Embodied Politics: Crowds in Late Nineteenth Century American Fiction

by

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in English in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

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Advisor: Peter Hitchcock

In this dissertation I examine descriptions and representations of politically excited crowds in selected nineteenth century American fiction from the Civil War to the turn of the century. I argue that these depictions of crowds provide new opportunities for addressing theoretical concerns about collective agency and political action in contemporary accounts of Marxist informed literary scholarship. In particular, the dissertation turns to the political and ethical philosophies of Benedict de Spinoza to emphasize the importance of thinking collective agency through embodied politics. With Spinoza's concept of affect in mind, I assert that we can best understand the collective cognition of crowd behavior in the selected fiction by reframing our interpretative strategies toward theories that develop models of bodily intelligence. To this end, the dissertation offers a new genealogy for the study of crowds that primarily attends to the fiction of Martin R. Delany, Charles Chesnutt, Paul Lawrence Dunbar, Mark Twain, Bret Harte, and Frank Norris. It also introduces new theoretical perspectives through intensive readings of texts on group psychology, animal behavior, religious ecstasy, financial crisis, and social emotions. I imagine here a radical ambiguity about the potential for crowd behavior to become a sovereign force for collective action, but I contend that crowd sovereignty is powerful because assemblages of bodies have the capacity to act in the name of life and death through excited expressions of synchronized gestures and symbolic production.

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And in the next room is Ania Kozlowska, who gave me a new reason to finish. She also gives me the reason to begin again.

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Chapter One

Embodied Cognition

In Mary Wilkins Freeman's *The Portion of Labor* (1901), a young Ellen Brewster runs away from home after a fight with her depressed mother. She stumbles into the arms of an older woman who finds her and wants to get her back home. It's a small New England factory town, but not everyone knows their neighbor. Ellen refuses to identify herself, and the woman, Cynthia, takes her back to her house. Cynthia doesn't try very hard to return Ellen; she always wanted a daughter. The next day, "all the city was in a commotion over little Ellen's disappearance" (Freeman 24). Search teams spread out through the town and nearby woods. Photographs of the missing girl are pasted everywhere. Two reporters from Boston arrive in town. A third editor, one Mr. Walsey of *The Spy,* arrives to interview the distressed mother. Freeman notes that he was not "accustomed to the feminine possibilities of manufacturing localities…he had never seen a woman of that sort, and thought vaguely of the French Revolution and fish-wives when she gave vent to her distress over the loss of her child" (Freeman 26). Meanwhile, the young reporter from *The Star* postulates that the family's domestic problems led to the child's disappearance. The rest of the papers copy that "sensationalism," and within a day the circulation of the local papers have doubled (Freeman 28). The lost girl is a good story.

The young Ellen stays with Cynthia for two days in a bewildered state of curiosity; for one, she is curious about the black couple that lives quietly in a room off Cynthia's living room. For another, Cynthia lives in an awfully nice house. It's much nicer than the one Ellen ran away from. But the real reason Ellen isn't afraid of Cynthia is that Cynthia will not stop

talking. Weirdly, her voice has magical qualities. Cynthia uses "language with the precision of a musician," and she "seemed to feel that much of her power lay in her speech and voice, like some enchantress who cast her spell by means of her silver tongue" (Freeman 34-5). Out of some affectionate longing, Cynthia keeps talking to distract Ellen from the fact that she isn't yet home. Finally, when Ellen yells for her mother, Cynthia relented. She "turned white" and realized that "the nature of the crime was in reality more foreign to her nature than virtue, and her instinct was to return to her narrow and straight way" (Freeman 35). Despite Cynthia's newfound desire to 'return' Ellen, Ellen will still not say her name. When she finally does go, she leaves on her own accord and walked out the front door.

A nearby group of men and women are in a bar when they see young Ellen walk outside the window straight into the arms of her Aunt Eva, who, as a matter of fact, is just then out looking for her. Their bar talk quickly escalates: one woman "began to dance, she laughed, she sobbed, she waved her lean hands frantically" (Freeman 40-1). The group runs outside, some sobbing. A man named Jim Tenny is the first to reach her. The rest gather around Aunt Eve and Ellen, and the former becomes fearful. "Even when a great cheer went up from the crowd," Freeman notes, the Aunt cannot feel "the joy of recovery…until she saw Jim Tenny's face working with repressed emotion and met his eyes full of the memory of old comradeship" (41). At that point she joins the rest. Within the crowd, the women begin to cry in unison, "a chorus of feminine sobs" (Freeman 41). The collected crowd has begun to form a ceremony, spontaneously.

At just this moment, as the men begin to cheer, the town's factories let out for the day. Anticipating the rush of new bodies into the crowd, Jim takes Aunt Eva into his horse carriage and the crowd parts for them. As they head towards Ellen's home, "the crowd

pursued them with cheers of rejoicing," all the while Aunt Eva herself is "weeping in her terrible candor of grief and joy" (Freeman 42). As they proceed to the house, Jim's buggy becomes "the nucleus of a gathering procession, shouting and exclaiming, with voices all tuned to one key of passionate sympathy" (Freeman 43). When Ellen's mother sees her, she rushes to her. They join. "The crowd who had followed stood gaping with working faces," Freeman observes, and "the mothers wept over their own children" (Freeman 44). At this Ellen's mother kisses her with streaming tears, "at once pathetic and terrible. She was human love and selfishness incarnate" (Freeman 44). When her grandmother sees them together, she returns to the house and falls on her knees, kneeling before the Bible. Her father is in the house passed out, exhausted from searching all night. When he awakes to his child, "the sound of his sobbing filled the house and reached the people out in the yard, and an echo rose from them" (Freeman 46). When the crowd and the father finish weeping together inside and out the house, the assembled townsfolk finally disperse.

This short scene comes to shape Ellen Brewster's life in unexpected ways. Ellen grows up to be a highly articulate and well-respected student with a profound sympathy for equality. When the local shoe factory begins to downsize and cut wages during a recession, Ellen feels compelled to give a speech for her valedictory address that arouses the townfolk into a strike that paralyzes the town. While we won't investigate that speech just now, it's important for this dissertation to simply catalogue the themes prominent in the scene presented here, for nearly all of the aforementioned details form a constellation of qualities that this dissertation will pursue.

First, we have a relatively homogenous working-class town, but one on the edge of social and domestic fracture along class lines. Ellen runs away from a misunderstanding in

her house, where her mother and grandmother have been venting discord about the work in the home. When Ellen disappears, this domestic fracture evaporates into a generalized anxiety that unites other working-class homes into a collective audience. Crowds tend to form at moments of crisis, and so Ellen's disappearance acts as a shock to the town's working-class. They see her as one of their own. As we will come to see in the novel, this shock precipitates the crowd formation that will occur later specifically within class dimensions.

At this early juncture, however, the working-class community isn't in control of Ellen's narrative. Instead some local newspapers, some with rather tawdry tabloid styles, help circulate and amplify the anxiety felt by the bodies in the immediate neighborhoods where Ellen lived. The newspapers take her loss, make it into a narrative, and then sell the story in nearby cosmopolitan cities like Boston. In short, they convert Ellen's loss into variable capital for their owners and shareholders, but do so by structuring the town's anxiety into a "machine" for affect production and consumption – a machine in the Deluezian sense, which is to say an assemblage where two different bodies (print technology and the human body) work together temporarily to do something that neither could do alone. We're probably already familiar with the ways that newspapers convert sensations of narrative and photograph into capital by asking readers to purchase those sensations. Those anonymous readers become so many machines: for pity, for sympathy, and, since the papers blamed Ellen's family, for contempt and for shame. The point of view and implicit blame within the article acts as a code for structuring those potential emotional reactions in the bodies of the readers. Her story was supposed to be a specific kind of machine. We will see these attempts to code events into proper channels operating again in the chapters to come.

The structures of affect production we see in the newspapers cannot exert control over the situation, though. Ellen is a symbol to her working-class community in ways that newspaper narratives cannot determine. So even as her narrative circulates through the town's readership, the dominant reaction in her working-class community remains one of almost desperate anxiety. She is the absent center of the town, a common loss that they can identify as an extension of "us." Through circulation, mediation, and conversation, Ellen has become a symbol. The anxiety in the town is in direct proportion to their elevation of her into this symbol, and it comes to produce an almost religious intensity. This is no doubt in part due to her status as a child. That her loss could have this effect on complete strangers is thus due to the fact that her symbolic status structures the response of the working-class community who actively searches for her. Since they are working-class and have little control over the means of their social reproduction, they are shown projecting into Ellen what emotions they collectively repress from their position in the social order.

There are lessons here for this project. We can't begin to understand the formation of class-consciousness here, if indeed that's what we want to understand, without specifically addressing that class-consciousness as a temporal, embodied *event*. It also means we must consider the ways that collective, embodied consciousness can function in ways similar to individual consciousness, with similar displacements, evasions, and contradictions. The possibility of consistency of thought and feeling across households here – so that collective consciousness is possible – does imply, too, a certain consistency in the reactions of Ellen's neighborhood. This is due in part to the transitivity of the machines that structure affect, and not, I would argue, because of any inevitable solidarity of class position. This ability of affect machines to manufacture this consistency will receive my focus in this dissertation. Crowds that form around sovereign conflicts of life and death are contingent, yet powerful events.

As such, class solidarity competes with other contingent expressions of collective identity that emerge from interaction with affect machines; in Freeman's novel, these would be Christianity, the US nation, gender assignments, and racial category.

It is important for us to mark that a crowd forms at the critical moment when Ellen is found. The forceful embodied emotions that have shaped the town thus far, emotions that we might tentatively call for now the social affects, have exploded into visible social passions and "spontaneous" ceremony. Returning to the scene in the novel, we see an almost primordial rite instantly overwhelming everyone involved. Bodies fall into synchronous waves of emotional expression that involve movements and gestures, utterances and cries. They communicate in simple, direct, "spontaneous" patterns to proclaim their grief. The reporter who had previously noted "French Revolution" qualities in Ellen's mother's expressions would perhaps, too, have noticed that the character of Aunt Eva enters the crowd, so to speak, at the moment when she recognizes Jim Tenny as a old "comrade." The field of consciousness expressed here, one where the intelligence of synchronic bodies seems to dominate, assumes a structure whose "nucleus" becomes sensible in that solidarity; and so we can, after all, add class organization to the affect machines that make the town's social reproduction possible. There is a politics implicit to the congregation, but one that is yet indivisible from an "instinct." Instinct suggests the prominence of what I will call here the body's animal agency, or the body's fast intelligence. And as the crowd forms a procession to carry Ellen home, we are left to wonder about the exact relationship between the magical speaker she has met, Cynthia, and the speaker she herself would become, years later, during the town's labor crisis.

The conditions that create crowds are multiplicities; they are complex and extraordinary. The co-presence of public crisis, literary speech, intelligent bodies, affect machines, "spontaneous" behavior, collective gestures, distributive technologies, and emergent organizations of collective identity will continue to resonate in the chapters to come. All of these themes combine in new formations to produce continually the mysterious subject at very center of my inquiry: crowds, or, as nineteenth century group psychologists called them, "the crowd." My dissertation will examine the crowd in the short fiction of Bret Harte and Paul Lawrence Dunbar, as well as in the novels of Martin R. Delany, Charles Chesnutt, Mark Twain, and Frank Norris. Each chapter will revisit and dilate on one of the themes we have encountered so far in Freeman's novel. This admittedly long introduction and the chapter that follows it will provide a theoretical and genealogical background for my arguments about crowds and crowd formation, as well as the transmission of affect, bodily agency, and crowd sovereignty. This will mean addressing the main philosophers under-pinning those arguments: Brian Massumi, Elizabeth Grosz, Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Baruch de Spinoza, Etienne Balibar, as well as Warren Montag and Antonio Negri. There is only a little precedent in nineteenth century American literary studies for this project, and so I will address various relevant monographs in footnotes and endnotes without making the history of crowds or American literary history the focus of my subject.[1] I should state at the outset that my concerns here are synthetic, speculative, and

[1]The enlarged scope of these attentions means transitioning from any easy conflation between emotional characters and the transmission of affect. This conflation rhetorically and conceptually has become a common and thus confusing move in recent American studies scholarship that conflates sympathy with affect. This dissertation is post-humanist in orientation and therefore will attempt to differentiate between the analytical moves necessary to understand affect as autonomous, and thus beside and distinctly separate from its capture by human bodies, and affect as emotionally captured, which is the kind mostly recognized by characters and narrators as specific emotions – and by literary scholars.

theoretical; I am less interested in showing literary meaning based on its historical and cultural context and more interested in showing how novels work as theoretical machines themselves.

My second chapter is an extension of the discussion that will arise here in the introduction. It argues that we must understand crowds as sovereign agents of political power, and returns to the notion of crowd sovereignty through Baruch de Spinoza and a complementary group of contemporary Marxist philosophers of language and politics. These philosophers, such as Ernest Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Warren Montag, draw upon a framework that positions democratic politics as an intersection of antagonist collectives. These collectives compete for political power through populist positions that assemble and mobilize as many bodies as possible for making concrete demands from the state. These collectives can also form crowds that can act directly in pubic space to create new political institutions or destroy old ones. The excitements of populism are not simply organizational or inspirational, but functional and sovereign. To act against institutions or other groups, sovereign crowds must be able to designate other bodies as friends and enemies. Drawing upon the political theory of Carl Schmitt, Laclau and Mouffe assert that the production of enemies and friends is necessary for politics, although Schmitt sees that necessity of enemy production as a primary condition of state power. I will argue that the basic attitude towards the sovereignty of states and crowds can be found in Spinoza.

My third chapter begins with Martin R. Delany's uncompleted serial novel *Blake, Or the Huts of America* and its narrative about a central character called Henry (he later becomes Blake) who attempts to foment a Nat Turner style slave insurrection across the plantations

of the south. I argue that the novel is an attempt to both represent and produce crowds, and as such concerns itself specifically with the ways literature and bodies could become machines for affect production – the type of machines that could make crowds. I follow my reading of *Blake* through to Paul Larwence's Dunbar's short story "The Lynching of Jube Benson," to his novel *The Sport of the Gods,* and to Charles Chesnutt's turn of the century rewriting of the 1898 Wilmington municipal coup *The Marrow of Tradition.* Dunbar and Chesnutt explicitly construct narratives about white southern lynch mobs, and thus demonstrate a sharp shift in the African-American intellectual imagination about the crowd as a tactic for political conflict. From what we can see in Delany's *Blake,* This transformation is the analogue to the critique of southern lynch mobs by Ida B. Wells.

My fourth chapter addresses Bret Harte's short story "The Luck of Roaring Camp." This piece of fiction was an enormous commercial success for Harte, who is credited with popularizing the short story in the United States as a genre for regional, local-color writing after the Civil War. It may surprise contemporary scholars of American literature to remember, then, that the story concerns how a settlement of male gold miners in California adopts a child together after his mother, the settlement's prostitute, falls fatally ill shortly after labor. They name her child Luck. When the miners gather together to decide what to do with Luck, they form a crowd. They go through a process of democratic decision-making in which they arrive at the "right" course of action by measuring and evaluating their bodily responses to various ideas. In the process, they achieve a collective, embodied consciousness. Since they share the labor of decision-making as an embodied collective, I tentatively ask us to think through how the shared labor of felt democracy could be rendered as "communist." It is from this communist consciousness that they assign authority to particular individuals in the crowd to care for Luck. Strangely, the process of crowd

formation to create democratic actions also changes gender embodiment; their care for the child mutates into "spontaneous" new behaviors of the camp's gender codes. Although Luck and his central care-taker die at the end of the story, the narrative is significant because Harte employs an evolutionary vocabulary, presumably Lamarckian, to account for the biosocial behavioral shifts of the miners' bodies.

My fifth chapter addresses Mark Twain's semi-autobiographical novel *Roughing It.* In the novel, set in the 1850s but written twenty years later, the narrator leaves St. Louis to join his brother in Nevada so he can try his own luck mining silver. When he arrives he finds a mining community fully euphoric with fictive capital: that is, the "stocks" and other credit instruments meant to value and trade for the presumably infinite supply of silver in the foothills of the desert. As he participates in the "flush times," he documents the events and legends that animate the region. Some of the local stories predictably involve larger than life figures of the 'old West,' and some of them, such as the tale of the renegade Slade, help us to understand how a democratic crowd like that in Harte's story "Luck" can fully transform itself into democratic "swarms" capable of apprehending Slade and killing him. Their nominal status as "outlaw" vigilantes redirects our concerns back to the constitutive purpose of sovereign crowds: they form during moments of crisis (even when they produce that crisis themselves) to reconfigure an immediate local politics. They form in order to create new political conditions. Even in Twain's crowds, it's self-evident that this sovereign authority can come from their ability to act collectively and with violence or the threat of violence. He pointedly points to the moments where the crowd can remake law by acting to remove particular bodies from public space. In Slade's case, this means "trying" him – killing him – for repeated transgressions against local settlements.

After discussing the rather dramatic way that the crowd could create its own law as an emergent and temporary authority, the chapter counters the Slade episode by examining Twain's description of the Sanitary Fair auctions that appear in the silver settlements during the Civil War. Just as Lincoln was rushing Nevada into statehood to support the Greenback currency and increase his political power in Congress, the Sanitary Fairs appeared in the settlements to inspire donations to the Union cause. These Fairs gave way to public auctions as elections materialized; the money raised from the auctions went to support the Fairs after they left the settlements. The auctions became symbolic occasions for the settlements to outbid one another for regional bragging rights. We should see the auctions as both affect machines and state apparatuses. They extracted capital form the region just as elections – which are, inevitably, also state apparatuses – began to regulate camp's bodily capacities for self-regulation and democratic crowd formation. In the transition to representative government, a sophisticated system of symbolic regulation appeared in the territories to channel local economic euphoria into patriotic enthusiasm – and national coffers. Twain follows that symbolic production rather gingerly to the American flag, gloriously flapping in the breeze.

The Sanitary Fair auctions captured crowds and coded their embodied, collective consciousness with national referents, and in chapter six I will more fully examine what it means to capture crowds through more sophisticated apparatuses of the capitalist state – echoing Louis Althusser and Georgio Agamben, I will more thoroughly investigate how apparatuses can become sentient through the crowd. To do so I will relate how Frank Norris' turn of the century novel *The Pit* details the exchange of wheat contracts in the Chicago Board of Trade – it is in the pits of the exchange floors where Norris plots his story. Norris describes *the* Pit as a sentient apparatus, a kind of living complex assemblage

that has its own agency and power. Over the course of the narrative, it 'sucks' in an ambitious investor, Curtis Jadwin. Jadwin is convinced that he can 'corner' the wheat market by interpreting the intensities of his body's sensations to the exchange market. Yet the more exposure that occurs between Jadwin and the Pit, the more the latter is able to disrupt his homeostatic functioning. He increasingly relies on the sensations of the market to dictate his behavior, his desires, his metabolism. He becomes part of a complex, sentient assemblage. He is initially successful at his market corner, but his attempt to sustain a corner fails as he increasingly cannot maintain any coordination over his reflective consciousness. This chapter is a practical place to conclude my dissertation, since the Pit's sentience indicates the degree to which the crowd's embodied cognition has been usurped into state apparatuses. More and more, I argue, the collective cognition of bodies now make machines for capital extraction.[2]

Crowds, Affects, Bodies

The literature on crowds has varied since it emerged from transatlantic psychology and sociology in the second half of the nineteenth century, but the role that it played at the

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[2] The second half of the nineteenth and early third of the twentieth centuries in the United States is a particularly vivid period for studying social networks and crowds. During this period, the rise of powerful industrial corporations overwhelmed the federal government's experiments in democracy following the end of the Civil War and the passing of the 14th amendment. The turning point for the era could be seen as 1877: the negotiated presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes ended Reconstruction in the south, and state milias across ten states forcibly ended the first nationwide labor strike. In a sense, the political and legal recognition for workers, including African-Americans in particular, could not overcome the authoritarian movements that arose to defy the recent experiments in democractic government following the war. Indeed, according to Robert Paxton's definitions in *The Anatomy of Fascism,* it's possible to see the era's collusion between the corporate and political spheres as the emergence of a fascististic government, sustained by ultra-nationalist white supremacists that targeted the internal "enemies" of the state: at times.

inception and early decades of the social sciences in anthropology, sociology, psychology, even later in psychoanalysis gave it enormous gravity during the mid to late nineteenth century. As such, I argue that it is still present as a palimpsest in the thought of those same disciplines, both as a positive agent and as a subject those disciplines have defined themselves against. It has in any case also travelled through to continental philosophy in unexpectedly productive ways. Some of those pathways will provide major treads for some of my reflections to come. Yet because the crowd as a sustained object of inquiry disappeared from high scholarship around the time that Canetti published *Crowds and Power* in 1962, I have made a point to return to the original social science texts where the crowd played its first roles. I have done this, in part, to re-trace the impressions it has made on other genealogies of knowledge.[3] So as we re-evaluate the very real *political* role "the crowd"

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As one can see in the crowd that concludes this paragraph, perhaps I should amend this statement to say that the crowd disappeared from serious inquiry in the second half of the twentieth century because both contemporary sociologists and literary critics sought to rationalize its behaviors back into individuated modes of critique. For instance, in *The Crowd: British Literature and Public Politics,* John Plotz argues that the crowds that materialized in London from 1800-1850 were new social features of urban industrial life, and Plotz commits his project to reading them "from below," such as in the work of George Rudé and Eric Hobsbawm. Pointedly, however, he understands these crowds as significantly different from those of Le Bon and Le Bon's English and French precursors, such as Thomas Carlyle and Hippolyte Taine. "All three claimed," he says, "that the crowds that they described had an inarticulable essence" (4). It was these critiques, he argues, that allowed writers like Canetti to "make the passing appear permanent, and the contingent configuration of working-class protest seem a deep-seated fact of the human psyche" (4). In his efforts to disprove Le Bon, Plotz turns to instability of the crowd itself as a problem: since we cannot use it *either* as a noun or a verb, he contends, it is just a metamorphic representation used by different writers to mean different things. His argument, then, rests on using crowds in literature to explain how the battle to define the crowd explains "representational struggles" in the British public sphere between 1800 and 1850 (7).

My theses could vigorously oppose the substance of Plotz's contention that crowds have no essence, although there are various insights he makes that I am sympathetic towards. While I will leave it to my readers to follow the rest of this dissertation as one enormous reply to Plotz's work, I will squarely address Plotz's casual dismissal of the crowd as such: the lexical instability of the crowd testifies to the virtual dimensions of it; crowds are in fact contingent configurations that become active due to interactive protocols of genes and affect from human evolution; and the evolving discourse about crowds – and affect – in fact provides us with insight into political conflicts in post-bellum American literature. I would argue further that the political crowd is the constituent body of the political, and that the intense phenomenon of crowd sovereignty coincides with religious ecstasy. By turning to anthropology, sociology, Marxism, evolutionary biology, economics, and literature, I

played in the American novel during the nineteenth century, we will also perhaps stop in some unexpected locations to examine how and why that literature needed the crowd to represent the social world of that era, and why in very crucial ways those representations are valid and legitimate contributions to a very real subject – the crowd – with very real implications for our understanding of American history and even contemporary politics.[1]

My arguments here revolve around re-conceptualizing the crowd as a political agent with unique powers of action. I will put forth the argument here that it is the real, physical crowd that is constitutive of all political groups.[4] The crowd has this political power, however, because groups – assemblages of human bodies – are a constitutive source of human identity. This social identity, however, depends in part upon immanent memories in

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would like to offer this project as a mediation on crowds *as they were theorized by American authors,* in addition to crowd theorists, and not as a *meditation on crowds in American literature.* I will stand by the failures of my arguments.

[4]The emergence of crowds in situations of social crisis appears to be a consistent expression of political cultures, as well as an enigmatic becoming of collective action. Significantly, some argue that the crowd as a political subject is related to the rise of modern states. In *The Crowd* Jeffrey Schnapps and Matthew Tiews argue that "the era of popular sovereignty, industrialization, and urbanization saw the rise of a constellation of new forms of mass assembly and collective social action that reached their apogee in the firs half of the 20th century" (Schnapps and Tiews xi). This dissertation will not affirm this supposition; I will maintain that nation-states utilize the same forces of crowd formation as any other time period, just with different technologies. I follows Schnapps and Tiews, however, in their claims that crowd scholarship must regard industrial era crowds as historically specific kinds of "mass assembly" associated with the industrial revolutions and planetary urbanization. The problem with Schnapps and Tiews is that they make temporal arguments about the transformations of crowd power since the rise of nation states. They fall into a trap that conflates economic eras of Atlantic capitalism for some "real" linear progression of time.

If we understand the term "modernity" to refer to the exponential growth in production, population, and accumulation beginning at the very same era that state revolutions first exploded, then it seems the aggregate appearance of *many crowds* might be an instructive subject for the study of modernity itself, but not as a singular phenomena of it.

the body that we ascribe to genetic instincts or reflexes: pre-cognitive, autonomous, and "spontaneous" behaviors that reflect, perhaps paradoxically at first, deep evolutionary adaptations that helped bodies coordinate collective actions during emergencies. As I plan to show by reading fictional representations of the crowd beside group psychology and relevant critical theory, language and affect play extraordinary roles in organizing this behavior. The very indeterminacies that we associate with post-structuralist semiotics, in fact, are instrumental to understanding the effectiveness of crowd action, crowd control, and crowd cognition.

In this dissertation I will offer a supplemental genealogy of knowledge for the crowd. This body of knowledge will be necessarily interdisciplinary and trans-historical. Many superficially distinct works address the constitutive aspects of crowd formation and symbolic collective identity. For example, both Emile Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* and Pierre Bourdieu's *Language and Symbolic Meaning* discuss the ways that symbols work within crowds to become common referents for forming collective identity. Both linguistic signs and human bodies can act as these symbols. These signs can be circulated, distributed, and transformed. Linguistic signs may take the form of symbolic markers and spoken words, while bodies can simultaneously act to amplify and code those signs with varying registers of intensity, excitement, and affect. Yet these symbols are empty referents; the crowd can take the emptiness of the referent and by investing it with excitement give the referent a temporal and semiotic immediacy through the power of the crowd's own bodily presence. The symbol can be made solid by structuring the crowds' excitement to it.

Symbols can be created through the repetition of specific signs within rhetoric: a word or image is repeated until it becomes the "flag" of the crowd. This flag is then coded

through bodily excitement and given ‘presence.’ This presence has the effect of changing the experience of time for bodies in the crowd; the affect of ecstasy collapses the future into the present, into a kind of evolving “now,” and this allows the crowd to temporarily suspend the threat of law, punishment, or force.[5] Within this time, the law emerges from the crowd. This is partly what gives the crowd its unique power to create the conditions necessary for re-legislating state law during times of crisis. It is also what gives the crowd the public moral authority to challenge other institutions, such as corporations or courts. This is also what gives the crowd the power to kill and be killed. The stability of the crowd, and thus of this power, however, is constantly threatened with disruption, disintegration, and dissolution.

In this project I will focus on moments in the fiction where the crowd becomes plainly visible, but also on those occasions where crowd formation is merely possible, or where virtual fields of crowd spaces appear. The crowd’s identity is indeterminate because it rests on empty referents, but also because the organization of disparate bodies into collective action is an intensification of circulating sensations that are always susceptible to decay. The legibility of crowds depends on our understanding the situations where they are more or less likely to appear. The “degree” of the crowd is therefore a critical issue for this project; it means that the crowd is not quite “one,” but always *almost* one. That is, “the crowd” does not appear whenever or wherever the word “crowd” appears in fiction or in the

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It will become clear for the reader that I also understand the “time” of the crowd to correspond to the specific production of ecstasy for bodies within it. I will borrow some of my interpretations of these readings from theories of religious time. In *The Sacred and the Profane,* for example, Mircea Eliade writes that for “religious man” ceremonies can create a “primordial time, sanctified by the gods and capable of being made present by the festival. This transhuman quality of liturgical time is inaccessible to a nonreligious man” (71). The important aspect of Eliade’s theory of time here is that the festival makes it “present.” I would qualify this description for crowds by asserting it is the crowd bodies that produce the intensification of affect that can create the sensations of primordial time. I would also amend his comments to suggest that for political crowds – which work in similar structural fashions as religious ceremonies – the invocation of a mythical past is frequently subsumed by a utopian time of the future. Furthermore, “nonreligious man” can all the time directly experience just these sensations of time – see the forthcoming notes on Zizek and Lacan.

accompanying texts. As a process rather than an object, moving bodies are always becoming-crowd and therefore crowds are emergent agents of social formation. All assembled bodies are virtual crowds, even if not all assembled bodies become crowds. The actual formation of crowds very much depends on symbols of threat and the perception of emergency. In order to delimit my scope to my immediate investment in revolutionary political action, the crowds chosen for my project are explicitly political either in visibility as crowds, or as virtual crowds that offer insights into formed crowds. They are political agents that act in emergencies.

My engagement with the concepts of virtuality, sensation, and intensity speaks to my theoretical interest in connecting my scholarship on crowds with what's been called the "affective turn" in literary and cultural studies. I would describe my work on crowds here as an interdisciplinary materialism; I play with scholarly threads of affect and materialism influenced by the work of Gilles Deleuze, for example. This introduction will address this influence most directly in the work of Brian Massumi and Elizabeth Grosz, respectively. I will take the opportunity here to introduce, define, and qualify my engagement with the ideas that will reappear throughout this project.

I follow Brian Massumi's argument in *Parables For the Virtual* that our turn toward affect is a necessary complement to critical vocabularies of resistance, subversion, and power that theorize politics with a discursive or performative body at the center of action and subjection. By contrast, Massumi's project clarifies the role of the "sensing body" rather than a "subject 'constructed' by external mechanisms" (Massumi 2). The previous theory of subject construction imagined bodies positioned on a grid that sorted and processed them through a binary code of gender, sexuality, and race. Massumi does not suggest that such a grid isn't correct or explanatory, but only that it better explains bodies that are arrested and

not bodies in motion. The stationary, arrested body is, for Massumi, politically and conceptually static.

To theorize bodies in motion, then, we must think through motion as a different dimension. Bodies in motion have a different set of capacities. Massumi proposes that the difference between static and moving bodies is just this "phase-shift" of capacities (Massumi 5). The indeterminacies of bodies in motion give them different virtual potential; it creates new possibilities for action, for identity, and for emergent behavior. Massumi describes potential as "unprescripted," but also as "a variation implicit in what a thing can be" (Massumi 9). The tension between the openness of "unprescripted" and the implicit closures of "variation" is actually quite meaningful, but I will address that below after defining more of the terminologies at stake in our discussion here.

Massumi defines affect through Spinoza's idea of affect as an affectation of the body. This affectation is sensed by the body and for that reason stands out. It stands out because Massumi theorizes, following Bergson, that consciousness as a whole is inhibitive and subtractive and not additive, and therefore sensation is a degree of consciousness. This consciousness is not what we traditionally call the mind, but instead a layered doubling over of sensations upon sensations that produces a consciousness as an enfolded bundle of intensities sensed at different speeds. The body's consciousness of an external impingement is abstracted as a sensation in the body, which is one kind of such folding. Each folding provides another doubling that, as a composite phenomena, can become mind. This mind can be a reflective consciousness. The doubling and folding of sensation into consciousness also creates repetitions of the impingement as traces, and these traces begin to determine a tendency, or a potential, for the impingement's direction. As the folds of sensation layer

upon themselves into parallel feelings in body and as mind, the "origin" of the impingement is "conceived as a third state, an excluded middle" (Massumi 32). This excluded middle is affect. It is different from the sensation and different from the impingement. It is always felt and always almost perceived, but can only really be perceived "in effect" (Massumi 32). This almost-perceived affect (perceived in bodily effect) defines the emergent intensities that might appear as possibilities for bodies. This affect as singular intensity defines the virtual potential of any event. It is immanent to events and experiences. In crowds, singular intensities create effects in bodies: this too is affect. To understand crowds we need to understand these intensities and sensations.

The sensations of impingements on bodies can move and act prior to the thresholds where we recognize reflective consciousness. Massumi introduces the thought of Gilbert Simondon to define affect as preindividual; it is important to distinguish affect as preindividual, however, without saying that the bodily "effects" of affect are prior to individuality (I will attend to this distinction in a later section). Instead the preindividuality of affect refers to its "excluded middle" status as an implied realm of potential for movement. Affect exists in an emergent dimension that represents a phase space that is out of sync with formed bodies. This dimension is full of vectors of possibility, or possible directions for movement and action. This dimension is full of attractors that pull bodies and systems of bodies toward those possible directions, or vectors. It consists of thresholds rather than boundaries; these thresholds are dynamic switches that determine qualities and speeds of movement and action. This dimension of thresholds is the space of affect's autonomy – as Massumi writes, its "autonomy is its openness" (Massumi 35). Various thresholds allow affect to escape from bodies even as it conditions their expression. Bodies capture affect and turn it into intelligent information. "Emotion is the most intense (most contracted)

expression of that *capture,"* Massumi writes (Massumi 35). The capture of affect will be an important idea for my discussion here – also to be discussed in a moment, as part of my dialogue with these concepts. It is also important to reiterate the crucial notion of phase space for intensifying bodies into particular "thresholds" of the social: the "punctual" recognition of a change in affect, for example, can be felt as shock (Massumi 36). Shocks can act as triggers for the phase states of bodies. This transition from one phase state to another can create the virtual conditions that crowds emerge from. I will argue that economic cycles over-determine phase states in populations.

Massumi also uses these concepts to explain the function of ideology. To do so he asks us to imagine the "non-ideological means by which ideology is produced" (Massumi 42). Ideology, then, works at the bodily level; all politics are embodied politics, so to speak. Affect and bodies can change depending on sensations and intensities. One of these means is induction, or the "triggering of a qualification, of a containment, an actualization" (Massumi 42). The other means is transduction, or "the transmission of an impulse of virtuality from one actualization to another and across them all" (Massumi 42). Transduction transmits force of potential, while induction triggers potential. Signs and voices can trigger a crowd to new actions. The circulation of affect can transmit the potential for force to various bodies in crowds. These concepts help frame ideology as events and actions, rather than static or implanted ideas.[6] These transductions and inductions can come from

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[6] The triggering of a capacity within the body means we must contemplate the intensification of affect in a different way than post-structural psychoanalysis might consider how pleasure works to structure politics. Yet at the same time, some of the psychoanalytic observations about how symbolism works at the bodily level constitute a perhaps necessary limit on how bodies become excited by certain symbols. In *Plague of Fantasies,* for instance, Slovoj Zizek refers to Lacan's idea of 'separation' to describe the gap between the "hard kernel" of *jouissance* and the ways this kernel is "caught in different ideological fields" thus rendering *jouissance* "undecidable" (50). He goes on to say that "the enthusiasm of fans for their favourite [sic] rock star and the religious trance of a devout

ideological sources: Massumi describes this productive power of induction and transduction as an "analog theory of image-based power: images as the conveyors of forces of emergence, as vehicles for existential potentialization and transfer" (Massumi 43). This analog theory of image-power provides us with a major concept for understanding how crowds emerge from ideological apparatuses, how crowds behave and amplify affect, and how crowds cross thresholds of excitement into action.

I understand the body's autonomic nervous system to be a coding and capture system. This is what I call the implicit "variations" that limit certain bodies in crowds, or even limit certain bodies from becoming part of crowds, in contrast to what Massumi calls the "unprescripted" openness of bodily potential. My emphasis here will be on the possibilities of political behavior that can emerge from crowds within those variations. In other words, the enormous potential of affect and virtuality to mutate and transform politics is limited by the variations possible in the body's nervous system. This nervous system channels and codes through the evolving matrix of the body's biosocial signatures. My work

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Catholic in the presence of the Pope are libidinally *the same phenomenon;* they differ only in the symbolic network that supports them" (50). It is an open question to what degree religious ecstasy and *jouissance* are the same phenomena – this is a point to be explored in chapter three, but not in in Lacanian terms. Interestingly, however, both of the situations that Zizek mentions here revolve around crowds or crowd structures; we have the concert and the Pope. Zizek continually renders the crowd as one where a body feels for the leader (the rock star, the Pope), where the crowd in question for this dissertation is not a leader-crowd situation.

It is right, though, to respect Zizek's contention that there is a "unique ineffable kernel" that all ideology seeks to "attach" itself. For him, this kernel is the Lacanian "Real" that remains the same throughout all varieties of symbolic encounters. Zizek calls this an "objectless ecstasy," and to that degree it would seem that the thresholds of intensification that work on crowds do so by cathecting the surplus affect of the crowd into symbolic referents cannot ever mean what the collective believes it to mean. For our purposes here I would propose that this kernel is not the endpoint intensification of affect in the body, but that this intensification isn't meant to be pleasurable. It is meant to *do something.* I would argue that this pleasurable dimension to group ecstasy is a survival intelligence, not an ecstatic excess; that is, it's not a function of sexual selection, but of natural selection. The rock concert is a threshold of excitation of this ecstasy, but the experience of sovereignty is arguably its horizon.

will straddle what I call the interface between the infraemprical and superemperical qualities of affect and the human nervous system. "Force is infraempirical," Massumi writes in *Parables for the Virtual* (Massumi 160). The infraempirical refers, in part, to a force cannot be seen or measured by perception. The infraempirical becomes prenoetic: it is force processed by bodies. Alternatively, superempirical perceptions are too large to fit into perception. Both the infraempirical and the superempirical work on and through bodies, however. The body has adapted to this force over time, through hundreds of thousands of years of evolution. It leaves me with a subject that I would tentatively call the becoming-human of animal intelligence.

As with my analysis of Spinoza's multitude later in the next chapter, I believe there is a radical ambiguity at the heart of our discussions about affect and its potential for what might be called progressive social change. Here my work modifies certain claims made in *Parables of the Virtual.* Massumi writes, for example, that ideological social categories (gender, race, sexuality) act like "grids" that diminish our ability to conceive bodies as open. He also wonders how the grid itself can change from one "construction" and "gridlock" to one of becoming (3). For him this occurs because he imagines bodies as frozen on the grid, and imagines that that those categories subtract movement from their explanations. Yet I would respectfully reposition this analysis by claiming that affect's "capture," to borrow his term, delimits a range of "variation" for some bodies. On an individual level, it is impossible to say how this would work because of the randomness of genetic variation and its interaction with environmental triggers. At the level of populations, however, these variations become more legible. These variations don't signify any superiority or inferiority of bodies, nor do they signify any kind of normativity. But populations do express tendencies, and these tendencies can help us describe how bodies "encode" affect into the nervous system, into the affect

system, and into an embodied consciousness. My own emphasis here is on an enlarged sense of the grid – a grid that was "always already" affected by the nervous system of populations, even if not in the scholarship of subject "construction." I should stress at the outset, however, that this grid is an "open" one.

This open code challenges Massumi's notion about how affect interacts with bodies at the level of social expression. He writes that his "emphasis is on process before signification or coding," and that certain cultural critiques that don't factor in the "Bergsonian revolution" have limited applicability, though they are not "wrong" (7). For him, the idea that social construction works at all is "miraculous" (7). His tone here is rightly wondrous at the idea that social ideologies work so well to describe subject formation; he has pointed to dozens of concepts where we might refine and re-imagine how bodies move and what they can do. My notion of the nervous system as a coding system can actually be read next to Massumi's own explanation for how, following Simondon, there is no "categorical separation between the social and the presocial, between culture and some kind of 'raw' nature or experience" (Massumi 9). The virtual potential of the body's own interior code system, then, expresses itself as culture that then works to "back-form" bodies. Evolution is also a biosocial process of these back-formations and feedback loops. Massumi writes that "these possibilities delineate a region of nominally defining – that is, normative – variation. Potential is unscripted. It only feeds forward, unfolding toward the registering of an event: bull's eye. Possibility is a variation *implicit in* what a thing can be said to be when it's on target" (9). The variations implicit in bodies will be how I write through the interface between affect, intensity, and crowd behavior. When Massumi writes that "implication is a code word," I understand him to mean that implications are the implicit variations. The codes of variation are the nervous system and its affect programs. The variations in

individuals do not match the variations expressed at the level of populations, and vice versa. "The point," he writes, "is that the 'natural' and the 'cultural' feed forward and back into each other. Their continuum is s dynamic unity of reciprocal variation…It is necessary to theorize a *nature-culture continuum"* (Massumi 11, italics his).

Following Bergson, Massumi prioritizes the power of habit. Habit is "an acquired automatic self-regulation" (Massumi 11). Habit can be usefully situated next to the idea of the force of affect from images. We can imagine ideological apparatuses as habit arrangers that structure and "prime" bodies for coding through the affect program. Massumi says that images work through a "multilevel" semiotic process that also creates intensities of sensation, in addition to signification of meaning (24). It involves a "crossing of semantic wires" (Massumi 24). Massumi is quick to stress the disconnection between what images can mean and how they can make one feel. Although the content of an image is indexed to its conventional meanings, the "strength or duration of the image's effect" belongs to its intensity. This intensity can exceed or diverge from the index of semiotic meaning associated with the image.

For him – and this is a crucial idea for the dissertation, too – the semiotic indeterminacy between form and content is compounded by the further indeterminate relations between sign, signifier, and intensity. "The disconnection between form/content and intensity/effect," he proposes, "is not just negative: it enables a different connectivity, a different difference, in parallel" (Massumi 25). The semiotics and the intensity of the image are both embodied, and, for him, mostly manifested through "purely autonomic reactions most directly manifested in the skin – at the surface of the body, at its interface with things"

(Massumi 25). The intensities that language produces on the body function differently, he argues, than the semiotic meanings so important to reflective consciousness.

While affirming his analysis of the semiotic event as one fraught with the intensities produced by language in addition to the meaning of the content, I would proffer here several addendums. The first expands on the intensities of language by pointing to how the horizon of meanings associated with language accounts in part for how intensities affect bodies. Therefore those associations would work on different bodies in different ways. This intensity of signification depends on a code of *reading* that is culturally and linguistically specific. The speed of this linguistic processing, formed by habit, can happen faster than reflective consciousness. Massumi says that intensity is a "nonconscious, never-to-be-conscious autonomic remainder. It is outside expectation and adaptation, as disconnected from meaningful sequencing, from narration, as it is from vital function" (Massumi 25). I see Massumi's "outside" here as one rather far from a bodily intelligence that has integrated a practice of reading and interpretation into the autonomic response system itself. I approach his idea of this "outside" as a kind of ultra-limit of preindividual intensity, but I argue that intensities can also function fully through the interface of the culture-nature continuum he describes earlier. I argue that the "remainder" of the intensity corresponds to an excess of affect in the body's ability to code sensation into information, but I respectfully challenge his idea that "an emotional qualification breaks narrative continuity for a moment to register a state…for the skin is faster than the word" (Massumi 25). I believe the speed of the skin can be faster than the word, but since the word must be *understood* the body's intelligence has already incorporated language into its habit of autonomic response. I argue that it is *the speed of this intelligence* that works faster than reflective consciousness. This intelligence can apprehend both signs and chains of signs – that is, narrative.

I would further argue that this practice of reading and its relation to the body's intelligence as an encoding intelligence works differently for images than it does for narrative. I will use the concept of the image next to the concept of the "symbol" in his project. I believe that symbols are important because they have a special status as signifiers that supposedly connote collective identity, and, moreover, the feelings of collective identity. In a certain sense they are unifying signs meant to both produce and capture the intense sensations of collective identity. The image and the symbol both work to intensify meaning and sensations differently than language and narrative. While language and image both create sensation, I believe that for crowds symbols and images are important because of their special capacity to signify the crowd back into itself. This gives them a special amplifying force.

Massumi attunes his theory of bodily "affects" as translations of "affect" in some of his specific readings in *Parables for the Virtual*. In his discussion of Ronald Reagan, he writes how "confidence is the emotional translation of affect as *capturable* life potential; it is the particular expression and becoming-conscious of one's side-perceived sense of vitality" (Massumi 41, italics his). We may or may not agree with this conjecture about confidence, but the concept of bodies translating affect is important here. It is important to note that the process of affect capture happens mostly through Massumi's language of virtuality. I would return to his idea that consciousness is inhibitive and subtractive as a way to open ourselves to how affect capture works. The autonomic nervous system adapts to the singular environment of the body, but it doesn't adapt that environment into a blank system of totally open possibilities. My desire to mark the body's intelligence is also not meant to subscribe us to a determined set of variations, genetic or otherwise. My desire to locate a

radical potential in the autonomic response system is due to the fact that this system can help us explain the political relations along the culture-nature continuum.

We can expand on Massumi's own idea of affect translation through the autonomic response system by taking seriously what Silvan Tomkins called the open program of the affect system. His work balances speculative theory about the body's affect system with a complex and non-reductive formulation about the interaction of this system with various degrees of consciousness and ideology. Unlike Massumi, Tomkins does not think through the virtual possibilities of affect prior to its coding into the body. He characterizes the body's affect program as a complex response, one that organizes sensation neurologically. This system is "aroused easily by factors over which the individual has little control," he writes, though they are "controllable with difficulty by factors that she or he *can* control" (Tomkins 54, italics his). Affects can be felt as alien by those individuals. The duration of one's experience with affect can expand through what he calls "psychological magnification," or the connection of one "affect-laden scene with another affect-laden scene" (Tomkins 58). He theorizes how memories, narratives, images, and language can produce affects in bodies by acting as "scripts." These scripts are linguistically and culturally specific. "Languages are centuries ahead of psychology in having named very subtle distinctions in affect complexes," he notes (Tomkins 59). Like Spinoza, Tomkins believed that the study of embodied and translated affect as "affects" was crucial to understand motivation. Like Spinoza, Tomkins also saw such affects as the primary basis for understanding the constitutive antagonisms of politics.

Like Massumi, Tomkins was explicitly concerned with explaining politics as an embodied phenomenon. His work on the nature-culture continuum led him to an innovative

approach to study the "biopsychological mechanisms" that linked political ideology and the affect system of the body. He called "ideo-affective postures" any organized set of feelings and ideas about feelings (Tomkins 111). Ideological "resonance" occurred in bodies that felt similarly toward certain ideas. He believed these resonances were themselves adaptable and adaptive. He also thought they were overall outgrowths of economic cycles and economic geographies: "if the distance between the ideology and the ideas and feelings of a people, particularly of the elite, grows too far apart too quickly, then in such an ideological vacuum we may expect a vulnerability to any ideology which fits better than the rejected older ideology" (Tomkins 114). So not only did Tomkins believe ideology might break along class lines and in relation to the overall way bodies 'felt' the economy, he believed that purpose of adopting new ideologies was in fact related to forms of evolutionary becoming in the interaction of biosociality. Bodies could adopt ideologies that "felt" the best, which is different from saying bodies adopt ideologies that are in some sense "right" for them. Strikingly, Tomkins felt at the time he published his ideas on affect that the "major ideology is Marxism" (115). Somewhat anachronistically now, his work configures how the political left and right prioritize different affects with different ideas; yet these somewhat historically specific configurations are valuable for his general claims about the body's general tendencies, such as his claim that "human beings are excited by risk and by novelty" (Tomkins 131). In a related moment, he also argues that some bodies pursue positive affects for their own sake, and in the process create a dependency on that stimulus: one can become "addicted to creating satisfaction " (Tomkins 169). He also promotes how the "vocalization of affect" can amplify and intensity the experience affect in bodies (Tomkins 94).[7]

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[7] In *Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth*, Elizabeth Grosz writes that Herbert Spencer believed that music and the musical principles of language was the 'indirect outcome of the advantages bestowed on language use for survival. As language use developed, its emotional

Statements such as this have the explanatory power without being deterministic, and will be present in some of the analysis on crowds to come.

The main purpose of returning to Tomkins after Massumi, however, is for his gloss on the idea of implicit variation in what bodies can do, rather than for another gloss on the idea about what "unprescripted" bodies can do. Our turn to Tomkins isn't meant to definitively explain those variations, but rather to structure the possibilities of bodies within their neurological adaptations to evolutionary time. Although we will explore this idea further in chapter three's meditations on ethology and crowds, we can incorporate here how Tomkins argued that the body's affect system developed during a relatively long period when environmental scarcity shaped the structure of evolutionary becoming. He imagines that it was the "intensification of violence" associated with war and hunting that produced the "bifurication" of affects into excitement, surprise, anger, and disgust versus enjoyment, distress, shame, and fear. Rather than contest the facticity of this claim, I will retain here the idea that populations evolved capacities for violence as an adaptive strategy. The real point of this claim is that the past of the body's experience with scarcity and pre-industrial economic environments provide a set of protocols for behavior that can amplify or dampen particular affect responses with the environments of industrial capitalism – especially those that also produce scarcity for classes and populations. These protocols are open codes that structure the variations of the body's capacity. They can contradict, compete, and co-evolve with cultural protocols, such as those that we associate with language, narrative, and semiotics – but they do so through engagement with the body's affect system, or through the relative strength of their *intensities*. What matters is still sensation.

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resonances and excited uses particularly emphasized the prosodic or melodic elements of speech, which became gradually uncoupled from words and attached to sounds" (Grosz 31). These resonances are perhaps compatible with Tomkins' claim about the force from vocalization of affect.

Without determining behavior, the economic and ecological "past" of the body provide the protocols that tend to influence behavior during crises. This is crucial to understanding crowd behavior. I furthermore would press forward, then, with Tomkins' summation that the "major dynamic of ideological differentiation and stratification arises from perceived scarcity and the reliance upon violence to reduce such scarcity to allocate scarce resources disproportionately to the victors in adversarial contests" (Tomkins 162). Tomkins is right to focus on *perceived* scarcity rather than actual scarcity; it is no accident that he does so in a discussion largely focused on the differences between left and right affect codes. Capitalist economies create the perception of scarcity when, in fact, there would be none through different methods of distribution. While I would certainly hesitate to say that all bodies rely upon violence to rectify scarcity, I do argue that the capacity for sovereign violence refers back to this perception – real or imagined – of scarcity.

This perceived scarcity, we should note, too, is also consistent with ideas of social deprivation after peaked economic cycles. In a fascinating reference to anthropological studies, Tomkins writes that "stratification of the sexes" as well as "age and class stratification" occurs in societies when bodies perceive environments to be threatening to social survival. Stupendously, collective bodies react to threats through stratification; stratified identities are a response to perceived scarcity and would de-territorialize in socially sustainable environments. If we think of Massumi's critique of socially constructed "grid" identities, then, we can use Tomkins' biosocial approach here to consider how various politically coded identities are specific expressions of capitalist cultures of scarcity, deprivation, and threat, rather than 'natural' expressions of genetically determined individuals. Eugenics is thus not just a racist science, but in this way it is also a specifically

capitalist racist science – and not because it needed to develop racially and gendered bodies for specific forms of undesirable labor.

All of these expression and reactions take place because of the affect program. Tomkins uses the metaphor of "program" and coding because of the influence of cybernetics while he was writing. "The capacity of the cognitive mechanisms to receive, transmit, co-assemble, store, and transform information," he writes, "is as innately endowed as is the capacity of the affect mechanisms to amplify information and make it urgent. Cognition without affect is weak; affect without cognition is blind" (Tomkins 308-309). It is both the affect system and the reflective consciousness of slow cognition that Tomkins believes is necessary to understand behavior as the complex behavior of becoming-human. The interaction between cognition and affect is mutually constitutive, however; remember how the process of reading and storytelling can 'backform' the body, too. It is in this way that affect as intensity or affect as force becomes the "affects" that we recognize as states of panic, euphoria, shame, or the like. Along the line of that continuum, there are more stable moods and emotions that persons can identify as personal feelings. All three of these cRudé categories of affect can overlap, twist together, contradict one another, and recombine in simultaneity, and in which an individual can recognize, manipulate, and evaluate his or her sensations. In this way the idea of affect, which is the capacity to be affected or to affect other bodies, can become encoded into the nervous system as the specific affects Spinoza and others call shame, fear, and joy.

One of Tomkins' students is the contemporary psychologist of emotion Paul Ekman. Like Tomkins, Ekman became intrigued by Charles Darwin's proposition in *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* that facial expressions were signs of affects and

emotions, and that the capacity for certain emotions and their expression was universal in all human cultures. In the wake of twentieth century anthropologists of socially constructed identity such as Margaret Mead, Ekman set out to prove Tomkins theory wrong and did so through numerous double-blind experiments among hundreds of cultures across the globe. What he found, though, was the opposite. He did find that expressions of emotion and affects can differ because of "display rules" that determine their expression in public and in private (Ekman 4). He also writes that the expression of emotions and affects can change depending on cultural circumstances, but that the contingency of culturally specific situations that create fear expressions didn't change how faces expressed that fear.

Ekman is useful because he extends from Tomkins a vocabulary that explains how the body can think intelligently and quickly through the autonomic affect system. "Emotion is a process," Ekman writes, "a particular kind of automatic appraisal influenced by our evolutionary and personal past, in which we sense that something important to our welfare is occurring, and a set of physiological changes and emotional behaviors begins to deal with the situation" (Ekman 13). In language that echoes Massumi, through from a different direction, Ekman writes that some "triggers" generate changes to certain bodies while other triggers work differently on different bodies (Ekman 18). These triggers can be generalized to all bodies through evolutionary adaptations, can be specific to particular historic cultures, and can be specific to individuals. We then learn about what triggers work on particular bodies by tracing how certain overlaps across these triggering dimensions amplify or dampen bodily behavior. With Tomkins' emphasis on perceived scarcity in mind, Ekman writes that "the most common way in which emotions occur is when we sense, rightly or wrongly, that something that seriously affects our welfare, for better or worse, is happening or about to happen" (Ekman 19). The affect programs of bodies – that is, their intelligence – are

uniquely threaded to protocols and thresholds that orient bodies toward emergencies. The purpose of this intelligence is move at speeds faster than reflective consciousness in order to survive emergencies, even if the state of affect in the body produces that emergency. It is necessary for the body to physically prepare for those emergencies, and hence the autonomic system regulates heart rates, sweat, and breathing, among other changes.

Ekman argues that "autoappraisers" in the body's perceptual system constantly scan the environment for threats, although this scanning doesn't take place at the level of consciousness (they are scanning, then, for the emergence of meaningful information in infraempirical and the supraempiracal). Ekman's language borrows from the cybernetic language of Tomkins: "we must have *automatic* appraising mechanisms that are continually scanning the world around us, detecting when something important to our welfare, to our survival, is happening" (Ekman 21). What Ekman and a group of related emotion researchers claim is that these autoappraisers have themselves adapted to particular kinds of situations that, over long periods of time, have provided bodies with common triggers for emotional response. Many of these situations, or "core relation themes," are essentially primed to coordinate how bodies interact and behave with other bodies. The main triggers the autoappraisers scan for concern events that were common and important over time. "For each emotion," Ekman writes, "there might be a few such events that are stored in the brains of every human being. It might be a schema, an abstract outline, or the bare bones of a scene" (Ekman 23-4). There are "universal" themes and "variations" of themes that are specific to cultures and even individual lives (Ekman 24). The variations from the core themes mean that emotions and affects evolved from cultural and individual experiences are weaker than those evolved from genetics of the open affect program in the body. Ekman calls this species-constant learning. In short, anger is part of any affect system's open

program, and certain themes could trigger anger in most bodies. On the other hand, the open nature of the affect program means that some variations on the anger theme will materialize in certain lives.

Like Tomkins, Ekman believes that the autoappraisers adapted the body to an environment of scarcity, and thus the behaviors of our "hunter-gather ancestors" (Ekman 29). The hunter-gather body has contributed a constant set of protocols that may or may not become the basis for expression in bodies. Ekman continues with the computer metaphor to suggest that the common triggers are found in an "emotion alert database" that is "written" by both biology and individual experience (Ekman 29). Events that catalyze themes from evolution and from individual experience are "hot" triggers. This database is open and information is constantly added to it. This is what allow reflective appraising, or the conscious consideration of events. The purpose of conscious reflection, though, is not to replace emotion with some pure cognition or reason. The purpose of reflective cognition is to determine the 'right' emotional state for the situation. The body's ability to create its own affects is thus crucial for producing emergencies and also for surviving them.

Ekman's analysis of the relationship between language and affects should interest us because of Massumi's own claims in that regard. Ekman obviously emphasizes how language can create emotion, but he further theorizes that "written language is converted into sensations, pictures, sounds, smells, or even tastes, in our mind, and once this happens, these images are treated like any other event by the automatic-appraisal mechanisms to arouse emotions" (Ekman 35). In this way memories, talking, empathy, instruction, and imitation all have the ability to change the affects felt by bodies. Yet each of these paths works in the brain as if, once felt, the affect had originated in the body.

Ekman has a somewhat reactionary political project, and his politics are different than Tomkins' own. He is significantly concerned with appropriate displays of emotion, and violence in particular. Like classic crowd psychology, then, we must read his work carefully in order to make sense of his claims for crowds. He writes, for example, that in a "refractory state" the body cannot admit information that contradicts the emotions and affects that it feels (Ekman 39). Therefore it is difficult to break from an "inappropriate emotion" (Ekman 39). Refractory periods that last too long, he theorizes, can significantly alter how bodies respond to information. These refractory states are what I will call, and have called thus far, the phase states of the body. They are particularly relevant to crowd behavior. These refractory states can be triggered by universal themes.

Ekman theorizes that the "core relational themes" develop into "scripts" that become a way to "see" emergencies through the lens of past events. This can happen for the universal themes and also for their variations. Bodies might be "importing" scripts that then distort reality (Ekman 41). These scripts can themselves form from cell assemblies that take place when the brain writes memory. Even when certain scripts become dampened through reflective consciousness, they tend to reappear when the body perceives stress or harm in the environment. "Our emotion system was build to keep triggers in," Ekman writes, "not get them out, mobilizing our emotional responses without thought. We are biologically constructed in such a way that does allow us to interrupt them readily" (Ekman 44). This is why, following the psychologist Robert Zajonc, Ekman calls such states "inescapable," and why Tomkins felt the affect program was such an important central mechanism for regulating behavior (Ekman 65).

Ekman believes that his and Tomkins' use of computer programs as a metaphorical language to understand emotional states can "serve us well" in understanding emotion, especially because, as he argues repeatedly, so little is still known about how affects work (Ekman 66). I follow Tomkins and Ekman's use of computer metaphors for understanding crowd behavior. I will try and use it productively next to the language of sensation and politics to make sense of sovereign crowds.

The body, then, is a multiplicity where multiple forms of intelligence "processing" interact at various speeds, and that switch on at opportune times. This proposition puts my ideas in critical tension with some of the logic expressed by not only Massumi, but also Elizabeth Grosz. In *chaos, territory, art: deleuze and the framing of the earth,* Grosz writes that "sensation is the zone of indeterminacy between subject and object, the bloc that erupts from the encounter of the one with the other. Sensation impacts the body, not through the brain, not through representations, signs, images, or fantasies, but directly, on the body's own internal forces, on cells, organs, the nervous system. Sensation requires no mediation or translation" (Grosz 73). While I admire many of her arguments, Grosz's distinction here between "brain" and "body" is superficial. Sensation here supposedly works directly on the organs – where the brain *is not an organ* – and becomes itself a mystified source of freedom and emergence. The problem here is the assumption that signs and images don't change the constitution of cells and organs, as if culture didn't backform nature, as Massumi would say; there is only one side to the continuum. Furthermore, the "nervous system" here is assumed to be a disinterested apprehension system, or a blank reception slate for the "body." It's not, of course. The nervous system, as we see with Ekman and Tomkins, is a system with its own paths and channels. It makes distinctions.

To make it otherwise is to make the body into its own revolutionary subject; it means we replace the emergent revolutionary agency of a class with the emergent revolutionary agency of a "body." What I would propose instead with the crowd is an ambiguous subject of converging and diverging agencies. These agencies, or intelligences, each registers information at different speeds. I would propose that the intensification of sensation is essential to understanding the virtual dimensions of the crowd, and therefore its political force, but that these sensations and intensifications are not 'apart' from culture. The body is a site of "past" cultures and present cultures: this is the open affect program that Ekman and Tomkins articulate above. This helps us to understand the specific biosocialities of historical bodies.

Despite my concerns with Grosz's utopian rendering of the body, her descriptions of sensations and affects productively allow us to see how they work in the crowd. "Sensations are always composite," she writes, and primarily full of precepts and affects (Grosz 75). These precepts and affects are "extracted from the energetic forces" that are generated by subjects and objects in movement. Sensations are mobile and mobilizing, she writes. It de-subjectivizes and dis-embodies affection and perception and becomes independent of affection and perception. She further says that "percepts and affects are the inhuman forces from which the human borrows that may serve in its self-transformation and overcoming" (Grosz 77). Like Massumi, she sees these percepts and affects as elements of virtuality. They are unpredictable and uncontainable; they are excessive. Then, following Deleuze, Grosz explains that affects are "man's becoming other, the creation of zones of proximity between the human and those animal and microscopic/cosmic becomings that the human can pass through. Affects signal that border between the human and the animal from which it has come" (Grosz 77). Grosz here iterates for us the idea that sensations – as composite affects

– are independent of reflective consciousness and can mobilize the body to act in various ways. Sensations are also the stuff of revolution and change, both literally and politically.

Her return to Deleuze to offers us a path for seeing the human in the animal and vice versa is a turn toward ideas of animal intelligence and crowd cognition. Her proposal that affects signal the "border" between a human and the animal "from which it *has* come" should make us pause, however, as we contemplate again nature-culture continuums. I would argue that sensations intensify forms of embodied cognition that exercise the animals *that we are*. Affects do not necessarily signal a border, but mobilize bodies into crowds with faster capacities for cognition. The point is not that affects can mobilize a zone of proximity but that affects can mobilize zones of *indeterminacy* between different modes of consciousness. For us the real challenge is to theorize in what ways crowds allow a becoming-animal to occur within new complex dimensions of language, signification, and intensification. The crowd is a technically constituted herd; the biotechnologies of linguistic and amplificatory technologies that intensify sensation and also control it, even as the rhythms and patterns of crowd behavior extend from protocols of genetically "open" herd behavior. The crowd is complex because the protocols of genes interact with the protocols of biosociality, and from that friction emerges new politics of behavior.

My concerns are drawn to the ways that the affect program might exercise agency. The affect program organizes information for the body that acts intelligently beside and through reflective cognition. This agency has previously been conceived in terms that both illuminated and mystified the body's intelligence, and occasionally acted as conceptual "givens" for critical theory, such as "desire" or various "drives." This led various theoreticians, such as Freud, to propose biosocial structures of explanation for human

behavior, such as the death drive, that failed to account for the complexity of evolutionary somatic adaptations for human behavior. Rather than "root" human behavior in various over-deterministic structures such as the death drive, I argue that it's possible to see actions of bodily action as *agency* rather than *instinct.* Since "instinct" was a term employed by nineteenth century novelists and social scientists, I have tried whenever possible to incorporate my own post-humanist perspective in ways that demarcate the historical specificity of the original use of the term. As with my use of the term "crowd," it is my hope that we will be able to see at various moments the difference between the implied discursive meaning of the terms, which were frequently denigrating or mystified, and what those terms allowed characters, bodies, and situations *to do things*.

More than anything else, my investment in trying to articulate the intelligence and agency of bodies and crowds alike arises from how moments of supposed spontaneity signify the very moments of openness that continually allow for the emergence of entirely new possibilities for bodies and behaviors. From this openness we can understand how bodies plug into larger organizations of social behavior, such as crowds, but also any of the various complex social assemblages that have stoked recent work on networks that animate the ideas of Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker's *The Exploit* or Manuel Delanda's *A New Philosophy of Society* and *A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History,* among others. In those projects that provide touchstones for some of my own approaches here, complex systems of social organization operating on scales much smaller and much larger than the individual, and at much faster and much slower rates of speed than observable by casual perception, help to focus our attention on the political ecologies of institutions, cities, networks, and economies. Delanda examines the massive flows of energy and resources in and out of cities over long periods of time in order to make observations about the metabolic necessitates of

human biomass and the logic of metabolic growth for economic institutions such as global markets. Galloway and Thacker raise the theme of political resistance and intelligent communication by drawing upon the network model of social agency found in insects, media, and viruses. For reasons both of scale and subject, these thinkers are important – though by no means the most cited – precedents for the claims made here.

What my work shares with theirs is the conviction that somatic agency operates on scales larger and smaller than individuated consciousness, and that the post-humanist focus on affect as a force prior to its encoding in the body's nervous system allows for entirely new conceptions about the power we imagine possible for media systems to distribute and recode affect, and, by extension, to refigure the codes that create and sustain the social "passions" that we conflate with visible crowds.[8] The emphasis here on *autonomous* actions of the body is

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[8] It is with this in mind that we must carefully examine Raymond Williams' influential account of the structures of feeling. Raymond Williams defines structures of feeling as "certain common characteristics in a group of writers but also of others, in a particular historical situation" (Williams 22). For Williams these structures resonate between fiction and material social production as an "incoherent multiplicity" where possible and actual consciousness intersect. Fiction's place in the study of "possible consciousness" requires a criticism developed around what gives it a "strict literary quality" (Williams 23-4). Fiction demonstrates "a community visible in the structure of feeling" through "choices of form" (Williams 25).

Glenn Hendler reads Williams' structures of feeling as "useful for linking a narrative genre with a broader politics of affect" (Hendler 10). Public emotions play vital roles in the broad transmission of cultural feeling. Hendler argues that this primarily takes place through a Freudian idea of sympathetic identification. Identification in that sense straddles conscious choice and unconscious imitation. Freud's example of sympathetic identification from *Group Ego* largely depends upon unconscious imitation, and Hendler's use of it largely depends on "something that requires an imaginary bridge in order to be shared or communicated," whether it's an act, event, or text.

It is my hope that this dissertation productively troubles the Freudian discourse of conscious and unconscious identifications, since I find the latter term contains assumptions about identity that may conceal new discourses for thinking through alternative bodily agencies. I furthermore would insist that Williams' account unfairly generalizes from one class of writers to a larger historical era, and that such generalizations too easily foreclose the complexities of both socio-economic conflict and ecologies of affect.

meant to attack any assumptions that heretofore understood those actions as *spontaneous:* the difference is a vital one, since the former allows us to begin imagining how bodies think while the latter forecloses on them. By again pressing upon the moments in novels where texts represent such bodily agency even while passing over its potential significance, we can open our field of inquiry into not only the agency of crowds but also, enclosed though it often be in the language of sentiment, the agency of affects.[9]

Crowd analysis requires that Williams' structures of feeling break away into new architectures, scales, and speeds of affect. When Williams speaks of the "incoherent multiplicity" that exists between possible and actual consciousness, we see him beginning to describe just the tensions that start to emerge from discussions about the possibilities of interaction between virtual and the actual crowds.

[9]These new frameworks come out of recent literary and theoretical conversations about the intersecting collision of "affect studies" and "post-Marxism." Affect studies rises out of post-queer attentions to role of affective drives in human behavior, with an emphasis on negative affects such as shame. Its main line runs primarily through the scholarship of Silvan Tomkins, Eve K. Sedgwick, and Sianne Ngai. By contrast, post-Marxist philosophers like Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, and Brian Massumi return instead to Baruch Spinoza's *Ethics,* and primarily emphasize a broader definition of affect as a potential force that exists within and across human and non-human bodies. Rather than locating "affects" as various emotional states, like shame or excitement, these studies understand affect as an autonomous impingement, extant everywhere; it is possible for machines and organisms, for example, to transmit various qualities and intensities of force that might later, in human bodies, *become* recognizable emotions. Ultimately, both lineages of affect studies can open questions about the efficacy of affect and affective labor in the production of social movements antagonistic to capitalist accumulation its attendant political repression.

A dissertation that examines affect and crowds necessitates moving between critical theory that speaks to those subjects, but it also means historicizing the relationship of literary representations to intertextual, transnational trends in scientific and political writing during the era in question. To that end, this project follows in wake of several exciting and influential works of interdisciplinary scholarship reaching through several disciplines and fields, including Dera Frezza's *The Leader and The Crowd: Democracy and Public Discourse, 1880-1941* (2007), on the politicized emergence of social science disciplines, like eugenics and crowd psychology; Laura Otis' *Membranes: Metaphors of Invasion in Nineteenth-Century Literature, Science, and Politics* (1999) and *Networking: Communicating with Bodies and Machines in the 19th Century* (2001), which traces the metaphors of connectivity and disease in transatlantic literature; and within the immediate field of American literary studies, Michael Warner's *Publics and Counterpublics* (2005) and Glenn Hendler's *Public Sentiments: Structures of Feeling in Nineteenth Century American Literature* (2001).

By agency of affects, I refer to the ever-present potential for the coding and recoding of force through various mediums of information. Following Baruch de Spinoza's *Ethics,* I take affect in its widest possible sense, which is as a power to affect or be affected. The quick jump many literary critics make to immediately fasten the term "affect" to emotion is one that I hope to avoid here, though not in order to avoid a conversation about the significance of retaining emotion as a legitimate category of analysis. Being that emotion mostly refers to a quality of individual sensation, it cannot by definition be a common destination for an analysis of crowds. But since the novel's point of view has *only* and entirely traced individual and not crowd consciousness in narrative focalization, it has been my duty throughout this project to re-piece the purposes of entire narratives to a field of inquiry, crowds, that the entire medium of fiction has only been able to represent as an object and never as a subject. While I'm sure it would have been both a dizzying and confusing read to follow a novel written from the point of view of a crowd, where the transmission of affect from energetic information to body knowledge might be foregrounded, the artifacts in question here are the recognizable vehicles of modern subjectivity that we have spent the last few decades reading for the very same politics of representation that I am attempting in part to engage here. Despite its ambiguous capacity for both fascistic and anti-totalitarian behavior, one could even argue that the crowd deserves a rightful place as a queer, subaltern subject – one that cannot be represented because it so sincerely defies the very contours of individuated subjectivity, although, ironically, its voice is often the most noticeable aspect of its expression aside from the multiplicity of bodies that constitute it.

As I will argue later in this introduction, Spinoza's conception of autonomous affect helps explain how varying intensities of affect can change its reception and encoding for

bodies. What has been called the 'excessiveness' of affect is responsible for this autonomy, but for my purposes in this dissertation we can understand this autonomy as a way to account for the disjunction between the codes that transmit information and affect and the impossibility of accounting for how affect intensifies, travels, and mutates as it circulates. We note this disjunction within organs of the media, political speech, and advertisements; no matter how carefully rhetoric has been constructed to program and anticipate the conversion of energetic affect into a known response, texts and rhetoric have a life of their own once they circulate. This aspect of that circulation is actually familiar to us. We today call narratives or images "viral," but editors and reporters also said a story had a 'life of its own,' or something 'had legs' – at least they did in old movies. This is how we account for surprise successes in the arts: something 'hits' or 'connects.' Something else is meant to shock, but doesn't.

My purposes here require us to focus less on the surprise qualities of those complex codes of textual production we call novels, less on how they make us feel, and less on how *individual* characters feel. Instead I want to draw our attention to specific representations of the ways affects become coded into what psychologists call the "basic" emotions and the "social' emotions, since these are overwhelmingly representative of the conditions ripe for crowd formation. As we shall see in a minute, the reasons for this have to do with evolutionary biology. The power of these emotions to transmit and circulate affect also accounts for their strategic use by political institutions and crowd leaders. Creating fear is easier than creating complex emotional and intellectual responses in bodies, and it's more effective at manipulating behavior when it's successful. These are the same reasons that literary criticism likes to deride both artistic artifacts and political speech for provoking those responses as "sensational," where the word is derogatory and not descriptive. Simply put,

stimulating the nervous system into producing the sensations of the basic emotions inspires derision because of the assumption that producing basic responses in an organism requires less time investment, less labor, and less skill than producing complex responses in complex organisms after considerably more labor. Complexity and subtlety are more highly valued. Therefore education is often seen as a marker of a body's potential to experience more complex sensations, in part because we believe that more difficult codes of information – such as the modernist novel – must necessarily produce better kinds of experiences. Media that offer even the appearance of complexity are typically more highly regarded by the liberal perspective than the media that aims for direct emotional appeals, such as the tabloid media. My own focus will largely be on the latter kind of media, and the kinds of circulation that tend to accompany it, such as gossip. Far from being dumb forms of production and circulation, this kind of media is instrumental in forming crowds because crowds cohere and materialize due to emergencies, contingencies, and shocks – and tabloid media, sensational newspapers, and viral gossip are often both the producers and distributors in those situations. They don't appeal to "base" emotions so much as continually exploit the body's necessary capacity for arousal. Crowds are necessary in emergencies, and crowds are necessary for creating emergencies. During moments of crisis, the production of collective identity is vital. Collective identity is vital during crisis because, theoretically, during true crises both survival and social reproduction are at stake. One must be willing to kill or die in those situations, or make existential threats – or recode the social order, as it were, by overthrowing it. Revolutions require the basic emotions.

When a newspaper simultaneously represents and produces events through narrative and photographs, such as in the example from Freeman above about the missing child Ellen Brewster, its ability to encode the "original" event (of Ellen's loss) changes through the

process of reproduction and distribution, in part because transforming the event into discourse, narrative, and image is rather famously unstable. Its meaning depends on the context of its reception, its repetition, its audience, its author, and its photographer, among a multitude of other factors we are trained by our discipline to consider. These factors all help to "code" the object with rules and conventions that allow readers, in particular, to "know" what to do with it, and how to feel about it. Yet at any point or position in its 'life' the newspaper account of Ellen can produce changes to the environment and to bodies that amplify, distort, negate, destroy, or excite affect. My focus here will be on the encoding of information into bodies and vice versa. As we're all aware, very often the codes meant to replicate some intended affect in the body of the reader are the fastest to decay. Often times this may mean passing over the far too frequent conflation of sentimental rhetoric with emotional rhetoric, and emotional rhetoric with that of affect. What I call the "dialogic discourse of affect" in the nineteenth century often took the form of rhetorical invocations of anything and everything energetic and technological, and some good scholarly work has made historical observations about, for example, the sudden eruption of electricity metaphors and telegraph metaphors to describe transformations in how novelists and scientists described the biomechanics of interpersonal relationships.

This dissertation will attempt to historicize the interaction between bodies, affect, and media in the nineteenth century; therefore our concern will primarily attend to print media, the telegraph, and other distributive symbolic technologies that we might not immediately associate with communications technology, such as systems of credit exchange and the symbolic instruments of credit itself – stocks, prices, and futures contracts. It will be my contention in the chapters that close this dissertation that these instruments at once generate their own affect, and that the circulation of these instruments can cause or reinforce

economic cycles; they can act both as amplifiers and as shocks. In my concluding chapter on Frank Norris' *The Pit,* I will examine how wheat futures exchanges in the Chicago Board of Trade produce and circulate their own affect as a thinking machine for capital markets, and in the process capture crowd bodies for surplus extraction using the very bodily capacities evolved for crowds. In this way, technologies of credit and institutions of markets also act as machines for affect production and distribution, and thus produce the very intensities that stimulate bodies' autonomic responses for crowd formation. I will argue that this provocatively demonstrates the various biosocial scales of agency that influence crowd behavior.

It is provocative, too, to consider the way media technologies allow various symbols and rhetorical codes of affect to spread across vast territories. Crowd behavior works at the intersections between the symbolic production of collective identity, the circulation of shared affects, and social reproduction. This symbolic production and this circulation of affect can be distributed by institutions, media, and actors of all size within a culture, and the unifying symbols and registers that attempt to code those symbols with affect are competitive within and across cultures. The now familiar arguments of Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities* are worth reconsidering here for how he was already implicitly theorizing nationalism as a type of embodied consciousness: nationalisms are "cultural artefacts [sic] of a particular kind. To understand them we properly we need to consider carefully how…they command such profound *emotional* legitimacy" (Anderson 4, italics mine). He describes the "modular" nature of nationalism with a wide variety of "political and ideological constellations," arguing that they create "deep attachments" (Anderson 4). To make nations you need industrial-scale affect machines to create events that intersect with bodies' space and time. More importantly, though, Anderson notes that nations – perhaps

we should say nationalism – inspire people to sacrifice their lives for them. In his chapter on patriotism and racism, he writes that the "attachment" people feel for nations raises the question of why they're "ready to die for these inventions" (Anderson 145). His use of the world "invention," with its associations of contraption and apparatus, points towards the efficacy of studying patriotism and crowd formation from similar perspectives, as embodied collective consciousness mediated by encoded symbols. Anderson's discussions follow these observations with reflections about the necessary "purity" of a symbolically mediated "group" (Anderson 147). As we shall come to see, the industrial scale of national symbolisms connects to the phenomena of crowds on much smaller scales. Nations are connected crowds. I will address the capacity of crowds to inspire dying in a sub-section to come.

As with *Imagined Communities,* these claims and arguments are meant to challenge how we consider the efficacy of political behavior within nineteenth century capitalism, and also how certain capitalist practices and institutions work to change how bodies work within capitalism. As I draw from a varied and interdisciplinary constellation of texts to explain crowd behavior, I will ask my readers to allow me the space to speculate on the reasons *why* crowds are effective political agents, in addition to cataloguing how they are able to behave in ways that simply cannot co-exist with still "common sense" conceptions of identity that privilege "rational," self-contained, and bounded individuals as the central subject of democratic society, constitutional rights, and even productive labor. I argue that the affects are more than a descriptive category for understanding the transmission and production of emotionally recognizable states of the body, or even that affects matter because shared bodily states are more important than, say, shared class positions. Instead, the transmission of affect is important because bodies that share the same affective field are bodies that are

capable of acting with coordination. This coordination of action allows bodies to act from the same motivation and intention, which can then guide individual bodies within the crowd to act in ways consistent with the desire of the crowd. The overall coordination of these actions is collective cognition; it allows bodies to operate in a field of consciousness. Nineteenth and early twentieth century group psychologists called this the crowd's "Group Mind." I hope to prove that this crowd cognition, operating through affect and with *social bodies* as the subjects and agents of power, opens up an entirely new space for understanding political trajectories of the United States in the nineteenth century and also the possibilities for politics today. I believe it definitively answers the prejudicial and over-simplified castigations of the crowd as irrational, childlike, and regressive.

Nineteenth century group psychologists also thought it the height of criticism to call the crowd animalistic.[2] Although it is not my intention to also place my foot inside the burgeoning sub-field of animal studies, it is also not my intention to mystify the reasons that crowd cognition is possible.[10] As I hope to prove from an intervention that traces the current "affective turn" through Charles Darwin's *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals* into twentieth century ethology, animal behavior offers us an extremely intriguing window with which to understand how crowd cognition is possible. Allowing our conceptions to flow in this direction is in some ways the final and supremely ironic rebuttal to the prejudicial nineteenth century mind that also believed crowds turned superior bodies into inferior ones: rational men into irrational women, civilized adults into uncivilized

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10 To the extent that "Animal Studies" is relevant here, I would direct our attention to Grosz's work in *Chaos, territory, art: deleuze and the framing of the earth*, where she takes her notion of the animal as a conceptual overlap with the human body. "Art begins with the animal," she writes, "which is itself a conjunction of bodies and and bodily forces with territories…All art begins with the animal, for it is the animal, and not machines, minds, or subjects, that carves territories and bodies simultaneously: minds, machines, subjects are themselves the artistic products of this coupling of bodies and milieus" (Grosz 35).

children, citizens into savages, workers into socialists, and, horror of horrors, humans into mere mammals.

Our anthropological understanding of the crowd requires us to visualize its structures as uniquely powerful moments for organizing bodies into political and religious fields of collective identity, but our concept of *agency* here fully depends on recognizing the ways that animals construct groups in order to maximize their potential for survival. The fact that crowds often form in life or death situations, such as when Ellen Brewster was lost in the above scene, is not a coincidence. Yet neither is the appearance of the crowd a magical vestige of prior evolution within the human body. The crowd thinks with a multiplicity of bodies. It is an active and evolving intelligence, and we can learn how it works by admitting that its powers – and particularly its *affective* powers – evolved to help it behave during crises. To understand the crowd is to understand how our genetic memory, what we mystify as "instinct" and reflex, is the unconscious agent of the body. Yet our use of the term "unconscious" cannot correspond to a Freudian unconscious rooted in drives. The unconscious here is a synonym for the aporia within our knowledge of ourselves as animals, and as animals whose collective behaviors are intelligent despite appearing "spontaneous." Along with Elizabeth Grosz and Henri Bergson, I will argue that it is these seemingly spontaneous actions that are necessary for what Bergson calls "freedom," and that it is this freedom of crowd behavior that in fact holds the potential for the emergence of political freedom. Crowds are animal collectives, and, ironically, it is our animality that activates political action and carries real potential for both social justice and social terror.

Some of these powers stem from the unique qualities of crowds that allow them to behave in surprising, unexpected ways. Some of my claims may seem strange at the outset,

but I hope with sustained evidence to consolidate scattered claims about the crowd throughout the past hundred-plus years into a coherent and recognizable body of knowledge theorized already, as it were, by the literary texts in question.

Spontaneous Behavior, Political Freedom, Animal Collectives

In order to begin re-conceptualizing the "spontaneous" behavior of crowds as intelligent, it is worth first considering why crowd behavior deserves to be taken so seriously as an agent of politics. I turn here to Elizabeth Grosz's succinct essay from the recently published anthology *New Materialisms,* "Feminism, Materialism, and Freedom," which poses a new definition of freedom that gives a new vocabulary – and a new political framework – to well-wrought ideas of agency and autonomy that locate autonomous political power in the rational individual. With Grosz, I argue that we imagine this individual to act at a slower, more deliberate speed of cognition, and extend to that slow cognition a special kind of intellectual and political authority. We can imagine here the deliberative legislative bodies that we perhaps too quickly associate as *the* institutions that constitute democracy. Without arguing that the fantasy of the slow thinker is at the *sole* center of our imaginations about the democracy subject, Grosz would suggest that the common-sense assumptions about individual reflection are synonymous with eighteenth century ideas of Reason. In that way, we could see them as ideological vestiges from transatlantic discourses that depended on binary splits between rational and irrational subjects, with the former often acting as a biological corollary for white male bodies and the latter coming to mean adult non-white, non-male, and non-adult bodies.

The politics of these assumptions are then, not surprisingly, extended to conceive of individual freedom as property, and thus freedom comes to mean "freedom from" the kinds of state constraints that we might recognize as patriarchal or oppressive. As in many perspectives that critique the politics of rights, the "freedom from" notion of rights in fact divests that "free" subject of any real democratic agency, since the very notion of that freedom externalizes an outside agent, the state, as the legitimate authority and author of those rights. Grosz proposes that we redefine freedom from an idea of "rights" granted to subjects to one that emphasizes "acts" that we might characterize as free. She borrows this notion of free acts from Henri Bergson, and side-steps rehearsed arguments about a subject's free-will by spelling out how many different kinds of life can create *free* acts. This post-humanist definition of freedom will help us eventually to conceive the agency of affect and intelligence of crowd behavior.

Grosz summarizes Bergson's position on free acts by focusing our attention on what *acts* are free, rather than one what *subjects* are free. She summarizes Bergson's argument that free acts come when "the self alone will have been the author of it, and…it will express the whole of the self" (Grosz 144). She amends this statement by quickly redefining the "self" away from a self-contained individual. Free acts, she interprets, "not only originate in or through a subject, they express *all* of that subject" (Grosz 144). It's slightly confusing to define Bergson's statement about a self that freely acts "alone" to also include free acts that "originate" "through" a subject, but that contradiction appears in Bergson's formulation, too. Grosz zeroes in on the "whole" self in order to make the claim that "all" of a self must include influences *beyond* the body. Otherwise, it's difficult to understand why we would need, at this early step, to make sure we were talking about free acts and not free subjects. "All" of a self includes, then, acts that are also somehow originating "through" a subject. I'm

partial to this formulation, since it allows us to think through bodies beyond individual bodies, such as social assemblages, including crowds. This early step is all the more important for how it steers clear of Marxist vocabularies of ideology; rather than interpret actions as instances of false consciousness, it's much more productive to consider the Deluezian and Spinozist mechanics of involution machines – bodies changing other bodies, but not over-determining each other forever.

Grosz continues with her mediation of Bergson by opening up the term "consciousness." "When one person's will is imposed on another's without his or her conscious awareness," Grosz writes, "Bergson argues that there must nevertheless be a retrospective cohesion between the subject's current act and the previous chain of connections that prepared for and made it possible" (145). Only after an act has taken place, then, can we ascribe it a coherent cause and effect. This after the fact retrospective order allows us to comprehend the tension between the spontaneity of free acts and how we might later conceive them as intelligent. For Grosz and for Bergson, however, it is important to insist on the perceptual incompatibility with what came before because it is from that incompatible past that we can begin to understand something like "evolution" to be taking place. We can see new behavior as the emergence of new intelligences and new adaptations beyond the molecular scale of genetic codes. In short, some acts have no adequate causes, and that doesn't imply they're stupid. Some bodily movements aren't dumb reactions, despite moving at faster speeds than the ones we associate with reflective cognitive thought.

Although it's possible to analyze the conditions that might provide us with adequate *causes* for the emergence of new behavior, we can also speculate over the psychical states that make free acts possible. Various states of the body have more virtual potential to act freely.

Rather than consider psychical states spatially, we should think through these states as virtual, generative, and tense with immanence. These states might themselves offer us different attitudes toward what the proper durations would be to recognize intelligence. Acts don't last long, but we remember them. And our bodies remember them: matter shapes memory.

The subject that can create a free act, however fleetingly, can come from bodies even when those bodies aren't thinking at slow speeds. Those acts then change who we are; free acts change the subject. They begin the reconstitution of bodies. Following from Bergson, Grosz writes that "if this subject from which acts spring is never the same, never self-identical, always and imperceptibly becoming other than what it once was and is now, then free acts, having been undertaken, are those which transform us" (Grosz 146). This makes sense. Grosz's movement to the first person plural here, from the implied "alone" that came with Bergson's "self" above, seems to suggest what was implicit in her earlier argument that the "self alone" is not really alone – it is an "us," a *we*. This we is present in the psychical states, the duration, during which selves can become through their acts. These selves are to *bodies,* in a sense, what affects are to emotions: just as the body has agency prior to and together with the reflective subject here, the affects become encoded into the nervous system at far faster speeds than the subject can recognize. This is why emotions can shift after processing by the self. One can decide how one feels about issues that require reflection. An embodied consciousness and emotionally situated reason would mean that the reflective epiphany is co-extensive with the accompanying emotional sensation. One can get excited about something he or she discovers after considering a subject. Yet it is the faster processing speeds that allows affects to achieve much quicker encoding into nervous systems that also must be present in a discussion about free acts and crowd behavior. Many bodies

can process information and affect at fast speeds and act intelligently at those speeds. There are actions that can take place at those speeds, then, to which I argue we must pay attention.

Grosz, I believe, would agree with this point. Free acts, therefore, don't come from choices made by free subjects. They come from a "freedom of action that is above all connected to an active self, an embodied being, a being who acts in a world of other beings and objects" (Grosz 147). Free acts are relational, not definitive. Here again we see that the definition of freedom Grosz articulates always comes with a vocabulary of "self" that quickly morphs, implicitly and explicitly, to a body acting with other bodies. This comes to be more important further on because Grosz returns to the definition of free acts that come from "all of one's being" (Grosz 147). This "all" seems to be twisted into a world of other bodies.

Grosz takes a different direction to make some of her conclusions in the essay. Rather than understand free acts as embodied by a being with *other bodies,* free acts are the "exception" of expression "against a background of routinized or habituated activity" (Grosz 148). Politically, it seems here that Grosz offer us a method for considering how the free acts of crowds have a revolutionary capacity in part because we can define them as exceptional acts in public space that break work schedules, disrupt flows, and redirect affect back toward state apparatuses. The crowd is its own affect machine. The crowd can recode the symbols of the state by substituting its own symbols or by changing the referent of common ones: the flag no longer refers to the bodies of government institutions, but instead refers to our bodies here in the group. They are the illegitimate bodies, the illegitimate authorities, the illegitimate referents. We are the legitimate referents; we are the flag; we and the symbol are one, simultaneously, in this time, and therefore we can act now, here, with

the legitimate authority of the law, because our free acts create the sovereignty that our very symbolic status refers back toward.

It is only when the symbol and crowd collapse into one among the bodies in the crowd that sovereignty materializes. This is the same point in time when the future and the present merge, so that the revolutionary moments previously deferred finally emerge. This is the time when regimes change, when state authority acknowledges that they are no longer the bodies that define the contested symbols produced heretofore by the bodies united under the sign of the state. Somewhat paradoxically, the crowd is never more powerful and never acts with more freedom to create the conditions for new systems than when all traces of other possible referents are most obscured. The master signifiers are "empty," but when the crowd is visibly present to all involved it temporarily fills those signifiers with symbols, repetitions of linguistic signs, bodies, and, of course, affect.

It is excess production of affect that intensifies into an ecstatic experience for the bodies of the crowd. Many bodies are usually required for that kind of amplification, and many voices. The rhythm of the crowd's voice itself helps to create the sense that the symbolic referents of the crowd are really 'real.' The ecstatic reaction of those nervous systems occurs because the volume, noise, and sensations of the bodies push past a virtual threshold. After this point the affects in the crowd can become self-reinforcing, expansive, and more intense. This is still the sign of collective intelligence. Forming crowds have been and continue to be necessary to protect human bodies from massacre, destruction, and extinction. The excited crowd is thus always a potential war machine. The deaths of individual bodies don't matter. The survival of the crowd matters more. It must be possible to excite bodies to die and kill for the crowd. Collective violence is intelligent, which isn't to

say that it's always moral, ethical, or even *necessary* for survival. But it is what some bodies can 'remember' from the past, as Bergson would say, and how the past can make bodies move.

We can use this to reconsider the spontaneity of crowds, crowd behavior, individuals within crowds, and revolutionary history in general. It is also an invitation to consider the conception of crowds, crowd formation, and crowd cognition as specifically *human* forms of social organization. Grosz turns to the Bergson of *Time and Free Will* to stress the relation of freedom between organic and inorganic matter. Free acts mean the "capacity to act" is structured "by the ability to harness and utilize matter for one's own purpose and interests. Freedom is not the transcendent quality inherent in subjects but is immanent in the relations that the living has with the material world, including other forms of life" (Grosz 148). Besides sounding very much like an amendment to Marx's definition of *labor,* her point also suggests an addendum to the definition of Deluezian machines. The ability to harness and utilize matter occurs at various scales of life and even in non-living systems. The intelligence required to manipulate matter also need not happen at human scales and at reasonable speeds. Grosz splits her notion of an embodied consciousness from human bodies, and posits after this, profoundly, "life is consciousness" (149). The intelligence of movements, like consciousness itself, is a matter of degree. Splitting bodies into smart and dumb does violence to our conceptions of life. Defining movements according to their speeds does violence to how we perceive the organization of life and the legitimacy of free acts. Grosz goes to further define how life is consciousness: "consciousness is the projection onto materiality of the possibility of a choice…it is linked to the capacity for choice" (149). This is some linkage. Grosz sees the term consciousness as not fully congruent with what it's meant to describe. Her definition here is in part what I have been calling "intelligence." To say bodies are intelligent and crowds have intelligence require us to redefine not only their

"capacity for choice" but also the speeds possible for making those choices. Choices made by the human nervous system can be thought roughly equivalent to choices made by certain animals. That is, there is not necessarily a sharp distinction between the conscious and unconscious, but rather degrees of difference between what systems in and between organisms make choices. Intelligence requires consciousness, and not necessarily for the *effects* of choices to be smart.

Just as there are degrees of free acts, there are degrees of consciousness linked to the capacity for those free acts. All forms of consciousness contain the possibility to act *out of routine,* and those free actions are both transformative and already in the relations living beings have with the world. Bodies act freely when they act out of routine, but these bodies can act in concert with other bodies, too. What's missing here is Grosz's theorization of *multiplicities of free acts,* or free machines. Grosz doesn't invite us to explore how an individual body cannot solely be responsible for free acts, even though her most basic definition of free acts requires the presence of other bodies. Indeed, it's possible to contend here, as I do, that many free acts require a multiplicity of bodies acting together, which is to say, potentially, individuals acting "all" of their selves. The sometimes de-individuated bodies in crowds, the famously "irrational" subjects of crowds, can now be usefully reconsidered as sharing consciousness at the same time that the duration of psychical states allows that crowd to "act" out of routine. Since actions necessarily arrive from consciousness, then crowd actions here are self-identical with shared consciousness. Rather than spend our time thinking through the *cause* of crowd consciousness, we only need to consider here the *duration* of it, since crowd actions are coterminous with crowd consciousness. Crowds are indeterminate; or, rather, perhaps assembled bodies are indeterminate, but crowds can offer moments of

free actions *by those assembled bodies*. Bodies assembled in space are not crowds: crowds are bodies acting in space, freely.

Besides not quite offering us how to imagine the machines we might include for thinking freedom, we also don't quite receive the concepts for imagining the varying scales of freedom possible in other species, in human-animal combinations, and in animal crowds, such as swarms, herds, and packs.[11] It is the purpose of this dissertation to begin imagining those machines, but in part by conceiving of human crowds and animal crowds as similar kinds of those very machines. The crowd, in other words, remembers the animal tactics of the pack, the swarm, and the herd through the codes that help direct behavior in bodies – that is, genes. To argue for the gene as a code is not to argue for genetic determination. Like a newspaper, a gene alone cannot determine behavior. But both the newspaper and the gene attempt to code the information that have influence over the behavior of human bodies; they just do it from quite different openings, at very different speeds and scales, and with different degrees of intelligent intention.

Further, many human genes share their codes with animal genes, as is well known. Yet this knowledge has not translated into an analysis that redefines the degree to which human behavior and animal behavior are less analogues, or metaphors for one another, than behaviors shaped by similar codes. The great political transformations in literary theory

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In *Swarm Intelligence*, James Kennedy and Russell C. Eberhart discuss swarm behavior in the context of artificial intelligence (AI). They deemphasize what they call the cognitivist view in AI research that places an individual and autonomous thinker at the center of its study. They emphasize the adaptive and dynamic nature of "life in general" and "human intelligence in particular" to support a perspective that sees the profound similarities between human social behavior and other species (Kennedy and Eberhart 3). They argue that "minds" move in "high-dimensional abstract space" (3). Like Delanda, they see living systems and inorganic systems operating together to produce what we call life. While they write that living systems and organs operate in ways that technology can mimic and replicate, I would advise us to see, especially for the nineteenth century, how bodies were able to "mimic" what we believe new technology can only do now (at faster speeds).

(feminism, critical race theory, psychoanalysis, queer theory) have each concentrated on re-establishing new politics through the incorporation of formally excluded points of view, and have worked hard (and continue to do so, for good reason) to establish the biogenetic equality of all human bodies. I am invoking genetic codes in this project, however, as a way to loosely structure the variable codes of the body's long memories from its animal past. My movement into this vocabulary is meant to invite us to consider the ways that the social construction of knowledge is always already tied up into complex biosocial fields of evolution and development. We are not, then, simply the output of cultural codes and historically specific communities. Evolutionary biology must be reconsidered a legitimate field of inquiry for new Marxist materialisms. It can also inform literary criticism as much as the social science disciplines that literary studies has reached toward over the past several decades. I mean to retrieve through evolutionary biology an alternative discourse for us to imagine the biosocial body than one that is rooted in psychoanalytic drives, while not excluding psychoanalysis from the conversation.

Evolutionary biology and genetic codes help us to imagine alternative sites of agency than the liberal humanist "self" of classical economics and bourgeois novels. Grosz's challenge in her essay from *New Materialisms* is to force a reassessment of what behaviors and bodies we privilege so that we can explore new frameworks for understanding life and politics. This is what I mean, in this dissertation, by a post-humanist perspective: we no longer put the human body at the center of all projects examining cultural studies and textual politics. While this move has become a regular part of the thinking in contemporary continental philosophies influenced by Deleuze – I am thinking here of Keith Ansell Pearson, Delanda and Grosz, among others – it has not found its way into nineteenth century literary studies.

In my own project here, my incorporation of this perspective for the study of crowds thus carries certain complications. One arises from a post-humanist perspective that attends solely to depictions of human crowds. To this complication I would re-assert the claim, made here throughout, that the primacy of the body and of affect necessarily asks us to step back from even the de-centered subject of psychoanalysis. In its place we are left with bodies that are multiplicities; that is, bodies with overlapping and sometimes competing systems of behavior, regulation, function, purpose, identity, and meaning-making actions. To study crowds from a post-humanist perspective, then, means that we take seriously the agencies, scales, and speeds that think and evolve to create new actions, new politics, and new worlds. It means unwinding individual consciousness from both the split-ego of Freud, in which repression and displacement receive a central role in subject-analysis, and from any easy return to the liberal humanist "self."

In place of psychic regulating structures that continually create control and liberation narratives, both in terms of ideological production and discursive regimes of power, we can turn our attention to individual consciousness as a composite illusion created from a multiplicity of overlapping flows (metabolic, linguistic, etc.), working at various speeds with various biosocial machines at scales large and small, and constantly switching between embodied modes of intensity and agency (running bodies that are moving are intelligent, just in different ways than bodies composing music quietly and not moving). It means taking the affective turn in literary studies seriously, and not just as an excuse to write about how it feels to read, how characters feel about one another, and how feelings circulate. It means attempting to theorize feelings as a complex field. It doesn't mean we put an emotional subject at the center of our study, but that we complicate "feelings" and make them the subject, not the object, of our concerns. Obviously one scholar can't realize this ambition in

a dissertation or even alone, but I would again like to point us toward the possible productivity of opening a discussion that places affect at the center of study, rather than subjects, but also one that also theorizes the intelligence of that affect in bodies by re-posing the biosocial speeds of intelligence that we mystify as instinct. This is what I am calling the animal dimension of collective intelligence in crowds.

It is especially interesting for our purposes that nineteenth century novelists began to think through various evolutionary discourses in the wake of Lamarck, Darwin, and Spencer. Even when we read those discourses for their original eugenic or reductive naturalist intentions, they nonetheless signal the anxious relationship many persons felt to the ever-blurring distinctions between human and animal, as well as the politics of supporting the science of superior and inferior bodies. The discursive assaults that assailed certain behaviors as savage, beastly, and animalistic should complicate our conversation without negating some of the possibilities contained in deracinating those prejudices from the ideas they follow.

Grosz herself would rather see the politics of free acts as a challenge to gender assignment and homo-normativity. She concludes her essay by reminding us that "freedom pertains to realm of actions, processes, and events that are not contained within, or predictable from, the present; it is that which emerges, surprises, and cannot be anticipated entirely in advance" (152). It functions, as she says, "through activity" and not through "right," or constitutional rights. For feminism, she advises a search for policies that enable women to act in ways that we haven't yet imagined, not for policies that grant women rights equal to men. I do not think it is incongruous with her argument here to suggest we might think the same thing about other bodies besides gendered bodies. Besides theorizing how

human-animal machines – if that term is not already a misnomer – can act freely, we might consider it an ethical imperative to allow other forms of life and consciousness the ability *for free acts*. To say that patriarchy restricts some of the possibilities for free acts by female bodies is not so much different than saying that restrictions on animal bodies also prevent freedom. It moves the conflict away from animal rights and toward policies that promote free actions. The destruction and restriction of domesticated and non-domesticated animals destroys the possibilities of evolution, of emergence, and of freedom, even though it does not eradicate the potential for the evolution of life. It eradicates a politics of resistance by eradicating other forms of social organization and social reproduction.

The Marxist commitment to freedom, like the feminist or queer one, must reflect on the move toward a Bergsonian materiality offered by Grosz. This move involves a responsibility to think through all the dimensions of life, and the many different kinds of crowds possible. It is not an accident that Deleuze layered his notion of wolf packs and war machines on Elias Canetti's concepts in *Crowds and Power,* and that Canetti found his inspiration for crowds though combinations of anthropology, ethology, linguistics, and biology. Bodies acting with other bodies allows them to do things they can't do alone – this, too, allows all combinations of life, and all kinds of crowds of bodies, to have the capacity to act "out of routine." All crowds have political potential. All crowds have the potential for freedom.

Chapter Two

Multitudes, Crowds and Spinoza's Concept of the Political

This dissertation began as an inquiry into the efficacy of thinking through the power of crowds at the social and political scale of the state. This project is one of many recently that have attempted to rethink the ways that we might re-conceive systemic disruptions to capitalist institutions and practices in the present moment. In addition to the recent substantive critiques of capitalism made by Marxists such as David Harvey (in *The Enigma of Capital),* there has been a larger turn in Marxist theory (sometimes under the guise of post-Marxism) towards reformulating a potential revolutionary subject from a revolutionary class into something else. Interestingly enough, some of the same studies that have attempted these reformulations have also turned to affect and affective labor as a potentially new and useful heuristic (the latter term, affective labor, meaning most basically the labor of producing affect, such as anything from sex work, body work, and teaching, to social organizing). Many of these same studies have thus returned to the original philosopher of affect, Spinoza. Though beginning perhaps with Deleuze, these studies have continued in his wake in Marxist studies, including works by Antonio Negri, Warren Montag, and Etienne Balibar.[12] Many of these same studies have also proposed that crowds, or subjects like

[12] In *The Philosophy of Marx* Etienne Balibar writes that Marx's philosophy is "the example of a modern ontology of relations…of the transindividual," and even that we must turn to "complexity…the most alluring expositions of this are based metaphorically on the new alliance between physics and biology" (Balibar 121). For Balibar a transindividual "intersubjectivity" was itself an expression of Marx's ontology; in fact, for him the philosophy of Marx was a "modern ontology of relations" (Balibar 121).

This ontology appears to be a new field of inquiry for traditional Marxist categories or concepts. In *Time for Revolution,* Negri's vocabulary is significantly more Deleuzian than in *Multitude.* As in

crowds, should be placed back into legitimate conversations about revolutionary subjectivity. All of this work is present-ist, however, and it is my hope that by reframing the use of nineteenth century novels we can see how representations of crowds in fiction then might offer us new knowledge about crowds generally.

This knowledge is complicated, of course, by the notion that affect works at different registers of agency than an organized, methodical proletariat. These registers of agency – fast embodied consciousness rather than slow "reasonable" consciousness – becomes complicated once more by our attempts to account for the transformation of affects as they move. The movement of affects is interactive to the extent that the energetic transmission of force through a medium shifts depending on the codes through which affect is assembled and disassembled, or how over time it can intensify or decay. Rather than solely see affects as fast embodied sensations that precede self-conscious decision-making, it is perhaps this transformative quality of affect that best describes what Brian Massumi has in called the "autonomy of affect." Crucially, individuals or groups can also purposely produce affects – can perform affective labor – and can spread and create sensations in others to motivate them to act.

Spinoza understood these affects to be the primary motivations for bodily movement, and also the explanation for the social and political passions that could order and disorder political cultures. Therefore he extended his political philosophy from this thesis.

Multitude, Negri's concern is sympathetic to a redefinition of the "common." But as a prior necessity alongside this common to come, he speaks of a "metamorphosis of bodies" that must take place. For him this phrase means "the ensemble of sensorial, perceptive, and mental mutations that the bodies themselves produce through direct experience of the innovation of the world of life…produced by a permanent process of deterritorialization. Metamorphosis is biopolitical generation" (Negri 235).

The Marxist returns to Spinoza have made considerable use of his political philosophy, especially since he naturalizes his politics as an extension of his pre-Darwinian, unified field theory of evolutionary life in his *Ethics*. Whatever is lost in these contemporary Marxist transitions away from a teleological notion of class consciousness in the proletariat is thought to be gained by placing Marxism more firmly in such a logic of Spinoza's universal evolutionary science. Unfortunately, in some of this work, such as Negri's work with Michael Hardt, a rather utopian preconception of Spinoza's politics has severed Spinoza's claims about an embodied politics from his rather ambiguous assessments about political destinies. We can nevertheless incorporate Spinoza's concept of "multitude" into this dissertation because it allows us to think through a collective, embodied consciousness motivated to act by the intensity and presence of affect. We need only lose the sense that this agent necessarily appears to initiate any particular politics and accept it as a constitutive agent of change, and one immanent within political societies.

This chapter will make an intervention into the main Marxist appropriations of Spinoza for the purposes of disciplinary critique, but more importantly in order to propose Spinoza's multitude as one of the central philosophical touchstones for my genealogy of knowledge about the crowd. I will challenge here efforts to re-read Spinoza for his subversive elements only, and critique Negri and Hardt's conception of a subversive 'Multitude' in particular. Instead, I argue that Spinoza's multitude fits much more comfortably inside Ernest Laclau's political theory of populism. For Laclau, various groups within states compete for power against one another. These antagonistic collectivities make demands through rhetorical and psychological strategies that first of all depend upon affectively engaged and motivated bodies. It is important for my argument that we imagine the most powerful expressions of these collectivities as crowds, and that furthermore we

understand these crowds as singular expressions of a Spinoza's multitude. This also allows us to begin conceiving of many crowds working alongside and against one another. These crowds do not know any one political party. Their capacity for violence, and the state's capacity to act violently to repress it, comes from their real physical presence as bodies that can directly challenge the state's monopoly of force, and thereby challenge the legitimacy of state power. They also have the power, as we noted earlier, to redefine the symbols and referents that signify the state's authority. It is this capacity "really" to challenge power that should interest contemporary Marxist theory, even as it potentially revises the revolutionary subject as one rooted in an economic class to one emerging from bodies temporally united by common affective postures in crowds.

The crowd's capacity to kill or die brings us to another important intersection with Laclau's theory of politics. Along with his collaborator Chantal Mouffe, Laclau contends that the antagonistic collectivities competing for political dominance act as examples of Carl Schmitt's theory of political culture. Schmitt's definition of political culture argues that the constitutive feature of political groups depends on friend-enemy distinctions; Schmitt puts this thesis at the center of his theories of state power. The irrepressible presence of friend-enemy groups is what led Schmitt to his theory of strong states that could both monopolize violence and dictate those friend-enemy distinctions for the purpose of state power and political order. To be effective, states would maintain this order through the biopolitical management of life, but states could only achieve this management by inspiring bodies to kill or die for the state. Not coincidently, this inspiration is the same quality of patriotic self-sacrifice Anderson notes in *Imagined Communities*. This assertion matches claims made by Spinoza. In his political theory we see a state-centered political order, but one where the state's biopolitical monopoly on inspiring life and death politics can be challenged by

multitudes. Although I contend that we must imagine these multitudes as crowds, we must also extend Schmitt's concept of the political to them. We must imagine both sacrificial crowds and potentially violent ones, and further imagine that the legitimation of state power can radically depend not on the state's ability to inspire bodies to kill or die for it, but on the ability of crowds to kill or die for the multitude – that is, for itself.

I would argue that this quality of designating an enemy to kill or be killed is actually a potential dynamic in all crowds, and, depending on what codes structure crowd behavior, one of the primary functions of all crowds. The distinction I would make is that crowds don't *necessarily* make enemies or even enemies of the state; codes that manipulate symbols into referent categories and then intensify them past a threshold for violent behavior do that work. In other words, at the furthest limit of logic, the us and them categories that make enemies are not inevitable. The *capacity* for making enemies is what's inevitable, among others, in a crowd.

Multitudes and Collectivities

In Antonio Negri's published lecture "The Labor of the Multitude and the Fabric of Biopolitics" in the Spring 2008 issue of *Mediations,* he iterated the assertions he made with Michael Hardt in their *Empire, Multitude, Commonwealth* trilogy that "the" Multitude is a relatively new revolutionary subject of post-Fordist capitalism. Negri argues that capitalism was "in the past capable of reducing the multiplicities of singularities to something close to the organic and unitary – a class, a people, a mass, a set" (Negri 22). Yet today, Negri writes, the multitude "should thus be necessarily thought of as a disorganized, differential, and

powerful multiplicity" (Negri 22). His definition of multiplicity is at first close to the one we used earlier for the individual: composite and complex.

This diffuse and disorganized multitude that converges into resistance against capital has been criticized as inefficacious and utopian, particularly by those with very different conceptions of how political action works and by whom. In his 2001 review of *Empire* in *diacritics,* for instance, Ernesto Laclau claimed that one of the weaknesses of the multitude conceived by Hardt and Negri was that "the universality of the proletariat fully depends on its *immanence* within an objective social order which is entirely the product of capitalism" ("Social Struggles" 5). Laclau stresses the utopian and contradictory dimension of a universal multitude composed by "spontaneously" converging political actors ("Social Struggles" 7). These two positions are not totally irreconcilable, however. Negri's understanding of the multiplicities within his concept of Multitude can be bent to connect with Laclau's own emphasis on collaborating *and* antagonistic collectives competing for power within institutions, parties, movements, public space, as well as by attempts to control strategic symbols of supposedly universal signifiers, such as flags. In other words, Laclau's definition of struggles between different social collectivities that variously converge or diverge can describe multiplicities that operate within individual states. Rather than necessarily uniting, multiplicities also compete for hegemony and leverage over each other, spontaneously or not.

This chapter will develop that premise further by situating Laclau's politics within a Spinozist trajectory. I'll pursue this premise in order to establish Spinoza's conception of politics and multitude within an alternate trajectory of contemporary Marxism – namely, one informed by Laclau's and Chantal Mouffe's discussions of "the democratic tradition of

popular sovereignty" (Laclau and Mouffe 19). For them, popular sovereignty and democracy are concepts that can describe competing political collectivities that operate within what they call the "pluralism" of a democratic tradition.[13] This notion of pluralism stresses the "conflict and division" between collectivities (Laclau and Mouffe 19). This conflict and division occurs in part because these collectivities are constructed through "difference," wherein also "every identity becomes purely contingent" (Laclau Mouffe 21). By stressing the contingency of various collectivities competing within a state for power, Laclau and Mouffe's concept of difference speaks first to the Spinozist concept of self-preservation, where bodies compete against other bodies for power. This competition for power is really a striving for expansion by those bodies. There is an understandable logic of self-preservation when we imagine scarcity and barriers to social reproduction (though the idea of "self" here, I argue, must ultimately apply as much to individuals as to crowds). On the other hand, Spinoza would argue that the striving for power *for* expansion is not just a determining and immanent affect limited to scarcity. It is a force that animates living bodies. It is within this context that various bodies combine to form alliances and groups and crowds, and they do so against other combinations of bodies. This constitutes, for Spinoza and arguably for Schmitt, the material basis for politics within states.

In *Ethics,* Spinoza traces this self-preservation as an extension from the evolving 'substance' of nature and natural bodies, *conatus,* which acts as the underlying evolutionary force that propels all life. *Conatus* is a kind of vital force or energy that unfolds into the specific modes and attributes of living bodies. He argues that it is *conatus* that expresses itself

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Lenin's critique of democracy in *The State and Revolution*: "A democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism, and therefore, once capital has got control of this excellent shell…it establishes its power so securely, so firmly, that *no* change of individuals, of institutions or of parties in the bourgeois-democratic republic can shake this power" (14).

as the desires and appetites of the human body, called *cupiditas*. For Spinoza, the human body strives toward power and expansion as an expression of the affect joy. Other affects or passions, such as anger or fear, inform bodies about their relative position in relation to joy.

Laclau and Mouffe argue against the rational and consensus-driven liberal pluralism of John Rawls, for example, because in his ideas "passions are erased from the realm of politics" (Laclau and Mouffe 31). However divisive, passions influence and motivate political cultures. Following Schmitt, Laclau and Mouffe reject the notion that a "non-coercive consensus" is possible within liberal democracy, and instead claim that the lack of consensus and presence of affective passions in collectivities is what assures "the dynamics of the democratic process will be kept alive" (Laclau and Mouffe 32). They imagine a dynamic democratic process where passionate collectivities compete to exclude others from power. The power within this democratic competition lends itself to Spinoza's contention that bodies, whether individual or collective, constantly seek to expand their power to act. This power to act occurs by natural right, and is co-extensive with the actual capacity of bodies to successfully maximize power. This concept naturalizes the power to act without naturalizing explicit forms of domination.

The dynamics of passionate politics in Laclau and Mouffe furthers the possibility that Spinzoa can deepen our understanding of a constitutively embodied politics, and also the way Spinozist 'multitudes' might materialize within states. This means examining how the passions work in a multitude, and also means defining when a collectivity materializes into a multitude. I argue that a collectivity materializes into a multitude when it becomes a physical *crowd* of bodies, and when it tries to coerce power from the state itself. A collectivity is an institution that already has structures of symbolic representation, circulation, and

identification from which crowds are more likely to emerge. The virtual potential of the crowd is closer to "one" than not. In *Parables,* Massumi defines the virtual as the "pressing crowd of incipiencies and tendencies…a realm of potential" (Massumi 31). This dissertation imagines the collectivity as a bodily threshold of interconnection beneath that of the crowd, or in a different phase state. The ultimate distinction for the virtual transformation, however, would always come to depend on whether or not belonging to the collectivity could inspire crowds whose actions are ultimately about life or death – that is, biopolitical.[14]

Spinoza complements Laclau and Mouffe's position, too, in another critical respect. His emphasis on the way that circulating affects become coded in and among individual and collective bodies is critical to his conception that politics extends from human bodies, and thus how singular multitudes intervene in state power. I contend that Laclau's own conception of populism and "populist reason," with its emphasis on collective bodies excited to 'excessive' positions on the left and the right, can be productively situated next to Spinoza's descriptions of multitudes. Stripped of its universal and spontaneous character, "the" multitude Hardt and Negri describe might still usefully describe smaller-scale qualities of revolutionary collectives – or *singular* multitudes – that Laclau conceives as "short-term" and "autonomous" ("Social Struggles" 10). The temporality of these multitudes, which act at those faster speeds described as "spontaneous," is also consistent with other influential positions within contemporary Marxist thought – notably, in interpretations of Spinoza's

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[overprinted text] In *The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect*, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen / Lacan's symbolic-reading of Freud, with the latter's insistence on a group whose fully collective love centers on a special father. In an idea that I believe reflects the endlessly deferred symbolic 'truth' of crowd identity, he writes that "what the members of the murdering tribe submit to, what they gather to form community around, is *nothing* – no Subject, no Father, no Chief – but there absolute mortality, their own finitude, their own inability to be Absolute Subjects" (35). I would rewrite this to say that the "nothing" here is symbolic; the *sensation of that nothing,* however, is what constitutes the crowd. The intensification of that crowd is what allows bodies to act on that nothing – to act in the name of life and death.

multitudes as crowds, such as in Warren Montag's *Bodies, Masses, Power* and Etienne Balibar's *Masses, Classes, Ideas.*

Crowds and Populism

Instead of a universal 'Multitude' evolving within 'Empire,' Spinoza's multitude can be temporally contingent and localized. Its contingency stems from its composition in space; bodies must gather together and act. Yet its contingency is also a product of metabolism and affect *prior* to encoding by the nervous system: crowds exist only as long as bodies don't need to eat, sleep, or be somewhere else. The amplifications and intensifications that excite bodies to the thresholds necessary for self-sacrifice and killing are difficult to sustain without the assemblages that create affect machines. This could include newspapers, spectacles, charismatic speakers, and any other various technologies for affect production and encoding.

After Spinoza begins his *Political Treatise* by announcing that the "passions" are the constituent category of the political, he writes that in order to "understand human actions," we must look upon the passions such as "love, hatred, anger, envy, ambition, pity, and other perturbations of the mind, not in light of vices of human nature, but as properties, just as pertinent to it, as are heat, cold, storm, thunder" (Political *Treatise* 288-9). For him, bodies excited together by the affects typically refer to affects that have already become encoded into what I would distinguish as basic emotions or social emotions. The "phenomena" of these affects are "inconvenient," he writes, but "are yet necessary, and have fixed causes" (Political *Treatise* 288). He refers to the *Ethics* to confirm that "men are of necessity liable to passions," and soon affirms that the "steep" road to reason means anyone believing that "the multitude or men distracted by politics can ever be induced to live according to the bare

dictate of reason, [sic] must be dreaming of the poetic golden age, or of a stage-play" (Political *Treatise* 289). Here, Spinoza would seem to anticipate arguments about a necessarily communist multitude. What we take from this is at least the initial fulcrum for our contentions about an embodied politics.

Before continuing on to a definition of crowds as singular multitudes, we should reflect on Spinoza's conflation between affect and emotions in this translation of his work. There are certain reservations we should have about the universality of his claims. What I propose matters to his arguments is that human nature *tends* to produce similar affects across similar situations; wealth produces envy, illness produces pity. These affects of envy and pity excite bodies, and that excitement forms the basis for collectivities. We might amend this by pointing to the work of Silvan Tomkins and Paul Ekman, whose work also posits the universality of bodily affect and emotion through cross-cultural comparisons of facial expressions (and we would turn, too, to Darwin's *The Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animal).* But however various historically specific biosocialities adapted affect codes to economic and ecological conditions (in which all bodies expressed shame, for example, just in response to culturally specific stimuli), I argue that Spinoza's claims would nonetheless offer a valuable theory of general tendencies and expressions. In the last instance, this argument would connect to earlier claims about the agency of the body by asserting that the human nervous system and basic variations of it – the range of variations of *nervous systems* across all human bodies – *is itself the primary machine for coding affect.* This is akin to Noam Chomsky's claim for a general grammar that acts as the potential for all languages.

Let us return to a more straightforward Marxism. The notion of the crowd as singular multitude cements Etienne Balibar's own notion of the Spinozist multitude as

crowd. Balibar sets his own discussion of Spinoza's multitude in the context of mass movements (Balibar 4). In his reading of Spinoza, "the masses become an explicit theoretical object, because in the last analysis it is their different modalities of existence, according to the historical conjunctures and according to the economies or regimes of passion, that determine the chances of orienting a political science toward a given solution" (4). Balibar's concept of a mass acting as a "regime of passion" at a historical conjuncture quite readily defines the crowd theorized in this dissertation and recalls the contingency that define Laclau and Mouffe's own politics. It is interesting that Balibar assigns his reading, in part, to Negri's insistence in *The Savage Anomaly* that Spinoza wrote his project from the "standpoint of the mass" even as he gave examples that showed he feared it (Balibar 5). In this way Balibar's attention to the crowd also identifies the logic of our synthetic connection between Negri and Laclau.

Moreover, this "regime of passion" is arguably similar to what Laclau understands as "populist reason." In *On Populist Reason,* Laclau opens his definition of populism from a reading of Peter Worsely, who claimed that understanding populism meant understanding its "performative dimensions" (On *Populist Reason* 14). Populism does not reflect a particular type or organization of political culture of ideology, but is instead an expression of politically excited bodies that describes collective behavior. Laclau traces this behavior through crowd psychology as it developed in transatlantic nineteenth and early twentieth century thought, particularly through Gustave Le Bon's *The Crowd* and Sigmund Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* among others (On *Populist Reason* 42). As we'll see in the next chapter, Le Bon believed crowds corrupted the reasoning capacity of individuals, and infected the

social and political sphere with degenerate socialist mass movements.[15] Le Bon especially blamed the "contagion" of "pathological transmissions" among retrograde populations for socialist movements (On *Populist Reason* 28). His manifesto infamously became a potent source for future fascists, including Hilter and Mussolini. Within Le Bon's social scientific discourse, however, Laclau is able to find "some crucially important aspects in the construction of social and political identities…[such as] the relationship between words and images, the predominance of the 'emotive' over the 'rational,' the sense of omnipotence, the suggestibility and identification with leaders, and so on" (On *Populist Reason* 39). His move to repair Le Bon's ideas from his prejudices is a formula that will explain many more moves of my project. The elevation of the emotive above the rational immediately recalls Spinoza's own belief that the passions play a larger role in politics than reason. Laclau extends this notion of the 'emotive' to the early sociologist William McDougall, whose work will also come up in chapter three. He summarizes how McDougall distinguished crowds from other social bodies by emphasizing that the "crowd requires the exaltation and intensification of emotions" (On *Populist Reason* 48). More specifically, he asserts that McDougall's idea of "self-regarding sentiment," or the *sentiment* of self-identity, can be extended toward and cathected to images and objects beyond the self. This idea merges with Freud's notion in *Group Psychology* that the emotional bond of groups cathects affect to identification from one body to another. This identification, for Freud, takes the form of a libidinal investment in an object.[16] This is the moment, for us, when we might imagine the symbolic properties of

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In *Citizen Audience: Crowds, Publics, and Individuals*, Richard Butsch writes that Le Bon's perspective was symptomatic of the prejudice against [illegible] "standard of evaluation was the conscientious, cultivated, and informed citizen," crowds were "bad citizens" (2). It should go without saying that the "evaluation was class-based and reinforced class and other social hierarchies" (2).

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Laclau's admission that politics is libidinal was not his own discovery, and neither was his return to Freud's group psychology to make that claim. I would argue that Laclau both does not do enough to

other human bodies. It is only because one can make another body into a symbol that such a body can intensity, amplify, and create affect in such great disproportion to how well we know that *person.* Symbols are the great affect machines. Bodies that become symbols are thus greater affect machines.[17]

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disassociate himself from Freud's contention that it was the love of the father that held the group together, and also points out that such love that binds together crowds is symbolic and thus necessarily unstable and not gendered.

In *The Emotional Tie,* Borch-Jacobsen develops his theory of affect out of Freud's work on group psychology. He notes that "someone may object that Freud unveiled the libidinal nature of the political as no one had before and that, in this sense, he undermined the ideology of power by exhibiting the love by which authority authorizes itself, the voluntary slavery that supports tyranny" (3). Borsch-Jacobsen rightly discusses how this theory doesn't allow us to consider how power manifests itself through coercion and force; tangentially, he is more concerned with decoupling love from politics than explaining politics in terms of love (the libidinal social bond).

Borch-Jacobsen's approach is anything but doctrinaire Freudianism, and in fact he alerts us to the not unproductive overlap between various psychoanalytic categories and the virtual evolutionary concepts in this dissertation. For example, he re-reads Freud's ideas of Eros as a theory for explaining the bonding of social organisms for survival. Eros is the life-drive, but if we start to see "drives" as capacities we might be able to think through the problem of psychoanalysis and its legacy differently. "By bonding in a "cellular State" (Zellenstaat) or by binding external excitations, single-celled organisms defer their own death drive. The same principle applies to higher organisms: by binding or bonding with the *other* or *outside,* by uniting with it in a higher *Verbingdung* or *Vereinigung,* different organisms neutralize the disbanding, lethal tendency that drives them to form an individual band" (5). There is much here that I would discard by way of completely reframing – the death drive, the principle of cellular and higher organisms working together because of drives that extend from small to large bodily scales, and the idea of bonding as a counter to a lethal tendency to form individual bands. The possibility that human bodies and cellular bodies might mimic behavior on radically different spatial scales could be due to any number of reasons, and I'm not convinced about the evidence for a death drive that forms a lethal tendency for bodies to isolate. I'm also not convinced that what's being described here operates in all human bodies – that is, that it's universal. (My arguments are for populations and not universal individuals.) Yet Borch-Jacobsen's idea that external excitations can bond bodies to unity through an outside other begins to signal a capacity of bodies in question here.

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It is important in this return to Freud [illegible] theory of group seems the perfect precursor to fascism. [illegible] read Le Bon and, infamously, so did Hitler. There is something true but not universal in this observation: there is something *like* libidinal identification in crowds, and it's possible that can help explain the crowd aspects of fascism. And it's thus easier to understand how Laclau would say that fascism is a form of populism, or has a populist potential, and that populism is the constitutive embodied political state of bodies. Many of my own arguments follow from these conjectures, but it is again worth divesting ourselves of the core assumptions about the universality of Freud's group psychology. Crowds are a potential capacity. We don't want to get bogged down in psychoanalytic categories, but neither do we

So it is from Freud that Laclau derives his cues for populism. Rather than dismissing populism as a "political phenomenon," it should be considered "in its specificity as one legitimate way among others of constructing the political bond" (On *Populist Reason* 63). Laclau's argument here should make the arguments made throughout this chapter more recognizable, but it should also be clear that this dissertation actually argues that the populist expression really begs the question of the "political bond" itself – one we should again weave from Anderson through to Schmitt, and one we should rehearse as ultimately about the production of a collective *sovereign* ecstasy. But since Laclau's immediate interest is more in the discursive construction of this "political bond" as the bond itself, he pays particular attention to how linguistic signifiers function to actually organize collectivities than he does the role of the affect specifically.

His attention to the rhetoric and discourse of varying populisms, with their discourses of "vagueness and indeterminacy" in particular, again speaks back to Spinoza's own arguments about affects and politics. Populist rhetoric first depends upon constituting the collectivities that it purports to represent. In particular, its use of "empty signifiers" works out for politics the post-structuralist arguments about how language functions at the level of the signifier: namely, that words are distinct from the objects they represent, and cannot ever fully denote their meaning. The means by which language expresses something it can't Laclau calls "catachresis" (On *Populist Reason* 71). Populist rhetoric is a discourse of

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want to dismiss those aspects of crowd psychology in play with such categories. Even Borch-Jacobsen writes that Freud denied something obvious about panic as affect: Freud dismissed the possibility that suggestion (during panic) could occur as an immediate fusing with another. I would amend this to say that panic is not the identification of an ego with another ego, but induction into the affect program from one body to another, by the body. It should go without saying that bodies intelligently initiate these states, and that the "divorce" of reflective consciousness from bodily intelligence is not an ego-unconscious split (where the unconscious is the body's intelligence) isn't totalistic but layered and interactive.

demands and claims that works "at a very incipient level…to constitute the 'people' as a potential historical actor" (On *Populist Reason* 74). The vagueness of the "people" becomes the catachresis that crystallizes collectivities into larger formations. The very "indeterminacy" of the rhetoric allows it to unify several different kinds of demands and claims made by different groups, or what Laclau calls "equivalential chains" (On *Populist Reason* 74).[18] This process of unification suggests how local collectivities might materialize into national multitudes. It's also worth nothing that Laclau here keeps his discussion at the scale of the nation-state, which is not something this project will do. It is through the function of these equivalential chains of indeterminate signifier that Laclau explains the "contagion" of apparently spontaneous crowd actions observed by so many crowd theorists. Laclau turns to crowd scholar George Rudé and his discussion of 18th century food riots for an example of how a "mixed" discourse of populist rhetoric allowed those riots to flourish by exciting several different collectivities to act as crowds with seeming simultaneity. Quoting from

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This semiotic aspect of Laclau's populism here recalls Zizek's definition of ideology in *Plague of Fantasies*: the "elementary ideological gesture is the imposition of a signifier which starts to function as a kind of empty container for the multitude of mutually exclusive meanings – there is no ideology without such a 'pullback' from the signified content into the empty symbolic form" (Zizek 74-75). Lest we not see the connection quick enough, listen to Zizek explain how ideology appeals to bodies in its representative inconsistencies. He writes "in order to be 'effective' as a social bond, it *always has to combine* a series of 'inconsistent' attitudes" (75). In short, for Laclau and for Zizek it is the bodily need for the social bond that ideology exploits. And for both the semiotic function, or the sliding content behind the representation of populism or ideology, turns upon uniting disparate and rather incoherent positions – in the case of populism it is disparate social groups coalescing, and for ideology it is a fetishized male fantasy of an aggressive, "phallic" woman tearing down a patriarchal order (thus satisfying patriarchal fears and feminist awareness. Quite suggestively, Zizek says the "truth" of ideology is in that logic.

We can see Zizek's ideology converge with Laclau's populism again when Zizek basically asserts that populism, for Laclau, always works like ideology (rather than the reverse). Using the example of democracy, Zizek says that "the reference to the signifier 'democracy'…is precisely the struggle to impose an ever new meaning on this term…the very plasticity of the signified content (the struggle for what democracy 'really means') relies on the fixity of the empty signifier 'democracy.' *What characterizes human existence is thus the 'irrational' fixation on some symbolic Cause, materialized in a Master-Signifier to whom we stick regardless of the consequences, disregarding our most elementary interest, survival itself"* (Zizek 94-95, italics mine). This last statement describes the genetic protocol of the crowd.

Rudé, Laclau cites how "the crowd may riot because it is hungry or fears to be so, because it has some deep social grievance, because it seeks an immediate reform or the millennium, or because it wants to destroy an enemy or acclaim a 'hero'; but it is seldom for any single one of these reasons alone" (On *Populist Reason* 75). Rudé's slip here between a hungry crowd and one that fears hunger is important: the crowd here riots because of anxieties over survival. The sense of potential catastrophe doesn't just help create the crowd, but really seems to structure the crowd's power to risk harm to itself because its immediate bodily needs are already threatened. For Rudé, the sum of all possible motives combines to express a "leveling instinct." This "instinct" is in fact a terrific suggestion for the arguments made here, and a great example of the cross-discourse between Marxism and Darwinian biology that speaks to the interdisciplinary subject of the crowd.

For his part, Laclau glides past an analysis of the leveling instinct to Rudé 's impossible critique of all the possible definitions for the food riots: the meaning of the riots, for him, "cannot, in itself, have a content of its own." Without getting stuck on the indeterminacy of the crowd's referents, we should amend Laclau's analysis. The food-riot crowd mentioned in Rudé 's example does more than present the way populist rhetoric might function to consolidate social bonds. It makes visible how a multiplicity of collectivities can act against a centralized power, even "spontaneously," in the way Negri might insist is possible for a global Multitude. More essentially, the leveling instinct Laclau cites depends upon a variety of affect machines and affect codes, whether those affects materialize as fear, resentment, envy, or pride. Those Spinozist affects are coded by the rhetoric; inversely, the rhetoric intensifies, and becomes embodied, by coinciding with and also producing specific bodily states. No matter the particular expression of affect or how

the rhetoric codes it, what matters is that the bodies become *excited* by the affects themselves. Affects stimulate bodies and *intensify* excitement to produce and sustain crowds.

Spinoza might feel ambivalent about the power of this intensity, and excitement, to create the kind of dynamism that unites collectivities to act against power. It also potentially undermines unity among different collectivities: "In so far as men are tormented by anger, envy, or any passion implying hatred, they are drawn asunder and made contrary to one another…and because men are in the highest degree possible liable to these passions, therefore men are naturally enemies" (Political *Treatise* 296). The potential for affect decay or disintegration as a result of competition among each of the collectivities' affect machines and their accompanying codes marks a divergence from Schmitt in the work of Laclau and Mouffe. They write that the political possibility of dissolution "also entails that the existence of such a unity is itself a contingent fact which requires political construction" (Laclau and Mouffe 54). Both unity and dissolution of crowd or state turns upon particular situations where embodied populism generates centrifugal or centripetal affects. Some populist crowds create the conditions for their own destruction by producing the opposite bodily reactions from their affect machines. The symbols used to unite one group repel another.

Managing the body's liability to affect codes that structure the symbols of enemies and friends would obviously be important, which is why Schmitt spends so much effort upon the theme (he was a Nazi, after all). Exciting affects in bodies 'from above,' as it were, should warn us about the scale of affect machines, but Laclau rightly critiques this danger as one inherent to all political cultures. Moreover, the relative size of affect machines produces sensations in bodies that steer us away from ideological critiques of false consciousness. Even Spinoza admits that "because as we are treating here of the universal power or right of

nature, we cannot here recognize any distinction between desires, which are engendered in us by reason, and those which are engendered by other causes" (Political *Treatise* 292). His logic is useful here because it deepens our commitment to the types of apparatuses that produce interpellation, and that inform Laclau's discussion of fascism in *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*. Just as ideological interpellation "is the practice [of] producing subjects" that can think and act all by themselves, Spinoza claims that bodies cannot "recognize any distinction between desires" which are engendered by reason or from other causes (Politics *and Ideology* 108). Interpellation works because apparatuses are affect machines and not brainwashing machines. They code and script behavior for bodies, but they do not control bodies. Their power comes from their ability to create sensations in the body, since that is what the subject feels as a *property* of his or herself, rather than as an alien force.

The relation between interpellation and affect also sheds light on Spinoza's own awareness of his ambivalence about the human nature of political ethics. For him, bodies cannot always determine the causes of their passions. This indeterminacy occludes bodies' ability to use reason, but it also allows those same bodies to act together. In our language here, we would say that the indeterminate causes of affect nonetheless allow bodies to move, and movement is intelligence. Spinoza writes that what seems "ridiculous, absurd, or evil" arises from a "partial knowledge of things," and a misrecognition of the "coherence of nature as a whole" (Political *Treatise* 295). This coherence allows for us to understand singular situations not for their ethical context but merely as instances of "natural right." For him it follows that since "everyone is so far rightfully dependent on another," it holds true that "he is under that other's authority," which is to say that everyone is, to some degree, under everyone else's authority. All bodies are potential affect machines.

This intersection of competing authorities occurs between bodies of unequal power and right, and so some with authority have power through brute force while other authorities can make bodies "dependent" in mind and body (Political *Treatise* 295). Spinoza argues that this dependency and shared feeling of body and mind occurs "only as long as the fear or hope lasts, for upon removal of the feeling the other is left independent" (295). Problematically, the independence from an authority that Spinoza alludes to here would seemingly foreclose the possibility of forming larger collectivities, crowds, or multitudes. Dependency on other bodies in mind and body seems necessary for both state power and for multitudes. Politics is always embodied, and describes the constitutive relationship between bodies, not a secondary one.

Ironically perhaps, Spinoza will later argue that "without mutual help men can hardly support life," and moreover "men in the state of nature can hardly be independent" (Political *Treatise* 296). Spinoza defines this mutual help as protecting themselves, defending cultivated land, and repelling violence. His description of mutual actions that "support life," then, are explicitly biopolitical. This matters because crowds are then necessary formations for the survival of human groups. It is only then that Spinoza claims that bodies combined together possess these general rights, and that this 'state' is a "dominion." This dominion, whatever its form as democracy or monarchy, "is determined by the power of a multitude" (Spinoza 296-7). Spinoza is not just naturalizing the state or state-power. He is theorizing the virtual dimensions of crowd power by claiming that the nucleus of the state is, in fact the crowd. The dominion that extends its power from the multitude is a legitimate political authority because of the multitude; the state is a legitimate power because of the crowd. The biopower that Agamben critiques as a product of emergency powers in *The State of Exception* actually alerts us to the biopower immanent in all bodies – not an individual "right" co-extensive

with power, but a biopower from which sovereignty emerges. Putting aside terms like legitimacy and illegitimacy for a moment, which are products of liberal state theory, we can see that crowd creates the "state" of emergency as the ultimate affect machine. This state isn't so much an institutional *structure* as an embodied *duration* that coincides with the intelligent behavior of the crowd.

The Marxist interpretation of the multitude wants to save it, however, for Marxism. The determining power of the multitude is what allows Warren Montag in *Bodies, Masses, Power* to champion Spinoza's attention to the "decisive role of the masses," and even "their insurrections, for any regime or form of government" (Montag 80). Montag is keen to note that Spinoza frequently refers to these decisive masses committing insurrections using Latin terminology that emphasized masses as *crowds,* and in particular the terms *vulgus, turba,* and *multitudo.* The names "often described entities composed of *plebs* organized for the purpose of engaging in threatening or openly violent behavior against their supporters" (Montag 76). Montag's definition, it should go without saying by now, again refers us to the state of emergency that crowds can create or intervene into, and, additionally, do so through sovereign biopower.

At the same time, Spinoza insists that subjects who attempt to "seize sovereign power, or to place it in different hands," are committing treason (Political *Treatise* 208). The crowd terrifies him. He claims that "the state must be preserved and directed by the sole authority of the sovereign" (Political *Treatise* 208). And yet Spinoza allows for the condition that if punishment for individual treason "were not to overtake him till he had succeeded, it would have often come too late, [since] the sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred already" (Political *Treatise* 208). A populist insurrection, then, is treason except

when it's successful. For Spinoza, the ethics of power ultimately depends on the effectiveness of revolution.

I maintain that the effective insurrection is physically a crowd. The crowd can be a violent mob or a non-violent one; it is always a question of tactics, codes, symbols, and thresholds. Crowds can act in the name of a state or party, or as a social movement. The force of the crowd, however, comes from the immediate assemblage of bodies, and the power of those bodies *in the present.* Crowd cognition operates at different speeds, by acting immediately or by planning to act. This notion dispels the long-running fear of crowds as mobs, present at times even in Spinoza, as irrational and unthinking. Bodies aren't stupid; irrationality is a term of derision that one applies to crowds that act for an idea *one does not agree with.*

The politicized crowd is solely capable of *immediately* making institutions adapt to demands, act with urgency, or repress those demands *in the present.* The crowd can act outside the checks and balances of democratic institutions. For this reason the crowd is uniquely capable of becoming a revolutionary collective: it has the physical power to overthrow governments, block transportation flows, create general strikes. Crowds embody Laclau's idea of populist groups articulating demands as autonomous agents and acting in the short-term. Following Laclau and Mouffe, crowds are the visible agents competing to represent the symbolic and political space of a heterogeneous and antagonistic public sphere.[19] This

[19] Some contemporary Marxist theory has called symbolic production and the manipulation of symbols "immaterial labor." Problematically, this theory has assigned immaterial labor a "time" of dominance in the present. Immaterial labor in the industrial era is still the production of codes, signs, texts, information, and the rest. Immaterial labor isn't, then, *post-Fordist:* it is not a temporal distinction, but a descriptive one (otherwise, can there have been a pre-Fordist immaterial labor?). Hardt and Negri's description of immaterial labor includes service work, intellectual labor, and cognitive labor. They also say it has two principle forms, intellectual/symbolic and affective labor.

competition occurs both for symbols and for bodies. Both states and political groups seek control of symbols that unite bodies, but also those symbols that can *excite those bodies to act.*

The inevitable antagonism between opposite populist positions within states further recalls the primary importance of friend-enemy distinctions that Laclau and Mouffe extend from Schmitt's concept of the political, which is to say his concept of the biopolitical. For Schmitt political cultures also depend on conflict. "For as long as a people exists in the political sphere," he writes in *The Concept of the Political,* "this people must…determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy. Therein lies the essence of its political existence" (Schmitt 49). The state must intensify in bodies that willingness to die or kill for it among its constituents. The creation of an enemy is therefore necessary. This political sphere underlines that concept of an affective "state," or intensified duration, that excites bodies to sacrifice themselves or destroy others. When Spinoza considers a multitude that can overthrow the state in revolution, however tepid and contradictory Spinoza could feel at such a prospect, he too implies the prospect of such a state. "It is clear that the right of the supreme authorities," Spinoza writes, "is nothing else than simple natural right, limited, indeed, by the power, not of every individual, but of the multitude, which is guided, as it

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For them, intellectual labor produces ideas, symbols, codes, texts, linguistic figures, and images. For them, affective labor produces or "manipulates" feelings of unease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion. Hardt and Negri claim that both intellectual and affective labor are immaterial to the extent their *products* are immaterial, not their labor. I choose not to use their term immaterial because of the confusion it inspires for any "New Materialisms" I'm more sympathetic towards – Grosz's in particular. In their writing, however, Hardt and Negri equate immaterial labor (the production of *immaterial* products) with biopolitical labor (the production of social life). It seems reasonable to keep "biopolitical" in the Foucauldian sense. Biopolitical labor corresponds to the production and maintenance of social relations, or what this dissertation calls social reproduction.

were, by one mind" (Political *Treatise* 301). Echoing McDougall's idea of a group mind, this "one mind" that spreads through many bodies retraces the group psychology of Laclau's populism. The one mind is the mind that operates collectively at fast speeds. It is the mind of crowd cognition and collective intelligence. It is the expression of a singularity among a multiplicity of bodies. It is the embodied collective consciousness of the crowd.

The singular consciousness of the crowd explains the capacity of crowds to act as legitimate oppositions to state regimes under the sign of "the people." It expresses the necessity of state power to excite in its citizens the sovereign biopower that it uses as the basis of its own legitimacy. This excitation can occur through various kinds of excitement machines that use symbols and language as codes that structure the potential actions of crowd ecstasy.[20] Yet the autonomy of affect and the emergence of collectives, of virtual crowds, cannot give any state absolute control over bodies; whatever control exists is temporary. The state can hope to control the leveling instinct of crowd power. The structures of the state must, by necessity, thus create enemies in order to prevent *themselves* from becoming that enemy. Populism is not so much the logic of linguistics and signs, as it

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As we shall see in chapter three, I would argue that the production of this ecstatic state means that
we have traverse the theory of religious bodily states to fully understand what takes place in these moments. In *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy,* Mircea Eliade writes that the "shamanic ecstasy could be considered a reactualization of the mythical *illud tempus* when men could communicate *in concreto* with the sky" (499). For Eliade, then, the intensification of affect in the body derives from some previous mythical state when bodies and "the sky" were coupled together. "The technique of ecstasy," he writes, was in fact due to the role shamans played in collectives (507). They played "an essential role in the defense of the psychic integrity of the community…In a general way, it can be said that shamanism defends life, healthy, fertility, and the world of 'light,' against death, diseases, sterility, disaster, and the world of 'darkness'" (508-9).

I would of course argue that biopolitics necessitates its owns shamnanic spectacles, but I would also insist that crowds themselves produce ecstasy, too. It is more than pertinent that Elide describes the shamanic séance as something akin to the intensification of crowd sensations for the purposes of action: the crowd, too, makes "the world in which *everything seems possible,* where the dead can return to life and the living die only to live again, where one can disappear and reappear instantaneously, where the 'laws of nature' are abolished, and a certain superhuman 'freedom' is exemplified and made dazzlingly *present"* (Eliade 511).

is for Laclau, as it is an expression of how any number of culturally specific symbols and codes continually work to program nervous systems into sovereign excitement. The state, in this argument, must too produce enemies in order to prevent free acts from emerging from collective bodies. The threat of the enemy is enough to regulate bodies in the name of the state. Institutions can act as complex affect and code machines, handling directives and missives about the right channels and the right times to excite bodies – like electoral cycles, political campaigns, advertising campaigns, and commercial sports arenas.

States, Multitudes, and Democracies: Crowd Sovereignty

The project to incorporate what Negri calls a "subversive" Spinoza into contemporary discussions of post-Marxism requires us to reconsider the role of the state as a mediating power between collectives competing for hegemonic influence, and also as the power of 'last resort' among them – that is, the largest power with the *most* sovereignty, and thus the entity most able to employ the legitimate use of force. State sovereignty and the use of force is at odds with a multitude that must, in turn, claim the right to potentially overthrow the state on its own. In *Subversive Spinoza,* Negri asserts that Spinoza's general claims in the *Theological-Political Treatise* are in fact claims about early capitalism and modernity, and that "the fabric of the problem is that of a mass society in which individuals are equal from the viewpoint of right and unequal from the viewpoint of power" (Subversive 14). It is noteworthy that this could be one of several moments where Negri might move Spinoza's discussions about the relationship between multitudes and the state into a Marxist discourse about class conflict. Negri's argument rests here, however, on a discourse of rights

and equality indebted to constitutional liberalism and social contract theory. His direction does not take us to a dead end, though.

This is because Negri breaks into a different line of discourse when he writes that the "revolutionary character" of Spinoza's "political proposal consists in the conjuncture of the concept of democracy and a radical and constructive theory of natural right" (Subversive 9). The natural right he refers to here differs from the idea of constitutional rights critiqued in the previous section on Grosz and Bergson, for it focuses on Spinoza's insistence that individual and collective bodies *naturally* have the power to act; it is an immanent power that emerges from bodies, not one granted to them. Further, a multitude's power to act is in direct proportion to its ability to do so.

This is consistent with Spinoza's articulation of political power. In the *Theological-Political Treatise,* Spinoza writes that we must conceive "every individual to be conditioned by nature, so as to live and act in a certain way" (Political *Treatise* 200). Using the example of fish, Spinoza writes that the greater fish "devour the less by sovereign natural right" (Political *Treatise* 200). Returning to his idea of nature more generally, Spinoza explains that "her right is co-extensive with her power" (Political *Treatise* 200). In the *Political Treatise,* Spinoza complements his discussion of right and power by theorizing the power that comes from combinations of bodies. "If two come together and unite their strength," he writes, "they have jointly more power, and consequently more right over nature than both of them separately, and the more there are that have so joined in alliance, the more right they all collectively will possess" (Political *Treatise* 296). As Warren Montag glosses in his explication of this claim, Spinoza insists that any understanding of sovereign power and natural right concern itself with the ways bodies combine together.

More than this, Spinoza is also theorizing that natural right arises from complex social assemblages as much as individuals, and that the sovereignty of natural right is in fact dependent upon the ability of bodies to act, to move, and to labor. "Inasmuch as the power of nature is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her individual components," Spinoza writes in *Political Treatise,* "it follows that every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can" (206). From this passage we can confidently assert that the behavior and actions of all bodies possess degrees of natural right, and natural right is the condition by which we assert their sovereignty. In democratic and representative government, we at first believe that what subjects symbolically transfer to representatives by voting is exactly this sovereignty. But just as our critique of freedom in the discussions by Grosz and Bergson required us to stop seeing freedom as a property of subjects, here too we must critique electoral democracy as *only* the symbolic transfer of sovereignty for the purposes of law and representation. The real body of the representative, however powerful, cannot actually strip the subject's body from its natural right. Natural right is an expression by bodies, not subjects. To the same degree that acts contain the capacity for varying degrees of freedom, so too behaviors possess varying degrees of natural right – and, quite potently, those degrees of natural right depend on the combinations of bodies moving together. The more bodies in a crowd, the more potential sovereignty it has if those bodies act.

So for Spinoza, the ability to act with force multiplies as bodies unite into ever-greater formations and collectives: the larger the body, as a collective of many bodies, the more power those bodies have, and thus the more natural right they have. Montag follows Pierre Macherey and Pierre-Francois Moreau in arguing that the combined power of bodies – what Macherey calls strikingly "assemblages" – form collectivities that "themselves comprise individuals, or singularities, that are no less real than human individuals" (Montag

69). The "specific character" of these singular collectivities, the "ingenium" Moreau emphasizes from Spinoza, "are what makes them what they are and no other" (Montag 69). This *ingenium* can define a crowd or a nation. It is what makes the crowd a singular multitude.

While sovereignty and natural right is co-extensive with the power of crowds and states, there is no reason that those desires should correspond to the desires of other collectivities, states, or crowds. With Schmitt and Negri in mind, it is worth noting that Montag resists any reading that would legitimize, for example, a clerical regime that forces its way into power and thus claims its right to do so based retrospectively on the success of that force. "While a regime may 'possess' absolute right to do all that it pleases by law or in theory," Montag infers, "no regime actually exercises absolute power" (Montag 66). The logic here is vaguely a faulty predicate: since there is no such thing as unlimited natural right in Spinozist politics, no government can claim to be completely legitimate.

While this affirms the "absolute" horizon of Spinoza's natural right, it doesn't negate that the clerical coup Montag exemplifies is *more* legitimate than not, given that it did successfully claim power. Montag continues, though, by declaring that "absolute power can be nothing more than a juridical fiction," and "one more example of a legal right that can never be actualized" (Montag 66). Yet along this line of argumentation that stresses the degrees of freedom and natural right, all power is somewhat conditioned by this "fiction." All juridical power depends upon claims to sovereignty that aren't "one" with the symbolic power of the law. Montag goes onto claim that the right to property is another example of a legal right that can never be actualized. Indeed, Spinoza himself maintains that "contracts or laws, whereby the multitude transfers its right to one council or one man, should without doubt by broken, when it is expedient for the general welfare to do so" (Political *Treatise* 311).

The instability Montag assigns to the mythical clerical regime and the state's fictive claims to protect property both rest here, though, on any one state or regime's claim to "absolute power." Yet the symbolic power of all political authority is actually indeterminate, as Laclau argued, and as we know from the nature of the linguistic sign. So while it matters when Montag turns to Spinoza's arguments in the *Political Treatise* that tyrannical regimes cannot by nature last long because they will produce indignation in their populations, the example is still one that depends upon the most extreme form of absolute power: tyranny. The underlying logic of the tyrannical coup as an assemblage that produces opposite affect in opposed bodies is consistent with discussion here as a whole. This tension also suggests that positive feelings for a state regime, whether for an authoritarian or a democratic one, play a not insignificant role in sustaining power overtime.

Yet it is somewhere between the absolute power of a regime and a teleological liberation by a universal Multitude that the real of Spinozist politics would seemingly become visible. Montag's qualification about the ultimate instability of tyrannical regimes points to the same basic ambiguity found in Spinozist natural right that defies Negri's contention about Multitude. Spinoza understands the notion of right and power as 'perfection' in *Ethics.* Perfection is a way to say that right is co-extensive with power, and that all that happens is, in fact, ethical. This right of power is then inherently *un-ethical,* for some, in *Ethics:* it *is,* as opposed to *should be.* The clerical coup Montag imagines has every right to seize power, just as an ambitious crowd does to, say, storm the Bastille or form a Paris commune. Even as this idea of natural right embodies the notion of sovereignty into all bodies, it does not imply that any one collectivity might act towards a teleological end, such as communism, or lead to the 'withering away of the state' famously formulated by Marx. Indeed, for better or worse, Spinoza never imagines a political culture without the state. The

tension in Negri's dual assertion of Spinoza's "constructive theory of natural right" on the one hand and his "unequal" individuals from the viewpoint of power on the other speaks, in fact, to the profound ambiguity in Spinoza about the politics of liberation. Spinoza's notion of right co-extensive with power, by contrast, could arguably apply as easily to plantation slave-masters and corporate executives.

Indeed, the inequality of power in Spinoza's political project is a function of what he calls "human bondage" in *Ethics*. His theory of natural right is much more ambivalent than constructive. True, this ambivalence rests upon Spinoza's conception of the multitude as a *potential* agent of force for or against the state. This is the immanent collective subject nestled in Hardt and Negri's Multitude, and recalls the power in Spinoza Negri translates in *The Savage Anomaly* as *potentia*. For Negri, power as *potentia* arises from the natural right of multitudes, to which he opposes *Potestas,* or the power of the state or "command." Following the discussion of natural right above, though, this *potentia* – like populism – is as ambiguous as the politics of any given multitude. As an immanent possibility within the state (or potentially within capitalism), it does denote the power of bodies to act together. Yet Spinoza's multitude much more resembles the war machine of Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* that move in packs than it does a revolutionary Multitude composed of multiplied and converging networks acting in resistance. *Potentia* can create and sustain *Potestas* as often as not.

This ambivalence in Spinoza is what allowed Leo Strauss, for one, to find so much commonality in his reading of Carl Schmitt and Spinoza, even as Schmitt was writing during the rise of the Nazi party. The production of the enemy depended upon creating a love for the state that solidified its power. Strauss found this idea in Spinoza's critique of religion in

Theological-Political Treastise, and was able to merge that critique with Schmitt because the 'religion of the state' would replace religion per se. The ability to manufacture this reading from Spinoza cannot be so easily disavowed, in part because it speaks directly to the ambiguous populism that extends from natural right and the necessity of a strong state in Spinozist politics. Granted, Spinoza believes that the object of the state is human freedom. In part, the state must secure that freedom for bodies because of the conflicts naturally occurring among bodies all seeking their own joy, which Spinoza proposes is the natural desire of bodies in *Ethics.* The state, in that reading, must produce affects of love and hate in order best to manage bodies that might become affectively excited by other agents, whether religious or political, and which might pull the state apart and thereby inflict harm on the state's ability to manage life.

The strong state in Schmitt might be one extreme point of potential for politically excited bodies that can arise from a Spinozist politics. The fascist structure of the state is the ultimate populist state of "one mind." In his own arguments about fascism in *Politics and Ideology in Marixst Theory,* Laclau poses this same interdependency between populism and fascism in his review of Ortega y Gasset's reflections on fascism: "It asserts authoritarianism and organizes rebellion…It seems to pose itself as the forge of a strong State, and uses means most conducive to its dissolution" (Marxist *Theory* 81). In contrast to theories of fascism that emphasize its authoritarian character, Laclau's discussion focuses on "mass mobilization" required for fascism to come to power and its character as a "mass regime" afterwards" (Marxist *Theory* 88). In our terms, the excess affect created by excited bodies would be reinforced back into the state's affect machines, and structured according to the strictest possible codes of enemy production. This authoritarian threat of fascism is present in the privileged role that the sovereign plays in Spinoza's imagination of monarchy, which

Spinoza conceives along side democracy and aristocracy. More generally, the sovereign's individual body as a locus of state power is extremely influential for Spinoza's own imagination of political power. Fascism is the amplification of bodies' ecstatic sovereign threshold to a point of permanent war. Besides creating a surplus of enemy production codes and apparatuses for affect capture and extraction, the fascist state attempts to annihilate both other crowds and the potential for other crowds. It recodes the affect of state symbols so that all bodies that don't coincide with its referents cannot be allowed to survive. It does this by justifying its actions as acts of survival.

The fascist potential in Spinoza's state deepens our ambivalence about both natural right and the necessity of state power, and delimits the ultimate expression of the multitude as populist: the mass mobilization of fascism, too, derives from "populist reason." Laclau appeals to this in *Politics and Ideology* when he argues that the populist concept of "the people" provides a catachresis "for the ensemble of political and ideological relations of domination and not just the relations of production" (Marxist *Theory* 108). While for Laclau the class struggle overdetermines the hegemonic competition operating among collectivities claiming to represent "the people," the class struggle is nonetheless given "coherence" by "presenting its class objectives as the consummation of popular objective" (Marxist *Theory* 109). Laclau argues that the mass mobilization of fascism depended on interpellating bodies so that they would "remain disconnected from any socialist perspective…the German petty-bourgeoisie which was experiencing in a confused way the post-war crisis, the iniquity of the Versailles Treaty, inflation, foreign occupation, etc, was interpellated by nazism [sic] as a *race* (Marxist *Theory* 120). From his interpretation, we might in turn summarize the multitude's potential to become fascist as one when the friend-enemy distinction has intensified to the maximum extent possible – in this case, with the racial purities of Third Reich.

The multitude's connection to fascism as a *populist horizon* is possible because the multitude's capacity for sovereign acts – to kill and die – stems from the ability of affect machines to excite the intensity thresholds of bodily nervous systems. Furthermore, following Laclau, autonomous affects circulate differently in growing or contracting economic cycles or during periods of material scarcity. The sudden disappearance of affect machines – such as stimulating products possible to purchase during periods of expanding credit – can also cause homeostatic "withdrawal" effects in bodies and populations. This is audible in Laclau's reference to inflation and the general economic crisis of post-war Germany, which hit the working class hardest. It is here that, among many potential places, Spinoza intersects with Marx, though triangulated through Laclau's implied logic of affect.

The fascism of the 1920s and 1930s evolved from a volatile and sad post-war period. The depression was unprecedented, in economic and historical terms, and so was the German response. It isn't simply that the "lack of articulation of popular interpellations with socialist discourse left [the working class] flank increasingly exposed to the ideological influence of fascism" (Marxist *Theory* 128). The interpellation of ideology by subjects must be understood as a phenomenon of a Spinozist affects that intensified the potential for crowd formation. It is the ambiguity of political responses to homeostatic readjustments in populations that allows bodies to become excited by the left or right, and that allowed the German working class to fall under the "influence" of fascism. It is exactly when the circulation of affects during expansive economic cycles conclude that the homeostatic systems of bodies try to compensate for the loss of joy. Strangely, we may have to consider here that the ultimate joy is in fact the sovereign excitement that creates the ecstatic intensities of life and death. This same sensation that allows one to die for a symbolic collective, a crowd, is the same one that allows one to kill for it. To reach that point of

expansion, to connect with other bodies in such a vast assemblage, the body must inevitably feel a kind of joy. The sovereign excitement, then, is one of ecstasy – while the crowd lasts, or while the body lives. For the Germans, the fascist multitude became a war machine for the state: its *potentia* formed into *Potestas.* The success of seizing power by the Nazi party extended the power of the bodies under its "influence" and increased, in turn, their natural right. It gave them, at first, joy. In his book *Political Affect,* John Protevi calls this "fascist joy" (Protevi 50). And true to Spinoza's formulation of sad affects in *Ethics,* this joy ultimately destroyed the excited bodies that felt it.

We can theorize that the Nazi bodies acting within fascist Germany did so within the framework of Spinozist natural right. The production of power that arose from those bodies was situational and historically specific, but all the same depended on a definite relationship to the circulation of positive and negative affects. Their intensity depended on the affect machines by which that intensity could be sustained and reproduced through media and other bodies, and by the larger economic reality that over-determined the joy or sadness of the state. This point of convergence between Spinozist affect and Marxism's insistence on the primary role of the economic in bodily life positions the Spinozist multitude closer to Laclau's "people" than to Marx's proletariat. Bodies that exist in poverty might not be ready collectivities for Marxist-style liberation because the circulation of affects might create a love for the state, as in Nazi Germany, or a love *for a particular collective,* such as a political party. The multitude that might act out a revolutionary campaign against the state, or capitalism, might be simply the collectivity where the circulation of negative affects about the state excites those bodies to act against it.

As ambiguous as the multitude might be in Spinoza, because *it can be excited against the state* it potentially has the power to overturn government. And because it is a contingent multiplicity and not simply a transcendent laboring class, it offers a better way to explain the formation of real revolutionary collectives. A revolution would thus take place when the natural right of a particular crowd coincides with its ability to create biopolitical joy. To achieve immediate power in a revolutionary time, while the duration of the encoded affects are still intense and exciting, the multitude must form a crowd. The excited crowd that occupies the physical structures and spaces of power does so because it believes it can be happier there, and thus will throw the old bodies out. There is not reason to believe, though, that this crowd will be communist – or "democratic." For Spinoza, it will be whatever makes its bodies most joyful, and that joy is above all located *in the body*.

The State and Revolution of Human Bondage

Politics works affectively. "Everyone is drawn away by his pleasures," Spinoza writes, "while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and the like so engross the mind that reason has no place therein" (Political *Treatise* 204). These affects are central to the "laws of his desire" that will determine how bodies order their lives (Political *Treatise* 201). Likewise, Spinoza acutely reveals that "men are more led by blind desire, than by reason" (Political *Treatise* 292). Communism, for Spinoza, is not teleological. It must bring joy, not equality. Communism must be necessary. The multitude that acts as a crowd to overthrow a government must excite bodies with the intensity of material joy. Almost by definition, the logic of the body insists that this would more likely occur in a period of relative deprivation. Moreover, the time of the multitude is *the present*. The time joyful affects spend 'in' the body recalls the

"short-term" duration of political actors mentioned in Laclau: the time of revolution is not a time to come, as Negri writes, but a time of coincidence between real power and intense excitement. It is the time of crowds. Consequently, this power and excitement are the locus of Spinoza's political anthropology. For Spinoza, the problems of the state and revolution are not problems that originate in the state's relation to bodies, but in the human body itself, and its capacity to be excited by the affects.

Spinoza attends to this conflict between affects and the body in *Ethics,* which must be read alongside the *Political Treatise* in order to locate a politics out of either. The reason the body is so central to this project is because, as Negri himself argues, "human passions [are] the sole effective reality upon which political analysis can operate" (Subversive 14). These bodily passions are of the affects, but Spinoza argues that the affects most often capture bodies in what he calls "human bondage." It is only by using "reason" within this bondage that a body can come to know and love "God," and thus live without injury to others. It is through Spinoza's valorization of God that we can come to understand that much of what is politically necessary for Spinoza, including the state and sovereign, occurs because knowing God is so difficult and rare. Knowing God produces the ultimate affects of blessedness and glory, which come from this love for God. Knowing God is the achievement of the *Ethics,* and it is only when each individual knows and loves God that natural right and equality become equivalent, for it is only then that each participates in the general intellect, which is to say, it is only when all feel blessedness and glory and intellectual love that the *bodily* affects pale by comparison. It is at this point that the self-interest of each coincides with the self-interest of all. Multitudes – crowds – in Spinoza do not seem actually liberating because they cannot produce blessedness and glory. This argument may not be the same for us.

Knowing God is Spinoza at his most utopian, and also at his most liberal. He is quick to clarify that without God the affects of bondage generally dominate. Loving God allows one to contemplate the body from a vantage that acknowledges death and the transience of the body, its affects, and its passions. The perception of the body's mortality is one of the key perceptions necessary to love and know God. Spinoza writes that for those that love God, they "hardly fear death" and are affected less by "evil" affects (Ethics 178). Even as one recognizes that the body dies along with consciousness and memory, the mind can contemplate its commonness with God "under a species of eternity." This intellectual love is not the same as those that come from bodily affects, because "only while the body endures is the mind subject to affects which are related to the passions" (Ethics 176). Since they come from a knowledge that cannot change, the affects of blessedness, glory, and intellectual love are permanently accessible affects. They contrast with the transient duration of the other bodily affects. It is important, first, that the love of God lessens the affects of fear that surround death. Second, this fearless attitude toward death plays back into Spinoza's multitude in ways perhaps crucial for our arguments about sovereign joy.

For now, what distinguishes the affects of human bondage is their volatility, their movement, their speed and duration, and their continuous flows – it is these very qualities, after all, that separates them from the sense of "eternity" – a sense that *is,* for Spinoza, God's love. Spinoza writes that "we live in continuous change," where bodies are dependent upon "external causes" for happiness" (Ethics 178). This continuous change corresponds to a flowing economy of affects, against which bodies constantly strive for increased power and more joy. Bodies strive toward increased power of action through the excitation of joyful affects. In this bondage, exchanging joyful affects with other bodies is an end for itself; one seeks out more power in one's own self-interest to experience more joy. "The more each

one strives, and is able, to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his being," Spinoza writes, "the more he is endowed with virtue" (Ethics 176). This passage underlines the problem of constantly expanding desires due to constantly expanding bodily constitutions, and suggests an infinite potential for human desires – and a problem for human bodies when they combine with technologies of mass extraction and energy production. "If men lived according to the guidance of reason, everyone would want to possess this right of his without injury to anyone else. But because they are subject to the affects, *which far surpass man's power,* or virtue, they are often draw in different directions and are contrary to one another" (Ethics 136, italics mine). This is Spinoza's challenge to Marx: "Man's *lack of power to moderate and restrain affects,"* he writes, "I call bondage" (Ethics 113, italics mine). This is the context for his aforementioned statement in the *Political Treatise* that "men are more led by blind desire, than by reason" (Ethics 292). This bondage works like fascism itself: it is ultimately self-destructive to bodies, even as it may, for a time, be expansively joyful.

It is here that Spinoza makes an intervention. The only affects stronger than desire, besides blessedness and glory, are love and *fear* of the state – this might be somewhat surprising. The individual's love of God is sub-ordinate to a larger combination of bodies, a larger collective. Spinoza writes that the multitude believes that "they are free to the extent that they are permitted to yield to their lust," and that they feel "bound to live according to the rule of divine law. Morality, then, and religion, and absolutely everything related to strength of character, they believe to be burdens" (Ethics 180). If the multitude knew that there was no reward to come in the afterlife, Spinoza writes, they would "prefer to govern all their actions according to lust" (Ethics 180). One can read here the necessity of the state, since the threat of sovereign force becomes the check on the lust that underwrites human desire. "In order that men may be able to live harmoniously, it is necessary for them to give

up their natural right and make one another confident that they will do nothing which could harm others," he adds (Ethics 136). Poignantly, the state is necessary not only because of the difficulty of loving God, but because the state must produce embodied ideologies that use an anxiety about death to offset a virtual nightmare of existential decadence. "Society has the power to prescribe a common life by [making] threats," he writes (Ethics 136). In other words, the state must use fear and the threat of death to control the infinite desires of bodies.

In a continuation of this argument in his *Political Treatise,* he writes that subjects are dependent upon the commonwealth "as they fear its power or threats, or as they love the civil state" (Ethics 304). The state must produce stronger affects than those of lust and desire, whether through fear or love. The purpose of multitudes is to make revolutions against bad states, but not to extinguish them. It must create affect machines of patriotism and encode its affect production with friend-enemy distinctions. The production of these stronger affects by the state fall to the sovereign, whether as the democratically elected head of state or as the monarch. Spinoza writes in the *Political Treatise* that a free multitude is better than one ruled by fear, however, and thus a commonwealth must "direct affairs in the best way" by channeling the multitude's love of the civil state. Since Spinoza believes "men's natural passions are everywhere the same," a commonwealth where laws are broken must be a "bad state of dominion," and blamed on the state itself. The state must constantly evoke a love of itself, then. This love must rely on bodily affects, and therefore the sovereign's capacity to produce joyful affects becomes essential to the preservation of the commonwealth. The intense production of positive affects for the state seems to be a necessary project for the sovereign. The real project of the sovereign is to become the symbolic referent of the state and the strongest affect machine – and its most powerful encoder.

The general problem of inspiring love of the civil state as a preferable mode of power over the multitude allows us to pause on the political relation of the crowd and the sovereign. In short, both the sovereignty of the state and the multitude are a continuous problems in Spinoza. If we acknowledge that a strong sovereignty of a free state might be necessary to counter the bodily affects, even one that can "compel men by force," we also run into the problem of how sovereign power works to produce strong and joyful affects: how it creates a state religion (Ethics 204).

We must always recall, though, that the multitude's power of consent in any commonwealth depended on the multitude's own ability to use of force. The ultimate sign of illegitimate power for the liberal state, then, is the visibility of large crowds opposed to it. "A commonwealth is always in greater danger from its citizens than from its enemies," Spinoza writes (Treatise 343). This danger from citizens speaks to the power of the multitude's capacity to wage a war of natural right against the state. Even for a commonwealth Spinoza imagines as a monarchy, Spinoza simultaneously argues that the proper condition of the multitude is mandatory conscription in militias. All citizens "are to be bound to have arms," just as all citizens are to share public property. The armed citizens must want to die for the state, Spinoza writes, as a condition of monarchy: "the multitude may preserve under a king an ample enough liberty, if it [is] preserved by the defense of the multitude itself" (Treatise 344). The sovereign must inspire the multitude to kill for him or her, and short of that the sovereign has failed the test of civil love, of sovereign joy.

This domain of killing is what Carl Schmitt saw as *the* concept of the political: he claimed that the possibility of dying and the reality of death was the only way to ensure civic *responsibility*. Like Spinoza, Schmitt understood the intense role that death must play as a

concept that produces very strong affects. The symbol for extinction, its repetition as a concept, the invocation of anti-life: this is the ultimate limit for encoded affect. It is the reason bodies have biopolitical thresholds. It is the reason crowds intersect with biopolitics, with that joy, with that time of revolution: the animal must run or defend itself. The memories of matter in bodies *are emergencies*. The threshold for excited bodies is one that allows those bodies to overcome the fear of death. To overcome this fear of death without the use of reason implies a mass mobilization of bodies that would require a most intense form of love for the state, or else a fear of other states. It requires the collective intelligence of bodies in crowds.

To know God and to move in crowds is to not feel fear. When discussing the excited multitude, Spinoza famously said, "The mob is terrifying, if unafraid" (Political *Treatise* 144). In his description of loving God, Spinoza also said that knowledge meant not fearing death. In his discussion of how a single sovereign could maintain civil love, the test, as we've heard, is also just this willingness to die for the state. The affects that make death seem like a knowable "species of eternity" must be produced when the multitude overthrows the sovereign, or the state, or other crowds.

The sovereign joy that stimulates bodies into self-sacrifice would seemingly be related to the blessedness and glory of loving God, since they both concern the sensations of a collapse of the future into the present. The time to act is a time experience beyond life and it is the feeling that the body has actually escaped death by escaping time. The body operates so fast that the contemplation of death and its images is impossible – or least a negative meaning, an inhibitive meaning, to them. There is just a movement that thinks. Sovereign joy, its ecstasy, is a sensation of movement that folds and doubles back into consciousness to

produce collective consciousness, not individuated consciousness. The folding and doubling of crowd sensation arises in part from the loops that follow from the body's ability to move with other bodies. As Bergson writes in *Matter and Memory* and Mark Johnson writes in *The Meaning of the Body,* time is experienced *through movement.* Some crowds must feel themselves as extensions of the sovereign (when there is one), armies of "one mind," of one symbolic meaning. Or they must somehow experience in the movements of the crowd itself the affects that allow them to feel that the glory of "eternity" has arrived in the present. The crowd would feel that they know God, because knowing God is conditioned by knowing *time.*

Let us imagine that killing is the domain of the political, as Carl Schmitt claims, but let us imagine that the sovereign and the state must be made into the enemy. Spinoza does say the sovereign must fear the citizens the most. But he also says that "the king can be deprived of the power of ruling, not by the civil law, but by the law of war, in other words the subjects may resist his violence with violence" (Political *Treatise* 343). So we move on to the rest of the dissertation with this thought: the consent of the multitude rests upon its ability not to die for the sovereign, but to die for itself – that is, the "unafraid" crowd must be willing to sacrifice its bodies for another system. It seems the first and best choice would be sacrifice one's body to state violence to de-legitimize the state, and thereby expose the lack of consent between sovereign and subject. The next choice would be to decide whether one loved the crowd – and *its* life – enough to kill for it.

Chapter Three

Revolutionary Excitement and Pathological Regression in the Nineteenth Century African American Novel

If we are fully to explain the transition in attitudes about crowds in the African-American novel from Martin R. Delany's *Blake, Or the Huts of America* (1859-1862) to Charles Chesnutt's *The Marrow of Tradition* (1901), it is perhaps best we turn to the Civil War battlefield – the one in New York City. In July 1863, the wartime economy of the United States had stagnated. The sink into recession was felt keenly in New York City. The economic boom that accompanied the beginning of the war had given way to rapid inflation, sharp rises in the price of goods and services, and even resource scarcity – beef, rents, and coal were all up double-digits while the actual value of currency declined by a staggering 43%. The desperate crowds that first appeared a couple years earlier in Tomkins Square Park begging for food "to kepe us from starving," as Edwin G. Burrows and Mike Wallace recount in *Gotham: A History of New York City to 1898,* had turned into thousands of squatters living in the rocky ravine shanty towns above 50th street (Burrows and Wallace 883). The number of unions increased from 33 to 133 in just the previous year alone. Employers began to hire strike-breakers to defeat them. Three months earlier, in March, the Erie Hudson railroad hired African-Americans for just that purpose. White workers had begun to seriously racialize the labor crisis the previous year, when almost three thousand bodies in an Irish crowd threatened to burn the Watson and Lorillard tobacco factories to the ground. Only the arrival of the police kept them from starting the fires that would "roast the niggers alive" (Burrows and Wallace 884).

With the economic cycle continually withdrawing the commodities of social reproduction from hungry bodies, the appearance of Irish crowds that formed into agents of sovereign excitement can't surprise us much. In the draft riot frenzy that exploded into action in 1863, however, we can see briefly the signal event that would shape, perhaps more than any other, the tendencies of postwar American crowds to code affect by symbolically assigning the racialized body to the position of the "enemy" responsible for threatening the life of the collective.[21]

The collective intelligence that speeds and coordinates movements through 'crowd time' operates through bodily nervous systems evolved to act in emergencies, and to respond to affect thresholds intensified by threats to the survival of the collective. The excited movement of bodies can be explained, in part, by the collective genetic and cultural memory reproduced in bodies genetically and linguistically. I remind us of this because the politics of

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In *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930*, Stewart E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck write that the frequency of lynchings in the south during the decades in question fluctuated with the price of cotton. When cotton prices rose, lynchings decreased, and vice versa. The economic cycles allowed for virtual conditions that would produce the lynching as a particular kind of crowd. Although their work is specific to a historical period and specific collectives, I argue that their findings support the general assertions I'm making in this dissertation. Economic conditions over-determine crowd formation, but particularly violent crowds.

Their analysis of "mob violence" against African Americans in the south could reasonably describe some of the characteristics of Irish crowds during the Civil War Draft Riots. About southern lynchings, Tolnany and Beck write that lynch violence served four functions: "1) to eradicate specific persons accused of crimes against the white community; 2) as a mechanism of state-sanctioned terrorism designed to maintain a degree of leverage over the African-American population; 3) to eliminate or neutralize African-American competitors for social, economic, or political rewards; and (4) as a symbolic manifestation of the unity of white supremacy (50). I would argue that functions 1, 3, and 4 are all much closer to why lynchings took place. The second reason seems to identify why the federal government and state governments allowed local lynchings to take place (and thus an unidentified reason would be that those governments allowed the lynchings to take place to maintain their own legitimate representation over the white communities practicing lynching). Besides drawing an historical comparison to the Civil War Draft Riots, my intention here is to announce that Tolnay and Beck have produced another generalized description about why sovereign crowds act in the first place: to eliminate competitors in the environment during periods of perceived scarcity. In short, it is not just that their book historicizes the real theoretical economic conditions for crowd formation, but that they have theorized the very reasons why crowds kill.

crowd movements are almost always flowing from a system designed in scarcity. Therefore the politics of the collective moment activates an organic, evolutionary system that conflates scarcity and the threat of scarcity into behaviors meant to destroy other bodies. While these systems and commands do not operate in all bodies because of cultural and genetic diversity, the state of emergency they create in populations is meant to excite all the bodies it can. For the right codes to make enough bodies move, though, those bodies must be brought closer to the threshold by affect machines.

The draft riots are a good example of the autonomy and semi-autonomy of affects circulating prior to crowd formation. They also give us a glimpse into how bodies move together in swarms to redirect resource flows back toward their own collectives, and how the production of the enemy is a symbolic necessity for the crowd so that behaviors, once they are working at quick speeds, will nonetheless act to stabilize resources to sustainable, homeostatic flows and also reinforce affect production to try and affect more bodies outside the crowd. They also explain how the collective, "swarm" intelligence of bodies makes crucial distinctions about the symbolic targets of its violence. The horror of crowd violence, even in the Draft Riots, cannot obscure from us that their logic echoes the "leveling instinct" Laclau sought to emphasize in Rudé 's commentary of the French food riots. They also give us insight into the code and affect production that makes crowds more likely to materialize.

For example, the recently passed National Conscription Act (1863) that said one could pay for a draft substitute was not popular, and certainly not in New York. This act itself was a technology of affect production; it was an affect machine, but no one from Lincoln's Republican government planned to work the way it did. The fact that it provoked

such negatively encoded affects in the body, such as hate and resentment and indignation, helps us to understand that the autonomy of affect depends in part on its encoding, but also in part on interpretation. The justification of the Conscription Act as a public necessity was illegitimate to working-class New Yorkers both because they were being asked to *die* and because the class logic of the substitution exposed the fiction of equal national sacrifice. As such, the state made a life or death demand of its working-class that it was not making of its elite. Democrat Politicians like Governor Seymour rallied against it; in a mass protest meeting on July 4, he said "Remember this – that the bloody and treasonable and revolutionary doctrine of public necessity can be proclaimed by a mob as well as by a government" (Burrows and Wallace, 888). The mass protest rally opened a further vector into the virtual potential of the crowd, and Governor Seymour's recoding of sovereign right from a property of the Republican party to one of the Democratic party actually here proclaimed the very logic of Spinozist natural right that we considered in the introduction: sovereignty belongs to bodies, not states.

During the actual start to the morning draft reading, the volunteer firemen of the Black Joke Engine Company No. 33 arrived and destroyed all evidence they had been drafted. They stoned the building, broke the draft wheel, and set fire to the building. Word of their actions reached both the police and the populations in the tenements. It is at this point that we can see the draft "riots" properly begin. Notice that in *Gotham* Burrows and Wallace cannot help but conflate the agent of the riots, the crowd, with its status as a description of many bodies moving: "Tremendous numbers of people poured out of the tenements. Crowd members began to isolate the area, cutting down telegraph poles that connected local police precincts to the Central Office" (Burrows and Wallace 889). Notice the overlapping speeds that describe the behavior of the crowd. Burrows and Wallace rightly

reach for 'flow' verbs ("poured"), which act on one speed, and then break down movements into verbs that signify slower amounts of time ("began to isolate"). They then go on to describe how the crowds directed their actions against "targets identifiable as Republican" (Burrows and Wallace 889). Among other attacks, they would act against Brooks Brothers, German clothing stores on Grand street, and the like. They beat the police and stationed soldiers. As the strikes against symbolic targets continued, city officials begged for Federal intervention and the declaration of marital law.

It was at this point that the crowds became the source of new crowds. A reinforcing cycle of violent behavior and movements became its own affect machine. The crowds attacked African-Americans and their houses next, in what Burrows and Wallace call a "day of atrocities" (Burrows and Wallace 895). Indeed, the hangings, drownings, murders, and mutilations against African-Americans and black men in particular are as well documented as any other aspect of the riots, and have come to play a large part in our contemporary public memory of them. Should the attacks have concentrated *solely* on symbols and bodies of *class,* such as the "hated grain elevators" burned in Brooklyn by ex-employees, the riots might be remembered as ambiguously understandable, or even romanticized (like later labor strikes) (Burrows and Wallace 895). The atrocities committed by the working-class Irish in particular still shock us, in part, though, because they were 'ordinary' persons committing the violence, and because the specter of racial difference in historical memory can over-determine what events 'mean.' Calling the Civil War draft crowds a "riot" removes from them, as with any crowd, their collective agency and intelligence.

Part of the national and civic response to the riots was to establish the Merchants' Committee for the Relief of the Colored People, which handed out clothing and alms to

thousands of black workers. The Republican Party also gave the African-Americans of New York guns, and by December the Twentieth Regiment United States Colored Troops marched through the same city streets where the attacks had occurred. By March of the next year the Regiment fired off their bayonets in a gigantic rally in Union Square. By that time the national economy had recovered and a "war boom…roared on" in New York City (Burrows and Wallace 899). In short, the answers to the autonomous affects of scarcity were affects of credit. Burrows and Wallace write that the war was now "offering countless ways of making fabulous amounts of money" (Burrows and Wallace 899). Congress legalized trading with the confederates for cotton; the Homestead Act created enormous supplies of credit in land speculation, and allowed for the working-class to emigrate west; and stock manipulation "reached new heights" led by corporate frauds, massive speculations in currency markets, and insider-trading from private ownership of the telegraph lines.

Several elements of the Draft Riots should give us pause as we reflect on their meaning for the representation of crowds in the African-American novel. The first is that the July crowds in 1863 New York were ones that Spinoza would have immediately recognized as a dangerous multitude. However intelligent we might see the crowd's collective action as being intelligent, its vicious acts of mutilation and violence against target bodies that posed no real dangers to the working-class Irish is significant. The crowd might have been logical to defy the Conscription Act during an era of deprivation, depression, and scarcity, but the only logic behind mutilating black men and attacking a black orphanage is the biopolitical one – and one whose technologies organized through larger spaces and longer times international law calls genocide. The failure of the economy to distribute the means of social reproduction to the various populations of New York created the conditions for the working-class Irish to try to exterminate a competitor collective, while at the same

time the "leveling instinct" saw thousands break the glass of class-specific stores and attack the symbols of the Republican war machine.

It must have been a tragic irony for New York's black population to become the symbols of hatred for the working-class Irish at the moment when black populations in the south were walking off the plantations. The lynchings during the riots would soon become a spectacle of terror for African-American populations all through the south in the decades to come. In her famous essays on the southern lynch mobs, Ida B. Wells would offer those black populations a variety of strategies other than joining the army, as they did in the Civil War, though she did note in *Southern Horrors* that armed black populations were not attacked in Jacksonville, Florida and Paducah, Kentucky. Her general strategy, however, was the creation of "healthier public sentiment" (Southern *Horrors* 68). She wrote that they "may employ the boycott, emigration, and the press" as counter-actions to white southern violence (Southern *Horrors* 72). Her emphasis on public sentiment here is striking, since it locates the circulation of affects as a route to nonviolent resistance. Her use of the word 'healthy' to describe that public sentiment is also very much connected to how intellectuals began evaluating the circulation of affects through the discourse of pathology and prescription – both discourses stemming from a medical literature attempting to describe healthy bodies. For our purposes in this, though, we must remember that it is Wells' conviction that politics and political resistance is always *embodied* and *transformed* by the affect machines and codes of a culture.

One aspect of African-American intellectual thought that did not change was just this recognition that public sentiment was the crucial field for political struggle. What became contested over the second half of the nineteenth century was exactly the conflict

raised by the Civil War Draft Riots: whether or not the technologies and strategies of democratic agency should include violent self-protection and organized crowds. So on the one hand, both Delany's *Blake* and Wells' *Southern Horrors* recognized that sovereignty and democracy did extend, ultimately, from the behavior of bodies and their combinations; Wells wrote that a "Winchester rifle should have a place of honor in every black home, and it should be used for that protection which the law refuses to give" (Southern *Horrors* (70). Yet by the time Chesnutt published *The Marrow of Tradition,* the entire concept of the crowd as violent swarm had become symbolic of white racial atrocities. The perverse behavior of white crowds became conflated with crowds themselves, just as socialist crowds became conflated with immigrant bodies at earlier moments of labor crisis.

The two novels by Delany and Chesnutt bookend events that drove the second half of the 19th century: the end of slavery and the juridical beginning of the Jim Crow regime. Along with its discussion of these two novels, the chapter will conclude with an explication of Paul Lawrence Dunbar's *The Sport of the Gods* (1902), which uses a pathologized discourse of affect to explain how the very same cultural prejudices against crowds became the basis for a prejudice against the autonomy of affects, and in particular their ability to create bodily behavior at faster speeds than we associate with self-control, which really means disciplining the body's capacity to think and move on its own. This self-control, by the turn of the century, was an element of both liberal political citizenship (the rational subject) and indicated the subject's mental health (Dunbar's argument is that urban environments over-stimulate bodies and produce too much autonomous affect).

In their divergent perspectives on crowd production and crowd control, the three novels tell a story about the way African-American fiction understood the political efficacy

of forming crowds, and how that notion changed from the middle of the 19th century to the turn of the century. By Chesnutt's time, black writers jettisoned the idea of the crowd as a political tool to confront threats to collective life as the post-Civil War liberal state became a *potential* source of security and protection, in part, I would argue, because of the protection it initially offered prior to the failure of Reconstruction in 1877. *The Marrow of Tradition* and *The Sport of the Gods* reflect this pessimistic turn. The liberating excitement of the slave revolt ended with the 14th amendment, but as the Ku Klux Klan and later lynch mobs grew in power, the idea of crowds became threatening, and identified with race riots and massacres. Like the elite social scientists who conceived transatlantic psychology and sociology in part in order to discredit socialism, African-Americans grew wary of crowds in the second half the nineteenth century, though for quite different reasons. Of all the chapters, this second chapter foregrounds the dialogic "discourse of affect" that fiction authors used to represent affect and its encoding into nervous systems. In particular, we will pay special attention to moments where the fiction theorizes the autonomy of affect as "contagion," a term many writers employed to signify the pathologically viral aspects of that autonomy.

The Social Network in *Blake*

Blake was published serially first in *The Anglo-African Magazine* (1859) and later in the *Weekly Anglo African Magazine* (1861-1862). In *Public Sentiments: Structures of Feeling in the Nineteenth Century,* Glenn Hendler notes that the novel's plot is little more than "serial acts of communication" across southern plantations by the eponymous protagonist Blake (Henry) (75). He mostly communicates his plan to organize slaves into an active revolt. We never actually hear the plan, nor see it manifest, and it doesn't ever actually happen (though the

novel unfortunately was never completed). *Blake* delineates a concept of black-national separatism consistent with Delany's views in his political treatise *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People in the United States, Politically Considered* (1852). In the closing pages of *Blake,* which take place in Cuba, an elite group of African-American men and women begin to organize a government, though one that's conspicuously framed as a bourgeois vanguard for the new black state. The shape of the revolt is less important than those serial acts of communication about how to spread a plan for them. These acts of communication constitute the distribution of the plan, but they are also the affect machines meant to start the insurrection. They are, to borrow from Hendler, "epistemologically, empty, but affectively full" (79). In other words, the plans are the empty referents mentioned in the introduction: they are the empty symbols designed to unify bodies into a crowd and then effect the insurrection that the crowd materializes to create. Laclau calls the catechesis of populism the very same empty referent meant to link the "signifying chains" together; that is, to provide a symbol capable of uniting different bodies together. Taking this claim further, I'd argue that the "affectively full" discourse Delany employs signals a kind of epistemological perspective about the way affect and revolution work. He theorizes *how* a revolutionary plan might circulate autonomously through oral slave networks in two senses: as both excitement and as content, as protocol and as affect machine.

Discourses about affect and its contagious qualities connect early modern political philosophers, like Spinoza, to nineteenth century political psychologists like Gustave Le Bon. The genealogical vocabulary for Delany's and Chesnutt's rhetoric on crowds came from transatlantic political philosophy about the necessity of the state as a sovereign powerbroker for a population otherwise engaged in a Hobbesian war of all against all. The threat of populations actually exercising their natural right of combination also grew out of the major

political events of eighteenth century state revolutions. This was particularly the case in Haiti, where the radical black population liberated itself from French administration. The specter of the Haitian revolution (1791-1804) famously echoed in subsequent political movements for equal rights and franchise in Europe and the United States, especially throughout the rise of socialist, abolitionist, and democratic movements in the middle of the 19th century. The Haitian revolution especially troubled southern white slave-owners because it challenged their racist contentions about the inferiority of black agency and the necessity of slavery. Representations, allusions, images, and narratives of the Haitian revolution also acted as affect machines for anxiety, guilt, and fear. These feelings were predominant in the white south because of the basic instability of the slave system.

Since the state system paid benefits in far greater proportion to the wealthy elite than to the working-class, the natural right of the crowd to act in its own name quickly meant that it became a sign of modern instability in new forms of republican government, even though it was usually in the last instance an expression of bodies caught in economic insecurity or indignation, such as the farmers in the Whiskey Rebellion or Shay's Rebellion. Therefore elite observers of the crowd came to conflate the class-based historical character of many crowds with behavior that could intensify into violence. Simultaneously, the appearances of more and more bodies assembled in cities and towns for factory work made many people see the crowd as a sign for both the progress and chaos associated with industrial capitalism. This was reinforced by the slow spread of unionization or worker combination before the Civil War, and definitely after it. In the context of industrialization and movements for representative democracy, the crowd doubled as an expression of popular sovereignty – an image of "the people" -- and as a threatening specter of class war. The French Revolution

haunted the nineteenth century European elite, and similarly the Haitian one haunted the southern American imaginations of slave-masters.

Nineteenth century newspaper, periodical, and political writing employed a crowd vocabulary deeply colored by the relative class interests of major newspapers, and in terms like rabble, mob, the multitude, and crowd, one can intuit a short history of attitudes toward franchise, state power, and class. The problem with crowd terms, as the aforementioned historian George Rudé has noted in *The Crowd In History,* is that they are "stereotypes" and "present the crowd as a disembodied abstraction and not as an aggregate of men and women of flesh and blood" (Rudé 9). Although here Rudé attempts to move beyond "mere patterns of behavior" when studying the crowd, we should be careful to note that his idea stereotype and abstraction seem to lead him back to place the individual body and its subject-ego at the center of his analysis (10). The crowd is really both an "aggregate" of men and women and also a singularity. The stereotype of the crowd in newspapers anxious over the immanent economic instability of capitalism would seem to find it easier to contain the crowd's behavior as an isolated, destructive event. By situating crowds in a historical line of purported political catastrophes, like the Haitian and French revolutions, newspapers could attempt to deter democratic organizations and class-based unions from forming. It is important to have these stereotypes in mind when turning to *Blake* because it helps make visible how literature offers us a different location for the representation of crowds, even if some of the same prejudicial discourses appear. By Delany's time, it was clear that the power of crowds came in part because they were the lasting specters of former revolutions. This explains why, in *Blake,* the effectiveness of rumors about revolution is as important for him to narrate as an actual one. The threat of distributing revolutionary ideas, or misinformation about one, was a resistance tactic.

In *Blake,* the transmission of a plan *about* a potential slave revolution moves through oral slave networks instigated by the novel's only consistent character, the eponymous Blake. Delany probably knew these networks from his extensive travel through the US and the south, which one can trace in Frank Rollin's 1868 biography, *Life and Public Services of Martin R. Delany.* There, he most likely encountered first-hand the secret cells that hustled bodies through the Underground Railroad, a network whose success precisely depended upon a communications system delivered by bodies and spoken language, not just through documents, wire, or rail. It was an effective model for Delany's novel. Writing about the underground railroad, Fergus M. Bordewich describes "a diverse, flexible, and interlocking system with thousands of activists reaching from the upper South to Canada" (5). Scores of itinerant preachers, teamsters, peddlers, slaves, lawyers, families, parishioners, and "friends" connected runaway slaves to their destinations. Secrecy about the next "station" of the underground meant that specific knowledge of the railroad became precious intelligence, and entirely too valuable to be recorded. "Although cell-like in structure," Bordewich writes, "the underground resembled the Communist Party much less than it did the Internet, [and] few who were involved in the underground knew the names of collaborators farther away than the next town or two" (5). Bordewich means the "Internet" metaphorically, of course, but his language suggests an embodied path of nodes, stations, points, hubs, and links: an embodied social network. While there was no systemic control, the network itself worked along lines of protocol that directed bodies to free space.

At this point we should pause in order to theorize how the Underground Railroad social network could give us clues about how crowds work, even though it was certainly not one – and in fact succeeded by never becoming one. The social network, however, does demonstrate a collective intelligence. This intelligence can work at a different speed than a

crowd, for example, because bodies within crowds must reach an intensity of excitement that cathects to a shared common symbolic field in order to coordinate movements without repetitious systemic control. The actions of the crowd involve the refinement of movements and the shared repetitions of language and symbols. At that point the bodies can move quickly without hierarchal command directing every behavior. Most bodies would only need to know what nearby bodies were doing. To this extent, one could say that the encoding of affect into common symbols is a degree of protocol. Social networks like the Underground Railroad can generate somewhat longer chains of communication, and can persist longer in time, in addition to not necessitating visibility in public space. A point of commonality between the two, however, would be the way both speed up moments of information processing in ways that destabilize individuated subjectivity. In *The Exploit,* Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker describe how human subjects on the one hand "thrive on network interaction (kin groups, clans, the social), yet the moments when the network logic takes over – in the mob or the swarm, in contagion or infection – are the moments that are most disorienting, and most threatening to the integrity of the human ego" (Thacker and Galloway 5). Thacker and Galloway seem to assume that destabilizing the ego is a threat rather than a phenomena of collective consciousness. This seems fair, given the history and discourses surrounding the phenomena. Strikingly, their argument insists that the network logic that "takes over" is a condition of the "nonhuman quality of networks," and also evident of events that "spiral out of control" (Thacker and Galloway 5). The scale that they're describing is both literally viral (as in epidemics) and non-human (computer worms), but one of their points is that a non-human agency describes collective human behavior. I fully endorse their attention to the "network logic" that gives rise to emergent forms, including social and political ones, but I would also rehearse here my arguments about the

specific reception of various codes through the human nervous system. It is this system that routes energy and information into neural regions responsible for evolutionary protocols of behavior – which isn't to say deterministic protocols.

There are important distinctions to make between networks and crowds before we turn toward a more integrated discussion about the autonomy of affect. Thacker and Galloway argue, for instance, that networks are "internally inconsistent" and that their power is "additive, not exclusive" (18-19). By internally inconsistent, they mean to say that networks contain asymmetrical power relations. This is also reasonably true of most crowds, in that various thresholds of intensity for excitement can overwhelm the codes and commands of a central authority, speaker, or symbol. On the other hand, the idea that crowds could be additive and not exclusive is only partly the case. As we saw in our discussion of Schmitt and Spinoza in the introduction, part of the virtual dimension of all crowds includes a symbolic, semiotic logic that seems keen on enemy production.

In a helpful discussion in their chapter "Nodes," Thacker and Galloway describe the complex social assemblages that can link crowds to forms of media and inorganic systems. This will help explain our discussion of Delany, and reappear in chapter five on Frank Norris. Thacker and Galloway first write that "protocol is not a single thing but a set of tendencies grounded in the physical tendencies of networked systems" (Thacker and Galloway 28). It is from this definition of protocol that we can start to theorize how a set of tendencies could code certain machines for particular affects and modulate behavior. It also seems consistent with my description of evolutionary neural systems less as deterministic commands and more as protocols embodied in "physical tendencies." Thacker and Galloway then add that by networks they mean "any system of interrelationality, whether biological or

informatics, organic or inorganic, technical or natural, with the ultimate goal of undoing polar restrictiveness of these pairings" (28). The simultaneous connections of the organic and the informatic is what I invoke here as the social assemblage, and another element of assuming a post-humanist perspective. In terms of protocol, it should be added that Thacker and Galloway see the "physical tendencies" of networked systems as tendencies from which mutations emerge. Networked logic is evolving, thinking, and learning.

To press deeper upon the evolving cognition of networked thinking, Thacker and Galloway describe how control societies produce "network effects" within individuals whereby the sense of individuated desires and identity distributes modes of being (41). In other words, individuality is an effect of how control societies produce "infinite variation" in subject positions. They oppose this to disciplinary societies whereby the dominant modes of subject positions are anatomical and physiological. For a contemporary example, they describe "crowds" on busy city streets as examples of the "elements of the unhuman within human-oriented networks" (41). It goes without saying that the crowds they mention here are not the subjects of this dissertation. It's also relevant that the novels in question appear in the time period we associate with disciplinary societies, and that the racial categories of subjectivity meant to control private and public spaces like the plantation, the home, and the street affirm that control societies are not consistent with this period. I would also pose that crowd protocols as I understand them do not resemble the network protocols that create infinite aggregations of identity in control societies. In this sense, crowds are not the networks Thacker and Galloway describe above.

Crowds do share some aspects of their networks, but with crucial distinctions. Both crowds and networks can become part of complex social assemblages that utilize both

biological and informatic systems of communication and interaction. Crowds can incorporate media technologies to make themselves work, and also to extend and project their symbols, their codes, and their protocols across space and time. This creates the virtual conditions for crowd behavior by forming collectivities of shared affections, symbols, languages, and interests. But I would insist that the crowd is a unique phenomenon of both disciplinary and control societies – in that it's possible in each – because the crowd is a subject of collective consciousness designed, at its furthest political logic, to die or to kill. In this way the protocols of the crowd, its physical tendencies, tend toward syncing the bodies of the crowd together, both expressively and symbolically.

As a political agent, the crowd really only gives rise to the conditions for particular types of emergent forms. Yet the movements in the crowd, and the agency of the bodies in it, depend upon our understanding of what Thacker and Galloway call networked logic, or network effects. In both, intelligence can seem too "spontaneous" and quick to be fully appreciated, and it is from the many different behaviors and actions that new social and political forms arise. It is also possible to argue that both crowds and networks are multiplicities. They define multiplicities, following Deleuze, as "an organization belonging to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system" (61). This definition allows for the idea that a crowd or network can hold tension in its form despite being constituted by different parts; in short, something can be made of many things, and those things can shift and transform without threatening the stability of the whole. I believe that we must see the Underground Railroad, too, as a rudimentary form of the network Thacker and Galloway describe. Its physical tendencies really all pointed in one direction: north. How it adapted and learned to shuttle bodies in that direction probably

involved various network effects – split second decisions about where to stash evidence, interpret strangers' faces, and understand the hidden meanings within messages.

The collective intelligence of the Underground Railroad was called "the grapevine telegraph" by African Americans, and that term appears in many documents of the period. Notably, Booker T. Washington's *Up From Slavery* explains it as the source of his mother's knowledge about the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. The network of the Underground Railroad arguably provides the basic map for Blake's journey through the slave bodies of the south. During Blake's journey, he imparts the secret of the slave insurrection to cells of slaves plotting to join him. Blake explains to potential comrades that all one must do is find the "right person" and "impart the secret to them, and make them the organizers for their own plantation, and they in like manner impart it to some other next to them, and son. In this way it will spread like smallpox among them" (Delany 41). The importance of affect arises from Blake's insistence that the secret will spread autonomously, like smallpox. The "contagious" quality of the plan here is treated as a sign of strength, not pathology. The plan is thought to be viral, to use the body as a technology of its own reproduction.

It is a mystery how that plot will actually work, and how information is supposed to travel. His plan is to spread a message that goes viral. Blake's plan will distribute itself by producing its own energy – as an affect machine – by exciting the bodies that hear the plan. In other words, the protocol for insurrection is supposed to incite insurrection. Delany is keen actually to relate how information travels through an Underground Railroad station. In one early scene, a slave named Ailcey hears about Henry's plan to escape the plantation and begin his journey. Bodies are the nodes of the network:

> Having heard the conversation between her mistress and Henry, Ailcey, as a secret, informed Van Winter's Derba, who informed her fellow servant Biddy, who imparted it to her acquaintance Nelly, the slave of esquire Potter, Nelly informing her mistress, who told 'Squire, who led Franks into the secret of the whole matter. (28)

Here, the action in the novel occurs as the distribution of information. Lacking the aspects of the network that could communicate information faster, like a real telegraph, bodies themselves become instruments for distribution. Implicit within this configuring of bodies as technology, or as performing media, is a structure for the nature of the insurrection; it will use stealth, shock, and surprise.

Delany's novel is explicitly less concerned with the practical policies that might organize US slaves than with describing the way human bodies could morph into technologies of information and affect production. We learn that a character named Mammy Judy was "expected to…act as an oracle" for the other slaves. Delany contrasts Judy's stationary position in space with Minny, who always travels around the plantation, "going about from place to place talking of everything" (55). Judy's introduction as an "oracle" extends the theme of the body becoming a technological prosthetic for the social network. Judy becomes host to many slaves from several plantations. She arrives at the last, the Craig's, and begins her transmission in *media res*. Without any other character present known to the reader, Judy "soliloquized…when the first dash of news through the boy Tony reached her, that Ailcey had gone [etc.]" (55). It's unclear just how the news "through" Tony reached her, and whether Tony himself arrived or she spontaneously connected to it through an invisible or implied chain of gossip. In this moment, her body is a medium. She reports information from the grapevine telegraph and sends it back out for others. Judy stations herself as an information oracle and receives "the slaves who continually came and went

through the day…letting a number come in, gossip, and pass out, only to be immediately succeeded by another" (57). She does it so that streams of slaves can hear news and depart so others can enter for the same purpose. Crucially, the most catalytic and most valuable knowledge is encrypted in the minds of the slaves.

Contagion and Autonomy

We will now turn toward exploring the ideas of networked effects, networked logic, collective consciousness, and bodily agency by moving from the historical account of pathological and contagious emotion to a contemporary theorization of autonomous affect. In Gustave Le Bon's enormously influential tract *The Crowd,* translated into English in 1896, he explains crowd behavior in the context of 1890s psychological theories on hypnosis, hysteria, and socio-neurological disorders. LeBon's prognosis about hypnosis and suggestion provides insights for our discussion here. Hypnosis is a rather directed and isolated state of consciousness when the patient falls under the control of the doctor. It resembles what happens when bodies fall into sync in crowds, though Le Bon emphasized the authoritative power relationship in both the doctor-patient relationship and the relationship between a charismatic public speaker and a crowd. Although hypnosis was seen at the time as a potential cure for hysteria or panic disorders, it also opened up the scientific and popular imagination to both the instability of the subject-ego and the possible problems presented by the power hypnosis seemed to have. This power generally came to be called the power of suggestion, and did not necessarily have to require the full hypnotic trance. Le Bon's vocabulary would also describe the ways that suggestions could spread even without authority, much like Freud's notion of "mental infection" in his discussion of the way egos

imitate one another through unconscious, mimetic identification in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of Ego* (a work heavily indebted to LeBo, and in particular to his notion that the crowd's group behavior reduces its thinking to a "primitive" mind) (Freud, 49).

These terms have carried through to contemporary explanations of identity formation in nineteenth century literary studies. In *Public Sentiments,* Hendler borrows Freud's idea of ego imitation, "sympathetic identification," to explain the production of national public culture. When Hendler speaks of male conversions to temperance at pubic meetings, for instance, he speaks of the way the "conversions" signaled by tears produced a local instance of an "affective politics" (30). Hendler also focuses on the way novels taught readers to "feel right" and focuses on the production of gendered masculine "identification." Freud and Hendler's ideas of sympathetic identification are intriguing, and also under-theorized. It is notable that sympathetic identification at temperance meetings seems to work as if the temperance meeting was an affect machine of the sort invoked throughout this dissertation. But what goes undeveloped is the biomechanics of that conversion process, and just how "affective politics" work. I would contend that the conversion experience is also about intensification of bodily thresholds, but also that not just any male bodies could experience that conversion. I would also question the efficacy of conversion experiences as ultimately dependent on the duration of the meetings. The "affective politics" of sympathy differs, too, from the politics of contagion in authors like Delany and Chesnutt.

For his part, Le Bon addresses the affects in crowds as seemingly autonomous due to the crowd's excitement, intensity, and open state of consciousness. "In a crowd every sentiment and act is contagious," Le Bon writes (Le Bon 7). Le Bon regards this contagion as illness, and so diagnoses the crowd's symbolic productions as illness; when a crowd

"thinks in images," its collective visions become "hallucinations" (Le Bon, 15). Thus by his own definition of open, collective consciousness, the transmission of affect registers as a physical and mental disease; this accounts for the ease of accepting metaphors of illness and disease into descriptions of crowds *and* affect. It also explains the logic of conflating crowd behavior with colonial stereotypes of "primitive" thought and the eugenically-informed ease with which Italian crowd theorists connected crowds with a criminal and racially regressive underclass. And to the extent that early psychoanalysts like Freud understood emotional hysteria during the period as an expression of a specifically feminine illness, it's also not surprising that Le Bon could use the word "sentiment" so effortlessly in his discussion of a crowd's "contagious" hypnosis.

The relationship between emotional contagion in Le Bon and the autonomy of affect isn't exact. The autonomous quality of affect and its relation to an "image" does also appear in Brian Massumi's *Parables for the Virtual,* albeit not without certain and obvious disjunctions, such as those that follow a word in translation and across time. Massumi defines the "autonomy" of affect through the example of an image. Affect is the ability to produce a change in one's mind distinct from the content of the image; this change depends on the image's "intensity." In the short fractions of time where we react to the intensity of an image or stimulus – to affect – Massumi writes that "what we think of as 'free,' 'higher' functions, such as volition, are apparently being performed by autonomic, bodily reactions occurring in the brain but outside consciousness" (Massumi, 29). It is from this definition of affect that we start to apprehend the qualities of speed, consciousness, and the body that have proved such influential concepts in the arguments here.

When the intensity of an image impinges on a body, a person's recognition of that impingement is a doubling back of affect into consciousness. Emotion, for Massumi, "is the most intense…expression of that *capture"* (35, italics his). The capture of affect into emotion isn't total; something always escapes. This affect that escapes is ultimately productive; Massumi understands this escape of affect as a condition of its autonomy. Massumi's illustration of affect as distinct from the content of an image is a useful example of affect's capacity to move in excess of an image's representation, or depth. The meaning of an image is intertwined with the affect it produces and the subsequent "capture" by the body into emotion.

Blake's plan's vagueness speaks to Delany's intention to theorize what a revolution would require from slaves emotionally, and not a specific policy or plan that would work. In fact, the autonomy of affect would be as important as the excitement generated by its protocol. Some of the affect from the plan would have to become encoded into bodies as excitement *about* the plan, but the excess would be necessary to generate the intensities to excite bodies into crowds. It is also significant that Blake describes the plan as simple. It would have to be in order to coordinate that much movement across that much space. The question of tactics would be limited. When Blake explains to a slave named Andy how the revolution will succeed, he says, "it is so simple that the most stupid among the slaves will understand it" (Delany, 39). The plan's simplicity would also depend on the idea that it is the movement of the slaves into crowds that mattered, and not some kind of complicated logistics. In other words, the bodies will do the thinking.

Blake goes on to explain his plan to Andy using a combination of images and symbols that defies logic but resonates as a discourse: "So simple is it that the trees of the

forest or an orchard illustrate it; flocks of birds or domestic cattle, fields of corn, hemp, or sugar cane; tobacco, rice, or cotton, the whistling of the wind, rustling of the leaves, flashing of lightning, roaring of thunder, and running of streams all keep it together constantly before their eyes and in their memory, so that they couldn't forget it if they would" (Delany 39). Some of the work these images do is associative; they invoke both crowds (flocks of birds and cattle, trees of the forest and orchard, fields of crops), the transmission of affect (whistling wind, rustling leaves, running streams), and affect as an impinging, electric power (lightning, thunder). The purpose isn't to interpret the images but to create sense within the logic of their patterns. They all point, at least, to *movements* that occur at the speed of the body, and of natural processes that require no explanation, no logistics. In other words, Blake naturalizes the insurrection as a kind of extension of natural right.

The images of flocks and cattle, for instance, run alongside the earlier image of the crowd-mobilizing secret that spreads "like smallpox." The connection between these two ideas, the animalized crowd and the contagious disease, is less randomly associative and more discursively consistent when we return to Le Bon fifty years later: "Ideas, sentiments, emotions and beliefs possess in crowds a contagious power as intense as that of microbes. This phenomenon is very natural, since it is observed even in animals when they are together in number" (Le Bon 78). Here we find disease (microbes) and animals together in one statement again. Le Bon's statement here about the contagious power of ideas and emotions as microbes wasn't scientifically coherent even by 19th century standards, and doesn't make logical sense as a dialogic discourse that was meant to stand in for concepts like bodily agency and network effects. Only as concepts somewhat distinct from the real vocabulary do they make sense together discursively. Perhaps more important to our object here is that Le Bon theorizes the crowd as an animal pack.

This connection might become most visible when Le Bon goes on to write, in the same passage, that "a panic that has seized on a few sheep will soon extend to the whole flock" (Le Bon 78). For Le Bon, the transformation of the human into the panicked animal during collective panics is consistent with his idea that individuals in the crowd regress into "primitive" states. His allusions to the crowd as animal are all the more fascinating, then, because they really suggest a much more canny and fluid animal agency that defines the actual intelligence of bodies, rather than the fixed eugenic types that rooted so much of white supremacist science. The potential for human bodies to become animal when moving at collective speeds carries through to Elias Canetti's 20th century crowd theory, in *Crowds and Power* (1960).

Like Le Bon, Canetti would categorize different types of crowds, such as "Feast Crowds" and "The War Pack," but would do so in far more detail and by announcing new aspects of crowd feeling and production, such as crowd feelings of persecution. Canetti's chapter on "Crowd Symbols," however, does much to connect Delany's images of corn, wind, and streams beyond to the flocks of birds or cattle, which might be more recognizable comparisons to "flocks" of human bodies. For Canetti, ideas like fire, corn, wind, and rivers are mythological symbols of crowd behavior. He calls them "collective units...which are felt to be crowds. Corn and forest, rain, wind, sand, fire, and the sea are such units. Every one of these phenomena comprehends some of the essential attributes of the crowd" (Canetti 75). Canetti's analysis of these symbols brings these associative symbols into the basis for larger discourses about crowd. His analysis, however, itself seems to hinge on metaphors of crowd agency. "Fire is the same wherever it breaks out," he writes, "it spreads rapidly; it is contagious and insatiable; it can break out anywhere, and with great suddenness; it is multiple; it is destructive; it has an enemy; it dies; it acts as though it were alive, and is so

treated. All this is true of the crowd" (Canetti 77). Perhaps Canetti is describing only a particular type of crowd. Nonetheless, his assertion that "these likenesses between fire and the crowd have led to the close assimilation of their images" echoes another critically important passage in *Blake*. When Blake reaches Georgia to spread his secret plan, Delany writes how, "receiving their messenger with open arms, the aim of his advent among them spread like fire in a stubble. Everywhere seclusions were held and organizations completed, till Georgia stands like a city at the base of a burning mountain, threatened with destruction by an overflow of the first outburst of lava from above" (Delany 109). As with Le Bon, the connection between these passages in Delany and Canetti doesn't prove a pattern of behaviors in "the" crowd. What it instead signals is that a discourse of crowds might be at least extant, and to the extent that "fire" behaves like "smallpox," it suggests that this crowd discourse may be inextricably linked to the dialogic discourse of affect. More specifically, it also at least situates *Blake* as a literary artifact that belongs to the history of crowd psychology and affect machines.

The novel also turns upon its descriptions of the virtual conditions for crowd formation. Listen to Delany characterize the excitement of the white response in New Orleans. As "women and children run in every direction through the streets…editors, journalists, reporters, and correspondents, all were busily on alert, digesting such information as would form an item of news for the press, or a standing reminiscence for historical reference in the future" (107). Delany is explicit about how he understands the press as a source of protocol and affect, and even uses language indicative of the biologizing of information into an affective response: "digesting" information. Moreover, he concludes a chapter about a potentially violent revolt by focusing on the rumor itself as the event. The revolt has not even happened; the panic is the story. This seems true of the novel as a whole.

The narrative is about the chain of gossip, the mediation of information, and an insistence upon the way individual bodies, parcels, information, and money work together to *move* populations in and out of affected states of being.

The Marrow of Tradition

Chesnutt's *The Marrow of Tradition* is based upon the Wilmington Insurrection of 1898, an infamous massacre of blacks by angry whites over-throwing local government through racially directed violence. Its similar plot is about an anti-government insurrection, but brings this radical act to its narrative conclusion. As in *Blake, The Marrow of Tradition* explains the methods used to organize individuals into a crowd capable of acting outside the law, and thus allow the town's whites to re-take municipal political control from African-Americans. To different degrees, then, both these novels are preoccupied with using technologies of media to encode affect for crowds and revolution. In *Blake* that technology is essentially the human body re-visualized as various kinds of social media, though in Chesnutt it is the print media – the same that Ida B. Wells cites as the source of white supremacist public sentiment – that transmits the kind of energy that moves bodies together. The production of revolutionary acts in the novel directly returns us to the biopolitical ecstasy of crowd intensities, as well as the symbolic production of the enemy.

In *Marrow of Tradition,* the newspaper is the affect machine, and helps form a white crowd by provoking the specter of miscegenation among the town's mixed race population. This tactic was infamous throughout the south, and in *Southern Horrors* Wells refers to white newspaper editorials as simultaneously producing sexual anxiety in readers and authorizing the legality of whatever actions readers might take in response. The events of Wellington in

the novel and Wilmington in actuality both point toward the central and violent role played by white crowds in the south during the Jim Crow era. Our own concern, however, is with the extraordinary actions taken by the crowd in the novel as a specific analogue to real events, since the "riots" in Wilmington led to a municipal coup and not a lynching. The role of newspapers thus differed in that the newspaper, in the case of the Wilmington insurrection, used the specter of miscegenation to enact a wholesale overthrow of government.

Chesnutt's novel is less a dissection of the actual (fictionalized) event than an account of how the town leaders in "Wellington" organized the attack to retake political power for themselves and the rest of the town's white elite. The leading elite used the newspaper as an instrument to organize and direct white public emotions against the town's blacks. The power of the newspaper to create collective behavior is itself a point of wonder in the story. "What more powerful medium for the propagation of an idea?" one of the organizers, Major Carteret explains. For Major Carteret and arguably for Chesnutt, the successful realization of political plans depends upon the way other symbols, like that of the black male, can be intensified through the creation of affect encoded into specific cultural anxieties. The newspaper and the white crowd become a social assemblage, combining organic and inorganic bodies to effect political change. Human bodies assemble into the protocol of the newspaper, and so the media networks include human voices, human bodies, and human movements – though the agency is, following Thacker and Galloway, inhuman. One could think of the results as inhuman, too, though with the stress on a different meaning. In any case, between Delany and Chesnutt the shift in the efficacy of crowd formation occurs alongside a shift in its technological distribution, from one that relies primarily on human networks to one that relies primarily on print.

In this literary anatomy of the 1898 Wilmington race riots, a trio of powerful white conspirators self-proclaimed as the "Big Three" plan to re-take Democrat party control of Wilmington from the "fusion" ticket of Republicans and Populists. They're aware that they lack the votes necessary to pursue the legal channels of democratic elections. Instead, they spend their time preparing an issue to arouse the emotions of the town's white population. One of the Big Three, General Belmont, tells the others that "in dealing with so fundamental a right as the suffrage we must profess a decent regard for the opinions of even that misguided portion of mankind which may not agree with us. This is the age of crowds, and we must have the crowd with us" (81). In effect, the problem for the Big Three is to produce the virtual conditions for the emergence of the crowd. They will then have to program the public sentiments necessary to whip the town's white population into what Le Bon called the "exaggerated emotions" of the crowd (Le Bon 21). One of the three, Major Carteret, is editor of Wilmington's largest newspaper. "You, Carteret, represent the Associated Press," says General Belmont. His role is to circulate a public grievance at a strategic moment. Insofar as the event comes from the editor's office, the intention of the "Big Three" is, in fact, to produce the political event that they find precedence for in the Central American coups they reference in their conversation. They understand that the race riot will create a crowd that would operate by it-self. If the emotional motivation is right, the crowd will already know what to do.

They are able to produce the crowd by reproducing an article from the *The Afro-American Banner,* Wellington's black newspaper, reflecting on the causes of lynching. Referring to the typical lynching justification of inter-racial rape between black men and white women, the *Banner* opined that such crimes were probably "voluntary acts," and that the lynching was most likely an actual effort to maintain a "fanciful purity of race" (85). The

Wellington three decide to reproduce, rather than suppress, the argument. Alongside the article, Carteret editorialized on its content "with comment adapted to fire the inflammable southern heart" (243). The "fire" here echoes Canetti, and Carteret's special use of language "touched the Southern white man in his most sensitive spot" (248). The town's whites responded by gathering weapons and ammunition. The town's blacks were denied firearms as a precaution against their use in defense against the coming riot. "The conspirators," Chesnutt notes, "were jubilant at the complete success of their plans. It only remained for them to so direct this aroused public feeling that it might completely accomplish the desired end, -- to change the political complexion of the city government and assure the ascendancy of the whites. A revolution, and not a riot, was contemplated" (249). This direction of "aroused public feeling" is by now familiar, and certifies our reading. In order to unleash the violence of the crowd, Chesnutt invokes Le Bon-influenced social psychology, but he does not to reverse the stereotypes that Le Bon used to define the crowd. Le Bon's crowd psychology is somewhat at odds with the racial logic of individuated, embodied difference, because that psychology places a *collective* subject at the center of its focus. Le Bon would claim that it was the primitive elements of a population that was most susceptible to crowd formations.[22] For Chesnutt to connect white men with that role is a contradiction. Chesnutt

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Indeed, as Richard Butsch writes in *The Citizen Audience*, "crowd psychology both expressed and fueled elite fears about the people who lived by manual labor. Its implied solution was to disperse crowds or to provide them with elite leaders who could propagandize them" (33). As we see in this chapter, Chesnutt was skeptical of both crowds and of the elites that tried to provide them with leadership and propaganda.

Butsch points out that Le Bon's book, with its "scientific sheen," influenced American sociology until at least the mid twentieth century. He quotes Gordon Allport's comment that it was perhaps the "most influential book ever written in social psychology" (33). In the text, Le Bon treats crowds and masses as one and the same phenomena. He emphasized "suggestability," an idea made relevant from nineteenth century hypnosis, as the organizing stimulus for crowds. Le Bon believed that race was the relevant factor for knowing what bodies could resist crowd suggestion.

moved against this hypothesis by pointing out a contradiction contained in the premise: if 'well-bred' whites were at the root of the affectively transmitted riot that closes the novel in a paroxysm of violence, then the reversion to atavistic traits (the sudden reduction of the person to a 'primitive' state) meant that the identity of the white body was more fluid than fixed. The racial body was not fixed. In this way, Chesnutt attempted to use the novel to mediate between the racism of biology and psychology.

Furthermore, that superior white race "aroused" by the Wellington editorial becomes a "white mob thirsting for black blood" (298). There is an element of Chesnutt's description here that speaks to the vivid fears that crowds inspire. There is nothing romantic about their viciousness. They are created to kill, and their desire expresses itself as a necessity.

Chesnutt also attends to the collective intelligence of the white crowd, however homicidal, as a swarm. During the riot, "spontaneously the white mob flocked toward the hospital" (299). The crowd surrounds the hospital and demands the African-Americans inside give up their weapons. The black group inside, led by Josh Green, refuses. Someone in the white crowd fires on him, and Green's resisters fire back, killing one of the white men. This is, Chesnutt writes, "an unpardonable sin" (303). In "Southern white consciousness," he explains, "the person of a white man was sacred from the touch of a negro, no matter what the provocation" (303). Chesnutt explains here the symbolic dimensions of the racial

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Boris Sidis, a student of William James, advanced Le Bon's suggestion that women and inferior races were more susceptible to crowd suggestion. It was Sidis that the influential sociologist Edward A. Ross cited. He used the ideas to write about crowd control. Le Bon's ideas also influenced Robert E. Park, another prominent sociologist. Park's student, Herbert Blumer, extended Le Bon's ideas into critiques of movie audiences and sociology textbooks. Blumer's ideas about crowd control also informed police and military manuals about riots and civil disturbances.

Butch writes about the idea of crowds as audiences; he returns to Le Bon's idea of audiences as "heterogeneous anonymous crowds" to study turn of the century texts such as *The Psychology of the Aggregate Mind of an Audience* to show the transformation of cultural concern from the crowd as an agent of disorder to the "speaker/message" as an agent of danger (37).

body, and also emphasizes the circulation of that symbol as a "sacred" symbol in white collective consciousness. The white body has a religious register. The racial dimension of the violence is as interesting here as Chesnutt's allusion to "white consciousness." The specific symbols that code crowd behavior become culturally recognizable. The way those symbols work as affect machines is localized. The logic of transgression against the white body symbolically enacts violence against the entire crowd. In this logic, then, the entire crowd has been wounded and attacked. The crowd understands the attack as a violation, but only because the symbolic body has become conflated with the bodies in the crowd. The attack on a symbol registers as an attack on everybody. Thus the "provocation" of the white man's death quickly escalates into an unmediated explosion of violence. The hospital is torched.

Before describing the torching, Chesnutt decides to explore the psychological dynamics of the white crowd's decision to do so. He remarks that the leaders of the revolt had already achieved the "overturning" and set up a new "provisional government" (303). After withdrawing from the crowd, several of these "ringleaders" attempted to prevent further disorder, but find they cannot now control the crowd. "Those who set in motion the forces of evil cannot always control them afterwards," Chesnutt relates (304). He goes further, too, to describe how the men leftover in the crowd were "the baser element of the white population, recruited from the wharves and saloons" (304). Chesnutt is implicitly subscribing to the psychological theories of Le Bon, in that the workers and poor are more easily attracted to, and influenced by, crowd behavior and suggestibility. One of the original Big Three, Captain McBane, does nothing to stop the attack because he had "lived a life of violence and cruelty." This "baser element" cannot be led by the more 'honorable' man of status among them, Captain McBane, because he himself can appreciate the purpose and pleasure of violence. Such men cannot be "converted," Chesnutt writes, because "they do

not change their natures" (304). This pessimistic explanation for the immutable reaction of the white population – they behave according to rigid inherited traits – follows the generic tendencies of American naturalism during the 1890s and proves an intellectual concession, however misguided, to Le Bon. Chesnutt does not believe that the elites think better than their inferiors because of their racial identity, but does seem to imply that men of higher class position, white or black, are not as susceptible to crowd passions. Whether black or white, there are passionate populations of workers that are more suggestible to symbols and sensitive to affect than others. Such a perspective affirms the logic, then, that crowds of workers must be directed, managed, and manipulated carefully. The ultimate tragedy of race riots and crowds, for Chesnutt, is that those in positions to *produce* affect (such as the newspaper editors) must do so with more caution and responsibility. The idea that institutions must regulate behavior is essentially a liberal one.

The virtual conditions for crowds in both novels depend on rumor. In *Blake,* for instance, rumors of slave revolt work up white New Orleans into paranoid hysteria. In Wellington, "the rumor spread with incredible swiftness that the Negroes in turn were up in arms, determined to massacre all the whites and burn the town" (299). This rumor gave the town's whites more reason to assault the community's blacks. In both novels it's essential to observe the autonomy of affect from its encoding through particular symbols, images, or bodies. Delany and Chesnutt are both well aware that the transmission of affect is the connecting force between powerful language, the production of crowds, and the threat of violence. The intensification of affect into emotional encoding and the collective agency of the crowd is a promise for Delany and yet it disturbs Chesnutt. This tension speaks to the central ambiguity of the multitude in Spinoza.

In both novels, the powerful production of affect occurs through the affective labor of an elite revolutionary figure or a small group formerly capable of influencing the intensity and codes of the messages for exciting crowds. These leaders depend upon the fact that affects of joy or fear makes bodies move, not the authority of their command. In Chesnutt, the strength of the newspaper editorial to create crowds depends less on the physical status of newspaper editorials as print media and more on the bodies imagined by the readers. The editorials play on white anxiety over miscegenation, and so it is really the fantastic image of sex between black men and white women that produces the affects driving the white mob in the novel.

The role of affect and language is essential to the semiotic split that allows for what Laclau calls catechesis. This is because the autonomy of affect is another point of disjunction between the signifier and signified, and so those who attempt to "author" crowds, like Blake or the editors of the Wellington newspaper, must also reckon with an affected crowd that does, or can do, all by itself. It was theorized by early sociologists like William McDougall in *The Group Mind* (1920) that people form and enjoy crowds in order to act out or say things that should otherwise stay silent, either by common collective consent or explicitly through policed repression. This somewhat Freudian explanation explains crowd behavior as the expression of repressed desires. Yet the novels here make us rethink this claim. The technologies of symbolic production, their work as affect machines, really do *create* the events that crowd behavior expresses, rather than *permit* those actions to happen. Or, put somewhat differently, the fantasies of action are not inevitable in groups, but rather fantasies are images of virtual possibilities. When crowds form in order to intensify the sense of natural "right" one feels for those fantasies, those fantasies become actual expressions. But they are fantasies among other fantasies, and the repetitions and images and affects that intensify

them into reality could have created other referents, and made other worlds. The potential for those fantasies, violent and all, also depends on the thresholds of emergency and the collective experience of pleasure associated with the joy of movement and the joy of expression, even when those movements are outright vicious.

The Sport of the Gods

Paul Lawrence Dunbar takes a position similar to Chesnutt's in his short story "The Lynching of Jube Benson" (1902). Dunbar depicts the anatomy of a lynching through a re-telling of it by the narrator Gordan Fairfax, a doctor. It's here that Dunbar, too, translates some of Le Bon's ideas into fiction. "In a crowd every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest," Le Bon writes (7). In Dunbar's story, by the same idea, Gordon Fairfax begins his story of the lynching by revealing an "epidemic of typhoid" that broke out in the town (527). After mending his patients, he becomes sick himself. His servant Jube attends to him. Playing off the analogue of typhoid contagion as affective contagion, Fairfax then begins his story of the lynching episode. He arrives home one day to find "a crowd surrounding it" (528). His friends in the town claim that a beautiful young white girl has been raped, and his loyal servant Jube is suspected. "Something in the sullen, settled horror in the men's faces gave me a sudden, sick thrill," he explains. As the crowd abducts Jube to kill him, Dr. Fairfax reflects on how the network effects removed his conscious sense of agency from the situation: "I cannot describe the feelings I experienced as I went out that night. I went forward under the impulse of a will that was half my own, half some more malignant power's" (529). It is this distortion of the subject-ego which runs parallel to the

typhoid illness above. The crowd, in that sense, creates mental illness. The sensation of collective consciousness is the symptom. This sensation is the movement without thinking. It is precisely this kind of movement that the plot rejects. It is only when Dr. Fairfax analyzes a piece of skin under the dead girl's fingernail that he realizes that the rapist murderer was white, not black. At this point, it is already too late. Jube is dead.

Like Chesnutt, Dunbar wrote *The Sport of the Gods* as a narrative meant to mix sentimental tragedy with the naturalist narratives of fate over-determined by forces beyond human self-control. The story follows the Hamilton family's fate after their father, Berry, is accused of a crime he didn't commit. Although the plot focuses on the events of the novel after the family moves to New York City from the south, what really propels the destiny of characters in the novel is the way that the bodies of two children, Joe and Kitty, become infected by the overstimulation of New York. Their bodies are constantly searching out those emotions that might counter the humiliation and shame they felt back home in the south. Problematically, the fastest routes towards these feelings send them into situations that are either self-destructive or, from the point of view of the narrator, embarrassing. Joe begins running with an alcoholic and depressed gang of gamblers, and Kitty begins dancing "coon ditties" in a black chorus line. *The Sport of the Gods* was an explicit warning to the black working-class about their vulnerability to the technologies and opportunities for capturing affect and assimilating into a kind of false pride: it is false for the narrator because sensations of joy that aren't lasting or socially productive are wasted. In the case of Joe, his desire for pride turns into a pathology.

Dunbar begins the story in the south on a reconstruction plantation, where the family of Berry and Fannie Hamilton live in the back cottage of the land's owner, Maurice

Oakley. Maurice is a wealthy planter and his relationship with Berry is that of a paternalistic father. Berry and the Hamiltons are relatively well off because of their relationship to the Oakleys. One day, Maurice Oakley's brother Frank is about to return to France where he is a young and untalented artist caught in an expensive romantic tryst. He steals 500 dollars from his brother; Maurice suspects Berry; Berry goes to jail. The broken Hamilton family then goes to New York for a new start. Once there, the son Joe and the daughter Kitty fall into a bad crowd. Joe develops a hysterical crush on a local singer named Hattie. In a fit of madness toward the end of the novel, he kills her. He's arrested and sent to prison. Meanwhile, a reporter for a tabloid-like daily newspaper becomes interested in Joe's life. He goes back to the south to find out the truth of Joe's father's crime. He finds out that Berry was innocent. Berry is released from prison. The novel ends on the plantation, again, with Berry and Fanny alone. The last line of the novel is self-explanatory: "It was not a happy life, but it was all that was left to them, and they took it up without complaint, for they knew they were powerless against some Will infinitely stronger than their own" (148). This "Will" is a spiritualized personification of naturalism itself: some omnipotent power traced back into a central source, like the tentacles of that railroad-octopus that connect backwards into some strange corporation's malevolent brain. What we find in Dunbar, by contrast, however, is that this "Will" signifies the aggregate forces shaping their lives without their consent, but also describes the disturbing illness of the body's own agency.

The novel is not so much a liberal critique of crowd production as a critique of this embodied consciousness, of the body's ability to move on its own. Like Delany or Chesnutt, however, Dunbar is keen to note the transmission of information in the black neighborhoods where the Hamiltons live. In a chapter called "The Justice of Men," Dunbar details the news of how Berry's arrest spreads through town: it was "the cause of unusual

commotion in the town" (27). Dunbar describes how the "accuser" and the "accused" were both well known to the white and black communities. The commotion becomes a story in the newspaper, like Ellen Brewster going missing in *The Portion of Labor*. Dunbar writes that the "evening papers had a full story of the crime," and it spends considerable space speculating to those black and white readers about the probable events of the crime. The purpose of the story here produces the shame that would drive the Hamiltons away.

The town becomes suspicious about Berry immediately. A local lodge, "The Tribe of Benjamin," starts checking Berry's accounts. Next is the church: it "hastened to disavow sympathy with him, and to purge itself of contamination by turning him out" (28). Here, the growing suspicion surrounding Berry's crime turns into a fully contaminating shame that different groups in the community want to expel. Berry has become the symbol, and, to a degree, the enemy. The purity of the virtual crowds depends upon his expulsion. The scene is reminiscent of another naturalist novel, Stephen Crane's *Maggie: Girl of the Streets,* when Maggie Johnson's family is livid about her return to the family after being "ruined" by a seduction. As they shame her out of her apartment before a crowd of tenement onlookers, her brother Jimmie scorns her without touching her: "Radiant virtue sat upon his brow and his repelling hands expressed horror of contamination" (96). The pathology associated with touching the contaminated bodies here becomes understood as an extension of communal fears about the contagious quality of negative affects encoded into socially harmful emotions, like Maggie and Berry's shame in Crane and Dunbar. These anxieties, which echo the work of Mary Douglas in *Purity and Danger,* suggest that social anxieties about negative affects must be projected onto a body so that the body can be ejected from the community, thereby 'cleansing' it.

In this way, Dunbar's own use of "sympathy" and "contamination" suggests slightly different implications of social contagion and contamination in nineteenth century bodies. Just as Maggie's family must remove her from their home, the shame and lack of sympathy for Berry spreads out to, and is disavowed by, the black community in the novel. "They turned away from one of their own kind upon whom had been set the ban of the white people's displeasure," Dunbar writes. "If they had sympathy," he continues, "they dared not show it…they have brought down as heritage from the days of their bondage both fear and disloyalty" (28). It is interesting that the black community's "heritage" here seems to be biosocial. The ban that originates in the white community's displeasure encodes shame, or fear, onto Berry's body. These affects of fear and shame are what produce the "ban" Dunbar mentions. The ban is real. The effects produce a reality for Berry, and thus a judgment upon him, that's not officially stated, nor *in* law, or achieved by legal channels. It's a judgment that emerges through what Wells would call "public sentiment."

Like the revolutionary ecstasy in Delany and Chesnutt, public sentiment affects the law through the fact of natural right. How bodies feel produces a sort of emergent sense of that right. Public sentiment is jurisgenerative; it transforms the 'real' conditions of the social so that the political institutions can follow. Delany and Chesnutt put this transformative potential next to the relative failings of democratic institutions in the US at different moments of opportunity for African-Americans. The political power of public sentiment comes from the fact that it has been circulated through various mediums beyond newspapers. The shame doesn't need to be enforced so much as circulated to have this effect: or, rather, the circulation is the enforcement.

The politics of affect, in other words, are powerful in part because they are not states where individual agency is active. Like the network effect, it's a non-human entity that can become embodied and encoded. As if to prove this, Dunbar spends the rest of the chapter tracing various bits of conversation in the black and white communities, from the mouths of characters who never reappear in the text. What they say isn't half as important as what Dunbar is trying to show: the circulation of affect and symbols together.

The next crucial example takes place in New York, once the Hamilton family moves. Dunbar sets the scene by describing New York as a city that produces its own disruption to the homeostatic systems of bodies: speaking of a new visitor, Dunbar remarks that "if he has the right stuff in him, a something will take possession of him that will grip him again every time he returns to the scene…a new emotion will take his heart as the people hasten by him…the real fever of love for the place will begin to take hold of him" (46-47). The agency he describes here is what would come to act on Berry's son Joe, but it is really not an alien agency. It is the sensation of collective consciousness. It is also the feeling of becoming an assemblage, and of the interaction between bodies that's expressed as excessive movement. Dunbar describes, for example, Joe's "intoxication" when he encounters the singer Hattie: "his nerves tingled and his hands twitched" (59). This tingling and twitching is the realm of the autonomy of affect, in that the energetics of affect surges past the capture in the nervous system and the movement registers that excess. Dunbar also implies that bodies can become dependent on this stimulation, on its excess, and also on the autonomic capture of affect from another body when that capture produces joy. Hattie makes Joe feel good, but, lacking other sources of joy, he becomes dependent on her – or rather on the sensations he feels around her.

Joe also meets a man named Sadness at a place called the Banner Club. Dunbar's language again goes back to disease: the Club "was composed of all sorts and conditions of men, educated and uneducated, dishonest and less so, of the good, the bad, and the – unexposed. Parasites came there to find victims, politicians for votes, reporters for news, and artists of all kinds for colour and inspiration" (66). This rich passage is fascinating because of the discursive consistency of exposure and parasites, but also because what's implicit in the passage is the power of affect itself: it is, after all, the job of the hustler is to trick his victim by exploiting the gap between how he makes a body feel and what that body really knows.

In a later scene at the Banner Club, Dunbar writes how Joe's situation has been reversed. He is in a withdrawal from bodies. He "took a seat by himself, and, ordering the cocktail, sat glowering at the few other lonely members who had happened to drop in. There were not many of them, and the contagion of unsociability had taken possession of the house" (81). "Contagion of unsociability" suggests a socially transmitted loneliness. Confused by his feeling, Joe asks Sadness for an explanation. Sadness begins by relating that he, like Joe, lost his father in the south. Earlier, we learned from Sadness that "a distant relative" had "once had a great grief" and that he "never recovered from it." Now, he explains to Joe that his father had been lynched; Sadness – an emotional name – invokes the violence of "The Lynching of Jube Benson" and of Chesnutt's racial violence in Wellington. As with the Hamilton family, what Sadness feels is the absence of a father. It's not necessarily the fatherly role that's lost, but his love, the intimacy that could come from feeling joy with him. Bodies that resonate together react differently apart. The separation of these bodies from each other interrupt the homeostatic relationship they create together. Together they were complex machines; apart they feel bad. Much of Dunbar's thesis is that bad feelings, more than anything else, explain human behavior and shape local cultures.

Sadness speaks to something like the homeostatic relationship that forms between bodies that are close. He explains, "You see Hamilton, in this life we are all suffering from a fever, and no one edges away from the other because he finds him a little warm. It's dangerous when you're not used to it; but once you go through the parching process, you become inoculated against further contagion" (84). The fever describes a body carrying the memory of the past as an excess of movement, of affect production. This excess morphs to an expression shaped by the event itself – it's cast through that trauma, as if the trauma became a code, a protocol. It creates tendencies of facial expression, of posture, of speech. The parching process here describes, in part, a state of emptiness after grief. The leftover sensations after Sadness' father's lynched body has here ridden along into the city – it's become his blues.

It either spreads to Joe, or Joe suffers from it, too. That alone is a fascinating way to consider the legacy of violence done in one region and carried to another, like a plague; events in one place have a material consequence in others because the traumas move with bodies. Basically, then, Joe goes 'crazy' from this collection of negative affects all migrating into New York with their hosts. He falls utterly under the spell of the fever and kills Hattie in a fit of madness. In his homicidal state, though, Joe's body seems to be the agent; the chapter refers to him as a Frankenstein. He becomes angry with Hattie because she wants to stop seeing him.

These passages expand our speculative scope by reminding us that this is a naturalist text describing a transmission of affects specific to race. In *The Transmission of Affect* Teresa Brennen writes that "the way is open to further historical inquiry once we make an initial case for the idea that the self-contained Western identity has to be a construction and that

this construction depends on projecting outside of ourselves unwanted affects such as anxiety and depression in a process commonly known as 'othering'" (12). While Brennen's model isn't definitive or even internally consistent, her notion of projective affect should compel us to refigure the specific displacement of undesirable affect onto another body. It is meaningful to us here because it suggests, as Dunbar does at the turn of the century, that the social identity of race is not a eugenic science that categorizes bodies. We can imagine race as an emotional positioning of bodies within a thousand displacement machines; bodies write that positioning into nervous systems. The effect is a biosocial expression of bodies materially transformed by witnessing and inscribing the horror of violence done to those bodies imagined as racially other.

It seems Dunbar at least already understood something like the way affect mediated race relations in the United States. Shame forces the Hamilton family out of the south, excitement and depression destroy them in New York, and a wave of sympathy for Berry wins him freedom from prison at the end. The narrative begins and ends with a newspaper circulating a story about Berry. In each case, it's not the news that has convicted or freed him, but the wave of shame and sympathy. The ultimate power in the novel is public sentiment. It is the determining power of public sentiment and the emotional reality of embodied politics that provides insight into Dunbar's own narrating position in the novel, which can also seem concerned with the effects of urban life on new migrants from the perspective of an affective overload: "Oh, is there no way to keep these people from rushing away from the small villages and country districts of the South up to the cities, where they cannot battle with the terrible force of a strange and unusual environment?" (122).

This question echoes the earlier context about naturalism itself, with the "terrible force" of the environment a foreshadowing of the "Will" that overpowers the Berry family. But curiously, this terrible force seems to be the power produced by circuits of encoded affects, and the way they determine protocols for how bodies should feel and when. Dunbar is highly aware that these spreading powers can organize social reproduction. He is aware that these powers leak from body to body, and shift and transform from the spoken to the written word. He's aware that certain words and symbols can rearticulate and recode the bodies they're meant to describe. But it seems, too, that Dunbar is also conscious that the circulation of viral stories, coded with culturally specific affect, is a power that shapes human destiny like the power of gods. And, in that sense, it may be sensible to regard affects as agents of an emergent social intelligence without a center, but an intelligence nonetheless – the gods of the social network are alive. They can create physical tendencies that spread past the culturally inscribed boundaries of race, and they spread and excite bodies regardless of color. And yet, perversely, they also seem to explain how a feeling like shame, or the blues, can attach itself from generation to generation, autonomously, from one place to another, on precisely those bodies marked by the logic of exclusion.

Chapter Four

Animality and Emergent Behavior in Bret Harte's "The Luck of Roaring Camp"

By the turn of the century, post-war African American authors had decisively shifted how they understood the strategic possibilities for exploiting the revolutionary excitement of black persons in order to form insurrectionary crowds. This new cautiousness over the political efficacy of crowds paralleled broader transformations in the way American publics, intellectuals, scientists, and authors articulated group psychology. Crowds were more and more thought to express atavistic behaviors from a pre-modern past. These behaviors were thought to be anachronistic movements that did not fit the industrial organization of space, or the economic rationalization of restricted movements required by factory machines. In the new industrial order symbolized by highly regulated standardizations of time and space, the persistence of crowds in public space seemed contradictory and chaotic. Their presence seemed to suggest a primitive degeneracy right in the midst of modern progress. Victorian America would celebrate groups that were highly disciplined and organized, like the men that fought in Civil War armies, joined the National Guard, or entered the offices of the expanding railroad corporations. Bureaucracy and rationalization of methods were heralded in the name of efficiency and management.

This made the public and private confrontation with organized labor all the more fantastic: the otherwise healthy citizens degenerated into savage workers operating in a different mode altogether. The technological evolution of factories and the rapid proliferation of fossil fuel transportation – coal and trains – seemed to pit a marvelous new

world of World's Fairs developed by the political economies of corporate-led nation states against stereotyped images of foreign, dirty, and uncontrolled worker bodies. The growing unions of the labor movement itself straddled the line between managed organization and organized excitement, since the strikes and mass rallies they sponsored produced new collectivities and social networks coded by the terms of class consciousness the unions helped form. As with any other collectivities or virtual crowds, the intensification of excitement and the presence of threat often created crowds that could act all by themselves. The violent general strikes in July 1877 that set off unprecedented week-long confrontations between crowds and the police, and led to the equally unprecedented intervention of a federalized National Guard, would fully express the emerging contradictions between crowd behavior and the capitalist organization of space for surplus extraction.

These clashes intersected with parallel developments in social science that would, by the end of the century, also lead to the discipline of eugenics.[23] As biology flared into new social sciences, the cultural desire fully to code and categorize human bodies into recognizable racial and gender types and predictable classes of potential workers articulated its formulas based on theories of inherited traits. This theory of acquired characteristics,

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Dario Frezza writes in *The Leader and The Crowd* that, "the distinction commonly accepted in progressive circles between the 'rational' public formed by the mass media and the 'irrational' masses, elaborated by European theories of the French school of Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon, was colored by racial traits elaborated by the anthropocentric theories then in vogue" (Frezza 3). Such fears of the irrational masses took place in the context of profound white anxiety in both the north and south over their ability to maintain power. Anxiety over threats to their power over-determined much of the national public narrative. Social scientists like Edward A. Ross and John R. Commons, for instance, stirred anxiety about race suicide that inspired Theodore Roosevelt to bring the subject of white middle class reproduction to national attention. As we read in the last chapter, from about the mid 1880s onward the crowd became identified with those same groups that white intellectuals considered to be naturally inferior, such as women, children, African-Americans, and other non-white races. "The crowd," Frezza writes, "like the mob, women, and savages, had no legitimacy as a responsible collective subject because of its mutability and irrationality" (Frezza 68). It's no accident those same groups were advocating for more civil rights and more protection against political and economic practices.

popularized by Lamarck, could be expressed both as species-specific features as well as behaviors. It was believed that new behaviors could be passed down to subsequent generations. This belief fit adjacent to the Victorian insistence on the link between good manners and good breeding. Together with culturally inscribed racial and gender assignments, one's gestures had the power to make visible the history of one's body. It was thus inevitable that working-class cultures and bodily expressions of that culture would open into eugenic assumptions about the natural inferiority of working class bodies. To the Victorian imagination, then, stereotypes of working-class body movements, such as dancing and promiscuous sex, became problematic signs of potential national decay.[3]

The ultimate sign of this decay was the crowd, which was regularly read as working-class even when specific crowds were more heterogeneous. It was important that the main quality of the crowd was its status as an affect machine. It amplified, it distributed, it was heard for blocks. The visibility of bodies in public space gesturing with excited, exaggerated expressions helped to create an intellectual climate in which such exaggerated movements became diagnosed as symptoms of illness and disease – hysteria, nervous disorders, panics, and anxiety attacks. Victorian science compounded this illness by gendering it. Such public expression of excessive emotion was read as a feminine illness, and its presence in male bodies was then considered an emergent mutation. It should go without saying that the Victorians considered these mutations as strong manifestations of widespread cultural decline, though a decline stemming in part from the transmission of bad cultural *gestures* to bodies from the healthy classes. They would logically find these bad cultural movements in the working class. Therefore the danger of working-class crowds arose in part because the transmission of bodily movements seemed most logically contagious in them. Encoded affect from the working class, registered as bad emotions like anger or indignation, created fear in the Victorian middle- and upper classes. It would also inspire reforms in public education and eventually give political capital to the early twentieth century Progressives.[iv]

In the under-theorized fiction of Bret Harte, narratives can turn upon plots that represent the cultural anxieties about the intersection of naturally inferior bodies with healthy and civilized ones (see "The Princess Bob and Her Friends"). His short story "The Luck of Roaring Camp" (1868), on the other hand, focuses solely on the working class bodies of California miners as they attempt to raise an orphan child born into their California camp. As in many of Harte's stories, the narrator's tone is one of comic irony and curious pity. The characters are meant to amuse, though their problems often reflect the very difficult decisions made by isolated men in the early years of the California gold rush. The story of "Luck" was an enormous commercial success and helped launch

the genre of regional local color. Mark Twain worked with Harte in San Francisco in the late 1850s when the latter had already become a national legend. Harte was in the strange position of writing about the working class while cultivating a tone that was at times outright condescending to his subject. Despite this, the work that the text "Luck" does for the study of crowds fits into this dissertation as yet another occasion when we must see crowds through the reverse lens of texts meant to exploit, demonize, and pathologize them. We turn to "Luck" at first because of a new dialogic discourse to explain crowd behavior. Written almost ten years after *The Origin of Species,* the story is in part significant because of the co-presence of medical and evolutionary discourse to explain the changes in the miners' bodies as a result of crowd participation.

This chapter will explain how we can recover in that dialogic discourse insights into the "spontaneous" behavior of crowds as a potentially immanent democratic social form, and how the speed of emergent behavior might provide us with concepts for thinking through the political agency of the body. Furthermore, the story will allow us to test the concept that the intelligent agency of the body might actually extend from the agency of the body as "animal," where we would have to redefine the animal as a degree of consciousness, not a species or type, and thus claim that animal consciousness is really a way to classify the different speeds of embodied agency. In a final move, this chapter will also de-center the working-class subjects of Harte's story by proposing that the broader affect machines of their local economy made crowd formation possible in the first place – or at least increased the virtual potential of the crowd by generating social affect expressed as a unique form of joy: financial euphoria. Nineteenth century euphoria hasn't received as much critical attention as the negative affects, like anxiety, in individuals (whether as neurasthenia or hysteria). We might speculate that this is be due to the fact that cultural and economic incitement of euphoria was productive, and thus did not carry the unproductive stigmatism of anxiety or hysteria.

The fiction that followed the embodiment of what Harte and then Mark Twain called "Flush Times" profoundly altered the experience of the miner's class position. The discovery of gold and the extension of credit for miners to borrow against future claims created the virtual conditions for crowds. Gold and credit produced sensations of euphoria: they were affect machines. Just as the disappearance of commodities due to wartime scarcity contributed to the virtual conditions for the Civil War Draft Riots, the appearance of gold and credit increased the miners' potential access to luxuries and stimulated new desires and expectations about access to material goods. Just as the Draft Riots grew out of violent reactions to class-based indignation, the financial euphoria in the gold settlements had the opposite effect – it created the conditions for democratic crowds. The role of financial euphoria poses questions about the vectors of crowd formation during different economic environments. Depressive excitement can create tendencies for intensities to shift crowds into war machines, while euphoric excitements may create intensities for shifting crowds into communist machines. By depressive excitement I mean bodies stimulated into excited affects during economic depressions, which would affect the circulation of both joyful affect production and basic commodities. Depressive excitement is desperate excitement. By communist machines I mean machines that tend to distribute decision-making among the collective and that share labor and social reproduction.

But the most important reason that gold and credit excited bodies, I argue, is that gold and credit also functioned as potent symbols with empty referents. Just as crowds coalesce around signs whose very indeterminacy allows for crowd formation, the circulation of instruments that stand in for value have the effect of endlessly deferring their true meaning. H.W. Brands calls this symbolic effect the "metaphysics of gold…the dream of instant wealth" (454). Gold and credit were the stuff of dreams. They meant one could buy whatever one wanted. It was the constantly shifting fantasies about what to do with the gold and credit that allowed it to mean whatever miners needed it to

mean. In this way it functioned like surplus capital, but from the perspective of the worker; the indeterminate meaning of money means that it constantly produces sensations of excitement and wonder according to whatever one imagines it *could* mean. The main role of money in this sense is symbolic.

What allowed gold to have a material affect on bodies, however, was the fact that the endlessly deferred indeterminacy of its symbolic meaning also gave it the power to produce excess affect. A symbol for everything just keeps exciting bodies. Gold's simultaneous status as a commodity, an affect machine, and an indeterminate symbol generally created virtual conditions for the crowd by giving the miners a distributed embodied sensation that was common to the settlement. This either allowed for them to become a collective or reinforced their position as workers into something resembling class-consciousness. We can guess that their bonds, though, came from an embodied shared experience with gold, not from a sense of identity resulting from a shared sense of exploitation. Joy brought them together, not indignation. The physical tendency for crowds to form in times of excess is different than the physical tendencies that create crowds during times of deprivation and scarcity. Although we can imagine the sovereign exception of crowds as one potential vector for crowd behavior, crowd behavior at different thresholds works to excite crowds to other forms of emergent movement. It is crowd behaviors at lower thresholds than emergency-produced depression that can theoretically allow for the emergence of *adaptive* behaviors. Another way to imagine adaptive behaviors would be to return to Grosz and Bergson's concept of "free acts" in the introduction. It is to these behaviors that we will now turn.

Democratic Biology

In *The Age of Gold,* H.W. Brands writes that the "revolution" of the Gold Rush fundamentally shifted the colonial fantasy of the American Dream (489). "America had always been a land of promise," he writes, ignoring African slaves brought to the US by force, "but never had the promise been so decidedly – so gloriously – material. The new dream held out the hope that anyone could have what everyone wants: respite from toil, security in old age, a better life for one's children" (Brands 489). To the extent Brands has a critical perspective, we might call it faithfully trite; however, Brands does articulate here the myth of the Gold Rush, and also its ever-shifting signification as a never-ending satisfaction of "wants." To be fair, Brands is also quick to point out the Gold Rush's "dark side," with its extermination of indigenous populations, its speculative scandals and mining monopolies, and its ecological devastation (490).

In any case, Brands doesn't quite believe an alternative existed: "Maybe it did, but only if human nature could have resisted the temptation to seek a shortcut to happiness. America's enthronement of individualism magnified the impact of the gold discovery" (490). It is significant that there is some logic in Brands' easy reduction of the Gold Rush to human nature. The "nature" and "temptation" he refers to here is vaguely Christian and Victorian, though, and so we must excavate the logic from this notion that the Gold Rush was about "happiness," and from the irony implicit in his rehearsal of American "individualism." He would say that the "desire for happiness" was the "most basic" of human desires, and that therefore persons "couldn't resist" a fast route to this happiness. The logic of his observation comes not from his repetition of truisms, but from what they imply about the intersection of a real materialist opportunity for joy with the affect machine of the Gold Rush as a discourse, a representation, and a fantasy. No sooner was gold discovered in California than the news itself circulated the idea of instant wealth – which was itself a sign that meant anything and everything. There was so much participation by both the working and middle classes in the migration west that we can infer multiple forms of desire emerged from the Gold

Rush. But the Gold Rush as a rumor, as gossip, and as narrative coded the eruption of affect that excited movements west. This is the irony of Brands' invocation of "individualism." It is the empty referents behind the shock of sudden access to credit that actually structures all those "individual" fantasies into coordinated migrations and movements. In other words, all those individual fantasies produce, in aggregate, logical networks of migration west, where bodies were fed to the fast organization of corporate mining operations. This excitement to individualism as a method of surplus extraction perhaps most resembles elements of the control society mentioned in the previous chapter's discussion of network effects and swarms.

This chapter will follow a story that disrupts the easy narrative of the Gold Rush as a parable of American individualism. The California Gold Rush miners were the "Argonauts of '49," as Harte mythologized them. They were the subject of national fascination in the late 1860s and early 1870s and his commercial fiction appealed to middle-class curiosities in sentimental sketches of exotic characters, locales, and situations. It was a dramatic landscape for fiction anyway. Some of the narratives cast a semi-tragic tone, which offset the wonder of the Gold Rush with a realist logic that would grow more and more somber in regional fiction as the century progressed. In "Luck," for instance, a group of rough and tumble miners assume group paternal duties for an orphan born to the settlement's half-Native American prostitute, Cherokee Sal, who dies shortly after labor. As the miners face their new parental responsibilities, they realize they must somehow clean the camp and change their gruff habits in order to raise the child honorably, who they name, of course, "Luck." Luck has an effect on the mining settlement similar the disappearance of Ellen Brewster in the scene from Freeman's novel *The Portion of Labor* that opens this dissertation. In both narratives it is the sudden absence or presence of a child that leads to a crowd, and which stimulates an excess of affect coded into the child as a symbol.

Over the course of the story, the men adopt new behaviors that run counter to nineteenth century gender codes. In an unexpected flourish at the end of the story, a flood drowns the camp's most significant fatherly figure, along with Luck. The story is often read as a semi-comical treatment of men adopting feminine habits of care and domesticity; the comedy arises from the contrast between the masculine associations of working-class masculinity dutifully performing maternal acts. Some criticism ignores Harte's tone and politicizes the story as an adventure in political correctness. For instance, as Axel Nissen writes in his essay "The Feminization of Roaring Camp: Bret Harte and the American Woman's Home," in the story Harte represents a "battle for control over the home" and a "counter move to the attempt to establish female hegemony in the home" (Nissen 380). Nissen contextualizes the story's use of domestic language by contrasting it with Catherine E. Beecher's *Treatise on Domestic Economy,* published in 1869. In that work, women are charged with household duties and men are to be charged with municipal, state, and civil affairs. Nissen considers the text openly misogynistic because of the settlement's contempt for the dying Native American prostitute.

"Roaring Camp" is a deeply under-theorized story, and Nissen's analysis of gender and sexuality in it mostly highlight the text's unrealized interpretative possibilities. His argument that the story is essentially trying to replace middle-class housewives with domesticated white working class miners is problematic. It misses the tone, which is sentimental and at times contemptuous of the miners as well as of Cherokee Sal. Harte's commercial success was built on just such satirical condescension; the rough logic here is indirectly minstrelsy, but one located in class stereotype rather than racial caricature.

It remains true, however, that the feminization of working-class masculinity does run against middle and upper class Victorian expectations in a strict sense. What seems rather striking to us

here, though, is how Harte describes the evolution of the miner's movements through the dialogic discourse of Lamarckian evolutionary science and the mutating "spontaneity" of behaviors in crowds. It is also rather striking that untying the complexity of the text's dialogic discourse also means noting the explicit political vocabulary of democratic government. Tellingly, Harte writes approvingly of the crowd from within the crowd itself. Rather than see all these narrative choices as indicative of a moral sexual politics, I propose we read them as theories about the collective agency of bodies within crowds, and the social function of herd animal behavior implicit in Harte's bio-democratic depiction of "spontaneous" free acts.

The men do not rationally plan or organize the changes in their behavior. Instead, their bodies suddenly open to new actions when they form crowds. As the story opens, the settlement miners gather on several occasions to debate their plans for Luck. At this point Cherokee Sal is still alive, but gravely ill. Not coincidently, Harte describes a surge of "excitement" that circulated among the men in the camp upon realizing they had to care for the infant (Harte 128). The gathering soon takes on special significance. It morphs into an informal democratic body. Rather than founding institutions of checks and balances or bureaucratic rationalization, the miners embody democratic values through gestures and movements. When the character Kentuck first nominates another character Stumpy to look after Luck, Harte writes that "the crowd approved the choice, and Stumpy was wise enough to bow to the majority" (Harte 129; italics mine). Kentuck's nomination of Stumpy appears as an authentic act of distributing power through the group, and whatever inclination we have had to see that nomination as fatuous is dispelled by the crowd's approval and Stumpy's bow. Though consistent with the big motions of crowds, these somewhat exaggerated gestures show a visible communal fraternity and a genuine cheerfulness. Given Harte's typical tone, our alertness to the possibility of his rendering Stumpy's bow as a sarcastic gesture by Stumpy is dispelled by the line's concluding political term. Stumpy bows to the "majority" out of respect for its size, and, given

Harte's light touch, it is probably unlikely that Stumpy is deep enough to perform the event with an ironic physical recognition. His name, after all, is Stumpy.

The form of the crowd's democratic movement occurs with the assumption that they already see themselves as equals in the settlement. The democratic movement here thus begins with the reminder that the discovery of gold has given them a sense of solidarity. This scene is also notable because this crowd isn't represented as criminal or pathological. If Harte is ultimately intent on domesticating working-class white male miners through feminization, as Nissen suggests, he is also attempting to domesticate the crowd through just this democratic process. It's also important to note that the crowd enacts democratic procedures by following a protocol of democratic ceremony, particularly at this early stage of explication. And yet, too, Stumpy's bow to the majority can be read as a respect for its collective strength. We could rehearse here, too, that the law emerges from the crowd: in the California settlements, a crowd such as this both functioned as a synecdoche of representative government back east and as its own legitimate government.

The democratic orientation of the crowd is all the more notable when Harte describes the types of men composing it. "The assemblage numbered about a hundred men," he writes, and adds that "one or two of these were actual fugitives from justice, some were criminal, and all were reckless. Physically, they exhibited no indication of their past lives and character" (Harte 129). These details about various debaucheries and histories aren't there to titillate readers with the thrills of outlaws. To stress their physical exoticism, Harte continues to describe their various physical disabilities, body sizes, and appearances. These descriptions are meant to make visible the inferior status of their bodies, and thus biologize the miners' class position as an extension of their inferior origins. Victorian beliefs about the criminal at this point shaded into beliefs about the basic degeneracy of criminal bodies, but, as we shall see, bodies were understood to be able to mutate new

inheritable traits within one lifetime. Harte is about to reverse the logic of Victorian fears about the contagious traits of working class bodies as a parallel reversal of the gender roles already noted.

He is careful to assert that whatever their individual conditions, no oddity could "detract from their aggregate force" (Harte 129). This detail begins to shift the individuals of the preceding section into a social assemblage, and also into an affect machine. Together they become something else: an organism whose collective metabolism comes into sync and produces excess affect. This excess "force" provides the organism with a productive capacity, and it is from this new capacity that the crowd will continue to generate new movements. External shocks can change the nervous system codes for routing affect into information for that movement. This occurs, for example, when the crowd's excitement transforms into anxiety when word finally arrives that Cherokee Sal is dead. This quick shift from euphoric excitement into anxious excitement acts as a microcosm of the way euphoria and panic can flip suddenly from one to the other, though both are amplified energetic bodily states. Harte declutches the tension from this flip by joking; the crowd's first decision, it seems, was to nurse the infant with a donkey. Democracy, it seems, has its pitfalls for Harte.

The domestication of the miners fully begins when they file in to see Luck a couple days later, in order to pay their respects to him. It is here the crowd again opens new possibilities of emergence for their behaviors. Stumpy has his hat off, and the others do the same. The immediate emergence of new behaviors occurs through repetition, or mimetic repetition made possible by the close proximity of the bodies in the crowd. Once more the act is simple: the first man entering removes his hat, and the others follow. "In such communities," Harte replies, "good and bad actions are catching" (Harte 132). The "catching" gesture reverses the Victorian fear of contagion, and implies again the biological origins of moral actions as a signs of healthy bodies. The sense of "catching" as it suggests a crowd contains the capacity to reproduce gestures from body to body as a

form of syncing together. The simulated gesture is not only a moral improvement in the Victorian sense, but once again a sign of respect for the child. This respect could again be read as gestural absurdity, since Stumpy does it out of deference to an infant that has no way to perceive it. Neither is the gesture meant for the others to copy; it's made clear that they do this on their own, spontaneously.

The mimetic repetition is an example of emergent behavior, and it occurs simultaneously with the crowd's recognition of Stumpy's leadership. The settlement's public engagement with Luck again happens in a crowd, though this time the crowd appears to be in a different state. The repetition of that gesture comes without the democratic debate in the previous scene, but the idea that Stumpy's gesture has representative power clarifies the mimetic acts of the others. The action helps stimulate the free acts of the others because, as a movement, it is symbolic. For Stumpy it's a sign of respect. This explains why it would be copied. The repetition of this sign again and again by the bodies gives the crowd a self-organizing quality, and shows its political significance. This repetition is also a form of consent to Stumpy's authority as the settlement's sovereign.

As Kentuck and Stumpy continue to care for the infant, the camp meets once again to determine their next steps. They decide to continue caring for Luck. The discourse of democratic government begins to intertwine with the image of the crowd: "A resolution to adopt it was unanimous and enthusiastic. But an animated discussion in regard to the manner and feasibility of providing for its wants at once sprung up" (Harte 134). A procedural act of democratic debate encounters the crowd's singular enthusiastic expression as consent. It doesn't vote on the resolution, but offers its consent as excitement, as an implied "unanimous" hurrah. We can compare that implied hurrah to the "animated discussion" that follows in order to give more definition to its character. The crowd is able to switch states quickly from unification to conversation. It has an

immanent capacity to express a fast speed of intelligent collective behavior and to then return to a slower speed of various assemblages – men talking to other men in clusters. The clustering of bodies into slower modes of conversation that follows its ability to speak in a unified manner at faster modes of consent gives us a clear picture of the embodied dimension of democratic process. This is a good example of a multiplicity: it has structure despite an ability to change form and reconstitute the structure of the bodies that give it that structure. It also alerts us to the fact that crowd forms vary upon an ability to switch states like this.

Harte explains that the discussion contained none of the "fierce personalities" that normally dominated discussions in the camp. His logic here reminds us immediately of the "leader and crowd" conversations that would take place later in the century. Those fierce personalities would have the power to command the crowd, it seems, because of their charismatic ability to influence crowd protocol by coding it with a confidence that would travel with the protocol, making it easier for bodies to recode quickly as belief. There is also the rather straightforward implication of intimidation. In a larger sense, Harte's crowd here actually starts to reconcile the plot's initial contradiction between the rough masculinity of the camp with the nurturing 'feminine' care that Luck needs.

The crowd's self-organization into clusters allows it to test several vectors for possible action. The camp dismisses offering the infant to another camp, doubts that a nurse will choose to live with them, and rejects the possibility of hiring another prostitute. They reject the last possibility, according to Harte, because their bodies have already began to morph into Victorian codes of conduct. Their rejection of a new prostitute was "the first spasm of propriety," Harte offers, and "the first symptom of the camp's regeneration" (Harte 135). A discourse of emergence appears here as a "spasm" that gives us the ability to reinterpret the quotation just above where the crowd

conversation "sprung up" after its hurrah. This new phrasing is part of the dialogic discourse tangling together vocabularies of nineteenth century evolutionary science, and Lamarck in particular. This moment decisively invites us to consider the reversal of working-class behaviors as a beneficial contagion, but with a caveat. It is not that the working-class can transmit its behaviors to new bodies through mimetic repetition or other means, but that its evolutionary mutations not so coincidently become legible expressions of Victorian middle-class "propriety." This complicates whether or not these are the "free" behaviors that break habits into new social forms.

Collective Consciousness and Animal Agency

We will pause in our interpretation of the Harte story and return to it in the next section, since we must reckon with the "spasm" and "regeneration" of Harte's language here in a new way. It appears that if we are to hold on to the possibility of free acts, we will have to account for whatever new openings we can. These openings are probably to be found in the concept of the mutation rather than the social form that emerges. To draw upon this concept, however, means re-theorizing it out of disproved Lamarckian notions of evolution. I propose that we turn instead to ethology, or the study of animal behavior, to begin accounting for the fast speeds of collective intelligence that bodies demonstrate in crowds. Instead of seeing behavioral mutation as a biologically inherited trait, we should see it as a complex act of emergence within the dense social assemblages of crowds. Major theorists of ethology, such as the mid-twentieth century German Nobel prize winning ethologist Konrad Lorenz, wrote contested studies (such as *On Aggression)* on the complex relationship between human "instincts" as a social animal and the "memory" of past emergencies that have been structured into the body's evolution in environments as an animal prior to the full development of *homo sapiens.*

As with Silvan Tomkins, the burgeoning field of cybernetic theory influenced Lorenz. In *On Aggression,* he details his belief that instincts were not simply reflexes, but "open programs" and "patterns" that gave the human body a basic "design" for actions in its environment (22, 23, 24). What he thus calls the "open instinct" is a "varying portion of genetic design" that interacts with "relevant experience" during a body's life to help the body survive in an environment (24). This idea of the open instinct helps to add a dimension to the biomechanical aspects of biosocial interactivity we can see in much of the fiction. He further argues, "no matter how much learning is incorporated into the completed pattern, the total influence on individual behavior will proceed with nearly the form of a closed program directing an insect in the heart of an oak" (25). While I hope to address more of Lorenz's thought and ethology generally here, I must attend to the degree that Lorenz believes behavior is a "closed program." It doesn't seem consistent with Grosz and Bergson to argue that behavior is a closed program. While Lorenz might say that it is the *genetic* influence on behavior that is a closed program, his syntax suggests that learning cannot undo that influence. I would position myself somewhere between Lorenz and Bergson: I believe culture obviously evolves at a faster speed than genetics, but that neither is determining. My efforts here to address the body's agency as animal stems first of all from what I believe are real gaps in critical theory's management of the biological aspects of cultural production, which I see as a continuation of Eve Sedgwick's desire in *Touching Feeling* to engage disciplines next to the humanities. I also believe that one simply cannot understand crowds from a purely sociological perspective, as if the cultural study of crowds was empty of the body's complex and at times even contradictory evolution over hundreds of thousands of years.

The added dimension of ethology gives us a further set of ideas to see as an embodied system of intelligence to help us make sense of how autonomous affect becomes encoded into bodily structures able to move at very high speeds – speeds higher, in fact, than consciousness. The

consciousness of the subject-ego's capacity for reflection thus works at a slower speed because it is actually this slower speed of operation that allows consciousness to map potential vectors of future behavior rather than continue operating on faster but more simplistic systems, such as those that code affect into fear during perceived emergencies. Such a fight or flight system is an example of this faster, more simplistic system, though it seems the third possibility of that system is simply *panicked paralysis*.

Lorenz wrote with an awareness of Tomkins and others who explained behavior in terms of a psycho-motor system. He observes that a "contemporary vocabulary" of psychology tended to explain behavior in terms of "drives," but that these drives were a "euphemism" (he wrote most of his popular works in the 1960s and 1970s; his disregard for drives is noted). Lorenz would prefer to describe behavior in terms of evolutionary programs. Notably, Lorenz theorizes the evolutionary need for herd animals to group together: "there was no other evolutionary road other than to join forces" with an "effective union of bodies" (203). Like other major ethologists of the period, who all referenced the second World War as a matrix for their own theories, Lorenz saw an innate control of space as an evolutionary tactic to secure the environment for the needs of the group. Lorenz links the modern forms of territorial conflict to this programming. "What we call patriotism," he offers, "is a calculable force which, released by a predictable situation, will animate man in a manner no different from other territorial species" (Lorenz 203). For Lorenz the defense of territory inspires a kind of love for the environment by the body. He is ambivalent about this "force," the same way Spinoza is ambivalent about the multitude. Lorenz isn't arguing that patriotism is the central explanation for human behavior. He is suggesting that the social passions work in complex systems coded by genetic protocol, and that what we've been calling a sovereign excitement, an ecstatic and aggressive force, is immanent within populations if not within all bodies in those populations. The

purpose of this claim isn't to make an ethical judgment, but to try and re-explain "death drives" and what Anderson called the bonds of nation in biocultural terms.

Lorenz calls them "innate processes," and remarks that "hitherto it is only the demagogues who seem to have a working knowledge of these matters," in another reference to World War II (he mentions Pearl Harbor repeatedly) (218). Yet the demagogue's association with crowd behavior is undeniable, too. Lorenz goes on to to suggest the biological capacities of bodies to kill, as in a lynch mob, while at the same time attempting to theorize the actual materialization of such events as biosocial, or what I've been calling here biocultural. The sovereign crowd is thus a biosocial machine that activates biosocial protocols from hunting parties: "men enjoy the chase and the kill…torture and suffering are made public spectacles for the enjoyment of all" (Lorenz 17). It's important not to reduce the violent crowd to the biological circuits that Lorenz is emphasizing here, but to see how the text can press upon uncomfortable expressions of some crowds, which isn't to say all crowds or all bodies in all populations work like this. It does return to Chesnutt's observation about the blood lust of the crowd in *The Marrow of Tradition,* and opens up space to speak about the pleasurable dimensions of violence.

It's also crucial for Lorenz to allow some further explanation for his claims. "Man is a predator of long predatory origins, whose predatory nature has shaped much that we are" (Lorenz 241). There is weird pronoun slippage here between "man" and "we," and there is also a sense that the "long" "origins" and past tense of "shaped" all imply a static past. The temporal dimension of an evolutionary science such as this is strangely ideological, since it seems to be caught in the discourse of the ancient primitive. There are no "origins." There is a constantly evolving field of mutations that are also interacting with machines and codes and affects. Nonetheless, even if we do not allow Lorenz's claims to be explanatory for all bodies, we must allow here – I argue – that the

hunting party Lorenz imagines forming a sort of lasting genetic memory and code for behavior in random variations within a population is consistent with the qualities of crowd behavior that have been treated with such ambiguous and ambivalent perspectives throughout this dissertation. Lorenz said that his own ideas were meant to spur new directions in group psychology, at least, and the object of this dissertation is reasserting a genealogy of crowd knowledge.

Citing Alfred Russell Wallace, Lorenz remarks that the “capacity for acting in concert, for protection of food and shelter,” he writes, should be considered next to “sympathy, which leads all in turn to assist each other,” as well as “the sense of right, which checks depredation upon our fellows” (Lorenz 261). For Lorenz it is the engagement with dueling systems of embodied protocols that shapes the body’s own intelligence. This intelligence is primarily emotional, and those emotions are sympathetic with body movements, gestures, and facial expressions. Some emotions are synchronized with gestures, and the reverse is also true: gestural movements can produce emotions. The body is a kind of distributed brain, where emotional cognition takes place in distinctly different ways than in language. The way the body’s emotional intelligence acts as a distributed brain is actually corollary to the ways in which social assemblages are multiplicities. Just as the crowd discussing Luck could unify for a consenting hurrah and then quickly redeploy bodies into conversation clusters, so too the body can unite its actions for coordinated movements and then re-localize attention to particular regions for specific expression, as when someone running might trip and then flush red with shame.

We can remark over and over again the sophistication of the cerebral cortex and the sophistication of cultural apparatuses and institutions, but perhaps one certain claim we could make is that the affect coding machines of political parties work very well, and the primary agency of the body’s emotional intelligence remains vividly viable. The challenge that it poses to Marxist science is

blurry, though the broad contours it might suggest for the Spinozist revision of contemporary Marxist critical theory appear self-evident. The notion of the Deleuzian war machine and wolf pack are also conceptually parallel to Lorenz, though much more flexible than Lorenz's apparent genetic privileging. It's also fair to say that several of the many crowds Canetti discusses resemble the hunting party, including crowds that hunt humans. The purpose of citing ethology here, and thus for figuring out what's useful in Lorenz's concepts, is to begin to offer us a concept of "animal" to deepen our understanding of "body." We do not want to have the body act as a idealistic cipher that is uncomplicated by the same moral and ethical ambiguities with which we critique cultures of class conflict and various discriminatory and genocidal regimes. We gain little from insisting that war machines are solely produced by exceptionally violent cultures, or from believing that the recent alterations of the legal and scientific edifice for race, gender, and sexuality fundamentally changes a population's capacity for slavery and genocide. We gain little from believing that ordinary citizens cannot become killers and executioners. It is not an abandonment of politics to signal that the "drives" of psychoanalysis and Tomkins' affect theory may possibly be better re-conceptualized as complex systems of protocol that can re-arrange how we're defining the human.

Deleuze and Guatarri do point in this direction when they remarks that one must "kill the fascist" inside. Lorenz sees ideologies as effectively affect machines: they produce a force to code the world *into* a body with the virtual capacity to kill. It is this virtual capacity of bodies that we should attend to as we organize the specific cultural and political machines that create vectors for the body's potential acts. To say that these vectors exist as virtual possibilities within the range of protocols in the body isn't to say that violence is inevitable, but does work to explain those dimensions of the crowd that Chesnutt feared. It also gives even more legitimacy to Wells' claims that arguing over the ethics of lynching isn't quite effective in preventing them, but that changing "public sentiment" may be instrumental. Like the advertisers who read Edward Bernay's *Propaganda*

(1920) a couple of decades after Wells' *Southern Horrors,* there was a recognition among cultural critiques of the crowd in the late nineteenth century that newspapers and other distributed media networks were important machines for recoding the possible vectors for the direction of metabolic energies in populations. Surplus affect is a fact, and populations have a seemingly inexhaustible metabolic supply of virtual potential to form crowds or to become suggestible for behaving in certain ways. While the predictive abilities of what one body might do is quite difficult, one can make broad predictions about populations, and this is what became the science of public opinion in the early twentieth century, and which grew directly out of group psychology and from Le Bon's *The Crowd* in particular (see Walter Lippman). The commercial potential of exploiting the virtual pathways of possible behaviors is what came to define twentieth century consumerism.

Lorenz makes several more points that we must briefly incorporate. He argues that culture exists to perfect the "impact of aggression" by ritualizing it and subjecting it to rules and regulations (277). He also continues to insist that the labor of care-work matters as much as the aggressive force in human evolution. He cites sympathy and friendship as examples. Yet his return to the destructive capacities of the body is always co-present with the bonds that keep groups together. The "animal needs" that he believes are central to explaining and motivating behavior are security, stimulation, and identity. He thus offers the possibility, following William James, that war may be more stimulating than peace, and thus capable of bringing pleasure. Together, though, "evolutionary command is unconscious," by which we take him to mean that evolutionary command is a protocol that creates the virtual conditions for certain tendencies, and is unconscious to the extent that it is the territory of the body's agency.

His work in *Behind the Mirror* perhaps provides a transition here. In that later work he moves further from the centrality of aggression and more toward explaining human behavior as a function

of herd behavior. He argues that human rituals resemble animal rituals, and that common elements of human cultures are present in the social behaviors of animals.[24] He believes that coordinated movements in animals are "effected by a means of signals which symbolize a particular behavior pattern" (Behind *the Mirror* 209). In ways that are necessary for us to understand Harte's story "Luck," Lorenz claims that gestures are in fact a language, and that animals communicate using this language of gestures. "Expressive or display movements" and "ritualized means of communications" provide the basis for "behavior patterns" that form collective communication and, thus, collective intelligence. For Lorenz the ritualization of these collective communications is essential to giving the group identity. In particular, communication rituals channel "certain behavior patterns into specific areas," and can also work to create "new motivations which actively influence the complex of social conduct," and also the "creation of independent symbols" (Behind *the Mirror* 209). Animals groups are able to communicate outside of language, using the body. Body language is actually a form of signs and signals. The communication of this language can occur at much higher speeds than linguistic communication, and, to a certain exist, is perceived by the body at faster speeds than the conscious mind can cognate. Crowds think at this speed because crowds communicate both at this speed and at the speed of linguistic communication. Crowds think at multiple speeds, and crowds think with the *body,* which is to say a multiplicity of systems that quickly assimilate external information into protocols.

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24 It might be worth considering the rather easy conflation of landscape and territory in Lorenz and others with Grosz's idea in *Chaos, Territory, Art* that territory is an active construction: "The first artist, for Deleuze, is the architect, the one who distinguishes inside from outside, who draws a boundary, a we have discussed previously. This boundary is not self-protective but erotico-propretorial: it defines a stage for performance, an arena of enchantment, a mise-en-scene for seduction that brings together various heterogeneous and otherwise unrelated elements: melody and rhythms, a series of gestures, bows, and dips, a tree or a perch, a nest, a clearing, an audience of rivals, an audience of desired ones" (Grosz 48). Even with this rather more interactive and temporal conception of territory, however, I would still point to a disconnect in Grosz's tone that is instructive. She says that the boundary is not "self-protective," but that territory is brought about, in part, to collect "an audience of rivals." The emphasis here, and in the longer passage from which it comes, focuses on sexual selection. Yet to deny the protective function of territory seems to be a utopian stance. The fact of the rivals suggests that there is a looming confrontation that, for some species, can end in death.

This is where Lorenz fully departs from any sense of genetic determinism and begins to account for how cultural productions of symbols and codes could re-orient and coordinate the actions of entire groups – crowds. "Every high differentiation of a communicative action implies the coming into existence of an altogether new, autonomous fixed motor pattern, which, like every other, possesses its own spontaneity and its own appetitive behavior" (Behind *the Mirror* 212). New communications via new gestures can emerge from crowds. Strikingly, Lorenz adds that "the animal *wants* to perform this sequence of movements; the performance has become a need" (212). He further suggests that the structure of communities, both human and animal, is determined by the ritual behaviors, and that the imitation of behavior by bodies helps coordinate group movements. He extends from this an analysis of symbols that suggests their power to "stand for a whole range of objects and actions, especially emotions, felt by members of the group to have value" (Behind *the Mirror* 229). This statement is most interesting in that he considers how symbols could stand *for emotions,* which is a point that we will return to later.

For now we should note that Lorenz considers moods essential to understand group behavior, and that "external forces can greatly influence the amplitudes of these fluctuations of mood" (Behind *the Mirror* 239). He counters this with the idea that bodies "need" *stimulus,* and that even without external prodding the body will "search for missing stimulus" with an "autonomous appetite" (Behind *the Mirror* 53). For him rituals help capture this need, which is driven by a metabolic excess. For him the line between ritual and instinct is indistinct, and one is actually a function of the other. Cultural rituals, then, are elaborate expressions of bodily needs, and we must change our definition of instinct from reflex to something more complex. "Ritual has become a need for the animal, an end in itself," which would seem to include sex acts as rituals *rather* than instincts for reproductive ends. The various kinds of rituals are then expressive of collective identity. Some rituals

redirect bad affect from the group onto an object: the scapegoat. Other rituals include the triumph ceremony.

In *Language and Symbolic Power* Pierre Bourdieu addresses the rituals of ceremonies, and some of his observations start to complement our genealogy of crowd knowledge here. He is necessary to bring in here for how he starts to incorporate the linguistic dimension into the rituals of communication Lorenz discusses. Bourdieu argues that we can understand the more specific transactions that take place in crowds, if we are to consider these rituals and ceremonies as constitutive examples of crowd behavior. Bourdieu theorizes a situation that seems to define the events of the Luck crowd and Stumpy above. A representative of the group is mutually imbricated with the crowd; neither is more powerful than the other. "The representative creates the group which creates him," Bourdieu writes, and this representative is a "fictitious person," a symbol, and "he lifts out of the state of a simple aggregate of separate individuals, enabling them to act and speak, through him, 'like a single person'" (Bourdieu 106). The leader of the crowd, however temporary or occasional, is fictitious in the sense that his or her body is semiotically apart from his or her actual body. Bourdieu routes this ritual "social magic" into the speaker's ability to "produce and impose representations…of the social world" (111, 127). This is where he says politics begins. The language spoken to the crowd has a performative dimension. It is a vision meant to bring about in the world what it utters. Language heard by the group becomes authorized at the same moment that it is expressed, because it "draws its legitimacy from the group over which it exercises authority" (Bourdieu 129). He draws upon neither Austin's illocutionary force or Weber's charisma, but instead upon the "labor of enunciation" and the "labor of dramatization" (Bourdieu 129). We can think of this labor as, in part, the labor of coding affect into political protocol. We can also imagine that this labor is distributed and not necessarily the inevitable product of a single body in the crowd. This will be a subject of chapter five on Frank Norris' *The Pit*.

Emile Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* speaks to the transformations that occur in bodies within crowds. His work is useful for theorizing more about the specific way that symbols and signs interact with gestures, movements, and the extreme intensities of crowd expression. He follows the logic of Laclau's critique of the empty referent of populism, catachresis, and from this we can see how the affect and protocol machines of culture might connect with Lorenz's claims about the body's own code of evolutionary genetics and communication rituals. The first step in moving from a gestural code of communication into a symbolic one is addressing how any various number of bodies can come to signify the sacred in the crowd. This sacred structures the group's collective identity. Durkheim calls the "totemic principle" the idea that groups worship an "anonymous and impersonal force" that can only become concretized in objects (Durkheim 191). The nature of this force isn't quite clear, but seems to be an excess that is present, a sort of affect for life itself.

The totem for Durkheim is a kind of a cultural fetish, but a fetishization that produces an intense form of devotion and worship. This is how he explains religious affect. He claims that the totemic principle is notion that totems stand in for this force, and that "if the emotion elicited by the thing itself was really the determining cause of totemic rites and beliefs, then this thing would also be the sacred being par excellence…[but] it is totemic emblems and symbols of all kinds that possess the greatest sanctity" (Durkheim 208). So the sacred affect of the totem must have an object, but the actual referent behind the object is a specific kind of energetic force.

Durkheim starts to clarify the function of the totem's relationship with the energetic force when he says that the totem is somewhat arbitrary, but comes to represent a *need* for identity: "it is the flag of the clan, the sign by which each is distinguished from the other, the visible mark of its distinctiveness" (Durkheim 208). The function of the totem is thus divisive and unifying. It seems to

be both productive of identity and productive of "other" identity. That is, the totem productively consumes affect; it intensifies the crowd's emotions to the point where the crowd considers the symbol nearly indivisible from the crowd. As with Bourdieu's claims about the "fictitious" speaker earlier, the totem is the fictitious symbol of the group itself, but creates a loop of meaning whereby the totem refers back to the group which refers back to the totem, just as Bourdieu would argue that the fictitious speaker represents the group by sustaining the group that he or she represents. Therefore the crowd is able to use the totem or the speaker as a loop machine for identity, and thereby short-circuit the referent's real emptiness. Yet the continual intensification of affect in the crowd thus continually produces the sensations in bodies to an ever-greater power, and thus the looping process that clarifies the otherwise indeterminate meaning of the symbol also creates a self-reinforcing cycle of intense sensations.

Durkheim describes the general attitude adopted by the group as respect. The intensifying process describe above ultimately creates a reverence that is akin to a sublime kind of respect. This respect for the referent exceeds the respect one has for one's own body. This is thus the affective state necessary to create bodies capable of sacrificing for the crowd. The "representation" has such "power" that it "calls forth or inhibits conduct automatically, *irrespective of any utilitarian calculation of helpful or harmful results"* (italics his; Durkheim 209). Crowd intelligence doesn't originate from hunting, but does seem to actualize vectors of possible behavior into states with life or death stakes. Such a crowd phase state means that it has become an organized singularity of bodies – a social assemblage that is also an event. The experience of temporal collapse within the crowd, the sense that time has become fully 'present,' coincides with the vulnerability of the crowd's actual ability to persist in this time. Time, in that way, can only be 'now' for a short while.

The crowd in this phase is a multiplicity, where individual identity and behavior have become coordinated and assembled into a temporary organism, with consciousness. This organism is a phase state of the social. It's an organism made of bodies that sustains the tensions of its separate parts through the communication of the parts together. This is what assemblage means. Collective consciousness within this phase is a thinking machine, but its ability to "think" resembles the way bodies think expressively, in movement, in motion, and also through a different kind of speech. This speech is simplified and repetitious. It has refrains, and is punctuated by cries of affirmation. These cries of affirmation help to give the crowd in this phase an ability to stay together. It is at this moment that individual voices in the crowd are as important to the sustainability of the crowd as any main speaker. The hoorah, the "yes," the "amen," the cheer, the clapping, and booing (to show displeasure) are all cries of affirmation. A crowd synced together will often develop rhythms of expression coordinated to the speech of the speaker or speakers. We can see aspects of all these qualities in the crowd Harte describes in "Luck." This should remind us of what Tomkins called the "vocalization of affect."

It's possible to further this claim by pairing it together with the specific excitements of the crowd. In an echo of what we have read so far, William James in *The Principles of Psychology* (Volume *Two)* also writes that crowds are an anthropological expression of common psychological behavior in populations. He writes that "higher" feelings emerge in ceremonies and ordeals, and which seem to be "universal in our species" (James 428). For James, the "excitement of concerted action" so common to militaries, religions, festivities, civic exercises, and parties increases the sensations experienced within those ceremonies (425). People are excited from seeing other people, and they are also excited to see concerted movements. "There is a distinct stimulation at feeling our share in the collective life," James writes (425). James compels us to consider why we developed this "primitive element in our nature" by thinking of hunter-gatherer tribes. Like many others, he

believes there is a direct line of evolution from military engagement (hunting and war raids) to the pleasures associated with symbolic military engagements: games.

James argues that the intensifying excitements that bodies experience in crowds can depend upon a particular kind of pleasure felt therein. It's possible this is part Spinozist joy: bodies feel pleasure because they're with other bodies. With those other bodies, bodies can experience the joy of combination and expand. James, though, directs our attention to consider how the evolutionary past of bodies encodes crowd movements into pleasurable sensations. James too ascribes an evolutionary reasoning for crowd formation. His allusion to the "primitive element in our nature" reinforces the degree to which the body's own intelligence system intensifies the "distinct stimulation" of crowds through its own nervous system codes. This stimulation is the "need" Lorenz attributes to organisms generally, and calls into question how we might trouble the idea of this element as an intelligent instinct.

Crucially, James defines instincts together with emotions. "Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions shade imperceptibly into one another," he argues, and he goes on to contend that "every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well" (James 442). It would seem from this definition, then, that the body's reaction to the crowd produces more than an intensification of excitement. It's possible to understand the excitement of the crowd as a particular "higher feeling," as he said earlier. This high feeling of excitement would give the crowd its own emotion. With Durkheim in mind, we might say directly that the feeling of the crowd is religious. A crowd would then be able to produce religious feeling around any kind of ceremony, be it violent or not, because of the presence of the religious feeling. James' theory of emotion presumes that all emotions-instincts come from objects, which would lead us to assert that symbols themselves then become the object of religious feeling; they would make it possible to distribute crowd excitements

and project the crowd into space. "The mere memory or imagination of the object," James writes, "may suffice to liberate the excitement. One may get angrier in thinking over one's insult than at the moment of receiving it; and we melt more over a mother who is dead than we ever did when she was living" (443). Both his examples are instructive. Although James is not defining symbols of crowd excitement in this passage, he conjures here images of a dead mother or an insult carried past a confrontation. His point is exactly that the mother's body has become a symbol, and that the insult, remembered as a pointed linguistic hook, nonetheless *represent* something in excess of what they actually did as events.

We should note that James' theory of emotions as embodied phase states does much to affirm what Tomkins and Ekman suggested about the physiology of culture in the introduction. "Bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact," he writes (449). For James these changes are already processed through the biosocial codes of perception; he doesn't imagine something like "pure" sensation, except as it might exist for infants. As pure sensation becomes more processed through cultural environments, the body adapts its affect program accordingly (again, recall Ekman and Tomkins). This process of adaptation – of becoming – changes the body's affective orientation toward objects, environments, and other bodies. James insists that this orientation actually comes to be "reality" for bodies. "Reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life…Whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real" (James 295). The reality of the environment and the sovereignty and even legibility of other bodies, then, rests upon a perpetual system that's over-determined by the affect program. "Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life," James surmises, rather profoundly, "are things of whose reality I cannot doubt" (298). This statement demonstrates why the body's coupling with the crowd allows

the politics of speech and action to define reality itself.[25] The sovereignty of the crowd depends in part on a religious feeling (what Ekman calls a refractory state) that gives bodies the sensation that the crowd – the crowd of "us" – is simply all that exists.[26]

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25 In *The Emotional Tie*, Borch-Jacobsen's version of this follows from Lacan's analysis of hysterical speech: "it does not matter whether or not hysterical speech adequately represents a past reality; what matters is that it 'founds,' performatively the truth of the subject in the here and now of its enunciation, with all the consequences that this implies for the future" (90). Interestingly for our discussion here, Borch-Jacobsen then turns to Levi-Strauss' account of shamanism as a technique of symbols. Levi-Strauss believed that shamanism was a sociotherapy founded on group consensus; it helped to cure 'cure' bodies by integrating the "ineffable psychical or physical pain in a common language" (91). It is not just any speech, though, that can cure – "not all symbols are valuable" (92). Borch-Jacobsen argues that it is not the content of the myths or symbols that is important, but the '"ecstasy"' that can assure the passage from one emotional state to another (93). Curative speech is in this sense "mimetic speech," or, tellingly, speech in which "I speak 'under the name of an other'" (93). It isn't inter-subjective speech, but the "speech of no subject" (93). Crucially, Borch-Jacobsen argues that the speech of such trance is one where the "I" is spoken by the other that it incarnates, and which "simultaneously experiences all the affects of his role" (93). This is what Lacan excluded from the reality principle – the cathartic speech of hypnosis.

Borch-Jacobsen immediately connects such speech to crowds and "crowd phenomena," particularly by way of addressing the fact that no one discipline can really explain it. This "X" is confused across disciplines, who each seem to name it differently and also to describe different ways that it works. Of the "depersonalization" that occurs in crowds, he rightfully surmises that the affect of "being-other" cannot be communicated, and thus "every discourse on the trance…can do nothing but miss its object, precisely because it makes an object of it" (101). I would make the same case for the crowd. It is always already almost one.

It is yet key that, citing Levi-Strauss, Jacobsen writes that ritual furnishes the patient and the group with a myth that expresses otherwise un-expressable bodily states. He keenly rehearses the idea, following Laclau, that the ritual is a floating signifier, and thus "destined, like all mana categories, to symbolically integrate a state or situation that escapes the symbolic system" (107). The state that escapes is the state of affect in bodies that we are trying to explore in this project. This escape is related, though not identical with, the autonomy of affect.

Finally, it is relevant to note that Borch-Jacobsen writes that Freud thought that affect concealed the real meaning of representations, when in fact that affect "does not think" (144). "It is acted," he writes, according to a "will" that does not deliberate before moving. Freud thought that is action was the action of the repressed. But Borch-Jabobsen argues that affect is the *cognito* of the unconscious. For him, then, "we must conclude that it is the unconscious itself" (145). I would contend that the will or *cognito* of particular affects work according to the biosocial interactions of bodies' affect programs. There is no one will. I would agree that the action of affect have less to do with the repressed than with, first, Tomkin's Ekman's notions of scripts, and second, the genetic protocols of the affect program as a specific intelligence processing of environmental data. It is thus much more complicated than to say that unconscious can act like a subject; the closest we get to that here is considering the body as a kind of subject. But as I said in the introduction, we should resist positing the body this way. It is a multiplicity of competing systems. When Borch-Jacobsen writes that it is affect and its effects that materializes during transference, this is another way of saying that instead of re-surfacing the repressed other bodies can excite the affect program of bodies into action. Those bodies are affect machines.

The crowd couples to itself as an environment; there is no outside except what can be projected as an outside from within the crowd itself. That outside is therefore necessarily everything that isn't real to sensations of ultimate 'life' – this would be death and all the bodies that are thus symbols of death. This is how we can conceive of the crowd's excited ability to not fear death (recall Spinoza: the mob is unafraid). Those objects and bodies would be even more unreal, too, because they are conceptions – empty referents – that work instead to structure the collective identity of the crowd. "Sensations are more lively and are judged more real than conceptions," James adds (300). Yet by the same logic, James allows for the converse to be true, too: "the more a conceived object excites us, the more reality it has" (307). The only real conceptions, then, are those that create exciting sensations. In this way the very symbols of other bodies and objects, however true or untrue, can become more real than the bodies and symbols they purport to be or represent. One does not suspend belief or not; one believes, by contrast, because one is excited.

The excitement of conceptions can form crowds and give direction to crowd movements. Even for James the consequences of how sensations and emotions constitute the real of reality become immediately political. "The reason of the belief is undoubtedly the bodily commotion which the exciting idea sets up," he offers, and speculates that such bodily commotion explains too "our political or pecuniary hopes and fears" (James 308). Unsure whether such passions are examples of insanity or just physical phases, James poignantly pairs the sensation of religion together with crowd behavior: "Such are the revelations of mysticism. Such, particularly, are the sudden beliefs which

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[26] In *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* James explore further the evolutionary structures of religious thought. Citing Darwin, James writes that "you see how natural it is, from this point of view, to treat religion as a mere survival; for religion does in fact perpetuate the traditions of the most primitive thought. To coerce the spiritual powers, or to square them and get them on our side, was, during enormous tracts of time, the one great object in our dealings with the natural world" (495). For James, then, the feeling of "faith" is a benefit to survival. In what he calls the "faith-state," despite holding a "minimum of intellectual content," bodies feel a wonder and courage (505). Whatever positive intellectual content "is associated' with this faith-state "gets inevitably stamped in upon belief" (506).

animate mobs of men when frenzied impulse to action is involved" (309). The religious sensations of crowds seem to interact with the specific biosocial ecology of specific political cultures.[27]

Crowds experience reality through the affect codes of a nervous system adapted to particular affect machines: bodies become hardwired to culture. "Whatever be the action in point," James philosophizes, "whether the stoning of a prophet, the hailing of a conqueror, the burning of a witch, the baiting of a heretic or Jew…the fact that to believe a certain object will cause that action to explode is a sufficient reason for that belief to come" (309). James' examples here are again explanatory. Remembering Schmitt's conception of friends and enemies, the enemy production of the witch, of the heretic, and of the Jew reveals something structural to how the crowd creates an "outside" for its own collective identity, which is to say an outside for reality itself. The real has a border that is marked by the bodies of the crowd's enemies. James is strenuous about claiming that the biosocial basis for this reality means that our bodies are indeed back-formed by our cultures. Reality is a bodily commotion that, in a crowd, stimulates bodies into a religious excitement. It is this excitement that allows for the sovereignty of the crowd: the crowd acts in the name of reality – that

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We should remember here Alberto Toscano's claim in *Fanaticism* that politics is ultimately about a management of affect within social systems "and with emotional ambition." Toscano also refers to just the sensations James is describing here by citing Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia.* Mannheim defines fanaticism as "chiliasm," or "a state of mind that strives toward some kind of realization" (92). Mannheim believed there were different states of mind depending on one's politics, but that all visions of utopia are qualified by a temporality or duration of time that feels like eternity. "Chiliasm," Toscano explains, "is marked by a particular emotional and cognitive state that Mannheim calls 'absolute presentness'" (93). Besides remembering that Spinoza described knowing "God" in much the same way, Toscano's rehearsal of this present-ness should directly relate to the sense of time produced by the crowd. Also of interest to us here is that Toscano summarizes the Chiliasm of "millenarian movements" as "defined not by their theological form but by their affective content, by the transformative collective energies that drive the situated negation and transcendence of the social status quo" (97). Both Toscano and Mannheim, then, also insist that political movements are in fact religious movements. He extends this line of thought to John Gray's *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia,* but interprets Gray's thesis about revolution being religion by another name by moving to ground that impulse in the body, as James does here. "There exists a basic affective and anthropological drive or function known as 'religion,'" he writes, "characterized by absolute certainty, invariant across wildly different, genealogically distant and geographically unconnected phenomena of militancy" (Toscano 211). The terms affective and anthropological here remain exactly the under-theorized concepts that I am attempting to explore in this section of the chapter.

is, the crowd acts in the name of life. The crowd evolved to escape death by bodies becoming together the very *feeling* of life. The bodily commotion of sovereignty is a sensation that one has joined a sacred machine. The speed of the body's own intelligent processing allows bodies to die or kill within the assemblage of that sacred machine. The experience of killing and dying is utterly coincident with the truth of reality itself.

One of the functions of the crowd is to create the conditions for this sovereignty, and that is the political significance I have been emphasizing throughout the dissertation. Yet the other purpose, relevant to this chapter, is that this phase state allows for fast communications to take place in the crowd, and for new behaviors to emerge and also be learned at fast rates of speed. The crowd is thus a location for fast processing of new cultures. It is a way to disseminate new information and to test and assess what the information means to the collective. The way that the miners of the settlement in "Luck" called a meeting is indicative of this. The purpose of the meeting was to process information. This can also be a point of clustering. As those clusters collect and share opinions, they can test reactions to ideas through embodied forms of cognition. The purpose of slow processing, which is to say conversation, is also to set up a dialogue between the complex codes that mediate between various possibilities for desire. This means bodies can be persuaded one way or another, but the purpose of debate between persons is to arrive at a position that 'feels right.' What feels right can be changed, but it's always a complicated and uniquely specific set of circumstances that allows this to happen. This is why prejudice, especially prejudice 'hardened' into bodies as emotional memories, can be difficult to alter in some persons. One develops hardened memories, or individually and culturally specific emotional positions, because those positions define the identity of individuals and entire cultures.

Durkheim doesn't attend to the possible ways we might assemble the religious ceremonies of crowds into concepts of bodily agency that blur into concepts of animal intelligence.[28] The reason for this is because, following Bergson and Grosz, we are more interested in understanding the consciousness of crowds, networks, and animals because we are not invested in reifying individuals as the screen of understanding political cultures. Instead of fetishizing the individual human body and individual human consciousness, we are willing to think degrees of consciousness as degrees of life, where, following Grosz, "life is consciousness." The purpose of marking out the individual human is normative. To break from defining the human in terms of its reproductive origins is to break from defining the human in order to exclude other bodies from that category. This is a further break from the eugenic paradigm that insists upon naming the human as a body with pure origins. The purpose of racial and gender categories, so alive during Harte's era and the late nineteenth century, was to provide the ultimate 'natural' and scientific rationale for the labor of slaves, immigrants, and women. The purpose of the human category today is to exclude other forms of consciousness from legal protections, respect, rights, and freedom. Just as women and African-Americans were slaves in the nineteenth century because they were property, today we cannot allow animals to lose the status of property, though not for the labor they perform. This is also true for artificial intelligence.

To say that the human has an animal intelligence is really a way to describe the speed at which the body processes information and acts all by itself, but also a way to describe the complex

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28 I should note that my concept of animal intelligence as a bodily speed of perception breaks from Grosz's ideas in *chaos, territory, art* that defines the animal as "lowly" (63). Following Deleuze's idea that the animal and first architect, are the first artists, she writes that art comes from excess, and from something within us that is "bestial" (63). She pursues this line of thought by reasoning that psychoanalysis was "at least half-right" in its assertion that art has relations to sexuality: "art is connected to sexual energies and impulses, to a common impulse for more" (63). I would argue that the "impulse for more" comes from a "need" or organisms for stimulation, and not necessarily due to sexual energies re-routed elsewhere. I might even suggest that sexual energies derive in part from that need for stimulation. Grosz and Freud believe that artistic energy is displaced sexual energy; I would argue that metabolic surplus is constitutive of living organisms.

protocols and systems operating within the body, and which intersect. In *A Thousand Plateaus,* Deleuze and Guatarri theorize a transition of phase space whereby embodied consciousness could flip back and forth from faster to slower speeds of cognition. They see bodies and social assemblages as multiplicities and machines, as evolving and transforming parts and layers: "I am on the edge of a crowd, at the periphery; but I belong to it, I am attached to it by one of my extremities, a hand or foot" (29). This passage draws out the location whereby the body *movement* connects to the crowd spatially, and focuses on what a body *does,* rather than where the subject's from. The crowd in Deleuze here can become a war machine, which is immanent as a virtual possibility of bodies. "As for the war machine in itself, it seems to be irreducible to the State apparatus," they write (352). They go on to say that "the war machine is of another species, another nature, and other origin than the State apparatus" (352). The war machine doesn't even necessarily refer to human crowds. There is such a sense of openness and an active anticipation of emergence: "It is because no one, not even God, can say in advance whether two borderlines will string together or form a fiber, whether a given multiplicity will or will not cross over into another given multiplicity, or even if given heterogeneous elements will enter symbiosis" (251). It's this notion of "symbiosis" that could start more fully to define how language, symbols, cries, gestures, and synchronous movements synthesize distinct bodies into another consciousness. "The self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities," they write (249). It is perhaps most intriguing that the sorcerer figure in *A Thousand Plateaus* is the body "becoming-animal."

Durkheim gives us another discourse to try and apprehend the becoming animal of the crowd, and how the process of crowd intensification works. He chooses to follow the transformation of the symbol into encoded affect, and why it can move bodies. There is some privileging of a mystified affect here that there is not space to define as we follow his description of the rising threshold levels of crowd affects. He writes that a psychic "energy…bends our will" and

that it acts as a pressure that moves "within us," even as what we feel is "respect" (Durkheim 209). Then the "intensity" of the representation in the individual mind "finds resonance in all the others," and the crowd can "translate" bodies into more intensity than it could alone (Durkheim 209). This translation is able to coordinate behaviors, movements, and beliefs. Durkheim even goes so far as to say that "the mental representation of a thing that is the object of a state of opinion has a tendency to *repress* and hold at bay those representations that contradict it; it commands instead those actions that fulfill it" (Durkheim 210). This repressive tendency is interesting because it isn't Freudian or psychoanalytic.

I would argue that this repressive tendency codes affects that intensify joy at the very idea of the crowd. To feel part of the crowd is to feel a sort of invincibility, a mastery of space, a sense that because consciousness is co-present with time one cannot die. This eliminates the fear of death, or the dread of death. The crowd ultimately intensifies the sense of life, the power of being alive, by enlarging the scope of consciousness. It is almost like seeing farther: one's perception is somewhat impossible because one shares one's body. It is like a delirium. It is from within this state that one can forget the fear of death, just as the introduction implied about Spinoza's affects of blessedness and glory, because the collective consciousness has repressed it. One does not deny death. One thinks as part of an organism that excludes it. It is in this sense that Le Bon says that the crowds think as if they are dreaming. The consciousness of the crowd operates within its own protocols.

Durkheim claims that persons have mistaken this affect for God and gods, but that, in fact, this influence of *society* comes from "psychic mechanisms that are too complex, to be easily traced to the source" (Durkheim 211). We might add here that there is no "source," and that the mechanisms in question are actually biosocial interactions determined by the intensity thresholds of particular assemblages that have organic and inorganic parts. Durkheim further argues that all political,

economic, or religious parties hold ceremonies where followers can renew their commitments to the "common faith" (Durkheim 212). He also describes the man talking to the crowd that Bourdieu mentions, and in similar terms. The "surplus" of the speaker's gestures and language "comes to him from the very group he is addressing" (Durkheim 212). We might agree with this to a point, but we might also argue here that it is possible that the surplus of those gestures come from a surplus of affect that cannot be encoded into bodies. Movement can only express so much affect by making it intelligent as gesture and emotionally distributed thinking (as if each thought had a part). Notably, Durkheim theorizes that without symbols, social feelings would be too unstable to unite groups of bodies together. In this sense, symbols act as codes or protocols. He writes that the strong feelings that occur when bodies are close together disappear when bodies disperse, except in memory. The technology of language and memory, for him, arises from these crowd behaviors: the "movements by which these feelings have been expressed must become inscribed on things that are durable, then they too become durable" (Durkheim 233). This is the technology of the flag and also of writing.

Gender Mutation

We return to our long detour into the theory of animal intelligence as a way to speak to the body's agency, and to account for the possible systems that code affect and make the behaviors of crowds intelligible. Back in the settlement of the miners, under the care of his new male parents, Luck grows bigger and healthier. Almost satirically, Harte explains his growth: "the invigorating climate of the mountain camp was compensation for material deficiencies. Nature took the foundling to her broader breast" (Harte 135). Yet the explanation actually makes sense here in the context of nineteenth century science, which thought that climate and health were locally interrelated. The "asses' milk" fed the child heartily (Harte 136). The rituals of raising the child

consume the business of the camp. On the day they christen him, an "expectant crowd" gathers before a makeshift church service (Harte, 137). Stumpy invokes God to cement his role as godfather, which was "the first time that the name of the Deity had been uttered otherwise than profanely in the camp" (Harte, 137). The Christening fully establishes the miners' transformation into pious and respectful moral agents. "And so," Harte concludes at the end of the scene, "the work of regeneration began in Roaring Camp. Almost imperceptibly a change came over the settlement" (Harte 138). Harte's use of the word regeneration is in contrast to the eugenic fear of regression. It's a thematic development of the biosocial evolution of the settlement, but also continues to create a teleological progress for the bodies into middle-class Victorians. It is almost like a turn of the century Progressive fairytale. Stumpy works for the "rehabilitation" of the cabin where he lives with Luck (Harte 138). He cleans and white-washes it. The other miners see the new cleanliness and copy it, in another wave of mimetic repetition. Even Kentuck cannot escape noticing the "stricter habits of personal cleanliness," and "such was the subtle influence of innovation that he thereafter appeared regularly every afternoon in a clean shirt" (Harte, 138-9). By "influence of innovation," we are able to grasp some of the appeal new behavior had; it was copied in part because it was different, and also for reasons of conformity. The intelligence behind such a decision would rest on the logic – animal logic, that is – that learning new movements might help the collective stay together. It suggests that the purpose of mimetic repetitions is ultimately a survival strategy, but not because new behaviors help one survive. It is indirectly related to survival, in that it keeps the group cohesive. Long term, group cohesion is necessary to survival. It's not a surprise to us, then, that the new adaptations in behavior increase. The men cease to yell and make noise. They quit cursing. They begin to practice singing lullabies. Walking Luck through the trees and scenery, the men begin to notice the beauty of flowers.

Harte's tone at this point is playfully confident. "Such was the golden summer of Roaring Camp," Harte writes, "They were 'flush *times,'* – and Luck was with them. The claims had yielded enormously" (italics mine; Harte, 142). Here the narrative grows ever more fascinating. The narrator tells us that the convergence of Luck the child with the "luck" of gold claims speaks to an analogous role of the child and the gold itself. The child and the gold are conceptually linked. Just as gold becomes the empty referent of endlessly deferred dreams, the child Luck becomes a symbol for something else. On the one hand, the shock of the child Luck created a crowd, and from that crowd mimetic and repetitious behavior came to extend the collective identity of the crowd during its formation into signs of unity once the crowd had dispersed. This is just as Durkheim proposed when he said that one must inscribe the crowd's movements into a language and disseminate that language in order to code surplus affect back into signs that symbolize the group. In this way signs of the crowd act as code machines and affect machines – they're two-way and interactive technologies. They code surplus affect back into memories of the crowd, and also stimulate affect in the body, which is itself coded back into the nervous system and back into consciousness. It works to create memory and extend the identity of the crowd through time.

Just as finding Luck creates a crowd, so does the shock of finding gold create one, too. We might read the child, then, as Harte's method of concretizing and personifying the crowd formation that materialized as a result of financial euphoria. Yet this reading might be overly reductive, for we also have Harte's suggestion that the animal intelligence of crowds could express rituals of democratic behavior as an immanent and virtual capacity. A democratic process that can flip between fast and slow speeds, such as the one in the story, would seem to be another aspect of the "leveling instinct" Rudé cites as a function of the crowds in the French food riots. If so, one could make the argument that perhaps crowds under a certain size could embody democratic practice

without the need of institutions, and to the extent that they use this process specifically to define labor tasks we might call such a crowd communist.

Seen with all these possibilities, it is almost hard to remember that Harte meant us to imagine all of the crowd's mutations as *feminine* middle-class behaviors. The men, after all, come to care for the settlement as if it is a middle-class home. The possibilities of embodied democratization, queer labor, and emergent crowd behavior are all quite literally washed away when Harte suddenly vanquishes the child and the miners in a flash flood at the end of the story. Luck is with his other "father," Kentuck, and so it is left to Stumpy to weirdly summate that "water put gold into them gulches," and thus what's "been here once will be here again!" (143). It would be easy to say that the story ends this way as a slapping ideological closure of all the aforementioned possibilities. But read closer, the story makes us think differently. Stumpy leaves us on the idea of gold. The water is really a random act that appears out of nowhere, a fate, and thus indicates the operation of a larger ecosystem with some degree of agency over life. In a real sense, the analogue here would be capitalist economy. The discovery of gold, like credit bubbles, can collapse in shocks as easily as it appears. The way that the discovery of gold creates the virtual conditions for a particular kind of crowd is what matters most to us here. The crowd that's *not* threatened with scarcity and deprivation does not intensify past thresholds of fear into sovereign war machines. Even crowds that think through bodies becoming-animal can still become communist. The speed of collective intelligence is not inevitably violent. The crowd doesn't necessarily always create an enemy: it also constructs an "outside" onto which it projects its hopes. This outside symbol becomes an attractor for the emergence of new behavior.

Chapter Five

Silver Euphoria and Nationalism in Mark Twain's *Roughing It*

Almost exactly ten years after the initial gold rush of 1849, a gigantic deposit of silver ore found in Mount Davidson called the Comstock Lode attracted a new wave of miners to the western Utah region in search of quick and fantastic wealth. Many of the miners that returned on the overland trails had originally crossed there on the way to California a decade earlier. It was a fortuitous find for the United States generally. The discovery of terrific mineral silver ore deposits coincided with the secessionist acts of the southern states. The combination of regional economic desires and the federal need for wartime cash served as urgent forces for extracting the mineral wealth in the region, and helped to carve the new Nevada territory from Utah less than a month after the Confederacy ratified their rebellion in February, 1861. President Lincoln then appointed three territorial judges to sort out the competing and confusing mining claims staked out all over Mount Davidson. The sooner the better: the silver assets extracted from the Comstock would fund the Union army. Moreover, Lincoln and the Radical Republicans needed an extra vote for the 13th amendment as much as they needed assets to secure the wartime "Greenback" dollar. Settling the political-economic order would mean an early path to statehood for the territory.

Yet by the time Lincoln began to appoint federal representatives to organize and oversee the national interest in the new territory, the Comstock rush had come to be an opportunity for new and ambitious young men to live out the now vintage mythology of the Gold Rush itself. They were less anxious about the contemporaneous political disintegration of the nation and now more keen finally to find the buried treasure that might affirm the ultimate dream of American speculation: a life free from labor, which would presumably free the body to ever-greater pleasures. The motivations of the

miners settling new claims and stakes by the thousands were much different, at least on the surface, than those national interests urging the federal government to intervene. Many of the new workers had come for a belated sequel to the Gold Rush and were excited by the renewed fantasy of easy wealth. The Comstock rush would become, in fact, *the* regional addendum to the Gold Rush, with the same circulation of infinitely shifting dreams and the corresponding stimulation of endlessly deferred desires.

The combination of newspaper accounts, personal connections, and authoritative confirmation of the Comstock's bounty did much to legitimize the rumors of bonanza pushing male workers to Nevada. Just as President Polk included mention of the gold discovery in his State of the Union address, Lincoln's sudden desire to incorporate Nevada did much to convey the reality of the Comstock to the uncertain. And as with the Gold Rush, at first the hopes of the bankers, the federal government, and the individual miners hinged upon the completely unknown quantity and quality of deposits sitting in the mountains. The previous success of the Gold Rush itself gave everyone a concrete fantasy, and something real to base their Silver Rush dreams on. After all, this had happened before.[29]

For the brother of Orion Clemens, the newly appointed Secretary of the territory, the long overland journey from St. Louis to the newly formed settlement of Virginia City, Nevada, provided a

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The function of fantasy here is produce desire, not realize it. The Gold Rush fantasy was a transhistorical one; we can see it in the Spanish colonization of the New World and also in the migrations to California. With this in mind, however, I nonetheless mean my notion of fantasy to contend with the fantasy Slavoj Zizek describes in *Plague of Fantasies:* "a fantasy constitutes our desire, provides its co-ordinates; that is, it literally 'teaches us how to desire.'" (7). Zizek's notion here insists that fantasy structures desire and not the other way around. In his example, we do not desire strawberry cake and then, not getting it, fantasize about it in order to fulfill our lack of cake. Instead the cake itself structures our desire for it.

This definition seems a rather crude model of social construction, and disregards why strawberry cake came into existence in the first place. The Gold Rush could structure how individuals fantasized, but the rush for Gold reflected a material desire for gold. Against Zizek and this particular fidelity to psychoanalysis, I would argue that we have to consider the "needs" of the body through its own biosocial protocols.

pretext for retracing the Gold Rush, which was perhaps the most significant national episode of the immediate pre-Civil War era. Like many others who would make that journey, Samuel Clemens – Mark Twain – would discover out west that opportunities for individual enrichment often turned upon collective struggles in labor, politics, and mutual self-defense. The fantasy of individual wealth was an asset to institutions of liberal capitalism; like any other ideology, liberal capitalism needed affect machines to code the behaviors of bodies, and to organize them. And where surplus affect combines with such codes, crowds often form.[30]

The crowds we have seen so far in this dissertation have been virtual, regional, and local. This *lack* of interaction with technologies of national identity means that we not yet seen crowd formation that really exceeds regional importance, with the possible exception of the imagined production of a black national consciousness in *Blake*. The miners in "The Luck of Roaring Camp" came together through the twin shocks of gold and a child, both of which encouraged potentially communist distributions of labor. In the Civil War Draft Riots, the potential slave insurrection, and the white racist coup in chapter two we saw bodies form crowds through the symbolic production

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The surplus of affect could be mobilized to specific ends: the structuring codes of liberal capitalism were the relevant and dominant ideological structures at that time. The ideology of liberal individualism needed its own apparatuses, and in some cases those machines were households and in some cases those machines were western towns.

Zizek remarks that one of the reasons that ideology actually works is because it benefits bodies. Rationally, subjects appear to believe against their 'interests,' but it's essential to remember that bodies believe in ideologies because they feel right. Zizek puts it this way: "an ideological identification exerts a true hold on us precisely when we maintain an awareness that we are not fully identical to it, that there is a rich human person beneath it…close analysis of even the most 'totalitarian' ideological edifice inevitably reveals that, not everything in it is 'ideology'…in every ideological edifice, there is a kind of 'trans-ideological' vision which cannot be reduced to a simple instrument of legitimizing pretensions to power (notions and sentiments of solidarity, justice, belonging to a community, etc.)…the point is thus not that there is no ideology without a trans-ideological 'authentic' kernel but rather, that *it is only the reference to such a trans-ideological kernel which makes an ideology 'workable'* (21, italics his). Zizek brackets what, for us, is the real reason ideologies have such material sway over bodies. Although his word for the relation between bodies and affect is "sentiment," it's obvious from his choices here that he believes ideologies function because, at their center, is a crowd and a *need* for collective identity ("solidarity," "belonging").

of enemies, followed by the real or implied destruction of those bodies. And so we have not yet seen what kinds of structures might create crowds and connect them.

This chapter will move to detail speculative euphoria in the American west after the Gold Rush, the Nevada Silver Rush. Like Harte, Mark Twain would investigate the interaction between financial euphoria and political crowds almost a decade after the event itself in *Roughing It,* published four years after Harte's story in 1872. Notably, Harte and Twain both chose to narrate the shocking inflation and collapses of regional credit bubbles in the west and the small cultures of gambling and crowd sovereignty that flourished in their wake. We might find even richer cultural resonance in Twain's retroactive position in the mid-1870s, as he wrote after the burst, in 1869, of the post-war economic bubble in railroad stocks and, of course, gold. More importantly, Twain's overland journey to the Nevada territory, where he followed his brother on his way to becoming the new territory's Secretary, allowed him to recount and reflect on the co-joined presence of excited bodies forming crowds for two distinct reasons. Each of these reasons refers to types of crowds we've seen already: those crowds united by money, and those forming for the purpose of sovereign action.

Many individuals would come to find their fortune in Nevada. On the one hand, they shared their euphoric excitement with other miners in crowds, which reinforced their motivations and gave new legitimacy to their personal emotions. As with Harte's miners, the intensity of the affect created a euphoric sensation, and one that arose from the actual discovery of silver and also the *potential* discovery of silver. The excitement of credit lies in consuming the material joys of the present as if those joys were material *facts* of a future yet-to-come; the joy of credit comes from the way objects triangulate the temporal dislocation between the present and the future by anchoring the latter in a solid thing. It's tautological: the future is here because I can touch it, and it's already becoming a part of my body. In that sense, financial euphoria was future-oriented; the excitement of

the affect was expectant, anxious, and hopeful. Euphoria was analogous to the kind of financial instruments that were developed to assign value to the *possible* value of the silver mines. Twain would be keen to describe this, as we shall see momentarily.

Twain begins his narrative with descriptions of vigilante crowds in Montana, which we have been calling sovereign crowds. He would then transition into the euphoric silver crowds in Nevada. We will conclude with his description of the invasion of national affect machines, meant to excite bodies as a method to extract surplus capital from the region, in the form of the Civil War Sanitary Fairs. The logic of transitions from one crowd to the next in his narrative provides a neat challenge for our analysis. When describing the local vigilante crowds of Montana, Twain's discourse turns upon the same vocabulary of participatory democracy as Harte's "Luck." The violence that these crowds commit in the name of stabilizing the law in territories outside state control actually offer us a nineteenth century American version of the English Enclosure Acts. The Silver Rush itself is an episode of primitive accumulation, where mining corporations arrive ahead of the state to organize labor. This facilitates the arrival of the political institutions of state representation, which simultaneously with the Sanitary Fairs worked, in part, to create sympathy for the Union cause in the Civil War. In such a situation, we have to begin seeing democratic institutions through a reverse lens in order to understand their true politics: the process of transferring sovereignty to representatives through voting does not actually symbolize consent of the governed, but really establishes the representative as an agent of the state in particular localities. It is an ideological mirror. Oddly, this process of territorializing the west allowed for something resembling an embodied communism to appear precisely where we would least expect it: in the 'lawless' vigilante towns of the rural west, in which sovereign vigilante crowds formed. What we have long called lawless was actually a site of local sovereignty.

In particular, vigilante crowds embodied communism by sharing the labor of policing and protecting their territories – protection and defense are a labor, too. As in Harte's story, the division of labor in the settlements operated in the logic of a gift economy: no one was paid for it. It was done for the collective. These sovereign crowds, acting as militias, required bodies that could quickly enforce the protocols of the local territory. Moreover, as Twain would show, it was precisely these kinds of crowds that were usurped by the formation of representative democracy in the Nevada territory, and at a time when professional police forces were becoming more common in urban centers back east. It would be the intrusion of political institutions based on representative government that would act decisively to alter the local composition of regional democracy at a crucial moment of the Nevada credit bubble. These institutions would use new apparatuses of national hegemonic influence, including the telegraph, the Sanitary Fair, and the Civil War charity auction, to channel euphoria for silver into symbols of nationalist power, and thereby re-allocate regional wealth by coding local affect into national signs. Since crowds centralized these apparatuses through spectacles like the auction, and thus powered their own non-technological and bodily media, the auction would become situations where outside authorities could rationalize and re-direct flows of affect and capital into networks of national power. Perhaps even more oddly for nineteenth century America, these same moments of nationalist crowds were also ones that could incorporate bodies of national symbolic exclusion into technologies of capital extraction. During the charity auction, everyone gave their money for the cause – Indians, women, Chinese.

Vigilante Crowds and The Sovereign Exception

Roughing It begins with Twain traveling to Nevada with his brother. The travel-narrative novel recounts his trip across the overland trail, his encounter with the Utah Mormons, his

experiences in Nevada as a miner and general laborer, his trip to San Francisco, and finally his journey to Hawaii. As Twain recounts the overland journey from St. Louis to Nevada, his narrator collects various stories he encounters and retells. Twain's ultimate motivation in traveling to Nevada seems similar to the liberal fantasy of personal fortune motivating other seekers of the Comstock, but his writing betrays a preoccupation with regional political assemblages of self-organized locals acting together in premeditated acts of popular sovereignty. And so as Twain journeys out west, he discovers a rapidly shifting political context in the road toward the Comstock, where memories and rumors of excited crowds circulate as pragmatic lessons of violent assertions of self-government in the settlements, stations, and roads of the west. The overland trail to Nevada was then still politically remote enough from institutions of US political power that Twain could remark upon leaving, with minimal exaggeration, that his caravan had now "left 'the States' behind us" (Twain 32). Poignantly, many of the people that Twain encounters are ambiguous citizens; they live outside state borders. In places in his text, Twain considers his new position beyond the protection and regulation of the state as one of precarious excitement. He is at once 'free' and also vulnerable. This vulnerability will remain constant throughout the text. He almost dies after getting lost in Utah, is constantly threatened with financial crisis, and works as an itinerant laborer for most of his trip, scouting for work constantly. Even in mythic Nevada he discovers that the free spaces of his mobility are also unregulated zones of primitive accumulation, where upstart businesses and proto-corporations operate in a kind of liberal free for all. This is the context for the state's absence – scarcity and precarity alongside unregulated corporations.

It was in this context that radical democratic collectivities organized throughout the western territories. The ambiguity of citizenship and the urgent need for protection created a necessity for self-government that depended on a declaration of natural right by western colonists. Predictably, groups formed around protocols of racial and sexual identity. The most vivid example of this is

Twain's strange encounter with the Mormons, whom he contrasts with dying groups of Piute Native Americans. In regards to the latter, he is so overcome with abjection and disgust that we realize his emotions are rather excessive, and therefore revealing. In a work so preoccupied with precarious life and labor, there a presentiment of Marlow's racist description of the dying African workers of the Belgian Congo in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness,* whose illness is called "inefficiency."

There is also a capitalist myth that Twains tells with the images of the Piutes and his precarious labor. Besides Marx's parable of pre-capitalist primitive accumulation, he is rehearsing Hobbes' state of nature as a war of all against all. The radical uncertainty of the west as a space both outside and *prior* to the state produced a contraction between liberal philosophical values of freedom and equality. As Chantal Mouffe argues in *The Democratic Paradox,* the free-zone of liberal capitalism requires democratic formations and institutions. For Mouffe the "tension between equality and liberty cannot be reconciled" (Mouffe 5). Crucially, the liberal emphasis on "individual liberty and on human rights" conflicts with a democratic tradition that emphasizes "popular sovereignty" (2). It is the latter scene that Twain encounters early in *Roughing It,* though it is often in the name of the former, individual freedom, that the state claims sovereignty. The Hobbesian justification of the state is consistent with Spinozist political philosophy, which also argued that the state was necessary to regulate bodies from expanding too far for other bodies to survive.

Writing against liberals such as Habermas and John Rawls, Mouffe argues that the intersection between these two traditions means that liberal societies of "pluralism" – of competing groups and differences – will only produce "contingent hegemonic forms of stabilization of their conflict" (5). Even as Mouffe refers here to political cultures negotiating within the boundaries of nation states, Mouffe describes competing groups as what she terms antagonistic "adversaries" (13). These adversaries compete against one another within the context of biopolitical regulation, but they

would so outside that regulation as well. It is of interest to us, particularly with the preceding chapter in mind, that Mouffe argues further that as these groups interact they do not negotiate among themselves as much as contaminate one another: "each of them changes the identity of the other" (10). Mouffe's description of constantly morphing social formations can be imagined as an example of Manuel Delanda's definition, from Deleuze, of *assemblages:* "as always in social life, there is a 'gestaltic' dimension which is decisive in understanding the perception and behavior of collective subjects" (10). The morphing quality of the social collectives underlying group identities is particularly relevant to understanding crowds, whose behavior and actions seem to make moments of involution and tension visible.

Although Mouffe is incredibly skeptical of the liberal project, she supports institutions of the liberal state that provide locations for non-violent negotiations between social adversaries. She nonetheless believes that liberal pluralism is always threatened by the possibility that disagreement between these adversaries will produce violent conflict. Therefore adversaries are 'friendly enemies,' that is, persons who are friends because they share the same symbolic space but also enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way" (13). We should hear echoes here of the dissertation's introduction. This terrain of contestable symbolic space reveals an important part of Mouffe's argument, in part because it informs her shared judgment with Carl Schmitt that liberal pluralism is a self-destructive philosophy and political program. While Mouffe is quick to assert that Schmitt's own political proposals are too extreme, she shares with Schmitt a belief that adversarial divisions of "us" and "them" are constitutive of social and political life. Mouffe cites Derrida's notion of a "constitutive outside" in "grasping the antagonism inherent in all objectivity and the centrality of the us/them distinction in the constitution of collective political identities" (12). So besides being simply political adversaries, Mouffe here claims that the symbolic logic of group identity over-determines 'us and them' distinctions prior even to the adversarial

relation among competing political groups. For her, the only possible outside to "concrete content" is that which puts into question "concreteness as such," however, and so the outside of political groups is not a dialectical negation but a revealing of the "radical undecidability of the tension of its constitution" (12). Thus, in its full logic, the "'them' is not the constitutive opposite of a concrete 'us', but the symbol of what makes any of us possible" (13). This theory of enemy production and the collective identity of crowd formation is not consistent with Bourdieu, Lorenz, or Durkheim. We will pass over this disjunction for now, but note that Mouffe does not explore it further in *The Democratic Paradox*. We can agree, moving on, that the indeterminate and unstable symbolic logic that underwrites collective group formation remains an important aspect of its ability to work as a machine.

The democratic initiatives of the western settlements mirror in some ways what happens in "The Luck of Roaring Camp." The initial settlers and miners in Nevada desired to formalize through *writing* their claims upon land they seized. They asserted their status as the founders of the new Gold Hill Mining District, for example, through a mutually written local constitution. As many miners learned during the Gold Rush, the California courts eventually recognized written titles over specific lands documented by the original miners of particular claims. The precedent was thus set for informal meetings begetting legalistic agreements made between the miners as written rights to the claims. Their contract was a declaration of sovereignty; the Gold Hill miners codified their ability to enforce those claims through collective force. The document consolidated their seizures symbolically, even though the use of a constitution seemingly worked within a liberal democratic framework. In reality the constitution operated differently than a contract. It inscribed sovereignty into the locality. In *Nevada: The Great Rotten Borough,* for example, Gilman M. Ostrander quotes that miners' declaration as follows: "it is necessary we organized in body politic for our mutual protection against the lawless and for meting out justice between man and man" (21). This discourse

establishes the "body politic" through a radical act of what Mouffe calls "popular sovereignty." As in the American constitution, the body politics emerging in the American west championed a liberal discourse of rights while actually authorizing and legitimating the rights of specific bodies: in this case, white ones.

As with the contracts drawn up by the Gold Rush settlers, future courts would eventually recognize the contract drawn up by the Gold Hill Mining District in part because white bodies wrote it. The liberal political and economic contract discourse used by the miners would match the language of US courts, and even more importantly would solidify financially and politically the white power groups already operating political parties back in "the States." Before that recognition arrived, however, the legal limbo of the mineral-rich territories of the west offered travelers and observers a first-hand chance to see microcosms of the colonial American dynamic, repeated like ever-shrinking repetitions of the larger imperial pattern. On the one hand, the racial exclusivity of the democratic experiments unfolding in the settlements of excited miners underscored a decisive characteristic in the literary representations of crowds in Twain and, as we saw in the previous chapter, in Harte. At the same time, the relative absence of a sovereign state power or strong regional political institutions made the settlements novel locations for observing local self-government by self-organized collectives.

What distinguished many of these settlements further from rehearsing classic 'state of nature' accounts all too simplistically was the new primary fantasy motivating their shared excitement to manage the political space of the west. Their collective affective relationship to politics was not an angry nationalism aligned against an outside power, as in the American revolution, but instead an excited desire to participate in the construction of a collective fantasy about wealth production for them *as individuals*. Sovereign crowds formed primarily to create and defend a liberal fantasy of

individualism anchored not in nationally sanctioned individual freedom, but instead one forming as local projects of imperialistic individual accumulation. It was a fantasy expressive of colonial capitalism, and one that produced an excess of affective excitement itself useful for the real labor of the mines undertaken by companies, and later by the US for the purposes of channeling it into support for the Civil War and the financing of the war through the American greenback dollar. And most paradoxically, it was a unifying fantasy that allowed for an embodied communist practice to divide labor at the margins of capitalist space.

In *Roughing It,* Twain often recorded stories he overhead on the road, and a sizable number revolve around these political conflicts. Twain's ordering of the uncollected stories and rumors he recounts serves to re-assert a form of control over those discourses. This stylistic form is further reinforced by the fact that Twain is self-consciously re-telling stories and rumors of group political formations and collective identity formation. Thus several crucial episodes in the text recount regional tales of self-government. In addition to the informality of the stories themselves, the spontaneous quality of Twain's narration – represented by extended stream of consciousness prose and garrulous talkers – mimics the way rumor itself works. The stories propel their own reproduction based upon their ability to convey affects of shock and excitement.

Upon reaching the Rocky Mountains, Twain explains that two-thirds of the stories recounted by the stage-coach drivers referred to the "desperado" Slade. Twain decides to "reduce all this mass of overland gossip to one straightforward narrative" (Twain 70). Twain explains his retelling "in order that the Eastern reader may have a clear conception of the desperado Slade" (70). This print capture of oral and gossip excitement performs a somewhat dissimilar action to Twain's brother Orion's entrance into the Nevada territory to help govern it. As if to cement the logic of that analogue, Twain himself remarks that rumors of Slade always accompanied those of California

and the Nevada silver mines: "we heard drivers and conductors only talk about three things" (69). In the intensity of the euphoria over the minerals, then, the spreading excitement slipped into fear and anxiety over the very "lawless" threats to settlements like the Gold Hill Mining District. Although the sovereign crowds seemed to embody democratic values, the lawless individual *man* was a source of terror – an irony given the myth of individual freedom that instigates Twain's text, the fantasy of the Silver Rush.

The precarious legal status of the renegade Slade helps to define the excited panic that energizes oral networks of overland gossip – a rather different anxiety than the insurrectionary excitement that Blake spreads.[31] Blake and Slade both share an ability, however, to panic the landscape with their reputation as "the most bloody, the most dangerous, and the most valuable citizen that inhabited the savage fantasies of the mountains" (70). The "dangerous" "citizen" is the individual sovereign, not the collective one. Slade's reputation is as ruthless. Twain explains that Slade left Missouri on a California wagon train, killed the driver, escaped, and then killed three Native Americans and cut off their ears. His "fearless reputation" earns him a position as an

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In *Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea,* Alberto Toscano argues the religious intensity of political zealots is in fact a kind of religious belief. It is interesting for us here to link Delany's brand of abolitionism with that in antebellum America. "The fanaticism of the abolitionists," he writes, "was thus both a matter of passionate conviction and of mediated strategy, combining the attractions of symbolism and affect with the instruments of power and calculation" (Toscano 10). In contrast to the slow, mediated strategy of debate, Toscano explicitly asks us to consider how the calculated outrage of the abolitionists doesn't make it inauthentic. Instead, he wants us to see the democratic potential of such fanaticism.

Toscano also repairs the work of elite social psychologists of the period, such as Gabriel Trade, who like Le Bon sought to understand the criminality of political dissidence. He rightfully points out that Tarde is important because he sought to explain criminal dissidence in material terms rather than in eugenic ones: "It is not in the individual that the sources of insurrectionalism are to be sought, but in the particular of affect and ideas, aided and abetted by their material support in new forms of communication" (Toscano 21).

In a note in the next chapter, we will see that Toscano finds in Tarde a political theory that would treat collectives as "pride-groupings" that could be managed with symbolic representation. He offers us a history, then, of how early sociological already understood that political bodies lived through a "cultural physics" where "the idea of politics as a management of affect…joined to the suggestion that we could envisage a kind of scientific project to manage cultures as 'systems endowed with moral ambition'" (Toscano 37).

overland division agent at Julesburg, where he ruthlessly punishes all offenders (71). His success there restoring peace and order earns him a transfer to the Rocky Ridge division in the Rocky Mountains, where he encounters a "paradise of outlaws and desperadoes" (72). In the Rocky Ridge division there is "no semblance of law," "violence was the rule," and "force was the only recognized authority" (72). Slade responds to communal transgressions through overwhelming force, including meting out punishments of death, and so "the rest…admired him, feared him, obeyed him" (72). He is singularly capable of terrorizing the local population. It will thus be the sovereign crowd that opposes him. He is captured briefly, for instance, "by a party of men who intended to lynch him" (74). Yet his wife rode to his rescue and he is given another chance.

Eventually, Twain explains, about two or three years afterward "news came to the Pacific coast that the Vigilance Committee in Montana (where Slade had removed from Rocky Ridge) had hanged him" (77). The Vigilance Committee of Montana, which was nationally known and a common form of law enforcement in the nineteenth century United States, decides that "in the absence of a regular civil authority they would establish a People's Court to try by judge and jury" (77). The People's Court would be the "nearest approach to social order" (78). Apparently, the People's Court stages an inevitable confrontation between the Committee and Slade; it is ironic, Twain remarks, because Slade is himself a "Vigilante," and "openly boasted of it" (78). The clash between the Committee's People Court and Slade is, in fact, a conflict between the two different forms of sovereign exception: the crowd versus the individual. Twain's language supports this by representing the local conflict in the larger terms of state and civil conflict.

After receiving many warnings, Slade makes a "declaration of war" by ripping up his arrest warrant. It is then the "Vigilance Committee now felt that the question of social order and the preponderance of law-abiding citizens had then and there to be decided" (79). The natural right to

the "social order" is ironic here because, paradoxically, the Vigilance Committee is acting in the name of "social order" at the same time that it openly admits there is no "regular civil authority." It cannot conceive of emergent forms of law that coincide with acts of sovereignty made legitimate by the crowd, not the state. Moreover, the People's Court would only be as strong as its ability to produce a crowd to enforce its decision.

In order to realize their desire for "social order," the Vigilance Committee has a messenger ride down to Nevada to inform leading men that there is a "feeling of unanimity on the subject" of executing Slade (80). In response, the "miners turned out almost *en masse,"* Twain writes, with some 600 men arriving "armed to the teeth" (80). Poignantly, it is the "feeling of unanimity" against Slade that authorizes the Committee to send for reinforcements. There is no justification of misdeeds with any further appeal to legality. The paradox of acting outside the law in the name of the law became subtended into the non-rational "feeling" *shared by all present.* As with Harte's Roaring Camp crowd that seemed to speak for itself, the authority of *common feeling* legitimizes the mobilization of the 600 miners, who themselves become a war machine marching north to join in the common act. Even when they arrive, the Virginia men from Nevada are reluctant to initiate the execution until the leader of the miners has heard the "announcement of the feeling of the Lower Town" (80). Just as the committee in Montana declares a "feeling of unanimity," so too the Nevada miners first have to declare that their "whole body was agreed" before the execution of Slade can take place (80). The embodied democratic process here matches that in Harte's "The Luck of Roaring Camp" to an uncanny degree. Because they are also equalizing labor and sharing the responsibility and risk of finding Slade, the crowd can be conceived as communist.

When the Committee finally seeks out Slade, various "numbers of the citizens joined the ranks of the guard when the arrest was made" (82). Twain's final allusion to "citizens" and "the

guard" affirms the strange logic of the episode, but Twain's vocabulary would shift again, this time back to the rhetoric of volunteers. After the arrest, despite some protesters beneath the hanging post, Slade is eventually hung by the "party of volunteers" (81). Here, the "party" morphs out of the "Committee" and the "masse" to convey the presence of the crowd without the employment of the actual term. Nevertheless, Twain demonstrates the phase switch from communist crowd to war machine or swarm.

In his book *Vigilante!* on Americans who 'took the law into their own hands,' William E. Burrows notes that vigilante action in the United States was a common, frequent, and necessary component of American life, particularly in regions that were outside control of police or state forces. Burrows claims that vigilante violence, particularly in the American west, "was conceived as the only feasible defense against the perils of a constantly expanding frontier that usually left effective law enforcement behind" (Burrows 16). Southern whites lynching African-Americans in the post-Reconstruction period would also use this concept of violence as a "defense" rather than an outright war against particular groups. Yet the notion of crowds acting on their own behalf through common feeling and collective force, including even the use of violence, also remains central to ideas of protest and resistance against political repression and central to the idea of localized self-defense.

Following this logic, Burrows also claims that "the ideology of vigilantism, which began to take shape during the first few decades of the nineteenth century, had three basic components: popular sovereignty, the right of revolution, and the law of self-preservation" (Burrows 17). Burrows traces these concepts of violent and collective self-assertion to the colonial era of the US, and links popular sovereignty to American democracy. This violent democratic condition followed from the "the belief that the rule of the people superseded all other rule" (Burrows 17). Burrows continues his

discussion by asserting that this violent ideology rests "on the ultimate argument of survival as the first law of nature – kill or be killed" (Burrows 18). For Burrows here, the condition of group political survival rests on a local crowd's ability to kill its enemy. This is the sovereign crowd we have studied throughout this dissertation.

It is this notion of popular sovereignty that Carl Schmitt wants to usurp for the state in *The Concept of the Political*. This is because for Schmitt the basic ideology of the (biopolitical) state is the same as Burrows' basic tenet of vigilante ideology: the capacity to kill. Schmitt understands the state's capacity to kill because it is the "decisive political entity," but he understands this capacity to kill or be killed as intrinsic to all political entities (Schmitt, 46). These political entities, like the state, "can derive its [their] energy from the most varied human endeavors, from the religious, economic, moral, and other antitheses" (38). Schmidtt's word "energy" might usefully be replaced with "affect" here, or crowd affect. Further, Schmidtt argues that what matters with this energy/affect is "always…the possibility of conflict" (39). What all political entities need are enemies and others: "the political entity is by its very nature the decisive entity, regardless of the sources from which it derives its last psychic motives" (43-44). This political entity that needs "sources" of "psychic" energy is necessary to create the law in the first place. Schmitt argues that to create "legal norms" by harnessing the affective powers of its members to kill and be killed, political entities lead toward the state by ever increasing the space of violence that it is possible to control. Vigilante groups and the biopolitical state, then, both *create* the law through the exercise of violence. This violence is founded upon an unstable symbolic logic that constantly creates a constitutive outside to the group, even as that outside – that enemy -- constantly contaminates the group attempting to kill it.

This uncertain symbolic space does appear in Burrows, who seems skeptical about the authority and sovereignty of natural law. "It was as simple as that," he writes of vigilante violence,

"or so vigilantes assured one another time and again" (Burrows, 18). Burrows' skepticism comes precisely from the unstable symbolic situations that mark the uncertain status of the law when there are competing sovereign powers to enforce their own symbolic narratives and real material hegemony over the same spaces. Vigilante organizations acted in the absence of sovereign law enforcement, and so the "law of nature" and "natural law" invoked depended on how local groups could "interpret" that law "in a given situation" (Burrows 13). The uncertainty of the law was the justification for vigilante action, and, paradoxically, the reason vigilante action was necessary. Burrows relates that the "classic" vigilante organization both "bases its existence on the imperative of survival," as we've learned, but also "makes known that it is acting out its last resort" and "professes to work for the ultimate strengthening of the legal system" (Burrows 13). Much of the affective production necessary for the political entity of the crowd itself – which is typically a visible expression of another collective identity – comes from the shared social affects occurring at a singular moment. It is the singularity of the symbolic space that captures the singularity of the crowd itself, and that is necessary to excite the crowd's bodies to violence *in order to create the law in the name of popular sovereignty.*

Euphoric Confidence and Capitalist Science

To navigate the break between Twain's description of sovereign crowds and euphoric crowds we should press upon the concept of euphoria. Euphoric crowds help us to expand our theories about how crowds form. They first of all explain how virtual conditions for crowd formation arise, since the rapid proliferation of affect during economic expansions usually becomes coded through reinforcing cycles of joy and happiness. The appearance of affect prior to coding is literally a kind of force or energy, and its excess arises from the over-production of assemblages and

machines that appear during expansions, such as small businesses and consumer purchases made with credit. Each transaction, large or small, helps to *make* and stimulate bodies. The presence of new affect during the increases in literal energy usage (at this time, transport horses, coal-fired locomotives, and whale oil kerosene) stimulates populations as a whole by creating better conditions for social reproduction.

It also stimulates individual bodies by increasing regular access to commodities and other phenomena other unavailable to persons during periods of economic contraction; in particular, we can see these excitements created from new clothes, new vacations, new forms of entertainment, and new investments in personal technology. These experiences are more accessible, and, it should be noted, depend upon the body's open relationship to a state of symbiosis. In addition simply to being stimulated by novelty, bodies also enjoy the pleasure of movement. Remember too the claims in the previous chapter that bodies have a metabolic need for stimulation. The capacity to tolerate ever more stimulation occurs when economic expansions become embodied and reified metabolically, and plays not a large role in understanding how material conditions can satisfy demands that otherwise might be expressed through political cultures and crowds. Political antagonisms tend to become quieter, and sometimes suspended, during such expansions. This is because not only scarcity but deprivation increase the likelihood of crowds, particularly sovereign crowds, for security and protection. This is also because the animal intelligence of crowds functions to repress the bad feelings within collectives by projecting them onto other bodies and populations.

In addition to reminding us of Spinoza's claim in *Ethics* that all bodies want to expand, the excitement created by embodied economic expansions really registers as intensifying confidence. This is how animal intelligence codes sudden increases in the intensity and frequency of connections to affect machines during expansions. These excitements act like the distributed inscriptions that

Durkheim theorized would help the collective identity of crowds persist after the crowd disassembled. The difference here, of course, is that the affect machines do not remind bodies of anything. Instead, the increased circulation of money and other financial instruments, such as credit and stocks, work as a kind of symbolic language. In this language, however, it is the direction of prices and numbers that creates meaning for the symbols, rather than refer to a stable relationship of meanings the way that words can. More importantly, the circulation of this symbolic economy helps to code the increasing degree of affect created by the real economy. In that way the symbolic economy creates a protocol for bodies interpreting that economy; bodies tend to code the upward rise in stock values as confidence, and tend to code the upward rise in prices as anxious. There is also an obvious inverse relationship to that protocol.

This helps to explain, to a point, what is meant by the autonomy of affect. When credit cycles expand or contract, they produce or reduce the presence of countless machines and assemblages that physically expand the metabolism of populations. They also add to the size and quantity of machines that necessitate energy, such as horses, houses, factory equipment, and locomotives. In addition to using energy, these machines create surplus affect that can then be recoded into bodies as confidence. The effect then of rises in the stock market creates a kind of fractal relation to the distribution of that confidence: as the rise in market value increases lending and thus access to credit, working and middle-class bodies suddenly notice more machines, more bodies, and more commodities in the field of space, and the aggregate effect of these machines is to produce more confidence – because bodies code this frequency of non-threatening and joyful stimulation as an indication that the environment is safe for social reproduction.

The expansion of affect machines happens all over economic space, but appears concentrated in particular spaces and appears intensified in particular bodies. When the embodied

expansion intensifies past a certain threshold, economists have called the resulting phase state of consciousness "euphoria." In a euphoric phase state, the virtual conditions for crowds occur, but different types of crowds materialize than sovereign ones. Euphoric crowds sometimes concentrate together, and we can see this most legibly in capitalist state apparatuses such as the stock exchange, boards of trade, banks, and corporate offices. To different extents each of these spaces are places where bodily movements are synchronized the way bodies become synchronized in crowds, but they are synchronized into specially regulated spaces. The floor of the stock exchange is the most vivid example of bodies that come together in potentially euphoric crowds to make uncoordinated but still extremely similar sets of communication signals. While each broker is after a different exchange, it is the presence of other bodies alongside him or her that reinforces the confidence he or she feels. Therefore even capitalist practices create crowd behaviors that can reinforce the authority, respect, and excitement of the collective – even and especially symbolically – without each capitalist agent cooperating with his or her competitors. Bodies within these spaces are vulnerable to euphoria because they work in an environment completely devoted to the analysis and integrity of the symbolic economy, and thus during expansions the constant coding of affect very easily passes the threshold to euphoria.

Theorizing of this euphoria began in interest during the historical period we're tracing here in the late nineteenth century. There was also a cultural and economic interest in the inverse phase state that materialized during economic contractions: panic. Just as the excitement from the positive self-reinforcing expansion of an economy can open bodies to new social forms and politics, likewise economic contraction deprives bodies of affect machines that bodies code as fear -- this fear is the material evaporation of machines in the environment that create safe spaces for social reproduction. Such fear increases the likelihood of anxiety, social conflict, and violence.

Liberal economic theory has long assumed that rational individuals act in their own self-interest to make choices that ultimately benefit others.v The behavior of market and commodity prices reflects real values of supply and demand, and changes in prices ideally reflect the aggregate market behavior of individuals making the best choices based on the best possible information. Focusing on the psychology of crowds and the influence of euphoria or panic means sharply revising constitutive categories of economic interpretation away from liberal humanist notions of the self. Thus, in many ways the liberal economists here share a basic premise with Thorstein Veblan's *Conspicuous Consumption,* published in 1889, which did much to popularize the view that individuals make economic decisions based on feelings, and will pursue status objects in order to project the pride of an elite class position without actually belonging to an elite class. As we see in this dissertation, though, during euphoric phase states excitement coded as confidence escalates financial risk-taking and speculation to the point where religious optimism defines beliefs about the future.

Several twentieth century economists theorized the basic instability of capitalist economic cycles, including Joseph Schumpter, John Maynard Keynes, and Hyman Minsky. However liberal their policy prescriptions to correct such instabilities, these economists challenge the notion of self-optimizing markets regulated by individual rationality.[32] George Cooper argues in *The Origin of*

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It should be noted that some of the major scholarly monographs on crowds have continually emphasized the individual, rationalistic aspects of how they function. In *Collective Behavior*, Richard Berk emphasizes that to understand collective behavior one must look at motivation of the individuals within collectives. In his analysis of the My Lai massacre in Vietnam, he describes how each of the individual soldiers experienced certain events preceding the massacre that might explain their decision to murder civilians, women, and children. They weighed their decisions: did they receive orders to shoot the civilians? Would they be punished? Did they care about killing innocent people? What's odd about Berk's suggestions here is that he has little evidence to corroborate these questions, which, on their face, appear absurdly logical and even stunningly trite. Yet it is such "Decision Theory" that he claims better explains crowd behavior than the perspectives of Le Bon.

Alternatively, his work on "collective decision-making and emergent norms" is more influential in sociology. This theory says that "people in crowds don't all behave alike, yet their actions are perceived by participants as reflecting an important consensus" (64). In those situations, norms emerge from heterogeneous actions of different crowd participants; deviant behavior is punished. Furthermore, "people tend to conform to norms

Financial Crises that blame must be placed "at the collective feet of the academic community for having chosen to continue promoting their flawed theories of efficient, self-regulating markets, in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence" (Cooper 171). Both emotionally-driven individuals and economic markets prone toward instability directly challenge the efficient markets hypothesis, which claims that supply, demand, and prices all co-exist in relative balance. This is the core logic of the Austrian and Chicago schools of economics and their most influential voices, Fredrick Hayek and Milton Friedman. Their emphasis on laissez-faire equilibrium argues that any interference in "free" markets disrupts the optimal balance of prices, supply, and demand.

Liberal economics is still valuable for its insights into the function of capitalist markets, even though it can't explain how economic expansions and contractions operate as cultural phase states

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unconsciously," although Berk admits that "the psycho-dynamics of this process are not well understood" (64). They thus conform, for whatever reason, because the "rewards" are greater. Besides being more interested in the processes Berk claims are not well understood, I would also be more interested in exploring the local politics of such norms. I find his use of the word "emergent" relevant and more than coincidental. (He concludes his assessment with game theory.)

In *The Myth of the Madding Crowd,* Clark McPhail also rejects the basic idea that crowds are amorphous social agents. He instead breaks down crowds into gatherings of two or more people. He breaks down elementary forms of behavior in concert. He analyzes crowds by examining their duration and what people do in them. He cites the twentieth century critics, such as Muzafer Sherif, who said that "individuals were not transformed by the crowd" (61). McPhail turns to critiquing this theory and emergent-norm theory by saying that crowds are so heterogeneous and diverse that we cannot really say anything about one crowd. Therefore some crowd theorists say that crowds are purposeful and rational, and other crowd theorists say crowds transform individuals within the crowd.

McPhail addresses the work of Carl Couch, who critiqued political crowds specifically as anti-social. McPhail replies that political crowds are mostly non-violent and rarely violent. McPhail treats Couch's critique of crowds by discussing various claims and then offering various terms to analyze what crowds actually do while they behave; he looks at mutual attention, focus, responsiveness, and futures. He has many charts and tables and graphs. McPhail wants to study crowds by studying their behaviors alone. Thus, McPhail writes that "the archaic notion of crowds composed of individuals possessed of or driven by simple and sovereign motives is not sufficient to explain the complexities of intermittent individual and collective action. Second…contemporary students of collective phenomena assume some model of a rational individual actor…but, having said this, it must be emphasized that rational actors are not emotionless actors" (144). Since this project seems to be "archaic," I should mention here that political crowds where *bodies kill and die* for their beliefs can, I fact, be motivated by "simple and sovereign motives." Second, McPhail gestures toward the idea here that emotions and reason are not at odds – a point from which we began our thinking about crowds. It might be useful here to emphasize the crowd of Le Bon was always a political crowd; when and how it became something else – a gathering, for example – is guesswork for another time.

of capitalism. Explaining credit cycles as phenomena of the capitalist economy is necessary, however, for understanding the power of affect machines on bodies. Credit economies are more complex than simple supply and demand theory would suggest. The American economist Hyman Minsky argued that capitalist markets were fundamentally predisposed for disequilibrium, which he called the Financial Instability Hypothesis. According to his model, financial markets generate waves of credit expansion and asset inflation followed by severe contractions and asset deflation in sequenced chains of expansions and recessions over time. The waves continually expand and continually contract credit markets.

Cooper argues that the cause of these waves is from collateralized lending. Collateralized lending, which is the basis of financial banking, causes credit waves because the value of the loans are ultimately tied to the value of the productive assets that necessitate those loans. When banks secure loans using real assets, they continually check the value of the collateral against the loan. Where assets have risen or fallen in value, the loan then becomes over- or under-collateralized. If the borrower cannot provide additional collateral in the case that they fail to repay the loan, then the bank sells the collateralized assets to cover their loss. As Cooper notes, this sale necessarily occurs in a falling market and thus depresses the value of the asset. The bank also reassesses the credit quality of the borrower; this in turn means the bank charges higher interest rates. Higher interest rates lead to the sale of more assets by the borrower, who must now sell into a market where the bank is also selling. Prices fall further. This situation demonstrates, as Cooper argues, that "financial instability is hard wired into the mechanics of the asset and debt markets" (Cooper 101). Self-reinforcing asset-debt cycles also explain the way financial crises have actually worked since modern finance began employing ever-larger credit and debt networks.

Minsky's critique of credit cycles does nothing to explain the embodied economy, though. In *Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises,* Charles P. Kindleberger follows Minsky's arguments about the Financial Instability Hypothesis by extending them into a broader definition of asset bubbles. In a thorough tracing of the major credit bubbles that have appeared since the advent of modern capitalism, Kindleberger shows what nineteenth century financial crises had in common with those from earlier and later periods: external shocks that begin and conclude bubbles. Minsky called these shocks "displacements." For Kindleberger, these shocks set off euphoria during the asset price climbs of the initial bubble. Kindleberger points to a model of asset-debt bubbles that contains many specific historical situations where an "exogenous shock" triggers the mania and also the collapse: good harvests and bad harvests, technological innovations like railroads or electricity, or a monetary event like a recoinage, a change in the ratio of gold and silver under bimetallism, or, significantly for Twain and Harte, "a discovery of precious metals" (Kindleberger 17). Meanwhile, the trigger for collapse is often the revelation of some "misfeasance" that occurred during the mania portion of the asset bubble. Kindleberger compares these episodes of economic euphoria to all non-sustainable financial practices, including Ponzi schemes, chain letters, and pyramid schemes. The central issue is that the anticipated value of an asset, such as a house, does not match its real value. When asset prices begin a parabolic rise, an entire population can share in the "mania" of speculation and investment; there is a "frenzied pattern of purchases" (Kindleberger 13). When the price finally reaches a point where there are no more buyers, the asset bubble collapses. This collapse necessitates a buyer of last resort, which would be a central bank, a sovereign government, or both.

Kindleberger pays particular attention to the role of group psychology in credit bubbles. Group psychology does much to explain economic booms, as opposed to the self-reinforcing negative spirals that drive down credit markets upon collapse. The "manias" associated with

"economic euphoria" include surges in feeling that accompany access to plentiful credit (Kindleberger 10). When asset prices inflate, as in housing, the corresponding optimism and confidence produced in property owners also grows. "Rational exuberance morphs into irrational exuberance," Kindleberger writes, and "economic euphoria develops and investment spending and consumption spending increase" (Kindleberger 12). During this boom period, euphoria develops. A general belief in a constant increase of asset prices sets in among borrowers and lenders. Collateralized assets are often other forms of debt, such as stocks, liens, claims, and other financial instruments. Debt is secured by more debt. Speculation quickly elevates one's material position and status, and feelings of confidence, pride, self-esteem, and optimism become attached to the value of one's capital, which is often not in the form of real money.

Kindleberger sees this practice as fundamentally irrational. We can listen to this discourse as one fully embedded in liberal paradigms of individualism. For him, mania "suggests a loss of touch with rationality, something close to mass hysteria" (Kindleberger 38). As he cites canal manias, railroad manias, joint stock company manias, real estate manias, and stock price manias, Kindleberger argues that the "rationality assumption that underlies economic theory does not appear to be consistent with these different manias" (38). He believes these manias are immanent features of the capitalist system and occur cyclically; "in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, crises occurred regularly at ten-year intervals (1816, 1826, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1866), [and] thereafter less regularly (1873, 1907, 1921, 1929)" (38). Following Fernand Braudel, he sees these regular "crazes" and "passions" as constitutive episodes of modern capitalism, but refrains from asserting, as Braudel does, that patterns of maniacal consumption patterns of spices, styles of dress, craving for knowledge, and land purchases shares the same features of euphoric episodes as asset-debt bubbles (Kindleberger 41). For him to do so would require him to consider affect machines, and would necessitate changing the model subject of economic philosophy – the individual. Most importantly,

Kindleberger ascribes the breakdown of individual rationality to "general irrationality or mob psychology" (Kindleberger 41). He equates group thinking and 'herd' mentality with "hysteria," quickly cites Le Bon's *The Crowd,* passes over Charles MacKay's discussion of the 1720 South Sea Bubble in *Extraordinary Delusions and the Madness of Crowds,* and then returns to Minsky as a way to contextualize mob psychology as the antithesis of individual rational behavior. He sees crowds as sick bodies, and *not a production of capitalist expansions.*

In *A Short History of Financial Euphoria,* John Kenneth Galbraith also blames crowd behavior for speculative episodes of financial euphoria. The "rush to participate" in buying speculative assets pushes up asset prices into unsustainable bubbles, and only afterwards are these "flights" described as "mass insanity" (Galbraith 2). Like Kindleberger, Galbraith believes that the "mass psychology" of the speculative mood comes from the twin forces of a "powerful personal interest that develops in the euphoric belief" and the "seemingly superior financial opinion that is brought to bear on behalf of such belief" (5). Individuals trapped in euphoria experience a "mass escape from reality," and given the "extreme brevity of financial memory," the ensuing collapse is also forgotten (13). "Past experience," he writes, "is dismissed as the primitive refuge of those who do not have the insight to appreciate the incredible wonders of the present" (13). For those investors or asset purchasers whose personal wealth increases during the bubble, it becomes hard to shake the confidence that one's perceptions are intelligent and not lucky. Even though the creation of debt is a necessary part of financial innovation, the extent of leverage risked by lenders and borrowers can become exacerbated by "aberrant optimism" (22). Like Minsky and Cooper, Galbraith asserts that speculation "comes when the popular imagination settles on something seemingly new in the field of commerce or finance," such as the Tulip craze in mid 1630s Holland (28). After the collapse of the bubble, too, the shock of wealth destruction spreads "bitterness" and the "search for scapegoats" (33).

Citing the Marxist-liberal economist Joseph Schumpter, Galbraith writes that after the panic of 1873 and prior to the Great Depression "recurrent manias" were assumed to be a normal feature of business cycles and the "creative destruction" of capitalism (67). These manias extend from institutions of finance down to every gradation of speculator. Even those institutions that were supposed to contain manias, such as central banks and New Deal regulatory agencies, did as much to create bubbles in the twentieth century as they did to prevent them. For, Galbraith both "individuals and institutions are captured by the wondrous satisfaction from accruing wealth" (106). Institutions like banks and central banks provide speculators with institutional authority, and this only furthers the "general mood of optimism" (110). This optimism eventually becomes euphoric when the bubble reaches its biggest size, which is always just prior to the shock that initiates the collapse.

Galbraith is keen to document the speculative episodes in the nineteenth century United States that provide a context for what he might call the "specie" mania in Harte and Twain. Like Kindleberger, Galbraith tracks the regular occurrence of nineteenth century American financial crashes. These crashes are tied to contractions in the credit cycle brought on by over-valuation of assets relative to loans for those assets. The 1837 speculative bubble was in western real estate, manufacturing, and commodities, and was financed by a large number of banks that rose in the absence of the Second Bank, the second US central bank that Andrew Jackson ended. Much of the real estate finance bubble went into canals and turnpikes. Funds from Britain flooded into the country. Property values increased and then, inevitably, crashed. Six US states defaulted on their loans, and borrowers directed anger at overseas creditors demanding to be repaid.

Galbraith argues the next speculative era that ended in 1857 arose because "public memory faded" (63). For him, the regular occurrence of debt bubbles coincide with the real memory of those

involved in the crashes. Nonetheless, everything changed with the Civil War. The post-war years preceding the panic of 1873 "were ones of generally euphoric increasing and pyramiding values and generally euphoric conditions in manufacturing, farming, and public construction. Increasing values again brought increasing values" (64). Just as with canals and turnpikes a generation earlier, this time railroad investment surged. British loans again became available. More investment was "sustained by financial amnesia" that had forgotten the defaults of 1837. Then Jay Cooke & Company failed in September, and the New York Stock Exchange was closed for ten days. Banks quit payment in hard coin. The problem of debts came to the foreground, as did the issue of money. The retirement of the Civil War greenbacks and the move to the gold standard was criticized. The Greenback Party and advocates for free coinage of silver became significant political movements, climaxing in the election of 1896 and William Jennings Bryan cross of gold speech.

Galbraith and Kindleberger detail the nineteenth century history of credit and asset cycles, cycles within which regional manias could have dramatic consequences far beyond their borders. The California gold rush of 1849 drove vast numbers of prospective workers into the west, for instance. The failure of Jay Cooke & Company disrupted the entire US national economy. Both are instances of financial "contagion," which borrows the language of viral transmission to describe the movement and spread of financial shocks from one place to another.[33] These shocks can come in the form of asset price collapses or asset price increases; the shock that drives contagion is usually an extreme creation of wealth, often through debt by credit, or an awesome collapse in wealth, which

[33] The term "contagion" is a frequently used term in both nineteenth century and contemporary literary studies. In Priscilla Wald's *Contagious: Cultures, Carriers, and The Outbreak Narrative*, for example, she writes that there is an "outbreak narrative" that is about literal spreads of infection and infectious bodies. She sees these narratives as myths that are ultimately about collective identity, and therefore helps to contextualize the politics of representing human bodies as "representational figures" of the dangers surrounding interdependency (9). Her work would presumably shed light on crowds by emphasizing how crowd bodies were rendered as ill and medically unstable. But I cannot find in her work an actual account of, say, the transmission of affect.

occurs when a significant debt cannot be repaid. The creation of wealth creates "aberrant optimism" and leads to euphoria, and the destruction of wealth leads to panic. Individually, investors or debtors may feel confident or afraid individually, but the social transmission of that feeling to others is what we understand to be euphoria and panic.

Both Kindleberger and Galbraith pathologize euphoria as a symptom of mass insanity, mob psychology, and herd mentality. They associate euphoria with crowds because they assume that investors and debtors making similar financial decisions must be making those decisions under the influence of pathological emotional outbreaks. This language is present in the dialogic discourse of affect in fiction, too. The descriptions of the gold and silver rushes in Twain and Harte are articulated with a vocabulary of psychological "fever," but one that Galbraith and Kindleberger would instantly recognize.

Galbraith, Kindleberger, and Minsky all share a contradiction in their conceptualization of crowds and financial euphoria. This contradiction goes to the very center of the problem of pathologizing crowds as irrational and privileging individuals as rational. All three authors at once suggest that chaotic periods of disequilibrium are chronic to capitalist credit cycles. They isolate an over-confident and over-optimistic "euphoria" as a bodily symptom of expanding debt bubbles, and do so as economic 'doctors' ready to diagnose the condition and prescribe the solution. Strikingly, their solution more than a little resembles the mesmerists, hypnotists, and psychologists attempting to cure nervous anxiety and hysteria in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. So too for twentieth century liberal economists, then, the capacity of the body to code and produce affect is disruptive. This is no doubt in part due to the fact that classical economic theory began as a masculine science during an era when the project of transatlantic social science and natural history generally arose to

produce knowledge that normalized the reasoning, bounded self of the white western bourgeois body.

What separates Harte and Twain in these two chapters, in fact, is their attempt to write from within the crowd and not outside it, and during an era when masculine social sciences shared many assumptions with liberal economic theory.

Silver Crowds

The politics of a crowd sharing a "feeling of unanimity" as a "whole body" would re-appear in the very center of *Roughing It,* though the politics of crowd euphoria would become much more implicit as the euphoric excitement of the silver crowds grew more 'contagious,' and seemed, at first, to be less organized. Crucially, as Schmitt argues, any codes that can capture affect and bodies become apparatuses for the state. When Twain finally arrives among the silver miners of the settlements in Nevada and the Comstock Lode, the presence of sovereign crowds on the overland trail has given way to crowds of another sort: the euphoric ones fully enmeshed in the "mania" that Kindleberger partially defines.

Yet these euphoric crowds retain the sense of democratic natural right that the ones in Montana earlier did. Already upon Twain's arrival the excited miners are resentful over Lincoln's federal appointments to the territory. Their impulses are democratic and local – terms that we might imagine *must* be paired together – and thus their inclination is for self-government. As Twain summarizes, they "did not enjoy having strangers from distant states put in authority over them – a sentiment that was natural enough. They thought the officials should have been chosen from among themselves – from among prominent citizens who had earned a right to such promotion, and who

would be in sympathy with the populace," Twain writes (147). Twain notes that the "sentiment" of self-government is its own feeling, and one recognized by its common presence among the miners. They recognize each other through this feeling, and desire a leader whose "sympathy" will be with them.

The notion that democratic representatives should share the feelings of their collective suggests that the Virginia City crowds still share a democratic ethos with the Vigilance Committee of Montana. Territorial appointments do not have the consent of the local miners. Moreover, the assumption of sovereignty by Lincoln's appointees displaces the popular sovereignty of the miners, who cannot be expected any longer to organize into crowds acting in their own name, as the Montana Vigilance Committee did against Slade. The desire for local representatives is in some ways an extension of democracy as embodied sensations, and one at odds with Lincoln's representative appointments.

Even as the new Nevada government was poorly funded and the currency weakness of the American greenback produced regional hyper-inflation, the new local-federal government allowed formal local infrastructure to develop. Twain recounts, for instance, how even when "greenbacks had gone down to 40 cents on the dollar" the freighting business carting out precious metals grows "to such important proportions that there was nearly as much excitement over acquired toll-road fortunes as over the wonderful silver mines" (148, 151). The context of wartime inflation and an unstable currency give the silver all the more value in the eyes of the miners. It comes to symbolize something concretized: stability and security. This may be what Durkheim imagined as a symbol that represented an emotion. In this way a symbol does not code affect, but refers to the *idea* of security as sensation.

The euphoria over the discovery of the precious metal, however, quickly grows into a compulsion to acquire tangible forms of the symbolic economy, such as debt contracts, written loans, and other paper financial instruments that inscribe into reality the sensations of the economic expansion. These tangible forms become their own affect machines, in part because their portable status as real objects allows them to stand in for the ecstasy of a "force" that they can not really even symbolize – as Durkheim would note, they are totems. Each totem becomes an affect machine that intensifies the confidence of the miners into euphoria. Twain notes how the miners "smitten with silver fever" predict that the sale of land will infinitely rise. Potentially yielding claims quickly grow to "four thousand dollars a foot," and many claims see an "astonishing advance in value within a short time" (151). Writing from within the speculative episode, Twain recounts how he himself had "gone mad like the rest" (152). Here, Twain utilizes the dialogic discourse of affect, described as "fever" and "madness," to write from within a body influenced by other bodies. The discourse, as we saw in the previous section, is one that cannot quite make sense of bodies other than as behaviors indicating rational or irrational intelligences. Yet the fever is a form of intelligence – it just moves too quickly to note, since it comes from the fast processing speed of the body.

The economic expansion spreads not from contagion or transmission, but from the exponential increase in the quantity and frequency of affect machines. The movements of the population follow. "Every few days news would come of the discovery of a brand-new mining region," Twain recalls, and "away the surplus population would scamper" (153). Migrants migrate. With new credit constantly extended to the miners from wealthy San Francisco speculators and banks, the groups of "rambling prospectors" from Gold Hill to Humbolt re as "feet crazy" as they are silver mad (154). By feet crazy, Twain is describing how the symbols of the economy come to become totems of their own. Since the potential mines are measured in feet, the value of stocks and deeds attached to those mines quickly become as great as the silver supposedly inside them.

Crucially, the secondary real estate and paper instruments connected to the silver actually produce real wealth in Nevada, as long as one can turn over those deeds and stocks to a buyer. Confidence allows the instruments to circulate. The decay of confidence in the instruments would be linked to the evaporation of their referents – the silver, which is its own symbolic machine. Ironically, there is in many cases no real silver to anchor the chain of references that gives value to the instruments. Thus confidence alone actually propels them.

It is a classic debt bubble, but Twain is adamant about locating its bodily dimensions: as he and others ran to camp in nearby hills to dig, he speaks of the way the experience bring out a universal "nomadic instinct" and a "gratified thrill" (158). The euphoria Galbraith recognizes in a pathological sense Twain relates as a sense of pleasure and embodied expansion. It increased his metabolism, his power to move, his excitement with life. The pleasure even disrupts some of his everyday routines of eating and self-expression. The encoded confidence cannot express the actual energy of affect through sheer movement, and so, in a sense, that additional energy allows him to move without eating. Twain recounts that he "couldn't eat or talk, [and was] full of dreams and far away" (161).

The shock of silver extends desires that are already present rather than induce and implant desires that do not exist. Those desires express the body's innate desire to expand its power, as Spinoza argues in *Ethics*. Furthermore, the extension of the body's desire for more power interacts with a fantasy that already has a real material history: the Gold Rush. And just as the Gold Rush was built on previous fantasies of New World gold, the Silver Rush has a previous mythology that gives real material possibilities to the fantasies of wealth. Twain alludes to these structuring myths by focusing on how they feel in the body, such as when he writes that the "secret search among the hidden treasures of silver land was the nearest to unmarred ecstasy" (160). The previous mythology

allows for a new collective one. The collective euphoria syncs the behavior of the miners into crowds.

They came together to assess potential new mineral strikes. As Humboldt filled up with miners, Twain recounts that "we fell victims to the epidemic and strained every nerve to acquire more feet" (166). As they prospect and take up new claims, they often give them names like the "Universe" or "Treasure Trove" and move to claim another few feet. Miners trade the feet and give value to the paper. Twain writes that they all own thirty thousand feet of the "richest mines on earth" but "were in debt to the butcher" (166). Almost inevitably, the excitement of the prospectors moved from the actual material silver to the future potential of the silver claims, and as such debt instruments appear to harness and exploit that future potential. The "feet" used to measure potential claims become the commodity traded; the contracts written to claim ownership over this "feet" became a more liquid way to transfer property rights, and thus a faster method of acquiring "real" wealth. The impulse behind inventing credit contracts is to identify the "feet" where potential silver might appear, and to monetize very quickly the silver already in the ground. If one can guess at the value of a particular silver mine based on its size, then one could exchange the claim as credit and even for cash.

A local culture quickly develops. Twain writes that there is "nothing in the district, no mining, no milling, no productive effort, no income and not enough money, but 'bloated millionaires'" (166). More prospecting parties arrive every night, and "we were stark mad with excitement" and "drunk with happiness" (166). The euphoria continues, and will continue, until the circulation of affect machines ends. This will happen quite quickly, in a rapid switch of phase states. As with other euphoric bubbles, an exogenous shock triggers the switch, and thus withdraws affect machines from the Silver Rush. Tellingly, Twain understands that precious metals are affect

machines, and perhaps the strongest kind. He argues that it is the physical presence of shiny objects like gold that create a lust for it. Confronted with "ostentatious glitter," he offers, "commonplace human nature cannot rise above [it]" (163). At this point Twain leaves Humbolt and arrives in Virginia City to describe another new episode of mining, stocks, and credit; it's clear that the driving force behind the lust for precious metals is not a preoccupation with glittery rocks. Gold is an illustrious totem.

The euphoric phase is in full blossom. In the "wildcat mines" of Virginia City, Twain observes, "all men were beside themselves with hope and happiness" (230). It is not the silver (or gold) that motivates the miners, but the possibilities of converting silver claims to credit derived from speculative value: the hope of quick money that might appear unattached from any corresponding labor. The miners "bought and sold with feverish avidity in the boards everyday," Twain stresses, and their goal was "to make money, to make it fast," all "as easy as it was to eat your dinner" (231). Here, the "feverish" rhetoric of contagion changes the metabolism of bodies, which Twain comically refers to as a habit regular as eating. The practice of credit production again means "new claims taken daily," a trunk full of "stock," and more generally a grand "flush times" (231, 232). Twain writes that they had "pockets full of stock" where the "price went from 5-10 to 70 in a week," as if a "wild spirit possessed the mining brain of the community" (233). Prospectors pointedly sell using deception to take advantage of the initial affective reaction of buyers: "one plan of acquiring such wealth was to 'salt' a wildcat claim and sell out while the excitement was up" (234). All of these moments occur during the bubble preceding the crisis. It is during a phase of credit expansion when ordinary prospectors can potentially gain from the rapid exchange of silver, credit, and money.

It is during these financial conditions, when "money was plenty," that Twain describes how the miners decide to "spend it" (236). Since the bubble has occurred during the Civil War, the US Sanitary Commission has begun to solicit donations for wounded sailors and soldiers of the Union. The Commission sends Sanitary Fairs all over the north at this time, where citizens can interact with veterans, volunteers, and advocates for the war. In parades, booths, and on stages, these interactions are meant to generate sympathy for the cause of war. In Nevada, they become structures to extract capital by recoding the euphoria from the mines into nationalism and patriotism.

Ironically, the recoding of affect for the nationalist government depends upon the collective identity of local crowds. Donations to the Sanitary Fairs become competitive, and symbolic for the value of the collective. When word comes that San Francisco has "responded superbly" to the Sanitary Commission request, for example, Virginia City rallies to outdo San Francisco "before the telegram was a half day old" (236). The regional pride among the Virginia City miners makes them more likely to *donate* their money by redefining the referent of the money as a symbol: they changes it from a totem that includes them to one that necessarily excludes others. Furthermore, Twain describes their charitable giving as an extension of the speculative euphoria itself, and one materially extended from the silver mines to the Sanitary Fairs literally through the money that passes from one venture to the other.

In this sense, the mines are not just backing the Civil War greenback currency, but financing the production of American patriotism in a region that is not yet a state. Twain is keen to describe the formation of crowds to facilitate this moment when the speculative "fever" becomes politicized. It occurs, of course, in a crowd that becomes a singular assemblage. "Virginia rose as one man," Twain tells, and as a committee is organized, a local chairman climbs an empty cart to "make the clamorous multitude understand" (236). Here, assembled in part to sympathize with a nationalist

cause, the "multitude" includes everyone and not just white Anglo miners. As his "voice drowned in cheers," Twain specifies that even "Chinamen and Indians caught the excitement" and "dashed their half dollars into the cart without knowing what it was about" (236). In a further irony, the moment the federal state incorporates all these bodies is one that depends upon sympathy for veterans, soldiers, and the cause of the war: national *unity* waged in the name of extending freedom to African-Americans. It isn't surprising, then, when Twain says that even "women plunged into the crowd" and "fought their way to the car with coin" (236). As the "wildest mob Virginia had ever seen" gives away more and more of their earnings, Twain recalls that they "came 'flush' and went 'busted'" (236).

The Sanitary Fairs interrupts the euphoric phase of the miners. The region becomes even more transformed when local elections arrive. This interruption shifts the totems from stocks. It also shifts the implied referent of signs from those signifying local identity to those of national identity. This instability allows for the appearance of new totems. An ordinary flour sack, for example, becomes a new totem. The appearance of the sack is relatively arbitrary. Twain writes that Reuel Gridley Austin, a Reese River country Democratic candidate for mayor, has told his political challenger that the defeated man in the local election should carry a flour sack home. As the loser, Gridley then decides to auction it for the Sanitary Fund when he gets home. Like the chairman of the Fair committee before him, Gridley stands on a dry box and begins speaking to the crowd that has followed him. As he auctions it off, the "sympathies of the pioneers awoke" and they give the sack 8000 dollars (237). The auction becomes an apparatus of national capture. The sack comes to refer to the emotions and bodies produced by the Sanitary Fair. But the sack gets filled with real silver.

As this exchange takes place, the structuring myth that inspires the fantasies of the miners also changes. The Gold and Silver Rush euphoria that had propelled the miners into Nevada came from a speculative myth about America itself, and even the New World, where wealth emerged from the land for the colonists who claimed it. This myth became tangled with the political rhetoric of the *Declaration of Independence,* with its seductive allusions to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The politics of the state merged with class and folk fantasies of freedom through wealth. Bodily desires for expansion and power found seemingly possible spaces for expression in California and Nevada. The real circulation and expansion of credit gave a material reality to the excitements generated by these fantasies. It was in this context that the equally intense narratives and affects of the Civil War intervened. As such, the federal government did not have to commit precious resources to assume control of the region. Instead, it could provide a structure both for capturing the capital and coding the affect in the region. The auction was a suitable extension of the Fair structure because it created a dramatic spectacle defined by the commitment of capital. The Fair and the auction captured capital in state apparatuses by exploiting bodily excitements. The euphoric crowds of the mines became ideal subjects for capitalist cultures, and were the historical antecedents for post-Civil Rights control societies. The crowd that forms outside Gridley's home is one Twain describes as a "multitude…fairly in the spirit of the thing" (238).

After the Gridley auction, Gridley takes the sack to Virginia City for a repeat of its success. Unfortunately, the people there are "not thoroughly aroused" and in consequence the "sale dragged" (238). Twain's admission that the sack does not function in the same way further supports the contention that its power comes from the crowd itself, and not in what they imagine the sack to represent. It is the collective consciousness of the crowd that provides bodies with the sensations they imagine come from what the sack represents. It is in this way that symbols actually produce *nothing* except for the intensification of affect that becomes coded *as sensations of the referent.* The

crowd outside Gridley's home is different, too, because Virginia City was a different virtual environment. No one there had experienced the event of the election previous to the auction. Realizing this, Gridley and others create a crowd in Virginia City to produce the sensations that they can then code through the sack, and thereby extract capital. So the next day they organize music, a parade of open carriages, and a "moving display of flags" next to the sack in prominent view, with gild lettering and bright paint (238). The ornamentation stimulates bodies. The bright paint and gild lettering excite a crowd, who then begin to turn the sack into a totem. The "moving" display of flags nearby codes the affect of the crowd into sensations of nationalism. Poignantly, federal exploitation of the local situation depends upon exciting bodies into temporal states of intensity. In those times, crowds form around centralized objects or bodies in order better to circulate those affects through bodies. The bodies themselves then feed back into each other.

This intense circulation allows for the emergence of new social experiences. Twain's tone sparkles with the absurd as he describes how the crowd of "huzzaing multitude of citizens" comes to see the sack before it goes to Gold Hill. Yet Twain's continued reference to the bodies as "citizens" stresses the transformation of the euphoric silver into state subjects. This is when the real transfer of sovereignty happens. There is yet again a liberal rationale for the state's presence, however, and one that fully concludes the Hobbesian transformation of the competing war machines into individual citizens. Twain again uses the word "multitude" to explicitly convey the diversity of the participating bodies who come to pay their respect to the sack. He notes, for example, that when the sack parade comes into Gold Hill the "whole population" gathers together again, just as they had during the initial Sanitary Fair collection (238). "Men, women, and children, Chinamen and Indians, were massed in the main street," Twain repeats (238). "All the flags in town were at the masthead," he adds (238). The diversity of participating bodies signals that the idea of the nation extended from the idea of the crowd.

The nation produced here refers to a collective identity where the symbolic meaning of skin color, race, and gender does not matter. This poses an opening for many, but an opening that comes with enormous costs. Suddenly, white men are not the sole "citizens." Paradoxically, Twain defines the "multitude" as transracial and transgendered "citizens" in the moment when those citizens are most actively asserting their legitimacy through the act of donation. This is where the true cost of nineteenth century nationalism would be felt – this nation is one actually led by industrial capitalism.

The crowd formed around the flour sack for the Fair auction is not exceptional. The sack and Gridley are representatives of the state, and they foreclose the earlier possibilities of the sovereign crowd of the Montana Vigilance Committee. This is accomplished through the telegraph as an instrument of mediation; it extends the affects of excitement from Virginia City to Gold Hill and beyond. In Gold City, bulletin boards are set up to track competing bids from neighboring towns that send telegrams back and forth. Then the procession of the sack makes its return to Virginia City, where "torches were glaring, flags flying, bands playing…and the city ready to surrender at discretion (239). Again, Twain's use of political rhetoric here is instructive. Twain claims that the encounter with the sack causes people to "surrender at discretion." This surrender also extracts much money from those bodies. At the end of the day 40,000 greenbacks are donated to the cause, and the sack becomes a national affair thereafter, most likely propelled forward by the telegraph and print media. It is sold in Carson City, then St. Louis after San Francisco, and it then travels east where it raises $150,000 dollars by the end of the episode.

Throughout 1863 and after, "speculation ran riot" and the war goes on (281). Twain explains that $25,000,000 in bullion is extracted from the Comstock and surrounding hills; much of this wealth goes to back the war effort. In a further conflation of the speculative euphoria channeled into a nationalist imaginary, Twain recounts that one night a "little flame on Mount Davidson"

appears – the same Mount Davidson that contains the Comstock Lode. Twain tells that by looking closely he can see that "it was the flag," and it was attracting attention as a "mysterious messenger" in the form of a "rich golden flame," and that the flag shines brightly through it (303). Twain's language here is no longer ironic, playful, or critical. It's reverent and respectful – projecting a new totem. The sacredness of the Union cause seems to resonate for Twain, and might explain his shift in tone.

Pride and reverence for the flag also rise among the miners and travels throughout the settlement. In discussions, people "wrought up" "great news from the war," and from "heart to heart and lip to lip on it spread" (303). In a parallel to the spread of euphoria during the Silver Rush, the excitement around the appearance of the flag circulates largely on rumor – on speculation. Although no one knows any concrete news from the war, Twain says that a lone telegraph operator sworn to official secrecy can't reveal that only he among the "speculating multitude" knows about the fall of Vicksburg and the Union victory at Gettysburg (303). This "speculating multitude" has fully shifted from workers fantasizing about the spontaneous appearance of wealth into a regional *people* of the United States, collectively sharing a fantasy of identity – or temporally sharing a collective identity, depending on one's perspective.

Twain's position within the euphoric collective allows him to write from a perspective 'within' the crowd. But like Harte, Twain is also outside the crowd. He has access to knowledge that cannot be known except to the telegraph operator. His narrative occurs after the event in question. But for the "journalistic monopoly that forbade the slightest mention of Eastern news till a day after its publication in the CA papers," Twain explains, "the gloried flag on Mt Davidson would have been saluted" (303). Besides noting his emphasis on "gloried," a reader should also attend to Twain's mention of the telegraph as the instrument of information and control. The lack of news

distribution in Nevada because of California's political and economic policy reveals San Francisco's hegemonic influence over the timing of knowledge. This ownership over the news and control of knowledge as property also contextualizes the telegraph as the instrument of instantaneous knowledge and national simultaneity. And yet this instrument of dependence and domination allows for the circulation of rumor that increases the feelings of nationalism in Virginia City, in part because the withheld information created a space for the projection of a local fantasy about the meaning of the flag. The arrival of the newspaper as an instrument of class protocol had fully appeared.

Perhaps not coincidently, it is at this point that Twain decides to leave Nevada for San Francisco. As he is leaving, he recounts the initial failed referendum on the first state constitution in Nevada, when local property holders vote against it because of concerns about taxes. The constitution requires a tax on all forms of mining equipment and property, not just profits from the mines. The shock of this political failure changes the conditions of the market, and that failure becomes a trigger for further risk-taking. Instead of soothing the soon to be citizens, it spread confidence. Lower taxes means more money for investment. Speculation becomes frenzied, stocks rise, and everyone began buying on silver stocks: "bankers, merchants, lawyers, doctors, mechanics, laborers, washerwomen, servant girls" (312). But the last-minute frenzy was doomed to pop, like any bubble. All of a sudden, Twain writes, "out went the bottom and everybody went to ruin and destruction! The wreck was complete. The bubble scarcely left a microscopic moisture" (313). Twain's self-conscious reference to a popped "bubble" is heartening here. It contrasts markedly with the aforementioned reverence for the flag. There are new totems around for him to believe in. The state he left behind for "freedom" has found him again, and he is glad.

After the national moment, Twain catalogues the local ruins in the old territories, where sovereign crowds once lived. As he travels to San Francisco he passes through the already "decayed mining camps" of Tuolumne, California, where there once were "flush times of 12-15 years before" (323). The collapse of Tuolumne was probably a regional aftershock of the Gold Rush. It is here that Twain catalogues the aftermath of a credit bubble, and he does so by emphasizing a disconnection from both circuits of news and affect. Twain encounters a group of miners there that had "seen the town spring up, spread, grow, and flourish in its pride; and they had seen it sicken and die, and pass away like a dream" (324). Twain carefully observes the dilapidated ruins scattered among the landscape of the previous settlement. Of the miners who remain there, they "long ago resigned themselves to their exile" (324). He assigns the worst part of their life to their isolation from the communication infrastructure of what he imagines to be state power: they are "far from telegraphs and railroads," in a "living grave, dead to the events that stirred the globe's great populations" (324). For Twain, the "living grave" of the remaining miners is an exclusion from the "events" elsewhere that shock far-off bodies into feeling "stirred."

And so the final irony here is that Twain has misinterpreted the symbols of ruin and destruction here as failures due to a freedom beyond state borders. He believes the isolation of collectives in the western territories, even with their embodied behaviors of democracy and communism, are not capable of social reproduction. He believes it is the technologies of the state that are the key to that reproduction, not the local environment itself. Those technologies of stimulation, and what they stir in those who refuse that freedom in exile, are the affect machines that expand one's sense of place – literally. Yet there is a mistake here. The territories were indeed a geography beyond state borders, but they were always a site for primitive accumulation. Business had been happening there, and that business would only grow more and more disciplinary and sophisticated. For the majority of the populations who would join their territories to the ever-

expanding interior of the United States, the sacrifice of popular sovereignty to the capitalist state would be a tough bargain. The truly powerful individuals in capitalist states are legal fictions – corporations. The world to come would be theirs, and the actual compromises to be made with them would be ones made at very fast speeds. That world would not offer a government to protect bodies, but rather an economy for citizens to embody. The world of the state isn't just *conceptually* liberal; bodies *live* liberalism by following stocks and expanding metabolisms through money. The totems of capitalism, then, would be the ever-increasing paper that told citizens they had a future, and allowed them to feel it as if it were real.

Chapter Six

Crowd Capture and Brain Machinery in *The Pit*

This dissertation has by now made the case that crowds are not always spontaneous collections of individuals acting together for the purpose of forcing changes to political institutions. Crowds can also become institutionalized themselves. We saw this in the previous chapter in *Roughing It,* when Mark Twain describes the way Civil War Sanitary Fairs channel the euphoria of Nevada silver miners into a regional auction where towns competed against one another to donate newly minted earnings to the federal cause. Authors like Twain tend to illustrate the behavior of these 'captured' crowds as almost magically unified. Literary authors were able to develop a sophisticated descriptive vocabulary to describe crowd behavior, and we can place these descriptions side by side with social philosophies that theorize "bodies" that act in combinations beyond the individual. Helpfully, Spinoza conceived of bodies in just this sense. In his reflections on the human "mind," Spinoza centers his notions of mind in and through bodies that expand beyond the individual. "When a number of bodies, whether of the same or of different size, are so constrained by other bodies that lie upon one another," he writes, "that they communicate their motions to each other in a certain fixed manner, we shall say that those bodies are united with one another and that they all together compose one body or individual, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies" (Spinoza 42). This union of bodies will provide a relief upon which we read anew Frank Norris' *The Pit,* a novel that provides us instruction about how a "union of bodies" works as a crowd, and how that crowd's institutionalized status as a "Pit" of bodies extends through communication links into investor bodies to capture capital and make decisions by 'feeling' the market for wheat futures contracts. We will see, through the process, how the over-excitement of

financial euphoria felt by the novel's central character, Curtis Jadwin, can give us perspective about the role individual bodies play in crowd behavior and in capitalist economies.

In order to explore these themes, let's return to turn of the century Chicago, where two of Norris' principal characters are exploring an opportunity to gamble on wheat futures. Samuel Gretry, a broker, is trying to convince his friend and partner Curtis Jadwin, a real estate mogul, to help him finance a short sale of wheat futures to a circle of commodities investors whose agents frequent "the Pit" in the Chicago Board of Trade, where commodities are bought and sold. Selling short means borrowing shares, or in this case contracts, for their current price and selling them to a pre-determined buyer at a later time. If the real price of the contract goes down in the interval, the seller profits. Gretry needs Jadwin to help fund the initial advance so that he can sell his wheat contracts to rival investors, but Jadwin is skeptical. Gretry assures him that he's not betting against the market; Gretry has inside information that seemingly guarantees the probability that wheat will go up and then down, soon. He has an inside man in Paris, which is a major market for American grown wheat. He's learned that the political situation there will directly affect the price of wheat. The French Chamber of Deputies is going to introduce heavy import duties on foreign grain. The news isn't general yet, and investors are eagerly awaiting a crop report due any moment that they believe will rally the wheat market. Gretry knows that the news from France will drive the price right back down. He wants Jadwin to come in big and earn a certain fortune.

Part of Jadwin's hesitation is simply over this form of speculation. Derivative securities such as futures contracts don't measure tangible products, but instead derive profit from differences in prices from one month to another in, say, the wheat market. They act as indexes for the aggregated value of such products between buyers and sellers who, unknown to each other, depend on financial intermediaries to connect them through space and time. Jadwin trusts Gretry, but he's a little unsure

of himself. He's unsure because this form of investment does something to one's body. "Speculation," especially in these derivative securities, seems to act on the body the way gambling does. It can create trances. "A man gets into this game," Jadwin warns, "and into it, and into it, and before you know he can't pull out – and he don't want to" (Norris 68). Jadwin's initial reluctance to join the "game" is prescient, but how he articulates his fears speaks directly to the contorted desires that seem to wrap a body into speculation itself. Just as Mark Twain in *Roughing It* eventually comes to feign amazement at the ability of "flush time" euphoria to overwhelm Nevada silver miners, including himself, with fantasies of instant wealth, Jadwin too already intuits the destructive intensity possible from instantly profitable securities.[34]

It turns out to be ironic that Jadwin's fears here will come to pass in the novel. His insistence that speculation is a game, even a peculiar one, is the first of several motifs in the novel that I'll analyze in the current chapter, and the first that articulates how much about speculative investment depends upon the feeling of that game in one's body, and how much of that game and its feelings both entrain and alter other bodies. To focus on these bodies requires that we turn to the Pit as a character. The Pit contains a different kind of crowd than we have seen in previous chapters. The political crowds that we saw in those chapters were organized to affect governments. In the case of Twain's Nevada silver crowds, the Sanitary Fair auction arrived in order to channel sympathies for union soldiers and regional pride into nationalist capital. The crowd in the Pit is a relative of the Sanitary Fair auction: institutionalized, functional, and catalyzed by the transmission of affect. The institution that creates the apparatus of the Pit, however, is not one regulated by the government. The Chicago Board of Trade Building, where the Pit brokers exchange wheat contracts, is a space

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The plot of the novel stems from actual events. Norris became interested in the subject when Joseph Leiter infamously tried to corner the wheat market on June 13, 1898. Leiter's powerful role as an individual contrasted with notions of market crowds and financial contagions that contemporary commentary on credit crises also emphasized. This same literature, however, placed special importance on the similar psychological states that influenced crowds and individuals.

created by and for capital. It operates within the urban space of Chicago's democratic political culture, but the productions of the broker crowds in the Pit exist to extract surplus value. This institutional space is important; I will discuss it both as a social assemblage and also as a state apparatus. Previous crowds in this study have occupied outdoor spaces and have always intersected with discourses and scenes meant to evoke threats or challenges to various democratic regimes, whether in restricted slave economies, experimental post-Reconstruction ones, or relatively autonomous territories in the west. The crowd in the Board of Trade's Pit, by contrast, is institutional. As such, it offers us the opportunity to establish and unpack the themes that have filled this project thus far: the capture of autonomous affect from crowds and its conversion into capital; the technological connections from the crowd that extend from closely clustered bodies into diffuse communication networks; the discursive representation of intensified affective sensations in bodies, coded through a hybridic vocabulary of nineteenth century sentimentality and contagion; and, finally, the political effects produced by the power of crowds.

This chapter will discuss the crowd in the Pit as "brain machinery," place that brain machinery in the context of social assemblages, discuss Jadwin's role in that social assemblage, and theorize how the Pit as social assemblage works as an apparatus. The chapter will also focus on Jadwin's sense that he is "blooded" to the game, and how the sensations of volatility in the wheat futures market are too difficult for Jadwin's body to absorb. The end of the chapter will briefly address the biopolitical implications of these themes.

As in the previous two chapters, the affect of euphoria represented in the fiction is closely linked to credit bubbles, capital over-accumulation, and financial crisis at that defined American economic life throughout the nineteenth century. As mentioned earlier, it also becomes most visible in crowds. For American literature as well as in crowd psychology, the financial panics that followed

credit bubble crashes had assumed center stage in economic discussions, and marked a shift in crowd theorization away from the realm of democratic, socialist, and racist politics. As in previous chapters, focusing on moments in the text relevant to euphoria and crowds provides for the occasion to integrate situations of nineteenth century transatlantic discourse about group psychology with contemporary theories of affect. Fusing and un-fusing this integration between historical and contemporary discourses is crucial to untangling how American literary authors imagined the complex experience of capitalist contradictions through an ever-morphing constellation of vocabularies that this dissertation calls the discourse of affect.

Situating the discourse of affect alongside crowd power in the Pit is complex, but by no means counter-intuitive. On the one hand the Pit is a place where "the speculating is done," but also one where the larger vice of capitalism's corrosive and awesome extraction can be represented (31). It's a place where Norris can mark the legibility of speculation through its bodily effects, but also a place where his descriptions allow us the chance to note the legibility and interactivity of affect. The wheat market is just one of the Provision Pits of the Board of Trade that acts as a site where affects circulate, and where traders compress into their bargaining maelstrom. There, brokers gather in dense clusters to buy and sell futures contracts. They compete to monetize a constant barrage of telegraphed news, and each new piece of information about weather and politics may reveal decisive stratagems to act upon. It is within this "monolithic" and "monstrous sphinx" thay day-traders shout orders and scramble for deals in passionate crowds, united by the excitement of individuated desires intensified by other bodies (31).

In the novel, Norris shows that the euphoria and panic running through the Pit ripple out into households and friendships. Jadwin eventually does succumb to Gretry's designs, and his involvement does, in fact, consume him. As his success and power earn him respect and a national

reputation, he also courts his future with Laura and eventually persuades her to marry him. With his loyal assistant broker Gretry, Jadwin pursues less and less his real estate ventures and more and more trading in wheat futures. This venture is marked out by the investment community as somewhat forbidden, since predicting both market demand and agricultural supply depends on haphazard guesswork about global constellations of farming reports from the American Midwest and Europe, as well as European markets where grain purchases fluctuate according to the same swirl of prices and harvests. Legends of failed attempts by previous traders brought to ruin by their tries to corner this market, which eventually becomes Jadwin's overriding ambition, abound in the gossip coursing through the Pit. Jadwin's own best friend, Charles Cressler, refuses to enter Jadwin's increasingly brazen dreams to conquer the monthly contracts by completely cornering the market for even a month – a situation in which he could set the price for all the buyers. To do so he would have to ply an enormous supply of personal capital and find access to better information through faster channels than the rest of the traders. With each new capital gain, however, he does just that.

Yet as his methods prove successful and national fascination with the wheat market climaxes in his ultimate cornering of all May wheat, his mind and body grow increasingly wired to the information ensuring his dominance, as well as the returning profits and public esteem his fortunes bring him. He recognizes the euphoria of a wheat bubble he personally blew to gigantic size as the stuff of profound confidence and pride, but it's accompanied by both nervous exhaustion and classical hubris. A rival network of traders is caught in Jadwin's monopolistic trap, including his friend Cressler, though his involvement is unknown to either until too late. The cornering of the market ruins Cressler and he shoots himself; fresh in a depression over Jadwin's distance, Laura discovers his body. Concurrently, a record amount of June wheat appears from transatlantic farmers trying to take advantage of soaring prices, and supply overwhelms demand. The market crashes despite Jadwin's obstinate refusal to sell for anything less than May prices. The Pit goes into a frenzy

over the price collapse, and the new prices humble and bankrupt Jadwin. Everything must be sold, and in conclusion Laura pulls Jadwin from his malaise for a move out west to try their fortunes again somewhere out in the closing frontier.

Rather than trace out the sequence of actions in the novel to ultimately tease out Norris' moral stance on speculation, this chapter will focus on scenes in the novel that can open critical discussions about how crowds in the Pit work. Rather than suggest that Jadwin's participation in the speculative "game" solely reflects Norris' moral concerns about the corrosive possibility of this particular capitalist practice, I contend that the scenes where Jadwin 'loses himself' in the game and becomes unhinged from his domestic life are in fact episodes that dilate upon how various bodies within crowds work – and, in particular, a crowd that we have not seen yet in this dissertation: one that works within an institutional apparatus. Norris' descriptions of Jadwin's break from traditional perspectives of individuated, self-contained identity are places we can press to find out how crowds are simultaneously singular and heterogeneous. They aren't just singular social assemblages that function within a state apparatus, but multiplicities whose parts – the bodies that make them – can fundamentally alter that singularity. This is the case whether individuals or groups within the singularity of the Pit expand their power to act, or whether instead those bodies lose that power. Over the course of the novel, Norris shows both through the character of Jadwin. The example of Jadwin does not just illuminate how the complexity of crowds can change the bodies that form its parts, but also point to how those bodies distribute information. This function of the Pit corresponds in part to its status as a singularity, and also as an apparatus. This singularity helps us to understand the Pit as a living, organic assemblage composed of various bodies, some human and some electronic.

It is one, in fact, that Norris describes as “brain machinery.” This brain machinery will allow us to further explore the Pit as an assemblage that thinks – but also one that feels. This thinking is different than previous crowds in part because the Pit’s institutional status allows us to make visible crowd *cognition;* it provides, too, a window into how capitalist markets function through crowds. This brain machinery is adaptive and sentient; it thinks in a continually evolving process from its half-human and half-technic parts – the very example of a Deluezian machine.[35] One of the consequences of apprehending crowd cognition is that it helps us see the agency of affect, and how affect mobilizes for capital can help us “see” a distributed agency within capitalist apparatuses – one that mobilizes human bodies as human bodies mobilize it. The Pit is irreducible to those individuals. This is what allows the Pit to survive the moral sequence of the plot and continue to self-replicate as an institution at the end of the novel, despite Jadwin’s financial losses and geographic ejection to the west with his chastened marriage. Behind him in Chicago, the Pit’s accumulation continues. The crisis brought on by his attempt to corner the market is not generalized. The crisis is an occasion for the Pit to remove a part destructive to it; crucially, this will occur because Jadwin’s re-production of the affect he experiences from speculation is so de-stabilizing to the Pit that it triggers the geopolitical financial crisis of the May wheat corner. The Pit can show the incredibly special role particular bodies play when they act as virtual attractors within the market, or points of power that bring market crowds to a threshold of transition from bear to bull cycles. When single bodies have the power to tip the dynamic circulation of affect from a homeostatic position of euphoria to

35 In *Insect Media: An Archaeology of Animals and Technology,* Jussi Parikka writes that new computer programs called “parasite computing” actually works to produce media systems that work like insect colonies. The individual nodes – the insects – are “individually dumb, but highly efficient when coupled with their environment” (xii). Parikka broadens the definition of media from technological use of mass communication to processes of transmission, recording, and connecting. Media “are a contraction of forces of the world into specific resonating milieus” (Parikka xiv). Echoing Spinoza, Parikka writes that bodies can carry the potential forces and expressions that we associate with media technology.

depression, they help switch the potential tendencies of actual markets from buy to sell, from excited euphoria to excited panic, from bubble to bust.

The previous chapters examined the intersection between euphoric crowds and expressions of regional democratic politics in the western continent before and during the Civil War. By the turn of the century, however, the relatively buoyant and open possibilities associated with crowds had shifted in tone, particularly for financial fiction, though not unsurprisingly for socialist texts such as Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle* and Mary Wilkins Freeman's *The Portion of Labor*. Mark Twain had ultimately sympathized with the Civil War crowds bidding on an auctioned flour sack he depicted when he wrote *Roughing It* in the early 1870s. The crowds were naïve and excited, as he was, in the spoiled riches of Silver rush Nevada. In *Blake,* Martin R. Delany also had a keen enthusiasm for the possibilities of a slave revolt in the pre-war south. Yet southern lynch mobs would tinge the meaning of crowds with something very different for Charles Chesnutt, who in *The Marrow of Tradition* conflated passionate hatreds with crowds generally; in referencing Le Bon's own fears of socialist crowds, he implicitly agreed that the lower classes could act heinously, though, he might insist, of any race. In any case, the lack of self-containment experienced by individuals in crowds that Zimmerman notes implied degeneracy and mental illness. Twain himself eventually rewrote his crowd auction scene from *Roughing It* in *The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg,* a novella published in 1900, where a seemingly perfect small town becomes corrupted by a contagion of greed.

The Pit accentuates these anxieties about crowds by adopting the tactic of Chesnutt and Twain: rather than showing the pathology of crowds in degenerate populations, where Le Bon and other elite intellectuals located them, he focused on a member of the elite, Jadwin. He does so, however, in order to emphasize the corrosive nature of capitalist practices. Norris worries over the ways that nervous systems code those practices into destabilizing emotional states, and like other

authors, he renders bodily instability through a hybridic nineteenth century discourse of sentimental romance, electrical science, and psychic illness. Also like the other authors, Norris uses the threat of affective contagion circulating through crowds to critique larger social conflicts. Just as Twain fretted over the ways populations could be manipulated by affects produced by political strategists, and Chesnutt troubled over the extralegal powers created by white supremacists, Norris used the crowds of the Pit to suggest that there was something toxic to bodies participating in capitalism. And yet, as we shall see, the assemblage of the Pit could ultimately survive the absence of its former leader.

Resituating *The Pit*

By situating the novel's sentimental action around the Chicago Board of Trade, Norris can trace the way systemic disruptions explode during capitalist crises by projecting seemingly abstract catastrophes into and on the emotional lives of particular persons. This focus allows Norris to signal his concern about investment practices, but also his concern over the power of individuals within modern finance to wield as much power as entire governments. Jadwin's position of financial power and his trading reputation don't qualify him as a responsible authority in the marketplace, and his position of power arises solely from his supply of capital and credit. Yet there is a pressing concern in *The Pit* that Norris spends far more time enumerating. His literary impulse to showcase the sentimental overtures of naturalism's dark romanticism requires him tirelessly to expound upon the emotional lives of his characters. Whether these emotions are basic or social, Norris scripts an inordinate amount of text within the discourse of affect. To begin to understand the interaction between the bodily practice of capitalism and the affective behavior of crowds, then, it's necessary to underscore the relative autonomy of Jadwin's body from cognitive direction, and yet, ironically, its

powerful capacity nonetheless to influence crowds and markets. The affects influencing his decisions not only signify a kind of counter-intelligence to cognition, but they also signify a crowd cognition: inseparable from the crowd, Jadwin's body thinks with other bodies, and their collective, distributed intelligence is the product of affects themselves.

In order for us to understand Jadwin's experience of investment as crowd participation, we must isolate and then expand those moments in the novel where Norris' descriptions lend themselves to the necessity of close-reading, and, still further, to the kind of analytical lens. As with this project as a whole, it should be clear by now that the novels are not artifacts where historically concurrent discourses about group psychology and financial anxieties became deposited, cRudé ly speaking, but in fact are locations where socially-minded American authors, like Norris, attempted to represent complex systems of finance, communications, and politics through networks of interconnected characters. By relying on a medium of entertainment that often attempted to generate emotional identification and sympathies in readers, writers like Norris explored and represented emotions in his characters. Far from being incidental to those complex circuits, emotional characters are in fact the necessary key that unlocks the entire turn of the century culture of investment and derivatives that the text explores. It is therefore both intellectually reasonable and productive disciplinarily to rely as much on Norris' descriptions of crowds, bodies, and affects as on the narrative sequences that establish moral order by the end of the text. This is not to say that conclusions don't matter, but instead to insist that our gravitation toward the most peculiar moments in the text, to which the crowd scenes contribute mightily, justifiably deserve at least our equal attentions. I would even recommend here, at the end of this dissertation, that we regularly

think more openly about engaging the possibilities of these pre-conclusive moments as the "social theory" that simply could not be imagined in any other medium or genre at the time.[36]

This distinction is crucial and not simply academic, so to speak, particularly for unpacking the crowd scenes in the novel that revolve in the Pit. As a case in point, *The Pit* has been read by its first generation of critics, as well as subsequent ones, as a simplified morality tale about the stock market, cast in pre-Freudian terms and dyed as a representative of turn of the century naturalist fiction. These interpretations relay some of the themes so far described here. In *Rebels and Ancestors,* Maxwell Geismar writes that it "was really a study in the pathology of the gambler, not far from Freud's speculations about the obsessional temperament of Dostoyevski" (42). Geismar considered the novel an aesthetic failure, as many traditional literary still do, and read the "Victorian moralism and sentiment" in the conclusion as a sign that Jadwin was a "tragic hero" rather than "an amoral or obsessional figure of finance" (43). Similarly, several decades later Morton Rothstein writes that the novel has found success in spite of its aesthetic failures, as with many "lasting works of art," because the work "fit into the tradition of protest against social consequences of economic change" (51-52). Geismar's asides about Freud, pathology, and obsession should begin a conversation about the text, not conclude one. Pathology and obsession in particular, with their negative connotations, are ripe concepts to reverse. They indicate a normative critical orientation that cannot scale up its lens to "see" the crowd or the assemblage, where those same qualities would be read completely differently.

36

In this respect I follow the work of Jane Tompkins, who in *Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790-1860* argues that "works of fiction and stories should be studied not because they manage to escape the limitations of their particular time and place, but because they offer powerful examples of the way a culture thinks about itself" (xi). Tompkins goes on to say that literature is not a "stable entity," as seen from the evolution of literary anthologies (190). Yet Tompkins argues that the merits of these books come from the "cultural work" they do "within a certain historical situation," and that we should "value them for that reason" (200). I would press us to go further: the significance of *The Pit* is the *theoretical work* that it does in *our* "historical situation."

More recent critics, such as Renata R. Mautner Wasserman, read the novel for how it matches other texts in the period. This is a powerful engine for opening discussions about psychology and crowds that critics like Geismar ignore. It brings us closer to seeing the novel as a text of social theory. Mautner sees the novel as representative of a cluster of late nineteenth, early twentieth century fiction focusing on "market conditions and crowd psychology" (Mautner 193). She places *The Pit* in the context of these "financial fictions," and shows how both the naturalist style and thematic focus comes from similar works in French, such as Zola's *L'argent* (193). Usefully, she cites Elias Canetti's concept of "money, multitude, and meaning" from *Crowds and Power* to explain that such novels document a period of individually-felt alienation in the shadows of transatlantic industrial expansion. Following Canetti, Mautner suggests that the monetary instability of industrial countries, in, for instance, the gold and silver wars in the United States, led millions to feel as if money was no longer dependable. This feeling of instability led to unsettled crowds, particularly during bouts of inflation (Canetti's prime example was hyperinflation in Weimar Germany). When money was depreciated, individuals felt so, too. Drawing from real events, Norris and Zola transcribed this instability into individual characters hovering next to crowds of all kinds – at the theater, in finance houses, on the urban street.

Rather than read the novel as a poorly wrought naturalist morality play with social protest overtones, David Zimmerman offers an extremely compelling intertextual historical genealogy for *The Pit,* and one that opens the critical categories available to its interpretation. *In Panic: Market Crisis and American Fiction,* Zimmerman places *The Pit* beside Hamlin Garland's *The Shadow World* (1898), his second novel about his time as chief investigator for the American Psychical Society. Garland recounts an investigation about a piano played by invisible hands, and Zimmerman explains that the "uncanny independence" of the hands from "conscious control" interested more than just psychic investigators at the turn of the century. "The autonomy of these hands," Zimmerman states, "eerily

demonstrated that the hegemony of consciousness was tenuous, that under certain conditions other selves and other energies could usurp control of the mind, that there was a mechanism churning just below consciousness that might sometimes be given over to its own uncanny automatism" (124). He goes on to address the many "financial fiction" writers that turned to the study of hypnotism and hysteria to explain financial panics and market crashes, and how those writers saw in markets an "aggregation of minds" that could act together. Zimmerman takes these ideas seriously from a historical perspective, but doesn't draw out the logic raised by writers thinking through an "aggregation of minds."[37]

This chapter theorizes how exactly this "aggregation of minds" might work, though for Zimmerman it is Norris' representation of the sublime that is at stake: the Pit is a romantic symbol capable of mass hypnosis through its awesome power. The sublime Pit aligns Norris with "contemporary sociologists and crowd psychologists who studied how mass suggestion and emulation threatened the idea of a sovereign self, the self-determining subject of classical political economy" (125). Zimmerman again here connects the way crowd psychologists were themselves attune to the ways the circulation of affects in crowds displaced theoretical lenses, such as those of classical economy, that privileged individuated consciousness. He doesn't go on to challenge those same assumptions, still ever present in contemporary economics and, to a lesser extent, literary

[37]Instead, he returns to the intertextual meanings of the novel in order to offer us potent insights into the speculative map Norris may have been making with the novel. Zimmerman's interpretative schematic insists that the novel must ultimately act as a synecdoche for the collection of texts that influenced other financial writers at the time. Since financial critics understood markets as hypnosis, then Jadwin must be the hypnotist, or perhaps even the Pit. He says that Jadwin is a hypnotist and the wheat market is a mesmerized patient, for example, but he also writes that both Jadwin's mind and the market would become "ungovernable machines" (125). Here, Zimmerman unintentionally presses upon the machine concept that, as this dissertation asserts, actually suggests something interesting about the novel's depictions of crowds. His rhetoric creates a false choice between governable and ungovernable machines, though, because he means machines metaphorically.

theory. Instead, he returns to the Pit's textual status as an emblem of the naturalist genre. The economic sublime of the Pit "fits easily enough with the romantic experience," he writes, and goes on to argue that it appears in Jadwin as "hysteria, engulfment, seduction, and dissolution" (italics mine, 142). In moments of panic, this economic sublime passes to others, and "self-identity becomes up for grabs since one's own beliefs and desires become wholly confounded with the beliefs and desires of others" (142). Zimmerman's language here is evocative and exciting, but lacks a theoretical perspective that might allow him to credit the text with a meaningful contribution to social theory. He does leave the impression, though, that there are qualities of crowds that go beyond historical context, and have yet to be taken seriously by economists at least.[38]

Brain Machinery in the Pit

It is in the Pit that Curtis Jadwin attempts to corner the market in wheat contracts, command and monopolize the prices for a month, and then extort buyers for the highest costs possible. It is from the Pit that Jadwin asserts his control. Yet because the Pit is the nexus of exchange where all distant commands routed and relayed information, Norris never allows the reader to believe a space of such multiplicity can be contained or controlled. Everything that the Pit will come to represent for Norris – its affective life in particular – also opens a discussion about the affective life of the crowd within it. The pitched excitement, euphoria, and confidence that circulate among and excite trader crowds during bull cycles in the Pit can sometimes mobilize and direct

[38]The "runaway mimeticism" that Zimmerman sees as a significant aspect of affect circulation offers both him and Norris the opportunity to critique the market itself, where we find "the speculator in the marketplace whose economic selfhood is constituted by the endless field of others' imitative desires and expectations" (147).

trades, and thus compromise the notion of investor agency and cognition. The moments when traders erupt with fear and panic are already linked in the era's literature explicitly to the contagious qualities of crowd behavior, which fit the negative associations linked to crowds.[39] It's fair to say Norris' motivations in the novel aren't far removed from those associations and concerns, but the text's literary qualities make clear he also has another agenda in mind.

With those negative images and associations of the crowd not far away, Norris' descriptions of the Pit still do more than mark the threatening themes of crowd contagions. It's worth noting first of all that the Pit itself supposedly housed the best and brightest of white male America, and not swarthy, feeble-minded immigrants frothily advancing socialist demands. In this sense, Norris deflects the stereotypes of the ethnic and gendered crowd by making the same move as Paul Lawrence Dunbar in "The Lynching of Jube Benson" and Charles Chesnutt in *The Marrow of Tradition,* who both re-locate the supposed perversities of crowd psychology to white southern lynch mobs. Norris takes this relocation one step further by extending the problem of the crowd into the

[39] Even as single individuals would come to manipulate that aggregate market in new ways during the post-war era, American writers were just as interested in narrating what David Zimmerman calls "market crowds." In *Panic! Markets, Crises, & Crowds in American Fiction,* Zimmerman details how anxieties and representations over financial panics overlapped with those of crowd psychology. Zimmerman's study examines "panic novels" to explore how novelists "shaped the popular discourse of financial panics," and even how they "turned to the science of mob psychology" to narrate how "market crowds" focused on economic ruin as a theme (Zimmerman, 1). Panic novelists often used their plots as analogues for the strange way market machinations spread economic and psychological dynamics together. As they excited mass emotions, financial panics showed that those emotions could unhinge local and national politics. "At bottom," Zimmerman writes, "market crowds served as field sites for investigating economic and emotional interdependencies" (Zimmerman, 4). He is especially interested in the panic novel as a genre, and how character entanglements in "far-flung casual webs" brought emotional and narrative clarity to economic catastrophe. "Financial panic," Zimmerman writes, "as an exemplary instance of and metaphor for baffling excess, provided fiction writers with a potent resource for interrogating the limits and capacities of novelistic form and accounting" (Zimmerman, 2). Zimmerman's understanding of individuals networked into market crowds will be expanded here into readings of actual crowds.

"As moments of crisis and discontinuity," Zimmerman writes, "panics promised to expose what other events and phenomena could not: the source and scope of market effects, the forces binding and driving crowds, and the social trauma shadowing corporate and financial modernity" (Zimmerman, 2).

heart of the white financial elite in Chicago, and in the process suggests that the excited speculative bodies of these traders reveal something organically demented about the practice of capitalism. More ominously, the parts played by these bodies add up to a whole larger than their sum. This whole is the Pit.

Norris' rather naturalist fascination with the quixotic force of the Pit is symptomatic of a writer perhaps overly-saturated in the genre's episodic simplifications about the forces over-determining human behavior, but his explorations into the function of the Pit simultaneously map a new language for the affective dimensions of capitalist practices and pinpoint the primacy of the body for cognition, and, by extension, for investment. It's difficult to discern at times whether or not Norris substantially understood a defined division between those practices and those bodies; in other words, it's just as likely he believed that capitalist practices over-determined bodily excitement and crowd behavior rather than the other way around. What's most interesting is his idea that the Pit is more than the aggregate of the individual trader bodies, even though he also described the Pit as distinct from any larger generalization about capitalism. The Pit is a force unto itself, and early on he focalizes it through Jadwin's perspective as a constellation of liquid commands that seem to be a living thing:

> Often Jadwin had noted the scene, and, unimaginative though he was, had long since conceived the notion of some great, some resistless force within the Board of Trade Building that held the tide of the streets within its grip, alternately drawing it in and throwing it forth. Within there, a great whirlpool, a pit of roaring waters spun and thundered, sucking in the life tides of the city, sucking them in as into the mouth of some tremendous cloaca, the maw colossal sewer; then vomiting them forth again, spewing them up and out, only to catch them in the return eddy and suck them in afresh. (63)

Besides observing that Jadwin's thoughts here resemble most Norris' own narrative penchants, the liquid Pit here works to subtend the agency of the futures exchange to some fetid dynamics

operating within the Board of Trade Building. Like the Octopus image he used to describe the railroad corporations in his previous novel, the shitty waters of the Pit here daringly abscond with the life on Chicago's streets and turn it into the putrid mush of capital. As he continues the passage, Norris relates how the dirty vacuums and expulsions puking from the Board of Trade went "all through the Northwest, all through the central world of the Wheat," and "spread and spread till grain in the elevators of Western Iowa moved and stirred and answered to its centripetal force" (63). The Pit is the nexus of production and consumption, and through its interactive anus it subsumed far-flung regions into continental networks of exchange. It's fair to assume that Norris was skeptical of capitalist re-investment, even as his vocabulary respects its awesome power.

The oceanic cloaca also interests him, and us, however, because it gives a positively psychological spin to the motivations of the investors – anachronistically, we may call it a pre-Freudian one. In the midst of all that spreading and sucking are movements that stimulates and tickles the bodies participating in the flow. The phenomena of the Pit might be non-living, a sort of body without organs, but its effects are material; they are affective. "Terrible at the centre," Norris writes, "it was, at the circumference, gentle, insidious and persuasive, the send of the flowing so mild, that to embark upon it, yielding to the influence, was a pleasure that seemed all devoid of risk" (63). Norris' touch here is fantastic for its interplay between the language of pleasure and influence, firmly inside our social psychological understanding of bodily affections, and also that of investor parlance. Capitalist practice here is not so much economic and calculated as exciting, even sensual. These sensualities are not quite so much metaphorical as indicative of why bodies become attached to the practice of buying and selling. Those pleasures are transmissible, material, and, as readers will come to see, capable of transforming into the primary sensations that inform identity itself. They make bodies move. "Men upon the streets of New York," Norris relays, "felt the mysterious tugging of its undertow engage their feet, embrace their bodies, overwhelm them, and carry them bewildered

and unresisting back and downwards to the Pit itself" (63). What will come to occupy the remainder of the novel is the discovery of how the Pit embraces and overwhelms bodies, and what power those bodies have to send their own singular ripples back into it.

What we learn from the subsequent narrative is that the Pit's sentience, to the extent we can understand it, comes from the collective movements of all the bodies it touches. Those movements coalesce in its center, in the Chicago Board of Trade, because of the disproportionate power of the capital collected there in the hands of futures investors. In turn, those investors possess far more power than the bodies at the periphery, and thus the affective circulations moving them - and their feedbacks, too – matter more than the rest. The concentration of information through telegraph wires streaming toward Chicago via New York and Paris and Iowa gives them a centered but distributed brain, and this brain is the abstraction whose effects are seen as the invisible hand of the wheat market. Norris will develop a different vocabulary to untangle the mix of synapse and telegraph firings that make this diffuse machine work as a matrix of electricity and chemicals. When the building opens, for instance, "a whole new set of nerves came into being," and a "whole new system of brain machinery began to move with the first figure called in the Pit" (74). This brain machinery operates by interpreting information in order to buy or sell contracts, but its organic structure, its human parts, mean that perfectly *rational* interpretations are impossible. The computational domain of the economic is created from chemical tissues highly susceptible to affective sensations and intensities. In fact, information is felt by the body *and* dissected through cognitive mapping that attempts to frame that information through known categories and previous histories.

While Norris' vivid descriptions tend to belie the inherent problems of this brain machinery, much in the same way crowds were critiqued as animal legacies corrupting civic life, they offer us the

opportunity to observe the way collective bodies could think. They offer us an opportunity to understand crowd cognition as an affectively located collective intelligence. They help us understand how groups of bodies communicate by spreading stimuli by various channels that in the end are chemically and not electronically received: information that comes by wire must always be filtered through human eyes, and to human brains lodged in chemical baths of hormones and fragile neural circuitry. Norris' language offers us ways of conceiving inter-mental patterns as indications of social organisms that function using human bodies beyond the scale of individuals. Social organisms operate here as discrete systems themselves housing linguistic and chemical communicative systems. By expanding our scale from the individual human body to groups of bodies, we can widen the frame we place around consciousness, and cut its over-determined association with single bodies without losing its material basis in human parts.

The productions of these human parts are manifold. Events that arrive bearing news of conflict, for example, such as that between England and Turkey, strike each body in the Pit as a potential factor to be weighed in the price of wheat. Small movements in the price tip back and forth as a response of the brain machinery, as each separate and competing faction in it attempts to discern the outcome of the political disruption caused by that international turbulence. These movements are not reflective of the current state of affairs or the present production of wheat, but reactions to the potential valuations of wheat in the future. The reactions of the wheat market are thus virtual expressions of the actual demand for wheat. The function of the brain machinery is thus to create a virtual vector for the market to move, and, far removed from the interests of the collective investors, to interpret the significance of the political incident through the specific interests of capitalist culture.

The unverifiable nature of the news, quickly named the "Higgins-pasha incident" and of no real consequence to the novel's plot, provides Norris with the chance to put the figurative movements of the market into physical action. "The messenger boys ran back and forth at top speed," he writes, "colliding with one another, and without interruption intoning the names of those for whom they had despatches [sic]. The throng of traders concentrated upon the pits, and at every moment the deep-toned hum of the murmur of many voices swelled like the rising of a tide" (76). The half-sentient Pit here again becomes conscious through the human tissue of its non-living parts, and it's important to visualize this language as constitutive, not descriptive, of the Pit. This becomes even more evident as Norris describes the human parts as again and again mixed with the electric appendages of the electronic information, coiled into the building like a dumb cyborg:

> And all these sounds, the chatter of the telegraph, the intoning of the messenger boys, the shouts and cries of clerks and traders, the shuffle and trampling of hundreds of feet, the whirring of telephone signals rose into the troubled air, and mingled overhead to form a vast note, prolonged, sustained, that reverberated from vault to vault of the airy roof, and issued from every doorway, every opened window in one long roll of uninterrupted thunder.

The purposeful repetition of this brain machinery occurs here because it sustains, in rather operatic fashion, Norris' thematic initiative to write a naturalist novel that's at least partly about a transindividual subject. It's also key to the way the text self-consciously blends this brain machinery back into the sentimental discourses informing that genre.

Later in the novel, during the recession that first provides Jadwin his opening to corner the market, Norris writes that the "cogs and wheels of the whole great machine of business…had dried up" (156). He flips this into the more traditional language of investor *sentiment:* "And that peculiar, indefinite thing known – among the most unsentimental men in the world – as 'sentiment' prevailed more and more strongly in favor of low prices" (156). His own scare quotes mark this transition to

the affective properties of the "machine" for individual bodies, and he follows it by remarking that Jadwin, being "blooded to the game," made unconventional forays into speculation precisely at this time, "delighting in the shock of battle" (156). His recursive return to the battle imagery of capitalist practices also reaffirms the significance of particular individual bodies to move the Pit markets. He does so by emphasizing Jadwin's own biochemical attachment to the stimuli of his experiences rather than any direct urgency simply to make more money. By the time the Pit has caught wind of Jadwin's monopoloy, Norris changes his language once again: "the nervousness of the 'crowd' increased" (272). Again marked with his own scare quotes, Norris here invites us to focus on the specific relation of the crowd to the individual, and not to treat these as distinct entities. They are integrated into one another through a material fabric of real bodies communicating through affects of euphoria and fear.

The Pit: Assemblage as Apparatus

During the conversation with Gretry summarized at the opening of the chapter, Norris describes how Jadwin's desire for speculation is simultaneously the reason for his success and for his destruction. As Jadwin considers Gretry's offer, Norris represents that desire as bodily and innate: "Jadwin hesitated. In spite of himself he felt a Chance had come. Again that strange sixth sense of his, the inexplicable instinct, that only the born speculator knows, warned him" (70). The biologized origin of Jadwin's desire as an "inexplicable instinct" signals an aporia, for Norris and in part for us, about the source of Jadwin's status as a "born" speculator. Together with the organic and circulatory image of "blooded," Norris keenly locates Jadwin's skill as an investor in a "sixth sense," not a rational and calculating strategy. This direction of these signifiers, as blood and instinct and sixth sense, however, all direct us towards a model of cognition that is wholly integrated with the body's

ability to perceive sensations beside or through information, whether as linguistic signs, statistical data, or news headlines.

Jadwin's "sixth sense" echoes works of economic theory published around the same time. In Theodore E. Burton's *Financial Crises and Periods of Industrial and Commercial Depression,* published in 1902, he writes that the "speculative disposition" is a consequence of industrious persons and energetic "people," but that underlying "psychological tendencies" are nonetheless sometimes responsible for crashes of the entire system (46, 68). The psychological tendencies Burton invokes are parallel to the sixth sense and instincts Norris uses; it is only necessary that we continue to imagine the capacity for euphoria as an excessive sensation of confidence. In a representative move, Burton invokes the interdependency between financial flows and affective sensation: "credit, like confidence, is in the first instance a matter of belief" (100). Credit needs trust and confidence to operate, yet belief itself, operating as a faith that can be 'sensed,' is felt by the body. Trust is a feeling, and not necessarily quantifiable. "The cause of the abuse of credit," Burton writes, "is a spirit of speculation created under the influence of successful operations and large accumulation of capital…or the indulgence in extravagance and waste somewhere" (102). Burton understands a credit crisis as a state that puts a body "under the influence" and as symptomatic of "indulgence." These terms evoke alcoholic stupor, but also imply how the intensity of affective states changes the constitution of the speculating body. "Inflation of the currency stimulates the speculative fever," Burton concludes.

It is crucial to mark Burton's rhetoric here for the way it echoes our previous discussions of speculative euphoria, but it is also instructive to see how changes in the body accompany inflation in the supply of money. One could apply the lesson to individuals: the personal inflation of money, and its accompanying power and "indulgence," could as easily lead to speculative euphoria in individuals

as in crowds, or towns, or nations. Euphoria is the hyper-confidence that one feels from quick money. Norris ties Jadwin's capacity for this euphoria to the stimulation of capital flows: "In the air about him he seemed to feel an influence, a sudden new element, the presence of a new force" (70). This "influence" will reappear in a subsequent passage discussed below, but for now we only need to note that it is the interaction between the capacity to feel a sensation (the sixth sense) and the outside influence (information that is interpreted through bodily registers) that defines the speculation at stake. Interestingly, the passage from *The Pit* in question here ends with an echo of our earlier discussion of Bret Harte in chapter four. "It was Luck, the great power, the great goddess;" Jadwin believes he has found his sixth sense. "Luck" here is the master-signifier, the sign that can barely cover what it implies in content – a co-incidence of affect and information that registers as an event, temporally distinct and perceptually charged. Bodies feel the market information for patterns, and these felt sensations can only be filtered through human bodies, sensed through the complexity of the nervous system. The reification of affect into an approximate emotional state can't be transformed into information for mechanical comprehension. Instruments can communicate and transmit affect, but cannot measure it, or reassemble it – at least not at the point of reception. The experience of affect, then, is a method of measuring the complex patterns of prices.

The central crowd within the assemblage, the Pit, evolves as a matrix that fundamentally reshapes the purpose of the wheat market. What began as an exchange where contracts connected distant buyers and sellers across time and space instead becomes so complex that it is possible to bet against fluctuations in that market, which therefore means that the fundamental cost of growing and shipping wheat to market in any one month is a fundamental factor in the price of wheat, but by no means the only one. Speculating profitably means that investors will also have to gauge how other investors apprehend shifts in market conditions. This dimension of the wheat market was

psychological and for the most part concerned with how other investors perceive those shifts. At its most extreme, speculators can suspend their concentration on market fundamentals and instead concentrate on how information, such as political news, can create waves of panic or confidence in the market. This makes it easier for Jadwin to put his "sixth sense" to work. He has to anticipate investor reactions by feeling out their reactions to news. What he can make profitable are the sensations related to these anticipations.

The image of Jadwin acting alone as an improbably successful speculator feeling his way through news relevant to wheat futures is incomplete, however. The entire system of communication networks that links global regions together into the clearinghouse of the Chicago Board of Trade is a self-sustaining institution that necessitates figures – that, is, bodies – like those of Jadwin. Jadwin operates through the Chicago Board of Trade, and so does the Pit. Within the Pit all manner of possible directions for wheat prices are at all times possible, though perhaps more or less likely to rise or fall depending on the day. While each individual investor or representative has an interest in predicting and even determining the direction of that price, the resulting movement of the real price serves to stabilize and coordinate all the possible variables in one overall direction. This constellation of possibilities narrowed into one real movement, or trend, can give farmers and buyers a valuable window into how to plan their activities. At the same time, this window is always distorted by the fact that investors like Jadwin are projecting their own anticipations about other investor reactions to the market into the price of wheat. The real value of wheat futures, then, is always complicated by the self-interest of investors and by the fact that those futures priced into the contract the additional value of the presumed psychological state of all other investors about the state of the market.

These layers of value priced into the real value of the wheat help us understand the function of the crowd that centers in the Chicago Board of Trade. This crowd, filled with representatives of large investors and other brokers, perhaps understandably demonstrates the central role that various affects play in the exchange of wheat futures. Just as the frenetic transactions at the New York Stock Exchange come to represent that establishment, the Pit arguably functions clearest when it was a crowd. The assembling of bodies exchanging contracts together, however, does not quite explain its function. Since I argue that crowds must share the same psychical state and act together to fully express themselves as "crowds" in the specific sense of this dissertation, the Pit crowds form when the brokers act together, which is evidenced in degrees. When bodies act together, they have more power, and act "freer" in the sense described by Grosz in the introduction to the dissertation.

Even though the market would has to move up and down each day, and thus evince a coordination of behavior tending toward a generalized rising or falling of price, the more dramatic moments of fast volatility that mark rapidly expanding or rapidly contracting markets are when crowds appear in their most visible form – that is, when everyone is either buying or selling. Within the Pit, the expression of affect as panic or euphoria would be most visible at these moments. Far from being exceptional, though, these moments make visible the *bodily* logic that we've established here to connect the intertwined flows of affect, capital, and information. It is within this field of bodies that investors like Jadwin can attempt to find the tangible reality already intuited from the market generally. In this sense the bodies in the Pit do more than exchange contracts. In addition to creating a virtual field where the tendency of future prices is materialized, these bodies concentrate the organic structure of the Pit as a capitalist apparatus. The Pit is an assemblage, then, that functioned as a probability matrix for capital, but one that computes the possibilities of the market by transforming affective force first into nervous-system "affects" like confidence or fear and also

into financial data. It is a mechanic organism that had its own metabolism, with a flurry of circulating human bodies at its center.

The integration of Jadwin's body into the Pit parallels the integration of the Pit into communication networks, such as the telegraph and other instruments of global linkage that allow investors, farmers, and wholesalers to connect. The Pit is an assemblage, described above as "brain machinery," but it is also an autopoetic apparatus of the capitalist state. The Pit assembles data about wheat electronically streamed from global markets, but functioned in part by measuring prices intuitively as bodies feel that data through embodied sensations and intensities. A body's capacity to sense changes in the market can become as important as assessing the fundamental costs of bringing the commodity to market. Overall, the brain machinery in the Pit had to assess those costs, but it does so by collectively apprehending, too, various fluctuations in the intensity of affects flowing though and alongside the information about wheat and the promises of capital that result from it.

The brain machinery of the Pit is first of all an assemblage, or a socially complex "machine." In *A Thousand Machines* Gerald Raunig offers the example of a person riding a bike as the basic Deleuzian machine. Helpfully, he pulls his example and his gloss on machines from Marx's "Fragment on Machines" in the *Grundrisse*. Following Marx, he defines the machine as a "means for producing surplus value," and one that "encloses the knowledge and skill of workers and scholars as objectified knowledge and skill" (Raunig 21-22). Rather than understanding the Pit as a machine for circulating information about wheat and gambling on already existing value (fixed capital), I argue here that the Pit is a machine the sense meant by Raunig and Marx. Raunig and Marx use a vocabulary of a human-mechanic hybrid that resembles Norris': a machine is living, "consisting of numerous operating and intellectual organs" (22). This resemblance to Norris' brain machinery isn't

accidental. Norris' description of brain machinery reveals his attempt to try and represent a machine as a social assemblage, one that Marx carries forward into his theories on "the general intellect." This general intellect has been interpreted for other purposes elsewhere, but I mean for us to imagine it here as the brain machinery, "permeated by mechanical, intellectual, and social 'organs,' which not only drive and operate it, but also successively develop, renew, and even invent it" (24).[40] This passage helps clarify how the machine as organism can have its own agency beside or beyond the individuals, and simple mechanisms, that form it. The combination of the human-mechanism parts of the social assemblage are the organs. The notion that such a machine could "develop" or even "invent" new forms of itself makes it possible for us to begin envisioning how capitalist state apparatuses not only reproduce social forms of domination, such as futures trading, but do so through a technic-evolutionary capacity that evolves on its own in relationship to its environment.

Gilles Deleuze uses the wasp and orchid example to describe the machine. Manuel Delanda follows him to assert that relations in a mechanic assemblage are "contingently obligatory" (Society 11). This means that the relation between the wasp and the orchid is temporally indefinite.[41] One might say their relationship consists of brief but powerful moments of exchange, and that the reproduction of their individual species depends on the temporary formation of fleeting assemblages. They co-evolve together without sharing actual DNA. They exercise their capacities to

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[40] This idea was critical to Italian Operaism and postoperaism, among other theorists and movements.

[41] For example, the expressive capacities of the wasp-orchid assemblage could transform a new generation of orchids into plants whose petals grew too large. These large petals would begin to enclose some of the wasps who gravitated inside the sweet chamber, trapping them. The weight of the bud might bend the plants closer to the ground, where enterprising small mice smelled them and used their tongues to pry open and kiss the interior chamber where the wasp was stuck. However unrealistic, this example shows the way synergistic interactions can produce a population of wasp-orchid assemblages with emergent properties. These interactions would be a product of the assemblages, and completely detrimental to the wasp bodies. It would, however, open new possibilities for orchid-mice assemblages.

pollinate and extract nourishment together, but the logic of their relationship stems from the fragile and tenuous historical coincidence of a shared mutual interaction.[42] I imagine a social assemblage, such as the Pit, as a complexion of machines that can reproduce itself over longer durations than the wasp and orchid example. This can occur, too, because the specific machine of the Pit works in a time set by the capitalist work day – it endures day-time trading hours, rather than the time it takes to pollinate a flower.

This characterization is descriptively important because it teaches us about how institutionalized crowds work, both in the context of discovering the central role particular affects play in markets, and also analytically for this text. Jadwin's financial destruction is incomprehensible without understanding the role he plays in the Pit as an assemblage. The notion of an assemblage as apparatus is necessary, however, for this analysis since it offers a critical perspective for evaluating the specific kind of affective labor that Jadwin contributed to that assemblage. That affective labor, characterized by his speculative "sixth sense," is itself a source of surplus value for the entire Pit. Marx's labor theory of value says that commodities become more valuable because labor changes the nature of the commodity, and the variable capital added to the fixed capital already contained in

[42]This mutual capacity to co-evolve through fleeting temporal assemblages has implications for how bodies that form assemblages can stabilize or destabilize their identities. Deleuze would call this territorialization and deterritorialization. Delanda calls the former role material and the latter role expressive. Essentially, parts of an assemblage can stabilize identity while other parts transform it. To conceive these processes fully, we must consider the ways multiplicities contain an immanent potential to connect with other bodies at multiple scales, both interior and exterior to how we traditionally imagine the bodily limits of, say, the human.

Although he doesn't discuss crowds, Delanda offers several helpful examples of social assemblages: conversations, interpersonal networks, institutions, and hierarchal organizations. Each has a varying duration and structure. Two bodies involved in a conversation could have an obviously short lifespan, but as a momentary assemblage even this simple exchange can be lethal – just imagine a violent encounter between lovers. (While Delanda doesn't address the transmission of affect within and between assemblages, it will be important to theorize how affect works in assemblages like the Pit.)

the commodity allows the capitalist to extract more value from the sale of the commodity than the commodity in its 'raw' state was actually worth. To say that Jadwin creates value because he can raise the price of wheat generally through his ability to predict the market's macroeconomic movements means that his affective labor, his speculation itself, can conceivably contribute to the value of wheat. He therefore adds value to the value of the raw wheat, but not by changing its commodity form. He can alter the notional value of the wheat through an intellectual exercise – timing the market's movements – that has more in common with intellectual labor than manual labor (such as farming). His labor is symbolic (he manipulates the price of wheat), but that ability to alter the financial representation of the wheat (its obvious price, on a telegraph roll) arises from a bodily capacity that doesn't "use" the intellect in the traditional sense of the term. One can only begin to understand the body's role in speculation by letting go of the mind-body distinction whose discourse this dissertation has tried hard to resist in favor of alternatives.

Delanda defines assemblages in ways relevant to discussions of bodily interactions in crowds, and useful for understanding the Pit. First, an assemblage can be characterized as a "whole" (machine) with component parts that may detach from it and recombine in different ways; they are productive, transversal, and phenomenal. Assemblages are machines that, in the broadest sense, describe the capacity of bodies, whether organic or inorganic or both, to move and affect other bodies. As a concept, the assemblage captures more a sense of *social* complexity than the machine, which can describe a vast array of interconnections – a person peddling a bicycle is a machine. Assemblages have many parts, and these different parts interact to transform bodies at different scales and to seemingly infinite virtual ends.[43] To narrow some of the obvious horizons of such a

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[43] The human body is a good example of an assemblage whose status as a multiplicity seems easy to visualize. In the digestive system are millions of bacteria that work to metabolize food. The secretions and enzymes that they produce help the digestive system funnel nutrients into the bloodstream. When food is present, the organs of the human digestive system form an assemblage, or machine, with these bacteria. When food is not present, the human body's

definition, it will be meaningful for us to focus on a narrow field of flows that define the Pit: the affects, capital, and information that bodies exchange in order to make surplus capital from the *future* prices of wheat. Moreover the Pit as an assemblage persists despite the appearance and disappearance of the individuals participating in it. It's a crowd that can completely replace its individual bodies without altering what it does.

This potential is first of all interesting for how we might imagine the specific ways that crowds activate assemblages between bodies. The circulation of affect and circulation of language within crowds appear to be the primary catalysts for altering the material role of crowds, or their status as emergent, stable, or dissipating. Affect and language also appear to define crowds' expressive capacity, or their ability to affect other bodies, and more importantly political institutions. The complexity of the crowd as an assemblage, for this chapter, arises from the possible contradictions between the character of Jadwin and the rest of the investors in the Pit. Jadwin's relation to the Pit overdetermines its expressive function as an exchange for wheat contracts.

Delanda points toward just these persisting social assemblages, such as interpersonal networks and formal social institutions, that have longer durations and more complex arrangements of bodies through time. He writes that social assemblages "also process a variety of other material components, from food and physical labor, to simple tools and complex machines" (Society 12). This reference also allows us to imagine the metabolic necessities and energetic flows that make it possible to 'see' the organic non-living matter that constitutes what we might call the ecology of

capacity to exercise its role in this assemblage remains inactive but possible. The complex interaction of this assemblage with other assemblages external to the human body deepens our understanding of its status as a multiplicity: for instance, we can imagine their eyes that might see a food ad on television, stimulating the emotional "reward center" of the brain, which sends signals to the mouth to stimulate saliva glands. Here, the interaction between the eyes and the screen form an interactive exchange, however brief, that activates tiny neurotransmitters that connect neurons together in the brain.

social assemblages. To view social assemblages as producers and consumers of raw materials strongly corresponds to Norris' own descriptions of the Pit, and also to how he imagined class interaction through railroads and telegraph wires in the late nineteenth century United States. The bare dependency of bodies on organic flows of matter might also solicit echoes of the novel he wrote before the wheat trilogy, *McTeague.* (Norris' focus on the Pit's status as an urban "brain" in downtown Chicago furthers an overlap of concerns between him and Delanda, who also argues for a liquid understanding of "buildings" and "physical locales" as infrastructures that channel flows of organic matter into denser constructions. In *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History,* Delanda invites us to contemplate how small-scale assemblages like Deleuze's wasp-orchid resemble large-scale patterns of emergent self-organization such as cities.[44])

Delanda's descriptive enumeration of assemblages must be supplemented, however, by an analysis here that contemplates the subsumption of the Pit as an institutionalized crowd that participates in surplus production as well as extraction, even as this additional surplus production can potentially circulate from one speculator to another, and thus spiral into the general rising and falling of prices connected to credit cycles. For this I'd like to move to Giorgio Agamben's essay,

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[44]He claims that tracing the transformations of these assemblages requires a methodology of that practices an analysis that borrows a vocabulary and set of concepts from nonlinear dynamics while not practicing the serious mathematical computer modeling that accompanies and defines it. Nonlinear analysis developed as a way to study the emergent properties of dynamic systems, and to explain how the "self-organization" of matter and energy occurred within complex ecologies of living and non-living bodies, whether the object was understanding climate change or economic cycles (Nonlinear *History* 16). I am not proposing that we rely on these terms as scientific metaphors for symbolic events; what I offer here through Delanda is not the deconstructionist principle of linguistic "indeterminacy" that 'sounds like' Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. What I instead argue is that Norris and others represent dynamic systems like the stock exchange through the moral dramas of narrative fiction, and furthermore, that their descriptions of the dynamic interactions of bodies and machines in the assemblages of the Pit are actually arguments for how crowds circulate affects that can potentially produce economic cycles. It would be a mistake to misconstrue the theoretical value of *The Pit* because previous literary theory perhaps assumed some of its argumentative value in part from the authority of the scientific terms it used as analogies.

"What is an Appartus?" This essay begins with Foucault's assertion that defines an apparatus as a "kind of formation, so to speak, that at a given historical moment has as its major function the response to an emergency…[it] therefore has a dominate strategic function…[it is] essentially strategic" (Agamben 2). Agamben interprets this as an investigation into the "concrete modes in which the positivities (or the apparatuses) act within the relations, mechanisms, and 'plays' of power" (6). As per typical Agamben, he then segues back to the Greek concept of *oikonomia,* a concept that signifies the management of the home through a divine economy – in this sense the "economy" as such is a 'sacred' administration that includes regulatory political institutions.

The definition is not far from Althusser's ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), the more familiar idea, but broadens it: "I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings" (Agamben 14). Though this definition carries the risk of becoming too broad (where perhaps Althusser was too narrow, too specific in the institutions he called ISAs), it allows Agamben to reframe the "everywhere" of the apparatus by furthering that very logic; for him apparatuses "are rooted in the very process of 'humanization' that made 'humans' out of the animals we classify under the rubric Homo sapiens" (Agamben 16). The apparatus is therefore an essential process of subjectification, related to the becoming 'human' of the body. Within this process, there is what Agamben calls "the Open," or something like a possibility of knowing "being," a return to his concept of finding something like an animal perception (in *The Open* he imagines the possibility of "seeing" from the perspective of a tick). This separation of subjectivity from the body marks an interruption from the Open, but also its possibility, and for him many apparatuses help persons "enjoy" the Open (17). He writes that at the "root of each apparatus lies an all-too-human desire for happiness. The capture and subjectification of this desire in a separate sphere constitutes the specific power of the apparatus" (17) In other words, the process of

becoming human involves a sort of original sin of subjectification, one that implies humans become human through a technology of administration that captures the subject for use, as it were, but one whose power is sustained by human desire to reclaim the lost perception of human "being" itself. In short, apparatuses capture bodies in part because those bodies desire that administration *because* it confers identity to the body, though at the cost of an immediate perceptual relation to the world. The apparatus allows us to become ourselves through a technology that captures the production of that "us."

Agamben's theory here sounds like a late Freudian parable cast by Marxist shadows, and, assuredly, the grand trans-millennial *long duree* invoked in becoming human here seems far beyond the scope of this chapter, though not without its resonance for an undercurrent of argumentation I'd like to make about crowds as animal packs. Yet important aspects of Agamben's notion here appear congruent with the Pit and, implicitly, possess explanatory power for complicating Delanda's idea of the social assemblage. Delanda's concept appears evacuated of politics, and Agamben's of something like historical specificity. For one, the Pit alters Jadwin's perceptions and senses, and transforms his sense of identity, at the same time that it creates him as a speculator. His status as a speculator allows us to imagine him as an almost pure capitalist, as one who can create capital and value by sensing the virtual direction of the market as it expands or contracts. As we have seen and as we shall trace in the next section, his subjection to the Pit, even as a capitalist (perhaps the ultimate 'personification' of capital?), "bloods" him to the game in such a way that he finds it impossible to divorce himself from the Pit – even as, in his capture, the Pit almost destroys him physically and certainly does so financially. The existential crisis that Jadwin experiences through participation in Pit speculation echoes Agamben's assertion that the apparatus of capture is productive even as it constitutes the meaning of the human. Jadwin's interaction, too, opens his "sixth sense" to the point where he seems unusually integrated into his own body's "being," even

though, paradoxically in the sense of Agamben, his body is being used up through the apparatus. The mechanic assemblage that turns him human destroys him, though through it he constitutes himself. His constitution is ironic, tragic. And in a further echo of Agamben's argument, Jadwin does so out of desire, out of a perverse sense of happiness. His success in the Pit, and the sensations it gives him, are pleasurable – until they're not, and it destroys him.

The Investing Body

Jadwin's speculation occurs within the complex social apparatus of the Pit's brain machinery, and, as Agamben argues about apparatuses generally, that speculation reconstitutes Jadwin's relationship to his own body. When he first becomes involved with Gretry, his sixth sense is an "inexplicable instinct," a biological urge. The affective sensations of the Pit complement the brain machinery with a corresponding nervous system in the brokers, such as Jadwin's partner Landry, who acts as his agent in the Pit itself. As Jadwin becomes more closely integrated into wheat futures, Norris is keen to describe the daily rush of the price volatility that stimulates bodies there. After a round of exchanges, for example, Norris notes how "by degrees the tension of the opening relaxed. Landry, however, had refrained from selling more than ten 'contracts' to Paterson. He had a feeling that another advance would come later on" (80).[45] In this example Landry's decision to buy or sell bears no correlation to the fundamentals of wheat supplies or consumption. Within the smaller daily cycles of price movements, Landry can add surplus – he can create capital, however fictive – from

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[45] Important transactions carry intensity because of the large amounts of money wagered on the contracts. They heighten perception because the reward from success is swift and material. Transactions increase one's attention to detail and therefor intensify time; they slow it down. Such bodily reactions to daily market cycles mimic, almost like fractal behavior, the general moods that develop around the longer credit cycles over periods of months or years.

timing the "advance" of sudden eruptions in investor confidence in the Pit itself. "He could feel," Norris describes, "how this market moved, how it strengthened, how it weakened. He knew just how to nurse it, to humor it, to let it settle, and when to crowd it, when to hustle it, when it would stand rough handling" (80). This passage exemplifies the point, but also treads forcefully into vocabulary that describes an abusive domestic relationship. Speculation isn't simply a gambling; the creation of capital from these transactions is still an extraction from other investors – but the extraction doesn't occur from the manual labor fixed into the capital signified by the wheat, but rather the extraction of capital comes at the futures stage, in the Pit, from the bodies of other speculators. The circulation of the futures contract could add variable capital to the wheat, measured sometimes in the tenths of a cent per unit of wheat, if the contract could be bought or sold at an opportune moment of market sentiment, if only for very short periods of time, to the minute.

The purpose of feeling the market here is to manipulate it emotionally, as it were. Landry feels the market by creating an emotional interdependency; he gives and takes confidence, and he creates fear as necessary to create the right psychological circulation for profit. The partial irony is that he's able to practice this manipulation – a kind of predatory affective labor, an aggressive 'working the crowd' – by explicitly trusting his own *affective* sensations. His body *feels* the market through proprioception, but he *calculates* how to make other investors feel in return for his own self-interest (and for his boss, Jadwin). The bodily perceptions that allow him to sense the market through a kind of felt spatial extension *into* the Pit (as a part of the assemblage) happen at a speed that's too quick to apprehend other than through the body. Since the rising and falling of prices indicates the general prevailing sentiment, confident or afraid, sensing the speed of affects depends on sensing the pace of prices. Discovering the pattern of prices allowed Landry to discover the right times to feed contracts into the exchange *in order to change the felt sensations that those prices produce in other bodies*. His strategy is to change how affect circulates in the market by manipulating prices as much as

possible. The circulation of affect and prices are mutually imbricated, and a successful speculative strategy incorporates this knowledge. The body's capacity to apprehend the speed of affects gives it a computational power – a power that isn't additive, but sensitive – that no industrial device can mimic or perform. The human nervous system has evolved to sense otherwise incomprehensible affective patterns that accompanied changing patterns of information, such as prices. As numbers, prices carry an affective potential in any given situation, like spoken or written language. Only the body can sense the speed of immediate fluctuations in the market.[46] By the body, I mean embodied consciousness that is open to its environment and that creates meaning from affect and emotion as forms of knowledge.

It is the very primacy of the body's capacity to sense market fluctuations that also allows for its destruction through a nervous breakdown. For Jadwin, the sensations of reward that arise from successfully influencing the market eventually become the reason for investment, not a result of investment success. Those sensations are akin to sensations of power and dominance: as the scene with Landry 'nursing' and 'hustling' the futures crowd shows, the sensations of investment success are akin to the pleasures of intimate dominance, with the implication of indirect abuse, a sadism distributed through the apparatus of the Pit. Instead of imagining this relationship as a one-to-one coupling, however, the power sensations of successful dominance are abstracted and represented through symbols – that is, prices. This abstracted sadism, which does in fact create real physical harm, allows for the dominating body to feel the 'pleasures' associated with violent sexual aggression without actually performing the coercive physical acts. Indeed, it removes the dominating body from any direct confrontation with physical harm to another. This sadism is constituted most of all as

[46] Investor sentiment matters because it matters as much as any other data in the market, feeds back into that market, and, still to this day, cannot be replaced by analog or digital computers.

affective and emotional harm, although there is, at its horizon, real violence that acts upon bodies. The abstracted effects of this sadism – its disguise through its rapid (mis)representation as 'simply' prices – allow the dominating body an absolution from the negative affects or emotions that might arise as feedback, such as guilt or regret. This lack of an effective check or feedback on the sensations of joy that accompany the power of successful investment means that the only inhibitor to this joy would be to stop investing.

For Jadwin to save himself, he would have to walk away from the "game." Yet Norris' entire thesis in the novel is that Jadwin's instrument, his body, possesses its own freedom to act, to invest, through or beside the distinct being Jadwin would recognize as his ego. His body, like Landry's, has a capacity to sense affective patterns from complex and rapid prices before a cognitive consciousness can 'decide' what they mean, but this same capacity implies that the body acts on its own. Bodies have lives with Jadwin and Landry, but they are not self-identical with them. And that life is integrated not only fully capable of providing knowledge to them about the affects accompanying price data, but that life had an agency of its own, distinct but not separate from the consciousness of a singular self that Jadwin and Landry would call by their names and recognize in their faces as "themselves." The agency of their bodies wants its own pleasures. In a sense, Jadwin and Landry share the sensations of power that arise from investment with their bodies, but perhaps without the conscious knowledge that they depend on those bodies for that success, and, from another perspective, those bodies are really sharing those sensations of power *with them.* More importantly, the reason that their bodies could sense and also manipulate the affective sensations of other bodies in the wheat market is that the market is a crowd. In that crowd, though captured and distributed by an apparatus of capital extraction and circulation, the ultimate sensations of dominance always require an interdependency of multiple bodies together. Affects are unintelligible

without bodies, and no matter how abstracted and represented and re-represented 'real' bodies are required. The crowd is necessary to play the game.

The only way this complex exchange can be understood by the characters in the novel is, in fact, as a game. For them speculation is wrong because it resembled gambling. As Jadwin becomes more immersed in futures investment, his friends and family, and his wife Laura in particular, grow more and more concerned that his speculation is merely that. Concerned over his time at the Pit, his friend Cressler tells her "it is simply betting. Betting on the condition of the market weeks, even months, in advance…the gamblers – well, call them speculators if you like. Oh, the fine, promising manly young men I've seen wrecked – absolutely and hopelessly wrecked and ruined by speculation!" (104-105). This speculative ruin from behavior much like gambling is comprehensible to Cressler and Laura because they both appear compulsive. This compulsion reveals part of the tension surrounding the body's agency, and its distinction from the imagined individuality of the self. This agency primarily works through affective registers; it is precognitive and most accessible though financial transactions, such as gambling and speculative investment, because the apprehension and perception of the *meaning of numbers* occurs in the body, affectively, and immediately confers real material sensations of dominance and power. The body's motivation is primarily through this register, and this register works in cycles of duration that are necessarily short-term. These durations can last only as long as consciousness can remain active; this is why gambling can keep players up all night. Sensations are more easily accessible in the 'short-term' than the long-term. The time of sensation doesn't correspond to labor hours or abstractions of time past the body's capacity to feel. One can imagine the future but one cannot feel it, and yet motivation responds primarily to material sensations.

A body's sensitivity to these material sensations changes over time. Jadwin's body evolves in its material relationship to the Pit, and over time, instructively, his bodily desires for those sensations become more and more demanding. An evolution takes place: the body becomes more integrated into the affective flows that accompany the symbolic manipulation of prices. In his attempt to dissuade Jadwin from speculation and to further warn his wife Laura, Cressler proclaims that the speculator has "lost the taste, the very capacity for legitimate business…it's worse than liquor, worse than morphine. Once you get into it, it grips you and draws you and draws you, and the nearer you get to the end the easier it seems to win, till all of a sudden, ah! there's the whirlpool!" (106). This passage corresponds to the oceanic cloaca description of the Pit offered toward the beginning of the chapter, which helps to clarify that Cressler's vocabulary here closely shadows Norris' own narration of the Pit; we should note that Cressler's description of speculation resembles a drowning within the watery flows that we earlier understood to pass through the mouth of the Pit. The Pit and speculation, conflated here, constitute two aspects of the same process. The Pit is the apparatus for crowd capture that regulates and extracts additional surplus from capital flows relevant to wheat futures. It's also essential to my argument to figure the capture of the body into speculation as if the speculation were an alien force, with agency. Speculation, for Cressler, is an "it" that can "grip" and draw upon a body – the latter verb carrying the full implications of extraction associated with the apparatus. These verbs, one should note, also carry the same implication of agency as the aforementioned passage describing the Pit's flows.

Jadwin misunderstands the terms of his own capture. As speculates more and more, he "committed himself…irrevocably to the send of the current. But something was preparing. Something indefinite and huge. He guessed it, felt it, knew it. On all sides of him he felt a quickening movement…in its ever-increasing swiftness there was exhilaration and exuberance" (188). The "something" Jadwin feels is the agency of the Pit itself. His "sixth sense" is really his capacity to

assemble, to become part of the captured crowd that the Pit produces and extracts from. The tragic repercussions of his speculation begin in part from his misrecognition of the Pit's alien agency as a quality that has come from within him. Yet Norris cannot help but represent Jadwin's feeling as a form of knowledge. Jadwin's "feels" and "knows" his connection to the Pit as consecutive or overlapping registers of acquiring knowledge about his position in the Pit. What makes him necessary for the Pit, too, is his risk appetite (to use a revealing investor cliché). Jadwin's participation in the Pit as a figure who attempts to corner the market does produce capital, even though it's unsustainable and requires an eventual market correction. This is the sense whereby he's necessary, even though the eventual failure to realize any more capital from the cornered market (after the intervention and coordinated actions of rival investors) is predictable. He's necessary because his body is capable of taking the risk, even though the eventual crisis will destroy his body – though not the Pit. This is a sign of the Pit's "intelligence," but not its wisdom. It demonstrates that crowd cognition doesn't require the crowd to think, or feel, as a single organism. An intelligent social assemblage doesn't "need" its organs forever, particularly if it extracts surplus labor, in the form of affect and intellect, from those bodies. It can afford to destroy its own organs because, it converts the variable capital from those expendable bodies into fixed capital (it reallocates that surplus into the non-living), and, also, because it is an infinite growth organism. The periodic crises that such machines visit upon individual bodies such as Jadwin's are metonymic symptoms of the inevitable condition for the entire machine. The Pit will die when it finally runs out of human bodies.

Crucially, the pre-cognitive knowing-feeling that assimilates Jadwin into itself registers as an intensity that we might recognize as euphoric. The primary mode of affective stimulation that the Pit communicates to its bodies is excitement. This excitement is "necessary" as brain machinery because the logic of crowd cognition, of brain evolution, is understandably to think faster. The purpose of

the Pit is to create cognitive strategies about wheat futures through a competition that also relies on a speculation about the general direction of affect felt by the bodies participating in futures investment. An ability to synthesize the meaning of news from abroad is just as valuable as the ability to determine the general mood of bodies. What mattered is speed and sensitivity. A body like Jadwin's natural response, then, would be to adapt to this assemblage by becoming excited. This adaptation had the advantage of also feeling pleasurable, even though that pleasure is really a surplus, an excess, that accompanies a state of intellectual and emotional alertness that rewardes excited bodies with money. Slow reactions to news and slow plans for investment mean that slow investors would not make money. The competition within the Pit against rival investors insures the Pit as an assemblage will only produce faster and faster flows of information. What appears as competition among individual bodies for profit in fact reveals a method of encouraging faster communication networks and encouraging bodies more sensitive to affective flows to assemble within the Pit. Jadwin was the somatic outlier whose "sixth sense" allowed him to fulfill the machinic logic of the Pit itself. The matrix of bodies at its center, the crowd, will always produce an intelligent outcome for the Pit itself (if we understand intelligence as self-sustaining strategies and self-reproductive behavior).

As Jadwin's body grows more and more integrated into the Pit, descriptions of him become more visibly associated with the symptoms of financial euphoria described in earlier chapters. When Jadwin meets others, he is "excited, elated, talkative" (209). As we should find familiar, the euphoria alternates with anxiety during periods when his success in the market appears unclear. Describing himself as "touchy," Jadwin tells a broker friend Sam, "there's so many things to think of, and all at the same time. I do get nervous. I never slept one little wink last night – and you know the night before I didn't turn in till two in the morning" (266). Rather than see his behavior as pathological, we should view his compulsive actions as indications that he has become more and more affectively

integrated into the flows of information and capital that define the Pit. His late nights and insomnia, viewed from one perspective, appear like a minor illness conditioned by too much work. From our perspective, these descriptions are merely qualities of his capture. He's part of a social assemblage with its own organs, its own agency; he's part of the Pit. His own metabolic patterns, his habits of eating and resting, appear excessive only when viewed in isolation. His body is awake because of the role he plays in the brain machinery. The brain machinery has metabolic patterns that are simply on a different scale, and don't require "rest" the ways that its human organs do – in part this is the case because other bodies in other time zones are awake, in Paris and elsewhere, when Jadwin should be asleep.[47]

His nervousness is also a quality of the crowd. Since Jadwin's aim is to corner the market, his success necessarily comes at the cost of the crowd's failure. Therefore while both are always in a state of excitement, Jadwin's euphoria and nervousness alternate with the crowds'. When he finally succeeds in cornering the market, the "nervousness of the 'crowd' increased" as it realizes that the prices can only move in one direction (272). Norris' own marking of "crowd" here is an obvious citation and allusion to the terms' theoretical status at the time; what matters in this instance, however, is how the nervousness among the crowd transforms itself. The ultimate end-state of the circulation of that nervousness becomes, for Crookes the rival investor, shame: "Dismayed, chagrined, and humiliated, he and his click sat back inert" (272). Humiliation is both a state of being and an emotional recognition. As a social emotion and not a basic one (such as joy or fear), it already

[47]The global extension of the Pit implied here helps define it from the beginning. In some of Norris' initial renderings of it, its bodily appendages are referenced in direct relation to the sources of news and information essential to the brain machinery. "Arms were flung upward in strenuous gestures," Norris writes, "and from above the crowding heads in the Wheat Pit a multitude of hands, eager, the fingers extended, leaped into the air…and on the instant the hundreds of telegraph keys scattered throughout the building began clicking off news to the whole country, from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Mackinac to Mexico, that the Chicago market had made a slight advance" (78-9).

implies an unequal social relation: to be humiliated is to recognize that one has lost his or her place in a hierarchy. The financial outcome of poor speculation is economic loss or bankruptcy, but that outcome is inextricable here from its accompanying affect. Importantly, the humiliation reinvigorates the idea, mentioned in a previous section of this chapter, that the bioculture of the Pit functions like an abusive relationship. The social logic of speculation isn't financial, but political; yet it is a politics limited to the small circle of investors who are able to participate. This social logic operates as a sadism mediated by symbolic representation and enforced through the body's own affective economy.

Jadwin will eventually come to "taste" the bitter dregs of this economy. His success with the market is ephemeral. Almost by definition a crowd cannot be controlled by one of its organs. The general tendency of crowds is toward combination and collective intelligence, not hierarchy. In a moment of prescient recognition, Jadwin realizes just this prior to the collapse of his second attempt to corner the wheat market. Norris relates how Jadwin stands beside the door to the Pit's central chamber, and "even in that moment of confidence, his great triumph only a few hours distant, Jadwin, for the instant, stood daunted…the roar was appalling, the whirlpool was again unchained, the maelstrom was again unleashed…he imagined…a hollow distant bourdon as of the slipping and sliding of some almighty and chaotic power" (311). The alien affect of the Pit is really not some "chaotic power," but in fact a power that inspires fear because its noise and storm signify, as expressions, the real fact that it depends on the extraction of surplus of bodies to create its flows. The noise and the movements of bodies within the Pit, with the constant waving of hands and shouts for orders, are not signs of doing business but real expenditures of labor. The watery roaring that characterizes the Pit here, as throughout the novel, gets half-rendered as cognizant from Norris because the Pit's intelligence might be construed, by one perspective, as an intelligence that's about

as *complex* as what it *simply* does, because in this case its actions are indivisible from its intelligence. What it thinks and what it does are the same – which is how crowds think.

The Biopolitics of Speculation: A Coda

The alien affect that Jadwin feels is, I argue, a sensible extension of the Pit's agency and intelligence.[48] The power that this assemblage is able to exert over the price of wheat is an ethical concern for Norris both in the novel and in his "Trilogy of the Wheat" series, which traces the wheat from California farmers (who were coerced by the railroad companies) to Chicago futures exchanges and then into European bread markets (Norris died before completing the third book in the series, *The Wolf*). In a complete inversion of the image of an exited crowd occupying public space in order to voice democratic demands or seize power, the crowd at the center of the Pit is private, and sanctioned by the law. Yet its removal from the recognizable political sphere of public space or government institution did not prevent material consequences for the populations affected by the

[48] The complexity of its brain machinery is structural, however, and not, we should remember, a product of complex argumentation or logic. The basic rules of the game that assemble Jadwin's body into the social assemblage are simple, because the logic of capital is simple: whatever the motive, the pursuit of profit is the goal. The sheer number of transactions, and the volume of information and capital that circulates to support those transactions, accounts for the rapidity and intensity of the bidding associated with wheat futures in the novel. The symbolic economy of wheat prices, though, trades on little more than the collective input and output of various brokers who either sell or buy, who either say yes or say no. This economy functions like computer code; at its base, it is the simple alternation of 1s and 0s that accounts for the vast language of software. And yet, as this chapter has argued, the motives behind these trades matter in ways that far exceed the drive for profit. Just as wheat futures are really a market for the prices of wheat, but not necessarily the wheat itself, the reaction to the symbolic success of a profitable transaction 'paid off' in the body of the speculator as much as in his wallet.

It's possible to entertain this vision, at least in part, because the Pit requires an affectively sensitive crowd of bodies in order for any of the individuals within it fully to gauge the direction of prices. A futures market that trades contracts for wheat far above the actual real value of wheat cannot, by definition, reflect the wheat market. It's a market that prices in the circulation of affect. A speculator like Jadwin can succeed, for awhile, at least, because in order to know the crowd one has to be a part of it – to know it, as Norris shows, is to feel it. This crowd isn't on the streets, however, attempting to change the political order by redefining the affective content of political language and political symbols. It's an institutionalized crowd that self-generates the excitement and intensity necessary to rapidly respond to the ever-cascading news and information that might change the market for the prices of wheat. Its institutionalization reflects the structural and infrastructural biomechanics that contribute to the various flows that Pit speculators transformed into new capital.

price of wheat, namely farmers and consumers. The fact that wheat was such a vital commodity – essentially a necessary one – means that the actions of wheat speculators have biopolitical consequences, though not the immediately recognizable kind that we might see in Agamben's *homo sacer* or some other "bare life" subject of state administration, emergency power, or lethal sovereignty. Instead, we can understand the cumulative social and ecological effects of the wheat economy generally, and its future speculation specifically, as a micro-biopolitical sphere of intervention. Rather than view wheat politics in the blunt territory of bare life, we should see the wheat economy in Norris' novel in a manner Marx might recognize: as surplus extraction delimited, at its material horizon, by the prospect of temporary totalitarian control over a basic life-sustaining commodity. After all, the idea of the "wheat corner" is the idea that a private speculator can hold the "rights" to wheat, irrespective of the needs of producers or consumers. Speculation in commodities is intrinsically a biopolitical discipline, but it brings into focus the administration and distribution of commodities, like wheat, that are necessary to the health of the population, if not, at its most extreme, also necessary to the survival of some bodies within it.

Throughout the novel Norris is keen to make his own version of this point, though it appears alternately within a tragic discourse and a heroic one. On the one hand, the skeptical character Cressler, who you might recall from the previous section is the one who equated speculation with gambling, from the beginning believes that cornering the wheat is "wrong…the world's food supply should not be at the mercy of the Chicago wheat pit" (12). Later, in another one of his warnings to Jadwin's wife Laura, he criticizes the Pit speculators by saying that "they don't care in the least about the grain. But there are thousands and thousands of farmers out here in Iowa and Kansas and Dakota who do, and hundreds of thousands of poor devils in Europe who care even more than the farmer. it's life or death for either of them. And right between these two comes

the Chicago speculator, who raises or lowers the price out of all reason, for the benefit of his pocket" (104-5). Cressler's comments here are more directly concerned with the biopolitical prospect of indirect famine and financial ruin for farmers than perhaps necessary; after all, the only reason futures have value for farmers is because they can hedge their own supplies against uncertainty, without taking on as much risk themselves. Cressler's concern here is thus mostly logical as a response to the "life or death" prospect of a market corner that holds enough wheat hostage long enough to create insecurity among the most vulnerable classes of consumers.

The unlikely and infrequent possibility of the corner, however, is the constant threat immanent within the Pit and any futures market, and is also, inevitably, the logical goal of any speculator. The corner is the monopoly; it is, though, a monopoly over biomass that has been commoditized for the purpose of capital conversion. Jadwin understands this as he puts his corner together, but with none of the reservations that Cressler has: "They must have the wheat, and I've got it to give 'em – wheat that I bought, oh, at seventy cents, some of it, and they'll pay the market – that is, eighty cents, for it. Oh, they'll pay more. They'll pay eighty-two if I want 'em to" (195). The biopolitical management of population here, for the speculator, arises from the threat of not delivering the wheat, even though all parties involved understand the wheat must be delivered. It's the threat of potential famine, or some other severe disruption to the population, that guarantees that the speculator will receive the bid for the investment. It's a monopoly over a commodity that must be purchased, one that also carries the threat of "life or death," and yet one that cannot, except in circumstances that do not seem possible for the novel, ever exercise the implicit power of that monopoly by *not realizing* the exchange of wheat for real capital.

Biopolitical power for the speculator thus gives him the authority to threaten life or death without taking on the moral authority or exercising the political sovereignty that would actually

decide who lives and who dies. Thus his biopolitical power is anonymous and distributed; the simultaneity of this anonymous sovereignty with real biopolitical authority is akin to the capitalist's authority over labor power that Marx places at the very center of capitalist structures of power. In other words, the specter of speculative sovereignty over life, and his distant but real threat over populations, approximates by degree the sovereignty that the capitalist has over the body of the laborer in Marx. Moreover, the speculator's definitive involvement in a basic aspect of social reproduction – eating – means that his power is more legibly political within the realm of life or death.

This would be why Norris frequently relates the business of speculation to war. When Laura first passes the "Provision Pits" of the wheat exchanges one night after the evening opera, she notes how the "dreadful" work within the buildings "had all the significance of field hospitals after the battle – hospitals and tents and commanding generals. The wounds of the day were being bound up, the dead were being counted, while, shut in their headquarters, the captains and the commanders drew the plans for the grapple of armies that was to recommence with the daylight" (31). Laura's fantasy of post-battle assessment and strategy works to illuminate the real threat contained in the Pit. Norris' narration merges with this fantasy, as it did with Cressler, when Jadwin is close to cornering the wheat. "Was it the moment for a chief?" he writes, adding, "Was this upheaval a revolution that called aloud for its Napoleon? Would another, not himself, at last, seeing where so many shut their eyes, step into the place of high command?" (31). In addition to extending the theme in question, Norris' questions, perhaps focalized through Jadwin, reverse the structure of crowd politics while nonetheless invoking the crowd. The image of a "revolution," which we might understand as an occupation of public space by the crowd, is refigured into a scene of reactionary political control by a military leader; the war machine becomes a reactionary army of bodies, a way to re-channel potentially disruptive affect back into the state. This image, with its reversal of crowd politics,

nonetheless carries forward the biopolitical sovereignty reserved for the state – the power to make war and destroy life. The speculator embodies the sovereignty of the military general; his power differs by degree.[49]

The comparison evokes this logic, too, through the specter of the crowd. This crowd brings our attention back to the alien agency of the Pit as a social assemblage, or it should, because re-conceiving the biopolitical sovereignty of speculation changes once again when we reconsider the Pit's capacity to self-reproduce itself as a capitalist apparatus, and one whose affective circulation provides a material matrix of capture for bodies such as Jadwin's. Just as Jadwin fulfills the inevitable capitalist logic of monopoly that delimits the ultimate function of a futures market, the Pit as a social assemblage fulfills its programming to produce capital through its affective capture of Jadwin. His focus on cornering the market actualizes the virtual potential of the Pit as a machine for extracting capital. His realization of the corner and subsequent failure to realize a second corner in no way erases or prevents the Pit from creating ever new vectors for new corners to materialize. All it needs are new bodies with a sixth sense. It just needs a crowd.

Yet ascribing intelligence to the Pit also requires us to re-conceptualize both its sovereignty and its biopolitical power. The Chicago Board of Trade had the power to create legally-binding contracts, and also to regulate itself. For the duration of its operation in the nineteenth century the Pit regulated – or didn't regulate – itself. They had the power to set contracts enforceable by the

[49]The Chicago Board of Trade began attempting to limit market corners in 1868, though to little degree of success. Beginning in the 1880s hundreds of bills were introduced into Congress to limit, ban, or tax futures trading. The Federal Trade Commission published a multi-volume report in 1920 recommending various methods of regulating futures. The Grain Futures Administration appeared in 1922 as a result of the Grain Futures Act, and became an agency of the USDA. It was overseen, however, by the Grain Futures Council led by the Secretary of Agriculture. In 1936 the Commodity Exchange Act prohibited outright the use of 'put' options on commodities such as grain. This option ban was repealed in 1981.

Chicago police. Another way of saying this, after conceptualizing the crowd cognition and machine intelligence of the Pit, is that the social assemblage that produced futures contracts really did have the sovereign authority of the law. Just as a crowd acts in public space to change the circulations of affects through bodies in order to create new sentiments for political administration, the Pit too was able to actively create lawful prices of wheat simply by processing those prices through itself. In short, the crowd's special capacity to determine the law by actively creating it holds both for the political crowd and also for the Pit. Norris' consistent conflation of the Pit with a battlefield location speaks to the bizarre simultaneity of its status as an alien entity *and* a political sovereign. We know already that crowds have sovereignty; it is, in fact, something that they can produce. This is their power in public space.

Norris' conflation of the Pit with a battlefield or revolution isn't an exaggeration of prose but a logical extension of the Pit's real power. By way of conclusion, then, it may be most appropriate to conclude this discussion by returning to Laura, Jadwin's wife, when she visits the Board of Trade early in the novel. In accordance with Norris' blending of narration with his characters, Laura's reflection on the Pit evokes a language evocative of the sentient waters that absorbed and controlled the flows of capital and affect that found their center in Chicago. Her evocation, however, fully fuses with the biopolitical significance we've considered here in this section:

> Suddenly the meaning and significance of it all dawned upon Laura. The Great Grey City, broking no rival, imposed its dominion upon a reach of country larger than many a kingdom of the Old World. For thousands of miles beyond its confines was its influence felt…it was Empire, the resistless subjugation of all this central world of the lakes and the prairies. Here, midmost in the land, beat the Heart of the Nation, whence inevitably must come its immeasurable power, its infinite, infinite inexhaustible vitality. Here, of all her cities, throbbed the true life – the true power and spirit of America; gigantic, crude with the crudity of youth, disdaining rivalry; sane and healthy and vigorous; brutal in its ambition…

> "There is something terrible about it," she murmured, half to herself, "something insensate. In a way, it doesn't seem human. It's like a great tidal wave." (51)

This passage demonstrates yet again the alien agency that incorporates Jadwin's body into the Pit, with its flowing reach seemingly connected to biomass, capital, and affect. Norris, via Laura, isn't suggesting that bodies with real sovereign authority over markets, such as Jadwin's, aren't somehow responsible for coordinating the "subjugation" of regions and populations. Throughout the novel Norris would, in fact, follow the decisions and bodies of those in such positions of authority. In passages like this, however, Norris is representing the agency of the Pit, and the sentience of the machines like it, machines made of human bodies but transindividual in composition. The "true life" that "throbbed" and beat with a heart, but yet wasn't human, is far more than an attempt to represent the sublime metaphorical motor of nineteenth century US growth in nationalist, Whitmanesque tones. Laura is quick to note how "terrible" it is, as something that can't quite be human in part because it doesn't possess emotional capacities of self-recognition. It produces and consumes feelings, but its brain machinery can only go so far. When Jadwin becomes part of it, as a body within its assemblage, his behavior comes to mimic in micro-form what the Pit produces at large. To be part of the machine, and to feel although one dominates within that machine, one's body has to become a part that reads and acts upon affect – that can feel market sentiment – without stopping to question whether an excited, euphoric, anxious, or depressed market is good or bad. One's concern is merely to measure the mood and make choices that generate capital. And so what one's left with is similar to what Laura sees: "infinite, infinite" growth, but a wave, too, that drowns the bodies it finds.

[1]Nicolaus Mills' wrote the first book that examined crowds in American literature, *The Crowd in American Literature* (1986). For him, the crowd was a source of power that necessitated study, just as class and social position did as well. "In settings where society is in flux or breaking down," he adds, "the crowd adds a political dimension we tend to ignore" (Mills 6). I agree with this point.

Mills believes that the crowd represents a "vital" source of power for "those at the bottom of society" (Mills 6). Mills claims that crowds can "convert the one thing the poor can claim as their own, their bodies, into a strength that can counteract the might of those at the top of society" (Mills 6). Mills goes on to suggest that for the poor the "collective release" of becoming a crowd 'is often the first step toward self-liberation," though in literature it's a point when the poor, through the crowd, gain "an identity" (Mills 7). Despite the advantages it offers the "poor," this political crowd threatens nineteenth century notions of democracy. "In the midst of nationalism and expansion," he writes, "it reflects an abiding fear that in America democratic men are the enemy of democratic man" (Mills 12).

This brings us to the second book on crowds in American literature, Mary Esteve's *The Aesthetics and Politics of the Crowd in American Literature* (2003). In her critique of Nicolaus Mills' monograph, Esteve questions Mills'

discussion of the "antidemocratic" tendency of mostly male crowds to follow mostly male leaders, particularly in Cooper, Hawthorne, Melville, and Twain (Esteve 23). Her summation of Mills rests on his suggestion that "the central conflict made visible by crowd representation is between the individual and the group" (Esteve 23). Mills' propensity to highlight the dangerous quality of crowds, particularly as Twain's slave hunters or as complacent sailors, accentuates Esteve's argument that those crowds "violate the republican or liberal virtues by means of which the polity legitimizes its democratic structure" (Esteve 23). It should be mentioned that for her this is a negative thing. For Esteve, it is precisely because "members of such crowds have abandoned the ethical principles of propriety, public reason, and justice as fairness that render popular sovereignty an acceptable form of governance" (Esteve 23). In her view, the "psychic susceptibilities" of crowds that Hawthorne, Melville, and Twain narrate "do not for all that imply an internal contradiction within democracy itself" (Esteve 24). Instead, her own work focuses on the urban crowd, whose "double duty as democratic icon and aesthetic object" makes it a "discursive touchstone for the modern era" (Esteve, 25).

She asserts that the representation of urban crowds in American literature bears a very particular kind of political function. For her, it's a "negative" political meaning, insofar as the assertion that crowds' popular sovereignty "entailed the negation of their place at the political-liberal table" (Esteve 3). Esteve's politics here seem self-obvious: her scholarship suffers for it.

In contrast to the "politically motivated or purposeful crowds," the urban crowd became a discursive figure without "harboring any specific political contention." The very vapidity of the urban crowd allows Esteve to construct it as a non-threatening political subject. She sees these crowds playing a special role in the second half of the nineteenth century. Esteve only nods to the somewhat perverse irony, given her arguments, that the same time-period saw the consolidation of natural historical knowledge into distinct disciplines of crowd psychology and psycho-physiology, which thereby "called into question the human being's capacity to function as an autonomous, self-determining, rational subject" (4).

Esteve aptly traces the history of the crowd "mind" from mostly French and Italian medical writing on hypnotic suggestion and imitation, and I've attempted to summarize that same genealogy in other footnotes and endnotes. Like Ruth Leys, she sees American sociology coalescing around the idea of imitation-suggestion. This is interesting, of course, because the discourse of the crowd filters into American literature during this period through the language of medicine and illness. She quotes from Edward Ross's *The Mob Mind* (1897) and Boris Sidis' *The Psychology of Suggestion* (1898) in order to link their ideas on the crowd to Gustave Le Bon's. All three reinforce how the crowd was pathologized in order to illustrate its negative effects on individuals, whose personalities it was said to evacuate or inhibit. In addition to understanding crowd participation as a kind of illness, then, Ross and Le Bon sought to manage crowds by controlling and influencing their thoughts and actions. To that end, both sought to promote notions of leadership. Later, other thinkers on democratic publics would seek to influence the minds of both crowds and individuals through new techniques of advertising.

Esteve's interest in urban crowds originates in her reading of Williams' idea of the psychological "mosaic." In James, Esteve argues, there "is no place for leadlerly management of pure experience…the mosaic marks the originary novelty of being, the emergence of something out of nothing, of persons and consciousness out of an impersonal, non-conscious state" (Esteve 8). However much she evacuates it of political meaning, Esteve rightly zeroes in here on the crowd. The crowd as mosaic does more than re-position Esteve's urban crowd away from the manipulated mass of Le Bon. It allows Esteve via James to concentrate on the ways the crowd becomes a social state whose power arrives from its potential to become something other than what it is. Although this doesn't necessarily address the loss of agency implied in the cynical writings of crowd control authors, it does suggest that the individual's experience of the crowd is a strategically critical time. In the crowd, a new politics or new experience of being is possible – what Esteve rightly calls a "hyper-materialist ontology."

In her hyper-materialist ontology, Esteve offers to re-negotiate individual consciousness in the crowd by calling attention to crowd subject's status as an "edge" of the mosaic. She believes that this edge can embody both the crowd *and* maintain a "commitment to the political requirements of liberal republicanism whose presumed citizen possessed self-conscious reason" (Esteve 8). She locates this simultaneous position of the American crowd subject as both emergent and republican liberalism within the larger philosophical traditions that, with Kant as their source, attempt to configure the ethical boundaries of the modern subject as a balancing between reason and un-reason.

Esteve's attention to writers that make this "u-turn" from crowd consciousness back to republican liberalism is instructive. To counter the radical spirits of the crowd, Esteve must return to the categories that define the liberal subject. In the anti-slavery writings of William Ellery Channing, she therefore privileges disciplines that "excite" actions based on reasoned principles. She carries Channing's idea to John Rawls, whose notion of a "conception-dependent desire" carries less risk of exciting the subject to unreasonable action (Esteve 9). Rawls opposes conception-dependent desires to object dependent ones, which, in Esteve's words, "comprise our bodily impulses and socially internalized inclinations."

Esteve traces these ideas back to Kant. Desires that stem from reason form the basis for a universal reason that links "individual morality to political justice grounded in equality" (10). Citing Gregg Crane's *Race, Citizenship, and Law in American Literature,* Esteve goes on to suggest that it was just such reason – a version of Kantian "Enlightenment universalism" – that was crucial to the abolitionist movement against slavery. Esteve via Crane sets this universalism against what we must understand to be its opposite, "coercive ideology," and from there posits that this universalism of Kantian ethics played a key role in shaping the "political and cultural landscape of the nineteenth century," and, as I understand her argument, in the shaping of democratic institutions in the United States in its quest to form a post-Civil War liberalism.

Esteve admits she is "less motivated by the idea of developing a positivist reception history of Kant's work than by the ambition of tracking the effects of a Kantian way of thinking in American literature and culture"

(11). She believes that nineteenth century fictions' representations of crowds "formed a crucial venue for registering and affirming the features and implications of a Kantian political-ethical logic" (11). To this extent, she avoids examining texts that show conflict between leaders and crowds and between different economic classes. Her orientation has "little to do with the ideology critique of power" (12). She instead wants to illuminate a "broadly existing culture of affect" and "sphere of political-liberal reason" (12). She thus focuses on the "hypnotic persons entering the crowd mind by affective compulsion and the abstract, self-conscious persons entering the public square by reasoning" (12).

She goes on to argue *against* Michael Warner and Nancy Fraser's critique of Jurgen Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* by insisting that liberalism's privileging of universalism in the public sphere cannot be definitely linked to the "genetic" domination of marginalized peoples by a bourgeois public. As a concept, she insists liberal universalism works fine precisely because it is abstract. Since it is not a utopia but set of reasoning principles, whatever failures we might ascribe to it historically or in particular are the result its failing to become "culturally naturalized" (13). One might re-read this for exclamation. The values she sees promoted by this universalism are fairness, legislative openness, due process, and "so forth" (13). Set against the "postmodern suspicion of the Enlightenment [that] has inspired this general assault on reason," Esteve wants to recuperate Kantian ethics from theoretical models that have "legitimized" this trend, from deconstruction to Bakhtinian dialogism.

Esteve rightly critiques Phillip Gould's arguments in *Covenant and Republic* about the politics of crowd discourse. In his discussion of nineteenth-century American romance and Puritanism, Gould's Bahktinian analysis of "dual voices" links cultural voices that fear crowds to "conservative republican ideology" (Esteven quoting Gould, 14). Esteve challenges Gould's perspective by critiquing the easy division of Gould's analysis. "In this account," she writes, "writers who represent crowds as impassioned and unreasoning register their conservative, reactionary fear that a democratic populace threatens to destroy their stable world of reason, hierarchy, and privilege" (Esteve 15). Esteve extends this logic to its conclusion, which reduces "crowd passion" as "essentially democratic and thereby of positive political value" (Esteve 15). Returning to Rawls, Esteve writes that a "reasonable pluralism" consistent with liberalism would have to reject the "disallowed doctrines" that threaten liberal democratic society (Esteve 18).

Esteve is thus critical of crowds that reveal "the *human subject's affective propensity to over-stimulate itself to the point of self-evacuation"* (Esteve 18 italics mine). This is where she values a liberal aesthetic, one that "divides itself off from the political," as if the two were not mutually constitutive (Esteve 18). She chooses to analyze crowd fiction that shows a "prevailing commitment to the a priori principles underwriting political liberalism" (Esteve 18).

She criticizes a collection of essays on Hannah Arendt because some of the author's privilege "radical transformation" of the public political sphere, and a willingness to "re-theologize" the political, all through an aesthetically transformative sublime. She sees these moves as slips into "anarchic and fascist violence"

(Esteve 20). To this end, Esteve values Kantian liberal reason. Her crowd fiction allows room for "abstract, disinterested, secular reason," and centers the role of the crowd within the larger frame of "constitutional liberalism" (Esteve 21). For her, the two opposing viewpoints are "the illiberal crowd mind and the liberal public square," with the latter best served by Kant and Habermas.

It should go without saying that her arguments are themselves full of violent ideology, and her disavowal of "violence" in the name of liberalism resembles the very worst of political discourse.

[2] Much nineteenth century crowd writing, whether scientific or fictional, alludes at least to the split perspective between the raging mob and the heroic revolutionary crowd. In *Crowds, Psychology, and Politics, 1871-1899,* Jaap van Ginneken traces European scientific speculations to "mob scenes" in 19th century European fiction. He finds much of the fiction historically oriented toward the English and French revolutions, as in the work of Charles Dicken's *A Tale of Two Cities* (1851) or Victor Hugo's *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* (1831). His work summarizes crowd fiction by threading it into the proliferation of texts and authors seeking to explain it through naturalism, political psychology, criminology, psychopathology, eugenics, and evolutionary theory that increased through the nineteenth century.

Like Schnapps and Tiews, Ginneken links this proliferation of crowd writing to an era of modernity, which he situates between 1789 and 1888 (the latter date somewhat arbitrarily marking the publication of Guy de Maupassant's diary *Afloat).* The increased demographic and technological capacity for producing crowds, Ginneken argues, depends upon "some of the most radical transformations" in all of European history (Ginneken 3). Besides noting increases in population and urbanization, he refers to the new material innovations that moved information faster: "Steamships and railway services increased mobility; postal and telegraph services expanded communication. On this basis new information and organizational patterns emerged: networks of voluntary associations, corporations, bureaucracies, and nation-states" (Ginneken 3). These information networks coincided with the revolutions in capitalist production and accumulation, and also with the empirical disciplines of crowd psychology, for one, whose science conflated the pursuit of scientific knowledge with "management and control" techniques to be used, ultimately, for crowd manipulation. Benedict Anderson would argue, of course, that the same infrastructure of information helped organize communities of print capitalism. Newspapers in particular helped these print communities form themselves into "imagined communities," which in turn helped solidify popular support for the project of the nation *as state.*

From Ginneken, we can learn much about the nineteenth century origins of crowd psychology that preceded its firm disciplinary arrival as a specific field of investigation in France and Italy in the 1880s. Ginneken sets their arrival against earlier, more loosely arranged theoretical writings on the theme of crowds, such as J.F.C. Hecker's *The Black Death and The Dancing Mania* (1832) or Charles Macaky's *Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds* (1841). Ginneken is not interested in evaluating the science behind crowd psychology. Instead, his work is an "exploration of the links between these theories and their various contexts," which is

similar to some impulses in this dissertation (Ginneke 15). Ginneken cites Thomas Kuhn's notion of paradigm shift and Bruno Latour's study of shared meanings in scientific laboratories as a way of reading the transformations in nineteenth century science that transitioned from Hecker and Macakay to others such as Hippolyte Taine, an important early French historian of the French revolution.

Ginneken pays special attention Taine as a critical figure in early cultural psychology, and one whose ideas intensely reflect his particular brand of French nationalism and racism; he rejected the 1791 French constitution as Jacobin excess. During his lifetime, French contributions to natural science were foundational to the production of transatlantic science. French natural science writing provided Taine with a discourse for his reactionary perspective on French crowds. As one of the first evolutionary biological scientists in the modern sense, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck was then receiving a great deal of attention to his theories on heredity and environment. Lamarck's work was notable for popularizing the idea that physical principles and forces drove changes in natural bodies. He believed animals, for instance, developed more complex characteristics because of traits acquired through their adaptations to local environments. His idea of use-inheritance proposed that bodily organs are developed or undeveloped by use or disuse, and that any changes to the organism could be passed forward through inheritance. He believed that these characteristics could be spontaneously generated; obviously, his ideas preceded both Charles Darwin and Gregor Mendel. The concept of spontaneous generation or degeneration would become an important concept for Taine, and thus for the study of collective psychology in the nineteenth century. The conceptual net used to hold nineteenth century crowd vocabulary passes through Lamarck and on to Taine, and so also must any trace of its convergence into a discourse of affect.

Taine attended lectures on botany, zoology, anatomy, and physiology at the Sorbonne, where natural scientists were studying "how material conditions affected the physiological makeup of peoples, and how these changes resulted in the evolution or degeneration of stock" (Ginneken 23). Taine applied these changes to the study of psychology, but through the frame of French political events such as the 1789 storming of the Bastille and the 1871 Commune. He believed that individual and collective passions might be studied as "chemical reactions," and that these chemical reactions grew out of elementary sources: race, environment, and epoch (la *race, le milieu, le moment).* The German philosopher Johann Gottfreid Herder influenced his ideas about race and environment; Herder emphasized the relationship between language and thought, and also privileged the importance of patriotism and nationality. Herder's concept of the *volk* would become an precedent for Taine, since he imagined the *volk* class to be unified through national sentiment, whatever the real hierarchy of class composition of a nation. Just as Herder distinguished the *volk* by climate, education, tradition, and heredity, Taine's French innovations in literary interpretation focused on race and environment, with the additional variable of epoch.

The combination of evolutionary biology and nationalism would further conjoin with Taine's work on psychology. Along with his colleague Theodule Ribot, he founded the journal *Revue Philosophique* in 1876. Taine's 1870 *De L'Intelligence* stressed the need for psychology to advance empirical research and case studies. It also advocated for more sustained studies of psychological functions. This gave Ribot the inspiration to

publish on psychological heredity, sentiments, and personality. He legitimized French psychology as an empirical discipline and one dependent on physiological and biological information, as Taine suggested. As a student of Jean Martin Charcot, another enormously influential nineteenth century neurologist, Ribot's work filtered to Taine more emerging concepts of neurological illness. Charcot was the first to describe multiple sclerosis, but his most disseminated work was on hysteria, hypnosis, and nervous disorders. Like Ribot, Sigmund Freud and William James would begin much of their own work in psychology by extending Charcot's interests in neurology and hysteria. One idea in particular grounded Ribot's speculations in psychological pathology for Taine in particular: his main principle of "dissolution" (Ginneken 25). Ribot imagined dissolution as a law of regressive amnesia, whereby an ill individual first forgot recent memories, then personal memories, and finally emotional memories in successive stages of illness. Ribot's specific theorization of the dissolution mechanism concretized for individual psychology what Lamarck had proposed about the adaptively susceptible organs of natural bodies, as well as it fit together with Taine's investments in a naturally occurring, environmentally influenced, hereditary nationality.

Both Taine and Ribot were influenced by the transnational success of Herbert Spencer's 1855 *Principles of Psychology* and 1862 *First Principles.* Spencer's ideas influenced the direction of multiple disciplines in late nineteenth century science, including Henri Bergson and Emile Durkheim. Spencer's famous Darwinian summation inspired by his reading of *The Origins of Species,* "survival of the fittest," did not actually extend those ideas into his work on ethics, politics, and economics. Instead, Spencer consistently posited the Lamarckian notion of use-heritance described earlier. Ribot, Spencer, and Spencer's colleague John Huglings Jackson Experimental psychology crossed together with social scientists influenced by earlier nineteenth century natural scientists. Taine wrote about collective mentality, unconscious phenomena, memory, personality, and volition within a transatlantic scientific community also transitioning from natural to social science. He read Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Psychology,* but remained compelled by concepts in evolutionary natural science such as progress and regression. Darwin's concept of "backward development" and retrogression would become a frame for why Taine would take his particular position on the crowd. For Taine, the crowd was the lever that caused civilization to regress.

In *The Origins of Contemporary France,* Taine examines the successful attack on the Bastille by describing the immediate lack of government as a "spontaneous anarchy" (Ginneken 20). He believes this anarchy is representative of revolutionary success in a negative sense. He found the "suppression of government" worse than corrupted or tyrannical power. As in Hobbes' *Leviathan,* he describes government as the "brain" of the body politic (Ginneken 20). When the state lacks a brain, a "band" of the most destitute and "enthusiastic" is able to take over. This destitute band is "irrational," and from the "dregs of society." By itself, Taine's condemnation of crowds as "irrational" speaks to newly formed Enlightenment ideas of a privileged bourgeois subjectivity that behaves, acts, and thinks rationally. This rational and ethical individual is the anchor of Kant's ethical claims about an autonomous, unitary ego that can self-legislate using freewill. This rational agent could make decisions by testing them against universal principles that the agent held independent of his or her surroundings.

In this context, the subjective identity of the "band" itself is already a problem for this Kantian notion of the rational individual. The revolutionary band that stormed that Bastille becomes the hieroglyph for the nineteenth century science study of crowds, although it will later become important to distinguish the ways that the 1791 revolution in Haiti that defeated French slavery shadow it. To understand Taine's influence on the way the French Revolution would be perceived, however, one must review his treatment of the crowd as an identity that exists outside the accepted norms for the Enlightenment ego. In this sense, then, the revolutionary crowd that stormed the Bastille committed an irrational and potentially criminal act in the moments *before* it actually overthrew the French government. According to Taine's logic, the moment the crowd formed itself it already existed beyond the normative horizon of healthy subject formation. The self in the crowd has more permeable boundaries, and this interactivity represents a *collective* will that cannot co-exist with the unitary will of the rational Kantian ego. This Enlightenment notion of the rational person was entirely too monolithic and inflexible to incorporate the phenomena of the crowd into a coherent category of knowledge.

Moreover, Taine writes, the action of the anarchic band quickly "carries him further than he intended to go" (Ginneken 21). In a passage that promises to be an important line in the diagram tracing the discourse around the relationship of crowds and affect, Taine continues:

> His anger is exasperated by peril and resistance. He catches the fever from contact with those who are fevered, and follows robbers who have become his comrades. Add to this the clamours, the drunkenness, the spectacle of destruction, the nervous tremor of the body strained beyond its powers of endurance, and we can comprehend how, from the peasant, the laborer, and the bourgeois, pacified and tamed by an old civilization, we see all of a sudden spring forth barbarian, and, still worse, the primitive animal, the grinning, sanguinary, wonton baboon, who chuckles while he slays, and gambols over the ruin he has accomplished. Such is the actual government to which France is given up (quoted in Ginneken, 122-4).

Ginneken reads this passage for how it can illuminate Taine's approach to the study of human behavior, but for this project Taine's passage here intertwines several separate discourses together that cumulatively form a single 'affective discourse of crowds' that explains its flexible power since Taine's writing. Taine is keen to hook together several dimensions of crowd behavior into a language saturated with a particular political perspective on those very crowds. Instead of perceiving a strategy into the successfully staged attack on the Bastille, Taine refuses to legitimate revolutionary violence by calling it anarchic, which appeals to the sense that anti-state violence is random, haphazard, unfocused, and therefore dangerous. He also calls attention to the negative emotions generated by legitimate grievances against state power by focusing on the "anger" motivating the events. He pathologizes this anger by immediately connecting it to that idea that one contracts it from contact by a contagious "fever." He then describes the symptoms of this pathologized, feverish crowd state as a nervous disorder, as a clamoring body replete with "tremors." All at once, the body degenerates into the primitive, the simian, and the savage. For Taine, the collective bodies that form crowds are individually sick. In his bizarre and influential logic, the illness of the crowd also dehumanizes all classes of French class identity ("peasant," "laborer," "bourgeois") through this degeneration into an animality.

Taine's anxiety over the status of the human in the crowd reveals the consequences when a generation of intellectuals adopts a monolithic category of the human based upon a limited perception of what determines "rational expression." Since the rational ego of the Enlightenment self appeared violent and emotional in the crowd, the crowd was necessarily irrational. It's curious that anti-crowd authors like Taine either could not or would not accept the possibility that individuals were rationally motivated to participate in crowds for the same reason individuals join armies, or even attend public events. In both those situations, one can choose to enter into a new field of social interaction defined by temporary suspensions of self-assertion for the benefits of participatory action or collective engagement. In other words, people can choose to become crowds. Once they've formed crowds and the crowd has become manifest, it's no longer relevant to solely categorize the crowd as a collection of individual bodies. The crowd is a social organism that serves different purposes. It can alter its composition depending on specific situations. It is responsive, retains the capacity for direction, and can function violently or non-violently. The purposes of assembly are manifold, and "seeing" the crowd can be a complex exercise. Twentieth century studies in collective behavior by sociologists and social psychologists developed a far more objective set of vocabularies for the study of crowds. These studies mark a break with the discourse around crowds that are visible in Taine's description.

The pathology of crowds would have enormous consequences for the development of political strategies by states in the nineteenth century. Since crowds were always respected at least as agents of potential power, the development of strategies against those groups most likely to form crowds became paramount. In France and other European states, these target groups were most likely branded as the infamous "rabble" that elite intellectuals feared would explicitly re-enact the drama of the French Revolution. Indeed, this human-to-animal transformation in the crowd becomes the very contradiction at heart of fears about the crowd. What Taine ultimately seemed to fear was the crowd's power to infect bodies *other than* those already determined to be at risk.

In the United States, the slave population fed fears of Haitian style rebellions, which seemed confirmed by incidents like Nat Turner's rebellion in 1833. With the help of an armed crowd, John Brown's 1859 raid on Harper's Ferry helped ignite, as it were, the Civil War. By pathologizing crowds as groups of irrational and sick bodies, anti-crowd intellectuals were able to make links to racist categorizations of the human body that already guided natural science claims about the biological inferiority of African-Americans and women – that is, all non-white male bodies. Blacks and women were the very bodies most likely to form crowds, then, and were already determined to be inferior biologically through natural science, as examples of what Londa Schiebinger calls a key contradiction of the Enlightenment: the idea that "all people are by nature equal was met in conservative quarters with the search for natural differences…scientists, with their privileged knowledge of nature, became consecrated priests of the new secular order, intermediaries between the laws of nature and of states" (Schiebinger 9). Thus the biological lack of women and blacks justified their 'fitness' for slavery, whether in form of plantation chattel or, in the case of marriage, as legal domestic property.

The development of anti-crowd sentiments helped, in turn, to justify the legitimacy of state violence against bodies in crowds *and* bodies prone to form crowds. It also justified containing domestic female property in the home, and slaves to plantations: implicit in the fear that a slave might escape is the fear that slave might join other slaves, rather than simply inspire others slaves to escape. Especially in the United States, however, this "fevered" notion of the crowd's contagion would run up against the very same scientific claims that asserted the biological superiority of white males. The "fevered" crowd participant could potentially infect others even as natural science categories of the human body were scripting the supremacy of the white male body.

This would form the basis for a contradictory logic about fears of degeneration, however, since crowds of sick bodies nonetheless contained both the potential to spread its actions beyond its intention ("carries him further than he intended to go") through the very possibility that emotions might drive the "spontaneous anarchy" of the crowd itself. The exasperated anger of the crowd participant in Taine's description quite literally carries a fever caught from those already "fevered." Thus the fascinating transformation of the human into the animal occurs through the prism of crowd participation, which happens to be one of the most powerful expressions of collective action against the state possible, and the only one capable of over-turning the state itself.

This human become animal would illustrate a social crisis in racial attitudes that lingered throughout the nineteenth century in the transatlantic states most invested in eugenic paradigms of racial science, and would later explode into the turn of the century "race suicide" rhetoric from Theodore Roosevelt as well as Madison Grant's 1923 manifesto *The Passing of the Great White Race.*

3

It was considered a degenerative and destructive alien within the healthy national public. The vocabulary of medicine was no accident. Just as elite nineteenth century French intellectuals like Gustave Le Bon would pathologize socialism, political unrest associated with American labor agitation was situated as a medical problem. For them, the discourse of contagion in Harte and Twain was conflated with that of affect in order to represent the spread of euphoria through white male bodies and beyond. Harte and Twain manipulated the discourse in a way similar to Delany: they used it to talk about the way affect can move bodies in regional locales into new political dimensions with national implications.

As in *Blake,* the pre-cognitive transmission of euphoric excitement was particularly important to describe because it suggested that the boundaries of individual bodies were permeable. The appearance of bodies that were open to external influence, both affective and behavioral, was a major preoccupation of nineteenth century transatlantic science. While studies in group psychology and crowds exploded in popularity toward the end of the nineteenth century, the question of how ideas and feelings moved from body to body had begun in the mid-eighteenth, and the literature of psychic contagion had progressed first from mesmerism, then to hypnotism, and then finally to the psychology of nervous disorders.

At the University of Vienna in the 1760s, Anton Mesmer proposed that variations in atmosphere tides – similar to gravity – might explain the progression of bodily disease. As Derek Forrest writes in *Hypnotism, A History,* Mesmer argued that there was a universal fluid "affecting not only planetary bodies but everything on earth and leading to tidal effects within the human body in the flow of blood and nervous excitation" (Forrrest 2). Mesmer turned to magnets as a therapy for patients with nervous disorders in an attempt to steer these tides toward better health for patients. At first, Mesmer's practice seemed to work. The technique came to be called animal magnetism. Over time, however, it became clear that a large part of his medical success

was due to his own persuasive charisma. He carried his idea to Paris in the late 1780s, where his reputation for innovation traveled in elite European social circles. His methods convinced enough of his rich patients of his treatment that he was able to live luxuriously, at least for a time. The inability for other doctors to reproduce the therapies of animal magnetism, however, led to schisms within the Parisian medical community and a few official reports denouncing animal magnetism. A report by the Royal Commission drew attention to the epileptic-like seizure responses of some of his patients, particularly women. They fell into hysterical trances and convulsions, sometimes with hallucinations. Mesmer would defend his reputation and his practice by constantly asserting the reality of the universal fluid, and by denying any sexual motives in his cures. In any case, the extreme affective responses of his patients and the apparent epidemic of their behaviors would become recurrent symptoms and tropes in group psychology throughout the nineteenth century. The vulnerability of a body permeable to outside influence expressed through nervous excitement would become, in fact, *the* subject of not only Le Bon and Freud but also Harte and Twain.

Mesmer's specific notion of a universal fluid connecting human bodies persisted in the intellectual and public imagination. This was in part due to the lingering possibility of therapeutic potential if one could control nervous excitement; after all, some of Mesmer's most notable successes occurred in his treatments of patients suffering from anxiety. The combination of an affective, nervous field and the possibilities of controlling that field also captured intellectual and public imagination at the time of the French revolution. It was only natural, then, that even after Mesmer's expulsion from Parisian medical science the idea of bodily anxiety, affective contagion, and political agitation would consistently travel together. The next author to take up the idea of animal magnetism, for instance, would be Nicholaus Bergasse, who wrote in his *Considerations sur le magnetisme animal* that the magnetic fluid "was the agent in both the physical and moral spheres," and thus the fluid was the means by which bodies could become 'good' (Forrest, 57). He believed that rural populations responded better to animal magnetism and that urban life corrupted bodies. A new French democracy would thus mean reforming the health of the nation.

Bergasse's connection between permeable bodies and national politics would fade until the end of the nineteenth century, however. Other physicians influenced by Mesmer would evolve his ideas away from animal magnetism – and outright political science – and into the more focused realm of hypnotic practice. After feeling repulsed by the violent trances of Mesmer's patients, for instance, the Marquis de Puysegur discovered that he could influence his patients much more quietly when they were in a state that resembled sleep. Puysegur realized that the "magnetizer's will" was an exclusive and essential part of the magnetic cure. Patients would respond to his direction if he was sufficiently persuasive. Similarly, the Museum of Natural History librarian J.P.F. Deleuze stressed the "emotional aspect of the magnetic relationship" (Forrest, 85). Alexander Bertrand argued, by contrast, that the "somnambulistic state" depended on the subject's ability to enter it, rather than on the magnetists's ability to induce it (Forrest, 98). Bertrand popularized the idea to the point that in 1829 a 53-year old woman had her breast cancer removed under the influence of no more pain management than "magnetic analgesia" (Forrest, 102). By this time magnetists were in the major Parisian hospitals. It was after this point in the 1830s that mesmerism and magnetism entered the United States through Charles Poyen, who had witnessed magnetic trances in Paris and met Puysegur's brother in Haiti. Poyen began demonstrating with the sonambulist Cynthia Gleason in Rhode Island and then translated Deleuze's practical magnetism manual into English. J.B. Dods and J.S. Grimes carried his work into new techniques when they found that subjects staring at a coin held in hand could go into a trance state. They claimed the trance came from an electricity that passed from the metal to the human body, rather than from the universal fluid. They called it electrobiology. Interest in the invisible exploded in 1848, when the Fox family of Hydesville, New York claimed to experience paranormal activity through rappings and tappings, which they claimed was communication from their deceased family and friends. Spiritualism grew exponentially. By 1853 one of ten spiritual periodicals put the number of practicing mediums in the US at 30,000. The magnetist became the medium.

The most significant development in the medical evolution around hypnotism occurred with Jean-Martin Charcot was appointed to the Salpetriere mental hospital in 1862. The hospital had over 5000 inmates at the time of Charcot's appointment. Between 1862 and 1870 he became famous for his discoveries in neurology, including multiple sclerosis. He said that the patients suffering from nervous convulsions had problems with their nervous tissue rather than damage to their bodies, as many then believed. His work progressed into an analysis of hysteria itself. He used photography in an attempt to categorize phrases and types of hysterical behavior. He authored a paper called "On the various nervous states determined by hypnotism in hysterics." By the time Freud visited in 1886 Charcot's lectures were attracting large crowds. Charcot had made it acceptable to study hypnotism as a form of therapy in France, almost a century after Mesmer. His "prestige triggered a change in professional attitudes and in scientific concern," and new theories, such as those by Hippolyte Bernheim, would extend Charcot's studies elucidating on the ways hypnotists could control the attention and behavior of their subjects through the influence of suggestion, or could "excite particular ideas and emotions and influence memory" (Forrest, 230). It was here that the potential benefits of hypnotic therapy could collide with the possible intentions of a demagogue, and this is what, in fact, Le Bon would argue in the late 1890s about the role of suggestion in crowds.

The long transition from mesmerism to hypnotism to crowd psychology was one that was, by turns, concerned with both nervous excitement and nervous anxiety; at times, it appeared as if excitement and anxiety were of the same affective species. Indeed, the concept of a body open to external influence, if only to the suggestion and influence of the magnetist, was a concurrent assumption of eighteenth and nineteenth century medical science. In order for a patient to receive the suggestion of a magnetist or hypnotist, one would have to pre-suppose that a body was an open field for affective transmission – a quality so important that the notion of "transference" between subject and analyst would become one of the dominant legacies of Freudian psychoanalysis. This transference and interpersonal influence depended upon the direct power of an agent – the hypnotist, and later the analyst – who was responsible for manipulating and thereby curing nervous excitement. This model did not overlap with the contagion discourse emanating from germ theorists, whose models of invisible infection seemed to suggest that if there was a universal fluid, it was full of malevolent agents that could wreck entire populations with mass hysteria or illness.

American thought on bodily vulnerability to outside influence also came out of germ theory in the 1840s and 1850s. Fears of real viral and microbiotic contagion mixed with anxieties around the real segregation of bodies, and helped define social policy. The American germ theorist J.K. Mitchell described infectious organisms as a generalized and feminized evil. In *Membranes: Metaphors of Invasion in Nineteenth Century Literature, Science, and Politics,* Laura Otis writes that Mitchell's "vivid images of insidious parasitism have a literary quality, and were meant to arouse strong emotion" (Otis, 40-1). She notes that he profoundly influenced his son S. Weir Mitchell, the author of the infamous nineteenth century rest cure for hysterical women, by conflating the chaos and decay caused by bacteria as a "feminine evil, a force to be contained and controlled" (41). Both crowds and women were the objects of particular fear for influential American scientists. Mitchell often used the word "mischief" to associate parasitic bacteria with a "group of children or an unruly mob," and also believed bodies susceptible to mesmerism – mid nineteenth century hypnosis -- indicated a loss of self-control and character that necessitated strong individual will to contain the boundaries of the self. By 1877 Mitchell would publish his concerns in his "Clinical Lecture on Nervousness in the Male," where he argued that men must learn self-restraint in order to repress emotion and restrain the exhibition of feeling, and that this discipline and policing of desire must remain checked at all times.

Discussions of hysteria had also developed out of diagnoses of its predecessor concept, neurasthenia, which the American electrotherapist George Beard coined in order to find a common language for describing other nervous episodes imagined as critical to the healthy national development of the United States. By the 1870s American scientists and intellectuals transposed the pathological discourse around disease "contagion" into one for affective contagion; since individual hysteria was an illness expressed by emotions, emotions themselves were a problem. Since mental illness was thought to reveal the way even healthy minds worked,

extreme episodes of emotional expression, such as hysteria, had come under medical scrutiny. The transmission of affect was thought to spread like germs: as a pre-cognitive agent capable of transforming the bodily state, possessing and inhabiting the subject's body like a disease. The same circulation of affects then associated with mental illness, such as hysteria, depression, anxiety, fatigue, impotence, and depression, also appeared as the primary symptoms of crowds. Crowds became cesspools where emotional miasmas congregated and infected. Twain and Harte were writing about male crowds prior to this emphasis on closing the masculine body to external affects, and prior to the diffusion of Mitchell's ideas into the American public sphere. Their men were not disciplined and constrained, and were in fact incredibly open to the feelings of hope, greed, cheer, and excitement associated with prospecting. Twain and Harte were able to narrate this difference in the way masculinity could be open to external influence in part because the bodies they chronicled were particularly vulnerable to affects produced from extreme changes brought on by access to credit.

[iv] It is notable that Harte published his narratives of the gold and silver rushes almost a generation after the initial mass migrations to the mines and mill-works sought to find precious metals in the American west. He wrote from the perspective of the late 1860s and early 1870s, just prior to the explosion of labor unrest following the panic of 1873 and the railroad strike of 1877. By that time the Civil War had been over for a few years, and the project of incorporating local regions into a national imaginary could seem, in hindsight, like an obvious and self-evident trajectory. Bret Harte's "The Luck of Roaring Camp" are all the more remarkable, then, because they incorporate the dialogic discourse of affect as a way to capture the financial "fever" then circulating within the towns and settlements mining precious metals. Harte's use of this contagion discourse is ironic because in the post-Civil War era stigmatisms against the crowd became most pronounced.

[v] The process of rational decision-making stood alongside hard-work as the moral justification for capitalism, particularly in the late nineteenth century US. Mark A. Martinez writes in *The Myth of the Free Market* that capitalism could temporarily persuade middle-class accommodation by promoting itself against aristocratic and royal power. "Over time," he writes, "stories of individual achievement helped create a mountain of disdain for both aristocracy and for entitlement granted by birthright…Horatio Alger stories were instrumental in purging aristocratic and royalty myths that were tied to an anachronistic and feudal past" (Martinez, 31). The moral justification for class antagonism, then, became rooted in stories that promoted individual talent and fortitude. It was against these myths and stereotypes of market participants that elite intellectuals lobbied against crowds, particularly in the United States.

Martinez rightly examines the power of individual heroic myths to influence and persuade a majority of the middle-class into accepting the moral logic of capitalism. The more relevant and fascinating aspect of capitalist ideology, however, is that it depends upon the emotional power of nationalism to secure its real power. As Martinez identifies in countless examples, the US "state" has intervened on innumerable occasions to protect the interests of the capitalist class or individual companies. The logic of state intervention returns, in fact, to the rise of capitalism and nation-states themselves. Herman Schwartz writes in *States Versus Markets* that the state monetized the economy to pay for war, and thus gradually began to recognize more property rights. "Kings wanted order and legitimacy," Schwartz writes, and thus the state began to monopolize the use of violence. Order allowed taxes to be collected more efficiently. Sovereigns granted new property rights and legal infrastructures to merchants, whose increasing wealth also helped subsidize imperial adventures. This opened the way for middle-class nobles, artisans, scholars, and merchants, whom Schwartz says "were interested in money and discovery than in maintaining stifling customs and traditions" (Martinez 117). Karl

Polanyi, too, argues in *The Great Transformation* that "the rise of market societies was a result of specific state-building strategies" (Martinez 123). In the US, manifest destiny legislation like the 1862 Homestead Act – as well as the entire legal apparatus that justified slavery – also point toward the historic and indeed structural inter-relation between states and capitalism. The axiomatic monopoly on violence by the state also threads most of the basic philosophy of the state, whether of Hobbes, Rousseau, or Spinoza. The state sovereign must guarantee that monopoly because state security is the most basic justification for the state itself, particularly for wealthy elites and yet also for "the people."

Besides combating the myth of the individual hero that upholds moral capitalism, these claims break the clean distinction between the rational, individual capitalist and the emotional, inferior crowd. Since the crowd challenged the state's monopoly on violence in the name of an opposing "will" of the people, crowd theory in the nineteenth century easily followed events on both sides of the Atlantic. American experiments with franchise were examined skeptically by much more sclerotic regimes in Europe, while the history European socialist movements became a major source of American anxiety as immigration increased towards the close of the century. Eric Hobsbawn writes how the 1848 revolutions had shown "how the masses could irrupt into the closed circle of their rulers" (Hobsbawn 99). The memory of those uprisings would re-affirm the serious threat of mass mobilization, and the oceanic crossing of intellectual and political ideas about the management of crowds fit squarely into the plans of politicians such as Otto von Bismarck and Benjamin Disraeli, who understood that the ruling class must be "preserved not by head-on conflict with liberalism and nationalism, but only by twisting the framework of both to its advantage" (Hobsbawn 72). The aftermath of 1848 also proved the industrial proletariat was a force in political affairs, even as their cause did not quite match the international emphasis of *The Communist Manifesto.* European workers and labor leaders were very much subsumed by nationalism and national concerns. In the United States, the slave economy would not collapse in a meaningful uprising that linked American slaves to those in the Caribbean or elsewhere. The general strike of the slaves preceded their joining the Union to fight the Confederate armies. Although the conflict escalated over the right to practice an extreme capitalism, both sides fought under the banner of regional or unified nationalism. The scale of "feeling" that could practically motivate mass movements seemed only to extend to the imagined edges of national consciousness.

This phenomenon does not explain, however, the frequency with which other constellations of collective identity proved equally as important – and durable – for uniting bodies. In fact, Hobsbawn writes that the "alternative to a 'national' political consciousness was not, in practice, 'working-class internationalism' but a sub-political consciousness which still operated on a scale much smaller than, or irrelevant to, that of the nation-state" (Hobsbawn 93). While it's hard to imagine precisely where Hobsbawn imagines this smaller scale of political consciousness to reside, it's reasonable to suggest that local crowds were regular features of pre-national political life in France before the Revolution; we need remember only the French food riots chronicled by George Rudé.

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