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PRO-DEMOCRACY PROTESTS IN CHINA, 1978-1989.

By

Hsiang-tao Hsu

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Political Science in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York

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ABSTRACT

PRO-DEMOCRACY PROTESTS IN CHINA, 1978-1989

by

Hsiang-tao Hsu

Adviser: Professor Donald S. Zagoria
Reader: Professor Bernard E. Brown

This investigation describes a comparative case study of pro-democracy protests in post-Mao China. Pro-democracy protests were an important factor which significantly influenced the Chinese Communist Party's political succession, as well as the direction and speed of regime transition since 1978.

The main subject of this research are three pro-democracy protests: the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-79, the Student Movement of 1986-87, and the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989. The causes, processes, and consequences of these protests are examined and compared within Huntington's analytical framework of democratization as proposed in The Third Wave(1991). Five factors that brought about democratization-- legitimacy problems, economic development, cultural change, external actors, and demonstration effects--are examined from the standpoint of the situation in China. A comparison of three cases shows that legitimacy, economics, and culture were the major causes of the protests. The level of the correlation between the last two factors and the protests was low, though they also played important roles in the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations.

This research highlights two crucial interactions between the government and its opposition, and between reformers and "standpatters" in the governing coalition. The report finds that the protests always flourished in a context when the CCP leadership was divided over the policy toward liberalization and democratization. But the transformation of the CCP regime to a liberal one failed, not only because the democratic leaders were not strong, but also because the protesters were unable to unite and to coordinate with the democratic reformers. Also, many protesters, especially those that occupied Tiananmen Square in June 1989, underestimated Deng Xiaoping's determination to defend the communist regime and maintain stability in China.

The dismissal of two Party general secretaries--Hu Yaobang in 1987 and Zhao Ziyang in 1989--demonstrated Huntington's proposition: If "standpatters" dominate the government and extremists dominate the opposition, democratization is impossible.

To my parents
and sister
Ching-wah Liu

Preface

1.

This dissertation attempts to analyze and compare three cases of pro-democracy protest in China between 1978 and 1989. The guidelines for selecting a case of pro-democracy protest are that it firstly has to be an organized activity, no matter how loosely organized it is. Secondly, there should be a substantial number of citizens participating in the protest activities. Finally, a pro-democracy protest is one that is not only motivated by grievances but is also aimed at changing the authoritarian system into a democratic one. The three cases in this study--the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-79, the Student Movement of 1986, and the Tiananmen Demonstrations of 1989--clearly fit my guidelines.

It is true that many of the protesters in the three cases did not have a clear idea of democracy. Hence, the nature of the protests is always questioned. For example, Julia Kwong noted: "To call the student demonstrations in December 1986 a democratic movement--that is, a movement agitating for political democracy--is a misnomer." She said that the nature of the students' demands cannot be defined as "democratic" because the only issue involving democracy was the question of elections but "beyond this the term

'democracy' was merely rhetorical, giving the movement unity and flexibility to incorporate varied grievances on different campuses." She finally asserted: "It was the nonthreatening nature of their demands that put the government off guard and kept it from taking prompt action until the demonstrations became so large and so widespread as to attract world attention."¹

In responding to Kwong's criticism, I have analyzed the nature of the 1986 Student Movement in Appendix A. I also found that she ignored other important materials and the restrictions of the environment in China. In short, an analysis of the values and aims pursued by the students shows that one of their aims was to establish a democratic system, whether it be on in campuses or in a larger sphere.

It is also true that, as Daniel Kelliher asserted, mainstream activists believed in "elite democracy" and "new authoritarianism." They preferred restricting full participation to the better-educated and argued that authoritarianism would be "an express train toward democracy."² Thus, Kelliher concluded that their goals

¹ Julia Kwong, "The 1986 Student Demonstrations in China. A Democratic Movement?" *Asian Survey*, XXVIII:9, September 1988, pp. 970-985.

² Daniel Kelliher very roughly divides the opposition intellectuals into "mainstream activists," who prevailed in the contest to define democracy, and "radical democrats," a minority who believed the mainstream conception was too narrow. Those party-connected intellectuals such as Chen

"came closer to what westerners might call liberalization, rather than full democratization."³ Because of their vision of democracy-for-the-elite, Kelliher further concluded that "the Chinese protests...never quite evolved into a democracy movement."⁴

Even in light of Kelliher's arguments, it is still difficult to deny the pro-democratic nature of the 1989 protests. Firstly, Kelliher gives no clear definition to the opposition intellectuals and he attempts to use the mainstream activists' conception of "new authoritarianism" to define the nature of the 1989 protests. Therefore, the fact that Kelliher's analysis mixed party-connected intellectuals such as Chen Yizhi, Yang Baikui and, probably,

Yizhi and Yang Baikui were the mainstream activists. Daniel Kelliher, "Keeping Democracy Safe from the Masses. Intellectuals and Elitism in the Chinese Protest Movement," *Comparative Politics*, July 1993, pp. 381-3.

Chen Yizhi, one of the former premier Zhao Ziyang's top advisors. Yang Baikui, a researcher in the Institute of Political Science, CASS.

Therefore, according to Kelliher's grouping, Fang Lizhi, a party member and vice president of the University of Science and Technology(UST) in Hefei, Anhui in 1986, was one of the mainstream activists. However, Fang might have had a quite different view of "new authoritarianism" which made him disobedient to the Chairman of the National People's Congress(NPC) Wan Li in 1986. See chapter IV, p. 49.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

Fang Lizhi with mass protesters may lead to a misinterpretation of the pro-democratic nature of the protests.⁵

Secondly, there is no clear evidence that "new authoritarianism" prevailed in the 1989 protests. The tragedy of massacre and the fall of Premier Zhao Ziyang and his protégés proved that their conception did not dominate the development of the protests. Apparently, the 1989 protests were able to evolve into a soul-stirring event not by the guidance of new authoritarianism but by the appeal of democracy.

Finally, even though elite democracy and liberalization are not equal to democracy, and they may or may not lead to full-scale democratization, in view of the usually complex and prolonged process of democratization, it is undeniable that elite democracy and liberalization can be part of the process of democratization. In fact, evidence shows that democracy was one of the aims or hopes, albeit distant, of the participants in the three protests.

As materials have shown, many participants in the three protests embraced an aim or hope of a democratic

⁵ According to the guideline set by Huntington and Meryl Goldman, instead of mixing party-connected intellectuals with the opposition, I put the former under the group of democratic elite in the governing coalition. See chapter I, pp. 4-5, and chapter IV, pp. 45-46.

China; therefore, this dissertation deserves the title of "The Pro-Democracy Protests in China."

2.

Not all of the reformist elite are pro-democratic. Deng Xiaoping is the best example. He proposed political reforms in late 1978 and again in early 1986. However, he quickly changed his position and suppressed the pro-democracy activists. Hu Yaobang tried to protect the democratic elite, but was restrained by the political structure. As Dr. Brzezinski was told, Hu limited his reforms to the innerparty democracy and would not change the nature of the CCP.⁶ Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, and Hu Qili were even more conservative. They changed their position of pro-political reforms during the 1986 Student Movement and left Hu Yaobang to the attack of the standpatters.⁷ Strictly speaking, there was no true supporter of democracy in the political elite during the three protests. Therefore, under the group of reformers I do not use the term "democratizers" as Huntington suggested for his model.

I also found that one of the main differences between the standpatters and the liberal reformers is that the reformers were hesitant to use violence in handling

⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Minutes of Hu Yaobang-Dr. Brzezinski Discussions. The Chinese Domestic Scene. Section 4. (July 1986).

⁷ See chapter IV, p. 46.

protesters, especially the students and intellectuals protesters. However, it is noteworthy that smart and skillful standpatters such as Mayor Li Ruihuan of Tianjin and Mayor Jiang Zemin of Shanghai also tried to use peaceful measures in 1986 and 1989. They consequently gained Deng Xiaoping's appreciation and were promoted.

However, it is important to point out that Deng Xiaoping instructed in a 1986 speech that the death penalty not be applied to political and ideological deviants. In that speech Deng said: "Those who have merely made mistakes should not be given any criminal sanctions, let alone the death penalty."⁸ This instruction shows that Deng tried to avoid the cruel measures used in the past and may explain why none of the dissidents was sentenced to death.

3.

It should be stressed that this research is an initial social scientific effort to examine China's democratization during Deng Xiaoping's era. Several major original contributions can be highlighted as follows:

(1) This project could be a first attempt to apply comparative case studies and Huntington's democratization theory to the study of three major pro-democracy protests in

⁸ "Talk at a Meeting of the Standing Committee, (January 17, 1986)," Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, III (1982-1992), (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), p. 155.

Deng's China. There are many single case studies and reports of the protests in China, especially regarding the 1989 Tiananmen Demonstrations. However, in a literature review attached as Appendix B, I found that among more than sixty books on China's pro-democracy protests published after 1989, only Minxin Pei compares regime transition in China and the Soviet Union during 1979-1991.⁹ I hope this dissertation will attract more valuable opinions and better research on China's democratization.

(2) The interactions are simplified by the use of figures, charts and tables so that we can have a clearer view of the often complicated and confused situations in the pro-democracy protests. The changing degrees of correlation of five variables--legitimacy, economics, culture, snowball effects and external actors--with the pro-democracy protests during the period of 1978-1989 are synthesized into table VI.1 in the concluding chapter. This table shows an increasingly influential role of demonstration effects and external actors in the occurrence of pro-democracy protests. I think this phenomenon deserves our attention.

(3) I held some important interviews related to the Democracy Wall Movement in 1978-79. One valuable original

⁹ Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: the Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).

products of my interviews is Mr. Wang Ruoshui's firsthand report on Hu Yaobang and other high-ranking officials' discussion about the Democracy Wall Movement. His report was published in the *World Journal* (New York) and is appended to chapter III. I appreciate Mr. Wang's help and courage.

Restrained by sources of information this research has flaws in some aspects such as the lack of study of interactions among the protesters. My judgments of correlation between variables and pro-democracy protests are, to a certain degree, a subjective evaluation. More follow-up studies such as--provincial leaders' reactions to protests, local elections in China, and comparison between China and other countries--are needed in order to better understand regime change in post-Mao China.

4.

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my committee members who have helped me to complete this dissertation. Professor Zagoria, the sponsor and the chair of examining committee, and Professor Brown, the reader, have guided my work with patience and generously devoted their time to my problems. Other members of the committee, Professor Bernstein, Professor Markovitz, and Professor Rivlin provided me with valuable comments after reading the

draft. Without their help this dissertation would not have been possible.

I also want to express my gratitude to Professor Brzezinski for providing me with a portion of his minutes of discussion with Hu Yaobang in July 1986. Mr. Liu Qing, Chair of the Executive Committee, Human Rights in China (HRIC, New York), gave me valuable information about his activities as a leader in the Democracy Wall Movement and his fighting for Wei Jingsheng's human rights which led to Mr. Liu's imprisonment for more than ten years. Other interviewees including Professor Guo Luoji posed useful suggestions to this project and verified published records. I will never forget their contributions. All errors and shortcomings, are of course, my own.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Objectives of the Study

Multiple internal crises such as economic dislocation, political instability, vicious ethnic warfare, and large-scale civil disorder are erupting in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The problem of post-Communist transition is becoming intellectually the most interesting and politically the most essential issue as Brzezinski predicted in 1989.¹ Just in 1989, the tragedy of Tiananmen massacre shook the Beijing regime and shocked the world. The relatively rapid return to political quiescence in China after the Tiananmen suppression does not imply a diminution of political tension. Many factors and so-called "hostile forces" contributed to the undercurrent of political tension.² Among them the pro-democracy is considered to be

¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure. The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), p. 161.

² In a report by Tao Siju, the Minister of Public Security, stability in China is threatened by six kinds of hostile forces: (1) hostile international forces are attacking China in the name of democracy, freedom, and human rights; (2) hostile forces from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao are engaging in a "psychological warfare" offensive against

first serious trouble by the Chinese communist regime. Can Communist China avoid instability in its transition to marketization and liberalization?

Pro-democracy protests, a special phenomenon which appeared in post-Mao China, were an important factor which has significantly influenced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s political succession as well as the direction and speed of regime transition in China. However, up to now, few Western works on post-Mao China have been devoted to comparative case studies of Chinese protests.³ As for works in the Chinese language, they are predominantly based on personal accounts or recollection and lack social science methodology. In the Chinese community abroad, although there have been extensive discussions and extremely hot debates regarding democratization in general, few systematic, comprehensive, and conceptual treatments of democracy in

China; (3) hostile elements who have stayed abroad are carrying out intensified subversive and destructive activities; (4) a small minority of domestic reactionary elements belligerent toward Communist Party leadership and the socialist system; (5) religion's illegal activities; (6) nationalist splittist activities. *Inside China Mainland* (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies), March 1992, pp. 8-14.

³ For example, of more than seventy English books dealing with China's post-Mao pro-democracy protests collected by me, sixty focus on the Tiananmen event of 1989 and after; four pay special attention to the 1986 Student Movement which resulted in Hu Yaobang's purge; eleven devote to the Democracy Wall Movement in 1978-80. None of them uses the comparative case study method. For a literature review on China's democratization between 1978 and 1989, see Appendix B.

China have appeared to date. Therefore, this research attempts to make an in-depth study of China's pro-democracy protest. Firstly, by using the method of case study, this research intends to analyze the causes and results of pro-democracy protests and the interactions in the processes of protests. Also, with a theoretical framework of democratization, this research tries to examine the factors in favor or in opposition to democracy in China. Finally, by applying the comparative method to Chinese cases, Huntington's propositions on democratization will be tested through an evaluation of Chinese experience.

2. Issues to be Examined

Three aspects of the Chinese cases will be examined and compared within Huntington's analytical framework(see chapter II). They are: causes of the political protests; interactions in the processes of political protests; and consequences of the political protests.

2.1 Causes of the Political Protests

While it may be true that the preconditions for China's democratization did not exist as Huntington asserted,⁴ pro-democracy protests did occur. Why did they

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 105.

occur? What were the key factors for their happening? And, why were some factors more influential than others? These are the questions to be examined in this study.

In Huntington's opinion, the five major factors that caused democratization were (1) legitimacy crisis; (2) economic development; (3) Catholicism; (4) external actors; (5) demonstration effects. I will attempt to replace Catholicism, a factor with little importance in China, by cultural change in post-Mao China, to further examine these factors by case studies.

2.2 Interactions in the Processes of Protests

As the figure I.1 shows, in the complex political processes of regime transitions Huntington observed five groups of crucial participants: (1) the standpatters, (2) the liberal reformers and (3) the democratic reformer in the governing coalition, and (4) the democratic moderates and (5) the revolutionary extremists in the opposition. He also found three crucial interactions between the government and its opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the governing coalition, and between moderates and extremists in the opposition.⁵ The interactions between these groups can be expressed in chart I.1.


⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-3.

Figure I.1 Political groups involved in democratization⁶

<u>Attitudes Toward Democracy</u>			
	<u>Against</u>	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>
Government		Reformers Democratizers (3)	Liberals Standpatters (2) (1)
Opposition	Radicals Extremists (5)	Democratic Moderates (4)	

(numbers are added)

Chart I.1 A model of interactions in democratization



<- -> interaction

Due to the restricted information sources and the limited scope of the project, this research is unable to examine all three interactions. Instead, it will highlight the interactions between the regime and the protesters. The inner-Party struggle over the issue of pro-democracy protests will be explored too.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

2.3 Consequences of the Pro-Democracy Protests

At the end of 1980s, the democratic wave engulfed the communist world. However, China did not participate in this trend. Instead, it seems that the results of the pro-democracy protests in China were only the imprisoning and killing of the protesters. Is the use of force against the opposition unavoidable and why? Huntington's basic explanation was that China has had no experience with democratic government and the modernizers of China have been the Confucian Leninist of the Nationalist and Communist parties, therefore, when economics grew rapidly in the late 1980s, "economics reinforced culture in opposition to democracy."⁷

Were political, economic, and cultural obstacles to democratization in China really as tremendous as Huntington stated? How did these obstacles restrain democratization in China? More specifically, what variables do explain China's experience of democratization and what variables do not? Also, what lessons can we learn from Chinese cases? And, which type of regime change is more feasible for China? These issues will be examined through a comparison of major pro-democracy protests.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 301-2. For more detailed discussion of Huntington's view on China's democratization, see chapter II. 2.3 & 2.4.

3. Case Studies

3.1 Defining Pro-Democracy Protest

Not all protest is pro-democracy. Protest may also be nationalist, splittist, right-wing, pro-fascist, anarchist, Trotskyist, etc., and many of them are carried on under the cloak of democracy. Therefore, a clarification of the boundary of pro-democracy protest is needed in order to distinguish pro-democracy protest from other anti-government activities. My guideline for selecting a case of pro-democracy protest is that it firstly has to be an organized activity, no matter how loosely organized it is. Secondly, there should be a substantial number of citizens participating in the protest activities. Finally, a pro-democracy protest is not only motivated by grievances but is also aimed at changing the authoritarian system into a democratic one.

Accordingly, a pro-democracy protest in China has to be a protest aimed at changing the authoritarian Communist regime into a democratic government. Many protests and riots in China were politically rooted or democracy oriented, but they were either not organized or did not fully express their political purpose. Consequently, these kind of protest activities can not be categorized as pro-democracy protests even though the protesters'

disobedience or intellectually alienated behavior may have eroded or challenged governmental authority.

3.2 Important Cases in China

The Tiananmen incident in April 1976--an event cannot be ignored--was a self-motivated mass action honoring the memory of Premier Chou Enlai and denouncing the "gang of four."⁸ That event was bloodily suppressed by Jiang Qing and her confederates. Deng Xiaoping was accused of being a ringleader behind this incident and was dismissed from all party and government posts. The incident was rehabilitated in 1978 when the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CCP declared the "Tiananmen incident" to have been revolutionary. Although it is hard to define this incident as a pro-democracy protest, it must be reviewed as it was the first spontaneous mass protest in large scale and it has had influence in shaping Deng Xiaoping and other top leaders perceptions of the pro-democracy protests.

I have selected three pro-democracy protests as the main subject of this research. They are: the Democracy Wall

⁸ The Gang of Four were: Jiang Qing, Mao's widow; Wang Hongwen, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Zhang Chunqiao, premier of the State Council; Yao Wenyuan, head of the Party's propaganda department. In October 1976, they were arrested in a coup staged by the anti-Gang forces including Hua Guofeng, the first vice-chairman of the Party and premier of the State Council. For more details of the Tiananmen incident, see Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, China Without Mao. The Search for a New Order, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 6-25.

Movement (or Beijing Spring) of 1978-79; the student's pro-democracy movements of 1986-87; and the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989.

The three pro-democracy protests clearly fit my guideline. In these protests a substantial number of citizens had loosely organized themselves to demand human rights and a change from the authoritarian system to a democratic government. As an article in the *People's Daily* stated, there were three "high tides", in the growth of "bourgeois liberalization" in China. The first occurred in the 1979 "Beijing Spring," when some individuals advocated socialist reform along capitalist lines, i.e. the Democracy Wall Movement. The second came at the end of 1986, when Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang and others urged the establishment of the capitalist system in China, i.e. the Student Movement. The events of 1989 called for the overthrow of the CCP and the socialist system, and their replacement by a "bourgeois republic totally dependent on the West," as was described by the CCP.⁹

It is true that separatist movements in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia were politically important and, in some degree fit the working definition for pro-democracy

⁹ *China Quarterly*(CQ), December 1989, p. 899. Fang Lizhi (b. 1936): Leading astrophysicist and the PRC's best-known dissident, whom the government labeled the instigator of the student unrest. Wang Ruowang (b. 1918): Prominent writer.

protest because their interests in independence or autonomy obviously challenge the authoritarian features of the Chinese communist regime.¹⁰ However, the ethnic protests are beyond the scope of my study because they basically aim at territorial objectives. Therefore, they are not discussed in this project.

¹⁰ Major cases of ethnic riots in the 1980s are the Lhasa independence demonstration in late September 1987 in which at least nine people died, according to official Chinese sources; and the Lhasa massacre in March 1989 in which hundreds of people were killed. The other is a riot that occurred in Aykir Utok, Xinjiang on April 15th and 16th, 1989. At least 22 died in this ethnic riot aimed at establishing a new state of East Turkestan. *CQ*, March 1989, p. 160. Judith Shapiro, "Roots of Muslim Riots in Xinjiang," *Minzhu Zhongguo (Democracy for China)*, February 1992, no. 8, pp. 12-16. Tang Daxian, "A Factual Report on the 1989 Event in Tibet--Lhasa under Bayonet," *Minzhu Zhongguo*, August 1990, no. 3, pp. 33-50.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
VARIABLES TO BE EXAMINED

1. Theory of Democratization

Pro-democracy protests do not necessarily lead to democratization or democracy.¹ However, protests were a central tactic of the opposition in virtually all countries and an indispensable part of the overall process of democratization. Numerous theories have been proffered to explain democratization. Some theories identify objective conditions, mostly economic and social, as independent variables for democratization. Others tend to emphasize the strategic behavior of political actors. Huntington reviewed these democratic theories and synthesized an explanation of his own.

In his new book The Third Wave (1991), Huntington observed that three waves of democratization have occurred in the modern world. "A wave of democratization," in Huntington's words,

¹ In Huntington's words, popular election of the top decision makers is the essence of democracy, the critical point in the process of democratization is the replacement of a government that was not chosen this way by one that is selected in a free, open, and fair election. Huntington (1991), p. 9.

is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also usually involves liberalization or partial democratization in political systems that do not become fully democratic.²

The third wave democratization began in 1974 when the Portuguese dictatorship ended.³

After a comparative study of more than thirty countries in southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe that shifted from authoritarian to democratic systems of government in the period between 1974 and 1990, Huntington found five changes in independent variables that seem to have played significant roles in bringing about the third wave. These factors are: (1) declining legitimacy; (2) economic development and economic crises; (3) religious changes; (4) new policies of external actors; (5) demonstration effects.

² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³ The dates of these waves are more or less as follows:

First, long wave of democratization	1828-1926
(rooted in the American and French revolutions)	
First reverse wave	1922-42
(began with Mussolini's disposal of Italy's democracy)	
Second, short wave of democratization	1943-62
(starting in W.W.II in allied occupation areas)	
Second reverse wave	1958-75
(the change was most dramatic in Latin America)	
Third wave of democratization	1974-

Ibid., p. 16.

(1) As for the first factor, Huntington pointed out that:

The legitimacy problems of the authoritarian regimes varied with the nature of the regime. One-party systems that were a product of indigenous political development, such as in revolutionary communist states, Mexico, and the Republic of China, had a more secure basis of legitimacy. Ideology and nationalism could be jointly harnessed to buttress the regimes.⁴

Over time, however, communist governments found it more difficult to invoke communist ideology to support their legitimacy. In the People's Republic of China, the way the authoritarian leaders responded to the erosion of legitimacy is by coerced obedience.

(2) The "transition zone" theory is an important thesis Huntington posed to explain the relation between economic development and democratization. According to Huntington, the correlation between wealth and democracy implies that transitions to democracy would occur primarily in countries at the middle levels of economic development. Hence, transition will occur in the zone between poor countries where democratization is unlikely, and rich countries where it has already occurred. "As countries develop economically and move into this zone, they become prospects for democratization."⁵

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

Of the twenty-one countries riding the third wave of democratization, about two-thirds of them were concentrated in the income zone between roughly \$300 and \$1,300 in per capita GNP(1960 dollars).⁶ In other words, as soon as country reached the middle and upper-middle levels of economic development, it is entering political transition zone.

(3) In Huntington's observation, the third wave of democratization was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave. Roughly three-quarters of the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 were Catholic countries.⁷ As Huntington indicated,

Catholicism was second only to economic development as a pervasive force making for democratization in the 1970s and 1980s. The logo of the third wave could well be a crucifix superimposed on a dollar sign.⁸

Although Catholicism was not an influential force in China, the tide of Westernization did sweep across China in recent years. The spiritual face of Chinese people has changed tremendously. Therefore, I propose that the factor of Catholicism can be replaced by cultural change in the study of Chinese cases.

(4) External actors significantly helped third wave democratizations. The Vatican de-legitimated authoritarian

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

regimes in Catholic countries; the European Community provided incentives for democratization in southern and eastern Europe, the United States pushed democratization in Latin America and Asia; and the Soviet Union removed the principal obstacle to democratization in Eastern Europe. As Huntington said:

In the absence of those policy changes and the influence of these external actors, the third wave would have been much more circumscribed than it was.⁹

(5) In Huntington's words, what did demonstration effects demonstrate are:

First, they demonstrated to leaders and groups in one society the ability of leaders and groups in another society to bring about the end of an authoritarian system and to install a democratic system. They showed that it could be done, and hence presumably stimulated those in the second society to attempt to emulate those in the first. Second, demonstration effects showed how it could be done. People in the follow-on society learned from and attempted to imitate the techniques and the methods used to bring about the earlier democratizations... Third, the later democratizers also learned about dangers to be avoided and difficulties to be overcome...¹⁰

The fifth factor--demonstration effects--gained its power from, firstly, the tremendous expansion in global communications and transportation; secondly, geographical proximity and cultural similarity; and thirdly, lead countries such as Spain, Portugal, Argentina, the

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 101.


Philippines, and Poland. These countries helped stimulate demands for changes in neighboring and culturally similar countries. Huntington concluded that:

[T]he impact of the demonstration effects did not depend significantly on the existence of economic and social conditions favorable to democracy in the recipient country. As the snowballing process went on, indeed, that process itself tended to become a substitute for those conditions.¹¹

The method Huntington used to formulate his ideas of third wave democratization is a high level cross-country comparative method. Based on Huntington's theory of democratization and combined with a model of interactions in democratization (see chart I.1), Chart II.1 displays the major elements of an analytical framework of pro-democracy protests in China.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

Chart II.1 An analytical model of pro-democracy protest in China



2. Variables to be Examined

As Huntington explained, five changes in independent variables in the 1960s and 1970s produced the dependent variable, democratizing regime changes in the 1970s and 1980s. Five such changes are: (1) the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian systems in a world where democratic values are widely accepted; (2) the rapid economic growth that moves a country into the "transition zone" for the starting of democratization; (3) the changing attitude of the Catholic Church in the 1960s from defenders of the status quo to proponents of social, economic, and political reform; (4) changes in the policies of external actors; (5) demonstration effects that the lead countries stimulated and provided models for subsequent efforts at regime change in other countries. After replacing the factor of Catholicism by cultural change this research will discuss these five variables in the Chinese context. In this way, it will allow me to identify the issues of democratization in China and probably the solutions for them, on the one hand; and to show through case studies the need to modify or clarify Huntington's propositions.

2.1 Legitimacy crises

After a preliminary study of Chinese pro-democracy protests I began to realize that the factor of legitimacy

crises was favorable to the occurrence of pro-democracy protests in China. Unquestionably, the legitimacy crises were the fundamental causes for demanding the realization of a democratic China. Having suffered the horror of the Cultural Revolution and economic stagnation in the 1970s, Chinese people were tired of the Communist doctrine and had lost trust in the Party and the government. Therefore, the so-called three crises of faith, belief, and trust had quickly become a popular phenomenon in the post-Mao era. Threatened by the declining legitimacy, Deng Xiaoping and his associates faced a complex and difficult dilemma: how to end the twenty-year reign of Leftism in China without at the same time opening the door to Rightist agitation, political opposition, and consequent instability.¹² As a result, the Chinese leadership was repeatedly found in a situation exactly as Huntington described:

Declining legitimacy usually provoked doubt in the minds of authoritarian leaders and divisions within the leadership over which response to choose. The resulting hesitation, disagreement, and fluctuations in action then further decreased the legitimacy of the regimes

¹² As Richard Baum pointed out, to apply ideological labels to individuals and groups in Chinese politics has always caused confusion. According to Baum's explanation, "Since the advent of post-Mao reforms in 1978-79, Leftism in China has generally stood for *conservatism*, that is, devotion to traditional CCP institutions and values, while Rightism has connoted *liberalism*, meaning support for market reforms and/or democratic institutions and values." Burying Mao. Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 14-15.

and encouraged political groups to think about successors to them.¹³

Huntington also found that, among five ways in responding to the erosion of legitimacy, the Chinese communists chose to survive "by becoming increasingly repressive, by, in effect, replacing evaporating duty with coerced obedience." And this often required a shift in regime leadership such as what happened in China in 1989.¹⁴

2.2 External Actors

As Huntington said, "Democratization in a country may be influenced, perhaps decisively, by the actions of governments and institutions external to that country."¹⁵ He also pointed out that foreign influences may lead to democratization efforts before countries reach the political transition zone or they may retard or prevent democratization by countries which have reached the level of development. So, the role of the external actors in China's pro-democracy protests needs to be explored.

A primary research shows that the external actors were becoming involved in China's democratization efforts

¹³ Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁴ There are four other ways authoritarian leaders could and did respond to the erosion of legitimacy: (1) they simply ignored the problems; (2) they attempted to restore legitimacy by an appeal to nationalism; (3) they pretended to become democratic by holding elections; or (4) they simply took the lead in ending authoritarian rule and introducing a democratic system. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-57.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

more extensively and the volume of the foreign actors was increasing. The external actors' increased interest and involvement in China's pro-democracy protests can be reflected by related English publications and news reports. According to my investigation, up to the end of 1994, there were eleven books devoted to the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-80; four books on the Student Movement of 1986-87; and over sixty books on the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989. It is understandable that little attention is paid to the Student Movement of 1986-87 because, in contrast to the Democracy Wall Movement which was mainly a movement of big character posters and underground publications, the Student Movement did not publish any unofficial press. However, due to the Student Movement's mammoth momentum and a more opened China, the student protests in the end of 1986 were covered more intensively by foreign media.

In view of the increased involvement of the external actors in China's domestic and international affairs, it is appropriate to ask: To what extent did the external actors help the occurrence of pro-democracy protests in China? And, which external actors played more important roles in China's protests? These are the issues to be explored in this comparative case study.

2.3 Demonstration Effects

The failure of China's democratization shows that snowballs of the third wave melt in an unsympathetic environment like China. Why cannot the Chinese move toward democracy on the third wave? To this question, Huntington provided compelling answers:

Chinese per capita GNP was half that of the Philippines and one-tenth that of Korea; economically China was far from the political transition zone. China lacked a powerful bourgeoisie. It had never been occupied by or colonized by the United States. Christianity was weak and the Catholic Church almost nonexistent. China had no previous democratic experience and its traditional culture had many authoritarian elements.¹⁶

Yet, Huntington believed that

demonstration effects were a powerful force promoting efforts at democratization in both Romania and China. They moved the third wave from the carnations of Lisbon the carnage of Beijing and Bucharest.¹⁷

The above two descriptions seem to contradict each other. Therefore, this project was undertaken to examine the impact of demonstration effects on the democratization in China.

2.4 Economics and Culture

Economics and culture are two factors so complicated that their relations with democracy and democratization

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

cannot be clarified easily. To paraphrase a remark made by Huntington, first of all, relations between and among economic development, culture, and democratization are complex and probably vary in time and space. Furthermore, economic and cultural factors have significant impact on democratization but they are not determinative.¹⁸ Although Huntington did not directly discuss the correlation among economic development, culture, and democratization, he did imply their inseparable relations by saying that "economic development appears to have promoted changes in social structure and values that, in turn, encouraged democratization." Among five reasons that economic development encouraged democratization, Huntington also indirectly mentioned the effects of cultural change upon democratization.¹⁹

Although the Chinese economy has continued developing since 1980, Huntington, as many other scholars, was pessimistic about the impact of Chinese culture on democratization. His thesis is that

Mainland China has had no experience with democratic government, and democracy of the

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁹ In short, the five changes made by economic development that encouraged democratization are: (1) the values and attitudes in favor of the existence of democratic institutions; (2) more highly educated people; (3) greater resources available for distribution among social groups; (4) the opening of society to the impact of the democratic ideas; (5) the expansion of the middle class. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

Western variety has been supported over the years only by relatively small groups of radical dissidents. "Mainstream" democratic critics have not broken with the key elements of the Confucian tradition. The modernizers of China have been the Confucian Leninists, in Lucian Pye's phrase, of the Nationalist and Communist parties. In the late 1980s when rapid economic growth in China produced a new series of demands for political reform and democracy on the part of students, intellectuals, and urban middle-class groups, Communist leadership responded in two ways. First, it articulated a theory of "new authoritarianism," based on the experience of Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea and justified by the argument that for a country at China's stage of economic development authoritarianism was necessary to achieve balanced economic growth and to contain the unsettling consequences of development. Second, the leadership violently suppressed the democratic movement in Beijing and elsewhere in summer of 1989.

Hence, Huntington concluded that

In China economics reinforced culture in opposition to democracy.²⁰

Huntington's thesis contains two important factors that closely relate to democratization. One is cultural, the other is economic. To discuss economic factor firstly. As Huntington pointed out, the relation between economic development and democratization is complex and probably varies in time and space. In China, that relation is more complex. On the one hand, there are no easy answers to the important question of how rich China is. As Figure II.1 shows, from 1978 to 1988, real per capita national income in China increased from 315 yuan to 613.86 yuan (in 1978's

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 301-2.

value), with an average annual growth rate of 6.9 percent.²¹ Ostensibly, based on the official exchange rates,²² the real per capita GNP in China was far below the income zone between roughly \$300 and \$1,300 in per capita GNP (1960 dollars) which makes democratization more likely as Huntington suggested. However, according to Vaclav Smil's estimation based on the purchasing power parity of the *renminbi* (People's yuan) in 1988, the value of *renminbi* was about 3.7 times greater than the official exchange rate with the dollar. Thus, the adjustment would put China's real 1988 GNP at \$1,300 or, in constant 1980 dollars, at almost exactly \$1,000.²³ This conclusion is also confirmed by Nicholas Lardy that a prudent estimate of China's real per capita income in 1990 is something around \$1,100.²⁴ But, this number does not reflect the gap between rich and poor provinces and between the peasant and urbanites as Smil

²¹ Ding Lu, Entrepreneurship in Suppressed Markets. Private-Sector Experience in China. (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), p. 161.

²² In 1978 the official rate stood at 1.42 *renminbi* to the United States dollar; by 1985 it had weakened to around 3:1, and by 1990 the currency was devalued to 4.79 to the dollar.

²³ Vaclav Smil, "How Rich is China?" *Current History*, 92: 265-269, September 1993. Reprinted in Donald Altschiller ed., China at the Crossroads, (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1994), p. 81.

²⁴ Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy, (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), p. 18.

suggested.²⁵ Therefore, in applying Huntington's thesis to China, specific conditions, such as level of real per capita income, income distribution, changes in Chinese culture, influence of overseas Chinese, have to be considered.

On the other hand, the relation between economic development and democratization is complex because economic factors are not determinative in bringing about democratization as Huntington immediately pointed out.²⁶ Although the economic crises experienced by the Chinese people during the 1980s did provide impetus and context for waves of political protest and social disturbance, there were deeper origins of the demands for democratization in China.

One of the deepest origins of the demand for democratization is cultural change which occurred after Deng Xiaoping's reinstatement in 1978. We should not forget that it was Deng who earlier than any other leaders appealed to emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future.²⁷ In the congenial political

²⁵ In Smil's words: "Taking rural per capita income of less than 200 *renminbi* in 1987 as an indicator of abject poverty, no fewer than 8.3 percent of peasant households, or more than 60 million people, were below that line, and it is unlikely the total dipped below 50 million by 1990." *Ibid.*, p. 87.

²⁶ Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²⁷ Speech on December 13, 1978. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 1975-1982 (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1979-1982), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), pp. 130-143. Hereafter Deng xuan, I.

climate created by the reform leaders and fostered by the democratic elite the seeds of democracy were able to sprout.

Therefore, even though in China Confucianism has been inhospitable to democracy, and economics reinforce culture in opposition to democracy as Huntington proposed,²⁸ I still believe that Huntington's thesis has its limits in the explanation of the occurrence of the democracy movements in China. It is true that Confucian societies lack a tradition of rights against the state; however, it is also true that under Confucianism, Chinese intellectuals are mandated to speak out against abuses of power and to resist despotic rulers. They were to expose and criticize wrongdoing of officials even at the risk of their own lives as Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang did in the 1980s and Wang Dan and Wei Jingsheng are now doing in China. Without this tradition of Confucianism it will be difficult to explain the occurrence of political protests in China. This tradition also appeared in an investigation conducted shortly before 1989. The questionnaire interviews were made in a prominent university in Northern China. Among the respondents, 51.8 percent did not agree with the proposition of complete Westernization, compared with 42.8 percent who were more willing to accept Western thoughts. Among the students who held the first kind of attitude and

²⁸ Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-302.

participated in the student movements in 1985-86 and late 1988, 48 percent of them acted out of the "responsibility to society" instead of the belief in Western values.²⁹

In fact, Chinese culture has been constantly challenged and penetrated by the Western culture since the nineteenth century. After thirty years of isolation China came alive under Deng. As Yue Daiyun, a professor of Beijing University, proclaimed: "Chinese culture is entering a new period, in which conflicting viewpoints co-exist."³⁰ It is fair to say that Chinese culture including Confucianism was undergoing changes due to Deng's open policy and marketization of communism. Although it is hard to predict which elements of Confucianism will be developed, changed, or discarded in the future, I am as optimistic as Huntington that "even if the culture of a country is at one point an obstacle to democracy, cultures historically are dynamic rather than passive."³¹ Therefore, Huntington's supposition that in China economics reinforced culture in opposition to democracy will be re-examined in this project.

Through comparative studies of important pro-democracy protests in China, the above five variables--


²⁹ Peter Chen(pseudo.), "Value Orientations of Chinese College Students. A Report and Analysis of a Questionnaire Interview," *Dangdai(Con-Temporary)*, Taipei, No. 67, 1/11/91, pp. 57, 59.

³⁰ *Economist*, 11/28-12/4, 1992, p. 32.

³¹ Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 310-1.

legitimacy problems, external actors, demonstration effects, economics, and culture--will be examined in order to advance our knowledge about China's democratization.

Figure II.1 Real per capita national income, 1978-90



Source: *China Trade and Price Statistics 1988*; *China Statistical Abstract 1989*; *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, 22 Feb. 1990, p. 3, 23 Feb. 1991, p. 3.

Source of figure II.1: Ding Lu, Entrepreneurship in Suppressed Markets. Private-Sector Experience in China. (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), pp. 162.

CHAPTER III

CASE 1: THE DEMOCRACY WALL MOVEMENT, 1978-81

1. The Democracy Wall Movement, 1978-81

1.1 Historical Background to the Post-Mao Pro-Democracy Protests

Except ethnic protests, all major pro-democracy protests in China after 1978 share the same historical background. First of all, China has a strong tradition of resistance to oppression and a substantial body of protest literature. "Official repression induces popular rebellion" (*guan bi min fan*) is an old Chinese idiom still favorably used today. Secondly, under Confucianism, the moral commitment and sense of mission have long been a part of the Chinese intellectual heritage. Traditionally, Chinese people have regarded scholars and university students as members of a social elite whose responsibility was the articulation of the grievances of the people and the formulation of better alternatives for society. In twentieth century, we have witnessed two revolutions led by social elites: Dr. Sun Yat-sen's nationalist revolution that

overthrew the Qing dynasty(1644-1911) and Mao Zedong's socialist revolution that established the Communist China.

Furthermore, The legacy of the May Fourth Movement in 1919--anti-imperialism, patriotism, democracy, and intellectual ferment and exploration--is so magnificent that every major pro-democracy movement claimed itself as the spiritual successor of the May Fourth Movement.¹

Besides, the relatively open politics and disaster of the Cultural Revolution had taught the younger people valuable lessons. Although they were indoctrinated with blind loyalty they were also encouraged to challenge the authority. They had learned to organize themselves and to resort to every kind of means to make their demands. Awakening from fanaticism, they enthusiastically explored the problems which existed in the communist system and advocated human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.²

Finally, many Chinese intellectuals were inspired by the reform efforts of Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary. The

¹ From many discussions on Chinese tradition of protest Chu-yuan Cheng made a succinct summary in his Behind the Tiananmen Massacre: Social, Political, and Economic Ferment in China (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1990), pp. 67-77.

² The far-reaching impact of the Cultural Revolution on the former Red Guards and the young people is well illustrated by Ta-ling Lee's "Red Guards and Political Dissidents(II): Victims Beyond a Generation," in Yuan-li Wu, et al., Human Rights in the People's Republic of China (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), pp. 210-232.

self-management system of Yugoslavia and the Solidarity movement in Poland were especially attractive to the Chinese.³ The economic achievement of the four little dragons of East Asia, particularly Taiwan, also stimulated the intellectuals to look at their Confucian brethren more seriously. The effectiveness of demonstration in both socialist and capitalist countries provided another ground for the protest against China's backwardness and unreasonable systems.

Whereas many participants in the pro-democracy movement always attribute their actions to the sense of mission and often refer to the May Fourth Movement, for many democratic activists in the post-Mao era the April Fifth Tiananmen Incident in 1976 was the preview of the Democracy Wall Movement which climaxed in 1978-79.

1.2 The Implication of the April Fifth Tiananmen Incident in 1976

In the spring of 1976, during the Qingming Festival, when the Chinese traditionally visit the ancestral tombs, an increasing number of people went daily to Tiananmen Square to pay tribute to the late Premier Zhou Enlai who died on January 8, 1976. When the wreaths laid at the Monument to

³ After the Cultural Revolution the Chinese government sent a cluster of researchers and reporters to Eastern Europe to learn their reform experience. Many books in this field have been published in the 1980s.

the Martyrs of the Revolution were removed in the eve of April 5, people were enraged. On April 5, about 100,000 people gathered at Tiananmen Square in a protest demonstration. The demonstration targeted Mao and the leftist leaders then in control of the government. Emotion soon reached a feverish pitch and the demonstration turned violent. Frenzied demonstrators set fire to four motorcars and raided a military barrack before they were suppressed by the urban militia.

Deng Xiaoping was blamed for the riots and dismissed from all party and government posts. Meanwhile, the appointment of Hua Guofeng as premier and first vice-chairman of the party was announced.

The death of Chairman Mao Zedong on September 9, 1976 escalated a power struggle between Hua Guofeng and Jiang Qing, Mao's widow. A month later in a coup at midnight, October 5, Hua Guofeng and four other leaders arrested the Gang of Four.

The smashing of the Gang of Four paved the way for Deng Xiaoping's returning to power in 1977. A year later, on November 15, 1978, the verdict that the Tiananmen Square Incident was counterrevolutionary was reversed to read revolutionary. As Deng Xiaoping acknowledged in 1980 the mass base established by the April Fifth Movement in 1976

was the first factor that had shaped a collective force to arrest the Gang of Four.⁴

This is the only self-motivated mass action ever recognized by the CCP in its history. The incident shows that the Chinese people were awakening politically. They didn't want to be fooled anymore by the Communist propaganda or tortured again by the abuse of power. Hence, the incident marked "the beginning of a new era in China's quest for democracy."⁵ The experience of the April Fifth demonstration also gave the people the confidence that public opinion and spontaneous mass movement could be an important factor in China's politics. Encouraged by the confidence in people's power Chinese people strongly demanded political participation in the 1980s.

Moreover, the rehabilitation of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident had grave political implications as Jurgen Domes pointed out. Firstly, a new evaluation of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident weakened Hua Guofeng and Wu De's positions and consequently strengthened that of Deng. This was because Hua and Wu, as minister of public security and mayor

⁴ Deng Xiaoping, "Answers to the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci. August 21 & 23, 1980," Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 1975-1982 (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-82) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 308. Abbr. as Deng xuan, I.

⁵ "Democracy and National Construction," tr. from Democracy and Modernity in James D. Seymour ed., The Fifth Modernization, China's Human Rights Movement, 1978-1979 (New York: Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980), p. 155.

of Beijing Municipality separately in 1976, had been in charge of the suppression of the incident. Secondly, rehabilitating the 1976 Incident meant legitimizing the intervention of social forces into intraelite conflicts, and perhaps, therefore, also endangering the current leadership.⁶

1.3 The Democracy Wall Movement, 1978-81

Due to insufficient sources of information many scholars believed that the Democracy Wall Movement (DWM) was ended either in April 1979 after Wei Jingsheng was arrested or in December 1979 when the Beijing Municipal government closed the Xidan Democracy Wall. However, new material shows a different picture that active interaction between the CCP and the democratic activists occurred between April and September 1979. Moreover, the activists had been unremittingly published unofficial press (*mingban kanwu*) until the nationwide arrests in April 1981. Therefore, it is fair to say that the Democracy Wall Movement lasted longer than we usually think.⁷

⁶ Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. 158.

⁷ The pro-democracy movement occurred in 1978-1979 is usually called Beijing Spring. However, a few scholars also addressed the Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989 as the "Beijing Spring." This study designates the first Beijing Spring as the Democracy Wall Movement in order to avoid confusion. For a pro-democracy movement originating from a piece of wall, and symbolized as "democracy wall," which has

Four periods of the Democracy Wall Movement can be distinguished:

(1) The Outbreak, November--December 1978

Agitated by the reversal of the verdict of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident, a spate of wallposters suddenly appeared in Beijing in November 1978. The posters appeared mostly on a small wall next to a municipal bus depot on Xidan Street from which the Democracy Wall earned its name. At the very beginning, the posters focused on the case of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident. A few days later, the topics in the posters extended to almost all the aspects of the political and social life. Many of the posters poured out grievances and suffering which people had experienced at the hands of the Party and bureaucrats. The others exposed the problems of the system and suggested correction and change. Still, some posters appeared to reflect divisions within the party leadership and represent certain faction's interest such as the demands for the redress of certain leaders' cases. Treatises, short stories, and poetry in classical and modern style were the forms of expression. Activists also made speeches and held discussion meetings to promote their causes. Peasant petitioners' demonstrations in Beijing were

appeared in many Chinese cities, the Democracy Wall Movement is an appropriate title.

an inseparable but undesirable part of the Democracy Wall Movement for the moderate activists.

Unofficial periodicals printed by mimeographs were the driving force that quickly spread the movement to far-flung parts of the country. The first unofficial magazine--*April Fifth Forum*--was founded in Beijing on November 15, 1978. Another magazine, *Enlightenment*, originated in Guiyang (southern China) and established a branch in Beijing before the end of the month. The far-famed *Exploration* was founded on January 9, 1979. Among a variety of unofficial publications, *April Fifth Forum*, *Today*, *Fertile Ground*, and *Beijing Spring* were the most long-lived and popular periodicals. However, many periodicals published only one or two issues. Based on available sources the unofficial groups and periodicals existing between 1978 and 1981 and their major members are listed in Appendix III.1.

The reversal of the verdict of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident only turned on the green light for the appearance of the posters. Other factors were also important for shaping and propelling the Democracy Wall Movement.

First of all, the struggle between restorationists and reformers during 1978-82⁸ gave the Democracy Wall

⁸ The restorationists wanted to reactivate and revitalized the institutions and policies of the mid-1950s and early 1960s that the reformers proposed to restructure and revise. Compared with the restorationists, the reformers wished a sharper and more decisive break from both Maoism

Movement a chance to play a role in Chinese politics. In order to weigh down Hua Guofeng's group and to grasp political dominance, Deng Xiaoping's strategy, as Harry Harding has observed, "was to mobilize support not only from within the highest level of the Party but also from vocal sectors of the broader population."⁹ For example, accompanied by Hu Yaobang, Deng visited some of Beijing's universities and colleges to observe the posters and talked to the students and faculty on the night of November 16, 1978. In a conversation with the faculty and students of the Beijing Geology College, Deng encouraged people to put up posters. He guaranteed them that every citizen's constitutional rights must be realized.¹⁰ In other remarks of 26 November to the chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan, Deng commented about the upsurge in poster-writing:

and the Soviet model. The restorationism's chief representatives in Beijing were a group of five central leaders who had risen from second-echelon posts to national prominence during the Cultural Revolution. Hua Guofeng, the prime minister; Wang Dongxing, a public security official who commanded the elite force of Party bodyguards; Chen Xilian, the commander of the Beijing military region; Ji Dengkui, vice-premier responsible for agriculture; Wu De, mayor of Beijing. Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution. Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 45, 57-66. The restorationists are also called the "whateverists."

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹⁰ The institutes that Deng had visited are: Beijing Geology College, Beijing University, Qinghua University, Aviation College and Normal College. *Shibao Zhoukan* (China Times Weekly), New York, 4/22/79.

This is a normal phenomenon, a manifestation of the stable situation in our country... The writing of big-character posters is permitted by our situation. We have no right to negate or criticize the masses for promoting democracy and putting up big-character posters. The masses should be allowed to vent their grievances. Not all of the opinions of the masses are well considered and it is impossible that all their demands are completely correct, but this is not to be feared. Tempered through the Great Cultural Revolution, the overwhelming majority of our people is exceptionally great in their ability to distinguish between right and wrong and in their concern for the destiny of the country. The broad masses demand stability and unity and take the whole situation into consideration. The masses have doubts on some questions and there are words that are not conducive to stability and unity and the achievements of the Four Modernizations. We must make things clear to the masses and be good in leading them.¹¹

Deng Xiaoping's understanding of the people's mood earned him overwhelming prestige and won for his faction important positions in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCCPC held in December 1978. (For a comparison of power constellation in the period before and immediately after the Third Plenum Appendix III.2 provides two name lists of the major decision makers and officials who were related to the DWM.) Therefore, in the crack of the power struggle between factions of Deng and Hua the wall posters were able to burst out like spring thunder.

An equally important factor for the upsurge of the Democracy Wall Movement is the democratic elite's campaign

¹¹ NCNA, Beijing, 11/27/78; FBIS-CHI-78-229, 11/28/78, p. E7.

for opposing Mao's thought. Since the spring of 1978 the theorists in the Central Party School, the training center for high officials, launched a campaign-like discussion of the slogan "Practice is the sole criterion of truth." Supported by Hu Yaobang, currently the vice-president of the Central Party School and the head of the Organization Department of the CCP, the discussion, as Michael Schoenhals pointed out, marked the first time since 1949 that Mao, his ideology, and policies had been directly contested from within the political system.¹² The discussion had broken through the forbidden zones of the ideology to a degree that by the fall of 1978 articles in the official media were calling for democratic elections, limited terms of office, freedom of press guaranteed by law, etc. As Merle Goldman argues:

Even before Wei Jingsheng of the Democracy Wall movement coined his famous slogan on the need for the "fifth modernization"--democracy as necessary for the four modernizations--the concept was already being discussed in the official press under Hu Yaobang's jurisdiction.¹³

The open door policy announced in 1978 gave the people a chance to reach the outside world and raised their

¹² Michael Schoenhals, "The 1978 Truth Criterion Controversy," *China Quarterly*, no. 126 (June 1991), pp. 243-268.

¹³ Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy. Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p.41.

expectation and demands for freedom and democracy.¹⁴ The P.R.C.'s normalization of its diplomatic relations with the United States on December 15, 1978 was a special impetus to the democracy movement. Topics about the model of American politics, economy, and society were vigorously discussed and debated in the unofficial press.

Generally speaking, the moderate political reforms launched in the late 1970s and early 1980s as well as Deng Xiaoping's need for a mass base in the power struggle had relaxed political life and slightly expanded the opportunities for popular participation in political affairs. That was the context wherein the Democracy Wall Movement occurred.

(2) The High Tide and First Crackdown, January--March 1979

The Democracy Wall Movement reached its high tide in January-March 1979 when demonstrations occurred intensively, more groups and activities organized, and unofficial press spread nationwide.

More radical groups and press were founded in this period. The most prominent ones were: Chinese Human Rights League, *Exploration*, and *Thaw*. Almost all the major cities had their own democracy wall and unofficial press were

¹⁴ The impact of China's "open door" policy has been succinctly summarized in Donald S. Zagoria, "China's Quiet Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1984), pp. 879-904.

circulating from city to city. However, at least on the surface, most of the unofficial press took a moderate attitude toward the communist regime and refrained from directly challenging its legitimacy. Based on available materials Table III.1 presents a tentative spectrum of their orientation in an oversimplified way.

Table III.1 Orientations of unofficial periodicals(11/78-3/79), A sample

<u>System-rejective</u>	<u>Remonstrant (within-system)</u>	<u>Literature and non-political</u>
<i>Exploration</i>	<i>April Fifth Forum Beijing Spring</i>	<i>Today</i>
<i>Thaw --Enlightenment--></i>		<i>Fertile Ground</i>
<i>China Human Rights</i>		<i>Autumn Fruit</i>
	<i>Spark</i>	
	<i>In Search of Truth</i>	
	<i>Masses' Reference News</i>	
	<i>Science, Democracy, Legality</i>	
	<i>Seashore of Pohai</i>	

Note: Because The *Enlightenment* had shifted its position from system-rejective to "within-system" opposition, some radical members split with it and established the *Thaw* in February 1979 in Guiyang and Beijing.

Two documents symbolized the beginning of this high tide: one is the "Nineteen Points on Human Rights" declared by the Chinese Human Rights League; the other is Wei Jingsheng's "The Fifth Modernization" which asserts the supremacy of democracy over economic modernization.

The movement reached its first climax when Fu Yuehua, a well-known female human rights activist, organized

several thousand peasants from various provinces to demonstrate in Beijing. They demanded democracy, human rights, and most of all, food. Throughout January, the peasants marched through the street and to Zhong-nan-hai, the residential compound of top officials, shouting "Against hunger and oppression, for democracy and human rights." Large-scale demonstrations and riots also occurred in Shanghai during the Spring Festival of 1979 in February demanding the right to live and work in the cities.

A tension between the regime and the activists also developed in this period. The arrests of Fu Yuehua and other peasant protesters on January 18 and 27 was the first real blow to the democracy movement. In response to Fu Yuehua's arrest and the authorities' discrediting the movement seven unofficial magazines held a joint conference on January 28.¹⁵ In a joint statement they made their position known that they had determined to rescue the persecuted citizens. The seven groups also mounted a coordinated poster campaign in February to inquire into Fu Yuehua's case.

The second blow came with Wei Jingsheng's relentless criticism of Deng Xiaoping. In an editorial of

¹⁵ The seven people's press and groups are: *April Fifth Forum*, *Exploration*, *Masses' Reference News*, *Human Rights League*, *Enlightenment*, *People's Forum*, and *Today*. See James D. Seymour, ed., *The Fifth Modernization* (New York, 1980), p. 252.

Exploration issued on March 25, 1979, Wei Jingsheng cried out against Deng Xiaoping:

He now wants to strip off his mask of protector of democracy and suppress the democratic movement. He is prepared to set himself against democracy and resolutely safeguard dictatorial politics. He is no longer worthy of the people's trust and support, because his actions have shown that he does not want to pursue democracy. He no longer safeguards the people's interests. He is following a dictatorial road after deceitfully winning the people's trust.¹⁶

Shortly thereafter Wei Jingsheng was arrested on March 29. On March 30 Deng Xiaoping delivered the notorious speech "Insist on Four Cardinal Principles" in which he strongly rebuked the democracy movement. Around this time many cities and provinces publicized a new policy restraining wall posters and demonstrations. The second crackdown ended in April when more than thirty radical activists were arrested nationwide.¹⁷ The Democracy Wall Movement hence entered another period.

(3) The Moderates' Stage, April--September 1979

The regime's partial crackdown on the Democracy Wall Movement left the stage to the moderate activists. Liu Qing and Xu Wenli of the *April Fifth Forum* were now playing a guiding role in the movement. The missions they took up were extremely heavy. On the one hand, they had to rescue

¹⁶ Wei Jingsheng, "Which is Wanted: Democracy or a New Despotism?" *Ibid.*, pp. 198-9.

¹⁷ Among the arrested are Ren Wandong, deputy chairman of the Human Rights League, and Chen Lü, Zhang Wenhe.

the arrested colleagues such as Wei Jingsheng, Fu Yuehua, and Ren Wanding. Meanwhile, they had to continue the movement in a more strategic way.

The moderates' forbearance and self-restraint had made the movement look more acceptable to the society and the regime. Although the government never lessened its pressure on the movement, a conciliatory approach had been taken toward the activists. According to Liu Qing, the convener of the Joint Conference of Unofficial Publications (JCUP), he was offered a job in the Communist Youth League (CYL). Liu turned down the offer but was asked to present the offer to the Joint Conference. The Joint Conference rejected the offer but did not object to one of its individual members accepting it. The Joint Conference also rejected the suggestion of moving Xidan Democracy Wall to an out-of-the-way place.¹⁸

As a leader of the Democracy Wall Movement Liu Qing had played the role of intermediary between the movement and the Party's democratic elite. For example, in June-July

¹⁸ These kinds of proposals were put forward by persons with special background such as Tang Ruoxin, a journalist of the *Beijing Daily*. Serving in the Department of Internal Reports, the *Beijing Daily*, Tang had a long term contact with the activists and had written internal reports on Democracy Wall Movement. It was said that his reports on the April Fifth Forum was so touching that Peng Zhen, then vice-chairman of the Fifth NPC and director of the Committee on Legality of the NPC, had dropped tears. My interview with Liu Qing, 3/12/94.

1979 Liu Qing served as the convener of a theoretical conference sponsored by the *China Youth*, the organ of the CYL. The democratic activists had also been invited by Yu Guangyuan, then director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (IMLMT) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), to attend international and national theoretical conferences.

Unofficial press had also established contact with the democratic elite in the *People's Daily*, especially the current deputy editor in chief Wang Ruoshui. Communication and exchange between unofficial press and official media, such as the *Liberation Army Daily*, were voluminous.

The relationship between the unofficial press and the regime seems to have been improved despite the activists' continuing protests and pursuance of democracy and human rights. The Democracy Wall Movement, as Robin Munro pointed out,

experienced a considerable revival during the late summer of 1979, when a series of new unofficial journals appeared. Even the radical exploration recommenced publication, despite the earlier arrest of its main editor, Wei Jingsheng.¹⁹

During this time period, there was talk in the Party that the colleagues' magazines (*tongren zazhi*, a euphemism of unofficial press) should be allowed to register. By the end

¹⁹ Robin Munro, "China's Democracy Movement: A Midwinter Spring," *Survey*, Summer 1984, p. 76.

of October 1979 the Beijing Municipal Party Committee even passed a message to the democratic activists that the leaders of the municipal government would like to talk to them soon after National Day on October 1st.²⁰

The situation looked so optimistic that the unofficial press dared to mobilize a large scale march on the National Day, October 1st, and launched democracy speech meetings to support the Star Star (*Xing Xing*) Arts Group to fight for their rights to exhibit modern art. Organized by Xu Wenli and Liu Qing, their protest forced officials to open up an exhibition space in the Beijing Art Gallery. The two shows of unofficial and modern art were a watershed in the movement to liberalize Chinese culture.²¹

The march was also a watershed for the Democracy Wall Movement according to Liu Qing. The communist authorities were so embarrassed by a demonstration on National Day which had never happened before, that the established official contacts with the democracy movement broke off abruptly. Liu Qing believes that it was not a coincidence that Wei Jingsheng was sentenced to 15 years in prison two weeks later on October 16th. A month later, Liu

²⁰ The message was relayed by Liu Xun, the chairman of Beijing Association of Artists. My interview with Liu Qing, 3/12/94.

²¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)*. (Hong Kong), November 27, 1981, p. *Jiushi Niandai (The Nineties)*. (Hong Kong), June 1985, p. 76. *Inside Asia*. (London), November-December 1985, p. 28.

Qing himself was illegally detained and imprisoned for over ten years.²²

(4) The Close of the Democracy Wall and Nationwide Crackdown, October 1979--April 1981

Step by step the communist regime tightened up its control over the society and lay the ax to the root of the democracy movement.

Already in March 1979 a particular regulation aimed at wallposters was made known but was not seriously implemented. Then, against the background of the Party's fierce attacks on Wei Jingsheng and "bourgeois" human rights and democracy,²³ a meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC in late November 1979 announced a resolution to abolish the Democracy Wall and assigned the Beijing authorities to handle this issue.

Effective on December 8 the Xidan Democracy Wall was closed and a new posting site in Yuetan Park in the western suburbs of Beijing was designated. A new provisional stipulation proclaimed that

[T]hose who put up the big-character posters are required, before posting, to register their real

²² Most of information in this section are provided to me by Liu Qing on 2/18/94 and 3/12/94 in New York City. Liu Qing is now the Chair of the Executive Committee, Human Rights in China (HRIC), New York.

²³ Examples see "Resolutely Punish Counterrevolutionary Criminals," *People's Daily*, 10/17/79; and "A Brief Discussion of Human Rights," *Guangming Daily*, (Beijing) 10/26/79. Harold C. Hinton, ed., The People's Republic of China, 1979-1984. A Documentary Survey (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), pp. 345-351.

names, addresses and units to which they belong. The contents of the big-character posters shall not be examined by the registration center.

Furthermore,

Those who put up the big-character posters shall be held responsible for the political and legal implications of the content...

and,

Creating disturbances or riots at the site where posters are put up is prohibited. Violators shall be only duly punished according to the law.²⁴

Similar or more stringent regulations were promulgated in other cities such as Hangzhou and Nanjing.²⁵

On January 1, 1980, the P.R.C.'s first criminal code came into effect. The term "counterrevolutionary crimes" was defined as those behaviors aimed at overthrowing the regime of proletariat dictatorship and socialist system, and endangering the People's Republic of China.

Under this circumstance, most unofficial journals in Beijing were forced to close down by early 1980. The *April Fifth Forum* stopped publication in March 1980. However, Xu Wenli continued to publish *Study Bulletin* and *Humanity* by himself. In a struggle for the survival of unofficial

²⁴ Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee notice, 6 December 1979. Harold C. Hinton, ed. *op. cit.*, pp. 370-1.

²⁵ In Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, posters can only be put up in designated cite of the writer's work unit. Those posters referring to units other than his/her own have to be transferred to the related or higher organs and shall not be put up on the street. Zhonggong Nianbao, 1980 (The CCP Yearbook, 1980), (Taipei, 1980), p. 3:21.

journals He Qiu initiated the creation of the All-China Association of the People's Press in Guangzhou in January.

He Qiu's appeal was answered by unofficial organizations from Shanghai, Kaifeng(Henan), Changsha(Hunan), Changchun(Jilin), Ningbo(Zhejiang), Anyang(Henan) and, finally, in August 1980, the All-China Association of the People's Press was inaugurated in Guangzhou. In Robin Munro's opinion, the focus of unofficial publishing tended to shift to south and central China because political conditions there appeared to be more favorable.²⁶ Table III.2 presents a tentative list of journals which survived by or were founded after October 1979.

Table III.2 Unofficial periodicals struggling for survival(10/79-1981). A sample

<i>April Fifth Forum</i>	Beijing	11/78--3/80
<i>In Search of Truth</i>	Beijing	9/79--?
<i>People's Road</i>	Guangzhou	9/79--?
<i>Responsibility</i>	Guangzhou	9/80--?
<i>New Current of Democracy</i>	Guangzhou	10/80--12/80
<i>Mission</i>	Guiyang	11/80--?
<i>Sea Spray</i>	Qingdao	11/80--?
<i>Wind Against the Waves</i>	Taiyuan	winter '80--?
<i>Study Bulletin</i>	Guangzhou/Beijing	late 1980--?
<i>Humanity</i>	Beijing	1/81--?

On September 10, 1980 the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress approved the motion of revising Article 45 of the state constitution of 1978. The resolution

²⁶ Robin Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

deleted the provision according citizens the rights to "speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters."

The deteriorated situation of the Democracy Wall Movement can also be reflected from harsher and harsher speeches by Deng Xiaoping.²⁷ As a response to the unofficial press' active effort of linking together and criminal problems, Deng Xiaoping, in a speech on December 25, 1980, announced that, the People's Republic of China had never been softhearted toward "the antagonist elements, counterrevolutionaries...", and demanded the strengthening of the state machine of the people's democratic dictatorship in order to thoroughly destroy each kind of force that breaks stability and unity.²⁸

In spite of the regime's serious suppression, the unofficial press continued to struggle for their survival. For instance, the already closed *April Fifth Forum* had managed in November 1980 to render congratulations to

²⁷ See Deng xuan, I. From four speeches related to the Democracy Wall and unofficial press I found that Deng has changed his tones from therapeutic and conciliatory to penal. The four speeches are: "The High Level Cadres Have to Take the Lead to Carry Forward the Fine Tradition of the Party," (11/2/79); "The Present Situation and Tasks," (1/16/80); "Implement the Policy of Readjustment, Ensure Stability and Unity," (12/25/80); "On Fighting Against Wrong Thinking," (3/27/81).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 329-331.

Solidarity on its victory in Poland.²⁹ In an attempt to stamp out the remaining seeds of democracy the CCP undertook a nationwide arrest in April 1981. The well-known activists arrested in April were Wang Xizhe, Yang Jing, Chen Erjin, Fu Shenqi, Sun Weibang (Sun Feng), and Zhang Jingsheng.³⁰ Such action continued into the second half of 1981. It had successfully suppressed the voice of the dissents. Thus, Deng Xiaoping satisfactorily concluded:

After we proposed four basic principles our thinking became clearer. Besides, we took resolute measures to ban illegal organizations and illegal publications. Therefore, the situation has become better.³¹

²⁹ See Xu Wenli's letter to Lech Walesa (11/14/80), *Zhongguo zhi Chun (China Spring)*, (New York), July 1983, p. 70.

³⁰ Democracy Wall Prisoners, (New York: Asia Watch, March 28, 1993.) Wu Yuan-li, et al., Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 219.

³¹ "A Statement on the Problems in Ideological Front (July 17, 1981)," Deng xuan, I, pp. 347-8.

2. Interactions in the Governing Coalition

2.1 The Democracy Wall Movement as a Factor in the Inner-Party Struggle

(1) Stage 1: The Democracy Wall Movement and Deng's First Victory in the Third Plenum, December 1978

It is generally agreed that, in his struggle with Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping's strategy was to mobilized support not only from within the highest level of the Party but also from vocal sectors of the broader population.³² However, little material can well explain how the Democracy Wall Movement became a factor in the intraparty interactions until Ruan Ming publicized the inside stories he had experienced.

Ruan Ming, a dissident now residing in the United States, had been Hu Yaobang's helper in the Central Party School during 1977-1982. As a long-term and high placed party official who was deeply involved in theoretical debate with the leftists and Maoists, and, as a ghost writer for Hu Yaobang and, occasionally, for Deng Xiaoping between 1977 and 1982, Ruan Ming's testament on the inner-party power struggle is a highly reliable source of information. In his book, Hu Yaobang at the Turning Point of History, Ruan Ming briefly but specifically describes the role the pro-

³² For example: Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 61.

democracy movement played in the defeat of the "whateverists."³³

According to Ruan Ming's observation, Hu Yaobang was always sincere to Hua Guofeng and had no intention to replace Hua. Also, it seemed that Hu Yaobang did not coordinate with Deng Xiaoping in turning Hua Guofeng out of the leadership.³⁴ As the vice president of the Central Party School(CPS) designated by Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang was responsible for school's daily work under the direct supervision of two whateverists--Hua Guofeng, the president of the CPS; and Wang Dongxing, the first vice president of the CPS.

Nevertheless, Hu Yaobang struggled to weaken the dictatorship of the governing "whateverists." To achieve this goal he did a lot of work in the areas of ideology and organization. Firstly, to refute the dogma insisted by the "whateverists," he launched a campaign-like discussion of

³³ Ruan Ming, Lishi zhuanzhedian shangde Hu Yaobang (Hu Yaobang at the Turning Point of History), (River Edge, NJ: Global Publishing Co. Inc., 1991.) Abbr. as ...Hu Yaobang. He also published Zhonggong renwu lun(A Critical Biography of the CCP Figures), (River Edge, NJ: Global Publishing Co. Inc., 1993.) and the often cited Deng Xiaoping diguo(The Empire of Deng Xiaoping), (Taipei: Shihpao chupan kongsi, 1991.) Ruan Ming(1931-) was a head of research section of the Department of Propaganda, CCCPC, before he was purged during the Cultural Revolution. In 1977, Hu Yaobang, currently vice president of CPS, invited Ruan Ming to work for him as the editor of *Theoretical Trends* and the deputy director of the section of theoretical study until 1983 when he was expelled from the Party.

³⁴ Ruan Ming, ...Hu Yaobang, pp. 11, 13.

the slogan "Practice is the sole criterion of truth" in the spring of 1978. By the fall of 1978, the concept of the "fifth modernization"--democracy as necessary for the four modernizations--was already being discussed in the official press under Hu Yaobang's jurisdiction even before Wei Jingsheng coined "fifth modernization" as his famous slogan.³⁵ Secondly, using his power as the head of Department of Organization, Hu Yaobang proceeded to review and reverse numerous unjust verdicts which had happened in the successive campaigns during the Maoist period. By 1979 most of those who had been labeled "landlords," "counterrevolutionaries," "capitalists," or "rightists" had secured their political rehabilitation. The return of Deng Xiaoping's followers and liberal intellectuals undoubtedly had strengthened the reformers' influence.

The Central Work Conference from November 10 to December 15, 1978 was held against this background. Although the conference was originally manipulated by the "whateverists," and intended to insist in continuing revolution and class struggle, Hu Yaobang was able to convince Hua Guofeng to make the leading reformist intellectuals such as Zhou Yang, Hu Jiwei, Yu Guangyuan,

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27. Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China, Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 35-41.

Yang Xiguang, to attend the conference. Thereby, these liberal reformers had influenced the course of the conference.³⁶

The surging posters movement on the Democracy Wall has caught Hu Yaobang's eyes. He instructed the Central Party School, the Communist Youth League, news agencies, and newspapers to watch the development of pro-democracy movement in the society. He also wanted them to immediately report the important issues raised in the Democracy Wall to the conference. These issues included the demands for the reversal of verdict on 1976 Tiananmen protest and those unjust verdicts which had occurred in the Cultural Revolution, the reevaluation of Mao Zedong, a better life, the freedom of speech, the freedom of journalism, democracy and rule of law, and the changes of dictatorship and bureaucratism as well as the criticism of some Maoist leaders and the support to Dengist leaders. Everyday, through different kinds of channels, the issues raised on the Democracy Wall were immediately reported to and discussed in the conference. Thereby, the pro-democracy movement in the society and the reformist forces in the Party had in fact formed an alliance.³⁷

³⁶ Ruan Ming, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Yang Xiguang was the editor-in-chief of the *Guangming Ribao*, another Party organ.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

The social pressure had shaped such an atmosphere in the conference that many attendants believed that it was impossible to realize modernization without solving the critical historical issues and the important problems of real life. The debates in the conference finally led to the end of the whateverists' hegemony in the ideological field. Wang Dongxing was released of his reign in the fields of propaganda and ideology. The Central Special Cases Investigation Group controlled by Wang Dongxing was abolished.³⁸ China therefore had entered into a short period of ideological emancipation. And the transformation from the class struggle to the four modernizations was reaffirmed by Deng Xiaoping in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCCPC on December 18-23, 1978.

Encouraged by his great victory over the "whateverists," in a famous curtain speech to the conference Deng Xiaoping, among other things, emphasized the importance of democracy:

³⁸ Wang Dongxing was the director of the Central Special Cases Investigation Group. With power of examining each special case, Wang Dongxing's principle is that whatever case established by the agreement of Mao Zedong absolutely cannot be reversed. Otherwise, the banner of Chairman Mao will be damaged. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 30. It was said that Chen Yun took over Wang Dongxing's power over Party's organization and security. Kang Mingshu. "A Primary Observation on the CCP's Third Plenum," *China Times*, 12/27/79. Reprinted in Gongfei yuanshi ziliao huibian (Collection of the CCP's Original Materials), (No. 12) (Taipei: Ministry of Defense, 1979), pp. 115-120.

One important condition for getting people to emancipate their minds and use their heads is genuine practice of the proletarian system of democratic centralism. We need unified and centralized leadership, but centralism can be correct only when there is a full measure of democracy.

At present, we must lay particular stress on democracy, because for quite a long time democratic centralism was not genuinely practiced: centralism was divorced democracy and there was too little democracy...

We must create the conditions for the practice of democracy, and for this it is essential to reaffirm the principle of the "three don'ts": don't pick on others for their faults, don't put labels on people, and don't use a big stick. In political life within the Party and among the people we must use democratic means and not resort to coercion or attack. The rights of citizens, Party members and Party committee members are respectively stipulated by the Constitution of the People's Republic and the Constitution of the Communist Party. These rights must be resolutely defended and no infringement of them must be allowed.

...The masses should be encouraged to offer criticisms. There is nothing to worry about even if a few malcontents take advantage of democracy to make trouble. We should deal with such situations appropriately, having faith that the overwhelming majority of the people are able to use their own judgment. One thing a revolutionary party does need to worry about is its inability to hear the voice of the people. The thing to be feared most is silence.³⁹

The Democracy Wall Movement played such a significant role in the inner-party power struggle that Ye Jianying highly praised: "The Xidan Democracy Wall is the model of

³⁹ "Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future," Deng Xiaoping. Speeches and Writings. 2nd ed. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1987), pp. 65-66.

people's democracy, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCCPC is the model of inner-party democracy."⁴⁰

(2) Stage 2: The Democracy Movement as Deng's Sacrifice in the Power Struggle, March 1979

It seemed that Deng Xiaoping was willing to develop democracy in China in January 1979 when the Theory Conference was continuing its first session. Having listened to the arguments on the abolition of lifelong system of leadership, the refutation of continued revolution theory, and the termination of personal worship, Deng Xiaoping asked the conference to emphatically discuss the issue of democracy on January 27, the day before his visit to the United States. According to Ruan Ming, Deng has instructed:

More than sixty years after the October Revolution, democracy has still not been perfected. You have to write a great thesis of twenty to thirty thousands characters in the first half of the year, discussing the development of the May Fourth Movement, clearly explains the appearance and development of democracy from the viewpoints of the development of world history and the trends of the human society.

The bourgeoisie built itself up on democracy, anti-feudalist dictatorship... The proletariat democracy should be the higher stage of democratic development and should transcend bourgeois democracy. Good things in the bourgeois democracy has to be carried forward.

....

We want to make the people the master of the state. How can we make the people feel that they themselves are the master? The bourgeois has a system to make themselves the master: election,

⁴⁰ Ruan Ming, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

legislation, control of government. We need to find measures to let the people feel that they are the master of the state. I can not clarify it today. Organize twenty or thirty persons to concentrate in writing this thesis.⁴¹

Deng has designated Hu Qiaomu to organize a writing group to write the thesis on democracy. But, Hu Qiaomu never did that because, according to Hu Qiaomu's reasoning, Deng Xiaoping intended to transform the Communist Party into a democracy party. Hu Yaobang had tried but in vain to infuse Deng's points into his curtain speech for the close of conference due to the change of situation.⁴²

The situation was changed by P.R.C.'s invasion of Vietnam in February/March 1979. The assault on Vietnam, which had mainly been promoted by Deng himself, did not proceed smoothly but revealed grave weaknesses in the PLA. Comments on this war became a topic on the Democracy Wall and Deng Xiaoping was criticized. The most intolerable criticism for Deng Xiaoping is Wei Jingsheng's serious warning of the danger that Deng Xiaoping was becoming a dictator.

Instead of an asset for Deng, the Democracy Wall now became a debt for him. Two standpatters, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, took this chance to meticulously collect materials about the Democracy Wall Movement and exaggerated their

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

"malicious attacks" on Deng Xiaoping in order to change Deng's attitude towards democratization.⁴³ Deng's adversaries now argued that the Democracy Wall Movement had gone beyond Party control and had developed its own momentum, which started to pose a threat to the Communist regime.

Deng also suffered setbacks in other fronts. Firstly, the bolder and bolder criticism of Mao's ideology and policies and some aspects of orthodox Marxism-Leninism since the spring of 1978 had provoked the resistance and opposition of the elders. Secondly, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and their conservative associates now disagreed with Deng's policies toward the economy. They opposed the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and the liberal policy toward hiring labor and economic management. In view of the deteriorating economy in the first quarter of 1979 Li Xiannian proposed the policy orientation of "readjustment, reform, consolidation, and improvement" (*tiaozheng, gaige, zhengdun, tigao*).⁴⁴ Along with large scale human rights and pro-democracy demonstrations and protests in Beijing, Shanghai, Yunnan province, and other cities, a third bad omen for Deng was the rising crime rate and social chaos

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴⁴ Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China. Political Conflict and Economic Debate, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 89-91.

that had spread across the country which shocked and embarrassed the CCP leadership.

Situated in such a context, Deng had to take defensive measures for himself. The first thing he did was to announce his complete break with the pro-democracy movement in a speech delivered to the Theory Conference on March 30, 1979. In that notorious speech, "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles," (written under Hu Qiaomu's direction) Deng Xiaoping severely condemned the Democracy Wall activists:

Recently a handful of people in some places have been stirring up trouble. Some bad elements, turning a deaf ear to exhortations and explanations by party and government responsible persons, ... incited part of the masses to storm party and government organizations, occupy offices, stage sit-in strikes, block traffic and disrupt work schedules, production order and social order.

Moreover, they raised sensational anti-starvation and demand for human rights slogans to induce some people to parade in the street, purposefully letting foreigners report their activities. A so-called China Human Rights Group had the temerity to paste up a big character poster asking the U.S. President to have 'concern' for human rights in China. Can we allow such conduct of asking foreigners to intervene in our domestic affairs? A so-called Thaw Society has issued a declaration opposing the proletarian dictatorship, charging it with splitting the mankind. Can we permit such 'freedom of speech' in contravention of the principles of the Constitution?

In Shanghai some people at the so-called Democracy Forum have slandered Comrade Mao Zedong and displayed a large placard bearing counterrevolutionary slogans calling proletarian dictatorship 'the source of all evils' and pledging to 'thoroughly criticize the Chinese Communist

Party.' ...Some of them asked for 'political asylum' in the foreign countries, some even clandestinely connected with Jiang Kai-shek's secret agency and planned sabotage.

Deng Xiaoping continued to analyze the necessity of handling these events while criminalizing the democratic activists:

Firstly, these people can easily confuse public opinion because they generally operate under the signboard of democracy. Secondly, by exploiting problems left over from the reign of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, they have little trouble to gull some people who have been in distress and the government has yet to come to their aid. Thirdly, they have formed various secret or quasi-open organizations in liaison with one another across the country, while making effort to link up with political forces in Taiwan and other countries. Fourthly, some of them have joined hands with hoodlums and followers of the Gang of Four to expand the scope of their sabotage.

Finally, Deng Xiaoping sent out a warning to the inner-party democratic elites:

Fifthly, they would exploit indiscretion of some of our comrades to have their way or for their protection.

Deng Xiaoping thereupon explained the principle of handling the "counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements":

The above situation shows that the struggle with these people is not a problem which can be easily and quickly solved. We have to do our best to separate those deceived masses (many of them are naive youth) from these counterrevolutionaries and bad elements, and seriously handle these counterrevolutionaries and bad elements according to law.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Deng xuan, I, pp. 159-161.

Thus, the Democracy Wall Movement was sacrificed by Deng Xiaoping for his need in the power struggle and policy conflict.⁴⁶

(3) Stage 3: The Democracy Movement Sacrificed for Deng's Second Victory in the Fifth Plenum, February 1980

As part of Deng Xiaoping's legal reform the NPC approved the new criminal law and the criminal procedure in June 1979. However, the arrests and trials of Wei Jingsheng, Fu Yuehua, and many other dissidents in the second half of 1979 was not in accordance with the new Criminal Law which would come into force on January 1, 1980.⁴⁷

The October trial of Wei Jingsheng not only showed that it was clearly a political case but also showed the tyranny of the elder standpatters in the Party. The

⁴⁶ Based on the analysis of a report delivered by Liao Gailong, one of Deng Xiaoping's most eloquent spokesmen, Stuart R. Schram sharply pointed out: "[I]t had been necessary to throw the young hot-heads of the 'Democracy Movement' to the wolves in order to preserve the possibility for carrying out reforms in a systematic way, from above." Stuart R. Schram, Ideology and Policy in China Since the Third Plenum, 1978-84, (London: Contemporary China Institute, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1984), p. 10. Hu Yaobang was unprepared for Deng's abrupt change of mind, but Hu dared not to directly pose different opinion. Ruan Ming, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁴⁷ An analysis of the case of Wei Jingsheng can be found in Hungdah Chiu, "The Case of Wei Jingsheng, the Pioneer of the Democracy Movement," in Winston L.Y. Yang and Marsha L. Wagner, eds., Tiananmen: China's Struggle for Democracy, (Baltimore, MD: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1990), pp. 7-22.

liberal reformers' inferiority was so obvious that even the secretary-in-general Hu Yaobang felt helpless for it because, as Hu told Ruan Ming, Peng Zhen had directly sent the judgment to Deng Xiaoping for his approval without notifying Hu Yaobang. Hence, Hu was unaware of the judgment beforehand and could do nothing about it after that.⁴⁸

Certainly, there was no need for Peng Zhen to pay attention to Hu Yaobang. Peng was so senior that, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, he already was one of the strongest political figures in China and a might-be successor to Mao Zedong if he had not been purged early in 1966. He was just rehabilitated in 1979 and, in late June 1980 at the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth NPC, was appointed a vice-chairman of the NPC's Standing Committee and chairman of the newly established Work Committee related to Legal Affairs of the NPC. At that time, Peng was mainly

⁴⁸ Ruan Ming, *op. cit.*, p. 37. The helplessness of the liberal reformers can also be reflected in another example. It was said that the representatives of Beijing City at the National People's Congress (NPC) requested the procuracy and the court to explain the process of handling Wei's case, but the Municipal Party Committee instructed the procuracy and the court not to do so. Only after a deputy chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, Tan Zhenlin, criticized the Municipal Party Committee and the Municipal Revolutionary Committee (municipal government), was a cadre from the Organization Department of the City Party Committee--not from the procuracy or the court--sent to explain the process of handling the Wei case to the representatives. Hungdah Chiu, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

responsible for the development of the legal system and taking general charge within the party of security and legal work--a portfolio he held twenty years before.⁴⁹ Indeed, all during the period under Peng Zhen's supervision over the legal system the democratic activists were one by one put into prisons, the Democracy Walls everywhere were closed, moreover, the Fifth Plenum in February 1980 adopted a proposal to eliminate the constitutional article which provided for the right to engage in "big contending, big blooming, big debate," to put up "big character posters."

It seemed true that, as Deng had calculated, the purge of democracy movement did gain for him enough time to consolidate his power base and to rally his attack on the whateverists. Earlier in the Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh CCCPC assembled in September 1979, Peng Zhen was elevated to the Politburo as a full member, and so was Zhao Ziyang, who had so far been only an alternate. Three other veteran purgee cadres who belonged to the coalition that rallied around Deng--Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, and Yao Yilin--were appointed as additional vice-premiers in June 1980.

Finally, the triumph of Deng seemed almost complete at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh CCCPC which convened on

⁴⁹ Robert B. Oxnam and Richard C. Rush, eds., China Briefing, 1980, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 111. Richard Evans, Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China, (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), p. 249.

February 23, 1980. The coalition of forces around Deng at the Fifth Plenum had secured a majority on the Politburo. More importantly, four strong supporters of Hua--General Wang Dongxing, General Chen Xilian, Wu De, and Ji Dengkui⁵⁰--were now removed from that body. Hua Guofeng was isolated as the only remaining advancer of the Cultural Revolution in the inner leadership core. By their affiliation with the power groups, Table III.3 lists the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo as of February 29, 1980, the day the meeting was closed.

⁵⁰ These four central leaders were called "Little Gang of Four" because they had risen from second-echelon posts to national prominence during the Cultural Revolution. Besides their membership in the Politburo, Chen Xilian was the member of the Standing Committee of the CMC, the commander of the Beijing Military Area; Wu De was the Mayor of Beijing City; Ji Dengkui was the vice premier and director of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Leading Group, CCCPC.

It is interesting to note that, contrary to the description in Lieberthal's Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (1992, p. 14), Ji Dengkui's leading group did appear on organizational chart in 1979 which includes another six members: (1) Zhao Cangbi, deputy director of the group, head of the Public Security Ministry; (2) Ji Pengfei, head of the Liaison Department (with the fraternal parties abroad), CCCPC, (3) Jiang Hua, head of the Supreme People's Court; (4) Cheng Zihua, head of the Civil Administration; (5) Tao Xijin, deputy director, the Legal Affairs Committee, the Fifth NPC; and (6) Yin Qizhi, background unknown. Ji Dengkui's leading group was replaced by the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, NPC. Zhonggong Nianbao, 1979, p. 10:6. Carol Lee Hamrin, "The Party Leadership System," in Lieberthal and Lampton, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

Table III.3 Standing Committee of the Politburo membership
as of February 29, 1980

	<i>The Ye Group</i>	<i>The Deng Group</i>
Hua Guofeng	Ye Jianying Li Xiannian	Deng Xiaoping <--Chen Yun-- Hu Yaobang Zhao Ziyang

Note: Chen Yun later joined Ye-Li group in opposition to Deng's radical reforms.

(4) Stage 4: The Influence of Polish Crisis, December 1980

By the fall of 1980, a wave of official liberalization surged in almost every aspect of life, as Peter Moody ironically indicated that "many of the more breaks with the past come well after the suppression of the democratic movement."⁵¹ Changes were proposed in political ideology and institutions, and in cultural and economic policies. Generally speaking, the new course proposed included reducing the scope of political intervention in social life, especially in artistic matters, intellectual affairs, and daily life; conducting direct election at the county level; loosening the control of the party over the government and enterprise management; revamping the nation's civil service policies; and reducing the role of ideology while

⁵¹ Peter Moody, Chinese Politics after Mao. Development and Liberalization, 1976 to 1983, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 83.

transforming the major tenets of Maoism and Marxism to the development of production.

The wave of reform reached its high tide on August 18, 1980, when Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech on "Reforming the Party and State Leadership."⁵² Liao Gailong, a member of the Policy Research Office of the Central Committee, went further than Deng and pushed the wave to another high tide. On October 25, 1980, Liao called for the party's separation from not only the government and the economy but also cultural activities, mass organizations, and the media.⁵³

However, economic reform and political relaxation had had side effects: the rise of crime and corruption, the expression of unorthodox opinions by intellectuals and students, experiments with new styles of expression by writers and artists, and the emergence of a materialistic, often vulgar, popular culture among ordinary Chinese. These phenomena were intolerable to the standpatters in the Party leadership. After several months of unsuccessful campaign against Dengist reform programs, the Polish crisis finally gave the standpatters a chance to establish a coalition.

In summer 1980, the shipyard workers in Gdansk and other Polish cities had gone on strike to protest the rise

⁵² Deng xuan, I, pp. 280-302.

⁵³ Merle Goldman, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

in food prices and had formed the independent workers' union Solidarity. The development in Poland had frightened the elders into retreating on political reforms and repressing dissent in order to prevent the development of a Chinese Solidarity.

On September 24, Hu Qiaomu wrote Hu Yaobang a lengthy letter on the Polish crisis arguing that China could also "burst out a situation like what was happening in Poland." Hu Qiaomu specifically warned that

the unity of a few political dissidents and a mass of discontented workers could become a tremendous force, ... Therefore, we can not be easily satisfied with suppressing the so-called spontaneous organizations into underground. Instead, ... in regard with the members of these organizations a task of top priority is to educate them, to win them over, and to disintegrate them, and these works should be supplemented with necessary strikes."⁵⁴

Hu Qiaomu's argument won Chen Yun's support quickly. Together with Deng Liqun, Zhao Ziyang, and Li Xiannian, the Chen Yun group proposed a retrenchment policy toward the economy and launched an attack on "bourgeois liberalism" and political reform in the Central Work Conference held on December 16-25, 1980. As a concession to Chen Yun group, Deng Xiaoping, on the last day of the meeting, read a speech drafted by Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun which sharply condemned the "illegal organizations and illegal publications," and

⁵⁴ Ruan Ming, *op. cit.*, pp. 50, 130-1.

pledged to crack down on them resolutely and relentlessly "not only once but also many times."⁵⁵

The December Work Conference marked the end of the "first wave" of reform as Fewsmith indicated:

Against the freewheeling intellectual atmosphere that had emerged following the publication of Hu Qiaomu's article 'Act in According with Economic Laws' [1978--*Hsu*] and the reform experiments and justifying arguments..., there now emerged a conservative backlash that effectively shut off intellectual debate and new explorations of reform, at least for a while.⁵⁶

Pressed by Deng Xiaoping, the implementation of his instruction was completely enacted in April 1981 in a nationwide crack down on the democracy movement.

2.2 Patterns of Interactions in the Governing Coalition


The history shows that the Democracy Wall Movement had made itself an important factor in the inner-Party struggle. Without the support of public opinion articulated by the Democracy Wall, Deng Xiaoping would not have been able to harvest a significant victory in the Third Plenum of the 11th CC in December 1978. However, when the public dissent grew more critical to the core political institutions and values of Chinese Marxism in the early winter of 1978-79, the Democracy Wall turned into Deng's heavy

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-3. Deng Xiaoping, "Implement the Policy of Readjustment, Ensure Stability and Unity (December 25, 1980)," *Deng xuan*, I, pp. 329-331.

⁵⁶ Fewsmith, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

liability. Under the influence of internal and external factors Deng repeatedly sacrificed the Democracy Wall in order to defend himself against the Maoists and to consolidate his power. Charts III.1-4 in the following pages show the patterns of interactions in the governing coalition in relation to the Democracy Wall Movement at each stage of inner-Party struggle.


Chart III.1 The DWM and the inner-Party power struggle, Winter 1978/79



Notes:

- (1) In mobilizing people's support for his struggle with the Hua-Wang group, Deng tolerated the Democracy Wall and even defended the right of citizens to express their views, although he was irritated by the China Human Rights League's open letter to U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
- (2) As the victim of the Cultural Revolution, Deng was the only top leader with the moral rationale to appeal for public support in the inner-Party struggle.


Chart III.2 The DWM and the inner-Party power struggle,
Spring 1979



Notes:

- (1) Fu Yuehua, Wei Jingsheng, and others were arrested in February and March 1979.
- (2) Deng endorsed the four cardinal principles in his speech of March 30, 1979. The speech marked a watershed in the party's handling of the Democracy Wall.
- (3) Frustration over the stalemate in Sino-Vietnam war was the unforeseen international factor that stiffened Deng's attitude toward the dissidents.
- (4) A rising crime rate and social disorder were the domestic factors for a partial oppression of the Democracy Movement.
- (5) The NPC approved the criminal law in June 1979. The new law narrowed the definition of "counterrevolutionary crime" to the public opposition to the four cardinal principles.
- (6) The NPC also publicized new a electoral law. The first experimental elections were conducted in the winter and spring of 1979-80.


Chart III.3 The DWM and the inner-Party power struggle, February 1980



Notes:

- (1) The standpatters such as Peng Zhen were reigning. In October 1979, Peng gave Wei Jingsheng a heavy sentence of 15 years' imprisonment.
- (2) In November 1979, Liu Qing was detained illegally and imprisoned for over ten years.
- (3) Hua's faction, the "Little Gang of Four" were removed from the Politburo in February 1980. A new governing coalition was shaped. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were elected to the Politburo Standing Committee. Hu was designated as general secretary.

Chart III.4 The DWM and the inner-Party power struggle,
December 1980



Notes:

- (1) Deng was preoccupied by the Polish crisis throughout the summer of 1980. The Polish crisis was the most important exogenous event that influenced the CCP's decision to suppress the Democracy Wall. Pressed by Chen Yun's group, Deng demanded the complete crash of the Democracy Wall in December 1980.
- (2) From August to October 1980, Deng, Hu, and Liao Gailong proposed the "Gengshen reforms" to prevent political rebellion.
- (3) In September 1980, the NPC deleted the four big freedoms from the constitution.
- (4) In the latter half of 1980, local elections at the county level caused campus unrest at Hunan Teachers' College and Beijing University.
- (5) Most of the key activists of the Democracy Wall were arrested in the spring of 1981.

3. Interactions between the Regime and the Democracy Wall Movement

3.1 Structure of Interactions


This section tries to study the protests by examining interactions between the Democracy Wall Movement and the Chinese Communist regime. But, it will focus on the events which occurred in Beijing City only. There are three reasons. Firstly, there are much more documentary and live data on the democracy movement in Beijing than in other cities. Secondly, the interactions between the CCP and the Democracy Wall Movement are much more direct and frequent in Beijing than in other cities. More importantly, Beijing is the center of Chinese politics. The events which happened in such a highly sensitive place can have significant effect on the people in other part of China, and, therefore deserve an in-depth study.

To give a clear picture of the interactions between the regime and the protest movement, chart III.5 provide a model of the social structure explaining how the social structure determines the process and outcome of the protest movement.⁵¹

⁵¹ The model draws its concept from Frances Fox Piven, "The Social Structuring of Political Protest," *Politics & Society*, 6:3 1976, pp. 297-326.

Major factors to be analyzed in this model include: (1) timing, place, and forms of defiance; and (2) aims and values pursued by the protesters. It's important to note that interactions between the protesters and the regime do not necessarily occur at every level and can be occurred between different levels.⁵²

Chart III.5 A model of social structure and the protest movement



Based on the Chart III.5 and available sources, Table III.4 provides a relatively detailed picture of the

⁵² This chart is adapted from my unpublished paper "The Kaohsiung Incident, 1979: A Study of Political Violence in Taiwan," p. 30. The paper was prepared for Professor John H. Mollenkopf in 1983.

authorities and individuals that directly or indirectly interacted with the DWM in 1978 and 1979.

Table III.4 Structural levels of the regime that interacted with the Democracy Wall Movement, 1978-79

<u>Levels:</u>	<u>Authorities and Individual Actors:</u>
<i>Central</i>	<u>Elders:</u> Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen <u>NPC:</u> members of SC, few representatives <u>CCCCP:</u> Central Political and Legal Affairs Leading Group, General Office
<i>Layer of staff & party organs</i>	<u>State Council:</u> Ministry of Public Security, and other line ministries, Depts. of Organization & Propaganda, <i>People's Daily</i> , <i>Guangming Ribao</i> , NCNA, Central Party School, CYL, CASS
<i>Local</i>	Beijing Municipality Party Committee, Dept. of Organization Beijing Municipal Revolution Committee (RC), Public Security Bureau (PSB), other organs Beijing Municipality People's Congress, few representatives Beijing Higher People's Court, Intermediate People's Court work units
<i>Street</i>	Police stations, other social control agents ⁵³ .

On the other hand, Table III.5 shows the levels of the protesters in the social structure. Although many protesters such as Wei Jingsheng, Xu Wenli, Ren Wandong, Fu

⁵³ Put it simply, the social control agents are the social audiences that oversee control of deviance. In the PRC the agents are comprised of the police, party organizations, street residents' committee, and public security committees in the factory, institution, or neighborhood. Amy Auerbacher Wilson, Sidney Leonard Greenblatt, and Richard Whittingham Wilson, eds., Deviance and Social Control in Chinese Society, (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 9. Ronald J. Troyer, Social Control in the People's Republic of China, (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 27-29.

Shengqi, were average workers and belonged to the lowest circle of society, I regard them as unofficial national figures because of their leading role in the democracy movement and their national and international prestige. Besides, dissidents such as the members of Li-Yi-Zhe Group who already earned national fame are also regarded as actors at the unofficial national level. However, this study will focus on the interactions which proceeded in Beijing while examining local interactions by comparison.

Table III.5 Structural levels of the protesters in Beijing, 1978-1979

<u>Levels:</u>	<u>Protesters:</u>
<i>National</i>	Wang Juntao (CYL)
<i>Prominent</i>	Guo Luoji (Beijing University, Beijing
<i>Activists</i>	Municipal People's Congress)
<i>Unofficial</i>	Wei Jingsheng, Xu Wenli, Ren Wandong,
<i>National</i>	Liu Qing, Fu Yuehua (Beijing)
<i>Leaders</i>	Fu Shengqi (Shanghai)
	Wang Xizhe, He Qiu (Guangzhou), etc.
<i>Local</i>	Yang Jing (Guangzhou)
<i>Activists</i>	Yang Zaixing (Guiyang), etc.
<i>Street</i>	masses

Please note that many local activists earned national or international fame in the later period of the Democracy Wall Movement and therefore elevated themselves to the national level. When we compare the above two tables we

shall see why Wang Juntao was able to have a face-to-face conversation with Hu Yaobang while Xu Wenli could only have marginal contact with Wang Ruoshui, the deputy editor-in-chief of the *People's Daily*.

By the same logic, the social structure determined the way the protesters communicated with the regime. The political communication systems in China, as Alan P.L. Liu has maintained,

are closely regulated and controlled by the Communist party. The party regards itself as the "gatekeeper" of Chinese society and relegates to itself the prerogative of deciding what information and how much of it is to be made available to the public. Political communication is structured to enable the party to perform such a gatekeeping function.⁵⁴

Liu then divides the communication system of the PRC into two types, the formal-institutionalized and the informal-noninstitutionalized as shown schematically in Figure III.1.

As P.L. Liu indicated,


The main difference between the formal and informal system of opinion expression and communication is that the formal system is legitimized (hence controlled) by the Communist party whereas the informal system is not legitimized by the party and is the object of Communist suppression.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Alan P.L. Liu, How China is Ruled. (1986), pp. 262-3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

However, for the spontaneous publications in the Democracy Wall Movement, there was indeed a period of non-suppression by the Communist. The following section will explain this phenomenon through the analysis of the interactions between the CCP and the protesters.

Figure III.1 Divisions of Communication and Opinion Forums in the PRC



(Source: Alan P.L. Liu. How China is Ruled, p. 263.)

3.2 Stages of Interactions

(1) Stage 1: Tolerance for the Posters, October-December 1978

The wall poster is a derivative as well as a tool of factional struggle in the CCP. The Li-Yi-Zhe Poster which appeared in November 1974 during the Cultural Revolution is an example in point. Entitled "Concerning Socialist Democracy and Legal System," the poster ramblingly criticized various aspects of the Communist regime such as growth of a new class, cult of personality, officials' nepotism, and Lin Biao's dictatorship. Li's poster created a traffic jam in the city as tens of thousands of people congregated to read it. The local party authorities did not effectively silence Li's group until March 1975.

That Li-Yi-Zhe Group was able to publicize their poster was due to the renewed factional struggle between the leftists (Gang of Four) and the party pragmatists headed by Deng Xiaoping. As P.L. Liu described:

Before Li's poster appeared, Beijing had already witnessed a wave of officially (i.e., by the leftists) instigated posters attacking Deng's followers. Thus Li was able to capitalize on the political instability in China in 1974 to air his views.⁵⁶

In the same vein, the golden opportunity for posters came in November 1978 when the Party leaders were having

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

conflict on the ideological problems and the economic policy. In order to overcome the whateverists in the party Center, Deng Xiaoping encouraged the people to air their grievances. Consequently, the topics of the posters became, more and more, fundamental critiques of the Communist system.

As usual, the poster was still a tool of power struggle in the eyes of the Party leaders. However, this time it was used and encouraged almost exclusively by the Dengists. Hua Guofeng and his associates could only sit and watch themselves attacked by the posters. Balanced by Deng's faction, Hua Guofeng group was unable to suppress the posters even though Wang Dongxing, the vice-chairman of the CCP, was in charge of propaganda and public security. Therefore, in my opinion, the tolerance for or non-intervention in the posters was more of a result of the top leaders' inability to reach consensus than of "a decision at the highest level" as Roger Garside was convinced.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, non-intervention did not mean that the public security establishment could do nothing about the poster movement. In my estimation, there are several

⁵⁷ Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China after Mao, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). pp. 222-3. In fact, as Garside has seen, Hua group did has suppressed a poster campaign in favor of Deng's return in January 1977 when the people used the first anniversary of the death of Zhou Enlai to intensify the campaign. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

reasons for lack of reaction from the security system. Firstly, the operational climate was not appropriate for policing the poster movement because, on the one hand, the poster movement had been repeatedly encouraged by Deng Xiaoping. From November 16 to December 13, 1978, Deng had praised the posters at least five times. As a prominent leader warmly welcomed by the people, Deng was regaining and consolidating his power in the Party. Therefore, it was wiser for Zhao Cangbi, the minister of Public Security, to keep his professional neutrality until the result of the power game is published. On the other hand, it is also probably because of the indecisiveness of the top leadership on the policy toward the poster movement that the security system was unable to take action.

Secondly, the security system could not locate the targets at this stage because the pro-democracy and human rights organizations and leaders had not appeared or been identified yet.

Finally, the development of the poster movement did not turn into demonstration or activities threatening social order and the entire Communist regime.

Under such an atmosphere, the interactions between the regime and the protesters was mainly the interactions between the reformers and massive protesters including some activists such as Wang Juntao. The communication between

them were mostly indirect and the channels were uncertain and non-institutionalized. As mentioned before [section 3.2.(2) stage 1], Hu Yaobang had instructed the Party organs to watch the posters and reflect the situation to the ongoing Central Work Conference. Other leaders were very concerned about the DWM too. For example, Chen Yun, an elder just assigned to the vice-chairman of the CCP after the Third Plenum in December 1978, also instructed *People's Daily* to gather information about the DWM. This was the beginning of the contact between the *People's Daily* and the Democracy Wall.⁵⁸ This was a typical operation code for the CCP's formal intra-party secret communication as P.L. Liu has indicated. (see Figure III.1) The main purpose of this type of communication was to keep Party's leading role in the society and to keep the people away from directly participating national politics. Therefore, it is highly possible that the reformers might have intended to guide or coordinate, or even manipulate the poster movement, as Roger Garside has observed:

A few of the posters may have been inspired by hints from highly placed officials. Sometimes the themes of posters so closely paralleled what was being said inside the Work Conference as to suggest coordination.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Wang Ruoshui, *op. cit.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

Another example of indirect but very special interactions is Deng Xiaoping's communication with the masses through foreign journalists John Fraser and Robert Novak on November 26 and 27, 1978. Entrusted by the masses in front of the Democracy Wall, Novak brought up the masses' questions to Deng on the first day, and Fraser reported Deng's answers back to the masses the next day. Although this is an indirect communication between a top leader and the masses, it is certainly a very special one. As Garside has pointed out:

Nothing quite like this had happened before in modern China. These people had sent their message and questions to Deng yesterday and today they would get his reply. For once, they had bypassed the bureaucracy. (...now there was a dialogue.)⁶⁰

Undoubtedly, this was a breakthrough of the communication system of the P.R.C. The episode won for Deng the enthusiastic support and trust of the people. It also gave the people an illusion that democracy would come true in China in no time. However, an informal and non-institutionalized communication like this soon would be proved to be an exception in the CCP's history.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

(2) Stage 2: Two Oppressions of the Democracy Wall Movement, January--April 1979

The pattern of interactions between the CCP and the Democracy Movement changed in the first three months of 1979. On January 18, 1979, the peasant demonstration in Beijing shocked the city and possibly the Central Government by marching in the streets, interrupting the traffic, and shouting "Against hunger and oppression, for democracy and human rights." Accompanying the Beijing demonstrations was the sharp criticism of Mao and the political system on the Democracy Wall, as well as the large scale of protests in other places such as Shanghai and Yunnan.

The protests had challenged the legitimacy of the CCP and threatened the whole Communist system. Now, the Democracy Wall Movement was not an asset for Deng anymore. Rather, it became a liability for him. Deng and other elders such as Peng Zhen who, it was said, was sympathetic to the Democracy Wall were now changing their attitudes toward the movement.

Table III.6 shows the timing, participants, forms and aims of protest, and the CCP's reaction to the three runs of interactions between the DWM and the CCP in Beijing.

Table III.6 Three Runs of Interactions between the DWM and the CCP in Beijing, January--April 1979

-
- I. Human rights demonstrations and first oppression, 1/18-29
- (1) Timing: 1/18
 - (2) Participants and forms of protest: Fu Yuehua's peasant demonstration, marching, sit-in-strike, shouting system-rejective slogans. Coordinated with the Human Rights League.
 - (3) Aims and values: better life, human rights, democracy.
 - (4) The CCP's reaction: (a) Arrested Fu the night of 1/18 and other activists in the following days. (b) Mobilized the social control agents to vilify the whole DWM.
- II. The JCUP's response to oppression, 1/22-3/16
- II.1 The establishment of the Joint Conference of Unofficial Press (JCUP)⁶¹
- (1) Timing: 1/22, after Fu's arrest.
 - (2) Participants and forms of protest: Seven unofficial organizations organized the JCUP. They publicized a Joint Statement on 1/25 to express their aims and values and to search for people's support.
 - (3) Aims: United for survival.
 - (4) The CCP's reaction: N/A
- II.2 The JCUP's protest meeting
- (1) Timing: 1/29, the day Deng arrived in the U.S. and was embarrassed by reporters' questions on the protest in Beijing.
 - (2) Participants and forms of protest: Seven unofficial organizations held a protest mass meeting in Xidan Stadium.
 - (3) Aims and values: Introduce the protesters themselves to the public; explain their aims in and actions for democratization in order to refute the authorities' vilification; express their determination to fight for democracy.

⁶¹ Details about the JCUP see Liu Qing, "Lianxi huiyi...", *Beijing zhi chun*, May 1994, pp. 96-100. And Liu Qing, "Wei Jingsheng fuchen ji--huiyi yu suixiang (Wei Jingsheng's rise and fall--a memory and a random thought)," *Mingbao yuekan*, (Hong Kong), October 1993, pp. 123-6.

- (4) The CCP's reaction: monitoring, tracking, harassing, disturbing.
- (5) Result: Rumor on the DWM rested in two days.

II.3 The activities for rescuing Fu Yuehua, 1/22-3/24

- (1) Timing: the PLA invaded Vietnam(2/17-3/15), Shanghai riot(2/5-3/6).
- (2) Participants and forms of protest: The JCUP organized a journalists' team to visit the Public Security Bureau and judicial organs to gather information about Fu; reported Fu's situation to the world; held public meetings on Fu Yuehua, appealed for her release and protested her illegal detention; published a special issue on Fu Yuehua.
- (3) Aim: To rescue Fu Yuehua.
- (4) The CCP's reaction: Official media repeatedly warned and attacked the DWM from 2/6 to 3/22; Deng Xiaoping criticized the DWM on 3/16 in his secret report on the Sino-Vietnam war.

III. Second oppression: the arrests of Wei Jingsheng and other dissidents, March-April 1979

- (1) Timing: The CCP decided on 3/16 to set limitations on freedom of speech in a central document.
 - (2) Participants: On 3/25, Wei Jingsheng warned in an article that Deng was becoming a dictator.
 - (3) Aims and values: Strip off Deng's mask of protector of democracy and declare Wei's determination to carry out democratization.
 - (4) The CCP's reaction: (a) Arrested Wei on 3/29. (b) The police inspected the *April Fifth Forum* on 3/29. (c) Regulations on posters and demonstrations were issued in Beijing and in other cities. (d) Deng announced Four Cardinal Principles and strongly rebuked the DWM on 3/30. (e) All posters were removed from central Beijing. (f) 30 dissidents including members of the Human Rights League were arrested in April. (g) *Red Flag* condemned the democrats in May.
-

This is a period in which confrontation and opposition characterized interactions between the DWM as a whole and the CCP regime. However, not all the unofficial

groups held the same perception of the situation and the same attitude toward the regime. There were system-rejective radical democrats and moderate democrats, as well as within-system democrats according to Liu Qing.⁶² Their behavioral patterns were also different from each other. Still, the radicals played a major role in this period and finally buried the movement in the future.

(3) Stage 3: From Conciliation to the Fall of the DWM, April-October 1979

The pattern of interactions changed after the imprisonment of the radicals. Although the protests and the activities of rescuing the arrested democrats were never stopped, there was an aura of conciliation and new unofficial presses kept appearing after April 1979. It seemed that the CCP was taking a conciliatory approach or win-over strategy toward the DWM. The following facts furnish evidence on the conciliatory aura and new pattern of interaction:

1. A few days after Wei Jingsheng's arrest in April, the Office of Policy Research of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League (CYL CC), sent some staff to contact the activists of the DWM. The CYL firstly met Liu Qing, the convener of the JCUP, and asked for his help to contact other unofficial presses which include *Exploration*, *Issues of Human Rights*, *Human Rights League*, *People's Voice*, *April Fifth Forum*, *Today*, *Fertile*, and *Beijing Spring*. The Office of Policy Research had frequently contacted the unofficial presses for a period and wrote a favorable report

⁶² Liu Qing, "Lianxi huiyi...", *op, cit.*, p. 96.

on the DWM. The report was so touching that, it was said, Peng Zhen had dropped tears upon reading it.⁶³

2. Tang Ruoxin, a CYL's staff, had invited Liu Qing to do youth work for the CYL. Liu turned down the offer but was asked to bring Tang's suggestion to the JCUP. The JCUP as a whole decided not to accept the offer but agreed to let their members consider the offer as individuals. Liu Qing's younger brother, Liu Nianchun, an editor of *Today*, thereafter worked for an official literature periodical.⁶⁴

3. Tang Ruoxin also suggested that the JCUP to move the Democracy Wall to the Yuetan Park in the western suburbs of Beijing. Evidently, Tang was communicating the Center's idea which was carried out in December 1979.⁶⁵

4. Hu Yaobang held a talk in his home with Wang Juntao and Lu Pu (son of a prominent musician Lu Ji). Hu tried in vein to persuade them to quit politics. Hu also suggested that the CYL nominate Han Zixiong and Wang Juntao to be elected to the CC CYL. In addition, Hu Yaobang has suggested recruiting the authors of the Li-Yi-Zhe Poster to work in the Central Party School. However, the proposal was rejected by the standpatters because they were not party members.⁶⁶

5. As mentioned before, there were many direct or indirect contacts between the unofficial press and party's organs including the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and the *People's Daily*. Liu Qing has also served as the convener of conferences sponsored by the CYL and the CASS.

6. On August 19, the *AFP* reported a resurgence of posters and unofficial publications in Beijing. The report indicated that for the first time since April the posters had not been removed after a few hours.

It is worthy to notice that only those national level activists with special background such as Wang Juntao

⁶³ "Wei Jingsheng's Dialogue with Liu Qing and Hu Ping," *Beijing zhi chun*, November 1993, p. 8. And my interview with Liu Qing.

⁶⁴ My interview with Liu Qing.

⁶⁵ My interview with Liu Qing.

⁶⁶ Ruan Ming, *op. cit.*, p. 30. Wang Ruoshui, *op. cit.*

could have direct communication with Hu Yaobang, but not with the leaders higher than Hu. However, the local level activists like Liu Qing and Xu Wenli could have indirect communication with the top leaders through some special figures like Tang Ruoxin. That is because Tang's father, Tang Ke, was the minister of Energy and an associate of Deng Yingchao (Zhou Enlai's widow). It is also because some sympathizers of the DWM were the children of high ranking officials and were willing to pass the messages to the unofficial press.

Also important is that the unofficial press interacted with the party organs in an institutional form albeit not formally recognized by the regime. Besides, street level interactions had been reduced at this stage. Finally, the DWM interacted mainly with the layer of Party organs' staff, research centers and institutes. Understandably, these were the places where the democratic elite gathered.

The aura of conciliation changed abruptly after the Star Star Art Group (*Xingxing huahui*) marched in Beijing on October 1, the P.R.C.'s national day. In conjunction with other protest activities, the untimely march on such a sensitive day and in such a sensitive place certainly irritated the authorities. Therefore, the active and positive interactions between the liberal reformers and the

DWM was interrupted. In just a few days, the CCP switched its approach toward the DWM from the conciliatory style to the penal style of control. In other words, there was no more constructive interaction except arrests and imprisonment. Table III.7 shows the CCP's reaction to the DWM after October 1979.

Table III.7 The CCP's reaction to the DWM after October 1979 till January 1980

<u>Date:</u>	<u>The CCP's reaction:</u>
10/15/79	Peng Zhen criticized <i>People's Daily</i> , CC CYL, and Foreign Language Publishers for their support of the DWM.
10/16	Wei Jingsheng was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.
11/2	Deng Xiaoping criticized the DWM and prompted a two-hand strategy in handling protesters.
11/11	Liu Qing was detained illegally and imprisoned.
11/29	The NPC referred the problem of the Xidan (Democracy) Wall to the Beijing Municipal government.
12/8	Democracy Wall was closed and shifted to the suburbs.
1/1/80	The new Criminal Law came into force.
1/16	Deng Xiaoping severely criticized the DWM and warned the party cadres to stop their connections with the DWM.

(4) Chained to the Abyss of Misery--the Dissidents' Inescapable Fate

The imprisonment of the radicals might have given the liberal reformers and the moderates an opportunity of rapprochement. However, three factors disturbed their

coalition. Firstly, the standpatters were still dominant in the government. Secondly, the actors of the DWM had misconceptualized the conciliatory atmosphere in the months between May and October 1979. They became excited and vehement and underestimated the danger of the sensitive timing of October 1st. Finally and most importantly, because participants of the JCUP were obligated to support and rescue the persecuted activists as had been promised in the joint statement, it was inevitable for the moderates to confront the authorities and therefore involve themselves in each other's case. Consequently, the activists were imprisoned one by one for each other's sake. The pattern of this chain reaction can be figured as:

imprisoned <== Fu Yuehua and her group members, 1/79

<== Wei Jingsheng and his followers, 3/79

<== Ren Wanding and his Human Rights League, 4/79

<== Liu Qing (in place of his followers), 11/79

<== Xu Wenli and other members of the National
People's Periodicals Association, 4/81


In summary, as Liu Qing has said, the Fu Yuehua event is really the DWM's locomotive of calamities. The coalition of the unofficial press did not strengthen the DWM and survive the oppression of the CCP. Instead, their mutual assurance of rescuing each other brought sufferings

to the activists and the fall of the Democracy Wall Movement.

3.3 Patterns of Interactions between the Regime and the Democracy Wall Movement

Charts III.6, 7, 8 summarize the patterns of interactions between the regime and the protesters in the period of 1978-79. No chart is needed for the period after 1980 because the Movement went underground and became the target of oppression.

Chart III.6 Interactions between the CCP and the DWM,
October--December 1978




↔ interaction <...> indirect interaction

Notes:

- (1) Basically, the interactions between the DWM and the regime are informal-noninstitutionalized.
- (2) Foreign actors such as Japanese visitors and American journalists intentionally or unintentionally played a role in communicating Deng's messages to the Democracy Wall in November 1978.
- (3) A national leader was not appeared yet.

Chart III.7 Interactions between the Regime and the DWM,
January--April 1979




Notes:

- (1) The radicals dominated the Democracy Wall Movement. The interactions were characterized with confrontation and opposition.
- (2) The activists had temporarily lost their communication with the Communist leaders and could only act at the street and local level.
- (3) The arrests were selectively conducted by the Beijing Municipality. The decision to make arrests was made by Mayor Lin Hujia.

Chart III.8 Interactions between the Regime and the DWM,
April--October 1979

Social Structure



↔ interaction <...> indirect interaction

Notes:

- (1) The talks between Hu Yaobang and Wang Juntao/Lü Pu does not necessarily represent an interaction between the regime and the Movement as a whole. Instead, it was more of a win-over strategy toward certain key actors in the DWM.
- (2) Notwithstanding Liu Qing's efforts to legitimize the communication between the democratizers in the Party and the moderate activists in the DWM were interrupted, mainly because of the standpatters' obstruction.

4. Conclusion

4.1 Legitimacy Problems

Undoubtedly, the post-Mao Chinese Communist regime faced serious legitimacy problems due to economic depression and political repression. The smash of the Gang of Four in 1976 alleviated the CCP's legitimacy crises. Supported by the reformers and the majority of people, Deng Xiaoping's return to power in 1978 and his promise to modernize China legitimated himself as a charismatic leader. Combined with a totalitarian control of society, the CCP regime under Deng was able to maintain its legitimacy. Therefore, it is interesting to find that the DWM was caused by the CCP's legitimacy crises and, at least for a short period, accepted, if not totally supported, Deng Xiaoping regime's legitimacy.

4.2 Demonstration Effects and External Actors

To the Chinese democrats, President Carter's diplomatic recognition of the P.R.C. (December 1978), Vice President Walter Mondale's visiting Beijing (August 1979), and Solidarity's victory in Poland (Summer 1980) were important events that encouraged the democrats' expectation of democratization. However, the demonstration effects of these events were weakened by their distance and the government's tight control of society. Furthermore, in

order to forestall the crisis encountered by Polish Communists, Deng's preemptive measures were a promise of Gengshen political reform and more arrests of the dissidents in 1980-81. Consequently, the demonstration effects of the Polish crisis produced a counter effect in China.

Only few foreign journalists and diplomats had a closer contact with the Democracy Wall activists. Although foreigners' presence and their talks to the Chinese people excited and encouraged the participants of the DWM, none of the foreigners tried to hasten the movement. Incidentally, John Fraser of the *Toronto Globe and Mail* and American syndicated columnist Robert Novak played a role as messengers between Deng Xiaoping and the people in November 1978. But, this was only an exception and their role was marginal.

In sum, the correlation between the DWM and the demonstration effects was weak, or even negative. And, none of the actors such as governments and institutions external to China took any action to influence the Democracy Wall Movement.

4.3 Economics and Culture

In retrospect, the DWM occurred at a time when the Chinese economy had suffered a long-term depression and political tensions and conflicts between society and the state were intensified by the Cultural Revolution(1966-

1976). As a result, the post-Mao leadership in China was under strong popular pressure to raise living standards and expand individual freedoms. Apparently, economic crises, legitimacy crises, and undermined official ideology were causes favorable to the occurrence of the 1976 Tiananmen protests and the DWM. In other words, at least during the very beginning of the DWM when it was supported by Deng's group, a depressed economy and a decayed politics reinforced cultural change in favor of democracy. Therefore, in terms of the case of the DWM, Huntington's supposition that in China economics reinforced culture in opposition to democracy cannot be well proved.

In sum, a case study of the DWM shows that not all factors favorable to democratization were present or strong enough to bring about democratization. For example. Economic crises may have eroded the CCP's legitimacy. But, economic crises are also a negative factor for democracy. Also, as Michel Oksenberg observed, a mentality of strident and isolationist nationalism still existed in the Chinese.⁶⁷ Thus, nationalist self-esteem plus political terror had reduced the DWM's contact with the external actors--an

⁶⁷ Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, (America and the World), 1986, p. 504.

important and valuable resource.⁶⁸ Table III.8 summarizes the degree of correlation between five variables and the DWM.

Table III.8 The degree of correlation between five variables and the DWM, 1978-79

<i>The degree of correlation to the DWM</i>	
<i>Five variables:</i>	
1. Legitimacy problems	<i>high-->low</i> after Deng consolidated his legitimacy within and without the Party
2. Economic crises	<i>high</i>
3. Cultural change	<i>high-->low</i> after Deng lost his sympathy of the DWM
4. Snowballs	<i>low</i>
5. External actors	<i>low</i>

⁶⁸ Contact with foreigners may give the regime an excuse to incriminate the democrats as "spies bought over by the capitalists"--a charge which could sentenced them to labor camp or death. See "An Interview with Wei Jingsheng (February 1979)," A Collection of Underground Publications Circulated on Chinese Mainland, Vol. 5 (Taipei, 1981), p. 332. Also, many democratic activists and Communist officials did believe that democratization was the domestic business of Chinese. Hence, there was no need for foreigners to give their concerns about or intervene in China's human rights and democracy movement. Deng Xiaoping, a standpatter in essence, has condemned the connection between the activists and foreigners. Wang Ruoshui, a liberal reformer, also questioned Xu Wenli's relations with foreigners. See Wang Ruoshui, "A Past Event About Democracy Wall..." in Appendix III.3. And my interviews with Liu Qing and Xue Mingde. Xue, now lives in New York, is an avant-garde artist who was active in the DWM.

Appendix III.1 People's Press, Organizations, and Key Actors, 1978-1981

- April Fifth(Siwu)*, Hangzhou
April Fifth Forum (Siwu luntan), Beijing. formed by a merger of *April Fifth News* and People's Forum; Liu Qing, Xu Wenli, Zhao Nan, Zhang Tieling.
April Fifth News, see above.
Autumn Fruit(Qiu shi), Beijing.
Beijing Spring(Beijing zhi chun), Beijing. Han Zhixiong, Wang Juntao, Li Zhousheng.
Bell(Zhongsheng), Wuhan.
China Human Rights(Zhongguo renquan), Beijing and Tianjin.
China's April Fifth(Zhonghua siwu), Beijing. mass society.
Democracy and Modernity(Minzhu yu shidai), Beijing.
Democracy Bricks(Minzhu zhuan), Anyang, Henan. Lu Jianguo.
Democracy Forum(Minzhu luntan), Beijing.
Democracy Weekly(Minzhu zhoukan), Beijing.
Enlightenment(Qimeng), Beijing and Guiyang. Huang Xiang, Li Jiahua, Mo Jianguang, Fang Jiahua, Yang Zaixing, Liang Fuxing, Huang Jie, Zheng Jilian.
Exploration(Tansuo), Beijing. Wei Jingshenq, Lu Lin, Yang Guang.
Fertile Ground(Wotu), Beijing. Li Jiawen.
Four Modernizations Forum(Si hua luntan), Beijing. Chui Quanhong.
Future(Weilai), Guangzhou. Wang Xizhe.
Grass on the Plain(Yuan shang cao), Beijing.
Ground Fire(Di huo), Kungming, Yunnan. Wu Zhongmeng.
Human Rights, see China Human Rights
Human Rights League(Renquan tongmeng), Beijing. Ren Wanding, Chen Lu, Wang Quanshan, Zhao Qin, Shun Yen.
Humanity(Ren), Beijing. Xu Wenli, Sun Weibang, Tang Gedan.
Hundred Flowers(Bai hua), Beijing.
In Search of Truth(Qiu shi bao), Beijing. Bao Huibing.
Lighi(Guangming), southern China.
Livelihood(Shenghuo), Guangzhou. Huang Yingshi.
Masses' Reference News(Qunzhong cankao xiaoxi), Beijing. Xia Xunjian.
Mission(Shimin), Guiyang.
New Current of Democracy(Xin minzhu langchao), Guangzhou.
New Democracy Promotion Association(Zhongguo xin minzhu cujin hui).
New Sprouts(Xin lei), Guangzhou.
People's Forum(Renmin luntan), see *April Fifth Forum*.
People's Road(Renmin zhi lu), Guangzhou. He Qiu after 9/79.
People's Songbook(Quanmin Gezu), a compilation of songs in several volumes.
People's Voice(Renmin zhi sheng), Shanghai. Fu Shengqi.
Red Bean(Hong dou), Guangzhou.
Republic News(Gonghe bao), Changsha, Hunan. Zhang Jingsheng.
Responsibility(Zheren), Guangzhou. Fu Shenqi, He Qiu.
Science, Democracy, Legality(Kexue mingzhu fazhi), Beijing. Gong Nianzhou.
Sea Spray(Hailanghua), Qingdao. Shun Feng(Sun Weibang).

Seeking Truth News(Qiu zhen bao), Beijing.
 Sichuan Democratic Alliance, Sichuan.
Sino-American People's Friendship(Zhong-Mei renmin yihao bao), Beijing.
Spark(Huohua), Beijing.
Spring Grass(Chun cao), Guangzhou.
Study Bulletin(Xuexi Tongxun), Guangzhou. Xu Wenli, Yang Jing, Wang Xizhe.
Thaw(Jiedong), Beijing and Guiyang. a spin-off of *Enlightenment*; Li Jiahua, Lu Mang,
 Wang Yinfeng.
Today(Jintian), Beijing. Liu Nianchun.
Voice of Democracy(Mingzhu zhi sheng), Shanghai. Fu Shenqi.
Voice of the People(Renmin zhi sheng), Guangzhou. He Qiu.
Wanderers(Liulangzhe), Changsha. Zhang Jingsheng.
 Wuhan April Fifth Study Group(Wuhan siwu xuehui), Wuhan.
Wind against the Waves(Fengfan), Taiyuan.

Note: This list is only a sample of numerous unofficial publications and organizations. By early 1981, at least eighty-nine such unofficial magazines and organizations were known to the outside world. See *Freedom Appeals*, no. 8(March-April 1981) :22-24; no. 10(May-June 1981):29-31. Cited from Ta-lin Lee, "Intellectuals and 'democratic Elements': A distrusted Underclass," in Yuan-li Wu, et al., Human Rights in the People's Republic of China. (1988), pp. 183, 192.

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China Spring(Zhongguo zhi Chun). New York.
Zhonggong Nianbao(The CCP Yearbook), 1979. Taipei. pp. 6:2-47.
 Liu Shengji. Beijing zhi Chun, 1978-1979. Taipei, 1984.
 Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard. "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movement, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals," *Asian Survey*, XXI:7, July 1981, pp. 747-774.
 My interview with Wu Zhongmeng from Yunnan, China. New York, 3/21/94.
 Robin Munro. "China's Democracy Movement: A Midwinter Spring," *Survey*, London, Summer 1984, pp. 70-98.

Appendix III.2 Hua-Deng power struggle: two selected name lists, Winter 1978/79

List 1: Power groups before the opening of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress on 12/18/78

<i>The Hua Group</i>	<i>The Ye Group</i>	<i>The Deng Group</i>
Hua Guofeng(1)	Ye Jianying(2)	Deng Xiaoping(3)
Wang Dongxing(5)	Li Xiannian(4)	
	Zhao Cangbi(7)?	Hu Yaobang(6)
Zhang Pinghua(8)		Hu Jiwei(9)
Wu De(10)		Lin Hujia(11)

Major positions held by:

- (1) Hua Guofeng: Chairman, CCCPC; member, Standing Committee(SC) of the Politburo; chairman, Central Military Commission(CMC) of the CCCPC; premier, State Council; president, Central Party School(CPS).
- (2) Ye Jianying: Vice-chairman, CCCPC; member, SC, Politburo; vice-chairman, CMC; chairman, SC of the Fifth National People's Congress(NPC).
- (3) Deng Xiaoping: Vice-chairman, CCCPC; member, SC, Politburo; vice-chairman, CMC; vice-premier, State Council; chief of the general staff, PLA.
- (4) Li Xiannian: Vice-chairman, CCCPC; member, SC, Politburo.
- (5) Wang Dongxing: Vice-chairman, CCCPC; member, SC, Politburo; director, General Office, CCCPC; first vice-president, CPS. Wang is in charge of propaganda and public security.
- (6) Hu Yaobang: Head of the Organization department, CCCPC; 2nd vice-president, CPS.
- (7) Zhao Cangbi: Minister of Public Security. group unclear.
- (8) Zhang Pinghua: Head of the Propaganda Department, CCCPC. Wang Dongxing's follower.
- (9) Hu Jiwei: Editor in chief, *People's Daily*.
- (10) Wu De: Director, Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee(RC); 1st secretary, Beijing Municipal Party Committee, member, Politburo; 2nd political commissar, Beijing Military Region; 1st political commissar, Beijing Garrison Command. Wu's leadership of Beijing has already been replaced by Lin Hujia on 10/10/78.
- (11) Lin Hujia: former director, Tianjin Municipal RC.

List 2: Power groups at the end of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress
on 12/24/78

<i>The Hua Group</i>	<i>The Ye Group</i>	<i>The Deng Group</i>
Hua Guofeng(1)	Ye Jianying(2) Li Xiannian(4)	Deng Xiaoping(3) Chen Yun(5)
Wang Dongxing(6)	Zhao Cangbi(8)?	Hu Yaobang(7) Hu Jiwei(9)
Zhang Pinghua(ousted)		Lin Hujia(10)
Wu De(ousted)		Peng Chong(11)

Changes to the status of:

- (1) Hua Guofeng: same but made self-criticism.
- (2)(3)(4) Ye, Li, Deng: no change.
- (5) Chen Yun: promoted to Vice-chairman, CCCPC; member, SC, Politburo; first secretary, Central Commission for Discipline Inspection(CCDI)
- (6) Wang Dongxing: made self-criticism and lost his power in party organization and security to Chen Yun. Wang also lost his leadership of the General Office, CCCPC to Yao Yilin, Deng's associate. Yao also assumed Vice-secretary general of the General Secretariat, CCCPC and the leadership of Ministry of Commerce.
- (7) Hu Yaobang: promoted to member, Politburo; secretary general, Secretariat of the CCCPC; third secretary, CCDI. Soon after the meeting Hu replaced Zhang Pinghua as the head of Propaganda Department, CCCPC. Meanwhile, Hu also assumed secretary general of the reestablished Central Secretariat, CCCPC. Song Renqiong, Deng's another associate, took over Hu's organization work.
- (8)(9) Zhao Cangbi, Hu Jiwei: no change.
- (10) Lin Hujia: Director, Beijing Municipal RC. Promoted from Tianjin.
- (11) Peng Chong: promoted from 3rd secretary to 1st secretary, Shanghai Municipal RC; and from 2nd vice-director to director, Shanghai Municipal Party Committee; member Politburo; also promoted to 2nd political commissar, Shanghai.

Appendix III.3

A Past Event About Democracy Wall

-- My firsthand understanding of the CCP highest authorities' requirement on party cadres' political standpoint

by Wang Ruoshui¹

The World Journal (Shihjie Ribao, New York), 2/27/94, p. A18.
translated, subtitled, annotated & reparagraphed by Hsiang-tao Hsu

1. My contacts with Democracy Wall

When Democracy Wall just appeared in 1978, the CCP leaders paid a good deal of attention to it. Chen Yun instructed the *People's Daily* to send journalists to collect the information about the movement and report the situation to the authorities. Thus, the journalists of the *People's Daily* made contacts with the Democracy Wall activists.

However, this kind of connection came under suspicion. In a "Conference on Theories" (*Lilun wuxu hui*)² summoned in early 1979, two editors from the *People's Daily* made a joint statement comprehensively analyzing the situation of Democracy Wall. They favored a tolerant attitude, but that was not accepted by the central authorities. At that time, what the party's intellectuals spoke in the "Conference on Theories" and what the non-party democratic activists posted on Democracy Wall were close to each other in many points. It seems that they were echoing each other.

This phenomenon aroused high-ranking officials' vigilance. It should not be something extraordinary to them if it was that a few young people put up big-character posters (*dazibao*). What they especially worried about was the integration of these two streams of strength. They worried that non-party democratic elements were gaining support from influential figures in the party.

Some high-ranking figures in the central authorities began criticize the *People's Daily*. Minister of the Public Security, Zhao Cangbi, said to a cadre of the *People's Daily* that, according to his knowledge, a few of people in the *People's Daily* now have connection with Democracy Wall. The day before the trial of Wei Jingsheng,³ Peng Zhen criticized the *People's Daily*, the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China (CYL) and the Foreign Language Publishers by name when he was mentioning the units supporting Democracy Wall in a conference.

Several days later, the *People's Daily* published Guo Luoji's article "Political Issues are Discussible," saying that people should not be arrested just because he or she expressed anti-

¹ The author was a visiting scholar at the Harvard University and is a member of the board of directors, Human Rights in China (HRIC), New York. Mr. Wang went back to China in June 1994.

² Literary means a conference that pays attention to the abstract aspect of a situation. The purpose of it is intended to make political-ideological preparation for a task such as how to tackle with Democracy Movement.

³ Wei Jingsheng was tried on October 16, 1979.

revolutionary opinion.⁴ The article had been written [a long time before Peng Zhen's criticism]. However, the publication of the article at this very moment gave people an impression that it was defending Wei Jingsheng. There was an outcry from some party members. The relationship between the *People's Daily* and Democracy Wall became an extremely sensitive issue.

In this period, Xu Wenli came to the *People's Daily* and contacts me once or twice. Two other people came with Xu Wenli to the *People's Daily* in the first time. I never imagined that one of Xu's companions was the eyes and ears(ermu: spy) of the Bureau of Public Security. There is a party regulation that the use of detective measures against party cadres are forbidden. Nevertheless, they did not care for the regulations when they confronted an issue like this. Soon after my talk to Xu Wenli, a report was presented on the table of the Minister of Public Security.

2. The report from the Ministry of Public Security

On December 13, 1979, Hu Yaobang (currently a member of Politburo, the third secretary of the Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline, secretary-general of the party Central Committee, head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee) ordered Hu Jiwei, editor in chief of the *People's Daily*, and me (currently deputy editor in chief of the *People's Daily*) to come to his house. Presented in the meantime were Zhu Muzhi, deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP, and Han Ying, secretary of the Central Committee of the CYL.

Hu Yaobang said to us: "On November 30, the leading Party group (*dangzhu*) of the Ministry of Public Security sent a report to the Standing Committee [of the CCP] asking me to pass on the report to the Central. The report mentioned something about Wang Ruoshui indicating that he gives support to the *April Fifth Forum* (*Siwu luntan*)." While saying that, Hu Yaobang passed along the report.

The report said that Xu Wenli, the person in charge of the *April Fifth Forum*, had come in and out of *People's Daily* not only once. On November 15, Xu Wenli [and his companions] came to the *People's Daily* to visit a journalist of the department of readers' letters (*duzhe laixin bu*). Xu asked him to transmit to the Central a letter demanding the release of Liu Qing.⁵ Wang Ruoshui received them and talked to them. Xu Wenli said after he left the *People's Daily*: it looks like Wang Ruoshui is not against unofficial magazines (*mingkan*: people's press). Xu also said that the Central Committee of the CYL supports them, too. On November 20, Xu Wenli visited Wang Ruoshui again. Wang told him: "Don't worry, the materials [you gave me] have been published on the internal reference [*neican/neibu cankao*: material for internal reference use]. Moreover, the *People's Daily* had added comments to the internal reference. However, some incidents reflected in the comments such as that Liu Qing was stripped of clothes for check-up were simply a

⁴ The article was published in November 1979. Guo Luoji was a professor of the Beijing University. He was exiled by Deng Xiaoping to the Nanjing University in 1982. Professor Guo is now a visiting scholar in the Columbia University and a member of the HRIC Board of Directors, New York.

⁵ Liu Qing, editor of the *April Fifth Forum*, was imprisoned since November 11, 1979 for more than ten years. He is now the Chair of HRIC Executive Committee, New York.

fabrication. (I checked it with Liu Qing recently. He said that it was true, but it was a regular check-up before being held in custody.)

In reacting to the report of the Ministry of Public Security, Deng Xiaoping wrote an instruction on it: "Should require Wang Ruoshui and others to submit a formal report on this matter."

Hu Yaobang also instructed in writing: "Suggest the Standing Committee [of the CCCPC] to assign a person to talk to the *People's Daily* and the related departments. Let's put the problem on the table and check whether there is a backer for the *April Fifth Forum* in the *People's Daily* and other units. Thereafter, we can decide in which way we should handle it. 12 o'clock in the night of November 30."

The last written instruction from Hua Guofeng is: "Suggest Comrades Yaobang, Muzhi and Han Ying to take charge of it."

The report of the Ministry of Public Security was signed by the secretary of the leading Party group [in the Ministry of Public Security] and presented to [Party] Chairman Hua Guofeng, vice-chairmen Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun. Hu Yaobang was not asked to transmit the report [to the Central] originally. His name was added to it later. Hu Yaobang said: "I should give my comment in this way because I wasn't on the name list at first. I am oversensitive."

I described the whole event: I went to the department of readers' letters for other matters at that time and met Xu Wenli accidentally.⁶ I read their letter and had a short conversation with them. They demanded the release of Liu Qing and suggested that the government administer Democracy Wall instead of letting things drift. (I understand that they attempted to legalize Democracy Wall by this method.) I agree to publish their letter in the internal reference of the *People's Daily*. I suggested that they delete a sentence insulting Peng Zhen in their letter. (It was understood by the Ministry of Public Security that I was offering advice to them.) I said to them: It is impossible to completely realize democracy in a morning. It needs a process. Still, some resistance has to be conquered. It is impossible to alter outmoded customs in a stroke. We can only do it step by step. In any case, it is more democratic now than in the past. I also said: The matter of the Chinese should be managed by the Chinese ourselves, why do you call on so many foreigners? (It was my thinking that many foreign journalists were calling on Xu Wenli at that time.) Xu Wenli argued that he was approached by the foreigners.

I said to Hu Yaobang: I read some public opinions on Democracy Wall. Among them the opinion of the *April Fifth Forum* is the most moderate. They don't agree to swear at Deng Xiaoping. They also criticized the *Exploration(Tansuo)*.

It should be said that this organization is acceptable.

After that, Hu Yaobang said something. Others said something, too.

⁶ In a telephone conversation with Liu Qing at 4:30pm, February 28, 1994, Liu Qing said that, as Wang Ruoshui told him recently, Wang Ruoshui was instructed by the head of the department of ideology of the *People's Daily* to contact Xu Wenli.

3. Hu Yaobang on the dissidents

Hu Yaobang said: "I do not clearly understand what kind of person Xu Wenli is. The Ministry of Public Security thinks that he is not doing well politically. As I've said before, they intend to compete with the Party. Once upon a time, I talked to Lin Xiling.⁷ I told her, you are imbued with individualism and you will make a big mistake in the future. Later on, I was called on to investigate her case. They said that Lin Xiling missed me in jail regretting that she did not listen to comrade Hu Yaobang's opinion at the very beginning. Later, I told the special group for the investigation of her case that they gave to her a heavy conviction. Still, Lin Xiling sent me a letter last year. It is no use to speak softly to this kind of person. You have to put it strongly."

Han Ying said: "Xu Wenli is a railroad electrician and a martyr's son, twenty years or so, a little young man."

Hu Yaobang made a few remarks on the issue of youth work. In referring to Li-Yi-Zhe in Guangdong, Hu Yaobang said: "Never debate with him. You can not win. Don't put labels on him. Nevertheless, the poster he wrote is not a Marxist one. It is a small producer's socialism. I have discussed [this question] with a few young people for four hours. They were convinced [by me]"

He then described his discussion with Lu Pu (musician Lu Ji's son) and Wang Juntao.⁸ The main point is: You [young people] are not good at politics. You can only engage in politics under the leadership of the older generation. Otherwise, you are definitely hopeless in the future. The school youth should study hard. They should not jump from school to the society. They should prepare to make contributions to the country in the future. A youth in the government should make a good job of his vocational work and love his professional work. Why do you have to publish political essays? After two hours of discussion, [Hu] asked Lu Pu, how he felt? Lu said: firstly, you are very frank and open; secondly, you are amicable and easy of approach; thirdly, I reserve my own viewpoints.

Hu Yaobang said to us: "I used every way to find two hours for [a discussion with] them. How difficult it is! In our first discussion, he said that it is good for him and he wants to consider about it. A week later he came over again and said, Uncle Hu, I haven't straightened out my thinking yet... Of course, some youth simply cannot be educated no matter in what era. It is impossible to expect everyone to become a useful person. The history is merciless and pitiless. It is useless even though I have spent so much energy [on them]. Let them run into snags and be foiled. Certainly, they cannot be tortured during the education through labor[laojiao]. Some people in the People's Daily might have shown favoritism or even undeserved kindness to them."

⁷ Lin Xiling, a woman college student in 1956, attacked the "new class" system from a Marxist perspective and argued that China could not achieve a genuine socialist society until China became genuine democratic. She was jailed until after the death of Mao in 1976.

⁸ Wang Juntao: a student leader in the 1976 Tiananmen Incident; member of the Central Committee of the CYL; arrested and imprisoned after the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre.

4. Hu Yaobang on Xu Wenli

Hu then referred to Xu Wenli again: "According to my intuition, this person will become very dangerous in the end. Surely, that is his own problem and is not tantamount to Ruoshui's problem. Ruoshui is an old party member, an old comrade, and has been purged by the gang of four. He is reliable. However, I want to remind you: be careful and do not be fooled. I agree to conduct education in the first place. Secondly, [we] must on no account be fooled. Why did they catch you instead of others? You must keep a distance from them ideologically and politically. Won't Ruoshui make a formal report? It does not need to be long. Perhaps you have to discuss some lessons [you've learned]. You can also discuss your viewpoint on the *April Fifth Forum*. The Central only wants to understand a bit. Don't encumber your mind with it."

Hu Yaobang continued: "In the last one year, there were criticisms of the *People's Daily* from provinces and cities. I think some of the criticisms are based on an exceedingly high level of principle. However, some aspects including editorials need our attention. Of course, I have mistakes too. There were shortcomings in my talk. It is difficult to be completely faultless. We should take care of it as best as we can. Still, the *People's Daily* made an important achievement, so did Comrade Ruoshui. Of course, [we] have to draw lessons too."

5. Han Ying's discussion with Wang Juntao and Han Zhixiong

Han Ying said, Xu Wenli did call on the Central Committee of the CYL for Liu Qing's affair. He said, Party committees in schools have a lot of difficulties in doing [ideological] work on them [i.e. dissidents]⁹ because they [Party cadres] are less knowledgeable than them [dissidents]. He said that he had talked to Wang Juntao and Han Zhixiong.¹⁰ "What is in their mind is totally different from what in ours. They think China is not a socialist country including the period of [first] seventeen years [1949-1965]. Otherwise, why [are we] not as good as Japan? You see, what his point is? Yet, he is full of confidence. They also said, our generation and your generation of the forties don't have same language." Han Ying also called on Wang Juntao's father, but the father couldn't persuade his son.

Hu Yaobang asked: "In that way, how come he was elected into the Central Committee of the CYL?"

Han Ying said: "He is a hero of the April Fifth [of the 1976 Tiananmen Events]. It won't do if he was not elected."

6. Zhu Muzhi's viewpoints

Zhu Muzhi held the most clear-cut viewpoint. His talk had an implication of aiming at me. He said: "I am against spontaneous organizations. These people are disappointed with the Party

⁹ "To do ideological work on somebody" means to carry on political indoctrination, to explain and motivate the masses to carry out the policy line or undertake a project.

¹⁰ Han Zhixiong: a student leader in the 1976 Tiananmen Incident; editor of the *Beijing Spring*.

and the country. They think your formula won't do and want to search a different road. Certainly we have to do work on spontaneous organizations. It is not good to give up our leadership, but what position do we have to take in doing work on them? Do we have to encourage them or to correct their mistakes? Why do they react in that way? Exactly because they feel that they enjoy support. I don't agree that this organization (referring to the *April Fifth Forum*) is acceptable. We can not divide spontaneous organizations and publications into two [i.e., acceptable and not acceptable]. Precisely, we must oppose them. I also disagree with the wording of 'a generation of thinking' that sounds like we haven't found the road yet, and still need to 'explore' like Wei Jingsheng is doing."

Hu Jiwei didn't speak out.

7. Deng Xiaoping's severe criticism of the Party cadres

Back in my office, I wrote a report about my discussion with Xu Wenli. The journalist in the department of readers' letters also reported to the higher authorities the situation about his instructed connection with the Xidan Democracy Wall. It seemed all right because Deng Xiaoping didn't say anything.

After that, Democracy Wall was banned.¹¹

A month after our conversation, Deng Xiaoping spoke in a cadres' conference summoned by the Central on January 16, 1980. After criticizing Democracy Wall, Deng Xiaoping gave a long passage of speech severely aiming at some people:

The Communist Party members, the Party cadres, especially the high-ranking cadres, must be clear-cut and stand firmly in this struggle of anti-criminal elements of various kinds... Absolutely, no one is allowed to have connection with these people behind the Party's back. What I mean is that kind of connection sympathizing with them. Of course, it does not include the connections which occurred when some comrades were doing work on them. The kind of connection sympathizing with them certainly existed... Some people who support their activities are not only Communist Party members but also cadres of not a low status. We have to tell these Party members clearly that their stand is very wrong, very dangerous. If they don't correct it immediately and thoroughly, disciplinary action within the Party must be taken against them...¹²

This passage reminded me of the report in which I did admit that I was sympathetic to Xu Wenli. The word "sympathy" exactly provided evidence to confirm Deng Xiaoping and others' anxiety.

¹¹ Democracy Wall was closed on December 8, 1979.

¹² See also Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 1975-1982. (Selections of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982). (Beijing, 1983), p. 218.

8. Conclusion

Just because of this minor event, I became a suspected high-ranking cadre. The related department investigated me a lot. However, they never called on me in person. The only thing which occurred is that when something happened, some people then cast suspicion on me: "His relations with underground organizations..."

Deng Xiaoping said that "it does not include the connection occurred when some comrades were doing work on them." This sentence has protected Hu Yaobang. But, it is observable that Deng Xiaoping was not interested in this kind of method. Judging from Hu Yaobang's conversation, it is true that Hu Yaobang did not say a word in sympathy with [the dissidents]. He also lacked understanding of Xu Wenli and others. However, he did not favor suppression in the first place. Instead, he favored dialogue, persuasion and guidance in the first. Nevertheless, those young people might have thought that this is because [Hu Yaobang] thought that he himself was completely correct, and his only purpose was to persuade them instead of listening to their opinion. On the other hand, those conservatives might have thought that Hu Yaobang not only connived at (to be indulgent toward) Democracy Wall elements but also the Party cadres like me. There was an Enlightenment Society in Guizhou province at that time. Hu Yaobang favored the use of educational method to solve the problem with this organization and he believed that this method would be a successful one. But, Hu Yaobang's method was neither agreed to by the Ministry of Public Security nor supported by Deng Xiaoping.

Seven years later, Hu Yaobang was ousted from his office by a charge of conniving "bourgeois liberalization." Thereafter, a group of figures who were considered the typical representatives of "bourgeois liberalization" were cleared out of the Party. I was cleared out as well.¹³

(Note: I gave my great thanks to Mr. Wang Ruoshui for writing this article on 6/11/94, the eve he left the U.S. for China. I met Mr. Wang occasionally in New York on 1/29/94. I gave him a summary of my proposal and asked him some questions about China's democracy movement. This article is a kind of response to my questions.)

¹³ Wang Ruoshui, Hu Jiwei and other editors of the *People's Daily* were forced out of their jobs in an intensification of an antiliberal campaign in November 1983.

CHAPTER IV

CASE 2: THE STUDENT MOVEMENT OF 1986-87

1. The Student Movement, 1986-87. A Short History

1.1 Background to the Student Movement

After the crackdown of the Democracy Wall Movement, the CCP launched three campaigns to tighten political control and reassert intellectual orthodoxy. The first, in 1980-81 was the Party conducted campaign against "bourgeois liberalism" in literature and art. The "scar literature" which had depicted the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution and revealed the darker side of socialism was the primary target of this movement. The second campaign was the movement against "spiritual pollution" in 1983-84. This campaign was originally directed against those Marxist theorists who had rediscovered the early Marxist theories of humanism and alienation, and who had sought to apply them to socialist society. Over time, however, the movement also extended to ordinary people's life styles such as attending disco dances, growing long hair, or wearing fashionable clothes. The third campaign in 1985-86 attacked such

"unhealthy tendencies" as vulgarity in the arts, corruption in the economy, and extravagance and waste in public life.

These campaigns were launched by the conservative Party leaders such as Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu, Wang Zhen, and Chen Yun. The conservatives at each level of government and party used every measure to tighten political and ideological control of the society. This was harmful to the economic reform because it had damaged people's enthusiasm for reforming the economic system. For example, in 1985-86, many reformist enterprise leaders or managers had lost or quit their jobs due to various unfounded accusations.

Recognizing the problem of too much intervention in government administration by the Party, Deng Xiaoping began to talk about the extension of economic reform to politics, education, and science in early 1986. In a talk at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, he said:

The last time I talked with some comrades about economic work, I called their attention to the necessity of reforming the political structure, including the need to separate the functions of the Party and the government and to delegate powers to lower levels.

I suggest that our leading comrades of the Central Committee, especially those in the Secretariat, consider this question. They might first spend a year or so making investigations, identifying the problems and drawing up a workable plan before taking any action. The reform of the political structure and the reform of the economic structure are interdependent and should be coordinated. Without political reform, economic reform cannot succeed, because the first obstacle to be overcome is people's resistance. It is human beings who will--or will not--carry out the

reform. For instance, we encourage devolution of powers, but other people take powers back. What can we do about it? So in the final analysis, the success of all our other reforms depends on the success of the political reform.¹

In carrying out Deng's concepts of political reform, Hu Yaobang and his followers extended political reform even further to the sphere of ideology, art, and literature. 1986 was the thirtieth anniversary of the Hundred Flowers Policy of Mao's directive to "let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend." Encouraged by the liberal leaders, the democratic elite used this opportunity to provoke debate and controversy over orthodox party ideology and demanded institutional change. In the Spring of 1986, China's intellectuals suddenly came to life politically. As Orville Schell vividly described:

It was as if a main switch had been thrown, sending a current along unused lines to a whole network of long-darkened lights. Universities, departments of the government, and publications seemed to flash on, suddenly sponsoring seminars and meetings to discuss political reform. Literary and political *shalong*, or salons, became the rage. Writers and intellectuals long silent on such subjects spoke out, while newly founded independent student organizations blossomed on campuses and invited speakers of every kind to address enthusiastic gatherings. But what started as an echo of the views of liberal technocrats in the Party leadership soon acquired a vibrant life of its own; until, for the first time in twenty years, China enjoyed a real political debate

¹ "Help the People Understand the Importance of the Rule of Law (June 28, 1986)," Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, III, p. 167. Hereafter Deng xuan, III.

focusing on the place of democracy in Chinese society.²

By the end of 1986, the atmosphere of liberalization had filled the air in China. In this atmosphere, the university students started to agitate again.

Already in September 1985, students in several major cities, including Beijing and Shanghai, the symbolic centers of past student movements, attempted demonstrations. In commemorating the Japanese invasion of China in the World War Two and in opposition to Japan's economic encroachment in recent years, the students took to the streets and put up big-character posters. For example, on the evening of October 1, 1985, an estimated 50,000 students from ten different universities and colleges held a demonstration in Xian. While shouting anti-Japanese slogans, the students also demanded freedom and democracy and indirectly attacked the state leaders. The CCP immediately took steps to seal off campus disturbances. Some student and worker activists were arrested.³

Earlier than these student unrests, through 1984 and 1985, soccer games produced a series of outbursts, most notably in Beijing when the Chinese national team lost to

² Orville Schell, Discos and Democracy. China in the Throes of Reform. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 28-29.

³ *Inside China Mainland*, January 1986, p. 4.

tiny Hong Kong and was thereby bumped out of the Asian Cup tournament. The fans spilled out onto the streets and rocked buses and surrounded foreigners' cars. In fact, student unrest has never been stopped since 1984.

As Woodruff and Schell observed, the Chinese youth in the 1980s were a generation with rising expectations. Stimulated by the liberal political atmosphere, many young adults extended their expectations beyond the economy and well into politics. Having lost their belief in the Party, confidence in socialism, and trust of cadres, the educated youth fantasized about the West as the promised land and idealized the political concepts and systems that had brought it such evident wealth and power.⁴ In Schell's words:

In any case, if Chinese students were unsure of what they did believe, most were ever more certain of what they did not believe. They no longer believed naively in socialism, and a decreasing number had become unwilling to blindly follow the Communist Party.⁵

Domestic factors aside, demonstrations of "people's power" in China's neighboring countries--the Philippines and South Korea--also marginally helped stimulate the student movement of 1986. Marcos was dislodged as Philippine president in February 1986 from his 20-year tenure. In

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 212. John Woodruff, China in Search of Its Future. Reform vs. Repression, 1982-1989. (New York: Carol Publishing Company, 1990), p. 158.

⁵ Schell, *op, cit.*, p. 212.

South Korea, a violent student and dissident movement made 1986 the most tumultuous year.

Against this background, the Chinese student movement burst out in December 1986.

1.2 The Wave of Student Protests, December 5, 1986-- January 5, 1987

Starting from December 5, 1986, a wave of student protests swept across China in a month. The protests were initiated by the students of the University of Science and Technology (UST or Keda) in Hefei, Anhui Province, who demanded that they be allowed to choose candidates for the provincial People's Congress (China's legislative branch of government).⁶

On December 9, in the name of commemorating the December Ninth Movement of 1935,⁷ three thousand UST's students marched on the offices of the government and

⁶ In the P.R.C., usually, the candidates for the elections had all been designated or approved by the Party. University campuses are independent election zone and can elect their own people's representatives to the local People's Congress.

⁷ December 9, 1935 is an sacred date for Chinese students. On that day, and in the weeks that followed, students at Yenjing University in Beijing and elsewhere in the northeast China took to the streets to protest Japanese aggression. Their protests, which brought no concrete result but helped to weaken Chiang Kai-shek's Government, marked a resurgence of Chinese nationalism. Embellished in party histories by Mao's contemporaries, many of whom helped organize the protests and later moved north to join the Communist armies, the uprising became known as the December 9 Movement. Robert O. Boorstin, "Chinese Protests: Tracing the Roots," *New York Times (NYT)*, 12/22/86, A14.

demanded that outside candidates be allowed to run for office. The news of UST's demonstrations traveled fast and caused intellectuals all over the country to take notice. Encouraged by local officials' agreement to postpone the elections and to allow the submission of the names of non-Party candidates, the wave of protests quickly spread to central and coastal cities. On the same day of December 9, students in Wuhan protested in front of city government against the Party-monopolized election. On December 12, Beijing University students put up posters in support of UST's students.

The protest movement reached its high tide on December 21 when 50,000 students marched on the streets of Shanghai shouting demands for democracy and press freedom. This was the largest spontaneous demonstration since the Tiananmen incident in 1976. During the days between December 17 and 24, thousands of students from institutions of higher learning in Shanghai Municipality put up posters, held speeches, packed the streets, and demonstrated outside city government offices. According to available materials, more than twenty campuses of higher education were engulfed in Shanghai's protest movement. In order to give the readers an idea of the magnitude of the demonstrations in Shanghai, Table IV.1 lists the names of schools known to outsiders.

Table IV.1 A Name List of Schools Involved in Shanghai's Student Movement, December 1986

Shanghai Jiaotong University (*Jiaoda*, lead campus)
 Tongji University
 Fudan University
 Shanghai Teacher's University
 Shanghai University
 Shanghai Medical University
 Shanghai University of Finance and Economy
 Shanghai University of Science and Technology
 Shanghai Marine Products University
 Chinese Textiles University
 Huadong Teacher's University
 Shanghai Institute of Drama
 Shanghai Institute of Arts
 Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade
 Shanghai Institute of Foreign Languages
 Shanghai Institute of Chemical Industry
 Shanghai Shipping Institute
 Shanghai Institute of Mechanical Engineering
 Shanghai Institute of Traditional Chinese Medicine
 Shanghai Institute of Railway Transport
 Huadong Institute of Textile Industry

Sources:

Liu Lu, "Shanghai Xuesheng Da Shiwei Neiqing Zuiji. 12/18/1986--1/14/1987 Riji Zhaichao (A Memoir of the Inside Story of Shanghai Students' Great Demonstrations. An Abstract of the Diary between 12/18/1986--1/14/1987)," *Zhongguo zhi chun*, No. 64, September 1988, pp. 6-14. Abbr. as Liu Lu, "Shanghai Students' Great Demonstrations."
 NYT, 12/21/86, pp. A1, A14, A19.

The movement reached another high tide in Nanjing where students had demonstrated since December 22. The movement reached a climax on December 24 when 5,000 students and workers demonstrated in the university precinct. The students from Nanjing University, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing Institute of Engineering, and other schools held open-air debates and discussion on freedom, economics and

the future of China for six straight nights from December 23 to 28.

During the three days of December 23-25 in Tianjin, thousands of students demonstrated outside the municipal government building and conflicted with the police. Several policemen and students were injured. The main force of the protests was the students of Nankai University--a prestigious institution in China.

In Beijing, posters calling for democracy and freedom had already appeared on December 12 on many campuses. Students of Qinghua University and Teacher's University also marched on the streets in support of the student protests in Shanghai, Nanjing, Kunming, Xian, and other cities. Tightly controlled by the Communist regime, the students of the Beijing University(*Beida*)--historically the pacesetters of Chinese student movements--finally defied the newly announced rules for demonstration and marched to Tiananmen Square on the first day of 1987. Dozens of students were arrested during the daytime but were released at midnight under pressure from more than 8,000 students.

Until January 6, 1987 when the protest movement quieted down, this wave of protest had totally engulfed more than a hundred fifty university campuses in twenty eight

cities across China.⁸ Based on available information, Appendix IV.1 and Map IV.1 show the dates and cities engulfed in the student movement.

1.3 The Regime's Reaction: From Conciliation to Suppression

I can not describe each local government's reaction to the student movement because it is beyond the limited space of this research. Besides, we know very little about the situation in many cities except those accessible to outsiders. Due to the more abundant information about the movement in Shanghai and Beijing, my description and discussion of the interactions between students and the governing coalition are mainly based on the development in these two cities.

The Party was caught off guard and quite literally had no idea how to respond to this unprecedented situation. Reasons for authorities' indecision are many. Firstly, the school administrators and party officials were not experienced in handling a spontaneous student movement. In the past, all the movements were manipulated by the Party and the authorities had never been challenged by such a large scale of student protests. Secondly, it was impossible for the local officials to satisfy students' demands for

⁸ According to He Dongchang, director of the State Education Commission, the demonstrations had spread to twenty eight cities in eighteen provinces. *Zhongyang ribao* (Central Daily), (Taipei, overseas edition), p. 6.

democracy and freedom. The local government officials just did not have a say on the big issue of political structure which had to be decided by the top leaders in Beijing. Moreover, the students' watchwords like "democracy" and "freedom" were absent of concrete content as some China watchers and scholars observed.⁹

Besides, the students--the key link to the realization of the four modernizations and the favorites of the nation--were a group of people too sensitive to be harshly treated. As Chinese students always say: "Those who suppress students will certainly come to no good end." Most important, the Central was seemingly inclined to take a conciliatory attitude toward the student demonstrations at the early stage. According to the *New York Times*, on December 20, an unidentified "leading official of the State Education Commission" had recognized the students' constitutional right to hold demonstrations. In an interview by the official New China News Agency (*NCNA* or *Xinhua she*), the official is quoted as saying:

According to the resolution of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Twelfth Party Central Committee, one of the important planks of the restructuring of the political system is to expand socialist democracy. It is understandable that college students should be concerned about the

⁹ John Woodruff, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-5, 162-3.

restructuring of the political system and hope to express their view on this issue.¹⁰

Similarly, another official with the Foreign Affairs Office of the Shanghai city government was repeatedly quoted as saying the demonstrations were completely legal.¹¹

Indeed, there was a split in the Party's leadership. According to Merle Goldman,

When the demonstrations first began in early December, Deng urged Hu at a meeting of the Military Affairs Commission to stop them from escalating, but Hu, in a rare act of defiance, did not crack down on the demonstrators. Following his lead, his propaganda director, Zhu Houze, restrained the propaganda apparatus and his public security head, Ruan Chongwu, restrained the public security forces.¹²

Therefore, when Shanghai City Mayor Jiang Zemin went to Tongji University to meet the students, he apparently was pursuing the party's policy of dealing with demonstrations by conciliation and persuasion.

¹⁰ *NYT*, 12/21/86, p. 1. Orville Schell, Disco and Democracy. China in the Throes of Reform, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 227-8.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹² Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China. Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 204. Merle Goldman does not base her account on any verifiable source. But, as Yang Zhongmei has pointed out, a split over the issue of how to handle the student movement did occur among the coalition of the reformist leaders--Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang. However, no detail about the split is available. Yang also mentioned the meeting of the MAC in December 1986. Strangely, no further information is provided. Yang Zhongmei, tr. by William A. Wycoff, Hu Yaobang, A Chinese Biography, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988), pp. 155-7.

The local authorities' reaction to the student movement was also influenced by factors such as the timing, the level of demands, the degree and scale of protests, the location of the city, and the attitude of the local leaders. For example, Shenzhen University had canceled a tuition hike in response to student demands and the student unrest had quickly ebbed in two days from December 14 to 15. In Hefei, the local authorities had allowed the students to nominate their own candidates and postponed the election to the end of December 1986. Consequently, Fang Lizhi and another student were elected to the Anhui Provincial People's Congress. However, in three days from December 23 through 25, a serious conflict happened in Tianjin that injured students and policemen because Mayor Li Ruihuan refused to compromise with the students. Li Ruihuan's firm stand in suppressing the students was praised by Deng Xiaoping.¹³ Evidently, Li Ruihuan had acted at the right time when Deng Xiaoping and other standpatters were getting impatient at Hu Yaobang's conciliatory approach.

December 20 was a watershed from which the regime abruptly changed its attitude toward the student demonstrations. On the same day (December 20) when the high-ranking education official still recognized student

¹³ "Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Bourgeois Liberalization (December 30, 1986)," Deng xuan, III, p. 197.

demonstrations, the *NCNA*, in late evening, issued an article that quoted a Shanghai city government spokesman as denouncing the student demonstrators for a long list of illegal acts. The *NCNA* account said a small number of

lawless elements had... blocked [traffic] and pounded on cars, damaged shops, flung bundles of burning straw, beat pedestrians, insulted women, stepped on grass and flowers, and damaged transport equipment.¹⁴

The account also accused students of beating up thirty-one policemen, breaking into the city council offices, and "releasing leaflets," which is prohibited in the P.R.C. In general, demonstrators were accused for trying to disrupt "stability and unity" and "derange production and social order."¹⁵ In the terms usually applied by the Chinese Communist Party, these allegations would have been more than enough to justify the use of force to put down the demonstrations.

The police used force to break up the sit-in in Shanghai's People's Square at about 6:30 a.m. on December 20. This was the first time that authorities had acted directly to clamp down on protests since they began in Hefei and other cities. In Beijing, the police also forcibly broke up student gatherings in Tiananmen Square on the New Year's Day of 1987.

¹⁴ *FEER*, 1/8/87, p. 8.

¹⁵ *NYT*, 12/21/86, p. 19. John Woodruff, *op cit.*, p. 162.

The CCP's attitude toward the student movement was officially expressed in the *People's Daily* on December 23, 1986. In a front-page editorial titled "Cherish and Develop the Stability and Unity of Our Political Situation," it warned that

drastic measures by those with different ideas could influence stability and unity, obstruct the freedom of other people's work, study and life, and interfere with the smooth progress of construction and reform. Even though their intentions were good, the result could be contrary to their wishes, or even taken advantage of by a few with ulterior motivations and those who crave nothing short of chaos.

The commentary was a relatively soft appeal to students not to endanger the progress towards reform, though there was no mention of the demonstrations themselves.

On December 25, the *People's Daily* published a commentary entitled "Political Reforms Can Only be Introduced Under the Leadership of the Party." Again, there was no mention of the demonstrations. As the most direct answer to the students' demands for more democracy, the commentary sternly warned in its conclusion:

If anyone miscalculated the situation and tried to stir up people to break away from Party leadership and deviate from the orientation of socialism, obstruct the progress of the reform and disturb production and construction, he would never succeed, but would eventually eat bitter fruit.

In another commentary titled "Democracy Cannot be Achieved Without Adherence to the Four Cardinal Principles," the *People's Daily* warned in a harsher tone than ever:

Anyone who treats the party and people's government as if it were a reactionary government is placing himself against the people.¹⁶

These three articles and an editorial issued by the *Beijing Daily* titled "The Big Character Wallposters are Not Protected by Law" were praised by Deng Xiaoping in a talk to Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, and Hu Qili on December 30.¹⁷

Parallel with the Central's changing attitude toward the demonstrations were the old guards' condemnations against the demonstrators, more restrictive regulations on demonstrations, and various soft and hard measures used by the local officials to deal with the students and workers which will be discussed in next section. But, the most important incident proceeding at this time in the party was the standpatters' reaction toward Hu Yaobang and his intellectual network.

¹⁶ *People's Daily*, 12/29/86, p. 1.

¹⁷ Deng xuan, III, p. 197. The *Beijing Daily* even laid the blame on Taiwan's agents.

1.4 Aftermath of the Student Movement

(1) Purge of Hu Yaobang and His Intellectual Network

Exasperated by student demonstrations and instigated by the standpatters' criticism of Hu Yaobang, on December 30, 1986, Deng Xiaoping blamed Hu for his lack of resolution in dealing with the demonstrations. On January 2, 1987, Hu offered his resignation as general secretary to Deng Xiaoping. January 4, Sunday, in Deng Xiaoping's house, Zhao Ziyang, Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, and Yang Shangkun, general secretary of the Central Military Commission (CMC), decided to remove Hu Yaobang.¹⁸ Supported by the military on January 16, 1987, an enlarged meeting of the Politburo announced Hu Yaobang's resignation from the position of secretary-general of the CCCPC but retained Hu's membership on the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The coup-like meeting also made Zhao Ziyang acting secretary-general.¹⁹ In the following months Hu Yaobang's protégés were discharged and reassigned to non-strategic positions. Many democratic elite were either expelled from the Party or purged in various ways.

¹⁸ Ruan Ming, *op. cit.*, p. 70. "Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Bourgeois Liberalization (December 30, 1986)," Deng xuan, III, pp. 194-7.

¹⁹ Yang Zhongmei asserts that Hu Yaobang was ousted in a situation similar to coup d'état. A detailed description of Hu's fall see Yang Zhongmei, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-9.

The standpatters also compiled a booklet of excerpts of articles and speeches by Hu Yaobang's network as well as the slogans used by students in the 1986 demonstrations. In making the compilation, they sought to prove that those connected with Hu Yaobang were responsible for the student protests.²⁰ Nevertheless, the campaign against the democratic elite met active as well as passive resistance. Contradictory to the standpatters' anticipation, "[T]he more one was criticized, the more prominent one became; the more one's works and ideas were singled out and quoted for criticism, the more they became known and were found appealing." as Merle Goldman indicated.²¹

Apart from the effort of punishing liberal intellectuals, the standpatters closed down at least eight papers and journals, and criticized many others. Generally speaking, the political climate had undergone a chilling change.

(2) The Party's Reprisal to the Student Demonstrators

Already in 1985 after the September Student Unrests, the Party had developed a strategy for dealing with student upheaval. Again, the strategy was perfected after the student movement of 1986-87. The first thing to do was to

²⁰ *Zhongguo zhi chun*, No. 54 Supplement to November 1987. Translation of this issue see *China Spring Digest*, I;6, November/December 1987.

²¹ Merle Goldman, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

identify deviant students and distinguish them from ordinary students. In a speech to the 1987 education conference, Li Peng, vice-premier and director of the State Education Commission (SEC), demanded thorough investigations of the situation in every school where demonstrations had taken place, as well as of every student who had been involved. He added that "only those who have both stability and political integrity are to be regarded as qualified students fit for taking part in socialist construction." At the same time, ideological and political education in schools should be strengthened.²²

In order to correct students' deviant behavior and prevent future unrests, various and penetrating means had been used to control students' ideology and life. But, the toughest action was directed at the student demonstrators. The most visible action was to expel those pro-democracy students from the universities. According to Wang Ruowang, thirty three excellent students were expelled by the Zhejiang University. Shanghai Jiaotong University expelled one hundred twenty seven students, among them forty five were students of graduating classes. Moreover, the reasons for expelling these students were malevolently declared as

²² *China Quarterly*, No. 110, June 1987, p. 336.

degenerate.²³ Therefore, even though not a single student had been arrested for taking part in demonstrations or writing big-character poster as He Dongchang, deputy director of the SEC, reaffirmed on December 30, 1986,²⁴ those dissident students were actually cleared out in a sinister manner before the summer of 1987.

(3) Reaction of Chinese Students Abroad

As a result of the open-door policy, a surge of Chinese students went abroad to study. By 1987, from 20,000 to 2,5000 students were estimated to be in the United States alone. Firstly agitated by the student movement of December 1986, and later angered and worried by the possible return to Maoist policies toward intellectuals, large numbers of Chinese students studying abroad were anxious to express their concerns both about the fate of Hu Yaobang, Fang Lizhi, and many other democratic elite and about the future of reforms in China. On January 20, more than a thousand Chinese students studying in the United States took the unprecedented step of endorsing an open letter to the CCP leaders expressing concern over recent events. The letter said:

A deep sense of mission for the future of our motherland has prompted us to write this letter openly to express our views to the Party's Central

²³ *Zhongyang Ribao* (Central Daily), Taipei, overseas edition, 7/25/87, p. 6. Quoted from *Baixing* (Ordinary People), Hong Kong.

²⁴ *China Quarterly*, No. 109, March 1987, p. 156.

Committee and the State Council. We feel that the ultra-leftist practice of labeling people arbitrarily and finding fault with others has redominated the area of communications. We are concerned about the prospect of economic and political reforms in China. We fear the recurrence of the political situation of the Cultural Revolution, in which 'ruthless struggle' and 'merciless criticism' were rampant.

Praising Hu Yaobang's contributions to China, the letter continued:

We are shocked and deeply upset by his departure, which will gravely harm the people's confidence in reform and the Four Modernizations... We sincerely hope that the Party and the government will persist in reforms, opposes retrogression, persevere in the principle of the rule of law, and avoid punishing people for voicing their opinions.²⁵

Another unprecedented and surprising action was the fact that of 1,000 students from more than fifty-one United States colleges and universities who endorsed the letter, 480 of them signed their real names. Moreover, international pressure was mobilized in support of the three targeted intellectuals--Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan, and Wang Ruowang. Because of their fame in the outside world, one hundred sixty Western scholars, some of them Nobel laureates, sent statements to the Politburo calling for a cessation of the attacks on the three. Twenty one China specialist at the University of Michigan signed a statement expressing concern about the campaign in China. The international pressure surprised Deng and the standpatters, and

²⁵ Orville Schell, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300.

therefore, gave the reformist leaders the leverage to stop the possible reversal of economic reforms. As Merle Goldman suggested, perhaps the Deng regime was concerned with not antagonizing either the international community or China's intellectual community, and perhaps the standpatters' own experience of persecution in the Cultural Revolution may have restrained them from pushing too far, and for fear of sparking another upheaval, Fang, Liu, and Wang did not become non-persons in the renewed campaigns against liberalization and Westernization.²⁶

²⁶ Merle Goldman, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-8.

2. Interactions between the Regime and the Student Movement

2.1 Shanghai and Beijing: Two Major Cases

This study will chose Shanghai and Beijing as two major cases for the analysis of interaction. Reasons are clear. Demonstrations in Shanghai were the largest in China and had attracted great attention of the CCP and the world. Shanghai has several noteworthy features: it is China's largest city with a population of 7 million in 1986; it occupies a vital position in communications and transportation in China; it is one of China's most important centers for culture, higher learning, industry, finance and international trade, therefore, it has very active contacts and interactions with the foreign actors. Shanghai has been a locus of radical political activity for much of this century. The Chinese Communist Party was founded there in 1921. In 1966, Mao Zedong used radical Shanghai intellectuals and students to trigger the Cultural Revolution.

Although the demonstrations in Beijing were not as mammoth as in Shanghai, the *Beida* and *Qinghua* students' defiance of the regulations of banning protests had directly challenged the ultimate authority of the CCP in such a sensitive place. Beijing is a sensitive place for the following features: it is the location of national capital and a symbol of political power; it is also a center of

culture, higher learning, industry and trade. After China's adoption of the open-door policy Beijing became a center of international politics and therefore it closely interacts with foreign actors like diplomats, journalists, tourists, businessmen, and students. China's first socialism study group was founded in Beijing by Li Dazhao. Members of the group included Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong. Beijing has been the place of origin of many political movements in this century: the May Fourth Movement of 1919 in which "democracy" and "science" were the catchwords; the December 9 Movement of 1935 that was protesting the Japanese invasion of China; to name just a few. Students were the main force of these movements and the CCP had organized the December 9 Movement that had helped to weaken Chiang Kai-shek's Government which was carrying a conciliatory policy toward Japan.

Because of the large scale and significance of the demonstrations in Shanghai and Beijing, also because of more thorough coverage by media of these two cities, I choose to focus my study on the demonstrations in these two cities. However, the selection of Shanghai and Beijing does not mean that other cities are not important. Undoubtedly, Hefei--the city of the first protests--has its significance because it caused a snowballing effect across the country. Serious events may have happened in few cities in the remote areas that caused the top authorities to be concerned and have the

information blockaded. However, due to the above mentioned reasons it is more convenient and more valuable for this research to concentrate in Shanghai and Beijing.

2.2 Shanghai: Conciliation and Control

Section two briefly described the student movement in Shanghai. This section will present a more detailed picture of interactions between the students and the CCP in Shanghai by Table IV.2. Table IV.2 shows the timing, participants, forms and aims of protest, and the CCP's reaction in the three runs of interactions between the students and the CCP in Shanghai.

Table IV.2 Three Rounds of Interactions between Students and the CCP in Shanghai, Dec. 1986

Actions by the regime are in italics.

I. Protests in campuses, Dec. 9-18

Prelude: Wallposters began to appear at *Fudan*, *Tongji*, and *Jiaoda*. Posters criticized the slowness of political reform, university lining standards, boring curricula, inflation, and the stultifying bureaucracy of the Party.

Spark: *Jiaoda* students beaten by the Shanghai Stadium security guards.

Timing: 12/18/86, Thursday

Participants and forms of protests: *Jiaoda* students held meetings on campus and called for demonstrations.

Aims and values: Demanding that authorities punish the offending guards or the police to apologize.

The CCP's reaction: The Mayor, Jiang Zemin (an alumnus of *Jiaoda*), went to *Jiaoda* to have a "dialogue" with the students in hopes of claming them down. But in the end, he was unceremoniously hooted out.

II. Demonstrations on the streets, Dec. 19-21

Timing: 12/19, 20, 21. Friday, Saturday, Sunday.

Participants and forms of protests: In the climax of protests, 50,000 students marched on the streets. Some workers and middle-school students. Onlookers. Sit-ins at city hall and People's Congress building. Printed manifesto to propagate democratic ideas. Speeches. Marches.

Aims and values: 1. Greater freedom. 2. Freedom of the press. 3. Guarantees for the safety of the student protesters. 4. A statement from the Mayor that the protests were legal.

The CCP's reaction: 1. The Mayor met with the students late Friday night until 3 a.m. and agreed to declare that the protests were legal and that the safety of the students would be assured.

2. The police forcibly broke up the sit-in at city hall on Saturday morning. (The arrests of students agitated the protest to its climax on Sunday.)
3. An unidentified "leading official of the higher learning department of the SEC" acknowledged the right to hold demonstrations. (12/20)
4. NCNA lashed out at the demonstrators for disrupting "stability and unity,"--the CCP's first formal reaction to the student protests. (12/21)
5. The Mayor called the state farms in suburban to keep rusticated youths from returning to Shanghai.
6. Surveillance by the police.
7. Surveillance and dissuasion by schools' leaders and political cadres.

III. Banning the demonstrations: Dec. 22-24

Prelude: A new wave of demonstrations sparked by police violence against students and the PSB's new decree of restricting demonstration (12/21).

Timing: 12/22-24, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday.

Participants and forms of protests: Students held "dialogue" with the university administrators before pouring into the streets.

Aims and values: More freedom and democracy. Right to demonstrations. Publicize the truth of the protests. Refute the distorted reports on the protests by official propaganda.

The CCP's reaction: 1. NCNA accused students of beating 31 policemen on 12/19. (12/22)

2. Shanghai Municipal PSB issued a notice prohibiting demonstrators from "harming the interests of the state,

- society, or collectives and the legitimate freedom and rights of other citizens." (12/22)
3. PD editorial warned and appealed to the students not to play into the hands of the anti-reformists. (12/23)
 4. PD commentary reprimanded students saying that "political reforms can only be introduced under the leadership of the Party." (12/25)
 5. The police and the schools tried to keep students on campuses. However, the police did not use force when they couldn't stop students from marching.
 6. Surveillance by police.
 7. Locked workers in their factories.
 8. Arrested some workers.
 9. Blockade railroad station to prevent suburban students from entering Shanghai.
- The schools' reaction:*
1. Warning that all who participated in marches will be treated as having "cut school."
 2. Informing PSB to reject students' application for demonstrations.
 3. Sending school cadres to dissuade student activists from holding demonstrations.
 4. Writing, calling, or visiting students' parents in order to motivate (or harass) them to dissuade their children from joining demonstrations.
 5. Systematically screening the student leaders and demonstrators
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Sources:

- FEER*, Dec. 1986-Jan. 1987.
 Orville Schell, Discos and Democracy (1988).
 Liu Lu, "Shanghai Students' Great Demonstrations," *Zhongguo zhi chun*, Sept. 1988, pp. 6-14.
 Stavis, China's Political Reforms (1988), pp. 89-110.

Demonstrations in Shanghai show, at least tentatively, a pattern of interaction that includes several features:

Firstly, the police did not use force against demonstrators anymore after December 20. In the early morning at 6 a.m. of 20th the police forcibly broke up the sit-in at city hall, beating and arresting some student demonstrators. Although many of the students were released

in a few hours, this event made the issues of releasing students, protesting police violence and protecting students' lives a focus of the student movement. Obviously, the police violence had raised students' interpersonal values and strengthened their solidarity. The immediate release of student demonstrators and the self-constraint of the police were helpful in calming down students in the final days of the movement.²⁷

Secondly, as with the city authorities, the officials of universities were pursuing a policy of dealing with demonstrations by conciliation and persuasion. Each school may have taken somewhat different measures to disturb students' activism, however, under the pressure from the students, every school was able to cooperate with students in their preparation for demonstrations apparently not to further agitate students. For example, the students of a Shanghai college had successfully urged the administrators to agree to (1) not put "cut class" in the records of those demonstrators, (2) let students use two college vehicles, (3) let students use college flags, banners, megaphones, etc.²⁸ The American educated president of the Shanghai Institute of Chemical Industry was even more cooperative

²⁷ For example, later on, the policemen did not respond to any kind of students' language provocation and police cordons gave way to students without conflict.

²⁸ Liu Lu, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

with students when he dispatched school buses to transport students to the center of the city and he himself followed the students' marches in a car. This was acknowledged by the higher ranks as encouraging demonstrations and he consequently lost his bright future in the system.²⁹

Thirdly, compared with leaders in other cities I found that Shanghai Mayor Jiang Zemin was the only active local leader who had directly interacted with student demonstrators, even the Municipal Party Secretary Rei Xingwen did not show up on front stage.

Fourthly, although many student activists, university administrators, party cadres, police officers had been involved in the interactions, I see only one person's name appeared in the published materials. I can not even find a student leader's name in Chinese or foreign reports. This is a phenomenon which deserves our attention.

Fifthly, under the circumstance that the news was censored and blockaded by the CCP, the Voice of America (VOA) was the primary information source for the student actors. Albeit the VOA was often jammed by the CCP and was mainly a one-way communication instrument, the students were able to use VOA's coverage to find out the truth of the fact, to estimate the situation, and to plan their actions. Actually, the VOA played a larger role than just as a

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

broadcast service. The VOA functioned like a messenger who passed news about a city to others. Without the VOA the campuses in the vast earth of China would not have been able to echo to each other in a few days. And many Shanghai students became aware of the function of foreign actors when several hundred students marched past the American Consulate in Shanghai shouting that they wanted their demands to be publicized around the world.³⁰

Finally, the city authorities had successfully segregated Shanghai students from workers, onlookers, and suburban students. For example, the police barricaded People's Square where students gathered for speeches and demonstrations in order to prevent non-students from entering it. The factory security also turned students away from visiting the workers while prohibiting the workers from even contacting the students not to mention marching on the streets. All those workers who were staying home due to the shortage of raw material were called back to factories so that they would not be wandering in the streets or joining the students.³¹ The segregation of students from other actors in the society was an important factor for the ebbing of the demonstrations.

³⁰ *NYT*, 12/21/86, p. 19.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

2.3 Beijing: The Last Surge by *Beida*

In responding to the student demonstrations in Hefei, Shanghai, Nanjing and other cities, university campuses in Beijing, except *Beida*, had put up posters and marched in the streets since December 7. *Renda*, *Qinghua*, *Beishida* (Beijing Teacher's University), almost all major campuses were throbbing at this time. However, it seemed that the whole student movement would be incomplete and insignificant, as long as *Beida*--the traditional pacesetter of Chinese student movement--did not take action. *Beida* was unusually quiet in December. The top leadership had praised *Beida* students' calmness during the student movement.³²

Beida was tightly controlled by the Party. Firstly, the Party was using every possible method to calm down *Beida* students. There were this and that kind of activity in *Beida* such as arts festival, dancing parties, shows, concerts and movies everyday. All these activities were designed to take students' mind off the demonstrations. Secondly, *Beida* students were still terrified by the arrests of two students of the Department of History who had participated in the September 18 Demonstrations of 1985. Headed by the *People's Daily*, a series of news commentaries

³² Long Qiuyao, "Beida xuesheng yuandan Tiananmen youxing jishi [A True Record of Beida Students' (1987) First Day Marches to Tiananmen]," *Zhongguo zhi chun*, no. 52, November 1987, p. 60.

had daily intensified the terror of suppression. Besides, there was no event in *Beida* or in Beijing that was serious enough to attract students' attention and cement various values and aims together.

The opportunity came on December 26 when the standing committee of the Beijing Municipal People's Congress issued ten rules that in effect banned any public protest by students in the capital. The "Ten Rules" gave students an excuse for action. The new wave of demonstrations was preluded with a march headed by *Beishida* students in the early morning hours of December 29 when as many as 3,000 students marched through the university quarter. Starting at about 2:30 a.m., the student crowd proceeding to *Renda*, and later, other Beijing universities, reached *Qinghua* University at about 6:00 a.m. That evening, the *Beijing Evening News* reported that it was an unsuccessful attempt by *Beishida* students to get their counterparts at *Beida* and *Qinghua* to join them in the march. On the same day of December 29, the *People's Daily* had already harassed the students by a direct warning that: "Anyone who treats the party and people's government as if it were a reactionary government is placing himself against the people."³³ The *Beijing Daily* even spoke of meddling in student affairs by

³³ *People's Daily*, (overseas edition) 12/29/86, p. 1.

Taiwan agents, and of "secret and conspiratorial schemes" by "hostile elements against the socialist system."³⁴

Angered by the "Ten Rules" and by the official press' distortion of the demonstrations, and agitated by the marches passing by the *Beida* campus, students at *Beida* planned to launch a march to Tiananmen. It is interesting to find that the students' determination and decision were actually strengthened and achieved by the government's overreaction. The mutual enhanced interactions between the government and *Beida* students can be expressed as shown in Table IV.3.

Table IV.3 Interactions between the Regime and *Beida* Students, December 1986-January 1987

governmental action printed in italic.

I. Ferment in an atmosphere of high crisis, Dec. 26-31

Timing: Dec. 26-31, after the decree of "Ten Rules" and *Beishida's* marches.

Participants: *Beida* students.

Interaction I: Several graduate students (Party members) applied for marches. They withdrew the application under the party's pressure.

Interaction II: 1. Little wallposters shown in *Beida* calling for "Marching on the First Day (1987)!" and "See You at Tiananmen on the First Day!" But, the posters were torn off quickly.

2. The VOA broadcasting said that *Beida* students had "announced" a plan of marching to Tiananmen on the First Day of 1987.

3. *The People's Central Broadcasting Station (PCBS), in referring to Beida's wallposters and the VOA's "promotion," announced that "anyone who dare to make trouble at our sacred Tiananmen Square will be punished unrelentingly!" (12/29 ?)*

³⁴ John Woodruff, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

4. Beida students began mobilization for marches in responding to PCBS's announcement.
5. General Wang Zhen of the CPS threatened to kill a group of students, professors, and intellectuals. (12/30) It was said that Armed Police Forces prepared to crash student demonstrations.

II. Skirmishes, daytime of 1/1/87

Timing and Place: The First Day of 1987 at Tiananmen Square. The political climate was severe and tense like piercingly cold weather in Beijing.

Participants: Beida students.

Interaction:

- Official resistance:*
1. The street-watering trucks had systematically sprinkled every inch of Tiananmen Square to make the public space a vast and treacherous ice rink.
 2. The Monument to the People's Martyrs and buildings around Tiananmen Square were surrounded by rings of the Young Pioneers, thousands of policemen, and army before dawn.
 3. The police cleared spectators out of the square.

Students: Shortly after 10 a.m., a few hundred students passed the police line and reached the Monument to the People's Martyrs. In front of the monument, they sang "The Internationale" and "The March of the Volunteers." Students would unroll one or two "democracy" or "freedom" banners whenever they felt safe.

Regime: 1. Each time the students made a new move, the police would grab however many students they could.

2. PCBS confirmed that "two hundred or so who unsuccessfully made trouble at Tiananmen Square were taken away by the public security." (8 p.m., 1/1/87)

The students and the police repeated the above described pattern of interaction until the arrest-depleted demonstrators were outnumbered by midafternoon.

Scores: Demonstrators started the day by getting all the way to the forbidden monument at the center of Tiananmen Square itself, several times briefly forming small parade units and raising banners at the fringes of the square. On the police side, the demonstrations had been kept from going on for any length of time that might encourage bystanders to join in.

III. The night marches, midnight 1/1-2/87

Context: The concern about still detained classmates by thousands of *Beida* students personalized the issues of democracy and freedom and provided the spark.

Students: 1. 8 p.m.-9:30 p.m. thousands of *Beida* students gathered in front of the main auditorium. University president Ding Shisun agreed to try to get the students out of detention.

2. By 10:30 p.m., students were pouring out of the dormitories. After gaining recruits from *Qinghua* and *Renda*, as many as 10,000 students walked toward downtown Beijing.

3. 1,000-1,500 students reached Tiananmen Square at 3:30 a.m. Not long after 6 a.m., with the last of their schoolmates free, the student demonstrators boarded buses provided by the city and headed back to their campuses.

Police: The seven police cordons served as a tactic to retard student marches without conflict in order to let the vice president catch the students and persuade them to go back to the campus.

IV. Burning the *Beijing Daily*, 1/5/87

Protests: On January 5, some students organized a campus ceremony to burn copies of the *Beijing Daily* in a protest against the antagonistic and blatantly one-sided coverage their demonstrations had received in the party organs.

Sources:

FEER, Dec. 1986-Jan. 1987.

Orville Schell, *Discos and Democracy*(1988).

John Woodruff, *China in Search of Its Future*(1990).

Apparently, the Beijing demonstrations were less magnificent than those in Shanghai because of the government's preparations. However, demonstrations of the two cities were similar in their features and patterns of interactions between the students and the regime except that the interactions in Beijing were limited to the street level.

2.4 The CCP's Reaction to the External Actors

Besides the standpatters and reformist leaders, there were three groups of actors--democratic elite, workers, and external actors--who were involved in or related to the Student Movement of 1986-87. The democratic elite had played the role of intellectual antecedents of the student movement. Few workers had sporadically joined the students' actions. Compared to the Democracy Wall Movement, the external actors played a greater role in December 1986. The CCP is always sensitive to the ties of different kinds of actors in the period of protests. In dealing with the relations between the students and other actors the CCP had principally adopted a policy of segregation and isolation. This is a policy of prevention as well as remedy in nature. In carrying out this policy the CCP applied different measures according to those actors' social status and the CCP's scope of jurisdiction. For example, the CCP applied only political sanctions against democratic elite but harsh penalties against workers. However, the Party could do nothing more than jam extraterritorial broadcasting, accuse the provocation of the VOA, BBC, and Taiwan's secret agents, or blame foreign scholars' intervention in China's domestic affairs. The external actors had played a role so special that a further study is made in following pages.

The external actors who were involved in or had influenced the student movement of 1986-87 included: (1) the Western visitors and foreign journalists, (2) those extra-territorial communications networks that had broken the CCP's censorship, (3) Chinese students and scholars studying abroad and foreign scholars who had protested against the Party's harsh reaction to the student movement, and (4) a special actor--Yang Wei--a returned student from the United States who was arrested for participating in the student movement.³⁵ The external actors were a hot potato for the CCP.

Although most of the Chinese students and scholars studying abroad and the returned student, Yang Wei, were Chinese citizens, I have to assume that they played a role similar to external actors because they were able to interact with the regime by drawing support from the international community. In view of overseas students' strong concern about the situation in China and Yang Wei's arrest,

³⁵ Yang Wei, a Chinese student of University of Arizona who had recently returned to Shanghai was arrested on January 11, 1987 for supporting the China Spring pro-democracy movement while in the United States, and for his involvement with student demonstrations in Shanghai. Yang remained in prison, without being either publicly charged or tried, until December 1987, when he was sentenced to two years in prison for "counter-revolutionary" activity. Yang's case had worried Chinese students studying in the U.S. and ruffled Sino-US relations. The US Congress had adopted resolutions calling for Yang's release. Schell, *op. cit.*, p. 287. *FEER*, 1/7/88, pp. 14, 15.

the Chinese government dispatched a delegation abroad to explain the political changes in China and announced several new policies to the students. Led by He Dongchang, deputy director of the State Education Commission, the delegation paid a visit to the United States, Canada, and Japan in May and June, 1987.³⁶

Mr. He's mission was not successful because the students had already lost their trust on the CCP. Nevertheless, He Dongchang's mission might have implied that both the student abroad and the regime were searching for a new pattern of interaction between state and a tiny but indispensable sector of society, albeit their very different motivations.

Other less controllable foreign actors for the CCP were those extraterritorial communications networks and foreign journalists as well as the Western visitors. It is interesting to find that the *BBC* and *VOA* were not only the sole sources of comprehensive information about the student movement, but also interacted with the Party in stirring up *Beida* students' emotion for demonstrations on the First Day of 1987. According to a *Beida* students' record, the interactions between the students, the *VOA*, and the Party was proceeded in following way:

³⁶ A complete record of He Dongchang' speech in Houston and comments on it see *China Spring Digest*, November/December 1987, pp. 25-33.

Table IV.5 Interactions among *Beida* Students, VOA, and the regime, Dec. 26, 1986-Jan. 1, 1987

<i>Date:</i>	<i>Interactions in Beijing:</i>
12/26/86	Students were angered by the new rules that in effect banned any public protest in the capital.
12/27 -28	Wallposters appeared in <i>Beida</i> calling for marches to Tiananmen on the First Day of 1987. The nights of same days, the VOA said that <i>Beida</i> students had announced a plan for marching to Tiananmen. In fact, <i>Beida</i> students did not yet begin the mobilization for marches.
12/28 or 29	<i>PCBS</i> in referring to <i>Beida</i> 's wallposters and the VOA's "promotion," announced that "anyone who dare to make trouble at our sacred Tiananmen Square will be punished unrelentingly!"
12/28 -31	Because of the VOA's reports and the <i>PCBS</i> 's threats, <i>Beida</i> students were caught in a dilemma: either take the risk of political purge and personal safety in marching to Tiananmen or lose the face of <i>Beida</i> that <i>Beida</i> students are too coward to fight for democracy.
12/30	<i>Police</i> barricaded <i>Beida</i> campus.
12/31	<i>Wang Zhen</i> threatened to kill a bunch of students, professors, and intellectuals.
pre-dawn of 1/1/87	<i>Beida</i> students marched to Tiananmen in small groups

Actions by the regime are in *italics*.

Source: Long Qiuyao, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

The above interaction can be further simplified as a pattern in Figure IV.1:

Figure IV.1 The VOA's role in the *Beida* student protests on January 1, 1987.

Authorities banned demonstrations

<-- students called for marches (12/26/86)

<-- VOA reported on Beida

<-- *PCBS rebuked VOA and students*

<-- students held demonstrations
(1/1/87)

[Actions by government are in italics; <-- : reacted to]

Undeniably, the VOA did play an distinguished role in the student movement of 1986-87. Without those extra-territorial communication networks the regime would have more effectively blockaded the news about the demonstrations. It is no wonder that Party officials and particularly members of the security apparatus "looked upon members of the Western press as little more than glorified spies," as Orville Schell observed. And, just in January 1987, an American journalist, Lawrence MacDonald, had been expelled from China for engaging in unspecified activities that were "incompatible" with his status as a journalist. In addition, a student from Tianjin University had been arrested for "secret collusion and providing intelligence" to MacDonald.³⁷ Again, this is a typical measure of the CCP to isolate foreign actors from the protesters specifically as well as from Chinese people in general.

³⁷ Schell, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

It is also interesting to find that, besides the snowball effect of Hefei protests, demonstrations in Shanghai were sparked by an incident related to an American rock group. The incident happened on December 15, 1986 when the American surf-rock band Jan and Dean was giving the last of their six concerts in Shanghai Stadium. During the concert, some students in the audience began to get wild, climbed over the barricades that separated the seats from the stage and began to dance. Afterward, as Schell described,

stadium security guards reportedly tried to arrest one of the dancers, a student from Jiaotong University. When he protested his innocence and resisted arrest, he was beaten. Angered by the behavior of the security guards, a group of fellow Jiaotong University students formed to demand that authorities punish the offending guards, or at least put them on notice that what the students called such "special privileges of certain cadres who are above the law" would no longer be tolerated. When their demands were ignored, the agitated students reportedly appealed directly to the mayor of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin, who happened to be a university alumnus.³⁸

It is very possible that student demonstrations could still have broken out, even if American rock band had not been in Shanghai. However, unexpected to the Party, the dance incident did provide a spark to the explosive situation. Therefore, we can say that Jan and Dean had

³⁸ Schell, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-4. The date of the incident was identified in Liu Lu's memoirs. Liu Lu, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

accidentally played a role as an external actor in the Student Movement of 1986-87.

2.5 Patterns of Interactions between the Regime and the Students

As Charts IV.1 & 2 show below, two cities shared very similar patterns of interactions between the regime and the students.³⁹ First, interactions were kept at local and street levels in both cities. Among local government leaders, only Shanghai Mayor Jiang Zemin had personally met the student representatives and visited Jiaoda. (Tianjin Mayor Li Ruihuan also met the students and calmed them down.) Second, the municipal and university authorities were pursuing a policy of dealing with demonstrations by conciliation and persuasion. And they used limited force against the demonstrators although the beating and arresting may have not been necessary. Third, no prominent student leader can be found in the interactions. Fourth, in both cities the students were successfully segregated from workers. Finally, the VOA played a crucial role in the interactions (a) between the students and the regime, and (b) among the student demonstrators.

³⁹ Probably many other cities also had a similar experience. But, some cities with serious situation may have taken forceful measures to break up the student marches and demonstrations. For example, in Tianjin "a number of minor injuries" were suffered when the students clashed with the police. *IMC*, February 1987, pp. 1-5.

The pattern of the mutual enhanced interactions between Beijing authorities and Beida students was repeated in the 1989 democracy movement. The official press' distortion of the events and government's overreaction only helped to deteriorate the situation.

Chart IV.1 Shanghai: interactions between the authorities and the protesters, December 1986

Social structure





Chart IV.2 Beijing: interactions between the authorities and the protesters, 1986-87



3. Interactions in the Governing Coalition

3.1 The Cleavage between the Reformist Leaders and the Democratic Elite

Before analyzing the struggle between the stand-patters and the reformers headed by Hu Yaobang, I want to briefly discuss the interactions among the reformers on the eve of the student demonstrations of 1986-87. By the term "reformers" I am referring to both the reformist power elite and the democratic elite. Both categories of actors had been the intellectual antecedents of the Student Movement of 1986-87. It is important to examine their relationship because, firstly, the democratic elite⁴⁰ had played the role of catalyst in the student protest of late 1986. Encouraged or tolerated by the reformist leaders, the democratic elite had created a new atmosphere of liberalization that stimulated the students to more reflection on contemporary society and their own social and political status. Secondly, while Deng-Hu-Zhao's reforms were earnestly

⁴⁰ According to Merle Goldman, members of China's democratic elite are "individuals and loose congeries of highly placed intellectuals, some associated directly, other indirectly, with Hu Yaobang, ... At the center of this elite was a group of Marxist theorists and editors, who... sought to humanize Marxist-Leninist ideology. They were joined at times by writers such as the journalist Liu Binyan, the Shanghai author Wang Ruowang, the screen-writer Bai Hua, ... In the mid-1980s, several prominent scientists--including the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi and the historian of science Xu Liangying--became part of the group. Various disciples and former students also followed the example of their mentors." Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy (1994), pp. 1-2.

supported by the democratic elite, they were not controlled by or closely coordinated with the reformist leaders. The democratic elite hence became Deng-Hu-Zhao's liability, and the sacrifices (including Hu Yaobang himself) later, in the power struggle with the standpatters. Besides, it is noteworthy that most of the democratic elite were the party or government cadres and therefore were part of the government coalition. Table IV.5 shows a sample of the reformers' groupings according to their attitudes toward democratization in late 1986.

Table IV.5 The reformers' groupings in late 1986. A sample

Reformers	
<i>Reformist power elite:</i>	
<i>Paramount chief</i>	<--Deng Xiaoping
<i>Top leaders & their protégés: (power elite)</i>	<--Zhao Ziyang <--Wan Li <--Hu Qili
	Zhu Houze Wang Meng Ruan Chongwu
<i>Democratic elite:</i>	Fang Lizhi Liu Binyan Wang Ruowang Wang Ruoshui Su Shaozhi Hu Jiwei Yan Jiaqi

<-- Persons who dropped their support to Hu Yaobang later and compromised with the standpatters.

The interactions among the reformers in Hu Yaobang's era were a complicated story of which Merle Goldman did a thorough and in-depth study in her recent book, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy(1994). In summary, Deng's initiation of political structure reform had detonated a chain reaction of political discourse that, undesirable to Deng and other leaders, had created the context for student demonstrations. Chart IV.3 summarizes the interactions among the reformers in 1986.

Chart IV.3 The chain reaction of political discourse among the reformers in 1986. A summary

Paramount chief--Deng Xiaoping:

Revived Gengshen political structure reform in spring. The reform was limited to streamlining the administrative structure and to separating the Party and the government.⁴¹ However, the reform have to carried out under the leadership of the CCP.



Reformist power elite--Hu Yaobang and other liberal leaders: extended political reform to the creation of an atmosphere of free expression and an environment of democracy. Expanded autonomy in the academic sphere. Exploration in the social, economic, and political spheres was encouraged. However, the fundamental nature of the Party would not change and the CCP would remain as the leadership core for China.⁴²



| a domino effect



Democratic elite--(a sample)

⁴¹ "On Reform of the Political Structure. September-November 1986," Deng xuan, III, pp. 178-181.

⁴² Minutes of Hu Yaobang-Dr. Brzezinski Discussions. The Chinese Domestic Scene. Section 7. (July 1986). Courtesy of Professor Brzezinski on 9/7/94.

Fang Lizhi: "democracy is something to be struggled for, not conferred from above." and called for "struggle to bring about a better intellectual environment."
 Liu Binyan: sought to serve as the Party's moral conscience.
 Wang Ruowang: promoted liberalization under the ancient slogan "govern by doing nothing that goes against nature."
 Wang Ruoshui: "Freedom of creation is a right of the citizens... It is not bestowed and cannot be abolished by any person."
 Su Shaozhi: recommended recognizing different views and group interests in a socialist society.
Yang Baikui: called for some form of multiparty system.⁴³ .

Sources:

Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds...(1994), pp. 166-185.
 David A. Kelly, "The Chinese Student Movement of December 1986 and Its Intellectual Antecedents," *AJCA*, January 1987, pp. 127-142.
 Orville Schell, Discos and Democracy(1988), pp. 23-337.

Two features characterized the interactions between the reformist leaders and the democratic elite. Firstly, there were fundamental points of difference which cannot be compromised between them. Ideologically, the democratic elite denied the orthodoxy and usefulness of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought in guiding Chinese people's lives and in solving China's problems. Politically, the democratic elite denied the four basic principles and tried to cancel the Party's monopoly of state power. The democratic elite even suggested the replacement of socialism by capitalism and Western-style democracy. Even though Hu Yaobang and his protégés would be able to tolerate these points, other

⁴³ Yang Baikui, member of the Institute of Political Science, CASS.

reformers such as Wan Li would not agree with them. For example, in a debate which occurred in Hefei during student demonstrations, while Wan Li insisted that democracy is something that can only be handed down, Fang Lizhi would never surrender his belief that democracy cannot be handed down by a leader to someone else. Another difference between them was Fang's insistence in academic freedom and university independence from Party control. The two men departed at loggerheads when Fang quoted the Constitution to make the point that the UST students had done nothing illegal by demonstrating.⁴⁴

Wan Li's debate with Fang marked the liberal leaders' conciliatory approach toward the democratic elite-- a second feature of the interactions between the liberal leaders and the democratic elite. Wan Li had been following Fang Lizhi to the universities where Fang gave speeches. Wan would request a tape right after Fang's talk. Fang believed that Wan was trying to find an opportunity to criticize him in order to protect the reform wing of the Party against the hard-liners.⁴⁵ For the same purpose and possibly also for the safety of the persons concerned, Hu Yaobang had personally told Liu Binyan and passed the message to Wang Ruowang to control themselves.⁴⁶ However,

⁴⁴ Orville Schell, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 215-6.

⁴⁶ Wei Ge, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

the democratic elite did not stop their criticism of and challenge to the Party. Fang Lizhi even blamed the Vice-Mayor of Beijing, Zhang Baifa, and the hard-line Marxist theorist and Politburo member, Hu Qiaomu, by name for their unethical behavior.⁴⁷ Wang Ruowang's broadside against Deng Xiaoping's rather puerile notions of egalitarian enrichment had even ultimately led to the close down of the *Special Zone Workers' Daily*.⁴⁸ However, the differences between the liberal leaders and democratic elite does not mean that they were confronting each other. Instead, it might be that the democratic elite were so optimistic about the future that they believed that they could or should promote China's reforms independently.

Four things are worthy of attention. Firstly, the intractability of the democratic elite shows that no pan-reformer alliance existed before or during the student demonstrations. Secondly, the democratic elite is not a power group. They are only a stratum of intellectuals. Most of all, they are just an opinion group whose common interests in political reform are stronger than other social groups or strata. Thirdly, even though many democratic

⁴⁷ Fang publicly denounced Zhang for contriving to join a scientific delegation that had been invited to attend a conference on synchrotron radiation in New York State. Hu Qiaomu was criticized for compelling Fang to make an apology to the Beijing Party Committee for slurring the Vice-Mayor. Orville Schell, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-8.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

elite were uncompromising with the Party's line, Hu Yaobang had tried to protect them from the standpatters' purge until Hu's resignation as general secretary. Fourthly, Deng Xiaoping kept silence until the end of 1986 even though he might have been outraged by the democratic elite's criticism and student protest as well as the liberal leaders' inaction against liberalization and demonstrations.

3.2 The Leadership Split and The Fall of Hu Yaobang

In the end of 1986 the whole Party was split over the questions of liberalization and student demonstrations. Exacerbated by personal animosities the Party had broken down into three main groupings.

The first was a broad united front of the standpatters consisting of those old guards, their intellectual network and the younger conservatives with Deng Xiaoping as the core. Liberal leaders such as Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li and Hu Qili also joined this front as an expedient measure. The second was an isolated group consisting of Hu Yaobang and his protégés such as Zhu Huoze, Wang Meng, and Ruan Chongwu. The third group consisted of heterogeneous and loosely organized democratic elite. Table IV.6 lists a few select actors of each group in the governing coalition in late 1986 and 1987.

Table IV.6 Key actors in the governing coalition in 1986-87

(1) <i>Standpatters</i> (a united front)	<i>Liberal leaders</i> (2)	<i>Democratic elite</i> (3)
Deng Xiaoping<--		
Zhao Ziyang<--	Hu Yaobang	
Wan Li<--		
Hu Qili<--		
Li Xiannian		
Peng Zhen		
Chen Yun		
Wang Zhen		
Bo Yibo	Ruan Chongwu	
Yu Qiuli	Zhu Huoze	
Hu Qiaomu	Wang Meng	
Deng Liqun		
Li Peng		
Qiao Shi		
Yao Yilin		
Tian Jiyun<--		
		Fang Lizhi
		Liu Binyan
		Wang Ruowang .

<-- Person who dropped his support to Hu Yaobang and compromised with the standpatters.

As was mentioned in section 1 the crossfire between the standpatters and the democratic elite lasted for many years after the Democracy Wall Movement. There was a setback for the standpatters in July 1985 when Hu Yaobang replaced Deng Liqun with Zhu Houze as director of the Propaganda Department, and appointed a genuine writer, Wang Meng, as minister of culture in June 1986. Now, the student demonstrations provided the standpatters with the opportunity they had been waiting for to win Deng Xiaoping's acquiescence to a crackdown, not only on the student

demonstrators, but also on their sympathizers in the party-- Hu Yaobang and his intellectual network. With Deng Xiaoping by their side, the standpatters represented by Wang Zhen, Peng Zhen, and Bo Yibo were able to form a coalition with other revolutionary elders, the army, and conservative theorists to arrange the oust of Hu Yaobang.

Reasons for Hu Yaobang's fall are many and deep-rooted. For example, he had offended Deng Xiaoping by pushing Deng to retire. Hu also had displeased the army by cutting military expenses and reducing military staff. According to Yang Zhongmei, beginning in late December 1986, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, and others held several meetings of party political commissars, criticizing Hu Yaobang for committing three great crimes: (1) Hu was so "rightist" that he had released "a bourgeois liberal flood," therefore he has to be responsible for the student movement incident; (2) Hu had forced "many old comrades to retire" and promoted "a lot of cadres from the Communist Youth League system;" (3) Hu had used "the law to punish the children of old comrades who had violated the law."⁴⁹ Other than these allegations, there were specific charges against Hu at the enlarged Politburo meeting held on January 16, 1987. In short, the nature of conflicts between Hu and the standpatters were

⁴⁹ Yang Zhongmei, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

organizational, ideological, and personal as Merle Goldman has indicated.⁵⁰

The enlarged Politburo meeting had been carefully planned in secret for quite some time. Deng Xiaoping made military arrangements for the meeting through Yang Shangkun, general secretary of the Central Military Commission(CMC), Zhou Lin, director of the General Office of the MAC, and Qing Jiwei, commander of the Beijing Military District. Peng Zhen deployed the People's Armed Police(PAP), which was under his control. The attendants included members of the Politburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Central Advisory Commission(CAC), Central Discipline and Inspection Commission(CDIC), and other related "comrades."⁵¹ The meeting was called and chaired by the chairman of the CAC and chairman of the CAC, Deng Xiaoping. Since the meeting was illegal in accordance with the provisions of the Party Constitution passed by the Twelfth Party Congress, Yang Zhongmei qualifies it as a coup d'etat.⁵²

Illegal though it was, the enlarged Politburo meeting "accepted" Hu Yaobang's resignation but kept his membership in the Politburo. Thereby, the standpatters won a run of power struggle with the reformers.

⁵⁰ Goldman, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

⁵¹ Here, "comrades" refer to some leaders' family members. Yang Zhongmei, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-8.

⁵² *Ibid.*

Table IV.7 samples the changes of leadership before and after Hu Yaobang's fall.

Table IV.7 Changes of leadership before and after January 1987. A sample

<i>Standpatters</i>	<i>Reformers</i>	
I. Before January 1987		
<u>(1) Top leadership(Politburo & Secretariat):</u>		
Li Xiannian	Deng Xiaoping	
Chen Yun	Zhao Ziyang	Hu Yaobang
Yang Shangkun	Wan Li, Hu Qili	
Peng Zhen	Tian Jiyun	
Wang Zhen, Li Peng		
Hu Qiaomu		
<u>(2) Staff:</u>		
<i>Jiang Zemin, Rui Xingwen</i> (Shanghai)		Ruan Chongwu
<i>Li Ximing</i> (Beijing)		Zhu Houze
<i>Li Ruihuan</i> (Tianjin)		Wang Meng
=====		
II. After Jan. 1987 till Oct. 1987, the 13th Party Congress		
<u>(1) Top leadership(Politburo & Secretariat):</u>		
Li Xiannian	Deng Xiaoping	
Chen Yun	Zhao Ziyang	Hu Yaobang
Yang Shangkun	Wan Li, Hu Qili	(out of stage)
Peng Zhen	Tian Jiyun	
Wang Zhen, Li Peng		
Hu Qiaomu		
<i>Jiang Zemin, Rui Xingwen</i> (Shanghai)		
<i>Li Ximing</i> (Beijing)		
<i>Li Ruihuan</i> (Tianjin)		
<u>(2) Staff:</u>		
<i>Wang Fang</i> (Public Security, in place of Ruan Chongwu)		
<i>Wang Renzhi</i> (Propaganda, in place of Zhu Houze)		Wang Meng
		(dismissed later).

Names in italics were the persons promoted in 1987.

Sources: Zhonggong Nianbao(The CCP Yearbook). 1987, 1988.

3.3 The Pattern of Interactions in the Governing Coalition


The rise and fall of the Student Movement is a trilogy of interactions in the governing coalition. The first part of the play was the intellectuals' endeavoring to smash political and ideological shackles, on the one hand; and their high expectations of the newly revived program of political reforms in the spring of 1986.

The second part of the play was the cleavage between the reformist leaders and the democratic elite. Believing that they could or should promote China's democratization independently, the democratic elite had actually overdrawn the freedom promised by the reformist leaders. When the democratic elite strode over the frontier drawn by the Party, the democratic elite's cleavage from the reformist leaders became irreparable. To make things worse, the standpatters were massing the forces and targeting the reformers in another campaign of anti-"bourgeois liberalization."

Finally, the Student Movement gave the standpatters a chance to attack. Burdened with the heavy load of the demands for democratization and liberalization, the reformist leaders lost not only their troops of critical intellectuals but also the General Secretary.

Chart IV.4 depicts the pattern of the inner-Party power struggle in relating to the Student Movement of 1986-87.

Chart IV.4 The Student Movement and the inner-Party power struggle, Winter 1986-87.



<-- responded to Deng's calling for political reform in 1986

4. Conclusion

4.1 Legitimacy Problems

Obviously, the legitimacy of the CCP regime was challenged when the student demonstrators demanded the rights of political participation and the establishment of a democratic political system. However, the legitimacy of the regime had already undergone a serious erosion since 1985. Besides the trends of intellectuals' rising demands for liberalization and democratization, other significant examples of social unrest witnessed in 1985 were: a riot occurred at a Beijing soccer match, a fresh wave of complaints on price decontrols, the September 18 students' anti-Japanese demonstrations, a resurgence of xenophobia on Chinese college campuses, and, a Uighur students' demonstration in Beijing in protest against continued Chinese nuclear weapons test in Lop Nor, Xinjiang. Figures IV.1 and 2 illustrate the inflation rate and the increase of economic crimes in the 1980s. Therefore, the legitimacy problems raised by unbalanced economic growth under the communist dictatorship were an important cause of student demonstrations in 1986.

4.2 *Domestic Demonstration Effects*

It is true that democratizations which occurred in the Philippines and South Korea in early 1986 had some

influence on the Chinese, but little evidence shows that events in the Philippines and Korea had vividly stimulated the student demonstrations in China in December 1986. However, it is visible that the protests in those "lead campuses"--Heifei Keda (UST), Shanghai *Jiaoda* and *Tongji*, and Nanjing University, etc.--helped stimulate demonstrations in other campuses. Hence, I call this phenomenon "*domestic demonstration effects*."

After the protests in UST and in Wuhan's two universities in early December 1986, other campuses appropriately asked, "How can we fall behind other campuses?" Certainly, many reformers and students had been influenced by the third wave of democratization, but, it was the lead campuses that raised the wave of protests and accelerated its spread to all of China.

4.3 External Actors

Two categories of external actors played special roles during and after the Student Movement. Foreign broadcasting services are the first kind of external actors that provided Chinese people the sole sources of comprehensive information about the Student Movement. As my study shows, the VOA also interacted with the Chinese authorities and *Beida* students to trigger demonstrations on the First Day of 1987.

Chinese students and scholars studying abroad as well as international academic circles were another kind of external actors. Their public concerns about the CCP's penalties upon Hu Yaobang, Fang Lizhi, and many other democratic elite and about the future of reforms in China surprised the Chinese government. Conceivably, the international academic community had posed pressure on the government and prevented the standpatters from pushing too far.

Nevertheless, the external actors were not the cause of the student demonstrations. In fact, foreign governments, especially the United States, remained friendly toward China. Therefore, the factor of the external actors was only marginally relevant to the Student Movement.

4.4 Economy and Culture

Although the occurrence of the 1986/87 Student Movement defies Huntington's assertion that economics reinforced culture in opposition to democracy, the case study of the Student Movement shows difficulties in clarifying the correlation between economically provoked cultural change and pro-democracy protests. The effects of economic development on Chinese culture were complicated even though the Chinese economy continued to grow on the eve of the Student Movement. On the one hand, the economy has not grown into the "political transition zone." On the other

hand, not all changes in Chinese culture were in favor of democracy. For example, many negative results of marketization and cultural change such as: the sharp increase of urban crimes, economic crimes, and superficial understanding of Western values were obstructive to the establishment of market economy, and in turn, a democratic system in China.

In conclusion, first of all, other causes of democratization such as demonstration effects from external environment and external actors' intervention were not strongly present, though the Voice of America (VOA) did interact with the Chinese actors at the end of the Student Movement. Even though unbalanced growth of the economy has caused a high inflation rate, social unrest, and a new urban crime rate in 1985, Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms have built up a momentum of their own and reduced the regime's legitimacy crises. Therefore, it is appropriate to say that the Student Movement occurred in an environment where all the factors favorable to democracy were immature. Table IV.8 summarizes the degree of correlation between five variables and the the Student Movement.

Table IV.8 The degree of correlation between five variables and the Student Movement, 1986-87

	<i>The degree of correlation to the Student Movement</i>	.
<hr/> <i>Five variables:</i>		
1. Legitimacy problems	<i>high</i>	
2. Economic development and dislocation	<i>high</i>	
3. Cultural change	<i>high</i> but not totally in favor of democracy	
4. Snowballs	<i>low</i>	
5. External actors	<i>low</i>	.

Appendix IV.1 Cities Engulfed in the Student Movement, Dec. 1986--Jan. 1987

<i>City(province)</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Campuses/Participants</i>
1. Hefei*(Anhui)	Dec. 5-13	<i>Keda</i> & other campuses
2. Wuhan(Hubei)	Dec. 9	two universities
3. Beijing*	Dec. 12--Jan. 5	<i>Beida, Qinghua, Shida, Renda</i> , etc.
4. Shenzhen	Dec. 14-15	Shenzhen University [Shenzhen SEZ in Guangdong]
5. Kunming(Yunnan)	Dec. 17-18	Yunnan Univ. & Kunming Industrial Univ.
6. Shanghai*	Dec. 17-24	<i>Jiaoda, Tongji, Fudan</i> , etc. Some workers and residents.
7. Xi'an(Shaanxi)	Dec. 20	Xi'an Univ.
8. Hangzhou* (Zhejiang)	Dec. 21-22	Hangzhou Univ. and others.
9. Guangzhou (Guangdong)	Dec. 22	Zhongshan(Sun Yatsen) University
10. Tianjin*	Dec. 23-25	Nankai Univ. and others.
11. Nanjing* (Jiangsu)	Dec. 23-28	Nanjing Univ., Normal Univ., etc. Workers and residents.
12. Suzhou(Jiansu)	Dec. 27	students
13. Wuhu(Anhui)	Dec. 27	students
14. Changsha(Hunan)	Dec. ?	Hunan Normal Univ.
15. Hengyang(Hunan)	Dec. ?	students
16. Lanzhou(Gansu)	Dec. ?	students
17. Chengdu(Sichuan)	Dec. ?	students
18. Chongqing(Sichuan)	Dec. ?	Sichuan Univ. and others.
19. Jinan*(Shandong)	after Dec. 24	students
20. (Guizhou)*	after Dec. 24	students
21. (Liaoning)*	after Dec. 24	students
22. Harbin* (Heilongjian)	after Dec. 24	students
23. Ningpo*(Zhejiang)	after Dec. 24	students
24. Laoshan*(Sichuan)	after Dec. 24	students

Note: Twelve cities marked with * are where student movement raised the CCP's high degree of concern according to a Chinese radio broadcast on December 26, 1986.

Sources:


Inside China Mainland, Taipei, February 1987, pp. 1-5.

Dalu guancha(Mainland Review), Taipei, January 1988, pp. 23-32.

Zhongguo dalu(Mainland China Monthly), Taipei, January 1987, pp. 8-14.

NYT, December 21, 22, 28, 1986.

FEER, 1/8/87, p. 9.



The People's Republic of China

Map IV.1
Cities engulfed in the Student Movement, Winter 1986-87






Figure IV.2 Inflation rate of overall retail price, 1978-1990



Source: *China Trade and Price Statistics 1988*, T 2.7; State Statistical Bureau's annual reports of 1989 and 1990.

Figure IV.3 Embezzlement and bribery cases, 1980-1990



Source: *P.R. China Yearbook*; *Procuratorial Yearbook of China*; *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*'s related reports. (The number of 1980 includes all sorts of economic crimes).

Source of figures IV.2 & 3: Ding Lu, *Entrepreneurship in Suppressed Markets. Private-Sector Experience in China*, (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994). Pp. 136, 137.

CHAPTER V

CASE 3: TIANANMEN DEMONSTRATIONS, 1989

1. The Tiananmen Demonstrations, 1989

The tragic events of June 4 are well enough known. The events began with Hu Yaobang's sudden death on April 15, 1989. The death of the former general secretary of the CCP sent a shock wave among Chinese students and the intellectual community, which regarded the late leader as a symbol of political reform and a valued advocate of more tolerant policies toward critical intellectuals. The students' deep lament over Hu's death and resentment against gerontocracy in China can be shown in a cynical elegy: "The one died who should not have died. Those who should have died live."

Fermented by popular discontent about profiteering by officials, speculation, high inflation rate (18.5 percent in 1988), low teachers' pay and social disorder, student response to Hu Yaobang's death quickly moved beyond mourning to heated protests for democracy and freedom. Waves of student protests quickly spread across the nation and were joined by people of all ranks and classes. According to an incomplete official calculation, during the period of the

"turmoil" (April 15-June 9), there was a total of about two million eight hundred thousand demonstrators which poured into streets from six hundred universities and colleges in eighty four cities of twenty nine provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions.¹

The result of the incident is now known to all. On the night of June 3, 1989, tens of thousands of soldiers armed with AK-47 assault rifles and supported by armored personnel carriers (APCs) forced their way into the city of Beijing and drove unarmed student protesters from Tiananmen Square. When hundreds of thousands of Beijing residents and students blocked their paths, the soldiers opened fire. In Timothy Brook's estimation, the soldiers killed two to three thousand people as opposed to the reported hundreds during the night of June 3-4.²

However, the development and results of the democracy movement in cities other than Beijing are different due to the differences in the district environment and the leadership of local government. For example, bloody conflict and rioting occurred in Xi'an (Shaanxi, April 22-23), Changsha (Hunan, April 22-23) and Chengdu (Sichuan, April 22,

¹ National Committee of Education, ed., Jinxin dongpo de wushiliu tian (The soul-stirring 56 days), (Beijing: Dadi Publishers, 1989), p. 230. Abbreviated as 56 Days.

² Timothy Brook, Quelling the People. The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 169.

23 and June 4) while the movement proceeded and concluded peacefully in coastal areas. Appendix V.1 and Map V.1 chart the situation in some big cities during the high tide of democracy movement.

Still, my third case study will focus only on the democracy movement in Beijing City. This is not only because of Beijing's position as the center of power but also because the democracy movement finished with a tragedy of massacre in Beijing.

1.1 The April 26 *People's Daily* Editorial

Three turning points presaged the horrible fate of the democracy movement in 1989. The first is a *People's Daily* editorial, published on April 26, under the page-one headline, "It Is Necessary to Take a Clear-cut Stand to Oppose Turmoil." Faced with a seemingly contagious situation of expanding student protest and escalating anomic violence, the editorial echoed Deng Xiaoping's uncompromising statement of April 24 about the unpatriotic motives of student leaders, claiming that the student demonstrations were incited by "a small number of people with ulterior motives" whose intention was "to poison people's minds, plunge the entire country into chaos, and sabotage the political situation of stability and unity." In a threatening tone, the editorial alleged that "[T]his is a planned

conspiracy, a turmoil which, in essence, aims at negating the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system." Lastly, the editorial commanded the Party members and all the people to "actively go into action and struggle for the quick and resolute quelling of the turmoil."³ At this time, April 23-30, General secretary Zhao Ziyang was visiting North Korea. Although Zhao subsequently disavowed the hardline thrust of the April 26 editorial, it was later claimed by President Yang Shangkun that Zhao had cabled his "complete support" of the editorial's contents from North Korea.

The counterproductivity of the April 26 editorial became evident almost immediately. On April 27, summoned by newly established nonofficial student organizations, over 100,000 students and nonstudents marched to Tiananmen Square in a call for the retraction of the editorial, and a dialogue between state leaders and students, and in opposition to "bureaucracy, corruption, and special privilege." Without government's positive and sincere response, the protests continued and became radicalized when a hunger strike was launched on May 13.

³ Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen. Reform and Reality in Modern China, (San Francisco, CA: China Books & Periodicals, Inc., 1989), p. 156.

1.2 The Hunger Strike since May 13

The second turning point is marked by the hunger strike in Tiananmen Square. The arrival of Gorbachev on May 15 and the presence of scores of international journalists and television cameras prevented the government from taking effective countermeasures against the movement. The ranks of the hunger strikers quickly swelled to over three thousand; large crowds of sympathetic on-lookers also flocked to the square, forcing the Chinese authorities to reroute Gorbachev's motorcade and change the Soviet leader's scheduled activities.

The hunger strike was so stunningly successful in generating favorable publicity for the students that some movement leaders became intransigent and soon decided to fast "to the bitter end," or until the government capitulated to their demands. The rhetoric of moral outrage also became inflated. A group of hunger strikers from the Beijing University eloquently declared:

In this bright, sunny month of May, we are hunger striking. In the finest moment of our youth, we must leave behind everything beautiful about life. But how reluctant, how unwilling we are!

.....

Farewell, my love, take care! I cannot bear to leave you, yet it must come to an end.

Farewell, mother and father! Please forgive your child who cannot be loyal to the country and act with filial piety at the same time.

The vows written with our lives will brighten
the skies of the Republic!⁴

With such a spirit of martyrdom, the hunger strike served
further to polarize the conflict.

Although Zhao Ziyang persisted in trying to bring
about a peaceful resolution, his influence over decisions
affecting the handling of the student movement diminished
quickly. Zhao was in disgrace primarily because Deng
Xiaoping had already made up his mind to get tough with the
students. Deng also lost confidence in Zhao for his soft
stand toward the students and his disclosure of a secret to
Gorbachev. During a meeting between Zhao and Gorbachev on
May 16, Zhao confirmed the existence of the secret protocol
enacted at the Thirteenth Party Congress (October 25, 1987),
granting Deng Xiaoping final say on all important matters of
policy. Deng reportedly became livid upon learning of
Zhao's revelation.

1.3 The Martial Law Declared on May 20

With Zhao's influence on the decline, his effort to
achieve a compromise settlement through dialogue led
nowhere. Indeed, the party's Central Military Commission
(CMC) had prepared to impose military control in Beijing on

⁴ Han Minzhu ed., Cries for Democracy: Writings and
Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 199-
201.

May 16 before the government leaders' show of conciliatory gestures on May 18 and 19. However, it was, firstly, the break of a televised meeting between Li Peng, Li Tieying, Chen Xitong, and Yan Mingfu, and student leaders Wu'er Kaixi, Wang Dan, and others on May 18; and, secondly, a small number of radical students' refusal to terminate their hunger strike without prior government concessions, that totally failed Zhao Ziyang's attempt to forestall a declaration of martial law.

It was the martial law--the third turning point--that made the killing irreversible. On Saturday morning, May 20, Premier Li Peng signed the order imposing martial law in eight administrative districts of Beijing. By the time Li Peng declared martial law, approximately 100,000 PLA troops were already on the city's perimeter, having moved the previous night. However, alerted residents of Beijing have already taken to the streets, erecting makeshift barricades along key motor routes and placing themselves squarely in the path of the military convoys. In eyewitnesses' estimation, between one and two million people of Beijing took part in the May 19-20 effort to stop the PLA from entering the city. Most incoming army units thus had been immobilized. As Timothy Brook has explained:

Partly because martial law was leaked ahead of time, but even more because the citizenry was adamant that the Army not enter the city, the

soldiers found no place left unguarded. The offensive had failed within hours of its start.⁵

The declaration of martial law prompted not only nationwide but worldwide demonstrations, along with strikes and more violent actions in some Chinese cities. From May 20 to 23, numerous sympathy demonstrations were held in Xi'an, Shanghai, Nanjing, Kunming, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and in many smaller cities. The military action in the Beijing region provoked the anger of people throughout the country and deepened the people's hate for the regime. Beijing residents were determined to protect the students. New autonomous associations of intellectuals and workers were formed. Groups other than students constituted themselves as formal organizations, formulated demands, and issued manifestoes. Consequently, "what started as a student action became a broad protest movement," as Brook observed.⁶

While Zhao Ziyang's supporters and activist intellectuals were trying to use the National People's Congress (NPC) to shift the balance of power from the hardliners, Deng Xiaoping was also circling his wagons. By May 26, commanders of all seven greater military regions had publicly declared their support of martial law. On May 27, two days after Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the

⁵ Brook, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

NPC, rushed back to Shanghai from the United States, Wan also publicly announced his support for martial law. On the evening of June 3, preparations for the crackdown were nearing completion.

Most of the killing in Beijing took place between 10:45 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. at several locations throughout the city. The most horrible killing field was a section between Muxidi and Xidan on West Chang'an Boulevard, three miles from Tiananmen Square (see Map V.2: Maps of Beijing). Resisted by thousands of angry demonstrators, advancing infantry units, supported by APCs, and escorted by the People's Armed Police (PAP), discharged their AK-47s directly into the crowd. Hundreds of civilian people were killed along this particular stretch of Chang'an Boulevard.

But in Tiananmen Square itself, where an estimated three to five thousand students huddled around the base of the Heroes' Monument, no shots were fired. At about 4:00 a.m. on June 4, four intellectual hunger strikers, Liu Xiaobo, Hou Dejian, Gao Xin, and Zhou Duo negotiated an evacuation with the local commander of the PLA. Shortly before 5:00 a.m., the students began to withdraw and exit from the southeast corner of the square, singing the "Internationale." Just before dawn broke on Sunday, June 4, the PLA reoccupied Tiananmen Square.

On June 9, Deng Xiaoping appeared on television, congratulating military leaders on suppressing the "counterrevolutionary rebellion." Deng defended his reform policies and argued that

This disturbance was bound to come sooner or later. It was determined by the international macro climate and China's micro climate. It was definitely coming and was something that could not be diverted by man's will; it was only a matter of time and scale...

...The nature of this incident is the antagonism between bourgeois liberalism and adherence to the Four Cardinal Principles...⁷

Deng's speech marked the end of the 1989 Democracy Movement.

⁷ Han Minzhu, *op. cit.*, pp. 369-370.

2. Interactions between the Protesters and the Regime in Beijing

2.1 First Stage: Petitioning for Dialogue, April 15-May 4

(1) Petition movement in early 1989

It is not accidental that the protests after Hu Yaobang's death were mounted in a form of petition in addition to marches and demonstrations. Since the end of 1988, dissenters in China were linking together through conversations, meetings in salons and clubs, open air speeches and discussion on campuses. Moreover, as Stanley Rosen has observed, the pattern of dissent in China had undergone a startling and important change, that is the rise of prominent intellectuals as "dissenter," in a sense the "Sovietization" of dissent; and what might be called "internationalization" of their activities.⁸ Loosely gathered, the dissenters not only criticized the government but also raised demands by signing petition letters to government leaders. In the first three months at least eight petitions were activated. Signatories of these petitions included thousands of Chinese and foreign intellectuals. Among them were Fang Lizhi and many other well-known scholars.

⁸ Stanley Rosen, "Dissent and Tolerance in Chinese Society," *Current History*, September 1988, p. 261.

(2) Students' petitioning for dialogue

Under the impact of the democratic elite's petition movement, it is no wonder that Wang Dan and other students also attempted to present their petition to the NPC Standing Committee in a sit-in in front of the Great Hall of the People on April 18. More petitions presented by the students and intellectuals in the following days.

The petition movement continued. But, it is quite different this time. Although the students also demanded the release of Wei Jingsheng, they insisted in holding a dialogue with the high-level state leaders.

According to an official document, at 8:00 a.m. April 18, the responsible officials of the Party Central Committee and the Petition Office of the State Council's General Office invited student representatives, Wang Dan and Guo Haifeng, to the Great Hall of the People and accepted the petition. Coming out of the hall, Wang Dan expressed his dissatisfaction with the dialogue and agitated the students to demand a dialogue with the chairman of the NPC Standing Committee. The officials explained to Wang Dan that certain procedure is required for meeting the chairman. Wang Dan then demanded a dialogue with the members of the NPC Standing Committee.

Insisting on their demand for a dialogue with state leaders, the students went on to sit in front of the hall

until 5:30 p.m. when Liu Yandong, member of the NPC Standing Committee, and Tao Xiping, Song Shixiong, members of the NPC, met the student representatives and accepted the petition.⁹ However, the students continued to stage a sit-in and refused to leave.¹⁰

"Dialogue with Li Peng" became a crux of the problem from then on. Before dawn on April 19, several thousand students had gathered outside Zhongnanhai, official residence of party and government leaders, to stage a sit-in and had demanded that Premier Li Peng come out to talk with them. In a police charge, several students were injured. The episode supplied the students with the weapon of martyrdom, thus strengthening their belief in democracy and, particularly, demand for meeting Li Peng.¹¹

⁹ Summarily, students' petition contained seven demands: 1. Reevaluate Hu Yaobang's achievements and errors. 2. Severely punish the assailants who beat up the students and masses. 3. Promulgate the press law... to allow the publication of private newspapers and assure freedom of the press. 4. State leaders publicly reveal their own and their children's sources of income and property. Investigate and deal with official profiteering. 5. Relevant state leaders make formal self-criticisms to the people for mistakes in education policy... A big increase in the education budget and improve the treatment of teachers. 6. Reevaluate the [1987] "anti-bourgeois liberalization" campaign, and rehabilitate those citizens who were incorrectly denounced. 7. Fair and faithful news coverage of this patriotic democracy movement. Suzanne Ogden, et al., eds., China's Search for Democracy. The Student and the Mass Movement of 1989, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992), p. 91.

¹⁰ 56 Days, p. 22.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

At 11:00 a.m. April 22, when the official memorial service for Hu Yaobang was concluded and his remains left the Great Hall of the People, tens of thousands students chanted, "Dialogue, dialogue" "We demand dialogue" and "Li Peng, come out." At 11:30 a.m., three students conducted a mock ceremonial remonstrance on the eastern steps of the Great Hall, presenting their scrolled-up petition on hands and knees in an obsequious manner. Since the students insisted in meeting Li Peng face-to-face rather than transferring the petition through the officials of the memorial service, the petition was not delivered.¹² Believing they had been fooled by government leaders, students were disappointed and angry. Thereafter, the demand for dialogue with government leaders gained support from the student population as well as professors.¹³ The desire for dialogue even superseded other demands and became an aim of the student movement.¹⁴

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹³ For example, on April 21, one hundred forty-three professors and scholars from Beida signed an open letter to the NPC and CPPCC, petitioning for dialogue and non-violence. Again, on April 24, more than two hundred Beida teachers signed a big-character poster appealing the government to conduct dialogue with the students. Some Party member professors of the University of Political Science and Law made same request in an open letter to the Central of the Party. *56 Days*, pp. 33, 45.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22, 33.

(3) Student protesters were unprepared for dialogue

Although it seems clear that the students were desperately demanding a dialogue with the government, in the initial phase it was not clear how to bring the government to the table and, more importantly, who could represent the students on the table and what topics should be discussed in the dialogue. These were the serious issues facing the student protesters.

On April 24, sixty thousand students from thirty-eight institutes of higher learning, including Beijing University, Qinghua University, People's University, and Beijing Normal University, started a boycott of class in order to force the government to accept the students' seven demands raised on April 18. On campuses, students held meetings, staged sit-ins, marched, and posted small- and big-character posters to cry for democracy in China.¹⁵

Channeled by official All-China Students' Federation (ACSF), the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and the Municipal Government issued an invitation to student representatives from Qinghua University to a dialogue at 2:30 p.m. April 25. However, Qinghua was unable to send its representatives because of cleavage among the students.¹⁶

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 47. According to overseas Chinese newspapers, Qinghua student representatives' congress had assembled to discuss the matter of dialogue upon receiving the invitation. The students had decided by ballot not to

The SAFCUB later in a statement admitted the mistake of failing "to make an immediate response to the government's promise of 'having a dialogue.'"¹⁷

(4) April 26 editorial and April 27 demonstrations

Already in the morning of April 25 Deng Xiaoping and the Politburo Standing Committee, except Zhao Ziyang who was visiting North Korea, had categorized the student protest as "turmoil" (*dongluan*).¹⁸ Deng's allegations about a "planned conspiracy" embedded in the student demonstrations was

attend the dialogue for following reasons: (1) The government demands that the student delegation has to be composed of ten representatives from official student organizations and five from autonomous student organizations. A composition like this cannot be representative for all the students. (2) Even though some members of autonomous student organizations are willing to attend the dialogue in one's own name, many students worried that the unity of whole students in Beijing will be broken. (3) Qinghua does not represent all the universities and colleges in Beijing. A dialogue with the government should be attended by the representatives from the Provisional Students' Federation of Colleges and Universities in Beijing. (4) Finally, none of the members from the government are members of the NPC Standing Committee. Consequently, they are totally powerless to make decision on students' Seven Demands.

The aborted dialogue was presented by State Council Deputy Secretary-general Liu Zhongde, State Education Commission Vice-Chairman He Dongchang, Beijing municipal party deputy secretary Wang Jialiu. Wu Mouren, et al., eds., Bajiu Zhongguo Minyun Jishi (Daily Reports on the Movement for Democracy in China, April 15-June 24, 1989), (New York: August 1989), p. 47. Abbrev. as Jishi.

¹⁷ Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

¹⁸ "Turmoil" (*dongluan*) is a scary term that has been equally used to describe the disaster of the Cultural Revolution. Compare with "disturbance" (*naoshi*), the term used to characterize the student demonstrations of December 1986, "turmoil" is a more serious term which implies a bloodshed.

quickly echoed in the editorial of *People's Daily* published on April 26. Actually, the editorial had already been broadcast by the China Central People's Broadcasting (CCPB) and China Central Television (CCTV) on the evening of April 25.

Identified by the government as "illegal organizations" and "counterrevolutionary rebellion," autonomous student organizations and their leaders were suddenly under the threat of the government's reprisal and suppression. As a tactical defense, the Students' Autonomous Federation of Colleges and Universities in Beijing (SAFCUB, the Students' Autonomous Federation)--an umbrella organization of more than twenty-one branches--launched a large scale of demonstration on April 27.¹⁹ The demonstration was aimed firstly at protesting against the slanderous and evil wording thrown by the April 26 editorial and secondly at declaring the students' stand in pursuing stability and peace. By demonstrating peacefully while singing the "Internationale" and chanting officially approved socialist slogans, the students' tactic also served to reduce the likelihood of a police crackdown.²⁰ Their unified slogan in Tiananmen Square was: "We demand dialogue!"

¹⁹ More than thirty thousand students and some teachers from thirty-eight institutions of higher learning in Beijing have marched to Tiananmen Square. *56 Days*, p. 52.

²⁰ It is interesting to find that Beijing municipal government and the State Council responded differently to

(5) April 29 dialogue and the SAFCUB's frustration

There was a dialogue, but not with the Students' Autonomous Federation. In a two-pronged attempt to deflect mounting public criticism and drive a wedge between various groups of Beijing students, government leaders now agreed to hold televised talks with representatives of officially sanctioned school associations, but not with the SAFCUB.

The meeting was held in the afternoon on April 29. But, the announcement of the meeting was made only in the morning of the same day. Forty-five students from sixteen colleges and universities were invited by the ACSF to talk to the officials from the State Council and Beijing municipal authorities.

At the meeting, State Council spokesman Yuan Mu relayed Premier Li Peng's opinion that the target of the April 26 *People's Daily* editorial had not been the broad masses of patriotic student demonstrators, but rather a

the demonstration. The spokesman of the municipal government pointed out that the marches were not permitted and, therefore, had violated the rules of the "Ten Articles on Demonstrations." He also urged students to return to class and schools and to disband all the illegal organizations immediately. Instead, the spokesman of the State Council expressed that the government welcomes students' demand for dialogue. He said: "We party and government always favor direct dialogue with the mass. But, an atmosphere for dialogue is needed; we have to conduct [dialogue] in appropriate manner." *Ibid.*, p. 57. This phenomenon mirrored a power struggle between Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang as the events unfolded shortly later. But, I still don't understand how did Zhao's faction reveal their attitudes through the system of the State Council.

small group of "behind-the-scenes conspirators." State Education Commission Deputy Director He Dongchang then reiterated the government's refusal to recognize the legality of the SAFCUB. The dialogue was subsequently televised in its entirety several times by CCTV.

The SAFCUB's newly elected president, Wuer Kaixi and three other leaders of the student protesters were also invited. However, when Wuer Kaixi arrived, he was demanded to represent himself instead of the SAFCUB to which Wuer Kaixi agreed. But, when he was demanded to hold his tongue in the meeting Wuer Kaixi angrily withdrew from the talks. In the evening, Wuer Kaixi told the Chinese and foreign reporters that the SAFCUB does not recognize the meeting as a "dialogue." He insisted that a real dialogue should be held between the officials of the State Council and the Standing Committee of the SAFCUB.²¹

Angered by the "dialogue" dramas directed by the government and the officials' avuncular attitude throughout the session,²² the student protesters were even more determined to pressure the government to talk with genuine student leaders. On May 2, over seventy students from

²¹ Jishi, pp. 79-94, 97-98.

²² The government continued to play the shows of "dialogue" the following days. On April 30 and May 1, Mayor and Party Secretary of Beijing Municipality, and leading officials of seven ministers had separately talked to student representatives.

Beijing's universities delivered a petition to the NPC Standing Committee, State Council, and Party Central Committee. The petition demanded the government and the Party to have a dialogue with the representatives from the Students' Autonomous Federation. The dialogue should be based on complete equality and sincerity and the representatives from the government should be at or above the level of member of the Politburo Standing Committee, vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, or vice-premier of the State Council. In the form of ultimatum the petition demanded to receive an answer before 12:00 noon on May 3. Otherwise, the students would continue demonstration marches on May 4.

The demands were rejected by Yuan Mu, the spokesman of the State Council, in a press conference on May 3. The May 4 demonstrations did occur on not a small scale. But, the SAFCUB also announced the end of class strike. It is now clear that, as Shen Tong has observed, a real dialogue between the government and the SAFCUB was almost impossible, because the government had repeatedly called the Students' Autonomous Federation an illegal organization and because the SAFCUB was so disorganized that it was heading nowhere.²³

²³ Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), pp. 211, 217. Shen, a student of Beijing University and an organizer of the Students' Dialogue Delegation.

2.2 Second Stage: Dialogue and Hunger Strike, May 5-19

The student movement was in an ebb for several days following the May 4 demonstration. Most students had returned to classes and tried to catch up on their lost studies of the previous three weeks. In order to better prepare a dialogue with the government and, more importantly, hoping to surmount the primary obstacle to a dialogue: the government's hostility toward the Students' Autonomous Federation, the SAFCUB had decided to found a new student organization, the Beijing Students' Dialogue Delegation (the "Dialogue Delegation"). On May 3, ten schools sent representatives to form an independent dialogue delegation. Xiang Xiaoji and Shen Tong were made the chairman and vice-chairman of the Dialogue Delegation.²⁴ In the next two weeks, a new effort for dialogue was undertaken within a new context.

(1) Zhao's conciliatory line and deferment of dialogue

Upon his return from Pyongyang on April 30, Zhao Ziyang immediately posed to try a softer approach with the students. On May 4, Zhao Ziyang met with delegates at the 22nd annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank in the Great Hall of the People. During the meeting, Zhao for the first time openly but indirectly refuted the April 26

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 215, 217-8. Xiang, a student of the University of Political Science and Law.

editorial with such remarks as "China will not sink into turmoil." In terms of how to deal with the student demonstrations, Zhao clearly sent out a signal to the students chanting outside the hall that:

I believe it also has to be solved according to the rule of democracy and law and in the atmosphere of reason and order. At present, we need to hold extensive and consultative dialogues with the students, with workers, with intellectuals, with various democratic parties, and with people in all fields.²⁵

Under this atmosphere, the Dialogue Delegation actively searched for a real dialogue. To show students' sincerity, the Delegation set no precondition for dialogue. However, their requests for a substantial dialogue were repeatedly deferred from May 8 to May 11 and to anytime in a week.

(2) Hunger strike and the break of dialogue, May 13-18

Angered by repeated deferment of the dialogue, the radical students started a hunger strike on May 13. The hunger strike dramatically escalated student confrontation. Students who had returned to campuses struck again. The people of all fields, including policemen and soldiers, were discontented with the government, too.

Circumscribed by Gorbachev's predated visit on May 15 and the scores of international media gathered in Beijing, on the one hand; and stalled by the hardliners'

²⁵ Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

rejection to retract the April 26 editorial, on the other hand; the government was both unable to suppress the students and unable to compromise with them. Still, the CCP had tried every soft approach, except retracting the April 26 editorial, to solve the dilemma. The efforts by both sides in this period are chronicled as follows:

May

- 13 7:00 p.m. Yan Mingfu met forty or so students, young scholars, officials from the ACSF and CYL, Party Committees of CYL from Qinghua and Beida, and Wuer Kaixi and Wang Dan from the Hunger Strikers' Group. All agreed to hold dialogue immediately.
- 14 2:30 a.m. Li Tieying, Li Ximing, Chen Xitong, et al. visited students fasting in Tiananmen Square. But, they tried in vain to dissuade them from fast.
- 6:00 p.m. Li Tieying, Yan Mingfu, Yu Jianxing talked to the representatives from the Dialogue Delegation, the SAFCUB, the Students' Petition Group of Colleges and Universities in Beijing, and Hunger Strikers' Group. The dialogue was interrupted at 7:30 p.m. because the students insisted on getting the Party to revoke the April 26 editorial and televising the meeting live. Students also demanded that Yuan Mu and He Dongchang resign; and that Qin Benli, the editor-in-general of the *World Economic Herald* in Shanghai be reinstated.
- 15 8:30 a.m. Beijing municipal government broadcast at Tiananmen that the square was under martial law. But, no police were enforcing the martial law. Gorbachev arrived in Beijing.
- 8:30 a.m. the ACSF and the Beijing Students' Federation (BSF) invited over fifty students from Beijing's colleges and universities to talk to Li Tieying and Yan Mingfu, et al. in the CPPCC. Still, they were unable to dissuade students from fasting.
- 16 1:00 a.m. The government broadcast to the students gathering in Tiananmen Square, appealing to them to return to schools and not to obstruct the Sino-Soviet summit conference.
- 5:25 p.m. Yan Mingfu went to Tiananmen Square. He offered himself as the students' hostage until the government agrees to have a dialogue with the students. The hunger strikers did not accept Yan's offer.

- 17 Before dawn, Zhao Ziyang sent a message to the hunger strikers in Tiananmen Square on behalf of the Central Committee and the State Council, Zhao personally acknowledged the patriotic spirit of the student movement and promised no reprisals if the students would terminate their strike. Although a clear majority of the strikers reportedly favored accepting Zhao's offer, acceptance was blocked by a minority coalition of hard-line Beijing students and students from out of town.
- 8:00 p.m. Politburo Standing Committee decided to declare martial law in some districts of Beijing. Zhao Ziyang said that he could not execute this decision and offered to resign. His resignation was rejected.
- 10:00 p.m. Li Tieying visited striking students who were hospitalized in three hospitals.
- 18 5:00 a.m. Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi came to Beijing Xiehe and Tongren Hospitals to visit hospitalized fasting students. 3504 students had been treated in hospitals.
- 11:00-12:00 a.m. *Li Peng, Li Tieying, Li Ximing met student leaders (Wuer Kaixi, Wang Dan, et al.) in a discussion broadcast live on Chinese television. Talks were broken off because of Li's refusal to discuss the students' demands.*
-
- Gorbachev left China via Shanghai.

Official meetings are in *italics*.

Sources: 56 Days.

Jishi.

Shen Tong, Almost a Revolution.

The meeting on May 18 was the most important, last-ditch official effort to coax the students into calling off their strike and peacefully evacuating the square. Still, neither party was unable or unwilling to break the deadlock. Finally, Wang Dan declared that "the government will be entirely to blame." Li Peng was heard to remark: "You've gone too far."

(3) May 19: Zhao falls, martial law declared

At last, the deadlock was broken by declaring martial law and cracking the leadership. Early morning on May 19, Zhao Ziyang, by offering to take full responsibility for the student disturbance, made one last attempt to forestall a declaration of martial law at a Politburo meeting. The offer was rejected. Once again Zhao offered to resign. AS before, Zhao's resignation was rejected on the grounds that it would reveal a deep split within the leadership and would thus encourage the students to continue their strike.

At 5:00 a.m., tailed by Li Peng, Zhao Ziyang visited hunger strikers at Tiananmen. Zhao tearfully acknowledges the validity of the students' demands and declared his support, but confessed that he had "come too late." At 10:00 p.m., Li Peng tells a meeting of party, government, and military representatives that martial law in parts of Beijing had been approved and would be in force as of 10:00 a.m. the next day. Zhao Ziyang does not attend the meeting, claiming ill health.

2.3 Third Stage: Street Action and Massacre, May 20- June 4

The declaration of martial law immediately closed the door of direct communication between the students and the central government. The level of interactions again returned to the original point--the streets. The only

difference was that the students' democracy movement became a people's movement involving millions of citizens from all walks of life.

The street level interaction between students supported by Beijing residents, on the one side, and incoming troops, on the other side, lasted for over two weeks until late in the evening of June 3 when the massacre began in the boulevards leading to Tiananmen Square. The only possible indirect communication between the students and the regime was a meeting between an assistant of Deng Pufang, Deng Xiaoping's son, and Wuer Kaixi, Wang Dan, and other student leaders in the mid-night of May 22. They were told that the students at Tiananmen would have a respite of eight hours for retreat before the troops took over the square. Hence, Wuer Kaixi announced a retreat to the Embassy District. However, nothing happened eight hours later on the morning of May 23. Later, Wuer Kaixi was dismissed as chairman of the SAFCUB.²⁶

In fact, none of the student organizations was able to interact with the regime at local and national levels after the declaration of martial law. The SAFCUB had since retreated from Tiananmen Square to *Beida* and had become paralyzed. Xiang Xiaoji, chairman of the Dialogue Delegation, had already left Beijing on May 21 and escaped

²⁶ Jishi, p. 370.

to Hong Kong in July. Only the hunger strikers were waiting in the square for their uncertain fate.

2.4 Patterns of Interactions between the Protesters and the Regime

(1) Indirect interactions, April 15-May 4

Compared with the direct and national level of interactions at the second stage (May 5-18), the first stage marked indirect and insubstantial interaction between the students' autonomous organizations and the government. This is because the students and the government were contradictory to each other in their attitudes toward and conditions for dialogue.

Since the government refused to recognize autonomous student organizations and resolutely rejected a dialogue with "illegal" organizations, the interactions between the student protesters and the government could only remain at the street level and were fruitless in creating a solution of the student movement. Chart V.1 shows the levels of the interactions at this stage.

(2) Direct interactions, May 5-19

The juxtaposition of hunger strike and the Gorbachev visit intensified the confrontation between the students and the government. The mission of negotiating the hunger strikers' evacuation from the square before Gorbachev's arrival was assigned to Yan Mingfu, director of the United

Front Work Department, CCCPC. For three days before Gorbachev arrives in Beijing, Yan Mingfu had met intensively with student leaders from the Dialogue Delegation, the SAFCUB, and the Hunger Strikers' Group.

These interactions at the national level could have been the opportunity for the so-called "illegal" organizations to be tacitly accepted by the government. However, none of the radicals on either side intended to reach a compromise settlement. That chance never came back after Zhao Ziyang lost his influence and after the declaration of martial law on May 19. Chart V.2 depicts the levels of critical interactions at this stage.

(3) Back to the streets, May 20-June 4


The declaration of martial law banged shut the door of communication between the student protesters and the government. Unable to interact at a higher level, the movement went back to the streets.

But, something had changed after one and half month of the movement. The hunger strikers were not the only heroes in Beijing. Workers, teachers, high school and grammar school students, intellectuals, journalists, medical workers, and even customs officials and employees of the State Council and the Foreign Ministry were involved in this people's movement. The number of actors had largely expanded and the ranks of participants had diversified. Thus, in

Chart V.3 we see a picture of democracy movement quite different from what we saw five weeks ago.

Chart V.1

Interactions between the CCP and the student movement, April 15-May 4, 1989




↔ direct interaction <...> indirect interaction

Notes:

1. As Yuan Mu has said that the form of dialogue can be various and multi-dimensional, the government representatives are always composed of officials at central and local levels.
2. In order to have student protesters absorbed into or channelled through official student organizations, the protesters were invited by the ACSF or BSF to attend the dialogues in his/her own names.
3. More dialogues were held between various government ministries and their subsidiaries during this period.

Chart V.2

Interactions between the CCP and the student movement, May 5-19, 1989




Notes:

1. Direct interactions between the students and the Central leaders at national as well as street levels were made possible by the crisis caused by the hunger strike. Both Central and municipal leaders visited the students at Tiananmen and in hospitals. (May 14, 16, 18, 19.)
2. The moderates in the student movement were losing their influence to the radicals who were in charge of the Hunger Strike Group.

Chart V.3

Interactions between the CCP and the student movement, May 20-June 4, 1989



↔ direct interaction

Notes:

1. The Central leadership was now controlled by the hard-liners and strongly influenced by the military and old guards with Deng Xiaoping as their head.
2. In place of public security forces, the PLA and PAP were the main forces in quelling the people in the streets.
3. Although many activists and student leaders had tried to resume contact with the government, non of them had succeeded to interact with the central leadership in solving the crisis.

3. Interactions in the Governing Coalition

3.1 The standpatters in charge, the governing coalition in split, April 15-30

(1) Differences of opinion in the Politburo

According to Zhao Ziyang, there was no difference of opinion among the members of the Politburo Standing Committee on the student activism before the funeral ceremony for Hu Yaobang was held on April 22.²⁷ After Hu's funeral, Zhao proposed that (1) students must return to classes and stop marching; (2) the government should adopt a guiding principle of dredging and guiding to handle student unrest, and should develop various kinds of dialogue and communication; (3) bloody incident has to be avoided with every effort, but violent behavior must be punished in accordance with the law. In Zhao's words, "Comrade Li Peng

²⁷ "Summary of Zhao Ziyang's talks at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee (June 24, 1989)," *Shijie ribao* (World Journal, New York), 6/5/94, p. 2. Abbrev. as "Summary of Zhao's Talks." However, according to Chen Yizhi, in the morning of April 20 when Politburo Standing Committee held a meeting discussing student movement, Li Peng asserted that a few students are manipulated by bad men and they are targeting at the party and government, especially the old comrades. Zhao Ziyang did not believe that such a large number students can be manipulated by few bad men. Zhao insisted that persuasion and dialogue are the better ways to solve the problem. Chen Yizhi, Zhongguo: Shinian gaige yu 89 minyun (China: Ten Years of Reform and the Democratic Movement of 1989), (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1990), p. 151.

and other Standing Committee comrade members agreed with [my opinion]."²⁸

However, according to Richard Baum, the Politburo on April 22 held an urgent meeting at which it was decided (a) to terminate the official period of mourning for Hu Yaobang; (b) not to capitulate to student demands to reverse the verdict on Hu; and (c) to reaffirm the correctness of the 1987 campaign against bourgeois liberalization. Among those present at the meeting, only Zhao, Wan Li, and a small handful of others reportedly opposed the Politburo's decision.²⁹

(2) Li Peng drafted a policy in Zhao's absence

On April 23, Zhao left for a scheduled week-long visit to Pyongyang, North Korea. At this time, bloody incidents had already taken place in Beijing, Xi'an, Changsha, and Chendu.³⁰ Pushed by Beijing Municipality Mayor Chen Xitong and municipal party secretary Li Ximing, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Wan Li suggested that

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Richard Baum, Burying Mao (1994), pp. 248-9. It is contradictory to find that Zhao was later blamed to having refused other leaders' suggestion of summoning a meeting to study the student unrest in the eve of his leaving for North Korea. Instead, Zhao was blamed to play golf in a manner as nothing is happening. National Education Commission, et al., eds., Wushi tian de huigu yu fansi (A retrospect and reflection on the fifty days), (Beijing: The Higher Education Publishers, 1989), p. 20.

³⁰ In Beijing, the PAP had ambushed the students twice on April 20 (Xinhua Incident) and on April 22 at Beijing Railroad Station. Riots happened in Xi'an, Changsha, and Chendu on April 22/23.

Premier Li Peng convene an emergency session of the Politburo Standing Committee in Zhao's absence. In addition to Li, Qiao Shi, Yao Yilin, Hu Qili, the meeting was also joined by old guards Wang Zhen plus Yang Shangkun, who served as Deng Xiaoping's proxy. At the meeting, the student protest was described, for the first time, as a "turmoil" (*dongluan*) conspired by a handful people. Those at the meeting decided to set up a Group for Preventing Turmoil in the central government. Meanwhile, the meeting demanded Beijing municipal party committee and municipal government to mobilize the masses in order to quell the turmoil as soon as possible.³¹

- (3) April 26 editorial draws a line between the stand-patters and the liberals

On the morning of April 25, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun briefed Deng Xiaoping on the Standing Committee meeting and on the developing student protest situation. Accordingly, Deng labeled the student movement as an "anti-Party, anti-socialism turmoil." Based on Deng's uncompromising statement, a *People's Daily* editorial headlined "It Is Necessary to Take a Clear-cut Stand to Oppose Turmoil" was drafted and broadcast on the night before April 26.³²

³¹ Baum, *op. cit.*, p. 249. 56 Days, p. 46. Chen Yizhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-3.

³² It was claimed that Zhao had cabled his "complete support" of the editorial's contents from North Korea. But, Zhao argued later that the term of "turmoil" only referred to the scale of student unrest and the extent of its

The editorial intensified contradictions between the regime and the students. Extremely angered by the government's hard-line approach, the students launched on April 27 an impressive but peaceful demonstration involving over 100,000 people. The editorial had also quietly drawn a line between the standpatters represented by Li Peng and the liberals led by Zhao Ziyang.

3.2 Li Peng sabotages Zhao's soft-line, May 1-20

(1) Deng gives Zhao a try

Returning from North Korea on April 30, Zhao Ziyang rushed to Beidaihe to confer with Deng Xiaoping and to convey his misgivings about the government's choice of tactics in dealing with rebellious students. As Richard Baum has described:

Apparently taken by surprise by the strength of the popular backlash against the April 26 editorial, Deng agreed to allow Zhao to try a softer approach with the students, telling the general secretary: "The most important thing is to stabilize the situation... [Once] the situation is stabilized, you may carry out your plans: if they

influence on social order. In Zhao's opinion, "turmoil" implied neither the autonomous nor antagonistic nature of the student movement. See "Summary of Zhao's Talks."

Besides, according to an indictment of Zhao made by Yang Shangkun, China's president, in an internal speech to top-level Party officials later in May, Zhao made it known within the Party's high circles that he did not support the April 26 editorial, seizing the excuse that the text of the published editorial differed slightly from the text of the piece he had seen and endorsed by telegram while in North Korea. Han Minzhu, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

prove feasible [you may] disregard what I said [before].³³

Thereafter, Zhao appointed Director of the SEC Li Tieying to supervise the Committee for Student Affairs--a group in charge of the student unrest originally dominated by Li Peng. The Committee was composed of Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, Li Tieying, and the Minister of Public Security Wang Fang.³⁴

In line with Deng's instructions, Zhao outlined a more conciliatory government response. On May 3, Zhao delivered a speech at an official meeting to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, in which he suggested that democracy and reform could not materialize if China failed to maintain political stability, indicating that the students should help maintain order. Also in that speech, Zhao refused to stress "fighting bourgeois liberalization," although Li Peng and Yao Yilin had requested him to do so.³⁵

On May 4, Zhao made yet another speech during a meeting with delegations attending the twenty-second annual conference of the Asian Development Bank. In that speech,

³³ Baum, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-4.

³⁴ *South China Morning News (SCMN)*, (Hong Kong), 5/8/89. Cited by Jishi, p. 166.

³⁵ Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 38. Chen Yizhi, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

Zhao expressed his understanding of the student demands and further signaled his willingness to dialogue with students.

(2) Split deepens between the standpatters and Zhao after May 4

Zhao's speech to the delegates of the Asian Development Bank was actually an open challenge to the position of the standpatters. It had now been officially branded a "turning point" for the "escalation of the turmoil." According to Beijing Municipal Mayor Chen Xitong, Zhao was contradictory to the spirit of the April 26 editorial in three aspects: (1) Zhao denied the fact of turmoil; (2) Zhao negated that the real nature of the turmoil was anti-Communist; (3) Zhao also totally negated that a handful of people were creating turmoil as the "Party center" has judged.³⁶ It was said that Zhao even told Li Peng: "[I] hope you also listen to the school comrades' opinions. There is a great gap between our understanding and theirs."³⁷

The split between the liberals and the standpatters can be observed from the interactions on the following days:

On May 4, Zhao suggested to the Politburo Standing Committee that, in order to alleviate contradictions, he would like to take the responsibility of issuing the April 26 editorial and writing another editorial. Li Peng was

³⁶ Yi and Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.

³⁷ Chen Yizhi, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

persistently against this idea. Li also rejected Zhao's suggestion of investigating the profiteering activities of Zhao's two sons, saying, "Is this a challenge to the old comrades?"³⁸

Predawn on May 6, opposed to Zhao Ziyang's suggestion, Li Peng told the administrators of eight institutes of higher learning in Beijing that the April 26 editorial had been drafted according to Deng Xiaoping's opinion and, therefore, stood for the spirit of the Central Committee. What Zhao Ziyang had said could only represent himself. Li Peng also insisted that no one can change the following judgments: (1) the nature of the events is a turmoil; (2) the students are manipulated by a handful bad men; (3) the autonomous student organizations are illegal organizations.³⁹

On May 6, Zhao instructed Hu Qili and Rei Xinwen, who were in charge of propaganda, to further strengthen press freedom and permit truthful reporting of the student activities. Already on April 28, Hu Qili (no doubt at the urging of Zhao Ziyang) had told newspaper editors they could truthful report what was happening. Hu Qili was later expelled from the Politburo with this action cited as one of his major "mistakes."⁴⁰

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 157. Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

On May 8, Zhao Ziyang posed six points concerning the investigation of anticorruption, revoking leaders' privileges, and promoting judicial reforms. Zhao also suggested publishing his proposal in the *People's Daily*. Wan Li completely agreed with Zhao. But, Li Peng said: "That's only your personal opinion. It has not been discussed by the Politburo. Therefore, it cannot represent the Politburo's opinion." The next day, Li Peng also refused to publicize Zhao's opinion in the name of the NPC Standing Committee. Upon the insistence by several vice-chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee, an abstracted article about these points was published on May 12.⁴¹

On May 14, obviously opposed by Li Peng, the dialogue between Yan Mingfu and the students was unable to be broadcast live. The dialogue was interrupted and failed. A chance for student-government rapprochement was thereby lost. Li Peng also opposed Zhao's proposal of visiting student hunger strikers in Tiananmen Square.

On May 15, Zhao got in his car and again attempted to visit the students. Li Peng opened the door and told Zhao: if you visit the students, then you have to be responsible for splitting the Party. Consequently, Zhao

⁴¹ Chen Yizhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-9.

circled around the Square twice without getting out of the car.⁴²

(3) Deng loses confidence in Zhao

Finally, in a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on May 16, Zhao proposed to revoke the April 26 editorial. Li Peng said that texts such as "this is a planned conspiracy," "a turmoil," "its essence is, once and for all, to negate the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system," "this is a serious political struggle confronting the whole party and the people of all nationalities throughout the country," are Deng Xiaoping's words which cannot be changed.⁴³

At this time, Deng Xiaoping had lost his confidence in Zhao, in part, because Zhao was unable to stop the student unrest before the Gorbachev visit; and, in part, because Zhao confirmed the existence of the secret protocol granting Deng (and, to a lesser extent, Chen Yun) final say on all important matters of policy.

On the night of May 17, the Politburo Standing Committee met in Deng's house. Zhao preferred a peaceful resolution of the student unrest. Then, Yao Yilin made a long speech of more than one hour to attack Zhao. After that, the SC put the martial law to a vote. Li Peng and Yao

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 159.

⁴³ "Summary of Zhao's talks."

Yilin voted for martial law; Zhao voted against it; Qiao Shi abstained from voting and expressed his obedience to the "organizational decision" of the Party; Hu Qili expressed his obedience to the "organizational decision" and abstained from voting, but had reservation. With the army behind Deng, the decision of declaring martial law was made in Deng's home.⁴⁴

Zhao offered to resign on the spot, and again the next day, but was rejected. On May 19, Zhao refused to attend an emergency meeting of several thousand party leaders, military officers, and Beijing municipal officials in which Li Peng declared a state of emergency in Beijing stating that the government had decided to take "resolute and powerful measures" to quell the turmoil in Beijing. President Yang Shangkun then declared that under the circumstances there was "no choice" but to move PLA units into the capital. Actually, the troops had already entered the capital the previous night.⁴⁵ Thus, Zhao Ziyang's soft-line was totally defeated.

⁴⁴ Chen Yizhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-2. Zhao was defeated by Deng's last trump in following dialogue between them. In response to Zhao's plea to refrain from imposing martial law, Deng played his high card. "I have the army behind me," declared the patriarch. "But I have the people behind me," countered Zhao. "Then you have nothing," trumped Deng. Richard Baum, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

⁴⁵ "Summary of Zhao's talks." Richard Baum, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-3.

3.3 Last struggles in the governing coalition, May 20- June 24

(1) The democratic elite struggles for convening the Standing Committee of the NPC

In the first week following the martial law decree, a number of democratic elite were struggling to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict and to shore up Zhao Ziyang. Aiming at nullifying the martial law, three petitions were circulated among members of the NPC Standing Committee calling for a special session of the SC to be convened immediately to deal with the crisis. Initiated by Hu Jiwei and assisted by Cao Siyuan of the Stone Company, the petition collected the signatures of 57 members of the Standing Committee (out of a total of 156) on May 24. Since the 57 signatures (6 of which were later alleged to be unauthorized) fell well short of the absolute majority of 78 needed to call a special session of the committee, the petition drive failed.

(2) Wan Li supports martial law

The constitutional approach also failed because of Wan Li's and the old guards' compliance with the Deng-Li-Yang group. Wan Li, chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, was abroad on state business at the time of declaring martial law. High hopes were placed on Wan Li who, on May 22 in the course of an official visit to Canada and the United States, had publicly criticized the decision

to invoke marital law and declared his intention to "firmly protect the patriotic enthusiasm of the young people in China." Before returning to China, Wan Li indicated in the presence of President George Bush, that the protests would not be suppressed by violence.⁴⁶

However, when Wan Li cut short his visit to North America and returned to China on May 25, he landed in Shanghai and was immediately whisked into seclusion by Shanghai party chief Jiang Zemin. Two days later on May 27, Wan reemerged and publicly announced his support for martial law. Obviously, Wan Li was convinced by Jiang's briefing on the latest political developments in Beijing. Without choice Wan had to accept the fait accompli from a wholly pragmatic calculation.

(3) The old guards comply with Deng

In Beijing, Peng Zhen, former chairman of the NPC SC, convened a vice-chairman's meeting on May 22 in attempt to defeat a constitutional challenge to Li Peng and to win the old guards' compliance. At the meeting, Peng explained to the eighteen NPC vice-chairmen the necessity of martial law. According to Beijing Radio's report, the vice-chairmen had collectively expressed their gratitude to Peng for providing necessary clarification.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Richard Baum, *op. cit.*, p. 268. Yi Mu and Mark v. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁴⁷ Richard Baum, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

The Central Advisory Commission (CAC) of the CCP under its chairman Chen Yun also convened a highly irregular meeting which strongly endorsed the declaration of martial law. Also, Li Xiannian, the president of the symbolic political institution called Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), made a strong speech supporting martial law.⁴⁸ According to Yang Shangkun, old guards such as Wang Zhen, Deng Yingchao (Zhou Enlai's widow), Marshals Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangqian also expressed their concerns and support for martial law.⁴⁹

(4) Deng consolidates the army

In order to manage the political crisis, immediately after the declaration of martial law, Deng Xiaoping set up the National Guiding Group for Preventing Turmoil (*Fangzhi dongluan quanguo zhidao xiaozu*) in the Central Military Commission (CMC). The Group was personally commanded by Deng Xiaoping with Yang Shangkun and Minister of Defense Qin Jiwei as Deng's assistants.⁵⁰

On May 24, Zhao Ziyang's dismissal from the Politburo SC was approved at an enlarged session of the Polit-

⁴⁸ Yi and Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁴⁹ "Vice chairman of the CMC Yang Shangkun's speech at Emergency Enlarged Meeting of the CMC, May 24, 1989." *Jishi*, pp. 427-8. Abbrev. as "Yang Shangkun's speech on May 24."

⁵⁰ *SCMN*. Cited by *Jishi*, p. 348. It is noteworthy that the Group was set up in the Party's military headquarters instead of in the State Council.

buro. Of course, Zhao also lost his post of the first vice chairman of the CMC. With the general secretary in disgrace, vice chairman of the CMC Yang Shangkun stepped up his criticism of Zhao's behavior in an enlarged emergency meeting of the CMC on May 24. Zhao was accused of splitting the party into two competing camps and of inspiring Beijing students with the anarchistic behavior of Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. In conclusion, Yang Shangkun warned:

We can no longer retreat, but must launch an offensive. I want to tell you about this today so that you can prepare yourselves mentally. In particular, the army must be consolidated; this is of vital importance... If any troops do not obey orders, I will punish those responsible according to military law.⁵¹

Mobilized by Deng and Yang, commanders of all seven greater military regions had publicly declared their support by May 26,, with the Beijing regional commander the last-- and apparently the most hesitant--to do so.

(5) Deng realigns the governing coalition

With the army lined up behind and the old guards surrounded, Deng, Li, and Yang were able to quell the people with force and to shape a new governing coalition at the same time. The Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee held on June 24 therefore formally removed Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili from the Politburo and the Central Secretariat.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 430.

Zhao stood accused of a series of grave errors and mistakes. However, Deng Xiaoping refused to persecute Zhao as a criminal. Though Zhao was stripped of all formal powers and posts, he was not expelled from the party. What Deng Xiaoping was mostly concerned about was the establishment of the new party leadership.

As early as May 31, Deng had already made known that Jiang Zemin should be the "core" (*hexin*) of the new party leadership. On June 16, Deng urged the CCP to establish its third generation of collective leadership. Deng cautioned leading members of the Central Committee of the CCP that a collective leadership must have a core; without a core, no leadership can be strong enough. He diligently advised the new leadership to make an effort to maintain the core-- Comrade Jiang Zemin.⁵² As a compromise among present party leaders, the Fourth Plenum therefore chose Jiang to replace Zhao as general secretary. To round out the party's new leadership, other newcomers were promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee and the Secretariat. The party's new leadership after the Tiananmen Massacre is listed in Table V.1.

⁵² "Urgent tasks of China's third generation of collective leadership," Deng xuan, III, pp. 300-1.

Table V.1 Party's new leadership, the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee on June 24, 1989


<i>paramount leader</i>	Deng Xiaoping
<i>Politburo</i>	
<i>Standing Committee</i>	Jiang Zemin, general secretary Li Peng, premier Qiao Shi, vice premier Yao Yilin, vice premier Li Ruihuan Song Ping
<i>members</i>	Wan Li, chairman of the NPC SC Yang Shangkun Tian Jiyun Li Ximing Li Tieying Ding Guangen Wu Xueqian Qin Jiwei Yang Rudai
<i>Central Secretariat</i>	
<i>Secretaries</i>	Jiang Zemin, general secretary Li Ruihuan, Ding Guangen, Qiao Shi, Yang Baibing
<i>CMC</i>	
<i>Chairman</i>	Deng Xiaoping
<i>First vice chairman</i>	Yang Shangkun
<i>Second vice chairman</i>	Liu Huaqing
<i>Secretary-general</i>	Yang Baibing
<i>CAC</i>	
<i>Chairman</i>	Chen Yun
<i>Vice chairman</i>	Bo Yibo, Song Rengiong


3.4 Patterns of Interactions in the Governing Coalition

(1) First stage: dispute and split. April 15-May 17

Constant dispute and split over the policy and tactics toward the student unrest are the prominent features of the interactions in the governing coalition before Zhao Ziyang was disgraced on May 17. The dispute and split occurred in the top leadership as well as in the party and state organs. At the central level, the Politburo split into two camps--hard-liners and soft-liners. At the middle level of the political organizations, the employees had either petitioned to the authorities or protested in the streets. Because of the lack of consensus among the members of the Politburo, there was a stalemate between the standpatters and the liberals as well as between the regime and the protesters. Not until Zhao was completely defeated in a duel with Deng on May 17, was the deadlock finally broken by the decision of declaring martial law. Chart V.4 shows the pattern of interactions in the first stage.

Chart V.4 The pattern of interactions in the governing coalition, April 15-May 17



 Split \longleftrightarrow direct interaction

Notes:


1. This is only a model. Not all elements are included. For example, dispute also existed in the PLA although we know very little about it.
2. Serious dispute and split also existed in the democracy movement.
3. Private institutions include organizations such as the Stone Corporation and the Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (SERI) which supported the movement or tried to mediate the conflict between the student protesters and the CCP.

- (2) Second stage: realignment and repression. May 18-
June 4

With Zhao Ziyang in disgrace and martial law in practice, Deng Xiaoping began to integrate various power groups into a front of anti-democratization and liberalization. These power groups included, first of all, the military, and then the old guards in the NPC, CPPCC, CAC, as well as numerous retired cadres. This was the time when Jiang Zemin was transferred from Shanghai to the Party center and the greater military regions expressed their support for martial law.

On the other hand, different voices in the Party were silenced and Zhao's faction and supporters were purged. Military officers such as General Xu Qinxian of the elite 38th Group Army, who tried to avoid ordering his troops to enforce martial law, were arrested or transferred. Therefore, the Party leadership was unified enough on the eve of the Tiananmen Massacre to suppress the dissents within the Party and in society. Chart V.5 shows the interactions at the second stage that led to the Tiananmen Massacre.

Chart V.5 The pattern of interactions in the governing coalition. May 18-June 4



split

↔ direct interaction

<..> indirect interaction

Notes:

1. Hu Qili was dismissed from the Politburo later. Qiao Shi subordinated to the standpatters.
2. Jiang Zemin should have informally replaced Zhao as early as May 24 when Zhao's dismissal from the Politburo was approved.
3. As the executor of martial law, the PLA was the key actor at this stage.

4. Conclusion

4.1 Legitimacy Problems

On the eve of the 1989 pro-democracy movement the CCP faced more serious legitimacy problems than in 1986. By the end of the 1980s the CCP's reform had encountered serious economic difficulties and social unrest. The most acute problems were runaway inflation, social disorders that resulted from rampant economic crimes, and worsening inequality of income distribution. Politically, people were angry with the Party officials' corruption and nepotism. For example, in the 1989 protests, wall posters on the Beijing University and Qinghua University campuses publicized alleged "family ties in the government." Because many of Chinese leaders' children and relatives were placed in a position to become China's new ruling class, this group of future successors were called the "Prince Party" (*Taizi dang*). Hence, neither Deng Xiaoping's charisma nor communist dogma could dissuade the people from challenging the CCP's legitimacy. Determined to quickly restore its authority and maintain its dominance, the Communist regime used brute force to suppress the protesters.

4.2 Domestic Demonstration Effects

As in the Student Movement of 1986-87, again the factor of *domestic demonstration effects* played an un-

deniable role in spreading the student protests throughout the country. This time in 1989 it was the protests on those "lead campuses" in Beijing--Beida, Qinghua, Renda, Beishida--that helped stimulate demonstrations on other campuses and brought students from provinces to the capital to participate in demonstrations. In the later period of the movement, those non-Beijing students became the main body of the movement and even dominated Tiananmen Square.⁵³ Moreover, the snowball was not only rolling from one campus to another, but also from campuses to the society, making the student protests a mass movement.

To emphasize the *domestic* demonstration effect does not mean that the demonstration effect of foreign countries was not a factor in promoting China's democratization. The name of the first autonomous student organization, the Beijing University Students' Solidarity Committee, is a reflection of Poland's Solidarity. The Beijing Workers' Autonomous Union was also inspired by Lech Walesa's Solidarity. One of slogans in the movement asked: "China's Walesa--Where Are You?"⁵⁴ A big-character poster at People's University even urged that the Chinese people "to wage a continuous struggle against the ruling party, as did

⁵³ For example, Nanjing University student Li Lu left for Beijing on April 26 and became a leader of the Hunger Strikers Group. Li Lu, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁵⁴ Han Minzhu, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

Poland's Solidarity, until we achieve legal status."⁵⁵

Also, the hunger strike as a symbolic act of suicide was one of many imported symbolic acts. Gorbachev's visiting Beijing in May also produced dramatic demonstration effects. His reforms in the Soviet Union and his image as a democratizer demonstrated to the Chinese students another possibility of change in China. In a word, it is not difficult to find the signs of *external* demonstration effects. But, these *external* demonstration effects were always resisted by the government and, most of time, it was those "lead campuses"--the elite students of the society--that spread the impact from abroad to inland China.

4.3 External Actors

Many external actors played a role in the 1989 pro-democracy protests. Among them, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, international communication networks, and overseas Chinese greatly influenced the development of demonstrations in Beijing. Firstly, Gorbachev's timely May 15 visit helped the student movement gain momentum. Western news media flooded into Beijing for the event of Sino-Soviet summit (some had arrived earlier to cover the Asian Development Bank meeting that began May 4). As Craig J. Calhoun observed:

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

Their presence gave the students a chance to gain space on various nations' front pages and news broadcasts... The powerful visual images of the movement, set against the backdrop of both imperial and communist landmarks, made for effective television and brought enormous international attention, which both pushed the students forward and upset the government.

Gorbachev appealed to the students as a charismatic reformer in another communist country. He symbolized the possibility of change within communism and the validity of political liberalization.⁵⁶

Although Gorbachev saved face for the Chinese government by making no direct public reference to the demonstrations, the presence of Gorbachev and the media not only inhibited the government from taking harsh action to suppress the students protests but also abruptly swelled the ranks of the hunger strikers and protracted the protests.

Just as in the 1986/87 Student Movement, the BBC and VOA were the most important and reliable source of information for the Chinese audience since mid-April 1989. The student protesters listened to the BBC and VOA every day. They summarized new reports on posters and put them up.⁵⁷ The VOA not only contributed to the fast diffusion of student protests but also interacted with the Chinese audience. The VOA even broadcast a telephone number for

⁵⁶ Craig Calhoun, Neither Gods Nor Emperors. Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 67.

⁵⁷ Li Lu, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

listeners in China to call in the week after the massacre.⁵⁸ The VOA's service was so successful that since May 21, the Government in China had been jamming its Mandarin broadcasting, making listening much more difficult and much more tedious. On June 14, the Chinese government even expelled Al Pessin, the VOA's chief correspondent.⁵⁹ Prominent international media such as the *New York Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, and *Los Angeles Times* also played a role in 1989. Their reports on the demonstrations were reported back to China and became part of the *xiaozibao* (small character poster) in the movement. During the Tiananmen Massacre, the TV cameras even brought the bloody scene into the living rooms of American families. Together with international human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch, the nongovernmental foreign actors had provoked international sanctions against the Beijing regime.

Another important group of foreign actors is the overseas Chinese sympathizers, especially those in Hong

⁵⁸ According to Richard W. Carlson, director, VOA, U.S. Information Agency (USIA), many calls from China requested more hours and more news from the VOA, and help from the United States. The Role of the United States Embassy and the Voice of America in the Recent China Uprising. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, June 15, 1989. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 38-51.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

Kong, Taiwan, and the United States. During the weeks of the hunger strike and immediately after the massacre, the Hongkong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China raised a total of HK\$30 million (US\$4 million) for the Tiananmen protesters. Taiwan government and civilian groups also raised millions of Taiwanese dollars for the students at Tiananmen and those exiled abroad.⁶⁰ It can be said that the movement was sustained by a stream of cash donations from China's private sector and from overseas sympathizers.

Although the external actors played a big role in the 1989 pro-democracy movement, most of them did not provoke or intervene in the movement. With the exception of the overseas Chinese and a few foreigners, most of the external actors were only observers. Obviously, the external actors did not bring about the protests even though they were highly relevant to the escalation and sustention of the 1989 protests in the final stage.

4.4 Economy and Culture

The economic reforms had helped to increase Western influences upon Chinese culture. Through comparisons with the West, China's intellectuals felt a twinge of humiliation

⁶⁰ "Stirring the Blood. Dissidents seek Overseas Chinese help in ousting leadership." *FEER*, 8/24/89, pp. 16-19.

at China's poverty and weakness, and therefore, were pre-occupied in 1989 with a sense of cultural crisis. Students and intellectuals considered about China's fate and questioned what it meant to be Chinese at the end of the twentieth century. They also questioned the relationship between Chinese culture and democracy.⁶¹

Aside from cultural crisis, Craig Calhoun also found that changes in interpersonal relationships and in the role of university campuses provided soil for the protests. Drawing on participant-observation, Calhoun found that friendship bond was a factor that mobilized the student protests. In 1989, the strong feeling for friendship overcame the previous commitment to communist ideology and party. In Calhoun's opinion,

the resurgence of friendship was one of the most basic manifestations of society beyond the reach of state manipulation... It offered an important resource for insurgency. Friendship networks were a genuine form of organization, if one of only limited capacity.⁶²

Calhoun also posed a special view of the correlation between protest and the "civil society." He suggested that, though the reform era saw an increase in "free spaces" for discussions such as private restaurants, the most important institutional spaces for the nurturance of protest were the universities themselves. As Calhoun indicated:

⁶¹ Craig J. Calhoun, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11, 213-4.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 172.

Although the 1989 movement gained from the emergence of new, independent organizational bases outside the official purview of the state, the protest was rooted much more fundamentally in institutions run as part of the state apparatus. The "civil society" that mattered was not altogether distinct from the state but had roots deep within it. And the public sphere--however limited--that emerged depended not only on the support of new structures but also on changes in the significance and use of state-sanctioned entities.⁶³

Of course, there were many signs of cultural change in China.⁶⁴ What Calhoun has seen were the changes that most relevant to the 1989 student protests. In any case, there was enough evidence to show that unbalanced development between political and economic systems reinforced cultural change in favor of pro-democracy protest even though the Chinese economy had not grown into the "political transition zone" in 1989.

Quite different from the Democracy Wall Movement and the Student Movement, many causes for student protests clearly existed in 1989. When the students established independent student organizations, shouted: "Li Peng, come out!", and staged protests in defiance of martial law, the

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁶⁴ Many books provided data about social and cultural change in China. For examples: Deborah Davis and Ezra Vogal, eds., Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen: The Impact of Reform, (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1990) and Godwin C. Chu and Yanan Ju, The Great Wall in Ruins: Communication and Cultural Change in China, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993).

regime's legitimacy crises were exposed and its authority challenged. The external actors such as foreign visitors, overseas Chinese sympathizers, and international media were either actively involved in the demonstrations at Tiananmen or reported the events to the outside world. However, a scanning of major factors of democratization shows that the efforts to democratize China in 1989 failed partially because some factors such as external actors and demonstration effects existed only at a lesser degree. Also, due to the lower level development of the Chinese economy and the students' superficial recognition of Western democracy, China was not well prepared to realize democracy in 1989. Table V.2 tries to evaluate the degree of correlation between the variables of democratization and the 1989 pro-democracy protests.

Table V.2 The degree of correlation between the variables and the 1989 pro-democracy protests


	<i>The degree of correlation to the protests</i>
<i>Five variables:</i>	
1. Legitimacy crises	<i>high</i>
2. Economic dislocation	<i>high</i>
3. Cultural change	<i>high</i>
4. Snowball effects	<i>low-->high</i>
5. External actors	<i>low-->high</i>


Appendix V.1 The situation of some big cities during the heydays of Democracy Movement, April-June 1989

<i>Cities(Provinces)</i>	<i>Number of participants in demonstrations</i>	<i>Violence or Riots(yes/no)</i>
1. Beijing	2 million	no
2. Tianjin	150,000	yes
3. Shanghai	1 million	yes
4. Nanjing(Jiangsu)	500,000	yes
5. Wuhan(Hubei)	500,000	yes
6. Xi'an(Shaanxi)	500,000	yes
7. Lanzhou(Gansu)	200,000	yes
8. Changsha(Hunan)	200,000	yes
9. Chengdu(Sichuan)	700,000	yes
10. Urumqi(Xinjiang)	30,000	no
11. Lhasa(Tibet)	20,000	no
12. Kunming(Yunnan)	100,000	yes
13. Nanning(Guangxi)	80,000	yes
14. Haikou(Hainan)	30,000	yes
15. Guangzhou(Guangdong)	500,000	yes
16. Fuzhou(Fujian)	60,000	yes
17. Hangzhou(Zhejinag)	400,000	yes
18. Nanchang(Jiangxi)	100,000	yes
19. Hefei(Anhui)	150,000	yes
20. Jinan(Shandong)	60,000	yes
21. Shijiazhuang(Hebei)	60,000	yes
22. Taiyuan(Shanxi)	300,000	yes
23. Hohhot((Inner Mongolia)	50,000	yes
24. Shengyang(Liaoning)	700,000	yes
25. Changchun(Jilin)	90,000	yes
26. Harbin(Heilongjiang)	120,000	yes
27. Yinchuan(Ningxia Huizu)	70,000	yes
28. Zhengzhou(Henan)	80,000	yes
29. Guiyang(Guizhou)	300,000	yes
30. Xining(Qinghai)	250,000	yes


Source:

An Investigation of the General Situation in 29 Provinces, Cities, Regions in Support of Beijing Democracy Movement[Chinese],(Taipei: Bureau of Military Intelligence, Ministry of Defense, September 1989).





Map 1. Beijing.



Map 2. Central Beijing.

Map V.2 Maps of Beijing (source: Timothy Brook, *Quelling the People* (1992), pp. 23, 132.)

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA

1. Why Did It Happen?

After scanning five key variables in three Chinese cases of pro-democracy protest, I want to discuss the nature of the variables and the relationships between the key variables and the protests in this concluding chapter.

1.1 Legitimacy Problems

As the case studies show, legitimacy problems were highly correlated to the pro-democracy protests. From a comparative perspective, two aspects of the CCP's legitimacy problems should be discussed here:

(1) The declining legitimacy of the CCP regime

If the validity of a governmental legitimacy rests upon the voluntary obedience of citizens, then we can say that the level of the CCP regime's legitimacy began declining after 1978. The volume of participants in the protests was greater and greater. The main force of the protesters expanded from workers in the Democracy Wall Movement to students in the Student Movement (1986-87), and

to all walks of life in the Tiananmen demonstrations. The protesters' demands became broader and more radical. The imprisoning and killing of the protesters, and the dismissal of two general secretaries also delegitimated the CCP regime.

(2) Searching new sources of legitimacy

Immediately after Mao's death in 1976, Hua Guofeng quickly found that he could not rest his legitimacy just on Mao's will: "With you in charge I am eased." In 1978, Deng Xiaoping rebuilt the regime's legitimacy on his charismatic leadership and his promise to modernize the nation. His regime also benefited from "negative legitimacy" deriving from the disaster of the Cultural Revolution. However, the unbalanced economic growth and the failure of political reform exhausted these sources of legitimacy. Although the regime tried to base its legitimacy on economic performance, the *dilemma of unbalanced economic growth under the authoritarian regime* damaged its legitimacy more seriously in the 1986/87 Student Movement and the Tiananmen Massacre.¹ As a result, in addition to economic performance, Li Peng-Jiang Zemin regime has to appeal to police force and nationalism for new sources of legitimacy. Whether or not the new

¹ Huntington said that authoritarian regimes lost legitimacy if they did not perform and also lost it if they did perform. The Third Wave(1991), p. 55.

sources of legitimacy will affect the democratization in China remains to be seen.

1.2 Economic Development and Economic Crises

Economics is a very complicated variable that produces various and even contradictory effects on democratization. For example, marketization of communism produced a group of people with vested interests in the regime and society who became the supporters of economic reform and, therefore, the legitimacy of the regime. On the other hand, economic development increased international communication which, in turn, created opportunities for the Western culture, the demonstration effects of the third wave of democratization, and the external actors to assert their influence on China.

In comparison, economic crises were a cause of the DWM in 1978/79, while in 1986 and 1989 both economic growth and economic crises were a cause of the pro-democracy protests. Because the economic factor underlined social unrest and intertwined with other factors to enhance the momentum of the protest, it is no wonder that variable of economy was highly correlated with three pro-democracy protests.

1.3 Cultural Change

Like the factor of economy, culture can have both negative and positive effects on democratization in China. As a result of Western influence on Chinese culture or the response to Western culture, some elements, new or old, in Chinese culture such as nationalism, xenophobia, individualism, or indifference to politics can be negative to democratization. But, other elements such as liberalism, Westernization, or a higher demand for the government can be favorable to democratization. In any case, China today is undergoing enormous change. For example, a core value in traditional China--submission to authority--has been weakened radically, as a recent survey indicates.² Therefore, even though not all the changes in Chinese culture are in favor of democratization, changing patterns of behavior that appear to be fundamentally different from the past were certainly the main cause of various protests including pro-democracy protests in China. In comparison, when the influence of Western culture on China was stronger and

² According to a field study of cultural change in China, Godwin C. Chu and Yanan Ju found eight major characteristics in new Chinese culture: (1) family ties remain stable, (2) latent hard working ethics, (3) rising materialism, (4) social relations becoming superficial, (5) submission to authority weakening, (6) rejection of passive philosophy of life, (7) belief system in doubt, (8) adventure and risk taking. The Great Wall in Ruins. Communication and Cultural Change in China, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 272-297.

stronger along with the open door policy, the correlation between the cultural change and the pro-democracy protests became higher and higher.

1.4 Demonstration Effects

The third wave of democratization certainly had the sort of influence on China which Poland's Solidarity Movement and Taiwan's democratization. But, compared with other factors, demonstration effects are a less evident occasion of pro-democracy protests in China. Although it is difficult to analyze the effects of demonstration effects in individual cases as Huntington recognized,³ little marks of demonstration effects can be found. For example, former vice-president of the UST(Hefei), Fang Lizhi is a typical figure deeply influenced by the Western democratic ideas. But, Fang and his species were a minority in China even though they were the most important agents of change who diligently promoted democratization in China. Students' watchwords also reflected the impact of demonstration effects. However, many of these watchwords such as "Give me liberty or give me death!"(Patrick Henry) and "Government of the people, by the people, for the people."(Abraham Lincoln) were quoted from the first wave of democratization in the nineteenth century.

³ Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

For Chinese protesters political models usually came from democratized Western countries especially the United States. The primary reason for this phenomenon is simple. As Huntington suggested, "The American democratic model was appealing in part because it stood for freedom, but also, one has to assume, in part because it conveyed an image of strength and success."⁴ For the Chinese workers and probably some student activists, Poland's Solidarity was their model.

Compared to the United States, other lead countries in Europe and in Asia such as Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines had only a marginal impact on China. Although Chinese protesters did mention the examples of their neighboring countries, it is obvious that those demonstrations in China did not occur in response to the external environment.

It is interesting to find that nation-wide pro-democracy demonstrations and protests were triggered by a few lead cities or lead campuses on several specific occasions. I call this phenomenon "*domestic demonstration effects*" in order to distinguish it from the demonstration effects from the *external* environment. The 1978/79 Democracy Wall Movement, the 1985 student unrest, and the 1989 Democracy Movement were launched in the capital, Beijing, or by the students of Beijing University (*Beida*).

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 286-7.

One exception was the 1986/87 Student Movement which was triggered in Hefei (Anhui) by the students of the University of Science and Technology (UST). The demonstrations were quickly spread to neighboring cities and campuses in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Wuhan (Hubei). Under the tight control of the Party, Beijing was the last city to catch the wave. The main reason for this exception was that students of UST were influenced by Fang Lizhi, current vice president of UST and a prominent democratic elite.

It is also interesting to find that there were one or two lead campuses in every city. Traditionally, *Beida* had been the pacer of student activism for the whole country since the end of nineteenth century. In Shanghai, Shanghai Jiaotong University and Tongji University are the lead campuses in the modern history of China. Nanjing University, UST at Hefei, Wuhan University, Xi'an Jiaotong University, and Changsha Teachers' College each played a leading role in that district. It was these lead campuses that caused demonstration waves in China.

Judging from the above mentioned facts, it is appropriate to say that while there were lead countries that helped stimulate demands for comparable changes in neighboring and culturally similar countries, there were also lead cities or lead campuses in China that produced demonstration effects in other parts of the country which

had similar conditions. Therefore, my supposition is that while the snowball effects melted in China, *domestic* demonstration effects may have strengthened demonstration effects from the external environment to make the fire of protests burn across the country.

1.5 External Actors

The comparative case study shows that both external governmental and nongovernmental organizations did not play a major role in China's democratization until and after the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. Two features are worthy of our attention. Firstly, foreign governments, especially the United States, have not substantially changed their non-intervention policy toward China's democratization. Secondly, even though non-governmental organizations and overseas Chinese enthusiastically involved in Tiananmen, it is unsure that they will express same enthusiasm if there were pro-democracy protests in the future. However, there is a general trend that the external actors are more concerning about China's human rights. The implication of this trend on China's democratization needs a further study.

Generally speaking, factors of legitimacy, economics, and culture were highly related to the occurrence of the pro-democracy protests. However, a high correlation between a variable and the protest does not mean that that

variable is necessarily in favor of *democratization*. And factors of external demonstration effects and external actors were marginal in relation to protests. In an attempt to compare the effects of each variable in different cases, Table VI.1 sketchily synthesizes the relationships between five variables and the protests. The nominal per capita income and inflation rate during each case is included for reference.

Table VI.1 The degree of correlation of five variables with the pro-democracy protests, 1978-89

<i>Five variables</i>	<i>correlation with</i>		
	Case 1 1978/79	Case 2 1986/87	Case 3 1989
1. Legitimacy	<i>high-->low</i>	<i>high</i>	<i>very high</i>
2. Economics	<i>high</i>	<i>high</i>	<i>high</i>
3. Culture	<i>high</i>	<i>higher</i>	<i>very high</i>
4. Snowball effects (domestic demon- stration effects)	<i>low</i> <i>high</i>	<i>low</i> <i>very high</i>	<i>low-->high</i> <i>very high</i>
5. External actors	<i>very low</i>	<i>low</i>	<i>low-->high</i>
nominal per capita income (yuan)	300-400 US\$230+/-	700-900 US\$260+/-	1100-1300 US\$240+/-
inflation rate (approx.)	2%	7%	18%

2. How Did It Happen and Fail?

2.1 Divided Governing Coalition and the Protests

A comparative study of Chinese cases shows that, basically, the protests occurred in a context when the CCP regime was threatened by the declining legitimacy and a leadership divided over the policy toward liberalization and democratization. Because the legitimacy crises were caused by the horror of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping and his associates faced a complex and difficult dilemma: how to end the twenty-year reign of Leftism in China without at the same time opening the door to liberalist agitation, political opposition, and consequent instability. As a result, the Chinese leadership was repeatedly found in a situation of cleavage exactly as Huntington described:

Declining legitimacy usually provoked doubt in the minds of authoritarian leaders and divisions within the leadership over which response to choose. The resulting hesitation, disagreement, and fluctuations in action then further decreased the legitimacy of the regimes and encouraged political groups to think about successors to them. (underline added)⁵

A review of Chinese experience shows a correlation between the leadership cleavage and the pro-democracy protests. During the Democracy Wall Movement in 1978-79, when Party chairman Hua Guofeng tried to block Deng

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

Xiaoping's reinstatement, Deng proposed political reform to cripple Hua's power and encourage people to air their grievances and discontent in against Hua and his leftist colleagues. Consequently, the DWM found a chance to claim the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and a transition of regime from authoritarianism to democracy.

The case study of the 1986/87 Student Movement shows that the student protests sprouted and burst out in a context of policy and theoretical argumentation between the reformist power elite and the democratic elite (such as vice-premier Wan Li's debates with Fang Lizhi) and between the reformers and the standpatters (such as Fang Lizhi's criticism of Zhang Baifa, deputy mayor of Beijing). Because of the division in the governing coalition and Hu Yaobang's insistence on using a conciliatory approach in the first half of the Student Movement, the local governments were hesitant to use oppressive measures to handle student unrest. Consequently, the pro-democracy student protests quickly reverberated throughout all of China.

The correlation between the division in the regime and the flourish of pro-democracy protests in 1989 is apparent. From the very beginning of the student activism, differences of opinion existed among the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, such as how to define the nature of the student protests and what measures should be

adopted to handle student unrest. Consequently, because of this argumentation within the governing coalition, its policy toward the student protests was inconsistent. Worse than that was the unpredictable reaction from the students. The students were neither deterred by the hard-line attitude nor dissuaded by the soft-line approach. In the course of time, the differences between the reformers and standpatters deepened and the division in the central leadership spread to the whole Party. Together with other factors, the student protests evolved into a social unrest and became more difficult to subdue. Therefore, it is safe to say, while the pro-democracy protests were started with demands for constitutional rights and democratization of the system, the protests were able to flourish only when a governing coalition divided over the policy toward liberalization and democratization.

2.2 Deng Xiaoping's Perception of the Protests and the Use of Force

It is doubtless that Deng Xiaoping was the highest decision maker for the Tiananmen Massacre. How did Deng's perceptions of the democracy movement influence his decision of using the PLA to quell the people? Comparing Deng's comments on the 1976 Tiananmen Incident and the 1978-79 Democracy Wall Movement, I found that Deng still held his negative perceptions of the democracy movement in 1989.

Firstly, Deng did not believe that the 1989 democracy movement was a spontaneous mass movement. He looked at the demonstrations as a "turmoil" and believed that the student unrest was "entirely a planned conspiracy" aimed at overthrowing the CCP and the socialist system. He also believed that the students were influenced by a handful of bad guys like the rebellion faction during the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, he condemned the autonomous student organizations as "illegal."⁶

Secondly, in 1989 Deng insisted more than ever on upholding leadership by the Communist Party and upholding socialism--the two most important elements of the Four Cardinal Principles. Also, he was more determined to maintain stability in China and not to tolerate turmoil.

Regarding the government's attitudes toward the demonstrators, Deng, in his talk with Richard Nixon, reiterated his two-handed tactics: to educate students and forgive them on the one hand, and to punish "the handful of people with unbridled ambitions who tried to overturn" the government, on the other hand.⁷

⁶ "#24 A Document Circulated among Senior Party and Government Officials Earlier This Month[April 25, 1989]," Michel Oksenberg, et al., eds., Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict. The Basic Documents, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), pp. 204-5.

⁷ "The United States Should Take the Initiative in Putting an End to the Strains in Sino-American Relations (October 31, 1989)," Deng xuan, III, p. 321. These tactics are consistent with Deng's instruction in a 1986 speech that

Based on these perceptions, Deng had, as early as April 25, foreseen the use of force in the suppression of the chaos caused by student unrest. To prepare his protégés mentally, Deng told Yang Shangkun and Li Peng that "We must do our best to avoid bloodshed, but we should foresee that it might not be possible to completely avoid bloodshed." Then, Deng Xiaoping used Georgia, the Soviet Union, as an example that concessions cannot solve the problems.⁸ This is the fundamental political reason for the Tiananmen Massacre. Unfortunately, many protesters underestimated Deng Xiaoping's determination to defend the communist regime and maintain stability in China.

The tragedy of the Tiananmen Massacre sadly proved Huntington's proposition: If standpatters dominated the government and extremists the opposition, democratization was impossible.⁹

2.3 Failed Transformation

As Huntington indicated, in the 1970s and 1980s, political leaders and publics ended authoritarian systems

the death penalty would not applied to the political and ideological deviant. In that speech Deng said: "Those who have merely made mistakes should not be given any criminal sanctions, let along the death penalty." This instruction shows that Deng tried to avoid the cruel measures used in the past and may explain why none of the dissidents was sentenced to death. See "Talk at a Meeting of the Standing Committee, (January 17, 1986)," *Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁸ Michel Oksenberg, et al., eds., *op. cit.*, p. 204.

⁹ Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

and created democratic ones in three ways: (i) transformation guided by the authoritarian regime; (ii) replacement pushed by the opposition; (iii) transplacement arranged between government and opposition.¹⁰ In the P.R.C., the regime transition principally took a way of transformation. But, all three cases show that the transition from liberalized authoritarianism moved backward instead of forward. As Huntington correctly observed:

A limited opening could raise expectations of further change that could lead to instability, upheaval, and even violence; these, in turn, could provoke an antidemocratic reaction and replacement of the liberalizing leadership with standpatter leaders... In China ultimate power presumably rested with Deng Xiaoping. In 1987, however Zhao Ziyang became general secretary of the Communist party and began to open up the political system. This led to the massive student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989, which, in turn, provoked a hard-line reaction, the crushing of the student movement, the ouster of Zhao, and his replacement by Li Peng.¹¹

In the same pattern, Hu Yaobang was ousted in 1987. Similarly, earlier in 1979, the liberals in the Party such as Hu Jiwei and Wang Ruoshui, the chief editor and deputy chief editor of the *People's Daily*, were severely warned by Deng Xiaoping. Although Hu Yaobang tried to protect Hu, Wang and other liberal intellectuals, they were finally purged in late 1983.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 124-161.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-5.

In contrast with preconditions posed by Huntington for the transformation to occur, it is apparent that the transition process was not well founded in China. In order to highlight the immature conditions for China's transforming to democracy, Table VI.2 contrasts China's situation with Huntington's assumptions for transformation.

Table VI.2 A contrast of China's conditions with Huntington's assumptions for transformation

<i>Preconditions for transformation</i>	<i>Conditions in China</i>
central players: reformers <-> standpatters	yes
Were reformers stronger than standpatters?	<i>Not at all</i>
Was the government stronger than the opposition?	Yes
Were the moderates stronger than the extremists?	<i>Not at all</i> .

Note: According to Huntington, all answers have to be yes to make transformation possible.¹²

It is not surprising that transformation in China failed in view of the immature conditions. The three case studies revealed that the protesters failed to compromise in two important aspects:

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 124.

Firstly, the protesters failed to achieve unity among different dissident groups and to develop a unitary strategy in dealing with the government. In the DWM, Liu Qing and Xu Wenli tried to guide the movement in a moderate style. However, involved by the radicals' arrests, Liu and Xu were imprisoned too. In 1986-87, the student protesters did not even have a concrete organization. In the Tiananmen Massacre, the student protesters split and the radicals refused to compromise with the regime and the moderates. The results were not only the killing of the people but also the ruin of democratic forces.

Secondly, due to the divisions within the opposition, the protesters were unable to coordinate with the democratic reformers in (1) maintaining the existence of the spontaneous social or student groups; (2) expanding the power base of the democratic reformers; and (3) institutionalizing the process of dialogue between the protesters and the regime. The results were the failure of democratization and the elimination of the democratizers in the regime. Figure VI.1 tries to synthesize a pattern of interactions that failed to transform the CCP regime in the 1980s.

3. Reflections

Throughout this comparative case study of the pro-democracy protests in China, interactions in the process of protests were analyzed, factors that caused or related to the protests were examined, and conditions for China's transforming to democracy were evaluated. In this last section, I would like to reconsider Huntington's proposition on China's democratization and to reflect on the problems of the regime transition in China.

3.1 Huntington's Thesis on the Democratization in China

Through the test of this research, much of Huntington's explanation and proposition about the third wave democratization is applicable to China. Actually, none of the variables he proposed for the occurrence of democratization can be disproved. However, after a comparative study of Chinese cases, I found that Huntington's formulation that in China economics reinforced culture in opposition to democracy is simplistic and inconvincible. In chapter two, I already indicated that, to be brief, firstly, there are no easy answers to the important question of how rich China is. For example, the estimated real per capita national income in 1988 can range from 600 yuan to 1,300 yuan. Moreover, this number does not reflect the gap between rich and poor provinces and between the peasant and

urbanites. Secondly, the relation between economic development and democratization is complex because economic factors are not determinative in bringing about democratization as Huntington indicated. As this study has shown, besides economic crises, there were deeper origins of the demands for democratization in China. Thirdly, Chinese culture including Confucianism was changing rapidly due to Deng Xiaoping's open policy and marketization of communism. Even Huntington himself admitted that "even if the culture of a country is at one point an obstacle to democracy, cultures historically are dynamic rather than passive."

In addition to the above mentioned points, I have some reflections upon Huntington's thesis on democratization in China:

Firstly, Huntington derived his conclusion from only one case--the 1989 Tiananmen Demonstrations. However, he did not support his conclusion with an intensive case study of the 1989 pro-democracy protests nor compare that event with other cases in China. As Arend Lijphart pointed out, a single case cannot constitute the basis for a valid generalization.¹³ Therefore, did Huntington reach his conclusion too early?

¹³ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., Comparative Politics. Notes and Readings, (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1977, 5th ed.), p. 63.

Secondly, Huntington summarized the CCP's responses to the demands for political reform and democracy in two sentences:

First, it articulated a theory of "new authoritarianism," based on the experience of Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea and justified by the argument that for a country at China's stage of economic development authoritarianism was necessary to achieve balanced economic growth and to contain the unsettling consequences of development. Second, the leadership violently suppressed the democratic movement in Beijing and elsewhere in summer of 1989.¹⁴

Actually, an examination of China's pro-democracy protests shows that (1) not every democratic movement resulted in violent suppression; (2) there were different responses from the regime before the troops moved into Tiananmen Square; (3) the massacre was not unavoidable if the student protesters left the square early; and (4) other than "new authoritarianism," there are four cardinal principles that have constrained political development in China since 1979. In fact, the government has stopped talking about "new authoritarianism" after the massacre in Tiananmen Square and jailed a representative theorist. Therefore, did Huntington over-simplify the CCP's responses to the demands for democracy?

Thirdly, Huntington's pessimistic perception of democratization in China can explain neither the surge of

¹⁴ Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-2.

democratic movements nor the citizens' sacrifice for the course of democracy. It seems to me that Huntington may have paid too much attention to the 1989 Tiananmen Demonstrations and the CCP's anti-democracy argument. In contrast, in view of the fated success of marketization of Chinese communism, Zbigniew Brzezinski is more optimistic about the appearance of political pluralism in China. He also pays attention to peculiarly Chinese factors which will help the reform program: nationalism, the forty million Chinese living overseas, the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, and the Chinese passion for reunification with Taiwan. All these factors are bound to reinforce China's change, political, economic, and cultural.¹⁵ Therefore, my third question, which is also part of my efforts in this project, is: How do we better understand the process of regime change and apply the knowledge to promote democratization in China?

Part of my answer to this question is to substitute the factor of Catholicism with cultural change in China. This modification is valid because Western Christianity is weak and oppressed in the P.R.C., and, as a survey shows,

¹⁵ Brzezinski believes that, under the circumstances of expanding interaction with the outside world, "the pressures for genuine political liberalization, and then for true democratization, are bound to increase... At the same time, political dissent will be more difficult to suppress in the setting of economic changes congenial to greater social and economic, and hence also inevitably political, pluralism." The Grand Failure (1989), pp. 180-5.

traditional Chinese culture such as Buddhism and ancestor worship were destroyed under Mao's rule.¹⁶ Meanwhile, it is necessary to clarify the concept of culture and re-examine the elements of Confucianism and its development in modern China.

3.2 Reflections on Regime Change in China

In the P.R.C., two features characterized structural limitations of the interactions between the regime and the protesters. One is the frontier set up by the Four Cardinal Principles. The other is the absence of communication between the government and the protesters.

Since Deng Xiaoping's declaration of the Four Cardinal Principles in March 1979, the interactions between the regime and the protesters were limited to the unchangeable core principles: upholding leadership by the Chinese Communist Party and socialism.¹⁷ Consequently, when the dissidents were tolerated they could only interact with the regime through informal-noninstitutionalized communication at best. Most of the time, their interactions were at the

¹⁶ Submission to authority, the way of the golden mean, ancestor worship, and belief in Buddhism were four pillars of traditional Chinese culture. They served important *system-sustaining* functions. Chu and Ju, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-3.

¹⁷ Deng xuan, I, pp. 130-143. On September 16, 1989, Deng emphasized to Professor Tsung-Dao Lee that leadership by the Party and socialism are the two most important things of the four principles. Deng xuan, III, p. 314.

street and local levels. Therefore, misconceptions and miscalculations about each other were highly probable in a crisis such as the 1989 Tiananmen Demonstrations. On the other hand, the Four Principles not only constrained the protesters' space to maneuver but also limited the regime's dynamics in responding to challenges.

But, in 1986 and 1989, the student protesters were able to interact with local leaders through the channels of the Party and the education administration. It was an exception that in 1989 the Dialogue Delegation communicated with officials at the national level which was arranged through formal-institutionalized channels. Moreover, there was an opportunity to institutionalize the dialogue if it was not sabotaged by the standpatters in the government and the extremists in the student movement. This is a lesson to be learned.

Consequently, the prodemocratic groups in both government and opposition have to study China's experience of democratization as well as in other countries in order to improve their political skills. In view of social, political and economic trends in China and in the post-cold-war era, on the one hand,¹⁸ and the regime's monopoly of

¹⁸ These trends include: popular desire to maintain stability, cultural change toward individualism and liberalization, continued development of marketization, denationalization and decentralization, increased regionalism at home and its increasing interdependence abroad,

force, on the other hand, replacement is a less realistic way of regime change for China. Instead, transformation or transplacement is more practical for the future. Liberal reformers in the government alone have been unable to transform the communist system. Therefore, the pro-democratic groups should learn to coordinate with each other in order to create an opportunity for transplacement. Conceivably, that would be a process that has to be projected into the twenty first century.

expanded private sector in national economy, increased social mobilization and differentiation, declining authority of the Party and dying gerontocrats, enlarged role of external actors, collapsing role of communism and Maoism in daily life and in international relations. Martin King Whyte, "Prospects for Democratization in China," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1992, pp. 58-70; Richard Hornik, "Bursting China's Bubble," *FA*, May/June 1994, pp. 28-42; Gerald Segal, "China's Changing Shape," *Ibid.*, pp. 43-58; Donald S. Zagoria, "The End of the Cold War: Its Impact on China," in Frank J. Macchiarola and Robert B. Oxnam, eds., The China Challenge. American Policies in East Asia, (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1991), pp. 1-11.

Appendix A. The nature of the student movement of 1986-87

Many issues caused the 1986/87 Student Movement. The first issue raised by the UST's students was a call for increased representation in local legislative bodies. This demand quickly expanded to calls for greater freedom of speech and more political rights.

Other issues are seemingly mundane: bad food and lighting in universities, rising school fees, and complaints about bureaucracy. Nevertheless, these substantive issues about university environment provided students an excuse to launch demonstrations in pursuance of higher aims of democracy and freedom. At the same time, the students hoped to use the demonstrations to realize the freedom and rights written in the constitution. Most importantly, it was the consciousness of human rights and political rights that underpinned the personal demands. Therefore, the 1986/87 Student Movement cannot be simply regarded as an event motivated by self-interests or not related to democratization just because of some complaints concerning campus life.¹

¹ Julia Kwong regarded: "To call the student demonstrations in December 1986 a democratic movement--that is, a movement agitating for political democracy--is a misnomer." She said that the nature of the students' demands cannot be defined as "democratic" because the only issue involving democracy was the question of elections but "beyond this the

Based on the various issues raised by the students of different campuses I have categorized three levels of values and aims pursued in the Movement as a whole:

1. Welfare values

Issues: lighting regulations, tuition fees, food.

Aims: (1) improving campus life; (2) expanding students' rights in school affairs.

2. Interpersonal values

Issues: concerns about (1) students' physical and political safety as well as human rights in general; (2) students' manner and standpoint to the Movement; (3) Deng Xiaoping's attitude toward political reform as well as the Student Movement; (4) liberal reformers' position in the government coalition.

Aims: (1) preventing and protecting students from persecution; (2) catching the tide of movement, showing a solidarity of students, keeping crowd's affection toward the movement, and coordinating a nationwide student movement; (3) supporting Deng Xiaoping and his calls for political and economic reform; (4) enhancing liberal reformers' position on liberalization and system reform.

term 'democracy' was merely rhetorical, giving the movement unity and flexibility to incorporate varied grievances on different campuses." She finally asserted: "It was the nonthreatening nature of their demands that put the government off guard and kept it from taking prompt action until the demonstrations became so large and so widespread as to attract world attention." "The 1986 Student Demonstrations in China. A Democratic Movement?" *Asian Survey*, XXVIII:9, September 1988, pp. 970-985.

Her points are not well grounded because she did not give consideration to the restrictions of political and social environment on spontaneous mass movement. She also did not examine other important materials about the 1986 Student Movement such as Deng Xiaoping's comments on the events and the secret documents of the Secretariat of the CCP publicized by the *Zhongguo zhi chun* in November 1987. (English translation see *China Spring Digest*, I:6, Nov./Dec. 1987.)

Watchwords (sample): "Against suppression of student movement!" "Protest against police's beating students!" "Give back my classmates!" "Maintain solidarity with our fellow-students from Shanghai!" "We are men. We ought to receive the respect that is due to men." "Guarantee human rights!" "Support Xiaoping, endorse reform."

3. Power values

Issues: concerns about (1) procedures of election; (2) rules for demonstration and assembly; (3) freedom of speech and press; (4) political change; (5) liberty and democracy.

Aims: fighting for the rights of (1) political participation; (2) demonstration and assembly; and establishing a democratic political system. Also, attacking official ideology and reputation of the authorities and law.

Watchwords (sample): "Give me Liberty or give me Death!" (quote from Patrick Henry) "Government of the people, by the people, for the people." (quote from Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address) "Hooray for democracy" "Hooray for freedom" "Down with dictatorship!" "Down with despotism!" "Down with the evil Communist Party!" "Abolish the four basic principles!" "Down with Communism!" "Democracy is not bestowed as a favor. We must struggle for the share of it that we deserve."

Even though most of the student demonstrators could not clearly explain the meaning of "democracy" as Western observers had found,² the values and aims indicated in the demonstrators' slogans as well as the CCP's reaction clearly prove that the Student Movement of 1986 is a pro-democracy

² John Woodruff, China in Search of Its Future. Reform vs. Repression. 1982-1989, (New York: Carol Pub. Group, 1990), pp. 162-3. Orville Schell, Disco and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 242-3.

protest as has been defined in this research. No matter how rhetorical the term "democracy" used in the movement, it cannot be said that the nature of the movement was "nonthreatening" to the Communist regime as Julia Kwong has regarded.³ It was exactly because of the "slogans that call for opposition to leadership by the Communist Party and to the socialist road," and the "exceedingly pernicious statements" made by "certain individuals," that Deng Xiaoping had claimed to take action against "those persons who have acted out of ulterior motives."⁴

Also, I agree with Schell's penetrating analysis that the demonstrations of 1986 were indeed "a great exploration" of democratic ideas. Schell's evaluation is worth quoting at length:

It is true that the students neither accomplished much in a practical sense nor greatly clarified which ism or ideology (or combination thereof) would ultimately be suitable for China; and it is also true that by antagonizing Party hard-liners, they had in the short run even retarded--or at least provided an excuse for retarding--the process of political reform. But the tumultuous events of December had most emphatically reminded students of the power their relatively small numbers had traditionally been able to wield in China, and revealed both to themselves and the Party leadership how unconvincing Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as a belief system. As one Tongji University student told me that

³ Julia Kwong, *op. cit.*, pp. 970-985.

⁴ Deng Xiaoping's talk with Noboru Takeshita, Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, on January 13, 1987. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. III, p. 198.

February, "What is the alternative to democracy for China? Communism is finished. It has bankrupted itself. Power struggles have robbed the top leadership of idealism. For us students there is no alternative to democracy except to leave the country."⁵

Perceived from the above analysis it is obvious that the 1986/87 Student Movement is a pro-democracy protest that was aimed at changing authoritarian features of the communist system in China into a democratic one.

⁵ Schell, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

Appendix B. Literature review on China's democratization,
1978-1989

1. Imbalance of studies on political protests in China

A new field of research suddenly appeared after the massacre in Tiananmen on June 3-4, 1989. Since the end of 1989 a craze of literature entitled "Tiananmen" and so on have been published. Up to now, more than sixty English books are devoted to the massacre and democracy movement at Tiananmen Square. Essays, reports, and comments on Tiananmen in English magazines and newspaper as well as those studies indirectly related to Tiananmen are even more than we can count.

Compared with those studies related to the Student Movement of 1986-87 (three books) and the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-80 (ten books or so), the Tiananmen Demonstrations catches the greatest attention in the study of democratization in China. It is understandable that little attention is paid to the Student Movement of 1986-87 because, in contrast to the Democracy Wall Movement, the Student Movement did not publish any unofficial press; and, in contrast to the Tiananmen Demonstrations, the Student Movement was covered by a few foreign reporters only. The uneven amount of publications on political protests in China

is a prominent feature of the literature on China's democratization.

2. Literature on political protests in 1978-1987

The prosperous publications of unofficial press in 1978-79 provide many raw materials for the study of the Democracy Wall Movement. James Seymour (1980) and Gregor Benton (1982) made a valuable contribution to both specialists and non-specialists in collecting and evaluating unofficial publications.¹ David Goodman (1981) made his contribution by weaving his collection of unofficial press into a concise history of Democracy Wall Movement.² But the most vivid testimony of this democracy movement is told

¹ James D. Seymour ed. The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978-1979, (Stanfordville, New York: Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980). Gregor Benton ed. Wild Lilies: Poisonous Weeds: Dissident Voices from People's China, (London: Pluto Press, 1982). The most thorough collection of unofficial press in China is made by the Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, a subsidiary of the Military Intelligence Bureau, Taiwan, Republic of China. More than fifteen volumes of Dalu Dixia Kanwu Huibian (A Collection of Underground Publications Circulated on Chinese Mainland) have been published in Taipei, Taiwan since 1980.

² David S.G. Goodman. Beijing Street Voices: The Poetry and Politics of China's Democracy Movement, (Boston: Marion Boyars, 1981). Although Mr. Goodman was "failed to convey to the non-specialist a coherent understanding of the background of his subject" as David Lattimore pointed out, the Beijing Street Voices, in my opinion, did provide an introduction to the Democracy Wall Movement at street level with reprints of cover pages of unofficial press which shall be interesting to the non-specialist. David Lattimore, "Politics and Poems," *The New York Times Book Review*, 4/12/81, pp. 9, 36.

by Roger Garside.³ Besides, Munro, Brodsgaard and Nathan have each made profound analysis and explanation of the movement.⁴ However, I found that it is necessary to talk to Liu Qing in order to understand the interaction between the regime and the movement--an aspect to which little attention has been paid.⁵

It is really a pity that there are very few publications by the Student Movement of 1986-87. Fortunately, the foreign journalists' efforts have somehow filled the vacancy of raw materials. The *Far East Economic Review* and the *New York Times* covered the Movement with a large volume of reports. Senior journalists such as Gargan, Schell, and Woodruff also gave first hand descriptions of the Movement in their books.⁶ Their reports are even more useful than

³ Roger Garside. Coming Alive. China after Mao, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981).

⁴ Robin Munro, "China's Democracy Movement: A Midwinter Spring," *Survey*, Summer 1984, pp. 70-98. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals," *Asian Survey*, July 1981, pp. 747-774. Andrew J. Nathan. Chinese Democracy. The Individual and the State in Twentieth Century China, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985).

⁵ Liu Qing: the editor of *April Fourth Forum* and a leader of the Democracy Wall Movement. He was jailed for more than ten years in China. Mr. Liu is now the chairman of Human Rights in China, New York.

⁶ Edward A. Gargan. China's Fate: A People's Turbulent Struggle with Reform & Repression. 1980-1990, (New York: Doubleday, 1991). Orville Schell. Disco and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). John Woodruff. China in Search of Its Future, Reform vs. Repression. 1982-1989, (New York: Carol Pub. Group, 1990).

Benedict Stavis' scholastic work which, in Stanley Rosen's words, "appears to be overly protective" in dealing with personal sources.⁷

3. Raw material for the study of the Tiananmen Demonstrations

Among the books spawned by the drama of Tiananmen Square there are first-person and journalistic accounts, chronicles, collections of primary documents, and more academic descriptive narratives cum analysis of causal background and future implications. This feature is highlighted by Judy Polumbaum and Lowell Dittmar in their review articles on the political upheavals of 1989.⁸ From fourteen books in the categories of documentary and chronicle Polumbaum distinguished three anthologies of documents which are "extremely useful for both research and teaching purposes" and three eyewitness testimonies that are "perceptive and intelligent."⁹ I think, these six books,

⁷ Benedict Stavis. China's Political Reforms: An Interim Report, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988). Book review by Stanley Rosen in *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1989, pp. 187-8.

⁸ Judy Polumbaum, "Making Sense of June 4, 1989: Analyses of the Tiananmen Tragedy," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*(AJCA), No. 26, July 1991. pp. 177-186. Lowell Dittmar, "Tiananmen Reconsidered," *Pacific Affairs*, Winter 1991-92. pp. 529-535.

⁹ Three anthologies are: Cries for Democracy: Writings & Speeches from the 1989 Democracy Movement, edited by Han Minzhu (Princeton University Press, 1990). Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict. The Basic Documents, edited by Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan and Marc

together with two other books by Yi Mu and Mark Thompson and by Suzanne Ogden et al,¹⁰ should provide researchers with sufficient and basic raw material. Generally speaking, these books are either more formal or more comprehensive than those occasional works on the Tiananmen Demonstrations.¹¹

Although there is a certain overlap among those collections of documents, the different ways they organize the documents and the different sources from which they capture the documents reflect different aspects they intend

Lambert (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1990). Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement, edited by Mil Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1990).

Three eyewitness accounts are: Michael S. Duke's The Iron House: A Memoir of the Chinese Democracy Movement and the Tiananmen Massacre, (Lyton, Utah: Gibbs Smith, Publisher, 1990); Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon's Tiananmen Square: An Eyewitness Account of the Chinese People's Passionate Quest for Democracy, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989); and Tiananmen: The Rape of Beijing, by Michael Fathers and Andrew Higgins (London: The Independent/Doubleday, 1989).

¹⁰ Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson. Crisis at Tiananmen. Reform and Reality in Modern China, (San Francisco: China Books & Periodicals, Inc., 1989). Suzanne Ogden, et al. China's Search for Democracy: The Student Mass Movement of 1989, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1992).

¹¹ A typical book for the occasion is: Dedicated to Freedom, (New York: Roxene Corp., 1989), a short Chinese/English book that compiles seven official and unofficial documents with a preface by James C. Hsiung. Another occasional but strenuous work is Harrison E. Salisbury's Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in June, (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), which based his accounts mainly on the VOA or BBC and hearsays.

to illuminate.¹² Therefore, the document collections have to be mutually consulted. Similarly, the eyewitness testimonies and, especially, the autobiographical works by Chinese student leaders, have to be cross-examined.¹³

¹² For examples:

(i) Oksenberg divides the Beijing Spring of 1989 into five periods: the crisis begins, the political struggle for Tiananmen, martial law, premonitions of violence, and the aftermath.

(ii) Han Minzhu cuts the 1989 democracy movement into six phases: the birth of the movement (April 15-22), the founding of the Beijing Students' Federation (April 22-May 1), the seventieth anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement (May 1-13), the hunger strike (May 13-19), the martial law (May 19-27), the crushing of the movement (May 27-June 9).

(iii) Ogden periodizes the student mass movement into five stages: the movement begins (April 15-27), the conflict escalates (April 28-May 12), the hunger strike (May 12-19), martial law (May 19-June 3), massacre and its aftermath (June 3-4).

Instead of periodizing the movement, Yu and Harrison categorize their collections according to sources from students, workers, party members, soldiers, and the intellectuals.

¹³ Of many participatory accounts two appeared in the form of book: Li Lu, Moving the Mountain, (London: McMillan, 1990); and, Shen Tong with Marianne Yen, Almost a Revolution, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990). A revolution? Although it is arguable that whether the protests at Tiananmen Square is almost a revolution, Shen Tong's autobiography provides a lot of firsthand inside story about the early interactions between the students and the regime and the infighting of the student organizations. Patricia Dorff thereby concludes that Shen Tong's book has reinforced the argument that the prodemocracy movement was "spontaneous and unplanned." (*Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, p. 200.) However, since Shen Tong has lost his leadership of students at Tiananmen Square after mid-May 1989, and since none of the student leaders could master the developments, it is safer to give limited credential to his book. Similarly, we cannot bestow full trust to the memoir by Li Lu, a student leader emerged in the second half period of the Tiananmen student movement. It is also interesting to find that,

Actually, anyone interested in understanding the events leading up to the massacre would find the work of examining and screening the various, and sometimes conflicting, sources very cumbersome. While Nicola Macbean(1992) might have been disappointed by the absence of such an effort,¹⁴ I found that Orville Schell(Mandate of Heaven, 1994) and Richard Baum(Burying Mao, 1994) did a good job in selecting sources for their new books.¹⁵ Baum's book is especially useful to me because of its lively, chronological treatment of post-Mao Chinese politics. In my opinion, Burying Mao is another scholastic achievement after Harding's China's Second Revolution(1987).¹⁶ Still, more efforts in the study of the Tiananmen Demonstrations is ultimately needed. These efforts include further collection, examination and

while Shen Tong has angrily criticized Li Lu, Li Lu has never mentioned Shen Tong in Moving the Mountain.

¹⁴ Book reviews by Nicola Macbean in the *China Quarterly*, June 1992. p. 417.

¹⁵ Orville Schell. Mandate of Heaven. A New Generation of Entrepreneurs, Dissidents, Bohemians, and Technocrats Lays Claim to China's Future, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). Richard Baum. Burying Mao. Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994). Almost all of the Part II (The Road to Tiananmen) and III (The Beijing Spring) of the Burying Mao are already collected in Roderick MacFarguhar, ed. The Politics of China, 1949-1989, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

¹⁶ Harry Harding. China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987).

cataloging of raw materials as well as the unification of translations.¹⁷

Biographies of the democrats also provide useful raw material not only for identifying important actors, but also for knowing their opinions on democracy and the democratic movement, and locating their places in the events. In my point of view, the biographies of Fang Lizhi, Yan Jiaqi, Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, Han Dongfang are the ones most relevant to the Tiananmen Demonstrations.¹⁸

Another aspect of the Tiananmen Demonstrations is the CCP's repression of the dissidents since June 4, 1989. Copper and Lee, and the Asia Watch Committee have supplied important information on human rights after Tiananmen

¹⁷ For example, it is confusing to find that "Beijing Zhishijie Lianhehui" is translated as "Beijing Intellectuals' Autonomous Association" and "Beijing Independent Intellectuals Association" in the same book edited by Tony Saich. The Chinese People's Movement. Perspectives on Spring 1989, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990). pp. 114, 175.

¹⁸ Fang Lizhi. Bringing Down the Great Wall. Writings on Science, Culture, and Democracy in China, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991). David S.K. Hong and Denis C. Mair, tr. Towards a Democratic China: The Intellectual Biography of Yan Jiaqi, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1992). Yan Jiaqi and China's Struggle for Democracy. tr. & ed. with an introduction by David Bachman and Dali L. Yang, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991). George Black and Robin Munro. Black Hands of Beijing, Lives of Defiance in China's Democracy Movement, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), a vivid chronicle of the lives of two unofficial intellectuals--Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao--and worker leader, Han Dongfang.

Demonstrations in China.¹⁹ In addition, for those who are interested in collecting and examining raw material about the Tiananmen Demonstrations, the sections of "note on sources" in the books by Lee Feigon, Michael Duke, Black and Munro are worthy for reference.²⁰ In the appendices of The Broken Mirror (1990), Joseph Y.S. Cheng prepared "A Chronology of Selected Documents and Statements" and "Who Was Who During Beijing Spring."²¹ Both appendices provide researchers convenient and important information about the Tiananmen Demonstrations. It can be said that none of the political protests in the Chinese Communist history has ever produced such an enormous grist for research as the Tiananmen Demonstrations did.

¹⁹ John F. Copper and Ta-ling Lee. Tiananmen Aftermath: Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, 1990, (Baltimore: University of Maryland, 1992). Timothy A. Gelatt and James Ross. Criminal Justice with Chinese Characteristics: China's Criminal Process and Violation of Human Rights, (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1993). Asia Watch Committee. Punishment Season: Human Rights in China after Martial Law, (New York, 1990). News from Asia Watch. Repression in China Since June 4, 1989, (New York, 1990).

²⁰ Duke, *Ibid.* pp. 174-180. Black and Munro. *Ibid.*, pp. 373-8. Lee Feigon. China Rising: The Meaning of Tiananmen, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1990), pp. 259-262. Duke has discussed the inconsistencies in the reports of mass killings on Tiananmen Square and believes that his Chinese eyewitness reports are basically true.

²¹ George Hicks. The Broken Mirror: China after Tiananmen, (Chicago: Longman Group, 1990). pp. 475-516.

4. Analysis of the Tiananmen Demonstrations

Agitated by the events which happened at Tiananmen Square, many authors tried to express the causes and results as well as the development and impact of the Tiananmen Demonstrations. The Broken Mirror (1990) and Yang and Wagner's Tiananmen (1990) are typical works of this kind.²² The later gives readers a quick overview of the incident through a collection of reprints of fourteen articles by American journalists and scholars.

However, a general view simply cannot satisfy one's curiosity about the roots of the events and the perspectives of democratization in China. Various approaches are needed for an in-depth study on the Tiananmen Demonstrations in specific, and on China's democratization in general. After reviewing the literature on Tiananmen study, I found that three subjects of methodology deserve a brief discussion. They are the subjects of (1) the impact of democratic tradition on China's democratization; (2) the use of the comparative method in the study of democratic movements in China; (3) the application of political science concepts to the study of democratization in China.

²² *Ibid.* Winston L.Y. Yang and Marsha L. Wagner, ed. Tiananmen: China's Struggle for Democracy. Its Prelude, Development, Aftermath, and Impact, (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1990).

Firstly, those who have adopted a historical and cultural approach have tried to trace the origins of student activism to the Chinese democratic tradition. But, how far back this tradition should be traced is arguable. While acknowledging the influence of Western culture, the Cultural Revolution, and Deng Xiaoping's reform, in the Behind the Tiananmen Massacre (1990), Cheng Chu-yuan recalls the political role of Chinese intellectuals as far as two thousand years ago.²³ Although most people attribute post-Mao democratic movements to the tradition of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Lee Feigon, in China Rising (1990), attaches importance to the organizational skills and skeptical attitudes forged during the Cultural Revolution.²⁴ He also traces the movement to several small preexisting groups of student dissidents or "democratic salons" led by student leaders in Beijing's universities. To Andrew

²³ Cheng Chu-yuan. Behind the Tiananmen Massacre: Social, Political, and Economic Ferment in China, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990). p. 68. Merle Goldman also traces democratic movements to Confucian tradition. Merle Goldman. Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China. Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). chapter 1.

²⁴ Lee Feigon. China Rising: The Meaning of Tiananmen, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1990). In a similar vein, Lowell Dittmar emphasizes: "To understand the upheaval that swept all of urban China in the spring of 1989, it is necessary to return momentarily to the origin of this type of spontaneous uprising, the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution represents a historic shift from elite-sponsored mass movements to spontaneous mass mobilization,

Nathan(China's Crisis, 1990), it seems that the students were only following the logic of two decades of Chinese democratic activism, albeit he usually traced the democratic tradition in China back to the end of the nineteenth century and the works of Liang Qichao(Chinese Democracy, 1985).²⁵

The second subject concerns comparing democratic movements in China with those in other countries. Tony Saich(1990) tries hard to relate the Beijing people's movement of 1989 to the more general fate of spontaneous social movements under systems of state socialism where the ruling party has undertaken a program of economic reform.²⁶ He observes that such movements inevitably become confrontational unless the ruling party reacts by accommodating them. Although it is risky to pattern China's student movement after western protests, Lee Feigon(1990) boldly points out

splitting the CCP..." China Under Reform, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1994). p. 131.

²⁵ Andrew J. Nathan. China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). p. 172. Nathan. Chinese Democracy: The Individual and the State in Twentieth Century China, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1985). Liang Qichao: the most brilliant journalist and most influential modern political thinker in China of the 1890s.

²⁶ Tony Saich. "When Worlds Collide: The Beijing People's Movement of 1989," in Tony Saich ed. The Chinese People's Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990).

the similarities between Chinese young rebels and American activists of the 1960s.²⁷

Contrary to Allen Whiting's observation that Andrew Nathan "correctly denies any analogy with East European developments,"²⁸ Nathan did imagine a development of China's democratization along the route of Poland's.²⁹ He hopes that

the patience and nonviolence of the democratic opposition in China, even if it is a product of weakness, may help the regime navigate a democratizing reform as did the cautiousness of Solidarity in Poland.³⁰

Nathan also tries to compare political development between Taiwan and China even though he recognizes that they "have very different political traditions and face different issues."³¹

While there are striking similarities between China and other countries in some aspects, there are also tremendous and substantial differences in other aspects as

²⁷ Feigon, *op. cit.*, p..... Contrarily, Julia Ching found differences between the student demonstrators in China and the Americans at Kent State(1970) or the South Koreans at Kwangju(1980). Julia Ching. Probing China's Soul. Religion, Politics, and Protest in the People's Republic, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), p. 158.

²⁸ See Allen S. Whiting's book review in *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1991. p. 132.

²⁹ Nathan, China's Crisis. p. 208.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 208. Walder would rather analogize the Beijing events to the 1956 rebellion in Hungary. Andrew G. Walder, "The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989," *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct. 1989. p. 40.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

Gordon White has concluded.³² A systematic comparison of democratization between China and former socialist countries as well as some capitalist countries is the task of the new generation of scholars.

The third subject of the Tiananmen study concerns the application of concepts from comparative politics to China. In a tide of combining political science and area studies, many scholars are eager to apply social science concepts and theories to the illumination of the background and development of the Tiananmen Demonstrations. The most often used concept is "civil society." Scholars like Jonathan Unger, Geremie Barme, Thomas Gold, David Strand, Barrett McCormick, Su Shaozhi and Xiao Xiaoming have used the concept of civil society to illustrate or explain the pro-democracy protests in China, or to forecast the future of Chinese democracy.³³

³² White believes that there are substantial political differences between the Chinese and East European political situations. Gordon White, "Democratization and Economic Reform in China," *AJCA*, January 1994, p. 40. But, in view of the political changes in Eastern Europe in fall and winter 1989, Julia Ching believes that the Chinese government had been correct in its estimate of the gravity of its own situation in April and May. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

³³ Jonathan Unger and Geremie Barme, eds. The Pro-Democracy Protests in China: Reports from the Provinces, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991). Thomas B. Gold. "The Resurgence of Civil Society in China," *Journal of Democracy*, Spring 1990. pp. 18-31. David Strand. "Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Public Sphere in China," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1990. pp. 1-19. Barrett L. McCormick, Su Shaozhi and Xiao Xiaoming. "The 1989 Democracy Movement:

While many authors are arguing the existence or development of civil society in China, Walder refuses to characterize Beijing's popular rebellion as a movement by "society" against the "state" because "China's ordinary citizens did not organize to force themselves onto the political stage."³⁴ Brantley Womack also cautions that "the contradiction between state and emerging civil society must be treated carefully."³⁵ Using the examples of Guangdong and Fuzhou, Womack reminds us:

If society was marching against the party-state, it was a society structured by the party-state. Moreover, it is striking that the most advanced and internationalized localities, Fuzhou and Guangdong, were least active among the big cities.³⁶

Aside from the concept of "civil society," other new- or old-fashioned theories and concepts such as: the elite politics (Cheng, 1990),³⁷ the political culture (Pye, 1990),³⁸ factionalism (Nathan, 1990),³⁹ the model of social

A Review of the Prospects for Civil Society in China," *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1992. pp. 182-202. In my point of view, the concept of civil society is implied in Pei Minxin's essay: "Societal Takeover in China and the USSR," *Journal of Democracy*, January 1992. pp. 108-118.

³⁴ Walder, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

³⁵ Brantley Womack's review of The Pro-Democracy Protests..., *AJCA*, July 1992. p. 180.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

³⁷ Chu-yuan Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre (1990).

³⁸ Lucian W. Pye, "Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture: The Escalation of Confrontation from Moralizing to Revenge," *Asian Survey*, April 1990. pp. 331-347.

politics(Hamrin, 1990),⁴⁰ the reluctant duelists(Manion, 1990),⁴¹ the crisis in authority(Sullivan, 1991),⁴² the Rebel Faction(Anita Chan, 1991),⁴³ the rise of the new middle classes(Glassman, 1991),⁴⁴ the neo-culturalist perspective(Wasserstrom and Perry, 1992),⁴⁵ and elitism

³⁹ Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis(1990). Although the author claims to "show how a fairly consistent approach explained unfolding events," I cannot find his application of factionalism model to or the reinforcement of the model by the analysis of Chinese democracy in 1989. *Ibid.*, p. ix; and chapters ten and eleven.

⁴⁰ Carol Lee Hamrin. China and the Challenge of the Future: Changing Political Patterns, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1990). Social politics, in Hamrin's words, is the interaction of leaders and the bureaucratic establishment with other social groups, primarily intellectuals. This level of interaction was central to the dynamics of the Cultural Revolution and is again of growing importance in post-Mao China.

⁴¹ Melanie Manion, "Introduction: Reluctant Duelists. The Logic of the 1989 Protests and Massacre," in Michel Oksenberg et al, eds. Beijing Spring, 1989.(1990). pp. xiii-xlii. Manion believes that protesters and hard-liners were "reluctant duelists," although massacre ultimately dominated other choices for hardliners.

⁴² Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Beijing Massacre. The Crisis in Authority," in David Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds. China in the Nineties: Crisis Management and Beyond, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). pp. 81-104.

⁴³ Anita Chan, "The Social Origins and Consequences of the Tiananmen Crisis," *Ibid.*, pp. 105-130. The Rebel Faction refers to a concept that, during the Cultural Revolution, social groups cut through class lines and coalesced in a grand alliance. Chan adopted this concept which was elucidated by Yang Xiguan(alias Yang Xiaokai). *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁴⁴ Ronald M. Glassman. China in Transition: Communism, Capitalism, and Democracy, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991).

⁴⁵ Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds. Popular Protest & Political Culture in Modern China: Learning from 1989, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1992).

(Kelliher, 1993)⁴⁶ are used for exploring both the Tiananmen crisis of 1989 and democratization in China. Among these scholars, I think, Nan Lin(1992) is more successful in applying a sociological concept--the resource mobilization--throughout his analysis of the 1989 Tiananmen events.⁴⁷

My first conclusion is that albeit various social science theories and concepts have been used in the study of Tiananmen and contemporary China, Huntington's analytical framework for the study of democratization has not been fully applied to the case of China. Many authors tried to identify the barriers to and forces favoring democratization in China and hence answer the question of "why" democratization is possible or impossible in China.⁴⁸ But,

Counterpoised against the old-fashioned culturalist approach exemplified by Lucian Pye and his followers' works, Wasserstrom et al tried, but in vein in Anita Chan's viewpoint, to give "old" cultural symbols new meanings. see Anita Chan's book review in *AJCA*, July 1994. pp. 173-5.

⁴⁶ Daniel Kelliher, "Keeping Democracy Safe from the Masses. Intellectuals and Elitism in the Chinese Protest Movement," *Comparative Politics*, July 1993. pp. 379-396. Kelliher maintains that elite-mass conflict has retarded the Chinese protest movement.

⁴⁷ Nan Lin. The Struggle for Tiananmen. Anatomy of the 1989 Mass Movement, (Westport, CT.: Praeger Publishers, 1992). Pye also use Chinese culture to persuasively explain the behavior of the students and the Party.

⁴⁸ Such as Martin King Whyte's "Prospects for Democratization in China," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1992, pp. 58-70. And the argument between White and McCormick: Gordon White, "Democratization and Economic Reform in China," and Barrett L. McCormick, "Democracy or Dictatorship?: A Response to Gordon White," *AJCA*, January 1994, pp. 73-92, 95-110.

if democratization of China is a desirable goal, we also need to study processes of democratization, i.e., to answer the question of "how" to transform the Communist regime. This research tries to make a contribution in this aspect.

Secondly, we need more horizontal comparative study of democratization between China and other countries as well as vertical comparison of democratic movements in China. Some scholars have started their studies in this field. By using the concept of "societal takeover," Minxin Pei pioneers in the comparison of regime transition in China and the Soviet Union during 1979-1991.⁴⁹ But, a systematic vertical comparison of democratic movements in China is still needed.⁵⁰ I think the new generation of scholarship should enhance comparative research in order to draw useful lessons for democratization in China.

Finally, I agree with Harry Harding that the democratization of the political system is one of the major

⁴⁹ Minxin Pei. When Reform Becomes Revolution: Regime Transition in China and the Soviet Union, 1979-1991. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, November 1991.

⁵⁰ Many scholars made comparison between this and that democratic movements, among them I am more impressed by Merle Goldman's comments on the 1985, 1986 and 1989 student demonstrations, and Julia Ching's comparison of the two Tiananmen Incidents of 1976 and 1989. Merle Goldman. Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China. Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). pp. 201-3. Julia Ching. Probing China's Soul. Religion, Politics, and Protest in the People's Republic, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1990). chapter 7, pp. 145-162.

tasks of the scholarship. I also agree that there is the necessity of better research guides to the materials for the study of Chinese politics.⁵¹ This is not only because of the greater range and variety of obtainable raw material, but also because of the varied character and uneven quality of literature on democratization in China. In view of the immediate coming of the post-Deng era in China, this is a compelling task.

⁵¹ Harry Harding, "The Study of Chinese Politics: Toward a Third Generation of Scholarship," *World Politics*, January 1984. pp. 284-307.

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