts. It is much like collapsing the two contextualized meanings in part I of the diagram and limiting the speaking context. In one and the same context of utterance, the words or phrases have more than one meaning, perhaps even contradictory meanings. The following anecdote illustrates heteroglossia.

In light of Labov's (1973) claim that dialect identifies "who you are", the use of "Yo Homeboy!" by male students at a middle class private high school to hail each other seemed strange. Repeated instances showed that the salutation was said ironically. In so doing, the students re-accentuate or "re-envoice" the "street slang" of urban African-american males. This acknowledges, by holding up for scorn, the outright toughness and machismo which is admired yet not part of culture of which they are members. Not said ironically, these boys would falsely identify themselves as "street-wise". These disparate yet combined positions of adolescent male social behavior--the macho toughness of the street amidst the verbal dueling of the intellectual middle-class--are expressed in this bit of discourse.

In order to convey meaning, the utterance implies a context of "urban African-American male adolescent street

situation-discourse": this is an example of context of meaning. Context-of-use is the verbal exchange between the adolescents. Therefore in a heteroglossic configuration, context of use determines the possible meanings which necessarily includes the contexts of meaning. Conversely, urban black street adolescents could use the phrase "Yo Homeboy!" in such a way as to mock their white middle-class counterparts' use of their own original phrase. Given that this depiction of meaning occurs, then how does this aspect of meaning develop? How do we come to use language in this intralinguistic multi-referential function/form?

Bakhtin (1984a, 1984b) and Vygotsky (1987, p. 383) both find evidence in literature. This, however, does not solve the problem of how this might occur in ordinary discourse as Hickmann (1985, p. 185) notes. With the exception of Luria and Yudovich's (1959) monograph on the twins' specialized speech forms for particular audiences and Dore's (1987) re-analysis of the multi-voiced discourse of Socratic dialogues, linguistic or psychological studies which directly investigate multiple signified discourse are rare. Further, evidence which suggests that in ordinary discourse contrary or different viewpoints are suppressed was found by Blank (1981). His adult subjects shown different versions of the same stimuli, rejected or ignored the differences in viewpoints in conversation with dialogue partners. However,

evidence from preschoolers' play suggests a precursory step to the more fully realized heteroglossia.

Some evidence from play

Catherine Garvey's (1987) study of three year olds' resolutions of conflicts in pretend play offers evidence of a beginning intermingling of disparate meanings. Garvey reports speech of three year olds offering a conciliatory response which incorporates (**adjacently**) the contradictory meaning of another playmate into their own. This makes for an interesting if immature construction. In the sample of discourse below, the contradictory points of view are highlighted in the text and the conciliatory resolution incorporating both meanings is underlined.

Episode 1:

A: No, **he's not ready.** (Protesting the statement **that the "snake" is cooked.**)
B: Yes he is ready. <u>I see ground beef on him so we have to put him back in the oven</u>.

Episode 2:

A: **I be the daddy, okay?**
B: **No, you be the little one, okay?**
A: Little daddy? No, I wanta be a big daddy?
B: Well there's only one. Be a <u>little daddy</u>.

(Garvey, 1987)

It is not improbable that the three year olds' demonstrations of a side-by-side construction of multiple ambiguous meanings might be prior to a later full integration (perhaps **heteroglossic**). It is interesting to note, both that such a construction arises out of an

opposition, and occurs under the conditions of play. The first point supports Bakhtin's (1984b) description of an opposition as underlying heteroglossia, the latter, his findings of displays of heteroglossia in serio-comic genres.

Another intriguing instance of the potential development of multi-voiced meaning lies in the recognized hallmark of pretend play situations. The child re-enacts some scene of home life in order to counter the overriding affective content which according to Piaget (1962) prevents accommodation into a schema. For example, the child who is fussing at the bad baby who "won't eat all of your cereal". We assume here that the "bad baby" is the child herself presumably unhappily scolded for not complying with her mother's insistence on eating. Does this play indicate that a dual role develops which encompasses understanding? That is, part of the emergence of the child's individual meaning includes understanding the situation: the child does not alternate between the "discourse/role of the bad baby and the discourse/role of the other" but always carries both. This would seem to imply that double-voiced discourse may arise from the situation of double roles--with the "voices" being extracted/becoming autonomous, i.e., independent from the situation, later as solely a discourse phenomena? Hampson (1988) reports evidence for this in the play of a 3-year old with her mother, as does Andersen (1977) in her study of children's development of register.

Is this situation one in which the child has the ultimate problem of reference? How to get speech to refer to something other than itself while being produced? But with an addendum of what is referring and being referred to is discourse, hence is intralinguistic? The child must "construct" the words so that they sound like her mother while retaining the character of being produced by her.

The problem of reference--a brief look.

The problem of how we come to refer even singly has intrigued scholars and investigators since Augustine (1961). According to Lyons (1977, p. 74) particular concepts of language functions actually constitute theoretical positions. Halliday and Hasan (1976) define reference as language which instead of being interpreted semantically in its own right, makes reference to something else for interpretation. Reference is often defined by Frege's (1970) distinction between extensional as opposed to intensional (**sense**) meaning. But even that has been appropriated. Mertz (1985) interprets Frege's dichotomy to be between **sense** as contextualized meaning and **denotation** as a set of extensions. Reference has also been defined as purely semantic as opposed to indexical or pragmatic.

Ostensibly, "reference" can mean a language function which a) incorporates both semantic and pragmatic aspects, b) is purely semantic, or c) is purely pragmatic. The most fundamental function of "referring" is to "point out", a

pragmatic conceptualization attributed to Frege (1970) in the distinction between extensional meaning (**reference**) as opposed to intensional meaning (**sense**). Reference has also been defined as purely semantic, as opposed to indexical or pragmatic. The complexities involved in determining functional capacities of language have motivated Silverstein (1985) to caution against the too simplistic grouping of "intensional" and "extensional" functions. He (1985) offers a more specific classification of kinds of reference, including the formation of "discourse referentiality". He calls the kind of reference indicated by Frege (1970) "pure reference". Frege limited "reference" to the extensional dimension of meaning. However, most linguistic reference includes some characterization of the thing referred to (some predication about it), therefore is semantic as well. Silverstein calls this kind of reference "attributive" and claims it is identified by the indexical-denotationals (Donnellan, 1966, as cited by Silverstein, 1985). Silverstein introduces a kind of reference which combines both the semantic and pragmatic aspects, "discourse referentiality", but is limited to the intralinguistic context.

While Silverstein refers to language functions as **reference**, others (e.g., Vygotsky, Bakhtin) focus on signs as representative/mediating of psychological processes, the contextual aspect, use **sense**. In Frege's distinction, sense

would be thought of to be intensional in contrast to referential. But Silverstein's theory of referentiality challenges this dichotomy. **Sense** for both Vygotsky (1987) and Bakhtin (1968), as well as Nelson (1985), is the "meaning" of words which change(s) according to context. It is more like a common sense definition of **meaning**. However, recently, **meaning** (Vygotsky, 1987; Bakhtin, 1984b) has been used to denote the symbolic, or lexical, or decontextualized meaning, with 'sense' referring to the changes in meaning according to context (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 392). Bakhtin (1984a) clearly states that "sense" not "semantic meaning" is the cornerstone of the heteroglossic character of language. Vygotsky and Bakhtin both claim that words change **sense** according to their speakers. In agreement with this notion, but using different terms, Mertz (1985; also Lee, 1985; Silverstein, 1985; Parmentier, 1985) argue that research into meaning rests upon the study not of the **symbol** but the **sign**. Their distinction is based on Peirce's (1947) explanation of a symbol as the sign which best exemplifies decontextualized, semantic meaning (Mertz, 1985) with signs being drawn as material indices grounded in context.

In addition to Mertz et al (1985), Peirce's (1947) theory of signs has recently come to the fore after several decades of Saussurean (1959) domination (e.g., Bakhtin, 1984b; Wertsch, 1985a; Stewart, 1986; Vygotsky, 1987; DeLauretis, 1987). Saussure views signs as bipartite stand-

ins: as links between "an overarching whole composed of the concept (the signified) and a sound image (the signifier). Peirce describes the "stand-in" relation as a connection made by a sign vehicle (represetamen) between some object (that which the sign stands for) and an interpretant (a mental representation created by the sign vehicle in its function of standing for some object) (Vol. 2, p. 228). His tripartite analysis designates the sign as a mediator between the object and its interpreter. Peirce's depiction concurs with Vygotsky's notion of signs as tools, as mediators of psychological processes. Peirce also identified different kinds of signs, classifying a sign according to its relation to objects. A sign is classified as an icon if there is an inherent similarity between the sign and its object, as an index if it refers to an object by an existential contextual connection and as a symbol if connected by a general law which permits the two to be interpreted as connected. More plainly, an icon must in some way appear to be like its object in order for the relation to exist, such as a drawing or a diagram of an object. A symbol stands for its object by decree of laws of association, albeit culturally computed. The index differs from the others in that it can only stand for an object if it is in spatio-temporal contiguity with it. For example, a pointing finger only stands for what it is pointing to in context; it means something else out of that particularized

moment. In language, deitics and anaphoras are examples of linguistic signs which are indexes. The index is the most highly contextualized, most immediate, type of sign in Peirce's theory, and underlies both Silverstein's construct of discourse referentiality as well as Bakhtin's notion of heteroglossia.

Silverstein (1980) argues for a pragmatic rather than propositional (decontexted) notion of reference, focusing on the "computing of the referential value of the sign with relation to the situation of speaking ...in which the instance of the sign occurs" (p. 1). Further, he (1980) points out that referencing in speech includes the intralinguistic as well as the extralinguistic context. Building upon a Quinian definition of reference, Silverstein (1980) argues that **objects** in a speech situation can exist as introduced through speech:

> ...A simple example (of a reference maintaining device) from English is the chunk of discourse "Some man was walking down the street the other day. He...," where the unit "he" indicates that the referent of this noun phrase is **the same** as the referent of the noun phrase instance "some man" that occurred earlier. (p. 6)

The computed reference value of "he" is possible because a linguistically created object has been introduced and is now presupposed. The indexical relationship is an

intralinguistic presupposition, hence an instance of discourse referentiality.

Bakhtin's uses the notion of **sense**, rather than **reference** to denote the referential aspect of spoken language. Sense, attributed to words as spoken by others, is referenced in addition to the speaker's own meaning/ sense. The heteroglossic character of speech permits a double referencing of senses, an **indexing** of the speech of the other. Heteroglossia is a

> "hybrid construction" which is constrained by grammatical (syntactical) markers to a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two "languages", two semantic and axiological belief systems. No formal composition and syntactic boundary exists between these utterances, styles, languages, and belief systems; the division of voices and languages takes place within the limits of a single syntactic whole, often within the limits of a simple sentence. It frequently happens that even one and the same world will belong simultaneously to two languages, two belief systems that intersect in a hybrid construction and consequently the word has two contradictory meanings, two accents.
>
> (1984b, pp. 304-305)

Speech which references both discourses of the self and the other extends Silverstein's construct of discourse referentiality. Bakhtin's quest differed from that of Silverstein and others who explore the dynamics of language. He emphasized the intricate relationship between speech and the social situation of the speaker/meaners. For example, if one of the speakers has more expertise, the acceptance of this by her inferior partner can be represented as the interanimation of both "senses", rather than the acceptance or rejection of one as proposed by Rommetveit (1974). This double-voicedness is the linguistic analogue to the adult's position in the ZPD described by Wertsch, i.e., the holding of two views, that of the child and of the adult (1984, p. 12). What Wertsch does not suggest, but would be no doubt sympathetic to, is that this doubling could be manifested as a linguistic construction, a characteristic of discourse. To wit: the notions of figurative and literal meanings of a metaphorical construction are replaced with adult and child meanings intermingling in the adult's discourse to the child, both displayed simultaneously. And, the argument of this project is, this capacity also exists for the child meaner--the ability to have and display more than one meaning in the same speech string. How might this develop?

Intralinguistic reference development

Researchers in intralinguistic reference, such as Hickmann (1984) and Karmiloff-Smith (1979), have studied

children's developing capacity to engage in multi-functional speech. Karmiloff-Smith (1979) studied children's use of anaphoric reference. She found that small children rely on extralinguistic features to clarify ambiguity while middle school age children begin to use the intralinguistic markers, first by overmarking and finally by using the adult system. Karmiloff-Smith argues that intralinguistic reference is cognitively more complex than deitic (extra-linguistic) reference.

Maya Hickmann (1985) studied children's developing capacity to use multifunctional language, focusing on indexicals. She was concerned with the Vygotskian problem of the development of inner speech as a regulatory function both extralinguistic and, in her hypothesis, intralinguistic as well. Using Vygotsky's theory of the multifunctionality of language (e.g., his identification of the two macrofunctions of signs, the interpersonal /communicative and the cognitive /representational), Hickmann examined children's developing use of speech to mediate sign-using activity. Hickmann explored how language becomes its own context, citing two ways in which the uses and interpretation of linguistic signs are partly determined by others. In discourse, linguistic signs can have an indexical relationship with other linguistic signs: the relation of co-presence between them and other signs in previous/subsequent speech as discourse unfolds through

time. These may be deictic indexical relationships or inter-linguistic, i.e., refer to the non-linguistic context or contribute to cohesion in discourse (e.g., Halliday and Hasan's, 1976, "text-forming function" of language whereby linguistic signs are "linked" to one another across clauses by being dependent on one another for interpretation). Secondly, in addition to pointing to other signs, linguistic signs can point to the various properties and uses of signs, the metapragmatic use of speech to refer to speech (using speech in one situation in order to represent speech which was uttered in another). It is also possible to combine metapragmatic and pragmatic uses of speech. Speech can simultaneously represent and affect aspects of the ongoing speech event in the immediate situation. The message in the immediate context of utterance and the message reported, is often indicated by a "frame of some kind", typically a clause indicating a relationship. Hickmann hypothesized that both the intralinguistic and metapragmatic uses of speech to be late developments, considering the complexities of the indexical relationships involved. The literature suggested that extralinguistic (deictic) forms would be transferred to the intralinguistic context for referring, but Hickmann's study tested the hypothesis further, improving on previous studies by providing functionally equivalent situations and using production rather than comprehension with non-isolated forms.

Hickmann asked 4, 7, 10 year olds and adult English speakers to narrate "stories" in two situations: film/ narrative and pictures/narrative. She examined the intralinguistic means used to "create" the referents linguistically and to maintain reference to them as well as to provide the metapragmatic framing devices used to objectify speech events and transform them into cohesive texts. In the film/narrative situation ten children of each age were asked to narrate short filmstrips for an interlocutor who had not seen them and who then told the stories back and answered some questions about them. Hickmann found a gradual increase in the uses of effective referent-introducing forms: 4 year olds, 36%; 7 year olds, 59%; and 10 year olds, 89%. Only the ten year olds were found to use effective forms to create referents systematically and consistently more often than ineffective-mixed ones. Results were similar for a picture-narrative condition. Hickmann explains the relatively high proportion of referent-introducing forms at 7 years compared to the 4 year olds as indicative of the emergence of these skills. Her findings are consistent Karmiloff-Smith's (1979) studies suggesting that cohesive uses and interpretations of referring expressions are relatively late-developing. Hickmann concluded the development of intralinguistic and metapragmatic skills is very gradual in narrative production.

In a related article, Hickmann (1985) analyzed the same corpus of data for evidence of children's developing ability to report the speech of others. She argued that there are extensive forms for reporting the speech of others, approvingly noting the form-function analysis of Voloshinov's (1973) proposed continuum of speech forms for reporting speech of others. His analysis is based on the boundaries between the speech being reported and the speech of the reporting, such as "fusion", identification. At the extreme end of differentiation is the "linear style", where there is a clear cut boundary and the "authenticity" of the speech is preserved. At the other end, Voloshinov identifies the "pictorial style" which tends to obliterate the boundaries; the speech is reproducing while simultaneously infiltrated with some sort of commentary (humor, irony, etc.). Hickmann finds this continuum persuasive, but cautions

> Most of these writings focus on the variants of reported speech as literary means for various effects, such as the "fusion" or identification between narrator and characters, "perspective shifts","double-voicing", "role taking", "stream of consciousness", et cetera. Very little is known about the forms and functions of reported speech in ordinary discourse using the same principles of analysis. (p. 185, ff#5)

Hickmann examined the children's narratives in terms of quotes, direct and indirect, to determine the development of metapragmatic skill of reporting speech events. She found a predictable trend with the youngest (4 year olds) failing to report speech explicitly, or when doing so failing to reproduce, e.g., to "frame" the dialogue directly while the 7 and 10 year olds used devices that explicitly framed the narrated dialogue. Although the 10 year old narratives showed the clearest indications of the use of pragmatic and metapragmatic aspects of speech, even the 7 year old narratives indicated that they were about "speech events". Hickmann points out that these skills are developed in conjunction with other discourse skills (reported in the earlier study), and counsels against the mistaken analysis of children's developing metapragmatic skills, since often the same formal means are used for different functions.

In contrast to Hickmann's findings on children's developing capacity to report speech, Andersen (1977) reports evidence of very advanced set of sociolinguistic skills when 4-7 year old children "act out" different social events. Children used appropriately different types of utterances to indicate the roles of parents and children, of doctors and nurses. These showed a developmental trend, the youngest children relying on nonreferential markings, i.e., voice quality (pitch), phonological and prosodic aspects of utterances rather than directives, although all children

displayed more imperatives when playing the adults. Hickmann cautions, as does Andersen, that more research is needed in order to determine the children's awareness of these pragmatic forms. But Andersen recognizes that the data indicate that children very early demonstrate a communicative ability, clearly reflective of the social situation, a point closer to Bakhtin's focus of study.

In support of Andersen's cautiously put forth hypothesis of early acquisition of adult style/forms of talk, Elena Levy (1989) finds that the crib talk of a 23 month old reflects some features of her father's talk and yields evidence of the early use of anaphora for text cohesiveness, an intralinguistic capability. John Dore (1989) presents even stronger evidence from the same corpus of the "re-envoicing" developmental path to language acquisition. Utilizing Bakhtin's constructs, he argues that the child incorporates the talk of her parent while making it her own.

> ...An obvious early re-envoicement occurs when Emmy reproduces the father's line, "we're gonna...."
> ... This is neither an imitation nor a creation of her own, but intermediate between the two. Emmy re-envoices the theme..., the structural feature of listing names, and the stylistic feature of emphatic stress on names of people and objects [all features of her father's talk]. (p. 253, brackets mine)

In a leap from infants and preschoolers to adolescents, Tappen (1991) argues that the development of moral authority arises from the experience of dialogue both between and within persons (p. 18). He uses Bakhtin's notion of the "internally persuasive" discourse of the other (Bakhtin 1981, pp. 345-356) to illustrate differences between teenage girls' speech about moral responsibility. Dore and Dorval (1990) use Bakhtin's theorizing to provide a dialogical account of intimacy between teenage friends. These beginning explorations using insights from Bakhtin's analysis provide support for examining school age children's changing constructions of meaning as moments of interaction between voices of their teachers and their own.

Summary

In this introduction I have provided an argument for the examination of children's development of communicative meaning as a process of incorporating the voice of the other into their own talk. Support was drawn from three main theoretical sources: Werner and Kaplan's metatheory of the process of symbolizing in particular the role of the addressee; Vygotsky's insights into both the interpersonal and semiotic aspects of development in particular his construct of inner speech and word development; and Bakhtin's analysis of the incorporation of the voice of the other into one's own voice. I have proposed that the

communicative meaning interaction between an acculurating adult and a lesser interlocutor, the child, be viewed not only as an instance of interpersonal interaction or as a scaffolding, but as a moment of contact between two competing views qua voices or discourses with conventional or ideological, as well as cognitive dimensions of difference between the two. Finally I have suggested that in contrast to previous depictions of the communicative meaning interaction, the process should be understood as the child's incorporation of the voice of the adult into her own voice and not the replacement of one by the other.

Empirical evidence from developmental investigations strongly suggests that children both demonstrate early capacities for internalizing another's dialogue through role playing and for using intralinguistic references to reference other's speech. Vygotsky (1987) has argued that, by six years old, children use inner speech in planning and problem solving, suggesting a dual system of meaning. The analyses of literary (including heretofore overlooked evidence of double-voicing (Johnson, 1986; Gates, 1981, 1988)) and adolescent discourse provide evidence of multi-signifying discourse. Importantly, conditions of play produce a situation conducive to the demonstration of multiple meanings. These, along with the work of Werner and Kaplan, Vygotsky, and Bakhtin suggest the following research questions as well as a method by which to answer them.

AIMS OF THE STUDY

In light of the theoretical work and empirical findings, the following research questions guided the study.

1. Are children's communicative meanings determined by the audience being addressed, as evidenced by changes in dialogue genres in response to addressee?

2. Will children's communicative meanings change/develop as a consequence of verbal interaction with their teacher, as evidenced by differences in children's a) interpretations, b) dialogue genres, or c) both, following verbal interaction with their teachers?

3. Will differences in talk/meanings between unequal discourse participants, i.e., children and teachers, result in the children's accommodation to the authorial voice of the teacher as evidenced by: a) absence of their own meanings, b) display of the teacher's meanings, c) interposition of both meanings adjacently, or d) interanimation of both meanings, heteroglossia?

CHAPTER II

METHODS

Design

The dynamics and development of dialogically constructed meaning were explored in a quasi-experimental, naturalistic cross-sectional design. The study drew from both naturalistic and experimental methodologies. The design aimed to provide an opportunity for a naturally occurring phenomenon to be studied in a quasi-experimental situation. The phenomenon under study was the construction of meanings in dialogue among 3rd and 4th graders and changes and/or development of those meanings through dialogue with adults, namely, their teachers. The opportunity for this phenomenon to be observed was created by introducing a stimulus designed to provoke talk. The stimulus was a video presentation of two short skits of the Bert and Ernie characters from Children's Television Workshop's Sesame Street Show which afforded multiple interpretations to adults and children alike (Newman, 1980). The quasi-experimental situation was manifested as three discourse elicitation conditions, or phases: two dyadic discourse phases before and after an intervention phase. Children's dialogical constructions of meanings about the video were elicited as talk among two good friends before and after the intervening phase, talk with their teachers in a classroom activity. The dyadic discourse phases differed

carnivalized. Children were given props with instructions to be as comic or teacher-imitative as they wished in talking about the skits. Following Bakhtin's (1984b) claim that double-voiced discourse was most manifest in serio-comic genres, this manipulation was initiated to provide maximum contextual support for the display of multiple meanings. All talk was audio and video recorded. Interpretative methods were employed in the data analysis.

Sample and Setting

The study was initially designed to explore dialogical constructions of 3rd and 4th grade same gender dyads and their teachers. Developmental differences were expected to be observed by sampling 3rd and 4th graders. These grades represent a socio-cultural shift (whether arbitrary or developmentally driven) in schooling from early to middle elementary childhood education. However, actual school practices required modification of the sample criteria to avoid tampering with the everyday goings-on of the teachers and children. To preserve the naturalistic design of the study three changes were made. First, grade limits were extended to accommodate class configurations when 3rd and 4th graders were in bridge classes (two grades in one classroom) with 2nd and 5th graders respectively. The sample grade criterium was extended to include 2nd and 5th grade classroom peers in order to a) preserve the natural classroom milieu, b) meet the criterium of friendship for

dyad partners and c) upon teachers' informal counsel that some of their second graders' performances would simulate or exceed that of the third graders. Second, there was an implicit practice among the teachers against excluding any child willing to participate from the study since their classroom peers and teacher was involved. The naturalistic design of the study precluded violating this practice[1]. All children with parental consent (see Appendix A for schematic of consent form letter sent home to parents) participated in the study, although not every child's talk was included in the data analysis. Third, since very few children from two 4th-5th grade classrooms participated in the study, the teachers from these classes and the researcher decided to combine the children into one "class". The decision was based both on the teachers' familiarity with children from both classes and potential inequity of numbers. Teachers insisted it "would not matter" which of them interacted with the children. The targeted group, i.e., 4th graders, were primarily based in the class of the teacher who conducted the classroom activity for this group. If not combined, the small numbers of the children in each class would have made the classroom activity qualitatively different than that experienced by children in other classes.

Given these operating practices, thirty-four same gender dyads, one mixed gender dyad, two children without a

dyad partner (n = 72) and five teachers from two schools participated in the study. The same gender dyads consisted of three 2nd graders, three 2nd-3rd grade pairs, twelve 3rd graders, twelve 4th graders, and four 5th grade pairs. Seventeen of the 2nd-4th graders were girls and thirteen were boys. The four 5th grade dyads were all girls.

Children were recruited from 3rd and 4th grade classes of one school and four bridge classes (two 2nd-3rd grades and two 4th-5th grades) from a second school. With the exception of the 4th-5th bridge grades, the teachers were from the same classes as the children. Children and their teachers came from two inner city alternative public schools. The designation of alternative distinguished these schools on many parameters, but one feature was germane to this study. Both schools were identified as providing more verbal interaction between teachers and students than typified inner city public schools. The first school had been an alternative school for many years serving a mostly African-american and Latino population. The second school was more recently established with a multi-cultural philosophy and student quota system to guarantee a multi-ethnic population. Both schools were small, hence housed in a building with a larger, traditional public elementary school. Each school had one class of every grade level except for the bridge classes, of which there were two.

Ethnically, the sample was diverse, although the majority of the children were from African-american, Latino, and African-american-Latino families (71%). The remainder were from White (19%), East Indian (3%), and other multi-ethnic (7%) families. Teachers were similarly ethnically diverse. Of the 4 women and 1 man, two were African-american, one was Hispanic, one White and one multi-ethnic.

Materials

Stimulus

The stimulus for evoking talk between dyad partners and providing teachers with material for a class activity was a video of two skits of the Bert and Ernie muppet characters developed by Children's Television Workshop. The skits were extensively analyzed in earlier research by Newman (1980) and found to offer three interpretations to both adults and children (1980, p.198). The skits were short (approximately 1.5 to 2 minutes in length) and did not have an novice-expert underlying format or an educational goal (e.g., letter learning). Newman (1980) found that the skits were interesting and sufficiently entertaining to capture both children's and adults' attention. Familiarity with the muppets from Sesame Street television shows would not necessarily affect the subject's interpretations since Ernie is presented as clever rather than ignorant (to the adult viewer at least). In other televised episodes, Ernie is

often stereotyped as dumb and Bert portrayed as slow but smart (Newman, 1980). In this research, two skits were used rather than one because of similar content and length. Each was too short alone to provide sufficient material for a class discussion.

The stories which make up the skits are about Ernie's deception of Bert in the context of sharing some prized food. Copyright restrictions preclude precise transcripts of the skits, entitled "Bert and Ernie share a banana" and "Ernie shares Bert's cookie"[2]. A typical adult rendering of these skits, hereafter referred to as "the banana skit" and "the cookie skit", is provided by Newman (1980):

> **The banana skit.** (91 sec.) Ernie returns home with a bag of groceries. Bert asks him if he got bananas. Ernie says he did, pulls one out of the bag and begins eating it. Bert, thinking there was only one banana hints he wants some by saying "I like bananas, too, ya know." Ernie emphatically agrees: "I don't blame you Bert, they really taste terrific". (Ernie knows that Bert is requesting some of the banana and is pretending to misinterpret Bert's intent). Bert hints again before calling Ernie selfish. Ernie now acts as if Bert has convinced him saying: "You're right ... share and share alike..." (Bert thinks Ernie is now convinced and willing to share). Ernie says he is going to "divide this banana up so both of us can have some". He turns

his back on Bert. Before Bert can see, Ernie gobbles up the rest of the banana. When Bert does see that Ernie has eaten all the banana, Ernie explains that they are sharing it--he's taking the inside part and Bert can have the outside. (Bert is shocked by the realization he has been tricked.) Ernie tells Bert he was only kidding and pulls another banana out of the bag.

The cookie skit. (116 sec.) Bert is about to eat a cookie that he has been saving all day when Ernie bursts on the scene, sees the cookie and decides he wants it. Bert insists that it is for him alone but Ernie begins trying to convince Bert to share it. Ernie argues that if he (Ernie) had the cookie, he would share it with Bert. (This may not be true. Ernie may be trying to convince Bert or may be setting the stage for his next move.) Bert doubts that Ernie would, so Ernie takes the cookie telling Bert that he would. Bert objects to Ernie taking the cookie, but Ernie says he is just going to demonstrate. (This is a lie to get Bert's cooperation.) Ernie asks Bert to ask him if he (Ernie) would share the cookie with him (Bert). (Bert believes this to be a pretend scene, the demonstration.) Bert reluctantly asks the question. Ernie answers that he would be happy to share the cookie. Ernie breaks the cookie in half, gives half to

> Bert and begins eating the other half as he walks away. Bert is left dumfounded. (Ernie has half the cookie and maybe legitimately since if the demonstration has proved he would share, then he has a claim to half of the cookie). Ernie returns momentarily to ask Bert if he would share his half of the cookie. Bert screams. (pp. 58-59)

Newman (1980) classified subjects' understanding of the cookie skit as their interpretations of Ernie's plan. Subjects thought the skit was about a) a share plan, b) a trick plan or c) a con game. A trick plan differed from a con game in that in the latter the victim is not sure whether or not he has been done a favor. The three interpretations were found to have a character of sophistication for the youngest and oldest subjects. Most 1st graders interpreted the skit as a sharing plan by Ernie while very few college students understood the story in that way. Most college students interpreted the cookie skit as being about a con on Ernie's part. The 3rd-4th graders and 6th graders viewed the skit equitably in all three ways. The con game interpretation could be said to be the most sophisticated and sharing the least sophisticated.

The banana skit was also analyzed by Newman (1980). Most subjects saw it as being about teasing, albeit different sorts of teasing. However, these skits were not shown together in Newman's study, and were used for quite

different purposes, i.e., questioning subject's understanding of strategic interactions. Since the story line is similar, it was reasonable to suppose that the banana skit could be interpreted as being about sharing or about Ernie's being interested in tricking Bert. Although if seen alone, the con game interpretation would be less likely to be given for the banana skit, the two skits overlapped in permitting the first two interpretations. To heighten the potential of the skits together affording all three interpretations, the cookie skit was shown last.

Equipment

A Portable Sony Video Cassette Recorder and Panasonic Portable Video Camera or Camcorder were used to show the videos and record verbal interactions. Color televisions in both schools were used as monitors. The second school also provided their Video Cassette Recorder. The camera was positioned on a stainless steel extendable tripod. Audio recordings were made on a portable Sony recorder with attached remote microphone.

Procedures

Initial permission to conduct the study was requested through the principal or director of the respective schools. Since the study depended upon teachers' interactions, their approval and agreement to participate in a study about "children's development of meaning in interaction with their teachers" was also recruited. Following administrative

approval, consent forms were sent home requesting parental permission for the children to participate.

Children with parental consent were paired by their respective teachers on the criteria of same gender and friendship, i.e., "kids who are good friends and whom you see talking to each other a lot in school". The study took place at the end of the school year, thus children and teachers were familiar with each other. Children without a same gender partner were paired with an opposite gender partner from the same class. If no child was available, the researcher served as dyad partner. Each school provided the researcher with the use of a room which functioned most of the time as an office for school personnel.

Initial dyadic discourse phase

Dyads previously selected for being "good friends" were escorted by the researcher into a room which was set up with a video camera and cassette recorder, monitor, audio recorder with remote microphone strategically placed for maximum pick-up, and two small chairs facing the monitor. Children were told that they would see a couple of Bert and Ernie skits and then talk about them with each other "sort of like you would if you were watching something on TV at home and talked about it to each other". They were also told that I was interested in what children understood about the skits and would be recording what they said. Children were assured that "you can say anything you want about the

skits, no one will see or hear this except me; not your parents, teachers or principal (director), no one" (see Appendix B for protocol for eliciting talk in the initial dyadic phase).

Children sat in the two chairs facing the monitor. A warm-up session began. Children were shown a skit of Bert and Ernie and the researcher asked them what it was about. Following their responses, the researcher then told them that they would see two other skits and talk about what these skits were about to each other, without the researcher present. After the banana and cookie skits were shown, the researcher turned off the monitor and rearranged the children's chairs, slightly facing each other in view of the video camera. The researcher ascertained that the children understood that they were to talk about what the skits were about to each other. Children were told they had fifteen minutes to talk alone to each other; that the researcher would check on them in a few minutes to make sure everything was going okay, but would be right outside the room in case they needed her. Children who finished before fifteen minutes were encouraged to continue talking about the skits or anything else for the remainder of the time. At the end of the session, children were thanked and shown a few seconds of the videotape of them talking. No further instructions were given.

Upon completion of the observations of all children from one class, the classroom activity was scheduled with the teacher. Although the activity was planned for the following week, the scheduling had to be flexible to accommodate children's absences.

Classroom discourse phase

The classroom discourse phase was designed to be normative. Teachers were asked to conduct a class activity in which they would talk "in any way you normally would to the kids" about what the skits meant. The video of the skits was available to the teachers for viewing prior to the scheduled classroom activity. Teachers from the first school viewed the skits in the school and told the researcher what they thought the skits were about. The teachers in the second school felt their schedules were too hectic, and took copies home to view the skits. One teacher declined to view the skits prior to the classroom activity.

The class activity took place during regular school hours at a time convenient to teachers' schedules. Children participating in the study either went with their teacher to a designated room, or stayed in their own classroom while their non-participating classmates were elsewhere. The room, or section of the classroom was set up for video presentation and audio and video recording. The teacher wore a small remote microphone.

The activity began with teacher and children viewing the video of the skits together. After the presentation, the monitor was turned off and audio and video taping of the teacher and students by the researcher began. Since teachers could conduct the class activity in any way they wished, length of time, method of presentation, and what to say were determined by each teacher. No prescribed "talk about the skits" was provided by the researcher although several teachers asked about a pre-formed script.

Final dyadic discourse phase

The final dyadic discourse elicitation phase began one week following the class activity to prevent mimicry of the teacher's talk, and was completed as soon as all children could be observed. The final dyadic phase was designed to replicate the initial dyadic phase with one critical manipulation: it was carnivalized by the use of props and instructions in order to elicit double-voiced discourse. The setting differed only in the addition of a white twelve inch squared cardboard box of props containing two blouses, two shirts, two sashes suitable for use as belts or ties, and two pair of eyeglass frames. Two pieces of costume jewelry, a string of black plastic beads and a bracelet were also in the box, although seldom used.

Children were brought to the set-up room now familiar to them, by the researcher. On the way the researcher told them that they were going to see the Bert and Ernie skits

and talk about them again, but this time would be a little different. Upon arrival at the room, the researcher asked the children if they remembered the skits. Depending upon whether the response was "not sure" or "yes", the researcher said she would show them the two skits again either for remembering or for making sure they remembered every part.

After the skits were shown, the chairs were again re-arranged for recording. The researcher introduced the props, demonstrating uses for several (e.g., showing the shirts or blouses or the lens-less glasses). Children were encouraged to use the props and "talk about the skits in any way you want, make it funny, maybe talk the way ..... (teacher's name) did". They were again assured that "you can say anything you want about the skits, no one will see or hear this except me" (see Appendix C for protocol for the final dyadic phase). The researcher left the room with the same instructions as in the initial dyadic discourse phase regarding time, checking of equipment and her position outside of the door should she be needed. Children's talk was recorded for fifteen minutes or until the children finished. Upon leaving the room, all but the last dyad to be recorded from each school were asked not to "tell the others" about the props. The comedic or carnival manipulation of the phase was used to provoke a playfulness, thereby providing maximum contextual support for children's

multiple meanings to be expressed (e.g., Andersen, 1977; Bakhtin, 1984b; Garvey 1987; Hampson, 1988).

Transcription

Talk was transcribed from audio and video tapes. The talk in the dyadic phases was transcribed in columns for each speaker. The classroom talk was also transcribed into columns, with teacher's talk in one column and children's in another. Interruptions, simultaneous talk and other vocalizations, such as laughter, were noted by transcription conventions indicated in the Key to transcription in Appendix D. In addition, children's pauses, gestures and actions which elucidated the immediate context of the talk were included in the transcript.

Data Analysis

The analysis of dialogically constructed meanings could never be exhaustive since discourse is multiformed. In this research specific elements of dialogically constructed meanings were analyzed by developing category schemes. The precise development of specific categories, while informed by *a priori* concerns, can not be completed without rich textual, even hermeneutic contact. Thus, while the category schemes appear and are presented prior to the data, they are in fact as much a product of the research as that derived by traditional analyses.

Three category schemes were developed in response to the following questions. First, what were children's *interpretations* of the skits? Newman's (1980) findings formed the basis of this classification. Second, in what ways did children and teachers talk about the skits? What dialogue genres or modes of speaking were employed by children and children and teachers? This scheme was informed by Bakhtin's (1986) analysis of *speech genre*. Third, what were children's *dialogic interaction* with the classroom discourse? This was designed as a measure to determine children's appropriation of the discourse of the other, i.e., intertextuality. Intertextual references are discourse which is the constructed text of the other within one's own speech, thus indicate an interaction with the discourse of the other.

Classification of Interpretations of the skits

Todorov (1973) defines interpretation as the activity of looking for the hidden meanings of a text and giving them preference (p. 73). He distinguishes interpretation from other sorts of activities with texts such as the reading of a text which is concerned with the relationship between various **levels** of meaning, with the **multiplicity** which the text as a system enjoys (Todorov as referenced by Hawkes, 1977, p. 105). Newman's (1980) research yielded three categories of interpretation of the skits, **sharing**, **tricking** or **conning**. Three additional categories were generated by a textual analysis of the data collected in this research. First, both teachers and children found the skits to be about a deficiency in consideration for others. This was attributed either to self-interest, i.e., being **selfish**, or appetites, i.e., being **stingy** or **greedy**. Although this interpretation might be seen as a derivation of **sharing, the** two were treated as distinct. One teacher made it quite clear when he said, "... awright being greedy, so very little kids might have to learn what sharing is .. greedy is something else." This interpretation was notated as being selfish. Friendship was a second interpretation generated from the data. Although this interpretation was most frequently mentioned by the teachers in the study, some children also viewed the skits as being about how to be good friends and expectations of friendship. Finally, in an

unexpected twist, some children said the skits were about being funny: about humor rather than a message--entertaining. The six interpretations constituted the categories of this coding scheme. What counted as an interpretation was guided by Newman's (1980) original work.

Sharing

A sharing interpretation was coded if subjects referred to Ernie's and Bert's concerns as about sharing. They ascribe either to the characters a concern about sharing (Newman, 1980, pp. 97, 103) or decide the "message" of the skits is about sharing. Some instances of dialogue which indicate subjects interpret the skits as being about sharing follows.

> "Well, Ernie wants some of Bert's cookie, but he doesn't think that Bert will share it with him, so he takes it and shares it with Bert."
>
> "Hmmm, Ernie has lots of bananas that he wants to share with Bert, but he (Bert) doesn't know that, so he faints."
>
> (Newman, 1980, p.93)

Selfish

A selfish interpretation was coded if the subjects viewed the skits as being about some deficiency in character, whether motivated by self-interest or appetites. Although this interpretation is often part of a **sharing** interpretation, the focus was less on the act of sharing than the **character** of the characters. Dialogue samples indicative of an interpretation of **selfish** are,

> "so what else do you think it might be about? in addition to sharing? ...being greedy .. so very little kids might have to learn what sharing is . greedy is something else"
>
> (Excerpt, Teacher)

> "Well, but the banana was selfish ... he knew ..that Bert could not eat the outside and that ... you not supposed to eat the outside ... it was very stingy of him."
>
> (Excerpt, 4th graders)

Trick

A trick interpretation was coded if subjects view the skits as being about Ernie's deception of Bert in order to get some of the cookie or eat the whole banana (Newman, 1980, pp. 96, 106). Subjects talk about Ernie's deception of Bert whether or not they see Bert as being suspicious. For example,

> "Ernie wants to play a joke on Bert, so he pretends there is only one banana."
>
> (Newman, 1980, p.96)

> "And with th' banana, he tricked 'im ... "this is your banana Bert". An' then he said, " I said, I get the inside and you get the outside, Bert"."
>
> (Excerpt, 4th graders)

Con

A con interpretation was coded if subjects view the cookie skit as being about Ernie's deception of Bert with Bert thinking that he is being done a favor. For example, in the cookie skit, although Ernie takes the cookie away, Bert has been tricked into thinking that the cookie was Ernie's and he (Bert) was getting a half (Newman, 1980, pp. 93, 110). The difference between the trick and con interpretations rests on whether the subject thinks Bert has

been conned along with being tricked, i.e., a subject viewing the cookie skit thought that Bert believed he was getting a deal, or that Bert was made to feel guilty about sharing in order for Ernie to pull the trick off. Samples of discourse in which subjects indicate the skits were about Ernie conning Bert are:

> "Bert (looking puzzled at the half of the cookie) is so dense, he can't figure out that Ernie took half his cookie."
>
> "Ernie turns around, and Bert, he doesn't get it, he thinks Ernie is going to give him some banana."
>
> (Newman, 1980, p. 96)

Friendship

A friendship interpretation was coded if speakers found the message of the skits was about being friends, i.e., what it means to be a good friend and how such friendship was violated by the characters' actions of tricking or not sharing. Some samples of discourse which indicate subjects interpreted the skits as being about friendship were:

> "Do you think it was right for Ernie to play that trick on his best friend? ... would he have changed ... at some point in the middle of it to make it better for his friend..."
>
> (Excerpt, Teacher)

> "Th' story's about sharing because ... because his friend didn't wanna share an' then his friend wind up sharin' it anyway."
>
> (Excerpt, 3rd graders)

Funny

A funny interpretation was coded if subjects indicated that the skit was about being funny, about entertaining.

Although recognizing other interpretations, this characteristic of the skits was the most manifest for some children. This category was not coded when subjects found a character funny; only when the skit was found funny. Discourse samples which provide evidence of this interpretation are:

> "An' I think there was some humor in it, cuz ... when he, he, it was kinda funny cuz, when he ate the banana he said, .. givin' it to him, 'Here, I got da inside, you got da outside'."
>
> (Excerpt, 4th graders)

> "It was funny for a little kid . if I was a little kid an' I was five, I would be laughin' ..you know it would be funny."
>
> (Excerpt, 5th graders)

Classification of Dialogue Genres

In addition to the interpretations given for the skits, meaning construction was determined through an analysis of "ways of talking" or speech genres. Bakhtin (1986) argues that speech genres organize speech in the same way that syntactical forms organize language. Moreover, the type of speech genre can depict the sorts of meanings which are constructed (Bakhtin, 1986). However, the construct of speech genre was found to be wanting when applied to the conversational data in this study. It should be noted that the assignment of "speech genre" to these data even with the modification I suggest does not resolve the larger problem of status of speech genre, which is a focus of a debate currently taking place within developmental psychology. I

am side stepping the larger issue here to adapt the notion of a speech genre for application to the data in this study, which may, of course, ultimately convince only some.

For my purposes the problem with the notion of speech genre is that arising from a literary context, static linguistic elements are markers of identification. In contrast, while an individual speaker's or writer's speech may meet underlying criteria for an analysis of genre, speech arising from conversation is more variable, dependent upon the interactive participants. Consequently the construct of a speech genre does not provide a "good fit" for the more possibly spontaneous constructions in mutually constructed conversations. Although potentially only splitting hairs, I propose a modification of the construct from **speech** genre to **dialogue** genre which will facilitate its usefulness without challenging the main construct. To those who find that the construct of "genre" is too weighted for the kind of application I am proposing, my depiction will not quell anyone's basic disagreement. The criteria I have outlined, illustrates that there are sufficiently formulaic, sufficiently distinctive ways of speaking which preserve the thrust of Bakhtin's analysis: 1) that people use certain forms of speech which both identify them and the "truth value" of their words (i.e., whether the speaker is being satiric, for example); 2) that speech genres mime social interaction, thus function to produce intimacy,

formality, deceptiveness, etc. Within this frame of reference, I propose to use the term, **dialogue genre.**

Dialogue genre is conceived of by this writer as a hybrid arising from Bakhtin's construct of speech genre (Bakhtin, 1986; Wertsch, 1990) and Werner and Kaplan's (1963/1984) symbolizing situation. The characteristics of speech genre are maintained while the interactive aspects of a dialogue are valorized. For example, like speech genres, dialogue genres signal how utterances are to be considered, i.e. literally (Minick, In press-a) or figuratively (Gates, 1988, pp. 52-53), is this talk to be accepted prima facie as in a conversation about some topic or is this a story whose truth is determined by cultural factors (Heath, 1984)? While these are in play, equal importance is given to the participants' representation in speech of certain elements of the context in which they are speaking, i.e., the context of utterance. Following Werner and Kaplan, this includes a manifestation of a) who is being addressed and b) what is the object of the discourse, both of which indicate c) how to respond (1963/1984, p.40-51). Although speech genres encompass these aspects of talk, dialogue genres place the emphasis on the speakers rather than the speech. Whereas speech genres provide a grammar for speech, dialogue genres provide a grammar for speakers. Instead of providing parameters for speech, dialogue genres are guideposts for the apparent spontaneous construction or assemblage of talk.

The exploratory nature of this study limited a priori expectations to three overarching and obscurely defined dialogue genres: **children's friendship conversation, teachers' talk**, and **carnival talk**. The textual analysis of the data revealed that subjects exhibited four types of dialogue genres. Two of these genres could be classified as realistic talk and two which were feigned to some degree. The realistic genres were **children's friendship talk** and **classroom discussion** genre. The fable types were **fictional** and **carnival** genres. In addition three distinctive forms of **children's friendship talk** were identified. Distinguishing features of each genre type are outlined below with samples of talk provided for styles originating with this work.

Realistic dialogue genres

Children's friendship talk

Children's friendship talk is a conversational mode of interactive speech between two children who are friends, i.e., well known to each other and who have a history of interaction with each other. Dorval (1987, 1990) outlined some characteristics of children's friendship conversations, and considered the possibility that such speech constitutes a type of speech genre (personal communication, May, 1991). His work was based in part on how children constructed intimacy (see Dorval and Dore, 1990) in their talk. In contrast, this study brought friends together for purposes of talk markedly different from those of Dorval's work.

Instead of their friendship being the topic, friendship was assumed and children were asked to talk about the skits. However, exhibiting what Rom Harre (1986, p. 91) calls the "most pervasive human practice" [conversing], children's talk was found to adhere to conversational formats. These were both typical of peer interactions and conveyed a sense of familiarity or cohesion expected of friends.

Conversations and conversational formats have been the topic of much scholarly work. Linguists, socio-linguists and ethnomethodologists have and continue to provide detailed analyses of the constituents of conversation (e.g. Gumperez, 1982; Sachs, H. & Schegloff, M. 1974; Tannen, D. 1984; 1989). Since the purposes of this study are not to detail these types of utterances but to examine children's development of meanings through dialogue, then the common sense notion of a conversation will suffice[3].

Talk between at least two children was considered indicative of **children's friendship conversation** when the following broad parameters of conversation between peers were evidenced:

1) mutual contributions of discourse partners which indicate that each utterances of each participant are interdependent, i.e., dependent upon the responses of the discourse partner(s);

2) a pattern of turn-taking;

3) symmetry of input or accepted abridgment of that equity;

4) mutual control over the discourse with respect to beginning, ending, introduction of topics and what counts as a proper expression;

5) use of many forms of adjacency pairs including comment and comment rather than a plethora of question and answer pairs.

In addition, at least one of the following markers of familiarity were present in order for speech to qualify as **children's friendship talk:**

6) an informality of talk: use of dialects, grammatically incorrect sentences or ease of mutual construction of talk, i.e., beginning the talk as if in the middle of a sentence or paragraph;

7) a strategy of repetition (e.g., Tannen, 1989, p.52)

8) ease of disagreement;

9) ease of instigation of play, ex: hitting the other child, game playing with objects in the room;

10) smiles, actions, looks and talk indicating the two were in collusion (McDermott & Tybor, 1983) against the "authority" as represented in this study, by the accoutrement of the experiment, such as the camera, the room, the researcher, the principal, i.e., sitting still, passively waiting until alone in the room, then jumping up,

giggling and talking as soon as the door was closed and they were alone; monitoring what could be said as in "don't talk about that"; keeping watch on noise outside the room which would indicate entry by an adult.

Within the parameters of **children's friendship talk**, three variations were noted. The first exemplified the conversation-as-genre and speech as an analytic tool. There were many short exchanges between discourse partners. A sense of discovery about the supposed problem, i.e., figuring out what the skits were about, was infused within more typical casual talk about themselves. This style was referred to as the **conversational** style of children's friendship talk in this setting.

Two other patterned variations were not as typical. An **enactive** style of speaking, a form which exemplifies the performance aspect of speech (see also M. Franklin, 1979, p. 199 for speech as performance-in-context) was observed. A third style, **personal narrative** exemplified the narrative aspect of talk. These children were story tellers. A comparative description delineating the distinctive aspects of each type provides evidence of these as formulaic styles of talk with specific truth conditions and characteristics.

Conversational style was coded when in addition to the characteristics for **children's friendship talk** above:

a) speech was addressed for the most part to the other discourse partner;

b) the object of discourse was a consideration of, perhaps even a reflection on some "text";

c) a mutual interaction between the two children was privileged while other aspects of the context, such as the video taping were diminished;

d) the truth value of what was said was not questioned, all utterances had the prima facie value of being truthful.

Excerpts from the transcribed talk of two children serve as a sample of this type of dialogue genre. These are taken from a conversation in progress. The dialogue indicates a reflection on Sesame Street with the analysis of the characters intertwined with personal knowledge of the speakers' siblings.

A's Talk	B's Talk
	...I know My little sister watches it every morning~, you know this morning, when uhm, Ernie, he caught dese, uhm, .. dese sheeps, .. an' dey came and uh, .. pulled uhm, .. Bert outa da room [laughs] it was funny. Sesame Street is funny I know, but you know what be funny? When they be havin' to do numbers.
[laughs] I like Count Dracula, Count Da- Count Dracula	
	//No, Count, uhm, Count
Yeah.	
	Count? Yeah he like to count 'em. One, One, One kinda, two kinda
[laughs]	
	three kinda,

Bert and Ernie is the funniest, th're too funny.	
	Big Bird is funny too [laughing].
Bert get mad too much.	
	I know.
That's because, uhm, Ernie gets him mad.	
	Ernie be kickin' him out da room sometimes.
Ernie, Ernie, /<u>like, Ernie, wait</u>	//<u>I like, uh,</u> <u>you</u> know what part I like? I uh, on Sesame Street when I was watchin'. I like the way he sang "Rubber Ducky, you're the one (singing), Bring me back some
//<u>Ernie, he always jokin'</u> dats why	/<u>loads of fun</u>.

Enactive genre requires description before the parameters are delineated. Children engaging in this type of speech are focused on the extra-linguistic elements in the speech situation, elements of the context if you will. In this case, these elements were the video-audio equipment, the room, the scene[4]. Children's talk had the quality of a performance, whether serious or comedic, within the frame of a conversation. Unlike the conversational style described above, talk was addressed both to <u>the camera</u> or whomever the camera stands for as well as the dyad partner. The <u>object of the discourse</u> in the sense that term is usually employed, may not be known, or if known, may seem insignificant since their talk has a performance rather than verbal dimension. Both children colluded in this form of talk--it is a mutual decision about how to talk about the skits. Designating

this style of conversation as **enactive** follows Barton's (1979) differentiation of children's gestures as enactive if movements represent actions on objects or are performed with objects (p. 142). Similarly, the children in this mode use their talk to act on or in performance with the context of the discourse situation.

Children's talk was coded as **enactive** type when in addition to criteria for children's friendship talk, the following was evidenced:

a) there were dual addressees, local and public; talk was addressed to the ostensible listener, while simultaneously being addressed to another more public addressee, in this case, the camera or whomever the camera represented;

b) the object of the discourse is uncertain and may be non-existent since the speech reflects a performative intent;

c) turn taking may occur with less regularity than in either of the other two conversational genres;

d) the tone of the speech varies from that of conversation; i.e., may be one of recitation or merriment in these data.

The following sample of transcribed excerpts of children's talk illustrates this kind of talk. Two 4th grade girls are talking, at once addressing each other and the camera.

A's talk	B's talk
Whaddaya think it was about?	
	Well, I thought it was about sharing, ... and having, having, uhm,
...*	
What I think .. it was about, the first one was about uhm, .. uhm, teasing, whaddayou think?	
	I most certainly do agree with you. [looking directly at camera, finger poised coyly on chin]
	[both smile]
...	
[both staring out, like daydreaming yet talking]	
Bert is very, I mean Ernie, (yeah), Ernie is very slick. /___ He always found a way that you get somethin' that Bert has.	//___?___
	I most certainly do agree (stares directly into camera, smiles] [changes focus, looks at A) But, Barbara, .. what was your favorite part about it?

* '...' in the middle of dialogue columns indicates continuation of talk not being quoted.

Personal narrative is the third style of children's friendship talk uncovered in the textual analysis. While conforming to the criteria for conversation, the stylistic of the talk took a different turn. Within the frame of a conversation, children created a mutually acceptable and adhered to personal story telling. This genre, while limited to a few children, was compelling and too regular to ignore[5]. Children utilizing personal narrative style addressed their talk mostly to the discourse partner, but as

in any kind of story telling the talk seemed to have a historical quality of being retold. This quality was realized in the conversational situation as being dually addressed: to the discourse partner and a remote other. Following from this particular style of address, the parcels of utterances were less dependent upon the discourse partner's responses than those in strictly conversation genre. Children constructed what might be called mini-narratives within the conversation. These mini-narratives took two forms: a) singly authored, i.e., functioning as stories, extractable for re-telling without the input of the conversational partner or b) dually authored, hence more integral to the conversational format. However, all the stories are personal, told about the speaker, her friends and relatives. The stories are told as a report of "reality", but the likelihood of fantasy being interjected is present (see Heath on elements of a good story in an African-american community (1984, p.166-167)). The reality aspect of this kind of talk hints at the genre of gossip, but the fantastic tone and the weaving of the theme of the skits into a story suggests the spinning of a tale rather than a revelation about the private goings-on of others.

Personal narrative genre was coded when in addition to the criteria for **children's friendship talk**, the following was evidenced:

a) the discourse consisted mostly of mutual sequential telling of stories about themselves, friends or relatives which were related to the themes of the skits;

b) the stories were told as anecdotes (i.e., reports of "real" experiences) but had elements of fantasy and as such the listener was not expected to take them literally;

c) the stories often had a normative tone (e.g. talk about the "right way to behave");

d) the addressee was the other child, but the talk had the quality of being non-addressed or addressed to a remote audience at the same time;

e) the object of the discourse was not the immediate text of the skits, but a message or moral of the skits;

f) the turn-taking dimension of the dialogue took the form of larger chunks of speech, since a turn might depend upon the discourse partner's completion of a story.

Two samples of transcribed talk of third grade girl dyads exemplify this style of talk.

Sample #1: **Personal narrative** genre

A's Talk	B's talk
My sister she, she she'll have, I'll have sum'in', right? She don't share nuttin' wit me. So I, she says, 'Oh, can you share a wit me?' I say 'Yeah.', so I share it wit her. Next time she gets sum'in' /	
	//she has to share it wit chu.

I axe her an' she says 'No,
I'm eatin' it alone.'

...

Yeah, just like that time,
remember when, Maria, had her
soda, her potato chips, an'
her sandwich an' everything
an' she was like
everybody was askin' her "oh,
can I have a potato chip",
she like 'get outa my face,
Man.' An' we be / ? //but
her stuff you know /so the

Sample #2: **Personal narrative** style

A's Talk	B's talk
	and den, Bert shared with Ernie
yea but-but Ernie didn't share with Bert but Ernie/	//it's the same thing like me an' m' sister
yea but Ernie didn't share with Bert but Bert still shared with him, like-like Janine shares with me, but but I don't share with her. Right, if she don't share with me, but I still share with her ..right? she never have candy /but I still be given her some	//it's, it's
	last weekend .. my sister .. I be givin' my sister a lot of stuff .. den she den . she won't give me none a' her stuff, she only give me a little teeny piece [shows how small]
well well, well, my sister be givin' me whole pieces of her candy an' right right I don't be givin' 'em nothin' cuz I don't be havin' anything but right right if she don't have nuttin' I	

still be givin'it ta her //my grandma be sayin'[with high voice and squinched face) "give her some 'fore she start cryin'" an' I give her some	it's the same/ [smiling]

Classroom discussion genre

Although originally thought of simply as "teacher's talk", the style of speaking observed in the classroom talk arises from a particular kind of classroom activity and may not be observed in other types of classroom activities. **Classroom discussion** genre is a type of formulaic speech recognized by both children and adults as indicative of teachers' ways of talking in a modified conversational format to a group of students in a classroom. The format is referred to as "classroom discussion genre" to differentiate from other instructional formulaic speech such as "lecture", "demonstration", or "instructional conversations" between the teacher and one or more students. Classroom discussion is typified by the use of a) an informal question and answer interactive format with students expected to be active contributors; b) an educational goal, i.e., to inform and expect that the listeners have learned something they did not know and most likely would not know without the assistance of the teacher, and c) multiple addressees, i.e., a group of students who usually who share some identity such as membership in the same class. The teacher controls the discourse, introducing topics, setting procedures, (i.e.,

"raise your hands"), evaluating and determining the appropriateness of students' responses, etc. The children are expected to "converse" with the teacher in keeping the talk moving by supplying answers, displaying what they know and at times asking questions. This kind of classroom talk conforms most of the time to Courtney Cazden's IRE (teacher initiation-student response-teacher evaluation) model of classroom discourse which she claims is the most common pattern of classroom discourse identifiable by "anyone hearing it ... as classroom talk" (1988, pp.29-30).

Some canonical elements which identify **classroom discussion** talk as a distinguishable way of talking are:

a) conversational adjacency triads: questions, responses and evaluations of responses; the latter is often dually utilized by the teacher who accentuates the child's response by repeating it as a link to the next question: for example, A child says "they were nice to each other" and the teacher responds, "They were nice to each other? Okay. Does anyone have a different opinion?"

b) questions which function to elicit responses rather than information (the teacher knows the answers): ex: "What was it in these skits... how did you know that Bert and Ernie are best friends?"

c) tallying the students for agreement to some proposition, ex; "How many people think yes? Raise your hands."

d) questions about the interstices of a story or presentation, ex: "How do you think Bert felt when Ernie did that to him?"

e) the symmetry of the verbal exchanges is that of two conversants, but the students function as one of the conversants as evidenced in the following excerpt:

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
We raise our hands okay? What were the names of the two /characters in these two little sketches we saw. Kenneth.	c?://oh, oh.
	K: Ernie and Bert.
Do you /think	c?: //No!
Ahh. (for not raising hands) Do you think, that Ernie and Bert were friends?	
	cl: Yeah.
	cl: Yess.

Key: c? = a unidentified child; cl= class, children speaking in unison

f) the control of the discourse is asymmetrical in that the teacher decides when it begins, ends and what counts as a proper expression, but its success depends upon the children's participation, i.e., if the children don't respond, either the teacher ends the interaction or changes the pattern by providing all the information.

Inventive genres

In response to the carnival manipulation of the second dyadic discourse phase, some children engaged in imaginative

talk of two kinds, **fictional** and **carnival**. Although both genres retreat from authenticity and use another's "voice" as a instrument to convey meaning, there is a crucial difference between the two. Fictional talk differs from carnival talk in that the hallmark of carnival, the bifurcation or opposition of dialogues, that of the other and the self, is absent. To take on a role or <u>en-voice</u> a character is a particular case of double-voicing. The relationship between the speaker and the dialogue of the other which is being en-voiced is not that of opposition. In fact, the distance between the two dialogues is minimized as in drama. Other distinguishing characteristics are outlined below.

Fictional genre

The fictional dialogue genre is inventive or imaginary talk. Within the format of a conversation, dramatic and/or voice devices are employed which suggest that the speech being constructed is fictional--either verbal or dramatic fantasy. The speaker either takes on a voice not her own or fabricates a narrative. These devices may be explicitly identified as in "let's be teenage girls" or spontaneous though changes in voice pitch or dramatic actions indicating role playing. Mutually interacting parts-much like the pretense play characteristic of younger children can be created. Consequently, although there are dual addressees, the fictionalized audience and the dialogue partner, the

latter remains the primary addressee. To this adult observer, the children's behaviors had the sense of an improvised play.

Speech was classified as **fictional genre** when the following characteristics were observed:

1) portrayed dialogue through employment of a dramatic device, i.e., role or voice enactment or creation of a verbal fantasy;

2) dual addressees: talk was primarily directed to the discourse partner, but as in a performance, addressed also to an unidentified other, imagined audience;

3) the object of discourse was a fabricated scenario with a relationship to another text which would not necessarily be discernable (e.g., replication);

4) replacement of any notions of realism with that of pretense, i.e., suspension of prima facie character of non-fabled speech in the sense that truthfulness is not a quality of speech.

Carnival genre

Carnival genre is defined by the use of a comedic device to produce a relationship of opposition between two dialogues being voiced. The most primitive comedic device used to express that opposition employed by these children was mockery or ridicule and the most sophisticated was caricature.

Dialogue which had the following characteristics was classified as **carnival genre**

1) exaggerated speech through employment of a comedic device, from ridicule to parody;

2) dual addressees: talk was primarily directed to the discourse partner, but as in a performance, was simultaneously addressed to an unidentified other;

3) the object of discourse was primarily a derision;

4) observable double voiced discourse: the speaker's orientation to the dialogue of the other, was evidenced;

5) replacement of any notions of realism with that of hyperbole, i.e., suspension of prima facie character of non-fabled speech in the sense that the truthfulness was not a quality of speech.

Classification of Intertextuality

Children's incorporation of the classroom discourse into their dialogically constructed meanings of the skit(s) was identified by categories designed to illustrate the interrelatedness of the classroom discourse and children's discourse as displayed within their final dyadic talk. The categories were based on the concept of heteroglossia and Bakhtin/Volosinov's (1973) work on reported speech. Heteroglossia is defined as the interanimation of two meanings in the same word or phrase; the indexing of another's discourse in one's own (Bakhtin, 1984b). This is

determined by any utterance which can not be understood without reference to another's discourse or a word/utterance with two significations, i.e., the joining of two sign systems (e.g., Kristeva 1980,p.73, as cited by Wertsch, 1985b, p.66). This may be evidenced in the "awkwardness" in these data as the children struggle to present the version offered by their teacher: they talk as if they mean it, but it does not ring true such that the listener is attuned to the "strangeness" of the word use.

This semiotic dimension of speech has also been defined as intertextuality, the referencing of one text by another by displaying the referenced text characteristics explicitly while commenting on it, enlarging it, revering it, ridiculing it. The important defining characteristic of double-voiced discourse or intertextuality is that its full meaning can not be comprehended without recognizing its dual referencing. In this study, such an analysis turned on determining if and how children's discourse in their finale dyadic talk dialogue reflected their teacher's or fellow students' dialogue in the class activity.

Recognizable double-voiced discourse indicates the simultaneous representation of two voices, two ideological positions within the same utterance. Since this research aimed to capture the process of children's changes in meaning as they interacted with the dialogue of the classroom or the teacher, talk approaching fully realized

double-voicedness were important to the analysis. Variations of double-voicedness as precursors to a recognizable heteroglossic construction constituted the categories.

Reporting

The other's discourse is transported into speakers' dialogue mostly unmediated by the speaker's voice except by repetition. The discourse of the other is marked linguistically by a frame (Hickmann, 1985) which indicates that the "utterance belongs to **someone else**, an utterance ... originally totally independent, complete in its construction, and lying outside the given context, ... transposed into an authorial context" (Volosinov, 1973/1986, p.116). There is no obvious relationship of the speaker to the text of the other except in its being re-stated. The differentiation between the reporting speech and the reported speech is clearly marked: there is no dual authorship of the speech. This category is exemplified by direct quoting, either marked or unmarked. The following sample of discourse demonstrates this type of dialogic interaction.

Sample #1: **Reporting**

Following several children's non-committal responses, the teacher tries to elicit richer responses by referring to

herself. Her self reference was observed in a dyad's subsequent talk.

Excerpt from classroom talk

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
If I had-d .. cookies in the room, as I often do .. and-d .. I just sat there and ate 'em and ate 'em and ate 'em and didn't offer you any, and you wanted some, would you have an opinion about that?	
	c?: Yes! cl: yes
What would you say? What would you call me?	
	c?: greedy c?: selfish
Greedy, selfish.	
	c?: pig
Pig, we have 'fat pig' in the corner. Oh, you not gonna get a good grade, I can see that.	
	cl: [laughing]
Anthony!, right now we're talking cookies. ..	
	A: yes c?: cookies!
Okay, so how would you feel if I ..	
	c?: ?
wouldn't share my cookies with you? Or pretzels, or whatever it is I had.	

...

Excerpt from children's talk

(Note: 'Penny' is the pseudonym of the teacher.)

A's talk	B's talk
Talk!{insistent]	
	About what?
The play! well, about Penny what Penny was sayin'	
	What Penny?
what Penny was sayin'	

	Oh that .. she was sayin' what's th' main point?
an' /th' main point ?	//how would you would act . if someone axed you . if Penny had a . pack of cookies an' she didn't offer you nothin' . how would you feel?
mean .. sad	
	hungry?
[laughs]	[laughs]

Importing

Importing represents the transportation of the other's discourse into speakers' dialogue minimally mediated in being re-spoken as one's own. There is no overt acknowledgment that the speaker is reporting dialogue. The authorship of the transposed dialogue may be obscured. The discourse of the other has begun to become internally persuasive (Bakhtin 1981, p. 345; Tappan, 1991, p. 17), but the struggle is not the struggle between competing ideologies or ideas but an apparent acceptance of the other's discourse **almost** as one's own. Although "ventriloquation" has been defined differently by others utilizing Bakhtin's insights (e.g., Wertsch 1992, Tappan, 1991), this talk is most like the common sense notion of ventriloquation. It is as if the discourse of the other is "spoken through" the speaker. There is no sense of an opposition resulting in dualism in this talk. Without the history of the discourse being previously said by an other,

stumbling over a word or the startling use of a phrase which "stands out" from the rest of the dialogue. Unlike written discourse which must use linguistic markers to convey double-voicing, oral importation may be difficult to discern in an interactive situation. This category ranges from implicitly quoted dialogue (a direct replication, albeit not framed) to a use of the others' discourse as one's own. With respect to the latter an apt metaphor from contemporary music reproduction illustrates the quality: the talk of the other is "sampled", taken and replayed as one's own. Importantly, the form and/or content of the transported utterances are not changed. Two examples of discourse illustrate this type of dialogic interaction.

Sample #1: **Importing**

The teacher asks for words which "describe" the character's actions. She elicits the description of Ernie's behavior as that of a **con artist.** The subsequent excerpt illustrates a child's use of the same description. Although the form of the discourse changes, the content did not. Notably, the child was not the respondent in the class discussion.

Excerpt from the class talk

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
Well what do you call people who kind of . have a way of . making other people do what they want them to do?	
	J: conmics

[gestures that she hasn't quite got it]

J: cons

Yeah they like . he's a con artist he was conning . poor Bert . and what happened to poor Bert?

J: he got robbed of his cookie.

...

Excerpt from the children's talk

(Note: The children are talking in "valley girl" voices.)

A's talk	B's talk
Why did, why did Ernie trick Bert?	
	heaven knows [walking around the room]
huh?	
	heaven knows
because Bert is so dumb he listen to anything, but Ernie is a con artist, get it, he's a con artist...Ernie con people into doing things... that . should not be done, so Ernie is a con artist, he conned, he conned, he conned Bert into doing that	

...

Sample #2

In this 3rd grade classroom discussion, the teacher is fine tuning the interpretation of the skits being about tricking or joking. She elicits the characterization of Ernie as a practical joker. Two boys subsequently talk about the skits using the same characterization. Notably, neither of the children were the respondents during this interchange with the teacher.

Excerpt from the class talk

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
Whadda we call people who like to play jokes all the time? Maya?	
	M: (Practical joker)
Say that nice and loud (whispery].	
//Practical joker. Now practical jokers sometimes can be fun, and sometimes . whadda they make people feel?	M: Practical /joker
	Cl: sad.
Sad, or?	

...

Excerpt from the children's talk

A's talk	B's talk
yeah it's Bert or Bert whoever	
	well whichever one you
	mean .. anyway he don't like it because he's more intelligent he __?__ like to play practical jokes on people
yeah well .. he don't like to play practi- practi practi-/	//practical
///practical jokes because cuz maybe it'll get so serious it'll hurt somebody else's feelings	///practical jokes

...

Juxtaposing

Juxtaposing is evidenced in the display of two different discourses in sequence, the speaker's and the referenced speaker's. The discourses have neither been

altered by each other nor have they blended. The referenced speakers' discourse is imported and followed in these data by the speaker's own prior discourse. This indicates a relationship of acceptance, sanctioning or endorsing the other's discourse by voicing it, with opposition to that discourse existing subsequent or prior to its place in the talk. It as if the dual voices in a heteroglossic form were artificially separated. Identification of this type of intertextuality rests on the sequential display of discourses, however the precise boundary between the two voices may not be easily perceived. There is intermingling, but not simultaneous production of two discourses. The discourse as a whole sounds like one is mulling over the pro's and con's as if having an argument with one's self, but actually it reflects a character of call and response when what is called is the discourse of the other. Two samples of discourse illustrate this category.

Sample #1: **Juxtaposing**

Two 3rd grade girls are talking. They start out saying the skits are about sharing--which is their interpretation from their initial dyadic talk and will be the interpretation they conclude this dialogue with. This is quickly followed by voicing the interpretation from the classroom discourse about being conned, which is voiced playfully. Then at 1.35, one of the children changes the discourse and will re-state her earlier view. She

acknowledges the two disparate views by saying "Now, I also see it another way". At 1.44 minutes she begins "re-speaking" her words from their initial dyadic dialogue which employed personal narrative genre. The utterances indicate a difference with the classroom discourse both in form (genre type) and content (interpretation). The speaker will continue with an example from her personal experience that the skits are about not sharing. This is in contrast to the talk that the skits were about being "conned", being taken advantage of. Both voices are adjacent, representing a combination of voices, intermingling only sequentially.

Excerpt from children's talk

Time	A's talk	B's talk
.22	Now, the skits~ are about sharing.	
		[laughs] An' I think Bert .. was [goes into voice) .. very very soft
.36		. Like he let Ernie .. con him into ..uhm, .. sharing his things .. every time.
	I think he did! Well .. Also Ernie, he did (voiced, exaggerated) wrong, he absolutely did wrong. I mean .. he just tricked	[laughs]
	/him.	/Hmm, hmm.
	I mean.. he took,he said I	
1.06	/___?_____	//He took advantage of him.
	Yeah. He said it was just . for demonstration, then .. an' so/	//[laughing]
1.13	An' so/ he took the cookie, then he broke in half when he was supposed to .. It	//He conned him into it.

	was just a demonstration and they, and now he was supposed to give him back	
1.24	the half of cookie but instead .. /he ate the	//he ate one half
	half he ate the /half	one half, the half //ha]
1.30	But that was not what he was supposed (singsong) to do.	
1.35		Now, I also see it in another way. [blinking eyes-playing] [licks lips, into camera]
	[laughing at the imitation/dramatization]...	
		[dramatic, but now not in voice) Now, you must remind me, a time
1.38		[laughing) when when when I'll
	The banana part was so uh	
1.44		It remind me of the time~ when ... I, .. had a Baby Ruth .. bar, right?

Sample #2: **Juxtaposing**

Two girls are talking about whether the skits are about not sharing (which is their teacher's talk about the skits from the classroom talk). They are engaging in the kind of dialogue used by their teacher in the classroom talk, i.e., using "hypothetical" situations in here talk to illustrate a point. The talk is about when you ought not share. They continue to pose examples describing situations when either of them would not share. This talk mimics the class discussion. Then after saying in what situations they wouldn't share up until 11.41, at 11.50 the talk changes and one child begins with "man, ... ". At this point she is doing an apparent turnaround and talking about how sometimes

you have to share or wind up in a hospital, etc.. In saying this, she begins to talk as the two of them had in the initial dyadic phase regarding the realities of life. The display of the discourse of the classroom, particularly the teacher's talk about not sharing, is followed by a contrary dialogue, but there is no indication of either of the discourses interacting except by juxtaposition.

Excerpt from children's talk

Time	A's talk	B's talk
9.58		But uhm, listen sometimes when s___?___ I wouldn't give it to my friend if they wasn't nice. I give it to my friend becuz
10.07		somebody else would probably want it .. but, but they would like, be like a little, no I ain't gonna say that, if they gonna be like a, a little
10.19		.. a little .. a little kid botherin' people an' askin', botherin' people, people an' pickin' them around I'm ain't gonna give them nuttin! I'm just gonna, I'm just
10.28		gonna walk away.
	/I, okay say with Jennifer in Penny class. An'Jennifer just got, just got outa .. botherin' people from Ann's class an' Laura class. An' beatin' 'em up real, real bad an' den she jest went over an' say can I have, can I have one of your	//<u>But that's</u>
10.50	lifesavers, would you give it to her?	

...

11.34 if they woulda did that to you an' they wouldna make up an' stuff would you have given them stuff after that?

No.

11.41 Uhm, uh few weeks later?

Yeah if they became my friend of course.

11.50 Man but sometimes, it's a problem when you don't share but when you do share. Bert sh-, uhm, Ernie shoulda share wit Bert right? Not that way- he shouldn've 'cuz remember when he had da banana he still had some in it? It was equal to

12.04 to the other part he ate, so he shoulda gave that to 'im.

Yeah.

Instead a bein' a joker.

I tell you.

12.16 Sometimes you haf to, sometimes you don't if

//<u>What's want want to listen becuz</u>

you don't /<u>sometimes you sometimes you don't</u>

...

12.34 No I mean you haf to if uhm, if you, if uhm, you haf to .. if you don't wanna be in the hospital 'cuz you go to a dentist an' have a, things [gestures with hand on teeth].

Transforming

Speech indicates that the discourse of the other has been incorporated into the speaker's discourse, but undergoes change. Transforming indicates a relationship of assimilation between the two discourses, but the discourse of the other is not directly imported into the speaker's

talk. It is as if the speaker accepts the discourse of the other but preserves her own voice by adjusting the discourse of the other. The voice or text of the other drives the speaker's talk, but the mimetic aspect is diminished. Instead of the precise words, the understanding of the teacher's words are displayed and represent a change from the children's previous constructions (see also Cazden, 1988, p. 108). Two samples of discourse illustrate this type of voicing the text of the other.

Sample #1: **Transforming**

The teacher says that the current behavior of the children in the classroom represents the skit. The two girls' subsequent dialogue makes the same point although indirectly. The two girls are engaging in fictional discourse--pretending to be adult teachers who are friends and cohorts talking about the skits. They began by discussing the skits, then relate the skits to their invented classroom experience.

Excerpt from classroom talk

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
What I'm getting is what you're doing to Bryan right now is just about the same thing that we saw. So I don't believe some of you really did learn anything. He's having a hard time speaking, but <u>you</u> are taking that right away from him. .. You're not sharing. [loudly}It's okay for you to speak, but it's not okay for Bryan because you don't want	

to share by making him feel embarrassed. It's the same cookie ... and the same banana.

Excerpt from children's talk

A's talk	B's Talk
Yes, indeed . /I agreed.	//I know Like you always do . but I still think it's not right . they should do sump'in' about that stinginess . stinginess stinginess . that's what I have in my class today . people give stuff starts givin' me back, givin' me back
you know //Yes this boy in my class, he had gave this little girl a pencil . then a few minutes go /he wanted his pencil back ... and at their age.	/ that's not very nice. //They were fighting I know . They were just fighting . that's very naughty.
An' they are fourth grade . [said emphatically}at their age!	

Sample # 2: **Transforming**

In the second sample of discourse illustrating this category, two boys employ both the teacher's style as well as his message in the dyadic dialogue following the class activity. The teacher used 'say' fifteen times in his dialogue. He also attempted to question the "best friends" relationship of the skit. He repeatedly implied that Bert should not have been conned again, but he never stated it.

Below is a sample of the teacher's dialogue regarding the issue of best friends followed by a dyad's subsequent talk.

Excerpt from classroom talk

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
So they're always together . so they're good friends an' I guess you know	
	c: ?
that they've been- they're best friends an' they've been there for a long time . Tessa.	
	c: (?)
What?	
	c: (?)
They're best friends .. but how do you know they're best friends . from these two things?	
	...
... an' how about Bert? .	
	c: ?
he should know by now because they've been friends for . twenty years or something	
	M: for a long time
for a very long time . /an' he always goes along with him.	M: /but ?
	M: Yeah so that so that he could ? [noise outside classroom]
Right. It . Ernie seems to be having a good time always . it's Bert . is th' one who goes "oohhh" at the end. Maria, what were you gonna say?	

Excerpt from children's talk

A's talk	B's talk
	I still think that uh Bert has I mean Ernie has been very greedy . even . even

	tho' they still best friends because . uhm .. because Ernie . still s-
shared the banana wit 'em. Yeah . /<u>but</u>	//<u>An'</u> . I think
//__?__	they're best . uh /<u>bes</u> friends because uhm .. because uhm when uhm Ernie tricked Bert into uhm givin' him da cookie . he shared wit Bert.
Yeah.	So they are best friends.
/<u>He didn't</u>	//<u>It even</u> said they were best friends __?__.
I think that Bert ..	[plays with glasses]
[plays with glasses] I think that <u>Ernie</u> . should be smart enough by . by <u>now</u> . to see to know that he's gonna try to trick 'im into . no to trick im into . no, to <u>know</u> . that he's gonna try to trick him into	**<teacher's implication>**
__?__ / __?__	// <u>What</u> he's sayin' [points to A] is that ..
[raises hand, gestures to B) //<u>What</u> /or quit(?)	*What you're /<u>sayin'</u> is
that . uhm .. that you	think that uhm Bert is smart enough to know . not to let Ernie trick him into givin' him stuff.
[lowers glasses) Yes he should by now, don't you think, Man?	

---

* = utterance form is that of teacher's way of talking observed in the classroom activity, but not part of teacher's speech excerpted above.

Caricaturing

Caricaturing the other's discourse is an instance of heteroglossia, when the speech of other and that of the self are spoken simultaneously. The relationship of opposition or derision is evidenced in the speaker's use of satire,

parody or exaggeration in re-envoicing the discourse of the other. In the sample of discourse below, two 5th grade girls are caricaturing their teacher in style and words, mimicking his patterns of movement and liberally using moments from the classroom dialogue. Although not obvious in the children's excerpt below, the dyad partner took on the roles of children in the class.

Excerpts from the classroom talk

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
Uhm . so what . who would like to comment . other than laughing I mean it's silly it's silly to think that uh .. you know when they design these they really look at how people act an' they have . silly looking puppets . but I hear stuff like that all the time . uhm . even people in this room . have conversations like that with other people . so whaddayou what whaddayou think . that they were talking about?	
	...
We didn't know that . I thought he was <u>really</u> .. gonna say you know I'll share th' inside you share th' outside . people say things like that	
	...
Ernie kept tricking Bert? Ernie? {can't hear because of noise] kept trickin' Bert Ernie kept <u>tricking</u> yes you know . we said that . Ernie kept tricking <u>Bert</u> . an' how about Bert? .	
	...
I have a question . doesn't he put his best friend . through a lot . through a lot of grief?	
	c: no ?
I mean they're best friends . but he's <u>always</u> . doing these very corny .. numbers on him! he's always	

makin' him go through a whole lotta
. thinking that he's cheating him .

c: yeah

you know . so . Does it seem ah
equal friendship?

Excerpt from children's talk

A's talk	B's talk
[mimics teacher's actions when he watched the video} claps hands, fakes a laugh, etc.]	
	[watches A]
[in role} Okay now .. okay now uhm that the videos are over I thought they were very unusual . I need uhm to ask you kids some things [mimes Teacher's behavior]	
	[laughs]
Uhm [pulls chair back, changes body position]	
	[pulls chair back, faces A]
First of all . what did you think . of the videos why did you think /<u>they were so</u>	//<u>Tom ?</u>{murmurs instructions about teacher's behavior]
Like . why do you think . that . Ernie was trying to trick Bert? 'cuz they're supposed to be best friends and I don't think that was very friendly . I think they might need a mediator .. okay uhm Diana whaddayou think?	
...	
Okay that's very interesting uhm . sst why you think . do you think this is like in real life because I . I remember you guys actin' like this before.	
...	

Reliability

Reliability was assessed for dyads' employment of types of dialogue genre and intertextuality. Since both category schemes originated with this study, classifications of these aspects of the data by independent raters required familiarity both with the material and the coding schemes. Raters were given written descriptions of each coding scheme including criteria for each category. Verbal clarification was provided by the researcher. Transcribed samples of talk from dyads who participated in all phases of the study and provided talk about the skits in both dyadic phases were provided for coding (n = 30). Audio-video texts were included for the most voice-dependent samples, i.e., carnival and fictional genres and caricature. Video texts were also available for viewing upon request by raters. In addition, reliability for one category of intertextuality, **juxtaposing**, was assessed differently since it would have required raters to read entire transcripts of classroom talk and entire dialogues of children's talk. Application of this category was agreed upon by consensus between the raters and the original coder, the researcher.

Reliability for categorizing employment of type of dialogue genre in terms of percent of agreement was 78% based on two coders independently judging samples of talk from 15% of the dyads; talk was sampled from both initial and final dyadic discourse phases (n = 60 dialogues).

Reliability for categorizing the type of intertextuality exhibited by children in the final dyadic phase (n = 30) was 83% based on two coders independently judging samples of talk from 20% of the dyads.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

The data analysis was designed to both a) describe the phenomenon of children's dialogical constructions of meaning and b) analyze changes or development in these constructions following talk with their teachers. The data consisted of verbal interactions observed in three sequential phases of the study: the initial dyadic discourse phase, the classroom activity and the final dyadic discourse phase. Analysis focused on four dimensions of subjects' talk: 1) amount of time, 2) dialogue genre or mode of talk employed, 3) interpretations of the skits, and 4) children's incorporation of their teachers' voices. Analysis of change involved a two step process. Children's initial dyadic talk served as measure to analyze changes in their final dyadic talk. Second, these changes were examined for evidence of classroom discourse. The results are presented in three sections: Sections i and ii depict the results of the analysis of the first two phases of the study, respectively. Section iii includes the results of the analysis of the final dyadic phase with emphasis on the changes both between dyadic phases and resulting from phase two, the class activity. Each section begins with a description of sample characteristics and activity specific to each phase.

Section i

Initial dyadic discourse phase

Sample characteristics

Thirty-four same gender dyads, eighteen 2nd-3rd grade, twelve 4th grade and four 5th grade pairs, participated in the initial dyadic phase. Seventeen of the 2nd-4th grade dyads were girls and thirteen were boys. The four 5th grade dyads were all girls. There were 17 dyads from each of the two schools in this phase of the study.

Description of dialogue construction

Dyads of children readily engaged in mutual construction of dialogues. Together they generated a patterned sequence of interdependent exchanges, each arising from the other. If talk lasted longer than a few minutes, dialogues evinced a pattern of multiple sequential topics divided for the most part by distinctive segues[1]. The segues were typically talk about the context/situation, i.e., the room, the equipment. This natural partitioning of dialogues into topics was utilized where appropriate to analyze the children's talk.

Time

Talk was analyzed for the amount of time talked and amount of time talked about the skits (rounded off to the nearest five seconds). Time talked consisted of the amount of time children talked: from the initial utterance or when the researcher left the room whichever came first, to the time their talk ended. Time talked about the skits measured the

amount of time children talked about the skits directly or indirectly (i.e., related themes or expansions).

Children talked to each other for 2 to 16 minutes, averaging 9.25 minutes for the sample. Talk about the skits averaged 5.26 minutes for the sample, thus 56% of the children's talk was found to be talk about the skits. One-way Anova's were obtained for grade, gender, school and class differences in amount of time talked and amount of time talked about the skits. No statistically significant differences were found for grade, gender or school on either measure. However, as seen in Table 1 below, a trend was observed for grade in the percentage of time spent talking about the skits: the older the children the less amount of the time spent talking was talk about the skits. Sixty-three percent of 2nd-3rd graders talk, 51% of 4th graders' talk and 37% of 5th graders' talk was about the skits.

Table 1

Grade Differences in Means (and Standard Deviations) of amount of Time Talked and amount of time talked about the skits (Skit Talk) in the initial dyadic phase (in min.)

	Time Talked		Skit Talk	
Grades	M	(SD)	M	(SD)
2nd/3rd (n=18)	9.36	(4.82)	5.92	(4.23)
4th (n=12)	7.99	(4.70)	4.11	(3.30)
5th (n=4)	14.33	(2.45)	5.31	(5.73)

Class differences were found to be statistical significant for the amount of time talked about the skits for one class. As seen in Table 2, the 3rd graders in Class #3 talked longer about the skits ($F = 4.23$, $p < .01$, $N = 34$) than any of the other classes.

Table 2

Class Differences in Means (and Standard Deviations) of amount of Time Talked and amount of time talked about the skits (Skit Talk) in the initial dyadic phase (in min.)

	Time Talked		Skit Talk	
Classes	M	(SD)	M	(SD)
#1 (n=5)	9.02	(5.13)	4.82	(2.45)
#2 (n=5)	6.55	(3.60)	2.27	(2.10)
#3 (n=8)	11.32	(4.90)	9.64	(4.65)*
#4 (n=9)	8.17	(4.39)	4.72	(3.65)
#5 (n=7)	11.39	(5.58)	3.52	(3.71)

Note: n = number of same gender dyads, * = $p < .01$.

Dialogue genres

Children's talk in the initial dyadic discourse phase was classified by topic according to the type of dialogue genre employed. Single utterances or several singly authored utterances (one dyad partner) were not considered indications of genre change within a topic[2]. The thirty-four same gender dyads provided dialogues with seventy three topics about the

skits able to be classified according to the Dialogue Genre Category Scheme developed for the purposes of this study. Variability in dialogue genre was found for very few dyads: 79% (n = 27) of the dyads employed only one of the dialogue genres outlined in the coding scheme for the entirety of their talk and two dyads consistently intermingled two dialogue genre styles throughout their entire talk. Only five dyads were found to shift dialogue genres between topics. This consistency in dialogue genre or mode of talk characterized the children's dialogues in the initial dyadic discourse phase.

Typicality was found with respect to type of dialogue genre. **Children's friendship talk--conversational style** was employed by 76% (n = 26) of the dyads for at least one topic. Departures from this dialogue style were small but informative. Thirty-two per cent (n = 11) used the **enactive** or **personal narrative** style: five dyads used either of these styles for the entirety of their talk. Two dyads intermingled **enactive** and **conversational** styles and two other dyads (6%) engaged in a **carnival** genre.

The variations in types of dialogue genres employed, albeit small, were significant in revealing gender and, to a lesser extent, school differences. Among the 2nd-4th graders (n = 30 dyads), all but one of the eleven dyads engaging in a variation of the **conversational style** of **children's friendship talk** were <u>girls</u>. The two dyads engaging in **carnival style**

were boys. A Chi² analysis was performed on the gender differences in children's employing a **conversational** or other types of dialogue genres. Dyads were classified as other if any topic indicated the use of dialogue genre different from the **conversational** style, regardless of previous or subsequent use of the **conversational** style. No statistical significance was found, (x^2 (1, N = 30) = 2.73, p < .10). Gender differences in the types of dialogue genres employed by 2nd-4th grade dyads in the initial dyadic discourse phase are illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3

Gender differences in percentage of 2nd-4th grade dyads employing type of dialogue genre in the initial dyadic discourse phase.

Dialogue genres	Girls (n=17)	Boys (n=13)
Conversational Style	65% (11)	85% (11)
Enactive Style	35% (6)	6% (1)
Personal Narrative	24% (4)	0
Carnival Genre	0	13% (2)

Note: n = number of dyads.

With respect to school differences, although children from School #1 produced more topics able to be classified than School #2 (roughly 60:40 ratio) children's type of dialogue style differed between schools only with respect to the use of

personal narrative style. But this difference was found to be confounded by gender and strongly determined by grade. Three out of the five 3rd graders from Class #3 (and another 4th grade girl dyad) from School #1 employed the **personal narrative** style when talking about the skits.

Interpretations

Children's interpretations of the skits were analyzed by their verbal references to the six categories of interpretations, i.e., 1) **sharing**, 2) **joking or tricking**, 3)**conning**, 4) **friendship**, 5) being **selfish** (including being **greedy**, **a pig**; or 6) the skits were **funny**, entertaining, as well as any other interpretation. References to an interpretation were coded when children used: a) the precise words denoting the interpretations as well as related words, e.g., 'slick' indicated a **trick** interpretation, b) the root word and any variation, i. e., joking, joke, and c) quotes of skit dialogue which also referred to an interpretation, i.e., 'share' and 'selfish' (e.g., there was no way to discern whether a quoted reference differed from a non-quoted reference with respect to an interpretation). Children's interpretations of the skits were analyzed by the numbers of dyads referring to each type of interpretation[3].

The most frequently referenced/mentioned interpretation by the children in the sample was **sharing** (91%, n = 31 dyads), followed by **trick** (44%, n = 15), **selfish** (42%, n = 13), and

funny (35%, n = 12). Fewer of the children found the skits to be about **friendship** (22%, n = 7) and only one pair talked about the skits as **conning** (3%). Only one dyad mentioned an interpretation not captured by the categories of the coding scheme. These data were examined for grade, gender, school and class differences with few notable differences found. Among the 2nd-4th graders (n = 30), girls differed from boys in 1) the most frequently mentioned interpretation other than **sharing** and 2) in variety of interpretations. As seen in Table 4 approximately half of the girl dyads (47%, n= 8) found the skits to be about questionable character, i.e., being **selfish**, while slightly over half of the boy dyads (54%, n = 7) talked about the **trick** in the skits. Additionally, boy dyads referred to different types of interpretations more than the girls.

Table 4

Gender differences in types of coding scheme interpretations referenced by 2nd-4th grade dyads in the initial dyadic phase

Interpretations	Girls (n=17)	Boys (n=13)
share	94%(16)	92%(12)
selfish	47% (8)	38% (5)
trick	29% (5)	54% (7)
con	0	8% (1)
friend	18% (3)	30% (4)
funny	18% (3)	46% (6)

Note: n's = number of dyads.

Class differences in the types of interpretations mentioned by children in the initial dyadic dialogues were observed for Classes #1, #3 and #5. As seen in Table 5, the dyads in Class #1 referenced the fewest types of interpretations. Children in Class #3 were unique in referring to all types of interpretations including conning. Children in Class #5 were unique in being the only class in which every dyad did not refer to the skits as being about sharing.

Table 5

Class differences in percentage of dyads referencing each type of interpretation in the initial dyadic phase

Interpretations	Classes				
	#1 (n=5)	#2 (n=5)	#3 (n=8)	#4 (n=9)	#5 (n=7)
share	100%	100%	100%	100%	57%
selfish	0	40%	63%	56%	14%
trick	0	20%	75%	56%	29%
con	0	0	13%	0	0
friend	20%	20%	62%	11%	0
funny	20%	0	38%	56%	57%

Note: n = number of dyads.

Section ii

The Classroom Activity

Sample characteristics

In the five classes the amount of time of the classroom activity ranged from twelve minutes and twenty seconds to seventeen minutes. The number of children in each classroom activity ranged from ten to seventeen. The gender distribution was roughly equal (e.g., differences ranged from two to four) in all classes except for Class #5 where the number of fifth grade girls (n = 8) contributed to the inequity of twelve girls and three boys. Figure 2 illustrates the number of children, grades, average ages and amount of time of each class activity.

Figure 2

Number of children, grades, ages, and amount of time spent in each class activity

	Classes				
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5
Grades	2nd/3rd	2nd/3rd	3rd	4th	4th/5th
Children(n)	10	11	16	18	17
Avg. age(yrs)	8.16	8.5	9.0	10.08	10.58
Time(min)	12.25′	15.5′	16.5′	17′	12.25′

Description of dialogue construction

Although classes varied by teachers' approaches to skits as well as children's participation (see Appendix E for ethnographic accounts of accentuating individual qualities of each class activity), certain characteristics were common to all five class activities. First, all teachers engaged the children in verbal interactions about the skits utilizing a classroom discussion format. For the most part, children were active respondents. Any child who was not an active discussant was individually approached: every teacher directly solicited opinions about the skits from any child not verbally responsive. Second, although the classroom talks initially appeared to be organized into one long discourse, closer scrutiny revealed subtle shifts indicating a series of **sequential topics.** Third, teachers identified and/or elicited **many** of the interpretation categories in the coding scheme rather than focusing on one as had been expected. Fourth, teachers had both local and broad educational agenda. The local agenda involved a particular "message" of the skits which was specific to each class. The broader agenda common to all teachers was that children would understand the skits as having a particular signifying function. That is, the skits gua text were cast as a "transparency": "laid" on top of other things. Teachers wanted children to understand the skits functioned as metaphors, applicable to children's everyday contexts.

Time

As seen in Figure 2 above, the amount of time teachers engaged the children in talk about the skits ranged from 17 to 12.25 minutes. Length of time was affected more by teacher's evaluation of students' participation than by grade, school or gender of the children when comparing the mean difference in amount of time spent talking in class. Teachers in Classes #1 and #5 informally evaluated their students as not fully engaged (see Appendix E), and were found to conduct the shortest class activities. As seen in Figure 2, the length of time talked in both those classes was 12.25'. Children in the other classes (#'s = 2, 3, 4) were engaged in talk with their teachers for an average of 4.08 minutes longer. While apparently trivial, it may be worth noting that the this difference constitutes approximately 1/3 of the total amount of time the negatively evaluated classes spent interacting with their teachers.

Dialogue genre

Classroom discourse from every class conformed to **classroom discussion genre** as described in the category scheme for types of dialogue genres. Teachers and children mutually engaged in this type of dialogue. The identifying characteristics of this genre outlined in the category scheme were evidenced in the five class discourses as illustrated by excerpts in Appendix F. There were minimal variations among classes in the pattern of teacher-student response. Two

classes (#1 and #2) had a pattern of more child responses for every teacher response for approximately half of the time of the class activity. That is, teachers elicited responses from several students rather than just one before providing the evaluative response. But no class talk diverged significantly enough from the IRE pattern to be classified as having a conversation rather than a discussion. Further, children in all classes followed a pattern of hand raising, another indicator of class discussion (e.g., Cazden 1988, p. 55).

Topic Construction

Initially, classroom discourses appeared to be organized into stream of talk within the constraints of the genre. Upon closer scrutiny, subtle shifts indicating topic changes were found. Topic shifts were marked by a) changes in thematic content and b) degree of interpretative power being brought to bear on the skits. With respect to the latter, with each sequential topic teachers called for more of the speaker's ideas to be brought to bear on the skits, thus the textual material became less prominent or authorial. For example, in the first topic teachers elicited children's descriptions of the skits. In the second topic, teachers "upped the ante". While appearing to call for more sophisticated descriptions of the skits, teachers actually imposed more of reading from the students onto the text. Their questions changed from "what is going on?" or "Are Bert and Ernie friends?" to "what else is this about?" or "what did [the character] feel?". To

determine how a character feels requires speculation beyond the presented material. Or teachers' serialized the individual skits, drawing information from one to explain behavior in another. Since neither script suggested continuity between the two episodes, to provide information beyond the script is to increase the interpretative power being brought to bear on the text by the viewer.

These two features, thematic shifts and increase in the interpretative power coalesced in the sequential formulation of several types of topics. Structurally, in the first topic, teachers in all five classes engaged children in describing the text of the skits. Children were asked for a verbal portrayal of the text. In the second topic teachers wanted an more generalized depiction. The third topic was the message of the skits. A message was an interpretation which has pro-social implications. This topic required further abstraction by the students as the skits shifted from being about something to becoming an instance of some idea. A fourth topic which was optional, functioned as a coda in as music score. If the third topic was the main and essential movement, namely, the construction of message(s), the fourth was an extension, almost as an afterthought.

Concordant with the structural analysis, the content of the topics also shifted. However, topic content was more variable: the first and second topics differed by grade and the third and fourth by class. In the initial topics,

teachers of 2nd-3rd grades asked for descriptions which focused on the **characters and their actions**, eliciting an explicit delineation of the text. Teachers of the older grades asked for descriptions which reflected children's **understanding of the skit** rather than an explicit portrayal of the actions and events of the skits[4]. With the second topic, generalizing, teachers of the younger grades moved from descriptions of the actions of the characters to a **character analysis**. For example, in Class #3 the description of Ernie as "conning" Bert in the first topic was moved to his being characterized as a full-fledged practical joker. In contrast, teachers in the older grades asked children for generalized **interpretations** of the skit, rather than an analysis of characters. In Class #4 for example, the second topic centered on an interpretation that the skits were about "using psychology" with children encouraged to explicate the features of this behavior.

The content of the third topic and fourth topics varied by class. The third topics, the **message(s)** were unique to each class/teacher. Messages were most often specific interpretations of the skits, i.e., "trust", or an instance of "victimization". The exception to such messages was found in Class #4, where the teacher suggested the message was an "application" of the skits to children's experiences. The fourth topics codas, when exhibited, also differed by class but were regulated by the preceding topic. In Class #3 the

fourth topic centered on an **application of one of the messages** from the third topic. In Class #4, where the message of the third topic was an application of the text, the coda took a different form. It began with the teacher's evaluation of how well the message was understood by the children, but spontaneously included a **reproduction of the message** in the earlier topic.

The classroom discourses were analyzed for type, content and timing of topics. A sample classification of illustrating how one teacher's utterances revealed the pattern of topic shifts can be found in Appendix G. Figure 3 represents a schematic illustration of the results of this analysis, illustrating the timing, structure and content of each topic in all five classes. The first line within each topic segment of Figure 3 indicates the structural topic type; the emphasized words identify the content which varied according to grade level and the words in quotes indicate the content specific to each class.

Figure 3. Topic timing, structure and content of the classroom activities.



timing, structure and content of the

#1				
Class #2	.00 3.32'	3.32' 7.35'	7.35'' 10.13'	10.18 15.25'
	Describing characters' actions in first skit	Describing characters' actions in the second skit	Generalizing character analysis	Message "victimization"
Class #3	.00' 3.48'	3.53' 7.08'	7.08' 11.04'	11.04' 15.20'
	Describing characters' actions	Generalizing character analysis	Message(s) "many messages"	Coda "application"
Class #4	00 4.35'	4.35' 10.00'	10.00' 12.00'	12.00' 17.00'
	Describing skit	Generalizing interpretation	Message "application"	Coda "evaluation" & "re-application"
Class #5	.00' 3.45'	3.45' 9.20'	9.20' 12.20'	
	Describing skit	Generalizing interpretation/ character analysis	Message "fair with friends"	

The schematic illustration shows that each teacher interpreted the request to talk to their students about the skits as requiring talk about the skits in terms of a message. Second, the move from **describing** to **message** in the younger grades invariably included a character analysis, was also a difference. An older grade class (#5) also engaged in character analysis as a means of **generalizing**. However, this talk arose in response to a particular circumstance. The teacher of this class reverted to a character analysis when he was unsuccessful in eliciting an interpretation (see Appendix E and the 2nd topic in Class #5 in the diagram). His class discussion was similar to that of Class #4 (the other older grade) in the first topic and beginning of the second. When the students were not forthcoming in the second topic, he focused attention on the characters. This pattern of "recycling" to a format typified by younger grades in this sample suggests that the teacher reverted to a more explicit analysis of the text as a strategy when his expected level of students' responses lagged. Thus, the class discussion ceases to be distinguished from that of the lower grades.

Educational agendas

Teachers had different local educational agendas and a similar general one. The local agenda were evidenced in part in the messages derived from the skits. Teachers wanted to communicate to the children a particular meaning of the skits. These differed according to Classes. In Classes #1 and #2 the

teachers' local agendas were in the messages communicated. In Class #3 the teacher's interpretations of the skits mushroomed into another agenda--whether sharing always was good. The teacher in Class #4 also had a two-tiered agenda: for the children to understand that the skits were about "getting over" seemingly to recognize how these texts could be applied to themselves. In Class #5, the teacher also wanted the children to understand that the behavior of the skits was apparent in their own behaviors. All these local agendas were met with the exception of Class #5. The teacher of these children reverted to a discussion with the question of whether the skits indicated "friends acting fairly".

The general educational agenda common to all teachers was for the students to recognize that the skit(s) functioned as a "transparency": applicable across contexts, not anticipated by a restricted reading. This was enacted differently according to grade levels. Teachers of the younger grades engaged their students in a course of discovery, wherein the zenith was their realization of an interpretation far removed from the actual skit. Teachers of the older grades assumed the first step, and executed their agendas of illustrating that the skits could signify as a transparency, by enlisting the students in the process itself--of discerning that the skits replicated everyday goings-on[5]. This was not observed in any of the younger grade classroom talks.

Common to all teachers was the impetus to realize their educational agenda. All class discussions included the input of the teacher's particular "message" of the skits. However, teachers were flexible in the extent to which their agenda were realized. When students were perceived by their teachers as not engaged, teachers settled for informing the students and/or reverting to a more realizable goal. For example, the teacher in Class #1 struggling to communicate with her students, engaged in the talk about "message" for thirty seconds and quickly ended the activity.

Interpretations

Classroom discourses were analyzed for the type and frequency of references to the six categories of interpretation outlined in the coding scheme, then examined for novel interpretations. A novel interpretation was any interpretation not categorized by the coding scheme and/or variations of coding scheme interpretations which were particularly emphasized in the class discourse. These were the words which captured the ear and the eye; marked by their singularity to each class (i.e., either not found or not emphasized in the other class dialogues) and expected to be salient for the children. When novel interpretations were similar to coding scheme interpretations, independence of the two was achieved by distinguishing between references to the particular and unique interpretation (i.e., novel) apart from the reference to the general category. For example, in one

class 'practical joker' was classified as novel while references to 'joke' were classified as indicative of the general category of trick. The same criteria for identifying references to interpretations in the initial dyadic phase were applied to the classroom talk. **Coding scheme interpretations**

Class discourses were examined for references to the six interpretations of the coding scheme: 1) **sharing**, 2) **joking or tricking**, 3)**conning**, 4) **friendship**, 5) being **selfish** (including being **greedy**), and 6) the skits were **funny**, entertaining. In addition, the first and last mentioned interpretation for each class was assessed. The most frequently mentioned coding scheme interpretation for the sample was **sharing** (n = 103 references), followed by **tricking** (n = 77) and **friendship** (n = 76). These were referenced in every class (n = 5). Being **selfish** (n = 50) was mentioned in four classes. **Conning** and **funny** were the least mentioned.

Similarities and differences among classes were analyzed both by overall references to interpretations and by the number of times mentioned by teachers. Two findings departed from Newman's (1980) earlier work. First, although **sharing**, **tricking** and **friendship** were the interpretations mentioned in every classroom talk, in two classes, (#1 and #5), the skits were talked about more often by the teachers as being about **friendship** than about **sharing**. In Newman's study not even adult subjects were found to interpret the skits as being about **friendship**. **Selfish** was another interpretation not

anticipated by previous work, but unlike **friendship**, being **selfish** was mentioned slightly more often by children rather than teachers. Unexpectedly, **conning**, the most sophisticated of the interpretations offered by Newman's subjects, was not mentioned in each class. The skits were talked about by children and teachers as **conning** only in one class (#3) and mentioned only once by a teacher in Class #4. Notably, the class in which **conning** was talked about by both teachers and children was only class in which any dyad had interpreted the skits as being about **conning** in the initial dyadic phase. Table 6 illustrates the frequencies of references to coding scheme interpretations of the skits in each classroom discourse.

Table 6

Frequency of references to coding scheme interpretations of the skits (and said by teachers) in each class discourse

Class	Interpretations					
	share	trick	con	friend	selfish	funny
#1	10 (3)	22(18)	0	19(19)	0	0
#2	21 (9)	14(10)	0	7 (7)	10 (4)	0
#3	40(21)	20(10)	8(4)	20(12)	17 (8)	0
#4	15 (8)	12 (6)	0	2 (2)	13 (4)	0
#5	23(16)	9 (3)	1(1)	28(18)	11 (5)	2(2)

Note: Numbers in ( ) = teachers' uses.

In order to determine whether children's subsequent interpretations of the skits would be affected by whether the interpretation was said by teachers or children, the ratio of teacher to child mentioned interpretations was analyzed by class and by grade. The ratio of teacher to child mentioned interpretations overall varied little between classes (ranging from .9:1 to 1.6:1) except for Class #1. In Class #1 the ratio of teacher to child mentioned interpretations was 3.6:1. As seen in Table 7, when the ratio of teacher to child mentioned interpretations was analyzed by grades, the most notable difference was that teachers of the younger grades mentioned **tricking** more often than teachers from the older grades. In contrast, children in the older grades mentioned **tricking** more often than their teachers. Other differences between grades such as the ratio between teacher to child mention of **friendship** varied more among individual teachers within grades than between grades per se (see Table 6 above).

between grades such as the ratio between teacher to child mention of **friendship** varied more among individual teachers within grades than between grades per se (see Table 6 above).

Table 7

Grade differences in the ratio of teacher to child mentioned references to the coding scheme interpretations of the skits during class activities

	2nd-3rd classes (n = 3)	4th-5th classes (n = 2)
Interpretations	T : C	T : C
share	38 : 33	24 : 14
trick	38 : 18	9 : 12
friend	38 : 8	20 : 10
selfish	12 : 15	9 : 15
con	4 : 4	1 : 0
funny	0 : 0	2 : 0
Total =	126 : 78	65 : 50

Note: **n**= number of classes, **T**= teacher said, **C**= child said.

Novel interpretations

The introduction of novel interpretations of the skits was assessed for each class. Entirely new interpretations of the skits were introduced in three classes (#1, #2 and #4) and variations of the coding scheme interpretations were emphasized in the other two (#3 and #5). Novel interpretations specific to each class were: Class #1, **trust**; Class #2, **victimization** as indicated by references to the muppet

Section iii

Final dyadic phase & Between dyadic phases comparisons

Sample characteristics

The sample was diminished from the initial dyadic phase by three dyads. Absenteeism eliminated two girls dyads, a 3rd grade pair and a 5th grade pair, both from School #2. Talk from a 3rd grade boy dyad School #1 was lost due to equipment failure. The 31 dyads consisted of seventeen 2nd-3rd grade dyads (9 girls and 7 boys), twelve 4th graders (7 girls and 5 boys) and three 5th grade girl pairs.

Description of dialogue construction

Similar to the initial dyadic phase, children engaged readily in mutual construction of dialogues, arising in a pattern of interdependent exchanges. Although the **carnival manipulation** constituted a departure from conventional methods for intervention analysis, it was notable that some children talked in precisely the same manner in this phase as they had in the non-carnival phase while others exploited the comedic or dramatic aspect. Anecdotal evidence suggested that the carnival manipulation expedited the aims of the study. Several children were initially reluctant to talk about the skits "again". Upon the discovery of the change in the situation (i.e., it looked like fun and they could talk any way they wanted), they were eager to take part. These observations indicate that the carnival manipulation was a necessary naturalistic probe--inviting but not overwhelming.

However, children's talk from this phase was segmented into less regular topics than observed in the initial dyadic phase. This change seemingly issued both from the repetition of the phase as well as the carnival manipulation. With respect to the former, children's talk in the initial dyadic phase which was a three minute topic could be referenced/ abbreviated into less than a minute of talk. Second, when children exploited the comedic or dramatic potential of the carnival manipulation, length of topic or shift in a topic could reflect the employment of drama or comedy. Dramatic shifts instigated by changes in roles/voice between children rather than content would indicate a shift in topic. Comedic timing in "being funny" or eliciting laughs could either produce a shorter topic or overshadow the topic construction altogether. That is, a comic exchange of several utterances could be a more crucial indicator of double voicing than the topic in which it was embedded. The units of analysis were adjusted to compensate for the differences in topic constructions in keeping with the aims of the study. That is, when analyzing children's talk in this phase for <u>dialogue genre</u> and <u>intertextuality</u>, **utterances** and **episodes** (exchanges of two of more utterances from each dyad partner) as well as **topics** and **entire dialogues** were classified.

<u>Time</u>

Talk from the 31 dyads (sixteen 2nd-3rd graders and fifteen 4th-5th graders) participating in the final dyadic

phases was compared to the amounts of time talked and time talked about the skits in the initial dyadic phase. Since one dyad in the final dyadic phase had an artificial interruption of time, the number of dyads for comparison of time talked was thirty. Prior to the comparison, Anova's were performed on amounts of time talked and time talked about the skits in the both dyadic discourse phases for the reduced sample by grade, gender, class and school.

With the reduced sample of 31 dyads in the initial dyadic phase who completed the study, 5th graders were found to talk statistically significantly longer only than 4th graders, ($F = 3.44$, $p < .05$), $N = 30$) only. Class differences in the amount of time talked about the skits found for larger sample in the initial dyadic phase only approached statistical significance for the reduced sample. Children from Class #3 were again found to talk about the skits more than children in any other class, but this was not statistically significant, ($F = 2.66$, $p < .055$, $N = 31$).

With respect to the final dyadic phase, no statistically significant differences for grade, gender, class and school were found for either measure of time. Unlike the initial dyadic phase, the 5th graders did not talk statistically significantly longer than the 4th graders in the final dyadic phase. Table 8 displays the grade differences in the Means (and Standard Deviations) of the amount time talked and time talked about the skits in the final dyadic phase.

Table 8

Grade differences in Means (and Standard Deviation) of amount of Time Talked and time talked about the skits (Skit Talk) in final dyadic discourse phase (in min.)

	Time Talked		Skit Talk	
Grades	M	SD	M	SD
2nd/3rd (n=15)	10.01	(4.42)	6.91	(5.18)
4th (n=12)	8.69	(4.69)	5.36	(3.50)
5th (n=3)	9.25	(1.61)	4.75	(1.77)

Class differences in the amount of time talked and the amount of time talked about the skits were minimal. Although as in the initial dyadic phase, dyads in Class #3 talked longer about the skits (M = 10.43) than children in any other class, the difference did not approach statistical significance. Table 9 illustrates the class differences in the Means (and Standard Deviations) of the amount of time talked and the amount of time talked about the skits in the final dyadic phase.

Table 9

Class differences in Means (and Standard Deviation) of amount of Time Talked and time talked about the skits (Skit Talk) in the final dyadic discourse phase (in min.)

	Time Talked		Skit Talk	
Classes	M	SD	M	SD
#1 (n=5)	10.63	(3.76)	3.56	(3.76)
#2 (n=4)	6.79	(3.38)	4.17	(2.49)
#3 (n=7)	11.50	(4.84)	10.40	(5.63)
#4 (n=9)	8.75	(4.63)	5.23	(3.17)
#5 (n=6)	8.88	(3.92)	5.35	(3.80)

Note: n = number of dyads.

Between dyadic phases comparisons

Comparisons of the mean amount of time talked and the mean amount of time talked about the skits by children between the two dyadic phases were analyzed by Repeated Measures t-tests. No statistically significant differences were found in the time talked ($t = -.17$, $df = 29$, p .86) or time talked about the skits ($t = -1.60$, $df = 30$, p .11) between dyadic phases for the sample. Grade and class differences for the mean amount of time talked about the skits in each dyadic phase were compared. As seen in Table 10, minimal differences were found in the mean amount of time talked by grade between dyadic phases.

Table 10

Comparison of grade differences in Mean (and Standard Deviation) amount of time talked about the skits between dyadic discourse phases (in min.)

	Dyadic Phases			
	Initial		Final	
Grades	M	(SD)	M	(SD)
2nd/3rd (n=16)	5.92	(4.22)	6.91	(5.18)
4th (n=12)	4.11	(3.30)	5.36	(3.50)
5th (n=3)	5.31	(5.73)	4.75	(1.77)

Note: n = number of dyads.

Class differences in time talked about the skits between dyadic phases was also minimal for all classes except #2. As seen in Table 11, 2nd-3rd graders in Class #2 (n = 4) spoke approximately twice as long about the skits in the final dyadic phase compared to the initial dyadic phase.

Table 11

Comparison of class differences in Mean (and Standard Deviation) amount of time talked about the skits between dyadic phases (in min.)

	Dyadic Phases			
	Initial		Final	
Classes	M	SD	M	SD
#1 (n=5)	4.82	(2.45)	3.56	(3.76)
#2 (n=4)	2.29	(2.43)	4.17	(2.49)
#3 (n=7)	8.79	(4.29)	10.40	(5.63)
#4 (n=9)	4.72	(3.65)	5.23	(3.17)
#5 (n=6)	3.80	(3.97)	5.35	(3.80)

Note: n = number of dyads.

Interpretations

Units of analysis

Changes in children's interpretations in the final dyadic phase were assessed by new interpretations, i.e. those not mentioned by the dyad in their initial talk. There were two sources of new interpretations: 1) those originating in the classroom talk, i.e., novel interpretations, mentioned in the classroom talk and emphasized by each teacher or other interpretations mentioned in the classroom talk but not emphasized by the teacher, and 2) those outlined by the category scheme, hence not unique to classroom talk and not able to be verified as originating in the classroom activity.

Novel or other interpretations originating in the classroom talk were by definition new to the dyad. A dyad was coded as mentioning a new category scheme interpretation[6] under two conditions: a) the interpretation was not observed in their initial dyadic talk or b) the interpretation was mentioned only once in the initial dyadic dialogue but emphasized by repeated references in their final dyadic talk[7].

New interpretations

Children's final phase dyadic talk was examined for any references to interpretations outlined by the category scheme: 1, **sharing**, 2) **joking or tricking**, 3) **conning**, 4) **friendship**, 5) being **selfish** (including being **greedy**, **a pig**; or 6) the skits were **funny** and compared with their references to interpretations in their initial dyadic talk.

Children's final dyadic talk was also examined for novel or other interpretations specific to each class. The novel interpretations were: Class #1, **trust**; Class #2, victimization as indicated by references to characters being **mean** or not being **fair**; Class #3, **joker/practical joke(r)** and **con artist**; Class #4, using **psychology**; Class #5, not being **fair** with **friends**. Two classes (#3 and #5) had novel interpretations which were similar to interpretations of the coding scheme. Independence of the two measures, novel interpretations and similar coding scheme interpretations, was preserved as mapped out in Section ii (p. 162) above.

Repetition and difference

Of the 31 dyads, 68% (n = 21) mentioned a new interpretation (e.g., category scheme, novel or other) in their final dyadic talk and 91% (n = 28) of the dyads repeated at least one of the interpretations mentioned in their initial dyadic talk. Only 7 dyads repeated the interpretation(s) exhibited in their initial dyadic talk without mentioning a new interpretation. Of the 3 dyads who did not repeat their previous interpretations, one dyad mentioned a new interpretation and the other two dyads did not repeat an original interpretation by default--the children did not mention **any** interpretation in one of the dyadic discourse phases.

Children's new interpretations were classified by source: 1) 65% (n = 20) mentioned a new coding scheme interpretation; 2) 35% (n = 11) mentioned a novel interpretation; and 3) 6% (n = 2) mentioned an other interpretation arising from the classroom talk. Variability in the source of new interpretations was slightly higher than singularity: 65% (n = 13) of the children mentioning a new coding scheme interpretation also mentioned a novel or other interpretation.

Children's new interpretations were examined for grade, gender, school and class differences and effect of first and last mentioned interpretations. There were no effects observed for first and last mentioned interpretations in any

class. Children's new interpretations were not more likely to be those mentioned first or last in their class activities. No notable gender or school differences were found. Within grade class differences were observed but differed according to grade level. The 2nd-3rd grade classes (#1, #2, #3) differed in new coding scheme interpretations and novel interpretations. In Class #1 20% (n = 1) mentioned a new category scheme interpretation and no dyad referred to the novel interpretation. In Class #2, 75% (n = 3) of the dyads in mentioned new interpretations overall: 50% (n = 2) mentioned a new coding scheme interpretation and one of those dyads as well as another dyad (50%, n= 2) referred to the novel interpretation. In Class #3, 86% (n = 6) mentioned new interpretations from the coding scheme, and five of those dyads (71%) also mentioned the novel interpretations.

The 4th graders in Classes #4 and #5 exhibited a difference only regarding novel interpretations. Although 78% (n = 7) of the 4th grade dyads in Class #4 mentioned new category scheme interpretations, not one dyad mentioned the novel interpretation, **using psychology** although this class had the only dyads who mentioned other interpretations arising in the classroom talk. The 4th graders from Class #5 also mentioned new interpretations from the category scheme (100%, n = 3), but 66% (n = 2) mentioned the novel interpretation, i.e., being **fair** or being **fair with friends**. The remaining dyads in Class #5 were 5th graders (n = 3) of whom 66% (n = 2)

also referred to the novel interpretation. Table 12 displays the class differences in percentage of dyads in exhibiting new interpretations in the final phase. In the table the novel and other interpretations are treated as composite(s) since these were specific to each class.

Table 12

Class differences in percentage of dyads exhibiting new interpretations in the final dyadic discourse phase

Interpretations	Classes				
	#1 (n=5)	#2 (n=4)	#3 (n=7)	#4 (n=9)	#5 (n=6)
share	0	0	0	0	33%(2)
selfish	0	0	14%(1)	44%(4)	33%(2)
trick	20%(1)	25%(1)	86%(6)	11%(1)	33%(2)
con	0	0	29%(2)	0	0
friend	0	25%(1)	14%(1)	44%(4)	50%(3)
funny	0	0	29%(2)	22%(2)	17%(1)
novel	0	50%(2)	71%(5)	0	67%(4)
other	0	0	0	22%(2)	0

Note: numbers in parentheses = number of dyads.

New category scheme interpretations

In trying further to discern the effect of the classroom talk on children's new category scheme interpretations, the frequency and authorship (who said it, teacher or child) of interpretations in the classroom talks were compared with

children's subsequent talk. The comparison revealed first, that with the exception of the **sharing** which was ubiquitous across all phases of the study, the more frequently a category scheme interpretation was mentioned overall in the classroom talk as well as by the teacher, the higher the number of dyads referencing that interpretation new in the final dyadic discourse phase. As illustrated in Table 13, the interpretations which were most often mentioned new by dyads in the final dyadic phase, i.e., **friendship** and **trick**, followed by **selfishness**, were referenced much more frequently in the classroom talks than **conning** and **funny**.

Table 13

Frequency of references to coding scheme interpretations in class discourses (and said by teachers) compared with percentage of dyads exhibiting new coding scheme interpretations in the final dyadic discourse phase

	References		Dyads
	Class Talk	Teacher Said	%new
Interpretations			
share	103	(56)	6% (2)
trick	79	(47)	32% (10)
friend	78	(58)	32% (10)
selfish	50	(21)	26% (8)
funny	2	(2)	10% (3)
con	8	(4)	6% (2)

One exception to this pattern was worth noting. When the data were scrutinized for differences between grades, classes, schools and gender, a disjunction between teacher mentioned interpretations during the classroom activity and children's responses in the final dyadic phases was found in 4th graders' interpretations of the skits as being about **selfishness**. **Selfishness** was the most frequently mentioned <u>new</u> category scheme interpretation (50%, n = 6) by 4th graders although it was not an interpretation emphasized by either of their teachers[8]. As seen in Table 7 (above) the ratio of teacher to child mention of **selfish** in the older grade classes (#4-#5) was 3:5. In contrast, the most frequently and only <u>new</u> category scheme interpretation mentioned by the younger children in all three classes (#1, #2 and #3) was **trick** (50%, n = 8). The ratio of teacher to child mention of **trick** in the younger grade classes was approximately 2:1. This finding in concert with the notable absence of any mention by 4th graders in Class #4 of the <u>novel</u> interpretation (so eagerly talked about in the class discussion) indicates a difference in 4th graders' responses to the classroom talk. There were no effects observed for first and last mentioned interpretations in any class.

<u>Dialogue genre</u>

Children's final dyadic talk was examined for type of dialogue genre employed. Change in dialogue genre was

assessed by difference between genres employed by the dyad in the final dyadic phase when compared with initial dyadic phase talk. Differences were assessed by the numbers of dyads engaging in each type of different dialogue genre and by the percentage of time each dyad talked about the skits in the same and different dialogue genres. As in the initial dyadic talk, dialogue genre was classified conservatively, by the dialogue genre most consistently exhibited within a topic with one exception. When assessing change, episodes and utterances as well as topics were considered to indicate a change of dialogue genre if these constituted the only evidence of a dyad's employment of a different genre[9].

Talk from 30 dyads was classified since one 5th grade dyad did not engage in any sustained talk about the skits, conversing instead about their teachers. Of the 30 dyads, 80% (n = 24) exhibited a change in their dialogue genre from their initial dyadic talk when talking about the skits. Of these 36% (n = 9) talked in a different dialogue genre for all or most of their talk, 45% (n = 11) talked in a different genre for at least one topic, and 16% (n = 4) talked in a different genre for episodes/ utterances. The ratio of the amount of time spent talking about the skits in same and different genres as those employed in the initial dyadic phases was analyzed for the sample, then by class, grade and gender. An approximate ratio of 60:40 different dialogue genre to same

dialogue genre in talk about the skits was observed for the sample, although class and gender differences were found.

Children in Classes #1 and #2 spent more time talking about the skits in the same dialogue genres used in their initial dyadic talk, 62% and 55% respectively. In contrast, children in Classes #3, #4 and #5 spent more time talking about the skits in different dialogue genres, 64%, 54% and 86% respectively.

Gender differences were more striking. For the sample of 2nd through 4th graders, boys (n = 12) spent approximately half their time talking in the same and different dialogue genres: a ratio of 55% of skit talk in the same dialogue genre to 45% different dialogue genre. Girls (n = 15) spent approximately two-thirds as much time talking in a different dialogue genre about the skits than that employed in their initial dyadic talk: 67% different dialogue genre and 34% the same. This difference increased with age for the girls. That is, the older girls exhibited more of a tendency to talk in a different dialogue than their younger counterparts: 83% of the 4th grade girl dyads' (n = 8) and 5th grade dyads' (n = 3) talk about the skits was in a different dialogue genre.

Types of different dialogue genres employed

Dialogue genre differences were classified by dyad according to the **type** employed. Of the 24 dyads who engaged in a dialogue genre different from that employed in their initial dyadic talk, 79% (n = 19) engaged in one type of new

dialogue genre and 17% (n = 4) engaged in two types of genres concordant with topic changes. Only one dyad used two dialogues genres interchangeably within the same topic(s). The dialogue genre types most frequently employed by these children were **classroom discussion** and **fictional** genres. **Classroom discussion** was employed by 42% (n = 10) dyads and 62% (n = 15) engaged in **fictional** genre: of these four dyads were coded in both categories. One dyad engaged in the **enactive conversational** style of friendship talk which represented a change from their earlier **conversational** style and two dyads engaged in **carnival** genre. One dyad's talk could not be classified. Regarding the six dyads who exhibited no change in dialogue genre in their talk, two dyads continued to employ **carnival** talk as they had in their initial dyadic talk, and the remaining four dyads engaged solely in the **conversational** genre observed in their initial dyadic talk.

Gender and grade differences were found for the types of different dialogue genres employed by both 2nd-3rd and 4th graders. Including the dyads employing two different dialogue genre types, most pairs engaging in **classroom discussion** genre were girls (70%, n= 7). Grade differences in percentage of dyads engaging in each type of new dialogue genres are illustrated in Table 14. Second-third graders employed **classroom discussion** more often than the older children while 4th graders engaged in **fictional** genre (75%, n = 9) more than

any other new dialogue genre. No 2nd-3rd grade dyad engaged in **carnival** genre.

Table 14

Grade differences in percentage of dyads engaging in new types of dialogue genres in the final dyadic phase

	Grades		
Dialogue genres	2nd/3rd (n=16)**	4th (n=12)***	5th (n=3)
Classroom	44% (7)**	25% (3)**	0
Fictional	31% (5)**	75% (9)***	33% (1)
Carnival	0	8% (1)*	33% (1)
Enactive	6% (1)	0	0

Note: '*' = number of dyads exhibiting more than one type of dialogue genre.

Content analysis of children's different dialogue genres

A content analysis of children's different dialogue genres revealed an unanticipated form of children's talk. As seen in Table 14, most (95%, n = 23) of the children employed a new dialogue genre indicative of potential double-voicing, i.e., **classroom discussion**, **fictional**, or **carnival**. It was striking that most of the children's employment of these styles had a dramatic (i.e., acting) rather than verbal/narrative form (e.g. use of speech forms). Seventy per cent (n = 7) of the dyads employing **classroom discussion** genre role played teachers. All children engaging in **fictional**

genre (n = 15) enacted characters although two of these dyads had momentary lapses into fantasy narratives (i.e., the improvised nature of the situation occasioned such extensions). Of the two dyads using **carnival** genre, one dyad employed a dramatic form (i.e., role enactment) while the other utilized speech forms (i.e., verbal rather than a dramatic enactment).

Further analysis revealed gender differences in roles exhibited by this sample of children. Boys (n = 8) typically enacted characters originating from television and video: six dyads re-enacted Bert and Ernie, either specifically replicating the scenes from the skits or changing the theme within the structure of the character. Only one 3rd grade boy dyad created imaginary human characters not identified as video/film originated characters for <u>part</u> of their talk. In contrast, the girls' (n = 7) imaginary characters were all generic human stereotypes whether derived from social interactions, i.e., collegial teachers, girls other than themselves, or television talk show hosts, valley girls, etc. Only one girl dyad (5th graders) took on the roles of Bert and Ernie to re-enact the skit.

<u>Intertextual referencing of the classroom discourse</u>

Children's final dyadic talk was examined for speech referencing the classroom discourse. The corpus of data for this analysis included all speech indicative of: a) **carnival**

genre, from simple mocking or ridiculing to the more sophisticated parodying; b) **fictional** genre, from creating a mini-episode for several exchanges to complete embodiment of a character throughout a dialogue; c) **classroom discussion** genre whether enacted by role playing or not; d) <u>new/ different</u> dialogue genres or <u>new</u> interpretations embedded in **conversational** genres; and e) random quotes, utterances or even words replicating the classroom talk. All speech referencing classroom discourse other than one's own was then classified according to the type of intertextual referencing outlined by the category scheme, e.g, **reporting, importing, juxtaposing, transforming, caricaturing.**

Of the 31 dyads, 58% (n = 18) engaged in talk which replicated features of the classroom talk not authored by them, i.e., not a repetition of their own words in the class talk. Dyads were classified according to the most complex type of intertextuality observed. That is, three dyads were observed to engage in more than one type of intertextuality. These dyads were classified by the most sophisticated type of intertextuality observed, with **reporting** being the least and **caricaturing** being the most complex for this sample. One dyad's talk could not be classified.

Of the 17 dyads whose talk could be classified according to the categories of intertextuality, only one dyad (6%) simply **reported** the dialogue of the other in their own speech. The majority of the dyads (41%, n = 7) **imported** the dialogue

of the other into their own talk with two of those providing second and third topics indicative of **juxtaposing** the dialogue of the other with their own voice. Twenty-nine percent (n = 5) **transformed** the dialogue of the other in their own talk, and 12% (n = 2) **caricatured** the dialogue of the other. The last category needs further distinguishing. While both dyads caricatured the class talk, for one pair the talk was ambiguous, resulting in a subtle caricature lasting approximately 1 minute which was a send-up of talk spoken as much by peers during the class activity as by the teacher. In contrast the other pair provided a wicked caricature of their teacher's class dialogue for 5 minutes, including voice and mannerisms. Their talk constituted the only explicit parody of a teacher's voice in these data.

Talk from the remaining 14 dyads did not exhibit any referencing of classroom discourses, although ten of these dyads employed dialogue genres indicative of double-voicing. Their talk ranged from mockery to caricature, either about the skits or dialogue characteristic of the stereotypical voices and/or characters being enacted.

Grade and class differences in intertextuality

Although the numbers are small, grade and class differences in type of intertextuality were interesting. Of the eight 2nd-3rd graders referencing their teacher's talk, the majority (63%, n = 5) **imported** the teacher's talk in their own dialogues. The eight 4th grade dyads presented a mixed

picture, both varying across the spectrum of types of intertextuality and concentrating in one form. As seen in Table 15 below, half of the 4th grade dyads engaged in **transforming** the teacher's talk while the other half engaged in all other forms of intertextuality except **juxtaposing**. The lone 5th grade dyad exhibiting intertextuality presented the most sophisticated type of double-voicing, engaging in a complete **caricature** of their teacher's talk. Table 15 shows the grade differences in the types of intertextuality engaged by the children in the final dyadic phase.

Table 15

Grade differences in percentage of dyads exhibiting each type of intertextuality in the final dyadic phase

	Grades		
Intertextuality	2nd-3rd (n=16)	4th (n=12)	5th (n=3)
Reporting	0	13% (1)	0
Importing	63% (5)	25% (2)	0
Juxtaposing	25% (2)	0	0
Transforming	13% (1)	50% (4)	0
Caricaturing	0	13% (1)	33% (1)

Note: n = number of dyads.

In addition to differences in the forms of intertextuality employed, further grade differences were uncovered when children's intertextual displays of the voices of the other

were examined. Fourth graders' intertextuality was found to differ qualitatively from both their younger and older counterparts. Unlike the 2nd-3rd graders and 5th graders, 4th graders minimized the other's talk in their intertextual references. When **reporting** or **importing**, 4th graders' talk was limited to utterances within a topic which was mostly their own expressive talk. For example, one dyad while engaging in classroom genre for the entirety of their talk (12.26 minutes) exhibited only several utterances which directly referred to their teacher's talk. In contrast, a 3rd grade dyad's talk using the same type of intertextual referencing would be replete with direct referrals to their teacher's talk. Further, most 4th graders **transformed** the teacher's talk, which by definition provides a minimal explicit display of the text of the other. In contrast, most 2nd-3rd grade dyads when **importing** or **juxtaposing** (71%, n = 5), the teacher's talk was pronounced. And the 5th graders **caricaturing** did not limit their intertextual references to utterances. In order to caricature a voice, one must reproduce it fully, thus the voice of the other, i.e., their teacher, was also quite prominent in the 5th grade dyad's talk.

Class differences were observed quantitatively in the numbers of children exhibiting any type of intertextuality for the younger (2nd-3rd graders) children only. As seen in Table 16, no dyad in Class #1 (n = 5) provided evidence of a re-

envoicing of the classroom talk able to be classified. In Class #2 50% (n = 2) of the dyads engaged in intertextual referencing, and in Class #3 86% (n = 6) of the dyads engaged in intertextual referencing. Minimal differences were observed in the older grade classes, originating from the oldest children (5th graders). No difference was observed for 4th graders: 66% from each class (Classes #4 and #5) engaged in intertextuality.

Table 16

Class differences in percentage of dyads exhibiting each type of intertextuality in the final dyadic phase

Intertextuality	Classes				
	#1 (n=5)	#2 (n=4)	#3 (n=7)	#4 (n=9)	#5 (n=6)
Reporting	0	0	0	11%(1)	0
Importing	0	25%(1)	57%(4)	22%(2)	0
Juxtaposing	0	0	29%(2)	0	0
Transforming	0	25%(1)	0	22%(2)	33%(2)
Caricaturing	0	0	0	11%(1)	17%(1)

Note: n = number of dyads.

Content analysis of children's intertextuality

Children's intertextual referencing was further analyzed to determine what aspects of the classroom discourses were most likely to be referred to in the children's talk. Although the phenomenon is holistic in the sense that the

interaction of the discourse of the other within one's own ought not be examined by an analysis of the parts of that discourse, utterances, etc., the question of whether certain aspects of the classroom discourse were more likely to be referenced than others warranted inquiry. **What, if any, were the salient aspects of the class talks as evidenced by children's references? Did children's talk refer to the descriptions, generalizations, messages or codas of the classroom talks?**

Children's integration of the classroom discourses within their own talk (i.e. measure of intertextuality) was examined. The only regularity observed among the children's intertextuality was a tendency to reference the message(s) of the teacher regardless of when it occurred in the class talk (some teachers mentioned the message across topics) and regardless of the level of organization of the message. Messages were organized on two levels: interpretations of the actions of the characters, i.e., being a joker or con artist (Class #3) or untrustworthy (Class #1) or indicative of things happening everyday/applying the message to oneself (Classes #4 & 5). All but three of the dyads (82%, n = 14) intertextuality referred to the messages identified in their respective classroom discourses. The identified intertextual referencing of the other three dyads consisted of teacher's random utterances or re-envoicing the descriptions of the skits, not the messages.

Composite analysis: interaction among dialogic variables

Children's display of new interpretations, different dialogue genres, and intertextuality were analyzed independently in order to assess the characteristics of change in children's talk. The data were then analyzed for evidence of interactions among variables. An interaction was observe between new interpretations and dialogue genres. Each dyad's initial mention of each new interpretation(s) was examined for the context of the utterance. For both 2nd-3rd and 4th-5th graders, 78% of the dyads' initial mention of a new interpretation was nested within a different dialogue genre or in a different voice within the same dialogue genre. That is, with respect to the latter, if dyads engaged in the same dialogue genre observed in their earlier talk for most of the topic, the utterance identified as the initial mention of a new interpretation was said in an exaggerated voice.

An interaction was also found between intertextuality and dialogue genre: all but three of the dyads'(83%, n = 14) intertextual referencing was coextensive with a dialogue genre different from that employed in their initial dyadic talk. This different genre was not always the dialogue genre of voice being referenced (teacher or other peer). Several dyads (24%, n = 4) used fictional dialogue genre in referencing their teacher's talk.

However the use of a different genre did not determine either interpretation changes or intertextuality. Although

few in number, dyads could engage in a different dialogue genre without changing their interpretations and/or referencing their class discourse. Of the 23 dyads employing a different dialogue genre, 22% (n = 5) mentioned a new interpretation without referencing the classroom discourse, and 17% (n = 4) neither mentioned a new interpretations nor referenced the class discourse.

Development of a different, possibly oppositional voice

In the preceding analyses of final dyadic talk provides evidence of children's development of a different, possibly oppositional voice is scant. Although able to mock, ridicule and caricature as evidenced in children's use of fictional and carnival genres, only one dyad specifically caricatured their teacher's voice and two dyads juxtaposed their teacher's talk with their own talk. Notwithstanding such findings, there were moments of transgression in children's talk which though irregular in exhibition, suggested the impulse toward the development of a different, possibly oppositional voice. These moments were neither repeated with any consistency nor fully developed as codable items, hence beyond the scope of this research. Although observed in talk from both the younger and older grades, subtle and ambivalently presented evidence of a developing oppositional voice was more often observed in 4th graders' talk, i.e., 50% (n = 6) of the dyads provided such moments. The two samples below illustrate the potential observed.

Sample #1

Two 3rd grade girls using a fictional dialogue genre, attempt a re-envoicing of their teacher's interpretation of Ernie's "joking" in their own voice. First, they re-envoice the classroom use of 'joke'. Then after smiling at each other, one tries to use 'joke' in a different way (utterance is accentuated).

A's talk	B's talk
dumb Ernie is picking on poor, old Bert .. an'/Bert shoulda	//but Bert did something first of all
I know //an' it's not a very good joke that is not ah . very good joke	/but he doesn't know how to ?
	[smile at each other]
so / **let me tell you a joke about Ernie**, he shoul/da uhm did	//but look,
...	

Sample #2

Two 4th grade girls are speaking as adult teachers talking about the skits. They begin a new topic at 3.00 minutes, talking about how their students' behaviors replicate that in the skits. This is a transformation of their teacher's talk in the classroom discourse. In between these two topics, at 2.51 one child raises her head and says in a haughty voice, "teachers shouldn't have favoritism" and the two slap hands in a "high five" of agreement. This critique of teachers contrasts with the topics which precede and

succeed this interaction when their talk replicates the class discourse.

Time	A's talk	B's talk
		[exaggerates) an' that is very naughty.
2.34	Naughty . indeed!	
		As we call our little children in school . naughty, naughty, naughty!
	Naughty.	
		Little brats like . ooh~!
2.51	Oo-oh{throws head back]! Teachers shouldn't have favoritism.~	
		Yes, I agree{extends palm].
2.54	Gimme five.	
	[slap hands in "high five"[10]]	
		Awright!
3.00	An' uhm . Ernie yeah . uhm . Bert had . the banana! He didn't wanna share it . with . uhm Ernie because uhm he	

....

Summary of Results

Initial Dyadic Phase

In the initial dyadic phase 34 same gender dyads talked to each other for an average of 9.42 minutes, 56% of that talk was talk about the skits. Dyads from Class #3 talked longer about the skits ($p < .01$) than dyads from any other class. Dyads' talk about the skits was constituted into dialogues consisting of 73 topic segments able to be classified into types of dialogue genres. **Friendship talk-conversation style** was the most common style employed by children (76%) for at least one topic. Gender and school differences were observed in the departures from the **conversational** style. Girls were more likely that boys to engage in **enactive** or **personal narrative** styles (10 out of 11 dyads) while only boys displayed **carnival** talk. Further, girls from School #1 were the only group found to use the **personal narrative** conversational style of **children's friendship talk.**

The interpretation of the skits most frequently mentioned by children in this dyadic phase was **sharing** (91%, n= 31), followed by **trick** (44%, n = 15) **selfish** (42%, n = 13), and **funny** (35%, n = 12). Few children mentioned **friendship** (22%, n = 7) and only one pair talked about the skits as **conning** (3%). Class differences in the variety of interpretations was observed. Third graders from Class #3 referenced more types of interpretations than children from any other class and 2nd-3rd graders from Class #1 the fewest. Gender differences were

found in the type of interpretation most frequently mentioned other than **sharing**. Girls were more likely to interpret the skits as being about **selfishness** while boys more frequently interpreted the skits as **tricks**.

Middle Phase--Classroom Activity

During the classroom activity children were engaged in verbal interaction by their teachers to talk about the skits from 12.25 to 17. minutes. In all of the five classes the classroom discourse conformed to the conventions of **classroom discussion** genre. Classes with children whom teachers' evaluated as reluctant to participate (#1 and #5) spent the least amount of time talking (12.25 minutes each). Class discussions were motivated by teachers' agenda to elicit a message about the skits which indicated that the skits were to be understood as signifying everyday experiences. Teachers' realized this goal/agenda through the construction of class discourses structurally organized into three major topics, **description**, **generalization**, and **message** derivation. A fourth topic, found in only two classes, functioned as a **coda**. The content of topics was found to be grade and class dependent.

Classroom discourses were found to be replete with references to interpretations of the skits rather than focusing on just one, both those outlined by the coding scheme as well as new/**novel** interpretations emphasized by teachers

and unique to each class. Every class discussion contained references to interpretations of the skits as being about **sharing**, **tricking**, and **friendship** and all but one class also referred to the skits as being about **selfishness**. The interpretations of the skits as being about **conning** or **funny** were infrequently mentioned. **Conning** was mentioned more than once in only one class (#3) and **funny** was only mentioned by the teacher in one class (#5). **Novel** interpretation(s) were observed in all class discourses.

The ratio of the frequency that each interpretation of the coding scheme was mentioned by teachers and students was found to differ by sample and grade according to type of interpretation. All teachers mentioned **friendship** more often than children. Conversely, in every class where mentioned, children were more likely to refer to the skits as being about **selfish** more often than teachers. Grade differences in the ratio of teacher to child mentioned interpretations across classes were observed only for **tricking**. This interpretation was mentioned more frequently by teachers in the younger grades and more frequently by children in the older grades.

Finally, classroom discourses indicated that all teachers' had individual immediate **educational agendas** in terms of the messages of the skits which were realized in every class except one. The larger underlying **educational agenda** common to all teachers was effected differently according to grade. In pursuit of children's understanding

that the skits could be seen as a transparency, teachers of the 2nd-3rd graders focused attention on a textual understanding of the skits and those of the upper grades focused attention of what the skits meant to the children.

Final dyadic phase and between dyadic phases comparisons

The sample of dyads was diminished by three, thus 31 dyads' talk comprised the data for the analyses of the final dyadic talk and between dyadic phases comparisons. In the final dyadic phase, dyads talked for an average of 9.32 minutes, 61% of that time was talk about the skits. Unlike the initial dyadic phases, no statistical significance difference was found for grade, class, gender or school for either measure of time. Additionally, no statistically significant difference was found amount of time talked or amount of time talked about the skits for the sample between dyadic phases. However, children in Class #2 were observed to talk twice as long about the skits in the final dyadic phase as they had during the initial phase.

Children's talk in the final dyadic phase did differ with respect to interpretations and dialogue genres employed. The majority (68%) of the children mentioned new interpretations of the skits in their final dyadic talk as well as repeated interpretations mentioned in their initial dyadic talk. Only one dyad was found to supplant their interpretation from the initial dyadic phase talk with a new interpretation. Within grade class differences in new interpretations were observed

for the younger children only: one dyad (20%) in Class #1 mentioned a new interpretation compared with 75% in Class #2 (n = 4) and 86% (n = 6) in Class #3.

Children's new interpretations were found to be related to their classroom talk in two ways. First, with respect to the interpretations of the coding scheme, there was a similarity in ranking between the mid phase, (e.g., the class talk) and the final dyadic phase. With the exception of **sharing**, the more often an interpretation was mentioned in the class discourses, the more dyads referenced that as a new interpretation in their final dyadic talk. Second, the majority of children in three classes (#2, #3, and #5) mentioned the novel interpretation(s) from their classroom talk in their dyadic talk. Variations in grade differences were observed in children's responses to the frequency of references to interpretations during the class talk. With the exception of **sharing** which was ubiquitous across all phases, **trick** was the most frequently mentioned new interpretation by 2nd-3rd grade dyads in their final dyadic talk. This paralleled the frequency **trick** was mentioned in the 2nd-3rd grade class discourses and the frequency mentioned by their teachers. In contrast, **selfish** was the most frequently mentioned new interpretation for 4th graders although neither older grade teacher emphasized this interpretation.

Dialogue genre differences were also observed in children's final dyadic talk. While this might be expected

from the carnival manipulation of this phase, neither the type of new dialogue genre nor the form displayed was anticipated. Eighty per cent of the 30 dyads who talked about the skits exhibited a difference in dialogue genre from their initial dyadic talk. Quantitatively, dyads were found to exhibit a 60:40 ratio of time spent talking about the skits in different and same genres as employed in the initial dyadic phase. Class differences in the amount of time spent talking in a different dialogue gender were found although gender differences were more compelling. Children in Classes #1 and #2 spent more time talking in the same dialogue genres as they had employed in the earlier dyadic phase and children in the latter three classes talked more in a different dialogue genre. Boys were found to split their time talking about the skits roughly equally (55:45) between talking in the same dialogue genres and employing different genres. In contrast, girls spent approximately two-thirds as much time talking in a different dialogue genre about that skits than the same style employed in their initial dyadic phase.

Of the 23 dyads able to be classified as employing a different dialogue genre, most children (62%) engaged in **fictional** discourse and/or **classroom discussion** (42%). Two dyads engaged in **carnival** genre and one dyad employed a different **conversational** form of **children's friendship talk** than observed in their earlier talk. Gender and grade differences in types of different dialogue genres were found:

70% of the dyads engaging in **classroom discussion** genre were girls and 75% of the 4th grade dyads engaged in **fictional** genre. A content analysis of children employment of **classroom discussion** and/or **fictional** dialogue genres revealed that children more often engaged in dramatic rather than verbal/narrative forms of these genres. Most dyads (82%) spontaneously produced mutually constructed dramatic moments/events. Boys generally role-played television/film characters and girls enacted generic human stereotypes derived from social contexts and/or television, i.e., teachers, Valley Girls, etc.

Finally and at the crux of this research was the analysis of evidence indicating an incorporation of the classroom talk into the children's own talk as measured by types of intertextuality. Seventeen of the 31 dyads exhibited a classifiable type of intertextual interaction with the classroom discourse. The implied level of complexity in intertextuality from **reporting** through **caricaturing** was exhibited as a suggestive developmental trend with 2nd-3rd graders mostly **importing** and only a 5th grade dyad engaging in a full **caricature** of their teacher's classroom dialogue. The 4th graders' intertextuality was distinguished qualitatively from the other grades in their minimization of their teacher's voice.

Class difference in intertextuality was observed. Dyads from Class #1 exhibited no intertextual referencing of their

classroom talk compared to at least 50% of the dyads in any other class. With respect to the development of double-voicing as opposition to the voice of authority, only two dyads engaged in fully realized **caricature** of their class talk, although many other dyads' talk suggested an <u>impulse</u> in that direction.

Regarding an interaction among dialogic variables, most children who employed a different dialogue genre (n = 23), engaged in a triad of dialogue difference: 61% employed a different dialogue genre while when referencing the text of the other and co-currently mentioned a new interpretation. Only two dyads were found to mention a new interpretation without either engaging in a different dialogue genre or intertextuality.

To determine the effect of the classroom talk on changes in children's dialogic constructions, findings were summarized by class. The 2nd-3rd grader classes (#1, #2, #3) varied in a step-wise manner. The 2nd-3rd grade children from Class #1 (n = 5) exhibited the least amount of change. Only 20% (n = 1) mentioned a new interpretation and no dyads mentioned the **novel** interpretation. Three dyads engaged in a different dialogue genre, but only one dyad sustained (other than utterances) talk in a different style from the initial dyadic phase. No intertextuality was observed. Notably, children in this class exhibited the fewest variations in types of interpretation prior to the classroom talk with their teacher

although they did not talk the least amount of time nor talk the least amount time about the skits compared to other classes. Descriptive evidence, (observation and teacher's informal evaluation), suggested that the children were minimally engaged in verbal interaction with the teacher during the classroom activity, if not resistant.

Children from Class #2 (n = 4) exhibited moderate change. Prior to interaction with their teacher, these children talked the least amount of time and the least amount of time about the skits in the initial dyadic talk compared with all other classes. Children's participation in the class talk varied, from a few children engaging in verbal interaction to the teacher most of the time to children not speaking at all. In the final dyadic phase, although these children still spoke the least amount of time for any class, they talked about the skits twice as long as they had in the initial dyadic phase. Fifty percent of the dyads referred engaged in the triad of dialogic change, re-envoicing their classroom talk while employing a different dialogue genres and mentioned new interpretations. One other dyad also mentioned a new coding scheme interpretation, but did not employ a different dialogue genre or exhibit intertextuality.

Class #3 (n = 7) had the highest number of dyads exhibiting new interpretations (86%), <u>novel</u> interpretations (71%), different dialogue genres (100%) and intertextuality (86%). Children were engaged in the classroom discourse and

the teacher was animated in her talk with them. Class #3 was the only class whose teacher emphasized more than one novel interpretations. However, in determining which way the arrow points, prior to the classroom activity this class was found to be statistically significantly different from all other classes in the amount of **time talked about the skits.** These children also arrived at the classroom activity having, as a group, mentioned all the interpretations of the coding scheme. This was the only class in which a dyad talked about the skits as **conning** in the initial dyadic phase.

The 4th graders were more alike across classes than the 2nd-3rd graders in their exhibition of dialogic change with the exception of **novel interpretations.** The majority of 4th graders in both classes (#4 and #5) mentioned new coding scheme interpretation(s). Second, although both teachers minimally referred to the interpretation of the skits as **selfish, selfish** was the most frequently mentioned (other than **sharing**) interpretation by 4th graders (75%) with 50% mentioning it <u>new</u>. Third, 66% of the dyads in both classes engaged in intertextual referencing. When referencing their teacher's talk in their own speech,dyad's intertextuality was limited to minimal explicit references to the teacher's talk regardless of class membership.

The most striking difference between classes in 4th graders' final dyadic talk was exhibited with <u>novel</u> interpretations. No child in Class #4 explicitly mentioned

the novel interpretation in spite of children's pleasurable verbal interaction with the teacher about the skits as **using psychology** during the classroom activity. In contrast, 66% of the 4th (and 5th graders) in Class #5 mentioned the novel interpretation of the skits. These differences parallel the differences in the teachers' talk during the class activity. The teacher from Class #5 explicitly provided a novel interpretation of the skits when his evocation of children's understandings of the skits as indicative of their actions failed. The teacher in Class #4 talked about the skits as indicative of children's experience.

The 5th graders' interactions serve as a beacon suggesting where the next step might be. To this end, a 5th grade dyad showed an ability to engage in heteroglossia, the intermingling of two opposing meanings within the same speech, their voice and that of the other's. Heteroglossia was minimally exhibited in a 4th grade dyad's talk, caricaturing the classroom discourse rather than the teacher's talk. It is worth noting that although only one dyad of 5th graders caricatured their teacher's voice, in their final dyadic talk another 5th grade dyad was critical of their teacher. The two regaled in their dislike of him, gleefully pointing out his and other teachers' foibles. Not one of the 4th graders [much less 3rd graders] mentioned any negative aspect of their teacher in any of their talk. Their opposition to the teacher

as the voice of authority was only suggested in momentary their talk but not sustained.

Finally, in Class #5, although the 5th graders were similar to the 2nd-3rd graders in Class #1 in being reluctant to talk, they were not similar in their display of new interpretations. Unlike the dyads in Class #1, most of the 5th grade dyads mentioned the novel interpretation in their final dyadic talk. It is worth noticing that their respective teacher's informal evaluation of their resistance differed. The younger grade teacher said the class talk didn't work, while the 5th grade teacher said the students understood but were rebelling. Both were apparently correct.

CHAPTER IV

Discussion

Dialogicality can take two forms: the interaction of voices in the construction of a dialogue and the interaction with a foreign voice. This study was focused on the latter as accomplished within the former. The question which guided the work was whether children's initially created meaning constructions (in dialogue) would change following verbal interaction with a more expert acculturating adult? And if so, would these reformulated meanings be evidenced as double-voiced constructions depicted by Bakhtin's semiotic analysis of speech? Three aspects of dialogicality were explored, the role of the audience or addressee in formulating dialogue, the dynamics of verbal interaction between an acculturating adult, a teacher, and the children who are her students, and the development of new communicative understanding as a consequence of the interaction between the child-child's original meaning and children-teacher meanings. As in any exploratory study, the results provide suggestions and hypotheses for further investigation.

Role of audience/addressee. It could be argued that communicative meaning is first and foremost about the other, both the communicative other in the interaction of dialogue and the emulated other as the incorporated voice. The

critical nature of the other as interactive partner was evident in the effect of the audience/addressee in the construction of dialogic meanings, but the role of addressee was found to be more crucial to speech formulation than was anticipated.

Regarding what was anticipated, clearly the stylistic differences between conversational and classroom discussion dialogue genres are partly informed by the role of addressee. Among the distinctions between classroom discussions and conversations pointed out by Cazden (1988), is the role of children. Children and teachers perform very different roles in class discussion than as interactive dialogue partners, thus affecting the talk. In this study children engaged in conversational styles of talk with their dyad partner in the initial dyadic talk and classroom discussion genre with their teachers in the class activity. Children did not use the classroom discussion genre in any consistent way with their discourse partner until the final dyadic phases. In the every class when engaged in class discussion, children acted as one addressee/conversant in a two part dialogue. Additionally, although the class discussion was teacher controlled, children's participation as audience affected teacher's speech. Teachers from two classes shortened their class interaction when their students were non-responsive and changed the style of the class discussion was dictated as a consequence of children's

talk. The teachers retreated to more directive informational speech when their students were reluctant to provide information to them about the skits. One teacher changed his interpretation of the skits in response to his addressees. These findings of children's affect on the teacher-child classroom talk supports Bates' (1982) and others' arguments that even when children are the lesser interlocutors they **"seize and create for themselves some minimal amount of communicative interaction"** (p. 62).

More subtle and unexpected effect of addressee on dialogue formation was evidenced in the variations of children's friendship talk uncovered in this study. The differences in addressee determined in part, differences in the style of friendship talk employed by children. The two variations, **enactive** and **personal narrative** styles, support the findings of both Ervin-Tripp (1979) and E. Kaplan (as cited by Werner and Kaplan, 1984). The enactive form style of children's talk provides support for Kaplan's finding of different addressees affecting speech forms. The topic of talk about the skits remained the same as the more typical proto-conversational style, but the ways of talking about the skits differed. When engaging in the **enactive** style, children's speech revealed that the addressee was other than their supposed audience, their discourse partner. The personal narrative style supports Ervin-Tripp's findings that topic and audience affect speech. The topic was

changed from the skits per se to the thematic content of the skits. When employing the personal narrative style, children talked about incidents either reported or imagined from their own experience which were analogues to the skits. Thus both the topic and audience, the remote other in a story telling performance as well as the dialogue partner, changed.

Further, it is worth noting that what can be said of an individual's speech with respect to the effect of addressee, is also true of mutually constituted talk. Children collaboratively produced the different styles of children's friendship talk. They mutually constructed speech which was addressed to a remote other as well or instead of the local addressee. Few investigations of conversationally constructed speech have posed the question of the effect of the addressee. However, there is much theoretical support for the import of the addressee in the formation of linguistic texts. In addition to Werner and Kaplan's (1969/1984) model, the indelible and dialogic mark of the addressee on speech was acknowledged by Bakhtin's description of the addressee "... as an immediate participant-interlocutor in an everyday dialogue" (1986, p. 95). He claimed that any utterance reflects at once who is speaking and who is being addressed (1986, p. 95). The definitive nature of the audience was also recognized by Burke (1972) who argued that "psychology of the audience"

(which he viewed as the role of expectation(s)), shapes the future (p. 16). This concurs with the received view in contemporary semiotic theory that texts are not created without an audience/reader being a part of the process (e.g., Iser, 1974). These elements from theoretical and contemporary research interests in other fields suggest that developmental investigations into communicative meaning might productively focus on the role of the addressee.

Interaction. Most children constructed their initial dyadic verbal interaction as dialogues indicative of some form of children's friendship talk. This frame of talk was changed by 80% of the dyads participating in the final dyadic phase to include mutually constructed dramatic and comedic talk in response to the props and instructions to carnivalize their talk. Minimal temporal differences in dialogue construction between dyadic phases was observed. Children from one class did double the amount of time they talked about the skits in the final dyadic phase. While not observed among children in the other classes, researchers studying the effects of classroom interventions on children's understanding should not ignore the possibility that for <u>some</u> children, extended discourse about a text may be an outcome of their verbal interaction with teachers.

Teachers constructed their verbal interactions with children as a series of topics suggesting a prototypic

pattern of interpretative practices of a text within a classroom discussion. This suggestion of prototypicality of teachers' textual interpretative practices is not meant to imply this is the **only** way teachers could approach such a task. While it seems reasonable to suppose that teachers would proceed as observed--from description to message, this supposition presumes a linear rather than holistic model of instruction. Further investigation into teachers' textual interpretative practices is needed before a definitive model could be proposed.

When the classroom interaction was examined for effects on children's subsequent dyadic talk as measured by changes in interpretations of the skits and/or discourse, two developmental differences were found. First, an age/grade difference was observed for the effect of children's verbal engagement with their teachers in the class activity. The younger children's subsequent talk/meaning constructions were affected by their level of engagement in discourse with their teacher while the oldest children's were not. The 2nd-3rd graders in Classes #1, #2 and #3 exhibited change in their talk about the skits in the final dyadic phase which parallelled their verbal engagement with their teacher. Children in Class #1 who were least active participants in the class talk, exhibited almost no change in their dialogic meanings of the skits in the final dyadic phase. Children is Class #2 who were moderately engaged (i.e., some were

active participants, others passive) exhibited moderate change: 50% of the dyads exhibited change on each of the measures of interpretation and discourse differences between dyadic phases. Children in Class #3 were actively engaged in talk with their teacher and subsequently exhibited the most change in interpretations and discourse.

In contrast, the oldest children's final dyadic meaning constructions were not affected their lack of active participation in classroom dialogue. All of the 5th graders refused to engage in talk with their teacher during the class activity, yet two out of the three dyads mentioned their teacher's specific (i.e., novel) interpretation of the skits in their final dyadic talk.

Differences in the nature of the classroom interaction were observed. For heuristic purposes and following Vygotsky (e.g., Minick (In press-b, p. 24)) the teacher-children instructional interaction can be understood as constituting a zone of proximal development (ZPD). Although I am somewhat hesitant to apply this construct in a many-to-one interaction, the application is enlightening. If we understand the ZPD as a holding space which can be entered into by both adults and children, it is worth noticing that the materiality of the ZPD changed according to age/grade levels. The 2nd-3rd grade teachers, although arguably having different child participants (ranging from scant (#1) to rich (#3)in prior-to-class dyadic talk in variety of

interpretations), were similar in their focus on the text of video and different from the teachers in the older classes. The teachers of the younger children carefully pointed out what was being signified **inside** the video text (if you will) and with subtlety guided their students through a path of discovery. In contrast, the older grade teachers drew attention to the text as a signifier of their [children's] experiences and engaged in the role of teacher as facilitator rather than guide to enlightened understanding. These grade differences in the ZPD effected by the teacher both in content and teacher-student role(s) provide evidence that students are held increasingly accountable for interpretations of texts, not a surprising finding.

The grade difference in the instructional ZPD's may account for the grade difference in children's most popular new interpretation of the skits following the class activity. The new interpretation of the skits most frequently mentioned by 4th Graders, i.e., **selfishness**, in the final dyadic phase was remarkable in not being emphasized by teachers. In contrast, the most frequently mentioned new interpretation of the skits by 2nd-3rd graders, **trick**, was frequently mentioned by teachers during the class discourse. Although a competing hypothesis to explain this and other 4th graders' actions (see below) arises from developmental differences between 3rd and 4th graders, the effect of the context can not be ignored.

Teachers of the 4th graders engaged in a different interaction both in content and roles with their students. Although these elements of the interaction were not directed toward children's assertions of **selfishness** per se, the differences in the quality of the class interactions between older and younger grades could account for 4th graders' adherence to such an interpretation. Such a possibility serves as a hypothesis deserving of further attention.

Second, a characteristic of the ZPD is its presumption of an attainment: of something that is not previously known that will be known. In the instructional ZPD the attainment of something previously not known becomes played out by the actors: the adult knows something which in the interaction between her and the children will be construed in such a manner that the children (hopefully) will depart from the interaction the wiser. Much attention (and ensuing controversy) has focused on the nature of the interaction between the acculturating adult and child within such a developmental affording matrix (e.g., Bruner, 1983; Rogoff, 1990; Wertsch, 1984; Griffin & Cole, 1984; to name a few). But my interest lies elsewhere.

In a recent paper, Minick (In press-b) quotes Vygotsky from the Psychology of Art (1933/1976): "The play-development relationship can be compared to the instruction-development relationship, but play provides a background for changes in needs and consciousness of a much wider nature.

Play--Play is a source of development and creates [a] zone of proximal development." (pp. 537-554, as cited by Minick, p. 24). Vygotsky's argument that the adult-child instructional context and the child-child play situation both constitute ZPD's albeit differently constructed (Goncu & Becker, In press) in concert with his model of the sequence of development as proceeding from the interpersonal to the intrapersonal, suggests that children's uptake of their teacher's interaction may be examined through the re-creation of the ZPD in play.

When the study data are re-examined through this eyeglass, one of the contradictions arising from the analyses dissolves. Children from Classes #1 and #4 while being differently engaged in the class interaction were similar in the outcome measure of novel interpretation. Children in Class #1 were not effectively engaged in talk with their teacher while children in Class #4 were. Yet children in both classes were alike and distinct from the other classes in **not** exhibiting the novel interpretation arising in their class discourse. Attempts to understand this difference by examining contextual differences such as individual teacher's style were unsatisfactory.

When children's final dyadic talk is re-examined in terms of creating pretend play scenarios within which or subsequent to children displayed new meanings of the video text, the differences in children's performance (Classes #1

and #4) more accurately reflect the differences between the two class interactions. During the class activity, children in Class #1 did not actively engage in dialogue with the teacher and were resistant to her interpretations of the skits, thus children were not engaged in an instructional ZPD. In addition to not mentioning the teacher's novel interpretation of the skits, only one dyad engaged in fictional [dramatized] talk, a play-play ZPD for longer than a few utterances in their final dyadic talk. In contrast, while children in Class #4 also did not mention the novel interpretation in spite of having engaged in pleasurable talk with the teacher about this reading of the skits, 86% of dyads engaged in fictional [dramatized] talk. Changes in their interpretations of the skits were embedded within or subsequent to their dramatic talk in five out of the seven dyads.

When the data are re-examined in this manner, the findings suggest that our understanding of children's dialogic development could be enriched by exploring school-age children's activity of imaginary play as a ZPD. A similar recommendation was offered by Forbes (1979) for examining children's fictional role playing to enhance our knowledge of children's perspective taking. Although Vygotsky claimed that "play creates a ZPD of the child" (1978, p. 102), he referred to younger children's play. Following his lead, studies of fictional play have been most

often been limited to preschoolers (e.g., recently, Auwarter, 1986; Goncu & Becker, In press) or examined as creative planning (Baker-Sennett, Matusov & Rogoff, 1991). The results of this study suggest that older children's spontaneous fictional discourses provide a rich field for developmental psychologists to mine.

Intertextuality. The aim of this study, to capture the process whereby the discourse of the other is integrated into one's own discourse, was realized in the contribution of a beginning understanding of this phenomenon. First, although the re-envoicing was expected to be exhibited as more complex constructions than **words** within utterances, (as proposed by the introductory argument), support for examining change in children's dialogical construction of meaning as **words** within utterances evolved from the study. Measures of children's change in talk could not be constructed a priori since the intervention phase was part of the study. While lexical meanings were not anticipated, part of what teachers did in the class activity was to introduce new words as novel interpretations of the skits. In addition, although Vygotsky (1987) and Bakhtin (1981, 1984b) claimed that units of meaning did not rest with the word as a semantic unit, both were quite concerned with word use (see for example, Bakhtin, 1981, p.341-343). Given these empirical and theoretical considerations, changes in

children's final dyadic talk which indicated their appropriation of the classroom discourse were measured both as changes in words nested in utterances referencing interpretations, as well as discourse styles.

When examined through these multiple measures, the following information regarding the process(es) of intertextuality was uncovered. Even when not directly re-envoicing another's dialogue, rarely did children mention a new interpretation as a word within an utterance, without engaging in a different (for them) discourse style. Of the 68% of dyads exhibiting new interpretations of the skits, only two dyads exhibited new interpretations of the skits without also exhibiting discourse stylistic changes. Second, there was little evidence of children's relinquishing their own meanings whether measured by interpretation gua words nested in utterances, or discourse. Only one dyad was found to supplant their interpretation from the initial dyadic phase talk with a new interpretation and no dyad was observed to talk about the skits in the final dyadic phase solely in the ways derivative of the class talk. Children's final dyadic talk indicated a ratio of 40:60 same and different discourse style as their initial dyadic talk. Children readily engaged in displays of multiple voices, their own and sometimes more than one other dialogue genre or more than one other fictional characters.

Second, two **contextual factors** in the intervention phase, i. e., the classroom activity, were found to play a prominent role in children's intertextuality. Children's intertextual references centered most often on the messages in the class discourses regardless of when these occurred in the classroom talk. That is, their intertextual referencing did not reflect the **topics** of talk in the classroom discourses. Second, engagement with the teacher in the class talk affected the younger children's displays of intertextuality in the final dyadic discourse phase. The 2nd-3rd graders least engaged in the classroom talk exhibited no intertextuality (no dyads in Class #1).

Third, the data provided information about the forms and development of intertextual referencing. The analysis of the types of intertextuality revealed an underlying developmental acquisition of double voiced discourse among school age children. The youngest children were mostly engaged in **importing**, with the mid-age (4th grade) children mostly **transforming** the talk of the other and only the oldest children **caricaturing** the teacher's voice. This finding was strengthened by the evidence that children's ability to display the voice(s) of the others in voices different from their own was unquestionable. Children readily replicated many other familiar voices and a 3rd grade pair provided evidence of caricature. However, only at 5th grade was the intermingling of oppositional "voices"

as verbally represented ideological perspectives i.e., heteroglossia, fully expressed. This observation concurs with Hickmann's and Karmiloff-Smith's findings in narrative production that intralinguistic and metapragmatic skills gradually develop between ages 5 and 10 (5th graders).

Further, children's talk was not found to indicate that the types of intertextuality are developmentally primitive to one another. While several dyads imported the teacher's talk prior to juxtaposing or transforming it, other children simply employed one of the more advanced forms without any prior steps. This indicates that intertextuality may take several forms in more advanced speakers. As Bakhtin (1981) states "during everyday transmission of another's words, the entire complex of discourse as well as the personality of the speaker may be expressed and **even played with** (in the form of anything from an exact replication to a parodic ridiculing and exaggeration of gestures and intonations" (1981, p. 341).

The interanimation of voices expressed as heteroglossia however appears to be achieved, apparently developmentally undergirded phenomenon. I would argue that the younger children's lack of display of heteroglossia is not an artifact of the study. Literary and anthropological research on the speech community of most of these children, inner city African-american, suggest a socio-cultural matrix with an exemplary capacity for dual voicing (e.g., Gates,

1988; Baker, 1984). Gates and Baker write that African-american oral tradition is identifiable by: a) a multiplicity of voices (Baker, 1984), and b) the inherent dualism of "signifying" (of not being taken literally, Gates 1988; Mitchell-Kernan, 1973). Marjorie Goodwin provides socio-linguistic evidence of African-american school age children's ability to engage in complex oppositional conversation (Goodwin, 1990; and Goodwin & Goodwin, 1990).

The findings of this study suggest that what develops late is not an ability to ridicule or mock, but the intralinguistic ridiculing or mocking in the parody of an authorial voice. It is telling and indicative of Bakhtin/ Volosinov's (1973) insistence that the social and the semiotic are inseparable that: a) only 5th graders talked about their teachers disparagingly, and b) were the only grade to engage in explicit caricaturing of the teacher's voice.

If 5th graders' accomplishment is viewed as a beacon of what will develop, then differences between 2nd-3rd and 4th graders' intertextuality warrant consideration. Rather than a tract suggestive of U-shaped development, I hazard an enlightened guess that lack of explicit references to the teacher's talk among the 4th graders in the development of an oppositional or "resisting" voice to the other be understood as the minimizing or silencing of the voice of

the other. This can be also seen as supported by 4th graders' peculiar privileging of an interpretation in the final dyadic phase which was both a) most often referenced during the class activity by children and b) underemphasized by both older grade teachers, i.e., **selfishness**. Fourth graders move away from the valorizing identification with adults and begin to form preferential peer relationships. Whether this accounts for 4th graders' differences in intertextuality remains to be seen. However, it is worth investigating whether for middle school age children, the resisting voice expressed in the parody of the voice of an adult in authority--is developmentally preceded by the silencing of that voice.

Gender differences. With the exception of the small but telling quantitative difference in most frequently referenced interpretations of the coding scheme, differences between 2nd-4th grade boy and girl dyads centered on the quality of talk. In the initial dyadic phase, the majority employment of alternate forms of dyadic children's friendship talk was displayed by girls. In the final dyadic phase, girls' spoke in dialogue genres different from their earlier talk (in the initial dyadic phase) more often than boys. In addition, girls' role playing featured characterizations of generic human stereotypes rather than the cartoon characters enacted by boys. While all three

differences are suggestive, I will focus on the difference in the initial phase since it is most instructive with respect to future studies.

First, with respect to the use of the **personal narrative** dialogue genre which was limited to very few dyads, I suggest that: 1) the small numbers, 2) the disappearance of the personal narrative genre in older girls' talk, and 3) the strikingly formulaic speech forms which identify these girls' display of a personal narrative style, invite the possibility that this is an alternative way of speaking seldom observed in experimentally guided studies. This style was peculiarly feminine and limited to African-american girls from the school whose students lived in the surrounding neighborhood. Socio-linguistic findings of Marjorie Goodwin's (1990, pp. 190-225) analysis of talk of Black children from a single Philadelphia neighborhood provide support for these girls' speech formulations constituting a particular dialogue genre. Developmentally, it would be important to ascertain if these girls were engaging in a form of female adult talk peculiar to their community.

Second, in attempting to understand the function of alternative forms of children's friendship conversation in the initial dyadic phase used by girls in this study, attention is drawn to the contextual element, the skits. Televised children's programming is a media genre which

permits children (girls and boys alike) to construct their own meanings without adult assistance. However, Bert and Ernie are both male cartoon characters written into skits for preschoolers. Girls in this study are being asked to talk about cartoon characters which may at their ages impact upon them differently then boys. Following Walkerdine (1990) and contemporary gender theory, studies are needed which examine whether girls produce different kinds of talk [in educational settings] when presented with materials which disallow an identification of the sort boys might have. Do young school age girls (or children) impose their own "readings", interject their own voices into the void when permitted?

A theoretical explanation.

The argument which initiated this undertaking was that communicative meaning develops through the interaction of discourse as <u>voices</u> <u>intermingling</u>. The data suggest that children do re-envoice speech of the other, the adult, but it remains unclear whether the interaction of discourses arises from: 1) <u>new</u> meanings or 2) <u>different</u> meanings conflicting with the children's own? Further, we might ask, what prompts children to invoke other's discourses?

With respect to the first question, in writing about the influence of adult social interaction on children's cognitive development, Rogoff (1990) carefully contrasts

Piaget's theory (1963/1977) with Vygotsky's (1987) model (as cited, p. 147) regarding the conditions under which development can occur. Piaget views the inequitable power relations inherent in the asymmetrical adult-child situation as leading a child to "abandon their own ideas for those presented" (cited by Rogoff, 1990, p. 147). For Piaget, change arising from social interaction requires equity which permits developmental change though conflict. This can only be offered socially by interaction with peers and not adults.

Rogoff contrasts Piaget's view with Vygotsky whom she claims, finds that "ideal partners are not equal, but the inequity rests with skill and understanding rather than power" (Rogoff, 1990, p. 148). Development from a Vygotskian perspective occurs because the child is assumed to be interested in gaining from the more expert partner, who adjust the dialogue to fit within the child's zone of proximal development (p. 149). Without disregarding the arguments for the differences between these two theorists (e.g., Glick, 1983; Rogoff, 1990), these two views provide a contrast between conflict and mastery models of development. Do children's dialogic meanings change as a result of difference (conflict model) or newness (mastery)?

Bakhtin's theorizing perhaps mediates between the two and provides a theoretical description of the processes observed in this study. Bakhtin (1981) views the discourse

of the more expert other (in Vygotsky's system) as producing a conflict model reflective of power (as Piaget theorizes). The construct of double-voicing arises within a social context where the voice of the other is not equitable, but is viewed as having authority (1981, p. 345). Bakhtin's resolution is a gradual apprehending of the more powerful discourse. He suggests that when discourses are powerful, the speaker can "while creatively stylizing upon and experimenting with another's discourse ... attempt to guess, to imagine, how a person with authority might conduct himself... In such experimental guesswork, the image of the speaking person and his discourse become the object of creative, artistic imagination" (p. 347-348). Further, he proposes that the path of struggle may begin with the more powerful discourse being initially "internally persuasive", but when resisted by stylizing discourse in the image of the speaker, becomes "parodic" (1981, p. 348). The outcome of such a process for Bakhtin, is the genesis of one's own discourse, which I would argue was not seen in these data.

Instead, Bakhtin's description of the path of struggle with the discourse as internally persuasive was observed in the children's performances in this study. The younger children's preference for **importing** the discourse of the other lays the groundwork for internally persuasive discourse. The realization, or beginning resistance realized by imagining of the speaker was evidenced in the

4th graders preference for fictional discourses, pushed further into the parody of the 5th grader dyad.

Bakhtin's semiotic description merges mastery with conflict resulting from inequitable power relations. Vygotsky's mastery can be view in these cases as voices /discourse of authority which do reflect power relations recognized by Piaget. But rather than a Piagetian inevitability of conquest (which was not supported by the data), Bakhtin argues for potential overcoming of the discourse of the powerful other through artistic imagination. In Bakhtin's proposed resolution, we wonder about the plethora of various speech forms observed in this study. Although the role playing was evoked by the carnival manipulation, the richness of the dramatized voices as well as the girls' different speech forms in the initial dyadic question whether this was provoked by the contextual change or a process waiting to happen?

Finally, the question of what would motivate the infusion of a different discourse into one's own, lies outside the semiotic considerations of this study. The question of motivation while important, can only be addressed here as recommended paths to be pursued. Work is needed which focuses on integrating affect or motive into studies of cognitive or speech development. When teachers interact with their students, emotion flows in and through their speech in their attempts to engage their audience.

Children's uptake in a classroom may hang on their connectedness to the adult speaker, which in turn may be grounded in or mediated by affect.

Vygotsky's work on aesthetics which incorporates affect as a primary factor (Minick, In press-b) provides some direction for addressing this lack. Vygotsky's concept of "emotional thinking" may shed more light on children's and adults' interpretations of texts presented as entertainment but intended to teach. Another candidate for exploring the motivation of intertextuality lies in the developmental hypothesis offered by Rom Harre (1986) to account for the interpersonal becoming the intrapersonal. He proposes that "psychological symbiosis" permits imitation of "bits and pieces of complementary activities of the symbiotic other" ... [while] builds up a mere aggregate of fragments" rather than a template (p. 124) Harre's thesis may more accurately depict the replication activities in this study than a strictly imitational model. Either of these attempts could assist in furthering our understanding of communicative meaning development.

Suggestion for future work.

At the end of any work, the light shed performs a dual function, illuminating the research problem informed by a particular perspective and casting our gaze to the shadows along the borders of the light wherein lie questions faintly

forming and elaborations for future work. Sutton-Smith and Kelley-Bryne (1984) conclude their work on play with just such an realization, viewing their work as a necessary step to more enlightened study of play (p. 187). This study began the investigation of a phenomenon grasped largely in order to articulate more specific and succinct questions.

The quest was to examine the speech community of the child as it interacted with the speech community of the cultural institutional, the school--an interaction not considered particularly friendly to inner city children. I argued that this interaction might be displayed in the interanimation of discourses--two opposing sign systems. Bakhtin's semiotic insights about speech appended to Vygotsky's insights of development proceeding from the interpersonal to the intrapersonal offered a method to explore this communicative meaning construction.

I conclude the work wondering about the preoccupation with speech as the manifestation of the phenomenon to be investigated. What the children as well as the teachers in this study demonstrated is that communicative meanings and development of these occur as discursive performances. Performances which are perhaps more of a performance and less discursive than originally understood. Examinations of the process of children's development of communicative meaning might be better suited to a dramaturgical analysis (Burke, 1969; 1972; and as applied Feldman, In press;

Kaplan, 1983; Cirillo & Kaplan, 1983). Within a dramatistic analysis, affect as mediator of social interaction need not be neglected. The child is understood as an actor who must embody performances in various socio-linguistic contexts rather than primarily as a speaker in a world of alien and sometimes oppositional discourses. Voice is modulated by a full range of affective possibilities within a dramaturgical model. Such an elaboration of the phenomenon could broaden our understanding of communicative meaning development. That is, until the next study is done.

ENDNOTES

Chapter I

1. Not all scholars agree with this reading of Saussure. For example, Lee (1985, p. 113) disagrees, claiming that for de Saussure, "there is a sliding continuum between **langue** and **parole...**".

2. Implicit in Derrida's statement, "as though literature, theater, deceit, infidelity, hypocrisy, infelicity, parasitism, and the simulation of real life were not part of real life!" (1977, in Staten, 1984, p.iii), is the idea introduced by Wittgenstein that words are more than symbolic stand-ins, hence the nature of meaning can never be understood by a theory of meaning which sets the symbol apart from its context.

3. Although currently disputed, Michael Holquist and others (e.g., Todorov, 1984) suggest that Bakhtin wrote or was primarily the author of works under several names: Voloshinov is one of these.

4. I am using the word **arbitrary** because it aptly describes the point being made. This use in not to be confused with the more traditional concept of language as arbitrary in de Saussure's writings as well as many other linguists and philosophers.

5. While recognizing the two components, the social and the semiotic, Susan Stewart (1986) argues that Bakhtin offers an adualistic thesis in contrast to most theorists of language.

6. Even prominent theorists of the linguistic construction of intersubjective meaning, Searle (1985) and Labov (1972) impose this criterium on shared meaning (see Rommetveit 1979 for a critique of that criterium).

7. Oswald (1962) argues for a 20th century update, (i.e., abandonment) of certain key words ('incontinence') and concepts created by Aristotle, replacing 'continence' (**enkrateia**) with 'moral strength'(p. V). However, contemporary (20th C.) philosophers, (e.g., Phillipa Foote, Donald Davidson) use Aristotle's original concept, i.e., "the problem of **incontinence**". Their choice reflects a discomfort with the substitution of 'morally weak' for 'incontinent'. The problem has been interpreted as a conflict in reasoning, of dually held albeit contradictory judgments, and not as a problem of moral weakness.

8. Benveniste (1984) argues that "Polysemy is simply the possibility of adding a new meaning to the previous acceptations of the word without having these former meanings disappear ... equivocation can be treated as one of the conditions of semantic changes" (p. 123). Ullman (1984:117) quotes W. M. Urban, 'The fact that a sign can intend one thing without ceasing to intend another, that, indeed, the very condition of its being an expressive sign for the second is that it is also a sign for the first, is precisely what makes language an instrument of knowing. This "accumulated intension" of words is the fruitful source of ambiguity, but it is also the source of that analogous predication, through which alone the symbolic power of language comes into being' (Language and reality, p. 112).

9. I mean 'other' in both symbolic senses here, as the embodied, corporeal other who spoke the words and in the sense of the socio-historical 'other'.

Chapter 2

1. The teachers who did informal recruiting of children by eliciting parental consent when children forgot to return forms would have been immeasurably burdened by having to exclude children from their classes who wanted to participate or console a child without a same gender partner who couldn't participate. The disturbance of an implicit classroom practice was contraindicated by the naturalistic design of the study.

2. Copyright laws disallow precise translations which can only be obtained by contacting Children's Television Workshop. A more detailed summarized transcripts of the skits can be found in Newman (1980).

3. By common sense notion I mean that the markers of a conversation were so apparent as to appear to be self-evident. For example, children's talk indicated "joint production" (e.g., Bakhtin, 1981; Voloshinov, 1986; McDermott & Tybor, 1983; Tannen, 1989).

4. In other situations this talk still is constructed as much for the larger context as the targeted listener. Children using this form of talk in a classroom for example are as much concerned with the broader context of the classroom, namely their peers, as with responding to a teacher's or another's question.

5. This style of conversation was so identifiable across dyads engaging in this form of talk that I considered calling it by it's ofttimes signalling words: "m' sister m' sister."

Chapter III

1. The segues were affected to some extent by dialogue genre. For example, children engaging in personal narrative genre could have either very brief segues or their talk could glide from one topic to another.

2. For example, a 3rd grade boy responded to his partner's query about the skits that "they're dope". 'Dope' is a speech genre term originating from the African-American hip-hop community which denotes 'good'. His discourse partner smiled in recognition but did not respond within this speech genre.

3. The nature of the data, i.e., discourse, made it impossible to determine which interpretation each dyad found most persuasive [unlike the interview data collected by Newman (1980)]. Children's talk indicated that most often they understood several interpretations of the skits. Therefore, children's interpretations were assessed by the numbers of dyads referring to each category of interpretation, as well as any others.

4. In fact, their talk indicated that the teachers expected children to provide **descriptions** of the skits comparable to the **messages** elicited by teachers of the younger children. The older grade children did not provide evidence of such an understanding of the skits in their responses.

5. In Class #5, the teacher began the class activity by stating that he had seen "similar things going on right here in school". In Class #4, the teacher and students related how <u>they</u> "used psychology" discerning the features of such actions.

6. This measure adequately captured the change in children's interpretations although it did not distinguish between the different forms the mention of a new interpretation could take. There was no discernable way to determine whether <u>adding</u> a new interpretation alone or <u>exchanging</u> an interpretation by adding a new one and de-emphasizing a previously mentioned one, indicated an interpretative difference. This measure demonstrated what could be observed with certainty.

7. For example, in the first dyadic phase one dyad repeatedly referred to Ernie's **trick**, mentioning once that the skits were **funny**. In their second encounter, there was no reference to **trick** and repeated talk about the skits being **funny** (10 references). This change was considered marked enough to suggest that the interpretation shift to **funny** was comparable to those dyads referencing a previously un-mentioned interpretation.

8. In both classes, children introduced this interpretation without prompting from the teachers. Both teachers acknowledged the interpretation but emphasized other interpretations.

9. For example, one dyad's talk indicated a shift in voice to a fictional genre for an episode--an exchange of several utterances. Since this was the only evidence of a change in dialogue genre for the pair, the episode was used for classification.

10. "High five" is slapping the hands in a gesture of special agreement often indicating the position of opposition with a hint of transgression. It is not done with persons in positions of formal power.

Appendix A

Schematic parental consent form letter

Dear Parent,

My name is Marianne Arieux and I am working with ..... from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. We are studying how children's understanding grows and develops from interaction with their teachers. We want to understand how children's understandings change as a result of talking with their teachers.

If you agree to let your child participate, he or she will participate in a classroom discussion with their teacher. The teacher will show a video tape of two muppet skits and talk about what they mean to the children. Before your child participates in the class discussion, I will show the skits to him or her and a friend from class. The two of them will talk about the skits right afterwards. Then your child's teacher will show the skits and talk about what they mean. After the class discussion, your child will again be asked to talk about the skits with the same friend.

This is the most natural way to find out how children's understanding changes through class discussions. Talking with a friend is a very natural way that children show what they understand. All these discussions will be recorded and take place at your child's school during regular school hours. Your child's participation is completely voluntary.

I would appreciate it if you would permit your child to participate in this study. Both your principal and your child's teachers have agreed to this study. Your child should enjoy participating in this study. There is no physical or psychological harm involved. The educational information we get from the study will be shared with you and the school. If you have any questions, please call me at ..... .

If you agree to have your child participate, please fill out the form below and have your child return it to his or her teacher. All identifying information, names and school will be kept confidential and all information gained will be used for professional purposes only. Your child's participation is completely voluntary. Your child can be withdrawn from the study at any time. If you have any other questions about the study, you can also contact the Office of Sponsored Research at the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York.

.....

Child's name_____ Age_____

Grade_____ Date of Birth _____

Parent/Guardian_____ Date_____

Appendix B

Protocol for eliciting talk, initial dyadic discourse phase

Hi, you two are very good friends, right? Your name is _____ and your name is _____. You both just saw a couple of Bert and Ernie T.V. skits, right? ... And you remember that I am interested in finding out what kids think those skits are about. ... So, I would like the two of you to talk about what you think the skits are about, sort of like you would do it if you were at home, okay? It's okay if you don't agree about what was going on, sometimes people don't agree about what's going on television, but make sure both of you get to say what you think the skits were about. Remember to talk about both of the skits. I'll be back in about 5 minutes to make sure every thing is okay; and then when you finish in about 15. If you need me, I'll be right outside the door, okay? Just talk like you would at home or in the playground or anywhere. ...

Thank you for helping me. I will see you again soon.

Appendix C

Protocol for eliciting talk, final dyadic discourse phase

[1-3 weeks from classroom activity]

Hi, remember what we did before about talking about the Bert and Ernie skits with your friend? ... I want you to talk about them again like you did before, like the good friends you are. Only this time I want you to talk about the skits in a funny way and I have brought you some things to dress up so you can do that. You can talk about them any way you want, maybe like your teacher did in the classroom even. No one except me is going to hear what you say. And it's okay to say anything you want as long as you talk about the Bert and Ernie skits.

I'll come and check on you in about 5 minutes just like before to make sure everything is going okay, then I'll be back in 15 minutes after that and you'll be finished. I will be right outside the door if you need me. ...

Thank you for helping me.

Appendix D

Transcription Key

The transcriptions were conventionalized to indicate oral speech as much as comprehensibly possible. To this end for example, '..' are used to indicate pauses in speech, sometimes replacing (whenever comprehensible) those signified in written discourse by commas. The following conventions were utilized.

1. The talk was separated graphically by dialogue partners: one on each side of the page. Children were treated as one of two partners in the classroom discourses.
2. . = very short pause, not necessarily identical to a comma in written speech
3. .. = short pause
4. ... = longer pause
5. ( ) = very softly spoken, almost as if only for one self
6. / = being interrupted
7. //= interrupting
8. /_____ = said simultaneously after being interrupted
9. //_____= said simultaneously after interrupting
10. ///_____= said in unison
11. [ ] or ( ) = affective behaviors, i.e., laughs, giggles, etc.
12. [ ] or ( ) when set in mid page = behaviors jointly produced.

13. ( ] description inside brackets refers to words spoken prior to
14. [ ) description inside brackets refers to words spoken after
15. Cl = Class (many children speaking at the same time)
16. c? = unidentified child
17. _____ = word(s) underlined without any other notations indicate words stressed by the speaker
18. ~ = unusually stressed, ex: ending with a tonal change
19. [?] = can't be sure, barely heard speech
20. ? = speech heard, but incomprehensible
21. Change of lines during one speaker's talk = clear evidence of a new utterance although sentence structure may differ
22. @ = inspiration
23. ' ' = signal a quote, but indicate that the speaker's voice alone did not change to signal a quote; the only way to determine that it is a quote is to a) know the original text or b) contextually, from other elements in the utterance

Appendix E

Ethnographic account of each class activity

Class #1

Class #1 consisted of ten 2nd-3rd graders, six girls and four boys. The teacher was seated on a chair in her room with some children seated on a bench to her right and others on the floor in front of her. She attempted to engage the children in a discussion of the skits for 12.25 minutes. She opened the discussion by asking her students to "imagine" themselves as Bert and Ernie. Since the children were recalcitrant, this teacher provided most of the interpretations of the skits rather than eliciting them from the students (see Table 7). The emphasis in her talk was on friendship. She concluded that the skits were about "trust" particularly among friends. The children were both reluctant to speak and resistant. For example, when the teacher asked her students if they wanted to be treated in the hurtful way Bert was treated by Ernie, several gleefully replied in unison "yes". At the close of the discussion, the teacher remarked to the researcher that "sometimes it doesn't work" acknowledging the difficulty she had engaging the children in the discussion.

Class #2

Class #2 consisted of eleven 2nd-3rd graders, four girls and seven boys. One girl of a same gender dyad was absent and two of the children were part of an opposite

gender dyad. The teacher sat on a chair in her classroom with the students on the floor in front of her. The teacher had an explicit agenda for her 15.5 minute discussion as she had previously informed the researcher. She began by eliciting answers from the children regarding "what the skits were about". Midway in the discussion (e.g., 7.5 minutes), the focus began to change. The teacher used analysis of the characters' actions to set up the talk for the message/her agenda. The teacher cast the skits as illustrative of how not to be victimized. She reminded the children of a previous lesson and used that lesson in her talk about the characters in these skits. Children's participation in this discussion varied. Some children were eager, becoming raucous when talking about what a "mean" response (to a victimization situation) would be. Others were less engaged, preferring to play with each other.

Class #3

Class #3 consisted of sixteen 3rd graders, ten girls and six boys. The teacher stood to the side of the students who were grouped in chairs and seated on a sofa in a room used by parents and teachers for informal meetings. For 16.50 minutes she animatedly led her class into an analysis of the characters which terminated in an her unique agenda. She explicitly focused on words, initially focusing on the representative aspects of the skits. She asked the children to think of a word which described the "characters",

referring to the "script". Ernie was described as joking, conning, being selfish. Finally he was depicted as a "practical joker". In an unusual twist, the teacher used the word "funny" in describing Ernie's behavior as a joker. The talk then moved to a request for "messages" of the skits. Although the teacher accepted the children's answers, she ultimately focused on whether one should share all the time. Instead of suggesting that it was good to share, she talked about situations in which one might not want to share. The children actively participated in the discussion, providing all the answers the teacher elicited.

Class #4

Class #4 consisted of eighteen 4th graders, ten girls and eight boys. The teacher sat in a chair in front of the students seated on chairs and a sofa in a room used by teachers and parents for informal meetings. The teacher began her seventeen minute discussion by asking the students to "think of word to describe the skits", but moved the focus of that activity from the text to the students. She asked the students to analyze the skits by concurrently applying it to themselves. The teacher joked with the students, suggesting that one of them was not going to get a good grade for calling her "fat pig" when talking about Ernie's greed. When the students suggested that Ernie was doing "psychology" on Bert, she jokingly acknowledged that her daughters probably did the same to her. However, she

concluded the discussion by very seriously pointing out that the children's refusal to listen to a child who was having a difficult time expressing himself was similar to the skits--not sharing. Her words were "same cookie, same banana" referring to the children's behavior. The children were hesitant participants, apparently enjoying talking to the teacher, but not wanting to appear eager.

Class #5

Class #5 consisted of fifteen 4th-5th graders, twelve girls and three boys. One child did not have a dyad partner. The teacher sat on a chair with the students seated on cushions on the floor in a semicircle to his left. For 12.25 minutes he attempted to elicit the children's recognition of the skits as illustrative of their own interactions. He opened with a long narrative about the skits, explicitly stating that he had "seen similar things happen every day here". However, the students were not very responsive and the discussion never reached the agenda he intended. Most of the responses and interaction came from the younger (4th graders) children. Following the discussion, the teacher informed me that he thought the students understood what kind of behavior the skits' signified. He attributed their resistance to an overall current rebellion by students in the higher grades to established school behavior.

Appendix F

Sample class talk evidencing classroom discussion genre

Class #1 (2nd-3rd graders)

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
...*	
Uhhuh . Just I mean just stop the joke before . the end? Is that what you think? I mean he started playing at the beginning an' stop th' joke before the end? That's one way he could have changed it, right . so his friend . would've . realized that he was playing with him, but not felt completely bad about it?	
	Cl: [quacking noises]
Yes . Marc please	
	Cl: [quacking noises]
Marc! Santos	
	S: What Marc said . if he gives a half to Bert he'll be ___?___
I don't understand you	
	S: What Marc said . give the /other half to Bert
	M: //then cut it, cut it with a knife an' den eat da other half wit . an' eat da other /half an den' uhm
	c?: //_____?
	M: Uh Ernie eat da . no an' den Bert
Sit down! Sit down!	eat da other half
Okay!	
So	c?: Dey brothers?
So if you . if you were Ernie . would you . would you . would it be fun for you to play ... to play a	c?: No they aren't

joke like that on your friend?
Would you /

c?: //Yes
c?: Yes

enjoy it? How many of you would enjoy playing a joke all the way through with Ernie . with your friend?

c?: I would
c?: I would
c?: I would

How many of you would do it just half way?

c?: Because

You would all play th' whole joke like that even if your friend feels bad?

c?: Yeah
M: You stop . else I'm goin' punch you

An' you would feel good if somebody did that to you . you would think That was funny?

c?: No
c?: Yeah
c?: Yeah
c?: Yeah

Yeah?

c?: Cuz I don't like bananas!
[laughter]

Class #2 (2nd-3rd graders)

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
...*	
stop it please	
	O: but
an' I I need to /hear from you{said to another child]	O: //Bert . when
	O: had th' banana but . when uhm . Ernie had th' banana Bert would've snatched it . outa his hand an' pretend ?
Is that ah nice thing to do? to /snatch something from someone's /hand	c?: //no
But is that {points to	O://take it out of his hand

another child while looking at, responding to O) a nice thing to do?

[nods head]

uhhuh

. yeah . what? (to J]

umhmm

Oh but remember he said he had been saving it all day an' he . I think he had it in his lunch or somethin' he was saving it 'til the end of th' ?____day . that was probably the only cookie that he had ?___ But what he could've done something . so that Ernie wouldn't 've gotten half of it [points to a child] [coughing]

c?: no
O: uhm he shouldna did it
S: Bert

S: I mean Ernie uhm said . for example uhm . that . what he said . when he was showing him th' example he really wouldn't have done that

S: what he did with th' banana I don't know how he could do that

J: uhm [loud noises from somewhere] uhm Ernie . uhm was . uhm when Ernie was showing Bart . uhm . whatever . whatever his n-/
c?: //Bert
J: ///Bert
c?: ///Bert
J: uhm . that uhm . letting him share it with him . he took 'em his he broke th' piece in half . an' ate ah half an' . Bert dropped his . half

J: an' he didn't get any

...

Z:also . in in th' banana one he couldn've /
c?: //___?___

...

Okay so he could've explained to him about fairness, right? . [points to another raised hand] What else? Did you have your hand raised Leon? . Anthony?

A: uhm th' /

// ?___ you haven't said anything yet . or neither you Narima . go 'head

A: uhm Ernie could've just .

m [looks down, muses,pauses]

Class #3 (3rd graders)

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
We raise our hands okay? What were the names of the two /characters in these two little sketches we saw. Kenneth.	c?://oh, oh.
	K: Ernie and Bert.
Do you /think	c?: //No!
Ahh. (for not raising hands) Do you think, that Ernie and Bert were friends?	
	c1: Yeah.
	c1: Yess.
Wait. Raise your hand. And if you think they were or you think they weren't I need to know why. Patricia.	
	P: I think they were friends.
Why?	
//you	P: Because they live together/and
How do you know they live together? Does it tell you they live together on this-s-s-s/	
	c?: //No.
	c?: [?]
No, I'm just talking about these two little skits we saw . Just, just .. on the basis of these two skits,	

.. do you think that they're friends?

c?: Mmmhmm.
c?: Yeah.

You do? Then why.

c?: [?]
c?: (They were nice to each other.)

They were nice to each other?
Okay.
Does anyone have a different opinion? Maria.

M: I, I, think they were friends, but like sometimes it looked

like .. what they, uhm, half the part dey was friends and half the part dey wasn't.

Okay. Which part .. were they friends? Which part made you think they were friends?

c?: ///When they were/
c?: ///When they were
____//shar
...
P: Sometimes ... in the first one wit da banana, he gave the pare, then he gave 'im, gave him uh whole banana.

Okay, so what does that tell you,maybe?

P: Oh, that he wants to be funny.

He just wants to be funny.

P: and//

/Do you think that he might come back with another cookie?

c?: No.
c?: No
c?: No
P: [?]

How many people understood what Patricia said? How many of you noticed that at the end of the first skit, after he gave Bert the skin, whaddid he do then?

P: ///Gave 'im another banana
c?: //Gave 'im
c?: ... a whole banana

So what does that tell us? What does that confirm to us? That what?

c?: He wanted /to be funnier.
c?: //he wanted to be funny.

No-o.

c?: He wanted, he wanted to be /funny.

//Whadda we call people who like to play jokes all the time? Maria.

M: (Practical joker)

Say that nice and loud (whispery].

M: Practical /joker

//Practical joker. Now practical jokers sometimes can be fun, and sometimes . whadda they make people feel?

cl: sad.

Sad, or?

cl: mad.
cl: angry.

Angry.

c?: or /mad
c?: //like th'

Or mad.

P: [?]

One minute, raise your hand. Patricia.

Class # 4 (4th graders)

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
Tryin' to get over! O-okay! Is that a good policy especially with a friend?	c?: Yep! c?: No! c?: No-o-o
Charlotte thinks its a good policy you think its a bad policy, so let's hear why.	

//Shush!

Right. It's gonna be ... the opposite feeling, right.

Do you like what chu you do to your ... mother?

when you psyche her out?

Would you like it if she did that to you? (said very rapidly]

Raise your hand if you ... wouldn't like it if someone ... psyched you out.

if you do it to them.
Okay, raise your hand if you do it to them but you wouldn't want want them to do it to you.
Raise you hand if you don't know.
Ohhhh/h

You don't care why don't you care?

(Okay) So, I'll remember~ that in class.

I'm only kidding. I'm only kidding, you know that.

c?: I think because like if you have sum'in', an' that's ... ... like you trick somebody when you have sum'in' and den /when dey have sum'in', and uhm, dey trick you uhm, you gonna feel the same way dey, dey felt when you tricked dem.

c?:[?]
...

c?: Yes
c?: [giggle]

c?: No.

cl: No-ooh.
c?: I wouldn't like it.
c?: Can't do it.

c?: [Conversing with another child].

c?: //I don't really care.

c?: It don't matter as long as I get my own way. I don't [laughter from others] care.

c?: [?]

c?: [?]

Aha ha you don't believe
that aha ha ha ha ha ha
okay ...let's see what else
I wanted/

c?: //[?]

to think about. Anyone else
have anything to ... say
about the film that may be
... I've overlooked? Debra.

D: Like uhm, but uhm, hey
you know what Bert had a
cookie .. and Ernie
was
demonstratin' about the
cookie and he, he, he
was he took the
/and

//S'cuse me, sweetheart.
I expect wh, when someone
is speaking that we all
... This is another time
.. that we might be usin'
psychology to get over

[pause]

This is a group .. sharing.
So if you now not sharing,
and you are doing something
else, that is another get
over, psyche thing. ... You
can not always be the one
... who is talking. Sometimes
... you have to be a listener.

D: Like uhm he uhm, Ernie
went, no Bert was uh,
demonstrating on the
cookie and uh, he broke
it in half like it was
just like Bert, uhm
sharing with, uhm, Ernie
but .. he tricked 'em.

He tricked him. He shared
his own cookie with him,
right?

c?: Umhum.

Someone else?/
Melinda.

c?: //[?]

M: I think that uh, Ernie
was stingy because ..
whenever Ernie gets

some

... he don't ever share
it wit Bert but sometimes
.. when, when he, when
Ernie does it to Bert,

Bert tries to get back ... but even tho' he, uhm .. Bert always shares wit him except, he always shares it wit Ernie except the times when Ernie tries to trick 'im.

Okay. I haven't heard from you Summer. You have any comments? ... Did you enjoy the films?

[giggles]

Nuthin'? Just enjoyed? Okay.

Class #5 (4th and 5th graders)

Teacher's talk	Children's talk
Okay, so you have all seen those twice . uhm . I was laughing because .. there's a lotta stuff in there that we've done . we've got fractions in there . you got sharing . like Eskimos in there . uhm . so what . who would like to comment . other than laughing I mean it's silly it's silly to think that uh .. you know when they design these they really look at how people act an' they have . silly looking puppets . but I hear stuff like that all the time . uhm . even people in this room . have conversations like that with other people . so whaddayou what whaddayou think . that they were talking about? .. what was the subject of both of both of them? . Rosalie	
	R: sharing
Okay sharing . what about sharing? 'cuz it wasn't sharing it wasn't like a lesson in sharing . whaddidyou see these two puppets . these two	

characters do . that uhm .. an' then how did you feel about it?

[pause]

Let's go around . let's start with Melinda

M: (?)

What did you see going on? what could you say about them? if they were real . if they were real people . what could you say about them?

M: Uhh . that they both didn't like t'shar-

like

Ernie for instance . when he had th' banana an' he didn't wanna

share

it with Bert right?

when

Bert had th' cookie he didn't wanna share it with Ernie

Bert was the skinny one right?

T: n-nyeah

I always get this wrong okay

[laughing]

So . when they had . awright th' first thing it seemed like when they had whoever had th' thing <u>first</u> . didn't wanna share it with the other one . okay [claps hands]. Bob you had your hand up.

B: .. uhm .. Ernie .

Ernie

is th' greediest one

out

of both __?__

Wait . say that . say that again

B: Ernie was the

greediest

one out of both of

them
Ernie . you said Ernie was the greediest one of

both of them . uhm why'd you say that?

But what did he <u>do</u> .. that let's you know he's greedy?

a

uhm

th'

How did you know that?

.

to

Okay . you you . you caught th' whole thing . I have a question then . uh . Pretending that they were real for a minute . awright . assuming they were real . what else could you say about . th' way Ernie an' Bert are . 'cuz everybody agrees it was about sharing . my questions is . <u>Is it</u> only about sharing? . you know because . sharing is- everybody knows what sharing is even . even very young kids __?___ half your age an' younger . know what sharing is . so <u>what else</u> do you think it might be about?

...

I mean whaddidyou see about th' way they were . the way

B: because he is

B: Oh when uhm . he had

banana an' he didn't wanna share it with uhm . with uhm . Bert an' uhm . he had th'

. th' __?_____...ate

whole thing without giving . any to Bert.

B: because
R: ooh{whispers, raising hand]
B: . because .. because

he said [? [sounds like recapture of the cookie skit, too low

hear well]] "will you share that half . of cookie with me?"

they were friends . cuz they
obviously were friends .
what about it?

[pause]

Anybody?

[pause]

Were they good friends?

c?: yeah
c?: yes

How could you tell?

c?: because they . cuz

/they

B:

/they

live in th' same

house.
Right . uh they seem to
live in th' same house

c?: yeah an' they/

//Yeah they do right!

c?: an' they always be
together an' they

never

. they never break up
or 'cuz they're

always

together

[loud hammering noises]

So they're always together
. so they're good friends
an' I guess you know

c?: _?_

that they've been- they're
best friends an' they've
been there for a long time
Tessa.

c?: _(?)_

What?

c?: _(?)_

They're best friends
but how do you know they're
best friends . from these
two things? how . how do
you know they're best
friends?

c?: _?_

There is somethin' that
they do an' there's
somethin' that they don't
do . in a way

c?: one thing they say .
uhm . I think it was

Ernie . he said that

in th' thing wit da cookie? Ernie said .

that they were best

friends . Right but . awright you . that . he he s-<u>said</u> it . let me get back . let me get to Rosalie 'cuz I skipped her

---

* ... when set in mid page indicates missing speech.

Appendix G

Sample classification of classroom discourse into topics

I. Evidence of the first topic describing

The teacher begins the classroom activity with the first topic by asking for details of the text/skits as revealed in this excerpt (see Appendix D for transcription conventions).

Time	Teacher's talk	Children's talk
.00	We raise our hands okay? What were the names of the two /characters in these two little sketches we saw. Kenneth.	c?: //oh, oh.
		K: Ernie and Bert.
	Do you /think	c?: //No!
	Ahh (for not raising hands]. Do you think, that Ernie and Bert were friends?	
		Cl: Yeah.
		Cl: Yes-s.
	Wait. Raise your hand. and if you think they were or you think they weren't I need to know why.	

The teacher continues with this topic for four minutes and forty seconds. She explicitly asks for a description from her students approximately every minute as evidenced by these three questions.

Time	Teacher's Questions
1.45	"Can you think of a word that might describe a person who likes to play tricks?"
2.55	"Who can describe what happened in that situation? "
3.55	" ... Now let's think of some words that describe Bert."

II. Evidence of the second topic, generalizing.

The shift to the second topic is as subtle in this classroom discourse as in the others. The teacher instigates the second topic by asking once more for a description, but what counts as an response changes. It is telling that the use of 'description' also fades after this bridge from one topic to another. The talk focuses on an analysis of the characters. From 4.15 to 7.10 minutes/ seconds the teacher invites the children to speculate about the characters. The children are called on not just to identify aspects of the characters in the given text but to generalize about their behaviors. The shift in discourse is evidenced in the following excerpt at 4.45 minutes, the teacher instead of accepting as a response a child's description of the skit, the asks if the character had a reason to be angry.

Time	Teacher's talk	Children's talk
4.38		c?: he always getting mad, like my Daddy.
	How did he get mad?	
		c?: Oh, [?] cuz Ernie had such a big piece, then he go mad.
4.45	You think it's wrong that he gets mad?	
		c?: No-o, 'cuz he got mad for a reason.
	Ahh, say that again,	
		c?: He got mad for a reason.
	Yeah, do you think Bert had a reason to be a little angry?	
5.00		Cl: yes-s-s..

The hallmark of the second type of topic is further illustrated as the talk in this classroom focuses on Ernie's character. The teacher once again at 5.56, requires the class to go further than the identifying the features in the text. The talk centers on the observation that Ernie actually gave Bert a banana, therefore he was trying to be "funny". This attribution does not suffice as a characterization of Ernie's behavior since it is not general enough. The teacher elicits a depiction of Ernie as a "practical joker". There is nothing in the skits which define Ernie is an inveterate player of practical jokes.

Time	Teacher's talk	Children's talk
5.12	So what can we say about Ernie?	
		P: Sometimes, ... in the first one wit da banana, he gave the pare then he gave 'im, gave him ah whole banana.
5.28	Okay, so what does that tell you .. maybe?	
		P: Oh, that he wants to be funny.
	He just wants to be funny.	
		P: and/
	//Do you think that he might come back with another cookie?	
		c?: No. c?: No c?: No P: [?]
	How many people understood what Patricia said? How many of you noticed that at the end of the first skit,	

after he gave Bert the skin, whaddid he do then?

P: //Gave 'im another banana
c?: //Gave 'im
c?: ... a whole banana

5.50 So what does that tell us, what does that confirm to us? that what?

c?: He wanted ///to be funnier.
c?: ///he wanted to be funny.

5.56 No-o.

c?: He wanted, he wanted to be /funny.

6.00 // Whadda we call people who like to play jokes all the time? Maria.

M: (Practical joker)

Say that nice and loud (whispery]

M: Practical /joker

//Practical joker.

The second topic ends with the Ernie being grouped under the characterization "con men". The teacher responds that this was talked about before, and begins to introduce the shift to the third topic.

III. Evidence of the third topic, the message.

The teacher shifts the discourse about the characters to ask for a "message", explicitly. She says,

7.08 So what can you tell me? Can you give me . anything at all? Whaddayou think the person who wrote this script, the author who wrote this script, was he tryin' to give us a message?

Several candidates for message are offered by the children and accepted. Then the teacher apparently spontaneously focuses on one which becomes the fourth topic, the application of a message--whether a person should share.

IV. Evidence of the fourth topic, coda.

The shift to the coda is noted when after the messages are given, the teacher she asks for different kind of thinking/response, asking children to speculate.

11.04 "Whaddaya think? This is .. just a hypothetical question. Whaddaya think the next step might be?"

The talk evolves into a discussion about the application of the message of the skits (e.g., times when sharing might not be the good) to the children's own experiences. Very little mention of the skits marks this discourse topic. The talk centers on children's consideration of sharing or not sharing. Children provide some argument with the teacher's suggestion that there are times when you shouldn't share, by appealing to a moral or a hypothetical experience.

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