

THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY:
CULTURE, COHESION, AND COMPETITIVENESS
IN THE MAKING OF EU-EUROPE

by

KATHARINA BODIRSKY

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2012

© 2012

KATHARINA BODIRSKY

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Date

David Harvey
Chair of Examining Committee

Date

Gerald Creed
Executive Officer

Michael Blim

Donald Robotham

Don Kalb

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY:
CULTURE, COHESION, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN THE MAKING OF EU-EUROPE

by

Katharina Bodirsky

Adviser: Distinguished Professor David Harvey

This dissertation examines a particular way of governing (through) “culture” as a means to reflect on the making of a “non-national” state form (EU-Europe) and its implications for social inequalities. The term EU-Europe highlights complex and often conflictual relations between European Union (EU), national, and regional governmental levels, and the study focuses on relations between the EU and the city of Berlin. The dissertation critically examines the development of a policy common sense that emphasizes the potential value of cultural diversity for economic competitiveness. Such value, it is assumed by policy-makers, can be realized by combining support to the creative and cultural industries with an approach to immigrant integration that respects individual cultural diversity, ensures equality of opportunity, and fosters intercultural dialogue. Because such interculturalism goes on the EU level hand in hand with a new narrative of EU-Europeanness, the study also “moves outwards” onto relations of EU accession established with Turkey where this has been articulated particularly clearly.

The study argues that interculturalist policy constitutes an attempt to overcome challenges to legitimacy and cohesion on EU and city levels by establishing “non-national” modes of belonging and entitlement that work with the neoliberal agenda that has dominantly informed EU-European state-making of the last decades. In selectively embracing cultural diversity, such policy is to turn “culture” from a *problem* into a *resource* in the making of “cosmopolitan” places conducive to capital. In Berlin, this has fed into processes of gentrification that serve the generation of rent and effectively void the “right to place” of populations marked through class and culture. In the politics of Turkey’s EU accession, the claim that EU-Europeanness is defined through an embrace of diversity has in turn obscured and enabled EU support of the development of a Turkish “competition state.”

The dissertation furthers our understanding of contemporary “non-national” forms of statehood and of the ways in which these (re)produce inequalities between people and places. It is based on extensive analysis of policy and political documents, interviews with key policy-makers, attendance of policy events, and experience of local politics in Berlin gained during a stay of 12 months.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to all those who have contributed in their diverse ways to the completion of this project for their challenges, patience, friendship, and support.

David Harvey has been a great inspiration to me and a wonderful adviser on whom I could always rely. He provided me with both freedom and guidance in trying to discover what I really wanted to find out and say, while reminding me that what I do should have social relevance. I am deeply grateful to him for all his support throughout the years. Michael Blim and Don Robotham have always been open to discussion and exploration since my first year in the anthropology program and have insightfully commented on numerous drafts of my dissertation. I sincerely thank them for it. A heartfelt thank you also to Don Kalb for his astute comments and helpful suggestions as outside reader of my dissertation.

The CUNY Graduate Center and in particular the GC anthropology department has been a uniquely welcoming, intellectually stimulating, and politically challenging place, and I am thankful to all who made it such. A special thanks goes to Ellen DeRiso, who has never failed me in her expertise and kind help. I have much benefitted from my conversations with Banu Karaca, Ceren Özgül, and Mary N. Taylor on the role of “culture talk” in Europe. Taking some of the hurdles on the way to the Ph.D. together with Barış Kuymulu has made them seem less insurmountable. My cohort and many others among students and faculty in the anthropology department provided much exchange and support.

The research and writing of this dissertation has been facilitated by a travel grant of the anthropology department and a dissertation fellowship of the CUNY European Union Studies Center, which I acknowledge gratefully. This work would not have been possible without the good will and generosity of all those who agreed to be interviewed, whom I cannot name here, or contributed in other ways to the research. A special thanks to Didem Daniş and Kağan Şenyüz for their support during my preliminary fieldwork in Turkey.

I thank my friends, in New York, Ankara, Istanbul, Berlin, Cologne, Barcelona, Zurich, and elsewhere in Europe and the world, for being there through the tough and the good times, without which all of this would have been so much more difficult. My parents, Hans und Maria Luise, have always encouraged my brothers and me to express our ideas and to take our own course in life. I thank them for their unfailing trust and support. I also thank my brothers, Manuel, Sebastian, and Benjamin, for much joyfully contentious conversation. Aren Leon Mücen has brought much light and laughter to our lives in the last year. Barış Mücen has been there with and for me all this way, and any thank you would be much too little to account for his part in the journey. Thank you, nevertheless, most deeply.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	Studying State (Trans)Formation: Culture and Class in the Making of EU-Europe	1
CHAPTER 1	Unity in Diversity: The Making of “Neoliberal Union” and its Contradictions	46
CHAPTER 2	Multi-Level Governance: EU Structural Funds and the Making of Capital-Conducive Places	87
CHAPTER 3	Culture’s Utilities: The Economic and Political Value of Diversity	128
CHAPTER 4	Be Berlin: Diversity and Difference in the Intercultural, Creative City	176
CHAPTER 5	“Cosmopolitan Entrapment:” EU Normative Power and the Making of a Turkish Competition State	225
CONCLUSION	Cosmopolitanism in Crisis: Deepening Neoliberal Union and its Contradictions	267
BIBLIOGRAPHY		287

INTRODUCTION

Studying State (Trans)Formation: Culture and Class in the Making of EU-Europe

Europe is in crisis. This crisis reaches out from the fiscal problems of several European Union (EU) member states and the frantic political attempts to “save the Euro” into the very heart of the “European project.” In a moment where state elites on EU and national levels focus their energies on catering to the demands of finance capital at the cost of the majority of the population in “core” and “crisis” states, class inequalities and virulent culturalist politics are on the rise and popular legitimacy of EU-European state-making is at an all-time low. This study interrogates the wider contradictions of class and culture at the heart of EU-European state-making of the last decade(s) that have now erupted into the open. It critically examines the development of an instable EU-European state form of “regulatory unity in diversity” that worked through rather than against the production of social and regional inequalities within a frame of “neoliberal union” and where state elites turned to “culture” as a means to address resulting problems of state legitimacy and social cohesion. In particular, it interrogates the origins and effects of a “liberal cosmopolitan” policy approach in EU-Berlin and EU-Turkey relations that was to activate culture’s utilities for the creation of state legitimacy, social cohesion, and external influence under the overall political prerogative of ensuring economic competitiveness. A particular approach to culture (as creative production and ways of life) was thus made into a tool of crisis-prone state-making, but in such a way as to harness it to the

processes of neoliberalization that had contributed to such crisis in the first place. The way in which culture was now to be employed in the making of capital-conducive place both within EU-Europe and beyond thus formed part of rather than resolved the contradictions at the heart of EU-European state-making.

◇◇◇

In 2007, the European Commission thought it necessary to propose a new *European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World*. This key document emphasized that culture – as cultural production, human development, and ways of life – was of central economic and political importance for Europe at the same time as increased internal cultural diversity brought about by globalization required a new articulation of its role in the European project. It declared that

Europe's cultural richness and diversity is closely linked to its role and influence in the world. The European Union is not just an economic process or a trading power, it is already widely - and accurately - perceived as an unprecedented and successful social and cultural project. The EU is, and must aspire to become even more, an example of a "soft power" founded on norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue, values which, provided they are upheld and promoted, can be of inspiration for the world of tomorrow. Europe's cultural richness based on its diversity is also, and increasingly so, an important asset in an immaterial and knowledge-based world. The European cultural sector is already a very dynamic trigger of economic activities and jobs throughout the EU territory. Cultural activities also help promoting an inclusive society and contribute to preventing and reducing poverty and social exclusion. As was recognised by the conclusions of the 2007 Spring European Council, creative entrepreneurs and a vibrant cultural industry are a unique source of innovation for the future. This potential must be recognised even more and fully tapped. (European Commission 2007a: 3)

A lot is brought together in this statement that seems discrepant: culture as diverse ways of life with culture as the arts and creative industries, Europe as normative political power with Europe as an international economic competitor. The concept of culture, with its multiple

meanings, serves to paper over these discrepancies.¹ By recognizing the value and value-creating capacity of cultural diversity, we are told, Europe can become, once again, a global economic and political power and moreover ensure inclusive social relations internally. For that to happen, the *Agenda* sets out “three interrelated sets of objectives:” the promotion of, first, “cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue,” second, “culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs” which sought to enhance EU-Europe’s competitiveness in the knowledge economy, and third, “culture as a vital element in the Union’s international relations” (2007a: 7-8). Support for culture, in brief, was to secure harmonious social relations in a “diverse” Europe as well as economic competitiveness and external influence. These are the key themes of culture’s new utilities that are explored in this study in their origins and effects in the making of EU-Europe.

With the term EU-Europe, I refer to a developing state form that is delimited by but not limited to the EU as supranational scale of governance, entailing complex and often conflictual relations between EU, national, and regional governmental levels.² In examining the role of

¹ While the *Agenda* notes that culture is here meant in its “various facets” – “works of art, cultural goods and services” as well as “a symbolic world of meanings, beliefs, values, traditions” (2007a: 3) – it focuses on culture as the arts as sphere of policy application. Nevertheless, it reflects wider changes underway in EU level policy. Since about 2000, EU institutions such as the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council have increasingly invoked the notion that cultural diversity not only of long-standing “European” cultures but also of “non-European” immigrants constitutes an economic, social, and political resource for EU-Europe which needs to be tapped through appropriate policies in fields such as immigration, the integration of immigrants, regional development, and foreign relations. Thus, support for “cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue” (the first objective of the *Agenda*) is not only to secure social *cohesion* of “multicultural” populations by preventing the formation of “segregated” cultural communities excluded from the labor market and political participation. It is also to contribute to economic *competitiveness* by generating support for the creative and cultural industries, attracting needed, in particular high-skilled immigrants, and fostering creative energies needed for innovation (the second objective) and to ground a strengthened role for EU-Europe in *international relations* (the third objective).

² While the term “EU” is frequently used for both the tier of governance constituted by EU institutions *and* for the ensemble of EU member states that are bounded by it – which runs the risk of giving the impression, through an

specific policy approaches to “culture” in the – past and ongoing – making of EU-Europe, this study seeks to further our understanding of contemporary “non-national” forms of statehood and of the particular ways in which these (re)produce inequalities between people and places. The core of the research focuses here on “intercultural” policy developed on EU and city levels, which are interrelated through EU structural funds policy for regional development as well as European networks and programs concerning immigrant integration in cities. Such internal interculturalism goes on the EU level hand in hand with a new narrative of EU-Europeanness that founds a cosmopolitan identity and external role for EU-Europe.³ The research therefore also “moves outwards” onto relations of EU accession established with Turkey where this “cosmopolitanizing mission” has been articulated in particular.

The study is based on interviews with policy-makers and politicians (technocrats in state administrations and parliaments, parliamentarians, and external policy experts) in Berlin involved in structural funds policy and wider related fields of regional development and immigrant integration, on extensive reading and analysis of policy and political documents in these fields, and on the experience with the politics of place in Berlin from June 2008 to June 2009 and repeated visits since. EU relations were here pursued through analysis of EU structural funds the city receives and the Intercultural City Program and European policy

overly unifying perspective, that the EU is a supra-nation-state (in the making) – I use the term EU for the former and EU-Europe for the latter. The latter term is thus to indicate the continuing central role that national states play in this developing state form as well as the increased importance of regions, as opposed to the assumption that the EU as supranational institutional tier now constitutes a new “higher” state level. Studying the making of EU-Europe thus requires us to move beyond a study of the EU as supranational tier of governance and to take into view the latter’s relations with national and regional governmental levels.

³ This two-pronged nature of current EU culturalism is also illustrated in the Commission’s *Agenda for Culture* which as we have seen invokes the importance of respect for culture and diversity for both *internal* and *external* relations.

networks in which Berlin participates. This research in Berlin was complemented with an analysis of European Commission, Council, and Parliament documents on the topics of immigration, integration, and “culture” in the European project on the one hand and Turkey’s EU accession on the other hand as well as with a limited number of interviews of members of the European Parliament and EU officials involved in Turkey’s accession process.

In this introduction I briefly outline the main argument of the dissertation, present the state theoretical framework employed and contribution to relevant literatures, and conclude by giving some more details on the research on which this study is based.

Situating “Culture” in EU-Europe

This study shows EU-Europe as a deeply fragmented space characterized by increased uneven development and social inequalities as a consequence of neoliberal state-making where borders are increasingly “open” to the right kind of “creative” immigrant but closed to those seemingly lacking economic utility. It shows EU-Europe as a place where the degree and foundation of an EU-European “political community” to be developed is still deeply contested – nothing shows this more clearly than the debates surrounding Turkey’s bid for EU membership – all the while on the level of EU institutions, a liberal version of European unity grounded on the mediation of differences by universal rules has come to dominate. This stands in contrast to how many people in Europe experience “political community,” which seems much more firmly tied to a sense of national belonging than EU-European state-makers would want to hope, not least because it is on the level of the nation-state where “entitlements” of the liberal

democratic and welfarist sort are still located, even though neoliberal and in part supranational state-making has severely undermined them. Related to the resulting increased class inequalities, a neo-nationalist culturalist politics has been on the rise since the 1990s across EU-Europe, in opposition among others to what is perceived as supranational rule by foreign or “cosmopolitan” elites.

The making of EU-European “neoliberal union” has moreover produced a space where localities such as cities have been forced to compete for the favor of capital in a context of dwindling financial resources, increasingly class-divided populations, and resulting volatile culturalist politics. Berlin is a case in point. When the Berlin Wall fell, its industries in both the former east and west of the city were exposed to market competition from which they had been previously shielded, in part even in the west due to subsidies from the federal level to the “enclosed” city. Within a very short time span, large parts of the working population – in the west many of them so-called “guest-workers” in particular from Turkey – found themselves unemployed. They found themselves unemployed in a context where federal politics was busy undermining the welfare state while national and local political elites had big dreams of Berlin’s new status not only as national capital but also as prospective global city. The result was near fiscal collapse of Berlin by the early 2000s, rendering it increasingly dependent on external financial resources such as EU structural funds, and prompting the coalition government of social democrats and socialists at the time to slash social and public infrastructure expenditure as well as support for alternative cultural projects. When Berlin failed to develop into a global city, local politicians discovered the creative and cultural industries – fuelled by “creative workers” (making on

average less than 10.000 Euros⁴ a year) that in particular the Green party has come to consider not only as an economic base but also as a key political constituency. The cultural diversity of both “old” and “new” immigrant populations moreover became one of the few resources the city could claim. Here, the attempt to use culture for enhanced economic competitiveness aligned with political efforts to ensure social cohesion in the city by making people – among others those working in state institutions – “aware” of the value of diversity and ensuring equality of opportunity. City politics here was clearly moving to the Left of federal politics, as it had been for past years, but nevertheless remained overall within a neoliberal frame. The city has been governed in the last decades by the social democrats in shifting coalitions, at the time of research together with the socialists supported in particular (but not only) by voters in the eastern districts of Berlin. Subsequent to the most recent elections in 2011, the social democrats have now formed once more a coalition with the Christian Democrats that won in some of the western outer districts of Berlin. Time will tell whether this will prompt a move away from the attempt to treat immigrant diversity as a “resource” to be activated.

As industrial decline has affected in particular also long-standing immigrant populations in Berlin, the city – where pro-diversity and equality of opportunity policies of the recent Berlin government stood against culture-exclusivist mobilization – has been a focal point for German national debates on “immigrant integration.” Such national and local debates on who belonged to and was entitled to resources and political say in particular places have tied into similar struggles on EU level, where they have been incited in particular by Turkey’s bid for EU

⁴ About 13.000 dollars as of December 2011.

membership. EU level contestation on what founded a European identity and community could thus not be disentangled from national and local struggles on the role of cultural diversity in “political community” in particular in states with significant Turkish or Muslim populations.

Turkey in the EU-European imaginary appeared predominantly as a place that had economic potential (for interests in Europe) but whose supposed cultural cum political difference posed the question head-on whether or what kind of “political community” was to be represented by EU institutions. When the moderate Islamic AKP came to form the government in 2002, relations with the EU were first deepened because of a seeming overlap between EU and Turkish interests in “politically liberalizing” the Turkish state. The AKP has however not only pushed political liberalization forward – and in fact, seems to have lost interest here in the last years – but has also been very effective in neoliberalizing the Turkish state and economy. While high growth and “stability” have been able to win the AKP another term in 2011, social inequalities in Turkey have been on the rise. Contestation concerning the place of Turkish populations and the Turkish state in EU-Europe thus touches upon both capital/ class and political community/ culture and in this way shows particularly clearly what kind of place and state is in the making here.

Against this backdrop, this study presents the origins and effects of shifting notions of “culture” in EU-European state-making through a focus on political attempts to use culture’s utilities in Berlin in their relation to EU level policy, which I complement with an analysis of the construction of an external culturalist identity and role for EU-Europe in the politics of Turkey’s

EU accession. I trace the development of a policy common sense on and between EU and city levels that emphasizes the potential value of culture and diversity for economic competitiveness. Such value, it is assumed by policy-makers, can be realized by supporting the creative and cultural industries on the one hand and granting an individual right to culture, ensuring equality of opportunity for immigrants, and fostering intercultural dialogue on the other hand. Such “intercultural” approaches to achieving social cohesion in the multicultural and class-divided polity are developed in explicit opposition to multiculturalism as well as exclusionary or assimilationist cultural politics in the nation-state.

I argue that these intercultural approaches constitute attempts to overcome challenges to legitimacy and cohesion – and thus to state-making – on EU and city levels by establishing “non-national” modes of belonging and entitlement that do not endanger but work with an overall neoliberal agenda. In selectively embracing cultural diversity, they seek to turn “culture” from a *problem* into a *resource* in the making of “cosmopolitan” places conducive to capital. On EU level, I show, this intercultural embrace of diversity moreover contributes to a “cosmopolitan” narrative of EU-Europeanness that finds particularly clear expression in the politics around Turkey’s EU accession. In contrast to earlier attempts at establishing European identity, this narrative emphasizes not civilizational unity but the EU’s capacity to mediate between differences on the basis of universal norms and thus entails a selective opening of EU-European place and political community towards the “non-European.”

Despite its apparent inclusivity, I argue, this intercultural and cosmopolitan embrace of diversity has distinct limits. The diversity valued is defined through class position in a neoliberal context and presumes an entrepreneurial and political-liberal relation to culture as individual property. This links to the way in which attempts to pluralize regimes of belonging and entitlement in EU-Europe are subordinated more generally to the neoliberal prerogative of ensuring competition and competitiveness in a free market. I thus critically examine the implications of this policy approach for the (re)production of inequalities between and within places through the lens of contestation around the “right to place” in Berlin and the politics of Turkey’s EU accession. This analysis shows among others that intercultural/cosmopolitan stances can dovetail in politics and policy with the exclusionary cultural politics they explicitly reject, a rejection on which their normative claims are based.

This has become quite explicit in the contemporary moment of crisis in EU-Europe, where support for diversity turned very quickly into control of what was now portrayed as problematic difference. Austerity measures enforced on Greece and other “fiscally challenged” members of the Eurozone in the declared attempt to “save the Euro” were thus presented as an attempt to rein in the supposed “cultural” propensity of “Southerners” to laziness, tax-evasion, corruption, and overspending. Cultural diversity in this context appeared no longer as a value, but as a danger to the “European project” – at least in its current emphasis on “neoliberal union.” The goal of such culturalism of course was to help push through highly unpopular political measures by obscuring the actual roots of crisis in the contradictions of capital and the way these have been promoted in the EU through “neoliberal union” into which

people and places were very unequally inserted as well as the class content of the means chosen to “save the Euro.” The limits to the recognition of diversity entailed in (neo)liberal cosmopolitan state-making have thus become explicit in the current context of crisis where diversity no longer appears as “benefit” but as “cost.”

Culture and Political Community in “Non-National” Capitalist States

This study developed from an interest in whether or how notions of political community change with the development of “non-national” state forms in the context of neoliberal globalization. I chose to focus on the making of EU-Europe where contemporary processes of state formation were possibly pushed furthest when it came to attempts to create not only economic union but also (supranational) “political community.” I was particularly interested in the role that culturalist notions might play in such state formation processes. This interest had sprung from engagement with studies on how national and colonial states had employed constructs of cultural identity and difference for purposes of creating state legitimacy and stabilizing rule and regimes of exploitation. These constructs were adapted to different state forms and historical conjunctures. At the same time, liberal theories of cosmopolitanism or “post-nationalism” frequently, and often uncritically, referred to EU-Europe as a place where new forms of political community were being developed. I was intrigued by the question whether developing “non-national” state forms such as EU-Europe were relying on their own particular culturalist constructs for creation of state legitimacy and rule and to what effect for state-making and the (re)production of social inequalities.

In contrast to much of the ongoing anthropology of Europe, I however wanted to examine this question by bridging what had come to be a divide between an anthropological and sociological concern with constructions of community and identity in Europe on the one hand and political-economic or policy-oriented engagement with economic and political-institutional dimensions of the making of EU-Europe on the other hand. I thus chose to focus my research on EU structural funds and accession policies as examples of the latter where I nevertheless expected to find cultural politics at work, given that structural funds in Berlin were to further “immigrant integration” and that the politics of Turkey’s accession was dominated by culturalist themes. I moreover sought to overcome this divide on the basis of a state theoretical approach – presented in the following – that allowed me to combine the insights of anthropological, sociological, and post-colonial studies of culturalism in national and colonial states with those of critical political economic approaches to state transformation.

In this way, my study adds to culture and political community studies a deeper insight in how culturalist governance in developing new state forms is profoundly embedded in – though not reducible to – the deeply contradictory ways in which state practices contribute to the reproduction of a crisis-prone capitalist order and stabilize the class-divided society this necessitates, along with the particular effects this has on the shaping of inequalities between people and places. To political economic theories of contemporary state transformation, the study contributes by showing that the role (or difficulties) of developing state forms in reproducing and stabilizing capitalist social relations cannot be disentangled from attempts of state elites to ensure state legitimacy and cohesion of class-divided societies on the basis of (a

specific brand of) *culturalism* rather than more explicitly class-based measures such as welfare-provisioning. Although this study focuses on the case of EU-Europe, policy approaches that seek to harness the value of diversity for political and economic purposes have in recent years been popular internationally. The implications of this study – while decidedly “Europe-centric” – thus reach beyond an explanation and critique of culturalist politics in Europe.

Studying State (Trans)Formation and the Making of EU-Europe

Contemporary processes of state (trans)formation – that is, the *formation* of “non-national” state institutions and the related *transformation* of nation-states – are fundamentally tied to changes in global capitalism in the last decades commonly captured as “globalization” and the, related, demise of Keynesianism with the economic crisis of the 1970s and the consequent turn to neoliberalization (see Brenner 2004a; Clarke 2004; Harvey 2003; Jessop 1999; 2008b; Peck & Tickell 2002). This, as chapter one shows, is also the case for EU-Europe, even though “European integration” dates back to the post-WWII-period. In such processes of state (trans)formation, not only supranational governmental institutions such as the EU, the IMF, the World Bank, WTO, and the like have gained in importance, but also subnational governmental levels and movements and “non-governmental” organizations such as corporations or NGOs. Moreover, as most of the literature now emphasizes, nation-states are not “declining” but play continuing important, though reconfigured roles in governance. Thus, contemporary processes of state transformation should not be seen as a mere “upscaling” of governance. The European Union, as this study shows, is far from constituting a “supra-nation-state.”

Some theorists of the state in neoliberal globalization have referred to global networks developing between international institutions and powerful states as the emergence of a transnational state (see Kalb 2005 for overview). EU-Europe is of course bound into such transnational networks and the way these privilege a transnational capitalist class (see *ibid*). It however also presents a particular case in so far as the EU is to a much greater degree *publicly* perceived as a state-like governmental arrangement or even as a state in formation. State projects striving for a form of European statehood have always accompanied, if not necessarily centrally driven, “European integration.” These have always also entailed visions of a European political community.

In the face of such developments, the classic Weberian definition of the modern state seems too restrictive as a general definition of statehood. This notwithstanding, as Shaw remarks critically, “much literature assumes that it knows what the contemporary state is: the nation-state, in a system of nation-states. In reality, just as states have not always been nation-states, so their transformation in recent times have produced state forms which go far beyond the nation-state as classically understood” (2003: 118). The tendency to equate “the state” with the nation-state is not unique to the Weberian tradition, or much of the anthropology of the state for that matter,⁵ but also implicitly informs Foucauldian anthropological approaches to contemporary processes of state (trans)formation that advocate the study of (transnational)

⁵ The anthropology of the state has so far largely focused on nation-states, (post)colonial states, empires, or imperial nation-states (e.g. Altinay 2004; Borneman 1992; Coronil 1997; Das & Poole 2004; Dirks 2001; Hansen & Stepputat 2001; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Wedeen 1999; Wilder 2005). While there have been some programmatic statements on the anthropology of contemporary processes of state transformation (Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Sharma & Gupta 2006a; Trouillot 2001), there is as yet a dearth of anthropological studies on the topic. The focus in such cases has tended to be more on changes in the *nation*-state (e.g. Appadurai 1999; Basch et al 1994) rather than *nation-state* or non-national forms of statehood.

governmentality (see Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Ong 2006; Sharma & Gupta 2006b; Shore 2006a) – rather than (non-national) statehood.

Implicit equations of statehood with the model of the nation-state also inform views of EU-Europe as *either* an ensemble of independent nation-states *or* a supra-nation-state in the making – neither of which seems to hit the mark entirely. In European studies, the tendency has been to end the debate between “intergovernmentalists” and “supranationalists” in favor of approaches of “multi-level governance” (e.g. Hooghe & Marks 2001), “Europeanization” (e.g. Featherstone & Radaelli 2003), or, less frequently and usually not in critical intention, “Empire” (see Gravier 2009) or “cosmopolitanism” (discussed in more depth below). These have the advantage of seeing the continued, though transformed role of the nation-states in an EU-European system of governance, but tend to be quite uncritical or even implicated in the governmental logics they describe. Some critical scholars in particular of the EU’s “eastern enlargement” have also studied the EU through the lens of empire (i.e. earlier European contiguous empires; e.g. Böröcz 2001). However, while historical parallels can work against the view of the EU as supra-nation-state, they are not particularly suited to develop a deeper understanding of what is *particular* about transformed statehood in the *contemporary* conjuncture.⁶

Critical political economic studies offer promising alternative approaches to state (trans)formation and the making of EU-Europe. They have analyzed contemporary

⁶ In this regard, a critical perspective on EU-European *imperialism* might be more promising, as it is not necessarily tied to a particular state form.

developments as *changes in the form of statehood* – rather than as the proliferation of governance *beyond* the state – because “the state” in the Marxist tradition has been primarily defined in its relation to the reproduction of a capitalist economy and social order and only secondarily through particular institutional features (which have been primary in much of political sociology). Consequently, the contemporary development of non-national institutional formations through which socioeconomic governance is exercised and the shifts in the principles of such governance (from Keynesianism to neoliberalism) is seen as response to and enabling of changes in the organization of capitalism (e.g. Brenner 2004a; Jessop 2008b; Peck & Tickell 2002; Sassen 1996; Shaw 2003; Swyngedouw 1997; Ziltener 1999). This study broadly follows this approach, because it enables us to understand the particularity of contemporary state forms in the reproduction of a (capitalist) socioeconomic order and social inequalities in particular of class.

However, political economic literature on contemporary changes in statehood also has limitations that this study seeks to address. For instance, the periodization of different regimes of accumulation and corresponding state forms in the tradition of the regulation school produces relatively static forms of analysis, notwithstanding the fact that such state forms are seen as a result of political processes. My conceptual frame thus focuses on *state-making* (rather than the identification of types of statehood) to allow for a more dynamic perspective which, I suggest, is a necessity in the case of EU-Europe that continues to be in formation. Processes of state-making, I moreover add, involve not only the development of particular state institutions and practices oriented *directly* towards the reproduction of a (changing) capitalist

economy, which are foregrounded in the above literature, but are also driven by attempts at achieving *statehood*, that is, publicly acquired authority *as states*, for example through the realms of “culture” and “community.” This in turn has implications for both the particularities of state forms developed and for whether or how these can secure the reproduction of capitalist social orders.

A perennial problem of defining “the state” in its relation to a capitalist social and economic order rather than through particular institutional features has been whether all institutions in society that serve to reproduce capitalism or, in Poulantzas’ (1975) terms, to achieve “cohesion” in a class-divided society, form part of “the state.” How is “statehood” constituted? Recently influential contributions to state theory have here emphasized that statehood – in the form of publicly acquired authority for seemingly “transcendent” state institutions – is construed, not pre-given.

State-Making: The Problem of Achieving “Statehood”

In an influential contribution to state theory, Philip Abrams (2006 [1988]) argued that the *idea* of the state as *unitary* and *transcendent* agent – an idea, he posited, that informed not only political sociology but also Marxist theorizing – and as serving an “illusory common interest” obscured actual political processes and was thus an important facilitator of “politically organized subjection.” Abrams emphatically did not argue that we should abandon the study of

the form and role of the state-system⁷ but that we also need to pay attention to the way an *idea of the state* is construed and to its role in political domination.

Although Abrams did not draw this conclusion himself, his argument shows that “statehood” – i.e. the recognition of governmental institutions and practices as having authority because they are of “the state” in the above sense – is not given but has to be *politically achieved*. For institutions of governance to acquire public authority they need to be associated with a “state idea,” as it is “the state” that supposedly acts in a “common interest.”⁸ Corrigan and Sayer (1985) have in this vein analyzed how “moral authority” was constructed for the developing institutions of the British state and supported the latter’s projects of “moral regulation” in the development of a capitalist social and economic order. Building on Abrams and Foucault, Timothy Mitchell also emphasized that the boundary between state and society is “a line drawn internally, within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a social and political order is maintained” (2006 [1999]: 170), among others through modes of representation embedded in social or governmental practices that “create the effect of an enduring structure apparently external to those practices” (ibid).

⁷ Abrams noted that the “internal and external relations of political and governmental institutions (the state-system) can be studied effectively without postulating the reality of the state. So in particular can their involvements with economic interests in an overall complex of domination and subjection” (2006 [1988]: 122)

⁸ Importantly, the construct of the state thus rests *not* on “subjective beliefs”, but is “a representation in visible everyday forms” (ibid: 173).

These contributions – while themselves focused on the nation-state and thus not delivering a blue-print for this study⁹ – show us the importance of paying attention not only to changes in the institutions and practices of governance in contemporary processes of state (trans)formation, but also to whether and how new governmental arrangements achieve statehood and what particular consequences the way this is done has for the structuring of political domination and social inequalities. This study shows that processes of state-making in EU-Europe are in part driven by and acquire distinctive qualities through attempts at achieving statehood and that constructs of culture play a crucial role here.

The centrality of attempts to achieve statehood in EU-European state-making is linked to the EU's – but also to the member states' and cities' – perennial “legitimacy problem,” as the making of EU-Europe could or did not rely on the established legitimacy principles of post-WWII welfare-oriented nation-states. EU-Europe is deviating from what Gellner (1983) has called the “nationalist principle of political legitimacy” due to the existence of substantial “supranational” decision-making structures in the absence of a “European nation.” The deficiency of EU

⁹ As David Harvey reminds us, “the content of the state-idea has not remained constant over time” (2009: 264). I suggest that current culturalist politics in EU-Europe is fuelled in part by a search of state elites for “non-national” state ideas as means of ensuring consent to EU-European state- and place-making. To examine state-making in EU-Europe, I thus cannot simply apply the insights of Abrams, Mitchell, or Corrigan and Sayer, because they establish their arguments through an equation of “the state” with the nation-state. Abrams does not make explicit that “the state” can appear as serving the common interest because the nation (as “imagined political community” (Anderson 1991)) has also been prominently constructed as *unitary*, sharing in a *common character*, and thus as having *one* interest. Thus, I posit, the state idea as described by Abrams relies fundamentally on the idea of the nation as political community with a single character and interest that can be represented by the state as similarly unitary agent acting in the general interest. This of course begs the question – which this study aims to address – what happens to legitimation and the achievement of “politically organized subjection” through the state idea when this congruence of state and nation appears increasingly tenuous (see e.g. Appadurai 1996; Sharma & Gupta 2006b; Sparke 2005; Trouillot 2001). In regards to Mitchell's view of the state, Matthew Sparke has argued that it entails a spatial view that “so closely yokes nation and state ... that ultimately Mitchell only connects the quasi-transcendental qualities of state effects to the territorialized effects of the hyphenated nation-state” (2005: 116-17), leading to the neglect of transnational state-making. In the case of Corrigan and Sayer, their explicit interest is of course in the analysis of a process of (nation-) state formation.

institutions when it comes to principles of liberal democratic representation¹⁰ not only deepens the EU's "democratic deficit" but also diminishes liberal democratic self-determination on national scale (or renders it void, as in the recent case of Greece). Moreover, the neoliberal dominance in recent "European integration" has resulted in escalating class inequalities and a widespread shift from welfare to workfare that contradicts established principles of "output legitimacy" of the welfare state.

State legitimacy and the means used to secure it however are central to what Poulantzas (1975: 50-1) has called the "global" (or generic) function of the capitalist state – the ensuring of "cohesion" in the form of the continued existence of divided classes and the dominance of one over the other. Social cohesion in this "critical" sense therefore does not refer to the overcoming of an unequal social order, but to its stabilization through state practices.

In the case of EU-Europe, I suggest, the very roots of its legitimacy problems – neoliberalization cum "supranational" integration in a largely non-democratic way – also increase the difficulty of achieving cohesion. Increasing class divisions fuel a neo-nationalist culturalist politics directed against immigrant and minority populations as well as EU-European state-making. EU-European societies thus seem increasingly divided by both class and culture, which poses distinct obstacles to the achieving of EU-European statehood and the reproduction of stable capitalist social relations. In this context, "integration" (of immigrants and their descendants – in the

¹⁰ The EU is seen to lack a "demos" (e.g. Balibar 2004) while key institutions (e.g. European Commission, European Central Bank) are removed from democratic influence or (European Parliament) have little say in the decision-making process on EU level.

following: immigrants¹¹) has emerged as the culturalist correlate of “cohesion” in the critical sense. This is also far from a neutral term. As Corrigan and Sayer have pointed out, the question is always “who is seeking to integrate whom, to what ends, by what means, and in what forms; and who suffers, which ends are denied, which means declared illegitimate, which forms suppressed, whose histories rewritten, thereby?” (1984: 195)¹²

Incidentally, attempts to secure cohesion in the critical sense need not always constitute an explicit class project of state elites in their relation to capital with the motivation of stabilizing particular conditions of accumulation. They can have a further origin, as this study shows, in political concerns with improving the lot of disadvantaged populations all the while accepting a capitalist socioeconomic order as given or necessary. In contemporary EU-Europe, policy-makers seek in particular to address “social exclusion” of populations marked through both class and culture. In fact, the concern has been with establishing cohesion in both class-divided and “multicultural” societies *both* for the sake of disadvantaged populations *and* for the sake of ensuring competitiveness in a capitalist context. The latter, as this study shows, was seen to require the labor power of the low-skilled (immigrant) currently excluded from the labor market and the creativity of the high-skilled immigrant attracted by a tolerant environment

¹¹ In the following, I use the term “immigrants” for both new immigrants and for the *descendants* of immigrants for better readability. The reader should keep this in mind in particular for the Berlin-specific discussion. I have decided against the more common terminology of “migrants” – in Germany, the politically correct terminology is now “persons with a migration background” – because of its problematic connotation in particular in countries such as Germany with a guest-worker system where in-migration was long denied. As the term migrant connotes a state of movement, it reinforces such notions. The official terminology and definition of “persons with a migration background” is problematic because it only includes the first and second generations, thus neglecting how later generations are affected by discrimination. I have also decided against the term “minorities” because it is a term that connotes official status, and it is not how immigrants and their descendants are perceived, described, or officially recognized in Germany.

¹² They refer here to the more general sociological concept of integration, which however equally applies to the more specific case in which integration is understood widely today, as the integration of immigrants.

only. Together, this fed into the development of so-called “intercultural” policy promoting respect for individual diversity cum equality of opportunity.

Political economic theories of state transformation tend to neglect the implications of such “culturalist” policy that seems not immediately related to the role of the state in the reproduction of capitalism. In this way, they neglect however a central dimension of contemporary state-making in EU-Europe. In turn, culture and community studies generally failed to explore in depth the role that the contradictions of capital and class played in state-making as well as in the generation of culturalist politics on the ground (see Kalb & Halmai 2011 for critique and alternative perspectives). My study seeks to capture these fields of study in their interrelation by examining *state*-making in its relation to *place*-making, and through a focus on *culturalism* and *its class dimensions* in both.

The Making of “Thick” and “Thin” Places

Why place-making? For one, because an important driver in contemporary state (trans)formation processes has been the increasing mobility of capital, itself supported by neoliberal changes in governance, which has heightened competition between places in which their particular qualities played an important role (Harvey 2001a; 2001 [1989]; Peck & Tickell 2002). As a consequence, policy-makers have turned increasingly to attempts to shape and market the qualities of places such as to make them conducive to capital. That is, much of contemporary state practices are oriented towards supplying conditions that would attract increasingly mobile capital to place. As this study shows, a developing policy common sense

holds that sought-after capital and high-skilled workers prefer multicultural, cosmopolitan, vibrant places over homogeneous, exclusionary, traditional ones. In this context, diversity appears as a place-specific value to be fostered and promoted.

In the value attributed to diversity, I argue in the following chapters, the attempt to create places conducive to capital intersects with another dimension of state-making: political efforts to reconstitute belonging and entitlement in place in a way that differs from established national paradigms, framed as attempts to adjust to new social realities in a globalizing world and to secure state legitimacy. Such efforts are directed explicitly against exclusionary visions of place and political community and thus are situated in embattled terrain. Struggles here involve stakes such as who has the right to enter political community in place and benefit internally from limited resources, and need to be seen themselves as resulting from neoliberalization. As Don Kalb points out, neoliberal globalization and struggles for place-making are intricately related as “places and popular identities were becoming hamstrung between an intensifying dialectic of infinite openness and reactive and fearful closure” (2005). This is clearly visible in the EU-European promotion of intercultural and cosmopolitan policy – for the making of place in the city, for example – in explicit opposition to exclusionary culturalism that has been on the rise (more on that below).

The concept of place evokes the “unique qualities and character of some segment of the earth’s surface and the coalescence of human activities into some sort of distinctive structured coherence” (Harvey 2009: 171) which is established through practices of bounding, internal

ordering, and establishing particular external relations (see Dirlik 2001; Harvey 1996; 2009; Massey 2005). Defined by social relations, places are socially *made* rather than mere locations in space, and such place-making often is a conflictual process, involving struggles on which social groups and which visions are to shape the distinctiveness of place. The concept of place as employed in this study, while presupposing some form of bounded distinctiveness, therefore does not entail a determined degree of closure or openness or a particular kind of internal organization of social relations. Rather, such qualities of place form *stakes* in contemporary place-making in EU-Europe, both on city and EU levels, in their intersection with struggles around the (re-) constitution of “political community” and the demands of capital.

While the concept of place often evokes rootedness, places made in such contestation can thus be “thin” or “thick” (Entrikin 2003),¹³ they can be “open and porous,” as Massey (1994: 5) wants to see them, or characterized by exclusionary politics, as Harvey warns us they are prone to be (e.g. 2009), they can be unified by collective identity, however imagined (Harvey 2006: 310) or of a “much vaguer sort”, as Massey (2005: 153) contends most are. Most often maybe they are open and porous for some and closed and exclusionary for others.

Entrikin describes the difference between “thick” and “thin” place in view of relative openness or closure, itself based on particular relations to cultural identity and difference:

¹³ J. Nicholas Entrikin here refers to Robert David Sack’s application of Michael Walzer’s conceptualization of “thick” versus “thin” morality relevant in the making of political community. Walzer’s (1994) terminology in turn was inspired by Clifford Geertz’s notion of “thick description,” though he uses the notion of “thickness” not in order “to offer a thick description of moral argument” but “rather to point to a kind of argument that is itself ‘thick’ – richly referential, culturally resonant, locked into a locally established symbolic system or network of meanings” (ibid: xi). With “thinness” he in turn refers to a “moral minimum” (for example, the notion of “justice”) embedded in such “thick” moral argument but with the ability to resonate across “thick” location.

Thick places rich in cultural traditions and customs create difference, but often through erecting highly impermeable boundaries that restrict entry and access. Boundaries here could in some instances mean political borders but could also refer to social and cultural barriers that maintain distinctions between insiders and outsiders. To the view of outsiders such places remain opaque, and in the extreme instances, they are closed to all who are not members. Thin places are more permeable and more open to view, but as a result they may lose a sense of local difference and become more like other places. This latter type of place is often associated with the homogenizing qualities of globalization, while the former is linked to cultural particularism (2003: 53).

This distinction goes back to Michael Walzer's (1994) conceptualization of "thick" versus "thin" morality, the former being developed in a particular (cultural and political) community and therefore relatively "opaque" to outsiders, the latter "abstracted" from such "thick" moorings and thus able to engender solidarities with outsiders but of a less profound sort.

On the plane of political theory, "thickness" thus tends to be associated with communitarian place and community constructions and "thinness" with liberalism and its universalist aspirations. Both finds its critics: the "thickness" of the former has often been linked with the exclusion of outsiders in form of virulent culturalist and nationalist politics, while the "thinness" of the latter has been shown to aim at formal rather than substantive social equality in line with the necessities of a capitalist social order.

This brings us to a "second" dimension of "thinness" or "thickness": it invokes not only particular relations to cultural identity and difference as implied in Entrikin's and Walzer's definitions, but also the question of how social solidarities more broadly are organized in place and political community, in contemporary societies in part through the state. The dismantling of welfare states in recent decades, involving among others the individualization of risk and the

active destruction of organized working-class solidarities, has here led to a “thinning” of state-organized solidarity in an effort to create capital-conducive place.¹⁴ The “thinness” or “thickness” of place in this dimension thus stands in immediate – and possibly contradictory – relation with state attempts to ensure “cohesion.”

In brief, I propose to examine the “thinness” and “thickness” of place in view of both openness and closure and the quality of social solidarities. We should not assume here that “thickness” of solidarity requires “thickness” of culturalism. Rather, the yardstick for a progressive politics might exactly be the degrees to which it enables “thick” social solidarities that are nevertheless open to the “cultural outsider.” The place-making approach examined in this study, however, is less “open” to the cultural other than it claims to be all the while it relies on a quite “thin” notion of social solidarity in its alignment with demands of capital – and thus, as will be argued, feeds into rather than resolves the contradictions in the making of EU-Europe.

Particular qualities of place, I have suggested, are the consequence of place-making practices, often involving contestation between different social groups with different interests and visions of place. State elites, institutions, and practices take a central part in such place-making. While they do not create places as such from scratch, they play an important role in shaping specific forms of bounding, internal ordering, and establishing external relations that give places their distinctiveness (Harvey 2009; Massey 2005), in alignment with or opposition to place-making

¹⁴ Importantly, however, it is not a done deal that “thick” place serves as base for resistance to the forces of capital and state, as Dirlik (2001) seems to hope, although arguably “thin” (liberal) places tend to less contradictorily cater to the former’s needs.

projects of social groups. Moreover, states themselves, as David Harvey has argued, can be understood as “the outcome of a distinctive process of place formation” (2009: 262) in so far as they themselves are distinctly bounded, internally ordered, and externally related as particular outcomes of place-and state-making projects and struggles. In the case of EU-Europe, for example, recent state-making has involved contestation between different visions of what kind of place *Europe* is: a “thick” one characterized by unitary civilization (excluding Turkey) or a “thin” one united by universal norms (conditionally accepting Turkey)? A “thick” one involving social solidarity supported through state-organized redistribution or a “thin” one united by a common market only? Thus, examining specific (state) practices of place-making, in their relations to culturalism and capital, might allow us to capture the distinctiveness of a state form in the making as well as examine the latter’s consequences for the (re)production of inequalities between and within places.

Studying the Making of “Political Community”: Culturalism

In the wake of the “cultural turn,” scholars of the state have become interested in the role culture – variously defined – plays in constituting the state (Steinmetz 1999: 2-3) as much as in how states shape ‘culture’ (e.g. Corrigan & Sayer 1985; Hall 2006; Massad 2001). My intention in focusing on the role of “culture” in place- and state-making is a different one. I do not employ the culture concept as an analytic tool, I am not studying *culture* itself, whether as force or effect.¹⁵ Rather, in line with recent developments in anthropology,¹⁶ I examine the role that

¹⁵ Of course, I do study what often has been subsumed under the culture concept (i.e. “new” ideas of culture, according to Wright – see below): constructions of meaning, representations, etc. But I prefer *not* to study these dimensions of social life under the rubric of *culture*, as I do not see particular heuristic value in doing so and

particular culturalisms – different ways of thinking about culture in the polity – play in the making of states and places, with what effects for the (re-)production of social inequalities.

With the term culturalism, I refer to publicly available and often institutionally engrained repertoires of conceptualizing the relation between culture (or “differently cultured” populations and individuals) and “political community.”¹⁷ Such repertoires have undergirded state legitimacy and governance, constructions of belonging and entitlement in the polity and in place, and external relations of states and places and are thus a central dimension of state- and place-making (for studies on such issues, see in particular literature on colonialism and on nation-making, e.g. Asad 1993; Chatterjee 1993; Dirks 2001; Feldman 2005; Massad 2001; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Stoler 2002; Wilder 2005).

because of the politicization of the concept. In that sense I differ from Shore, who intended to study the political use of the culture concept with help of an anthropological concept of culture (Shore 2000).

¹⁶ As Susan Wright notes, “academic definitions of ‘culture’ are themselves positioned and political and therefore a resource ... to use in establishing or challenging processes of domination and marginalization” (1998: 14). From a different angle, Shore also observes that “culture is also an *indigenous* category, or folk idiom, and that native perceptions and uses of the concept of ‘culture’ constitute a fertile area of study” (2000: 23-4; see also Grillo 2003). Both the “old” anthropological concept of culture as way of life of a bounded people and “new” ideas about culture as process of contested meaning-making, Wright argues, are wielded in different political arenas today. Anthropologists, she claimed, should study such “politicization of culture” by decision-makers who use “the concept in a range of fields of power” (1998: 7). In a similar vein, Virginia R. Dominguez has noted that it is important to examine “*what is being accomplished* socially, politically, discursively” when culture is “invoked to describe, analyze, argue, justify, and theorize” (cited in Yúdice 2003: 25).

¹⁷ “Claims of culture” (Benhabib 2002) are a central means to stake political demands in the contemporary context. As Benhabib notes, “whether we call the current movements ‘struggles for recognition’ (Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth), ‘identity/difference movements,’ (Iris Young, William Connolly), or ‘movements for cultural rights and multicultural citizenship (Will Kymlicka), they signal a new political imaginary that propels cultural identity issues in the broadest sense to the forefront of political discourse” (2002: viii). However, culturalism not only articulates political struggles, but can also be profoundly naturalized and common-sense. While culturalism always has political implications, it is not always politicized.

A key repertoire for European nation-states has been culture-exclusivism (or what Stolcke (1995) calls “cultural fundamentalism” in the contemporary context)¹⁸ which sees culture as essential feature of groups and the self and tends to ground it in a particular place (such as state territory) from which cultural difference is to be excluded. Culture-exclusivism founds state legitimacy and belonging and entitlement in the polity on a relation of identity with a culturally homogeneous nation and informs state practices that seek to establish the latter (see e.g. Brubaker 1992; Hayden 1996; Karakasidou 1997). It is a paradigm of spatial-political *separation* of cultural insiders and outsiders (thus of “thick” place and political community) that undergirds what Ernest Gellner has termed the national principle of political legitimacy. This “requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” (Gellner 1983: 1), that the state represents all members of the nation and only members of the nation, so that furthermore “ethnic boundaries within a given state – a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation – should not separate the power-holders from the rest” (ibid).¹⁹ This is also the principle that informs contemporary neo-nationalist movements (chapter 1).

Such culture-exclusivism is usually contrasted with liberal universalism in the making of nation-states (e.g. Brubaker 1992) which conceptualizes belonging in political community in

¹⁸ Stolcke (1995) refers with this term to right-wing anti-immigrant politics in Europe that postulates the incommensurability and thus need of spatial and political separation of different cultures, which she grounds in the history of nation-state practices and national identities.

¹⁹ Colonial states, which violated this latter principle, thus had to rely on a different culturalism to justify domination. As Partha Chatterjee has noted, “the premise of its [the colonial state’s] power was a *rule of colonial difference*, namely, the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group” (1993: 10, emphasis added) on the basis of hierarchical constructions of race/culture (see also Dirks 2001; Stoler 2002). József Böröcz calls this form of culturalism “coloniality,” implying “a fixed system of inferiorized otherness” (2001: 18). Coloniality can be aligned with culture-exclusivism as well as with liberal universalism.

predominantly “civic” rather than “ethnic” terms. However, this does not mean that liberal universalism is free of culturalism (see also Asad 2003; Comaroff & Comaroff 2004; Brown 2006a). Brubaker for example notes that in the French case, “[P]olitical inclusion has entailed cultural assimilation, for regional cultural minorities and immigrants alike” (1992: 1), which leads Verena Stolcke to emphasize that the assimilationist idea that grounded French citizenship paradigms assumed “that formal legal equality among citizens presupposes cultural homogeneity” (1995: 9, footnote 11). Liberal universalist culturalism translated into state practices not so much of exclusion of the “cultural other” as inclusion on the basis of assimilation or cultural transformation (in realms considered relevant for “civic” participation in the nation), while certain cultural freedoms were to be retained through formal rights (e.g. to religious practice). It thus relies on a quite different conceptualization of culture than the one implied in culture-exclusivism. In the latter, culture is an essential feature of the self, while in liberal universalism, the subject stands – or rather, can come to stand – in relation of autonomy to her culture and thus can discard cultural practices not acceptable in the liberal polity (chapter 4). Individual freedom of cultural practice and its limits are founded on a system of (formal) rights. Liberal universalism thus constitutes a “thin” mode of place and political community construction.

In the post-colonial context, multiculturalism moreover has gained importance as a culturalist repertoire that deviates from both culture-exclusivism and liberal universalism (or rather, combines elements of both in an often contradictory manner) in so far as it affirms both the essential nature of different cultural communities *and* the possibility of integrating them into

the polity through schemes of *collective* recognition and sometimes representation as well as shared norms. As Meinhof and Triandafyllidou note, “[mu]lticulturalism implies that members of such [immigrant and minority] groups should be granted equal rights ... without being expected to give up their diversity, although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key values” (2006: 8). Multiculturalism thus adds to liberal universalism the recognition of a public (rather than private) right to collective cultures under the condition that these are compatible with liberal political norms or other forms of “civic integration” (for discussion and critique, see e.g. Asad 1993; Hale 2005; Turner 1993).

None of these repertoires seems to have been able to measure up to contemporary realities and requirements of state-making in EU-Europe. While culture-exclusivism has been on the rise in Europe with widespread popular support for neo-nationalist parties, it stands in contradiction to what state elites see as demands of a globalized economy (including select labor immigration), to projects of “European integration,” and to the challenges that in particular governments of large deindustrialized cities with substantial immigrant populations but no gate-keeper function face. Allegedly “culture-blind” liberal universalism does no longer seem a feasible alternative in so far as it cannot accommodate increased cultural claims-making (Benhabib 2002) in Europe. Multiculturalism in turn has been profoundly discredited across states in Europe not least by politicians catering to the renewed prevalence of popular culture-exclusivism (although it also garnered strong critiques from the Left) with the claim that it fostered segregated culturalist communities relying on the welfare state.

While on the national level, the tendency has been to return to exclusionary or assimilationist culturalist repertoires, this situation has also provoked – as this study shows – a search for “non-national” culturalism (and related “state ideas”) that would be more appropriate as a foundation for legitimacy and governance of class-divided and multicultural populations in particular on EU and city levels. More specifically, this study describes the development of a brand of – overall “thin” liberal – culturalism in EU-European state-making that combines an internal “intercultural” approach to the management of class-divided multicultural societies with an external “cosmopolitanizing” mission, both of which are harnessed to the demands of creating capital-conducive place in a neoliberalized context. Its articulation in EU-European policy is reminiscent of cosmopolitan theories of EU-Europe that have gained salience in EU studies in recent years and here in particular of Beck and Grande’s vision of a “cosmopolitan Empire Europe.”

Beck and Grande (Beck 2004; Beck & Grande 2004; 2007) state that Europe *is* already cosmopolitan and needs to *become* more so if it wants to be successful in ensuring internal support and enhancing its global role, and, as Grande (2007) adds, to be economically competitive. Cosmopolitanism for them “combines the tolerance of otherness with indispensable universal norms” (Beck & Grande 2007: 71). Beck and Grande oppose this to a liberal universalism that dissolves difference on the one hand and culture-exclusivist nationalism on the other hand. A cosmopolitan European Empire, they state, is both directed towards the inside by regulating a “Europe of difference” and towards the outside in contributing to a regime of multiple cosmopolitanisms globally. It is best secured, they suggest,

by an asymmetric governmental framework of “unity in diversity” allowing for local interpretation of general rules and (only) a “minimum” of social protection.²⁰ Beck and Grande’s vision entails the “key themes” of culture’s new utilities in EU-Europe: respect for diversity within limits to ensure social cohesion, competitiveness, and state legitimacy internally, and a cosmopolitanizing mission in external relations.

“Double Polarization” of Class and Culture: Situating Cosmopolitan Europe

Indeed, as Rovisco observes, in recent years EU rhetoric has shifted away from “the narrative of Europe as a space of common cultural roots and core values ... in favor of a conception of Europe based upon a commitment to cosmopolitan values” (2007: 204). As this study shows, the EU is now presented as an institution that draws its legitimacy from its capacity to *mediate* differences on the basis of shared norms and political values rather than as representative of a culturally united European people. It is these norms and values, moreover, which are presented as informing the EU’s external role. This “thin” vision of EU-Europeanness, I argue, has in fact been institutionally engrained on EU level in the wake of the (failed) draft constitution for the EU and in the context of debates on Turkey’s potential EU membership when “thicker” notions of the European project lost out.

²⁰ As untrammelled neoliberalism provokes nationalist backlash, Beck and Grande promote a “universalist minimum” of social provision internally to prevent absolute poverty, while otherwise prioritizing struggles of recognition over those of redistribution, as the former shape “European identity” (2004: 284). This very “thin” vision of social solidarities is easily aligned with neoliberal prerogatives and differs for example from Habermas’ (2001) propositions – another key figure in the recent interest in a European cosmopolitanism – which align more with a Keynesian solution on a European scale and are primarily concerned with securing democracy rather than questions of cultural diversity. Where Habermas and Beck and Grande meet is in their desire to strengthen EU-Europe internationally - as an economic and political counter-weight to the US (Habermas) or as its cosmopolitan(izing) ally (Beck & Grande).

EU policy-makers or documents, to be sure, do not use the term cosmopolitanism²¹ (see also Rumford 2005), unsurprisingly maybe given its often negative meaning in Europe. I find it nevertheless highly likely, given that EU policy-makers tend to be well aware of relevant academic debates, that they have come across cosmopolitan theories of Europe that have gained importance not only as a way of re-envisioning European identity (Delanty 2002; 2005) but also for the examination of EU policies and politics (see e.g. Antonsich 2008; Beck & Grande 2004; 2007; Eriksen 2006a; Habermas 2001; Parker 2009; Rumford 2007; Sellar & McEwen 2011) in particular also in the case of Turkey's EU accession (Baban & Keyman 2008; Bürgin 2010; Parker 2009; Rumford 2007). To see the turn to intercultural/cosmopolitan policy on EU level as an application of cosmopolitan theories however would be overly simplistic, and this study examines some of the broader economic and political roots of this development. Thus, the study of the role and effects of cosmopolitan culturalism in EU-European state- and place-making allows us to critically reflect on cosmopolitan theories. In turn, a brief examination of the general conditions of the rise of (academic) cosmopolitanism and of its assumptions here might help us identify some of the social roots and implications of EU level policy.

Visions of a cosmopolitan Europe build on more general liberal cosmopolitan theories which need to be seen as an expression of global transformations in the post-Cold-War context and the effects of the neoliberalization of economies and states. Cosmopolitan approaches split into more ethical and culture-oriented (e.g. Appiah 2006; Cheah & Robbins 1998; Nussbaum & Cohen 1996) and more liberal democratic strands (e.g. Archibugi 2003; Archibugi & Held 1995;

²¹ Instead, the European Parliament and Council for example mention the importance of "encouraging active European citizenship open to the world" (European Parliament & Union 2006)

De Greiff & Cronin 2002; Held 1995). Political theorists of a liberal cosmopolitanism such as David Held (1995) were in fact concerned with the re-institutionalization of democratic governance in a global context where no state in isolation could address issues such as global warming or footloose capital, and where the decisions made in one state had effects on those in other states *not* involved in the decision-making process via democratic institutions. They tended to be very positive about the democratizing force of global civil society as well as about the EU as an incipient “cosmopolitan” model (see e.g. Linklater 1998) because of its “unbundling” of sovereignty, territory, and citizenship and its multi-level institutional structure. Although they sought to reduce global inequalities, as *liberal* theories, they also remained firmly wed to capitalism, if not in its untrammelled neoliberal form, and thus necessarily to class inequality.²² This is very visible in Beck and Grande’s cosmopolitan vision which not only harkens back to earlier claims of a “European civilizing mission” but also resonates with the class-based neoliberal agenda in Europe, despite their claims to the contrary (see conclusion).

Liberal cosmopolitanism thus formed a political-liberal strand of globalization discourse in the 1990s which, as Don Kalb argues, “was a political platform that allowed free-market liberals and political liberals to sustain a coalition of forces that helped to shape an entire epoch of world history in the immediate aftermath of the fall of socialism” (2005: 182). An alignment of political liberals with the demands of neoliberalism is also a characteristic of current

²² As Calhoun notes, there are “important tensions between liberal cosmopolitan visions that exempt property relations from democratic control and more radical ones that do not. If this is not addressed directly, it is easy for the rhetoric of cosmopolitanism – and indeed cosmopolitan democracy – to be adopted by and become a support for neoliberal visions of global capitalism” (2002: 890). For further critique of liberal cosmopolitanism, see Harvey (2009).

intercultural policy and cosmopolitan visions in EU-Europe, and this study provides us with a deeper understanding of its political roots and effects in processes of state- and place-making.

Cosmopolitan theories draw much of their normative appeal from their rejection of neo-nationalism and an exclusionary culturalism on both national and European levels. They here reiterate a wider schism of “double polarization” of class and culture, that is, of cosmopolitan elites on the one hand and “traditionalized and culturally ‘enclosed’ populations” (Kalb 2005: 197 in reference to Friedman 2003b) on the other. Jonathan Friedman (2003b) has described this as a consequence of “hegemonic decline” (of the West), the effects of which led to a search for “more stably rooted identities,” resulting in processes of diasporization, indigenization, regionalization, and nationalization, as well as to the “globalization of elites” who promote cosmopolitan culturalism. Don Kalb (2005) has further argued that current (culture-exclusivist) populism is in fact fuelled by such opposition of both culturally and materially dispossessed working-classes to the “cosmopolitan elites” that seemed to have “sold out” the nation.

This study similarly seeks to show some of the concrete processes that produce such “double polarization” in a focus however on its “liberal cosmopolitan” pole, illustrating that it is not only an expression of the experience of travel and consumption of a globalized elite, but develops as policy and political practice from the active search of state elites (in particular of the liberal Left) for state legitimacy and cohesion in “non-national” state forms while taking the continued existence of (neoliberal) capitalism for granted and catering to its perceived requirements. It argues that resulting intercultural/cosmopolitan policies not only fail to address the increased

inequalities that provide the seedbed for exclusionary culturalism, but are profoundly enmeshed in their production. By implication, they are unlikely to overcome neo-nationalist culturalism but contribute to the latter's continuing salience. The study moreover shows that a liberal cosmopolitanism catering to neoliberal demands places distinct limits on what counts as support-worthy diversity and thus can in fact dovetail in political and policy practice with the more exclusionary culturalisms it explicitly rejects.

In this way, the study further provides a critique of cosmopolitan theories of Europe – in particular of Beck and Grande – by showing how the governmental arrangements cosmopolitan theorists support serve in fact to (re)produce inequalities of class, “culture,” and region in EU-Europe and that therefore the “cosmopolitan” solution they propose will, contrary to their claims, neither solve the problem of exclusionary nationalism in Europe nor the legitimacy crisis of the European project.

The Research

My state theoretical perspective translates into a study of the intersection of EU, national, and regional governmental institutions and practices, in contrast to the focus on ethnography in *EU* institutions (e.g. Barry 2001; Bellier & Wilson 2000; Shore 2000) that has been common in anthropology. My main original sources of information have been policy documents, interviews and informal conversations with policy-makers and politicians, transcripts of parliamentary debates and committee meetings and other public documentation – such as media reports – of political debates, attendance of political and policy events, and experiences gained by living and

observing in place. I thus approached the role of culturalism in state- and place-making through a research focus on policy, which I sought to situate in its wider political field.

As Shore and Wright (1997) have noted, policy documents are a main source of information for the anthropology of policy, which I have complemented with interviews with policy-makers. More specifically, I interviewed politicians of both governmental and oppositional parties in Berlin as well as technocrats and external experts directly involved in EU structural funds and accession policies. In my analysis of policy documents, I began with a set of key documents in the respective policy fields and then broadened out to further material that I identified as central to the policy-making processes on the basis of inter-textual references, references by interviewees, lists of key documents made available on official institutional websites, thematization in parliamentary debates, distribution at conferences and public events, and the like. In this way, I was able to draw connections not only between different governmental levels, but also between interrelated policy realms that otherwise might have appeared distinct (e.g. immigrant integration and creative and cultural industries policies).

I have chosen this research focus on policy-making because it allowed me to trace the interrelations between various governmental levels in EU-Europe, to gauge state projects of the state elite (in the “narrow” sense), to determine the conceptualizations and principles that inform state practices as well as their effects, and to bridge divides between political economic and culturalist studies of the state. Of course, neither places nor states nor policies are made by policy-makers in the narrow sense alone – a point quite visible in the current context of crisis,

where bankers and rating agencies seem to set the terms more than anyone else. My research focus thus comes at the cost – for matters of keeping scope of the research feasible – of not attempting a closer examination of such broader social forces or an in-depth engagement with popular politics. I have sought, however, to present the policies and policy-making processes I examined in their relation to wider social processes, interests, and struggles among others on the basis of existing studies, media reports and debates, transcripts of parliamentary debates and committee meetings, and my own experience with politics in place.

My research in Berlin began in the summer of 2008, when I started exploring the “presence” of the EU in Berlin, in particular in the form of EU structural funds, and the way it connected to local politics and policies through a broad reading of policy documents. I was able to identify relevant wider policy fields and EU-Berlin-governmental networks and political relations moreover through attendance at EU-related events in Berlin (a conference organized by EUROCITIES, a public presentation of the Intercultural Cities program in the *Bezirk* Neukölln, and the like) and informal conversations with participants in these contexts. Such events were announced by the city government through a particular online calendar where anyone could post anything of EU or Europe relevance. Moreover, I screened and analyzed transcripts of political debates and committee meetings of the Berlin Parliament from the ongoing and previous legislative periods on relevant topics. All of this allowed me, together with following the local media and the experiences of living in the city, to situate these policy issues in local political context in addition to providing me with an understanding of how local problems and policy solutions were framed from – and across – different political positions. For example,

living in place showed me the centrality of gentrification as an issue of local struggle, contestation around the city government's pursuit of a "creative city strategy," and various ways of constructing and contesting immigrant diversity in the city, which stood in clear connection to the course taken in regional development and integration policies in the EU-Berlin intersection.

In the winter and spring of 2009 I additionally conducted interviews in Berlin with politicians of the political parties represented in the Berlin Parliament (apart from the Christian Democrats who, despite repeated attempts, did not agree to an interview and did not follow through with answers on written questions they had requested instead) working on EU and regional development related themes, with policy-makers in the administration on city and borough level, as well as with an external expert involved with the strategic planning and evaluation of structural funds use in the city. The interviews were conducted on the theme of EU-Berlin relations and the strategy and use of EU structural funds in Berlin. Apart from an interview with an official working on immigrant integration issues, I did not bring up the question of "culture" and "cultural diversity" myself. The interviews allowed me to obtain information not otherwise available – such as on the negotiations between the Commission and the city government on the strategy of the use of structural funds – and to deepen, test, and modify my initial insights obtained through the channels described above. Having granted anonymity and promised to distribute the dissertation upon completion, I have only provided very general information on the interviewees in the text, as it would otherwise be very easy to identify the respective persons in the policy community in Berlin.

Upon completion of the research in Berlin, I followed up in more depth on the references to EU level policy on themes related to “integration” and “culture and the creative industries” that I had encountered in Berlin, among others in European policy networks and programs. My analysis of these documents showed very clearly that policy-making on managed immigration, the integration of immigrants, the cultural and creative industries, and the EU’s external role were treated as interrelated in current EU-level policy – interrelations that resonated with my findings in Berlin, though they were less explicit there. In particular in the presentation of the EU’s internal and external identity, the documents moreover resonated with my findings of an earlier textual analysis. In 2008, I had analyzed European Parliament (EP) debates on Turkey’s EU accession in view of different portrayals and framings of Europe, the EU, Turkey, and the accession process. This analysis had established the centrality of a political discourse that identified EU-Europe with human rights and respect for diversity, and Turkey with the lack there-of. Accession was presented from different political positions in the EP as a means to spread cosmopolitan values in Turkey, both enabling and obscuring that accession processes supported neoliberal transformations in Turkey (Bodirsky 2009).

These initial results of my research led me to modify the initial objective of the study, which had been to examine, in addition to the use of EU structural funds in Berlin, EU pre-accession financial assistance to Turkey. The two cases had been conceptualized as windows through which I could gain an insight in contemporary processes of state transformation in EU-Europe. Given that both sites involved populations whose ‘Europeanness’ had been contested I had expected to find a relation to contemporary exclusionary culturalist politics. However, what had

started to intrigue me when I began my research in Berlin was not so much “Culture Talk” (Mamdani 2004) as the dominance of “Diversity Talk.”²³ It was ubiquitous not only in the policy documents of the structural funds themselves, but also in policy and politics in Berlin and related EU programs and documents more generally. City government officials, parliamentarians, business people, the media, and civil initiatives all invoked the value of diversity, often in demanding or justifying particular state practices. Cultural diversity was not to be treated as a problem, but as “potential,” as a resource to be activated for greater social cohesion and economic competitiveness. This was the new mantra especially, but not only, of the liberal Left. Such claims were directed explicitly against the forms of exclusionary culturalism that continued to be salient in national and city politics.

Through this focus on “Diversity Talk,” the frame of the dissertation itself changed. As a consequence, the Turkey case was not to stand on its own, but to complement my research focus on the “internal” role of interculturalism with an analysis of the way in which it was constituted by or fed into construction of an external identity and role. I thus accorded it less space in the research and presentation, with EU-Berlin relations providing the core of the argument. In a way, this was fortunate, as I would have run into difficulties with my original research plan in Turkey. The accession process had slowed down, the implementation of pre-accession financial assistance through IPA was delayed, and the question of membership no longer formed a central part of public discussion, as it still had been in 2007 when I did my

²³ Mahmood Mamdani states that “Culture Talk assumes that every culture has a tangible essence that defines it, and it then explains politics as a consequence of that essence” (2004: 17). Culture Talk in this sense is akin to what I have called culture-exclusivism. This stands in seeming contrast to the praise of “diversity” within a polity that I have encountered during my research. Culture was here understood mostly not as “fixed,” but as the outcome of creative practices of individuals who choose and make cultural identities.

preliminary research. Indeed, the *absence* of the EU from public life in Turkey was glaring, and maybe best reflected in the fact that its “information center” which had previously been open to the public on a shopping-street in the center of Ankara was moved to TOBB (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges) in the outskirts of the city. My argument on the role of the politics of Turkey’s accession in EU-European state- and place-making relies on an analysis of European Parliament debates from 2004 to 2010, of EU Progress Reports and other relevant documents on the accession process since Turkey acquired candidate status, on a limited number of interviews that I conducted with officials in the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey working on issues of rural and regional development as well as with Members of the European Parliament, a range of informal conversations with “experts” (journalists and scholars in Turkey) on EU accession processes, and an understanding of local politics gained in place, as I have been living in Ankara since the summer of 2009.

Chapter Overview

The study is divided into five chapters, which each present a particular argument and together combine to an interrogation of EU-Europe’s developing state form and of the role and social effects of culturalism in EU-European state- and place-making. The first chapter starts out from the current crisis in EU-Europe to interrogate state-making practices of the last decades and the particular “crisis-prone” EU-European state form this has resulted in. It shows that “culture” – European identity constructions established among others through cultural policy – rose in this context as a means to ensure state legitimacy despite increasing social inequalities and gives some of the reasons for why this initial culturalism proved unsuccessful.

While this first chapter thus focuses on EU-level state-making, the second chapter approaches the current EU-European state form “from the bottom up.” It critically interrogates the question “who makes the rules” in so-called “multi-level governance” and to what effects through an examination of the use of EU structural funds for regional development in Berlin. The chapter similarly shows EU-Europe as a developing state form that prioritizes competitiveness in a common market over questions of social and territorial cohesion and highlights how local policy-makers have largely accepted this as the given frame for local politics. “Culture” in the form of creative and cultural industries and immigrant diversity emerges in this context as a resource for improving competitiveness.

Chapter three further interrogates this new “utility” of culture through a focus on EU-city policy relations. It argues that the roots of the value now accorded to “diversity” are of “economic” and “political” nature. That is, they lie in the dominant economic imaginary of the knowledge economy and the actual role “culture” has come to play in inter-local competition on the one hand and the attempt of policy-makers to ensure social cohesion and secure legitimacy by departing from long-standing national culturalist repertoires on the other hand. On EU level moreover, resulting intercultural policy in immigrant integration links up with a revised “liberal cosmopolitan” narrative of EU-Europeanness.

Chapter four focuses on Berlin and presents a critique of the role of interculturalist policy in securing “cohesion” by showing how its subordination to the political prerogative of making capital-conducive place reintroduces new hierarchies of belonging and entitlement in place.

The concept of diversity thus proves to be far from an inclusive concept. Its limits of both “class” and “culture” in intercultural city policy become apparent in the latest debate on “immigrant integration” sparked by Berlin’s former Senator of Finance as well as in the way in which culture’s utilities are used for the support of gentrification processes in the city.

Chapter five further interrogates the new narrative of EU-Europeanness outlined in chapter three by showing how a liberal cosmopolitan identity for EU-Europe has been institutionally engrained on EU level in the context of debates on “political community” sparked by Turkey’s bid for EU membership. It argues that the foregrounding of political liberal principles in the politics of Turkey’s EU accession has obscured the way in which the EU has in fact supported the development of a Turkish “competition” state in Turkey that has contributed to the rise of class inequalities in the country. Thus, just as in internal relations, current EU “cosmopolitan” culturalism is harnessed to neoliberalization in external relations.

The conclusion both sums up the overall argument and presents some reflections on the possible future of liberal cosmopolitan state-making in the current moment of crisis.

CHAPTER 1

Unity in Diversity: The Making of “Neoliberal Union” and its Contradictions

This chapter shows how culturalist politics – of both “supranational” and “neo-nationalist” sorts – has resulted from and indeed forms part of the contradictions in the making of EU-Europe. Starting out from the current crisis which has thrown the particularity of the current EU-European state form and its contradictions into sharp relief, this chapter shows that EU-European state-making in the last decades produced barriers for achieving EU-European statehood as it made it increasingly difficult for state elites on EU and national levels to ensure state legitimacy and cohesion in a class-divided society. It created its own contradictions. “Culture” in this context emerged as both “problem” and “solution”: while the rise of neo-nationalist culture-exclusivism posed a distinct challenge to EU-European state-making, EU policy-makers initially turned to the construction of a “thick” European identity in an attempt to win allegiance to a “European project.” By showing why this proved maladjusted to what EU-Europe was in fact becoming, the chapter further provides part of the backdrop to the recent (neo)liberal “thinning” of EU-European culturalism, the specific political and economic origins, policy content, and social implications of which are discussed in depth in the following chapters.



In May 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared before Christian Democrat party members that *Südländer* (southerners) should work harder in response to the fiscal crisis of their states and German and EU financial “help:”

We cannot have a common currency and then some take a lot of vacation and others very little. ... The point is also that in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, retirement age must not be lower than in Germany; rather, everyone has to make somewhat of the same effort...²⁴

Drawing on long-standing intra-European culturalized hierarchies, this was a typical response to the fiscal crises in Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain in the wake of the more general financial crisis of 2008 onwards. Merkel’s statement invoked the assumption found (not only) in the popular press in Germany that the *Südländer* were in trouble because they were lazy, corrupt, and tax-evasive. It served to justify that EU-IMF credits to Greece backed up by EU member states were made conditional upon austerity measures which had severe social costs and were highly likely to push the Greek economy further into recession. In this way, EU-European state elites helped to ensure that those mainly responsible for the financial crisis would also profit from it most, the big banks speculating on state bonds (Pfeiffer 2010: 84), while the costs were to be born by the majority of the population, with severe social consequences.²⁵ The response

²⁴ Cited in: Wandler, Reiner: “Die Kanzlerin und die ‘Südländer’: Mit Merkel am Ballermann”, taz, May 5 2011; at: <http://www.taz.de/!71032/>

²⁵ As Paul Mason notes in the Guardian: “The reality is ... queues on the streets of Athens for healthcare provided by NGOs who normally provide only to undocumented migrants. The European political class insists a new bailout should be imposed on Greece only at the price of the same austerity that made the old bailout fail.” Paul Mason: The European Dream is in Danger: Prepare for Another Rude Awakening. The Guardian, May 24, 2011, at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/24/european-dream-single-currency>

to the crisis supported on both the EU level and by national governments thus speaks of the political prioritizing of demands of capital over those of social justice.

Culturalist stereotyping such as the one by Angela Merkel has served the purpose of putting the blame for the fiscal crises entirely onto the shoulders of the defaulting states and their citizens. This obscures the external roots of the crisis. On the one hand, the more general financial crisis (see e.g. Harvey 2011: 16) and the related decline in economic productivity and rise in unemployment, the Greek state's consequent bail-out of banks in trouble (Dullien 2010), and financial speculation with state bonds, turned Greece's longer-standing national debt into a real problem. On the other hand, the particular mode of "unity in diversity" that characterizes the Eurozone – the unitary frame of the common currency coalescing with uneven development – both was a major cause in the decreased competitiveness of the Greek economy and ensured that Greece could not respond to its fiscal crisis with measures of its own. As Costis Hadjimichalis argues:

When the unequally developed SE [...] regions found themselves with the same hard currency in 2000, very few in the SE and in the Commission – under the influence of the neoliberal doctrine – paid attention to their pre-existing highly unequal regional production systems and specializations, to their structurally different regional labour markets and to their unequal accessibility to markets ... vis-à-vis the 'core' of the eurozone And even fewer paid attention to differentiating the socio-spatial effects of putting an unevenly developed SE into a macroeconomic and fiscal framework designed purposely for north-central European economies and particularly Germany – a kind of imposed straightjacket. (2011: 6)

The problem was that the shared currency, in the absence of redistributive mechanisms or an economic government on EU level, both intensified uneven development in the Eurozone and imposed a unitary "straightjacket" on governments that prevented them from countering this.

In fact, contrary to what Merkel's culturalist statements insinuated, the German economy had profited from the Greeks' "overspending" on imports, while its much-prided status as *Exportmeister* (export champion) was based on wage-repression, that is, the "internal" political prioritization of competitiveness over social justice. Thus, as Costis Hadjimichalis points out, "the Greek external deficit reflects ... the strategy of German and other European elites ... aimed at regaining market shares and political hegemony in the eurozone by squeezing their production costs via freezing compensation to their workers" (2011: 10), while, given the shared currency, "Germany's neighbours are unable to undercut German exports [or react to the current crisis] with currency depreciation" (ibid).

The class politics in the response to the crisis and the prospect of a strengthened European Commission and "European transfer union" have enlivened popular nationalism (see e.g. Clarke 2009: 13), which links up with renewed nationalism by member state governments and jeopardizes the "European project" on a second front. Exclusionary nationalism, supposedly tamed by "European integration," is very much on the agenda today, going beyond a direct response to the so-called Eurocrisis, but frequently manifested in anti-EU positions. A number of contemporary examples – such as France's suspension of the Schengen treaty in response to Italy's issuing of tourist visas to Tunisian refugees and Denmark's reintroduction of permanent border controls, the new Hungarian constitution pushed through by the nationalist-conservative government with its two third parliamentary majority which established ethnic Hungarianism as foundation of the state, or the newly elected nationalist and anti-European

government in Finland provoking concerns about its role vis-à-vis the EU's attempt to "save the Euro" – signal a more general rise of culturalist "renationalization" by EU member states.

The EU thus finds itself in a profound legitimacy crisis. On a basic level, this originates in the EU's violation of national, liberal democratic, and welfarist principles of legitimacy²⁶ that have dominantly informed state-making projects of the last centuries and decades in Europe. In the current moment where austerity measures are externally imposed on countries such as Greece and class inequalities escalate, where the further concentration of power on the EU level is likely, and where citizens of EU member states are asked to show "solidarity" with states (and, in fact, finance capital) in trouble, while popular protest against all of this has been on the rise, this is of central relevance. It shows the fragility of EU and EU-European states' capacity to ensure "cohesion"²⁷ and of their public authority. This is an EU-European problem afflicting not only EU institutions but also member states appearing as "agents" of the EU or as limited in their agency by the EU. Liberal state elites more generally face great difficulties because they have troubles *articulating* rather than *repressing* class divisions – that is, they have troubles ensuring cohesion in the critical sense – in a neoliberal context of crisis (Kalb 2009: 208).²⁸

²⁶ As an EU-critical comment in a conservative German newspaper observed, Greece's "path to the transfer union leads over democratic castration," reducing its autonomy to the "freedom of choice whether to first sell the harbor of Piraeus or of Thessaloniki. Athens can choose whether to decrease the salaries in public service by 10 percent or the pensions for state officials by 20 ... or, best of all, both."

Rainer Hank: "Das Drama der Solidarität", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 13, 2011; at: <http://www.presseurop.eu/de/content/article/719741-das-drama-der-solidaritaet>

²⁷ While (territorial and social) cohesion is a frequent trope in EU documents, let me recall here that I am using the term in the critical sense via Poulantzas (1975). That is, cohesion indicates not the creation of equality in a substantive sense but the stabilization of *an unequal social order*.

²⁸ "Comparativist historical sociologists such as Barrington Moore Jr. (1978), Michael Mann (1999), Ira Katznelson (1998), and Charles Tilly (2004) have suggested that the class cleavage under democratic capitalism must be faced, articulated, and organized rather than repressed if liberalism is to keep a hold on the center of the democratic process." (Kalb 2009: 208)

The current crisis, in brief, highlights that current EU-Europe is riddled with contradictions: the institutionally and politically engrained support for the demands of capital engenders increased inequalities of class and uneven development and fosters neo-nationalist politics, so that EU-European state elites have profound difficulties in establishing popular legitimacy and ensuring cohesion. This, this chapter shows, is a result of the particular quality of EU-European state-making of the last decades and the specific – and instable – form EU-European statehood has acquired as a result, the contradictions of which the crisis and the (culturalist) politics accompanying it have made particularly visible.

More specifically, the chapter argues that particular state-making projects in EU-Europe since the 1980s have resulted in an instable EU-European state form of “regulatory unity in diversity” that prioritizes economic competitiveness over social justice, works through the (re)production of inequalities between people and places, and violates established principles of national sovereignty and liberal democracy. Combined, this has undermined state legitimacy, fuelled neo-nationalist culturalist politics – which also has renewed salience in the contemporary moment of crisis – in opposition to EU-European state-making, and posed challenges to state institutions’ capacity to ensure cohesion, that is, the stabilization of an unequal social order.

The efforts of EU elites and others supportive of the European project to make Europeans “aware” of a shared civilizational identity through various cultural and symbolic measures in the 1980s and 1990s (Shore 2000), I show, was an initial attempt at addressing such difficulties of EU-European state-making. This attempt proved unable to ensure consent and maladjusted to

the reality of what EU-Europe was actually becoming. It is in the context of this failure that we need to situate the “thinning” of a European “state idea” to a liberal cosmopolitan articulation and the related attempt to ensure social cohesion through “intercultural” approaches to immigrant integration that is the subject of later chapters.

EU-Europe on the Path to Neoliberal Union

The development of EU-Europe’s current form needs to be seen in a wider context of “neoliberalization” in the wake of the earlier crisis – of capital accumulation – of the 1970s. Linked to transformations in the global economy (Harvey 2003: 98-99) and conjoined with a legitimacy crisis of Keynesian nation-states (Harvey 2005; Jessop 1999), it provided more generally the seedbed for new state-making projects that pushed neoliberal policies and the development of new “non-national” governmental arrangements through which they were pursued (see e.g. Bornschier 2000a; Brenner 2004a; Brenner et al 2003; Clarke 2004; Jessop 2008b; Peck & Tickell 2002; Sassen 1996; Shaw 2003). As David Harvey notes, this was a process where “[t]he capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalization ... through a series of gyrations and chaotic experiments that really only converged as a new orthodoxy with the articulation of what became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s” (2005: 13). Structural adjustment programs and international rule regimes enforced by international financial organizations and the (western) states they largely represented changed the external conditions for policy-making and enforced neoliberal state practices beyond the original neoliberal heartlands. In the case of EU-Europe, such “externality” was “internalized” in form of the embedding of neoliberal frameworks on a supranational level – an outcome of different

state-making struggles, as the following shows – which constrained the scope for alternative state projects. Thus, the case of EU-Europe shows particularly clearly that the neoliberalization of state practices has “been accompanied by – and partially achieved through – changes in neoliberalism’s scalar constitution” (Peck & Tickell 2002: 391).

Neoliberal state practices that became dominant through phases of “roll-back” and “roll-out neoliberalization” (Peck & Tickell 2002) included the priority given to the free market and supply-side policies more generally, support for mobile capital and regional and cross-border economies, the strengthening of inter-local competition, the backing up of processes of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003) for example through privatizations, “financialization of economic policy” and the bailing out of the financial system when it ran into trouble, the dismantling of systems of welfare in favor of workfare arrangements and related increased involvement of ‘civil society’ as well as the individualization of risk in line with normative constructions of the entrepreneurial subject, a shift from “government” to exercise of “governance” through public-private partnerships, and the undermining of democratic processes by authoritarianism and rule by experts (see e.g. Brenner 2004a; Clarke 2007; Harvey 2003; Peck 2002; Peck & Tickell 2002; Rose 1993). Put generally, neoliberal state practices were “extending and bolstering market logics, socializing individualized subjects, and disciplining the noncompliant” (Peck & Tickell 2002: 389-90).

Bob Jessop terms the state forms – such as in Europe – that resulted from the spatial reconfiguration of statehood and related changes in state practices in the realms of economic

and social policy, a *Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime* (2004b), which he distinguishes from the *Keynesian national welfare state*. This seems to imply a fully developed state form. However, the making of EU-Europe suggests – never more so than in the current crisis – that we better understand contemporary governmental arrangements as in a continuing process of formation, which resulted and results from the dynamic interaction of various state- and place-making projects.

Although “European integration” dates back to the post-war period, the 1980s constituted a true watershed in EU-European state formation (Bornschiefer 2000a) and crucially shaped subsequent developments. The Single European Act of 1987, which established the “four freedoms of goods, services, capital, and labor” of the Single Market, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 that named the European level of governance European *Union*, spelled out the plan for the European Monetary Union (EMU) including the Maastricht convergence criteria, and introduced European citizenship, the Schengen agreement of 1995, though not immediately tied to the EU, which eliminated border controls between signatory states and intensified external controls as a complement to the Single Market program, and the introduction of EMU in 1999 constituted key developments on the European level that resulted from renewed state-making projects in the 1980s of the Commission, various social forces, and of course the member state governments. Together, they established a supranational institutional

framework²⁹ which, though subject to continued transformation and struggles, had significant implications for subsequent state- and place-making at various other scales in EU-Europe.

These developments need to be seen against the backdrop of the 1970s when not only the European economies and European states, but also the European project were in crisis (Strath 2000b: 401). Efforts to revive the European integration process, such as the propositions for renewed European state-making laid out in the Tindemans report of 1974, which “argued for a decisive shift from the mere coordination of policy to the creation of common policy over a broad range of competencies, including economic and monetary policy, defense, foreign relations, social policy, and citizenship” (Holmes 2000: 50), only really took off in the 1980s with the move towards the Single European Act, which Bornschier sees as adding “a new, additional dimension of statehood in Europe” (Bornschier 2000b: 10). It was politically framed as a necessary response to a competitive threat posed by the US and Japan (Bornschier 2000a; Rosamond 2002).

Transnational corporations in particular had an interest in the greater economies of scale that a Single Market could provide and were successfully lobbying at the Commission via the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) that had been founded in 1983. The ERT, Van Apeldoorn notes, was a central part of a developing “transnational elite network that ties together the elite of European business with key policy makers and politicians at both the

²⁹ In this period of renewed state-making, moreover, not only the supranational scale, but also the regions were gaining in political and economic significance. See below.

national and supranational levels of the European polity” (Van Apeldoorn 2000: 166).³⁰ Their state-making project had its roots in attempts to refashion space and place for capital accumulation in a changed global political-economic context.³¹

Such projects of “negative integration” contended with more social democratic attempts at European state-making. Most prominently, then President of the Commission Jacques Delors sought to combine the creation of a European market with a strengthening of the so-called “European social model.” This was consistent with the more “dirigiste” approach of the French government. Social democrats in Europe, including labor unions, often supported the EMU as a means to “develop a common social and economic policy – a ‘Euro-Keynesianism’” (Parker 2008: 401). In fact, the Maastricht Treaty included a “social chapter” next to the goal of establishing a Single Market and the plan for EMU. While it thus contained elements of these different state-making projects, the “social” dimension was de facto limited by the overall neoliberal orientation of the convergence criteria for the EMU (Hermann & Hofbauer 2007; Moss 2001: 115; Van Apeldoorn 2000: 171), emphasizing deflationary measures and low budgetary deficits and helping “to justify austerity across Europe” (Bonefeld 2001) – an orientation now intensified in the crisis. This was a result in particular of the influence of the

³⁰ According to Van Apeldoorn, the ERT was initially divided between a neomercantilist approach, which aimed at instituting a larger economy of scale through the single market and thus enhancing Europe’s economic strength vis-à-vis non-European competitors and was supported by a “Europeanist” fraction of transnational capital, and a neoliberal approach that sought to “further open up the European region to the globalising world economy” (ibid: 166) emphasizing deregulation, privatization, and the overcoming of “labor market rigidity” and was pushed – successfully – by a “globalized” fraction of transnational capital.

³¹ On a most basic level, “time-space compression” inherent in the capitalist process, pronounced in recent decades due to developments in communication, information, and transportation technologies and the reduction of barriers to capital movements not least through the policies of reconfigured state institutions and practices, provided an “impulse towards the transformation of the geographical scale at which capitalist activity gets defined” through “political re-territorializations such as the European Union” (Harvey 2003: 98-99).

German government in the design of the EMU, while the British government was central in rendering EU policy “increasingly market-oriented” (Moss 2001: 127) since Maastricht. Thus, the “degree to which France has been able to impose its particular conception of a social Europe at the European level has to date been limited, just as Delors’ strategy from inside the Commission did not prove entirely successful” (Parker 2008: 405). This overall neoliberal orientation of “economic integration” and the subdual of the “social dimension” on the EU level with the Maastricht Treaty was to a good extent the consequence of interests of some member states and social forces to “lock-in” new rules of the game.³² As contemporary events show particularly well, the reified forms of such state-making cannot be simply reversed and make it increasingly difficult for governments to follow independent approaches for example in employment and social policies.³³ This is one way in which “European integration” violates widely accepted legitimacy principles of national sovereignty and liberal democracy, the more so as the EU level is frequently critiqued for its (liberal) “democratic deficit” associated in particular with the relative lack of influence of the European Parliament if compared to national parliaments and the power of the appointed rather than elected Commission.

³² As Hudson and Williams point out, pressure on European welfare states was exerted by macroeconomic strategies that shifted priority “from full employment to countering inflation and trade imbalances, a process that has been exacerbated but not caused by the convergence criteria of EMU” (1999b: 10).

³³ As Offe notes, “lacking any governing capacity and fiscal authority of its own, Commission and Council do not enjoy the authority to boost overall European labor market performance, while member state governments maintain the responsibility for labor market and employment policy in the name of “subsidiarity” – a responsibility, however, that is largely rendered nominal by the unfettered mobility of both labor and capital, on the one hand, and the constraining EMU (“Maastricht”) criteria, on the other. Thus member states have the nominal authority, yet not the effective means, at their disposal to do something about the employment situation which in its turn determines the sustainability of the welfare state edifice” (2003: 459).

The Maastricht Treaty however not only deepened “negative” integration, but also sought to push “political integration” further as a complement to the common market that, as Delors famously put it, “no one loves.” That is, legitimacy for this renewed round of state-making, which, as Hudson and Williams among others convincingly show, profoundly deepened inequalities of class, ethnicity, and gender within and between places in Europe (Hudson & Williams 1999a), had to be sought through other means than “output legitimacy,” i.e. increased welfare. The newly introduced EU citizenship, automatically granted to EU member state citizens (only), constituted both an attempt to increase consent to EU-European state-making and to realize the Single Market’s “four freedoms.” However, it also inscribed new hierarchies (see following section). As discussed in detail below, the introduction of EU citizenship moreover coincided with attempts to foster European identity through cultural policy and symbolic means. To no avail, it seems: EU-European state-making continued to be bedeviled by legitimacy problems, as both the widespread resistance to the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent developments showed.

The EU’s so-called “Eastern Enlargement” of the 1990s and 2000s was the source of another round of state-making in the 2000s which deepened EU-European neoliberalization and inequalities (see following section). The decision to have post-socialist countries enter into accession negotiations with the EU was based on various motivations, from ensuring a so-called “return to Europe” (i.e. free market economy and liberal democracy) and pursuing material interests of transnational capital and EU member states, in particular Germany, in the form of new markets, privatized assets, and cheap labor, to attempts of in particular Great Britain at

preventing “deeper” integration. The largest round of accession so far, of various greater and smaller countries that all were significantly below EU average GDP (the basis for calculating member state rights to structural funds), was seen to require “institutional reform” of the EU to ensure the “functioning” of EU institutions. In fact, it was to secure the continued influence of the “old” and in particular “core” member states and to prevent significant financial redistribution to the “new” ones.

This “institutional reform” was turned into an attempt at enhancing the EU’s “political” dimension – and legitimacy – by presenting it as a *Constitution* for EU-Europe, which clearly backfired. Not only was the content of the draft constitution highly contested among member state governments – a conflict that signaled fundamentally different visions as to whether the European level could be a foundation for “political community,” and if yes, what was to characterize the latter (chapter five) – but its rejection in referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005 showed how profound the EU’s legitimacy crisis was. As Nicolas Schmit, then President-in-Office of the Council, said in a speech during the EP debate on “the future of the Union after the referenda on the European constitution:”

I cannot help but recall the huge vote that the European Parliament expressed on 12 January 2005 in favour of the draft European Constitution. This vote was driven by a great hope; a conviction that the European Union, following enlargement with ten new members, could strengthen its democratic basis, operate more effectively and more transparently, anchor its future in the common values [sic] that are so close to our hearts and in this way, finally, regain the full confidence of its citizens.³⁴

This statement of course obscured that “regaining the full confidence of citizens” might not have required so much a declaration of shared values (which, moreover, were themselves

³⁴ European Parliament Debate on June 8, 2005 on “Preparations for the European Council, including the future of the Union after the referenda on the European constitution”. At: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu>

contested), but a move away from the neoliberal prioritizing of the free market over questions of social justice, which was a crucial reason for the rejection of the draft treaty in particular in France. However, despite such openly withheld popular consent, much of the substance of the draft constitution was in 2009 ratified in form of the Lisbon Treaty, no longer called a constitution.

Around the time of the referenda, the Council also revisited its “Lisbon Strategy,” which it had decided on in 2000 with the goal to turn EU-Europe into the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” (2004) and through that achieve growth and employment. The strategy informed among others the EU’s structural funds policy for the 2007-2013 funding cycle. The 2000 formulation of the strategy entailed “social cohesion” as one objective, to be achieved through measures alleviating poverty and (broadly understood) social exclusion as well as the “modernization” of welfare systems (see Daly 2006; Hermann & Hofbauer 2007). As Daly argues, while this increased EU competence in the area of social policy, the tendency to see the market and employment as primary means to overcome “exclusion” has been strengthened with the renewal of the strategy in 2005. She notes that the Lisbon Strategy’s approach to social policy³⁵ entailed

visible elements of what Streeck ... has called ‘competitive solidarity’ wherein ‘supply side egalitarianism’ prevails, with policies aiming not for decommodification but for the creation of equal opportunities for commodification. This approach tends to frame the role of the state in terms of investment in productive capacities, especially in the human capital endowments of individuals. Dynamism and flexibility are the sub-text – ideally

³⁵ The goals in social policy were now to be pursued through the new “Open Method of Coordination” (OMC) applied in policy areas where harmonization between member states was difficult to achieve due to both embedded “diversity” of institutional arrangements and political resistance. For critical discussion of the OMC, see e.g. Parker (2008) and Offe (2003).

these are envisaged as properties of both individuals and social security systems. (Daly 2006: 469)

This emphasis on “equal opportunities for commodification” via “investment in human capital” also informs EU structural funds and immigrant integration policies, as we will see in later chapters. Given this neoliberal equation of the “social” with “labor market inclusion,” Hermann and Hofbauer (2007) argue that the Lisbon strategy has become a *means* to transform national social models in the name of “modernizing” them (for example pension systems) in an overall move towards the re-commodification of labor. We will discuss some of the implications of this neoliberal orientation towards “supply side egalitarianism” in subsequent chapters.

The neoliberal orientation of the Lisbon strategy was a main factor in the mobilizations against the draft constitution in particular in France. The fact that the renewal of the Lisbon strategy intensified rather than alleviated the neoliberal prioritization of competitiveness and related dismantling of established welfare systems suggests that state elites lacked the will to respond to “legitimacy problems” of the EU by turning away from neoliberalization. Moreover, while the Lisbon Treaty had improved the position of the European Parliament, this was not remedying the “democratic deficit” of the EU level in terms of norms of liberal democracy (as is quite apparent in the contemporary moment), while the EU itself of course continues to violate principles of national sovereignty. The legitimacy problems of the EU are thus likely to constitute a driving force in EU-European state-making in the future. The more so as neoliberal state-making has resulted in an EU-European state form that supports increased inequalities within and between places and thus makes cohesion in the critical sense more difficult to achieve.

Regulatory Unity in Diversity and the Challenge of “Cohesion”

The current crystallization of a state form out of the discussed processes of state-making differs significantly from the ideal-type of the nation-state. The Westphalian state, and more so the post-WWII Keynesian welfare national state (see Jessop 1999), relied on an image – never quite a reality, though informing state projects and practices – of statehood where the national scale was predominant and national state sovereignty extended over a clearly bounded, exclusive territory that did not only include a relatively homogeneous people and territory but also functioned as a container for economic processes. In this state form, cohesion of a class-divided society was to be ensured through social protection and the reduction of capital-driven regional inequalities, civic and political rights exercised in particular via liberal democratic institutions, as well as notions of national community, all the while state practices also actively engineered the “homogeneous” people state elites claimed to represent.

In contrast, the state form that is EU-Europe extends over a fragmented territory without permanent or continuous borders, containing a population the *diversity* (though not *difference*, as chapter four shows) of which is affirmed as constitutive of unity, relying on an image of globalized economic processes not contained within any political boundary, prioritizing competitiveness over social justice and diversity over homogeneity, and undermining rather than strengthening liberal democratic institutions. The EU’s culturalist motto of “unity in diversity” (more on that below) thus appears, I suggest, as an ideological reflection of a particular *reality* of regulatory unity in diversity that *works through* the (re)production of social

and regional inequalities in EU-Europe. The problems this creates for EU-European state-making have become amply visible in the current crisis.

State-making projects on the EU level did not replace European nation-states as centers of governance and “political community,” but rather had to accommodate the latter’s continued centrality, all the while binding them into an emerging EU-European state form. While the latter is partly “inter-governmental,” the introduction of the supranational level of the EU has also changed the rules of the game, enhancing the importance of regions, entrenching the policy paradigms and preferences of (some) national governments and (thus) limiting the scope of action for all, but also allowing for a certain “diversity” of institutional arrangements and state practices. The institutional form that consequently characterizes contemporary EU-Europe indeed entails “unity” in some realms and “diversity” in others, with distinct consequences for the internal ordering of EU-European place.

For example, the particular scaling of “economic freedom” versus “social policy” – establishing “unity” when it comes to the single market but (national) “diversity” in realms of social policy – reinforces the bias of EU-European place-making towards creating conditions conducive for capital rather than addressing class inequalities. As Grahl (2008) points out, corporations have an interest in both *EU*-level market-based *economic* integration centered on the “four freedoms” of goods, services, capital, and labor and the continuation of the current *social* policy system centered on the *member states*, as this allows for “regime shopping” by corporations. Moreover, “diversity” of national policy is both maintained and constrained

through general, unitary EU guidelines, directives,³⁶ and recently the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), as well as – most prominently, as the current crisis shows once more – the common market and EMU, in the overall service of the interests of capital.

This has had profound consequences for the shaping of place(s) in EU-Europe. As Hudson and Williams pointed out in 1999, the result of the Single Market and EMU was greater “unity” in EU-European space combined with greater “diversity” (i.e. inequality) within and between EU-European place(s):

The single European market programme, European monetary union and the prospect of a single ‘euro’ currency are indicative of the drive towards the creation of a unified economic space in which market forces will have much greater scope to influence the socio-spatial distributions of economic activities, resources and income. Thus these changes in the character of the EU can also be regarded as bringing about a homogenization of its space, seeking to establish the hegemony of capitalist social relations over its entirety. At the same time, giving wider and freer play to market forces has led to increasing territorial differentiation within the EU. Seemingly paradoxically, these processes of homogenization are enhancing the significance of differences between places in influencing the locations of economic activities and the quality of people’s lives within Europe. (1999b: 8)

The consequence of these interrelated processes of spatial homogenization for the free play of market forces and territorial differentiation which supports place-making conducive to capital, they argue, is the undermining of “cohesion” (ibid) within EU-Europe.

As their statement also shows, “supranational” integration fed into a “subnational” or regional turn³⁷ to increased entrepreneurialism³⁸ that, as Neil Brenner (2004a) argues, was at first

³⁶ As Grahl notes, member states’ social policy could “interfere with the working of competition” if they were entirely unrestrained by EU directives, while “a centralised labour market policy at EU level would [also] be very unwelcome to the big employers, who much prefer regime competition.” Consequently, employment and labor market policies were organized as an “intermediate zone” where “member states define their own positions, but subject to some general [EU] standards” (2008: 49).

situated broadly within a “spatial Keynesianism” which aimed to balance out uneven geographical development, but developed until the 1990s into a neoliberal approach that worked through intensifying uneven geographical development by strengthening regions that were already competitive (Brenner 2003; 2004). The recent alignment of structural funds policy with the Lisbon strategy – that is, the alignment of what is generally seen as a “Keynesian” EU instrument (see Hooghe & Marks 2001)³⁹ with a neoliberal take on competitiveness (Van Apeldoorn 2002) and its negative consequences for cohesion, as chapter two shows – speaks of the adoption of this strategy on the EU level.

Eastern enlargement further enhanced this form of “unity in diversity” in EU-Europe. Although initial “shock therapy” and other measures of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003) were pushed in particular by IMF and World Bank, critical scholars have also pointed at the role that the EU played in installing a neoliberal market economy in the post-socialist states and entrenching unequal trade (Bohle 2006; Böröcz & Kovacs 2001; Burgess 1997; Hofbauer 2003). As Dorothee Bohle argued, the institutional inequalities of the accession process allowed the EU to push a “market-radical” form of neoliberalism in the post-socialist candidate states – in

³⁷ The increased importance of regions on EU level since the 1990s was accompanied by a policy discourse of the “new regionalism,” partly reflected in the academic literature, which saw the economic and sometimes the political future of the EU in the competitive strength of its regions in the context of the decline of the (Keynesian) welfare state, thus further supporting a particular take on EU-European “regional diversity.” (For critical discussion, see e.g. Blim 1990; Brenner 2000; Keating 2003; Narotzky & Smith 2006). In this context, regions won increased direct as well as indirect representation in the EU. The Committee of the Regions, founded in 1994, has an advisory function to the EU Commission, Council, and the Parliament. Moreover, city networks such as EUROCITIES bypass national organizations and are lobbying in Brussels with some influence (Güntner 2007; McNeill 1999). This has sometimes been accompanied by the strengthening of regional identities (Keating 2003; McNeill 2004).

³⁸ Fiscal constraints on the nation-state, in part related to the convergence criteria for EMU, but also to home-made “austerity policies” (sometimes justified in reference to the EU) had led to increased pressures on regions to “fend for themselves.”

³⁹ EU structural funds were significantly stocked up in the context of the Single Market project with the declared goal to buffer its negative consequences.

contrast to the “embedded neoliberalism” within the EU that incorporated some social democratic concerns (Bohle 2006: 70). While some in the region had initially put their hopes on a “new Marshall plan” for post-socialist states, it soon became apparent that EU countries were not willing to act upon their initial promises of support (Berend 1999: 334-5). All of this had devastating social consequences. In initial years of so-called “transition,” unemployment soared, real wages declined, living standards deteriorated, mortality rates increased (Berend 1999: 341-48; Hofbauer 2003: 56-7). While EU membership brought benefits that had been withheld during the accession process – labor migration, increased investment, and EU funds (Kalb 2009: 219) – the post-socialist states continue to be incorporated into EU-European “unity” on subordinate economic and institutional terms.

Resulting EU-European territoriality (see also Berezin & Schain 2003) can also be seen as instantiation of “unity in diversity.” For one, while EU member states are ‘unified’ through the Single Market, the latter’s “four freedoms” are differentially applied. While newcomer states in the “eastern” round of enlargement had to open their borders to the movement of capital, goods, and services, the EU continued to impose tariffs and many old member states applied (temporary) restrictions on the free movement of labor to prevent the in-migration of the “Polish plumber,” a populist symbol especially in France. (This incidentally had the effect that (transnational) *corporations* but not *workers* could (legally) exploit wage differentials in a unified market while thus “illegalized” work immigrants from post-socialist Europe provided a further exploitable labor force in the core EU that also allowed to keep wages down).

EU-European territoriality does not simply correspond to a vertical model of “stacked” regional, national, and European scales. EU agreements also produced their own scales⁴⁰ for example in the case of EMU (of which some member states “opted out” and others are not considered eligible yet) or Schengen (which includes non-EU states but not all EU member states).⁴¹ While Schengen, which was to support “free movement” within the Single Market (Armstrong 2007: 2), and related coordination of immigration policy on EU level contributed to the dismantling of internal borders and fortification of external ones, the latter do not constitute a cohesive “geobody” (Winichakul 1996) as has been the norm for nation-states.⁴²

Regulatory unity in diversity thus supports a complex set of inequalities and consequently produces challenges to cohesion in both social and territorial terms. EU citizenship, introduced with the Maastricht Treaty in an attempt to enhance EU legitimacy and foster a shared European identity, in fact further contributes to this contradiction. EU citizenship is accorded automatically to citizens of EU member states and entitles to free movement in the EU⁴³ as well as to the right to vote in municipal elections in an EU country where one is not a national after

⁴⁰ Geographers emphasize that scale is a *product* of social processes, relations, and struggles rather than a mere geographical level on which these necessarily play out (Katz 2001; Smith 1993; Swyngedouw 1997). This perspective is based on a more general understanding of space as produced in social and economic processes.

⁴¹ EU-European territoriality embeds and reproduces historically constituted inter-European inequalities of west-east and north-south (see e.g. Bakic-Hayden 1995; Goddard et al 1994b; Wolff 1994). The west-east hierarchy, which dates back to uneven development as a consequence of western European colonialism and related culturalist coloniality in the Enlightenment period (Wolff 1994) and has been further engrained during the Cold War, was activated in the unequal relations of “Eastern enlargement” and related culturalist stereotyping (Böröcz 2001; Kovács 2001). Inter-EU-hierarchies are further materialized, as Andrew Asher notes in his study of the border city Frankfurt (Oder)-Slubice, “in the form of differential mobility and access to spaces” (Asher 2005: 136).

⁴² While John Agnew emphasized that “territory does not necessarily entail the practices of total mutual exclusion which the dominant understanding of the territorial state attributes to it” (1994: 54), EU-Europe arguably corresponds to the latter less than most national states.

⁴³ For purposes of travel, but not necessarily of work or residence. The free movement and residence of persons who might constitute a strain on the social system of the state of immigration might be restricted.

five years of residence. While it might have led to increased European identification among those with the means and right to travel, it in fact has introduced new hierarchies centered on the idea of Europe and its “other” (Balibar 2004; Shore 1996). As Seyla Benhabib has argued, EU citizenship disaggregates the “unitary model” of national citizenship, “which combined continuous residency upon a given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoyment of political rights, and subjection to a common administrative jurisdiction” (2004: 146) and establishes a “two-tiered status of foreignness” (ibid: 153) between EU and non-EU nationals residing in a country where they are not citizens.⁴⁴ Here again, a system of “regulatory unity in diversity” prevails, as unitary EU citizenship in fact is bound to national citizenship in an EU member state (no immigrant to EU-Europe can acquire EU citizenship independent of national citizenship in an EU member state), while citizenship regulations in those diverge widely.⁴⁵ In this way, “third country nationals” are not only subject to the citizenship restrictions that are specific to any particular member state, but also barred from the rights that are specific to EU citizenship.⁴⁶

In brief, regulatory unity in diversity that characterizes the current crystallization of EU-European statehood produces hierarchical differentiation and inequalities – of class, region, nationality, and the like – within and through a unitary frame, which make it more difficult for

⁴⁴ The “two-tiered status of foreignness” has for example the result that a person from France residing in Berlin for five years would have the right to vote in municipal elections, while a person from Turkey residing there for 20 years would not be able to.

⁴⁵ As a consequence, a person of Turkish background residing in Germany might have a harder time acquiring EU citizenship (through national citizenship) than a person from Turkish background residing in France, due to different citizenship regulations in the two states.

⁴⁶ The EU propositions to introduce “civic citizenship” for “third country nationals” – discussed in chapter three – might be an attempt to respond to such critiques.

state(-making) elites to secure cohesion and legitimacy. This is aggravated by the fact that current EU-European statehood – with the introduction of supranational, neoliberal, and executive-led union – clearly deviates from what have been the established (national, liberal democratic, welfarist) parameters of state legitimacy. The rise of neo-nationalist politics, discussed below, has to be understood against this backdrop.

Challenges to Legitimacy: The Rise of Neo-Nationalism in Opposition to EU-Europe

As a result of EU-European state-making, EU-Europe has become a different place in a relatively short period of time, and more so, it has become a different place for different kinds of people. While some enjoyed the new possibilities of traveling, working, and consuming in the Europe of the “four freedoms,” others were barred from such possibilities due to the institutionalized hierarchies of EU-European territory and citizenship and/or the dwindling of their financial resources as a result of increasing class inequalities, erosion of welfare entitlements, and other forms of dispossession. The latter developments were stark in the post-socialist countries, where local elites colluded with transnational forces in shaping the path to a neoliberal market economy and preventing alternatives (see e.g. Dunn 2004; Kalb 2009; Verdery 2003), but were also felt in long-standing capitalist states of the “old EU” as they shifted to neoliberalization. They have fuelled, as critical scholars have pointed out, the rise of culture-exclusivist neo-nationalist politics across Europe.⁴⁷ Thus, what Jonathan Friedman (2003b) has called “double

⁴⁷ Don Kalb therefore posits that populism that gained force in reaction to the consequences of neoliberal state-making had “broadly similar social roots and comparable constituencies” and was “occasioned by related processes of neoliberal globalization and class restructuring” (2009: 209) in both western and eastern Europe.

polarization” – of class and “culture” – seems to have been inscribed into the very organization of EU-European place.

The intensification of a culturalized politics in particular since the 1990s which has been variously analyzed as cultural racism (Taguieff 1990), cultural fundamentalism (Stolcke 1995), integralism (Holmes 2000), neo-nationalism (Gingrich 2006), or populism (Kalb 2009) needs of course to be understood at a most basic level in light of the success of long-standing nation-building projects in Europe. While such projects have entailed the – often violent – fabrication of national histories, traditions, and identities (see e.g. Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983; Karakasidou 1997), this ‘success’ should *not* be understood as primarily concerning the creation of a false consciousness. The way in which the nation has been imagined (Anderson 1991) has indeed mattered for the construction of entitlement – and exclusions therefrom – in realms such as political representation, citizenship, and material redistribution of the welfare state. It has moreover resonated with how people perceived themselves and their place in the world, including through cultural belonging.

It is this *reality* of the nation-state that has been under pressure in recent decades in EU-Europe (as well as elsewhere in the world) as a consequence of the combined processes of supranational integration and neoliberalization. That is, concretely, both the class compromise of the Keynesian welfare state and the principles of national and liberal democracy have been challenged and in the process established economic and political entitlements eroded. Thus, these processes constitute the more immediate root of the increased support for neo-

nationalist parties⁴⁸ in recent years. The EU has been a main target of such neo-nationalist politics, as EU institutions symbolize much that has gone awry in EU-European state- and place-making of the last decades. They are seen as an inaccessible bureaucracy undercutting national decision-making, led by liberal cosmopolitan elites that do not represent the majority of people in terms of (class) interests or (cultural) identity, and responsible for declining welfare of much of the population. A language of cultural and national belonging thus serves to articulate, as Don Kalb notes, an opposition to “liberal elites [on EU and national level] and ideologies that fail to use the resources of the democratic national state to harness global process to local needs and desires, that celebrate an elite cosmopolitanism, or that use state power and cosmopolitan ideologies for outright local dispossession” (2009: 209). He proves his point with a detailed discussion of processes of material and cultural dispossession in post-socialist Poland that provided the ground for populism directed against the new liberal elites.

In western Europe, neo-nationalist and culture-exclusivist politics can be seen to an extent as an attempt to *reclaim* entitlements of the Keynesian welfare-state in a “post-socialist” context where a language of class has lost legitimacy,⁴⁹ so that belonging and resulting claims on

⁴⁸ I am using this terminology of neo-nationalism as opposed to the other terms because it highlights to a greater extent the fraught relation to EU-European state-making than the other terms cited above. Andre Gingrich argues that forms of neo-nationalism are qualitatively different from “historical predecessors in Europe in basic elements of their ideological structure, their sociological basis and the international contexts in which they have thrived” (2006: 200).

⁴⁹ In the case of Germany for example the mass parties of the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats have turned to neoliberal politics, dismantling welfare entitlements and supporting low-wage and low-security jobs, thus turning away from a support for workers previously grounded in traditions of socialism and social Catholicism respectively. The support for neo-nationalist parties which speak to working-class-based concerns but combine this with an exclusionary politics of culture needs to be understood in view of such processes.

entitlement have been articulated through long-standing ethnic nationalism.⁵⁰ Such claims have frequently been staked by identifying who does *not* belong, in particular ethnic minorities linked to labor and (post-)colonial immigration and more recent refugees and immigrants. While this can constitute a protest of subordinate strata of the national population, a “claim for *integration* ... on more favorable ... terms directed at dominant ... groups” which uses “opposition against immigrants and foreigners” as a means to highlight common ground with the national elites (Turner 1993: 17), neither the constituency of such parties nor the general culturalist sentiments they articulate is limited to them. We find these spread across social classes (see Gingrich 2006) and the political mainstream.⁵¹ In fact, both actual *material and symbolic* dispossession of (newly) subordinate strata and the *fear of such dispossession* and resulting downward mobility of the middle classes expressed in an “‘angry white men’ syndrome” (Gingrich 2006: 208) can provide support to a politics that promises to re-establish securities. Such desire for security stems not only from threats to material livelihoods but from a more general sense of erosion of one’s moorings in today’s world, which has strengthened

⁵⁰ As Mulhern states: “Particularism and fundamentalism suppress dissent, confuse and divide working classes, subordinate women, oppress vulnerable minorities. They are, as a whole, reactionary. But they are not merely atavistic. If they have a shared motivation, it lies in the effort to assert some kind of collective control over the common life, to establish basic securities in conditions where these things are denied or threatened. And their common, negative precondition is the frustration of socialism.” (1993: 202-3)

⁵¹ Claus Offe’s description of the “ideological space of political contestation and policy debates” in the then EU-15 as constituted by a “triangle of reluctant social democrats, aggressive market liberals, and more or less militant rightist populists” (2003: 455) remains largely true today. The latter, he argues, addressed the “tension between liberal market freedom and welfare state status rights by ethno-nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-European appeals” (ibid: 454) and by a politics of “granting benefits and offering paternalistic redistribution to needy members of the national community” (ibid: 455). This formula, he notes, has sometimes “been able to accomplish the unlikely success of attracting both the support of prosperous libertarian middle class ‘yuppies’ ... and frustrated working-class elements who have lost faith in leftist policies and promises” (Offe 2003: 455).

identities articulated through a language of culture and rootedness in place (see Holmes 2000: 5,10).⁵²

Contemporary neo-nationalisms should therefore not be understood as *atavistic* elements in an otherwise cosmopolitanizing Europe, as is often done by EU elites themselves. Rather, while they draw on longer national and colonial genealogies, they are in good part *produced by* the contemporary state- and place-making in EU-Europe just as much as they have a *productive* role in them. For example, when Angela Merkel catered to popular discontent in explaining the public deficit of Greece with cultural stereotyping and demanding “austerity” and an improved “work ethic” as ways out of crisis, she struck a chord with chauvinism. This however also served to appease her constituency and thus ensured, however tenuously, support for measures that were to stabilize the neoliberal financial and political system of EU-Europe.

Moreover, contemporary neo-nationalist politics is directed not only against EU elites or “Brussels” but often entails its own brand of a “European project” by aiming at “a newly reconfigured fortress Europe ... rebuilt around solidly reinvigorated national states that cooperate defensively against consequences of globalisation that are perceived as evil and dangerous” (Gingrich 2006: 200). Here, anti-EU nationalist politics seemingly paradoxically goes hand in hand with long-established notions of European superiority that serve to exclude the

⁵² Neo-nationalist politics in western Europe has to moreover be understood in one political field with increased cultural and political claims-making (Benhabib 2002; Brown 1995) of (immigrant) “minorities” in nation-states, which itself is tied to both the grievances that resulted from the history of the various culturalist (culture-exclusivist, liberal universalist, multiculturalist) ways in which belonging and entitlement has been organized in nation-states and the crisis of such paradigms in contemporary processes of state transformation.

“non-European.”⁵³ The current dominant “other” in many EU member states is “Islam,” associated with Muslim immigrants and minorities as well as Turkey as EU candidate state.⁵⁴ As Kira Kosnick states, “claims regarding a basic cultural incompatibility of Islam with ‘Western values’” – prevalent in many European countries in particular with substantial immigrant population from Muslim countries – “are increasingly articulated in supra-national terms” (2007: 14), that is, as in conflict with *European* values. Thus, in this regard as well, neo-nationalism cannot be conceived simplistically as the antithesis of a united Europe – the more so, as such exclusionary and hierarchical visions of Europeanness have been implicit in earlier EU attempts to foster a European identity (see e.g. Balibar 2004; Shore 1996).

Although EU and member state elites frequently enough cater to neo-nationalist sentiments, such popular opposition has turned into a real problem for EU-European state-making and attempts to constitute place(s) conducive to capital. It is a central factor that renders cohesion (in the critical sense of the term) increasingly difficult to achieve in EU-Europe. The turn to intercultural integration strategies on EU and city levels, as the following chapters argue, can be seen in part as a response to this. It is an attempt to enhance legitimacy and work towards cohesion in EU-Europe by managing both immigrant and majority populations *without*

⁵³ Thus, one finds the seemingly paradoxical situation where nationalists who reject the very idea of a politically united Europe are represented in the European Parliament where they oppose Turkey’s EU membership on the grounds of a culturalist European identity that a Muslim country cannot share in.

⁵⁴ This had led Matti Bunzl to argue in a controversial article that, unlike anti-semitism, “Islamophobia functions less in the interest of national purification than as a means of fortifying Europe” (2005: 502). The psychologizing notion of Islamophobia (Özyürek 2005) however is indicative of Bunzl’s failure to thoroughly analyze the relationship between exclusionary constructions of European identity relying on Islam as its ‘other’ and processes of state transformation in EU-Europe, including their class implications. Among the further problems of the article are its reduction of anti-semitism in Europe to Muslim youth, the failure to see the genealogy of so-called Islamophobia in both European colonialism and Europe’s relation with the Ottoman Empire, and the reduction of Turkey’s contested EU membership to “Islamophobia”. For critiques, see responses to the article published in the same issue.

abandoning the overall neoliberal orientation of state practices that have compounded this problem in the first place. It has been developed in the wake of the failure of an earlier EU-level attempt at achieving cohesion and legitimacy on the basis of a “thick” narrative of European unity, to which we turn now.

European Identity: The Role of “Culture” in EU-European State-Making

Towards the mid-1980s, the European Commission presented European level cultural action explicitly “as a means towards the fostering of a common identity” (Sassatelli 2006: 27). European level cultural policy de facto began to develop in this period.⁵⁵ This has been described as the “cultural turn” in European integration, as Europeanness came to be defined in culturalist terms and promoted through cultural policy. Such European governance of culture sought to foster a “common identity” built on a historically formed “idea of Europe” (see Pagden 2002) which had been developed within the relations of power of colonialism in particular and continued to rely on the construction of various “non-European” or “not-so-European others” (e.g. Asad 2002; Balibar 2004; Hall 1996; Said 1979; Stoler 2002). It involved what Ash Amin calls its “four myths of origin”:

first, the supremacy of a legal system based on Roman law; second, an ethos of social solidarity and common understanding based on Christian piety and humanism; third, a democratic order rooted in recognition of the rights and freedoms of the individual; and fourth, a universalism based on Reason and other Enlightenment principles of cosmopolitan belonging. (2004: 2)

⁵⁵ While official competence for culture was established on EU level with the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, initial EU attempts to govern through culture date back to the 1970s (Barnett 2001: 409). Because the European Community did not have “formal competence to act in this area, cultural action had to be justified in relation to economic objectives” (ibid) at the time, such as culture-based urban regeneration supported with EU structural funds (ibid). Since about 2000, Kiwan and Meinhof moreover note “an increasing output of policy documents by a number of EU and international institutions which relate to culture” (2006: 58) which speaks to an intensification not only of attempts to construct European *belonging* through cultural policy, but to govern *through* culture in a number of further realms (chapter 3).

These – Roman Law, Christianity, and the democratic and universalist heritage of the Enlightenment – were the cornerstones of a *civilizational* European identity promoted on EU level also. The goal of the European Commission when it stepped up its efforts in “cultural action” was, as Cris Shore (Shore 2000) argues, to make EU citizens “aware” of their shared European identity in these terms and thus create legitimacy for EU institutions in a context of intensified state-making and decreasing cohesion. In parallel to earlier proclaimed “national awakenings,” the Commission seemed to hope for a “supranational awakening” of a European people. As critics of national ideologies (e.g. Hobsbawm 1990) have pointed out, nations never simply “awoke” and became conscious of themselves – they had to be created in political processes. The European Commission, according to Cris Shore, seemed intent on doing just that.

The concept of a “European identity” had in fact been launched in 1973 with the Copenhagen *Declaration on European Identity* in the context of both economic and political crisis as well as a distinct lack of “communal” feeling in Europe (Strath 2000a; 2000b).⁵⁶ This initial declaration already entailed a particular articulation of the principle of “unity in diversity” that was later to become the official motto of the EU. It noted that the then nine member states of the European Community “have decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common” and “wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected” at the same time as they desire “to preserve the

⁵⁶ As Bo Strath remarks: “If there had been a sense of identity, there would have been no need to invent the concept as a means by which to induce new community in the Community” (2000b: 385).

rich variety of their national cultures” (European Communities 1973: 2). The declaration further read:

Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity.

While democracy, human rights, and the rule of law continue to be invoked today when there is talk of “European values,” the view that social justice is the ultimate goal of economic progress is unlikely to form part of an invocation of European identity in contemporary EU documents. In fact, the very terminology of social justice, though sometimes still invoked for example in the European Parliament, sounds like an anachronism in a dominant neoliberal policy context that takes economic growth on the basis of competitiveness as “ultimate goal” and limits references to the “social” to statements that growth will also increase employment and measures of anti-exclusion. This of course, as the previous discussion showed, is due to the very direction EU-European state-making has taken in the last decades.

Against this backdrop, the “cultural turn” in European integration can be interpreted as a means to secure “cohesion” in a context of increased class and territorial inequalities as a consequence of the adoption of neoliberal policies on EU, member state, and regional levels. Political legitimacy of Keynesian nation-states had rested to a good degree on the “production of welfare,” a mode of securing legitimacy that had been rapidly eroding since (just before) the economic crisis of the 1970s (see Strath 2000b) and the neoliberal responses to it. In this light,

culturalist “European identity” constructs appear as attempt to ensure consent, in a context of escalating class inequalities, to state-making processes that helped to produce this escalation.

However, according to Bo Strath, European identity had initially been conceived not to smooth the path to neoliberal union, but to bolster an attempt to establish new “Euro-corporatist” institutions and thus “to save the national tripartite bargaining model by shifting it onto a European level” (Strath 2000b: 402) in the 1970s.⁵⁷ When in subsequent years suggestions for a European Keynesianism lost out to the recommendations of the OECD McCracken report promoting the free market (ibid: 403-4), “European identity policy [acquired] a new political context” (ibid: 404). It was linked in particular since the 1990s to a concerted effort at obtaining political support for EU institution-building as well as deregulation on the European level through the governance of *culture*. According to Clive Barnett, the European Commission “clearly presented culture as a medium through which to shape a popular consensus in support of moves towards market and monetary integration” (2001: 409). Recourse to a construct of culturalist European identity in parallel to national forms of representation might here also have been an attempt to paper over the deficiency of liberal democratic institutions on EU level which had become the focus of critique. Uta Staiger notes that “the Community sought to base its legitimacy on normative and cultural grounds” (2009: 4) when it became clear that the neo-functional assumption that economic integration would lead to political union did not materialize.

⁵⁷ For a similarly view (on European identity, solidarity, and a social democratic Europe) in the contemporary moment, see Habermas (2001).

Arguably, the goal of EU governance of culture was not simply to define European identity, but to in fact create a *European* people that EU institutions could then legitimately represent (Shore 2006b: 10), together with other measures aiming at establishing a “People’s Europe,” such as EU citizenship or the strengthening of the European Parliament. Cris Shore’s (Shore 2000; 2006b; Shore & Black 1992) work on EU cultural policy and symbolism shows that European identity was to be erected on “culture” in a double sense. Not only was cultural policy in a broad sense a central means of choice for ‘creating Europeans,’⁵⁸ but European identity itself was conceived in civilizational terms, in this way providing a culturalist foundation of belonging and entitlement to EU-Europe. An array of means to *represent* and *construct* commonality – such as the EU flag, anthem, or the imagery of the Euro, cultural events such as the European Cities of Culture, European Years, Europe day festivals, or student exchanges through Erasmus and the like as well as cultural policy in the narrower sense, such as audiovisual policy – were not only to demonstrate and celebrate a “shared” heritage of “diversity,” but also to establish actual cooperation and networks, and (thus) enhance identification with a Europe of *civilizational* unity encompassing *national-cultural* diversity (see Barnett 2001; Sassatelli 2002; Shore 2000).

In fact, two different conceptions of European identity were promoted and informed state-making around the time of the Maastricht Treaty, reaching back to earlier formulations of what Chebel d’Appollonia (2002) has identified as “anti-national” versus “pro-national” forms of

⁵⁸ As Sassatelli notes, “[o]ne of the aims of cultural policy has always been the fostering of specific identities and thus the formatting of a fully socialized, compliant citizen. Although normally associated with the national level, today this is becoming manifestly relevant both at the local and supranational level” (2006: 24).

“European nationalism.” They were tied into different visions of EU-European state and place formation. The European Commission in particular envisioned the “construction of a pan-European cultural space” in line “with the enlargement of European cultural markets and spaces” (Kiwari and Meinhof 2006: 3), which contrasted with “a new regionalist agenda with the slogan of a ‘Europe of the regions’” (ibid) which found expression in the establishment of the Committee of the Regions and was in fact tied to regional attempts at gaining autonomy from nation-states (see Williams 1999). These two approaches constituted different emphases in the EU’s later motto of “unity in diversity.” In the former, European unity is seen to encompass regional and national diversity, while in the latter, European unity is constituted by regional diversity. While both articulations of European identity gave expression to the different dimensions of a very real reorganization of statehood that entailed increased importance of both supranational and subnational governmental scales, they also continued to rely on a *national* imagery (Chebel d'Appollonia 2002: 178; Shore 2000: 50)⁵⁹ that tied “culture” to “place” (Barnett 2001; see also Gupta & Ferguson 1992), excluding “non-European” diversity. Thus, the regionalist approach was “a programme for a Europe of the small nations” while the pan-European one “represented an attempt to reinvent Europe in terms of an enlarged nation-state” (Meinhof & Triandafyllidou 2006: 4) and both constituted because of their adherence to the national model, as Meinhof and Triandafyllidou posit, “a cultural agenda that was inadequate to the complexity of what Europe had actually become” (ibid).

⁵⁹ As Chebel d'Appollonia observes, “during the postwar years ... European nationalism has borrowed most from the national mystique by defining itself according to the same criteria as the nation-state: historical memory-building, a common identity and culture for all of the entities grouped within the bounds of a given territory and political and economic objectives destined to ensure general prosperity and to defend the global interests of its participants” (2002: 178). Shore also notes that “despite claims made by its supporters that the EU is forging a unique political entity that ‘transcends’ the nation-state ... the new Europe is being constructed on much the same symbolic terrain as the old nation-states of the last two centuries.” (2000: 50)

The “Old” Idea of Europe: “Too Small” and “Too Big” for EU-European State-Making?

The attempt to establish legitimacy and cohesion by invoking commonality through a culturalist construction of European identity entailed a number of contradictions that made it an unsuccessful “state idea” for developing EU-European statehood. This forms the backdrop against which we have to understand recent EU re-definitions of what constitutes EU-Europeanness (chapter 3). On the most basic level, the attempt to establish a civilizational European identity failed to win the support of people for the European project. This was manifested very clearly in the rejection of the draft constitution for the EU, which showed that “the EU’s consistent sacrifice of social objectives to the overriding priority of market-led economic integration has tended to deprive it of popular support and political legitimacy” (Grahl 2008: 44) and that constructs of European identity, far from compensating for this, engendered increased opposition against a seemingly overpowering EU.

As Shore has argued, the European Commission’s understanding of multiple identities as a number of concentric circles, the European encompassing the national and regional, is overly harmonious, overlooking that such identities can be in opposition to each other (Shore 2000: 52). The rise of neo-nationalist parties is a testimony to that. Moreover, the fact that such parties often are directed not only against the EU but the “non-European” (in particular Muslim) immigrant shows that an exclusionary sense of *Europeanness* is indeed widespread in Europe in common-sense political understandings and practices, but that this sense need not translate into an explicit identification with a European political project.

However, as a civilizational construction of European identity dovetailed with such culture-exclusivist constructions of Europeanness and their national and colonial genealogies, the EU undermined its own claims on moral authority and legitimacy, which were founded on opposition to the exclusions and culturalist violence of the nation-state. A central legitimizing claim for EU-European state-making is that the EU came as phoenix out of the ashes of the Second World War in order to prevent the latter's repetition.⁶⁰ Public critics of "Fortress Europe" however pointed at the way in which the EU reinstated exclusionary culturalism previously associated with the nation-states on a supra-national scale.

Such critiques were not limited to academic discourse, but found mainstream public expression also in the liberal Left circles that are usually supportive of "European integration." They highlighted on the one hand the culture-exclusivism of narratives of Europeanness which identified European unity with a shared civilizational heritage constituted by "the Greco-Roman tradition as the cradle of European civilisation and aesthetics, the Judaeo-Christian tradition as its normative foundation, and the Enlightenment as the basis for rationality and rights" (Staiger 2009: 6, in reference to Eder 2000) and limited the recognition of diversity to European regional and national cultures (see e.g. European Commission 1987) rather than acknowledging a history of immigration. In such narratives of Europe, Muslims for example were ever only "in" rather than "of" Europe (Asad 2002). Thus, critics highlighted that the reliance of European identity constructions in opposition to the "civilizationally non-European" (in particular Muslims) or "not-so-European" (in particular eastern Europeans) informed the hierarchies and exclusions

⁶⁰ For an alternative historical narrative, see Judt (1996).

entailed in EU citizenship, the Schengen area, or enlargement (Balibar 2004; Böröcz & Kovacs 2001; Shore 1996).

As a consequence, the civilizational idea of Europe was unlikely to mobilize anyone for the “European project.” As Ash Amin asks rhetorically:

Who will it [what he calls the “old” idea of Europe] appeal to and who will care enough to be swayed by it? What will it mean to cosmopolitans and everyday consumers riding the swell of global made-up-as-you-go affiliations? How will it fire the imagination and loyalty of minority ethnic groups with loyalties split between host nation and imagined communities dispersed around the world and rooted in non-European histories? Indeed, will it mean much to the growing number of everyday folk in majority communities, who, destabilized by the presence of strangers in their midst as well as the complexities of multiple assaults on their identities, yearn for the simplicity and security of local community and ethno-national belonging? (2004: 3)

As neither cosmopolitans nor minority or majority populations would identify with it, the civilizational idea of Europe, he concludes, was both “too big” and “too small” to create attachments and a sense of commonality. In brief, it was unlikely to solve the problems of cohesion and legitimacy that afflicted EU-European state-making. The shift to a selective embrace of the non-European and a cosmopolitan identity for Europe on EU level (Rovisco 2007; Staiger 2009) might constitute an attempt to at least bring those in for whom this idea was “too small” – accepting the further alienation of culture-exclusivist EU opponents that are already “lost” to the European project.

The interpretation of “unity in diversity” that excluded non-European diversity however also proved “too small” for the ambitions of (parts of the) EU-European state elites themselves. That is, a third contradiction stems from the fact that constructs of European identity played a

role in shaping EU enlargement. The indeterminate geography of Europe allows for keeping the EU's borders flexible. Geographically speaking, Europe is not a continent, but a part of Eurasia, so that its borders have to be drawn on culturalist grounds open to interpretation and contestation (see Parker 1960). A culture-exclusivist understanding of Europeanness built in opposition to Islam here however reinscribes fixity, which works against those who try to maintain flexibility in extending the EU's sphere of influence.

Although long-established hierarchies of Europeanness had played a role in the EU's so-called eastern enlargement, this problematic became particularly obvious with Turkey's EU candidacy. Culturalist rejections of Turkey's Europeanness not only rely on older historical imaginaries of European Christianity positioned against the Muslim invaders (see Gingrich 2004; Strasser 2008), but are also tied to the increasingly prevalent claim that "multiculturalism failed" in European societies. Many member states have turned to exclusionary or assimilationist approaches as a consequence (see Koopmans et al 2005; Modood et al 2006). While EU elites and institutions as well as member states are divided over the question of Turkey's membership, in particular the European Commission has an interest in Turkey's eventual accession because it faces the loss of credibility if Turkey was barred from membership even if it was to fulfill all official criteria. The danger of a rejection of Turkey therefore does not emanate so much from EU institutions as from some member states, such as France, which pursues a different agenda here. Culture-exclusivism on supra-national as well as national scales thus now constitutes a problem for the political agenda of *EU-Europe*.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the particular course EU-European state-making took, prioritizing demands of capital over social justice, contradicting principles of national sovereignty, undermining nationally embedded institutions of liberal democracy, and more generally instituting regulatory unity in diversity, have created problems of state legitimacy in particular on EU and member state levels and difficulties in ensuring cohesion in increasingly divided societies and territories. Culturalist politics – in form of both neo-nationalist culture-exclusivism and a supranational promotion of “thick” European identity – have been the immediate expression of these contradictions within the EU-European state form.

The initial attempt of EU elites to address challenges to cohesion and legitimacy resulting from the effects of EU-European state-making through the development of “thick” supranational culturalism – providing a “state idea” for EU-Europe in analogy to the established national principle of legitimacy – however proved unapt for the developing state form of EU-Europe. It neither ensured consent to EU-European state-making nor did it easily allow for Turkey’s EU membership and thus also posed obstacles to political expansionary ambitions for EU-Europe. While this explains in part the move away from such “thick” European identity constructions in EU level policy, the particular brand of culturalism that has come to be adopted instead in the last decade has more complex origins, which will be discussed in the following chapters. Its hallmarks are a *selective* opening of place and political community to “non-European” diversity through so-called “managed immigration” and “intercultural” immigrant integration strategies,

based on the notion that it is *political* values rather than civilizational identity that founds European unity, a notion that in principle also allows for Turkey's EU accession.

CHAPTER 2

Multi-Level Governance: EU Structural Funds and the Making of Capital- Conducive Places

While the previous discussion has shown through a focus on *EU-level* state-making how culturalist politics emerged as both problem and “solution” for the making of EU-Europe, this chapter examines the particularity of EU-European “unity in diversity” from the perspective of the *city of Berlin*. It both provides us with a critical understanding of “multi-level governance” that has been described as the hallmark of a developing (“cosmopolitan”) EU-European state form and points at how culture emerges in this context as a means to enhance a city’s competitiveness in a space of competition fostered not least through EU level policies. This is crucial backdrop to the argument of the following chapter, which shows how the attempt to address problems of cohesion and competitiveness through culturalism has now been harnessed in EU-European policy to the goal of activating culture’s utility for economic competitiveness. The emphasis in this chapter however is on the exploration of how seeming contradictions in the political orientation of EU and Berlin city level policy are “resolved” when it comes to the use of structural funds as a means to further our understanding of the current EU-European state form and its implications for increasing inequalities within and between places ordered for the demands of capital. It focuses here on the alignment of EU structural funds policy with the Lisbon strategy and the resulting neoliberalization of a traditionally Keynesian instrument. Thus, this chapter deepens and complements the argument of the

previous chapter on the relations between neoliberal union, regulatory unity in diversity, and culturalism through a more detailed study of one particular realm of EU-European state-making that is of relevance if we want to understand the turn to intercultural policy and its “thinned” vision of place discussed in chapters three and four.

◇◇◇

In the winter of 2008, I came across postcards advertising the European Commission at the European Union information center in Berlin. They pictured various cucumbers in different shapes – none of them straight – and the caption *Für Vielfältige* (“for the diverse”). The



postcards alluded to one notorious instance of EU regulation that had come to symbolize “Brussels” in Germany: the marketing standard prescribing the amount of curvature allowed for cucumbers sold (as category I) in the common market. People often referred to the EU’s concern with *krumme Gurken* (bent cucumbers) when they wanted to emphasize its bureaucratic, overly regulatory, and homogenizing character.⁶¹ Not least, these perceived qualities of “Brussels” were seen to threaten local specificities and traditions, among others of the culinary sort. This is not specific to Germany. In Turkey, for example, the rumor circulated in the early phase of the membership process that the EU will forbid *kokoreç* (sheep intestines

⁶¹ The EU Commission in the UK takes a stance on this issue online under the heading ‘euomyths’: “Cucumbers do not have to be straight. There are grading rules, which were called for by representatives from the industry to enable buyers in one country to know what quality and quantity they would get when purchasing a box, unseen, from another country. Nothing is banned under these rules: they simply help to inform traders of particular specifications.” At: http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/euomyths/myth26_en.htm

grilled on charcoal, mostly sold by street vendors) as part of its hygiene regulations, thus abolishing a popular local late-night snack.

When in November 2008, marketing standards were abolished for twenty-six products, including cucumbers, the European Commission tried to get the message out that Brussels is not about homogenization, but can accommodate the many differences that exist in Europe. The unitary frame of the EU, it was implied, is about the recognition of diversity. By invoking the term “diversity” – usually associated with people(s) rather than cucumbers – the European Commission established a parallel between “regulatory” and “cultural” unity in diversity. It implied that the EU does not strive to turn into a (supra-)nation-state that establishes uniformity by relinquishing existing national traditions, particularities, and identities, but rather constitutes a form of governance suited to diversity. EU “unity in diversity,” was the broader message conveyed, entailed general rules that could accommodate difference, may they concern human rights or the common market.

Did the Commission heed Beck and Grande’s warning that the political project of Europe can only succeed if “a novel, cosmopolitan approach to integration [is introduced] that is no longer concerned with harmonizing rules and eliminating (national) differences, but [intent] on recognizing them” (2007: 72)? Since the Maastricht Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity was to ensure that problems were solved on the lowest possible governmental level,⁶² de facto

⁶² Subsidiarity has been seen as a key feature of EU-European governance, even though – or because – it in fact was an attempt to prevent concentration of power on EU level. For discussion of this principle and its roots in Social Catholicism, see Holmes (2000). The critique by Prodi cited below seems to suggest that subsidiarity is now

limiting the competences of the EU. Since about 2000, the Commission has propagated the notion of “governance” (Shore 2006a) as an alternative, cooperative way of ensuring common solutions that would respect local priorities. Cris Shore cites then President of the European Commission Romano Prodi’s proposition that

we have to stop thinking in terms of hierarchical layers of competence separated by the subsidiarity principle and start thinking, instead, of a networking arrangement, with all levels of governance shaping, proposing, implementing and monitoring policy together (cited in Shore 2006a: 712)

In brief, “governance” – a term which, as Cris Shore notes, the Commission adopted from the academic literature and presented as entirely benign and democratic – was conceived of as a “dialogic” process between different governmental levels and so-called “social partners” which respected pluralism (ibid: 719).

Structural funds policy, which is examined in this chapter, can also be situated within this model of governance. It has been a prime example in the literature for “multi-level-governance,” because it involves EU, national, and regional governmental institutions as well as social and economic civil society “partners” (Hooghe & Marks 2001). While the EU formulates general criteria for the use of the funds, the actual strategies are developed on regional or national levels and then “negotiated” with the Commission. In that way, cosmopolitan theorists might argue, they respect the “particularity” of the respective region within a general frame of shared norms⁶³ (see also Sellar & McEwen 2011).

perceived as a barrier to EU-European state-making and that the notion of “governance” might constitute an effort to overcome such limits to EU influence.

⁶³ Although it is not singled out by Beck and Grande in their discussion of the different ways in which the EU could achieve “differentiated integration” (Beck & Grande 2004; 2007), they are likely to approve of it, as it can be seen

However, the question that Claus Offe poses to the EU's Open Method of Coordination (OMC)⁶⁴ might be pertinent more generally: How can we be sure that such supposed non-hierarchical modes of "governance" do not entail "the imposition of new rules mediated by the exercise of social and economic power?" (2003: 463) In this vein, this chapter addresses the question: How do we explain the outcomes of particular policy and political processes involving "negotiation" and "dialogue" between various "levels" of governance? This is particularly interesting in the case of the use of EU structural funds in Berlin because of a seeming contradiction between the political orientations of the European Commission and the Berlin city government. The city government at the time – a coalition of social democrats (SPD) and socialists (die Linke)⁶⁵ – opposed the EU on issues that were seen to conflict, in their neoliberal orientation, with local political priorities of more social democratic quality.

The question how the outcome of "multi-level governance" is to be explained gains relevance in view of possibly diverging place-making strategies – involving the ordering of social and

to allow for a "European" solution without clear imposition and homogenization "from above." It is similar in that regard to the Open Method of Coordination which they evaluate positively for a cosmopolitan Europe.

⁶⁴ The *Open Method of Coordination* (OMC) was initiated with the Lisbon strategy of 2001. While it was initially applied to the area of social and employment policy, it has since gained more widespread application in order to achieve harmonization between member state practices in areas where agreement is difficult to reach. It seeks to generalize "best practice" through (voluntary) participation in benchmarking, monitoring, and the like. Programs such as "Intercultural Cities" – in which Berlin participates – as well as related attempts to find a "common language" in questions of integration also follow this logic.

⁶⁵ From 2001 to 2011, the social democrats (SPD) were governing in a coalition with the socialists (die Linke); the oppositional parties in the city parliament were the Christian Democrats (CDU), the Greens, and the neoliberal FDP. The SPD had briefly formed a coalition with the Greens (in 2001) after the coalition with the CDU (1991-2001) lasting two legislative periods broke apart subsequent to a bank scandal involving a leading figure of the CDU in Berlin. In the most recent elections in the fall of 2011, both the social democrats and the socialists lost some votes so that they could no longer form a coalition. The SPD remained the strongest party with 28%, followed by the CDU (23%), the Greens (18%), the Linke (12%), and FDP (2%). The surprise of the election was the new Pirate Party which gained 9% of the votes and 15 seats. Coalition talks of the SPD with the Greens failed early on because of conflict on the issue of a city highway the SPD insists on building and the Greens reject. The SPD is now once more forming a coalition with the CDU.

economic relations in EU-Europe and Berlin for which structural funds (policy) constitute a resource – of these different governmental levels. The chapter thus inquires into multi-level governance practices as a means to both further our understanding of EU-European statehood and to gauge its implications for the internal ordering of place. The chapter focuses in particular on the EU's new emphasis in the current funding cycle on using funds for increasing *competitiveness* in line with the renewed Lisbon Strategy (Council of the European Union 2006). This has to be viewed against the backdrop that structural funds policy since 1988 was to secure social and territorial *cohesion* by buffering the negative consequences of the Single Market⁶⁶ and thus constituted “a bedrock of the anti-neoliberal program” (Hooghe & Marks 2001: 106) in the EU. The new orientation of structural funds along the prerogative of competitiveness signals a move away from this program. I show that cohesion is no longer to be achieved by buffering the consequences of increased competition, but to be harnessed for the latter. The question that arises is whether or how this EU level shift translates into policy on the regional level and with what consequences for the inequalities within and between places in EU-Europe.

The chapter shows that EU-European “multi-level governance” cannot be understood by looking at institutional relations and their “non-hierarchical” quality in isolation and that the result of such governance in the case of recent structural funds policy is likely to intensify rather than alleviate the twin dynamics of uneven development and increased class polarization that has already characterized EU-European state-making. All of this sheds doubt on the assumption

⁶⁶ For a critique of the efficacy of earlier structural funds policy in this regard, see Amin and Tomaney (1995).

of cosmopolitan theories that EU regulatory unity in diversity is the best framework for the “recognition of otherness” when it comes to allowing for regional alternatives to neoliberalism but also to overcoming neo-nationalism that thrives on inequalities.

Multi-Level Governance of EU Structural Funds in Berlin

Who is involved in and what are the processes of structural funds policy-making in the case of Berlin? “Multi-level governance” here begins in fact with negotiations involving the national governments and the Commission on the total amount and distribution of funds accorded to member states and the overall orientation of their use. The regions also have a number of venues through which they can seek to influence such policy-making and decisions on EU level. Given the federal system of Germany, representatives of the German *Länder* are part of the Council of the EU in policy areas that are exclusively issues of the *Länder*. Moreover, the Berlin *Senat* can try to impact the European policy of the national government through the *Bundesrat*, which represents the *Länder* on national level.⁶⁷ Berlin also has one representative in the Committee of the Regions, which has a consultative function to the Council, Parliament, and Commission and the influence of which was considered small by the politicians I interviewed.

Apart from these official political channels, there are a number of ways in which the city government pursues lobbying on EU level. It has a “bureau” in Brussels which both informs the

⁶⁷ Berlin is one of the German *Bundesländer* (i.e. federated states, in the following: *Land* (singular) or *Länder* (plural)) and thus a city-state. The Berlin executive – the *Senat* – is represented in the *Bundesrat*, one of the two chambers on national level (the other being the parliament, the *Bundestag*). On city level, we furthermore find the *Landes* parliament (*Abgeordnetenhaus*). The *Land* Berlin is further subdivided into 12 boroughs (*Bezirke*), each with their own mayor, elected borough council (*Bezirksamt*), and administration (*Bezirksverwaltung*), without these constituting independent municipalities.

Berlin *Senat* about political developments in Brussels and represents Berlin interests vis-à-vis EU institutions. Several of my interviewees compared the relatively small bureau of Berlin with the impressive one of Bavaria in order to illustrate Berlin's limited capacity of exercising influence, not least because of its limited financial resources. At the same time, it was emphasized that within these limits, the bureau did a good job. Berlin moreover participates in city networks such as EUROCITIES that lobby for greater inclusion of city concerns and of particular policy orientations into EU policy.

Despite these channels of EU level influence, there remains of course an asymmetry between the impact that the EU can have on the regional level versus the influence any *one* regional level can have on the EU (a question of the power of scale). Interviewees of the center-left parties in particular brought up the role of EU competition law in this regard, which is a clear instance of hierarchical decision-making and conflicted with local priorities in several instances (more on that below).⁶⁸ Structural funds policy is a less hierarchical "presence" of the EU in the region. Much welcomed by all my interviewees as necessary financial resources for a fiscally, economically, and socially challenged city, these do not simply feed into the city budget, but

⁶⁸ Given such new realities of EU-European policy-making, we find positions of "Europe" or "EU expertise" in different administrative and political institutions on *Senat* and borough level in Berlin. These are both supposed to shape Berlin's European policy and to attract and implement EU funding and programs. The 'highest up' in the hierarchy is the governing city mayor Klaus Wowereit, who has the responsibility for European policy. While a city brochure (Senatskanzlei Berlin 2009) states that he is "aided" by the state secretary in this matter, it is more likely that her offices do most of the work. Her task is to represent Berlin in various EU-related institutions and to coordinate Berlin's European policy with the different *Senat* administrations in Berlin. In these administrations, we in turn find "EU-Referenten" dealing with EU matters concerning the particular policy area of each administration, developing positions and initiating participation in EU projects. On the *Bezirk* level, we find "Europabeauftragte", i.e. officials responsible for EU issues, who do public relations for Europe on the communal level as well as are active in the EU project landscape in the *Bezirk*.

rather are to be used in line with a strategic orientation defined on the EU level and then translated into national strategies for the use of the funds.

In the case of Germany, the role of the national level in the use of structural funds (in particular ERDF) is less pronounced than in some other EU member states due to its federal structure. For one, the German National Strategy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie 2007) was devised on the basis of proposals from the German *Länder* rather than being developed independently as guideline for them, as an official responsible for the ERDF strategy in Berlin told me. Moreover, the German *Länder* developed their own strategies for the use of funds in line with national and EU strategic orientation.

Structural funds are distributed on a project-basis to state programs, companies, and civil society institutions or initiatives applying for the funds. For this purpose, the city government developed a strategy for the use of the funds (Senat Berlin 2006) that articulated the Operational Program (OP) (Senat Berlin 2007a; 2007b) for each of the structural funds (European Social Fund (ESF) and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)). These OPs in turn require approval by the European Commission before funds are disbursed. Their development involves negotiation both within the *Senat* administration and subsequently between the *Senat* and the European Commission in terms of the overall strategy and the actual programs and projects funded (discussed in more detail in a later section).

Structural funds, just as European policy more generally,⁶⁹ are largely an executive matter in Berlin. In the previous parliamentary period (ongoing at the time of research), structural funds were only discussed once in the Parliament and related Committees in response to a motion of the Green party.⁷⁰ The debate in the plenary⁷¹ stayed on a relative general level and conveyed the impression that everyone was more or less in agreement with what was supposed to be done while the debate focused on whether it was actually being done.⁷² As my interviewee from the Green party stated critically on the lack of parliamentary engagement with questions concerning structural funds:

...the kinds of conflicts that concern priorities in the distribution of funds, that they, in their particular Committees and thematic relations (*Zusammenhängen*) in particular policy areas (*Fachpolitik*), are actually always directly affected, that there are EU funds, that there is a process of negotiation, that there are unused reserve funds: such things are simply not registered [in the *Abgeordnetenhaus*].

The relative non-involvement of the *Abgeordnetenhaus* in structural funds issues in Berlin was explained by my interviewees – and generally accepted (only the Green party was harshly

⁶⁹ The city executive, the *Senat*, can determine who sits in the Committee of the Regions (at the time a state secretary and a parliamentarian, while the latter does not have in this function any link with or obligations to the *Abgeordnetenhaus*), the *Senat* sits in the *Bundesrat*, the *Senat* runs the bureau in Brussels, the *Senat* is involved in city networks (which, as one interviewee noted, also bypass the parliament), while the Europe Committee is a ‘weak’ one with, apparently, not much capacity to thoroughly grasp EU-European issues and influence the *Senat* on this count.

⁷⁰ The Green party was clearly the one most involved with the politics of structural funds in the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, which might result in part from the fact that part of their constituency is likely to be involved in (social, cultural,...) sectors funded through structural funds. Moreover, the parliamentary factions of the governing parties (SPD and Linke) had different channels of information and influence, while the Christian Democrats, as one interviewee put it, “likely lack the expertise” (which confirmed my own impression in the review of committee and plenary discussions and the lack of response to my written questions on the theme of structural funds that had been asked from me in place of an interview I had requested) and the neoliberal FDP was both torn about structural funds (rejecting them on principle, but having greater difficulties of refusing them in the case of Berlin given fiscal problems) and a small party in Berlin.

⁷¹ Verbatim transcript of the plenary session on Feb. 1, 2007, *Abgeordnetenhaus* Berlin, Drucksache 16/0213

⁷² For example: the Parliament should be involved – is involvement sufficient? Available funds should all be used – are they used? Strategy should be focused – is it focused? Culture and environment should be funded – are they sufficiently? An actual discussion of the goals of the funding, of the overall strategy, or of the programs did not take place. Furthermore, the role of the EU seemed not at all a concern – the Greens only used the supposedly more stringent EU guidelines to buttress their critique, while others refuted the view that these guidelines were more concrete.

critiquing it) – as due to lack of expertise, as the *Abgeordnetenhaus* is a “part-time-parliament.”⁷³ But it is also related to the fact that the development of the strategy for the development of the funds, the choice of programs and projects funded, and the negotiation of these with the Commission are all executive matters in Berlin. An interviewee that did not want to be cited identifiably with this statement declared that “all of this [the process of developing strategies for the funds] can be very much criticized from the standpoint of democracy” as it involved a “pre-calibration of the distribution of budgetary funds” which in fact falls into the competences of the *Abgeordnetenhaus*.⁷⁴ The background to this was the fear, the person continued, that the negotiation of the OPs would take too long if the *Abgeordnetenhaus* was also involved. My interviewee from the Green party asserted that this constituted a clear “democratic deficit” as millions of Euros were exclusively under the purview of the executive in Berlin which decided on the use of these funds *in dependence on* a governmental level [i.e. the Commission] which *also* was not submitted to any parliamentary control.

⁷³ One Committee of the *Abgeordnetenhaus* is dealing with questions of European policy, which however is joined with “media” and “cooperation with Brandenburg”. As my interviewee from the Greens noted, this was problematic – it was, she stated, like two different committees accidentally having the same meeting time. The engagement with European themes suffered from this, as my interviewee from the FDP concurred. Structural funds for example were only discussed once in response to a motion of the Green Party for the main assembly, and then not in depth. Indeed, several of the persons I wanted to interview told me that they did know much about structural funds but could talk about European politics in general. In one instance, when requesting an interview, I was referred by a parliamentarian in the Europe Committee to the Economic Policy Committee as being the one actually dealing with structural funds, while the parliamentarian in the Economic policy Committee then referred me to the Europe Committee with the same argument. Thus, it seems assumed that someone is dealing with the topic in depth, while this is apparently not the case.

⁷⁴ The *Abgeordnetenhaus* has the capacity to reject individual budget items concerning structural funds – which would not have influence on the overall strategy – or the entire budget, what the oppositional parties do already (while the budget is of course passed with the votes of the governing coalition). Thus, a parliamentarian from the Greens stated during a 2007 meeting of the Committee on Economic policy discussing the structural funds motion of the Greens that it was a strange understanding of democracy to say that the Senate determined the ‘big lines’ and the Parliament could then ‘switch around’ funds a little (Content transcript of the meeting on January 29, 2007 Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin (Inhaltsprotokoll WiTechFrau 16 / 3)).

In fact, there was a discussion that preceded the presentation of the strategy for the funds, as Economic Policy Senator Harald Wolf emphasized during the plenary debate on the topic – with the “social and economic partners” in line with the EU’s “partnership” principle (see e.g. Baun & Marek 2008a). Such “partners” are also accompanying the process of implementation through the institution of a monitoring committee (*Begleitausschuss* (BGA)). As protocols of the meetings of the committee show and as one of my interviewees confirmed, the “partners” in the BGA were and are critical of the *Senat’s* division of the sub-committees of the BGA along the lines of the “cross-cutting goals” of equality of opportunity, integration of immigrants, and sustainability, rather than the action fields of the OPs (i.e. “economy”, “knowledge,” “city development”) where they could have had more influence on matters that were likely of greater concern to them.

“Multi-level governance” in the development of the strategy for the structural funds in Berlin, in brief, involved primarily the Berlin *Senat* and the European Commission. In this light, the Commission’s assumption (according to Shore) that governance is “inherently more democratic and inclusive” (Shore 2006a: 719) seems highly questionable and is also not perceived as such on the regional level. The later examination of how this plays out when it comes to developing the strategies for the use of the funds in Berlin has to be seen in view of the EU level redefinition of the goals of structural funds policy in EU-Europe.

The New EU Structural Funds Objective 2: Funding Cohesion for Competitiveness?

For the current 2007-2013 funding cycle, the EU redefined its structural funds objectives, that is, the goals that structural funds policy was to serve and accordingly the criteria determining eligible regions. The overall strategic guidelines for the use of the funds were now oriented along the renewed Lisbon strategy,⁷⁵ that is, they emphasized competitiveness in the knowledge economy primarily through supply-side policies. They were threefold: first, “improving the attractiveness of Member States, regions, and cities,” second, “encouraging innovation, entrepreneurship and the growth of the knowledge economy,” and “creating more and better jobs by attracting more people into employment or entrepreneurial activity, improving adaptability of workers and enterprises and increasing investment in human capital” (Council of the European Union 2006: 14).

While this applies to all regions receiving funding, the EU also redefined the different funding categories in line with this strategic orientation. While in the “objective 1” category, funds continue to flow to regions that fall below 75% of EU GDP average for the purpose of “convergence,” objective 2 now no longer targets “declining industrial regions” as was previously the case. Instead, it is *potentially* available to *all* regions – that is, to those above the 75% cut-off mark – for improving “competitiveness and employment” in line with the EU’s renewed Lisbon strategy. Berlin is receiving under this objective about 1.2 billion Euros⁷⁶ for the

⁷⁵ The Lisbon strategy was initially devised in 2001 and renewed in 2005. See also chapter 1.

⁷⁶ About 1.55 billion dollars as of December 2011.

current funding cycle (2007-2013), 875 of which stem from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and 335 from the European Social Fund (ESF).⁷⁷

Because Berlin is funded under objective 2, its strategy for the use of the funds has to pursue the goal of enhancing “competitiveness and employment” through *innovation* in line with the EU Lisbon strategy’s suggestions as to how to turn the European economic area into the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.” As Baun and Marek note, the “Lisbonization” of structural funds policy entails a shift towards a “focus on developing human resources and the knowledge economy” in contrast to the “more traditional ‘equity’ approach to economic development aimed at alleviating regional disparities and focused on large-scale infrastructure projects” (2008b: 9). The alignment with the Lisbon strategy has to take place both on the level of strategic orientation of the use of the funds as set in the Operational Programs (OPs) and on the level of actual programs. In objective 2 regions 75% of the projects funded have to be “Lisbon-conform”.⁷⁸ This is a requirement by the European Commission that constitutes a bedrock in the “negotiations” of concrete strategies for the use of the funds.

Although 82% of the EU funds continue to be concentrated in objective 1 regions in the current funding cycle, the redefinition of the objectives reflects important processes. Beyond being a

⁷⁷ Previously, Berlin received funding as objective 1 region, due to its formerly East German districts (though formerly West German districts also received money, through a separate program, in the funding cycle 2000-2006). For the current funding cycle, Berlin was no longer eligible for convergence funding.

⁷⁸ In objective 1 regions, a minimum of 60% of the funds has to go to Lisbon-conform projects. While the new member states are formally exempted from this requirement, they are expected to adhere to it on a voluntary basis – see Baun and Marek 2007: 8-9.

response to political demands from the old EU member states,⁷⁹ it seems to indicate a relative shift in power on the EU level between “neoliberal” and “Keynesian” factions, a power struggle that has already been discernible in the late 1990s in regards to structural funds policy (see Hooghe & Marks 2001: 105-16), as Lisbonization aligns with the move away from the alleviation and towards the exploitation of uneven geographical development in regional policy that is in turn related to the neoliberalization of spatial relations (Brenner 2004a; Peck & Tickell 2002).⁸⁰

With the formation of the European Single Market – and liberalization processes more generally in the wake of the global shift to neoliberal accumulation regimes – European regions were increasingly exposed to competitive pressures. With capital being more mobile, their place-specific features became more important (Harvey 2001 [1989]), which they consequently sought to enhance. This development has been accompanied and indeed pushed by a shift in regional policy away from a “spatial Keynesianism” (Brenner 2004a) aimed at the improvement of economic performance of “backwards” regions and a relatively homogeneous state territory towards the support of already competitive ones and their insertion into European and global capital circuits (see also Harvie 1994; Heeg 2001).⁸¹ In this context, “[t]he goal of national, regional, and local state spatial policies is no longer to alleviate uneven geographical

⁷⁹ “Eastern enlargement” brought many regions used to receiving EU funds above the 75% cut-off mark, as the EU GDP average itself changed. Under the new objective 2, they continue to be eligible for funds.

⁸⁰ While uneven geographical development and class inequalities are necessary features of a capitalist mode of production (Harvey 2006; Smith 1984), they are crucially mediated through state practices (Brenner 2004a). In a simplified manner, Keynesian policies aimed to secure the conditions for capital accumulation through balancing out – though not entirely leveling – spatial and class inequalities within a state territory. In contrast, neoliberal governance aims at capital accumulation through the intensification and exploitation of such inequalities.

⁸¹ Brenner (2000) argues (for the case of Germany) that the Keynesian approach to spatial development in Europe and Germany began to unravel in the 1970s, while regions began to develop their own forms of crisis-management through the 1980s. After 1989, he argues, “neoliberal projects of regionalization” emerged. Thus, the system of federalism was directed away from equalization through fiscal transfer towards “competition federalism” (Brenner 2000: 335), while regional policy was built on uneven development between the *Länder*.

development, but actively to intensify it through the deployment of urban locational policies designed to strengthen the place-specific socioeconomic assets of strategic, globally linked city-regions” (Brenner 2004: 16). This is clearly reflected in the opening of structural funds to “already competitive” regions via objective 2. In principle, it thus allows for an intensification of the uneven geographical development that structural funds had long been thought to address.

The stronger alignment of funding in particular (but not only) in objective 2 regions with the renewed Lisbon strategy moreover speaks of this increased neoliberalization of structural funds policy and its intensification of regional but also class inequalities. The Lisbon strategy, especially in its “renewed” form, was a supply-side approach to economic policy that emphasized competitiveness through innovation in the knowledge economy and increased employment on the basis of resulting growth. It subsumed social policy to this overall agenda by focusing attention on creating appropriately skilled and flexible workers for the knowledge economy.⁸² On the regional level, the structural funds thus fed directly into strategies to attract investment in competition with other regions⁸³ by supplying funding, appropriately skilled workers, and an “attractive” city environment to companies.

⁸² The Lisbon strategy came out of an initiative of the European Roundtable of Industrialists and intended to open services and protected sectors to global competition, increase flexibility in the labor market, and turn provisions such as education, health, or pensions into an individual responsibility (Altvater & Mahnkopf 2007: 124-5). See also chapter 1.

⁸³ In Berlin, locational competition with the *Land* Brandenburg (which in fact encapsulates Berlin) was an immediate concern often brought up by interviewees, as Brandenburg moreover still received objective 1 funding.

In fact, the capacity of structural funds to achieve “social and territorial question” has always been in question (see Amin & Tomaney 1995),⁸⁴ even though they were reformed and given additional resources in 1989 to counter the negative effects of the Single Market and EMU on weaker regions. The declared concern however was with the achievement of *cohesion* in the face of competitive pressures and their unequal consequences. The current orientation of structural funds policy in turn emphasizes the importance of *competitiveness* – and claims to ensure cohesion *through* not *despite* that. Not only does objective 2 support in principle already competitive regions with the goal to make them even more so, but the use of funds in the “convergence” objective 1 is now also oriented to a greater extent along the goal of enhancing competitiveness via innovation.

That the EU’s cohesion policy is not intended to counter the effects of neoliberal globalization, as it “has been divested of its redistributive connotations and re-articulated within a discourse of competitiveness” (Rumford 2000: 184), is now even more explicit. Neoliberalization here does not mean the absence of state intervention, as neoliberal theory might demand. A certain level of (territorial and social) cohesion is considered necessary for the common market to function (Rumford 2000: 189) and for places to be attractive for investment (Altvater & Mahnkopf 2007: 129). However, it fosters cohesion under the premise of competitiveness. The assumption is that increased competitiveness leads to increased growth, which leads to increased employment, which solves social problems. What moves out of focus in this story

⁸⁴ Amin and Tomaney (1995) link this to the insufficient amount of structural funds, the belief in market forces and rejection of direct redistributive measures among others by the Commission, the advantaging of already advanced regions and larger firms in Europe through other dimensions of EU policy, the emphasis on SMEs, and the failure to consider the role of transnational companies in Europe.

however are the *relations* between the different hubs of this “polycentric” system of increasingly competitive regions and cities, although competitiveness is a relational concept (not everyone can be equally competitive, otherwise competition loses its meaning, thus, there will be necessarily losers).⁸⁵ What moreover moves out of focus is that growth does not necessarily lead to employment, that “social cohesion” might not be achieved through employment alone, and that the state might have a “social function” beyond securing employability.

The opening of structural funds to regions above the 75% cut-off mark however could *in principle* also be interpreted as a means to address questions of “social” next to “territorial” inequality in EU-Europe. This, at least, is the interpretation that the Berlin *Senat* lobbied for on EU and national levels. In 2004, a representative of the Berlin Bureau in Brussels discussed their lobbying efforts and goals in depth in the Europe Committee of the Berlin *Abgeordnetenhaus*.⁸⁶ From his narrative emerges a more social democrat approach to “objective 2” than the one envisioned by the Commission. The background to this is the fact that it is up to the respective *member states* which regions in their territory are to receive which amounts of funds, though the total amount allocated to each member state is decided on EU level in negotiations between the member states and the Commission. As the Bureau representative emphasized:

In principle – and it won’t turn out like that – and as the Commission envisions it, the [German] federal government could say: The funds that we have through objective 2 will go to Munich or Stuttgart, these are wonderful places in which innovation can

⁸⁵ The EU thus seems to have adopted a somewhat different approach of “polycentrism” compared to the one that was announced in 1999 in its European Spatial Development Perspective (European Commission 1999) and which Governa and Salone evaluate as “a normative agenda for achieving two policy goals which are often conflicting: social and territorial cohesion on the one hand; economic competitiveness on the other hand” (2005: 266).

⁸⁶ Verbatim transcript of the meeting on August 25, 2004 (Wortprotokoll 15/40).

develop. This would be theoretically possible for the Commission. I think, hope, and am sure that in Germany this would not be possible in this form.

He defended his view that objective 2 funds should – and would – not go to already successful regions in view of the fact that the Treaty clearly stated that structural funds should help balance uneven development in the EU and that there was no mentioning of innovation being the goal of such funding. That is, he emphasized that the primary goal was *cohesion*, not competitiveness (though he did not contest the assumption that competitiveness could lead to cohesion, as long as the weaker regions were primarily funded). The goal, of course, was to secure funding for Berlin, which was no longer eligible for funds under objective 1 and would not be for objective 2 if only the most competitive regions were funded. Thus, the Berlin Bureau proposed the selection of objective 2 regions according to any of three socioeconomic criteria: GDP below EU average, a rate of unemployment significantly above EU average, or a rate of economic growth significantly below-EU-average.⁸⁷

In fact, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg (just as the other German *Länder* not eligible for objective 1 funding) did receive substantial amounts of objective 2 funding for the current cycle, which speaks of the move away from “spatial Keynesianism” discussed above (on Germany, see also Brenner 2000), though the respective amounts were lower than the one Berlin received. Of course, the fact that Berlin received objective 2 funding does not decide in itself whether the use of the funds will indeed serve the reduction of socioeconomic disparities. Incidentally, the representative of the Berlin Bureau noted that the Berlin *Senat* and the *Länder*

⁸⁷ According to all criteria, he pointed out, Berlin would be eligible for funding, as it had at the time a GDP of 98,6%, an unemployment rate of 200% (18.6%), and the second-lowest rate of growth (-1%) in all of the EU.

more generally were largely agreeing to what the Commission proposed to fund through objective 2 – namely, innovation and knowledge-based economy, environment and prevention of risk, and access to traffic and telecommunication networks. This declared overlap between EU and city government goals seems counterintuitive given that the latter was at the time composed of social democrats and socialists critical of EU neoliberalism. How then was the strategy for the use of the funds developed and what did it entail?

The Development of the Strategy for the Use of Structural Funds in Berlin

The official in the *Senat* administration that I interviewed on the development of the strategy for the funds in Berlin presented the process of developing the OPs for the 2007-2013 funding cycle as one that developed simultaneously “from above” and “from below.” The *Senat* administration had to bring together the demands of the different departments (and, as an official on the *Bezirk* level told me, of the *Bezirke*) and the requirements of the EU Commission. It did so, the same official noted, by checking whether the requests corresponded to the strategic goals set out for the use of funds – requests which did not were put aside – and by subsequently bundling them into broader themes for the overall strategy for the use of the funds and the individual OPs. As state secretary Volkmar Strauch explained during a Committee meeting in the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, the first criteria in the selection process was whether the requests could be deduced directly from the funding requirements of the EU Commission, then whether they could be deduced indirectly (*mittelbar*), and lastly, whether national co-

financing⁸⁸ was guaranteed.⁸⁹ As my interviewee of the Green party noted similarly, in the context of the internal negotiation process – which involved conflicts between different departments, as several interviewees pointed out – it was also decided with what kinds of keywords (*Schlagworten*) and program ideas the *Senat* would “go to Brussels.” The external expert I interviewed who had been involved in the development of the OPs viewed it more critically, describing it as a “cynical process” in which already existing instruments were bundled while the overall strategy was written subsequently in an attempt to give an impression of it being coherent (*schlüssig*).⁹⁰

In the negotiation of the OPs with the Regional Policy Directorate of the Commission, the most important conflict concerning the strategic orientation of the OP was about the *Senat*’s emphasis on using funds for supporting the creative and cultural industries, discussed in more depth in chapter three, which the Commission initially opposed but eventually accepted. Apart from this conflict, as one interviewee involved told me, the representatives of the Commission asked during the negotiations in a “quite technical and detailed” manner about particular instruments which they knew from previous funding cycles and which they thought would be continued. The OPs, he explained, were purposively written in an unclear manner in this regard,

⁸⁸ EU structural funds have to be co-financed to at least 50% with other available financial means by the city government (often national funding instruments). We will discuss the implications in a later section.

⁸⁹ *Inhaltsprotokoll* (content transcript) 16/2 of the meeting of the Committee on Economic Policy, Technology, and Women on January 15, 2007.

⁹⁰ The Green politician saw this as a necessary outcome of the process: “The starting point is that every department has projects which it would like to fund. Every department found something that is important. But there is no money for that. Therefore, the big task is not to think, top-down, this is the Lisbon strategy, how do I implement it, and what benefit can Berlin draw from that, but the other way around, how do I get my projects from my department rewritten in such a way that they are Lisbon-conform, and then we talk about the other 25 percent which do not have to be Lisbon-conform, and then we have the total (*Gesamttopf*).”

because the *Senat* did not want to make much visible ‘below’ the priority axes (i.e. general description of areas in which funding was to be concentrated) of the OPs in order to keep the Commission out of their business. In his view, the Commission did not inquire sufficiently into the strategic orientation and coherence of the program, including whether or not it would fulfill the goals (in particular innovation) of the Lisbon strategy.⁹¹

In line with keywords of the EU’s Lisbon strategy, the resulting Berlin strategy for the funds declares the overall goal of “strengthening Berlin in its competitiveness and attractiveness”, with the ESF focusing on “people” and the ERDF on “companies.”⁹² The strategy differentiates between three “fields of action” [*Handlungsfelder*] in which this overall goal is to be worked towards: “economy” (capacity for innovation and adaptation), “knowledge” (using “knowledge” and “creativity” as motor of economic and social development), and “environment and city development” (ecological improvements and social integration).

The ERDF funds are accordingly distributed among four “priority axes:” 293 million Euros go to “funding of improvement in the competitiveness of companies and of start-ups” and 285 million to “innovations/knowledge-based economy.” The focus of these priority axes is on supply-side programs providing funds, counseling, and other resources for companies. 183

⁹¹ The expert explained the Commission’s lack of interest in strategic issues among others with the fact that an EU regulation that aimed at greater strategic orientation wasn’t really picked up by the Directorate-General for Regional development because it entailed greater systemic change than they wanted. The official in the *Senat* administration similarly conveyed the view that the Directorate-General regretted that OPs are now of greater strategic character and that the Commission now no longer has to approve of changes in program planning.

⁹² In addition to the Operational Programs required by and negotiated with the Commission, which are independently devised for the ERDF and the ESF, the Berlin *Senat* developed (together with experts) an “overall strategy” (*Gesamtstrategie*) for both funds. Both ERDF and ESF funds are seen to work towards the same goals, through different means.

million and 80 million, respectively, go to “integrated city development,” which focuses in particular on neighborhood-based programs for social, economic, and built-environment “improvements,” and the “environment.”⁹³ ESF funds in turn are used for “improvement in adaptation capacities and competitiveness of employees and companies” (38 million), “improvement of human capital” (149 million), and “improved access to employment/ social integration of disadvantaged population groups” (135 million). Supported programs focus on job training and counseling as well support for entrepreneurialism. While the concern of Berlin policy-makers is clearly also with the social consequences of high degrees of unemployment due largely to structural changes in Berlin subsequent to German “reunification,” this interpretation of the “social” is – in line with EU requirements – nevertheless largely a supply-side approach that seeks to “improve human capital” and to include people into the labor market largely on this basis.

Berlin’s strategy for the funds moreover defines as a third “cross-cutting” goal the “integration of persons with a migration background” – in addition to the ones made obligatory by the Commission (sustainability and equality of opportunity between men and women) – which is a novelty that was readily accepted by the Commission, as interviewees told me. This needs to be seen against the backdrop of an exorbitant unemployment rate of 44% among “non-German” citizens, compared to already high 19 percent among German citizens, according to the ERDF

⁹³ These were to be one priority axis under the heading “city development” according to *Senat* plans. As interviewees told me, the Commission insisted in the negotiations of the OPs on two priority axes, which made shifting of funds between these areas more difficult.

OP (Senat Berlin 2007a: 30).⁹⁴ The wording of the cross-cutting goal however implies both integration into funded programs and social/economic integration through such programs. Its broader basis is, as the following chapter discusses in more depth, a new approach to “integration” taken by the Berlin *Senat* in recent years which emphasizes that cultural diversity can also constitute an asset for the competitiveness of the city. Noticeably, immigrant diversity figures into the OPs as both a resource to be tapped more fully (for example by encouraging immigrant entrepreneurialism) and as a problem to be addressed (for example in form of high concentration of unemployed immigrants in particular neighborhoods).

This suggests that Berlin’s distribution of structural funds, despite apparent concerns with social cohesion, largely adheres to the supply-side orientation of the “Lisbonized” guidelines for the use of the funds. It indeed aims to provide an “attractive” environment for companies not only by providing financial and other resources, but also an appropriately skilled labor force and attractive city environment. Beyond reducing unemployment through labor market inclusion policies, the overriding goal is to enhance the city’s position in inter-local competition and to enhance the competitiveness of the local economy.

The *Senat*’s aim to concentrate funding in three “growth clusters” – in the health industries, the communication, media and cultural industries, and transport, which are considered sectors

⁹⁴ At the time there were no administrative capacities to distinguish between German citizens “with” or “without” a migration background (the only statistical criteria was citizenship). The indicators through which social categories could be registered in a more differentiated way by the city administration were being developed at the time in participation of “social partners” forming part of the monitoring committee.

of high growth and competitive potential⁹⁵ – further pursues this overall goal. In particular the importance of the creative and cultural industries cluster is emphasized.⁹⁶ The strategy paper for the use of the funds highlights that the growth cluster related to culture and the creative industries,⁹⁷ though not primarily technology-based, has great potential for fostering growth and employment, forming the base for cultural tourism in the city, and more generally contributing to the competitiveness of the local economy as “creativity is a necessary basis for all innovation” (Senat Berlin 2006: 17; 2007a: 15-17), although creative workers might have to learn to translate their “creativity” into “economic activity” and success on the market (Senat Berlin 2007a: 18). As a result of this “general importance” of the creative and cultural industries for Berlin, support for the cultural sector was not made a separate priority (e.g. as “action field”) but mainstreamed. According to state secretary Almuth Nehring-Venus, about 50 percent of all economic funding in Berlin (i.e. including, but not only EU structural funds) go

⁹⁵ It further supports the technologies central to these clusters, in line with the “competence field strategy” [*Kompetenzfeldstrategie*] that was initiated by the previous coalition government (SPD/CDU) and continued by the *Senat* at the time.

⁹⁶ Actors in Berlin sometimes use the term *Kulturwirtschaft*, sometimes *Kreativwirtschaft* (cultural or creative industries, respectively) to refer to a wide range of “symbolic” production: the arts, media, design, computer games, and the like. Sometimes, the term *Kreativwirtschaft* is also used for any “creative”/ “innovative” start-up idea. The usage is often vague and thus in line with Garnham’s observation that “creative and cultural industries” rhetoric generally “assumes that we already know, and thus can take for granted, what the creative industries are” (2005: 16). A *Senat* report on cultural industries in Berlin (which carries the ERDF logo) – which declaredly “wants to overcome the prejudice that culture is only a, possibly dismissible, ‘soft locational advantage’” (Senat Berlin 2008: 3) – however defines the cultural industries in line with a definition on the federal level as encompassing among others the books and art markets, film, music, design, and architecture and creative industries as entailing *in addition* among others advertisement and software/games industries (ibid :5). The report implies that the cluster communication, media, and cultural industries also encompasses the creative industries (ibid: 16; see also Senat Berlin 2007).

⁹⁷ The culture economy is seen to encompass the public and private sector as well as civil society initiatives (Senat Berlin 2008).

into the creative sector, encompassing media, information technology, and the creative and cultural industries.⁹⁸

Senat support for culture aligns here with, as my interviewee from the socialist *Linke* explained (affirmatively), the what he called “new” approach to creative industries – targeted towards innovation and the market – rather than, he stated, older “clientelistic politics” (*Klientelpolitik*) supporting artists not producing primarily for the market.⁹⁹ While the ERDF OP declares that the targets of Berlin cultural and creative industries policy are not only the large number of SMEs and their employees in this sector, but also the “20.000 freelance creatives” (*Senat Berlin 2007: 15-16*), this concerns in particular their market access and competitiveness. Thus, special programs in the realm of “creative and cultural industries” involve training and counseling in the “creative” professions (ESF) and “cultural industries” (ERDF), an emphasis on “culture” in job training for youth (ESF), as well as an investment program in cultural institutions (ERDF) and a Venture Capital Fund “Creative” (ERDF),¹⁰⁰ which funds *growth-oriented*¹⁰¹ companies in the areas of film, broadcasting, publishing, music, entertainment, advertisement, fashion, design, architecture, multimedia, games, software, art, and culture, or a program to support

⁹⁸ Verbatim Protocol (Wortprotokoll 16/25) of the meeting of the Committee of Economic Policy, Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, April 25, 2009.

⁹⁹ He made this statement in the context of a conflict between the governing coalition and the oppositional Green party on the earlier funding available for artist workspaces in prime inner city locations and (as he noted, otherwise not sellable) artworks. The *Senat* discontinued this funding (offering artists instead workspace in less attractive neighborhoods), which garnered critique from the Greens. As the socialist politician noted, in his party as well, some supported the continuation of this support for non-commercial culture. He himself thought that such funding was not justifiable in the view of limited resources and other social groups needing support more urgently.

¹⁰⁰ The Green party criticized this instrument for being too limited, i.e. not addressing the “breadth” and “mass” of people working in creative professions in Berlin (Verbatim transcript of the meeting of the Committee of Economic Policy (Wortprotokoll 16/25), Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, April 25, 2009).

¹⁰¹ According to state secretary Almuth Nehring-Venus (Verbatim transcript of the meeting of the Committee of Economic Policy (Wortprotokoll 16/25), Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, April 25, 2009).

innovation potential in culture (ERDF) that focuses on issues of marketing and new technologies. Thus, support for culture via the structural funds clearly is oriented towards the market through emphasis on entrepreneurialism and market skills for “creative workers” and financial supply to start-ups and companies.

To sum up, despite critiques from various sides of the lack of orientation of the *Senat’s* use of the funds along EU strategic guidelines, the basic outset of the OPs and the programs funded go in line with the EU’s emphasis on supply-side policy within a field of competition and on achieving social cohesion *through* that. It also affirms the importance of creativity and innovation for such competitiveness. Its emphasis on the role of the creative and cultural industries in this regard was initially resisted by the Regional Policy Directorate of the European Commission in the negotiation of the OPs, but resonates with recent EU level policy developments that embrace the creative and cultural industries’ importance for achieving the renewed Lisbon Strategy (Council of the European Union 2007a). How do we explain this overlap, if the development of the OPs was largely “from below”?

Implementing the Lisbon Strategy?

Interviewees from different political parties and the administration all emphasized that the city government was not concerned with implementing the Lisbon strategy locally, but rather with presenting already existing projects in a Lisbon-conform (and thus fundable) manner, and that the general and vague quality of the Lisbon guidelines allowed for that by and large. That is, they presented a picture of “regulatory unity in diversity”: while the EU issued general,

“unitary” guidelines for the use of the funds, the actual use of the funds followed in fact broadly compatible local priorities. According to oppositional parties – especially the Greens – the city government’s priorities diverged from the EU’s, conforming to the latter only on paper, by adopting “EU lyrics.”¹⁰² In contrast, my interviewee from the governing SPD emphasized the general compatibility of EU and city government policy – in the realm of structural funds use – in particular after the Commission accepted the *Senat*’s support for the creative and cultural industries as contributing to innovation. Although otherwise vocal in his critique of EU neoliberalism and its impact on Berlin via competition law, he saw no further conflict between EU and *Senat* goals in the area of structural funds after this part of the OP was accepted.

In fact, the “unity” of the regulatory system of regional development in EU-Europe is not simply constituted by EU guidelines but by the facts of increased competition created by the Single Market and neoliberal policies and a shared policy common sense that accepts regional competition as necessary framework for governmental practice and values innovation and the mobilization of “culture” as means to compete. We will discuss this in more depth below. However, beyond these “shared conditions” for policy-making, the EU has two mechanisms in place that ensure that the Berlin *Senat* cannot simply employ EU structural funds as *additional* resources in line with their own goals – that is, that limit the “diversity” in regional development strategies and the implementation of funds.

¹⁰² Verbatim transcript of the plenary session on Feb. 1, 2007, *Abgeordnetenhaus* Berlin, Drucksache 16/0213.

The first mechanism is the requirement that 75% of projects funded be Lisbon-compatible. Lisbon-compatibility was thus considered in both planning and implementation stages for the use of structural funds in Berlin. That is, requests for funding from administrative departments that were not (or could not be made) Lisbon-conform did not find entry into the OPs, while requests for funding on the basis of proposals during implementation were also decided partially in relation to these EU requirements. Conflicts arose here in particular as regards the question of infrastructure, because Lisbon-compatibility hinges on the condition of “innovativeness.” As an official in the *Senat* administration told me, requests such as for infrastructural improvements of public pools or school sport halls, the planting of street trees, or the construction of public libraries through ERDF means thus had to be rejected – unless they could be presented as contributing to Lisbon goals (which was the case for funds flowing into libraries and into computers in schools in “socially weak” areas). This limitation becomes problematic on the one hand given budget constraints in Berlin. As the same official stated:

Of course it is not forbidden to do these other projects. But if there is no money, then these projects aren't being done. And Berlin is in the end a quite poor state (*Bundesland*), and as a result, the restoration of schools or day-care centers for example has been very much neglected over the past years.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ In the winter of 2008, teachers of the *Bezirk* Mitte protested both their low salaries and the conditions of their schools. Articles in newspapers abounded of schools where it rained through the roof and other infrastructural problems, while, on another note, one of the pet projects of the city development senator was the construction of an expensive highway through Berlin that garnered critique. Nevertheless, the money that came to Berlin through the federal government in reaction to the financial crisis in form of the 2008 *Konjunkturpaket* (stimulus package) was then indeed largely allocated to infrastructural investments in public institutions, that is, schools, public baths, and the like. This allocation of the unexpected money shower seems to hint at the fact that the political will to invest here is existing to a certain degree, but that the money was lacking at least within the framework of the existing financial politics in Berlin. (However, in interpreting the official's above statement, one should also consider that at the time of the interview, the protest of the teachers was still quite current and that the general outline of the *Konjunkturpaket* was already known; the interviewee might have portrayed the conflict between innovation and infrastructure in this light.)

On the other hand, the implications of this situation is potentially expounded by the second mechanism mentioned, which is the fact that EU funds are not simply given on top of the existing budget but rather require co-financing of 50%. That is, EU structural funds, while adding necessary financial resources to the city, also bind city funds of an at least equal amount to EU-compatible goals.¹⁰⁴ Theoretically, the local government has the choice to not use all of the EU funds in order not to provide co-financing and thus keep resources for non-EU-fundable programs. Practically, as interviewed politicians emphasized, this was politically unwise, given the symbolic implications, Berlin's financial situation, and the need to participate in inter-regional *Standort* competition through economic funding.

While interviewees currently did not see a problem with this co-financing requirement – viewing the EU funds indeed as *additional* resources – this had not always been the case. While in the opposition, the socialist *Linke* had taken a stance *against* general co-financing of both EU and federal funds – which means, by implication, *for* rejecting funds – in order to be able to use already existing financial means in a more self-determined manner. As my interviewees from the *Linke* told me, the Green party and parts of the social democrats sympathized with this stance at the time. However, the parliamentarian of the *Linke* explained, when the *Linke* formed part of the governing coalition in the subsequent legislative period, they changed their mind – in the context of strict budget consolidation due to Berlin's debt crisis – and decided that they would take whatever they could get in terms of funding and co-finance:

¹⁰⁴ Such co-financing can consist of resources of the *Land* Berlin, funds given for particular programs or areas of investment by the *Bund* (such as GA or *Soziale Stadt*), or private means. While other *Bundesländer*, according to an interviewee, have particular “pots” in their budget reserved for co-financing, Berlin does not. Similarly, within Berlin, some (richer) *Bezirke* have “pots” reserved for co-financing, while others (like *Mitte*) do not.

And then the tendency was to say, we already have to cut down on everything in a brutal manner [*dass es knirscht und knackt*], so let's take the external funds that we can get This was in the context of household consolidation. In this case, one is willing to pay the price that one can only use the means in line with the restrictions of the EU or the federal government.

Thus, the degree of influence the EU can have on regional policy of a particular region through structural funds guidelines appears to depend not only on the degree of "good fit" (Börzel & Risse 2003) between EU and local policy goals, but also on the local financial resources available.

Nevertheless, I posit, if we want to understand why a social democrat-socialist city government does not see a contradiction between the neoliberal orientation of EU strategic guidelines aligned with the renewed Lisbon strategy and its own policy, we have to look beyond the above discussed dynamics and mechanisms of "multi-level governance" to another outcome of EU-European state-making: the reality and policy common sense of competitiveness in a common market.

Demands of Competition: Creating Places Conducive to Capitalism

The overall emphasis on supply-side policies, innovation, and competitiveness in Berlin's strategy for the use of the funds, in line with the latter's "Lisbonization," might seem in contradiction with the principles of the "red-red" government of Berlin which repeatedly took a stance against EU neoliberalism both on a general level¹⁰⁵ and when it came to local conflicts

¹⁰⁵ The case of the socialist *Linke* is particularly pertinent not only in light of the fact that it rejects the Lisbon strategy because of its neoliberal orientation, but also because of the *Senat's* abstention from voting on the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in the *Bundestag* as a consequence of pressure from the *Linke*. The reason for this rejection particularly highlighted in the press was the *Linke's* critique of a militaristic orientation of the EU, as well

with EU competition law.¹⁰⁶ However, the orientation of policy along the primacy of innovation, competitiveness, and growth is a more general feature of contemporary governance and not unique to neoliberals, who value it positively (see Brenner 2004a; Harvey 2001b; Jessop 2002). As interviewees from different political party backgrounds put it in so many words, no one has a problem with innovation; at the same time, all emphasized the need to engage in competition to attract investment. Thus, the primacy given to competitiveness in regional development in Berlin seems not imposed “from above” by the Commission through its strategic guidelines.

For local policymakers, competitiveness is an actual concern in two (interrelated) regards. On the one hand, they see the necessity of fostering a competitive economy. Such an economy has come to be equated less with long-standing, and since “reunification” ailing,¹⁰⁷ branches of manufacture than in particular with the service sector, “content” production, and “innovative” start-ups. Attempts to turn Berlin into a “service center” have dominated the 1990s (Strom & Mayer 1998). The *Senat* at the time of research, and in particular its socialist Senator for Economic Policy Harald Wolf, emphasized the continuing importance of industry – as a “backbone” for services, as a politician of the *Linke* told me.

as of its neoliberal qualities. Several interviewees however noted that in their view the position of the local *Linke* was related more to the party stance on the federal level.

¹⁰⁶ This concerned the EU’s demand of privatizing the public transport system (here, the *Senat* “won”) and the Berlin *Landesbank* (where it “lost”) as well as, more recently, the *Senat*’s introduction of a minimum wage in public procurement that was rejected by the European court– see later discussion.

¹⁰⁷ In the “east”, the end of the socialist regime left existing industries exposed to market forces and interests. In the “west”, the fall of the wall meant the end of subsidies. As a consequence, “the city lost over 11% of its manufacturing employment between 1991 and 1995, as firms in both the east and west faced market competition for the first time, and higher land prices made the city a less affordable business location” (Strom & Mayer 1998). High unemployment among former industrial workers is one central cause of the higher than average levels of unemployment of immigrants who came to Germany as so-called “guest-workers”.

On the other hand, policy-makers are concerned about locational (*Standort*) competition, where Berlin is perceived as constrained in attracting companies because of its tight budget – it cannot provide large financial incentives.¹⁰⁸ As one interviewee put it, in this context, the only “trump” of the city is its livability and attractiveness. “Attractiveness” however plays a role not only for attracting investment in production or the high-skilled. In the context of Berlin’s designation as German capital, the city was also considered an attractive location by developers. In an attempt to turn Berlin into a “world city,” local elites have “rushed to accommodate office builders not only to balance the budget, but because these developers promise to deliver the kind of city Berlin’s elites long for: corporate, international, and clean” (Strom & Mayer 1998). Speculative real estate investment has not only frequently meant devaluation, but also rising rents for commercial and non-commercial tenants (*ibid*). In the contemporary context, “creative city” strategies in Berlin, which try to make “multicultural” neighborhoods attractive for the “creative industries” further contribute to gentrification processes and have been a central point of contestation in city politics, as chapter four shows in more detail.

The concern with competitiveness of course reflects real changes in inter-local spatial relations (Peck & Tickell 2002)¹⁰⁹ which have been promoted significantly by the European Single Market

¹⁰⁸ This is in good part a “self-made” problem. Krätke states that “the major part of the city’s total debt burden, which amounts to roughly 50 billion euros today, represents the social cost of the real estate and banking activities of Berlin’s politicians” (2004: 526) in particular from the time of the SPD/CDU coalition government.

¹⁰⁹ As David Harvey argued initially, the shift from ‘managerial’ to ‘entrepreneurial’ approaches to urban governance resulted from an economic context where, due to the “reduction of spatial barriers” and resulting increased competition between localities, “[u]rban governance has ... become much more oriented to the provision of a ‘good business climate’ and to the construction of all sorts of lures to bring capital into town” (2001

and related neoliberal EU level policies, as the previous chapter showed. Berlin's emphasis on culture as a contribution to competitiveness in both dimensions (via innovation on the one hand and enhancing the city's attractiveness on the other hand) also needs to be seen in this context.

Within new realities of increased "competitive pressures," non-neoliberal governments see themselves forced to adhere to the "rules of the game." They see themselves forced to subordinate their place-making efforts to the demand of capital – supplying "capital-conducive" places has come to be the political prerogative of the day. In this way, new realities of competition have engendered a new policy common sense of competitiveness. There seems to be indeed no alternative to playing the game of competitiveness so that the search for alternatives is in fact given up. What comes to matter is whether or in which ways the pursuit of "competitiveness" is to be reconciled with "social cohesion." In this light, the approach of Berlin's *Senat* seems more in line with what Brenner has identified as "social democratic or offensive approaches to urban locational policy" which assume "that territorial competitiveness hinges upon the provision of non-substitutable socioeconomic assets such as innovative capacities, collaborative inter-form networks, advanced infrastructural facilities and skilled labor power" (Brenner 2004: 208-9) – in contrast to neoliberal approaches which "are based on the assumption that *lowering the costs of investment* within a given territory will attract mobile capital investment and thus enhance its competitiveness" (ibid, emphasis added). The attempt of the Berlin *Senat* to introduce a minimum wage – resisted on the federal level until recently

[1989]: 359). It was based on "a radical reconstruction of central to local state relations and the cutting-free of local state activities from the welfare state and the Keynesian compromise (...)" (ibid: 367).

and torpedoed in the case of public procurement by a decision of the European Court – might serve as an indicator that it does not primarily follow the neoliberal strategy of lowering costs of investment in the region. However, what prospects does this “social democratic” approach have for enhancing “social cohesion” in and for a “capital-conductive” place?

Reconciling Competitiveness with Cohesion?

The contemporary prioritizing of growth through competitiveness goes in line with claims that this will also have positive social effects through enhanced employment. That, of course, is not a necessary consequence. In Berlin, it is unlikely that growth in the “competitive” clusters for example will lead to a decrease in social polarization via employment. For one, structural funds for regional development have no mechanism in place to guarantee the creation of jobs. Unlike in the case of German federal funds (*Gemeinschaftsaufgabe/ GA funds*), ERDF funds cannot be tied to guaranteeing employment by imposing conditions on companies receiving funds, as I was told by a politician from the *Linke* and his consultant. Moreover, unemployment in Berlin concerns to a large extent workers formerly employed in manufacturing branches that declined after “reunification.” Growth in the new “clusters” is unlikely to provide employment for them (and in turn, the reduction in social security on the federal level pushed by successive national governments cannot, and is not meant to be compensated through ESF funds). As Krätke argues, while the *Senat’s* strategy to pursue competitiveness (in the double sense) through support for the creative and cultural industries might work, this is unlikely to provide jobs for those who currently need them most:

Today, Berlin has once again become a prime centre of knowledge-intensive economic activities and the culture and media industry. From this perspective the city proves to

be an attractive location for global players who wish to make use of the worldwide selectively concentrated pools of talent in particular subsectors of the creative economy. However, the successful development in specific subsectors of Berlin's regional economy does not compensate for the tremendous loss of jobs in traditional sectors of the regional economy and the related problematic developments in the city's social fabric. (2004: 519)

Thus, competitiveness here clearly does not contribute to “cohesion” via employment.

The measures of “sustainable city development” funded in Berlin through the ESF as well as the ERDF funds are also unlikely to remedy this. ESF means are used by and large for measures that aim to insert people into the “economic game” by improving their “employability” in line with the EU interpretation of the “social” in the name of the fund. Like social policy in the Lisbon Agenda, it is “clearly subordinated to market-led integration; the contributions of social policy would be to promote skills and increase employment” (Grahl 2008: 51). In Berlin, as noted earlier, measures are split between “improving human capital” and securing “improved access to employment and social integration of disadvantaged groups.” The first group of measures tends to be in line with assumptions about the (untapped) entrepreneurial capabilities of particular social groups (such as women, artists, (some) migrant youth) and improving capacities for the knowledge economy. The second group of measures aims at (re-)integrating the long-term unemployed, migrant youth, disabled people, and other “problem groups” into the labor market. The question of course arises: integrating into where? Certainly not into the higher ends of the labor market of the “creative economy” that is foregrounded in the regional development and structural fund strategy.

As Ingo Bader moreover points out, the work conditions in the “creative economy” are quite “diverse”: most of the jobs, such as in the security staff of entertainment venues or as service forces in clubs, pay low wages (2009: 19). Similarly, Krätke and Borst note that Berlin appears closer to a “capital of cleaning brigades” than to a “global city” in terms of employment structure (2000: 73). However, the conditions of those who could be construed as the “creative workers” proper are often not much better: one fifth of those *self-employed* in the “creative professions” – 40% of all “creative workers” as a result among others of privatization and closure of cultural institutions and the related greater market-orientation of the cultural sector (Manske 2009: 17) – live below the poverty line and outside the system of state security (ibid: 18). According to a speaker invited to the Economic Policy Committee in the *Abgeordnetenhaus* in 2009, the average yearly income in the creative industries in Berlin is below 10.000 Euros.¹¹⁰

What about the “social component” of the ERDF in Berlin then? This encompasses in particular funding for “integrated city development” that flows largely into neighborhood-based projects and programs, such as *Quartiersmanagement* (neighborhood management) which is co-funded through the federal program *Soziale Stadt* (Social City). The declared goal of this program was to stop processes of *Abwertung* (depreciation/ deterioration) and small-scale segregation in selected neighborhoods through infrastructural measures and, since 2006, “model projects” geared in particular towards (labor market) integration, especially also of immigrants, and

¹¹⁰ Verbatim transcript (Wortprotokoll 16/25), Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, April 25, 2009. The speaker continues (note the relation established between themes of precarious employment, independence from “state transfers,” and the “value” of culture): “One can judge this negatively, as banks often do, and say, this is precarious self-employment that one needn’t support. But one can also judge this positively and say: these are people who are independent from state social transfers. But for our city it is much more important that these are people with high innovative potential who contribute to enlivening the economy and especially the creative industries in Berlin.”

entrepreneurialism as well as image improvement.¹¹¹ Neighborhoods were selected based on indicators concerning the percentage of recipients of unemployment benefits or social security (differentiating between foreign and citizen residents), youth with migration background, and migration into or out of the area. They were selected, in brief, on the basis of factors (of class and “culture”) assumed to indicate problems of “social cohesion” as well as processes of *Aufwertung* (upvaluation/ improvement).

The program *Soziale Stadt* reflects currently dominant policy approaches to addressing social inequalities in the city that were developed in interrelation between EU, national, and regional governmental institutions (Güntner 2007). One of its goals is to build self-help structures in neighborhoods: to involve residents in both selection and implementation of projects oriented towards improving “cohesion.”¹¹² The latter is seen as threatened by the coincidence of “socioeconomic” with “cultural” exclusion and to be remedied by turning cultural diversity from a *problem* into an *asset* for cohesion and competitiveness in the city. Later chapters discuss this as a key way in which policy-makers now seek to reconcile cohesion and competitiveness on EU and city levels, in fact by subordinating the former to the latter.

¹¹¹ Official website of the program: <http://www.sozialestadt.de/programm/>

¹¹² The EU, *Bund*, *Land*, and *Bezirke* now distribute funding to initiatives and social organizations in neighborhoods for their place-making efforts: such *local* practices are to secure a minimum of “cohesion” in a context of both cultural diversity and social inequality. Thus, place-making practices of residents and civil society organizations coincide with the place-making efforts of various state institutions. This is an uneasy relation: members of the resident association *Soldiner Kiez e.V.* which developed out of a “participatory” dimension of *Soziale Stadt* for example contested the external indicator-based view of their neighborhood as “problematic.” An image campaign run by a resident of the neighborhood and funded through *Soziale Stadt* declared that residents themselves perceived their neighborhood positively as “diverse.” (<http://www.soldinerkiez.de/imagekampagne/index.html>). Nevertheless, the declared goals of the association – to improve (or rather, “rectify”) the external image of the neighborhood, to foster positive developments internally, and to connect different cultures – are reminiscent of recent attempts pushed on EU and city levels to create intercultural places attractive to capital (see later chapters).

Neil Brenner evaluates neighborhood-based programs that seek to redress exclusion as addressing “at least some of the disruptive effects of unfettered uneven spatial development – albeit still within the parameters of an explicitly growth-driven, competitiveness-oriented model of state spatial regulation” (2004:17). They are thus unable to provide a real remedy, as they fail to address the basic mechanisms that produce social inequality and exclusion through their focus on social integration and an improved living environment and tend to support a fragmented project landscape that does not cohere into a city-wide strategy (see e.g. Güntner 2007: 297). In Berlin, programs such as the *Quartiersmanagement* have further been critiqued for extending neoliberal (“self”-) governance and by flanking a shift to “workfare” as well as for being oriented along the concerns of the middle classes in “improving” neighborhoods (Groeger 2001; Lanz 2001).¹¹³ In fact, in this way, neighborhood-based programs of “improvement” can even add to those mechanisms that produce social inequalities in the city by supporting gentrification processes and related displacement of those residents not able to pay higher rents and costs of living in the neighborhood. Thus, the use of structural funds in Berlin through such channels is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the alleviation of social and class inequalities and might even contribute to them.

In this way, such city-based attempts at reconciling cohesion with competitiveness feed back into the EU-European frame of “regulatory unity in diversity.” As Neil Brenner points out, they contribute to “refocusing mainstream political debate on the question of how to manage the

¹¹³ Such critiques were also raised at a public discussion I attended in one of the “Social City” neighborhoods in which members of the resident association *Soldiner Kiez e.V.*, of the local *Quartiersrat* (neighborhood council, an institution created with the Social City Program), and the *Bezirk* official responsible for EU-issues participated. In this context, Social City projects were criticized as a “substitute program” for more far-reaching involvement of the state in the context of the “draining” of resources from the communal level by federal governments.

polarizing socioeconomic consequences of the new interspatial competition” (2004: 299) and thus further entrench the policy common sense that accepts the latter as given. As a consequence, “uneven development is further institutionalized in a realm of post-Keynesian statecraft that has been, for the moment at least, insulated from direct political contestation” (ibid).

For policy-makers in Berlin concerned with “cohesion,” this constitutes a lived contradiction. “Competitiveness” is accepted as a prerogative that policy-makers have to cater to even though, as my interviewee from the SPD acknowledged when pressed by me on this point, it stood in “irresolvable” contradiction to achieving social cohesion. The social democrat position on this matter, he continued, was to acknowledge the necessity to maintain both these two goals, in their contradiction.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that “how rules are made” in “multi-level governance” depends not only on continued asymmetries between the EU and regional levels – which do play a role, though they are far from constituting a relation of “top-down-imposition” – in relations of “negotiation,” but on the creation of an actual *reality* of competition that constitutes conditions and constraints within which policy is made. Local peculiarities such as Berlin’s severe fiscal problems moreover interact with such general constraints and asymmetries. I am emphatically *not* arguing that the EU is “imposing” rules on the Berlin level or that Berlin policy-makers do not pursue local priorities. Nevertheless, the outcome in form of the use of structural funds in

the city is one that is largely *compatible* with the EU's prioritization of competitiveness. Thus, not only is the EU's turn away from "spatial Keynesian" in the making of EU-European place likely to intensify uneven development – thus challenging "territorial cohesion" – but the way the funds are used in cities like Berlin is unlikely to address increased class polarization within places ordered for the use of capital – thus reinforcing problems of "social cohesion." Beck and Grande's – and other cosmopolitan theorists' – failure to interrogate this economic "unity" of EU-Europe and its effects, just as their failure to take a critical look at the implications of greater "diversity" in the Single Market, thus renders their pursuit of a "cosmopolitan Europe" via "regulatory unity in diversity" problematic.

Within the resulting dynamics of increased competitiveness and challenges to cohesion, "culture" – in the form of the arts and creative and cultural industries as well as immigrant diversity and intercultural competence – has acquired a new "utility" (see Barnett 2001). This was already hinted at in this chapter, which has shown how policy-makers in Berlin saw culture in the form of the creative and cultural industries as a means to achieve both advantages in inter-local competition and increased competitiveness of the local economy, while culture in the form of immigrant diversity presented a challenge to cohesion (in the "neighborhood") that was to be turned into an asset in competition. These new-found utilities of culture are the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

Culture's Utilities: The Economic and Political Value of Diversity

While previous chapters have shown how EU attempts to address challenges to cohesion and legitimacy for EU-European state-making that have resulted from increased “diversity” (i.e. inequality) in EU-Europe through the promotion of “thick” European identity have failed and how culture moreover has emerged in the context of neoliberal union as a means to promote economic competitiveness, this chapter now examines in detail the consequent development of an intercultural approach to “meta-governing” cohesion in EU-city relations and the related “thinning” of the foundation given to EU-Europeanness in EU level policy. In brief, this chapter examines why and how a “thin” form of culturalism in EU-Europe has been developed as a new policy common sense shared in particular by EU institutions and left-leaning governments of big European cities such as Berlin that seeks to activate culture as a “resource” and which, in its “thinness,” is not only selectively open to the “non-European” but also harnessed to capital-conducive modes of place-making. While the chapter focuses on the development of intercultural policy in EU-city relations – whose unequal implications for belonging and entitlement in Berlin are discussed in chapter four – it also outlines how interculturalism goes hand in hand with a liberal cosmopolitan re-interpretation of the “EU-European” narrative, the institutional embedding and political effects of which are examined more broadly in chapter five through the lens of Turkey’s EU accession.

In April 2009, I met with a parliamentarian from the Green party in the Berlin *Abgeordnetenhaus* who was specialized among others on questions of European and economic policy in order to discuss the use of EU structural funds in Berlin. The Green party had submitted a motion to the *Abgeordnetenhaus* in February 2007 where it had demanded from the *Senat* to orient the use of structural funds in Berlin to a greater extent along the strategic guidelines of the European Commission (increasing the attractiveness of the city, enhancing innovation capacities, creating more and better jobs – see chapter 2). Next to a greater emphasis on environmental concerns, the motion had concretely asked for the strengthening of Berlin’s internationality, significantly increasing investment in the cultural sector, enhancing cooperation between science and economy, and focusing professional training for unemployed youth on migrants.¹¹⁴

I began the interview with Corinna Schornberg¹¹⁵ (name altered) by inquiring about this motion,¹¹⁶ pointing out that the governing coalition could claim to already do all those things the motion demanded, especially in the areas of support for culture, internationality, and immigrant youth. “Not as much as one *could* do,” she answered, given that the cultural sector,

¹¹⁴ Fraktion Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen: *Antrag: Schwerpunkte der EFRE- und ESF-Förderung in der neuen Förderperiode*. Drucksache 16/0213. Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, February 24, 2007.

¹¹⁵ Name altered, as all interviews were conducted in view of anonymous publication. I am using this pseudonym for better readability in the following.

¹¹⁶ Schornberg explained that the motion was the only means available to them to ensure a discussion in the *Abgeordnetenhaus* on both the strategy submitted to Brussels and the use of structural funds for concrete projects in Berlin and to criticize the executive on these issues, given the fact that structural funds are a purview of the latter (chapter 2). They of course knew that it would not pass.

she added, was unquestionably one of the few opportunities for Berlin, both as an important growth sector and as a basis for tourism. “What do we have in Berlin?” She asked rhetorically: “We are a relatively industry-free city, we are not a financial center, but culture is an area that is becoming increasingly important. Here it is worth investing.”

“And what is the background to the demand for greater internationality?” I asked. “Two points,” Schornberg noted. For one, there was the question of opportunities for economic growth in Berlin. If one saw structural funds not only as a means to “plug holes” but as about the development of opportunities in Berlin, then it was immediately obvious, she continued, that Berlin had to position itself *internationally* concerning the competences of politics and administration but also in terms of advertisement for Berlin. Berlin, she explained, had a potential advantage in locational (*Standort*) competition because of high-skilled workers with multicultural background on the one hand and its attractiveness in terms of the presence of “media in the broad sense” on the other hand. She emphasized that “one has to advertise this, one has to market and support these competences of the city.” It was a problem, she added, laughing, if an international company interested in investing in the city – “it doesn’t have to be SONY, it can also be a smaller company” – met with an administration which did not quite yet see this [i.e. internationality] as an opportunity. In other words, internationality in this sense concerned the city’s “attractiveness” within inter-local competition on the basis of providing conditions attractive to (transnational) capital, conditions to which “culture” now was considered crucial.

The second point, Schornberg continued, was that “internationality” was “always also the other side of the coin when one talks of successful integration” (i.e. of immigrants and their descendents). When I asked what she meant with that, she explained: “Basically, it is a precondition for internationality, for successful internationality, that there is also successful integration.” This required a different approach to a multicultural reality, she emphasized:

Internationality does not develop by, let’s say, determining on the basis of a census that this or that many nationalities live here. The question is how they are interrelated, how they live together, and whether they are in fact in their daily practice international or rather again only national, each one in his small.... This is not internationality, this is only statistical internationality; you can indeed decorate yourself with that, but it is not a true asset for this city.

That is, while the existence of a multicultural population could already be a dimension of city marketing (in her words, of “decorating”, presenting the city), *successful* internationality that would be a *true asset* in her view required interaction, “living together.” When I asked how the Green party would foster this kind of internationality or “successful integration,” she stated that it would only require a different emphasis in the goals of already existing projects directed at immigrant communities. The current emphasis in such projects, she declared, was the notion “dear migrants, please adjust to German expectations.” The question was, she continued, whether one could develop an “international” perspective instead. Could one “for example use the potential of persons with a migration background for all of society, for example language competence, for example cultural competence, contacts, all these things.” Internationality as a *true asset*, it appears, was again thought in the economic sense primarily. Immigrant integration of the “right kind” – internationality in the second sense – was to ensure that a multicultural population indeed contributed to the city’s economic competitiveness via internationality in the first sense (attractiveness to transnational capital).

I cite this interview at length because it is paradigmatic for a particular approach to culture's utilities that has come to inform both city politics in Berlin and EU-level approaches to cultural diversity. In brief, culture – in the form of the arts and creative and cultural industries as well as immigrant diversity – has been discovered as a resource for economic growth and competitiveness and *in view of* that for social cohesion. Culture as the “cultural and creative industries” (what Schornberg calls above “media in the broad sense”) is considered an important growth sector in its own right, but also as crucial for constituting the attractiveness of the city for investment and tourists. A multicultural population is also considered a benefit in this regard, because immigrants are seen to have skills, competences, and connections that are important in an “international” economy. Not all forms of cultural diversity will do, however. To encourage “internationality” – that is, to attract foreign investors, tourists and, as we will see, high-skilled workers – local cultural diversity has to be “international,” that is, oriented towards intercultural exchange and mixing, not “closed off” in respective national-cultural communities. Cultured *individuals* (as we will see) have to be “interrelated” and “living together” in “daily practice,” as Schornberg had explained – a picture of social cohesion achieved not through homogeneity, but social interaction between diverse individuals. Because this also has benefits for a city's international attractiveness, it is assumed, policy-makers have to encourage such intercultural practices and value resulting diversity rather than insisting on assimilation.

This chapter presents this approach to culture's utilities as emerging “EU-European policy common sense” and examines some of its origins in particular state-making projects and policy networks on and between EU and city levels. I suggest that the turn to *culture's* utility for

competitiveness and cohesion needs to be understood on the backdrop of a reality of competition in the “knowledge economy” that has structured the search for economic solutions in particular in cities like Berlin that are seen to “lack” a strong industrial base. It moreover originates in the independent quest, on both EU and city levels, for state legitimacy and approaches to the governance of cultural diversity beyond established national paradigms that could address problems of “social cohesion.” On the EU level, I suggest, these merge in a state project that seeks to “meta-govern” cohesion without abandoning the prerogative of competitiveness. It here moreover contributes to a reinterpretation of the narrative of EU-Europeaness for both internal legitimacy and external identity.

As Clive Barnett has posited, “the role allotted to cultural action [on the EU level] since 1992 has been less to do with engineering a single European identity than it has had to do with ‘the multiplication of culture’s utility’ in relation to the objectives of the EU” (2001: 412).¹¹⁷ This is in line with George Yúdice’s (2003) observation that “culture” has in the contemporary conjuncture increasingly served as an “expedient,” aiding the withdrawal of the state from social provision and the stabilization of the neoliberally reconfigured economic and political system. In this light, Banu Karaca has also observed in the EU a “shift from the governance of culture – often taken to be the traditional focus of cultural policy – to governance *through* culture” (2009: 28). While such governance *through* culture has a longer history than Yúdice’s

¹¹⁷ This increased emphasis on the social and economic *utility* of culture is for example reflected in the Cultural Capital Program of the EU, which developed from a “celebration of cultural excellence of major capitals (in an elite culture sense) to being used as an instrument for development of the cultural capital of marginal cities” (Sassatelli 2006: 35), with Glasgow’s turn as Cultural Capital in 1990 marking the turning point (see Richards 2000; Tretter 2009), where a local business organization sought to use the nomination to “remake Glasgow as a centre for corporate headquarters and encourage other related ‘service-sector’ economic development” (Tretter 2009: 120).

account might make us believe,¹¹⁸ it is clearly important to understand its particularity in the contemporary context, as this allows us an insight into the specificity of current state- and place-making processes.

Thus, it seems that the particular vision of ‘culture’s utility’ has changed together with the objectives of the EU even in recent years. According to Barnett’s analysis of cultural action in the 1990s, EU institutions first emphasized culture’s utility for the creation of *cohesion* by first, providing employment in the cultural industries, second, improving the image of regions as a means to attract investment, and third, enhancing the ‘employability’ of people in less developed regions based on fostering skills of creativity and flexibility (Barnett 2001: 418). Culture – as arts and other forms of cultural expression – was seen as “crucial to the mediation of the contradictions arising from the elite-driven integration of market structures and the persistence of geographically uneven development” (ibid: 416). While contemporary policy approaches maintain many of the tropes of this earlier vision of culture’s utility, I suggest that there has been a crucial shift in emphasis away from a primary concern with cohesion to one with *competitiveness*, in line with the reorientation in the EU’s approach to social and territorial cohesion discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, harnessed to this goal is now not only culture in the form of the creative and cultural industries but also of immigrant diversity.

¹¹⁸ For earlier examples of governance through culture, see e.g. Dirks (2001), Stoler (1992), or Asad (1993).

Culture's Utility in Berlin and EU Policy

The critique of the Green party of the *Senat's* strategy for the use of EU structural funds with which we began this chapter did not entail a foundational conflict of respective goals. The Green party merely demanded *more* of what the *Senat* was already doing in the realms of support for the arts and creative and cultural industries on the one hand and integration policy on the other hand. As the previous chapter showed, the Operational Programmes for the use of structural funds in Berlin describe culture as the arts and creative and cultural industries as well as immigrant diversity and intercultural competences¹¹⁹ as means to enhance the competitiveness of Berlin's economy and of Berlin as city in inter-local competition. This reflects dominant orientations in the *Senat's* economic and integration policies respectively. Culture (arts and creative and cultural industries) has come to be seen widely as one of the few ways in which Berlin could achieve growth and competitiveness and has been designated therefore as one of Berlin's "growth clusters" into which funds are to be predominantly channeled (chapter 2). Moreover, the *Senat's* recent concept for the integration of "persons with a migration background"¹²⁰ emphasizes the value that diversity has for the city:

Berlin would be unthinkable in its diversity, its international attractiveness, and its values such as liberty, openness, tolerance, culture, and creativity without century-long cultural interplay across state borders, without the continuous adoption of originally alien cultural influences. (Senatsverwaltung für Integration et al 2007: 9; original in German)

¹¹⁹ For example, programs support the acquisition of intercultural competence, mostly through work-based stays in other European countries, language courses, and the like. This, as the OPs declare, should make individuals more employable and companies more competitive in international and European markets where such a competence, it is stated, is increasingly necessary. It also dovetails with the necessity pointed at by several of my interviewees from the *Abgeordnetenhaus* to create transnational networks and an expansion of markets in particular in the direction of the east (the importance of this for Berlin was emphasized across political party lines).

¹²⁰ The strategy was initially devised in 2005 and presented in a revised version in 2007.

After thus having established the importance of diversity in the past and present of the city in a way that evokes what Schornberg called “internationality” in the first sense (international attractiveness) the document continues:

The support for cultural diversity is both an opportunity and a challenge The integration of migrants is a reciprocal process. Persons with migration background and the German host society are in equal measure required to develop a greater disposition to cultural openness. Only intercultural dialogue enables understanding. The handling of cultural pluralism has to become a key competence for all members of society (ibid: 9).

Thus, what follows is “internationality” in the second sense: an approach to the integration of immigrants which emphasizes the need that “all members of society” engage in intercultural dialogue and learn to respect pluralism. This “new” theme of respect for diversity and intercultural exchange, which is pursued in particular through measures in the realms of cultural policy, educational policy, and the “intercultural opening” of state institutions, is combined with more “traditional” measures of ensuring access to education and employment.

The guiding principles for integration that the concept establishes are (in this order) first, to strengthen Berlin’s international attractiveness and to make its cultural diversity visible, second, to ensure access to professional training and employment for everyone, third, to improve the educational level of immigrant children and to turn childcare centers and schools into attractive places for learning for everyone, fourth, to improve cohesion in the city/ neighborhoods (*Stadtraum*), fifth, to guarantee equal access of immigrants to the city administration, sixth, to fight against discrimination and violence and to strengthen participation and civil society, seventh, to work against exclusion of refugees, and eighth, to secure cooperation between the *Senat* and the *Bezirke* in matters of integration

(Senatsverwaltung für Integration et al 2007). They thus combine an attempt to market Berlin's diversity (the first goal) with measures aimed at equality of opportunity and equal access that are now to be pursued in a way respectful of cultural diversity.

We will examine this approach to integration policy of the *Senat* in more depth in a later section. The remainder of this section discusses EU level policy-making which aligns with the Berlin approach to culture's various utilities on the basis of an analysis of EU (Commission, Council, and Parliament) documents on immigration and integration of immigrants (Council of the European Union 2004; 2007c; European Commission 2000; 2003; 2005a; 2007b; 2008a) and on the economic and political role of culture in its "various facets" for EU-Europe (Council of the European Union 2007a; 2007b; 2009; European Commission 2007a; 2008b; European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2008; European Parliament & Union 2006).¹²¹

¹²¹ In April 2009, I attended a EURO CITIES conference for policy-makers working on questions of immigrant integration in cities that was hosted by the city government of Berlin and featured talks and panels with EURO CITIES, European city governments, and European Commission representatives. Participants at the conference received as part of the conference folder a written statement by the Committee of the Regions (2009) on a Commission working document on integration policy. The fact that it was distributed at the conference highlighted the complex ties that now existed between EU and city levels in efforts to, as one speaker at the conference put it, develop a "common language" on questions concerning the integration of immigrants in cities. This prompted me to follow up on EU level integration policy which, as I found, was in fact seen as a necessary complement to a more open approach to the "right kind" of labor immigration that the European Commission propagated. The concept of intercultural dialogue linked this policy realm to wider conceptualizations of the utilities of culture in EU-Europe, as it was to not only ensure immigrant integration, but also contribute to the achievement of the Lisbon strategy (i.e. competitiveness in the knowledge economy via support for culture in form of the creative and cultural industries and arts in particular), and found the EU's external relations. I thus broadened my analysis to also include the perceived role of culture in these policy realms.

Since immigration and the integration of “third country nationals” became an EU competence by the late 1990s,¹²² the European Commission and Council have consistently advertised an approach to integration that built on the principle of “unity in diversity.” They emphasized that integration policy should be anchored in “the acceptance of diversity” (European Commission 2000: 20). Policy-makers and politicians needed to “emphasise the benefits of immigration and of cultural diversity” (ibid: 22) and condemn “racism and xenophobia” (ibid). At the same time, they suggested that Member States adopt forms of “civic citizenship” oriented along the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights that would grant core rights and obligations to third country nationals in line with European and national values, including the right to cultural identity and practice (Council of the European Union 2004; European Commission 2000; 2003: 18; 2005a). That is, diversity was to be protected through a unitary frame of universal rights.

Such respect for diversity and relative equality in the polity was to be achieved through “formal rights” (European Commission 2003: 17) for immigrants that were to ensure that “the individual has the *possibility of participating in economic, social, cultural and civil life*” (ibid) of the “host society.” That is, they are – as a later document specifies – to ensure access to

¹²² Immigration had become an EU competence with the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997, which modified the Maastricht Treaty. At the European Council meeting in Tampere in 1999, the Council specified the parameters of a common asylum and migration policy within the frame of developing an “area of freedom, security, and justice.” This involved the demand to “fair treatment of third country nationals,” i.e. non-EU nationals *legally* residing in EU member states, among others through a “more vigorous integration policy granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens,” and the fighting of economic, social, and cultural discrimination as well as racism and xenophobia (Council of the European Union 1999). It also involved a call for “managed immigration,” which the Tampere conclusions framed in view of preventing illegalized immigration, while later Commission proposals added to this the need for increased labor immigration. Thus, with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Tampere conclusions, a *European* competence on immigration and integration was initiated (i.e. for working towards harmonization of member state regulations on these issues). This decision was followed by various European Commission propositions and Council resolutions on principles of immigration and integration.

*employment and education*¹²³ and *equal access to institutions and private and public goods and services, participation in the democratic process* and in the formulation of integration policy in particular on the local level, and the *right to the practice of diverse cultures and religions* “unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law” (European Commission 2005a). That is, measures are to ensure an individual right to culture within certain limits and, with their anti-discrimination and pro-access emphasis, equality of opportunity despite such individual ‘difference.’

This emphasis on formal rights ensuring participation and equality of opportunity – that is, on a supposed “level playing field” rather than more substantive equality – is a hallmark of political liberalism¹²⁴ and in fact very much compatible with a neoliberal emphasis on the activation of “human capital” in the knowledge economy (more on that later). Equality of opportunity assumes that once a “level playing field” is created, once equal access to the market and political institutions is guaranteed (and even this is likely to require more than formal rights),

¹²³ Education figures both as a right and a responsibility, entailing both a greater reflection of diversity in the curriculum and improved access to higher education as well as tackling “migrant youth delinquency” (European Commission 2005).

¹²⁴ As Don Robotham argues, in its emphasis on formal rights within the capitalist frame, liberal cosmopolitanism entails “a conditional humanism, inherently incapable of being consistently antiracist and of standing up for substantive (not only formal-legal or moral) equality between peoples” (2005: 577) because, as humanism of the bourgeoisie, it always supports “privilege and property” (ibid) first. As Wendy Brown points out: “Historically, rights emerged in modernity both as a vehicle of emancipation from political disenfranchisement or institutionalized servitude and as a means of privileging an emerging bourgeois class within a discourse of formal egalitarianism and universal citizenship” (1995: 99). As Marx (1992 [1939]: 245) has famously argued, liberal values and their juridical, political, and social institutionalization are enabled by *realities* of freedom and equality in exchange in a capitalist society. Thus, on the one hand, the development of capitalism creates realities of equality and freedom reflected in the (liberal) thought of the emerging bourgeoisie. On the other hand, however, this thought presents only an incomplete image of this reality, it presents the reality from the perspective of circulation only (Marx 2001 [1872]: 177-78). The worker is ‘free’ to sell his labor-power because he was ‘freed’ from the means of production in the capitalist system of private property. This ‘freedom,’ if he wants to survive, forces him into exchange. And while he receives the equivalent for his commodity (labor-power) in form of its exchange-value, the use-value of this commodity (the capacity to add value) creates surplus appropriated by the capitalist.

everything can take its own course. Of course, it is to take its course in the EU's so-called social market economy which as we have seen prioritizes competitiveness in the free market and, as capitalist economy, necessarily relies on class inequality. The creation of equality of opportunity thus appears as a means to ensure "cohesion" in the critical sense in a neoliberalizing context, as it binds people into the *class* system by promising individual mobility within it provided such individuals treat themselves as "human capital."¹²⁵ Such equality of opportunity is now also to be offered to immigrants and their descendants in the EU – in a way that respects their cultural diversity.

Importantly, the EU's interpretation of respect for diversity here aligns with what has become known as *intercultural* (rather than multicultural) approaches to integration, which seek to allow for cultural pluralism (to a greater extent than classic liberal universalist approaches do) by forestalling the formation of "segregated" communities through an *individual* rather than *collective* right to culture paired with equality of opportunity and an emphasis on the importance of intercultural exchange and mixing (more on that below). In this vein, the seventh of the EU's *Common Basic Principles*¹²⁶ for integration policy states:

¹²⁵ The notion of "human capital" implies that every human "is for himself his own capital" (Foucault: 2008) which s/he seeks to invest in and accumulate: "a ceaseless work of training and retraining, skilling and reskilling, enhancement of credentials and preparation for a life of incessant job seeking: life is to become a continuous economic capitalization of the self" (Rose 2004: 161). As Fernando Coronil has moreover pointed out, when people are defined and treated as capital they are "taken into account insofar as they contribute to the expansion of wealth, and marginalized if they do not. ... They are valued as sources of profit. As human beings ... are defined as capital, the logic of capital comes to define their identity as 'assets'" (2000: 365). This is the more problematic in a context where unemployment is high and the production of value tends to be equated with the "creativity" of the *high-skilled*.

¹²⁶ The common basic principles have been adopted by the Council in 2004. The other principles are: 1) integration as "a two-way process of mutual accommodation", 2) respect for basic values of the EU, 3) employment as key to integration and the contribution of immigrants to the host society which needs to be made visible, 4), "basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions", 5), education as key to making immigrants

Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens. (Council of the European Union 2004: 18)

The integration of immigrants along these lines, the Commission had declared in an earlier document on immigration, integration, and employment that prefigured these themes,¹²⁷ was “both a matter of social cohesion and a prerequisite for economic efficiency” (2003: 17). An integration process based on respect for diversity and equal opportunity, the Commission had already explained in a 2000 document, was “particularly important in attracting migrants to highly skilled jobs for which there is world-wide competition” (2000: 2), which in turn have come to be seen as a necessity for EU-Europe’s economic competitiveness as well as, to lesser extent, the continuity of its (reformed) institutions of social protection. In fact, integration policy on EU level has been presented as a necessary complement to greater openness towards (the right kind of) immigration.

Since its initial communication in response to the decisions at the Council meeting in Tampere (European Commission 2000), the European Commission has consistently argued that “the existing ‘zero’ immigration policies which have dominated thinking over the past 30 years are no longer appropriate” (2000: 6). In the face of demographic changes and labor shortages in particular “in information and communication technologies, in advanced technologies or in

“more successful and more active participants in society”, 6) equal access to institutions and public and private goods and services, 7), see citation in main text above, 8) guarantee of “practice of diverse cultures and religions” as long as they do not conflict with “other inviolable European rights or national law”, 9) participation of immigrants in the democratic process, 10) mainstreaming integration policy, and 11) developing “clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms” (Council of the European Union 2004: 17-24).

¹²⁷ However, adopted principles do not explicitly mention the concept of civic citizenship that is central to Commission proposals, among others in the document cited above. Several of the common principles however go in this direction, in particular the “equal access” and “democratic participation” provisions.

health care, but also among some low-skilled occupations” (European Commission 2003: 14-15), EU member states needed to open their borders to suitable immigrants through a “managed” approach to immigration. Importantly, the admission of non-EU-immigrants was framed as a necessary step not only for cohesion (demographic changes that endangered existing social security schemes such as pensions) but, more prominently, for economic competitiveness. As the Commission declared, “immigration has become an important factor for the development of the EU's Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, which recognises that appropriate management of economic immigration is an essential element of EU competitiveness” (2008a: 3).¹²⁸

Apart from rendering EU-Europe a more attractive place for the sought-after high-skilled workers of the knowledge economy through its integration policy, the Commission however also wanted to activate the (economic) potential of *existing* immigrant populations. Thus, it noted in its document on immigration, integration, and employment that “the EU must first and foremost mobilise its current human resources, including migrant workers residing in the EU” (European Commission 2003: 14). The common basic principles adopted later by the Council

¹²⁸ The kinds of workers to be admitted were thus to be selected in line with the goals of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy that sought to turn EU-Europe into the most competitive knowledge economy by 2010. Sought after were first and foremost the high-skilled immigrants expected to contribute to innovation in the European knowledge economy and to a lesser extent those workers (European Commission 2000:13; 2003:14-15; 2008:5,6) needed as service providers for them, as low-wage producers of value, and as guarantors of the continuity of (however “modernized”) institutions of social protection. In turn, the borders were to remain firmly closed to immigrants without such economic utility: the strategy of *managed* immigration combined greater “openness” towards select labor migration with a “coherent and co-ordinated approach to illegal immigration” (European Commission 2000: 6). In light of this development, Van Houtum and Pijipers (2007) suggest that the EU’s current approach to immigration can be best understood through the metaphor of a “gated community” rather than the notion of a “Fortress Europe” that had been in circulation ever since the simultaneous institutionalization of “free movement” within much of EU-Europe and the institutional and symbolic closure of Europe to the “non-European”. The current immigration regime in EU-Europe, they note, in contrast entails “the simultaneous attraction of economically valuable and the rejection of allegedly market-redundant immigrants” (ibid: 292).

also speak of this goal in its emphasis on employment and education as a means of ensuring integration and “success” in the labor market.

The strengthening of intercultural dialogue – which has become a central trope in EU documents in particular since the mid-2000s – was seen here important in several respects. Not only did it play a role in “fostering the successful integration of citizens of different origin, culture and religion in Europe and in counteracting racism and extremism” (Council 2007: 26). Intercultural competences and dialogue were considered crucial for contemporary work life (European Commission 2008b). Thus, the 2006 European Parliament and Council decision on proclaiming the year 2008 a “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue” emphasized that intercultural dialogue not only promoted “cultural diversity in Europe,” but also fostered the creation of flexible and innovative people for the knowledge economy, the support of the creative and cultural industries as generator of growth, and the enhancement of Europe’s political role in the world (European Parliament & Union 2006: 1-2). Exactly how intercultural dialogue as, presumably, a dialogue between differently cultured individuals and groups, was achieving these goals was however left unspecified. The Commission’s *European Agenda for Culture* one year later gives us a hint. Culture – in what the Commission called its “various facets”, i.e. encompassing human development, the arts and cultural goods and services, and its “anthropological meaning”¹²⁹ – was presented “as a catalyst for creativity in the framework

¹²⁹ These “various facets” are incidentally those that Raymond Williams identified in his *Keywords* (1983: 90). As the Commission states: “‘Culture’ is generally recognised as complex to define. It can refer to the *fine arts, including a variety of works of art, cultural goods and services*. ‘Culture’ also has an *anthropological meaning*. It is the basis for a symbolic world of meanings, beliefs, values, traditions which are expressed in language, art, religion and myths. As such, it plays a fundamental role in *human development* and in the complex fabric of the identities and habits of individuals and communities. In the context of this Communication, the main focus will be on the

of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs” (2007: 8). The keyword here is “creativity.” Chapter four suggests that culture in the form of cultural production and ways of life have come to be seen as a source of human (capital) development by fostering creativity, which in turn is presented as necessary for innovation and competitiveness in the knowledge economy.

Not only immigrant diversity, but also the creative and cultural industries have in this light come to play a particular role in recent EU documents on “culture” as a means to achieve the goals of the Lisbon strategy, including through regional development. As the Council for example stated in a recent document, “strategic investment in culture, as well as in cultural and creative industries, in particular in SMEs, is vital for promoting culture as such and for strengthening a dynamic creative society in the European Union, for creating jobs and enabling the fulfillment of the Lisbon goals” (2009: 3). The cultural and creative industries were supported not only because they were hyped as key sector in the knowledge economy and important provider of jobs, but also because of “the specific role that culture, the cultural sector and cultural and creative industries ... play in fostering” (ibid) *creativity* more generally and thus “in boosting innovation and technology” (Council of the European Union 2007a: 3). This, so the argument ran, could in particular be a driver of “the development of European regions and cities, as they [culture and creativity] enhance local attractiveness and help revitalise local economies, including through the clustering of cultural and creative industries at local and regional level” (Council of the European Union 2009: 3). And here we are back full circle with Berlin’s regional development strategy. To recall, Berlin’s regional and integration

importance of the *various facets* of culture in developing strategies both within the EU and with third countries.” (2007a: 3).

strategies similarly invoke the role that both cultural and creative industries and intercultural respect for immigrant diversity play in ensuring social cohesion and economic competitiveness.

EU-European Policy Networks: Developing Policy Common Sense

Although Berlin receives EU structural funds for regional development and although it participates in the “Intercultural Cities” Program of the Council of Europe and the Commission¹³⁰ which propagates integration policy along the lines outlined above, the overlap between the EU’s and Berlin’s proclamation of the value of culture and diversity should not be seen as the result of a “top-down” process. In fact, it might in part have been the other way around. This is suggested by the disagreement between the Berlin *Senat* and the Commission’s Directorate-General on Regional Policy over the emphasis on the creative and cultural industries in the Berlin OPs for the use of the funds. According to several of my informants, the Commission contested in the negotiations over the OPs that support for the cultural and creative industries contributes to innovation, which was a precondition of the use of the funds in line with the Lisbon strategy (chapter 2). As Garnham observed in 2005 (around the time of the negotiations), while

the model of innovation ... maps well onto the cultural/creative industries, ... in the general Schumpeterian vision that now underpins much national and European Union economic policy under the ‘information society’ label focused on innovation, innovation systems and national competition for the comparative advantage that successful innovation supposedly creates, it is *technological* innovation that is the focus and it is entrepreneurs and technologists who are the ‘creative’ drivers. (2005: 22, emphasis added)

¹³⁰ The program has two strands, the first of which - “governance and policies” - is run by the Council of Europe and is meant to “work towards development and implementation of intercultural strategies” with the help of experts; the second, “awareness and exchange”, is run by the city network EUROCITIES and entails visits from city to city for dialogue and exchange of good practice. The city of Berlin participated in the second strand and its *Bezirk* Neukölln in the first. During the time of research, the project was in its pilot phase.

And indeed, as one interviewee who had been involved in the process put it, the Commission took a more “old-fashioned” stance on innovation as *technological*. In the final version of the OPs (Senat Berlin 2007a: 90-91), the Berlin government however could reference the Commission’s 2007 *Agenda for Culture* that invoked the role of culture for achieving the Lisbon strategy, which was also affirmed by the Council (2007a). The fact that the European Commission eventually accepted this dimension of Berlin’s strategy for the use of the funds might in part be due to internal differences within the Commission and (thus) the fact that EU level policy provided a “resource” for the city government that enhanced its bargaining power. In turn, the recent emphasis in EU documents on the creative and cultural industries as contributing to innovation and competitiveness and thus the realization of the Lisbon strategy might have its origin at least in part in lobbying on part of city governments which wanted to ensure the availability of EU funds for regional development strategies that support “culture” as the “only resource left” to deindustrialized cities.

Policy-making in cities now takes place in an EU-European horizon, all the while cities are an important presence on the EU level. For example, city networks such as EUROCIITIES now try to develop a “common language” on questions concerning the integration of immigrants in cities, as a speaker at a EUROCIITIES conference in April 2009 in Berlin put it. The conference, which I attended, brought together EU and city level policy-makers and carried the title “Embracing Diversity – Achieving Equal Opportunities” – emblematic, as I found, for the current policy approach developed on and in interaction between EU and city levels. EUROCIITIES is a city network that bypasses the national scale, aims to develop a shared policy horizon for European

cities, and lobbies in Brussels. As Leitner and Sheppard have argued, networks such as EUROCITIES “created new collaborative possibilities and new political spaces for cities to challenge extant state structures and relations” (2002: 167), while the fact that they tend to be “dominated by networked local elites relying on professionalized governance and decision-making processes, can facilitate implementation of a neo-liberal agenda of competitiveness and innovation” (ibid: 165).

The EUROCITIES vision of the role of culture in cities once more reiterates the themes that we have already encountered.¹³¹ Berlin is a part of EUROCITIES. It has participated in its “Integrating Cities” project, which developed common principles for the integration of immigrants in cities and takes a central role in the project MIXITIES (Making Integration Work In Europe’s Cities) – co-financed by the European Commission through the recently created European Integration Fund – that began in late 2010. EUROCITIES is also involved in the *Intercultural Cities* program mentioned above, a joint action of the Council of Europe and the European Commission in which Berlin and in particular its *Bezirk* Neukölln take part. It supports the development of intercultural strategies by city governments through networking and sharing of best practice. That is, the EU, the Council of Europe, and EUROCITIES want to initiate and be involved in shared policy formation and give the impetus to the direction this policy takes.

¹³¹ As its official website declares: “Culture and creativity are a vital aspect of our societies, and people need access to a wide range of arts and cultural activities. Europe’s cities are home to a rich mixture of people including migrants from all parts of the world, and this diversity represents a valuable source of cultural wealth and human potential. EUROCITIES believes that culture and creativity should be supported by public policies at all levels, including the European level, and that the impact of culture on the economic development and social cohesion of cities should be recognised.” At: <http://www.eurocities.eu/main.php>

Such actual interrelations between European cities and between EU and city levels contribute to the creation of a shared EU-European policy common sense.¹³² In our case, such common sense draws centrally on the more widely influential theses of policy-gurus Richard Florida and Charles Landry and their respective arguments on the “creative” and “intercultural” city. The associative links established in EU documents between “intercultural dialogue” and “competitiveness in the knowledge economy” can only be understood against this backdrop. I therefore give a brief overview of their theses to provide an understanding of the background arguments that inform the policy approach discussed above and provide it with a seeming scientific justification.¹³³

Florida (2003) posits that the motor of competitiveness in today’s knowledge economy is the “creative” sector, and in particular, “creative” workers in the form of what he calls “the creative class.” Places where such creative workers are concentrated, Florida posits, are characterized by higher economic growth. Policy-making is thus faced with the question how to attract the “creatives,” as this supposedly decides a region’s fate in international competition. The creative class, according to Florida, prefers places that support their creativity and individualist lifestyle – places that not only have the appropriate amenities, such as cultural entertainment venues, but also feature diversity and tolerance.¹³⁴

¹³² Such common sense need not be universally accepted across European cities (as it is more germane to the liberal Left than conservatives), but has gained salience in the policy forums and programs discussed here.

¹³³ For critique, see e.g. Peck (2005) as well as chapter four on the place-making implications of creative and intercultural city strategies.

¹³⁴ Of which the presence of homosexuals, immigrants, and bohemians function as indicators (Florida & Tinagli 2006: 27).

One policy consequence of the “creative class” argument is therefore that “opening the doors” to high-skilled immigrants is a necessary¹³⁵ but not sufficient condition for increasing competitiveness. Policy-makers also have to provide attractive local conditions (of diversity and tolerance) so that they actually would want to come. An attendee of a study group on the “immigration of the high-skilled into cities” at the “Integrating Cities” conference thus answered the question by the moderator why the high-skilled don’t come to Europe, but only the low skilled: “Because in the US, no one asks: why do you look different?” Independent of the question whether the US is indeed “more tolerant” (the fact that diverse appearance is normalized does not mean that it does not matter), this answer indicates that intolerance and racism now emerge as problems in view of international competition for the “creative worker.” This view – next to a concern with social “cohesion” – forms the backdrop to the Commission’s declaration that a “proactive immigration policy will require strong political leadership and a clear commitment to the promotion of pluralistic societies and a condemnation of racism and xenophobia” (2000:22).

The “intercultural” integration strategies that Charles Landry and Phil Wood (Landry 2000; Wood & Landry 2008) propose are meant to address such problems of “cohesion” in the name of increasing “competitiveness.” They further reinforce the notion that the creation of cohesive cosmopolitan place can promote economic competitiveness, adding to Florida, whom they cite, the notion that culture *itself* has a productive function because it is linked to creativity, which in

¹³⁵ Florida and Tinagli thus suggest that European countries should use the potential locational advantage of their tolerant attitudes and values by changing immigration politics towards greater openness for “talents from all parts of the world” (2006: 31-2).

turn leads to innovation. EU documents reiterate this argumentative chain (e.g. Council of the European Union 2009). Diversity can become a benefit rather than a problem, Wood and Landry posit, when brought into exchange, as the “process of trying to understand the ‘Other’ can broaden the mind ... and lead to hybrid inventions. It can generate a special cross-cultural creativity” (2008: 5-6). This is the claim that also informs the EU’s representation of the economic utilities of “intercultural dialogue.” “Innovative capacity,” the Commission declared in 2008, “is closely linked with creativity as a personal attribute based on cultural and interpersonal skills and values” (2008b: 1). Drawing on diversity management theses, Wood and Landry posit that such cross-cultural creativity is only generated in conditions of mixing and openness. Thus, “a positive impulse to *intercultural exchange* is vital to encourage cross-fertilization from which innovation can proliferate” (ibid: 11). Just as on EU and Berlin levels, the intercultural strategies proposed for that goal rest on twin measures of *equality of opportunity* (non-discrimination and equal access) and respect for individual *diversity* within conditions of intercultural exchange (ibid). The *Intercultural Cities* program in which Berlin participates takes its cue from Landry’s visions – it explicitly cites Comedia, Landry’s policy platform.

While the development of a shared policy common sense between EU and city levels can be understood in part as resulting from the proliferation of such ideas through policy networks and other “multi-level” policy relations, this does not yet explain why it is these rather than other ideas that have become widely shared common sense.

Before we turn to a discussion of these origins, let me emphasize that I am not saying that intercultural policy has come to dominate approaches to immigration and integration in all of EU-Europe. Quite to the contrary in the case of many EU member states and cities. However, as an official working for Berlin's Commissioner for Integration and Migration and involved in this function in European policy networks and EU structural funds implementation pointed out to me, big European cities – other than nation-states – often had similar interests when it came to questions of integration policy, because they were not responsible for the control of borders but in effect home to most of the immigrants coming to Europe. Therefore he saw a necessity, but also possibility, for such cities to develop shared basic principles of integration (in contrast to nation-states, where he thought harmonization would be difficult) as well as for the forging of coalitions with the Commission on such issues in circumvention of the nation-states. Such shared principles in EU-city relations have come to center on a particular (“intercultural”) embrace of diversity.

What I thus *do* suggest is that there are certain alliances forming between (in particular big) European cities and EU institutions and networks which have a shared interest in enhancing a city's “competitiveness” and at the same time in “governing cohesion” in (resulting) contexts where increased class inequalities articulate with structural culturalist discrimination in the nation-state. In fact, as we will see in more detail below, their embrace of “diversity” in the intercultural rather than multicultural sense is directed against the latter (national paradigms of culture-exclusivism, liberal universalism, or multiculturalism), while their emphasis on equality of opportunity rather than e.g. redistribution is compatible with the dynamics of competition

that have contributed to the former (class inequalities). Let us therefore now turn to the “economic” and “political” origins of this particular view of culture’s utilities.

“Economic” Foundations of Culture’s Utility

Bob Jessop has argued that “the knowledge-based economy has become the hegemonic representation or self-description of the economy as an emerging reality, an object of calculation, and object of governance in contemporary world society” (Jessop 2008a). He explains that economies are always to an extent “imagined” in particular and partial ways given the hypercomplexity of actual economic relations that require complexity reduction for management or governance (Jessop 2004a; 2008a). Such economic imaginaries, he explains, “emerge as economic, political, and intellectual forces seek to (re)define specific subsets of economic activities as subjects, sites, and stakes of competition and/or as object of regulation and to articulate strategies, projects and visions oriented to these imagined economies” (Jessop 2004a: 163). Thus, they are both “discursively constituted and materially reproduced” (ibid: 162).

Both EU and Berlin level policy are clearly oriented towards the “economic imaginary” of the knowledge economy. Both have come to see not only support for the creative and cultural industries but for “culture” more generally as an important means to achieve competitiveness within it. Neither culture as the arts nor immigrant diversity (as opposed to labor power) has been understood predominantly in view of an *economic* function in previous times, nor has their potential economic contribution (as for example in the case of the arts) been understood

as consisting in the enhancement of *competitiveness*. Why then this discovery of “culture’s utility” for competitiveness in the knowledge economy?

As Bob Jessop points out, different economic imaginaries establish different ideas of competitiveness,¹³⁶ while the economic imaginary of the knowledge economy defines competitiveness “over innovation policies and how best to subordinate the extra-economic to the ‘demands’ of economic competition” (2004a: 28). This includes both the “expansion of the ‘economic’ to include an increasing array of factors and forces that were previously considered ‘economically irrelevant’” and the “widening of ‘extra-economic’ factors and forces that are now considered ‘economically relevant’” (ibid: 29). The hype around the creative and cultural industries, I suggest, figures into the former, the discovery of the arts and in particular of immigrant diversity for competitiveness into the latter (as their ‘non-economic’ quality is still acknowledged, all the while their ‘economic utility’ is to be activated).

This however still does not explain why *culture* in its “various facets” has become an extra-economic resource for the knowledge economy in contemporary policy. I suggest that this has both “economic” and “political” origins. The first is tied to the particular utility support for

¹³⁶ As van Apeldoorn notes, in EU-European state-making, competitiveness has become “a key concept because of its potential to represent the ‘general interest’, as it appeals equally to neo-liberals, neo-mercantilists and social democrats” while “what competitiveness actually means, and how it has to be achieved, is an open question decided in concrete struggles” (2002: 171). In the case of the EU, he argues, a largely neo-liberal rather than neo-mercantilist or social democratic notion of competitiveness won out and indeed has become “the linchpin of a process of hegemonic articulation” (ibid: 173). By the 1990s, this interpretation of competitiveness on EU level was closely tied to tropes of globalization and a shift to a knowledge-based economy (Rosamond 2002: 163). It informed state- and place-making processes (the creation of the Single Market, most prominently, but also the shift in structural funds policy discussed in chapter 2) that had the effect of intensifying competition between locations, thus limiting political alternatives and contributing to the development of a policy common sense that prioritized supply-side policies as appropriate response to such new realities (Brenner 2000; McNeill 1999: and chapters 1 & 2).

culture has acquired in a context of increased mobility of capital (supported by neoliberalized state practices) and resulting inter-local competition. This utility is two-fold. For one, as David Harvey (2001 [1989]) showed, entrepreneurial city governance intent on supplying the right conditions for attracting capital to as well as fuelling consumption in place has prominently relied on culture – in the form of spectacle, the promotion of “authentic” ways of life, the arts, and the like – as one of the means to present the city “as an innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place to live or to visit, to play and consume” (Harvey 2001 [1989]: 355), and, we can add, to work and invest in. Florida’s emphasis on the importance of the right kind of “cultural” properties of a city for the creative class has simply added to this already existing dynamic,¹³⁷ which is driven by the neoliberalization of “spatial” relations and state governance on different scales.

Entrepreneurial governance, David Harvey argues, seeks to develop appropriate physical and social infrastructures that would form the basis “for monopoly rents to be created and realized by both private interests and state powers” (2001a: 404). And here we arrive at the second utility of culture. Cultural “properties” of places have gained importance as a basis for the generation of monopoly rent, which arises on the basis of the *uniqueness* of a “directly or indirectly tradeable item” (Harvey 2001a: 395), as David Harvey shows. The increased mobility of capital has in fact not decreased, but increased the importance of the particularity of places, because “natural monopolies” (of space, location, state protection) have diminished (ibid: 399)

¹³⁷ As Peck notes, Florida’s theses have created “[a]lmost at a stroke, a new dimension of urban competition” (2005: 747).

as a consequence of innovations in transport and communication technologies and the shift to neoliberal state practices in the regulation of economic processes.

David Harvey argues that “the idea of ‘culture’ is more and more entangled with attempts to reassert such monopoly powers precisely because claims to uniqueness and authenticity can best be articulated as distinctive and non-replicable cultural claims” (ibid: 399). As this study shows, such claims to uniqueness are not necessarily framed in terms of authentic and homogeneous traditions. Places like Berlin, which could not easily establish their uniqueness in these terms (though attempts at imposing particular visions and continuities of history and culture did and do exist in Berlin) instead seek to stake claims on their (unique) “international” or cosmopolitan qualities.¹³⁸ Thus, claims about cultural distinctiveness of place are currently

¹³⁸ EU institutions (and not only those) have also sought to present *EU-Europe* as such a unique place to do business in due to its diversity and tolerance. For example, during a panel discussion I attended at an event on Europe and the Creative Industries hosted by the Delegation of the European Commission in Berlin in 2009 speakers across the board (with and without EU affiliation) declared that Europe’s cultural diversity and tolerance as well as the intercultural competence of its population had “great economic potential” – which, however, they lamented, was not yet used sufficiently. One speaker highlighted here barriers to the immigration of non-EU-European ‘creatives.’ This emphasis on the economic potential of EU-European diversity echoed what Garnham has called “the bizarre proposal that the United Kingdom and Europe had comparative creative advantages vis-à-vis the United States because of their cultural heritage” (2005: 25). In fact however, such statements relied not only on older stereotypical notions of Europe as “continent of culture” in contrast to the US which “lacks history,” but utilized the tropes of diversity, exchange, and tolerance rather than heritage, in line with the assumption that cultural diversity sparks creativity, which produces innovation, which founds competitiveness and the redefinition of Europeanness discussed in the previous chapter. Clearly, media, art, and design actors can latch on to a dominant EU discourse for purposes of mobilizing EU resources for the support of “culture” in the name of creativity, innovation, and competitiveness. At the same time, their social and economic position might predispose them to believe in the value of diversity, which, incidentally, also relied on bringing the “creative and cultural industries” and “ways of life” into an associative rather than logical connection through the encompassing term of “culture.” (The one-day conference was entitled “Are the Creatives European – Is Europe Creative? Creative Industries and the Dynamics of Innovation and Business Success” (*Sind Kreative europäisch – ist Europa kreativ? Kreativwirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Innovationen und Unternehmenserfolg*). It featured a panel discussion with a representative of the European Commission, one of the “ambassadors of the European Year of Creativity and Innovation,” and several representatives of media, art, and design institutions on the overall topic of creativity, creative industries, and the EU. This was followed by two workshops on “best practice in the creative industries” and “programs and networks for the creative industries” respectively. This was a joint event of the European Commission, the Enterprise Europe Network Berlin-Brandenburg, and the Berlin Chamber of Industry and

often claims about cultural mixing, tolerance, and a creative atmosphere generated through arts.¹³⁹ This reflects, I suggest, actual *social* value attributed to *particular forms of diversity* (see chapter 4) without which such attempts to generate monopoly rent could not be realized.

However, the policy argument that cultural diversity constitutes a means of enhancing competitiveness through *innovation* cannot be explained directly through the above “utilities” of culture in the neoliberalized context, although, as chapter four shows, policy strategies aligned with it can serve the generation of monopoly rent. This argument aligns with the economic imaginary of the knowledge economy as described by Jessop, which links competitiveness to innovation, and innovation in turn to the creativity of the creative worker. “Culture” here seems an intuitive “extra-economic” resource to activate, as “culture and creativity,” as the Council of the EU among others posits, “are inextricably linked” (2009: 2). Culture thus becomes a means of human capital formation in line with the assumption that “the relative international competitiveness of nations and industries [was linked] to the institutional structures supporting innovation, part of which was the provision of suitably trained human capital” (Garnham 2005: 26). This claim underlies the use of culture in “all its facets” – both culture as the arts and intercultural competences are seen as the source of important (creative) skills in Berlin and EU level policy.

Commerce. It took place on May 13, 2009 in the context of the European Year of Creativity and Innovation 2009, the Europe Week 2009, and the First European SME Week.)

¹³⁹ This generates a particular contradiction, as city after city aims to constitute itself – with the same policy mix – as ‘distinctive’ cosmopolitan and creative place (see e.g. Peck 2005). That is, if all cities now try to capitalize on their cosmopolitan flair in line with Florida’s and Landry’s precepts, then what makes the “cultural mix” of Berlin unique when compared to the ones of other metropolises? On the contradictions of monopoly rent, see (Harvey 2001a).

Beyond this shared “imaginary,” we have to however look at political projects to understand the recent emphasis on the economic utility of immigrant diversity. Thus, the “expansion of the economic” (Jessop) to include culture as the arts and other forms of “symbolic production” via the “creative and cultural industries” can be explained with Garnham as a result of “an attempt by the cultural sector and the cultural policy community¹⁴⁰ to share in its relations with the government, and in policy presentation in the media, the unquestioned prestige that now attaches to the information society¹⁴¹ and to any policy that supposedly favours its development” (2005: 20). A similar process, I argue, has been going on in the case of the promotion of intercultural integration strategies as a means to enhance economic competitiveness.

Here, I suggest, policy-makers have latched onto “diversity management” (a discursive framing and social practice very much in line with the economic imaginary of the knowledge economy which claims that the appropriate inclusion and organization of diversity in the workplace contributes to innovation and thus competitiveness) *as a means to* defend a change in culturalism informing state practices away from the established repertoires of nation-states. That is, as we will see in more detail later, interculturalist claims form part of a political attempt to establish *cohesion* by overcoming the disadvantaged position of (individual) immigrants in a

¹⁴⁰ Garnham highlights that there are two implicit claims in the use of the term “creative [rather than “cultural”] industries,” namely, first, that they are the “key new sector of the economy” and thus, second, “the key source of future employment growth and export earnings” (2005: 25). The term “creative” here served to include the computer software sector, he argues, without which these claims could not be maintained. This in turn enabled an alliance between cultural workers and publishing and media conglomerates around questions of copyright protection, as well as an argument on the part of the cultural sector for public support of the training of ‘creative workers’ (ibid: 26).

¹⁴¹ Or knowledge economy, in our context. Both the terms “information” or “knowledge” are used for “symbolic or cultural production” supposedly central to the contemporary economy (Garnham 2005:21).

way that is subordinated to the premises of competitiveness. The economic argument is frequently presented as a (mere) *rationale*, but, I suggest, speaks of a deeper enmeshment with the presumptions and governmental priorities of competitiveness in the knowledge economy.

For instance, Landry and Wood make the case for a foregrounding of the *economic* value of diversity as follows:

We have argued our belief that getting on and being intercultural is in every way preferable to moving apart Some people, however, are never satisfied with the entreaty simply to 'do the right thing'. They need a reason and we should try to give them one – the diversity advantage. Now money isn't everything but it means a lot to many and so, unless intercultural diversity can't add to the bottom line of companies, cities and nations, an awful lot of people aren't going to give it much credence. (2008: 219)

Thus they posit that attempts to “do the right thing,” that is, to create more open and cohesive societies, have to be presented in such a way as to conform to an economic logic of attributing social value because this logic has come to dominate public decision-making. This is also, I propose in the following, what policy-makers in Berlin primarily concerned with creating more equal and pluralistic social relations in place by turning away from national paradigms of assimilation, exclusion, or multiculturalism have done.

“Political” Origins of the Embrace of the Value of Diversity

In April 2009, I attended the EURO CITIES conference “Integrating Cities III: Embracing Diversity – Achieving Equal Opportunities” hosted by the Berlin *Senat*. The conference announcement described its goal as follows:

The role of diversity management and equal opportunities in local integration policy will stand in the centre of the conference debates. Mayors and EU policy-makers will engage in a high-level dialogue on how best to harness the enriching opportunities of

diversity in Europe's cities.¹⁴² They set the frame for a number of panel discussions which will explore how cities can effectively implement policies for diversity management and equal opportunities in their roles as service providers, employers and buyers of goods and services.¹⁴³

The dual emphasis in the conference announcement on strengthening "diversity" (as a resource) and ensuring "equal opportunities" reflects the main orientation of the Berlin *Senat's* integration concept (Senatsverwaltung für Integration et al 2007), which is similarly entitled with the motto "encouraging diversity, strengthening cohesion" (*Vielfalt fördern, Zusammenhalt stärken*).

In the following, I want to relay in some depth my interview with a staff member of Berlin's Commissioner for Integration and Migration, Mark Neuer (name altered),¹⁴⁴ in which we discussed among others the background and orientation of this integration concept, as it allows us insights into the political motivations behind the adoption of intercultural city strategies. The interview took place in May 2009 subsequent to the "Integrating Cities" conference where I had asked Neuer after a panel on "attracting high-skilled immigrants" to cities whether he saw a contradiction between this goal and the support of "long-standing immigrant diversity" in Berlin. In the interview, I explored this theme – among others – further. Early on, I inquired

¹⁴² Conference presentations moved between the poles of presenting cultural diversity as a resource (such as for competitiveness) and discussing the role of institutions in adjusting to this new perspective on the one hand and of presenting cultural diversity as a problem for social cohesion and addressing the state's role in managing this on the other. Among city representatives, those of Berlin were most clearly speaking the (EUROCITIES/EU) language of using diversity as a resource for city development. The Berlin Commissioner for Integration and Migration in Berlin, Günter Piening, stated in his final address that such different emphases were a result of "different national traditions". As we will see in the following, this tension between constructions of diversity and difference is however not only one *between* different policy approaches, but also necessarily *internal* to one that treats "culture as a resource".

¹⁴³ Note how state institutions and practices are here subsumed under the logics of the market.

¹⁴⁴ Name altered, as I conducted all interviews in view of anonymous publication. I use a pseudonym in the following for better readability.

about the motto of the integration concept: what was the meaning of “diversity” here? He answered:

Diversity means especially cultural, religious diversity, that is, especially the one that develops from migration – although there are of course other types of diversity, gender, sexual orientation, lifestyles, and so forth. Strengthening cultural and religious diversity is related to the paradigm change of which we have just spoken [a change from seeing immigrant diversity as “deficit” to “resource”]. Diversity as an asset [*Gewinn*] for every city, and a city is well advised to make diversity into something lively [*lebendig*] and sustainable [*tragfähig*], to use it as a resource. But therefore also the addition “strengthening cohesion” – this doesn’t work without also emphasizing at the same time that equality of opportunity, social cohesion also in the neighborhoods, is an important basis for diversity to play a relevant role. Otherwise one only has a superficial diversity, but below it a parceling or division of society. But if one would reverse it and only aim at equality of opportunity, one would have a relatively homogeneous society which might be equal [*gleich*] but does not necessarily do justice to a globalized society of the 21st century.

Let us open up the main themes in this statement – finding a culturalist paradigm that “works” for a globalized society, diversity as a resource, and the necessity of also ensuring social cohesion through equality of opportunity – as they together give an understanding of the political “why” and how of a turn to interculturalism.

A central dimension of support for diversity in integration policy in Berlin (just as in EU level policy and intercultural city strategies) is the “intercultural opening” of state institutions and in particular of those delivering a “public service.” This means in practice both the increased recruitment of “persons with migration background” (as these are currently underrepresented in such institutions) and the enhancement of “intercultural competences” of state officials delivering such “public services.” Neuer explained the reason for pursuing this goal as follows:

a sociopolitical [*gesellschaftspolitisches*] argument is in the foreground: if in Berlin today one fourth of the population has no roots in Berlin, that is, is not originally from Berlin, but from other countries, who immigrated, themselves or their parents, then public

administration has to think about how to develop social and other services for this citizenry [*Bürgerschaft*] which do justice to the needs of these people.

That is, in his view, a social and political reality had developed where “the state” no longer “represented” its citizens – where the “identity” between “ruler and ruled,” to put it with Gellner (1983), was broken, which constituted problems of legitimacy. This is shown by his further statement that

the public service as translator [*Umsetzer*] of a state idea [*staatliche Idee*] has to reflect in its composition the composition of the population. Therefore the interest in recruiting more migrants for public service, for democratic or legitimacy reasons, because one has to ask at some point, for whom do you work after all, if oneself can no longer really reflect the population.

The solution that Berlin’s integration policy entails for such problems of democracy and legitimacy involves the re-establishment of a relation of identity, however, as the above statement shows, *not* by transforming (homogenizing) the population, as was frequently the case in nation-states, but by *heterogenizing* the state. That is, *identity* is to be re-established *on the basis of diversity*. This is a more *contemporary* solution, Neuer suggested:

Things like “intercultural opening” are being developed because the public service [*öffentliche Dienst*] notices that it is distancing itself from the citizens for who it is to implement policy [*Politik umsetzen*]. Therefore it is a form of sociopolitical responsibility to also transform it [public service] internally, in order to offer better services or implement policy in a more contemporary [*zeitgemäß*] manner.

What this statement suggests is that contemporary state institutions on the city level in particular are struggling for developing principles of legitimacy and representation that differ from the established paradigms of the nation-state. That is, policy-makers affirming interculturalism want to move away from culturalist paradigms of culture-exclusivism or liberal universalism, which are based on legitimacy principles of homogeneity and (abstract) unity respectively, as legitimacy is reestablished by making the state conform to actually existing

diversity. This needs to be seen in part against the backdrop of the cultural claims-making by minorities in recent decades and related challenges to national culturalism.

The rejection of culture-exclusivism and liberal universalism however does not precipitate a move towards multiculturalism, which has lost political purchase in the last decade. Intercultural repertoires want to “integrate” cultured individuals, not groups. The diversity that Berlin integration policy now affirms is “not about particular groups, like the Dutch model of the 80s and early 90s”, Neuer explained: “The *Senat* has sought to avoid this for many years now.” He continued:

The point is not to say that we want to especially foreground the Turks or the population of Arabic origin or whatever. The idea is rather, and this is probably something more modern, to say that urban society [*Stadtgesellschaft*] or communities in urban societies never entail clear-cut ethnic boundaries, but there is something third [*etwas Drittes*] that develops in cities through a constant exchange of information and processes of change ... There are ethnic communities, but they are not as clearly separated as it is often presented in a simplified manner. Diversity is rather what develops when persons or groups meet who haven't always already been similar [*Vielfalt ist eher das, was entsteht, wenn Menschen oder Gruppen sich begegnen, die nicht ohnehin immer schon ähnlich getickt haben*]. What develops in this process is what cities live from and an important ferment for policies in big cities [*Großstadtpolitik*]. It is an important foundation for being attractive as a living space [*Lebensraum*].

The diversity to be supported in brief differs from the vision of a variety of separate ethnic communities as is associated with multiculturalism. Multiculturalist repertoires have increasingly been discredited in EU-Europe in recent years (see e.g. Koopmans et al 2005; Lanz 2007). While multiculturalism has been critiqued from positions of the Left, more general recent attacks from liberals and conservatives alike have likely been of more importance in this regard. While the next chapter will discuss this in more detail, it is important to point out here that such critiques in Germany have generally emphasized that multiculturalism reinforces the

formation of “parallel societies” (*Parallelgesellschaften*), that is, supposedly ethnically closed and segregated communities that violate the human rights of their subordinate members and moreover fail to be integrated in the labor market. The intercultural paradigm, as we have already seen, also explicitly rejects support for *collective* and *exclusive* culture and instead emphasizes more complex diversity, mixing, and exchange (as in the above statement), as well as an *individual* right to cultural identity and practice. It thus seeks to establish a pluralist vision of society by countering the kinds of critiques that have eroded the basis for multicultural policies.

Such intercultural diversity, Neuer’s statement concluded, constitutes an important ground for city politics and a city’s attractiveness. This view is in line with what he had described in the outset of the interview as a “paradigm shift” from a deficit-oriented to a resource-oriented perspective in integration policy of the last 5 to 10 years. Immigrants are now presented as having potential, as resources that needed to be used, as enriching cities, he explained. This was also the reason, he added, for including the goal of “making diversity visible” as a means to enhance the “attractiveness” of the city¹⁴⁵ into the integration concept. The goal was, he explained, to

move away from a “social pedagogy” approach to integration policy, that is, the notion that integration policy is the better administration of a condition of deficiency It is that in many cases, and a lot of money flows into this area for good reasons, this is very important as a foundational dimension of social policy especially in a relatively poor city like Berlin, but this is not all that integration policy is about, it also has a cultural policy and an economic policy dimension. Integration policy so to say is not only the attempt to minimize lack but also the attempt to discover resources, and those are in part in the innovative capacity or attractiveness that originate from big companies like MTV or

¹⁴⁵ This goal is to be pursued primarily through cultural policy. On background to the relation between cultural policy and “immigrant diversity” in Berlin, see Kosnick (2007).

Universal [note that he chooses examples from the ‘creative industries’] for a very different strata of migrants, who are nevertheless immigrants, who are not our first concern, because they can look after themselves, they have enough money, but nevertheless are part of the migrant population which one cannot neglect entirely – or should not, because Berlin of course lives from that.

The relatively high turnover of *temporary* international migrants with new ideas, he explained, constituted much of the attractiveness of Berlin. This was the foundation of the positive image of Berlin, he noted.¹⁴⁶ One should therefore not simply start from the assumption “how horrible it is in *Neukölln*” (a *Bezirk* of Berlin regularly getting bad press in Germany because of so-called integration problems).

Thus, we encounter a “bifurcation” of integration policy based on class position. On the one hand, there is an attempt to ensure “cohesion” by addressing a “state of deficiency” of immigrants that concerns, we can infer from above, in particular integration and “success” in the labor market and is to be addressed through the creation of “equality of opportunity” but also the intercultural adaptation of state institutions. Recall that in the statement by Neuer cited in the beginning of this section, “equality of opportunity” was seen as necessary complement to the support for “diversity” in order to avoid a “parceling” of society. On the other hand, the “resource”-orientation in integration policy seems to concern primarily a different group of immigrants, the “new” type of labor migration for the creative and cultural industries that should encounter an “interculturally open” and “diverse” environment (thus, the

¹⁴⁶ As the *Senat’s* integration concept states on this point: “Berlin relies on its relaxed tolerance for different social and cultural lifeworlds. This ... characterizes Berlin as a cosmopolitan [*welttoffen*] European city of high national and international attractiveness. An approving and relaxed attitude towards diversity fosters intercultural competence, the liveliness and capacity to act of the city, and leads to advantages in international competition. Especially young people, artists, researchers, and students from all over the world are attracted to Berlin. Here, they can develop and test ideas at relatively low costs of living.” (Senatsverwaltung für Integration et al 2007: 9)

point in the integration concept that addresses the city's attractiveness for such high-skilled immigrants entails programs such as the development of a "welcoming culture" and greater reflection of immigrant diversity in the city's cultural institutions; also recall Schornberg's comments) and which constitutes a "true" asset for Berlin. Berlin's integration concept sought to bring such concerns with cohesion and competitiveness and de facto with two different immigrant populations together, which, as Neuer acknowledged, was not fully successful yet.

What thus emerges from these statements is a perceived need to reconcile policy seeking to establish cohesion with new demands of competitiveness, while alignment with the latter is perceived as an opportunity for achieving a shift in perspective (from "deficit" to "resource") in integration policy more generally. The integration concept's primary emphasis on equality of opportunity and anti-exclusion measures suggests that the goal of achieving cohesion via equality of opportunity is arguably still primary in this approach. However, as Neuer emphasized, the use of a city's diversity for economic policy could or should not be neglected. This on the one hand speaks to the degree to which the "economic imaginary" of the knowledge economy and related views of the importance of (culture for) competitiveness have become engrained. On the other, I suggest, it also becomes a means to support the more general political project of moving away from national culturalist repertoires identified earlier: the defense of a realignment of "the state" for reasons of democracy, legitimacy, and "better service" (also in the realm of "cohesion") along the principles of *diversity* requires the development of a positive vision of the latter. Establishing or latching on to claims about culture's utility in the knowledge economy is a means to do so that is likely to work, given the

existing dominance of economic logics of evaluation (see also below). The more so, as this conforms well in the case of Berlin with the economically-oriented attempts of the *Senat* to establish a cosmopolitan city brand for Berlin to enhance its attractiveness in inter-local competition for investors, consumers, and the high-skilled (chapter 4).

While the intercultural emphasis on diversity thus aligns with the political prioritization of competitiveness, the goal of achieving cohesion through equality of opportunity is also not in contradiction with it. Demanding that “persons with a migration background” have *equal access* to education, labor market, and social services with “Germans,” it fails to address the ways in which supply-side-oriented changes in all these areas – such as the decline of social protection and security in the job, increased temporary and flexible employment, the lack of a minimum wage, the erosion of welfare entitlements and rise of workfare, and the like – contributes to escalating class inequalities. Bringing immigrants on a par in this regard entails only a limited vision of equality and cohesion.

Moreover, the notion of equality of opportunity in this contemporary context of re-commodification of labor entails the implicit imperative to *use* the opportunities thus created – and thus also the assumption that if one fails to “move up” the social ladder, it is because one has failed to use one’s potential, one has failed to constitute oneself as suitable human capital. (Remember that one of the goals of EU integration policy was to activate the “dormant” resources of existing immigrants for increased competitiveness). And it is here where the equality of opportunity cum human capital perspective easily aligns with an ethnicized “culture

of poverty” argument. As the next chapter shows, this holds that unemployed immigrants are unemployed because they prefer to shut themselves off, socially and culturally, from the ‘host’ society. This “blame the victim” move buttresses demands to exclude them from “entitlement” to state resources and plays along with culture-exclusivist or assimilationist demands.

EU State-Making: “Meta-Governing” Cohesion and Re-Defining EU-Europeanness?

Solving problems of legitimacy by emphasizing diversity might not only suit local state institutions catering to “multicultural” populations but also the EU. I thus want to conclude this chapter on a more speculative note – building on the argument above and the analysis of EU documents – with some remarks on the possible origins and implications of the shift to “intercultural” principles on the EU level and what this entails for a vision of EU-Europeanness or an EU-European “state idea.”

For one, the EU level turn to interculturalism seems motivated by the perceived need to enhance *competitiveness* in line with the economic imaginary of the knowledge economy and of culture’s utility in competition. Integration along the principles of “unity in diversity” was presented in EU documents as a necessary complement to the goal of “managed immigration,” because it would help attract the high-skilled to Europe and in this way contribute to the realization of the EU’s Lisbon strategy. By ensuring equality of opportunity, it was moreover to activate “unused resources,” that is, the labor power and special skills of long-standing immigrant populations which were disproportionately affected by unemployment. Similarly, support for intercultural dialogue and the creative and cultural industries was to be a catalyst

for “creativity” more generally that would drive innovation and thus ensure EU-Europe’s competitiveness.

In this way – in a way that was not only considered compatible with but in fact as enhancing competitiveness by *attracting* and *activating* “human potential” – intercultural integration was moreover to ensure *cohesion* on two counts. First, the *recognition of diversity* was to both accommodate minority claims-making and engender a more welcoming attitude in the majority population, while adherence to shared European (political) values and laws was to prevent excesses on part of “extremists” on both sides. In this way, “culturalist” conflicts were to be prevented and a “tolerant” atmosphere that would attract sought-after immigrants fostered, all the while the negative consequences of increased competition that had in fact produced problems of “cohesion” (chapter 1) were to be buffered in their “culturalist” consequences. Second, the unitary principle of “civic citizenship” was to help ensure equality of opportunity of immigrants in terms of access to the labor market and state institutions and services. The concern was here not only with the prevention of marginalization and exclusion, but also with ensuring that no potential resources were lost to the European economy.

In this regard, the EU’s propositions for intercultural strategies in member states and cities appear as an attempt to “meta-govern” social *cohesion* – that is, to ensure cohesion in EU-Europe by shaping the ways in which member states and cities pursue it – without abandoning the prerogative of *competitiveness*. As Claus Offe points out, the “anti-discrimination” and

“labor-market inclusion” agenda that is associated with the “new normative concept of cohesion”¹⁴⁷ that was introduced into EU level policy around 2000

has the dual attractiveness of (a) being ‘egalitarian’ in terms of rights and opportunities, without redistributive strings attached, and (b) being instrumental, if implemented, for the viability and sustainability of member states’ public pension systems ... as well as, less explicitly, inducing wage restraint and downward stretching of the wage-scale through the mobilization of additional labor supply at the lower range of it (2003: 462).

In this emphasis on equal access rather than redistribution and the dismantling of social security and employment schemes, it is thus largely compatible with the agenda of (“embedded”) neoliberalization pursued dominantly on different governmental scales in EU-Europe in the last decades.

Such an attempt to meta-govern cohesion for competitiveness not only speaks of the concern of EU elites with harmonizing entrenched governance practices along a more “pluralized” model – which I think is a central motivation – but possibly also of an EU-level state-making project. As Offe (2003: 457) further argues, “European elites have every political reason to go beyond the negative integration of markets and proceed, visibly and credible, towards a positive integration of a ‘social’ Europe” if they want to “hold together the component parts of integrating Europe and to pave the road towards wider and deeper future integration.” This is because “pro-European consensus and identification among non-elites is likely to dwindle, strengthening the forces of populist re-nationalization, in case a loss is perceived to take place not just in terms of democratic legitimation, but also of social protection and security.” In brief,

¹⁴⁷ He notes that the underlying logic of this concept is that “discrimination” and “unemployability” “add up to the pathology of economic and social ‘exclusion,’ which must be fought by strategies of ‘inclusion,’ strengthening social ‘cohesion.’ Inclusion refers to fighting discrimination by race, ethnicity, and nationality, [i.e. here the immigration integration complex], but most importantly by gender ... and by age.” (ibid: 462)

it is a response to the contradictions of EU-European state-making discussed in chapter one – which, however, does not go the full way to a “social Europe” that Offe sees necessary, but rather remains within the frame set out by neoliberal union.

The EU’s suggested integration policy addresses these two interrelated origins – loss of social protection and related populist re-nationalization – of its legitimacy problem through the emphasis on the importance of *popularizing* the acceptance of the value of diversity combined with the promise of individual mobility *within* a class system through equality of opportunity and self-formation as human capital, *without*, to reiterate, abandoning the prerogative of enhancing competitiveness that has dominantly informed recent EU-European state-making and that in fact creates these problems of cohesion by intensifying class and regional inequalities.

This approach, on a last note, might tie into state-making in so far as it further promises to redress some of the problems that have afflicted the “old” idea of Europe through which EU elites previously sought to establish legitimacy for the EU (chapter 1). To recall, the civilizational idea of Europe had proven both “too small” and “too big” (Amin 2004) for generating identification on part of residents and citizens in EU-Europe and moreover constrained international ambitions for EU-Europe. The EU’s current approach to culture’s utilities in the fields of immigration and integration now also subtly redefines this narrative of EU-Europeanness, as it both opens the doors selectively to “non-European diversity” (through managed immigration) and treats them as part of political community in their diversity (through

the concept of civic citizenship which includes the individual right to cultural identity and practice). As chapter five argues in more depth, this move away from a civilizational foundation to EU-Europeanness on the EU level is moreover grounded in the result of struggles on the draft constitution for the EU and Turkey's EU membership, where a "political" interpretation of shared values won out over "thicker" versions of European identity.

This selective opening of EU-Europe to the originally "non-European" and its implications become apparent in the Commission's 2007 *European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World*,¹⁴⁸ affirmed also by the Council (2007b), which in fact subtly reinterpreted the principle of "unity in diversity" that had already informed the "culture" article of the Maastricht Treaty. This article, which officially founded cultural action on the EU level, had declared that "[t]he Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common heritage to the fore" (European Communities 1992: 30). This formulation prefigured what was to become the official motto of the EU in 2000 – "unity in diversity" and later, "united in diversity."¹⁴⁹ It implied a narrative of EU-Europeanness that established "unity" on the basis of a common *civilizational* heritage that encompassed (European) *national* and *regional* "diversity." This narrative emphasized what Europeans *share* as a means to establish cohesion and limited diversity to "originally" *European* national and regional cultures.

¹⁴⁸ A new approach to culture is presented as important in the context of increased diversity and cross-cultural influences due to migration and globalization. The Agenda proposes three objectives, to promote cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, to promote culture as a catalyst for creativity in view of the Lisbon strategy, and to promote culture as an element of the EU's international relations. While culture is to be understood in "all its facets," the actual measures proposed weigh more heavily on the classic cultural policy side.

¹⁴⁹ The motto was the winner of a school contest on initiative of a French newspaper. The original French - *Unité dans la diversité* – was first translated as "unity in diversity" and then as "united in diversity."

In its new *Agenda* about fifteen years later, the Commission had to reiterate the formula of the Maastricht Treaty, as this remained the basis for the EU's cultural action. However, it reinterpreted both what constituted "unity" and what "diversity" in EU-Europe. European cultural heritage, it noted, was "the result of centuries of creativity, migratory flows and exchanges" (European Commission 2007a: 2), thus giving up the notion of civilizational belonging and linear emplaced cultural transmission that drew a direct line "from Plato to NATO" (McBride 1988, cited in Shore 1993) in favor of a history of cultural exchanges, migration, and creative acts which was not necessarily excluding the "non-European." Thus, "diversity" was also no longer limited to *European* national and regional cultures.

Again, this inclusion of the non-European into EU-European diversity was done subtly, and coincides with the recent affirmation of the value of diversity in immigrant integration strategies. The *Agenda* stated that "cultural diversity needs to be nurtured in a context of openness and exchanges" to "simultaneously bring our common heritage to the fore and recognise the contribution of *all cultures present in our societies* (ibid: 8, emphasis added). That such "cultures present" were viewed also as those of "non-European" immigrants was indicated by an earlier statement in the text that grounded the necessity of a new *Agenda for Culture* on the claim that recent globalization (not, for example, European integration) "has contributed to the diversity of our societies" (ibid: 2).¹⁵⁰ This increased (non-European) diversity – which, we

¹⁵⁰ Previous rounds of 'exchange' under European colonial and imperial dominance, which in fact is the origin of much of the "diversity" in some EU member states, remain unmentioned as such, despite implicit references (such as to "linguistic ties" with other countries).

remember, the Commission wants to promote through “managed immigration” – the Commission continued, was both a “benefit” and potential problem:

This [increased diversity] has heightened our curiosity and capacity *to exchange with and benefit from* other cultures, and contributed to the diversity of our societies. However, this has also raised *questions about Europe's identity and its ability to ensure intercultural, cohesive societies*. (ibid: 2, emphasis added)

In brief, what constituted “unity” and what “diversity” in the European project had to be redefined because increased diversity constituted a problem for *cohesion* which, we can read between the lines, needed to be addressed among others by rethinking European identity constructions. The choice of the term *intercultural* (rather than multicultural) points at the way the Commission sought to do that – which we have addressed in the previous discussion. This approach, the *Agenda* implied, not only ensured greater cohesion, but also entailed benefits for economic competitiveness, “as Europe's cultural richness based on its diversity is also, and increasingly so, an important [economic] asset in an immaterial and knowledge-based world” (ibid: 3).

Based on the intercultural principle, European unity was no longer to be established on a shared cultural identity, but through the mediating force of shared *political* principles and values that included respect for diversity as long as the latter was itself respectful of the cultural rights of others (as the following chapters show in more depth). This not only served to ground the EU's legitimacy not so much on a relation of “representation” (in line with or modifying the national principle) as on its success in the mediation of differences within EU-Europe. The claim was that the EU had been successful because of

its ability to respect Member States' varied and intertwined history, languages and cultures, while forging common understanding and rules which have guaranteed peace, stability, prosperity and solidarity - and with them, a huge richness of cultural heritage and creativity to which successive enlargements have added more and more. (European Commission 2007a: 2)

This, moreover, was according to the Commission also to inform its external identity. The EU, it declared, fostered intercultural dialogue and human rights abroad (ibid: 7). More so, it had in fact the cosmopolitan mission to promote the principles that supposedly enabled the respect for diversity in EU-Europe. The EU, the *Agenda for Culture* declared, already is and must further enhance its international role as a “soft power’ founded on norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue” (ibid: 3). Chapter five discusses in more detail the implications in the case of Turkey’s EU accession.

This narrative of EU-Europeanness that includes (selectively) the non-European into the European project and founds its claim to internal legitimacy and external influence on (intercultural) “respect for diversity” and “human rights” will clearly not do the trick for the “neo-nationalists” opposing “European integration” in general and EU institutions in particular. However, it might speak to those on the liberal Left who are already supportive of the “European project” and who have been alienated by the civilizational view of Europe that evoked the national culturalist paradigms they sought to dismantle.

Conclusion

The politician from the Green party with whom we began this chapter declared later in the interview that the argument that something contributed to economic growth was

a very important lever with which one can justify things, can create legitimacy for entirely different things. I mean, we [the Green party] are using the same lever¹⁵¹ when we demand that culture is to be supported more, when we define this through the attractiveness of the city, tourism and so forth. Then one can still think by oneself that one actually wants to support culture because it constitutes a value in itself. ... But one will justify it with the fact that it is support for the economy.

The interview at large as well as the wider discussion above however showed that this economic argument has become much more than a “mere rationale” – it constitutes part of a dominant “economic imaginary” adjusted to and promoting a reality of (state) neoliberalization. As the following chapter shows, it clearly informs state practices oriented towards the creation of capital-conducive place. Thus, defining the value of cultural diversity through its supposed contribution to economic value-creation is far from harmless and in fact contradicts some of the aims that policy-makers declaredly set out to achieve.

¹⁵¹ She refers here to the EU's emphasis on economic criteria in the Lisbon strategy. She brought up this point in the context of a discussion of the EU Lisbon strategy, which in her view showed through points such as anti-discrimination policy where “the EU was further than state practices in Germany” that the EU did not simply subordinate the social to the economic. Then she brought in the culture argument with the statement that the economic was an “important lever” and that the Green party was “doing the same thing” with culture.

CHAPTER 4

Be Berlin: Diversity and Difference in the Intercultural, Creative City

This chapter examines the implications of the attempt to use culture's utilities in the making of capital-conducive place in Berlin for the "right to place" of differently marked populations and in this way also critically reflects on EU attempts to "meta-govern" cohesion on the basis of intercultural policies in line with demands of competitiveness. This concludes the thread of argument that has placed a polarized culturalist politics in the contradictions and prerogatives of neoliberal union and examined the development of intercultural policy as a particular response to these contradictions by critically interrogating some of its effects in place. The emphasis is here on showing how the Berlin government's attempt to pluralize regimes of belonging and entitlement in the city in opposition to culture-exclusivism in particular is limited by its adherence to the prerogative of creating capital-conducive place, a prerogative with which intercultural policy, in its (neo)liberal orientation, aligns through the particular limits it places on what kinds of differences count as support-worthy diversity. Thus, while *formally* everyone has the right to be and live anywhere in the intercultural city, this does not translate into a *substantive* right to place of populations marked by class and culture in the context of processes of gentrification promoted by intercultural and creative city policy in a declared attempt to activate culture's utilities. Here, moreover, the intercultural emphasis on "mixing" dovetails with a conservative demand to end "parallel societies." The case of Berlin thus

reflects critically on EU attempts to enhance cohesion and state legitimacy on the basis of intercultural policy by showing how the latter forms part of the contradictions that created problems of cohesion and legitimacy in the first place and is thus unlikely to “resolve” them.



Berlin is a unique city: creative, lively, and always in motion. The metropolis at the river Spree wins you over with its lively cultural and city life, as prime location for research and science, and as a flourishing location for young, future-oriented industry. The heart of the city however are the Berliners themselves.¹⁵²

Our city is full of life – it’s creative, energetic and cutting-edge. This city attracts people from all over the world. In an environment of unparalleled diversity, it captures the attitudes and lifestyles of people from over 180 nations and really makes the city by the Spree “the place to be.”¹⁵³

Berlin: a young, creative, diverse, cosmopolitan city, European cultural capital, center of innovation. This is the image that the campaign “Be Berlin” wants to create for the city nationally and internationally as a means to better position it in international competition.¹⁵⁴

Since 2008, the campaign is advertising the city as an attractive location and destination for creative, cosmopolitan people, companies, and tourists with innumerable modifications of its

¹⁵² <http://www.sei.berlin.de/kampagne/>, accessed February 2011; literal translation of the German version on the website of “Be Berlin” campaign.

¹⁵³ <http://www.be.berlin.de/en/campaign/>, accessed March 2011; official English version of the website of the “Be Berlin” campaign.

¹⁵⁴ Its “mission” is spelt out as follows: “The Berlin Senate launched the *be* Berlin capital city campaign in the spring of 2008. In 2009, the city is set to extend the campaign’s appealing invitation to be Berlin throughout Germany and to the world. In doing so, it will endeavor to confidently and strategically position itself as a major competitor among the world’s leading cities.” The linked webpage states then that the “goal is to strengthen Berlin’s positive image and to showcase the city on a national and international level as a great place to live and do business, as well as an exciting tourist destination.”

At: <http://www.be.berlin.de/en/campaign/mission/>, accessed March 2011.

motto “Be open, be free, be Berlin” – such as “Be unique, be diverse, be Berlin,”¹⁵⁵ “Be creative, be involved, be Berlin,” “Be art, be enjoyment, be Berlin,” “Be international, be diverse, be Berlin,”¹⁵⁶ or “Be Berlin, be Neukölln, be different.”¹⁵⁷ Berlin, is the message conveyed, is made by the people who live in the city, and these people are unique, diverse, creative, innovative. The message however can also be read with a different emphasis. The imperative of the slogans then signals that *in order to belong* to Berlin, in order to “be Berlin,” one *has to be* unique, diverse, creative, innovative. In brief, the message entails a particular *normativity*.

Based on a study of integration policy in Estonia, Gregory Feldman has posited “that studying policymaking processes offers a promising view on how cultural forms get reworked and remade to produce normative citizens ... against whom we are measured and ranked” (2010: 141).¹⁵⁸ He specified:

This is neither to argue that policy determines the outcome of complex subject-making processes nor that all possible discourses flow through policy circuits. Rather, the point is to recognize that policies institutionalize the authoritative discourses that contain the range of legitimate subject-positions. These discourses inform how networks of international, national, and local officials come together to pursue a commonly identified ‘policy problem.’ ... Implicitly or explicitly, policy articulates the normative qualities one must possess to ‘fit’ a particular political-economy (Martin 1994, p. xviii). (ibid: 141-2, emphasis added)

¹⁵⁵ If not noted otherwise, the slogans are from the “Be Berlin” brochure published by the Land Berlin in 2008.

¹⁵⁶ Slogan of the campaign Be Berlininternational.

¹⁵⁷ Title of description of the Intercultural Cities Program in a brochure on EU programs in Berlin (Senatskanzlei Berlin 2009: 53).

¹⁵⁸ In the case Gregory Feldman analyzes, the demand entailed in such “normative citizenship” was to create flexible, interethnic communities “cast as multicultural, democratic, and tolerant and unbothered by a state system that structurally marginalizes minorities” (2010: 151) and in this way, he argues, to reconcile the contradictory state aims “to secure and protect the Estonian culture and language in keeping with the decision to deny citizenship to Soviet-era immigrants” on the one hand and “to integrate Russian speakers as participants in an open, neoliberalizing, EU-bound Estonia” (2010:146) on the other. It thus speaks of processes of state-making and state transformation from the angle of the nation-state, in contrast to the EU and city levels the previous discussion has focused on.

In brief, policy “institutionalizes” particular normative subject positions that have a more complex social-political origin and, we can add, through such institutionalization inform state practice that differentially targets differently categorized individuals or social groups. Thus, “normative subject positions,” I suggest, also inform hierarchical constructions of belonging and entitlement embedded in state policy.¹⁵⁹

This chapter examines normative subject positions implicit in creative and intercultural city policy and some of their social-political origins as well as effects for the “right to place” in the city of such differently marked populations through three interrelated lenses – the latest German “integration debate” sparked by Berlin’s former Senator of Finance Thilo Sarrazin, the particular meaning that “diversity” has in intercultural city policies, and gentrification processes in Berlin. The chapter shows that while the intercultural, creative city might be “formally” open and the Berlin Senat pursue a “thick” notion of equality of opportunity, such right to place fails to produce substantive equality in belonging and entitlement as long as the political prerogative lies with the creation of capital-conducive place. As the *Be Berlin* campaign shows explicitly, the Berlin Senat has sought to position Berlin as a diverse and cosmopolitan city in international competition. This was not only a matter of creating the right image through a campaign, but also of “making place(s)” in the city in such a way that they would be attractive to capital. This has involved attempts at capitalizing on existing “assets” of culture and *diversity* and the

¹⁵⁹ The construction of belonging and entitlement in the political community has been conceptualized most often through the concept of (national) citizenship and the (civic, political, social) rights (Marshall & Bottomore 1992) associated with it. Belonging and entitlement – in particular also in “sub” and “supra”national contexts – however need not necessarily be formalized in this way, as this chapter shows.

management and control of *difference* that did not conform to the image of cosmopolitan place.

The concept of diversity as it has come to be implicitly defined in intercultural and creative city strategies, I suggest, thus needs to be seen despite its apparent inclusivity as an inherently limited and classist concept: not all forms of difference, that is, are seen as worthy of support. Those populations construed in opposition to the normative subject position of the *diverse individual* defined through (a particular relation to) culture and class appear as problematic *difference* which is not unconditionally embraced by policy-makers but which is rather a target of state management and control.

The notion that not all forms of *difference* count as *diversity* relies on the terminology that Thomas Hylland Eriksen has proposed for “two fundamentally distinctive ways of dealing with, and identifying, cultural variation” (2006b: 21) in current public discourse in Europe – support-worthy *diversity* on the one hand and problematic *difference* on the other:

Bluntly put, there is considerable support for diversity in the public sphere, while difference is increasingly seen as a main cause of social problems associated with immigrants and their descendants. In the present context, then, diversity should be taken to mean largely aesthetic, politically and morally neutral expressions of cultural difference. Difference, by contrast, refers to morally objectionable or at least questionable notions and practices in a minority group or category, that is to say notions and practices which are *held to* (i) create conflicts through direct contact with majorities who hold other notions, (ii) weaken social solidarity in the country ..., and (iii) lead to unacceptable violations of human rights within the minority groups. (ibid; emphasis added)

Difference, in this definition, appears as the practices and identities *seen as* in conflict with majority normativities, so that only those who are easily accommodated to the latter are subsumed under the positive heading of diversity.

While my research results similarly show that diversity is far from an inclusive concept, my analysis of the origins of the split between *diversity* and *difference* in the intercultural, creative city policy paradigm diverges from Eriksen's more general argument which ties it to "the freedom to choose – the ethos of consumerism or neo-liberalism" (ibid: 21). While I agree that the perceived choice, secured through formal rights, of cultural practices and attachments plays a central role in the construction of diversity, I see this as a more general trait of *liberalism*, including its *political* versions.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, while I agree that the construction of diversity needs to be seen as tied into neoliberal state projects and normativities, I do not see these as primarily defined through such an ethos of consumerism.

Rather, I posit, we need to pay attention to how the *diversity/difference* split feeds into attempts to dismantle welfare entitlements and to (in part in this way) activate "human resources" for the market, not least via the creation of "equality of opportunity." Moreover, it is tied into neoliberal normativities informed by the "economic imaginary" of competitiveness

¹⁶⁰ I take ("political") liberalism and ("economic") neoliberalism – without wanting to imply that one is reducible to the "political" and the other to the "economic" – as distinct political projects. This is in line with Don Robotham's distinction between "liberal social democracy" as "a position on the left of the political spectrum, critical of the social failures of capitalism but operating within the framework of private ownership of the means of production and the capitalist economy" (2009: 213) and "neoliberalism" as a doctrine "about the primacy that a free market must occupy in any feasible modern social order" (ibid: 214). While "liberal social democracy" was tied into Keynesianism (see ibid: 215), today's "political liberals" tend to be closer to "Third Way" perspectives that are quite compatible with neoliberalism.

in the knowledge economy discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, the normative constitution of *diversity* versus *difference* relies on the alleged economic ‘utility’ of differently ‘cultured’ individuals due to their supposed conformity with (liberal) norms of tolerance as well as (neoliberal ones of) creativity, entrepreneurialism, and self-reliance. Such ‘utility’, as the final section of this chapter shows, however, not only concerns an increase in productivity and competitiveness, as is foregrounded in politics, possibly to secure popular consent, but also the generation of rent.

The Politics of Pluralizing Belonging and Entitlement: Berlin in the National Context

Policy-makers in Berlin, as the previous chapter has already pointed at, have sought in recent years to develop a culturalist repertoire – for governing a multicultural population, for constituting belonging and entitlement in the (imagined) political community, for establishing state legitimacy – that diverges from national paradigms, which were found unsuitable for “contemporary” society in a “globalized world” and in particular for cities who have no control over the gates but have to simply deal with challenges of “cohesion.” Thus, the *Senat’s* embrace of interculturalism in integration policy is an explicit rejection of exclusionary or assimilationist positions, which are propagated in city politics in particular by the Christian Democrats and increasingly the neoliberal FDP. As the Berlin Senator for Social Issues declared in a plenary debate on the first version of Berlin’s integration concept:

The guideline [*Leitmotiv*] for integration policy of this *Senat* is: Encouraging diversity, strengthening cohesion! With this, we clearly and explicitly draw a line to conservative ideas of integration which confuse integration with assimilation.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ Verbatim protocol (Plenarprotokoll 15/72), Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin, plenary session Sept 1, 2005.

Such assimilationist or exclusionary positions have gained increased prevalence in both city and national politics. Berlin has in recent years been the focal point for several of Germany's periodic "integration debates"¹⁶² – for example the debate sparked by violence at the *Rütli-Schule* (a secondary school) in the *Bezirk Neukölln*, which led among others to demands to "repatriate" violent and criminal youth, notwithstanding the fact that these were generally born and raised in Germany.¹⁶³ Moreover, Berlin has seen its own stack of debates, sometimes in response to the city government's attempt at pluralizing regimes of belonging in the city. For example, the *Senat's* introduction of the obligatory subject "ethics" from 7th to 10th grade subsequent to voluntary attendance of "religion" (i.e. Catholic or Protestant faith) classes was to put students of a faith other than Christianity as well as those without confession on the same footing as Christians.¹⁶⁴ It provoked heated resistance, culminating in a referendum in 2009 that however approved of the city government's approach (11 percent voted). The *Senat's* introduction of the *Gemeinschaftsschule* (community school) – currently 20 schools in Berlin – rather than the German tri-partite system, which is to improve equality of opportunity among students of different class and cultural backgrounds, was similarly contested. These measures point at a "thick" vision of equality of opportunity as opposed to the emphasis on "formal

¹⁶² Periodically, public debate in Germany is dominated by themes relating to the so-called "integration of migrants" and, relatedly, the nation-state's take on immigration. In recent years, such debates have been sparked by international, national and local events.

¹⁶³ This debate coincided with Berlin's hosting of the soccer world championship in 2006 that brought about a public revival of German "patriotism." Given the "peaceful," "cosmopolitan" quality of the event, it was "alright" again to be proud to be German. Everybody else was proud, so why not we? was the general tenor of debate. Public (and private) discussion failed to draw a relation between a revived "patriotism" and the dominance of culture-exclusivist responses in the "Rütli" debate.

¹⁶⁴ In other German *Länder*, students usually have to choose between ethics or religion classes. The city website declares that the subject ethics "includes everyone and excludes no one." It "fits to Berlin" because, as a city of a "diversity of people of different origins, religions, worldviews, and cultural traditions, every young person has to be able to gain clarity about the basis of our society."

At: <http://www.berlin.de/sen/bildung/unterricht/ethik/index.php>

rights” in EU level intercultural policy, even though the goal remains equality of *opportunity* rather than more substantive equality.

Such measures of pluralizing belonging in the city were in clear contradistinction to and sometimes explicit confrontation with the national level (such as in the attempt to introduce communal voting rights for non-EU-citizens in Berlin). Thus, Kira Kosnick notes¹⁶⁵ that

Berlin has for several decades been at the forefront of changing integration politics. ... Immigrants and people of color living in Berlin still carried the *Ausländer* label,¹⁶⁶ foreigners in terms of symbolic national belonging, but they could be presented as part of the city¹⁶⁷ – a city that was increasingly trying to represent itself as the multicultural and cosmopolitan capital of a reunited Germany. (2007: 10)¹⁶⁸

This divergence from the national level was particularly pronounced in recent years, which saw a shift from attempts (under a federal government of the SPD and Greens) to move *away from* culture-exclusivist citizenship regulations based on *jus sanguinis* in the late 1990s/ early 2000s to increased culture-exclusivist policies through the 2000s in particular under the previous CDU/SPD and current CDU/FDP government, culminating in Angela Merkel’s recent declaration that “multiculturalism is dead.”¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Ruth Mandel in turn observes that the city of Berlin presents itself as “an experiment in the making of a distinctive German national narrative through the (re)constitution of a late- or even postmodern cosmopolitan city” (2008: 5).

¹⁶⁶ The *Ausländer* (‘person from outside the country’) label usually attaches in Germany to everyone of seeming non-German origin, whether or not they have German citizenship.

¹⁶⁷ The city offers itself as site of identification when national belonging continues to be tied to ethnicity. Many long-term residents in Berlin of non-German origin, when asked how they would describe themselves (e.g. as *Türkischdeutsch* (Turkish German) or *Deuschtürke* (German Turk)), answer that they are “Berliners.”

¹⁶⁸ It remains to be seen how the recent elections and the formation of a coalition of the Social Democrats with the Christian Democrats, who to the greatest extent support culture-exclusivist assimilationism (i.e. demands for assimilation where exclusion is not possible based on assumptions that Stolcke (1995) has called “cultural fundamentalist”), will affect this.

¹⁶⁹ “Multiculturalism” in Germany never meant the recognition of special rights for cultural minorities, but more basically, cultural appreciation and tolerance and measures such as the support for immigrant cultural organization, cultural festivals, and the like. Critics of “multiculturalism” renew assimilation demands, which are doubly problematic as the notion that one can only “be”, not “become” German continues to be strong.

In the early 2000s, there was increased acceptance, also on part of the conservatives, that Germany is indeed “a country of immigration.” The federal government, a coalition of the SPD and Greens under Chancellor Schröder, was consequently able to push through a reform in national citizenship laws that entailed a move away from the principle of *jus sanguinis* as basis for citizenship.¹⁷⁰ This benefitted in particular the descendents of immigrants, who can now acquire double citizenship (though have to decide by age 21 for either of them), and was linked in particular to the long-standing rejection by the Green party of culture-exclusivist formulations of national identity. However, the easing of access to place was also driven by the attempt to attract high-skilled migrants – the “Indian programmer/computer scientist” was here the paradigmatic figure, leading to a campaign of the Christian Democrats against the initiative with the motto *Kinder statt Inder* (Children instead of Indians) – which led Schröder to propose a German Greencard system for IT specialists (in place from 2000-2004), in fact an updated “guest-worker” system for the high-skilled, as it only allowed for a stay of up to 5 years.

Culture-exclusivist positions again gained the upper hand in the aftermath of events such as September 11, the murder of film-maker Van Gogh, and the cartoon debate in the Netherlands, which served culture-exclusivists and some liberals to posit a fundamental incompatibility between “the West” and “Islam.” In particular immigrants and their descendants from Turkey and Middle Eastern countries were construed as problematic difference through the association with Islam, as became apparent in debates in Germany on the building of mosques,

¹⁷⁰ On the foundation of German citizenship on culture-exclusivist notions of national identity, see e.g. (Brubaker 1992; White 1997).

the wearing of headscarves by teachers, “forced marriage” and “import brides,” or “migrant youth” violence.

In recent years, such tropes of cultural incompatibility have also been linked to declaredly “failed integration” in *socioeconomic* terms, that is, in terms of upward social mobility, education, and employment compared to immigrants from other countries. To illustrate, a local boulevard newspaper in Berlin titled “Our Vietnamese are more German than the Turks” in the aftermath of a much-discussed study in 2009 with the title “Unused Potential” on different degrees of “integration” of immigrant groups in Berlin, measured in particular in terms of “success” in education and the labor market.¹⁷¹ The more widespread assumption that this newspaper headline conveyed was of course that it was cultural difference that was responsible for unemployment and low-wage-employment of immigrants from “Muslim countries” in particular, erasing a complex history of “guest-worker” immigration, rapid deindustrialization, the slashing of social budgets on both federal and city levels, the state-supported increase in low-wage and workfare employment, and (in part structural) discrimination in past and present (see e.g. Lanz 2007).

On the federal level, the relative strength of culture-exclusivism combined with the continued tendency to establish the value of immigrants through their “economic” contribution to society has led to renewed demands for a restrictive/selective immigration regime combined with more assimilationist integration policies. For example, since 2007, non-citizen family members

¹⁷¹ The study was conducted by the *Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung* and is available on its website: http://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Zuwanderung/Integration_RZ_online.pdf

of residents and citizens in Germany have to show command of basic German in order to receive a “family reunion” visa, i.e. *before* they enter Germany. While justified with the needs of “cohesion” and a proven will to “integration,” this requirement of course entails a selection process based on economic and cultural capital: who, for example, can afford the high prices of German language classes at the Goethe-Institute in Turkey (in Istanbul or Ankara) which give certificates if she happens to live close to one, or learn German on her own?

This moreover points at the way in which constitution of belonging links up with questions of entitlement. The goal of the above policies is also to ensure “integration” into the labor market and thus avoid that immigrants have to be supported through social security schemes. This has prime relevance in a context where these are severely embattled. Debate and political contestation in Germany here focuses on what is popularly called “*Hartz IV*”: the 2005 “reform” in social services, which established a unitary *Arbeitslosengeld II* (“unemployed money”)¹⁷² in place of the previous *Abeitslosenhilfe* (“unemployed help”) and *Sozialhilfe* (“social help”) and in fact reduced it to below the level of the latter. Presented as a means to reduce unemployment, it was primarily a (not quite successful) means to reduce social spending. *Hartz IV* has become the symbol for the neoliberal policies of the red-green coalition government under Chancellor Schröder, continued by subsequent governments, undercutting welfare entitlements and moving towards workfare through measures such as so-called “One-Euro-Jobs.”¹⁷³ Together

¹⁷² There is a differentiation between *Arbeitslosengeld I* (which unemployed can receive for a length of 18 months) and *Arbeitslosengeld II* (which is lower and unemployed receive subsequently to this initial period).

¹⁷³ These are jobs of “public interest” for recipients of *Arbeitslosengeld II* which are meant to allow for a re-entering of the labor market and pay from 1 to 2,5 Euros an hour in addition to the amount received through *Arbeitslosengeld II*. Unemployed persons who refuse to take such jobs can be sanctioned with a 30 percent

with the persistent refusal of the national government (until recently) to set a minimum wage and a number of other measures such as attempts at reducing *Lohnnebenkosten* (non-wage labor costs), this has increased low-wage and low-security employment and class inequalities in Germany, as well as worsened the conditions of the unemployed. In the case of Berlin, the federal dismantling of welfare entitlements has coincided with the local slashing of social spending as a consequence of the city's near financial collapse in the early 2000s, itself, as Stefan Krätke (2004) argues, in part a result of misled policies throughout the 1990s, all the while unemployment had increased tremendously as local industries collapsed in both formerly eastern and western parts of the city.

In this context, who is or is not entitled to what kind of benefits and what kind of support has been a central theme of public debates in Germany and often found culturalist expression. Thus, the national CDU found much support with their repeated declarations that "multiculturalism is dead" also because "multiculturalism" had come to be associated with support for so-called "parallel societies" (*Parallelgesellschaften*) of Turkish immigrants in particular who were claimed to have gotten "comfortable in the welfare state" (*sich im Wohlfahrtsstaat einrichten*).

Berlin's adoption of *intercultural* (rather than multicultural) integration strategies promoted within EU-city networks and the foregrounding of a cosmopolitan identity for the city as well as the limitations (discussed in later sections) of this particular embrace of diversity need to be

reduction of *Arbeitslosengeld*. This measure was critiqued among others for replacing regular employment in certain sectors and repressing wages.

seen in this dually embattled terrain. Important to note here is that the city government is confronted with the consequences of both culture-exclusivist regimes of belonging on the national level and the federal downsizing of welfare entitlements as a significant part of Berlin's population is politically excluded (via lack of citizenship) and/or unemployed. It is against this backdrop of high (German citizens) and exorbitant (other nationalities) levels of unemployment in a fiscally "broke" city that the latest "integration debate" in Germany sparked by Thilo Sarrazin has to be seen. The more so, as Thilo Sarrazin – former Senator of Finance in Berlin – was a key person in the management of Berlin's "fiscal crisis" via a course of austerity in particular in social spending. And just as in the current moment the fiscal crisis of EU member states is being "managed" through recourse to culturalist stereotyping justifying the imposition of "German" financial discipline onto "overspending and lazy Southerners," supposedly to animate them to greater work ethics, Sarrazin took recourse to classist culturalism in his propositions for how Berlin was to be "saved" economically.¹⁷⁴ While his austerity course in Berlin had won him a place on the executive board of the German Federal Bank, his comments that sparked the debate discussed below cost him his job. Hypocritically, as some say, as Sarrazin's stance towards immigrants and what he called the German *Unterschicht* was widely known and debated before his appointment to the German Federal Bank.

The Sarrazin Debate: The Turkish Grocer's Productive Function in the City of the Elites

During his time as Senator of Finance in Berlin (2002-2009), Thilo Sarrazin had acquired notoriety with his derogatory statements on immigrants and the German *Unterschicht*

¹⁷⁴ I thank Don Kalb for pointing out to me this wider relevance of the "Sarrazin moment" in the current crisis.

(underclass/ lower class). In city politics, he had complemented his support for broadly neoliberal policies, including reduced social spending, with volunteered suggestions for *Hartz IV* recipients on how to feed themselves for less than 4 Euros a day (the amount foreseen for food in the calculation of social security benefits on national level). After he had left Berlin for his position at the German Federal Bank in 2009, Sarrazin produced a new *éclat* with national reverberations with an interview for the magazine *Lettre Internationale*. The text was entitled “Quality Rather Than Quantity – From Capital of Transfer Payments to City of the Elites” (*Klasse statt Masse: Von der Hauptstadt der Transferleistungen zur Metropole der Eliten*) and entailed Sarrazin’s vision for achieving this transformation. Hotly debated at the time,¹⁷⁵ the issue flared up again one year later subsequent to a pre-publication of parts of his new book in the magazine *Spiegel*. In the book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany Abolishes Itself), Sarrazin painted an apocalyptic vision of the demise of Germany as a consequence of failed immigration and integration policy and proposed measures to improve the latter to avoid this fate. While Sarrazin’s mostly outrageous statements might seem far off the political mainstream, this is not in fact the case. The debate is thus highly relevant because it shows particularly well what is taken for granted and what contested in the contemporary politics of belonging and entitlement and thus also points at some of the wider political-social origins of both the (neo/liberal) embrace of diversity and its particular limits. In particular, it shows an uncanny affinity between interculturalism and Sarrazin’s brand of racist and classist culturalism which reflects moreover, given Sarrazin’s personal background as “manager of fiscal collapse and

¹⁷⁵ Because this debate took place after I had already left Berlin, I draw in the following mostly on media coverage and commentary by left, center-left, and conservative national and local (Berlin) newspapers, which I read against the backdrop of my earlier research results.

finance,” interestingly onto the culturalism of the financial system now contributing to the management of austerity in EU member states. Support for diversity, it seems, can turn very quickly into the control of difference when it seems to constitute a “cost” rather than a “benefit” to the system.

While those proposing intercultural strategies for cohesion and competitiveness in Berlin would outright reject any association with Sarrazin’s racist and culturalist arguments, I suggest here and elaborate in the following that the hierarchies he establishes in fact very much dovetail with the normative subject positions entailed in creative and intercultural city policies as well as the *Senat’s* strategy of creating place conducive to capital. In fact, by combining the embrace of immigrant diversity for the sake of competitiveness in the knowledge economy with a culture-exclusivist rejection of “difference” in the form of the unemployed immigrant, Sarrazin shows how interculturalism can inadvertently be complicit with the culture-exclusivism it rejects because it buys into the logic of attributing cultured individuals (differential) economic utility.

Sarrazin contested the rightful belonging and entitlement of in particular “Arabic” and “Turkish” immigrants and their descendants in Berlin (Sarrazin 2009) and Germany (Sarrazin 2010), merging cost-benefit with culturalist and racist notions. The individual contribution to a competitive, knowledge-based economy constituted for him the yardstick establishing hierarchies in belonging and entitlement in particular but not only of those of ‘non-German’ origin. Berlin had the problem, he declared, of “forty percent lower class births,” and given that “human talent is in part socially, in part genetically determined,” the percentage of “intelligent

achievers" (*intelligente Leistungsträger*) was continuously falling (2009: 198,200). Therefore, he noted, "the intellect that Berlin needs has to be imported, and it will be imported" (ibid: 199).

In this regard, he was optimistic, he declared:

The well-educated people live where they like it best. Industry, which is increasingly immaterial and entails a growing portion of services and intellectual work, will go where the best human capital can be found. ... Among these centers, Berlin will increase in importance. Top attorneys, business consultants, manager, engineers, scientists – many would like to live in Berlin ... (ibid: 198)

In brief, what Florida calls the "creative class" – an argument Sarrazin evokes implicitly – had to and would be attracted to Berlin, while "the about 20 percent of the population which are not needed economically in Berlin, 20 percent live off *Hartz IV* and transfer payments ... this part has to grow out" (ibid: 198). He immediately linked this statement directed against the "*Unterschicht*" in general to a discussion of particular immigrant groups (with for him too high birthrates (ibid: 199)):

A great number of Arabs and Turks in this city, whose number has increased due to the wrong kind of policies, has no productive function apart from trade in groceries [sic], and in all likelihood no opportunities will develop. This is the same for parts of the German lower class... (ibid: 198)

The lack of "productive function" he attributed to the "Turkish grocer" – one of the most cited and most contested of his statements – needs to be read against the backdrop of his answer to the interview question what kind of dream he had of Berlin:

I would turn Berlin into a city of the elite. ... Part of that will entail to let the non-achievers (*Nichtleistungsträger*) know that they should non-achieve (*nichts leisten*) somewhere else. ... I would say: Everyone who can and wants to achieve something here is welcome, the rest should go somewhere else. ... Then it would be clear that one wants a city of elites and not a "capital of transfer payments" (*Transferleistungen*). The media is oriented towards the social problem, but Turkish tea houses cannot make the city advance. (2009: 201)

In his vision of the “city of the elites,” Sarrazin thus contested the right of belonging and entitlement in the city of all those who did not fall into the category of the “achievers.” This included the working “non-elites” (those working in other than the top “creative” professions), but in particular also the “unemployed *Unterschicht*” and most of all, Turkish and Arabic immigrants (other immigrant groups were portrayed more positively) who were, he declared, “to the greatest part neither willing nor capable of integration” (ibid: 199):

I do not have to recognize anyone who lives off the state, rejects this state, does not properly take care of the education of his children, and constantly produces new little headscarf girls.

Just as in the statement above, Sarrazin constructed *difference* on the basis of “non-integration” in the labor market (and thus reliance on “the state”) and supposed violation of political-liberal norms. In fact, the former was for him due to the latter. Most Muslims, Sarrazin posited in his later book, migrated to Germany in order to rely on the too generous German welfare system (2010). This, he declared, was due to the particular mix of “Islamic religiosity” and “traditional ways of life” of Muslim immigrants which

inhibits economic and cultural integration and furthermore results, due to the related deficient emancipation of women, in the particular abundance of children of Muslim migrants, which is further fostered through the benefits of the welfare state. (2010)

Sarrazin’s view of who can or cannot contribute to “making the city advance” thus linked hierarchies of class in the knowledge economy to those of culturalism and racism (applied to the “German *Unterschicht*” just as to the “Turkish grocer”). The predominant factor for him however was class.¹⁷⁶ Thus, he noted in the book excerpt that an immigrant with sufficient

¹⁷⁶ However, he tied the capacity to become an “achiever” as well as of “integration” to culturalist deterministics. Belonging and entitlement for the “non-German non-achievers” in a second step was tied to the latter: For example, his statement that Muslim immigrants were welcome to stay in Germany as long as they respected “our”

qualifications for a Green Card would of course be accepted even if he was from a Muslim country (2010). His demand that immigration be restricted to the high-skilled and that immigrants should no longer receive *Transferleistungen* (transfer payments) thus logically followed from the agenda described above (2009: 199).

The term *Transferleistungen* has with the shift to *Hartz IV* (establishing *Arbeitslosengeld*) come to replace in Germany the previous terms “unemployment help” (*Arbeitslosenhilfe*) and “social help” (*Sozialhilfe*) in public lingua. Rather than denoting social *solidarity*, as the latter do, it emphasizes *transfer* and is thus used by those who want to imply that financial resources are redistributed – “transferred” – from those who “work”, are “productive”, and “contribute to the common good” to those who are assumed to do and be none of these things. Sarrazin’s use of the term highlights his political and normative alignment with the neoliberal shift from welfare to workfare, where, as Rose argued, “labour alone is to be the means by which the poor can acquire the status of citizen” (2004: 164). However, while Sarrazin can seek to reduce the entitlements of what he calls the German *Unterschicht*, he cannot easily contest their belonging (in the state, though he attempts to exclude them from the “city of elites”) and thus has to make a minimum of concessions (that is, he cannot easily refuse them *Transferleistungen* tout coup the way he does for immigrants). In this light, Sarrazin’s culturalism appears as embedded in a class project of dismantling welfare entitlements which exploits the precarious belonging of immigrant populations.

laws, did not oppress women or raise violent youth, and made their own living implied that most did not do so (2010).

In the view that Sarrazin represents, those who constitute a “cost” rather than a “benefit” for the state – those relying on “transfer payments” supposedly due to their “cultural dispositions” – lose the right to place and entitlements. However, the use of one’s labor in itself is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for full entitlement in the political community ordered for competitiveness. The high-skilled Muslim migrant is welcomed, the Turkish grocer at best tolerated by Sarrazin. While this dimension of the hierarchy he established was publicly embattled – public responses in the media tended to be particularly outraged by the derogatory statements about the Turkish grocer (see below) – the attribution of value to the creative worker and its denial to the unemployed went largely unquestioned.

Sarrazin was not only critiqued harshly, but also received widespread support for “finally expressing publicly what many are thinking privately” about the ‘refusal of (some) migrants to integrate,’ and this not only by the Right. Sarrazin’s (enforced) resignation from his position at the German Federal Bank and the steps taken to exclude him from the Social Democrat Party (which failed)¹⁷⁷ were linked primarily to his so-called “biologist” remarks (rarely called “racist”) about inherited intelligence (or lack thereof) and about a particular gene shared by Jewish people. In contrast, his culturalist statements on the reasons of failed *integration* and the costs rather than economic contribution of (some) immigrants garnered wide-spread support.

¹⁷⁷ The social democrats were divided over the question whether or not to exclude Sarrazin from the party, with much of the “basis” being very critical of the party elite for not having done so. While the Greens and the *Linke* were vocal in their critique of Sarrazin, the CDU as well as the FDP tended to agree with him.

Such support has many sources. Of course, Sarrazin's statements played into the hands of those (mostly on the far- and center-right)¹⁷⁸ who demand more restrictive immigration policies and see "integration" as a process of immigrants conforming to a German *Leitkultur*¹⁷⁹ (without ever *really* being able to "become German," as this still tends to be linked to descent). The underlying notions of Germanness are common-sense and thus have broad appeal. Sarrazin's statements moreover resonated with those liberals who see Islam by force as a threat for liberal society.

Sarrazin's views however also found support, I suggest, because his decrying of 'transfer payments' from the 'productive' to the 'unproductive,' which sprang from a neoliberal political project and normativity, articulated with the wide-spread popular value given to labor and "work ethic" [*Arbeitsmoral*]. In browsing online newspaper forums, I noticed that many positive responses to Sarrazin's theses came from the large part of the population that, as they stated explicitly, barely made a living through employment – but was proud of working at all. Rather than demanding policies that would secure a living wage, they critiqued that a non-working ("lazy") population received the same amount of money or more from the state, pointing out that they themselves would nevertheless not rely on the work of others – thus inadvertently offering support to those (neoliberals) largely responsible for their condition.¹⁸⁰ Maybe not surprisingly against this backdrop, Sarrazin received most approval from people with the lowest

¹⁷⁸ The right-wing NPD (National Party of Germany) of Saxony tauntingly offered him the job of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* (Commissioner for Foreigners) (*Die Zeit* online, Sept 29, 2009).

<http://www.zeit.de/2009/42/01-Sarrazin-Integration?page=1>

¹⁷⁹ The notion of a *Leitkultur* (lead culture) was brought into public debate in 2000 by a top Christian Democrat in the context of the reform of German citizenship law. It was directed against multiculturalist policy and demanded that immigrants adjust to "foundational cultural principles" in Germany.

¹⁸⁰ A similar logic is at work when Merkel's denouncement of the "lazy Greeks" finds resonance.

educational level (likely to work in low-pay jobs) and from supporters of the neoliberal party FDP according to a survey for the magazine *Stern*.¹⁸¹ However, the equation of unemployment with laziness is clearly not limited to these social groups. I have frequently encountered the statement by people working in professional jobs that they, if faced with unemployment, would do “any kind of job” rather than relying on the welfare system. Those professing these views do not necessarily employ culturalism. However, when unemployment is reduced to laziness, it is not a big step to explain the much higher percentage of unemployment among immigrants and their descendants with supposed cultural propensities – in particular given wide-spread culturalist stereotyping and the structural discrimination of national institutions and identities that link entitlement to exclusionary notions of belonging.

The wide-spread way in which supposed economic utility informs the attribution of social value in particular of immigrant populations is further illustrated by the gist of the *critical* mainstream contributions which did not question the standards through which Sarrazin established belonging and entitlement but rather focused on whether or not immigrants indeed failed to fulfill its demands. For example, critics highlighted that there are many high-skilled Turkish German entrepreneurs. Özcan Mutlu, Green member of the *Abgeordnetenhaus*, noted that there are 6000 German-Turkish entrepreneurs in Berlin who created almost 20.000 jobs.¹⁸² Many newspapers ran portraits of ‘successful’ Turkish immigrants and their descendants. In line

¹⁸¹ Daniela Vates, Damir Fras: Spiel mit dem Populismus. *Berliner Zeitung online*. Sept 2, 2010. At: <http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/fall-sarrazin---die-parteien-distanzieren-sich-vom-bundesbankvorstand--doch-die-waehler-unterstuetzen-seine-thesen-teilweise--friedman-haelt-sie-fuer-gefaehrlich--spiel-mit-dem-populismus,10810590,10740050.html>

¹⁸² Cited in: Seith, Anne: Bundesbank: Sarrazin’s türkenfeindliche Tiraden lösen Entsetzen aus. *Spiegel Online*, October 10, 2009. At: <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,652571,00.html>

with popular notions of work ethic, Sarrazin's prioritization of the creative workers in the knowledge economy was however contested. Thus, Sarrazin's derogatory attitude towards the "Turkish grocer" was widely criticized, usually with the argument that one should appreciate that he "does something" rather than relying on the German state, tying into the earlier mentioned articulation of popular with neoliberal normativity.

The fact that neoliberal norms that serve the dismantling of welfare entitlements articulate to an extent with the popular value attributed to labor and work ethic might explain to good measure how neoliberal value structures with their emphasis on self-reliance, productivity, entrepreneurialism, and the individualization of risk have become hegemonic in Germany. As a critical commentary differing from the mainstream noted, political parties in Germany adhere without exception to a mode of thought that treats people as "human resources" and uses criteria of usefulness, usability, or productivity as a normative standard, including the Greens and the socialists, although they might not express it as openly as Sarrazin did.¹⁸³ This point seems proven by an interview given by Renate Künast, a key figure of the Green party in Germany who ran against city mayor Wowereit in the last elections (and lost, though the Greens still gained a whopping 17.6 percent). She answered the question of the interviewer whether the Green party was still "Left" with "Yes." A position of the Left for the Greens, she declared, was about "equality of opportunity," "not leaving anyone behind," and "not living at

¹⁸³ Steinfeld, Thomas: Thilo Sarrazin: Die Guten ins Töpfchen, die Schlechten ins Kröpfchen. Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 30, 2008. At: <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/thilo-sarrazin-die-guten-ins-toepfchen-die-schlechten-ins-kroepfchen-1.994024>

the expense of others”¹⁸⁴ – key themes of the workfare state. Incidentally, the discussion was followed by Künast’s declaration that “as a Green politician,” she also wanted to approach (“*ran wollen an*”) the “creative and responsible bourgeoisie in the political center or just a millimeter to the left of it.”¹⁸⁵

As Schmidtke has argued, to explain why “seemingly enlightened circles” support Sarrazin’s theses, one needs to turn to the mainstream of current immigration debates where dominant – and seemingly progressive – perspectives evaluate immigrants almost exclusively on the basis of their macroeconomic utility: “A world view which perceives migrants primarily as commodities on a global labor market always already entails aversion against the seeming ‘unproductive’” (Schmidtke 2010: 51, original in German). This is the danger that attempts at pluralizing regimes of belonging and entitlement by using neoliberal economicist arguments face.¹⁸⁶ If diversity is valued as a resource, what happens to those forms of cultural difference which do not seem to have (such) a utility on the market or even seemingly hinder the construction of “cosmopolitan place” conducive for capital? Sarrazin’s statements render explicit what remains implicit in intercultural support for *diversity*. While the latter emphasizes

¹⁸⁴ She continues: “We are a modern, liberal-thinking Left which does not correspond to the categories of the 70s and 80s. We do not promise transfer payments for particular groups and say: everything will be fine. Justice is for the Greens first of all education. Even during a financial crisis, we say that one has to always justify and account for new debts.”

¹⁸⁵ “Ich will ran an das kreative Bürgertum“: Renate Künast über das Spitzenduo der Grünen im Bundestagswahlkampf, mögliche Koalitionen und die Ziele der Partei. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 7, 2009, p. 5.

¹⁸⁶ In a tongue-in-cheek manner, the *Globale Medienwerkstatt* in Berlin sent a letter to Sarrazin’s “employee”, the head of the German federal bank Axel Weber, where they proposed to organize a seminar for the executive board of the bank to “prepare Mr Sarrazin for the diversity in this country” (*Neues Deutschland*, October 9, 2009. At: <http://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/157050.vitamine-ohne-produktive-funktion.html>). The term “diversity” is still an embattled concept, it continues to hold attraction for those seeking to revise long-standing German constructions of belonging and entitlement. Therefore, it is even more important to show that the way the concept of diversity has been activated in recent policy continuous to rely implicitly on the production of the *different* subject in its merging of culturalism and class.

the role it can play as a resource for competitiveness, Sarrazin posits that cultural *difference* failing to do so constitutes a strain on the state and economy. And in fact, as we will see in the following, the invocation of difference is never far away when the value of diversity is being promoted.

Diversity: Normative Subject Position(s) in the Intercultural, Creative City

Corinna Schornberg, the Green politician cited at length in the previous chapter, had explained to me why Berlin's "internationality" constituted a potential asset in inter-local competition in the following way:

Berlin has quite interesting potential in terms of a well-educated workforce with multicultural background and all that. We have relatively big communities both from eastern European states and for example from the Middle East, not only the classic Turkish migrants who are always written about in the newspapers, a relatively well-educated English-speaking community and all that. This could actually be a locational advantage [*Standortvorteil*] for many things.

The potential of a well-educated multicultural workforce here emerges against the backdrop of the "classic Turkish migrant written about in the newspapers" – in brief, the figure that Sarrazin paints of him/her. In the same vein, the integration official cited in the previous chapter had emphasized that Berlin could not be equated with its borough Neukölln (standing in for the "classic Turkish migrant") but also had a positive image that stemmed from the new, creative, temporary migrants attracted by the city.

Examples abound of this opposition between the "diversity" interculturalism embraces and the "other" this implies. Thus, when the then Berlin Senator for Social Issues, Heidi Knake-Werner,

discussed the *Senat's* integration concept in a plenary debate in the *Abgeordnetenhaus*,¹⁸⁷ she initially emphasized that “the diversity of Berlin is an opportunity and not a deficit.” She continued: “We support internationality and competition, which develop from diversity, and we work to limit exclusion and ensure equitable social relations [*gleichberechtigtes¹⁸⁸ Miteinander*].” After thus lauding the potential of diversity for competitiveness, she pointed out that there are however “clear limits” when it comes to democracy, basic rights, and the rule of law: “Forced marriage, violence against women, and discrimination are not foundational values of our society.” These particular examples of unacceptable difference of course implicitly referred to the stereotypical view of Muslim immigrants. Though this does not exhaust my list of similar examples, let me conclude it here with a particularly visual one, a brochure of the Berlin *Senat* (Senatskanzlei Berlin 2009) which presented various EU-funded projects in Berlin, among them the *Intercultural Cities* program. *Intercultural Cities*, the accompanying text explained, sought to find a form of living-together in which cultural diversity was understood and lived as an opportunity, not a problem. The accompanying photo however presented an exact counterpoint to this claim. It captured the inside of a room where people were meeting around a table in front of a white board on which a number of keywords were jotted: *Forced marriage. Violence. Honor killings. Oppression.*

The implicit or explicit opposition between the supposedly differently cultured, between *diversity* and *difference*, I suggest, is paradigmatic of the intercultural embrace of diversity.

¹⁸⁷ Plenarprotokoll 15/72 Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin of the plenary session Sept 1, 2005.

¹⁸⁸ This term in fact invokes the liberal interpretation of equality as concerning equality in formal rights (*gleichberechtigt* literally translates as “of equal rights”).

Diversity, I posit, constitutes a partial rather than inclusive concept, despite appearance to the contrary. Thus, the notion of “diversity” in interculturalism refers to a particular subject position of the diverse individual that acquires the status of the norm through which hierarchies in belonging and entitlement are established and which influences, as I show later, the way policy oriented along it unequally structures the right to place. The limits inherent in this concept of diversity have their social-political origin in the necessarily limitations on equality in a liberal-capitalist society and the particular shape this takes in the contemporary moment and the particular context of Berlin, as highlighted by the Sarrazin debate, which also showed that these limits are established through class position on the one hand and a particular relation to “culture” on the other hand.

Let us recall: one of the hallmarks of intercultural integration strategies is respect for diversity. In EU level policy (see chapter 3),¹⁸⁹ this is framed as an *individual* right to cultural practice and identity where this does not conflict with the individual rights of anyone else. Universal principles such as human rights are to both guarantee individual rights to culture¹⁹⁰ and ensure that any one’s cultural rights do not encroach on those of others. This is a classic *liberal* principle of the management of freedom (also adopted by liberal cosmopolitan theories of

¹⁸⁹ In the following, I draw on the analysis of the EU documents that also informed the previous chapter.

¹⁹⁰ As William Hale notes, while “the rights of individuals are fairly well established in international human rights instruments, those of collectivities ... are not. As an example, the European Convention of Human Rights nowhere mentions minority rights as such. In the absence of a clear entitlement to independence or autonomy, the question of cultural rights (in particular the use of minority languages in education and for other official purposes) appears to be the most critical issue.” (2003: 116) As Mark Mazower (2004) explains, human rights rose as a conceptual foundation after the failure of the minority rights regime of the inter-war period in Europe; they were to protect minorities through *individual* rather than *group* rights and thus avoid politicization of a collective sort. While in recent decades, the “right to culture” of cultural *groups* has been increasingly central to formulations of human rights claims (Cowan et al 2001) and partly found its way into indigenous and multicultural rights regimes (Hale 2005; Speed & Sierra 2005), the EU largely adheres to the interpretation of human rights as *individual* rights.

Europe, see e.g. Beck and Grande 2004).¹⁹¹ Not included in the right to diversity are, as the EU puts it, “cultural and religious practices” (presumably within minority groups) that

prevent individual migrants from exercising other fundamental rights or from participating in the host society. This is particularly important as it pertains to the rights and equality of women, the rights and interests of children, and the freedom to practice or not to practice a particular religion” (Council of the European Union 2004: 23).

This reiterates the statement of the Berlin Senator for Social Issues cited above, who had similarly distinguished between support-worthy diversity and unacceptable difference. Although, as mentioned above, Berlin goes beyond granting formal rights in seeking to ensure equality of opportunity through more structural changes in education and the like, its integration strategy similarly foregoes *collective* support in an explicit rejection of multiculturalism (see also chapter 3) and sets adherence to the German constitution as limit to acceptable diversity (although the official working on immigrant integration cited at length in the previous chapter, Mark Neuer, emphasized that this concerned both German citizens and immigrants and that it was assumed that most immigrants “move on the grounds of the constitution”).

The first normative dimension that frames the subject position of diversity is thus adherence to liberal norms – in particular of human rights, (liberal) democracy, and tolerance. (As we have seen above, these were also invoked by Sarrazin). While this resembles liberal multiculturalism,

¹⁹¹ Culture has emerged as a problem for contemporary liberals because, as stated by Kymlicka (2001), it can be seen not just as an expression of individual freedom, but as constraining it. That is, not all cultural practices are seen as compatible with individual freedom or autonomy. And as Foucault among others has pointed out, liberal governmental practice “must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etcetera” (2008: 63-4). Part of that (state) management of freedom has been the system of rights – combined with the force of police and law – which is to ensure that the overall order of (liberal) freedom is not encroached upon by those who do not value (this form of) liberty.

interculturalism adds a second normative dimension in its emphasis on intercultural dialogue, exchange, and mixing. As the concept for the *Intercultural Cities* program puts it, intercultural strategies aim at “cross-fertilisation across all boundaries, between ‘majority’ and ‘minorities’, ‘dominant’ and ‘sub’ cultures, localities, classes, faiths, disciplines and genres, as the source of cultural, social, civic and economic innovation” (Council of Europe & European Commission 2008: 10-11). As a means to foster such exchange, interculturalism foregoes acknowledgement of *collective* right to culture or representation of cultural groups, in explicit opposition to multiculturalism (e.g. Council of Europe & European Commission 2008: 5).¹⁹² On EU level, diversity is exclusively recognized through the *individual* right to cultural practice and identity.¹⁹³ Similarly, Mark Neuer had emphasized that the Berlin *Senat* sought to avoid support for bounded cultural communities (chapter 3).

From this emerges a view of diversity that consists of differently cultured *individuals* engaging in practices of exchange and mixing. It is such diversity of the *cultured, tolerant, and open-minded individual* which, as proponents of interculturalism claim, constitutes an “asset” in a knowledge economy that relies on the creativity and intercultural skills of its workforce for innovation and competitiveness. As the Commission states in its “explanatory memorandum” on a “European Year of Creativity and Innovation:”

¹⁹² In this regard, it differs from what Hale has called “neoliberal multiculturalism” in the Central American context, namely, an “integral relationship between these new [collective] cultural rights and neoliberal political economic reforms” which stands in contrast with what is “often assumed [to be] the central tenet of neoliberalism,... the triumph of an aggressively individualist ideology of ‘economic man’” (Hale 2005: 12). Interculturalism in fact aligns more closely with this latter ideology.

¹⁹³ The EU documents on integration analyzed nowhere mention a right to self-organization or political representation of cultural communities, but rather the right to the “practice of diverse cultures and religions” (Council of the European Union 2004: 23) as one of the “Common Basic Principles” and the right to maintain one’s cultural identity (European Commission 2003: 18) – which are rights of the individual, not the collectivity.

The modern economy, with its emphasis on adding value by means of better use of knowledge and rapid innovation, requires a broadening of the creative skills base involving the whole population. In particular, there is a need for skills and competences that enable people to embrace change as an opportunity and to be open to new ideas that promote innovation and active participation in a culturally diverse, knowledge-based society. (European Commission 2008b: 1)

The knowledge economy, in brief, requires individuals who are flexible, creative, and interculturally competent. (In Berlin, EU structural funds are used among others for the formation of such “intercultural competence.”) As the same document rephrases the gist of the statement above: “Innovative capacity is closely linked with creativity as a *personal* attribute based on *cultural* and interpersonal skills and values” (ibid; emphasis added). The choice of the term “values” indicates that the notion of culture here extends beyond the sphere of symbolic production, which the Commission and Council also see as founding individual creativity.¹⁹⁴

At the heart of this view – and thus the normative subject position it founds – is the notion, I suggest, that culture is an *individual* property, acquired and discarded through individual choice, which can be secured through an *individual* right to culture and which can be mobilized as an asset through exchange. ‘Culture’ thus becomes a *property* of the *individual* in the sense of both *Eigenschaft* and *Vermögen*, which are two ways in which the term property can be translated into German. Culture is an individual property in the sense of *characteristic (Eigenschaft)*: everyone ‘has’ a culture that is particular to him. This culture is perceived as

¹⁹⁴ EU policy emphasizes the role of culture in forming the desired creative individual. While the Council emphasizes “the specific role that culture, the cultural sector and cultural and creative industries ... play in fostering” (ibid) *creativity* more generally and thus “in boosting innovation and technology” (Council of the European Union 2007a: 3), this importantly is not limited to ‘culture as the arts’ or ‘symbolic production.’ For example, EU policy emphasizes the importance of acquiring “intercultural and interpersonal competences” if individuals are to “participate in an effective and constructive way in social and working life, particularly in increasingly diverse societies” (European Commission 2008b: 3) and as a basis for creativity and innovation (ibid:1). Thus, one of the proposed components of “lifelong learning” is “cultural awareness and expression” (European Parliament & Council of the European Union 2008: 1).

Vermögen, which has a double meaning in German: it refers to both property as *ownership of wealth* and to an individual *capacity*. Culture is portrayed as *Vermögen* in the sense that it founds an individual *capacity* (of creativity and innovation) to create *wealth* (on the basis of competitiveness) – which, as is of course *not* noted in the policy documents at stake, turns in a capitalist context into the property of someone other than the one who produced it.

The social-political or “material” foundation of this particular articulation of diversity is, as chapter three has shown, increased competition in neoliberalized spatial relations, produced among others by neoliberal state-making, that has provoked the rise of “culture” as a supply-side condition for capital and a means to obtain monopoly rent and an emphasis on the supposed role of the “creative (cultured) individual” for innovation and competitiveness within the “economic imaginary” of the knowledge economy.

This notion of culture as property of the diverse and tolerant individual, embedded in processes of neoliberalization, relies on a liberal ontology which, as Boggs (2002) notes, conceptualizes the subject as in a relation of externality to culture, rather than as formed in cultural belonging. As Wendy Brown (2006a) has argued, this notion of the individual’s externality to and autonomy from culture also founds liberal notions of tolerance. In our case, for example, the demand to be tolerant in intercultural exchange requires detraction from the absoluteness of one’s cultural positioning. Intercultural dialogue presupposes the capacity to ‘converse’ about what, in the end, is ‘only culture’. The liberal (tolerant) subject, Wendy Brown notes, is thus seen to “own” culture rather than being “owned” by it. This notion of ownership, I suggest,

entails in the intercultural paradigm not only the requirements of autonomy from culture, but also invokes market relations where the subject treats his culture as property to be acquired, enhanced, exchanged, and discarded. This is an underlying assumption of demands to abandon cultural practices incompatible with the universal as well as the emphasis on cultural mixing and exchange.

In fact, only when an individual *owns* culture rather than being owned by it can he use it as a *resource*, in line with the imperative of competitiveness in the intercultural repertoire. The imperative to treat oneself as human capital that informs the norm of “homo oeconomicus” (Foucault 2008) or the “new citizen” (Rose 2004) in neoliberal governance here extends to “culture” understood as individual property. The individual that *owns* culture and on this basis is able to be tolerant, engage in intercultural exchange, and contribute to creativity and innovation is the “normative subject” that the notion of *diversity* refers to in the intercultural repertoire. It is such individuals which are seen to constitute the “prime asset” for, as Sarrazin put it, a “city of the elites.” In turn, those who are seen as “neither capable nor willing,” as Sarrazin declared, to activate their culture in this way, are construed as problematic *difference*. The merging of culture and class discussed above refers to exactly that seeming double refusal, in a context of supposed “equality of opportunity,” of “owning culture” and “using it as resource.” It is closely tied to neoliberal normativities and political prerogatives.

Thus, the paradigmatic problem of liberalism turns in the contemporary context also into a problem for the neoliberal attempt to activate “human capital:” While every person is seen to

have the capacity to be a *diverse* individual in the above sense, the fact is, not everyone is.

What to do then with those who do not conform? The Council of the European Union gives the following answer:

Constructive social, inter-cultural and interreligious dialogue, education, thoughtful public discourse, support for cultural and religious expressions that respect national and European values, rights and laws (as opposed to expressions that violate both the letter and spirit of such values and rights), and other non-coercive measures are the preferred way of addressing issues relating to unacceptable cultural and religious practices that clash with fundamental rights. However if necessary according to the law legal coercive measures can also be needed. (Council of the European Union 2004: 23)

In brief, *difference* – those who do not conform to the normative subject position of *diversity* by deviating from *liberal* norms – needs to be transformed, managed, controlled, and as a last resort, coerced. Sarrazin showed how such liberal norms can be tied into a neoliberal project by denying belonging and entitlement to those who supposedly constituted a “cost” rather than “benefit” for the German state and economy due to their (non-liberal) “culture.” In his narrative just as in the statements cited in the beginning of this section – such as the statement by the Senator of Social Issues that respect for diversity does not include practices of forced marriage and the like – it is the *Muslim* immigrant that figures implicitly or explicitly as supposed violator of (neo)liberal norms.

In brief, the *diverse* individual is a *liberal* individual in line with the prerogatives of the *neoliberal* state and economy; thus, this liberal subject position is defined by both class and culture. Wendy Brown shows the relation to the latter. Muslims, she argues, are construed as shaped by organicist – rather than a liberal relation to – culture and thus as necessarily

intolerant and intolerable (i.e. as unacceptable difference).¹⁹⁵ The liberal individual has however not only been defined through a particular relation to culture, but has also always been a “classed” individual. In liberal thought, it is property and education (see Mehta 1997) first of all that ensure an individual’s autonomy. Today, education also figures first in political attempts to ensure that people “own” culture rather than being “owned” by it, in view of both liberal and neoliberal norms. Thus, the diverse individual, the “creative worker,” is the *educated* worker. In turn, it is the immigrant *community* (from an “organicist” society) that allegedly has no interest in using the opportunities given to them but instead takes refuge in the welfare state and fails to take ownership of their culture by discarding “unacceptable” practices that emerges as prime target for transformation and control – of what Corrigan and Sayer (1985) have called “moral regulation” through the state. This emerges very clearly in the German notion of (Muslim) “parallel societies,” much fuelled by imaginaries of Berlin place(s) such as Neukölln – that interculturalism feeds into rather than detracts from (see below).

In intercultural *city* policy, these normative subject positions implicit in the partial, culturalist, and classist concept of diversity link up with particular place-making strategies for “deindustrialized” cities. The keyword here is “mixing.” As the Intercultural Cities Program states its vision of intercultural place (in a way that is reminiscent of the vision of “internationality” discussed in the introduction to chapter three):

¹⁹⁵ More specific, Wendy Brown argues that it is the *liberal* individual who is seen to “own” culture in the liberal self-understanding while societies construed as “organicist” – that is, as lacking a relation of autonomy to “their” culture – are thought to be “owned” (“ruled and ordered”) by it, which is posited leads to intolerance, which in turn cannot be tolerated by liberal society (2006b: 150). She states: “Nonliberal societies and practices, especially those designated as fundamentalist, are depicted not only as relentlessly and inherently intolerant [because of the incapacity to treat culture as property] but as potentially intolerable for their putative rule by culture or religion and their concomitant devaluation of the autonomous individual” (ibid: 166).

The Intercultural City does not simply “cope” with diversity but uses it as a source of dynamism, innovation, creativity and growth. It accepts diversity as a norm [sic!] and helps people from all groups – minorities as well as the majority – benefit from it. The intercultural city shapes its educational, social, housing, employment, cultural and related policies, and its public spaces, in ways which enable people from different cultural backgrounds to mix, exchange and interact for mutual benefit (Council of Europe & European Commission 2008: 1)

“Accepting diversity as a norm” means “to mix, exchange and interact for mutual benefit.” The concept thus differentiates the Intercultural Cities approach from assimilationist and guest-worker policies. It however also opposes multiculturalism, whose acceptance of difference, it is stated, “may in some circumstances lead to separate or even segregated development” (2008: 5). As Landry and Wood, whose arguments clearly inform this policy document, warned: “Creativity may be encouraged by fragmentation, but certainly not by marginalization. Inward-looking ethnic ghettos are unlikely to contribute to solving the wider problems of cities” (2008: 264). Such “wider problems” – in fact of the social and economic problems created to good measure by neoliberalization – are now framed as those of “competitiveness” in a neoliberalized economic and political context. Thus, the normativity inherent in the support for diversity (and, as we will see, the management and control of difference) feeds into the making of capital-conducive place.

The “other” of the norm of diversity when it comes to place-making is thus “segregation” – involuntary as much as voluntary one. This is how intercultural city policy on the one hand is directed against established culturalisms of nation-states (leading to involuntary segregation)

but on the other hand meets its bedfellow in the conservative “ghetto” discourse (Lanz 2007)¹⁹⁶ in Germany. The latter denounces the declared tendency of some immigrant groups, supposedly reinforced by multiculturalism, to voluntarily segregate in “parallel societies” and particular localities. This complicity of interculturalism with a supposedly diverging political stance results from the above-discussed split, itself tied to the liberal support for a neoliberal order (chapter 3), between culture as “resource” (diversity that “mixes”, is “tolerant”, and “productive”) and as “threat” (difference that “shuts itself off”, does not respect human and cultural rights, and is a drain on city resources rather than a resource itself).

As the Intercultural Cities program declares, “one of the defining factors which will determine, over coming years, which cities flourish and which decline will be the extent to which they allow their diversity to be their asset, or their handicap” (Council of Europe & European Commission 2008: 4). Interculturalist city strategies propose to turn diversity into a resource rather than threat on the basis of “mixing.” And this is a policy prerogative that can be ascribed to from quite different political stances – from a primary concern with “diversity” (i.e. the enabling of ...) or with “difference” (i.e. the prevention of ...), with “competitiveness” or “cohesion” – as is illustrated well by Neukölln’s participation in the Intercultural Cities Program. The latter’s emphasis is on creating capital-conducive place for which difference is a handicap. Neukölln in turn joins this from a primary concern with social order. Its social democrat mayor Heinz Buschkowsky has been one of the more prominent figures promoting a “ghetto discourse” in

¹⁹⁶ As Lanz points out, “ghetto discourses” in Germany – mainly practiced by Christian democrats, but also some social democrats, and increasingly by the FDP – posit that ‘foreigners’ refuse integration, prefer their own culturally homogeneous ‘ghettos,’ and are thus responsible for “preventing cultural diversity” (2007: 158).

Berlin while also advancing a (relatively “thick”) vision of place where people live together as good neighbors. The imperative of interaction, where these political goals meet, informs strategies of creating places with a “good mix,” implying both culture and class. To be prevented are “ethnic ghettos” where middle classes no longer want to live. To be fostered is the attractiveness of place for those “creatives” who are seen to produce a more diverse image and thus help the process of “mixing.” Here, the concern with social order or cohesion links up with capital-conducive place-making in the form of gentrification. As the Intercultural Cities report for Neukölln declared:

As ghettos usually don’t re-converge on their own with society, it is important to recruit new inhabitants ... According to local actors, the transformations have already begun. More and more artists are looking for apartments, galleries and studios in the district. This is a good sign, because, according to a model that repeats itself in many European cities, this is the first step towards gentrification. (Council of Europe & CEC 2008: 5)

It is to such processes that we now turn: to attempts to create place conducive to capital that draw on culture in its “various facets” and materialize the split between diversity and difference in the form of substantively unequal right to place. This brings us also back full circle with the discussion in chapter three of the political attempts to use the utilities of culture “in its various facets”—namely, in form of the creative and cultural industries and their “creative workers” and as immigrant diversity – which are now seen in their implications for the making of (social inequalities in) place. Such attempts, as the following section also shows, are not uncontested. Contemporary Berlin place-making takes place in conflict between political supporters of capital-conducive place in line with the implicit hierarchies of diversity and difference outlined above and resistance on part of some of those whose “diversity” is to be turned into a resource in this way.

Different “Facets of Culture” and the Right to Place in the Gentrifying City

In early 2011, city mayor and Senator for Culture Klaus Wowereit managed to antagonize much of the Berlin art world by calling on Berlin-based artists to participate in a contest leading up to a contemporary art exhibition. Part of the problem was the title of the latter: “*Leistungsschau junger Kunst aus Berlin*” (literally: Exhibition of Achievements of Young Art from Berlin). The term *Leistungsschau* is usually used for market-oriented trade fairs. In a critical open letter entitled *Haben und Brauchen* (Having and Needing) written by an initiative of artists and other members of the art world and signed by close to 2500 persons in reaction against the project,¹⁹⁷ the very framing of the exhibition was therefore criticized for applying “neoliberal rhetoric of efficiency and capability (*Leistungsfähigkeit*) to the arts” and for suggesting that it is possible to “objectify and measure the quality of artistic production”, in addition to a critique of the questionable focus on *young* artists. This critique fed into the letter’s accusation that the city government tried to “instrumentalize artistic work for purposes of city marketing and the economization of culture.” It stated:

The international appeal (*Anziehungskraft*) of contemporary art contributes decisively to the attractiveness of Berlin. But the resulting profit and image gains for the city do not flow back to the actors [*Akteur*, i.e. the artworld], to the contrary: the actual working and living conditions of Berlin cultural producers are deteriorating noticeably due to increasing rents and the loss of self-organized open spaces.

While the letter welcomed the city government’s dedication to contemporary art, its writers argued that improving the conditions of working and exhibiting for artists in Berlin would require a different use of funds than a showcase exhibition (which was to cost 1.6 million Euros) as “one-time spectacle.” The city should rather financially secure the diversity and

¹⁹⁷ The complete text of the letter is available on the website of the initiative:
http://www.bbk-berlin.de/con/bbk/front_content.php?idart=826

decentralized quality of cultural infrastructure in Berlin.¹⁹⁸ In brief, what this initiative contested was the political attempt to mobilize culture's utilities – in this case, in the form of art – for rendering place attractive to capital all the while the city government indirectly rendered livelihoods and work of such “cultural producers” increasingly precarious.

The controversy around the *Senat's* initiative is just one moment in a broader conflict on the making of place that has dominated city politics in recent years. A broad-based movement has developed that contests the *Senat's* efforts (and in particular of the social democrats within the coalition government) to create place attractive to capital by capitalizing on the “various facets” of culture in neighborhoods in Kreuzberg and Neukölln in particular. Thus, a most recent demonstration against the *Senat's* policies, in which an estimate of 5000 people participated, called for “saving your city” among others from privatization, gentrification, and elimination of alternative culture.¹⁹⁹ The key word here is gentrification as a capital-oriented way of place-making. While gentrification clearly has been an ongoing process in Berlin since the fall of the wall in particular in the former east German districts of Prenzlauer Berg und Mitte (see Holm 2006), these neighborhoods, and in particular the core parts of Mitte, as the magazine *Spiegel* declared, are now “expensive and boring.”²⁰⁰ Strategies of *Aufwertung* (improvement; literally: up-valuation) now focus on neighborhoods in Kreuzberg, already seen as characterized largely

¹⁹⁸ The critique needs to be seen on the backdrop of another controversy. The exhibition was intended as a “test” of a permanent exhibition hall for contemporary art, an expensive and highly controversial pet project of Wowereit. The letter critiqued that the project simply ignored this controversy. It initiated a prolonged debate among participants in the art world as well as politicians on cultural policy in Berlin.

¹⁹⁹ One slogan for example declared: “Subcultural pioneers for the upgrading and better marketing of the neighborhoods (*Kieze*)? Not with us – we are staying!” Accessible at: http://www.megaspreed.de/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Aufruf-Rette_deine_Stadt-Kurz.pdf

²⁰⁰ <http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,706506,00.html>

by diversity attractive to capital, and Neukölln, which is considered to have the potential for turning from currently problematic difference into the “right kind” of diversity.²⁰¹ Various leftist groupings and tenant associations have been protesting against the capital-oriented transformations of these neighborhoods and managed to mobilize residents more broadly, for example in the referendum on the *Senat’s Mediaspree* project (discussed below). The resistance to *Mediaspree* in fact has been a key crystallization point of the ongoing protest. It highlights the stakes in the political attempt to mobilize culture’s utilities for the making of capital-conducive place.

The investor project *Mediaspree* – long supported by the *Senat* and the *Bezirk* governments²⁰² – is transforming a section of the banks of the river *Spree* that separates Kreuzberg from Friedrichshain into an area primarily for the creative and cultural industries, including offices, lofts, hotels, entertainment venues, and the like. As this segment of the *Spree* formerly constituted part of the border between the east and west German parts of the city, the riversides were characterized by open spaces and unused buildings where a number of subcultural venues were created after the fall of the wall. Because of the “multicultural” and “creative” quality of the adjoining neighborhoods, they were considered attractive locations for commercially-oriented creative and cultural industries and their workers and consumers. *Mediaspree*, in brief, was a project in line with Florida’s propositions for “creative city” strategies.

²⁰¹ Kreuzberg and Neukölln both figure in the city imaginary as multicultural places. Kreuzberg is often presented as a successful example of multiculturalism, while Neukölln is stigmatized as a ghetto (Lanz 2007).

²⁰² The “Green” *Bezirk* government has sought to accommodate some of the demands of the *Mediaspree versenken* initiative (see below), which prompted the *Senat* to threaten with withdrawing competences for the issue from the *Bezirk*.

The *Mediaspree* project did not only entail the privatization of much of the previously public space and the displacement of alternative cultural projects at the riverside but also threatened with the transformation of place in the adjoining neighborhoods. Who would have access to the neighborhood and what kinds of social groups and social relations were to characterize it internally would now be determined, it was feared, by requirements of capital and the displacements of residents likely to occur as a consequence of rising rents. Given that these neighborhoods were characterized by high unemployment also among immigrant populations, this would affect in particular also the latter. A video mobilizing for the referendum against *Mediaspree* that the initiative *Mediaspree versenken* (Sink Mediaspree) managed to force through – and win – in 2008²⁰³ got to the heart of these concerns with the ironic statement: “Of course, everything strange and different is still welcome in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, as long as it serves to inspire the creatives.”²⁰⁴ Implying that the degree of *difference* that this brand of “creatives” could tolerate as inspirational was rather limited, the video suggested that the development project would lead to the displacement and control of subcultures and poorer residents of the neighborhoods bordering *Mediaspree*, many of them immigrants, who did not figure as support-worthy (i.e. attractive to capital) diversity in the policy imaginary and thus lost their right to place. In brief, protestors feared that gentrification processes pushed by the *Mediaspree* project would destroy actual “lived” diversity of a more complex or “non-(neo)-

²⁰³ The referendum allowed people to vote for the current plan of the project or an alternative suggestion of the initiative *Mediaspree versenken* (including a free space of 50 meters to the river, no high-rise buildings. The result however is not binding for the city government. It was followed by protracted struggle, involving members of *Mediaspree versenken*, the *Bezirk*, the *Senat*, and the investors, as well as continued public protest. While the (Green) district government of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg was willing to compromise on some issues, the Berlin Senate feared claims of compensation of the private investors.

²⁰⁴ “Pocket Parks” by Karl Schreier was presented at the film gala of the civil society initiative *Mediaspree versenken* on June 30, 2008. It is available on youtube: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Eofw-PJXwc>

liberal” sort for the “thin” one conducive to capital. This has prompted some to erect new “barriers to entry” to place (this time for the rich) among others by setting fire to expensive cars in the neighborhood, a form of protest (though the “nonpolitical malcontent” also participated) that kept the local police, judiciary, and media busy in recent times.

While protest against *Mediaspree* is ongoing, it has now translated into a wider project of contesting state support for gentrification processes and the capital-dominated transformation of place. While fear and critique of gentrification and rising rents mobilizes wider strata of residents, many of the people protesting are in fact those that are seen to render the place interesting for capital – artists, students, and “creatives” and subcultural groups more generally. The general narrative of gentrification has it that artists and students moving into run-down neighborhoods because of low rents, followed by galleries, scene bars, cafés, and the like, will render the neighborhood more interesting as an investment site (as long as other factors also allow for potentially higher rents), which, when they materialize, leads to the displacement of residents who cannot afford increased costs of living into other neighborhoods, sub-standard quality apartments, or a different, ‘poorer’ life-style.

Policy-makers (and many of the middle or upper classes whose lifestyle such changes support) have come to see such processes as positive (Smith 2008) and actively support them. Intercultural and creative city policies simply play into that, among others by seeking to use culture (in the form of both a “multicultural” population and a “creative scene,” as in the case of Kreuzberg) as a resource for rendering place “attractive” to the creative and cultural

industries, in turn perceived as one of the few (economic) opportunities for Berlin (chapters 2 & 3). The Berlin government has for example introduced *Zwischennutzung* (temporary use) contracts of vacant property especially for creative establishments in neighborhoods such as Kreuzberg or Neukölln in the hope that this will improve the image of the respective locations (Holm 2007: 8-9) and further attract the (not so bohemian) cultural and creative industries. This is in line with internationally widespread strategies to attract the creative class to gentrifying neighborhoods (see Smith 2007). It is their *instrumentalization* for such purposes that the initiative *Haben und Brauchen* and various others contest, not least because the consequences erode their very existence.

What current anti-gentrification protest thus demands is not an end to support for “culture,” but a respect for “true” diversity and creativity, among others through state measures that prevent the increase of rents. In Berlin however, successive city governments have in fact paved the way for rise in rents and displacement through measures such as foregoing rent regulation, drastically reducing availability of public housing, privatizing building societies, and allowing for an increased use of apartments as vacation rentals (e.g. Lanz 2001: 5,7). This has also been the case for the current coalition, where the socialists failed to push through limits to the rent hike. In fact, the Berlin Senator for City Development Ingeborg Junge-Reyer (SPD) openly declared in response to a 2011 survey that determined an 8% increase in rents in Berlin’s housing market compared to 2009 (making a 4% yearly increase) that the *Senat* wants the *Aufwertung* of neighborhoods.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ Rolf Lautenschläger: Neuer Berliner Mietspiegel: Berlin bald Weltklasse, taz, May 30, 2011.

To pave the way for *Aufwertung*, the city government moreover supported various efforts at *actively transforming* places – at constituting them as *diversity* rather than *difference*. And it is here that we come back to the intercultural vision of cosmopolitan place. If capital today seeks out places that are characterized by harmonious diversity, as seems increasingly wide-spread policy common-sense,²⁰⁶ then places that figure predominantly as *different* in the public imaginary – because of widespread poverty affecting in particular immigrant populations, which is framed in policy as problematic constellation of “social problems” in form of high reliance on “transfer services” and “percentage of immigrants” (see also chapter 2) – appear as *problems with potential*. To realize this potential (not least in the form of higher rents), they have to be made safe for capital. *Difference* has to be turned into *diversity*, and intercultural city strategies present means to do so by emphasizing the importance of mixing and tolerance, inclusion into the labor market under the premise of equality of opportunity (with support from the EU, for example, see chapter 2), and, if all fails, the control of those continuously violating the norms of diversity.

The example of the neighborhood *Schillerkiez* in Neukölln illustrates how this is being done. While the adjoining Berlin boroughs of Kreuzberg and Neukölln both figure in the city imaginary as multicultural places, Kreuzberg is often presented as a successful example of multiculturalism, while Neukölln is stigmatized as a ghetto (Lanz 2007). However, in recent years it has been of increased interest to investors as the next possible place where higher

At: <http://www.taz.de/l71653/>

²⁰⁶ See e.g.: “Those looking to invest their time or money in one city as against another will now be swayed by a number of factors. Of growing importance amongst these is the sense of openness of a place. Places which are uniformly monocultural or seem unwelcoming of difference will lose out to those places with a cosmopolitan ‘buzz’.” (Council of Europe & European Commission 2008: 8)

rents might be realized. The fact that artists and students from the increasingly expensive neighboring district Kreuzberg-Friedrichshain move into the area as well as rising rents in neighborhoods close to Kreuzberg such as the *Reuterstraße* (see Investitionsbank Berlin 2009: 69, 71) are seen as indicators of the beginning of gentrification processes. The 2008 closure of the airport *Tempelhof* which borders Neukölln has given such processes a further push. For the last few years, the vast area – a veritable city tundra – was open to the public, following intense public mobilization and attempts at occupation directed against privatization or other possible commercial uses of the space. The current plan of the city government is to turn the area into part public park, part new (up-scale) residential area and office space for the creative industries, once more in line with creative city precepts for gentrification. This has turned attention to adjacent neighborhoods, in particular the “multicultural” *Schillerkiez* with its good building structure, as places where higher rents can be realized. In fact, while some rental agencies working in the neighborhood already declared in 2010 that every square meter was snatched out of their hands, a local broker whose clients are mostly unemployed stated that he could no longer find apartments for them in the neighborhood.²⁰⁷

The Schillerkiez is however currently characterized by *difference*: high levels of unemployment and a substantial immigrant population, with the presence of “the state” in form of social projects and the like quite visible in the neighborhood. It has become the focal point for anti-gentrification protests not only because of its proximity to the *Tempelhof* areal, but also because of the particularly blatant attempts of the local *Quartiersmanagement* (QM) to

²⁰⁷ Kathleen Fietz: Willkommen in Prenzlökn, taz, Nov.11, 2010. At: <http://www.taz.de/!60084/>

transform or control such *difference* for the needs of capital. To recall (chapter 2), QM forms part of the federal program *Soziale Stadt* (Social City), which is co-financed with EU structural funds and aims to improve “problem neighborhoods” on the basis of a stronger participation of inhabitants (see Güntner 2007). It has been critiqued among others for supporting processes of gentrification and neoliberal governance (Holm 2001, Lanz 2001, 2007). While QM in different neighborhoods varies widely, as they are run by quite different organizations and initiatives, the current QM in the *Schillerpromenade* is indeed a company²⁰⁸ working for the ‘revitalization’ of cities. It aims, in line with prescripts for gentrification and intercultural city strategies, to turn the area into a new “alternative and creative location for culture” and to attract students and artists to the area to achieve better “mixing” of the population. It hopes to improve with these measures the image of the area, which in turn is to help change the neighborhood’s business structure away from “cheap chains and delis” which “devalue the area economically.” Currently however, it is stated, the neighborhood has an “image-problem” insofar as outsiders fail to perceive it as the tolerant place it actually is (Quartiersmanagement Schillerpromenade 2009a). To put it differently, the image of the neighborhood as *different* rather than *diverse* created a problem for its *Aufwertung*. The problem for the QM was in particular the “security problem” it identified with drinkers occupying public space, “neglected” children of Roma families, and the overcrowding of apartments by seasonal workers from Romania (Quartiersmanagement Schillerpromenade 2009b, p. 7). The QM’s support for *diversity* in form of endeavors to render the place attractive to the “right kind” of cultured individuals (the right kind for initiating

²⁰⁸ BSG- Brandenburgische Stadterneuerungsgesellschaft

gentrification, it was assumed) was thus flanked by attempts to control such forms of *difference* that currently prevented such “mixing” (see below).

The QM was severely criticized by leftist groups as well as local residents for seeking to tackle what were in fact problems associated with poor living conditions and poverty through a “militaristic” approach, namely, a so-called *Task Force Okerstraße* in which the QM cooperated with the *Bezirk* government and the police. Presented as a democratic attempt “to shape the Schillerpromenade as an attractive and diverse living space also for other strata of the population,” the measures proposed weighed heavily on control and sanctions through the police and civil society surveillance. The policing of difference characteristic of gentrification processes more generally (for Berlin, see e.g. Holm 2006) thus appeared as an attempt to enforce appropriate *diversity* and to reconstruct the image of the area on that basis.²⁰⁹ The (formal) right to place of those construed as *different* thus proved itself as without substance in the face of rising rents and state practices of “moral regulation” in line with the “normative subject position” of the diverse individual, itself tied into the primacy that demands of capital have been accorded in the neoliberalized state. In fact, “right to place” in this context has come to mean the right of access of the better-off to potentially attractive neighborhoods as a means to achieve the “better mixing” supposedly attractive to capital and conducive to “cohesion” and the denial of “substantive right to place” for those not fitting the image and not being able to pay the costs of such a “cosmopolitan” place.

²⁰⁹ As Margit Mayer notes, while “[d]eprived communities and their organizations do benefit from concrete concessions that the new development and integration programs present to them ... they come at the price of new exclusions and divisions: Whatever cannot be turned into a subject of value or a potential for growth and regeneration becomes marginalized or even criminalized” (2007: 100).

Conclusion

This chapter has examined hierarchies in the construction of belonging and entitlement, and their implications for right to place, in Berlin and intercultural and creative city policy catering to the demands of capital in the making of place. Such hierarchies, I have argued, have their socio-political origins in the political attempt to manage a “fiscally challenged,” deindustrialized city with a large population of unemployed workers in both east and west, many of them former “guest-workers,” and the very concrete conflicts around belonging and entitlement in place that this engendered. They were informed by a *neoliberal* attribution of social value on the basis of supposed contribution to economic value-creation which broadly resonated with popular normativities of productivity and work ethics. However, as the discussion of gentrification processes illustrated, much of what is going on in light of “enhancing Berlin’s position” in inter-local competition – by activating culture’s supposed utilities – does not concern so much the *production* of value as its *appropriation* in the form of rent. Moreover, the control and displacement of populations that figure in the policy and political imaginary as problematic *difference* rather than support-worthy *diversity* in attempts to attract the latter, highlight a very real tension between the *Senat*’s declared integration policy goals of achieving both “cohesion” and “competitiveness” by turning the diversity of the city into a resource. In this light, the EU’s attempt to “meta-govern” cohesion in member states and cities through promoting culture in “all its facets” in line with the prerogative of competitiveness in the knowledge economy (in the case of Berlin, through structural funds support for the cultural and creative industries and programs such as Social City and Intercultural Cities supporting gentrification), as discussed in chapter three, seems unlikely to achieve its goals. Rather, as this

chapter shows, it feeds into the kinds of inequalities and supports political processes that have produced such problems of “cohesion” in the first place. However, the case of Berlin also provides hope that this might not only engender a backlash of the violent culture-exclusivist sort, but also protest against the “thinness” of capital-conducive place in favor of “thicker,” more substantive forms of diversity and equality.

CHAPTER 5

“Cosmopolitan Entrapment:”²¹⁰ EU Normative Power and the Making of a Turkish Competition State

As chapters one and three have shown, the shift in attempts to “(meta-)govern” cohesion on the basis of intercultural policy attributing value to diversity has gone hand in hand with a revision of an “EU-European narrative” away from a “thick” version of European identity towards a “thin” liberal cosmopolitan notion of unity established through the capacity of universal principles to mediate between differences. This revision allowed in principle for the inclusion of the “non-European” not only in the form of immigration and immigrant integration discussed in previous chapters but also when it comes to the EU accession of Turkey, the cultural difference of which is generally affirmed even by its supporters. While the previous chapter has shown how the split between support-worthy diversity and problematic difference has informed the unequal ordering of cosmopolitan place in the city, this chapter now examines how it translates into an “expansive” state project in external relations that is framed as a mission of turning the Turkish state from problematic difference into incorporable diversity. But just as interculturalism internally was harnessed to the overall goal of economic competitiveness, so is this “cosmopolitanizing mission” very much in line with neoliberal state-making and its attempts to create capital-conducive place. Making Turkey safe for diversity thus

²¹⁰ The notion of “cosmopolitan entrapment” stems from Bürgin 2010, though I employ it somewhat differently here. See below for details.

translated into support for the neoliberalizing projects of international organizations and elites in Turkey, into the creation of a “Turkish competition state” that provided a friendly business climate for transnational corporations. Thus, this chapter concludes this study by showing how a developing EU-European place and state form – and the culturalism at work in both – is not only defined through the social relations promoted internally, but also through the external relations this feeds into and is in part shaped by.



In the European Parliament debate on Turkey’s 2007 Progress Report,²¹¹ MEP Jacques Toubon from the conservative PPE-DE gave the following reasons for his (implied) rejection of EU membership for Turkey:

Turkey is a nation-state, one of the last of its kind, one of the strongest and one of the most aware. Its unity is a nationalist unity, and this is clearly discernable in relation to the acknowledgement of genocide in Armenia. Its policy is increasingly inspired by a single religion even as it backs away from the secular aspects that form the very basis of its constitution. It manifests its desire for independence, while here we wish to implement a principle of integration and delegation of powers and sovereignty. This is nothing other than a head-on collision between both parties. Let us be under no illusions, let us refrain from telling the Turks anything and everything, and having them believe we are willing either to accept their accession without actually meeting the Copenhagen criteria, or reject it because of them, when what is actually at stake is us, and what we want our European project to be. Furthermore, let us define a durable partnership structure that uses a win-win approach to allow Turkey to take up its role as a regional power, and the EU to continue the construction of its world identity.

Toubon²¹² thus drew the picture of two incompatible state forms: the “old” (and obsolescent) form of the nation-state, represented by Turkey, that relied on cultural and religious

²¹¹ European Parliament Debate on October 24, 2007: EU-Turkey Relations. (see below)

homogeneity and classic state sovereignty and geopolitics on the one hand, and the “new” state form of the European Union on the other, which respected diversity, integrated and delegated powers, and had a cosmopolitan “world” identity. The consequence of this incompatibility for him was “partnership” rather than “membership” for Turkey, which would, he posited, allow Turkey to become a *regional* and EU-Europe a *global* power.

The vision of a “cosmopolitan Europe” emerged here through the contrast with Turkey as culture-exclusivist nation-state. The key features of a “cosmopolitan Europe” that Toubon implicitly or explicitly identified were respect for diversity (implied in his reference to a non-acknowledged past of culture-exclusivist violence), safeguarded also through secularism allowing for religious pluralism, and the particular state form of EU-Europe that entails cooperation limiting state sovereignty. Together, this seemed to be the foundation of Europe’s “world identity,” which presumably meant both its cosmopolitan qualities and its global aspirations.

All of this, Toubon could have taken from Beck and Grande’s (2004) vision of a cosmopolitan Europe, which is similarly defined through “unity in diversity” in both culturalism and state form, and bases a cosmopolitanizing mission on this cosmopolitan identity. However, and this makes Toubon’s statement seemingly peculiar, Beck and Grande and others subscribing to a “cosmopolitan” identity for EU-Europe generally are conditional supporters of Turkey’s EU

²¹² Jacques Toubon is known – or notorious – for the “Loi Toubon,” a law of 1994 aiming at the elimination of Anglicisms in French language that he pushed during his term as culture secretary in France. This reflects interestingly on his accusation of the Turkish state of excessive nationalism and supports the point made later in the chapter, that culture-exclusivist opponents of Turkey’s EU membership have come to use political liberal (cosmopolitan) argumentation.

membership, that is, if Turkey fulfills the accession criteria. While they would not disagree with Toubon's description of the current incompatibility between two state forms, they see the transformation of Turkey – from incompatible *difference* to incorporable *diversity* – as a test case for cosmopolitan Europe and its “normative power” (see also Baban & Keyman 2008; Parker 2009; Rumford 2003). Toubon's statement shows clearly what this *difference* is now seen to consist in, namely, in the violation of the Turkish state of EU principles of “unity in diversity” in particular when it comes to respect for cultural and religious diversity as part of the unitary framework of human rights.

At the same time, Toubon declared that “what is actually at stake is us, and what we want our European project to be.” This statement rarely surprises, as Turkey's bid for EU membership and in particular the opening of accession negotiations in 2005 had been hotly debated in view of the “future of Europe.” Such debates involved not only concern for the future of the EU project in the narrow sense, but also broader struggles around culturalist foundations of political community in particular in member states with substantial immigrant population from Turkey. What might surprise, however, is that Toubon – member of the conservative/ Christian Democrat PPE-DE, which tended to champion a relatively “thick” version of a civilizationally united Europe, not least on the basis of Christianity – tied the future of Europe not to the question whether Turkey was “culturally European,” which had been central to earlier debates, but to a concern with Europe's “world identity”. That is, he tied it to what in fact had been the “thin” vision of European community contrary to the one usually espoused by opponents of Turkey's EU membership.

This chapter shows, through a discussion of EU documents as well as the politics of Turkey's EU accession as reflected in European Parliament debates,²¹³ that the vision of a (liberal) "cosmopolitan Europe" is not only championed by the liberal Left, but emerges from different political positions on the EU level. It argues that this is due to the way in which a new narrative of EU-European political community has become institutionally engrained, informing among other things accession policy, subsequent to negotiations on the draft constitution, which itself has to be seen in the context of debates on Turkey's EU membership. The first part of the chapter shows what culturalist notions of EU-European political community Turkey's renewed application for EU membership has brought to the fore and how related struggles have been decided in favor of "liberal" visions of EU-Europe, which in turn has forced conservatives to frame their rejection of Turkey as support for liberal cosmopolitan Europe. The second part examines what the "normative power" (see below) of "cosmopolitan" Europe looked like in the actual process of accession in the case of Turkey, arguing that this has not only involved

²¹³ I examined plenary debates on Turkey from 2004, just before accession negotiations were opened (for earlier debates, see Giannakopoulos & Konstadinos (2005)), through 2010, determining the main themes in the debates as well as what dimensions of accession were not discussed and analyzing what visions of EU-European political community were articulated through what kinds of culturalist repertoires. The debates analyzed were (all available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu>):

European Parliament Debate on December 13, 2004: Turkey's Progress Towards Accession.

European Parliament Debate on September 28, 2005: Opening of Negotiations with Turkey—Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement.

European Parliament Debate on September 26, 2006: Turkey's Progress Towards Accession.

European Parliament Debate on October 24, 2007: EU-Turkey Relations.

European Parliament Debate on May 21, 2008: Turkey's 2007 Progress Report.

European Parliament Debate on March 11, 2009: Croatia: progress report 2008 - Turkey: progress report 2008 - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: progress report 2008.

European Parliament Debate on November 25, 2009: Enlargement strategy 2009 concerning the countries of the western Balkans, Iceland and Turkey

European Parliament Debate on January 20, 2010: Democratisation in Turkey.

European Parliament Debate on February 20, 2010: 2009 progress report on Croatia - 2009 progress report on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - 2009 progress report on Turkey.

attempts to make the Turkish state adhere to principles of democracy and human and cultural rights foregrounded in the debates, but support for the attempts of local elites and international institutions to create a Turkish “competition state.” An equation of “the political” in accession politics with the transformation of Turkey from *difference* to *diversity* in culturalist terms has both enabled and obscured transformations in such realms thus defined as (merely) “technical.”

My goal in this chapter is not to examine EU-Turkey relations, membership prospects, the accession process, and its implications for Turkey as matters in themselves (on this, see e.g. Arikan 2003; Ertugal 2007; Müftüler-Baç & Stivachtis 2008; Ugur & Canefe 2004) but rather to reflect through an examination of the politics and processes of accession onto a process of state-making in EU-Europe. This sheds, from the angle of “external relations” established in state- and place-making, further light on the current peculiar embrace of “diversity” in EU-Europe and its political support for the creation of capital-conducive place in and beyond EU-Europe.

Turkey’s Bid for EU Membership in the Making of EU-Europe

While Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987 and official relations between Turkey and the European Communities date back to the association agreement of 1963, Turkey’s membership application was brought back to the political agenda with the end of the Cold War and the opening of accession negotiations with post-socialist states. The question of Turkey’s EU membership came to constitute a key moment in EU-European state-making as it helped to

place the question of the “future of Europe” at the center of political debate in the late 1990s to mid-2000s in particular. The potential accession of a “Muslim,” “poor,” and “populated” country to the EU brought to the fore discrepant views on how EU-Europe should be organized in socioeconomic, political-institutional, geopolitical, and culturalist-identitarian terms. The debate in fact concerned what kind of place and political entity EU-Europe was (or was to become), involving questions of bounding,²¹⁴ internal ordering²¹⁵ and external relations.²¹⁶ As Baban and Keyman have put it, “the debate about Turkey is in essence a debate about the future of Europe in terms of its identity, its geography, its political and institutional structure, and its role in our globalizing world” (2008: 109).²¹⁷ It entailed divisions not only between supporters and opponents of EU-European state-making (beyond the “economic”) but also

²¹⁴ The dominant question here was where “Europe” ended and thus, where the “enlargement” of EU-Europe was to find its end, as membership in the European Union was by Treaty only open to “European” states. Whether or not Turkey was considered part of this “Europe” of course depended on how the latter was defined. In brief, the conflict was here between “thick” and “thin” notions of place and political community discussed in more depth below. Another concern as regard bounding was whether or not it would be geopolitically advantageous for EU-Europe to have boundaries with Middle Eastern countries perceived as instable, as a consequence of Turkey’s accession. While some emphasized that Turkey’s admission would pose a security risk, Beck and Grande (2004) argued for “incorporating zones of insecurity” into a European empire by admitting Turkey, while still others held that political incorporation of Turkey into the EU could help in reducing risks associated with the Middle East.

²¹⁵ This concerned questions of belonging and entitlement in place and political community among others, reaching from questions of financial redistribution via the structural and cohesion funds (some claimed that the admission of Turkey would mean the end of a cohesion-oriented Europe, which of course is also related to the question which states can make a claim on “European solidarity”) to those concerning political influence in the institutional structure of the EU, i.e. the concern that Turkey would achieve ‘disproportionate’ influence due to its population size. This of course implies that Turkey cannot or should not be a “core” EU-European country: because what determines the ‘appropriateness’ of influence? Lastly, internal ordering of course also involved questions of the foundation of political community discussed in more depth below.

²¹⁶ This involved different views on whether the admission of a “Muslim” country would expose the EU to increased security risk or rather reduce the latter. Usually, those advocating for a greater political role of the EU in the world also spoke in favor of Turkey’s EU membership. There was thus an affinity between visions of a “cosmopolitan Europe” – which often saw the transformation of Turkey as a goal in itself – with those wanting to turn EU-Europe into a significant “global actor.”

²¹⁷ Bürgin argues that the positions of political actors on the Turkey question are formed predominantly in view of questions of “identity” more than “economic and/or geostrategic interests” (2010: 36) – not only, we could add, because Turkey is associated with “Islam” which has been a central “other” in the construction of European identity (see e.g. Asad 2002; Gingrich 2004; Strasser 2008), but also because the Customs Union completed in 1996 already served EU-European economic interests and geostrategic goals which could, at least in the view of Turkey-critics, be pursued through a “privileged partnership” rather than full membership. Nevertheless, economic and geopolitical arguments clearly did form part of the debate on Turkey.

between different views of what was to constitute EU-European political community.²¹⁸ Moreover, debates on Turkey's EU membership were fuelled by member state internal struggles on national belonging and entitlement especially in states with significant immigrant populations from Turkey, with conservatives in particular raising the specter of further immigration, the fortification of "parallel societies (chapter 4)," and the "Islamization" of Europe. The vision of a culturally "thick" European identity was in this context doubly exclusionary, not only of Turkey as potential member state but also de facto of Muslims *in* Europe that in this vision could never be *of* Europe (Asad 2002).

Conflict between different visions of political community thus predominantly drove the debates on Turkey, showing one front where the making of EU-European statehood and more general processes of state (trans)formation continue to be embattled. As Baban and Keyman highlight, when it comes to visions *EU-European* political community, there were

two competing ways of defining the cultural framework of European integration. The first sees Europe as a multicultural project and envisions a postnational and cosmopolitan Europe created by the diverse cultural traditions within European countries The second views Europe as a civilizational project, framed by the cultural boundaries of a Europe defined by a Christian heritage and a shared history grounded in the Enlightenment tradition (2008: 115)

Both positions are taking for granted that Turkey is (now or always) *different* from EU-European society/ies²¹⁹ but, drawing on different culturalist repertoires, differ on whether or not the EU-

²¹⁸ For some, the admission of Turkey, as a "culturally different," big, and relatively poor country, entailed the end of "political" and "cohesion-oriented" Europe altogether, reducing EU-Europe to a common market – and this was either welcomed or deplored. For example, commentators often emphasized that Great Britain supported Turkey's EU membership because this would make "political integration" more difficult – and moreover keep redistributive schemes within EU-Europe to a minimum.

²¹⁹ There is a minority perspective that inscribes Islam/Turkey in European history and highlights current Muslim populations in EU-Europe, thus rendering these an "original" part of "European diversity."

European polity can eventually be incorporated as compatible *diversity*. The civilizational view of Europe is culture-exclusivist and rejects Turkey's membership on this basis. It posits, as made explicit by MEP Camre of the conservative Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN),²²⁰ that Turkey and Europe are "two widely different civilizations whose values are incompatible," assumes that values are part of culture, and that culture is not easily changed if at all:

Mr Schulz said it clearly in this House today: Turkey must adopt all our laws and values. That is something, of course, which Turkey cannot, however, do. A country's culture cannot be taken away from it; or, rather, any attempt to do so takes centuries.²²¹

Such views were proposed by both (neo-nationalist) opponents and, often more subtly, by "Christian Europe"²²² supporters of "European integration." That is, they were associated with those seeking to limit EU-European statehood as well as with supporters of more culture-exclusivist EU-European community.

What Baban and Keyman term the multicultural, postnational, cosmopolitan vision of Europe can in turn be further divided into differing perspectives of liberal universalist and liberal cosmopolitan conditional supporters of Turkey, associated in the European Parliament predominantly with the Social Democrat "Socialist" bloc (PSE) on the one hand and the Greens and some liberals (ALDE) on the other hand. Liberal universalists in the European Parliament ground universal values in European history and culture and imply that belonging to a European value-community – more on that below – requires cultural transformation. That is, such liberal universalist views of EU-Europe entail a vision of "thin" place that is nevertheless relatively

²²⁰ The following discussion is based on my analysis of European Parliament debates (see above).

²²¹ European Parliament Debate on December 13, 2004: Turkey's Progress Towards Accession.

²²² In this view, even in the absence of an active Christian faith among large parts of the population, institutions and practices inspired by Christian history and values form central part of European culture/civilization.

homogeneous. This has implications for the dynamics of the ordering of place in the process of accession: If universal values are historically tied to modernization in Europe as (part of) the West, they have to be adopted in 'non-Western' contexts – such as Turkey – under guidance of the former.²²³ In this spirit, MEP Schulz (PSE) – to whom the above statement by MEP Camre referred – presented accession as a process of exporting *non-indigenous* structures and values in view of eventual incorporation:

... if we succeed in making Turkey democratic and stable, if Western values succeed in putting down roots in its society, if we give the Turks the chance to become what they want to be, in other words, people in Europe, accepting European values for themselves, then we will be creating a European Union that will be making a reality of its peace process, its potential for peace and for the stabilization of democracy in a region that more than ever needs democracy, human rights, social security and peace. It is these very things that we in the European Union should be exporting to Turkey – if all goes well!²²⁴

In contrast to this agenda of (cultural) assimilation, a minority perspective in the European Parliament – adopted mostly by the Greens – puts forth a broader vision of cultural pluralism in the political community by positing that there are a number of universal values that all cultures can ascribe to and that these should be the foundation of the (multicultural) polity “united in diversity.” In this *liberal cosmopolitan* view, European unity does not necessitate a choice between “political” and “religious/cultural” values; rather, EU-European political values allow for cultural pluralism:

²²³ This draws on a longer genealogy of identifying modernity with Europe. In this view, “[O]nly European ‘civilization’ ... could have produced ‘modernity’ – a catchall term for a pastiche of customs, norms, and practices that flourished in the capitalist world-economy. And since modernity was said to be by definition the incarnation of the true universal values ... modernity was not merely a moral good but a historical necessity. ... Unlike European civilization, which was asserted to be inherently progressive, the other high civilizations must have been somehow frozen in their trajectories, incapable therefore of transforming themselves into some version of modernity without the intrusion of outside (that is, European) forces” (Wallerstein 2006: 33). On the specific case of Turkey, see also Ahiska (2003).

²²⁴ European Parliament Debate on December 13, 2004: Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.

Turkey can demonstrate that democracy and Islam very much go hand in hand. ... Europe can show that, based on shared values, there is room for more than one culture and that in the Europe of the twenty-first century, there is room for more than one religion” (MEP Lagendijk (the Greens))²²⁵

Turkey’s accession process thus becomes the test case for the development of a cosmopolitan political community that combines universalism with respect for diversity:

Turkey’s accession would confirm the nature of the European Union as an open, tolerant society that draws strength from its diversity and is bound together by shared values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. (MEP Battilocchio on behalf of New Italian Socialist Party)²²⁶

Again, we encounter the view that “cosmopolitan Europe” is characterized by its capacity to maintain and mediate differences:

Those claiming that Turkey is not European really mean it is not Christian. But why should that be a criterion? The motto of the European Union is ‘unity with diversity’ – we are not trying to standardise cultures, but to find ways of working together while keeping our different languages, religions and so on. Accepting a secular state whose population is largely Islamic would enhance that principle. (MEP Corbett (PSE))²²⁷

Given their view that all cultures can ascribe to universal values from *within* their cultural positions (though when there is conflict, universal values override particular ones), liberal cosmopolitans in the European Parliament do not present the EU as “exporting universal values”, as liberal universalists do,²²⁸ but rather as supporting local efforts at reform.

Thus, the prospect of Turkey’s EU membership has led to quite different articulations – drawing on different culturalist repertoires – of the identity of EU-Europe and (thus) the kind of political

²²⁵ European Parliament Debate on December 13, 2004: Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.

²²⁶ European Parliament Debate on December 13, 2004: Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.

²²⁷ Written statement to the European Parliament Debate on October 24, 2007: EU-Turkey Relations.

²²⁸ In this regard, liberal universalists adhere to the classic modernization perspective, while liberal cosmopolitans share the view of theories of multiple modernities that consider non-Western contexts as sites “where people ‘make’ themselves modern, as opposed to being ‘made’ modern by alien and impersonal forces.” (Goankar: 16) This view continues to rely on a distinction between “societal modernization” and “cultural modernity” and thus fails to “really address the problem of ...historical representations of modernity” (Ahiska 2003: 361). Thus: “In the framework of multiple or alternative modernities, modernity appears to be a desired final destination the ‘latecomers’ have their own creative ways of approaching” (ibid: 361-2) and maintains the model-quality of Western modernity.

community that is to inform place- and state-making in (and beyond) EU-Europe. However, as Keyder points out, “[w]hat has eventually prevailed ... is not a culturalist understanding of European identity, but Europe as a ... project bringing together a political community defined by allegiance to a common set of ground-rules” (2006: 80). That is, the notion of political community that won out – in the making of EU-Europe – accords with the *liberal* visions outlined above and, with the general emphasis on respect for diversity, evokes in particular the liberal *cosmopolitan* one. With the Lisbon Treaty, which builds on the failed draft constitution for the EU, it has become institutionally engrained on the EU level. How did it happen that this protracted debate seems to have been “resolved” in favor of a liberal vision of EU-European political community?

The “Cosmopolitan Entrapment”

The explicit goal of the attempt to develop a constitution for EU-Europe in the early 2000s was to strengthen the political dimension of “European integration.” It can thus be understood as a political means to achieve “statehood” and was, as was to be expected, as such heavily contested. EU member state governments were divided over the question whether or what degree of “political community” was desirable as well as what was to found the latter. Contestation thus replicated the divisions in the debate on Turkey’s accession outlined above. This was not incidental. Questions such as whether or not the draft constitution should entail a reference to Christianity gained their relevance not least because of the heated debate on Turkey’s EU membership prospect,²²⁹ though the problematic clearly went beyond that. France

²²⁹ This also informed in part popular rejection of the draft constitution.

for example staunchly opposed Poland's requests in this regard on the grounds of defending secularism. The Lisbon Treaty moreover, in response to contestation around the draft constitution, dropped references to EU symbols that were too closely (for some) related to statehood (it includes however a declaration by 16 member states of their continued allegiance to these symbols).

In the face of such opposition – of some of the more powerful EU member states – the notion of political community in the draft constitution that was later to form the basis of the ratified Lisbon Treaty was “thin:” it was to be based on shared *political* values. Article 1 of the Lisbon Treaty states that

[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

Importantly, the Lisbon Treaty – in line with the draft constitution – refers here to what has previously been called shared *principles*²³⁰ (of political organization) as *values*. Thus, EU-European political *community* was to be based on shared *political values*, and more precisely, the values of political *liberalism*. The choice of the terminology of values in turn highlights that what was sought here was nevertheless *community* – or *statehood* on the basis of claims to commonality the interests of which “the state” is said to pursue – even though a “thin” one.

²³⁰ This is still the case in the Maastricht Treaty. Based on a review of the Treaty of Rome (1957), the Declaration on European Identity (1973), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2003), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union (2000), and the Consolidated Version of the Lisbon Treaty (2007).

Through this “thin” articulation, and although the Preamble to the Treaty declares that such “universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law” have developed “from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe,” EU-European political community was potentially and conditionally opened to the “cultural other.” (As we have seen both liberal universalist and liberal cosmopolitans allow for entrance of (initial) cultural difference, though on the basis of different premises).²³¹ That the selective and conditional opening of EU-European political community to the “cultural other” not only applies to the differently cultured *individual*, as discussed in the previous chapters, but also to *states* is shown by Article 49 of the Treaty, which states that “[a]ny European State which respects the values referred to in Article 1a and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.” This forms the backdrop to how the Turkish state, for liberal supporters, can come to constitute itself as incorporable diversity (and why, for culture-exclusivists that link values to culture, and see Turkey as culturally different, this becomes per se impossible).

Thus, supporters of a culture-exclusivist EU-Europe lost a further battle when accession negotiations were opened with Turkey in 2005, after protracted debates in the Council. This practically concluded the debate on whether Turkey was part of “Europe”²³² – as, see above,

²³¹ While the grounding of universal values in European history follows liberal universalism, the emphasis on minority rights, tolerance, and pluralism in Article 1 of the Treaty internally and in external relations speaks of a liberal cosmopolitan embrace of diversity.

²³² In fact, earlier decisions – the Association Agreement of 1963 and the granting of candidate status in 1999 - had already acknowledged Turkey as a European country. But the opening of accession negotiations made it even more difficult for EU institutions to step back from their commitments. In European Parliament Debates, statements that Turkey is “not European” are less frequent after accession negotiations have been opened, while they dominated discussion of the 2004 debate that preceded the decision on this matter.

only “European states” can apply for membership – and instead focused attention on whether or not Turkey fulfilled EU values in form of adherence to the EU’s *political* accession criteria requiring stable democratic institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. Bürgin (2010) has called this the “cosmopolitan entrapment” of opponents of Turkey’s EU membership.

While Bürgin refers with this term to the failure of opponents of Turkey’s EU membership to produce a slow-down or rupture in accession negotiations through argumentative strategies invoking Turkey’s non-compliance with official accession criteria,²³³ I argue that such “cosmopolitan entrapment” that derives from the institutionally engrained liberal cosmopolitan notion of EU-European political community led culture-exclusivist opponents of Turkey’s EU accession in the European Parliament to reinforce the vision of a cosmopolitan Europe that they in fact opposed by emphasizing the violation of human and cultural rights and principles of liberal democracy in Turkey. This is, I suggest, because the articulation of their opposition through a focus on the *political* (rather than other) accession criteria served them as means to posit a fundamental incompatibility of Turkey with EU-Europe without explicitly invoking cultural difference or “non-Europeanness.” The statement by MEP Toubon with which we began this chapter provides one relatively explicit example of this strategy.

²³³ Bürgin notes that “supporters of Turkey share a value- and norm-based cosmopolitan understanding of European identity” (2010: 33) which also frames “the official EU position” (ibid: 34). He argues that opponents’ “argumentative strategies had only a limited impact on the ongoing accession talks”, achieving “a slowing down of the accession talks but no rupture with the official EU approach” (ibid).

That is, once accession negotiations had been opened with Turkey and the battle on whether Turkey can (conditionally) qualify for EU membership on the basis of “Europeanness” had been lost by its opponents, their opposition had, to be successful, to be framed not in explicitly culturalist terms, but by Turkey’s failure to comply with the criteria for membership, on the basis of which eventual accession would be decided. Opponents mainly emphasized non-compliance with *political* criteria – or, with the Lisbon Treaty, “EU-European values” – not only because this was an easy target but also, I suggest, because these could serve as a stand-in for “culture” to continue to convey fundamental difference. This is because of the close relation between “culture” and “values” made in culture-exclusivist repertoires, as noted above. The assumption here is that values (also of the “political” sort) derive from culture rather than, as in liberal repertoires, standing above and mediating cultural differences.

This leads for example to the notion, which is according to Elizabeth Hurd prevalent among those opponents of Turkey’s EU membership supporting a (secular) Christian vision of Europe, that “the secularist separation of religion from politics and the democratic settlement of which it is a part is ... a unique Western achievement” and that “full secular democracy can be fully realized *only* in societies possessing a (Judeo)-Christian heritage” (Hurd 2007: 91). Thus, Turkey opponents in the European Parliament tended to invoke in particular the discrimination against Christian minorities in Turkey as implicit “proof” of the incompatibility between “(secular/Christian) Europe” and Turkey as a “Muslim country”. For example:

Basically, Turkey is still a long way from respecting the values of the European nations [sic], as demonstrated by the situation of the countless ethnic and religious minorities which make up the country. (MEP Louis (IND/DEM)^{234,235})

This quote frames concerns about *Christian* minorities in Turkey as a question of supporting diversity in line with European values. Such statements have the paradoxical result of supporting the representational effect of a *liberal cosmopolitan* EU monitoring the recognition of diversity *through* and *within the limits* set by human rights (recall that this has also been a feature of intercultural policy seeking to manage non-European difference within EU-Europe) – though in fact their own vision of EU-Europe is distinctly non-cosmopolitan and their culture-exclusivist visions of political community in EU-Europe stood in opposition to a predominantly “civic” definition of European values in the draft constitution and Lisbon Treaty.

That the guiding vision in such political positions is not multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism, despite their argumentation in support of liberal respect for diversity, is illustrated nicely by the fact that those critiquing Turkey’s violation of religious rights of Christian minorities also make demands that in effect limit religious freedom of Muslims in EU-Europe. For example, a Christian Democrat MEP who in conversation with me opposed Turkey’s membership on the grounds that it is not a European country and in disagreement with basic European values (she in fact described Turkey as a “feudal country”) criticized the Turkish government’s notion of religious freedom because it did not extend to non-Muslim minorities, and rejected the building of big mosques in Germany with the argument that these supported the emergence of “parallel

²³⁴ Independence/Democracy Group, a eurosceptic political group in the European Parliament at the time.

²³⁵ European Parliament Debate on November 25, 2009: Enlargement strategy 2009 concerning the countries of the western Balkans, Iceland and Turkey

societies.” Similarly, MEP Eurlings (PPE-DE), the rapporteur of the 2006 European Parliament report on Turkey, declared that “for a country that wants to be European, it is very important that it should be as easy to build a Christian church in Turkey as it is to build a Turkish mosque in the rest of the European Union.”²³⁶ The statement, the intended meaning of which equates “Europeanness” with the recognition of (religious) diversity, reads ironically from the vantage point, for example, of the recent “minaret” decision in Switzerland (while not an EU country, no one would question its compatibility with EU-Europeanness) but also of the opposition to the building of mosques in countries like Germany or Italy ongoing at the time the statement was made.

While the rights of Christian minorities tended to be emphasized by political conservatives opposing Turkey’s EU membership, they colluded with conditional (liberal) supporters of Turkey’s accession in the critique of the Turkish state’s violation of the human, cultural, and religious rights of the Kurdish and Alevi populations in Turkey (see Arikan 2003: 25).²³⁷ Supporters of Turkey’s accession implied that such issues could be solved by adopting “European” attitudes towards *diversity* that in turn would allow for political *unity* (see also Giannakopoulos & Konstadinos 2005). For example:

The fear that we have to combat, for those of us intent on seeing Turkey join the European Union, is the misplaced fear amongst some of the majority population [in Turkey] that, in a multi-ethnic country, what we call minority rights are a threat to the unity of the state. In modern Europe, quite simply, they are not. (MEP Howitt, S&D²³⁸)²³⁹

²³⁶ European Parliament Debate on September 26, 2006: Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession.

²³⁷ Similarly, the Cyprus issue or the recognition of Armenian genocide are frequent themes brought up by both supporters and opponents of Turkey’s membership, which together reinforce the vision of a cosmopolitan Europe where neighbors supposedly live in peace and gave up nationalist ambitions (notwithstanding the fact that Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, as EU member states, clearly have not done so)

²³⁸ Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, replacing PSE in the current legislative period.

This is why our sincere support for the reforms in Turkey will also encourage the EU's fundamental values to be upheld, with one of the most important of these being respect for ethnic and religious differences and diversity. I am sure that the bright prospect of accession to the European Union will speed up the respect for human rights and the reforms in Turkey. (MEP Kazak (ALDE))²⁴⁰

Thus, I suggest, although cosmopolitan liberals are a minority within the EP, the focus across political positions on political criteria resulting from the liberal articulation of “belonging” to EU-European community and in particular on the violation of minority rights and respect for diversity resulting in part from the concerns of conservatives with religious minorities, produces – implicitly or explicitly – a *vision* of EU-Europe as organized by the intercultural principle of respect for diversity within and through universal principles. It reinforces one particular way of construing EU-European political community and internal and external identity, one particular project of EU-European state- and place-making. In particular, it buttresses a project that is outward-oriented, that is *expansive* in so far as it defines EU-Europe through an active (“cosmopolitanizing”) role in the world. As a European Parliament resolution on enlargement declared in 2009, “the enlargement strategy must be much more than a negotiating methodology, reflecting the core belief that the EU is a community of shared values, and is inextricably linked to the debate on the EU's objectives and effectiveness, its future and its role in the neighbourhood and the world” (European Parliament 2009). In brief, the vision of EU-Europe that emerges from the debates is one that reinforces the notion that the EU has the duty and capacity to exercise “normative power” in external relations – in particular in the realms of adherence to human and cultural rights.

²³⁹ European Parliament Debate on January 20, 2010: Democratisation in Turkey.

²⁴⁰ European Parliament Debate on November 25, 2009: Enlargement strategy 2009 concerning the countries of the western Balkans, Iceland and Turkey

Normative Power: Conditionality and the Cosmopolitanizing of Turkey

Both liberal positions in the European Parliament described above start out from the assumption that the accession relations with the EU constitute a means to transform Turkey, to transform it in a direction that is desirable for and beneficial to the Turkish population, by making the Turkish state adhere to “EU norms and values.” In many cases, this was even presented as the reason why Turkey’s EU membership perspective was to be supported (rather than EU-internal interests and concerns). In this regard, liberal MEPs accord with academic visions of what has been called the EU’s “normative power” whether or not they use this concept explicitly. In fact, the view that the EU is a “normative power” (Manners 2002),²⁴¹ that is, a polity that is able to generalize its own norms in external relations without (necessarily) relying on military might and, it is frequently assumed, with due respect for the alternative modernity of others, has not only gained currency in academic discourse²⁴² but also informs EU self-representations.²⁴³ Foregrounded here are the norms of a liberal (cosmopolitan) polity, that is, of liberal democracy, human and cultural rights, and rule of law. Thus, we recall that the European Commission declared in its *Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World* that

²⁴¹ Manners argues that the unique “historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution” (2002: 240) of the EU predisposes it to act normatively in the international arena, i.e. to promote its own norms and to define what is considered “normal”, in a manner that is different from past and present imperial powers. EU-Europe, Manners states, “exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and ... this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative way” (2002: 242).

²⁴² For Beck and Grande, EU-Europe’s peculiarity as cosmopolitan Empire in its foreign relations is the ability to “respect alternative modernities” (in contrast to the US) and the fact that states *voluntarily* join it through accession (Beck 2004: 263; Beck & Grande 2004: 337).

²⁴³ As Sjørusen points out: “Indeed, the fact that it [the argument on normative power] corresponds very closely to the EU’s own description of its international role could be enough to set the alarm bells ringing” (2006: 235). She adds, however that “there might be some validity to such conceptualizations of the EU” (ibid).

the EU is, and must aspire to become even more, an example of a “soft power” founded on norms and values such as human dignity, solidarity, tolerance, freedom of expression, respect for diversity and intercultural dialogue.

“Normative” (or “soft”) power is usually employed as a positive concept, as is assumed that adherence to EU norms will constitute an improvement for non-EU societies. Through what means and to what extent such “normative power” works in external relations such as of accession is debated in the literature but a central focus tends to be on EU “conditionality,” that is, the fact that EU membership is made *conditional* upon the fulfillment of accession criteria. The EU’s normative power is then seen to rest among others on the degree of desirability of EU membership for candidate states and the credibility of membership perspective on part of the EU (i.e. what EU lingua refers to as “*pacta sunt servanda*”). Conditional support²⁴⁴ for Turkey’s EU membership by MEPs thus follows this logic. Its rationale is the exercise of “normative power” the foundation of which are the hierarchical “asymmetries” of accession, as the so-called “accession negotiations” upon the success of which accession is made “conditional” in fact entail the *non-negotiable* adoption of *acquis* law as well as additional requirements concerning the “political” and “economic” accession criteria that can go beyond EU law (see below).

Turkey’s accession process commonly figures as a prime test case for the EU’s soft or normative power. The declared goal here is to make the Turkish state adopt EU-European principles of “unity in diversity” in both culturalist and institutional terms (as discussed in previous chapters) in good liberal tradition of a “civilizing” and in this case “cosmopolitanizing” mission (for

²⁴⁴ With “conditional support,” I mean support for membership if Turkey fulfills the accession criteria (and only then), in line with the principle of “*pacta sunt servanda*”, i.e. that the EU has to deliver on its promises if Turkey meets the criteria.

discussion of how such “expansive” projects are at the core of liberalism’s self-understandings, see e.g. Asad 2003; Brown 2006). In particular, the expectation is that the Turkish state adopt a liberal relation to internal *diversity* (not *difference*; the Turkish state for example is expected to respect the cultural rights of the Kurdish population but not the PKK). Oliver Rehn, then Enlargement Commissioner and a conditional supporter of Turkey’s EU membership, declared for example in 2008 in the European Parliament:²⁴⁵

The essence of these reforms [required for EU membership] is to ensure *Turkey’s transformation into an open and modern society, with full respect for freedom and democracy, diversity and tolerance* – that is, for democratic secularism. The very existence of our Union rests on the basic values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights that we share among ourselves. ... The Negotiating Framework with Turkey spells out these values, and it is the Commission’s duty to monitor them.

Supporters of EU membership in Turkey often align with this perspective that EU accession will, via “normative power,” support democracy, respect for diversity, and democracy in Turkey. As Keyder argues, support for EU membership by various social groups in Turkish is “a strategic choice for reforming the Turkish state by anchoring the process to the momentum and the prestige of the European project” (2006: 77). Turkey’s EU membership is in particular supported by social groups which seek greater respect for cultural and religious pluralism by the Turkish state²⁴⁶ but also by big business and others supporting a neoliberal Turkish state (Insel 2005). This latter support group however should also give us a pointer as to what else the EU’s

²⁴⁵ European Parliament Debate on May 21, 2008: Turkey’s 2007 Progress Report.

²⁴⁶ The Turkish republic had been built on a state project whose culturalism identified Turkishness with Sunni Islam and only defined *religious* minorities as minorities, in turn denying the difference of Alevites and the Kurdish population, who have in recent decades been asserting their right to difference and, in the case of the latter, autonomy. At the same time, political Islamic groups have contested the laicist brand of secularism of the Kemalist state that subordinated religion to state control. While support for EU membership feeds upon this critique of the Turkish/Kemalist state by these circles, critique of the EU often constitutes a defense of the latter’s Kemalist and nationalist principles. Nationalists on the right and on the left as well as Kemalists represented by the CHP find that requirements of EU accession undermine the sovereignty of the state – seen as a value – and the “unity” of the country (see Canefe & Bora 2003; Insel 2005).

“normative power” might entail. Respect for “alternative modernities,” I suggest, in a process of “cosmopolitanization” is quite compatible with the generalization of “modernity’s” latest achievement: a neoliberal social, economic, and political order.

Cosmopolitanizing Turkey? The Political and the Technical in the Accession Debates

The AKP government, in power in Turkey since 2002, has been praised for bringing Turkey closer to the EU by having undertaken substantial reforms in the sphere of political rights and freedoms, as a result of which accession negotiations with the EU were opened in 2005. Since then, however, the European Commission and the Parliament in particular have lamented a stalling of the accession process and slowness in implementing “reforms.” US and EU-European newspapers now speculate that Prime Minister Erdoğan’s ambitions reach beyond the “European prospect” in that he wants to turn Turkey into a regional power in its own right. And indeed, the AKP’s election campaign of 2011 did not bring up the EU accession process. It also did not center on claims about improving political and civic freedoms associated with EU membership, as in earlier periods. Instead, the campaign posters distributed in the city landscape featured promises in the realms of social and material well-being of the population - invoking modernization and upward social mobility -, national security, and political stability. The election results – with the AKP increasing its share of the votes to over 50 percent – seem to suggest that a good part of the population indeed values ‘stability’ over ‘political freedoms,’

as the AKP government has tightened its stance on opposition, using both police violence and questionable legal means.²⁴⁷

All of this flies in the face of the hopes that some of the liberal Left in EU-Europe have placed in the reformative power of the AKP government when it comes to dismantling the authoritarian, 'classically nationalist,' Kemalist state. While the AKP is indeed busy dismantling the "Kemalist state," its record as regards dismantling authoritarianism and securing (political) freedoms is less stellar, despite initial actions that won it the support of some in the European Parliament (EP). As I was told by an MEP of the political bloc of the Greens, the latter had come to cooperate with the conservative AKP because of a shared interest in liberalizing Turkey, thus forming "strange bedfellows."

The fact that the (only) political party that, in the view of center-left supporters in EU-Europe, had the capacity and will to render Turkey EU-European is turning openly authoritarian and showing less and less interest in the 'European option' seems to suggest that the "key question

²⁴⁷ For example, journalist Ahmet Şık was arrested and his book entitled *İmanın Ordusu* ("The army of the Imam") on a political Islamic group said to have close ties to the AKP "deleted" before publication, on charges of being involved in Ergenekon. The Ergenekon case, which was initially seen as a chance for democratization, increasingly turned into a means of the AKP government to suppress opposition, not least by showcasing the arbitrariness of state power. Thus, a student at Middle East Technical University was sentenced to six years for terrorist activity although even the prosecutor stated that there was no evidence against him. Moreover, while the AKP's declared "Kurdish opening" inspired hopes for a political solution to what has been called the "Kurdish question" with "PKK terrorism," subsequent violent repression did not deliver on them. In the aftermath of the elections, a court decided that several opposition MPs of the political bloc of the Kurdish party and Socialists as well as of the CHP who at the time were imprisoned on political grounds were banned from Parliament although they had been approved as candidates and elected, thus effectively voiding the vote of Kurdish and AKP-critical citizens. When the Kurdish/Socialist bloc and the CHP refused to enter the Parliament until the matter was resolved, Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that the Parliament would work "smoothly" (*bal gibi*) without them. The stance towards the Tekel worker protest in 2009 showed that the AKP government, despite its populism, did not intend to improve worker rights and well-being beyond the benefits that might or might not accrue through the "free market". The current situation in Turkey provides a further clear example how the liberalization of markets is very much compatible with authoritarian/ neoconservative government (see Aybar 2001: for Turkey).

for many in Europe and Turkey”, namely, “whether Turkey – officially accepted as a potential EU member and currently in negotiations with the EU – can emulate an ostensibly cosmopolitan Europe” (Parker 2009: 1086) is already decided. The EU, it might seem, has (so far) failed in exercising its “normative power” to “cosmopolitanize Turkey.” As a Turkish journalist specializing in EU-Turkey relations put it in conversation with me, he agreed that “soft power” was needed for stability, however, he added, the EU “simply doesn’t know how to use it.”

Such a portrayal, however, runs the danger of accepting the dominant framing of what characterizes EU-European statehood and what EU accession is thus all about. Foregrounded in political debates on Turkey, as we have seen, are the “political” accession criteria which are associated with a cosmopolitan identity of EU-Europe. In contrast, debates in the European Parliament – and national debates certainly do not provide an exception to this (for an overview, see Giannakopoulos & Maras 2005) – have elided any discussion of other dimensions of the EU’s supposed “normative power” in Turkey. In this way, debates on Turkey’s EU accession also highlight what is contested and what is taken for granted in contemporary EU-European state-making. Contested is the quality and degree of “political community” in EU-Europe for which Turkey’s supposed difference articulated through reference to political criteria functions as a foil. In fact however, the political criteria form only one of the three “Copenhagen Criteria” for EU accession. The other two require a functioning market economy capable of coping with competitive pressures and market forces in the Single Market and the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*, the legal framework of the EU. What is taken for

granted are these economic and institutional features of EU-European state-making: they appear as *fait accompli* best dealt with by experts in the process of accession. (The complete elision of the EU's external role in this regard is the more interesting as EU neoliberalism is widely debated *within* EU-Europe).

Thus, an MEP supportive of Turkey's membership told me two years after accession negotiations had been opened that the European Parliament saw itself responsible for the political criteria, while technical issues such as alignment with the *acquis* were dealt with by experts. Here, he added, things proceeded as foreseen. Taking issue with another MEP's critique – which I conveyed to him anonymously – of the Commission for “only seeing the economic dimensions of Turkey's EU accession” so that the European Parliament had to focus on political questions (which, in her view, precluded Turkey's membership),²⁴⁸ he did not see a strict division of labor between the European Parliament and the Commission in so far as the latter also dealt with political questions, as the yearly progress reports showed.

Be that as it may for the Commission, division of labor applies in so far as the European Parliament does not engage with the supposedly “technical” macro-economic and *acquis* questions. As my analysis of European Parliament debates showed, even after accession negotiations had been opened in 2005, there was no discussion of the supposedly “non-political” Copenhagen criteria in the European Parliament. Even mere references to the

²⁴⁸ This corresponds to Gates' view that “Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and representatives of the Commission are not in agreement over the extent to which human rights should be a priority in Turkey's reform process” (2009: 401) while the “limited amount of money directed toward human rights reform in Turkey reveals the Commission's particular preferences” (ibid: 404).

economic and *acquis* dimensions of accession were extremely scarce. As the same MEP told me, Turkey's economic transformation was seen as relatively unproblematic, as it was already a capitalist country, unlike the post-socialist former candidate states.²⁴⁹

In turn, then Enlargement Commissioner Rehn can be seen to explain the predominance of political criteria in accession debates with the “absolutely fundamental guiding principle of the EU enlargement policy”, namely, that

the pace of negotiations depends on the progress made in legal and democratic reforms – and especially on their implementation. In other words, the technical talks on chapters make up the walls and rooms of the house – maybe even the roof one day – while the legal and democratic reforms constitute the very foundations of any new EU member's construction. And, as every builder knows, one must first make very solid foundations before moving on to putting the walls together. So, first the reforms, then progress in the technical negotiations.²⁵⁰

In this case, the focus on political criteria would merely reflect the temporality of different phases in the accession process. This statement – just as the bias of the debates – of course obscures that Turkey has already been “making progress” in aligning its state institutions and practices with the EU-European governance framework in a number of areas, whether or not these changes lead to official “progress” in the negotiations or to eventual membership.²⁵¹

²⁴⁹ Böröcz however points out that in the case of “eastern enlargement” as well, “the first criterion along which the east European applicant states were evaluated for possible full membership in the EU was the stability of their democratic institutions and general respect for human rights, interpreted as political rights, with a particular emphasis on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and non-discrimination.” (2005: 111)

²⁵⁰ European Parliament Debate on May 21, 2008: Turkey's 2007 Progress Report.

²⁵¹ Moreover, what this statement means is that Turkey might “adjust” to EU-Europe in “technical” matter as much as it likes, its membership remains unsecure as long as “political criteria” are not fulfilled. And as we have seen, opinions on whether these “political criteria” can ever be fulfilled by a “Muslim” country are divided in the European Parliament and are likely to remain so; evaluation of whether or not Turkey fulfills them is thus likely to remain bound to such particular culturalist assumptions.

This split between the “political” and the “technical” both relies on and reinforces the notion of the EU as a community of *liberal* cosmopolitan values, including their bias on the civic and political rather than economic and social dimensions of human rights (for critique, see Harvey 2000; Schmid 2004). The European Parliament’s silence on glaring class inequalities in Turkey – related to neoliberalization in Turkey that the EU supports, as the following sections show – implicitly construes these as a “non-political” and even unimportant issue. Thus, the European Parliament never demanded that the Turkish state do something about class inequalities beyond supporting the right to unionize or demands to improve the socioeconomic situation in the southeast as a means to solve the “Kurdish question.” Neither have those conditionally supporting Turkey’s membership attempted to use “normative power” to address such issues, nor have those opposing it tried to use it as a factor against Turkey. The Commission, in turn, has failed to address class inequality as a “technical” issue. No contributor to debates in the European Parliament has demanded from the Commission to change this. Nor has anyone suggested that the EU might be supporting processes in Turkey that increase social inequality (and which moreover are unlikely to be addressed through the granting of rights alone). The reduction of “the political” to the “political criteria for membership” thus also means the reduction of a critique of inequality to a critique of the state of affairs of the (institutional system that is to secure the) granting of civil and political rights and the “thinning” of demands for equality to a liberal emphasis on formal rights.

In this way, political debate also completely elides an area where the EU’s track record has been less than stellar, thus contributing to the vision of Europe’s essential “goodness” (Böröcz

2005). This elision not only obscures much of what the EU in fact supports in Turkey. The emphasis in the politics of accession on the EU's "normative power" when it comes to questions of human and cultural rights, which develops as I have shown in part from EU-*internal* struggles on the "future of Europe," also helps to secure consent – both within EU-Europe and in Turkey – to and thus indirectly to enable a process of state (trans)formation the "technicality" of which is in fact far from "nonpolitical."

EU-Europe's Normative Power: Dimensions of the Accession Process

Critiquing an exclusive focus on the political accession criteria in political debates is not to say that they are unimportant in the reality of accession. After the EU accepted Turkey as a candidate state in 1999, tying the opening of accession negotiations to political reforms,²⁵² "nine reform or 'harmonization' packages made their way through the Turkish National Assembly" (Kubicek 2005: 365), most of them under the AKP government that had come to power in 2002. These changes involved among others the right to broadcast in Kurdish, the abolition of the death penalty (contested because many wanted to see PKK leader Öcalan executed), and some limits on the power of the military, and prompted the EU to open accession negotiations in 2005. Since then, the European Commission continues to demand in its yearly progress reports improved implementation and further reforms in view of meeting the "political" membership criteria. Such demands included issues such as the granting of cultural (in particular language) rights to the Kurdish population, the reduction of the role of the

²⁵² Sufficient alignment with the "political criteria" was a precondition for the *opening* of accession negotiations, not only for eventual membership. Turkey's membership request had initially been rejected on this basis.

military in political institutions of the state, judicial reform, anti-corruption policy,²⁵³ adherence to international human rights law, or improvement in civic and political rights (including religious freedom of non-Muslim communities). Social and economic rights are interpreted in terms of the conditions of vulnerable groups such as women and children in the labor market, the freedom to unionize, and anti-discrimination. As regards cultural and minority rights, the 2010 Progress report declared that

Overall, Turkey's approach on minorities remains restrictive. Full respect for and protection of language, culture and fundamental rights, in accordance with European standards, have yet to be fully achieved. Turkey needs to make further efforts to enhance tolerance or promote inclusiveness vis-à-vis minorities. (European Commission 2010: 32)

Such demands are only partially articulated in official accession negotiations, which concern the adoption of the EU *acquis* – that is, the EU legal framework also valid for existing member states – in the form of 33 chapters, of which only chapter 23 on “judiciary and fundamental rights” concerns the political criteria. The existence of these criteria *in addition* to the requirement of adopting the *acquis* thus means that candidate states have to fulfill conditions – specified in the Accession Partnerships – that are *not* formalized in EU law. Conditions for meeting the Copenhagen criteria can thus be quite flexibly stipulated, not least in view of political expediency. That means also that the EU can in the accession process potentially effect changes in “policy areas beyond the reach of Community competence in the member states” (Grabbe 2003: 308). This reflects interestingly on the notion implied in the notion of a

²⁵³ Jacoby argues that “the construction of the fraudulent ‘other’ is an effective means for European elites to gain greater access to Turkish markets. ... [B]y building on older notions of the obreptitious [probably meant: surreptitious] Turk, the need for extraneous guidance is substantiated, anti- corruption programmes which impinge on Turkish sovereignty are justified and further European capital penetration is facilitated.” (2010: 664)

cosmopolitan and cosmopolitanizing EU-Europe that “EU values and principles” that are *already shared internally* are to be “spread” through the accession process.

What the focus on the political criteria however renders “merely technical” are the particular implications of the other two accession criteria. Thus, while EU law is “thin” on matters demanded by the “political criteria” – or on social policy, for that matter – this is not so when it comes to those regulations the adherence to which is to help ensure that Turkey is a “functioning market economy” able to “cope with competitive pressures” in the EU’s single market (the economic Copenhagen criteria). Of the 33 chapters of the *acquis* to be adopted in accession, thirteen clearly fall into the area of economic policy and three into the area of agriculture.²⁵⁴ Among the remaining ones, several have economic implications.²⁵⁵ Moreover, as in the case of the political criteria, the economic Copenhagen criteria allow for the imposition of “additional reform requirements ... that are not part of the *acquis*” (Bohle 2006: 70). In Turkey these criteria are usually tied to requirements by the IMF, and Turkey tends to get relatively good grades in this area in the Commission’s progress reports.

Another presence of the EU in Turkey is through financial aid that is to help accession preparation. Here, Andrea Gates observes that “in spite of the fact that human rights in Turkey appear, based on proclamations by EU representatives, to be of critical importance, human

²⁵⁴ In 2010, 13 of the chapters had been opened for negotiation and only one (Research and Science) provisionally closed, while 8 chapters remained suspended due to the conflict with Cyprus.

²⁵⁵ Adjustments in these chapters have been a mixed bag, according to recent progress reports. For example, alignment with intellectual property law or competition policy is relatively high, while alignment in agricultural policy towards CAP is limited; in most chapters, the most recent progress report notes “some progress” (Progress Report 2010).

rights reform in Turkey has not been a primary target of EU pre-accession aid” (2009: 401), amounting in recent years to 2-17% of the budget according to her calculations (ibid: 404). The funds the EU provides to Turkey to help with the accession process via the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA, discussed below) are directed to the greatest extent at alignment with the *acquis* as well as regional, rural, and human resources development. Of the five components encompassed by IPA, only one – “Transition Assistance and Institution Building” – entails funds to help for preparation towards meeting the political criteria of membership. Currently, below one third of total funds go to this component, which is furthermore not exclusively devoted to issues of human rights and democracy, but is also to help with the adoption of the *acquis* and so-called civil society dialogue.²⁵⁶ The bulk of IPA funds goes to the preparation for structural funds and the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ Included here are also artistic exchange programs, which Marc Pierini, Head of the Delegation of the EU to Turkey, presented together with education exchange as an apolitical “politics of culture” during a conference on “Cultural Policy Development in Turkey” in Istanbul in March 2011. He referred with this term to the capacity of culture to shape relations between societies and peoples “away, far away from politics” which, he noted, tended to produce “polarization rather than harmony”. In line with intercultural perspectives, cultural exchange is to produce the latter. Banu Karaca notes that “[f]rom the perspective of those who are frequently ‘the object’ of cultural exchange – ... in this case artists from Turkey – these initiatives frequently fall short of their proposed goals by re-inscribing the very stereotypical notions and power differentials that they are supposed to transcend” (2010: 122). For example, a group of performers from Turkey who were invited to perform in the Netherlands were not able to challenge the perception that their play was about “honor killings” (ibid: 130). This links up with dominant representations of Turkey in EU-Europe as well as presentation of accession as a process of turning Turkey from problematic difference into EU-compatible diversity. Beyond its culturalist implications, Banu Karaca argues that EU cultural policy had an effect on the art world in Turkey in terms of policy adjustments which were *not* directly an accession requirement but undertaken in anticipation of EU funding, which however “materialized only slowly” (2010: 121).

²⁵⁷ Hughes et al have similarly noted for the earlier round of “eastern enlargement” that “in practice EU aid has been overwhelmingly targeted on improving the market economies of the CEECs. This prioritization in aid disbursement for economic development and the administrative and institution-building and capacity-building required by advanced market economies has been strengthened by the accession process. The pattern of aid suggests that the EU focus on economic development, while expecting the CEECs to meet political conditionality more or less independent of aid, is driven by the EU’s overriding concern with markets rather than democracy or human rights.” (2004: 23-24)

What, then, is entailed in these “technical” dimensions of the accession process? The following discussion suggests that EU accession has supported neoliberalization in Turkey, the roots of which go back to the coup of 1980, and which the current AKP government has pursued maybe most “successfully.” As Öniş (2009) argues, the period after the 2001 crisis in particular has seen the development of a Turkish competition state “which only sees a minimal role for the state “in the realms of development and income distribution” (ibid: 412). My argument below is that the EU membership perspective as well as concrete accession requirements by the Commission have supported the demands of the IMF and World Bank²⁵⁸ and played into the hands of local elites seeking to push neoliberalization in Turkey further. Not coincidentally, big and transnational business (as well as, though more critically, SMEs) and what Insel calls the “neoliberals” (2005: 204-5) are core supporters of EU membership. For them, political liberalization appears as a necessary correlate of the (neoliberal) free market²⁵⁹ fostered by the Customs Union and the EU membership perspective and impeded by the policies of a bureaucratic, interventionist, and authoritarian Turkish state.

Alternative Modernities: Supporting the Turkish “Competition State”

Critics of the EU’s earlier “eastern enlargement” have pointed out that the membership condition of a “functioning market economy” de facto meant the installing a neoliberally regulated market economy benefitting in particular transnational and Western capital (e.g.

²⁵⁸ Turkey was hit by severe financial crises in 1994, 2000, and 2001. A stand-by agreement with the IMF had already been agreed on in 1999, but the IMF’s influence increased considerably in the context of the later crises, which also sparked structural adjustment programs in the area of agriculture by the World Bank (see Oyan 2002).

²⁵⁹ TÜSIAD (an association of Turkish industrialists and businessmen) has supported Turkey’s EU accession, one of the arguments being that “a participatory, pluralistic democratic system” was necessary for an economic order based on the free market (Sugden 2004: 254).

Bohle 2006). In the Turkish case as well, the establishment of a Customs Union with the EU in 1995 – before official EU candidate status – extended free trade and entailed regulatory changes at the same time as it excluded agricultural products, involved more significant changes for Turkey in terms of the reduction of tariffs, and was not “buffered” through sufficient transfer payments (Eder 2001; Türkay 2002). This served the interests of transnational and EU-European capital but also export-oriented (big) business in Turkey.

Since the start of negotiations, the European Commission further required Turkey to comply – as part of meeting the “economic criteria” – with the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank (see also Türkay 2002: 225), which included among others measures aimed at disinflation and privatization. In its progress reports, the European Commission repeatedly approved of and requested continuing privatization of state enterprises. The 2008 progress report noted for example that “the process of structural transformation of the economy has advanced relatively well, mainly in the form of privatisation” (European Commission 2008c: 36). Not coincidentally, foreign direct investment and large-scale privatization increased significantly after the opening of accession negotiations (see Öniş 2009: 418) – not only because of EU pressure, but because of the signals this sent to investors about a “stable investment environment.” Here, the political criteria had a further role to play. As Öniş notes, “key segments of national and transnational capital [assumed] that *political* reforms were important for the long-term stability of the *economy*. In other words, the political elements of the Copenhagen criteria ... were increasingly seen as the key to a stable business environment which would provide a stronger degree of protection for their investments” (2009: 417-18).

While successive Turkish governments had pursued market liberalization and export-oriented policies in place of the previous import-substitution model after the coup of 1980,²⁶⁰ Turkey still appeared in a 1996 World Bank report “among the worst three privatizing countries” (Eder 2001: 204) and showed comparatively low figures for direct foreign investment (see Adly 2010; Eder 2001). The EU accession process contributed to changing this: privatization (required by the EU) and foreign direct investment (encouraged by a “stable business climate”) really took off around then (see Adly 2010: 282; Öniş 2009: 423).²⁶¹ The EU membership prospect supported the Turkish government’s pursuit of neoliberal supply-side policies²⁶² as “significant components of the Turkish public saw orthodox, IMF style reforms as an instrument for attaining EU membership and its associated material benefits” (Öniş 2009: 420), given that the European Commission explicitly endorsed IMF requirements. Thus, while the EU did not “export” neoliberalism in the strict sense, in so far as it supported processes already under way, it is unlikely that neoliberalization could have been pushed as far without the EU membership

²⁶⁰ Liberalization concerned in particular trade, the capital account, and prices. Governments however also actively supported export through subsidies and were relatively reluctant to privatize state industries, although this “had appeared on the government’s agenda in 1984” (Adly 2010: 282). Neoliberalization however also entailed the break-up of union power and the support of temporary employment models that accorded workers no economic and social rights (Cam 2002: 95,97). Real incomes of workers (as well as civil servants) decreased significantly, which was considered a means of reducing labor costs and increasing FDI, and regional and social inequalities increased (Cam 2002: 103-04; Savran 2002). As “the replacement of unionised workers by temporary employees has now become a major challenge to labour solidarity” (Cam 2002: 98), the EU’s call for increased rights of labor unions will in itself not be sufficient to improve the condition of labor in Turkey.

²⁶¹ According to Adly, while privatization had been on the official agenda since the beginning of market liberalization policies in Turkey, it only took off in 2006 (after accession negotiations opened). Throughout the 1990s, privatization never brought more than \$400 million in revenue; while it jumped from \$1,266 million in 2004 to \$8,209 in 2005 and continued to be high in subsequent years (Adly 2010:282).

²⁶² Ziya Öniş sees a critical shift towards the stabilization and deepening of the neoliberal regime in Turkey in the wake of the 2001 crisis, where IMF demands worked together with the opening of EU accession negotiations “to create a suitable environment for the restructuring of the neo-liberal model in such a way as to make it far more compatible with the objective of sustained growth” (2009: 411) through elements of both de-regulation (privatization, reduction of corporate tax, easing FDI, reducing agriculture subsidies) and re-regulation (fiscal and monetary discipline, greater autonomy of the Central Bank, regulation of the banking system, strengthening of autonomous regulatory agencies) (ibid: 421).

prospect and the EU's alignment with the interests of local elites and the International Institutions.

Material Benefits – For Whom?

Critics have emphasized that processes of neoliberalization in Turkey have drastically increased social inequalities (of class, but also, in their intersection, for example of gender and region) (e.g. Balkan & Savran 2002; Cam 2002). This stands in seeming contrast to one of the reasons for popular support of EU accession in Turkey: expected material benefits. While such benefits indeed accrued to business²⁶³ in the process of accession and independent of actual membership (which of course would bring further “material benefits” in form of EU structural funds), the question is whether or when they will materialize for the larger part of the Turkish population.²⁶⁴

In fact, while EU accession works in favor of the interests of capital, it does little to address Turkey's tremendous class and regional inequalities and high levels of unemployment. The *acquis* – reflecting the consequences of EU-European state-making of the last decades – to be implemented during accession entails one chapter on “social policy and employment,” which

²⁶³ This is born out by Öniş's study, which shows that transnational and domestic big business in Turkey assessed post-2001 economic policy favorably, while SMEs were somewhat more critical for example when it comes to their ability to access credits as well as “more sensitive to issues relating to unemployment and regional inequality” (2009: 427). Labor unions, in turn, were highly critical, arguing that such “unequal and lop-sided” growth will not contribute to improving employment and reducing poverty (ibid).

²⁶⁴ While increased growth and EU membership itself might indeed bring about “prosperity” for some, how created wealth is to be distributed is a question not touched upon by EU requirements. EU institutions and the Turkish government might speculate on consent of the population at large to a process that increases class inequalities by ensuring that most are better off than before due to increased productivity. That this gamble might indeed pay off – even if only temporarily – is indicated by the recent re-election of the AKP government which had pursued a high-growth agenda.

addresses issues such as work safety, employment policy, and union rights. Among the Commission's Progress Reports, only the most recent one (European Commission 2010) made more substantial demands on questions of social policy, noting that unemployment benefits and social protection more generally are too low – possibly due to sustained critique of the EU's lack of interest in class inequality in Turkey (see below).

Thus, given the bias of the *acquis* towards (neoliberal) economic changes over questions of “cohesion,” alignment with the *acquis* is not likely to bring about substantial improvements in social inequalities but might rather foster their increase. What then about the other realm one might look for a potential positive EU impact, pre-accession financial assistance (IPA)?

As Europeanists Ayhan Kaya and Senem Aydin note in their report to the European Parliament on the 2009 IPA programme (requested by the Committee on Foreign Affairs):

The EU is often perceived in Turkey as an international organisation that puts primacy to issues of economic efficiency and macroeconomic stability, rather than social issues in a candidate country. ... Yet..., unemployment, poverty and unequal distribution of income are key problems of Turkish society. It is difficult to significantly contribute to overcoming these problems by focusing solely on capacity building and infrastructure projects. Thus, there should be a strong orientation towards tackling social issues directly and visibly, which would also help enhance the EU's legitimacy in Turkey. ... Emphasis should also be placed on the establishment of a rights based welfare system of the state in Turkey. (2010: 7)

As this critique indicates, not only have the EU's macroeconomic membership criteria fostered supply-side policies, but the orientation of IPA has not counteracted the likely effects in terms of increasing class and regional inequalities. In fact, the aid given to Turkey through IPA in preparation for structural funds is not meant to do so. As a member of the European Delegation

in Turkey told me during the introduction phase of IPA, EU pre-accession funds were not expected to have a significant impact in terms of actual developmental goals. Rather, they were to help “build institutional capacity” for the actual use of structural funds in the case of membership. As Grabbe notes, despite their comparatively low amounts, pre-accession funds “have an important role in reinforcing the transfer of EU models ... [and] can change the order of priorities on a government’s agenda” (2003: 314).

A means to install “regulatory unity in diversity” in Turkey,²⁶⁵ IPA cannot be considered an instrument for alleviating uneven development, class inequalities, or poverty. First off, although there is a significant projected increase in money received through IPA (from just below 500 million in 2007 to about 780 million Euros²⁶⁶ in 2011), the funds allocated would not be

²⁶⁵ An instance here is the contested case of Regional Development Authorities (RDAs) in Turkey, the EU has pressed for decentralization as a precondition for membership and the administration of structural funds (see in particular chapters 22 in the Progress Reports). Turkey did not have any administrative or political institutional structures “above” the provincial and “below” the national level, while the provincial administration “primarily serves to carry out basic administrative tasks under central authority” (Lagendijk et al 2009: 386), until it introduced NUTS II regions in 2002 in response to EU demands. This, as well as EU requirements to establish Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) for the future administration of structural funds (and, until then, of IPA), and the more general devolving of powers to the local administrative scales, was perceived by some in Turkey as an attack on the territorial sovereignty and unity of the nation-state. In fact, as Ertuğal points out, “the fear that the wider geographical area of a region might include a dominant ethnic group endangering the unity and security of the nation” (2010: 98) had prevented an earlier formation of a regional level of public administration (see also Lagendijk et al 2009: 386). At stake was here of course primarily the fear of Kurdish separatism, deeply related to the culturalism on which the Turkish nation-state had come to be founded (see Akçam 2004). The AKP government eventually met EU demands with a public administration law that entailed changes in centre-local relations, a shift away from centralization to subsidiarity, and the introduction of regulatory local government. The EU Commission “welcomed” it “insofar as it devolves the responsibility for a number of executive functions to the lower tiers of the public administration and introduces a measure of local democracy at the provincial level” (European Commission 2005b: chapter 22). The law establishing the RDAs, passed by the parliament in 2006, was however brought to the Constitutional Court by the parliamentary opposition “principally on the grounds that the setting up of DAs would undermine the territorial integrity of Turkey” (European Commission 2007c: 56). The court however decided in favor of the law and by 2009, RDAs had been established in all NUTS II regions in Turkey (European Commission 2009). While this entailed a *limited* move towards decentralization rather than “a move to more regional autonomy as advocated by the EU” (Lagendijk et al 2009: 389), it does show the state-making significance and culturalist implications of EU “regulatory unity in diversity”.

²⁶⁶ From about 650 million to about one billion dollars according to currency conversation rates in December 2011.

sufficient. The total amount received is still relatively low if compared with the allocation of monies through EU structural funds and other programs within the EU. As we saw, Berlin alone receives a total of 1.2 billion Euros in structural funds in the funding cycle 2007-2013. To compare: the just above 1 billion Euros²⁶⁷ to be spent on regional development in Turkey in the time-frame 2007-2011 are to be distributed among all eligible regions. Thus, when I had a conversation with a Turkish journalist specializing on EU issues on the likely impact of accession, he pointed to a TV screen in the café where we were sitting, which showed that the on-going auction of a state-owned refinery was at that moment up to 1.8 billion Lira,²⁶⁸ and declared: “The pre-accession funding is peanuts for Turkey”.

But even if the pre-accession funds were sufficient to have an impact in terms of development, the same reservations apply as for the likely impact of structural funds more generally. Just as the latter, which prioritizes competitive growth over redistribution (Rumford 2000: 192), IPA follows the (neoliberal) primacy of increasing competitiveness and subsumes social policy only under this heading. While the regional development OPs take up concerns of “convergence” by focusing on less and least developed regions in the eastern half of the country and by investing in infrastructure, monies for “research and development” go to already more competitive regions (also in the West), because only these are seen to have the necessary capacities and potential (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2007). Just as in EU-Europe, there is thus a possible contradiction between the different objectives of the funds – enhancing “unity” through convergence and “diversity” through competitive growth of the already competitive.

²⁶⁷ About 1.3 billion dollars as of December 2011.

²⁶⁸ At the time, the dollar stood at about 1.3 Lira.

Similarly, as officials in the Delegation working on rural development pointed out to me, the main concern in IPA concerning agriculture was to increase standards up to EU level. Only projects that fulfilled this requirement would receive funding. An example they gave was milk quality: Cooling equipment has to be up to EU standards for the sake of food safety, they noted. At the time, they saw big problems in this area, as producers were not registered and sold milk on the streets, resulting in diseases. The goal of funding, they stated, thus was to both help producers with increased investment costs and to secure quality for consumers. Upon my question who is likely to benefit from such funding, as writing proposals requires cultural capital, they noted that there is now help from Turkish state institutions and NGOs on teaching farmers how to write projects, but acknowledged that this was not sufficient – not only in terms of issues such as illiteracy, but also in view of lack of awareness that funding exists. All this reminds of Elisabeth Dunn’s analysis of the likely impact of EU hygiene regulations on the Polish meat industry which, she argued, placed “a differential burden on large and small agribusinesses” (Dunn 2003: 1494). She thus saw it as a “Trojan pig” with which the Commission sought to achieve market reorganization in a candidate country, increasing the market share of large, multinational agribusiness to the detriment of small local firms and farmers (ibid.: 1498–99, 1500). The base-line thus is that IPA is oriented towards aligning institutional capacities and practices in Turkey with demands of EU regulatory unity in diversity, including market competition, not at reducing class and regional inequalities.

Combined with the earlier argument on the support of the Commission of neoliberalization in Turkey, the “normative power” of EU-Europe appears in a different light. Transforming Turkey

(while respecting its “alternative modernity”) seems to be, once more, primarily about creating place conducive to capitalism. Even the political criteria, while one clearly cannot reduce political support for them in EU-Europe or Turkey to this goal, can here serve the creation of a “stable business climate.” Turning Turkey into “acceptable diversity” thus de facto has come to mean rendering it safe for capital.

Conclusion

The view on “technical” dimensions of accession – which are, as this chapter shows, of high political import – provides a somewhat different vision of the “normative power” of a “cosmopolitan Europe” from the one espoused in debates on Turkey (or, for that matter, by cosmopolitan theorists examining EU-Turkey relations). EU accession as a process of aligning Turkey with EU norms in brief is *not* best understood as the *benign* effect of an *external* agency concerning predominantly the *political* liberalization or modernization of an obsolescent nation-state (the more so as the “neoliberalizing” seems to have clearly worked better than the “liberalizing” in recent years in Turkey).

First off, to locate the source of transformations exclusively “outside” Turkey overlooks the way in which local elites have played the Europe card and approached EU requirements selectively in pursuing their own interests. The fact that the AKP is increasingly giving the EU the cold shoulder is likely due to their new confidence that they no longer need the membership perspective for their regional as well as domestic aspirations (and reinforced by the current crisis of EU-Europe). However, by catering to the interests of (parts of) domestic and

transnational capital in accession, the Commission's prioritization of the creation of places conducive to capital over questions of social justice – which, though still contested within EU-Europe, is not an issue of debate when it comes to the kinds of “external relations” established with Turkey – moreover places the *benign* quality of EU-Europe's “normative power” in question.

Nevertheless, it is wrong in my view to present cosmopolitan culturalism as an *intentional* mask for neoliberalization. While it might be employed as such in certain cases, the overall politics of accession has a different dynamic and culturalism a different place in it. Previous chapters have shown that *interculturalism*, which was developed in EU-European policy as a particular attempt to address problems of cohesion and legitimacy internally, also informed the way in which a new narrative of EU-Europeanness and an external “cosmopolitan” European identity have been construed. This chapter has now further shown that state-making struggles, which in part were sparked by the problem that Turkey's bid for membership posed to constructions of EU-European “political community,” have led to an institutional engraining of a liberal (cosmopolitan) articulation of the latter that has structured the politics of Turkey's accession. Entailing the depoliticization of the supposedly “technical” dimensions of accession, this played into the hands of those whose interests the latter predominantly supported, domestic and transnational capital, and silently endorsed its adverse consequences for social equality. In this way, “cosmopolitanism” was harnessed to the creation of capital-conducive place and a Turkish competition state in external relations just as the “interculturalism” on which it founded had been subordinated to the neoliberal prerogative of competitiveness internally.

CONCLUSION

Cosmopolitanism in Crisis: Deepening Neoliberal Union and its Contradictions

This dissertation has argued that EU-European state-making has been afflicted with problems of achieving both legitimacy and cohesion in the critical sense. These problems had their root, first, in the prioritization of the demands of capital over those of social justice on EU, national, and regional levels, which produced an escalation of class inequalities in both East and West and undermined one of the “pillars” that had supported legitimacy of post-war states in Europe, namely, increased prosperity and security for the working population. The second root was the violation of principles of liberal democracy and national sovereignty in the very set-up of EU-Europe. Third, and related to the problematic of “national sovereignty,” was the deviation from the “national principle” in the development of EU-Europe, namely, the notion that state legitimacy rested on the political elite representing a unified people. The fact that few people identified as “Europeans” turned EU-European state-making for those affirming this principle into an instance of “foreign rule” by a “cosmopolitan” or “multicultural” EU elite and its national collaborators. All of this fuelled neo-nationalism and made cohesion – the stabilization of a class-divided society – increasingly difficult to achieve. EU-European state-making had thus produced its own contradictions, which found particularly clear expression in the contemporary crisis, itself a product of the contradictions of capital.

Problems of “legitimacy” and “cohesion” were not limited to the EU level of governance, but afflicted national and regional levels also. The introduction of a supranational governmental tier violating principles of both liberal democracy and national sovereignty also undermined the legitimacy of national governments and institutions. Moreover, neoliberalization on all governmental levels in EU-Europe meant that state elites had greater difficulties in articulating rather than repressing class divisions (Kalb 2005), all the while the “welfarist” principle of legitimacy was being hollowed out. On city level, as the case of Berlin has shown, this has meant that city governments had to manage increasingly impoverished “multicultural” populations in a context of increased low-wage, low-security employment and high levels of unemployment, with former “guest-workers” disproportionately affected. In Berlin, the city government tried to counter economic decline and its social consequences by building on the “competitive potential” of the creative and cultural industries, working against social exclusion through an emphasis on labor market inclusion, equality of opportunity, and neighborhood improvement (feeding in turn into gentrification processes), and treating immigrant populations as a potential “resource” and internationality as an “opportunity.”

Cultural diversity in form of the creative and cultural industries as well as immigrant diversity in this context thus acquired value for cities such as Berlin as a means to enhance competitiveness – and to secure monopoly rent – in intense inter-local competition resulting not least from European “neoliberal union.” At the same time, however, policy-makers in Berlin saw the intercultural embrace of diversity as a means to enhance state legitimacy – recreating a relation of representation between “state” and “society” on the basis not of identity, but diversity – and

to ensure cohesion in city societies whose “cultural” and class divides they had to “manage” in a manner compatible with economic competitiveness that appeared to decide a city’s fate in the contemporary moment. In brief, they sought to balance demands of competitiveness and cohesion and enhance local state legitimacy by adopting “creative” and “intercultural city” strategies that were largely compatible with neoliberalization.

The study showed that this particular policy approach resulted from a *reality* of competition created among others by EU level policies and the common market within which culture acquired new utilities, combined with wide-spread neoliberal *common sense* encompassing both notions of what constitutes competitiveness in the knowledge economy and normative assumptions on who is entitled to and in place. It was not a result of direct imposition of EU level policy on the city in “multi-level governance,” although fiscal problems made the latter dependent on external sources of funding such as EU structural funds. Rather, city policy-makers largely perceived EU structural funds policy – including its recent alignment with the EU’s “Lisbon Strategy” for enhanced competitiveness and employability in the knowledge economy – as compatible with their own goals once the Commission accepted their plan to channel resources predominantly into the creative and cultural industries. Moreover, city policy-makers participated in the development of shared (intercultural) EU-European policy on immigrant integration through European policy networks and EU programs such as EUROCITIES and Intercultural Cities.

In their alignment with neoliberalization, the study argued, such creative and intercultural city policies however were unlikely to counter problems of cohesion. Not only was the support of the creative and cultural industries unlikely to benefit those who had lost their jobs in former industries – apart from employment in the low-wage sector – while moreover a guarantee of equality of opportunity for the currently disadvantaged, even when pursued “thickly” through measures going beyond formal rights, was very far from constituting even relative equality under such labor market conditions. But intercultural policy also supported new hierarchical regimes of belonging and entitlement that drew distinctions between support-worthy diversity (the high-skilled, “creative” immigrant) and problematic difference (the stereotypical “Muslim immigrant living in parallel societies” in particular) that allowed for an uneasy alliance with culture-exclusivist politics, as the Sarrazin case showed. Intercultural and creative city policy moreover fostered processes of gentrification in the name of support for culture and diversity. This entailed control of those categorized as “different” and effectively voided the right to place of low-income residents, many of them falling under this latter category. In this regard also, intercultural policy aligned – in its emphasis on “mixing” – with culture-exclusivist demands for ending “parallel societies.” Neither class divisions nor virulent culturalist politics were thus likely to be mitigated through intercultural attempts at (meta-)governing cohesion by making use of culture’s utilities. To the contrary, in their alignment with the political prioritization of competitiveness in a neoliberalized context, they effectively reproduced the contradictions EU-European state-making was afflicted with.

On the EU level, “culture” had long acquired utility beyond such concrete attempts to “meta-govern” cohesion in a manner compatible with a neoliberal prerogative of competitiveness. It had formed part of the development of an EU-European “state idea,” initially in the form of “thick” European identity constructions, but more recently – in the context of struggles on EU-European political community centered on the negotiations for a draft constitution and debates on Turkey’s EU membership – in a “liberal cosmopolitan” articulation that emphasized an EU capacity to mediate differences on the basis of universal principles and values. This supposed EU capacity was both reflected in “intercultural” integration policy – where the respect for diversity was to be both enabled and limited by human rights – and in the politics of Turkey’s EU accession, where the Turkish state’s (in)capacity to respect human rights, including cultural rights, was foregrounded by both supporters and opponents of Turkey’s EU accession. This new EU-European “state idea” was an “expansive” one, combining the management of internal “non-European” populations with an external “cosmopolitanizing mission.”

On the EU level, intercultural policy has thus gone hand in hand with a subtle revision of the EU-European narrative now “selectively open” to the “non-European.” EU-European place and political community was opened not only to immigrant populations through managed immigration and intercultural integration strategies – in a both select and conditional manner in line with a particular (neo)liberal framing of demands of cohesion and competitiveness – but also, conditionally, to Turkey as a candidate state considered still largely “different” from EU-Europe (because state institutions were seen to violate cosmopolitan principles in their “obsolescent” nationalism and/ or because populations of Turkish background were already

marked as such *within* EU-Europe). If Turkey was to accede to the EU, it had to be transformed from such problematic “difference” into incorporable “diversity.” Liberal supporters of Turkey’s membership sought to achieve this through the exercise of “normative power” while culture-exclusivist opponents doubted that it would ever be possible. Because the liberal cosmopolitan “state idea” of EU-Europe had however become institutionally engrained on EU level in the wake of failed attempts to develop a “thicker” culturalist basis of European community, the liberal vision tied to “EU conditionality” has come to dominate the politics of accession. As a consequence, liberal *political* principles were foregrounded in the politics of EU accession, which helped to obscure that the actual accession process was to a good extent about neoliberalization, this time in form of EU support for the development of a Turkish “competition state” that had resulted in increasingly high levels of social inequality in Turkey.

In brief, recent EU-European attempts to activate culture’s supposed utilities for cohesion, legitimacy, and external influence in subordination to the overall prerogative of enhancing competitiveness has done little to overcome the contradictions of class and culture at the heart of EU-European neoliberal union. To the contrary, it further fed into them. The current crisis in EU-Europe – a crisis not only of several EU member states and of the Eurozone as a consequence of the contradictions of capital, but of EU-European state-making at large – has shown this particularly clearly. What then does this study tell us about the likely future of EU-European state-making in crisis and in particular about its culturalist dimensions?



Just before the so-called “Eurocrisis” cast the fragility of the “European project” into sharp relief, Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande (2007) had declared that cosmopolitanism – as a form of political integration that respects diversity – was the only “way out of crisis” for EU-Europe.²⁶⁹ And indeed, as this study has shown, policy-makers and politicians on EU level, in city networks, and in Berlin have turned in recent years to a culturalism akin to the one liberal cosmopolitan theorists of Europe propose, in the face of weak state legitimacy and problems of cohesion (in the critical sense) in class-divided and multicultural societies and of EU-Europe’s seeming dwindling international political and economic power. They have done so, I have moreover argued, by seeking to realize the value of diversity *within* processes of neoliberalization, thus harnessing “cosmopolitan” culturalism to the neoliberal state-making that has produced problems of legitimacy and cohesion in the first place by placing demands of capital above those of social justice. Liberal cosmopolitan culturalism in EU-Europe – that is, “intercultural” approaches to internal diversity linked to the construction of a “cosmopolitanizing” external role for EU-Europe – thus appears as a tool of state-making in (de facto perpetual) crisis that addresses some of the latter’s symptoms while strengthening its roots.

²⁶⁹ This crisis, they note, was institutional, economic, and political, showing that “the process of European integration has reached a critical threshold and that the political energy reserves of the European project are now exhausted” (2007: 69). Cosmopolitanism, they posit, can and should be the new political vision needed to reinvigorate political integration (ibid).

Introducing Contradictions of Class and Capital to the Cosmopolitan Empire

Beck and Grande might now point out that current EU-European state-making is still what they call “deformed” cosmopolitanism rather than the “true” one they propagate²⁷⁰ and that they themselves advocate a “non-neoliberal” EU to avoid nationalist backlash (Beck and Grande 2004: 229). In that reading, a “true” cosmopolitanism would still appear as the “way out of crisis.” On closer interrogation of Beck and Grande’s vision of the “truly cosmopolitan” Europe, it however becomes apparent that their rejection of neoliberalism remains on the level of mere rhetoric. Neither in their analysis of the current state form of EU-Europe nor in their propositions for a “truly cosmopolitan” European Empire is the relation of state-making to capital examined or for that matter concerns with social justice raised.²⁷¹ For example, what they call “asymmetries” within EU-Europe (economic and political inequalities between member states and regions) appear as largely unproblematic differences (or diversity) within an institutional form relying on “network power” rather than hierarchical ordering (ibid: 111, 117). The notion of Empire in fact serves them to sidestep an analysis of the processes of capital and state-making that in fact produced such “differences.” In contrast, this study has argued that such “asymmetries” are in fact the consequence of – in recent decades state-supported – uneven development and the prioritization of competitiveness over goals of (territorial and social) cohesion.

²⁷⁰ For further critique of Beck and Grande, including their – spurious and nebulous – distinction of “true” versus “deformed” cosmopolitanism, see Harvey 2009.

²⁷¹ What Beck and Grande in fact reject is a “neoliberal” project of EU-European state-making that wants to see it reduced to a common market, refusing political integration. However, the kind of “political integration” they affirm amounts to nothing more than Third Wayish *neoliberal regulation*. Neoliberalism does not only involve *de-* but also *re-*regulation, as critical scholars have frequently pointed out.

That Beck and Grande's notion of Empire evades a critical interrogation of questions of power and capital is also illustrated by their argument that empires are about establishing "security" and "welfare" for the population through variable borders (in contrast to the nation-states, which do so by fixing them), without ever asking *whose* security and *whose* welfare are thus to be ensured. Like other empires, they declare, the cosmopolitan European one solves problems of security by incorporating zones of insecurity (e.g. Turkey) and welfare problems by ensuring access to resources and new markets (ibid: 108). This suggests that what they call problems of welfare might be more accurately termed problems of over-accumulation. And indeed, as this study has shown, the EU's "normative power" in accession is in fact harnessed to a process of neoliberalization of benefit not only to transnational capital but also local elites, to the detriment of those on the other pole of class inequalities reaching tremendous levels in Turkey, but also on the rise in countries such as Germany whose "economy" – always a handy term to obscure questions of (unequal) distribution of "welfare" or "wealth" – supposedly benefits.

The class implication of Beck and Grande's argument is thus illustrated nicely in one of their sub-chapters entitled "Welfare versus Security" where they conveniently equate welfare (*Wohlfahrt*) with wealth (*Wohlstand*). They initially speak of the function of Empire to secure *Wohlfahrt* and then however turn to assert that expansion of a common market enhances *Wohlstand* (ibid: 107-8). How such increased *Wohlstand* is to be distributed is not addressed here – thus eliding the fact that this might not at all serve the *Wohlfahrt* of most people or in fact of those who helped to produce *Wohlstand* for some. In a later chapter however, Beck and Grande give an implicit answer. They argue that conflicts concerning "recognition" (i.e. identity/

culturalism) override those of “inequality/redistribution” (i.e. class) in a cosmopolitan Europe, because only the former help sharpen “European identity.” What they thus ask for is a universalist minimum of welfare that prevents absolute poverty – and nothing more (ibid: 284). It is a very “thin” vision of social solidarities in place and political community to be created.

All of this shows that Beck and Grande’s cosmopolitan Empire is far from a rejection of neoliberalism but in fact affirms and builds on the neoliberal quality – both internally and in relations of accession – of current EU-European regulatory unity in diversity discussed and critiqued in this study. As a consequence, the culture-exclusivism that Beck and Grande decry is unlikely to vanish from this particular “cosmopolitan” Europe, if we take the argument seriously that contemporary neo-nationalism has as its roots the “workings, effects, exploitations and humiliations of class” while “the wider public culture of neoliberal growth, gentrification and cosmopolitan class formation denies its denizens the availability of the language of class” (Kalb 2011: 14). Contemporary (neo)liberal cosmopolitanism in EU-European state-making and its academic acolytes participate in such a denial of a (leftist) language of class all the while the policies promoted actively feed into the reproduction of class inequalities in a neoliberal frame. Moreover, as this study has shown, as long as the value of diversity is defined through its contribution to economic competitiveness, what counts as diversity has distinct limits of both “class” and “culture,” which speaks against the seeming inclusivity of cosmopolitan culturalism.

If we depart from this frame of Empire and instead bring the role of “the state” in the reproduction of capitalist social and economic relations into the picture, and if we moreover

place demands of social justice in the class sense on equal footing with the necessity to pluralize regimes of belonging and entitlement in the culturalist sense, a quite different picture of “cosmopolitan Europe” emerges. Liberal cosmopolitan state-making then appears as fundamentally involved in the (re)production of inequalities between people and places in “neoliberal union” and as riddled with contradictions that deepen rather than alleviate its “crisis-proneness.” The consequences are likely to reinforce rather than prevent the “nationalist backlash” liberal cosmopolitanism allegedly was to overcome.

Given the way in which liberal cosmopolitanism feeds into the contradictions in the making of EU-Europe, and given the current harnessing of chauvinism to the neoliberal politics of crisis, are we therefore currently not only witnessing a crisis of the EU-European state-making, but in particular also an end to its liberal cosmopolitan articulation? I suggest that the answer is “probably not.” While (neo)liberal cosmopolitan state-making is clearly in crisis, and while diversity seems to have lost its value in the context of frantic attempts to “save the Euro” and equally frantic cultural stereotyping to serve the goals of enforced austerity, this does not mean the complete retreat from liberal cosmopolitanism in the making of EU-Europe. Let me explain.

Deepening Neoliberal (Fiscal) Union: The Most Recent Round of State-Making

In December 2011, the heads of all EU member states – save British Prime Minister David Cameron²⁷² – agreed on the development of a European “fiscal union” in response to the crisis

²⁷² Cameron here responded to pressure of the conservative Eurosceptics and gained both huge applause for his veto on changing EU Treaties for the fiscal union and harsh critique not only from the liberal Left for isolating the UK and diminishing its political influence in Europe. As a consequence of Cameron’s veto, the “fiscal union” is now

at the core of which is currently the plan to ensure fiscal discipline through sanctions as opposed to other possible content of a “fiscal union” such as convergence in realms of taxes, welfare, and labor market regulation. It thus also buries the hope of those who thought the crisis would bring about a more Keynesian “economic government” on EU level. This most recent political response to the “Eurocrisis” suggests two things. First, it shows that state elites – save the British conservatives – have turned to a *new round of EU-European state-making* rather than pushing for re-nationalization (or repatriation, as the British have it). Second, it highlights that state elites have converged on a path of deepening *neoliberal* union in EU-Europe, in line with past “regulatory unity in diversity” that supported uneven development within the “straightjacket” of the Euro that has contributed to the current crisis.

Thus, although “intergovernmentalism” – in particular in the form of agreements between the French and German Heads of State – rather than “supranationalism” has indeed been prominent in response to the crisis, the proposed fiscal union will de facto end budget sovereignty of the signatory member states, in particular of those forming part of the Eurozone. It will do so, moreover, in good neoliberal tradition and allegedly in line with rediscovered “Germanic values”²⁷³ by enforcing budgetary discipline and austerity rather than by working against uneven development. The regulation of the financial sector – a prospect that prompted Cameron’s veto on the changing of EU Treaties, for which reason the “fiscal union” is now

not to be implemented by changing the EU Treaties, as was initially the proposal by Merkel and Sarkozy, but through a separate agreement signed by the members of the Eurozone and other voluntary signatory states. This is likely to reduce the extent to which sanctions can be imposed on states that are not members of the Eurozone. Incidentally, Cameron’s veto is not to be interpreted as a rejection of neoliberal state-making, as the official rationale was to prevent financial regulation affecting the City of London.

²⁷³ Conveniently forgetting, among others, that Germany has long violated the convergence criteria for the Euro without having had to fear sanctions.

institutionalized through a separate agreement among the remaining 26 member states – remains a matter of future negotiations.

In brief, the current fiscal union will deepen not only *neoliberal* union but also the uneven development and social inequalities it has been associated with in the past. It will thus deepen the contradictions that have contributed to the current crisis not only of the Euro but more widely of the European project. (This relation should not make us believe, as the mantra goes in Germany and other comparatively “pro-European” states, that saving the European project requires saving the Euro on the terms of finance capital). It reinforces the dynamic where the consequences of (neoliberal supranational) *state-making* render the achievement of *statehood* – in the form of legitimacy and cohesion in the critical sense on which not only the stability of capitalism but also of any state form rest – more and more difficult.

Put differently, the political response to the crisis is likely to further undermine state legitimacy and cohesion in the critical sense by contributing to the escalation of class and regional inequalities and curtailing the national sovereignty of member states in an highly undemocratic manner, which further fuels neo-nationalist politics. At the same time, the crisis – or rather, the declared need to cater to finance capital in the response to it if the Euro and “Europe” are to be saved – has further narrowed the political options available to EU-European state elites in their attempts to address such problems of legitimacy and cohesion if they are not to risk a radical change in direction in EU-European state-making.

To recall: I have suggested that political legitimacy and the capacity to ensure cohesion in the critical sense of post-war capitalist states in Europe rested on three pillars, all of which stand on shaky ground in contemporary EU-Europe: the “national principle” à la Gellner (1983), which could be articulated in “thick” ethnic or “thin” civic terms, institutions of liberal democracy, and the promise of increased prosperity and social security for the working classes. EU-European state-making has been defaulting on all of these. In the recent past, EU-European state elites have in response to the dilemmas this posed for EU-European state-making promoted “non-national” EU-European state ideas to replace the nationalist principle of political legitimacy as well as made limited moves towards greater correspondence of EU institutions to norms of liberal democracy (in particular by enhancing the powers of the European Parliament). At the same time, as this study showed, they actively played into the dismantling of welfare state structures and other measures of supplying conducive conditions for capital, thus continuing to undermine one of the pillars of state legitimacy in the past. What then is their likely response to intensified problems of cohesion and legitimacy in the contemporary moment?

In late October 2011, then Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou had announced a referendum on the proposed debt agreement with the EU, IMF, and European Central Bank that had just been negotiated. The motivation of his move seemed clear: he wanted to enhance legitimacy for his politics of crisis that had been confronted with persistent popular opposition. It met however with consternation and anger among the other heads of EU member states and the Commission, and Papandreou was forced to step back from his plan a few days later amidst both foreign and domestic pressure.

This event – just as the more general highly undemocratic nature of the attempts to “save the Euro” (finance capital) through enforced austerity – suggests that any serious efforts to enhance state legitimacy by strengthening democratic institutions in EU-Europe are off the table because they would pose concrete dangers to “saving the Euro” on the banker’s terms.²⁷⁴ EU-Europe’s “citizens” are unlikely to approve of what appears, depending on where they stand, as austerity measures enforced on those who did not provoke or benefit from the crisis or as the institutionalization of a “transfer union” for which the tax-payers have to bear the risk. The commotion in response to the prospect of a Greek referendum clearly shows the degree to which state elites fear popular opinion and (liberal) democratic control. This, as everything else in the political response to the crisis, also shows that there is no political will whatsoever to do the one thing that could truly enhance state legitimacy in EU-Europe: to move away from *neoliberal* union, to stop catering to demands of capital, to work towards the development of a social Europe. That is, to build on the “welfare” pillar that has bolstered state legitimacy and cohesion in the post-war period. The content now given to an EU-European “fiscal union” shows this clearly.

Given that both substantial democratic reform and an “economic government” oriented along social democrat principles would threaten dominant EU-European state-making of the last decades – which in turn would, as politicians don’t tire to point out, infuriate the “markets” or rather, finance capital – state elites in EU-Europe seem to be left with culturalism for their efforts at bolstering already weak and in the current context ever more rapidly dwindling

²⁷⁴ They are off the negotiation tables of heads of states, all the while the current crisis has led to renewed proposals for alternative, “democratic” forms of EU-European state-making in academia and beyond.

popular legitimacy and cohesion. On the national level, this has translated into open chauvinism,²⁷⁵ in particular in “core” state which sought in this way popular appeasement as regards immensely unpopular political measures. Enforced austerity in line with neoliberal state-making was thus presented in Germany as necessary means to rein in the “lazy and overspending Southerners,” in line with supposed German virtues of work and financial discipline. But we can also expect renewed neo-nationalism in “crisis” states where dispossession is openly going on as long as popular insecurity, fear, and protest does not find articulation through a leftist language of class (more on that below).

Liberal Cosmopolitanism in Crisis

What then about liberal cosmopolitanism in this context of increased cultural stereotyping and the potential escalation of neo-nationalist, culture-exclusivist politics? I suggest that even though in the current moment, one might look in vain for open promotion of the value of (unity in) diversity by EU-European state elites – as such “diversity” (in the form of the supposed incompatibility of “Southerners” with “German” financial virtues rather than of actual state-supported uneven development) is now being blamed for the crisis – liberal cosmopolitanism is too engrained in both policy and the political field to simply “go away.”

In fact, the currently envisioned fiscal union is quite compatible with liberal cosmopolitan visions of Europe that cater to neoliberalism as against those on the Right resisting further

²⁷⁵ However, such displayed national chauvinism does not necessarily mean a *new* move to “renationalization” of EU-Europe, in so far as national elites in the EU have always to a greater degree played the national card as this still founds to a good extent state legitimacy.

integration in the form of a “transfer union” or on the Left pursuing a truly social Europe. Moreover, the response to the crisis does not touch on those policy realms where interculturalism has been most prominently developed, all the while the “strategic goals” of the EU in view of which these were framed are likely to continue or even increase in salience: increasing economic competitiveness²⁷⁶ through supply-side rather than demand-supportive policies in places aligned with the demands of capital and managing increasingly volatile culturalist politics linked to escalating class inequalities.

That is, without necessarily being foregrounded in political discourse, the attempt to use culture’s utilities for cohesion and competitiveness is likely to continue on and between EU and city levels, though probably in a way (recall Sarrazin) that caters more openly to a strengthened culture-exclusivism by policing the limits on support-worthy diversity constituted by liberal norms and neoliberal prerogatives. In brief, the “overspending” of “Southerners” in this perspective does not constitute a realm of support-worthy diversity but problematic difference to be contained. In external relations in turn, the fact that EU-Europe clearly has lost economic appeal as a consequence of the current turmoil might only reinforce EU attempts of playing the culturalism card in its efforts to maintain external influence and “normative power,” in the various dimensions described in this study.

²⁷⁶ For example, the successor to the “Stability and Growth Pact” that had not been implemented stringently in particular to states such as Germany or France – the “Euro-Plus-Pact” adopted in March 2011 – was initially called “Competitiveness Pact” and specifies political reforms that are to ensure competitiveness, employment, and fiscal stability of EU member states.

Liberal cosmopolitanism's likely persistence has also to be considered in view of the fact that it has long stood in a "polarized" relation to culture-exclusivism, a polarization of both class and culture (Friedman 2003a,b; Kalb 2005, 2011). Because either of these has different constituencies and feeds politically from the other, a rise in the strength of one pole provokes a strengthening of the other. It is not only that culture-exclusivism is a reaction against the liberal cosmopolitanism of elites, the reverse is also true: Increased culture-exclusivism strengthens the case of liberal cosmopolitanism in countries where anti-nationalist stances (i.e. against culture-exclusivist nationalism) are not limited to the radical Left and where popular critique of the EU technocrats does not necessarily entail a rejection of any form of European project (certainly the case in Germany, but also in countries such as France or Spain). Given the weakness of a leftist language of class and the dominance of neoliberal common sense, this opposition to neo-nationalism is likely to be framed in liberal terms catering to neoliberalism.

That is, just as (neo)liberal cosmopolitan state-making provokes neo-nationalist resistance, so does the strengthening of the latter seem to increase the urgency for *liberal cosmopolitan* state-making, as long as – as Beck and Grande's "deformed" argument shows well – capital and class is not brought out into the open as the subtext of all these processes and politics. In fact, this is not so much about unveiling that much of current (culturalist) politics is about class – this would be readily acknowledged, given the prominence of "classist" talk about the "lower classes" and concerns with "social exclusion" as much as of critique of financial and other elites from different political standpoints – but to recuperate a *leftist* language and critique of class for popular (not populist) politics.

I thus find it likely that in the near future the move towards strengthened neoliberal (fiscal) union, which also sharpens the contradictions of EU-European state-making, will be accompanied by an increasingly volatile culturalist politics characterized by deepened polarization between liberal cosmopolitan elites and supportive middle classes on the one hand and culture-exclusivist neo-nationalist movements supported by the newly disenfranchised and dispossessed and those who fear disenfranchisement and dispossession on the other hand. However, the current moment also seems to provoke a return of a critique of capital and class in form of protest against neoliberal non-democratic state-making and against finance capital.

In such a context of increasingly precarious social cohesion and state legitimacy, culturalism of the liberal cosmopolitan sort, which has always been a “soft” tool of state-making, seems less and less likely to effectively address problems of statehood in EU-Europe. As we have seen, its capacity to ensure cohesion is profoundly limited due to its emphasis on formal rights and equality of opportunity within a sphere of competition and limited embrace of diversity and thus due to the way in which it feeds into the (re)production of culturalist, class, and regional inequalities. As a state idea, moreover, it from the start addressed a limited (liberal) constituency.

Will the contradictions in the making of EU-Europe which now lay bare for all to see and which the current response to the crisis deepens thus eventually force the break-up of *neoliberal* union (not necessarily of the EU as such)? Put differently, will the current class politics in EU-European state-making provoke sustained popular unrest and possibly mobilization against

(neo)liberal state-making that cannot be contained by liberal cosmopolitan culturalism? Will it thus force EU-European state elites to rely on the other pillars ensuring state legitimacy and cohesion, namely, concessions in the realms of liberal democracy and social justice? Might this then provoke a – however partial – move away from neoliberal union in EU-Europe towards more social, democratic, and geographically balanced forms of EU-European state-making?

Mobilizations and protest across the “crisis” states and the formation of an “Occupy” movement in Europe have provided some hope that resistance is forming and that the forging of “thick” solidarities between and beyond the “thickness” of cultural identity might be possible, though such protest has not been a sustained and well-articulated force and failed to have impact on state elites (yet). Though the hope is faint, hope there is nonetheless that the current crisis will provide a political window to escape the false alternatives of liberal cosmopolitanism versus neo-nationalism and to create alternative solidarities based on a politics of “thinness” when it comes to the openness of place and political community to the initial “outsider” and of “thickness” in regards to substantive solidarities extended within and between places. What stands against this hope for the development of more broad-based solidarities against neoliberal union is the extent to which, as this study has shown, neoliberal normativities have become common sense, linking up successfully with the value systems not only of political liberals but also of those whose interests neoliberalism directly contradicts. A main political challenge for alternative state- and place-making projects in EU-Europe will thus be to break with classism and to recuperate a popular leftist language of class.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrams, Philip. 2006 [1988]. Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State. In *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, ed. Sharma, Aradhana, Akhil Gupta, pp. 112-30. Malden: Blackwell.
- Adly, Amr. 2010. Unorthodox Liberalism, Democracy, and Post-Liberal Distributional Coalitions: The Case of Turkey. *Turkish Studies* 11:269-86.
- Agnew, John. 1994. The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory. *Review of International Political Economy* 1:53-79.
- Ahiska, Meltem. 2003. Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern. *South Atlantic Quarterly* 102:351.
- Akçam, Taner. 2004. *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide*. London: Zed Books.
- Altınay, Ayşe Gül. 2004. *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Altvater, Elmar, Birgit Mahnkopf. 2007. *Konkurrenz für das Empire: Die Zukunft der Europäischen Union in der Globalisierten Welt*. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Amin, Ash. 2004. Multi-Ethnicity and the Idea of Europe. *Theory, Culture and Society* 21:1-24.
- Amin, Ash, John Tomaney. 1995. The Challenge of Cohesion. In *Behind the Myth of European Union: Prospects for Cohesion*, ed. Amin, Ash, John Tomaney, pp. 10-47. London: Routledge.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Antonsich, Marco. 2008. The Narration of Europe in 'National' and 'Post-national' Terms: Gauging the Gap between Normative Discourses and People's Views. *European Journal of Social Theory* 11:505-22.
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1999. Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy. In *The Cultural Studies Reader*, ed. During, Simon, pp. 220-30. London: Routledge.
- Appiah, Anthony. 2006. *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Archibugi, Daniele, ed. 2003. *Debating Cosmopolitics*. London: Verso.
- Archibugi, Daniele, David Held, eds. 1995. *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Arikan, Harun. 2003. *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?* Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Armstrong, Warwick. 2007. Introduction: Borders in an Unequal World. In *Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement: The Fortress Empire*, ed. Armstrong, Warwick, James Anderson, pp. 1-8. London: Routledge.

- Asad, Talal. 1993. Multiculturalism and British Identity in the Wake of the Rushdie Affair. In *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, pp. 239-68. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Asad, Talal. 2002. Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam? In *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, ed. Pagden, Anthony, pp. 209-27. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge University Press.
- Asad, Talal. 2003. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Asher, Andrew D. 2005. A Paradise on the Oder? Ethnicity, Europeanization, and the EU Referendum in a Polish-German Border City. *City & Society* 17:127-52.
- Aybar, Sedat. 2001. The Recent Turkish Crisis: Another Step Toward Free Market Authoritarianism. *Historical Materialism* 8:297-308.
- Baban, Feyzi, Fuat Keyman. 2008. Turkey and Postnational Europe: Challenges for the Cosmopolitan Political Community. *European Journal of Social Theory* 11:107-24.
- Bader, Ingo. 2009. Kreative Stadt für die globale Dienstleistungselite: Wie sich die Kreativwirtschaft in Berlin selbst auffrisst. *MieterEcho: Zeitung der Berliner MieterGemeinschaft* 333:19-20.
- Bakic-Hayden, Milica. 1995. Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia. *Slavic Review* 54:917-31.
- Balibar, Etienne. 2004. *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Balkan, Neşecan, Sungur Savran, eds. 2002. *The Ravages of Neo-liberalism: Economy, Society, and Gender in Turkey*. Huntington: Nova Science.
- Barnett, Clive. 2001. Culture, Policy, and Subsidiarity in the European Union: From Symbolic Identity to the Governmentalisation of Culture. *Political Geography* 20:405-26.
- Barry, Andrew. 2001. *Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society*. London: Athlone Press.
- Basch, Linda G., Nina Glick Schiller, Cristina Szanton Blanc. 1994. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. New York: Gordon and Breach.
- Baun, Michael, Dan Marek, eds. 2008a. *EU Cohesion Policy after Enlargement*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Baun, Michael, Dan Marek. 2008b. Introduction. In *EU Cohesion Policy after Enlargement*, ed. Baun, Michael, Dan Marek, pp. 1-14. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Beck, Ulrich. 2004. *Der kosmopolitische Blick, oder, Krieg ist Frieden*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Beck, Ulrich, Edgar Grande. 2004. *Das kosmopolitische Europa: Gesellschaft und Politik in der zweiten Moderne*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Beck, Ulrich, Edgar Grande. 2007. Cosmopolitanism: Europe's Way Out of Crisis. *European Journal of Social Theory* 10:67-85.
- Bellier, Irène, Thomas M. Wilson, eds. 2000. *An Anthropology of the European Union: Building, Imagining and Experiencing the New Europe*. Oxford: Berg.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Benhabib, Seyla. 2004. *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berend, T. Ivan. 1999. *Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Berezin, Mabel, Martin Schain, eds. 2003. *Europe without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Blim, Michael. 1990. *Made in Italy: Small-Scale Industrialization and its Consequences*. New York: Praeger.
- Bodirsky, Katharina. 2009. A Cosmopolitan Europe? On 'Unity in Diversity' and the Politics of Turkey's EU Accession. *Focaal - European Journal of Anthropology* 55:12-26.
- Boggs, James P. 2002. Anthropological Knowledge and Native American Cultural Practice in the Liberal Polity. *American Anthropologist* 104:599-610.
- Bohle, Dorothee. 2006. Neoliberal Hegemony, Transnational Capital and the Terms of the EU's Eastward Expansion. *Capital & Class* 88:57-86.
- Bonefeld, Werner. 2001. The Politics of Europe: Monetary Union and Class. In *The Politics of Europe: Monetary Union and Class*, ed. Bonefeld, Werner, pp. 1-9. Houndsmill: Palgrave.
- Borneman, John. 1992. *Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Borneman, John, Nick Fowler. 1997. Europeanization. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 26:487-514.
- Bornschiefer, Volker, ed. 2000a. *State-building in Europe: The Revitalization of Western European Integration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bornschiefer, Volker. 2000b. Western Europe's Move Toward Political Union. In *State-building in Europe: The Revitalization of Western European Integration*, ed. Bornschiefer, Volker, pp. 3-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Böröcz, József. 2001. Introduction: Empire and Coloniality in the 'Eastern Enlargement' of the European Union. In *Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU- Enlargement*, ed. Böröcz, József, Melinda Kovács, pp. 4-50. Holly Cottage: Central Europe Review.
- Böröcz, József. 2005. Goodness is Elsewhere: The Rule of European Difference. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 48:110-38.
- Böröcz, József, Melinda Kovács, eds. 2001. *Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU- Enlargement*. Holly Cottage: Central Europe Review.
- Börzel, Tanja, Thomas Risse. 2003. Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe. In *The Politics of Europeanization*, ed. Featherstone, Kevin, Claudio Radaelli, pp. 57-79. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, Neil. 2000. Building 'Euro-Regions': Locational Politics and the Political Geography of Neoliberalism in Post-Unification Germany. *European Urban and Regional Studies* 7:319-45.
- Brenner, Neil. 2003. Rescaling State Space in Western Europe: Urban Governance and the Rise of Glocalizing Comeptition State Regimes (GCSRs). In *Europe Without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age*, ed. Berezin, Mabel, Martin Schain, pp. 140-66. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Brenner, Neil. 2004a. *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, Neil. 2004b. Urban Governance and the Production of New State Spaces in Western Europe, 1960-2000. *Review of International Political Economy* 11:447-88.
- Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, Gordon MacLeod, eds. 2003. *State/Space: A Reader*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Brown, Wendy. 1995. *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, Wendy. 2006a. *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, Wendy. 2006b. Subjects of Tolerance: Why We Are Civilized and They Are the Barbarians. In *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*, ed. Vries, Hent de, Lawrence Eugene Sullivan. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bürgin, Alexander. 2010. Cosmopolitan Entrapment: The Failed Strategies to Reverse Turkey's Membership Eligibility. *Perspectives* 18:33-56.
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie. 2007. *Nationaler Strategischer Rahmenplan (NSRP) für den Einsatz der EU-Strukturfonds in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2007-2013*. Berlin.
- Bunzl, Matti. 2005. Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe. *American Ethnologist* 32:499-508.
- Burgess, Adam. 1997. *Divided Europe: The New Domination of the East*. London: Pluto Press.
- Calhoun, Craig. 2002. The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism. *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 101:869-97.
- Cam, Surhan. 2002. Neo-liberalism and Labour Within the Context of an 'Emerging Market' Economy--Turkey. *Capital & Class* 77:89-114.
- Canefe, Nergis, Tanil Bora. 2003. Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in Turkish Politics: The Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism. *Turkish Studies* 4:127-48.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cheah, Pheng, Bruce Robbins, eds. 1998. *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Chebel d'Appollonia, Ariane. 2002. European Nationalism and European Union. In *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, ed. Pagden, Anthony, pp. 171-90. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge University Press.
- Clarke, John. 2004. *Changing Welfare, Changing States: New Directions in Social Policy*. New York: Sage Publications.
- Clarke, John. 2007. Subordinating the Social? Neo-liberalism and the Remaking of Welfare Capitalism. *Cultural Studies* 21:974-87.
- Clarke, John. 2009. What Crisis is this? *Soundings*:7-17.
- Comaroff, Jean, John Comaroff. 2004. Criminal Justice, Cultural Justice: The Limits of Liberalism and the Pragmatics of Difference in the New South Africa. *American Ethnologist* 31:88-104.

- Committee of the Regions. 2009. *Local and Regional Authorities at the Forefront of Integration Policies. Own-Initiative Opinion*. CdR 212/2009 fin. Brussels.
- Coronil, Fernando. 1997. *The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Coronil, Fernando. 2000. Towards a Critique of Globalcentrism: Speculations on Capitalism's Nature. *Public Culture* 12:351-74.
- Corrigan, Philip Richard D., Derek Sayer. 1985. *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell..
- Council of Europe, CEC. 2008. *Intercultural Cities. Übersetzung des Berichtes des Europarates nach dem Besuch am 18. und 19. Februar 2009 in Berlin Neukölln, Deutschland*. DGIV/CULT/IC(2008)04.
- Council of Europe, European Commission. 2008. *The Intercultural City: What it is and how to make it work. Introductory Documents for Cities Participating in the Pilot Phase of the Intercultural Cities Programme, Joint Action of the Council of Europe and the European Commission*. DGIV/Cult/IC(2008)01.
- Council of the European Union. 1999. *Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions*. At: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm
- Council of the European Union. 2004. *Extracts from Presidency Conclusions on the Lisbon Strategy by Theme: European Councils Lisbon (March 2000) to Brussels (June 2004)*.
- Council of the European Union. 2004. *Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union. Council Conclusions*. 14615/04 (Presse 321). Brussels.
- Council of the European Union. 2006. *On Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion*. Official Journal of the European Union L 291/11-32.
- Council of the European Union. 2007a. *Council Conclusions on the Contribution of the Cultural and Creative Sectors to the Achievement of the Lisbon Objectives*. 9021/07. Brussels.
- Council of the European Union. 2007b. *Resolution of the Council of 16 November 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture*. 2007/C 287. Brussels.
- Council of the European Union. 2007c. *Strengthening of Integration Policies in the European Union. Council Conclusions*. 10267/07 (Presse 125). Brussels.
- Council of the European Union. 2009. *Council Conclusions on Culture as a Catalyst for Creativity and Innovation*. Brussels.
- Cowan, Jane K., Marie-Benedicte Dembour, Richard Wilson. 2001. Introduction. In *Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives*, pp. 1-26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Daly, Mary. 2006. EU Social Policy after Lisbon. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44:461-81.
- Das, Veena, Deborah Poole, eds. 2004. *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press.
- De Greiff, Pablo, Ciaran Cronin. 2002. *Global Justice and Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Delanty, Gerard. 2002. Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism. *Perspectives on European Politics & Society* 3:345-59.
- Delanty, Gerard. 2005. The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe: On the Cultural Significance of Europeanization. *International Review of Sociology* 15:405-21.
- Dirks, Nicholas B. 2001. *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Dirlik, Arif. 2001. Place-Based Imagination: Globalism and the Politics of Place. In *Places and Politics in an Age of Globalization*, ed. Prazniak, Roxann, Arif Dirlik. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Dullien, Sebastian. 2010. Von der Griechenlandkrise zum Euro-Kollaps? *Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik* 6:9-12.
- Dunn, Elizabeth. 2003. Trojan Pig: Paradoxes of Food Safety Regulations. *Environment and Planning A* 35:1453-511.
- Dunn, Elizabeth. 2004. *Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Eder, Mine. 2001. Deeper Concessions and Rising Barriers to Entry: New Regionalism for Turkey and Mexico. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36:29.
- Enrikin, Nicholas. 2003. Political Community, Identity, and Cosmopolitan Place. In *Europe without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age*, ed. Berezin, Mabel, Martin Schain, pp. 51-63. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Eriksen, Erik Oddvar. 2006a. The EU- A Cosmopolitan Polity? *Journal of European Public Policy* 13:252-69.
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 2006b. Diversity versus Difference: Neo-Liberalism in the Minority Debate. In *The Making and Unmaking of Difference*, ed. Rottenburg, Richard, Burkhard Schnepel, Shingo Shimada, pp. 13-36. Bielefeld: Transaction.
- Ertugal, Ebru. 2007. EU Regional Policy and Its Implications for Domestic Governance. In *Bridging the Real Divide: Social and Regional Policy in Turkey's EU Accession Process*, ed. Tsarouhas, Dimitris, Ebru Ertugal, Ayşe Idil Aybars, pp. 44-71. Ankara: METU Press.
- Ertugal, Ebru. 2010. Europeanization and Multi-Level Governance in Turkey. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 10:97-110.
- European Commission. 1987. *A Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community*. COM(87)603. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 4.
- European Commission. 1999. *ESDP European Spatial Development Perspective: Towards Balanced and Sustainable Development of the Territory of the European Union*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- European Commission. 2000. *A Community Immigration Policy. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament*. COM (2000) 757 final. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2003. *Immigration, Integration and Employment. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions* COM (2003) 336 final. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2005a. *A Common Agenda for Integration: Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union*. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2005b. *Turkey 2005 Progress Report*. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2007a. *A European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions* COM (2007) 242 final. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2007b. *Towards a Common Immigration Policy*. COM (2007)780 final. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2007c. *Turkey 2007 Progress Report*. Brussels.

- European Commission. 2008a. *A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions* COM(2008) 359 final. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2008b. *Explanatory Memorandum European Year of Creativity and Innovation (2009). Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council*. COM(2008) 159 final. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2008c. *Turkey 2008 Progress Report*. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2009. *Turkey 2009 Progress Report*. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2010. *Turkey 2010 Progress Report*. Brussels.
- European Communities. 1973. Declaration on European Identity. *Bulletin of the European Communities* 12:118-22.
- European Communities. 1992. *The Maastricht Treaty: Provisions Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community with a View to Establishing the European Community*. Maastricht.
- European Parliament. 2009. *European Parliament Resolution on the Commission's 2009 Enlargement Strategy Paper Concerning the Western Balkan Countries, Iceland and Turkey*. November 26, 2009.
- European Parliament, Council of the European Union. 2008. *The European Year of Creativity and Innovation (2009). Decision No 1350/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008*. L 348/115. Official Journal of the European Union.
- European Parliament, Council of the European Union. 2006. *The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2008). Decision No 1983/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006*. L 412/44. Official Journal of the European Union.
- Featherstone, Kevin, Claudio Radaelli, eds. 2003. *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Feldman, Gregory. 2005. Culture, State, and Security in Europe: The Case of Citizenship and Integration Policy in Estonia. *American Ethnologist* 32:676-94.
- Feldman, Gregory. 2010. 'Many Nice People': The Nation-State, post-Fordism, and the Policy Norm of Flexible Ethnic Relations in Estonia. *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 16:138-58.
- Ferguson, James, Akhil Gupta. 2002. Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality. *American Ethnologist* 29:981-1002.
- Florida, Richard. 2003. Cities and the Creative Class. *City & Community* 2:3-19.
- Florida, Richard, Irene Tinagli. 2006. Technologie, Talente, Toleranz. Europa im kreativen Zeitalter. *Perspektive21. Brandenburgische Hefte für Wissenschaft und Politik* 31:19-40.
- Foucault, Michel. 2008. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Friedman, Jonathan. 2003a. Globalizing Languages: Ideologies and Realities of the Contemporary Global System. *American Anthropologist* 105:744-52.
- Friedman, Jonathan, ed. 2003b. *Globalization, the State, and Violence*. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press.

- Garnham, Nicholas. 2005. From Cultural to Creative Industries: An Analysis of the Implications of the "Creative Industries" Approach to Arts and Media Policy Making in the United Kingdom. *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 11:15-29.
- Gates, Andrea. 2009. Mixed Messages and Mixed Results: The EU's Promotion of Human Rights in Turkey. *European Law Journal* 15:401-11.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press..
- Giannakopoulos, Angelos, Maras Konstadinos. 2005. Der Türkei-Diskurs im Europäischen Parlament 1996-2003. In *Die Türkei-Debatte in Europa: Ein Vergleich*, ed. Giannakopoulos, Angelos, Maras Konstadinos, pp. 21-34. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Giannakopoulos, Angelos, Konstadinos Maras, eds. 2005. *Die Türkei-Debatte in Europa: ein Vergleich*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Gingrich, Andre. 2004. Concepts of Race Vanishing, Movements of Racism Rising? Global Issues and Austrian Ethnography. *Ethnos* 69:156-76.
- Gingrich, Andre. 2006. Neo-Nationalism and the Reconfiguration of Europe. *Social Anthropology* 14:195-217.
- Goddard, Victoria A., Josep R. Llobera, Cris Shore, eds. 1994a. *The Anthropology of Europe: Identity and Boundaries in Conflict*. Oxford: Berg.
- Goddard, Victoria A., Josep R. Llobera, Cris Shore. 1994b. Introduction: The Anthropology of Europe. In *The Anthropology of Europe: Identity and Boundaries in Conflict*, ed. Goddard, Victoria A., Josep R. Llobera, Cris Shore, pp. 1-30. Oxford: Berg.
- Governa, Francesca, Carlo Salone. 2005. Italy and European Spatial Policies: Polycentrism, Urban Networks and Local Innovation Practices. *European Planning Studies* 13:265-83.
- Grabbe, Heather. 2003. Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process In *The Politics of Europeanization*, ed. Featherstone, Kevin, Claudio Radaelli, pp. 301-27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Grahl, John. 2008. A Dead End for the EU? *Soundings* 39:44-55.
- Grande, Edgar. 2007. Differenz als Potential - Das kosmopolitische Europa. In *Europa und seine Fremden: Die Gestaltung kultureller Vielfalt als Herausforderung*, ed. Jöhler, Reinhard, Ansgar Thiel, Josef Schmid, Rainer Treptow. Bielefeld: transcript.
- Gravier, Magali. 2009. The Next European Empire? *European Societies* 11:627-47.
- Grillo, R.D. 2003. Cultural Essentialism and Cultural Anxiety. *Anthropological Theory* 3:157-73.
- Groeger, Frederick. 2001. Armut, Alltag und ethnisch-soziale Konflikte. Nachbarschaftskonflikte im "Problemviertel" und ihre zivilgesellschaftliche Bedeutung. In *Migration und Integration in Berlin. Wissenschaftliche Analysen und politische Perspektiven*, ed. Gesemann, Frank, pp. 349-62. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Güntner, Simon. 2007. *Soziale Stadtpolitik: Institutionen, Netzwerke und Diskurse in der Politikgestaltung*. Bielefeld: Transcript.
- Gupta, Akhil, James Ferguson. 1992. Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference. *Cultural Anthropology* 7:6-23.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2001. *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Hadjimichalis, Costis. 2011. Uneven Geographical Development and Socio-Spatial Justice and Solidarity: European Regions after the 2009 Financial Crisis. *European Urban and Regional Studies* 18:1-22.

- Hale, Charles R. 2005. Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Dominance in Central America. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 28:10-28.
- Hale, William. 2003. Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process. *Turkish Studies* 4:107-26.
- Hall, Stuart. 1996. The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power. In *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*, ed. Held, David, Don Hubert, Kenneth Thompson, Stuart Hall, pp. 184-228. Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Hall, Stuart. 2006. Popular Culture and the State. In *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, ed. Sharma, Aradhana, Akhil Gupta, pp. 360-80. Malden: Blackwell.
- Hansen, Thomas Blom, Finn Stepputat, eds. 2001. *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Harvey, David. 1996. *Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
- Harvey, David. 2000. *Spaces of Hope*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Harvey, David. 2001a. The Art of Rent: Globalization and the Commodification of Culture. In *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography*, pp. 394-411. New York: Routledge.
- Harvey, David. 2001b. *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography*. New York: Routledge.
- Harvey, David. 2001 [1989]. From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism. In *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography*, pp. 345-68. New York: Routledge.
- Harvey, David. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, David. 2006. *Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development*. London: Verso.
- Harvey, David. 2009. *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Harvey, David. 2011. Crises, Geographic Disruptions and the Uneven Development of Political Responses. *Economic Geography* 87:1-22.
- Harvie, Christopher. 1994. *The Rise of Regional Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Hayden, Robert M. 1996. Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia. *American Ethnologist* 23:783-801.
- Heeg, Susanne. 2001. *Politische Regulation des Raumes. Metropolen - Regionen - Nationalstaat*. Berlin: edition sigma.
- Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hermann, Christoph, Ines Hofbauer. 2007. The European Social Model: Between Competitive Modernisation and Neoliberal Resistance. *Capital & Class* 93:125-39.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric, Terence Ranger, eds. 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hofbauer, Hannes. 2003. *Osterweiterung: Vom Drang nach Osten zur Peripheren EU-Integration*. Wien: Promedia.

- Holm, Andrej. 2006. *Die Restrukturierung des Raumes: Stadterneuerung der 90er Jahre in Ostberlin: Interessen und Machtverhältnisse*. Bielefeld: transcript.
- Holm, Andrej. 2007. "Endstation Neukölln" oder "neuer Trendkiez"? Zwischen Rütlichschule und Landwehrkanal wird darüber diskutiert, ob in Nord-Neukölln Gentrifizierung stattfindet. *MieterEcho: Zeitung der Berliner MieterGemeinschaft* 324:6-9.
- Holmes, Douglas R. 2000. *Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks. 2001. *Multi-level Governance and European Integration*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Hudson, Ray, Allan M. Williams, eds. 1999a. *Divided Europe: Society and Territory*. London: Sage Publications.
- Hudson, Ray, Allan M. Williams. 1999b. Re-Shaping Europe: the Challenge of New Divisions within a Homogenized Political-Economic Space. In *Divided Europe: Society and Territory*, ed. Hudson, Ray, Allan M. Williams, pp. 1-28. London: Sage Publications.
- Hughes, James, Gwendolyn Sasse, Claire Gordon. 2004. *Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality*. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman. 2007. *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Insel, Ahmet. 2005. Europäisierung der Türkei: Eine historische Reifeprüfung der nationalen Würde? In *Die Türkei-Debatte in Europa*, ed. Giannakopoulos, Angelos, Konstadinos Maras, pp. 197-212. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Investitionsbank Berlin. 2009. *IBB Wohnungsmarktbericht 2008*. Berlin.
- Jacoby, Tim. 2010. Turkey and Europe: Culture, Capital and Corruption. *Review of International Studies* 36:663-84.
- Jessop, Bob. 1999. Narrating the Future of the National Economy and the National State: Remarks on Remapping Regulation and Reinventing Governance. In *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*, ed. Steinmetz, George, pp. 378-405. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Jessop, Bob. 2002. Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State-Theoretical Perspective. In *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe*, ed. Brenner, Neil, Nik Theodore, pp. 105-25. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
- Jessop, Bob. 2004a. Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy. *Critical Discourse Studies* 1:159-74.
- Jessop, Bob. 2004b. Multi-level Governance and Multi-level Metagovernance: Changes in the European Union as Integral Moments in the Transformation and Reorientation of Contemporary Statehood. In *Multi-level Governance*, ed. Bache, Ian, Matthew Flinders, pp. 49-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jessop, Bob. 2008a. A Cultural Political Economy of Competitiveness and Its Implications for Higher Education. In *Education and the Knowledge-Based Economy in Europe*, ed. Jessop, Bob, Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, pp. 13-39. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
- Jessop, Bob. 2008b. *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Judt, Tony. 1996. *A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe*. New York: Hill and Wang.

- Kalb, Don. 2005. From Flows to Violence: Politics and Knowledge in the Debates on Globalization and Empire. *Anthropological Theory* 5:176-204.
- Kalb, Don. 2009. Conversations with a Polish Populist: Tracing Hidden Histories of Globalization, Class, and Dispossession in Postsocialism (and Beyond). *American Ethnologist* 36:207-23.
- Kalb, Don, Gábor Halmai, eds. 2011. *Headlines of Nation, Subtexts of Class: Working-Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal Europe*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Karaca, Banu. 2009. Governance of or through Culture? Cultural Policy and the Politics of Culture in Europe. *Focaal - European Journal of Anthropology* 55:27-40.
- Karaca, Banu. 2010. The Art of Integration: Probing the Role of Cultural Policy in the Making of Europe. *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 16:121-37.
- Karakasidou, Anastasia. 1997. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Katz, Cindi. 2001. On the Grounds of Globalization: A Topography for Feminist Political Engagement. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society* 26:1213.
- Kaya, Ayhan, Senem Aydin. 2010. *Analysis of the 2009 Annual Programme for Turkey under the Pre-Accession Instrument in the Context of the 2009 Enlargement Package*. Brussels: European Parliament.
- Keating, Michael. 2003. The Invention of Regions: Political Restructuring and Territorial Government in Western Europe. In *State/Space: A Reader*, ed. Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, Gordon MacLeod, pp. 256-77. Malden: Blackwell.
- Keyder, Çağlar. 2006. Moving in from the Margins? Turkey in Europe. *Diogenes* 53:72-81.
- Kiwan, Nadia, Ulrike Meinhof. 2006. Perspectives on Cultural Diversity: A Discourse-Analytical Approach in Transcultural Europe. In *Cultural Policy in a Changing Europe*, ed. Meinhof, Ulrike Hanna, Anna Triandafyllidou, pp. 57-81. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, Florence Passy. 2005. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kosnick, Kira. 2007. *Migrant Media: Turkish Broadcasting and Multicultural Politics in Berlin*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kovács, Melinda. 2001. Putting Down and Putting Off: The EU's Discursive Strategies in the 1998 and 1999 Follow-up Reports. In *Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU-Enlargement*, ed. Böröcz, József, Melinda Kovács, pp. 196-234. Holly Cottage: Central Europe Review.
- Krätke, Stefan. 2004. City of Talents? Berlin's Regional Economy, Socio-Spatial Fabric and 'Worst Practice' Urban Governance. *International Journal of Urban & Regional Research* 28:511-29.
- Krätke, Stefan, Renate Borst. 2000. *Berlin: Metropole zwischen Boom und Krise*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Kubicek, Paul. 2005. The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey. *Turkish Studies* 6:361-77.
- Kymlicka, Will. 2001. *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Legendijk, Arnoud, Serap Kayasu, Suna Yasear. 2009. The Role of Regional Development Agencies in Turkey: From Implementing EU Directives to Supporting Regional Business Communities? *European Urban and Regional Studies* 16:383-96.

- Landry, Charles. 2000. *The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators*. London: Comedia.
- Lanz, Stephan. 2001. Der Staat verordnet die Zivilgesellschaft. *MieterEcho: Zeitung der Berliner MieterGemeinschaft* 286:4-8.
- Lanz, Stephan. 2007. *Berlin aufgemischt: abendländisch, multikulturell, kosmopolitisch? Die politische Konstruktion einer Einwanderungsstadt*. Bielefeld: Transcript.
- Leitner, Helga, Eric Sheppard. 2002. "The City is Dead, Long Live the Net": Harnessing European Interurban Networks for a Neoliberal Agenda. In *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe*, ed. Brenner, Neil, Nik Theodore, pp. 148-71. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
- Linklater, Andrew. 1998. Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian European State. In *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, ed. Archibugi, Daniele, David Held, Martin Kohler, pp. 113-37. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. 2004. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Mandel, Ruth. 2008. *Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:235-58.
- Manske, Alexandra. 2009. Prekarisierung auf hohem Niveau: Arbeiten in der Kreativwirtschaft. *MieterEcho: Zeitung der Berliner MieterGemeinschaft* 333:17-18.
- Marshall, T.H., Tom Bottomore. 1992. *Citizenship and Social Class*. London: Pluto Press.
- Marx, Karl. 1992 [1939]. *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)*. London: Penguin.
- Marx, Karl. 2001 [1872]. *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Der Produktionsprozess des Kapitals*. Köln: Parkland.
- Massad, Joseph. 2001. *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*. New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press.
- Massey, Doreen. 1994. *Space, Place and Gender*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Massey, Doreen. 2005. *For Space*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Mayer, Margit. 2007. Contesting the Neoliberalization of Urban Governance. In *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers*, ed. Leitner, Helga, Jamie Peck, Eric S. Sheppard, pp. 90-115. New York: Guilford Press.
- Mazower, Mark. 2004. The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950. *The Historical Journal* 47:379-98.
- McNeill, Donald. 1999. *Urban Change and the European Left: Tales from the New Barcelona*. London: Routledge.
- McNeill, Donald. 2004. *New Europe: Imagined Spaces*. London; New York: Arnold.
- Mehta, Uday S. 1997. Liberal Strategies of Exclusion. In *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Stoler, Ann Laura, Frederick Cooper, pp. 59-86. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Meinhof, Ulrike Hanna, Anna Triandafyllidou. 2006. Transcultural Europe: An Introduction to Cultural Policy in a Changing Europe. In *Cultural Policy in a Changing Europe*, ed. Meinhof, Ulrike Hanna, Anna Triandafyllidou, pp. 3-23. Houndmills: Palgrave.

- Ministry of Industry and Trade. 2007. *Regional Competitiveness Operational Programme*. Ankara.
- Mitchell, Timothy. 2006 [1999]. Society, Economy, and the State Effect. In *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, ed. Sharma, Aradhana, Akhil Gupta, pp. 169-86. Malden: Blackwell.
- Modood, Tariq, Anna Triandafyllidou, Ricard Zapata-Barrero, eds. 2006. *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach*. London: Routledge.
- Moss, Bernhard H. 2001. The EC's Free Market Agenda and the Myth of Social Europe. In *The Politics of Europe: Monetary Union and Class*, ed. Bonefeld, Werner, pp. 107-33. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, Yannis A. Stivachtis, eds. 2008. *Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Mulhern, Francis. 1993. A European Home? In *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*, ed. Bird, Jon, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam, George Robertson, Lisa Tickner, pp. 199-204. London: Routledge.
- Narotzky, Susana, Gavin Smith. 2006. *Immediate Struggles: People, Power, and Place in Rural Spain*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2002. *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Nussbaum, Martha C., Joshua Cohen, eds. 1996. *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Offe, Claus. 2003. The European Model of "Social" Capitalism: Can It Survive European Integration? *Journal of Political Philosophy* 11:437-69.
- Ong, Aihwa. 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Öniş, Ziya. 2009. Beyond the 2001 Financial Crisis: The Political Economy of the New Phase of Neo-Liberal Restructuring in Turkey. *Review of International Political Economy* 16:409-32.
- Oyan, Oğuz. 2002. From Agricultural Policies to an Agriculture without Policies. In *The Ravages of Neo-Liberalism: Economy, Society and Gender in Turkey*, ed. Balkan, Nesecan, Sungur Savran, pp. 55-71. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Özyürek, Esra. 2005. The Politics of Cultural Unification, Secularism, and the Place of Islam in the New Europe. Commentary on Matti Bunzl: Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe. *American Ethnologist* 32:509-12.
- Pagden, Anthony, ed. 2002. *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge University Press.
- Parker, Owen. 2008. Challenging 'New Constitutionalism' in the EU: French Resistance, 'Social Europe' and 'Soft' Governance. *New Political Economy* 13:397-417.
- Parker, Owen. 2009. 'Cosmopolitan Europe' and the EU-Turkey Question: The Politics of a 'Common Destiny'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 16:1085-101.
- Parker, W.H. 1960. Europe: How Far? *The Geographical Journal* 126:278-97.
- Peck, J., A. Tickell. 2002. Neoliberalizing Space. *Antipode* 34:380-404.
- Peck, Jamie. 2002. Political Economies of Scale: Fast Policy, Interscalar Relations, and Neoliberal Workfare. *Economic Geography* 78:331-60.

- Peck, Jamie. 2005. Struggling with the Creative Class. *International Journal of Urban & Regional Research* 29:740-70.
- Pfeiffer, Hermannus. 2010. Griechische Tragödie: Über Staatsverschuldung und die Zählung der Finanzmärkte. *Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik* 4:79-88.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. 1975. *Political Power and Social Classes*. London: Humanities Press.
- Richards, Greg. 2000. The European Cultural Capital Event: Strategic Weapon in the Cultural Arms Race? *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 6:159-81.
- Robotham, Don. 2005. Cosmopolitanism and Planetary Humanism: The Strategic Universalism of Paul Gilroy. *South Atlantic Quarterly* 104:561-82.
- Robotham, Don. 2009. Liberal Social Democracy, Neoliberalism, and Neoconservatism: Some Genealogies. In *Rethinking America: The Imperial Homeland in the 21st Century*, ed. Maskovsky, Jeff, Ida Susser, pp. 213-. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Rosamond, Ben. 2002. Imagining the European Economy: 'Competitiveness' and the Social Construction of 'Europe' as an Economic Space. *New Political Economy* 7:157-77.
- Rose, Nikolas. 1993. Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism. *Economy & Society* 22:283.
- Rose, Nikolas. 2004. *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rovisco, Maria. 2007. Cosmopolitanism, Collective Belonging and the Borders of the European Union. In *Cosmopolitanism and Europe*, ed. Rumford, Chris, pp. 202-20. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Rumford, Chris. 2000. European Cohesion? Globalization, Autonomization, and the Dynamics of EU Integration. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences* 13:183-97.
- Rumford, Chris. 2003. Resisting Globalization? Turkey-EU Relations and Human and Political Rights in the Context of Cosmopolitan Democratization. *International Sociology* 18:379-94.
- Rumford, Chris. 2005. Cosmopolitanism and Europe. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences*:1-9.
- Rumford, Chris, ed. 2007. *Cosmopolitanism and Europe*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Said, Edward W. 1979. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Sarrazin, Thilo. 2009. Thilo Sarrazin im Gespräch: Klasse statt Masse - Von der Hauptstadt der Transferleistungen zur Metropole der Eliten. *Lettre Internationale* 86:197-201.
- Sarrazin, Thilo. 2010. Vorabdruck aus "Deutschland schafft sich ab". *Der Spiegel*. Accessed September 2010: http://www.spiegel.de/thema/thilo_sarrazin/.
- Sassatelli, Monica. 2002. Imagined Europe: The Shaping of a European Cultural Identity through EU Cultural Policy. *European Journal of Social Theory* 5:435-51.
- Sassatelli, Monica. 2006. The Logic of Europeanizing Cultural Policy. In *Cultural Policy in a Changing Europe*, ed. Meinhof, Ulrike Hanna, Anna Triandafyllidou, pp. 24-42. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Sassen, Saskia. 1996. *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Savran, Sungur. 2002. The Legacy of the Twentieth Century. In *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*, ed. Balkan, Nesecan, Sungur Savran, pp. 1-20. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

- Schmid, Dorothée. 2004. The Use of Conditionality in Support of Political, Economic and Social Rights: Unveiling the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's True Hierarchy of Objectives? *Mediterranean Politics* 9:396-421.
- Schmidtke, Oliver. 2010. Einwanderer als Ware: Wie die Marktlogik Migranten aussortiert. *Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik* 10:51-57.
- Sellar, Christian, Laurel McEwen. 2011. A Cosmopolitan Analysis of the Contradictions in EU Regional and Enlargement Policies as Drivers of Europeanization. *European Urban and Regional Studies* 18:289-305.
- Senat Berlin. 2006. *Berliner Gesamtstrategie für mehr Wachstum und Beschäftigung - Strategie für die EFRE- und ESF-Förderung in Berlin 2007-2013*. Berlin.
- Senat Berlin. 2007a. *Operationelles Programm des Landes Berlin für den Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung in der Förderperiode 2007-2013*. Berlin.
- Senat Berlin. 2007b. *Operationelles Programm des Landes Berlin für den Europäischen Sozialfonds 2007-2013*. Berlin.
- Senat Berlin. 2008. *Kulturwirtschaft in Berlin: Entwicklungen und Potenziale*. Berlin.
- Senatskanzlei Berlin. 2009. *Europa beispielhaft: EU-geförderte Projekte in Berlin*. Berlin.
- Senatsverwaltung für Integration, Arbeit, und Soziales, Der Beauftragte des Senats von Berlin für Integration und Migration, Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin. 2007. *Vielfalt fördern - Zusammenhalt stärken: Das Berliner Integrationskonzept*. 16/0715. Berlin.
- Sharma, Aradhana, Akhil Gupta, eds. 2006a. *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Sharma, Aradhana, Akhil Gupta. 2006b. Introduction: Rethinking the State in an Age of Globalization. In *Anthropology of the State: A Reader*, ed. Sharma, Aradhana, Akhil Gupta, pp. 1-41. Malden: Blackwell.
- Shaw, Martin. 2003. The State of Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Transformation. In *State/Space: A Reader*, ed. Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, Gordon MacLeod, pp. 117-30. Malden: Blackwell.
- Shore, C. 1996. Ethnicity, Xenophobia and the Boundaries of Europe. *International Journal on Minority & Group Rights* 4:247-62.
- Shore, Cris. 1993. Inventing the 'People's Europe': Critical Approaches to European Community 'Cultural Policy'. *Man* 28:779-800.
- Shore, Cris. 2000. *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*. London: Routledge.
- Shore, Cris. 2006a. 'Government Without Statehood'? Anthropological Perspectives on Governance and Sovereignty in the European Union. *European Law Journal* 12:709-24.
- Shore, Cris. 2006b. "In uno plures" (?): EU Cultural Policy and the Governance of Europe. *Cultural Analysis* 5:7-26.
- Shore, Cris, Annabel Black. 1992. The European Communities: And the Construction of Europe. *Anthropology Today* 8:10-11.
- Shore, Cris, Susan Wright, eds. 1997. *Anthropology of Policy: Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power*. London: Routledge.
- Sjursen, Helene. 2006. The EU as a 'Normative' Power: How can this be? *Journal of European Public Policy* 13:235-51.

- Smith, Neil. 1984. *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space*. New York: Blackwell.
- Smith, Neil. 1993. Homeless/ Global: Scaling Places. In *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*, ed. Bird, Jon, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam, George Robertson, Lisa Tickner, pp. 87-119. London: Routledge.
- Smith, Neil. 2007. "Der Zusammenschluss zwischen Anti-Gentrifizierungskämpfen und den Aktivitäten der weltweiten Bewegung für soziale Gerechtigkeit kann extrem bedrohlich werden". *MieterEcho: Zeitung der Berliner MieterGemeinschaft* 324:9-11.
- Smith, Neil. 2008. On 'The Eviction of Critical Perspectives'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 21:195-7.
- Sparke, Matthew. 2005. *In the Space of Theory: Postfoundational Geographies of the Nation-State*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Speed, Shannon, Maria Teresa Sierra. 2005. Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and Multiculturalism in Neoliberal Latin America. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 28:1-9.
- Staiger, Uta. 2009. New Agendas? Culture and Citizenship in EU Policy. *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 15:1-16.
- Steinmetz, George. 1999. Introduction: Culture and the State. In *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*, ed. Steinmetz, George, pp. 1-49. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Stolcke, Verena. 1995. Talking Culture: New Boundaries, New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe. *Current Anthropology* 36:1-24.
- Stoler, Ann. 1992. Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion. *Comparative Studies in Society & History* 34:514-51.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. 2002. Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule. In *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule*, pp. 22-40. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Strasser, Sabine. 2008. Europe's Other: Nationalism, Transnationals and Contested Images of Turkey in Austria. *European Societies* 10:177-95.
- Strath, Bo. 2000a. Introduction: Europe as a Discourse. In *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, ed. Strath, Bo, pp. 13-44. Brussels: Peter Lang.
- Strath, Bo. 2000b. Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other. In *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, ed. Strath, Bo, pp. 385-420. Brussels: Peter Lang.
- Strom, Elizabeth, Margit Mayer. 1998. The New Berlin. *German Politics & Society* 16:122-39.
- Sugden, Jonathan. 2004. Leverage in Theory and Practice: Human Rights and Turkey's EU Candidacy. In *Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues*, ed. Ugur, Mehmet, Nergis Canefe, pp. 241-64. London: Routledge.
- Swyngedouw, Erik. 1997. Neither Global nor Local: 'Glocalization' and the Politics of Scale. In *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, ed. Cox, Kevin R., pp. 137-66. New York: Guilford Press.
- Taguieff, Pierre-Andre. 1990. The New Cultural Racism in France. *Telos* 83:109-23.
- Tretter, Eliot M. 2009. The Cultures of Capitalism: Glasgow and the Monopoly of Culture. *Antipode* 41:111-32.

- Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. 2001. The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization. *Current Anthropology* 42:125-38.
- Türkyay, Mehmet. 2002. Turkey's Integration with the European Union: Modalities and Limitations. In *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*, ed. Balkan, Nesecan, Sungur Savran, pp. 215-30. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Turner, Terence. 1993. Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What is Anthropology that Multiculturalists Should Be Mindful of It? *Cultural Anthropology* 8:411-29.
- Uğur, Mehmet, Nergis Canefe, eds. 2004. *Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues*. London: Routledge.
- Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. 2000. Transitional Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists. *New Political Economy* 5:157.
- Van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. 2002. *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration*. London: Routledge.
- Van Houtum, Henk, Roos Pijpers. 2007. The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-Faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU. *Antipode*:291-309.
- Verdery, Katherine. 2003. *The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist Transylvania*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2006. *European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power*. New York: New Press.
- Walzer, Michael. 1994. *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Wedeen, Lisa. 1999. *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- White, Jenny B. 1997. Turks in the New Germany. *American Anthropologist* 99:754-69.
- Wilder, Gary. 2005. *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Williams, Colin H. 1999. Nationalism and its Derivatives in Post-1989 Europe. In *Divided Europe: Society and Territory*, ed. Hudson, Ray, Allan M. Williams, pp. 79-106. London: Sage Publications.
- Williams, Raymond. 1983. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, Thomas, Estellie Smith, eds. 1993. *Cultural Change and the New Europe: Perspectives on the European Community*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Winichakul, Thongchai. 1996. Maps and the Formation of the Geobody of Siam. In *Asian Forms of the Nation*, ed. Tonnesson, Steil, Hans Antlov: Curzon.
- Wolff, Larry. 1994. *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Wood, Phil, Charles Landry. 2008. *The Intercultural City: Planning for Diversity Advantage*. London: Eearthscan.
- Wright, Susan. 1998. The Politicization of 'Culture'. *Anthropology Today* 14:7-15.
- Yúdice, George. 2003. *The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Ziltener, Patrick. 1999. *Strukturwandel der europäischen Integration: Die Europäische Union und die Veränderung von Staatlichkeit*. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.