
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THE DISPERSIVE AND REINTEGRATING NATURE OF POPULATION SEGMENTS OF A THIRD WORLD SOCIETY: ARUBA, NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

by

FLORENCE KALM

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the City University of New York.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

> The national bourgeoisie turns its back more and more on the interior and on the real facts of its underdeveloped country, and tends to look toward the former mother country and on the foreign capitalists who count on its obligingcompliance. (Fanon 1963: 165)

Since the 1960s, inquiry into the processes, structures, stresses, and stagnation of dependent, underdeveloped societies has increasingly commanded the attention of social scientists who seek to understand the dynamics of stratification, change, and/or barriers to change in emerging Third World societies. This study addresses the hierarchical ordering of the population segments of a formerly colonial society, Aruba, Netherlands Antilles; in terms of the factors that led to the formation of its plural sectors, and the conditions under which the population segments tend alternately to disperse into the wider society, then coalesce into relatively unitary, stratified groupings.

The specific and particularistic elements of Aruban social organization, based on its own unique historical development, differentiates it from other emerging Third World societies. Nevertheless, significant similarities, arising out of necessary mutual adaptations to colonial and post-colonial conditions, permit inclusion of this analytic study in the wider framework of dependent, albeit autonomous societies.

For this reason, I employ the methodology of the present-day "dependency theorists" (see, for example, Furtado 1971; Frank 1969; and Fallers 1973) to organize the relevant historical and structural data and the political factors that underlie the hegemonic control of the sectors of Aruban society. I shall then offer a sample "factor analysis" to demonstrate how a "systems flow" technique can be utilized to isolate the variables that are significant to the implementation or impedance of the mobility of the sectors. This technique is, in effect, a modification of the systemic approach introduced by Easton (1965): it offers a functionally efficient scheme for the analysis of the variables that affect the ordering, maintenance, and relaxation of group boundaries.

Notwithstanding the special circumstances that attend the origin and maintenance of the"structures of inequality" (Fallers 1973) in Aruban society, I submit that the following hypotheses are applicable to the neo-colonial condition:

1. Population segments of formerly pluralist colonial societies tend to disperse, lose their segmentary identities, and become part of the wider society during periods of relative economic and political stability; but, concomitantly with stress situations, they again redefine their boundaries and manifest the characteristic features of "plural segmentation."
2. Economic, political, and social stratification of these segments is not necessarily identical or parallel but may, as in the case of Aruba, display differing and transitory hierarchical arrangements--indicating the dynamic and shifting nature of the segments' "access to power," rather than the static

rigidity implied by conventional theoretical models of societal stratification.

3. Imbalances of hierarchical positions may be viewed as dependent variables in a larger, macro-perspective; for example, the relationship, including dependence, of Aruba, economically and politically
   a. to the Lago Oil Refinery, owned and operated by the Exxon Corporation, the major employer,
   b. to the United States export market, in terms of Aruba's severely unbalanced ratio of export to import,
   c. (in conjunction with the other islands of the Netherlands Antilles) to their erstwhile "mother" Holland, in terms of that country's continuing matching subsidies, contributions to the island's educational and religious institutions, and significant exports of food and other commodities to this non-productive island,
   d. to Curaçao, legislative seat of the Federation of the Netherlands Antilles, and
   e. to Venezuela, in terms of her claim that, as her continental shelf virtually abuts on Aruba's shores, the island should be incorporated into her national boundary.

The data to support these hypotheses were amassed in Aruba, Curaçao, and Caracas over the four-year period from 1969 to 1973.

In 1969, my fieldwork investigations focused upon the identification of group segments and inquiry into the relationships between these segments. During my second period of fieldwork, in 1971, I became aware of the tightening of group boundaries in response to the increasingly

antagonistic attitudes of the national (Aruban) segment. I revisited former informants to assess their perceptions of the nature of this antagonism. As I came to realize the extent of the influence of the oil refinery operations on all of the segments of Aruban society, I directed my third period of fieldwork interviews (in 1973) toward the government officials in the Departments of Social and Economic Welfare, and the management staff of the oil refinery.

From the data it is apparent that the present hierarchical statuses of the segments devolve less from the historical "accidents" that transferred the desert island from the colonial influences of Spain to the benevolent neglect of Holland, than from the entry, in 1929, of the Lago Oil Refinery. For the "native" Aruban segment of approximately 30,000 people (descended from an eighteenth century intermix of Arawak Indians, Dutch and Sephardic Jewish settlers, and African slaves) presently represents only half of the total island population. The remaining half are the "introduced" groups who arrived in response to the recruitment call from the refinery, and to the concomitantly increased demand for goods and services.

Three of these non-national segments, the West Indians, the Chinese, and the Eastern European Jews, will be discussed in detail. I wish to demonstrate how prior historical influences acted upon the national and non-national segments to shape the collective identities that underly present inter-group antagonisms. Also, I will elaborate upon those economic, political, and social factors that are relevant to the institution of group boundedness.

For, although the West Indian immigrants were immediately excluded from social participation in Aruban society--because they were

perceived by the "native" group to be successful competitors for the economic offerings that the Arubans felt were "naturally" theirs, the Chinese and the Jews were initially welcomed, as non-competitors, into the larger society. However, when the growing affluence of the non-national merchant groups brought the "foreigners" into conflict with the middle-class Aruban entrepreneurs and the increasingly debt-ridden workers, the resultant negative vibrations precipitated the withdrawal of the Chinese and Jewish merchant groups into traditionally defined plural entities.

This a priori development does not coincide with the classic notion (see Furnival 1939) that plural societies originate with the introduction of a dominant (colonial) ruling elite. In fact, the colonial period of Aruba's history is notable for the virtually negligible demarcation of hierarchically ordered sectors; for, within a few generations after the inception of colonization (by the Dutch West India Company),the population consisted of the aforementioned "mix." In addition, the inherent fragility of the ecological balance of the desert island effectively limited its exploitative possibilities beyond meager subsistence. Thus, except for the Island Commander and his family, Aruba supported a relatively classless society into the twentieth century.

The presently fractionated population derives from the dependence of its sectors on the Lago Oil and Transport Company (Exxon's largest refinery in the Caribbean). Not only the economic well-being, but the political and social affairs of the people are tied to the policies and practices of the refinery management. Because the affiliate company is, in turn, dependent upon the direction of its parent

corporation, Exxon, I will elaborate on the larger concerns of this multicorporate giant to illuminate the significance of Exxon policy to the present and future concerns of this "autonomous" society.

A realistic assessment of the dependence and underdevelopment of this agriculturally non-productive region necessitates an inquiry into Aruba's alternative options for growth and independence. As will be seen, the options are not only minimal, but to date have received little support or encouragement from the major exploiter, Lago, or from the Central Government in Curaçao. Thus, the vulnerability of the people, particularly in light of recent expansionist moves by the Venezuelan government, presents a paradox to the growing nationalistic sentiments of the native segment.

The overwhelming victory, in the 1973 elections, of the leaders of a newly formed political party, is directly traceable to the party's slogan, "Status Aparte." Although the independence movement specifically addresses the separation of Aruba from Curaçao (the Central Government controller of Aruba's national budget), the present waves of hostility extend to the non-national groups on the island, and are perceived by the involved groups to threaten their continued residence in Aruba.

In the concluding section of this study, I shall identify (and demonstrate, via a systems flow representation) the specific internal and external (metropolitan) factors that are significant to the mobility of the population segments. The value of such a dynamic model lies not only in its efficiency as a tool for assessing the feedback of factors relevant to the past and present structures of the society, but in its predictive potential. Given the past and present factors that operate

to impede the "true" development of the national economy, the introduction of alternative variables can aid in the assessment of these options in terms of their predictable effects on the mini-structures within the larger society.

The application of this kind of systemic methodology will hopefully provide a functionally efficient mechanism for the understanding of change and/or barriers to change in the developing nations.

CHAPTER TWO

DEMOGRAPHY

Physical Environment

Aruba is a "low" island, part of the Netherlands Antilles (Leeward) triad of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. It is the smallest of the "ABC" islands, being only nineteen miles long and six miles at its widest point, with a total area of approximately one hundred twelve square miles. The primary axis of the island runs northeast-southwest.

Aruba lies fifteen miles north of the Venezuelan peninsula of Paraguaña, and the submarine shelves of both are so close that an early landbridge may be assumed to have existed (Hummelinck 1950).[1] Although it is situated only twelve degrees, twenty-four minutes north of the equator, the constant trade winds which blow at an average velocity of twenty knots keep the mean temperature at eighty-two degrees (with minor fluctuations of approximately five degrees for daily as well as seasonal temperatures). The mean humidity is seventy-three percent but the strong winds diminish the discomfort of the relatively high humidity. As Aruba lies outside of the hurricane belt, the annual average rainfall is less than nineteen inches. The periods of predictable rainfall are confined to late fall and early spring; thus, the dry, breezy, and sunny winter and summer seasons coincide with the periods of heaviest tourist traffic. The pleasant climate

and the virtual absence of flying insects, attract an ever increasing number of tourists each year, despite the barren desert landscape of this "Isla Inutile."

An unpublished and unsigned manuscript (thought to have been written in 1947 by a Seroe Colorado minister for the inter-denominational church in the residential enclave of the refinery) states that geological study has established that the island is merely a continuation of the mountain range which runs north along the Paraguañan peninsula. He also states that violent subterranean movements have lifted and submerged the island at several widely separated intervals of time. His assertion is apparently based on such evidence as the clearly discernible shorelines, at three different levels, along the north coast of the island. He also notes that, although the town of Santa Cruz lies one mile inland, its surface ground is still covered with fossils of sea animals and water-eroded tunnels and caves surround it.

Although the minister does not cite specific references for these geological findings, he probably refers to the geo-morphological survey conducted on Aruba in 1930, under the direction of the Geology Department of the University of Utrecht. J. H. Westermann, leader of the expedition, asserted that the volcanic activity which caused the uplifting and folding of Aruba's older rock formations probably occurred during the older Tertiary or early Mesozoic. These events would account for the major diabase and hornblende-schist outcroppings on the center parts of this otherwise flat island; Jamanota (185 m.), Arikok (185 m.), and Hoolberg (112m.)[2] During this orogenesis, diorite batholiths intruded into the older (Cretaceous) system, observable because of the metamorphic nature of these formations. Massive boulders at Ayo,

Casabiri, and Felsenmeer, consisting of smooth, rounded, and exfoliated diorite blocks, Westermann explains in terms of "selective erosion." Later geological study (Hummelinck 1950), however, suggests that the erosion occurred under the sea and that the batholiths were pushed up and resettled during a volcanic thrust.

Westermann does not provide an adequate explanation for the three distinct shorelines--each of which is encrusted with an overlay of limestone which lies ". . . unconformably on the older rock formations" (Westermann 1932:9) and which houses mollusk, coral and echine fossils. Although he tentatively suggests that glacial influences may have been responsible for one of the limestone terraces, more recent geological analyses of similar phenomena in island and coastal regions throughout the world provide a more logical hypothesis. The successions of limestone terrace levels can be explained in terms of their relationship to the three major glacial melts that occurred between the major Ice Ages and resulted in significant changes in sea levels even in areas as far removed from glacial activity as the islands of the Caribbean.

The island's coastal dunes are very "young." They lie along the east, northeast, north, and west coasts, and are fashioned both by the tradewinds and by the hand-shaped inland bays and junctional canals to the sea (such as at Druif and Spanish Lagoon). The northeast and east coast are steeply undercut (bocas) and are unsuitable for transportation by sea and for general habitation. The south and west coasts are low and flat, containing the natural harbors, gentle lagoons, and dense concentrations of industry, shipping operations, and habitation. Parallel to the south coast are long, narrow shore-coral reefs.[3]

In his study of the flora and fauna of the islands of the Netherlands Antilles, Hummelinck (1950) notes that, as a result of the prevailing rainfall conditions, the "tropical dry-forest" vegatation is xerophytic, currently dominated by deciduous and thorny shrubs and cacti. A formerly prolific deciduous tree, "Kwihi," is now protected by law from further exploitation and export. The "divi-divi" (a variety of "bush-tree") serves as directional sign throughout the island because the trade winds, constantly blowing from the north-east, bend the branches so that they point directly southwest.

The land in many areas is denuded, and in general supports only scanty vegetation. A few areas along the coasts contain some beach vegetation (primarily "sea-grape"), and, in the lagoon areas and lining the man-made canals, are fairly abundant mangrove clusters.

"It is not impossible that, by altering the vegetation, the human agency has noticeably changed the macro-climate" (Hummelinck 1950: 10). Hummelinck notes the common occurrence of extensive weathered dripstone formation (and lack of significant active dripstone) which indicates that the climate must have been considerably less arid for some time after the emergence of the lower limestone terraces. In addition, the arrival of man on the island, with accompanying destruction of formerly forested areas ("brazilwood"), cultivation of the land, and introduction of new plants and domesticated animals (especially cattle), has seriously reduced the local fauna and flora (as well as possibly effecting the change in the macro-climate). A sophisticated, Holland-educated, eighth generation native-born Aruban, when questioned about the presence of thousands of free-roaming goats on the island (not milked and, according to their owners,

seldom slaughtered for their meat) replied wryly, "They're very important in speeding up the erosion process."

The indigenous fauna (that appear to have preceded the arrival of man on the island) includes small cave-dwelling bats, iguanas, ghekkos, lizards, hares, fish, many varieties of crustacea, and a rare species of "white" rattlesnake. The general similarity of the indegenous flora and fauna of Aruba to that of the Paraguañan peninsula of Venezuela indicates, according to Hummelinck, either that a landbridge existed between the two localities, or that the shorelines were once so close that faunal migrations and drifting of floral seeds could have occurred.

Social Environment

The population of Aruba in 1972 (Statistische Mededelingen Nederlands Antillen, July 1973) was 61,293 (compared to Curaçao with 150,008 and Bonaire with 8,181). The ratio of births to deaths for that same year, i.e., 1,201 to 275, reflects a marked levelling off from the rapid population increase during the decades following the establishment of the oil refinery. (The 1962 ratio was 1,787 to 215.)[4]

Approximately one-half of the total population are said to be Aruban. No clear-cut statistical information is available with regard to this designation. The last published breakdown of population by "nationality" (1966 Statische Jaarboek) lists figures for Antilleans (origin Netherlands Antilles, which includes, in addition to Bonaire and and Curaçao, residents from the Windward Islands of Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Martin), but does not offer a separate listing for native-born Arubans. The total number of Antilleans in 1966 was 44,918, but local

informants estimate the total number of native-born Arubans to be less than 30,000.

Although, for general purposes, the term Aruban includes any persons born on the island, my nationalistic informants make very clear distinctions between the following categories of Aruban:

Arubiano: descendants of the "Top Ten" founding families (of primarily Dutch,Sephardic, and Indian interbreeding),

Arubano: descendants of native-born parents whose ancestors came to Aruba during the nineteenth century from South America and Europe,

di Aruba: native-born offspring of twentieth century immigrants.

In light of the increasing nationalism of the "native" segment and the concomitant hostility toward those groups that settled in Aruba since the third decade of the twentieth century, these distinctions assume more significant dimensions. For this reason, my use of the term Aruban throughout this paper refers only to the first two categories--as the native-born offspring of the twentieth century immigrants, notwithstanding their Dutch citizenship status, are considered by the national segment to belong to the non-national affiliations of their parents.

A partial list of "Other Nationalities" enumerated in the 1960 census includes:

Non-Antillean Netherlanders:	
origin Holland	1,640
origin Surinam	1,215
origin elsewhere	2,314
North Americans	1,237
Venezuelans	632
British and French of Caribbean origin	3,000
Others	1,954

Census figures are further obfuscated by the omission of identification of Eastern Jews (mainly merchants) and Chinese (mainly merchants and restaurateurs,) two of the economically significant population segments investigated during my fieldwork study in 1969. Estimates (based on informants' statements, data on synagogue attendance, and attendance at the Chinese Social Club) yield approximate figures of 120 for the current Jewish population, and 300 for the Chinese.[5]

The present residential distribution of the population, although there has been some relocation of members of island ethnic groups during the past two decades, still largely reflects the early settlement patterns of the immigrants. The first Dutch colonists and the Sephardic immigrants from Curaçao tended to cluster in the areas of Buena Vista, Parkentenbosch, and Savaneta. Through intermarriage and interbreeding with the local Amerindians, members of this mixed population soon came to constitute the "Top Ten" families, the aforementioned Arubiano social elite. Most of these families established "town residences" in Orangestad (Playa), the present capital of Aruba, while retaining their cunucu (rural countryside) plantations. As the population grew with the introduction of Venezuelan, Colombian, and a few southern European immigrants, these "new" families (some of whom intermarried with the earlier colonists) clustered in the few relatively fertile inland areas of Noord and Santa Cruz.

With the advent of the oil refinery industry during the third decade of the twentieth century, the phosphate-mining town of St. Nicholas, which coincidentally was adjacent to the refinery complex, became the residence of the "imported" West Indians, the "Antilleans," and Chinese and Jewish merchants. As the Jewish merchants became more

affluent, many moved to Oranjestad. European and North American refinery personnel have, since the beginning of refinery operations, been housed almost exclusively in the walled enclave of Seroe Colorado, at the southeastern tip of the island.[6]

House Types: Residence Patterns

The typical cunucu house, still carefully maintained and occupied by rural Arubans, is a small, single-storied structure, supported by thick (insulating) plaster walls, with a tiled (formerly thatched) roof. Houses and yards are surrounded by stone or cactus fences (also referred to as "cunucu").

The tradition of annually painting the outside walls with pastel or bright colors is popularly explained as a carry-over from the dictates of an early Governor of Curaçao, said to have suffered from severe headaches aggravated by the glare from the houses which were then all painted white. He initiated a law which forbade the use of white paint on any house within his purview.

A unique form of decoration known as Kas Floria, superimposed on the outside corners and just below the functure of walls and roof, is apparently a modification of the "curtain motif" introduced into Curaçao in the mid-nineteenth century. The decorative motifs, erroneously called "hex signs" in tourist brochures, fall into three main categories: "Natural" (plants and animals), religious (abstract depictions of Arawak Sun God and Catholic figures and symbols), and nautical emblems (anchor).

The few remaining plantation homes reflect both Spanish and Dutch influence in design, but they are neither as elaborate nor as

grandiose as their counterparts on Caribbean "plantation-economy" islands.

The town of Oranjestad, viewed from the harbor or from the air, presents a panorama of gleamingly "Dutch-white" government structures and churches. The white walls and orange-tiled roofs invariably elicit from "States" tourists a "Howard Johnson City" encomium!

St. Nicholas (also Sint Nicolaas), on the other hand, still accords with the 1943 description by Philip Hiss, as

> . . . frontier-American. The town is a hodgepodge of dirt streets, wooden shacks, Chinese restaurants, saloons, and a few shops that would not be out of place in Paris or London. It sprawls in disorderly fashion up to the very gates of the refinery, which forms a dramatic background . . . and extends to the west along the coast road toward the Savaneta military camp . . . (Hiss 1943: 9)

Rural towns like Santa Cruz and Noor retain an isolated, "small village" ambience. Goats, boars, and chickens roam undisturbed through the streets and courtyards; housewives continue to hang their wash on the cactus fences (reminiscent of the old-fashioned nail-studded box frames that were used in the States as "curtain-stretchers").

Traditional cunucu and even town houses were formerly constructed to face directly into the trade-wind, thus obviating the need for supplementary air-cooling devices. Now, however, the Arubans who continue to build their own homes, while they retain the style and construction of their forebears' dwellings, face their houses directly onto the street, so that they are airless and hot, unless they are equipped with "airco," an item of conspicuous consumption that confers status but is inordinately expensive to maintain as well as to install.

Language

Although the Spanish language for the first century and a half of colonization gradually superseded (Caiqueto) Arawak, since 1634 Dutch has been the official language of Aruba and has persisted in the presently Aruban-controlled administrative and legislative spheres. Papiamentu (which manifests a composite lexicon of Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, English, and Amerindian) has, however, begun to pervade "office talk," economic and social interactions.[7]

One of the causes of friction between the Aruban employees of the Lago Oil Refinery and the office and management staff was the decision (prompted by the Arubiano elite) that Papiamentu was unsuitable as a Lago "lingua franca" because it lacked a technical vocabulary (Hartog 1961). The consequent "language difficulty" provided a convenient excuse for the Company to "import" English-speaking West Indians. However, now that the majority of the West Indian workers are back in their home islands and Arubans again occupy most of the positions on the non-managerial level, Papiamentu is the recognized "plant" language while English remains the "official" language.

Arubans who have received a "Dutch" public school education are multi-lingual: the Dutch language is introduced to first grade children, quickly displacing the "home language," be it Papiamentu, English, or Spanish. The last two named languages are then reintroduced in formal instruction from the fifth through the twelfth grades.

Although grammar school graduates (as well as less educated Arubans) generally possess little literacy in these superficially taught "secondary" languages, most display remarkable verbal fluency in them. Their constant exposure to these languages through tourism,

visits to coastal South America, and employment by Lago and tourist-oriented shops provides the motivation for this fluency.

The translation of the New Testament into Papiamentu in 1916 indicates that the church, if not the literati or the Lago administration, has acknowledged the supremacy of the native vernacular. An excerpt from the liturgy demonstrates that, if Papiamentu lacks a technical vocabulary, it can nevertheless adequately express emotional and spiritual content and values:

> Te laat den anochi, Maria
> To zoya su Ninjo Keri
> A canta ya mil melodia
> Pa cera su wowo chicki. (Liturgia: 36)
>
> (Until late into the night, Mary
> You rock your beloved child
> Singing a thousand melodies
> To close your little one's eyes.)

Religion

Roman Catholicism remains the dominant religious affiliation of the island's population, despite three centuries of Dutch occupation and administration.

> The roots of Catholicism go very deep in the Leeward Islands, for they were planted by the Spaniards more than a century before the Dutch conquest of the islands, and since 1705 Catholic missionaries of various nations . . . have been continually at work. They were the more successful because many Protestant landholders, wishing to emphasize the distinction between themselves and their slaves (in the case of Aruba, subservient Indians) had (those) children christened as Catholics, and neither at this time nor subsequently did the Protestant Church make any effort to promote their faith. The result has been that about seventy-five percent of the population is today Catholic. (Hiss 1943: 158)

The most recently published enumeration of island religious affiliation reads:

Roman Catholic	80%	
Other religions	19	
of which Protestant	8	
Methodist	2	
Anglican	6	
No religion	2	(Statische Jaarboek 1971: 40)

Presumably subsumed under the heading "Other religions" and not included in the Protestant subdivisions are the Eastern Jews and the Chinese Buddhist segments.

Catholic influence in island schools is even greater than the actual number of Catholics in the islands would indicate, demonstrated by the fact that, in 1938, fully ninety percent of the school children attended Catholic schools (which provide a "Dutch" secular education in addition to religious instruction). By 1958, two Protestant schools were established, one in Oranjestad, the other in St. Nicholas. A third school, built in the Seroe Colorado "colony," provides a "state-side" education (with curriculum and teachers from the United States) for the Lago expatriate children of management and professional personnel.

Government--Political Structure

Under the terms of a Charter introduced by Queen Juliana in 1954, Aruba as part of the Netherlands Antilles was granted the status of co-equal "partner" with the Netherlands and Surinam, although Holland retained the "duty and privilege" of providing for island defense and of making policy decisions in foreign affairs.

> The preservation of fundamental human rights, freedoms, and the principles of justice are also Kingdom Affairs, and the high ranking judges are appointed by the Crown to insure the independence of the judiciary. The highest authority in Kingdom Affairs, Her Majesty Queen Juliana of the Netherlands, is represented in the Antilles by a Governor appointed by her. (Official publication, Dept. of Economic Affairs 1972: 7)[8]

The internal affairs of the Antilles are administered by the Central Government(seated in Curaçao) which is composed of a Council of Ministers and a parliament of twenty-two members (Staten) elected every four years. Aruban island politicians since the 1940s have been directing their energies toward gaining greater recognition and more seats for Aruba in the central governing body.[9] Indeed, the rallying point of the 1973 Central Government elections in Aruba leading to the upset victory by the Movimiento Electoral di Puebla party was "Status Aparte"--more specifically, "Separation from Curaçao." This cry echoed the expressions of hostility and frustration of significant sections of the Aruban populace for many decades.

Each of the ABC islands maintains its own Island Council (elected every four years, the election date generally occurring one year after the Central Government election, unless "special" elections are called). At any time the authority and responsibilities of the Island Council depend on the fluctuating policies of the Central Government concerning decentralization. Generally, judicial and police activities, communications, imposition of taxes, social security, public health, education, economic controls, establishment of economic enterprises, labor conditions and legislation, money and banking and foreign currency are under the control of the Central Government. Matters pertaining to water and electricity supply, local labor policies, the running of schools, and the area of local housing are relegated to Island Council. The Central Government retains the right to annul any Island decision that is considered to come into conflict with the "public interest," as this is defined by the Central Government.

Economy

The present state of the Aruban economy (more detailed information on Aruban economic development will be presented in the section, "Historical Background and Economic Development") is closely tied to the Lago Oil and Transport Company, Ltd. In 1973 its refinery was producing over 500,000 barrels of refined oil daily (mostly from Lake Maracaibo "crude," but over the past few years the refinery has also been processing crude oil from the Middle Eastern oil fields in which Exxon has substantial holdings). Lago is reputed to be the island's largest taxpayer: the only available statistical evidence to support this statement is found in the 1966 Statische Yaarboek which gives the following figures under the heading of "Direct contribution of oil refineries to the national product":

(amounts are in millions of florins, approximately 1.79 Netherlands Antilles florins to $1.00)

	1960	1963	1964	1965
Compensation of employees	106	85	80	72
Taxes	12	12	12	12
Local purchases, contractors, pilot services, etc.	26	19	16	16
	144	116*	108	100
	(*erroneously totalled in Yearbook as 166)			
Total as a percentage of net national product	33	27	26	24

The decreasing "contribution" of Lago over the above period is attributable to its drastic cutback in personnel following the completion of the "automation of refinery operations." In addition, the fixed 12 million florins tax assessment is based on Lago's annual production of 500,000 barrels of refined oil. Thus the Central Government

does not benefit from the significant increase in profits to the parent company from the sharp rise in the price of refined oil and the diminution of costs to the refinery occasioned by the cutback in required personnel and concomitant "local purchases."

Although the tourist hotels are an increasing source of employment for Aruba's pool of unskilled labor, there has been as yet no return from tourism to the Central Government in the form of taxes. By a Central Government ordinance of 1956, exemption from corporate profits tax and personal income taxes for ten to twelve years was granted to

> 1. Enterprises which may be expected to broaden the Antillean economic base. . . . The enterprise must create additional employment for at least ten Antillean laborers. . . .
>
> 2. Enterprises for the exploitation of a hotel and directed towards the promotion of tourism. . .
>
> The tax holiday also applied to Real Estate tax and to Occupancy tax. Such enterprises are also exempt from import duties on materials and goods used in construction of the premises for the enterprise and from duties on the initial equipment.
>
> A ten year import duty exemption may also be obtained on raw materials and semi-finished products used in the production process. (Dept. of Economic Affairs 1972: 29).

Income, therefore, from the soaring tourism of the past five years has largely continued to flow back to the corporate hotel-chain syndicates of the United States, because all of the major hotels (save one which is owned by the island merchant and government elite) have been built since 1968 and are thus still exempt from taxation. The largest island groups to profit from tourism are the storekeepers and restaurateurs (primarily Eastern Jews and Chinese). The income and tax assessment of these people, however, is not represented in government publications.

Although the reported net national income per capita in 1967 was $1,020, which is very high by Caribbean standards, the need to import

almost all goods for domestic consumption and production promotes a cost-of-living index that is inordinately high by any standards. Moreover, automation of the Lago refinery operations, begun in 1957, resulted in serious unemployment, which, although alleviated periodically by Lago's expansion activities and more recently by increased opportunities for domestic employment in the major hotels, presages serious problems for Aruba's future economy.

Plans sporadically presented by government economists and by private citizens to expand and diversify the economy have met with very limited success. Small manufacturing enterprises are not able to compete successfully in the labor market with the large expatriate-controlled corporations because, for example, Lago offers a slightly higher than minimum wage and an "attractive benefits package." As the Central Government does not provide unemployment compensation to its citizens, Lago remains the most successful bidder for semi-skilled labor. Attempts by the Central Government to "keep domestic costs of production to a minimum" and to "stabilize" profits, while directed at maintaining local industries in a competitive position in the world economy, have in fact stifled these local industries, which are dependent on the outside market for all their materials.[10]

Diet

The dietary staple for native consumption has for centuries been maize, formerly locally produced <u>maishi grandi</u> or <u>Sorghum vulgare</u>, but now <u>harinja heel y blancu</u> (or yellow and white cornmeal imported primarily from the United States.

> Sorghum vulgare is a cereal typically adapted to warm regions where rainfall is low. Last century when tillage in Aruba was superior to what it is today, it was a traditional procedure to plant two plots with this crop: one a clay soil, the other a sandy soil. This ensured a "double chance" at harvest-time. If the yield on the clay soil was not up to expectation due to heavy rains, the deficit was compensated by a good crop on the sandy soil and vice versa. (Steenmeijer 1957: 39)

The most important and traditional maize-based Aruban dishes are:

funchi: boiled cornmeal, molded into "pudding" and cut into slices, eaten with soup or fish,

pambati: maize meal cakes, used as bread for sandwiches,

arepa: combined maize and wheat flour mixed with egg and salt, shaped into round patties, eaten with fish and meat; and

ketjapa: ground maishi grandi, baked on a charcoal fire, resembling a Mexican tortilla, still prepared by cunucu women.

These or varieties of wheat bread, such as pan awa, pan leche, or pan dushi (sweet), are eaten with soup or meat stews as lunch or dinner and form the basic menu.

Imported rice (polished) appears several times a week as accompaniment to meat, fish, and maize meals.

> Like rice, oats too, are eaten by almost every family. . . . It is interesting to note that the Papiamentu word for oats is "kwaker", based on the well-known brand name "Quaker Oats". (Steenmeijer 1957: 46)

Preferred vegetables, including white potatoes (batata), sweet potatoes (batata dushi), tomatoes, beans, and other garden greens, are also imported. Local subsistence farmers seldom produce a surplus of vegetables for sale, although local Chinese-operated farms that are "irrigated" sell to small markets and Chinese retail stores.

Imported "banana" (plantain), fried when overripe and liberally sprinkled with sugar, is served as embellishment for almost every meal; imported oranges, apples, and tinned juices, although expensive, appear frequently on the Aruban table. Locally cultivated watermelons, mangoes, avocados, and limes are common desert dishes.

Milk--powdered, frozen, and tinned--is imported, as are cheeses. Eggs, from locally raised chickens, are used more for baking bread, pudding, and cakes than for eating as breakfast food.

Cattle, goats, pigs, and sheep are imported from South America via Holland, because of her control over large-scale purchases--thus making the price of meat considerably higher than it would be if imported directly. Local goats are (reported to be) slaughtered only when imported supplies are low. Local chickens, fried or boiled in soup, and eaten with funchi or pambati, provide the traditional Sunday dinner.

Locally caught fish are once again coming to constitute an important protein alternative to the meat that is priced out of reach for frequent consumption. (I observed, during the summer of 1973, that meat consumption was down to once a week for most of the St. Nicholas residents.) Picuda (barracuda), pargo (red snapper), and djampo (grouper) are marketed at harbors and inlets, where housewives wait patiently each day until sunset when the outboard motor-boats come in with their catch. ("Market-price" of fish during the summer of 1973 was 3 fls. per kilo, regardless of variety.)

Water, once the most treasured commodity on this rain-parched island, is now available even in remote cunucu areas. A seawater distillation plant built in the 1930s (primarily to satisfy the needs of

the oil refineries, the major consumer) processes over 25,000 tons of pure drinking water per day. The distilled water is so pure and flat that minerals have been added to it to give it taste. Brackish water (from the inland canals)and sea water are pumped to houses and commercial plants for non-drinking purposes.

Notwithstanding the easy availability of water, alcoholic beverages continue to be the preferred drink for the Aruban men. They consume beer, rum, and whiskey in such quantity that Aruba was reported in the 1969 Journal on Alcoholism to be in the sixth percentile of alcohol consumption per capita among the nations of the world.

NOTES

[1]Venezuelans explain that present overt and covert efforts at establishing closer (indeed dependency) relationships with Aruba are based on a natural affinity, arising not only out of mutually shared cultural similarities, but also from the "fact" that Venezuela's continental shelf extends into Aruba's coastal waters, so that in essence they are conjoined.

[2]The unique composition of the Hooiberg rock formation has led to its being named Hooibergite.

[3]These reefs have been broached and sections removed in the harbor areas of Oranjestad, Barcadera, and St. Nicholas to permit the entry of large sea-going tankers and luxury ships. The effects of this disruption of sea and land have not as yet been investigated.

[4]The significance of Lago involvement to the declining birth rate will be discussed in the section on the "Power Elite."

[5]A more detailed but (in terms of specific national origin) hardly more enlightening enumeration was compiled for me by the Chief of the Registry Bureau in 1969:

Argentina	12	Jordan	1
Belgium	2	Lebanon	18
Brazil	5	Malaya	6
Canada	49	The Netherlands	54,312
Chile	2	Norway	4
China	307	Austria	2
Colombia	239	Panama	9
Costa Rica	1	Paraguay	1
Cuba	17	Peru	3
Denmark	6	Portugal	270
Dominican Republic	289	San Salvador	1
Germany	18	Spain	18
France	180	Trinidad	7
Greece	6	Turkey	1
Great Britain	2,001	Uruguay	3
Haiti	105	Venezuela	826
Ireland	3	U.S.A.	542
India	4	Switzerland	11
Indonesia	2	Without nationality	111
Israel	5		
Italy	8		
Jamaica	1	Total	59,408

The figure for China does not indicate whether the individuals migrated directly from Asia or re-emigrated from South America--which, in fact, is the case for almost half of the Chinese in Aruba.

The numbers for France include Guadeloupe and Martinique.

The numbers for Great Britain include the British West Indies. (The one Jamaican and the 7 Trinidadians should then have been included in the larger category.)

The "Netherlands" figure obviously includes a veritable pot-pourri of Windward Islanders, Leeward Islanders, Surinamers as well as Holland Dutch.

[6]I was informed, during my first interview with Lago managers, that the Seroe Colorado "colony" was integrated as of 1973. When questioned as to who was now encouraged to buy or build in the colony, "integration" was explained as referring only to Aruban engineers and management level staff.

[7]I was surprised to discover, pinned to the inside door of an office in the Department of Economic Affairs in Curaçao, the following hand-written sign:

"Lokual ta pasa majoria parti di hende
no ta pasombra nan sa mucho poco cos pero
pasombra nan sa mucho hopi cos no ta berdad."
("What is happening to the majority of the people
is not because they know too little but because
they know too many things that are not true.")

[8]This "catch-all" paragraph has provided the "legitimacy" for Holland's continuing involvement in island economy and politics.

[9]Aruba holds 8 seats, Curaçao 12 in the Staten, a condition that is most unsatisfactory to Aruban nationals. It becomes a focal point of acrimony during each Central Government election. Arubans insist that their annual contribution to the Central Government (based on national income, oil refinery taxes, etc.) is larger than that of Curaçao, and for this reason Aruba should have equal representation despite the disparity in population.

[10]Attempts by local planners, architects, and sociologists to conduct feasibility studies and surveys of urban (ghetto) housing in St. Nicholas, or to introduce plans for housing projects and economic development, are often "encouraged" with small grants. Final reports, analyses, and urban renewal plans are accepted, printed, and then shelved indefinitely. (Access to these reports can be obtained only through "oblique" methods.)

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC "DEVELOPMENT"

Former Chief Librarian and sole published historian of Aruba, Johan Hartog, believes that Aruba, unlike many of the Caribbean islands, was never inhabited by the Carib Indians. He quotes from reports of Van Heekeren, a Dutch "Indianologist" who traced the migration patterns of Carib and Arawak Indians northward from the Amazon basin of Brazil. Van Heekeren asserts that the earliest inhabitants of Aruba were Caiqueto and Jirajara Arawaks.

An archaeological dig conducted by Hunter College in 1968 uncovered ceramic shards that closely resemble those of the Dabajuro complex of the Maracaibo region of the Eastern Venezuelan coast. Carbon-14 dating places the finds in the 1000-1500 A.D. period of the Neo-Indian epoch as defined by Rouse and Cruxent for Venezuela.

Van Heekeren (1960) determined, from artifacts found in several areas of the island, that two separate Amerindian migrations formed the aboriginal population. The first group was the Ciboney, " . . . marginal, non-ceramic coastal fishermen . . . who practiced cave burials and . . . used sling-stones, stone balls and shell gouges" (Van Heekeren 1960: 115). Rock paintings, still clearly imprinted in cave areas in Santa Cruz and the southeastern tip of the island, show close links to art forms of the Venezuelan Ciboney. The second group, the Arawak Caiquetos, left prehistoric evidence of their skill as farmer-merchants. Their decorated

pottery displays anthropomorphic flat and incised designs. These Caiquetos practiced urn burial.[1]

In 1499 Alonso de Ojéda, a Spanish explorer and commanding officer of one of the caravels that sailed in the second expedition of Christopher Columbus, named Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao "Las Islas Adjacentes a la Costa Firme." Later the islands were popularly, if somewhat inaccurately, known as "Las Islas Inutiles." In 1501 Their Catholic Majesties of Spain, Ferdinand and Isabella, appointed Ojéda governor of "la isla de Caquivacoa" (Cape Chicwacoa on the peninsula of Goajira). The royal decree also granted to Ojéda the district of Coro which included the three islands, in fief.

In 1513 the Spanish Viceroy of Española, Diego Colon, commissioned Captain Diego Salazar to transport Indians to his plantation in Santo Domingo to provide free labor. Salazar directed the capture and removal of over two thousand "red slaves" from the three islands--how many of these were native to Aruba is not recorded,

With the royal appointment of Juan de Ampues, as "factor" and "principal officer" of Santo Domingo in 1515, Their Catholic Majesties issued a decree prohibiting further molestation and enslavement of Arawak Indians. This decree was soon followed by the decision (made by Ampues and approved by the "audiencia," the Española court of jurisdiction) to return the Indians to their almost depopulated islands. Apparently the decision stemmed from a belief that the Antillean Arawaks were more likely converts to Catholicism than were the Caribs who inhabited many of the islands under Spanish rule. King Charles V included in his letter of assent a proviso that the returned Indians were no longer to be considered slaves. They were not to be ill-treated and

were henceforth to be called "freemen."[2] The three islands were subsequently repopulated although, according to Hartog (1961), not necessarily by their original inhabitants.

At about this time, Ampues, self-styled "Lord of the Islands," left his sugar plantation in Santo Domingo (manned by abducted Indians) and brought some of his European cattle and horses to the virtually abandoned island of Aruba (also written in early records as Orua, Oruba, Ouruba, Ruba, Curua, and Arouba).[3] He also arranged for the transportation of goats, sheep, dogs, donkeys, and pigs to the relatively barren island, which soon took on the aspect of a "Spanish rancho" (Hartog 1961: 33). Cattle and horses were set free to roam the island.

Brazilwood (Haematoxylon Brasiletto Karst), one of the island's principal resources during the early period of colonization, had been cut and transported by the crews of passing sailing vessels throughout the fifteenth and into the sixteenth century. By the seventeenth century a monopoly granted by the Spanish government initiated the export of considerable quantities of brazilwood to Amsterdam. There it was ground to a powder and used in the preparation of a red dye. "The grinding was done by the crews of homebound ships, or in Amsterdam, by prisoners" (Hartog 1961: 30).

The condition imposed on Ampues to convert the Indians to Christianity was apparently not fulfilled with much zeal. Early records indicate that neither resident priests nor island churches were established in Aruba during Spanish occupation. Nevertheless ". . . it seems safe to say that on the coming of the Dutch a large percentage of the then Aruban population was Catholic and received regular visits by priests from the opposite coast (Paraguaña)" (Hartog 1961: 39).

The Dutch West India Company, which was constituted in 1621 and was initially more interested in conquest and buccaneering than in the peaceful pursuit of trade, captured Curaçao without opposition from Spain (Hiss 1943: 55). Although the Dutch immediately occupied Curaçao and Bonaire, they showed no interest in the settlement of Aruba until 1625. Nevertheless, from the inception of the Dutch conquest, the Spanish began to evacuate Aruba, taking "their" Indians with them. Thus, by the time the Dutch took possession of the island, it held fewer than two hundred Indian inhabitants.

The Dutch government vested administration of the colonies in the Dutch West Indies Company. By the terms of its charter,

> . . . the West Indian Company was granted virtually all the rights of sovereignty--the right to declare war, to acquire possessions and to make treaties; and the territory embraced by the charter gave the company control of the slave trade. . . . The Company was further granted freedom of imports and exports. (Hiss 1943: 56)

The decision of the Dutch West India Company to make Aruba a center of horse-breeding, Curaçao an agricultural producer, and Bonaire a source of salt and maize, initiated the extensive slave trade in Curaçao (which soon became the major slave-trading center for the Caribbean).[4] Since the Company was satisfied with Indian "vaqueros," as the horse-breeding project expanded, Indians were brought in from other islands. Thus the relatively small number of African slaves in Aruba (bought as "domestics" by the mid-eighteenth century settlers) apparently made no significant contribution to the Aruban gene pool. The reverse is true for Curaçao and Bonaire.[5]

Although the Company declared that the relocated Indians were not to be regarded as slaves and were to be treated as subject to the same laws as the resident Dutch administrators, early reports on the

conditions of these Indians describe them as "utterly destitute drudges." One account tells of an early Commander ". . . who was so cruel as to force the Indians to carry cactuses, in the manner of guns, on their naked shoulders" (Hartog 1961: 51).

Instructions from the Company in 1636 directed the administrators to "free" the Indians from "barbaric practices," to educate Indian children to Christian conversion, and to give them preparatory training for "useful" occupations, particularly farming. However, a lawsuit recorded in 1804 discloses that, although Indians were allowed to raise goats (for local consumption), they were not permitted to own donkeys, horses, or cattle, for these were exportable commodities.

The Company did not permit other "white men" to settle in Aruba prior to 1754. In that year Moses Levy Maduro, grandson of the Moses Maduro who had migrated to Curaçao from Amsterdam late in the seventeenth century, became Aruba's first "colonist." The Company granted him (as a "Concession") a parcel of land on the south side of the island "for the pursuit of agricultural endeavor only." The Company demanded that he swear the following oath:

> That, arriving on Aruba, you will behave as a loyal resident, obeying the Commander in everything, and assisting with the other inhabitants (?) in executing the Company's work, and that you will help to clean the wells; that you will in no manner engage in any commercial transaction on said island and will not sell anything to any person whatsoever nor purchase anything from strangers, and that, if anything of the kind should happen done by others you will immediately warn the Commander. . . . that the land granted to you will be cultivated by yourself and that you will not allow it to fall into other's hands, or give it to others to sell it; but that you will allow your descendants to live on it, to cultivate it, and to enjoy its proceeds subject to the same condition. . . . and that the land on the extinction of you and your descendants will again revert to the Honourable Company. . . ." (Hartog 1961: 70)[6]

From 1768 to 1772 Commander Gilles Poppe issued several licenses to private persons (primarily Sephardic Jews from Curaçao) for settlement on the island. Although for a brief period thereafter no further requests for settlement were received, in 1780 licensing was resumed and, according to Hartog (1961: 72) all old Aruban "Top Ten" families (the present social elite) can be traced back to the half-century following the issuance of these licenses.[7]

For the next century Dutch, English, Portuguese, and a few Italian and French families arrived to settle in Aruba. The first settlements were in Buena Vista, Parkentenbosch, Santa Maria, and Dalmari (which are now among the most sparsely populated areas).[8] During these years plantations appeared in the settlement areas but, because the land was not suitable for any continuing large-scale cultivation of crops, the raising of sheep and goats soon became the primary economic activity. Eventually villages grew up around these plantations. With the growth of the harbor town of Oranjestad, many of the established plantation owners moved to the town, although most also retained their "garden-houses" (cunucu) in the countryside. The eighteenth and early nineteenth century surnames of Maduro, Henriquez, and Croes continue to proliferate throughout the island, as evidenced not only by the lists in the local telephone book, but on the ballot sheets for Island and Central Government elections.[9]

Although England briefly took possession of the ABC islands in 1800, the Treaty of Amiens restored control of the colonies to Holland by 1802. Again in 1805 the British, and in 1806 the Spanish, occupied Aruba for short periods. In 1816 the newly created Kingdom of the Netherlands formally "recognized" the colony of Aruba and appointed

Commander Boye to be the "Chief of the Island." He was second in command to the Governor General of Curaçao (who was also a Crown appointee). Henceforth the ABC Islands were no longer under the aegis of the Dutch West India Company but were directly supervised by the Netherlands central government.

In 1848 the constitutional reform of the Netherlands parliament provided for the recognition of Antilleans as Dutch citizens. A "colonial council" was constituted in Curaçao, consisting of an executive section of five members (government council) and a legislative section of eight members, all initially appointed directly by the "Crown." It soon became the practice for the governor (as Crown representative) to appoint council members from the social and economic elite. Although an Aruban was occasionally appointed to this Council, actually such appointment was very rare, being generally restricted to those Arubans who were resident in Curaçao.

Administration of island affairs was vested in the office of Lieutenant Governor (replacing the position of Commander) appointed by the "Crown." The Lieutenant Governor was to adhere to the instructions and orders of the Governor who, pending the decision of the "Crown," had

> . . . a right of suspension, to be exercised only on cogent grounds . . . /and upon whom, by 1920/ his appointment devolved. . . . All persons on Aruba were bound to honour and obey him, and all officials stood under him. . . .
>
> The lieutenant-governor was responsible for the maintenance of internal peace, order and safety, and was to be on his guard against aggression from outside. For these duties he was in command of the armed forces /not/ present on the island, and of the police and the militia. . . . (Hartog 1961: 131)

The Lieutenant Governor was assisted by two councillors: the "District Council" supplied him with information and advice. They

were empowered to present petitions to the King, the States-General of the Netherlands, the Curaçao governor, and the Colonial Council. The District Council was also responsible for the maintenance and construction of roads, bridges, and harbors. They superintended "poor relief" and enacted regulations concerning education, "public morality," and health. "The councillors were elected for a four years' term by those of the inhabitants who had the franchise" (Hartog 1961: 131).[10]

Aruba obtained two permanent seats in the Antillean representative body (Staten) in recognition of her increased importance as a consequence of the establishment of the oil industry on the island in the late 1920s.

Shortly after the end of World War II Aruba mad a strong bid for autonomy. Up to this time Aruba's political strength (or leverage) was vitiated by her unequal representation in the Central legislature--certainly it did not correspond to the large financial contribution made by Aruba for the general welfare of the islands. Politically active Arubans saw themselves as impotent in the present governmental system and they argued that "the only way to accomplish anything /was/ . . . to sound the trumpet of sedition whenever possible" (Hartog 1961: 416).

In 1946 a group of the local legislature traveled to the Netherlands to petition the Queen for "decentralization" as the necessary preliminary step toward achieving autonomy. The Round Table Conference (consisting of representatives from Holland, Surinam, and Curaçao),held at the Hague in 1948, considered the requests made by Aruba and decided to establish a committee to study the feasibility of granting this request. However, until 1951, the granting of extended suffrage to all

"nationalized" Aruban adult males and females, and a guarantee of eight Aruban representatives to the Staten, were the only positive changes in the political situation. A provisional constitution, promulgated in 1951, increased the size of the Antillean legislative council, and, more important for Aruba, authorized the institution of individual Island Councils, whose functions include control over local administrative, police, and economic matters.

A concomitant change took place in election procedures. Parties, rather than "independents," introduced nominations for election to local and Central Government positions.

> /Henny/ Eman, who had climbed the breach in the Legislature to increase the number of Aruban representatives, consistently set to work to ensure to the Arubans a majority in the Aruban Island Council. Considering the activity and the growing number of non-Aruban electors (who migrated to Aruba in the 1930s to supplement the Lago working force) it was by no means inconceivable that at a given moment the members born on the island would form a minority. . . . An additional difficulty appeared to be a close definition of who exactly can call himself Aruban.
>
> By Eman and his followers the matter was put thus: a person, who though he has been living here all his life and is devoted heart and soul to the island, cannot become an Aruban unless he has been born here. But any person born outside of Aruba whose parents count as Arubans will be recognized as a native the moment he decides to put foot ashore on Aruba. (Hartog 1961: 425)[11]

On December 15, 1954, the Netherlands Antilles (consisting of the Leeward Islands of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao, and the Windward Islands of Saba, St. Eustatius, and St. Martin) were granted complete autonomy (except in foreign policy and defense decisions) and Aruba, along with the other units of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam, became a "partner" in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The fact that the seat of the government for the Netherlands Antilles remains based in Curaçao, home of the Governor who presides in the name of the Queen of Holland, is a growing irritant to the emerging

nationalism of the people of Aruba. Although Arubans often express anti-Dutch and anti-American opinions, these are not as emotionally charged as are the vehement attacks by newspapers and political groups on restrictions and rulings imposed on Aruba by Curaçao.

The popular slogan of the Aruban Popular Party (AVP) that formed in 1970 to counter the "establishment-based" Aruban Patriots Party (PPA) was "Aruba for Arubans." Although the new party came close to victory in local elections, its proposal to restrict residence to Aruban "nationals" had a relatively limited appeal. On the other hand, a splinter group of the AVP, the Peoples Movement for Separation (MEP), won a landslide victory against the PPA in the 1973 Central Government elections by the loud proclamation of "Separation from Curacao" and the softer (but clearly understood) appeal for "separation" from the non-nationals.

Holland has recently announced to its Netherlands Antilles "partners" that she will sever her remaining ties with the islands within the next few years (certainly by 1980). Arubans react to this "promise" with mixed feelings; during my stay in Aruba in the summer of 1973, positive expressions of national "pride" were overlaid with negative representations of fear and alienation.

Economic Development

From the time of the initial Spanish judgment in the sixteenth century that Aruba was a "useless island," agricultural endeavors there have always been minimal and rarely successful. Recorded rainfall for any year has not exceeded twenty-three inches. During the early era of New World exploration the felling of brazilwood by passing sailing vessel crews for sale in the mother country rapidly depleted Aruba's

few forested areas. The overall destruction of the island flora (which may have contributed to the decline of the rainfall over the past two centuries to less than nineteen inches per year) and the paucity of minerals in the land surface have severely limited the agricultural potential of the island.

Efforts by the formerly Dutch and now Aruban administration to augment or extend the rural sector of the island economy have to date been sporadic and only moderately profitable.

Aloe (vulgaris) cultivation, the only agricultural undertaking that provided more than marginal profits, began in the 1850s. Because the variety of aloe grown in Aruba yielded the highest aloin content of any known species, its resin extract was in demand in the United States, England, and Germany, where the resin was converted into various medicines. Export of aloe resin continued into the twentieth century but in the 1930s was halted for several years while the oil refinery was being established. After 1950 planting on a larger scale was resumed. "In 1951 the aloin output amounted to about 15,000 pounds or circa thirty per cent of the world production" (Hartog 1961: 383). Nevertheless, the total income from this product (which yielded profits of 60 to 80 guilders per ton to the few planters, who paid the pickers between 25 and 50 Dutch cents per eight-gallon vat) is still small in absolute terms.

Other agricultural projects started and then abruptly abandoned as unprofitable were: the rearing of cochineal beetles for carmine dyes, the extraction of tannin from the pods of the divi-divi trees, and the growing of tobacco, cotton, peanuts, and cashews. Maize and bean crops (sown by farmers in two plots, one sandy and the other clay, as

insurance against drought) have always been produced for private consumption only. During the 1800s droughts and near-famine conditions were frequently experienced: from 1820 to 1825, in 1858, 1863, and 1869, and from 1897 to 1900.[12]

Animal husbandry, originally intended to be the primary occupation for the early settlers, never prospered. The land-issue policy of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries kept private holdings to a minimum until 1823; this precluded the possibility of any private person's possessing sufficient pasture land to enable him to engage in large-scale animal raising. When, after 1823, private land holdings were enlarged, the lack of suitable pasture throughout the island still restricted the cattle population. The xerophytic vegetation, however, proved to be particularly suited to the donkeys and goats which have remained a familiar addition to the Aruban landscape.

Goats were of some economic importance during the nineteenth century, when goat dung was collected for export to Barbados and Grenada as fertilizer. Hides were accepted by the Central Government in Curaçao in payment of taxes until late into the nineteenth century.[13]

Presently the (approximately two thousand) goats which roam freely throughout the island appear to have no commercial significance. Although owners may occasionally bring their (cunucu-based) goats to the local slaughter-house to kill for their own consumption, there is no export of Aruban goats. Cunucu farmers still enjoy stew made from young goat (cobrito) but say that their local wild goats are too tough and stringy to eat. Imported goat meat is too expensive for regular consumption. Domesticated pigs and chickens supply part of the protein needs of the local population. Town people have recently been limiting

their consumption of imported meat because of rapidly rising prices. Beans and fish are once again providing the necessary protein supplement to the daily diet.

The continental bank between Aruba and the Paraguañan peninsula reaches a depth of approximately six hundred and fifty feet and is a rich fishing ground. Nevertheless, no fishing industry of any size has ever developed; only a few men (generally of Portuguese extraction) engage in small-scale fishing to meet local subsistence needs.[14]

Thus the plant and animal resources of the island, inadequate to meet the subsistence needs of the local population, offer little prospect for commercial exploitation.[15]

The discovery in 1824 of high-quality alluvial gold gave the first significant boost to the local economy and to the income of the Dutch government. From 1824 to 1827 farmers, fishermen, and townspeople extracted and sold gold from the gullies of Rooi Fluit to the island Commander (who arranged for its transhipment to Holland). In 1827 "the gold fields were declared out of bound to local persons" (Hartog 1961: 135). By 1830 laborers employed by the Dutch government had extracted and sent to the Netherlands "a total of 90.396 kilos having a value of ca. 144,000 (Dutch) guilders" (Hartog 1961: 135). (In the mid-nineteenth century Dutch guilders as well as florins were valued at 2,489 to $1.00.)

As gold production from the first site declined, additional areas were exploited at Daimari, Wacobana, Arikok, and Hadicuradi. Unfortunately (for the Dutch government) the capital outlay for extraction and shipment of the gold began to exceed the sale value:

Year	Capital Expenditure	Value of Gold	
1824	10,640 fls.	48,405 fls.	
1825	27,930	29,426	
1827	15,863	9,169	(Hartog 1961: 138)

Upon the death of the Island Commander in 1827, the Dutch manager of the gold-mining operation was appointed Commander. Because of the imbalance of capital outlay as against diminished profits he ordered the cessation of work in all gold fields. By 1829, however, the Commander had realized that the importance of providing work and wages for the Islanders would outweigh the lack of profit to the Dutch government. He petitioned the Governor-General (at Paramaribo, Surinam) to permit the issuance of licenses to private persons.

> /In 1829/ Gold-seeking was freed from government-restrictions; the plots, numbering 1,534 were to be assigned by lot against a concession of fifteen guilders annually for each. . . . In 1831 the first report mentioned the handing in of a nugget of 13/16 ounce old Dutch weight to the value of 42 guilders, one third of which was claimed by the government. . . . The first 13,875 nuggets represented an amount of 19,843.45 guilders. . . . /A/ Spaniard, who was staying here at the time . . . found a lump of gold weighing about 42 pounds, after which find he returned to his native country. . . . several lower-class people repeatedly found lumps of a weight varying between two and ten pounds. (Hartog 1961: 139-141)

By 1832 prospecting for alluvial gold had begun to decline because of the paucity of gold finds. Private persons were released from the obligation to deliver gold to the local administration. Mining was declared open to everyone upon the issuance of monthly permits.

Gold ore was discovered in the late 1820s. "Lumps" weighing from 25 to over 40 pounds were extracted from the mines of Westpunt by local residents. Over 120 kilos were forwarded by the Island Commander to the Netherlands.[16]

In 1854 the Dutch government again prohibited the "free" mining of gold. The Hague issued a forty-year concession to a Dutch citizen, Louis Joseph de Jongh, for exploitation of the mines at Westpunt and Balashi. The licensee sent his engineer to Aruba to manage the mines. Despite the low wages paid to the resident miners (one-half guilder a day), the costs of extraction of 40 ounces of gold were over 1,900 guilders; as the value of the gold (in Holland) was stated to be only 8,000 guilders, the operation ceased to be of interest to the concessionaire. In 1866 the concession was withdrawn; once again the Commander reinstated the practice of gold-mining under the permit system.

> /In 1867/ a concession for the duration of twenty-five years was granted to I. Isola against a fixed due of 2,500 guilders annually. Isola in 1868 transferred the concession to Messrs. Ricket & Co. of New York, who in their turn sold the rights in 1872 for 251,509 pounds to the Aruba Island Goldmining Company in London. The latter began to work the ore with an old-fashioned stamping-mill . . . /The company/ constructed a gold-smeltery at Bushiribana and a pier at Forti Abao. . . . This company operated from 1872 to 1882 . . . working 2,938 tons of raw material, producing 2,075 ozs. of fine gold. The capital of this company amounted to half a million pound sterling. (Hartog 1961: 144)

The cyanide-process was introduced to refinery operations in 1890. Comparison of this process with former methods discloses that the new process resulted in a doubling of the amount of fine gold refined from the ore quartz.

As capital investment increased, the export of refined gold decreased. In 1881 (the second consecutive year that no gold was exported) the Company assigned its rights to the Aruba Agency Company Ltd. of London, and in July of 1889 exploitation was resumed on a small scale. In 1899 the Aruba Gold Concessions Ltd. of London renewed its concession for an additional 40-year period. This company was required to pay "a fixed annual due" of 3,750 guilders and 25% of the net proceeds

that exceeded 6% of its capital. The company operated at an ever increasing loss; in 1904 returns amounting to 13,191.19 pounds were counterbalanced by an expenditure of 31,533 pounds. In 1907 the ratio of proceeds to expenditure was 27,184:20,151, but by this time "the debit balance from the previous years /had/ risen to 75,802 pounds" (Hartog 1961: 147). The company's work engineer advised the Company to "scrap" the concession.

A local "combination," the Aruba Loud Maatschappij (the first company in which native interests were involved as shareholders and in management) was organized in 1908. It replaced the Aruba Gold Concessions Company and took possession of the machinery and buildings of the defunct company. The shareholders and staff came from the elite Arubiano merchant group: Henriquez, Arens, Beaujon, and DeVeer. The ten-year concession granted to this company expired with the outbreak of World War I.

During the years of its incorporation, the Company operated with a capital of only 40,000 guilders. The returns to the Company, therefore, were most "satisfactory"; a 50% dividendwas declared in 1910. But over the ten-year period the Company reported a continual decrease in the gold-content of the ore mined from the few over-exploited areas; in 1908 27 dwt. was extracted per ton, in 1915 only 18 dwt. per ton. From 1913 to 1915 the Company processed approximately 185.858 kilogrammes of gold, for which Holland paid 243,745 Dutch guilders. (The value of gold during this period was about 1,200 guilders a kilo /Hartog 1961: 148/.)

With the outbreak of World War I materials necessary for mining, such as cyanide and dynamite, ceased to be exported to the island.

Mining operations ceased in 1916. After the war ended the smelting refineries, furnaces, electric plant, and other equipment were unusable because the machinery " . . . had been allowed to fall into decay after the work had been stopped" (Hertog 1961: 149). Although the gold-mining period had provided work for many of the local farmers and fishermen for several decades, the actual cash return to Aruban wage-laborers was always minimal.

Fortunately for the economy, at the same time that gold mining profits were diminishing, phosphate mining operations, also initiated during the mid-nineteenth century, were yielding higher returns. Phosphate mined in Seroe Colorado (now held in lease by the Lago Oil and Transport Company) returned in 1895 over 9,000,000 guilders to the Aruba Phosphaat Maatschappij; and the Central Government collected 4,000,000 guilders in export duties. As this company was formed by joint investments from Aruban and Curacellanean merchants with a British-affiliated phosphate company, the substantial returns went largely to the same elite group that profited from the gold-mining operations. Phosphate mining was abruptly abandoned in the late 1920s when the Lago Oil and Transport Company obtained the lease rights to Seroe Colorado.[17]

In 1924 the monopoly that the Royal Dutch/Shell Company (a conglomerate of Shell Transport Co. Ltd., London, and N. V. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Mij., the Netherlands) held in the Lake Maracaibo basin was broken when the Lago Oil Corporation entered the field by acquiring control of the British Equatorial Oil Company, Ltd.

> After studying the possibilities of a deepwater field even closer to the oil fields than Wilemstad (Capital of Curaçao and location of the Royal Dutch/Shell refinery) it was decided to

> improve the harbor of St. Nicolas at the southeastern end of the Island of Aruba. The Lago Transportation Company of Canada was organized to transport the oil from Lake Maracaibo to the storage tanks of St. Nicolas. . . . In 1926 and 1927 the reef protecting the southern coast of Aruba was blasted out to form an entrance to the harbor of St. Nicolas and the harbor was dredged. The construction of a refinery with a daily capacity of 110,000 barrels of crude petroleum was begun in 1928. . . . When the refinery was finished in 1930 at a cost of eleven million dollars, it was the most completely electrically operated refinery in the world. . . .
>
> During its phenomenal growth, the control of the Lago Oil and Transport Co., Ltd. passed from the Lago Petroleum Corporation to the British Mexican Petroleum Co., Ltd., to the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Co., to a holding Company--Pan-American Eastern Corporation--to another holding company, the Lago Oil and Transport Corporation of Delaware, which was controlled by the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, and to a final holding company--the Pan-American Foreign Corporation--which is ninety-six per cent owned by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. (Hiss 1934: 126)[19]

The sudden economic and demographic changes following the establishment of the refineries forced Arubans to make many social adjustments, not only in the southeastern tip of the island but throughout the countryside. Lago recruited as unskilled labor all available Aruban males from the rural as well as from urban areas. Just outside of St. Nicholas two new residential areas, Lago Heights and Essoville, were cleared for construction (by Lago contractors) of inexpensive, box-like bungalows to house foreign semi-skilled workers ("imported" mostly from the British West Indies). As more laborers were recruited from outside the island (to replace the hundreds of Aruban laborers that Lago found to be "undependable)

> . . . the tiny fishermen's village of Sint Nicolaas mushroomed into a boom-town of the type found in the U.S. during the opening up of the West. In the helter-skelter of the pioneering settlement houses were knocked together out of everything that could be laid hands on. Petrol cans were eagerly collected to provide materials for walls . . . (Hartog 1961: 317)

(Many of these "flimsy temporary dwellings" are still "home" for West Indian Village residents.)

At the same time the government abandoned projects formerly initiated to bolster the agricultural economy, so that aloe fields and land cleared for tobacco and cotton were soon invaded by cactus and scrub.

During the early years of the new industry, relations between the newly emerged Aruban working class and the Lago management were often strained and sometimes hostile. One of the basic reasons for this friction, according to Hartog, was that in Aruba the Standard Oil Company (now Exxon) operated differently from the pattern it had followed in its other overseas stations. The refinery management decided not to adopt ". . . the country's vernacular (Papiamentu) as /the/ office language" (Hartog 1961: 356), a decision taken upon the advice of "intellectual" Arubans (actually the aforementioned elite) that Papiamentu was not an "adequate" language for commercial or technological activities.[20]

Two other factors, one related to the language problem, have, I believe, contributed more significantly to the hostility, both covert and overt, that continues to score labor-management relations. The language "difficulty" is invoked by the management personnel to explain the need to import thousands of English-speaking workers from the British West Indies.[21] In 1951 (the high point of Lago employment) the ratio of West Indian to Aruban employees was 2,252:2,465. The presence of such large numbers of foreign workers caused strong resentment and hostility in many areas of socio-economic interaction. The total Aruban labor pool then amounted to almost 5,000 men--so that only half of the employable Aruban males were hired by Lago; most of the other half held the unskilled (and considerably less lucrative) menial jobs throughout

the island. (Census figures for 1951 indicate that only 120 "employable" workers were unemployed for that year.) Although Lago offered vocational training and scholarships for advanced technical training abroad to Antilleans and West Indians alike, most Arubans, relatively unsophisticated and less mobile than their West Indian co-workers (and, according to the opinion expressed by a local newspaper editor, urged by their fathers to continue their weekly wage contribution to the family budget) opted to remain on the island. Consequently, they received only the minimal training necessary to hold the lowest paying jobs. (I will expand on the different educational backgrounds of the two groups in the chapter on the West Indians.) On the other hand, many of the West Indians who were not yet "rooted" on the island welcomed the opportunity of receiving advanced training in the United States. Those who returned to Aruba with degrees in engineering were naturally placed in superior positions over their former peers. The Aruban workers, characterized by Lago management as "a passive, pleasant, alcoholic people," felt themselves overwhelmed and dominated by the more aggressive and demanding West Indians. An Aruban ex-employee for Lago told me: "Those 'British' agitators told the Arubans they should strike for better conditions. Arubans were forced to accept decisions they didn't want. . . . Arubans could not explain themselves to their bosses so they used the 'British' as intermediaries. <u>They</u> explained it their way to make the Arubans look bad."

The need to house the imported workers as close as possible to the refinery complex (because of the lack of efficient means of public transportation) resulted in a dense concentration of West Indians in the St. Nicholas area, whereas the Aruban workers lived further afield and

had to travel to work packed uncomfortably into open trucks and the few operating buses. Social interaction between Arubans and West Indians was thus limited to working hours--periods of tension and frustration for the Arubans.

Lago initially provided financial subsidies to West Indian islanders (or their "leaders") for the building and maintenance of social and sports facilities, and it encouraged (with the tacit approval of the Dutch administration) the installation of many "cribs" in the saloons adjoining the refinery, in which imported prostitutes could "service" the predominantly single West Indian workers and the transient sailors and merchant mariners. Arubans, however, for the first few decades after the building of the refinery received little of this largesse. Apparently the Lago management believed that the Arubans could provide their own sources of entertainment.

A widely expressed reason for the antagonism felt by the Arubans and other "locals" towards the Lago management refers to the differential rates of pay offered from the beginning of the operations: United States expatriate foremen, engineers, and managers are paid on a United States dollar basis; their Antillean, West Indian, and European counterparts are paid in Antillean guilders (approximately $1:1.87 Antillean florins in 1973). Arubans have continued to show little inclination to study and train abroad for higher level positions partly because of this differential rate of payment. Indeed, most of those few locals who earned professional degrees abroad have remained in the countries where they received university education and where they can compete on an equal pay basis with metropolitan professionals.

> The transition from patriarchal conditions to humming modern life took place with such rapidity that the people, having no time to keep pace spiritually with industrial and commercial developments, began to conceive the smooth glossy wonders of technique as the noblest manifestations of culture. Refrigerators and nylon-products, concrete . . . were deified as the marvels of modern times. The electric washer . . . became the attribute of the masses, the 'Persian' carpet the altar-cloth of the bourgeois.
>
> Within a few years even the siesta, customary and necessary in tropical regions, vanished (for refinery workers, not for the other island residents). The peaceful atmosphere so typical of Aruba was shattered by a display of businesslike drive. . . Dipsomania, an age-old treat to Arubans . . . for indeed are they not Indians . . . spread like wildfire when a population unaccustomed to thrift was enabled to come by money in an easy manner. (Hartog 1961: 374-75)

For the first three decades of refinery operations the crude oil processed in Aruba came from the Lake Maracaibo basin. For the past few years, however, crude oil from other countries (particularly from the Mid-Eastern Arab countries) has been shipped to Aruba for processing. Apparently Lago (Exxon) is anxious to lessen its dependence on its Venezuelan oil leases (which are due to expire in 1984). Fluctuating attitudes of the Venezuelan government toward United States exploitation and control of Venezuelan oil alternately encourage, then threaten the continuation or renewal of the leases held by Exxon, Shell, Texaco, and other major foreign corporations.

Because the transition from a minimal subsistence economy to rapid industrialization did not precipitate significant alteration of the "native" economy--except for the expanded wage earnings of Lago employees--the island's fortunes remain tied to the revenues from the oil refinery. The continued importance to the Antillean economy of the export of refined oil derives not only from customs returns[22] but also from the refinery taxes paid to the Central Government by Royal Dutch/Shell in Curaçao and the Lago Oil and Transport Company in Aruba. (As previously mentioned this tax has been "fixed" according to the number

of barrels shipped annually. In early 1974 the Central Government proposed a change in the tax base which would raise the annual return to the government from 12 million florins to 45 million florins. At the present date this increase is still being "negotiated.")

Even more important to local merchants and worker-residents are the local purchases made by the refineries and the wages paid to employees and contractors. Thus, in 1968 the combined (Royal Dutch/Shell and Lago) contribution to Aruban and Curacellanean refinery workers and local stores was 125,000,000 NAF (Statische Jaarboek 1971).

By 1959 the Lago Oil and Transport Co.,Ltd., was processing over 400,000 barrels of crude oil per day (in contrast to 110,000 barrels per day in 1930). However, the increase in company and governmental profits from this augmented production was accompanied by a sharp decrease in local employment. Modernization and automation of the refinery facilities

> . . . and greater efficiency and . . . elimination of non-essential activities . . . contributed to reducing the refinery's work force /from/ 7,817 employees in 1950 /to/ 5,134 by 1960. /An official in the Department of Economic Welfare told me that Lago's total work force in 1973 was 1,551./ The unemployment problem, which had ceased to exist in 1928, again came to the fore in the fifties. . . . . . In 1954 there were 340 unemployed persons; in January 1956, 504 were registered; in the following December this number had risen to 1,072, /finally/ reaching an apex of over 1,350. (Hartog 1961: 437)

The unemployment figures do not reflect the total reduction of the Lago work force because only "locals" are included in the figure. In cooperation with the suggestion made in the early 1950s by the island Department of Economic Welfare, the Lago management fired mainly the non-nationals (or replaced the non-Antilleans who held "essential" jobs with the Company with "local" people). Unemployed non-nationals forfeited their work permits and were quickly returned to their home islands.

(The order of "laying-off"--obviously a euphemism, because neither the Company nor the local government offered the possibility of re-employment to the non-nationals, will be discussed more fully in the chapter on the West Indian segment.)

Nevertheless, many Arubans also lost their jobs at the refinery, and in response the Island Government in November 1959 made available (through petition to the Netherlands government) one million guilders for unemployment relief work. Most of the newly unemployed Aruban men were given jobs in road and bridge construction.

Unemployment figures for 1970 were 17% for males and 36% for females, but these rates were significantly reduced by 1971, when Lago embarked on expansion and modernization projects and began the construction of a hydro-desulphurization plant.[23] Although larger contracts were let to "outside" companies, sub-contracts were given to small Aruban firms (some owned by former Lago employees who had acquired, at much reduced prices, some of Lago's surplus equipment after the 1952 modernization period). Jobs not only became available for the local population; contractors also re-instituted the pattern of "importing" work gangs from Jamaica and Trinidad (one local contractor only hires Seventh Day Adventists) as well as from the more recently exploited hinterland of Colombia.[24] In addition, Aruban manual laborers have, since 1971, replaced the "colored" (West Indian) workers in the hotels at the tourist end of the island, while Aruban women (until recently "forbidden" by fathers and husbands to work outside the home) have been replacing their black counterparts in "domestic" positions in these hotels.[25] Increasingly,Aruban girls are replacing Dutch office workers, bank tellers, and shop-girls.

The Lago management asserts that the company is trying to "lower its profile on the island" and is encouraging the establishment of island-owned and operated small business enterprises, through partial subsidy and equipment. Nevertheless, no significant increase in local industry was observable in 1973. The Allied Chemical Plant, built in the 1960s and subsidized jointly by Lago and the Netherlands government, and encouraged by tax concessions from the local island government, ". . . flopped when the ten year tax concession expired--three quarters of the plant is not working--after they managed to do a good job of polluting our waters" (personal communication--editor of local newspaper). A few bottling plants (franchised by Pepsi-Cola, Amstel Beer, etc.), an aloin-processing plant (owned and operated by a "Jewish-American" and employing only a few local pickers and processers), a small coffee-roasting factory, a cigarette factory, a few small ice-plants and rum-distilleries, all producing for local consumption, represent most of the "new" local industries.

Smuggling (perhaps the first reciprocal trade activity of the island Indians, who in the seventeenth century ". . . trade with the buccaneers when they call in /under the leadership of Sir Henry Morgan/ exchanging sheep and goats for linen, thread and anything else they need. . . ." /Exquemelin 1969: 145/) had, until the 1970s, been regarded by Arubans as a prime source of export revenue. Obviously there are no available records of profits made from smuggling; but customs officials are said to have maintained an attitude of "wowos cera y manos habri" (closed eyes and open hands) during the comings and goings of small rowboats, each equipped with three powerful out-board motors strapped side by side.

An editor of a local newspaper explained:

> Our wholesale business was our export also. This has dropped enormously. Our export of dry goods, cigarettes, coffee, liquers to Colombia and Venezuela has dropped to nothing. One of our largest department stores in Oranjestad has had to lay off 60 girls (we used to get most of our cotton goods that way from Colombia).. . . Did you know Aruba used to be the biggest coffee exporter in Latin America? . . . We brought in more coffee than Colombia and Venezuela could sell herself--we bagged it and stamped it and sold it cheaper than they did. . . . to Nescafé for instance. . . . The Venezuelan and Colombian governments got mad. . . . Their Coast Guards set up "walls" to keep our motorboats out . . . and /wistfully/ it's all finished now!

Aruba's recently acquired reputation as "the tourist mecca of the Caribbean"[26] has to date conferred only limited benefits upon the total economy--limited, that is, because cash returns from the increased tourist traffic have not yet "filtered" out or down to the general public. Although the Aruban menial laborers, in the past chronically un- or under-employed, have been able to secure the hotal jobs formerly held by West Indians, the minimum hourly wage that these jobs offer is considerably lower than the wage/benefit package secured by the International Oil Workers Union for Lago employees. The domestics, formerly employed by expatriate families, now receive less remuneration for hotel employment. Moreover, as expatriate foremen, engineers, and managers are being replaced by Arubans, who are paid on a guilder, rather than a dollar basis, the demand for female domestics has been considerably reduced. Aruban construction workers receive sporadic employment as new hotels are built or enlarged, but again, these laborers are paid at the minimum wage scale, whereas Lago and its expatriate contractors pay a higher wage to construction workers.

The groups that have received the most direct financial benefit from the increase in tourism are the retail clothing and jewelry merchants

(primarily Ashkenazim) and the restaurateurs (Chinese). Cruise tours and hotel package tours include one or two days of shopping in the free-port stores in Oranjestad. Whereas during the boom days of Lago, most of the merchants had operated out of ". . . old-fashioned little shops and 'tiendas'" (Hartog 1961: 438) in St. Nicholas, since the 1960s these same merchants have opened large modern air-conditioned shops not only in Oranjestad but also in the hotels and motels along the "tourist strip." For instance, a modest jewelry shop in St. Nicholas (which also offers exorbitant credit financing to town workers and residents) presently has three glittering "sisters" at the tourist end of the island. Chinese "cafés" (a euphemism for "crib-saloons") in St. Nicholas are now the poor relations of the "extended family" plush restaurants that cater to tourists and the wealthier businessmen.

The Department of Economic Affairs does not record in identifiable, separate figures the taxable income from the expanded business operations of the merchant group; it can only be assessed by observation of the expanded life-style of these businessmen and their families (for example, by noting the cars per family unit, the recently built luxury houses, club membership, etc.). The children of the Ashkenazic and Chinese merchants are invariably sent abroad for their secondary and university schooling. Family holidays are spent in the United States, Europe, and South America. In general, it appears that large capital expenditures of the non-national merchants are either absorbed by investment in additional shops and restaurants, or are made outside of Aruba.

Economic returns from tourism to the island government are not commensurate with the rapid increase in the numbers of tourists who visit the island each year. The ten to eleven year tax concessions to recently

built hotels will not expire for another five or six years. Benefits from tourist purchases of free-port items do not offset the increased prices of imported goods. In addition, the "average" tourist of the 1970s (who admits that the attraction of Aruba lies not so much in her "fine beaches and sunny climate" as in an atmosphere "free of friction and tension" /Hannau 1969: 63/27) is not the affluent "free-spender" of the 1960s. Instead he is a middle-income member of a "packaged-tour" group; the "package" of air fare, food, and board has been paid to the agency abroad before his arrival in Aruba, and any extra money he has to spend usually does not leave the hotel premises. The gambling casinos of the hotels (whose taxable income also does not appear in the public records) entice the guests to "make back the cost to them of the package tour" (personal communication--casino employee). The risk to the hotel of the tourist's leaving before he had planned to (because he has spent his vacation money) is minimized because the management has already been remunerated for its share of the "package."

In short, the advent of expanded tourism, the increased profits to merchant groups, and the additional construction of hotels and Lago facilities have not significantly altered Aruba's economic underdevelopment and position of dependence. "The absence of any ongoing structural transformation in the . . . economy since the advent of the foreign refining industry in the 1920s" (Department of Economic Affairs 1972) has impeded the development of the "non-oil sector" of the national economy. The ratio of import to export for the Netherlands Antilles in 1971 (no separate figures are given for Aruba) was 440,000,000 NAF: 77,000,000 NAF. These figures do not include oil refinery exports but do include machinery and transport equipment manufactured by expatriate concerns (32,000,000 NAF)

so that only 45,000,900 NAF actually represent the total local industrial export of the Netherlands Antilles.

> The heart of the matter . . . is that wages in the non-oil sector will never be able to "catch up" with those prevailing in the refining industry. . . .
>
> Even refraining from considering the monopolistic pricing arrangements prevalent among the international oil "majors", higher capital intensity per man (i.e., a higher capital/labor ratio) would--by the tenets of the marginal productivity theory of wages--procure for the oilworker a relatively higher hourly remuneration than that received by the waiter in a local restaurant. . . . Furthermore, labor costs /are/ generally not the major item in the total costs of a refining establishment; not so for the local drycleaner's. . . . Third, it seems that technical progress is transmitted more rapidly in the oil business than in the private domestic sector of the Antillean economy. . . /This/ has helped ensure for the refinery worker an ever-rising productivity per manhour pari passu with rising oil sector wages. (Department of Economic Affairs 1972: 3)

The high per capita income of $1,200 for Arubans in 1972 ($1,108 in 1958 and $1,008 in 1963) is claimed by the Department of Economic Affairs to offer an erroneous index of the "prosperity" of the average Aruban because it does not adequately represent the poverty of the non-oil sector of the economy.

Although the percentage contribution to the national income from the oil industry declined from 40% in 1957 to 23% in 1967[28] (and Lago employment dropped from 33% of the total Aruban labor force to only 7% in 1973), "/the/ fact that the per capita income did not decline proportionately was mainly due to foreign aid and to the increasing contribution of the tourist sector to national income, viz., from 4% in 1957 to 13% in 1967" (Department of Economic Affairs 1972: 7). The per capita income figure thus is an artificial construct; it does not fairly indicate the annual wage of the average Aruban who is not employed by the Lago Company, particularly when it is set against the cost of living index, which showed only a 1% annual increase from

1963 to 1967 but increases of 3½% in 1970 and 4% in 1971. Thus, the real per capita income is declining rather than growing.

Subsidies and grants from the Netherlands (estimated by an Exxon executive I interviewed to increase the Aruban government's budget by approximately 50% annually) are described by local government economists as "gifts with strings" because they are offered in the form of matching contributions for development projects, or as loans to be repaid on a long-term (and high interest) basis.

Aruba, then, although minimally exploitable in terms of her natural and mineral resources, conforms to the model of underdevelopment and dependent neo-colonial economies. Fanon (1963: 304) asserts:

> /When the nationalist parties/ are questioned on the economic program of the state that they are clamoring for, or on the nature of the regime which they propose to install, they are incapable of replying, because, precisely, they are completely ignorant of the economy of their own country. (Fanon 1968: 150-51)

On the face of it, this statement seems rather harsh. It is, however, particularly relevant in the case of the recently victorious leader of Aruba's nationalist party. During our interview, held one month after he was elected to a seat in the Central Government Council, I asked him if there was anything he would like me to send him from New York. "Yes," he replied, "how about a book on economics!"

NOTES

[1]Several urns were discovered by a bulldozing crew during the winter and spring of 1971. They were turned over to the government after inspection by visiting archaeologists. Now housed in the old disused Water Tower in St. Nicholas, they represent the only "museum exhibits" in Aruba.

[2]Subsequent references to "red slaves" as resident-workers in Aruba, as contrasted with "freemen" and coloureds," indicate that this proviso was largely ignored.

[3]Hartog discounts an early account that the name derives from "oro-hubo," Spanish for "there was gold once," because this would assign Spanish origin to the name. He is certain that the name originated from the Carib words "ora" (shell) and "oubao" (island).

[4]As the agricultural potential of Curaçao was limited and commercially unprofitable, the Company embarked on extensive slave purchase and resale. A Governor of Curaçao, Peter Stuyvesant, was rewarded for his successful promotion of the island's slave-trading industry by being offered the governorship of New York.

[5]The hostility of Arubans expressed toward Curacellaneans is generally conceded (by nationals of both islands) to have strong racial overtones. "Why do we have to be told what to do by those blacks?" Curiously, Arubans feel "kindly" toward the Bonaire nationals, who are as dark-skinned as the Curacellaneans. Apparently Aruban hostility toward blacks has less to do with skin color than with economic and political friction.

[6]The practice of granting "Concessions" continued into the nineteenth century. During the registration period for Aruba's first elections, held in 1924, when "landowners" were told to come forth to register, descendants of early concessionaires insisted that they owned their parcels of land. The Lieutenant Governor made the decision (claimed to be "illegal" by the present director of the Land Office) that these concessions were henceforth to be regarded as "land-ownership."

[7]Population records for the period between 1780 and 1816 list 19 Jews and 290 Protestants. The small figure given for "Jews" apparently reflects the fact that within a few years of their first arrival the Sephardic males had intermarried with the native and Roman Catholic European population, and the offspring of these marriages were baptized in the religions of their mothers.

The figure of 290 Protestants also includes those Indians who were baptized after the Dutch conquest.

Census figures for 1816 indicate that the Catholic population (Indians and offspring of Sephardic-Indian marriages) was 1,106.

The predominance of Catholicism into the present period (approximately 85% of the total population) is noteworthy considering that the period of Spanish occupation ended in 1634.

[8]The Civil Registry on Aruba does not possess an apparatus to register the number of inhabitants per dwelling-center but on the strength of the data available the population in 1953 was localized as follows:

Oranjestad	11,670
St. Nicholas	20,664
Santa Cruz	8,977
Sabaneta	4,910
Noord	4,823
Paradera	2,500

[9]"The Local," a St. Nicholas newspaper, carried a comment from an "unknown observer" after the 1973 election, that ". . . regardless of which party you were voting for, you were sure to be voting for a Croes cousin." (Croes is the name of the leader of the MEP: this same surname appears several times on each of the other two major party ballots.)

[10]"In 1903 no more than 57 people voted in the elections of the Council. 1905 was a vintage year; 70 people put in an appearance. A year afterwards J. E. Lampe was elected councilor by unanimous vote, 43. Every two years one of the councilors resigned, but became immediately re-eligible" (Hartog 1961: 131).

[11]Eman's policy was expanded in 1971 by the Aruban Popular Party (AVP) when it adopted the "exclusionist" definition of "Arubano"--which referred only to those nationals who had been born on the island prior to 1930 (that is, before the onset of large-scale importation of West Indian and other non-Antillean groups).

[12]In addition to periods of drought, a series of epidemics of scorbutic deficiencies and childhood diseases occurred during the first decades of the twentieth century. As recently as July 1925 official reports from the Department of Health stated that many people were dying from lack of proper food and drinkable water. In the 1930s poverty was so widespread that a daily distribution was made to the residents of Savaneta and Santa Cruz (from money sent by the Netherlands government).

[13]Government revenues for the year 1827 were

"Gold	9,169.50	Dutch guilders (florins)
Import duties	88.40	
Duties on cattle	133.33	
Export duties	28.33	
Anchorage	697.09	
Stamp duties	637.37	
Taxes on sale of slaves	244.40	
5% public auctions	50.17	
2% on chattel transfer	16.52	
Taxes on exports of slaves	13.33	
Sale of government donkeys	960.00	
Total	12,127.85	

"(The expenses for the same year, however, amounted to 21,976.85.)" (Hartog 1961: 224)

[14]1952 census: 160 registered fishermen out of a total population of 56,206.

[15]I have had several discussions with officials in the Department of Economic Welfare about the feasibility of introducing irrigation to cunucu areas (see Evanari's 1974 article, "Desert Farmers: Ancient and Modern," which addresses the high productivity of those desert farms that provide catchment basins for rainfall retention). Aruban cunucu farmers during the late nineteenth century had access to communal tankis (large rectangular rainfall basins) but these were so large that water evaporated too quickly. Also, they were so distant from most of the farms that they were virtually useless.

The reactions of the government officials were invariably negative: "Too expensive . . . wouldn't make that much difference . . . besides, we're not large-scale farmers."

[16]From 1840 to 1850 David Capriles (descendant of one of the first Sephardic settlers) boughtover 7,051 ounces of gold from local collectors. He sold this gold to Sephardic merchants in Curaçao.

[17]When I questioned the President of Lago about the possibility of reopening the phosphate mines on the southeastern tip of the island, he explained to me that detritus from force-blowing the phosphate out of the mines might adversely affect the refinery products. (Since the tradewinds come from the northeast it seems hardly likely that the "detritus" could drift anywhere but out to sea.)

[18]I elaborate upon the significant details of the entry of Standard Oil of New Jersey into the foreign oil fields in the chapter on "The Power Elite."

[19]Hiss neglects to note that all of these companies were affiliates or subsidiaries of the parent company, Standard Oil of New Jersey.

[20]I asked many Arubans and expatriates at Lago about this decision. The answer invariably given was that Papiamentu lacked a technical vocabulary. "For instance, there is no word for stainless steel." When I suggested that, as Papiamentu consisted of a composite lexicon--of Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and English words--technical terms could have been introduced from any of these languages, I was offered a quizzical expression or shrug.

[21]An additional explanation for the decision to import workers was that the Arubans were "lacking in technical skills," so that West Indian workers were needed to fill the construction and refinery jobs. No answer was forthcoming when I asked how and where West Indians had acquired these skills.

[22]A comparison of oil export and "other goods" exported from 1925 to 1951 in terms of tax returns to the Central Government shows the disproportionate values:

Year	Oil and Oil Products	Other Goods
1925	89,111,434.	217,414.
1935	271,837,545.	2,631,935.
1945	342,626,431.	2,631,935.
1948	411,692,427.	8,405,433.
1949	486,866,287.	8,809,046.
1950	608,776,899.	6,756,627.
1951	687,643,894.	6,221,893.

[23]Lago publicized the construction of the HDS plant as "Lago's contribution to improving the environment through the removal of the polluting effects of sulphur from crude oil." Actually, the project was mandated by the Clean Air bill enacted by Congress in 1970. Also, the sulphur that is extracted from the oil is exported at a high profit to Exxon.

[24]In staffing at least two occupational categories in Aruba, those of manual workers and prostitutes, Colombia has become a Third World's Third World.

[25]The local government has continued its policy of expatriating non-nationals. Its over-all design is apparently two-fold: to ensure the employment of all available Arubans by replacement of non-nationals, and to achieve the expulsion of non-franchised (non-"white") residents. The two aims neatly coincide, as loss of employment for a non-national results in the nullification of his/her work permit and loss of the work permit is accompanied by almost immediate deportation from the island. Thus the slogan "Aruba for Arubanos" is rapidly being implemented by the local government despite the defeat (in 1971) of the political party which originated the slogan.

[26]

Year	/Hotel/ Visitors	Cruise Visitors
1958	5,300	10,200
1960	13,100	16,200
1962	12,000	14,500
1964	20,000	16,300
1966	26,400	19,300
1969	52,000	27,300
1970	75,000	44,700
1971	86,000	27,474"

(Investment Information: 8)

[27]Since the 1960s the anti-white hostility displayed by Jamaicans, Virgin Islanders, and Trinidadians has sharply undermined the tourist industry of these islands. The "friendly" and light-skinned Arubans, on the other hand, offer a relaxed, non-threatening background for tourist enjoyment of the "sun-filled beauty of the Caribbean."

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ARUBANS

The stereotypical response of Arubans to questions about their ethnic or racial ancestry is "Indian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch."[1] Whereas the designation "Spanish" refers to their South American (primarily Venezuelan) forebears, "Portuguese" refers to the Sephardic Jews who emigrated from the Iberian peninsula to escape the Spanish Inquisition (Hoetink 1972: 107). Descendants of Sephardic emigrés founded the first European settlements in Curaçao and Aruba.

> The history of Jews in Latin America is the record of two successive and radically different populations. The first community took form shortly after the discovery of the New World. It always lived under adverse conditions and disintegrated long before the end of the colonial era. (Cohen 1971: XV)

This generalization is not applicable to the Curaçaoan Sephardim.[2] The Jews who arrived in Curaçao during the 1650s became the merchants and financiers and "especially in the course of the nineteenth century . . . developed into a Latin-Caribbean cultural aristocracy within the then Dutch colonial setting" (Hoetink foreword, Karner 1969: v).

In 1391 the historical precedent was established for the eventual expulsion of the Jews from Spain:

> . . . vicious anti-Jewish riots engulfed the entire country /Spain and Portugal/. . . . The riots had all the trappings of spontaneity. But like the Russian pogroms nearly half a millenium later, they had been carefully planned by the ruling classes of Spanish society. Troubled by decades of internal disorder and the mounting threat of revolution, these classes cast about for a scapegoat to absorb the discontent of the mob. They found their

> targets in the Jewish community. The riots resulted in the confiscation and destruction of untold property and the death of as many as fifty thousand Jews. (Cohen 1971: XVII)

Church polemics provided the rationale for the initial series of ecclesiastical persecutions: the focus of the religious attack was directed against Jewish implication in the death of Jesus, exacerbated by their recusant refusal to accept Jesus as the Messiah.

> Thus while the Spanish governments were waging their battle to destroy the Jews, the ecclesiastics during the riots and for decades thereafter were striving to draw them to the baptismal font. (Cohen 1971: XVIII)

In 1492 Their Catholic Majesties, Ferdinand and Isabella, offered to their Jewish nationals the alternatives of conversion to Christianity or expulsion from Spain.

> According to Jewish and Christian sources the majority of the exiles, numbering between 100,000 and 120,000 emigrated to Portugal. (France refused to admit the Jews and offered asylum only to conversos who sought admission as Christians.) The remaining exiles, who probably numbered no more than about 50,000 sailed . . . for North Africa or Italy and the East. . . On July 31, 1492 the last (practicing) Jew left the soil of Spain. (Baer 1966: 439)

King Manuel undertook the protection of the newly expanded Portuguese Jewish community. Initially unsuccessful in his effort to persuade the Jews to convert, in 1497 he addressed an assemblage of the Lisbon community and ". . . baptized many by force and declared all of his Jews to be Christians by fiat" (Cohen 1971: XIX). Many of the Jews, whose conversion was based on pressure rather than conviction, continued to practice their traditional rituals in secrecy. Four decades later the introduction into Portugal of an inquisitorial tribunal led to the sentencing of "conversos" as "insincere Christians and Jews at heart" (Cohen 1971: XXIII). The "convicted Jews were permitted to choose between expulsion or death".

Their Catholic Majesties had issued an edict which prohibited "New Christians" from emigrating to the Americas. Charles V later redefined the opprobrium and limited the prohibitions to recent conversos and convicted Judaizers (secret proselytizers of the Law of Moses) and to two generations of their descendants. A like pronouncement from King Manuel, restricting the emigration of New Christians from Portugal, remained in effect into the sixteenth century.

> In 1601, in consideration of the sum of 200,000 ducats, King Philip VII granted the New Christians the right to emigrate freely to any of the colonies of the combined Kingdoms of Spain and Portugal. Though granted irrevocably, the right was withdrawn in 1610. (Cohen 1971: XXXVII)

However, in 1629, the Court reversed its restrictions and again granted permission for Sephardim to emigrate.

Even during the period of total restriction on emigration, some Sephardim left the peninsula. Illegal Jewish exoduses occurred during the few periods of relaxation of customary investigations into the origins and backgrounds of Spanish and Portuguese applicants. The "laissez-faire" attitude toward Neo Christian emigration occurred, according to Cohen (1971), in response to the increasing economic decline of Spain, and the conviction of King Philip that

> . . . it could be at least partially alleviated by an injection of New Christian enterprises in the colonies, particularly the Americas. The fact is that the New Christian immigrants . . . greatly developed the industry and trade of the New World, and soon included some of the wealthiest and most important citizens of both New Spain and Peru. (Cohen 1971: XXVII)

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Iberian-sponsored courts of inquisition were instituted in Mexico and Peru; consequently, the number and influence of Jewish colonists in these colonies were considerably reduced. In Brazil, however, the absence of an inquisitorial tribunal, and the Dutch capture of the Portuguese city of Recife in 1630,

permitted the establishment of a powerful Jewish merchant enclave. The Dutch tradition of religious tolerance extended to the Mexican and Peruvian refugees. Holland Jews emigrated to the new colony to join their "emancipated brethren." By 1645 the Jewish population of Recife equalled the number of Jews in Holland, approximately 1500.

The economic activities of the Brazilian Jews ranged from professionals (doctors, lawyers, architects) to merchants, importers, farmers, and owners of sugar plantations and refining mills, many of which displayed "such un-Jewish names as 'Good Jesus' and 'Our Lady of the Rosary'" (Cohen 1971: LVII). A prominent group of businessmen became bankers and middlemen to the slave trade. "So vital was this function of the Jews to the slavers that slave auctions were not held on the Jewish Sabbath or holy days" (Cohen 1971: LVII).

> In 1654, Dutch capitulation of Recife to the Portuguese led to the evacuation of the town by the Dutch officials and merchants and by the Jewish population, who were carried off in overcrowded vessels to Holland or to other Dutch possessions in the West Indies. (Geyl 1964: 74)

Settlement of the Dutch Antilles officially began in 1659, when twelve Sephardic families arrived from Holland with permission from the Dutch West India Company to initiate an agricultural colony on Curaçao. Jan de Yllan was issued the first permit. When agricultural development proved to be unprofitable (because of the scanty rainfall and relatively infertile soil), Yllan and a few associates began a trade in logwood and horses from Aruba and Bonaire (for shipment to Holland and Venezuela) ". . . which they bought on credit from Lucas Rodenburgh, Vice-Director of Curaçao" (Hartog 1961: Vol. II: 60). In 1664, when news of the growing mercantile profits reached Holland, families and friends of the newly arrived settlers left Amsterdan for Curaçao. "Their better knowledge of

the regional opportunities in trade and their knowledge of the Spanish language, led to their control in the trade mainly directed to the Spanish colonies" (Romer 1969: 24). The Holland Jews were soon joined by Jews from Brazil, Italy, Surinam, and Portugal.

> Soon there were more businessmen than businesses with a consequent sharp decline of the level of profit. The situation became so critical, that in 1736 a rule was passed by the administration in Holland which denied travel permits to poor Jews, fearful that they might become an even greater burden once in Curaçao. This measure managed to consolidate the Sephardic position during the latter half of the eighteenth century, and in general, during these years many Sephardim started laying the foundations of considerable fortunes . . . . (Karner 1969: 29)

> While the Jews of many European countries were subject to numerous trade restrictions, those of Curaçao were free from discriminatory laws. Like the other inhabitants /Dutch/, however, they could not pursue certain occupations, among them the slave trade, which was the exclusive monopoly of the Company. (Emmanuel 1970: 75)

This qualification lasted only until 1674, at which time,unable by its own efforts to achieve its goal of making Curaçao the largest slave center of the Caribbean, the Company relaxed its restrictions and permitted the colonists to enter the slave export trade. Since 1659 Jews had been permitted to purchase slaves to work on the "show" plantations that they had built ". . . not so much out of greed as . . . to show the achieved status level . . . a type of conspicuous consumption seen . . . in the greater Caribbean context, where the planters' economy was in full prosperity" (Römer 1969: 23).

> The slaves employed by Jews were generally treated . . . humanely. A few were even given an education, and they rested completely on Saturdays and on Jewish holidays. . . . Is it surprising that the slave conserved a great respect for this religion which gave them complete rest on at least 64 days of the year? /sic!/ (Emmanuel 1970: 79)

Curaçao, by the mid-seventeenth century, supported a growing population of Dutch nationals, West African slaves, and Sephardic Jews,

together with a much diminished indigenous population. These heterogeneous segments, which characterized the early Curaçaon society, maintained distinct social, religious, economic, and political boundaries. This heterogeneity, according to Karner (1969: 11), facilitated the creation of a powerful Sephardic enclave, occupying a niche which generally has been denied to Jews upon their entry into an already established society.

> They formed a separate enclave, and even underlined this separateness by . . . geographical isolation, settling on the Western side of the island, more specifically in the area close to the harbor which formed a natural barrier between them and the Dutch Protestants. . . . Around 1830, we find that for reasons not obvious, residential sites were changed; the Jews moved to the Eastern sections of the city and the Protestants built their houses on the West shore. (Hoetink 1958: 36)

The social isolation of the Sephardim led to the development of a bilateral, extended family pattern (Karner 1969: 11) which lasted well into the twentieth century. Because the marital choices, considering the relatively small number of unrelated families who formed the original Sephardic settlement, were obviously restricted, the high incidence of cross- and parallel-cousin marriage (still a predominant feature of Arubiano society) has always been characteristic of the Curaçaoan Sephardim.

Evidence of the prevalence of cousin marriage comes from the dowry list of 1849-1880:[3]

Date	Bride	Bridegroom
6/69	Rachel de Elias Jesurun Henriquez	Elias de Daniel Jesurun
7/71	Rachel de Jeosuah Jesurun Henriquez	Jacob Cohen Henriquez
1/73	Esther, sister of Rachel	Mordechay Cohen Henriquez
4/76	Della, " " "	Aron Alveres Correa
12/80	Rebecca de Jeosuah Jesurun Henriquez	Isaac Cohen Henriquez
12/80	Sarah de Elias Jesurun Henriquez	Elias Salomo Levy Maduro

(Emmanuel 1970: 362)

The repetition of this pattern among the early Jewish settlers of Aruba arose from a significantly different set of circumstances, to be discussed later.

The prevalence of the same surnames, e.g., Henriquez, Maduro, Jesurun, also can be connected with the practice of Sephardic masters entering into extra-marital unions with African slaves. In most instances the father not only "recognized" the illegitimate children of these unions; he also gave them his surname and included them in his will.

The Sephardic community rigidly observed Mosaic law. Until the early eighteenth century, group worship was conducted in individual homes; in 1743 Mikve Israel (the oldest synagogue in the Americas) became host to the Sephardic community. Attendance at all religious services was mandatory and discipline was strictly enforced by the elders upon the membership.

> The funeral of a notable Curaçaoan Jew was a noteworthy event. It was attended by hundreds, regarded as an important social event, talked about long afterward. . . . The deceased, if his home was any distance from the one cemetery, was placed in a coffin, then in a special canoe, followed by families and notables in canoes rowed by slaves. . . . During the burial, soil imported from Jerusalem/??/ was placed on the eyes. . . . Immediately after burial "hebrah" (ritual foods) were sent to poor and rich alike--the first meal consisting mainly of hardboiled eggs, eaten while seated on the floor. . . . During the mourning week it was customary for every Jewish member of the community to visit the bereaved family. (Emmanuel 1957: 73)

The "Burial Society" enforced its rulings on rebellious or deviant members by threats to impose the "berakiah" (curse of excommunication). Emmanuel (1957) notes that, in the absence of police authority in the Jewish community, this served as a tremendously powerful disciplinary weapon; the sacraments and a religious burial were denied not only to

the excommunicant but also to those members of his family who died during his lifetime.

Karner (1969) attributes equal importance to the social aspects of the religious observances as unifying and reinforcing mechanisms for the preservation of the separate character of the Sephardic community. Participation of the entire Jewish community was obligatory for individual, family, and communally observed rituals: absence from any ceremony was regarded as an affront to the community as well as to the family. Every birthday, whether of child or adult, required personal recognition in the form of individual payment of homage by every member of the famiya (extended family). On the Sabbath, the oldest male married member of the famiya was the host at a sumptuous luncheon, and on Sunday, the Christian Sabbath, kinsmen gathered to discuss the business and social events of the past week. This ". . . inward focusing made these early generations extremely conscious of the familial ties, both in longitudinal and horizontal lines" (Karner 1969: 22).

In addition to the self-imposed residential barriers,

> . . . religion, in-group marriage, and in-group social actions, the social-cultural aloofness of the Sephardics was further deepened by the difference in language between the Jews of Iberian origins and the Protestants from Holland, a difference which had continued to exist since the beginning of their co-settlement in Curaçao. (Karner 1969: 24)

Although Dutch had been the official language of Curaçao from the inception of settlement in 1634, it was not the preferred language for the Sephardim. They continued to speak Spanish and Portuguese, which, together with their use of Papiamentu (the creolized idiom of the Antilles), further ensured their isolation from the Dutch community. Sephardic boys received their primary education in "public" (Dutch government) as well

as parochial schools (first Midrasj," then"Jesivah" academy). Even in the public schools, however, separatism was maintained; the government schools offered a Dutch curriculum and language, and were attended by Protestants; others, jointly maintained by the government and the Roman Catholic Church, offered Portuguese, Spanish, English, and French studies. The latter were attended by the Sephardic youths.

The chief economic concerns of the Sephardim, shipping, banking, law, and medicine, did not bring them into active competition with the Dutch, who continued to control the administrative, legislative, artisan, and small-scale merchant activities. Although some of the wealthier Jews continued to build lavish plantations into the nineteenth century, they did so not for the purpose of acquiring additional income from agriculture but to "advertise" their prestige and status. The often intimate relationship between plantation master and slave resulted in substantial benefits to the Sephardic merchants who employed "house" slaves in their urban businesses. Even after slavery was abolished, the "compadrazgo" system continued to provide economic advantages to the merchants, who received, in return for their godparental protection, trustworthy as well as free labor (Karner 1969: 24).

The Sephardic segment maintained its isolation from the Dutch Community into the twentieth century. Although by the end of the eighteenth century the large Protestant Dutch segment had divided into "Higher" and "Lower" groups, the latter holding the artisan and small business position, the former occupying the administrative and legislative positions, this separation occasioned no change in Protestant-Sephardic relations. The Sephardim refrained from social contact with both groups. The lower class Protestant males intermarried with South

American immigrants and with former slaves, the offspring adopting the Roman Catholic religion of their mothers. This group came to constitute the "Ladinoized" segment which presently represents 90% of the total society; but, because the Jewish merchants were involved in the more lucrative enterprises, the rapidly increasing lower segment presented no economic threat to them. Despite the absence of direct economic competition between the Sephardim and the Higher Protestants, an ever-widening social breach separated them. Each group considered itself to be "superior" in culture, tradition, and status, so that even into the twentieth century the groups have ". . . vied for first place in the segmented structure of Curaçao" (Karner 1969: 33).

By the middle of the nineteenth century the Sephardim became actively involved in the Colonial Council and in the Legislative Staten. Since then the names of Henriquez, Jesurun, and Maduro have figured prominently as legislators, administrators, and diplomats; Jews have also served as Attorney General (second in rank to the Governor General) and in the Consular Service--this despite the fact that the Sephardim currently represent only 1.1 percent of the total population.[4]

The Curaçaoan Sephardim still maintain a dmoinant position in the Island's society; their superordinate social, political, and economic status there has been acknowledged by my Aruban and Curaçaoan informants who are also aware that the political clout of the Sephardim is a significant factor to the welfare of all of the people of the Netherlands Antilles. In its development, this elite segment provides a dramatic contrast with those of their kin who formed the nucleus of the first European settlement in Aruba.

For while the Sephardim of Curaçao retained their religious identity,and remained aloof from social participation with the Protestant Dutch colonial administrators and the bourgeoisie, the circumstances surrounding the early settlement of Aruba precluded the duplication of this pluralistic pattern in Aruba. Notwithstanding the similar juxtaposition of Protestant Dutch, Sephardic Jew, Arawak Indian, and African slave, the first settlers in Aruba did not maintain their separate structures.

Here, the factors that were significant to the early assimilation of the disparate religious, cultural, and racial segments, derive from the different demographic conditions that attended the introduction of colonial settlement.

Although the island of Curaçao boasted a thriving and growing population by the end of the eighteenth century, its sister island, Aruba, only thirty-five miles to the northwest, remained virtually uninhabited.

In 1754 representatives of the Dutch West India Company, discouraged by the "burden" of this non-productive island, determined to promote a more self-sufficient status for Aruba. To initiate the settlement of the island by "European" colonists, the Company granted a parcel of land to a Curaçaoan Sephard, Moses de Salomo Levy Maduro. The grant was accompanied by "conditions" which prohibited him from owning cattle, selling any part of his land, and from engaging in any commercial enterprise. The Company also sought to ensure, by demanding an oath of fealty from the grantee, absolute loyalty and obedience to the Island Commander.[5]

Within a few years of his arrival on the island, Maduro realized that he could not produce enough food to sustain his family of six children; he petitioned and received permission from the Company to own and raise goats (Emmanuel 1970: 529). By 1790 several other Curaçaoan Jews had received Company grants of parcels of land on Aruba. The newly established Sephardic community included the names of the Henriquez, Marchena, Maduro, and Curiel branches of Curaçaoan Sephardic families.[6]

> Between 1816 and 1826 the Jewish population fluctuated between nineteen and thirty-one souls, as follows:
>
> | | |
> |---|---|
> | 1816 | 19 |
> | 1820 | 22 |
> | 1822 | 28 |
> | 1824 | 31 |
> | 1826 | 31 (Emmanual 1970: 530) |

Emmanuel then states, with no explanation, that between 1871 and 1929 the Jewish population varied between one and five.

Given Karner's assertion (1969: 14) that ". . . despite high infant mortality, the number of offspring per nuclear family was very large, an average of 6.2 with up to 8-12 children," the lack of growth of the Aruban Sephardic population is at first sight puzzling. However, Karner's explanation for the diminution of the Curaçaoan Sephardic population during the nineteenth century indirectly provides the reason for the decrease of Sephardic identity in Aruba:

> . . . due to poor business conditions, young men of marriageable age were forced to migrate from Curaçao and permanently settle abroad. There they might marry foreign women. . . . The fact that it was male members of the Sephardic segment who formed part of the foreign "satellite" communities, led to the perpetuation of the Sephardic family names in countries other than Curaçao. Offspring of the mixed marriages which were contracted in these, primarily Latin, countries carried their father's surname, thereby ensuring the continuity of a recognizable enclave. . . . Another interesting development during this time was the fact that since a number of the marriages contracted abroad were in Latin, hence Catholic, countries, the children resulting from these unions generally were brought up in the mother's Catholic faith. More precisely, in a

> marriage between a Sephardic male and a Catholic female, the offspring, especially if the couple was wed in church by dispensation, followed the religion of their mother, at the same time carrying the typically Jewish name of their father. (Karner 1969: 14-15) 14-15)

Curaçaoan Sephardic males whose business interests necessitated prolonged absences from the island often returned to Curaçao with Roman Catholic fiancees. The Sephardic community would offer conditional acceptance to the girl, demanding religious study and conversion to Judaism prior to her incorporation into the famiya bosom. Because the Roman Catholic church in Curaçao refused to perform a marriage ceremony between a Sephard and a Catholic, the girl had no alternative but to embrace the Jewish faith.

The situation in Aruba, however, was different. Here, the Sephardic immigrants did not establish a religious community. For many years the bodies of Jews who died on the island were shipped back to Curaçao for burial. Marriages between Sephardic males and Roman Catholic (primarily Indian) females could only be performed by ". . . reluctant visiting priests" (Hartog 1961: 116). If no Catholic priest was on the island, a Dutch Protestant minister there might perform the marriage ceremony; in many instances the unions were never "solemnized." The issue of these unions, however, were recognized by the Roman Catholic church; and visiting priests baptized the children with the name of the father. Thus, because it was rare for an emigrating Sephard to bring a bride with him, or to return to Curaçao for a wife (likely to be a cross or parallel cousin), within one or two generations the same surnames of Maduro, Henriquez, and Curiel represented a predominantly Roman Catholic population of Iberian, South American, Indian, and African admixture.

My Ashkenazic (Eastern European Jews) informants offered an additional explanation for the rapid transition from Curaçaoan Sephard to Aruban Roman Catholic:

> The Sephardic men who left Curaçao for Aruba were surely not the first sons of the family, so they weren't entitled, according to Mosaic laws of primogeniture, to become the chief inheritors of the father's estate. So, because these 'second sons' had no stake in the family's fortunes they would be more inclined to flout the religious and social traditions of their relatives in Curaçao. . . . And besides, they /the Aruban Sephardim/ were probably all illegitimate anyhow . . . you should pardon me, bastards!

Within two generations of the first settlement, the "founding families" also included some Protestant Dutch admixture. For although during the early days of "white" settlement in Aruba, the Dutch West India Company restricted land grant licenses to the aforementioned Curaçaoan Sephardic "farmers," some Dutch settlement also transpired. This occurred because of the option taken by many of the Company Commanders

> . . . to stay on in Aruba (engaged in trade rather than farming) after their term of office. Through this they do not only become progenitors of (some) of the oldest Aruban families, but their children, born and bred here, automatically become the persons marked out for Aruba's highest office. Thus arise the well-known commander's families, who often were interrelated. (Hartog 1961: 72)

By the end of the eighteenth century, intermarriage was commonplace--between Dutch, Sephardim, Indian, and African. Although the Arubianos assert that their "white" ancestry sets them apart from the predominantly black Curaçaoan population, nevertheless

> . . . at all periods the mixture of the various racial elements on Aruba went on. Of the whites arriving here only a few blended at first with the native Indian population. In the long run, however, even the most prominent families, but for a very few exceptions, absorbed Indian blood. . . . In 1806 (from the records of Commander Van den Broek) of the total population . . . of 1,546 . . . there are 256 heads of families on Aruba, namely 60 whites, 141 Indians, 10 mulattos, 35 (lighter skinned admixtures) and 7 negro-family heads. . . .

> Owing to this continuing process pure descendants of whites were soon to disappear altogether. In 1868 their number . . . amounted to no more than one and one half percent of the population. The "lower classes" blended at a far greater rate. (Hartog 1961: 111)

Thus, within two generations (or approximately fifty years) of initial settlement, the Arubiano segment was formed. Despite Hartog's reference to "lower classes," the small and intermixed population of the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries can hardly be classified as rigidly stratified. Access to economic, social, or political positions of importance in this minimally exploited colonial society was so limited that a stratified class structure, except for the separate status of the Commander's family, seems unlikely.

Similarly to the Curaçaoan Sephardic preference for cousin marriage, this pattern has continued for the offspring of the Arubianos. A young Arubiano man told me:

> It's not for religious reasons since most of the island is Roman Catholic anyway. It's probably because we see each other all the time while we're growing up. It's sort of expected that whoever we date, when we're ready to marry it'll be one of our cousins.

This endogamous pattern for the nineteenth century, however, derived more from the ecological limits of the desert island, than from individual or family preference. Until cattle-breeding, aloe production, and gold-mining became profitable inducements for further immigration, the island's resources could barely support the small group of settlers of the mid-eighteenth century. The marital choices of their descendants, therefore, were limited to the cousins who bore the previously mentioned surnames.

When, during the middle of the nineteenth century, the few natural and mineral resources that could be exploited for profit attracted

the attention of merchants in Holland and underemployed workers in southern European and northern South America, small numbers of immigrants came to live and work in Aruba; they generally settled near the mining towns or the processing plants. Until the entry of oil refining operations plunged the island into "instant industrialization," these two groups, the "white" descendants of the "founding families" (Arubiano) and the nineteenth century immigrants (Arubano--many of whom intermarried with the "lower-class," predominantly Indian, black, and mulatto offspring of the first settlers) constituted the "native population" referred to throughout this study as Aruban.

Green (1969), in her study of the voluntary associations in Aruba, comments on the slight differences between these early groups:

> /There are/ . . . several "shades", if not actually varieties, of "real" Aruban culture: (1) that of the "Top Ten" i.e., the old wealthy /not necessarily/ families with their connections with Holland, Curaçao and mainland South America; (2) that of . . . Oranjestad, or the "city" dwellers generally; (3) that of Savaneta which was formerly the island capital where the European settled. As a result, the preponderance of European genes shows up very clearly in this area, and other Arubans accuse . . . /them/ of having a superior attitude; (4) that of Santa Cruz and its environs, an area rich in aboriginal finds, which is considered one of the strongholds of the conservative "real" Aruban. Here one finds European, Mestizo, as well as a large number of Indian phenotypes. . . . Earlier there were vocabulary variations as well as slight differences in dress and customs between some of the island communities. . . . When the Santa Cruz girls were wearing elbow length sleeves, the Savaneta girls were wearing short sleeves. In the more isolated areas there were even strong feelings against outsiders, not necessarily non-Arubans, particularly against those potential suitors of the locality. (Green 1969: 68)

I asked several doctors (the Surinamer town doctors, the Dutch doctors at the Lago clinic, and the Dutch government psychiatrist) whether they had observed any deleterious consequences of over two centuries of Aruban interbreeding. They generally agreed (although never acknowledging awareness of the Arubiano/Arubano distinction) that the

"native" population supports a high incidence of diabetes, club foot, obstructive eye flap, and a marked "emotional dependence" for the adolescent and adult men (on their mothers and, later, on their wives).

Informants' descriptions of the "ideal" Arubiano phenotype include: "light to white" skin, sparse freckles, hazel eyes, light brown to auburn hair, pronounced cheekbones, small boned frame, medium height.[7] As most of the Arubans are medium-brown skinned, dark eyed, and dark haired, it appears that the majority of Arubans fall into the Arubano category.

The Aruban personality is characterized by outside observers as shy, retiring, passive, dependent, friendly, and gentle. They tend to be

> . . . family oriented . . . in fact family dependent . . . The Aruban customs are an interesting blend of Dutch, American and Latin patterns. The modified machismo complex seems to exist; males must be "potente", and men are frequently found out carousing together. The Arubans are generally quiet, peaceful people; However, under the influence of alcohol, many become violent and during these occasions begin fights and arguments even with their best friends. . . .
>
> Another of their more Latin traits is the close chaperoning of women. Even now in the more conservative sections of the island, parents accompany their daughters to the various dances. . . . /Women/ once married, were to devote their attention to home and the family which was traditionally large; the rearing of a large number of children attested to her value and the potency of the husband. The latter, however, was able to go out whenever he pleased, incurring community displeasure only if he failed to take adequate financial care of his home and family.[8]
>
> One of the definitely non-Latin traits . . . is that men help with certain household chores . . . and they frequently serve their guests at parties. Another is the apparent absence of any shame over the exposure of the body. Men of all classes may work around their homes in shorts without . . . feeling the need to put on a shirt in front of their immediate friends and neighbors. Women sweep off porches and yards in their shorty nightgowns. (Green 1969: 72-73)

Generally, the Arubanos constitute the lower-class workers and middle-class bourgeoisie. Although most of the Arubianos are also in

the lower to middle economic levels, a few "extended families" hold the dominant "status" positions in the "autonomous" government offices, in banking and commercial enterprises, with branches in Curaçao and Venezuela. As a group then the Arubianos do not occupy the highest rung of the economic hierarchy; they are, however, (regardless of economic status) the social and political elite.[9]

The twentieth century transition from cunucu subsistence farming to urban employment has not, to date, eradicated the rural lifestyle for many Arubiano and Arubano families. Their activities outside working hours still tend to center around the family and close friends. Socializing with non-Arubans is still minimal, except for Friday and Saturday night "drinking with friends"--an accepted euphemism for weekly visits of the men to the crib saloons of St. Nicholas.

Adolescent Aruban females have recently broken with the protective tradition which precluded their participation in secondary schooling and urban employment. Although many families state that their daughters' financial contributions are essential to the household budget, parents express wistful resignation and sadness about their unmarried daughters' "liberated" status. Young males, on the other hand, who (according to Green 1969: 72) were traditionally expected to be "wild" and were at the age of 13 or 14 introduced to the "machismo" pattern of excessive drinking of rum and whiskey and to "womanizing," have experienced minimal alterations in attitudes and behavior. Reports from the psychiatrist and from island doctors indicate that the inordinately high rate of alcoholism for the native population is not declining. "Crimes of violence" are said to be "directly related to alcoholism which

"releases the inhibitions of these ordinarily gentle and passive men" (Government psychiatrist: 1973).

Within the past two years the interests of the lower- and middle-class Arubano and Arubiano people have merged sufficiently to encourage them to act in unison in the Central Government elections of 1973. Except for the small group of wealthy and influential Arubianos who generally reside within the district of Oranjestad, the great majority of Arubans switched their allegiance from the "establishment"-oriented Aruban Patriots Party (PPA) to the nationalistic People's Movement for Separation (MEP) party. The candidate who received the largest popular vote is a phenotypically "ideal" Arubiano, Bettico Croes. His departure from the status quo philosophy of the PPA, while it alienated the élite group who are very much tied to the banking, commercial, and political interests of the Central Government in Curaçao, nevertheless attracted an overwhelming number of the lower and middle-upper classes who increasingly resent their dependence on "outside" interests. The MEP call for "Status Aparte" had the overt function of appealing to the national resentment against the "blacks in Curaçao who are exploiting the people of this island." The covert, and probably more emotionally satisfying, appeal was directed against the economic competitors (West Indians) and the "foreign" merchants. Excerpts from the district results of the summer elections reveal the voting patterns of national district residents.

	1971		1973	
	PPA	MEP	PPA	MEP
Oranjestad	2,431	1,276	2,769	3,077
Noord	724	998	595	1,825
Santa Cruz	737	989	546	1,576
Savaneta	601	429	1,033	1,033
St. Nicholas	3,075	750	3,251	1,462

(The Local, August 9, 1973)

Oranjestad: predominantly elite Arubiano (upper-middle and upper class)
European (Dutch and Ashkenazic families)
middle-and lower-class Arubano

Noord: predominantly Arubano and rural Arubiano--mostly rural but some workers commute to Lago and to town jobs

Santa Cruz: almost entirely Arubano and Arubiano cunucu dwellers, many of whom also are employed in St. Nicholas and by Lago

Savaneta: formerly Arubano, but since the last decade also the residence for many West Indian lower-middle-class families and Chinese merchant families

St. Nicholas: area of largest "imported" population of West Indians, Colombians, and Venezuelans

A comparison of the voting patterns of 1971 and 1973 provides the clearest evidence that the support for Status Aparte came from the lower- and middle-class Aruban districts. For the St. Nicholas residents, recognition that the MEP slogan covertly included hostile intentions toward all non-nationals persuaded the large majority of "foreigners" to vote for the party that held a status quo platform. Apparently, then, whatever social distinctions once separated the majority of Arubianos from the Arubanos are submerged in the mutually nationalistic sentiments of the "native" society. An MEP party official told me, "It is now us /Arubiano and Arubano/ against them /West Indians, Jews, and Chinese and their children (di Aruba)/."

The specific factors that are relevant to the present antagonism Arubans express toward the non-national groups will be addressed in the ensuing chapters. Each segment will be discussed in its historical context and in the particularistic and institutional relationships of the group vis-à-vis the national segment.

NOTES

[1]During my three periods of fieldwork investigation, I have met, visited, and questioned over one hundred Arubans. Not one person acknowledged the presence of "black" ancestors when recounting the "Indian, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese" ancestral backgrounds of the first settlers.

[2]Hebrew term meaning "of Spain, after Sefarad . . . formerly believed to have been situated on the Iberian peninsula" (Hartog 1961: 1023).

[3]The Cohen and Levy prefixed surnames were "restorations," resumed by the Sephardim after their settlement in the Americas.

[4]"The Jesurun family, for example, represented Great Britain as consuls from 1857 to 1920, the consulship passing from father to son. The Maduro family has represented the Republic of France for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. . . . /At present/ of the 32 countries now having consulates in Curaçao, 19 are represented by Curaçaoan Jews" (Emmanuel 1970: 488).

[5]The details of the oath demanded by the Dutch West India Company appear on page 33.

[6]These surnames are retained by over two hundred families in Aruba. On the basis of census estimates of an average of six members per family, these four surnames alone represent over twelve hundred of Aruba's thirty thousand "native Arubans."

[7]Most Aruban adult males are heavily-jowled and paunchy. They profess a distinct preference for solid fleshiness for their mates ("something to hold on to"). The typical response to questions about their (extra-marital "girlfriends" was, "Oh, that's different . . . she must be slim, straight, graceful, and beautiful . . . you know our Aruban girls. . . ." This was invariably accompanied by explicitly expressive gestures. (By graceful, Arubans refer to the unusual and attractive walk of the Aruban female--which involves a gentle rocking of the pelvic girdle, in contrast to the familiar side to side hip movement.)

[8]I believe this to be a relatively recent development. In the chapter on the Power Elite I will discuss the influence of Lago practices on Aruban family relationships.

[9]By political, I refer to the Arubiano dominance in the local government structures. Since the "white" Dutch have given over (along with the granting of autonomy in 1952) their government positions to the Arubianos, most of the island residents concede hegemonic status to the Arubiano government officials. However, as these officials are thus far powerless to initiate significant policy decisions and strategies, my more sophisticated informants agree with me that the Lago executives, the policy makers who, in effect, determine the destinies of the resident population, are the true political (more specifically power) élite.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ASHKENAZIM

Historical Background

> Three branches of European Jewry, differing from one another in language, ritual, and many other aspects of culture, have contributed to the Jewish population /of the New World/. The earliest . . . is the Iberian branch, known as the Sephardim. . . . The others are from Germany and Eastern Europe (Ashkenazim). . . .
>
> It is thought that the Jews gain their unity from the Jewish religion, and the associated culture traits, such as food laws, rites of passage, holidays, and the ethical values of Judaism. But throughout their long history the Jews have undergone a considerable amount of cultural differentiation. Despite the continuity of a core of scriptural beliefs and attitudes, Jewish values and patterns of behavior have always been subject to the influences of the different and sometimes sharply contrasting social milieu in which they have settled. (Wagley and Harris 1958: 204, 206)

The shibboleth of "Jewish unity" is chimerical, or at least obfuscatory, if we employ Webster's definition of unity as "the cohesive oneness of a complex or organic whole." A significant body of Jewish folk literature (see, for example, Sholom Aleichem 1912, Helene Frank 1912) includes acerbating cavils, if not reductionist ridicule, directed against the "other" branches of Jewry, and similar (albeit tempered) criticism of the critics' own groups.

Drawing upon my 1969 to 1974 data on the Ashkenazic segment of Aruban society, I suggest that Jewish "unity" there is a temporary response to external politico-economic pressures. I offer, as supportive evidence, my observations of the responses of Jewish groups to specific social, economic, and political events in the Netherlands Antilles. I propose

that the unified response is a contingently adaptive, protective mechanism and that alternations of relaxation and reinstitution of ethnic boundaries coincide with the fluctuations of political policy in the society at large.

A brief synopsis of European Jewish political and socio-economic history provides the explanatory precedents for the inter- and intra-group relationships of the contemporary Ashkenazic segment in Aruba. The following quotations from my Ashkenazic informants will subsequently be elaborated in the context of their relevance to group boundary maintenance. I cite them here to illustrate the attitudes of these Ashkenazim toward fellow Jews.

In response to my question about the omission of any census reference to Sephardic Jews, I received the following response:

> Maybe there /Curaçao/ but not here. . . . Here there are no Jews but us /from Russia/Poland and Germany/. If they ever <u>were</u> Jews they forgot . . . and what kind of Jews anyway? Sephardim aren't real Jews, they're Orientals!

In explanation of the reinstitution of Ashkenazic solidarity in response to the 1969 Curaçao riots:

> We agreed that there was nothing to be gained from "leaking" our worries to the outsiders. You know we never really got along before . . . not even among ourselves. . . . It had to take something like this to stop the in-fighting!

<u>Western European Jews</u>

According to Wagley and Harris (1958):

> The Jews from Germany came from ghettos. The European ghetto was at first a voluntary corporate city-within-a-city designed to protect Jews, and was established at their own behest. Gradually, however, it assumed the character of an instrument of oppression. (Wagley and Harris 1958: 205)

Lowenthal (1939) injects an "inside" view of Jewish feelings about the "voluntary" nature of the ghetto establishment:

> It is true, the ancient and early-medieval Jew elected to live, like other distinct racial and economic classes, in a quarter of his own. . . . The social requirements of Judaism--the daily use of the synagogue, the need for a special bakery, slaughter-house, bath, court of justice, and cemetery--rendered it almost inevitable. . . . It is likewise true that the segregated Jewry with its gates and police and massed population served as a protective device, a defense against the outer enemy and a preservative of the inner life. But neither a romance nor utility can obliterate the difference between a Jewry and a ghetto--a home and a prison. . . . It was the compulsion which stung, and which turned the Jewry lane into what the Church meant it to be, a habitation of cruelty, whose doors closed on houses of darkness. . . .
>
> /During the 14th century/ the first compulsory ghetto was decreed by the Synod of Breslaw "to prevent the Christians from falling under the influence of Judaism." (Lowenthal 1939: 93)

Wirth's observation, "The ghetto is not only a physical fact, it is also a state of mind"(Wirth 1928:8), is particularly relevant to the responses of the Ashkenazim in Aruba to outside pressures.

In eighteenth century Germany the transition from"protective" to "oppressive" ghetto confinement occurred in direct response to Christian usurpation of the Jewish merchant and craft guilds. A 1781 monograph describes mid-eighteenth-century government policy with regard to Jewish participation in the economy:

> Agriculture, our chief occupation, is forbidden to them. Every craft and trades guild would feel itself dishonored if it admitted a circumscised worker to its ranks. The few available professions are surveying, natural science, and medicine--and these only to men of exceptional talent under the favor of an exceptional prince. Nothing, consequently, is left to this unfortunate people but commerce. Yet in commerce itself they are handicapped by stringent restrictions and onerous taxes, so that none but a lucky few can rise to become wholesalers. For the most part they remain tied to peddling and petty trade, and even then under trammels and prohibitions which allow them but the barest livelihood. The profits are so meager they attract only the poor wretch who must choose misery or death. (Dohm 1781, quoted in Lowenthal 1939: 210)

Wagley and Harris (1958) state that after the replacement of Jews by Christians in the merchant and craft guilds, "Jews were confined by law to a narrowing sphere of occupations such as usury, pawnbroking, and the sale of secondhand goods. The became in effect a guild of money-lenders" (Wagley and Harris 1958: 205, emphasis added). The might better have said remained, as Jewish participation in money-lending activities was hardly a new occupation for them. By the end of the eleventh century increased European involvement in mercantilist commerce stimulated a proliferating demand for liquid capital. Canon law, which forbade Christians from exacting interest from co-religionists (Talmudic law includes similar proscriptions), promoted Jewish dominance as money-lenders to Christian merchants.

The statement that ". . . many Jews, despite prejudice, discrimination, and segregation, rose to positions of great wealth" (Wagley and Harris 1958: 205, emphasis added) by mid-eighteenth century is contradicted by Marcus' (1934) evaluation of Jewish economic participation in Germany. The 1815 occupational breakdown of the Jewish enclave (which comprised no more than 1.20% of the total German population) shows:

Bankers, manufacturers and large scale traders	2.0%	
Medium traders	8.	
Petty traders	40	
Peddlers	20	(Marcus 1934: 106)

Into the middle of the nineteenth century, and except for brief periods of relaxation by German governments of occupational restrictions (in response to the "liberal" vibrations from Napoleonic Western Europe, and during the first decades of the building of the Second Reich),

> On the whole they were barred--in progressive degree as time and anti-Semitism went on--from all government and allied services; and they were shut out, likewise in progressive measure as monopoly and state capitalism developed, from big business and key industries.

> By and large, they were barred by their own background--training, interests, and connections--from field, forest, and mine; from common labor in industry and, though to a lesser extent, from skilled labor in most crafts.
>
> As a result, they chiefly engaged in commerce and private banking, as owners and employees; in comparatively small manufactures and independent craft, particularly in the textile and garment industry; and, for their intellectuals, in the "free" arts and professions such as literature, drama, journalism, music, beaux arts, pure science, medicine and law--everywhere that individual merits or capital could provide a career. (Lowenthal 1939: 271)

In 1871 the German Jews were "legally" emancipated. With unification of the several states into the German Confederation (the "second" Reich), William I and Bismarck signed an edict wherein ". . . All hitherto existing restrictions of civil and political rights, based on religious differences, are hereby abolished" (Lowenthal 1939: 262). The formal abolition of the ghetto and the granting of the rights of citizenship did not, however, insure "equal status."

> In 1873, partly as a result of . . . speculation and partly in consequence of a world-crisis, the Great Panic ruined not only the speculators but a large portion of the population. It was Germany's first taste of modern capitalism on a decent scale.[17]
>
> The Jews were immediately accused of the disaster. As the depression continued, a flood of books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles made increasingly clear that the Jews were considered a race and damned as such. Passing from literature to politics, the movement created an anti-Semitic party; and passing from politics to action, it culminated in boycotts, riots, and looting in 1881. (Lowenthal 1939: 265)

Encouraged by the promises if not by the reality of their "emancipation," many of the more acculturated and secular German Jews severed their remaining ties with the Orthodox tradition by intermarrying with German nationals.

> Between 1906 and 1930 /Intermarriage/ amounted to 27% of all marriages in which Jews were concerned; and mixed marriages generally resulted in 80% of the offspring being lost to Jewry. It would appear that if the Nazis had waited a bit, there would have been no "pure" Jews to torment them. (Lowenthan 1939: 270)

Led by Abraham Geiger, a group of radical intellectuals formed a splinter "Liberal" sect (the forerunner of the American Reform sect) which "emphasized the prophetic and universalistic, rather than the separatistic phase of Jewish Life" (Marcus 1934: 196). A second faction, under the leadership of Zecharias Frankel, who felt that ". . . the Liberals had gone too far" (Lowenthal 1939: 196), but that traditional Orthodoxy was too rigid to be relevant to the newly "enlightened" German environment, formed the Conservative sect.

> The extremely orthodox Jews (whose leader was Samuel Raphael Hirsch) did not wish to be affiliated with the Liberals and Conservatives. They felt no community of religious interest with any Jews who were not thoroughly Orthodox, and, as an act of self-preservation, they appealed to the state to permit them to secede from the Gemeinde (Jewish Community).
>
> In 1876 they created their own Secessionist Community. . . . Their secession was a blow to the concept of unity upon which German Jews had laid so much emphasis. (Marcus 1934: 197)

The inter-group antagonisms provoked by the fission into three distinct religious units remain an exacerbant to the sporadic attempts to "re-unify" world Jewry.[2] Indeed, viewed historically, the sole united stand of the three sects of German Jewry was expressed in their resentment of the Eastern European Jews.

> Even since the Cossack massacres of 1648 /Polish and Russian/ Eastern Jews have drifted into Germany. . . . The German state has always objected to these immigrants because they were poor and uncouth. This prejudice is . . . shared by the German Jews themselves who use the term Ostjude (Eastern Jew) as one of reproach. (Marcus 1934: 200)

While the Liberal and Conservative German Jews eagerly welcomed the government's offer of secular education for Jewish children, the Orthodox Jews resisted acculturating attempts to divert them from their traditional devotion to religious study.

> Every community of ten men or more had a synagogue, every synagogue its school, and with few exceptions every /male/ child sat in

> its benches. Moreover, schooling seldom ceased with childhood. Throughout a man's life he spent on his books every hour he could snatch from work or sleep. . . . /T/he purpose of this learning, the endless question and debate, was not, like scholasticism, the discovery of abstract truth. The letters the Jew pored over he lived by.
>
> Men began to yield to the insidious delight of considering /learning/ an end in itself. The hours devoted to it lengthened until they consumed a man's whole life, leaving the wives and daughters to earn the daily bread. Nay, the Jewess spurred her son and husband on to study much as the Christian woman spurred her man to fight. /sic!/ . . . /Since the 17th century/ this discipline, when carried to Slavic lands, became the backbone of European Jewry. (Lowenthal 1939: 109)

By the end of World War I, a political issue further widened the Liberal-Orthodox schism.

> The problem now became not Liberalism versus Orthodox but Zionism versus anti-Zionism; this "nationalistic" struggle was far more bitter than the religious conflict had ever been. . . . /The Liberals favored/ a religious development in consonance with the spirit of modernism. It is opposed in principle to the parochial schools and is an uncompromising opponent of Zionistic "separatism" . . .
>
> /T/he Zionistic Jewish People's Party (whose main adherents came from the Orthodox camp) wishes to change the basis of the Gemeinde from a religious to /a/ racial one. It believes that it is the ethnic rather than the religious tie that holds Jews together. . . . The People's Party also favors a parochial school system through which Zionist ideology may be impressed on the younger generation. It stresses the close bond between all Jews in all lands and wishes to pledge the material resources of German Jewry to the material rebuilding of Palestine. It is (in theory) very sympathetic to the needs and problems of the East European Jews in Germany. (Lowenthal 1939: 199)

When the initially enlightened policies of the Bismarck regime reverted to "hard-line" covert and overt anti-Semitic restrictions, some 50,000 German Jews (mostly disillusioned Liberals) left Germany for the United States. By 1930 an additional 25,000 German Jews had joined their Americanized brethren. In 1935 the remaining half-million German Jews (.9% of the total German population) faced "economic boycott" (Lowenthal 1939: 398), then "final liquidation" by the masters of the Third Reich.

Eastern European Jews

> In spite of growing intolerance, the position of the Jews in Russia until about the sixteenth century was much better than that of their West European brothers, whose legal status was that of servi camerae (property of the King). The Jews of Russia were free men. They were members of the city merchant class and enjoyed liberty of worship even after the Russian state was converted to Christianity. During the Middle Ages, when there were Jewish ghettos in other parts of Europe, there was no segregation of Jews in Russia. (Greenberg 1944: 4)

> During the Crusades, beginning with the first in 1096, a steady stream of Jews who found themselves persecuted in the provinces of the Danube and the Rhine began to find their way to Poland. . . .
> From their German brethren the Jews of Poland received their communal organization, their religious culture, and their language, which was a German dialect interspersed with Hebrew and Polish expressions and forms which gradually developed into what is known at the present time as Yiddish. . . . The special relationship to the ruler, the hostility of the Church, and the partial local autonomy of the Jewish communities were transferred from the West to the East almost in their entirety. In Lithuania, however, the Jews /had/ enjoyed a great deal more autonomy and tolerance than in Poland. This accounts for the superior status which the Lithuanian Jews have maintained to the present day as over . . . the rest of Eastern European Jewry. (Wirth 1928: 90)

In contrast to the traditionally urban pattern of residence and economic involvement of the German Jew, the Polish Jews, into the mid-eighteenth century, were free to engage in village agricultural pursuits and in town trading and money-lending activities.

> They engaged in the trades, handicrafts, and many other economic functions, including the leasing of crown and Shlakhta (landed nobility) estates, with the right of propination (distillation and selling spiritous liquors), which they continued to exercise on behalf of nobles even after the partition of Poland. The Jews were also the leading tax-farmers of the country . . . favored by royalty and . . . by the big Shlakhta estate owners, and opposed by the clergy and their burghers. (Wirth 1928:90)

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the formerly small-scale and intermittent anti-Jewish pogroms (defined by Webster as organized massacres) instigated by local peasant and Cossak units, had grown into Church-directed "uninterrupted massacres of Jews" (Wirth 1928: 91).

In 1762 Catherine II, concerned about the increasingly inflammatory Church castigations of the "Judaizing heretics," issued a manifesto which halted further Jewish immigration. Her initial efforts to "control" the Jewish population failed: from 1772 to 1795, as a result of the partitions of Poland and Lithuania, Russia "inherited" nine hundred thousand Jews. Catherine's 1772 proclamation to the newly acquired provinces

> . . . made a distinction between the Jewish and non-Jewish subjects. The latter were promised that they could exercise the rights they had enjoyed under their former government throughout the Russian Empire. The locale in which the Jews could exercise their former rights was specifically limited to the territory in which they were living at the time of the partition. (Greenberg 1944: 8)

The restriction of Jewish residence to limited areas (the Jewish Pale)[3] ushered in a series of oppressive and discriminatory edicts, designed to exclude Jews from participation in public life, and to "close" most occupations and secular education to them.

During the early years of the nineteenth century, Alexander I attempted to ameliorate some of the restrictions. Jews were now encouraged to send their children to any schools within the Russian Empire, and to engage again in agricultural activities. In 1827, however, these "inducements" were largely offset by his "edict of Conscription and Military Service," whereby

> . . . in addition to supplying recruits for the army to serve a term of twenty-five years, Jews also had to produce cantonists (juvenile conscripts) from the ages of twelve to twenty-five. The Jewish communities were charged with the duty of filling the required quota of recruits. In case of failure the community elders were liable to severe punishment and even to military service. (Greenberg 1944: 10)

Disheartened by the oppressive nature of the edict of conscription, most Jews resisted the "generous" offer of secular education for their children. Their suspicion that a desire for their conversion to Christianity motivated Alexander's offer was well-founded; a confidential

rescript addressed to the Minister of Public Instruction "leaked" out to the Jewish communities via a "Jewish sympathizer." The public ukase (enactment) bespoke the government's desire to incorporate religious and secular teachings, but

> . . . in the secret rescript the tone was altogether different. There it was stated that "the aim pursued in the training of the Jews is that of bringing them nearer to the Christian population by eradicating the prejudices fostered in them by the study of the Talmud"; that with the opening of the new schools the old ones were to be closed down . . . that attendance would become obligatory; that the superintendents of the new schools should only be chosen from among Christians, etc. (Dubnow 1918, Vol. II: 58)

Russian and Polish Jews, who had long cherished their "privileged autonomy" concerning the education of their children, adopted tactics of passive resistance:

> Out of 1,906 university students in Russia in 1835, only eleven were Jews. Of the 2,866 students who attended the higher institutions of learning in 1840, fifteen were Jews, and of the total number of 80,017 pupils in the primary and secondary schools, forty-eight were of the Jewish faith. (Greenberg 1944: 32)

In 1844 a new law, designed to convince the Jews of the government's sincere efforts to provide a secular education for the Jewish community, directed the establishment of "special" schools for Jews--to be supported by the Jewish community through the imposition of special taxes. Jewish theologians would supervise religious instruction; Christians and Jews would teach the secular curriculum (similar to the Gymnasia curriculum of European secondary schools). Again, however, the true nature of the designs was disclosed when a secret supplement to the law "leaked" the covert purpose of the new education policy; ". . . to uproot those superstitious and harmful prejudices which are instilled by the teachings of the Talmud" (Greenberg 1944: 33). The Minister of Education enlisted the services of an "enlightened" German Jewish educator, Max Lilienthal, to "sell" the new plan to the

Jewish community. Lilienthal's unsuccessful proselytizing efforts reflected his shared suspicions that the government's intention was to eradicate the "Jewish heritage."

A further prohibition against Jews' re-entering the Pale of Settlement after completion of secular education stiffened Jewish resistance to "outside" schooling. Jewish recalcitrance toward all such efforts at indoctrination and conversion exacerbated subsequent political edicts. Government tax collectors and administrators were brought into the Kahals (Jewish self-governing communities) to supersede local administrators; "basket taxes" were imposed on kosher (ritually slaughtered) meat, on immovable property, and on business pursuits, and heavy taxes were levied on religious items, e.g., Sabbath candles, prayer shawls, and prayer books.

In 1843, Tsar Nicholas appended a resolution to the report of the Council of Ministers, ordering the relocation of all "border" Jews on the Prussian and Austrian frontiers. These "fringe" residents were to move out of Russia/Poland and settle inside Prussian and Austrian borders. "Those possessing their own houses are to be granted a term of two years within which to sell them" (Dubnow 1918: 62). Thus tens of thousands of Jews were forced to emigrate to these two countries (which did not welcome their intrusion).

Nicholas' plan to "transform" the Russian people included the classification of Russian Jews into categories: useful and useless.

> The former category was to consist of merchants affiliated with guilds, artisans belonging to trade unions, agriculturalists, and those of the burgher class who owned immovable property with a definite income. All other burghers who could not claim such a financial status and had no definite income, in other words, the large mass of petty tradesmen and paupers, were to be labelled as "useless" or "detrimental"; and subjected to increased disabilities. (Dubnow 1918: 64)

In 1856 Tsar Alexander II introduced a program of sweeping reforms. In the hope that the disastrous results of the Crimean War might be alleviated by the re-entry of Jewish industry into the national economy, he abolished the cantonist system and granted to "special classes of Jews" the right to unrestricted residence and the opportunity for government service. The economic competition engendered by the relaxation of restrictions reactivated anti-Semitic pogroms throughout the empire. "These attacks upon Jews, although not directly engineered by the central government, were at all times tolerated by it, despite an occasional face-saving protestation to the contrary" (Greenberg 1944: 19).

After three decades of unremitting massacre had ensued, a central committee, charged with "reviewing" the "Jewish problem," reported that the pogroms were righteous expressions of Russian outrage at the Jewish abuse of the civil rights granted to them by Alexander II. Measures to calm the "aroused"populace included:

1. the prohibition of new Jewish settlement in the villages of the Pale
2. prohibition against ownership or management of real estate and land outside of city limits, and
3. prohibition of wholesale or retail trading in strong drinks in villages or hamlets.[6]

In 1882 Alexander III, in opposition to the "liberalizing" reforms instituted by his father, instituted a rigid quota system to limit the educational opportunities for Jewish youths: in reponse to the new system which required the enrollment of a "new" Christian student for each Jewish entry, many Jewish parents undertook to pay for the tuition and training of Christian boys to guarantee their own son's acceptance into a government

school. Based upon complaints from provincial authorities that the Jews were responsible for the dissemination of revolutionary ideas in the schools, Alexander imposed more stringent quotas. Jews were discouraged from entering professional institutions; those who had already earned professional degrees were barred from practice. Jewish youths who fled their country to avoid military service, or to seek greener fields abroad, took with them the knowledge that their indigent parents would be fined 500 rubles. If they were unable to meet this obligation the government auctioned the household goods to collect it.

The Temporary Rules of 1882 redefined village and town boundaries; the towns that were redesignated as "villages" banned the residence of new or relocated Jews. In some instances Jewish soldiers, after completion of their twenty-five year tour of duty, were barred from entering their native villages on the ground that they were "new" settlers.

An 1891 retroactive law prohibiting Jewish settlement in Moscow effected the immediate expulsion of twenty thousand Jews--two-thirds of the Jewish community of Moscow.[7] "Only about a third of Moscow's Jewry--people with a higher education, first-guild merchants born there, and children of soldiers who had served under Nicholas—was allowed to remain" (Greenberg 1951: 44).

Despite the unalleviated repression, relocation,and diminished occupational and educational opportunities, large-scale emigration only became an actuality in 1881--following upon the assassination of Alexander II. The conservative Jewish leadership and press opposed emigration, encouraging the Jews to be patient and to wait for "better days." The weekly journals (Ruzzky Ezvrei and Voskhod) expressed the view that emigration would injure the cause of emancipation, and that it would

furnish the anti-Semites with a means of discrediting the loyalty of the Russian Jews. After 1881 an influential newspaper (Razvet) reversed its stand and became the champion of organized emigration. Through its influence "Central Committees were organized to direct and facilitate the movement of emigrés" (Greenberg 1951: 64).

From 1881 to 1890 the number of Russian Jewish immigrants to arrive in the United States totalled 135,003. In 1891, 100,000 more joined them, and by 1893 an additional 30,000 Russian Jews left their homeland.

In 1891 a United States commission, appointed by Secretary of the Treasury Charles Foot to investigate the causes leading to emigration to the United States, spent several months touring Russia. The report read in part:

> All told the same story . . . old men, women and children importuning the committee (Moscow Jewish Relief) to give heed to their cries and help them get away from their surroundings, any place being better than here where they are living in constant terror of persecution. Homes are destroyed, businesses ruined, families separated, all claiming that they are not criminals except that they are charged with being Jews; all expressing a willingness and an anxiety to work, begging for the opportunity to begin life somewhere, where they do not know nor do they care. . . . (Greenberg 1951: 74)

During the 1890s Baron Hirsch, a German Jewish philanthropist, conceived the grandiose scheme of arranging for the transportation of the entire remaining Jewish population of Russia (approximately three million) to South America (particularly to Argentina).

> A few years later it was . . . realized that the mountain had given birth to a mouse. Instead of the millions of Jews as originally planned, the Jewish Colonization Association succeeded in transplanting during the first decade /of the twentieth century/ only 70,000 Jews. (Dubnow 1918: 421)

The outbreak of World War I halted the massive emigration of Russian Jews. Because of the exigencies of military transport and only as a temporary war measure, the Tsarist government abolished the Pale of Settlement. With the February 1917 Revolution, the Provisional government conferred complete civil equality upon the Russian Jews. The removal of discriminatory restrictions, coupled with the enactment in the United States of the Johnson Emigration Act (1924), ended large-scale Jewish emigration.

The heritage of the Ashkenazim in Aruba, whether of Eastern or Western Europe, understandably is "imprinted" with first-hand impressions of ghetto confinement, periodic pogroms, restrictions of economic and educational opportunities, and, above all, the "ghetto state of mind" (Wirth 1928: 8).

These commonly shared experiences did not, however, provide a unifying link for the Ashkenazim who emigrated to Aruba during the 1930s. Rather, ethnic boundedness occurred two decades after their arrival, in response to economic and political pressures exerted by the national segment. The relevance of their prior experiences in eastern and western Europe lies in the traditional response of the Jews to such pressures--reinstitution of group boundaries. The circumstances that led to the ethnic solidarity of the Ashkenazim of Aruba are discussed in the following section.

The Ashkenazim in Aruba

Ethnicity and boundary maintenance studies (see, for example, Barth 1966, 1969) deal with sets of people as if they comprise enduring and cohesive groups:

> /The/ ethnic group . . . shares fundamental cultural values . . . makes up a field of communication and interaction . . . has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. (Barth 1969: 11)

Moreover, there is in these analyses an assumption, whether explicit or implicit, that such groups always display characteristics that are continuously and clearly identifiable, both by their own members and by outsiders.

For the first decade after their arrival in Aruba, the Ashkenazim did not fit this model. To facilitate the understanding of their present "ethnic insularity" I shall offer a diachronic analysis of their emergent solidarity.

That all but three of the forty Ashkenazic merchants established residence in Aruba during the four-year period 1930-1934 was neither simply by chance nor by planned design. A juxtaposition of historical and economic conditions paved the way for their joint occupation.

The merchants arrived singly, after brief periods of residence in North and South America following their twentieth century emigration from Europe.[8] Their arrival was in direct response to Aruba's abrupt transition from a minimal subsistence economy to a bustling industrialized center. In 1929, the Lago Oil and Transport Co., Ltd., founded for the purpose of trans-shipping oil from Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela, embarked on an ambitious conversion project--to establish a center for refining crude oil.

By 1930 the thousands of workers imported by the Company to assist in the construction of refinery tanks, "cracking" towers, machine shops, and the related extension of docking and harbor facilities not only greatly augmented the island population (15,000 in 1931, 30,000 in 1941)

but also constituted a ready-made market for manufactured goods. News of the "boom-town" rapidly reached the scattered emigrés, because recruiting agents for the Company traveled throughout the Caribbean and northern South America. Because these Ashkenazim were recent arrivals from Europe, they had not yet sunk roots nor begun to prosper in the established and competitive American markets. Withdrawing their meager profits from recently established trading and peddling activities, forty unrelated Ashkenazic "strangers" re-emigrated to Aruba.

The transplant was successful: within a few decades their businesses, nourished with minimal capital, proliferated and spread--from St. Nicholas (the refinery town) to Oranjestad (the island capital) to the large tourist hotels at the farthest (commercialized) end of the island.

During all of my initial interviews in 1969, the Ashkenazic merchants employed the same phrase, "lack of economic opportunity," in referring to the motivating force behind their decision to leave Europe. Other more specific pressures leading to their emigration came to light only after their reactions to being interviewed changed from wary politeness to moderate enthusiasm. During the first decade of the twentieth century these Eastern European Jews (only four of the merchants were from Western Europe) had been plagued by renewed pogrom atrocities and increased military conscription quotas; their misery was compounded by the national economic depression that further impoverished the small scale traders and peddlers in the eastern countries. Many of my informants finally acknowledged that their desire to escape conscription provided the primary motivation for emigration; the aggravation of their families' chronic anxieties and their realization that each wave of economic depression would initiate

stepped up pogroms provided additional pressures to leave Europe "before it left us."

Similarly, the rising anti-Semitism in pre-Third Reich Germany canalized the conviction of the Western Jewish emigrants that their "lot was not a happy one." Interspersed with self-congratulatory observations that their perciplence allowed them to escape the oncoming holocaust, my informants gave grim accounts of the tragic fate that overtook their families and friends.

Shudders and twisted grimaces invariably accompanied the negative responses of merchants to my questions about their past or contemplated visits to the motherland:

> Why would I ever go back! All my family is dead . . . all killed in the war or in the concentration camps. . . . There was nothing for me there before, there's nothing now. Besides I wouldn't trust them. If there was any way they could hurt me, even now, they would!

The coincident entry of the Ashkenazim with that of thousands of Caribbean Islanders (referred to by Arubans as "English") accorded the former a fortuitous chiaroscuric backdrop. The light skin color of the Ashkenazim facilitated their rapid acceptance by a society that felt overwhelmed by the black inundation. Thus these merchants were spared the hostile reception generally experienced by emigrating Jews (see Wagley and Harris 1958, and Shibutani 1965).

The ready-made local demand for the ready-made goods of the merchants also sweetened their early years in Aruba. The economic depression suffered by the western world throughout the 1930s never reached Aruba's shores. Indeed, for the first time in their lives, many Aruban and West Indian workers had cash to spend--for clothing, for jewelry, and for imported luxuries. Credit arrangements offered to the over-extended,

and to the few under-employed, workers augmented the "captive" market of willing buyers.

> Only one banking branch of the powerful Arends family remained aloof . . . refused to extend credit to Jewish merchants. . . . It turned out to be the best thing for us. . . . We turned to the Curaçaoan Sephardim for loans. . . . As religious "brothers" they were obliged to grant us loans without interest.

With the exception of this one Arubiano group, my informants felt that they were encouraged by Aruban "society" to participate in all island events: government-sponsored functions, inaugural balls, group and individual parties. "At that time we knew who they were even better than we knew who we were!"

Given the Ashkenazim's insistence that throughout the 1930s and 1940s the merchant families were "completely assimilated into Aruban society," I could not at first understand why, in the early 1940s, the merchants jointly financed the construction of the Aruban Country Club on cunucu land along the leeward shore.[10] In 1942 the Ashkenazic families celebrated the "grand opening" of their "plantation" club.

> The Lieutenant Governor and all of the "important" island society came to our "inaugural ball." Our club became the center for all the important social activities in Aruba. It only started to disintegrate when one of our /Reform/ members left to join the "exclusive" Tivoli Club.[11]

A former club president stated wistfully that the initial participation of Arubianos in the club's social affairs "gave us status and recognition. For a while the Arubianos came to our moonlight balls and parties. . . . We had bands flown in from Curaçao." His statement provided me with a clue to the resolution of the paradox of "complete assimilation" accompanying the beginnings of the Ashkenazic group boundedness. Apparently, the initial welcome that the Arubans afforded the separately

arriving emigrés reflected their perception of the merchants' lack of economic status. But, as soon as the growing prosperity of the merchants became apparent, the Arubans began to withdraw from them and the Ashkenazim to form an enclave. Thus the physical construction of the country club largely coincided with the psychological construction of ethnic boundaries.

In addition to being the locus of secular social functions, the Aruba Country Club also served as the "temple" for the religious activities of individuals and of the group:

> During World War II the American Jewish soldiers, stationed in Aruba to guard the refinery and the harbors, made our club their home away from home. When Jewish chaplains were flown in for the High Holy Days, they held joint services for the soldiers and us at the club.

These Jewish chaplains of the United States army were the only ordained rabbis ever to conduct religious services for the Aruban Ashkenazim. Even after the opening in 1952 of the Beth Israel synagogue, the merchants themselves continued to conduct religious services and to prepare their sons for Bar Mitzvah (initiation into men's religious society). The common rationalization for this "self-service" was, "We were never too religious, even in the old country." A merchant, who refuted the otherwise unanimous assertion that all of the Ashkenazim men had attended Cheder and Gymnasium in Europe, said,

> So why did they choose me to conduct services for twenty-five years? Gymnasium! Ridiculous . . . they came here knowing nothing, and they don't know any more now. . . . I gave the services until last year /1968/ when the congregation hired a religious teacher from Curaçao. I'm sure they let us have him because they wanted to get rid of him. . . . We had four boys to prepare for Bar Mitzvah. This man is a "reconstructionist"--not even as religious as Reformed. . . . It's terrible . . . I'm only halfways through chanting the section of the Torah and he's already finished.

The Ashkenazim explained (rather apologetically) to me that for the first few years after their arrival they tried to "keep kosher" (that is, to consume only ritually slaughtered and prepared meat, to maintain the separation of meat and dairy foods and of the utensils involved in their preparation and serving, and to observe proscriptions against using certain kinds and parts of animals).

> It was too hard to keep Kosher. After all a man and his wife were both working in the store. . . . We had Aruban maids. . . . You couldn't expect them to know how to cook Kosher and keep the meat and diary dishes separate. . . . But we still prefer our own country's foods. . . . On special occasions the wives get together and cook our special dishes.[12]

Sabbath restrictions also dissolved:

> Are our stores open on Saturday? Of course, it's our biggest shopping day. Why should they /Arubans and West Indians/ have to suffer because we're Jewish!

Stores operated by Ashkenazim generally close only for Rosh Hashonah (Jewish New Year), Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), and, for individual merchants, for memorial services--Yiskah prayers for the dead, although, as one merchant told me,

> When my wife died I wanted to get someone to run the store but I couldn't find anyone who knew the business, so I had to come back after the funeral and open the store. /This despite his obligation to observe the ritual Shivah mourning period./

Because their involvement in the retail stores initially necessitated their working for twelve hours a day, most of the Ashkenazic merchants built their first residences directly over their "one- or two-door shops."[14] Then, in the 1950s, with the increased income from their branch stores in Oranjestad,all but a few of them built expensive houses in the fashionable Klip section of the island capital.

> At first we were scattered throughout St. Nicholas, with only a couple of merchants residing and operating stores in Oranjestad. But after 1950, when I built the first house in the Klip it became

the choice location for most of the Jews and also for the wealthier Arubianos.[15]

The Temple Beth Israel (designed for Conservative ritual observance) was built in 1952, on land jointly purchased by the Ashkenazic congregation, and as it is located in the Klip, it serves as the hub of the Ashkenazic residential complex: "Outsiders sometimes think that the Jewish houses encircling the synagogue project a ghetto image. It's not really so. It's just that we had that land available."[4]

Into the 1960s, whereas synagogue attendance was for most of the congregation "a sometime thing," the merchants assiduously prepared their sons for Bar Mitzvah. Nevertheless, other than to provide the specific training required for a boy's participation in the reading of the Torah, the Ashkenazic families did not emphasize the "Jewish heritage" in the education and upbringing of their children:

> All I knew about the "old country" was from stories my mother occasionally told us. She told mostly funny anecdotes about the people in her town--she never went into details about pogroms or the family's extreme poverty.
>
> As a matter of fact, as a child I knew much more about Roman Catholicism than about my own religion. My "nurse" would take me with her to Sunday Mass--and, because there were no Kindergartens I attended parochial school until I was ready to begin first grade.

Although before the mid-1950s Ashkenazic children had generally attended Dutch-administered primary and secondary schools, by 1955 most of the youngsters were sent to United States "preparatory" schools. Some merchants explained that "the schools here weren't that good. We wanted our children to go abroad to college anyway, so we thought they would be better prepared if they attended U.S. prep schools." But one informant, born in Aruba and resident there until she was thirteen, contradicted the merchants' statement as a "typical misrepresentation":

> Look, there really was no choice for our parents. We'd grown up with Aruban friends. . . . We even preferred them to the Jewish kids we saw at the Club. By the middle of the 1950s, when we were teen-agers, our parents were nervous about the possibility of our marrying Arubans (some of us did) so they shipped us out as soon as they could.

After 1950 the concern of merchants about their children's intermarriage with Arubans increased concomitantly with the sudden change in the island economy.

In the mid-1950s the period of business expansion following World War II halted with the restructuring of the Lago operations and the consequent reduction of refinery personnel:

> Many factors contributed to reducing the refinery's work force during the 1950s (from 7,817 in 1950 to 5,134 in 1960--in 1973 down to 1,534).
>
> Competition increased throughout the decade, principally through the construction of new refineries and expansion of old ones in nearly all of Lago's marketing areas. . . . This brought with it a growing need for greater efficiency and the elimination of non-essential activities. In addition, benefits from the many years of intensive training could be realized, and the number of expatriate employees required was substantially reduced. (Hartog 1961: 437)

The "expatriate employees" were primarily West Indians, the major "consumer pool" for the St. Nicholas merchants. Because most of the West Indian migrants were single men, they had fewer responsibilities and more cash to spend than did their Aruban co-workers. The loss of West Indian business differentially affected the Ashkenazim. Those merchants who had remained small-scale owners of single stores in St. Nicholas suffered irreparable losses, whereas those whose expanded holdings included large shops in Oranjestad experienced only a temporary setback. For the latter the concomitant and independent growth of tourism counterbalanced their diminished profits in St. Nicholas. Most of the small-scale merchants who failed left Aruba (for the United States) during the 1950s. Except for three or four of the remaining merchants,

however, the Ashkenazim have become increasingly affluent into the 1970s.

As incomes of, and direct taxes paid by, merchants are not reported in census enumerations, I can only estimate the affluence of the Ashkenazic merchants on the basis of my four periods of observations, interviews, and visits to store, home, and synagogue. My estimate that the annual income of the average Ashkenazic merchant is at least $75,000 to $100,000 is based on the Ashkenazic families' conspicuous consumption of material and non-material items:

Commodity or Activity	Estimate (approx.)
Present value of homes (as unofficially reported to me by an employee in the Department of Economic Affairs	$50,000
Furnishings: (accessories and furniture) imported heavy cut crystal, silver utensils, elaborate antique "decorative" items, massive imported furniture	$50,000
Personal accessories: Furs (except for the mink stoles and jackets, worn only on annual trips to New York, Europe, and South America) Jewelry--elaborate gold and diamond rings, watches, clocks, bracelets, etc.	$30,000
Automobiles--two per household: one large U.S.-made "luxury" car one European "compact"	$15,000
Additional expenditures: Two trips abroad each year Tuition and board for 2-3 children at preparatory school, college, or university (plus their round-trip fares to Aruba for winter and summer holidays)	$15,000 (each year)
Annual club membership fees and donation to: Aruba Caribbean Hotel and Casino (most of the foreign and national merchants own stock in this hotel) Simon Bolivar Culture Center	$3,000 (each year)

/continued/

YMCA
Little League sponsorship
Kiwanis, Lions, or Rotary-- most
merchants belong to the Lions)
United Jewish Fund
Carnival Committee
ORT (Jewish Relief Committee)

By the 1960s the obvious and disproportionate affluence of the Ashkenazic merchants was increasingly provoking expressions of hostility among the economically depressed Aruban and West Indian workers. Moreover, although by the 1960s many of the elite Arubianos enjoyed "good" government positions and others held "prestige" banking and commercial executive positions, in economic terms all but a very few still have to be classed as "low-middle" to "middle" income families. Thus, the unequal access to wealth continues to sour Aruban-Ashkenazic relationships, which bears out Shibutani's (1965) observation that "much of the resentment against . . . the Jews in Europe and America arises from minority groups possessing economic power not commensurate with their standing in the community."

* * *

In February 1969, during my first brief visit to Aruba, I was introduced to several of the Ashkenazic merchants and their families. Their warm welcome at that time eased my apprehensions about the field study of Aruban population segments I planned to undertake the following summer.

Two weeks before my return to Aruba in June 1969 I read a brief account of the May 30th riots in Curaçao, which were described as a "spontaneous outburst of random violence, looting and burning of stores and homes" (New York Times, June 1, 1969: 29).

In mid-June 1969, I revisited my Ashkenazic acquaintances in Aruba to assess their evaluation of the event. Struck by their dramatically altered manner (from complacent volubility to uneasy taciturnity) I then realized that the "fall-out" of the riot had radiated beyond Curaçao's shores. I later learned that it had also shattered the former Ashkenazic "collective representation" of their assimilation into the Aruban society.

The merchants at first parried or deliberately evaded my specific questions about the causes, direction, and effects of the riots--then after several weeks of persistent questioning I began to receive stereotyped "party-line" responses:

> It's just like they said in the papers . . . random. . . . They were drunk and excited, they didn't know what they were doing. . . Of course some Jewish storekeepers suffered but so did the whole business community. . . Could it happen here? Why should it? . . . We're all one!

That we were not one became more and more apparent throughout the course of interviews and observations. I was therefore not surprised when one of the merchants inadvertently added to the "collective" statement, "There's been no trouble here . . . yet!" It was the yet which encouraged further investigation into the Curaçao riots. Detailed confirmatory accounts came from Aruban (not Ashkenazic) informants:

> For a long time the people of Curaçao resented the corrupt power of the Jewish /informants did not then distinguish between the Sephardim and the Ashkenazim/ storekeepers, especially because they hold the government in their hands.
>
> The night before the riots a group of oil workers who were angry because the Governor refused to mediate their complaints against the Shell's hiring of non-union workers to unload offshore supply barges held an all night meeting. They decided to strike. They sent word that all who were in sympathy with them should meet at the Shell gate and join them in a demonstration parade to town /Willemstadt/.
>
> The parade was led by Papa /Wilson/ Godet, head of the Frente Obrero (Worker's Party). He told them to keep the demonstration

> peaceful. They passed a supermarket owned by a white Englishman. The food in this store was so expensive that only macambas /term formerly used to designate "white Dutchmen, now an opprobrious term used by hostile nationalists to include all white "foreigners"/ could buy there. Some of the men broke in to get liquor. Then things started to get out of hand. They overturned cars (owned by macambas) and burned some trucks that delivered food to the supermarket.
>
> They wanted to march on the Governor's house. Then the police stepped in. Papa Godet tried to calm down the workers. The police shot him in the back. Then all hell broke loose. The workers streamed into town. Yes, they burned and looted--but not every or any store. Anyone could see that afterwards. On each block some stores were wrecked while others were not touched. They knew who they were getting even with. It was those storekeepers who had exploited the people for so long. . . . A few Dutch but mostly Jews. You know, since the early days the Jews used their shopgirls for mistresses--made children by them--paid them almost no wages. Even now girls can be fired with no notice. And you also know how the Jews bleed their customers--put them in debt--peonage forever. And the law protects the merchants . . . it's the same thing here!

Only in 1973 did the Ashkenazic merchants in Aruba, through the overseas Ashkenazic media, acknowledge the anti-Semitic focus of the Curaçao riots. An article in Freeland, the New York periodical of the League for Jewish Territorial Colonization, states:

> The Jewish community /in Aruba/ is purportedly very prosperous. . . . Aruban Jews today own many of the industries and shops in their rapidly prospering country. Perhaps the chief attraction of the lovely island for Jews is its atmosphere of complete religious tolerance. Unlike its eastern neighbor Curaçao, which had a series of anti-semitic outbursts in 1969--Jewish shops and homes were burned down--Aruba has never witnessed any anti-religious reactions of any kind. (Berliner-Fischthal 1973: 6)

The article reflects the image which the Ashkenazim in Aruba wish to "sell" to the outside world; that they themselves do not "buy" this image is apparent from the protective insularity which since 1969 has characterized group attitudes. One of the merchants who left Aruba in 1952 but returns for annual visits assessed the "new" phenomenon of Ashkenazic solidarity:

> They're such hypocrites. . . . This new united front is only a reaction to their fear of an uprising in Aruba similar to the one

> in Curaçao. . . . They were never united before. It had to take something like this to stop the infighting. You'll see, when things quiet down, they'll go back to their separate ways and try to get back into the whole society.

As I continued my interviews and observations of the merchant families, I became increasingly aware of the group's deliberate attempts to direct my inquiries away from the present and toward the "boom days" of the 1930s. The assertion of "complete assimilation into Aruban society," invariably presented as a continuing "fact," masks the reality of increasing group withdrawal into their social enclave.

Ashkenazic merchants' fears that anti-Semitic uprising might occur in Aruba mounted during the pre-election campaigns in the late summer of 1969. The "establishment" Aruban Patriot's Party (PPA), supported financially but not overtly by the Ashkenazic merchants, was opposed by the more recently formed Aruban Popular Party (AVP). That the PPA members and supporters should feel increasingly threatened by the vigorous AVP campaign became more apparent when I understood the implications of the AVP slogan "Aruba for Arubans." Whereas outsiders (like me) may have been deluded into thinking that Aruba's emergent nationalism militated against only the involvement of expatriate non-nationals in the local economy, the Ashkenazim, the West Indian, and, of course, theArubans knew better. With little prompting, more politically active Aruban informants volunteered the "party" definition of Aruban, "third generation born in Aruba." When I asked whether the Jewish and West Indian "nationals" (many are Dutch citizens) were aware of the exclusionist nature of the slogan, one informant laughingly responded, "You bet they do. That's why they're shivering in their boots. They know we want them out!"

That the merchants were aware of the threat to their continued residence in Aruba clearly emerged from the statement of the erstwhile Aruban merchant:

> Don't kid yourself. They won't tell you but they know they're here on borrowed time. They talk about nothing else in their synagogue get-togethers. They've agreed among themselves that they would only further jeopardize their position if they "leaked" their apprehensions to the outside world!

The Ashkenazic "wall of silence" excluded me from their circle by the end of my 1969 fieldwork period. Even before the fall elections these people had become increasingly reluctant to permit interviews; during our last discussions the merchants were visibly uneasy. They spoke in lowered tones and constantly interrupted our talks to glance apprehensively around the store. By this time they were only willing to share past reminiscences; they ignored all references to their present situation and future tenure.

Evidence of their recognition of the "loss" or deterioration of their former social contacts with Arubans came to me only obliquely:

> When B. gave a Bar Mitzvah party for his twins at the Astoria Hotel /Chinese restaurant/ last month. . . By the way it's too bad he hadn't met you then, he surely would have invited you . . . anyway, there were 400 guests. You know we're only twenty-five families now, so obviously he had mostly non-Jews--Arubans, Chinese, some English--everybody.
>
> Look, years ago we always went to their affairs and they to ours . . . so I supposed they felt they had to come. . . .
>
> True, we invite more of them to our parties than they invite us to theirs . . . but, after all, they have so many of their own to take care of.

Behind the mask of "complete assimilation" the Ashkenazim continue to strengthen their ethnic boundaries. Children, who are sent abroad by the time they are fourteen and who return home intermittently for brief vacations, are encouraged to seek "nice Jewish" mates by the end of their college or university training. The statement offered

during the first weeks of my interviewing, that "even when our children intermarry (generally white Dutch but occasionally Aruban) the girl invariably converts to Judaism before the marriage" changed by the end of the summer to

> In spite of everything we tried to do he married a Protestant Dutch girl . . . we hope she'll want to convert. . . . Our girls, thank God, they haven't yet married out of the faith. /This last was refuted by my non-resident Aruban Ashkenazic informant, who said, "They're lying . . . I can tell you of five of my former friends--three of whom married Arubans and didn't convert./
> Look, we hope and we try, but we can't always make them do!

Thus the older Ashkenazim who have traditionally opposed marriage "outside of the faith" have become increasingly distressed by (and more actively opposed to) the "rebellious" marriages of their youngsters to Aruban and Dutch nationals. As to marriage with West Indians, a typically horrified response was, "My son marry a black Englishman? God forbid! We'd have to leave here."

The concern with "keeping" the faith as a mark of group identity now extends to markedly increased attendance at synagogue services. Prior to 1969 Sabbath attendance was so sporadic that one merchant admitted to me that the men often found it "necessary" to invite tourists from the hotels to Sabbath services. By necessary he meant that the invitation was profered not out of hospitality but because the tourists were needed to supply the full complement required for a minion, the minimum required for group Torah reading. (Nine adult males plus the Rabbi--or, in the case of the Ashkenazim in Aruba, the leader of Sabbath services).

From 1969 to 1971 I found that synagogue attendance had grown noticeably. During three Friday night visits to the temple in 1971 I observed that most of the merchants were present--if not for the actual

services, then for the Oneg Shabat (after-service refreshments hosted by different families each week).

The narrow defeat of the AVP in the 1969 elections did nothing to ease Ashkenazic fears for their future. Throughout the 1971 period of fieldwork I observed that ethnic boundaries were somewhat relaxed. While synagogue attendance continued to be regular, the impetus for participation seemed to derive more from social habit than explicitly from fear. Several merchants (who received me with wary politeness but not the effusive warmth they offered on my first visit in 1969) had sufficiently recovered from the AVP threat to resume capital investment in new boutiques and renovations of department stores. The weakened social ties with the Arubiano elite had not been re-established nor were daily confrontations with Aruban and West Indian workers more positive, but I sensed an over-all diminution of mutual tension.

This tentative relaxation of group boundaries ended in 1973. The unexpected election victory of the splinter faction of the AVP, whose slogan of Status Aparte received overwhelming support from anti-black Arubans, shocked the West Indians and the Ashkenazic merchants (as well as the Arubiano elite and the Lago management). The covertly expressed but clearly understood party platform of the 1969 "war cry," Aruba for Arubans, reactivated Ashkenazic anxieties. The "ghetto state of mind" (Wirth 1928: 8) re-encapsulated the merchant group. Once again, I was excluded.

NOTES

[1] In consequence of the 1813-1814 "War of Liberation" from French dominance, France poured millions of gold (francs) indemnities into Germany. For years "Germany speculated--bankers and cabdrivers alike" in a grand commercial boom.

[2] For instance, since its inception, the Israeli legislature (a congeries of German and Eastern European Zionists, Liberals, Conservatives, Reform, and Orthodox Jews) has been engaged in vituperative "internal warfare," only intermittently interrupted by "external warfare."

[3] "This pale of settlement virtually represents a ghetto within a ghetto. . . While its boundaries have varied, in 1905 it contained the following fifteen districts: Besserabia, Vilna, Vitebsk, Volhynia, Grodno, Yokaterinoslav, Kovno, Minsk, Moghilef, Podolia, Poltava, Taurida, Kherson, Charnigov, and Kiev. Within these districts, moreover, the Jewish settlements were restricted to the cities and town The regulations pertaining to the settlement of Jews prohibited them from living at all in the rest of Russia, though at some time certain population groups were excepted, among them graduates from universities, merchants of the first guild, and prostitutes." (Wirth 1928: 3,4)

[4] "The recruiting agents hired by the Kahal (Jewish community) or its 'trustees', who received the nickname 'hunters' . . . hunted down /the escapee conscripts/ trailing them everywhere. . . . In default of a sufficient number of adults, little children, who were /an/ easier 'catch' were seized, often enough in violation of the provision of the law. Even boys under the required age of twelve, sometimes no more than eight years old, were caught and offered as conscripts at the recruiting states, their age being misrepresented. The agent perpetrated incredible cruelties. Houses were raided during the night, and children were torn from the arms of their mothers, or lured away and kidnapped. . . . The unfortunate victims who were drafted into the army and deported to . . . far-off regions were mourned by their relatives as dead." (Dubnow 1918 Vol II: 23)

[5] "That these outbursts were not spontaneous but planned and organized by higher-ups is obvious from the common pattern they pursued. The procedure was as follows: often before a pogrom started a rumor would spread through the town about coming disorders scheduled for a particular date. Alarmed, the Jews would ask the authorities for protection. They would be told to go home and reassured about their safety, but no steps were taken to forestall the possible riots. Then on the appointed day there would appear at the railway station a band of out-of-town hooligans under the leadership of a literate ringleader who had a prepared list of

Jewish homes and business establishments. Having fortified themselves with liquor, the howling ruffians would swoop down upon the Jewish quarter, and there would follow an orgy of pillage, killing and looting." (Greenberg 1944: 19)

[6]"A common charge by the government was that Jews were the cause of widespread drunkenness among the peasants" (Greenberg 1944: 27). In the late 1800s my paternal grandmother operated a "restaurant" on the outskirts of Vilna. Her profits from the food she cooked and served were meager. Her "real" income derived from the (illegal) sale of vodka in false-bottom glasses.

[7]Expulsion of Jewish merchants and storekeepers brought unforeseen consequences to the general population: "The silk business failed, massive unemployment plagued the metropolis" (Greenberg 1951: 44).

[8]Twenty of the twenty-five Ashkenazic merchants who presently constitute the "Jewish community" emigrated from Russia, Poland, and Lithuania.

[9]Between 1929 and 1932 ownership of the Lago company had passed from the British Equatorial Company to Pan American Petroleum Corporation to Standard Oil Company of Indiana to Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.

[10]The site of the abandoned country club (defunct since 1952) is directly opposite the hotel strip. In 1969, one month before the Curaçao riots, representatives of a hotel syndicate approached one of the merchant-investors with an offer of $500,000 for lease rights to the land. Immediately after news of the riot reached the syndicate the offer was rescinded.

[11]The Tivoli Club, the first Arubiano "exclusive" social club, was and still is dominated by the Arends family. Two years ago (1972) they relaxed their exclusionist policy to offer membership to an American couple (who had rented a house in Oranjestad from one of the most influential Arends families).

As the guest of this couple I was invited in February 1974 to join the group for their pre-Carnival "jump-up" parade and party at Club Headquarters. Since I had previously met a few of the Arends men when I was a guest lecturer for the Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, I received a most effusive welcome--and was invited to participate with them in their preparations for the elaborate float they construct each year for the Grand Carnival parade. (They usually win first place.)

[12]Notwithstanding this last sentence, only two weeks before our interview, the same informant had hosted an elaborate reception to celebrate the Bar Mitzvah of his twin sons--catered by the Chinese hotel-restauranteurs in St. Nicholas.

[13]I have not yet established (in my own mind, that is--because of the absence of recorded data, I can only infer the actual beginnings of boundedness) whether the Arubans had effectively begun to withdraw before

or after the opening of the country club. Thus I cannot determine whether the initial ethnic boundaries were constructed in direct response to emerging Aruban hostility or, alternatively, if confrontation with the first lavish display of Ashkenazic "conspicuous consumption" stimulated the Aruban withdrawal.

[14]Merchant "success" in the first decades of their business ventures was directly expressed in terms of conversion from one-door (approximately 30-foot store-fronts) to three-door department stores. The few merchants who arrived in Aruba after 1936 still reside in their "over-the-store" apartments. They blame their "poor cousin" status on the "fact" (?) that "all the good stores were taken by the time I got here."

[15]Although the "best" homes and the choicer sites for homes for wealth Arubans and expatriates have shifted to the Malmok strip at the westerly tip of the island, the Lieutenant Governor still maintains his lavish residence in the Klip.

[16]I find it interesting that, whereas the Arubans "lump" together Sephardim and Ashkenazim as Jews in their historical representations, the Sephardim and Ashkenazim cherish their distinctly "separate" contributions to Curaçao's history and economy, and view each other with disdain.

[17]An exuberant Ashkenazic Hausfrau chuckled as she told me of her stock response to proselytizing efforts of various church representations: "From a chicken I cannot become a fish!"

CHAPTER SIX

THE CHINESE

Historical Background

The Chinese who migrated to the countries of southeast Asia during the nineteenth century were initially welcomed and well treated. By the early 1900s, however, perception of the inordinate prosperity of many of the Chinese merchants altered the attitudes of their hosts and in turn altered the status of these immigrants. For instance, a pamphlet, widely distributed in Thailand[1] referred to the Chinese as the Jews of the East:

> /The author/ made the comparison between the Jews and the Chinese again and again. They were both minority peoples living in foreign countries that did not always welcome them. Both peoples excelled in trade, both had their own culture which they were anxious to preserve, and both peoples often had stronger loyalties to their family and race than to the countries in which they had settled. . . . /They were/ the greatest menace facing Thailand . . . worshipping Mammon, and being ready to lie, rob, cheat, embezzle and kill in the pursuit of money. They were aliens . . . owing their allegiance to a foreign government, and unassimilable by the countries where they lived. . . . /They were/ parasites on the Thai economy, buying little that was produced in Thailand, and draining off wealth from the country to send home as remittances to their families in China.
>
> It was said that the Chinese businessmen, acting together, could ruin a country, and that the natives of a country could not compete against Chinese skill in business combined with the low standard of living. (Mitchison 1961: 24, 27)

If in southeast Asia the Chinese have incurred the kind of dislike historically directed at Jewish merchants in most countries, in Aruba they maintain a distinctly different identity and image. There

the Chinese segment constitutes a small fraction of the total society: its merchants, however, play a no less significant role than do the Ashkenazim. The Chinese are the retail and wholesale food merchants, restaurateurs, and saloon owners (who are also employers of the prostitutes assigned to the bars of St. Nicholas). They are thus the primary purveyors of vital goods and services. Although the "alien" origin of the Chinese precludes their inclusion in the "Aruba for Arubans" society, the group maintains a relatively positive image in the eyes of the Arubans.

Discussion of the relevant traditions and historical "accidents" that shaped the values and orientation of the Aruban Chinese will precede my analysis of the factors that account for the present status of the group. Because the home base of the "creole" and "homeland" Chinese was the province of Kwantung, I will confine my historical synopsis to southeastern China.[2]

That the Chinese people have been viewed by unsophisticated Westerners as "one" racial and national entity partly stems from the exclusive nature of early colonial contact with the port cities of Canton and Hong Kong. Traditionally, however, the southern Chinese were regarded with disdain by the "culturally privileged" northern Chinese.

> /The emigrants to southeast Asia and the Americas/ came mostly from the uneducated classes in China, and only a handful of them in the nineteenth century could read enough of the complicated Chinese characters to let them follow a Chinese book or newspaper. They also came from a traditionally despised area. Southerners knew that many northerners, particularly Peking men, looked down on them as too small and delicate. Southern men, said northerners, came from an uncultured region without good architecture or beautiful gardens--hardly Chinese at all--just the place to provide immigrants to barbarian countries. This meant that the despised

> southern peasant with no public position or esteem and no scholarly background to bind him to his country was readier than a northern scholar would have been to accept the customs of a new country. (Mitchison 1961: 37)

Into the twentieth century, mainland China has supported more than fifty "minority nationalities" (People's Republic term for ethnic groups). Despite all of the attempts of earlier imperial regimes to amalgamate the ethnic groups, whether "by coercion or by sentimentalities of family alliance" (Chai Ch'u 1962: 41), the incorporation of "minority nationalities" continues to be paramount in Mao's Thoughts: "The unification of our country, the unity of our people and the unity of our various nationalities--these are the basic guarantees of the sure triumph of our cause" (Mao 1957: 251).

Although the political structure of the imperial governments in some ways facilitated physical and cultural uniformity, both through the recruitment of civil service officials on the basis of individual merit rather than elitist status,[3] and because of the absence of internal barriers to migration, the class distinctions between chun-tzu (the politically powerful nobility) and hsiao jen ("small people" or commoners) nevertheless operated very much as caste barriers to intergroup mobility and integration.

Even with the modification of the Confucian chun-tzu/hsiao jen principle that occurred toward the close of the Chou dynasty (about 249 B.C.)--with the collapse of the feudal system, economic and sociopolitical mobility remained limited. The definitions of the separate roles of "mind-laborers" and of "body-laborers" still reflected the doctrine of Mencius: "Those who labor with their minds govern, those who labor with their strength are governed. Those who are governed serve;

those who govern are served. This is the principle universally recognized" (Chai Ch'u 1972: 74). The "body-laborers" were now subdivided according to occupation as peasants, craftsmen, and merchants. The ideologically exalted (but economically depressed) peasants were likened to the root of the state economy, whereas the merchants were only the branches.[4]

Although the "exalted" body laborers had little chance of achieving social and political mobility, their local villages were virtually autonomous. The chain of administrative command descended from central government administrators who relayed orders of the emperor, (who was "The Son of Heaven,") to village headmen (nominated by the village residents and confirmed by district magistrates. Regional headmen conferred on the merits of the order and, if they reached consensus, transmitted the details to the village leaders.

Imperially appointed chun-tzu (scholar-officials) acted as buffers between the central administration and the village leaders. Villagers were free from imperial and central bureaucratic interference as long as they paid their allotted taxes and "kept the peace." Even the village leaders (retired chun-tzu)maintained an aloof indifference to village affairs, partly because the chun-tzu were deliberately retired to villages far from their natal homes so as to obviate possible "conflicts of interest."

In 1931 the Nationalist government attempted to end the autonomy of the villages by replacing the village leaders with pao tsun (chiefs who were directly appointed by central government administrators). By introducing a modified version of the eleventh century pao chia system, which required that the peasant post on their doors

detailed biographical lists of all household residents, the Nationalist government hoped to facilitate the recruitment of peasants to fight the communist guerillas. Under the new system ten households were grouped into a pei, ten pei into a chia, ten chia forming a pao. Chia members were held responsible for each other's conduct and were required to denounce violators of the law to the pao tsun.

By the mid-1930s the peasantry had reacted predictably to this unwelcome imposition of authoritarian rule, and their resentment engendered by the loss of village autonomy extended to a general agitation and dissatisfaction with the Nationalist "reform" program. Communist promises of an equalization of agrarian resources and of the return of "power to the People" received welcoming support from large numbers of disgruntled peasants.

The failure of the pao chia system largely derived from its contradiction with the traditional emphasis on "proper" social relations. Confucian principles of "right relations" between human beings were incompatible with the demands of pao chia:

> In the course of centuries, the Chinese have developed many institutions and customs to conserve and perpetuate society, to give joint protection to individuals, and to strengthen proper relationships among the people. . . . In China there are five traditional social relationships--governmental, parental, conjugal, fraternal, and that of friendship. Out of these five relationships, three concern the family: the remaining two, although not familial relationships, can be conceived in terms of family. (Chai Ch'u 1961: 79)

The pao chia system, then, conflicted with traditional basic moral obligations "which made it very hard for one villager to report another villager's bad behavior to a government authority or to an outsider" (Chai Ch'u 1969: 150).

The family, central to the development of an individual's duties and responsibilities, provides the model for all social relationships:

> Mutual affection first arises out of the family, and then extends to the community. In other words, affection manifests itself in different degrees of intensity. From affection arises an appropriate attitude in a given moral situation, which one person assumed as reciprocal duty to the other. Thus for the parents, the appropriate attitude is kindness; for the children filial piety; for the brother, fraternity; and for the married couple, fidelity. Ethical relationship is indeed a relationship of affiliation and the appropriate attitudes that go with it. It is through the genuine fulfillment of the ethical relationships that exist in the family that the fulfillment of other relationships in the entire community is brought about. . . . /I/t is family affection that binds together all social relationships, and hence is the basic unit of all social relationships. (Chai Ch'u 1969: 82)

Freedman (1958, in his discussion of the traditional Chinese family and lineage units, supports those social analysts who reject the commonly held notion that the "joint family" was the norm in Chinese social organization (see, for example, Hsu 1943 and Lang 1946).

The requisite resources for the support ". . . of a joint family of elderly parents, two married sons with their wives, and four children in the next generation were only available to well-to-do families" (Freedman 1958: 19).[5] Although the rule of viripatrilocal residence brought collateral women into the household, the conflicts occasioned by the traditional vesting of equal property rights in the sons

> . . . tended to pull the component elementary families in a joint establishment apart. The head of a household holds its property in trust; (the disposition of major landholdings dependent on the consensus of all male trustees) his control of it did not obliterate the individual rights of the men under his hand. The junior men might be powerless to exercise their independent rights during the head's lifetime, but these rights were latent and were apt to find expression in bickering over the allocation of domestic duties

> and privileges. The strength of the insistence in Confucian ethics on the solidarity of brothers was matched by the pressure forcing them apart. (Freedman 1962: 22)

Peasant families of Kwantung province generally split into "small family" groupings after the death of the household head. The equal rights of the sons to shares in the land and assets of the deceased father (except for the "extra portion" /responsibility for the maintenance of the family's ancestral shrine/ awarded to the eldest son) facilitated the fission of joint family households. Once the estate was divided, the ensuing conflicts between brothers (and their wives) over individual responsibilities and duties could best be resolved by the assertion of individual rights, that is, by the division of the household into independent economic units.

> Yet at the same time, newly separated households were at least potentially members of one ancestor-worshipping unit in relation to recent forbears, and some forms of ad hoc economic cooperation might be instituted between them. (Freedman 1958: 23)

The formal rupture of large household units into their conjugal components thus did not necessarily provoke a sharp transformation from "involvement to indifference" (Freedman 1958: 23).

Adherence to the ideal of the joint family household was only feasible for well-to-do merchants and landowners. Their extensive landholdings and capital resources could support large-scale agricultural enterprises, expensive education for sons, plural marriages for father and sons, and the numerous offspring of these marriages. Most peasant families, on the other hand, could barely survive (with their scanty resources) the periodic vicissitudes of flood and famine, and they frequently had to resort to delayed marriages and female infanticide (or relinquishment of daughters to wealthy adoptive parents). Thus it was only the

wealthy who could afford to maintain the gentry ideal of joint family households.[6]

In contrast to the primacy of the father-son relationship in joint households, most peasant families stressed the husband-wife tie. Notwithstanding the wife's economic and domestic contribution to the maintenance of the conjugal unit, the political and social status of women reflected the agnatic principle which dictated:

> A boy is born facing in; a girl is born facing out. . . . Although there appears to have been some regional variation in the nature of the control over women exercised by those who had given bride-price for them, it is clear that the legal rights vested in the families from which women married were very few. Once married a woman visited her original family as a kind of guest and, at least in theory, only with the permission of her husband's people. (Freedman 1962: 31)

Although a woman earned increased power and greater recognition when she bore children, she was never completely assimilated into her husband's group. She retained her own surname, which excluded her lineal inscription of his family tablets. Her ultimate status coincided with her death, when she was buried in her husband's grave. A widow could remarry only with the permission of her husband's family. A young wife was also a catalytic agent, her presence promoting the fissile tensions that ended only with the "splitting" of economic family units.

Within the agnatic constellation, the wu fu principle overrode tsu (lineage) concerns in certain situations: "although it /the wu fu/ owns no property and is relatively impermanent and relatively informal in organization, its members have recognized obligations to one another" (Hu Hsien-Chin 1948: 17). Each member was required to attend all wu-fu ceremonies, particularly family funerals, and to be available to mediate chia disputes. An individual's wu fu included all of the people with whom

he maintained intimate social, political, and economic relationships.[7] One could not marry within the wu fu (who were generally people of the same surname) and, according to the codified Ch'ing law, an individual was not required to disclose the crimes or offences of his wu fu family.

Ancestor worship at the domestic shrine differed from ritual in the ancestral hall not only because a man had more intimate ties with recently departed relatives of the elementary household, but also because of the specific obligation he owned to deceased members of his close family.

> The survivor sought to provide the dead with the material comforts--housing, money, clothing, and food--which they continued to need in the other world. . . . In their turn the ancestors participated in the festivities of the home . . . gave advice on important matters . . . and used whatever powers they might have in the other world to bring benefits to those they had left on earth. When personal knowledge and affection for the dead began to fade, the ancestors were beginning to move forward to the boundary of the domestic shrine. (Freedman 1962: 84)

The intimacy of an individual's concern with his immediate, domestic ancestors, in contrast to the impersonal devotion he paid for ancestors beyond the third ascending generation, also reflects hid differential personal involvement with chia and with tsu kin. Analogously, although women were traditionally barred from ancestral halls (because of their loss of agnatic affiliation), they remained the central figures in domestic worship rituals.

> The women cared for the domestic shrines and probably carried out the ordinary daily rites of lighting incense. Certainly, if the behaviour of overseas Chinese is any guide, it was the women who had prime charge of the ancestors in the home, remembering their death-dates and praying to them in need. (Freedman 1962: 85)

Ancestor worship, albeit a significant feature of Chinese religious concern, comprised but one segment of the ethical-religious Gestalt.

> The Chinese word for religion is Chiao which means teaching or a system of teaching. To teach people to believe in a particular deity is a chiao; but to teach them how to behave toward other men is also a chiao. . . . /T/he Chinese people make no distinction between /animism/, the theistic religions,/ancestor worship/ and the more purely moral teaching of their sages. Therefore the term Chiao is applied to Buddhism, Taoism, Mohammedanism, as well as Confucianism. . . . They are all systems of moral teaching. Teaching a moral life is the essential thing; and the "ways of the gods" are merely one of the possible means of sanctioning that teaching. (Hu Shih 1934: 79)

Somehwat at odds with the ethical and moral principles embedded in the Chinese ideology, which mandates devotion to family over self-interest, is the traditional and widespread indulgence in opium smoking and in gambling. The contradictions inherent in the Chinese reliance on opium to "retreat into a state where conflict with the environment is reduced" (Hsu 1953: 61) are not directly addressed in the literature. Some historians (see, for example, Tsiang 1967, Yang 1945) explain the traditional use of the poppy derivative in terms of its pain-reducing function; others (Hsu 1953, Lafourette 1965, Franke 1967) totally disclaim the widespread use of opium prior to its nineteenth century introduction by British and Portuguese factors.[8]

In refutation of Francis Hsu's statement that "opium was introduced into China at the beginning of the nineteenth century . . . by the British"(Hsu 1953: 56), Immanuel Hsü (1970) states:

> The opium poppy was first introduced into China by the Arabs and the Turks in the late 7th or early 8th century. . . . /At first used/ chiefly as medicine or to relieve pain and reduce tension, opium smoking for pleasure was unknown until much later. . . . /T/ practice spread in the 1660's to Fukien and Kwantung. . . . It rapidly became a fad with the leisure classes, and before long even the poor took it up. The demand for opium led to increased foreign importation and to native cultivation in Szechwan, Yunan, Fukien . . . and Kwantug. From a moral concern, Emperor Yung-Cheng prohibited the sale and smoking of opium in 1729, and Emperor Chia-Ch'ing outlawed its importation and cultivation in 1796. (Hsü 1970: 215)

In 1773, Sino-British trading relationships, heretofore much more lucrative for China than for England,were transformed with the entry of the East India Company into the opium trade. The Company established a monopoly over the cultivation of the poppy in India and its distribution in China. Because of the eighteenth century imperial edict that prohibited the sale of opium in China, the East India Company took pains to disengage from "official" traffic,

> . . . by leaving its distribution to the country /British/ ships which sailed under the Company's license. . . . Thus the East India Company perfected the technique of growing opium cheaply and abundantly in India, while piously disowning it in China. Legally and officially, it was not involved in the illicit trade. (Hsü 1970: 215)

By 1938 the deficit of silver inflow ($18,000,000 worth of opium was imported, as against $17,000,000 worth of silk and tea exported) so angered Chinese officials that they demanded an immdiate end to opium traffic. The British government's answer to the ultimatum was to withdraw the trade monopoly it had granted to the East India Company and to enact a "free trade" resolution. In effect, the appointment of William Napier as chief superintendent of the British trade in China only"substituted official relations . . . for private relations" (Hsü 1970: 220). The British factors in China became even more propserous with their legitimization by the British government.[10]

In 1839 Commissioner Lin of Canton ordered the confiscation of over 20,000 chests of opium stored in British factories. When the factories gave his order only token compliance, Lin "ordered the stoppage of trade, the withdrawal of Chinese compradores and servants, and the siege of /a/ British factory" (Hsü 1970: 228). This ushered in the first phase of the Opium War. In retaliation against Lin's "piratical act," Chief Superintendent Elliot urged the Foreign Office to dispatch

a military and naval force to effect a total blockage of the ports of Canton and Ningpo.[11]

In 1842, after a series of "unsatisfactory" offers of concessions by the Chinese, official hostilities ended with the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, in terms of which the Chinese government agreed to

> 1. An indemnity of $21,000,000: $12,000,000 for military expenses, $6,000,000 for the opium destroyed by Commissioner Lin, and $3,000,000 for the repayment of hong merchants' debts to British traders. . . .
> 3. Opening of five ports to trade and residence of British consuls and merchants and their families.
> 4. Cession of Hong Kong (a barren island in 1840). /The Chinese text of the treaty euphemistically states that the Emperor graciously grants a place of rest and "storage" to the British after their long voyage to China/ (Hsü 1972: 237)

By 1807 British dominance over China's economy was clear: 84% of shipping, 34% of cotton-yarn spinning, and 100% of iron production were under their control; and 93% of China's railways were foreign-owned. By the second decade of the twentieth century, "the scope of foreign influence was as wide as the modern sector of Chinese economy, which had been reduced to 'semi-colonial'" (Hsü 1970: 523).

The severe imbalance in the cooper-silver exchange, caused by the continuing diminution of Chinese exports, caused a disastrous decline in the value of a common laborer's wages. Finding it impossible to support his family, a man resorted to loans from usurers, which involved him in spiralling and unpayable debt. Peasant families suffered as well. By the mid-1840s the decreasing size of individual land-holdings (fragmented each generation into smaller mou (1/6 acre parcels), so limited a peasant's production that he could no longer feed his family. Thousands of farmers sold their mou inheritances to become tenants of their chia landlors. By mid-nineteenth century, the increasing concentration of land in the hands of the wealthy gentry left

> . . . 60% to 90% of the people /with/ no land at all. The life of the landless peasant was wretched. He had to pay 50% of the yield for rent; and as the rent was not paid in kind but in commuted money, in the process of commutation usually another 30% was levied. . . .
>
> Many displaced and unemployed peasants drifted to the cities as porters, dockhands, and sailors, while others went abroad to seek a new life, and still others became idlers, rascals and bandits. Had there been large-scale industries in China at the time, these surplus persons might have found their way into productive channels, but unfortunately there were no such industries, and the jobless became a source of unrest in the society. (Hsü 1970: 272)

It was during this mid-nineteenth century period of economic and social depression that large numbers of Canton and Hong Kong landless farmers and jobless laborers left China for the countries of southeast Asia, Australia, and the Americas.[12] That such massive emigration out of China did not occur until the pressures of overpopulation, underemployment, famine, and consequent internal rebellion made life in the homeland intolerable for thousands of peasants and common laborers, can only be explained in terms of "the attachment of the average Chinese to his native soil and village, his strong kin ties, /and/ duties with regard to the ancestor cult" (Skinner 1947: 123).[13]

July 14, 1843, signalled the official entry of the British West India Company into the Chinese "coolie contract" trade. The Company's decision to import Chinese laborers followed the urgent requests of British Guianese planters for a new source of inexpensive labor to replace the emancipated black slaves and the East Indian workers who had completed the terms of their indenture. During the prior decade, thousands of Chinese had been "satisfactorily" introduced to plantation labor in the Straits settlements. The Company agreed with the planters,

> . . . that the introduction of Chinese coolies would probably have a better effect on the emancipated negroes than the introduction of any other race. They would set them an example of continuous and

> industrious application. Present political considerations in China (which made emigration without official consent illegal) made it necessary to limit the ports of embarkation to the Strait Settlements. Therefore any Chinese coolies engaged for the West Indian colonies would have already found their way to the Straits ports /mainly Singapore/ . . . (Campbell 1923: 89)

Secretary of State Lord Stanley attempted to design a "fair contract" for the Chinese laborers; he thus had to address the problem of the exclusively male nature of Chinese emigration. "Recognizing that tradition bound women to their ancestral villages" (Campbell 1923: 90), he suggested that the contracts be limited to five years, and that the coolie should be allowed to rescind his contract after arrival in the colony, if he felt that the contract terms of the labor conditions were unjust. The West India Company objected to the "power of immediate termination" clause. Lord Stanley effected a compromise, stating that the contract would be obligatory for six months after emigration and that prior termination of the contract would require the coolie to pay for his transfer home. At the end of each year of service, the contract laborer would have the option of continuing or rescinding the contract.

> Whatever the destination of the coolies under contract, the method of their recruitment was essentially the same. "A trifle advanced to give their hungriness food, a suit of clothes to cover their nudity, a dollar or two for their families, and candidates in abundance are found for transportation to any foreign land." The common designation of the system was "the buying and selling of pigs." (Campbell 1923: 94-95)

British firms, engaged by associations of West Indian employers, hired recruiters to "lure" coolies into "barracoons" (pig-pens). The promise of large gambling profits to offset debt-bondage persuaded thousands of Chinese to bet the "possession of their person" against freedom from debt.

> The fraudulent methods of recruitment, the shortage of food and water provided by mercenary agents, the harsh treatment not infrequently meted out by captain and crew on the long voyages across the Pacific . . . or across the Indian and Atlantic to Cuba (and the other Caribbean islands) occasioned, not seldom, riot . . . murder . . . and high mortality. (Campbell 1923: 97)

The planters, generally satisfied with the "industrious" Chinese laborers, urged the Company to step up its imports:

> Their physical endurance was superior to that of the East Indian indentured laborers, although . . . /For those Chinese who became ill/ their resistance to medical treatment by European doctors retarded their recovery--"Me no like English doctor; he wash out my inside all same as one teacup." (Campbell 1923: 106)

In 1856 the Dutch entered this recruitment trade when they found the Javanese and East Indian immigrant laborers on the Surinam polder farms to be not only unsatisfactory but also resistant and troublesome (see Malefijt 1963).

Campbell notes that the Chinese imported as contract laborers in the mid-nineteenth century, while they were characterized by their colonial employers as "valuable labourers . . . intelligent . . . independent and order-loving" (Campbell 1923: 160), nevertheless made no "distinct impression" on the social history of the colonies. She explains this as a consequence of the Chinese view that their employment was "temporary." Although most of these immigrants did not in fact return to their homeland after completion of their terms of contract, many believed they would return "home" eventually, with money and gifts to "reward the patience and fidelity of their families" (Campbell 1923: 160), an attitude that obviously affected the degree to which they were willing to try to integrate themselves with the host society.

Despite (or perhaps partly because of) the fact that many of these Chinese did not feel impelled to commit themselves wholly to the West

Indian societies in which they were now working, in general they appear to have made a successful "adaptation" to the Caribbean experience. I believe that an important reason for this is that the Chinese who emigrated to the Americas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries came mainly from the British-dominated port cities of Canton and Hong Kong. Such immigrants faced a re-adjustment to an already understood colonial situation of master-servant exploitation; they did not have to deal with novel demands in a totally alien context. Obviously, for those Chinese who came in the twentietch century to Aruba after a staging period in Surinam or British Guiana, adaptation was even more easily achieved.

The Chinese in Aruba

The relatively facile adjustment made by such Chinese emigrants to the Aruban condition derived not from a benevolent Dutch colonial ideology or regime, but from the greater influence that the Lago Oil Company in Aruba exerted on island policy. Because Lago, in effect, dominated the local government's decisions and practices (overtly until after World War II, and since then more covertly but no less effectively), it became "government" policy to afford the same status to the Chinese that it gave to all of Lago's wage-earning workers. For the Chinese, this status was considerably higher than they had previously known. Moreover, the piecemeal pattern of their settlement (as only small numbers of Chinese arrived within any one year) permitted them to ease into rather than to innundate the island society. Relevant in this respect is Bunzell's discussion of the different kinds of treatment afforded overseas Chinese around the world:

> What happened to all of the /se/ aggregates of Chinese depended on the interaction of a number of variables including the rates of migration and total number of migrants, the relative sizes of Chinese and host populations, the ethnic background of the migrants, the ways in which they made their livings in the new locale, and the political and social structure of the receiving society. (Bunzell 1958: 60)

The first few Chinese to settle in Aruba were crew members of British-owned oil transport vessels. When, in 1927, ownership of the oil transport company passed from a British to an American company and the British vessels were withdrawn, several of the Chinese sailors "jumped ship" to stay in Aruba and work for Lago.[14] In the late 1920s a second group, of approximately twenty "creole" Chinese, arrived from Surinam to work as cooks for Lago construction crews and maintenance men. As one of my older informants reminisced:

> Some of my friends who worked in Paramaribo /capital of Surinam/ went around the farms and villages to encourage us to listen to the people who had come from Aruba to offer us jobs. They said we would earn much more money and we would have more free time to enjoy ourselves. Anything seemed better to us than working on farms where we had nothing left over after we finished paying the company store and sent a little back to our homeland families.

For the first ten years after their arrival in Aruba, these young bachelors cooked and served three meals a day to refinery workers and (in a separate dining room) to expatriate foremen and supervisors.

> Actually we worked about 15 hours a day because we had to be up before dawn to start preparing for 6 o'clock breakfast. After the 5:30 dinner we had to wash and clean the dining halls, kitchen and barracks--it took until about 10 at night. Still, it was easier than the work we did in Surinam, and there was no problem in getting food, since we could have the left-overs from each meal. Also, nobody treated us bad and we had money to send homeand some left over for gambling.

By the late 1930s most of the Lago workers were housed in small bungalows: Lago needed fewer cooks and accordingly dismissed all but a few of them. Those men who had managed to accrue some capital opened

small cafeteria-saloons, rum shops, or groceries in St. Nicholas. Others sought different employment in the Lago refinery complex--as time-keepers and machine-shop operators. By this time the Chinese population had been augmented by over fifty Trinidadian Chinese and by several Hong Kong and Canton men whose emigration was financed by relatives in Aruba. Many of the Trinidadian Chinese, however, left Aruba in the 1950s when approximately two thousand "non-essential" personnel were dismiseed. Lacking naturalization papers and being unable to find profitable employment they were unable to retain their working papers. Along with over a thousand West Indians, these Chinese returned to their "home" islands.

The 1948 census figure of 271 Chinese did not reflect the true size of the Chinese segment of the population before the massive "lay-off" period (in 1952) because "creole" Chinese were officially registered by the immigration department as "nationals" of their islands of embarkation and therefore were not counted as Chinese.[15] My Chinese informants believe the present (1973) size of the group to be about 500. Their estimates are based on the membership rolls of the Chinese Club. (The figure of 500 is based on the 160 adult members, with 3 to 4 children per couple--only one "extended family," which I will discuss later in this section, does not belong to the club.)

That 80% of the present Chinese population is Roman Catholic not only reflects the traditionally eclectic attitudes of these people toward religious affiliation, but is also explicable in terms of their pragmatic response to the demographic exigencies of the 1930s. Into the first two decades of the twentieth century, the long-standing reluctance of Chinese

families to permit emigration of their wed and unwed daughters precluded arrangements between overseas and homeland Chinese:

> It was supposed that the wife's presence in the home village meant that the young man must eventually return to China, and before he returned he would send regular remittances home to support his family. . . . Many young men, from families who could not afford wedding expenses, emigrated unmarried. Others looked for a temporary or a second wife in their new countries. (Michison 1961: 36)

Notwithstanding the parallel reluctance of Aruban families to give their daughters in marriage to non-Arubans, many Chinese-Aruban weddings were celebrated into the 1950s.

Malefijt's (1963) account of the rationalizations offered by the Javanese of Surinam for "outside" marriages is also relevant here:

> Of the more feasible marriages outside the Javanese group, the Chinese were by far the most desirable. The Javanese image of Chinese men was often expressed by stating that they are "dangerous" people. But the connotation of this term is by no means negative. To be "dangerous" means to be daring, bold, venturesome, courageous: characteristics to be admired, more so because these are not among the most outstanding features of the Javanese themselves. Through these attributes the Chinese were very successful in business. . . .
>
> Javanese informants entertained the belief that "in the city" a great number of Chinese made a good living by secretly operating gambling houses, opium dens, or brothels. All in all the Chinese were considered to be good providers. Moreover, there was a folk belief that the conjugal union of a Chinese man with a Javanese woman is very fertile, so that many children may be expected. . . . (Malefijt 1963: 118)[16]

Albeit Malefijt's characterization of the Javanese as a gentle, passive people (and strongly resistant to change) coincides with the personality stereotype attributed to the Aruban, I do not suggest an absolute identity of rationalization for inter-racial marriage in the two societies. However, I believe that in both instances the "industriousness" of the Chinese immigrants, as well as their "exotic," non-threatening image, made them more desirable marriage partners than the "black" West Indian immigrants.

Although the first group of Chinese to marry Aruban girls retained their Buddhist or Protestant religious affiliations, the children of these intermarriages were baptized as Roman Catholics. Thus the set of circumstances that caused the offspring of nineteenth century Sephardic-Aruban marriages to become Roman Catholic also affected, in the 1930s, the Chinese-Aruban children.

> In the twenties and thirties of this century most families in China for the first time allowed wives to migrate with their husbands, or to join already established husbands or fiances. Most of the . . . governments welcomed the Chinese women and allowed them in on more generous quotas than were applied to Chinese men. The argument was that unmarried Chinese men led an unnatural life. . . . It was hoped that more Chinese family life would cut down on Chinese men's crimes of violence, opium smoking and gambling. (Mitchison 1961: 42)[17]

The Aruban Chinese began to import wives from Hong Kong during the late 1940s, and the inception of this practice may well coincide with the beginning of their ethnic enclaving. The enclaving occurred despite the fact that most of the Chinese who "imported" their wives agreed to the incorporation of their children into the larger Roman Catholic affiliation:

> When our children were ready to start school we were told that the Dutch schools had no room for them and that we would have to send them to the parochial schools in St. Nicholas. So our children were baptized Roman Catholic. There weren't enough of us who were Buddhist to build a temple or hire a teacher to instruct them in the Chinese way, so what else could we do?

Whatever the circumstances that led to conversion, the fact that 80% of the Chinese in Aruba <u>are</u> Roman Catholic clearly improves their status in the larger Aruban society. Nevertheless, these families do not participate in the social activities offered by the Roman Catholic church, and they say that they prefer to socialize with "their own." Moreover, the older Chinese do not consider themselves to be bound by

such religious affinities. They say that, more importantly, the two segments that arrived during the 1930s (the creole and the homeland Chinese) are linked by mutual social, political, and economic interests.

Since their earliest days in Aruba the needs of the Chinese people, largely ignored by the colonial administration, have been served through the offices of the Chinese Club. Until 1950 the Chinese Club in St. Nicholas was a small barracks-like structure, whose primary function was to provide cafeterial services for the Chinese bachelors. The few married women took turns at cooking and serving meals. After the war, with most of the bachelors married, the Club members decided that the kitchen facilities were too expensive to maintain on a daily basis. In 1950 a larger and more elaborate structure was built on the original site. Since that time the club has functioned as a social and gambling center, and as a meeting place for the merchants to discuss their business activities.[18] In addition, according to the statement made to me by a Chinese merchant, "it takes the place of a Chinese consulate. We help our members to obtain passports and we intercede for those members who only speak Chinese. Government officials contact our officers and we translate their requests to our people."

The 160 couples pay an annual fee to support the purchase and maintenance of sporting equipment (pool and ping-pong tables, basketballs, and children's games), gambling materials (chiefly mah-jhong sets, checkers, poker chips, and cards), and movies and cartoons for the children.[19] Part of each subscription goes toward the purchase of special foods and decorations for New Year and family celebrations, and part is placed in a "welfare fund." From this fund small amounts of cash are advanced as interest-free loans to "temporarily embarrassed"

members. Although one of the officials told me that the club primarily serves as a "benevolent association," the money-lending activities of the club differ from their counterparts in traditional Chinese associations (see Fei 1939: 267 and Smith 1899: 152)wherein "groups of people engaged themselves to pay sums of money at regular intervals, the collections being placed at the disposal of individual members in turn" (Freedman 1958: 93). The "benevolent" nature of the club in Aruba lies not only in the extension of interest-free loans, but also in the "comfort and welcome it affords to Chinese from all parts of the world who come to visit or stay in Aruba." In short, the Chinese Club largely conforms to Freedman's model of "voluntary association" among mainland and overseas urban Chinese:

> We know of Chinese life in the big towns and in the places overseas where Chinese settled that, in the setting of urban occupations and social alignments not resting on traditional principles, associations--some more voluntary than others--were built up to co-ordinate economic activity and provide the groupings within which social life might generally be regulated. . . . Studies of Chinese overseas have demonstrated the high degree to whichvoluntary associations, recruiting on a number of different principles, have ordered both the local and the wider ties of the settlers. (Freedman 1958: 93)

Thus, my creole Chinese informants state that, although initially they felt no affinity with the homeland immigrants who arrived during the early 1940s, the social and political bonds that were created in the Chinese Club brought them into harmony with the later arrivals. Also, through exposure to the activities and interests of the homeland Chinese, the creole group "reactivated" for themselves many of the homeland traditions and values--such as large family celebrations and the religious as well as secular rituals involved in New Year's observances.

It was particularly difficult for me to determine whether the obvious group solidarity that exists between the creole and the homeland Chinese was a direct consequence of the specific efforts of club members to foster "unity" or whether it had appeared in response to awareness by the Arubans of the growing affluence of the Chinese immigrants. My Chinese informants, invariably polite but very busy, offered evasive answers to my questions about their relationships with the other segments. No "homey" anecdotes supplemented their brief replies to my questions about the growing prosperity of their community and the accompanying diminution of their socializing with other groups of segments of the population. Responses were generalized, vague, and obfuscatory. "Oh, we have several businesses here and there. . . ." "Of course we have social dealings with all the peoples on the island . . . but of course our homes and the club are only for us." Only once did an informant make a specific statement about the Ashkenazim:

> My closest friends, outside my own circle, are the Jews in Aruba and Curaçao. In many ways it is hard to tell the difference between us in customs, and especially in feelings about family and friends. The Jews here are most like the Chinese.

The Chinese merchants presently hold a virtual monopoly over the small retail and wholesale grocery establishments that cater to the Arubans and West Indians. By the 1960s their newly built "supermarkets," owned and managed by family units, significantly augmented the family incomes. Profits from grocery stores, "crib-saloons" in St. Nicholas, fine restaurants in Oranjestad, and "other" (never elaborated on) business interests in Aruba and Curaçao, pour into pei coffers. As the owner of one luxurious restaurant-hotel in St. Nicholas (host to the aforementioned Bar Mitzvah reception) explained:

> My wife manages this place, which leaves me free to conduct my "other" business in Curacao. My mother runs a "cafeteria" /crib-saloon/ near the refinery gate and my younger brother is the automobile dealer in Savaneta /one of the largest franchises in Aruba/. No, none of us own any of these businesses individually. We share ownership of all of the enterprises, under the family name.

Evidence of exclusion of the Chinese from the larger Aruban society is, as it is for the Ashkenazim, only indirectly ascertainable. The practice of Chinese-Aruban intermarriage terminated during the early 1950s. A shy, Singapore-born matron explained the decision of homeland Chinese to import their wives from Hong Kong:

> My first cousin /manager of the aforementioned restaurant-hotel in St. Nicholas/ arranged for my passage here from Hong Kong (where I lived most ofmy life) to marry her neighbor's son. She also brought my sister to marry one of their bachelor friends. . . . We don't have the same kind of association in Aruba that the Chinese have in other places, where the whole association contributes to the passage of people from our homeland--here, people are brought over by individual families. . . .
>
> Before automation, when there were many more hundreds of Chinese living in Aruba, a lot of Chinese men, especially those from Surinam and Trinidad, married Arubans. But most of these marriages didn't work out--there were too many divorces. So the men decided to send for their wives to Hong Kong. . . . Now they are very much happier.
>
> Maybe I shouldn't tell you, a stranger, but I am very happy with my husband. He is very good, very loving. . . . He doesn't not need to go to bars where there are prostitutes . . . like most of the men do.

A 24-year-old bachelor, born in Hong Kong, confirmed her explanation. He emphatically asserted that, although he is not yet ready for marriage (he is presently completing doctoral studies in New York), he will eventually marry a Chinese girl:

> Those marriages to Arubans were bad. The Aruban women used their husbands to advance themselves financially, but too many of them shared their family's feelings that they were superior to the "money-grubbing Chinee". . . . Funny, my folks say that at first the Arubans didn't mind our men marrying their girls . . . not when we were just starting out in business. . . . Well, anyhow, at this point we don't want to marry them. A Chinese girl knows her place, she defers to her man, anticipates his wants, and trains the children to the Chinese way. That's better for us.

Concurrently with the increase in their wealth, the Chinese parents decided to send their children abroad for advanced schooling. The limited educational services in Aruba and the parental concern over the liasons between their children and Aruban and West Indian youngsters overrode, as it did for the Ashkenazim, the heavy burden of financing overseas college education. Thus, the proprietor of a dingy bar-cafeteria on the main street of St. Nicholas proudly related the scholastic achievements of six of her eight children:

1. eldest son, 27--received his bachelor's degree at Cambridge, now broadcasts for BBC
2. eldest daughter, 25--attended a "posh" modelling school in London, is a high fashion mannequin
3. second son, 23--graduated from the University of Amsterdam, is with the Aero-Space program in England
4. second daughter, 22--earned her bachelor's degree at the University of Arizona
5. third son, 20--attends Lowell Technological Institute in Massachusetts
6. third daughter, 18--is enrolled in a pre-medical program at a London college

The youngest daughter, about to graduate from the Collegio Arubano (advanced secondary school), plans to attend college in Canada. Her youngest son's decision to work for Lago rather than to attend college marks him "the black sheep of the family."[20]

My curiosity about the "hidden" source of wealth requisite for the tuition, transportation, room, and board of seven chilren prompted my investigation into the "other" sources of family income. Although my informant dismissed my questions about her musband's participation in the family business, merely muttering "He works down the street," I later discovered that he is the owner-operator of one of the most lucrative (and sleazy-looking) crib-saloons in St. Nicholas. Further inquiry into the large incomes issuing from bars that provide the services of prostitutes, compared with those which only offer liquor, opened a new channel of investigation--into the involvement of many of the Chinese merchants in prostitution.

The bars that include two or three "crib-calls" on the premises are all Chinese-owned. A creole agent who recruits the prostitutes from Colombia also arranges for their three-month work permit--which is stamped "meeteren," Dutch for seamstress.[21] The prostitute pays the bar-owner only a minimal rental fee for her crib and retains almost all of her nightly earnings.[22] The economic advantages to the landlord derive from the large amounts of liquor she urges upon her prospective customers, and her commitment to him is to persuade each man to buy (for herself as well as for him) as many drinks as possible before the couple retires to the crib. On Friday and Saturday nights in St. Nicholas the bustling bar-business of crib-saloons contrasts significantly with the forlornly deserted crib-free bars.

It was not possible for me to discover whether all of the more prosperous Chinese families include in their pei holdings one or more of these crib-saloons, but I suspect that such is the case. Given the medically acknowledged incidence of Aruban alcoholism, and the socially accepted practice of "drinking with the boys" in crib-saloons on Friday and Saturday nights, I believe that the revenue from these bars is potentially too great to be passed over by pei enterprises.

It is likely that the annual incomes and the total assets of the Chinese segment at least equal and perhaps surpass those of the Ashkenazim. Nevertheless the images of the two groups perceived by outsiders do not coincide. The Arubans acknowledge that the Chinese are "pretty rich," but they do not regard them with the hostility that they show towards the Ashkenazim. It is true that by the 1950s the Chinese could no longer be regarded as "exotics" (see Hoetink's /1967/ discussion of the degree of objectivity held for exotic groups in colonial societies).

Moreover, the cessation of Chinese-Aruban marriages after World War II, the increasingly social and political functions of the Chinese Club, and the exclusive nature of Chinese hospitality and socializing suggest that a growing social separation of the Chinese from the rest of the Aruban population coincided with the rising prosperity of the Chinese. Despite all this, the attitude toward them remains one of relative tolerance.

I believe that, in addition to the religious affinity shared by most of the Chinese with the Roman Catholic Arubans, the acceptance of the former as a distinct group depends on two interrelated factors: the short-term credit arrangements that the Chinese extend to Arubans; and the indispensable goods and services that the Chinese provide--in contrast to the non-essential or luxury items sold by the Ashkenazim.

The family-owned and-operated groceries and rum-shops of the Chinese operate on minimal capital; the clerks are generally not paid wages but receive "allowances" to supplement their free room and board. Staple foods (rice, sugar, flour, cornmeal, for example) are purchased from Chinese wholesalers (who generally reside in Oranjestad) and sold in small units (a kilo or less) to customers who cannot afford to pay cash (and cannot receive credit for the larger and more expensive packages in the supermarkets). Similarly, Aruban and West Indian men make their daily purchases of pint bottles of rum and whiskey at the rum shops. For those customers who lack the ready cash, the store owners extend short-term credit, expecting to be paid as soon as the men receive their paychecks. Thus food and liquor debts do not become onerous burdens for families with limited incomes.

After a man pays his family's bills for food, liquor, rent, and utilities, he spends the remainder of his cash on "his pleasures"--drinking and carousing at the crib-saloons. At this point he has no cash left to pay off his many debts. In order of priority items (to most Arubans and many West Indians) these include:

car-loan--"My car is more important than my feet!"[23]

television set--to be found in even remote cunucu areas (the more affluent Arubans have been purchasing color sets, even though there are at present no plans for introducing color reception to the island)

refrigerator--in almost every house (ice for non-electric food chests is very expensive)

air conditioner--considered to be "necessary" in houses that face away from the trade wind

(All of these payments are made to Aruban loan companies.)

clothing--Arubans are very clothes-conscious: "We are not like the people from the other islands. We make good money and we want everyone (tourists particularly) to see us always at our best."

jewelry--gold or gold-plated watches, rings, bracelets, and earrings are worn by even the poorer Arubans and West Indians.

(These payments, for "luxury goods" /clothing and jewelry/ are made to the Ashkenazic merchants.)

As purveyors of luxury goods, the Ashkenazim are the last to be paid. The average working family generally has no cash left by the end of a pay period to buy outright the clothing and jewelry that Arubans and West Indians feel are necessary accessories to the decorative image they want to uphold. These items are invariably purchased with very small down payments. With little or no liquid assets to meet the ever-compounding interest on established credit, the cost of a watch, for example, can soar from the original tagged price of $50 to $125 in as little as three years. Workers rely on their Christmas bonus checks

and vacation pay to diminish these debts. Unfortunately, few of the luxury items are completely paid for before they are supplemented with newly purchased replacements.

The amount of resentment and anger which the Arubans (more so than the West Indians) express toward the Ashkenazic merchants seems to be commensurate with the amount of their debts. On the other hand, I seldom heard any Arubans make hostile statements about the Chinese merchants: "They're fair. They don't soak us for so much. They understand that we have to live, and that their living depends on our living." Although my Aruban and West Indian informants recognize that the Chinese are relatively wealthy, they appear to be unaware of the extensive nature of Chinese family holdings. This ignorance stems, I believe, from the "low profile" that the Chinese offer to the other segments of the population, a profile that coincides with the tradition of moderation and "holding to the position of the mean" (Chai Ch'u 1962: 130). The modest homes and furnishings of all of my Chinese informants did not reflect their real affluence. Except for those few social occasions when the Chinese Club (also modestly furnished) is open to the public, Chinese parties and family celebrations are restricted to "members only."

The one Chinese family group that remains aloof from even this closed circle of compatriots is a source of annoyance to my Chinese friends. This "extended," farming family of seven adult men, three women, and four children operates a lush vegetable farm, irrigated by the one dependable inland stream at the southeastern end of the island. They employ a Papiamentu-speaking creole to deliver vegetables to the small grocery stores. The adults apparently do not leave the farm, and, except for the daily trips of the children to a St. Nicholas school, the

family shows no interest in island activities. The two visits I made to the farm (accompanied by one of my Chinese-American students) revealed a family whose clothing, farming techniques, and total solidarity indicated that they had no association with the larger society:

> We don't even know where they came from! They live too poor. . . . They might as well have stayed in China. We've offered them membership in the club but they never even answered. . . . We can't imagine why they bothered to come here.

The Chinese in Aruba profess to be unaffected by the rising tide of Aruban nationalism. They have refrained from participation in island political affairs, and they agree that only "known Aruban families" can operate successfully in the local and central governments. Throughout the island elections campaigns of 1969, they evinced no overt interest in the outcome.

> Most of us old-timers never received naturalization so we don't vote. Our children are not interested either, although they are Antillean citizens. We do our work and send what money we can to our families in China. We train our children at home "in the Chinese way," and we hope they don't marry outside their tradition. If they /the Arubans/ decide to make us leave, well, most of us are ready to retire anyway, and our children seem to want to live in the United States or Europe.

If this group is expelled along with other non-nationals, this will happen not because the Chinese are held in low esteem, but rather because they will be "lumped" with the "foreign exploiters" and, as such, will have to leave the island. If indeed the pressure increases to "rid our island of the non-nationals," the Chinese in Aruba may suddenly find themselves to be classified as "The Jews of the East."

NOTES

[1]"The pamphlet was rumored to have been written by the young Thai King Wachirawut" (Mitchison 1962: 23).

[2]"Creole" refers to the Chinese who emigrated during the 1850s as contract laborers for the Caribbean plantocracy; the "homeland" Chinese migrated directly from Hong Kong or Canton to Aruba during the twentieth century.

[3]In fact, the expensive tutoring and intensive study required to pass the stringent examination levels virtually narrowed the competitive field to sons of wealth gentry.

[4]The People's Republic continues to support this principle--"extolling the root and supress/ing/ the branch" (Chai Ch'u 1962: 74).

[5]The typical village household size is represented by Lang's (1947) study of a Fukien village of forty families:

	Conjugal	Stem	Joint
Poor peasants	10	8	3
Middle peasants	3	5	1
Well-to-do peasants	1	-	3
Merchants and Landowners	1	1	4

"Conjugal" refers to the "small family" of a man, his wife, and their unmarried children; "stem" refers to the elementary family with the addition of the husband's parents.

[6]I stress Freedman's analysis because of its relevance to the emigration of nineteenth and twentieth century peasants. Sons who were not hampered by restrictive filial obligations could disengage from family enterprises without undue disruption of household arrangements.

[7]The "hard core" of an individual's wu fu included his agnatic third cousins and four ascending and descending generations in the direct line of descent.

[8]The Canton Trade in opium was conducted between private Hong (commercial firm) agents and British "factories."

[9]Analogous perhaps to the "social" clubs of British, gentlemen, wherein the ostensibly solidary atmosphere merely served as a secure background within which one could retreat into silent and solitary preoccupation. In the Chinese opium den, communication is virtually non-existent: within a few minutes after the fumes are inhaled, the user withdraws into a dream-filled stupor.

[10]"In 1838, nine out of ten people in Kwantung and Fukien provinces were addicts, and opium shops in their towns were as common as gin shops in England. . . . /Addicts included/ government officials, merchants, literati, women, servants, soliders, and even monks, nuns, and priests" (Hsü 1970: 217).

[11]The British expeditionary force consisted of "sixteen warships mounting 540 guns, four armed steamers, twenty-seven transports, one troop ship, and 4,000 soldiers" (Hsü 1970: 321).

[12]By 1852 an estimated 24,560 "coolies" emigrated to the Caribbean from Canton; between 1856 and 1857 18,000 Hong Kong coolies were shipped out on contract to British Guiana planters.

[k3]Although I could find no data that enumerated such details as the rates of emigration of eldest son versus younger sons, I suggest, based on my fieldwork investigations, that the eldest son, charged with the "extra portion" of responsibility for the family ancestral shrine, was not free to break homeland ties. On the other hand, the younger sons, who had the "legal right" to dispose of individually held mou parcels, could leave more easily.

This would coincide with the situation that obtained for the Curaçaoan Sephardim who emigrated to Aruba: for the Sephardim the rule of primogeniture facilitated emigration for the younger sons.

[14]Estimates of the size of this group of sailors from Hong Kong range from 15 to 25.

[15]Census figures for "foreign residents" issue from the passports temporarily relinquished upon entry into Aruba.

[16]"The stereotyped notion of the Chinese as an invariably fertile population is contradicted by their demographic history in British Guiana. At no time have the Chinese made any sensational increases in numbers and they have always been among those groups in the colony which had the lowest birthrates. Between 1931 and 1946, for example, the Chinese birthrate was virtually constant at about 20 per thousand; during the same period the East Indians increased their rate from 37.1 to 40 per thousand." (Fried 1958: 52)

[17]My chief informant, whose father was Chinese, her mother Aruban, recalled (after our four years of close friendship) that her childhood home included an opium den. A trap-door in the kitchen floor led to the "secret" basement. Although the room was off limits to the children, my friend remembers the weekly visits of her father's merchant friends, who "waved to me as they disappeared under the kitchen floor."

Thus in Aruba, at least, marriage to Aruban or Chinese women did not lead to "cutting down . . . on opium-smoking."

[18]One of my creole informants, however, asserted that he prefers to play cards with his Aruban wife's family and friends. "When we play poker together they drink a lot--I have a better chance of winning."

[19]My informant, an officer of the club, seemed to be annoyed by my interest in the amount of the membership fee. He suggested that, as the Chinese confined financial discussions to members of the group, I would be well advised to refrain from asking any of my Chinese acquaintances about "money matters."

[20]This family is the largest Chinese "small family" in Aruba. The families of my other informants did indeed conform to the norm of three to four children per family represented by the club officials.

[21]An official in the Social Welfare Department explained that the appelation actually comes from a Dutch slang association of "sewing" with "fornication."

[22]After her three-month stint, the girl returns to Colombia with from $1,500 to $3,000 (U.S.). I was told that this money is used by single girls as dowry payment, married women put it toward the education of their children or as down payment on a house.

[23]The interest rates on car loans are excessively high, because, rather than repossess automobiles (of which there are presently one er per six people), the loan companies issue new heavily compounded loans when the initial loan period runs out.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE WEST INDIANS

Historical Background

Although the Chinese of the East Indies have been called the "Jews of the East" (Mitchison 1961: 24) because of their similar economic interests, an even more remarkable affinity has been posited between the black people of the West Indies and the European Jews:

> The general historical experience of the Caribbean Negro peoples, all in all, has not been unlike that of the European Jew. Both of them have been uprooted peoples at the perennial mercy of the forces of migration and accident. "Like the Jews", a Jamaican observer noted in 1899 of his own folk, "they have had unforgettable experiences. They have come through the wilderness, through a land of drought and of the shadow of death, through a land that no white man /??/ has passed through, and where no white man has dwelt, and the misery and loneliness of it all is still with them. (Lewis 1968: 66)

From my observations of the dependency relationships of the West Indian residents of St. Nicholas with the Jewish merchants, the notion that a common diaspora might have served to initiate even a fragile bond of empathy between these disparate groups, is absurd. From the time of their arrival in Aruba, the roles and statuses of the Jews and the "English" were clearly set into exploitative opposition.[1]

The historical circumstances that led to the periodic exodus of European Jews to "the land of opportunity," and the factors that were influential in shaping their group identity, are not those which

affected the condition of Caribbean blacks. To assess the early and present status and hierarchical ordering of the West Indian segments in Aruba, the relevant variables derive less from the African heritage and the colonial life of plantation slaves, than they do from the varied social adaptations of the Caribbean blacks to specific post-colonial developments. For Arubans do not view their West Indian co-residents as a homogeneous group; instead, they assign distinct (albeit negative) personality labels to each island group, labels that reflect the differential statuses of "outside" blacks.[2]

Dutch Antillean blacks (from Surinam, and from the Leeward and Windward Islands) hold a separate position from that of the British Caribbean islanders. Whereas straightforward competition apparently is the motivating force behind the antagonism that Arubans express toward their black partners in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, socio-economic factors underly the relationships of Arubans and West Indians.

During the period from 1930 to 1950, the imported West Indian workers comprised almost half of the Lago labor force.[3] The decision of the Lago management to import thousands of Caribbean workers "because the Arubans were largely unskilled" (Hartog 1961: 315) still irks my Aruban informants:

> Where did they get those skills? They were only poor farmers like us. And what skill was needed, anyway. After all, we had always built our own homes, furniture, shops . . . with our own hands. No, they hired them because they knew they could control the outsiders--ship anyone out who acted up. Also, they spoke English . . . really a bastard English . . . and we, who spoke Papiamentu, Dutch and Spanish, were discriminated against in favor of those black illiterate peons.

The perjorative labels that Arubans pin to Caribbean groups are personality or character tags, not phenotypical markers.

Predictably, the most negative descriptions are reserved for those groups whose behavior and attitudes contrast most sharply with the ideal of the "passive, gentle Aruban" (Green 1969: 65). The decreasing order of hostility Arubans express toward the West Indians coincides with the Big versus Little island origins of the Lago workers:

Big Islanders	Labels
Bee Gees (Guyanese)	loud, arrogant, bossy
Jamaicans	too emotional, uncontrollable
Trinidadians	non-conformists, know-it-alls
Little Islanders	
Bajuns (Barbados)	more reliable (for blacks)
Kittitians (St. Kitts)	softer, not much trouble
Nevis and St. Vincent	more religious, little trouble

For the proper understanding of the origin of these ascriptions, I believe it is more relevant to concentrate on the local political and socio-economic factors that preceded the emigration of Caribbean blacks to Aruba than to probe into the variant African heritages of these people: first, because Aruban-West Indian relationships depend on the specific island nationalities of the incoming groups, and, second, because of the inherent problems that complicate the study of West Indians as African transplants. The very concept of a shared African inheritance

> . . . presupposes a uniformity and uniqueness of African cultures which ethnography does not support . . . /even when studies are confined to the British Caribbean colonies, as a subdivision of the Caribbean complex/ . . . the ambiguity derives from the inverted order of this study of African heritage. Instead of starting at the beginning of the process of culture contact and change and then tracing its development up to the present, we start at one end of such a process and try to reconstruct hypothetical courses of development for attributions of varying status and value. (Smith 1957: 36)

Smith dismisses the "African survivals" postulated by Herskovits (1938, 1948) and Clarke (1953) as "ambiguous . . . parallelisms" (Smith 1957: 42), and he suggests that African ascriptions should be analyzed meticulously, "from the clearly known to the less clearly known, from the concrete and particular to the general" (Smith 1959: 45).

Because the "meticulous" investigation proposed by Smith has not yet been undertaken for the British Caribbean populations (Mintz 1971), it is not possible to assess with accuracy the common ancestral cultural heritage of New World blacks. On the other hand, the specific conditions of slavery on British-controlled plantations varied little from island to island.[5]

The relative homogeneity of plantation societies throughout the Caribbean area (whether under British, French, or Dutch domination) derives from several commonly held conditions: monocrop sugar production, which required heavy foreign capital investment; the consequent credit arrangements with European banking and mercantile houses, and absentee proprietorship "even in the hey-day of sugar prosperity" (Lowenthal 1972: 34). Moreover, even the resident European planters formed no enduring social ties in the West Indies. The profits accruing to the planters from their exploitation of the islands flowed back to their metropolitan creditors.

Canesugar cultivation was so labor-intensive that planters were increasingly concerned to secure the least expensive, the hardiest, and the most controllable workers:

> African slaves were not only cheaper than indentured servants, but they and their offspring were bound for life and were presumably already habituated to hard tropical labour. Slaves were needed in quantity; a West Indian sugar plantation of 500 to 1000

> acres might require 250 hands in field and factory. . . . Sugar not only caused Caribbean territories to resemble one another, it substantially unified them. (Lowenthal 1972: 28)

Despite the frequent changes in metropolitan governance ("St. Lucia changed hands seven times in the space of half a century" /Lowenthal 1972: 29/), planters of diverse national allegiances were more concerned with maintaining their interdependence, sharing common problems (slave uprisings, outside competition), interests, and values, then with far-removed metropolitan policies. Many planters extended their land-holdings to islands that were dominated by rival metropoles. In effect, they came to consider themselves as transnational: "Legislative decrees broadcast throughout the Caribbean gained support from and buttressed the authority of local élites" (Lowenthal 1972: 31), so that, for instance, English, Dutch, and French planters made common cause against runaway slaves.

Into the post-colonial period, the small numbers of the population who were neither master nor slave--the indentured servants, the merchants, the yeoman farmers--were no more stable a population than were the planters. As rootless as the European planters and the African slaves, the members of these classes frequently changed jobs and residence in the hope of finding more lucrative employment on "greener" islands. Many slaves also moved about; some were transhipped as plantation labor requirements shifted, other escaped from bondage on one island to become "free colored" on another.

Thus, for owner and slave, for merchant and servant, the pervasive discontents engendered by rootlessness, by the rigors and cultural sterility of plantation life, by the irritations of an imposed

symbiosis--persisted into the post-emancipation period. That a common "social will to evolve" did not emerge until the twentieth century Furnivall (1939) explains as a natural concomitant of the plural nature of these societies.[6] But, accepting the modified and less limiting conditions for pluralism advanced by M. G. Smith (1960) and by Despres (1967), such concepts are too general to account for the differential movements of Caribbean societies toward nationalism and independence, or for the intergroup rivalries that have occasionally spurred rather than retarded the development of positive group identity.[7]

Another commonly expressed rationale for the delay in the development of strong group identity (again explanatory only in the generalized sense, and therefore no more adequate than the concept of pluralism to account for differential development), is the "deep-rooted state of mind which is the most lasting legacy of a prolonged exposure to colonial institutions and affect/s/ every aspect of life" (Balandier 1951: 81). This postulated "culture of poverty", asserted by Dizard (1970) to be the primary deterrent to the growth of a black "collective identity," serves, as does the essentially static notion of pluralism, to obscure the realities of differential group adaptation in the Caribbean area. I suggest that a more fruitful approach to the dynamics of group identification (for the Caribbean area, at least) demands an inquiry into the post-emancipation diversification of the island economies and the concomitant possibilities for employment that obtained for the larger islands but not for the small monocrop "sugar" islands.

The specific conditions that preceded the abolition of the slave trade and the emancipation of the slaves in the British Caribbean islands are addressed in this fashion by contemporary scholars (see Waddell 1967; Lowenthal 1972; Parry and Sherlock 1963). These authors agree that the abolition of slavery in the West Indies occurred not so much in response to the humanitarian efforts of British social reformers, but from the promptings of metropolitan mercantilists and creditors. When beet sugar from India became cheaper and more accessible to European markets, the demand for the excessively taxed and monopolistically controlled West Indian cane sugar rapidly diminished. It then served the interests of the commercial establishment to join with the social reformers in the crusade to terminate the slave trade and then to abolish the slave system.

The gradual decline of the West Indian plantations, after the Emancipation Act of 1834, began with the resistance of the freed blacks of Jamaica, Trinidad, and British Guiana to the stop-gap system of compulsory apprenticeship imposed by the plantocracy. Under this system, the newly freed slaves were obliged to spend up to three-quarters of each working week in the employ of their former masters. However, the freed blacks on these islands could resist successfully because of a fortuitous availability of economic options.

Toward the close of the eighteenth century many planters on the larger islands and territories, concerned to lessen the dependence of their slaves on expensive imported foods, introduced new food plants (cocoa, yam, ackee, and breadfruit) and encouraged the slaves and freemen to cultivate small garden plots. After emancipation, the freed blacks

> . . . forsook the estates for smallholdings--often extensions of slave garden plots--on abandoned lands or in the hills. Many bought or simply squatted on unused private or Crown lands. Cooperative groups . . . established many free villages.
>
> In Guiana, the movement /toward independent farming/ was on an impressive scale. In Berbice, in 1838, out of a population of 20,000 there were 15,000 who were newly emancipated and none of these owned land. Four years later over 1,000 of these families owned 7,000 acres purchased at a cost of more than $100,000. . . . There was a similar wave of settlement in Jamaica, where also land space exceeded the supply of labour. . . . In Guiana the expansion was on to land that was fertile and rich. The choice was more restricted in Jamaica. . . . Many estate owners . . . thought that they could compel labour to accept their terms if they could deprive them of the use of the/ir/ grounds and so they drove them from the estates by high rentals and by ejections. Missionaries . . . gave a lead in the establishment of free villages, and the general result of this process transformed the emancipated slave into a peasant proprietor. . . . It appears that the number of freeholders assessed in 1838 was 2,014; and in 1840, 7,848. (Parry and Sherlock 1966: 195-96)

Thus, in the larger and more agriculturally diversified island territories, many ex-slaves were able to become independent farmers and many more were at least semi-independent, supplementing family income with temporary wage labor on the plantations. "On the other hand, in such fully exploited islands as Barbados (St. Kitts, Nevis) and Antigua there was no room for the emergence of an independent peasantry" (Waddell 1967: 86).

Into the twentieth century, the independent peasantry of the larger territories could, until they themselves were tied into the export markets, largely ride out the fluctuating periods of prosperity and depression that affected the monocrop sugar plantations into the twentieth century. Rice cultivation in British Guiana and banana growing in Jamaica, initially small-scale peasant enterprises for domestic subsistence, came to be the major sources of income for those peasant farmers who entered the export trade. Many sugar plantations

also converted to the production of these more lucrative crops; and their soaring profits attracted the attention of capital investors in the United States. (By 1899 "the United Fruit Company hald a virtual monopoly of the United States market" /Waddell 1967: 977.)

During the late 1920s the exploitation of the mineral resources of Trinidad and of British Guiana brought oil refineries and bauxite processing into these territories. Although these industries are not labor intensive on a long-term basis, many blacks were able to supplement their seasonal agricultural wages by working in the mines, the refineries, and the processing plants.

Despite the increasingly serious socio-economic problems of underemployment and overpopulation (aggravated by the continuous influx of migrant workers from the severely depressed "sugar" islands of Barbados, St. Kitts, Nevis, and Anguilla--and compounded by the world-wide economic depression of the 1930s), the larger islands still maintained a significant economic advantage over the small monocrop islands. Jamaicans, British Guyanese, and Trinidadians, given the local economic diversification and alternatives for employment, thus "early developed an independent and rebellious spirit" (Curtin 1968: 26).

I may have overemphasized the significance of these material factors, but I believe that they do at least coincide with the independent attitudes that Arubans attribute to the Big Island men; just as the dependent, non-troublesome image of the Small Islanders appears to be concomitant with the economic stagnation of the small "sugar" islands of Barbados, St. Kitts, and Nevis.

Political activism and agitation for improved legal status by the freed blacks followed a more or less parallel road to the economic developments of the Big and Small island territories.

> The West Indian /constitutional/ system remained fixed and rigid for very nearly two centuries. In England those with or without the franchise were free citizens, and public opinion could be used to compel constitutional change. In the West Indies the free citizens were a small section of the community and it was vital to them to preserve the situation which existed. . . . Another basic weakness of the West Indian constitution was that the power to govern lay with the assembly and the responsibility to govern lay with the governor. (Parry and Sherlock 1963: 208)

Into the middle of the nineteenth century, the British pattern of local colonial government replicated the municipal and parochial structures of the towns and villages of the homeland planters. Small vestry parishes were supervised by elected trustees who were empowered to levy taxes for the support of the local clergy and for the maintenance and repair of roads. For most of the territories, this "representative" (white) legislative pattern preceded the establishment of centralized administration (of the newly created Crown Colonies). The notable exceptions to the general pattern were Trinidad and Barbados. The Crown permitted the administrators of the territory of Trinidad to retain the highly centralized model which was the legacy of the formerly Spanish governance. At the other extreme, Barbados retained the traditionally planter-dominated local legislative system it had known for the two centuries of uninterrupted British control; in fact, Barbados never achieved Crown Colony status.[8]

By the last decade of the nineteenth century, under pressure from the British government, the larger and more economically viable colonies had introduced modifications of Crown domination. In Jamaica,

the "representative" body (white) altered the form of the Legislative Council, dividing power between the governor and an equal number of "official and unofficial" (colored) members (the latter to be elected by restricted franchise). In British Guiana, the "unofficial" members were chosen through "direct elections" (Parry and Sherlock 1963: 216).

More important than these minor legislative modifications for the development of national self-consciousness were the attitudes and actions of the individual governors and island administrators. These men often ignored Crown directives and governed according to class- and self-interest. In doing so they activated the opposition of other segments of the population to such obvious exploitation. On the "large islands" obstructive and reactionary governors were gradually rendered impotent by the efforts of black and colored labor leaders and teachers from middle- and lower-class communities. The charismatic leaders in Jamaica and British Guiana in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century set the precedent for nationalist movements throughout the Caribbean. However, the requisite pre-conditions for effective grass-roots movements toward self-determination did not obtain in the small dependent islands (with the notable exception of Grenada, which was small but economically diversified after the introduction of valuable spice crops).

The fluctuations in metropolitan interest in the economic and political welfare of the colonies are significant for the generalizations made by social historians about the so-called "psychological dependence" of the black people of the Caribbean. They do not, however,

account for the apparent variations in island personality. I believe that part of the weakness of the "dependency" argument lies in the simple assumption that the economic welfare of the national population coincides with the economic value of the island economy to metropolitan commercial interests. More germane to the understanding of the observed variations in group image is the presence or absence of economic options, especially of alternatives to employment related to sugar production. The problem not generally addressed by many dependency theorists is the monetary return to the average worker from the economic benefits that accrue to the large producer. The profits from sugar-estate exports do not flow back significantly to anyone other than the capital investor. In particular, the individual worker receives little benefit from a rise in sugar profits; his dependence, in the "sugar" islands, has been directly related to the decline in the industry. Thus, if he has no alternative opportunity for wage employment, he and his family are locked into the inevitable diminution of weekly wages that accompanies the increasingly depressed condition of these islands. Even a cursory consideration of the wages and employment opportunities for the Caribbean working population prior to the massive emigrations of the 1930s reveals a significant contrast between the monocrop islands and the diversified agricultural and incipient industrial islands.

Nevertheless, although economic and political variables are significantly involved in the shaping of island personalities, other social factors are so interwoven as to obscure the distinct nature of each separate thread. For example, the creole populations of

British Guiana and of Trinidad during the mid-nineteenth century reacted quite differently to the introduction of indentured contract laborers to the economy. The Guyanese response was hostile and competitive:

> . . . the freed blacks fought the entry of these laborers with all the weapons at their disposal. They terrorized the East Indians, ridiculed the Portuguese with the appelation of "white nigger," and appealed to the abolitionists and missionaries to save them from "the introduction of masses of sensual and idolatrous Asiatics" . . . /who/ will render nugatory the effort of the emancipated labourers . . . who are endeavoring to inculcate upon their rising families a practical respect for the claims of chastity and other Christian values. (Skinner 1960: 904)

Moreover, the Guyanese did not retreat in the face of active participation of the East Indians in the agricultural economy after the expiration of the indentured contracts of the latter. Instead they maintained and even expanded their small land-holdings, and they competed fiercely with the industrious East Indians.

The Trinidadians, on the other hand, were supplanted by East Indian and Chinese plantation workers, and they "had no economic alternative but to retreat into the urbanized areas of Port-of-Spain commerce and /later/ southern Trinidad oil" (Lewis 1968: 201).

The social stratification and rivalries among ethnic groups that characterize the plural societies of the larger islands (see Braithwaite 1960; Skinner 1960; R. T. Smith 1967) also were significant factors in shaping the group ethos of the black proletariat and small farmers. Skinner (1960) suggests that the Guyanese, by adhering to European-imposed cultural ideals, developed attitudes of social superiority towards the East Indians. The East Indians, maintaining their traditional orientations, avoided social interaction with the

antagonistic creoles, but rapidly secured superior economic footholds in urban as well as in agricultural occupations.

Social stratification in Jamaica, however, took a different form. Here the introduction of indentured labor promoted the development of "Two Jamaicas" (Curtin 1968). Released from the obligation of plantation labor, the great majority of freed blacks cultivated their own hillside farms and interacted not at all with the indentured laborers. The growth of ethnic solidarity (manifest as early as 1865 in the Morant Bay Rebellion) did not stem from ethnic rivalry with the East Indians but from recognition by the blacks of the effectiveness of mass participation in the redress of legislative oppression.

Another important variable in the development of group identification was the availability of education for the black populations in the different islands. Into the late years of Crown Colony administration, extensive education for the children of black laborers was restricted "to accommodate the planters' notion that formal education at any level would make children indisposed to join the labour force as manual workers; so that even today much is still done to instil into the mind of Barbadian youth the virtue of manual labour and the impropriety of entertaining social aspirations" (Lewis 1968: 231).

In British Guiana and Jamaica it was mainly in response to the continued efforts of energetic labor leaders that the colonial governments reluctantly expanded and improved general educational facilities. The eventual provision (in the third decade of the twentieth century) of university training for secondary school graduates,

however, quickly bore fruit: now, many of the effective leaders of political parties on the larger islands are graduates of local colleges. In the smaller, monocrop islands, on the other hand, the educational opportunities have remained limited to primary schooling (from outdated metropolitan curricula) and "practical" training; relatively few students from these islands are prepared for tertiary education.

The West Indians in Aruba

I stress the differences in economic and educational opportunities between the Big Island and Small Island blacks because of the persistence of differential self-regard for the West Indian groups who migrated to Aruba during the 1930s. For example, the contrasts in island attitudes toward education--ranging from the pride voiced by Jamaican and Guyanese informants (none of whom boasted more than six years of primary education) to the apologetic excuses offered by "small island" informants (who have, in fact, also experienced at least six years of schooling)--reflect the recurring differences between positive and negative group image.

The various religious affiliations of the West Indian segments in Aruba can also be traced back to the differential developments of the British Colonies. Although the early and continued efforts of Protestant missionaries to "christianize the Africans" (Waddell 1967) were undoubtedly successful everywhere, the marked heterogeneity of cult affiliations found among the blacks of the larger islands is minimal among the Small Islanders. Thus "The Revival, Revival Zion, Pocomania, Convice, and other Jamaican Afro-Christian

cults" (Lowenthal 1972: 115) have not spread to the islands of St. Kitts, Nevis, or Barbados. The Small Island folk "remain in established denominations and shun revivalism, resembling American Negro Baptist and Methodist sects in their more orthodox behaviour" (Lowenthal 1972: 116).

One social characteristic common to both "Large and Small Island" West Indian segments in Aruba is the "matrifocal condition" (see Solien 1960; Clarke 1957). However, its occurrence among Village residents in St. Nicholas is a recent phenomenon, an adaptation to the economic conditions in Aruba during the 1950s, rather than to a continuation of some general Caribbean pattern.

Solien (1960) introduces her analysis of Caribbean household arrangements with the definition of "family" as "a group of people bound together by that complex set of relationships known as kinship ties, between at least two of whom there exists a conjugal relationship" (Solien 1960: 106). She excludes from consideration as a family unit the "single parent" and her dependent children: "I would not call this unit a family at all: consisting only of a mother and her children, it is on a lower level of organization than a family which must include a conjugal relationship and what Fortes would call patrifiliation" (Solier 1960: 105).

My female West Indian informants who live in the Village area of St. Nicholas would be shocked to hear of their definitional exclusion from family status. Each of these women (the primary contributor to the support of her children) refers with fierce pride to her "family" and asserts that the years of hardship and sacrifice are more than repaid by the "loving consideration" she continues to receive from her children.

That so many of the West Indian women who continue to reside in Aruba are "single mothers" from the small islands of Barbados, St. Kitts, Nevis, and St. Vincent, derives from the casual hiring and deliberate firing practices of the Lago refinery management. The majority of the men from the small and large islands who were hired by Lago during the boom period of 1930-1950 stayed long enough to "settle in" and establish "families" (some of the unions were legal, some consensual, some "going together" arrangements).[9]

Between 1940 and 1954, thousands of West Indian men were "laid off" by the refinery.[10] Loss of work permit and of residence visa quickly followed dismissal, and most of the men returned to their home islands within two months after being fired. Many of their women, however, remained in Aruba, having secured wage employment as domestics and sleep-in maids. With the expansion of the tourist industry and the construction of additional hotels and restaurants, the women could secure additional part-time and full-time employment.

A few hundred West Indian men, who had been lucky enough after their dismissal from Lago to find immediate employment at gasoline service stations, bars, and restaurants, retained their work permits and residence visas. Some of these men have secured permanent visas through marriage to Antillean women. Although such an alliance does not guarantee the husband any legal equality with Aruban nationals it does make the "outsider" less vulnerable to expulsion, as the children of the union can apply for citizenship upon reaching the age of 18.

Thus, for most of the West Indian women residing in Aruba, the establishment of their own matrifocal households represented the

only practical solution to the problems of child-rearing and the severely unbalanced sex ratio.[11] For them to have returned to their home islands with their mates would almost certainly guarantee chronic underemployment for the couples.

Since the 1930s Aruba has offered to legitimate residents relatively greater opportunity for employment and higher wages than have any of the other Caribbean islands. Indeed, many of the long-time resident women have managed to save enough money out of their monthly wages (approximately 120 fls.) to feed, clothe, and educate their children, as well as to advance the passages from their home island of sisters, nieces, and female friends to secure work in Aruba.[12]

Another generalization said to be characteristic of the plural structures of Caribbean society is the "overriding colour consciousness" (Henriquez 1953: 46). The distaste that the Arubans express for the "blacks," however, cannot simply be explained in terms of phenotype. Arubans assign the West Indians of all shades to the lowest levels of the social hierarchy, according to their places of origin; the black (Dutch) Antilleans occupy a clearly higher level, and black-skinned Arubans are still more elevated. The fact that most of the Caribbean residents have consistently earned higher wages (and display considerably more items of conspicuous consumption) than have the Arubano cunucu nationals certainly raises their standing in the economic hierarchy, but it has done nothing to enhance their social standing.

The residential surroundings of the majority of the West Indians are hardly conducive to raising the social status of the

occupants. The Village, home for the lower- and many middle-class West Indians, as described by Hartog (1961) "was knocked together out of everything that could be laid hands on. Petrol cans were eagerly collected to provide material for walls" (Hartog 1961: 317).

If the initial and "temporary" constructions of the 1930s were ramshackle hovels then, the appearance of the present-day Village has further deteriorated. The unpaved lanes that lead off the main street of St. Nicholas are so rutted as to present a real hazard to pedestrian and driver. The average "cell" that serves as home for the single mothers and for a few "live together" couples and their children measures ten feet by twelve feet; partitions of sheets or beads mark off the living-room, bedroom, dining, and kitchen areas. Water and electricity are included in the monthly rentals but the plumbing and utilities are inadequate and usually inoperative.[13] In contrast, the greater size and more costly furnishings of the conjugal dwellings seem luxurious. I was surprised, therefore, to detect no signs of envy or of dissatisfaction from my single "Small Island" female informants towards their more "respectable" neighbors; nor did the married women disdain their single friends. Each reserved her contempt and antagonistic remarks for the small number of remaining Big Island residents.

Throughout the first period of my fieldwork I was unaware of this hostility between West Indian islanders. My initial contacts were with West Indians from the Leeward Islands of St. Kitts, Nevis, and Barbados. As these people introduced me to their friends and neighbors, and I met their fellow parishioners at the Methodist, Anglican, and Baptist churches, I assumed that my sample of West

Indian informants was representative of the earlier migrant force.

Toward the end of that first summer of 1969, however, as the opposition party of the AVP stepped up its campaign activities and the implications of its slogan "Aruba for Arubans" became more obvious, the Village became a closed enclave. My appointments for interviews were abruptly cancelled (politely but without explanation). The West Indian social clubs closed their door to outsiders. Finally, and too late for me to pursue her lead, my closest acquaintance, a "single mother" from St. Kitts, voiced the apprehensions of the Village community:

> We know that if they can carry out their promise to get rid of everybody but Arubans, we'll be the first to go. They've already managed to throw out most of the Bee Gees and the Jamaicans and Trinidadians. . . . Thank the Lord. Now they'll have to show their superiority by attacking the small island folk. They're telling us that if we don't vote for them /the AVP/ we'll really get it. . . . It's crazy, most of us don't have the vote. . . . The people they really want to get rid of are the Curacellaneans . . . you known, that's a different kind of black. The Arubans hate them because they have more power . . . the Arubans are just their puppets.

During my 1971 studies I began to inquire into the antagonism of the "Small Islander" toward the "Big Island" people.[14] This inquiry revealed the importance of Lago's hiring and firing practices. Therefore, I included in my next period of field interviews with Lago and government administrators, questions about the West Indians who had once comprised almost half of the total work force. My specific aim was to check the allegations, made by West Indian informants, that, since the earliest years of refinery operations, the dismissal of employees followed a deliberate policy agreement between the refinery management and the government administrators, namely, that the West

Indian men would be dismissed and, whenever possible, Arubans be assigned to their jobs. The discussion that follows, therefore, is largely a reconstruction of the features of a segment of the population most of whose members no longer reside in Aruba.

In contrast to the quiet entry of the small numbers of Ashkenazim and Chinese into the Aruban economy, the arrival of the Caribbean immigrants created immediate and threatening waves in St. Nicholas.[15] Whereas the merchant groups were never in direct competition with the Aruban working force and indeed were welcomed for the goods and services they offered, the West Indians were not merely competitors with, but actual replacements for the "alcoholic, unreliable, and unskilled Arubans" (Personal communication: Lago superintendent).

The small group of technically trained or university-educated Big Island men who arrived to fill the openings for foremen and managers (positions that had never been offered to the Arubans) was resented for their "arrogance and superiority." The larger group of Big and Small Island laborers (eventually numbering in the thousands) received the full blast of Aruban animosity.

I have received contradictory explanations for the decision of the Lago management to import large numbers of Caribbean workers. The reasons given by each of the groups are more than Rashomonian reflections of group perceptions. They also represent the conflicting self-interests of the manipulators and the manipulated:

Aruban	"Papiamentu was an inadequate language so they had to bring in English-speaking outsiders"
West Indian	"The Arubans were uncultured and illiterate--and they didn't know how to deal with Americans"

Lago administrators	"The Arubans lacked technical skills. . . . They were undependable and unmotivated. If they'd been out drinking the night before (and they always were) they might not show up for a few days. . . . The island only had a small number of qualified workers. We needed a much larger force than the island provided."
National government officials	"Non-national workers can be controlled. If they act up they can easily be deported and replaced."

An outspoken Arubiano official in the Department of Economic Welfare insisted that the "control" factor coincided not only with the hiring practices but also with the firing policies of the Lago management. "And since they /Lago/ were, in effect, the government here in Aruba until we gained independence /?/, naturally the Dutch colonials worked hand in hand with them. But the real control showed in the order of the layoffs."

Even before the large-scale dismissal of workers following upon the automation of the major operations of the refinery, significant numbers of Jamaican, Guyanese, and Trinidadian workers were fired from Lago and returned to their home ports.

> They were actively involved in union activities which resulted in the/ir/ deportation after the first main strike. . . . It is interesting to note that some of the ex-Lago employees have, upon returning to their home islands, become actively involved in politics and two have become prime ministers. (Green 1969: 88-89)

The Big Island men, at first preferred by the Lago managers for their "quickness and adaptability to American methods," soon were perceived as threatening the authority of the expatriate foremen and supervisors. A former employee for Lago referred with anger to the Jamaican, Trinidadian, and Guyanese workers:

> They were not pliable . . . they were impatient and resentful. . . . . . Those British agitators told us that we should strike for better conditions. We were forced to accept decisions we didn't want.
>
> For the first years we could not explain ourselves to our bosses so the British acted as intermediaries. They explained our wishes <u>their</u> way to make us look bad.

When the "agitators" and their Caribbean followers were identified, they were fired and deported within twenty-four hours.[16]

The collective representation of "cultural superiority" to which the West Indians subscribed exacerbated the already negative attitudes of the Arubans: "In the past the English felt that the ordinary native Arubans had not been sufficiently exposed culturally, were 'not tooclever,' that they lacked interest and initiative in 'getting ahead'" (Green 1969: 169).

In 1971, however, as I inquired into the intra-group differences, I heard very few assertions of cultural superiority from West Indian informants. The remaining segment has considerably modified its criticisms of the Aruban nationals. For one thing, the present degree of literacy and multi-lingual facility of the Aruban community renders the earlier West Indian judgment largely inapplicable. More important, the entire West Indian segment now recognizes its vulnerability in light of the increasingly nationalistic sentiments of the dominant Aruban majority.

To date, the black community from the small dependencies of St. Kitts, Nevis, and Barbados has been more successful than have the Big Islanders in deflecting the animosity of the nations: "They're more like us . . . quiet, they mind their own business . . . and they're more religious . . . not like those Bee Gees and Jamaicans . . . or even those Calypso loudmouths who were not only noisy but arrogant and sinful."

The Windward Islanders understand that the "more like us" encomium expresses relative tolerance, but certainly not acceptance into the Aruban society. A Kittian informant said:

> We never really feel comfortable with them. Even the nicer ones somehow let us know they feel superior to us. The poorest Aruban knows that he owns this island--and that he's just letting us stay here as long as we don't make trouble. When the big shot Bee Gees and Jamaicans left, things were better for us. But that doesn't mean we're here to stay.

Or, as related by a Trinidadian who married an Aruban woman:

> When I married her in 1950, her parents were wild. After a while I was more or less accepted in the family, but they (my wife, too) always manage to let me know that I'm black . . . even though one of the other daughters is married to a St. Martins man who's really black . . . and they don't bug him . . . I wanted to move out of St. Nicholas a few years ago, but my wife's family said it would be better if we stayed here. Better for who?

Green (1969) described the attitude of most Arubans toward the Village residents:

> They are generally looked down upon as this is considered an area of vice, loose family ties, and poorly reared children. Observation has shown that this area /ālsō/ has French (blacks from Martinique and Guadelope), Colombian . . . and Curacellanean families as well as "English".
>
> In addition, some of these residents hold skilled posts at Lago and other businesses. They either continue to think of their residence in the area as temporary or are caught in a web of family ties and customs which does not allow unmarried family members to live away from home. (Green 1969: 99)

These observations do not address the involuntary nature of residence in the Village ghetto stemming from the coercive pressures employed by the local realtors (who act in cooperation with the Department of Social Welfare) to "keep the blacks in one place" (Arubano social worker, March 1971).

The head of the inflammatory MEP party (which gained several seats in the Central legislature in the 1973 elections) explained the

delay in the implementation of the government's plan to raze the Village "eyesore" and to provide alternative low-cost houses for residents of the Village:

> Well, have you seen the housing project outside St. Nicholas (off the main streets and effectively hidden from notice)? It's almost finished. It was actually built to give low-cost housing to poor Arubano families, but . . . I think when we come to power after next year's island elections, we'll push through our proposal to move the blacks fromthe Village and put them all there. . . . It's better that way. They like to live together . . . you know, it's the traditional system of the blacks to live practically one on top of the other . . . and besides /smile/ we can keep a better eye on them if they're together.

Just outside the "English" enclave are several public (but tuition paid) schools, built in the 1940s and 1950s from metropolitan funds. These schools were specifically intended to absorb the large influx of Protestant families. Whereas the Chinese immigrants were told that the Dutch schools had no room for their children, so that the Chinese were obliged to enroll their children in the Roman Catholic schools, the parochial schools could not handle the thousands of new (and mostly Protestant) immigrants. Thus, the Dutch public schools of St. Nicholas educate the children of black, Jewish, and the few Dutch residents of the refinery town: the Roman Catholic schools of St. Nicholas offer to the Aruban, Chinese, "French," and other Roman Catholic non-nationals a parochial, Latinized additive to the modified Dutch curriculum.

The consequent advantage to the Caribbean pupils of the "little Dutch schools" of being taught by metropolitans may well have been an important factor in their securing of subsidized scholarships. Since the 1940s Lago has offered two types of scholarships to qualified applicants (the first qualification for application is that applicant must

be a son of a Lago employee): a subsidized training program in the Lago Vocational School (this school was closed in the late 1960s) and a full tuition scholarship (plus allowances for travel and board) leading to an engineering degree in a university in the United States (this program is still in effect). That so many Caribbean students won the university scholarships is cited by an Aruban editor of a Papiamentu newspaper to be a direct cause of the "backward condition" of the present-day Aruban lower classes:

> The Lago Vocational School was a bad thing for our people. Lago said "We are the benefactors. We will take your children in when they leave school; the bright children are welcome at Lago to learn a trade and prepare for a job with the company."
>
> The parents in those days did not look further than their nose, they only saw how the children could study near home and make money. So they sent to Lago one hundred of the brightest children--and Lago got out of these boys lovely tradesmen and laboratory workers. But the island of Aruba did not get out of their "brains of relations", academicians, "heads" that could, when they were prepared, enter the government and take the responsibility of island government on their shoulders.
>
> The foreigners, especially the English, prepared their children, getting them out to college and even masters degrees. They pushed them to try for the special scholarships of Lago. Then those boys came back as engineers and are working for Lago. They have been thus created--while "our brains" went to make tradesmen. They gave the scholarships to the British because to be able to compete in the world market they need men who have the same capacity as the foreigners but will not make the same money as the foreigners.

Just as the educational and residential enclaving separated the West Indians from the Arubans, the religious affiliations of the former group alienated them from the Roman Catholic majority. An Anglican church, a Baptist church, and two large Methodist churches (one in town, the other on the outskirts of St. Nicholas and presided over by an Irish minister) are attended regularly by a majority of the "single mothers," married couples, and dependent children of the black community. A fair-sized Pentecostal church has, since the late 1950s,

attracted a growing number of disenchanted Methodists, who state that the "excitement of Pentecostalism gives more flavor to our lives."

A few store-front churches, such as the Church of Zion (which syncopates its Southern Baptist hymns and includes bongo players, guitarists, and tambourine thumpers in its congregation), open for a few years and then are replaced by residential units or by small grocery stores. As one of my Methodist informants see it:

> These little bastard churches are for the shoppers. The flighty women go from one to another . . . as soon as they hear that it's more lively in one store they'll try it for a while. . . . Most of us, though, we know that a good, devout Methodist is doing right in the eyes of the Lord. The best thing about our church is that it's just like the one at home /Barbados/. . . . And my friends from the other islands say it's just like their home church too. . . . We had an Irish minister in our home parish too. . . .
>
> But those Arubans, they say our churches are just right for us blacks. We couldn't live up the demands and the sacrifices their church asks of them. Those hypocrites. . . every Aruban man has to drink himself blind in the rum shops next to every Catholic church before he can get up the courage to go in to confession.

The Protestant churches offer to the black families regular programs of social activities: beach picnics, community suppers, sports events for children and adults. For the past few years these programs have been expanding, to substitute for the island associations or clubs that had formerly played an important role in the segregation of Caribbean island groups (see Green 1969). As the black population of Aruba diminished, most of these social clubs closed. The few remaining clubs, bearing such curious names as "Ancient Order of Foresters Friendly Society" and "United Order of Mechanics Friendly Society" are presently attended by more women than men. These, and the Central Boys Dominoes Club (which features

pool and card playing more than dominoes), are open to "all in the Village."

The efforts of the Protestant churches and the social clubs to attract the teen-aged children of the Village people have been met with increasing, and hardly passive, resistance by the adolescents. The black youth not only puzzle, but also frighten their parents. Since the late 1960s many of the youngsters, in search of a "black identity," have organized "Power to the People" clubs, sport Afro hairstyles and pseudo-African clothing, and present a united front of defiance to the local authorities, to the Arubans, to the storekeepers, and to their own parents. This overt "disrespect" is perceived by the older West Indians to be the major factor in stimulating the growing hostility of the Aruban nationals toward the whole black community:

> They'll get us thrown out yet. It's just the excuse the Arubans need to get rid of all the British. Things were so nice and peaceful here after most of the Big Island folks left. Now . . . who knows how long we can stay. . . . I'll tell you this, though . . . after they get us out, they'll turn on their own blacks. If that new party gets in we'll be out on the first plane. That leader likes to raise his people up. He knows he can get them together by blaming us (and those Jews) for all the trouble here.

Although it is hardly likely that the "new party" will act immediately on its "promise" to expel non-nationals (because--as my informants in the Department of Economic Welfare sadly acknowledge--this would create havoc with the economy) the West Indians in Aruba are certainly a "vulnerable" segment. Less crucial to the tourist industry than the Ashkenazim and the Chinese, and considered as "non-essential" by the Lago management and the local government,

the West Indians may indeed, within the next few years, be forced to emigrate once again.

NOTES

[1]During the second and third periods of my fieldwork studies, I heard the Arubans refer to the blacks as "West Indians" or "Caribbeans" more often than as "English."

[2]For Arubans, as well as for many other Caribbean islanders (see,for example, Henriquez 1953 and Mintz 1974), skin color is not an absolute mark of negritude. Indeed, I have interviewed many Arubans whose phenotype would lead me to classify them as "black." However, they see themselves (and are viewed by fellow Arubans) as "white."

[3]According to a 1951 census, the ratio of Aruban to "British" employees was 2,465:2,252. For "other than Lago employment" the ratio was similar, 1,967:1,089.

[4]The Big Island term refers more to the relatively industrialized and agriculturally diversified nature of the economies of Jamaica, Trinidad, and the (Southern American mainland) economy of British Guiana than to their actual size. Small Island, on the other hand, refers to the "sugar" monocrop islands.

[5]The colonial and post-colonial periods of Caribbean history are well documented: see Comitas 1968, Lowenthal 1972, Goveia 1965. For a social history of the Dutch Windward islands, see Keur 1960.

[6]Furnivall defines a plural society as one composed of two or more elements (or social orders) which, although inhabiting the same area, nevertheless do not commingle. Thus each group maintains its own religious identity, unique culture, customs, and language. The sole point of contact is in the market place.

[7]In British Guiana, for example, the creole-East Indian rivalry has motivated the political activism and economic development of each segment. This rivalry has persisted in present-day Guyanese society.

[8]Parry and Sherlock (1966) reveal their paternalistic bias in their apologia for Crown Colony administration: "It prepared the way for social and economic development, for it introduced a policy of trusteeship . . . its basic principle being the direct protection by the Crown of the unrepresented class, which takes the place of representation" (Parry and Sherlock 1963: 217).

[9]"The Dutch regulations for entry and continued stay in Aruba have served to increase formal marriages and limit some of the extramarital activity among the 'folk'. In order for mates to enter, couples had to be legally married and after the earliest years of immigration, adequate housing had to be secured for the family or spouse. . . . as a result numerous British families, or couples

where one is British, live/d/ in legal relationships." (Green 1969: 87-88)

Many of the "extra-legal" consensual relationships (and only 4 of the 30 West Indian women I interviewed had ever been legally married) took place after 1940, when single girls and women began to emigrate to Aruba in response to the demand for domestics. At that time, Aruban females were not permitted by their families to work or to live away from home.

[10]According to my informants, most of the Jamaican, Trinidadian, and Guyanese workers were discharged before the 1950s, "because they were trouble-makers, urging the Arubans to strike for higher wages and better working conditions, and then staying in the background when the Arubans went out on strike." After the completion of construction and automation of the refinery, most of the Small Island men were dismissed.

[11]The census yearbooks do not include male:female ratios, but my West Indian informants agree that there are at least four unmarried women for each single man.

[12]Many of my informants send their pre-school children back to their home islands. They send money each month to pay for the "caretaker" services provided for the children by the grandmother or aunt. When the child is of school age, my "single-mothers" send for them and enroll them in St. Nicholas schools. Thus the women can maintain full-time employment shortly after the birth of their children.

[13]I asked one of my "single mothers" if she would rather live in her home island, assuming she could earn the same wages back home: "First, I couldn't earn the same wages. Second, why would I want to live there? Here I can have my very own house." This last was said while she surveyed her meagerly furnished shack with obvious pride.

[14]Lewis (1972) notes: "The Trinidadian attitude toward the 'small islands' has been one of genial contempt, the Jamaican attitude one of sheer disinterest, compounded by gross ingorance" (Lewis 1968: 130).

[15]For several years, in fact into the 1950s when thousands of blacks were returned to their home islands, the contact between the populations of St. Nicholas and Oranjestad, however, was slight. In my interviews with the Ashkenazim and the Arubans who lived in or near the capital, Oranjestad, I came to realize that the sixteen kilometers between the towns might have been sixteen hundred, for all the interest and awareness the residents of one town showed in the other. Several people from the small villages north of Oranjestad assert that there are more blacks in Aruba now than at any time in her history. In fact, as these villages are closer to the hotel complex than to the refinery, many Arubans are experiencing their first real contact with black domestics, waiters, and bartenders.

[16]During the summer of 1973, I witnessed a similar "firing and deportation" incident. A group of 130 Colombians, brought in by a construction company under contract to Lago, engaged in a "spontaneous" walk-out. Exactly twenty-four hours after they returned to the plant, I watched their departure in an unscheduled charter plane headed for Colombia.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE LAGO MANAGEMENT: POWER ELITE

> The term "élite" was first used by seventeenth century shopkeepers to describe their best quality merchandise. (Lipset and Solari 1967: vii)

Although the authors assert that, according to present-day usage, the term applies to those positions in society which are at the summits of key social structures (that is, the higher positions in the economy, government, military, politics, and the professions), I believe that the Lago executives and administrators I interviewed during the summer of 1973 would feel more comfortable with the original definition than with the contemporary one. While they agreed that into World War II ". . . we were the government," the policy of the parent company now dictates that their affiliates maintain a low profile in the governmental affairs of the host country.[1] The effect of this low profile, however, is covert, instead of overt participation in the determination of government policy.

For the past forty years the resident population of Aruba has readily acknowledged its dependence, individually and collectively, on the Lago Oil and Transport Company. This dependence, however, is expressed in economic terms: the jobs and pensions of former and present-day employees, the annual taxes paid by Lago to the Central Government, and the related benefits of Lago operations

to the shopowners, construction companies and crews, and the restaurants and bars.

Curiously, all of my informants placed the Lago executives at the summit of the island's economic hierarchy, when, in fact, the annual salaries (or the total "known" income) of the president, vice-president, superintendents, and managers are relatively moderate and stable, compared to the rising incomes of the Ashkenazic and Chinese merchants, and a few Arubiano extended families.[2]

Few of my informants, however, recognize the political influence of the management of the company, and none of my informants was aware of the larger networks of manipulative control that the parent company, Exxon, wields through its affiliate, Lago.[3] Although the literature on the history of Standard Oil of New Jersey (since 1972, Exxon) is often contradictory, I submit that the real "power" of the Lago management lies not in the executive offices in Seroe Colorado but issues directly from the New York and Coral Gable offices of Exxon. For while the handbook published in 1964 by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey states that

> . . . all affiliates are highly independent; each has its own officers and directors who manage its affairs. A policy of decentralization of management, in fact, has long existed in the Jersey Standard family. It is based in part on the belief that spreading responsibility throughout the organization gives many people opportunity to grow in ability. Moreover, decisions made by men who are actually resident in and familiar with a particular country or region are more likely to be correct and prompt.

Larson, Knowlton, and Popple (1971: 802) assert:

> The parent company (in 1927) developed a complex system of communication--written and personal, vertical and horizontal. Communication became increasingly important as the company's investments and operations grew in size and complexity. . . . A comprehensive number of written reports kept the parent company informed

> about the operations of affiliates. . . . Two-way personal consultation tied the various departments and divisions of the parent company closer to their counterparts among affiliates.

I experienced the same contradiction during my first week of interviews at Lago. Contrary to the smiling assertion by the President of Lago that the parent company "is not concerned with our meetings with government and union officials and with the community," a recently appointed Arubiano manager told me: "All our hands are tied. Until word comes down from the States no one, not even the President can make a move!"

Out of my direct contacts with the "front offices" of Exxon and Lago, I have determined that these patently contradictory statements can be blended to reveal the actual policy of Exxon with regard to its affiliates. Although the parent company does delegate to its overseas managers the authority to make some autonomous decisions (particularly in matters affecting local public relations, contributions to local organizations out of its annual budget, the hiring and firing of local workers), all of these activities, as well as data relevant to refinery operations, are included in the regular reports of the affiliates.

The geographical separation of the overseas company from the metropole affords it no de jure isolation. Regularly scheduled (and frequent unscheduled) official and unofficial reports from all departments of Lago leave the island via airmail and a direct telephone cable line. These reports receive almost instant response: Lago decisions are either confirmed or reversed by return cables and telephone calls from the New York or Coral Cable headquarters of Inter-American Affairs.

Because Lago is but a small cog in the omnipresent wheel of Exxon Corporation, the covert and overt power it wields over the economic, political, and social affairs of the resident population can best be understood in the context of the development of this most powerful of the "Seven Sister" multinational oil corporations.[4] By extension, the increasing interest of the Venezuelan government in the Lago refinery is directly tied to the humble origins of the Lago Oil and Transport Company, Ltd., in the Maracaibo basin of northeastern Venezuela.

The phenomenal growth of Jersey Standard, from the vertically integrated Standard Oil Trust that was dissolved into separate state corporations after the Sherman Anti-Trust Decision in 1911, to the multicorporate giant Exxon Corporation, is directly attributable to the three "great principles" of its founding president, John D. Rockefeller:

> "(1) Pay a profit to body . . .
> "(2) Hide the profits . . .
> "(3) Say nothing . . ." (Tarbell 1902: 127, 245)

Only twenty-five years after the first recorded use (in 1850) of surface oil for its medicinal properties,[5] the Standard Oil Trust

> . . . /represented/ the most perfectly developed trust in existence; that is, it satisfies most nearly the trust ideal of entire control of the commodity in which it deals. Its vast profits have led its officers into various allied interests, such as railroads, shipping, gas, copper, iron, steel, as well as into banks and trust companies, and to the acquiring and solidifying of these interests it has applied the methods used in building up the Oil Trust. It has led in the struggle against legislation directed against combinations. Its power in state and Federal government, in the press, in the college, in the pulpit, is generally recognized. . . . It is the pre-eminent trust of the world. (Tarbell 1902: vii)

In light of the 1911 anti-trust decision that dissolved the Standard Oil Trust into separate corporate bodies, it at first appears paradoxical that

> . . . if /today/ Exxon were shorn of all its foreign /oil/ operations, it would still be the ninth . . . largest United States industrial company. . . . Exxon's petrochemical operations, which produce materials that go into fertilizers, records, pantyhose and myriad other products, would rank about fifty among United States chemical companies. If Exxon merely transported oil, it would be the world's biggest shipping firm, with 155 tankers of its own and varying numbers under charter at sea. . . . In finance it is a substantial banker. . . . When profits fall in one part of its empire, Exxon rolls with the punch, because profits rise in another part. . . . (Time, Feb. 18, 1974)

In fact, the rapid growth of Jersey Standard is directly related to its purchase, in 1932, of the Lago Oil and Transport Company, the first large-scale oil producing company in Venezuela.

For, although Jersey Standard retained, after the trust was dissolved, the president of the original company, John D. Rockefeller, and the largest holding in United States refineries as well as some overseas marketing affiliates, it lacked access to crude oil production. This it sought to acquire (cautiously, to avoid congressional accusations of trust involvement) through initial purchases of half-share interests in foreign oil concessions and leases. Because several European oil companies had already embarked on purchases of oil field concessions immediately after the start of World War I, Jersey Standard was a latecomer to the foreign oil fields.[5]

Prior to World War I the British were able to gain a virtual monopoly over the oil fields of Venezuela through purchases of individually-held concessions. General Castro, Venezuela's first president, had issued oil concessions in Lake Maracaibo to friends who

were interested in exporting the surface asphalt (solidified petroleum). The firstnational mining code, issued in 1854, insured to the state the retention of its subsoil deposits.[6]

Under ths shaky and tyrannical leadership of President Castro, the leases issued to friends included the stipulation that exploitation of the oil fields must be undertaken within one year from the issuance date, or the fields would revert to the state. Unable to finance profitable exploitation, these lessees willingly sold their leases to British representatives of Shell Oil. When Castro was unseated by General Juan Gomez (who was to be the president of Venezuela from 1908 to 1935), the concession policy was liberalized. To acquire revenues to meet administrative expenses, Gomez officially invited foreign investors to "come in and develop his nation's resources. . . All of this was very alluring to petroleum investors, especially after 1911 when the fall of Diaz brought in an era of revolution and uncertainty in Mexico" (Lieuwen 1955: 12). By the end of World War I, British or British-Dutch companies held nearly all of the Venezuelan oil concessions.[7]

In 1919 President Wilson, pressed by American oilmen to exert official pressure on the British to end their monopolistic policies, urged the United States delegation at Caracas to help the Sinclair Oil Company obtain a concession. Thus the United States officially entered the competitive battle for the oil fields of Venezuela.

> Competition was not always clean. British firms in Venezuela sent their Yankee employees, disguised as agents of American companies, to tap the United States legation's sources of aid and information. American tactics were no more honorable. (Lieuwen 1955: 20)

In the second decade of the twentieth century, the American-owned companies bought their way into the Venezuelan oil fields, principally through purchase of leases from the political favorites of President Gomez and the native landowners. For the first few years the most active purchasers were Standard of Indiana, Sun Oil, Texaco, Gulf, and Sinclair.[8]

By 1924, the competition between the British and American companies for further purchases of concessions was considerably diminished. The oil potential of the Maracaibo basin had not even begun to be tapped, and the world-wide demand for fuel oil could easily be satisfied by limited production.

> The pattern of production on the eastern shore of Lake Maracaibo soon found Shell on the land, Gulf (who acquired leases of the British owned Creole Syndicate) in the shallow water along shore, and Standard of Indiana in the lake. Operating side by side (and setting occasional fires at the edges of their lease lands) this trio carried on competitive offset drilling along their common boundaries, all extracting crude from a common underground reservoir. (Lieuwen 1955: 39)

Thus, until Jersey Standard entered the race, these companies were the Big Three, the major exploiters of Venezuelan oil.

In 1924, the Lago Petroleum Corporation (a subsidiary of the Pan American Petroleum Company) became the first American company to export oil from Venezuela. Lago (formed in 1923 out of the purchases of twenty concessions from friends of Gomez) then acquired the lake bed concessions of the British Equatorial Company. In 1925, Standard Oil of Indiana purchased this first large-scale oil producing company.[9] In 1932, Jersey Standard bought the rights to Lago production from Standard Indiana.

Jersey Standard, whose previously acquired oil leases had proved relatively unproductive, came into the competitive field not through those leases, but through direct purchase of already exploited concessions. Through its purchase of the Gulf-owned Creole Syndicate and its subsidiaries, Jersey Standard began to achieve prominence as an oil producing company. Then, in 1932, when Congress, concerned that the cost of Venezuelan crude to American refiners was much lower than domestically produced crude, placed a high tariff on domestically produced crude oil, Jersey Standard effected a significant coup. Because Standard of Indiana was primarily a refiner for the domestic market, the new tariff imposition made her Venezuelan production unprofitable. Jersey Standard, which held extensive foreign marketing outlets, purchased Indiana's largest subsidiary, the Lago Oil and Transport Company. "Lago's oil, which formerly went to the United States, now found outlets in Europe and South America" (Lieuwen 1955: 54).[10]

By 1935 Jersey Standard, the latecomer, exceeded Shell's production and became the leader in Venezuelan oil production. By 1945 it was responsible for half of Venezuela's extracted oil and ever since "it has produced more than all the other companies combined" (Lieuwen 1955: 54).

> Standard's competitors began to wonder whether the company which had become such a power in the industry had not become a power in the government too. . . . Critics of the Company charged that its success was achieved by highly questionable methods . . . . /chiefly/ by bribery of government officials. (Lieuwen 1955: 60-61)

The Big Three had been supplanted by a newcomer. While not the most experienced company in the field of international

exploitation, Jersey Standard undoubtedly profited from the 1911 decision that dissolved the Standard Oil Trust. Stripped of her access to crude oil production, but backed by the liquid assets and genius of its president, John D. Rockefeller, Jersey Standard's "forced entry" into foreign oil fields was a fortuitous outcome of the futile federal attempt to limit the monopolistic practices of the powerful industrial trusts.

Until the "energy crisis" of 1973 clarified the true nature of the totally integrated multinational oil industry,[11] however, the extent of its cooperative control over the extraction, the processing, and the marketing of most of the petroleum resources of the non-Communist world was underestimated by the economic analysts.

Penrose (1968) disputes the charge made by the Federal Trade Commission in 1952 that the oil industry operated as a cartel. She states that the industry at that time did not demonstrate a sufficient community of interest to permit the creation of a

> . . . true cartel through which the several Companies could plan as one enormous monopolist, setting overall targets for world output and for each Company's share therein, deciding jointly the prices that would prevail, and establishing machinery for dealing with the fringe of outside independents and for disciplining any cartel member who failed to adhere to the decisions taken. To have been effective, such a cartel would have had to extend to the markets for products, since without some agreement among the Companies on their respective shares in product markets, a crude-oil agreement would always have been under strain. (Penrose 1968: 151)

Into the 1960s the United States "majors" had not secured control over their "independent" competitors; therefore, at that point they could hardly hold cartel status. The events that led to the "energy crisis" of 1973, however, reveal the design of the "majors"--the elimination of their competitors. During the spring

of 1973 the "industry" announced to the wholesale consumers that an "unanticipated" demand for fuel oil had created a "temporary" shortage. To alleviate the situation, the Companies "voluntarily" initiated an allocation plan:

> In many cases, the shortages are more anticipated than actual. They reflect actions by major suppliers who are changing their marketing methods to fit new conditions. The suppliers, in effect, already are imposing some rationing at the wholesale level. (Oil and Gas Journal, April 16, 1973)

The impact of the Arab oil embargo on the American consumer, during the fall and winter of 1973-1974, provided fortuitous "fuel" for the Public Relations offices of the Seven Sisters (who responded as one to the attacks from a suspicious public). Using the free services of the national communications media (in the form of Public Interest television announcements), the Companies announced that they were making valiant efforts to supply their wholesale outlets with fuel oil and gasoline. Their "valiant efforts" were rewarded:

> Although the gasoline shortage has affected many groups, the most severe impact has been on the independent marketers. This segment of the industry consists of "private brand" marketers and independent distributors of "branded" gasoline. Together they account for 30% of the total market (in the United States). The impact on private brand marketers has been especially severe. This is due primarily to the dependence of these marketers on gasoline produced by the major refiners in excess of the needs of their integrated or branded distribution channels. . . . When no surplus exists, the independents have no source of supply and, consequently, nothing to sell. (Lindahl 1973: 54)

This same pattern was followed throughout Europe. There, Royal Dutch/Shell and British Petroleum (despite the severe hardships that obtained to their own national populations) manipulated the oil allocations until the "independents" were eliminated.

The effectiveness of the "artificial shortage," in eliminating competition from the independents, can be judged from the statements made in the Background Paper prepared in 1973 (just prior to the "major" crisis precipitated by the Arab oil embargo) for the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in the United States Senate:

> The supply problem of the independents has generated speculation that the gasoline shortage might be artificial rather than real. There is no doubt that, in either event, the major petroleum companies are reaping four major advantages: First, competition from the independent markets is eliminated through supply starvation or reduced through lower price differentials; second,the majors have been able to exercise greater control over their franchised dealers by limiting supplies or imposing other restrictions; third, the majors have benefited from the unprecedented price increases in the price of gasoline due to the imbalance between supply and demand . . . fourth, the oil industry has an issue with which to counter environmentalists in disputes of air quality regulations and refinery siting.
>
> A marketing tactic which has disturbed the independent marketers is the attempt by the majors to establish their own chains of discount stations. The fact that the majors are getting into the discount business at a time when the independents are being forced out has led many to question the legitimacy of the shortage. Exxon is currently marketing discount gasoline under the brand name "Alter" in four states. . . . (Lindhahl 1973: 62, 64)

Now that the independents have been rendered ineffective, the multinational oil industry has surpassed the penultimate level of cartel organization--and reached the status of a monopsony. By its cooperative price agreements it is the sole important purchaser of crude oil. The producing countries, regardless of whether they are now nationalized or are contemplating nationalization of their oil fields, can wield no effective lever on the purchaser:

> Leaders of the producing countries have heady visions of refining, transporting and selling worldwide through their own national oil companies.

> Exxon officials, who can remember expropriations in Mexico, Peru, Cuba and Iraq, remain quietly confident that the producing governments in the end will turn to them for help. They already control refineries, pipelines, tankers and gas pumps that, they still believe, the producers cannot do without. Iran nationalized its oilfields in 1951, but a consortium in which Exxon has a 7% share still operates the wells and sells most of the oil. (Time, Feb. 18, 1974: 35)

How much control does the United States, through its executive, legislative, and judicial representatives, exert over these "United States" oil companies?

> Do these . . . companies follow United States foreign policy in their dealings abroad? Or do they effectively make policy, by what they do and don't do and by their ability to get the ear of presidents, secretaries of states and national security planners? . . .
>
> Over lunch . . . an executive of one of the American oil giants was asked how the company dealt with the argument advanced by some members of Congress that as American corporations the companies should see to it that this country gets adequate oil supplies, by diverting non-Arab oil from other markets if necessary. "We are not an American company," the executive replied heatedly: "We are a multinational company!" (Cowan, New York Times, Feb. 4, 1974: 4)

Considering the fact that the multinational industry is, after all, run by people (notwithstanding the recent claim by the Tour Guide for Lago that "here we run 80% by computer"), it is important to understand the remarkable homogeneity of the management staffs of the parent company and its affiliates. The "unity" of Company employees was ensured early in the operations of the founding company, Standard Trust:

> The efficiency of the working force of the Standard was greatly increased when the trust was formed by the opportunity given to the employees of taking stock. They were urged to do it, and where they had no savings, money was lent to them on easy terms by the company. The result is that a great number of the employees of the Standard Oil Company are owners of stock which they bought at eighty, and on which for several years they have received from thirty to forty-eight per cent dividends.

> It is only natural that under such circumstances the company has always a remarkably loyal and interested working force. (Tarbell 1902: 252)

When Jersey Standard restructured its corporate organization in the early 1940s, it established an Employee Relations Department to

> . . . provide leadership in setting up in the United States a training center for managers from abroad as well as at home. . . . /The department/ advised affiliates in analyzing their employee problems and in developing and applying new or revised programs and techniques. They helped transfer useful experience from one affiliate to another. The department also sponsored general meetings of employee relations personnel in Europe and Latin America as well as in New York. It similarly arranged conferences of overseas specialists to consider specific matters, such as salary and wage compensation, benefits plans, and communication. (Larson, Knowlton and Popple 1971: 612)

This early program has been expanded by the Exxon organization to include personality and attitude evaluations by company supervisors:

> Exxon's executives are expected to have an accommodating manner and a willingness to listen to other's ideas. . . .
>
> As a staff for the world government, Exxon has created what amounts to a global civil service that concentrates on identifying potential managers early and promoting them fast. The company recruits promising geologists, engineers and business school graduates from colleges in the United States and abroad. From their first day on the job they are constantly watched and rated by their immediate bosses and if they do well, moved--into a new job, or perhaps even a new country--roughly every three years.
>
> The company insists on giving its future leaders rounded experience. It regularly sends accountants to help run refineries /sic!/, switches lawyers into marketing.
>
> Each year, chiefs of every Exxon division, subsidiary and affiliate have to compile lists of their executive jobs and identify people who have the potential to fill them in the future. (Time, Feb. 15, 1974: 29, 31)

Thus, not only does Exxon carefully monitor the operations of its affiliates, but also the loyalty and the "potential for promotion" of the staffs of its overseas companies.

Especially significant to the understanding of many of the impersonal, if efficient practices of the Lago management (particularly

in their hiring and firing practices) is the professional background of the refinery executives and administrators:

> In politics and public relations, Exxon has been less adroit. Its top men, who are still largely geologists and engineers, are just learning that they are operating in a highly charged atmosphere in which all the company's moves have to be explained /??/ to a wary public. (Time, Feb. 15, 1974: 24)

I had my first contact with one of Lago's "top men" during the spring of 1971, while I was a co-director of the Hunter College Program in Aruba.[12] While the faculty and students felt that the academic and social experiences were generally enjoyable and rewarding, we were always aware of the clouds of disapprobation that issued from the "front offices" of Lago. According to the Public Relations Manager (who was replaced in 1973 by a young Arubiano elite) the administrators (reflecting, he said, the attitudes of the residents of Seroe Colorado) charged our students with being responsible for introducing drugs, "loose moral behavior," beards, long "unwashed" hair, rock music, interracial parties, and (certainly not the least of our misdemeanors) "bra-less females" to the colony. Even worse, we were corrupting the teen-agers of the community by encouraging their visits to our facilities.[13]

When, as a faculty member for the spring semester session in 1971, I had the responsibility of meeting with the Public Relations Manager for "orientation," I was understandably apprehensive. (Obviously, the concern of Exxon management that its overseas representatives "are expected to have an accommodating manner and a willingness to listen to other's ideas" /Time, Feb. 15, 1974: 29/ is a recent development.) His opening barage increased my anxiety:

> I'll tell you right now. We won't stand for any more nonsense from your kids. They had better look like, sound like, and act like good clean Americans.
>
> I promise you, if we find one kid with hair just touching the shoulder, I personally will have that kid off the island and back in New York in two days!

When I ventured to inject a lighter note by asking, "Does this rule apply to the girls too?" I received a blistering answer:

> Girls! You can't even tell them apart from the boys anymore. In my day you couldn't make that mistake. And that reminds me, you'd better see to it that the girls wear brassieres, night and day!

I did not venture to point out his self-contradiction.

During the four years of the Hunter College program, although students and faculty had the unqualified cooperation and encouragement of the Lieutenant Governor, his second-in-command, the Island Secretary, and two officials from the Department for Cultural Affairs when we conducted ethnographic investigations, this encouragement was not shared by Lago. Here, when we approached the office of Public Relations for permission to interview some residents of Seroe Colorado, we were told in no uncertain terms that we were not only not to interview but that we should refrain from visiting the colony residents.[14] We were permitted to join the Esso Club and to have access to the private beaches and movie theater in Seroe Colorado. Our continued membership was jeopardized on a few occasions when students invited their West Indian friends to join in their beach parties.

These unpleasant memories were still with me during the spring of 1973 when I made the preliminary contacts to ease my acceptance into the Lago "front offices." I was able to enlist the assistance of a colleague whose brother was the Senior Advisor for Mid- and Far-Eastern Affairs for Exxon. His telephone call secured a meeting date for me with

two Senior Advisors and a representative of the Public Relations Department for Exxon in their New York offices.

I feel that it is relevant at this point to outline the chronologically ordered series of communications that took place on my behalf--between Exxon in New York, their Creole affiliate in Caracas, and Lago management officials in Aruba. Since I have no reason to infer that my anticipated interviews were important enough to occasion any untoward increase in telephonic or cable communication between the parent company and its affiliates, I can only assume that the aforementioned "frequent communication" is the normal procedure:

Dates	Events	Communication
week of June 20th	Meeting with Exxon advisors for the Middle and Far East and for Latin America; First calls to alert Lago	Exxon ⇄ Lago ↘ ↗ Creole
Week of July 15th	Lago notifies Exxon that I should postpone my visit because labor contract negotiations were underway I explain to Advisor's secretary that I cannot postpone my "visit"	Exxon ⇄ Lago
	Secretary makes hotel reservations for me in Caracas and appointment with sociologist for Creole (said by Advisor to be training ground for managers)	Exxon ⇄ Creole
Week of July 25th	Preliminary meetings with sociologist in Caracas He receives okay from Lago	Lago ⇆ Creole
Week of Aug. 15th	President of Lago flies to New York for special meetings (not on my account, but I <u>was</u> discussed during one of these meetings)	Lago ⟶ Exxon

Throughout my three-day stay in Caracas (and even after four meetings with the sociologist for Creole) the motive of the Exxon advisors in arranging for me to visit the affiliate company remained a mystery to me. The sociologist contradicted the assertion made by the Senior Advisors that Creole was the "training ground" for promising managers and supervisors:

> For the record, Lago operates autonomously. . . . It severed official connections with Creole a few months ago. . . . Instead of reporting to Creole, who then contacted Exxon, Lago now reports directly to the States. . . . But anyhow, I never heard that Lago administrators were trained here. . . .

Why then was I sent to Creole before I could start my round of interviews with Lago management in Aruba?

I received the answer, indirectly, from the Creole sociologist when he met me, one week later, in Aruba:

> You know, they /the Lago administrators/ were still not sure about the purpose of your interviews. They were concerned about your talking to workers--who might regard you with suspicion since they'd know you were also talking to management. They did tell me by telephone /to Caracas/ that you said in New York you were only interested in interviewing administrators, but they asked me to get this point clear with you before you came here. . . . Also, they asked me to check on the questions you planned to ask them, and to find out what your objectives were. When I relayed back to them my assessment of your project--that you were interested in learning from Lago management the factors they felt to be responsible for the positive image of Lago in Aruba, they were reassured, and told me to set some meetings for you with Lago men . . . but first we have to meet the President and the Vice-President tomorrow.

And then, with obvious anxiety: "This is going to be the real test though. If the President likes you, you're in. . . If he doesn't . . ." The mystery was solved. I had been sent by Exxon to Creole for "clearance"; and so far, I had passed the first security test.

For the first fifteen minutes of my meeting with the chief executives of Lago I spoke (in very general terms) about the fieldwork

studies I had been conducting in Aruba since 1969. The President clearly indicated that I had passed the "real" test when, leaning back in his chair, he smiled and said: "I really think that if I had to do it all over again, I'd be an anthropologist!" He countered the surprised and politely disbelieving looks that had spontaneously appeared on the faces of his subordinates with:

> After all, we're all dealing here with people--maybe it's time we understood more about them. . . . You know Hartog says there are more than 52 nationalities here. . . . Even the Governor of Curaçao is Lebanese /actually a Sephard/.

While I was basking in the "new" atmosphere of friendly acceptance (in contrast to the hostile camp of 1971), the President abruptly resumed his official posture. Addressing the sociologist he asked for the list that had been prepared in Caracas. He read off each name, agreed with or dismissed from consideration a few of the names. "That's all?" He then secured from his desk a file that held the life resumés of each member of the managerial, supervisory, and legal staff. He briefly discussed each staff member after perusing the resumé--how long the individual had been resident in Aruba, how aware he was of Aruban history and of Lago's early operations, how verbal and "informed" the individual was, etc.

To the obvious chagrin of the sociologist, whose prepared list was now scrapped, the President suggested the names and offered the office numbers of all but one of the top level management staff (the omitted member would "be too involved in contract talks to have time" for me) and about half of the lower level superintendents. He directed the sociologist to prepare a daily schedule of appointments for me (and said that he would be pleased to head my list).

As we walked out of the office building, the sociologist, alternating between shock and annoyance, said, "I don't know what you did or how you did it! I've never seen him so enthusiastic. What kind of pull do you have, anyway?"

To my complete surprise, the next day the secretary for the "new" Public Relations Manager called me to say that a rent-free car would be delivered to my door that day--for my use for the next two months. One hour later the Vice-President called me to ask whether I had been able to secure "comfortable" accommodations. When I said that I had only temporary lodgings, he offered to "find" an empty bungalow for me--at the modest "Company" rental.

For the next two months I interviewed expatriate and Aruban managers, supervisors, and executives. To my initial questions, which focused on specific Lago policies and practices in the areas of local community affairs, hiring and firing practices, and the benefits "package" offered to Lago employees, I received "programmed" answers. I often felt, during the beginning of an interview, that some direction or briefing session must have preceded my scheduled meetings. It is also possible, however, that these "patterned" answers merely reflected the previously discussed "homogeneous" quality of the management staffs of Exxon and its affiliates.

The recently appointed Public Relations Manager (promoted from "beginning" engineer to Superintendent to Manager within three years and, because he was Aruban, not completely indoctrinated into the "pattern") explained:

> The careful screening of expatriate potential managers and executives is to filter out the individualist . . . you know, those "creative" characters who think of themselves first,

> instead of the Company. That's why the Public Relations man before me was suddenly retired. It had gotten so that most Arubans thought he was the President!

Essentially, then, the management staff of Lago operates as a collective identity; the academic and job training experiences of these staff members, their goals, their loyalties, their commitment to promotion are so identical as to justify a "single" image for the whole staff.[15] The following discussion of the organizational structure of Lago, and of the involvement of past and present staff representatives in the lives of the resident population and in the island government, derives from the collective views of the Lago management.

In its hierarchical structure the organizational form of the Lago management is typical of present-day Exxon overseas affiliates: the national origins of its staff members, however, do not yet reflect the publicized policy of Exxon to "bring along young nationals to managerial positions as fast as possible" (The Lamp, Spring 1974: 16). Although in most of Exxon's overseas operations, all but the top level executives are "locals," Lago, until 1971, was completely staffed by expatriate Americans and Europeans.

The Organization Chart of August 1, 1973 (Figure 1 below) indicates that at present there are four Aruban superintendents and one Aruban manager.[16]

The first manager I interviewed told me that Lago was "nationalizing" the refinery. When he observed my surprised reaction, he pointed to several of the pictures on the chart, saying, "He's Aruban, he's Aruban . . ." etc. (I later learned that of the ten



(Pictures and names of staff members have been omitted, and national origins of the individuals substituted.)

FIGURE 1

ORGANIZATION CHART, LAGO OIL AND TRANSPORT COMPANY
(AUGUST 1, 1974)

pictures he pointed to, only five would be classified by Arubans as Aruban. Three of the ten were Antilleans--from Surinam and Curaçao, one was Venezuelan and one was from the British West Indies.) When I suggested that he was actually describing an "Arubanization" process, he quickly retorted, "That's quibbling over semantics." I asked whether the Lago policy included "nationalization" of the higher level executives and relinquishing control to the local government. "Of course not!"[17]

In similar fashion, I was notified that the Seroe Colorado colony was now "integrated." Further inquiry revealed that integration again referred to Arubanization. Houses in the colony are now "available" for rental to Aruban engineers and managers. My informants also noted with pride that several (actually two) Arubans are now building their own homes in Seroe Colorado, whereas expatriates can only rent. I later learned from the Chief of the Land Office that the Civil Code of 1924 permits concession rights to surface land only to registered nationals. Non-nationals may only lease or rent. (Expatriates have recently taken to buying expensive homes in the fashionable Malmok area. The Land Office Chief told me that, since they cannot own the land on which the house is built, "they are foolish to invest so much money.") Since Arubans are the only residents whose homes are built on land that they may hold in deed, Lago is hardly displaying magnanimity in granting permission to Aruban professional employees to lease land that is due for renegotiation in 1980.

I do not propose to dwell here on the historical development of Lago's relationship with the government and with the resident

population, inasmuch as these data have been presented in the preceding sections. Of more relevance is the identification of some of the specific factors that deal with the overt and covert involvement of Lago in the political, economic, and social lives of the people.

In 1971, the editor of a widely circulated daily newspaper told me that into World War II "Lago was the government. They made no attempt to hide that fact." When, in 1973, I questioned representatives of Lago management about this assertion, I received complete confirmation:

> Well of course! The government in those days just consisted of a Dutch Commander and his underlings. They were interested only in carrying out the directives they received from Holland. They certainly werent' prepared to cope with all the problems of administering a tremendously increased and transient population.
>
> And since we had to sign to accept responsibility for all the workers we brought in, obviously we had to hold the reins of government. . . . Now, no . . . we are only involved with the government in explaining our plans and decisions to the government officials. . . . They can carry the ball from there.

How then does this jibe with the statement in the Time magazine article, "Exxon: Testing the Tiger": "Their bosses caution Exxon men to treat all governments alike: maintain friendly and correct relations, but never get too close or become too hostile" (Time, Feb. 18, 1974: 31)?

Whether, in the early 1950s, it was Lago or the local government that initiated the policy of replacing non-nationals with national workers, is a moot point. Was it by coincidence that, shortly after the following event, the population fell from 57,303 to 55,483?

> On 9th August 1951 an outlaw strike broke out at Lago Oil and Transport Company. In the course of a few days it assumed impressive proportions--about 3,500 people took part in it. . . .

> On Sunday August 12th the /Island/ Council had an emergency meeting. Matters even came to such a pass that units of the Royal Dutch Marines, had to become active against rioting groups, which, as it turned out, was mainly composed of imported hands. (Hartog 1961: 428)

I suggest that Lago, by "assuming responsibility" for its imported working force, felt justified in arranging for the local government to deport those workers who "were demanding their rights." Then, by the mid-1950s, when automation of the refinery was completed, and the work force was drastically diminished (this occurred at the same time that Exxon was spending millions of dollars to expand its refinery operations in the Middle East), the precedent had already been established; non-national workers were to be dismissed first--in the manner outlined in the previous section, and consonant with the national (or Lago's?) assessment of Big Island and Small Island personality ascriptions. An official in the Department of Economic Affairs told me, "Government policy now dictates to Lago that as soon as an Aruban is qualified (through on-the-job training or outside schooling) he is to replace a non-national worker. Government officials say that this policy was initiated by the local government to solve the unemployment problem. Curiously, however, it coincided with Exxon's stated policy, to replace expatriates with "young nationals" as soon as possible (The Lamp, Spring 1974: 16).

The delay in the Arubanization process with regard to its managerial staff (considering that Lago is Exxon's oldest and one of its largest overseas refineries) stems from the rapid advancement during the 1940s of British West Indians to foreman and supervisory positions. Once government policy "demanded" the ousting of non-nationals from Lago employment, the Company had to speed up its

program of training young Arubans to replace these West Indians. Unfortunately, the native Arubans are presently little more concerned than they were in the 1940s to avail themselves of the opportunity to secure Lago scholarships. Thus, although the present ratio of national to non-national wage-earners is approximately 9:1, the ratio on the managerial level is 1:6.

Although the management was loath to address the more cogent reasons for the continued delay in the Arubanization program, it was not difficult to discover that the original "problems that made it necessary to import outside workers," namely the language difficulty, the lack of motivation, and the alcoholic propensities of the Aruban men, still obtain. Now, however, these "problems" can no longer be "solved" by replacing "unsatisfactory" nationals with outside workers. For example, while the official "office talk" continues to be English (contrary to the practice of Exxon's overseas affiliates of conducting business in the vernacular of the host country), the laborers and foremen converse in Papiamentu. The daily "Report Sheet," printed in an office in the administration building, carries side-by-side articles in English and Papiamentu.

Alcoholism, claimed by Hartog (1961) to have plagued the Aruban population even before Lago came to Aruba, has reached serious proportions. The town doctor (who is also the government-appointed medical "examiner" of the prostitutes in St. Nicholas) told me that, according to the results of an international conference on alcoholism, held in Aruba in 1969, the island ranks in the sixth percentile of world per capita consumption of alcohol.[18] The

Lago doctors I interviewed claim that the "problem alcoholics" have, by now, been weeded out of Lago's working force. The town doctor was frankly contemptuous of this claim.

> They don't know anything about it. An Aruban only goes for Lago medical services if he gets hurt on the job. Anything that has to do with his drinking problem, he stays far away from those doctors. . . . And if he gets in trouble outside the plant, the police report won't say anything about his being drunk, not if he works for Lago!

At any rate, it becomes apparent that the decision to hire outside workers had little to do with the stated defects of the Aruban men. A local doctor told me:

> The Company knew they'd have trouble on such a small island if they were too open in firing the locals on any whim--especially if they threatened to go out on strike. So they told the Arubans that they were incompetent, and that they had to hire outsiders because they couldn't rely on the Arubans. The West Indians, knowing of the power Lago wielded over their lives, worked harder and more regularly than the Arubans. So they rose to higher positions in the refinery . . . much quicker than the Arubans did.

Since the 1960s most of the Arubans employed by Lago have been affiliated with the local branch of the International Oil Workers and Atomic Energies Union. However, this local chapter operates, in effect, as a company union. A Lago manager told me, with obvious condescension:

> In 1969, one of "our" union leaders delivered a paper at an international union conference in Hungary. We /members of the expatriate supervisory staff/ help him write the paper, "How Union Can Survive after a Drastic Loss of Membership."
>
> When the man was questioned on the specifics of the Lago union contract, he had no idea what it was about. . . . Lago's union leaders don't want any assistance from the international union. . . . They don't have the vaguest idea of how to conduct proper negotiations with the Company. We continually tell them, "You can't come into the bargaining room with--'What do you think of this idea?' You have to come in with a worked out proposal."

If Lago directly controls the union, through "advice and assistance," it plays a quieter, but no less effective role in island politics.[19]

The overwhelming victory of the MEP party in the summer elections of 1973 surprised and upset the managers:

> We underestimated the appeal of that school-teacher /Croes/. Of course we don't vote in thse elections because we're U.S. citizens. But it was obvious that the PPA /conservative party supported by the Arubiano elite, the merchants, and the non-national workers/ was becoming too apathetic. They're too sure of themselves. . . . They'd better start getting busy for next summer's island elections. . . . They surely don't want those rabble-rousers to take over. . . .

The Lago management, despite their criticism of Arubiano apathy, clearly identify with the elite class. At those social and political events that are sponsored by the local government and attended by the affluent merchants, the social elite,and the high-level government officials, the Lago executives are honored guests. On the other hand, at most community affairs, even those which are publicly supported by donations from the Lago budget, management representatives are as conspicuously absent. A local newspaper editor said:

> One terrible thing about Lago, that has made Arubans turn against them, is, when we have inaugurations, lay cornerstones, have big funerals and weddings . . . for which we always have an empty seat in the place of honor, they never show up. They always do, though, for the hotels or for the fancy government affairs.

The results of the summer election quickly reached Exxon headquarters. During my second interview with the President of Lago, we discussed the recent event:

> When I mentioned the outcome of the Central Government elections at a New York meeting last week, I told them the same thing I've been saying to you--the party won on their platform of

> "Separation from Curaçao"--but party promises are cheap. If he can't produce, and it's hardly likely that he will, the people won't vote for him in next summer's local elections. . . . They /In New York/ weren't at all concerned.

They weren't? When I visited the Sernior Advisors for Exxon in the fall of 1973, the first question they directed at me addressed the summer elections: "How do you assess the significance of the outcome of the election?" When I asked, "From whose point of view?" the two men exchanged glances. Then one said, "What does that leader really want? Does he really mean Separation from Holland too? . . . And what's his attitude toward Venezuela? Is he just a lot of noise?"

The concern of Lago managers to maintain close relationships with the Aruban elite is evident from the participation of the administrative and professional staff in the local chapters of Kiwanis, Rotary, and Lions. Curiously, the Lago membership in these associations duplicates the hierarchical representation of the Aruban and merchant groups in the organizations.

Before I became personally involved (as Guest Lecturer) in these organizations, I had assumed that the merchants, the government officials, and the Lago professional and managerial staff would belong to these clubs out of personal interest in the functions of a particular association, or through invitation from friends who were members. This is not the case.

The membership of the Lions is confined to the Jewish, Chinese, and middle-class Aruban merchants. The other two organizations, however, are dominated by the Aruban elite and the Lago executives, managers, and engineers.

I was introduced to these organizations through my association with Lago. Toward the end of an interview with one of the general managers, he asked me to be a guest speaker at the forthcoming Kiwanis meeting (to be held in one of the club rooms of the Aruba-Sheraton Hotal). I noticed from the roster of club membership that the names identified some of the better known Aruban merchants, assistants in the various government departments, and a few Lago professionals and managers.

The following week, another of the managers asked me to speak at the Rotary meeting. (Obviously I had "passed muster" at the Kiwanis meeting.) Because this eventwas relevant to my future relationships with the Arubiano elite, I will elaborate on the details of this meeting.

The manager who had extended the invitation escorted me to the dinner meeting, held in one of the most expensive restaurants in Oranjestad. As we entered the room, the members momentarily interrupted their "Happy Hour" imbibing to nod in my direction (acknowledging the presence of the only female in the room). They then resumed their chatting and drinking until they saw the President of Lago walk toward me. Once again they paused to watch. The President spoke to me for a few moments, while the other members stared with increasing interest. To test my notions of the significance of their added regard, I asked the President if I might discuss something with him in private. He led me to a quiet corner at one end of the room. When he leaned closer to hear me over the sounds of the taped music, the rest of the assembly, as one, inclined

the upper parts of their bodies in our direction. (At this point the cocktails they held would have had to be poured into the ear.)

When we finished our conversation, stood, and walked toward the group, I was more than greeted: I was enveloped in warmth and graciousness--"How can I help you? . . . Charming. . . . If you have any questions in your work, please come to see me. . . ." These offers, I soon realized from the names of the members as we were introduced, came from the very same elite Arubianos I had thus far been unable to approach on my own. When I was shown the roster of membership, I also realized that the group included

the recently retired Lieutenant Governor
the Minister of Justice
the Chief of the Land Office
the Chief of the Department of Social and Economic Affairs
the President of the largest shipping lines
the Presidents of three of the largest banking firms
and, as mentioned,
the President of Lago

in short, the political, economic, and social elite.

For the balance of the summer I had easy access to government officials, and Arubiano business and social leaders. My association with the President of Lago was never mentioned during these interviews, but I was offered enough inferential (and deferential) responses to all of my questions to substantiate my notion that acceptance by the "front office" at Lago conferred automatic acceptance into the elite circles. This, notwithstanding the statements often made to me during my interviews with government officials and Arubiano businessmen, that Lago executives could never be part of the "inner circle" because they lacked the primary qualification--Arubiano heritage.

The elite Arubianos (as well as all of the other social and economic classes in Aruba) recognize full well the importance of Lago to the island economy. In all of my interviews with government officials in 1973, I detected a note of uncertainty as we discussed the contributions of Lago to island revenues. Several times my informants admitted that they were concerned that Lago "might one day pack up and leave. And we know we're not ready to run the refinery by ourselves . . . particularly since Venezuela is obviously more and more interested in the possibility of gaining control of our refinery." I could not track down the source of this "possibility."

When I mentioned this concern (not only expressed by government officials but also by many island residents) in my interviews at Lago and with the Exxon advisors, I received offhand, sometimes cryptic responses:

> Go? Go where? . . . Exxon has a lot of money invested in Lago. . . . Of course, it's happened before that we've had to relocate . . . if a government became hostile toward our operations . . . but we've never given any indication that there are any such plans in the works.

With respect to the tax contributions made by Lago to the Central Government, all sectors I met agreed that these contributions represent the largest source of revenue to the government (as property and income taxes from the large tourist hotels will not be forthcoming for several years). The universally expressed complaint, that the benefits to Aruba from these large tax revenues are minimal, is not directed against the refinery management, but against the Central Government in Curaçao.

I was not surprised to learn from the managers of Lago that their opposition to the idea of Status Aparte directly relates to

their concern to "lower the profile" of Lago in Aruba:

> Those people /MEP/ are totally irresponsible. This island can't stand alone. Our taxes and the tourist income aren't enough to float this island. We've supported the introduction of new industries, but they just never pan out. We support the growth of the tourist industry, but it'll take years before that will lessen the dependence of the people on us. . . . Now, if Aruba actually does separate from Curaçao, they'll become even more dependent on Lago.

And how does Lago actually "support" outside investment in "new" industry, and local investment in Aruban enterprises?

The two expatriate-owned factories, the Grace Chemical Company and the Bacadera plant that manufactures industrial gases, polyester products, and machinery parts, both share, as their major consumer, Lago. Although in the United Staets, Exxon affiliates make all of their purchases through their vertically integrated subsidiaries in the United States, the transportation costs for necessary supplies to the overseas affiliates make these supplies more expensive than locally purchased equivalent items. This is also true for the purchases Lago makes from local furniture, electric appliance, and mechanical equipment stores (none of which are Jewish or Chinese owned). Lago purchases these supplies to furnish the houses in Seroe Colorado which it rents to its engineers, supervisors, and managers.

Thus Lago's "direct contributions to the island economy" are made in accordance with the injunction of the parent company to minimize costs--even when this is in apparent contradicton to the rationale it adopted when it took into its corporate bosom those companies that manufactured equipment and supplies necessary to the functioning of the oil refineries. "Support" of island

industries, then, would hardly be out of altrustic concern for the island economy.

Lago support for the reinstitution of those industries that preceded the establishment of the refining operations (for example, aloe production, gold mining, and phosphate mining, all of which are unrelated to the functioning of the refinery) has been less than encouraging:

> Yes, there's been a lot of talk about the reopening of the phosphate mines. You know they're located on "our" concession /actually lease/ land at the tip of the colony. We've been approached by a couple of outside and local companies that want to lease that land from us. . . . We've looked into it. . . . But the only proper way to extract the phosphate would be by dynamite blasting--and we feel that the detritus from the blasting could contaminate our product . . . so, no!

The economic development of Aruba, then proceeds, or rather stagnates, according to Lago's droit de seigneur.

However, since the 1930s Lago has done more than determine the economic lives of the resident population. In the following chapter I will address the direct and indirect involvement of Lago management in the inception and maintenance of inter-group antagonisms. In addition I will discuss Lago's role in the reinforcement of the negative self-image of the national segment.

NOTES

[1]Although the corporate name of Exxon was adopted in 1972, throughout my discussion of the historical development of the corporation I use the former name Jersey Standard, to differentiate the founding company Standard Oil Trust from the separate corporation that formed in response to the Sherman Anti-Trust Decision of 1911.

[2]All of my informants agree that the Arubiano and Arubano government officials now occupy the top rung of Aruba's political hierarchy, and that any "outside" control over these elite comes from Holland and Curaçao. Some of the more aware officials and merchants acknowledge the coercive power of Lago with regard to governmental policy decisions but they insist that the Lago management cannot be classified as elite because they do not hold equivalent social status with the nationals. I submit that the Lipset and Solari (1967) definition confers the status of "Power Elite" on the Lago management.

[3]In 1947, after Jersey Standard completed a successful merger with Standard of Louisiana, Standard of Pennsylvania, and the Colonial and Beacon Oil Companies, the conglomerate reorganized under the name Esso Standard Oil Company. In 1972, after a series of international mergers, the corporate name changed again, to Exxon Corporation.

[4]The Seven Sisters are Exxon, Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, Standard of California, Royal Dutch/Shell, and British Petroleum.

[5]"By the middle of the century it was without doubt the great American medicine. 'Seneca Oil' seems to have been the earliest name under which petroleum appeared in the East. . . . While it was admitted to be chiefly a liniment it was recommended for cholera morbus, liver complaint, bronchitis and consumption, and the dose prescribed was three teaspoonfulls three times a day!" (Tarbell 1902: 5).

[6]This fortuitous decision has put Venezuela into a much better bargaining position now that she is embarking on a program of nationalization. That Mexico was unable to profit significantly from her nationalization of expatriate concessions occurred because of the insistence of foreign investors that their ownership included the subsurface as well as the surface lands.

"Unlike the unfortunate Mexican laws which caused such difficulty, Venezuelan law was always clear and constant on this point. Secondly, the granting of oil leases was made an exclusive power of the president. With property rights, leasing powers, and administrative authority thus clearly defined before any important concessions were granted, the area for future legal disputes was greatly reduced" (Lieuwen 1955: 7).

[7]"/In 1907/ the dynamic head of the Dutch firm, Sir Henri Deterding, succeeded in effecting a merger with his leading competitor, the Shell Transport and Trading Company of England, thus forming the Royal Dutch/Shell combine.

"Between the two powerful companies, Shell and Standard, a rivalry began which spread over the entire globe and continued unabated until 1929" (Lieuwen 1955: 8).

[8]"They sidestepped the 80,000 hectare clause /in the mining code/ the total amount that could be held by one company or individual, by creating numerous subsidiaries" (Lieuwen 1955: 39).

[9]"When Standard of Indiana had difficulty marketing crude in the United States in 1927, it shipped to Shell (which had built a refinery) in Curaçao and to its own refinery in Tampico. It saw little reason to ship Venezuelan crude for refining to the United States when nearly saturated American markets forced it to find outlets abroad. Accordingly, it decided to build a refinery near the Venezuelan source of supply. The company already owned a terminal on Aruba, and the Dutch government welcomed construction of a refinery. Because Gomez was indifferent about domestic refining, because Standard of Indiana chose not to expose its costly plant to the anticipated violence in Venezuela when the aging dictator passed away, Aruba was selected" (Lieuwen 1955: 48).

Lago's explanation for the company's decision to build the refinery in Aruba did not include the above stated reasons. Instead, they said that it was simply based on logistics. Ocean tankers could not pass over the twelve-foot bar at the entrance to Lake Maracaibo, thus shallow draft lake tankers were employed to haul the oil to the transhipment center in Aruba. As oil production increased, the Company decided to substitute on-the-spot refining for transhipment.

[10]This explains the evasive answers I received from Lago managers during our discussions of the oil shortage in the United States during the summer of 1973. (I later discovered that even at the height of the shortage in the winter of 1974 /the period of the Arab oil embargo/ refined oil from Lago was still being sent to "outlets" in Europe and South America. As the disposition of the oil refined by Lago directly lies within the purview of the parent company, I can only assume that regardless of the domestic needs, Exxon will only ensure adequate supplies of oil to the United States when the wholesale and retail prices for refined oil become as profitable to the company as are the present-day foreign oil prices.

[11]"/Multinational/ does not imply an industry owned and/or controlled by the world's many nationals. Instead it refers simply to the fact that this is an industry which operates internationally, with a complex network of relationships connecting most countries of the world. Its ownership and direction lie mainly in the hands

> of a very small group of companies known . . . as the 'international majors'. . . . Of the seven 'international majors' no fewer than five have their headquarters and the overwhelming majority of their shareholders in the U.S.A. . . . Of the two remaining . . . Royal Dutch/Shell and British Petroleum /each/ has extensive refinery and marketing outlets in the U.S. . . . Ultimately . . . British Petroleum will be the ninth or tenth largest company in the United States" (Odell 1970: 14-15).

[12]In 1967 the City University of New York, through its Research Foundation, entered into a leasing agreement with Lago for a block of unoccupied houses and an abandoned school building in the Seroe Colorado colony--vacant since the completion of automation of the refinery.

The Aruba Research Center was designed to provide a "natural laboratory," offering courses in biology and anthropology to undergraduate and graduate students of the colleges of CUNY.

The four-year lease included a renewal option clause. In September of 1971, because of the mounting problems of financing the program, the University did not exercise this option.

[13]In fact, most of these Seroe Colorado "teenagers" were students of United States and European universities, home on vacation for spring holiday. As a group, they were exceedingly more sophisticated than our students in the "youth culture."

[14]We had heard that in 1966 a New York sociologist had received permission from Lago to conduct an attitude survey among the residents. His report shocked and infuriated the colony. The Public Relations Manager referred to this study during out meeting:

> "That fool tried to make a Kinsey Report on our community. He said our wives were alcoholics, husband swappers, and I don't know what else. We told him what he should do with that report!"

[15]My closest continuing contact with Lago (since 1969) is a Belgian engineer. Although he has been an employee at Lago for the past seven years, and is therefore entitled by seniority to promotion to Senior Engineer, his attitude rating are sufficiently unsatisfactory as to block his advancement. His supervisor has told him that the Company feels he has not shown the proper commitment to Lago. He is regarded by his colleagues as non-conformist. His professional skills and job performance place him at the top of his department, but his "radical" temperament disqualifies him from merit pay raises, promotion, or "special consideration" (permission to rent a three-bedroom bungalow on the more desirable beachfront strip of the colony).

During my last visit to Aruba in 1974, the President of Exxon arrived for a brief stay at Lago. On the day he was to "inspect" my friend's department, this "non-conformist" received a message to stay in the bathroom while the President was walking through his section.

[16]The Vice-President, who gave me this chart, advised me not to "show it around at Lago. The workers have a general idea about the structure of the organization but they don't know the details."

This gratuitous explanation was further evidence that the management was still concerned that I might be interviewing Lago workers.

[17]When I met with the Senior Advisors for Exxon, after my return from Aruba, I referred to the "nationalization" program--and mentioned that I had been told I was being unduly fussy when I questioned the term. The Advisor for the Mid- and Far East was upset:

> "I hear this talk all over . . . recently in Malaysia--it's sloppy talk! I don't agree that you were quibbling over semantics. Nationalization is something else!"

[18]At present there are nine Alcoholics Anonymous centers on the island--for an adult male population (Aruban) of approximately 9,000.

[19]Here, the precedent comes from Exxon's covert (but thinly disguised) policy of "influencing" the political elections of host countries. For example, immediately after the election, in 1973, of President Carlos Perez in Venezuela,

> "he . . . /had/ to combat widespread charges that he is the 'man of the U.S. oil companies /Exxon is the major concessionaire/. The governing Social Christians openly charged that foreign oil companies had contributed to Mr. Perez's campaign. . . .
>
> "Oil companies deny the charges but generally admit that they prefer Mr. Perez to the Social Christians" (New York Times, December 14, 1973: 7).

The Senior Advisor for Latin American Affairs told me, during our last meeting in March of 1974, "It certainly is to our interest to promote' a stable and friendly government in any area where we have vital crude or refinery concerns."

[20]The annual budget that Aruba receives from the Central Government in Curaçao is based on the assessment of local government expenditures; it does not take into account the inordinately higher tax recepts of Lago compared to the contribution of the Royal Dutch/Shell refinery in Curaçao.

If Aruba were indeed to separate from the Central administration of the Netherlands Antilles, the taxes from Lago would feed directly into the island coffers.

CHAPTER NINE

THE LAGO MANAGEMENT: SOCIAL MANIPULATORS

Just as Lago influences, either through overt participation or covert direction, the economic and political destinies of the population, so does it manipulate the social statuses and ethnic rivalries of the population segments.

After I had identified the previously discussed group segments and learned of the antagonisms between them, I became increasingly curious to discover the origins of the stereotypical labels each group pins on the other segments, to wit:

Arubans--docile, passive
West Indians--trouble-makers, aggressive
Jewish merchants--profiteers, usurers
Chinese merchants--reasonable, hard-working.

Although, in fact, the hundreds of people I have interviewed over the four years of my field studies, tend to concur with these personality markers, some of my more perceptive informants insist that the group boundaries in St. Nicholas were artificially constructed--in response to "outside" pressures.

At the onset of group contact in the early 1930s, only the Arubans and the West Indians were set into immediate opposition. But while the initial focus of the Aruban hostility had an economic base, incurred from the replacement of Aruban workers by the migrant newcomers, for the past three decades the continuing antagonism

widened this focus to encompass social distaste and overt discrimination--relegating the British West Indians to virtually untouchable caste status.

Similarly, the Jewish merchants were initially welcomed and accepted into the larger society--until they were perceived by the national segment as economically threatening to the emerging middle-class Aruban entrepreneurs and as unduly exploitative toward the lower classes. Thus these segments, at different time periods, were set into economic opposition. The Chinese, on the other hand, although their group functions were almost identical to those of the Jewish merchants, have thus far managed to deflect the extreme hostility Arubans express for the other two segments.

But why was the major exploiter not perceived by any of the groups to be the center point of these economic oppositions? Not, I submit, because Lago was so big as to be outside the circle of economic competition. Indeed, the wages paid by the Company, its hiring and firing practices, its local purchases, all contribute directly to defining the opposition of the segments:

- the antagonism between the Aruban and West Indian workers, engendered by economic competition;
- the dependence of Aruban and West Indian workers (through incurred and compounded debt) to the Ashkenazic merchants--after Lago terminated its commissary facilities;
- the dependence of Aruban merchants and contractors on the local purchases made by Lago (which have declined since the 1950s, at the same time that the Ashkenazic and Chinese merchants entered their upward spiral of business expansion--with the advent of the tourist industry).

How then has Lago managed to avoid the negative Big Brother image

that large expatriate corporations generally hold in similarly dependent economies?

Given the size and insularity of the island, the small number of its local population, and the naïveté of a colonially dominated subsistence farming and mining society--suddenly precipitated into twentieth century industrialization--the answer can be traced to the early practices of the Lago management.[1]

A young Aruban, recently graduated from the University of Utrecht (and part of a very small group of "local radicals") offered this blistering indictment of Lago "policy":

> Right from the beginning, the Company started on its policy of Divide, Neutralize and Destroy.
>
> It set the different groups against each other by suggesting to each that the "others" were hateful, and potentially harmful.
>
> They got them so busy hating each other that they couldn't see who the real enemy was. They defused their anger against the employer who pays peon wages--and then says that the wages are high enough, compared with the other Caribbean islands. In other words, point to a starving dog and say, "See, you have a bone, what are you complaining about!"
>
> And worse, the people <u>believe</u> they are doing pretty well--and even those who are barely making it from week to week--do they blame their hardships on Lago? No . . . they point the finger at Curaçao. And how do the people know they are prospering? Not from their pocketbooks, certainly. They know it because Lago and the government (same thing) constantly <u>tell</u> them so! It's a great way to keep attention away from themselves. . . . Convince the people, not by direct statements, but by inferences, that <u>you're</u> the benefactor--that without you the island would sink into the sea--and that all the people's troubles are caused by the blacks and the big money-makers (not Lago of course, but the merchants) . . . in other words, it's the <u>outsiders</u> (that Lago brought in) that are exploiting the people!

Do the Lago managers themselves subscribe to the aforementioned personality ascriptions? Verbally, no:

> Are the Arubans really passive and docile as they are said to be? Well, you'll see for yourself if they go out on strike next month. /<u>They didn't.</u>/ The first thing the government does

> when a strike breaks out anywhere on the island, is close all the rum shops . . . and cover over the liquor bottles sold in the supermarkets. /You can only buy liquor in the Esso Club's retail store which sells only to the expatriate residents of Seroe Colorado./ Everyone knows how aggressive they get when they're drinking. They won't even take orders from their own police. /The police are from Curaçao./
>
> The West Indians--They're much more motivated to succeed than the Arubans. In the early days when more than half our work force was English, they caught on quickly to American methods. For the most part they got along very well with our foremen and supervisors. . . . They were bright, studied hard . . . and they rose very fast to foremen and supervisory jobs.
>
> The merchants /obviously referring to the Ashkenazim/--There's never been any trouble here, like happened in Curaçao. Look, they're here to make money, like businessmen anywhere. . . . The trouble is most Arubans are not business oriented. . . . And besides, who likes someone they owe money to? That's why we decided, in the 1940s, to discontinue our commissary facilities here in the plant. The concession was running in the red. . . . It had to start extending credit to the workers. . . . That's not our business.

Although it is certainly possible that the hostilities that prevail between the segments might obtain even without the overt and covert encouragement from Lago management, it can hardly be denied that the initial device engineered by the management--the replacement of local workers with imported workers--set the stage for the initial antagonisms. Similarly, the continued and ever-increasing hostility between the workers and the foreign merchants can be traced to the decision made by Lago to discontinue its commissary services to its employees, and to encourage the Ashkenazic merchants to establish credit arrangements for the local and West Indian workers. The small-scale Aruban merchants, whose livelihood depended on the technical equipment, furniture, and household accessories that Lago purchased for its expatriate personnel, have suffered severe financial losses since the massive lay-off periods of the 1950s. The continued diminution of their capital resources, in

contrast to the rising fortunes of the foreign merchants, continues to widen the breach between the local and non-national groups in the commercial community.

As corollary to the involvement of Lago management in the relationships between thepopulation segments, specific decisions and actions undertaken by refinery administrators, supervisors, and medical staff have served to denigrate the self-image of the Aruban nationals. Aside from the practice of importing West Indian workers to fill the jobs that the Arubans felt were rightfully theirs, the managers, during the first two decades of refinery operations, expended considerable time and money to provide housing and recreational facilities for the non-national workers--ignoring (according to my Aruban informants) the similar needs of the nationals. Lago construction crews built the workers' bungalows at Essoville and Lago Heights for their more permanent personnel--and provided materials for their transient migrants to construct the shacks in the Village. One of my Aruban informants, recently retired from Lago after twenty-five years of service, said:

> Even though, on the whole, Lago has been a blessing to this island, whatever anger Arubans feel for the West Indians goes back to the first years after Lago brought these workers in. Lago paid much more attention to the blacks than to us. They sponsored the West Indian island associations, the social clubs and the athletic clubs in St. Nicholas. They built the Lago Heights Club and the Sports Park. The Company spent over one hundred thousand florins on them, but nothing for Arubans.
>
> Even now (though they finally started to donate recently to some of our organizations) they give annual donations to the Protestant churches and the YMCA without even checking to see how the money is used. This demoralizes the acceptors, they don't do anything themselves, they even hire people to clean their own premises. Many clubs folded because of the lack of initiative.
>
> You know the Essolito Club, the one the local editor told you about--the one he brags that Lago built and supports for

> the black and Aruban kids? Every year he thanks Lago in his newspaper for their generous donations. . . Well, that club doesn't even exist anymore . . . but it still gets its annual donation. . . . You know why, it's to keep the editor quiet!

During the same period that Lago was giving financial support to the construction of housing and recreational facilities for the West Indian immigrants, the doctors at the Lago Hospital were engaged in an "effective" program to reduce the birthrate of the Aruban nationals:

> Into the late 1940s the birthrate for the Arubans was up annually to 40 per 1000. . . . We delivered 900 babies in one year in this hospital alone. . . . Imagine. . . . Of course the Church was encouraging the people to have as many children as possible. One of my medical colleagues, a Roman Cathlic, actually praised his women patients who had between 6 to 8 children.
>
> By 1950, before I was appointed Director, I myself had already performed hundreds of vasectomies and ligations on Aruban men and women. . . . I had to stop the tubal ligations in the mid-1950s because the new medical director was opposed to my program. I resumed again in 1960 when I became Director. This time I had the tacit approval of the Church and of course the government doctors now are beginning to sponsor birth-control clinics--but the impetus has slowed. It's been difficult to gain momentum again.
>
> The problem was that they weren't responding to the birth control techniques we prescribed. . . . We fitted the women for diaphragms. They may have worn them as a charm around the neck . . . they certainly weren't using them internally, judging by the frequencies of pregnancy.
>
> It's not really difficult to convince people of the wisdom of this course. Once you build up trust in your patient, he or she will take your advice. Usually we advised sterilization when a woman was pregnant with her third child. The problem became that after one child they wanted sterilization. . . .
>
> I had no trouble with the men on vasectomies--when I assured them that it wouldn't interfere with their sex life. In fact, they welcomed the idea because it meant that their extramarital life would be safer. For a woman's ligation we always required the written consent of the husband. Often a man at this point would say that he preferred to have the sterilization done to him--that he would rather bear the scar than have his wife's wife's body marred.

West Indian men and women were not offered this service: "They went to the town doctors generally . . . although the hospital services were offered to all of Lago's employees."

The doctors I interviewed were pleased with the success of this program. "The birthrate for the Aruban sector is now down to 10 per 1000." That neither the local government nor the Church was consulted for approval indicates the freedom the Lago staff exercised in matters that hardly related to refinery operations.

The sterilization program also had significant side-effects on the relationships between Aruban men and women. First, the fact that the woman required the written consent of her husband before she underwent sterilization, while her husband needed no consent from her, reinforced and even aggravated the traditional male dominance in the Aruban family. One of my female informants recalled the animosity she felt toward her husband after his vasectomy:

> He treated me real bad. Before his operation I begged him not to do it. We were young then. I said, "What if I was to die soon? Wouldn't you want to marry again and have children by your wife?" He laughed . . . "Now, for the first time I'm free. I have my two sons to carry my name. Now it's time for me to enjoy. Don't worry. I won't use you if you don't want. The 'girls' say it's better to be with a man when they don't have to use anything." . . . For many years now he hardly ever uses me.

Perhaps by coincidence, it was during this same period that the saloon-cribs of St. Nicholas, formerly frequented by the transient marine crews and the West Indians, became the weekend haunts of Aruban men. For the past twenty years the Arubans have been the primary source of income for the Chinese saloon owners and the Colombian prostitutes.

An American manager at Lago, scornful of the "total lack of cultural achievement" of the Aruban people, laughed, "Oh yes, they do have one national institution, or I should say two--alcoholism and 'visiting' the bar girls."

Many Arubans, even the rising professional engineers and superintendents at Lago, feel that they are treated as "second-class citizens" by the management staff. When I asked the expatriate managers and engineers about the delay in the Arubanization of the managerial staff the responses were either condescending or contemptuous. Generally, the expatriate engineers were the most antagonistic:

> You know, the policy of Exxon has always been to recruit their engineers from the top graduates of the best universities. The competition for a good refinery position, especially this one here in Aruba, has always been fierce. Now . . . through Lago's scholarship program, we've been subsidizing these Aruban guys, getting them into West Virginia Polytech and no-name schools like that--no way could they make it in any decent school. They just don't have a sense of dedication--They're only in it for the money. And /this from my "non-conformist" informant/ by the way, that's what the whole Arubanization program is about. The expatriates get paid in dollars, the Arubans in florins--in accordance with island government regulations, which dictate the same wage scale for their government or industrial engineers. They don't want all their professionals to "defect" to Lago. So really, it's all an economy move. . . . Lago has to remain competitive /I heard this from each one of my informants at Lago--and I've never been able to determine with whom they are supposed to be competing/ so they have to cut costs. . . .
>
> When the refinery is all Arubanized, Lago's payroll is going to be much smaller than it is now!

Underlying the resentment that the expatriates express toward the Aruban professionals, is the clear understanding that the expatriates are being "phased out" of their positions--out of the "happiest years of our lives." Added to their professional work assignments, the expatriates have the responsibility of training and preparing their national replacements.

The Arubans who are receiving this training, in turn resent their expatriate supervisors,

> . . . for their superior attitudes. Even though we received our degrees in the United States, they never treat us as equals. They don't show us the respect we deserve. And, after all, since

> they are paid on a higher scale than we get, that could account for their superior feelings . . . though it's also true they somehow have more polish, more executive ability than we have. . . . And they let us know that Lago is so anxious to conform to government regulations to replace the expatriates as soon as possible that Lago is willing to take us even if we don't get good marks or come from the top schools. . . . And we know we are pushed much faster to higher positions. . . .
>
> It usually takes at least five years to go from beginning engineer to senior engineer--but I went from beginning engineer to superintendent in less than four years. . . . They don't like being bypassed, even though they knew the handwriting is on the wall for them.

According to the doctors at the Lago clinic, the rate of "sick call" for Aruban managers and supervisors is on the increase. Although the complaints are usually of a minor nature: headache, stomach upset, and frequent upper respiratory infection, the accounts of physical distress often include reference to the psychological stresses and tensions that accompany the training and promotion programs. One of the doctors related the "chronic syndrome" as reported to him by an Aruban superintendent:

> They /expatriates/ expect me to demand respect from the workers--to demand that the workers listen to me. But that's not right. I should be given the respect, because of my title and my academic training.
>
> They say we get the same training they received. . . . But that's not really true. They got the training in their own countries. . . . They weren't foreigners, trying to catch on to the ways of a new country while they were studying unfamiliar subjects. It's not as easy for us. And we are watched all the time for mistakes--by the foreign supervisors and by our own people. . . . who are less willing to take orders from their own people than from the foreigners. . . . No matter what I do, it's never right!

At the heart of the conflict between the expatriate supervisors and the Aruban professionals (as well as the conflicting interests of management and workers, and the West Indians and the Aruban workers) is the basic contrast between the "traditionalism" of the Roman Catholic national segment and the "rational" Protestant ethic of the power elite.

Although the expatriate corporation did not provide, for Arubans, the initial contact between these disparate ideologies, it did impose the Weberian model, the "spirit" of capitalism upon the pre-industrial population.[2] To date a successful replacement (or synthesis) of the Roman Catholic "traditionalism" with the Protestant work ethic has not been effected.

The first managers of the Lago refinery, faced with a local working force that was unaccustomed (and resistant) to the restrictive disciplines of a rational economy, sought an expedient solution to their immediate problem. By importing a British-oriented work force--one that clearly understood its vulnerability to deportation, the Company ensured to itself a malleable, controllable, and predominantly Protestant labor pool.

By 1954, as the need for a large labor force diminished, and the parent company embarked on its policy of replacing immigrant personnel with locals, the original dilemma returned to plague the relationships between the expatriate management and its Aruban workers and professionals. The Aruban, on the other hand, is understandably frustrated by his inability to perform in accordance with "the ideal type of the capitalist entrepreneur . . . /who/ avoids ostentation and unnecessary expenditure, as well as conscious enjoyment of his power" (Weber, trans. T. Parsons 1958: 71).

The expatriate managers, fully conscious both of their conformity to the ideal, and of the "power behind their power" (as Lago proposes and the parent company disposes) "remain quietly confident" (Time, Feb. 15, 1974: 35).

To infer from the foregoing that Lago, the affiliate, and Exxon, the parent company, between them are wholly responsible for shaping the present statuses of the populations of Aruba, would do an injustice to the continuing influences of the other metropolitan interests. Both Holland, through her economic and political involvements in the policies of Curaçao, and Venezuela, through her maternal claim on the ancestral heritage and the potential oil riches of the Netherlands Antilles, play significant roles in the manipulation of the local populations.

But the special significance of the Lago refinery to the people of Aruba derives from the intimacy and immediacy of the management-worker relationship, and the involvement of the management in the local affairs of the resident population. Ironically, the people I interviewed are fairly well informed (through newspaper articles and editorials) about the activities and plans of Holland and Venezuela, as they relate to the present and future destiny of Aruba. Accounts of refinery policy, however, are so scanty and ill-defined as to obfuscate the significance of Lago to the local population. The old Standard Trust philosophy of "Say nothing" has been adopted by Lago management even to the point of keeping the people totally uninformed about the overall design of refinery operations, and the dependent tie of Lago to the parent company.[3]

I stress the involvement of Lago (and Exxon) in the local economy and in the social lives of the resident population not only because of the past and present practices of the refinery management, but also because of the uncertainty in the mind of many of the people I interviewed, about the place of the expatriate corporation in the

immediate future of the island. Although I could not trace the origin of the fear expressed by many of my informants that "Lago may decide to pack up and leave," the naïveté behind this fear underlines the deliberate policy of Lago to withhold the realities of the refinery's decision-making policies from its host population. What is worse, even the Aruban professionals who are being trained to replace the expatriate (lower-level) staff, state that they are not being prepared to assume the responsibilities attendant upon full management of the refinery, should the parent company decide to transfer the plant to the Aruban government. "It's true the island would sink if Lago management leaves."

Apparently, for the present Exxon has no intention of "packing up the refinery." During my last luncheon meeting with the Senior Advisor for Latin American Affairs (who has never visited Aruba) I commented on the concern expressed by many people that Venezuela was stepping up its efforts to extend its national boundaries to include the island of Aruba. The Senior Advisor smiled and said: "Neither the United States nor Holland would want Venezuela to move into Aruba. And if the United States doesn't want it . . . it won't happen!"

NOTES

[1] I do not impute malevolent intentions to the past and present Lago managers. It is just as possible that the Company's indifference to the social and psychological needs of the expanded population reflects the parent company's preoccupation with efficiency--both in plant operations and in the determination of personnel requirements. The Company's commitment (dating back to the philosophy of its founding president) to

"1) Pay a profit to nobody . . .
"2) Hide the profits . . .
"3) Say nothing . . ." (Tarbell 1902: 245, 127)

militates against humanitarian concerns.

For example, working from the framework of efficiency, the Company is able to justify the hiring and firing of nationals and non-nationals with no necessary regard for its concomitantly negative effects on the groups involved.

[2] The Dutch, although they exemplify the ideal of the Protestant ethic, did not effect any significant alterations of the Aruban "spirit": the colonial administrators were hardly evangelical in their dealings with the farming and fishing folk: rather, they encouraged the status quo of the Roman Catholic tradition.

> "No colonizing in the real sense of the word was done. . . . If, after the expiration of their term of office, a few servants of the Dutch West Indian Company did stay on here, they nevertheless did not present a striking contrast to the rest of the population. They were not active Protestants. . . . Aruba acquired a Protestant as well as a Roman Catholic elite, a society closely interknit owing to the peculiar practice in case of religiously mixed marriages of educating the sons in accordance with the father's religion and the daughters in accordance with that of the mother. As a result of this there can be no question at all here of a Protestant-Catholic antithesis. What is very noticeable is a strong Spanish admixture in both camps, each group being closely allied with the Continent by family ties" (Hartog 1961: 269).

[3] A typically obscure (and, to the Arubans, most unsettling) statement, carried on page one in the December 18, 1973, issue of The News: Antilles First Daily, quotes the message of the President of Lago to the people of Aruba. In part, it reads:

> "All things considered, it can be said that there has never been a time when the future of the oil industry was harder to predict even though the future demand for the industry's principle products has never been more assured. . . .
>
> "The rapid changes in the supply situation and the uncertainties such changes convey can affect development plans being considered by the Company such as expansion of its facilities for handling large crude carriers. . . ."

[4]During the late fall of 1973, at the height of the "energy crisis," I learned that the Senior Advisor for the Mid- and Far East had "left" his position with Exxon to "serve" on the Federal Energy Board for Chairman William Simon.

CHAPTER TEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

> Lokual ta pasa majoria parti di hende no ta
> pasombra nan sa mucho poco cos pero
> pasombra nan sa mucho hopi cos no ta berdad.
>
> (What is happening to the majority of the people
> is not because they know too little but because
> they know too much that isn't true.)

The true significance of this brief summation of the present realities of the Aruban condition is, unfortunately, lost on even my most knowledgeable informants. The Arubans believe that the bases of their present frustrations, in the face of the disparity between their elevated social status and their economic stagnation, stem from their inequitable representation in the Central Government at Curaçao, the disproportionate return to the island government from the taxes Lago pays to the Central Government, and the disproportionate wealth of the non-national segments.

The wider networks of power and control (through the policies of the multinational oil industry, the economic interests of the United States, Holland, and Venezuela) that impinge upon the daily lives of all of the people of the island and which, in effect, are cogent forces in the determination of the hierarchical statuses that separate the haves from the have-nots, have not as yet entered the consciousness of any of the Arubans I have come to know.

Arubans do not recognize that the "structures of inequality" that are inherent in pluralistic societies, whether they were initiated out of the colonial condition or introduced through the post-colonial domination of multinational corporate interests and continuing metropolitan interests, persist to exacerbate both national underdevelopment and inter-group antagonisms.

In 1969, when I first undertook the study of what I thought to be a typically "plural society," I employed the methodology of the traditional theorists (Furnivall 1939; van Lier 1950; M. G. Smith 1965, 1969, etc.) to identify the group segments. As I became aware of the multiplicity of factors (both external and internal) involved in the maintenance and relaxation of group boundedness, I realized that the traditional approach was too limited. The traditional approaches are essentially static; for example, they do not deal with the transition period characteristic of many emergent nations wherein the "reins of office" have been transferred from the "dominant minority" (Smith: 1969) to the numerically dominant majority. Theoretically, this should alter the pluralistic nature of the society but, in fact, this seldom occurs: the pluralist status of the minority groups does not necessarily change. This is particularly true of those Caribbean societies "created" (Hoetink 1967) from the displacement of groups of people.

The "reticulated model" of R. T. Smith (1961) which presupposes that the cultural sections are enmeshed in an overall institutional system is not more applicable to the Aruban situation than are the aforementioned static models. While there <u>is</u> a certain amount

of "leakage" between hierarchical boundaries, the segments are generally laterally rather than diagonally demarcated.

Despres (1964), who feels that two-dimensional models are inadequate because they do not permit the systematic investigation of organizational activities, suggests the addition of a third dimension, wherein "spatial and temporal arrangements are manipulated to become functional in some ways rather than others" (Despres 1964: 1071). I feel that Despres' contribution provides only a partial solution to the construction of a model which will have predictive value and will also indicate the dynamic nature of hierarchical shifts. Despres' model remains bounded, representing population segments "pinned" in time and space. A "systems flow" representation (see Easton 1965),on the other hand, not only has the value of demonstrating current realities but also allows for the multiple directing and manipulating influences on the segments. Thus the vulnerability of population groups, and the vulnerability of the total society to external, international policy shifts, world trade situations, etc., can become clearly manifest.

Throughout my second and third periods of fieldwork I adapted the approaches of the contemporary dependency theorists (see Frank 1972; Fallers 1973; Furtado 1972) to my investigation of group boundedness and hierarchical ordering. By adding a social and historical dimension to my inquiries I was able to utilize a broader base for understanding the internal and external networks of power and control and to apply the "progressive identification of factors that are specific" (Furtado 1971: vii) to the analysis of a dependent economy.

Following a brief summary of the significant factors that led to the initiation, ordering, and maintenance of the hierarchical structures of Aruban society, I will demonstrate, via a "systemic feedback loop," how the systems approach can be utilized to order "unity out of multiplicity" (Easton 1965: 376).

Given the historical events that led to the transfer of control of the island of Aruba from Spain to Holland, and the barren environment that attended the denudation of the island's forest cover, the Dutch West India Company (which held, into the nineteenth century, a virtual monopoly over Holland's economic interests in the New World) recognized that the exploitative possibilities of Aruba were too meager to warrant the introduction of a plantation economy. In consequence, the early settlers who came to the island from Curaçao and interbred with the island Indians and with the few Dutch colonials, could co-exist in a relatively egalitarian atmosphere. Even for those few families who expanded their subsistence base by breeding cattle and sheep, the insular exigencies which limited marital choice to related individuals within the small population of (Roman Catholic) Indians, (Protestant) Dutch, and (Sephardic Jewish) Curaçaoans, precluded the initiation of the characteristic plural structure of colonial societies.

Into the first two decades of the twentieth century the sporadic and minimal immigration of South Americans and Europeans--to work in the phosphate and gold mines and at aloe production--created only a minor social "layering." The social distinction between the earlier settlers (Arubiano) and the nineteenth century

immigrants (Arubano) has come to assume minor importance since both groups have access to similar economic pursuits and government positions.

Within the first decade after the onset of oil refinery construction, the greatly expanded population exhibited the more typical characteristics of a plural society--with social boundaries separating the introduced groups from the "settled" population. (As Holland did not relinquish /overt/ political control to the national segment until 1954, the Dutch colonials had the only access to political positions.)

The West Indians, recruited to satisfy the expressed needs of the Lago management for a "stable, skilled and English-speaking" work force, were the first group to be set into a separate and "incompatible" (Furnivall 1939) subordinate social stratum. Nevertheless, as the wages of the West Indians were considerably higher than the income of the average Aruban, this segment soon came to occupy an economic niche that was superior to both the Aruban working class and the Aruban cunucu farmer; this did not, however, raise their social status.

The specific factors that were significant to the economic ordering of the West Indians in Aruba (see Figure 2 for group stratification just prior to the 1930s, Figure 3 for the period 1930 to 1950, and Figures 4, 5, and 6 for the altered hierarchical arrangements since the 1950s) are:

the recruitment, during the early 1930s, of skilled West Indians to supervise Aruban manual workers for Lago;
the recruitment, from the mid-1930s into the 1940s, of thousands of West Indian laborers to replace the "unsatisfactory" Aruban employees.



FIGURE 2

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE
TO 1930s (PRE-LAGO)



FIGURE 3

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRATIFICATION AND ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION
MID-1930s TO MID-1950s



FIGURE 4

ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION
MID-1950s TO 1973



FIGURE 5

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
MID-1950s TO 1973



FIGURE 6

POLITICAL STRATIFICATION
MID-1950s to 1973

These decisions of the Lago management influenced the disparity between the social and economic statuses of the West Indians vis-à-vis the Aruban working classes. The Arubans, denigrated to lower paying manual labor on government subsidized road construction projects and similar "welfare" occupations, nevertheless maintained superior social and political niches.

The social and political factors significant to the depressed political and social standing of the West Indians are:

- the Dutch citizenship status of the Arubans versus the resident visa vulnerability of the West Indians,
- the exclusionary tactics of the national segment--which served to withhold even minor political positions from non-Arubans,
- the "closed door" policy of all strata of the national segment--which assigned a derogatory "black" opprobrium to the "English" segment (but not to their own phenotypically black nationals),
- the agreement between the local government and Lago to fire "threatening Big Island agitators"--which served to intimidate the remaining Big and Small Island residents and which continuesto undermine intra-group relationships,
- the provision (by Lago) of separate residential facilities in St. Nicholas for West Indian laborers--which created an "instant ghetto."

The economic factors that operated to set the Arubans and West Indians into antagonistic opposition did not, at first, obtain for the Ashkenazim. The Ashkenazic merchants, attracted to the Island because of the increased demand for goods and services, enjoyed two decades of social acceptance by the Aruban society. The alien religious affiliation of this group did not preclude their participation in the social affairs of the elite society. With the expansion of the tourist industry, however, the concomitant rise in the economic fortunes of the Ashkenazic entrepreneurs antagonized the middle-class Arubans who, although firmly entrenched in the upper strata of the social structure, were generally engaged in small-scale

retail enterprises that were unaffected by the increased tourist industry. As the income of the Jewish merchants rose, so did the hostility of the lower working classes (the Aruban and West Indian employees of the Lago refinery and of related enterprises).

By the mid-1950s, the relatively high wages of the workers were more than counterbalanced by the rising cost of living (which necessitated cash payment for rent, utilities, food, and liquor) and the increased demand for "luxury goods" (imported clothing and jewelry--sold by the Ashkenazic merchants). Payment for these luxury goods was based on extended credit arrangements with the merchants. This credit was at first welcomed and appreciated by the purchaser, but as the burden of debts compounded, the frustrations of the debtors turned to anger against the creditors. The Ashkenazim withdrew from social participation in the larger society--the traditional response of the Eastern European Jews to the animosity they incurred in their homelands "/from/ possessing economic power not commensurate with their standing in the community" (Shibutani 1965: 37). For the Ashkenazim in Aruba, however, their continued social enclaving has not hampered their economic expansion.

The factors, then, that are significant to the relative assimilation of the Ashkenazim into Aruban society prior to 1950 are:

- the sudden demand for retail goods (after Lago closed its commissary)--which encouraged the merchants to feel that they were welcomed by the larger society,
- the light skin color of the immigrants--which permitted them to ease into elite Aruban social circles,
- the small numbers of Ashkenazic immigrants, compared to the thousands of West Indians who arrived during the same period--which afforded relative obscurity to the Jewish immigrants,
- the construction of the first "country club" by the Ashkenazim--which brought the elite Arubans into frequent social contact with the merchant families,

- the relinquishment of Orthodox ritual observance--which might otherwise have alienated the Ashkenazim from the Roman Catholic Arubans,
- the extension of credit to the Aruban and West Indian working classes--which allowed the latter groups to purchase luxury goods even after they had expended their cash wages for rent, utilities, food, and liquor,
- the dispersed residences of the merchants families--some situated over their stores, others scattered throughout St. Nicholas and Oranjestad.

These factors contributed to the initial acceptance of the Ashkenazim by all of the population segments. The factors that precipitated the social enclaving of the merchants families into the 1950s include:

- the expansion of their retail businesses concomitantly with the increase in tourism,
- the consequent rise in the economic fortunes of the Ashkenazic merchants just as the middle-class Aruban entrepreneurs (who were dependent on Lago purchases) began to decline,
- the increased resentment of Aruban and West Indian working groups--as they became enmeshed in spiralling compounded debts to the Ashkenazim,
- the "conspicous" nature of the expanded life-style for the merchant families--as exhibited in the luxury homes built in the fashionable section of Oranjestad, expensive automobiles, overseas university schooling for their children, etc.--which increasingly irritated the socially secure but economically depressed Aruban elite.

The beginnings of residential separation, the reinstitution of religious commitment (with the building of a large synagogue in the center of their residential circle), and the withdrawal (or exclusion) of the Ashkenazim from participation in Aruban social fucntions stem directly from the above factors. In 1969, as news of the Curaçao riots riots--largely directed against its Jewish merchants--reached the Ashkenazim in Aruba, the social boundaries drew the groups into a tight, united community.

The Chinese, who arrived within the same time period as the Eastern Jews and the West Indians, perhaps because they (in contrast to the Ashkenazim) retained the same "low profile" they had adopted

from the time they established residence, have thus far managed to elude the undue attention of the dominant and subordinate groups. Neither fêted nor ostracized, the Chinese began to withdraw behind ethnic boundaries during the early 1950s. Apparently this occurred more in response to the unsatisfactory nature of their early intermarriages with the Aruban women than from the overall animosity of the national and non-national segments. The economic good fortune of the Chinese, largely derived from their wholesale and retail groceries, rum-shops, restaurants, and "crib-saloons," did not, until the early 1970s, antagonize the Arubans who generally find the Chinese to be "reasonable."

The tighter boundaries the Chinese have drawn in the past three years (since 1971) is apparently conditioned by the emerging nationalistic sentiments of the Arubans, which increasingly "lumps" all non-national entrepreneurs as exploiters and parasites, feasting on the island economy but depositing the derived benefits outside of the island.

Thus although the major economic factor that precipitated Aruban hostility for the Ashkenazic merchants also obtained for the Chinese merchants, namely the rise in their economic fortunes at the time that Aruban-operated enterprises were becoming depressed, the fact that the Chinese evaded the antagonism directed at the "foreign" merchants is explainable in terms of the following factors:

- the Chinese at no time attempted to penetrate the social sanctums of the Aruban elite,
- the Chinese retained the low profile they held initially even after the rise in their economic status,
- the assets of the Chinese are less discernible than those of the Ashkenazim--as business enterprises are extended family operations rather than individual holdings,

the credit offered by the Chinese is on a short-term basis--thus precluding the compounding of indebtedness,
the children of the original merchants group were baptized Roman Catholic,
the different nature of the goods and services offered by the Chinese--namely, food, liquor, and prostitutes, all considered by the Arubans to be necessary to their physical and psychological well-being.

Whatever social enclaving exists for the Chinese apparently stems from the early and generally unsatisfactory marriages of Chinese men to Aruban women.

Thus, the Chinese have voluntarily established group boundaries, as expressed in their preference for intimate association with homeland and creole Chinese, and their expressed disinterest in political activity. The disparity, then, in the economic and sociopolitical statuses for both the Chinese and the Ashkenazim devolved from different sources: for the Ashkenazim, their diminished social position was the involuntary consequence of the conspicuous display of their accrued wealth--which the working classes perceived to be derived from usurious profits at their expense, and the Aruban middle-class entrepreneurs felt to be a direct affront, in light of the diminution of their income.

The Chinese, on the other hand, because they made no initial attempt to infiltrate elite circles, but instead remained relatively aloof from social and political participation in the affairs of the Aruban community, have maintained a consistent, if "inferior," social standing, while they continue to advance to the summit of the economic hierarchy.

What has been left out of this hierarchical equation thus far is the primary "factor," the Lago management. Primary, because with

the entry of the Lago Oil and Transport Company into Aruba, the tiny, virtually ignored desert island, its inhabitants barely subsisting on unreliable harvests of corn and garden vegetables, fish and wild goats, was abruptly transformed into a booming industrialized economy.

Rather than reiterate the details of Lago (and Exxon) involvement in the economic, political, and social affairs of the Aruban and the non-national segments, I will list some of the more relevant factors and then, employing a modification of the model proposed by Easton (1965) in his systems analysis of political structures, demonstrate how the introduction of one factor, namely the decision of Lago to recruit West Indians into Aruba, set in motion a continuous feedback loop--so that the economic dependence of the West Indians, on Lago and on the extended credit of the merchants, as well as the political dependence on the island and central governments for continuation of their residence visas and work permits, all served to solidify the control of the Lago management over its vulnerable labor pool.

Economic Factors	Political Factors	Social Factors
Hired Aruban laborers	Until World War II assumed functions of government	Approved (or initiated) "crib-saloons" for transient workers
Replaced "unsatisfactory" Aruban workers with West Indians	Since World War II covert direction of government policy	Approved and implemented sterilization of nationals
Encouraged entry of "foreign" merchants	Support "establishment"PPA political party	Court social elite
Before 1954 fired most Big Island workers	Maintain "wall of silence" about refinery operations, Lago (Exxon)policy	Built separate residential compound for professional staff
During mid-1950s fired most Small Islanders and 2,000 Arubans	Maintain coercive pressures on non-nationals	Separate beach and social club
Make local purchases of furniture, appliances, refinery supplies		Aloof from participation in community affairs
		Reinforce, through hiring and firing practices, negative self-image of Arubans

(continued)

Economic Factors	Political Factors	Social Factors
Encourage tourist industry	Encourage belief that Arubanization is equivalent to nationalization	Participate in elite associations (Rotary)
Discourage re-institution of pre-Lago industries	Encourage retention of "company" union	Larger donations to West Indian clubs, etc.
Differential pay scale		
Above minimum wage rate		
Fixed tax base		

These factors, when introduced to the economic role relationships of the various segments (see Figure 7) can then be set into "systemic feedback loops" (Easton 1965: 378) to demonstrate how the practices of the Lago management involve all of the population segments and the governmental structures (i.e., the Central Government at Curaçao, the island government, and the local community /St. Nicholas/). In addition, the positive feedback from all of these groups acts to reinforce the control of the Lago management over the population.

Thus, as shown in Figure 8, Lago ensured to itself, during the high-tide of refinery and dock construction (from 1935-1950), a stable and controllable work force, namely the West Indians. By holding the threat of deportation over this group and by offering (via the foreign merchants) the goods and services that increased the West Indians' dependence and indebtedness, the management also reinforced the dependence and cooperation of the governmental structures, through its tax contributions, the wages paid to island residents, the purchases made locally, and contributions to local organizations.

The demonstrable efficiency of systems analysis lies in its applicability to single factor or multiple factor introduction, and to past, present, and future variables. For, given the systemic



FIGURE 7

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS OF GROUP SEGMENTS



FIGURE 8

SYSTEMIC FEEDBACK LOOP

feedback of historical and present-day social, political, and economic variables, it should be possible to demonstrate specific predictable influences (and possible causal nexuses) for change arising out of the manipulation (by various interest groups as well as by the exigencies of ecological and "internal" pressures) of dependent variables.

The application of this systemic methodology to the study of newly autonomous Third World Societies will hopefully provide a functionally more efficient mechanism for the understanding of change and/or barriers to change in underdeveloped nations.

To conclude, in the case of Aruba, the hierarchical ordering of its population segments can be seen as (1) temporal responses to economic and political pressures, (2) dynamic rather than static, and (3) dependent on external (and often conflicting) metropolitan interests.

Clearly, for the past four decades the Aruban community has experienced higher wages, less endemic unemployment, and relatively little severe poverty for its members. Notwithstanding these economic benefits to the national segment, the community has also experienced widespread and chronic dissatisfaction--as evidenced by the inexorable increase of alcoholism and the general reluctance to cope with the pressures of impending independence. These dissatisfactions, aggravated by the people's dependence on the non-national segments, the major exploiter, Lago, and on the uncertain support of outside national interest groups, reinforce the people's belief that the independence their new leaders urge is illusory, if attractive.

Could they break the chain of dependence if indeed they were presented with "hopi cos ta berdad"?

Mi no sa!

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