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THE AGE OF ANALOGY:
Theories of Knowledge and Their Influence on Major Eighteenth-Century English Literature

by

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Preface

The central idea of this dissertation-- that analogy had a particular siginificance for the eighteenth-century writer and that how he interpreted and used it directly influenced what and how he wrote-- grew upon me almost unawares and was the result of a variety of reading and learning experiences during my years as a graduate student at CUNY.

Among those whom I wish to thank for this study are Maynard Mack and Earl R. Wasserman. Each wrote an article that informed me of very much while giving me just enough with which to heartily disagree. I am especially grateful to my advisor, Professor Frank Brady, who first introduced me to many of the eighteenth-century writers who have since become old friends, and who spent long hours reading some equally long and convoluted sentences. Also deserving of my gratitude for their careful reading and helpful suggestions are Professors Lillian Feder and Miriam K. Starkman.

The New York Public Library, the Beinecke Rare Book Library at Yale, the Union Theological Seminary Library and the CUNY Graduate Library made available to me many nearly inaccessible texts, and their librarians were always cordial and encouraging.

My thanks, of course, to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation for a Dissertation Year Fellowship which enabled me to complete most of my research in one year. And last but not least my thanks to Laurence Sterne for the following excerpt which brightened my more discouraging moments and with which, having been unable to fit it in elsewhere, I conclude this preface:

> ...Now if a man were to sit down coolly, and consider within himself the make, the shape, the construction, com-at-ability, and convenience of all the parts which constitute the whole of that animal call'd Woman, and compare them analogically-- I never understood rightly the meaning of that word-- quoth my uncle Toby-- ANALOGY, replied my father, is the certain relation and agreement which different-- Here a devil of a rap at the door snapp'd my father's definition...in two,-- and, at the same time, crushed the head of as notable and curious a dissertation as ever was engendered in the womb of speculation....
>
> Tristram Shandy
> I, vii

Marilyn Schauer Samuels

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Chapter I Introduction

The making of analogies is fundamental to the philosophy, religion and literature of the Eighteenth Century. Almost all English philosophers, theologians and writers of the period, for example, saw in both the immediate and the remote past demonstrations of the "causes and consequences"[1] of human actions which they could apply by analogy to their own lives. Although certain periods of ancient history were generally exalted as models with which the present age should strive to be analogous, political expediency was often sufficient to reverse the purpose of the comparison. From the reign of Charles I through that of George I, as James W. Johnson observes English kings were analogized with Augustus who was portrayed as a paragon of Roman leadership. But in 1726 when George II, christened George Augustus, took the throne, the Tories reacted to this final assertion of Whig supremacy with a determined reversal of the analogy. Now history was re-examined for analogous faults of Augustus. Alexander Pope in his imitation of Horace's Epistle to Augustus (1737), however, preferred a more subtle approach.[2] He damned the English king with praise, by showing through his ironic use of the analogy that there was none:

> A vile Encomium doubly ridicules;
> There's nothing blackens like the ink of fools;
> If true, a woeful likeness, and if lyes,
> 'Praise undeserv'd is scandal in disguise....' (410-413)[3]

Just as the same political or historical analogy could be used as a model of good or of bad conduct as well as employed satirically by setting it up only to knock it down, so the same literary analogy could represent a real likeness between two positives and two negatives as well as reveal an actual lack of resemblance by making unlike things appear analogous. Pope's Peri Bathous (1728), for instance, in form and procedure analogous to Longinus' On the Sublime, reveals through inversion the very opposite of the sublime. Often, as W.K. Wimsatt suggests, the eighteenth-century poet could best illustrate the classical rules of art he was advocating by presenting "burlesque examples of how rules were violated."[4] The mock-epic, for example, sets up a purposely oblique analogy between the elevated grandeur of the traditional epic form and the ordinary or even debased characters and situations to which it is applied. At the same time, in a poem like Pope's Dunciad (1743) the analogy has at least two levels. On the one hand, it is ridiculous for Colley Cibber to be set on a throne of state, or for diving into muck to be described as an epic game. But, on the other, Pope does mean his comparison to be valid. The dunces take on real epic grandeur[5] because they are as serious a threat to human culture and learning as ever Satan and his devils were to human creation.

It is the purpose of this study to demonstrate that eighteenth-century literary analogy involves a unique bringing into relationship of ideas and objects which are both alike and different. This process is not accomplished as in the metaphysical conceit through what Samuel Johnson calls the "yoking" of "heterogenous" ideas "by violence together." Instead, it is the method of creativity which replaced that of Donne and Cowley-- a proper bringing into combination of "wit" (or fancy) and "judgment."

Alexander Pope laments in An Essay on Criticism (1711):

> For Wit and Judgment often are at strife
> Tho' meant each other's Aid, like Man and Wife. (82-3)

The fact that wit and judgment are supposed to work together to produce good poetry becomes significant in a study of analogy particularly because of the roles which the literary criticism of the period assigned to each. While there is some confusion between "wit" and "fancy" among them, both Hobbes and Locke essentially agree that the function of that faculty described is primarily to discover how things which appear unlike are in some ways similar, while the function of judgment is to discern how things apparently similar are in some ways unlike.[7] Through judgment, according to Locke, one may "avoid being misled by similitude and by affinity to take one thing for another."[8] By examining those and other theories of wit, fancy, judgment and imagination I shall attempt to

show the extent of their influence on the eighteenth-century writer's use of analogy.

While eighteenth-century analogy is in some sense the adaptation of seventeenth-century figures to a new theory of poetry, it is not merely a different use of metaphor and simile. Wallace Stevens in The Necessary Angel has even suggested that a poem is an analogy "of which images are merely a part":

> ...poetry becomes and is a transcendent analogue composed of the particulars of reality, created by the poet's sense of the world,...his attitude, as he intervenes and interposes the appearances of the sense.

This twentieth-century distinction between figures of speech and analogy places an emphasis on the artist's sense of self which would be inappropriate to the eighteenth-century way of thinking. There is in the period itself, however, a large body of religious literature in which the same differentiation is made, although for different purposes and from a different point of view. Most of this material consists of attempts to protect religion from the damaging influence of Deism and the new science by showing a basic analogy between natural and revealed religion. In the process, however, the works of theologians like King, Butler, Barton, and Browne reveal much of what constituted the analogical framework of the eighteenth-century writer's approach to his art.

An example of that approach is Pope's use in An Essay on Criticism (1711) of figures of military stratagem to describe both the devices of literary art and the devices of nature. Those "Freer Beauties" of poetry which deviate from the rules must not be automatically condemned, he writes, because, sometimes, figures appear "monstrous" by themselves, but "proportion'd to their Light, or Place,/ Due Distance reconciles to Form and Grace":

> A prudent Chief not always must display
> His Pow'rs in equal Ranks, and fair Array,
> But with th' Occasion and the Place comply,
> Conceal his Force, nay seem sometimes to Fly.
> Those oft are Stratagems which Errors seem,
> Nor is it Homer Nods, but We that Dream. (175-180)

Twenty-five lines later, he says of the major cause conspiring "to blind/Man's erring Judgment":

> Whatever Nature has in Worth deny'd,
> She gives in large Recruits of needful Pride;
> For as in Bodies, thus in Souls, we find
> What wants in Blood and Spirits, swell'd with Wind;
> Pride, where Wit fails steps in to our Defence,
> And fills up all the mighty Void of Sense! (205-210)

The first passage by a comparison of art and expediency shows that an apparent deviation from the rules ("Nature methodized") is not a violation of Nature ("Universal Light") if it appears reasonable when viewed in the proper perspective. The second passage makes an ironic comparison between human nature and expediency. Just as wind will not take the place of blood and spirit, so "Recruits of needful Pride" are not really an adequate protection against lack of sense.

Through a similar figure the one shows "Stratagems which Errors seem," the other errors which stratagems seem. This and other analogies which I shall examine in the works of Pope, Swift and others suggest a more complex relationship between Art and Nature (in its various meanings) and between other fundamental opposites in eighteenth-century thinking such as Ancient versus Modern and City versus Country than has been fully recognized.

It is my contention that this type of analogy which accounts, often simultaneously, for both the similarities and the differences between two or more objects, persons or ideas, and which includes figures of speech but is something more than figurative language, together with its various applications for satiric purposes,is characteristic of the best eighteenth-century literature, and that recognition of this fact leads to a clearer understanding of the period as a whole.

Critics have been attempting a more enlightened analysis ever since Tillotson's On the Poetry of Pope in 1938, and perhaps Maynard Mack has done more than any other modern scholar. But, as James Clifford politely hints, the one possible drawback of studies like Mack's "Wit and Poetry and Pope..."[10] is that they require the application of "modern standards,"[11] that they set out to demonstrate the presence of "essential attributes" which may not have been essential at the time the literature in question was

being written. What follows is an attempt to avoid that drawback by showing that, contrary to W.K. Wimsatt's belief analogy is not simply "a less imaginative similitude" than metaphor, but that in the eighteenth-century uses of analogy, as in the metaphysical conceit, "specific difference as well as similarity is involved,"[12] and that this particular use of analogy arises out of the fundamental approaches to knowledge that were prevalent in the Eighteenth Century.

Footnotes

[1] James William Johnson, The Formation of English Neo-Classical Thought (Princeton, 1967), p.9.

[2] Ibid., p. 19.

[3] Alexander Pope, "The First Epistle of the Second Book of Horace Imitated," The Poems of Alexander Pope, one-volume Twickenham Ed., ed. John Butt (New Haven, 1966). All subsequent quotations refer to this edition.

[4] W.K. Wimsatt, JR., "The Augustan Mode in English Poetry," ELH, 20(1953), 9.

[5] Aubrey Williams, Pope's Dunciad: A Study of Its Meaning (Baton Rouge, 1955), p.137.

[6] Samuel Johnson, "Abraham Cowley," The Lives of the English Poets, ed. G.B. Hill (London, 1905), I, 20.

[7] Thomas Hobbes, "Human Nature," X, 4, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (London, 1839), IV, 68.

[8] John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, ii Oxford, 1960), p. 86.

[9] Wallace Stevens, "Effects of Analogy," The Necessary Angel (New York, 1951), pp. 149-50.

[10] Maynard Mack,"'Wit and Poetry and Pope': Some Observations on His Imagery," Eighteenth Century English Literature: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. James L. Clifford (New York, 1959), 21-41.

[11] James L. Clifford, "The Eighteenth Century," MLQ, 26 (1965), 122.

[12] W.K. Wimsatt, Jr., "The Substantive Level," The Verbal Ikon (Lexington, Kentucky, 1967), pp. 149-50.

Chapter II Analogy Within Limits: 1) Eighteenth-Century Philosophy

> It is by these observations, and a wary reasoning by analogy in that kind of argumentative process, which Suidas calls dialectic induction,-- that I draw and set up this position as most true and veritable.
> (Sterne, Tristram Shandy, III,xx)

Truth, mysteriously revealed or scientifically demonstrated, is in every era a primary object of the human quest. Not many men are able to deal with the truth when they do discover it, but few would relinquish the opportunity. The Englishmen of the Restoration and Eighteenth Century were no exception. Nevettheless, they are seldom portrayed as questors, although those known as "moderns" most certainly were; and they are thought to have had a dim view of "soaring," particularly into the skies, as those labeled "ancients" most certainly had. Whatever searching they did do is believed to have been seriously constricted by insurmountable paradoxes, not the least of which was the following: that although man comes into this world knowing absolutely nothing, yet in all he learns here via experience there is nothing "new." A literary age subscribing to the idea that man brought no innate truths into the world and could neither generate nor be inspired by any while he remained there must have been undoubtedly an age of limitation.

Being limited, however, is a necessary accompaniment of being mortal. Consequently, each age requires a set of boundaries within which to structure its discovery and interpretation of reality and truth, and to wrestle a complex combination of fear and desire to go beyond the limits that, more or less consciously, it has set up for itself. The Great Chain of Being, the system of Correspondences, the Ptolemaic conception of the universe-- all such methods of analogizing were ways of setting limits to the uncovering and describing of truth. Within the strict confines of the macrocosm-microcosm vocabulary was a seemingly unlimited number of analogies and comparisons for the sweeping imaginations of Shakespeare and Donne. Within the clearly prescribed boundaries of the circle of perfection, with man as its epitome, aritistically speaking, almost anything was possible. But freedom within limits which had flourished in one form or another since the Middle Ages seemed destined to end as the Copernican universe and the new science gained in recognition. As Marjorie Nicolson explains it, the breaking of the circle met with two opposite responses. The sudden hugeness and incomprehensibility of the universe and the uncertainty of man's place in it were frightening; while the possibility of "realms of knowledge"[1] unbounded and, as yet, unimagined was irresistibly inspiring. Milton's Paradise Lost is in some ways a commentary on these conflicting attractions:

confinement, the enclosed garden, on the one hand; and sublime, uncontrolled vastness, the infinite universe, on the other.[2]

Similar changes occurred almost simultaneously in the political sphere. The deposition of Charles I and the establishment of a Commonwealth had irreparably weakened the sense of security derived from the divine right of kings. Cromwell and the Puritans proved to be, in their own way, even more restrictive than an absolute monarch; and the subsequent Restoration society found that they had indeed restored the bits and pieces of their shattered liberty, but had failed to restore the necessary framework within which to pursue it.

The late seventeenth-century Englishman suffered from having ceased to control and constructively utilize his imperfect nature. Being an undefined part of inconceivable vastness is the most limited of existences possible. As a momentary sensation of something opposite to ourselves, the infinite, it is the highest form of sublimity; but as a permanent state it leads to spiritual and mental paralysis. To avoid such paralysis the Eighteenth Century had to find another basis for referral, another way of analogizing that would be compatible with scientific truth and still allow for some sense of comforting divine and human purpose amid an immense unknown. This search for limits was not new, it was simply more conscious than it

had been in past ages, because this time there was an active consciousness that something indispensible had been lost.

The major problem that eighteenth-century philosophers set out to reassess was the relation of man to the universe and more specifically to everything external. But disillusioned by the violent dispelling of previous analogically-derived truths about this relationship, they also wished to discover a method of finding truth which would be less susceptible to error. Both Bacon and Descartes had laid the groundwork for this approach by suggesting, although by opposite methods, that habitually and uncritically accepted principles and maxims be re-examined. For Bacon the criterion of truth was the observation of accepted precepts as they actually operated in external phenomena; for Descartes the criterion was the logical argument for them in the mind itself, since it was mind alone that could be proven to exist. The methods of pure mathematics formed the substance of Descartes' theory; those of applied mathematics, tested probabilities, supported Bacon's.

Both out of and in reaction to the work of these philosophers and of the interim writers whom they influenced, came the pivotal philosophic treatise of the Eighteenth Century: John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Locke recognized that there were weaknesses as well

as strengths in both approaches, and that the extremes of either would be disastrous to human thinking. He took from Descartes his concern with the internal operations of the mind, and his belief that the necessary prelude to pursuing truth was accurately defining the true limits within which the mind could carry on such a search. He took from Bacon and the inductive school the basis for his denial of innate ideas and his insistence that the mind could operate only on ideas derived from experience-- the impressions made on the mind by the sensation of external objects. Once these simple ideas had been received, the mind combined and contrasted them, either immediately through intuition, or in intermediate stages through the process of reasoning. In this way alone man might attain that amount of true knowledge of which he was capable.

The Eighteenth Century used the term "analogy" to describe two specific processes: 1) the setting up side by side of two or more objects or ideas or two or more equations of objects or ideas in order to determine the proportion of similarity or difference between two or more known quantities; 2) the comparison of something known to something unknown or unable to be known in order to determine the degree of probability that the unknown quantity actually exists or produces certain effects based on the extent of its projected resemblance to an existing quantity known to be the cause of similar effects. John Locke's entire theory of human understanding is based on

the first type of analogy, while his actual discussion of the term is based on the second.

Knowledge, according to Locke, is the "connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas."[3] Truth is "the joining or separating of signs, as the Things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another."[4] Our knowledge is intuitive when we perceive the relation of two or more things immediately upon their being presented to the senses. We know at once, for example, that a black cat is different from a white one. More often, however, our knowledge is demonstrative:

> ...when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together as by their immediate comparison, and as it were juxtaposition or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain, by the intervention of other ideas... to discover the agreement of disagreement which it searches. (IV, ii)

This analogical process of making the degree of similarity and difference between two objects or ideas of objects (A and B) depend on the type and degree of relation which each bears to a third object or idea (C) is what Locke calls "reasoning." In his chapter on "Reason" he calls the knowledge derived from this analogizing "rational" when the analogy can be clearly and certainly demonstrated. When the connection is only probable, the knowledge of it is a "Judgment."[5] Aside from its philosophical implications,

this reasoning by analogy which involves making one object the measure of or means of clarifying a relationship between other objects or ideas which are both alike and different is a central technique of Eighteenth-Century Literature. It frequently takes the form in poetry of depicting two abstract concepts such as Art and Nature by means of the same image, in order to visibly demonstrate by the different applications of that image both the similarity and divergence of the terms involved. It is essential to recognize the derivation of this and other literary methods of analogy from the contemporary conception of how man reasons and of how man perceives. Herein lies the major difference between writing analogically and writing figuratively; and this difference is a distinguishing characteristic and strength of eighteenth-century writing.

Locke divides all of the agreements and disagreements between ideas which are capable of being known into four types: 1) Identity or Diversity-- that the idea "is, or is not the same with some other idea;" 2) Relation: that one idea is in one or more ways like another idea; 3) Co-existence or Necessary Connexion: that the idea does or does not always co-exist with some other idea in the same subject; and 4) Real existence: that the idea corresponds or is similar to some real presence outside the mind.[6] This fourth type is the most crucial to the validity of Locke's system, and in some sense is dependent on the principle behind

the other three. The philosophy of Descartes had depended on the real existence of innate ideas within and as a part of the mind. If Locke were to substitute comparisons of ideas received from objects outside the mind as the basis of knowledge, he would have to prove their "real existence." He attempted to do so by means of analogy. Locke argues that the things of which we have ideas actually exist outside the mind because these external objects and our ideas of them are analogous rather than identical:

> For I ask anyone, Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks of savour or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our senses,as we do between any two distinct ideas. (IV, ii)

In other words, by the same comparative process with which we distinguish two independent ideas and their type and degree of relation to one another in our minds, we can demonstrate reasonably that an external object is similar to but not the same as our idea of it, and therefore must exist independently. To those who would argue that we may only dream or imagine we perceive the objects from which we form ideas, Locke counters with one of the most basic supportive arguments in eighteenth-century thinking: the analogy of cause and effect. For this purpose, he adds to intuitive and demonstrative knowledge a third type which he

labels "sensitive." When we feel pleasure or pain, such as just enough or too much heat, we know that the particular effect must have had a cause; and that if we ourselves are not the cause, it must be something external to us such as fire.[7] There are obvious weaknesses and unanswered questions in this line of reasoning, and many of them were taken up and re-evaluated by later philosophers. But right or wrong, complete or incomplete, the primary method of the Eighteenth Century's germinal philosophic treatise is analogy.

Yet while Locke saw in the analogical technique an opportunity for the mind operating on the material of experience to restore freedom of inquiry within definable limits, he was not without reservations about its dangers:

> ...the wrong connexion in our minds of ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another, has such an influence and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after. (II, xxxiii)

Like his contemporaries, he was very much in favor of applying by analogy the principles of mathematics to other realms of thought. But he largely rejected the <u>a priori</u> mathematics of Descartes; and he was not unmindful of the possible pitfalls of the other extreme. The application of demonstrative mathematics to the non-material could be reductive-- could blur and even obliterate distinctions, instead of clarifying the properties and position of man in

the visible world. One of the major exemplars of this threat was the work of Thomas Hobbes.

Hobbes' definitions of Identity and Analogy in his Elements of Philosophy (1655) are strictly mathematical, and are a necessary accompaniment to his statements in the Leviathan (1651). In Part I, chapter xi of the Elements he says of Identity and Difference:

> ...Two bodies are said to differ from one another, when something may be said of one of them, which cannot be said of the other at the same time.[8]

Analogism he defines as "proportion" or the "estimation...of magnitudes by comparison" (I, xiii). From an analogism (a=b : c=d) three degrees of relationship are discoverable: equality, excess, and defect. The analogies or proportions which appear in the Leviathan almost all participate in a reductive equation. It is very rare to find something being said about one side that cannot also be said of the other with the result that, essentially, Hobbes identifies rather than compares the human and the mechanical, the natural and the artifical. The interchangeable terminology in his introduction is a clear indication of the method that will ensue:

> Nature, the art whereby God hath made and governs the world, is by the art of man... imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and

> wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life?...Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE,...which is but an artificial man...and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body. 9

Machines have life, and living beings are machines. Therefore, everything is or might as well be everything else. Hobbes' method is parallel to the tendency of earlier analogical systems to identify God, the Creator, with man, the creator,and macrocosm with microcosm. The important difference is that in these earlier analogies the value of each component is enhanced by the comparison, the greater becuase it is worthy of being a standard, the lesser because it is in some ways comparable to that standard; while in Hobbes' system all is demeaned and whittled down to a mechanical process which is mostly involuntary. This reductive analogy or proportion colors every topic of discussion in the Leviathan. Imagination, for example, is described as a "decaying sense" because just as in water

> though the wind cease,the waves give not over rolling for a long time after: so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internal parts of man, then, when he sees, dreams,&c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. (I,ii)

The future is defined as "but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past, to the actions that are present..."

(I,iii). The prudent man conducts his life on the simple assumption that "like events will follow like actions" (I,iii), or, in other words, that the same cause will always produce the same effect. The universal "natural laws" which Hobbes derives from applying this rigid reductivism to human behaviour should be clearly separated from those more liberal searchers after general laws, even though their terminology is sometimes similar. Locke, forinstance, in setting up the probable boundaries of human knowledge was not attempting to constrict it, so much as to disclose with some certainty the range and manner of free inquiry which would be most productive and satisfying and least liable to lead astray.

All who were anti-Hobbesians and at the same time believed in systematic reasoning as man's surest guide below shared the same dilemma. If man could know only what he could perceive through his five senses, and yet there were ideas and operations not reducible to the mechanics of motion, nor differing only in degree from what could be physically demonstrated, then how could they be known or even specualted on within the agreed upon limitations of the human mind? The answer, hesitatingly professed by Locke, was analogy.

Paving the way for Bishop Butler, he describes as the only "grounds of probability" the drawing of analogies between

what is known and what is unknown. The lower half of the Great Chain of Being lends itself to assessment with certainty of the agreement and disagreement between men and lower creatures; and it is by analogy (in its second eighteenth-century sense) with these demonstrable relationships that we may reason upward regarding less confirmable ones:

> Observing...such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those parts of the creation that are beneath man, the rule of analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in things above us and our observation; and that there are several ranks of intelligent beings, excelling us in several degrees of perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite perfection of the Creator, by gentle steps and differences....This sort of probability, which is the best conduct of rational experiments, and the rise of hypothesis, has also its use and influence; and a wary reasoning from analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths and useful productions, which would otherwisw be concealed. (IV, xvi)

Sterne takes the "wary reasoning by analogy" with which he demonstrates that the difference between wit and judgment is similar to that between the two equal knobs of a chair, or, very little difference at all, directly from Locke, the very man to whom he attributes the "erroneous" contention that they are different. His far-fetched comparison not only adds to the comic irony in most of Tristram's opinions, it is also a serious comment on the perceptual dilemma that was common to the philosophy and the

literature of the time. Comparisons had to be made in order for knowledge and understanding to be even slightly augmented; but comparisons incorrectly drawn were the basis of fanciful unreality at the one extreme and dehumanizing reductivism at the other.

Bacon had observed long ago that no meaningful analogy could be established between two entities until, by means of careful observation, an accurate list of those properties accompanying both had been compiled. Until we knew what there was in gold that gave it its "goldness," we could not clearly distinguish it from copper. While Locke denied that man could know the essence of an object, he did contend that he could know its primary qualities (extension, figure and motion) which were invariable and co-existed with the object. Opposed to these were the variable or secondary qualities such as color, smell, and taste, the existence of which outside the mind could not be proved. Among the many responses to this supposition was the work of Bishop Berkeley who disclaimed a distinction the object and its secondary qualities,which he defined as actions of the mind rather than properties of real things. According to Berkeley the analogy of cause and effect was inconclusive. Cause and effect were not reversible as in the mechanistic equations set up by Hobbes, but were "recognized and differentiated" with reference to a "principle" or "true cause" independent of the material world and known

as "Spirit."[10] Such a view was a cautious step backward from Locke's wary reasoning by analogy toward, in some respects, the a priori reasoning of Descartes. Simultaneously, it was a movement forward, in that it brought philosophy that much closer to David Hume.

A central premise of Leslie Stephen's History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century is that Hume's skepticism was the only possible solution to the problems that had been raised by Descartes, and that everything written in-between these two was another stage in the preparation for it. The history of eighteenth-century thought is, for Stephen, a study in futility: "they assumed nothing could be really known that was known subjectively; and they discovered that nothing could be really known independent of themselves."[11] In the retrospect of the late nineteenth century this statement is partly correct. It recognizes, historically, that one human possibility must be completely exhausted before a fresh and, in Stephen's view, superior alternative can take its place. What it sometimes fails to take into account is that the philosophers engaged in this eventually-to-be-discarded approach did not know that they were merely clearing the atmosphere for another period's more satisfying endeavor. In their view, theirs was no exercise in futility, but a pursuit in earnest of what they hoped would

be true knowledge.

It is clear in the Introduction to A Treatise on Human Nature (1738)[12] that Hume equates reasoning by analogy as it was variously explained and demonstrated by Hobbes, Locke and Butler, with the figurative devices used in rhetoric. Both are clever gymnastics rather than authenticating proofs:

> Amidst all this bustle, it is not reason which carries the prize, but eloquence: and no man need ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypotheses who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours. (p.4)

Hume supports this general premise with another analogy: "The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword, but by the trumpeters, drummers,and musicians of the army" (p.4). He never denies the illustrative value-- indeed, given human limitations, the communicative necessity-- of analogy or of the figurative language with which he generally equates it. His chief objection is that to elevate analogizing to a rational process is to violate truth.

Hume accepts Locke's contention that there is a difference between the impression an object makes on the senses and the idea that the mind forms from this impression, but argues that it is only a difference in "degrees of force and vivacity" (I,i). In the interval between being an impression and becoming an idea the object retains a

considerable degree of its original vividness. Once entering the imagination, "it entirely loses that vividness and is a perfect idea" (I,iii). These ideas may be united, separated, and reunited by the imagination at will, and this arbitrary association of ideas relies on three general qualities: resemblance, contiguity of time and space, and cause and effect, which is the strongest of the three. Significantly, Hume also recognizes a more complex type of connection similar to Locke's demonstrative or rational knowledge:

> Two objects are connected together in the imagination not only when the one is immediately resembling, contiguous to, or the cause of the other, but also when there is interposed betwixt them a third object, which bears to both of them any of these relations. (I,iv)

There is a major difference, however, between this version of how the mind forms relationships and Locke's. To Hume the resulting analogies derive not from controlled reasoning, but merely from habit. They prove neither that the original objects from which the ideas were supposedly formed actually exist, nor that there is any real connection between them, either inside or outside of the mind.

Furthermore, according to Hume, there is no such thing as an abstract idea that is not "limited and confined" in quantity and quality (I,vii). A particular idea becomes general when by habit it is "annexed to a general term": "that is to a term which from a customary conjunction, has

a relation to many other particular ideas, and readily recalls them in the imagination" (I,vii). One evident implication is that the definable properties of an abstract term on the basis of which we decide if and how it is analogous to another abstract term are purely arbitrary. From this point of view, Locke's suggestion that abstract concepts like "virtue" may be reasoned about with mathematical precision by "setting down the collection of simple ideas"[13] represented by the abstract terms and agreeing to use them "consistently" in that way is of little ultimate use in establishing certainty.

One point, nevertheless, cannot be overemphasized. Hume never says that analogy has no function in philosophic thinking. On the contrary, in the Treatise, and even more so in his later work, he is careful to point out that for the skeptic the role of analogy is indispensible. Although for different reasons, Hume, like Locke, sees in the making of analogies the only way that the mind can conceive of how it operates, given its human limits:

> The only difficulty that can remain on this subject, must be with regard to that custom which so readily recalls every particular idea for which we may have occasion, and is excited by any word or sound to which we commonly annex it. The most proper method, in my opinion, of giving satisfactory explanation of this act of the mind, is by producing other instances which are analogous to it, and other principles which facilitate its operation. To explain the ultimate causes of our mental actions is impossible. It is sufficient if we can give any satisfactory account of them from experience ad analogy. (I, vii)

All of Hume's points about the analogical operations of the mind in the Treatise reappear and are developed further

in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748).[14] Here, what Hume considers the strongest association of ideas-- the analogy of cause and effect-- receives the most attention. "All reasoning concerning matters of fact," he notes, "seem to be found on the relation of Cause and Effect":

> ...The utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience and observation. (IV, I)

Hume's purpose is to investigate whether or not there is any "necessary connexion" between a cause and an effect, irrespective of the subjective connection made by the human observer. If there is no such causal necessity, or if it is, as Berkeley proposed, an independent Spirit, the nature of which the human mind is incapable of conceiving, then the "utmost effort of human reason" (I,ii), at least via all presently known mthods, is inconclusive.

Hume argues that "every effect is a distinct event from its cause" (IV,I). Although we observe a magnet attract a piece of metal several times, which allows us to deduce by reasoning that a magnet, even when no metal is present, can never be without the property of attraction. We only assume that there is a necessary connection based on our incomplete experience. While Hume does not dwell on Spirit, he does contend that if causal necessity is at all capable of being

deduced by "reason and argument," there is "required a medium." What the nature of this outside medium is, if indeed there is one, "passes" Hume's "comprehension," and, by implication, anyone else's comprehension as well (IV, II).

Having established that all reasoning based on the observation of cause and effect relationships is subject to doubt and error, Hume offers a "Skeptical solution" to these doubts requiring a particular use of analogy. He will examine the nature of belief and of the "customary conjunction, whence it is derived" in order to discover "some explications and analogies that will give satisfaction; at least to such as love the abstract sciences, and can be entertained with speculations, which, however accurate, may still retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty" (V,I). The skeptic philosopher's hypothesis is that man's capacity for truth is seriously and irrevocably flawed. His ultimate goal is to confirm this premise and to use the materials of his proof to reduce man's capability of error. Ideally, the boundaries of exploration which he constructs will be narrower than those of Locke, but having also narrowed the margin of error, his freedom of enquiry within tighter boundaries will be greater. Realistically, the system he is proposing will carry the concept of freedom within limits to its extreme. Not trusting the reasonableness of analogy at all becomes as potentially reductive as Hobbes' method of never questioning its perfect accuracy as the basis

of natural law.

Hume defines belief as "...a conception more intense and steady...than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination," and explains that "this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses" (V,II). He declares "that it will not be difficult upon these suppositions to find other operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these phenomena to principles still more general" (V,II). One of the analogies he uses is as follows:

> When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame....But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception, except only a present object and a customary trasition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence; and it is a satisfaction to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and solidity to the related idea. (V,I)

This line of argument and the analogies which support it prove, according to Hume, that when the mind observes a connection between two objects, it is merely observing the acquirement of such a connection in the thoughts of the observer. By means of this arbitrary connection, the two objects "become proofs of each other's existence..." (II,ii).

However, we can no more prove the existence of one object by analogizing it with another object than we can, as Locke suggests, prove the real external existence of those objects by their analogy with the ideas we form of them in our minds:

> By what argument can it be proved, that the perception of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them (if that can be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself...or from some other cause still more unkown to us? (XII, I)

Hume, or speaking generally, the eighteenth-century skeptic, uses analogy as he understands it to define or at least illustrate the limitations of the analogical process, on the basis of which he determines in turn the limits of human understanding. The obvious weakness of this approach is that the subject and the method used to explore it are essentially the same. Conversely, this procedural paradox, from Hume's point of view, is his solution's main strength: "No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism, than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity" (VII,II). If in applying the only method by which man can have any knowledge at all to studies of the various restrictions of that method, the skeptic is able to survey those restrictions thoroughly, then he has achieved the ultimate truth available to the perpetual doubter: a

simultaneous display of what the human mind can and cannot do. The first is revealed by the technique of his writings; the second by their subject. And both, to an extent of which Hume himself was not entirely aware, are analogous.

Hume concluded that we must analogize in order to know at all, but that our analogies were indecisive and incapable of evincing real knowledge of genuine relationships. Ultimately, the only alternative to this hopelessly constricting view was the establishment of a new basis of referral, a new standard of truth to replace external reality. The increased emphasis on finding analogies for internal states of mind rather than external states of nature, what Norman Maclean calls the shift "from action to image,"[15] that characterized much of the literature written in the latter half of the Eighteenth Century was a general movement in this direction. It reached its philosophical peak with the assertion by Immanuel Kant that the mind interposed its own form on experience, and tha internal processes of mind, rather than external operations of nature were the measures of truth. In Descartes' proposition that man could not know anything clearly and distinctly unless he could know it unsubjectively (in the sense of its being placed within him, rather than perceived by sensation) lay the grand for Hume's eventual conclusion that therefore man could know nothing for certain at all. Similarly, in Hume's own comment that man

cannot prove that the mind's perceptions are caused by objects outside it, because they might just as easily "arise...from the energy of the mind itself" (I,vii) lay the raw material for his eventual refutation.

Nevertheless, it can be too easily forgetten that well over half a century intervened between the publication of Hume and the public recognition of Kant, and that during this period there were alternatives to skepticism proposed, which still assumed that subjectivism was an insurmountable deterrent to complete knowledge, but suggested types of analogy which would compensate for and maximize a freedom of inquiry within acknowledged limitation.

Perhaps the most significant of these alternatives for eighteenth-century literary technique is David Hartley's Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations (1749).[16] Hartley developed his theory of the association of ideas out of a brief discussion in Locke's Essay and remarks in the Reverend John Gay's preface to Edmund Law's translation of De Origine Mali. His own exposition of it, however, includes at least two important innovations. The first is an attempt to show a direct analogy between the "Doctrine of Association" and Isaac Newton's "Doctrine of Vibrations." Like the system propsed by Hobbes, this analogy required the dangerous equation of the material and the non-material; but unlike Hobbes, Hartley made it quite clear that the relationship he was suggesting involved an

analogy of cause and effect in which the things compared differed both in degree and in kind. The ground for the juxtaposition was a similarity of operation and function, and its purpose was to increase our knowledge of the one process by applying it to our knowledge of the other:

> ...if these Doctrines be found in fact to contain the Laws of the Bodily and Mental Powers respectively, they must be related to each other, since the Body and Mind are....Vibrations should infer <u>Association</u> as their Effect and Association point to Vibrations as its Cause. (I,i)

If Hartley could not answer Hume by proving that the connections made in the mind between causes and effects were based on reason, he could at least show, via analogy, that they were based on scientific regularity, rather than caprice. He posited that "external objects impressed upon the senses occasion, first in the Nerves on which they are impressed, and then in the Brain, Vibrations of the infinitisimal, medullary Particles" (I,i,4). When a series of vibrations from different objects or ideas are continually associated, the subsequent perception or recall of one automatically calls to mind all of the others. Most significant is not the reasonableness of this theory, but the interdisciplinary analogy on which it relies. Hartley attempts to apply to philosophic inquiry not merely a specific discovery of Newton's, but his inductive method of discovery in general:

> The proper Method of Philosophizing seems to be, to discover and establish the general Laws of Action, affecting the subject under Consideration, from certain select, well-defined, well-attested Phaenomena, and then to explain and predict other Phaenomena by these Laws. This is the method of Analysis and Synthesis recommended and followed by Sir Isaac Newton. (I,i)

It is Hartley's broad interpretation of kinds of "other Phaenomena" to which a law derived from limited personal experience can be applied that underlies most of his discussions in the Observations on Man,... Like Newton and Bacon, he believed that knowledge could be significantly increased, only if under carefully controlled experiments, the number of operations demonstrated to be analogous in terms of discovered natural laws was continually expanded. Ideally, this type of analogizing was the way that man could gain almost total control of his environment: by confining all of its operations within the boundaries of a very few laws that he had discovered and that he could understand.

If expansion via analogy was the means of unearthing "new Truths in Matters of Science" (IV,i), it was also, according to Hartley, a way "of producing new Beauties in Works of Imagination" (IV,i). The creative artist could also profit by the application of Newtonian techniques:

> ...Analogy will lead him by degrees, in works of Fancy, from the Beauties of celebrated Masters to others less

> and less resembling these, till at last he arrives at such as bear no visible Resemblance. Deviations and subordinate Analogies contained within them, will do this in a much greater Degree; and all Analogies, will instruct him how to model properly such entirely new Thoughts, as his Memory and Acquaintance with Things have suggested to him. In Science Analogy leads on perpetually to new Propositions; and by itself some Presumption of Truth is a Guide much preferable to mere Imagination. (IV,i)

What Hartley really means by the seemingly strange opposition of Analogy and Imagination cited above can best be seen by considering his second innovation: the identifying of the association of ideas with analogy and the distinguishing of both from the imaginative process by which figurative or ornamental language is produced. As Robert Marsh remarks in his study of the Observations as dialectic,"'analogy' and 'association' are sometimes interchangeable expressions."[17] An example appears in Proposition 28 of Part II:

> Association,i.e. Analogy, perfect and imperfect, is the only Foundation upon which we in fact do, or can, or ought to assent; and consequently a Dissonance from Analogy, or a Repugnancy thereto, is a necessary Foundation for Dissent.

It is clear throughout that Hartley's entire theory of association depended to a great extent on his proving, not only that it was scientifically regulated, but also that it

represented a kind of analogy which, contrary to Hume and others, was distinguishable from simile and metaphor, and was more a source of clear and distinct truth than a means of either decorating or confusing truth and fallacy. To accomplish this task, he sought to redefine the term "analogy," altering the explanations of Hobbes and Locke, and to reinterpret the relationship between figurative language and analogy as one of subordination rather than equality. Partly, this prospective change in their connection rested on the fact that analogizing as opposed to imagining was a function of Reason:

> ...things are said to be analogous to one another, in the strict mathematical Sense of the Word Analogy, when the corresponding Parts are all in the same Ratio to each other. Thus if the several Parts of the Body in different Persons be supposed exactly proportional to the whole Bodies, they might be said to be analogous in the original mathematical Sense of that Word. But as this restrained Sense is not applicable to Things, as they really exist, another of a more enlarged and practical Nature has been adopted....Analogy is that Resemblance, and in some cases Sameness, of the Parts, Properties, Functions, Uses, etc. any or all, of A to B, whereby our Knowledge concerning A, and the Language expressing this Knowledge, may be applied in the Whole, or in Part, to B, without any...important practical Error....Analogies in this sense of the Word...present themselves to us everywhere in natural and artifical Things; and thus whole Groups of figurative Phrases, which seem at first only to answer the Purposes of Convenience in affording Names for new Objects, and of pleasing the Fancy...pass into analogical Reasoning, and become a Guide in the search after Truth, and an Evidence for it in some degree. (I, 82)

Figurative language, when properly used, is an artificial analogy that supports the natural analogy from which it is derived. If the original basis for the connection is a true one, then the figure enhances the original truth and increases its appeal. But Hartley's is also a "wary reasoning by analogy," since he recognizes that given human fallability, a very opposite result is also possible:

> Similes, Fables, Parables, Allegories, etc. are all Instances of natural Analogies improved and set off by Art, and they have this in common to them all, that the Properties, Beauties, Perfections, Desires, or Defects and Aversions, which adhere by Association to the Simile, Parable, or Emblem of any Kind, are insensibly...transferred upon the Thing represented. Hence the Passions are moved to Good or to Evil, Speculation is turned into Practice, and either some important Truth felt and realized, or some Error and Vice gilded over and recommended. (I, 82)

Hartley was far from giving free licence to the poetic imagination, even if its inventions could be based on reasonable analogies traceable to the laws of nature. But in his revaluation of the relationship between natural analogy and figurative language he did suggest a principle of creativity and artistic organization by which reason and imagination might be combined to the advantage of both. The effect of this and other distinctions between analogy and figure in the philosophy and theology of the age on how eighteenth-century literature was composed and on the formulative principles which lay behind it was considerable.

While Hobbes' way of analogizing was founded on the assumption that every human mind works in exactly the same way on exactly the same materials, Hartley's system allowed for a degree of individuality which might not prevent or even distort the disclosure of elemental truths. His allowance for subjectivity was the analogy of cause and effect applied to human behavior patterns:

> There are sufficient sources for all those Pleasures of Imagination, which the Beauties of Nature excite in different Persons; and the Differences which are found in different Persons in this respect, are sufficently analogous to the differences of their Situations in Life, and of the consequent Associations formed in them. (IV,i,94)

But despite these associational differences, by the observation of which Hartley identifies himself as an early environmental psychologist, the decisive conclusions drawn from them are the same. All of these Pleasures "are a principle Source of those which are annexed to the View of Uniformity with Variety...i.e. of Analogies of various Orders; and consequently are a principle Incitement to our tracing out real Analogies, and forming artificial ones" (IV,i). The ultimate end of all analogizing is the recognition of uniformity amid variety, similarity complemented by difference, as a universal principle, and, to Hartley, as the grand analogy itself. His identification of analogy with a particular structuring of likeness <u>vis à vis</u> unlikeness is

significant for the literature of the period, particularly as it manifests itself in eighteenth-century aesthetics.

There were numerous other philospohical projections from 1750 up until and beyond the initial publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1782. All were in some way a reaction to the mechanism exemplified by Hobbes, on the one hand, and the skepticism of Hume, on the other. Most were an attempt to steer somewhere in-between, usually by means of some form of analogical reasoning akin to Hartley's or to Locke's. A partial exception is the work of Thomas Reid,[18] who had more faith in what could be learned from "accurate reflections upon the operations of our own minds" (I,4) than Hume; but had even less faith than his theoretical adversary in the making of analogies as an approach to truth. As opposed to Hartley, he maintained that "all arguments drawn from analogy are still the weaker, the greater disparity there is between the things compared; and therefore must be weakest of all when we compare body with mind, because there are no two things in nature more unlike" (I,4). His example shows that he also did not recognize Hartley's distinction between analogy and figure, and was perhaps more in sympathy with Hume than he would have liked to admit:

> ...i.e. the analogy between a balance and a man deliberating, tho' one of the strongest that can be found between matter

> and mind, is too weak to support any argument. A piece of dead inactive matter and an active intelligent being are things very unlike; and, because the one would remain at rest in a certain case, it does not follow that the other would be inactive in a case somewhat similar. (I,4)

Also like Hume, however, Reid was unable to describe his own avenue to knowledge, introspection, without himself resorting to analogy:

> The difference between consciousness and reflection is like to the difference between a superficial view of an object which presents itself to the eye while we are engaged about something else, and that attentive examination which we give to an object when we are wholly employed in surveying it. (I,4)

Throughout eighteenth-century philosophy there is this more or less intrusive, more or less conscious paradox: that analogy is not entirely trustworthy, and yet, that given the concept of human understanding which man derives from experience, he cannot really know anything without somehow relying on it. In the theory and practice of eighteenth-century literature the dilemma and resulting struggle to cope with it are roughly parallel.

A solution similar to the positive and far-sighted approach of Hartley also appears in George Campbell's theory of rhetoric. A major source for most rhetorical studies appearing in the first half of the Eighteenth Century, Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria[19] is concerned with

analogy primarily as a means of determining the rules of language or of the outward signs of things. According to Quintilian, analogy is the "chief support of reason" and the "proof of the uncertain by reference to the certain" (I,vi). As a means of building an orator's vocabulary,

> ...analogy was not sent down from heaven at the creation of mankind to frame the rules of language, but was discovered after they began to speak and to note the terminations of words used in speech. It is therefore based not on reason, but on example, nor is it a law of language, but rather a practice which is observed, being in fact the offspring of usage. (I, vi)

George Campbell, on the other hand, seeks to establish a philosophy of rhetoric based on a direct cause and effect analogy between the art of rhetoric and the science of human nature.[20] Like Hume, he argues that the ideas of the imagination lose the natural vivacity of the original perception. Unlike Hume, he suggests a remedy: "Resemblance, contiguity, causation and other relations among ideas can become circuits through which vivacity transfers from an already lively idea to a languid one" (p.xxv). Here again an eighteenth-century philosopher presents the process of analogy as a reasonable foundation for simile and metaphor. Significant historically is the new measure for this connection: not resemblance between natural and artificial analogies, but that between the reactions to both

in the minds of the observers. As the Eighteenth Century moves along, analogy is continually adapted to the increasing importance of the individual mind and its inner workings; but not until the Nineteenth Century does it cease entirely to be a compensation for subjectivity and become a means of purposely intensifying what is different and unique.

Campbell's analogies between the philosophy of rhetoric and the science of human nature, like those of Hartley between the doctrine of association and doctrine of vibrations, is a broad application of the Newtonian method of discovery. Hartley proposed a similar method to the writers of literature, and Campbell recommends it also to their critics:

> ...In composition the first attempts would be in the art and...afterwards from the comparison of different attempts with one another...would arise gradually rules of criticism....
>
> ...From observing similar but different attempts and experiments, and from comparing their effects, general remarks are made which serve as so many rules for directing future practice; and from comparing such general remarks together, others still more general are deduced. (p.lii)

What emerges from an overall view of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy is the dependence, even on the part of those philosophers who most actively question its ultimate validity, on some form of analogy. For Hobbes, analogy is

a proportional equation by means of which all natural and artificial processes are reduced to one basic substance and its motions; for Locke, it is, first, the type and extent of agreement and disagreement by which the mind connects and contrasts simple ideas and thereby attains true knowledge, and, second, the necessary but not always reliable method of predicting the unknown by comparing it in its capacity as a cuase or an effect to something that is know. For Hume, analogies are formed from habit and caprice, rather than by reasoning, and are therefore inconclusive proofs of causal necessity. They are no more founded on truth than figurative language, and yet they are essential to the skeptic if he is to demonstrate the actual extent to which human understanding is limited. For Hartley analogy is much more. It is the association of ideas and the conception of uniformity amid variety which describes the general structure of the universe as well as of the smaller systems which it incorporates. Perhaps most important, it is the Newtonian method of scientific discovery which is applicable to almost every field of human inquiry, and a way of containing all external processes and phenomena within patterns and laws that are not beyond the boundaries of man's perception. Berkeley, Reid, Campbell, as well as minor philosophers not specifically mentioned here-- all fall somewhere within the range of this spectrum in their interpretation and use of analogy.

This kind of analogy which served as a compensation for, rather than a support of,subjectivity seems to have functioned almost exclusively in the Eighteenth Century. But perhaps the clearest view of its purposes appears in a speech delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society for Rhode Island on September 7, 1831 by Reverend Francis Wayland and entitled "Discourse on the Philosophy of Analogy." Wayland, like Hartley, sees in the Newtonian method, 'in the wide sweep of his far-reaching analogy" (p.17), the key to true knowledge in all areas of intellectual interest. Discovery, he says, be it in science, literature, or religion, is the "observing a particular law in an individual instance, and then by analogy extending the dominion of that law to the infinitely greater instances within the reach of our observation" (p.27). This has been the approach of all the great seventeenth and eighteenth-century "discoverers"-- specifically, Boyle, Pascal, Bacon, Newton. Locke, Milton, and Bishop Butler; and this is the method to be developed into an organized science in the present and utilized as such in the future. Putting into words what the Eighteenth Century tried to put into practice, Wayland declares that through analogy alone man can discover to the full his "own limitations," and that only when these are known, can he fully appreciate,again by analogy, the corresponding "greatness of the Universal Plan" (p.27).

The Nineteenth Century too was attempting to adjust

its religious beliefs to its scientific discoveries, and to find an expression for both in its literature and art. To determine a unifying basis for these different spheres of activity, Wayland was suggesting, the Nineteenth Century should take a lesson from the interdisciplinary analogizing of the Eighteenth:

> The intellectual exertion on which the fine arts depend consists of a combined effort of imagination and taste. How closely connected are the analogies of science with those of imagination will easily be seen. In the analogies of science, we commence with a single cause, and search through out the universe for effects which may be brought under its dominion. In the analogies of the imagination, we commence with an effect, and range throughout all that the mind hath conceived in quest of causes which produce a similar effect. It is thus that we are able to enrobe the deductions of the understanding with aught that creation can present of beauty or of grandeur....
>
> Thus we perceive that the effort of Newton, carrying out by analogy the principle of gravitation to the utmost verge of the material creation, was strikingly analogous to that of Milton in his Allegro or Penseroso, looking through all that the eye hath seen or the heart imagined, in search of images of gaiety or of sadness. (pp.21-2)

It was Wayland's contention that art and science as they operated haphazardly in the Eighteenth Century, and as they should operate deliberately in the Nineteenth, were inextricably united in a parallel search after and expression of uniformity amid variety, mutually pursued via analogies of cause and effect. As Alan D. McKillop has observed, the eighteenth-century artist's conception of his possible

role in a Newtonian universe was much more deliberate than the Reverend Dr. Wayland supposes,[21] and a close examination of individual literary works reveals an analogical approach already consciously operative. We have seen the groundwork develop for this analogical system of literary creation in eighteenth-century philosophy and in the major problems it posed to those who both desired and feared to embrace it. We turn next to a parallel development in the theology of the period and to a consideration of how it too contributed to both the technique and the subject matter of the eighteenth-century writer.

Footnotes

[1]Marjorie Nicolson, The Breaking of the Circle (New York, 1962), p. 177.

[2]Ibid., p. 188.

[3]John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690 New York, 1959), vol. II, Bk. IV, ch. I.

[4]Ibid., ch. V.

[5]Ibid., ch. XVII.

[6]Ibid., ch. I.

[7]Ibid., ch. II.

[8]Thomas Hobbes, "The Elements of Philosophy," The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. William Molesworth (London, 1839).

[9]_____, "Leviathan," English Works..., ed. Molesworth (London, 1839).

[10]Henry M. Rosenthal, "Introduction to Berkeley," Foundations of Western Thought (New York, 1962), pp. 524-5.

[11]Sir Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1876), I, 46.

[12]David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), ed. A.D. Lindsay (London, 1964), I, 4.

[13]Locke, Bk. IV, ch. II.

[14]David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748," The Philosophical Works, ed. Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose (Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964), vol. 4.

[15]Norman Maclean, "From Action to Image," Critics and Criticism, ed. R.S. Crane (Chicago, 1952), 408-460.

[16]David Hartley, Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty and His Expectations (1749), Facsim. reproduction, intro. by Theodore L. Huguelet (Gainesville, Fla., 1966).

[17]Robert Marsh, Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry Chicago, 1965), p. 89.

[18]Thomas Reid, Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man (London, 1785).

[19]Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans.H.E. Butler (London, 1920).

[20]George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), ed. Lloyd Bitzer (Illinois, 1963).

[21]See Alan D. McKillop, The Background of Thomson's "Seasons" (Minneapolis, 1942).

Chapter III Analogy Within Limits: 2) Eighteenth-Century Theology

It is not easy to separate Philosophy and Theology in the Eighteenth Century, because so many of the period's problems were of concern to both. The topic under discussion between Locke and his friends when the germinal idea for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding first occurred to him-- "that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with"-- was the relationship between the "principles of morality and revealed religion."[1] Both the major philosophers and the leading orthodox theologians were trying to counteract the disorienting effects of the new science and deism by discovering and emphasizing the ways in which reason and belief in God were analogous. The major difference between these similar efforts was their goal. The philosophers wished to discover reasonable truth and a reasonable method of attaining it; the theologians to prove that reasonable truth and the accepted doctrines of the Christian religion, particularly of the Anglican Church, were the same.

Ironically, the Deist argument, directed against the Church of England, was in essence the same argument that Chillingsworth, Tillotson, and other Protestant clergymen had used earlier to attack Catholicism and its belief in

miracles. In a sense, the bedrock of English Deism was Tillotson's pronouncement against Rome that "nothing ought to be received as a revelation from God which plainly contradicts the principles of natural religion."[2] The foundation of natural religion was demonstration as opposed to faith. Picking up Locke's definition of knowledge as perceiving the agreement or disagreement of ideas, the deist, Toland, argued that we could only judge of this agreement or disagreement when all the objects being compared were clearly visible. What all men could see and therefore reason about through proportional analogy was alone what all men could believe. To reason via analogy regarding the probability of what could not be personally observed was an emergency measure to be utilized only when demonstration was impossible and some immediate action on the point in question was absolutely necessary.[3]

Recognizing the temper of the times, and, perhaps, being not entirely without their own doubts, the orthodox clergy condoned and even advocated actively the role of reason as a confirmation of religious belief. The clergy viewed natural religion not as a substitute for Christianity, but as a demonstration through analogy that the basic doctrines of the Church were true, or, phrased in the negative analogy adopted by Butler, that there was only as much evidence for their not being true as there was

for drawing the same conclusion about the principles of the Deists. Those aspects of Christianity, such as miracles, revelations, and spiritual beings, which could not be visibly juxtaposed to natural phenomena must be judged reasonable by the type of analogy that Locke had suggested as the only means of expanding our knowledge of the unknown. The major alternative, suggested by some defenders of the faith, was not to presume to judge of these matters at all, but rather to accept them a priori.

Both the deists and the orthodox clergy argued from their concept of limitation. In the deist's view, man was limited to reason, to those things which were universally perceptible and capable of being compared. In the view of Anglican theologians, man was limited by reason. Recognizing through analogy that God was not so limited, he must accept as probable the existence of forms and concepts beyond his understanding, if for no other reason than that it was in his best interests to do so. A counterpoise to both these views and the logical alternative to the rejection of both was skepticism. The skeptic viewed man as limited to and by reason. He could, in fact, he must analogize, but his comparisons were conjectures rather than reasons, so that he could be no more certain about what he reasoned to be so than about

what he believed to be so on faith.

The major eighteenth-century spokesmen for religious faith confirmed and supported by reason were neither absolute middle-of-the-roaders, nor absolute eclectics. It is more accurate to say that they saw in Deism and Skepticism a Scylla and a Charybdis; and that in all they wrote they were charting various courses by which the ship of religion might steer safely past both. They did not entirely achieve their goal, but by their employment and discussion of analogy in the process they contributed significantly to the shaping of English literature in their time.

The same fluctuation between inductive and deductive reasoning which affected the use of analogy from century to century is also operative in the responses of different Christian apologists in the Eighteenth Century. One of the earliest to answer "Mr. Hobbes, Spinoza and their Followers" is the Reverend Samuel Clarke, who was immortalized in Pope's Dunciad as the "clerke who takes the "high Priori Road" (IV, 471).[4] In his series of sixteen sermons delivered in 1704 and 1705 under the sponsorship of the Robert Boyle Lectures (On the Being and Attributes of God, 6th ed., London, 1725) Clarke addresses himself to "speculative" deists or atheists only, and confronts them with a mathematics of pure reason

inspired by Descartes and modified by Locke. His purpose is to prove that even in a well-ordered and preconceived universe there is a "certainty of Liberty as opposed to Necessity and Fate." Here again is the desire to re-establish a freedom within limits, and here also is a new chapter in the literay debate of Necessity versus Free Will. If the universe and everything in it is analogous to a machine, which having been started up continues along its pre-charted path without interruption, then what if any choice has man regarding his role in this process? Free will does exist according to Clarke, because of the reality, independent of experience, of certain unalterable relations among things which, to the extent that he is capable of understanding them, are responsible for the type of behavior whiach man selects to pursue. God perceives all of these relations which make possible a proper balance of good and evil in the universe. When man pursues an improper course through his partial ignorance of these eternal analogies of things, his is an evil of imperfection or a natural evil, neither of which is really evil at all, but rather "the proper attributes or lack of attributes in each of the variety of created species" (pp.99-100). Only when man chooses a wrong path as a result of ignoring what he knows or can know about the connections of things has he committed a moral evil and abused his liberty. To the extent that

they may know them,

> The same necessary and eternal different Relations, that different Things bear one to another; and the same consequent Fitness or Unfitness of the Application of different things or different Relations one to another; with regard to which, the Will of God always necessarily does determine it self, to choose to act only what is agreeable to Justice, Equity, Goodness and Truth, in order to the Welfare of the whole Universe; ought likewise constantly to determine the Wills of all subordinate rational Beings, to govern all Their Actions by the same Rules, for the Good of the Publick, in their respective Stations. That is; these eternal and necessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for Creatures so to act; they cause it to be their Duty, or lay an Obligation upon them, so to do; even separate from the consideration of these Rules being the positive Will orCommand of God. (p.29)

These relations which determine moral behavior are discernible prior to the actual experiencing of them, and to a degree of certainty the equal of those by which we determine "Proportion or Disproportion in Geometry and Arithmetic," "Uniformity or Deformity" in different "figures or Bodies" (p.30).

That God Himself exists, Clarke proves somewhat like Locke from the analogy of cause and effect: "every effect must have a cause; therefore something must have always existed because something cannot come from nothing" (pp.8-9). The cause of evetything else, having existed from Eternity, must be "Self-Existent"; and the certainty of this idea of God is equivalent to the certainty that 2 plus 2 equal 4. To Descartes' cogito ergo sum Clarke adds:

"I think of God as having a certain relation to myself, and therefore He is." The only argument that can be brought against the a priorist's statement that God is a Perfect "Being of Infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth" is, according to Clarke, one "draw...a posteriori, from Experience and Observations of the Unequal Distributions of Providence in the World" (p.109). But it is an erroneous argument and a breach of true liberty because it supposes man capable of perceiving the eternal relations of all things or of having an ability to draw analogies equal to that of the Supreme Being. Instead, man must recognize his relation to God as one of imperfect to Perfect. He can then accept the fact that what seems to him "partial evil" may very well be "Universal Good."

The early eighteenth-century Deists also considered perceiving the realtionships of things and understanding the degree to which human beings could perceive as the basis of knowledge, and consequently, of all religious knowledge. Their foundation,however, was Locke's belief that all perception originated through the senses. An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason (London, 1709) by Anthony Collins is in some sections actually a paraphrase of Locke's Essay, adapted, of course, to the author's own purposes. His main concern is how to evaluate by means of reason the human testimonies on which belief in revealed

religion depends. These testimonies, like other facts, revealed or not, cannot be known as truth without man supposing in himself a "Power...by comparing things with one another, to perceive their relations on such Comparison" (p.10). In testimonies by witnesses of revelations or miracles there are two things to compare. First, what the man has said in this particular case in relation to his character in general and to the language in which he usually speaks and writes; and second, what he has said in relation to our "natural Notions of God" (p.11). Collins quotes Dr. Tillotson for confirmation: "Suppose a Man should bring the highest Testimony imaginable of his Divine Mission, by working of a Miracle for the Confirmation of his Doctrine; yet if there were anything in the Doctrine repugnant to the natural Notions which I have of God, I could not receive it as coming from God;' by a Parity of Reason applicable to any other absurd Doctrine, that confirmed by any Evidence whatever...." (p.11).

The term "Parity of Reason" is significant because a little later in Eighteenth-Century Theology it becomes the equivalent or the antecedent of an analogy; and it is a similar parity of reason or balance which characterizes the eighteenth-century couplet. The deist Collins also shares with his Anglican adversaries as well as with literary critics the concept of similarity amid difference which singularizes eighteenth-century analogy: "A Distinction

supposes some common agreement in the things distinguish'd" (p.20).

The difference between Collins' method of evaluating testimony and that of the Christian apologists appears in the juxtaposition of his Essay and a passage on faith supported by reason from Joseph Addison's "Of the Christian Religion" (1721):

> ...the learned Pagans of antiquity, before they became Christians, were only guided by the common rules of historical faith: that is, they examined the nature of the evidence which was to be met with in common fame, tradition, abd the writings of those persons who related them, together with the number, concurrence, veracity and private character of those persons; and being convinced, upon all accounts, that they had the same reason to believe the history of our Saviour, as that of any other person to which they themselves were not actually eye-witnesses, they were bound by all the rules of historical faith, and of right reason, to give credit to this history.[5]

While Collins advocates comparing the testimony of revealed religion with what we know to be natural, Addison suggests the analogy of cause and effect as a ground for judging the truth and accuracy of Christian doctrine, in this case of the existence and activities of Jesus Christ. The converted Pagans, he argues, drew an analogy between the indirect evidence proferred for belief in Christianity and similar evidence on which they had based their belief in everything else which they did not directly see. Finding a "parity of reason" they assumed that both effects (ie.

testimonies) were equally likely to have a similar cause (ie. that the thing tetified to actually did occur). Addison goes on to suggest that in judging of the truth of Scripture and of the Christian tradition his contemporaries should use an analogous procedure: as eye-witness accounts were to the Pagans, written accounts and tradition should be to the eighteenth-century Englishman. In this way "historical faith" is supported and confirmed by "right reason."

Directly parallel to the use of historical analogies to validate the principles of Christianity is the continual reference to the Ancients and their rules and practices as a basis for contemporary procedure in eighteenth-century literature and criticism. Deists like Collins and those eighteenth-cenutry writers called "Moderns" share in common a belief that only what they themselves can observe and compare has any validity. The observations of the past may or may not be the same as their own, but sameness or historical analogy alone is not sufficient to decide truth or determine behavior in the present or future. On the contrary, Collins in his Discourse on Free-Thinking (1713) expresses the general belief of the Moderns that it is a reasoning man's duty never to accept inherited opinions, and Jonathan Swift in an ironic spoof of the Discourse exaggerates this principle to the utmost extreme

by suggesting that there is a close analogy between the degree to which a thought differs from the view generally accepted and its proximity to real truth. In accordance with this topsy-turvy reasoning, the more it diverges from general knowledge, the more likely is an original idea to be correct.[6]

Like the methods of analogizing advocated by eighteenth-century philosophers, those introduced by the deists and the orthodox theologians all shared the same danger. While each, when properly or restrictively used, was a means of attaining some degree of truth, each, when in any way extended or abused, was equally capable of inconclusive ambiguity or outright distortion. The question throughout was how to cure the disease (ie. ignorance) without also harming the patient in some other way. While Collins avoided the reductivism of Hobbes by not insisting on the absolute identity of matter and spirit and of past, present and future, his system was potentially reductive in other ways. He sought to do away with abstraction and paradox by carrying further an idea already suggested by Locke. All abstract concepts, such as "infinity," ought "like other words in our Language, to have a determin'd Idea fix'd to it when used in a Proposition and not stand for anything existing, any farther than it has a conformity to our Idea;...the term Infinity should stand for an Idea,which we can as well comprehend as the number Three, or the colour Red" (p.33). By reducing all

abstract terms to a precise definition the reasoner could engage them in the same types of proportional analogies and equations which were used to understand the relationships of observable numbers and figures. This would put everything within the realm of reason grounded on experience and consequently within the reach of human understanding. Obviously, however, it would eliminate the positive as well as the negative aspects of mystery, and could easily oversimplify life to the point of absurdity. This type of knowledge could only be achieved at the cost of decreasing the importance of that which man sought to know.

The cooperation of reason and faith which Christian theologians espoused as a corrective to this kind of reductivisim and their opinion of its freethinking proponents is amusingly but instructively illustrated in an essay by George Berkeley (The Guardian, II,70, June 1, 1713) entitled "Analogy between St. Paul's and the Christian Church." Berkely, in describing his thoughts on passing St. Paul's Cathedral one day, again emphasizes the relationship of man and God as one who sees a part opposed to One who sees the whole. The freethinker, taking this part for the whole, sees everything as relatively small and is himself tiny. The Christian, viewing the wonders of the paet as a promise of even greater wonders "beyond this short span of duration" in the whole sees the "greatness of things" and feels himself greater in that he

can, even through his limited knowledge, in some sense "assimilate" himself with the Deity:

> the divine order and oeconomy of the one seemed to be emblematically set forth by the just, plain, and majestic architecture of the other. And as the one consists of a great variety of parts united in the same regular design, according to the truest art, and most exact proportion; so the other contains a decent subordination of members, various sacred institutions, sublime doctrines, and solid precepts of morality digested to the same design, and woth an admirable concurrence tending to one view, the happiness and exaltation of human nature.
>
> In the midst of my contemplation, I beheld a fly upon one of the pillars; and it...came into my head, that this same fly was a freethinker. For it required some comprehension in the eye of the spectator, to take in at one view the various parts of the building, in order to observe their symmetry and design. But to the fly, whose prospect was confined to a little part of one of the stones of a single pillar, the joint beauty of the whole, of the distinct use of its parts were inconspicuous, and nothing could appear but small inequalities in the surface of the hewn stone, which seemed so many deformed rocks and precipices.

Smallness of mind both in freethinkers and in "modern" writers is frequently depicted via an analogy with insects, which also emphasizes the interdisciplinary connection between the two.

Another important eighteenth-century analogy which is of equal weight in theological comparisons of nature and religion and in literature is that based on the principle of gravitation. Both Pope in the Dunciad and Cowper in The Task make imaginative use of this scientific discovery, and were certsinly aware of its frequent appearance in the religious and philosophical works of the time. The basic idea behind

this analogy was the popular belief expressed poetically in Blackmore's Creation and later in the poetry of Thomson, that the beauties and intricacies of Creation are a proof of the Creator and of His Infinite Wisdom, even in those things not visible. Observing the precision and delicacy, order and balance in the perceivable world, we are able to believe by analogy in an equally efficient system operating in the spiritual and moral world. As George Cheyne expresses it in The Philosophical Principles of Religion (London, 1715):

> God had most certainly implanted something Analogous to Attraction, in the greatest Central Body of each System toward the lesser ones of the same: Or, a Principle of Gravitation in these lesser ones towards the greatest Central one, and towards each other. From hence and from their directly impress'd Motions, all their comely, regular and uniform Revolutions, Appearances and Actions upon one another Spring....Something Analogous to this is the Spring and First Mover...of all the noble and regular Actions of Spiritual Beings. (pp.46-7)

Cheyne concludes from the observance of these and other relationships that

> This ANALOGY OF THINGS duly instituted is as certain a Demonstration of the Existence and Wisdom of the Author of these Things, and of the Contriver of this Analogy, as also of the true Nature and Qualities of these Things discovered by this Analogy, as any Mathematical Demonstration, is of the Proposition proposed. (p.39)

Cheyne and others saw in analogy a proof of God's existence

and of the nature of God's creations as certain as anything contrived by Euclid. And what is more, these analogies were not merely figures invented by man, but copies of those natural relationships produced by the original "Contriver" of Analogy-- God.

The defenders of Christianity, however, were put upon to prove a much more difficult point than the mere fact that God as conceived of by the Anglican Church really existed. Assuming that the God of the Bible does exist, countered their freethinking adversaries, how can He be the true God and still allow so much evil in the world? Like every age reshaping its concept of its physical and spiritual surroundings in accordance with contemporary science, the Eighteenth Century had to find some appropriate place in the system for that part of it which to all appearances was the opposite of good. For those theologians who wished to incorporate Locke's basic premises into their reasonable versions of Chrisitianity Samuel Clarke's explanation of evil as a result of man's attempting to reason a posteriori on the basis of inadequate experience was unsatisfactory. Once again they turned to analogy.

In his Boyle lectures, entitled An Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Evil (London, 1720), John Clarke argued analogically that in fact both the a priori and the a posteriori method, also known respectively as synthesis and analysis, were equally valid, and were essentially

interchangeable parts of the same analogy of cause and effect:

> Reasoning a priori is in it self as strong and conclusive as that a posteriori, and they have a strict Connexion with each other; for by the Observation of the Facts we get an Idea of the Cause, and from the Nature of the Cause we judge concerning the Facts. (p.34)

John Clarke agrees with Samuel Clarke that we see a part and not the whole, but reasons, unlike him, that we can judge on the basis of that part the total good of the entire plan. He calls his method "Parity of Reasoning," but it is clear from his description and application of it that parity of reason is the equivalent of analogy:

> For upon the most exact Inquiry, according to the nicest Observation, and strictest Rules of Reasoning; every Particular, which we have any Means of knowing the Circumstances of, is demonstrably made the most useful and serviceable, that the Nature of Things is capable of; and we ought by Parity of Reason to conclude the same of those Things which we have not had the Opportunity or Means of coming to so thorough a Knowledge of. (Preface)

Clarke denies the solution of a place for evil in the Christian world which posits two separate Infinite Beings--Absolute Good and Absolute Evil and their two respective causes. Instead, he re-defines "good" as anything "fit for the End and Purpose, for which it was designed" (pp.67-8). Out of this definition and his concept of the cause and

effect analogy in which the inductive and deductive methods of reasoning both participate evolves the following "general Rule":

> ...everything which exists, was created for some End and Purpose;...it is regulated by some Law or endued with some Faculty in its own Nature most proper and conducive to attain that particular End and Purpose; This we come to the knowledge of, by Experience and Observation and by an Induction of Particulars:...to make Observations in all the Instances where we have Means of doing it, and, where the Analogy is the same, to apply it to those Things that we cannot come at; and then by abstracting, form a general Rule a priori, from which we may safely agree afterwards. (p.209)

John Clarke concludes that all partial evil is universal good, but shows that through analogical reasoning this conclusion is not one which man must accept merely on faith or from a knowledge of his own inadequacy as an observer of relations.

Again, in this line of analogizing lay the danger of over-presumption. Clarke did not suggest that his method would allow man to see beyond apparent imperfection, but merely to be more firmly supported in his belief that there was something beyond it. This would forestall the kind of criticism which Clarke employs a deist analogy to illustrate and condemn:

> As in a clock or a Watch; He who should go about to condemn the Shape or Use of any particular Wheel, the situation or Design of which was not at all understood by him; it

> would but discover his own Ignorance,
> and not at all reflect upon the Workman. (p.61)

This method of turning the opponent's own analogies against him was a popular one in eighteenth-century literature as well as theology.

The best known of the justification-of-evil tracts is the translation by Edmund Law of William King, Archbishop of Dublin's De Origini Mali (London, 1732). There are really two separate approaches revealed in this edition: that of King's essay, first published in 1702, and that of the Preface, Remarks, and Notes of the translator, first printed in 1732. It is essential not to confuse the two, since on some points they are diametrically opposed, and since they represent the formal beginning of a controversy directly affecting the world of letters.

William King's concept of the place of evil in a Christian universe is practically that of Samuel Clarke:

> If we could compare the Good things with the Evil; if we could view the whole Workmanship of God; if we thoro'ly understood the Connections, Subordinations, and mutual Relations of things, the mutual assistance which they afford each other; and lastly, the whole series and order of them; it would appear that the World is as well as it could possibly be.... (p.219)

Since we cannot see the whole moral scheme, we can only suppose it is so by analogy with nature. In Edmund Law's words, King

> shews the unavoidableness and absolute necessity of contrary Motions in Matter, for the same Reasons that it had any Motion at all, and consequently of Attrition, Corruption and Dissolution, and all Natural Evils that attend them. In the next place, from the Nature of a Self-moving Principle, and the manner of the Operation, he deduces all the Irregularities incident to Volition, and the Actions consequent thereupon. (p. x)

Significantly, King places much greater emphasis than Samuel Clarke on partial knowledge being a direct result of the frequent divergencies between the essence of Things and their outward Signs. Reliance on Particulars can be misleading because

> certain Characters denote, not so much the Nature, as the Uses and Differences of things. Now since things being different internally, have sometimes the same external Marks, we must of necessity be often doubtful and sometimes deciev'd by the similitude of the Marks. (p.207)

In terms of literary creation it would follow that the outward appearance of things being often suggestive of similarities not confirmed by the essence of those things, the literary figures which are derived from these outwardly apparent resemblances, regardless of how accurately they are copied, may have no actual agreement with the true nature of the object or idea they are designed to represent. This brings us back to the Lockean supposition of primary and secondary qualties. The colors of rhetoric and of poetry develop from the most part from the artist's observation

and imitation of secondary qualities. If these qualities are not inherent properties of the objects in question, what can they or the similarities and metaphors based on them really tell us that can be considered certain?

The problem in theology centers on the nature and usefulness of the Divine Analogy; and here is where William King and his translator, Edmund Law, part company. Despite his emphasis on human limitations and error, King does not agree with the statement by Cotta in Cicero's De Natura Deorum that "just as a physician should not give a patient wine for medicinal purposes,if he knows he will misuse it, so God should not have given man reason, when He knew he would misuse it" (p.480). This analogy, writes King, is "very improperly made between things...disparate." Instead,

> Reason ought to be compared to Life, and natural Evils to the Distemper. If then God were to take away Reason lest men should use it amiss, he would be like a Man that kills his son for fear he should be sick. (p. 481)

King recognizes man as a prisoner of the senses, but argues that the ideas a man forms from his sensual impressions are "images of the supposed Essences of things" (p. 8). Although they are in reality only "Marks, Characters or Analogies" some of which may not correspond to God's direct perception of Essences, we cannot function

as reasonable beings at all. unless we proceed on the assumption that they are at least in part correct. He sees the reasoning process as a supposition and comparison of essences based on an analogy which, as opposed to figurative language, conceives a real relationship bwteen two beings, man and God, who are, nevertheless, different in kind as wellas in degree. The implications of analogy understood in this manner are clearest in an essay appended to the Origine Mali, entitled "Divine Predestination and Foreknowledge, consistent with the Freedom of Man's Will" (Sermon, May 15, 1709, Christ Church, Dublin, 5th ed.). Like Samuel Clarke, King is attempting to show in the context of the "new science" and in refutation of the Hobbists, that free will is consistent with the Christian understanding of a divinely ordered universe. Unlike Clarke, King relies for his proof entirely on the fact that the divine analogy is a juxta-position of two beings who are simultaneously alike and different. Here is the uniquely eighteenth-century parallel to Boethius:

> ...because we conceive of God's foresight by analogy with human foresight, we sometimes also make the mistake of thinking that God cannot have prescience and at the same time allow free will-- because a man could not both foresee what he must do and make a real choice...but God's Foreknowledge and Predestination are not of the same nature as ours, only analogous and comparable, not of the same kind. (pp.10-11)

Just as the picture of a man and the man himself are not the same, so man, the image of God, and God Himself are also different; although in both cases there is ground for analogy. In King's words: "those who confuse images of Scripture with reality of Deity are like those who think the map on a piece of paper is the same as the actual country it represents" (p.13).

Also in this sermon, King further clarifies the difference in his opinion between Analogy and Figures of Speech:

> ...there is a great difference between the analogical Representations of God, and that which we commonly call Figurative. The common use of Figures is to represent things that are otherwise very well known, in such a manner as may magnifie or lessen, heighten or adorn the Ideas we have of them. And the design of putting them in this foreign Dress, ...is to move our Passions, and ingage our Fancies more effectually than the true and naked view of them is apt to do, or perhaps ought. And from hence it too often happens, that these Figures are employ'd to deceive us, and make us think better or worse of things than they really deserve.
>
> But the Analogies and Similitudes that the holy Scriptures or our own Reason frame of divine Things, are of another nature; the use of them is to give us some Notion of things whereof we have no direct Knowledge, and by that means lead us to Perception of the Nature, or at least some of the Properties and Effects of what our Understanding cannot directly reach....
>
> And whereas in ordinary figurative Representations, the things express'd by the Figure is commonly of much less moment than that to which it is compar'd; in these Analogies the Case is otherwise, and the things represented

> by them, have much more Reality and Perfection in them, than the things by which we represent them.... (p.29)

Any attempt to apply this theological discussion of analogy and metaphor to literay theory and practice must, of course, be guarded. Nevertheless, King does make two important distinctions between these two types of comparison, both of which would recommend analogy as a more reliable and useful literary technique than the misleading ornaments which had dominated the literature of the immediate past. First, he states, that while figurative language merely decorates and distorts that which we already comprehend, analogy makes comprehensible and concrete that which we are otherwise unable to know. This could easily apply to abstract terms such as Art and Nature as to spiritual beings and Christian mysteries. Second, King states that while in figurative language the thing imagined overshadows the thing it is meant to represent, in an analogy just the opposite is true. The thing illustrated is greater and more siginificant than the object used to visibly represent it. Here, potentially, is a concept of imaginative writing which overcomes the submersion of content in form which the Eighteenth Century associated with the metaphysical poets and actively avoided. While there is no absolute proof that Pope read King in this way, it is certain that he and other major eighteenth-century poets were directly

acquainted with this religious controversy, and the emerging analogical approach in many of their works suggests strongly a possible influence.

Edmund Law takes an opposite and more restrictive view of analogy and its position with regard to figurative language. In his "Remarks" on De Origine Mali he claims that the proper analogy is that between things the same in kind, but different in degree. Only an analogy founded on proportion can have a greater certainty than a figure of speech:

> ...analogies between things different in kind, not in degree are like King's conception of Metaphor...,-- 'Our reasonings upon them' would be 'precarious and without any solid foundation in the Nature of things'. (p.89)

When we compare God and man in the divine analogy, we must think of the juxtaposition as one between two beings alike in kind, but different in degree of perfection. The idea that analogy consists of a simultaneous similarity and difference is central to Law's interpretation of King. The subjects of analogy are

> partly the same and partly different, or alike and unlike in different respects...viz, alike in Perfection, or in being Perfections of a certain kind, and unlike in Defect, or imperfection; i.e. as mixed with the contrary Qualities; or the same in Nature and Essence, but different in Degree and the manner of Existence. (p. 92)

According to Edmund Law it is neither necessary nor reasonable to argue as William Law has in the Case of Reason that if two things are alike in their perfections, they must also be alike in their imperfections. It is much more practical for man to "imitate" to the extent that he is capable "perfect or absolute Goodness" when he can see it "partially exhibited in the World," than to suppose it is something " 'transcendently high'...and totally different from any kind of Goodness" of which he can form an idea":

> ...we must not endeavor to conceive the several Attributes of God by substituting something in him of a quite different kind, and totally diverse from that which we find in ourselves...even tho' that could be in some respects similar and analogous to this: But we are to suppose somewhat of the very same kind and sort, the same Qualities and Properties in general to be both in him and us, and then remove all manner of Defect or Imperfection which attends the particular Modus or Degree of their Existence, as they are in us. (p.88)
>
> In like manner we frame a partial conception of a Spirit in general...not by substituting some properties different in kind from those which we perceive in our own Spirit; but by supposing the very same properties, i.e. in kind(viz. Thought and Action) to be also inherent in some other immaterial Beings.... (p.89)

Law's scheme, as opposed to King's, combines the two general eighteenth-century meanings of the term "analogy": proprtion and the conception of the unknown by means of the known. While Law contrasts analogy between things differing only in degree with the less accurate, more

frivolous comparisons that constitute metaphor, in reality, they both share a similar danger. The supposition that the spiritual and the abstract differ only in degree from the human, the material and the concrete is a potentially reductive and misleading as the idea behind metaphor that one term can equally represent two apparently unlike objects or ideas. The problems facing the Anglican theologians in their effort to conceive of God, man, and the external world and those of the eighteenth-century writers endeavoring to represent these concepts artistically become increasingly parallel; and, occasionally, they intersect.

The interconnection is apparent in a summary and revaluation of the analogous-in-kind versus analogous-in-degree controversy by Peter Browne, Bishop of Durham: Things Divine and Supernatural conceiv'd by Analogy with Things Natural and Human (London, 1733). Browne agrees with Law that "what just and sufficient Knowledge we have of God now in this Life, is obtained by Analogy or Similitude with those Perfections we find in ourselves" (p.39). But he emphatically disagrees with Law's description of the way human and divine perfection are analogized. Although he does not specifically name his adversary, clearly the process of abstraction which he defines and refutes is closely parallel to what Law considers analogizing:

> Abstraction is the separating in Thought one thing from another which is not separate from it in Nature; for a more distinct Consideration of the Mind. This hath been a profound Mistake, applyed in Religion to express the manner of our Perception or Apprehension of things Divine and Spiritual; by the Mind's abstracting intirely from all Perception and Conception of things Natural and Human.... (p.106)

Abstraction is exactly what Law is suggesting when he says that in order to conceive of God's perfection, we must compare it with man's perfection imagined as entirely separated from man's imperfections. As Browne demonstrates, this is not analogy, but the very opposite of analogy, since it requires of man the impossible task of imagining himself minus all his "natural Ideas and Conceptions" (p.107), particularly of matter, and consequently, deprived of the very tools necessary for making analogies in the first place. In other words, man cannot conceive of his properties as the same kind with God's because according to natural law they are not the same. They are, however, comparable through similar signification.

The important difference between Law and Browne and the connection they both share with the concerns and the language of literary criticism appear in their varied application of a similar example. If we were to take the idea that God's perfection and man's are unlike in kind, but that we can analogize the two, without having any idea of God and His attributes to its logical extreme, it would

follow, insists Law, that just as the

> Image of your face supposed to be seen in the Glass, is nothing real, solid and substantial contain'd in the Glass itself, but barely an appearance exhibited in the Brain; so all the conceptions which we pretend to have of the Divine Nature and Attributes, are nothing at all in God himself, but mere Phantasms and delusive Images, existing only in our own Mind. (p.92)

This is exactly so, agrees Browne; but understood in its proper context, it is a reassurance rather than an absurd and futile contradiction:

> This is seen then, as the Apostle speaks, Thro' a Glass darkly. As by the help of a Looking-Glass we see the Resemblance only or Similitude of a Man, but nothing of the Substance or Reality of human Nature; so God in his Revelations gives us a view of himself, and of all other divine things which have any Relation to us, in the Mirrour of this World: Which tho' it can afford us no Direct or Immediate Idea of the Real true Nature and Substance of these divine Objects as they are In themselves, yet exhibits to us such a Semblance and Representation of them as serves all the Ends of Morality and Religion in This Life. (pp.58-9)

Browne's theory of analogy is impressively subtle, if not entirely sufficient, and stays a commendable hair's breadth away from a comprimise between things known and unknown being alike either in kind or in degree only. He traces the identification of Analogy with "Parity of Reason" back to Aristotle, adding that "in Strictness and Truth the Parity of Reasoning is rather Built on the Similitude and

Analogy and consequent to them, than the same Thing with them" (p.2). His key definition is as follows:

> ...the Foundation of Analogy is an actual Similitude and a Real Correspondency in the very Nature of Things; which lays a Foundation for a Parity of Reason even between Things different in Nature and Kind: As when God is said to have Knowledge, Power and Goodness. (p.3)

This sounds strangely ambiguous, but only until Browne's distinction between the "very Nature of Things" (ie. their Essence) and "Things different in Nature and Kind" is clearly understood. The idea of knowledge provides an example. Man attains his idea of human knowledge from contemplating the operations of his own mind. Assuming that there is some type of resemblance between Creator and created, he transfers his idea of knowledge in a properly elevated form to God. At no time should he assume that the two types of knowledge are the same in kind, any more than that they are the same in degree. What he does assume as probable is a real proportion or analogy between what exists in his mind and the term "knowledge" by which he signifies it, and what exists in God's Mind of which he has no conception and the similar term, "knowledge," which he uses to signify that:

> ...we do not Take, no nor Borrow or Frame any <u>Ideas</u> or Conceptions of things Supernatural either from those things themselves, or from other Ideas; but we make the <u>Same</u> Ideas or Conceptions which we already have of natural

> and human objects Stand for and Represent correspondent divine and heavenly Objects.
>
> (p.170)

Respecting not only the divine analogy but "Analogy in general" (p.1), this use of the same term to signify two related but not identical concepts accounts for both the similarity and the difference between Analogy and Metaphor:

> METAPHOR in general, is a Substitution of the Idea or Conception of the Thing, with the Term belonging to it, to Stand for another Thing, on Account of an Appearing Similitude only, Without any real Resemblance, and true correspondency between the Things compared; as when the Psalmist describes the Vertue and Fruitfulness of Vallies by Laughing and Singing.
>
> ANALOGY in general is the substituting the Idea or Conception of one Thing to Stand for and Represent another, on Account of a True Resemblance and Correspondent Reality in the very Nature of the Thing Compared.... (p.2)
>
> ...when God is called a Father in respect of Christ, being derived from his very Nature and Essence; both the Word and the Conception are transferred to him by Analogy, founded on the very Nature of God and of Man, thus: What a Father is to his Son begotten in the way of Nature, That God the Father is to Christ who was derived from him by a supernatural Generation. The Application of the same Conception and Word Son to both is not Arbitrary; but founded on a real Correspondency Antecedent to any Operation of our Mind upon it. (p.4)

Browne, of course, is primarily concerned with the religious implications[7] of these distinctions and never directly applies them to literary matters. They bear an interesting, though not exact resemblance, however, to the defintions of "Analogy" and "Metaphor" that appear in Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language(London, 1755).

In a detailed listing of definitions and examples of "analogy" which takes up even more space in the Dictionary than he devotes to the word "Imagination," Johnson offers this variant interpretation of the word "analogical":

> When a word, which originally signifies any particular idea or object is attributed to several other objects, not by way of resemblance, but on the account of some evident reference to the original idea, this is peculiarly called an analogical word; so a sound or healthy pulse, or sound digestion, sound sleep, are so called, with reference to a sound and healthy constitution; but if you speak of sound doctrine or sound speech, this is by way of resemblance to health, and the words are metaphorical.

And under "metaphor" he writes:

> The application of a word to an use to which in its original import, it cannot be put: as, he bridles his anger...the spring awakes the flowers....

The implication is that an analogical adjective is a term used to convey the same meaning when applied to two different nouns. The metaphor, however, is a term which when transferred to a different situation, takes on a different but in some ways comparable meaning. The opposition of "some evident reference to the original idea" and "by way of resemblance" is roughly parallel to Browne's distinction between "real resemblance" and "apparent similitude." Although the example of an analogy between a sound pulse and a sound constitution is extremely

conservative, it does represent a proportion of part to whole not unlike that of the Father/Son analogy Browne uses. The point is not that Johnson's Dictionary was the bible of eighteenth-century literary theory, nor that he was directly influenced by Browne, but simply that the various ways of conceiving analogy, particularly as a valid means of comparison less fanciful than metaphor, were in the air and not by any means confined to the cloister.

Even Browne, while he does not engage in literary debate per se, does at one point in his discussion give strong support to artistic imitation, by clearly associating it with the analogy based on real resemblance of which he speaks. Rejecting the idea that the attributes of man and God are the same in kind rather than co-sharers in a "Correspondent Reality," he simultaneously denounces the macrocosm-microcosm analogy which dominated literature well into the Seventeenth Century and suggests that Eighteenth-Century imitation, if less transcendent, is also closer to truth:

> To bear a Similitude only, and Correspondency to the divine Perfection; is a thing directly contrary to the having a sameness of Kind or Identity of Nature with him, in any the least Degree. They differ as much as a Picture or Image doth from a Child, with respect to a grown Man; the first is a Representation only or a Similitude of the Man, the latter is of the same Nature or Kind in Miniature.... (p.148)
>
> ...if we have any one, even Moral Attribute of God in Kind, we must have his Kind of Will, and consequently his Essence, and be no other

than Gods in miniature. (p.155)

For the eighteenth-century theologian and the eighteenth-century writer, of course, men are not "Gods in miniature," but if analogy as Browne claims does constitute a real resemblance, and if literary imitation is the equivalent of this analogy, then man is capable of knowing and of artistically expressing a certain degree of truth. That such was the eighteenth-century writer's belief subsequent chapters on literary criticism and individual works of art will bear out. It is already clear that Browne strongly objected to Locke's "pernicious Insinuation" (p.130) regarding the Great Chain of Being, that "the Difference between the highest created Intelligence and the Creator himself, is as insensible as that between Man and Brute, and that there is the same close Connexion between them" (p.20). To him this was as dangerous as the "Atheistical Hypothesis of Spinoza," who "Consider'd the universal System of things, as a kind of a Huge-Brute-Animal" (p.126). In consequence, Browne's theory of analogy was a conscious attempt to remove the stigma of material reductivism from the analogical approach to knowledge, while at the same time removing the aura of spiritual mysticism from religious knowledge. Potentially, it offered the same happy solution to the discovery and depiction of truth in general.

It is not at all surprising, however, that the potential of a system too intricate to be correctly discerned by many, and too self-contradicting to be unquestioningly accepted by those who did comprehend it, was never fully realized. Among the first to misinterpret, or at least, underestimate Browne's meaning, and perhaps the only one to devote a full-size pamphlet to demonstrating his insufficient absorption was John Jackson. In his Answer...to Things Divine and Supernatural... (London, 1733), Jackson counters that "Analogy being nothing but Proportion and Parity of Reason must belong to Things of the same kind" (p.26), and that an analogy of things "so disparate and totally different in Kind, as that from one we can form no Ideas of the other" is "such an Analogy...as never enter'd into any but a distorted Scholastic Head" (p.27). He provides his own example of a correct Analogy:

> ...from a Circle of any given Diameter we can by Analogy form an Idea of, and reason about a Circle of any other given Diameter, and so prove the Analogy or Proportion between a Circle of a Mile Diameter, without supposing the Form of a Circle, to be different in Kind which is impossible. (p.27)

It was a similarly simple-minded, belittlingly mathematical approach to the grandeur and complexity of God's creations that the major satirists of the period were continually attacking. Jackson's example of being able to make predictions about everything circular through analogy with the one circle we do know is aptly comparable

to a typically Swiftian passage in Book III of Gulliver's Travels. There is probably no direct reference to Jackson (Book III is supposed to have been written as early as 1724-25), but rather a coincidental connection through similar imagery. Gulliver is describing the mathematical philosophers of Laputa, who like the over-zealous promoters of the "new science" have managed to reduce life to only those principles which are as indisputably certain as our belief that two and two equals four:

> ...what I chiefly admired, and thought altogether unaccountable,was the strong disposition I observed in them towards news and politics, perpetually enquiring into public affairs, giving their judgments in matters of state, and passionately disputing every inch of a party opinion. I have indeed observed the same disposition among most of the mathematicians I have known in Europe, although I could never discover the least analogy between the two sciences; unless those people suppose, that because the smallest circle hath as many degrees as the largest, therefore the regulation and management of the world require no more abilities than the handling and turning of a globe.8

Not Swift alone, but the eighteenth-century satirist in general made ironic use of his persona's analogical way of thinking to reveal by deliberately incorrect analogies the falsehood of the philosophy behind them. Partly along with contemporary theories of knowledge, partly in response to them, analogy in literature became a way of exposing deception and error, and so, an indirect as well as direct method for discerning truth.

Until the publication of Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durham's Analogy of Religion (1736), theological tracts on the subject concentrated on showing by analogy that the methods of reason used in support of Natural Religion could with equivalent validity be applied as proof of Revealed Religion. But whether resemblance between God and man and between the moral world and the natural was argued on the grounds of kind or of degree, deists and freethinkers still responded with thought-provoking objections that remained unanswered.[9] Suppose, however, that these objections against Christianity could be demonstrated by analogy to bear as great a resemblance to the doubts concerning natural religion as had been suggested to exist between both their certainties? This was Bishop Butler's aim: to establish a direct analogy between the doubts surrounding the two systems equal to that of the proportion between their proofs:

> ...this treatise aims to show that the several parts principally objected against in this moral and Christian dispensation including its scheme, its publication and the proof which God has afforded us if its truth; that the particular parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation are analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and course of nature, or providence; that the chief objections themselves, which are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact to be inconclusive--and that this argument from analogy is in general unanswerable.... (p.9)[10]

Nevetheless, even a negative analogy between things visible and things invisible had to have as its ground some acceptable

reason for making the comparison in the first place. The basis that Butler offered was the doctrine of probability. Branching off from Locke, he defined probability as related to demonstrated certainty, but distinguished from it by "admitting of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty to the very lowest presumption" (p.1). The more points of similarity that could be discovered between two objects, ideas or patterns of events, the one having been, the other supposed about to be, the more positive the probability.[11] To a greater extent than is often noted, Butler's approach was an application to theological matters of the procedure for scientific proofs recommended by Bacon. Both, in fact, had a similar final aim. Bacon wished to discover the laws of nature by which all knowledge could be pursued and regulated; and Butler, as Anders Jeffner observes (pp.71-2), to discover that nature and revelation are governed by such a set of laws, and that the laws of both as well as the derivations from them are analogous.

The laws governing our movement through the various stages of human life, for example, are parallel to those regarding our spiritual progress from finite to infinite:

> ...our being placed in a state of discipline throughout this life, for another world, is a providential disposition of things, exactly of the same kind as our being placed in a state of discipline during childhood for mature age. Our condition in both respects

> is uniform and of a piece, comprehended under one and the same general law of nature. (p.77)

Likewise, the system of rewards and punishments which operates in our present state is an indication of a similar system with regard to our future state. And just as in this world we often pay for the "sins of our youth" in our "dotage," so in reference to a future life "delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of presumption if final impunity" (p.34). Further, that "state of trial" during which we "prudently" value our "temporal interest" above "present gratification" is parallel to the one in which we "virtuously" forgo the joys of the moment in favor of our "future" interest: "Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal and our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes and have the same effect upon men's behaviour, are evidently analgous and of the same kind" (p.65).

Not only is the analogy of cause and effect probable evidence for a probable connection between the laws of nature and of revelation, but also the different ways in which these and other parallels are made known to us are significant in determining their accuracy:

> By reason is revealed the relation which God the Father stands in to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In Scripture are revealed the relations which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty

> which we are under to them....the obligation we are under, of paying these religious regards to these divine persons respectively, arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us. How these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration in the case; because the duties arise out of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed of them. (p. 127)

Having reasserted in his own manner arguments already proffered for an analogy between natural and Christian laws, Butler next concedes that Christian miracles cannot be reasonably explained in terms of known natural laws. Their justification is that they are as conformable to the overall Spiritual plan of the Divinity as are those deviations from the norm of Nature to His physical plan:

> Miracles must not be compared to common natural events which...are similar to what we daily experience, but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature; then the comparison will be between presumption against miracles, and presumption against such uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electiricity, so contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these powers. (pp.140-41)

According to Butler, it is this analogy which teaches us that in God's natural as in His spiritual design it is but a part we see and not the whole:

> Now that which affords a sufficient answer to objections against the wisdom, justice and goodness of the constitution of Nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or scheme imperfectly comprehended; a scheme in which means

> are made use of to accomplish ends, and which is carried on by general laws; for from these things it has been proven not only to be possible, but also to be credible, that those things which are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness; nay, may be instances of them; and even that the constitution and government of Nature may be perfection in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be a scheme, and of the like kind, it is evident that like objections against it must admit of the like answer. (p.156)

Analogy, then, is the means by which our limited capacity--seeing but a part-- is clearly recognized and also the instrument of probability by which we reason from a part to the whole.

Analogy so conceived,as the hand maid of probability, is also a major organizing factor and central device in eighteenth-century poetry, and especially, eighteenth-century satire. "When we determine a thing to be probably true," writes Butler, "suppose that an event has come to pass, it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some other event,which we have observed has come to pass" (p. 4). It is exactly the same method of reasoning that gives rise to Pope's Dunciad where the analogy between the dunces and Satan's devils assures the satirist that Eden and Eighteenth-Century London will suffer the same end. Butler himself observes, though not with any specific literary purpose, that there is a close resemblance between the analogical reasoning that gives religious prophecy validity and the similar mode of conception that gives credibility to satire:

> Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great resemblance to prophecy,...: the mythological and the satirical, when the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed. And a man might be assured, that he understood what an author intended by a fable or parable, related without any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully assured, that such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing, merely from its being applicable to them. ...his satisfaction, that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning of these writings, would be greater or less in proportion as he saw the general turn of them to be capable of such application; and in proportion to the number of particular things capable of it. (p.212-13)

Furthermore, the so-often-discussed attempt of eighteenth-century satirists, particularly Pope, to represent themselves as "l'honnete homme," the respectable and reliable observer and commentator, may very well correspond to the belief of Butler and others that "nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof of probability that persons are not competent judges of the facts" (p.210). Whether the satirist's persona is a naive, misinformed blunderer or a man of reason and integrity, the way in which he serves his literary purpose is the same. In both cases the reader is to compare the man with what he says and does. A similar type of analogy is suggested by Butler in the second dissertation appended to the Analogy entitled "Of the Nature of Virtue." "Our perception of vice and ill desert," he writes, "arises from, and is the

result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent" (p.267). Such an analogy of cause and effect, for example, would pose the question, if a madman, a child and a rational adult each commit the same crime, is each equally culpable? Butler would answer that the deed is relative to the doer.

This use of the negative analogy was a fresh assault on the incorrigible deists, but obviously it was not a panacea. Nevertheless, it had value independent of the immediate controversy, and from the mid-Eighteenth Century until 1870 Butler's Analogy of Religion was a "fixed part of the curriculum, especially at Oxford,"[12] and often a subject on examinations. Clearly, it was familiar to major eighteenth-century writers and might easily have impressed on their minds, consciously or not, what it said as well as what it implied.

In 1750, Richard Barton published his Analogy of Divine Wisdom in the Material, Sensitive, Moral, Civil and Spiritual System of Things (Dublin), which was in part a parochial reaffirmation of Bishop Butler. Like the Analogy of Religion, Barton's essay claimed that the similarity between the laws of nature and the supposed laws of religion confirmed the probability of revealed Chrisitan doctrine:

> We observe all through nature a vicissitude, decay or cessation of natural powers and a restoration of them....Most creatures have alternate times for sleeping and waking, and most countries have change of seasons....The analogy of things teaches us, that the human body shall rise again, and revelation assures us of it. (p.51)

Also like Butler, he tends to assume the negative approach: "For why should not temporal life be eternal life, what the immaturity of temporal life is to the maturity of it?" (p.78).

Both Butler and Barton place themselves among those predecessors who see analogy as a comparison of things alike in kind but different in degree. Butler writes that if we envision our own life with all the impurities removed, we can perceive perfection: "By imagining a society in which there is no vice, you can, based on experience, imagine what after life is like" (pp.56-7). Barton develops this line of thought, suggesting that our belief in Christ's actually sacrificing Himself to save all sinners, even those who betrayed and persecuted Him, is strengthened by our knowledge of analogous acts on the part of human beings, which were similar in kind but different in degree. As a pre-Christian example he gives the stroy of Codrus, the last Athenian king. Hearing that an oracle had told the Dorians they would conquer Athens, <u>unless</u> they killed the king, Codrus disguised

himself as a beggar, so that they killed him unknowingly and lost the war. Barton also cites Romans 5.7-8 in which St. Paul himself makes this analogy:

> For scarcely for a righteous man will one die: yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die.
> But God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.

To form a proportional analogy between man and God, in which the demonstrated action of the one will corroborate the probable actions of the Other, Barton also brings to his aide Butler's analogy between the doer and the deed. One of the major functions of such biblical admonitions as "do unto others as you would have others do unto you" is, according to Barton: "to show the similarity between the divine and human conduct, in such manner, that one may be made use of to explain the other" (p.95). We may judge of a particular human act by what we know to be the general character(morally) or the general style (artistically) of the person performing it. It would be reasonable, for example, to conclude that an otherwise unexplainable act performed by a man known to be ambitious is an ambitious act. And,

> as we thus Judge with great probability of the moral conduct of mankind by analogy, and thereby discover their real designs; so may we also, with great probability judge of the divine will, from that beautiful and copious analogy discoverable in all his works. (p.46)

Ironically, this type of argument by analogy, which boils down to sets of ratios, may also lead to the very over-simplification which theologians wish to prevent. Barton is quick to add that analogies do not "suppose an equality of mind, but a similitude of appearance" (p.116). He continually emphasizes that the differences between the objects, ideas or events compared are as much a part of the relationship as the similarities. Analogy is "that which implieth a likeness between things, so as to be a foundation of parity of reasoning in some cases, together with an unlikeness excluding it in others" (p.38). "All the works of the universe," he adds,

> and the whole system of things, not excluding the first and glorious cause are closely allied by similitude of natures, as well as distinguished by dissimilitudes-- This is the foundation of all reasoning by analogy. (p.40)

With Locke and numerous predecessors he notes disapprovingly the greater aptitude in most people to observe similarities and ignore differences, "one'wit,' the other 'judgment'" (p.41). An example of an "erroneous analogizer" (probably a reference to Hobbes) is one who "conceiving a Likeness between Motion and Thought, between very active subtle matter and a principle of cogitation," will then ask, "whether matter may not think?" (p.43).

It is often apparent that eighteenth-century theologians and philosophers identify all but the most

conservative poetic language and the arguments of free-thinkers and deists as similar failures to give proper weight to difference as well as similarity in the relations of all things. If analogy were nothing more than poetic figure in usefulness and reliability, then Hume would be correct in insisting that reasoning by it is always inconclusive. But analogy to eighteenth-century critics and writers was not just wit or figure but the proper combination of wit and judgment which for them constituted good writing. Barton adds to the important discussions in theological works of the distinction between analogy and metaphor, particularly in his use of Scripture. In one instance, he quotes Luke vi.38:

> Give and it shall be given unto you; good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again.

He then comments that these words are

> a general rule of Analogy between the divine conduct towards man, and the conduct of men towards one another. For the terms, being metaphorical, and meaning, in their natural sense, the known practice of dealing men, in measuring corn,...are in their analogical meaning, equally applicable to all human offices, of a moral nature, between man and man. In proportion to a man's disposition to give to all men, their due of the good things of the world, God will be disposed to give to him spiritual goods.... (p.90)

Barton's own purpose in distinguishing between metaphorical and analogical argument is to secure for analogy greater validity as a way of reasoning. But by suggesting what for different reasons David Hartley also suggested, that metaphor may be an instrument of analogy, or that figurative language and reason can work together to expand and disperse knowledge, he joins his treatise to the many prior and subsequent ones in which this implied approach to artistic conception was readily available.

In the concluding remarks to Barton's point of departure, the Analogy of Religion, Joseph Butler allowed that within the limits of his analogical construct there was a place for skepticism as a kind of precarious balance on the scale of probability:

> ...there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of...Christianity, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state of mind between these two, consists in a serious apprehension, that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it be so. And this...is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid before him.... (p.248)

In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1759)[13], however, David Hume demonstrates that the skeptic can go much farther, especially if he believes that whatever evidence is "laid before him" by analogy must be ever questionable and inconclusive. The principle behind Hume's series of discussions between an a priori theologian, Demea; an

empirical Butlerite., Cleanthes; and a skeptic philosopher, Philo, is the same denial of causal necessity which is central to his philosophical writings. Philo, Hume's spokesman, never denies that the analogy of cause and effect is the best way of speculating available to a finite being. He merely proves by pitting the one type of theologian against the other, and both against the deist, that it is not the way to true knowledge. Both deist and Anglican argue that reason by analogy is our freedom within limits to know the nature of our Creator and the operations of His universe. Their controversy, notes Philo, reduces itself to a dispute over degrees of resemblance between the human and the divine. With this as the only basis of their quarrel, they might well imperceptibly change sides. Theologians who claim that human perfection and divine differ only in magnitude might with little effort reduce the sense of spiritual essence which they are fighting to preserve; while deists and freethinkers, claiming that the Natural rather than the Revealed God is perfect Goodness and Virtue, might just as easily elevate their Grand Machine Maker above the confines of scientific proof.

There is some connection between man's operations and God's, argues Hume,and we may as well recognize it. But we must also recognize that analogy itself is limitation and that it leads nowhere:

> If the whole of natural theology... resolves itself into one simple, tho' somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence-- if the proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication, if it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forebearance, and if the analogy...can be carried no farther than to human intelligence, what can a religious man do but assent to it and 'believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the objections which lie against it?' (XII)

A particular analogy between the known and the unknown, which to Hume is really no different from a rhetorical figure, proves nothing except that it or some equally arbitrary alternative may or may not be correct. As Philo tells Cleanthes, we cannot conclude God to be the cause of the universe in the same way that we can conclude an architect to be the cause of a house: we have experienced a house being made, but we have never been witness to the construction of a universe. Discoveries by microscopes have shown that like effects do not always prove like causes (V). And "if our limited analogy could ever...be extended to the whole of nature" (VI), the evidence would be much stronger for the universe as similar to a human body than to a "human contrivance" (VII). At least, says Philo, this conjecture that the world is like an animal and "arose from generation" has "some faint

shadow of experience," since "Reason, in inumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of generation." The fact is that "our experience, so imperfect in itself and so limited both in extent and duration can afford us no probable conjectures concerning the whole of things" (VII).

The implications for literature of such a view of analogy become even clearer in the comparison Hume makes between man's explanation of the universe in terms of himself and a parallel conjecture by another civilization:

> The Brahmins assert that the world arose from an infinite spider, who spun the whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again and resolving it into his own essence....
> ...were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders (which is very possible), this inference would then appear as natural and irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design and intelligence, as explained by Cleanthes. Why an orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, it will not be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason. (VII)

The image of the spider weaving his web is at least in the first part of the Eighteenth Century a typical poetic representation of the writer who produces all from his own fancy, disregarding tradition and nature, and making himself the measure of all things. Such a practice was anathema to major philosophers and poets both; and of such

analogizing a Pope or a Cowper would want no part. Neither by writers nor thinkers, however, was the kind of destructive skepticism that must naturally follow from this constricting concept of reason immediately advocated. Until the analogy between the act and the doer, the idea and the thinker, slowly emerging in eighteenth-century ethics and aesthetics, could firmly establish a new standard of reference for the determination of truth via analogy, other than the experience of external nature, artists and divines alike were unwilling and unable to accept the fulility to which Hume's evaluation of empirical analogy must lead. As a result, the conflicting views of analogy as a means of defining and expanding human limits on the one hand, and as a limitation in itself, or else, especially in the hand of the deists, an enhancer of presumption and error on the other, continued to flourish in philosophy and religion even beyond the appearance of Immanuel Kant.

Footnotes

[1]Alexander Campbell Frazer, ed., "Introduction," John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I (Oxford, 1894),

[2]Sir Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1876), II, 65.

[3] See John Toland, Christianity Not Mysterious (1696) and Leslie Stephen, I, 89.

[4] See Hoxie N. Fairchild, Religious Trends in English Poetry (New York, 1939), I, 497ff..

[5] In Works (New York, 1853), II, 420.

[6] Jonathan Swift, "Mr. C_____ns's Discourse of Free-Thinking, Put into plain English, by way of Abstract, for the Use of the Poor" (1713), The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, ed. Herbert Davis and Irvin Ehrenpreis (Oxford, 1964), IV, 27-50.

[7] For Aquinas' influence on Browne's view of analogy see Ralph McInerny, Studies in Analogy (The Hague, 1968), pp.82ff..

[8]Jonathan Swift, "Gulliver's Travels" (1726), The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, ed. Herbert Davis and Harold Williams, II.

[9] For a more detailed background see Ernest C. Mossner, Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason (New York, 1936).

[10]All quotations refer to the Mossner edition (New York, 1961).

[11]For a mathematical breakdown and precise analysis of this aspect of Butler see Anders Jeffners, Butler and Hume on Religion (Stockholm, 1966), pp.37-8.

[12] Mossner, "Introduction," to Butler's Analogy, p.x.

[13] David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1759), ed. H.D. Aiken (New York, 1948).

Chapter IV Analogy and the Rules: Eighteenth-Century Literary Criticism and Aesthetics 1

The problem of eighteenth-century philosophers and theologians is how and to what extent man can know truth. Given the possibility of limited but objective knowledge, the problem of the eighteenth-century critic is how the artist can represent that truth in a way both pleasing and instructive. His several attempts to set up rules reveal important changes in perspective which begin along with Neoclassicism and are destined to supercede it. The Longinian Sublime operating over the shoulder of nearly every poet and critic from Dryden on, and the contagious fascination of Descartes and Locke with what is inside the mind make the gradual switch from external to internal nature as the measure of art's validity, in retrospect, inevitable. Eighteenth-century critical theory begins as an attempt to set up laws, classical and rhetorical in origin, which dictate to the artist what he must do to duplicate natural causes and induce natural effects. It becomes a recognition of instinctive guidelines, psychological and mythic in origin, which allow the artist to represent, not the object or the experience, but his own reaction to it, or that of his audience. In time, this reaction replaces external stimulus and emerges as the cause and the effect of the resulting work of art. [1]

In years past, twentieth-century critics considered it especially important to establish this change in emphasis and the poetry written under its influence as the immediate predecessor of Romanticism. More recently, the stress has been on distinguishing the forms these two periods produced and the different modes of thinking that lie behind them. According to scholars like Northrope Frye[2] and Geoffrey Hartman[3] the major distinction between a Warton and a Wordsworth is the difference between analogy and identity or simile and metaphor. In a Romantic poem subject and illustration, tenor and vehicle, merge to form a new whole. In the poetry of sensibility they are kept separate deliberately. Despite very basic differences between the first and the second half of the Eighteenth Century, the literature of both maintains a fundamentally analogical approach.

According to M.H. Abrams, there is a parallel distinction between the critical terminology of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century.[4] Generally speaking, terms used to represent the mind in eighteenth-century criticism portray it as a passive receiver of impressions from independent phenomena, while those in nineteenth-century theory suggest an interaction between perceiver and perceived during which separate identity is obscured. Putting aside the important differences between Seventeenth

and Nineteenth Century Poetry, what separates both from the century between them is their use of the participants in a literary figure to form a new identity, which in the context of the poem takes complete precedence over recognition of similarities and differences between the real and the imagined.

Without exactly saying so, several critics have implied that the simultaneous perception of similarity and difference which we have been referring to as eighteenth-entury analogy is what divides the Sensibility School from the Romantic School.[5] Few have even implied, however, that this way of analogizing is both a major link between the two halves of the Eighteenth Century and a significant gage of their difference. And most important, they have ignored the fact that eighteenth-century analogy provided the necessary re-evaluation of relationships between past and present, between different disciplines, between thought and feeling, reason and imagination, nature and art, object and perceiver, without which literature as an expression of human concern might never have recovered from the disabling shock of reality from the view of science.

These vital functions of analogy provide the framework for the present consideration of Eighteenth Century Literary Criticism and Aesthetics. Because the critical theory of a period is made up of many different

analogies, each is considered in a separate section. Their roughly parallel chronological development will reveal that each is connected to the other by its contribution to a general literary movement with significant implications for the writing of its own as well as future times. The purpose throughout is not to exhaust the possibilities, but rather to suggest them.

a) The Historical Analogy

The historical analogy operated in eighteenth-century criticism and literature as a mode of instruction, as a satirical device (particularly when the analogy was deliberately false), and as a means of adding acclaim to the writing of the present through its close resemblance to what had been considered best in the remote but glorious past. Behind the admonition of eighteenth-century critics to follow the Ancients was the idea that by adapting the rules of classical literature to contemporary efforts English writers could produce poems and plays that would be analogous in quality to those of the Augustans. As Walter Jackson Bate observes, this adaptation of classical guidelines to modern writing as introduced by the French was also appealing because of the opportunity it offered English poets to separate themselves from the giants of the more immediate past, while establishing affinity with more removed and less threatening competitors.[6]

In the early eighteenth-century literary world, either an "ancient" or a "modern" could claim to be another Homer or Horace. The difference was that the one would claim to be so because he paralleled the style and subject matter of his famous predecessor, the other, becuase his own original style and subject matter put him in the same rank among his fellows that Homer or Horace enjoyed among theirs. From this point of view, at least one of Dryden's seeming inconsistencies, his fluctuating between sides in the Ancient/Modern controversy, appears less fickle. Aspects of both approaches offered possible steps toward his main goal: establishing workable standards and unique values for the language and literature of his time. Employing a negative analogy similar in principle and intent to Butler's defense of Christianity, he argues in the "Defense of the Epilogue" (1672) that the petty faults of grammer and phrasing for which critics coneemned his plays were discernible in even greater number in the masterpieces of Shakespeare, Jonson, Beaumont and Fletcher. If these minor imperfections were sufficient cause to chastise the works containing them, then all the great writing of the Sixteenth Century must also be denounced. As an advocate of progress he notes too that the superior cultivation and refinement of his own Age has enabled it to eliminate the flaws of the past and to increase substantially

the vocabulary available to poets.[7]

In the earlier Essay on Dramatic Poetry (1668) the comparison of present literature and that of the more remote past follows a slightly different but not unrelated line of argument. Crites takes the view that classical literature is superior to contemporary English literature because the Greeks discovered the laws of nature and portrayed them according to certain rules of composition which all subsequent writers should follow to produce works of equal quality. Eugenius counters by demonstrating that if these rules, which were later derivations from works of ancient writers, rather than their own points of departure, are actually applied as a test of Greek writers, the Ancients too will often be found wanting. If it be granted, for example, that the three unities must be observed, it can be shown that modern plays observe them better. Even if an analogy is made only on the points of strength that Crites claims for the Ancients, it will be found that the modern writers, like the modern scientists, have outdone their predecessors and progressed beyond them. Crites provides a comprimising solution to the conflict by conceding that if the venerable Ancients had lived in Restoration England, they might have modified their procedures to suit the knowledge and needs of the times; but they are still to be revered for what they did contribute.[8]

This may not be a satisfactory conclusion, but it is

indicative of the essential difference between "Ancients" and "Moderns." Both sides respected Homer and Virgil; both sides produced translations of them and acknowledged their beauties. Both saw an analogy between their literature and Augustan writing which was based on similarity and difference. The Ancients, however, stressed the similarity, the adaptation to the present of previously established rules for depicting artistically what was chronologically unchanging-- universal Nature; while the Moderns stressed the difference, a progression out of, but away from the past's giants.

While documenting subtle, psychological changes is difficult, it appears likely that the progressive or developmental theory of literary history could not predominate (as it eventually did in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Century, along with what M.H. Abrams calls "biological analogies" and organic criticism"[9]) until the English poet had absorbed enough vitality from his adopted classical connections to feel both the need and the ability to stand on his own. Historical analogies based on how one measured up to the specific manner and matter of a former artist or period were also less necessary when critics became more sensitive to social and psychological conditions peculiar to each age which dictated insurmountable divergencies in their art.[10] Ever since man has had a past,

he has never stopped believing that he could learn from it in some way. What altered in the literary criticism and the politics of the late Eighteenth Century was how and to what extent direct analogies should be made.

If Geoffrey Tillotson is correct in his explanation of the philosophy behind poetic diction, then its popularity and subsequent decline may well be indicative of this gradual change. A poet like Pope's use of poetic diction reflects an interest not in the "freshness"of the experience, but in that freshness as it may be "accomodated" to past responses to similar experiences. A line like "Pour'd o'er the whitening vale their fleecy care" provides an analogy for a sight which Pope has shared with his earliest ancestors, and that combines within it an old response and a new one. The final image is both similar to and different from earlier ones. It allows the poet a certain amount of creativity, but adds significance to his achievement through its compatibility with acknowledged genius.[11] The crutch becomes unnecessary, even abhorrent, once the dependent discovers through having used it that he can operate on his own. Wordsworth's revulsion against poetic diction is partly traceable to this evolution in consciousness of the English writer in general.

The belief in a universal parallel both within and between centuries flourished through the height of the

Eighteenth Century and determined the functions of historical analogy advocated by critics for both the subject matter and the style of literature. It was common to substitute modern events and practices in English translations of the ancient poets and to use classical and biblical stories in original poems to illustrate by analogy implications of modern behavior or the significance of contemporary political events. In the Original and Progress of Satire (1697) Dryden says of himself and his fellow translators of Juvenal: "If sometimes any of us...make him express the customs and manners of our native country rather than of Rome," one reason is "a real analogy betwixt their customs and ours" (II,114). In poems like Absalom and Achitophel he demonstrates a comparable "real analogy" between modern and biblical times.

The historical analogy in this sense adds to the instructional value of poetry and to the efforts of early eighteenth-century critics to raise its reputation. If, writes Charles Gildon in The Complete Art of Poetry (1718),

> ...the Governing of Nations be the most noble Science, certainly, Writing well is of the highest Value, since from thence the Statesman draws his capacity of weighing present Occurences with past, and making his Judgment by former Events, on the like Occasions, in his own Time. 12

And if such analogies were of value to the political leader, they were also of use to the average Englishman, as

Joseph Addison assures him in Spectator #209 (Tues., Oct. 30, 1711):

> A Reader cannot be more rationally entertained than by comparing the Virtues and Vices of his own times, with those which prevailed in the Times of his Fore-Fathers; and drawing a Parallel in his Mind between his own private Character and that of other Persons, whether of his own Age or of the Ages that went before him. The Contemplation of Mankind under these changeable Colours is apt to Shame us out of any particular Vice, or animate us to any particular Virtue, to make us pleased or displeased with our selves in the most proper Points, to clear our Minds of Prejudices and Prepossession....13

This type of analogizing is important in the development of comparative ethics, particularly in the prose of Samuel Johnson. More significant here is its two-sidedness. To find the same beauties and virtues operating in the eighteenth century A.D. as operated in the 5th century B.C. or in biblical times is to enhance by association the sense of renewed worth that the people of the modern world were so desperately seeking. It was also contributive to the "Ancients'" argument that if present man, who already basically resembled his classical predecessors, would consciously emulate them, he could approach their greatness. To suggest, on the other hand, that in their current affairs, public and private, people were making mistakes analogous to those made centuries before, was to imply, unless one were a complete fatalist, that improvement

(through greater knowledge of human nature and of self) was possible. The idea that the present, ethically or artistically, could improve upon the past was held by many who would have considered themselves uncomfortable with what the "Moderns" implied in the term "progress." The re-emergence of individual worth eventually resolved this paradox. But first the period of close historical analogy, unimpeded by a sensitivity to subtle sociological fluctuations, provided a necessary transition from the old to the new justification of uniqueness and of poetry as its expression.

b) The Analogy of Poetry and Science

If one way to raise the position of poetry was to relate it to the grandeur of antiquity, another, and in some ways contradictory method, was to analogize it with modern science. In the Essay on Dramatic Poetry Crites observes that each era excelled in one or two particular disciplines--that the ancient climate had been most conducive to great poetry, while ours was more suited to scientific endeavors through which almost "a new Nature" had been revealed. Eugenius's rejoinder is that by adapting the same progressive approach we use in science to poetry, we can make parallel strides in that discipline:

> I deny not what you urge of arts and sciences, that they have flourished in some ages more than others; but your instance in philosophy makes for me: for if natural causes be more known now than in the time of Aristotle, because more studied, it follows that poesy and other arts may, with the same pains, arrive still nearer to perfection.... (I,43-4)

Already in the philosophies of Hartley and Campbell and the retrospective insight of Wayland there is a desire to apply to poetry by analogy the analogical methods of science, particularly of the Newtonian method. This tendency appears throughout the literary criticism of the period; but it is variously applied and brings with it certain dilemmas which are characteristic of all eighteenth-century use of analogy. The problem, as with the analogy of mind and matter, is to compare the two in a way that will bring improvement and advancement to poetry wihtout also reducing it to nothing more than a science. Again likeness and difference are simultaniously important, and the maintenance of these rational distinctions is the ground for their eventual decline by the close of the century.

In the first of a series of lectures with which Joseph Trapp inaugurated his appointment to the first Chair of Poetry at Oxford,he expresses his humility and uncertainty both about himself and his subject on these grounds: "For so it has happened that tho' all other Sciences the world can boast of have had their Instructors and Professors in this most flourishing University, Poetry alone...has hitherto wanted Schools for her Reception."[15] The elevation of poetry to a science meant that it was susceptible of being understood and controlled by certain laws. Trapp attempted an analogy that would express

this property, without overshadowing completely that special glow which made poetry something more than mathematics:

> Rage, indeed, is its Property; but a Rage altogether divine; not deviating from Reason, but rendering it more ornamental and sublime. It may be said to be a Fire; not like our consuming ones, but like those of the celestial Orbs above, that have not only the qualities of Heat and Brightness, but maintaining one uniform Course, are carried round our World at once with equal swiftness and Regularity. (p.2)

The figure was not original with Trapp and was closely allied to the popular gravitation analogy. Both called attention to the property shared by physical nature and art, or physical nature and morality (their regularity), while paying due reverence to the je ne sais quoi through which they diverged.

Dryden, who wrote in the Preface to Albion and Albanius (1685) that in art as in science the first inventors to arrive at perfection should set up laws to be adhered to by all that follow, used the regularity-of-the-spheres analogy in the person of Neander to defend the complex plots of English drama against the single-level plots favored by the French:

> Our plays, besides the main design, have underplots or by-concernments, of less considerable persons and intrigues, which are carried on with the motion of the main

> plot: just as they say the orb of the fixed stars,and those of the planets, tho' they have motions of their own, are whirled about by the motion of the Primum Mobile, in which they are contained. That similitude expresses much of the English stage; for if contrary motions may be found in nature to agree; if a planet can go east and west at the same time, one way by virtue of his own motion, the other by the force of the First Mover, it will not be difficult to imagine how the underplot, which is only different, not contrary to the main design, may naturally be conducted along with it.
>
> (II,71)

In this case, calculable contraries being natural, their analogous forms in poetry are likewise artistically correct.

Dryden sometimes minimizes the differences between poetry and science and poetry and mathematics in his eagerness to establish guidelines that will encourage the kind of freedom within limits in literature which Newton and Locke were attempting to establish in their areas. He often emulated their example as much as the ancients' in the testing of procedures and rules. In the Preface to Sylvae(1685) he gives as a primary motivation for the translating of the Miscellanies a desire to prove Lord Roscommon's prescriptions in the Essay on Translated Verse (1684): "For many a fair precept in poetry is,like a seeming demonstration in the mathematics, very specious in the diagram, but failing in the mechanical operation" (II,252).

Despite such statements, he is not as dogmatic as Sir Joshua Reynolds was to be much later in the century,

although their ideas of nature and universality are related. In the Seventh Discourse (1776) Reynolds proclaims that all art is neither divine nor mechanical, but founded in science, and that it is the very same taste for Truth "which relishes a demonstration in geometry that is pleased with the resemblance of a picture to an original and touched with the harmony of music."[16]

Science was closely associated with progress and modernism in the Eighteenth Century, yet, generally speaking, it was the "ancients" who stressed afinities in the poetry/science analogy, and the "moderns," re-baptized by Pope the 'dunces," who concentrated on how they diverged. Leonard Welsted in "A Dissertation Concerning the Perfection of the English Language, the State of Poetry,etc." (1724) argued that poetry was a "science of reason," but that it differed "from other sciences" in that,

> it does not equally with them lie level to all capacities, that a man, rightly to perceive the reason and truth of it, must be born with taste or a faculty of judging, and that it cannot be reduced to a formal science or taught by any set precepts. 17

Welsted, in companionship with the other "dunces," denied that poetry could be regularized, and discredited the ancient rules because they had been written as "comments" on works of genius rather than as guides to their composition. Nevertheless, he uses the movement-of-the-spheres analogy

which genrally appeared in support of the Rules in such a way as to maintain the validity of the comparison while reversing its entire basis. He compares that special something of poetry which puts it beyond understanding and control to that knowledge of final causes and immateriality which is beyond the scope of science:

> Astronomers tell us that bodies attract one another in proportion to their solid contents or quantity of matter; this, they say, they know by experiments and calculations, and that by these principles they can explain the motions of the planets which compose our system; but they do not pretend to show the mechanical causes of this gravitation or attraction; all they can say about it is that this general law was originally impressed on nature by God, who might give what laws to nature he thought fit. In like manner,...must we speak of taste, imagination, and of many beauties in poetry; we know by consciousness and experience there are such faculties of the mind, and such results of genius; we know the effect they have upon us and the pleasures they produce in us; but we cannot physically account for them...any more than we can for the soul itself.... (p.330)

This comparison, especially when read in the context of the entire essay, suggests by analogy that just as our limited knowledge of God's plan does not in any way imply that the plan itself is limited, so our limited knowledge of how poetry is produced and why it affects us as it does in no way regulates the extent of artistic creation or its results.

One of the most intriquing aspects of the Ancient/Modern controversy is this frequent use by both sides of similar analoqies for different purposes. The cause, in part, is a common intellectual milieu, and sometimes the effect is merely a different attitude toward the same image. For Swift and Pope the image of an insect producing everything out of its owm bowels is representative of presumptuous and inept writing. To Welsted it is analagous to the ideal:

> ...that which truly and lastingly pleases in writing is always the result of a man's own force and of the first cast of soul which gives him a promptitude to excel; it is his proper wealth, and he draws it out of himself as the silkworm spins out of his own bowels the soft ductile substance which is wrought into so great a variety of ornaments. (p.336)

Just as frequently, however, the figures used illustrate more subtle analoqies between the supposedly opposite points of view, such as the points of contact in their respective attitudes toward science, which substantiate a more complex relationship.

Eighteenth-century literary critics also juxtapose poetry and science to demonstrate that analoqizing the known with the unknown is a valid procedure for establishing rules for both. We have seen that Butler's use of this method derives in his own time from the discussion of probability by Locke and in former times from Quintilian, whom he quotes in a headnote. Charles Gildon, simultaneously

a strict rules critic and a believer in progress, prefers a quotation from Hypocrites regarding the science of medicine, which he finds equally applicable to the art of writing:

> All that is wanting for the Perfection of this Art, will without Doubt, be found out, by those ingenious Men, who will search for it, according to the instructions and rules of the Antients, and endeavor to arrive at what is unknown, by what is already plain and evident.[18]

From his comments on Reynold's Discourses and from his own poetry it is plain that to William Blake this coupling of Art and Science was as abhorrent as the coupling of Farce and Tragedy had been earlier to Pope. But it is imperative to be aware that in many of those later eighteenth-century critics whose basic tenets helped to prepare the way for Blake, analogies of science and poetry based on Newtonian precepts are manifest. The work of Alexander Gerard, for example, is significantly pivotal. In his Essay on Genius (1774) he interprets association (in Hartley often the equivalent of analogy) as a combination of ideas "different from every form which the senses have perceived"(p.41), and producing a "new creation." In this "operation of the imagination" he finds the "origin of genius."[19] Edward Young is credited with first using vegetable growth as an analogy for genius, but according to Bernhard Fabian,[20] it is Gerard who first develops what M.H. Abrams designates "biological analogy." Spontaneous growth from the root replaces that from the entrails of the spider as a representation

of individuality and uniqueness and becomes a positive rather than a negative image. But a thorough reversal of attitude comes much more slowly than the switch in figure. The main reason is implied in this evaluation of the change by Abrams:

> The momentous historical shift from the view that the making of a work of art is a supremely purposeful activity to the view that its coming-into-being is...a spontaneous process independent of intention, precept, or even consciousness, was the natural concomitant of an organic aesthetics. (p.187)

Once again, as at the breaking of the circle, man is placed in the ambiguous position of fearing and desiring loss of control. The freedom within limits that had been established by the middle of the century certainly was not altogether satisfying as a way of living and writing, but it did provide a framework. Gerard's reluctance to completely divorce himself from that framework, even while his basic beleifs would appear to make such a detachment inevitable, is apparent in his use of analogies. Fabian draws a similar conclusion from the almost equal use of biological and mechanical figures in the Essay on Genius and from the use of the magnet figure in the earlier Essay on Taste (pp.xxv-xxviii). But Gerard's precarious balance between the old and the new is also discernible in his repeated return to comparisons of poetry and science. He still speaks of the connection of parts in relation to a

whole design, Aristotelian in origin, and particularly of its relation to the analogy of cause and effect, a principle that comes to poetry and criticism from contemporary philosophy and science:

> ...this connexion which subsists between the parts and the design, and in general the connexion between all means and their end, is a species of the relation of cause and effect. (p. 120)

And at one point, he speaks of the principle of association, which he has formerly said was uncontrollable as having properties analgous to those phenomena scientifically observed by Bacon, which are reducible to general law. Bacon, noting the ancients' assertion that salt water would dissolve additional salt faster than fresh water, suggested that sugar be substituted for the salt to test their agreement in this particular characteristic. In both poetry and science, according to Gerard, "the mention of any phenomena or event, readily brings into our view another phenomena or event similar in its cause, its nature, its circumstances, or its consequences" (p.110).

Related analogies of poetry and science continue to appear in even later critical works whose authors are far less ambiguous in their departure from neoclassical precepts. The Highland bard, James Beattie, displays his commitment to native genius and original spontaneity in nearly all his poetry. In his Essays: On Poetry and Music (1779), however, he distinguishes between "Essential"

rules ("necessary to the accomplishment of the end proposed by the artist") and "Ornamental or Mechanical" ones (having "no better foundation than the practice of some great performer, whom it has become the fashion to imitate." He admits the "Essentials," provisionally, positing an analogy with science in their defense:

> ...it would be no less absurd, for a poet to violate the essential rules of his art, and justify himself by an appeal from the tribunal of Aristotle, than for a mechanic to construct an engine on principles inconsistent with the laws of motion, and excuse himself by disclaiming the authority of Sir Isaac Newton. (pp.5-6)

Another later eighteenth-century use of the poetry/science analogy which is useful in evaluating what the two halves of the period do and do not have in common appears in a sometimes self-contradictory combination of didactic poetry and critical prose by Erasmus Darwin. The Loves of the Plants (1789) declares as its "general design" to "inlist Imagination under a banner of Science; and to lead her votaries from the looser analogies, which dress out the imagery of poetry, to the stricter ones, which form the ratiocination of philosophy."[22] What actually follows in the versified sections is a total separation of poetry and science. Descriptions of the sex life of flowers are flowery ad nauseam. Personification is also excessive, often completely obscuring all connections with botany. And the language is often more "obscure" (ie. "balmy influence") than the line from Pope (WF, 341) which Darwin introduces in the "First Interlude" as an

example of poetry (the expression of the visible) being corrupted by prose (the expression of "abstract ideas" (p.1005). Actual scientific information appears in prose footnotes at the bottom of each page; and the poetry and prose are not at all interdependent.

The "First Interlude" between the Poet and the Bookseller seems to be an instrument for the author's own admission that his aim is impossible. He declares that poetry should confine itself to the visual aspects of matter and leave scientific abstracting, in which the "mode of reasoning is from stricter analogies than metaphors and similes" (p.1006), to prose. But in trying to apply imaginative writing to science in his verse sections Darwin has transformed science into fancy. He has replaced the one by the other, though his intention was to combine them. He has also not succeeded in transforming himself from a scientist into a poet, since the resulting verses, while totally unscientific, are only pseudo-poetic.

But the Loves of the Plants does demonstrate, intentionally or not, that the eighteenth-century way of analogizing in general and of comparing poetry and science in particular is well on its way to displacement. Analogy is no longer viewed as the logical argument of reason which must stand behind and justify rhetorical figures;poetry is no longer described as proceeding on

principles which are parallel to those of science. Being reasonable, as William Blake is already proclaiming at this time, has very little to do with being a poet. The nineteenth-century critic and writer continues to incorporate new discoveries of science into his vocabulary; but as he does so, he transforms them into something else-- a part of rather than a measure of his art. In similar fashion the later nineteenth and the twentieth century have incorporated the science of psychology into their writings. It definitely appears, however, that literature's standing beside science in eighteenth-century analogies was a necessary preparation for its standing on its own in subsequent eras.

c) The Analogy of Poetry and Painting

In comparisons of poetic technique historical analogies provided a way of measuring contemporary achievement-- for "ancients," by how much Eighteenth Century Literature repreated in its own time the ways of following nature that had been successfully employed by Homer and Horace; for "moderns," by the degree to which they excelled the established masters through new and improved methods. Analogies of poetry and science were also a means of measuring the value of writing. On the one hand, the extent to which writing like scientific

investigation could be regulated by demonstrably effective rules was the extent to which it could be taken seriously, and not regarded as idle fancy. On the other, the degree to which the laws of poetry like the laws of nature could improve and perfect human life determined just how serious a role poetry might play in a progress-oriented society. In both cases, this type of analogizing gradually declined as individual expression via the written word became its own justification.

When we recognize that behind both these analogies was the desire to establish a firm association between literature and truth, the similar, if more circuitous, route of the analogy between poetry and painting is easily understandable. Despite the important differences that Jean Hagstrum observes in the juxtaposition of poetry and painting in each century,[23] one common attribute continually obtains. Whether painting is believed to represent transcendent truth or visible truth, it is always a comparable power to evoke that truth which the literary critic or poet seeks by association. The prevailing eighteenth-century view of the truth that art conveys falls roughly between what is only felt, not seen, and what is merely detailed, but not interpreted. Even when the emphasis in literature shifts substantially

from representing external nature to representing human nature or eliciting via art what it is in human nature that responds to the external, the concern is still with seeing beyond the individual or the circumstantial. As the picture desired beomes one of the mind rather than of real objects on which the mind operates, however, the analogy of poetry and painting, always one in which similarity and difference function simultaneously, shifts proportion. Poetry begins to be measured by how differently and in what different areas it can do the type of thing that painting can do. Degrees of difference eventually outwiegh those of similarity, until the art pf poetry establishes enough independent qualities to uphold its own stature. As the Nineteenth Century moves into its own, "painting with words" becomes figurative rather than analogical. The expression no longer relies on a real resemblance between the arts, but has absorbed the origin of its vehicle to form a meaning of its own. Painting, painting with words, and writing emerge as three separate and comparably valuable forms of subjective expression.

Again,a good place to begin illustrations of this development is the criticism of John Dryden. In the preface to his translation of Du Fresnoy's De Arte Graphica entitled A Parallel of Poetry and Painting (1695), Dryden quotes

authorities, particularly Bellori, on the rules and characteristics of painting, and notes how the most ennobling ones apply to poetry as well. Central is the connection between the two disciplines based on their approach to truth and nature:

> As truth is the end of all our speculations, so the discovering of it is the pleasure of them; and since a true knowledge of Nature gives us pleasure, a lively imitation of it, either in Poetry or Painting, must of necessity produce a much greater: for both these arts,...are not only true imitations of Nature, but of the best Nature, of that which is wrought up to a nobler pitch. They present us with images more perfect than the life in any individual; and we have the pleasure to see all the scattered beauties of Nature united by a happy chemistry without its deformity or faults.
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> (II,137)

This discovery and representation of what is universal or essential is the quality that Johnson was later to characterize as not numbering the streaks of the tulip, but capturing in art what is appealing in all tulips. It may have begun as a property of painting attributed by association to poetry; but by the time it appears in Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses, it has been acknowledged as a characteristic of art in general. But while the principle of generality is the same, a shift of emphasis occurs in Reynolds which traces its beginnings back to Dryden and at the same time heralds the end of the very rational approach to art which the famed portrait painter intends to preserve.

Dryden, the dramatist, recognized universal emotions and opinions in men and may well have seen a connection between this type of non-specificity and that which he advocated in depicting externals. He did not, however, present the one as the psychological basis of the other as Reynolds does in the Eleventh Discourse:

> ...the impression which is left on our mind, even of things which are familiar to us, is seldom more than their general effect; beyond which we do not look in recognizing such objects. To express this in painting, is to express what is congenial and natural to the mind of man, and what gives him by reflection his own mode of conceiving. (p.187)

What "most pleases" in art and is most "natural" Reynolds has already defined in Discourse VII as that which "has in it" what "is analogous to the mind"; and in Discourse XIII he reiterates this point, supporting it by what have by now become the mutually illustrative rather than proportionally related arts:

> To illustrate this principle by a comparison with other arts, I shall now produce some instances to show, that they, as well as our own art, renounce the narrow idea of nature, and the narrow theories derived from that mistaken principle, and apply to that reason only which informs us not what imitation is,-- a natural representation of a given object, -- but what it is natural for the imagination to be delighted with. And perhaps there is no better way of acquiring this knowledge than by this kind of analogy: each art will corroborate and mutually reflect the truth on the other. (p.227)

Concern with how the mind operates, introduced into English thinking from Descartes through Locke, ties in with questions of literary criticism and aesthetics prior to Reynolds; but the Discourses are an interesting example of the partly compatible, partly clashing encounters between old and new, not unlike those in Gerard regarding the analogy of poetry and science. The next step, although there is hardly a smooth transition, is for the operations of the mind themselves to become the subject of pictures, usually through the allegorical personifications in eighteenth-century odes. While works of this kind move inevitalby closer to acceptance and eventual advocation of subjectivism, in most cases, in most cases, they avoid it by applying to their allegorical pictures of the mind the ever-present eighteenth-century criterion of generalization. As Chester F. Chapin and others have shown in their studies of eighteenth-century personification,[24] its purpose was to make abstract emotions and mental phenomena visible by one or two concrete images, and to avoid the ornamental, unrealistic details indulged in by the otherwise-to-be-admired Edmund Spenser. While personification, being a kind of picture, provided another point of contact between poetry and painting, it also represented a third stage in the self-destructive progression of this analogy.

Since allegorical paintings sketched in all the details of their personifications and even placed them side by side with real figures, they were judged less natural and less convincing than their poetic counterparts. One example of this twist to the parallel appears in the "First Interlude" of Darwin's Loves of the Plants (1789):

> In poetry the personification or allegorical figure is generally indistinct and therefore does not strike us so forcibly as to make us attend to its improbability, but in painting the figures being all much more distinct, their improbability becomes apparent and seizes our attention to it. (pp.1006-7)

First poetry had been compared with painting in order to increase poetry's stature; then, they had begun to be accepted as mutually illustrative; and next, still based on their both being in some way representative of truth and nature, poetry, at least in the eyes of literary critics, began to take its position on the weightier end of the scale.

Actually, suggestions that such might be the case appeared much earlier and depended on the observation that while painting might more accurately portray external nature, poetry clearly had the edge when it cam to the internal. In the first of his Lectures on Poetry (1711), Joseph Trapp declares that "Poetry excels Painting as much as the Soul does the Body, that being best represented by the former, as this by the latter" (p.18). And in

#172 of The Guardian, III(Sept. 28, 1713) Richard Steele exclaims:

> What applauses will he merit, who first made his ideas to sit to his pencil, and drew to his eye the picture of his mind! Painting represents the outward man, or the shell; but cannot reach the inhabitant within, or the very organ by which the inhabitant is revealed.

In these earlier juxtapositions "poetry" means essentially dramatic poetry. But with the appearance of poems like Thomson's The Seasons, and critical works like Joseph Warton's The Genius and Writings of Alexander Pope (1756), with the growing scarcity of good dramatists and the decline in purely generic criticism, descriptive poetry gained new recognition. Correspondingly, from the mid-forties into the last quarter of the century the poetry/painting analogy also gained impetus. Both arts venerated God through appreciative depiction of His creatures as examples of divine power and beneficence. But in 1789, the same year that the Loves of the Plants was published, a work of literary criticism appeared which both regenerated and reinterpreted classical generic distinctions. It reverted to the rationale behind comparisons of poetry and painting applied by Trapp and Steele; but at the same time was indicative of an important step in the direction of the future.

Thomas Twining's "On Poetry Considered as an Imitative

Art" (1789) is the first of two essays which preface his translation of Aristotle's Poetics. It argues that the term "imitative," as per its original use by Aristotle, may be properly applied to dramatic poetry only, "the description of passions and emotions by their sensible effects"; that former critics in order to justify their own theories have incorrectly applied the term "imitative" to other poetic types, notably descriptive poetry, "by the widest and most distant analogy" (p.990); and that the parallel between the arts which intends to prove by analogy that all poetry like all painting is imitative is invalid and more misleading than instructive:

> We are told that Poetry is an imitative art. In order to conceive how it is so, we naturally compare it with painting, sculpture, and such arts as are strictly and clearly imitative. But in this comparison the difference is so much more obvious and striking than the resemblance-- we see so much more readily in what respects poetry is not properly imitation than in what respect it is-- that the mind at last is left in that sort of perplexity which must always arise from words thus loosely and analogically applied, when the analogy is not sufficiently clear and obvious: that is, when of that mixture of circumstances like and unlike, which constitutes analogy, the latter is the most apparent.
> (p.984)

Twining extols dramatic poesy as the only truly imitative form of literature. But while he does not deny that painting is in its own way also imitative, he makes no dependent connection between the two, acknowledging dramatic

mimesis as a unique quality. This general attitude, rather than the specific points of Twining's theory, was increasingly prevalent in his day, and was only a hair's breadth from poetry's independent emergence in the criticism and art of the Romantics as an expression rather than an imitation of human feeling.

Eventually, as Ralph Cohen explains, the "developmental analogy" or "theory of progress" replaced the analogy of poetry and painting as completely as it was also to replace the neoclassical kind of historical analogy.[26] But this did not occur before poetry had risen up as an art form of self-inclusive value and before the analogy of poetry and painting had therefore ceased to function as a necessary and constructive measure for the literary critic.

d) The Analogy of Art and Nature

While comparisons of literature with classical predecessors, with science, and with other arts strongly affected the manner and matter of eighteenth-century writing and helped to establish poetry as a serious and self-justifying form of expression, the most significant influence on its form and stature was the parallel of art and nature. The complicated relationship between the two

depends, in each individual critic, on which of the many possible eighteenth-century meanings of "nature" or "natural" is intended. That Nature which it is the business of art to represent can be the underlying Ideal or the outwardly visible reality; the human passions, or a rugged country landscape; the spontaneous operations of the mind, or the regulated motions of the planets. Regardless of which meaning obtains, Nature is always the equivalent of Truth. It is not the business of Art to create or to be Truth, but rather to imitate it. Art should be beautiful and pleasing as well as morally useful; but "Trth is Beauty" is not usually a reversible phrase in eighteenth-century criticism as it is in Keats. Art is as false to its ultimate purpose when it seeks to become Nature as it is when it misrepresents Her. Whether the artist is imitating God's natural creative process, the methods of a classical writer which are indirectly Nature's laws, or a natural creation itself, his finished work should be comparable simultaneously for its difference and its similarity to the original model. Attempting to be the Divine Creator would constitute heretical presumption; trying to be Homer instead of writing in conformity with his principles would reduce the artist to a copier rather than an inventor; and to create a work of fiction indistinguishable from reality would be to deceive the reader

rather than to please and enlighten.

Again in these essential concepts of literary criticism, as in the philosophy and theology of the period, the basic paradox which made the use of analogies at once so necessary and so cautious is clearly operative. The desire to believe that objective, unchanging truths really did exist and that man could discover them conflicts repeatedly with the fear, substantiated by the experience of history and by scientific investigation that subjective error is inevitable and seems continually self-defeating. The resolution of this conflict at the end of the century was a new attitude toward subjectivism. Formerly a deviation from Truth, it became Truth's standard. Once this major change took place, the eighteenth-century way of analogizing had outlived its usefulness. But like the analogies of literary criticism already discussed the analogy of Art and Nature was partly responsible for the new developments which would replace it, and given the cultural shock that folloed the Renaissance, may well have been a compulsory prerequisite to any subsequent literary rebirths, Romantic or otherwise.

In Dryden's criticism, discussions of Art as an imitation of Nature apply mainly to dramatic poetry and its re-creation of "humour and passions." The measure of success for this literary art is how effectively the emotions portrayed are analogous to those of real people. In the Preface to his

translation of Ovid's Epistles Dryden extends this criteria to other genres which portray human nature:

> If the imitation of Nature be the business of a poet, I know no author who can justly be compared with ours, especially in the description of the passions.... Now I will appeal to any man, who has read this poet, whether he finds not the natural emotion of the same passion in himself, which the poet describes in his feigned persons?
>
> (I,233)

Nature takes on further modifications in the Preface to The Conquest of Granada, "Of Heroic Plays" (1672). Within reasonable limits the depiction of probable as well as actual creatures of God's universe ought also to be the subject of poetry, because "whatever is or may be is not properly unnatural" (I,154). Dryden analogizes the natural and the probable to expand the possibilities of art, just as Butler would juxtapose them to re-extend the possibilities of religion. Both rely on the negative argument that what cannot be proven false may be true. In the later part of the Eighteenth Century the acceptance of spirits and ghosts as subjects of literary composition is supported by the more positive argument that they are the outgrowths of natural genius. But even James Beattie maintained "that fiction should be...consonant to the general tenor of human affairs...that not possibilities, but probabilities should be the standard of poetical invention" (p.36).

Besides the visible and the probable there is a third Nature which Dryden juxtaposes to Art. While insisting on a strong resemblance between the emotions of fictional characters and those of real people, he also says that art should imitate an "ideal Nature," more "perfect than the life in any individual." The two concepts are not contradictory, if we understand them properly. They are both compatible with the eighteenth-century belief in universal sameness,and help to illuminate the analogous relationship between God and the poet. It is the job of the artist to select those qualities which are essential to an emotional feeling such as love or fear from among the various manifestations of it in the world around him. The same process applies to the artist seeking to catch the essential qualities of a flower. By so doing he is able to piece together a close approximation of the emotion or object in its original nature, or as a perfect idea in the mind of the Creator. In that the resulting work of art makes an impression on the reader analogous to the one made by visible nature it is a valid presentation of imperfect reality. In that it is drawn from a selection of all that is potentially perfect in the subject chosen, it is also analogous to the original idea in the mind of God. In A Parallel of Poetry and Painting (1695)

Dryden quotes Bellori's explanation of this concept in painting and sculpture and notes that it applies equally to poetry:

> 'God Almighty, in the fabric of the Universe, first contemplated himself, and reflected on his own excellencies; from which he drew and constituted those first forms which are called ideas. So that every species which was afterwards expressed was produced from that first idea, forming the wonderful contexture of all created beings.'
> '...the artful painter and sculptor, imitating the Divine Maker, form to themselves, as well as they are able, a model of the superior beauties; and reflecting on them, endeavor to correct and amend the common nature, and to represent it as it was at first created, without fault, either in colour, or in lineament.
> ...the idea of the painter and sculptor is undoubtedly that perfect and excellent example of the mind, by imitation of which imagined form all things are represented which fall under human sight....' (II, 117-118)

The creative process of God and that of the poet are not entirely alike, nor different only in degree. They are analogous processes of human mind and divine mind, at once significantly alike and different. Both God and man create beauty from an idea. But God creates his Idea out of nothing: man develops his by judicious selection from his experience of what God's ideas have produced in nature.

Sometimes, particularly in earlier works like the Epistle Dedicatory to the Rival Ladies (1674), Dryden employs figures, such as a reference to God as the "Almighty Poet,"

which suggest the interchangeability of terms differing only in degree that characterizes Elizabethan and metaphysical parallels of the divine and human creator. Other early eighteenth-century critics sometimes use this device, most often to gain esteem for poetic creation by allying iy with the origins of Nature. Joseph Trapp, for instance, maintains that

> ...Poetry is coeval with the World itself, and...the Creator may be said in working up and finishing his beautiful Poem of the Universe, to have performed the Part of a Poet, no less than of a Geometrician.... (pp.4-5)

Both Dryden and Trapp, however, basically allies of the rational as opposed to the enthusiastic approach to poetry, are equally explicit about the ways in which divine and human creation are not on a par. Both stress that the poet by his very name is, like God, a "maker," but that, unlike the Divine Maker, his inventiveness lies in what he does with materials of which he is not the originator. Hobbes and the Deists portrayed God as a Watchmaker for their purposes: Dryden portrays the poet as one to make an entirely different point:

> The employment of a poet is like that of a curious gunsmith or watchmaker: the iron or silver is not his own; but they are the least part of that which gives the value: the price lies wholly in the workmanship.
>
> (Preface to An Evening's Love, 1671, I, 147)

He reiterates this point in the Dedication of the

Aeneas (1697). When Macrobius and others charge Virgil with lacking "invention," they accuse him of a "capital crime." A "poet is a maker, as the word signifies"; but he is not a maker of the "common materials of poetry," which are "furnished from the magazine of nature." The "argument of the work..., its principal action, the oeconomy and disposition of it, these are the things which distinguish copies from originals" (pp.197-8). In Joseph Trapp's words:

> Poets are not called "Makers" as if it was their peculiar Providence to produce, out of nothing, new Matter for their Subject:... But the Apellation is given them by way of Eminence, as their Thoughts are more exercised in Invention, and forming Ideas, than any other Writer's; as such Symmetry and Harmony is required in their Compositions;...and lastly, such Management and Pains in working up the Machines of their Poem, and conducting the several Parts ofit, so as to make them all conspire to one Uniform Action. (p.19)

The Earl of Shaftesbury in Part IV, section iii of Characteristics (1711) comments similarly that the poet, like the sovereign artist or universal plastic nature,... forms a whole, coherent and proportioned in itself, with due subjection and subordinacy of constituent parts." In this technique the artist and God are analogous: "a poet is a second maker, a just Prometheus under Jove."[27] But while both seek to create order, Nature and Art differ essentially in their ultimate design:

> Now the variety of Nature is such as to distinguish everything she forms, by a peculiar original character, which, if strictly observed, will make the subject appear unlike to anything extant in the world besides. But this effect the good poet and painter seek industriously to prevent. They hate minuteness and are afraid of singularity, which make their images or characters appear capricious and fantastical. The mere face painter...has little in common with the poet but, like the mere historian, copies what he sees and minutely traces every feature and odd mark. It is otherwise with the men of invention and design. It is from the many objects of nature, and not from a particular one, that those geniuses form the idea of their work....and thus some considerable wits have recommended the best poems as preferable to the best histories, and better teaching the truth of characters and nature of mankind.

Contrary to the metaphysical view, the poet should not seek to be like God or Nature in producing the unique; but neither should he seek to distinguish himself from the Divine Creator by being only his copier. As "makers" of order God and the poet are similar; in their ends and in their materials they are unlike.

The degree of inventiveness in an imitation determines in what proportion to God and to other writers a poet is really a "maker." In Joseph Trapp's view, this is a generic distinction. The term "maker" is "more peculiarly applicable to the Epic and Dramatic Writers," and "to the rest,only, as we term it, by Analogy" (p.30). The lower genre poets are "makers" analogically according to the diminishing amounts of invention present in their work. This hierarchy of genres is parallel to the hierarchy of created forms in Nature, the Great Chain of Being. Both consist of links which are

both similar and different from those above and below them.

Argument from analogy is a frequent device of the genre-oriented critic in other contexts as well. Dryden's Neander uses as one of his defenses for rhymed dramatic verse that while Epic and Tragedy differ somewhat in manner, yet the "agreement betwixt them is such, that if rhyme be proper for one, it must be for the other" (101-102). In the Dedication of the Aeneas (1697) he again analogizes Epic and Tragic Poetry, this time to show in defense of the epic that while the effects of tragedy are swifter, and appear more intense, the opposite is actually true. Both are like purging medicines: a tragic poem like a chemical remedy, provides fast-acting but only temporary relief; an epic like a "galenical decoction, is a slower acting but more permanent cure" (II,158). The analogy implies that the nature of agreement and disagreement between the two genres makes the epic superior. In a second analogical amplification of his argument, Dryden gently modifies this departure from Aristotle, and demonstrates that in their own way the two are of comparable power. This time the relationship of genres is expressed in terms of the relationship between the planets:

> Is the Moon a more noble planet than Saturn, because she makes her revolution in less than thirty days, and he in little less than thirty years? Both their orbs are in proportion to their several magnitudes;

> and consequently the quickness or slowness of their motion and the time of their circumvolutions, is no argument of the greater or lesser perfection. (pp.158-9)

Such juxtapositions are particularly popular with neo-classical critics, because they verify that to follow Nature and to follow Homer really are similar. To Dryden and his literary heirs there is the same parallel between the classical rules of art and the laws of Nature that Butler would later try to demonstrate between the laws of Nature and the doctrines of revealed religion.

In like manner, the principle of similarity and difference which characterizes the poet's imitation of God also applies in his imitation of the classics. There are three types of translation according to Dryden's Preface to his Translation of Ovid's Epistles (1680): metaphase, paraphrase and imitation. The first is translating "word by word"; the second, a "strict following of the original sense but not of the exact phrasing. Imitation, however, is

> the endeavor of a later poet to write like one who has written before him, on the same subject; that is, not to translate his words, or to be confined to his sense, but only to set him as a pattern, and to write, as he supposes that the author would have done, had he lived in our age, and in our country. (II, 237)

It is only a short step from this liberal way of translating

to the method of emulating former masters which Dryden and his followers also describe as imitation. As he explains in the Dedication of the Aeneas (1697), Virgil "by reading Homer" was "taught to imitate his invention; that is to imitate like him." Pope makes the point even clearer in a note to Book I of his translation of the Iliad (1715-30): "Imitation does not hinder Invention: we may observe the Rules of Nature, and write in the Spirit of those who have best hit upon them, without taking the same track, beginning in the same Manner, and following the main of their story almost step by step." To imitate, in other words, is to draw an analogy between one's own work and that of a more established writer. The imitator aims to distinguish his work by its simultaneous agreement and disagreement with the guiding pattern of what has preceded it. The similarities show him in conformity with good judgment: the differences show his own inventiveness. As in the God/poet and the Nature/Art analogies, what distinguishes the good writer is his ability to invent out of materials he did not originate a pleasing and instructive work which does not go beyond the bounds of truth.

Critics' analogies of Art and Nature concerned not only the naturalness of the artist's methods, but also how closely his subject matter should resemble its natural source. The type of resemblance depended on whether the artist preferred grasping generalities or capturing specific

details. The general rule for dramatists was to achieve a proximity to Nature by stressing the common properties of an emotion shared to some extent by all mankind. This procedure would induce a catharsis in the audience similar to that evoked by the real thing. Classical ode writers who used allegorical personfications to represent emotions were also advised to restrict their description to a few recognizable characteristics rather than to require suspension of disbelief by being overly graphic. Whether the approach was rhetorical, psychological, or both, major critics well into the century agreed that the general impression was most analogous to objective reality.

The same guidelines applied when the subject was a natural object or a landscape; but the degree of likeness desired was also affected by what end the artist wished his imitation to serve. James Thomson comments in "Spring," that Nature is a painter far superior to Art, and the poet cannot hope to match Her brushstrokes with his own.[29] The most detailed description of daisy cannot reproduce the living flower. Despite the fact that Thomson's contemporaries often praised him for this ability, perfect reproduction was not his primary aim. The selective details that he does introduce illustrate the moral reflection that is about to follow. As Patricia M. Spacks remarks, Thomson does not want the reader to "see" the natural object or setting, but

to envision a natural analogy, a "meaning" between it and some aspect of the moral relation between God and man.[30] Although descriptive-didactic verse like The Seasons moves away from traditional imitation, it is not incompatible with earlier interpretations of why and to what degree Nature ans Art ought to be comparable.

According to Joseph Addison in "The Pleasures of the Imagination" (Spectator, #411-421), the viewer derives primary pleasure both from a work of Nature and from a work of Art because it conveys to him ideas of the grand, the beautiful or the uncommon. But when he perceives these qualities in a work of art, it is almost always because his imagination, being stocked with "particular ideas" from Nature which it can "enlarge, compound and vary" (3416) at will. has made a connection between its ideas of Nature's models and what it now sees represented in art. It is not necessary for the viewer to have seen the exact "place, action, or person" being represented, but only something in Nature which bears a "remote analogy" to it or raises analogous ideas. This comparative action on the part of the Imagination constitutes its "secondary pleasure." But while a sufficient degree of similarity is necessary between the natural idea and its artisitc representation in order for both to produce a similar pleasure, a degree of difference must be clearly discernilbe as well. The "final cause" for "annexing pleasure" to

the imaginative process of comparison is to promote its use in accordance with the other functions of the mind--reason and judgment: "to quicken and encourage us in our searches after truth, since the distinguishing one thing from another and the right discerning betwixt our ideas depends wholly upon our comparing them together and observing the congruity or disagreement that appears ..." (#416). Since the act of analogizing is a pleasure in and for itself, natural things which are physically unattractive can be artistically pleasing because they are effectively reproduced. The enjoyment comes not from the association of a pleasing quality in nature with the same quality in a work of art, but from a delight in the close connection between two ideas derived from two objects which are not the same:

> ...the description of a dunghill is pleasing to the imagination if the image be represented to our minds by suitable expressions, tho' perhaps this may be more properly called the pleasure of the understanding than of the fancy, because we are not so much delighted with the image that is contained in the description as with the aptness of the description to excite the image. (#418, June 30, 1712)

This fledgling attempt to give ugliness its due place in a theory of aesthetics is probably much more siginificant for what it parenthetically implies than for what it actually states. Comparisons of appealing qualities

in Art and Nature, Addison suggests, are pleasurable because the "more perfect pattern" of the original adds by association to the appeal of the artistic representation. The process involved is an exercise of the Imagination. Comparisons of unappealing qualities in works of Art and Nature, on the other hand, are pleasurable as an end in themselves. Our satisfaction comes from seeing the resemblance and not from dwelling on those qualities in which the comparison consists. In this case the comparison is an exercise of the Reason. Obviously, this argument is based on a false distinction. The act of comparing is still the same process of mind, regardless of whether or not the qualities compared are positive or negative, attractive or ugly. What Addison is really voicing is an early, not entirely conscious recognition of the inherent difficulty in trying to make reason, and especially the process of analogizing that is the essence of reason, a basis for creative art. To say that we can respond to beauty as such at the same time that we are comparing it with other beauties we have experienced, and that we can avoid responding to ugliness while at the same time deriving intellectual satisfaction from its resemblance to other ugliness is to say at once that man can and cannot feel and think at the same time. Making reasonable analogies, rather than fanciful metaphors the foundation of literary art may avoid unnatural excesses,

but it can also reduce the possibilities of natural excellence. Critics like Addison presented Nature and Truth as something outside of man with which he must somehow make a connection via legitimate analogies. But the most astute among them,while they feared the unrestraining alternative, were not oblivious to the price they paid for their relative safety from error.

The error to be avoided in comparisons of Art and Nature was the same error to which all analogies that faded into equivalencies were subject. When two similar but different ideas or objects were portrayed as equal, the inevitable result was to reduce the superior rather than elevate the inferior one. There is a considerable difference, for example, between portraying Divine Art and human art as two separate processes of creating order, differing in degree, materials and intention, and saying as Charles Gildon does that Divine Art and human art are both "Nature reduc'd to form." Similarly, when Art ceases to be Art, when the cyclops and chimeras it creates are not fictitious characters remotely connected with Nature by probability, but "another Nature" (I,50) superior to God's, the original purpose of the comparison is defeated. When Nature is brought too close to Art, it functions less effectively as the artist's objective standard. When the subject of Art too closely resembles

its original in Nature, both the pleasure and the instructiveness in comparing them are lost.

The nightmarish extreme of this distorted analogy is an identification of the two which results in a complete reversal of roles. Art masquerading as Nature becomes a favorite symbol in eighteenth-century literature and criticism for all misrepresentations of truth, deliberate pretenses and consequent disorder. The contention is always that appearances of reality can be discredited by going beneath the surface. The imagination discerns apparent likeness, and the judgment by digging deeper uncovers differences as well. The technique is central in Swift, but almost always has a more complicated intention than simple ironic reversal. Addison exemplifies it in Spectator #275, where he uses the analogy of Art and Nature ironically to exaggerate and expose the artificiality of a fop. He augments the effect by drawing a deliberately false analogy with the gods, and has also borrowed from Swift the idea of dissecting a Beau's head at an Assembly of Virtuosos. It

> appeared like the Head of another Man; but, upon applying our Glasses to it, we made a very odd Discovery, namely, that what we looked upon as Brains, were not such in reality, but an Heap of strange Materials wound up in that Shape and Texture, and packed together with wonderful Art in the several Cavities of the Skull. For as Homer tells us (Iliad 5.339-43), that the Blood of Gods is not real Blood, but only something like it; so we found that the Brain of a Beau is not real Brain, but only something like it.

Although confusions of Art and Nature are generally frowned on as presumptuous and misleading, there is one exception, which material from the Spectator papers also illustrates. To imitate the best classical literature is considered as accurate a conformity to truth as the imitation of Nature. This is so because the Ancients themselves were the best of Nature's followers. In Spectator #229 Addison relates a story from Plutarch of how Antiochus's physician identified the cause of his patient's symptoms as love rather than disease by comparing them with the manifestations of love described in a poem by Sappho. The implication is not that Art should be a standard for Nature, but that ancient art, having discovered and accurately portrayed the laws of Nature, is an equivalent standard of truth. It can never be forgotten in considering the eighteenth-century analogy of Art and Nature that "Nature" is valued only incidentally in and for itself. Primarily, it is a visible guide via analogy to the invisible but unerring truth. To Addison Nature and Revealed Religion are equivalent for artistic purposes, because both provide the foundation of truth on which a successful work of art can build. In Spectator #267 he praises the "action" of Paradise Lost because it is "filled...with so many surprising Incidents, which bear so close Analogy

with what is delivered in Holy Writ." Nature, like the Bible or an Homeric epic, is a guide to art because it gives the artist something outside of himself on which to confidently base his work.

The replacement of imitation by an organic theory of art, which makes the standard of naturalness internal is the subject of much insightful criticism. Too often, however, the major departures are looked on as a complete break with the analogy of Art and Nature, instead of a practically inevitable outgrowth of it. Constant interest in the inner workings of the mind, in how it creates and in what types of creations it responds to, were bound to gain respect for "naturalness" of mind, especially when these operations were regularly compared with the natural ordering of the universe. Developments in the theory of association were bound to give a greater value to independent exertions of the brain, especially as the emotional factors affecting individual patterns of analogy were given a more scientific, that is, psychological explanation. Already in Thomson's poetry (although it is often compared to landscape painting) the writer is succeeding in a purpose that Edmund Burke describes in Book V of his Philosophical Inquiry into Our Ideas of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1759) as exactly opposite to that of descriptive painting: "to affect rather by sympathy

than by imitation, to display rather the effect of things on the mind of the speaker or of others than to present a clear idea of the things themselves."[31] Analogies of Art and Nature become important not so much for the accurate representation of the original, as for the ideas in the creator's mind that the making of those analogies demonstrates. The same view prevails in William Jones' essay "On the Arts Commonly Called Imitative" (1772) with regard to the mind of the audience. He claims that neither depicting human emotions nor describing external objects is imitation, because the resemblance is not between the original and the reproduction, but between the response evoked by the two in the viewer:

> ...those parts of poetry, music and painting which relate to the passions affect by sympathy, so those which are merely descriptive act by a kind of substitution, that is, by raising in our minds affections or sentiments analogous to those which arise in us when the respective objects in nature are presented to our senses. 32

Partly, Jones' argument is Addison's aesthetics slightly altered. But the shift in emphasis is important. It is the internal process of analogizing that art seeks to reproduce either in itself or in the reader, and the accuracy of the resemblance between the work of art and its original, provided the intended effect is acheived, becomes increasingly insignificant. Attitudes like this one move criticism that much closer to art as an imitation of

the mind of the poet. It is only a short step to the substitution of "expression" for "imitation," and to the combining of artistry and naturalness in creative spontaneity.

Eighteenth-century criticism's changing attitude toward the use of personification also illustrates how theories of organic composition and natural genius are offshoots of the Art/Nature analogy as well as ultimate rejections of it. Personfication in the early and mid-eighteenth century is a rhetorical device by means of which abstract natural emotions are given physical embodiment. Through the judicious exercising of the Imagination and the Reason proper details are selected to describe Fear, Anger, etc. so that visualization of the idea represented will be possible for almost any reader. As interest in mental processes and especially in the workings of genius grows, personification comes to be interpreted not as a contrived concretization of abstract emotion, but as a natural function of human feeling. Lord Kames in the Elements of Criticism (1761) says of personifying that "the mind, agitated by certain passions, is prone to bestow sensibility upon things inanimate."[33] He further adds, "that such personification is derived from Nature, will not admit the least remaining doubt, after finding it in poems of the darkest ages and remotest countries" (p.361). Unfortunately, his supporting example is the works of Ossian.

Archibald Alison's argument for personification as a natural function is not based on its use throughout history, but on this type of analogy being itself a natural law which the poet cannot help but obey. Listing the ways in which qualities of matter function artistically as qualities of mind, he includes as one of the "indirect means"

> From analogy or resemblance-- from that resemblance which has everywhere been felt between the qulaities of matter and of mind and by which the former becomes so powerfully expressive to us of the latter. It is thus that the colours,...sounds,...forms, and above all...the motions of inanimate objects are so universally felt as resembling peculiar qualities or affection of mind, and when felt are so productive of the analogous emotion; that the personification of matter is so strongly marked in every period of the history of human thought; and that the poet, while he gives life and animation to everything around him, is not displaying his own invention, but only obeying one of the most powerful laws which regulate the imagination of man. 34

In retrospect, the analogy of Art and Nature by elevating literature to an expression of truth, while at the same time never losing sight of the important distinction between fiction and reality, opened the way for poetry's eventual emergence as its own truth and as the expression of an individual nature which did not depend on compliance with externals for its validity.

Footnotes

[1]See Ernest Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Boston, 1951), especially chapter VII, for an explanation of this change in European culture in general, which is different from but compatible with my own.

[2]Northrope Frye, "Toward Defining an Age of Sensibility," Fables of Identity (New York, 1963), pp.130-37.

[3]Geoffrey Hartman, "Romantic Poetry and the Genius Loci," The Disciplines of Criticism: Essays Honoring Rene Wellek, ed. Peter Demetz et al (New Haven, 1968), 289-314.

[4]M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (New York, 1953), pp.57-8.

[5]See, for example, Alexander Page, "Faculty Psychology and Metaphor in Eighteenth-Century Criticism," MP(1969), 237-247.

[6]Walter Jackson Bate, The Burden of the Past and the English Poet (Massachusetts, 1970), pp.17-18.

[7]John Dryden, "The Defense of the Epilogue," Essays of Dryden, ed. W.P.Ker (New York, 1961), I, 162-177. All quotations refer to this two-volume edition.

[8]Dryden, I, 55.

[9]Abrams, p.54.

[10]See G.M.Miller, Historical Point of View in English Literary Criticism, 1570-1770 (New York, 1913).

[11]Geoffrey Tillotson, "Eighteenth-Century Poetic Diction," Eighteenth-Century English Literature: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Clifford (New York, 1959), 218-220.

[12]Charles Gildon, The Complete Art of Poetry (London, 1743), I, 46.

[13]Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, The Specator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford, 1965), vol.II. All excerpts refer to this five-volume edition.

[14]See R.F. Jones, "Science and Criticism in the Neo-Classical Age of English Literature," The Seventeenth Century (Stanford, 1951), pp.41-74, for a discussion of the contradictions in these two comparisons.

[15]Joseph Trapp Lectures on Poetry, 1742, trans. William Bowyer and William Clarke (Hildescheim, 1969), pp.1-2.

[16]Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses (London,1842), VII.

[17]Leonard Welsted, "A Discourse Concerning the Perfection of the English Language, the State of Poetry, etc.," 1724, Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays, ed. Scott Elledge (New York, 1961), I, 329.

[18]Gildon, I, 68.

[19]Alexander Gerard, Essay on Genius, ed. Bernhard Fabian (München, 1966), p.41.

[20]Ibid., Fabian's "Introduction," p. xvi.

[21]James Beattie, Essays on Poetry and Music (London, 1779), p.3.

[22]Erasmus Darwin, The Loves of the Plants (London, 1789).

[23]See Jean Hagstrum, The Sister Arts (Chicago, 1958).

[24]Chester F. Chapin, Personification in Eighteenth-Century English Poetry (New York, 1955),

[25]In Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays, ed. Scott Elledge (New York, 1961), II, 990.

[26]Ralph Cohen, The Art of Discrimination: Thomson's "The Seasons" and the Language of Criticism (Berkeley and L.A., 1964), p.246.

[27]Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper), Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. J.M.Robertson (Gloucester, Mass., 1963).

[28]Alexander Pope, "Translations of Homer," Poems of Alexander Pope, VII, ed. Maynard Mack (London and New Haven, 1967), pp.82-83.

[29]11.468-475.

[30] Patricia V. Spacks, The Poetry of Vision (Cambridge, 1967), pp.13-45.

[31] Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, ed. J.T. Boulton (New York, 1958), p.72.

[32] In Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays, ed. Scott Elledge (New York, 1961), II, 879.

[33] Henry Home Kames, Elements of Criticism (New York, 1883), p. 361.

[34] Archibald Alison, Essays on the Nature and Principles of of Taste (1790), chapter I, Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays, ed. Elledge (New York, 1961), II, 1045.

Chapter V Analogy and the Rules: Eighteenth-Century Literary Criticism and Aesthetics, 2

a) Analogy and the Marriage of Wit and Judgment

That spontaneity of expression which would be synonomous with the "natural" in Nineteenth-Century Criticism also had its place in the Eighteenth Century. Like other instinctive behavior, it was potentially constructive, but had to be refined and modified before it could be of use to society. It is in these terms that Charles Gildon sees the relationship of Art and Nature in the technique of the poet and allies it with a parallel connection between Fancy and Judgment:

> For Fancy and Judgment must join in every great Poet, as Courage and Judgment in every great General;...Fancy is what we generally call Nature, or a Genius; Judgment is what we mean by Art, the Union of which in one Man makes a complete Poet.[1]

Gildon's statement is a near echo of Alexander Pope's Essay on Criticism (1711):

> Some, to whom Heav'n in Wit has been profuse,
> Want as much more, to turn it to its use;
> For Wit and Judgment often are at strife,
> Tho' meant each other's Aid, like Man and Wife.
> (11.8--83)[2]

Pope too sees "Wit" as a natural gift (Heaven's profusion") and Judgment as the art of applying it according to its own Rules ("Nature Methodized").

The fact that in major Eighteenth-Century Criticism wit(or fancy) and judgment are continually prescribed as the two necessary components of literary creation is clear evidence that the way of analogizing central to eighteenth-century thought also constitutes the recommended formula for writing good poetry. The philosophical definitions of fancy and judgment (Hobbes, 1640) and wit and judgment (Locke, 1690) which were popularly known and accepted (see Addison, Spectator #62) are further proof that making analogies was the basis of making poetry. Whatever difference exists in critical terminology between "wit" and "fancy," both share the primary function of finding "unexpected similitude of things otherwise much unlike," while the principal function of judgment is to discern "dissimilitude in things that otherwise appear the same" (Hobbes, IV, 68). They operate in the poet as "each other's Aid," because the business of poetry is to represent truth; and the truth is that things which bear a real resemblance to each other in some of their characteristics are unlike in others.

While functionless ornamentation is frowned on by eighteenth-century critics, creative use of the imagination is allowed and even encouraged when the resulting images elucidate the subject to which they are compared and, unlike metaphor, reveal rather than alter its essential character.

This type of comparison, a combination of wit and judgment, is what Pope recognizes as the essence of Homer's imagery, its justification and its effectiveness:

> Homer has been careful to contrive such Reliefs and Pauses as might divert the Mind to some other scene, without losing sight of his principal Object. His Comparisons are the more frequent on this Account; for a Comparison serves this End the most effectually of anything, as it is at once correspondent to and different from the subject. Those criticks...who fancy that the Use of Comparisons distracts the Attention, and draws it from the first Image which should most employ it (as that we lose the Idea of the Battel itself, while we are led by a Simile to that of a Deluge or a Storm:) Those, I say, may as well imagine we lose the Thought of the Sun, when we see his Reflection in the Water; where he appears more distinctly, and is contemplated more at ease than if we gaz'd directly at his Beams. For it is with the Eye of the Imagination as it is with our corporeal Eye, it must sometimes be taken off from the Object in order to see it the better.3

The right balance of fancy(wit) and judgment which constitutes the analogical structure of a poem is also, according to Francis Hutchinson (Reflections Upon Laughter, 1725), the means by which a comic poem evokes laughter: "That...which seems generally the cause of laughter is the bringing together of images which have contrary additional ideas as well as some resemblance in the principal idea...."[4] While Hutchinson does not distinguish between the different types of comedy, Dryden in the Preface to An Evening's Love (1671) differentiates Comedy and Farce based on the fact that the"first works on the judgment and fancy; the latter on the fancy only" (I, 136). In comedy

we are both amused and instructed because we recognize both the similarity and the difference between proper and extravagant human behavior. In burlesque, the attention focuses on the most absurd and unnatural behavior that can possibly be associated with human beings as an end in itself.

Just as fancy and judgment combine to delight and enlighten in good comedy, so fancy and understanding are both operative in the production and the appreciation of effective allegory. In John Hughes' opinion, allegory "is a kind of Poetical Picture or Hieroglyphic, which by its apt Resemblance conveys Instruction to the Mind, by an Analogy to the Senses; and so amuses the Fancy, whilst it informs the Understanding."[5] The discerners of similarity and of difference combine to produce an accurate analogy which is unexpected and pleasant to the Imagination; and, because of its aptness, more informative to the Reason than an unadorned discourse on the original subject itself. This type of cooperation by which the Imagination draws an analogy between ideas in the understanding and material objects in order to convey their agreement and disagreement to the understandings of others more clearly is also the cause of satisfaction in didactic poetry or prose. In Spectator #421, Addison comments on writers of morality, criticism and abstract speculation:

> ...these writers tho' they do not directly treat of the visible parts of nature, often draw from them their similitudes, metaphors

> and allegories. By these allusions a truth in the understanding is as it were reflected by the imagination; we are able to see something like color and shape in a notion and to discover a scheme of thoughts traced out upon matter. And here the mind receives a great deal of satisfaction and has two of its faculties gratified at the same time, while the fancy is busy copying after the understanding and transcribing ideas out of the intellectual world into the material.

The constant interchange of terms like "wit," "fancy," "imagination," "judgment," and "understanding" and their sometimes inconsistent usage make any accurate conclusion regarding them open to question. But, in this case, the fluctuations in usage themselves reveal a comparatively stable analogical framework. One of Dryden's earliest statements regarding fancy and judgment appears in the Epistle Dedicatory to the Rival Ladies (1664):

> This worthless present was designed you, long before it was a play; when it was only a confused mass of thoughts, tumbling over one another in the dark; when the fancy was yet in its first week, moving the sleeping images of things towards the light, there to be distinguished, and then either chosen or rejected by the judgment. (I,1)

The implied definitions are fundamentally consistent with those in the Preface to Annus Mirabilis (1666), where, however, the use of terms is far more complicated. Wit is a "faculty of the imagination" which combines "Invention," finding the thought; Fancy, "moulding the thought as the

judgment represents it proper to the subject"; and Elocution, adorning the thought with appropriate words. Wit "like a Nimble spaniel beats over and ranges through the fields of Memory, till it springs the quarry it hunted after." It "searches over all the memory" for the "Ideas of those things which it designs to represent." This definition is also compatible with the later description of "wit" in the Defense of the Epilogue (1672) and the Preface to Albion and Albanius (1685) as a propriety of thoughts and words:

> Propriety of thought is that fancy which arises naturally from the subject, or which the poet adapts to it. Propriety of words is the clothing of those thoughts with such expressions as are naturally proper to them; and from both these, if they are judiciously performed, the delight of poetry results. (II, 270)

In each case, "wit," which in this series of essays represents poetic creation, consists in the combined efforts of fancy and judgment. Fancy selects images which are similar to the thought they must represent and illuminate, and judgment determines whether or not the similarity is sufficient and yet distinct enough not to obliterate the difference. "Propriety" itself is an analogical word in the sense that analogy means proportion, because the word is suited to the thought in proportion to its power to evoke

in the reader's mind the idea that was in the mind of the writer, even though it is not the same as the idea, but only its sign.

Richard Blackmore echoes Dryden's interpretation of wit as a mutual effort of fancy and judgment, describing the "Man of Wit" as possessing

> ...the sprightly Operations of the Mind: by which means the Imagination can with great Facility range the wide Field of Nature, contemplate an infinite Variety of Objects and by observing the Similitude and Disagreement of their several Qualities, single Ideas, which will best serve its purpose.

But Blackmore also speaks of Wit in terms which suggest the old uncertainty that seldom ceased to haunt eighteenth-century thinking-- that there could be no real connection between Art and Nature. "It is evident," he insists, "that Wit cannot essentially consist in the Justness and Propriety of the Thoughts, that is the conformity of our conceptions to the Objects we conceive; for this is the definition of Truth..." (p.191).

In his Essay Toward Fixing the True Standards of Wit...(1744) Corbyn Morris picks up this opposition of Wit and Truth from Locke and explains it as a result of the "Direction" of each being "absolutely different" : "It being the Aim of Wit to strike the Imagination, and of Truth to convince the Judgment: From thence they never can be perfectly coincident" (p.xv).[7] Morris's comment must be

read in the light of his own definition of wit, not as the whole creative process, but as one of its several devices: "the quick Elucidation of one Subject, by unexpectedly exhibiting its Agreement or Contrast with another Subject" (p.3). But Blackmore, Norris, and all other eighteenth-century critics who questioned whether comparative imagery, even that which kept subject and illustration, vehicle and tenor distinct, could claim equal validity with those images which were reproductions rather than interpretations of the original, were all making the same fundamental error about the connection of analogy with truth. Literary analogies in the form of witticisms, similes, allegories, etc., amounted to the writer's expression of what the real object, emotion or event appeared like to him. The appearance qualified as an accurate presentation of the reality, if the majority of the persons viewing his work were able to make the same association and to recognize its meaning.

This important distinction between Falsehood, which is the opposite of Truth, and Fiction properly executed, which is analogous to Truth, was a major stumbling block for eighteenth-century critics and accounts for many of their serious misconceptions. That is why it is significant as well as surprising to find so astute an expression of this decisive concept in a work as early as the Oxford

Lectures on Poetry by Joseph Trapp:

> Thoughts are the images of things, as are of thoughts; and we all know that images and pictures are only so far true as they are true representations of men and things. Those passages in Virgil, "Terrasque, urbesque recedent," and the like, where things are represented, not as they are, but as they seem to be, are no objection to what I advance. For poets and painters think it their business to take the likeness of things from their appearance.... Their thoughts are just, according to the strictest rules of reason; for in description or painting that is truly expressed which is expressed as the thing appears to be. Neither metaphors, hyperboles, irinies or even equivocal expressions...nor fiction nor fable, are any deviation from this rule of right thinking, for there is a wide difference between falseness and fiction, between that which is truly false and that which is only so in appearance.8

The difference between figuratively representing the appearance of an object or idea and imitating the original, however, was not the same as the discrepancy between that apparent and real resemblance of the figure chosen. "True wit," says Addison in Spectator 362 (August 11, 1711), consists in an "obvious Resemblance" of Ideas, sustained by "some further Congruity discovered in the two Ideas that is capable of giving the Reader some Surprize." False wit, on the other hand, is a "Resemblance and Congruity" in outward appearances only-- in the words that stand for the ideas, but not in the ideas themselves. When all the similarity is on the surface and all the difference is in the substance, the figure or fiction is not an analogy with fact but a contradiction of it. "Mixt Wit" results when

the resemblance is partly in the ideas and partly in the words. This usually occurs in metaphors where the word used to take the place of the idea's customary signification is modified by some words which are proper to it in its original meaning and others which are proper to it in its figurative meaning. For example, the poet uses the word "Fire" as a metaphor for love, and then "mixes the Qualities of Fire with those of Love" by referring to the figurative word in the same sentence both "as a Passion and as a real Fire" (p.266). Such a comparison is not the product of a cooperation between Fancy and Judgment, but of their working at cross purposes. As an analogy it is

> more or less perfect as the Resemblance lies in the Ideas or in the Words: Its Foundations are laid partly in Falsehood and partly in Truth: Reason(Judgment) puts in her Claim for one half of it, and Extravagance(Fancy) for the other.

Joseph Spence objects to the same "confusions of the metaphor and the proper" in Pope's translation of the Odyssey and in Dryden"

> To say, "The god of light was driving his car down the steep of heaven,"...is metaphorical; to say "The sun is setting," is proper; but should I say, "The sun is setting with sloping wheels," this would be neither metaphorical nor proper; nor could it raise anything in the mind but a confusion of ideas.

> Such confusion of the metaphor and the proper have a great resemblance to that absurdity of mixing fable and reality together which appears so grossly in Mr. Dryden's Hind and Panther....9

In imperfect analogies such as these the problem is not a lack of clear similarity and difference between vehicle and tenor, but distortion of that clarity by the arbitrary appropriation to one idea of the distinguishing characteristics of the other.

It is this distortion which Corbyn Morris sees as the decisive difference between Wit and Metaphor. His comparison of them in An Essay Toward Fixing the True Standard of Wit,..(1744) unmistakably echoes the distinction between Analogy and Metaphor in Bishop Browne's Things Divine and Supernatural Conceived by Analogy,..(1733). The similarity is not evidence of direct influence but of a shared interdisciplinary frame of mind that explains and justifies the prevalence of analogy in the method and matter of eighteenth Century literature. In Wit, Morris suggests,

> the two subjects are suddenly confronted with each other, and upon their joint View, the original one is elucidated by the obvious Agreement or Contrast of the Auxiliary Subject.
>
> But Metaphor goes farther, and not content with arranging the two Subjects together, and exhibiting from thence their Agreement or Contrast, it actually snatches the Properties of the auxiliary one, and fits them upon the original Subject.

> ...in Wit the original Subject is enlightened, without altering its Dress; whereas in METAPHOR the original Subject is cloathed in a new Dress, and Struts forward at once with a different Air, and with strange, unexpected Ornaments.
>
> It is from hence, that by METAPHOR a more masculine Air and Vigour is given to a Subject, than by Wit; But it too often happens, that the METAPHOR is carried too far, as instead of elucidating, to obscure and disfigure the original Subject. (pp.4-5)

In Morris's comparison of Wit and Metaphor as in Browne's of Analogy and Metaphor the distinction is between a real resemblance of parallel but independent ideas and an apparent resemblance which is only on the surface and requires a misleading alteration of that surface to appear convincing. In both religion and literature there is a fear that fancy and enthusiasm will outsparkle judgment rather than be illuminated by it.

Like the other analogical concepts of eighteenth-century criticism the marriage of wit and judgment is an unintentional preparation as well as a counterfoil for what was to follow it. In Alexander Gerard's Essay on Genius (1774), for instance, the associative theory first systematically connected with the making of analogies by David Hartley, is more liberally interpreted and identified as the explanation of natural genius. The stress is not on the relationship between the original ideas acquired by the mind and the new associations it is able to make of them,

but on the fact that they are new and as such an expression of creative power:

> ...ideas do not lie in the mind without any connexion or dependence. Imagination can connect them by new relations. It knits them together by other ties than what connected the real things from which they are derived; and often bestows an union upon ideas whose archetypes had no relation.
> ...association is often so strong, that it bestows a sort of cohesion on several separate ideas, and makes them start up in numberless combinations, many of them different from every form which the senses have perceived; and thus produces a new creation. In this operation of the imagination, its associating power, we shall...discover the origin of genius.
> (I,iii, 39-41)

Though Dryden's man of wit and Gerard's man of genius are potential opposites-- the one a "discoverer," the other an "originator"-- both rely for their invention on the combined efforts of fancy and judgment, usually referred to by the later critic as "fertility" and "regularity." Gerard makes the connection even clearer by using a "dog" metaphor similar to theone in the Preface to Dryden's Annus Mirabilis:

> Genius implies regularity, as well as comprehensiveness of imagination. Regularity arises in a great measure from such a turn of imagination as enables the associating principles not only to introduce proper ideas but also to connect the design of the whole with every idea that is introduced.
> ....As acuteness of smell carries a dog along the path of the game for which he searches and secures him against the danger of quitting it upon another scent; so this happy structure of imagination leads a man of genius into those

> tracks where the proper ideas lurk....
> Neither fertility nor regularity of imagination will form a good genius if one be disjoined from the other. (pp.885-6)

Gradually, just as a clear distinction between Nature and Art and tenor and vehicle becomes less significant to the creative process, so the differentiation of fancy and judgment as separate faculties of the mind also diminishes in importance. As faithfulness to what is natural in the individual artist becomes the major criterion of truthfulness in artistic expression, natural genius comes to include within it an inseparable combination of fancy and judgment, an instinctive sense of rightness, which allows the reader to feel the shades and nuances of a poem's images, without having their similarity and difference spelled out for him. In this sense at least, eighteenth-century as opposed to nineteenth-century poetry is not product versus process. The images in a Romantic poem are the end result of all the processes of comparison and distinction that went on in the poet's mind, while the images of a neoclassical poem are an exhibition of those processes. "Uniformity amid variety," the ultimate analogy, is experienced in a Romantic metaphor; it is delineated reasonably in an eighteenth-century analogy. In this respect, nineteenth-century poetry would bring final fruition to some of the basic intentions of eighteenth-century analogizing, while at the same time

going well beyond the paradoxical restrictiveness of its basic approach.

b) The Analogy of Moral and Aesthetic Taste

A chief aim of such critical pronouncements as that Art should imitate Nature, Fancy should cooperate with Judgement, and literature should be both pleasing and instructive was to establish creative writing as a servant and disseminator of truth. Poetry did not merely transcribe what was appealing in human or material nature: it interpreted the significance of the appeal. To convey that significance, directly by imitating or indirectly by figure was its ultimate goal. Granted their important differences, the authors of Windsor Forest, The Seasons and The Task were all alike in believing that the material and the natural were effective analogues of moral truth. Distrusting anything abstract or invisible the eighteenth-century writers relied heavily on analogy to bring within the confines of an empirical society important notions which men could not experience directly through the senses. The inventive poet, in this respect, was a middleman between the non-material world and the less imaginative mind of the average reader, who was not as well-equipped to make connections between concrete and abstract reality, but could easily recognize these relationships once the poet had made them visible. In his Principles of Moral Philosophy

(London, 1740) George Turnbull even contends that "wit and poetry" are only a "consequence" of the real"analogy" between "moral and natural ideas" which they exist solely to represent (p.54).

It is in the matter of discrimination, however, that natural analogies between the material and the moral had their greatest long-term effect in critical theory. Eighteenth-century moralists and aestheticians were both curious about how the human mind develops tastes. Given the mind's ability to differentiate between objects and ideas, how did it make a value judgment? What innate or learned power made possible the conclusion that one species of flower was more beautiful than another, and that one course of action was ethically more right than its alternative? As respect for the art of poetry increased, so did the recognition that to properly appreciate it was an art in itself. Critics began to analyze literary taste and to look for analogous selective processes operating on the two standards of objective truth which are the measure of art-- Natural Beauty (pleasure) and Right Conduct (instruction). To some critics a taste for good literature was equivalent to distinguishing between different physical sensations; and both abilities were natural instincts which could be refined, but not instilled, by education. In Spectator #409 Addison defines literary taste as a "faculty

of the soul which discerns the beauties of an author with pleasure and the imperfections with dislike." This "mental taste which enables a reader to distinguish a genius and a hack" is directly parallel to the "sensitive taste" with which he distinguishes the nuances of flavor in different brands of tea. Addison's proof that this is a real resemblance is the fact that it has always been "so general in all tongues."

To other critics, artistic taste as well as artistic execution is comparable to proper social behavior. It may be enhanced by natural aptitude, but it is mostly a matter of learning and following a prescribed set of rules. Sir Joshua Reynolds defines "taste" in the Arts as the "power of distinguishing right from wrong."[10] The motivational force behind this power is natural-- "the natural appetite of the human mind...for Truth."[11] But like "self-love" in Pope's Essay on Man, is of little practical use until it has been linked up with something outside of and larger than itself. In Pope's scheme self-love and scial become the same. In Reynolds' when the artist conducts himself in accordance with the "invariable principles" of his discipline,i.e. the Rules, his work is true and is therefore in good taste. A genius, he says, is a man who can supplement good taste with the "power of execution." The comment incensed Blake, who wrote

in the marginal notes to his copy of the Discourses: "Taste and Genius are not acquirable but born within us."

The idea that fancy and judgment were one natural power which expressed the unique truth of the individual poet/prophet was a long way off. But already in the early decades of the Eighteenth Century attempts were being made to show that perception of what was appealing and what was just were different levels of the same natural operation. The Earl of Shaftesbury used this "direct analogy between discerning physical beauty and...beauty of character" to illustrate the difference between the sister arts, at the same time that he used the difference to indicate the direct analogy:

> Even in the arts, which are mere imitations of that outward grace and beauty, we not only confess a taste, but make it a point of refined breeding to discover amid the many false manners and ill styles the true and natural one which represents the real beauty and Venus of the kind. It is the like moral grace and Venus which, discovering itself in the turns of character and the variety of human affection, is copied by the writing artist. 11

This connection between sensitive and ethical discrimination becomes more plausible and more exemplary of analogy's role in eighteenth-century literature in the system of Francis Hutcheson. In his Inquiry into Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725)[12] he divides sense perception into two kinds-- external and internal. The external sense

perceives the secondary qualities of objects, but does not in itself use this information to expand knowledge. The internal sense perceives ideas of "similitude, proportion, analogy, or equality" (pp.353-4) and applies them to the objects or ideas perceived by the external sense. Contrary to Locke, argues Hutcheson, these internal senses by which the mind determines agreement and disagreement "no more presuppose an innate idea than an external sense": both are natural powers of perception, or determinations of the mind to receive necessarily certain ideas from the presence of objects" (p. 370-71). In W.J. Hipple's view, Hutcheson's aim in establishing the notion of internal senses" is to "demonstrate analogically a similar sense of moral actions, characters and affections."[13] In other words, both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson wished to demonstrate by analogy that man is naturally good, that his natural instinct is to choose the good over the bad, just as he prefers the beautiful to the ugly. But Shaftesbury's parallel also suggests, especially in the light of previous associations among literary, sensitive and moral taste, that the analogical or associative principle which operates in our appreciation of both physical beauty and moral good is the same natural sense which determines the representation of that beauty and good in works of art. The "internal sense" is a passive power of receiving ideas of beauty from all objects in which there is uniformity amidst

variety" (p.371). Uniformity amid variety or the perfect balance of similarity and difference which constitutes analogy is the ultimate good taste in natural beauty. As an expression of divine and moral order it is also the most tasteful ethically. And as both an imitation of natural beauty, a representation of moral order and an expression of the real resemblance between them it is also the essence of good taste in literature. To achieve uniformity amid variety and to appreciate its acheivement are the highest goals of the writer and critic respectively.

Identifying tastefulness in aesthetics, ethics, and literary invention as correspondingly natural processes of analogizing is not far from identifying individual spontaneity as their natural and unifying source. As exhibited in Gerard's use of the internal sense, the concept of native genius and of organic composition are almost inevitable offshoots of the analogical/associative approaches developed chiefly by Hutcheson and Hartley. Initially, "spontaneous" replaces "passive" as an adjective describing the creative mind's response to experience. But in the height of Romanticism images like Coleridge"s of the mind as an Aeolian harp and allusions like Wordsworth's to poetry as emotion recollected in tranquility suggest a more balanced view which incorporates what is truly universal in eighteenth-century critical theory, while rejecting most

of what it believed to be unchanging. Before poetry could once again be conceived as a simultaneous process of feeling, thinking and imagining, indivisible both in the poet's mind and in the resulting poem, the real connection between beauty, truth and art had to be re-established on new grounds. At least in terms of its effect on modern literature, the Eighteenth Century can honestly take credit for having reinstated faith through the intervention of reason-- particularly through reasoning via analogy.

c) Analogy and the Sublime

If a graph were to be drawn with one line representing the changes in theory and usage of analogy and the other the fluctuations in discussion and application of the sublime, chronologically, the two lines would be sometimes parallel, sometimes intersecting, and still other times, strikingly divergent. Such a graph might well serve as a paradigm of the complex and often illusive character of eighteenth-century criticism in general. Fundamentally, analogy is a deliberate, controlled process of reasoning, while the sublime is an uncontrollable outburst of feeling. Analogy is a comparison of like and unlike objects and ideas in order to more accurately determine their limits. But in the words of Edmund Burke: "to see an object distinctly is to see its bounds and a thing that is limitable is not sublime."[14] Analogy is comparison; and to experience the

sublime is to perceive something incomparable. Eighteenth-century analogy and the Longinian sublime according to their strictest definitions only converge in the sense that the one is a rhetorical device and the other is an effect which can be achieved or enhanced by rhetoric. But while three of Longinus' five sources of sublimity are the products of artfulness, these are not the sources emphasized by Boileau in his influential translation, nor associated with Longinus' Peri Hupsous in subsequent commentaries, such as those of Dryden and Dennis. The sublime may be achieved by emulation, which is a kind of analogy; but its chief source is "vehement and inspired passion." There are two sentiments proper to epic poetry, comments Addison in Spectator #279, "the Natural and the Sublime." The natural thoughts are those best expressed by comparative figures, and most appropriate for what Joseph Trapp refers to as "the middle Kind of Style between the Sublime and the Humble, suitable to every Branch of Poetry" (p.89). Those analogies which constitute "wit" are not meant to astonish because of their doubtful plausibility or their overpowering wonder, but because they seem so immediately appropriate that the reader is surprised at not having thought of or come across the same juxtaposition of ideas before. It is this line of reasoning which occasions Corbyn Morris's comment that

> in Wit the Subjects must be ordinary and level;...not such as are common, but such as have no extraordinarily exalted, or enlarged Qualites; and are not unsizeable in the particular Circumstances in which they are compared to each other;-- otherwise...the Result of the Arrangement will not be so properly WIT, as either the Sublime, or Burlesque. (p.3)

Comparisons with sublime ideas tend to reduce sublimity by distracting attention from the more perfect object, and are used primarily as a satirical device, where the inaccuracy is deliberate and is aimed at exposure rather than enhancement.

There are at least two occasions in earlier eighteenth-century criticism, however, in which Analogy and Sublimity are described as compatible aspects of poetry. The one is in Pope's notes to his translation of the Iliad, the other is in Warburton's defense of Pope's unheretical intentions in his Essay on Man. Pope's comment refers to the analogy in Book IV of a goddess protecting Menelaus inbattle with a mother protecting her sleeping child from a fly (11.163ff). Under proper circumstances comparisons of things which vary widely in degree but not in kind can produce both a sense of justness and a feeling of sublimity simultaneously:

> This is one of those humble Comparisons which Homer sometimes used to diversify his Subject, but a very exact one in its kind, and

> coressponding in all its Parts....To which it may be added, that if Providence of heavenly Powers to their Creatures is exprest by the love of a Mother to her Child, if Men in regard to them are but as heedless, sleeping Infants, and if those Dangers which may seem great to us, are by them as easily warded off as the Simile implies, there will appear something sublime in this Conception, however little or low the Image may be thought at first sight in respect to a Heroe. A higher Comparison would but have tended to lessen the Disparity between the Gods and Man, and the Justness of the Simile had been lost, as well as the Grandeur of the Sentiment.15

In cases like this one, reason precedes and induces feeling. The emotions aroused by the mind's operations on the ideas it recieves from objects, in this case from their representations in art, rather than the feelings aroused by the objects themselves, are the essence of the sublime.

In A Critical and Philosophical Commentary on Mr. Pope's Essay on Man (London, 1742) William Warburton employs a similar argument to explain a greatness of purpose and effect which Pope's more hostile critics, and possibly even Pope himself, had failed to recognize. The Essay on Man is clearly neither as aetheistical as Crousaz interpreted it to be nor as systematized as Warburton's explication manages to make it appear. What remains important in an otherwise petty dispute over minor doctrine is Warburton's reason for seeing in Pope's poem a first and perfect marriage of analogical methods and sublime thoughts. The central idea of the Essay on Man is

that the existence of evil does not obviate the validity of a Perfect and divinely controlled Universe. Pope knew, argues Warburton, that

> The way to prove his Point...was to illustrate the Effect of partial moral Evil in the Universe by partial natural Evil in a particular System. Whether partial moral Evil tends to the Good of the Universe, we cannot decide, but from known Effects; the Rules of Argument require that it be proved by Analogy,i.e. setting it by, and comparing it with a Thing <u>certain</u>, and it is a Thing certain, that partial natural Evil tends to the Good of our <u>particular System</u>. (p.37)

This analogy of the natural and the moral, of the known with the unknown, in that it "reveals so harmonious a Connection in the Disposition of things" is itself "transcendently beautiful." The idea that everything is in some way analogous to everything else brings our conception of the universe within limits, while at the same time astonishing us with the limitlessness of the system itself.

Warburton uses as a specific example of the mutually enhancing combination of Wit, or clever comparison, and the Sublime, or elevating sentiment, the Ape/Newton analogy in Epistle II:

> Superior beings, when of late they saw
> A mortal Man unfold all Nature's law,
> Admir'd such wisdom in an earthly shape,
> And shewed a NEWTON as we shew an Ape. (11.31-34)

According to Warburton, in order to properly understand this figure, we must realize the poet brings "none of the Ape's

Qualities, but its Sagacity into the Comparison" (p.74). We will then see why he uses an Ape instead of a "half reasoning Elephant":

> Because as none but a Shape resembling human, accompanied with great Sagacity, could occasion by Doubt of that Animal's relation to Man, the Ape only having the Resemblance.... And on this ground of Relation the whole Beauty of the Thought depends; Newton, and those superior Beings being equally immortal Spirits, tho' of different Orders. And here let me take notice of a new species of the Sublime, of which our poet may be justly said to be the Maker; so new that we have yet no Name for it, tho' of a Nature distinct from every other poetical Excellence. The two great Perfections of Works of Genius are Wit and Sublimity. Many writers have been witty, several have been sublime, and some few have even possessed both these Qualities separately....But none that I know of, besides our Poet, hath had the Art to incorporate them....in this compounded Excellence the Wit receives a dignity from the Sublime and the Sublime a Splendor from the Wit; which, in their state of separate Existence, they both wanted. (pp.74-5)

Theoretically this is an example of the same inducement of passion through logic that Pope observes in Homer. The reader is supposedly brought to the sublime feeling that a superior man is little different from an immortal Spirit by the presentation of the analogous idea that a superior animal is little different from a human being. Here are Locke's reverse proportions based on the two halves of the Great Chain of Being all over again. The difficulty is in believing that a skilled craftsman like Pope would leave the

most vital characteristic of the Ape for the purposes of his comparison imprecisely stated, unless he meant the implication to be purposely ambiguous. Further, in view of the verses which precede and follow those in question, all of which concern the presumption and pride of man in attempting to fathom the planets when he cannot even comprehend himself, it is almost impossible to read the passage as anything but ironic. The wit is most definitely an example of eighteenth-century analogy, not as it complements true sublimity, however, but as it exposes man's false sense of the sublime. Ironically, presumptuous man, thinking to make himself analogous to the angels by discovering the secrets of their milieu is in reality making himself that much more analogous to an inferior being-- an ape. The "superior beings" who show Newton as we would exhibit a performing animal are delighting in the antics of a lower order which are amusing to behold but in no way contribute to the function that this particular order was meant to fulfill. The Chain of Being is relevant, but only as a reminder that any link which performs functions inappropriate to it, makes itself that much more analogous to a lower form, regardless of its aspirations to the contrary: any upset in the Chain inevitably produces a downward, falling motion (I, 237-50).

Essentially, efforts like Warburton's to make Analogy and Sublimity "each other's aid like Man and Wife,"

even when they are not distortions of the text, must almost always be distortions of the nature of Sublimity--undeliberated and unreasoned passion. It is only in the second half of the Eighteenth Century when analogy and sublimity both take on more and more the character of internal associations based on emotional rather than reasonable comparisons that they slowly converge and meet, finally becoming the basis of a kind of poetry which is compatible with the pure form of either, and at the same time is an inevitable outcome of the shadings and tendencies of both. In Gerard's Essay on Genius (1774) association is the means of creating poetic relationships sometimes totally unlike those formed by the original ideas and objects on which they rely. "Habit or a present passion" (p.126) may set off a train of ideas that are analogous, not to each other, but to the emotions or state of mind that gave rise to them. The mind in a sublime state will recall in succession images of sublime objects that it has stored in its memory. At the same time, passion can inhibit association: "The objects strictly connected with a passion are naturally fit for introducing ideas related to themselves; the passion acts in a contrary direction, and endeavors to keep the mind from running off to these" (p. 126). In both cases the individual feelings attempt to control the use of reason, just as, conversely, in earlier writings, it was

reason that both promoted and tempered the sublime passions. In transitional criticism like Gerard's this reversal of cause and effect leaves imagination and reason on opposite sides. In later writings like those of Archibald Alison, analogy, being less exclusively a function of the judgment, and sublimity, being an emotional experience which is structured by passion, are no longer antagonistic. For the most part, they are no longer clearly separable from the type of imaginative association in which they both participate. "Judgment," writes Alison, "must be suspended for imagination to be in full play"; "the critic analyzing Milton's measures cannot let his mind flow freely over relationships and resemblances and analogies."[16] At the same time, the difference between an ordinary chain of thought and a "train of thought which is the exercise of the imagination on seeing a sublime...object" is that in the sublime analogy there must be "a uniform principle of connection through the whole train," and the ideas must be "ideas of emotion" (p.1041).

The interweaving of analogy and sublimity into a theory of imaginative association is comparable to the combining of wit and judgment into one creative faculty--natural genius. Like the movement from simile to metaphor it represents a concept of the creative whole which, perhaps ironically, would not have been possible without a prior

re-examination of the relationships of its parts. This re-examination constitutes Eighteenth-Century Analogy's major contribution, not merely to its own time, but to English Literature as a whole.

In Sum

It would be possible to misinterpret the evidence in the previous sections as further justification for assigning to Eighteenth-Century Criticism the role of necessary preparation for Romantic Poetry and to the first half of the Eighteenth Century the position of necessary preparation for the second. It is much more useful and accurate to dispense with retrospectively imposed categories and labels, and to see the major criticism written between 1660 and 1799 as evidencing in its analogical bent the type of reconsideration that, given the dissolution of old values, would have been a necessary requisite to any reassertion of the creative impulse at all. While the Twentieth Century tends to dissociate itself from the stiffness and rigidity of the Eighteenth, the fact remains that its eighteenth-century ancestors were the first to react to a cultural earthquake of which the communication and identity crises in Joyce, Beckett, etc. are the tremorous aftermath.

The present generation views the Eighteenth Century as a remote and unnostalgic past; while, in fact, the Age of Analogy was, at times in spite of itself, a consistently progressive age, scientifically and artistically. Like our own era it sought to salvage from the past what was worth saving, while simultaneously developing a new present and setting up the possibilities for a more idyllic future. As part of a continuous process of creative development, cyclical and progressive, and still in active operation, Eighteenth-Century English Criticism and Aesthetics through its use of analogy earns a historical prominence unaffected by the precarious balance of success and failure. Furthermore, several of its critical theories were the foundation for some really excellent literature. Twentieth-century critics, in applying present methods of literary analysis, have often misattributed this excellence; and, now and then, have failed to recognize it when the work in question could not be interpreted in compliance with the currently prescribed patterns for outstanding achievement. Ultimately, what a literay creation has accomplished is directly proportionate to what its author was trying to accomplish and to how he and his contemporaries viewed the materials and methods with which he chose to work. Only having explored the Eighteenth-Century view of analogy in its philosophical, religious and critical implications are we now adequately prepared to properly

examine and evaluate its application in specific authors and works and its role in Eighteenth-Century English Literature as a whole.

Footnotes

[1]Charles Gildon, "Dialogue II, Of the Use and Necessity of Rules in Poetry," from The Complete Art of Poetry (1718), in Critical Essays of the Eighteenth Century 1700-1725, ed. W.H. Durham (New York, 1915), p.56.

[2]Alexander Pope, "Essay on Criticism," The Poems of Alexander Pope, ed. John Butt (New Hven, 1963).

[3]Alexander Pope, "An Essay on Homer's Battels," Poems of Alexander Pope, VII, ed. Maynard Mack (London and New Haven, 1967), p.254.

[4]Francis Hutcheson, "Reflections Upon Laughter," The Dublin Journal, 10-11 (1725), in Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays ed. Scott Elledge (New York, 1961),I, 383.

[5]John Hughes, "An Essay on Allegorical Poetry,"(1715), in Critical Essays of the Eighteenth Century, ed. W.H. Durham (New York, 1915), p.88.

[6]Richard Blackmore, "Essay Upon Wit," 1716 (Augustan Reprint Society Publication #1, Los Angeles, 1946), pp.193-4.

[7]Augustan Reprint Society Publication #10 (L.A., 1947).

[8]Joseph Trapp, Lectures on Poetry, 1742, trans. William Bowyer and William Clarke (Hildescheim, 1969), p.230.

[9]Joseph Spence, "Essay on Pope's Odyssey, Evening the First," Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays, ed. Scott Elledge (New York, 1961), I, 401-2.

[10]Sir Joshua Reynolds, "The Seventh Discourse," 1776, Discourses (London, 1842).

[11]Shaftesbury, p.204.

[12]from excerpts in Eighteenth-Century Critical Essays, ed. Elledge (New York, 1961), I.

[13]Walter J. Hipple, The Beautiful, Sublime and Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory (Carbondale,Ill., 1957), p.27.

Footnotes (cont.)

[14]Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757), ed.J.T. Boulton (New York, 1958), Pt. II, sect. 5.

[15]Pope, Translations of Homer, ed. Mack, p.228.

[16]Alison, p.1022.

Chapter VI Swift's Tale of a Tub: Analogy in Eighteenth-Century Prose Satire

Attempts to establish Swift, the satirist, as Swift, the rhetorician, are numerous in modern scholarship.[1] Usually, they involve making some kind of distinction between what the naive persona or the satiric victim appears to be saying and what the satirist, his creator, really means. Most critics find that the apparent and the real meanings are both expressed in either directly opposite or completely identical versions of the same technique.

According to recent commentaries on Tale of a Tub, for example, there is either essentially no difference or else all the difference in the world between the "modern" wit's use of comparison and Swift's. In Martin Price's view, Swift's satiric adversary is the "fool" or "sophister" in whose inept hands all wit is poorly contrived and false. But the same reasoning by analogy recognized for its misconception becomes in Swift's hands a "brilliant satiric device"[2] for exposing these would-be wits and revealing truth.

The suggestion that those analogies made by the speaker (or speakers) in the Tale and those meant by the satirist are merely opposite applications of identical devices appears again in studies by Ronald Paulson and Harold D. Kelling.

Paulson contends that Swift ridicules the encyclopedic disorder of seventeenth-century writing by structuring the Tale as a comparable confusion of simile, allusion and metaphor,[3] while Kelling claims that the Tale is an "oration against rhetoric and at the same time an example of good rhetoric."[4]

Statements by Martin Price, D.W. Jefferson and D.J. Dooley about the imagery in the Tale[5] are along the same line. Their approaches and examples differ, but all three state in effect that the same comparisons are at once meaningless verbiage as applied by the persona, and the key to all meaning as applied by Swift. To mistake a likeness between two things for evidence that the two things are identical is a sign of self-deception and error in the modern wit, the Catholic, and the Dissenter; but to make the same "mistake" for satiric purposes is a sign of cleverness and perception in Swift.

One of his "favourite devices," according to Robert C. Elliot, is "to take literally a metaphorical statement of likeness between two things, then to push the implications of the statement into the grotesque." The grotesqueness of the literal meaning reflects on the stupidity of the speaker and of the ideas and opinions that he and the metaphor represent at the same time that it demonstrates the satiric dexterity of Swift.

All of these interpretations raise but do not answer the question of how the same manipulations of language can serve the forces of virtue and vice simultaneously; and many studies of this kind, as Miriam Starkman has commented, lose sight entirely of satire's relation to virtue and vice, preoccupied as they are with the bits and pieces of rhetorical contrivance.[7]

An alternative approach to satiric technique which attempts neither to see the whole only through its parts nor to ignore the author's ultimate purpose is Ellen Douglass Leyburn's study of "satiric allegory." Both allegory and satire, argues Miss Leyburn, are "sustained" comparisons which differ from metaphor in that both the likeness and the difference between the vehicle and the tenor are kept ever-present in the mind of the reader. The Tale of a Tub is a satire "allegorically conceived" because "in the digressions as truly as in the Tale, Swift is saying one thing and intending something else."[8] To see Swift's whole plan as "allegorical" in the sense that most of the rhetorical devices he uses have in common the sustenance of two levels of meaning, literal and symbolic, is to see a unifying explanation for the fact that in each rhetorical instance the same figures demonstrate one thing according to the "modern" and something entirely different according to the overriding intention of his creator.

But Miss Leyburn introduces as large a problem as she solves by declaring further that because they have similar methods and parallel purposes the two genres are interchangeable: "In so far as the work is an imaginative whole, the allegory is the satire and the satire is the allegory."[9] Whatever relevance this statement may have to twentieth-century satire, it would go wholly against the grain for both an eighteenth-century writer and his critics to conceive of his work as an intentional blurring of generic distinctions. If, as Miriam Starkman has suggested, the genre of satire is "conceptually parodic,"[10] the genre of allegory is conceptually idyllic. The satirist's motive is the exposure and denunciation of vice; and the satiric mood is mockery, indignation and anger. The allegorist's concentration is on a virtuous ideal and how to abstract it from the imperfect materials of the real world. E. De Selincourt says of the allegorical mood:

> The idealist, starting from the actual world of which he has experience, distills from it what seems to be its essence, and creates another world of spiritual and moral conceptions which becomes as real for him as that from which he has created it.[11]

The two genres cannot be exactly alike because in conception and mood they are exact opposites. However, the devices of satire may be and are used in works which are generically

allegories; and the devices of allegory may be and are used in works which are generically satires,[12] such as Tale of a Tub.

The Tale is an example of the genre of satire in which the sections on learning and those on religion achieve structural unity through different applications of the allegorical mode. The organizing allegorical device is the fictional construct of the adventures of the three brothers in the religious satire and of what Philip Pinkus describes as the "upside/down world of the Tubbians"[13] in the satire on learning. Most of the rhetorical devices are in some way subservient to this central allegorical mode, and each contributes to drawing an analogy between the participants in the fictional world of the Tale and their closest counterparts in the real world. Each rhetorical device as used by the modern narrator within his world is a valid expression of his avowed intentions when judged by the standards of that fictional world. But the same rhetorical device has other implications when evaluated by the satirist and his reader on the basis of the standards of their world-- the world of reality. The satiric purpose of the allegorical mode is to force the reader to analogize-- to see that behavior patterns and ways of thinking and writing which are compatible with a

world the values of which are avowedly self-deception, corruption and foolishness are not compatible with a world the values of which are, or at least should be, virtue and truth. The incongruity between methods and goals does not exist in the fictional world of the Tale. But as the reader gradually discovers via the analogies Swift directs him to make, it does exist in the real world. For Peter's purposes and for the Modern Wit's the metaphors they use are not grotesque; but for what should be the purposes of the eighteenth-century christian who is rationis capax they are.

I

The reader's first introduction to the means and ends of The Modern is the Bookseller's Dedication to Lord Somers. The Bookseller, practical, if simple-minded, presents his case with a minimum of rhetorical flourish. Quite openly, he declares that what is inside the book does not concern him; after all, it is Lord Somer' "Name on the Front" (p.23)[4] that will make it sell. He has no false illusions about the learning of his writers-- he would not expect them to know Latin, even though they are often hired to translate it-- and he considers their elevated state a result of their living in high garrets, up "a prodigious Number of dark, winding Stairs" (p.24).

Despite the "Dedication to Posterity," he feels sure that present writers do not write with the future in mind. Particularly, they do not write dedications for "After-Ages," since the faults and virtues of their subjects are almost always historically inaccurate. The Bookseller's unquestioning acceptance of the fact that this is the way things are and his charming lack of sophistication throw the reader off-guard. The analogy between his world and theirs is more amusing than unsettling. The very fact that it is an analogy, rather than a direct portrait, both increases its humorous associations and allows laughter without personal guilt.

Some eighteenth-century critics, notably Samuel Johnson, disliked the mixing of real people and the personified types characteristic of the allegorical mode in the same literary work. But in this case, the juxtaposition of Lord Somers and The Bookseller achieves the desired balance of fact and fiction. It also provides the first slight unsettling of the reader's complacency. Since many writers did not know the men whom they dedicated to personally, often, they complimented them with encomiums written for former greats or with cliché phrases applicable to anyone with talent or virtue. A calm acceptance by The Bookseller of this practice would be as

delightful and in keeping with the established tone of the piece as are all his previous remarks. Instead, he complains of having hired wits to furnish him with a panegyric for Lord Somers from those written for past great men, only to find that those supplied in no way differ from the "universal Report of Mankind" (p.25). Naturally Swift means this, in part, as a sincere compliment to Lord Somers. But also, it serves to halt the reader and make him re-think the relationships involved. A panegyric which actually suits its subject is unacceptable in The Bookseller's world, and admittedly, not often the case in the reader's. But to feel that one is cheated when presented with the truth is a perversion of values unconformable, even in a humorous vein, with the reader's standards of honesty and virtue, or, at least, with what he knows his standards ought to be.

In the story line taken literally there is nothing inconsistent with the values of his world in either the methods or the goals of The Bookseller. The reader delights in the similarity that appears to exist between The Bookseller's world and his own and doesn't mind laughing at the foibles of his own nature as portrayed in a make-beleive being. But when he recognizes that these foibles are exaggerated in the person of The Bookseller to

the point where they represent blatant disdain for decency and truth, he is shocked, on the one hand, by the fundamental difference between this fictional world and his own, and on the other, by their potential similarity. By applying the allegorical mode to his satire, Swift avoids the main cause of ineffectualness in direct attack. The reader cannot simply deny his guilt, because by recognizing the analogy himself, he becomes his own accusor.

In the next prefatory section, the "Epistle Dedicatory to His Royal Highness Prince Posterity," the allegorical mode once again serves Swift's satiric intention by directing the reader to analogies that are self-incriminating. On the literal level the speaker describes a group of writers who wish to win the favor of Prince Posterity for their works. But his guardian, the vicious monster, Time, keeps stifling and destroying them, long before his ward can look them over. Figuratively, this battle against Time represents the inability of contemporary wits to write anything lasting. This is the first analogy made by the reader and is based on a fictional construct which is simultaneously similar to and different from real life. The exaggerated naiveté of the speaker, who thinks he is defending the wits when he is really damning them, forces the more sophisticated reader to set the analogy straight, only to realize that in his unawareness of the full implications of

superficial, evanescent literature he may be more akin to the naive persona than he thought. The device of the innocent speaker functions here to deceive the reader into thinking he is seeing through the allegorical character, only to discover unexpectedly that by doing so he is also seeing through himself. He realizes that he can only understand The Modern's self-deception because it is analogous to his own.

It is for similar reasons that the imagery employed by the inhabitants of Modernia is consistent with the allegorical mode of satire and with Swift's intention to have the reader exercise on himself the reason of which he is capable. Assuring the Prince that he and his colleagues "do abound in Learning," the problem being "to fix upon Particulars is a Task too slippery" for his "slender Abilities," the Dedicator makes the following analogy:

> If I should venture in a windy Day, to affirm to Your Highness that there is a large Cloud near the Horizon in the Form of a Bear, another in the Zenith with the Head of an Ass, a third to the Westward with Claws like a Dragon; and Your Highness should in a few Minutes think fit to examine the Truth, 'tis certain they would all be changed in Figure and Position, new ones would arise, and all we could agree upon would be that Clouds there were, but that I was grossly mistaken in the Zoography and Topography of them. (p.35)

This analogy as the speaker intends it literally is not false, because it is consistent with the values of his fictional world and with the debased values of the real world to which the fiction refers. But as the reader discovers, the analogy has several other dimensions beyond a single ironic reversal of the very point the Moderns' defender thinks he is making. It is true literally and figuratively that the Grubstreet writers' works are as impermanent as the various shapes that clouds assume when moved by wind. But is is also true that the resemblance only pertains to superficial changes. The clouds only appear to the zealous imagination to be bears or lions; and even when their outward manifestation changes, the substance of cloudness remains, part of a natural and eternal process. The Moderns' swift-vanishing works are analogous only to the outward appearance of these clouds. This art does not resemble nature in that it has no substance beyond what is immediately apparent. The lack of resemblance does not violate Tubbian Laws but it does contradict the rules of reason.

By applying devices of the allegorical mode to his satire, Swift gives the reader several opportunities to reflect on the temporal versus the eternal and its relation to surface versus substance. The Modern spends only the

"Refuse of Time" (p.30) creating his masterpieces and denies that he should bother to furnish wit for succeeding ages, when the former have made "no such provisions for ours." Lacking a sense of historical continuity, the only way he can overcome the enemy, Time, is to deprive him of his power. By writing "six-penny worth of Wit" and "West-minster Drolleries" he and his peers have "turned back his hour-glass, blunted his scythe and drawn the hob-nails out of his shoes" (p.63). Swift's personification of Time is not merely a way of giving concrete form to an abtract idea. It is part of his dramatization of a world in which there is no difference between appearance and reality, between the physical or figurative representations of abstract concepts and the concepts themselves. By this point in the Tale, the reader has recognized a similarity between The Moderns' methods and his own and can see by analogy that if the writers and thinkers of his own world continue along these same lines, their end results, intentionally or not, will also be similar.

For The Moderns, Time, like everything else, is matter: destroy its material appearance and you destroy it. Works written in the "modern" way can achieve immortality; but even outlasting time is by Tubbian standards a material process. The work chosen for distinction is placed on a bookseller's shelf

> there to be preserved neat and clean, for a long Eternity, adorn'd with the Heraldry of its Title, fairly inscribed on a Label; never to be thumb'd or greas'd by Students, nor bound to everlasting Chains of Darkness in a Library: But when the fulness of time is come shall haply undergo the Tryal of Purgatory, in order to ascend the Sky. (p. 148)

By the reader's standards a literary work attains immortality for its author when it continues to be read long after he has past away. The Tubbian criterion is that the work must never be read but must remain a soul imprisoned in a body until the appropriate moment when it goes up in smoke.

The Tale being a satire in the allegorical mode rather than a work "allegorically conceived" is not concerned specifically with establishing an ideal. Usually, the reader supplies his own sense of the way things ought to be by discovering what distortions he shares or does not share with the fictional characters and in each case reflecting on how and why they are out of proportion. In some ways, however, the Tale itself is a model of what should be the proper techniques and purposes of literature; and often, the reader is purposely supplied with the means of analogizing the literature the Tale is attacking with the Tale itself.

There is a clear connection, for instance, between the statements about writers' relations to Time in the prefaces and digressions and Swift's claims for his own work

in "The Apology." Swift's contention that the Tale "seems calculated to live at least as long as our Language and our Taste admit no great Alterations" (p.3) is perhaps ambiguous. But at least it puts the onus of change on factors external to the book, and the opinion that alterations in language do make literary works obsolete was common at the time. Further, in comparison with the "Epistle Dedicatory" and the type of literature it represents Swift's Tale is the avowed "Product of the Study, the Observation and the Invention of several Years" (p.10).

The Tale as itself a topic of Swift's satire also provides the material needed for the reader to analogize Swift's own use of allegorical techniques for satiric purposes to distorted applications of the allegorical method which deceive rather than enlighten. The "most devoted servant of all Modern forms" tells us in "The Preface" that the Tale is the final piece of an allegorical puzzle discovered by the Grand Committee as a temporary expedient for avoiding attacks by writers on the "weak sides of Religion and Government." Noteing that seamen divert a whale from their ship by throwing him an empty tub, they decide to do the same to prevent Leviathan from upsetting the ship of state:

> But, how to analyze the Tub, was a Matter of difficulty; when after long Enquiry and Debate, the literal Meaning was preserved: And it was decreed that in order to prevent these Leviathans from tossing and sporting with the Commonwealth,...they should be diverted from that Game by a Tale of a Tub.
>
> (pp.40-41)

Actually, Swift's Tale did have this effect, as we learn in the "Apology," in that it diverted some critical attacks away from the abuses of Religion and Learning and toward the Tale, even though its purpose was to denounce the abuses and not the institutions themselves. In its fictional context, however, this parable used to divert attention away from real issues is an example of allegory in reverse, of suiting the subject to the illustration rather than the illustration to the subject. The allegorical mode used in this way is not an example of analogy which clarifies relationships, but of identification which confuses relationships by merging the literal level with the spiritual.

This type of allegorical contrivance which is not analogy and not Swift's method appears in the opening section of "The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit," when after relating the story of Mahomet's ass, the speaker declares,

> I will leave off discoursing so closely to the Letter as I have hitherto done, and go on for the future by way of Allegory, tho' in such a manner that the judicious Reader may without much straining make his Applications as often as he shall think fit....if you please,

> from hence forward instead of the Term, Ass, we shall make use of Gifted, or enlightened Teacher; and the word Rider, we will exchange for that of Fanatic Auditory, or any other Denomination of the like Import. (p.265)

To the speaker in the Tale there is no difference between the literal and figurative (or spiritual) level of the Grand Council's allegory-- both the tub and the tale, as conceived by The Moderns, are empty and one-dimensional. Likewise, to the speaker in "The Mechanical Operation..." the "enlightened teacher" and the concrete figure, an ass, are also one. The reader recognizes that not to distinguish the sign from the thing it signifies is the avowed purpose of allegory in the fictional world of The Moderns where such a distinction would only destroy the self-delusion on which The Moderns' way of life and literature depends. At the same time, he recognizes that distinguishing between appearance and reality is a necessity for the acheivement of those ideal values which in its moral and religious precepts his own world holds dear.

The reduction of an abstract concept to the equivalent of its concrete representation is a proper activity for a world such as the fictional world of The Moderns, whose avowed ideal is a state of blissful ignorance. But at the same time that the reader recognizes the relationship of these reductive practices to activities in his own world, he also perceives their inconsistency with the

ultimate purposes of a reasonable being. It is in this sense that the rhetoric of the Tale's narrator simultaneously has one significance from his point of view and quite another from the point of view of the satirist and his intended audience.

According to the narrator in Section I, for example, the"Physico-logical Scheme" of oratorical machines-- pulpit, ladder and stage-itinerant--

> contains a great Mystery, being a Type, a Sign, an Emblem, a Shadow, a Symbol, bearing Analogy to the spacious Commonwealth of Writers, and to those Methods by which they must exalt themselves to a certain Eminency above the inferiour World. (p.61)

Supported by the equation of weight of meaning with the actual weight in air of the words that represent meaning, this analogy both literally and figuratively reveals that to Modern Wits religion <u>is</u> the pulpit; politics <u>is</u> the Ladder; and literature <u>is</u> the stage-itinerant. The human representatives of these institutions are only as spiritually and philosophically elevated as their physical position on these raised platforms makes them. Through the analogical detailing of the properties and operations of these machines, The Modern, instead of illustrating the abstract via the concrete, reduces the one to identity with the other; while, simultaneously, Swift reduces philosophical enthusiasm to the equivalent of the

very Hobbesian materialism that it is seeking to reject. The persona's reductivism aims at self-delusion; the satirist's at public disallusion. The pulpit is not an adequate physical embodiment for religion as it should be in the reader's world, but it is a very accurate representation of the religious corruption which Swift intends to expose:

> The Matter...is of rotten Wood, and that upon two Considerations; Because it is the Quality of rotton Wood to give Light in the Dark: And secondly, Becuase its Cavities are full of Worms: which is a Type with a Pair of Handles, having a Respect to the two principal Qualifications of the Orator, and the two different Fates attending upon his Works.
>
> (pp.61-2)

Having destroyed the idea that modern learning is capable of any great heights, Swift now turns in Section I to dispelling the misconception that it is capable of great depth. Exaltation and penetration, ideally two positive goals of good literature, are in the Moderns' values both extreme departures from reason. As John Bullitt suggests,[15] Swift reduces each to an equivalent superficiality. In a series of analogies, frequently analyzed by critics, the champion of Grubstreetism complains,

> But the greatest Maim given to that general Reception, which the Writings of our Society have formerly received...hath been a superficial Vein among many Readers of the present Age, who will by no means be persuaded to inspect beyond the Surface and the Rind of Things; whereas Wisdom is a Fox, who after long

> hunting, will at last cost you the Pains to dig out: 'Tis a Cheese, which by how much the richer, has the thicker, the homelier, and the courser Coat; and whereof to a judicious Palate, the Maggots are the best. 'Tis a Sack-Posset, wherein the deeper you go, you will find it the sweeter. Wisdom is a Hen, whose Cackling we must value and consider, because it is attended with an Egg. But then, lastly, 'tis a Nut, which unless you chuse with Judgment, may cost you a Tooth, and pay you with nothing but a Worm. (p.66)

Price's discussion of these witty turns concentrates on Swift's conversion of false rhetoric into true satire, but almost totally ignores the function of the passage within its fictional context. The problem is not that the individual analogies become "less and less apt" (p.91); each in fact accurately represents one implication of wisdom's depth. The problem is that the speaker applies all these sage comparisons to the purported wisdom in the works of his colleagues, instead of to the true wisdom attainable by observing Nature:

> In consequence of these monstrous Truths, the Grubaean Sages have always chosen to convey their Precepts and their Arts, shut up within the Vehicles of Types and Fables, which having been perhaps more careful and curious in adorning, than was altogether necessary, it has fared with these Vehicles after the usual Fate of Coaches over-finely painted and gilt, that the transitory Gazers have so dazzled their eyes, and filled their imaginations with the outward Lustre, as neither to regard or consider the Person or the Parts of the Owner within. (p.66)

Instead of attempting by patient observation and right reason to discover the underlying wisdom of Nature and represent it in their works, the Grubeaens create their own obscurity in order to give the appearance of depth, and, by their criteria, of sagacity. This larger significance of the wisdom analogies becomes clearer when the passage is compared to the "Digression on Madness." There, according to the values and practices identified with the Moderns in previous sections, Reason, the means of attaining Wisdom, is a physical stripping away of the outer layers of the body to reveal the rather unattractive guts that are within. In this sense, that remaining well-deceived regarding the existence of guts is man's ultimate purpose, The Modern's earlier comparison of wisdom to a "Nut" which "may cost you a Tooth, and pay you with nothing but a Worm" is perfectly consistent with his views and not self-contradictory. At the same time, to the extent that the satirist confers a negative connotation on creaming off the top and leaving the "Dregs for Philosophy and Reason," and to being a "Fool among Knaves," the Wisdom/Nut analogy is not a reduction of Wisdom's value, but a realistic acceptance of the pleasures and pains of seeing things as they really are. Again, the reader must both separate and juxtapose the implications of the analogies

as they relate to the values that exist in the fictional world of The Moderns and to the values that should take precedence in his own world.

Similar cantilevered complexities are at work in the next section on corruption in learning, the "Digression Concerning Critics." The "close Analogy" which the Tale-teller sees the "Heavenly Descent of Criticism" (p.95) bearing to heroic virtue is a true parallel, provided one considers only the outward actions of both critic and hero and not the intention behind them-- the effect, in other words, divorced from the cause. It is true that a hero is always going off in pursuit of villains and monsters; but he does so only because he recognizes and wishes to preserve the forces of Good. The "true" critic, by The Modern's definition, is a "Discoverer and Collector of Writer's Faults." Therefore, he is really unlike the true hero, the implied satiric norm, whose main concern is preserving Beauty and Truth.

Tracing ancient writers' references to "true critics," like the tub analogy in Section I and the ass analogy in "The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit," is applying incompatible mysteries to literal meaning in an attempt to impose a meaning beneath the surface signification rather than to uncover a deeper meaning that already exists. Among its many functions, the allegory of the Ass is both a true Analogy (ie. critics of the modern kind

are "asses") and an instance of the same false association that the Tale-teller expects the reader to make with regard to the beliefs of Jack in Section XI:

> Nor do I at all question, but they will furnish Plenty of noble Matter for such, whose converting Imaginations dispose them to reduce all things into Types; who can make Shadows, no thanks to the Sun, and then mold them into Substances, no thanks to Philosophy; whose peculiar Talent lies in fixing Tropes, and Allegories to the Letter, and refining what is Literal into Figure and Mystery. (pp.199-190)

To make shadows "no thanks to the Sun" is to avoid following Nature, the only sure guide to truth. To mold ideas into substances and then discover hidden mysteries in them is not to rise above matter, but to found essences on the artificial. Swift makes the same point about the difference between analogizing from Nature to Art and from Art to Art more directly in the "Mechanical Operation of the Spirit." The mechanical operation of Enthusiasm is admittedly an "Effect of Art," rather than nature; but through habit and use "hath grown to be natural" (pp. 267-8). Another instance of art becoming nature is the development of a longheaded race of Scythians, a result of the technique used by miswives to deliver babies, which, according to the persona is "analogous" to the appearance in our island of a "Generation of Men called Roundheads." Their "Race is now spread over three Kingdoms, yet in its Beginning was merely an Operation of Art, produced by a pair of Sizars, a Squeeze

of the Face, and a black Cap" (p.268). This false comparison is meant to help the reader do exactly what both the persona and the satirist, for different reasons, wish him to do: "to distinguish, first between an Effect grown from Art into Nature, and one that is natural from the Beginning; Secondly, between an Effect wholly natural, and one...where the Superstructure is entirely Artificial" (p.269).

"A Digression in Praise of Digressions" (Section VII) illustrates still another method which participates in the allegorical framework of the Tale. Here Swift represents the norm and the deviation from that norm by the same figure. The persona describes his adversaries' unfavorable opinion of digressions and The Moderns' advocacy of them by means of the same analogy variously applied. To their detractors,

> ...Digressions in a Book are like Foreign Troops in a State, which argue the Nation to want a Heart and Hands of its own, and often, either subdue the Natives, or drive them into the most unfruitful Corners. (p.144)

To this argument, which expresses the satiric norm, the Tale-teller counters that it would have been fine for the Romans or Greeks, when wisdom was in its infancy, to confine their writings to a central theme. But in modern times,

> with Knowledge, it has fared as with a numerous

> Army, encamped in a fruitful Country; which for a few Days maintains itself by the Product of the Soil it is on; Till Provisions being spent, they send to forrage many a Mile, among Friends or Enemies.... Mean while, the neighbouring Fields, trampled and beaten down, become barren and dry, affording no Sustenance, but Clouds of Dust. (p.145)

The Tale-teller's intended meaning is that the Moderns have no choice but to digress, since their forebears have used up the greatest material. But his illustration to the reader who compares it with the similar analogy that comes before accuses the Moderns of wasting the soil provided by their ancestors and failing to refurbish it by rotation of crops and adaptation of the land to contemporary uses. Instead, the "army of the sciences" has labored to produce a system of shortcuts, so that the present writers can all leave the fields of learning and subsist as gentlemen farmers: "For <u>Labour</u> is the seed of <u>Idleness</u>, and it is the peculiar Happiness of our Noble Age to gather the <u>Fruit</u>" (p.146).

The overall effect of applying rhetorical devices in the allegorical mode to a satire on learning is that Swift accurately portrays the reductive, debased practices of modern writers through their fictional representatives, at the same time suggesting that while these practices are consistent with the values of the fictional representatives, they are incompatible with virtue and reason, the values to which he and his readers should ascribe.

Through this kind of analogizing he sharpens the reader's alertness to distinctions between substantial truth and shallow illusion at the same time that he is scolding the reader for having failed to make these distinctions on his own.

II

Swift himself describes the sections of the Tale concerning religion, not as a satire in the allegorical mode, but as an "allegory." The fact that the story of the three brothers when separated from the Tale as a whole is more an allegory using the satiric mode than a satire using the allegorical mode argues for Robert Adams' contention that someone other than Swift, possibly his cousin, Thomas, conceived at least the basic idea and structure for the parts on religion. However, the arranged alternation of the two story lines is Swift's; and whether he created or merely recognized and exploited the parallel concepts that the two fictions explore, the final integrated whole becomes his and is unified by a consistent use of analogy to simultaneously reveal to the reader both how his world is like the fictional construct and how it is not.

In both learning and religion error occurs when man relies too much or too little on concrete evidence. Analogies

of matter and spirit or of outward sign and inward essence are useful and increase knowledge, as long as it remains clear that parallels drawn between external representatives are only illustrative of, not the same as, the relationship that exists between the intangible ideas behind them. But enthusiastic mystical speculations which totally ignore analogies between visible nature and philosophic truth, which seek substance beyond matter instead of through it, arrive at the same superficialities and delusions as those that identify the seen and the unseen, instead of employing the one as a clarification of the other. Jack, the Aeolist, becomes most aware of the ditch as a physical presence the moment he chooses to close his eyes to its existence entirely.

Analogy confused with identity and analogy ignored are opposite extremes in one sense, but identical reductive approaches to knowledge in another. The happy mean between the two is potentially present in the character of Martin. Were we meant to separate the allegory of the three brothers as a whole from the distribution of its parts within the Tale as a whole, Martin might emerge as the personification of the allegorical ideal. But it is clear that as Swift finally presents it to us we are not meant to separate the allegory as a generic whole independent of its supporting role in the larger satiric unit.

The speaker in Section I describes the enthusiastic approach in religion, politics and letters as literally erecting "Edifices in the Air" (p.56). The persona's reduction of religion and learning to a ladder, a pulpit and a stage-itinerant is a thrust at materialism; while the fact that rising above matter comes down to obtaining a "superior position of place" ridicules superficial attempts at spirituality by making them as dependent on physical surface as their supposed opposites. Similarly, in Section II the Tale-teller describes the emergence of Catholic theology in terms of the most material of social pursuits--the following of fashion. The philosophy of clothes corresponds to the other oversimplication of the modern persona. But through his reversal of inner and outer Swift demonstrates how easy it is for analogical systems like the macrocosm-microcosm theory to confuse rather than illuminate relationships. Were man's relationship to the universe to be taken literally as a physical similarity, then it would follow that his non-physical part, his soul, would be his changeable, impermanent part. This ridiculous conclusion is implied in the identification of the soul as a celestial suit of clothes. Going beneath the surface then becmomes a matter of examining the physical part, the body, what the Tale-teller in Section IX mistakenly identifies as "reasoning"; and the result of

this probing is a "senseless unsavory Carcass" covered by the "outward Dress" which must "needs be the Soul" (p.80).

It follows in "Modern" logic that Peter, who wishes to change the soul of religion must change its "outward Dress." This he proceeds to do by relying, to begin with, on the physical presence of words and letters in his father's will, rather than on their underlying meaning, and finally by locking up the will and making whatever rules he sees fit. The Tale-teller reduces analogies between matter(words) and spirit(meaning) to identifications of matter and spirit: Peter reduces complete departures from the literal Bible such as belief in purgatory and in martyred saints to the very materialism he seeks to transcend.

Just as Sections IV and V reduce the religious and philosophical systems of Peter and the Tale-teller to equivalent confusions of external and internal by deliberately stressing the likenesses and ignoring the differences between them, so Sections VI, VIII and XI show that in their fundamental errors Catholicism and Dissent are also analogous. Both Jack and Martin upon recovering their father's will "compare the Doctrine with the Practice" and realize that "there was never seen a wider Difference between two Things" (p.134). But Jack seeks to

rectify this divergence by eliminating all visible differences between themselves and Peter: "Strip, Tear, Pull, Rent, Flay off all, that we may appear as unlike the Rogue Peter as it is possible" (p.139).

Swift's purpose is twofold. On the one hand he wishes to show that despite surface differences, Catholicism and Dissent are similar errors. On the other, he wishes to show that their errors are based on an abstraction which is the equivalent of materialism in its failure to go beyond appearance. He makes both points by putting to maximum use the analogical properties of allegory. In the fictional context, The Moderns' defender, unable to make distinctions between figurative and literal, presents the Aeolists' philosophy as a reduction of all learning to wind, a reliance on the depth of the bowels to supply the heights of the spirit. This is the same reduction of spirit to matter in terms of which he has earlier presented the practices of Catholicism. Therefore, it is totally in keeping with his limited powers of reasoning and with the values of the make-believe world for the speaker to conclude in Section XI that the similarity between Jack and Peter is based entirely on outer resemblance. The "Phrenzy and Spleen of both" have the same material cause, vapours from below, and so, they are

> ...as two Pair of Compasses, equally extended, and the fixed Foot, of each remaining in the same center; which tho' moving contrary Ways at first will be sure to encounter somewhere or other in the Circumference. Besides, it was among the great Misfortunes of Jack, to bear a huge Personal Resemblance with his Brother Peter. Their Humours and Dispositions were not only the same, but there was a close Analogy in their Shape, and Size and their Mien. (p.199)

The full satiric effect of this statement depends on its coming after Section IX, where the difference between curiosity and credulity, diminished in preceding section, is completely eliminated. Against the self-deception and physical probing of modern writing stands by implication the Tale of a Tub, which uses appearance not as a replacement or masking of reality, but as its necessary illustration. In these terms, the apparent equation of Peter and Jack, Catholicism and Dissent,is a way of demonstrating that beneath their differences of form they are ideologically analogous. The Tale-teller reduces essence(inside) to appearance(outside): Swift illustrates the analogy between essence (of Catholicism) and essence (of Dissent) by analogizing the outward appearance of each. Ultimately the Tale demonstrates to its reader that proper reasoning by analogy can increase knowledge, if both the agreement and the disagreement between ideas and their representatives and between the representatives themselves and the ideas themselves are clear and present at all times.

In both religion and learning when we equate the idea with its physical embodiment we also obliterate the basic distinction between right and wrong, truth and error, virtue and vice. This obliteration is the natural outcome of the standards acceptable to The Modern, The Catholic and The Dissenter: it is an unnatural outcome of standards accepted by the reasonable Anglican.

The important role analogy plays throughout the Tale is in part a result of Swift's own awareness that the similarity between appearance and reality, surface and substance, has and should have limits. He knows, for example, that the Tale itself will survive the abuse of shallow critics because it is not a papier-mâché edifice with nothing inside to sustain it, but is instead a firm structure, long in the making and not "to be battered with Dirt-Pellets, however envenom'd the Mouths...that discharge them" (p.10). But he also knows that if his adversaries cannot harm him by petty attacks on the external trappings of his work, neither can he penetrate their consciousness by thrashing away at their exteriors. Though wit and humor are respectively the "most useful" and the "most agreeable" "Gifts of human Nature,"

> ...the great Part of those who have no Share of Taste of either, but by their Pride, Pedantry, and Ill Manners, lay

> themselves bare to the Lashes of Both, think the Blow is weak because they are insensible; and where Wit hath any mixture of Raillery, 'Tis but calling it Banter, and the work is done. (p.19)

Because of this insensitivity on the part of transgressors against learning and religion, Swift chooses not to use the Juvenalian method. The Tale boasts the Teller, is "without one grain of satire." The reason from the Modern's point of view is that "the whole present procedure of human things" is so ideal that he can see no purpose in writing anything but panegyric. Since he exists in a world where everyone is or wants to be in "full possession of being well deceived," a "Fool among Knaves," his oblivion to things worthy of satiric attack is by the standards of that world reasonable and just.

But the less ostrich-like Swift has very different motives for omitting or camouflaging the more easily recognizeable vituperative satire from his Tale. "There is not, through all Nature, another so callous and insensible a Member as the World's Posteriors" (p.48). Realizing that direct denunciation is not the way to reach those who engage in practices that should be denounced (the knaves) and those who condone them (the fools), Swift adopts an indirect method of satire-- a way of analogizing

which may be conveniently titled allegorical.

The use of the allegorical mode for satiric purposes involves setting up a fictional situation in which personified figures representing Swift's satiric adversaries in the real world are given free reign to carry their ways of thinking and writing to their logical conclusions. The reader is maneuvered into the position of recognizing the similarites between the behavior of Modern Wits, Catholics and Dissenters in the fictional world and that of their closest counterparts in the real world, while also realizing the incongruity between the inevitable outcome of such behavior and the goals which should be ascribed to by himself and his peers. This incongruity is behind Swift's statement that "there generally runs an Irony through the Thread of the whole Book" (p.8). It is the kind of irony that Edward Honig describes in The Dark Conceit:

> Like all analogy, irony accumulates and condenses meaning with the force of poetic imagery. It proposes a basic congruence between two things which have a patent incongruence underlying them. 18

The "patent incongruence" in this case is between methods and ends, causes and effects. By continually forcing his reader to re-evaluate the analogy between the fictional characters in the Tale and their real counterparts,

between what appears to be said and what is really meant, Swift prompts him to recognize that the faults represented in this fictional world are to a large extent the faults of his own world. More important, they are faults in his own world because they serve values and lead to conclusions which are not the standards and ends of a christian being who is rationis capax. To the extent that Swift conveys this distinction his sub-title, "Written for the Universal Improvement of Mankind," is at once the presumptuous boast of a Modern and the legitimate claim of an accomplished satirist.

Footnotes

[1] In addition to critics referred to specifically in the text of this chapter, see Charles A. Beaumont, Swift's Classical Rhetoric (Georgia, 1963) which uses Tale of a Tub to verify Swift's "intimate knowledge of rhetoric as an art..."(p.1). For an opposite view, see John R. Clark, "Swift's Knaves and Fools in the Tradition: Rhetoric Versus Poetic in a Tale of a Tub, Section IX," SP, 66 (1969), 777-796. Clark bases his argument that Swift is not a rhetorician on Aristotle's distinction between the art of imitation and the art of persuasion. See also Clark's Form and Frenzy...(Ithaca, 1970).

[2] Martin Price, Swift's Rhetorical Art (New Haven, 1953).

[3] Ronald Paulson, Theme and Structure in Swift's Tale of a Tub (New Haven, 1960), p.197.

[4] Harold D. Kelling, "Reason in Madness: A Tale of a Tub," PMLA, LXIX (1954), 199.

[5] Martin Price, pp.90ff.; D.J. Dooley, "Image and Point of View in Swift,"PLL, 6(1970), 125-135. Dooley refers to D.W. Jefferson's discussion of "grotesque images" in the Pelican Guide to Eighteenth Century Literature, p.128. See also Maurice J. Quinlan, "Swift's Use of Literalization as a Rhetorical Device," PMLA, LXXXII (1967), 516-21.

[6] Robert C. Elliot, The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art (Princeton, 1960), pp.204-205.

[7] Miriam K. Starkman, "Swift's Rhetoric: The "overfraught pinnace"?, SAQ, 60 (1969), 189.

[8] Ellen Douglass Leyburn, Satiric Allegory: Mirror for Man (New Haven, 1956), pp.6 and 25.

[9] Ibid., p.14.

[10] Starkman, p.192.

[11] E. De Selincourt, "Introduction," The Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser, ed. J.C. Smith and E. De Selincourt (London, 1912), p.liv.

[12] For a discussion of the difference between generic prose satire and the satiric mode see Starkman, pp.190-192.

[13] Philip Pinkus, "The Upside-down World of a Tale of a Tub," English Studies, XLVIV (1963), 161.

[14]Jonathan Swift, Tale of a Tub, ed. A.C. Guthkelch and D. Nicol Smith, 2nd. ed. (Oxford, 1958). All quotations refer to this edition.

[15]John Bullitt, Jonathan Swift and the Anatomy of Satire (Cambridge, 1966), p.126.

[16]See Edward W. Rosenheim Jr., Swift and the Satirist's Art(Chicago, 1963), p.202.

[17]See Paul Fussell, The Rhetorical World of Augustan Humanism (New York, 1965), pp.144-5 for a different interpretation of Swift's military images.

[18]Robert Martin Adams, "Jonathan Swift, Thomas Swift, and The Authorship of A Tale of a Tub," MP, LXIV (Feb., 1967), 198-232.

Chapter VII Structural and Thematic Analogy in the Writings of Alexander Pope

Not a pattern of images, nor a series of clever metaphors, but a fundamental belief in a real analogy (system of similarities and differences) between the power and conduct of God and the power and conduct of man is an organizing principle in Pope's major works. Throughout, figurative language and literary allusions draw and elucidate the analogy of moral and cultural disorder with mis- and uncreation in nature.[1] God's creation of the universe and all its parts is the standard of judgment, and Pope's subjects, be they poets, politicians, heads of state or ladies of leisure, are praised or blamed depending on whether the analogy of their own productions to this divine one is positive or negative. The sustained analogy which Aubrey Williams observes in the Dunciad (1743) between Satan's efforts to establish Chaos on Earth and the dunces' efforts to restore the empire of Dulness in Britain[2] is not an isolated instance, but Pope's most mature presentation of this consistent thematic analogy.

His use of analogy as a structural and thematic focus is strong evidence against the opinions of Thomas R. Edwards and Paul Fussell that analogizing in general is antagonistic to the purposes of the humanist/writer. Edwards

claims that the eighteenth-century humanist distrusts analogy because it imposes a system of free will,[3] and Fussell contends that the eighteenth-century humanist suspects all juxtapositions of man and other creatures because they contradict his view that the "world of physical nature" is "irrelevant" to "moral existence."[4] Both Edwards and Fussell overlook the fact that while the eighteenth-century humanist seeks to define what is distinctly "human," he conceives of the limits of human potential, not as something unique in itself, but as a capacity distinctive only in its relation to something else. Man is the middle link in the Chain of Being because part by part he is similar in some ways to the forms above him and in others to the forms below him; but as the sum total of those parts he is a being very different from, although comparable to, those other forms-- he is man. Through the kind of logical comparison that the Eighteenth Century understood by the term "analogy," the humanist established these similarities and differences, and the humanist/writer used them in his literary figures, not to blur distinctions, but to clarify them. Pope's comparisons show the range of human behavior and values and are real analogies. It is the comparisons of his adversaries and the comparisons that he uses to expose them that confuse

rather than contrast human and non-human-- that are identifications rather than analogies.

I

The thematic analogy in Windsor-Forest (1713) is twofold. Pope requests of the Muse that power to re-create in verse the beauties of Windsor's groves analogous to the power given Milton to re-create the beauties of Eden in Paradise Lost. He wishes to produce a work of art which parallels Nature both in its accuracy of presentation and in its regularity. Also, he wishes to demonstrate poetically the relationship which both Eden's and Windsor's groves have to Creation as a whole:

> Not Chaos-like together crush'd and bruis'd
> But as the World, harmoniously confus'd:
> Where Order in Variety we see.... (11.13-15)

Having accurately described Windsor in its present idyllic state, he traces its history, using the changing conditions of the groves as a kind of political and ethical barometer. Oppressive, inhuman behavior on the part of England's rulers is mirrored in the disordered state of their environs. During the reign of the Norman tyrants, for example,

> In vain kind Seasons swell'd the teeming Grain,
> Soft Show'rs distilled and Sun grew warm in vain;

> The Swain with Tears his frustrate Labour yields,
> And famish'd dies amidst his ripen'd Fields.
> (11.53-6)

With the reascendence to the throne of more humanitarian kings and the re-establishment of Order comes the spread of "yellow harvests" over what used to be "Sandy Wilds" (1.88).

Bringing the parallel up to his own time, Pope analogizes the return to order which the signing of the Peace Treaty of Utrecht represents with renewed fecundity (industrial productivity and colonial expansion). The signing of the peace treaty is a making of order out of chaos comparable to God's creation of the Earth out of the Abyss as described by Milton:

Paradise Lost (I,19-22)

> ...Thou...
> .....with mighty wings outspread
> Dovelike satst brooding on the vast Abyss
> And mad'st it pregnant....

Windsor-Forest (11.429-30)

> ...Peace descending bids her Olives spring,
> And scatters Blessings from her Dove-like Wing.

From the traditional use of the pastoral poem, in which birds, trees, flowers and sheep are made to reflect the emotions and moods of the shepherd, Pope moves to a more original use in a poem in which fecundity or barrenness of nature becomes a reflection and measure of man's morality.

Just as Pope, patterning himself on Milton, could re-create the beauty represented by a Paradise of order in the beauty of his well-ordered lines of poetry, so man re-creates the orderly productivity of nature by adhering to moral order (i.e. governship instead of tyranny and peace instead of war). By this proper imitation the human being does not become something else, but rather fulfills himself as an artist and as a man. The organizing principle of the poem is that human art (A) and human behavior (B) are both analogous to divine creation (C) as exhibited by nature and by distortions of nature; and that human art and human behavior being analogous to the same standard of measurement are also analogous to each other (A:C = B:C).

That man should make his own efforts and behavior analogous to the orderliness of God's creation of him and the world around him is also an organizing theme of An Essay on Man (1733-4). Both the creation of the Great Chain of Being and the act of linking man's Ruling Passion to his greatest virtues are described in vivid images of fertility and fruitfulness, and all attempts to upset these well-arranged systems appear as efforts to mis- or uncreate.

In the final epistle of the Essay Pope argues that human happiness consists in virtuous behavior. The capacity for this kind of fulfillment is one of the ways in which man is godlike. Simultaneously, it links man to God's

other earthly creatures in that each fulfills itself by fulfilling the purpose for which it was made. Addressing Happiness as a "plant of celestial seed," Pope is using an analogy which suggests both affiliations, but also employs them to explain the way in which man's role is unique:

> ...if dropt below,
> Say, in what mortal soil thou deign'st to grow?
> Fair op'ning to some Court's propitious shine,
> Or deep with di'monds in the flaming mine?
> Twin'd with the wreaths Parnassian laurels yield,
> Or reap'd in iron harvests of the field?
> Where grows?-- where grows it not?-- if vain our toil,
> We ought to blame the culture, not the soil....
> (IV, 7-14)

Man is given the seeds with which to create his own happiness, and it does not matter where he plants them, external things being irrelevant to true happiness, but how he plants them: "There needs but thinking right, and meaning well" (1.32). Being virtuous breeds human happiness: all other attempts are fruitless.

In the Moral Essays, especially that on the "Characters of Women" (1735), Pope focuses on people who do not make thinking right and meaning well their guide to happiness, but unduly emphasize vanity and material wealth, with barrenness the result of their labors. He uses analogies with impotency and abnormal creation somewhat like those in the Dunciad to emphasize that the pursuits of all these ladies

are essentially similar: each violates the true ends for which human beings were created. Sappho (Lady Mary Wortley Montagu) spends the day amid her greases and powders that she may appear luxuriant at an evening Mask:

> So morning Insects that in muck begun,
> Shine, buzz, and fly-blow in the setting-sun.
> (11.25-6)

Narcissa, whi is "Chaste to her husband" but "frank to all beside" (1.71) is a "teeming Mistress. but a barren Bride" (1.72); and Flavia, who scorns prayer and lives by the maxim "eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die," suffers from "impotence of mind" (1.93). Atossa's sterility, on the other hand, results from inconsistency of mind: "No thought advances, but her Eddy Brain/Whisks it about, and down it goes again" (121-2). She tries to find happiness in meaning ill towards others. She hoards her money, and the only result of her selfishness is that she "Childless with all her Children wants an heir" (1.148).

The creation analogies in An Essay on Man stressed the ways in which man when he functions in his proper role as man parallels the productiveness of God's other creatrues when they are functioning properly in their roles. The miscreation images in the "Characters of Women"

demonstrate that when man steps outside his proper role, he approximates a lower form, and as such his creative efforts must be unsuccessful because he is not being himself.

II

In the Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot (1735) Pope's organizing comparison involves a more personal affront by dehumanized and dehumanizing elements in which he sees and makes his reader see a more general threat. Pope analogizes his own grotto with Eden and unending solicitations by inept writers with a satan-like invasion of his private paradise and his peace of mind:

> All Bedlam, or Parnassus is let out:
> Fire in each eye, and Papers in each hand,
> They rave, recite, and madden round the land
> What Wall can guard me, or what Shades can hide?
> They pierce my Thickets, thro' my Grot they glide.... (11.4-8)

The false flattery of these invaders consists of distorted parallels between Pope and the Ancients which even if true represent an analogy between similarities in physical appearance and similarities in writing ability which is false (11.115-124). Pope counters these false analogies between himself and respected artists with a self-description which compares effective literary creation to an Adam-and-Eve-like innocence, obedience to one's betters, and freedom from sin.

In the writers he is attacking, on the other hand, lack of ability is not just annoying, it is potentially dangerous, because it frequently appears in conjunction with one of man's greatest sins:

> That Casting-weight Pride adds to Emptiness,
> This, who can gratify? for who can guess?
> The Bard whom pilf'red Pastorals renown,
> Who turns a Persian Tale for half a crown,
> Just writes to make his barrenness appear,
> And strains from hard-bound brains eight
> lines a-year....
> (11.177-182)

This potential is realized in his portrait of Sporus (Lord Hervey) which demonstrates analogically that feebleness and inability to create too often combine with a satanic power to uncreate. Sporus "Wit ne'er tastes, and Beauty ne'er enjoys" (1.312); "Eternal smiles his emptiness betray"(1.315); he is himself a "vile Antithesis" (1.325); and he speaks in "florid Impotence" (1.327), an oxymoron which itself suggests a kind of creative uncreativity. On the surface, even Pope's identification of him with Milton's Satan seems to stress his harmlessness. He is evil discovered ("Parts that none will trust," 1.332); and Pope's description of his characteristics as "Wit that can creep, and Pride that licks the dust" (1.333) seems to refer to the lines in Book X of Paradise Lost in which God pronounces his punishment of the

serpent in whose form Satan tempted Eve: "Upon thy Belly groveling thou shalt go/And dust shall eat all the days of thy Life" (11.177-8). But Milton's God refers to the serpent as the creature whom Satan made the "instrument" of his "mischief" (1.166) and "polluted from the end/Of his Creation" (11.167-8). Pope's analogy of Sporus with Satan "at the ear of Eve" (1.319) and with "Eve's Tempter" (1.330) surely means to connect Sporus' seeming impotence with the fact that Satan too seemed harmless; yet he brought about, if only temporarily, the uncreating of creation. He was able to tempt Eve because, as Raphael tells Adam in Book V (11.519ff.), while the seeds of goodness were planted in mankind, he was given the free will to nurture or uproot them. Similarly, Sporus and the dunces are potentially harmful. While most men, as Pope declares in the Essay on Criticism, have "the Seeds of Judgment in their Mind" (1.20), and are afforded by Nature "at least a glimm'ring of Light" (1.21), their "good Sense" can be "defac'd" by "false Learning"(1.25).

Pope's use of analogies with physical nature to point up this aspect of man's essence, contrary to Edward's view, is no more the imposition of a system on free will than is the kind of free choice which it aims to describe. To the eighteenth-century humanist the fulfillment of human potential is not going beyond limits, but clearly establish-

ing those limits, so that everything possible can be accomplished within them. In the right hands, the making of analogies is especially conducive to this type of definition because it allows the writer to give tangible form to concepts otherwise amorphous and intangible.

Pope switches perspective in the Epistle, however, to show that on another level "false learning," "hypocrisy, and Lyes" really are "impotent" when contrasted to the "manly ways" (1.337) and creative powers of Truth (1.341). Pope's juxtaposition of his own virility and Sporus' impotency (11.334ff.) demonstrates that his own creations in verse are healthy and pleasing because they serve the ends of Morality and Truth.

Such changes in angles of vision do not create disharmony in the poem because they are all worked in to a planned series of analogies between good literary creation (by Pope) and freedom from sin(uncreation) and between incompetent writing (exemplified by Sporus) and commission of sin. The analogies are unified both by their style and by their purpose: to vindicate Pope personally and to establish in humanistic terms the moral relevance of writing generally.

Again in the Epilogue to the Satires (1738) Pope defends his own literary creations on the grounds that they are analogous with morality and truth. But the two

dialogues are even more significant as a defense of satire in general; and Pope organizes this defense on the principle that satire is only creative when it is an effective weapon against vice.

At the beginning of dialogue I, "Fr.," the adversary, reveals his misreading of Pope's satiric imitations by suggesting that the author could have spared his labor, since he has said the same thing Horace said before. He has not even said it as cunningly, because Horace managed to laugh and smile at offenders in a way inoffensive to them. Unwittingly, as Pope informs him, Fr. has hit on the very thing that makes Pope's imitations analogies rather than copies: he may use some of Horace's forms and phrases, but he is by choice no innocuous giggler (1.36).

"Fr." sees no harm in laughing out, provided the writer laughs at everyone and does not confine his ridicule to knaves and fools. But to Pope a primary function of satire is recognizing and revealing the actions and ideas that distinguish knaves and fools from other men. If Satire is to forego its proper "Distinction" of right and wrong, the form of creation that replaces it must have some other distinction as its aim. What about the "Dignity of Vice?" Are we to allow a porter, queries Pope in a mock reversal of allegiance, to think his small dishonesties

identical in cleverness to his master's larger ones? The comparison that follows establishes that virtue is as compatible with beggars as with kings, but that vice is only secure in the company of great ones. Since so many of the great have distinguished themselves by association with bad habits, however, they have set an example for the general public, which by emulating vice is inverting the ends for which God created man.

In dialogue II, "Fr." responds to this picture of Virtue in distress with still more ways for its would-be defender to be satiric without being effective. "Spare the person, and expose the Vice" (1.12), he suggests;but to do so, Pope points out, would be equivalent to a hawk's seeking prey by making his target all birds in general instead of one specific bird within his reach. The adversary's solution is that if Pope must name names, he should choose a target like Jonathan Wild. But since creative satire exposes vice, to attack a villain long since publicly condemned is just one more way of exposing the writer's own impotence:

> Down, down proud Satire! tho' a Realm be spoil'd,
> Arraign no mightier Thief than wretched Wild.
> (11. 38-9)

To prove that he is as capable of praising as he is of blaming Pope provides a lengthy description of well-known men whom he considers worthy and virtuous. He is also

demonstrating that praise is to virtue as blame is to vice: both the encomium and the satire are truthful and productive only when applied to specific persons and deeds.

On the other hand, it is the duty of all who write to consider any affront to Virtue as a threat to mankind in general and as a personal responsibility. Satire is a "sacred Weapon" which the poet wields with divine guidance (11.212-215) when he wields it in defense of the virtuous ways mankind should seek to fulfill itself. As such satire is an immortal creation which thrives long after it has served its initial purpose (11.246-7); and in comparison all other literary praise or invective is temporary and effete.

Throughout the two dialogues "Fr." is the spokesman for writing which is not creative because it is self-abortive satire. Pope compares this ineffective approach to his own concept of satire as weapon thrashing away at deceptive coverings and creating an atmosphere in which only truth and virtue can flourish. The analogy between means and ends, cause and effect, in literary creation and in physical creation is implicit throughout. It becomes explicit in a closing description of uncreative writers:

> Ye tinsel Insects! whom a Court maintains,
> That count your Beauties only by your Stains,
> Spin all your Cobwebs o'er the Eye of Day!
> The Muse's wing shall brush you all away:

> All his Grace preaches, all his Lordship sings,
> All that makes Saints of Queens, and Gods of Kings,
> All, all but Truth drops dead-born from the Press....
> (11.220-26)

The creation analogy is also a unifying motif between different poems through Pope's repeated use of the same allusion for analogous (similar but different) reasons. In An Essay on Criticism (1711), for example, he laments the brief duration of acknowledged geniuses such as Chaucer and Dryden which results from the "impermanent nature of the English language":

> So when the faithful Pencil has design'd
> Some bright Idea of the Master's Mind,
> Where a new World leaps out at his command,
> And ready Nature waits upon his Hand;
> When the ripe Colours soften and unite,
> And sweetly melt into just Shade and Light,
> When mellowing Years their full Perfection give,
> And each Bold Figure just begins to Live;
> The treach'rous Colours the fair Art betray,
> And all the bright Creation fades away!
> (11.484-93)

Comparable to this beautiful and orderly process of creating a "new World" is the chaotic creation of a monstrous "new world" (1.241) which Pope depicts in the Dunciad, Book III. Both are analogous to the account of God's creation of "new Worlds" (1.209) in Paradise Lost, Book VII. In both descriptions the standard of measurement is the same. The difference is that one emphasizes closeness of resemblance; the other distortion of resemblance. The creation of the new world in An Essay on Criticism takes

place like God's creation of Earth with the aid of "ready Nature" (1.487), while the creation by the playwrights in the Dunciad is of a "new world to Nature's laws unknown" (1.241). Just as God in Book VII of Paradise Lost creates an orderly division of Day and Night, Light and Darkness (11.339ff.), so the creative artist in An Essay on Criticism blends the colors of his work so that they "sweetly melt to just Shade and Light" (1.489). But where God, according to Milton's description, "made the Stars/And set them in the Firmament of Heav'n (11.348-9) to "illuminate the earth and divide darkness from light (1.352), Rich, "parodying"[7] God's action in the Dunciad,

> Yon stars, yon suns...rears at pleasure higher,
> Illumes their light, and sets their flame on fire.
> (11.259-260)

In An Essay on Criticism artistic creation which follows order and the laws of Nature appears as a parallel to the Order, Beauty and Perfection of God"s creation of Earth and man. In the passage from the Dunciad the unartistic production of wildly extravagant stage sets, "not touch'd by Nature, and reach'd by Art" (1.230), is presented as an inversion of the Order, Beauty and Perfection of God's creation of Earth and man-- a mimicry rather than an imitation.

One of the shaping purposes of An Essay on Criticism in general is the analogy both positive and negative

between criticism and creativity (in art and in nature). The Essay begins with the observation that both the excellent writer and the excellent critic derive their light from Heaven, but that among the incompetent members of each profession, it is probably the ill-judging that do the most harm. Frequently, they are themselves former writers whose attempted transition to judges has left them neither here nor there:

> Some neither can for Wits nor Criticks pass,
> As heavy Mules are neither Horse nor Ass,
> Those half-learn'd Witlings, num'rous in our Isle,
> As half-form'd Insects on the Banks of Nile;
> Unfinish'd Things, one knows not what to call,
> Their Generation's so equivocal. (11.38-43)

If they are not themselves analogous to malformations, they create monsters through the distorted way in which they view the work of others:

> Some Figures monstrous and mis-shaped appear,
> Consider'd singly, or beheld too near,
> Which, but proportion'd to their Light, or Place,
> Due Distance reconciles to Form and Grace.
> (11.171-4)

It is the responsibility of the critic to judge the work by the same broad values that should have been the writer's guide when he was producing it. One of the few unforgivable offenses is vacuous writing in combination with immorality:

> No Pardon vile Obscenity should find,
> Tho' Wit and Art conspire to move your Mind;

But Dulness with Obscenity must prove
As Shameful sure as Impotence in Love.
(11.530-33)

This "rank Weed" thrived through the neglect of corrupt kings. William III by permitting the Licensing Act of 1663 to lapse was the cultivator of petty religious and political disputes: "And the Press groan'd with Licenc'd Blasphemies" (1.553).

It is monstrous creations such as these that Pope admonishes good critics to attack; and his closing description of the commendable critic (exemplified by himself) is analogous to the humble exemplar of morality and truth that he sets up elsewhere as the model of the good writer. Throughout An Essay on Criticism the values and techniques of literary creation (A) and literary criticism (B) are analogized in that both are measured against the standards and principles of divine creation (A:C = B:C).

Pope's Peri Bathous, or the Art of Sinking in Poetry (1727)[8] is analogous by inversion to An Essay on Criticism. The values professed by the persona of the prose work are inversions of those recommended by the spokesman in the poem. Pope emphasizes the relationship by presenting both in his thematic creation/miscreation vocabulary. According to An Essay, Nature plants the

"Seeds of Judgment" in man's mind, but too often false learning uproots them (11.20-25). According to the Art of Sinking, "the taste of Bathos is implanted by Nature itself in the Soul of Man; 'till perverted by Custom or Example he is taught, or rather compell'd to relish the Sublime" (p.10). The similar language makes the difference between the two approaches more obvious, while simultaneously reminding the reader of the proximity of truth and distortions of truth.

At the same time, the way in which the speaker in Peri Bathous uses this language reveals that misconceiving truth and sinking in poetry are parallel. The good writer and the good critic compare rather than confuse the subject and the illustration of it: they analogize, not identify. To the persona in Peri Bathous, however, men are animals and animals are men. Among the various species of bathetic writers are the Porpoises, a category including John Dennis and Charles Gildon: "wherever they appear in plain Light...they are only shapeless and ugly Monsters" (p.27). Equating men with monsters, on the one hand, is Pope's way of ridiculing them. On the other, by attributing this equation to their own spokesman, he makes it an example of why they deserve such ridicule as well.

Pope as humanist/writer uses this technique repeatedly to define the conditions under which man relinquishes the qualities that make him uniquely human. In the Dunciad he draws an analogy between the wild creations of playwrights and the degradation of his country's moral standards; in Peri Bathous the persona makes this same analogy by implication, but in fact his example is an identification of art and nature-- an obliteration of the difference between fiction and reality, between created art and created man, which demeans both:

> When an Audience beholds a Coach turn'd into a Wheel-barrow, a Conjuror into an Old Woman, or a Man's Head where his Heels should be; how are they struck with Transport and Delight? Which can only be imputed to this Cause, that each Object is chang'd into That which hath been suggested to them by their own low Ideas before. (p.19)

The further away man and artist move from principles of creation analogous with nature's, the closer they come to the complete identification of what according to the human norm should be opposite values and functions. The persona of Peri Bathous depicts this erroneous identification in a physical image of poetizing:

> It may be affirm'd with great truth, that there is hardly any human Creature past Childhood, but at one time or other has had some Poetical Evacuation, and no question was much the better for it in his Health; so true is the Saying, Nacimur Poetae: Therefore is the Desire of Writing properly term'd Pruritus, the

> Titillation of the Generative Faculty of the Brain: and the Person is said to conceive: Now such as conceive must bring forth. (p.13)

As these and numerous other examples demonstrate, the structure of Pope's parody depends very strongly on 1) the tension between sound critical judgment and its inversion, both expressed in analogous language and on 2) the tension between analogy and identity, expressed in the juxtapositions of art and nature and of human and non-human.

III

The parodic structure of Pope's four-book Dunciad (1743) also depends on analogy. As Ricardo Aristarchus himself relates in his introductory comparison of the lesser and greater epic: "There must exist some Analogy, if not Resemblance of Qualities, between the Heroes of the two Poems" (p.713). Vanity, Impudence and Debauchery, the characteristics of the lesser Epic Hero, are not the exact opposites of Wisdom, Bravery and Love: they are distortions of these heroic qualities and, therefore, truly analogous to them. Bravery and Impudence, for example, both require a display of self-assurance, the difference being that the one manifests itself in the real action of "every limb," while the other "is all collected into the

Face."

Aristarchus's attempts to show a real relationship between Colley Cibber and an epic hero become increasingly unconvincing and are themselves examples of the dunces' inability to see and transcribe relationships clearly and accurately. But they are also part of Pope's effort to show the facility with which distortions of greatness can take on the appearance of the real thing and assume its powers if left unchecked.

The analogies via allusion to Milton's Satan and his uncreating power and those via miscreation imagery (chiefly involving insects, monsters and freaks of nature) counterbalance each other throughout the poem, working together to achieve Pope's main effects and make his main points. Both types of analogy stress the potential destruction by bad literature of order and decency, which is represented in turn by the methods and results of divine creation. But the comparisons of Colley and Satan stress the relation of the dunces to superhuman destructiveness, while those between the dunces and half-formed somethings or unnatural mutations stress a relationship between bad writers and sub-human forms of destruction.

Analogies of the dunces with evil forces of epic status serve to represent their efforts as attempts to be more than

human; and as attempts which merit serious attention, a) on a literary level as activities worthy of ridicule, and b) on a moral level as activities threatening enough not to be merely laughed at, but aggressively opposed. Analogies of the dunces with insects, half-formed nonsense and impotent bunglers alternate and intermix with the more elevating allusions and serve to demonstrate (as in Pope's previous works) that in attempting to be more than men, the dunces in reality make themselves less than men and less effective than men. When we recognize and expose them for what they really are, we render them harmless.

The opening lines of Book II exemplify this simultaneous use of elevating and demeaning analogies to compliment and modify each other:

> High on a gorgeous seat, that far out-shone
> Henley's gilt tub, or Fleckno's Irish throne,
> Or that where on her Curls the Public pours,
> All-bounteous, fragrant Grains and Golden show'rs,
> Great Cibber sate.... (11.1-5)

The epic grandeur in the allusion to Book II of Paradise Lost is offset by the farcical comparison with Curl in the stocks having rotten eggs and refuse malt flung at him. But that something capable of association with greatness is also comparable to absurdity is Pope's main point. The one allusion does not cancel out the other; together they

force the reader to reflect on the implications of both relationships.

Pope's purpose all through the four-book version is to make the reader reflect as well as laugh. He should recognize for example that the dunces' mistake is to identify their own productions and methods with natural fruitfulness. To Cibber his writings and his "more Christian progeny" (I, 228) are essentially the same. Pope's aim, however, is to show analogically that Cibber and his kind distort the divine and the human, but at the same time, that they are able to do so because there is a real resemblance between truth and distortion, between good and bad art and between good and bad conduct. Only by recognizing both how man is different and how he is similar to forms and values above and below him can he be in full knowledgeable control of right and wrong in himself and others.

The two parodies in Book III of Milton's Paradise Lost (Books XI and XII) and of Virgil's Aeneid (Book VI) are part of Pope's effort to give man access to this control. By having the spirit of Settle advise Cibber in language parallel to that used by the Archangel Michael with Adam and by the spirit of Anchises with Aeneas, he emphasizes how easy it is for apparently similar methods, not always visibly antagonistic to traditionally accepted procedure, to produce very different results.

When in Book VI of the Aeneid the spirit of Anchises gives to his son, Aeneas, a vision of his progeny, it is to show him the eventual rebirth of glory for their race. The founding and flourishing of the city of Rome will restore the age of gold. When Settle gives Cibber a vision of the progeny of Dulness, however, it is to show him the number of inept writers who "flow" like Welsted, "tho' stale, not ripe" (1. 170), of "poring Scholiasts" and vain preachers of nonsense, who together will aid the goddess in her hatching of a new age of lead. Virgil describes Rome as a city as blessed in her "breed of men" as is Berecynthia in her "brood of gods" : "Heaven-dwellers all, all tenants of the realm above" (11.784-7).[10] But in Pope's version:

> As Berecynthia, while her offspring vye,
> In homage to the Mother of the sky,
> Surveys around her, in the blest abode,
> An hundred sons, and ev'ry son a God:
> Not with less glory mighty Dulness crown'd,
> Shall take thro' Grub-street her triumphant round;
> And her Parnassus glancing o'er at once,
> Behold an hundred sons, and each a Dunce.
>
> (11. 131-8)

The final book of the Dunciad begins with a parody of the opening of Paradise Lost, Book III, where Milton invokes the aid of Light to describe Heaven. Pope's request is for one "dim Ray of Light" to make visible the "deep intent" of the "Seed of Chaos and of Night/To blot out Order, and extinguish Light" (11. 13-14). Miscreation

analogies dominate each ensuing event. The patrons, the third and outermost ring of followers magnetically attracted to Dulness, ~~is~~ are characterized in a footnote as serving the same function "in the moral World that Comets serve in the natural: to refresh and recreate the Dryness and decays of the system." Dr. Busby is compared to Milton's Molloch and his pedagogic methods are analogized with the aborting of growth and creativity. Aristarchus describes how he and his associate scholiasts create their own cocoon of nonsense out of which they find it difficult to extricate themselves or to bring forth even a moth. The Governor reveals the immortality of the age in his description to Dulness of the Pupil's advancement in the arts of bad taste and debauchery: "Thou gav'st that Ripeness, which so soon began;/And ceas'd so soon, he ne'er was Boy, nor Man" (11.287-8). Evacuation is analogous with reproduction in the Annius episode; and the botany enthusiasts, butterfly catchers and other indulgers of trivia are each represented as inverters of the ends of creation.

To the end of Book IV Pope consistently pursues his double analogy designed to demonstrate at once the preposterousness and the real potential of Dulness and her followers. Absurd as the coin-swallowing Annius or the single-purposed butterfly catcher may appear, they form

part of an ever-burgeoning force which is triumphant. In the finale of this seeming farce, Truth, Metaphysics and Mathematics are reduced to insects: "In vain! they gaze, turn giddy, rave, and die" (1.648). And "Nor human Spark is left, nor Glimpse divine!" (1.652).

The final version of the Dunciad closes with the vision of a total obliteration of what it is that makes man human. This could conceivably occur were his non-humanizing tendencies in art and life to proceed undetected. In almost everything Pope wrote he seeks to prevent this vision from becoming a reality by acquainting man with his proper position and values and by exposing what he sees as dehumanizing pursuits and goals. Throughout, his standard for literary endeavors and moral conduct is divine creation as exhibited in nature. His guiding philosophical principle is the Great Chain of Being, and particularly the fact that man is a middle link between angel and insect and possesses potentially some of the qualities of both.

Accordingly, the structural principle of his work is analogy-- the attempt to define the role of man and artist by recognizing both the similarities and the differences between man and other forms of creation. The main purpose of the different types of analogies observed

in Windsor-Forest, An Essay on Criticism, the Dunciad, etc. is to show that where man models his artistic efforts and his daily behavior on methods and precepts parallel to, but differing in degree from, divine creation, he fulfills his human purposes and is at the same time truly analogous to the divine being. But when he seeks to identify with other created forms or with forces whose purpose it is to subvert human goals, he reaches above the human and succeeds only in falling below it.

Analogy, rather than simile or metaphor, is an organizing center of Pope's work because he recognized it as an accurate artistic device for depicting the ambiguities and the ironies of man's position, while at the same time exploring and defining his possibilities as well as his limits.

Footnotes

[1] See Reuben Brower, Alexander Pope: The Poetry of Allusion (Oxford, 1959), p.328; and Thomas R. Edwards, "Light and Nature: A Reading of the Dunciad," Essential Articles: Alexander Pope (Connecticut, 1964), 715.

[2] Aubrey Williams, Pope's Dunciad: A Study of Its Meaning (Baton Rouge, 1955).

[3] T.R. Edwards, This Dark Estate (Berkeley, 1963), p.34.

[4] Paul Fussell, The Rhetorical World of Augustan Humanism (Oxford, 1965), p.8.

[5] Alexander Pope, The Poems of Alexander Pope, a one-volume edition of the Twickenham Text, ed. John Butt (New Haven, 1966). All quotations refer to this edition.

[6] John Milton, "Paradise Lost," John Milton: Complete Poetry and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (New York, 1957). All references are to this edition.

[7] Williams, p.97.

[8] Alexander Pope, The Art of Sinking in Poetry, ed.E.L. Steeves (New York, 1952).

[9] I am indebted to Aubrey Williams (Pope's Dunciad, 1955) for almost all of the parallels noted between Pope and Milton, although I do not use them for the same purposes. A full list of parallel passages in the works of Milton and Pope appears in Appendix A of Raymond D. Haven's The Influence of Milton on English Poetry (Cambridge, 1922), pp.573-83.

[10] Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. C.Day Lewis (New York,1952).

Chapter VIII William Cowper's The Task: Analogy and the Moral Landscape

Pope's Dunciad developed from a sophisticated, if somewhat bitter, burlesque into a significant indictment of his age.[1] So too, Cowper's The Task may have been originally conceived to fill a lady's request for a poem about a sofa, but Books III through VI emerge in their final form as a carefully designed exposition of larger issues and broader values. Through planned analogies the poet explores the similarities and differences between Good and Evil, and Nature and Society; and bases the moral vision of his poem on what its patterned comparisons reveal. His method is to set up and dissolve a series of boundaries, literal and symbolic, and in his explorations of past, present and future to create an unlimited moral landscape out of a physically limited locale. He compares the country and the city in terms of the flora and fauna of both and describes his personal retreat and the world at large both in terms of their flowers and their weeds. On a spiritual level, he connects the pre-Christian Garden of Eden with the post-millenial City of God by demonstrating the lack of barriers and of a need for barriers in both. Like the divine analogists in eighteenth-century theology, he devises a common terminology by means of which to demonstrate

relationships between things and ideas seemingly incomparable. And while Cowper does not make divine analogies of his descriptions with the same rhythmic regularity observed by Wasserman in Thomson's The Seasons,[2] he does make thematic and stylistic connections which enable him to discover larger meanings and to overleap the apparent boundaries of Olney and Weston.

Although spatially, Cowper's descriptions are somewhat limited,[3] temporally they exhibit a much wider range. In Books III-VI of The Task he juxtaposes the past, present and future moral setting of man. In the remote spiritual past lies the beautiful Garden of Eden where there is "eternal spring" (VI, 770) and "perpetual fruitfulness" (765) and where no "fence is needed, for "there is none to covet" (771-2).[4] Here, no barriers separate man from man, nor men from animals-- none but the "law of universal love" (360). Throughout The Task Cowper mourns the loss of this Edenic state; and in Book VI he envisions the eventual return of all it represents. He derives the ideal setting for man's future, however, not from Genesis, but from Revelation. In Book V (194-228) he describes the "confounding" of the tower of Babel and the Lord's division of the earth's populace into peoples of different "tongues," each restricted to an assigned portion of land. Still following the Old Testament, he

attributes the beginning of war to the resulting disputes between men who, unsatisfied with their "just demesne" (226), "covet" another's. The city and tower of Babel (Genesis, 11) were built by a proud people who wished to equal God. But the "sacred city" of Revelation 21, which Cowper describes in the final book of The Task, is built by God for his faithful worshippers. These chosen people are no longer enclosed by linguistic or geographic boundaries, but are united in their mutual love of the Almighty:

> The dwellers in the vales and on the rocks
> Shout to each other, and the mountain tops
> From distant mountains catch the flying joy;
> Till, nation after nation taught the strain,
> Earth rolls the rapturous hosanna round. (793-7)

The post-Christian City of God becomes the symbolic equivalent of the pre-Christian Graden of Paradise in that "the glory of all lands/Flows into her; unbounded is her joy,/And endless her increase" (802-4).[5] Both the rural setting of man's remote past and the urban setting of his ultimate future represent in Cowper's moralized landscape an absence of all forms of separation. Dividing lines, fences and enclosures are only necessary in a post-lapsarian, pre-Resurrection world, in which the evil intruder is an ever-present reality.

It is just such a world that William Cowper inhabits. Here, animals, instead of loving man, must fear

him, and must flee to the caves and thickets of the wilderness to protect themselves against him (IV, 400-405). Cowper "like a stricken deer" has "left the herd" and, rescued by Christ, also an injured innocent, has withdrawn to "silent woods," away from the "peopled scene" (III,108-109). He now leads a "domestic life in rural leisure passed" (III, 290) by means of which he attempts to re-capture the "surviving bliss of Paradise": "for earth has still/Some traces of her youthful beauty left"(11.298-9).

But it is not merely the remote past of Eden that he regrets having lost and that he realizes cannot be restored until the end of time. His thoughts also wander back to a more recent past: "Virtue and vice had bound'ries in old time" (1.75). Not so far off as the days of Adam and Eve was a time when even though both good and bad existed, the two could be clearly distinguished and set apart. Cowper equates this time with the simplicity of country life and its disappearance with increased urbanization. Accordingly, the English would naturally prefer the country, even in the barrenness of winter, "to the eclipse/That Metropolitan volcanoes make" (736-7) had they not "bid farewell" to the "virtues" of "better days" (744-5). "Better days" means the time when Englishmen stayed on their country estates, cultivating the

trees that their fathers had planted, instead of selling them. And in the realm of fancy "better days" means the "Arcadian scenes" of Virgil and Sidney. They may have been only a dream, laments Cowper, but nowadays, even to "suppose a scene" where virtue "presides,/Is tramontane, and stumbles all belief" (11.513-33). The use of the word "tramontane" itself evokes the idea of a barrier, not between virtue and vice, but between virtue and man.

There are really two rural landscapes in The Task: the general countryside which is being overrun by or deserted for the vices of the city, and the immediate area of Cowper's cottage where virtue, "the only amaranthine flow'r on earth" (1.268), thrives undisturbed. While all the other country animals are exposed to the "savage din of the swift pack" (1.24), only the poet's "shelter'd hare" lives in undisturbed quiet (11.334-6). While the victims of"self-inflicted" poverty are violating other gardeners' pales and other farmers' barns (IV, 429-38), Cowper raises his delicate cucumbers undisturbed. The description of the flowers in his greenhouse also reflects this artificial immunity. While the "winds whistle and the snows descend" (1.569), barricaded against winter's "shrewd bite," the exotic flowers still bloom: "Unconscious of a less propitious clime" (1.567). Like Cowper peeping

through "the loop-holes of retreat" (IV,88) at the "great Babel" of a world which cannot touch him,

> The ruddier orange, and the paler lime,
> Peep through their polish'd foliage at the storm,
> And seem to smile at what they need not fear.
> (III, 573-5)

In Book IX of Milton's Paradise Lost Adam warns Eve of the"malicious foe" who seeks to harm them, and tells her not to leave his side, that they may "avoid/ Th' attempt itself" (11.294-5). At first, Eve is offended by his mistrust. Later, she argues that if it be their "condition" to "dwell/In narrow circuit strait'n'd by a Foe" (323-4), then they are not free: their virtue is "unassay'd" (335) and, therefore, unproved. Adam answers that God has given them "free Will, for what obeys Reason is free," but that because Reason may be deceived, they had best not seek temptation (11.350-66). Cowper's rationalization of his retreat follows closely the lines of Adam's argument. While unlike the Parents of Man, he is not "secure from outward force" (347), nevetheless, the primary temptation he faces is the corruption of his mind. Retreat cannot restore the mind of man to its former innocence, but it can secure it

> From all assaults of evil; proving still
> A faithful barrier, not o'erleaped with ease
> By vicious custom, raging uncontroll'd
> Abroad, and desolating public life.
> (III, 680-83)

Eve, puffed up with pride, thought to "double honor gain" (IX, 332) by deliberately seeking the serpent and proving the strength of her virtue against him. Cowper, mindful of the results of her method, is more cauteous: "To combat may be glorious, and success/ Perhaps may crown us; but to fly is safe" (687-8). The mother of man felt that having to restrict herself to a particular spot curtailed her freedom. For Cowper, as for Adam, internal freedom is more essential. Being an Evangelical, however, for him real liberty consists not in free will but grace: "Grace makes the slave a freeman" (V, 688). It is not Cowper confined to a small physical space who is in "chains," but men who are "held/ In silly dotage on created things,/Careless of their Creator" (585-6). It is man's recognition of his natural surroundings as evidence that "there lives and works/A soul in all things, and that soul is God" (V,184-5) which makes him free. All the valleys, mountains and rivers become his the moment he acknowledges that his "Father made them all!" (737ff.).

Cowper takes in only small snatches of his actual physical surroundings at a time, yet he attains through contemplation of that limited view, a spiritual vision unbounded by time and space. To the enlightened soul the stars in the sky are "beacons in the blue abyss"

revealing the way to his eternal home: "As one... long detain'd on foreign shores," he "sees afar/His country's weather-bleached and batter'd rocks,/From the green wave emerging" (832-5).

In the moralized landscape of The Task the scrofulous and itchy plague" of "Excess" beginning in the town "taints downward all the graduated scale/Of order from the chariot to the plough" (IV, 585-6). But if the barriers between virtue and vice have been broken, the consequent trespassing is not one-sided. Virtue, manifested by the "love of Nature's works," can never be entirely shut out by city gates because it was "infus'd in man at his creation" (731-3). Even those "immur'd in cities," who "never pass their brick-wall bounds/To range the fields and treat their lungs with air" (771-2), are not entirely stifled. Even they maintain barren gardens and flower pots filled with "fragrant weeds" as token evidence that "nature lives" (759).

Nature in its most vital form, the rural ideal of Cowper's retreat, is, according to Morris Golden, not just the opposite of urban corruption, but "the best earthly balance" between the "wildness and savagery of uncontrolled nature," on the one hand, and the "profligacy"[6] of the city, on the other. By using images of wild or distorted nature to represent this profligacy, however, the poet effects a

fusion of the two extremes into one opposing force. He describes the corrupt city of London, for example, in terms of its fauna. In comparison to the tame hares and friendly squirrels native to rural England, sharks and leeches abound in the city (III, 816-17). In a reversal of the normal migration of swallows who fly south in winter to be warm and safe, the knights and squires migrate south to London to be sucked and preyed upon (814-15). In Book IV the city newspaper is described as a "map of busy life" on which is spread "mountainous and craggy ridges" that "tempt ambition," "cat'racts of declamation," "forests of no meaning," and "a wilderness of strange/But gay confusion" (55-79).

At the same time that the city represents corruption caused by savagery, it also signifies corruption based on what Golden calls "over-civilization."[7] This aspect too is expressed imagistically by an analogy between the flora and fauna of country and city

> ...has his pinions fledg'd
> With motley plumes; and where the peacock shows
> His azure eyes, is tinctur'd black and red
> With spots quandrangular of di'mond form,...
> And spades, the emblem of untimely graves.
> (IV, 211-214, 219)

Also in Book IV, Cowper's discussion of what military service does to young country boys, who return "indignant to the slighted plough," leads him to the following

observation on civilized organizations in general:

> Man in society is like a flow'r
> Blown in its native bed: 'tis there alone
> His faculties, expanded in full bloom,
> Shine out; there only reach their proper use.
> But man associated and leagu'd with man...
> For int'rest-sake, or swarming into clans
> Beneath one head for purposes of war,
> Like flow'rs selected from the rest, and bound
> And bundled close to fill some crowded vase,
> Fades rapidly, and, by compression marr'd,
> Contracts defilement not to be endur'd.
> (IV, 659-62; 665-70)

In terms of moral theme The Task recommends the setting up of barriers between the country and the city, virtue and vice. In terms of imagery, it tends to cut across these barriers by calling attention, as in the swallow passage, to the very subtle shade of difference that lies between them. In Book IV Cowper says that the "self-complacent actor" glancing at his audience from "floor to roof," is not half so joyful as he is in his winter retreat (200-206). In Book III he describes the order and beauty of the flowers in that retreat ranged in the same impressive array as the Romans assembled to see Roscius, or the English ranged before Garrick (596-605).

There are still other passages in which Cowper demonstrates an ironic relationship between what in the country is a virtue and what in the city becomes a vice. What good is it "to advertise in verse a public pest," he

complains, after a digression on excessive drinking,

> That like the filth with which the peasant feeds
> His hungry acres, stinks, and is of use.
> (IV, 502-4)

Just as the "stercoraceous heap" in Cowper's stable is necessary to grow those cucumbers of which he is so proud, the consumption of liquor is necessary, according to the ministers of state, in order to fill up the treasury with excise revenues (504).

The topographical view of England that emerges from Cowper's particular choice and application of his analogies is not a society half rural and half urban whose dividing line is being overleaped in both directions. It is rather a moralized landscape in which the world is seen as one huge post-lapsarian garden comprised of two varieties of human beings-- the flowers and the weeds. In Cowper's cultivated garden at Olney is a very elite society of plant life which absolutely rejects all trespassing by wilder forms:

> All hate the rank society of weeds,
> Noisome, and ever greedy to exhaust
> Th'impov'rished earth; an overbearing race,
> That,like the multitude made faction-mad,
> Disturb good order, and degrade true worth.
> (III, 670-74)

The city, on the other hand, contains an entirely different species who, if they appreciate the countryside at all,

appreciate it for the wrong reasons. They have failed to see that "Nature is but a name for an effect,/Whose cause is God" (VI, 223-4). Therefore, they are not free:

> 'Tis liberty alone that gives the flow'r
> Of fleeting life its lustre and perfume;
> And we are weeds without it. (V, 446-8)

The laurels that a Caesar reaps in the outside world are also weeds in comparison to the "fresh triumphs" that Cowper obtains through the inner spiritual conflicts he experiences in his retreat. In spite of the implication that weeds can be virtually excluded in the kind of existence that Cowper recommends, however, the poem gives the overall impression that no barrier the poet can set up for himself in this world could ever be sufficiently reassuring. Significantly, the only one of God's creatures completely secure from the cares of winter is the worm "safe/Beneath the frozen clod" (V,80-81). Similarly, the only retreat which will serve Cowper as an absolutely impervious barrier to human evil is death:

> Dismiss me, weary to a safe retreat,
> Beneath the turf that I have often trod.
> (VI, 1004-5)

Death will also serve to obliterate all barriers that now exist between his past, present, and future

moralized landscape. His soul admitted to the Heavenly City of Revelation, he will reassume his ideal condition in the Garden of Eden.

What began in response to a lady's request for a poem about a sofa, what ended up, according to some critics, a study in personal conflict amid local color, is in its broadest sense a purposeful panorama of the fading and shifting borders of good and evil. The Task is "impressionistic," but not, as Lodwick Hartley argues, because it lacks a"preconceived design."[8] It is the analogically ordered impression of a sensitive poet that the world of nature is a reminder, a warning and a promise. It reminds man of the time when no barriers existed; it warns him of the difficulty of recognizing and fixing barriers in his own time; and it promises him a future time when once again he will neither have nor need them.

Footnotes

[1]For the view that Pope's Dunciad does not make this transition successfully see Ian Jack, Augustan Satire (Oxford, 1952), p.126.

[2]Earl R. Wasserman, "Nature Moralized: The Divine Analogy in the Eighteenth Century," ELH, 20 (1953), 70ff..

[3]See Robert Huang, William Cowper, Nature Poet (London, 1957), p.115.

[4]William Cowper, "The Task," Poetical Works, ed. H.S. Milford (London, 1907). All references are to this edition.

[5]See Morris Golden, In Search of Stability: The Poetry of William Cowper (New York, 1960), p.150.

[6]Ibid., p.151.

[7]Ibid., p.76.

[8]Lodwick Hartley, William Cowper: The Continuing Revaluation (Chapel Hill, 1960), p.67.

Chapter IX Conclusion: The Age of Analogy, 1660-1798

The literature of every age depends in some way on the making of comparisons. To bring together by identification or by analogy the various objects and ideas that are part of man's real or imagined milieu is in some way the business of all art. What makes the period of English literature designated the eighteenth century more the Age of Analogy than any other literary period is the self-critical way in which it interpreted the analogical process and the self-limiting way in which its writers deliberately applied that interpretation both to what they wrote and to how they wrote it.

In periods of English literature preceding the eighteenth century there is a definite tendency toward revelation of self and individuality of expression. That tendency prevails, however, over a correspondent belief that the self is never really separate from other selves, other universes and parts of universes. Both medieval and Renaissance writers find expression for their individuality in figurative language which suggests at least interdependence, at most absorption in things larger than themselves to which they are identical but on a smaller scale. "I am a little world made cunningly" means I am

complete and perfect in myself, but only as a part and reflection of a larger Perfect whole of which I am the image. It is security in the knowledge that man is not really alone that permits the pre-eighteenth-century writer to isolate and individualize man imagistically.

The pre-eighteenth-century writer's analogies are a luxuriation in this security: the analogies of Swift, Pope and their contemporaries are an attempt to compensate for the loss of that security and to produce a satisfactory replacement. Their equal stress on the differences as well as the similarities between things they compare is not a diminished view of the relationship between all things, but an attempt to re-establish that relationship on less flimsy ground.

Most eighteenth-century philosophers, theologians, critics and writers were asking and attempting to answer the same question: How does man know? What the major philosophers from Locke through Hume were really asking was: since man can be sure of so very little in this world, what is the most he can possibly make from what he does know? Locke said that what man can make is analogies. The primary function of the mind is to record and compare the impressions of things visible in order to

observe the ways in which they are alike and the ways in which they are different. Through a second, more speculative type of analogy-making the mind can attain more tentative conclusions about what is only probable by juxtaposition with what it knows to be possible. The theories of subsequent eighteenth-century philosophers depend more or less on how much credit for accuracy they allow to the mind's analogizing. Hartley explains associating through analogy as the new, more scientific way of seeing and demonstrating the connection of all things-- the divine scheme-- in terms not beyond man's comprehension. At the other extreme, Hume admits that man is limited to knowing via analogy, but also limited by it. More important, for Hume, unlike most eighteenth-century philosophers, analogy is not the primary tool of reason. Yet he himself must resort to analogy time and again in order to reason.

The eighteenth-century theologian as well as the eighteenth-century deist faced similar problems and dealt with them in similar ways. Natural religion was belief based on what you could see and compare. The beauties of nature were not divinity's representatives; they were themselves divine. The idea of God was equivalent to the concrete terms in which he could be described. The theologian countered that the images man

used to reason about God were analogies with concrete things on the one hand, but were also analogous to an invisible, abstract conception of the Divine, which man could not see but could suppose really existed by analogy. Butler made the more striking suggestion that what man can only speculate regarding spiritual matters is true because it is analogous to what Natural Religion demonstrates as truth, and therefore, cannot be proven untrue. Most significant for English men of letters, there emerged from this debate among theologians much struggling with the difference between comparing the images of things and comparing the things themselves. The literary figure, particularly the metaphor, represented something as something else. In so doing, it misrepresented things, instead of clarifying them. If we thought of God as really being a giant-size Brain, we were being deceived instead of enlightened. If, on the other hand, we viewed God's creation of the universe as an act analogous to the human act of creating, but not conceivable in the same terms except by analogy, then we were expanding the limits of human knowledge without distorting or ignoring the existence of things and ideas outside those limits.

To discover the limits of man's knowledge, and more particularly the limits of man's ability to express

that knowledge artistically was the task of eighteenth-century literary criticism. If literature were to be anything more than fantasy and deception, it had to re-establish itself in a context compatible with man's new conception of himself and his world. The method applied was analogy. Analogy as a comparison of things both similar and different was a means of distinguishing the art of the present from the art of the past, while at the same time allowing the modern to gain recognition from being compared with his ancestors. Analogies between ancient and modern writers were, for different reasons, a means of justifying their critical theories for the neoclassical and progressive critic both.

Literary critics achieved further justification and respect for creative writing by analogizing it with science and with painting. Like the historical analogy these too were designed to demonstrate that literature was as analogous to truth as truth's other respected representatives. At the same time, critics stressed the sensible objectivity of art by advocating that it represent and clarify nature without pretending to be identical to nature.

Analogy also replaced identification in critical concepts of the artist's role and methods. God and the

poet were both makers, but that did not mean that the poet was little less than a god in miniature. The Divine Creations were from an original Idea in the mind of the Creator; human creations were original combinations and interpretations of those already existing ideas as they presented themselves to man through his observation of Nature.

The process of literary creation was itself viewed as a making of analogies, or a successful interaction of the writer's fancy or wit (his ability to see similarities between objects and ideas) and his judgment (his ability to discern the differences between them as well). To produce a work in good "taste," or, in the role of critic, to be able to recognize tasteful writing, was parallel to being able to recognize and follow good conduct. These analogies between morality and aestheitics were still further attempts by eighteenth-century critics to establish the art of writing as a serious discipline and as an accurate representation rather than a replacement of known truths.

This analogical approach to perceiving, knowing and applying truth because it dominated the philosophy, theology and literary criticism of his age, invaded the consciousness of the eighteenth-century writer. Locke's problem of how much man could know and speculate by

comparing the differences and similarites of things were also Pope's problem and Johnson's and Cowper's. Butler's and King's problem of how to extend the realms of the scientifically ascertainable to the reaches of the spiritually probable were also the concerns of Dryden, and Trapp and Swift. Most important of all, no eighteenth-century writer could even begin to fill his page without a keen awareness that the very act of rhyming a couplet or recording a figure committed him to some statement of knowledge regarding a relationship between things not identical. The eighteenth-century writer was doubly cautious in making analogies because of his sharp memory of the disallusionment of a previous age and because of his vivid sense of present error-- the dangerous digressions from true knowledge made by contemporaries whose methods of comparison were only slight distortions of the sole method on which he himself had to rely.

Because of this invasion of consciousness in the mind of the eighteenth-century writer his work could not have the spontaneous self-assurance, the wry but exultant sense of self-knowledge that permeates even the sadder pronouncements of William Shakespeare and John Donne. Every expression of ideas, every comparison in an eighteenth-century poem, prose work, or play had to be adequately weighed and measured, so responsible did its

creator feel for not adding to man's uncertainty or further confusing him in his doubts. Without considering the preoccupation of the age with analogy as a way of knowing and of conveying knowledge as the cause, critics have found it relatively easy to note these limitations in eighteenth-century English literature.

But without awareness of the extent to which the making of analogies-- not similes, not metaphors, not wild guesses or emotional suppositions-- but analogies determined the subject matter, the style, the texture and the tone of almost everything written after Paradise Lost and before Lyrical Ballads, critics have found it relatively difficult to appreciate what the eighteenth-century writer was able to accomplish within his self-imposed limits and what occasionally made him great.

Within the limits of analogy as the eighteenth-century saw it, Dryden was able to explore several seemingly inconsistent theories of literature. He was a turncoat only by the standards of another age;and if all his supposed changes of mind were viewed on the basis of how he used analogy, as we have viewed his various treatments of the Ancient/Modern controversy, it might well appear that his fickleness actually represented various realignments of the analogical framework in which he reasoned and wrote. Within the limits of analogical

composition, Swift and Pope were able in the rich context of a single work to expose foolishness, to explore at once its resemblance to and divergence from reasoned thoughts and actions, and simultaneously use brilliantly and criticize probingly the system of making connections to which they felt themselves confined.

Without losing themselves in the comfortable but self-deceiving merger of things, Pope and Cowper, each in his own way, were able to trace the similarities and differences between basic divine, universal and human processes. Without either obliterating a sense of self altogether or overemphasizing a sense of responsibility to the social whole, Samuel Johnson was able to give literary expression to the morality of his age by continually placing the determination of moral conduct in an analogical context. His Rambler essays, for example, constantly examine human behavior by reminding the reader of the analogy between the doer and the deed, the deed and the result, the result and the larger social circumstances in which all action takes place.

To what extent the eighteenth century is the Age of Analogy remains to be seen. Without a doubt, it is the first age since the time of Aristotle to be so analytically conscious of what it means to make comparisons. Without a doubt, in groping for new ways to relate themselves to their physical and social environment and to their Deity

eighteenth-century writers were just as intensely in pursuit of self as those writers of other centuries who so boldly proclaimed their quest in extended figures. Whether their use of analogy accomplished anything in and for itself or was merely a necessary transition to a subsequent age is a matter of individual study and assessment of the kind undertaken in the preceding chapters. The main point is that such a study can and must be pursued. Eighteenth-century poems, essays, novels, and plays should be read with the idea that their author's major creative thoughts arose in conjunction with his constant awareness of the responsibility and the possibility of making analogies. In other words, the study of the influences and uses of analogy in major eighteenth-century English literature does not conclude here. Hopefully, it has begun.

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