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UNITY AND VARIETY IN PAINTING

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2001

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee, Professors William Earle, Mary Wiseman, and Nickolas Pappas, for all their advice, help, and encouragement.

I would also like to thank Professors Douglas Lackey and Charles Landesman for their insightful participation in both my prospectus and defense examinations.

I thank all my teachers, especially Professor David Rosenthal for his support and guidance.

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INTRODUCTION

As can every act, the act of putting brush to canvas can be evaluated from the standpoint of ethics: regardless of what is intended, is the work productive of happiness in the world? It seems true that artistic activity of all kinds should be evaluated this way, but of course a proponent of art for art's sake might disagree, and, often, art's consequences are simply not taken cognizance of.

The actions of the art critic influence the actions of artists and audience, and can likewise be productive or not.

Of course, artists and critics ought not become confused by mistaken theories; if they do, their activities are not likely to be most productive of what's good. (Again, this may seem obvious).

It is my view that philosophers have a duty to try to supply those who are involved in both practice and criticism with answers to the crucial questions, in this case about art and beauty, which philosophy itself has raised. As time goes by without clear answers having been given to those questions, artists, critics, and members of the audience become farther and farther removed from an awareness of the good that can be realized through art.

The big question which so far has not been clearly answered has often been put, "What is art?" But in these days, when "art" carries so many different meanings, a search

for a definition or essence leads us away from the question which I think was really, in the past, being asked. We must, I believe, understand the search for the essence of art, for analysis of its concept, for definition of the word "art," to have been used as a means to answer the unconsciously conceived question of how it is that esteemed works make us happy. For, how can we explain the passion that has gone into attempts to answer the question, "What is art?", unless we suppose of those who asked the question that they, after having witnessed the power of particular masterpieces to bring happiness in the world, were moved to uncover art's essence in order to understand the observed process better, so that they, as critics and philosophers, might play a role in enhancing future production of the same effect? But answering the question of how these particular works make us happy does not in fact require that we take up the question of essence at all.

Thus, the question which was really being asked, and still must be answered, is: "How is it that long-esteemed paintings, sculptures, musical compositions, novels, etc. make us happy?"

Lacking the right answer once this question has been raised is a condition which corrupts artistic activity and tends to produce a state in which there is less good art than there would otherwise be. We are, at present anyway, less happy than we would have been if the question had never been asked.

Possessing the right answer to the question, however, can only serve to make us happier than we would have been.

In order to facilitate investigation of this question, let us, somewhat arbitrarily, narrow our focus to consider a more specific question: "How is it that long-esteemed *paintings* are productive of happiness?" It seems to me that the right answer to this

question has primarily to do with the spectator's direct awareness in these paintings of something like parity between internal relations of sameness and difference, or between relations of similarity and dissimilarity (see sections 9 and 10 for a discussion of other possible happiness-producing properties of paintings).

Of course this notion is not new: Francis Hutcheson came up with a version of it in 1725. But Hutcheson's theory was extremely vague, and that is perhaps why his views have not been popular. What was required was a clearer version of the idea of unity in variety, one in which a very careful account of the relevant relations was given. The work of Monroe Beardsley, Stephen Pepper and Rudolf Arheim represents progress in this respect, but much more needs to be done -- key questions about the perceptual conditions of (what I can call informally) beauty and art remain unanswered, these authors putting forth different views which must be adjudicated.

In this dissertation, I intend to address those issues. It is my hope that the dissertation will represent a step forward in the project begun by Hutcheson, a project which I think can contribute much toward explaining how it is that time-honored paintings make us happy.

In Chapter 1, I look at the unity-in-variety (UIV) theories of Hutcheson (§1), Beardsley (§2), Pepper (§3), and Arnheim (§4); and then I introduce (provisionally -- see §12) my own view, moderationism (§5). I present in Chapter 1 a mostly descriptive account of each of the five UIV theories. In each case except Hutcheson's, I begin by giving as clear a picture as I am able of just what relations, in terms of what I call *primary* kinds (such as sameness, difference, similarity, and dissimilarity) and *secondary* kinds (such as relations of color and orientation), the particular theorist appears to

identify as those which hold among the formal elements of a painted surface. In Hutcheson's case, I present his examples of uniformity-in-variety, which may be regarded as clues to the relations he might identify. In each of these cases, I go on to describe how the particular theorist attempts to connect his special brand of UIV to the production of human happiness.

In my section on moderationism I present a fundamental formal analysis of the visual field in terms of what I call "r-relations" (relations of sameness and difference) and "R-relations (the relations of identity, similarity, moderation, dissimilarity, and opposition). In becoming aware of how complex such an analysis in these terms will be, we begin, as I say on page 56, "to understand why the secret of beauty has remained difficult to discover, and more fully to appreciate the power of our faculty for unconscious discrimination."

Grounded logically (see §11) in a careful inspection of colored surfaces (mainly, an inspection of minimal images -- pairs of uniformly colored spots for instance), moderationism's two theses, S1 ("The awareness of moderation-richness is, as a rule, a fundamental good") and S2 ("Many objects, including the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, and Kandinsky abstracts, are moderation-rich, and this is, at least primarily, what accounts for the high esteem in which they are held") , should be regarded as my central claims

Still in Chapter 1, in §6, I show how moderationism is a non-essentialist view. In §7, I give a more general version, which I call the *general UIV theory*, of my moderationism. This version comprises two theses, SI ("The awareness of something like parity between sameness and difference relations among visual elements, or of

moderation-richness [nearness to precise parity] of these elements, of this balance as such, is, as a rule, a fundamental good"), and SII ("Many objects, including the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, and Kandinsky abstracts, have (1) something like parity between sameness and difference relations among their visual elements, or (2) moderation-richness of these elements, and this balance is at least primarily what accounts for the high esteem in which they are held"). This general UIV theory is *general* in that its first thesis (SI) seems compatible with the views of Hutcheson, Beardsley, Pepper, and Arnheim.

In §8, I talk about other kinds of UIV, and in §9, I bring values other than those connected with UIV into the discussion, and begin an evaluation of the second thesis (SII) of the general UIV theory. §10 clarifies SII in light of what has been said in §9.

Chapter 2 continues the evaluation begun in §9:

§11 supports the general UIV thesis, and in §12 I evaluate the theories covered in sections 1-5 in an attempt to discover whether moderationism (S1 and S2 -- §5), which involves a precise balance between sameness and difference relations, does in fact represent the correct specification of the general UIV thesis (SI and SII -- §7), or whether the correct specification will be more Beardsley-like, Pepper-like, or Arnheim-like -- i.e., whether it involves only a rough-parity, of one sort or another, between sameness and difference relations.

Chapter 3 addresses the work of three modern writers, Richard Wollheim (§13), Michael Baxandall (§14), and Arthur Danto (§15). I take note of the apparent failure on their part to have grasped the notion of UIV, and suggest how, armed with the UIV thesis, we might assess their views.

CHAPTER 1

UNITY-IN-VARIETY THEORIES

Section 1

Francis Hutcheson

Hutcheson, in *An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design* (1725) seems to understand the generation of our idea of visual beauty to occur in the following way:

As we look at a beautiful object, that object raises in us, by means of our (external) sense of sight, a complex idea of primary and secondary qualities. The complex idea then gives rise in us to the simple, necessarily and immediately pleasurable, idea of beauty, which is received by our (internal) sense of beauty. Thus, in the visual realm, the immediate object of our sense of beauty is a complex visual idea and its indirect object is the external beautiful thing. (It is unclear whether or not Hutcheson realizes that in the case of most beautiful, visible objects, the simple ideas which make up the complex idea cannot all have been sensed simultaneously. But, we can probably infer from his examples of beautiful things [few of which are visible in the ordinary sense -- see below] that he recognizes that the simple ideas need not be received simultaneously in order for the complex idea to give rise to beauty.)

But what property must such a complex visual idea (or the external perceived object) have for it to be able to raise in us the idea of beauty?

Hutcheson's answer is:

> . . . what we call beautiful in objects, to speak in the mathematical style, seems to be in compound ratio of uniformity and variety: so that where the uniformity of bodies is equal, the beauty is as the variety: and where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity.[1]

We can probably infer that what Hutcheson has in mind here is

$$UV \propto B$$

(That is, the product of uniformity and variety is directly proportional to beauty.)

Unfortunately, Hutcheson provides no analyses in terms of relations; rather, he relies on examples of beauty in order to elucidate his view. These examples, therefore, are of special value for us. They include the following:

(1) In his section on geometrical figures (§II, iii)[2], Hutcheson claims that (a) variety increases and uniformity remains the same in the sequence, equilateral triangle -- square -- pentagon -- hexagon, and in the sequence, regular pyramid (4 sides) -- cube (6 sides) -- octahedron -- dodecahedron (12 sides) -- icosahedron (20 sides), (b) uniformity increases and variety remains the same in the sequence, figure with four irregular curved sides -- trapezium -- rhomboid -- rhombus -- square, and (c) uniformity increases and variety decreases in the sequence, ellipse (not very eccentric) -- circle.

(2) In his section entitled *Of the Beauty of Theorems* (§III)[10], he notes how we find a variety of different particular truths included in (i.e. as instances of) one general theorem. (3) In the section on works of art (§III, vii)[11], Hutcheson points out how a

building, whether Grecian, Roman, Chinese, or Persian, will exhibit uniformity among its various parts.

Hutcheson gives examples of natural beauty as well: (4) "Beauties which charm the astronomer, and make his tedious calculations pleasant" (§II, vi)[3], are to be found in the way that (a) the (various) stars and planets all appear to be situated upon a sphere (a form having great uniformity), (b) the planetary orbits are all generally elliptical (the ellipse having more variety and less uniformity than the circle), (c) there is uniformity in the length of the planets' years and days, variety in the occurrence of the seasons, and of day and night, and (d) conjunctions, oppositions, and eclipses are repeated at fixed periods. (5) Under the heading *Earth* (§II, vi)[4] is this example: The earth is uniformly covered with green, but is diversified with light and shade. (6) Under the heading *Plants* (§II, vii)[5], Hutcheson notes how (a) there is uniformity in the manner of growth and propagation amidst the (diverse) botanical species, (b) the diverse individuals of one species exhibit uniformity in the structure of even their minutest parts, and (c) the shape and placement of branches on stalks or trunks is highly uniform. (7) Under the heading *Animals* (§II, viii-x)[6], he presents the following examples: (a) A variety of motions (walking, running, flying, swimming, etc.), of a variety of kinds of limbs, are performed by the same contrivance of a contracting muscle. (b) There is uniformity among the diverse individuals of the same species. (c) In each individual animal we find the uniformity of symmetry of its parts. (d) When animals are in motion, we see uniformity in the uniform repetitions of gestures and steps. (8) Under the heading *Fowls* (§II, xi)[7] are found these examples: (a) There is uniformity of feather-structure among all the different species. (b) There is uniformity of feather-structure among all the different individuals of

each species. (c) In the individual bird, there is a perfect uniformity (symmetry) in the feather-structures of its two sides.

(9) In the section entitled *Fluids* (§II, xii)[8], he gives this example: In a fluid, there is an almost infinite multitude of tiny parts, all having the same spherical (highly uniform) shape. (10) In the section pertaining to harmony of sound (§II, xiii)[9], we find this example: The vibration of two notes can regularly coincide -- this is a sort of uniformity.

Hutcheson's explanation for our enjoyment of uniformity amidst variety is ingenious, and probably cannot be much improved upon: We see uniformity amidst variety in the beauty of a theorem, i.e. one expression which encompasses many instances; and, we see it in the articulation of natural laws for the same reason. Without a *fundamental desire to generalize,* we would toil to learn even simple things; thus, God has, for the sake of our well-being, given us the sense of beauty.

Hutcheson puts it this way:

> . . . beings of limited understanding and power, if they act rationally for their own interest, must choose to operate by the simplest means, to invent general theorems, and to study regular objects, if they be as useful as irregular ones, that they may avoid the endless toil of producing each effect by a separate operation, of searching out each different truth by a different inquiry, and of imprinting the endless variety of dissimilar ideas in irregular objects. . . .
>
> Now . . . we may conclude that supposing the Deity so kind as to connect sensible pleasure with certain actions or contemplations beside the rational advantage perceivable in them, there is a great moral necessity from his goodness that the internal sense of men should be constituted as it is at present so as to make uniformity amidst variety the occasion of pleasure. For were it not so, but on the contrary, if irregular objects,

> particular truths and operations pleased us, besides the endless toil this would involve us in, there must arise a perpetual dissatisfaction in all rational agents with themselves, since reason and interest would lead us to single general causes while a contrary sense of beauty would make us disapprove them. Universal theorems would appear to our understanding the best means of increasing our knowledge of what might be useful, while a contrary sense would set us on the search after particular truths. Thought and reflection would recommend objects with uniformity amidst variety, and yet this perverse instinct would involve us in labyrinths of confusion and dissimilitude. And hence we see how suitable it is to the sagacious bounty which we suppose in the Deity to constitute our internal senses in the manner in which they are, by which pleasure is joined to the contemplation of those objects which a finite mind can best imprint and retain the ideas of with the least distraction; to those actions which are most efficacious and fruitful, in useful effect; and to those theorems which most enlarge our minds."[12]

Section 2

Monroe Beardsley

What relations does Beardsley identify as those which hold among the formal elements of a painted surface?

In *Aesthetics* (1981 [first edition, 1958]), Beardsley provides us with a short answer to the question, What are the possible relations that can subsist among the parts of a visual presentation? Speaking about what he calls "dual" relations, he says

> Suppose we single out two points of the visual design that are both in view at the same time--for example, two figures on a background--and compare them with respect to their similarity or difference of various characteristics. If we consider a particular characteristic--say, shape, color, orientation, or size--there are three possibilities to distinguish. They may be similar in that respect, though not exactly; or they may be contrasting in that respect, as dark vs. light, or large vs. small, or smooth vs. jagged, or

> they may be indifferently different, that is, they may not stand out as either much alike or much opposed.[13]

Thus, Beardsley uses the following terms to point to three kinds of relation (I will call any relation of this kind an *R-relation*): **Similar**, **Indifferently different**, and **Contrasting**. (Beardsley also uses the term "difference" in the above passage. Because he presents us with a similarity-difference disjunction, we can probably assume that by "difference" he means to refer only to relations of indifferent difference and contrast -- but, surely, similarity too is a species of difference. If color *a* and color *b* are similar colors, for instance, then they are not the same color, but are different colors.)

It must be noted that an R-relation, say a hue similarity relation, itself has properties; among these are: (1) what I will call its *primary* property (*primary* because of its generality), viz. its being a similarity relation, and (2) what I will call its *secondary* property, its being a relation of hue.

Beardsley's list, above, of kinds of R-relation reflects the primary properties of R-relations of three kinds; therefore, I will call such kinds *primary kinds*. I will present below (§5) what I take to be a complete list of these kinds. In order to obtain a better notion of the nature of the relations with which we are dealing (this being of fundamental importance), we need also to develop a list of *secondary kinds* of R-relation in the visual field, that is, kinds which connect with the secondary properties of these relations. (A similarity-of-hue relation, for instance, will be both of the primary kind, *similarity*, and of the secondary kind, *hue*, and "x is similar in hue to y" will be written "$S_h$xy.") In particular, in this section, we must ask what secondary kinds of R-relation Beardsley recognizes as existing in the visual field.

We have already seen that he would include dual relations of shape, color, orientation, and size. But in order to discuss fully Beardsley's treatment (Beardsley's §11) of such kinds of R-relation we must first look at his treatment of the design's *qualities* (§7). It seems likely that Beardsley uses "area" and "figure" interchangeably; if this is true, then the following probably reflects fairly well his notion of how these *qualities* are to be classified:

(I) His *qualities of an area* (= *figure*) are the following:

(A) The *basic* qualities of an area, according to Beardsley, are (1) **shape**, (2) **size**, (3) **position**, and (4) **tone** (= **color**). The components of position are (3a) **location** and (3b) **lie** (the way an area is oriented) and the components of color are (4a) **hue**, (4b) **lightness**, and (4c) **saturation.**

(B) His *dependent* qualities of an area are (1) **visual density** (This is the area's quality of impenetrability or of opacity. It is dependent on size, tone, and other qualities), (2) **implicit movement** (This is dependent on shape, size, and position), and (3) the following qualities: **warmth/coolness, advancing/receding, heavy/less heavy, bright/dull, gay/less gay**, and **lively/flat in timbre.**

(II) Beardsley's *qualities of a line* are the following:

(A) For Beardsley, the *basic* qualities of a line are (1) **length**, (2) **orientation**, and (3) **curvature**.

(B) His *dependent* qualities of a line are (1) **implicit movement** and (2) these qualities: **the qualities of being: unstable; quiet; peaceful; jagged; wiry; billowing;**

droopy; **nervous**; **steely**; **soft**; **flowing**; **restless**; **sweeping**; **bold**; **calm**; **tender**; **sharply biting**; **torturedly rhythmic**.

As the quotation above (pp. 10-11) indicates, Beardsley clearly means to identify kinds of (in my terminology) similarity, moderation, and dissimilarity relations in terms of the qualities with which they can be associated. He explicitly identifies similarity, moderation, and dissimilarity of shape, color, orientation, and size; that is, of the basic qualities of an *area* (he does not mention *location*, and by "orientation" he must mean *lie*). Later, he includes relations of (visual) density and (implicit) movement. It is not completely clear if he means to exclude the qualities I have above put under the heading I.B.3, but his discussion of the General Canons[14] seems to indicate that he does.

However, there is no reason to assume that he would omit the relations pertaining to the basic qualities of *line*, along with movement, and so (omitting the II.B.2 qualities) we can probably conclude that the following list of kinds of similarity, moderation, and dissimilarity relations fairly well represents Beardsley's scheme (asterisk indicates that Beardsley does not explicitly mention the kind):

The relation of (1) **area*** (we refer to a relation of this kind when we say, e.g., "This area is, in an overall sense, similar to that area") has as components the relations of (2) **shape**, (3) **size**, (4) **position***, (5) **color** (= **tone**), and (6) **visual density.** The components of the relation of position are the relations of (7) **location***, and (8) **lie.** The components of the relation of color are the relations of (9) **hue***, (10) **lightness***, and (11) **saturation***.

The relation of (12) **line*** has as components the relations of (13) **length***, (14) **orientation***, and (15) **curvature***.

The relation of (16) **implicit movement** has as components the relations of (17) (intensity of) **thrust** and (18) **direction** (of thrust).

Beardsley's comments on some of these kinds of R-relation give us a clearer picture of how he conceives of them:

Shape similarity can (Beardsley claims) be called *shape-harmony;* example: the letter "P" is similar in shape to "R", because the "R" contains a "P".

Shape moderation holds between the letters "P" and "M" because these letters are neither very similar in shape nor in clear contrast.

Shape dissimilarity holds between the letters "X" and "O", because one is all open and the other is all closed. Another example: the relation between a smooth and a jagged shape.

Size similarity can be called *size-harmony.*

The relation between a large area and a small one is an example of Size dissimilarity.

Similarity of color is called *color-harmony.*

Dissimilarity of color is called *clashing.*

Similarity of visual density is called *balance.*

(?)Similarity of implicit movement is called disequilibrium.

(?)Dissimilarity of implicit movement is called equilibrium.

Although Beardsley does not explicitly identify R-relations of hue, lightness, and saturation, there is no reason to believe that he would not endorse the inclusion of such kinds in a list of kinds. Beardsley gives no account of how such relations might translate into R-relations of color (of which hue, lightness, and saturation are components). Yet, such an account seems required if we are to obtain a good grasp of these relations (See my comments on pages 59-60). Similar problems arise in connection with the relation of the R-relations of area, position, line, and implicit movement to the R-relations of their components.

Beardsley singles out three kinds of R-relation which, he says, "have great structural significance in visual design." These are (1) color, (2) visual density, and (3) implicit movement:

Beardsley says that when we compare two parts of a design with respect to their *color*, we find that

> . . . they may be *harmonious*--the colors go well together. They may be *clashing* or conflicting--the colors are disturbed by each other's presence. Or they may simply be indifferent. Color harmony is one kind of similarity. . .[15]

When two parts of a design are similar in *visual density*, they are, Beardsley claims, said to be in *balance*. He says,

> Balance implies a point, or vertical line, of reference, an axis that divides the two comparable areas.[16]

Beardsley says the following about *implicit movement*:

> The third dual relation [of these three which in particular have great structural significance] arises when we compare two parts of a design with respect to their movement, including not only the amount of thrust in the movement, but the direction as well. Two black figures on a white background may, for example, seem to move in the same direction, say toward the upper left-hand corner. Or they may seem to move together, as if pulled by internal forces, or to drive each other apart, depending on their shape, size, position, and so on. Or there may be other figures that counteract these tendencies, so that a stable tension is generated, and the figures appear to be held in position. Thus, two such figures are either in *equilibrium* or in *disequilibrium.*[17]

Beardsley implies here that movement of two parts (figures or, presumably, lines) of a design can be related by similarity, indifferent-difference, and contrast. It seems likely that he means to say that equilibrium involves contrast of movement (where two movements are dissimilar enough to check each other) and that disequilibrium involves similarity of movement (where two movements are too similar to check one another). There is no reason to assume that he would not say that a dual relation of intensity of thrust and a dual relation of direction of thrust can exist, as can the composite dual relation[?], movement. He does not address the question of how these relations might relate to one another.[18]

What is Beardsley's brand of unity in variety (UIV), and how does he attempt to connect it to the production of human happiness?

Beardsley's unity

Beardsley believes that our ordinary concept of unity contains two components, which he calls completeness and coherence. According to Beardsley, the word

"completeness" refers to a simple quality, and, therefore, cannot be analytically defined. But, he claims, we point to its meaning (that is, we "talk around it" -- "with the help of synonymous expressions" we "show where to look") when we say that a visual design is complete when it "appears to require nothing outside itself; it has all that it needs; it is all there."[19]

Coherence is, according to Beardsley, another simple quality. Although it is undefinable, we can, he says, lay down a list of some phenomenal conditions which will tend to make a design cohere:

1. Coherence is promoted by *focus* (= the dominant pattern or compositional scheme, or "that part of the painting that has the greatest perceptual strikingness"[20]).

2. Coherence is promoted by *similarities* among the parts of the design. "As a rough generalization, we may say that, other things being equal, the more similarities there are among the parts of the design, the more coherent the design will tend to be."[21]

Beardsley's complexity

Complexity, for Beardsley, "is, roughly, the number of parts, and of differences between them."[22]

Beardsley makes clear that unity and complexity are to be regarded as two distinct things, which can vary independently, the opposite of unity being disunity, and the opposite of complexity being simplicity. He says that "unity and complexity are set over against each other: very broadly speaking, the former is increased by similarities of parts the latter by differences [dissimilarities?]"[23]

Beardsley claims that (1) as the number of similarities increases, unity increases[24], and as unity increases, the magnitude* of the aesthetic experience increases[25], and as this magnitude increases, aesthetic value increases[26], and (2) as the number of dissimilarities increases, complexity increases, and as complexity increases, the magnitude of the aesthetic experience increases, and as this magnitude increases, aesthetic value increases.

Beardsley seems to offer very little detailed guidance as to how his principles might be applied, and he seems to offer no real explanation for how the perception of such unity and complexity might tie into human enjoyment or fulfillment.

Section 3

Stephen Pepper

What relations does Pepper identify as those which hold among the formal elements of a painted surface?

Stephen Pepper, in *Principles of Art Appreciation* (1949; reprinted 1977), says

> . . . blues grade into greens, which grade into yellows, which grade into reds, thence into purples and violets, and finally back to blues again.

---

* Beardsley says on page 529 that to say that one aesthetic experience has *greater magnitude* than another is to say that the first is *more* of an aesthetic experience than the second. He says that magnitude is a function of the experience's unity, intensity (of dependent qualities), and complexity. He says that "the more unified the experience, the more of a whole the experience is, and the more concentratedly the self is engaged; the more intense the experience, the more deeply the self is engaged; the more complex the experience, the more of the self is engaged, that is, the more wide-ranging are its responses, perhaps over a longer time."

> This circle of hues grading into each other is their natural order, or, as I shall henceforth call it, their *sensory scheme.*
>
> There are sensory schemes for all sensations. We shall develop those for color, line, mass, and volume when we come to these topics later. It is the position of sense qualities in such schemes that determines whether they are closely or distantly related to each other. The further apart two qualities are from each other in a scheme (that is, the larger the number of barely perceptible steps of gradation from one quality to the other) the greater the contrast. There is not much contrast between red and orange, because they so quickly grade into each other. But between red and yellow there develops a moderate contrast, and between red and green a very strong contrast. Complementary sense qualities are always far apart in a sensory scheme. Where they exist, they are properly placed at opposite poles of a scheme, if it is constructed to represent the maximum contrast as it is actually felt and physiologically reported.[27]

Thus, Pepper uses the following terms to refer to four primary kinds of R-relation: (1) **Closely related, not much contrast;** (2) **Moderate contrast;** (3) **Distantly related, very strong contrast;** (4) **Maximum contrast.**

Let us look at what Pepper has to say about secondary kinds of R-relations in the visual-field.

Pepper says, in the passage above,

> It is the position of sense qualities in such schemes that determines whether they are closely or distantly related to each other,

and

> There are sensory schemes for all sensations. We shall develop those for color, line, mass, and volume. . . .

Thus, he would seem to be alluding to four secondary kinds of visual-field R-relations (although no schemes for the sensation of mass or volume are actually presented by Pepper). In addition to these four, Pepper elsewhere, explicitly and

implicitly, points to other secondary kinds of visual-field R-relations, some of which connect with properties of color, line, and mass.

In his section on gradation, Pepper says,

> We mentioned earlier the fact that sensory qualities can be organized in schemes. These schemes show which qualities are opposed to each other in strong contrast, and which ones are nearly related and close together. Now a gradation consists in following a sequence of nearly related qualities along a line in such a scheme.
>
> Thus a sequence of grays from black to white would be a gradation, or a sequence of hues from red through orange to yellow. In fact, draw any line from one point to another in the color scheme, and you will have a sequence of color gradations. The same, of course, is possible with lengths and widths and degrees of curvature of lines, with sizes of areas and volumes, with shapes such as gradations from circles into narrower and narrower ellipses, or from squares into narrower and narrower rectangles.[28]

Thus Pepper identifies at least eight more secondary kinds: grayness (value?), hue, length of line, width of line, degree of curvature of line, size of area, size of volume, shape.

In the section on pattern[29] Pepper speaks of a property which he calls *weight in aesthetic balance*, which must be distinguished from a property which gives rise to it, which he calls *apparent weight of colors*. Let us call the first "balance-weight" and the second "color-weight." Clearly, for Pepper, balance-weight on one side of a vertical axis can be compared with balance-weight on the other side. The relations he mentions, however, are merely sameness and difference. In *symmetry*, there is "an exact duplication of features on either side of the axis, but in reversed positions,"[30] so the balance-weight on both sides will be the same. In *balance*, also, there is equal balance-weight on each side, but "the estimating of these weights goes on in terms of a sort of aesthetic exchange based on a feeling for the teeter-totter principle -- the principle by which a larger weight

nearer the fulcrum . . . balances a lesser weight farther from the fulcrum."[31] In *unbalance*, "one side of the axis is heavier than the other."[32] Pepper says, "symmetry grades imperceptibly into pure balance and balance into unbalance,"[33] but what the nature of this sequence is supposed to be is not clear.

The factors which produce balance-weight are said[34] to be (1) distance from the axis, (2) size of an area, (3) depth, (4) color-weight, (5) movement away from axis, and (6) interest,

Pepper does not really discuss degrees of unbalance, so it is simply not clear whether or not he would include balance-weight relations as (secondary) kinds of R-relation.

Pepper's view of the secondary kinds of R-relation further unfolds in his treatment of what he calls the *aesthetic materials:*

The aesthetic materials, for Pepper, are **color**, **line**, and **mass** (the perception of filled space):

Color

The *primary* characteristics of *color*, he says, are **hue**, **saturation**, and **value**.

Pepper's scheme[35] for *hue* is this diagram (I have slightly redrawn Pepper's, and added color, in order to facilitate comparison):



The distance, along the circumference, between two hues is supposed to symbolize the perceptual difference between them. (So, in this circle, Y(ellow) is represented as being, perceptually, three times farther from R(ed) than O(range) is, etc.). Pepper presents this circle as (in some sense) the true representation of hue relationships, although he admits that the diagram is at odds with the more familiar hue-circle:



Pepper seems at first to be suggesting that the relative spatial distances along the circumference of his circle are to be viewed as reflecting the actual relations of similarity in hue, moderation in hue, etc. But he then, in possible contradiction to this, says of the circle illustrated below:

> If evenness of distribution [of hues, apparently] were what were sought, [this circle] would probably be the most nearly correct.[36]



His circle, unlike the last two mentioned, has the merit, he believes, of locating the complement of each hue diametrically across the circle from it, a *complementary* hue in this case being that hue which is seen as the after-image of the other hue. (I note here that there is in fact no reason at all to assume that hues which are complementary in this sense will necessarily be opposites in terms of perceived hue-to-hue distance.)

The question of which of the many proposed hue-circles, if any, accurately represents perceived hue-to-hue distance has been raised often. If the R-relations really do play the important role that I will claim that they do, then the resolution of this issue

(not, of course, the issue of the hue-diagram as such, but of hue-to-hue distance) is something very much to be desired. (See §12 for a further discussion of these issues).

Pepper gives no scheme for *saturation* in general, but we can suppose that it would be a straight line:



Pepper's scheme[37] for *value* is



Actually, his scheme is a gray scale. He probably should have presented something like the following as his scheme for value:

Although the poles of each of his saturation and value schemes seem to be in opposition to one another, Pepper does not explain precisely how, or even if, these schemes might reflect those R-relations other than opposition, which may hold between two instances of saturation, or between two instances of value.

The *secondary* characteristics of color, he says, are **color quality** (the quality that "makes the difference between a color in wool or silk or velvet"), **apparent temperature** (Pepper says, "the opposition of warm and cold in colors provides another means for color contrast besides those provided by the primary characteristics"[38]), **apparent distance of colors** (the cool colors are said to retreat and the warm colors are said to advance), and **apparent weight of colors**.

(The relation of these characteristics to R-relations is not made clear by Pepper. He does not say whether he believes that two objects can be closely related, be

moderately contrasting, be distantly related, or have maximum contrast in color quality, in apparent temperature, etc.)

Line

The *primary* characteristics of *line*, he says, are **length, attitude**, and **degree of curvature**.

Pepper's scheme for *lengths* of line is



where a relation of maximum contrast can be assumed to exist between the shortest and longest perceptible line. (Perhaps by "longest perceptible line," Pepper means a line which would span the static visual field, although rarely does the field remain static as art is being viewed. Presumably, his labels refer to unillustrated lines which are supposed to exist to the far right and far left of his diagram.) The scheme seems designed to suggest how some, at least, lines might be related in terms of close relation, moderate contrast, and distant relation, but Pepper gives no explicit description of this.

Pepper defines *attitude* as "the way [the line] stands in a composition in reference to the base of the composition."[39]

The scheme for attitude is a circle:



(Each point on the circumference represents a line with a certain orientation.)

Pepper says that "the scheme . . . shows at a glance not only the manner in which the attitudes grade into one another but also shows that the strongest contrast to the vertical is the horizontal, and that the strongest contrast to a right oblique is a left oblique."[40]

Pepper's scheme for *curvature* is:



Again, although the scheme is designed to show how instances of curvature relate to one another, Pepper supplies no explicit description of this in terms of the relations he has defined.

The *secondary* characteristics of *line* (of which Pepper gives no account in terms of relations), he says, are **apparent movement, width** (Pepper says, "This characteristic is chiefly important for the moods of strength and delicacy correlated with it"[41]), **intensity** (the degree of contrast of a line with its ground), and **quality** (which is "the color quality of the narrow surface between the boundaries of the draftsman's line"[42]). There are, Pepper says, two kinds of apparent movement: movement *along* a line (the feeling we have of following the course of a line), and movement *of* a line.

Mass

According to Pepper, the only *primary* characteristic of *mass* is **the feeling of**

filled space. (Pepper says, ". . . mass in itself has no shape . . . . Mass itself has no sharp boundaries, and no clear dimensions. It comes to us simply as a big or a small mass."[43])

The *secondary* characteristics of visual mass, Pepper says, are **all the characteristics of color** (Pepper says, "Visual mass consists of areas of color. All the characteristics of color, accordingly, become secondary characteristics of visual mass; namely, hue, value, saturation. color quality, temperature, apparent distance, and apparent weight"[44]), and formal characteristics of mass which come from line, namely, **shape** (Pepper says that a fusion of line and mass gives rise to shape), and **dimensionality** (i.e. visual mass can be two- or three-dimensional. Clearly, this characteristic cannot yield species of R-relation).

Pepper, in an important passage, provides a kind of rough treatment of mass which seems to presuppose a complex network of relations involving this aesthetic material:

> When we were discussing principles of color combination we were inevitably describing how masses of color could be advantageously related.
>
> Thus . . . . in discussing the method of contrast for combining colors we were implicitly calling attention to the contrasts of clearly or fairly clearly bounded *areas* of color. The relative sizes and distribution of these clear-cut *areas* of color and the degree of contrast of their color filling make up the two-dimensional mass composition of such a picture as Fra Angelico's *Madonna*. We have already remarked on the spotting of the blues and reds in this picture. Now consider the spotting and contrasts of these *areas* of blue and red. Notice the pattern of these areas . . . . Often this patterning is very subtle, and comes to the spectator only in terms of a feeling of a highly satisfying color balance. Many painters intent on these relationships paint on all parts of their canvas, so to speak, at the same time. If they place an area of color at the right of the picture, they will place their next patch on the left, and so the areas are filled in all over the picture plane in an intricate balance of hue, value, saturation, texture, apparent weight, and all the other aesthetic characters that can affect the filling of a visual area.

> In our discussions of linear patterns, we were inevitably often describing the *shapes* of masses. These become motives for repetition in metric patterns, and themes for variation.[45]

Here, Pepper introduces the properties of relative size and position ("distribution") which, we can suppose, involve their own relations (relations such as being closely or distantly related in size or in position), yet Pepper supplies no schemes for such relations. Nor do we see plainly just how hue, value, etc., are supposed to interact with size and position.

It seems clear that Pepper would recognize the following secondary kinds of R-relation:

(color): **hue, value, saturation,** (line): **length, width, degree of curvature, attitude,** (area): **size of area,** (volume): **size of volume,** though he would no doubt wish to include others as well.

What is Pepper's brand of UIV, and how does he attempt to connect it to the production of human happiness?

According to Pepper, *habituation* is "the process whereby sensations originally disliked come to be much liked, apparently as a result only of experience with them,"[46] i.e., as a result only of repeated stimulation by them.

Pepper claims that, via habituation, all visual sensations (colors, color-combinations, lines, line-combinations, masses, mass-combinations) could become

pleasurable for us if it were not for *fatigue* (monotony), which occurs when there is continuous or repeated stimulation (sameness) and which dulls the senses and thus the pleasure, and *confusion*, which occurs when there is so much disorder (difference) that we cannot grasp, and therefore cannot enjoy, the available sensations.

So, to maximize pleasure, fatigue and confusion must both be minimized. He says

> An artist is thus caught between two aesthetically undesirable results -- monotony and confusion. There is a certain amount of leeway between the two within which he can develop his object of beauty, but if he falls off on either side he drops into dullness or ugliness. The avoidance of confusion is often called unity. From this arises that age-old principle of unity in variety, which every work of art or thing of beauty must possess.[47]

Design

The methods of reducing monotony by introducing contrast, that is, dissimilarity relations, (in ways which more or less also introduce some unifying elements) are given by Pepper as the principles of *design*.

These principles, for Pepper, are **contrast, gradation, theme and variation**, and **restraint**:

Contrast

With respect to *contrast*, Pepper says,

> If an area of color begins to be monotonous, break it up into a number of contrasting areas of color. If a repetition of short vertical lines begins to get tiresome, put in some long lines, or a horizontal.[48]

Gradation

Pepper says that a *gradation*

> consists in following a sequence of nearly related qualities along a line in [any] scheme,[49]
>
> and,
>
> Thus a sequence of grays from black to white would be a gradation, [and] the same, of course is possible with lengths and widths and degrees of curvature of lines, with sizes of areas and volumes, with shapes . . . .[50]
>
> And,
>
> . . . the design principle of gradation has unifying capacities lacked by contrast.[51]

Pepper seems to be saying here that in order to reduce monotony in a painting, an artist may add to the picture (1) a feature F_1 which has quality Q_1 such that Q_1 *contrasts* with (i.e. is in a *dissimilarity* or *opposition* relation to) a quality, Q_2, had by another feature, F_2, (which has been added along with F_1 or was already existing) along with (2) a series of other features which spatially and qualitatively form a sequence between F_1 and F_2, all additions yielding a net contrast which is just great enough to annihilate the monotony. The idea thus seems to be that in a case such as this, although the particular Q_1Q_2 contrast alone would be so great that it would convert monotony to confusion, the presence of the sequence somehow diminishes the Q_1Q_2 contrast or (presumably by introducing sameness relations) offsets part of it, the result being just the right amount of new contrast.

Theme and variation

Pepper says that a *theme and variation*

> consists in the selection of some easily recognized pattern, such as a group of lines or a shape, which is then varied in any manner that the imagination suggests . . . . The only requirement is that the theme should be recognizable through all its variations. For if the recognition fails, the connection among the varied forms is lost, and so the order or sense of unity is lost, and confusion ensues.[52]

Clearly, variation adds *contrast* (*difference*) while repetition of (elements of) the theme adds *similarities*.

It is difficult to see why Pepper chooses to view theme and variations exclusively as a *design* principle, since adding a theme and variation to a work adds net contrast only if the repetition of the theme is not effective in offsetting the theme's variations. If, on the other hand, the repetition overpowers the variations, then the theme and variations should properly be seen as a *pattern* principle.

Restraint

For Pepper, the principle of *restraint*

> is the recognition of a need for economizing the expenditure of interest so that it will be adequately distributed over the whole duration and the whole extent of a work of art . . . .
>
> [Pictures and statues] have their points of highest interest or interest climaxes and intervening areas of lesser interest. A picture equally interesting all over is likely to be disturbing, and to contain less total interest than one that makes use of the principle of restraint.
>
> [In Fra Angelico's Madonna, the] area of maximum interest . . . is obviously that enfolding the Madonna's face and the child, and the Madonna's face itself is the point of maximum interest in that area. The face acquires this interest not only from its emotional significance and from its being a deeply sympathetic representation of a type of human beauty, but from what are often called the formal aspects of painting. The face is the largest area of very light color in the picture . . . . Eliminate all emotional, symbolic, and representational elements and think of the picture as mere line, color and shape, still the head of the Madonna would be the area of maximum interest, the climax of the picture,

and,

> Imagine an attempt to raise every surface of the picture to the intense interest of the Madonna's head. There would be too much competing interest and every area would lose interest by the rivalry of all the other areas.[53]

Note that Pepper here links large, light shapes to interest. What Pepper may be focusing on is the fact that the presence in a painting of very many large, light shapes, for instance, could, because of their *similar* sizes and *similar* values, produce a situation lacking in *variety.*

Pattern

Confusion, Pepper claims, is to be reduced or eliminated by the process of ordering the material (which, it is clear, is to be done by means of introducing sameness or similarity relations) via the principle of *pattern.*

Pepper says,

> *By pattern we mean the principles which produce unity through the action of attention*, or, conversely, the principles which keep away the confusion that comes from neglecting limits of attention.[54]

and

> . . . pattern may be defined as the number and arrangement of things that can be taken in intuitively by the attention.[55]

For Pepper, principles of pattern seem to be, except for unbalance, kinds of *repetition*:

Simple patterns, according to Pepper, are composed of up to eight units (a unit being, for instance, a short straight line). A simple pattern is **homogeneous** if each of its units is *identical* to every other unit. A simple pattern is **heterogeneous** if, clearly, the

identity of features is offset to some degree by *differences:* if these differences are quantitative (for instance, if longer lines alternate with shorter ones), then the simple heterogeneous pattern is **quantitative**. If these differences are qualitative (for instance, if lines of the same size alternate between vertical and horizontal orientation), then the simple heterogeneous pattern is **qualitative.**

Complex patterns are composed of simple patterns (of all kinds). If the simple patterns are brought together side by side to form a complex pattern, the complex pattern is an example of **combination by extension**. If the simple patterns are superimposed one upon the other, the complex pattern is said to be an example of **combination by superimposition**.

Organizing patterns are composed of (different) complex patterns. If the complex patterns are presented side by side, the organizing pattern is said to be **embracing**. If the complex patterns are attached to one another as are branches to a tree trunk, the organizing pattern is said to be **skeletal**.

In **axis patterns**, features are organized in various ways on either side of a vertical axis (which often runs down the center of the canvas). If all features on the left are *identical* with all features on the right, then the axis pattern is said to be one of **symmetrical balance** (or, simply, **symmetry**). If the *weight* of all features on the left is *identical* to the weight of all features on the right (weight being determined according to the teeter-totter principle, which amounts to this: weight increases with nearness to left or right edge), but other properties of the features on the left are different from corresponding properties of the features on the right, then the axis pattern is said to be one of **teeter-totter balance** (or, simply, **balance**). If the weight on the left is *not*

identical to the weight on the right, the axis pattern is said to be one of **unbalance**. (It is difficult to see why Pepper includes unbalance under the heading of pattern, since, as seems clear, unbalance could not be used by the artist in order to offset confusion.)

Thus, for Pepper, the plastic values involve only design and pattern, that is, it seems, difference and sameness. His view, then, is a formalistic (cf. Arnheim below) view of why good non-objective art must exhibit something of a balance between sameness and difference relations.

Section 4

Rudolf Arnheim

What relations does Arnheim identify as those which hold among the formal elements of a painted surface?

Rudolf Arnheim, in *Art and Visual Perception*[56] (1954, 1974), focuses not directly on static relations but on what he believes to be visual vectors of attraction and repulsion. The observer, Arnheim claims, sees these forces (tensions, not movements) in the visual presentation as genuine properties of the perceived objects. He says, "Similarity acts as a structural principle only in conjunction with separation, namely as a force of attraction among segregated things."[57]

Thus, Arnheim in some sense connects similarity (or sameness--he does not clearly distinguish similarity from sameness) with a visual force of attraction.

It seems clear (see, for instance, his figure 234,[58] which illustrates his view of the attraction and repulsion among hue primaries) that he means to identify dissimilarity (or difference) with a visual force of repulsion.

Therefore, for Arnheim, at least some visual attraction vectors are to be identified with similarity or sameness relations, and at least some visual repulsion vectors are, it seems, to be identified with dissimilarity or difference relations.

So, Arnheim appears to recognize only two primary kinds of R-relation: similarity and dissimilarity, which he may or may not distinguish from the two *r-relations*, sameness and difference.

It is not possible to obtain from Arnheim's text, in any clear and unambiguous way, a list of secondary kinds of such relations, but since some or all of Arnheim's visual forces of attraction and repulsion are to be identified somehow with R- and r-relations, then some or all of the types of visual forces which he presents ought to correspond to secondary kinds of R/r-relations. Let us therefore explore these forces:

1. There are forces, according to Arnheim, which are attributable to the "structural skeleton" of the painted surface: Arnheim claims that perceptual forces of attraction and repulsion exist between the object and parts of the surface such that the center of the surface exerts the greatest attractive power, the corners somewhat less, the centers of the sides less, and the edges, orthogonals and diagonals even less. (Just where the repulsion is supposed to reside is unclear).

It is difficult to see how any such forces as these could be identified with R- or r-relations, but perhaps Arnheim is thinking about positional similarity between the object and the picture's center and between the object and the corners of the picture.

2. There are forces which are tied to the visual weight of the object: These forces are, in general, downwardly directed forces.

The weight of an object, Arnheim claims, increases with (i) nearness to edge (ii) nearness to lower edge -- perhaps we can infer that Arnheim is thinking about a relation of location-similarity between object and edge, (iii) spatial depth, (iv) size, (v) redness (weight decreases with blueness), (vi) brightness, (vii) intrinsic interest, (viii) isolation, and (ix) regularity of shape.

3. There are forces which are due to object-to-object attraction and repulsion: Two objects which are very close together are said to attract by virtue of this placement alone; two objects which are farther apart, yet still close together, are said to repel by virtue of this placement. These forces can perhaps be tied to relations of location-similarity and -dissimilarity.

4. There are forces which are due to the shape of the object. For example, a triangle will apparently experience a force in the direction of its (highest?) apex. It is difficult to see what R- or r-relations could be involved here.

5. There are, according to Arnheim, forces of attraction and repulsion existing between colors.

There being three hue primaries, red, yellow, and blue, an object whose hue is a primary hue will be *repelled* from an object whose hue is a *different* primary hue.

An object whose hue is a primary will be *attracted* to an object whose hue is the *same* primary.

The completion effect: an object whose hue is a primary will be attracted to an object whose hues are the other two primaries. (Arnheim in this one case seems not to be tying dissimilarity to repulsion).

Similarity of the subordinate: an object whose hue contains $primary_1$ as subordinate and $primary_2$ as dominant will be attracted to an object whose hue contains $primary_1$ as subordinate and $primary_3$ as dominate, because in both objects, $primary_1$ has the *same* subdominate status.

Structural contradiction: an object whose hue contains $primary_1$ as subordinate and $primary_2$ as dominant will repel an object whose hue contains $primary_1$ as dominant and $primary_3$ as subordinate, because of the *different* status of $primary_1$ in the two objects.

Similarity of the dominate: An object whose hue contains $primary_1$ as dominant and $primary_2$ as subordinate will repel an object whose hue contains $primary_1$ as dominant and $primary_3$ as subordinate, because, apparently, the two essentially identical colors are distinguished by *different* admixtures.

6. There exists, according to Arnheim, a "tension" between an oblique or curved line and the orthogonal structure of the surface. Although Arnheim is not explicit about this, this tension can only be tied to *difference* relations of linear orientation.

7. In cases of ambiguity, where, for instance, oppositely directed visual force vectors are nearly equal, such that the eye is uncertain as to whether it is contemplating equality or inequality, then there occurs a kind of wavering, which itself, Arnheim claims, constitutes movement.

It is not clear what kinds, if any, of R- or r-relations might be involved here.

So, Arnheim appears to be using force-vector language in order to point to various secondary kinds of relations.

But Arnheim's view seems to imply as well the existence of certain (r-)relations which he does not equate with forces: implicit in Arnheim's thesis is the notion that the magnitude of a visual vector having this or that direction, or the sum of magnitudes of two or more vectors having that direction, is either the *same* as or *different* than the magnitude of a vector having the opposite direction or the sum of magnitudes of two or more vectors having the opposite direction. We must take note of these putative r-relations in order to understand Arnheim's notion of balance (see below, p. 43).

What is Arnheim's brand of UIV, and how does he attempt to connect it to human happiness?

The value of all art for Arnheim lies in its expressiveness. He seems to believe that non-objective art is capable of expressing, *inter alia*, a very general theme, or themes, which he calls "the human condition," "human experience," "the hidden clockwork of nature," etc. (But various other balances of sameness and difference would be required, in his view, for expressing other, specific, things). His many articulations of this idea seem to point to the expressive efficacy of a sort of balance between (what amounts to) sameness [s] and difference [d] relations. Arnheim clearly believes that Hogarth had in mind the same notion when he spoke of balancing similarity with difference (but Arnheim does not claim that Hogarth consciously took himself to be speaking about expressions of the human condition, etc.): Arnheim says,

> [Hogarth spoke of] a constant rule of composition in painting to avoid regularity [s]. In fact, even in works in which an overall symmetry [s] is appropriate to the subject, its severity is always mitigated by enlivening deviations [d];[59]

and Arnheim speaks of

> . . . mechanical order [s]--that is, lifelessness [s]--in life [d];[60]

and he says

> An ornament . . . presents an easy order [s], undisturbed by the vicissitudes of life [d];[61]

and

> Paintings . . . are self-contained statements about the nature of human existence and therefore they refer to this existence in all its essential aspects. An ornament presented as a work of art becomes a fool's paradise in which tragedy and discord [d] are ignored and an easy peace [s] reigns. A work of art displays the interaction between underlying order [s] and the irrational variety of clashes [d];[62]

and he speaks of

> . . . the serenity of life [s + d], not of death [s];[63]

and in his chapter on color, he says that

> A color composition based on nothing but [the principle of common elements, whereby colors are linked by similarity of hue, value, and/or intensity] could describe only a world of absolute peace [s], devoid of action [d], static [s] in mood. It would represent that state of deadly serenity [s] at which . . . entropy [s] approaches an absolute maximum;[64]

and

> [In visual art as in music,] it goes without saying that separations [d] are as essential to composition as connections [s]. When there are no segregated parts [d] there is nothing to connect [s], and the result is an amorphous [s] mash . . . . [In music, the] tones do not all fit together in easy consonance [s] but also provide discords [d] of various degrees. The traditional theory of color harmony deals only with obtaining connections [s] and avoiding separations [d], and is therefore at best incomplete.[65]

Balance for Arnheim appears to be his principle of unity. But balance is not enough; *dynamics*, he says, are required as well:

> If simplicity [= balance, harmony, equilibrium] were the one overriding goal of art, evenly stained canvases or perfect cubes would be the most desirable art objects . . . . So bland a diet does not satisfy.
>
> . . . a tradition of classicist aesthetics had taught us to describe and evaluate artistic form in terms of harmony and equilibrium alone . . . . We have begun to realize that the description of any visual object, be it Greek or minimal or otherwise, remains fatally incomplete if it limits itself to pointing out that everything fits nicely together. The analysis of balance and unity, though indispensable, avoids the question without which any visual statement remains incomprehensible: what is it that is being

> balanced and unified? [i.e., there must be separation (dynamics) [d] as well as balance [s]].[66]

It seems to be Arnheim's view that overall in a painting, for all directions, the sum (see above, p. 40) of vector magnitudes in each direction must be the *same* as the sum of vector magnitudes in the opposite direction; this appears to be the requirement of balance. This uniformity must itself be balanced by local clusters of imbalance, where opposing vector magnitudes do not add to zero, that is, where the relation between the sums of both sides is a *difference* relation; this appears to be the requirement of dynamics.

So, Arnheim can be interpreted as holding that, in certain very general expressions, something of a balance between sameness and difference relations must exist, and this, in my view, places him among the UIV theorists. Unlike Hutcheson and Pepper, whose explanations are formalistic, Arnheim has developed an expression theory to account for this requirement.

Section 5

Another Possible UIV System (Moderationism)

What relations do I identify as those which hold among the formal elements of a painted surface?

Combining the primary kinds of R-relation mentioned by Beardsley, Pepper, and Arnheim, we can construct the following list of five primary kinds, to which I assign my own names:

my terms	Beardsley's terms	Pepper's terms	Arnheim's terms
Ixy (x is identical to y)	_____	_____	Sameness; similarity; attraction
Sxy (x is similar to y)	Similar	Closely related; not much contrast	
Mxy (x is moderational to y)	Indifferently different	Moderate contrast	
Dxy (x is dissimilar to y)	Contrasting	Distantly related; very strong contrast	
Oxy (x is oppositional to y)	_____	Maximum contrast	Difference: dissimilarity; contrast; repulsion

Thus, for instance, two different points in a visual presentation may have *identical* hues (e.g. one may be a pure orange and the other may be brown such that the red/yellow mixture is the same); or they may have *similar* hues (e.g. the hue element in one may be red, the other orange); or they may have *moderational* hues (the hue element in one may be red and the other yellow-orange); or they may have *dissimilar* hues (one

may be red and the other yellow-green); or they may have *oppositional* hues (one may be red and the other green).

I show here how my terms correspond to terms used by Beardsley, Pepper, and Arnheim. In my terminology, the use of these terms can be extended to cover situations involving the existence of multiple *sameness* (SAMxy) and *difference* (DIFxy) relations within any part of the visual presentation:

I ----- The number of DIF relations = 0.

S ----- The number of SAM relations > the number of DIF relations.

M ----- The number of SAM relations = the number of DIF relations.

D ----- The number of SAM relations < the number of DIF relations.

O ----- The number of SAM relations = 0.

The following scale, which I will call the *R-scale* (having 100 *R-degrees*) affords us a more precise way of naming R-relations:



Another useful scale, which I will call the *M-scale* (a scale of 50 *M-degrees*), is this:



I suggested above (p. 43) that Arnheim's notions of visual balance and visual dynamics appear to have to do with certain configurations of r-relations holding between putative visual vectors of force -- that is, it seems correct to say, between other supposed r- and R-relations. Clearly, r- and R-relations do in fact hold between R-relations themselves. Here is an example of an R-relation (which we may call a *second-order* R-relation) of R-relations: Imagine two pairs of shapes, the first pair consisting of a pure red shape and a pure yellow one, and the second pair consisting of a pure orange shape and a light, 25% intense, pink one. The R-relation of intensity (I_i) holding between the shapes of the first pair has an R-degree of 0_i^R (zero) and an M-degree of 0_i^M (zero). The R-relation (D_i) holding between the shapes of the seond pair has an R-degree of 75_i^R and an M-degree of 25_i^M.

Therefore, the second-order R-relation which holds between the I_i relation and the D_i relation has an R-degree both of $D^{R(R)}$ (i.e. with respect to the R-scale values of the first-order R-relations) and of $M^{R(M)}$ (with respect to their M-scale values). (See my note 69 for a suggestion as to how second-order R-relations may be relevant to the present inquiry).

I would like to introduce here a handy notation for relations. Suppose that I have three colors c_1, c_2, c_3 such that

S $M_hc_1c_2$ & $D_ic_1c_2$ & $S_gc_1c_2$ & $D_hc_1c_3$ & $S_ic_1c_3$ & $S_gc_1c_3$ & $S_hc_2c_3$ & $D_ic_2c_3$ & $I_gc_2c_3$.

where R_h = R in hue, R_i = R in intensity, and R_g = R in gray-value.

Perspicuity can be achieved if we adopt the following notational scheme:

Symmetrical relation Rxy becomes

$$x \overset{R}{\bullet\!\!-\!\!\bullet} y \quad (\equiv \; y \overset{R}{\bullet\!\!-\!\!\bullet} x\,).$$

Asymmetrical relation Rxy, which I will not use in the present analysis, becomes

$$x \overset{R}{\bullet\!\!\rightarrow\!\!\bullet} y \quad (\equiv y \overset{R}{\bullet\!\!\leftarrow\!\!\bullet} x).$$

And we have (S')



which is essentially the same proposition as S.

Here is a sketch for a future survey of SAM, DIF, I, S, M, D, and O relations in the perception of a painted surface:

Consider three points, A, B, and C on the surface. We can say that (S1)



where two secondary kinds of difference are indicated: the points are different, DIF$_s$, from one another in spatial separation, and these relations themselves are numerically different, DIF$_r$, from one another. (Note that for every secondary kind of DIF relation, there is a corresponding secondary kind of SAM relation.)

The location differences have quantity: for example, suppose that DIF$_s$ has a quantity of 10 units (A is ten units from B), and that DIF$_s$' has a quantity of 5 units, and DIF$_s$" has a quantity of 11 units.

Thus we can now identify a third secondary kind, q (relation of spatial quantity), of sameness/difference relation: we can say that (S2)



Were we to look at the actual separations on a surface (where the separations are defined either as colored lines or separations between points whose color contrasts with the background) we would become aware that spatial-quantity difference relations such as these are also R-type relations (S, M, D, O relations. A spatial-quantity *sameness* relation is also an I relation).

But a problem immediately presents itself: what conditions must be satisfied in order for us to apply the terms "similar," "moderational," "dissimilar," and "oppositional" to a relation holding between any two color-defined spatial separations, between any two straight lines for example? Precisely stated, this question amounts to this: when we compare two straight lines, what dimension (or, to use Pepper's term, what *scheme*) are we dealing with when we wish to refer to them as being identical in length, similar in length, moderational in length, etc.? Assuming that the dimension we are dealing with is one whose minimum separation is zero (or the shortest perceptible unit), there are several possibilities for its maximum separation: its maximum separation may be (1) the longer of the two separations, (2) the longest of all existing color-defined

separations on the surface, or (3) the longest perceptible separation. (This last possibility describes Pepper's view.[67])

In order to answer this important question, we can consider the following *picture*:



If (1), above, describes the dimension we are dealing with, then the following *proposition* will be true:



(i.e., proposition S_1 states, "Line a is dissimilar in length to line b, and line a is dissimilar in length to line c.")

If (2) describes the dimension, then this will be true:



If (3) describes the dimension, then this will be true:



Inspection shows, I believe, that proposition S_1 is true, and so, when we compare two lines, the dimension we are dealing with is one whose minimum separation is zero and whose maximum separation is the separation whose quantity is that of the longer of the two lines.

So, we can add this secondary kind of R-relation to our catalog. In our 10 x 5 x 11 example, it is true that (S3)



(M_q, because 5 is half-way between 0 and 10; D_q because 5 is between 0 and 11 divided by 2; S_q because 10 is greater than 11 divided by 2).

We can note in passing that for all R_x, there is a corresponding r_x, where "r" stands for a SAM or DIF relation, but the reverse is not true.

Different DIF_s-triplets such as the one described by S3 define different angles ABC, each angle having a quantity from 0° to 180°. If the angle ABC is 0°, then A and C are positioned in the same direction from B, or $(I_{dB})AC$. If ABC = 180°, then A and C are positioned in opposite directions from B, or $(O_{dB})AC$. Thus the relation $(R_{dB})AC$ is different for each angle ABC (from 0° to 180°), every angle is to be associated with an identity, or a similarity, etc., and angles can be compared in these terms. Presumably (but perhaps not), if ABC = 90°, then $(M_{dB})AC$.

Orientation, R_o, is different from direction (R_{dX}):

If line L1 is parallel to line L2, then L1 and L2 have the same (identical) orientation, i.e.,

(S4)

$$L1 \overset{I_o}{\bullet\!\!-\!\!\bullet} L2$$

If L1 is perpendicular to L2, then (S5)

$$L1 \overset{O_o}{\bullet\!\!-\!\!\bullet} L2$$

If L1 is rotated 45° from L2, then (S6)

$$L1 \overset{M_o}{\bullet\!\!-\!\!\bullet} L2$$

And degrees of S and D exist regularly distributed in association with angles between 0° and 180°. (In general, for more precise analysis, a scale from 0 (zero) to, say, 100 could be used: 0 (zero) = I, 50 = M, 100 = O (opposition), so that S6 would read

" $L1 \overset{50_o}{\bullet\!\!-\!\!\bullet} L2$ ", etc.)

All this is pretty much in accord with Pepper's scheme.

Of course, A, B, and C may be of identical, similar, moderational, etc., *color*; i.e. color is a secondary kind of visual-field R-relation. But color as a property has component properties, perhaps three of them, but perhaps four or five, and those

properties are themselves tied to secondary kinds of R-relation. Those kinds which should be considered are:

1. hue (R_h) -- A hue circle can be used to illustrate how any two hues are related in terms of I, S, M, D, and O, so long as it is kept in mind that no distance greater than ½ the circumference is meaningful.

2. intensity (R_i) -- this term refers to the amount of pure hue in the color. Opposites are: (a) gray (including white and black) and (b) pure hue.

3. gray-value (R_g) -- this term refers to the character of the gray component of a color. Opposites are (a) black and (b)white.

4. value (R_v) -- this term refers to the amount of light perceived. Opposites are: (a) black and (b) the amount of light associated with pure white.

5. purity (R_p) -- Opposites are (a) black and (b) pure hue, pure hue+white, or pure white.

Thus, we can in general say that, given three points, A, B, and C, on a painted surface,

(S7)



and in contemplating this *propositional form*, which is about just three points on a surface, we begin more fully to appreciate the complexity of any analysis in these terms, and to understand why the secret of beauty has remained difficult to discover, and more fully to appreciate the power of our faculty for unconscious discrimination.

But there are many more relations to discover and to catalog, and many problems to solve before this sort of analysis can be complete. Some examples should suffice:

1. The grouping of objects: In our 10 x 5 x 11 example above (S3), B and C have the same property in that they both belong to the same *group*, i.e., (S8)



In general, any time there are three objects A, B, and C, such that (S9)



and R_1 is closer to I (identity) than is either R_2 or R_3, there exists a naturally-defined group consisting of A and B, which is different from a group consisting of C; that is

(S10)



and we can say that (S11)



and in complex cases, there will be groups contained within groups, and spatially-defined groups interlaced with color-defined groups, etc. in intricate patterns. And groups which are more well-defined and groups which are less well-defined may be defined by groups of R-relations.

In a representational painting, two separate shapes which represent parts of an object will tend to be seen to be grouped together, and two shapes which would, if there were no representation, be seen as being of the same group, may be viewed as belonging to different groups if the objects which the shapes represent are separate.

It is clear that difference relations can hold between groups. I believe that it is also clear that R-relations hold between groups; but to attempt to answer the important

question of exactly how the relations which hold between the individual components of two groups might determine the R-relation(s) holding between the groups themselves is a project which is beyond the scope of the present work.

2. combinative relations:

There seems to be good reason for supposing that when R_x and R_y both hold between two objects there appears a third relation R_{x+y} which is in some sense a combination of, or at least grounded upon, the first two.

For instance, in the figure described by S7, we can add R_{o+q} relations, and in a similar figure involving colored lines in place of mere point-to-point separations, we could no doubt add R_{o+q+c} relations to the list.

3. It is not at all clear how the color relation, R_c, is derived from its component relations, R_h, R_i, R_s, R_v, and R_p. Many authors have invented color solids which, on the model of the hue circle, can be construed as attempts to represent the relation between component distances and color distances. A full discussion of these is beyond the scope of this work.

R_c is probably an average of its components. If there are four components, R_h, R_i, R_s, and R_v, then R_c may well equal $(R_h + R_i + R_s + R_v)/4$, where R_c is associated with, say, a 100 degree scale, and R_h is associated with a 200-degree circle (100 degrees from hue to opposite hue), and R_i, R_s, and R_v are each associated with a 100-degree scale. (I will soon [p. 65] claim that moderation -- moderation being a component of moderation-richness -- is a good. In accord with the notion of moderation-richness, it will not be enough, in order for two colors to go well together, that they relate via a high

M-degree (see note 69 and pp. 46-47); the degrees must also be distributed quite equally among R_h, R_i, R_g, and R_v.)

4. It seems clear that two complex shapes can be compared in R-relational terms (R_{sh}). It will be a challenge (beyond the scope of the present work) to show how R_{sh} is grounded upon the already-mentioned (and other) relations.

5. What is balance?

If we place a single point P within a frame, the distances from P to the frame are significant:

With P at the center: there are many S_q relations existing between pairs of the P-to-frame distances. There is thus a new S_{bal} relation (perhaps conceived of as existing between P and the surface itself).

With P near a corner: there are many D_q relations of high degree of dissimilarity. There is thus a D_{bal}.

There exist placements of P which present a variety of S_q and D_q relations between the P-to-frame distances, such that a relation approaching a M_{bal} relation exists.

Since larger shapes have contours composed of more discriminable points than small shapes, over-long shape-to-frame distances for the larger shape, since they are more numerous, are more significant than similarly over-long shape-to-frame distances for the smaller shape.

We have identified a good number of the secondary kinds of r and R relations which exist in the field of a picture. In general, it seems correct to say that the relevant R-relations exist among single points, naturally-defined groups [68] (whether these *are* shapes or are *composed* of shapes), R-relations themselves, and among the parts of a shape's contour.

A full catalog of secondary kinds of R-relation will be very difficult to develop. A fuller investigation of this very important topic cannot be accomplished here. I do, however, hope that my method and examples can help to point the way toward a complete catalog. In ways which should become apparent, the application of the moderation-richness principles (see statements S1/SI and S2/SII below, and see §11 for proofs of these principles) to the complete set of relevant relations could, presumably, greatly facilitate the production of great paintings.

In the case of representational painting, we are dealing with, in addition to relations of the 2-D surface, relations in represented 3-D space. It is not apparent that any new kinds of relations come into play in transferring attention from the formal relations of the surface to the formal relations of the represented space.

What is my brand of UIV, and how do I connect it to the production of human happiness?

I now turn from the descriptive to the evaluative. In my exposition of this alternative UIV theory, I wish to avoid misunderstandings which derive from the use of

equivocal terms; so, my central thesis will not involve definitions of such terms. Terms such as "beauty" and "art" are equivocal in the sense that their meaning varies from person to person, and from decade to decade. (I do not believe that Wittgenstein was correct in claiming that the objects which a term denotes may be connected not by one common property, but by "family resemblances;" in my view, we can in principle define "beauty" and "art" for any given speaker of English -- but if Wittgenstein was in fact correct, we would have another reason to avoid any attempt at definition.) But I need not use, nor try to define, these terms in order to present the claims of my thesis (viz. the claims that the [visual] perception of moderation-richness is fulfilling to human beings [see below, page 65] and that the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, Kandinsky abstracts, etc, are moderation-rich, and that this is primarily what accounts for the high esteem in which they are held). I need only use concepts freshly articulated (though not necessarily new) utilizing a set of unequivocal basic terms.

So, in a fresh articulation of concepts, I will present the following stipulative definitions (i.e. the new terms are introduced, mainly, for the sake of brevity):

color-identity = identity of color

color-similarity = similarity of color

. . .

x is color-identical to y = x is identical in color to y

. . .

hue-identity = identity of hue

etc.

and if I use a term of the form

norm-x

the reader will be justified in inferring that I myself have a liking for x, and that I expect the reader to like x as well.

moderation-rich = having much moderation and having highly equal distribution of the moderation throughout the field ("moderation-rich" is a strictly descriptive, non-normative term).

moderation-poor = having little moderation and/or having unequal distribution of moderation throughout the field (a non-normative term).

similarity-rich = having many similarity relations.

similarity-poor = having few similarity relations.

dissimilarity-rich = having many dissimilarity relations.

dissimilarity-poor = having few dissimilarity relations.

moderation-rich$_D$ - moderation-rich qua contrasted with dissimilarity-rich.

moderation-rich$_S$ = moderation-rich qua contrasted with similarity-rich.

moderation-object = an object whose visual presentation is moderation-rich.

moderation-artifact = a man-made moderation-object.

intentional-moderation-artifact = a moderation-artifact made intentionally to be such and in the way that it actually is such.

The univocal intelligibility of these basic terms, and my enumeration (below) of examples of what I take to be norm-intentional-moderation-artifacts should be enough to show what extension my concepts have. Further connections between my concepts and familiar ones are brought out when I compare and contrast my view with the views of Hutcheson, Pepper, Amheim, and Beardsley, as, for instance, when I suggest that my *moderation-richness*$_D$ is to be identified with Hutcheson's *uniformity* and to Beardsley's *unity*, and that my *moderation-richness*$_S$ is the same as Hutcheson's and Pepper's *variety*. Here is a list of some suggested identifications:

norm-moderation-rich = beautiful (various authors)

moderation-richness$_D$ = unity (Beardsley), uniformity (Hutcheson)

moderation-richness$_S$ = variety (Hutcheson, Pepper)

norm-moderation-object = beautiful object (various authors), aesthetic object (Beardsley)

norm-intentional-moderation-artifact = art object (ordinary English)

norm-color-moderation = (color) harmony (Beardsley? Yet he *explicitly* identifies harmony with what I would call color-similarity (which, incidentally, is non-normative)).

norm-location-moderation = (aesthetic) balance, equilibrium (ordinary English; Beardsley? Yet he *explicitly* identifies balance with what he calls "density *similarity*," and equilibrium with a sort of *dissimilarity* (contrast) of "movement").

similarity-rich = simple (Beardsley)

dissimilarity-rich = complex (Beardsley)

But these suggested identifications are included only to facilitate understanding -- they are peripheral to my main exposition, and the correctness of them does not, strictly speaking, bear upon the truth of my thesis.

My thesis (an evaluative statement):

S1 *The awareness of moderation-richness is, as a rule, a fundamental good. (informal paraphrase: awareness of moderation-richness makes us happy).*[69]

a second proposition:

S2 *Many objects, including the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, and Kandinsky abstracts, are moderation-rich (both in 2D and represented 3D), and this is, at least primarily, what accounts for the high esteem in which they are held.*

My (speculative) answer to the question, Why does moderation-richness affect us this way?, is just a Darwinian version of Hutcheson's explanation of our response to uniformity amidst variety: we have evolved a faculty for the immediate enjoyment of perceiving that which unifies the many -- the species among the individuals, the genera

among the species, the natural law, the general theorem. We have evolved such a faculty because learning via the general is on the whole more efficient than learning via the particular, and *ceteris paribus* a species which is fitter to learn is fitter to survive. In my scheme, I see this faculty as having a simple character, as defined in S1 above. Thus, the search, in science, for some fundamental natural law could be said to be the response to a primary functioning of the faculty (since the faculty is operating towards those ends towards which it was designed to operate, so to speak), while the painting of a picture would be a response to a secondary functioning of it.

Section 6

The Moderation Thesis is a Non-essentialist View

I have *suggested* (§5) that "beautiful object" might, for some, have the same meaning as "norm-moderation-object" and that "art object" might, for some, have the same meaning as "norm-intentional-moderation-artifact." But, as I have indicated, it is possible (1) that neither of these suggested identifications holds true for anyone at all, and, at the same time, (2) that S1 and S2 are true.

And, suppose that I had used, say, "art object" in S2:

S2' *Art objects are moderation-rich*

which, perhaps, rings as true for me as do S1 and S2.

Because of the equivocalness of the term "art," the *sentence* S2' would possess

only a relative truth-value, a truth-value that depended on which of several *judgments* we took it to be expressing. The use of such equivocal terms would invite needless dispute: if my own concept of *art object* was narrower than my reader's, he likely would, even if he agreed with S1 and S2, accuse me of having committed the error of essentialism. I avoid such charges by using only univocal(-in-English) terms.

An alternative (and, I believe, false) version of S2 would omit "at least primarily":

S2" *Many objects, including the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, and Kandinsky abstracts, are moderation-rich, and this is (solely) what accounts for the high esteem in which they are held.*

S2" is objectionable, not because it is essentialistic, but because it is completely one-sided. My wording in S2 allows for the possession by these objects of representational values and of a full range of expressionistic values -- but S2 implies that these other values are of secondary importance.

Section 7

A Univocal Version of a General UIV Theory

A UIV similarity/dissimilarity-parity-type general thesis, the first part of which, SI, is compatible with Pepper's, Arnheim's, and my view (and maybe with Hutcheson's

and Beardsley's, if we interpret their theses in a way which involves at least rough similarity/dissimilarity parity) is

SI. *The awareness of something like parity between sameness and difference relations among visual elements, or of moderation-richness of these elements, of this balance as such, is, as a rule, a fundamental good.*

SII. *Many objects, including the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, and Kandinsky abstracts, have (1) something like parity between sameness and difference relations among their visual elements (both in 2D and represented 3D), or (2) moderation-richness of these elements, and this balance is at least primarily what accounts for the high esteem in which they are held.*

Section 8

Other Kinds of UIV

SI has to do with those visual elements which are to be associated with one's viewing, with one or both eyes, a static, one-dimensional surface, and with one's viewing, using one eye only, static, three-dimensional space; thus, SI relates both to viewing paintings and nature (i.e., viewing the latter using only one eye). But it can be expected that UIV among the fundamental relations of non-static and truly three-dimensional (i.e., as viewed using two eyes) visual fields (which dance, natural events, sculpture, and natural tableaux involve), and among the fundamental relations of

sound, will be similarly productive of human happiness. All such UIV I will call *fundamental* UIV. (Note that it is also *secondary*--see §5.)

But UIV which is *nonfundamental* can exist:

As has been mentioned, Hutcheson points out that UIV defines the relation between a satisfying theorem and the particular cases it generalizes (thus, this sort of UIV is both primary [see §5] and nonfundamental).

In painting, Hutcheson also points to what he calls *relative beauty*, which is determined not by relations among fundamental abstract elements, but between an accurately resembling representation and that which is represented by it: they are dissimilar in that one is a representation of the other, but similar in that the one is an accurately resembling representation of the other.[70]

Another kind of UIV, as Hutcheson indicates, may define the relation between metaphor and meaning.

In literature and film, effective montage seems to require a very complex sort of UIV: each scene must, in myriad ways, be related to the others such that the whole has UIV.

Humor appears to be explainable in UIV terms (see Hutcheson's *Reflections Upon Laughter*, appended to Hutcheson, op cit.)

Surrealism is another kind of UIV, and may in fact account for the high esteem in which certain paintings (not to be included in SII) are held.

Section 9

Other Values

As I indicate above, the general UIV hypothesis, SI and SII (or my special one, S1 and S2) cannot be said to be essentialistic, because the equivocal words "art," "aesthetic," etc. do not appear in it. This is also true because I do not claim that the enumerated objects in SII have the properties which I claim that they have in any sense essentially. Nor can my view be said to be essentialistic in the weaker sense of being completely one-sided, because I say, ". . . this balance is at least primarily what accounts for . . . ."

What else might, in a minor way at most, account for the high esteem in which these works are held? Let us consider two other possible sources of value: let us talk briefly about (1) representational values, and (2) values connected with the expression of the ordinary emotions of life.

Representational values

Some will argue that among the "many objects" to which I refer in my SII are works whose high esteem comes not from any UIV which they might have, but from the fact that in each case the artist reveals to us something important about that which he represents. Examples:

Rembrandt and psychological depth

Many believe that Rembrandt's greatness lies in his acute insight into the human psyche, and in his ability to reveal his discoveries to us. And his focus, they believe, is on the universal: "We feel," says Claude Roger Marx, "that Rembrandt took less interest in certain physical or moral characteristics than the common ground [these subjects] share with all humanity."[71]

Examples of reference to such alleged particular/universal revelations are legion in texts on Rembrandt: Mario Lepore writes

> When . . . Saskia's death and his own financial crisis overwhelmed him we see another Rembrandt, an embittered, distracted man, with whom life has dealt severely; his dark, withdrawn expression suggests that sorrow which gave his later works their gravity and their maturity.[72]

And of the "Staalmeesters" Lepore says

> Rembrandt shows . . . Holland as revealed in the thoughtful, reflective and peace-loving citizen . . . . The colour scale, with . . . the golden light which gently brightens the atmosphere and falls upon the grave, benevolent men in black, contributes greatly to the sense of unity of the whole, and to the pictorial life of the painting[73]

Thus, supposedly revealed here by Rembrandt, for us to contemplate, and to respond to as we will, are bitterness, distraction, sorrow, thoughtfulness, reflection, love of peace, gravity, benevolence.

But it is difficult to see what precisely it might be that we come to know about bitterness, distraction, etc. that we did not know before, or how Rembrandt might be getting it all across to us. If Rembrandt reveals by means of accurately representing gesture and facial expression, then he shows us no more about human nature than do our

own independent observations of actual people (and we need not then infer any special insight on Rembrandt's part). Does he use principles of association to accomplish his ends? Claude Marx says, speaking of Rembrandt's chiaroscuro in his self portraits

> If he deliberately subjected his face to lighting contrasts, it was not -- as in the case of his imitators -- to lend pathos to an everyday thing that lacked it, but to provide a plastic equivalent to the stormy climate which prevailed behind it, those contradictions, which we might call pre-Beethoven, of joy and distress, hope and doubt, such as every human being -- and that is why his self-portraits possess so much universality -- bears within him.[74]

But then Rembrandt would merely be pointing out the obvious fact that some psychological items exist in a relation of opposition to others.

And there is evidence to show that Rembrandt exhibited no exceptional skill or talent for portraying character, emotion, and mood:

First, other, lesser, artists seem to portray such things equally well. Compare, for instance, "The Burgomasters of Amsterdam Awaiting the Arrival of Maria de' Medici" by Thomas de Keyser with Rembrandt's "Staalmeesters" (both are in Lepore). If we pay attention to those features which we can consciously identify as suggestive of character, etc., and ignore those vague perceptions which we must admit could come from composition as easily as character, we see de Keyser's subjects as psychologically interesting as Rembrandt's. We might imagine, for instance that the man on the right in de Keyser's painting takes very seriously his civic role; the man in the center seems a little confused, etc.

Second, spectators differ on what they take to be portrayed. For instance, in the "Staalmeesters," I do not see the grave, benevolent men that Claude Marx does; rather (if

I were pressed to judge character by countenance -- always a mistake) I would suppose them to be somewhat haughty and self-satisfied.

But there is no doubt that Rembrandt's work is exceptional. Those who claim that Rembrandt has psychological insight are not guilty of total fabrication; rather, they are, I claim, responding unconsciously to Rembrandt's near-perfect handling of value- and intensity- moderation (and what Hutcheson calls "relative beauty," which possesses a species of formal, not representational, value, may play a minor role--see above, page 69): the mind requires explanations, and when the correct one is unavailable, another will be embraced to fill the gap. Look closely at the faces in the "Staalmeesters" -- you will sense a certain profundity there, a profundity which others have identified with depth of character in the portrayed subjects, but ask yourself if you might not be sensing a profoundly perfect chiaroscuro instead. (The case of Rembrandt's religious works and portraits of family members is different--see below).

Cezanne and insight into nature

There is no doubt that Cezanne's conscious intention was to truly represent nature. Stephen Pepper's comment seems correct:

> [Cezanne] said through his pictures and often in words: "Nature is not really as thin and static as the impressionists paint it. It is not merely a film of colors, however beautiful. What we perceive in nature is dynamic, solid things."[75]

But there is no reason to assume that an artist is necessarily conscious of his true intentions. Therefore, it makes sense to ask whether Cezanne's greatness really derives from his having pointed out (presenting example after example) the obvious fact that

nature is composed of solid things and dynamic tensions. Can such a truism possibly be what draws us to his wonderful paintings? Cezanne's "revealing" of this truism seems somehow an important thing for him to have done, and the "revelation" seems thus to constitute the works' value. In reality, we are responding to the paintings' moderation-richness.

Expressions of the ordinary emotions of life

In my use of the expression "representational value," I refer to the value we place upon representations which provide the spectator with knowledge about that which is represented.

Expressions of the ordinary emotions of life, on the other hand, bring to light no intrinsic properties of the thing which the artist represents, but arouses in the spectator emotions or feelings which, if the painting is representational, he or she takes to be in some way directed, by spectator or artist, toward that which the artist represents.

Rembrandt's expression

In the very same texts which attribute keen psychological insight to Rembrandt, one finds reference to his expressive genius. We see this especially in references to his religious works (for instance: " . . . the powerful and dramatic symphonies of form and colour in which [Rembrandt] honors the grandeur and eternity of the holy testaments. His new and impassioned expression of an ideal inner beauty clothed in a shining mantle dominates his vision and makes it unique."[76]) and to his portraits of family members (On

"Titus Reading": "The concentrated pose of the young man and the subdued colors emphasized by the warm light show the painter's affection."[77]).

But how does Rembrandt communicate his vision of the goodness of Christ and his love for Titus? It is evident that there is a strong tie between the formal values and the expressed values, and so one need not look further than the formal for the ultimate source of value in these works: the formal value comes to express the non-aesthetic values of life. It is not a mystery how it is that even unhappy themes can become expressively attractive in this way -- what is expressed in such cases is no doubt the artist's love and sympathy for suffering humanity. In general, we do not find any formally unremarkable paintings esteemed for their expressiveness. The formally badly-painted representations found in flea markets of the Sad Clown will come across to us as maudlin, yet a vacant-faced harlequin by Picasso is said to inspire feelings, perhaps, of reverie, or a deep feeling that Harlequin expresses the artist's sense of himself as acting a role, etc. Mozart makes a similar point, I believe, but with respect to music:

> . . . music, even in the most terrible situations must never offend the ear, but must please the listener, or in other words must never cease to be *music*.[78]

Cezanne's expression

Cezanne's reference to nature can, it seems, make sense to us if we see him as being concerned with expressing in some way his love of nature. But again, this love seems clearly to be expressed in a way that draws on his love of UIV. In this case, it appears, he was actually creating the beauty which he believed that he was discovering.

It is often noted that expression (with or without representation) can involve the use of, e.g. a bold, dark line to express strength, a modulated pastel field to express delicacy, a jagged contour to express anger, round & multicolored shapes to express joy, etc. It is not a mystery why viewing a happy painting can be a pleasant experience, but it is less clear why viewing a gloomy, sad, tragic, angry ,or even a strong or delicate painting can be associated with positive values. Once again, the presence of moderation-richness in, e.g. a gloomy painting, can explain its attractiveness. We do not find works among the esteemed which are gloomy, and ugly, no matter how well the gloominess is conveyed.

Consider Van Gogh's "Starry Night." Were it not for its formal beauty, I believe, its expressive qualities would be no more remarkable than those of many formally unsophisticated paintings made by, for instance, mental patients, which seem to express strongly the very same sort of inner turmoil. In such works, a tiny portion of what the artist feels is in fact conveyed to us, but the experience is chiefly of interest to the psychologist, and is not at all aesthetic. I believe that what engages us in the Van Gogh painting is its formal value: we feel actual joy in viewing the painting's UIV, in a way that we would feel it even if no expression were involved. This formal power is the source even of the painting's expressive power: Our real love of the painting's UIV is taken by us to refer to Van Gogh's love of his subject. We come to feel, I think, that despite his troubles, Van Gogh greatly loved the world, and it is in the context of that love that the other expressed feelings engage us. On the other hand, the formally

unsophisticated artist may love the world too, but is unable to express his love in any way that grabs us.

But, in the Van Gogh work, it is not, I believe, the expression as such that we esteem, it is the UIV; we would not esteem an artist who expressed his hatred of the world by means of formal ugliness.

Section 10

A More Detailed Articulation of S2/SII

Recall (see above, p. 65) my claim S2:

S2 Many objects, including the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, and Kandinsky abstracts, are moderation-rich (both in 2D and represented 3D), and this is, at least primarily, what accounts for the high esteem in which they are held.

and (see above, p. 68) my claim SII:

SII. Many objects, including the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, and Kandinsky abstracts, have (1) something like parity between sameness and difference relations among their visual elements (both in 2D and represented 3D), or (2) moderation-richness of these elements, and this balance is at least primarily what accounts for the high esteem in which they are held.

I wish now, in light of what has been covered in §9 ("Other Values"), to clarify S2/SII:

It is my view that a painting's inclusion on the time-honored paintings list is a function of a composite value which is composed of formal (moderation-richness) value (including moderation-derived expression value), pure-expression value, and representation value.

It seems true to say (if x's domain is paintings) that there is a degree D such that:

(x)(x has, roughly speaking, at least degree D of the composite value <--> x qualifies for inclusion on the list).

That is, roughly speaking, a painting will qualify for inclusion on the list of long-esteemed paintings if and only if it has a certain degree, D, of the composite value comprising formal value, pure expression value, and representation value.

My claims S2/SII say only that in the case of paintings on the list, the formal value always makes up, by far, the greater or greatest part of the composite value; pure (non-formal-based) expression value and representation value are necessarily small in paintings, (This may not be true in the case of music, and is probably not true in the case of literature.) Thus, moderation-richness, at least primarily, is what accounts for the high esteem in which these paintings are held.

Still speaking roughly, let us say that degree $(E+R)_{max}$ is the maximum amount that (pure-)expression value and representation value together can be expected to have.

Then degree D-$(E+R)_{max}$ approximates the minimum degree of moderation-richness found in the long-esteemed works. Degree D-$(E+R)_{max}$ of moderation-richness value is enough to put a work on the list only if expression and representation values are maximum. Degree D of moderation-richness value is possible, and so a painting can lack all pure-expression value and all representation value and still be on the list -- but if a painting totally lacks all moderation value, it will not be on the list. If the formal value of a painting is smaller than D, then it must be supplemented by expression value and/or representation value in order for the painting to be on the list. But if the formal value is smaller than D-$(E+R)_{max}$, then x cannot be on the list.

(Ignoring some conditions for list-inclusion, such as "x must have been in the public eye") we can say that the following propositions are true (where x's are paintings):

(x)(x is on the list --> x has moderation-richness value):

At least some degree of moderation-richness value is necessary for list-inclusion.

~(x)(x is on the list --> x has expression [or representation] value):

Expression [representation] values are not necessary for list-inclusion.

~(x)(x has moderation-richness value --> x is on the list):

A painting can have moderation-richness value, but not of a high enough degree for it to be included on the list. It cannot be said that the mere possession of some degree or other of moderation-richness value is sufficient.

~(x)(x has expression [or representation] value --> x is on the list)

But there is a D such that:

(x)(x has at least degree D of moderation-richness value --> x is on the list)

Roughly speaking, degree D of moderation-richness value is sufficient for list-inclusion.

Yet there is no attainable amount of expression value (or representation value), E_a (or R_a), such that:

(x)(x has at least degree E_a [or R_a] of expression value [or representation value] --> x is on the list)

So in no sense are expression values (or representation values) sufficient.

CHAPTER 2

EVALUATION OF VIEWS

Section 11

The General UIV Thesis Seems Supported

My reasoning in support of SI and SII goes as follows:

(1) My own observations of isolated color patches reveals that, for me, awareness of something like moderation of hue, is a good. (These experiments require discrimination: it is difficult to abstract hue, and the amount of goodness is small).

(2) The same for gray-value and line orientation.

(3) I infer that the awareness of any such parity among any visual elements whatsoever is a good, for me.

(4) My own observations of certain sets of relations, e.g. sets (each of which is composed of relations of hue, intensity, etc.) which make up relations of color (see above, pp. 54-55), reveal that, for me, awareness of something like moderation-richness is a good. (I.e., not only is moderation a good, but increasing the number of moderation relations -- or bringing the R-relation average closer to M -- and increasing the equality of their distribution augments that good.) (This is the subjective counterpart of SI.)

(5) It is evident to me that my list of esteemed-by-me paintings of the past contains only works which have, to a significant degree at least, a formal value-for-me, a value which is not to be identified with representational value or with values attached to the expression of the ordinary emotions of life. Let us say that that formal value is a property of each painting's *significant form* (after Bell[i]).

(6) At the level of ultra-simple experiments, I find that awareness of some sort of same-difference parity between pairs of visual elements has a value such that I can imagine a hypothetical painter combining myriad such elemental parities, and thus vastly multiplying the valuable-for-me effects, and creating one integrated composition of great value-for-me having what we might call *UIV form*.

(7) Surely Ockham's razor would have us identify significant form and UIV form.

(8) But it is not yet shown that UIV form accounts for *most* of the value-for-me possessed by these paintings. There are three kinds of value which can plausibly be said to compose this value-for-me; these are

(a) formal, UIV, value

(b) representational value

(c) (pure) expression value

In order to show that this value-for-me is mostly formal in all cases, it should suffice to show that representation value and expression value must be small in all cases.

(9) The representational value cannot be great.

Proof of (9):

(a) [= 4] All the paintings on my list are formally sophisticated, and this seems to suggest that the main value-for-me in all cases is the formal (UIV) value.

(b) Also, it is difficult to see what the paintings on my list might be revealing that other paintings do not [see §9,1].

(10) The expression value cannot be great.

Proof of (10):

(a) [= 4] All the paintings on my list are formally sophisticated. (b)(i) Some paintings (e.g. those of some mental patients) not on my list have the same expression, in a coarse-grained way at least, as paintings on my list, and (ii) these former are not in any way beautiful.

Objection (which I might raise against my own view):

Proposition (a) is no argument against the thesis that expression value, not formal value, is the main value-for-me, since we can posit a Fry-style expression/form link. (Fry seems to say that *order*, because it reduces perplexity, and *variety*, because it stimulates sensation, are both required for expression to be effective).

And proposition (b) is no argument against the thesis that expression is the main value-for-me for the following reason: it seems clearly true that there exists coarse-grained, at least, expression in painting, and we might assume that the medium of such expression utilizes resemblance, e.g. between visible forms and forms of feeling

(Langer), or between artistic structure and the appearance and behavior of people (Davies). But we can also make the claim that the medium of expression is fine-grained.

Furthermore, it appears evident, in the case of at least some of the paintings on my list, that expression-value is the main value-for-me.

Reply:

The objection fails to respond to (b)(ii).

But, further, the fact that it seems evident that expression value is at least sometimes the main value-for-me is consistent with the thesis that UIV value is in fact always the main value-for-me because:

(a) There are really (but minimally) expressive features, consciously perceived as expressive, in these paintings. If we find that we cannot tolerate the mystery of a painting's appeal, we may too hastily assume that the correct explanation must involve these features.

(b) We can summon up within ourselves, at will, emotions, any emotion at all, in front of any painting or no painting. Such imaginary emotions seem to be real in a way that imagined sensory states do not (though such real-seeming imaginary emotions and real emotions will always be distinguishable by us). We may too hastily utilize these, also, in an explanation.

(c) My real love of a painting's UIV can come across to me as involving expression, i.e. as involving some sort of reference beyond the painted surface (e.g. reference to the love which someone, perhaps the artist, has for some thing or person). A speculation: to this love the small expressively-aroused real emotions may become

attached, as modifications, thus producing whatever really valuable expression exists in painting, But in such a case, the main value-for-me would be UIV.

So, the positing of a Fry-style link, and of a complex fine grained medium of expression (Langer-style or Davies-style, for instance) is unnecessary; Ockham's razor favors (10). [See §9,2].

(11) Therefore (by disjunctive syllogism), with respect to the paintings on my list, there is only one main value-for-me, and that is formal, UIV, value. (This is the subjective counterpart of SII).

(12) My list of esteemed-by-me paintings of the past pretty much matches the list of time-honored paintings.

(13) Therefore (since both lists are large) the reasons for esteem are probably the same for all of us.

(14) Therefore, SI and SII.

Another argument for SI: the Darwinian version of the Hutchesonian notion of an instinctual desire to generalize provides a parsimonious explanation for both the pleasures of sensuous beauty and theorizing, but in order for it to explain these in me, it must be seen as explaining them in all people.

A third argument for SI: it is reasonable to suppose, as the UIV theorists do, that if UIV is a good in the visual arts, then it is a good in music as well. In fact, evidence can be found in music to support the (general) UIV thesis:

Each note is separated by twelve half-steps (= an octave) from a note having the same letter-name. These two notes are the same (they are both c's for instance, and possess a certain sameness of quality) and different (they are different c's, for instance, and possess a certain difference of quality). The fact of their sameness implies the existence of a hue-circle-like oppositional dimension of twelve notes:



Thus, for instance, D is oppositional to G#, is similar to D# and to E, is dissimilar to F# and to G, and is moderational to F and to B.

In general, if we play a series of single notes, creating a melody on a piano, the most satisfying resolution occurs when the 1st note of the scale follows the 5th note -- e.g. when C follows G. It may be seen as evidence for the UIV theses that G with its two moderation-notes

A# (midway between G and C#, up)

G

E (midway between G and C#, down)

are precisely those notes which, with C itself, make up the set of the first seven harmonics of C:

A# (approximately) -- seventh harmonic.

G -- third and sixth harmonics.

E -- fifth harmonic.

C -- first (= the fundamental tone), second and fourth harmonics.

Thus, playing C after G repeats the G while supplying G's moderation-notes, creating a satisfying cadence.

It is interesting that the only two-note progression within a scale whose second note supplies no M-notes at all to the first note is the 4-1 progression -- and when we arrive at the fourth note, generally in the middle of a phrase, we are indeed left hanging, having to work our way back to 1 via the 5.

Section 12

Adjudicating Among Several Possible UIV Theories

Hutcheson

Hutcheson posits two observable properties of objects, which he calls "uniformity" and "variety". Although he clearly assumes that the reader will well enough understand what properties he means to pick out using these terms, the terms are very much in need of clear definition. Hutcheson's examples may offer clues: e.g.,[2] variety increases in the sequence, equilateral triangle -- square -- pentagon -- hexagon, while uniformity remains the same. This must mean that an increase of variety is to be connected with the increase in the number of sides (and angles). This is consistent, at least, with a definition of "variety" as "the number of difference relations". And the example seems to indicate that uniformity is constant because each figure is the same as the others in that all its sides are of equal (uniform) size, so that "uniformity" seems to mean here something like: "having set(s) of parts which are in some way equal to one another."

But another example seems to obscure the matter: uniformity increases in the sequence, figure with [four] irregular curved sides -trapezium -- rhomboid -- rhombus -- square, while variety is said by Hutcheson to remain the same. It is perhaps possible to preserve here the definition of uniformity which seemed implicit in the first example such that degree of uniformity correlates with the number of sets of equal parts (i.e. it

could be said that each side of the trapezium constitutes a set of equal (in orientation) line segments, and thus it has greater uniformity than the irregular figure). But it is very difficult now to see what variety could be: while it is true that all the figures have the same number of sides, surely the total number of difference relations is decreasing along the sequence. And whatever we normally take "variety" and "uniformity" to mean, surely variety is decreasing here as uniformity increases.

Unfortunately, Hutcheson gives no catalog of elements and relations.

Further, if we assume that Hutcheson's uniformity (U) and variety (V) are real quantities, we run into ambiguity with respect to an idea, which Hutcheson calls "beauty" (B), which is raised up in us by our perception of some sort of a compound of U and V, and which, Hutcheson claims, is necessarily accompanied by pleasure. Hutcheson indicates that $UV \propto B$. In an example[3], he says that in the sequence, ellipse (not very eccentric) -- circle, U increases and V decreases, and B is constant. This would appear to indicate that nearness to U/V parity has no relation to B whatsoever, but that B is simply a product of U and V. And yet, if we look at, e.g., his examples from nature, we find that Hutcheson in general (apparently taking the presence of V for granted) points to the presence of B-making U. But these are all cases in which (if Hutcheson's use of "variety" is to relate at all to our ordinary use of the term) decreasing the U would surely increase the V; so, it is difficult to see how pointing to the U explains the B unless decreasing the U would decrease the parity of U and V. (There is even the example here [p.42] of the sphericity of planetary bodies. But Hutcheson had before [p.41] indicated that in the sequence, spheroid -- sphere, B remains constant. Perhaps even more indicative of parity as B-making is Hutcheson's example on page 42:

> As to the dry part of the surface of the Earth: a great part is covered with a very pleasant inoffensive color [green, apparently], how beautifully is it diversified with various degrees of light and shade, according to the different situations of the parts of its surface, in mountains, valleys, hills, and open plains, which are variously inclined toward the great luminary.

But surely every loss of shadow (loss of variety) would be a gain in uniformity of the green color. So, if parity is of no relevance, if B is merely a product of U and V, why is the green's being diversified B-making?

In fact, Hutcheson seems to be dealing with two different pairs of quantities when he speaks of U and V in connection with B:

(1) (UV $\propto$ B): quantities with respect to each of which the greater it is, the closer to B the composite is.

(2) (perhaps suggested by the phrase "uniformity amidst variety"): quantities which, the closer they are to being in (rough or precise) parity, the closer to B the composite is.

I could speculate that in the first instance Hutcheson's U and V can be identified with my moderation-richness$_D$ and moderation-richness$_S$ and that in the second, his U and V are the same as the number of similarity relations and the number of dissimilarity relations. In that case,
Hutcheson's view would be consistent with moderationism.

But Hutcheson's thesis is also fairly consistent with a rough, not precise, parity thesis, which, *à la* Pepper's and Arnheim's view, would allow for a range of near-parity ratios of similarity and difference to be equally good-making.

Of course, Hutcheson's explanation of why (rough or precise) parity is good-making is different from those of these other authors.

Beardsley

Is Beardsley's categorization of R-relations adequate?

Primary kinds of R-relation

In section 5, I suggested two ways in which primary kinds of R-relations might be represented. My *verbal* system (above, pp. 44-45) utilizes five terms ("identity," "similarity," "moderation," "dissimilarity," and "opposition"), the terms "similarity" and "dissimilarity" each representing both one kind (*primary genus*) of R-relation and an infinite number of kinds (*primary species* – i.e. one kind for each degree of similarity and dissimilarity) of R-relation. This system may be used when a precise approach is not required or is not possible. My *numerical* system (above, pp. 45-46) supplies a term (a number) for each kind (primary species) of R-relation, and will be useful in precision analysis.

Beardsley offers only a verbal system to represent primary kinds of R-relations. My table at the beginning of section 5 (above, p. 44) shows only rough correlations between my terms for kinds of primary R-relations and Beardsley's: while it is possible that Beardsley means by "indifferently different" precisely what I mean by "moderational" (a term referring to the exact midpoint of the scale), it is likely that what he means by his expression is "more or less moderational." This interpretation suggests

that Beardsley would advocate an R-scale such as the following (we do not know what relative lengths he would give to the segments):



Thus, it appears, Beardsley's "similar" and "dissimilar" probably ought to be understood to refer to smaller sets of R-relation primary species than do mine. It is difficult to say which usage of these two terms, Beardsley's or my own, might better accord with ordinary English; but, of course, either usage may be adopted by the analyst.

The problem with Beardsley's verbal system is that he fails to include terms for identity, (strict) moderation, and opposition (as a kind of relation distinct from dissimilarity) in it. He even seems explicitly to exclude identity (while nevertheless alluding to it) when he says in the passage I quote above, on page 10, "[two figures] may be similar . . . though not exactly."

Secondary kinds of R-relation

Beardsley, in focusing on area-to-area and line-to-line R-relations, fails to cover the more fundamental R-relations which hold between points and between (shortest, or straight-line) point-to-point distances.

Comparisons between areas and between lines are really comparisons between *groups of points*, and the treatment of such groups ought really to come only at a late

stage of analysis, that is, after the more basic groundwork (such as I have tried to supply in §5) has been laid.

Thus, Beardsley's categories do not, strictly speaking, much overlap with mine (I do speak of length and orientation of *straight* lines, which is just another way of speaking of point-to-point (shortest) distances, and a discussion about color relations between areas is not different from one about color relations between points). But we can talk about the particulars of his list in an informal way.

I will discuss only those secondary kinds of (what I claim are group-to-group) R-relations which Beardsley explicitly mentions:

It seems quite true that R-relations of ***shape*** exist between two areas, or figures. I assume that these (group-to-group) R-relations of shape are grounded upon the more elementary relations such as those to which I point in §5 (see my very brief comments on p. 60).

R-relations of **line** ("This line is similar to that line," etc.) can probably be regarded as special cases of R-relations of shape, a line being a long, thin shape.

It seems correct to say that R-relations of ***size*** exist between two figures. Perhaps figures' areas are to be compared in a way analogous to the way that the lengths of two straight lines (or distances) are compared (see above, pp. 50-53).

An R-relation of ***color*** between two figures, each uniformly colored, can be no different than any point-to-point color R-relation between the figures. But I believe that Beardsley is wrong when he says that "[c]olor-harmony is one sort of similarity. . ."[4] I think that color-moderation is probably what most people mean by "color harmony." Consider the fact, for instance, that bringing two colors which together are drab and lifeless into harmony requires making them less similar.

The supposed R-relation, *visual density*. Beardsley posits (without supplying evidence or argument) the existence of a *quality* which he describes as the "quality of impenetrability or of opacity"[5] of an area, and which "might be called the *visual density* of the area."[6] He claims that the degree of this quality "is a resultant of size, brightness and saturation of tone, contrast with the background, and other local qualities"[7]

He then claims (again without evidence) that there exists a dual *relation* (which I will here call "$R_{visdens}$") which "appears when we compare two parts of a design with respect to their visual density."[8]

He says that the two parts "may be similar in density, that is nearly equal, in which case they are said to be in *balance*."[9] But he also says, "Balance implies a point or vertical line of reference, an axis that divides the two comparable areas"[10] -- and we can probably infer from his examples that Beardsley understands this axis to be a *visible* mark. Therefore, he seems not to mean to say that every instance of $S_{visdens}$ defines a condition of balance, but that such a relation does so only when it connects areas on both sides of a visible, vertical axis.

We must ask this question: is there in fact an R-relation which compares a quality of something which might be called the "impenetrability" or "opacity" of two areas, a quality emergent from or somehow comprising size, brightness and saturation of tone, contrast with the background, and other qualities, and which is such that similarity of this secondary kind, connecting two areas across a vertical mark, is what we perceive as visual balance?

First of all, nothing suggests that we could not identify a combinative R-relation (see above, p. 59) which in some way comprises R-relations of size, brightness, saturation, contrast with background, and other R-relations.

But if we assume that the R-degree of the combinative relation would reflect, as it probably would, some sort of a relatively simple sum of the R-degrees of the component relations, then such a combinative R-relation cannot be what Beardsley has in mind, because he was surely aware of the fact that in actual cases of balance exhibited by two figures within a painting, their sizes may not be similar, nor brightnesses, nor saturations, etc.; and it is difficult to see how any combinative relation could be one of near equality when its component relations are characterized by lack of similarity. Thus, Beardsley's $R_{visdens}$ relation could only be some sort of "emergent" R-relation, whose R-degree correlates in some very loose or very complex way with R-relations of size, brightness, etc.

That the relation would be loose or complex can be seen when we consider the following example:

Imagine a composition having a very large, dark shape located to the left of a vertical line, and a very small dark shape located to the right of the line, and imagine that

this picture is not in balance. Were we to adopt Beardsley's notion of visual density, we would have to say that the two shapes, which are connected by relations of D_{size} and $I_{brightness}$, are not connected by $S_{visdens}$. According to traditional notions, and I suppose Beardsley would agree, it should be possible to change the brightness of the small shape in order to compensate for the difference in size of the two shapes, such that balance would be achieved. But, because these shapes are identical in brightness, any change in the brightness of the small shape would necessarily involve a decrease in the degree of similarity of brightness between the two shapes. This would mean, if we adopt Beardsley's view, that in *decreasing* the similarity of brightness, we have somehow *increased* the similarity of $S_{visdens}$.

If $R_{visdens}$ exists, I believe, it is not immediately detectable in the sense that R-relations of size, color, etc., are. Rather, it is known only through inference; it is a theoretical entity, brought in to explain the workings of balance.

Therefore, if we can explain balance in less mysterious and less novel terms, the R-relation of visual density (whose definition includes the notion that $S_{visdens}$ is balance) should be excluded from a catalog of secondary kinds.

I have suggested above (p. 60) that visual balance might be equated with the moderation-richness of R-relations holding among figure-to-frame distances. This view seems preferable to Beardsley's, because, while there is much to discover about precisely how we are to analyze balance in these terms, inspection seems to reveal that visual balance has to do with these R-relations, and there is no reason to expect in an analysis focusing on figure-to-frame distances that we would encounter R-relation kinds which

are radically different from those we have already identified, or combinative kinds which relate to their components in highly complex ways.

Further, the insight, which Beardsley and others possess, that the size of the figures has a bearing on balance accords with my account on page 60. And, it may be (and it is not clear to me whether this would constitute a new principle, or would be based on principles already stated) that all members of any non-spatially-defined group whatsoever (e.g. of a group defined by similarity of size, or of hue, or of contrast with the background) must together exhibit location-moderation in order for the whole picture to be perceived by us as moderation-rich. This requirement for moderation-richness would explain in another way the intuition that size influences balance, and might explain how brightness, saturation, etc. can affect it -- for instance, in changing the brightness of a figure, that figure may thereby be brought into a group to which it had not previously belonged; if the group had exhibited balance before, it might not now, or vice versa.

Thus I conclude that there is no such R-relation as $R_{visdens}$, that is, as the visual density relation. We can account for balance without positing such an R-relation. (There will be all manner of combinative R-relations connecting two figures; but, I maintain, there is no reason to assume that any one of them will be such that its being a similarity relation will equate with the two figures being in mutual balance.)[11]

Is there an R-relation of *implicit movement*? In line with how most painters, critics, and aestheticians talk about painting, Beardsley refers to the supposed *quality* of (*implicit*) *movement* within the (static) visual field. He says,

> Lines and figures, when they have certain characteristics -- certain shapes and orientations -- take on a kind of directed instability. They appear to be moving, or to be about to move, or to be straining in a direction in which they could move, A row of arrows with their heads all pointing the same way has this characteristic to a high degree . . . . A slanted shape has a falling tendency. . . .[12]

He speaks [13] of the *relation* holding between "two parts of a design with respect to their movement" as being a dual relation. This means that, according to Beardsley, these relations exhibit similarity, contrast, or indifferent difference, both of amount and direction of movement. But in discussing these relations (I will call the relation of movement "R_{mvt}", the relation of its magnitude "R_{mvtmag}", and the relation of its direction "R_{mvtdir}"), Beardsley uses language which to some extent obscures the R-relational structures. In saying, "Two black figures on a white background may, for example, seem to move in the same direction, say toward the upper left-hand corner,"[14] he seems clearly to point to the S_{mvtdir} (or I_{mvtdir}) relation. When he says of these figures that "they may seem to move together [converge], as if pulled by internal forces, or to drive each other apart, depending on their shape, size, position, and so on,"[15] he points to what could only be regarded as two varieties of D_{mvtdir} (or O_{mvtdir}) relation. And, he says, "Or there may be other figures that counteract these tendencies, so that a stable tension is generated and the figures appear to be held in position. Thus, two such figures are either in equilibrium or in disequilibrium."[16] Beardsley here appears to be saying that the movement of some figures can counteract the movement of other figures. But this would seem to imply a third kind of D_{mvtdir} (or O_{mvtdir}) relation -- and we might infer that a S_{mvtmag} (or I_{mvtmag}) relation is involved here as well.

But none of this is clear. We might ask, for instance, precisely how "shapes and orientations," or "shape, size, position, and so on" are supposed to correlate with movement. And when does D_{mvdir} correlate with equilibrium and when with disequilibrium? How do we square Beardsley's comments when he says, "A slanted shape has a falling tendency," yet says of Daumier's *Witness*, "The [*slanting*] angle of the figures, and the pointed wedges made by the knees, set up a strong rightward movement. . . ."[17]

The way becomes open, I believe, to gain clarity about the phenomena of implicit movement and visual equilibrium when we recognize that direction of movement is an *expressive* feature associated with *figure-orientation*, just as, probably, magnitude of movement is an expressive feature associated with *figure-size* and *figure-contrast-with-background*, *qua* factors influencing equilibrium, equilibrium being moderation-richness among R-relations of figure-orientation. I believe that although R-relations of movement exist for many spectators, they are not autonomous relations, but are merely the picture's figure-orientation, figure-size, and figure-contrast-with-background relations viewed expressively; thus, an individual who will not perceive a picture's movement (and such people exist) will nevertheless be able fully to perceive the picture's equilibrium or disequilibrium.

In summary then, the only secondary kinds of R-relations which Beardsley catalogues are kinds whose instances hold between *figures* (*lines* being a special sort of figure), not between the more elementary points and point-to-point distances. I agree with him that R-relations of shape, size, and color hold between figures, but the R-relation of

movement is not always present for the spectator, and when it is, it is, I believe, no more than an expressive mode of presentation of figure-orientation. And, the supposed R-relation of visual density does not, I believe, exist.

Are Beardsley's propositions about unity, complexity, aesthetic value, and aesthetic experience compatible with my S1?

In saying that ". . . very broadly speaking, [unity] is increased by similarities,"[18] Beardsley seems to be saying that

B1. (There is an increase in similarities) --> (there is an increase in [that quality which critics call] unity), very broadly speaking.

And in saying, ". . . the more unified the experience, the more of a whole the experience is, and the more concentratedly the self is engaged,"[19] he is saying,

B2. (There is an increase in unity) --> (there is an increase in [the object's capacity to produce] aesthetic experience)

It seems that we can infer, by hypothetical syllogism, that

B3. (There is an increase in similarities) --> (there is an increase in [the object's capacity to produce] aesthetic experience), very broadly speaking.

In saying, "'X has greater aesthetic value than Y' means 'X has the capacity to produce an aesthetic experience of greater magnitude . . . than that produced by Y,'"[20] Beardsley is saying,

B4. (There is an increase in the object's capacity to produce aesthetic experience) <--> (there is an increase in aesthetic value).

And it seems that we can infer:

B5. (There is an increase in similarities) --> (there is an increase in aesthetic value), very broadly speaking.

And in saying that ". . . very broadly speaking, [complexity is increased] by differences,"[21] Beardsley seems to be saying,

B6. (There is an increase in dissimilarities) --> (there is an increase in complexity [= what critics call "variety," etc.]), very broadly speaking.

And in saying, "the more complex the experience, the more of the self is engaged, that is, the more wide-ranging are its responses, perhaps over a longer time,"[22] he is saying,

B7. (There is an increase in complexity) --> (there is an increase in [the object's capacity to produce] aesthetic experience),

which seems to allow us the inference,

B8. (There is an increase in dissimilarities) --> (there is an increase in [the object's capacity to produce] aesthetic experience), very broadly speaking.

And B4 seems to allow us to infer,

B9. (There is an increase in dissimilarities) --> (there is an increase in aesthetic value), very broadly speaking.

If my S1 (viz. "The awareness of moderation-richness is, as a rule, a fundamental good." [see above, p. 65], where "moderation richness" means "much moderation [i.e. an average R-degree near M] and highly equal distribution of the moderation throughout the field" [see above, p. 63]) is true, then B5 and B9 seem to be false. B5 seems to be false if S1 is true, because according to S1, an increase in similarities, that is, a shift of the average R-degree toward identity, is often not a good; it is good only under the following conditions: (1) the average R-degree, before the shift, defines a point within the part of the R-scale labeled *dissimilarity* or *opposition*, and no inequality of distribution is introduced by the shift which offsets the positive effect of the move toward M; (2) the average R-degree, before the shift, defines a point within the part of the

R-scale labeled *moderation* or *similarity*, and an equality of distribution is introduced by the shift which offsets the negative effect of the move away from M.

B9 seems to be false if S1 is true, because according to S1, an increase in dissimilarities, that is, a shift of the average R-degree toward opposition, is often not a good; it is a good only under the following conditions: (1) the average R-degree, before the shift, defines a point within the part of the R-scale labeled *identity* or *similarity*, and no inequality of distribution is introduced by the shift which offsets the positive effect of the move toward M; (2) the average R-degree, before the shift, defines a point within the part of the R-scale labeled *moderation* or *dissimilarity*, and an equality of distribution is introduced by the shift which offsets the negative effect of the move away from M.

Thus Beardsley's system seems to run counter to S1. The following consideration seems to show that at least one of Beardsley's premises must be false;

It seems true to say that

(There is an increase in dissimilarities) <--> (there is a decrease in similarities);

that is,

(There is a shift in the average R-degree toward opposition) <--> (there is a shift in the average R-degree away from identity)

But then this inference follows from Beardsley's premises:

[(There is an increase in similarities) --> (there is an increase in aesthetic value)] & [(there is a decrease in similarities) --> (there is an increase in aesthetic value)], very broadly speaking.

But surely it is false to say that any shift whatever of the average R-degree, very broadly speaking, increases aesthetic value.

It looks as if Beardsley's false premises here are premises B1 and B6. I suspect that when critics speak of *unity*, they are speaking of moderation-richness$_D$ (that is, moderation-richness *qua* contrasted with dissimilarity-richness), and once we come to see unity this way it becomes clear that increasing similarities from the opposition-end of the R-scale increases unity (so long as equality is kept constant or is increased), but only up to a point (M). Similarly, when critics speak of *variety*, they are, I believe, usually talking about moderation-richness$_S$ (that is, moderation-richness *qua* contrasted with similarity-richness), and once we see this, it becomes clear that increasing dissimilarities from the identity-end of the R-scale increases variety (so long as equality is kept constant or increased), but only up to a point (M). Looking at things this way, we would have to say that, although Beardsley understood that increasing similarity on the opposition-half of the dimension causes an increase in value, he did not realize--because he did not grasp the underlying principle--that increasing it on the identity-half does not; and that, although he understood that increasing dissimilarity on the identity-half causes an increase in value, he did not realize that increasing it on the opposition-half does not. Thus his claims here seem false and contradictory.

But such a view probably does not do Beardsley justice. We are probably closer to the truth if we say that the mere use of "unity" in this context, i.e., where the word means "moderation-richness$_D$," implies that the degree undergoing change is on the opposition-half; thus, B1 can be taken to mean the same as "(There is an increase in similarities on the opposition-half) --> (There is an increase in unity), very broadly speaking," which would be *true* (so long as equality is not decreased by the change -- but note that Beardsley says, "very broadly speaking"), and B3 and B5 cannot legitimately be inferred after all. If "complexity" in this context implies that the changing degree is on the identity-half of the dimension, then, by similar logic, B6 would be true, and the apparent contradiction disappears. Instead of B5 we would have this true proposition:

B5'. (There is an increase in similarities on the opposition-half) --> (There is an increase in aesthetic value), very broadly speaking,

and instead of B9 we would have:

B9'. (There is an increase in dissimilarities on the identity-half) --> (There is an increase in aesthetic value), very broadly speaking.

If this second way of looking at Beardsley's notion of the relation of similarities and dissimilarities to aesthetic value is correct -- and I believe it is -- then Beardsley simply failed to see consciously and clearly the sense of his two quite true principles; a

slightly clearer understanding on his part would surely have revealed to him the single principle of moderation.

Pepper

Is Pepper's categorization of R-relations adequate?

As does Beardsley, Pepper offers only a verbal system to represent primary kinds of R-relations. He would probably approve of the following R-scale:



Thus, he omits identity and, no doubt, (strict) moderation.

In his enumeration of (what I have been calling) secondary kinds of R-relations, Pepper does not expressly talk about relations (or schemes implying relations) between elementary points or between point-to-point distances; but the secondary kinds, *hue*, *saturation*, and *value* hold between points and areas alike, and his secondary kinds, *length of line* and *attitude of line* hold between both point-to-point distances and straight lines. Others of the secondary kinds he mentions can only hold between groups of points, e.g., *degree of curvature of line*, *size of an area*. I will comment only on those R-relations which are represented in schemes to which Pepper makes reference.

Pepper is of course justified in including the scheme for *hue* in his survey, but his notions about how the various hues relate to one another, in terms of R-relations, seem incorrect. (And, in general, it is important that we come to understand the precise nature of the relationships with which we are dealing, since getting the details wrong can easily frustrate any attempt to use the theory in order to facilitate the actual production of beauty.)

For each hue, h_1, there is one other hue, h_2, such that light of hue h_1 mixed with light of hue h_2 will produce white light; and such that if we look at another color patch after staring at a patch of h_1 we will see the second patch as tinged with h_2 -- or as more intense if it is already of h_2 (successive contrast); and such that any colored patch near a patch of h_1 will appear to be closer in hue to h_2 -- or more intense if it is already of h_2 -- than it would appear to be if the patch of h_1 were absent (simultaneous contrast).

Let us call h_1 and h_2 *complements*.

The oppositions of the first hue circle presented by Pepper are just these complements. In a way, it is reasonable that Pepper should favor, as he does, this circle over the other two which he presents (He says of this circle, "I believe that [it] is the most revealing of the three"[23]): his principles of design are supposed to counteract monotony, but part of monotony in viewing color is, he claims, sensory fatigue, and seeing the complement relieves such fatigue.

The second of his circles, the traditional artists' hue circle (as Pepper says, it is "the most familiar arrangement"[24]), is structured upon an equal spacing of what are known as the *pigment primaries*. The selection of these hues as primaries, he says "originated in the fact that from mixtures of paints in these three hues, paints of all the

other hues on the circle can be produced to some approximation." He adds, "This is an interesting technical fact, but has no aesthetic significance."[25]

Pepper says, "It is often maintained that the color intervals in [the second circle] are more evenly distributed than in [the first circle]. For in [the first circle] there is clearly a crowding of hues between blue and red in comparison with the distribution of hues between blue and green. But in [the second circle] there is a crowding of hues between yellow and green in comparison with the distribution between yellow and red."[26]

There is indeed a spreading out of hues in the first circle between blue and green. Virtually one-third of this circle is blue-green. Surely this cannot be right. It cannot be true that a shade of bluish green appears to us to be as different from a shade of greenish blue as, say a reddish purple appears to be from a slightly orangish yellow.

Are the hues, in the second circle, between yellow and green in fact crowded in comparison with the hues between yellow and red? Most artists would say that the intervals are equal in both sections of the circle. The alleged crowding would be true only if we were to accept the first circle as exhibiting equal intervals from red through yellow to green -- but there is reason not to do that.

The third circle is based on an even distribution around the circle of the *psychologically primary* hues -- these are the four hues (red, yellow, green, and blue) which are said to appear pure, not seeming to be mixtures. "If evenness of distribution [of hues] were what were sought," Pepper says, "[the third circle] would probably be the most nearly correct."[27]

But this is confusing. According to Pepper, distances in the schemes are *supposed* to indicate perceptual distances between the represented qualities (recall: "It is the

position of sense qualities in such schemes that determines whether they are closely or distantly related to each other"[28]). In what way could the first circle be preferable as a scheme if another circle better represents the intervals?

At any rate, the third circle does not, in fact, represent the intervals as well as the second. (Since there is such consensus about which paintings are great, I assume there to be a certain measure of consistency of perception among viewers.) Nearly one-quarter of this third circle is made up of blue-greens.

Green does in fact seem to me to be quite primary (unmixed), though to a lesser degree than red, yellow, or blue, each of which appears to me to be unambiguously unmixed, pure. But there is no reason to claim that primaries must be spaced out equally around the circle.

Artists, whose work involves their constantly having to discriminate between intervals, have always preferred the second circle, and Pepper has offered no compelling argument against its acceptance as the most accurate of the proposed hue circles.

Of course, R-relations of *saturation and value* (= brightness) exist between points and between shapes, but probably what I have called (above, p. 55) *gray-value*, that is, the character (black-gray-white) of the gray component of a color, should be added to Pepper's list.

Pepper's scheme for *length of line* represents the R-relation scale for length as having the "longest [perceptible line]" in opposition to zero length (or, "the shortest perceptible line")[29], whereas, as I have suggested above (pp. 50-53), the R-relation of

length connecting any two straight lines is probably to be measured on a scale whose opposite-to-zero pole represents the length of the longer of the two lines.

Pepper's scheme for *attitude of line*[30] is the same as my account of line (= straight-line distance) *orientation* (see above, pp. 53-54).

His scheme for *line curvature* [31] , an oppositional dimension with the straight line (0° curvature) at one pole and the circle (360° curvature) at the other (see above, p. 28), cannot, of course, be applied to elemental point-to-point (straight-line) distances; rather, curved-line-to-curved-line R-relations are a species of group-to-group relation, and require a much fuller analysis than anyone has yet given them. My sense is that curved-line (or contour)-to-curved-line(or contour) R-relations are analyzable into sets of simple straight-line-to-straight-line-orientation R-relations. But this has yet to be worked out.

Pepper mentions [32], but does not present, a *line-width* scheme, that is, he gives no dimension along which would be plotted different line widths. Presumably, such a dimension would present the thinnest discernible width at one pole. Exactly how Pepper would conceive of the other pole is unknown. For purposes of achieving moderation-richness, the R-relations connecting such dimensions of lines probably can be regarded in the same way as those of any other figure. (But there probably exists a "figure-type' *r*-relation: as a square widens out it becomes a different figure-type, a

rectangle. As it further widens it becomes a line -- these r-relations no doubt play a role in composition).

Pepper mentions [33], but does not present, a scheme for *size of area*, that is, he gives no dimension along which would be plotted different area sizes, from smallest to largest (although we cannot know what Pepper would have considered the largest to be). As I noted above (p. 93), it may be that figures' areas are to be compared in a way analogous to the way in which the lengths of two straight lines are compared (see above, pp. 50-53).

Pepper refers to a scheme, or schemes, for *shape* when he talks about "gradations from circles into narrower and narrower ellipses, or from squares into narrower and narrower rectangles."[34] I believe that R_{shape} will be a very difficult group-to group relation to analyze. For now, we can note that Pepper's examples, although they represent movement along R-scales, give us no sense of what a comprehensive analysis of R-relations of shape might look like. (Pepper apparently means to imply that a very slim ellipse [a straight line] and a circle are opposite in shape [recall (above, p. 28) that the straight line and circle are also supposed to be opposite in *line curvature*]; but surely the shape of, say, a five-pointed star is more different from a slim ellipse than a circle is).

The supposed relation of ***weight***

Pepper suggests that "there is an affective sequence running from symmetry to unbalance . . . . [S]ymmetry grades imperceptibly into pure balance and balance into unbalance."[35]

The portion of such a scheme from balance into unbalance can probably be regarded as a scheme for R-relations of weight (at least across a vertical axis). (It is hard to understand what the portion of the scheme between symmetry [exact reversed duplication on each side] and balance might represent, since they both allegedly involve equality of weight).

Pepper maintains that, usually, there is, in a rectangular picture, a central vertical axis, and that balance requires that there be "equal weight on each side"[36] of this axis. This central axis, Pepper says, "can be neutralized or shifted to some other part of the composition only with great difficulty."[37]

Weight, Pepper says, increases (see above, p. 21) with distance from axis, size of an area, depth, color-weight, movement away from axis, and interest.

But Pepper's relation of weight is just a variant of Beardsley's relation of visual density, and as I said in my critique of Beardsley (above, p. 96), there is no reason to suppose that such an exotic relation exists when it looks as if more prosaic relations might be all we need to explain balance.

And there are other reasons to reject the traditional account of Beardsley and Pepper; for instance, if balance occurs fundamentally across a vertical axis, how do we explain the artist's desire to make *vertical* adjustments, of the position of figures, which are much like horizontal balancing adjustments? Note, for example, that in the

teeter-totter balance of two circles (where the smaller is placed closer to the edge on one side than the larger is to the edge on the other side), the artist knows that the circles' centers ought not be on the same horizontal line.

If Pepper's notion of S/D parity is correct, then S1 is false. Is Pepper's notion correct?

Pepper's explanation for why a parity of similarity and dissimilarity relations is good-making resonates with what many artists would, I suspect, say. But if Pepper is correct, then the parity can only be expected to be approximate -- since, if dissimilarity relations are introduced by the artist to combat fatigue, in the process of *design*, and similarity relations are introduced to combat confusion in the process of ordering the material via the principle of *pattern*, then there is no reason that the amount of dissimilarity and similarity should be equal. But let us take a more careful look at Pepper's thesis; in particular, let us take a case in which the sensitive spectator finds monotony in some part of a painting, and consider how the artist could have applied some principles of design to remedy the problem:

Suppose, for instance, that in one corner of a painting there is a horizontal series of five short, wide, vertical, pure red lines. We can imagine that Pepper would say the following about the problem of monotony and its solution, using principles of design, in this particular case:

(i) Via habituation, the spectator, having had a great deal of experience (let us suppose) in perceiving all the elements of visual sensation and a large number of their

combinations, has acquired a fundamental capacity for enjoying the sensation of this series of red lines.

That habituation occurs is proved by these facts:

(a) The first time we taste olives or certain kinds of cheeses, we may dislike them. But we come to enjoy them after we have experienced their taste time after time.[38]

(b) The history of music reveals that, over long periods of time, more and more of the intervals have come into general acceptance.[39]

(c) "Some experimental work has been done on this subject, enough to support the probability that there are no intrinsically 'best' color combinations, nor any intrinsically 'bad' color combinations . . . .

"Evidence indicated that the less experience with colors a person had, the greater the number of color combinations he disliked. Persons of much experience with colors would have very few combinations they disliked or none."[40]

Although the spectator has a fundamental capacity to enjoy these marks, two things stand in the way of his or her full enjoyment of them: sensory fatigue and attentive fatigue:

(ii) Because of *sensory* fatigue, as the spectator looks at the painting, the redness of the lines becomes less vivid, and so his or her enjoyment becomes less.

That sensory fatigue occurs, i.e., that with most of our senses (including our sensing of hue) the first stimulations are the most vivid, is proved by these facts:

(a) "The first taste of a pear or of maple syrup, the first odor of the sea, or of a flower, the first touch of a texture or pressure on the skin"[41] are the most vivid.

(b) "Put on a pair of blue glasses. At first everything is very blue, but in a few minutes this color change is less noticeable. The world is still blue but not nearly so intensely blue as at first. The cones of the eye, which are the organs that respond to hues, have lost some of their energy of response through continuous stimulation."[42]

(c) "After a little continuous stimulation a pleasant odor becomes less and less vivid and generally in consequence less and less pleasant. Similarly, an unpleasant odor becomes less and less unpleasant. After working with an unpleasant fertilizer for a few minutes one scarcely smells it."[43]

(d) "The color effect of a stage set is strongest when the lights first come on."[44]

(iii) Because of *attentive* fatigue, as the spectator looks at the series of vertical lines, the sameness of their orientation allows them [or the consciousness of their orientation?] to drop out of the spectator's awareness, thus reducing his enjoyment of them [or of their orientation?].

That attentive fatigue occurs is proved by the fact that "if you enter a room where a clock is ticking loudly, you are at first extremely conscious of the sound. But in a short time you find that you do not notice it any more."[45]

The painter can, using principles of design, change the painting such that the spectator will no longer experience sensory fatigue, and will no longer experience

attentive fatigue, and so will be able to enjoy the sensations afforded him or her by this part of the painting:

(iv) To combat sensory fatigue, the painter may change the color of several of the lines -- from red to green, for instance.

That this would relieve the sensory fatigue experienced by the spectator is supported by these facts:

"The reverse [sensory] fatigue mutation is simply a case of resting . . . .

"There is, however, another way of producing the counterfatigue mutation . . . . [T]here is plenty of evidence in the practice of artists indicating that the stimulation of the sensation opposite or contrasting to the one fatigued produces a quicker recovery than simple rest. Moreover, the fatiguing of one sensation apparently increases the capacity of vividness for its opposite. This effect is called *sensory contrast*."[46]

(v) To combat attentive fatigue, the painter may change the orientation of several of the lines, from vertical to horizontal ("as with sensory fatigue, a contrasting stimulus is the most effective way of restoring the original sensitivity"[47])."

Here are my comments on Pepper's account:

Points (i,a) and (i,b) demonstrate that habituation indeed exists. But Pepper commits the fallacy of hasty generalization when he infers from his evidence that all sensations whatsoever come to be enjoyable, in and of themselves, after they are

experienced for a period of time. His evidence is consistent, in fact, with the proposition that only some sensations can at first be unenjoyable, but then become enjoyable.

Regarding (i,c): the fact (if it is a fact) that people who have had much experience of color combinations dislike fewer such combinations than those with little experience of color, demonstrates, in my view, only that those who are more experienced have grasped the fact that any combination, whether or not it exhibits harmony in isolation, can, as part of a larger whole, serve to maximize (and equalize) the total moderation-richness of the picture. (Suppose, for instance, that a certain painting consists of shapes S_1, S_2, S_3 and S_4, and suppose that S_1 and S_2 are related by some quite nonmoderational color relation. It could be that changing the color of S_1 (or S_2) in any way such as to bring that color relation closer to moderation will reduce the nearness to moderation of the color relations holding between S_1 and S_3, and S_1 and S_4 (or between S_2 and S_3, and S_2 and S_4) to such an extent that such a change in S_1's (or S_2's) color will always (assuming that the colors of S_3 and S_4 are kept constant) decrease the total moderation-richness of the painting.) Thus, more experienced people will be hesitant to pronounce any combination bad.

Pepper's examples are consistent with the notion that some sensations which are potentially enjoyable for reasons other than simply that we are used to them, are not enjoyed at first, perhaps because we are at that time focusing on the differences between the given sensation and what we are used to -- such focus would surely hinder our appreciation of, for instance, an artwork's intrinsic moderation-richness. His examples are consistent with the notion that some sensations can never become enjoyable, a notion which seems to accord with experience.

Examples (ii,a) and (ii,c) seem to demonstrate that sensory fatigue does in fact occur in the realm of tastes and smells. Examples (ii,b) and (ii,d) are special cases and do not necessarily tell us anything about normal viewing. (ii,b) involves an overall distortion of color of the visual field. (ii,d) involves a sudden transition from black to full color); in fact, although successive and simultaneous contrast are real phenomena, nothing akin to the fatigue-caused lessening of the vividness of tastes and smells happens in vision: stare at a bright red object -- it will not become noticeably less vivid, no matter how long you look at it. And if it became less intense (Pepper seems to be talking about intensity, or saturation, of color), it would not, *contra* his assertions about habituation, necessarily become less enjoyable. The female cardinal's delicate reds, yellows, and browns are lovelier than the male cardinal's bright red. Two colors which contrast when positioned next to one another do intensify each other, but this is clearly not due to fatigue -- it is simply the way that the brain interprets what it sees -- such pairings, in fact, are often more enjoyable once one or both are toned down, made less intense (less vivid -- Pepper seems to equate vividness with intensity, so, for him, a grayed hue could never be vivid [so, how could it be enjoyable? Yet it can be]). Whereas tastes and smells can irretrievably disappear from consciousness, a pure hue, say, could at most become black, gray, or white -- but these are also colors.

Regarding (iii): lines on a canvas which is being attended to, are like the ticks of a clock which is being attended to, not like the ticks of a clock which is not being attended

to. Too many vertical lines in a series are never enjoyable, not even when we first look at them, and they do not pose a problem in a painting by fading from our awareness; rather, the sensitive spectator is only too aware (instantly) of their intrusive presence.

Thus, Pepper has not shown that all visual sensations, via habituation, could become pleasurable for us were it not for fatigue and confusion. And his claim that principles of design are applied (difference relations added) by artists in order to combat sensory fatigue must be false, because sensory fatigue does not in fact cause colors to become less enjoyable. And his claim that such principles are applied in order to combat attentive fatigue seems to be false as well, since we have shown that, in a typical case, attentive fatigue cannot account for the problem that the application of design is supposed to solve.

I conclude, then, that Pepper's account of the goal of design, and thus his explanation of the desirability of S/D parity in painting, cannot be correct.

And one general comment: if Pepper were correct, it would surely be impossible to exceed our ability to grasp what we are seeing by adding a small contrast to a very simple but elegant painting and thereby harm its beauty; and yet it is clearly possible to harm a painting this way. Similarly, small, but inappropriate, additions of unity in a fine, complex, work can lessen its value, although it is difficult to see how we could thereby suffer any monotony.

Arnheim

Arnheim does not attempt to supply a systematic account of r- or R-relations, either of their primary or secondary kinds. His discussions about relations often do not seem carefully thought-through. For instance, the expression, "Similarity and Difference" heads one section,[48] and he says there that "although all things are different in some respects and similar in others, comparisons make sense only when they proceed from a common base." He clearly means to contrast similarity and difference -- but similarity is a species of difference.

Arnheim, in his structural analysis of the painted surface, prefers to focus on supposed directed tensions, forces, and rest rather than on eternal relations. But he points to a correlation between the dynamic and atemporal points of view when he says "similarity acts as a structural principle only in conjunction with separation, namely as a force of attraction among segregated things."[49] Indeed we find in his exposition on color that sameness of primary hue correlates with attraction, whereas difference of primary hue correlates with repulsion. However, since Arnheim claims that a primary hue is attracted to the combination of both remaining primaries, implicit in what he says is that oppositional hues attract. Also, two objects which are physically very close to each other are indeed, according to Arnheim, seen as attracting each other, and this would tend to support his claim that similarity acts as a force of attraction; yet, two objects perhaps only a little less close to one another are said to repel each other.

Although he claims that identity of primary hues acts as a force of attraction, identity between opposing *forces* seems not to imply force or motion at all, but rest.

For reasons such as these, although he seems to wish to link R-relations and forces in some way, it will not be possible to derive an enumeration of kinds of r-relation from his enumeration of forces.

I spoke above (p. 41) about Arnheim's apparent belief that painting can express "the human condition," and I said, "His many articulations of this idea seen to point to the expressive efficacy of a sort of balance between (what amounts to) sameness . . . and difference . . . relations." In these articulations, Arnheim uses terms such as "symmetry," "order" (vs. variety), "connections," and "amorphous mash" to convey the meaning of *sameness*, and expressions like "deviations," "irrational variety of clashes," "separations," and "segregated parts," to get across the meaning of *difference*.

But if the value, in painting, of including something of a balance of sameness and difference relations lies in the notion that only such a parity is capable of expressing, in the way he claims it is, the whole human condition, not just a part of it, then we would expect (though it would not necessarily be true) that such parity would not need to be exact in order for it to be productive of maximum value. Thus, Arnheim's view of the parity, while not strictly running counter to my S1, seems nevertheless to be at odds with it.

Arnheim understands that there is great value in at least a rough S/D parity; but is his account of the nature of this parity correct?

In answering this question, we must first note that his expression theory is most plausibly correct in conjunction with his claim that the visual field is "pervaded by active forces." How does Arnheim attempt to support this latter claim?

Consider the Hering illusion:[50]



Although the vertical lines are imprinted on the retina, i.e. in the *ontogram*, as straight lines, we see them, i.e. in the *phenogram*, as bowed inward.

The existence of this sort of difference between ontogram and phenogram, Arnheim claims, amounts to "tangible evidence that the visual field is pervaded by active forces."[51] His argument can be paraphrased as follows:

> *We can say that in the Hering illusion the ontogram has presented the organism (the spectator) with a set of instances of one line intersecting another. Let us call the angle of intersection of one such instance angle i. We can infer that the organism, in viewing such an instance, experiences a tension whose*

magnitude directly corresponds to the amount of angle i's divergence from 90°, and that there then arise certain dynamic processes which go to work to bring angle i closer to 90° in the phenogram; in this way, the tension is reduced. But the processes themselves must be components of our conscious perception of this pattern of lines. (Arnheim says, apparently referring to these or similar processes, "As long as light affects the brain centers of vision, the pushing and pulling keep going on....Is there any reason to assume that only the outcome of the struggle is reflected in visual experience? Why should the play of physiological forces itself not also find its counterpart in perception? I suggest that it is these forces which we perceive as 'directed tension' or 'movement' in immobile patterns."[52])

Therefore, we infer that the visual field is, fundamentally, in some sense, pervaded by active forces.

It seems true that physiological forces are at work in perception to produce phenograms which are different from their correlative ontograms (surely some difference relations in the ontogram are exaggerated in the phenogram, probably, I speculate, to heighten our powers of conscious discrimination).

But Arnheim moves without justification from the premise that there is *no reason* to assume that the physiological forces are *not* perceived to the judgement that they *are* perceived. Moreover, it might be said that the premise that there is no reason to assume that the physiological forces are not perceived itself may be false; for we might presume that evolutionary processes would have worked against there being such potentially confusing content within our conscious awareness of the world: although a heightened

color contrast, say, between two similarly-colored objects sitting side by side helps us discriminate the true circumstance that we are, indeed, looking at two objects, and misleads us but little, a perception that the two objects are, say, attracted to one another would seem to mislead us as much as assist us.

Another objection against the thesis that, in some sense fundamentally, visual perception is pervaded by forces would be that some people do not see them. Arnheim indicates that such people are simply repressing their natural faculties. He says,

> Any observer not hopelessly spoiled by the practice of static measurements, which dominates our civilization, will confirm Henri Bergson's observation: "C'est que la forme est pour nous le dessin d'un mouvement."[53]

And he says,

> The dynamics is an integral part of what an observer sees as long as his natural sensory responsiveness has not been repressed by an education geared to the static metrics of inch and foot, wavelength, and miles per hour.[54]

And he says,

> Even so perceptive an observer as the philosopher Hans Jonas asserts that "no force-experience, no character of impulse and transitive causality, enters into the nature of the image." Such blindness to a conspicuous fact is probably due to what psychologists call the 'stimulus error,' namely the assumption that if a property cannot be found in the physical stimulus object, it cannot exist in the perceptual image either.[55]

This rebuttal by Arnheim does seem to answer the simple objection that some people do not see the forces, but we must still ask, how could the perception of forces be repressed in a person yet the person's enjoyment of art, and indeed, as in my own case, his insight into S/D parity *not* be repressed?

Furthermore, the apparent fact, as can, I believe, be established through minimalistic experiments, that goodness correlates precisely with higher M, counts against any version of Arnheim's thesis which has it that greatest good is not correlated with precise parity.

Perhaps most importantly, Arnheim fails to show why such expression of the human condition is valuable to us at all. By contrast, we have in the Hutcheson generality-seeking instinct an explanation for how it is that S1 might be true.

CHAPTER 3

DEALING WITH THE EXPLANATION-GAP:

INFLATIONIST AND "DEFLATIONIST" STRATEGIES

Section 13

Wollheim and the Inflationist Strategy

We can probably summarize Wollheim's central claim, in *Painting as an Art* [1], in the following conditional statement:

S_w:

IF a certain instance of painting activity is practiced such that the painter, in an activity called "thematization," wills that the properties of *mark*, *surface*, *orientation*, *motif*, or *image* be handled in his painting in this or that way so as, primarily[2], to endow the surface with *meaning* (see below) and, secondarily but importantly, to get and give pleasure, or visual delight, and

IF[3] this thematization reaches aspects of painting too fine-grained for language to follow, and it occurs within that fragment of our psychology which is essentially embodied, and *style* is exhibited,

THEN this instance of painting-activity is an instance of painting practiced *as an art*.

What Wollheim means by "meaning" in S_w

I interpret Wollheim as saying that a painter may paint with the intent of seeing to it that

(1) the spectator *sees* a certain thing *in* the painting, e.g. the spectator sees a bison (represented) in the painting, or that

(2) the spectator has an experience of *expressive perception*; e.g. he experiences a landscape as melancholy, or that

(3) the spectator experiences the painting as articulating (in some sense) some proposition, and presenting it in a certain light (connecting with it certain thoughts, feelings, or emotions), or that

(4) the spectator experiences some motif or image borrowed from earlier art (the artist seeing the context in a certain mode of its presentation) in a certain light -- as connecting (in a publicly-established way) with certain thoughts, feelings, and emotions, such that other meaning in the painting is amplified or revealed, or that

(5) the spectator experiences the painting as a whole, or some large zone of it, as a metaphor for something else (viz., most fundamentally, the human body), under a certain description or mode of presentation, such that certain feelings, certain emotions, sentiments, or phantasies are experienced, or that

(6) The spectator experiences that which the act of painting itself means to the painter.

When the painter paints in order to produce one of these experiences in the viewer, and indeed paints in such a way that a suitably sensitive and informed spectator will respond in the desired way, then, Wollheim says, the painting possesses, thereby, *meaning.*

When the intended experience is of type (1) above, such a painting is said by Wollheim to have *representational meaning;* when it is of type (2), it has, according to him, *expressive meaning;* type (3): *textual meaning;* type (4): *historical meaning;* type (5): *metaphorical meaning.* These five are kinds of meaning which Wollheim calls *primary meaning.* When the intended experience is of type (6), the painting is said by Wollheim to have *secondary meaning.*

I will not say in any *direct* way whether I take this central claim of Wollheim's S_w to be true or false, since, for reasons I have stated, I eschew here all questions of definition/essence of art.

I do intend, however, to assess some of Wollheim's particular claims concerning artists' intentions.

Wollheim on textual meaning – Poussin's* Rinaldo and Armida *(Wollheim's Chapter IV, B.2)

Nicolas Poussin's *Rinaldo and Armida* of 1629 is discussed by Wollheim in connection with his notion of textual meaning. The subject matter of this painting derives from Torquato Tasso's *Gerusalemme Liberata.* Wollheim writes of this painting,

> It is one of two paintings in which Poussin represented the moment when the heathen Armida, about to kill the sleeping Rinaldo, a Christian knight, holds back, overcome by his beauty. This event, as it occurs in the epic, allegorizes -- and the lead here comes from Tasso himself -- the triumph of reason over concupiscence: reason symbolized by the young crusader, concupiscence by the infidel sorceress. If we ask, now recognizing it to be a further question, And does the painting too, as well as the event itself, allegorize the text?, then, on my view of the matter, we are required to look at the picture to see if . . . Poussin revealed how he conceived of the victory of reason over sexual desire, or what this theme meant to him.[4]

Probably, the verbless expression, "the victory of reason over sexual desire," cannot be identified as the *text* which enters the content of the painting, since Wollheim says that a text must be propositional.[5] Wollheim in fact says of this painting and certain other paintings by Poussin, "The textual content is to the effect that reason should triumph over sexual desire or concupiscence."[6] What, then, is the textual meaning here? What does this text *mean* to Poussin? Wollheim answers this question, claiming that

> for Poussin the victory of reason over concupiscence is achieved through reason borrowing the resources of concupiesence. For him the defeat of desire by reason is experienced as the victory of one kind of desire over another.[7]

But what is Wollheim's evidence that this is in fact what the text in question meant to Poussin, and that this is what he intended to convey here to the suitably sensitive and informed spectator?

First, Wollheim claims that we can see in this painting an eroticized Rinaldo and a neutered Armida. Poussin's Rinaldo, Wollheim says,

> is not, I suggest, the austere and intrepid knight of religious epic, whom at this stage in this narrative we might expect. The relaxed limbs, set off against the burnished armour, the thick furry plume, the breeches of a shot yellowish-orange, which hange [*sic*] invitingly loose around the young man's thighs, tell a different story. They speak of a luxuriant

> sensuousness. Rinaldo sleeps on his shield, we notice, as though he were sleeping on a woman's breast.[8]

Of Armida he says,

> We see a woman of mask-like appearance, in sharp profile, with drapery floating behind her. . . .[9]

Moreover, Wollheim asks us to consider a certain painting titled *Armida carrying off Rinaldo*, which at least "surely preserves," Wollheim says, "an original composition of Poussin's":[10] this is a painting which depicts an immediately subsequent part of the same story that the first painting illustrates. If you look at this painting, Wollheim claims, you will see an Armida who is restored to her natural, voluptuous, state, and you will also see that the eroticism of Rinaldo has left him. "It is hard to resist the inference," Wollheim says, "that the sexuality that Rinaldo exudes in the [first] painting he there possesses at the expense of Armida."[11]

Further, Wollheim says that

> in order to convey the inner nature of this moral conflict, [the first painting] puts to use the third figure, who must be the incarnation, or the external agent, of Rinaldo's reason in its struggle with Armida's desire. For, as the putto, who holds back the arm which holds the dagger, surveys the scene, his childish puckered face is suffused with that same sexuality which, on my perception of this picture, Rinaldo has found himself taking over from Armida in order to ensure her moral discomfiture.[12]

But in my view, Armida's mask-like face and Rinaldo's erotic appearance are consistent with a more straightforward interpretation than Wollheim's: Armida's face reflects her intention to commit that act which, until this very moment, she was bent on committing. Her concupiscence, externalized as the putto, stays her hand. Rinaldo, the symbol of Reason, presents an aspect of the very sort that will charm concupiscence.

Nothing in this painting, then, seems to justify the notion that Poussin intended that a suitably sensitive and informed spectator of this work understand Rinaldo's sexuality as possessed by Rinaldo at the expense of Armida. Such an idea must be supported, if it can be, by other material advanced by Wollheim as evidence.

But his other evidence is even weaker: it seems plainly true that, in the second painting, *Armida carrying off Rinaldo*, Armida has not been eroticized. The figure is awkward, even comic. I find it difficult to believe in fact that this painting either is, or in any accurate way reproduces, a work by Poussin.

Wollheim on historical meaning -- Manet's racetrack paintings (Wollheim's Chapter IV, C)

According to Wollheim, an artist will experience a feeling of rivalry whenever he borrows a motif or image from an artist whom he admires. The artist's feeling of admiration together with his feeling of rivalry may, Wollheim claims, cause him to experience envy, which, he says, amounts to a desire to attack something because it is good. The artist's envy, in turn, gives rise, he says, to a feeling of anxiety because the artist fears retaliation, and because envy divides "the envious person against himself, getting him to hate what he loves."[13]

Moderate envy, Wollheim says, is compatible with art, but powerful envy is not.

Wollheim suggests that the borrowings of Edouard Manet are not connected with Manet's envy but with his *fear* of envy. Wollheim focuses on a group of Manet's works, paintings which Manet made of the horse races, which, Wollheim says, represent rivalry,

paintings in which we supposedly find Manet attempting to allay his fear of envy. It is unclear whether or not Wollheim means to imply that any borrowing occurs in these paintings; but it seems clear enough, at any rate, that he means to say that the rivalry represented by Manet in these works is the very same rivalry which is connected with his borrowings from older art.

The works which Wollheim points to are these: Manet's painting, *Races at Longchamp*, a drawing having the same title, and his *Races in the Bois de Boulogne*. In all of these works, Wollheim claims, we can see Manet attempting to come to grips with his fear of envy. "To allay this fear," Wollheim says, "the obvious means would be the cultivation of indeterminance, ambiguity, confusion, and Manet . . . uses them."[14]

Wollheim seems to believe that in the case of the first two works, Manet accomplishes his goal of producing a sense of indeterminacy, etc., by means of representing the races from a head-on vantage point. Wollheim claims that this vantage point "makes it maximally difficult to discover who wins, who loses,"[15] and in the first work, it is in fact difficult to tell which horse is ahead. In the second work, although it is easy for the viewer to discern which horse's legs are in front, some indeterminacy nevertheless exists, because the horses' bodies appear to blend together. Wollheim suggests that Manet intentionally conceals the winner in these ways *in order to* allay his fear of envy.

In the third work, *Races in the Bois de Boulogne*, Manet paints a side-view of the races. Although in this painting it is clear to the viewer which horse is winning the race, Manet represents only the first four horses, cropping the picture so that only the front half of the fourth horse is visible. Wollheim believes that Manet masked the rear of the field

in this work in order to conceal the *loser*, and that he wished to conceal the loser in order, once again, to allay his fear of envy.

But all of this can be nothing but sheer speculation on Wollheim's part. There seems to be no evidence whatsoever that Manet's choices of vantage point, his blending of forms, and his picture-cropping were motivated by the reasons Wollheim suggests.

There are, in fact, more prosaic possible reasons for Manet's having decided to paint the races from the front in the first two works. It may, for instance, have been a quite arbitrary decision on his part to do so: artists often choose their subjects more or less at random. In such a case, whatever happens to have found its way into the artist's field of view becomes for him or her a mere starting-point upon which to build a composition. Or, Manet might have imagined that works in which the races were represented from this standpoint would be compositionally challenging. He may well, for instance, have wished to see if a central cluster of shapes could be made to form the basis of a formally interesting work. These are perfectly plausible and simple explanations for his choice of station point. And one need not subscribe to any particular theory of composition in order to understand them as such: the typical art student of the recent past would have taken them to be grounded in common knowledge about artists' goals and methods. Wollheim's interpretation, on the other hand, is exotic and complex. Parsimony requires us to adopt the simplest of competing views unless good reasons can be given for choosing the more complex - Wollheim supplies us with no such good reasons. At most, Wollheim can justifiably claim that his view might be true.

In the second work, the horses' bodies are, indeed not very distinct from one another. But this sketch is clearly a compositional study, and compositionally, the horses'

bodies coalesced into a single shape. There is no reason to look for a complex psychological explanation.

In the case of the third picture, Manet's placing the lead horse in the picture's center necessarily obscures the loser. But such a placement would not be odd if, quite simply, Manet wished to portray the winner, or if he felt such placement would facilitate a strong composition: the placement of carriages and race horses in this painting produces a fairly lively yet controlled arrangement of dark shapes which compares favorably with, for instance, the way in which the dark shapes are uniformly spread out across the picture in John Dalby's *Racing at Hoylake, 1851*. There is no reason at all to hypothesize some complex psychological reason for Manet's failure to portray the loser in this painting.

Note the suspicious nature of Wollheim's arguments here: he claims that Manet's *obscuring* of the winner reveals his attempt to allay his fear of envy. But his *focusing* on the winner reveals the same thing, since he thereby fails to portray the *loser*. But presenting only the middle of the race would obscure the winner and loser and so ought to reveal the same thing; and if Manet had painted a long painting, illustrating in detail the entire field, then Wollheim could claim that the inclusion of all the horses distracts us from, and thus obscures, the winner (and loser) and thus reveals, again, Manet's attempt at allaying his fear of envy. Thus there is no way that Manet could have painted the races and avoided Wollheim's inference.

Metaphorical meaning (1) -- Titian's* Concert Champêtre *and* The Three Ages of Man *(Wollheim's Chapter VI, B, 1)

It is Wollheim's claim that in painting *Concert Champêtre* and *The Three ages of Man*, Titian's intent was that his painting be seen as a metaphor for the human body, the body as a locus of pleasure, beauty, and death.

The first principal way in which, Wollheim claims, Titian manages to see to it that these paintings metaphorize the body is this:

Wollheim says that Titian represents the bodies of his human subjects in such a way that a powerful sense of vitality is communicated to the spectator. According to Wollheim, Titian accomplishes this in two ways: (1) the body is presented such that it seems "about to move into action":[16] Titian imbues his figures with this (incipient?) action by portraying "the relaxation of the body, the sudden sagging of the limbs,"[17] and especially by portraying "the gaze, the searching activity of the eye, seeking to gain knowledge, to express adoration, to arouse desire, to catch, to return, to elude, the gaze of the other";[18] (2) the body is represented by Titian in such a way that "we become aware of the colored expanse in which we see the body as something spreading or pushing outwards."[19] Wollheim claims that one way in which Titian achieves this latter effect in *The Three Ages of Man* is by bending "the bodies of the young girl and her lover away from one another, [in order to make them] open up like the pages of a book; thereby he extends the silhouette that they jointly form to its maximum, so as to generate the spreading effect."[20]

Once Titian has filled bodies with vitality in these ways, Wollheim claims, he manages to transfer the bodily vitality outwards to the painting as a whole, so that the painting itself will serve (in the eyes of the suitably sensitive spectator) as a metaphor for the human body. The following are some of the ways in which Titian accomplishes this transfer, according to Wollheim:

First, Titian establishes equivalences between body and nature: in the *Concert Champêtre*, an equivalence is established between flesh and stone, and between hair and foliage; in *The Three Ages of Man*, an equivalence is established between youthful skin and sky.

Second, Wollheim says, "there is the anonymity of the represented figures, which in turn brings them closer to nature."[21]

Third, "there is a simplification of colour, and in particular the use of near-complementaries, which has a special binding effect."[22]

Fourth, perspective is neglected, in the *Concert Champêtre* for instance, where Titian fails to foreshorten the left leg of the seated woman. "This retreat from perspective encourages the global response to the picture as a whole."[23]

Fifth, "there is the production of what asks to be thought of as a paint skin. In the *Concert Champêtre* this is of a uniform graininess, exploiting the coarse weave of the canvas to which Titian inclined: in *The Three Ages of Man* . . . there are many deliberate alternations of texture, so that the visible brushstroke at one moment is there to portray detail, say a leaf in the foreground, and at the next moment suggests mass, such as the swelling of the hedge beyond the near meadow."[24]

The second principal way that, according to Wollheim, Titian sees to it that these paintings metaphorize the body has to do with the body as container:

In the *Concert Champêtre* there is a tiny background image of a shepherd, and in *The Three Ages of Man* there is a similarly diminutive figure of an old man. Because, Wollheim says, there is, with respect to these figures, an "absence . . . of all the obvious signs of a projective system in use, these small delicate cut-outs . . . turn into tiny decorative fragments which have been scattered across the picture."[25]

Also, Wollheim claims, certain *sounds* "lie around inside" the *Concert Champêtre* and *The Three Ages of Man*. These are the sounds which we would associate with certain things represented in these pictures: stringed instrument, wind instruments, water flowing out of a jug.

Thus, visual objects and sounds, Wollheim says, lie around inside of these pictures and cause the spectator to view the pictures as containers--the represented things come to be "thought of . . . as things that can be put away in a container,"[26] and the sounds bring to mind the fact that "the notes lie around inside the music box when the tune has stopped, or that the hum lies around inside the fridge."[27]

The thought of the picture as being a container, then, Wollheim claims, induces the thought of the body, since the body is also a container. Thus the picture, Wollheim says, is made to metaphorize the body.

Let us look individually at Wollheim's claims concerning the *Concert Champêtre* and *The Three Ages of Man*:

First, we may ask if Wollheim is justified in claiming that Titian portrays a sudden sagging of the limbs, and thereby charges the represented bodies with vitality. In

fact, the only limb which could perhaps be said to be sagging in these two paintings is the right arm of the young man in *The Three Ages of Man;* but, assuming that the arm is sagging, there seems to be nothing at all to indicate that there is a "sudden" sagging. In fact, there is no reason to suppose that the arm is in the act of relaxing as opposed to being in a state of relaxation. There seems to be very little to suggest limb-action in these two paintings.

Second, we may ask if we do in fact find in these works a special portrayal of the *gaze*, one which imbues the represented bodies with vitality. We must ask if we really do find in these paintings "the searching activity of the eye, seeking to gain knowledge, to express adoration, to arouse desire, to catch, to return, to elude, the gaze of the other." We can imagine how a painter might be able, in certain represented contexts, to portray such activities -- examples which come immediately to mind are story illustrations in magazines--but I do not see it here at all.

And we may ask if Titian in fact did intend that we see the represented bodies in these works as "spreading or pushing outwards" and thus see the figures as active. Specifically, we may ask if, in *The Three ages of Man*, the bodies of the young girl and her lover are in fact "bent away" from one another so as to "generate the spreading effect"? Again, I do not see this effect at all. These two figures are, of course, separated from one another by a certain distance, but there seems to be no justification for saying that they are bent away from one another as opposed to being statically placed or bent towards one another. One could make an equally (un)convincing case for the notion that these figures generate a *contracting* effect (they are, one could say, for instance, pressing tightly together on one side of the picture).

But, Titian can, in fact, be said to give his figures vitality through his rendering of rosy skin tone and of contour composed of "active" curves and angles. Thus, it seems correct enough to say, but not for Wollheim's reasons, that Titian portrays (as is common in such works) the human body in a way such as to give it some measure of vitality. (The vitality in Titian's figures does not appear to derive from any odd and mysterious Wollheimian effects, but from fairly straightforward ones.)

But we must still ask if this sense of a vital body, deriving straightforwardly from obvious association to what is represented, and from use of "active" contour, does, in fact, get transferred, as Wollheim would have it, from the figures to the painting as a whole:

Does Titian, for instance, in fact establish "equivalences" in these paintings between flesh and stone, between hair and foliage, and between youthful skin and sky?

One can, of course, discover similarities (and dissimilarities) between these items (there is shape-similarity for instance, between the head of one figure in the *Concert Champêtre* and the leafy boughs behind her), but there seems to be no basis for saying that significant equivalences exists, for instance that we come, in any significant way, to sense that the boughs have taken on human-bodily character (or that the head has taken on arboreal character).

It would seem that, since (for instance) there is some textural similarity (smoothness) and similarity of shape between the image of the stringed instrument and that of the grassy field behind it in the *Concert Champêtre*, consistency would require Wollheim to say that we therefore see the painting as beginning to metaphorize stringed-instrument-ness. And, it would seem, Wollheim would have to say that, since the

figures' skin has some resemblance (along with dissimilarity) to the sky, that the sky is spreading out, thus that the painting begins to metaphorize the sky. In fact, it seems preposterous to say that our associations ordinarily connect things to any appreciable extent along such tenuous lines of similarity as these, such that Titian might have been able to count on them to do so.

Also, there is dissimilarity between, for instance, skin and foliage -- should such dissimilarities as this then not work *against* the painting becoming a metaphor for body?

Regarding Wollheim's claim that the anonymity of the represented figures in these works bring these figures closer to nature: is this in fact true of these figures?

Perhaps one could make a case for the idea that represented anonymous human figures possess more similarity to represented trees, for instance, which themselves are always "anonymous," than representations of non-anonymous persons would be, and it seems true for other reasons that the figures in these paintings seem to exist harmoniously within their represented natural surroundings. Thus, there is in fact a unity here -- human beings being at one with nature. But the sense thereby conveyed is that body here exists harmoniously in nature, not that nature suddenly *becomes* body, not that trees, rocks and sky come to have attributes which up till this moment were uniquely possessed by the human body; and surely not that the painting itself has come to have bodily attributes.

Again, there are perhaps as many dissimilarities between these figures and their environs as similarities, and one wonders why the dissimilarities would not cancel out the similarities such that no metaphor would be set up.

And we can ask whether there *is* in fact, in these works, a simplification of color, a "use of near-complementaries, which has a special binding effect." It is not clear what

Wollheim means by "use of near complementaries," and the colors surely both bind together and are separate. Roughly speaking, for every item that unifies, an item could be found which disunifies -- should not Wollheim then claim that the painting itself must metaphorize both body and non-body? And according to this logic, if any painting contains a representation of some object, and that representation is on the whole similar to some other representation of an object within the painting, then the painting as a whole metaphorizes, at least to some extent, both represented things.

A further question arises: if we grant, for the sake of discussion, that represented trees and sky come to be seen as metaphors for body, what could justify the claim that we thereby come to see the painting itself as a metaphor for the body? Could such a claim be justified by pointing to an alleged failure of Titian to foreshorten the leg of the seated woman in the *Concert Champêtre*? It would seem that it could not, for she is seated on a rise of ground and upon a crumpled garment, and thus there is no reason to assume that there is any failure here to foreshorten the leg. And even if there were a minor "retreat from perspective," such could hardly justify the claim that it "encourages the global response" in any significant way, or that such encouragement was intended by Titian.

And what of the notion that Titian has produced "what asks to be thought of as a paint skin"? All paintings have a paint surface, and it must have texture, and the texture, as produced by a master, is likely to be fairly uniform across the surface. Why on earth would one suppose that what is there of necessity was intended to metaphorize human skin?

There is, I believe, no basis for Wollheim's claim that the sense of body which Titian gives to his represented figures spreads out into the painting as a whole, thus

allowing the painting to metaphorize body. Wollheim could claim that our experience in front of the painting ought to be enough to convince us that these works possess the sort of meaning which he attributes to them. But I do not see these paintings as bodily metaphor, and would caution those who do to be skeptical: a careful observer will take pains to distinguish between those feelings which are truly conveyed by the image from those which he has autonomously summoned up from his imagination.

But what of Wollheim's claim that certain small images and sounds "lie around" inside the picture and thus, in accord with some intention of Titian's, induce the spectator to think of the human body?

Wollheim here is clearly asserting that a certain chain of association takes place spontaneously in the mind of the suitably sensitive spectator as he looks at these works, and that Titian counted on these associations to occur, in order that his painting would metaphorize the body. But let us take a look at the putative chain of association:

Implicit here is the notion that, seeing the little figures, the spectator thinks (on some level): "these are like things that can be put in boxes and drawers; therefore, the picture is like a box or a drawer. The human body is a container, and therefore is like a box or a drawer. Therefore, the picture is like the human body."

But that our minds run along such wild paths of association is not plausible. These links are extremely tenuous (the following facts count against any such associations being experienced: it seems that we run into tiny things outside of boxes or drawers much more often than we run into them *in* boxes or drawers. And the human body seems much more dissimilar from a drawer than it is similar to it).

In the same vein, Wollheim implies that the following associations are likely to occur spontaneously:

> The picture represents musical instruments and flowing water. Musical instruments and flowing water make sounds. Music boxes and refrigerators make sounds and these sounds lie around inside them. Music boxes and refrigerators are containers. Therefore, the sounds of instruments and water lie around within their container, the picture. The human body is also a container. Therefore, the picture is seen as being (metaphorizing) a human body.

That we might think this way is a bizarre notion. Has anyone besides Wollheim imagined that sounds "lie around" in music boxes and refrigerators? It seems plainly true that the notion that all these connections might be made by a significant number of spectators is incredibly far-fetched.

The claim that Titian intended that his paintings be viewed as metaphorizing in these ways the human body seems to be a complete fabrication on Wollheim's part.

Metaphorical meaning (2) -- Bellotto's* Views of Schloss Königstein *(Wollheim's Chapter VI, C)

Some paintings, Wollheim claims, metaphorize the body without representing it. He presents several putative examples of such work, including Bernardo Bellotto's *View of Schloss Königstein from the South* (late 1750's) and Bellotto's *View of Schloss*

Königstein from the West (late 1750's). With respect to these works, Wollheim speaks of "three features of [the buildings'] representation that generate corporeality."[28]

First, he says,

> the buildings emanate a sense of mass, but they are also without massiveness. . . . [T]hey do not just lie on the grass . . . . They reach upwards . . . . They seem capable of gentle upward movement.[29]

Second, he says, the represented windows and doors are not

> represented as places where the wall surface has been cut into, a part of it excised and thrown away, and something else behind it then revealed to exist. The secret to their representation is that they are to be seen as integral or undamaged parts of the wall which nevertheless allow access to, and exit from, and, above all, knowledge of, what lies beyond the wall. They mark and decorate the junction of outside and inner, as do the eyes, the lips, the anus.[30]

Third, Wollheim claims, Bellotto presents

> the material of the wall not as some stuff, some chance stuff, out of which these free-standing buildings and their attachments have been modelled or given shape, but as something which has helped to determine their shape and their character.[31]

As an example of this supposed effect, Wollheim points to a wall in the foreground of one of the paintings: some of the plaster has fallen away from this wall, exposing in places the core of large stone blocks. "At least for a moment," Wollheim states,

> . . . we feel that nothing is missing and that what we are observing is the material weathering, maturing, forming a patina, exhibiting . . . the material's 'truth' . . . . The material is, ambiguously, now plaster, now hard core; it oscillates between the two. At one moment the hard core develops plaster like a bloom, the next moment it is the plaster that has caked into hard core.[32]

And Bellotto has achieved this effect, Wollheim says, by establishing a correspondence between paint surface and wall surface, by laying down over both the represented plaster

and the represented stone "an irregular grid of very thinly painted marks."[33] Thus, Wollheim claims,

> the paint surface becomes a surface. Nor, if I am right about the metaphoricity of Bellotto's art, does it, can it, stop there. Bellotto's paint surface, having become a surface, becomes a skin.[34]

Thus, Wollheim says, the architectural representations have been imbued by Bellotto with an aura of corporeality. How then does Bellotto, according to Wollheim, get this corporeality to spread outward to encompass the whole painting itself? Wollheim says,

> Undoubtedly in both these paintings the buildings, like the bodies in . . . Titian, appear to swell under our eyes so that, momentarily at least, they promise to take over the total picture.[35]

Wollheim, in continuing the remarks I cited immediately above, also alludes to another process (perhaps related to the first, perhaps not):

> Bellotto's paint surface, having become a surface, becomes a skin: not, of course, in its localized character, but in its overall effect.[36]

Wollheim may be correct when he says that a building in general "is a well-entrenched metaphor for"[37] the body, but we must ask, first, whether or not the buildings *in this case* were actually intended by the artist to metaphorize the body and, second, if they were, whether or not this metaphor in fact facilitates the transformation of the paintings themselves into metaphors for body.

With respect to the first question, Wollheim says that in the case of each of the three features which supposedly generate corporeality, "the feature is bound up with an optical effect which is not necessarily conserved in reproduction."[38] But even if we have

not been able to travel to Manchester to take a look at the originals, we can at least say whether or not his book convinces us:

First of all, we may ask, does anything come across to us from these reproductions which might give us a sense that the represented buildings "seem capable of gentle upward movement"? I, myself, simply do not experience this effect. I see large buildings firmly resting on the ground, and having no such capability of movement. (That is, I do not experience any such effect unless I intentionally summon an imaginary feeling that an upward force is a property of these buildings. I am also able to imagine that the force is lateral, oblique, or downward.) But even if such an effect were truly present, it is hard to see how it would convey a sense of corporeality, since human bodies sink to earth and do not rise like helium balloons.

Second, it is difficult to see what visual clues might possibly exist to set windows and doors which had been cut into the wall off from those which are an integral part of the wall (i.e. around which the wall was built?). And even if they were clearly an integral part of the wall, because this is the usual case in buildings, there would be nothing unusual at all here to suggest that the buildings in these works might serve as metaphors for the body.

Third, it is difficult to see how we might perceive the wall as one substance somehow oscillating between two manifestations, one of plaster and one of rock--the notion that an overpainting of small marks could cause, or could have been meant to cause, the viewer to experience such a strange perception sounds incredible; but even if it did, and the sensitive spectator were to see the wall as being made of such a substance, it is not clear how the spectator might come to think that such an odd material would have

been such as to determine the wall's shape. But if the spectator did come to think that strange thought, it is not clear how this fact would, in any significant way, get him or her to connect the wall with the human body.

Fourth, we can ask if it is *true* that "undoubtedly . . . the buildings . . . appear to swell under our eyes."

I do not see this "swelling" at all--and there seems to be nothing about these buildings to suggest that they *might* appear to swell. (Could our perceptual apparatus possibly be so deceptive that we perceive things swelling when they are not? Would not evolution have cured us of propensities for such apparently useless illusory perception ages ago? Cf. my discussion on Arnheim.)

Fifth, we ask, *does* Bellotto's paint surface become a skin? Once again, I do not see it, and Wollheim offers no evidence that the effect is actually present.

Here also, then, Wollheim's claims appear to be completely unsupported, and seemingly fictitious, or imaginary.

Secondary meaning -- Ingres' Antiochus and Stratonice, *etc. (Wollheim's Chapter V, B, 3,5, and 8)*

Wollheim points to certain spatial anomalies in the work of Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres which he claims reveals what the act of painting meant to Ingres. He says,

> [Ingres'] composition most endowed with such anomalies is *Antiochus and Stratonice* in all its versions. In both the Chantilly and Montpellier versions there are two large columns which are unambiguously behind the

> canopy of the bed. It is strongly suggested, both by the width of its profile and by how much of the rear wall it occludes, that the column against which Stratonice is silhouetted -- and the same must hold for the column at the left of the picture and that to the right of the bed -- is another member of this row, and that it is therefore at the same distance from the picture plane. However according to atmospheric clues this column stands within the depth of the bed-canopy. In the Chantilly picture the plinth on which the statue of Alexander is placed starts off, at its base, in the same plane as the column to its left -- the patterned floor shows this -- but, at the elevation of the statue itself, the impression is given that the plinth is behind the column. It is an impression that grows upon us as we retreat from the picture. In the Montpellier picture, the body of Stratonice appears to be so close to the column against which she is silhouetted as actually to cast a shadow upon it: she might even be leaning on it. But the positioning of her feet indicates her to be half the bed's width in front of it. Indeed if we turn to the other side of the picture we can see there that - as in the Chantilly picture, which in this respect it reproduces - the corresponding space is enough to contain the following: a circular table under which the nurse crouches; then a gap; and then another figure, who leans in distress against a column.[39]

Wollheim says,

> these anomalies require a strong explanation. Carelessness, clumsiness, oversight, will not suffice with such a fastidious, painstaking artist dedicated to self-examination and self-correction . . . .[40]

Thus, Wollheim seeks another explanation: "The spectator will, I suggest," says Wollheim,

> experience these spatial anomalies as though they had been brought about by someone strenuously trying to wrench apart the scene, to dislocate objects, to open up gaps, so as to accomplish changes upon which he has set his heart. He has made for himself increments of space within which he can impose his will.[41]

Ingres is, Wollheim claims, attempting to effect changes in the world by means of distorting space in his paintings.

But what are these changes that, as Wollheim would have it, Ingres is attempting to make in the world by means of his act of painting?

Wollheim claims that Ingres wishes to accomplish "a re-ordering of the family, in which one essential element would be the humanization of the father. The father must melt."[42]

It does seem true to say that the spatial anomalies about which Wollheim speaks do in fact exist in these paintings. But, although Ingres may well have hoped for changes of some kind to occur in his real or imagined relationship with his father as a result of his having taken up the oedipal theme here, there seems to be no good reason to assume that Ingres really intended to change his father and his own family by means of his wrenching-apart of represented space. In

fact, it is not clear that we can even make sense of the notion of Ingres having "made for himself increments of space within which he [could] impose his will."

Is it true that carelessness, clumsiness, or oversight will not explain these anomalies?

There is an effect, which I will call "thought-over-image dominance," of which many artists are aware, which often causes an artist's initial errors to remain uncorrected. What happens is this:

The artist wishes to mark his surface in a certain way, W. But, because of haste, because of creative lack of restraint, or simply because of how wholes must be built up from parts during the drawing/painting process, the surface comes to be marked in a different way, W'.

Now, even though the artist would see the canvas marked in way W' if he had not painted it himself, because he painted it himself, he may see the canvas marked in way W; that is, his *thought* may dominate what he sees. And, interestingly, there is no way

for him to see it the way everyone else sees it, that is, marked in way W', unless he looks at it in a mirror or turns the work upside down. Often, only the comments of another person will alert the artist to the problem.

Although it seems very generally true that mastery of the medium involves a lessening of the artist's fallibility along these lines, there is no reason to suppose that artists who have acquired superior mastery over much of what great painting demands of them, will not be prone to such errors. We need only suppose that Ingres was still to some small extent prone to make initial errors, then experience the thought-over-image dominance effect, and for whatever reason (excessive confidence?) failed to take those precautions which would have enabled him to catch these subtle errors. The key here is to note that the fact of Ingres' manifest fastidiousness ought not be taken to be good evidence to conclude that Ingres' spatial anomalies were not mistakes -- no matter how fastidious the artist is, he will not correct an error he does not detect.

The error explanation for Ingres' spatial anomalies seems far simpler, and thus more compelling, than Wollheim's very strange and incredible explanation: Ingres wrenched apart his represented space in these oedipal works in order to, somehow or other, wrench apart reality such as to make his father melt, to humanize his father, and make him become less of a rival or threat.

It seems entirely plausible, however, that Ingres did view these paintings as oedipally charged, and that this is behind his apparent fascination with them, and there is no reason not to suspect that on some level he expected that his act of painting would somehow determine the mind set or action of his father. In fact, the oedipal drama which Ingres illustrates must grab us as well on as deep a level as the story itself does, and

surely Ingres' command of UIV in one way or another enhances this experience. I simply doubt that the spatial anomalies have anything to do with all this.

The meaning-augmentation device of the unrepresented internal spectator – Friedrich landscapes (Wollheim's Chapter III, B) and certain of Manet's single-figure compositions (Wollheim's Chapter III, C)

Wollheim claims that in the case of each painting of a certain set of paintings which includes Caspar David Friedrich's landscapes and some paintings by Edouard Manet, the artist intended that there be an unrepresented internal spectator in the picture, and that this spectator have (1) a certain set of dispositions which will determine his actions, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, and (2) a field of vision which coincides with what can be seen in the picture. [Claim 1]

Further, Wollheim claims that the artist, in these cases, has supplied the means whereby an external spectator, looking at one of these paintings, can "retrieve" this internal spectator, in that the artist has somehow enabled the external spectator to become aware (unconsciously?) of the presence of this internal spectator *qua* one with such and such dispositions and field of view. [Claim 2]

The external spectator can, Wollheim claims, then look at the painting and start to imagine--as if from the inside of the internal spectator, and in accord with the very dispositions which the artist has given this internal spectator--the internal spectator perceiving, thinking about, responding to, etc., what is before him. [Claim 3]

Although the external spectator does not, in this process, really come to *have* these imagined perceptions, thoughts, responses, etc., he is, Wollheim says, nevertheless left "in that condition in which really having had such perceptions, thoughts, feelings, might be expected to leave [him]."[43] (This effect is called by Wollheim "cogency".)[Claim 4]

According to Wollheim, the external spectator as a result of this process "gains fresh access to the picture's content [viz. the painting's meanings],"[44] and thus comes more fully to understand the painting. [Claim 5]

Are any of these claims true? Claim 3, it seems, would be rather straightforwardly true if claims 1 and 2 were true, and we can note that a certain claim, a claim which is implied by claim 1 is obviously true whether or not claim 1 is, namely:

An artist may intend that there be an unrepresented internal spectator in the picture, and that this spectator have (1) a certain set of dispositions . . . . [Claim 1']

But his claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 require justification. Wollheim supplies a hint about how we might find this justification in specific cases. He says,

> unless [the internal spectator] can do more than perceive, . . . he cannot offer . . . distinctive access to the content of the picture. And it is only if he does this that he discharges his function, and it is only if he discharges this function that there is reason to believe in his existence, or to hold that the painting actually contains a spectator in the picture.[45]

Is Wollheim saying here that if I end up with distinctive access to the content of the picture, that I can infer the presence of an internal spectator such as is described

above (and with which I identified unconsciously)? But how might I know that my access is distinctive?

Or is Wollheim actually suggesting that I might actually become aware that although I did not really have, say, certain expressive perceptions, I am in a condition such as I would have been, *had* I had them?

Perhaps more plausibly, Wollheim is suggesting that if I *look* at his examples in light of his counsel that I will simply come to *feel* that the content of each work is what he claims it is, and that it contains an unrepresented internal spectator with just those dispositions he claims it has--he may believe, in other words, that the required justification comes about by way of simple, guided observation.

But this kind of evidence will not be enough for those of us who do not, in fact, see what we are supposed to see in his examples, and that others may see it does little toward justifying it for me, since I am aware of how careful we all must be here so that we do not fall prey to the power of suggestion, since mere imagining of the effects of which Wollheim speaks can mimic the grasping of real associations deriving from the work itself.

But Wollheim's explicit statement that it is "only if" the internal spectator discharges his function that there is reason to believe in the internal spectator's existence, does not necessarily mean that justifications other than that allegedly stemming directly from guided observation cannot be given, and, in fact, we do find other arguments and hints of other arguments in the sections dedicated to his examples. Let us then turn to some of these examples:

The Friedrich examples

We must ask, *are* claims 1-5 true of the Friedrich paintings? Does Wollheim supply any compelling argument for their truth beyond the simple appeal to (guided) observation?

Before answering this question, we must note that in his section on Friedrich, Wollheim adds specificity to claims 1-5. He further claims that in Friedrich's landscapes, the unrepresented internal spectator is (i.e. has the dispositions of) a "nature-artist of early-nineteenth-century Pietism."[46] Wollheim says (and it is not clear how he means this to fit into his exposition or argument) that the inclusion, in these landscapes, of such things as anchors, ships, and cornfields facilitates the following specific retrieval, by the external spectator, of the nature-artist's perceptions:

The external spectator can imagine, from the inside, the internal spectator, the nature-artist, *perceiving expressively* these anchors, etc. (for instance, the internal spectator might be perceiving the ship in shallow water as symbolizing death, etc.). The external spectator does not thereby himself perceive these images expressively, but cogency ensures that the external spectator will come to be in a condition in which really *having* had such expressive perception would be expected to leave him.

But Wollheim supplies little new evidence for the Friedrich-specific versions of claims 1-5. We do find fragmentary possible arguments; it is possible, for instance, that he means to say that the very presence of anchors, ships, and cornfields might argue for the existence of the unrepresented nature-artist; yet, it is hard to see how any very cogent argument could be constructed on such a weak basis. At any rate, he presents no clear argument along these lines.

The material, however, which most clearly seems to be properly construed as an argument for his claims yields the following reconstruction:

(a) In these landscapes of Friedrich's, there is a "high or rather high viewpoint and . . . consequent low horizon."[47]

(b) In Dutch landscapes which do not contain an internal spectator, "nothing precludes the possibility that the viewpoint is located on a high bridge, . . . or on some unexpected promontory or hump that the terrain throws up . . . .Friedrich's art is different. Any attempt to connect up landscape and viewpoint, or to offer a naturalistic explanation of how the viewpoint rises out of the landscape, is rejected."[48]

(c) A hovering viewpoint "coheres with the spiritual vision of the nature-artist."[49]

(d) Therefore, Friedrich intended there to be an unrepresented spectator, specifically a nature-artist, located within the pictorial space.

But, first of all, premise (a) seems false. The low horizon corresponds to a *low* viewpoint, not a high one. Some of the paintings illustrated thus seem to have a *low* viewpoint. In *Landscape with a Rainbow*, for instance, the station point is only as high as the waist of the standing (represented) person.

And there is absolutely no reason to accept premise (b). There is no reason whatever to suppose that the viewpoint, in those of Friedrich's paintings which might portray a high viewpoint, is not located on a bridge, or promontory, etc.

And, even if premises (a)-(c) were true, the conclusion would not be strongly implied.

The Manet examples

Are claims 1-5 true of the Manet paintings? Do we find in Wollheim's section on Manet any arguments supportive of the general claims which are more cogent than those already advance by Wollheim?

Edouard Manet, Wollheim says, intended, probably unconsciously, that his represented subjects be seen as preoccupied, as self-absorbed. In one case, Wollheim even claims to know the nature of the thoughts with which Manet means his subject to be preoccupied: Madame Brunet, he says, is thinking "headstrong, steamy, fleshy, uninhibited" thoughts.[50] Wollheim seems to trace Manet's intention to his relationship with his parents. In connection with Manet's 1860 portrait of his parents, Wollheim says that "the image of intimacy as a transient moment of intense, shared isolation must have stamped itself early on in Monet's mind."[51] The device of the inner spectator--in this case one who, the spectator is to imagine, experiences, as Wollheim puts it, "some of the tedium, some of the frustration, some of the sense of rejection that must attend any attempt to establish contact with the represented figure."[52]--Manet uses this device, Wollheim claims, so that he can express shared isolation in single-figure pictures. But what is Wollheim's evidence for all this? I believe that the case for preoccupation must rest solely on the fact that Manet generally portrayed his subjects as staring. But Ockham's razor dictates that prosaic explanations be chosen over exotic ones, when both are equally good. In this case, we ought, I think, simply to assume that Manet painted his sitters' eyes as they actually appeared while being held in a fixed gaze during those brief periods when Manet was rendering them. This explanation makes sense because Manet,

being deeply interested in composition for its own sake, would have comparatively little reason to attempt to disguise the fact of the sitting itself.

Regarding Madame Brunet's alleged thoughts: there is no reason not to assume that these are entirely of Wollheim's own invention.

Wollheim thinks that he has two pieces of evidence to support the notion that there is an inner spectator in Manet's single-figure paintings: the first involves frontality, and the second has to do with irrational or undifferentiated background.

Wollheim's frontality argument is incomplete, but seems to go as follows:

(1) A dominant feature of Manet's single-figure paintings is frontality.

(2) Frontality is compositionally problematic. (A missing premise.)

(3) Manet was not inept; therefore

(4) Manet must have had some reason, unrelated to the requirements of formal composition, for the frontal positioning of the viewpoint.

(5) "The frontal view of the figure is generated by what is the arbitrary viewpoint *par excellence*, head-on."[53]

(6) If Manet included an unrepresented inner spectator in these paintings, then it would have to be a roving one, i.e., one who would move around, trying to get the subject's attention.

(7) The desire to include a roving spectator can be identified as Manet's reason for the frontal positioning of the viewpoint; therefore

(8) there is an internal spectator in these works.

but, regarding premise (1): Wollheim gives no evidence that Manet's single-figure pictures are especially frontal. Regarding premise (2): frontality can be a problem when the painter's interests are sculptural, but not when the artist is focused, as Manet clearly was, on composition of the flat surface. Regarding premise (5): *is* the head-on viewpoint the arbitrary viewpoint *par excellence*? Can we possibly agree with this claim? It seems perhaps more reasonable to say that the head-on viewpoint is the *least* arbitrary of all viewpoints. Wollheim's argument is deeply flawed, and does not even begin to justify its conclusion.

What about Wollheim's other piece of evidence for this alleged inner spectator, namely, the existence of irrational and undifferentiated backgrounds in the single-figure works?

The argument is that Manet's use of these backgrounds can be explained, Wollheim says, by the inclusion of such an inner spectator, since they would afford this inner spectator space within which he could prowl around.

But this is a bizarre notion. We might ask just how an irrational background or an undifferentiated background is supposed to provide conditions for the prowling activity of an inner spectator. Has Wollheim worked out some sort of "physics" for how an unrepresented spectator inhabits and interacts with represented spaces? An attribution of such weird and complex intentions to Manet is surely ruled out by Ockham's razor, especially since we have far simpler explanations at hand: Manet's irrational backgrounds can be explained by his relatively intense concern with formal composition. And no further explanation for the undifferentiated backgrounds is needed beyond the notion that they simply served the composition.

Conclusion

I said in the introduction that the question about definition and essence must generally be rooted in the more fundamental question, "What makes long-esteemed works long-esteemed?" Wollheim's claim about essence suggests that he might well answer the second question this way:

S_w' : The painting activity which produced the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, Kandinsky abstracts, etc., was practiced such that the painter, in an activity called "thematization," willed that the properties of *mark*, *surface*, *orientation*, *motif*, or *image* be handled, in his painting, in this or that way so as, in the first place, to endow the surface with meaning and, in the second place, but importantly, to get and give pleasure, or visual delight, AND this thematization reaches aspects of painting too fine-grained for language to follow, and it occurs within that fragment of our psychology which is essentially embodied, and *style* is exhibited, AND all this primarily accounts for the esteem in which these works are held.

Now, clearly, endowing a painting with meaning, in Wollheim's sense, has nothing at all to do with Unity in Variety. For Wollheim, meaning is grounded in only representation values ("seeing in") and expression values ("expressive perception").

Nor does Wollheim's notion of the artist's intention to give pleasure, or visual delight have anything to do with UIV. In Chapter II, section E, we see that Wollheim views the pleasure or visual delight of which he speaks as being grounded upon this: something in a painting reminds a spectator of something he experienced earlier and enjoyed for other-than-aesthetic reasons. Thus the enjoyment is transferred , via

association, to the experience of viewing the painting. Again, this has nothing to do with UIV.

Therefore, S_w' and my own claim S2 cannot both be true.

But the mere presentation by Wollheim of examples of nonformal value could not prove statement S_w'. At most, it could prove only that some portion of the value of some long-esteemed paintings is nonformal, a proposition which, as I have made explicit in my sections 6 and 10, is fully consistent with my theses S2 and SII, which state only that the formal value of long-esteemed paintings always makes up the greater or greatest part of these works' composite value.

I believe that I have shown in the present section, however, that there is, in fact, no reason even to suppose that those *particular* meanings which Wollheim ascribes to the works he discusses can really be said to be embodied by those works at all. His examples, therefore, not only fail to support his thesis as I have restructured it, but do not even serve to reinforce the judgement, which is no doubt true, that at least some portion of the value of some long-esteemed paintings is nonformal.

The *remarkable* fact that Wollheim makes no reference whatsoever to anything like formal composition or unity in variety implies that he either has an aversion to, or utterly no grasp of, UIV theory. (His choice of works to investigate shows, however, that he has a solid unconscious grasp, and love, of UIV itself.)

We saw in section 9, in the case of certain writers (Lepore, for instance; but the problem seems typical of recent criticism), a similarly remarkable aversion to or lack of cognizance of theories of formal value (a value which seems to involve a more unitary and intellectual basis than the other values). It might be supposed that these other writers,

and Wollheim, wished that, or expected that, the source of power that they experienced in art would be found to be associated with only representational and expressive features. This, combined with an apparent willingness to investigate in a hasty manner (lack of sufficient attention to the question, "Is it true?"), produced their misidentifications of the source of painting's experienced power to engage us.

But Wollheim's unselfcritical misidentifications are much more lavish than those of these other writers: his fantasies are characterized by a sort of romantic extravagance which I have here labeled "inflationist."

Section 14

Baxandall and the "Deflationist" Strategy

Preliminary discussion

(A) In this Chapter, I discuss Michael Baxandall's *Patterns of Intention*[54].

This book can probably best be regarded as *a guide to the activity of explaining, in terms of artist's intentionality (specifically, in terms of the artist's response, under certain circumstances, to a problem), those properties* of a painting the explanations of which are appropriate to the art-critical enterprise*.

* I use the term "properties" although Baxandall prefers to say that what we explain is the painting as covered by a description: he says, "we explain pictures only in so far as we have considered them under some verbal description or specification."[p. 1]. He goes on to claim, "to say we 'explain a picture as covered by a description' can conveniently be seen as another way of saying that we explain first, thoughts we have had about the

Another way of putting this is to say that the book is a guide to the critical production of statements which have this form:

"This painting is [*explanandum*] because [*explanans*],"

where each particular *explanandum* is some property which is appropriately the focus of art-criticism, and where each *explanans* is given in terms of the artist's intentionality, and such that the *explanandum* is taken to reflect the artist's solution to such and such a problem confronted by the artist under such and such circumstances.

In particular, Baxandall seems to be concerned with guiding the reader with respect to four things:

(1) It seems clear that Baxandall means to indicate or suggest which of those *explananda* of the sorts that are appropriate objects of art-critical attention are in fact worth explaining; that is, which of such *explananda* are in fact of interest to us. He seems to indicate, for instance, that those properties referred to by "direct-description terms" (see (B) below) are not of interest (see (C) below). An implicit argument can be discerned in the book by which Baxandall seems to imply that a painting's being art, or a

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picture, and only secondarily the picture."[p. 5] This is probably untrue -- we explain the picture, or properties of the picture. So "properties" above might have to be construed *de re;* but even if construed *de dicto*, my use of the word "properties" here is probably not wrong, since, if we can take "explain a painting as covered by a description" and "explain a painting's properties" as substantially the same, Baxandall claims that we explain these properties, secondarily. We lose nothing, I believe, by articulating his view in this straightforward and clear way.

painting's being better than another painting are not interesting *qua explananda* (see "Re (D)" below). And in none of his examples can we discern *explananda* of a *general* sort (being art, being beautiful, having aesthetic value, etc.), a fact which, I believe, can be taken as an implicit declaration on Baxandall's part that such properties are not interesting *qua explananda* (see "Re (G)-(S)" below). And Baxandall also seems, via his discussions of "firm design" and "order," to attack the notion that good composition, and even art itself, are important *qua explananda* (see "Re (E) and (S)" below).

(2) Baxandall claims that there are certain categories under which description-words (*explananda*) fall. (See (B) below.)

(3) Baxandall makes claims about the nature of the meaning of all description-words (*qua explananda*), most pointedly, of "(firm) design" and "order." (see (T)).

(4) By analysis and examples, Baxandall means to show what a good explanation, in terms of the artist's intentionality, looks like.

(B) How does Baxandall classify description-words (terms referring to *explananda*)?

Although Baxandall gives the strong impression of positing just three species of description-words (his diagram on page 6, for instance, contains only three categories), in reality his system must be interpreted as attempting to define four: he posits two genera, one comprising three species and the other comprising one species. His first genus covers

indirect-description words. One species of this genus consists of what he calls "effect" words. As examples of effect words, he gives "poignant," "enchanting," and "surprising." A second species of indirect-description words, in Baxandall's system, are words which he calls "comparison" words, words such as "resonance" (which Baxandall presumably takes to involve a comparison with sound), and "columnar" (which involves a comparison of represented drapery to architectural features). Baxandall also apparently means to include here words which refer to anything represented in a representational painting; probably Baxandall would include under this species phrases such as "people bringing in the harvest" when the phrase is used to describe a painting which represents such subject matter. The third species of indirect-description words in Baxandall's system are what he calls the "cause' words, words which he sees as referring to that process which would cause an object to have the effect on us that it has. Baxandall's examples of cause words are *"assured handling"* (as in "This painting exhibits assured handling"), "a frugal *palette,*" "*excited* blots and scribbles," and "*firm design,*" as in "The firm design of this picture is partly due to Piero della Francesca's recent training in Florence."[55] Baxandall asserts that "design" has several senses; here (as a "cause" word) he seems to imply that it has the meaning "mental plan."

His second genus, which is also his fourth species, of description-words consists of words--I will call them "direct-description" words--which Baxandall claims describe the physical painting *directly.* His examples are "large," "flat," "[being made up of?] pigments on a panel," "red and yellow and blue," "[presenting?] an image," and "firm design," as in "I like the [firm] design of this picture." He seems to say that "design" used this way has the meaning, 'pattern."

(C) Baxandall says, "Most of the better things we can think or say about pictures" are expressible in terms of words of the first genus, indirect-description words, i.e., words which "stand in a slightly peripheral relation to the picture itself."[56] He says, "If we confined ourselves to [direct-description words] . . .We would find it hard to locate the sort of interest the picture has for us. We talk and think 'off' the object rather as an astronomer looks 'off' a star, because acuity or sharpness are greater away from the centre."[57]

(D) Baxandall says that "Among other things the book does not address is the question of what art is, and what makes one work better than another."[58]

(E) Baxandall singles out "firm design," apparently having the sense of "firm mental plan," for special attention: he points to Kenneth Clark's claim to be able to discern the presence of a "geometric framework" in (in some sense of "in") Piero della Francesca's *Baptism of Christ*, or to be able, perhaps, to infer that the thought of such a framework had existed in Piero's mind as he painted it. Baxandall quotes Clark:

> . . . we are at once conscious of a geometrical framework; and a few seconds analysis shows us that it is divided into thirds horizontally, and into quarters vertically. The horizontal divisions come, of course, on the line of the Dove's wings and the line of angels' hands, Christ's loin-cloth and the Baptist's left hand; the vertical divisions are the pink angel's columnar drapery, the central line of the Christ and the back of St. John. These divisions form a central square, which is again divided into thirds and quarters, and a triangle drawn within this square, having its apex at the Dove and its base at the lower horizontal, gives the central motive of the design.[59]

Here, Baxandall claims, Clark "develops an analysis of a quality which might be one constituent of 'firm design'."[60]

(F) Baxandall believes that, in the context of an intentionality-focus, "historical objects may be explained by treating them as solutions to problems in situations."[61] He supplies four examples which he apparently intends to serve as models for any such historical/intentional explanatory criticism. I will discuss two of these: his treatment of Pablo Picasso's *Portrait of Kahnweiler* and his treatment of Piero della Francesca's *Baptism of Christ.*

(G)-(O) below --A description of Baxandall's model-explanation of Picasso's *Portrait of Kahnweiler:*

(G) Baxandall implies that we can explain the *Portrait of Kahnweiler, qua* a painting, Baxandall would say, in which representational space is flattened, by positing that it was Picasso's intention to solve a certain problem, a problem which Baxandall articulates this way:

> . . . representational painters like Picasso represent a three-dimensional reality on a two-dimensional surface, this being a very old issue indeed. How is one both to represent things and persons, tables and art-dealers, recalcitrantly three-dimensional, and yet also positively to acknowledge the two-dimensional plane of the canvas? How does one make a virtue of this rather curious play at what can be seen as a mountebank's game of creating on the plane an illusion of depth?[62]

In order to solve this alleged problem, Baxandall says, Picasso drew on "Cézannian passage -- . . . representing a relation between two separate planes by registering them as one continuous superplane," and on the Cézannian technique of utilizing "high and sometimes shifting view-points that flatten out the picture-plane arrays of objects phenomenally receding in depth."[63]

(H) And Baxandall believes that we can explain the *Portrait of Kahnweiler*, *qua*, Baxandall would probably claim, a painting which focuses on form rather than color, by positing that it was Picasso's intention to solve this alleged problem:

> . . . colour is an accident of vision, a function of the beholder not an intrinsic quality of real objects; whereas form is not only real but offers the security of perception through more than one sense . . . . How then can a grown-up spend time playing about with colour when the form of the objective world is available to him?[64]

(I) And Baxandall explains the painting *qua*, presumably, a painting which presents face-on a multiplicity of the represented objects' sides, by referring to Picasso's intention to solve this alleged problem:

> [There is] a question about the fictive instantaneousness of much painting . . . . In fact it takes a painter much longer than a moment to paint a picture . . . . Might there be a case for the painter acknowledging *in the character of his depiction* the fact that this is a record of sustained perceptual and intellectual engagement with the object of representation? Should one not make a virtue, again, of the truth, which is that we do not just have a single sense-impression of an object important enough for us to paint? We have thought about it, analytically about its parts and synthetically about their constitution. We have studied it in different lights, very probably, and from different angles . . . . Our emotions are less about the object itself than about the history of our mind's engagement with the object.[65]

Beyond trying to solve these *primary* problems ((G)-(I) above), Baxandall tells us, Picasso also set about to solve, in *Portrait of Kahnweiler*, a *secondary*, derivative, problem:

(J) "There is a problem, newly heightened by the leaving open of the plane edges of the figure, of distinction between figure and ground, between the man and what lies around and behind him."[66]

Picasso's solution was to "establish the distinction tonally and by hue."[67] (Thus, Picasso's intention to solve this problem presumably serves as the explanation for the way in which the painting distinguishes between figure and ground; i.e., by differences in tone and hue).

The following, (K)-(O) describe (derivative) problems which are not claimed by Baxandall to be part of the *explanans* for any *explanandum*, any property, of *Kahnweiler*; rather, these are problems left *unsolved* in *Kahnweiler* (Baxandall indicates that they figure in explanations of *other* works):

(K) "There is, according to Baxandall, "a further and large problem about what is happening to colour, in the sense of hues. This is basically a duochrome picture. The problem was to increase for a year or so yet, to the point almost of monochromy."[68] Picasso's solution, Baxandall says, following Braque, was to detach "hue from the hued object itself and [redispose] the sum of hues in a more independent arrangement."

(L) There's a putative "problem . . . about the residual presence of tonal relief modelling on a basis of directional lighting from the right of the picture."[69]

It is not clear to me what Baxandall claims Picasso's solution (manifested in later work of his) is.

(M) There is "a problem...about the relation of scale, whether absolute or perceived, to the registration of objects. This is stated very clearly in the passage to the middle right, next to the figure."[70]

(I do not understand Baxandall's point here.)

(N) "There is a problem about local texture. For instance, all that stippling on the periphery must have been rather uninteresting to do and uninteresting to see."[71]

In response to this problem, Picasso, again following Braque, began using "collage and papier collé, decorator's graining combs, sand and fine gravel mixed with the oil paint."[72]

(O) "Above all," Baxandall claims,

> there is a problem stated firmly in the still life ... in the bottom left-hand corner. We know it is a still life because of where it is and because of the readable bottle at the top. But without these clues we might as easily think it was one of the Spanish hill villages . . . Picasso had been among that summer. The problem is about the relative authority of the immediate object of analysis, on the one hand, and the structural schemes and analytical disposition the painter had developed during a history of looking at many different objects, on the other. Much of the interest of the next years -- the so-called synthetic phase -- would lie in attempts to solve this.[73]

(P)-(S) below pertain to Baxandall's model explanation of Piero dell Francesca's *Baptism of Christ:*

(P) Baxandall seeks to explain the *Baptism of Christ qua* a painting having a group of three "obtrusive"[74] angels in the left foreground, the angels having the properties of "oddity, prominence and seeming separateness."[75] These angels, Baxandall says, "are not performing their usual function [in such paintings] of holding Christ's outer garment while he is baptized,"[76] and are "not venerating the event before them."[77] Baxandall purports to explain these putative oddities as follows:

> Baxandall says that
>
> > in fifteenth-century art [Angels] performed their function of intellectual inspiration in various ways -- . . . cueing us to devotion by their action, referring us by direct gesture to what we should attend to, or reminding us of specific points about the particular mystery, in the extreme case with a scroll and text.[78]

He believes that

> Piero's three Angels are doing all three of these things, but in a Pieresque [i.e. underplayed] way . . . . One [Angel] catches our eye, one registers frontal straight attention, one turns its body and with a gesture refers us to the central scene. And at an even more subtle and Pieresque level ... the middle Angel directs us to the fact of Baptism by completing a triplet of whites with Christ, at the center, and the bending man on the right. Instead of carrying a scroll with an inscription -- say, "wash me and I shall be whiter than snow" (psalm 51:7) -- it fully pictorializes its cue in the medium of ordered color and tone.[79]

Piero gave his angels the qualities of lightness and diversity, Baxandall believes, in order to solve the problem of his "idiom coming into contact with the pictorial tradition on a relatively large vertical panel. Piero's usual conception of the angel as a statuesque, not to say stolid, adolescent presence near-adult in scale made his task

difficult here. Three of these apparitions in an undifferentiated rank would have come near to taking the picture over."[80].

(Q) Baxandall seeks to explain the *Baptism of Christ qua* a painting wherein there has been a "shifting of the spectators [of the baptism], all but one man stripped for baptism, into the right background; and the dressing of them in a sort of Byzantinizing costume."[81] Baxandall purports to explain this putative oddity in the following way:

Piero, Baxandall notes, was given the charge of creating a vertical altarpiece in the pictorial tradition and in his own idiom. But Piero's idiom was such that his figures were large-scale, were monumental, and such figures, if they were to be included in the foreground of a vertical altarpiece would cause foreground congestion. Baxandall claims that Piero, using his resource of *commensurazione* (his ability to represent distance in depth through figure size), solved the problem by placing these spectators in picture-space such that they fit into a forward sequence through picture-depth, a sequence which corresponded to the temporal ordering of story elements in the first half of Matthew 3. According to this interpretation, Baxandall says, the spectators do not represent the Byzantine church, but are "just Pharisees and Sadducees and so on."[82]

(R) Baxandall seeks to explain the *Baptism of Christ qua* a painting within which there is a "change in the water around Christ's feet: in the background and middle-ground it is reflective but in the foreground it becomes transparent or, on some readings, dries up."[83] Baxandall purports to explain this oddity in the following way:

Piero was faced with this problem: it would seem that if Piero were (1) to follow pictorial tradition in representing Christ as standing in the water of the river, and (2) to remain true to his own idiom by representing the river in a "mirror-like mode,"[84] he would then have to represent a reflection of Christ's calves where Christ's feet should be, and this would not do. Piero solved this problem, Baxandall claims, by utilizing the established device of representing God's light, a shower of golden rays, rendered in gold leaf, descending upon the figure of Christ (remnants of which rays, Baxandall says, can be found in Piero's painting); Piero, Baxandall says, represented the water around Christ as being transparent (non-reflective and clear), intending the transparency to be seen as an effect of God's light shining down on it.

(S) Baxandall seeks to answer the question of what criteria can be used to validate any explanation of a painting. He articulates three criteria: Legitimacy, Critical Necessity, and Order.

In applying the test of *Legitimacy*, Baxandall says that "we try not to suppose things in a painter's culture which are not there. We look at one picture by a painter in the light of other pictures by him, with an expectation of some continuity . . . . And we lean heavily on a sense of kind or genre for the finer points . . . ."[85]

In applying the test of *Necessity*, Baxandall says, "One does not adduce explanatory matter of an inferential kind unless it contributes to experience of the picture as an object of visual perception."[86]

Baxandall's claim that the mere presence of *Order* in the explanation of a work of art tends to bolster the claim that that explanation is true, seems to be based upon this logic:

(i) Superior paintings have order. (ii) X is a superior painting. (iii) Therefore, X has order. (iv) Therefore, any explanation of X which arrives, through observation of particulars and logic other than the syllogism (i)-(iii) above, at a conclusion entailing X's order, is more likely to be true than if it didn't arrive at such a conclusion. (v) Any explanation entailing X's order thereby itself has order (and only such explanations are likely to have order). (6) Therefore any order-possessing explanation of X is more likely true than an explanation which doesn't possess order.

Baxandall says that order in the *Baptism of Christ* can be diagrammed by dividing the surface into halves, thirds and quarters. His diagram closely (but not precisely) matches the framework that Clark imagined [above (E)] and which Baxandall identified as possibly "one constituent of 'firm design.'"[87] Referring to order, he says,

> . . . we sense at some level the inherent role of halves, thirds and quarters in [the picture's] organization. Even narrative or iconographic matters such as those we have just been considering interlock with our sense of these relations -- the emphasis on Angels' choric glance at half way, for instance, and S. Antonino's three mysteries of the Trinity, Cleansing and Humility summed up in that privileged section from Dove to Christ's face. In a verbal explanation of a picture the authority of such matters, as compared to the significance of something or other found verbalized in some directory of symbols, is difficult to drive home. But their authority is primary, if we take the visual medium of pictures with any seriousness at all; they, not symbols, are the painter's language. Good inferential criticism observes this authority even if it is not up to invoking it.[88]

Implicit here seems to be the claim that an abundance of a certain sort of sameness relations exists within (in some sense of "within") the painting: because the lines of this supposed grid are *straight horizontal* and *straight vertical* lines, each line is such that each of its parts is the *same* as every other in both orientation and placement on either the x or the y axis, and, together, the lines form a large number of angles of the *same* size (90°).

Mention was made above ((Q)) of Baxandall's claim that Piero represented a temporal sequence by means of a sequence represented in pictorial depth. This, according to Baxandall, is an example of order. Although Baxandall does not say so, a representation such as the one he describes would present us with *sameness* of the relative positioning of correlated items, in the sense, that is, that story events occur in the sequence, ABC in time, while the spatial representations of these events occur in the sequence A'B'C' in depth, and it also would possibly present us with a *similarity* between relative temporal interval-size and analogous relative spatial interval-size.

Referred to above ((P)) was Baxandall's claim that the middle Angel directed us to the Baptism by "completing" (figuring in?) a triplet of white figures -- the other two figures being that of Christ and that of the bending man. Baxandall cites this also as an example of order.

In this case, we have three objects, A, B, and C, such that the spatial separation between A and B is *similar to* the spatial separation between B and C, and the color of all three objects is the *same*.

Another example of order given by Baxandall, referred to in the quote above, is this: In the horizontal center of Piero's painting, near the vertical center, is a group of three objects; the dove, which is directly above the water bowl, which is directly above the head of Christ. Baxandall says that the dove symbolizes the Trinity ("it is the first and great manifestation of the Trinity through God sending the Holy Spirit as dove"[89]), that the bowl symbolizes the sacrament of cleansing, and that the head of Christ symbolizes humility.

Baxandall says that these elements of the story are the key mysteries and, as such, were traditionally grouped together in the sermons and handbooks of Piero's time.

We can note, then, that here are three objects, each in the *same* position on the horizontal axis, that position being centered (so that the distance to the left border is the *same* as the distance to the right border). These three objects are in the *same* group in the painting and play the *same* key role in the sermons.

Baxandall claims that because Piero was so successful in representing pictorial depth through perspective, "the picture *plane* was losing its weight, or ... the relation between picture surface and picture space was losing its balance."[90] The inference here is that loss of such balance is a problem.

Baxandall says that, in order to solve this supposed problem, Piero deploys instances of order:

The dove, which is in the foreground, is similar (in color, size, and shape) to the clouds, which are in the background. This similarity, Baxandall claims, strengthens the

sense of the flatness of the surface, "a sense of the material reality of the picture as an object, a sense of ordered complexity."[91]

Certain bushes in the distant background, Baxandall says, have "incongruously sharp and bright blooms"[92] on them. Presumably, Baxandall believes that the contours of the blooms ought to have been softened by the intervening atmosphere. The effect of these blooms, Baxandall claims, is that the sense of pictorial depth is weakened.

Dark-against-light plant-shapes in the foreground are similar to shapes on the distant hillside, "conciliating" Baxandall says, "depth and surface."[93]

(T) Of description-terms in general, Baxandall says, "in an art-critical description one is using the terms not absolutely; one is using them in tandem with the object, the instance. Moreover one is using them not informatively but demonstratively."[94] "[The] description is made up of words, generalizing instruments, that . . . take on the meaning we shall actually use only in their reciprocal relation with the picture itself, a particular."[95] "The description has only the most general independent meaning and depends for such precision as it has on the presence of the picture. It works demonstratively - we are pointing to interest -- and ostensively, taking its meaning from reciprocal reference, a sharpening to-and-fro, between itself and the particular."[96]

But his only examples of such supposedly quite vacuous concepts are *firm design* and *order*. (Surely he would make the same exaggerated claim about, e.g. "poignant" or "enchanting;" but would he dare make it about, e.g. "three feet by four feet," "red, yellow and blue"?) He claims that if "you had no idea what the pictures looked like, [the words

'design' and 'firm'] would tell you little that would enable you to visualize the pictures."[97] And he says, "If I say of a picture, present or reproduced or remembered, 'The design is firm,' . . . .what I am doing is not to inform but to point to an aspect of its interest, as I see it. The act is one of demonstration: with 'design' I direct attention to one element in the picture and with 'firm' I propose a characterization of it. I am suggesting that the concept 'firm design' be matched with the interest of the picture. You may follow my prompts or not; and if you do follow my prompting you may agree or disagree."[98] And he says, "As a verbalized proxy for the quality in Piero's *Baptism of Christ*, 'firm design' would mean little; but by its reference to the instance it takes on more precise meaning . . . . Its meaning is largely ostensive: that is, it depends on both myself and my hearers supplying precision to it by reciprocal reference between the word and the object."[99]

And Baxandall says of *order* that it "is[, of the three criteria of validation, viz., legitimacy, necessity, and order,] the least easy to verbalize directly, except on the rather crude level of pointing to a triplet of whites or to a narrative temporal sequence through represented space."[100] I should note that, in saying that "firm design" and "order" mean little except ostensively, Baxandall is clearly not talking about how these terms are *learned*, but how they are *used*, how they ought to be regarded by anyone engaged in art criticism.

Deeper analysis

I said in the Introduction (pp. 1-2) that the asking of the big question, "What is art?" was really a way of asking "Why are long-esteemed works long-esteemed?" and that those who asked this question must, for the most part, have done so in order to enhance the possibilities of the future production of estimable art.

It seems true to say that that explanatory scheme, the use of which best conduces to uncovering an answer to this big question, can be illustrated by these examples:

E1: "Something is beautiful [or: is art; aesthetically valuable/good/better than something else; estimable; well-composed; expressive] because it . . . ,"

where the *explanans* is analytical, not historical, and is not given in terms of the artist's intentionality; and

E2: "This yellow shape next to this blue one is beautiful [or: artistic; aesthetically good; etc.] because it . . . ,"

again, the *explanans* is not historical.

Use of a historical, intentionality-focused *explanans* here would make the goal of finding an explanation more difficult to attain, since the search is best conducted via the theorist's close inspection of the art itself and his or her reactions to it. Beginning the investigation by focusing on the intentionality of the artist would be to do first that

which ought to be done later.

On page 64 I noted how concepts such as *beautiful, art, aesthetic,* and others might be viewed as having both evaluative content and descriptive content. (For instance, I suggested that *norm* (evaluative content)-*moderation-rich* (descriptive content) = *beautiful*.)

Now, Baxandall's work wrongly conveys a sort of "deflated" view of the most general, value-laden art-critical concepts such as *beauty, art, aesthetically valuable/good/better than X, estimable, well-composed,* and *expressive*: his work tends to convey the notion that these concepts have little evaluative and descriptive content and it does so by means of various, often subtle, devices.

Re (A): If we keep in mind E1 and E2 above, and the connection I referred to above which holds between such *explananda* and the non-historical *explanans*, we can see how Baxandall's preference for intentionality-focused explanation leads rather straightforwardly in the following argument to a seemingly deflationary conclusion by way of *Modus Tollens* and De Morgan's Theorem (actually, the deductive structures I attribute to Baxandall in this section might better be called *innuendoes* than *arguments*, and might better be said to *convey impressions* than to *yield conclusions*):

1. If the concepts *art, beauty,* etc. have real descriptive content and have real evaluative content, then I am not satisfied with intentionality-focused explanation. [unstated; false]
2. I am satisfied with intentionality-focused explanation. [true]

3. Therefore, (i.e., Baxandall leaves it to the reader to assume that Baxandall means to assert that) the concepts *art*, *beauty*, etc. lack any real descriptive content (and thus are unanalyzable) or they lack any real evaluative content (and thus are uninteresting). [unstated; false]

Re (C): Baxandall's remarks here have the effect of down-playing the role of direct-description terms in art-critical explanation, but E2 above shows how central these terms are to the most powerful explanatory schemes. The hidden premise, "If the concepts *art*, etc. have real descriptive content and have real evaluative content, then direct-description terms will be of central importance in explanation" leads, again via *Modus Tollens* and De Morgan's Theorem, to the same conclusion as the argument above:

1. If the concepts *art*, etc. have real descriptive content and have real evaluative content, then direct-description terms will be of central importance in explanation. [unstated; true]
2. Direct-description terms are not of central importance in explanation. [false]
3. Therefore, the concepts *art*, *beauty*, etc. lack any real descriptive content (and thus are unanalyzable) or they lack any real evaluative content (and thus are uninteresting). [unstated; false]

Thus, here again, Baxandall's exposition has the effect of deflating the content (evaluative or descriptive) of the most general value-laden art-critical concepts.

Re (D): Comments made by Baxandall such as "If we confined ourselves to [direct-description words, w]e would find it hard to locate the sort of interest the picture really has for us,"[101] allow us to conclude that he means to convey the notion that the book is meant to address (be a guide with respect to) what *interests* us about art--the natural inference being that no major categories of *interest* are meant to be excluded. Thus, Baxandall seems to be making the following argument:

1. The book addresses what's interesting. [implicit; false]
2. "Among other things the book does not address is the question of what art is, and what makes one work better than another." [explicit; true]
3. Therefore, what art is and what makes one work better than another are not interesting questions. [unstated; false]

The conclusion, if stated outright, would seem implausible or nonsensical; nevertheless, Baxandall's words here (premise 2) offer a deflated view of the evaluative content of the concepts *art* and *better than X*.

Thus, here, Baxandall's exposition conveys a deflated view of the evaluative content of the concepts *art* and *(aesthetically) better than X*, and by a natural association, the evaluative content of all of the most general, value-laden art-critical concepts.

Re (G)-(S): None of Baxandall's sample explanations (which purport to explain such features as being monotone, representing flattened space, presenting face-on a multiplicity of sides, presenting an odd group of angels, etc.) attempt to explain a

painting's (or some part of a painting's) being beautiful, being art, being aesthetically valuable/interesting, etc. (i.e., none of his sample explanatory expositions have the form possessed by E1 or by E2).

Thus, Baxandall seems to be making the following argument:

1. The book addresses what is interesting. [implicit; false]
2. The book does not address the most general, value-laden art-critically relevant, concepts such as *art, beauty, aesthetic value,* etc. [implicit; true]
3. Therefore, concepts such as *art, beauty, aesthetic value,* etc. are not interesting as *explananda*. [unstated; false]

Thus, in this way too, Baxandall's exposition conveys a deflated view of the evaluative content of these most general, value-laden art-critical concepts.

But Baxandall's near total neglect of broad questions concerning aesthetic value, his apparent refusal to allow himself to be guided by any unconscious grasp of concepts such as *art, beauty,* etc., his apparent lack of any cognizance of the power that unity in variety possesses to interest us, deprives him of the resource he needs in order to explain those properties of Picasso's *Portrait of Kahnweiler* that he *does* attempt to explain.

Thus, his explanations with respect to this painting miss the mark; they wrongly convey the notion that Picasso was a shallow person, interested only in trivial pursuits:

Re (G): Baxandall claims that it is important "positively to acknowledge the two-dimensional plane of the canvas," because to represent, on the plane, a second plane ("one continuous superplane") furthers the truth.

Now, it happens that it is usually wrong to lie, although the utilitarian would say that there are many cases when it is right to do so, and only the most extreme deontologist would find fault with the performance of a conjurer, for instance. But the burden is on Baxandall to show why, in those cases where everyone involved agrees to pretend that something is true, for some distinct benefit, as so often happens in the arts, such pretense constitutes a problem. Yet Baxandall fails to show why this should be so. We can also point out that in *representing* space at all, whether a quite flattened space or a realistically deep space, the artist is involved in pretense -- and the one who represents space as deep is offering a *truer* version of space.

Someone who enjoys working puzzles could, of course, set himself the goal of discovering how to acknowledge the plane in the work itself. But this activity would not be of great importance.

(Others might claim that flatness is of the essence of painting, therefore, the artist ought to in some way express or represent that flatness. But, again, it is difficult to see why iteration of the flatness would be of any value for anyone. It would seem to be good enough, that is, simply to let the painting *be* flat)

If this thesis of Baxandall's describes an intention on Picasso's part, it is difficult to see how such an intention accounts for any aesthetic interest we find in the *Portrait of Kahnweiler.*

But armed with knowledge of moderation, we can suggest a more plausible explanation: there is a genuine issue for artists which concerns the existence of the 2-D & 3-D spaces in a representational painting: the artist must be able to make sure that each of the two realms is in and of itself moderational. But this was not a problem for art awaiting Picasso's solution; rather it has always been a problem for individual artists which some have solved and some have not. I suggest that Picasso's "superplane" made the task easier for him by diminishing the possibilities of object-placement in 3-D space; this option was provided to him by the recent discovery that color and form have power to engage us, quite apart from their ability to represent a thing faithfully (or at all).

Re (H): Can the absence of a wide color-range in Picasso's cubist work really be explained by asserting that Picasso believed that "playing about with" color was in some sense a childish pursuit, because color is merely a secondary property of things? Of course, such a belief would be rather silly, and if Picasso ever really held it, he quite quickly gave it up.

A more generous explanation, one which cognizance of UIV allows us to get to, would be that when a diversity of color is used in a picture, then the color, in order for that picture to be well-regarded, must be moderated; and to moderate color is a very difficult task. But when the range of colors is greatly limited in a picture (as, for instance, in these cubist works; in Rembrandt; and in black and white photography), the viewer will probably not to be badly affected by the lack of color moderation, but will attend only to those elements (line and shape) which the artist did take care to moderate. Picasso made his task easier by limiting his palette, an option made available to him by

the recent discovery that accurate representation was not required. In this way, I believe, we can account for the absence of a wide color-range in Picasso's early cubist works.

Re (I): Baxandall claims that Picasso believed that painting an object as it appears from one point of view is in some sense dishonest because it fails to get across the *true* nature of the artist's experience, viz. his experience of the thing over time as viewed in different lights and from different angles. It is (for some reason) important that the artist's experience be presented truthfully in this way.

But, assuming that a particular artist does, indeed, study his subject in different lights and from different angles (and many artists do not), and if he represents it in the cubist style, then for every new truth he reveals, truth is also lost. For instance, if he presents the viewer with an image showing four sides of a box, only three sides of which are ever actually visible at a time, the apparent relative orientations among the sides as represented does not now reflect the true configuration of parts. (And if one wished to convey what the *inside* of something was like, he would convey a better idea of it if he were to show an inside view, perhaps using a cutaway [scientific illustration] rather than showing it smashed open.) And any new expression which might derive from the cubist approach of some emotion truly felt by the artist (and how such expression might be accomplished would have to be demonstrated) can only come at the loss of expressionistic fidelity: with every distortion, a sense of *chaos* is generated, and no one seems to suggest that this is what Picasso meant to express. Nor do we suppose that the paintings are meant to tell us that the world is chaotic. For these reasons, it is unlikely that, deep down, Picasso's cubist goals were as Baxandall describes them. (The only way

that a painter could represent all sides of the objects he represents with representational and emotional fidelity would seem to be to create a series of paintings, showing, e.g., the box from all angles.)

Again, a more generous explanation is at hand, available to us once we come to grasp UIV: Picasso, unconsciously sensing the power of UIV, and discovering that the presence of representational infidelity in a work did not lessen that power, felt free to *experiment*, to break up the image in the cubist manner.

Re (J): It is true that given such chaotic jumbling of planes as we find in these cubist paintings, a problem occurs with respect to the distinction between figure and ground. But if what is important about what Picasso was doing here is that he was breaking away from representation (a breaking-away which was never completed by Picasso) and that he was coming to understand the power of UIV in its own right, then the question of how to preserve a figure-ground distinction becomes very unimportant. It amounts to a very minor puzzle.

Re (E) and (S): The similarity between Clark's framework, which Baxandall says is a possible constituent of what he calls "firm design" (see (E)), and the framework Baxandall presents as an example of *order* (see (S)), suggests that Baxandall views order as a constituent of firm design.*

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*Clark's grid is similar to the grid Baxandall gives as an instance of order: a group of straight lines, running orthogonally vertically and horizontally (and a pair of diagonals) dividing the picture into segments. But it is not at all clear what justifies the claim that, in

Although Baxandall says that "firm design" and "order" have little more than ostensive meaning (see (T)), it does seem possible to say that "order," as Baxandall uses the term, means (see (S)) something like: having a set of sameness relations such that these relations are meant to perform some function. For instance, the set of sameness relations may serve to organize picture elements in such a way as to mirror some non-pictorial organization (the relations may, for example, link visual items to their literary counterparts)--Thus, these relations might emphasize angels' choric glance; facilitate the identification of the dove, bowl, and face of Christ as, respectively, Trinity, Baptism and Humility; facilitate identification of the onlookers; or convey the notion that the white angel directs us to the Baptism. Or, such a set of sameness relations may serve to bring the 2-D and 3-D components of a work into "balance".

Yet, "firm design" and "order" have meant to many much more than this. Whereas the term "order" may cover the sorts of examples Baxandall gives, it and "firm design" were, throughout most of the last century and before, for many art theorists, pretty much synonymous with *good composition*, which seems to have referred to the placing of line and the choosing of color such as to satisfy the barely consciously

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addition to visible contours, some more prominent than others, which may roughly separate areas of the picture into many irregular sections, there *are* a set of orthogonally placed straight lines (and two diagonal straight lines) somehow to be found "in" the picture. (For instance, it seems true enough to say that the left edge of the tree marks off the right-hand border of a somewhat irregular area having a width of about a quarter of the painting's width.) But what justifies one saying (in fact, what is the *meaning* of saying) that the right-hand border of this area is in some sense a straight line, and that it extends upward and downward to the edges of the painting? What could cognizance of such mysterious extensions add to our appreciation of the work? And if such a grid does exist, why should its presence interest us?

understood requirement which I have identified as the requirement that the picture have Unity in Variety.

Thus, if we take Baxandall as intending to equate the concepts *firm design* and *order* with *good composition*, a very general concept, then premise 2 in the argument given under the heading "Re (G)-(S)" above would be false, and my claim that this argument can be discerned in Baxandall's text would be false. But by so limiting the scope of "good composition" by persuasive definition (as I say above, "firm design" and "order," which for *me do* mean the same as "good composition," have meant much more than Baxandall's terms do), he manages nevertheless to deflate the concept's evaluative content. If Baxandall had only mentioned that order plays some role--even if he had not specified what that role is--in composition, in balancing shape against shape, color against color, etc., there would have been no such deflation.

If, on the other hand, we understand, as I believe we probably should, that for Baxandall "firm design" and "order" are not in fact value-laden terms, and mean something such as "rigid pattern/plan," or "set of sameness relations," then the argument of "Re (G)-(S)" holds.

Re (T): Again, if we understand Baxandall as intending "firm design" to be synonymous with "good composition," then Baxandall's claim that "firm design" must "mean little" if it is not used ostensively, will be seen as an attempt to empty the concepts "good composition," or "formal value," or perhaps, even to some extent "art," and "beauty," of descriptive content.

But *good composition*, etc., are not descriptively empty: Baxandall seems to confuse generality or abstraction with lack of precision, to confuse specificity with precision. In fact, of course, a general term may have a very precise meaning. It cannot be that all of our general terms require, in their daily use, ostentation in order for them to have meaning. (Again, it is clear that Baxandall is not here talking about how we come to learn a general term, a process which often requires ostentation; he is talking, rather, about our *use* of such terms.)

Conclusion

Whereas Wollheim, clearly sensing the power of esteemed works to engage us, in trying to close the explanation-gap, misidentifies art's power-source in a clearly inflationary way, a way that, wrongly, I believe, posits the existence of a lavish set of "meanings," Baxandall, on the other hand, takes a route which, *prima facie*, seems *deflationist*: he appears to deny, wrongly, the possibility of closing the gap via any broad explanation -- he seems to suggest, or to be attempting to convey the impression, that the aesthetic concepts of highest generality possess no real content, that nothing, or nothing of value, is shared by esteemed works.

Deflation would seem to be a classical strategy; but, on reflection we note that the eschewing of the use of the most general concepts in art criticism in the way that Baxandall does (i.e. not in order to get at what properties might be shared by long-esteemed works, but in order to discourage the search for such common properties) ensures that only the myriad particulars will be attended to. This is actually an

inflationary view, engendered by a romanticism exceeding even Wollheim's.

In fact, in order to apprehend how the common elements of Wollheim's and Baxandall's expositions upon which I have been focusing are tied together, we need look only to the notion of an obscuring romantic bias; for these elements -- prolificacy in explanation, unselfcritical theorizing, and (most importantly in the present context) summary rejection of any UTV-like theory -- can be seen as being separately grounded in those writers' romantic tendencies.

Section 15

Danto: a Second Inflationist View

Description of Danto's views

1. Throughout much of the history of Western art, Danto points out, in *Beyond the Brillo Box*,[102] people believed that in order for something to be a work of visual art, it had to portray accurately that which it represented. This was the belief, for instance of the ancient Greeks: "[R]esemblance," Danto says, "mistakenly became [the Greeks'] definition of art, and the eye became the arbiter of artistic excellence and opticality the criterion of artistic structure."[103] Even into the modern period, artists strove to be able to imitate with more and more fidelity what they saw. "As late as the Impressionists," Danto says, "artists were in the spirit of wholeness with their tradition. The Impressionists in particular saw their task very little differently than Vasari did: as the conquest of visual appearances, of arranging colors across flat surfaces in such a way as to affect the retina

as it would be affected by some scene in the real world to which the painterly array corresponded. They felt themselves closer to visual truth than their predecessors . . . . Their discoveries regarding the colors of shadows belonged to the same progress as linear perspective, aerial perspective, chiaroscuro."[104]

2.a. Danto discusses also another major view, the *formalist* view, which held that for something to be a work of art it had to be beautiful, it had to have what Danto calls *aesthetic qualities*. "[I]n 1790," Danto writes, "Kant published his *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, which treats of beauty and sublimity. It does not, however, especially treat art other than in terms of what it has in common with physical beauty. Kant thinks of aesthetics in terms of disinterested contemplation, where the paradigm aesthetic moment might be gazing at sunsets . . . . Kant seems to have taken a view of art as the occasion for aesthetic gratification and almost nothing else."[105]

Danto notes that "Kant defines beauty in terms of having no purpose though appearing to be purposive--'beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, so far as this is perceived in it without any representation of a purpose.' Kant's theory of art is somewhat more complex, but beauty is an essential part of it . . . . Kant's theory of art is this: Artworks please without subserving any interest (hence he opposes a theory of art as having any use)."[106] For Kant, Danto says, "nature and art seemed together the object of a single kind of disinterested judgment, abstracted from all questions of use and practice."[107]

b. Danto says that "the aesthetic attitude was revived in the 1950s and made almost official through the influence of the largely formalistic theories of the critic

Clement Greenberg."[108] Danto quotes Greenberg: "'It seems to be a law of modernism,' Greenberg wrote, in *Avant-Garde and kitsh*, 'that the conventions not essential to the viability of a medium be discarded as soon as they are recognized.'" "This division," says Danto, "between essence and convention . . . defines the project of Modernism as the search for essence."[109] Of a work exemplifying this thesis, a black canvas by Ellsworth Kelly, Danto says, "Everything inessential had been leached away, leaving only the essence of art behind."[110] "My sense is," Danto says, "that the history of art for which the Greenbergian paradigm has application has come to an end. Its emblem is the black purity of a single form by Ellsworth Kelly . . . ."[111]

Danto says that "in the decade of the fifties, . . . the Museum of Modern Art was a sort of temple of pure form and abstract beauty,"[112] "a sanctified precinct of high art construed in terms of aesthetic purity, uncontaminated with meaning."[113]

Danto characterizes the modernist aesthetic [formalist theory] as being "essentially ahistorical."[114] He says that "formalist analysis cuts across all times and all cultures . . . . All art exists for display and formal delectation, across an aesthetic distance . . . . All art . . . stands outside life, in a space of its own, metaphorically embodied in the Plexiglass display case, the bare white gallery, the aluminum frame."[115]

3. Starting sometime in the nineteenth century, Danto says, and ending in 1964, artists produced works which had the effect (and he suggests that, often, this was an effect which these artists consciously desired to bring about) of helping to uncover the essential nature of art. Thus, these artists, he says, in a series of "erasures," made works which, though still being works of art, less and less exemplified the older theories about the

nature of art. "The history of Modernism," Danto says, "beginning in the late 1880s, is a history of the dismantling of a concept of art which had been evolving for over half a millenium."[116] And he says, "Beginning with the Pre-Raphaelites, artists have distanced themselves from their histories in a more or less total way, which meant that they were implicitly involved in a semiphilosophical enterprise of saying what was and what was not art. The definition of art has accordingly come to play an increasing role in the making of art in modern times, climaxing in recent years when the question of whether something was art became more and more frequently and more stridently, expressed."[117] Danto says of the Abstract Expressionist period in particular, "It was as though it was imperative upon young artists to discover the true nature of art."[118]

4. Danto points to one method which he believes might assist *philosophers* to uncover art's essence: "A good philosophical procedure," he says, "for drawing lines [that is, in this case, for finding out what the difference between art objects and non-art objects is] consists in imagining things on either side of them that have in common as many properties as possible, for at least it will be plain that what divides them cannot be located in what they share."[119]

Danto says that among the artworks created during the period of erasures, some --Duchamp's *Fountain* (a urinal exhibited as art), Warhole's *Brillo Box* (a work which looked nearly identical to a Brillo box), and other works--were such that if philosophers were to apply the method to them, the question of art's essence could finally be answered.

According to Danto, what these objects, and imaginary examples which they suggested-- for instance, an imaginary net-like sculpture which was visually identical to an actual, "dramatically beautiful,"[120] African hunting net--first revealed to the philosophers was that, since each such object was a work of art, yet *looked* almost exactly like an object which was not a work of art, "what makes the difference between"[121] a work of art and its visual twin cannot be something *visual*. "I came to feel that with the *Brillo Box*," Danto says, "the true character of the philosophical question of the nature of art had been attained."[122] "What Warhol's dictum amounted to," Danto claims, "was that you cannot *tell* when something is a work of art just by looking at it, for there is no particular way that art has to look,"[123] "Before Duchamp," Danto writes, "it had seemed obvious that the distinction between artworks and other things was perceptual, that paintings looked as distinct from other things as roses, say, look distinct from tomcats. With Duchamp, and those who followed him, it became philosophically evident that the differences are not of a kind that meets or even can meet the eye."[124] "What the Pop artists showed," Danto says, "like the Minimalists who were working along a parallel track, was that there is no special way a work of art has to look . . . . With this came the recognition that . . . what makes the difference between art and nonart is not visual but conceptual."[125] Danto says, "That's my whole philosophy of art in a nutshell, finding the deep differences between art and craft, artworks and mere things, when members from either class look exactly similar."[126]

5. Danto believes that philosophers could not have gotten as close as they have to an answer to the question of art's essence had artists failed to produce the work that they

did, and neither could art pursue the question beyond a certain point. "My thought," he says, "was that the answer to the question [of art's essence] could not come from art, which exhausted its philosophical powers in raising it, and that the task for philosophy was now clear. Until the form of the question came from within art, philosophy was powerless to raise it, and once it was raised, art was powerless to resolve it. That point had been reached when art and reality were indiscernible."[127] And he says, "[What makes the difference between art and nonart] is a matter for the philosophy of art to discover, and having brought the matter to this point, Pop and Minimalism had brought the quest to an end. Artists no longer needed to be philosophers."[128]

6.a. So, according to Danto, given examples of works which are genuine artworks, but which possess no *visible* properties to distinguish them from "mere real things," it follows that the essence of art cannot be identified either with mimesis or with formal beauty.

But Danto seems also to deploy two additional arguments against formalist theory.

According to the formalists, our enjoyment of art has to do with our response to the painting *qua* set of color patterns on the painting's flat surface. Greenberg went so far as to tout flatness as the essence of painting as an art. It is this component of the formalist view which what I take to be the first of Danto's additional arguments against formalism seems to address. Danto does admit that "there is a description under which paintings are 'flat stains of color,' or, speaking realistically and reductively, that to be a painting is to be made of flat stains of color,"[129] but he says that it is a mistake to suppose

"so close a relationship between certain ideal paintings and the world that the *world*, reductively and realistically, is made of flat stains of color: and that it is thus that the innocent eye sees the world."[130] ". . . the miracle of painting," he says, "is that we see things and scenes and not, or not just, the flat stains of color of which the painting consists."[131] "Predilection to perceive pictorial depth," he says, "appears . . . universal in human beings . . . . And this means, if I may speculate recklessly, that pictorial depth can never have been discovered and that pictorial flatness is not a possibility."[132]

In a second auxiliary argument against formalism, Danto seems to argue that the formal value of a work cannot be great, and so cannot constitute art's essence.

His argument focuses upon the way in which the formalist theorist sees art as "pleasing without subserving any interest,"[133] or (as Danto describes Kant's view) not "having any use."[134] He suggests that rejection of the formalist analysis is necessary in order that we might be able to obtain "a deeper connection between art and life,"[135] and that we might be able "to reconnect to life."[136] "Formalism," Danto claims, "is finally unsatisfying, and the need for a philosophy of art under which art is responsive to human ends is a matter of absolute priority."[137] The opening up of one of the Museum of Modern Art's windows to the street, Danto says, was "an effort to reconnect art and real life, full of marvelous meanings . . . . That is where the energy is."[138] "Art cannot be integral to meaningful lives," Danto says, "without the shadow of dissent, difference, offense . . . . Art could not have the seriousness it has without the implication of danger and of disagreement."[139] Danto's suggestion seems to be that formalism cannot account for this fact.

b. Danto concludes from all this that it is the presence of *meaning*, and not the presence of beautiful form, which is constitutive of art's essence. For Danto, then, the question, "What is art?" which the *Brillo Box* was supposed to have prepared us to answer, is finally being answered. Meanings are not visible, it is not required that we be able to perceive flat stains in order to grasp them, and these "marvelous meanings," Danto believes, "connect art to life."

"The thesis which emerged from my book *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*," Danto says, "is that works of art are symbolic expressions, in that they embody their meanings . . . . To see something as art is to be ready to interpret it in terms of what and how it means."[140] Speaking about the artifacts of cultures other than our own, he says, "The criteria through which perception allows us to pick things out will not greatly help in identifying works of art when . . . the artifact of one [culture] might look exactly like the artwork of another. What makes one an artwork is the fact that it embodies, as a human action gives embodiment to a thought, something we could not form a concept of without the material objects which convey its soul."[141] And he says, "To be a work of art, I have argued, is to embody a thought, to have a content, to express a meaning . . . ."[142]

(We find a particularly clear articulation by Danto of his ideas on what might constitute art's essence in his book, *After the End of Art*, where he says that "*The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, in its effort to lay down a definition, hence chart the essence of art, did little better than come up with conditions (i) and (ii) as necessary for something having the status of art. To be a work of art is to be (i) *about* something and (ii) to *embody its meaning* . . . . My book ekes out [these] two conditions, and I was

(and am) insufficiently convinced that they were jointly sufficient to have believed the job done. But I did not know where to go next and so ended the book . . . . It seems to me, I captured part of the essence of art, and hence vindicated my philosophical belief that art is an essentialist concept."[143])

Thus, Danto's definition of art, as far as it goes, is not unlike Wollheim's. Danto, however, elaborates his definition by making special reference to the way in which meaning, as he construes it, must necessarily fit into a causal network of cultural discourse:

c. For Danto, the meanings whose presence defines (or partly defines) art's essence, it appears, are always an integral part of the causal network which is the discourse of the culture to which both artist and spectator belong (and it is apparently this feature of Danto's view which has given rise to* the "Institutional Theory" of art, according to which, as Danto puts it, "something is art when declared to be art by the art world,"[144] the discourse of which is one component of the culture's discourse. Danto does not subscribe to the Institutional Theory; "There is no fiat,"[145] he says).

For instance, artist Jennifer Bartlett reacts against "the severe imperatives of minimalism,"[146] that is, against the minimalist discourse, and the meaning of her work reflects this reaction.

The sculptor Christian Boltanski creates a tableau consisting of children's

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* Danto says, on page 38 of *Beyond the Brillo Box*, that the Institutional Theory of Art "was bred of a creative misunderstanding of my work by George Dickie."

clothing hung in a room lit by bare bulbs. Boltanski intends the work to convey the horror of the holocaust. But in order to understand the work, we have to have knowledge of these events -- which means that we had to have participated in that cultural discourse of which this knowledge is a part.

In Danto's examples in general, we seem to be able to identify meanings which are clearly grounded in art-world discourse, and we seem to be able to identify meanings of a sort which must be grounded in a wider cultural discourse.

In Danto's text, we find many references to the way in which meanings link to such systems of discourse:

"Whether animals are capable of expression," Danto says, ". . . in my usage, will . . . be a question of the degree to which they can be counted members of a culture in virtue of having internalized its codes." [147] "Symbolic expressions . . . are communications; and they presuppose a code that is supposed accessible to those to whom the communication is addressed."[148] "Symbolic expressions, as communications, in general define communities of implicit understanders."[149] And Danto talks about "a system of meanings" which "defines a community."[150] "There is," he says, ". . . a system of communication and an implied audience for the work, and we can identify that audience as the work's art world, in that members of it are conversant in the discourse of reasons that constitute that work as a work, and then as the work it is."[151] "To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry -- an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an art world."[152] "[N]othing really is a work of art outside the system of reasons which give it that status: works of art are not such by

nature."[153] (By the term "non-natural meanings," he says that he means "that such meanings have to be learned."[154]) "[T]he discourse of reasons is what confers the status of art on what would otherwise be mere things."[155] "[Artist Eva Hesse was] a participant in the discourse of Minimalist reasons."[156] "The discourse of reasons for a given culture is a sort of language game, governed by rules of play, and for reasons parallel to those that hold that only where there are games are there wins and losses and players, so only where there is an art world is there art."[157] "In order [to be able to see the *Brillo Box* as a work of art,] one had to participate in a conceptual atmosphere, a 'discourse of reasons,' which one shared with the artists and with others who made up the art world."[158] "To be responsive to works of pictorial art requires us therefore to be responsive to features of pictures to which animals cannot be responsive, since it falls outside the pictorial competence of which they *are* capable. They are incapable of it because seeing something as art is not a perceptual skill wired in but a matter of being located, as animals are not, in culture and in history."[159]

d. Throughout *Beyond the Brillo Box*, Danto supplies us with many examples of mostly recent works which he interprets in terms of their meanings. I will mention a few of these examples:

i. Warhol's stacked Campbell's soup cans, Danto says, exemplify the "profound human values" of "warmth, nourishment, orderliness, and predictability."[160]

ii. In a reference connected to Warhol's *Brillo Box*, Danto says, "The Brillo pad emblemizes our struggle with dirt and the triumph of domestic order."[161]

iii. He says of Warhol that, in general, he "celebrated the world in which he grew up and which he lost . . . ."[162]

iv. In what is clearly a reference to the work of Roy Lichenstein, Danto says, "The comic-strip panel distills the fantasies of our childhoods and graphically embodies, in its flagged colors and sharp outlines, the visual pleasures of innocence."[163]

v. *Metronomic Irregularity II*, by Eva Hesse, consisted of "three painted wood panels, each 48 inches square, separated by spaces of about the same dimension. The panels have been drilled at regular half-inch intervals, so they look like industrial pegboards, though 'made by hand.' And they are connected by coated wire, drawn loosely in and out of the holes, so that it looks like a tangle."[164] The key to grasping the meaning of this work, according to Danto, is to notice how "the work consists of two opposed sorts of elements, one mechanical and orderly, the other irregular and disorderly. One is classical, the other romantic; or: one is male and the other female."[165] "The work," Danto claims, "is organized around the tensions between [these oppositions]. The hopeless wire strives to unite the separated fragments of its counterpart, but they remain divided as it runs in and out of the openings in pursuit of unity and harmony and visual peace. It is then a funny, perhaps a very funny work . . . . Even the title . . . is funny

enough to give us a hint about the work, the metronome being that paradigm of regularity which would make an irregularly tocking metronome almost a Dada joke."[166]

vi. Eva Hesse's "celebrated and admired *Hang Up*," Danto says, "consists of a very large frame, around which she has carefully wound painted rags, and then a large irregular loop of metal tubing which comes shooting out of one corner, invades our space, and then slinks back into the frame at the opposite corner. A decision has to be made as to whether the loop is the work, a wormy sort of sculpture, or whether the work is a kind of balletic interplay between two components in a work which has no base at all."[167]

vii. "Certain metaphors," Danto says, "are implied [by Hesse's work], certain questions raised about the nature of sculpture, perhaps about the nature of women, perhaps even about the meaning of love."[168]

viii. Minimalist painter Robert Mangold exhibited what Danto describes as "large industrial panels"[169] in the Fischbach Gallery. Danto quotes Mangold about his work: "'The sectional units were constructed in terms of a four-foot division because that is the standard size of the building materials which were used. I would build the wall with the openings occurring roughly the way window-breaks might occur . . . .'"[170]

Danto says, "The reference [in this quote by Mangold] to four-foot divisions, standard sizes, and terms like 'constructed' and 'building materials' offer connotations that connect us with industrial reality and prefabrication and standardization .... But the

term 'roughly' carries connotations of hand and eye rather than machinal processes . . . ."[171] "So," he says,

> we find the same tensions between the mechanical and the intuitive, the social and the individual perhaps the repetitious and the playful, that we do in Hesse's works . . . . The interplay between these [oppositions] largely defines the history of Mangold's work, which, in its latest phase at least, virtually attacks regularity in the spirit of impulse. Of the new works, Mangold writes: 'They're kind of crazy . . . .' [T]hese works will have a sort of geometrical form within the quadrilateral, sometimes actually as opening, sometimes as a drawn or painted form. These forms cannot be *perfectly* inscribed within their spaces: they sometimes touch the sides, sometimes do not quite touch them, sometimes exceed their limits and are cropped. They are done freehand . . . . It is geometry subverted, order deflected, regularity defied. They are wonderful witty works.[172]

ix. Danto points to the work of French artist Christian Boltanski, who, Danto notes, "at one period exhibited works which consisted of objects from his childhood, displayed in biscuit tins."[173] He quotes Boltanski: "'Biscuit tins in France are also childhood objects with many associations .... The task is to create a formal work that is at the same time recognized by the spectator as a sentimentally charged object.'"[174] "Boltanski's project as an artist," Danto says, "is to present objects to consciousness in such a way that the viewer's past will be awakened to that consciousness, and it is to this end that he uses the objects that he does use-- snapshots, children's clothing, and of course biscuit tins. And his work succeeds when the viewer is overpowered with emotion, encountering his or her forgotten self embedded in familiar objects, and afflicted, all at once, with the irrecoverability of the past, the death of childhood, the ephemerality of life."[175]

x. "There is a work by Boltanski, called *Purim*," Danto says, "which consists of great quantities of children's clothing, hung up neatly, displayed under bare bulbs. Because of the title, there is a Jewish content, and it is impossible to repress the association that the owners of this clothing must all have died, and that this is an unendurably pathetic memorial to children who perished naked in the camps. The clothing is boisterously colorful, dresses and pants, overalls and tiny shirts. And it is cheap, mass-produced clothing, the kinds of things Anychild would wear."[176]

xi. Danto discusses the work of American artist Jennifer Bartlett. He quotes John Ashbery's description of her work: "'Early on she began using steel squares surfaced with baked enamel in lieu of canvas (subway signs gave her the idea), silk-screening them with graphlike grids and filling the squares with seemingly random arrangements of colored dots.'"[177] "The visual was pretty important to Bartlett," Danto says, "who selected from the twenty-five colors available as Testor enamel, red, yellow, blue, black, and white -- Mondrian colors, one might say; indeed, the primary colors, as one would expect from Platonistic work. It would have taken a shrewd critical eye to deal with the fact that she also used green. Later she told [Calvin] Tomkins: 'It always made me nervous just to use primary colors. I felt a need for green! I felt no need whatever for orange or violet, but I did need green.' That need for green is the key to Bartlett's work, which was also less mathematical than it looked."[178] "[Her early and late] works," he says, "in fact are by way of a battlefield in which the severe imperatives of Minimalism war with something warm, human, possibly feminine, certainly romantic, rebellious, playful. The works are allegories of the artistic spirit in the age of mechanical

reproduction, or a wild collision between the *esprit de géometrie* and the *esprit de finesse*."[179]

7. After Warhol's *Brillo Box*, Danto claims, the history of art ended. "I came to feel," Danto says, "that with the *Brillo Box*, the true character of the philosophical question of the nature of art had been attained. Closely connected with this, I began to believe, appropriating a famous thesis of Hegel's, that with the disclosure or discovery of its true philosophical nature, art attains the end of its history."[180] "Art," Danto says, "was no longer possible in terms of a progressive historical narrative. The *narrative* had come to an end."[181] "History in effect was over."[182]

8. But this does not mean, in his view, that art will now stop being produced. Danto says, "[I]t is not as though . . . there will not be art once art has come to an end."[183] "What the end of art means," he says, "is not, of course, that there will be no more works of art. If anything, there has been more art-making through the last decade than in any previous period of history. What has come to an end, rather, is a certain narrative, under the terms of which making art was understood to be carrying forward the history of discovery and making new breakthroughs."[184]

9. Now, according to Danto, we have entered a period of Pluralism in art: Although "every art movement of modern times has come in with a set of claims that invalidated every other way as unacceptable,"[185] all styles are now, in this Post-art-historical era, acceptable. The idea that the progressive historical narrative has

come to an end, Danto says, "really did mean that anything could be art, in the sense that nothing could any longer be excluded. It was a moment--I would say it was the moment--when perfect artistic freedom had become real . . . . [O]nce art had ended, you could be an abstractionist, a realist, an allegorist, a metaphysical painter, a surrealist, a landscapist, or a painter of still lifes or nudes . . . . Everything was permitted, since nothing any longer was historically mandated. I call this the Post-Historical Period of Art . . . ."[186] Danto says, "I did not believe [in the early 1980s] in a philosophy of art history in which there was to be some historically next thing."[187] He says: "I thought we had entered the post-historical phase of art in which there was no longer the possibility of the historically correct direction. This would be a period then of *deep* Pluralism."[188] "Recently I thought about the artists I like best," Danto says, "and how little they have in common with one another . . . . I have no grounds for excluding anything . . . . I can like it all."[189]

10. Not only has the end been reached, according to Danto, of the long period during which the making of art could be characterized in terms of discovery and innovation, but, Danto suggests, the fact that this end has occurred is to be explained teleologically. Danto writes that, at some point, he "began to believe, appropriating a famous thesis of Hegel's, that with the disclosure or discovery of [art's] true philosophical nature, art attains the end of its history."[190] "Spirit," Danto says, "in Hegel's philosophy, unfolds itself to itself in history, externalizing itself through various cultural acts, coming to awareness of its own drives and resources, I have often thought that art would be like this . . . ."[191] "I had [in 1981] begun," he says, " . . . to take

seriously a thesis of Hegel's that at a certain moment art turns into philosophy, for it seemed to me only in such terms could I make much sense of the recent history of art."[192] "[In the early 1980s] I thought," he writes, "that art had brought itself to the threshold of self-consciousness, and hence to its own philosophy."[193]

Evaluation of Danto's views

Re 4: With respect to the method which Danto utilizes in order to produce sets of visual twins, his central claim is this:

> *The general method described here, when applied to an attempt to uncover art's essence, can be used to show that what makes the difference between art and non-art is not something* visual.

But let us be more clear about what this method amounts to, and what it reveals in the cases to which it is here applied. First, let me state the method in a clear way:

M1

> *In order to find the essence of X-ness, imagine and/or find real examples of, pairs of items such that one member of each pair is an X and the other is a non-X, and such that their common properties are as numerous as possible. Then try to discern the ways in which the two items differ.*

Danto says, "It will be plain that what divides [these two members of the pair] cannot be located in what they share." But we must be more clear about "what divides" the X from the non-X in this pair. In fact, what is plain is only that *at least one necessary condition* for a thing's being X is absent in the non-X member of the pair. We must be careful not to assume that *all* components, *all* of X's necessary conditions (which together ought to be sufficient for X-ness), are missing in the non-X.

Thus, for instance, when method M1 is applied by Danto to art, and it turns up pairs of visual twins, Danto's argument in each case seems clearly to have this form:

(1) Object A is art and object B is not.

(2) Object A is visually the same as B.

(3) "[W]hat divides [A and B] cannot be located in what they share," and so cannot be something visual.

(4) Therefore, in general, "what makes the difference between art and nonart is not visual but conceptual."

But line (4) in an argument of this form cannot validly be inferred, because to say that what makes the difference *between A and B* is not something visual is to say only that *at least one* of possibly several properties necessary for a thing's being art is a nonvisual property; but to say, on the other hand, that what makes the difference *between art and nonart* is not visual is to imply that *all* of the properties necessary for a thing's being art are nonvisual properties. The universal cannot validly be inferred from the existential.

Thus, Danto's example of the pair consisting of an (imaginary) beautiful net-like sculpture and a visually identical African net, the former being a work of art and the second not, fails to demonstrate that what makes the difference between art and nonart is nonvisual--it shows only that at least one of the properties necessary for a thing's being art is nonvisual. (And I suggested [above, page 64] that "art object" might be defined as "norm-intentional-moderation-artifact." It seems that in this example, the net possesses all properties necessary for a thing's being an art object except the *nonvisual* property of being intentionally made to possess moderation-richness, a visual property.)

But the thrust of method M1 can be preserved and clarity enhanced if we use a somewhat modified version of the method as applied to long-esteemed works:

M2

> *In order to find what it is about the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, Kandinsky abstracts, the Laocoön, etc., that accounts for the high esteem in which they are held, that is, to find out what exactly is so* good *about them that they have warranted that esteem, imagine and/or find real examples of, pairs of items such that one member of each pair either is a Lascaux painting, etc., or seems to warrant esteem in the same way (whatever, in detail, that way turns out to be) that the Lascaux paintings, etc. do, and such that the other member does not seem to warrant esteem in this way, and such that the differences between the two members are as few as possible. Then try to discern the ways in which the two items differ.*

If application by me of *this* method were to produce any pair of visual twins, I might (depending on how broadly the expression "in the same way" is construed -- see below) be forced to doubt the truth of my thesis. (Notice that here we are not making divisions on the basis of possession of and lack of any set of properties that may be necessary for an item to be placed under a concept. If we were, then it is possible that this sort of production of visual twins would not pose a challenge for my view. Such a method would, for instance, if we were dividing items on the basis of the presence and absence of the concept **art** as defined by me on page 64, produce the net-sculpture/African net pair, which, as I have noted, presents no challenge to my thesis.)

The net-sculpture/African-net pair of visual twins would not be produced by this modified method, M2, in my view, since both items seem to possess that property which accounts for the appeal that the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, etc., have for us (whatever that property may turn out to be, i.e., whether it turns out to be moderation-richness, as I think it will, or some other property.)

The *Brillo Box*/Brillo box pair of visual twins might be produced by this method, however, because, in my view, the *Brillo Box qua* having the relational property of being exhibited in an art gallery possesses some moderation-richness of the sort which characterizes humor. But the pair could be produced by the method, I believe, only if we were to construe "in the same way" very broadly, such that visual art and humor are taken to be of the same kind. Only a pair of visual twins such that just one member of the pair seems to warrant esteem in the same way as the long-esteemed works do, where

"same" is construed more narrowly, can count as evidence against my view, and the *Brillo Box*/Brillo box pair does not seem to constitute such a pair. This is true even though the *Brillo Box*, but not the Brillo box, may embody meanings (Danto says, "The Brillo pad emblemizes our struggle with dirt and the triumph of domestic order." [194]), and may *therefore* fail under some concept which Danto labels "art."

The key point here is that Danto's examples of pairs of visual twins fail to demonstrate that whatever it is (i.e. whether it is moderation-richness or something else) which accounts for the appeal that the Lascaux paintings, Rembrandt portraits, Kandinsky abstracts, etc., has for us it is not something visual.

Re 5: It seems true to say that the answer to the question of art's essence "could not come from art," and it is certainly true that without art, philosophy could not have raised the question "What is art?" But Danto clearly seems to be saying that philosophy (beyond simply not *having* advanced) was "*powerless*" to advance beyond its theories of mimesis and formal beauty until the erasures pointed the way. He does not say why this should be so, however.

(Of course, my view is that, whereas it was reasonable that the philosophy of art should move beyond the theory of mimesis, it ought not have moved beyond the theory of beauty.)

Against the notion that philosophy might require guidance by artists in its search for art's essence, we can note that Hutcheson and Kant had already seen that mimesis was not required, long before Kandinsky realized that principle in paint.

Re 6.a. I have shown, I believe, that Danto, in using his visual-twin method, fails to demonstrate that the valued property of long-esteemed works is a nonvisual property. Thus, he fails, using this method, to show that this property is not formal beauty.

But what of Danto's other two arguments against formalist theory?

With respect to the first additional argument:

In saying, "we see things and scenes and not, *or not just*, the flat stains of color . . ." (emphasis mine), Danto appears to admit to the possibility of what is obviously true, that we are capable of seeing paintings for what they are, flat patches of color on a surface. His point seems to be, then, that we also are incapable of failing to see (recognizable) representations as what they represent. (The inference ought to be, then, that we are able to see a painting both ways simultaneously.) But if this argument is, as I take it to be, an argument against formal theory, it misses the mark, since our response to flat color patches presupposes only that we are capable of seeing a picture as composed of flat color patches, not that we see it this way exclusively.

With respect to Danto's second additional argument against formalism:

The expression, "has no use," like "is useless," means "has no instrumental value;" but, it seems, "has no use," and "is useless" are ordinarily used only when the thing they describe has no *intrinsic* value either. Thus, ordinarily, "X has no use" implies "X has no value"

So, in claiming that if what the formalists believe is true, then art must be viewed as not "having any use," Danto encourages the reader to pursue the following line of reasoning:

(1) If what the formalist believes is true, then art has no essential use.

(2) Therefore, if what the formalist believes is true, then not only does art have no essential instrumental value, it has no essential intrinsic value either.

(3) Art has either essential instrumental value, essential intrinsic value, or no essential value.

(4) Therefore, if what the formalist believes is true, then art has no essential value.

(5) But art *has* essential value. [This is true *a priori*.]

(6) Therefore, what the formalist believes is not true.

But in the case of formalists like Kant or Hutcheson, line (2) is false, because their views imply that whereas art has no essential *instrumental* value, it does have essential *intrinsic* value.

In the case of a formalist like Greenberg, on the other hand, line (2) may be true. Greenberg, it seems, confused the essence of *painting as an art*, which is exemplified by Rembrandt portraits, Kandinsky abstracts, etc., with the essence of *painting*, which is exemplified by Rembrandt portraits, Kandinsky abstracts, road signs, and painted walls of rooms. We might suppose also that Greenberg was influenced by the following invalid argument: Painting as an art *need* not represent spatial depth; therefore, painting as an art *ought* not represent spatial depth. At any rate, since Greenberg believed (*de re*) that the essence of painting as an art is the essence of painting, and if painting's essence is, as it seems clearly to be, not essentially of value, either instrumental or intrinsic, then line (2) of the argument is true of Greenberg, and the conclusion (line (6)) is true of him.

Therefore, Danto's argument here tends to refute the formalism of Greenberg, but not the formalism of Kant or Hutcheson, and not my own view, which is similar to Hutcheson's with respect to what our theories say about the ultimate source of art's value.

Re 6.b. Danto presents his interpretations of particular works in several different contexts: his interpretations of Warhol's soup cans and *Brillo Box*, Lichtenstein's comic-strip panels, Hesse's *Metronomic Irregularity II* and *Hang Up*, and Boltanski's biscuit-tin work and *Purim*, are brought out in order to show how meaning in art connects to a discourse of reasons, to a community of understanders. Danto's interpretation of Mangold's work occurs in the context of an exposition on kinds of interpretation, as part of a discussion in which Danto is critical of the sort of interpretation which involves the mere discovery of affinities. His interpretation of Bartlett's work occurs in the context of his discussion of how the end of style, narrowly personal or broader, might be inscribed in its beginning. But these examples can also be construed as constituting a challenge to my view, for if these works, which, it seems to me, have little or no formal beauty, nevertheless might come to be seen by me, perhaps as a result of Danto's guidance, as having a considerable amount of the sort of value which characterizes the long-esteemed works, then I would have little choice but to conclude that formal beauty is not the source of the long-esteemed works' power.

Re 6.d.i. Perhaps Warhol did intend, in creating *Campbell Soup Cans*, to express a desire to celebrate what Danto calls the "profound human values" of warmth, nourishment,

orderliness, and predictability, but the expression of something profound is not necessarily a profound expression, and indeed, as I look at this work, reading it as Danto suggests we do, I do not thereby find any value in it. In fact, it is difficult for me to believe that anyone would respond with any appreciable intensity to such expression. When we look at *Titus Reading*, we feel a deep resonance with Rembrandt's love for his son, and when we look at *Starry Night*, we respond to Van Gogh's palpable love for the world, but to say that we might feel moved by a salute to nourishment, for instance, does not ring true to me.

Re 6.d.ii. Once again, a celebration of the triumph over dirt does not seem to be the kind of thing to which human beings would resonate. I do not find that it strikes a chord. As I suggested in my discussion on Wollheim, a careful observer will endeavor to differentiate between those feelings which are truly conveyed by the image and those which he has autonomously summoned up from his imagination.

Re 6.d.iii. Danto's words, "profound," "struggle," "triumph," "celebrated," convey a positively-directed intensity which does not actually come across for me in Warhol's work.

Re 6.d.v. It seems clear that Danto is correct insofar as he identifies Hesse's intentions in creating *Metronomic Irregularity II* as having to do with the way in which the work consists of two elements, one orderly and the other disorderly, or, we might say, one similarity-rich and the other not; and, indeed, the presence together of these elements

creates at least the suggestion of the sort of parity which I have called moderation-richness. Since Danto focuses his critical sights on these features, we might suppose that he has some cognizance of the power of moderation-richness.

But Danto, it seems, augments his perception of this work by imagining that these static relations are intensely dynamic ones, and by fantasizing that the components (relata) might be capable of feeling hopeless and might be capable of striving, as if they were conscious beings.

I find that I am able to experience the work this way only as the result of a deliberate effort of my will (and even then, I do not find this drama of my own creation to be very engrossing). In my view, none of the more dramatic components of Danto's interpretation of this work can legitimately be said to point to any real property of the work, in the way that, for instance, tenderness can legitimately be attributed to Rembrandt's *Titus Reading*.

In my view, whatever real value this work by Hesse actually possesses derives from moderation among its parts (and such moderation is visual).

Re 6.d.vi. Here too, in the case of Hesse's *Hang Up*, Danto appears to me to augment his perception of real structures, which might be (very) slightly interesting in their own right, with a fantastic drama of his own creation.

Re 6.d.viii. Just as Danto seems, perhaps, to betray some cognizance of the power of UIV in his interpretation of Hesse's *Metronomic Irregularity II* , he does so in his

interpretation of Mangold's work as well--"regularity defied," after all, could be construed as an expressionistic reference to unity in variety.

Indeed, Mangold's work presents a minimal sort of moderation-richness; that is, it is a moderation-richness of small power, because it involves relations holding between a small number of elements, and I agree with Danto that the slight irregularities one finds in this work contribute to its value--in my view, the presence here of irregularities increases the work's moderation-richness.

But, it seems to me, Danto supplies an inflationary interpretation of Mangold's work, imagining that the work actually might express tensions between, for instance, "the mechanical and the intuitive," and imagining that the expressive property of the work really possesses the sort of intensity that his words are clearly meant to convey (the work, he says, "*virtually attacks* regularity in the spirit of *impulse*," and he says that the works are "*wonderful* witty" ones [my emphasis]).

Re 6.d.x. The greatest part of the power of a work such as *Purim* derives from the feelings we already possess about what is represented in it. Surely, Danto does not exaggerate the intensity of the expression embodied by *Purim*. But such art is of a different genre than the art upon which we have been focusing our attention, art the source of whose power has long been mysterious.

Re 6.d.xi. Again, in his interpretation of Bartlett's work, Danto seems to focus his attention on a real, but small, amount of unity in variety which her work seems to

present; but his interpretation, in my view, is inflationistic, because, as in the other examples, Danto exaggerates the importance of the work's expressive properties.

Re 6.d., in general: I wish to make two points about Danto's examples:

First, in my view, Danto fails to furnish an example of a work which is both powerful in the way that the long-esteemed works are, and non-beautiful.

Second, it seems worth while to note that Danto's interpretations are, like Wollheim's, inflationistic; but, whereas, in my view, Wollheim presents works which have a great amount of real value, while positing meanings in order to explain that value which are purely imaginary, Danto seems to exaggerate the intensity of the expressive properties and the value of the works he presents, while appearing actually to understand the intentions of the artists who made them. Thus, we can say, perhaps, that whereas Wollheim's claims are *qualitatively* inflationistic, Danto's are *quantitatively* inflationistic.

Re 7. I believe that two erasures of the general sort of which Danto speaks have, indeed, occurred in the modernist period; one of these was, as I see it, constructive, the other destructive.

First, in a process beginning, in painting, perhaps with Delacroix and Turner and culminating with Kandinsky, artists discovered that their work need not represent in order for it to have power and value.

Second, in a process beginning, in painting, in the 1940s, some artists of a romantic bent, and influenced by expressionist theory, came to accept the false proposition that their work need not have formal beauty in order for it to have the same sort of power and value which the long-esteemed works possess.

The second erasure has led, in my opinion, to a dead end (it is not, as Danto believes, art history which has ended, but merely the history of the second erasure), setting the stage for both a restoration of formalism and a third erasure, an erasure brought about by the realization that the presence of expression value in a painting is not necessary for the painting to have the power and value of the long-esteemed works.

I agree with Danto when he says that art's future is pluralistic. Surely, beautiful work rich in both representation value and expression value will continue to be produced. But I foresee the development of a certain genre of art which Danto does not foresee, a genre characterized by an art which is formally beautiful, nonrepresentational, and emphatically nonexpressive, and it will be in the context of such art that those new ideas will be generated which will carry art history forward: visual artists working in this genre, and sympathetic philosophers and critics, will endeavor to understand more and more about how formal beauty can be maximized in painting and sculpture, and their discoveries will provide a boon to those working in all genres.

What is necessary now, for the history of the visual arts to continue, is only that artists and others break free from the constraints of expressionist dogma.

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design*, ed. Peter Kivy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 40.

2. Ibid., 40-41.

3. Ibid., 43.

4. Ibid., 43.

5. Ibid., 43-44.

6. Ibid., 44-45.

7. Ibid., 45-46.

8. Ibid., 46.

9. Ibid., 46-47.

10. Ibid., 48.

11. Ibid., 53-54

12. Ibid., 91-92.

13. Monroe Beardsley, *Aesthetics* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), 175.

14. Ibid., 464-470.

15. Ibid., 175.

16. Ibid., 175.

17. Ibid., 175-176.

18. I omit here Beardsley's third canon, *intensity.* His first two canons involve dual relations among the basic qualities of areas and lines, density and movement. The third canon appears to involve only the dependent qualities (which I classify above as I.B.3 and II.B.2) themselves; that is, not relations among these but their intensities.

19. Ibid., 192.

20. Ibid., 194.

21. Ibid., 195.

22. Ibid., 205.

23. ibid., 208.

24. Ibid., 208.

25. Ibid., 529.

26. Ibid., 531.

27. Stephen C. Pepper, *Principles of Art Appreciation* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1949), 41.

28. Ibid., 51.

29. Ibid., 81-82.

30. Ibid., 78.

31. Ibid., 78-79.

32. Ibid., 83.

33. Ibid., 84.

34. Ibid., 81.

35. Ibid., 154.

36. Ibid., 157.

37. Ibid., 158.

38. Ibid., 163.

39. Ibid., 183.

40. Ibid., 184.

41. Ibid., 191.

42. Ibid., 191.

43. Ibid., 198.

44. Ibid., 199.

45. Ibid., 206-207.

46. Ibid., 28.

47. Ibid., 50.

48. Ibid., 50.

49. Ibid., 51.

50. Ibid., 51.

51. Ibid., 52.

52. Ibid., 52-3.

53. Ibid., 55-6.

54. Ibid., 58.

55. Ibid., 59.

56. Rudolf Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1974).

57. Ibid., 79.

58. Ibid., 353.

59. Ibid., 151.

60. Ibid., 152.

61. Ibid., 152.

62. Ibid., 152.

63. Ibid., 154.

64. Ibid., 348.

65. Ibid., 350.

66. Ibid., 410-11.

67. Pepper, *Principles of Art Appreciation*, 183.

68. See my pp. 57-59. I can, of course, focus my mind, arbitrarily, on some three, say, separate points within a uniformly colored region, and can *will* to conceive of these three points as constituting a group. This would be a *non*naturally-defined group. Such groups cannot possibly play a role here since their number is, even in a small painting, enormous -- the number of relations existing among such groups would be much larger still.

69. According to my definition (p. 63) of *moderation-rich*, there is both an amount-maximizing component and an equality-maximizing component to aesthetic value. To say that both higher total amount and greater nearness to equality associate with higher aesthetic value (æ), seems to be to say:

Increasing an R-relation's m-degree, then, involves bringing that R-relation closer to M. Given two or more R-relations , e.g, three R-relations among three areas of color, and given a choice among (1) increasing one R-relation's M-degree, (2) doing nothing, and (3) decreasing one Relation's M-degree, we will always want to increase the R-relation's M-degree -- even if in so doing we must increase inequality among the R-relations (Cf a similar topic in *ethics*). This satisfies the demand of maximizing the total amount.

If, furthermore, we have the choice of increasing either one, but only one, of two R-relations, we will always more strongly wish to increase the smaller of the two than the larger. This satisfies the demand of maximizing equality.

But this must mean that a change of an R-relation's m-degree, R, where the R is of smaller degree (i.e. closer to 1 or O) associates with a change of aesthetic value (æ)

which is greater than the change of æ which is associated with the same amount of change of an R-relation's R where that R is of larger m-degree (i.e. closer to M). The picture that seems to emerge is of the following correspondence between R and æ (i.e., we can look at it this way):



So, it is always desirable to add new quanta to that R among several R's which is of the smallest M-degree, and, if quanta must be taken, to take quanta from that R which is of greatest M-degree.

So,

The total æ associated with R = $\sum_{æ_{qmax}}^{æ_{qi}}$, which may be, if $æ_d$ is much smaller than 1, only a little greater than the sum (n-i) of all quanta where each has magnitude 1. But, it may be much greater than this (if, for instance, $æ_d = 1$).



Knowledge of n and $æ_d$ should allow each combination of R's to be compared by us, with respect to æ.

But for now, it seems enough to know that, in general, R's which are closer to M are better, and equal distribution is desirable. Intuitively, we can feel this -- e.g. if we are working with three patches of color in a composition and

c(olor patch)$_1$ is red
c_2 is yellow yellow-orange
c_3 is green

where

$R_1c_1c_2$ and R_1 is nearly moderational
$R_2c_2c_3$
$R_3c_1c_3$ and R_3 is oppositional (far from M)

then we will seek to increase the total M, but we will look first toward doing something about R_3 (before, e.g., trying to bring c_1 a little closer to c_2).

Further investigation may show whether or not the following is correct: to fulfill the moderation-amount-maximizing requirement of S1, maximize the total M-degree of first-order relations; to fulfill the equality-maximizing requirement of S1, maximize I (identity) of second-order relations (see p. 46-47).

70. In all cases of non-fundamental UIV we encounter a relativism which we do not find in cases of fundamental UIV. There is a certain kind of variation in audience response which can be explained, I believe, by a fact which is addressed by Nelson Goodman. Goodman says, "Neither here nor elsewhere have I argued that there is no constant relation of resemblance; judgments of similarity in selected and familiar respects are, even though rough and fallible, as objective and categorical as any that are made in describing the world. But judgments of complex overall resemblance are another matter. In the first place, they depend upon the aspects or factors in terms of which the objects in question are compared; and this depends heavily on conceptual and perceptual habit. In the second place, even with these factors determined, similarities along the several axes are not immediately commensurate, and the degree of total resemblance will depend upon how the several factors are weighted." (*Languages of Art*, Hackett Publishing Co, Inc., 1976, p. 39n.)

But enough people seem to possess similar enough conceptual and perceptual habits, and similar enough "weighting" proclivities, so as to allow these sorts of UIV to be widely appreciated.

71. Claude Roger Marx, *Rembrandt*, trans. W. J. Strachan (Universe Books, Inc.), 1960, 53.

72. Mario Lepore, *The Life, Times, and Art of Rembrandt*, trans. Julia Shaw (Crescent Books, 1967), 27.

73. ibid., 66.

74. op. cit., 24-5.

75. Pepper, *Principles of Art Appreciation*, 245.

76. Lepore, *The Life, Times, and Art of Rembrandt*, 40.

77. ibid. 57.

78. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, letter to his father, September 26, 1781

Chapter 2

1. Bell (*Art*, 1913) distinguishes natural *beautiful* form from the *significant* form of art --I would make no such distinction.

2. Hutcheson, *An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design*, 40.

3. ibid., 41.

4. Beardsley, op. cit., 175.

5. ibid., 96.

6. ibid., 96.

7. ibid., 96.

8. ibid., 175.

9. ibid., 175.

10. ibid., 175.

11. One example, somewhat speculative, might provide a small hint as to how location- moderation may perhaps be able to be identified with visual balance:
This picture (A) is not balanced:



This picture (B) is fairly well balanced:



(Note that in picture B, despite the fact that some measure of balance exists, there is no vertical mark which could serve as an axis.)

If we study the R-relations existing between the horizontal figure-to-frame distances we find that this structure exists:
(A):



Where R_q relates line-lengths, and R_{ptfd} (a point-to-frame direction relation I have not yet mentioned) relates directions of point-to-frame distances (such that, for instance, a distance toward the left of a figure is opposite in direction from a distance to the right of the figure).

(B):



and I informally suggest that R_{q+ptfd} combinative relations might look something like this:

(A):



(B):



Apparently (B) presents only a slightly higher total M-degree, but *much more equality* of the M-degree's distribution. (In (B), all second-order relations between R_{q+ptfd} relations are identity relations. See note 69)

Thus (A) is said to be not in balance, whereas (B) is said to be in balance.

12. ibid., 97.

13. ibid. 175.

14. ibid., 175-6.

15. ibid., 175-6.

16. ibid., 175-6.

17. ibid., 96.

18. ibid., 208.

19. ibid., 529.

20. ibid., 531.

21. ibid., 208.

22. ibid., 529.

23. Pepper, *Principles of Art Appreciation*, 157.

24. ibid., 154.

25. ibid., 157.

26. ibid., 156-7.

27. ibid., 157.

28. ibid., 41.

29. ibid., 183.

30. ibid., 184.

31. ibid., 185.

32. ibid., 51.

33. ibid., 51.

34. ibid., 51.

35. ibid., 84.

36. ibid., 78.

37. ibid., 79.

38. ibid., 28.

39. ibid., 29.

40. ibid., 31.

41. ibid., 38.

42. ibid., 39.

43. ibid., 39.

44. ibid., 39.

45. ibid., 42.

46. ibid., 39-40.

47. ibid., 43.

48. Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception*, 79.

49. ibid., 79.

50. ibid., 420-1.

51. ibid., 419.

52. ibid., 438.

53. ibid., 412.

54. ibid., 437.

55. ibid., 416.

Chapter 3

1. Richard Wollheim, *Painting as an Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

2. ibid., 22 and 44.

3. ibid., 25.

4. ibid., 195.

5. ibid., 187.

6. ibid., 192.

7. ibid., 197.

8. ibid., 195.

9. ibid., 195.

10. ibid., 196.

11. ibid., 196.

12. ibid., 197.

13. ibid., 232.

14. ibid., 235.

15. ibid., 234.

16. ibid., 310.

17. ibid., 310.

18. ibid., 312.

19. ibid., 310.

20. ibid., 312.

21. ibid., 312.

22. ibid., 312.

23. ibid., 312.

24. ibid., 312.

25. ibid., 314.

26. ibid., 314.

27. ibid., 315.

28. ibid., 350.

29. ibid., 340.

30. ibid., 340.

31. ibid., 340.

32. ibid., 340.

33. ibid., 341.

34. ibid., 341.

35. ibid., 340.

36. ibid., 341.

37. ibid., 338.

38. ibid., 340.

39. ibid., 274.

40. ibid., 275.

41. ibid., 275.

42. ibid., 277.

43. ibid., 129.

44. ibid., 129.

45. ibid., 130.

46. ibid., 133.

47. ibid., 132.

48. ibid., 136.

49. ibid., 136.

50. ibid., 157.

51. ibid., 155.

52. ibid., 160.

53. ibid., 161.

54. Michael Baxandall, *Patterns of Intention* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

55. ibid., 1.

56. ibid., 5.

57. ibid., 6.

58. ibid., viii.

59. ibid., 5.

60. ibid., 5.

61. ibid., 35.

62. ibid., 44-5.

63. ibid., 61.

64. ibid., 45.

65. ibid., 45.

66. ibid., 64.

67. ibid., 64.

68. ibid., 65.

69. ibid., 65.

70. ibid., 65.

71. ibid., 65.

72. ibid., 65.

73. ibid., 65-6.

74. ibid., 127.

75. ibid., 121.

76. ibid., 128.

77. ibid., 129.

78. ibid., 129.

79. ibid., 129-30.

80. ibid., 130.

81. ibid., 121.

82. ibid., 128.

83. ibid., 121.

84. ibid., 128.

85. ibid., 120.

86. ibid., 121.

87. ibid., 5.

88. ibid., 133.

89. ibid., 126.

90. ibid., 133.

91. ibid., 134.

92. ibid., 134.

93. ibid., 134.

94. ibid., 8.

95. ibid., 10.

96. ibid., 11.

97. ibid., 8.

98. ibid., 9.

99. ibid., 9-10.

100. ibid., 132.

101. ibid., 6.

102. Arthur C. Danto, *Beyond the Brillo Box* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1993).

103. ibid., 111.

104. ibid., 123.

105. ibid., 168.

106. ibid., 186.

107. ibid., 187.

108. ibid., 168.

109. ibid., 157-8.

110. ibid., 158.

111. ibid., 160.

112. ibid., 154.

113. ibid., 157.

114. ibid., 129.

115. ibid., 129.

116. ibid., 4.

117. ibid., 47.

118. ibid., 224.

119. ibid., 95.

120. ibid., 94.

121. ibid., 100.

122. ibid., 6.

123. ibid., 5.

124. ibid., 95.

125. ibid., 225.

126. ibid., 53.

127. ibid., 8.

128. ibid., 225.

129. ibid., 19.

130. ibid., 19.

131. ibid., 19.

132. ibid., 27.

133. ibid., 186.

134. ibid., 186.

135. ibid., 129.

136. ibid., 129.

137. ibid., 129.

138. ibid., 160.

139. ibid., 172.

140. ibid., 41.

141. ibid., 109-110.

142. ibid., 112.

143. Arthur C. Danto, *After the End of Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 195.

144. Danto, *Beyond the Brillo Box*, 38.

145. ibid., 52.

146. ibid., 245.

147. ibid., 57.

148. ibid., 68.

149. ibid., 70.

150. ibid., 78.

151. ibid., 41.

152. ibid., 38.

153. ibid., 39.

154. ibid., 21.

155. ibid., 40.

156. ibid., 46.

157. ibid., 46.

158. ibid., 5.

159. ibid., 21.

160. ibid., 41.

161. ibid., 41.

162. ibid., 41.

163. ibid., 41.

164. ibid., 43.

165. ibid., 44-5.

166. ibid., 45.

167. ibid., 45.

168. ibid., 45.

169. ibid., 51.

170. ibid., 51.

171. ibid., 51-2.

172. ibid., 52.

173. ibid., 68.

174. ibid., 69.

175. ibid., 69.

176. ibid., 70.

177. ibid., 243.

178. ibid., 244.

179. ibid., 245.

180. ibid., 6.

181. ibid., 9.

182. ibid., 225.

183. ibid., 8.

184. ibid., 10.

185. ibid., 222.

186. ibid., 9

187. ibid., 229.

188. ibid., 229.

189. ibid., 231.

190. ibid., 6.

191. ibid., 156.

192. ibid., 217.

193. ibid., 229.

194. ibid., 41.

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