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ORGANIZATIONS IN UNITED NATIONS DECISIONS ON
BIRTH CONTROL: A PROBLEM IN ORGANIZATION THEORY.

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**PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATIONS IN UNITED NATIONS DECISIONS ON
BIRTH CONTROL: A PROBLEM IN
ORGANIZATION THEORY**

by

John Corwin Burt

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Political Science in partial fulfillment of the re-
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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outcomes. Almost invariably their comments have been informal, extending well beyond the simply procedural. Their requests for anonymity are honored, regretfully.

ABBREVIATIONS OF SELECTED ORGANIZATION TITLES

ACMR	WHO Advisory Committee on Medical Research
AID	Agency for International Development (DOS)
APC	Asian Population Conference (sponsored by ECAFE)
DOS	Department of State (of U.S. Government)
ECAFE	UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECLA	UN Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs (of UN New York Headquarters Secretariat)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FPA	Trust Fund for Population Activities (initiated in the name of the Secretary-General of the parent UN organization)
GA	General Assembly (of parent UN)
HEW	Department of Health, Education and Welfare (of U.S. Government)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
IOA	Bureau of International Organization Affairs (of U.S. Department of State)
IUSSP	International Union for the Scientific Study of Population Problems
JCHP	UNICEF/WHO Joint Committee on Health Policy
NGO	Non-government organization, i.e., a private organi- zation, separate from formal national governments, and from inter-governmental organizations

- OEO Office of Economic Opportunity (of U.S. Government)
- PC Population Commission of ECOSOC (not to be confused with the Population Council, a private organization in New York)
- PD Population Division (of ESA)
- SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
- UNDP UN Development Programme
- UNICEF UN Childrens Fund
- UNIDO UN Industrial Development Organization
- WHA World Health Assembly (of WHO)
- WHO World Health Organization
- World Bank (see IBRD)
- WPC World Population Conferences (sponsored by UN)

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PART I. INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

PURPOSE AND METHOD

. . . The United Nations system, in contrast to a stably organized national government, consists of a congeries of quasi-autonomous agencies bound together only loosely by freely consented but weakly sanctioned agreement and inter-secretariat consultation. . . .

International officials receive their basic policy directives from a multiplicity of assemblies, conferences, councils, and boards--directives that are sometimes vague, ambiguous, or conflicting.¹

For a student of complex organizations, the processing of an issue by one or more of the twenty-five United Nations organizations, whether independently, or in collaboration with one or more of some 130 national governments, suggests a puzzling subject of inquiry. Make that issue a controversial one, and the search for factors involved in decision-making seems particularly challenging. Between 1965 and 1969, debate over the issue of a possible UN role in attempts to reduce over-population in developing nations prompted new UN policies, programs, and institutional relationships. The present study will analyze decision-making behavior within selected policy-making

¹Walter R. Sharp, Field Administration in the United Nations System (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 9.

bodies, and within administrative units, both inside and outside the UN system, as they contended with the issue.

Two Purposes

The study has two purposes, which may be expressed as follows:

1. Purpose: to describe how selected UN policy bodies, and administrative units, shared decision-making related to over-population with institutions outside the UN, between 1965 and 1969.

Three questions overlap:

- A. Which UN organizations were most involved in decisions concerning the issue of over-population, and to what extent?
- B. How did U.S. Government organizations formulate policies relevant to the issue, and pursue these policies in UN bodies and units?
- C. Which private organizations influenced U.S. and UN decision processes?

2. Purpose: to explain the salient organization characteristics of the UN decision processes examined.

Two approaches will be used:

- A. Comparison will be made of constants, and of variations, in over-population decision processes, across the selected UN organizations.
- B. Generalizations concerning decision-making behavior in a variety of UN settings should be expected to suggest themselves as hypotheses, for testing in future research.

Purpose No. 1, description, is the primary characteristic of Part I. Given such complexities as those suggested

by Professor Sharp, one presumably would undertake to identify varieties of organization structures, and sub-structures, before attempting to analyze multiplicities of organization roles, and interrelationships, in decision processes. Basically, then, Part I undertakes to sort out U.S., UN, and private organization sub-structures involved in political and administrative decision processes. An analytical framework will be used to assist the sorting.

Part II is intended as a bridge between description (Part I) and explanation (Part III). In Part II the framework will be used to analyze organization interaction in processes from which emerge decisions. Each chapter will be centered around a separate combination of UN organization components, the ostensible seats of decision-making. Moving in and out of decision-participation with components in four such UN combinations are representatives of national governments, and of private organizations.

Purpose No. 2 is explanation of salient characteristics displayed in decision processes. In Part III decision factors will be compared across processes centered in the four combinations of UN components, and generalizations sought. Of particular interest will be generalizations which might serve as hypotheses for future testing of decision processes in connection with other issues, and with other organization structures, in the UN system.

Family of Organizations

Before introducing a method for analyzing decision processes, the basic structures of major components of the UN family of organizations can be useful.

In mid-1945 representatives of fifty national governments met in San Francisco and signed the Charter of the United Nations, the Preamble of which ends,

. . . Do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

What then was to become known in Europe and elsewhere as "the United Nations Organization--UNO," consisted of six "principal organs," listed in Article 7 of the Charter in the following order: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, and Secretariat.

By the 1960s, however, it had become more meaningful to pluralize the word "organization"; eleven entities under the UNO umbrella maintained only a limited relationship with any of the six organs of the UNO (the latter sometimes referred to as "the parent UN"). In part because each raises its own operating funds, which are donated voluntarily by governments, five¹ of these organizations were

¹UNICEF, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).

See organization listings in: Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1968-69, General Assembly, Official Records: 24th Session, Suppl. No. 1 (A/7601), 1969. Hereafter, such entries will begin, "GA, OR, . . ."

all but independent of the UN regular budget. (By contrast, that budget is financed by assessments which each member government pays annually.) In common with these five, each of the remaining six organizations¹ within the parent UN has its own separate policy-making bodies composed of representatives of governments, paired off with Secretariats "semi-detached" from the Central Secretariat at Headquarters, or from its branch offices in Geneva. The nominal interconnection of these eleven organizations rests chiefly upon the filing of annual reports to the General Assembly, and upon the ranking of the chief administrators of their respective Secretariats high on a chart topped by the Secretary-General of the UN.

Independent of the parent UN are nine specialized agencies,² whose representative bodies of governments, and

¹The UN Economic Commissions for Africa (ECA), Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Europe (ECE), and Latin America (ECLA); the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

See source cited in previous footnote.

²International Labour Organisation (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), World Health Organization (WHO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).

See General Assembly (GA), 24th Session, Administrative and Budgetary Co-ordination of the United Nations with the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Administrative Budgets of the Agencies, 27th Report

heads of Secretariats, are considered the counterparts in the one case of the General Assembly, and in the other, of the Secretary-General. Five other organizations are also included under a common heading, "inter-governmental agencies."¹

In a small number of these twenty-five UN organizations, the issue of possible UN participation in programs to reduce over-population made fleeting appearances in the 1950s and 1960s; from 1965 forward, the number increased.

Given the variety of organization sub-structures involved in population-related decision processes, and given the interconnections with national governments, and with private organizations, it seems important to select an analytical approach as an aid in sorting out processes which take place in such structural complexities.

Method of Analysis

Analytical Framework

Two essays which appeared in a single volume in 1966

of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the General Assembly at its 24th Session (A/7818), December, 1969; and UN Office of Public Information (OPI), Chart of Agencies related to the United Nations (Press Release SA/213/Rev/7), February, 1969.

¹The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and three affiliates of the latter: the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

See source in previous footnote.

typify familiar and opposite approaches to the development of theory intended to explain decision behavior in large formal organizations of various types. In one essay, Ralph M. Stogdill surveyed the vast literature of interaction of factors such as work groups, skills, operations, etc. within an organization.¹ For example, a lengthy bibliography included Chester Barnard's landmark analysis of the executive who, as decision-maker, balances inducements to, and contributions of, workers;² and the pioneering study by March and Simon of numerous aspects of internal decision-making, such as internal constraints, and conflicts.³ On the other hand, in his contrasting essay, William M. Evan also searched literature on organization theory and found but a tiny number of works on outside relationships which a particular organization maintains.⁴ One example from the literature was Philip Selznick's account of how the Tennessee Valley Authority undertook to forestall possible opposition from private regional associations by inviting them to

¹Ralph W. Stogdill, "Dimensions of Organization Theory," in James D. Thompson, ed., Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh: University Press, 1966), pp. 3-56.

²Chester I. Barnard, Functions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938).

³James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958).

⁴William M. Evan, "The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations," in Thompson, op. cit., pp. 175-176.

participate in TVA decision-making processes.¹ Another was the Litwak and Hylton study of collaboration of local organizations in decisions formalized by a central community-chest organization.²

In the Evan essay, however, mention³ is also made of a work which links intra- and inter-organization theories. That work, by Talcott Parsons, suggests a theoretical point of departure for decision analysis in the present study. Two interconnected Parsonian hypotheses, one concerning internal levels of organization, the other, relationships of such levels with external institutions, will now be illustrated in UN contexts.

Internal Levels of Organization

Because he believes that many years' work will be necessary for the formulation of broad generalizations to explain decision behavior across various types of organizations, Parsons modestly sets out to suggest "ingredients" which, he believes, cannot conceivably be left out of future general organization theory. To him, a formal

¹Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

²E. Litwak and L.F. Hylton, "Inter-organizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Coordinating Agencies," in Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (March, 1962).

³Evan, op. cit., p. 176.

organization is structured both to mobilize resources and to integrate internal operations with external factors, for the purpose of attaining goals.¹ As one ingredient, or hypothesis of organization theory, he offers a "three levels" concept of decision processes within an organization:

1. At the bottom of the hierarchy of any complex organization is its technical system, which is responsible for specialized tasks: for example, the processing of income tax returns.
2. At the middle level is the managerial system, the internal function of which is to coordinate operations, and the external, to obtain resources and to mediate between the technical system and both suppliers and clientele.
3. At the peak of the hierarchy is the institutional system, which deals with broad external publics, seeking to legitimate the organization by gaining generalized support.²

The distinctive aspect of Parsons' levels concept is his implication that, except in military-type organizations, there is virtually no passing of a "decision-by-command" downward, from a higher hierarchical level to a lower, because differences in function are great. In his terms, middle-level managers customarily do not have the technical qualifications to make technical decisions for technical experts. Nor, in Parsonian principle, does a

¹Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), pp. 17-19, 28-38.

²Ibid., pp. 60-64, 77, 79.

board of directors supervise managerial decisions; the basic function of the board is simply adjustment of the organization to external conditions, adjustment geared to broad definitions of general objectives and policies. In matters of internal policy and management, managers must be free to decide.¹

Each of these decision levels will now be illustrated, in UN terms, particularly pertinent to the over-population issue, 1965-69.

Because the issue relates to the well-being of individuals, and of national societies, the principal organ cited in the UN Charter which is most conspicuously related to issue decisions is the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). However, the Charter (Article 13) assigns to the General Assembly, the responsibility for initiating studies and making recommendations for the promotion of international cooperation in various fields,

¹Minimization of vertical transactions within an organization and maximization of horizontal transactions with external groups as a fact of organization life is the theme of Chapter 2 of Parsons, op. cit., "Some Ingredients of a General Theory of Formal Organization."

Discussion of this theme against a background of general principles of organization theory can be found in: Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), pp. 38-39; Joseph A. Litterer, The Analysis of Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 305-307; and James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action; Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), pp. 10-12.

including the economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields. It is logical, therefore, to view both Assembly, and Council, as upper-level decision bodies for the parent UN organization as a whole. In Parsonian terms, each serves as a "board of directors" which relates the organization to the larger society.

A third principal organ cited in the Charter is the Secretariat, which becomes involved in over-population decisions at least as early as policy bodies (composed of representatives of governments) decide to authorize actual programs. The upper level of the Secretariat obviously includes at least the Secretary-General. However, because persons of under-secretary rank also have large responsibilities, they, like the Secretary-General, display some of the decision-making characteristics described by Parsons as institutional. For example, the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs not only heads up the department with the largest number of employees in the Secretariat of the parent UN, but often, on behalf of the parent UN, expresses detailed views on the economic and social health of the globe. The extent to which officials in UN secretariats do or do not join representatives of governments in decision-making is a question to be dealt with at length.

Although Parsons acknowledges the possibility of exceptions, he views the institutional, or upper, level of organization as collective, typically a board of directors,

in contrast to the managerial level, the latter resting in the hands of a single person--a manager. However, in the case of UN organizations, the concurrence of both types of decision mechanisms seems the rule, rather than the exception, at each level. This particular theoretical difference between Parsons and the UN can be explained in part by the types of organizations which he uses as illustrations: an institutional school board, or corporation board, coupled respectively with a managerial school superintendent, or a factory manager.

We turn, then, from the upper decision level, to the middle--the managerial system, UN style.

ECOSOC's sub-bodies include functional commissions, one of which is the Population Commission (PC), eventually composed of representatives of twenty-seven governments, and responsible for working out policy in the special field of population. Customarily, such policy is then translated into programs by the Population Division (PD), an administrative component of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ESA) of the Secretariat of the parent UN. The director of the Division characteristically concerns himself with such matters of internal policy as decisions on management of program and budget. Thus PC and PD each typify the middle-level, managerial system.

The bottom, or technical, level of organization--sections of PD--controls day-to-day decisions on the details

of individual projects; projects are components of a program. Professional specialists, typically demographers, are assigned to sections of PD which, in the late 1960s, were labelled respectively: Estimates and Projections; Demographic Studies and Surveys; and Fertility Studies Sections.¹ This third level does not have a policy-body "opposite number" within the UN, since the mid-level PC has no sub-body.

From the above introduction to some of the UN structures and decision-processes, it appears that each of the three organization levels exhibits the high degree of independence, one from the other, claimed by the Parsons hypothesis of internal organization, the subject of this sub-section of the chapter. The description thus far of these particular UN organization components, per se, however, sheds little light upon a decision-making generalization suggested by Alvin Gouldner, which extends the Parsons' implications. According to him, if the "functional autonomy" of components of an organization is high, then the degree of interdependence of such components will be low. A measure of degree of functional autonomy, he further suggests, is the extent to which a component can itself decide

¹UN Secretariat, Organization of the Secretariat (ST/SGB/131, 1966), pp. 26-27; also Secretary-General's Bulletin, Organization of the Secretariat: Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ST/SGB/131/Amend. 7, 1967), pp. 6-8.

to obtain independent financing, from outside the organization.¹ The last phrase, "from outside the organization," leads us to the second Parsons hypothesis, or ingredient of theory, namely, internal-external interrelationships in decision processes.

External Levels of Interaction

Parsons postulates that a given hierarchical level interacts with groups outside the organization. For example, at the lowest or technical level of operations in a secondary school, a teacher decides upon classroom techniques for educating the school's clientele--pupils.

Similarly, at the middle of such an organization, the managerial system--represented by the superintendent--combines decisions on the education functions within the school, and decisions on broad service to the community external to the organization.

Finally, the school's board of trustees typically concentrates upon budget decisions in relation to other competing demands upon the resources of the inhabitants of the community which the school serves.²

¹Alvin W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in Robert Merton et al., eds., Sociology Today (New York: Harper, 1965), pp. 419-420.

²Parsons, op. cit., pp. 86-89.

The literature on interaction of organization elements with external groups includes not only Gouldner, op. cit., which describes a "natural system" model, in which organization structures are viewed as "spontaneously and

Although the main focus of this study is upon the period 1965-69, it will be useful, on occasion, to illuminate the period by a brief reference to events in an earlier period. For example, in the paragraph which follows, extensive external relationships for decision-making undertaken by the League of Nations initiated precedents followed in more recent times.

In January, 1939 the Council of the League of Nations appointed a committee to study demographic problems in their economic, financial and social setting. However, before the Economic, Financial and Transit Department of the League Secretariat had time to translate this policy into program, World War II broke out and the Secretariat accepted an offer of hospitality at Princeton University. Three private American foundations then underwrote a detailed study of population projections for Europe, to the year 1970,¹ as partial implementation of the Council-Secretariat goal. This is a striking example of external relations; without

homeostatically" responsive to environmental factors (p. 405), but Thompson, Organizations in Action, op. cit., pp. 6-7, 10-13, which relates the Gouldner model to the three Parsons' levels. Also, in Principles of Organization (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961), p. 74, Theodore Caplow states: "To the sociologist, an organization is first and foremost an interaction network."

¹League of Nations, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union: Population Projections 1940-1970, by Frank Notestein et al. of the Office of Population Research, Princeton, N.J., 1944.

private outside funding, and without outside expertise, the initial organization mandate for implementation of policy would have disappeared by default.¹

Turning from the League to the UN, in 1945 the planners of the structure of the forthcoming UN proposed that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) form nine sub-bodies in the form of functional commissions, each composed of representatives of governments--an external dimension. One of these bodies, eventually to be known as the PC, would be responsible for decisions concerning demographic matters, including studies, and for advising ECOSOC on: national population growth and factors determining said growth; the effect of national policies designed to influence said factors; the bearing of national population changes upon economic and social conditions; and general population and migration questions.²

By the time that ECOSOC actually brought the PC into existence in 1946, large portions of national populations had been destroyed in Asia and Europe, and millions of refugees flooded across one national border or another.

¹In Parsonian "internal" terms, one can view the Council as the upper, or institutional, decision-making level, the Department as middle, or managerial. It is also possible to pair these levels off horizontally with Princeton University, collaborating with foundations on the institutional level, and the University's Office of Population Research as managerial.

²UN Preparatory Commission, Executive Committee, Report (E/EX/113/Rec.1), 1944, pp. 51, 53.

The initial external decision-making problem for the PC, therefore, was to assist national governments in locating, counting and classifying population. National economic and social recovery programs obviously depended in large measure upon the size and capabilities of work forces, numbers of mouths to be fed, and so on.

Internally speaking, the League project at Princeton, and the setting up of PC, and externally speaking, the acuteness of population re-location problems, all contributed to the initial decision-making characteristics of PD, and to precedents for its support. Frank Notestein, a demographer who had founded the Office of Population Research at Princeton, came into the Secretariat of the parent UN as a combination external consultant and internal acting director to set up PD, which he directed for several years. Internally, he was able to establish close relationships with PC, virtually all of whose members were demographers, and to budget programs requiring the work of a number of demographers in PD. Externally, successful budgeting decisions obviously reflected readiness on the part of member governments to see that a few hundred thousands of dollars of the UN regular budget be committed to population programs annually.

After a decline in scope of population activities by what had been the Notestein UN group¹ in the 1950s and

¹During a few years, in fact, symbolizing a downgrading of its role, the Population Division was known as

early 1960s, however, PD and PC eventually turned externally to individual governments for special grants, as a means of supplementing the regular budget. Also, the making of decisions for underwriting individual projects, such as seminars, or conferences, was on occasion shared by a private foundation, or association. Thus the PD managerial system can be seen as a conspicuous focal point in externally-oriented decision-making. One might even tentatively speculate that PD interacts with middle-level units of external organizations--such as bureaus in governments, or departments in private associations--which share in the making of UN decisions. Such a presupposition of domination of external interaction by a linkage of managerial systems across both a UN organization and an external one (governmental or private) might be inferred from the combination of the two Parsons' ingredients of theory. The presupposition will be tested not only in the remainder of this chapter, and in the U.S. Government portion of the next, but throughout Part II.

Focus of Analysis

Given the ingredients of organization theory, internal and external, the UN background sketched thus far points toward both the dependence of an internal organization level--say the PD--upon external support, and the

the Population Branch, before reverting to the original designation. See also the next footnote.

independence of each internal level from the two others, in decision-making. The question now arises as to whether such a statement can stand up, as a generalization, when it is viewed against a larger sample of illustrations. Details must await further evidence, but a few tentative observations may now be offered.

First, it has been noted that PC was created by, and formally reports to, a higher level--ECOSOC. However, PC drafts goals, and recommendations, in the form of resolutions which, except for one revised in the mid-1960s, were rubber-stamped by ECOSOC. Similarly, the General Assembly has, on occasion, supplanted ECOSOC in respect to population decisions. However, Assembly resolutions on population infrequently go beyond ceremonial wording.

Second, how independent has been the decision-making role of PD, the middle-level partner of PC? Do the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs and, above him, the Secretary-General--both part of the institutional system--defer to the Director of PD, in the formulation of population programs? As one piece of contrary evidence, Dag Hammarskjold in the middle 1950s cut back the budget of PD, thereby shrinking personnel and program.¹ Thus,

¹ECOSOC XXVII, Official Records (OR), Suppl. No. 3, PC 10th, Report, 1959, p. 6 and ECOSOC, PC 10th, Progress of Work During 1957-58 and Programme of Work for 1959-61 in the Field of Population (E/CN.9/155/Add.1, 1959), p. 1. See also the previous footnote.

neither in the first instance PC, nor in the second PD, has the managerial level achieved complete decision-making independence from the institutional level above it. Yet such impact from above is infrequent.

The further question of a possible Parsonian gap between the middle level, and the lower technical system, will be taken up later, after detailed accounts of the operations of the latter have been presented.

Thus far, an attempt has been made to supply enough preliminary background information on UN structures to illustrate an actual organization context for the application of the two Parsons' ingredients of theory to decision-making processes. Given the complexities of interaction of such structures with others in the U.S. Government, and in private organizations, it will continue to be necessary to deal frequently with various aspects of all three types of organizations. However, such aspects will be arrayed, with regularity, alongside the Parsons' framework, to serve the eventual purpose of explanation of organization behavior in decision-making processes.

Otherwise stated, a methodological goal of the study will be to use the framework as the essential skeleton of the study, draping upon the skeleton only as much source material as necessary to analysis, and to eventual explanation of such processes.

To extend the Parsonian analysis more broadly within the UN family, attention is now turned to three organizations extensively involved in decision-making related to the over-population issue.

Decision Processes

The UN organizations selected as focal points for analysis in this study, in addition to the PC-PD combination and immediately related organs in the parent UN, are: the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE); UNICEF; and the World Health Organization (WHO). There follow brief sketches of the structures of each one, as related to the processing of decisions on the over-population issue.

ECAFE

Just as PC represents a category of sub-bodies of ECOSOC described as functional, so the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) is one of four sub-bodies of ECOSOC known as regional. However, whereas PC is more recognizably specialized, as demonstrated by its title, mandate, and membership of professionals representing governments, the twenty-seven-government ECAFE makes decisions on a wide range of economic and social questions, and annual commission sessions are attended by national representatives of ambassadorial level. It discussed population

questions briefly and infrequently, but invariably in support of an ECAFE role. In Parsonian terms, therefore, the annual plenary session of ECAFE appears to be a high-level decision body, in contrast to the middle-level PC.

The contrast between the ECAFE plenary, and that component of the ECAFE Secretariat in Bangkok involved in decisions on population matters, is striking. For years that organization component consisted of a single demographer--as modest a technical system as one could imagine. By the late 1960s, however, population problems (with strong emphasis upon technical assistance to governmental administration of birth control programs) were being dealt with by a newly created division, headed by a director--that is, a managerial system. By contrast, the ECAFE plenary had no population-oriented sub-body meeting in regular session and therefore no specialized policy-making group composed of governments. The population decision-structure--thus almost entirely Secretariat--had depended partially upon modest external support from private American foundations. The sudden increase in size in the Secretariat unit, lifted it from the technical to the managerial level. That increase was the complete product of a U.S. Government decision to supply a grant.

UNICEF

If a functional commission, PC, and a regional one, ECAFE, each represent a separate category of organs subsidiary to a principal organ of the parent UN, ECOSOC, a

convenient third category for analysis may be viewed as being

. . . composed of organs created by the General Assembly to deal with specific problems, or areas of activity.

The programmes . . . of certain of these bodies are financed by voluntary contributions. Normally they are served by specialized units of the Secretariat, and their policies are formulated by governing organs composed of government representatives. . . . This category includes the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund [UNICEF]. . . .¹

Thus the thirty-nation Executive Board (EB) of UNICEF, like PC and ECAFE, files formal reports with ESOSOC, but unlike them, is obliged to look entirely beyond the parent UN regular budget for funds. In Parsonian terms, EB obviously qualifies as an institutional system in its decision-making.

The UNICEF Secretariat has no population units per se, because it has few employees whose full-time assignment is population, and few scientific specialists of any kind, in any types of field operations. The backbone of UNICEF operations in all fields is a field representative, i.e., a

¹The three categories are described in some detail in ECOSOC, Enlarged Committee for Programme and Coordination (ECPC), resumed 2nd session, General Review of the Programmes and Activities of the United Nations Family in the Economic, Social, Technical Cooperation and Related Fields: an Account of the Operational and Research Activities of the United Nations System in the Field of Economic and Social Development (E/AC.51/GR/L./Amend.1, 1969), pp. 11-13.

The third category also includes, among others, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Ibid., pp. 12-13.

"generalist" responsible for handling any type of assignment (with limited assistance, in particular instances, from specialists outside UNICEF). In terms of ongoing internal organization, therefore, the generalized UNICEF Secretariat has an all-purpose managerial system, but personnel below it constitute a "non-technical" bottom level. Yet in the late 1960s, UNICEF funding for assistance to birth control clinics in India and Pakistan surpassed that supplied by any other UN organization. Thus formal UNICEF machinery for decision-making on programs is much less visible than machinery mentioned in the two preceding subsections, and in that to be described in the subsequent one.

WHO

Mention was made early in this chapter of fifteen UN inter-governmental agencies, which are independent of the parent UN principal organs, and have their own policy-making bodies, secretariats and budgets. One of the fifteen is WHO, based in Geneva. Its highest-level decision-body is the World Health Assembly (WHA), composed of representatives of more than 130 governments. That body, unlike ECAFE, debated population questions at length--and debates reflected widely differing views.

Due in part to a combination of enterprise on the part of Sweden and of the United States, and to steps taken

by the Brazilian physician who headed the WHO Secretariat, WHO was the first of the fifteen agencies to institutionalize the allocation of both regular-budget, and special-voluntary funds, for advisory activities directly related to human reproduction. Included, though on relatively meager budgets, were: research in human reproduction; training in family planning; evaluation of birth control devices; and sponsorship of expert groups for recommendation of program directions in each of these subject areas.

The narrow specialization of tasks within the WHO Secretariat explains the dispersal of responsibility for decisions on the varieties of activities just mentioned, across several administrative units. Specialization, fractionated into a multiplicity of small units, suggests that program units probably fit the Parsons' technical system. On the policy-making side--that is, subsidiary to, or independent of, committees composed either of government representatives, or of experts serving as individuals --are organization units more elaborately differentiated than those found in other UN structures treated in this study. To fit Parsonian levels, therefore, an observer presupposes reduction of more than one hierarchical layer to a single one of the three Parsons levels. Thus WHO and WHA, and their components, present particular problems of analysis as far as the internal ingredient is concerned.

An analysis of the problems which have been raised in the three preceding sub-sections as to the Parsonian classification of organization sub-structures can best be undertaken within the context of actual events, from which decisions emerged. This analysis--involving not only ECAFE, UNICEF and WHO, but the combination of PC and PD, as well as interacting representatives of either the U.S. Government, or private organizations--is the subject of Part II.

U.S. Government Structures

Formulation of U.S. Government policy related to over-population problems, and articulation of that policy within the selected UN organizations, will be the concern of much of the next chapter.

Components of the population institutional system in Washington might be viewed on the one hand as including the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and on the other, as including the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IOA) of the Department of State, and bureaus or divisions of comparable rank in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). In the former instance, such policy committees deal infrequently with the over-population issue, but are the obvious decision instruments on a high level. In the case of the two Executive Departments in Washington, individuals at

the Assistant Secretary level seem to correspond, in organization-chart terms at least, to the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, in the Secretariat of the parent UN.

Actually, of course, other Congressional committees, and other Executive Departments, also figured in decision-making on over-population. In fact, the most prolonged, and no doubt influential, attempt by Congressmen to shape population policy was found in the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. During the years 1965 through 1968 the chairman of the Subcommittee, Ernest Gruening, Alaskan Democrat, conducted hearings under the rubric, "Population Crisis"--meaning both American, and global. The Gruening project considerably influenced legislation favoring government aid to individual developing nations, and to UN organizations.

The Gruening Subcommittee can conveniently be viewed as a middle-level decision-unit, as can sub-Assistant-Secretary-level spokesmen from Executive Departments in UN policy bodies. For example, in the Kennedy administration, one of the Number-Two men in IOA, Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard N. Gardner, presented in the 1962 General Assembly the U.S. Government case for a UN role in the exploration of solutions to world population problems. The managerial system can probably most usefully be interpreted broadly

in U.S. Government terms. For example, if the Director of PD of the UN has a program for which he thinks the Department of State might consider allocating a special grant, he might suggest it either to the head of an administrative unit in the Office of International Economic and Social Affairs of IOA, or to the director of that Office.

Again in Parsonian terms, since the managerial system has as one of its functions the arrangement of external operations, the lower level, the technical system, becomes more difficult to identify in a short study of this kind, particularly in the Department of State. The Department is an essentially non-technical organization; demography, health and other scientific functions are identified with sister Executive Departments in Washington, which supply such expertise to State, as well as to UN organizations.

Private Organizations

The interaction between U.S. Government and UN components in respect to over-population decisions is widespread, and continuous. However, private organizations participate in such decisions infrequently and, ordinarily, in a somewhat limited sense. For that reason, much less attention will be given in this study to structures of private organizations. Emphasis in this respect

will be upon the role of the individual who represents a private organization in a UN decision process. Infrequency of appearance, however, is not synonymous with inconsequence of impact upon a decision. Already we have seen illustrations of such private impact upon a decision outcome in an international organization.

Perhaps the most visible presence of a private organization in UN organizations, in connection with the over-population issue, has been that of John D. Rockefeller III who, as chairman of the Board of Directors of the New York non-profit organization, the Population Council, initiated and presented to the Secretary-General on Human Rights Day, 1966 a declaration signed by the heads of twelve governments, urging steps to reduce population. In a panel discussion at UN Headquarters in New York a year later the president of the Council, Frank Notestein, emphasized the double contribution to government action programs in birth control of first, training in UN demographic institutes in developing regions, and second, continuation of efforts by private agencies such as Planned Parenthood, and private foundations, to support such programs undertaken either by governments of developing nations, or private organizations within such nations. This type of public dialog at the UN illustrates the readiness of institutional-level officials of private organizations to join UN bodies in public relations efforts to broaden public acceptance of

population decisions.

Examples of roles of private organizations in UN managerial systems have already been suggested, in the form, typically, of an assignment of an individual member of a private organization to represent a government in PC, or of an offer by a foundation to help a secretariat finance UN conferences.

The technical system of an organization such as the private Population Council includes professional specialists, such as experts on birth control programs in the field in developing nations. The collaboration of such systems with counterparts in UN organizations, in implementation of decisions seems to be important, in terms of decision outcomes.

After structures and interconnections of UN, U.S. and private organizations have been described in this chapter and the next, they will be analyzed in terms of actual decision-making processes in Part II.

Constants and Variations

Part III will confront Purpose No. 2: explanation of the salient characteristics of the decision-making processes which took place in the selected UN organizations, particularly between 1965 and 1969. A comparison will be made of constants, and of variations, in decision-making for over-population. Tentative generalizations

concerning decision-making behavior in many of the twenty-five UN organizations might then possibly suggest themselves--generalizations of potential utility as tools of analysis in future UN studies.

CHAPTER II

GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS

. . . A simple comparative description of the structures and agencies that are involved in the creation of foreign policy and the dissemination of information would be extremely valuable. It would give us . . . the "map" of foreign policy-making. Only with this map in hand can we travel knowingly where we wish, follow the flow and exchange of information and deliberation, and trace the source and objective of a given decision.¹

Executive and legislative decision-makers for both domestic and foreign programs within a government obviously interact to an extensive degree. In the first three sections of this chapter will be described decision processes in Washington which shaped U.S. policy to reduce over-population, and decision machinery for expression of that policy in UN organizations. These sections respond to Question B of Purpose No. 1 of the study, just as the previous chapter was addressed to Question A: involvement of UN organizations. The response will be made in the form of a Parsonian descriptive "map" of organization sub-structures involved in the formulation of U.S. domestic and foreign policy, and of resultant programs, as suggested in the fourth section.

¹Roy C. Macridis, "The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," in Modern European Governments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 5.

The last section deals with private organizations, in response to Question C. National governments are sometimes described as the "owners" of UN organizations. By contrast, private organizations only exceptionally have important impact upon UN decision outcomes. As will become obvious in Part II, this statement can be defended despite the fact that Article 71 of the UN Charter authorizes the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to "make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which are concerned with matters within its competence." Under the Article, the Council grants consultative status to different categories of NGOs, i.e. mostly broad international federations of private citizens sharing a common professional or vocational interest.

Such formal consultation by UN policy bodies under the terms of the UN Charter is generally interpreted as not including single universities, or foundations, or other less universal types of private organizations. The latter types, however, frequently are consulted in decision-making by UN Secretariats. Many private organizations play roles of varying importance not only in Washington decisions on population problems, but in parallel decisions formulated in UN organizations.

This chapter is basically a descriptive map of the flow of population decisions through U.S. Government, and private, organizations. Periodically, the two Parsonian

ingredients of organization theory set out in the previous chapter will be used to aid in analysis of these particular processes. These ingredients--the framework--will later serve in Part II as an analytical link to Part III: explanation of decision behavior, the other purpose of the study.

Origins of Policy

Health, Education and Welfare

The first contribution by the Executive Branch in Washington to the solution of problems of over-population was within the United States: funds for state health clinics, in which some programs involved birth control. In Parsonian terms, until the 1960s, there was no sign that high-level executive decision-makers in Washington participated in birth control policy, since Federal funds were not earmarked for birth control. Middle-level bureau chiefs in Washington were obviously involved in over-all public health funding to the states, but once removed from birth control decisions. Thus professional program personnel in state health departments can be viewed as bottom-level, technical systems, vis-a-vis Washington.

North Carolina in 1937 became the first state to establish a birth control program. However, the Federal Government remained officially unaware of the programs until 1965.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) presented to congressional committees early in 1964 a variety

of programs related to various types of problems of over-population. Eventually approved, at a total of \$8.6 million for the fiscal year ending in mid-1965, were programs for funding under each of the following three of the Department's largest agencies:

1. The Social and Rehabilitation Service [SRS], including grants (via the Children's Bureau) to aid maternal and child health and welfare services, and funds for social and medical assistance (\$3.5 million).
2. The Public Health Service [PHS], including grants for training, and especially, under the then newly established ICHHD, aid to comprehensive state health plans (\$4.5 million).
3. The Office of Education [OE], including grants to states for sex education programs at all levels of education (\$0.6 million).¹

An agency outside HEW, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) of the Executive Office of the President, gained Congressional funding approval for its first community action program grants earmarked for birth control services (family planning) to the poor--some \$437,000 spread across seven states.² Thus, as of fiscal 1965, middle management of both HEW and OEO had openly blueprinted domestic "technical assistance" programs for birth control in such "developing areas" as state and local government

¹Figures for the last five fiscal years of the 1960s are given in House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Sub-committee on Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare and Related Agencies, Hearings on Appropriations for 1969, Part 2, 90th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 591-592.

²Information supplied informally by a consultant to the Sub-committee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives.

health clinics, and urban anti-poverty centers.

Foreign Aid

Just as fiscal 1965 was the beginning of program and budget visibility in HEW and OEO approaches to birth control, so it was for the Agency for International Development (AID) of the Department of State (DOS). The Agency's budget included \$1.2 million for the Reference and Research Unit, and nearly \$1 million for programs to be administered by the small AID Population Office. Of these funds, some \$200,000 was spent for organization development and in-service training.¹ AID collaborated with HEW in offering training to specialists from developing nations; and AID's birth control expenditures reached nearly \$50 million in fiscal 1969.

A sentence in President Johnson's State of the Union message early in 1965 read:

I will seek new ways to use our knowledge and to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources.²

Other high-level attention was immediately supplied in instructions to embassies by Secretary Rusk and to AID missions by the Administrator of the latter agency, William S. Gaud, in March, 1965. AID announced that it was prepared

¹U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Sub-committee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, Hearings on Population Crisis, 89th Congress, 1st session, 1966, p. 1543.

²Department of State Bulletin, January 25, 1965, p. 96.

to consider requests for technical, commodity, and local currency assistance in support of family planning programs.

However, AID would

. . . not consider requests for contraceptive devices or equipment for manufacturers of contraceptives, since experience has made it clear that the cost of these latter items is not a stumbling block in countries that are developing effective programs.¹

Top and middle decision-structures, for HEW, AID and the Department of State (DOS), will be identified in the section, "Later Executive Programs," which follows the section to which the study now turns.

Legislative Initiative

As in the preceding section on the Executive, description of the Congressional role in formulation of policy for reduction of over-population will set the stage for analysis of Parsonian ingredients. As a preliminary rule of thumb, it seems useful to consider the chairman of a Congressional committee as part of the institutional system of Congress, and the chairman of a subcommittee as managerial system. Similarly, a Congressman who is not a committee chairman, but who introduces a bill, may be thought of as middle-level. The lower, technical system hardly seems applicable to Congress, except perhaps in the limited sense of a non-chairman member of a committee, or of a subcommittee,

¹Population Crisis, June, 1966, op. cit., p. 1543.

possessed of considerable operational knowledge, who plays a non-conspicuous role in decision-making.

It might usefully be noted that, as this section will illustrate, the interaction of Legislative and Executive components seems invariably to lead to decision processes in which roles are inseparable.

Initial Proposals

The first attempt to promote birth control activities in Congress came in 1963. Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska introduced a bill which urged increased research in reproductive biology by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of HEW and called for a President's Commission on Population to educate the public and the Government about population problems and to make recommendations for solutions. An identical bill was introduced by Representative Morris K. Udall of Arizona in 1964, but neither bill received action.¹

A slightly more positive fate befell attempts late in 1963 by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, to promote an amendment to the fiscal 1964 Foreign Aid Authorization Bill. It provided funds "to conduct research into problems of controlling population growth. . . ."

¹Population Crisis, June, 1966, op. cit., p. 1575.

Gruening and Gardner

In June, 1965, however, a sub-committee of the Senate launched what was to become an annual series of hearings on "The Population Crisis," extending into 1968. As chairman of the Sub-committee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Government Operations Committee, Senator Gruening steadily pressed for Executive Department decisions. He scolded officials for, in his language: not elevating leadership of birth control programs; not expanding such programs rapidly; and not requesting larger sums of money from Congress to underwrite the programs.

Perhaps the most famous "fight" which he seemed to pick with the Executive--though steadily praising President Johnson for frequency of public statements urging greater attention to population problems--occurred in April, 1966 when HEW Secretary John W. Gardner appeared before the Sub-committee.

Four months earlier, the latter had issued a memorandum to heads of HEW operating agencies, for the first time defining the department's family planning policy. The memorandum announced a Department policy of pursuing such objectives as training, education, research, and assurance of safety and effectiveness of contraceptives.¹ It further

¹Recapitulated in a follow-up Memorandum to heads of HEW operating agencies of 31 January, 1968, announcing further program expansion in family planning.

stated that the Assistant Secretary of HEW for Health and Scientific Affairs, Philip R. Lee, would be in charge of family planning programs.¹ In May, 1966 the then Under-Secretary of HEW, Wilbur J. Cohen, announced that a new post, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and Population (middle level) had been established, to be filled by Milo Leavitt, under Dr. Lee (institutional level). The department had created a Task Force to arrange regional meetings within the U.S. to explain policies and to plan for a possible national conference.²

In 1967 Dr. Lee--having "served time" before the Gruening Subcommittee as "target replacement" for Mr. Gardner--appointed three consultants: Oscar Harkavy of the Ford Foundation; Samuel Wishik of the International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction at Columbia University; and Frederick Jaffe of Planned Parenthood--World Population. Ostensibly managerial-system, as scientists-administrators, their assignment was to examine progress

¹Population Crisis, June, 1966, op. cit., p. 1577.

²In December, 1965 President Johnson appointed a Committee on Population, as part of the President's National Citizens' Commission to offer recommendations to the U.S. Government during International Cooperation Year. The committee recommended that the Government make up to \$100 million available annually for three years to help other nations implement programs of family planning. (The committee report is reproduced in Chapter Six of a book edited by the chairman of the Commission, Richard N. Gardner, Blueprint for Peace, New York: McGraw Hill, 1966.)

made within HEW in implementation of birth control programs. The report which they made could conceivably have profoundly effected decision-processes in both middle- and upper-level government systems, for they found that none of the operating agencies or regional offices placed a high priority (as requested in the 1966 Gardner memorandum) on family planning:

Aside from the small staff in the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, there is the newly designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population and Family Planning,¹ a family planning specialist within SRS, and one in the Bureau of Health Services [BHS].

At the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta, five individuals . . . recently completed a two-week course in family planning. . . . This probably completes the enumeration of [the Department of HEW] employees devoting themselves full time to what is often identified as the world's second most important problem.²

The fact that a group of private experts, outside government, had been appointed as a hoped-for bridge, to link Legislative and Executive goals for domestic programs, provides a practical illustration of Parsonian horizontal decision-making, cutting across organization boundaries. A

¹A contemplated re-structuring of the responsibilities of Dr. Leavitt, mentioned above. In 1968 the new post was assigned to Mrs. Katherine Oettinger, formerly chief of the HEW Childrens' Bureau. The post called for coordination of functions throughout HEW, but not for operation of programs.

²HEW, Implementing DHEW Policy on Family Planning and Population: a Consultants' Report (mimeograph), 1967, p. 12.

different pattern of organization response to environmental conditions is reflected in the section which follows, on decision-making within DOS, and within AID, for overseas programs.

Executive Programming

Department of State

In appearing before the Gruening Subcommittee in 1968 the newly appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary for Population Matters, Philander P. Claxton Jr., a career foreign service officer, explained his middle-level mandate as "mobilizer" of cooperation of programs of: U.S. Government agencies; other governments providing overseas aid to population programs; multi-governmental agencies; and private organizations.¹ Operational decisions for sizeable grants, and for program-support, clearly rested, however, on the bilateral side, with AID, and on the multi-lateral, with IOA. In the late 1960s, the latter unit was headed by Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco.

In IOA there were three Deputy Assistant Secretaries of whom one, Walter Kotschnig, had played a role in the decisions of most UN organizations since the UN was founded. Under him, the principal responsibility for work-up of

¹DOS, Claxton Statement of 1 February, 1968 (to Gruening Sub-committee: mimeographed), pp. 3-4, 11, 13-14, 18.

decisions on population matters rested with the Division of Economic Affairs (DEA); its Chief was Leighton van Nort, a foreign service officer who for many years had specialized in population affairs--among others--in various UN governing bodies. The Division of Human Resources Affairs (HRA), which was involved in social (as separate from economic) affairs, exercised operational responsibility for American policy vis-a-vis UNICEF and WHO.¹

The Missions

While Mr. Sisco himself rarely appeared in UN economic and social bodies, other officials, mentioned in the sub-section above, regularly did. They shared preparation of U.S. positions with two broad categories of other government spokesmen at the UN: members of U.S. missions to UN agencies, the topic of this sub-section; and non-employees of the U.S. who, as part-time consultants, may represent their government in expert committees and in ad hoc bodies. Typical examples of such decision participation will appear in analyses of decision processes in Part II. The U.S. Mission to the UN in New York, which fills a ten-story building opposite the UN General Assembly, contains three officials of ambassadorial, i.e.

¹Based on interviews in Washington.

institutional-level, rank: the Permanent Representative; a political affairs representative; and one for economic and social affairs. In the Johnson years the latter role of decision-articulation was filled by Arthur Goldschmidt, an administrator who previously worked in the Department of the Interior in Washington, and then for several years in the UN Secretariat in New York, in charge of those parent-UN pre-investment projects of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and of its predecessor, the Special Fund, for which the parent UN acted as "sub-contractor."

Ambassador Goldschmidt's staff provided the principal "local support" to Mr. Kotschnig and his associates from Washington, particularly in the many UN economic committees, and social committees, and sub-committees, which meet in New York. United States representation in UNICEF, for example, was a combination of an outside welfare specialist, and foreign service officers from Washington or attached to the New York mission.

ECOSOC itself holds its spring meetings in New York and the summer one in the European UN Headquarters in Geneva; some of these same U.S. actors participate in both. In Geneva they received local support in decision-articulation from Roger Tubby, U.S. ambassador not only to the parent UN's Geneva office, but to WHO and to other UN units in Geneva. ECOSOC is often used as a forum for

re-emphasis of themes which a national delegation has earlier tried to "sell" in the PC, or in another ECOSOC sub-body.

At ECAFE, American representation is handled on a day-to-day basis as part of the responsibility of a small number of foreign service officers whose main duties are quite otherwise, in the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. Representation at annual sessions included such ambassadors as Charles Yost and Mr. Goldschmidt.

Throughout this section the term "foreign service officer" appears. The classification of each particular usage, on a Parsonian level of decision-making, presents a problem. Only the context can suggest an answer. For example, Mr. Claxton ostensibly operated at the managerial level, yet his assignment called for both a combination of rapport with institutional levels in Washington, and for some knowledge of technical operations in fields of population. By contrast, other officers conduct varieties of comparatively low-level, formal diplomatic tasks, as members of the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. Presumably they participate infrequently in population decision processes in an ECAFE context, and not at a technical level. Except in the case of representation within the PC, population problems are but one of a long list of subjects which U.S. delegates carry in their portfolios to sessions of UN

policy-making bodies. Except in the PC (which itself meets only for two weeks, at two-year intervals), population occupies an infinitesimally minor time segment of debate.

AID's Population Office

Congress in 1966 indicated its support of assistance to voluntary family planning efforts overseas in two laws. Both the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Food for Peace Act of 1966, provided decisions for new specific provisions concerning the use of U.S.-owned or controlled foreign currencies, accumulated through sale of grain and other U.S. commodities abroad, for birth control.

On the Executive side, a supposed managerial-level Office of the War on Hunger was established within AID early in 1967. Within the new office, in turn, was created a supposed technical-level Population Service, to formulate technical decisions on birth control aid. In May, 1967 AID decided to make contraceptives eligible for financing in assistance programs, and in September of that year announced the first assistance under the new policy:

Contraceptives--condoms and pills--were to go to India. . . . Also, out of a \$3 million grant made to the International Planned Parenthood Federation, \$1 million was for contraceptives, medical instruments, and other commodities. Later, another \$1 million was added to the IPPF grant for . . . additional U.S.-produced contraceptives and other commodities. . . .¹

¹AID, Office of the War on Hunger, Population Service, Population Program Assistance: Aid to Developing Countries

By 1968 fifty-five full-time, or nearly full-time, population specialists were at work in the agency as a whole.

AID historians also enthuse about another decision made during fiscal 1968, namely, passage of the then newly amended Foreign Assistance Act, including wording proposed by Senator William Fulbright. In this wording, through inclusion of a new "Title X--Programs Relating to Population Growth," Congress authorized the President to help carry out programs related to population growth and family planning by assisting

. . . foreign governments, the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international organizations and programs, United States and foreign non-profit organizations, universities, hospitals, accredited health institutions, and voluntary health or other qualified organizations. . . .

Of the funds . . . for the fiscal year 1968, \$35,000,000 shall be available only to carry out the purposes of this title. . . .¹

A year later, the last sentence above was amended to provide a \$50 million ceiling on U.S. assistance to family planning in fiscal 1969.

For the five fiscal years, 1965 through 1970, AID decisions provided grants under two broad headings: first, to American foundations and universities engaged in research into improved contraceptives, and training programs for

by the United States, Other Nations, and International and Private Agencies (September, 1968), pp. 8-10. Referred to hereafter as "AID Population Service, 1968."

¹Ibid., pp. 13-14.

specialists from developing nations; and second, to governments of developing nations, to extend clinical field projects.

Under the former heading, a total of \$7.5 million was granted over the latter two years to the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) for contraceptives and other supplies. Approximately \$6 million went to the Population Council over the latter four years, for: evaluation of effectiveness of intra-uterine devices (IUDs); birth-control education of new mothers; and experiments with possible "once-a-month" birth control methods. The private, non-profit Pathfinder Fund of Boston in 1969 received over \$3.7 million for contraceptive supplies and evaluation of IUD effectiveness. Institutes for family planning research and training were established, and various programs underwritten, at the University of North Carolina, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Michigan.¹

The largest AID bi-lateral grant was of \$7.7 million to India in fiscal 1968. The following total sums (in millions of dollars) distributed over one or more of the five years went to the following Middle-Eastern and Asian governments: Turkey, 3.6; Pakistan, 2.3; Philippines, 2.5; Thailand and Korea, approximately 2 each; and Indonesia, 1.5.²

¹In response to an inquiry made of AID program officers.

²Ibid.

Why Multi-Lateral?

When he was testifying before a House appropriations sub-committee in 1968, Mr. Sisco was asked whether a multi-lateral approach to birth control aid is superior, as decision policy, to an enlarged U.S. bi-lateral effort. He replied:

. . . The more we can do multi-laterally the more we can get others to share the political responsibilities and . . . finances. . . . The more other countries can share in the costs, the better.¹

Earlier, Mr. Sisco had been asked by the Sub-committee chairman, Otto E. Passman of Louisiana, whether there might be program duplication between AID bi-lateral aid and U.S. voluntary grants to UN agencies. Mr. Sisco's denial was reinforced by a statement:

Because of the rapidly increasing interest throughout the world in family planning programs, and the fact that a large program in this field is being carried out by the U.S. Government as well as by private American organizations, there is a shortage of trained personnel in the United States. UN programs will be able to draw upon trained personnel from other countries with experience such as the Scandinavian countries. . . .

Moreover, there are a number of countries in which, for political reasons, multi-lateral programs involving assistance from international organizations are more acceptable than assistance from a single country. . . .²

¹House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Sub-committee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, Hearings on Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1969, Part 2, 90th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 1491-92.

²Ibid., pp. 1428-29.

Thus, between U.S. Government statements in mid-decade on overseas population aid, and the Sisco statement of 1968 on an American "two-track" (bi-lateral and multi-lateral) system of aid, did U.S. overseas policy take shape.

Parsonian Ingredients

Upper Level

On the Congressional side of decision-making, it seems obvious that when Senator Fulbright speaks for his prestigious committee, reporting out a fiscal 1963 foreign aid bill which includes birth control assistance, or a fiscal 1968 Title X to provide a new high funding ceiling for such assistance, his enunciation of shifts in fundamental national policy illustrates the Parsonian "board of directors" concept of institutional role.

On the Executive side, the upper level can consist of either the President, or Secretary of HEW, or Under-Secretary, or Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, or Secretary of State, or Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, or Administrator of AID. Each of these persons articulates executive goals, and/or broad lines of guidance for programs. He is an "institutional spokesman" in high-level public forums, and in policy announcements. And his task includes harmonization of government programs with the political environment.

Middle Level

One of Senator Gruening's roles clearly was to use hearings in the sub-committee of which he was chairman to press the institutional level of the Executive Branch to build up its middle-management level so the latter could make operational more sizeable programs for birth control, at home and abroad. The decision-sharing role apparently sought by Otto Passman's Sub-committee in the House of Representatives was ostensibly to press Assistant Secretary Sisco for a detailed account of Executive decisions in process for actual bi-lateral, and actual multi-lateral, programs at the operating level. However, in testimony cited, and in other testimony involving AID witnesses, the effect of hearings held by the latter sub-committee seemed to have been to provide all spokesmen from the Executive Branch an opportunity either to minimize, or maximize, appeals for programs involving birth control.

Using the term "programs" as a synonym for the tasks of middle management, one can illustrate this particular Parsonian level of decision-making in the Executive Branch by: the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and Population in HEW; chiefs of bureaus, such as in the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, in HEW; the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters; and the head of the Population

Service in AID.

Lower Level

The Parsonian lower, or technical, level, of decision-making can hardly be located in the Congressional setting, unless one so labels staff assistants to Congressmen, or staff assistants to Congressional committees, a tiny portion of whose time becomes involved in seeking information on over-population problems, or in drafting paragraphs for bills on the subject. Large commitments of time, however, obviously were made by members of the staff of the Gruening Sub-committee, for which technicians the population hearings stretched out over years.

As for the Executive Branch, the passages from the Harkavy report quoted earlier, pointing out that only one or two specialists were working full-time to implement decisions in some of the HEW Sub-bureau administrative levels, surely illustrates the meagerness of the technical level at that time, and in that setting. By the late 1960s, however, the AID Population Service employed a couple of dozen professionals, working full-time on population matters, to shape projects as part of a multi-million-dollar program. The Department of State presented still another decision pattern: in various embassies Population Officers were appointed, but most of them, as a part-time function, performed a semi-professional advisory task vis-a-vis ministries

in the host government, in connection with discussions of potential U.S. birth control assistance.¹

Whatever the extent of expertise in population matters in the lower hierarchical levels of either of the branches of U.S. Government just discussed, there seems little evidence of professionalism, in the sense of scientific specialization, entering importantly into either policy or program decisions.

Liaison with UN Organizations

The two most fundamental decision linkages of Washington to UN organizations, it might be argued, are formal ones in which DOS implements U.S. Government representation in both upper- and middle-level decision-making bodies, and informal ones, in which middle-level program officers in the Department confer with middle-level program officers in UN organizations concerning the possibility of a U.S. decision to provide financial support. Each of these types of linkages will constitute strands of decision-making processes centered in UN organization sub-structures to be analyzed in Part II.

¹Based on conversations with members of the Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

Private Organizations

Scientific Advisors

A familiar practice in both the Congressional and Executive Branches in Washington is consultation with individuals, or committees, expert, or prestigious, in decision-making. An example of a highly traditional consultative institution is the quasi-governmental, private National Academy of Sciences (NAS), incorporated by an Act of Congress, and composed of more than 700 scientists chosen by their peers for their scientific accomplishments. It functions like a board of directors for its subsidiary, the National Research Council (NRC), a network of committees drawn from a national body of some 5,000 scientists.¹ In 1963 a sub-body of an NRC committee, an eight-man Panel on Population Problems, recommended increased Federal support for research and training in social and bio-medical sciences, and enlargement of family planning programs, as steps toward solution of "problems of uncontrolled growth of population."² In 1965 the chairman, William D. McElroy,

¹Kenneth Kofmehl, "COSPUP, Congress and Scientific Advice," in Journal of Politics, Vol. 28, No. 1 (February, 1966), pp. 101, 104, 107. The reference is to the NAS-NRC Committee on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP).

²National Academy of Science Publication #1091 (Washington: 1963); and NAS, Summary of National Academy of Sciences Report on the Growth of World Population (Washington: 1963), pp. 3-6.

biologist from Johns Hopkins University, submitted the report of a second panel, The Growth of U.S. Population, which urged the medical profession to encourage contraceptive practice by patients.¹

Citizen Advisors to the President

Like the Harkavy panel, the two McElroy panels were composed of private scientist-administrators primarily concerned with extension of effort at the program--i.e., middle level. Another type of consultative group, composed of prestigious citizens, is typified by a Committee on Population which was part of President Johnson's National Citizens' Commission to offer recommendations to the U.S. Government during International Cooperation Year. The chairman was Richard N. Gardner, Columbia University law professor who had been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Kennedy administration, and who had spoken for the United States in the UN General Assembly debate on population late in 1962. The membership also included, among others: John D. Rockefeller, III; and William H. Draper, Jr., director of a private association, the Population Crisis Committee of Washington, D.C., for the promotion of birth control. The committee decided to propose that the Government provide up to \$100 million a year for each of three consecutive

¹NAS, Publication #1279 (Washington: 1965).

years to help implement birth control projects in other countries; also, that U.S. assistance be related closely to operations of UN agencies.¹ Professor Gardner drew up a sample chart to show how funds would be apportioned among AID responsibilities, and those of UN agencies, and testified on the matter in Senate hearings in 1967 on Title X.²

In 1968, President Johnson appointed a Committee on Population and Family Planning. It was chaired by the then Secretary of HEW, Wilbur J. Cohen, with John D. Rockefeller III serving as co-chairman. Of the sixteen other members, ten came from the private sector (Ford, Foundation, Population Council, NAS, Harvard School of Medicine, etc.), and the remainder from HEW, DOS, AID, OEO and President Johnson's Office of Science and Technology.³

One recommendation was for a Government program target of making birth control information and services available by 1973 to all American women who want, but cannot afford, them. Another was for further expansion of the Center for Population Research (CPR)⁴ of NICHD of HEW.

¹Richard N. Gardner, "Toward a World Population Program," in Gardner and Max F. Millikan, eds., The Global Partnership: International Agencies and Economic Development (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 356-357.

²Ibid., pp. 357-359.

³HEW, Population and Family Planning: the Transition from Concern to Action. Report of the President's Committee on Population and Family Planning (1968), p. 6.

⁴Ibid., pp. 9-11.

And a third was that the President appoint a Commission on Population.¹

In 1969 President Nixon issued a message which re-emphasized the recommendations of President Johnson's Population Committee and the themes promoted over much of the decade by Messrs. Rockefeller, Notestein, Gardner and Draper, with notable later support by Senator Gruening. The first thrust of the message was international: the need for population control in developing nations, and the readiness of the U.S. to cooperate fully with

. . . the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international bodies [which] should take the leadership in responding to world population growth.²

The message then turned to domestic need for birth control programs, and proposed appointment of two members from each house of Congress, together with "knowledgeable" private citizens, to a two-year Commission on Population Growth and the American Future.³

Early in the year, twenty-eight bills on the subject of population had been introduced into either the Senate or the House of Representatives, calling for institutional

¹Ibid., pp. 12, 37-38.

²The message has been reprinted in convenient brochure form by the Population Crisis Committee as, Presidential Message on Population (Washington, September, 1969), see pp. 8, 9.

³Ibid., p. 16.

changes which ranged all the way from creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on Population and Family Planning, through establishment of machinery within the Executive Branch similar to that proposed by the President, to increase the annual AID budget for population programs from \$50 to \$100 million.¹

Typology of Private Organizations

It is characteristic of decisions announced by scientific panels, and by commissions of "distinguished citizens," that announcements emphasize "big names." It must be pointed out, however, that the name is invariably coupled either with the label of a prestigious institution, or a high position therein, or both. It can therefore be argued that the impact of appointees, upon readers of such announcements, or upon the process by which subsequent decisions are legitimized (by concurrence on the part of other decision-makers), stems basically from the organization with which the individual is affiliated, rather than from the individual himself.² One might, of course, argue

¹Population Crisis Committee, Population Crisis (Washington: A periodical newsletter, June, 1969), pp. 1, 4, 5; see also issue of April, 1969, p. 1.

²A variation of this theme, namely, that organization norms better explain organization behavior than does an individual member of an organization, is argued by Victor A. Thompson, in Modern Organization (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 8:

A bureaucratic organization is a structure composed of authority, status, technical, and social relationships. The structure can tolerate considerable variation in personalities.

for infrequent exceptions: a Rockefeller need only present his name, not his banking affiliation, to qualify as a notable; or a Nobel prize winner in science, his prize, not his employer.

The main point here is the question: not which particular individuals advised the President, or the public, but what types of organizations do these individuals represent? Or, otherwise stated, are not the individuals in a real sense the ambassadors from the private organizations? In which sense perhaps, the individuals, even if uninstructed by their organizations, thus reflect the views, or at least the institutional "flavor," of their employers, or of professional societies?

On such an assumption, then, the question may be re-phrased: "What types of private organizations were represented in decision-making by the scientific and citizen advisory groups cited above?"

One broad category of private organizations is represented by a single university, or foundation. Another is an association composed of individual members of a profession, or of local membership chapters. An example of a combination of chapters is International Planned Parenthood-World Population. An example of an association composed of individuals, as members, is the United Nations Association (UNA), which consists largely of business executives

interested in matters international. In 1969 a UNA policy panel on world population problems decided to recommend that an effort be made to convince donor governments to step up contributions to the Secretary-General's Population Fund from \$1.5 million to \$100 million per year. The recommendation had been prepared under the chairmanship of John D. Rockefeller III, with George D. Woods, Boston banker and former president of the World Bank, as vice-chairman, other members including Messrs. Gardner, Note-stein, and the Administrator of AID in the Nixon administration, John A. Hannah, former president of Michigan State University.¹

Lateral Linkage

In undertaking to generalize about the roles of such individuals, and organizations, in U.S. Government decision-making for over-population, at home and abroad, two Parsonian lateral linkages suggest themselves. At the middle level, the scientific committees composed of representatives of universities and foundations clearly seem to concentrate, in the dialog with program personnel in the U.S. Government, upon the specialized specifics of programs.²

¹United Nations Association of the United States of America, World Population: a Challenge to the United Nations and Its System of Agencies (New York: 1969), pp. 2, 8.

²Based upon conversations with some of the principals, in both private, and U.S. Government, organizations.

This is not to suggest that findings are not publicized, to help what scientists and administrators alike probably generally view as "the crusade" to extend public awareness of family planning, but merely to say that the technicalities come first, and the public relations second.

The other lateral linkage level is the upper, or institutional, one. And it is now suggested that a commonality of interest, in formulating decisions to extend birth control usage, prevails across the higher echelons of private and government organizations. Senator Gruening stimulated upper reaches of Government, by parading representatives of private organizations in hearings. He used their words as "testimonials" to the need for extending Government organization, program, and budget. The testifiers utilize the sub-committee as one more forum in which to publicize the birth control movement. On both sides the thrust is "institutional"--to extend the decisions of a given organization, out into its social and political environment, and thus increase the practice of birth control.

It should also be emphasized that some decision outcomes turn importantly upon lateral interaction at the managerial level. Interaction involves governmental, international-organization, and private sub-structures, as will be seen throughout Part II. And it is in the second half of Part II that the lower organization level will become explicit.

PART II. UNITED NATIONS POLICY AND PROGRAM

CHAPTER III

THE POPULATION COMMISSION AND THE POPULATION DIVISION

An executive decision is a moment in a process. The growth of a decision, the accumulation of authority, not the final step, is what we need most to study.¹

If one drops the adjective "executive," Miss Follett's observation of forty-six years ago seems broadly applicable to the multi-actor decision-chain which links PC, PD, and, at intervals, components of government, and private, organizations. In Part II will be presented in detail the flow of decisions through first this particular network of organization components; and then, in consecutive chapters, through three other networks, each centered in a separate UN organization: the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE); the World Health Organization (WHO); and the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF). And just as the two Parsonian ingredients of organization theory--internal levels, and external interaction--assisted the mapping of decision sub-structures of UN, U.S. Government, and private organizations in Part I, these same

¹Mary Parker Follett, 1926 lecture, "The Illusion of Final Authority," printed in Freedom and Coordination: Lectures in Business Management (London: Public Trust, Ltd., 1949), p. 1.

ingredients, as a framework, will now be applied to revealing in detail the dynamics of processes by which decisions were made, especially between 1965-69, concerning UN roles in assisting the reduction of over-population in developing nations.

Policy-Program Interaction

As background for the use of the ingredients in the analysis, the next three sub-sections will summarize decision events which preceded 1965-69.

PD Politics

In the late 1940s decisions were made by the secretariat to send UN experts to assist national economic and social programs of various types:

Experts were assigned to Barbados in 1953 and 1957, upon the request of the Government, to advise upon ways and means of dealing with population problems and on the development of a system of records in connection with a programme of state-supported clinics.

Demographers were assigned to India during 1952 to cooperate with experts assigned by WHO, in an experiment with the use of the "rhythm" method of family planning as an instrument for the Government's population programme.

Finally, a demographer was assigned in 1955 to advise the National Population Commission of the United Arab Republic (Egyptian region) on a programme of research and experimentation aimed at the development of a factual basis for national population policies.¹

¹ECOSOC, Commission for Social Development (CSD), XIX, 1967 Report on the World Social Situation (E/CN.5/417/Add. 1, 1967), p. 49.

It should be emphasized that these programs: involved tiny numbers of persons; at Parsonian technical levels; lasted briefly; and were not followed up subsequently by UN organizations in the 1950s. In fact, as noted in the 1955 PC session, what the PC viewed as "the ever-increasing importance of population as an element in economic and social development" was being short-changed by a decision to reorganize the secretariat which downgraded the administrative level of PD, its budget, and its program. The reorganization decision was made by Dag Hammarskjold when he took office in 1953, and resulted in the immediate shrinkage by one-third of the PD project load, and placement of seventeen projects in a "deferred" category. It was not until the mid-1960s that the Parsonian managerial-level PD, downgraded to a Parsonian technical-level Population Branch (PB), recovered its original name and rank.¹

Despite these setbacks PB, under the direction of John Durand, an American demographer who had been the deputy of Professor Notestein (who by the mid 1950s had left the UN), played a key role in preparations for the first international conference on problems of population to be sponsored by the UN. It was held in Rome in 1954 under the joint auspices of the UN and of a private,

¹ECOSOC XIX, Suppl. No. 5, PC 8th, Report, 1965, p. 2.

non-profit association of individual demographers, the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP). No scientific papers dealt with birth control campaigns, clinics or techniques.¹

The 1950s, then, furnished a test for both ingredients of organization theory, in terms of a secretariat. In internal, hierarchical terms, the institutional system, in this case the Secretary-General, provided an exception to Parsonian "separateness" of domain, between that system and the managerial system, in this case PD; a command from the top shifted the secretariat middle to the bottom: PB. As for external dimensions, an explanation is hampered by absence of information concerning Hammarskjold's reasons for deciding to downgrade PD. One hypothesis often suggested informally, in UN corridors, is that the decision was the result of pressure from governments of nations with a predominant Catholic population.² If so, Hammarskjold, in Parsonian terms, adjusted high-level, i.e. institutional policy of the organization away from external conflict--with numerous member governments.

PC Consensus-Building

It has been suggested in this study that PC corresponds

¹UN, Proceedings of the World Population Conference, Summary Report (New York: Publication 55.XIII.8, 1955).

²Based on confidential interviews.

to the managerial system, rather than to the institutional-- PC's parent body, ECOSOC, and the General Assembly, illustrating the latter system. However, the upper-level "harmonization-with-environment" analogy, combined with the middle-level "management-of-programs" analogy, both seem necessary for interpretation of a decision process in which PC members bargain for consensus on ultimate decisions. The consensus-seeking aspect of decision-making, therefore, resembles an upper-level function, while both locus of PC within the UN, and status and responsibility of members within their respective governments, fit the Parsonian managerial system.

At both the 1949 and 1959 sessions of PC, spokesmen for the U.S. Government proposed enlargement of the PC mandate to studies of all aspects of population growth. The 1959 debate provided an early illustration of the bargaining process in a UN policy body, when views of representatives openly differ. The representative of the United Kingdom argued that stagnation in economic and social programs worsens poverty in over-populated areas. The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that rapid population growth in his nation made mandatory either the expansion of economic development, or the contraction of population.¹

¹ECOSOC, PC, SRS, E/CN.9/SR./137, 1960, pp. 2-5.

Opposite arguments, on the side of non-interference by the UN, or by governments, in birth rates, were expressed primarily by one governmental representative, and by two non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The representative of the USSR expressed opposition to "artificial" measures to lower birth rates. The representative of one NGO, the World Union of Catholic Womens' Organizations (WUCWO), enjoying consultative status with PC, claimed that prevalence of families with small numbers of children can threaten a nation with a drop below an economic level essential for growth; and the representative of the International Catholic Childrens' Bureau (ICCB) stated that preservation of marriage as an institution is a factor fundamental to national social and cultural health.¹

Ultimately, PC decided to recommend expansion of programs involving training, seminars, publications, and assignment of experts.² However, program emphasis remained heavily demographic. Those governments which favored UN action programs to combat over-population--as against simply studying it--now turned to a different UN forum.

General Assembly Debate

In 1961 representatives of Denmark and Sweden, whose

¹ECOSOC, PC, SRs, CN.9/SR.136, 1960, pp. 4-9.

²ECOSOC XXVII, Suppl. No. 3, PC 10th, Report, 1959, p. 4.

governments earlier had pressed unsuccessfully in the World Health Assembly (WHA) of WHO for action in connection with such problems (see Chapter V), decided to submit to the Secretary-General of the UN a memorandum which requested placement on the agenda of the General Assembly an item entitled, "Population Growth and Economic Development."¹ However, the Assembly decided not to take the matter up, but to put it on the agenda for the next session, in 1962.²

Varieties of national positions were presented in the Second (Economic) Committee of the 1962 Assembly when a similar draft resolution was re-introduced by the initial sponsors, plus a few others. The most significant shift in a national position was that of the U.S.--from non-support of Asian-Scandinavian initiatives in the World Health Assembly (WHA) during the 1950s, to enthusiastic endorsement of the draft. The sudden reversal of policy was enunciated for the Kennedy administration by Richard N. Gardner, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, and by the U.S. Ambassador to ECOSOC, Philip Klutznick.³

¹GA XVI, OR, Annexes, Agenda Item 84, 1961, pp. 1-2.

²GA XVI, OR, Second Committee Report, 1961, pp. 430-435. Also see Richard N. Gardner, "Toward a World Population Program," in Gardner and Max F. Millikan, eds., The Global Partnership: International Agencies and Economic Development (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 347-351.

³GA XVII, OR, Report of the Second Committee, 1962, pp. 45-49; GA XVII, OR, Plenary Sessions, Vol. III, 1962,

An opposite position was taken in the Second Committee by the representative of Argentina. He argued that the draft resolution was part of a longtime propaganda campaign to introduce birth control methods as a possible solution to problems of economic development. He stated that the resolution would compel nations with a predominantly Catholic population to choose between support of multi-lateral UN aid to programs intended to reduce population, and the moral obligations of its own citizens.¹ Similar positions were taken by the representatives of Peru and Spain in the plenary session of the Assembly.²

As finally decided, the resolution reflected original Scandinavian concern for family welfare, and for problems stemming from over-population. It instructed the Secretary-General "to conduct an inquiry" among member governments, on population problems. It also asked PC to intensify its studies and research, and to assist governments in their population programs.³

p. 1178. See also GA XVII, OR, Annexes, Agenda Item 38, 1962, pp. 1-7, and Draft Resolutions A/C.2/L.657 and A/C.2/L.709/Rev.1/Add.1, 1962.

¹GA XVII, OR, Second Committee Report (1962), op. cit., pp. 443-444.

²GA XVII, OR, Plenary Sessions, Vol. III, 1962, op. cit., pp. 1172-1174.

³For the full text of the resolution, 1838 (XVII), "Population Growth and Economic Development," 18 December 1962, see Annex A.

Both the Assembly plenary, and the Assembly committees (in which all governments are also represented), bear some resemblance to institutional-level decision machinery such as boards of directors of corporations. As was of course also the case with the managerial-level PC, these policy bodies represent varieties of views, and face the task of reconciling them. In general, ambassadorial-level representatives of governments speak in the plenary, and managerial-level officials of foreign offices in committee; however, such representation sometimes is reversed.

Decision chains in which PD, and other secretariat sub-structures, figure conspicuously are the subject of the section which follows. First, Parsonian levels are viewed in action; next, external interrelationships through the mediation of expert committees are described; and a conference which further typifies linkage of sub-structures laterally, across organization boundaries, is examined.

Managerial Interaction

Secretariat Initiatives

The first speaker at the 1965 PC session was UN Under-Secretary Philippe de Seynes, in charge of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ESA), in which a majority of the employees of the Headquarters Secretariat work, and which exercises formal program supervision over the secretariats of the four regional economic commissions

(including ECAFE). In a typical institutional-level presentation, he emphasized that revisions of demographic estimates by UN Secretariat demographers can play an important role in economic and social decisions of governments of developing nations.¹

He was followed by Miss Julia Henderson, Director of the Bureau of Social Affairs (BSA), a major organization component of ESA; the PB, headed by John Durand, was part of BSA. In terms of levels, her role seems clearly managerial; his, in the light of the current downgrading of population within ESA, bordering upon technical. Miss Henderson introduced the secretariat report on the responses of governments to the secretariat inquiry of governments on population problems.² Of responses from governments of developing nations, she commented:

Some governments stressed particularly the inadequacy of food production and the need for its expansion to meet the requirements of a growing population; others were mainly concerned with . . . lack of health and educational facilities . . . unemployment . . . all . . . made more difficult to solve by rapid population increase.³

She announced that the secretariat at that moment--

¹E/CN.9/SR.179, 1965, pp. 5-7.

²ECOSOC XXXVII, Inquiry of Governments on Problems Resulting from Interaction of Economic Development and Population Changes: Report of the Secretary-General (E/3895, 1964).

³E/CN.9/SR.179, 1965, pp. 9-10.

Spring, 1965--was operating a technical assistance project in India, "in the family planning field."¹

Perhaps the most persistent efforts to reconcile "conservative" positions, favoring a limited UN role in population activities other than demography, and "liberal," or "Swedish," view, were those made by Milos Macura, who in the 1965 session of PC represented Yugoslavia. He: praised the secretariat for the quality of its documents on future programs; expressed the view that the fields of research and technical work represented a "balanced framework for future activity"; agreed with the USSR and French arguments for giving economic development a priority; favored the forthcoming secretariat mission to India; and supported the rights of individuals, and national governments, to opt for birth control.²

The U.S. representative, Professor Coale, who had succeeded Professor Notestein as Director of the Princeton Office of Population Research, said that family planning should be considered an integral part of economic and social development. Therefore, he argued, the cost of family planning programs appears modest indeed, given potential benefits.³ The debate ended in a compromise, in the form of a decision favoring relatively modest PD activities.

¹Ibid., pp. 11-12.

²Ibid., pp. 8-9.

³Ibid., p. 9.

When ECOSOC met two months later, in July, 1965, it made an unusual decision; instead of simply accepting the compromise resolution drafted by PC, it added a clause to the draft. The addition called upon the Secretary-General to provide

. . . advisory services and training on action programmes in the field of population at the request of governments desiring assistance in this field. . . .¹

In this instance, therefore, the consensus of management-system PC represented a common denominator of policy agreement which remained less explicit on UN response to government requests, than did the institutional-system ECOSOC. And, contrary to the Parsons concept of customary separation of internal level, the top level extended the decision made by the middle.

Among the priorities which PD had submitted to PC early in 1965, were those decided upon by the type of boundary-crossing institution now to be described.

Expert Committees

An increase in the secretariat budget in 1964 had enabled the Secretary-General to appoint an ad hoc committee of experts to serve as individuals--not as representatives of governments. The group met, and later submitted

¹For the entire text of the ECOSOC resolution, 1084 (XXXIX), "Work Programmes and Priorities in Population Fields," 30 July 1965, see Annex B.

recommendations¹ to PC,² which in 1965 endorsed them.³ Included was a list of five priority areas for expansion and intensification of research and technical work in population fields: fertility; mortality; internal migration and urbanization; demographic aspects of economic development; and demographic aspects of social development. Of these, it assigned top priority to fertility.⁴

Membership of the expert group included a prominent economist, Simon Kuznets, of Harvard University, and the Senior Demographer, Irene Taeuber, of the Princeton Office of Population Research. Two experts were members of the PC: Messrs. Macura, in charge of the statistical office of the Yugoslav Government, and Alfred Sauvy of France. Also included were the directors of the three UN regional demographic centers, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Finally, observers were invited from UN specialized agencies, and from private organizations. In the latter category were representatives of three deeply committed to both research and field programs in birth control, in developing nations:

¹ECOSOC, PC 13th, ad hoc Committee of Experts on Long-range Programmes in the Field of Population, Report (E/CN.9/182, and Add. 1, 1964).

²ECOSOC, PC 13th, Long-range Programme of Work in the Fields of Population (E/CN.9/196, 1964).

³ECOSOC, XXXIX, OR, Suppl. No. 9, op. cit., Annex I, pp. 39-52.

⁴E/CN.9/182, op. cit., paragraph 29.

the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and an operational organization financed by both, the Population Council. Representing the latter organization was its president, Frank Notestein, the man who had started up PD.

The make-up of this group hardly can be viewed as a clear-cut illustration of Parsonian hierarchical levels. The label "expert" suggests that members would be found in the technical, or bottom, level of an organization. However, given their decision-making responsibilities in their home institutions, for supervision of research or operational programs, they seem managerial--or higher. A similar conclusion might be drawn concerning at least part of the membership of a second expert committee chosen in 1965, to recommend implementation of the new PC Priority No. 1, fertility. Of the ten appointees, the one representing North America was Donald Bogue, a sociologist, and director of the Community and Family Study Center of the University of Chicago. In his case, expertise equates with leadership of an important institutional component of a university.

World Population Conference

Most of the persons just mentioned served as organizer, or moderator, or chairman of one or another of the twenty-four meetings which made up the Second UN World Population Conference, held in Belgrade in the fall of 1965. In fact, Mrs. Taeuber was the American Vice-President of

the Conference. Because the priorities of conference topics seemed to follow those recommended by the expert committee to PC, and because committee-membership interlocked with that of PC, and with that of the Conference, decision-making involved extensive crossing of boundaries of organizations. Unlike the 1954 Rome Conference, two meetings were devoted to fertility, and another to family planning.¹

The Parsonian external ingredient is amply illustrated by the Conference: not only as decision-collaboration between UN and government officials or professionals, taking place primarily at the managerial level, but, similarly, in parallel lateral liaison with private organizations.² Collaboration included representatives of four UN specialized agencies (the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNESCO, WHO and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and a private association composed of demographers, IUSSP. In fact, in any large UN conference, the host government plays a key role. As with the conference in India in 1965, it supplies

¹UN, World Population Conference, 1965, Vol. I: Summary Report (New York: 1966, Publication 66. XIII. 5), pp. iii-vi, 5, 7, 9. One of the most important organizers of the Conference was the representative of Yugoslavia at the 1965 session of PC, Milos Macura, Director of the Federal Institute of Statistics in Belgrade (p. 346), who in 1966 resigned to become Director of PD.

²UN, World Population Conference, 1965, op. cit., p. 1.

personnel at all three Parsonian internal levels, plus such material resources as meeting halls, office equipment, and staffing for services.¹

External Support

Decision-events of 1967 included the formation in July of a Secretary-General's Fund for Population Activities, to encourage special grants from donor governments, and the session of PC held in the Fall, the last to have impact upon population problems of the decade. The first event intensified UN-U.S. Government interaction; the second foreshadowed programs which began to blossom in 1969, both in the budgetary sense, and in the sense of expansion of managerial systems in UN organizations involved in population decision-making. Too, at the end of the decade another UN organization, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), became a factor in decision machinery for population. Each of these developments will be viewed from a different perspective, in terms of the Parsons framework.

Secretary-General's Fund

In mid-1967, Under-Secretary de Seynes mailed to governments an announcement of a new decision: to establish a Trust Fund for Population Activities (FPA). He described

¹Ibid., pp. 25, 346. Early in 1970 ECOSOC approved a third UN World Population Conference for 1974, and designated that World Population Year.

the Fund as a means of expanding population work over a five-year period. Of a projected goal of \$5.5 million, it was initially proposed that \$2 million be earmarked for ECAFE, \$1 million for the PD. The announcement stated, in part:

Up to the present the expenditures by the [parent UN] in the field of population have been relatively small and concentrated on Headquarters activities. Gross expenditures¹ have been increased from \$1.2 million in 1955 to \$1.6 million for 1966 and for 1967 \$1.7 million in response to growing interest of the member states in population problems.²

. . . Detailed regional . . . and country projects should be carried out in 1967 and 1968. This is the most critical element of the whole programme, on which future expansion of United Nations activities in . . . population will largely depend.³

The Government of Denmark was the first actually to contribute to the Fund--\$100,000 in November, 1967. Three other governments contributed during 1968: Sweden, \$200,000 in two installments, in February and October of the same year; the U.S., \$375,000 in two installments, in July and August; and the United Kingdom \$95,992 in August. Thereafter,

¹Includes programs of regional economic commissions and UN share of Chembur, in Bombay, India, and other demographic training centers.

²Amounts provided by the UN regular budget, underwritten by required assessments, or "dues," received from all member governments.

³Secretariat Circular Notice to Member Governments, July 12, 1967 (Reference: SO 314 (9)). The Fund was a response to General Assembly resolution 2211 (XXI) of December 7, 1966, calling for an expanded UN population program. By the mid-1960s, most resolutions on population, whether in ECOSOC or in the Assembly, called for increased activities.

contributions averaged more than \$2 million dollars per year, some 80 per cent of which came from Washington.¹ Further developments will be presented in the sub-section after the next one.

In 1968 the Fund was used to implement a decision to send six UN experts to advise twelve African governments on development of training, research and operational programs of various kinds. Other activities similarly funded were consultative missions to Colombia and Honduras on family planning projects, and the setting up of additional demographic projects at the UN centers at Chembur, India, and Cairo, UAR. Two other PD projects were also launched in January, 1969: family planning missions to India and to the UAR.

Final PC Action

By the time that the PC session opened in Geneva in November, 1967, population decisions had been adopted by several policy-making bodies in the UN system.²

At the 1967 session of PC, expressions of national program needs came from representatives of Jamaica and Pakistan, both of whom thanked UNICEF: the latter nation also thanked Sweden and the U.S. for decisions to grant

¹Information supplied by the UN Office of Public Information.

²References to this multiplicity of resolutions are set down at the outset of the PC 1967 Report: ECOSOC XXXIV, OR, Suppl. No. 9, PC 14th, Report, October, 1967, p. 6.

bi-lateral aid (see Chapter VI). The spokesman for India, recipient of aid from the same sources, emphasized vastness of need in his country for training in population research and statistics, and for mass dissemination of family planning literature.¹ By contrast, the representative of the USSR found the parent UN Secretariat report on recent population programs² to be too narrowly focussed upon family planning activities, with insufficient emphasis placed upon other aspects, such as demography.³

To further support for a UN role in attacking problems of over-population, the secretariat arranged ceremonies on Human Rights Day, December 10, 1966, and again on December 11, 1967, to announce decisions by first twelve, then eighteen, heads of government of various developed and developing nations, to publicize support for concerted efforts to balance population and food supply in the world.⁴

¹E/CN.9/SR.201, 1967, p. 12; also /SR.202, p. 2, and /SR.203, p. 3.

²ECOSOC, PC 14th, Recent Developments of the United Nations Programme and Co-ordination Activities in the Field of Population (E/CN.9/206/Add. 1, 1967).

³E/CN.9/SR.203, op. cit., p. 14.

⁴Joint statement and individual observations, reprinted in brochure form by the Population Council, World Leaders Declaration on Population (New York, 1968).

At the 1967 ceremonies, the Secretary-General paid tribute to John D. Rockefeller III, benefactor of various private, non-profit birth control enterprises, for his good offices in obtaining signatures by heads of state. Thus a private citizen, identified with leadership of a variety of prestigious private institutions, linked governments with international organizations.

In the previous section there was mentioned the appointment in 1965 of the ad hoc Committee of Experts on Programmes in Fertility.¹ The ten members included management-level demographers or statisticians from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, and a technical-level family-planning specialist from the Swedish Government foreign aid agency (SIDA), and Donald Bogue, of Chicago. Representatives of UNICEF, and WHO, and of FAO and UNESCO, were also invited to attend, as were those of the IUSSP, the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the Population Council and the Rockefeller Foundation,² providing an essentially management-level body. Committee decisions included a recommendation for development of data both on the frequency and consequences of abortions, and on the relation between abortions and contraception. Also recommended were questionnaires to be circulated in a given neighborhood on knowledge of, attitudes toward, and practices (KAP) concerning family planning.³

When PC in 1967 decided to adopt these recommendations by the outside committee, it was the Commission's last opportunity to make an impact upon UN population policy and program

¹ECOSOC XXXIX, OR, Suppl. No. 9, op. cit., pp. 34, 42.

²ECOSOC, PC 14th, ad hoc Committee of Experts on Programmes in Fertility, Report (E/CN.9/203, 1966), pp. 4-5.

³Ibid., pp. 10-17.

for the 1960s. Its next session would be held in Geneva in November, 1969, when it would review programs for the first half of the 1970s, and goals for a longer period.¹

Population Programme Officers

PC decisions of 1967 took on new meaning late in 1968 as a result of a decision made by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IOA) of the U.S. Department of State (DOS). The Bureau announced a second pledge of \$1.235 million to the Secretary-General's Fund. Of this sum, one million was earmarked for corresponding secretariat enlargement by PD, especially a new enterprise known as PPOs--UN Population Programme Officers.² Early in 1969 Halvor Gille, a Danish demographer, director of the Division of Social Affairs of the UN office in Geneva, came to New York to manage the training program for PPOs, and late in the year joined PD to take charge of programs and projects.

By late 1968 PD had begun to recruit and train PPOs to be posted in various parts of the world, to assist

¹The 1969 review called for doubling, or tripling, the number of national personnel trained in various aspects of population, and for stepping up of other types of technical assistance across all five of the priority areas authorized by PC in 1965. Paradoxically, however, attendance by national representatives continued to shrink; in 1965, 18 of 18 governments sat; in 1967, 22 of 27; and in 1969, 19 of 27. For a summary, see UN Population Division, Population Newsletter No. 7, December, 1969, pp. 5-6, 9-13.

²U.S. Congress, Public Law 90-554, Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, Chapter 3, Sec. 108 (a).

requesting governments in preparing decisions for workable population projects. Instructions to PPOs include evaluation of advantages to a particular government of various types of technical advice and financing--either bi-lateral or multi-lateral.¹ Eventually ten PPOs² were appointed for eighteen months--the time that the U.S. grant was expected to last. Clearly, they fall along the lower, or technical, level of the Parsons' hierarchy.

Hopefully, at the end of that period, PPOs would have become such a standard component in PD operations that their operations might logically be transferred to the UN regular budget.

Grantsmanship

The stir of new PD birth-control program activity in 1968 and 1969, just recounted, was based almost entirely upon "a la carte" grants, chiefly from the U.S., Sweden and Denmark. Given the ground rules of the Secretary-General's

¹Activities of PPOs are conveniently summarized in occasional issues of ESA, PD, Population Newsletter, op. cit. See for example No. 3, October, 1968, p. 10, and No. 4, February, 1969, pp. 1, 3-11.

²The PPOs were described as being specialists in one or the other of five fields: demography, economics, sociology, statistics and public administration. Their countries of origin were: Chile, Czechoslovakia, India, Pakistan, Peru, Sudan, Swaziland, UAR, UK and U.S. Eventually three were based in Africa, four in Asia (Bangkok, Djakarta, New Delhi, and Tehran), one in Latin America, and two in the Middle East. Population Newsletter, No. 4, February, 1969, pp. 1, 3-9.

Fund, such nations can have something to say about decisions for the destination of such donations. The point is that PD could extend population programming beyond the traditional demography underwritten by the UN regular budget, only by finding out just what types of programs the U.S. and other contributors--present and potential--will pay for. And the art of promoting such financing, in the final analysis, might indeed rest with the talents of persuasion of the PD official most completely involved in the greatest variety of project plans: namely, Mr. Macura, who in 1966 left his post in the Yugoslav Government and became the Director of PD.

When Professor Notestein created PD in the late 1940s, neither technical assistance nor separate grants by governments for economic and social programs had become "ruling ideas" in UN institutionalization. Clearly, however, he found ways to persuade majorities of the EC membership to back Headquarters statistical collections and studies, and majorities in the GA Fifth Committee to underwrite them in the UN regular budget. He obviously put together a decision-making coalition of technical supporters and government representatives with the support of higher-ups at the under-secretary level.

The term "shopping list" appears in conversations both within the UN Headquarters Secretariat in New York and in the offices of IOA in Washington. It has been said, for

example, that in April, 1968 the Director of PD submitted informally to potential donor governments a list of specific projects which the Division had developed, and which he hoped could be financed out of the Secretary-General's Fund. The projects he decided upon were said to have been: arranged chiefly by regions corresponding to the territories of the UN regional economic commissions (but minimizing Europe); proposed over a time span reaching into 1972; and estimated to cost \$2.5 million.¹

Mr. Macura, therefore, appears, in Parsonian terms, as the prototype of the managerial system; externally, as fund-raiser, and internally, as the person responsible for deciding upon programs composed of projects, the latter implemented by technical-system professionals who staff PD.

UN Development Programme

In June, 1969 Paul Hoffman, an American, the Administrator of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), with the rank of an Under-Secretary of the Parent UN, informed the UNDP Governing Council, composed of representatives of thirty-seven governments, that he had decided to sign an agreement with the Secretary-General committing UNDP to take over the responsibility of administering the Population Fund.

¹Based on informal conversations with members of American and Nordic government delegations to UN economic and social bodies.

By the end of 1969, nearly \$5 million had been paid into that Fund; of this sum, nearly \$4 million came from Washington.¹ Mr. Hoffman's organization had already agreed to furnish field office space for the newly appointed PPOs.²

Summary

The Parsons framework suggests a variety of findings in respect to PC, and PD, as centers of decision-making.

As for the internal ingredient, it has been indicated that: PD has a technical level but that PC does not; Mr. Macura is the managerial system of the former, while the members of the latter provide a middle-level, consensus-building, policy-making machine; and ECOSOC, the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and the Under-Secretary responsible for ESA, fulfill various aspects of the high-level, institutional role. As for interrelationships among levels, each generally exhibited "sphere of influence" control over its own segment of compound decisions; however,

¹Data supplied by the UN Office of Public Information. With its annual budget for economic and social programs of all types exceeding \$150 million, paid in as special pledges of donor nations, UNDP funds not only short-term technical assistance missions, costing a few thousands of dollars each, but long-range engineering feasibility studies, each of which costs millions of dollars. UN agencies serve as sub-contractors for UNDP projects.

²UNDP control over the Fund was formalized in January, 1970 with Rafael M. Salas, formerly Executive Secretary of the Republic of the Philippines, as Director (ESA, PD, Population Newsletter, No. 8, March, 1970, p. 9).

notable exceptions to this Parsonian insight were Mr. Hammarskjold's demotion of middle-level PD to bottom-level PB, and the ECOSOC 1965 extension of a PC decision.

In terms of PC or PD participation in horizontal decision processes across their respective boundaries, evidence in the present chapter confirms the Parsons external ingredient of organization theory. Lateral linkages are so numerous, and so extensive, that what appear nominally as UN decision processes seem, upon closer examination, to be guided as frequently from outside the UN system, as from within. As suggested by the reference to Gouldner in Chapter I (pp. 14-15), the necessity of locating outside the UN regular budget, funds for expansion of programs, provides more insight into program decisions by Mr. (Middle Management) Macura than does debate in PC. Resultant functional autonomy for the managerial system further reinforces the Parsonian gaps between internal organization levels.

While trans-boundary decision-linkage of international organizations, national governments and private organizations is most amply illustrated in this chapter at the middle level, evidence has been presented of interaction at the other two horizontal levels as well. However, lest the vertical dimension of decision-making be lost sight of, within the PC-PD pair of sub-organizations, levels "teamwork" should be emphasized. For example, there was little evidence of opposition, at any of the three levels, to

expansion of population goals and programs. Thus: public relations efforts by the institutional system; planning and promotion of programs, by the managerial system; and implementation of programs by the technical system, proceeded apace.

Further evidence to be used in testing the Parsons framework will now be sought in three different UN organization settings, each the subject of separate chapters which follow.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE FAR EAST

The Members of the United Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to supply the required momentum to world development efforts.¹

Thus, near the end of the 1960s, did the Asian Secretary-General of the UN view the problems of the forthcoming decade. The wording resembles in some respects the repertory of Asian problems, 1947, articulated by the management of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) twenty years later: long-time economic stagnation, aggravated by rapid population growth, topped by the devastation of World War II, which left in its wake heightened poverty, and disease.² It was to assist in the

¹Statement by U Thant at the opening session of a Conference, "The Second United Nations Development Decade: a Challenge to Rich and Poor Countries," sponsored by a private association, the Institute on Man and Science, at UN Headquarters, 9 May, 1969. See UN OPI, News Release SG/SM/1109, DD/21, p. 2.

²UN, ECAFE, Twenty Years of Progress (Bangkok, 1967), Doc. E/CN.11/766 Rev. 1), p. 2. Stagnation, population, war, poverty and disease recall the threats to mankind on the eve of World War I as viewed by Vicente Blasco-Ibanez in The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (Brewster, N.Y.: Dutton, 195th printing, 1967), p. 173: plague, war, famine and death.

reconstruction and development of the economies of the countries of Asia and the Far East that ECAFE was created in Shanghai by four governments of the region: China, India, the Philippines and Thailand, and six other UN members: Australia, France, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the U.S.. The membership grew to twenty-seven governments, and three associates: Brunei, Hong Kong, and Fiji.

It will be recalled that when population problems were discussed in the General Assembly in 1962, decisions originated in the Economics Committee. That committee assignment presumably was a strategy used by the proponents of a resolution, to emphasize population problems by tying them to other problems of building up the national economies in developing nations. By contrast, in ECAFE, embracing land inhabited by half of the world's population, population was considered a social, rather than an economic problem. And because the basic mission of the Commission was considered to be assistance in building up infrastructures in agriculture, commerce and industry, and extension of trade, hardly any secretariat staff was involved in decision-making for social problems, until well along in the 1960s.¹

To illustrate: one social welfare advisor was outposted to Bangkok by UN Headquarters in 1949, and a second

¹ECAFE, Twenty Years, op. cit., pp. 1, 3, 5, 7-8, 73-77.

in 1952. In 1956 a Division of Social Affairs (DSA) was created in ECAFE, headed by Miss Dorothy Moses of India. She and four other professional officers were responsible for three main areas of activity: demography, community development and social welfare; later a fourth subject area, social policy, was added. By 1967, the Commission's twentieth anniversary, the Division contained six full-time professional staff members, three regional advisors, one regional expert, and two temporary professionals--to serve member governments, and to collaborate with UN Headquarters Secretariat, in four subject areas.¹ Staffing of this size --and all, including Miss Moses, at the technical level-- can hardly be construed as a powerful machine for a massive attack upon the population explosion in the world's most dense mass of population, along with attention to other social aspects of human environment (to cite two of the Secretary-General's four priorities).

Secretariat activities included an area-wide conference in 1963, and a series of meetings by expert groups. On occasion, also, the plenary sessions of the Commission, composed chiefly of government representatives of ambassadorial rank, considered population questions. However, given virtual unanimity on such questions, the plenary review procedure hardly appears to be a major factor in decision-making.

¹Ibid., p. 73.

The first sub-section will deal with decisions of the 1963 conference, and the second with the plenary. In the subsequent section will be described the work of expert groups, and of the secretariat. Finally, processes will be reviewed according to Parsonian internal, and external, ingredients of organization theory.

The Institutional Dimension

Government representatives at annual plenary sessions of ECAFE are generally diplomats of ambassadorial rank. In Parsonian terms, this presents a problem of categorization. Within his own foreign office, an ambassador would appear to typify the managerial system; however, as the highest-ranking representative of his government in a foreign capital, he could be viewed as institutional, i.e., functioning at peak organization level, in the harmonization of internal affairs within his government, with external relations centered upon the government to which he has been assigned. Thus the formal U.S. Government voice at the annual two-week, policy-level ECAFE session functions at two decision-making levels: middle within the hierarchy of his own government, high as the head of his delegation at the session. Because said ambassadors obviously play more the role of articulator, than of formulator, of policy, their appearances seem more ceremonial, than substantive. Expertise is of course present in the form of guidance papers, and/or specialist-advisors.

If the plenary is viewed as a regional counterpart of ECOSOC (the body to which it submits its annual report)-- that is, constitutionally the peak decision body in its own domain--then a word is in order concerning sub-bodies-- i.e., managerial systems.

Apart from its own brief annual sessions, the Commission functions through subsidiary bodies. Three main committees--on industry and natural resources; on trade; and on transport and communications--meet annually. In addition, there is a series of bodies designated as conferences. One, called the Asian Population Conference (APC), produced its first event in 1963, as described in the next sub-section.¹ In fact, the chronology of decisions on population problems is an alternating sequence at top-level plenary sessions, middle-level conference meetings, and ambiguous-level expert groups, and conferences; witness this summary:

The United Nations Asia and the Far East Seminar on Population held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, . . . noted that national programmes of . . . development . . . were likely to be retarded . . . by the rising growth rates. . . .

Interest . . . was further stimulated by the . . . Demographic Training and Research Centre at Bombay, India, as a joint operation of the United Nations and the Government of India. The inaugural conference of the Centre suggested that the United Nations convene

¹ECAFE, Twenty Years of Progress, op. cit., p. 100. As a subsidiary body of the ECAFE plenary, APC is a "standing" committee which meets infrequently, to recommend plans for an actual conference, to be held at intervals of several years.

a regional conference on population, and this proposal was taken up by . . . ECAFE. . . .

The Commission, in resolution 28 (XV) [1959], requested the ECAFE secretariat to organize an Asian population conference to provide a forum. . . . The first . . . [APC] was held at New Delhi, India, in December 1963, with the Government of India providing host facilities. It was sponsored by the ECAFE secretariat, and by the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs [BSA] and Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations [BTAO], in co-operation with interested specialized agencies of the United Nations.¹

APC

In ceremonial terms, Prime Minister Nehru opened the Conference, and the next speaker was the head of the ECAFE Secretariat, U Nyun of Burma, whose title of Executive Secretary is the equivalent of Under-Secretary of the UN. The chief representative of the U.S. Government was Leona Baumgartner, Assistant Administrator of AID; her alternate was Conrad F. Taeuber, Assistant Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. If one views these as institutional-level officials, middle levels seemed characteristic of many other attendees, including Philip Hauser, University of Chicago sociologist who had represented the U.S. in the early days of PC. Somewhat closer to the technical level were observers present from the Ford Foundation and the Population Council, and staff members of the joint UN-Indian Government Demographic Centre.²

¹UN, ECAFE, Report of the APC and Selected Papers (New York: 1964, Pub. 65.II.F.11), p. v.

²Ibid., pp. 1-2, 58, 62.

Papers presented at the conference included ones dealing with birth control programs, authored by scientists from India, Pakistan and Taiwan. Observers were also present from several Catholic organizations; one such observer gave a paper entitled, "Why the Catholic Church Finds It Impossible to Endorse Contraception."¹

The report of the conference contained an eight-page chapter of recommendations "pertinent to policies and programmes of governments and international organizations." The highlights of those decisions which were directed at the secretariats of ECAFE, the two UN Headquarters Bureaus mentioned in the quotation above, and two of five other UN organizations represented at the conference,² were subsequently condensed into a draft resolution which was adopted the following year at the ECAFE plenary, as described in the next sub-section. As hypothesized by the Parsons external ingredient of theory, a technical system, in the form of the ECAFE Secretariat Division of Social Affairs, collaborated successfully with counterparts in the two UN Headquarters Bureaus, and with other UN organizations, in decision-making shared with government officials and specialists in both developing Asian, and developed non-Asian Governments, and in private organizations.

¹Ibid., pp. 59-60, 64.

²Ibid., pp. 48-55.

ECAFE Plenary

At the 1964 session, for all twenty-seven member governments and associate governments, where the U.S. delegation was headed by a career diplomat, Kenneth T. Young, ambassador to Thailand, a unanimous vote gave "full support" to the "proposals and conclusions" of the conference, which had been held three months earlier.¹ The vote was for a resolution which requested the Executive Secretary to:

- (a) Facilitate direct exchanges of information at the departmental level among Governments in the region on all aspects of population and social and economic growth,
- (b) Expand the scope of technical assistance available to Governments . . . for data collection, research, experimentation and action in all aspects of population problems, including family welfare planning programmes, through regional advisory services, development and strengthening of regional, sub-regional and national training and research institutions, study tours, fellowships and meetings of technical groups. . . .

The resolution also articulated a decision calling for meetings of technical groups designed to provide guidelines for governmental action and for international assistance.² Far removed though plenary delegates seemed, from population technology, they had indeed supplied a sweeping mandate to the secretariat.

¹ECOSOC XXXVII, OR, Suppl. No. 2, ECAFE Annual Report, 1964, p. 113.

²ECAFE Resolution 54(XX), "Population Growth and Economic and Social Development," 17 March, 1964. Reproduced in full as Annex C.

External Management

The ECAFE Secretariat lost no time in formulating decisions to implement this ambitious resolution. In terms of interaction across organization boundaries, implementation seemed to center upon regional technical meetings, and working groups of specialists who occupied either management or technical posts (or both) in governments, or in private organizations. It seems important, therefore, to set down in detail the particulars of a whole series of such undertakings.

ECAFE and New York-Secretariat officials now shared in selection of working groups outside the UN system, and in drawing up of programs in harmony with recommendations made by these groups. Previous ECAFE Secretariat population programs had been largely demography-oriented. But attention was now directed toward a well-tailored sequence of small forums, each expanding its decision focus wider than the previous one and handing recommendations on to the next forum. The accumulative effect, as will be seen by the end of this section, was construction of a heavy--but prestigious --work load for the ECAFE Secretariat.

Regional Technical Meetings

The first "technical working group" selected in response to the 1964 ECAFE resolution was the Working Group on Administrative Aspects of Family Planning Programmes,

which met in Bangkok in 1966.¹ The purposes of the meeting included facilitation of establishment of channels for further communication of experience in administering such programs.² The group was composed of twenty-three specialists engaged in such programs in ten ECAFE member governments, plus twelve participants in population programs conducted by organization components of the UN system, each participating in a personal capacity. Also present were technical-level field representatives of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and of the Population Council,³ and of organizations responsible for bi-lateral programs conducted by two donor governments: the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA)--the Swedish foreign aid agency. (As a further example of the heterogeneity of interrelationships, the latter government has never been a member of ECAFE.) After an analysis of possible project machinery, the report suggested investigation of a new institutional arrangement. This decision planted the seed for a second expert group:

Comparison of problems and issues as they arise in this new . . . field can help to streamline individual country programmes and promote . . . flow of information and technical knowledge. . . . The question of a

¹ECAFE, Asian Population Studies Series No. 1 (Working Group on Administrative Aspects of Family Planning Programmes, Report: UN Sales No. 66.II.F.10, 1966), p. v.

²Ibid.

³Represented by Sam M. Keeny, field agent, formerly with UNICEF.

resources center for family planning work in the region must be explored.¹

The 1965 ECAFE session in Wellington, New Zealand and the one the following year in New Delhi remained true to form, in that population questions hardly appeared in plenary debate.² At the latter session, however, authorization was given for the convening in Bangkok later in the year of this second committee, the Expert Working Group on the Feasibility of Establishing a Regional Population Center. It was organized by the ECAFE Secretariat, PD, and BTAD. The disciplines of demography and statistics were the dominant preoccupations of its seven members (including Irene Taeuber of Princeton). In essence, the expert group's recommendations consisted of several "mores": more staff, more seminars, more training, more information, on various aspects of population problems.³ While the decisions

¹Ibid., pp. iii, 45. See also Population Council, Studies in Family Planning, No. 14, September, 1966 (New York).

²In the former, however, an infrequent, in ECAFE territory, Catholic protest of family planning programs was made by Dr. Patricia Burns of the World Union of Catholic Women's Organizations, one of the few non-governmental organizations to take the floor in any ECAFE plenary session. She argued that there were not too many people in the world, but simply not enough food; all resources should be utilized by modern technology, in order that everyone on the globe might live comfortably. A representative of IPPF was present, but did not take the floor. (ECOSOC, ECAFE XXI, E/CN.11/709, a composite of SRs, 1965, p. 117.)

³ECAFE XXXIII, Report of the Expert Working Group on the Feasibility of Establishing a Regional Population Centre (Tokyo, E/CN.11/L.173, January, 1967).

recommended were general, the follow-up by the ECAFE Secretariat was not; it outlined a complete manning table of professional posts which hopefully could be added by 1970, and provided a long list of projects to be considered.¹

At its 1967 session in Tokyo, ECAFE decided upon a resolution which noted with approval the recommendations made by the Feasibility Group, particularly in respect to expansion of regional cooperation in population matters through strengthening of the ECAFE Secretariat.² In Singapore in 1967, twenty experts from thirteen member governments convened as the Working Group on Communication Aspects of Family Planning Programmes. IUSSP and IPPF were represented in a meeting "made possible by a generous grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)." The Group's report emphasized that:

In most countries of the ECAFE region, face-to-face communications--home visiting, group meetings,

¹ECAFE XXIV, Proposals for an Expanded ECAFE Programme in the Field of Population: the Asian Population Programme (Canberra, E/CN.11/L.202, March, 1968). Note p. 20, Table 1, for manning table. Similarly, see the table sketched in organization-chart form, ECOSOC, ECAFE XXV, April, 1969, Activities of the ECAFE Secretariat in the Field of Population (E/CN.11/860), p. 13. In both instances, the post, Chief of the Population Division of ECAFE, conforms to Parsonian managerial system, and all others as technical system. Until late in the 1960s, however, not even the head of Social Affairs in ECAFE--of which demography was a component--ranked above the technical system.

²ECAFE Resolution 74 (XXIII), "Regional Cooperation in the Field of Population," 17 April, 1967.

institutional meetings, etc.--have made much headway in health and other human development programmes. . . . a sustained programme of education, persuasion and motivation in face-to-face situations is necessary. . . .¹

In 1968 in Bangkok there assembled the Expert Group on Assessment of Acceptance and Use-Effectiveness of Family Planning Methods. Thirteen specialists from eight ECAFE nations were joined by sixteen others from American foundations and university institutes, AID, and SIDA.² American attendees included not only Social Scientists Ronald Freedman, Director of the Population Studies of the University of Michigan, and W. Parker Mauldin, Associate Demographic Director of the Population Council, but Medical Scientists Christopher Tietze, Director of Research of the National Committee on Maternal Health in New York, and Samuel M. Wishik, of Columbia University's International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction.

Costs of group meetings were underwritten by two or more organizations represented--international, governmental or private.

Upgrading

Until 1962 Miss Moses had a single demographer in her

¹ECOSOC, ECAFE XXIV, Working Group on Communication Aspects of Family Planning Programmes, Recommendations (E/CN.11/L.196, February, 1968), pp. 2-3. See also Population Council, No. 39, Studies in Family Planning, No. 39, May, 1968 (New York).

²ECOSOC, ECAFE XXV, Expert Group on Assessment and Use-Effectiveness of Family Planning Methods, Summary of the Report (E/CN.11/L.232, March, 1969).

administrative unit; in that year a regional demographic advisor was added.¹ Earlier, at the 1960 ECAFE session, the unit reported that it was at work, in collaboration with BSA in New York, on a forthcoming regional seminar for evaluation and utilization of census data to be recorded that year. It also reported: the drawing up, with BSA and BTAO, of a detailed plan for the 1963 APC; and continuation of assistance to the Demographic Training and Research Center operated in Bombay by the UN and the Government of India.² At mid-decade the population staff was doubled. The Rockefeller Foundation provided funds to pay for a second regional demographic advisor, and for a demographic expert.³

Mention has been made of two 1966 ECAFE expert groups, one to study the feasibility of a regional population center, and an earlier one on administrative aspects of family planning. Decisions reported by these groups; planning by the four-man Population Section in DSA; and favorable comment at the 1967 ECAFE plenary session, all preceded submission to the 1968 session in Canberra, Australia, of secretariat

¹ECOSOC, ECAFE 24th, Proposals for an Expanded ECAFE Programme in the Field of Population--the Asian Population Programme (E/CN.1/L.202), 1968, p. 5.

²ECOSOC XXX, OR, Suppl. No. 2, ECAFE, Annual Report, 1960.

³ECOSOC, ECAFE 24th, Proposals, op. cit., p. 5. It was expected that after two years, the salaries of the two new staff members would be absorbed into the UN regular budget.

proposals for an expanded ECAFE population program. One of the four who was active in formulating plans was P.S. Menon of India, whose experience includes stages at UN Headquarters in New York.

The ECAFE Secretariat Proposals document which he and his colleagues produced was basically a response to 1967 recommendations made by the ECAFE expert working group on a possible regional center. This group proposed that

The existing Population Section within the Social Development Division of the Secretariat be expanded and established as a separate entity directly under the Office of the Executive Secretary.¹

A year after 1968 ECAFE decisions supporting budget increases (to be financed chiefly by U.S. contributions to the Secretary-General's Fund), the following announcement was made:

The former Population Section of the Social Development Division [of the ECAFE Secretariat] was transferred to the new Population Division which is headed by Mr. Carl Frisen [of Denmark], formerly Chief of the Co-ordination and Operations Section of the Population Division at Headquarters.

Three substantive sections are in the process of organization: Fertility and Family Planning Section, General Demography Section, and Clearing House and Information Section. Two regional advisers are attached to the Division. . . . The appointment of additional professional officers and supporting staff is under way. . . .²

The new division would expand in numbers of professional

¹Ibid., p. 6.

²ESA, PD, Population Newsletter, No. 5, May, 1969, pp. 3-4.

posts from an initial four to eighteen by 1970. Total annual cost of the division program would rise from the 1967 level of \$164,000 to about \$457,000 in 1968, to \$700,000 in 1969.¹

Summary

In common with participants in the General Assembly and ECOSOC, delegates to ECAFE plenaries bespoke general population policy at infrequent intervals, but adopted resolutions which, above all, paved the way for programs, but also supplied a foundation for public relations within ECAFE nations. In contrast, however, to members of the middle-level PC, heads of government delegations at institutional-level ECAFE plenaries possessed no first-hand knowledge of population technology.

Until the end of the 1960s, the Parsonian managerial system can hardly be said to have existed within ECAFE. The standing APC group nominally appears to be such a system, but infrequency of meetings, to pre-plan a single specialized scientific gathering per decade, hardly seems to be a singularly significant piece of decision machinery, when viewed against the background of the secretariat's busy population work. And within the secretariat, a sizeable population

¹Proposals, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12. Note that the latter figure approximates the UN regular budget allocation to the PD, as of 1965 or 1966.

team--under a director clearly representing middle management--materialized only in 1969. The expansion represented the scaling up of the minuscule technical system which somehow had managed to mount projects over a decade and a half.

The "somehow" is largely attributable to decision partners external to ECAFE. The first UN professionals in social affairs to set up shop in Bangkok were field representatives of UN Headquarters in New York, with the primary mission of collecting Asian facts to add to global compilations. Collaboration with BSA and BTAO, with donor governments such as the U.S., and with governments such as Thailand and India, which help underwrite ECAFE Headquarters, and the Demographic Institute, respectively, and with private organizations, made ECAFE population programs possible. Whether such programs were initially the concern of the secretariat, which then sought outside support, or the reverse, externality seemed even more crucial to ECAFE population programs, than did outside support to PD.

In Chapter III, note was taken of the 1965 WPC, and of expert committees. Their ECAFE counterparts, the APC of 1963, and a much longer list of expert groups, emphasize the extended "outside-ness," or horizontality, of decision-making for ECAFE population programs.

A word is also in order concerning types of population programs. Demographers monopolized professional and administrative posts in both PD in New York and PS in

Bangkok. Nevertheless, in the latter instance, program emphasis shifted drastically toward family planning.

Attention now shifts away from decision areas in which either demography, or administration of family planning programs, predominate. In the two chapters which follow, internal and external ingredients of decision-making will be examined in public health settings.

CHAPTER V

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Formally . . . sources of the work-plan are the provisions of the Constitution and resolutions of the Assembly and the Executive Board.¹ . . . The Assembly and the Board are largely reviewing agencies that deal with proposals submitted to them.

. . .

WHO has relied on expert committees to formulate program and work plans. One of the significant roles of an international body is to use its offices to bring together the most learned authorities and to serve as a reflector of their consensus. . . .

Senior specialists at headquarters pay tribute to the work of such committees in setting guide lines for program, even to the promulgation of priorities for concentration of effort.

. . . WHO has turned to the establishment of panels, rather than committees. From these larger lists, small ad hoc committees can be selected for special problems. . . .

In many fields, international non-governmental organizations are a fertile source. Questions can be remitted to them for study: recommendations come out of their own programs.²

¹According to the WHO Constitution, Article 11, each member government in the (131-government) World Health Assembly (WHA) is to be represented by three delegates.

According to Article 24, WHA elects governments to the 24-man Executive Board. Each government appoints a representative who is "technically qualified in the field of health."

²Charles S. Ascher, "Current Problems in the World Health Organization's Program," in International Organization, Vol. VI, No. 1, February, 1952, pp. 37-38.

The above quotation, written by Charles Ascher, a management specialist, after an assignment with WHO on program development, suggests a pattern of decision-making wildly at variance with Talcott Parsons' two ingredients. From the statement, it would appear that active technical-level professionals outside WHO supply ready-made decisions to passive counterparts at the bottom of the WHO organization pyramid, and that these decisions are then simply ratified first by such passive middle-level managerial committees, and then by passive upper-level Assembly.

Further, such an hypothesis of the externality of this type of decision-making--altogether in the environment, instead of inside WHO itself--especially extends to representatives of private organizations, who constitute a majority of the membership of scientific panels. If so, how can one then account for the assumption that WHO, in common with all UN organizations, is customarily defined as "a joint stock company," in which shareholders are governments?

This chapter will begin with a look at the WHA role in decision-making. The next section will then deal with the question of expertise. The question appears in two separate contexts. Outside the organization, do experts recruited for WHO panels represent both systems at the same time--a kind of double-tier system, contradicting the Parsonian "separation of levels" concept? And within the

WHO Secretariat, are experts characteristic of both managerial, and technical, systems?

Institutional System

Unlike the conclave of foreign-office generalists which constitutes the annual ECAFE plenary, public health administrators, often of cabinet rank, almost invariably head national delegations to the annual World Health Assembly. Government delegations also tend to be larger, in size, and more specialized, than in other UN organizations. This is not, of course, to argue that sessions are any less political, because in both instances it is government policy which is being articulated. And politics accounts for the negative fate of early attempts to steer programs which deal with population problems toward active birth control projects.

Negative Consensus

Richard N. Gardner has described an unsuccessful attempt by representatives of the Government of Ceylon to persuade the 1949 WHA to consider a world-wide family planning program. Formation of a WHO committee to consider health aspects of population growth was proposed a year later¹ by the Vice Chancellor of the University of Madras,

¹Richard N. Gardner, "Toward a World Population Program," in Gardner and Max F. Millikan, eds., The Global Partnership: International Agencies and Economic Development (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 344. In the same volume see also Roger Revelle, "International Cooperation in Food and Population," p. 381.

India, Sir Arcot Mudaliar. He suggested that in more than one nation, population had increased to such an extent as to constitute a grave menace to the health and the social welfare of the citizenry. Another speaker, W.G. Wickremesinghe, Director of the Health Services in Ceylon, joined with K. Evang, Director-General of Norwegian Government Health Services to propose an expert committee to recommend action on the health aspects of the world "population problem."¹ The proposal received emphatic support from the Director of the Swedish National School of Nursing, Miss A. Janzan, who remarked that only men had preceded her in the WHA, which forum therefore needed to hear "the voices of the women of the world," which voices, she stated, would, if given the opportunity, express approval for action.²

In that 1950 WHA, P.J.J. Van de Calseyde, in charge of Health Administration in the Belgian National Ministry of Public Health and the Family, argued against WHO implementation of "certain economic and social theories" which were far from receiving universal approval. A member of the American delegation, K. Stowman, of the U.S. Public Health Service, said that discussion of appointment of an expert committee on health as a population problem placed the WHO on "dangerous ground." He proposed instead that

¹WHA.V, OR, Vol. 42, 1952, pp. 90, 98-99, 111, 204, 206, 237.

²Ibid., pp. 237-42.

the organization await the deliberations of the first world Population Conference and that meanwhile the Norwegian-Ceylonese proposal be rejected--which it then was.¹

Although the first WPC was held in Rome in 1954, and a small UN conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia the following year, sizeable UN program gains in any aspect of population seemed confined to the start-up of small-scale regional demographic training centers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Reasons for such modesty in decision-making remain somewhat obscure. One of the more prevalent rumors, in UN corridors, was that several governments of nations with predominantly Catholic populations threatened a mass exodus from WHO, should the Director-General of that organization press for adoption of a resolution which might later be construed as blanket authorization for birth control programs. Similarly, the Hammarskjold cut-back of demographic programs at New York Headquarters has been construed, by gossip, as a demonstration of intent not to repeat UN technical assistance missions of the early 1950s related to birth control.²

The Director-General and the U.S.

Whatever the cause, in August, 1962, shortly before

¹Ibid., p. 131.

²Based on confidential interviews.

the launching of the debate in the General Assembly of the UN, the Director-General of WHO, M.G. Candau of Brazil, presented a statement on research in human reproduction at the IVth World Congress on Fertility and Sterility held in Rio de Janeiro. He emphasized that the biology of human reproduction is not as well understood as other aspects of medical science, but that clearly, the importance of many medical, biological, social, cultural, and economic factors in human reproduction makes it a major public health problem.

On the strength of this public airing of a controversial topic, the WHO Secretariat convened two separate groups of scientific experts on related topics, both in 1963. The first, dealing with the biology of human reproduction, examined gaps in knowledge and formulated decisions concerning research in neuro-endocrinal, gonadal, fertilization, and biochemical aspects. The second dealt with research needs related to lactation.¹

In 1963 the U.S. Government decided to contribute \$500,000 to the Organization's Special Account for Medical Research, for research in human reproduction, to implement research and expert group priorities recommended by the

¹WHA XVIII, Provisional Agenda Item 2.12, Decisions of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency Affecting WHO's Activities (Programme Matters), Programme Activities in the Health Aspects of World Population Which Might be Developed by WHO, Report by the Director-General (A18/P&B/4, April, 1965), pp. 1, 4; Annex B, pp. 4-5.

1963 Group on the Biology of Human Reproduction.¹ Thus, half a year after the strong U.S. statements in the UN General Assembly on support of programs to help solve population problems, the first large U.S. overseas grant related to birth control was committed in an institutional framework of public health. Without the grants, the Director-General's program could hardly have been launched.

Fading Opposition

At the 1965 WHA the Director-General proposed a variety of WHO activities involving broad research and training in the health aspects of "population dynamics."² Also, a draft resolution supporting the program goals was introduced by twelve governments--six from Western Europe, four from Asia and two from Africa. If one compares such a coalition with voting patterns in PC in the same year, the first factor to come to mind is the institutional home of chiefs of national delegations. As previously noted, in contrast to demographer-statisticians, WHA delegates almost by definition are associated with health ministries--ministries which, in developing nations, generally are responsible for implementing maternal and child health programs in general, and family planning programs in particular. Ministries in the governments of the six developing nations (Ceylon, India,

¹Ibid., pp. 3-6.

²WHA XVIII, OR, No. 144, Part II, 1965, p. 359.

Pakistan, South Korea, Tunisia and the UAR) either already operated both types of programs, or planned very soon to add the latter type. Similarly, all of the governments of the six developed nations (members of the Nordic Council, plus the UK) already supplied foreign aid in birth control, or had given indications of intent to do so.¹ Institutional-level WHA-participants in birth-control "action" programs, therefore, differ markedly in the subject matter with which they deal, from the managerial-level members of the PC, whose programs remained predominantly demographic.

U.S. representation in WHA, where the grant was announced, is both sizeable and prestigious. In the late 1960s the Chief U.S. delegate was William H. Stewart, the Surgeon-General, then the head of the "health" component of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In 1967 his alternate was a consultant to the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, and, after Roger Tubby, the U.S. Ambassador to UN agencies based in Geneva, were ranked two representatives of other private universities, another HEW official, and an officer of the American Public Health Association. Advisors were headed by Senator E.M. Kennedy, who came to invite WHA to hold its 1969 Assembly in Boston, in commemoration of the centenary of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health,

¹Ibid.

and by the then Congressman Melvin R. Laird.¹ At the 1967 session it fell logically to the ninth-ranking advisor, M.D. Leavitt, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and Population, HEW, a post one can term middle-level, to speak to one of his specialties, namely, programs for birth control in the U.S. He spoke in support of the standard annual WHA resolution of the late 1960s, calling upon the Director-General to continue WHO research and training in human reproduction.²

At the 1969 session in Boston Dr. S. Paul Ehrlich, Deputy Director, Office of International Health, PHS, HEW, represented the U.S. in the 24-nation WHO Executive Board (EB). Like WHA, EB can be considered institutional-level. A tropical health expert, Thomas Weller of Harvard, sat on the nine-nation, middle-level Advisory Committee on Medical Research (ACMR).³

Catholic opposition was expressed by the Rev. Father H.M. de Riedmatten, Advisor, International Catholic Organizations Center, Geneva, representing the Holy See, and T.J.

¹Congressional membership in a national delegation parallels the custom of the U.S. Mission to the UN, which includes a Senator, and a member of the House of Representatives (of opposite political parties) in each UN General Assembly.

WHA XX, OR, Part II, Plenary Meetings, No. 161, p. 15.

²Ibid., p. 358.

³Information obtained from WHO Liaison Office at UN Headquarters, New York.

Brady, Assistant Secretary, Department of Health, Ireland. The former said he favored decisions in support of basic scientific investigation, which he expected to contribute to knowledge of periods of infertility. The latter also favored research, such as that already undertaken by WHO on the biology of human reproduction, but opposed decisions involving promotion of artificial methods of limiting births.¹

The Soviet Union position differed markedly from that expressed in PC in the 1960s. J.P. Lisicyn, Deputy Director, Semasko Institute of Public Health Administration and History of Medicine, Moscow, said that WHO must decide to intensify its maternal and child health activities, and propagate the idea of "conscious" motherhood, and health education.²

Eventually, the compromises led to agreement upon a resolution which requested

. . . The Director-General to develop further the programme proposed [in his report]:

(a) in . . . studies on medical aspects of sterility and fertility control methods and health aspects of population dynamics; and

(b) in . . . advisory services . . . related . . . to technical advice on the health aspects of human

¹Ibid., pp. 363, 365.

²Ibid., p. 371. Contrast this position with Soviet views expressed in the PC: see Chapter III. See also subsection, "Later Debate," which follows.

reproduction and should not involve operational activities. . . .¹

Thus, by mid-decade, the institutional-level members of WHA and of the Executive Board had reviewed, and decided upon, technical programs proposed by the institutional-level Director-General of WHO. The U.S. Government had supplied "seed money" two years earlier, to underwrite expert committees which could help the secretariat blueprint such programs. However, in Parsonian terms, the role of individual private experts in such committees became more visible after 1965.

Technical System

WHA and EB have the power to decide upon expert committees, the members of which are chosen by the Director-General.² In practice, the WHO Advisory Committee on Medical Research (ACMR), composed of nineteen well-known scientists, formulates recommendations on studies to be undertaken, or pursued. Thus a month after the 1965 WHA endorsement of the Director-General's proposals to embark upon programs concerning the biological aspects of human reproduction, and the health aspects of population growth, ACMR

¹WHA XVIII, Resolution WHA 18.49, 21 May, 1965, "Programme Activities in the Health Aspects of World Population Which Might Be Developed by WHO." For text, see Annex D, of this study.

²WHO Constitution, Supplement on Regulations for Panels and Committees of Experts, Sections 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.

convened and proposed topics for expert groups.¹ In Parsonian terms, ACMR resembles a management system, while appointees to expert panels, a smaller percentage of whom appear to have heavy administrative responsibilities, fit the concept of technical system.

It is the latter which, in the form of ad hoc scientific groups, appear to fulfill the Ascher prophecy of leadership in decision-making.

Organization for Specialization

In the 1966 WHA, there was adopted a resolution which extended the 1965 one described above. It noted

. . . the importance of including information on the health aspects of population problems in the education of medical students, nurses, midwives and other members of the health team. . . .

And emphasized that

The role of WHO is to give members technical advice . . . in the development of activities in family planning, as part of an organized health service, without impairing its normal preventative and curative functions.²

At the same session, the Director-General reported that

. . . ACMR . . . in June, 1965 considered the reports of the Scientific Groups on: Neuroendocrinology and

¹This ACMR action was conveniently summarized in a statement made by a WHO spokesman at the 1966 session of the UNICEF Executive Board; see E/ICEF/CRP/66-47, 8 June, 1966, pp. 1-2.

²WHA XIX, Resolution 19.43, 20 May, 1966.

Reproduction in the Human; the Mechanism of Action of Sex Hormones and Analogous Substances; and the Biochemistry and Microbiology of the Female and Male Genital Tracts. . . .

ACMR recommended that . . . studies of fecundity, fertility and fertility control techniques, as well as of sterility, abortions, malformations . . . and mortality, should be undertaken. . . . Furthermore, such studies should be linked with medical programmes and clinical advice. . . .¹

The three scientific groups, or ad hoc expert committees, cited in the above quotations were part of fourteen which WHO convened between 1963, when the U.S. contributed \$500,000 to such undertakings, and 1967. Questions of exactly what types of research and operational activities the agency should decide upon, obviously are initially threshed out in these highly specialized miniature technical forums. Such a supposition is reinforced by the increasing tendency of WHA at its subsequent plenary meetings to ratify the Director-General's tentative decisions on population dynamics with virtually no debate.

Two scientific committees which assembled in 1965, and two in 1966, can be cited briefly. In 1965, Alexander Kessler, a research scientist at the Rockefeller Institute, New York (who was later to join the WHO Secretariat and head the Human Reproduction Unit), was one of two American members of the eleven-man WHO Scientific Group on the

¹WHA XIX, Agenda item 2.15, Programme Activities in the Health Aspects of World Population Which Might Be Developed by WHO, Report by the Director-General (A19/P&B/19, May, 1966, pp. 2-3).

Immunological Aspects of Human Reproduction. A few weeks later a twelve-man group concerned with oral gestogens included five Americans: Christopher Tietze, Director of Research of a private organization, the National Committee on Maternal Health, New York; Joseph F. Sadusk, Jr., Medical Director, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), of HEW; H.A. Salhanck of the Harvard Center for Population Studies; and medical staff members of two hospitals, one in Philadelphia and the other in Los Angeles.

A ten-man 1966 Scientific Group on Basic and Clinical Aspects of Intra-Uterine Devices again included Dr. Tietze, along with S.J. Segal, Director of the Bio-medical Division of the Population Council. A later seven-man group on the biology of fertility control by periodic absence included a Brown University sociologist and a representative of the Hartford, Conn. Health Department.

Employing the reasoning of previous chapters, some of the individual decision-makers just mentioned would ostensibly be identified with managerial systems in their home institutions. However, if their roles in these ad hoc WHO specialist panels were to serve as criteria, their contribution to WHO decisions would appear to equate with the Parsonian technical level. Thus a particular individual might, analytically speaking, rank higher along the internal dimension at home, and in a body advisory to PC and PD, or to the ECAFE Secretariat, than in WHO hierarchy. The primary

reason for such an analytical distinction is the preoccupation of a WHO special panel with the technicalities of scientific research; members concentrate their attention upon what seem essentially to be research problems. By contrast, the mandates of the ECAFE Secretariat, in the case of specialist groups cited in the previous chapter, are administrative; group members confront questions of organization machinery to solve problems of applied social science.

WHA Support

Mention has been made of the shift in the 1965 WHA by the Soviet Union toward family planning, in contrast to Soviet statements earlier in PC. In 1967 Professor Lisicyn placed emphasis upon medical aspects of the health of women, and proposed WHO sponsorship of studies which could contribute to the legalization of abortion and its practice in medical institutions under favorable conditions. He added that the need for development of safe contraceptives was so great, in the fight against abortion, as to justify

. . . the setting up, under WHO auspices, of an international reference centre or some other system of concentrating the efforts of physicians, biologists, chemists, pharmacologists and other specialists.¹

The 1968 debate on a draft resolution dealing with population emphasized the need for training, and, before

¹WHA XX, OR, No. 161, Part II, 1967, pp. 358-59.

adopting it, added the relationship between psychological factors and health aspects of reproduction as a topic for future investigation.¹

Secretariat Specialists

In 1965 the Director-General decided to establish, at Headquarters in Geneva, a separate Human Reproduction Unit (HRU). It consisted of three professional officers. Eventually, budget recommendations for the calendar year of 1969 called for an increase of two officers. The functions of the unit were described as

. . . to develop a documentation center at WHO on all aspects of human reproduction; to stimulate, coordinate and support laboratory and epidemiological research on the biological, medical and public health aspects of human reproduction, and, in cooperation with other units, to provide advisory services . . . on medical aspects of fertility, sterility and fertility regulation methods.²

A small technical system headed by Dr. Kessler, of New York, as previously noted, HRU was one of four administrative units which comprised the middle level of the Division of Medical Sciences, directed by A.N. Klimov of the USSR. The division was one of three headed by one of the five assistant directors-general. Another of the five assistant directors-general headed up another set of three

¹WHA XXI, OR, No. 169, Part II, 1968, pp. 432-33 and preceding debate. The Resolution is WHA 21.31, 22 May, 1968.

²WHA XX, Health Aspects of Population Dynamics: Report by the Director-General (A/20P&B/11), May, 1967, p. 4.

divisions, one of which was Public Health Services. The latter division was composed of seven administrative units, three of which might conceivably deal with aspects of family planning: National Health Planning; Public Health Administration; and Maternal and Child Health. Professional staff in the first-named of these technical units was slightly less than, and in the remaining two approximately double, that of HRU in 1966.¹ However, the actual involvement of such units in family planning appeared to be negligible, even later in the decade.²

During the years 1966-68, a multiplicity of decisions paved the way for creation of advisory services to thirteen governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America, thus indicating that the bulk of WHO projects need not necessarily remain Headquarters-centered, as may have been suggested by details presented above. In India, Nepal, Pakistan, and South Korea,

¹WHA, OR, No. 154, Proposed Regular Programme and Budget Estimates for the Financial Year January-December 1968, December, 1966, pp. 1 (including insert: organization chart), 63-65, 70. There is also a WHO division devoted to vital statistics.

²Based upon a communication from a national government observer. The communication also included speculation as to possible stimulation in the WHO MCH unit by appointment as chief in 1968 of Franz Rosa, formerly in charge of AID birth control programs in India.

In April, 1970 a new Division on Family Health was established. It consists of the units of Maternal and Child Health, Human Reproduction and Human Genetics (UN, ESA, PD, Population Newsletter, No. 9, June 1970, p. 16).

for example, WHO technical advisors addressed themselves to problems of integrating family planning with MCH services.¹ Such field activities are considerably facilitated by branch offices which WHO maintains in six regions of the world. The office for the Americas, for example, in Washington, with sub-offices in Latin America, has its own sub-secretariat, paralleling in organization many aspects of Headquarters in Geneva. Under its only Deputy Director are four middle-level operating divisions, the one known as General and Special Technical Services containing nine low-level administrative units, one of them Population Dynamics. Similarly, under the only Assistant Director are six divisions, the one labelled Health Services containing the technical MCH unit.²

A word about funding can give an idea of the scale of technical operations. For the calendar year 1969, the Geneva Headquarters Secretariat decided to request that HRU's annual budget rise to \$62,000, as against \$40,000 two years earlier. WHO obviously was spending sums under other headings, such as scientific advisory groups, and advice in the field, related to either family planning or human

¹WHA XXI, Health Aspects of Population Dynamics: Report of the Director-General (A21/P&B/9), April, 1968, pp. 3-4.

²From information supplied by PAHO Headquarters in Washington.

reproduction, but amounts could hardly be large. As against the total WHO regular budget estimate of \$60 million,¹ even a doubling of \$62,000 would mean an insignificant WHO budget commitment to population programs, alongside expenditures for such major budget commitments as disease control.

Summary

WHA and EB did indeed appear to be essentially reviewing agencies, but the other principal institutional component of WHO, the Director-General, seemed the centerpiece of organization (as contrasted with broadly public) appearances in behalf of a WHO role in coping with problems of over-population. Perhaps a major difference between the WHA-WHO summit, and that of either ECOSOC-Under-Secretary, or of ECAFE-Plenary-Executive-Secretary, is the absence in the first case of extended dramatic evocation of a drastic world population crisis. Further, conservatism seems to be a hallmark of WHA, of EB, of the Advisory Committee on Medical Research (ACMR), and of the Director -General. Meticulous medical professionalism supposedly guides decisions of the WHO Secretariat, and of ad hoc scientific committees.

The ostensible WHO middle management, as far as birth control is concerned, is represented by the internal ACMR, and by the external Joint UNICEF/WHO Committee on Health

¹WHO, OR, No. 163, Proposed Regular Programme and Budget Estimates for the Financial Year, January-December, 1969, December, 1967, pp. xxi, 43-44, 75.

Aspects of Family Planning. Birth control and closely related subject matter constitute a small part of the mandate of the former, and the total business of the latter. However, there does not appear to be a secretariat counterpart of either--any more than the Harkavy panel had been able to find central machinery within the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to bring together the fragmented efforts of small specialized units scattered through larger ones with much broader responsibilities than family planning. Does WHO program output have less impact on decisions in national governments, for example, than does the output of PD, a single-function sub-organization managed by a single director? Only a longer study than this one could attempt to answer this particular middle-level question.

It follows, from evidence presented in the previous section of the present chapter, that technical-level ad hoc scientific committees are the sun around which WHO planets, i.e. programs, revolve, in decision orbits. Presumably, once technical experts, in the Parsons sense--a majority of them from private organizations--recommend decision steps, then members of secretariat technical systems tend to concur, and counterpart specialists in national health ministries of donor governments move toward financial and other support, just as such ministries in recipient governments move toward a client relationship on aid. Such would seem to be the extended, horizontal implication of the Ascher hypothesis with which this chapter opened.

As a final note, a fundamental difference between the general characteristics of government relationships of WHA-WHO, and those of PC-PD, or of ECAFE-Plenary-Secretariat, is worth emphasizing. In the case of the latter two combinations of sub-organizations, clientele is somewhat indeterminate. In a given government, statistical offices in various ministries may have interest in UN analyses of censuses, and a planning office in damage which over-population could inflict upon economic and social programs; and the foreign office presumably funnels communications dealing with such matters back and forth across a government-UN boundary. In the case of WHA-WHO, however, the clientele probably is identical with that of a single government ministry: namely, health. And surely the scope of birth control programs for which HEW, for example, is responsible, will have much to do with the extent to which the U.S. Government helps fund WHO programs related to birth control. This shared singleness of function, linking one government ministry with a specialized agency, WHO, surely helps to cement commonality of purpose at the operational--in this case technical--level.

CHAPTER VI

UNICEF

Orders come from the work, not work from the orders.
Orders have roots in activities of people who are
obeying them. . . .

The important thing about a decision is not who makes
it, but what gets into it. What is important is not
to whom you are responsible, but for what.¹

These statements were made in London in 1933 by a
social reformer, the late Mary Parker Follett, of Boston.
They seem particularly appropriate to decision processes
which involve the UN Childrens' Fund (UNICEF) in birth con-
trol programs conducted by the governments of developing
nations. Late in the 1960s UNICEF began providing vehicles
to assist birth control clinics operated by maternal and
child health services of such governments, and supplies for
teaching aids in programs of education in birth control.
Obviously UNICEF "orders," whether construed as instructions,
or procedures, were rooted in the activities of employees,
or agents, of these governments engaged in "grass roots"
field projects. And such orders became meaningful only
after they had been translated into the "what"--namely, use

¹Mary Parker Follett, Freedom and Coordination: Lectures in Business Management (London: Public Trust, Ltd., 1949); Chapter II, "The Giving of Orders," p. 31, and Chapter III, "The Basis of Authority," p. 46.

of vehicles and supplies in an actual project.

The aim of UNICEF is often stated as improvement of the life condition of children and youth in developing nations. It is less well known that the original purpose also included aid to nursing mothers; in fact, in 1948, 1952 and 1956, UNICEF embarked upon publications' programs dealing with family matters.¹

UNICEF is financed by voluntary contributions. About three-fourths of its income derives from regular annual contributions by over 110 governments; income from other sources comes mainly from campaigns soliciting donations from private individuals, and organizations. If one looks at UNICEF budgets as the 1950s ended, projects to control diseases ranked first in funding; next came maternal and child health programs, and training related thereto; and most of the remainder was earmarked to support programs to improve nutrition.²

Variations on Parsons

In Parsonian terms, UNICEF program officers look

¹UNICEF, A Short Guide to UNICEF: An Introduction to the Policies and Working Methods of the United Nations Children's Fund (E/ICEF/Misc. 131, 1967), pp. 2-3. Also Robert E. Asher et al., The United Nations and the Promotion of the General Welfare (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1957), pp. 511-512.

²UNICEF, A Short Guide, op. cit., and Asher, op. cit. Also ECOSOC XXVII, OR, Suppl. No. 2, UNICEF Executive Board, Report, 1958, pp. 8-9, 19, and ECOSOC XXVII, OR, Supp. No. 2 A, UNICEF Executive Board, Report, 1959, pp. 3-5, 17.

very much like the low men on the hierarchical totem pole. But at the same time, as "administrative generalists" staff officers who arrange transfer of varieties of types of equipment and supplies of UNICEF aid, varieties which vary widely, from dried milk to trucks, they seem far removed from a technical system. Such UNICEF staff officers are by definition non-technical. Ground rules of the UNICEF Executive Board (EB) require that technical experts supplied by an outside UN technical agency, such as WHO, certify a project before it begins, and that the technical agency also assume responsibility for its technical authenticity thereafter.

The institutional decision system is represented by: the head of the UNICEF Secretariat, the Executive Director, who has the rank of Under-Secretary in the parent UN; and EB, composed of representatives of thirty governments. Most such representatives are civil servants; however, as in the case of the Population Commission, some are borrowed by governments from the private sector.

It seems logical to view committees of EB as part of a generalized system, interacting internally with what might be considered counterparts in the secretariat, namely, senior staff officers.

Within the secretariat lieutenants include the heads of Divisions at Headquarters in New York such as Programme, and Supply, and elsewhere, of one of the six regional field

offices, such as that for Europe and North Africa. Division and office heads appear to fulfill the middle-level decision function of linking policy formulated by EB, with programs actually implemented in developing nations. However, it would require a separate study to evaluate, in depth, the impact of the level on organization structures above, and below. The same is true for external dimensions. For example, the UNICEF/WHO Joint Committee on Health Aspects of Family Planning recommends policy above, to EB, and program below, to field administrators. There is also an "ambassadorial" aspect, in that WHO stations a coordinator permanently at UNICEF Headquarters. In respect to the lower organization level, decision interaction outside UNICEF, with governments and private organizations, is especially marked.

There is a real question, however, as to whether either the Joint Committee or the WHO representative have meaningful impact upon decisions. By contrast, there appears to be evidence that UNICEF Headquarters Secretariat officials unofficially but more meaningfully feed decision cues into EB deliberations.¹

The Executive Board

Three Debates

At the June, 1965 session of the UNICEF-EB, the U.S.

¹Based on interviews at Headquarters.

representative raised the question of the possible future role of UNICEF aid for family planning activities within the context of maternal and child health services. The U.S. proposed that the question be placed on the agenda of the next Board session and that the Executive Director be requested to prepare a report for that session, in consultation with WHO and with other relevant organizations.¹

The position of the French representative appeared to conform with that of his countrymen in other UN population policy-making bodies, when population questions veered toward a suggestion of fertility control. The representative, Robert Debre, who had been active in the founding of WHO, suggested that for the present, UNICEF should confine itself to indirect, but effective, means of population control--without identifying them.² The Soviet delegate questioned whether birth control techniques were yet sufficiently simple to use, reliable, cheap, and not dangerous to women.³

¹The debate is summarized in ECOSOC XXXIX, OR, Suppl. No. 15, UNICEF Executive Board, Report, June, 1965, pp. 32ff. For identification of governments participating, however, see SRs, beginning with E/ICEF/SR.324, June, 1965, p. 5.

The formal representative was P. Fred Delli Quadri, Dean of the New York School of Social Work. The deputy, responsible for continuing formulation of U.S. policy, was Katherine Bain of HEW, a longtime participant in UNICEF deliberations.

²E/ICEF/SR.327, p. 4.

³E/ICEF/SR.324, op. cit., p. 8, and E/ICEF/SR.237, op. cit., p. 6. See also ECOSOC XXXIX, OR, Suppl. No. 15 op. cit., p. 33.

As distinct from the classic Swedish and Indian positions, previously cited in this study, most governments, including those of virtually all of the nations whose populations had a Catholic majority, favored a "middle-of-the-road" approach, especially UNICEF orientation toward education and training programs for family planning. The only government delegate outspokenly in favor of no UNICEF programs related to family planning was the Swiss representative, Hans Conzett, also head of the private organization which raises private funds for UNICEF in Switzerland.¹ Eventually, the Board decided to adopt the U.S. proposal for consideration of a report on the subject, to be developed by the Executive Director and submitted at the 1966 session.

A word should be said about the occupants of the post just mentioned. Maurice Pate, co-founder of the organization and holder of the post for the first eighteen years of the life of UNICEF, died in January, 1965. He was succeeded by another American, Henry Labouisse, a veteran of many economic and social missions, now as a member of the U.S. Department of State, now of one UN agency or another. The Board session just described thus marked his debut.

At the 1966 session in Addis Ababa, Mr. Labouisse submitted his family planning proposal. He recommended a UNICEF response to family planning assistance requested

¹E/ICEF/SR.323, p. 14.

by two governments, India and Pakistan. The report contained technical material prepared with the assistance of William M. Schmidt, Professor of Maternal and Child Health, Harvard University, serving as consultant.¹

At the conclusion of the debate the chairman, Joseph W. Willard of Canada, appointed a Working Party, which included the representatives of Ethiopia, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, the USSR and the U.S., to seek an agreement. Eventually there emerged a consensus for a resolution which was adopted without objection, and read, in part:

The Executive Board,

. . . Requests the advice of the UNICEF/WHO Joint Committee on Health policy on the best way in which UNICEF might participate in programmes of family planning. . . [and] requests the UNICEF members of the Joint Committee . . . to be guided by the following principles:

- a. UNICEF assistance shall be given . . . as part of a country's health services and not as a separate category of assistance;
- b. [UNICEF assistance shall be] . . . limited to the usual forms of aid . . . approved by the Executive Board for many years, such as . . . training . . . vehicles, and supplies and equipment for maternal and child health services;
- c. UNICEF shall not take any responsibility for the organization and administration of the governmental programme relating to family planning; and

¹ECOSOC, UNICEF, EB, Family Planning Report of the Executive Director on the Possible Role of UNICEF (E/ICEF/L.1259), March, 1966.

- d. UNICEF shall request the technical assistance of WHO and the Bureau of Social Affairs of the UN Secretariat in connection with any such assistance.¹

The Board also agreed to decide (in a poll by mail) whether to accept possible requests for family planning aid from India and Pakistan, assuming preliminary approval of the UNICEF Secretariat, and WHO technical approval.² A few months later, formal requests, for one-year UNICEF projects costing \$340,000 for India and \$260,000 for Pakistan, were so approved by UNICEF-EB.

When the Board next met in New York, in 1967, it endorsed JCHP terms of reference for types of projects.³ Switzerland sent a different representative, who voiced no objection.⁴

Family planning was hardly an issue at the Board session in 1968, in New York. Given the problem of deciding upon funds for future requests submitted by governments other than India and Pakistan, the Executive Director expressed the view that the 1967 ground rules (including a

¹ECOSOC XXXXI, OR, Suppl. No. 13, UNICEF Executive Board, Report, May, 1966, pp. 59-60.

²Ibid., p. 60.

³ECOSOC XXXXIII, OR, Suppl. No. 8, UNICEF Executive Board, Report, June, 1967, pp. 15-17. The JCHP report on the Health aspects of family planning is E/ICEF/556.

⁴Based on a conversation with a participant. The new pledge of "sympathetic and understanding" consideration by the Swiss government was expressed formally in the 1967 session by Bernard Turrettini (E/ICEF/SR.361, 12 June, 1967), p. 12.

ban on supplying contraceptives) provided a "good basis" for operations as matters stood.¹

Field Programs

The Pakistani Case

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the role of UNICEF as the executor of a field project within the framework of an over-all program of the recipient government is to look at the Pakistani request, initiated in 1966 and implemented in 1967 and 1968:

Because of the emphasis which the national family planning policy places on the protection of mothers and children and on family welfare, the Government of Pakistan has invited UNICEF to participate in the implementation of the scheme,² together with a number of other agencies including the U.S. Agency for International Development (US/AID), the Ford Foundation, the Population Council and Swedish Aid.

¹ECOSOC XXXV, OR, Suppl. No. 8, UNICEF Executive Board, Report, June, 1968, p. 16.

Note: in 1970 the Board decided to authorize the secretariat to include contraceptives, or equipment to make contraceptives, in supplies it furnished for family planning and child welfare aspects of maternal and child health programs, at the request of governments, and with the technical approval of WHO. (ECOSOC XXXIX, OR, Suppl. No. 8, UNICEF, Report of the Executive Board, 1970, p. 14.)

²The third Pakistani national economic five-year plan (1965-70) contains a "Family Planning Scheme" calling for expenditure over the period of \$60 million with the objective of reducing the birth rate from 50 to 40 per thousand population. ECOSOC, UNICEF Program Committee, Recommendation of The Executive Director for an Allocation, Pakistan Family Planning (E/ICEF/P/L.755, 1966), pp. 1-2.

At meetings held in Karachi in January 1966, in which all assisting agencies participated with the Government officers, the role of each was reviewed and the main problems of implementation examined. . . .

A large number of vehicles are required. On the average . . . each of the 52 districts will need eight vehicles for use by doctors, health visitors, nurses, midwives, and supervisors. Vehicles will also be needed for health education units. The total . . . is estimated at 484 vehicles. . . .

The immediate and acute need is for 108 vehicles, three per district for the 36 districts in which the programme is operative in 1966. . . . With 37,000 personnel trained and already working in the field to encourage families to accept the scheme, each week that the medical staff . . . are unable to reach the villages means a serious hindrance. . . .¹

UNICEF accordingly decided to provide: the 108 vehicles; 160 sets of clinical equipment for new family planning clinics; audio-visual aids for village dais (traditional birth attendants, relied upon in family planning programs as a "major resource" in encouraging villagers to participate); and 45 tons of paper for manuals in the vernacular. Total: \$276,000.²

It is worth noting that UNICEF aid, not only in Pakistan but in a similar \$334,000 project for India,³ begins with equipment quite similar to that it traditionally has supplied in hundreds of rural maternal and child health

¹Ibid., p. 4.

²Ibid., pp. 3, 5.

³The Indian counterpart of the UNICEF Pakistani proposal is Document E/ICEF/P/L.754 (April, 1966).

centers in those two nations and contains, as a component, training aid which is like a two-way street: workers trained in malaria control, or some other health problems, are "convertible" as family planning aides, just as persons trained initially in the latter specialty, in future are potentially "re-trainable" for another standard clinical specialty.

In strictly family planning terms, UNICEF thus helps "round out" a national program in the geographical sense (by fulfilling the need for certain equipment in specific districts into which the nation has been sub-divided), and in the functional sense (by accounting for vehicles and manuals, for example, the Pakistani Government can turn elsewhere, such as bi-lateral American and Swedish aid, for contraceptives, and itself handle the payroll of personnel-- which was expected to reach 125,000 persons by 1970).¹

Adoption and Consortia

In 1967, \$1.7 million additional UNICEF funds were raised when private national fund-raising committees in different nations were given the opportunity to "adopt" certain projects, such as the Freedom-from-Hunger campaign. In the following year the Executive Director proposed to EB that rules be altered, on a trial basis, to permit establishment of funds-in-trust for special purposes. Types of projects "noted" by the Board as worthy of support, but for

¹ECOSOC, UNICEF, Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

which UNICEF funds were not then available, would then be endorsed by the Board.¹

Thus it was that at the 1968 session the Board decided to approve

. . . acceptance of specific purpose contributions from governments on a one-year trial basis. [It] also accepted an offer of the Swedish Government, made through [its foreign aid agency], for two projects. . . .

India. Health services (to extend to family planning activities. . . .)	\$401,550
Pakistan. Health services (to extend to family planning activities. . . .)	200,775
Total	<u>602,325</u> ²

It can thus be seen that a single government--that of Sweden--pioneered the separate birth control fund arrangement in UNICEF, subscribing a sum higher than the cost of the UNICEF Indian, and two-thirds of the cost of the Pakistani, projects described. In addition, contribution decisions by donor governments made possible the funding of projects in four other Asian nations in 1968, adding up to a UNICEF expenditure of \$2.5 million on family planning before 1969.³

The UNICEF adoption of responsibility for contributing particular components to a governmental program has its

¹ECOSOC, UNICEF, General Progress Report of the Executive Director (E/ICEF/573), 1968, pp. 63-66.

²ECOSOC, UNICEF, General Progress Report of the Executive Director (E/ICEF/586), 1969, pp. 87-88.

³Figure supplied in an interview with a member of the UNICEF Headquarters Secretariat.

counterpart in the supply of such components as contraceptive devices, and/or equipment for their manufacture, by AID, Swedish Aid, the Ford Foundation, and the Population Council--in the case of Pakistan, for example.¹ The "round table" type of consultation, among representatives of governments, private organizations and international organizations (in this instance, including UNICEF, the Bureau of Social Affairs of the parent UN Secretariat, and WHO), is reminiscent of the institution known as consortium, of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). The Bank conducts a Pakistani Consortium, for example, in which potential donors confer in order to harmonize their shares of loans to various industries in Pakistan.

From the UNICEF point of view, it might be argued that decisions as to equipment, and supplies, required in the Pakistani family planning program are as much a matter of consultation outside UNICEF, as within. Such a Parsonian external interaction takes place, at the lower level of the UNICEF organization, in the field. Another aspect of the horizontality of the decision process can be illustrated by the division of labor within a nation-wide family planning program. In India, for example, family planning ranks first among health priorities in the fourth Five-Year Plan for economic development (1966-1971), and its implementation is

¹E/ICEF/:/L.755, op. cit., p. 5.

the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and Family Planning. But implementation goes forward at three other levels of government: state, district and community, involving also varieties of public and private research, medical and health institutes. Each is consulted at some stage of long decision processes, in and out of formal, or informal, meetings of various committees--which one might view as "little consortia."¹

Parsonian horizontality thus is illustrated by UNICEF outputs, through lower level field officers, of funds for supplies and training as components of a national program. Horizontality may also be illustrated when funds are put into UNICEF by donors, such as Sweden; here the UNICEF Government decision interaction is either managerial, or institutional, or both. A variation on such decision processes for putting funds into UNICEF comes from the private sector. National private organizations affiliated with UNICEF supply funds, and varieties of womens' associations offer volunteer work at the community level.²

Summary

The question of what gets into a decision can be answered in a variety of ways at the institutional level.

¹E/ICEF/P/L.754, pp. 2-4.

²UNICEF, General Progress Report of the Executive Director, 1969, pp. 54-55.

In respect to EB, one aspect was U.S. Government initiative in placing the birth control item on the agenda; another, the momentarily idiosyncratic behavior of the Swiss delegate, contributing to a decision of postponement of the item for a year. Eventually countervailing the slowdown was the what of Swedish initiative: underwriting UNICEF contributions to sizeable projects, in Pakistan and India. Also, in common with WHO, the institutional what of UNICEF involves few generalized public-relations statements about a global population crisis.

Like the secretariats of ECAFE and WHO, the UNICEF managerial system is scarcely visible. And the lower levels of all three organizations represent the "business end" of program decisions, meaningfully utilizing support from corresponding levels of government and private organizations. Thus perhaps the most significant what of UNICEF field operations is participation in a sizeable consortium, responding to the Follett insight, "orders come from the work."

PART III. CONCLUSION

CHAPTER VII

THE FRAMEWORK IN PERSPECTIVE

In the highly specialized industrial society of today, the predominant form of organization is a highly rationalized and impersonal integration of a large number of specialists co-operating to achieve some announced specific objective.¹

The preceding chapters were addressed to the first purpose of this study, namely, description of the interactions of United Nations, U.S. Government, and private organizations in the formulation of population programs. This final chapter will deal with the remaining purpose, namely, explanation of the salient organization characteristics of decision processes previously described. The first section will present decision characteristics which remain constant in a variety of organization interactions. The second section cites conspicuous variations in other characteristics. And finally, generalizations from the two sections will be viewed in the light of UN decision settings broader than the setting of this study, in search of potential hypotheses for future inquiry.

¹Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization (New York: Knopf, 1964), p. 3.

Constants

The Vertical Ingredient

The study presented evidence of structures within UN organizations which confirmed that element of the Parsons internal ingredient which might be labelled, "separation of hierarchical levels." Thus the first constant of organization behavior is the demonstration that the upper, or institutional, organization level rarely "commands" the middle, or managerial level, but rather that each rather independently concentrates upon its own basically separate functions. For example, the Economic and Social Council only once rewrote a Population Commission draft resolution on population, and the Secretary-General only once appeared to have reversed a fundamental direction in Population Division programming. The "levels gap" appeared even wider between a plenum session of the upper-level Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, which supplied ceremonial approval for population programs, and bottom, or technical-level, specialists in the mid-1960s, who designed and implemented projects. A similar inconspicuousness of the middle level seemed characteristic of initial UNICEF policy and program, in the contrast between the functions of Executive Board and Executive Director at the summit, and those of program officers in the field.

The Horizontal Ingredient

The other ingredient of the Parsons venture into organization theory, the external, helped to reveal a second constant, when decision processes were compared. In this instance the comparison was made not just within given UN organizations, but extending outward, on one of the three hierarchical levels, into the process environment of U.S. Government structures, and of private organizations. The contrast in the two findings can be stated, in part, in terms of "separate-ness" in the above cases of internal, i.e. vertical, constant, and "togetherness" in the case of the external, or horizontal, constant. The previous chapters were replete with examples of close collaboration among UN, government and private organizations. It seems a truism that decision-making processes examined in this study were both (a) horizontal, cutting across types of organizations, and (b) symbiotic, i.e., most program decisions were produced by a partnership, not by a single organization alone. On this latter point, the dictionary definition of symbiosis seems apt: the living together of two dissimilar organisms [types of organizations?] in close association or union, especially where this is advantageous to both, as distinguished from parasitism.

It can be argued, therefore, that the two Parsons ingredients for organization theory served as searching devices in the preceding chapters to locate evidence of

constants, in organization behavior--constants stated as generalizations. In examining the one-paragraph summaries of ingredient constants just set down, a reader might react with a statement that the designated constants are self-evident. The author would plead that self-evidence set in after the study, not before. He would rest his case upon the argument that existing literature which borders upon UN decision processes runs heavily toward statement of dominance of outcomes by upper level notables, and rarely indicates the presence of other levels. An obvious example is accounts, whether journalistic or scholarly, of the Dag Hammarskjold role in the difficulties in the Congo in the early 1960s, in which other secretariat officials rarely are mentioned, nor are officials of national government below the level of cabinet member. Absence of mention of "middle managers," for example, hardly constitutes proof that their participation in decision processes was inconsequential. Such an approach contrasts dramatically with the Macridis dictum quoted at the outset of Chapter II, namely, that the complexity and multiplicity of organization structures necessitate a detailed road map as a prerequisite to the tracing of pathways of decision.¹ In future studies, much more extensive than this introductory

¹A dictum reinforced by the Follett quotations at the outset of Chapters III and VI, emphasizing stages in the growth of a decision, and its roots.

one, it would therefore seem fruitful to extend examination of a single decision-maker outward to detailed consideration of other individuals, or, by contrast, to carry the mapping of a long decision chain on to the stages of identifying the relative importance of particular actors, in relation to decision outcomes.

The Unpredicted Ingredient

In looking back over the interaction of organization units presented in Part II, one becomes increasingly aware of a factor unstated in the two Parsons ingredients, namely, the specialist. On a philosophical level, the ubiquity of the specialist is stated by Victor Thompson in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter. And on a methodological level, the question arises: do coalitions of specialists, spread out across all three types of organizations (UN, government and private) form a network which exerts a greater impact upon decisions than do either vertical or horizontal dimensions of organization structures? If so a third constant--the specialist--presents himself as a likely central object of future research.

The first specialists to appear in this study were demographers: within the parent UN Secretariat, within the delegations of national governments in the Population Commission, and in expert committees to advise both. Varieties of outside specialists made up expert groups which, as hypothesized in the Charles Ascher statement at the beginning

of Chapter V, "decide" program questions, which subsequently are "ratified" by supposedly superior officials, or governing bodies. Even the chiefly "non-specialist" UNICEF Secretariat is denied, by its mandate, the right to proceed with programs until outside specialists grant approval. Thus specialization is a constant fact of life in the UN organizations examined. Can specialists be thought of as functioning at the interstices of formal sub-structures of organizations, providing a fundamental information channel through which decisions flow? A generalization concerning this ingredient unpredicted by the Parsons approach--the specialist as the key decision-maker--will be presented in the final section of this chapter.

Variations

Two Particularities

As noted, the Ascher hypothesis, that the hierarchical bottom level dominates decisions formalized at higher levels, flies in the face of the Parsons internal ingredient, in which a veto power remains inherent, though infrequently used. It might however be argued that this situation may prevail in WHO as a particular case, and not in other decision networks examined in this study. In future research, it could conceivably prove important to analysis of decision processes, to examine functions other than population to test for presence of bottom-upward decision flow. Agriculture programming

in the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, or industrial development in the UN Industrial Development Organization, suggest themselves as functions worth examining, in UN organization contexts. Does such a flow vary according to function, or organization, or is it peculiar to WHO?

A second particularity, or variant in UN decision-making norms, uncovered in the present study, is the non-expertise of UNICEF staff. This trait, particular to UNICEF alone of the four UN decision networks investigated, suggests two types of future studies: (a) an inquiry into UNICEF operations as a "laboratory" of non-specialized administration in a supposed Victor Thompson age of specialists, and (b) construction, and testing, of a typology which would compare the decision characteristics of UNICEF with those of a highly specialized UN organization, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Budgets vs Programs

The allocation of resources is sometimes described as the heart of the political process. In the present study, budget amounts have been cited as indicators of the scope of population programs. And variations in these amounts, within a single UN organization, and in types of funding arrangements, seem endless.

It has been shown that a UN regular budget--that is, one financed through "club dues" paid by assessment of member

governments--figured importantly in only one particular UN network, namely, the one involving the Population Division. Funding made possible through extra payments by governments varied widely in type: UNICEF permitted perhaps the most novel and explicit earmarking of such payments to recipient governments, followed by the increasingly elaborate institutionalization of the Secretary-General's Population Fund, in a UN Development Program setting. The more varied the budget-funding options open to donor governments, the more flexible UN programming for birth control becomes; such a proposition merits attention in the final section, which follows.

Generalizations

The study now concludes with two speculative generalizations concerning possible application of decision findings, to UN organizations other than those involved in population problems. The first generalization stems from the final "constant ingredient," specialists; the last, from the concluding "variation," in the above paragraph.

The Specialist Under the Microscope

A kind of "house joke" among American demographers who participated in Population Commission sessions, in Population Division programming, in World Population conferences, or in ad hoc groups to supply advice thereto, is the application of the term "establishment" to their

collective selves. Are a relatively small number of persons trained in the specialty, or discipline, of demography--not just in the United States, but across the world--united by professional norms? Does the wearing of the same professional "school tie" (a) prompt them to "think alike" in technical decisions, and (b) prompt non-specialists found in decision networks, therefore to defer to demographers "collective wisdom?" And, if so, does it therefore follow that (c) demographers supply a convenient consensus, and thus (d) prevent what otherwise might become a "generalists'" decision-making impasse?

Obviously, further study would be necessary to test such an interlocking set of hypotheses, in either a network of PC-PD-private organization, or a counterpart demographer network based in ECAFE. A more complex approach would however seem to be necessary to carry the analogy over into WHO. If one hypothesizes that most professionals in the secretariat of the latter organization can be lumped under a supposed discipline, labelled "public health," an analysis would have to cope with a multitude of sub-disciplines, for the American Public Health Association is a confederation which encompasses fifteen different professional categories.

Thus the basic question comes down to this: do members of a single profession, employed in sub-structures of UN, government and private organizations, and/or momentarily

serving in ad hoc specialist committees functioning at the interstices thereof, function as a norm-unified network vital to the consummation of decision processes in which complex technology is a key factor? Such a question could be raised of nuclear scientists and engineers participating in decision processes centering around the UN International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, or around the UN International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal, for example. Methodology for this type of inquiry into the nature of the sociology of members of given discipline, or sub-discipline, and the impact of that sociology upon a given UN decision-making process, has yet to be invented, but it may well be a requisite to an understanding of the actual influence which a network of specialists exerts upon decision outcomes.

Special Funding Under the Microscope

If techniques remain to be devised for examination of specialists under some powerful kind of microscope (if such a term may be used as a figure of speech for theory), how could a study be undertaken into varieties of special-purpose funds of UN organizations, funds volunteered by governments?

As a rule of thumb, a UN organization's regular budget pays for the upkeep of its secretariat, as well as of programs which have become highly institutionalized. By contrast, rarely can a secretariat introduce a new type of

program, or launch a sizeable expansion in the scope of projects, without "selling" one or more donor governments on the importance of contributing voluntary funds. It has been shown that UN birth control programs almost universally depended upon the latter type of funding; that is, no extra payments from governments means no programs.

This kind of generalization could be tested in other UN contexts. For example, just as the United States and Swedish governments take a particular interest in birth control and therefore are the principal sources of contributions to the Secretary-General's Population Fund, so the government of the Netherlands takes a particular interest in two economic and social functions pursued by the parent UN, and backs up that interest by supplying the major portion of financial support. One Dutch sponsorship is the UN Research Institute for Social Development in Geneva, which concerns itself with studies of methods for integrating plans for national economic development, with corresponding ones for social development. Another Dutch initiative is funds to underwrite studies in the parent UN Secretariat of the technology of long-range economic development planning; a Dutch economist, Jan Tinbergen, and his university research group in the Netherlands, provide much of the background for such UN ventures. Comparison of types of institutionalization of contributions of government resources--financial and intellectual--remains to be undertaken. Yet if mandatory

government does rarely underwrite new programs, or sizeable increase in old, and innovative work depends upon funding by a particular government of a particular UN organization program, then such a research project of comparison seems important.

One final world. Summary of findings of the present study, comparison of decision elements across types of organizations, and search for generalizations and hypotheses, point almost entirely in the direction of UN economic and social problems. Perhaps these conclusions inevitably lean in such a direction, given the interrelatedness of the issue of this study, population, with such problems, especially after the decline in political opposition to UN population programs. May any of the conclusions found in this chapter be applied to processes out of which emerge decisions of high political import in the world, such as the search for peace in the Middle East, or extension of treaties to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weaponry? A hint that some of the approaches of this study to identification of decision-participants who may not be conspicuous, but actually influential, appeared earlier in this chapter, in connection with Hammarskjold and the Congo. It might be speculated that decision-actors in highly political circumstances are less visible than their counterparts in economic issues, and therefore a Parsons, or a Macridis, or a Follett, approach is more difficult. One could only approach such a question, whether pertaining to economics or politics, by undertaking a lengthy study.

ANNEX

ANNEX A

UN General Assembly: 17th Session
Resolution 1838 (XVII)
December 18, 1962

Population Growth and Economic Development

The General Assembly,

Considering that rapid economic and social progress in the developing countries is dependent, not the least, upon the ability of these countries to provide their peoples with education, a fair standard of living and the possibility for productive work,

Considering further that economic and social development and population policies are closely interrelated and may be carried out simultaneously to secure maximum benefits,

Recognizing that the health and welfare of the family is of paramount importance, not only for obvious humanitarian reasons, but also with regard to economic development and social progress, and that the health and welfare of the family require special attention in areas with a relatively high rate of population growth,

Recognizing further that it is the responsibility of each Government to decide its own policies and devise its own programmes of action for dealing with the problems of population and economic and social progress,

Reminding States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies that according to recent census results the effective population increase during the last decade has been particularly high in many low-income less developed countries,

Reminding Member States that in formulating their economic and social policies it is useful to take into account the latest relevant facts on the interrelationship of population growth and economic and social development and that the forthcoming World Population Conference and the Asian Population Conference might throw new light on the importance of this problem, especially for the developing countries,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1217 (XII), which,

inter alia, invites Member States, particularly the developing countries, to follow as closely as possible the inter-relationships existing between economic and population changes, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the co-ordination of the activities of the United Nations in the demographic and economic fields,

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolution 820 (XXXI) which contains provisions aiming at intensified efforts to ensure international cooperation in the evaluation, analysis and utilization of population census results and related data, particularly in the less developed countries, and which requests the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities of increasing the amounts of technical assistance funds which may be made available for these activities,

Recognizing that further studies and research are necessary to fill the gaps in our knowledge about the causes and consequences of demographic trends, particularly in the less developed countries,

Recognizing that removals of large national groups to other countries may give rise to ethnical, political, emotional and economic difficulties,

1. Notes with appreciation the report of the Acting Secretary-General, entitled "The United Nations Development Decade, Proposals for Action" which, inter alia, refers to the interrelationship between population growth and economic and social development;

2. Expresses its appreciation of work on population problems which has up to now been carried out under the guidance of the Population Commission of the Economic and Social Council;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to conduct an inquiry among the Governments of States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies concerning the particular problems confronting them as a result of the reciprocal action of economic development and population changes;

4. Recommends that the Economic and Social Council in co-operation with the specialized agencies, the regional economic commissions and the Population Commission, and taking into account the results of the inquiry referred to in paragraph 3 above, intensify its studies and research on the interrelationship of population growth and economic and social development, with particular reference to the needs

of the developing countries for investment in health and educational facilities within the framework of their general development programmes;

5. Further recommends that the Economic and Social Council report on its findings to the General Assembly not later than at its nineteenth session;

6. Endorses the view of the Population Commission that the United Nations should encourage and assist the Governments, especially of the less developed countries, in obtaining basic data and carrying out essential studies of the demographic aspects, as well as other aspects, of their economic and social development problems;

7. Recommends that the second World Population Conference pay special attention to the interrelationships of population growth with economic and social development, particularly in countries that are less developed, and that efforts be made to obtain the fullest possible participation in the Conference by experts from such countries.

ANNEX B

E/RES/1084 (XXXIX)
30 July 1965

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

1084 (XXXIX) Work programmes and priorities in population fields

The Economic and Social Council,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1838 (XVII) of 18 December 1962 on population growth and economic development and Council resolutions 933 C (XXXV) of 5 April 1963 on intensification of demographic studies, research and training and 1048 (XXXVII) of 15 August 1964 on population growth and economic and social development,

Bearing in mind the problems in the economic and social development of developing countries associated with the growth and structure of population and migration from the countryside to the cities,

Recalling the concern with these problems expressed in the responses of many governments of developing countries to the inquiry among governments on problems resulting from the interaction of economic development and population changes carried out in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution of the General Assembly,

Taking note of the views expressed by the Population Commission in the report of its thirteenth session on population growth and economic and social development and on possibilities of assisting governments of developing countries in dealing with population problems, and in particular the Population Commission's recommendations on the long-range programme of work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the population fields,

Being aware that many countries lack technical personnel with specialized training in population questions and facilities for training national technicians,

Considering that there is a need to intensify and extend the scope of the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies relating to population questions,

1. Endorses the recommendations of the Population

Commission in the report of its thirteenth session on the long-range programme of work in the fields of population, including its recommendations with regard to the increase and improvement of demographic statistics, the strengthening of regional demographic training and research centres, and other activities to increase the supply of technically trained personnel in the developing countries, expansion and intensification of research and technical work, widening of the scope and increase of the amount of technical assistance in population fields available to governments of developing countries upon their request, and conferences and related activities in the population fields;

2. Draws the attention of the Statistical Commission, the Social Commission and the Commission on the Status of Women to the recommendations and suggestions of the Population Commission relating to activities in their fields of interest;

3. Invites the regional economic commissions and the interested specialized agencies to give consideration to possibilities of modifying and expanding their programmes of activities in the population fields along the lines indicated by the recommendations of the Population Commission;

4. Calls to the attention of the General Assembly the need to provide the necessary resources, within the framework of the decisions taken to balance the budgets of the United Nations, for the United Nations to carry out the intensified and expanded programme of activities in the fields of population recommended by the Population Commission;

5. Requests the Secretary-General:

(a) To consider giving a position for the work in population in the United Nations Secretariat that would correspond to its importance;

(b) To provide, in accordance with Council resolution 222 (IX) of 14 and 15 August 1949 and General Assembly resolution 418 (V) of 1 December 1950, advisory services and training on action programmes in the field of population at the request of governments desiring assistance in this field;

(c) To consult the interested specialized agencies on the division of responsibilities and co-ordination of activities in the long-range programme of work in the population fields recommended by the Population Commission;

(d) To present to the Population Commission at its fourteenth session proposals with regard to the priorities of work over future periods of two years and of five years, within the framework of the long-range programme of work in the population fields.

ANNEX C

54(XX). Population growth and economic and social development

The Committee of the Whole of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,

Considering that the achievement of a satisfactory pattern of economic growth including advancement in health, nutrition, housing, education, social welfare and the whole range of social services, is a vital necessity for the region,

Considering further that any economic and social development programme should take into account and, if necessary, modify demographic trends in view of their interrelationship with economic and social processes,

Recognizing that the recent demographic trends amongst most of the countries of the region, which reflect high rates of population growth and an increasing mobility of the population, are hindering the achievement of satisfactory living standards in the shortest possible time,

Noting further that the problems relating to the increase in the volume of migration within countries, especially from rural to urban areas, require even greater efforts on the part of Governments to achieve urgently needed economic and social betterment,

Observing that efforts to find effective solutions for population problems have been hampered in many countries of the region by lack of facilities and funds, lack of

comprehensive and reliable demographic statistics, insufficient development of demographic and socio-biological research and shortages of trained personnel, all of which have heightened the need for international or intra-regional co-operation,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1838 (XVII) of December 1962, recommending that the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East intensify study and research on the interrelationship of population growth and economic and social development, and endorsing the view of the Population Commission that the United Nations should encourage and assist developing countries in obtaining basic data and carrying out studies of the demographic aspects of development,

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolution 933 (XXXV) of 5 April 1963, inviting the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East to examine the possibilities of intensifying its work in the demographic field within the general framework of the programme recommended by the Population Commission at its twelfth session,

Noting with approval the resolution unanimously adopted by the Asian Population Conference on 20 December 1963, strongly urging the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East to give its full support to the recommendations of the Conference,

1. Invites the governments of member States of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:

- (a) To take account of the urgent need to adopt a positive population policy related to their individual needs;
- (b) To take account, in their formulation and execution of general policies and plans for social and economic development, of the recommendations of the Asian Population Conference relating to national population policies;

2. Requests the Executive Secretary to:

- (a) Facilitate direct exchanges of information at the departmental level among Governments in the region on all aspects of population and social and economic growth,
- (b) Expand the scope of technical assistance available to Governments in the region, upon their request, for data collection, research, experimentation and action in all aspects of population problems, including family welfare planning programmes, through regional advisory services, development and strengthening of regional, sub-regional and national training and research institutions, study tours, fellowships and meetings of technical groups;

3. Further requests the Executive Secretary to organize a collaborative programme of regional, sub-regional and inter-regional technical working group meetings designed to provide guide-lines for governmental action and international assistance in particular fields of work relating to the population problems of the region;

4. Recommends that the Conference of Asian Statisticians give urgent attention to inadequacies in the concepts and definitions of the labour force, employment, unemployment and under-employment as used in the statistics of countries of the region;

5. Invites the United Nations and the specialized agencies

to expand the scope of the technical assistance they are prepared to give, upon the request of Governments, in the development of statistics, research, experimentation and action programmes related to population.

17 March 1964

ANNEX D

"The Eighteenth World Health Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Director-General on Programme Activities in the Health Aspects of World Population which might be developed by WHO,

Bearing in mind Article 2 (1) of the Constitution which reads: 'to promote maternal and child health and welfare and to foster the ability to live harmoniously in a changing total environment';

Noting resolution 1048 (XXXVII) adopted by the Economic and Social Council at its thirty-seventh session, August 1964;

Believing that demographic problems require the consideration of economic, social, cultural, psychological and health factors in their proper perspective;

Noting that the United Nations Population Commission at its thirteenth session, April 1965, attached high priority to the research and other activities in the field of fertility;

Considering that the changes in the size and structure of the population have repercussions on health conditions;

Recognizing that problems of human reproduction involve the family unit as well as society as a whole, and that the size of the family should be the free choice of each individual family;

Bearing in mind that it is a matter for national administrations to decide whether and to what extent they should support the provision of information and services to their people on the health aspects of human reproduction;

Accepting that it is not the responsibility of WHO to endorse or promote any particular population policy; and

Noting that the scientific knowledge with regard to the biology of human reproduction and the medical aspects of fertility control is insufficient,

1. APPROVES the report of the Director-General on Programme Activities in the Health Aspects of World Population which might be developed by WHO;

2. REQUESTS the Director-General to develop further the programme proposed:

(a) in the fields of reference services, studies on medical aspects of sterility and fertility control methods and health aspects of population dynamics; and

(b) in the field of advisory services as outlined in Part III, paragraph 3, of his report, on the understanding that such services are related, within the responsibilities of WHO, to technical advice on the health aspects of human reproduction and should not involve operational activities; and

3. REQUESTS the Director-General to report to the Nineteenth World Health Assembly on the programme of WHO in the field of human reproduction."

WHA XIX, 1965, Resolution WHA18.49.

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Documents Issued by UN Organizations

ECAFE

Reports of annual plenary sessions appear as a supplementary volume in the series of Official Records (ORs) of ECOSOC: for example, ECOSOC XXXVII, OR, Suppl. No. 2, ECAFE Annual Report, 1964. Details of population programs are meager in such reports, but are plentiful in:

Activities of the ECAFE Secretariat in the Field of Population (E/CN.11/860), 1969, and

Proposals for an Expanded ECAFE Programme in the Field of Population: the Asian Population Programme (E/CN.11/L.202), 1968.

Recommendations for population policy and program are found in reports of four expert committees:

Expert Group on Assessment and Use-Effectiveness of Family Planning Methods, Summary of the Report (E/CN.11/L.232), 1969.

Expert Working Group on the Feasibility of Establishing a Regional Population Centre, Report (E/CN.11/L.173), 1967.

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ECOSOC

The ORs of this body include separate volumes submitted by various UN organizations, including ECAFE and UNICEF, the assigned numbers (Suppl. No. __) varying from ECOSOC session to session. For example, ECOSOC Session XIX series includes Suppl. No. 5, Population Commission 8th Session, Report, 1965. In addition to ORs, vast quantities of mimeographed documents appear with the ECOSOC rubric at the top, some including an ECOSOC session number, some not. Varieties of such reports on population matters can be illustrated by such titles as:

Population Commission 13th, ad hoc Committee of Experts on Long-range Programmes in the Field of Population, Report (E/CN.9/182, and Add. 1), 1964.

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General Assembly

An example of the documents included in the OR series of a given annual Assembly session is:

24th Session, Suppl. No. 1 (A/7601), 1969, Annual Report on the Work of the Organization, 1968-69.

Documents pertinent to the 1962 debate on the population resolution include:

16th Session, OR, Annexes, Agenda Item 84, 1961.

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17th Session, OR, Plenary Sessions, Vol. III, 1962.

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_____, Draft Resolutions A/C.2/L.657 and A/C.2/L.709/Rev.1/Add.1, 1962.

A typical background document prepared by the secretariat for use in debate in Assembly Committees is:

24th Session, Administrative and Budgetary Co-ordination of the United Nations with the Specialized Agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Administrative Budgets of the Agencies, 27th Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the General Assembly at its 24th Session (A/7818), 1969.

Office of Public Information

Frequently press releases supply useful background on deliberations of policy bodies, or programs of the secretariats. For example:

News Release, Statement by Secretary-General on the Second Development Decade (SG/SM/1109, DD/21), May, 1969.

Population Commission

See listings under ECOSOC.

Population Division

See listings under Secretariat.

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Varieties of categories of documents range from "housekeeping" kinds of announcements of internal organization, through notices to governments, to periodicals, and, as indicated in previous listings, substantive background material for use in debate in policy bodies. Typical samples:

Circular Notice to Member Governments announcing Population Fund), (SO 314 - 9), 1967.

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Newsletter, all issues.

Organization of the Secretariat (ST/SGB/131), 1966.

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A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System. Geneva: 1969, Doc. DP/5, 2 vols. Report by Sir Robert Jackson.

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UNICEF, A Short Guide to UNICEF: An Introduction to the Policies and Working Methods of the United Nations Children's Fund (E/ICEF/Misc. 131), 1967.

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ECOSOC XXVII, OR, Suppl. No. 2, UNICEF Executive Board, Report, 1958.

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ECOSOC, UNICEF, Executive Board, Family Planning Report of the Executive Director on the Possible Role of UNICEF (E/ICEF/L.1259), 1966.

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