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POLITICS OF AGRARIAN ASSISTANCE IN ITALY: THE CASE OF THE CONTADINO-OPERAIO IN FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA

City University of New York PH.D. 1985

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POLITICS OF AGRARIAN ASSISTANCE IN ITALY: THE CASE OF THE CONTADINO-OPERAIO IN FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA

by

CHARLOTTE BUSHNELL WATSON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The Graduate Center of the City University of New York

1984

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ABSTRACT

POLITICS OF AGRARIAN ASSISTANCE IN ITALY:

THE CASE OF THE CONTADINO-OPERAIO IN

FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA

by

CHARLOTTE BUSHNELL WATSON

Advisor: Professor Patrick Peppe

This thesis focuses on the relationship of the depolarization of politics between the Christian Democrats and the Communist party in the northeastern Italian Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia since World War II to the process of development that has taken place there.

The governing coalition headed by the DC and The Church sought to maintain divisions between Italy's rural and urban sectors through a broad assistance network and political polarization as a vehicle for mass mobilization, which were to further their chosen model of urban-based industrial development. Though the gap between the two sectors and the parties remains strong, recent depolarization is the result of changes in both the base of the parties' power and in the leadership.

In Friuli, this change is taking place in both urban and rural zones, but it is coming about more rapidly and differently in the former than in the latter. The unit of analysis in the study is the contadino-operaio family, whose history is presented from the era before Italian rule,

through fascism to the present. The experience of accelerated and partially autonomous decentralized industrial development in a rural setting has allowed the adaptation of rural norms to a new economic situation rather than replacing them with urban values. The contadino-operaio is neither an urban worker nor a full-time farmer, and through both rural industrial employment and part-time farming, attempts to maintain as much independence as possible from the State's assistance structure. The contadino-operaio's depolarization is not as much the result of secularization as it is for the urban population.

In a Region such as Friuli, many parties have claimed responsibility for the area's new well-being, though they have followed more than initiated it. This, as well as internal party divisions which have allowed local leaders a variety of choices among national factions, has helped reduce the polarization of their constituencies though all parties continue to mobilize as propagandists. Polarization has not been replaced by a secular political culture which all Italians hold in common, and local politics are no more coincidental with national policy needs than they ever were. Italian politics continue to be based on regional, sub-national, and cultural divisions. With a gradual decline in polarization, increased fragmentation of the system seems the most likely result.

There is a distinct parallel between the social structure, land tenure, and the process of decentralizing

industrial production, between Friuli and other zones of the Italian countryside. There is little research on the political behavior of the contadino-operaio, but the unit is being recognized as a widely spread phenomenon in Italy. The study of the contadino-operaio may have some comparative value for other areas of Italy as well as for developing countries with large rural populations which depend on fragmented land holdings, and where there is a weak urban industrial sector. The conclusion that political development does not necessarily follow economic development, and that polarized mobilization as a substitute for mass participation can ultimately retard balanced development, has a broader application than to Friuli and Italy alone.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Turtura said, "One cannot understand this Italy if one does not know and comprehend the decisive role played by the people of the countryside who have never been peripheral to the nation's history or a stranger to its political reasonings." This is why I thank the people of Friuli-Venezia Giulia frist of all for not only being open and patient with me but demanding and challenging. I am grateful to have been invited not only into their offices but also their fields and homes. Without Mario, Italy would still be more a mystery than it is and without him I would never have been more than a visitor.

Second, this research would never have been possible without a few very special people at the City University of New York who have had faith in me even when I have not, or without A.J. who kept me a "person" while I was at the University.

My greatest asset has always been my unique family. Within it I have been given inspiration, encouragement and financial support. I hope each one who has given so much will be pleased with the end/beginning. My friend-sister-editor Diane has lived through the worst moments of it, my Mother and Grandmother the most expensive, and my Father the debate. My son Ned lived through it all. To all of you my deepest thanks.

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GLOSSARY AND FOREWORD

The Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia contains the four Provinces of Gorizia, Porenone, Trieste and Udine. Each of these is made up of Communes. When speaking of Friuli, often the whole Region is being considered. At other times, the Friulan area, meaning the Porvinces of Udine and Pordenone will be compared to the Giulan area which includes the Provinces of Trieste and Gorizia.

Carnia is the mountainous northern area of Udine. The Bassa Friulana or Bassa Friuli, or just the Bassa, is the souther part of the Region which is mostly in the Province of Udine with its eastern border in Gorizia and its western part including some of the Province of Pordenone. The southern part of the Bassa consists of the swamps and lagoons created by the rivers which run into the Adriatic sea. It is in this area where Bonifica Integrale, or just Bonifica, which includes land reclamation and the building and maintenance of irriagation systems are essential to agriculture.

Contadino may be translated as farmer or as peasant. It may be used as an insult or as an apology, or it may be used as a compliment or said with pride. Forms of farming in Italy are the mezzadria, tenant farming and the use of bracciante labor which is paid wages though these workers were once paid in kind. Both mezzadria and bracciante may also be sharecroppers but the farmer will be given a place to live by the landlord or padrone while the latter will

have to find his own house. Throughout history, agrarian contracts between the padrone and the mezzadria and the braccianti (the plural form of bracciante) have been as important an issue as land tenure and its reform. Those people who could no longer live off the land or who were put off a farm by the padrone, turned to brigantaggio, banditry, or to the black market for a living. The family unit of the twentieth centry has been more likely to emigrate to find work or to get a job in industry or the service sector. Operaio is the Italian word for worker. Our modern contadino-operaio is a family unit which relies on the land, often on industrial work and on other sources such as pensions for their income. In Friuli-Venezia Giulia and elsewhere in Italy, these families live side by side with farmers who own and work their own land, who are called direct cultivators.

There are several words which are essential to the vocabulary of the Italian farmer. Central to his life is his parrocchia or parish, and the priest or padre, whose title was Don. In the past it was through the Church that contadino could gain access to credit from the local casse rurali, the equivalent of a savings and loan association. The word servitù for the contadino represents the history of his dependence on a padre or padrone or on a State and in his vocabulary is the opposite of libertà. The phrase servitù militare, military servitude, means to the people of Friuli, a way of consolidating state centralization, whether

it is a communications network set up for the military installations throughout the Region, or the whole development plan which evolved for the area.

In the era before fascism we will encounter organizations of contadini called Leghe, or leagues, these will be both Rosse or red and Bianche or white, depending on whether their leaders were of the Left or the Right respectively. The Partito Popolare, or Popular Party was formed in 1919 as a response to post-World War I demands. It was led by many Dons and Padroni. The Fasci di Combattimento or Fasci were also formed in 1919. These were usually made up of veterans returning from World War I. They became the fascist squads or squadristi. Intrasigents is the word the Italians use for radical fascists who were tied to the squadristi, as they prefer to use the word "radical" to describe members of parties on the Left.

Confagricoltura or the General Confederation of Agriculture was set up in 1920 by the large landowners to protect their interests. The industrialists formed the Federzoni. The Federconsorzi was used to gather grain and other agricultural products during fascism, and in post-World War II years remained a link between agriculture and the central government's administration.

After World War II, one of the many organizations set up the Coldiretti, the Union of Direct Cultivators. The head of it, Bonomi, was also a director of the Federconsorzi. It is these two organizations which have

administered agricultural policy for the Christian Democratic Party since World War II. As a result, the contadini call this trangle's administration, "bonomiana". Lo Bianco was chosen by Bonomi in 1980 to take over the Coldiretti when the latter retired.

Also in the post-World War II years, we will find two very broad types of organization in Italy, those which are political and those which are cultural. Among the policial actors are the CLN, the Committe of National Liberation which was a coalition of parties that were part of the Resistance. Regardless of their later political loyalties they all considered themselves partisans. Among them were people who were part of the Partitio d'Azione, the Republican Party or PRI, the Liberal Party or PLI, and Socialist Party or PSI (and after their split in 1947 also the PSLI, later the PSDI), and the Communist Party or PCI, as well as the Christian Democratic Party or the DC.

Among the unions were the Coldiretti of the DC and , in 1946, the left's old Federterra became the Confederterra. In 1947 the PCI formed the Federmezzadri for the mezzardi and the Federbraccianti for the braccianti.

For industrial workers after the Second World War there was the CGIL unitl 1950 when the DC split away and founded the CISL. ACLI was a Christian workers organization and after the War was used as an industrial union and as a cultural organization by the Catholic Movement. Members

could be from the PSI or the DC or any other party except the PCI.

Among the cultural groups in Italy, the most important before, during and after the fascist era is Azione Cattolica, whose members are also called Azionisti. It is mosly this group which was responsible for the forming of the Catholic Civic Committee or CC which was instrumental in the election campaigns right after World War II which brough the DC to power.

Other important post-World War II actors whom we will incounter which are of importance are the AMG or the Allied Military Government and Confindustria, the organization of industrialists who wished to rebuild and further develop Italy. Employment and unemployment were central concerns after the War so the left's proposal called the Piano di Lavoro proposed on February 18, 1950 and the Government Employment Offices called Camere di Lavoro will be important in the discussion of the post-war era.


The Italian government is said to be run by "transformismo." The idea the word expresses is that one must coopt one's nearest rivals in order to form a coalition against common enemies. Enemies are defined as anyone who refuses to be coopted. If one asks an Italian how his government is run, he will look at you and say "tampone". This word means a bottle stopper, an ink pad for stamps and buffer. He means all three of things which he feels are all

part of bureaucratic, stop-gap methods of inefficient government administration.

In Italy, there is a clear difference between Catholic World, which is universal and monolithic, the Catholic Church, which is a body of theological doctrine and a hierarchical structure, and catholic area. The latter includes institutions, associations, and the press, as well as individual persons for whom catholic doctrine and mentality are reference points. The institutions of Church hierarchy: priests, sisters, the parish network, as well as the DC and all its old and new associations, are included in the catholic area as well as all Italians who have catholic values.

In this work, then, catholic with a lower-case "c" is simply meant as an adjective. Socialism, communism, catholicism, secularism, and clericalism are all part of the Italian political vocabulary, and an attempt has been made here to use the words both gramatically and ideologically as the Italians do.

The Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Italy



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A. A QUESTION OF THEORIES: PEASANT POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN DEVELOPMENT

In Italy during the 1970s, the abatement of post-World War II political polarization between the Christian Democrats and the Communists was signaled in part by a growth of the smaller parties. By 1979 in northeastern Friuli-Venezia Giulia, support for the centrist Republicans, Liberals, Socialists, and Social Democrats had grown in the cities, as had the extremist MSI and PR, more than it had in the rural areas where the decline in votes for the DC and the PCI was less noticeable. The same trend exists in both urban and rural areas, but is more pronounced in the former than in the latter.

The depolarization of Italian politics is partly the result of changes in both the base and in the leadership of the two major parties. There is a profusion of internal divisions and the inclusion of centrist and extremist parties as legitimate choices for voters. However, all parties continue to mobilize as propagandists rather than as informants. Problems are followed by their leaders rather than articulated. Administration is considered a substitute for politics and "the" system for participation in it. It seems that the ideological foundations of polarization have not been replaced by a secular political culture, separate from religious or ideological concerns, which Italians hold

in common. As a result, fragmentation of the political system is taking place rather than its pluralization.

The fact that political change is happening faster in Friuli's cities than it is in the countryside suggests that polarization is still more deeply rooted there than it is in urban areas. The contadino-operaio family which is at the center of Friuli's rural-based agro-industrial system is the logical unit of analysis, through which to view the history of polarization and its subsequent decline in the countryside. There is not just a quantitative change in the rate of speed with which political change is taking place in urban and Friuli, but a qualitative one as well. Development has not affected the life of the contadino-operaio as it has that of the urban worker. Presently, the contadino-operaio relies very little on the State assistance network, and is more autonomous than the urban nuclear family, because the former's income is the result of part-time farming and rural-based industry in addition to agricultural subsidies and pensions.

Historically, the ability of parties to mobilize the contadino-operaio has been weak and, as a group, its behavior is elusive to politicians as well as to State planners. As a social strata, the contadino-operaio has been used by Italy's development managers as a labor reservoir to be maintained in an economy, marginal to the areas where Italy's industrial development was concentrated. Rural areas such as Friuli have more recently become central to

the further progress of Italian industrial growth. As a result, and from what we know of the contadino-operaio's past political behavior, we may surmise that with the decline of polarization the contadino-operaio is less likely to simply give loyalty to alternative parties, but also to be increasingly independent of and deaf to the appeals of all political groups.

Friuli is an example of a place where accelerated and partially autonomous industrial development has accentuated the continuity of many traditional agrarian values. Rural norms have been adapted to a new economic situation, rather than becoming more modern or urban ones. The situation is also representative of other zones in rural Italy where there has been any industrialization at all, or where some modernization has come about through emigration.

Such a proposition may contradict some conclusions drawn from the changes in voting patterns which have been observed in Italy especially since 1976. Growth for the PCI in that year and then a decline in 1978-79, and slow but steady losses over time for the DC have been subjected to considerable analysis. Increasing percentages for the smaller center parties has caused speculation that society is becoming less polarized which is certainly true, but that this development is the result of secularization is much less sustainable.

Italian political parties, the Christian Democrats and the Communists, as well as the Socialists, the Liberals, the

Republicans, and others, represented clear ideological choices for the Italians at the end of the Second World War. Each symbolized distinct historical experiences whether of the Left, Center, or Right. Each was perceived by voters to be leading a socialist, catholic, or secular faction which had been temporarily united in opposition to the Germans and fascism. By 1948, however, the many contending suggestions for Italy's future coming from the mobilized mass of people had been marshalled to one side of the new political configuration or the other. Italian society had been polarized, and the DC dominated the government.

As the Cold War drew to a close, politicians made attempts to find a basis for cooperation between Left and Right, but precisely in the moments such as the 1960s center-left government when they did so, followers rebelled. Leaders had not bridged subcultural divisions or united traditional currents previous to the political parties. They had built political bases dependent on their maintenance. If the stands the DC's and the PCI's leaders have often taken have become less polarized since World War II, they do not seem to have brought the Italians any closer to national unity. In the 1980s, parties continue to suggest reforms, but substitutes for or revisions in the old ideological positions are not always eagerly acceptable to voters.

Even in the best of times, political polarization is a difficult basis on which to govern. Its atmosphere is not

conducive to co-operation between leaders or the formation of stable coalitions. The contending ideologies used to support competing bases of power do not allow a middle ground on which to negotiate. As the core of faithful followers continue to demand loyalty to the parties' original goals and ideas, conflict between representatives of tradition and those who desire reform, lead to splits within the parties. The DC of the 1980s is made up of one faction which would remain true to its christian origins and another which would prefer to see the Party become an aggregator of interests "alla americana." A great deal of the DC's time and energy is devoted to intra-party warfare.

The PCI continues to vacillate between a hard line and opposition to the DC on one hand, and on the other, to vary this stand with continued appeals to form a center-left coalition. Both parties have lost voters to the left and right of their cores. Small parties at the far ends of the spectrum have gathered up the extremist defectors and the secular or liberal center has absorbed the rest. All this may signal a trend toward depolarization; it could also be seen as a fragmentation of the Italian political system, not a development that is apt to help government concentrate on solutions to national problems.

Speculation about the future of government in Italy is, however, usually tied to the question of whether the nation is or is not becoming more secular. The resolution to present political dilemmas does not hinge on an analysis of

Italy's post-World War II history, nor of just the period since the nation's unification. Many of Italy's crises can be traced back to the story of the Church's struggles to gain and then maintain cultural hegemony. When the extent of its control and influence in each era is understood, it then becomes clearer what territory was left, or had to be forced open, in which other social forces and ideas were permitted to grow, the present not excluded by any means. A central concern of this research then, is the role ideology plays in development, whether it is traditional, as in the case of the Catholic Church is rural Italy, or whether it is revolutionary, of the sort the Vatican has tried to censure in Latin America.

The initial inspiration for this research, however, was a dual concern with the effects of development on the peasantry. Political science literature in particular asks why peasants rebel or do not rebel in the process of modernization. The peasantry may participate in a mass-based, communist led revolution. Land reform may have been enacted to "manage" peasant land hunger. Other cases explain the peasantry's alienation from political involvement. Most often, the end is development and the plans for it emphasize the role of the urban worker, while expressing the hope that land reform, either to complete or prevent a revolution, will control the peasant long enough for industrialization to turn him into a factory laborer or a productive commercial farmer.

Some researchers such as Barrington Moore, Eric Wolf and Samuel Huntington look at the peasant's role in development in a more detailed way.[1] For them, the peasant is more than a potential worker. Since industrialization has not proceeded as smoothly in the twentieth century as expected by either socialists or capitalists, reality has inspired them to look closely at the relationship of agriculture and industrial growth in predominantly rural societies.

More recent explanations of peasant involvement in the process of development, whether or not revolution is the focus, usually revolve around ideology, or exploitation and relative depravation, but most still rely on an elite's perception of peasant behavior. Joel Migdal argues that peasants act for concrete and specific goals.[2] Case studies of Asian, Latin America, African and European revolution, successful or not, confirm that the peasant desires land more than ideological goals.[3] Attempts to understand the peasant's belief system have led to theories of relative depravation and perceived exploitation. The later idea, only suggested by Barrington Moore, has been built on by patron-client and reciprocity theorists.[4] However, if it is the nature of the life of the peasant (or worker) to be exploited and grounds for complaints can always be found, then when does the perception of exploitation lead to active support of an organization? We might ask the peasant

whether he feels the organization wanting to better his future can do so nor not.

In other words, on what basis is the peasant being mobilized? What is the peasantry being offered that it does not have -- and wants? Often it is presumed that a rural person wants the same things an urban one may consider desirable which is not always so. The priorities of the contadino-operaio are a case in point.

The ideas then of relative depravation do not help explain peasant mobilization either. Jim Scott suggests some perceptions that might lead to group action.[5] Tilly and Snyder looked at the indices of relative depravation over time and found they could not be used to predict collective patterns of violence in France.[6] What underlies these studies is usually the presumption that the peasant will act if he feels the need to do so, but the act is judged by the researcher, not the peasant to be either a positive or negative move toward a better life. "Explanations" for the negative action or, no action at all, have been called the results of "amoral familialism", cynicism, or simply apathy or passivity, if we follow Banfield's arguments.[7] Is this the same peasantry which Hobsbawm and Molfese have suggested can be anti-state, anarcho-syndicalist, and anti-bourgeois intellectual rebels?[8] Robin Hoodism, social banditry, members of secret societies and millenarian movements cannot be termed apathetic.

The key to these contrasts may come in part from Eric Wolf, who claims that what makes an effective peasant movement possible is its relationship "to the field of power which surrounds it."[9] However, his focus on the intrusion of market forces into peasant life still leaves us with unanswered questions about why and when the peasant acts just as the relative depravation and perceived exploitation theories do.

Sidney Tarrow, in Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, states that, "values born of primary and personal associations infiltrate the world of impersonal modern social organizations."[10] This is a good reply to Banfield, but need one be the function of the other? The reverse could also be true, and certainly is to traditional sectors of developing societies which are most likely to be opposed to "modern" organizations such as the mafia for example.

Here one must focus on the peasant society itself as it functions in a particular area. Alavi's idea is useful. He states that:

> "The central issues in analysis of the political process in peasant societies relate precisely to the inconsistency of diverse pulls and conditions which affect their resolution . . . (and) requires identification of patterns of horizontal and vertical alignments, the contradictions which underlie them, and of the conditions which affect their resolution into changing political alignments in confrontations."11

Theda Skocpol, in her comparative study of revolutions, claims that the correlation of information on social-structural patterns with the process of political

mobilization must be done in the context in which it developed, including "the world-historical developments" important in "the affairs of the dominant class."[12]

World events which affect ruling elites is the often missing ingredient in the debates on a peasant movement's solidarity and autonomy.[13] The extent to which peasants can and cannot control decision-making, even locally, can be partly answered by Alavi. Tarrow, in his more recent work, Between Center and Periphery, suggests a structure for understanding the relationships between peasants and the local power structure, and those of the local elites to the central government. Skocpol shows how necessary it is to understand the historical patterns of those relationships and how international events can put elites in crisis situations. Wars are not the only major events which leave a vacuum of power in which the peasant can act especially if there is already a tradition of autonomous action or communal organization.

On these bases we may be able to assess peasant political behavior, his reaction to the developers plans for his future, as well as try to understand the relationship of various institutions to the peasantry. In other words, are the peasants still being organized with the presumption that they are just potential workers, or is there a new model based on the understanding of the important role they could play in the process of development as independent agricultural laborers? Are they viewed as simply a resource for

industrial development or participants in building a better life for all?

The answer to this question lies in the ongoing discussion of what modernization and development are and the prescriptions underlying them. Part of the complexity of a "transitional" stage (i.e. all paths to industrialization and modernity) is that day to day changes are rarely made by one institution with a coherent ideology about how these changes should take place. The peasantry, along with the rest of the population, is most often caught between competing developmental philosophies, and must somehow survive in spite of the conflicting policies inspired by a variety of future visions.

Italy's leaders have been forced to be extremely sensitive to American policy matters throughout the Cold War and the urban industrial model which was imposed on post-war Italy was very much an American inspiration. Only since the late 1960s has the American political science mainstream registered a change in emphasis on the requirements and processes by which a nation could be considered advanced and modern whether or not policy makers are listening to them. However, in the early post-World War II years, the optimistic ideal prevailed that through political tutelage and cultural diffusion, modern states could pass their knowledge on to the traditional or transitional ones, where their own elites would play a crucial role in the

transmission process. It was the opinion of writers such as Shils, Lipset, and Deustch that there was also hope for the advance of democracy and thus the importance of the American model as the goal for transitional polities was stressed.[14] They felt that Western culture would provide the new nation's elite with the inspiration and, in part, the means to bring their peoples what they wanted; in the process, democracy would grow as needs were provided for.

Barrington Moore and others began to express reservations about the actual dynamics of modernization and development. Democratic ideals gradually took a back seat when such problems as slow or stagnant growth rates were further exacerbated by quickly expanding populations. Rising expectations which could not be satisfied caused increasing frustration among the masses who, in turn, would threaten the elite's stability. Studies on the causes of revolution, of spontaneous and organized mass activities, emphasized the need to control and contain this new threat to developing states. In this light, it was suggested that "patterns of authoritarian rule" either could be considered as a tutelary period, or as a sign of weak political institutions.[15] It is from this point that studies on clientelism were done to demonstrate the fragility of patron-client relationships as bases for connecting central and local institutions. The mass function resulting from center-periphery ties was considered a major cause of alienation rather than participation in the developing

nations. This alienation might necessitate drastic tactics to overcome mass resistance to developmental and modernizing policies. At best, clientelism was considered a form of personalism, certainly a trait most often linked with traditional societies.[16]

In re-examining the evolutionary assumptions on which some of the previous models were based, however, Fred Riggs suggested that "transitionalness" may become permanent, and Huntington noted that the problems of underdevelopment may be self-reinforcing. Riggs went even further and claimed that there was some logic and rationality in what appeared to be the extremely disordered political patterns of underdevelopment nations.[17]

Controlling that disorder came to be an important concern for the mainstream of American political science, more so than understanding its "logic." Those who emphasized the political promotion of economic development were discouraged by the inability of developing institutions to push through policies, and even less to support revolutionary political transformations.[18] Those who were more concerned with political stability than economic progress were apt to be optimistic in the short-run, but no one held out hope for these nations if they did not create new and more effective political institutions.[19] The variety of cures chosen depended on the author's normative and analytical perspective. A common theme of these prescriptions is that the new institutions must be the work of elites who

will impose them from above on those below and that democracy is, again in the short-run, not just irrelevant but dangerous. In other words popular disturbances that arose in the process of initiating change needed to be controlled and an ideal way to do so was to centralize a "mobilization system."[20]

Barrington Moore claimed that coercive techniques would be required for industrialization under capitalist or socialist auspices. In either case it would be necessary to accumulate capital at the expense of rural producers, but the political problem resulting from this requirement is that there must be a social class in the society which is capable of making these changes.[21] Whether the expression was positive or negative, the proponents of political stability and economic development all centered the creation of institutional order on the axial role of governing elites.

If there was general agreement that order rests on effective political institutions, which may or may not be formally democratic, and this order was to be imposed on a mass, the variety of political elite able to create this pattern of acceptance for their decisions and to produce appreciable benefits from this state of order, varied both prescriptively and analytically. Perscriptively, analyses favored administrative personnel over political ideologists. In some cases, the military had some positive qualities for modernization.[22] Their ability to cope with political

tensions was often questioned.[23] Parties were another means of controlling masses rather than being organizations of popular voice, especially one party systems.[24] Overall, the implication is that some form of authoritarian control is a viable solution to the disorder of developing societies.[25] In Friuli, during the post-World War II era, all these elites were used to impose order.

One irony of the reversal of the original post-war principles is best expressed by Huntington who, in decrying the weakness of American political parties, said that "paradoxically, the form of political organization which was developed into a much stronger and (more) complex structure in Western Europe . . . was carried to its fullest and most complete development in the Soviet Union."[26] Order was imposed in Friuli not just to foster development but to oppose the appeal of socialism in the area.

From supporting whatever was necessary to further capitalist democracy in developing nations, the American political science mainstream first despaired of a growing nation's ability to create the economic base for stability and progress. Then it began to suggest that authoritarian methods or the symptoms of authoritarianism were acceptable and, in some cases, even desirable for promoting not only economic, but social and political development. Huntington's statement on political institutions sounds superficially Leninist: highly suspicious of spontaneous masses and firmly convinced of the necessity of an elite guide for

them. The moral bases of the two approaches, however, are fundamentally different. Lenin's idea was to arrive at equality by means of an elite leadership, while Huntington's is order to stabilize an elite.

Whether the latter meant to initiate a raprochement with Leninism or to deny the success of the "liberal" American idealism of the 1960's, will not be decided here, nor will the justness of the various moral bases for models of development. However, the two clashed in practice in post-World War II Italy and Friuli was ultimately stabilized very much by a Huntington-type model. Italy, and not just Friuli-Venezia Giulia is an ideal place to study methods and costs of defusing and avoiding social, political and economic conflict that arises in the course of development. A noticeable material improvement since the end of World War II for much of the country has not erased the still lively heritage of paternalism and neglect for some, exploitation and escapism for others. Over time some benefits have been channeled from Rome to appointed local destinations through a clientelistic, party-directed patronage or system of assistance.

Sidney Tarrow, in Between Center Periphery, compares the French and Italian systems. He states that the latter government has a welfarist mentality in "a state that is so weak and divided in its ability to implement policy that it is frustrating to deal with and unproductive in its investments." He then summarizes Italian political integration as

clientelistic and claims that its basis is in a particular history of developing center-periphery political linkages, as well as being the result of the policy outlook of the national elite which causes local officials to "go outside the bureaucracy for policy benefits by using personal and political ties to the capital."[27]

Luigi Graziano also says that clientelism is a specific form of politics that has originated in the course of developing the modern Italian state. Italian politics is particularistic and "the patron-client tie and its contemporary version, party-directed patronage, can be considered as the paradigmatic form of such particularism, both from the structural and cultural viewpoint."[28] Graziano affirms that the persistent southern Italian system of clientelism has "been able to condition all of Italy's political development."[29] Tarrow does not hold one area of Italy necessarily more responsible than another, but claims simply that the "lumbering Italian bureaucracy" has responded to every "problem in its troubled postwar years with financial credits and political payoffs," in other words, clientelistically.[30]

The majority of Italian literature on clientelism focuses on the Mezzogiorno. The points of the debate are many but the above authors and others such as Banfield, Schneider, Pugliese, Raynari, Gribaudi and Catanzaro support the idea that a "society of mediators" has been created whose network of institutionalized relationships between

center and periphery is based on the control and irrigation of financial flows. For all of them, the reasons why the South for instance, is defined as an economically depressed area, or one that is politically backward, depend on variables within the South itself, or the situation is blamed on the North, or in some measure on them both.[31]

While not wishing to deny that much of the North is more developed than the South, the northeastern area and parts of central Italy suffer many of the Mezzogiorno's ills, but are less often the subject of research and investigation. Through the example of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, in the extreme Northeast, it will be shown that clientelism is neither a Southern "product" nor is it just the result of a flawed society. To find the causes of Italy's "dualistic" political and economic development, one must start from the fact that constitutionally there is only one Italy, in which clientelism, a system of traditional authority, has been used as a tool by the State to produce and reproduce specific regional situations.[32] Here however, the term assistance will be used instead of clientelism, as the latter has dishonest connotations and moral preconceptions which are more of a hindrance than a help in the present research.

Thus, I am suggesting that patron-client literature is linked to discussions of modernization, development and transition but, depending on the "school" being followed, its role in the process may be viewed as a tool for development or as an excuse for the lack of it. Because of its

extensive clientelistic network, Graziano sees Italy as a modern industrial democracy gone astray. For Tarrow, clientelism is like an infectious disease, and a weak system is further weakened because it is not resistant to patronage.

How one sees clientelism, as a strong or a weak way to govern, and what sort of politics it produces depends very much on one's ultimate desires for the system. If instead, we see assistance politics as being more pervasive in Italy than it "should" be in an industrial state which is presumed to be politically modern, and find that is has persisted and adapted to a variety of historical situations over time, we need only view it in its historical context. In other words, how and to what ends has it been used, and what results has its use brought about?

According to Fred Riggs, the degrees of the practice of clientelism vary, and many of its tactics are found in advanced industrial states, although they are most obvious in underdeveloped ones. If a politically powerful, but administratively ineffective elite runs a government machine in which it is able to gain benefits from foreign and national sources, the nation's own material resources and the sources of legitimacy on which the elite might have built are both wasted. Pursuit of individual self-interest and duplicity are not illogical results in such a hypocritical atmosphere. Riggs's "Sala Model" of administrative structure shows how community divisions rather than nation-

building may be reinforced by these methods, and how an overdose of bureaucracy can worsen tensions and instability rather than guaranteeing political order. In describing the clientelism of non-modern states, Riggs points out that its elites may be powerful, but not necessarily effective. In his analysis there is no question about the fragility of democracy.[33] The effectiveness of the Italian elite is certainly questionable and the original governing coalition made little pretense of intending to promote democratic participation.

Let us presume for a moment that Italy is only partly industrialized and not necessarily a very democratic. Italy's governing elite has managed to avoid and partly defuse serious challenges to its hegemony from the Right and from the Left. The Christian Democrats have led a good, according to Huntington, tutelary-type coalition of administrative bureaucracy, industry, military, and intermittently, a variety of unions, with the common goal of industrial development. The elite has sought to maintain order, sometimes by allowing disorder and confusion to confound its opponents' appraisal of the system's vulnerable spots. The mass of Italians are alienated from either an interest in anything "political", or from any sense of effectiveness in that arena. This situation has been forged by means of an extensive assistance network which provides a material minimum for the masses and amply for the elites. In turn, the latter's policy is aimed at creating the

minimum of order required for the maximum economic development possible while still maintaining a tacit hope for economic, if not political and social equality. Thus, Italy's politics of assistance can be described as having been part of a persisting elite institution begun during early unity broadened during fascism and modernized in the post-World War years.

If the use of assistance in Italy is part of a tutelary stage of transition according to Huntington's model, then patronage may or may not fade as further development takes place. If explained as the structural price paid temporarily to industrialize the North until prosperity has had a chance to "trickle down" from there and eventually result in stronger political institutions, the uncomforting facts suggest that clientelism or assistance is not just a localized malady and that neither prosperity nor political modernization "trickle down". The use of assistance is inflationary, widespread, and tends to exacerbate social and political divisions, as well as increasing economic gaps between those divisions. On the other hand, perhaps it has been meant to do so, though it also tends to reproduce the need for more authoritarian means to keep the system intact. This is the vulnerable spot, where an erosion of legitimacy meets a constriction of the necessary material means on which the system depends. The collision combines in crisis when the short-run success formula for assistance politics that has been used to keep order has in no way prepared its

elite with alternative responses, nor society itself for that matter. The elite then is trapped into the continued use of ideology to promote more fear and in turn, the need for increased authority. As the Christian Democrats' hold has slipped, the campaign against terrorism, the Red Brigades and acts against the State can be seen as an attempt to revive the anti-Communist feelings which were so central to their earlier support.

The other essential ingredient in their long tenure has been their ability to monopolize control of the patron-client network. Assistance can be constructive if it aids sound development plans, though it is certainly less desirable to use simply to buy votes. In either case it is a method of control used by elites to govern, and, in turn, can also be a way in which people gain access to their government's resources in order to better their own lives. If they cannot, they will try to improve their own lot through alternative sources such as emigration or a submerged economy which includes illegal employment and the black market.[34]

One pressure on the assistance structure then, comes from the masses, rarely homogeneous on a national scale, and only a bit more so in sub-national groups. Secondly, elites must deal with other ruling or potentially ruling groups, whether they are competing classes or parties or institutions. These too will attempt to gain control of the

administration of economic resources and also of the status and prestige implied in giving and receiving favors.

Finally, and much more beyond an elite's hope of control, is the international arena.[35] All governing elites suffer pressures which may be as open as a trading partner's needs or its competition, or as simple as the ability to trade at all in the face of growing protectionalism. Economic dependence on a stronger and wealthier partner or ally brings pressures on a nation's political and social values. If an elite is classified as leading an "unstable" nation, it may not receive the help needed for its attempts to carefully control the economic structure. Impetus for mass and elite changes is thwarted by those who are the source of the original model, by economic dependence itself, by the social and political preconditions for those economics, and the resulting morass of internal conflicts they create.

Much of Italy's history concerns what has been done by leaders to defuse and avoid conflict in order to survive economically. The stability imposed in order to partially industrialize has halted all but unavoidable changes. The necessities of being part of NATO, of the European Economic Community, a fortress against Communism and Eastern Europe, the need to live down its fascist "experiment", have meant adherence to a Western model whose expectations and requirements have often been directly opposed to many of Italy's long-standing needs for development. Assistance politics produced a great deal of modernizing ideology and permitted

some industrialization in some parts of Italy. Its inability to politically "mature" or develop beyond "traditional" practices, however, may not be so much a result of what Banfield called an innate Italian "amorality" or a systematic flaw as it has been a response to the needs of survival in a situation of dependence in a world economy where Italy has a specific role as a national unit oriented to consumer export goods.

To revolt, to reform, to modernize, to develop - all these are ways of demanding or bringing change to a traditional agricultural society. In describing revolution from above and the path to nazism and fascism, Barrington Moore explains the popularization of originally elite ideologies. In Japan and Germany, an upper class militarism was essential to promoting in the masses a willingness to sacrifice for quick industrialization. He notes that this militarism was never a strong Italian tradition whereas what he calls "cynical opportunism," a sort of "take-what-you-can-while-you-can" attitude, was.[36] Moore's "cynical opportunism" is a "logical" response to the "irrational" system of patron-client relations whose basis in the traditional agrarian structure was prior to fascism in Italy and has also outlived it. If one sees clientelism purely as a dysfunction within the nation or as a sub-national product, the logic of assistance politics is easily hidden in the contradictions and difficulties that go unnoticed when one

does not distinguish precisely between modernization and development.

According to Alejandro Portes, modernity is structural and subjective.[37] Structural modernity consists of a series of social processes that include: urbanization, social mobilization, industrialization, democratization, and communication, converging in a stable whole only as a "post factum assertion". Subjectively, modernity is a set of orientations that internally represent "a certain mental flexibility" and externally resemble urban-industrial behavior patterns. The latter include: participation, empathy, ambition, individualism, secularism, egalitarianism, information, consumption orientation, urban preference, and geographic mobility. For Portes, the acquisition of those aspects of modernity are too often seen as the bases for structural development. He states instead that these characteristics are fostered by an ideology of modernization. One value implied in the ideology is that the evolution of an entire society is called "traditional" and thus labeled as a state to be progressed away from. This is done by choosing national developmental goals that will change economic, social and cultural states of underdevelopment. In practice, Portes claims that the ideology of modernity and the goals of development are anything but complimentary.

Some of Portes' objections are that first, the number of modern individuals in a society does not necessarily

increase the possibility for social change. Modern orientation may push people to emigration, or result in unemployment or a high rate of underemployment for the most highly trained; all of which will be confirmed by the case Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

Second, according to Portes, it should not be presumed that traditional culture is either homogenous or heterogeneous, nor that all of its values are obstacles to change. During periods of rapid development, traditional values have calmed insecurities and been used to promote the legitimacy of change and its planners. In Friuli-Venezia Giulia, for instance, we will see that many rural values have had a complex and often unexpected impact on attitudes to change and on the social structure.

Finally, if one is not to presume that all traditional values are stagnating, neither can one say that structural or subjective modernity leads to development. Modernizing ideology increases the pressure to consume and can threaten the capital accumulation necessary to development. To benefit from increased demand, it is necessary to have an agricultural and industrial infrastructure which can respond to it. Without a healthy balance consumer demand can become inflationary, create discontent, and waste human and material reserves.

Neither does the orientation to modernity create the support necessary for the promotion of developmental goals. If these go against the tendencies of individualism they may

seem illogical. In northeast Italy, we will show that assistance politics has promoted individual desires for only some aspects of modernity and increased skepticism in many about the legitimacy of the elites and the logic of their pleas for sacrifice to reduce inflation. Thus, there is a sort of "logic" which grows out of and around a structure which helps to account for areas that may be more subjectively modernized than they are developed, where non-development, or a particular form of development, may be a stable reality instead of a passing phase.[38] This is especially clear in areas and nations that began a development process late, where western cultural diffusion has been concentrated in urban areas and has promoted modernity simply by encouraging close contact with western values. Italy is certainly in this category. Its development did not really begin until the nineteenth century when it established nationhood. However, a large majority of Italy started the process of modernization and development only after World War II, in Friuli, not until the late 1960s.

The elites responsible for the model of development to be followed and its results, have often been convinced that the emulation of modern values was necessary to arrive at a more advanced state of development, but emulating values cannot recreate a "free market" where the necessities of governing require economic plans. In choosing to promote only structural or subjective modernity, leaders may create calm and order on which to base some development but, just

as easily, the development may be short-circuited by premature modernity. In fact, Portes suggests that in Latin American societies, when the historical reasons for underdevelopment are examined, one of the first causes to emerge is the modernity of the elites themselves.[39] The elites have divorced themselves from the economic realities of their countries and closed themselves off from the mass by condescending to traditional culture. In such an atmosphere it is easy for democratic institutions and political participation to run into trouble especially when economic stagnation increases competition for resources. Willingness to compromise both among leaders and followers is one of the first casualties as we will see to be the case in Italy.

Thus, we will follow Portes' suggestions here and use modernization (with or without the word ideology) and modernity to describe structural and subjective social and political processes. Industrialization should be taken to mean the results of capital accumulation and the building of an infrastructure for production. Development should be understood to mean the process of attempting to create a healthy balance between the changes being made in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Ideally, agricultural development should aim at technical changes which would include such things as scientific research on crops and chemicals, as well as improvement of the logic of land and labor use. Healthy policy in this sector would also promote change in how the agricultural worker sees himself: as

different from, but equal to, his urban counterpart in the society as a whole, as a producer and as a consumer.

A transitional society is one in which changes take place in the traditional economic, political and cultural conditions of an area.[40] One of the characteristics of a traditional rural economy which grows increasingly commercialized as opposed to auto-consumptive, is that new sorts of activities are funded either publically or privately, which results in organized political groups increasingly involving themselves in electoral competition as "deferential" culture disappears and new institutional leaders gain legitimacy.[41]

The obvious difficulty with using a model that moves on a continuum from traditional to modern is that it does not explain the institutional or ideological complexity of the transitional process nor does it help to explain its texture or duration. All societies have traditional and modern elements in any case. The term "transitional institution" is often used simply to indicate where modern functions are being performed in a traditional way, but this definition encompasses too much and says too little to be useful. Thus, it is best to make a clear distinction between an institution's involvement in and policy toward modernization on the one hand, and toward industrial development on the other. The former is usually used in service to the latter. How an institution promotes a modernization ideology in order to influence the form of development it considers

ideal will be essential to see in order to try to measure how successful they have been and what sort of transition has taken place.

It is helpful to view and frequently reassess the meaning of symbols used by institutions as they change in a variety of historical and social settings, redefining not just their significance but their cognitive directiveness as well. In Friuli, "tradition" has come to mean more than a set of symbols, it is used to describe a whole socio-cultural system which though depicted in the same way historically, has not remained the same. It has, in fact, been remarkably adaptive.

During such consideration, one must also take into account the institution's relationship as it is presented to the nation symbolically, historically as well as in the present. This examination may be done for a region such as Friuli-Venezia Giulia, in a national and international setting, just as it may be done for a party or the Church. If the institution's role is socially, politically and/or economically different in various spheres or over periods of time, the comparison will provide another clue not only to the nature of the transition but to its local variations.[42]

If, for instance, the peasantry has not been integrated into national life, whether through war, or subsequent revolution or reform, the problem of agricultural production to support development must be dealt with region by region. At the same time, in each area it is hoped that, however

slowly and painfully, the peasantry can be moved from their rural emargination to national participation. One of our questions, then, is to what extent this has happened and what has been tried in Friuli.

B. WHAT IS A CONTADINO-OPERAIO?

1. The People and the Administration

Arriving in Italy with theories was a beginning. The plan was to stay for six months. My son and I ended up living there for four years, which is probably long enough to say that this is the product of extended research. Not only did I spend many hours in libraries and offices, but also in the fields and was rewarded with wonderful evenings with contadino-operaio families. Much of the interviewing I did was over large plates of--not pasta, which is Italian, but polenta and fagioli--cornmeal mush and red beans. The Friuliani have only recently become Italians and are very proud of their mixed but individual heritage. In so many ways, they are not at all like the stereotypical image of people who are always singing and drinking wine, though the Friulani do plenty of both.

What they do have in common with other Italians is the State administration, much to their dismay, and often mine. A few personal examples can clarify the relationship of person and State in Italy. Through my son, I came in contact with the school system. His teachers were rigorous in their demands and on the whole well-prepared. How they

remain enthusiastic surrounded by the regulations and the jungle of "do's" and "don'ts" is a tribute to their dedication. Going to the post office is another good example of people and their "system." Four different officials will tell you four different sets of requirements for a package to be mailed overseas. When you at last find two who agree, their work begins; filling out forms, cutting and pasting the tags for the package, and then the process of adding up all the various charges which must be looked up in large books of complex tables. There are no adding machines. Two people double-check the figures. It is also at the post office where Italian people pay bills and their taxes and receive pensions. In other words, no one escapes encounters with the bureaucracy except the speediest of tourists. If the reader detects that my sympathy is more often with the people than it is on the side of their "system," the perception is accurate. The most important aspect of the contadino-operaio is that the family makes every effort to be as independent of the administration as possible, but cannot be so completely.

The contadino-operaio of Friuli is a social unit. A family which relies on a combination of roles and salaries which have evolved to permit not just its survival but its well-being. The unit counts on some industrial employment thus, it is part worker or operaio. It also depends on the land as a source of agricultural products and for security.

The word contadino means farmer or peasant, but also implies a rural life.

The pre-World War II contadino-operaio was the product of a history stretching back to Roman times. The males in the family worked the land for survival as long as they could, but when the unit could no longer manage, the able-bodied members migrated to find work. Women, grandparents and children were left to farm.

After the Second World War, pockets of industry grew in northeastern Friuli-Venezia Giulia as a result of emigrants' savings which were invested in the expansion of existing artisan businesses. Eventually, development planners discovered that keeping the family on the land, rather than situating it in large groups in the biggest cities, was an enormous saving for government and industry. In turn, the contadino-operaio found that it could not only survive, but save and have a better life than its urban counterpart, if some family members worked even part-time in industry while others farmed. The current configuration of the contadino-operaio is the result of both direct and indirect political decisions made by development planners, and of the way the economic system functions to permit his multi-faceted livelihood which, in turn, allows rural-based, decentralized industry to be profitable.

Presently, Friuli's industrial sector plays a particular role in the Italian national economy, where large industries are mostly in financial difficulty. Italy also

has two types of small-scale industries. The latter are mostly based in rural areas where there are an abundance of part-time farms, whether they are industries which have been induced by large industry or whether they are small-scale grass-roots businesses which are not dependent on a bigger one. In both cases, however, they have gone to the source of labor which was held in reserve on the land. They hired people at the edges of the workforce, which kept labor costs down relative to the cost of living. The most expensive or least profitable part of the manufacturing process was farmed out to "cottage" or small shops which were not under union control nor eligible for social benefits. These are not "traditional" businesses which have somehow escaped extinction with advanced development; they are thriving and profitable.

The workforce is neither an industrial nor a rural proletariat. They must take what opportunities they can to make a living. Seasonal layoffs are frequent, given a world market filled with absorptions, recessions, and depressions which affect wages and the price of goods. Italy's small plants are resilient and able to adapt to changing needs and their workforce, the contadino-operaio, must do accordingly.

When asked what the politics of such a group were, a professor of political science at the University of Udine said, "As an aggregate they are defenders of small property, petit-bourgeoisie and conservative," (implying a tradition-bound mentality). He went on to suggest that, when the DC

was in full control after the war, the rural population "indulged in destabilizing poujadism in order to generate legislative responses from the State. Look at France under DeGaulle." In other words, the less the Party could be controlled by elections, the more need there was for overt destabilization tactics. As the Christian Democrats and the PCI have become more equal in the voters' eyes, and with some growth in support of the center-left, the rural-based population, the small-scale industrial sector has become a swing vote. Splits within the two major parties have increased the importance of the contadino-operaio's vote. Their voting behavior, he claimed, was not "traditional" per se, but the result of an imbalanced social structure and the persistence of uneven economic development. He suggested this was the case in much of rural Italy and that local social structure and politics had national parallels. Thus, my research on the contadino-operaio in Friuli had to begin with an understanding of Italian social structure and a comparison of Friuli's to the whole to see whether or not local political behavior had any application to that of national politics.

2. The Structure of Rural Italian Society

The agricultural society in Italy is much larger than the census leads us to believe. Many categories such as day-labor on another person's land or a weekend's work on one's own are not included. The census claims that there

are three-and-one-half million Italian people employed in agriculture, but logic suggests that there are a great many more than that. Part-time farming in one form or another is a widespread phenomenon in Italy.[43]

The extremes of category in the sector are the first problem. There are anywhere from 200,000 to 600,000 agricultural laborers who work for a salary, though few of these work all year round in the sector. In the census of 1971, there were about 15,000 large land-holders and large-scale farmers in Italy who employed some of the wage labor of the sector on 27% of Italy's agricultural land.

Obviously, the greatest proportion of Italy's farmers are independent cultivators. In this category, there are three broad types; capitalist, or family farm, those which are large enough or profitable enough to be able to hire paid workers from time to time. There are probably about 350,000 of these on 45% of the arable land. Medium-sized farms are those which are worked exclusively with family labor. Small farms are not only worked by the family, but often its members hire themselves out to work the farms of others. About 1,500,000 contadini work medium-sized farms, of which 20% are part-time, 1,400,000 owners have small holdings, 50% of which can be considered part-time farms. Medium- and small-sized farms make up only 28% of Italy's agricultural land.

It is known that the South contains a large portion of salaried agricultural labor and poor contadini. Anywhere

from 65% to 70% of its emigrants are from this part of agriculture and have usually entered industry through the construction business and public works sponsored by the famed Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. It is partly because of the voluminous literature on the failure of these investments to bring development to the South and the continuing rate of emigration from there that the relationship between agriculture, emigration, and development seemed a good area to research in Friuli-Venezia Giulia.[44]

Land tenure is affected differently by permanent emigration than it is by temporary absences. In the former instance, where an entire family leaves an area, the land may be sold and consolidated in larger holdings. In the later case, the family remains on the land while the emigrant is away and serves as subsistence. In either case, the need to emigrate represents a lack of local alternative employment, whether it is in agriculture or industry, and thus suggests that national and international labor markets are also relevant to changes in agriculture.[45]

The class structure within the agricultural sector has two polar types. Extensive farmers who are able to make a living on the land are favored by government policy and that of the European Economic Community. These farms are also able to support a certain amount of salaried labor, even with a maximum of mechanization. This part of Italian agriculture cannot be called "backward" by anyone's

definition, though it cannot seem to reduce the massive deficit from agricultural imports which the nation carries.

The largest part of Italian agriculture is carried out in mountain and hill land which has long been used as the labor reservoirs of industry. The agricultural population dropped to half its number between 1951 and 1974. The first exodus came exclusively from the poorest part of the land. The decrease in the agricultural population continues and is not just a result of desertion but also of changing and overlapping categories of part-time farming. Those who remain on the land are not strictly a rural proletariat nor are they an industrial reserve, but exactly what they are is not altogether clear either. Where there is no local development, they are still the families of emigrants. Where there has been development, they are the contadino-operaio.

Assistance from the State for those who have remained on the land with small- or medium-sized holdings has been given only to the extent that it permitted subsistence agriculture through local governments. In large part, the policy of neglect has prompted emigration. The system of dependence and neglect has caused deterioration of living conditions in areas of Italy where there is no development and, politically, votes in these areas tend to be moderate or conservative. The people are neither petit-bourgeoisie by strict definition nor are they rural proletariat.

Economically, they may be closer to the latter than the former, but they see themselves as neither.[46]

Friuli-Venezia Giulia is considered a rural area of Italy. There is some extensive agriculture on the plains and there are large zones of hills and mountains. There is extreme poverty still in the latter, but the rest of the region appears well cared-for and prosperous. Holdings are small and family disintegration has been avoided, in contrast to what has happened in much of the South. The reason is that part-time farming and a locally available choice of non-agricultural employment has allowed a family to use the land as a way to reduce its cost of living and to accumulate savings which are obviously invested in improvements to the land. This group is widely dispersed in areas of recently developed small- to medium-sized industries.

3. Class Structure of the Non-Agrarian Sector: Service and Industry

Massimo Paci, in his social analysis of Italy, claims that the non-agrarian class structure of Italy, the service sector and industry, contain about 100 to 150,000 entrepreneurs and 750,000 petit-bourgeoisie. The latter group, a particularly Italian phenomenon, runs small independent businesses and industries. In quantity, this category in Italy is comparable only to Japan among the industrialized nations. Their large numbers make it harder, however, to quantify the industrial proletariat of Italy.

Probably about 33% of the population fall in this category, but there are a great many who work part-time, off the books, in cottage industries, and their number is increased by wage laborers in areas such as the Padana, who are considered an agricultural proletariat. There are approximately 5,500 workers in Italy, of which 41% are found in the northwestern industrial triangle of Milan, Genova, and Turin.

This suggests that there is not simply dualism in Italy between north and south, but between agriculture and industry and that there are two types of agriculture and two kinds of industry in Italy. Social and political divisions follow similar lines. On the other hand, the Italian manufacturing sector as a whole is dedicated to making consumer goods for export such as furniture and clothes. The most important domestic industry is construction, where people leaving agriculture usually find their first employment before passing on to the manufacturing sector.

There are two basic types of manufacturing industries in Italy, however, those which have large plants and employ more than 1000 workers and those whose smaller plants usually hire less than 100. In the former, the unions have been strong and able to influence legislative action. In the latter, there are many "irregular" workers who are not represented by unions at all and who depend on part-time farming to supplement low salaries. This group makes up more than half of the Italian working class.

Geographically, the Northeast is characterized as the industrial triangle of Italy, where the majority of big industry and large private farms are found, as well as the smaller businesses, all of which allow a great quantity of part-time farms to exist as well. The South, because of failure to develop, is characterized by small farms and emigration, though there is a workforce which is dependent on publicly financed industry. The latter has drawn the non-emigrant workforce to it in selected areas such as Puglia or around Naples, and many small businesses which once existed have failed in recent years, further exacerbating the necessity of emigration from their surrounding rural areas. Central and northeastern Italy have industries of the small variety on the most part. Those which were once big urban-sited plants have decentralized their production and been dispersed in rural areas or small towns.

Friuli-Venezia Giulia began to develop an urban-based large industrial sector around Trieste, which did not expand enough to end the flow of emigrants from the rest of the region. Emigration, however, ultimately permitted small businesses of artisan origin to expand. Part-time farming and the employment opportunities offered by the dynamic sector of the local economy brought the flow of emigration to an end and, as the large urban industries have also changed production sites to rural areas, many emigrants have come home to stay. The social structure involved in Friuli's development suggests that there will be likenesses

between it and that of central and some of northwestern Italy. It also suggests what has not happened in the South. Different social histories will, of course, temper the likenesses and differences.

The mass of Italians, then, are neither strictly workers nor are they farmers, so it is reasonable to expect that the various forms of industrial development will also have affected the middle classes. Returning to Paci's analysis again, he suggests that there are a very low percentage of Italians to be found in independent professions, from 1,000,000 to 750,000, or only about 8.9% of its workforce. It is particularly small when compared to 19.3% in France, 23.4% in Great Britain, and 24.1% in the United States. The Italian middle class is dominated by artisans, small plant owners, and government employees. There is a small population of white-collar employees and technicians. About 1,600,000 Italians depend on a government paycheck and the majority are not involved in an expansion of the productive sector, but are part of the administration of assistance. The incidence of public employees in proportion to all others is highest in the South, which also has the smallest productive sector. Government employment is one of the few alternatives to subsistence agriculture and emigration.

Small merchants, about 1,700,000 of them, are also one step removed from the group of poor farmers in Italy. They are usually subsistence businesses run by older family

members and students. They are linked to the assistance structure only through their need for political favors in order to get and maintain licenses. This is the group of petit-bourgeoisie which was expanded under fascism, and along with an enlarged group of public employees, seem to have been its strongest supporters.

Italy continues to have a small service sector beyond government. The lack of research institutions and white-collar positions has been acutely felt by the educated youth, about whom there is considerable discussion in Italy but very little data. Many have dropped out of the labor market altogether, while others make up what has been called the new group of emigrants. Those who are under-employed or are hard to measure. The school system and the productive system in "illegal" jobs are both behind technologically, which is not surprising in an economic system geared to the production of consumer goods, many of them luxury items.

What Paci's research tells us about Italy is that a large part of its productive structure and its labor force do not fall into the categories of advanced industrial nations at all. Those who have not been directly involved in the development of industry and agriculture according to the urban-based model have not become an urban lumpen proletariat, nor have all those who remain on the land been pauperized. The social strata are large and varied. Most significant, however, and characteristically, are the variety of groups to be found within the Italian industrial

sector, dominated by employees of small businesses and industries, whether they are independent artisan businesses or small dispersed plants which are dependent on large operations. A large percentage of these employees are also part-time farmers. The small- and medium-sized business that "should" have disappeared with the "advance of capitalism" has not come about in Italy, but this is not necessarily the sign of "backwardness" as some analysts suggest. None of them say why, after 100 years of development, this sector still consists mostly of "excessive population," which is maintained directly or indirectly in order to keep up a political consensus. The contadino-operaio of Friuli-Venezia Giulia will be seen to depend for very little, and certainly not its survival, on State help or political favors.

Instead, what the case of Friuli will show is that this large sector of the Italian population has an important productive function in the national economy. The government has been promoting the restructuring of industry, and the contadino-operaio is structurally connected to the vitality and competitiveness of small industry and artisan businesses.

The link is the role the Italian economy plays in the European Economic Community and the larger international market. Italy has specialized in the production of consumer goods for export, which requires flexibility to adjust to changes in fashion and to the rapidity with which technology

becomes obsolete. Both adjustments are made more easily if labor costs can be limited to a minimum. The use of the contadino-operaio as the labor force in small industries is ideal, both because it is flexible and the social costs of its reproduction are low. Italy is not "backward," nor is it undeveloped. It simply holds a peripheral role in a larger economy to which it has adapted. This, according to Paci, suggests that there is a reason why Italy has the largest Communist party in the West and why, too, it has been the Christian Democrats that have been in power since World War II. In this case, the complexity of the relationships between Friuli and the State, and between Friuli and the international arena, cannot be understood with reference only to State policy.

4. The Problem of Understanding Italian Voting Behavior

The contadino-operaio is being recognized as a widespread phenomenon in Italy whose social strata provide decentralized industry with considerable social savings. Though the history of Friuli-Venezia Giulia differs considerably from that of other Italian regions, planners should consider the political consequences of the model's application in Friuli before insisting on its use elsewhere. The analysis of Italian electoral behavior and the vote in Italy is made more difficult by the complexity of the dualistic social structure, by regionalism, and by religion. Thus,

the first problem is to determine what demographic data and voting statistics can tell us about Italian elections.

Italy has the next-to-highest electoral participation in Europe. An average 92.6% of eligible voters have cast their ballots regularly between 1945 and 1978. The reason for this, however, is institutional. The Italian Constitution states that voting is a civic duty. Voter registration is automatic at 18 and at 21 for the Senate. Lists are reviewed annually, and before an election, the necessary papers are sent to one's home address. Voting takes place all day Sunday and Monday, during which time there are reduced fares on all public transportation. The atmosphere is that of a national holiday, and if that is not enough of an inducement to vote, there is also the sanction that one can lose social benefits if one does not vote in several consecutive elections.[48]

Lipset's classic hypothesis that a high level of voter participation can be a symptom of decline in consensus or social stability is not applicable in Italy. Theories of party competitiveness which affect electoral behavior are not particularly relevant in Italy, either. In any case, competition is quite different in systems where power often changes hands than it is in Italy, where the DC has been in control for a long period of time.[49]

Karl Dittrick and Lars Johansen have suggested that most conclusions drawn from variations in voter participation in European countries are based on bad empirical

information and incorrect methods of data collection. One area they suggest for further research is voter abstention. It is not clear whether "white votes," as they are called in Italy, represent protest (as many did in the 1983 elections when the PSDI called for its followers not to vote), or voters who are already socially and economically disenfranchised and feel they have nothing else to lose. In any case, it is not possible to draw conclusions until more research has been done on the issue.[50]

Thus, if the level of voter participation can tell us little about electoral behavior in Italy, the fact that it is compulsory creates special problems for analyzing the results of an election. In an examination of the importance of analytical variables, Samuel Barnes claims that religious identification is not as important in Italy as is closeness to the Church. Religion, whether one is for or against it, is generally agreed to be an important variable in Italy, though its impact is not easily measurable. The secular-clerical conflict complicates all others, such as the importance of education, organizational membership, and sub-cultural identification.[51]

Involvement and interest in politics may be important as measures of Italian voting behavior, but little work has been done as of the present. There are strong ideological and sub-cultural differences between Italian parties and between party leaderships and their bases of power. In any case, Barnes suggests that issue preference among Italian

voters is not a good way to predict party identification. Calvi's research bares this out and supports the case that there is a very weak relationship between commonly held Italian values and the political vote. To complicate matters further, information on partisan voting is the hardest electoral data to acquire in Italy. People are especially reluctant to admit having voted for a leftist party unless they are clearly in PCI territory.[52]

Barnes suggests that where modernization and development have taken place recently, generational differences, occupation, and residence should be explored as variables, though he hardly mentions emigration, which has been experienced by so many Italians and certainly plays a major role in Friuli-Venezia Giulia's development process.

"Italy offers a fine example of a country with important regional differences. As such, it is an excellent unit to compare with other countries in which regionalism has political significance," states Barnes.[53] Indeed, the classical variables of occupational class, sex, and so on are only meaningful when viewed by region in Italy. Further, in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the variation between rural and urban votes suggests another complication for analysis. Rural class, especially if it is equated with occupation, is almost impossible to define by urban standards, as Paci's social analysis of Italy suggests. In the family of the contadino-operaio are industrial workers, bureaucrats, farmers, students, retirees, women, merchants, and others.

If occupation-class is decided by head of household on a census inquiry, it cannot be presumed that s/he decides how everyone in the family votes.

Though party loyalty is often shared by families, the reason is probably more the result of common tradition than shared views on issues. Usually, neither dramatic issues nor personalities are at stake in Italian elections, while access to resources are. The tradition of personalism and assistance is certainly relevant to Italian voting, it is still "the way things are done" nationally, though each region has its own style.[54]

All parties are organized more or less around personalistic ties with their constituency, and the power of each lies in the extent to which it can monopolize the role of intermediary in all transactions between the individual and public power. Thus, the voter's perception of a party's ability to transact for them is an important resource which party leaders guard jealously. It is the source of both legitimacy and accountability by the voter. If the party's image begins to change, the voter may be angered more by its loss of prestige than by new limits to a party's economic resources. The DC's power since World War II has depended not so much on the actual amount of assistance it has given out as on its ability to monopolize the role of political, social, and economic intermediary for the individual with the State.[55]

A party's base of support is local, partly explaining the importance of regionalism in the Italian vote, but the resource of voters' images of the party, only partly maintained by economic reward, reinforces the need over time to continue using ideology to maintain the voters' belief in it. The maintenance of myths and symbols is the basis of political polarization in Italy. The Italian political class painted themselves as defenders of justice, and the politics of "fortified parties" continues to be used to mobilize Italian public opinion. The party's closest supporters are thus the most likely to vote on the basis of ideology and how faithful they perceive the party is to its original ideals. Other supporters certainly feel less intensely, and here the party may have the benefit of tradition. In any case, ideology and regionalism are important determinants of political behavior in Italy, especially in explanations of the relationship between local parties and their base of support.[56]

In turn, the job of the party as intermediary depends on the relationship a local party organization has with national leaders. Since World War II, two things of great importance have affected ties between center and peripheries. One is the increasing number of factions in each party which a local leadership may choose to rely upon at the center of power. The other is the granting of power to regional governments which, as will be shown in the case of Friuli, have given local leaders less need for support from

the center where the regional government has a local source of social, political, and economic support. The personalistic and regional nature of leadership has increased in Italy since the Second World War rather than declining, at least in Friuli. In Palermo, Judith Chubb found that the greatest threat to the power of the DC there was economic development, which had created alternative resources that eluded the DC's control. In Friuli, the DC has made an attempt to appropriate these alternative resources by claiming credit for economic development, but they have had to share the credit with other parties.[57]

Thus, the study of Friuli suggests that regionalism in politics is still important, and because leaders have not been able to find another basis on which to mobilize their base of support, so is ideology. Leaders intended to use polarization after the war to bind sub-national interests together. Since then, however, politics have become increasingly depolarized for the mass of voters, if not for the core of party followers. National leaders have sought to create an atmosphere of accommodation on a national level in order to be able to govern. Support for the center-left government represents the breakdown of political polarization, but not the rise of a governing philosophy which unites Italy. The tendency, then, is for the system to fragment without the glue of polarization. In Friuli, at least, we may use Lipjart's criteria to judge the ability of leadership to overcome polarized or sub-nationally oriented

politics. Accommodation, he claims, require elites to be fully aware of and able to recognize the dangers inherent in a fragmented system and conscious of the destabilizing tendencies of divisions between sub-cultures. Elites must also want to maintain the system, not just have a stake in it. They must then be able to transcend sub-cultural cleavages and overcome the obstacles to comprehension between sub-cultures by stabilizing contacts between them. Finally, they must be able to create ways to respond to the demands of the various sub-cultures and make institutions which are available to accommodate differences between them where the "rules of the game" are agreed on by all.[58]

5. Institutions: The Developing Elite and the Church

The Christian Democratic-led government instituted order after the war to push for industrial growth, hoping in turn to create prosperity which would insure their long tenure. They allowed the Church to dominate the rural areas and saw foreign investments as essential for the building of predominantly urban industries, thus making themselves dependent on these two forces over which they had little or no control for their legitimacy or resources. The Party's role became that of planner and irrigator.

The introduction of market forces and the spread and redistribution of the central government's authority have reproduced and controlled the labor force, both as workers

and as consumers, through the model of decentralization. The social stability necessary for that development meant a quick defusion of post-war social protests. Social control was intensified by the West's need to militarily and ideologically fortify Friuli against Yugoslavia and the whole of the East. To these ends, the assistance structure of the Christian Democrats, with help from the Church has been a remarkably consistent and resiliant force in the task of bolstering every "conservative" element possible.

The Region has a tradition of popular revolt and "brigantaggio" that runs from the Middle Ages through to the Partisan organizations during World War II and beyond.[59] From an examination of some of the mass movements we will better understand what institutions and political strategies have been used to defuse and prevent further confrontations. However, if the revolts have rarely succeeded, it has not been because the society is disaggregated. On the contrary, it shows elements of solidarity that are both vertical and horizontal. Historical forces have created a society that is tightly aggregated. There is still a sense of unbreachable norms regulating the rights and duties of "friendship". Anyone asking for assistance is not just asking for a solution to a problem, but for attention for himself and the problem.[60] He may have asked help from a lord or a priest, or more recently from a policeman or political leader, but in Italian they are all addressed as "padre" or "padrone".[61] It was in an effort to break down

this solidarity that the politics of fascism was "imported" into "problematic" regions such as Friuli. Bureaucrats and teachers were sent from other areas of Italy to dismantle autonomous ethnic movements, and a special brand of neo-classical architecture was imported in which to house their efforts. Friuli suffered more "Italianization" than Sicily, Sardegna or Puglia.[62]

The Church continued this process after World War II, while trying to stabilize a thoroughly shaken social structure. It was the only mass institution left intact. Fascism, in company with the Church had prohibited agrarian reform except in a "backward" direction to promote a policy of autarky. If the economy was to be a closed one, then the government needed to induce men back to the land while the Church glorified the solid faithful peasant. It took very little after the Second World War for the suggestion of an open economy to bring the unproductiveness of such a policy into stark relief. Leaders for change were few, as the Communist Party had been descimated by the "Fasci," and other political forces were unorganized until they made their peace with the Church.[63] It was the latter which still had the means to promote a cultural message and halt all but a minimum of reform. The Christian Democrats and their Coldiretti soon provided the means to use the old agricultural structures as the basis on which to introduce and then redistribute "new" state powers after the war. In this context it should be remembered that for many

institutions, such as the Church, involved in making policy in Italy, "modern" means industrial and urban, but modernization and development have often been seen by them as different processes which may be antithetical, not just to each other, but to the ends of the Church.[64] Its continued presence and influence has allowed it to be the most important mass institution in Italy, and certainly in Friuli.

The contadino-operaio's history has been subject to a series of decision-makers, but in the past, all of these have had to deal with the Church to govern. It has been the Vatican, and more precisely for the contadino-operaio, the parish priest, which has been the most powerful and consistent cultural force in the family's life.

The real break from "traditional" relationships did not come in Friuli until the 1960s, when the Church's influence had declined to the point where other political parties had a chance to be acceptable choices in local elections. The Left made gains to add to its areas of traditional strength, founded both before and after the Second World War. At the same time, economic changes and the resulting adjustments in social roles were becoming more obvious. Differences had increased between coastal and prosperous agricultural areas, and those in more remote and hilly regions where the fruits of modernization were desired but could be achieved only by migration.

A new surge of political organization grew in 1964 when Friuli-Venezia Giulia gained independent status as a Region, in the same way that Alto-Adige, Sicily and Sardegna have, as legal entities within the Italian State. Friuli felt it had achieved a more autonomous relationship with Rome and the European Economic Community. Regional pride in Friuli's independence and initiative was reinforced. These qualities were quite obvious during the Region's recovery from the earthquakes of 1976. No one waited for Rome's emergency powers to go into effect to begin rebuilding. In the process, Friuli has also begun to create its own industrial and agricultural policies and the agencies needed to bring about their complementary development.[65]

Thus, through a great variety of agencies and institutions, Friuli has experienced both industrialization and modernity. In the past, a lack of basic social, political and economic change was the result of history partly shared with Italy and partly individual. Still, much of the Region's experience has been conditioned by emigration and religion. Both have supported the ideology of modernity, while detracting from the goal of a healthy balance between agriculture and industry.

A transition from an agricultural society has been attempted by using the existing social structure and land tenure to extend and redistribute state authority. Assistance payments have been employed to distribute the benefits of and to create and expand a national and international


market of labor and consumption.[66] The desire to expand the economy, while allowing as little change in the social base as possible, has ultimately cost political parties their ability to mobilize on any issue that is not immediately threatening to a majority of people. Recently, a sense of national economic panic has been enhanced by a common perception of the governing class as not just inefficient but corrupt. In turn, such a state of alienation from and anger in reaction to anything "political" has increased the State's dependence on and vulnerability to outside help to revive the system of assistance that was for so long the basis of power.

Though democratic participation has been the stated aim of both major and minor political parties, their concentration on gaining and keeping control over financial flows has increased the contadino-operaio's desire to protect home and family. As an object in changing developmental plans for Italy, the contadino-operaio has had a variety of social, economic, and political roles. The State has not courted the group's political participation, preferring instead its economic dependence. As a reaction to a marginal economic and political role in Italy, the contadino-operaio has developed a way of life that allows the maximum of immunity possible to government manipulation or their pleas for sacrifice.

A lack of balanced Italian national development, mirrored in Friuli-Venezia Giulia is representative of

imbalances in all developing countries. In some states of "transition," disequilibrium can be exaggerated depending on the extent of modernizing ideology promoted without the actual industrial development to support it. The rate of change is crucial, as it is people's ability to absorb it, as well as the success of the decision-maker's ends for it, that create the nature of transition. If leaders are perceived to be proposing policies, such as the DC's support of emigration, contradictory to stated aims such as their claims for balanced development, tensions are apt to be created which the elite can only control to a certain extent. It is precisely the "inconsistency of the diverse pulls and conditions [which] will affect their resolution."[67]

If the contadino-operaio is the product of late and unbalanced development plans, then this group also has a wider significance than for just Friuli and Italy. Incomplete industrial development tied to a fragmented agriculture which needs intensive labor to be productive can be found in much of the world. The individual history of each nation or region would need to be analyzed to see what part a peasant-worker can play as a link between agriculture and industry in a particular stage of transformation. If, in any case, this is to be fairly permanent figure, considering the present world economy, the contadino-operaio should be helped to be a positive rather than a negative actor in the process of development.



1. Alps - Carnico, Canal del Ferro and Val Canale
2. Pre-Alps - Giulie and Carniche
3. Foothills - Subalpine, Colline Triestine and Muggiese
4. High Plateau and Plain - Pianura Isontina, Orientale and Occidentale
5. Ideal Agricultural Land - Pianura Monfalconese, Orrientale and Occidentale
6. Marsh or Reclaimed Farm Land, Sealevel and below

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER ONE

1. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, N.H.: Yale University Press, 1968); Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, (N.Y.: Harper and Row Publishers, 1969. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, (Boston: Beacon Press; 1966).

2. Joel Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolution, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

3. Chalmers Johnson in Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, (Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1962), claims that specific goals mobilized the Chinese peasantry behind communist ideology. Jeffery Paige, Agrarian Revolution, (N.Y.: Free Press, 1975), makes the peasant into an economic determinist. Lars Rudebeck, "Guinea-Bissau: Difficulties and Possibilities of Socialist Orientation," Institute of Political Science and the Working Group for the Study of Development Strategies (AKVT), Uppsala University, Sweeden, January 1979, explains the necessity of a material base for the mobilization of the peasantry.

4. Migdal, op. cit.; James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, (N.H.: Yale University Press, 1976), and particularly for Italy, Sydel F. Silverman, "Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships in Central Italy," Ethnology, 4:2, (April 1965).

5. Scott, op. cit.; and an excellent definition of the patron-client relationship, mainly based on anthropoligical literature, is found in James C. Scott's, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change," a paper delivered at the 66th Annual Meeting of the APSA, Los Angeles, September 8-12, 1970. "The patron-client relationship, an exchange relationship between roles, may be defined as a special case of dyadic (two persons) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection and/or benefits for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering peneral support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron."

6. Charles Tilly and David Snyder, "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 1830-1960," American Sociological Review, 37:5, (October 1972).

7. Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958).

8. Eric Hobsbawn, Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959); and Franco Molfese, Storia del Brigantaggio dopo L'Unità, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1964).

9. Wolf, op. cit., p. 290.

10. Sidney Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, (N.H.: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), p. 59.

11. Hamza Alavi, "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," The Journal of Peasant Studies, 1:1, (October, 1973).

12. Theda Skocpol, in States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1979), has accented the importance of international events and pressures on elites in the occurance and success of peasant revolutions. I am indebted to her analysis and theory also for an understanding of how revolutions do not occur or are muted in agrarian societies. See especially pages 115-117.

12. Paige, op. cit.; Hamza Alavi, "Peasants and Revolution," The Socialist Register 1965, (London: The Merlin Press, 1965), pp. 241-277; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations," in Bendix and Lipset, (eds.), Class, Status and Power, 2nd. ed., N.Y.: Free Press, 1966); Wolf, op. cit. Moore, op. cit.; Henry Landsberger, Latin American Peasant Movements, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); and his Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change, (N.Y.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1973).

14. E. Shils, Political Development and New States, (The Hague: Mouton, 1962); S. Lipset, The First New Nation: America in Historical and Comparative Perspective, (London: Heinemann, 1963); K. Deutch, Nationalism and its Alternative, (New York: Knopf, 1969).

15. Shils, op. cit.; A. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXII, no. 1, (March, 1968); R. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, (New York: Wiley, 1964); D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, (New York: Free Press, 1958); K. Deutch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, no. 3, (1961);G. Almond and G.B. Powell,

Comparative Politics: A Development Approach, (Boston: Little and Brown, 1965).

16. Besides the previously mentioned bibliographies of Tarrow and Graziano, also see notes from James C. Scott's paper for the APSA meeting, footnote 5 above. Jane and Peter Schneider and Edward Hansen, "Modernization and Development: the Role of Regional Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 14, no. 3, (June, 1972) contains an excellent bibliography of the important highlights of the literature as does Sydel F. Silverman in "Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships in Central Italy," Ethnology, Vol. IV, no. 2, (April, 1965).

17. Samuel Huntington, op. cit.; p. 185-198; F.W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: the Theory of Prismatic Society, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).

18. Moore, op. cit., p. 385-410.

19. L.W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search For Identity, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962); and L. Binder, (ed.), Crises and Sequences in Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

20. Bendix, op. cit.; and D.E. Apter, The Politcs of Modernization, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

21. Moore, op. cit.

22. M. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, (Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1964).

23. M. Weiner, Party-Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

24. D.E. Apter, The Politcs of Modernization, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); and Huntington, op. cit., see especially page 432.

25. Huntington states that in underdeveloped societies, "the primary need is the accumulation and concentration of power, not its dispersion..." in Ibid, p. 137; C.E. Welsh, (ed.), Political Modernization, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1967) carries the same theme.

26. Huntington, op. cit., p. 132.

27. Tarrow, op. cit., p.7.

28. Luigi Graziano, "Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy," paper for the 1972 Annual Meeting of the APSA, Washington, D.C., September 5-9, p.2.

29. Ibid., p.3.

30. Tarrow, op. cit., p. 2. In Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), Tarrow describes the clientelistic nature of all Mezzogiorno politics, but he is more apt to emphasize the southern system's clientelism and the North's "political entrepreneurship" in Between Center and Periphery.

31. Besides an extensive bibliography and footnotes in the above works by Graziano and Tarrow, as well as works cited by the other authors mentioned, there is also: G. de Rosa and A. Cestaro (eds.), La questione meridionale: Antologia di scritti e documenti, (Napoli: Ferraro, 1970); and Rosario Villari, Il sud nella storia d'Italia, (Bari: Laterza, 1966), as well as the classics by Gramsci, Dorso and Salvemini.

32. A synthesis of many of the ideas about the model of development used in Italy may be found in A. Bagnasco, Tre Italie. La problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1977); and in his work in collaboration with M. Messori and C. Trigilia, Le problematiche dello sviluppo italiano, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1978). His thesis is to consider the formation of Italy as the articulation of three social formations with a specific territorial base, differentiated by their type of development: the Center (corresponding to the Northwest), the Periphery (central and northeast Italy) and marginal areas (the South). My translation of his synthetic statement is that: "The Northwest is an area noted by big industry, which has led and imposed its basic characteristics on the model of national development; the central and eastern regions are instead characterized by small business and on this basis they have lived a diverse and particular form of development; the Meridione, finally, is an area of relative underdevelopment, where the economy is disaggregated and reorganized to be dependent on outside needs." This synthesis has been shown to be too strict however, and authors such as S. Testoni and R. Raffaelli, in "Economia periferica e piccola e media impresa," in Problemi della transizione, n. 1, (1979), have reopened the discussion of the coincidence of social formations and corresponding national areas. They have done this on the basis of the existence of central, marginal and

peripheral areas within the Italian Northeast itself, as well as other variations within other regions. The above discussion and an ample bibiography with an emphasis on literature dealing with northeastern Italy is found in Pierluigi and Roberto Grandinetti's work, Il caso Friuli. Arretratezza o svillupo?, (Udine: Cooperativ a 'il Campo', 1979). The above quotation is on page 78.

33. Riggs, op. cit.

34. In the following text assistance will be used as the term which includes clientelism and party-run patronage and means especially the part that is given by the patron.

35. T. Skocpol, op. cit., p. 115-117.

36. Moore, op. cit., Chapter Eight, especially p. 439 and 491.

37. For the following section on modernity and development I have relied on Alejandro Portes' article "Modernity and Development: A Critique," Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. VIII, no. 3, (Fall, 1973); and on Jane and Peter Schneider and Edward Hansen, "Modernization and Development: the Role of Regional Elites and Non-Corporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 14, no. 3, (June, 1972).

38. Alex Inkles article, "Making Men Modern: On the Causes and Consequences of Individual Change in Six Countries," American Journal of Sociology, 75, (1969) p. 208-225 is an example of an author who tries to deal with this problem.

39. Portes, op. cit., p. 272.

40. Graziano, op, cit., p. 21 and p.4.

41. Peter and Jane Schneider and Edward Hansen, "Modernization and Development: The Role of Regional Elites and Noncorporate Groups in the European Mediterranean," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14:3, (June, 1972), p. 340. Their definition of modernization is the "process by which an underdeveloped region changes in response to inputs (ideologies, behavioral codes, commodities and institutional models) from already established industrial centers; a process which is based on that region's continued dependence upon the urban-industrial metropolis." Their description of development refers to it as a "process by which an underdeveloped region

attempts to acquire an autonomous and diversified industrial economy on its own terms." Although they have not been used here, the following terms are also useful: non-corporate groups are "a coalition, clique, or patron-client chain, in which individuals pool resources and skills." Corporate group's "power is a function of consolidated political systems," p. 335.

42. Sidney Tarrow, in Between Center and Periphery, (N.H.: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 15-46 summarizes the literature that deals with diffusion-isolation models, market and peripheral maginality, bureaucracy and peripheral integration, and all the sources he used for his own synthetic model. His ideas have been used differently here.

43. The analysis of Italian social structure is based on the work of Massimo Paci, "La strutura di classe della società italiana," and otehrs in the collection edited by Paci, Capitaliso e classi sociali in Italia, (Il Mulino: Bologna, 1978).

44. General works:
Val R. Lorwin, (ed)., Labor and Working Conditions in Modern Europe, (N.Y.: The Macmillan Company, 1967 and such collections as G. Hunnius G.D. Garson and J. Case, (eds.), Worker's Control, (N.Y.: Random House, 1973).
Works on Italy:
Samuel Surace, Ideology, Economic Change, and the Working Classes: The Case of Italy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); and "Teoria sociale e storia nella modernizazione in Italia," Studi di Sociologia 12, no. 3-4.
Emilio Reneri, "Comportamento di classe e nuovo ciclo di lotte," in Aris Accornero, (ed)., Problemi del Movimento Sindacale in Italia, 1943-73, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1976), p. 839-872.
Works on Friuli Venezia-Giulia:
Nino Agostinetti, "Cooperativismo e sinddcalismo cattolici a Gorizia nei primi anni del'900," Iniziativa Isontina, n. 74 a. XXII, (1980); and F. Mariani and M.R. Trasforini, Le Cooperative, 1980, (Padua: Gloria, 1980).

45. In English, the best seems to be Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); and Massimo Livi Bacci, (ed.), The Demographic and Social Patterns of Emigration from the Southern European Countries, Serie Ricerche Emperiche n. 7, Dipartimento Statistico Matematico dell'Universita di Firenze (Comitato Italiano per lo Studio dei Problemi della Popolazione, Firenze, 1972.) In Italian the most recent and thorough work is by Elena Saraceno,

Emigrazione e rientri, (Udine: Cooperativa editoriale "il Campo", 1981), introduction. For her research and her patient explanations and clear definitions I am deeply grateful.

46. Saraceno, ibid and Grandinetti, op. cit., Chapters 3 and 4. Renato Zangheri, op. cit.; and Emilio Sereni, Capitalismo e mercato nazionale, (Roma: Riuniti, 1974); and La questione agraria nella rinascia nazionale italiana, (Torino: Einuadi, 1975); and Giorgio Giorgetti, Contadini e proprietari nell'Italia moderna, (Torino, Einaudi, 1974).

47. Grandinetti, op. cit., Chapter 4 and Saraceno, op. cit.

48. The best introduction to Italian voting and analysis in English is Samuel H. Barnes, "Italy: Religion and Class in Electoral Behavior," in Richard Rose, (ed.), Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook" (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1974), p. 208-210 and especially p. 218-221. An excellent comparison of European electoral systems can be found in Karl Dittrich and Lars Norby Johansen, "La partecipazione electorale in Europa (1945-1978): Miti e realtà," Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, Anno X, no. 2, (August, 1980), p. 265-291.

49. S.M. Lipset, Political Man, (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 185.

50. Dittrich and Johansen, op. cit., p. 265.

51. Barnes, op. cit., pp. 193-195 and 200-204.

52. Gabriele Calvi, "La frattura tra valori e scelte politiche in Italia," Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, Anno X, no. 1 (April 1980), pp. 125-147.

53. Barnes, op. cit., p. 219.

54. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

55. For an excellent discussion of assistance in the South and the role of the DC, see Judith Chubb, "The Social Bases of an Urban Political Machine," Political Science Quarterly, (Spring 1981), pp. 107-125.

56. Calvi, op. cit., p. 146.

57. Chubb, op. cit., pp. 124-125.

58. Arend Lipjhart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, I (1968); also see Val

Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," Comparative Politics, III, (1971); and Adriano Pappalardo, "La politica conosciativa nella democrazia Italiana," Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, Anno X, no. 1 (April 1980).

59. Paolo Gaspari, Storia popolare della società contadina in Friuli (Monza: Officine Grafiche Piffarerio, 1976); and Le Lotte del Cormor (Udine: Centro Editoriale Friuliano, 1980). Other works consulted for background were Piero Brunello, Ribelli, Questuanti e Banditi (Venezia: Marsilio, 1981); and Aldo Mori, La Resistenza nel mondo contadino (Udine: Del Bianco, 1977).

60. Ritanna Armeni, "Intervista a Bruno Manghi," Il Manifesto, November 6, 1981, p. 4.

61. "Padrone" is a widely used word in the Italian language, and the dictionary defintion is extensive. The four major definitions are:

    a) absolute dominator; proprietor; giver of work.

    b) pertaining to private property, as padronale; a terrain belonging to one proprietor. "Padronato" (when used with a capital 'P') meant a governing or ruling group of owners.

    c) as an adjective, "padronale", applied to one who privately enjoys the priviledge or right of property as opposed to "imprenditoriale" which is used for entrepreneurial.

    d) the authority or right of property or proprietorship includes the behavior and customs of the "padrone" and implies knowledge and control.

62. Grandinetti, op. cit.; and Gaspari, Storia popolare, op. cit. Chapters 14, 15, 16.

63. Grandinetti, ibid; Gaspari, ibid; Arturo Carlo Jemolo, Chiesa e stato in Italia negli ultimi cento anni, Torino: Einaudi; and Giuseppe de Piero, L'Agricoltura della Bassa Pianura Friulana attraverso i tempi, Udine, Chiandetti, 1975.

64. R. Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 9. pp. 292-347; and Moore, op. cit.. Also Jemolo, op. cit.

65. The seven-volume Enciclopedia monografica del Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Udine; Giorgio Candeloro, op. cit.; Saraceno, op. cit.; Grandinetti, op. cit., plus

many volumes of Rivista di Economia Agraria, Quale storia and Storia Contemporanea in Friuli have all provided extensive bases for the research in Friuli. All will be cited extensively in the text. The economy is divided into the following sectors for Regional Government:

Primary sectors include: agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting. Secondary sectors are: the extractive and transforming industries such as: construction and public works, water, gas and electricity plants.

Tertiary sectors include all the other activities such as: distribution services (transportation, commerce and banking), public administration, teaching and the liberal professions, and other non-industrial workers.

Within the tertiary sector is also the service sector which includes: tourism, medicine, domestic service, entertainment, interior design and insurance.

The Figures cited unless otherwise stated, are all drawn from ISTAT, the Central Census Bureau. Important syntheses of census data can be found in: G. Tagliacarne, Il reddito prodotto nelle province italiane nel 1976. Serie storica 1970-1975 (Milano, 1978); and Il reddito prodotto nelle province italiane, 1951-1971, (Milano, 1973). The most recent data for Friuli were published in Il Piccolo, January 27, 1981, p. 7. On agriculture, the best summary of recent data is in: Roberto Grandinetti and Elena Saraceno, Le Aziende Agricole Part-Time in Friuli- Venezia Giulia, (Udine: Centro Ricerche Economico-Sociali CRES, 1980).

66. Among many other articles, the clearest are: Pietro Barcellona, "Nel rapporto città-campagna: nuove forme di dipendenza dal Nord, Rinascita, n. 32, August 7, 1981, p. 13 and Carla Barbarella, "Che novità, la CEE riduce i prezzi . . .," Rinascita, n. 43, October 30, 1981, p. 14.

67. Alavi, op. cit.

68. ISTAT figures for 1983 also published in Il Piccolo, 4 March 1984, p. 1.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HISTORY OF A MODERN POLITICAL "PROJECT": FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA

A. BEFORE ITALY: The Agricultural Society

1. What's in a Name?

Friuli's history is marked by a remarkable number of destructions and reconstructions; wars, famines, floods, earthquakes, invasions, conquests, and rebellions are the most obvious of these events. Its vulnerability to natural events and to human plans as well as its ability to rebuild after both are expressed in the folklore of the Region.

Ethnically, Friuli-Venezia Giulia has been a crossroads for people living south and west of the Alps, as well as those from the north and east. Consequently, Venetians, Friulani, Slovenians, Croatians, and Germans are only part of the mixture. Territorially, as in other border areas, the events of the last two centuries have weighed heavily on the collective population. All too frequently, as the political face of Europe has changed, the exchanges of territory were battled out in Friuli.

Thus, the Region may not be defined as an "historical" area in the traditional sense, nor through any homogeneous ethnicity, nor can it be delineated by natural boundaries, since these were politically sanctified. Many present contradictions within the social order and in the economic and political systems are echoes of patterns of the past.

For instance, Trieste and Monfalcone were prosperous ship-building ports since Roman times. Their economies are secular, mercantile, and international. In the last twenty years, the southeastern part of Friuli (actually Giulia) has turned to service industry in a massive way to try to revive an economy in crisis. The percentage of older people in its population is the highest in the nation. Both historical and present conditions provide fuel for the often virulent anti-Italian and anti-Yugoslavian tinge to its politics.[1]

The rest of the population of what is now Friuli-Venezia Giulia was essentially tied to the land until recently, but within this rural context two different models of industrialization were applied at different times, and within each historical phase various extremes and levels of development can be delineated. The discussion can be enlarged to focus on the difference in particular areas such as the mountainous zones, the foothills, the central areas and the plains.[2]

Ethnic and cultural differences are also evident among groups that speak various languages and dialects, and between those whose cultures were developed under Austro-Hungarian rule and those who found themselves under Italian rule after 1866. Some differences surfaced during the nineteenth century while others were discovered only after the Second World War, given that Trieste was separate from the Region and even from Italy for eleven years.[3] Thus, we

are dealing with a territory, much of which was organized by international and political forces beyond its confines.

The evolution of the Region's name is illustrative. The term Venezia Giulia was "invented" for political and military reasons after the Second War for Italian Independence, when the Veneto was already joined to Italy and its expansionism had to be justified both geographically and ethnically. At the end of the nineteenth century, it was rarely clear whether the Giulian people being described in documents were of Trieste or of Istria, and then the people of Gorizia were often mistakenly included. It was not until the beginning of this century that "Venezia Giulia" or "Regione Giulia" began to be in more common use. Even now Trieste is considered an urban area with its own hinterland tied to Friuli only as a political capitol. The "emotional" center of Friuli is Udine.[4]


Friuli itself is difficult to sort out in its various geographical connotations. It includes the right bank of the Tagliamento River, mostly Venetian or Venetianized. Within the Province of Udine broad differences can be found between Lower Friuli (often simply called the Bassa), whose eastern section was part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire until 1981, and the central area of Friuli which was annexed by Venice in 1866, as well as Carnia which has always expressed its own independent tendencies.

The administrative boundaries that separate Friuli from Veneto correspond only in part to the historic western lines

of the Patria of Friuli, which were moved back in 1818 when the district of Portoguaro was given to Venice, and again in 1853 with the transference of the Commune of Sappada to Belluno.[5] The change in boundaries lines represented a further incursion of Venetian culture into a Friulan-speaking people.[6] The grafting of a Venetian majority onto the Friulan Province of Pordenone reduced the historic linguistic and administrative ties to Udine. The bond has been further loosened in the last fifty years with the

MAP

Friuli in the days of the Romans from Gian Carlo Menis, Storia del Friuli, 1969.



development of industry fostered by foreign interests, resulting in competition with, and finally separation from, Udine in 1968.[7]

Another complete discourse is possible for the Province of Gorizia, which has its own particular identity and its own historical and administrative vicissitudes. It has shown a will to be an integral territory against all attempts to dismember it.

Friuli-Venezia Giulia, then, is a "project" more than it is a specific entity of its own. For this reason it is especially important to outline some of the early history and the resulting cultural layers introduced by a long series of conquerors, colonizers, and "project directors."[8]

2. Friuli's First Unity and Division: The Roman's Buffer-zone and the Theocratic Patriarchy

Before becoming a Roman outpost against the barbarian incursions from the north, Friuli contained settlements of various peoples, most of whom where Celts. Under the Romans, agriculture and trade flourished, especially in centers such as Cividale (Forum Iulia), Aquileia, and Trieste (Tergeste). Romanization was felt mostly in Lower Friuli with the building of roads to the north and east. Northern Friuli, or Carnia, continued to share communal goods and territory, and conquests less often affected the people's life.[9]

With the division of the Roman Empire trade continued, while the number of invasions increased. As Rome's bureaucratic and administrative power weakened, the vacuum was filled by the local dioceses, whose structure was little changed through the subsequent years of Longobardian rule.[10] The Region continued to suffer from cyclical war and rebuilding. It is from these early times that Friuli's role as a buffer-zone against all invaders was set.

During the Great Schism of 556, when the Bishop of Aquileia was among those who rebelled against Rome, another important tradition of Friuli was adopted. Before the healing of the breach in 699, this leader came to be called the Great Patriarch. The time of the Franks and Charlemagne in Italy hardly need to repeated, except that in Friuli, whenever the rulers were changed, Church power was left intact. The Patriarch was even awarded control over much of what had been Longobardian and, in time, gained temporal power to match the spiritual realm he already had. At present, the Patriarchy continues to be used as a symbol of an independent Friuli.[11]

The next period was no less filled with local squabbles and wars, although some amount of trade became possible again. The last Frankish emperor, Berengario, died in 924, and the gap was filled by local rivalries and Venetian harassment, so that the area was more vulnerable then ever. Waves of Hungarians overran the Region until 952, when Henry II of Carnizia, brother of Ottone the Great, finally

defeated them. At the end of the tenth century, Friuli became a Civitas Austriae, fully detached from the Regno of Italy. The new rulers had gained an area in complete ruin and chaos.[12] Over the next century, the Patriarchs of Aquileia continued to gain power and increase the Region's prosperity and autonomy. The foundation for the Great Age of the Patriarchs was constructed in this era, and along with it the trend to give loyalty to the German Emperors.[13]

The autonomous Patriarchal State was at its height from 1027 to 1420, serving as independent theocratic vassal to the Holy Roman Empire and as its bridge to the Italian territory until the thirteenth century. It was administered by an intricate web of lay and ecclesiastical officers. Castles were built surrounded by dwellings and the urban areas became free communes on the German model. The Council of the Prince-Patriarch evolved into a parliament by the middle of the twelfth century, which is worth note here as it was quite a different development from what was happening in the rest of the Italian peninsula at the time. Istria and Trieste were not within this structure but were governed as colonies, while the Counts of Gorizia attempted to keep their territory as much removed from another power's control as possible.[14]

In 962, the Realm of Italy was joined to the German Empire and Ottone I became such a powerful emperor that he controlled the election of the popes. The political and religious system he installed was like that found in much of

Austria. The Patriarchy was the highest feudal and religious power for the vast zone of the Veneto and Carniola. For several centuries the Patriarchs were of German origin and maintained ties which were more Imperial than Roman. Islands of lords kept their independence from the Patriarchy, but of the ancient Longobardian nobility, few remained. Castles and peasant houses alike had been destroyed, along with the inhabitants, by the invasions of the Hungarians and there was much for the Patriarchy to rebuild.[15]

At the same time, it was necessary to create a structure that would respond to feudal as well as military needs. Fields and monasteries, around which agricultural life had been centered, required repopulation. Labor was more difficult to reproduce quickly than buildings. The area of Lower Friuli, nearest the center of power, was peopled by Slovenian colonists, whose socialization was guided by the Benedictines. New feudal holdings were given to servants who had labored faithfully during a war. The turnover of land was especially great in areas where the Patriarchy felt the need to keep one lord from gaining too much power.[16]

Except for these changes, medieval agriculture was not too different from what it had been under the Romans' times, although it had suffered frequent destruction in the meantime. Pastoral agriculture had spread to what had once been cultivated land. Roman roads were in a state of disrepair, as were defensive structures. In rebuilding, vassals

further institutionalized their prerogatives: judicial, administrative, and military. They used the signorile model of economy, with the castle as the center of agricultural and artisan work. New lords pushed hard to give the appearance of wealth as soon as possible. Because wealth was measured by the number of mouths you had to feed, this meant an ever more onerous life for the contadini as the castles were built. The height of construction in Friuli came between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries. Thus, during the twelfth century when cities like Florence and Parma were becoming too large for feudal organization, the division of labor between city and countryside was just beginning in Friuli.[17]

As the rural economy was increasingly brought under the jurisdiction of political and administrative units, both internal and external structures required more force to support feudal organization. As a result, an agrarian contradiction was produced by the Patriarchy. With the growing need for products, laborers and vassals, there was an increase in the need for holdings to grant, beginning an accelerated encroachment on communal land. Let us explore in more detail this development which is critical for the future of agriculture.

The Roman roads stretched out from Aquileia leaving great margins of marshes, forests, and pastures. Small towns which were rural centers linking cultivating and grazing activities clustered along these roads. Much of the

open land was not fenced. Crops were planted in temporary spots, often alternated from year to year with grazing. During the Middle Ages crops were not grown just along the side of the road, but spread further into the forests. In the cultivation of grain, the yield per plot was not important, only the final amount produced. The cultivation of grain was a group project in which land was alloted to families and plowing animals were used communally. These large open tilling spaces seem to have lasted longer in Friuli than in many other spots in Europe.[18]

The forest was every bit as important, if not more so, to the farmer's economy than the fields. Wax, honey, greens, and fish from the streams and rivers were essential to the diet. In a sense, the forests were a reserve against hunger. Too many things threatened the crops, from invasion to hail. The forest also provided seasonings, medicine, roots that were storable for winter eating and firewood. Crops of grain and wine were demanded by the inhabitants of monasteries and castles, but they were not part of the rural diet. Thus, the autumn planting of grain for the white bread of the padrone was supplemented by a spring planting for the black bread of the contadini. The institution of planting and the use of forest resources permitted the people to survive. Any encroachment of the communal lands, and thus on this balance, was bound to cause hardship.[19]

By the twelfth century, the repopulation of Middle and Lower Friuli was well underway. There was some improvement

in the quality of life between 1200 and 1300, but not really for the contadini. Where they lived autonomously, life was a constant struggle against nature, invaders, bandits, and as if this were not enough, they were expected to protect their area commercially and militarily.[20] As feudal rights and territory were granted by the Patriarchy to both clerical and lay vassals, autonomous groups disappeared. Cultivated areas expanded and mills became important centers for both landowners and contadini. The owner could extend his territory from that center into the areas still held by free farmers who had wrested their land from the forests.

In the course of two centuries, the Patriarchy granted a great deal of land and Friuli blossomed with castles, monasteries and noble houses. Land ownership became ever more hereditary and those contadini who had once possessed land increasingly needed protection from a padrone, for which service he was to be paid in goods and labor. Over time, these later came to be part of the patrimony. Contracts were granted for specific crops. The landlord invested nothing, waited for the yield, and then took half to one-fourth of it. Though still not the formal mezzadria which we will encounter later, it was a start. Monasteries specialized in commercial agriculture using this method, especially in the production of wine and oil. Both of these commodities require a certain initial investment along with a great deal of manual labor. The economic gains from just storage and transport of these goods was considerable.[21]

With the increase of wealth in Friuli middlemen entered the picture: as controllers of mills and overseers of production. In 1300, usury was profitable, and it was rare for a farmer to start an agricultural year without debt. The gap between rich and poor also grew along with the overall increase in production. In a sense, the economic gap between "libertà" and "servitù" was even greater than the legal one. Even more critical was the feeling that one group produced wealth and another used it. This crystallization of positions lasted for centuries and prevented the bettering of rural conditions through productive or social development. It permitted a continuing cycle of exploitation, subordination and emarginalization.[22]

The majority of the governing classes of the Patriarchy had been given their titles by the Emperor and were German-speaking. The lower classes included both free and bound workers. The latter were in the very great majority. The former were few and generally lived in the urban areas; these could be called bourgeoisie. One of the striking features of the Friulan social structure, however, has been lack of a sizeable bourgeoisie class until quite recently.[23]

In the wake of the traffic from the crusades which brought new wealth for construction, there also came the flowering of the Friulan language. This development can be seen in the quantity of fine poetry, literature, song, and philosophy from that period. Although the upper classes certainly gained most from the long period of local peace

and stability, they were also isolated from the flow of linguistic and cultural change that swept the rest of the Italian peninsula. Friuli produced unique local product of culture, language, and leadership. A German imprint was left on sacred and military architecture, while the laws were a fusion of Roman, Longobardian, and Bavarian. A surprising number of customs are touched, even to this day, by Celtic folklore and tradition.[24]

By 1300, the Guelph Patriarchs who replaced the Ghibeline ones had lost half their territory to the Venetians and to various feudal lords, but increasingly to the powerful Counts of Gorizia. Political and economic chaos was again rampant. Some of the Florentines and Longobardians who fled from other troubles to Friuli brought with them the first infusion of Italian culture. Order and peace were reinstated from time to time, but never for very long. One Patriarch, Marquardo of Randeck, a celebrated German priest, instituted legislative reforms and a legal code that were in effect in Friuli until the end of the eighteenth century. He also felt compelled to begin war again with the Venetians and consequently, Trieste was lost and gained once more. He set up a chain of squabbles that continued after his death and led to the fall of the Patriarchy as a great power and the final loss of Trieste, which was not rejoin Friuli again until 1918.[25]

The last Patriarchs had no idea how to handle all the local rivalries. At the end of the fourteenth century, a

feudal war with populist overtones broke out. Venice intervened to create a truce, but not before the armies of the Serenissima, the Bavarians, and the Hungarians had warred all over Friuli, which was sacked and pillaged repeatedly until 1420 when the Venetians had almost completely occupied the territory.[26]

3. Venice: The Signorile System, Rebellion, and the Representative Assembly of the Contadino

The Venetians were mercantile and wielded their considerable economic power through a stratified bureaucracy. After having lost much of its vital commerce, Venice needed to make a transition from being solely a sea power to being a force on the land. In changing its productive base, it was hoped that it would not be required to open its ranks to the newly conquered nobility. However, as Venice took over, piece by piece, it found that its major problem was to combat Friulan nobles who were used to a rigid signorile system, and the Serenissima had to recognize the rights of the Friulian society. Friuli was to be governed as a colony, rather than changing the practice of centuries.[27]

A kind of feudal land speculation followed as the rich and noble of Friuli sold their holdings to the Venetians. The new owners tended to use the land without thought for reinvestment for greater productivity, which also increased the exploitation and abuse of the contadini. The Patriarch tried to redress some of the more severe abuses, but

enforcement was difficult. Local rebellions and protests were held in check only by laws requiring the community itself to repay damages, on top of heavy fines, for such an action.[28]

In time, the Venetians found that the greatest profit came not from the bonded worker, but from the free. This prompted them to replace serfdom with rigid agricultural contracts and the removal of even more land from common use. It is at this time, then, that the binding practice of mezzadria was introduced. From the contadino's point of view, there was also a further reduction of options for independent survival through the increased cultivation of former woodlands and the sale of communal areas.

Under these conditions, the Turks' invasions in 1477 and 1499 resulted in the almost complete destruction of the overburdened and just recovered population. The contadini were expected to make up the troops for fighting and, subsequently, divisions of them were maintained for rebuilding. They found, both as military units and as travelling work crews, that the harsh conditions were not local but widespread. Venice had been unable to mobilize sufficient protection before the damage was done. It rebuilt the areas closest to home for itself and left the rest of Friuli in chaos.[29]

The introduction of silk culture was added to the contadino's burden, along with the cutting off of communal land, the demand for intensification and diversification of

crops, and the responsibility for the upkeep and improvement of their own and the landlord's land. This new productive activity was to become a nightmare for the contadini of Friuli for the next three hundred years.[30]

Malcontent increased, and when Parliament tried to reinstate order, feelings exploded in rebellion. In July of 1509, the first castle as burned. When the nobles took up their positions again, they "rationalized" the system, but it remained firmly signorile, condemning Friuli to a static social and economic position until after 1800. The rebellion was among the earliest of the anti-feudal revolts that swept Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it came before the sense of need for political emancipation arose in the more communal age. Friuli passed, then, from a pure sort of feudalism to a signorile system which synthesized both feudal and bourgeois exploitation. It was a state in which Friuli was to remain for some time.[31]

Let us examine part of the situation in more detail, as it is at this point history that the agrarian structure and its social stratification took on many forms which have lasted into the twentieth century. Any new policies initiated by Venice were designed to maintain the pre-existing social system in which the basic feudal characteristics would remain, while the autonomy of the communities would be eliminated. In a period of economic depression for the whole of Europe, decision-making was consolidated in the hands of a few powerful Venetian families which prepared to

control military and administrative positions in order to funnel the greatest possible amount of wealth into that city. To this day, the peoples of Friuli feel that they added much to the splendor of Venice. At the same time, the city is said to be the source of all evil winds that damage the crops.

After the rebellion, Venice instituted the Contadinanza, a rural representative assembly, to gain time and support in countryside. It was used to bring the peasants back into order and was presented as an alternative to rule by their Friulan masters. These latter were left with territory, but without the ability to administer it. They were allowed only one representative in the Venetian Serenissma and could take little part in the decisions made for the use of their land. The Friulan nobility were also brought to heel by a Venetian alliance with the new landlords of the urban bourgeoisie, with whom the old nobles had refused to share power.[32]

The Contadinanza tutored the peasants in the needs and interests of Venice. It permitted the contadini to be heard, but was also an efficient way for Venice to keep track of population and settlements where increased extraction was possible. Tax collection was simplified, as was the control of remaining communal lands. Thus, the Contadinanza "created an institutional and objective relationship of solidarity between the peasants and the Venetian


power in opposition to the local nobility, without substantially changing the feudalism of the Region."[33]

It should not be forgotten that, at this time religious and political power holders were pre-occupied with peasant rebellions throughout Europe, not just in Friuli. During the Counter-Reformation, the Church, with the help of Jesuits in particular, began the job of ideologically transforming popular culture through repression. The Church maintained its ties with the dominant groups while strengthening its vast and multi-faceted net of relationships to the peasant. It became a "mediator of necessity" for the Serenissima.[34]

The Venetians used the Contadinanza to neutralize the revolt, and with it the hope for social and economic renovation, yet they did tolerate various forms of banditry while the Church in its turn was working on indoctrination through the Inquisition and the witch trials.[35] Any advances for the contadini which were made in the last two centuries were wiped out. While much of Europe was changing demographically, technologically, economically, and culturally, the areas under Venetian rule with the exception of the western regions of the Republic, stagnated.

MAP

Friuli and Istria from 1514 to 1797 from P.S. Leicht, Breve Storia del Friuli, 1970.



4. The Enclosure of Friuli under Venice, Napoleon, and Austria

In the second half of the sixteenth century, improvements to the land were rare, irrigation poor and sparse, famines and epidemics numerous. Although the data are variable for that era, all show a decrease in population between 1548 and 1642. The averages suggest that there were about 160,000 people in Friuli in 1548 and only about 120,000 by the later date.[36] The desertion by producers and devastation of production in addition to Venetian attempts at intensification created an even greater drop in production. This downward spiral lasted well into the 1600s. Only in the few spots where communal land remained was there a nutritional level barely sufficient for survival. It was not until 1620, when corn (maize) was found on the market in Friuli, that there began to be hope for stable nutritional intake. By 1700, the population of Friuli reached 350,000 and much of the increase was due to the introduction of this crop.[37]

The growth of Friulian cities was also adversely affected. The population of Udine in 1528 was 13,350. In 1620 it was 10,000 by 1795, it was up again to 15,837. Only Cividale, Portoguaro, and perhaps Pordenone had more than 3,000 people during the 1500s.[38] The heavy, demanding new contracts put on the contadini in the countryside, which were such an important factor in lowering production, were accompanied by a lack of solid social structure in the urban

areas. This backward economic and demographic cycle is all the more shocking when it is compared with the flourishing cities of the neighboring Veneto and others in Italy. The "Crisis of 1600" came eighty years early to Friuli. Whatever was produced in society that was of value came from the rural rather than the urban sector, in spite of the fact that technological improvements, such as changes of land tenure and crops, were not taking place.[39]

During the 1500s and 1600s, the relationship between the owners and the contadini, became more precise and rigid. The types of contracts were limited, but their social and economic content were put into legal forms that existed well into the twentieth century.[40] More importantly, the contractual relationship between two classes can be traced clearly into the present from this point in time.[41]

Once serfdom itself was abolished, rent took its place, usually in the form of fixed amounts paid in kind. In a short span of time, rents became variable and included mixed rents, mezzadria, share cropping, and "profit sharing."[42] All these forms of payment require little risk for the landlord, who has the possibility of an ever increasing supply of goods, while the contadino's ability to plan, his autonomy, is reduced to a minimum. Rents may undergo rapid changes due to fluctuations in the market, but the risks fall on the contadino who must pay his rent and his debts. If he fails to meet his obligations, all of his means of production are forfeited.

In good times or bad, rents were raised and contract periods shortened, which promoted an extremely diversified agriculture. The farmer attempted to grow the greatest variety of crops possible for his family, ideally large in order to have the fewest number of contacts with the towns and market. The labor of every member of the family was necessary for survival. Improvements to the land were to be avoided since they accrued to the landlord. Thus, transformation of the feudal system from a group of nobles living in castles to a bourgeoisie situated in villas meant little change for the contadino. Both classes held feudal prerogatives which differed only slightly over time.[43]

Contracts, both feudal and more recent, required "gifts" and "honors" for the landlord. Eggs, chickens, and other sorts of goods could be requested for holidays, and labor could be demanded for transport of the rent in kind to the house or baggage from a winter to a summer residence. These burdens were multiplied during the 1700s as population growth accentuated the over use of land, especially that which was owned by Venetians. Medium plots became small, and the smaller plots were further fragmented as more land was needed for renting. Higher yields per acre were offset by this parcelization and any sort of unified or stable production was made more difficult.

In other zones of Italy, the selling of communal property and the concentration of ownership permitted the formation of sizeable farms and more rational use of the

land.[44] Farmers in Friuli began to acquire a few new crops and techniques, but not a change in land tenure. This situation was aggravated by the overuse of fields nearby the dwelling which were preferred to distant fields, as the latter were the most vulnerable to intrusion from loose animals or robbers.[45]

Along with the problems arising form the inefficient land use and the severe contracts imposed on the farmers, the sale of communal land created further difficulty. The rebellions required damage payments, and as debts from these amassed, communal goods were sold off to pay them. The community was forced to sell to Venice the land, which represented the last vestige of autonomy. In 1600, when Friuli was the poorest and least populated of the Venetian holdings, Venice turned its attention to the remaining communal lands, and to land held by ecclesiastical groups. The Venetians gained about 40% of the communal land and about 42% of the profit from all sales. The nobility of Friuli were able to buy land, but the contadino could not, and thus his dependence on a landlord became more complete.[46]

At the end of the land sales era, approximately 48% of the arable land was owned by Venetian and Friulan nobility; 92% of it was the best land in the plains and foothills. 82% of all the farms in Friuli were less than 5 hectares, 12% had 5 to 10, 4% had 10 to 20, and only slightly more than 1% had 25 hectares or more. Considering that 10

hectares was a minimum for the survival of a medium to large family, only 20% of the area's farms could support a family and also produce surplus for the market.[47]

Only the very poorest land was left to community use by 1800. Consequently, there was an increase in the number of families migrating from richer to poorer land, the spread of the mezzadria in both good and bad farm land, and the beginning of deforestation and erosion. The plowing of lands once reserved for grazing also meant that there were fewer animals for paying rent or for the family's consumption. Elimination of the grazing cycle in crop rotation meant increasingly less fertile soil without pasturing herds. In turn, the crop yield was lower and the quality of seed was poorer. Both new and old fields which were forced to grow grain where there was once free land and dependent contracts, added to a growing population, opened the doors to the crisis of 1800.[48]

During the Napoleonic era, fragmentation and privatization of the land continued. From 1750 to 1850, the population of Friuli was sparsely settled and remained at about 350,000. Its static agricultural system was particularly evident during the corn and grain crisis of 1817 when the contadini had to grow potatoes and turnips to avoid starvation.[49]

The sale of all but the poorest lands continued, as did disturbances among the people. Friuli had its share of outlaw bands and these grew in the eighteenth century, not

just as a result of misery, but also because of government monopolies on salt, tobacco and other products. In Austria, there were no monopolies which led to a flourishing black market, supplied especially well by the mountain people of Carnia.


As the mountains had a short growing season and small and not particularly fertile fields, the land there was less attractive to large landowners. There, grazing and pasturing of animals was supplemented by gardens for household use and often by the growth of illegal crops. Whole villages, many of whose inhabitants had fled exploitative and dependent conditions on the plains, were organized around the growth and transport of tobacco. Squads of tax collectors were disarmed and terrorized by women and elders left behind while the rest of the people made the trip over the mountains to sell the crop in the cities.[50]

Further discontent was created around 1800, first by Austria and then by Napoleon, when land taxes were instituted to help pay off the debts incurred during the wars of both nations. Resolutions to the contadinis' problems of dependence and poverty are best summarized in a statement by a nobleman of the time, who stated that if one were too old or unfit for farming or for service of some kind, vagabondage and begging were the only alternatives. If there were other answers besides an illegal and precarious life in the mountains, they were few.[51]

Some revolutionary ideas were transmitted by the French army, but it was in Friuli for a short time and had little impact. The ideas found favor only among those who already possessed some sort of political consciousness, and rarely among the signori or the government administrations. Acts of discontent continued but the major struggle was for survival. The contadini had experienced "reforms" that had then been annulled, in effect, by the sale of communal lands. After each change in administration, support for the landlords seemed to increase.[52]

MAP

Friuli after the Congress of Vienna from Giuseppe Fornasir, Il Friuli, 1957.



Il Friuli dopo il Congresso di Vienna (1815).

Austrian dominance, continuing in some places until 1918, was no advance, but merely a continuation of static economic, political and social systems. The administration knew it was caught in the middle of anything but a dynamic situation, but several factors conditioned its failure to advance. During the previous century, those foremen and bookkeepers who had collected rents for the nobility, had amassed land for themselves, especially the most desirable on the plains. They did not then disassociate themselves from the nobility, either politically or ideologically. They became an important group within the Agrarian Association of Friuli.[53] The Austrians fostered the identification of these few bourgeoisie with the nobility through such associations.

The Austrians also counted on not only on the institutions they had inherited from Venice but also on the substantial and helpful links between religious institutions and the public administration. Priests were the only representatives of the State in remote areas. However, since they were not the State, they could give attention to malcontent, suffering and protest. The clergy's isolation also played an unexpected role. Priests who worked amidst great misery and poverty found that their assistance was the only outside contact the population had as city people increasingly ignored the misery of rural existence. Priests became the political interpreters of mass needs, and as they were also participating members in the economic life of a

community, at times, its rebel leader. Some priests made themselves part of the great noble families, some became landlords themselves, and others lived and died sharing the life of their poor followers. The clergy could be found in a variety of roles early in Friuli's history, but most important was that their part was central in every sector of the society.[54]

By 1866, when anti-clericalism had gained supporters among some members of the small middle class, the clergy were better able to represent the masses in their struggle against their landlords. Thus, the strong ties of the priest to the peasantry in rural areas existed long before the coming of Italian rule and continued after its arrival. The clergy kept the memory of the glory and the independence of the Patriarchy alive. Its autonomous status while Friuli was under Austrian rule became part of the area's cultural heritage as it was given new meaning as a symbol in the coming social struggles.[55]

The Catholic Movement in Friuli was first based on the organization of the parish rather than on any political boundaries. It was not long before these congregations were suggesting the need for a variety of social organizations such as rural savings and insurance funds.[56] Rural savings banks, or casse rurali, responded to the needs of small owners and renters, and permitted their alliance with the mezzadri. Later it will be seen that Italy used the casse to bring parts of Friuli under its economic domination

rather than allow them to remain as alternatives to the growing national banking system which was trying to centralize economic planning.

It was the Church then, which played a central role in Friuli before it was joined in Italy, but the same may be said for Italy before it gained all the territory which is now Friuli-Venezia Giulia. During the Middle Ages, the aristocracy lived mostly in urban areas, while the peasantry and many of the artisans remained in rural zones serving the needs of the nobility. Commerce and manufacturing were not acceptable pursuits for the "signori." The Church, fired by the spirit of the Counter-Reformation, used the capilary structure of the bishoprics and the parishes to administer a feudal system in which all social strata were unified by dependence on land and peasant labor.

There were rebellions in 1600 in Naples and elsewhere as there has been in 1500 in Friuli, but what is most striking in a study of them is the resistance of the social structure to change because of the unifying ideology of the Church. Its strength is even more evident in the 1800s where there was both popular and aristocratic resistance to the formation of a bourgeoisie which threatened to disrupt the existing urban-rural configuration. Regardless of the number of social strata involved, the homogenous nature of the society is a remarkable feature of Italian history up until the period of early industrialization.

Church ideology changed over time to accommodate new challenges as they arose. A secular trend grew in Italy as it did everywhere in Europe after the French Revolution. At the time of Italian unification, adherents to the new liberal ideas were to be found especially in the nation's northwest. A coalition between some of them who wished to industrialize Italy and large landowners from the rest of the nation, not just the South, was formed. Together they intended change for only part of the nation. The agrarian society was to continue to provide capital for investment in the new industries. The Church and the property holders were to be responsible for maintaining the preindustrial culture and social structure. The secular forces would have the job of governing and while the Vatican would not allow catholics to take part in politics, they were still free to invest and accumulate capital.

B. AFTER ITALY: Early Industrialization

1. The Coalition of Landlords and Entrepreneurs

In 1866, much of what is now Friuli became part of the Regno of Italy, though for a time, some of the area was still influenced by the policies of Vienna. The formation of the Italian industrial sector and the place made in it for agriculture has been the subject of a large number of studies. A synthesis of some of them, and an idea of Austria's contributions to Friuli's past, will suggest some of the effects of unification on the area.[57]

First of all, from the moment the strength of the industrial revolution in England became clear, the problem of lack of development was immediately created for other nations. The longer the period in which one did not catch up, the less likely one was to do it without an ever larger initial investment. Italy, along with other European nations, had to find capital to invest in the industrial manufacturing sector, try to inspire a national market to be in a state of continued demand for the goods produced, and if possible, also limit competition from more advanced countries.

In the first ten years of unity, the only Italian business that deserved the title industry was the textile sector: silk, wool and cotton. The protective tariffs of 1878 made a place on the market for these goods, and in some measure, for metalwork. However, the market needed enlarging geographically. This required attacking the natural,

domestic, auto-consumptive economy of a very large majority of potential consumers who lived in the countryside. In turn, productive investments in agriculture were necessary to allow some economic and social growth for the great mass of contadini.

The early process of accumulation was slow and it became necessary to speed it up while increasing agricultural yields. The major obstacle to growth in the Italian countryside was "backwardness", held in place by the social, economic, and political structures that had changed little from their feudal forms. The monopoly of land in the Mezzogiorno, the islands, and in some places in the North such as Friuli, meant that the internal market could not be expanded without some agrarian reform, enough to allow the contadino to become a consumer. The return from the land was spent elsewhere by large holders rather than being used to decrease agricultural prices, thus lowering production costs for industry, and ultimately allowing further changes in agriculture.[58]

The chosen alternative to reform was to base the accumulation of capital for industrial take-off on those classes that held the monopoly of wealth. The industrial capitalists and the large landholders decided to use the market in its poor and restricted state, rather than to risk the social, political and economic consequences of the profound changes needed to enlarge it. The accumulation of capital was to be based on the continued use of contadino

labor. As as result, protectionism was amplified to include tariffs on grain along with other industries in 1887, but foreign competition became virtually impossible and the price of grain was still kept high on the internal market.[59]

The effects of this method of capital accumulation on agriculture were profound. Wherever there were feudal holdovers, as in the Mezzogiorno and Friuli, inability to join in the national economy limited the internal market. As northern industry found itself unable to compete with those of other nations which already had markets, it was hoped that protectionism would improve the situation. Finding that its measures not only further limited the internal market, but created additional problems as well, northern industry needed to make choices which included the agricultural sector. In this process, the lumber industry suffered irreparable damage, and the grain problem became a permanent feature of the economy because there was a growing need for grain importation and an increasing tendency to grow it at the expense of other more necessary crops.

The decision to industrialize the Northwest, whether consciously or not at the expense of the South and Northeast, was made at this time. Italy founded a bourgeois state before ridding itself of the feudal one. The Northwest was chosen as an industrial site by agreement between the industrialists and the feudal landholders in the rest of Italy. As only a part of that coalition, the investors of the North were dependent on the consensus of their landed

cohorts. The latter did not want reform and remained powerful in the government with their profits from the use of their property making up an essential part of the national income. Thus, though they were threatened by peasant revolt and banditry, it was not the landlords who suggested changes, though the industrialists would have been willing to plan social alterations to create a larger basis for more extensive industrialization.[60]

If the tariffs had been meant to help with the problem of capital accumulation, they could hardly solve the more complex dilemmas of the internal expansion of the market itself. The monopoly of land continued to prevent that from happening, but it also prevented the modern means of agricultural production from developing, and in many cases, even hampered the entrance of agricultural goods into any market at all. Most of what a family grew, it continued to consume. At best, products remained in a local market with a family using its produce to support local artisans.

2. Agriculture as a Source of Investment Funds and Labor: The International Grain Market, Protectionism and Emigration

For the international marketplace of the nineteenth century, grain was as important as petroleum to the twentieth century. Comparing Italy's grain production to that of other countries can also tell much about the impact that the lack of reform had on italian agriculture.

With few exceptions, Italy's grain was raised without introducing a forage crop into the rotation cycle. Forage is essential as the basis for animal husbandry. Both the animals and the forage plants themselves provided nutrients for the soil that is to be planted in grain. Throughout Europe in the late 1800s, the extension of the grain crop was in inverse proportion to the yield of grain per hectare and to the percentage of agricultural surface used for forage.[61]

COUNTRY 1901	PERCENT OF FORAGE	SURFACE COVERED BY GRAIN	PRODUCTION OF GRAIN PER HECTARE
Italy	5%	23.2%	9.4 QUIN.
France	17%	18.6%	12.5 QUIN.
Belgium	48%	8.7%	23.2 QUIN.
England	66%	5.3%	20.7 QUIN.

In Italy there were regional differences that are important to note which compare with the figures used to show Italy's position within Europe. Italy's production of grain per hectare varied between 1875 and 1910 as follows:[62]

	1875	1910-12
North	8.9	13.8
Central	8.2	8.5
Mezzogiorno	8.5	7.9

Lombardy and Piedmont used the least amount of land and had the highest yields in Italy. Lombardy had been

developed "alla inglese" and early found itself with a number of large-scale capitalist farms. The hills of Piedmont were developed more after the French model, with the diffusion of peasant-owned and worked property. The figures in the above table are elevated for the North by Lombardy and Piedmont and by Liguria, where more modern growing methods were used, and where the mezzadria had been substituted with the renting of large holdings that permitted extensive farming. In these three areas the owners had been willing to make extensive changes. The center of Italy remained stalled because of the heavy burdens imposed on the mezzadria by contracts and agricultural methods that were slow to change.[63]

In the Mezzogiorno where the feudal structures remained the strongest, 56% of the land surface was given over to grain. The yield was low and only 14.6% of the farmers worked their own land.[64] In the overall picture, however, the fact that so much of the total agricultural land was planted in grain when it is capable of producting fruit, meat, milk, wine and vegetables in abundance, shows the weakness of the agricultural system. These latter crops require investment by the owners. The lower cost of growing grain was more attractive to landholders, even though it lowered the rate of return from the land, especially for those who did not diversify their crops.

When competition, especially from America, lowered the price of grain from 331 Lire in 1880 to 22.8 lire in 1887,

it brought crisis in an expansionist period, just when the northern industrialists, needed more than ever to have large sums coming into the government treasury. The economy had been primed for the crisis by the huge amounts it had been spending for infrastructure during the first years of unity.[65]

Though the grain crisis and protective tariffs did nothing to help resolve financial dilemmas, they consolidated the role of the great absentee landlords in the coalition of political power. Both they and the industrialists could then agree on colonial expansion and the extension of state commissions.

The other important consequence of protectionism and the grain situation was to chronically arrest modern development in Italian agriculture. By maintaining the high price of grain internally, rural consumption patterns became static and the diet continued to be based on inferior grains. Those who took large profits from the land were able to use them for the development of heavy industry. As grain required little investment, it hardly seemed wise to invest more in agriculture when industrial protection and government contracts for railroads, ships and factories permitted enormous profit in a secure national industry with an exclusive on the internal market.

Thus, large agricultural zones were blocked from possibly reordering production, not just on large farms, but also on the land of the contadino-owner. Stagnation made

the social and economic environment all the more vulnerable to international depressions. This same lack of development meant that there was no rapport between the industrial and agricultural sectors. The former adapted itself only to markets that were alternatives to the latter. The economy and its planners continued to reward those areas that were already advanced. At best, a status quo was instituted for regions where some agricultural reorganization had taken place.[66]

During the 1800s, all of these unresolved contradictions became unsustainable in Friuli. The terrible conditions under which people lived suggested that the feudal structure not only had not been modernized, but that it had developed new forms of exploiting the work force. All land was owned by someone by the nineteenth century, which meant there was no possibility for autonomy for a farmer without it. Those contadini, so in debt that they were thrown off the land, became surplus labor. These plus normal demographic growth dramatically increased the size of the lower classes. Where possible, people rented the smallest and poorest pieces of land, but during the second half of the century, many left for Venice or Trieste to become servants, builders, carpenters or porters. Trieste's population doubled in the 1800s. From 1870 on, the first flow of labor from the hills to the cities and plains became a labor force looking for work.[67]

Where communal lands had permitted people to remain in the countryside longer, fragmentation of property made the conditions of their staying worse. The decimation of the population from pellagra, dysentery, malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera is well documented, as well as widespread congenital malformation. In the mountain areas, thyroid and other glandular defects were found with great frequency. Between the disease and the growing migration, the landowners began to be preoccupied. They lost hands to one source or another. The workers they had worked badly and could hardly pay their rent, much less supply voluntary "gifts" and services.[68]

It was with the hope of some solution to these problems that the Agrarian Association of Friuli had been reorganized in 1855 to include, not just the most important aristocracy, but those who were simply wealthy and owned large amounts of land. Pecile, one of the more influential voices in the group said: "We believe that the association of strong landowners and of people who have relevant interests in agriculture is the most practical and rational basis that an agrarian association can have."[69] From that time on, every major decision for the countryside was passed through the Association. They changed some contract forms, but they wanted to avoid at all costs the promotion of salaried day laborers who were not tied to some plot of land.

Though crops and methods of agriculture varied in different parts of Friuli, depending much on altitude and

water supply, one area deserves particular mention. Lower Friuli, the Bassa, had large tracts of bogs and marshes. Wherever possible, the land was used in much the same way as it was in the higher plains, but it is also here that great changes took place which were in striking contrast to the persistence of land tenure structure in other areas of the region. It is also here that the Agrarian Association learned what they wanted to avoid doing in the future.[70]

For centuries, the fishermen had left the area for healthier climates during the summer. Malaria was common for those who stayed too long. Between 1750 and 1860, the land around the lagoons had come to be held communally by Venetian families who invested in the expansion of rice culture. For this crop, irrigation and great deal of human labor are essential. It is extremely unhealthy work, but both permanent and seasonal labor were plentiful, as few of the contadini had alternatives for supplementing their income. It is here in the Bassa that the farmers without land formed the basis of braccianti, or what was to become wage labor, and where all the "problems" typical of the group would be experienced. At first, the majority of the rice workers in Friuli were also mezzadri or share croppers. Extensive agriculture in the Bassa was formed on a feudal base, unlike the rice growing areas of the Padana of Lombardy or the Veneto which early on had a salaried group working capitalist-type farms.[71] In Friuli, rent and salaries were paid in kind, but the gathering of workers

required for rice culture prompted a local author to warn against the "dangers of collective experiments by workers" and especially against "the raising of salaries on demand."[72]

Another important occupation for the entire Region was silk production. Austria and Italy expanded its production from the 1700s on. The entire process tends to interfere with the raising of other crops, though the growing of mulberry trees and the maturation of cocoons lend themselves well to areas where land is fragmented. Beside the small holder who plants the trees in his yard, any unused plot could be used to grow mulberries. Silk production was furthered by an excess of manual labor and quantities of underemployed contadini and their families. Entire houses were given over to the necessary feeding and ventilation of the cocoons requiring constant attention at the same time of year that the crops were ready for harvest. Even if the merchants from Venice or Vienna paid well for the cocoons when the market was good, and the contadino remained with some money after paying his debts, it was still nowhere near enough to live on without his crops geared to self-sufficiency.

Often, members of the family worked in the silk mills for the slower winter months, which became the basis of the textile industry in Friuli. It is difficult to draw a clear line between cottage effort and real industry, but the agricultural and industrial outputs of Friuli were certainly

intertwined. By 1914, 40 of the Region's mills produced one-fourth of the silk of the Veneto and one-twentieth of Italy's total output. Only six of these mills could be considered mechanized.[73]

Changes became more visible in the Bassa and in the higher plains of Friuli through the second half of the 1800s as the land bristled with more and more mulberry trees. The final privatization of land had broken up some of the previous tenure system which, in turn had brought about popular revolts, emigration, and also the formation of a large group of contadini with little land. If many left, those with even a tiny plot stayed and bent to the possibilities open to them in seasonal rice and silk production. The rent or wages were still paid in kind. Every family raised a pig which was used to pay any leftover rent owed to the landlord.

In such a situation, where only a few feudal ties had been broken, the protective tariffs of 1878 and 1887 meant that the system of agricultural production and its relationships were fossilized in various ways. First, the small renter was always concerned about subsistence. Now he needed to be more concerned about the quantity of goods (especially grain and silk) than about their quality. He often needed to accept unfavorable contracts and had to be content with some relative security, and an income only slightly higher than that of a bracciante. Small renters or farmers with mixed contracts were less and less part of the

transition to larger or more rational landholding or a more secure tenure situation.[74]

Secondly, the large landholders tended to rent only the small plots of land where a tenant farmer would be forced not only to intensify his crop, but still need other work as well. This made the contadino and his entire family dependent for survival on the padrone of the land and on some sort of other employer, thus possibly introducing him to the industrial labor market.

Finally, in 1865, a law had been passed stating that a lease, even for an undefined period of time, did not permit the cultivator to make improvements to the land or property on his own initiative, and that the contract itself and rent payments could no longer be bargained on an individual basis. This act helped to further institutionalize not just the agrarian social structure, but also its infrastructure. This made it easier to plant grain than to decide on investment responsibilities for other crops. After unification, when the countryside felt a push from the marketplace, the response, or lack of it, is best understood in the above context.[75]

Only families with 20 or more members and 50 or 60 scattered fields could manage to pay the rent without difficulty. It was they who could deposit some small savings in the casses rurali, but only if they could work the fields and supply the other labors the landlord required.[76]

The "furberie," or slyness of such contadini, trying to do a bit better than mere survival, is legendary. Wars between farmer and foreman, who can get the better of whom and how often, are the source of endless tales around the firesides or in the ostarias. The villains in the stories were once Venetian or Austrian, but they also came to be Italian.[77]

It hardly seems strange, then, that entire families, or some members of families, left the region in search of something more secure and renumerative. Temporary, seasonal and permanent emigration rose from 16,498 people in 1879, to 55,536 by 1900. The majority of the flow came from the hills and mountains where poverty and fractionalization of the land were chronic and where there were no other means of supplementing income. Many were the communities where more than 10% of the population left: San Daniele 15.3%, Gemona 18.5%, Ragogna 33%, and Resia 42%, to name only a few.[78]

Thus, changes in the distribution of crops and population in Friuli in the 1900s were the direct result of protectionist policies. Compared to the 1800s, the percentage of agricultural land for seeding was up by only 1.7%. The average is lowered by the figures for the foothills and mountains where, because of desertion, the amount of land planted went way down. Only in Lower Friuli did the area farmed increase. As grazing land disappeared, it was replaced by fields of hay in the hill regions. There houses were spread out among the fields in one of the most

fragmented areas of the Region, dispersing the population more than ever, while the cultivation was intensified on what land the family found to work. This sort of change did not augment area, but rather transformed grazing land into hay fields, vineyards and stands of mulberry trees. Some of the same process took place in the Bassa and the plains. Where there were a few larger tracts of land to be found, these were mostly given over to grain.

However, before the First World War agricultural production in Friuli was of considerable value, even in relationship to the rest of Italy. There was great diffusion of grain in the plains as the preference of large landholders and renters, and thus too, the spread of braccianti labor. Small farmers concentrated on intensive labor crops and animals, so the amount of specialized vineyards and animal husbandry grew. The continued choice of corn for all was especially important for nutrition in the face of grain protectionism.[79]

3. Urban-Rural Division: The Link Between the Financial Sector and the Church

When Friuli became part of the unified state, it was different from other northern areas in that it had no independent industrial sector of its own, except textiles. At the time, the local governing group was not tied to the investors of the Veneto, Piedmont or Lombardy, but capital for development in the Northwest still included savings from

Friuli and other marginal areas which had not developed their own industries.[80] The landed class eventually did link themselves with other financial groups, but the passage from an economic group which collected rents to one which invested was neither easy nor direct.

In Friuli, during the early years of unity, the only way in which money came to be put back into rural areas was through the casse rurali. Frederick Raiffeisen began the institution in Germany on a cooperative basis to liberate the peasantry from the usurious practices they endured. The clergy helped him establish confidence among the people. Leon Wollenborg of Padova started the casse in Italy in 1883 and, by 1892, there were 72 in the Veneto. Here too, clerical backing was essential. They became the Casse Rurali Cattolici. By 1895 there were 513, of which 327 were in the Veneto-Friuli area. At the Fifteenth Italian Catholic Congress, the parish priests and the Catholic Movement could claim to their credit 921 workers' societies and 705 casse rurali, 419 for the contadini and 243 for the workers. Though these institutions were to be found in other areas of Italy, the greatest number were in the Northeast.[81]

The reason for this is the dual purpose of the casse, which grew out of the necessity to include the rural groups in the new capitalist structure. If it was to be a defense for the contadino against the hegemony of the local landholders, it could also be used as a means for an Italian industrial group to circumvent the local financial class

until such time as they could be brought into the coalition. The bank was structured to gather the emigrants' savings as well as what could be gotten from the large landholders, to invest in the profit producing areas of Italian industry.

Gradually the local group was brought into the governing coalition, as they found in the casse a way to avoid modifying rural society. It also permitted them to hold onto the mezzadria until after the Second World War. As long as they could maintain the social structure, they intended to hinder the claims of those without land and, later, also rural consumption, in order to continue to accumulate the flow of rent and invest it in the lucrative and secure industrial sector.[82] Thus, though Friulan capital came to be used by only a small group of financiers it was no longer controlled by those who were interested simply in local prestige or timid and limited investments.

The large landowners and those whose capital was being channeled into areas other than agriculture, counted on the Church to help keep the social balance that permitted them to continue to use surplus contadino labor, and hopefully avoid the creation of a local rural proletariat. In most of Friuli, except parts of the Bassa, the Catholic Movement was always strongest where the stability of social relationships had been sustained, and where any capitalist transformation of agriculture that has taken place had little changed the people's way of life.[83]

The Church was to help support the careful insertion of the necessary industrial structure into the rural setting. In order not to concentrate the population in one place too fast it was important to maintain a flow of labor based on the division of the contadino's time between field and factory or mill. In this way, capital was to penetrate the rural zones without altering the agricultural relationships of production and without excessively raising the rural standard of living, and above all, without forming a working class that was separated from the land.[84]

The clerical and lay members of the class that managed this transformation had a market place in mind, of which Friuli was only a small part. As the investors of Lombardy and Piedmont gathered allies among the local dominant groups, all desired to join the social, economic, and political structures of the region into the larger one of the Italian State, but without the "damaging" effects that capitalism had brought elsewhere.

The remarkable growth of the casse rurali took place in an agrarian sector with a pre-capitalist structure based on a "closed market," or what is also called a natural economy. If the landholders took part in the larger market, the rural folk did not. Great numbers of small and medium sized holdings were maintained by the use of agrarian contracts. In turn, it was the Church which was in close daily contact with the people, while the social and economic organization of that institution responded to the needs of the landed

classes and helped them affirm their new role in the capitalist structure of the nation. There were no other political forces to give the contadini a perspective that went beyond the protection of a minimum level of existence, much less suggest the profound transformation of the entire agrarian structure.[85]

However, in order to industrialize, some of society's members had to be displaced and a growing body of workers and intellectuals found a logical explanation of the inequities of the development process in socialist philosophers. Thus, there came to be two secular ideologies opposing catholicism's hegemony. Socialism and liberalism contended in growing urban areas while catholic populism began to take root in the countryside. The latter, by World War I, came to be called "white" socialism and formed the basis for the Partito Popolare, the main contender for the rural base of power Mussolini wanted for his own.

In other words, as industrialization progressed, the secular-clerical conflict became more complicated. The Church promoted a dual ideology for modernization; a progressive set of norms for leaders and intellectuals, and the maintenance of traditional values for the rural world. It opposed both liberal capitalism and Marxist socialism as theories of development. The populist catholic renewal of the 1980s, which proclaims its independence from the reforming wing of the DC, has its historical roots in the early twentieth century Church thought. Thus, there are a number

of factions and divisions to consider within each part of the secular-clerical conflict. The split developed urban and rural variations as well.

Pope Leo's vision of society was rural. Perversion and corruption, anything which negated the principle of authority, was of urban origin. In Medieval times, pro-testantism was the source of the challenge to papal authority, and by the era of early Italian unity, socialism was considered the latest descendent of that heresy. For the first time, it was necessary for the Church to have a "social doctrine."

Though it was no longer treasonous to discuss history, and everything need not be mediated by the Church, vast areas had to be defined where the Church had the right/duty to intervene in social problems. As the repository of authority, it could save society by properly restructuring relationships within it. This was to be done through the theory of "historic mediation" in society based on the "revelation of natural rights."

The centrality of the Roman seat in society was jus-tified by the need to unify the new government, thus a division of labor between state and catholic authority was reflected in the ideal social structure where duties and responsibilities were allocated to each social class. Politics became a vast new area for charity.

After 1922, Pius XII would build on these ideas, adding to them the necessity of the social functions of private

property. This development was the logical descendent of the "Rerum Novarum" which Pope Leo XIII wrote in 1891 on the question of workers. Before this, popes had not concerned themselves with "social issues," but in the full bloom of positivism and thirty years after Marx, Leo felt that the old economic order was breaking up. The world of the peasants and artisans, indeed the whole fabric of rural life was on the verge of ruin, and with it would fade the hopes of the men who were struggling for progress. Thus, the Pope felt it was time for the Church to develop a "social doctrine."

In the old rural structure there was no room for social conflict, which he labeled as evil and bad. Certainly the resolution of the workers' conflicts could not be left to the socialists, whom he felt negated the principles of property, offended natural law, and who desired the altering of the rights and duties of the State, and because of these aims, were disturbing the civil peace.

The Pope's Christian solution was based partly on Saint Paul and a variety of classical sources. Leo proposed an ideal society which was primitive and pre-scientific, but in some ways linked to the positivist sentiments of the age. The theory was founded on the similarities of the functioning of society to that of the human body. Each member has a specific duty and no one could refuse to perform the function for which he was created. In turn, a social division of labor was necessary. The health of the whole depended on

it, as the body must have all its parts working interdependently for good health.

If each social class needed the other, then harmony and peace between them was necessary for the society not to sink into barbarianism and confusion. The force of Christianity must be used to call for agreement between the rich and the proletariat and remind each of their mutual responsibilities in order to impose justice for all. This state would follow if the worker faithfully did the job he had agreed to do, and damaged neither the goods nor the person of the padrone. In defending his rights, it was not permissable for the worker to use acts of violence, or proper for him to mix with "bad men who promise good things."

In turn, the padroni were not to treat the workers as slaves, to respect their human dignity and "the nobility of the Christian character." The worker must have time for his religious duties and not be alienated either from his family or from his "love of saving." Leo made much of the importance of the rich not damaging the small savings of the worker in any way.

The problem of how new technology affected people would be resolved, according to the Pope, with the overcoming of conflict by means of inter-class political conciliation. His solution presumed that each would peacefully accept his role, that the boss would be a good boss, and that the servant or worker would accept such a permanent status in life. Therefore, at the base of his "social doctrine" was

social inequality: "One has to support ones own human condition, as ridding the world of inequality is an impossible thing."[86]

Forty years later, the Encyclical by Pope Pius XI on "The Restoration of Social Order According to Evangelical Law" would have different implications. The years of the spread of Leo's doctrine which stated not only how and why one must accept one's life as it was, but also that good Catholics must not associate with those who do not follow these papal teachings, were fundamental to the success or failure of the early peasants' and workers' movements in both the Austrian and Italian areas of Friuli.

Catholicism of a communal sort had always been present in the countryside, but it came to be at odds with the liberal utilitarianism and the anti-clericalism of the socialists where they grew in strength in the urban areas. From time to time there were attempts to unify the two.[87] The bettering of agrarian contracts could be reconciled, while the Catholic's defense of small property less so. At no time was the whole Catholic world in Friuli in agreement over the populist directions suggested by some of the priests and organizers.

At the end of 1800, both Austrian and Italian Catholics were taking little part in politics. What involvement they had tended to be concentrated against liberals who were the major economic power in the Region, rather than against the

socialists who were few and mostly limited to the city of Trieste.

Among the active Catholics were a handful of priests and lay people who, though sometimes divided, had been aroused by the "Rerum Novarum". The liberals were more heterogeneous, but presented a united front and were favored by still basically feudal electoral laws. What would prove to be important for their future was the lack of connection either group had to the Italian national struggles going on at the time, partly a symptom of the strong ties most groups in the Region still felt to Vienna.[88]

For the Catholics, the major political issue became that of the cooperatives, which struck hard at the basis of the social structure on which the liberals were dependent, but also eliminated much of the appeal the socialists might have had in the area. In fact, the "Rerum Novarum" gave many activists, both lay and clerical, the push to begin to study ways to reduce the effects of the papal teachings in practice, and it is through these efforts that the cooperatives developed so quickly.[89] They spread remarkably fast in the eastern-most Province of Gorizia.

That Province is one in which small and medium-sized landholders numbered about 22,000 in the end of the 1800s. Most often a farmer had less than half a hectare to cultivate. The large landowners who had the best fields were only 860 in number. Thus, there was an agrarian economy that was barely self-sufficient and there was no banking

system to give the contadino credit. The only way to better his situation seemed to be the way the Catholics suggested through the cooperatives.[90]

On March 23, 1896, the first Rural Raiffeisen Bank was founded in Gorizia. In 1899, the Agrarian Federation was created and included 96 banks, workers' societies, insurance groups for animals, and family cooperatives. All of this was started very much from nothing and was accomplished at a time when there was almost no political leadership offered by established parties.[91]

Along with these economic activities, cultural and sporting events were organized and sponsored by two local newspapers: the daily L'Eco del Litorale, the official Catholic paper of Gorizia, and Il Popolo, the Federation's publication. All these efforts resulted in an increased participation of Catholics in political life.

One of the most important leaders of the movement in the Austrian sector, Monsignor Luigi Faidutti, was elected deputy to the Provincial Diet in 1902 and to the Parliament in Vienna in 1907. In 1913, he became Provincial Captain of Gorizia and Gradisca, the most important local political office.[92] Though Faidutti was the most famous of the Northeast's priest-leaders, there were others such as Zanetti, Meizlik, Stacul and Camuffo.

The Catholic Movement was strictly hierarchical. "For God, for Country, and for the Emperor" was a recurrent phrase on the flags of the associations and to gain

membership it was essential to declare oneself a practicing Catholic.[93] More than any other factor this declaration divided them from the Socialist Leagues.

Priests began most organizations, but later lay people, usually large landholders, took over some of the important offices, so that if one looks at the associations for representativeness, the priest-landlord element always dominated. Once in a while, one of the mezzadri, or a small landholder, groups formed a majority of the membership of the Federation, gained a technical position, but never one of authority. Although it would have been unusual at that time for women to be in directive positions, the fact that it was women who were in charge of the family and farm when the men had to emigrate to find work might have brought at least a few of the women into lower posts if the Federation had been based on representative ideas - but it was not.[94]

Thus, though many of Friuli's leaders were rebelling against the effects of the "Rerum Novarum" in practice, there was no question in their minds of whether or not they were the proper leaders, any more than they questioned cooperation as the only proper way to settle conflict. They refuted any thought of strikes, of self-management for their organizations, or the use of affiliation with political groups for arbitration. They wanted order, discipline and obedience among the ranks which, in turn, limited their relationship with declared political groups to necessary

personal communications, or tentative contacts on a broader basis at election times.[95]

The few unions then in existence were organized to prevent strikes, and the use of arbitration was intended simply to settle internal differences. The strikes that did take place were usually in the cities, but in a predominantly rural economy the working class of the region was still extremely limited.[96]

This is not to say that there were not stirrings. The textile workers in the few factories around Gorizia were especially volatile. Their strikes were inspired by impossible living conditions, long hours, low salaries, the threat of immediate dismissal, and dangerous working conditions. In 1905, the textile workers were joined by other groups in Gorizia, from carpenters to carriage drivers in a strike. This further convinced the Catholics that the only healthy part of their society was the rural sector.[97]

In 1905, when the metalworkers struck, the Federation was a little less surprised and was prepared to violently condemn the workers who had marched on "The Day of the Red Carnations," May 1st. Because the strike was promoted and guided by "violent and provocative actions," it was equally harshly suppressed.[98]

That same day, however, the fishermen of Grado struck and this was a surprise to Catholic leaders. These were their faithful rural folk. It was a desperate action. There had been requests to the Federation for weeks to

arbitrate a dispute between the fishermen and a foreign buyer who had refused to pay his bill. It was not until the strike had lasted fifteen days that the local parish priest and some of the Federation heads came to the fishermen to request order and patience. The men were given a small percent of what was due them, and the leaders went away with new confidence in their ability to discipline their members. They had taken a position, but any question of representation, much less self-government of the unions remained out of the range of their discussion.[99]

One accomplishment of the Federation was a minor reform of agrarian contracts. The leaders realized that the contadino's life could not be improved through banks, which the majority were never able to save enough to use, and parish charity. Legislation was introduced in 1908. After suffering five years of objections, obstructions and revisions, it was passed in February of 1914. Opposition came from the socialists who felt it was too bland and ineffective a law, and from the liberals who felt it threatened their interests. In the end, it was war that blocked its being put into practice.[100]

If this was the situation in the easternmost area of Friuli, Pordenone in the west was only slightly different. There, contadini had been successfully organized and linked to the urban workers by Don Giuseppe Lozer. With workers and emigrants at its base, the group had more of an urban than a rural character. The parallel movement among the

contadini was strong in its own right when it was set up in 1913. It met with great disfavor from the leaders of the Province and in Rome, but its advance was stopped, as with the others, more by the war than by disapproval's ability to crush enthusiasm.[101]

All these organizations played an important part in creating what has been called "white cooperativism" in Friuli, which, in the end, promoted a nucleus of consciousness among the contadini that most of the Catholic leaders never intended. The parrocchia was the center for local organization and for handouts to the contadino. Through that institution, the Federations and associations, whether in the East or the West, had acquired the resources for their banks to split up and sell many of the large holdings.[102] With the full support of the Catholic press they also involved themselves in parliamentary activities for the bettering of agrarian contracts. These few efforts made in a marginal area came about without popular representation or relationships with national political groups, not even with the Slovenian catholics with whom they lived side by side in the East. Then came the war, changes of regime and boundary, national struggles and more changes. For years the contadino remained isolated and miserable, but the memory of the very concrete cooperative movement, its authors, and the hopes that it had brought for a better life, were not forgotten.

All over Friuli eyes had been opened, needs defined, and such slogans as, "La terra ai contadini" had begun to be heard. There was little change in material living conditions as the contadino continued to divide his time between field and factory, and there was no significant concentration of population in Friuli though its emigrants were among those who were demographically modifying other areas of Europe and northwestern Italy. In Friuli successful efforts were made not to separate the contadino from the land. The unions had little thought for him and he had no part in their decisions.[103]

In any case, the war destroyed the previous ten years of work by the Catholic organizations and, as most wars do, fell heaviest on the contadini, especially those who lived on the front line and those who were lost to emigration and in battle. They also continued to lose as a result of the mystification of their place in society. Their "wholesome ruralness" was made into an ideology of control through mass glorification which exhalted their sacrifices and the holy necessity to emigrate. The maintenance of small property and the "healthy" life of the honest farm family, also helped preserve the hegemony of the large landholders.[104]

After the war, construction was begun of Catholic Leagues in Friuli, based on the separation of the interests of the large holders from those of the small and medium-sized owners.[105] These Leghe, or Leagues, became possible partly because, during the war, anyone who could had fled to

the other side of the Piave River toward Venice. The contadini remained on the land without contact with the owners. The social life of the villages became more solid than ever and, when the owners came home, the farmers were little disposed to tolerate the reinstitution of all the old methods and demands of the former relationships.

The proprietors not only returned, however, but also insisted that the rents for 1917, 1918, and 1919 be paid. If they were not, the family was to be put off the land. The youths who returned alive, those who had stayed and tried to work the land, and the priests were those upon whom the collective demands fell. It was also they who became the nucleus for the Leghe Bianche.[106]

A not surprising characteristic of the Leagues was that, like the pre-war organizations, they were rarely headed by the contadini themselves, but again by Catholic "citizens" and priests. Leaders from among the contadini had not been formed through a series of popular actions. There were exceptions, such as a mezzadro of a former count of Pordenone, who became the leader of the Legha there, but not without the backing and support of Don Lozer.[107] The Don with two other priests, proposed that the movement be founded on the idea of the social and economic redemption of the rural masses, rather than be subordinated to the more political Partito Popolare.[108]

The organization of the Leghe in Friuli was a continuation of the cooperative movement, and both are at the heart

of the vision the Friulani have of themselves. Both became part of the mass imagination which went hand in hand with the socialization of a good Friulan catholic, and became part of what they feel are their traditional social, economic, and political roles.[109]

Some leaders of the Partito Popolare, such as Dons Tessitori and Minigher, had accepted the idea of an open class struggle. Others were less "revolutionary" and proposed contract changes as part of the bracciante's transition from being without land to the acquisition of some small property, though historically the opposite was much more often the case. The small landowner has usually been forced to become a bracciante to survive.[110]

Internally, the Partito Popolare had all the characteristics of a mass-based popular movement, but it had little democratic or progressive content to sustain it. Catholic social ideology was expected to mediate the demands for renewal being made by the rural masses, with those traditional and conservative ideas that had been instilled in the clergy and the functionaries of the Partito Popolare who were strict observers. It was rather a tall order when one considers the diversity of opinion between men such as Tessitori and Party leaders like Ostuzzi and Candolini who denounced class struggle. The latter claimed that the interests of the contadini and the large landholders were reconcilable based on the sociology of Toniolo, who stressed class harmony. The division between the two lines was

accentuated whenever possible by the landholders, and as the gap between the positions widened, much of the organization's impact was defused.[111]

The Leghe Bianche did obtain better agrarian contracts, but their structure remained traditional. By 1920 there were 175 Leghe with 30,000 members. In the committees of the Federation of the Mezzadri there were more than 4,000 people. All the same, the final direction for these contadini was left up to the landholder. His mixed rent demands and his right to give short notice for the contadino to leave the land were reconfirmed by a law of November 1920.[112] This law was certainly in part the result of landlord pressure on the directors of the Partito Popolare, but the political climate had already begun to turn in a reactionary direction. So soon did this change come about, that in the whole of Italy it would be hard to claim that the contadino's struggle ever really had time to produce concrete results.[113]

Rural life had improved slightly when viewed in comparison to past conditions in the countryside, but when seen in the context of the growth of big industry in Italy, with its alternate periods of development and crisis from 1800 to 1900, life was still miserable for the contadino. The first few years of unity had seen the building of a remarkable railroad system and fleet of ships, offering the contadini emigration as an alternative to his life. Inspiration for the investments in commerce and industry came with the

promise of secure profits by the State. As returns from the land lost their importance, and those from industrial ventures gained legitimacy, savings in banks grew, and emigration increased as well. Heavy industry's promise of returns prevailed over the profits offered by the few consumer businesses in existence such as textiles. For the Friulani, emigration then became a fact of daily life. Certainly, he was not asked whether he wanted to be a contadino or an operaio. He was swept into economic and political events way beyond his traditional world.

In the whirlwind before World War I, speculative fever was spread by the central financial powers. The banks, especially the Credito Mobilare and the Banca Generale - the first being replaced by the Banca Commerciale Italiana in 1894 - used a mixed banking system on a German model to insert itself directly into industrial production. They were no longer used just to collect interest, but began to invest in industry and commerce for their own quick profits.[114]

The resulting growth of heavy industry was astounding. In 1895 it was 28% of Italy's total industrial output. By 1914 it was up to 47%.[115] Protectionism favored the trend, but production was more than the domestic market could absorb. The State continued to be both the biggest client and backer of these same industries. With selling prices higher than the going rates on the world market, equilibrium to maintain the high returns for both the investors and the

industrialists was kept in its delicate balance by mutual agreement between the two parties on tariffs and state contracts. To break the thread would have ruined banking, finance, a good portion of industry, and a large number of people who trusted their small savings to the banks.[116]

With the beginning of war in 1914 came the need to rethink industrial priorities. The State could not continue to commission a never-ending flow of ships and railway lines, as well as produce an ever increasing number of arms. With social peace imposed in the fields and factories, producing for the war gave the industries the possibility of expanding and controlling the market more completely. In practice, it was the Central Committee for Industrial Mobilization which was allowed to regroup industries into big monopolistic complexes. Their control over the production and supply of arms brought them huge profits from anticipated state capital, as well as a variety of concessions.[117]

After the war there was a settling of accounts, not just in front of a commission to investigate war profits, but also in front of an internal market that could hardly absorb half the potential production. The fascist period, with its autarky and continued protectionism can best be seen not as a change of methods, or any sort of fundamental renewal, but as a continuation and consolidation of the state orientation that was set in motion with Italian unity and institutionalized in the First World War. In part, the

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FOOTNOTES CHAPTER TWO

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field, 200 lire rent for the house, or per hectare of grassland, half the silk cacoons, half the wine, four transport requests, 36 lire worth of poultry, and a man to work for the owners as chamberlan or foreman. There were contracts that were stricter, higher in amounts and more demanding. Few asked for less.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE YEARS OF FASCISM

A. Continuity: From Unity to Mussolini

1. Rural Populism Versus Urban Socialism: The Need for Social Change

To understand Italian fascism it is necessary not only to look at changes it made, but also its continuities with previous political formations. As both Salvemini and Tasca suggest, there is no short-cut to understanding these events. One can find a great many contradictory definitions of fascism and descriptions of its rise, its fall, and its long and short-term effects. Often fascism is represented as a break with the past, but both Gentile and Volpe felt that it was Italy's intervention in the War in 1915 rather than the March on Rome that was the real break.[1]

The same authors also claim that fascism was an attempt to defuse socialism, a frequently expressed sentiment of many fascists. On the other hand, Togliatti described fascism as a reactionary regime with mass support. Both fascists and non-fascists agree that it was a rising of the masses and an attempt to replace the old oligarchy.[2]

The success of the later goal, however, reflected in the situation of agriculture, is best discussed in terms of continuity. First there is the pre-war period up to the time when Mussolini was in full power. Then there is his fall and the fascist administration after World War II -- in

other words, the continuity between liberal Italy and fascism and then between fascism and the Italy of today, the Republic. However, if the rise of fascism can be attributed to a break with history in the Intervention Crisis of 1915, the culmination of which was the March on Rome in 1922, here it will be suggested that fascism was an attempt to break with the past as little as possible, while still appearing to do so.

In the previous chapter, some of the problems confronted by the Italian State have been pictured in detail. There was a limited electorate until 1912, a noticeable persistence of feudalism, and an alliance between the landed aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie, rather than a break-up of the former by the latter as was the case in England.[3] Various arguments can be made about the strength or weakness of the middle classes and their allies in Italy. However, since Germany, Japan and Italy were all late-comers to industrialization in comparison to England and France, they had to try to achieve the goals of national unity and development simultaneously. Each seemed a necessary condition for the other. The effects of the two processes were difficult enough when experienced gradually, but when felt at same time, they resulted in a need for increased state control. In both Germany and Italy, the rise of the working class posed a serious threat to the State's organization for industrialization, both economically and politically, but especially ideologically. The first phase of fascism's rise

pitted rural populism and urban socialism against each other.

In Italy, intervention in the First World War required the participation of everyone. However, the concentration of industry and its close relationship to the State, plus the inability of Parliament to control these forces as well as the bureaucracy set up to run them, became fuel for a fascist solution. Many of the structures put in place during the war were meant to be temporary, but the economy of the time was in a delicate balance. Peacetime market pressures only made restrictions more necessary than ever.

Social controls were needed then to reinforce the economic ones. According to many, it is this, more than anything else, which led to fascism's rise.[4] The early years of the Socialist Movement in Italy are still being documented, but organization of workers in industrial centers was the rule. In only a few areas did they include rural Italians.

As we have seen in Friuli, the countryside was organized around the parish, or parrochia. Socialists were found mostly in Trieste, but everywhere in Italy they were "young" and the struggle with the Church, which was "old", was an uphill battle. Within the catholic sphere there were a number of ideological choices. It was fascism rather than socialism that gained ground where Church authority had broken down, and especially where State structures were unable to keep social conflict under control without the

Church. Fascism took hold in areas of capitalist farms, such as the Po Valley, and share-cropping regions of Umbria and Tuscany. Where was not enough industry to absorb "excess" agricultural labor.[5]

Often, as in Friuli, industrial and agricultural reorganization did not drive people from the land. Emigration kept them there and further fragmented the land. In Friuli and other areas of Italy, where landlords counted on the pre-industrial social structure that remained, they grew increasingly alarmed over the growing organization of workers, whether this was taking place around them or not. Their aim was to hinder the creation of any groups of rural workers. New and severe contracts for the contadini were promoted.[6]

In 1921, it seemed as though the forces of fascism could have been divided into an urban and a rural type. Gramsci, in an article of that year, makes a distinction between the two fascisms. There were tensions between them over a pact with the socialists and the continued use of violence, but these were only symptoms of deeper differences. The split becomes clearer in a variety of local studies.[7]

Urban fascists often protested the continued use of terrorism by rural groups, while rural fascists made progress in the countryside of Ferrara for instance, by granting land to individual cultivators to combat the socialist line of collectivization.[8] There is, however, an enormous

lack of detail for much of Italy concerning the methods of agrarian fascism. Southern Italy has received more attention than the North. These studies, however, should be placed in the larger context of the fall of liberal Italy, as it is the earlier period which brought both types of fascism into being as well as forming part of the ideological basis for the post-World War II polarization of Italian politics.[9]

2. The Collapse of Liberalism

Entrance into Italy's ruling group before the War required that one was pro-monarchy, anti-clerical, and pro-capitalism. The philosophy of government was "Transformismo," the practice of "co-opting one's nearest rivals in order to form a coalition against common enemies who refused to be co-opted."[10] Power itself and the coalition were more important that the resolution of political and ideological differences. The policies of the Giolittian era were not meant to promote democracy, but were intended to pacify the masses. Methods for doing so included the use of cliques and individual "connections," rather than modern political parties. The electorate never had the feeling it was changing or even affecting anything.[11]

The majority of Catholics, especially those who might have been leaders of the State, were hostile to the liberal regime and, with few exceptions, remained so up to World War I. The workers and the contadini were not so much hostile

as they were indifferent, especially in the South and marginal regions such as Friuli, and other areas where the clergy continued to be their major link to the outside world.[12]

The decision to enter the war fell on the liberal rulers and divided their leadership, in the end permanently damaging the government. Parliament appeared discredited, and it became a common belief that only a war could prevent Italy from falling into revolution. A war might also restore some of the past glory and prestige of the nation. The masses were not consulted.

In order to keep people fighting, propaganda in the last years of the war promised land to the contadini, a better deal for the industrial workers, and participation for the middle classes. After the war it was no secret that the liberals had promised more than they could or wanted to deliver. Frustration and anger over unkept promises provided the basis for many of fascism's later claims.[13]

The Armistice was signed in November of 1918. The Russian Revolution had prompted the socialists to call for an end to the war and for revolution the year before. Thus, with the war over, groups who had been unwilling to participate in the liberal rule, such as the Catholics, offered their own alternative. In 1919, the Partito Popolare Italiano was founded as a response to post-War demands.

With industrial growth, there were some jobs, and working class families could generally keep pace with the

increasing cost of living. Agricultural workers were paid in kind, and because auto consumption was still the norm for so many, they were not as battered by the market of the war economy as the middle classes were. The rise of fascism depended especially on the latter and on the traditional ruling groups who had been left out of the war profits by the liberal regime. Class suspicion and antagonism was increased by the number of regional and linguistic differences that existed up and down the peninsula. The growing economic gaps only heightened resentments.

Fascism was also a response to a feeling of national inferiority and ineffectiveness which had been made worse by the war. There was little or no civic culture to build on in Italy.[14] Fiume became a symbol of Italy's frustrated hope that the war had not been fought in vain. The formation of the Fasci di Combattimento in 1919, was very much a result of these feelings.[15] Further, D'Annunzio's failure in Fiume weakened him as a rival to Mussolini and damaged Italy's image even further. The liberal government which had been negotiating for the territory could not control its patriots. Divisions within the liberal ruling group became still wider.[16]

From 1920 on, fascism began to make the changes demanded of it by those who were willing to support it on its way to power. Help came from the Milan industrialists and the big landowners. Mussolini's alliances with them meant that he would eventually have to control and disband

the squadristi, but only after they had organized the rural and industrial workers into unions to displace the Red and White Leagues, and had finished discrediting the socialists. The internal struggles of the latter, and the breaking away of the communists at the Congress of Livorno in 1921, accomplished some of his work for him.

The strikes and the take-over of factories in Milan in 1920 were feared and were countered with massive violence. The class war in the countryside was even more disturbing where the threat to private property was real. The Nitti government had sanctioned the take-overs, and the owners were outraged. In 1920, they formed the General Confederation of Agriculture, or Confagricoltura, in order to work out their own means of defense. It was later that year that the squadristi began their "punitive" rural raids against socialist and Catholic unions.[17]

When middle class fears of fascist violence were allayed and the labor movement seemed broken, the road to Rome lay open. By 1923, Mussolini could begin to discipline the squadristi. Other political groups were divided and, at the time of the last outbreak of squadristi violence in 1926, Mussolini had gained the power to send the leaders home. He could then co-opt and repress the unions. The Vidoni Pact and the Rocco Laws provided a basis for the employers to have a free hand in labor relations. The industrialist's organization, Federzoni was given control over part of the court system and the police in order to

finish bringing only the squadristi, but other local groups under the State. The urban and rural workers were demobilized, the middle classes gained a sense of national pride, and there was adequate stability for the landed class and the industrialists to get back to business.[18]

If there was anything original about the fascists, it was their "new" ways of using military and political means. Their violent actions and propaganda themes appropriated from the Left, combined with Mussolini's ability to bargain with other leaders, gained them time and followers. Though divided by 1921, fascism had by then become was indeed a mass movement, no longer simply the band of adventurers and vagabonds who had formed the core.[19]

There is fairly thorough agreement that at this point, fascism's strength was in the middle-classes. Although there were enormous ideological and analytical differences in approach, most, whether it be Gramsci or Gentile, also agree that fascism was used by the landowners and industrialists who made up the old governing coalition. The insecurity and fear created by socialism and especially the Bolshevik Revolution -- were perhaps more responsible for the rise of fascism than any ideological appeal it offered.

Where fear was genuine, it produced the same sort of reaction as it did where it was used as an excuse to reassert what appeared to be slipping authority. Certainly, many of the landlords felt that the threat of revolution was an ideal pretext for reinforcing their place and rights.

Thus, though there was not always continuity of ruling groups between the old regime and fascism, in many rural areas it was fascism that allowed them to remain. Administrative tools made this possible in the South and in Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

There had been some growth of unions and parties after 1866, but the administrative structure of the State had changed little. The war had increased contradictions between sectors while it strengthened the hold of the bureaucracy. Among ruling groups, a split had developed between those who were stirred by patriotism and those who were not, and the division challenged the State structure. It became fascism's job to protect the State and reverse the effects of the split of the dominant groups.[20]

Some new elements were brought in to help and they were given a new set of organizational tools to work with, but during fascism alternate institutions such as the monarchy, the army, the Church and big industry survived. Nor did the administrative or the police bureaucracy ever really make a break with the past. The police had ample freedom locally before, during, and after fascism. Mussolini also used the traditional court system of the Magistracy to bring local powers under control, but only temporarily. He gained the support of the military leaders by dropping plans for reform which they found unfavorable and let them run things as they had in the past. It is claimed that his control of the military was never more than nominal.[21]

Among his leaders, Mussolini promoted divisions in order not to have competitors, but while this strengthened his personal power, it also led many to continue their loyalty to the King and the military. This dual allegiance was as responsible for his fall, as were his military and foreign policy mistakes. His support among the people is difficult to determine with much accuracy. Membership in the Party was extensive, but also compulsory for any sort of aid or even a job.[22]

Of the institutions which predated Mussolini and which survived after him, were the Church, big industry, and the administrative bureaucratic structure, all of which controlled the fate of agriculture. These, in turn, and little changed, were the heritage of the Republic and the Christian Democracy.

3. The Old Coalition Reasserts Itself: Agricultural Autarky at the Service of Industry

Salvemini stresses the service fascism offered the industrialists, but also suggests that this was through Mussolini's mediation, not because of any direct control they had over the government. Tasca proposes more or less the same idea.[23]

The policy of autarky, instituted in 1936, was responsible for an increased concentration of capital and the fall of many small producers, both urban and rural. This, in addition to the swelling of the bureaucracy with the middle

classes, are the bases for Tasca's claim that fascism's sphere was that of power rather than profit. The economy of autarky was part of the War Plan and part of the nation's attempt to recover prestige. If fascism had little to do with financial gains, the capitalists could still try to influence the politics of fascism whenever possible, although policy decisions were not necessarily made for their benefit[24]

Other theorists have rejected these ideas. E. Rossi felt that politicians merely fronted for the industrialists, who were actually in control.[25] The variety of theories is endless and the truth is probably complex. A wide range of ideological interpretations suggest that the industrialists felt threatened by the extension of state power over production, but were very much behind the control of society. They objected to the demands for labor arbitration, but would permit it if it were carefully supervised and did not consume any more of their profits than necessary. Constant participation in the political and administrative structure was required in order for them to be as close as possible to the decisions being made. However, the beginnings of fascism were as hostile to big industry as they were to socialism. Later on, when the radical fascist elements had been pushed out of the way, the financiers had an easier time maintaining their influence.[26]

Sarti claims that the Corporative State legally sanctioned the power of the Confederation of Industry, or

Confindustria, which continued to exercise a remarkable degree of autonomy. He also points out that industrialists were careful to observe certain limits in order to maintain their autonomy. They were not to interfere in foreign policy, which was Mussolini's special sphere and he left them to work on the economy, a neat division of labor.[27] Later, when there was increased confusion of roles between public and private sectors, it was often not clear who was directing which forces, and a truly "mixed" economy was the result.

However, the industrialists themselves were not a united group. Migone's research points out the relationship of the United States and Italy in this period. He claims that the unification of the banks was suggested by J.P. Morgan rather than by Mussolini, as part of the push to centralize the State. Castronovo's biography of Agnelli of Fiat, illustrates his Keynesian views and deflationary policies, which were favored by the Montecatini group and which resulted in a variety of strategies being suggested to Mussolini by different factions. Although it was the agrarian group who were most enthusiastic about Mussolini's policies, it was the alliance between them and the industrialists that decided Mussolini's duration.[28]

It is clear that the industrialists gained increasing control over the entire Italian press, both before, during, and after fascism. This hold continues in the present and has been extended to include television and radio. The

Obsservatore Romano was probably the only daily to remain immune from interference. For its uncensored foreign news and commentary, it was read by many people who were not interested in Vatican policy. It's circulation rose to 250,000 during the 1930s.[29]

To begin with, it was Mussolini's friendship with England that was a controlling factor in the economy and later, his alliance with Germany. Most important is that until 1929, Italian industry was dependent on American capital. Whether for industry or agriculture, one can say that the era of autarky was one of both growth and stagnation. The period between 1936 and 1938, when there was the greatest growth in the concentration of industry, also contained the sharpest fall in production, proving that concentration does not necessarily mean rationalization.[30]

If the Italian economy grew more slowly under fascism than it had in periods before 1914, and in some cases before 1945, there was also a slowdown of the whole European economy at the time of the recession of 1929 to 1933. There were also American restrictions further limiting the numbers who could migrate there and the lack of emigrant's income adversely affected the balance of payments, as well as the accumulation of local savings in Italy. In this case, Mussolini's "ruralization" program and the limits he himself imposed on emigration, seem more of a response to changed conditions than an arbitrary effort to keep Italians at home. However, his push to send workers back to the

countryside, while promoting an increase in the birth rate, seems absurd under the same conditions. Certainly the glorification of the healthy rural life and the wholesomeness of the farm family were an effort to control and stabilize his base of power. This policy also provided his agrarian supporters with easily available and cheap labor, redressing somewhat the profit flow that had been coming more from industry ever since unification.[31]

As in so many Italian areas, the fascist economy is best seen as a series of contradictions. Putting a hold on wage increases and consumption probably helped maintain some of industry's profit. Its lack of growth was surely caused in part by the economy being a closed one, especially after 1929, when this was also the result of a broader economic situation. The government, however, never attempted to change social relationships in ways that would have permitted the expansion of the internal market. The only choice that seemed left to Mussolini was the same one that was made before World War I: a return to state spending and war. More rational investments, again came up against social objections. The reality of this is underlined by the fact that none of the industrialists seemed particularly enthusiastic about attempts to carve out an empire or to ally themselves with Germany, but these seemed the only ways out of an economic bottleneck.[32]

On the other hand, agrarian policies were highly satisfactory to the large landowners. The growth of

braccianti organization had severely threatened the tranquility of the countryside, much more so than the industrial workers had. The consciousness and revolutionary demands of the braccianti were equaled by few other groups. The control and stifling of the rural organizations became a top priority. The only way to fix the braccianti to the land without taking anything away from the landholders was to extend the use of mezzadria and various forms of sharecropping.[33]

Policies aimed at fixing the ex-braccianti to the land were closely linked to the overall industrial plan and to the lack of balance between agricultural and industrial prices. As the cost of products used for agriculture increased, profit received for what was produced remained low; thus while the agricultural worker suffered as a result of this policy, the cost was hidden from the rest of the society.

If in the past there had been a coalition between northern industrialists and the southern landholders, fascism was its reaffirmation. The extensive cultivation of grain was promoted by price supports as part of the prize. The devaluation of the lira hit those with the lowest salaries the hardest and brought not only unemployment, but complete failure to about half of the small landholders who had acquired land right after the First World War. They found their debts devalued while, in order to permit competitive export, the price of agricultural products was

allowed to fall. Any of the small farmers who remained were usually not able to get credit with which to change their cultivation to more labor intensive crops.[34]

The devaluation of the lira also brought about a compression of the internal market and a cancellation of most of the benefits that could have come about from some forms of industrial concentration. Since the Italian economic system could not sustain itself on its productive growth, it instead used the beginnings of its service industry and agriculture in its stagnant state.[35]

Public works and land reclamation programs were begun in 1928 as a response to the social and economic consequences of the devaluation. These attempts to promote an internal market for industrial products ended up transferring great numbers of workers and braccianti. This was aided by the prohibitions against emigration. Public works, however, absorbed only about 10% of the unemployed between 1931 and 1935, most of whom came from urban industries, especially shipbuilding.[36] In few areas did public works make a difference by providing jobs or make any sufficient changes in agricultural infrastructure. There was resistance to much of the work from the landowners and many of the projects were not finished until after World War II, if they were ever completed at all.

Fano states the problem well: "Agrarian politics of mature capitalist countries confronted the crisis, as in the case of the New Deal, by enlarging the credit, technical

assistance, price supports and infrastructures, from the moment in which it was realized that, if properly supported, these represented a high proportion of the demand for industrial products."[37] In the agrarian politics of fascism however, there was no room for such a policy. With the compression of salaries, the corporativization of workers could not have come about so easily if the economy had changed many of its pre-capitalist methods, methods which were allowed to escape a natural death from falling prices. Rural auto-consumption and marginal occupation helped maintain an agricultural economy of status quo at best. The crisis was overcome to some extent by the willingness of, or the necessity for the small holder to work harder and consume less.[38]

An economic structure which was geared to maintaining elevated profits in a period of economic crisis also needed to maintain a high yield from the land when prices for agricultural products were falling. It is in this context that both the public works efforts and the grain battle should be understood.

Grain, as we have seen, lends itself best to growth on large tracts of land. Other sorts of land tenure, such as mezzadria, could not compete. On small and fragmented holdings, a variety of crops had to be grown for the maintenance of the family that had little access to the market. Growing grain meant a reduction of labor needed for production, which was harmonious with the idea of returning the

braccianti to a condition of mezzadria. Propaganda promoting the myth of the small proprietor and praising his sacrifice served this end as well. The former tried to hang onto what land he could. He would accept lower salaries than the standard for a braccianti or an industrial worker, using both his income and the meager yield from his fields to support his family.

Autarky increased unemployment in all sectors of the economy, though it was lowest in heavy industry. On the other hand, with half of the population involved in agriculture, and the grain battle which lowered the need for labor in production, there was certainly more misery in the countryside. The small local industries which were hard hit, among them textiles, were also the ones that had provided most alternative and supplementary employment in the countryside. Regulations on internal and external migrations further limited employment possibilities. The cutting-off of income from emigrants increased rural poverty. Fascist family allowances did not compensate much for the lack of occupation.[39]

Autarky's impact in a country with a vulnerable industrial sector like Italy was severe. Even if the policy was applied late in the regime, that application was quickly felt. If the textile industry and construction were the hardest hit, one may say that big industry profited the most. Domestically produced iron and coal raised steel prices and consequently, the price of machinery. Italy's

limited economy and market reduced the demand for consumer goods. The resultant lack of production made it harder for Italy to recover from the depression.[40]

The regime introduced various salary reductions through the "Quota 90" and the forty hour work week. Regardless of efforts to hold prices to a minimum, these efforts often were not successful in keeping income above a level adequate to provide decent nutrition. All these policies, seemed aimed at exploiting the mixed economy of the contadino to its fullest, even the "safety valve" factor of internal migration or moving to Somalia or Lybia.[41]

The politics of agricultural prices, the duty on grain, the improvement through public works of the land of the larger holders, and the policy of autarky, kept the agrarian structure of the country stagnant, if it did not push things back a century.

The increase in national production was founded on the extensive cultivation of grain and other industrial crops and prices for them remained four times what they would have brought on the world market. The natural course Italy had begun to take in the growth of specialized crops was cut off just at the time when there began to be an extensive market for them. The value of production per hectare in such crops as grapes, fruit and vegetables was drastically reduced.

The politics of fascism also strengthened the concentration of land for the larger holders by means of specific legislation and with the help of State and Church

administrations. It is in these two institutions where we see the clearest continuity between fascism and the Republic, and how little fascism broke with its past.[42]

B. Fascist Ideology and the Administration of Agriculture

1. Serpieri and the Plan for State Intervention: Making the Most of Social Contradictions

There were many politicians, researchers and technicians who linked themselves to fascism, influencing its methods and philosophy of government intervention in agriculture. Among them were such men as Serpieri, Petrocchi, Jandolo, Trifone, and De Stafani. Of them all, Serpieri was the most influential, even if many of his programs and ideas were realized in ways that he would not always have agreed with. After 1934, when he was no longer Under Secretary of Land Reclamation and Public Works, it was people such as Rossoni, Tassinari and Nannini, who were responsible for the agricultural institutions which had been suggested by Serpieri.[43]

The major legislation for the agricultural administration was written by Serpieri. The most important laws were: the laws on forestry and those controlling agricultural experimentation in 1923; the law on the public use of land in 1927, and the law on agrarian credit in the same year; and all the legislation on public works and land reclamation (hereafter also Bonifica). Serpieri was also a major figure in the reorganization and reformation of the Autonomous Ministry of Agriculture.[44]

There are numerous recent studies on Serpieri and most agree that he represented a "trait-d'union" between the culture and the agrarian politics of liberal Italy, of the

fascist period, and of the Republic right up to the present.[45] He also influenced a great number of other leaders through his writing, especially in matters concerning the relationship of the State to the agricultural classes and forms of production. He presented interpretations and hypotheses as well as practical proposals that would influence these relationships.

Very briefly, he felt that the promotion of agriculture could not be accomplished without the intervention of the State. Although the State was not to provide everything directly, its role was to assure social, political, administrative and economic conditions for the promotion of agriculture.[46]

For instance, his ideas on the use of hill and mountain territory, covering the largest portion of Italy's land surface, took into consideration certain conditions in the North and others in the South. Overall, it was necessary to intensify agriculture in order to enlarge both woodland areas and those for grazing. This would balance the various interests which had been warring over control in these areas for some time. On one side, there were the interests of those on the plains who were concerned about soil and water conservation; on the other were the interests of industry, especially of those who most needed hydroelectric power. Finally, there were the interests of those who hoped to improve the agricultural production in the mountains. The balance could not be achieved without state intervention

using a system of forest and water control and a transformation of grazing activities, all of which would require credit, technical assistance irrigation and more. It was important to Serpieri that the State coordinate these activities by being the head of all the administrative mechanisms which would be needed. This sort of coordination in all areas could assure a satisfactory compromise of agrarian, urban and industrial interests.

What created a problem for Serpieri was the unionization and politization of the agricultural workers; braccianti and mezzadri as well as the small land holders. He was against their organization, but he still had to deal with the situation they created. The issue of agrarian contracts became the battleground. He felt it was not possible for the contracts to be bargained on a private basis, though he knew it was necessary to maintain their use. Again, he felt the State could use them to organize various agrarian interests.[47]

On the other hand, in his volume of 1925, he expressed the opinion that agriculture's potential was not fulfilled because of a lack of modernization and because there was a lack of unity among the dominant agrarian classes. None of them, he said, knew how to exercise effective political force. Rural groups were either silent or averse to national unity. Those who had power were either not rural based or they were anti-rural; in other words, they

represented the forces of industrialization with its bourgeoisie and its proletariat.[48]

The rural bourgeoisie, Serpieri felt, had not reacted to socialism, but even worse, they had closed themselves into their own tight little world of farm economics rather than involve themselves in national politics. Even before the War, the only politics in the countryside were those of the contadini, and their actions he considered "anti-rural."[49] Thus, under such historical and class circumstances, it would be the State which would allow agriculture to change from being a purely economic activity to a political force that could truly contribute to "the life and development of the nation." The State's function in relation to agriculture had to be reconsidered. It was the fascist regime that would be the "positive force" that could break the "critical situation."[50] To defeat the anti-rural groups it would be necessary to build a solid consensus among the rural interests which were "conservative by nature."[51]

To bring this about it would first be necessary to form organizations which were technically prepared to carry out the re-evaluation and rationalization of agriculture. The administrative tasks of the State needed to be completely reorganized in order to bind the different agrarian interests to it. The first part of the project was to be brought about by the formation of INEA, which was to manage public works and land reclamation as well as maintain control of

all agricultural experimentation, a technical structure to promote private activities through local institutions which would appear to be autonomous from the State administration. However, it would be the State itself, rather than a particular minister, which would bring about "a politics of agriculture that was understood not only as the promoter of productive growth, but also as the provider of a predominant role for rural classes."[52]

Thus, there was an idea of decentralization embedded in Serpieri's idea of a centralized State. He wanted to diffuse forms of interest representation through institutions which would bring about planned intervention on a national level and which, in turn, would also aggregate agricultural interests. Later, he insisted that it was not necessary to create representative groups for the rural sector and he decided that he was against any form of political decentralization.

His change of heart came about precisely over the issue of agrarian contracts and the role of the unions. These later were a "particular problem, as one could not use the same methods which were used for industrial unions because of the heterogeneity of technology and production which created too many different categories of agricultural laborer."[53] Above the many groups of contrasting interests there must be a means of "collaborating the work and interests of the entrepreneurs and the workers."[54]


The institutions formed to carry this out were the Consiglio Provinciale Agrario (the Provincial Agrarian Council), and the Bonifica Integrale (Integrated Public Works, or simply Bonifica).[55] These two brought the Consortiums into being,which were at the same time both public and private entities and it is also these which played a major role in Italy's colonization plans.[56] Finally, because of the special politics involved in Bonifica and because of its large costs and the long time spans involved in completing public works projects, continuous internal mediation would be necessary between the groups involved in and affected by the Bonifica. It would be corporativism that would mediate and discipline.[57]

Though this is a very brief look at Serpieri, it is still possible to point out some of the problems and contradictions of his thinking. He himself said that "modernization is conceived of and sought after within the context of the maintenance of the advantages in social backwardness."[58] It was indeed difficult for the State to assume the role of innovator when its politics were to be supported by rural classes who were, "by nature" conservative. Nor, especially in the matter of Bonifica, was it easy to bring about agricultural transformation through those whose interests went against these same changes. In a sense, these contradictions found in Serpieri are typical of fascism.

By the time the regime came to an end, the Agricultural Administration was a different institution from its original ideal. The State was neither able to mediate or coordinate the hoped for transformations nor the proposed class alliances. The institutions Fascism created are too numerous to mention and their frequent reorganization and leadership changes fill volumes. The essence of the confusion was felt at both local and central levels. Every entity created had the ability to intervene in agriculture. The Ministry of Public Works and that of Agriculture duplicated and overlapped in duties and tasks, and this was made even more complex by the entry of the Ministry of Corporations into the same field of responsibility.

MAP

Land reclamation plan to increase Italian agricultural production from "La legge sulla Bonifica Integrale," year one of its application by A. Serpieri 1931.



It was never clear, for instance who controlled the agricultural confederations or the credit institutions and matters were only made worse by a variety of other Ministries, such as that for Forestry, which seemed to maneuver independently of anyone's control.[59] In other words, between the end of the 1920's and the first half of the

1930's, chaos was created by a variety of interests entering the administration of agriculture at the same time that the relation between center and periphery was changing.

The Agricultural Ministry began to assume roles in areas where it had only been minimally involved before, such as Bonifica, market intervention, agricultural guidance and production development. In all these areas, the use of public funds to stimulate private initiatives became the primary aim, while the old function of "instruction" was taken over by the Ministry of Propaganda. Between them they exercised considerable influence over the instrument of political economy and over the rural classes. What the Ministry of Agriculture could have done but did not do, was to develop its service or technological functions. It assumed instead an ever more bureaucratic attitude in administrative procedures for financial concessions and, in doing so, blocked most potential development in agriculture.[60]

As a variety of rural interests began to take part in the administration of agriculture, there was an increase in the number of committees that replaced single functionaries. The tendency was to give public jobs to associations, federations and confederations of category and finance them with public money. Such forms of "representation" became more ideological than workable. What all this did achieve, however, was the legitimation of the growing link between the bureaucracy and rural interests.[61]

The purpose of these ties was to reinforce control from the center over peripheral groups, rather than to promote a central plan that still had relevance to a particular region. The new network of local offices was to take care of administration for the central Ministry, whose consolidation in this way would have serious effects on future intervention in agriculture. In the fascist years of bureaucratic expansion, local involvement in local affairs decreased and with it went any semblance of technological activity.

In turn, as the Ministry was reinforced, it became more closed in on itself. This increased already severe problems for the coordination of activities. Each of a plurality of bureaucracies wanted to extend its own powers through control of finances and privileges, which in turn, increased the number of groups, public and private, which were working with public funds. Thus, Serpieri's central problem of the linking of sectoral and State interests, guided by the center, was realized only in so far as agricultural interests tied themselves to the bureaucratic apparatus and entered into its activities for their own benefit. Centralizing administrative control, however, was not enough. The expanding bureaucracy also needed to increase the financial resources that it channeled through the new layers of its network.[62]

2. Funding Agricultural Assistance:

The Case of the Bank of Carnia

If Friuli had been left to its own resources and its own local power structure, we could simply say that it stagnated under Fascism, but this was not the case. The administration of agriculture from the center, devoted to supporting a development plan conceived by a group who had probably never seen the territory, was fascism's heritage. The small amount of autonomy which remained to the region was taken from it during Mussolini's time.

It is probable that the push and the requests coming from agrarian interests contributed a great deal to the centralization of sectoral intervention during fascism. However, this was also symptomatic of the weakness of agrarian groups in this period, especially in relation to the centrality of industry. The economic and political logic of fascism was to keep agriculture in its place and to solidify its conditions bureaucratically, leaving innovation and development behind. At best it was to be run by assistance and mediation and to become an agriculture of non-development.

A concrete example of exactly how this was done in one local case makes the situation clearer. Public works and land reclamation required funds. In the previous chapter we saw the beginning of a banking system in Friuli, but it was not yet firmly tied to the national network. Mussolini's compromises with the Church and the division of labor agreed

on by him and the financial leaders of Italy was the basis for the inclusion of areas such as Friuli in the national economy.

The Credit Institute of Carnia had been started right after World War I as a cooperative to invest the savings of a large number of emigrants from the mountains. The inspiration had been socialist. With the help of the Bank, work was begun to repair war damage, as well as that caused by the depopulation of the area, especially to agriculture. Projects such as dairy cooperatives to benefit small proprietors were favored. However, in order to gain further credibility and assistance after the War, several "outsiders" were invited to join the bank's direction. For a time, they were asked to remain in the shadows, as they were backed by a Venetian bank and foreign money, and thus were considered political "enemies" at the time the bank was formed.[63]

During the years before it had become clear how State intervention would take place, it was difficult to find credit with which to start new businesses. Economic crisis made it hard for the Bank to find new projects and funds for them at the same time. In these same years there was a decline in employment possibilities for emigrants, further constricting money available for investment. As the Bank needed more resources, both the projects chosen by it and the ideological justifications for them were taken less and less into consideration by the secret partners, who, not

surprisingly, were also strong supporters of fascism. As the outsiders investments increased, the Bank's autonomy was steadily eroded.[64]

The "Quota 90" had made times hard for small proprietors, an important part of Bank's financial base. This increased its need for outside help to adjust to the changes from devaluation and to support the public works projects it sponsored. Mussolini's idea of Bonifica, however, was not to create jobs, but to solidify relations with those who already had land.

The Bank of Carnia wanted funds to permit its own solvency and also to pay employed workers. The Bank found itself in an increasingly vicious circle as the people for whom and by whom it was founded and the political norms by which it worked came into conflict with fascist institutions. In Mussolini's reordering of the banking system, help was not given to the Bank of Carnia. It had been driven to accept compromises in its years of difficulty and later found itself tied inextricably to Venetian capital.

In the transcript of the hearing in Venice on the Bank's closing, it was stated, "We hope to be comforted by the fact that the Banca Cattolica will do its best to come to the aid of the local economy, and that above all, the small creditor will be better cared for and favored by it." If this was the Bank's statement, the judge and the Bance Cattolica, which was taking over, sent a telegram to the Duce asking how they were to conduct themselves.

Mussolini's reply was that the Bank's job was to"profoundly penetrate the agrarian and working social classes in order to stimulate savings and a sound fractionalized distribution of credit in order to promote sound local initiatives."

In turn, the Banca Cattolica wrote to Mussolini that it was "proud to have been chosen by the superior Authority to prosecute this activity and to assume from this moment on the character of true social assistance, and to insure in this sense that it can fully respond to the expectations that it will help the hardworking people of Carnia."[65]

In one sense this was a continuation of an old tendency to use Venetian money to bring about cultural change in Friuli. The catholics of Veneto also had their own plan to link a variety of regional economies to the Bank in Rome through their tight ties to industrial capital in northwest Italy. In the takeover of the Bank of Carnia, the Catholic Bank of Udine participated fully, as it had already been made part of the Vatican network which supported the Veneto group.[66]

This is not to suggest that the "salvage" of the Bank of Carnia was not carried out with the good of the territory in mind, but it was done at the expense of the same area and was intended to pay off economic and cultural supporters of the fascist state by giving them specific geographical and economic zones of power.

The end of the Bank of Carnia in its cooperative form was also due to a previous lack of development in the area

which the Bank had intended to change but could not. In turn, the fascists chose for Friuli, and for Carnia in particular, the roles of: provider of small savings, electric power station and the source of a ready and movable labor force.

The ability of the center to control banking, gained in Mussolini's time, would later add to the capacity of the State to intervene in agriculture after the War. In the meantime, the commercial-artisan class of Carnia, which had been left out of the benefits of both Austrian and fascist rule sided once and for all with the Vatican and Venetian powers which regulated the flow of money in Friuli. They were backed by international finance, which was to play an increasingly important role in the Italian economy after the War.

The Church was never far from where important economic and political decisions were being made. The downfall of the liberal pre-fascist regime which it hated and the compromises the Vatican made with Mussolini were both considered victories by the Church. The alliance it made with fascism against liberalism permitted it to shield many catholics in a way the left could not. In Carnia, many waited and planned and, having been able to be anti-fascist without having been in dangerous opposition, could supply the post-fascist era with leaders.

3. The Political Consequences of the Lateran Accords: The Survival of Azione Cattolica and the Future of the Republic

Two of the political consequences of the Lateran Accords in 1929 were the end of the Partito Popolare and of support among the top of the hierarchy for Mussolini's foreign policy. The Vatican's support for fascism meant that catholics had a more difficult time being against the regime, but many considered that simply the price that had to be paid to save the catholic banks from ruin in 1929. The closest the Vatican and Mussolini ever came to a break was not over the economy but over Azione Cattolica in 1931.[67]

Initially the fascists and the Church agreed on who their enemies were: the liberal regime and the socialists. Thus, there were four basic stands that were permissable for a Catholic to take in practical matters. The two extremes are best typified by the populist Don Luigi Sturzo, who pushed for legal and social reforms for both agricultural and industrial workers, and by Achille Ratti, who became Pope Pius XI in February of 1922. He was an economic and political arch-conservative. Other Catholics tended to divide along class lines in choosing positions.[68]

Two years after the Concordat was signed, Pius XI wrote an encyclical to adjust the Church's teachings to the Corporativist State. There was a repetition of the similarities of the human body's functions to those of the

State. "Social physiology" or consensus, was supported. "Social pathology," or conflict, was condemned. Pius stated: "The corporations are made up of representatives of workers' unions and of 'padroni' of the same profession."[69] He concluded that whoever detracted from this collective organization went against the common good.[70] What prevented collaboration within the corporations was the forbidden strike. Where the parties could not agree, a judge should intervene. In this way too, the Pope also supported the court system over which Mussolini had little control.[71]

The Encyclical goes on: "One needs little reflection to see the advantages of such order; the peaceful collaboration of the classes, the repression of the Socialist organizations and groups, and the moderating actions of a special judge."[72] Thus, the teachings of the Church reinforced the idea that participation in society was anchored in the idea of class cooperation. The basis for this was to be defined by the corporations. Consensus, concord and authority were values to be appreciated. Conflict, strike, socialism and the organization of classes were to be avoided. It is in this spirit that the mass of Catholics were educated.

It is not hard to see why Don Sturzo's idea of rising above class came to little in practice in such an ideological environment. His Partito Popolare had its roots in pre-World War I years and grew as a response to post-war conditions. The movement was as opposed to liberals as both

socialists and fascists were, but the Popolare were also against socialism. As early fascists were usually anti-clerical there was little chance of an alliance between them and the Catholic Popolari.

Eventually, Mussolini's conciliations with the Vatican and his skillful use of propaganda promoting a national and moral society overcame enough opposition for him to come to power. Once in office, Mussolini was to defend the Church and he hoped Azione Cattolica would no longer be necessary. The Pope preferred to keep the organization as a means of maintaining Catholic influence in the schools.[73]

The crisis point between them was reached when the anti-clerical faction around Mussolini pushed him to close the Azione's centers, claiming that they were full of ex-Popolari. Catholic anti-fascism came to the surface. Both the Pope and Mussolini realized that a compromise was necessary in order to prevent a break between them, which would have been a blow, mostly to Mussolini. Thus, Azione was allowed to remain as long as it did not involve itself in political or union activities. Ex-Popolari were to be purged, and Azione was not to sponsor athletic activities or use fascist symbols.[74]

Though tensions eased with time, it took longest for the dispute to blow over in strongly clerical provinces such as the Veneto and Friuli. However, Azione's survival tactics paid off by the Second World War, when it could be an open alternative to fascist organizations. Its meetings

were well attended, but too "apolitical" for the regime to be able to justify the use of repression. From it and other Catholic groups inspired by it, such as the Movimento Laureati, came the leaders who were ready to take over after Mussolini. It was with this purpose in mind that the Pope had defended Azione Cattolica as a vehicle for the future return and triumph of clericalism in Italy.[75] This, however, was still a vision of the future.

C. The Fascist Era in Friuli-Venezia Giulia

1. The Church and State Agree to Disagree

The heritage that fascism left bureaucratically in Friuli is clear but its ideological imprint is more difficult to distinguish. How deeply the Friulan people were committed to the movement can be inferred from a letter of 1929, written by the Prefect of Udine to the Minister of the Interior. He said: "I feel that the Party in the Province has not penetrated the population as it has in other provinces, because these people are of a cold and closed nature, and because they are sick of constant diatribes, and also because the bourgeoisie is still partly linked to clericalism."[76]

In 1929, the relationship between the leaders of the Church and those of the Party was good. It was at the base that there was tension. Many priests, whether or not they headed parishes, had been developed by, and in turn, nurtured, the Partito Popolare.


Disagreement was particularly pronounced over the issue of education, which had always been the exclusive province of the Church. To resolve the conflict, several priests were arrested and a new archbishop was chosen for Udine. The latter tried immediately to strengthen Azione Cattolica.

Orders finally came from above in the Party that they should minimize their differences with the Church, using as common ground, a joint campaign against public immorality. Both fascists and clergy could agreed that it was necessary

to limit vulgarities of every sort, ranging from swearing to the use of male bicycles by females.

Though nationally there was an alliance between Church and State, in Friuli it was never an untroubled one. The Prefect concerned himself with about the great numbers who attended meetings, not just of Azione, but of all Catholic cultural groups. Some of the clergy needed little excuse to find fault with the regime, though they could concur on the anti-communist campaign, especially during the period of the war in Spain; and on demographic propaganda and the hoped for victory in Africa.

Fascist institutions, such as the Balilla for school children or the after work organizations, were not much different in Friuli than they were in the rest of Italy. The regime concentrated its efforts in rural schools. Response to them was especially enthusiastic when new uniforms or physical competition were offered.



MAP

Planned improvements to the Bassa Friulana by two consortiums at the end of 1928 from Giuseppe de Piero, L'agricoltura della Bassa Pianura Friulana attraverso i tempi, 1975.

2. Land Reclamation, the Grain Battle and Emigration: The Gap Between Word and Deed

Fascism's plans for land reclamation and its record of public works in Friuli is another story. Ambitious schemes early became tied up in leadership struggles over the administration of funds. Before work could even begin, endless problems of land expropriation and taxation had to

be solved, as well as the way the land was to be "rationalized" by the project. Little benefit resulted from any of the work until after the war, and even that was limited. In most cases, fascism brought further debt or impoverishment to those who had small holdings. Many were simply pushed off the land. Bonifica was directed mostly by and for the large owners. They spent their effort arguing over whether it was better to use their property in 100 hectare parcels or to allot it in small portions to the mezzadria. In either case, there was no discussion of giving up control of profit from the land.

Land reclamation is one of the clearest examples of the gap between word and deed during fascism. It was all begun in a flurry of propaganda without taking into consideration the actual conditions of the agricultural sector in Friuli. It ended in 1935 when the regime concentrated its efforts on colonial enterprises. Private attempts at land improvement were brought to end since the small holders could not do it by themselves, no one else was much interested. In 1938 a law was passed that simply required the maintenance of what had been completed in the Bonifica program. No new projects were proposed.[77]

Thus, in Friuli the areas of development and non-development became clearer during fascism. Those few urban areas like Trieste where industry already existed contrasted sharply with Carnia where emigration kept company with subsistence farming. Within Friuli were the same sorts of

contrasting levels of development that could be found between the South and the Northwest of Italy.[78]

There was one project in Friuli which did benefit the people. It was in the Bassa where the draining of much marsh land helped in the battle against malaria. However, if many of the contadini had had small holdings before that project was begun, the proportion who owned land later fell.[79] Nearly three quarters of all those who owned property were restricted to plots of less than one hectare on 12.5% of the arable land, while 43.3% of it was held by 190 owners who worked plots of 50 or more hectares.

		Owners	
Amount of land held and total hectares		Number and Percent	
less than one hectare	8,720	19,433	70.5
from one to ten hectares	17,819	7,275	24.4
from 10 to 50 hectares	13,252	655	2.4
from 50 to 100 hectares	7,630	108	.4
more than 100 hectares	22,860	82	.3

Thus, gains that came from extended cultivation also caused further unemployment and misery in areas there had been no development of industry for an alternate source of income for those with little or no land. While there was also unemployment in Northwestern and the Central Italy during fascism, it was particularly high in the South and in Friuli. These areas fed the flow of migratory workers inside Italy and abroad.

Even before the market made an impact in Friuli unemployment and underemployment were chronic in the region, partly because agriculture, construction and the textile mills were all most active during the summer months. During the winter of 1921, 43,388 people unemployed, out of an active population of about 700,000. Fewer were without work between 1927 and 1933, but the number rose again to 39,430 and then to 50,070 by 1939.[80] To make matters worse, in 1936 a male agricultural worker in the province of Udine was paid about 1.40 lire an hour, a woman .85 for the same work, while one kilogram of bread cost 1.65 lire, corn meal 1.15, pasta 2.15, cheese 7, butter 12.50, sugar 6 and coffee 31.[81]

In 1921, the frontiers were still closed to emigration, though many came and went illegally, and much of the territory was still in disarray from the war. The "Quota 90" and the crisis of the 1930s set almost all Italian industrial development back so that it was of little help in combatting local unemployment even through emigration. By 1930, emigrants sent home 133 million lire; by 1932 the amount was down to 67.5 million. Only 11.5 million was received in Friuli in 1938. Emigration had always been supported by more conservative governing groups, and by the Church. Pressure on the land and the employment situation had made it a necessity for many.

During fascism, many workers re-entered the Region, more because of the financial situation in Europe as a whole than because of the success of Fascist propaganda. In a

sense, the restrictions imposed sanctified the situation more than they were provoked by it. Eventually, the regime found it necessary to organize internal migrations and projects in Africa. There were always volunteers from Friuli and usually its farmers outnumbered its workers three to one.[82]

In an inquest in Milan in 1927, it was found that one-fifth of the inhabitants of the emigrant barracks were Friulani. Many of these were from the hill and mountain areas which had become noticeably deserted. It is from the fascist period that most of the damage to the land there came about. As emigration and desertion created a vicious circle, further depopulation of the land was promoted. Possibilities for jobs in the plains had been eliminated by the consolidations of the large landholders who benefitted from Bonifica.[83]

This evolution in land tenure might have brought about some changes for the better, but on the whole, it did not. There was little work for the "released" labor force as the large holders were little disposed to invest in specialized, labor-intensive crops. The grain battle and protectionism promoted a dry agriculture, so public works did not receive a push from necessity either to create jobs or to improve the quality of agricultural infrastructure.[84]

Year	Hectares in Grain	Total Yield*	Yield per Hectare*
1926	30,327	316,490	10.4
1938	35,316	698,390	19.8

* measurement in quintals

The grain battle in Friuli did make some changes in production. A higher quantity of grain from each hectare was due to improved seed and fertilizer. The increase of land in use was the result of the enlargement of the farming surface through land expropriation, sales and reclamation.[85]

However, the achievement of such a yield was also damaging in the long-run. Many of the acres used were not ideal for the growing of grain and the poorer farmers lacked fertilizer. As more and more land was put into use, it was the important forage crop that was neglected, and this was reflected in the decrease of animal population. Less fertile land would result without livestock as well as a lack of protein for the people.

Grain for the market and corn for the contadino's table -- the latter hardly a protected product -- again became the basis for an underdeveloped agriculture and an underfed rural people. This situation was exacerbated by the prizes for grain production given out by the parishes and tax deductions and special arrangements offered by banks and agricultural federations. In addition, there were prizes for silk production, but never enough to equal losses

from the drop in the market price that came about after 1932.

Instead of achieving a further integration of agricultural activities, Friuli took a step backward. Regardless of the spectacular production of grain, the overall agricultural production in Friuli fell during the years of fascism.[86]

With a structurally and productively static agriculture, Friuli's mixed economy depended more than ever on various forms of temporary occupation. During fascism, the number of industrial jobs remained relatively stable, but the growth of small commercial enterprises is notable. An important part of a locally based economy is the exchange of artisan and alimentary goods as well as a variety of services. Small business produced such items as material, thread and furniture. These jobs were often taken by women and children, since many of the tasks could be performed at home. Thus, there was a combination of cottage industry and small productive centers which provided some salary to supplement whatever the family could grow for itself.

In the fascist era the need for an integrated family income increased. Unemployment could be hidden to some degree in the intensification of work done by the contadino family, an increase in the amount of land used for marketable crops, and a diversification of what the family grew for its own use. Certainly fascism intended to reorganize and rationalize both industry and agriculture in order to

compete with more advanced systems. However, by maintaining an industrial structure based on the use of the agricultural sector as it always had been, the latter adjusted itself as best it could to necessity, but came no where near what anyone of the day would have described as a modern agricultural system.[87]

3. Fascist Leadership , Consensus and the Resistance

When Mussolini came to Udine in September of 1938, the crowd that greeted him was large and enthusiastic, as it is shown in many photographs. The state of research in Friuli does not permit one to say with accuracy how many were truly enthusiastic about the regime, much less why they were or were not. On the other hand, if one considers the social and economic hardships endured by much of the region during fascism, it is hard to interpret that greeting as wide spread approval of and support for Mussolini's government.[88]

Among the local leaders the situation was much like what it was in most of Italy. An internal struggle had taken place between conservative fascists and intransigents, beginning with the March on Rome.[89] In Friuli it came to an end about 1933, not because there was any clarification of the Party's line, but because it had become so bureaucratized and institutionalized that it was incapable of elaborating policy from the center.

When Starace became General Secretary of the Party in 1931, he began to change the Party's image from one of an

elite group to that of a mass organization. The big increase in membership came after 1932, especially since a Party card was necessary to hold public office and often, even find a job. It is exactly at this point however, that control over the peripheral organs seems to have been lost.

Nationally the moderate wing of the Party was partly responsible for Mussolini's overthrow in 1943, as the conflict between them and the "radicals" had never really been resolved. In Friuli, the Party "moderates" were of the old notables who had used fascism to control the workers and the contadini.[90]

The "radicals", or intransigents were never a homogeneous group. They were unemployed soldiers, petit-bourgeoisie, secretaries and farmers. Sentiments among them ranged from anti-clerical, to anti-liberal, to anti-communist and, in some cases, simply expressed a desire to return to an imagined past. The impossibility of finding a common idea among them was their principal weakness and their best moments came when they had a common enemy.

The moderates were beaten for a while, but the intransigents governed for only a short time. The "youngbloods", as they are often called lost because they were excessively rigid in their adherence to the idea of the State first, in Friuli where leaders usually put their own local interests before all others. Fascism's representatives in the region were the Prefect and the police, and during the intransigents' rule the regime's officers created the feeling that

the Party was huge and involved totally in caring for itself and its auxiliary organizations.

The old local leaders emerged more powerful than ever from the inner-Party struggle. They became something apart from the regime they had once sustained. With the defeat of "the young upstarts," there was no one to keep them from using the Party for their own interests again, and they purged from their ranks anyone who did not conform to their Friulian interpretation of Fascist policy.[91]

A good example of what the priorities of the "moderates" were can be seen in the purge of one of the intransigents, Piero Pisenti. He had been associated with the most powerful financial leaders of the region before fascism, the same old notables who governed. Because of his adherence to pro-Austrian sentiments, Pisenti found himself unable to control his antagonism toward the Church hierarchy, and his persistent rudeness to the Bishop of Udine put him on his colleagues "to be liquidated" list. It was the policy of the regime to avoid conflict with the Church, but in Friuli, those who made up the "moderates" had long been in alliance with their bishops. It took little excuse for a group of senators, mayors, bank presidents, and heads of land reclamation committees to vote Pisenti's "resignation" from the Party.[92]

The turnover in the Party's elected offices was frequent but it was usually an exchange within a limited group. Prefects, Party and union appointees held short

terms and were also powerless locally. They were usually sent to Friuli from other places in Italy, so most of thier tenure was spent orienting themselves in a new environment and adjusting to a different mentality. Union leaders had to deal with an autonomous group of local industrialists as well. Between 1927 and the beginning of 1940, there were twelve people who circulated as secretaries and commissioners of the Federation of Udine which held the real power locally. Heading 175 fascist communes in the same period of time were 902 people, only a few of whom were in office more than once. As the Party grew more rigid and was increasingly directed by Mussolini himself, the centralization so desired by the regime for every peripheral organization resulted in frequent changes in personnel and a consolidation of the powers of the old notables in Friuli that Fascism had hoped to displace.[93]

This did not mean, however, that the Party in Friuli developed any independent policies. It was paralyzed by internal battles, and relied on an excessive bureaucracy rather than its own initiative. It followed some orders from the center and mostly limited itself to struggling locally with the cost of living and helping the needy. It was a policeman for the price of goods, gave job references, brought Christmas packages to large families, and presented trousseaux to young unemployed couples who wanted to marry. The Party tried to duplicate roles which had once been the exclusive preserve of the Church.[94]

Who were the supporters of Mussolini who greeted him in 1938? Some farmers who had come to town on market day, children in uniforms and their teachers, State employees who were given the day off, merchants and professional people, workers brought out by the union, and civil and religious authorities in formal attire. There were few women.

The female population of Italy, in general was badly treated during fascism. They were portrayed as silly, or at best, as the producers of heroes. They were the first to be fired and the last to be hired and were paid less than a man who did the same job. Most of the time they remained out of the picture, probably with too much work to do to come to a demonstration. However, in Friuli, prison and arrest records of the time show that when they could not feed their families, they were the first to protest. They also demonstrated against excessive taxes and against the closing of the textile factories where most of them were part-time workers.[95]

Women were not the only ones to protest during fascism, but most actions were local, short-lived and little publicized. Unions were paralyzed by their own contradictions. The employers were not to be offended, but the workers were to be protected. The union was supervised by the Prefect, but he was controlled by industrialists and large landholders. In most cases, when the union was called on to mediate, the farmer or the worker lost.[96]

Though the fascist unions did give the workers the experience of being part of a mass organization, they did not reach a majority of the farmers though the situation varied by region. Wherever emigration had been a necessary source of income, misery increased under fascism as it did in the hills and mountains of Friuli and in much of the South and the islands.

Northern European farmers were able to recover from the Depression by concentration on dairy and beef products that brought higher prices than grain did. In Italy, and as we have seen in Friuli, grain production reduced animal husbandry. The few small farmers who gained land after World War I were able to hold on to it, they were not the majority. Land tenure and the rural social structure were little changed during fascism.[97] The Depression caused more families to have to exist on what could be produced on a maximum of two or three hectares. Day-laborers and braccianti were the worst off. Wheat meant fewer jobs and fewer places to settle. It is ironic that this group took much of the brunt of the squadristi's rural pacification program.[98]

Certainly Friuli, but probably in most of Italy, contadini were less touched by fascism than urban groups, first of all because farmers had little contact with the media. The radio was not a common household item in Friuli during the 1940s, but Mussolini's speeches meant little to the contadini. Traditional folklore and the Church were the

interpreters of their lives. Fascist propaganda was boastful, but life had improved little for the small farmer since unification. Economic stagnation and overpopulation fed emigration. The better life that emigration brought to some was threatened by the Depression. The Church glorified the contadini when he accepted his fate and brought him hope for a better life after death. The fascists simply joined the long list of "foreigners" who determined how hard it was for him to survive.[99]

Fascism's policies widened gaps between social groups and geographical areas of the country. Its cultural policies did the same, although instruction in the Italian language did break down some local barriers. On the other hand, this would also be the basis for later claims of cultural imperialism which were leveled against Rome by separatists movements in Sicily, Sardinia, Alto Adige and Friuli.

Through fascist propaganda, ironically, Catholics gained further legitimation of their moral values, though Mussolini often seems to have expressed the idea that the Vatican was working solely for fascism's benefit. Rural folk were as little touched by the schools (most farm children left school after two or three years of education) as they were by the media.

On the other hand, the bourgeoisie of Italy seemed to lose some interest in the Church and were perhaps the most influenced by Mussolini's nationalistic appeals and his

desire for an Italy with more prestige among other nations. It has been suggested that Mussolini's values of virility and prestige through material acquisition led many to support him more out of opportunism than out of fear. Though this group's fondest memory of Mussolini seems to be that it was he who made the trains run on-time. It is hard for most to remember other things he actually accomplished for Italy.[100]

The more membership in the Party came to be a requirement, the more it came to represent the maintenance of a status quo for Italian society. It was a mass movement, but never a profound one. Fascists compromised their way into power. Those in the army, the courts and the civil service may have become Fascist Party members, but many had entered office under the liberal regime and many remained after Mussolini left. There was no real purge during fascism or after it. It never dislodged the legitimacy of the Church, nor of the military, and many intellectuals gained prestige under the regime whether they had been openly against it or not.[101]

In other words, the fascists never changed the old power structure, much less dominated it. Fascism did not change Italy into a modern industrial state as it had intended to do. It did not produce an elite that was more competent in dealing with modernization or industrialization, and certainly not with development as a whole. The old ruling elite who did not remain under fascism went

into exile or retirement, but most only temporarily, to wait for Mussolini to exhaust himself. Members of the left who were not killed went underground and later were an important part of the Resistance. These were joined by many catholics.[102]

In Friuli it was not until 1943 that the contadini and workers of Monfalcone created the Garabaldiana Resistance and the Fontanot Brigade. It attracted everyone from professional people to priests especially in those areas that had been destroyed by the War.[103] Many joined the Resistance as a way to avoid the draft or being sent to Germany.

The two largest Partisan Republics were those in Piedmont and that of Carnia. With Togliatti's return from Moscow, the communist's organization and appeal drew an even larger base of support for the Resistance, whether out of a desire to erase a fascist past or out of sincere conviction. Being a communist in 1945 in the Northeast was insurance of being on the winning side. Forms of action ranged from the underground press to guerilla warfare, depending on the territory, but the most remarkable influence they had was to reach the contadini as fascism had never been able to. Large numbers of them joined the Resistance and whole rural villages formed the Partisan's support system and supply route. The role of women in the Resistance was crucial and contributed much to in their later change of status. Thus, from 1945 on, the Resistance was built into a mass movement, not just because of a desire to drive out the Nazis, but

because it expressed the people's hope to take part in the rebuilding of the Nation.[104]

D. Continuity: From Mussolini to the Republic

During the years of Italian unity, the liberal regime and then fascism tried to create a truly national community, but both wanted to achieve this without fundamentally changing the social and economic systems. If the Risorgimento did bring about the legal unity of the national territory, it was little more than a front. Fascism used symbols to further national integration. Ironically, the last time most of what was Italy under Mussolini had been united, was under the Romans. Il Duce's emphasis on the past glories of the Empire suggest that fascism may best be summed up as a forced attempt at ideological unity.

What fascism did consolidate was a national elite. Part of it consisted of the liberals who had been discredited for a time, lost political control and then, after a brief interlude, continued their economic functions. The Church supplied the others. It had maintained its cultural influence and prepared catholics to join the governing class.

On the other hand, the fascist regimed did last for 20 years. Though the social base to whom it appealed was not fundamentally changed, the fact that government had tried to include workers and contadini at all was a unique experience for many. This development would require a new ideological flexibility of both the Church and the State after World War II. The secular-clerical configuration would need reinterpretation if the urban and rural sectors were to continue to

play the same roles that had been assigned them by development planners. The idea of a mass based party, however, would run into one major cultural bottleneck.

The most recent analyses of Italy tend to emphasize class struggle, but while this is relevant to post-World War II urban conditions, it explains little about the persistence of pre-industrial society in rural areas. Certainly there is class struggle in Italy, but there is also a struggle between two very different societies. This is the real dualism of Italy. The two cultures cannot be divided into neat geographical of societal categories, into North or South, or worker or peasant, without distorting the view. During fascism the two social systems began to co-exist more frequently in the same social and physical space though their density, quantity and quality, vary with region and socio-economic class.

Each culture, however, has its own social relations and its own rhythm of transformation which in turn, affect the formation of parties, day to day governing, the dimensions of the political system and the economic sphere. It is this dualism which has shaped post-World War II Italy because the new Republic's rules were fixed without pre-fascist sub-national conflicts much less national unity having been resolved. Pre-industrial norms and relationships and the local interests of pre-fascist leaders continued to play a large part in the way Italy's future was planned when the

war ended. The legitimazation of mass politics is not a profound social and cultural change.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER THREE

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CHAPTER FOUR

RECONSTRUCTION: The Consolidation of Power

The DC's electoral victory in 1948 came to represent a victory for the past more than the future many partisans hoped to shape. The new Christian party's first task was to gain as many adherents as possible from different social strata. It was not possible to appeal to all the local interests of each group, so instead of trying, Marx was pitted against God. In order to do so, the Vatican had to raise the PCI and communism to full membership in the secular-clerical conflict. This meant that socialism was defined as a belief system opposed to christianity which was not simply another secular philosophy. The voters were then forced into a position of having to choose between "them" or "us." The Socialist party split in two. The PSI was then at the left of the new line between acceptable and not acceptable partners in government, and the PSLI sided with the DC. On the Right, some fascists were purged and some were not.

In this way, the DC came to represent not just catholics who were finally allowed to take part in government, but also the secular bourgeoisie whose ranks had been enlarged during fascism, as well as sectors of that group which had not supported Mussolini. It brought dependent and independent farmers into its sphere and many workers. Among both leaders and supporters of the DC were those who had presided over agrarian society. With them came pre-

industrial values and social relationships founded on family and personal ties. Limited issues, local particularisms and rivalries, and personal interests were absorbed into the larger political structure, the administration of which was to be based on the previously existing network of bishoprics and parishes.

The DC built its own bureaucracy over time, but by using rather than eliminating the basis for patron-client relationships which the Church had provided. This is not to suggest that the Church condoned the practice of clientelism per se, but rather that personalism, obedience, and authority are not inconsistent with the Church's values. There is personalism in every system, but it is usually not found to be "excessive" where there are also other acceptable ways to do things, where the criteria for assistance has more to do with economic logic and efficiency than with who one "knows." In Italy by the 1950s, there were still no commonly accepted alternatives to the personalistic norms that would continue to propel the national bureaucracy even though the need for efficiency had begun to be recognized. Why and how this came about is the story of this chapter.

A. The Politics of Polarization

1. First Round: Eliminating the CLN and the Rise of De Gasperi

In May of 1944, Churchill admitted that the allies had made a great many mistakes, though this hardly absolves the Italian leaders of responsibility for the results of their own miscalculations. Italy came out of the War a physical disaster and morally exhausted, but in September of 1943, only part of the tragedy was over for the Italian people. There were still two more years of war to be fought on their soil and still the humiliation of occupation ahead of them.[1]

While Badoglio struggled with the new Republic between 1943 and 1945, the Germans remained in northern Italy. Either they or the partisans controlled scattered territories, one of which was Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Between 1943 and 1945, German massacres and summary executions in the region were nothing short of cruel and ferocious. Few families went untouched.

In October of 1943, on the same day that Badoglio declared war against Germany, Italy was recognized as a co-belligerent nation. However, their new status was not to alter the terms of the armistice. Italy was still enemy territory, but by the end of 1944, what there was of the Italian army and navy was sent to help the Allies on the Adriatic front and to help the Yugoslavian and Italian partisans.

The different groups who made up the Resistance and the National Committee of Liberation, or CLN, had a variety of reasons for joining the anti-fascist struggle. Though they were one in battle, the minute the fight was over, their differences surfaced. Without a common enemy, they no longer had the unity necessary to change Italy's assigned role in post-war Europe. However, while they were still fighting in the North, their fate was also being decided by events and by other forces.

The Church was indispensable in liberating Rome on the 5th of June 1944. On the 25th, Bonomi's new government announced that a Constituent Assembly was to be seated as soon as the fighting was over. It was also a year of presidential elections in the United States and, partly to gain Italian-American votes, the American Government gave the new Italy full diplomatic recognition. If it had not been for Great Britain's opposition, Italy might have gotten allied nation status then.

Eventually, Bonomi's government achieved some of its international aims. Domestically, chaos continued. Two problems loomed large. First, the Sforza laws were published in an attempt to establish criteria for eliminating all fascist influence from positions of power. In theory, the laws called for the elimination of all those who had supported Mussolini, but they were impossible to enforce, as too many people had had at least some moments of

"compromise." Discussions on the matter were profoundly divisive.

There was also a debate raging over another problem; the powers of the CLN. According to the Left, the CLN was to be used as a force for the renewal of Italian society. The Right, and most important, the Liberals and other moderates, felt that the CLN was temporary. Once an area was pacified, the CLN should give its powers over to the regular administration. The struggle between the two positions revolved around the Sforza laws.

Gradually, the moderates of the CLN came to Bonomi's side, but the rigidity of the position was dangerous and threatened the stability of any new cabinet. Churchill vetoed Sforza as the new government's leader and Bonomi took office again. At this point, the Left was still represented in the cabinet by Togliatti, among others.

The question of the Sforza laws and the "cleansing of Italian society" was resolved pretty much as the moderates wished. The procedure for the enforcement was given to local powers, and there the entire process died a slow death. The Allies continued fear of the Left's involvement in the government, and the support of the moderates helped in no small way to maintain the continuity of many of Italy's administrative and political groups.

Between 1945 and 1948, the Allies' reservations about the Left grew, and in turn, the Left became more fearful that outside intervention was inevitable "should they act."

Among Italy's social groups, a polarization took place in the midst of economic, social, and political chaos.

Italy was not yet reunified. The experiences of the North and those of the South were quite different during these years. The South did not participate in the outcome of the war in the same way the people of the North did, but neither were they acted upon to the same degree as the Northerners were. The South felt much of the negative side of the war and occupation, but less of the positive side which, in the North, led to the articulation of demands and organizations around specific issues. However, the state of Italy's economy was disastrous for almost all, regardless of geography.

The Socialists and Communists saw the formation of a new constitution as an opportunity to profoundly change Italy's economic and social structure. The Liberals and Monarchists felt that reconstruction should be carried out along traditional structural lines, with a change of personnel only where it was judged by them as necessary. The Liberals, in particular, reduced the problem of reconstruction to institutional change. In between these positions were the Christian Democrats and the Catholic Azionisti. Both wanted some alterations in Italian society, though neither felt they should be socially dramatic. Instead, they hoped for a "democratic revolution," which was to be "a political reconfirmation of the Lateran Accords."[2]

The short period in which the debate was an open one is remarkable, not only for the quantity of ideas that the Italians produced, but for their quality. The intellectual level of the period's writings is infinitely impressive. Opinion in the political realm was rich and diverse.

Reality, however, overshadowed the debate. The mass of Italian workers and contadini were impatient. The middle classes, at least, wanted to be able to return to normal as fast as possible. The resolution of economic problems was urgent, and most people were neither patient enough nor prepared enough to value the wonderful discussions taking place.

Both Left and Right would soon eliminate the possibility of experiment and a "middle ground," but most important, the realities of the Cold War necessitated the choosing of positions and this, more than any other fact, embittered and polarized Italian politics. The crystalization of opinions began to be clear by the end of 1945, as the anti-fascist solidarity of the CLN came to an end in their final struggle for power.

Although the Allied Command ordered demobilization, many military groups remained armed and in contact, ready to back up political demands. In the countryside, groups of partisans made retaliatory raids against landlords, and factory owners were threatened in the cities. The middle classes saw little difference between these acts and the installation of councils in the factories. For them, as for

many others, these actions seemed to threaten private property. This fear was much like the one that had brought fascism to power, only this time the situation appeared even more dangerous. The country was half destroyed, the economy was a disaster, and millions were hungry and without work.

Those leaving the army added to the ranks of the unemployed. What was different from the post-World War I era was that all ex-combatants, whether regular military, partisan, or returned exile, were armed. The old state had disintegrated, and the new one was not yet in a condition to be able to help anyone.

Though revolution was much discussed, Togliatti's politics were not pointed toward a coup. They were guided by respect for traditional democracy and for a tired and war-torn people. Above all, the Communist Party agreed that it must avoid "the Greek perspective," a revolutionary insurrection, at all cost. It had no desire to provoke an American intervention. It is this cycle of mutual judgements that controlled the situation.[3]

The Allies kept a careful watch on national politics as Bonomi's interim leadership fell and as Parri began his tenure in June of 1945. Enthusiasm among the Italian people was high, and his coalition was to fulfill an impossible number of hopes. His fame as a Resistance leader was to help bring Italian opinion together. It was less important that he had little experience in day-to-day politics. At first, this was seen as a refreshing advantage. What

brought him down was not so much that he could not keep order as it was his plan to control big industry.

To get production going again, Parri proposed a heavy tax on the largest factories, especially the ones that had been accused of making enormous profits from the war and during fascist rule. His plans also included a scheme for distributing scarce primary goods, which gave advantages to medium and small-sized businesses. Parri's aim was to reconstruct industry in a more balanced way and leave room for the growth of smaller enterprises.

The Liberals, among others, opposed him, saying that his plan was an "attempt on private property." The extreme Left supported the idea, which caused the Allies to accuse Parri of complicity with the Communists in trying to control Italy's economic life. In September of 1945, while on a visit to Italy, Amedeo Giannini, president of the Bank of America, claimed that the United States would never send economic aid to an Italy that was governed by Parri's directives. Formally, the Allied administrators pointed out the error in Parri's political economy and said that he risked wasting already limited resources. They attacked the bureaucracy and said it was excessively weak after the purge of fascists from its ranks.[4]

As national and international confidence in Parri's government decreased, social disturbances continued. Both moderates and conservatives were concerned that "normalcy" whould never return unless profound changes were made, over

which they were less than enthusiastic. The Liberals took charges of the crisis by withdrawing from the governing coalition on the 21st of November. They were followed by the Christian Democrats and, on the 24th, Parri's government came down.

The era of broad choices was already over. Gradually, there was a return to the old ways of doing things. While not necessarily fascist, the methods were paternalistic and authority-oriented. Representation would be allowed for some structures and institutions, but not in people's daily experience. Liberty could be formally guaranteed, but its content would be maintained by privilege. The theme of reform might continue to inspire programs, but few of them would be put into practice. The end of Parri's coalition meant the end of a "middle way." For the next twenty years, politics would be run in an atmosphere of polarized interests with parties grouped around the Christian Democrats and the Communists.

Parri himself said on his day of resignation that "the Fifth Column inside his government [the Christian Democrats and the Liberals], after having systematically undermined his position, had squeezed him out in order to achieve their own end of returning to power those political and social forces that had formed the basis of the Fascist regime."[5] It is a dramatic statement.

On the other hand, though, the Communist party had ostensibly shown sympathy for Parri; they had done little to

sustain him for fear that his politics of mediation might turn out to be an alternative to their own sphere of influence. They were then beaten on a governmental level and would be put out altogether in 1947. That would be the signal for the violent anti-communist campaign to begin. They did not fail just because of American controls. They were not able to appeal to the middle classes and showed little concern for the growing polarization of the rural groups, but no small part of their lack of success was due to the political expertise of De Gasperi.

The Allied Government in Italy and De Gasperi made use of the Left's weaknesses while struggling to bring Italy into the Western community of nations. Once this was done, the Left was further undermined by the process of and the reason for Italy's inclusion into NAT as an original signatory. This was to be the basis for Italy's economic recovery.

2. The Price of Recovery: Italy Joins the North Atlantic Treaty Powers, or Internal Security Becomes an International Issue

In his memoirs, Harry Truman recalled that one of the major reasons for including Italy in the Western bloc at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Paris on the 4th of April in 1949 was to counteract any attempt by the Soviet Union to take over Europe before resistance to it could be arranged.[6] Many Westerners involved in the negotiations

expressed fear of infiltration into Western European governments through Soviet backing.[7]

NAT, however, had a variety of aims: to protect Western Europe against subversion by internal and external communism, as well as against outright invasion. It was essential to rebuild Europe and, to do this, stability and thus confidence in the future had to be instilled among the members of NAT. The path to Italy's inclusion in the group was not an easy one. When Marshall spoke with the U.S. Embassy in Belgium in March of 1948 to find out how the other participants in the negotiations in Brussels felt about Italy joining, it was suggested that the decision be postponed until after the elections in April of that year.[8]

In February, the National Security Council of the United States had met and expressed the fear that the Italian Communist party, the largest outside of the U.S.S.R., was a genuine threat to the Christian Democrats. It also felt that, because of Italy's position in the Mediterranean, it could control the oil supply from the Middle East, as well as other sea traffic. Because it was situated next to the Balkans, it would also be an ideal spot for an air force installation. Italy was vital to American interests. Thus, their recommendation was: "The United States should make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power in such a manner as might be found most effective to assist in preventing Italy from falling under the domination of the U.S.S.R. either through

armed attack or through Soviet-dominated Communist movements within Italy."[9] In discussing the forthcoming Italian elections, Kennan proposed outlawing the PCI, having in mind the idea of instigating a civil war which would give the United States a reason to occupy Italy.[10] Other suggestions were a little less dramatic, one of which was simply to include Italy in the Brussels discussions on security.[11]

The Italians themselves decided not to participate until after the elections. De Gasperi wanted Italy to be part of the alliance, but he was unsure of the effect their immediate inclusion would have on the vote. There was reason for his insecurity.

A general alarm had been sounded when the Left showed strength in the elections for the Constituent Assembly in June of 1946. They gained support in November when Italy's local municipal administrators were decided on at the polls. This was during the height of the period of cooperation between the PCI and the PSI. The Christian Democrats did not have the same sort of good relationship with the Liberals and the Republicans.

Two events in particular changed the balance of power. First, in January of 1947, De Gasperi went to the United States. He expressed fear of the Left and the severity of Italy's economic problems. He received recognition of the post-fascist government and the promise of financial assistance.

In the meantime, a group of socialists, headed by Giuseppe Saragat, split from the Left, formed the PSLI, or the Social Democratic party (later to become the PSDI), which together made up the Democratic Popular Front. The line was now clearly drawn between Right and Left. However, January of 1947 saw the formation of a new cabinet, a coalition of the PCI, the PSI, and the DC. Though the Left was given fewer ministries, the time of the test of strength and the triumph of the DC was not yet ripe.

The United States suggested that Italy would receive more economic help if the Left were not in the coalition. By May of 1947, another cabinet was formed which excluded the PCI and the PSI. The promised Marshall Plan was a prelude to the direct political involvement of the United States in the 1948 electoral campaign in Italy. How this was done in Friuli-Venezia Giulia will be described further on. Nationally, the Christian Democratic victory over the PCI temporarily removed the problem of the latter participating in the government, but there were other difficulties to replace it.

Italy's role in the defense of Europe remained an issue, as did the peace treaty.[12] De Gasperi had to work hard to move his people away from neutrality, but by September of 1948, he felt secure enough to say to U.S. Ambassador Dunn that Italy was not trying to trade concessions or membership, nor did it wish neutrality.[13]

As discussions continued, De Gasperi became alarmed at the prospect that Italy might not be included. To increase domestic support for NAT, he and his Foreign Minister, Carlo Sforza, sought the approval of Giuseppe Saragat and his Social Democrats as their link to the Italian labor movement.[14] After negotiations with all parties except the Socialists and the Communists, the government expressed full agreement that Italy sincerely desired to take part in the discussions on European security. They stated that if they were not included in the Atlantic Pact, the Communists "would have a field day" and that the resulting unrest would surely threaten to destroy political stability and, along with it, hopes for economic recovery. It was this that forced the United States to take a formal stand. The Europeans agreed to leave the decision to the United States.[15]

In Washington, the reasons for and against Italian inclusion were debated, but the idea was stressed that "a rebuff would increase Communist influence in Italy and discredit the present government and its pro-western policies."[16] More serious, however, was that the Italian issue would cause an open split between the United States and the European nations, the most dangerous of which would have been with France, which absolutely refused to be a signatory without the Italians.

As the discussions continued, their membership came to be supported by the National Security Council, the military,

and the State Department, all of whom believed that Italy was of strategic importance. Hickerson and Acheson won the domestic American struggle primarily by stressing their worries about losing anything or anyone to Soviet subversion, and even down-played Italy's strategic importance.[17] In 1949, Hickerson said that he "hated to see one of the mothers of our civilization go Communist when . . . it could be avoided." He also stated that, "We won the election [of April 1948] and I hated that to be lost by having them left out of the treaty."[18]

The U.S. policy on civil war in Italy added more emphasis to the pro-inclusion side.[19] If Italy was of strategic importance, its salvation only was also necessary. The National Security Council stated that, "If any part of Italy should fall to the Communists, the United States would stop all aid to the Communist-controlled areas, strengthen the American military establishment, bolster the U.S. military forces in the Mediterranean, provide a show of strength in non-Communist areas of Italy, and deploy U.S. forces to Sicily or Sardinia."[20] In April of 1950, they wrote that the Italian government would still need help to suppress an internal Communist insurrections and that Italy would "be expected to invoke the appropriate provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty" should this happen.[21]

The significance of American policy was two-fold. First, Italy entered the Western bloc as an original and full member. Secondly, a way had been found, not just to

keep the PCI from pushing Italy into the Soviet camp, but to keep the Communists from coming to power altogether unless they were willing to battle all of Western Europe backed by the United States. Until Italy became stronger, a treaty would protect the Christian Democrats from the PCI by giving "physical and psychological defense against internal subversion."[22] In turn, Italy's membership in NAT provided them with the security which everyone felt was necessary to accomplish economic recovery through the Marshall Plan. Italy's internal security took on international importance as a political and economic investment to be protected against communism.

For De Gasperi, gaining stability for his government was a matter of internal public security, in which the Communists were only part of the problem. There was little faith in any quarter that the police force could do its job after the war. De Gasperi's concerns are expressed in a series of recently published documents that contain communications between him and his chief of police. They also underline De Gasperi's remarkable political talents and his pragmatism.

In various documents from the 1940s and in private conferences, he expressed fear that many judges were members of the Masons. He was, however, most concerned about the extreme Right, many of whom were in control of a variety of administrative levels of government, one of which was the police force. In public, he held the Communists responsible

for the slowness with which public order was being restored in Italy, but in truth, he held the Right no less responsible. He was determined that the consolidation of the Christian Democrats' power would not be undermined by Left or Right. The elimination of only one was necessary for international support.[23]

De Gasperi and his chief of police, Ferrari, allowed a series of documents to be published which accentuated the possibility of armed struggle from the PCI. His own notes of the time suggest that he was reluctant to believe that the Communists were so short-sighted that they would risk another "tragic Greek experience." He was more concerned that the Allies feel he was "sensitive to their preoccupations" than he was convinced that the PCI intended to overthrow the State.[24] On the other hand, De Gasperi was not confident that the Communists were sincere about participating in the government without causing trouble.

For the moment, he needed to quiet the most vocally combative elements in the coalition so that its solidarity would not be compromised and allow it to begin to resolve post-war problems. He kept the Left in the government until the DC was in better control, and when it was, he could allow the full attack on the PCI to begin. The offensive would then serve his ends, both domestically and internationally.[25]

Scelba followed Ferrari as head of the police. His tenure covered the next long period of unrest, and his

efficient repression left De Gasperi free to concentrate on the struggle for allies on the outside and to work domestically to pull public opinion away from neutrality in order to lead it to outright anti-communism. De Gasperi knew that the police were essential in the initial campaign for public order against Left and Right, but that, in the long run, it would be necessary to offer an ideological alternative to both. The Church would provide a choice of traditional or "progressive" paths to a common ground.

3. The Ideology and Social Organization of Christian Government

Fascism, and the war itself, had posed new problems for catholics. One of these was the question of how they should collaborate with communists in the Resistance. The dominance of the latter in the movement threatened to equate anti-fascism and anti-catholicism, though hardly all anti-fascists were anti-capitalists. The two groups worked together until 1947 in the struggle to include Italy in the "dollar zone" and in NATO.

In the Cold War climate, the new party of Italian catholics increasingly courted an alliance with the United States and broke the links they had formed with the Left during the Resistance. Many felt this had to be done, not just for domestic political reasons, but because of the role they wanted to play in Europe's future. The Vatican prepared the ideological ground.

The Christian Democrats were born a catholic party, populist to some degree and certainly anti-communist. Many of its adherents represented a pre-capitalist social structure, so it is better termed an inter-class party than a mass one. Formally, it was anti-fascist, but it was composed of many who were still linked to the ideas and the mentality of corporativism.[26] In this way, the fascist state was absorbed into the democratic one, much as the penal code of the Rocco laws was absorbed into the Italian justice system.[27]

Several elements of papal teaching had to be changed to allow the passage to take place from pre-capitalist fascism to an Italy linked with a democratic West. Liberalism, free exchange, and even capitalism itself had been condemned by the Church for some time. The catholics' "magnificent progressive future" would have to be expressed in an anti-Soviet context rather than a capitalist one.[28]

It was necessary to construct an ideology that would salvage the Pope's "social doctrine" and authority, but that could also allow lay elements to operate without an excess of theocracy. It would also have to be the basis for popular mass catholic consensus. The alternative had to be superior to liberalism and communism. It was a complex task, and was made more difficult by the way catholics had been trained for years. There was a vacuum of political and cultural mediators with theoretical suggestions.

The solution was two-fold. First, a comprehensive catholic organization was created, centered around the Christian Democratic Party, the CISL union as well as ACLI, and Azione Cattolica. Secondly, the Vatican began to "import" the personalistic thought of such theorists as Mounier and Martian to implant into grass-roots organizations where catholics would begin to "participate."[29]

From 1947 to 1960, there was a head-on cultural and ideological encounter between pre-modern, rural, provincial, and traditional authoritarian catholicism and liberal, urban, industrial, pluralist, and democratic progressive catholicism. The "Right" of the Church was to be linked to the Vatican and predominantly rural interests that were dedicated to profit from the land, construction, real estate speculation, and off-the-books labor. The Church's "Left" would stand for worldliness and democracy and link itself to international cooperation and development. The "international Christian Democracy" would join all European Christian and Social Democratic parties, and maybe those in other parts of the world as well.[30]

These two extremes were to be able to co-exist because the innovations would take place from within traditional stands. Strictly doctrinal and dogmatic questions were moved to a realm of personal opinion and choice.[31] Thus, a "progressive" catholic had to respect those who held "natural values" so that science and technology could be developed according to their own methods rather than

according to laws of theology. It was not "progressive" to speak of catholic mathematics, but rather a catholic who was a mathematician. There was a distinction now between catholic work and work catholics did.[32] "Sacred history" still had "ultimate significance," but "profane history" was given its autonomy. No one side was to have a monopoly on truth. There were to be complementary parts of a whole. However, there were no clear points to unite or synthesize the two sides. It has never been decided exactly what rapport exists for the catholics between "natural" values and "supernatural" ones.[33]

Theology became political when it was used as the basis for the relationship between religious and democratic authority. For Leo XIII and Pius XI, conflict had been "bad." The "progressive" catholic took the theme of "common good" which was already present and claimed that certain types of social conflict could exist and could be "good" if they served certain social functions. It is possible for two communities to have needs and aims that they partly share, but nevertheless to come in conflict with each other. The emergence of the conflict, rather than its suppression, is a sign of enlightenment. The conflict can then be institutionalized to allow an entity superior to the two forces facing each other to bring back harmony and peace. The superior who would alleviate conflict and condition peace was necessary, according to the "progressive" catholic, to safeguard the "common good."[34]

The traditional values can be partially summarized and seen next to their corresponding "progressive" idea in the following table, which is admittedly much oversimplified:[35]

TRADITIONAL	"PROGRESSIVE"
1) Dominance of supernatural	1) Autonomous natural values
2) History is sacred	2) History is profane
3) The evangelical mission of the Christian	3) The civilizing purpose of all believers
4) Monolithic doctrine	4) Pluralism
5) Doctrinal dogmatism	5) Religious liberty
6) Authority	6) Democracy
7) Priority of common good over the personal	7) The autonomy of the lay person within the community; i.e., personalism
8) Predominant role for clergy	8) Laic autonomy
9) Society as a "social body"	9. Society as a group of communities that need regulation
10) Anti-conflictuality and the necessity of harmony among social classes	10) The possibility of conflict to be resolved within the idea of what is accepted to be the "common good"

The encounter between the two affected not just the four major organizations of catholic government, but also all Italian institutions and the relations between them. The principle that the catholic groups had in common, whether party, union, or auxiliary organization, was inter-classism, which was used as an organizational formula to

oppose the idea of conflicting class interests. To link them together, they were given a single superior task.

The inter-classism of the Christian Democratic party was to mix the interests of industry, agriculture, and the service sector; Southerners and Northerners; contadini and urbanites; older classes and newer ones; those concerned with international cooperation; and those concerned with the internal market.

The inter-classism of CISL was based on the idea of creating an "American-type" industrial union that could help replace liberalism with democratic planning. ACLI was based on the feeling that it was necessary to define the nature of a "Christian presence" in the sphere of labor. It was important to take some of the action away from the communists and help relaunch the religious "social formation" of the worker.[36]

Azione Cattolica's reinstitutionalization was based on mass participation at all levels of the society. It was dedicated to religious education and the social preparation of all for participation in the administration of power. It promoted priestly assistance and ecclesiastical activities. Its basic unit of action was and still is the parish, the local entity most easily adaptable in terms of becoming a participatory institution. It was already a community's social center. All that remained was to give it more organization.

Tasks were allotted on the basis of three criteria. Division was according to role, such as masculine or feminine. Social functions were determined by age: children, youth, or mature groups. Finally, there were a series of sections based on category, sort of a participatory corporativism: catholic women, catholic teachers, catholic college graduates, or catholic employers, for instance.

It is particularly through Azione Cattolica that traditional catholicism continued to be taught in Sunday School, in catechism class, and through which it went on being the common denominator for instruction in elementary schools. Azione Cattolica taught the values by which legitimate Christian action was judged, based on the authority of the Pope in a hierarchical Church. Thus, tradition still governed such daily matters as matrimony and sexual relations, and the Gospel continued to be "the book" in which a rural Christian, especially, was expected to find the solution to his every problem.[37]

Progressive catholicism came to be taught only in socially and intellectually privileged sectors of society, giving it different functions than what was taught to "the people." It was often heard that, "We can say these things among ourselves because we understand each other, but not to 'them.'" There was a double standard of preaching and teaching, one broad with a traditional basis and the other selective, restricted, and cultivated. The first was intended to maintain popular religiosity, its rites and

forms. The second was to promote social change and to imbue religious knowledge with a rational understanding of reality. The tendency then was for the "progressive" catholic to look down on and fight "superstition" and traditional rites, which came to be seen as being embodied especially in the rural life and people of Italy.[38]

In the same way that the Italian language became a required subjected in schools, both in order to combat the variety of languages and dialects spoken at a local level and to break down sub-nationalism, so the job of "progressive" catholicism was to scale-down localist positions. It was to impose itself as the religion of the modernized, industrialist Italy that was truly a part of Europe.

If the message of the Church reached the people through auxiliary organizations, it was the catholic press that linked the various levels of the hierarchy together. A recent study of various issues covered in print states that, "Because catholics were by far the majority of the population, every position they took could not help but be known by the majority of the people."[39]

This did not mean that there was ever homogeneity of opinion. Lay organizations were carefully watched by the catholic press, and they often expressed different opinions. In Friuli, many papers began by rejecting the idea of a clerical party and regretted that priests were not abstaining from political activity, though they suggested great caution in "judging non-christian parties."[40] Understood

behind these admonitions, however, was the need for a single unified Catholic party, preferably one descended from the Partito Popolare.[41]

Not surprisingly, the catholic press followed the directives of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the proposals of catholic lay organizations, and those of the government. The latter allowed it censorship privileges without protest.[42] This was done particularly because the hierarchy felt it was necessary to control the clergy as well as their flocks, as many of their opinions were far from Vatican ideals.

Some members of Azione Cattolica had been raised to be leaders under fascism and were not sure that it was necessary to legitimate the party of De Gasperi, even though it had been founded with the Vatican's support. Most of Azione Cattolica, however, were surprised by the statements of a few in the Church hierarchy who wanted to convince people that the "new order" was not to be brought about "by the communists or the fascists."[43] The variety of opinions is too vast to document here, but allowing a great number fulfilled a precise function as the catholic press, the Church, and its organizations played their part in Friuli-Venezia Giulia's post-war politics.

4. Friuli-Venezia Giulia as a Testing-ground for Polarization: The Electoral Battle of 1948

a. The International Setting

Because of its location as the border territory with the East, there were some differences between what happened there and in the rest of Italy. The unity of the Resistance that had been fought for so hard was quickly broken up. Here, more than elsewhere, the Christian Democrats resisted mediation. The CLN in the Provinces went on meeting out of force of habit. ACLI's growth took away from other unions, and the clergy, early on, agreed to join the "front line" of the Cold War.

The region that first had partisans in the mountains and where the Resistance first became a mass movement was also the first to be "restored." In part, this explains the weakness of their worker's movement in later years, the suspicion with which discussions of democracy are greeted, and the people's isolated "pluralism." In the post-war years, the State itself became the one which had to be fought, replacing the "owner," the "boss," or the traditional "padrone."[45]

What is also unique about Friuli is that it became part of the ideological as well as geographical line between East and West. The border problems between Yugoslavia and Italy, which had begun with the drawing of lines after the First World War, were increased by the seemingly arbitrary division of or forced coexistence of two very different ethnic

groups. Slavs and Friulani were unequally distributed, especially in the countryside, and every claim that one was more numerous than the other in a particular area raised protests from the minority. This became more true under fascism, as nationalist propaganda was pushed and the ethnic balance was consciously altered.[46]

At the center of the territorial contest was Trieste, a mostly Italian city even if it does not think of itself as one, with a fine natural port that had been the center of Austrian trade since the 1700s. After it was dismembered, its economic value was still high and justified the claims made on it by a young Yugoslavia that wanted to use it as its trading center with Central and Eastern Europe.

At the end of World War II, the People's Republic of Yugoslavia, strong in its new nationhood after having beaten both German and Italian troops, claimed Zara, the Istrian Peninsula, Fiume (or Rieka), and Trieste, along with the entire region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. If these demands had been met, Italy's boundaries would have been returned to the lines of 1915.

Yugoslavia's claim was strong, not just because of her army, but also because, after the German surrender, she had held the territory for 45 days. Subsequently, after an agreement was made on zones of occupation with the English and American troops which had also arrived in Trieste, the Yugoslavs reluctantly pulled back to the Morgan Line that ran only a few kilometers from Trieste and left it under

Allied Military Government. The occupation zone assigned to the Yugoslavs was all of Istria, though not the city of Pola, and little of the rest of Venezia-Giulia. It was a temporary solution. The final decisions would be made at the treaty talks; preconditioned, however, by Yugoslavia's advantageous position.[47]

From an Italian point of view, the demands were irreconcilable. De Gasperi explained his ideas to U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes in a letter of August 22. He proposed the Wilson Line as the basis on which to divide the territory, the line which President Wilson had suggested as an alternative to what Italy had been assigned in 1919 at the Treaty of London. At least this took the ethnic factors into account, even if it left 80,000 Italians to Yugoslavia. De Gasperi tried to include cultural and linguistic guarantees for them in his proposal. Territorially, this was all in favor of Italy, allowing them to keep most of Istria and their rich bauxite mines. In Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the changes he suggested were of little importance, even if they favored Yugoslavia. He felt it was necessary, however, that the cities of Fiume and Zara maintain their autonomy.[48]

The negotiated solution was long and difficult. Italy was not allowed to participate, which increased the concern, particularly of the people in the disputed areas. De Gasperi and others did all they could, from making energetic proposals to conducting direct discussions with Yugoslavia. Tito and Togliatti met in November of 1946. The latter

obtained Trieste in exchange for Gorizia. The Goriziani were outraged and called the deals the "nefasta propospta di baratto," or "the evilly bartered proposal." In any case, it was rejected by the Italian government, and Togliatti, who was then Minister of Justice, was accused off trying to substitute PCI initiatives for state ones. Differences were accentuated in the Council of Ministers, and debate became bitter. Rome's last attempt to take the fate of Trieste out of Allied hands was with the suggestions of a plebescite. This was not acceptable, either.[49]

In March of 1946, a four-party commission had been sent to study the situation in the Northeast. Their task was to take all opposing needs into consideration and find a solution acceptable to all four powers. Not surprisingly, they were unable to come up with a common formulation, and each member presented his own. The Soviets accommodated almost all the Yugoslavian demands. The English and American proposals were not very different from each other, but the latter favored Italy slightly more than did the British. The French suggestion was especially sensitive to ethnic factors, and it is this plan which shaped the final decision after more protests from the Soviets, Americans, and English were heard. Trieste was then taken out of the contest. It was to be made into a free territory under the United Nations' administration. Both the Yugoslavs and the Italians were against the idea, but for the moment it seemed the only thing to do.[50]

After more difficulties, a provisional government was adopted and Trieste was divided into Zone A, which included the city itself and which was to be under English-American rule, and Zone B, which was all of Istria and was run by the Yugoslavian military. This systemization was intended to be very temporary, but it remained this way for seven years, until October of 1954. In the meantime, the peace treaty only partially resolved the problem of the rest of the border and still left open the question of Trieste's final destination. The rest of the solution would depend on the evolution of domestic and international politics. Relations with Yugoslavia and Italy became more bitter over time and often the tension was dangerous.[51]

Among all the subjects of the peace treaty--the military, restitutions, Alto Adige, the western frontiers, and the colonies--the most disturbing struggle was over Trieste and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. They were hard on the people of the region and on all the Italian people, especially those who had fought on and for the territory in the First World War. Many sacrifices seemed to have been made in vain. They maintained the hope that Trieste would be returned, but in the meantime, the issue would be exploited by interests and parties, especially on the borderlines of electoral districts. For Friuli in particular, which was trying to rebuild, not just physically but psychologically as well, it was a profoundly negative experience. Using a variety of

local newspapers and accounts of the time, it is worthwhile reviewing some of the developments and actors.

b. The Allied Military Government

By the time the Allied Military Government, or AMG, arrived, the power of the local CLN had already been considerably reduced. The Christian Democrats had absolutely refused to give it parity and were stubbornly opposed to the spread of an alternative mass organization. Neither the DC nor the CLN could refuse to give the full governing powers to the AMG, but the Christian Democrats did not really resist, either.[52]

Until September 16, 1947, the AMG controlled the local press. Only a specific number of papers were allowed to be published and there was careful censorship of those. No paper ever published an unkind word about the AMG.

Every community was required to send its yearly budget proposal to the Command and then have it checked again every three months. Gatherings and election lists were also monitored. Local candidates all had to have AMG approval.

It also interfered in protests and union negotiations. Fear of the Left and the fact that the AMG talked mostly to prefects and bishops perhaps kept the military leaders from being aware that they were preventing the political participation of a people who desired a part in influencing their own future. They had fought hard to be able to do so. Thus, the Friulani resented the fact that anti-fascist unity

had been broken up by the Allies, who were afraid of the links between the Yugoslavian and the Italian Resistance.

At best, the Friulani saw the AMG as a paternal force which was expensive and uncomfortable to maintain. Many felt that those resources should have been going to reconstruction, because the worst burden to the area was not the Allies but the conditions under which the people of the Region lived. Rebuilding would take time, but first it had to be decided who was in charge of the future.

c. Organization of the Urban-Rural Division: The Christian Democrats, ACLI, and the Coldiretti

In Friuli, local administrative elections took place throughout 1946 and 1947. Of the first 66 communities that voted, the Christian Democrats took control of 30; the Popular Republicans, 29; the Socialists, 3; and four were run by Independents. By the next elections, when 96 communities voted, the DC gained 52 towns; the Republicans, 26; the Socialists, 7; and the Independents, 10. By the summer of 1947, the Socialists and Republicans had combined their list and gained nine of the 20 communities that held elections then; the Independents gained 7; and the DC, only 4.[53]

Typical of all these elections were the maneuvers that took place in the cities of Udine and Pordenone. In the first, a pre-election accord was made to form a three-party

coalition to follow the national pattern. There was to be a Socialist mayor, and the town council was to include four members from the Christian Democrats, two from the PCI, and two from the PSI. The PCI and the PSI had agreed to vote for the DC, which used blank ballots and gained the post of mayor for itself. The Left was irate, but there was little it could do. In Pordenone, the PSI and the PCI had maintained separate lists. With those votes split, the DC managed to gain control by a slim margin, however, they still had to work with the Left.[54]

Just before the last group of these elections, De Gasperi had gone to the United States to negotiate a loan, and the socialists had split into the PSI and the PSLI (later the PSDI). By the end of that month, De Gasperi had formed his third cabinet, still in coalition with the Left, and on May 13, just before the last of these elections, his fourth. The national government was in full crisis. It was then time for the attack on the Left to begin.

In Friuli, all the elections were complicated by the issue of local autonomy for the Region. The question was whether it should be legislatively as well as administratively independent from Rome or not. In January of that year, the Popular Movement for an Autonomous Friuli had been founded by the DC, with such intellectuals as Pasolini playing an important part in its beginnings.[55]

On this issue, the Left miscalculated. At first, it had not been very interested in the voting at all. After

May 1947, it came out against regional autonomy, offending the strong nationalist feelings of many Friulani.

By July, all parties seemed to back the autonomy movement, even though national boundaries were not yet decided. The PCI voted for it on the grounds that Friuli was a mixed linguistic and ethnic area. The outcry was immediate: it was not possible to have a Slavic or language "problem" until the border questions were settled. In order to quickly subdue the flood of reaction, the PCI and the DC voted together that local parties had no competence to decide on Friuli's autonomy. In October of 1947, the entire question was temporarily suspended.[56] The time of their work together was about to end.

In the meantime, the Christian Democratic leaders had been busily organizing the consensus of the Friulan people. They tried appealing to all groups, continuing to use Azione Cattolica, of which most of them had been members during the years of fascism. Most of the important Party office holders had been leaders of Catholic Youth groups and thus also AC dignitaries. Their guiding principle was the avoidance of conflict with political adversaries; they simply defended their own values in local publications and organizations.[57]

Most of the Christian Democrats' opinions were expressed through the same channels, though some felt the Party lost much of its original character as it tried to appeal to everyone. It was usually former Azione members

who tried hardest to maintain some of their differences with the DC. One leader said, "Only when we stop considering the Party as the result of various orientations in an electoral body and of interests dependent on various clientele will the DC be a living movement." Another felt it was "absolutely necessary to exclude those from the DC who have become traitors to its social and universal ends and its anti-Communist function out of personal interest."[58]

It is exactly this last function of anti-communism around which the fiercest struggles took place in Friuli. The use of anti-Slovenian and anti-Yugoslavian propaganda was heaviest there, resulting in extreme isolation for the PCI and a very rightist orientation for the DC. The Slovenian minority was not recognized, and the campaign became an excuse for old fascists to return, leaving little room for the support of many of those who had been strongly anti-fascist.[59]

Part of the anti-communist drive centered itself on bilingualism and nationalism. The people of the border areas were terribly poor and needed the help the DC and the Church offered. The Slavs and Croatians were organized into the pro-Italian Tricolor Movement. Its members were given butter only if they took guns to fight their brother Slavs on the other side of the border. The idea behind the Tricolor was that the real fascists were the communists. The DC wrote: "We believe that a fifth column of Nazi-Fascists is already in operation, who propose to demonstrate

that a liberal and democratic regime is impossible. These men have gone from being Fascist to extremists and we must fear them."[60] Another article in the same issue of Il Nuovo Friuli, the voice of the local DC, said that, "The real Fascists are the Communists because of the reign of terror they have installed."[61] The Tricolor Movement was to stop infiltration at the border, wherever that was, and in the east of Friuli, nationalism became a weapon of the Right.

Another violent ideological campaign was launched using prisoners of war who were returning from Russia, many of whom had been partisans or members of the Alpine troops from Friuli. During 1945 and 1946, the Vatican sponsored trains that took them home by way of all Italy so that their testimonies could be heard. "Rather than live among the Russians, I would rather die of hunger with the Germans!" Or, "I have never seen a more satanic and brutal coldness than I saw in the Soviets. The Germans are by far superior."[62]

Given such an atmosphere, other Christian Democratic policies are not surprising. Concerning strikes, the DC publication wrote: "In a society which is in order, the strike is absurd and abnormal, a rebellion against order. . . . Whoever is for social progress must want the abolition of the strike."[63]

On labor questions, the DC worked through ACLI, which had been created specifically to counter-balance the socialist and communist unions. It was to give professional

training, but mostly political direction. Workers used it to get help in resolving all manner of post-war problems with the bureaucracy.

In Friuli, however, the acceptance of ACLI and its growth were slow until the CLN was out of commission. Only then could it begin to draw all categories of unions together. By the elections of June 1946, 32 members of ACLI were elected to the Constituent Assembly. At that time, their discourse with the Left became more intense. At first, the DC and the PCI claimed that ACLI was interfering with the solidarity of the CGIL, but as ACLI's mobilization increased, it drew closer to the DC.

The break with the CGIL came in 1948, and Carry of the American CIO was at the next big ACLI reunion, guaranteeing funds from the United States. The strike which took place after the attempt on the life of Togliatti was used as the final excuse to organize catholic workers through the ACLI, rather than the CGIL. ACLI could depend on the catholic network of parishes and work places for mobilization.[64]

For the agricultural population, there were other plans. During the Resistance, a program had been published promising an extension of credit, the promotion of more cooperatives, and a series of land reforms. The DC's plans for reconstruction intended to change the braccianti into mezzadri and small holders in order "to create a healthy class of small independent landowners."[65] The program

suggested the promotion of these categories as a way to promote "social stability and Christian values."

The DC supported administrative decentralization and presumed that agrarian reform meant the breakup of holdings only where there was an obvious monopoly by owners who blocked the sale of land. The Party in Friuli leaned heavily on the themes of private property and its defense, connecting this issue to its anti-communist campaign, especially near election time: the trend, however, was strong even in 1945.

The DC's Il Nuovo Friuli stated that it was "a basic communist principle to abolish private property and transform it into collective state property as they do in Russia. Provisionally you are given a limited and insufficient amount of personal and family property, but everything you need to produce and earn will belong to the government." The small owners were impressed by the message and the Coldiretti, the union formed for direct cultivators, organized the consensus.[66]

The constitution of the Coldiretti states that their purpose is to "balance the Left's preponderance among the industrial workers."[67] An issue of La Vita Cattolica, one of the Vatican's voices, in 1945 described what the organization would do. It would serve "as a go-between for the State and all variety of rural interest rather than have autonomous groups." The offices would be like that of any organization, but would also include ecclesiastical

counselors. It would have its own publications and "control assistance funds for farmers" and all important branches of the Federconsorzi. "The power of 'bonomiana' (after the name of the first and only head of the Coldiretti, until he named Lo Bianco his successor in 1980) will extend to the point where it will link itself with a majority of DC leaders."[68] In Friuli, the Coldiretti arrived in June of 1945 and claimed they were there "to make the small landowners' suffering and prayers worthwhile." Through the parishes, immediate help was given in the form of everything from credit to work shoes.[69]

There was not an extensive problem with large landowners in most of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, as there was, for instance, in the South. It would only have been around the mezzadri and the braccianti that the PCI could have organized a firm stand against the DC's and the Coldiretti's resources. If one considers the violent anti-communist campaign on the border issue, the defense of private property, the weight of the clergy, and the AMG, there was little room for the PCI to do much at all in Friuli. They continued to have support in the Bassa, but that was the area's tradition. They gained ground only where they made careful analyses of local farming conditions, but this did not happen often.[70]

The socialists were suspicious of alliances with the mezzadri and braccianti because "they do not want to be owners." The socialist paper, Avanti, claimed that the

Party had to "help them get out of their egotism and their backward spirit" and went on to compare the small owner to a waiter in a grand hotel "who is in a hurry to dress in tails and delude himself that he is the equal to the gentleman in evening clothes whom he is serving."[71] This elitist stand did not help them gain support of any but the rural landlords.

Beyond recognizing the need for private initiative, the Liberal Party and the Partito d'Azione had no particular policy on agriculture. Rossi-Doria of Azione was an important theorist of agriculture, but his party had little influence in rural areas. Thus, the field was open for the Christian Democrats. The next issue they had to tackle was agrarian contracts.[72]

In Friuli, the agrarian contracts had been more favorable to the farmer before the years of fascism than during them. The De Gasperi and Segni laws of 1946, which tried to limit the landlords' powers of negotiation, strengthened the DC's position as a party for the contadini. The landlords and those who had bigger farms and needed to hire bracciante help from time to time were not pleased. The DC berated the landlords and told them they were wrong to oppose better contracts, but agreed with them that the use of mass demonstrations and strikes to obtain better contracts was wrong.[73]

The Christian Democrats stepped up their campaign to divide the city and countryside, claiming that the former

had had a hard time during the war while the latter had tended to enrich itself at the city's expense. By the end of 1946, the DC sided with the landlords by saying that the demands of "those rich braccianti for bread and work were provocations." Frustration mounted in the countryside when it seemed that the contracts for the mezzadri were not to be reformed. The papers of the time warn of increasing rural tension. Many mezzadri were afraid of being put off the land. The landlords remained firm. The DC's press claimed that owners were making up lists of those whose contracts would not be renewed.[74] The DC and the landlords had agreed that:

> We must force a large number of farmers to go to centers of technological specialization by aiding the emigration of families and promoting the systematization of new farms through land improvements. The problem of the mezzadri does not exist. It is simply a social institution. We now have the liberty to move mezzadria families around with the logic of economic productivity in mind. We must also remember that the final objective for us is to raise the material and moral level of the rural Italian masses.[75]

Looking at the total economic picture of the time, one is more likely to say that the struggles of the braccianti were simply to obtain a decent level of living. For those who had jobs, salaries were higher that they had been, but inflation quickly eroded those gains. In 1946, they had gotten pay parity with an industrial worker, but after the elections of 1948, the DC raised the whole question of parity once again.

We will see that the strikes in Friuli's Bassa after 1948 had the support of local industry and of other rural and urban organizations, including the mezzadria, but police retaliation was also heavy; Police Chief Scelba is still infamous there. In the end, the braccianti retained some parity and a few benefits, but after 1948, jobs for them began to disappear.

The resolution of the braccianti struggle came about as urban industrial development drew workers elsewhere. The story is best told in figures for Friuli. In 1951, there were 163,000 braccianti in the region. By 1961, there were 83,000. In 1971, there were only 41,660 left.[76]

Among other reasons for the disappearance of the braccianti was that landlords preferred mezzadria to bracciante labor, as the former lived on the land they farmed, and contracts with them did not include wages. In many ways the mezzadria was "easier to handle" than the braccianti, so it is not surprising that the DC hoped the braccianti would be the first to leave the land and find industrial work and leave farming to others.

d. The Vatican Backs a Winner

Before the Republic had been decided upon, Azione Cattolica backed the Monarchy. After the reform of the AC in 1946, it was prepared to back the Christian Democrats. According to its new statutes of that year, one had to have the recommendation of a bishop to be a member, and Azione's

job was "to recover society's religiosity by helping, instructing, and propagandizing against, confronting, and defeating social communism."[77]

1947 was a year when every corner of society felt push from many organizations to bring about an electoral victory for the DC. The variety of associations was enormous. A cinema commission was formed to raise money from catholic theater owners. There was an organization formed to guide and counsel young female domestics, who then made contributions from their salaries to the campaign after their group had found them good jobs. ACLI sorted people into groups of workers and emigrants, with parallel associations for women and artisans. To be a member of any of them, one needed to be a catholic and a non-communist. A cooperative union for farmers was started whose by-laws stated that a member could not be a communist or part of their DC-run union if they were also a member of the PCI's National League of Cooperatives. The president and director had to be catholic and were subject to controls by the clergy, ACLI, the Coldiretti, and the DC.[78]

The organization's Hon. Cimenti wrote to Monsignor Bosco that, "In order to have quick success, we must not follow the system the Communists use to form cooperatives. They try to monopolize commerce, agriculture and industry through massive organization where the individual is lost and private initiative suppressed."[79]

In turn, Bosco wrote to suggest that there be an edition of the catholic paper Avvenire especially for Friuli. "It can be your newspaper," he said, "through which you can enter all local discussions and it can become a propaganda instrument for the future electoral battle."[80] Instead, it was decided to pool resources and use the locally run Il Popolo. By the end of 1947, all the real powers of the DC in the region had access to it, and still do.

With confidence in their ability to influence society through the parishes and auxiliary organizations, the DC began to arrange the financing of its political campaign. On the 8th of February, 1948, the National Civic Committee had been formally founded. In Friuli, it had been at work since the end of 1946 "to prepare a good practical economic, cultural, worker-oriented plan of assistance." It was not "to be just a political battle, but one of faith."[81] The Catholic Civic Committee, or CC as it will be called, was to have political responsibility for the Christian Democrat's electoral battle. The choice of the candidates was up to the DC, but had to be approved first by catholic "forces, among them the CC."[82]

The Civic Committee heads were to consist of two chosen by the DC, two from the Catholic Movement, and a fifth to be agreed on by all. The CC was to be independent in all technical and propaganda matters, but would support the DC in "all the ways where they take a stand for the religious

and moral values of Catholics." Then they drew up a plan of direct and indirect actions to take for thorough organization and financing.[83]

Religious initiatives included prayer cards linking the sign of the cross with the spot where one was to make an X on the ballot. There were local and regional pilgrimages in which the people would sing as they walked up a mountain to the shrine, "Oh, lord, save me from the satanic communists."[84] Then there would be a visit to the region of the beloved Madonna of Lourdes. A whole year of prayers and planning were invested in that "sacred voyage," called the "Crociata Mariana," in which the virtues of motherhood featured prominently.[85]

During some of these initiatives, the relations between the Catholic Movement and the DC came under stress. Catholic priests saw politics as a way to deepen and increase the practice of religion. The politicians saw religious practice as a way to guarantee themselves their politics. The Church admitted, however, that only the DC merited religious support, and only through their victory could Christianity be fostered.[86]

The Dioceses made predictions for the vote-to-come based on the elections of 1946 and from them drew up the election lists. These, in turn, were used to strengthen the organization of voter turn-out from every parish and to increase financing. Lotteries were widely used, which brought cries from Left and Right that the Church was

exploiting the poor. The catholic press then accused both groups of planning armed coups, an accusation which brought more funds to help from the United States. Americans of Italian descent also wrote to family and friends, sent money and gifts, and urged the Friuliani not to vote for "the Communists."[87]

Another effort pleaded for "help for the priests in the mountains who live in deplorable poverty," the same ones who lived in the border zones and worked with the Tricolor Movement. The "object of the help was the defense of the Italianization being carried out by them in these areas." Of the 2,000,000 lire given, the clergy of the hill zones received 514,000, and the rest went into the political campaign.[88]

The campaigners were given strict instructions about how political debate was to be carried out. Lay people were "to avoid being polemical or irritating. Be serene and optimistic. For the arm of irritation, substitute smiles and songs. Avoid arguing with those who contradict you. Dismantle our adversaries. Don't make enemies of them."[89] Priests were to do all they could "to intensify the religious attention and practice of the flock." As the Bishop said in a circular of March 1948, "Be serene and, I would say, humorously superior to electoral passions."[90]

However, messages from the pulpit were clear. To abstain from voting was not only irresponsible, it was sinful. The message was often couched in sermons concerning

the violence of the Russians and the Yugoslavians, reports of persecutions in Prague, the suicide of Masarik, the lack of liberty and the treatment of catholic bishops in the East, and the number of people fleeing from Communism. The clergy let no one forget the unpaid war debts and the prisoners who had not yet been returned, especially the group of 15,000 Alpine troops from Friuli which had not yet come back from Russia. A popular election poster pictured the sad face of one of them saying, "Mama, vote for me."[91]

The rest of the campaign was based on specific criticism of one's adversary. The Left attacked American assistance, sounded overly self-confident, and openly made personal and uncomplimentary remarks about priests. This only further inspired the Church to put everything they had into a total confrontation. According to the Church in Friuli, the DC won there "because of Masarik's suicide, De Gasperi's authentic electoral duel with Togliatti to prove who really guaranteed liberty, Scelba and his police force who brought efficient legal order and security to the people, and Einaudi and Pella, who convinced everyone that a financial solution had been found." That was also the precise order of their importance in the DC's victory, according to the Church.[92]

Voting results for the Province of Udine contrasting 1946 and 1948 show just how successful the campaign was.[93]

	1946	1948	
DC	46.0%	56.9%	
PSI	31.4%	14.8%	Socialist Union
PCI	13.8%	20.8%	Democratic Popular Front

The DC gained votes from the Right and from the Socialists after the Saragat split. Togliatti was not unhappy, he said, with the cut into Socialist support that the PCI made. The Communists became secure as the second largest party in Italy, while realizing that they had to be both nationalist and Italian in order to get the votes. In any case, it was not clear that the international situation would have let them win, nor did they ever really suggest what they would do if they had.[94]

On the other side, so much of the "catholic spirit" that was thrown into the political-religious campaign came from the confusing and changing ideology of the Church. The victory of a DC supported by the Vatican was filled with equivocations and contradictions. Eventually, the Church would find itself politically accountable for having helped the DC to victory. The people who believed most faithfully in the Church's sincerity and promises of social justice also had the highest hopes for the future. These populist Christians would be subject to disappointment before the liberals, the conservatives or the leftists would be. In the meantime, if the voting results were less dramatic than expected for the DC, considering the resources invested, the Vatican could be well pleased with the clergy of Friuli-

Venezia Giulia and its people, who were clearly divided between Left and Right.

B. Agriculture as an Industrial "Reflex": The Politics of "Polpa" and "Ossa," or, Let them Emigrate!

1. The Development Debate in Rome

While the Allied troops were invading the South between 1943 and 1944, regions of the Center and the North remained under the control of the Germans, who restored many fascist leaders to their former positions; whereas the Allies usually insisted on changes in personnel and symbols. In the North, and for a time in the Center, anti-fascist organization had wide support. The contadini were increasingly involved in guerilla warfare or supportive strikes. In the South they had begun to resist authority, whether it was the administration (for the amassing of grain) or the old landlords. The social dynamic in both areas remained in turmoil.

However, the situation in the countryside was rarely of more than marginal concern to the parties in Rome. They seemed to agree only that something needed to be done, but were cautious about initiating any structural reforms. From the South there were contradictory pushes, some from the contadini and others from the landowners. It is not surprising that there were conflicting provisions as a result. In December of 1943, Badoglio liberalized the sales of pork, wine and potatoes, and raised the prices to be paid for grain and vegetable oil collections. This was done especially to "quiet the contadini."[95]

Inspired by the same desire were the Gullo laws which permitted the takeover of lands that were "not cultivated or were improperly cultivated." Seven months later, in May of 1945, only 15,000 hectares had been assigned. At an economic convention of the same year, the PCI's Ruggero Grieco suggested that the law had been passed "more for the lawyers than for the contadini."[96]

Another decree was designed to adjust agrarian contracts by stipulating that a landlord who offered only the land for rent -- no tools, seed, house or livestock -- could demand only one-fifth of the produce. It was a big change, but it took years before both landlords and contadini would accept it, especially in the South.

In the North, where the Resistance was expected to mediate rural interests, structural innovations were set aside. This did not stop the mezzadri and the braccianti, especially in Emilia, from developing demands that were considerably more radical than most of the CLN coalition would be able to support.[97]

There was little action from Rome, but with time, discussions accumulated and touched on everything in the countryside from social relationships to infrastructure which needed to be "remodeled". The directors of change were not in agreement about the methods, especially while they were confronted with physical and economic disaster of vast proportions.

Though it was difficult to measure the extent of the damage the war wrought on agriculture. In a report by the Organization of Industrialists, Confindustria, in 1947, the value of loss was put at about 400 million lire.[98] This was only the direct structural damage to houses, trees, barns, irrigation and food processing factories. Indirect damage was noted but not calculated. For example, there were crops left unharvested due to lack of labor and much livestock had been confiscated.

The North's grain crop yield dropped from 33 million quintals in 1944, to 19 in 1945; the South's, from 11.6 to 8. At 9.3 quintals yield per hectare, the peninsula hit its lowest average since the beginning of the century.[99] As production diminished, prices went up as did the rate of inflation, to levels that had never been known before. Market prices increased 33% between 1939 and 1946, 35% for agricultural products. Again, as in 1919 and 1920, there was talk of the contadini having enriched themselves.

There were still price controls in 1946, though evasion of these and of enforced collections was widespread. Whereas 50% of the grain crop was collected in 1942-1943, only 26% was taken in 1945-46. Oil collection in the same years dropped from 70% to 33%. The reasons for this are many, but one incentive for evasion was the high price these products brought on the black market.[100]

An inquest in 1946 was aimed at finding out how the profits from such a "free market" were being used, and who

was really benefiting. Most rural profits were reinvested in the farm, though considering the state to which agriculture had been reduced for lack of tools and fertilizer, it was not surprising that the grain production was down anyway. What most all participants in the conference noted was the growth of savings in rural banks, though these were attributed more to the large and medium-sized landholders than to the small contadini.[101]

Panel members worried over the lack of land sales, which was attributed by some to the new state of well-being enjoyed in the countryside. "Even among the braccianti, the use of bicycles is now widespread," said one participant though doubt was expressed that such a trend could be maintained. If the braccianti salary was 18% to 20% higher in 1946 than it had been in 1936, the cost of basic necessities was, too. One member of the group summed up the complexity of the situation well.

> "One can say that both the improvement and the worsening of conditions are dependent on the same cause, the high price of agricultural products. Where ever it is possible to produce more than is needed for survival, collection evasions and the black market flourish. Instead, where land is scarce or poor, the minimum for existence is hardly satisfied and the rural folk must search everywhere for the means to live and work on their small farms. These are the victims of the same black market that brings comfort and sometimes wealth to others."[102]

After the exceptional fall in agricultural production of 1945, the next year showed some recovery. It was in 1946 that questions about prospectives for agriculture were transferred to the political arena, although these were

almost always subordinated to other issues. Reconstruction was essentially an industrial fact, though all the parties of Parri's government, except the Liberals, proposed agricultural reforms. The PCI suggested "the liquidation of large absentee holdings, the limitation of large capitalist property, a profound reform of agrarian contracts, and defense of small and medium-sized holdings." The Partito d'Azione and the socialists held analogous positions.[103]

The Christian Democrats proposed increasing the diffusion of small peasant holdings and wanted to facilitate the transfer of land into the cultivator's hands. This was to help eliminate the idea that there were indeed land monopolies. For others, such as salaried agricultural workers "whose needs keep them from having access to the land," the DC suggested a collaborative formula only slightly different from one they proposed for the mezzadria. Increasing the farmer's participation in decision-making for the land would eventually guarantee a "dignified way of life for each contadino family."[104]

Endless commissions, inquests and conferences followed the proposals. Everyone continued to claim that reforms were inevitable, though large landholders, not surprisingly, sustained a limited range of possible changes which were acceptable to them. Some were willing to discuss the abuse of property; others found it impossible to admit that land monopolies even existed. Agricultural experts, such as Eliseo Janolo, who had been a colleague of Serpieri during

the fascist years, felt it was "probably the large landholders who would best be able to use the means which will render agriculture industrialized."[105] This expectation applied to a small portion of owners at the time.

A superficial glance at the figures suggests a great diffusion of small holders in Italy, but only 39.8% of the

Size of landholding	Number of owners	%	Percent of total agrarian land surface farmed by various methods
less than ½ hectare	5,000,000	53%	39.8% direct cultivators
avg 1 hectare	2,800,000	30%	29.4% mezzadria
2 to 25 (average 5.5)	1,470,000	15.9%	16% rented
25 to 11 (average 45.5)	89,200	c.1%	15.8% extensively farmed
100+ (average 260)	21,400	c.1%	

productive agricultural land was held by them. The rest was in the hands of owners who were usually not farmers. 44.4% of the usable land was parcelled out to mezzadria, or simply rented. Only the remainder could be extensively farmed. Liguria, Campania, Piedmont, Abruzzo and Molise were regions where holdings were consistently small. Larger farms were usually found in Tuscany, Lazio, Umbria, Puglia, Basilicata and Calabria. Everywhere else -- the Islands, Emilia, Marche, the Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia -- complex

situations existed. Small properties were widespread, but coexisting with latifondia were the most fragmented and minute plots.[106]

For each land tenure form and combination of forms, there were a variety of agrarian contracts. Time-spans and obligations were often different, but the biggest gap was between those that required a single crop and those that required many products from a family. Whichever type, the family's income was usually less than that of a bracciante. Thus, the family was pressed to grow more for themselves on what land was not required for the market products in order to survive. If there were extra hands available, they were sent to find day-labor in other fields and swelled the ranks of the braccianti. The experts formed a picture of Italy in which there were islands of capitalist agriculture in a vast sea of a subsistence rural economy.[107]

In 1946, Paolo Bonomi, who became more important over time as head of the National Confederation of Cultivators, or Coldiretti, favored a structural reform that would be flexible and differentiated enough to increase the formation of small landholdings. The State would be required to invest heavily. He supported his argument by saying that the land occupations of 1921-22 had failed because the farmers had been deserted by political leaders. For the present, he felt that expropriation would cause problems for the national budget if the landlord were paid full value, nor was it fair to strip him of his assets either.

Therefore, since straight-forward land reform was too costly, the national plan should follow the Sicilian transformation example in which farmers were grouped into associations using Serpieri's laws of 1933, and the landlord then required to make improvements or risk appropriation of his land, but not without being properly payed.[108]

What Bonomi intended by all this was best stated by Rossi-Doria: "Until the general environmental conditions are different, we should have no illusions. The problem of land improvement is one with agrarian reform, because it is only this that can put the relationships of the proprietors and the contadini on another basis. In these lands, social structure represents the central problem."[109]

If the prevalent approach seemed to be to try to "reconstruct" agriculture in almost exclusively productive terms, part of this was because land tenure showed itself to be more tenaciously conservative than perhaps anyone had imagined. Resistance to every change of both tenure and contractual relationships was seen in the struggles of the mezzadri and the braccianti. Controlling these groups had been a principle of fascism and it was also one of the Republic's. Regardless of the debates between 1946 and 1950 about how to transform agriculture, policy went its own way.

The experts agreed that Italian agriculture was poor, precarious and loaded with inequities. The state of technology in the sector left everything to be desired, especially when compared to other European models. Three-

fourths of Italian agriculture was run as it had been a century or more before. There was growing pressure for land because of the war, fascist "ruralization" and its laws against emigration, plus the post-war black market. The problem of demand was only made worse by technical inadequacy and the distribution of ownership, all of which adversely affected the crops produced.[110]

The day to day activity of the government, however, was dictated by the need to renew the industrial sector. Agriculture's problems were considered socially and politically a sort of "reflex" of the larger issues with which the State had to deal. The countryside was seen as a temporary refuge for the unemployed. Proposals for it rarely went beyond price incentives and supports, especially after the Left was defeated and the DC could begin to insist on its suggestions of funding for public works to promote its own agrarian model.

At the 11th Congress of the Christian Democrats in 1947, Antonio Segni, Minister of Agriculture said:

> "In this moment it is not possible to formulate a policy of real agrarian reform. We are in a period of transition, of emergency. We have made progress on the road to economic recovery, and following this path we have made some sacrifices, but we should not be too sorry about these. Look at what we have achieved. The pacification of vast zones of Italian countryside, a result that was worth the sacrifice. We must permit the transformation of agriculture to take place around the formation of smallholders and the return of the large owners to the land. They cannot change things alone. Since much depends on the availability of workers we must have social peace."(111)

This was the DC's edition of "contadinismo" or "ruralization." The Left did not immediately have any plan to oppose it.

The communists and socialist's collectivist orientation was still strong and there were years of battle yet within the Communist party. Right after the war, the Agricultural Section of the PCI was run by Ruggero Grieco. Based on its analysis of the situation in the countryside, it decided to give full responsibility to local party cells for pulling workers and the contadini together, rather than having a fixed national scheme for such an alliance; nor did it feel it was wise to support cooperative efforts which were not collectivist. Rather than considering contadini as owners, it preferred to think of them as workers on a state farm.[112]

When Grieco died, Emilio Sereni took over direction of the party's Agrarian Section, but it was not until 1956 that the new line began to take hold. Sereni pushed the idea that associative and private ownership should be protected in a socialist state. He attributed a revolutionary role to the contadini, but just at this moment, the DC's attack on the Left began. The Grieco-Sereni debate deeply affected and divided the PCI for years - at the same time that it was being isolated by the other parties. Thus, any agrarian policy of the PCI can only be discovered in practice on a local level where the party did or did not correctly analyze a situation and act accordingly. We will examine a

representative situation on the Cooperative of Aquileia in Friuli.

It was, however, the DC which was firmly in power, and in 1949, Rossi-Doria, a Christian Democrat who had once supported land reform, stated that "after the illusions, it is time to bury the 'black cat' (i.e. land appropriation, expropriation, or any other profound land reform) that has terrorized and paralyzed Italian landowners, whether they be small, medium or large, for the last three years. It is time to propose and energetically carry out a different agricultural policy."[113] Support for the burial came from many sources.

The DC had presented itself as the heir to the only post-World War I Partito Popolare and had been able to gain support in the countryside through the catholic network of organizations. Except in areas where there were concentrations of mezzadri and braccianti, the Party's electoral successes were largely due to the Church and the Coldiretti. The latter's leader, Bonomi, emphasized the themes of assistance and corporativization as ways to consolidate the contadini and promote that idea that "the countryside no longer need be subordinated to or inferior to the cities or industry."[114] In other words, the Coldiretti became a sort of peasant party, with 60 deputies, 40 senators, and hosts of communal leaders to represent them. From 1949 on, they became increasingly responsible for the Christian Democrats' agricultural policy, especially once they had taken over the

direction of the Ferderconsorzi which administered agricultural prices.

The landowners had always been suspicious of any sort of mass contadino association and most did not like the new "ruralization" ideology that was being spread, but the post-war situation required that policy be guided by more than the old Agrarian Landowners' Associations. Their organization, the Confagricoltura, would continue to enjoy the support of the bureaucracy and the government, especially in their struggles with the mezzadri and the braccianti; but the "great old families" of agriculture had to cede leadership to Bonomi. If nothing else, the fact that Bonomi was able to control plans for assistance and corporations, as well as millions of contadini, with a very restricted small property ideology, probably was the major success of those leaders who came out of fascism into the Republic. The economic and social problems of agriculture remained, however, and with them the structural "bottlenecks" that no political ideology could easily cancel.[115] Rational policy had been sacrificed to achieve social control.

There were many who still did not wish to "bury the black cat" and felt that land reform would be a valid way to bolster production and the internal market. The path chosen was another. The policy was to have two complimentary objectives: first, to consolidate and increase the number of smallholders, including among them as many braccianti and

mezzadri as possible; and secondly, to increase more extensive production by investing in public works and land reclamation, as well as a program of incentives to help further the use of agricultural machinery.[116]

If these policies were to be effective they had to go into action right away, but they did not. Funds were not allocated for public works until the end of 1949 and the beginning of 1950. Mortgages for small farmers were not available until after 1950, and subsidies for mechanizations, not until 1952. For people living on little, the wait was too long. The effect this had on agriculture varied by region as we will show in the mountains of Carnia and in the Bassa of Friuli.

Unevenness in allocations was the result of an agreement by decision-makers on what part agriculture was to play in the overall plan for development in the period of reconstruction. Agriculture was assigned a triple task. It was to be a "container" of excess population, a role for which the small property holder is particularly well adapted. It was to be a supplier of goods at low cost, and, to this end, the politics of productivity favored the "modern family farm." Finally, it was to be an "open market" for industrial products, a major inspiration for the use of public funds for supports and subsidies. All these measures were to use agriculture for industry's ends.[117]

The policy makers understood that as industry grew in importance, the agricultural population would tend to

diminish, and as it did so, it was presumed that the average income of the population would increase. In time, this industrial model was intended to rescue them, but until then, said Rossi-Doria, "the agricultural problem will not be solved with reform, nor by politics. It will be resolved, it must be resolved, through abandonment, through emigration, whether abroad or to industrial areas of Italy. Today the problem is only one, that of resisting,"[118]

However, there was a good deal of resisting yet to do, for the "black cat" was not easily put to rest. The PCI's Confederterra had been reborn in 1946 to unite braccianti, mezzadri and coloni. Within it the Federmezzadri for the mezzadri was formed in 1947, and the Federbraccianti for the braccianti in 1948. These unions tried a series of coordinated struggles - for agrarian contracts, stable employment, and control over investments made on the land.

Effective coordination of all these was never achieved, as every group tended to move for its own ends, sometimes in alliance, but rarely with unity of time and place. However, there were mass strikes in 1947 and 1949, none of which were without some success. In 1949, the poorer contadini forced the government to accelerate its reform legislation as land takeovers got "out of hand." There were many partial gains for a time, before they were absorbed and turned around as the "other" agricultural policy was put into effect. The Coldiretti, through Bonomi's influence, remained aloof from most of these struggles.[119]

Again in 1949, the Federconsorzi was made private with Bonomi the leader, as part of a push to divide the workers' and contadinos' movements. Consensus was organized so that social tensions could be eased by the use of public funds. Agrarian reform was reduced to laws which promoted "the formation of contadino property." Agriculture was to be used for further capital accumulation for industry and the basis for social, economic, and political control.[120]

The inspiration for this policy seems to have come from what De Gasperi called the "fourth party" in his fourth cabinet of 1947. He described them this way: "Besides our regular parties, there is a fourth party in Italy which cannot have very many voters, but which is still able to paralyze all our efforts. It can organize the sabotage of loans and the flight of capital, the raising of prices and scandal campaigns. This experience has convinced me that you cannot govern Italy without attracting the representatives of this fourth party into the new formation of the government. This is the party that has the money and the economic force."[121]

It is this fourth party that has been held responsible for the lira's devaluation of 1947 and other economic measures that brought a rise in unemployment. In the spring of 1948, demonstrations by those who wanted work were so intense that the Minister of the Interior and the police had be become the peacekeeping arm of State.

The government wanted to augment exports through the lira's devaluation, while drastically reducing funds for public works, and thus too, for local employments; but then where were the workers to go? In 1948, industrial production was still a long way from its 1938 level. Foreign demand was essential because interal demand was absolutely stagnant[122]

The unemployment situation is the link, then, between a not-yet reconstructed industry and an impoverished agriculture, which kept the workers and the contadino struggles vibrant for some time. As late as 1951, the number of agricultural workers in Italy was up to 8,122,000 even more than the 7.9 million of 1931. Most of this farm labor was chronically underemployed. 83.6% of the property holders had less than two hectares of land, 95% had less than five, amounts which cannot even provide full time work for the owner, much less a hired hand. Braccianti tended to average only five months work per year. Often two-thirds of them were unemployed during the winter months.

An investigation in 1952 found that among direct cultivators, underemployment was chronic among 25% of the small owners, 18% of the renters and mezzadri, and 35% of the braccianti. Between 1949 and 1950, the per capita income for the average farmer was 150,000 lire per year, or less than half that of an industrial worker. Even among direct cultivators, for at least one fourth, or 1.2 million

of them, the situation was worse, regardless of the Coldiretti's resources.[123]

Thus, even though isolated after the vote of 1948 from the government, the Left felt it had the basis on which to organize. The Popular Front had been defeated, union unity had been broken, "progressive" and communist were not communicating, the police of Scelba had been installed everywhere, workers had been killed, and employment officers of the Camere del Lavoro, had been arrested all over Italy. 1949 was a year when the position of the PCI and the CGIL was weak. The Marshal Plan that came in the spring, and Italy's entrance into NATO, simply reinforced the new power bloc and the PCI's isolation.

Nevertheless, though the workers were on the defensive the social situation in the countryside was made even more effervescent by the De Gasperi laws. Restrictions for the mezzadria were put on land improvements, which affected not only the braccianti's salaries, but also the search for work by millions of unemployed in public works projects. A general strike was begun in the Val Padana on the 16th of May 1949; violence broke out near Bologna on the 17th. The strike extended to Puglia, Lucania and Sicily. Land occupations started again, as did more violence. A general strike was then planned for December 1st.[124]

From these actions cam the formulation of a plan by the Left to combat unemployment and to force the government to begin a series of investments in public works for both

industry and agriculture. It was hoped that the Work Plan, or Piano di Lavoro proposed by Giuseppe Di Vittorio at the Second National Congress of the CGIL in Genova in October 1949, would bring the PCI out of its isolation as well. Between the time of proposal and April of 1950, the CGIL and the PCI mobilized around the device of the reverse strike. It came to be known the world over as the strike "all'italiana". The actions were planned and precise and promised improvements and work for many beyond those involved immediately in the strike.[125]

The plan was published nationally on February 18, 1950. First, it expressed the convictions that the sustained capacity for struggle shown by the workers during 1949 should be supported through unified action to promote employment in both the short and long run. Secondly, it expressed the idea that it was necessary to institute a vast program of public works through the use of public funds, a program that would remove some of the structural imbalances within the industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as reinforce some balance between the two. Theoretically, it was recognized that these public works could have a multiple effect on demand and lead to growth in the internal market.[126]

It was a brave plan, but contained serious errors of analysis, not the least of which was a failure to recognized that capitalism did not simply raise prices to limit demand.

Their picture of capitalism was that it was without creativity or self-propulsion, that it was doomed to total crisis.

However, even with its limits, it was the Left's economic alternative, and struggle to support it spread throughout Italy from the end of 1949 to 1952. As Togliatti said, "It was all a political victory, but an economic defeat."[127]

In 1950, the PCI was fighting forces which had other plans for the workers. The Christian Democratic members of the CGIL has separated from it and in 1950 formed their union, the CISL. It was late for unity in a polarized society.

In Friuli, the moment for the Left had been just after the war. By 1950, their last try in the Bassa, with the reverse strike of Cormor, was valiant, but it never really had a chance. It was the State's plan which was bound ultimately to prevail. The best the CGIL could have done was to offer alternatives to make the inevitable mass dislocations toward the cities more of a choice than an immediate and desperate necessity.

What neither the CGIL nor the government realized was that most of the farmers, having a long history of being tied to the land and a very special relationship to it, did not want to leave. The CGIL offered them hope which perhaps the union had not intended. While the people of Carnia had a long tradition of emigration and little choice except to begin again, the people of the Bassa resisted longest. In

the end, it would be the State which was held responsible for forcing them to "choose".

Two kinds of agriculture were part of the national plan for development. Carnia was to supply labor for industry, and so its people were forced to begin emigration early. Agriculture and the labor market in the Bassa would have to be reorganized. The first, Carnia was to be the "ossa", or bone, and left to desertion or at best, a subsistence agriculture. The other, the Bassa, was to make up the "polpa," or the marrow, where land would be reorganized to support some full time agriculture. Whoever could not find a farm to work was to be forced to join the ranks of industry. This was the plan for Friuli. In this state, all of Italy either "polpa" or "ossa," and Friuli-Venezia Giulia with it would be brought into the EEC. Its farmers became one of its most exportable products.

2. Carnia: Subsistence Agriculture, the "Ossa"

In the previous chapter we saw how the mountain region of Carnia came to be included in the Italian economic structure, and how financial control was gained by Venice with Vatican backing. For a time, the war the the Resistance threatened to change the situation. For most, living was as difficult afterwarded as it had been before, and emigration, illegal during the war, began again for many as soon as it became possible. Those who remained continued to depend on communal land for handicraft material and for

greens and roots to supplement what they could grow. At least there was less pressure for land in the mountains than there was in the plains.[128]

There were massive problems to be confronted right after the war. To confront both infrastructural and employment needs, a series of public works projects seemed indispensable. Returns from the administrative elections of 1946 showed strong support for the Left and in most of Carnia they would be responsible for solutions. Financing was to come from the State and from the communities themselves. Local budgets were at an all-time low and depended mostly on payments from local companies for lumbering privileges, but everyone hoped the new government would produce funds soon.[129]

In the meantime, a series of absolutely necessary projects were begun, those without jobs being paid to do the work. The State, from its seat in Udine, gave the go-ahead.

The first hint of trouble came over public housing. One local newspaper began to accuse the contadini of profiting from the sale of land on which houses were to be built. Still, the State promised the financing, and enough enthusiasm was created to begin more new projects: water control, roads, schools and restaurants for the unemployed. Local merchants came out immediately and loudly against the latter idea.[130]

For years, the small commercial group of the mountains had profited from the contadinos' desire to buy and sell on

the black market, as well as from their need to emigrate. During the war, the borders between Italy and Yugoslavia or Austria had had to be crossed secretly and the trip had cost more than in the days when it had been legal. In many ways, the merchants separated themselves from the rest of Carnia's people.[131]

The new leftist leaders were well aware of how dangerous the opposition of the commerical group could be, but their course had been set. It did not surprise them, however, when the business community convinced some of the companies to limit their lumbering for "ecological reasons." The community's 50% was then smaller and so would the State's have been had it arrived, but still more new projects were begun. The Messaggero Veneto, paper of the Vatican and Venetian big business, accused many local mayors of "irresponsible spending," which began a debate that went on throughout the year. The local paper that defended the projects, Liberta, always replied. Bitterness on both sides increased until the discussion became a monologue. In the middle of 1947, Liberta was closed. Through pressure from the local Christian Democrats and from the "rival" Messaggero Veneto, Liberta was simply refused the credit necessary to continue publishing.[132]

Without a voice and without much in the way of funds, the leftist coalitions went ahead the best they could. Local unemployment grew. The Labor Office in Udine had organized the emigration of a large group of workers from

Carnia to France. In the meantime, others were forced to return from Austria because of a government disagreement over an exchange of cement. The numbers requesting emigration mounted. Many simply went secretly and illegally.[133]

Adding to the difficulties of many local governments was the internal split of the PSI. Most of the representatives from Carnia who had gone to the Party Congress in Rome had voted for unity, but once the division was final, many important leaders found themselves members of the new PSLI (later the PSDI). It became their responsibility to come to an agreement with the Christian Democrats. It would be these socialists, the DC, and the heads of the lumber industry who would begin to promote the idea of autonomous communities in Carnia.[134]

The Left felt that such a creation would only lead to another layer of bureaucracy, but the issue was debated with difficulty in a controlled press. In a series of local elections, there was no clear victory for anyone, though the DC made gains in a few areas. With the industrial and agricultural money of Venice to back them, the DC began a full attack on all of the administrations with whom they had not been able to negotiate the new version of "transformismo". As the elections of 1948 drew nearer, the press increased its efforts to invalidate and discredit all the activities of those leftists who still held office. As financing for them was increasingly a problem, sometimes

this was as easy as cutting off the rest of their funds. The accusations went from charges of extortion on a grand scale to petty complaints of selling wine without charging tax.[135]

In the elections of 1948, the DC did as well in Carnia as it did nationally. Where old administrations were re-elected, the Christian Democrats spent the rest of the year encouraging them to resign. With their former plans in paralysis and few funds coming from the State, there was often little else they could do. The conservative Messaggero Veneto began publishing accusations of all sorts against those who resisted. Many of these attacks were personal and resulted in court cases. Some appear to be persecutions of former administrative members, many of whom were fired from their jobs and forced to emigrate.[136]

In 1950, the Christian Democrats began to form committees to explore the possibilities for the development of tourism in Carnia. Soon to follow, with the backing of the Messaggero Veneto and Rome, as well as the Banks of Friuli and Carnia, was an international show to demonstrate the "beauty of these mountains, their simple hard-working people and [their] handicrafts to the world."[137]

In the meantime, the important mines of Ovaro in Carnia had still not received the financing which had been promised to repair war damage and restore full production. In 1949, a new request received a negative reply. Relief food for

the entire area was stopped as a result of allegedly insufficient government funds in 1950.

If the Left still had some power the area before, it not longer did after the new administrative elections in the spring of 1951. Most of the new representatives from the Christian Democratic and the Social Democratic parties were members of the business community. In the years to come, they would depend on tourism, mining, lumbering, and a few other small companies that would prosper.[138]

The rest of the people went back to emigration to earn the money to rebuild their houses. While the men were away, some of the family stayed behind, surviving on the same meager agriculture as their ancestors had in past centuries. After the war, hopes to change the pattern were short-lived. This was to be the "ossa," or the bone of agriculture, the part to be forgotten and discarded. Carnia was to supply Italy with lumber, electric power and a labor force.

3. The Cooperative of Aquiliea: Part of the "Polpa"

In the eastern Bassa, the Communist party had a strong following. In the area of Aquileia it was in control of local government and most of the mass organizations as well. Among the contadini was the tradition of both Red and White Leagues, which had begun the network of self-help that became the cooperative. After World War II, everyone was anxious to regain the ground that had been lost during fascist rule. In the first period, support was strong for

the cooperatives, which were given the job of satisfying immediate needs.[139]

Right after liberation, a somewhat individualist and disorganized move was made by a group of sixty people. Their aim was to occupy 37 communal hectares of Aquileia, though these had long been rented to two brothers from a nearby town. The memory was still vivid of the "civic use" of community land for the poor, and after the war, Aquileia had its share of unemployed. Most of the town had joined the Resistance early and stayed with it to the end. There was a lot of recoving to be done.

Local leaders legalized the common occupation of the land giving 25 hectares to the 60 people who had organized it in allotments of about three to three and a half thousand square meters for each. The brothers who had formerly rented the whole property agreed to work the remaining twelve hectares.

The organization of the operation was the job of the Cooperativa Aquileia di Lavoro Edile, henceforth CAL, which had originally been formed for the purpose of hiring the unemployed and putting them to work in a large variety of local projects, of which the newly formed group of farmers was only one. During reconstruction, they worked on the lagoons, arranged contracts for the workers of the huge SAICI of Torviscosa, and in a few years had as many as 900 worker-members. CAL was restructured after 1950 so that its activities were broadened even further, and during the next

ten years it became the most important local builder of public housing.

If CAL had had the possibility of paying rent to the community for the land, probably no problems would ever have come about; but the 60 small cultivators took over their new plots without capital. They proceeded to exploit their plots as fully as possible, until the soil was exhausted. In the years between 1945 and 1950, they also found themselves in debt to CAL for several hundred thousand lire. CAL had helped subsidize the rent, but had provided no organizational or technical assistance.

When it was time to renew the lease, CAL and local town leaders decided not to rent to the two brothers or to the 60 farmers. The whole 37 hectares would be rented out by the community to support the 22 most needy families of the original 60, and also give work to other unemployed of the town. Beyond that, the plan was not particularly concrete, but a committee was set up to organize and run the new cooperative.

An important member of the group was Giuseppe Moro, a contadino who had been an organizer in his early years. He had joined the mezzadria struggles before and after the First World War. As a Socialist, he was jailed in 1924, escaped, fought in the Resistance, was captured, and again gained his freedom to rejoin the partisans. After the battles were over, he held positions in the PCI and was elected provincial secretary of the Federmezzadri in 1945.

He believed in land for the contadini and, understanding their life well, did not think they were ready for the collective forms the Communist Party was talking of. Some Party leaders barely tolerated his presence, and his prestige was further damaged when he was tried in court for illegal land occupation in 1947. The Federmezzadri substituted another secretary for him in 1949, but he was still re-elected to the Party's national committee in Udine. When the Cooperative of Aquileia was formed, he turned away from all other party activities and dedicated himself fully to the new farm. His problems with the Party had just begun.

Since CAL did not have the resources to build the barns that would be needed, Moro was given the task of getting those who would farm the land to put up the buildings. He found seven small landowners who were willing and their number soon increased to nine. These nine full members of the Cooperative were to be joined by others who had no capital. They would be sub-renters and partial members. Moro sensed that this situation was fully of possible conflict, but for the time he kept his reservations to himself; and the nine full members began work in November of 1950. It was expected that the other 22 would be hired soon.

The community leaders of Aquileia were responsible for the hiring of as many of the unemployed as possible. What they forgot to calculate were differences in agricultural incomes, the function of agricultural capital, and the

limitations of an already poorly nourished 37 communal hectares. They could not support 31 families. All this began to surface when the nine stated that they would have difficulty paying rent for the next nine years, nor could they assume any more workers before then. The mayor agreed to a rent deferment of three years, but only if 15 of the planned 22 persons were hired. Moro began his fight with the Party. Not only had a different type of cooperative been formed than what the Party had in mind, but the land was simply not capable of what the PCI wanted it to produce.

The debate was long and bitter. The Party accused Moro of betraying the working class and the purpose of cooperativization. In the minds of many, the idea of the land's communal use persisted. "Why should 'they' have work when we don't?" was commonly heard. The nine full members calculated their pay for the number of hours they had already worked, in case their contract was not renewed when it came time in 1953.

In January of 1952, a meeting was held to resolve the whole issue. The Party still faced severe local unemployment problems and insisted that the 15 be hired. Though the Coldiretti agreed with Moro that the cooperative was a group of small direct cultivators and not an ultimate political solution, it did not help Moro's standing with the PCI to have their support. He was then simply told to get the members to comply with the Party's directives. Leaders from Udine intervened, but sides in the debate had already been

decided upon. Moro was voted out of the PCI and the Party was left in a state of paralysis with no solution in sight. The debate went on.

It was proposed that the nine members be paid for their work and the Cooperative be reorganized. However, without harvesting the crop there was no way to tell how much to pay the original members. The vicious cycle was becoming a blind alley. The members wanted Moro to take the responsibility of confronting the Party. Moro decided that he had little to loose. The PCI already considered him a "reformist." The way the Cooperative had been realized in relationship to the Party's agrarian line was not sufficiently "advanced." In both theory and practice, it was a difficult situation; but under the circumstances, Moro felt it had been the only way possible.

It was time that solved the problem. Slowly, after the PCI began to change at its Eighth National Congress, Sereni's philosophy started to gain ground. However, the PCI of Aquileia had not understood some of the implications of the struggle for agrarian reform in Friuli. They had wanted to skip steps that would have allowed a cooperative to be formed which was less traditional than Moro's. Time was on his side.

Eventually, he was taken back into the Party and the Cooperative went on as he had founded it. It is today, after some reorganization in 1959, one of the most important producers of the area. The people who work it say that

without Moro, the land would have gone to some big landowner of the zone.

Along with some extensive farming nearby, the cooperative has become the healthy part of Friulan agriculture, part of the Italian "polpa," or marrow. Its beginnings were surrounded with theoretical and technical problems, but the Party changed and, around Aquileia, Moro is now part of their tradition. The cooperative, based on a traditional system of mezzadria and the small direct cultivator, became a form that permits rational full- and part-time agriculture in an area where holdings have long been small. In turn, it can help sustain, as well as benefit from, extensive farms nearby.

4. Cormor: "Polpa" and "Ossa," or a Mixed Beginning

The region of Cormor in the Bassa lies between the Tagliamento and Torre Rivers, and the land is some of Friuli's richest. Its abundant water supply is the key to its development. For centuries, the economy here, as in the mountains, depended on subsistence farming of the contadino and the intense labor of the mezzadri, the diversity of employment in silk production, and seasonal emigration.

Survival included grazing, the use of the woods, marshes, and lagoons. Each season held a necessary group of activities for the family, from the cutting of reed for the roof to the gathering of grass for their small animals or

twigs for basket weaving. All this resulted in a very careful division of labor within the family, but also in a special rapport with the land that was not just economic, but cultural as well.[140]

Over time, the land was divided into many small holdings, and communal land, except for that on the river banks, virtually disappeared. The principle governing the original system of communal land division, in which the land was allocated in consideration of the numbers of people a family had to support, remained strong in the memories of the people. Its allocation according to social usage of the community was not necessarily "rational." It took only a few generations for any benefits a family may have derived from being granted ownership of formerly communal land to disappear. Along side these areas where property was divided into small and scattered holdings, there were a few large landholders who did improve and irrigate their lands. On these, the growth of braccianti labor followed, but most of the large holdings were divided up into rented plots or worked by mezzadria. Extended use of agrarian contracts prevented a change to more extensive agriculture in most of the Region.

From 1925 to 1940, when the huge establishment of SAICI Torviscosa was inserted by the State into the territory, many of the area's smallholders became braccianti. By 1938, 4500 of the area's 6,000 braccianti were used in the harvest of that farm alone. These usually held surrounding plots,

the minute remainders of their farms, which had been small to begin with. Thus, in the area of SAICI there was a concentration of braccianti, while to the east mezzadri were more numerous.

The politics of fascism and its emigration laws increased the availability of labor, and in turn, brought about a spread of labor-intensive crops throughout the area such as flax, tobacco and sugar beets. For these, a tertiary labor system was used in which a bracciante was given full charge of a planted and fertilized plot. From the harvest, he was allowed to keep 33%. The large landholders who did not have their "own" mezzadria, used this system and would keep only a few braccianti on for the winter months. Such a system is not wage labor. It is rather risk-free for the owner and it is certainly precarious employment for the farmer.

Because of the war, the extension of even these unsure means of employment was slow. Between 1946 and 1947, unemployment was widespread. The mezzadri took up their demands again for a larger percent of the crop. The next year, the braccianti actions began in the Val Padana. There, a real rural working class, used to cash wages rather than being paid in kind, had been formed during the land reclamations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the Bassa of Friuli, much of the agitation which the braccianti and the mezzadria joined in together was to insist that the land be improved so it could be

worked more intensively. As they became involved in the future of their land, they also discovered their old cultural and social ties, reinforcing the people's homogeneity and making it difficult to divide them with the same methods used elsewhere. The people of the Bassa wanted to stay on the land and didn't want to have to emigrate again. They were willing to work together to make the quality of life better for all.

In 1947, the braccianti and the mezzadri began agitation all over Friuli, which continued throughout 1948. In one area, they held a reverse strike to rebuild an old canal, in another, an aqueduct. The examples are many, and the nation-wide strike in May of 1949 brought an improvement of contracts throughout the Bassa, too. Hope and enthusiasm were high.

Back in 1938, Mussolini had given 15 million lira for land reclamation in Lower Friuli. Some had been used, but much had been lost in the lira's devaluation and in the personal projects of a few large landowners. The project for the region of Cormor, for which most of the money had been intended, had been considered necessary since 1903 for the transformation of local agriculture. Mussolini's unfulfilled promises had only increased the people's frustration. The CGIL's plan for public works was greeted with real excitement by Cormor. It would be a way to fight unemployment and get their extensive canal system finished. With more people working, prosperity for the merchants would

increase and, so the reasoning went, the well-being of everyone in the surrounding area was assured.

The CGIL's plan, or Piano di Lavoro, was put into effect in Friuli in the spring of 1950. Support for it spread beyond anyone's expectations. Part of the reason is certainly that, in Friuli, there were few of those "pure" braccianti for whom the plan had initially been conceived. The emphasis in Friuli was on the reverse strike where construction was begun without pay. Because of past neglect as well as the destruction of war, there was no end to the projects that needed to be started in the Region.

In many parts of Italy, most often the braccianti's enemy was the landlord. In Friuli, the State and its old public works consortiums were considered equally, if not even more guilty, for the lack of improvement to the land than any landlord.

Conferences and rallies increased support for the plan, which was to directly affect 15 townships, but the whole of the Bassa was behind the first phase. There would be bread and work for all and no one need emigrate again.

One the 19th of May, several hundred unemployed workers evaded the police and arrived at the scene of the project. On the 20th, 1,500 came. No one was allowed to work, but they kept their places with tools in hand. Each day the police set up road blocks, but each day more arrived to wait. Women, children, and grandparents all kept the men informed of dangers and roads to avoid. Each town had its

organization which was linked to others. The parish priests, most of whom were behind the effort, encouraged everyone on Sunday to begin again on Monday.

42 million lire were allocated for the project, an absurdly small amount for the completion of the work and for the 2,000 unemployed involved. Resolve to continue the demonstration was simply strengthened. When the mayors of the 15 surrounding communities, along with the workers, came to the scene where the project was to start, the police were unsure how to handle the situation.

The Communist party, which was to lead the action, was caught by surprise. They had not expected such complete participation. Their tentative response was turned into a more confident approach by the 23rd of May, and a full reverse strike was to begin work. As the digging started, there were storeowners, priests, children, all sorts who came to sign petitions of support and watch the shovels at work. Everyone sang partisan songs on the way home that night.

The new day of work on the 24th began with more workers than the day before and included women and teenagers who came with their tools to work beside the men. The officials met the same day to decide that 250 unemployed workers would be hired on the project until the 42 million lire was used up. They knew it would do nothing to alter the local employment situation, but they were worried that the agitation would spread to other projects. It had happened

before. Many strikes in the region had been linked together in 1946 and in 1948. What could happen now when there were from 50 to 55 thousand unemployed in Friuli? The officials knew that the strikes represented the people's desire to stay home and prosper, not to have to emigrate again. Thus, they also knew that such enthusiasm and numbers would strengthen the movement.

On the 25th of May, police action made its appearance on the Cormor project. Workers were followed home, separated, cornered and beaten, along with anyone who tried to protest such action or protect them. Houses and taverns were entered, workers and non-workers were dragged into the piazzas and beaten. The police made no distinctions. Day after day the project was off-limits, but many always returned, some stayed and slept in the nearby woods. Violence became more frequent, but solidarity simply grew.

Representatives were sent to Rome, where they were promised more funds, but these were not to come for another year or two. With this news, the whole of Friuli came to show support for the workers of Cormor, bringing truckloads of clothes and contributions of food from farms like the Cooperative of Aquileia. It was felt that if everyone could just hold on until De Gasperi's visit--promised for the 4th of June--he would see the work being done and find more money. In order to prevent more violence, the women of Cormor went to work with their men. It was a celebration full of singing--until the tear gas began. On that day of

the 29th of May with the women in the front line, the police got more than they expected. With their kerchiefs over their faces, the women fought with their wooden shoes if they had nothing else. The police chief and the local and union officials met that night. On the 30th, no one was hurt at Cormor. It was clear to all that violence was not going to stop the movement.

Work continued in the week before De Gasperi's arrival. He promised another 60 million lire in addition to the original 42 when he saw the project. The reverse strike went on for 20 more days after he left. What brought it to an end were other parties who had been surprised by events.

The Bishop of Udine sent a letter to all his parish priests instructing them to "invite the workers to stop their struggle and put distance between themselves and the communist agitators."[141] The local leaders of the Christian Democrats had been cut out of involvement in the demonstrations. If the spontaneity of it all surprised the Socialists and the Communists, it was threatening to isolate the DC and the non-aligned unions. In an area where only a few communities had not voted DC in the April 1948 elections, the struggle of Cormor seemed "to be threatening to overturn the good sense of the Friulan people and to put the DC out of the game in the whole of the Bassa."[142] The brutal behavior of the police put the DC in the position of having to justify their actions as a consequence of communist propaganda. The people did not feel used by the union

or the PCI and, as one old partisan commander said, "The DC claiming that the strike was the result of communist agitation is like saying that anti-fascist resistance was instigated by Africans."[143]

If the Christian Democrats made fools of themselves, they were the ones who were meeting in commissions which were to decide how to sub-contract the work at Cormor. They postponed the day of hiring again and again. After a month of struggle, the workers still had not taken home a lira of pay. Internal commissions of workers were formed to take part in the negotiations. In a short time, many who had never done more than work in the fields, became well-informed union activists.

On the 28th of June, the requests of the braccianti were accepted by the labor office in Udine. A thousand workers were to be hired. Work would begin the next day and they would have a say in the rules governing the hiring process. The influence of the CGIL and the PCI was at an all-time high in the Bassa.

However, problems were not long in coming, given the number of workers, the amount of money and the lack of state coordination. The funds would be gone in a few weeks if a plan was not formulated quickly. When the sub-contractors announced that 600 workers would have to be let go at the end of July, everyone began to realize that a different sort of political management of the economy was necessary and

that their struggle at Cormor alone would not bring them a solution.

When 800 were let go on the 5th of August, the workers who had land or who did not have large families left their places to those who needed them most. There was talk of beginning the strike again, but the DC would not be taken by surprise this time. They found more money to give to the project, but in very small doses until 1955. The Canal of Cormor was inaugurated in that year, after most of the unemployed had left for other lands or the cities. Two or three generations would have to find work elsewhere before they would be able to return to the place where they wanted to live and work. The great exodus of the 1950s from Friuli had begun.

C. The Political and Cultural Polarization of the Italian Model of Development: How the Assistance Structure Worked and For Whom

At the end of World War II, Italy needed a new government. Once it was decided whether it was to be a monarchy or a republic, a coalition of Left and Right was agreed upon to run it. Next, though there was no such sequence in reality, was to unite a war-torn society, both ideologically and administratively, in order to begin reconstruction and eventually to promote further economic development. All of these problems, however, were not strictly national ones. Especially from 1945 to 1948, Italy's international position influenced how political, social, and economic reconstruction were to be carried out.[144]

The Allies, and the United States in particular, felt that Italy was of strategic importance in the Mediterranean and was intent on influencing Italy's foreign policy from the moment they landed. In order to increase Italy's dependence on NATO, the United States was determined to strengthen the centrist governing groups, which also implied support for a market-oriented socio-economic system. The prevailing idea at the time was that economic development will eventually bring about democratic political development, thus it seemed logical for the United States to interfere in Italy's foreign and domestic politics in the interests of NATO. The ideal of an urban industry and a wide range of economic, political, military, and

psychological maneuvers were used to support anti-communist forces in Italy, and the central focus of U.S. strategy as the Christian Democrats. The United States was not about to accept a government role for the Left.

The DC's electoral victory in 1948, however, was not just the result of international efforts. The Party brought entire economic and cultural sectors of pre-industrial Italian society into its sphere. Once the smaller parties were defeated, it came to represent monarchists, remaining fascists on the Right, and the same old coalition of rural landowners and urban industrialists that had governed before fascism. It was not a class party at all, but the expression of a whole social bloc. Italy's fragmented bourgoisie, especially the petit-bourgeoisie, whose ranks had been swollen by fascism, were represented along with contadini of all sorts, and workers. Not only were many leaders of the past included in the coalition, but for the first time catholics participated fully in politics.

Building a political base which would include as much of society as possible meant absorbing each group's values; limited issues, local personalisms, particularisms, and rivalries. Pre-industrial values were included, along with the interests of class-oriented industrial groups. Such mutually antagonistic values and factions were all operating in the political structure by 1950.

It was not just the Allies and the Christian Democrats who were involved in these efforts, however. The Vatican

wished to reassert its cultural centrality in post-war Italy. Fascism had undermined its authority. The DC, as a mass party, was of strategic importance for the Church in the creation of an all-inclusive community. The Vatican could introduce the DC into all sectors of society through the pre-existing network of bishoprics and parishes. If the DC and the Church were jointly responsible for the sources of assistance, the Church was in a position to be exclusively in charge of the criteria for receiving it. Thus, there was teamwork between the DC and the Church, but also considerable potential for conflict between them over spheres of interest. Goods and prestige are the resources of assistance, and loyalty that of ideology; the authority of both institutions was to depend on these.

All of Italy's post-war leaders could not completely subscribe to a pluralist capitalism which was contradictory to many of catholicism's tenets. The idea of a free market was fine, but outright capitalism would be in conflict with the Church as the ultimate authority. The common enemy of both the Vatican and the DC, however, was communism. Anti-communism was chosen as the ideological adherent for both urban and rural sectors of a divided society. Before fascism, clericalism had opposed the secularism of the liberal regime. Socialism had simply been another liberal heresy. After the Second World War, the Church raised Communism to full membership in the ideological conflict. Socialism was to be opposed by a coalition of secularism and

clericalism. The new division was politically represented by the split of the Socialists into two parties, one of whom was within the Left. The other, the PSLI, went to the Right of the new line to join the DC's coalition.

The Church served another ideological function. The policies of the DC-led government to promote economic development were outlined using existing urban-rural divisions. Assistance to the agricultural sector was administered using the parish network and rural catholic values which represented not just eligibility criteria for them, but also a way to maintain the pre-industrial social structure in the countryside after peace was restored to it. At the same time, progressive ideas were developed by the Vatican to support the activities of the then small but essential activities of urban-based catholic bourgeoisie intent on capital accumulation for the growth of industry. Thus, there was a religious sanction not just of political polarization but of cultural dualism between urban and rural worlds as well.

The political base of the DC, however, did not depend solely on the Church's network. The Christian Democrats' power also rested on the Party's ability to manipulate scarcity through its own administration of assistance, the basis for which was inherited from fascist years. The DC needed to increase its own ability to control the peripheries of the State from the Center. Though the PCI was forced into competition with the DC for an alternative

network and resources, its economic and political isolation from government decision-making centers would preclude success for some time in areas where it did not already have a loyal following. Where the PCI had a strong base, it would also later be accused of using the same sort of assistance politics as the DC in order to hold onto it. The politics of the DC's assistance structure were very much the result of who was part of the government coalition and their desire to change society as little as possible. The PCI simply used a more modern version because their leadership was less constrained by pre-industrial values.

It is difficult for a modern industrial model to be oriented to efficiency criteria, however, if assistance, based on the use of clientelism by the historic bloc, is used to bring all centers of political and economic decision making under state control. There had been efforts to do so since before fascism. The liberal regime, the "fourth party," which De Gasperi and Parri both complained of and accused of financial manipulation, and the "baronie economiche," or economic baronies, which were governments within the government running large state enterprises, are all examples of groups which were in constant political war over who was to run them. Having control of who was to do the handing out and to whom meant that the large state-run industries became an important part of the assistance network.

To tighten the State's control over all parts of agriculture, the Enti di Riforma, or Reform Agency, was to be the technical arm of agrarian policy. The Coldiretti and the Federconsorzi would be the irrigators of public funds as well as the coordinator of activities between agriculture and other sectors, such as import or credit. The Enti di Riforma, or Enti di Sviluppo Agricolo (Agency of Agricultural Development), as it was later called, was to promote small contadino property before 1957. Until about 1961, it was used for another purpose as well--to ideologically help control and divide the contadino world that it had been so careful to unite in the earlier post-war years. From the early 1960s on, the Enti di Sviluppo Agricolo concentrated on agricultural production and on creating links with the industrial and commercial sectors to further credit. Thus, in the First Green Plan of June 2, 1961, it was given the job of "modernizing" agriculture and providing funds for "dynamic" farms only.

During fascism, the Federconsorzi had been used for the mass collection of agricultural products. In 1948, it was made the agricultural executive for the State and was to have almost complete control over the flow of agricultural credit. In 1949, Bonomi was made its head and, as a result, the split widened between the big land owners who had never before felt the need for state assistance and the newer holders who were eager to link themselves to the administration.

The Federconsorzi was also responsible for agricultural imports and exports as well as for the relationship between industry and agriculture. In the 1950s, Fiat, which made farm machinery, and the Federconsorzi projected the future mechanization of Italian agriculture and, with the chemical company Montacatini, its fertilization. During the 1950s, one bought a tractor through the local consortium. A down payment of one quarter of the price was paid at the outset, the rest would be paid over a five year term, with the State absorbing the interest on the finance plan. About 20,000 tractors a year were sold during the 1950s.[145] This is an agriculture-serving industry in many ways.

Thus, the DC had an agricultural policy which promoted the diffusion of, and assistance to, the small direct cultivator until industry had more positions to offer. It was their good fortune that the contadino structures which they supported were no more than the reality of the way most Italian contadini lived. When there was scarce demand for labor, public assistance permitted them to remain where they were for a bit longer. There was, however, an exodus between 1951 and 1958 out of the fields toward industries, especially those of public works and construction. Some of the results of the DC's uses of agriculture and the rural population for industry are evident in Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

The mostly rural economy of Friuli had not been as badly devastated by World War II as it had been in World War

I, but Mussolini's policies had increased the demand for arable land without increasing the availability of local industrial employment. Post-war unemployment was severe. Throughout the Resistance period, popular sentiment, expressing hope for a better future for Friuli, became increasingly well-organized and articulate. The Left was strong, and no one was sure how the region would vote after the war. Friuli became an important testing-ground for the effectiveness of the anti-communist campaign.

The ideological drive made use of border controversies that remained after World War I and of ethnic rivalries. The concentrated effort to polarize Friuli before the 1948 elections was probably more intense than it was anywhere else in the nation because Friuli was part of the West's dividing line between Communist East and Capitalism. Both Allied and Vatican forces were arrayed behind the DC in the effort to exclude the Left from local coalitions, just as they were to be put out of the national one, but it all happened earlier in Friuli.

In Carnia, the DC, with its new version of "trasformismo," showed its unwillingness to mediate with other political groups and enforced its own form of social and economic control on the area. In Aquileia, the isolated Left struggled to create its own network parallel to that of the DC's, but its analysis of the situation and its financial resources were limited. That part of the Bassa, as

well as Cormor were areas which the DC hoped would change over time as bureaucratic controls could be strengthened.

Everywhere in Friuli-Venezia Giulia after World War II, the DC used the traditional power of the Church to enforce social control through its auxiliary organizations until the state's bureaucracy was able to do the job. The DC had not been confident of its acceptance by the people of Friuli, and so they did not promote local participation in either local or national decisions. The DC needed a solid political base in the region which they were willing to maintain as long as they could have its vote and use the Friulani and what the region produced elsewhere.

As excess population left the land, there was no clear policy to implement reorganization of what was being deserted, no thought of agriculture being supportive of industry except in a reflexive sense. It had been presumed that contadini from the "ossa," the internal hill zones and the mountains where subsistence agriculture produced a great variety of things, most of which had no relationship to the market, would provide industrial labor. The "ossa" was the home of 71% of Italy's agricultural population in 1951. Emigration from these regions was an old habit, as it was in Carnia. Families were left on the land while the young worked elsewhere.

The new flood of emigration also came from what the leaders had intended to be the "polpa," the plains and areas of gentle hills which were irrigated and could be

mechanized. They left productive or potentially productive areas because the agrarian contracts were still unsettled everywhere in the 1950s and because public works and land reclamation projects were without funds. The example of Cormor is only one of many.

The results of the DC's dual policy of public investment and pressure to have the "excess" emigrate were double-edged in many ways. Two rather distinct groups of contadini were created, as well as two very different types of farming. First of all, there was a group of direct cultivators who could supply the market with specialized crops. For them, cooperatives, such as that of Aquileia, came to be an acceptable tool, even for the Coldiretti, and both financial and technical help were given, though there came to be divisions between them according to how much hired labor was required to produce a crop. Second, there was a vast layer of "subsistence" farms, where public funds were used to supplement the insufficient amount farmers could grow, with whatever other sources of income could be found, depending on the labor market.

One group was fairly well-off, able to make a living on the land and seemingly self-sufficient, as long as public funds were available. It was these contadini who were drawn into the interest group of old agrarian leaders and made part of the larger network which included the Coldiretti, the Federconsorzi, and the State assistance bureaucracy.

The other contadini consisted of all those who remained on the land even tenuously.

The contadino movement was defeated by the partial failure of agrarian reform and divided by the use of assistance. One part of the rural sector became a fairly well-organized faction of specialized workers, an agricultural sector to serve the market. The other group became a collection of small proprietors whose condition was not only difficult to translate into specific interests, and thus cohesive organization, but which would supply the labor market.

The small farm served the urban industrial model, first as a safety valve. The flood of workers could be routed through public works and the construction industry rather than directly into the cities and the manufacturing force. It was a labor pool from which workers could be drawn and trained gradually through public funding as they were needed. Financial support for construction and public works could be reduced when they were not. The small farm was a link between the industrial and agricultural sectors where the diseconomies of both could be partially balanced. In times of a decline in demand for industrial labor, even part-time farming helped reduce the burden on the State of supporting the unemployed. Finally, the small farm was also a social stabilizer, in that it provided part of an integrated income for a family, which as a whole could be higher than that of marginal industry or subsistence agriculture.

This is the role the contadino-operaio was to play in post-war reconstruction and in the further growth of the Italian urban industrial sector.

In Cormor, Carnia, and Aquileia, in all of Friuli, there was a desire for a choice after the war, for a better life, for social mobility. The State was not against these desires, but it was against the Friulani's proposed way of achieving them if the Left was to be involved. Once order was reinstated and the choices the Friulani were given were clearer, those who saw they were not to be part of full-time agriculture still desired the fruits of development. The small farm could provide only some of what they wanted. For them and for those with no land at all, the choices were the submerged economy and emigration, both to a large degree, outside the control of state programming. Labor which is paid off the books, emigration, and part-time farming are hardly long-term solutions for unemployment or a poor agricultural sector, but having acted on its own to gain social mobility through these means would eventually give the contadino-operaio a base of economic autonomy and increase the difficulty with which the group could be controlled from the center.

It was in the countryside of Friuli among its rural folk where the religious sanction of polarization and of cultural dualism was most strongly exercised. Cormor was divided between DC and PCI, and between emigration and state investment in agriculture. The PCI of Aquileia remained

isolated and relied mostly on an agriculture of self-help. In Carnia, the DC and the PSLI had only dependence on still very limited tourism to offer as an alternative to emigration. During the 1950s, both unemployment and emigration were high. The economic miracle was a long way off in Friuli. It would come late to the region just as the easing of political tensions would. The Americans remained in Trieste until 1954, and while pouring large sums into the shipbuilding industry nearby, they carefully monitored local elections. There was no question of an "opening to the Left" in Friuli.

Though the DC remained administratively in control of Italy during the 1950s, the government suffered from frequent changes of cabinet. The Christian Democratic party was riddled with debate over Nenni's proposal that his PSI join the governing coalition. In favor of the proposal were the Social Democrats, the Republicans, and the Left of the DC. Most of the latter were opposed, however, as were the Liberals, much of the business world, the U.S. government, and the Church, none of whom trusted the good intentions of the PSI.

In 1953, the DC had tried to reduce the effects of proportional representation and give themselves a real majority in the parliament by law. The Italians' acceptance of the idea would have eliminated the need for a coalition to govern. A strong vote was returned for the Left in the elections of that year. The people did not want the DC to

rule without opposition. The idea of an "opening to the Left" began to gain ground.

The PSI had already put distance between itself and the Communist party. The split widened after the events in Hungary of 1956. A Western Alliance was preferable to one with the Soviet Union. Leaders of the DC, such as Fanfani, began to turn opinion around, though division within the Party remained. The Liberals were cut off from the center by the Republicans and the Social Democrats. Pope John XXIII had softened his stand against the PSI, and even the business leaders accepted a few socialists among their ranks. The United States was not convinced, and did not change its policy before 1961. Even then, it would not be sympathy for the PSI that won over the Americans. The "opening to the Left" was simply a refined version of the same anti-communist policy. Wooing the PSI as far away from the PCI as possible was just a new tactic. The by center-left government would be judged by the United States by how effectively it could reduce the influence of the Left in Italy. In the meantime, the Italians were drawn more tightly into NATO when they were included in the European Economic Community.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER FOUR

1. Giuseppe Mammarella, L'Italia dopo il fascismo; 1943-1973, (Bologna: il Mulino, 1974), part II, Chapter 1.

2. Ibid, p. 59-67.

3. Ibid, p. 73- 78.

4. Ibid, p. 118-119.

5. Ibid, p. 123.

6. Harry Truman, Memoirs, 2 volumes (Garden City: 1955), vol. 2, p. 263.

7. Especially on the fear of subversion, see Secretary of State John Hickerson's Department of State Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, (hereafter FRUS), 3 (Washington, 1974) p. 40.

8. E.T. Smith, "The Fear of Subversion: The United States and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty," Diplomatic History, Vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring, 1983).

9. NSC Document 1/2, 10 February 1948, FRUS, (1948), p. 766.

10. NSC Document 1/3, 8 March 1948, ibid., p. 849.

11. Smith, op. cit., p. 141.

12. Ibid., p. 143.

13. 22 October 1948, FRUS (1948), p. 200-201.

14. 10 January 1949, FRUS (1949), part 4, p. 18.

15. Ibid.

16. 2 March 1949, FRUS, (1949), part 4, p. 145.

17. Smith, op. cit., p. 154.

18. Ibid., p. 155.

19. Ibid.

20. NSC Document 1/2, 10 February 1949, FRUS (1948), part 3, p. 765-769.

21. NSC Document 67/1, 21 April 1950, FRUS (1950), part 3, p. 1487-1489.

22. Smith, op. cit., p. 155.

23. Raoul Pupo, "Alcuni documenti sull'ordine pubblico nel 1946," Qualestoria, Anno VII, no. 3, (November 1979), p. 13-21.

24. Ibid., p. 17.

25. Ibid., p. 20.

26. As in the previous chapters, the classics are Candeloro, De Rosa, and Jemolo.

27. The Rocco Laws were the Fascist penal code passed in 1930 and 1931. As of 1983-84, only pieces of it have been reformed.

28. The section has been synthesized from Candeloro, De Rosa, Jemolo and three artciles by Della Pergola, "Ideologie politiche sociali dei cattolici italiani del dopoguerra", Testimonianze, no. 150, (1973); and in the same journal no. 136, "I gruppi di Comunione e liberazione," in Idoc Internazional, no. 6-7, (April, 1973), and his "Cristiani e internazionalismo operaio." Two other works that were consulted are F.L. Ferrari, L'azione cattolica e il regime, (Pararti, 1958); and S. Tramontin, Sinistra cattolica di ieri e di oggi, (Marietti, 1974).

29. Della Pergola, "I gruppi di Communione," ibid.

30. See the issues of 1945 to 1951 of Cronache Sociali for many articles on the theme.

31. Della Pergola, "Ideologie," op. cit.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Della Pergola, "Cristiani," op. cit.

35. From Della Pergola, "Ideologie," op. cit., p. 834.

36. On this particularly see Tramontin, op. cit.

37. Ferrari, op. cit., Conclusion.

38. This observation comes from having spent an entire week in the Diocesan libraries of Udine and Gorizia, reading pamphlets that were sent to priests teaching the proper

way to preach to the contadini. The tone is usually condescending, although sometimes it is just paternalistic.

39. Luciano De Cilla, "25 luglio 1943: Reazioni nel mondo cattolico Friulano," Storia contemporanea in Friuli, Anno IX, no. 10, (1979), p. 281.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid. p. 284.

42. Ibid., p. 285-289 plus appendix and documents.

43. La Vita Cattolica, 7 March 1943; and R. Orfei, L'occupazione del potere, (Milano, 1976), p. 23.

44. Besides the classic trio of Candeloro, Jemolo, and De Rosa, see also Faustino Nazzi, "Il ruolo dell'Azione Cattolica e dei Comitati Civici dal 1945 al 1948," Storia contemporanea in Friuli, Anno VI, no. 7, (1976), p. 98-204.

45. Flavio Fabbroni, "Friuli 1945-48, Linee d'interpretazione," Storia contemporanea, ibid., p. 15-97.

46. Mammarella, op. cit., p. 186-190.

47. Ibid., p. 186.

48. Ibid., p. 187.

49. Ibid., p. 188.

50. Ibid..

51. Ibid., p. 189.

52. F. Fabbroni, op.cit.; and his bibliography on the period of the A.M.G. in Friuli is exhaustive.

53. Ibid., for all the election figures.

54. Ibid.

55. Messaggero Veneto, 14 January 1947; Il Gazzettino, 11 May 1946, 7 June 1946; Lotta e lavoro, July 1946; Libertà, 6 July 1947, are good examples of the debates.

56. Lotta e lavoro, 27 July 1947; Messaggero Veneto, 4 September 1947, and 31 October 1947.

57. De Cilla, op. cit.; and Fabbroni, op. cit, have extensive support in their studies of journalism at the time.

58. Il Nuovo Friuli, 3 October 1948.

59. Among the weekly publications surveyed were: Il Nuovo Friuli, the provincial voice of the DC. La Vita Cattolica was the only paper in the region without financial problems, and it had the same directors during fascism up until after the War. It was read by everyone and given out free in the parishes. It contained national news and waged a war locally against, any sort of immorality including; dancing women outside the house, socialists, comunists and any attempts at grass roots organization. Il Lavoratore Friulano was the voice of the local PSIUP and was begun in May 1945. After the end of the Tri-party coalition it was practically the only organ to speak out against Catholic control. Lotta e Lavoro belonged to the provincial federation of the PCI and was started in July of 1945. Among the daily publications were: Libertà, run by the provincial CLN up until the elections of June 1946 when the DC left the directorate. It was then run by the PSI, PCI, and the Partito d'Azione until a financial squeeze closed it in June of 1947. Il Gazzettino was run by the Partito d'Azione until it was taken over financially by the Christian Democrats. The DC also took over the editorial board in March of 1946 to use the paper toward the elections of 1948. Messaggero Veneto was opened in May of 1946 in the middle of an electoral battle, by industrial and agrarian investors using money from Friuli but also from Lombardy. It is distinctly conservative in tone and never has a good word to say about any strike or contadino action. Though at first it supported the Monarchy, it faithfully backed the DC whenever that party struck out against the Left. Once the DC was in power and the PCI and PSI were out, the line was fairly consistent though the paper also was the voice for the Liberals and the Qualunaquisti.

60. Il Nuovo Friuli, 19 August 1945; and also 23 September 1945.

61. La Vita Cattolica, 30 September 1945, 7 October 1945; Messaggero Veneto 16 July 1946. The list of the testimonies published in Friuli alone could produce a volume. The most memorable artices on Russian-held prisoners are in La Vita Cattolica, 23 September 1945; and in Il Nuovo Friuli, 26 May 1946.

62. La Vita Cattolica, 10 June 1945; and again, Il Nuovo Friuli, 23 March 1947.

63. La Vita Cattolica 20 May 1945, 24 June 1945, 21 October 1945, and especially, 11 November 1945.

64. Compare Il Nuovo Friuli, 21 March 1946, 2 February 1947; also then, 1 June 1947. Messaggero Veneto, 22 July 1948, and successive numbers.

65. Elena Aga Rossi, Dal Partito Popolare alla Democrazia Cristiana, (Bologna: Cappelli, 1969) p. 333-334; and Curti and Bertolo Guerrini, "Aspetti della questione agraria e delle lotte contadine nel secondo dopoguerra in Italia: 1944-48," Italia contemporanea, (October-December, 1974.

66. Il Nuovo Friuli, 26 August 1945, 16 September 1945; also La Vita Cattolica, 19 August 1945.

67. La Vita Cattolica, 19 August 1945.

68. Ibid.

69. Il Nuovo Friuli, 9 December 1945.

70. Lotta e Lavoro, 4 February 1946; and 15 September 1945, especially.

71. Avanti, 13 February 1932, for the first quotation; and Il Lavoratore Friulano, 15 January 1946, for the second.

72. Fabbroni, op. cit., p. 62; and for report of the Liberal Party Congress in Friuli, see Libertà, 26 February 1946.

74. Messaggero Veneto, 20 August 1946, 1 July 1947; Il Nuovo Friul, 22 December 1946, 13 July 1947; Lotta e Lavoro, 29 May 1947.

75. Messaggero Veneto, 7 August 1948.

76. Lotta e Lavoro, 9, 23, 30 May 1948, 27 June 1948, 22 August 1948; Il Nuovo Friuli, 28 November 1948. Mario Lizzero, "Le campagne friulane nel Fascismo e nel dopoguerro," Quaderni Friulani, no. 1, (June, 1974), p. 9.

77. Faustino Nazzi, "Il ruolo dell'Azione Cattolica e dei Comitati Civici dal 1945 a 1948," Storia Contemporanea in Friuli, Anno VI, no. 7, (1976), p. 98-204.

78. Ibid., p. 122.

79. Ibid., p. 130.

80. Ibid.

81. Comitato Civico Diocesano (hereafter C.C.D.) No. 1, 8 January 1948. In the Diocesan library, correspondence for a day is numbered in order of appearance, whether sent or received.

82. C.C.D., no. 2, of 9 January 1948.

83. C.C.D., no. 3 to 7, of 9 January 1948.

84. La Vita Cattolica, 4 April 1948.

85. La Vita Cattolica, 28 March 1948.

86. Nazzi, op. cit., p. 157.

87. Ibid., p. 161-167.

88. R. Faenza, Gli Americani in Italia, (Milano, 1976) p. 257; Fascicolo Finanze, Relazione C.C.D., 2 September 1948.

89. C.C.D., no. 27, of 12 February 1948.

90. C.C.D., no. 28, of 12 February 1948.

91. Nazzi, op. cit., p. 176-178.

92. G. Dossetti, "Il 18 aprile e l'11 maggio," Cronache Sociali, (15 May 1948).

93. La Vita Cattolica, 25 April 1948. Il Nuovo Friuli, 25 April 1948.

94. Dossetti, op. cit., and Nazzi, op. cit., p. 185.

95. Camillo Daneo, Breve storia dell'agricoltura italiana 1860-1970, (Milano: Mondadori, 1980), Chapter IX synthesizes the writing of various authors on Italy in this period, such as Dario Perini on the overall situation, Corrado Bonato on Lombardy, Enzo Pampaloni on Tuscany, Vincenzo Ricchioni on Puglia, Carlo Vanzetti on the Veneto. Also used for this section is the Enciclopedia Monografica del Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Vol. 3 part 2, p. 757-766, (hereafter E.M. del F.-V.G.)

96. Daneo, ibid., p. 151.

97. Daneo, ibid.

98. E.M. del F.-V.G., op. cit., p. 758.

99. Daneo, op. cit., p. 152-153.

100. Ibid., p. 154.

101. Antonio Toldo, "La riforma agraria; risultati, obiezoni, rilievi," Aggiornamenti sociali, (January, 1957), p. 363-380.

102. Ibid., p. 365.

103. Daneo, op. cit., p. 157.

104. Ibid., and E.M. del F.-V.G., op. cit., p. 760.

105. Ibid., p. 158.

106. ISTAT census figures.

107. Daneo, op. cit., p. 165.

108. Ibid., p. 159.

109. Professor Rossi-Doria in La Stampa, 2 and 5 February 1956, p. 1.

110. Daneo, op. cit., p. 163-164.

111. Ibid.

112. Paolo Gratton, "La Cooperativa agricola di Aquileia (1950-53), "Storia contemporanea in Friuli, Anno IX, no. 10, (1979), explains the PCI policy nationally and its local interpretation.

113. Daneo, op. cit., p. 168.

114. Ibid., p. 169.

115. Confagricoltura was the large landowner's association which before, had always been responsible for agricultural policy. Federconsorzi was the group which was to coordinate and lead the public consortiums such as that for public works. More about it will be said later in the text. Also see glossary on agricultural organizations.

116. Daneo, op. cit., p. 172.

117. Toldo, op. cit., p. 379-380.

118. Daneo, op. cit., p. 174.

119. Ibid, p. 175.

120. G. Fabiani, "Il Piano del Lavoro e le lotte per la riforma," Il Piano del Lavoro della C.G.I.L. 1949-1950,

Atti del convegno organizzato della facoltà di Economia e Commercio dell'Università di Modena, 9-10 May 1973, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1978), p. 105-115.

121. E. Sereni, IL Mezzogiorno all'opposizione, (Torino, 1948) is excellent on De Gasperi's "forth party" and his cabinet.

122. C. Daneo, La politica economica della ricostruzione 1945-49, (Torino: Einaudi, 1975) especially p. 231-244.

123. Ibid.; and the E.M. del F.-V.G., Vol. 3, part 1, p. 411-434.

124. R. Stefanelli, Lotte agrarie e modello di sviluppo, 1947-1967, (Bari: De Donato, n.d.), p. 168-169.

125. P. Santi, "Il Piano del Lavoro nella politica della C.G. I.L., 1949-1952," in Il Piano del Lavoro, op. cit., p. 38.

126. G. Bonifati and F. Vianello, "L'economia italiana al tempo del Piano del Lavoro," in ibid., p. 89.

127. Daneo, La politica economica, op. cit., p. 320.

128. Laura and Marco Puppini, "L'amministrazione di concentrazione Repubblicana di Tolmezzo (1946-1951)," Qualestoria, Anno VII, no. 3, (November, 1979).

129. Ibid., p. 1.

130. Ibid.; and Messaggero Veneto, 18 March 1947.

131. Puppini, ibid., p. 2.

132. Libertà, 3 January 1947; Messaggero Veneto, 5 January 1947; Libertà, 5 January 1947; F. Fabbroni, op. cit., p. 17-18 on the closing of Libertà, also see footnote 59 above.

133. Libertà, 4 and 5 February 1947.

134. Libertà, 19 February 1947. Many of the verbal records of meetings are contained in the Istituto regionale per la storia del movimento di Liberazione, Udine archive CXXXIX/5.

135. Lotta e Lavoro, 13 July 1947; Messaggero Veneto, 2 January, 18 February, 2 April, 12 June 1948.

136. Messaggero Veneto, 21 May 1948; and Puppini, op. cit.

137. The government gave 250,000 lire, the Banca di Friuli 55,000, the Banca Carnica 50,000 and during July and August of 1950, there was an article on the show every day in Messaggero Veneto.

138. Messaggero Veneto, 27 August 1949, 27 April 1950, and 27 August 1951.

139. Paolo Gratton, op. cit., whose research on Aquileia's Cooperative is extensive, was the major source and help for this section.

140. For the politics and sociology of this area, Paolo Gaspari, Le lotte del Cormor, Sociologia e storia della Bassa Friulana, (Udine: Centro Editoriale Friulano, 1980). For the economic and technical aspects of bonifica and argiculture see, Giuseppe de Piero, L'agricoltura della bassa pianura Friulana attraverso i tempi, (Udine: Chiandetti, 1975).

141. Gaspari, op. cit., p. 107.

142. Ibid., p. 108 and footnote 62.

143. Ibid., p. 115 and footnote 92.

144. The conclusions drawn in this final section are syntheses of several volumes, especially: Carlo Catena,(ed.), La politica agraria in Italia, (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1979); A.A.V.V., Statute agricoltura in Italia 1945-1970, (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1980); Carlo Desideri, L'amministrazione dell'agricoltura (19101980), (Roma: Officina Edizioni, 1981); Camillo Daneo, Agricoltura e sviluppo capitalistico in Italia, (Torino: Einaudi, 3rd ed., 1972); Renato Zangheri, Agricoltura e contadini nella storia d'Italia, (Torino: Einaudi, 1977); Giorgio Lunghini, (ed.), Scelte politiche e teorie economiche in Italia 1945-1978, (Torino: Einaudi, 1981); and Giuseppe Mammarella, L'Italia dopo il fascismo: 1943-1973, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974); as well as the relevant issues of Aggiornamenti Sociali for the years of 1950 on.

145. Vittorio Capecchi, Lorenzo Cillario, Giuliano Murgia, Adele Pesce, "Problemi e nodi politici del ciclo agro-industriale," Catena, (ed.), op. cit., p. 183-229.

CHAPTER FIVE

COMPROMISES AND CONTRASTS: EMIGRATION AND THE GROWTH OF URBAN AND RURAL INDUSTRY, 1958 - 1968

A. THE ROLE OF EMIGRATION AND THE ITALIAN ECONOMY IN THE EEC

Even before World War II, advanced industrial nations used labor from less advanced countries or from their own colonies. Emigration/immigration is a product of uneven development. Though different levels of development may explain the causes of emigration, the function of immigration is not simply that of acquiring more labor than is available at home in a period or rapid growth. Long-term unemployment and immigration may be present in a host country at the same time, which suggests that the imported workers fulfill selected tasks in particular phases of development. The immigrant must be very productive during expansion and expendible during a recession to prevent overproduction. During expansion the immigrant is expected to consume less in order to reduce infationary tensions and in a recession, to "cushion a decline in demand." The immigrant population is an excellent "crisis regulator" for advanced industrial nations. Italian immigrants played all these roles in European Economic Community countries such as Switzerland, France and Germany while employed in jobs which were not those preferred by their natives.[1]

When the European Economic Community's agrarian policy was decided upon, capital, energy and labor were still at low prices. It was a good time to develop manufacturing industries while agriculture could function on a restricted base of production. The possibilities for development in those few regions where agriculture was already competitive could be supported and furthered. The design suited the realities of each member state quite well. Each had something to gain as well as to offer. The Community's support was to be given to the farmers Holland and France. There was a need for cheap labor in Germany, and an abundance of that was available in the unemployed and underemployed agriculture of Italy. It all seemed to fit together nicely in the 1950s.

Within Italy itself, there was a political as well as an economic logic in the use of migrant labor for its own model of industrial development which is also the source of uneven regional development. The concentration of industry and its work force in northwestern Italy and the maintenance of the status quo in the South and areas such as Friuli, was the result of political bargain made between the urban industrial leaders and the large landholders. The latter were to maintain the labor resevoir while the others ran the centralized bureaucracy. Together in the Christian Democratic party, and in the company of the Church, they maintained the divisions between the urban and rural sectors. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Italian "miracle"

increased the disparity between the two. Emigration to the other EEC countries, however, began to produce another process of development in the countryside of Friuli which would eventually reduce the economic, if not as much of the social and political distance between them.

By the end of the early 1960s, part of Italy could be considered an advancing nation with an urban industrial sector in the Northwest and a modernized agriculture geared to the marketplace. From the countryside, Italy supplied the EEC emigrants as well as its own industry that was, however, largely geared to the production of exportable consumer goods. By 1964 investment in private industry began to fall, exports lost their dynamic for lack of technology. The period of expansion was over. Technical advances has improved agricultural production, but the dependence of the economy on exports arrested agaricultural development and eventually forced Italy to import agricultural products from the more advanced sectors in France and Holland. At the same time, the decreasing demand for consumer items on the national and international markets, put many large industries in crisis. The urban industrial model for Italy's development was not working as it has been expected to.

While the planners has promoted the growth of urban industry and mechanized agriculture, support for small farms and emigration were aimed at maintaining the pool of potential workers on the land. Subsistence agriculture was

not enough for many who stayed in the countryside waiting for life to get better. Emigration, artisan business and domestic or cottage industry were some of their alternatives. Much of Italy's rural world resembled an underdeveloped nation which was coexisting in a small geographical space with an advanced one. In Friuli-Venezia Giula, however, the rural economy, built on alternatives to mere subsistence, began to adjust itself to the marginal role it was playing in Italian industrial development.

B. FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA: THE ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVE IN A MARGINAL ECONOMY DURING THE ITALIAN ECONOMIC "MIRACLE"

Friuli was a depressed area during Italy's period of economic expansion. As some of the people left the land, mechanization modernized the agriculture of part of the Bassa. The rest of the land remained in fragmented holdings. Emigration as a response to the lack of industrial work available locally, did not bring about a change land tenure. It permitted its crystalization instead, as returns came in which allowed the families of the emigrants to remain on the land. In turn, land, house and family as reference points of the rural economy were a response to the economic situation in which emigration was required for survival. Such values were not simply remnants of tradition. These along with the savings acquired through temporary and seasonal migration, increased the value of and the demand for land rather than encouraging its consolidation. It was on the basis of land speculation that the local ecomoic and political leaders consolidated their post-war power. Those who has been large landholders profited from their land and invested the returns in traditional urban industries of Friuli or elsewhere in Italy. Thereafter, they took little interest in a countryside where they did not live. The urban and rural areas of Friuli developed differently, and the urban-rural split within each province reflected these changes over time.

Through its long association with Venice, Pordenone was a Christian Democratic stronghold from the start. It had seen little partisan action and soon after the War, both Party and Church began to invest in industry, creating an urban area that had not existed as such before. Agriculture was reorganized to some degree in the surrounding fields. Where extensive farming was possible, investments were made by public corporations and financiers from outside the area. Politics became a simple matter of maintaining control over resources.

Gorizia and Trieste were ridden with not just anti-communism, but also anti-Slavic sentiments right after the War. It did not help matters that refugee Istrians were given preferential treatment, and were the first in the territory to receive housing and jobs. Resentment against them ran deep, but also turned against the Italian State which had put them there. On the other hand, in the forty-five days in which Yugoslavia occupied the eastern areas of Friuli, it was only fascists who were taken away, people's property was not confiscated. These Provinces experienced the most constant flow of anti-communist propaganda. The city of Gorizia and Trieste were run by DC administrations. The countryside was split between DC and PCI.

In the Province of Udine, the DC was also strongest in the cities. Northern Carnia had pockets of Christian Socialism, but there was mostly misery and poverty there

before the war and little changed afterwards. The Church promoted anti-communist votes with some success. The Bassa's braccianti organization was isolated geographically on the islands and marsh land that surrounds the Adriatic Sea. It remained a communist island before and after fascism. Its political isolation was a reflection of politics under De Gasperi when the PCI was not only out of the government but nationally quaranteened, and so it continued to be in the 1950s. Shipbuilding in the Monfalcone area just north of Trieste and big industries such as Zanussi in Pordenone flourished because of American investments. Well-being came slowly and in only some areas of the region.

During the era of the Cold War and Korea, the Church and the Christian Democracy were at the heart of everything in Friuli. The last election speech was always from the local pulpits. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the history of the Christian Democrat's progress in the countryside is also that of the parrochia. The Church increased its control over all possible cultural organizations. Pius XII pushed the Catholic Scouts, and gave support to groups of every personal and occupational category imaginable. Traditional individualist values were upheld through these still corporativist agencies, creating insurmountable problems for alternative organizations such as the cooperatives. There was little or no effort to these years to change the nature of the small direct cultivator. If he

needed a letter from the priest for a loan, he needed even more support for such a venture as a cooperative, unless he lived in the Bassa where the Communist party controlled some of the resources.

In other words, the social and political leadership of Friuli-Venezia Giulia continued to depend on political and social polarization and a division of tasks between them. The Church dominated the countryside and the DC the cities. The PCI did the best it could in agricultural regions to coexit with the Church. Political changes that came about over time reflect the dual development which took place in each of the two worlds.

The rural areas of Middle Friuli and the Bassa which had the highest rates of emigration during the 1950s and the 1960s also had the greatest concentration of small and medium-sized part-time farms. This is the same zone where the greatest industrial development took place during the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the exception of more remote mountain regions where emigration continued. In Central and Lower Friuli, part-time farming and the possiblity of local employment through a dispersion of small industrial units, became a substitute for temporary emigration. Integrated income provided local industry with an inexpensive and flexible work force capable of reproducing itself.

The pre-industrial social structure was changed as it responded to the diseconomies of urban-centered industrial

development. A rural bourgeoisie developed which lived with the manual labor it made use of in the countryside and was a very different type than its urban counterpart. The contadino-operaio is not a rural proletariat even though its economic conditions bare some superficial resemblance to that of an urban worker. Together they make up a rural industrial social structure in Friuli which coexists in the same region with an urban-centered commercial-industrial bourgeoisie. The political development of two separate societies has taken place not just at different rates of speed then, but in different worlds. Emigration has played a central part in the social, economic and political development of Friuli's countryside.

C. THE HISTORY OF EMIGRATION AS THE STORY OF RURAL FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA: THE THREE STAGES OF THE CONTADINO-OPERAIO'S DEVELOPMENT

The period from 1945 to the present contains three different moments where changes in the labor market and migratory movements were significant. 1945 to 1958 were years when the urban industrial model was central to development plans. Because of an insufficient number of jobs in Friuli, the emigration from there reached its maximum in that period. Then with the growing demand for labor from outside Italy, emigration became more temporary and seasonal and less permanent. Because he was rarely accepted as an equal member of the society in which he worked, the emigrant began to transfer his hopes for social mobility and his future back to his place of origin.[2]

From 1959 to 1968, the urban-industrial model began to show signs of stagnation and crisis, and interest began to be transferred to small and medium sized industries in rural areas. Businesses of artisan origin showed particular growth in these years. Part of the reason for their growth can be found in the increasingly temporary time of the emigrant's stay elsewhere. The flow of generations that left was balanced by the return of those who were retiring. This is the migratory chain that was formed between urban areas and foreign lands with rural zones. Through the emigrants' salaries, renovation of homes and farms began especially in the areas of heaviest migrant populations.

Between 1969 and 1980, the model of decentralized industrial development was preferred over the old urban model and along with the new one came an inversion of migratory movements. The earthquakes in Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 1976 brought an acceleration of reentries and more money with which to further local industrial development. [3]

Between 1945 and 1958 the "choice" to emigrate was made increasingly as it presented the only possible solution given the imbalances between the supply and demand of the labor market compared to possibilities for employment in other Italian areas or abroad. Just how forced this "choice" was in these years depended on one's area of origin and the development which was or was not taking place there. The following figure, tables, and maps show both the numbers involved and the dynamic of the movements. Seasonal and temporary employment elsewhere permitted many of the reentries and allowed the families to remain behind. Most of the pre-war departures had been permanent moves.Over time the trend began to change.

The zones of heaviest emigration were also those areas where industrial jobs to supplement what the land could produce were the least available. Thus, the urban areas of Udine and Pordenone in the Friulan region and almost all of the Giulian area saw little of what was an exodus from mostly rural zones. Over 80% of those who were "temporarily absent" came from the Friulan area and only 18.9% from Giulia. Of the approximately 95,000 people who left


Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 1951, a bit less than half went to other parts of Italy while a few more than half went abroad. Almost 70% of these emigrants were young men. Most of them came from the hill and mountain areas with a subsistence economy.

It was from the Bassa and other parts of the plain that workers tended to travel to the Giulan part of the territory to find work. In some cases a daily commute was possible for these workers, where it was completely impossible for those from remote mountain regions; thus the Bassa and areas around Udine served as local labor reservoirs for Giulan industry while those from the hills and mountains of Carnia went further away for jobs. Where there was the ability to travel to a local job and the possibility of continued farming, as we have seen in placed like Cormor, emigrants in this period tended not to go abroad. While there was still hope for the improvement of agriculture and opportunities such as the Cooperative of Aguileia, movement was more temporary.

Figure 1

1946 to 1979:

Emigration and Reentries in Friuli-Venezia Giulia



From Elena Saraceno, Emigrazione rientri, 1981, p. 33

Table 1

Emigration and Reentry in Friuli-Venezia Guila

From 1946 to 1979.

ISTAT, Annuario di Statistiche Demografiche 1973 and

ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di Statistica for each year.

Year	Emigration	Reentry
1946	10,558	356
1947	21,207	5,223
1948	24,474	9,505
1949	17,178	9,226
1950	14,389	4,148
1951	22,308	5,365
1952	17,126	8,271
1953	14,631	7,683
1954	15,630	7,465
1955	21,228	7,741
1956	20,099	9,593
1957	19,033	9,952
1958	12,973	8,434
1959	13,973	9,419
1960	17,580	12,131
1961	14,072	10,820
1962	12,524	10,712
1963	9,180	8,918
1964	10,521	8,926
1965	12,296	10,808
1966	13,219	11,622
1967	9,643	10,096
1968	8,104	8,572
1969	6,552	8,374
1970	5,984	7,816
1971	4,795	6,282
1972	4,211	6,241
1973	3,611	5,540
1974	3,514	5,015
1975	3,284	4,808
1976	2,916	4,313
1977	2,557	4,204
1978	2,663	3,911
1979	2,532	3,794

Temporary absences

Giulia in 1951.



more than 15%

from 10% to 15%

from 5% to 10%

up to 5%


Urban and suburban residents

Percent of temporary a
residents of a communit

Emigrazione e rientri,

Map 1

Temporary absences in the communities of Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 1951.



Percent of temporary absences in relationship to registered residents of a community. From Elena Saraceno, Emigrazione e rientri, 1981, p. 35.

Table 2

Migratory Movement in Friuli-Venizia Guila 1951

Zone/ Province	% of temporary absence	% of absence in relationship to no. of residents	% of total in in other communities	% of of abroad
Mountains	9.8	11.0	52.0	48.0
Western Foothills	11.3	15.8	34.1	65.9
Central Hills	18.2	15.5	33.3	66.7
Udine and Cividale	15.9	6.9	51.7	48.3
Pordenone and Sacile	12.2	8.4	38.1	61.9
Codroipo and San Vito	8.5	10.2	35.6	64.4
Bassa Friulana	5.8	5.2	70.0	30.0
Giulian area	18.3	4.1	66.6	33.4
Pordenone	27.9	10.8	36.4	63.6
Udine	53.2	9.2	45.9	54.1
Gorizia	6.3	4.5	78.8	21.2
Trieste	12.6	4.0	60.8	38.2
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	100.0	7.7	47.2	52.8

ISTAT, 9° Censimento Generale della Popolazione[4]

Table 3

Migratory Movement in Friuli-Venizia Guila 1961

Zone/ Province	% of temporary absence	% of absence in relationship to no. of residents	% of total in in other communities	% of of abroad
Mountains	13.2	19.7	38.2	61.8
Western Foothills	9.3	18.6	36.4	63.6
Central Hills	17.4	20.5	26.1	73.9
Udine and Cividale	16.1	8.4	45.5	54.5
Pordenone and Sacile	12.5	10.2	36.1	63.9
Codroipo and San Vito	6.8	11.5	33.2	66.8
Bassa Friulana	8.2	9.3	51.7	48.3
Giulian area	16.5	9.6	65.5	34.5
Pordenone	25.0	12.5	35.8	64.2
Udine	57.8	12.7	37.8	62.2
Gorizia	6.3	5.4	72.9	27.1
Trieste	10.9	4.4	61.6	38.2
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	100.0	9.7	42.1	57.9

ISTAT, 10° Censimento Generale della Popolazione

Table 4


Migratory Movement in Friuli-Venizia Guila 1971

Zone/ Province	% of temporary absence	% of absence in relationship to no. of residents	% of total in in other communities	% of of abroad
Mountains	12.2	9.3	71.2	28.8
Western Foothills	6.3	6.2	81.0	19.0
Central Hills	11.4	6.7	52.9	47.1
Udine and Cividale	17.3	3.7	82.5	17.5
Pordenone and Sacile	11.1	3.4	83.8	16.2
Codroipo and San Vito	4.5	3.5	85.1	14.9
Bassa Friulana	8.1	4.0	84.8	15.2
Giulian area	29.1	3.4	73.4	26.6
Pordenone	19.6	3.9	83.2	16.8
Udine	50.2	5.0	73.7	26.3
Gorizia	9.9	3.5	84.2	15.8
Trieste	20.3	3.5	68.7	31.7
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	100.0	4.2	75.5	24.5

ISTAT, 11° Censimento Generale della Popolazione

Map 2

Temporary absences in the communities of Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 1971.



Percent of temporary absences in relationship to registered residents of a community. From Elena Saraceno, Emigrazione e rientri, 1981, p. 91.

In the areas of heaviest emigration, we find that during the second period, from 1959 to 1968, the "choice" to emigrate became less forced by circumstances and more of a choice in fact. Possibilities for local employment in manufacturing improved, though the changes in this sector were modest at first. Emigrants went abroad in this new era because incomes in other countries or in other areas of Italy were higher than those in the region. Stemming from more than a lack of work at home, the decision to go abroad was the result of a family's desire to quickly acquire a level of saving it could not hope to achieve from the very limited industrial development in Friuli.

This situation makes the nature of the migratory chain clearer. If the purpose of emigration was to accumulate savings and reduce the cost of living at home, the likelihood of a permanent transfer diminished. This also explains the narrowing of the gap between the numbers of those departing and those returning in the later period. If it was easy to find work abroad, the emigrant could leave with a specific sum in mind that must be earned for his reentry. If the need arose, he would depart again and again. Early in his life he might leave with his wife who would also work abroad until the first child was born. The wife tended to remain behind, when the child reached school age. When the time came for the head of the family to retire or when a sufficient level of well-being had been achieved for the family, the next generation began the same cycle. Thus, the

migratory chain is both temporal and generational, but in this later period it is the element of choice rather than stark necessity which is most characteristic of this second wave of emigration.

What the figures cannot show us is that in this period there were two different types of migratory movement. Travel abroad was most common from the mountain and hill communities. 67.5% of the emigrants from these rural zones were predominantly men who left their families behind but who also returned from time to time. From the plains and from more urban areas, those who moved made up only 32.5% of the emigrants and only 65.5% of these who transferred to places nearer home were male. When part of the family went away together, the change of residence was more apt to become permanent over time, though the transfer was most often to another part of the Region or another community in Italy, where there were fewer cultural barriers.

The most typical emigrant of the second period was a male from a rural Friulan area who left behind an extensive traditional family where those who did not enter the labor market ran the farm: retirees, the housewife-contadina, students, and children. The male head of the family and sons over 18 left seasonally or for years at a time. Agriculture provided the family's day to day subsistence and the emigrant's salary was to be saved to buy more fields or machinery or to renovate the house and barn. Proof that emigration was a way to save and accumulate can be seen in

the lack of change in consumption patterns for the family members who remained behind. Families who transfered to the cities changed their way of living completely. Thus, the maintenance of the contadino way of life permitted a higher rate of savings for the rural family than it did for the urban one.

One of the uses to which the rural emigrant's savings were put, the acquisition of fields that had once been rented, prevented the desertion of the countryside which would have taken place if the entire family left for urban areas. Though it was without its male members for long periods of time, the rural family was still intact and in its place or origin. It is in these areas that the migratory chain is most noticeable as the young left and the retirees reentered. Such a chain, however, depends on temporary migration. Thus, while the availability of jobs on a local labor market is an important impetus for migration, the pull of external labor market should not be forgotten either. The two together affect how permanent or temporary emigration is and influence not just the lives of the emigrants and their families, but their expectations as well.

An example of some of the effects of temporary as opposed to permanent emigration can be found in Cosattini's study of the move of workers toward centers of industry after 1500. Though a great many emigrants did not participate directly in industrial production, the artisan and

agricultural products of rural areas became uncompetitive at the same time that their producers' expectations for a better life were increasing. Industry made cheaper mass-produced goods but also created an economic situation where it was harder for many to buy them. By the end of the 1800s, this situation changed from what had been temporary emigration to more permanent moves abroad in search of a better life. Between 1876 and 1942, almost 2 million emigrants left Friuli and only about 14.7% returned. From 1946 to 1958, 230,476 people left but 64,909, or about 28%, returned. In this period the nature of emigration changed again and became a new form of temporary emigration. [5]

The causes for these changes are both local and international. The major non-European countries that had received the greatest number of emigrants in the past, blocked entry in the same post-war period when Europe began to need manual labor in great quantities for reconstruction. The strong demand from England, France, Switzerland and Germany changed the emigrant's destination. It was also a new type of demand that replaced the old one. European host countries restricted the stay of foreign workers, regulated their work bureaucratically and had very specific limitations on family allowed to follow the worker. The emigrants' social and occupational mobility was blocked and carefully circumscribed. The new situation had to be temporary because of the politics of the host country.

As the emigrant became aware of these changes, he also shifted his desires for social mobility back to the place from which he had come, usually to where he had left his family. This was quite a different attitude than the one of a permanent emigrant who spoke of "doing America" as a way of saying he would make his fortune. The possibility of climbing the social ladder in another country was almost completely blocked after the Second World War. The emigrant changed his relationship then to the society in which he worked and became a "guest" rather than a citizen. He substituted the making of money for the old desire of social acceptance and, once he had the savings, he could return home to retire. Thus, after World War II, emigration was for a specific purpose and for a limited period of time. The more temporary the foreign job and the less likely the emigrant is to settle abroad, the more important his place of origin became. While emigration before the war had been responsible for a great loss of population, temporary emigration in turn permits the country of origin to be the place of the emigrant's eventual residence.

From a cultural point of view, the traditional society at home will be strengthened as it is remembered by the emigrant in comparison to the host country's society which did not accept him. In this context, the desire to have one's own house, which seems to be almost a fixation of most emigrants can be seen as the need to have material reassurance of a place to return to while in a temporary job far

from home. The family home in Friuli has become a cultural heritage and symbol of the traditional contadino family. Given the contadino's history, the house and all the traditional values it represents has served an important purpose.[6]

D. EMPLOYMENT CHOICES "AT HOME": THE DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN GIULIA

For the labor market, the period between 1945 and 1958 resembled the situation after the First World War, but there were new elements as well. The state of Friuli's infrastructure and the importance of the urban-industrial model created the highest rate of emigration in relation to resident population in all of Italy.

An analysis of the labor market must include a careful exploration of the need for workers in the manufacturing sector, as it is this group of industries which are of major importance for economic development and for the urban-industrial model. The variables which must be considered in each type of manufacturing are: where it is located within the province, its prevalence in urban or rural areas, the socio-economic zone of its location, its dimension, and its origins, and whether it is supported by finances from inside or outside the Region. These characteristics can then be used to demonstrate changes which took place during the subsequent periods.

The quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the labor supply must be considered in relationship to where it is found in the region, the social and economic state of each zone as well as its cultural environment, the relationship to land, and the means of production. The perspectives for social mobility in relation to labor supply

and demand will be clearer in this light. It is on this basis that the intensity and dynamic of the migratory movements help define the development of those zones which are the sources of emigration, and help describe the nature of the emigrants as well.

1. The Labor Market

Right after World War II, the national census showed that there were 1,226,121 people residing in Friuli-Venezia Giulia. About 45.6% or 559,759 were active on the labor market while about 7.7% of the total population was abroad or in other parts of Italy. Within the region, 559,759 were employed though only 200,685 had non-agricultural jobs. 91,876 worked in manufacturing industry and about 359,110 had work defined by formal agricultural categories.[7]

Table #5 suggests that unemployment was wide-spread after the War but it says little about underemployment. The labor market outside of agriculture and the growth of industry are factors which permitted some families to remain on the land. These will also decide whether some of the family will remain while the men emigrate or whether the whole family will change its residence. Many of those who are employed in agriculture are among the seasonally unemployed and when there is no day-labor to be found, these too will look for manufacturing or construction jobs to fill the family's financial gaps.

Table 5

Employment in Friuli-Venizia Giulia in 1951

Province	Agri-culture	Non-agri-culture	Manu-fac-turing	Other Non-agri-culture	Active Residents %	Active Residents number
Pordenone	86,926	27,992	16,734	11,258	20.5	114,918
Udine	179,947	86,137	31,105	37,105	44.3	248,084
Gorizia	31,450	28,276	18,390	9,886	10.7	59,726
Trieste	60,787	76,280	25,720	50,560	24.5	137,067
Urban and Suburban Commun-ities	116,857	143,960	66,582	77,378	46.6	260,817
Rural areas and Moun-tains	242,253	56,725	25,294	31,431	53.4	298,978
Total for Friuli-Venizia Giulia	359,110	200,685	91,876	108,836	100.0	559,795

ISTAT, 9° Censimento Generale della Popolazione

ISTAT, 3° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

Even though there were a certain number of jobs outside of agriculture in 1951, there was only about one job for every three who were looking for one and if one included agricultural employment, there was no more than one job for every two people who wanted one. When this information is broken down by provinces, Pordenone and Udine, the Friulan part of the region, had 64.8% of the employable workers. Gorizia and Trieste, or the Giulian section, had only 32.2% while 52.1% of the available jobs were to be found in this area. Jobs were much harder to find in the North and the West than in the Southeast.

Looking at the manufacturing sector in each area by itself, there were about four employable people in the Friulan zone for every job, while the ratio in the Giulian part of the territory was about 2 to 1. The whole of Friuli-Venezia Giulia had a great many more potential workers than it had jobs, but where there was much more supply than demand in the North and the West, these areas were potential sources of emigration even though they continued to have a greater potential for agricultural employment.

The labor market in Friuli also reflects the differences between the supply and demand configurations of rural and urban sectors. Certainly agricultural employment was more likely to be found in small centers, but because land tenure was so fragmented, alternative employment was also more necessary in the same areas.

Actively employable residents are more numerous in rural areas while the majority of non-agricultural jobs are to be found in urban areas, though even the number of jobs there cannot fulfill the needs of all the city's residents. If there were two job seekers for every position available in urban areas, in the countryside the ratio was 5 people for every non-agricultural job. These figures also suggest that it is the rural people who will more often need to move to find work in industry, though as we have seen, local demand could not begin to absorb them all. It is a classic situation in which emigration becomes the only answer for many.

2. Supply vs. Demand

Another factor which influenced the emigration of many workers was the type of job available in Friuli after World War II and the sort of worker who was most apt to be given the position. The largest manufacturing employers in the region in 1951 were the machine tool and textile industries. These two were predominantly located in urban areas, but there their similarity ends. The first industry started up in the region with large plants which held 100 or more workers and were placed mostly in the Giulian sector. Job definitions were typical of modern industry where there are few managerial positions in proportion to the total number of workers. Both categories were predominantly filled by men.

The traditional textile industry was usually made up of many medium- to large-sized plants hiring smaller numbers of workers. Here, too, there were few managerial positions available in proportion to the overall numbers employed but 84% of the total number who worked in this sector were women. The same patterns can be found in the next two largest industries of the region: clothing and furniture production. Both hired about 10,000 workers though the plant sites were divided fairly evenly between urban and rural settings. Clothing was a slightly more urban-based activity than furniture, and while both industries tended to be located more often in the Friulan area than the Giulian one.

More than half of the clothing industry was carried out in shops of only one or two workers and the entire sector was dominated by artisan enterprises. More than 50% of these businesses were operated by women working with other women and many were family-run affairs. The furniture industry also operated in a great many small shops. Although there were also medium sized and larger plants, these never employed more than 500 people to a plant. The great number of small units which where artisan-run businesses inflates the percentage of managerial positions in the sector.

Thus, the two largest industries in Friuli in 1951 were distinctly traditional while the third had more modern characteristics. Fifth and sixth in order of dimension,

Table 6

Profile of Major Manufacturing Industires in Friuli-Venizia Giulia 1951

Industry	Number	%	Urban	Rural	Friulan	Giulan	Size of Business by Number Employed							
							1-2	3-5	6-10	11-50	51-100	100-500	501-1000	1000+
Machine tools	29,028	31.0	87.9	12.1	25.3	74.7	8.6	6.3	4.9	10.6	3.9	8.8	5.4	51.4
Textiles	17,015	18.1	79.1	20.9	73.9	26.1	7.1	1.5	1.0	3.7	7.8	25.8	13.3	39.8
Clothing	10,425	13.4	56.4	43.6	61.4	38.6	56.3	15.6	6.4	9.4	4.0	8.3	-	-
Furniture	10,204	11.2	40.6	59.4	76.5	23.5	21.7	14.4	13.1	24.8	8.3	17.7	-	-
Food and Tobacco	8,157	8.2	68.5	31.5	49.3	50.7	11.9	12.9	10.1	22.8	18.5	23.8	-	-
Paper Products	5,470	6.5	74.7	25.3	53.9	46.1	7.3	5.7	6.4	18.8	11.6	50.2	-	-
Chemicals	4,850	4.9	65.3	34.7	42.9	57.1	1.8	3.1	4.2	10.2	11.4	12.9	29.8	26.6
Tile, Glass and Cement	3,924	3.9	56.9	43.1	77.3	22.7	4.0	6.2	5.7	41.2	21.7	21.2	-	-
Metallurgy	2,803	2.8	89.6	10.4	54.5	45.5	-	-	-	0.6	3.5	50.2	-	45.7
Totals	91,876	100.0	72.5	27.5	52.0	48.0	14.6	7.6	5.7	13.3	8.0	18.6	5.7	26.5

ISTAT, 3° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

Table 7

Profile of Major Manufacturing Industries in Friuli-Venezia Giula 1951

Industry	Average no. of employees per plant	Percent of employees in artisan businesses in relation to the total number of people employed in a type of manufacturing industry	Percent of employees by position			Percent of women by position			Percent of female workers per sector
			Heads	Foremen	Workers	Heads	Foremen	Workers	
Machine tools	10.4	13.9	13.6	12.9	73.5	0.6	2.7	3.6	6.9
Textiles	13.8	21.4	8.3	2.7	89.0	7.2	0.9	75.9	84.0
Clothing	1.9	76.4	64.5	1.4	34.1	25.9	0.6	24.1	50.6
Furniture	4.2	19.2	34.8	5.2	60.0	1.2	3.0	4.6	8.8
Food and Tobacco	7.1	14.8	23.8	11.9	64.3	5.8	3.9	30.5	40.2
Paper Products	11.0	13.6	12.6	12.2	75.2	2.5	3.2	30.8	36.5
Chemicals	29.1	5.9	3.9	23.1	73.0	0.5	5.7	5.8	12.0
Tile, Glass and Cement	13.4	7.9	10.1	5.1	84.8	0.1	0.1	1.9	2.1
Metallurgy	254.0	-	0.6	13.3	86.1	-	1.1	2.5	3.6
Totals	6.5	21.5				5.3	2.4	24.0	

ISTAT, 3° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

food and tobacco, and paper could be termed transitional. Though both were carried out in modern plants with technologically up to date machines, as businesses, they were run traditionally. Both could be found fairly equally distributed between rural and urban settings, and in Friulan and Giulian areas, though both tended to be a bit more urban than rural-based.

This distribution is easily explained by the fact the businesses such as bakeries and butcher shops tend to be found in all towns, large or small, while breweries are more likely to be located in larger centers. The paper industry was more often found in the Friulan than in the Giulian areas because it is in the former where most of the lumber was grown. In the paper plants, as many as 36% of the employees were women and many of them were the wives of the braccianti who worked for the large tree farm of SAICI in Torviscosa in the Bassa. The paper industry operated plants which tended to be larger than those for the food and tobacco sector which favored smaller sized units more typical of artisan businesses.

Again, typical of the traditional industries, 40% of the employees were women, though their inclusion in large numbers in this category is due to the fact that many businesses were counted here which would now fall into a commercial rather than a manufacturing classification. Part of the transition which these two sectors were undergoing during the 1950s will be seen in the changes of proportion

between managers and workers affected by larger plants in the paper sector and the elimination of small shops in the food and tobacco industry.

Finally, the three smallest employers of the Region in the 1950s were the chemical and metallurgy industries and the various tile, cement, and glass works. The first two were most often found in urban settings and the third was only a bit more urban than rural. More than half the chemical plants hired from 500 to 1000 workers while the other half tended to be of medium size. Metallurgy had a few small units but 96% of these businesses employed from 11 to 1000 people. There were few artisan shops in the chemical sector and absolutely none in metallurgy because of the expenses required in production. Tile and glass were most often produced in small artisan business while cement production accounted for the large-sized plants which hired as many as 500, but for all three products a great many plants existed where no more than 10 to 50 people worked.

The chemical industry was strictly modern and predominantly male oriented while the slightly more traditional shops which produced tile and glass hired more women. Metallurgy, in a transitions from traditional businesses to ones with more modern equipment, hired fewer women over time. All of these activities were more likely to be situated in the Giulian part of the territory except the smaller plants dedicated to metallurgy which were mostly in the Friulan area. The larger plants in this sector were

linked to the ship building industry around Trieste and were situated close by.

The chemical and metallurgy enterprises, all the most modern parts of all the industries in Friuli after World War II, tended to have administrative seats outside the region. If it is possible to say that 65,191 workers had jobs in locally financed manufacturing industry, and there were 91,976 jobs in the entire category, then it may be surmised that 26,785 were employed by businesses which depended on financing from outside Friuli-Venezia Giulia. There were then about 480 businesses in this category whose capital provided jobs for about 29% of the employees in the manufacturing sector.

From the above data, it is possible to differentiate two types of businesses more clearly. The first includes food, clothing, furniture, tile, and glass. The number of local enterprises correlates strongly with the number of employees hired. These tend to be based more often in rural and Friulan areas. The second type includes the textile industry, metallurgy, and the chemical business. These hired a greater number of workers in relationship to the overall picture, but the number of businesses is lower and they are more often dependent on financing from outside the Region. They are also most often urban-based and located in the Giulian part of the territory.

The largest business of all, the machine tool industry, falls into an intermediate category because of the variety

of enterprises which have been included. The large units linked to shipbuilding fall within the second group while the small shops, often in the Friulan region, should be included in the first. Outside capital could also be found in traditional industries such as textiles and in such modern ones as metallurgy. As the national plan for development began to favor large urban industry over other types there was an increase of funding to urban-centered ones, whether modern or traditional. This trend means that the Giulan area would get the majority of funds for development.

Right after World War II the provinces of Gorizia and Trieste were already the sites for a number of businesses which received their funding from outside the territory. These businesses accounted for at least 33% of the area's manufacturing jobs. This figure does not include those who were hired by the predominantly foreign-financed shipbuilding industries around Trieste. In both the Provinces of Udine and Pordenone, only 24% of the workers were hired by businesses which had administrative seats outside of the Region. If 460 extra-regionally based business are only 3.2% of the total in Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 1951 and 84.2% of the total are very local and small artisan affairs then of the modern or larger industries, only 12.6% are financed by local investors.

The average number of employees for an artisan business was 1.6 (25 for the larger regionally financed companies) and the average for the extra-regionally based industries

was 58 employees. Thus, we can conclude that regional industry is dominated by small rural based traditional artisan businesses, while outside financiers favored urban settings in the Guilan area where they backed larger plants whether the industry was a traditional or a modern one.

From these figures we can draw a few more conclusions about the state of industry and the labor market in post-World War II Friuli-Venezia Giulia. The occupational pyramid was heavily weighted at the bottom, with few office workers and foremen in relation to the number of low level employees; there were, however, a great number of independent workers in the artisan businesses. These later represented an effort to maintain an alternative to the very restricted possibilities for advancements in the larger industries as well as to the limited number of jobs offered on the labor market. This logic can be seen in the predominance of artisan enterprises in rural and Friulan areas compared to the greater number of positions in the Giulian labor market. The availability of jobs in traditional as opposed to modern industries underlines the conclusion. In the modern industries, the ratio of workers to office personnel and foremen tended to be even more weighted at the bottom than it was in the traditional ones, regardless of where the administrative base of the industry was. Consequently, it was only the rural based small artisan shop which seemed to be able to provide the possibility for social mobility without emigrating, and this need was most

acutely felt in the Friulan part of the territory where we have seen that most of the locally financed artisan industries were located.

The large incidence of feminization of this artisan sector in the Friulan area is another indicator that this sort of business was the only choice for mobility a woman had if she did not wish to work in a mill or the assembly line of a predominantly traditional industry. With the need to supplement family income from what could be grown on the land, women had even fewer choices than men outside of other agricultural labor. With time the implications of the situation will grow in importance.

In conclusion, the Giulian area presents a very clear example of the sort of development that can be imagined using the urban-industrial model. The machine tool industry employed the greatest number of workers, the majority of whom worked in large plants which were situated in urban areas. The mostly male labor force made up a pyramidal occupational structure with few responsible positions at the top, and most of the workers in skilled or unskilled jobs at the bottom, a situation typical of modern industry. The industrial sector was financed in large portion by both public and private funds from outside the Region. The agricultural areas of the Giulian zone were highly fragmented and land holdings there were mostly used for a family's subsistence.

Urban industrial development in the Friulan area was much less marked. The traditional sectors such as textiles and clothing manufacturing tended to predominate over other sorts of businesses, and the labor force had a much higher percentage of women, both in the textile mills and in the large number of very small artisan shops which catered especially to a local market. Investors, whether local or extra-regional, followed the logic of the urban-industrial model in a limited number of enterprises. Thus, because there were few modern-type plants, there were also fewer dependent workers and a less rigid organizational structure more typical of artisan-type businesses. The sort of economic structure resulting from this sort of industrial development meant that the Friulan region remained predominantly agricultural with even its industry being mostly rural based.

The model of industrialization imposed on Friuli-Venezia Giulia came about with the influx of capital from outside the region which concentrated its investments in urban areas and on plants of medium to large size, whether the sector itself was traditional or modern. However, the model did not provoke the same degree of urbanization that it did elsewhere. The need for urban labor was easily filled by people who lived in the immediate area of development and in the Giulian area. Those who resided in the Friulan sector depended on the small industries and artisan businesses which were present mostly because of

local investments. The large gap between the demand and supply of labor in this area stimulated mass emigration during the 1950s, especially from agricultural zones which still made up a majority of the entire region. Both because of a lack of dramatic development in the Giulan area and because of emigration, the families of those who left at least remained on the land and maintained their traditional way of life and a homogeneous social structure.

3. Characteristics of the Labor Force

If emigration was seen as a negative judgement made by people about the local job market in relation to the possibilities they saw for employment in other places, the following chart shows, correspondingly, that the Friulan area was still more dependent on agriculture than the Giulian area. Around cities like Udine, the emergence of service industries provided other alternatives to agriculture or manufacturing.

The difference between the economies of the hill and mountain region and that of the plains is not made as clear in the data as other divisions are. At least 64.8% of the active population lived in the plains but only 47.9% of these were employed in 1951. Of the employed in the hills and mountains, 64.4% are in agricultural jobs and only 35.6% live in cities or towns, meaning that the majority of those from Northern Friuli still have agricultural occupations and live in rural areas. The extreme fragmentation of land

Table 8

Distribution of Active Workers in Friuli 1951

Zone/ area	Agriculture %	Industry %	Service %	Total %
Friuli				
Mountains	32.9	44.8	22.3	100.0
Western Foothills	38.0	44.5	17.5	100.0
Central Hills	37.1	46.1	16.8	100.0
Udine and Cividale	33.3	33.6	33.1	100.0
Pordenone and Sacile	43.2	39.0	17.8	100.0
Bassa Friulana	46.4	33.5	20.1	100.0
Giulian area	6.0	38.8	55.2	100.0
Provinces				
Pordenone	43.7	38.9	17.4	100.0
Udine	38.0	37.8	24.2	100.0
Gorizia	17.6	46.7	35.7	100.0
Trieste	2.2	35.0	62.8	100.0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	28.1	38.3	33.6	100.0

ISTAT, 9° Censimento Generale della Popolazione

ISTAT, 3° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

tenure permitted people of the plains to remain on the land but with a very marginal income, rarely enough for the whole family's survival. If there were no opportunities for nearby artisan or industrial jobs, some member of the family was required to look to the labor market in the Giulian sector where there were more jobs, or to go abroad.

Fragmentation of land in the hills and mountains had also made it hard to acquire an adequate income but, as emigration had been common from these areas since 1500, some of the remittances had been reinvested in the territory to create businesses and commercial enterprises which could provide some alternative income to supplement temporary emigration. Changes during the 1800s had destroyed this tenuous balance and the flow of emigration was channeled toward seasonal construction jobs to complement what was produced in subsistence farming. Between the two world wars, and especially after the second, what few large holdings remained were broken up. Many were sold to direct cultivators and mezzadri, but even with technological advances in farming, the yields were still low and rarely went beyond the subsistence level. In 1951, even where artisan business or construction work was available, owning a rural residence and doing some farming were essential for the survival of about 70.6% of the actively employable mountain and hill population. The situation was little different for most of the rural people of the plains, but at least the agricultural yields tended to be higher. If the

farm was not much bigger, the growing season was longer and the soil richer and better irrigated. This slightly better, though still tenuous, existence meant that, in the past, artisan activity had been less often necessary for those rural people on the plains. The need for alternatives had always been great in the mountains.

All of these factors suggest several things about the demographic composition and the class structure of Fruili. The rural residences of the people are spread out in the territory but are also centered in small settlements and villages, most of which originated during the late Middle Ages. The families of these towns are mostly of contadino origin. The settlers had placed their houses together with an entrance on the road. The other side opened onto fields which radiated out from the dwellings. The life of the community was centered around agricultural activities, which created a very homogeneous social group. The commercial and administrative bourgeoisie and the main residences of the landed nobility were located in the few cities.

The Guilian area of Fruili contained the urban areas of major importance: Gorizia, Monfalcone, Muggia and Trieste. Here is where 92.3% of the non-agricultural jobs in the region were found as well as 35.2% of the active population. These people were involved in industrial or service activities and included the administrative and commercial groups as well as the office workers for the larger industries. It is in this area then where most of Fruili's middle class

resided and in this characteristic resembles other industrialized areas.

Therefore, well into the 1950s there was a relationship in Fruili-Venezia Guilia between one's place of residence, one's occupation and one's class. There had been changes in the functions of various social groups and relations between classes, but the residence-work-class correlation has been maintained up to the present.

In part, it is the cohesion of the rural society, as well as the fact that supply of labor greatly exceeded demand, which prevented the land in Fruili from being deserted more completely and earlier than it was. Here we find the reverse of what took place during England's industrialization. In Fruili, the rural population's ties to the land were strengthened whenever they became able to buy or rent a new piece of land from the break-up of large holdings. The idea of permanently pulling up roots and going to the city was an unattractive alternative to be avoided at all cost while there was even the faintest hope of staying on the land.[8]

E. TIME OF TRANSITION: 1959 to 1968,

THE BEGINNINGS OF A RURAL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN FRIULI

1. Shifting Demand for Labor

In this period, the productive struction of Friuli-Venezia Giulia began to change in ways which are only partially illustrated by data from the 1961 census. Agricultural employment decreased, but the number of jobs in local industry did not grow to absorb those who were no longer full-time farmers. There were 24.6% more non-agricultural jobs in the region than there had been in 1951, 16.8% of which were in the manufacturing sector. However, overall, there were 11.9% fewer jobs offered in the region by 1961. When agricultural work is added to the total, there was now one job for every three people who wanted one in the region.[9]

There was a change in ratio between labor supply and demand because there had been a reduction in the population from emigration. There were also changes which lessened the differences between the Guilian and Friulan parts of the region and between the urban and rural areas. There were 40.6% more jobs in the Friulan part of the region than there had been in 1951, but an increase of only 9.9% in the Giulian section. For both areas, the increases came about in construction, which hired 58.6% more workers, and in the service sector where the percent of the total work force involved was up to 23.9% by 1961. Only 16.8% of those employed were in the manufacturing sector.

TABLE 9

Employment in Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 1961

Province	Agri-culture	Non-agri-culture	Manu-fac-turing	Other Non-agri-culture	Active Residents %	Active Residents number
Pordenone	56,871	40,479	21,483	18,996	19.7	97,350
Udine	124,697	94,669	38,793	55,876	44.5	219,366
Gorizia	21,379	35,165	19,573	15,592	11.5	56,544
Trieste	39,948	79,739	27,497	52,242	24.3	119,687
Urban and Suburban Communities	78,779	168,776	74,999	93,777	49.8	245,372
Rural areas and Mountains	242,895	81,276	32,347	48,920	49.8	245,372
Total for Friuli-Venizia Giulia	242,895	250,052	107,346	142,706	100.0	492,947

ISTAT, 10° Censimento Generale della Popolazione

ISTAT, 4° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

Within the Giulian area lived 35.8% of the region's employable population, though only 46% actually had jobs. Labor supply slightly exceeded demand so that for every four people who wanted a job, three were employed. More than half of the work force lived in the Friulan part of the Region. By 1961 more than half of the population had found employment though demand for labor was still less than supply. For every five people who wished to work, three had jobs, one of which was agricultural labor. The labor market had become a bit less disparate between areas of Friuli, but supply was still greater than demand.

By 1961, 5.4% fewer people lived in urban areas than in 1951, though rural areas had been reduced by 17.6%. It was mostly from the latter that people left to go abroad. They did not choose to live in local urban settings. The overall reduction of residents, greater from rural than urban areas, meant that fewer individuals of the employable population were seeking jobs and thus the distribution of these was more even between urban and rural areas than it had been in 1951.

There was an increase in urban employment of 17.2% and in rural areas of 43.3% but the need for labor was still concentrated in the cities if less so than it had been before. The variation was minimum in 1961 but it was a sign of the future. The urban-industrial model was still the central focus of the planners, and the need for workers in urban plants had reduced the gap between supply and demand

for labor in rural areas. After the flow of migration during the 1950s, those who remained had a better chance of finding a job, especially as demand began to increase with a growth of rural-based manufacturing. Things were beginning to be a bit better in the countryside because of emigration, but also because of a gradual industrial transition taking place there.

The urban-industrial model had another beneficial, if indirect, effect on rural areas. The growth of the service sector took place in urban areas more oten than in rural ones, but the reverse is true for the large expansion of the construction business. Service and construction both profited from the needs of the manufacturing industry. The beginning of a new well-being in the region inspired anyone who could to renovate dwellings and the remittances sent home by emigrants were a major source of the surge in rural construction. The service and construction sectors in Friuli grew as a result of industrial development in other parts of Europe.

2. The Expansion of Local Artisans Business

There were important national and international currents which affected development in Friuli during this period of transition, but the most important changes in the manufacturing sector were local. Gradual shifts become apparent when dimension, location, source of investment, and

the occupational structure in industry in the 1960s is compared with the same data from the post-war period.

Before 1961, the majority of investments in industry went into large urban enterprises but, at this time, though outside financing continued to be poured into big plants, some local entrepreneurs began to take an interest in expanding a few small and medium-sized businesses of artisan origin located in rural areas, often those where emigration had been heavy.

The example of Pordenone's development during the 1960s is a preview of the type of change that took place more widely in Friuli in the 1970s. The link between economic development, the cessation of emigration, and the diffusion of the contadino-operaio presents itself in the western-most part of Friuli at an earlier time than in the rest of the region.

The growing industries were metallurgy, machine tools, furniture, and tile, glass, and cement works. The food and tobacco sector more or less maintained its former status, while textiles, the clothing industry, chemicals, and paper all experienced changes in emphasis and dimension. In first place with the greatest number of employees was still machine tool manufacturing, but textiles lost its second-place standing to the furniture business. Reduction of the former meant a loss to urban areas while the growth of the latter privileged rural zones. Urban concentration became less pronounced and the location of "dynamic"

industries changed. The majority of industry was still urban, but tile, cement, and glass businesses as well as furniture grew more often in rural zones than in urban ones.

Part of the reason for the reduction of the imbalance between the Friulan and Giulian areas was the growth of the machine tool industry in both parts of the Region. While the slowdown of textiles affected the Friulan area more than the Giulian one, growth in the furniture industry took place largely in the Friulan zone. The expansion of the latter took place in a more dispersed way in the territory, as did the machine tool industry, though much of it was concentrated in the area of Pordenone causing a surge of urban growth in a short period of time.

Because of all these changes, occupation was up 26.2% in the Friulan area but only 6.7% in the Giulian part, further reducing past differences between the two areas. Manufacturing in the Giulian area, especially in textile and paper operations, showed less than dynamic growth. In contrast, many of the traditional industries of Friuli, as well as some of the modern ones such as chemicals, machine tools, and metallurgy, were beginning to take off.

It is the variable of dimension which best describes the changes. The average number of employees in a manufacturing plant went up from 6.5 in 1951 to 8.6 by 1961. Both the largest plants and the smallest tended to be eliminated. In 1951, the number of shops employing only two people comprised as much as 14.6% of the manufacturing work

TABLE 10

Profile of Major Manufacturing Industires in Friuli-Venizia Giulia 1961

Industry	Number	%	Variation 51/61	Urban	Rural	Friulan	Giulan	Size of Business by Number Employed							
								1-2	3-5	6-10	11-50	51-100	100-500	501-1000	1000+
Machine tools	36,824	34.3	+26.9	82.8	17.2	41.9	58.1	6.4	8.4	8.6	15.4	8.5	11.2	8.7	32.8
Textiles	13,020	12.1	-23.5	81.5	14.9	54.4	45.6	5.6	1.8	2.1	6.8	8.9	32.8	18.9	23.1
Clothing	11,403	10.6	+9.4	61.3	38.7	65.4	34.6	36.5	14.2	6.5	13.7	7.1	14.1	7.9	-
Lumber and Furniture	15,032	14.0	+47.3	39.3	60.7	80.9	19.1	10.1	14.5	12.4	27.9	17.4	17.7	-	-
Food and Tobacco	9,632	9.0	+18.1	68.0	32.0	53.7	46.3	7.7	11.7	9.3	22.6	11.0	37.7	-	-
Paper and Other	6,139	5.7	+12.2	65.1	34.9	52.9	47.1	6.5	7.5	8.0	23.7	12.0	33.9	8.4	-
Chemicals	5,276	4.9	+8.8	72.6	27.4	48.9	51.1	1.8	3.6	4.3	11.7	11.0	27.8	15.0	24.8
Tile, Glass and Cement	6,183	5.8	+57.6	45.0	55.0	77.3	22.7	2.4	6.7	7.3	31.6	25.8	26.2	-	-
Metallurgy	3,837	3.6	+36.9	87.0	13.0	61.7	38.3	-	0.2	0.7	9.0	16.7	5.0	37.6	30.8
Totals	107,346	100.0	+16.8	69.9	30.1	56.2	43.8	9.4	8.7	7.6	17.6	11.5	20.2	8.6	16.4

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TABLE 11

Profile of Major Manufacturing Industries in Friuli-Venezia Giula 1961

Industry	Average no. of employees per plant	Percent of employees in artisan businesses in relation to the total number of people employed in a type of manufacturing industry	Percent of employees by position			Percent of women by position			Percent of female workers per sector
			Heads	Foremen	Workers	Heads	Foremen	Workers	
Machine tools	11.2	24.1	10.2	13.0	76.8	0.2	3.0	4.1	7.5
Textiles	16.6	9.3	7.0	4.1	88.9	5.7	1.9	65.2	72.8
Clothing	2.8	59.2	36.6	9.7	53.7	12.4	6.3	41.0	59.7
Lumber and Furniture	6.9	36.7	17.7	8.1	74.2	0.2	2.1	16.6	18.9
Food and Tobacco	9.4	17.2	12.0	17.0	71.0	1.0	7.2	34.8	43.0
Paper and Other	11.1	18.9	9.5	14.4	76.1	1.2	5.3	31.4	37.9
Chemicals	29.1	5.4	3.4	19.7	76.9	0.2	4.9	12.5	17.6
Tile, Glass and Cement	16.6	12.9	6.8	6.3	86.9	0.2	1.7	10.3	12.2
Metallurgy	123.8	0.4	0.8	8.9	90.3	-	1.6	1.4	3.0
Totals	8.6	24.5				2.3	3.6	22.2	28.1

ISTAT, 4° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

force, but by 1961 the percent was down to 9.4%. The businesses that hired from 3 to 500 workers increased over a ten-year period, while those which hired 1000 or more decreased.

Two very generalized types of manufacturing industries experienced these changes between 1951 and 1961. The sectors which used medium to small sized plants became more profitable than those which operated in the smallest or the largest units. In other words, clothing and shoe production, furniture, and the traditional sector of machine tools, cement, glass, and tile works were all affected.

The industries which used medium to medium-large sized plants became more dynamic than those whose production of the same goods took place in huge settings, the same ones which had shown the greatest development right after the war: textiles, metallurgy, and the less traditional parts of machine tool and chemical production.

The changes came about without affecting the location of the sites--urban as opposed to rural, or Giulian compared to Friulan. Large industries still tended to be located in the urban Giulian sector and the smallest units in the rural Friulan one. Medium-sized plants gained in importance wherever they were found. In other words, the changes did not come about because new businesses were started, but because small and medium-sized business evolved selectively at the same time that the largest enterprises needed to reduce the number of people they employed.

The number of manufacturing jobs increased from 1951 to 1961, but the acutal number of business was reduced by 11.6%. The small and medium-sized operations increased their size and the number of employees while the number of businesses became concentrated. Businesses of artisan origin increased 34.4% and their average size grew as well.

The source of investments for these changes reduced the importance of money from outside the region for local employment. External financing was responsible for giving jobs to 23,843 employees in 1961, 10.6% less of the manufacturing work force than in 1951. The textile business was the scene of most of this change. Outside investment in it had predominated in the early years of its development. The increase and growth in the artisan-type business came from local investments, so that where extra-regional money had supported 29% of the manufacturing work force in 1951, its influence was reduced to financing only 22.2% by 1961. What money did come from outside Friuli was used in the same ways as it had been previously in textiles and metallurgy, though the amount was reduced. Chemical and paper production did not receive less financing from outside, only more from local investors. Food, clothing, furniture, machine tools, tile, glass, and cement had always been more locally than extra-territorially financed and continued to be so. In 1961, locally financed businesses tended to be more dynamic than those which were run with non-regional funds.

Here again the machine tool industry, and especially the part of it which grew around Pordenone, is a good example of the two different sorts of production and the changes which took place in one sector. Because it was the largest manufacturing employer in both 1951 and 1961, comparison of the two periods is significant. In 1951 it employed 31.6% of all manufacturing employees, three-fourths of whom worked in the Giulan zone in big nationally run plants. The small artisan business in the sector had usually been located in the Friulan part of the region. By 1961 the machine tool sector employed 34.3% of those active in manufacturing, but those who worked in the Giulian area went from 21,677 down slightly to 21,400. However, in the Friulan area, the 7,351 employees of 1951 increased so that there were 15,424 by 1961, most of these found in the Pordenone area though a number were also hired by businesses around Udine. In both areas, already existing plants expanded with local financing.

To some degree, the part the region was to play in the national accumulation of capital, and industrial development as it had been planned for Friuli had already lost its push. The local investors who began to see chances for regional development favored neither the traditional nor modern sector. They backed new technology and increased production for sectors that already existed in the territory such as furniture, tile, and cement manufacturing. At the same time, outside investors maintained their preference for

either traditional or modern industries as long as they were situated in the Giulian region.

Specific changes can clearly be seen in a detailed examination of artisan business. 53.3% of the manufacturing work-force in 1961 were employed in locally financed enterprises. 25.4% of these workers were found in artisan businesses in 1951. The percent was up to 34.4% by 1961. The average number of employees for these businesses rose to 2.5 and for the larger locally financed industry to 30.9 workers per production unit, underlining the fact that growth came from the expansion of business which already existed in the territory. The total number of artisan shops was reduced by 11.7%, but the size of the plant and the number of employees hired per plant rose. It was the beginning of what would later be called decentralized industry. Rather than disappearing as expected, small to medium-sized artisan businesses began to adjust to the times and showed themselves capable of innovation.

In the countryside were found 49.6% of the total number of the dynamic new businesses, and the average number of employees in them rose to 5.2. The urban artisan shop, which had an average of 9.9 employees in 1951, had no more than 11.8 by 1961. The significance of this sort of growth for the future would be that, even though they moved from a small to a larger operation, they could continue to benefit from traditional relationships (often familial) in

production while still taking advantage of new technology for product innovation.

One artisan business, however, did not grow and survive the changes well. The decline of the textile and clothing industry was felt first in the small shops producing woolen goods. At the same time, the largest mills chose to reduce the number of their employees. New machines were installed to replace labor. Technology also reduced the need for artisan production of clothing so that jobs in that sector were reduced by 15.3%. However, medium-sized plants of artisan origin which produced clothing, shoes, and leather goods increased their employment by 62.6%. Thus, the total figures for textiles do not show the changes taking place from artisan shop to industrial plant, nor from the largest operations to medium-sized ones. It was not the small artisan shops in this case which expanded, as in the case of furniture or machine tools. The small businesses in the textile sector simply died out.

Key factors in the artisan form of production in Friuli-Venezia Gulia such as its growth or decline, both of employees or dimensions, as well as numbers of businesses are essential to understanding where production is dynamic and where it is not. These factors also point in the direction of the future. During the 1960s the urban Giulian industrial concentration began to lose ground, not so much if it is examined by itself, but in relationship to the rural Friulan growth of decentralized production.

In the Friulan part of the territory, changes in textiles, clothing manufacture, and furniture affected the distribution of jobs as well as the nature of their organization. Men were favored by the changes more than women. There were fewer independent workers and specialized labor was preferred to that which was unskilled. In the Giulian area, the reduction of extremes in the size of plants increased the overall number of jobs but the growth was in dependent categories. There was a need for more skilled labor which furthered the crystalization of pyramidal work organization. Because industries of the urban-industrial model were less dynamic, they hired fewer trainees and apprentices. Work became more specialized, which lead to a further bureaucratization and tighter organization in the factory.

Where Friulan industry grew from artisan roots, it was less likely to adopt a structured pyramidal urban industrial organization in the new setting. Because it was in a growth stage, it also hired more trainees and apprentices, though most of these were men. Many more family members were apt to be included in these businesses. Business expansion and one's promotion within the industry were likely to be through an informal passage where there were few precisely defined responsibilities. Instead of developing a complex hierarchy within the business, it was more likely that the workers were expected to take initiative and contribute creatively to expand production. This is quite the opposite

of what was happening to workers in the older industries where job definitions and tasks were increasingly rigidified.

The percentage of women in the work force diminished partly because of the reduction of employees in the large textile mills where they had been hired in great quantities, but the figures do not illustrate the change in status that came about for many. While more jobs were offered in furniture, tile, cement, and glass where women were hired as workers, a decline in the artisan clothing business meant they lost in independent and managerial categories. Those who left the textile mills went to jobs as trainees or as unskilled workers if they could find a job at all. It would be essential for the future of decentralized industry that there be a large reservoir of unskilled labor, which would permit the capital accumulation and thus the further expansion of decentralization. Larger industries, especially those financed with outside capital, would not be able to achieve the same level of profit using more expensive manual labor. In any case, what profit the latter group produced was not invested locally as it was in the case of the new decentralized group.

In conclusion, between 1951 and 1961 we see four broad trends developing in the manufacturing sector of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. First, the urban-industrial model is still the major employer in this time. A second trend, however, is that the small to medium-sized businesses of

local origin, whether located in urban or rural areas, begin to show themselves to be more dynamic than the others, especially more so than those financed with extra-regional capital. Third, by 1961 the Friulan zone had developed a very different type of labor demand than it had in 1951. The dominance of the textile and clothing business was replaced especially by the growing activities of the machine tools and furniture industries. Finally, though the imbalances between the Friulan and Giulian sectors diminished in these ten years, the gap between manager and worker widened in all industry, though less so in the newer artisan businesses than in the others.

3. The Labor Force Adjusts and the Rise of a Rural Bourgeoisie

The Friulani who emigrated had made a negative judgement about the local possibilities for jobs and even with an increase in demand, they continued to leave in great quantities. A family's ties to the land and its social standing in a community, not just the local labor market, decided who would emigrate and who would not.

Emigration came to be seen more and more as a temporary solution for social mobility during the 1950s and into the 1960s, especially as the requirements for work permits were increasingly complicated and limited in other countries. Because of this, zones of heavy emigration have a double significance. In general, they demonstrate the type of

environment which leads to the decision to emigrate. The place of origin is also important as the point of reference for the future social mobility of the emigrant.

The gap between the supply of and demand for labor was reduced between 1951 and 1961. There were no regional areas which grew fast enough to attract the labor force. The urban-industrial model could barely absorb the workers living in the nearby areas. Where there was a dramatic increase in the need for workers, as there was in Prodenone, the flow of emigration did slow considerably. Emigration, however, is not just inspired by a numerical relationship between supply and demand in the labor market. The worker must also decide where and how he can quickly acquire the savings he feels are necessary for the family. If he can get a job locally he may stay but if it is not as remunerative as one in another country he may just as easily decide to emigrate for a time. Thus, the migratory chain responds very slowly to changes in the local labor market.

Between 1951 and 1961 the population of Friuli-Venezia Giulia declined by 21,823 people. Most of the loss was in young men from the northern and central parts of the Region. The area's total population dropped 1.8% but the population of men from 25 to 44 years old dropped 11.7%. If only northern and central Friuli are looked at, not the Bassa and Giulian areas, then the drop in young males was 16.6%. However between 1945 and 1958 emigration became increasingly temporary. By the end of these years only one-fifth of all

TABLE 12
Distribution of Active Workers in Friuli 1961

Zone/ area	Agriculture %	Industry %	Service %	Total %
Friuli				
Mountains	16.8	54.6	28.6	100.0
Western Foothills	23.7	53.0	23.3	100.0
Central Hills	18.0	60.3	21.7	100.0
Udine and Cividale	18.7	40.8	40.5	100.0
Pordenone and Sacile	26.1	48.6	25.3	100.0
Codroipo and San Vito	34.2	42.7	23.1	100.0
Bassa Friulana	29.9	43.1	27.7	100.0
Giulian area	4.3	41.2	54.5	100.0
Province				
Pordenone	26.4	48.7	24.9	100.0
Udine	21.2	47.5	31.3	100.0
Gorizia	11.6	48.9	39.5	100.0
Trieste	1.8	36.9	61.3	100.0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	16.3	45.3	38.4	100.0

ISTAT, 10° Censimento della Popolazione

ISTAT, 4° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

emigrants that left went permanently. After 1961 the resident population in the Region went up, but temporary absences diminished little before the 1970s.

These data show us that temporary emigration does not cause desertion of the land as the permanent sort does but important demographic changes take place all the same. The families left behind which comprise the residents of the area are largely housewives, retirees and students. Thus, the employable population is significantly lowered in comparison to those who are not counted in the labor force. In 1951 45.6% of the resident population was in the labor market while in 1961 the percentage was down to 41.4%. The male work force went from 68.4% to 64.7% of the total in these years while the female part went from 24.2% down to 19.6%. To some degree, emigration is not responsible for all these changes. The retirement age had been lowered and many more students began to stay in school longer. Women who no longer had a formally defined job were usually dropped from the "employable" category. Locally in Friuli, it has been shown that there was still a lack of work for many who wanted it.

The employed population of Friuli-Venezia Giulia was 498,430 people in 1961, of whom 75.6% are male. 45.3% of all workers are in industry, 38.4% in the service sector and only 16.3% claim agricultural jobs. Service activities gain significance by the 1960s especially in the Giulian area. This was the result of the increased urbanization of the

four cities within that zone. In communities of more than 10,000 people we find 83% of the non-agriculturally employed work force and 89.3% of the non-agricultural jobs. The gap between supply and demand in the labor market was narrower in the cities than in rural areas, but the urban-industrial model did not increase the number of jobs it offered after its early growth.

In Friuli-Venezia Giulia, urban areas grew somewhat in the 10 years between 1951 and 1961, but while 35.6% of the actively employed population of the region lived in large cities in 1951, by the 1960s the percent was only up to 37.8%. In 1961, the number of people who lived in cities, in relation to total population, declined from 49.4% to 48.9%. Urbanization was not particularly significant and certainly not dramatic. 62.2% of those employed in industry or commerce lived in communities of less than 10,000. 64.2% of the whole active population lived in the Friulan area and, by 1961, 54% of the region's jobs were found there as well. Consequently, most people lived in rural areas without necessarily being employed in agriculture, though they continued to be an integral part of the social and economic structure of the agriculturally oriented countryside. They kept their houses and some land and adjusted their businesses to the needs of an agricultural community.

Even though there was a drop in the number of people who claimed agricultural jobs as their principle source of income, it was still the most important activity in most of

Friuli, especially in the Bassa and its Codroipo and San Vito areas. In central Friuli and in some of the hill and mountain regions, industrial employment in the newly expanding sector had created some jobs but hardly enough to make up for all those that had been lost in the agricultural sector. It is from these agricultural areas that most of the emigrants departed.

Percentage of total emigrants by zone 1961[10]	
Mountains 8.8%	Pordenone and Sacile 5.4%
Western hills 21.9%	Codroipo and San Vito 23.3%
Central hills 19.8%	Bassa Friulana 4.9%
Udine and Cividale 2.9%	Giuliana area 6.9%

In 1961 the first real agricultural census was taken since the post-war evaluation of damage, and it began to suggest some of the changes that had been taking place in the countryside. In the region there were 101,683 farms, but only 79,502 people claimed full-time agricultural employment, which meant that in Friuli-Venezia Giulia there were 22,181 farms without farmers. The diffusion of part-time farming began to be noticed. The family remaining on the land continued its traditional agricultural activities. They were carried out by the housewife and the oldest and youngest family members while others found local non-agricultural jobs or went abroad. Those who had local manufacturing jobs did agricultural tasks in the evenings,

on weekends, during vacations, or periods of unemployment. Those who did most of the region's farming were not counted in the census as having employment in the sector.[11]

As the number of women in the labor force decreased, there was a proportionate increase in part-time farming. The fewer possibilities for their employment in manufacturing, especially of an artisan sort, gave them more opportunity, if not need, to work the land more intensively. Where the women had once had more chance to work in industry, with time they took on the contadina role more often than the operaio one, though often they did both as the artisan-based industries increasingly used "cottage" labor for small parts in the overall production.

The phenomenon of part-time farming was at first especially pronounced in the hill and mountain zones where there was a long tradition of dividing one's time between agricultural and artisan or commercial activities. Temporary emigration permitted the survival of a social structure based on this sort of mixed economy, into which the expanding artisan-based industries could insert themselves. If there had been a sustained growth of employment in the urban areas of the region or if emigration had continued to be permanent rather than becoming temporary, it is unlikely that the social structure would have survived almost intact from the pre-industrial era, or that the new local industries would have had such a ready labor force available.

Temporary, as opposed to permanent emigration, did not cause desertion of the land nor its reorganization into larger holdings. In the hill and mountain zones, families remained linked to agriculture. The subsistence role played by the small farm has often been underestimated, if not completely overlooked, in emigration studies. For the household, daily food requirements and shelter were assured. The emigrant's salary was used to buy more durable goods, renovate the house, or acquire another small plot of land. In other words, during the 1960s the rural communities with high rates of emigration acquired the means to improve the existing agricultural infrastructure.

The use of capital acquired by emigrants to purchase consumer goods creates a situation that has been called "modernization without development" by authors such as Reyneri and Livi Bacci. Though they feel that the capital from remittances is money which should be used to expand the productive base, Reyneri suggests that the non-economic utilization of surplus by local dominant classes (those elites who are tied to commerce or live off of rents where no risk or innovation is required) is a major cause for the underdevelopment or non-development in areas of high emigration. The elites not only live, but prosper, on profits from the consumer goods that the emigrant's salary permits his family to buy. In such a situation there is little interest in changing the status quo.[12] This, however, was only part of the picture in Friuli. Emigrants

also used their savings to improve the region's productive base.

In Friuli, the commercial bourgeoisie was situated mostly in the city. The contadino-operaio is a product of rural areas. In a sense, the urban-industrial model, supported mostly by extra-regional capital, simply crystalized this division, though their differences came to acquire new characteristics. Temporary emigration was certainly an advantage for the commercial bourgeoisie. They got many of the benefits of "modernization without development" which they would not have accrued had emigration remained permanent: the increase in the emigrant's spending ability favored the services and goods they offered. On the other hand, one of the functions of the small farm for the contadino-operaio was to allow the family to have a lower cost of living than its urban counterpart.

One of the reasons that the urban-industrial model could not sustain its initial rate of growth was because of lack of interest and investment in it by the local urban bourgeoisie. The local banking network run by them is a good example. Savings deposited within it were usually invested outside the region, with the exception of large expenditures used to buy up local properties. The banks themselves became avid real estate speculators. The medium and large-sized local artisan-based industries almost always had to go to banks outside Friuli for their financing. The

fact that most of the region's residents were rural dwellers only made it more difficult to develop a philosophy of investment in which urban industry played a central role and more necessary for emigrants and small businesses to rely on self-help.

As a result, a rural bourgeoisie developed which began to make use of the abundance of manual labor and savings available in the countryside. They remained on the land surrounded by the emigrant's families. As we have seen, the latter considered non-agricultural jobs a way to save and reduce their cost of living and were not dependent on them in the same way an urban industrial worker was. In turn, the rural and locally available job served much the same function for a family as the job abroad had. The growing businesses had a ready source of labor which required a lower salary for their survival, permitting profits and competitiveness not possible for urban industries with huge numbers of dependent city dwellers.

The profits from rural-based industry was also usually reinvested locally, and it is on this basis that decentralized industries began to grow and, in turn, to "create" a new type of contadino who was also worker, or operaio. This artisan-industrial class, many of whom were also large landowners, began to make up a rural bourgeoisie with entrepreneurial characteristics which were quite different from those of the urban-commercial elite.

These various social groups deeply influenced the possibilities for local development and the forms it would take. It was the growth of artisan based industry in areas of emigration, coming about at the same time in which temporary emigration was permitting the renovation of the rural infrastructure, which would decide the future for this group. However, not only were two types of industry existing simultaneously in the region, two types of agriculture were also beginning to appear. Beside a politically and economically protected direct cultivator farm was a part-time and subsistence agriculture in which the political world showed little interest. The money emigrants sent home from abroad was important to the national budget, but the rest of his independent survival was hardly noticed. It is the migrants especially, however, which gradually became linked to the new rural entrepreneurial class. The combined effort of these two brought about the end of emigration during the 1970s quite independently of any national plan or policy.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER FIVE

1. Manuel Castells, "Immigrant Workers and Class Struggles in Advanced Capitalism: The Western European Experience," Politics and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, (1975), p. 35.

2. Without the help and the extensive research of Elena Saraceno, Emigrazione and rientri, (Udine: Cooperative editoriale "Il Campo," 1981) this chapter would have been impossible to compile without many years of work. She should not, however, be held responsibile for the conclusion. Both Elena Saraceno and Pierluigi and Roberto Grandinetti have done extensive research of the labor market and the manufacturing industry in Friuli-Venezia Giulia. I am deeply indebted to them all for sharing their work with me. The changes in Friuli's post-war industrial development are briefly explained in the Grandinetti's book Il caso Friuli, (Udine: Cooperativa editoriale "Il Campo," 1979) and N. Parmeggiani, Gli stadi dello sviluppo industriale nella provinca di Udine, (Udine, 1966).

3. The charts and the tables illustrating Friuli's population movements are all based on ISTAT data, either from the Annuario di Statistiche Demografiche, the ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di Statistica, or the ISTAT, Censimento Generale della popolazione 9°, 10°, and 11°.

4. Temporary absences "in other counties" are a more precise indicator of temporariness than those under "abroad," which also includes permanent emigrations which have not yet been registered as such. When an emigrant registered in another community within Italy, s/he was automatically dropped from the rolls of the place of origin, which did not happen if s/he went abroad. These things should be kept in mind when analyzing emigration data.

5. G. Cosattini, L'emigrazione temporanea del Friuli, (Roma, 1903), p. 14-16.

6. Other studies on emigration and the labor market which have been used for these observations included: Regione Autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia - Assessorato Lavoro ed Emigrazione, Movimenti migratori in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 1960-1976. Un'indagine orientativa, (Udine, 1977); and Indagine sulle caratteristiche dei lavoratori che rimpatriano dopo un periodo all'estero, (Udine, 1979); Annachiara Danieli, Migration Movements and Resettlement in the Local Labor Market of Returning Active Labour in Forces 1970-1977, (Udine, 1978); and Elena Saraceno, An Analysis of the Three Main Types of

Reentry in Udine and Pordenone from 1970 to 1975, (Udine, 1978); also See Organisation de Coopération et de Developpment Economiques, La chaine Migratoire, (Paris, 1978); and E. Reyneri, La catena migratoria, Il ruolo dell'emigrazione nel mercato del lavoro di arrivo e di esodo, (Bologna, 1979).

7. All data for this section comes from the ISTAT, 3° Censimento Generale dell'Industria e del Commercio, unless otherwise stated, the following tables have been organized from the source.

8. Cosattini, op. cit.; Reyneri, op. cit.; also Saraceno, (1981), op. cit., p. 38-39.

9. The data for this section come from the ISTAT, 4° Censimento Generale dell'Industriale del Comercio; and from ISTAT, 10° Censimento Generale della Popolazione unless otherwise stated.

10. ISTAT, 10° Censimento Generale della Popolazione; also see the study mentioned above Emigrazione temporanea, op. cit., published by the Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

11. ISTAT, 1° Censimento Generale dell'Agricoltura, Roma, 1962.

12. In the Friulan area, see M.L. Bacci, (ed.), "The CISP Survey on the Families of Italian Emigrants Abroad," in The Demographic and Social Pattern of Emigration from Southern European Countries, (Florence, 1972); and in the same volume, "The Countries of Emigration," also Reyneri, op. cit.

CHAPTER SIX

THE CONTADINO-OPERAIO: REENTERING EMIGRANTS, PART-TIME FARMING, AND DECENTRALIZED INDUSTRY--THE END OF POLARIZED POLITICS?

A. 1968: The Political and Economic Failures of the Italian Industrial Model

In 1968, the clash that came in Italy was not just symptomatic of all the ills accumulated by an industrial society. Nor was the conflict caused solely by a pre-industrial sector of society which was opposed to development in the marginal areas of Italy. The coexistence of both elements in a limited geographical space gave Italian politics during the 1960s and 1970s a combined flavor of labor radicalism and rural populism.

During the 1960s, the urban industrial triangle of northwestern Italy grew, and as the demand for its exports dropped, the proportions of an economic crisis increased. The problems of energy and labor costs by the early 1970s forced economic leaders to admit that their urban-based industrial model could no longer produce competitive consumer goods for export, their special terrain in the international market. In the analyses that followed the social, political, and economic crises, rural decentralized industry was found to offer an alternative to the old model. The labor force available in the countryside of marginal economies such as Friuli because of central importance to

the Italian economy by the 1980s. The leaders, however, knew rather less about their rural base than they thought.

During the 1960s the Italian government worked to create national and international support for the inclusion of the PSI in the governing coalition. The center-left was in full swing with the first Aldo Moro cabinet in December of 1963. The DC did not collapse in the elections of that year, the PSI continued to support NATO, and efforts to form a unified socialist party went on, with the hope of luring more of the electorate away from the Left.

By the 1968 elections, the unified PSU had been able to attract only 14.5% of the vote. It lost to the PSIUP (Italian Socialist Party for Proletarian Unity) which had broken away in 1964 in opposition to the center-left idea. It also lost to the PCI which made steady gains. They had 25.3% of the vote in 1963 and by 1968, 26.9%. By 1969, De Mita's idea of a "constitutional pact" between the DC and the PCI began to seem not only a possibility but necessity.

The DC lost heavily in the large industrial cities. It still had a strong base, however, in much of the countryside. Thus, there was a political logic, which again followed the economic logic of the leadership coalition; invest your money where you have political control. It sounded simple, but the central leaders of the DC would find that neither the local coalitions nor their political base were the same.

The political leaders of Italy traditionally considered urban workers to be potential supporters of the Left and the agricultural population to be basically conservative. Inner-party debates which followed the events of the late 1960s divided the DC and the PCI into factions over how to attract a broader political base from the middle classes who fell into neither camp naturally. One discovery of the discussions was that the urban bourgeoisie and their rural counterparts had different interests, though they intersected at various points in the State administration of the economy.

With the formation of regional governments, which were given some autonomous economic and decision-making powers, local leaders had new resources with which to maintain political followings. Independent Regional Status was granted to Friuli in 1963-64. Its leadership followed rather than initiated economic development there. They took credit, whether or not it was due, with the State administration, and supported the decentralization of large urban industries which were in crisis. This required a larger work force, which meant giving financial assistance to promote the re-entry of emigrants. These latter, as a base of political support, however, had become increasingly independent of the old leadership precisely as a result of earlier economic development in the area of Central Friuli. As the old leaders were joined by representatives of the new rural bourgeoisie, other parties became equal partners in

local coalitions with the DC. With changes in political leadership and in the cultural experience of their base of support, the behavior of the Region of Friuli became less predictable socially, economically, or politically for national planners.

Analysis of the contadino-operaio began during the 1970s but the effects of rural industrial development on this group's political behavior are still unclear. The study of rural-based industry in Friuli and of part-time farming there provide a basis for some speculation. In turn, because the social structure of Friuli bears a certain resemblance to that of much of rural Italy, and the growing emphasis of the whole Italian economy to rely on decentralized rural-based industries, what has happened in Friuli may suggest some possible trends for other areas of Italy as well.

B. Politics of the 1970s in the Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia

By 1968, gradual changes had come about that were noticed by all Italians. On the one hand, urban industrial growth was at a halt. On the other, more children had gone further in their studies than ever before. TV and radio were everywhere. The Church's influence had slipped. Not only was there less ignorance to control, but over time a series of complex realities had pounded people from all directions. "Believers" who had asked help from the Church in receiving war reparations were still without benefits. Then there were the Church crises of the Concilio and Valumbra. Many young priests rebelled and became outspoken supporters of the left. Catholics had begun to feel they could vote for a communist or a socialist and still be considered good Christians. The Christian Democrats were increasingly involved in government scandals. The Socialists in power had paid off companies to nationalize them, but people's enthusiasm for the proposals died with the results. Smaller parties benefited from the variety of disenchantments. Moro and Fanfani pulled the Socialists into the power structure and they all came down together.

There had been the issues of Hungary and later Czechoslovakia, reflected in the Communist party's policy, which became increasingly anti-Soviet. In national politics too, the public's perception of the PCI was that it had become less than "revolutionary." The discussions of the late

1960s reinforced all these trends; the waning power of the Church and the Christian Democracy, as well as the changing conceptions of communism and the PCI. In fact, the Church and both major parties were different, and so were the Italian people. Emigration and poverty had become part of the public conscience, as had the emargination of the South and of areas like Friuli. There was a new political vocabulary. In the elections that followed, the Communist party, but also the Socialists and the Liberals, gained votes at the expense of the Christian Democrats. Without the threat of an imminent communist take-over, there was less feeling that one needed to remain loyal to the DC. People's choices once more began to depend on family tradition or local history. In Friuli, the experience of emigration also shaped the new consciousness.

During the early 1960s, Church propaganda and anti-communist fear was relaxed in Friuli. Changes in the DC's old base and changes in the PCI led to the latter's gains in the Region. The increasing need for a party card to have access to benefits was used by all groups to gain supporters whenever possible and with time a coalition of Socialists and Christian Democrats became necessary to form local majorities. Assistance could come from a growing number of sources. By 1976, Communist party gains had mounted to the point where it was necessary to bring them into local coalitions, and the number of towns grew which were run by them.

In Pordenone, the Christian Democrats continued to have power, but the Socialists became acceptable partners. Gorizia, once exclusive DC territory, even elected a Socialist to the Provincial government. As urban-based industry entered into further crisis in the Monfalcone section, the PCI grew. The city of Udine began to pull toward the Left and the rest of the Province came heavily under the influence of radical young priests who wished to enter politics as activists. They were kicked out of the Church but much more of the area was added to the base the Communists already held in the Bassa. Though Trieste's vote for the Christian Democrats declined, local parties gained rather than the PCI.

In the final period under examination, 1969 to 1980, the reentries of emigrants will not be numerous to begin with, but they increase. A major reason for this is that as decentralized industries grow, the labor market in the Region offered more jobs in rural zones. The earthquakes of 1976 accentuate these trends.[1] The final stage in the growth of the contadino-operaio is an important chapter in the decline of the Christian Democrats and of the original post-World War II polarization of the people of Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

C. The Decentralized Rural Industrial Model


1. Employment and the Growth of Small Cities

The census for 1971 compared to those of 1951 and 1961 shows that most of the labor imbalances within the Region disappeared. Excluding agricultural labor, by the early 1970s, the Region had a job for three out of every four people in the labor force. From 1961 to 1971, the total number of jobs in the Region had fallen by 7.9%. The growth of work opportunities around Pordenone was somewhat offset by the decrease in jobs of 12.6% around Udine, 4.6% in Gorizia and 9.1% in Trieste. The change was minimal for the Giulian zone, while the gains in Pordenone were at the expense of Udine in the Friulan area. Pordenone shows itself to be the most dynamic area from an occupational standpoint, especially in contrast to the stagnant situation in the Giulian zone, a complete reverse of the situation which held in the 1950s.[2]


In the manufacturing sector alone, the Guilian area played a less important role as a source of employment by 1971 with a decrease of 7.7% in manufacturing jobs since 1961. The service sector grew 25.7%, the only sign of growth in that area. Friuli, however, showed an increase in service businesses of 20.3%, construction by 21.9% and manufacturing of 51.9%. By 1971, manufacturing had become more dynamic in Friuli than all other types of businesses. The labor markets of the Friulan and Giulian areas were no

MAP

Percent of increase in the number of employees in manufacturing compared to the Italian national average for the periods 1951-1961 and 1961-1971, from Grandinetti, Il caso Friuli, 1979, p. 23.



Relationship between supply and demand in the labor market by occupation 1951-1961 and 1961-1971, from Grandinetti, Il caso Friuli, 1979, p. 52.



longer so qualitatively different as they had been immediately after World War II.

The Friulan zone contained 64.1% of the actively employable workforce, 61.3% of which were employed in non-agricultural jobs. If agricultural labor is included, there were jobs for 9 out of 10 people who wanted one, a situation nearing full employment. Giulia, where 35.9% of the workforce lived, still had 38.7% of the Region's non-agricultural jobs. Though they are relatively insignificant in numbers in this area, if one included agricultural workers, labor supply and demand were almost in equilibrium in Giulia compared to the situation in 1961. Thus, by 1971, the Giulian zone had lost its role as the more important regional source of jobs compared to Friuli.

The new balance between the labor markets of the two areas was largely the result of a decrease in the number of people seeking jobs concurrent with an increase in the amount of employment available in the Friulan part of the Region. The new surge took place in rural zones and resulted in the growth of some of the smaller cities of Friuli. Cordenons and Porcia had been considered suburban areas in the 1950s and 1960s but, by 1971, they had grown to have more than 10,000 residents on their own. Tolmezzo, Spilembergo, and Latisana had been important if not large urban centers in the past. They had all been severely depopulated through the years of emigration, but with the growth of decentralized industry they expanded beyond their

original boundaries. Cervignano and Aviano both of which had been small villages, blossomed with new structures and houses, the latter in particular as a result of the American Air Force Base which was placed there, but also because it was within commuting distance of Pordenone. These centers, however, did not grow on the urban-industrial model of the 1950s, but as a result of the new decentralized industries.

If some areas were expanding, the overall population of the region diminished 7.9% from 1961 to 1971. Population in the old urban centers diminished 1.5% while the new ones grew 4.4%. Population in the rural areas contracted, however, by 10.8%. The loss of employable members of the communities came almost exclusively from the countryside as a result of the migratory chain. The number of jobs rose in rural areas 9.1% between 1961 and 1971 while labor demand was up only 5.4% in the old urban centers and 4.7% in the newer ones.

Between the 1960s and the 1970s, it was the manufacturing industries which were particularly responsible for continuing and increasing the trends of growth which have been adumbrated earlier. Service and construction businesses especially had been linked to the fortunes of the urban-industrial model as well as to the remittances of the emigrants. As urban industries continued to stagnate, both of these types of businesses became dependent instead on the expansion of rural based industry as well as on the needs of returning emigrants. They did not grow very much, but what

TABLE 13

Employment in Friuli-Venizia Giulia in 1971

Province	Agri-culture	Non-agri-culture	Manu-fac-turing	Other Non-agri-culture	Active Residents %	Active Residents number
Pordenone	30,790	67,954	41,619	26,328	21.7	98.744
Udine	77,746	114,723	49,965	64,758	42.4	192,469
Gorizia	17,729	36,180	18,448	17,732	11.9	53,909
Trieste	29,506	79,259	25,008	54,251	24.0	108,765
Urban and Suburban Commun-ities	67,625	194,001	82,377	111,624	57.6	261,626
Rural areas and Moun-tains	88,146	104,115	52,663	51,452	42.4	192,261
Total for Friuli-Venizia Giulia	155,771	298116	135,040	163,076	100.0	453,887

ISTAT, 11° Censimento Generale della Popolazione

ISTAT, 5° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

new jobs they did offer tended to be found in rural Friuli rather than in Giulia.

The overall regional job market contracted somewhat, but only between 1969 and 1973. By 1979 the trend reversed itself, even taking agricultural jobs into account. In 1970 135,000 people had manufacturing jobs. By 1978 the numbers were up to 142,000, but the growth took place entirely after 1973 as a result of the thorough restructuring of regional industry which had occurred by that time. The changes came about, however, in some businesses more than in others.

2. The Decentralization of Old Urban Industries

Comparing the censuses of 1961 and 1971 for the various manufacturing sectors, the clothing industry continued to decrease in size while all the others grew. Machine tools, furniture and textiles continued to be the largest employers. The food industry, which had been in fourth place in 1961, was replaced by clothing by the 1970s. It is the machine tool, furniture and textile group rather than the others which were among the dynamic businesses.

The furniture industries, especially those located in rural Friulan zones, began to specialize: Manzano for chairs, the hills north of Udine for kitchen furniture, Brugnera for bedroom suites and several mountain regions for rustic furniture. All of these businesses expanded from existing artisan enterprises, thus they remained where they were rather than changing sites. In areas such as Manzano,

the demand for labor was far greater than the number of potential workers in the village, so commuting to the growing sectors from surrounding towns increased during the 1970s.

A shift in geographical location also came about in the machine tool industry, which continued to become less important as a strictly urban activity as rural based plants expanded, especially in the Friulan zones. The steady growth of this sector in Friuli between 1951 and 1971 was accentuated in the 1970s as the ship-building industries around Trieste entered more deeply into crisis. At the same time, the manufacturing of household appliances in the Zanussi plant in Pordenone became the Region's largest industry. In 1961 the plant had 2,000 workers; by 1971 it had more than 13,000. During the 1970s however, this industry began decentralizing its production to favor a greater number of smaller rural-based plants rather than concentrating all its workers in one large plant in Pordenone.

Though it had fewer employees, the metallurgy business can also be placed in the new dynamic group. Strategically, however, it was the most important for the future growth of all other industries in the region as a local supply of machinery. It is logical, then, that because of the location of other growing businesses, to be nearer its customers it too should be placed in rural Friulan zones more often than in urban Giulian ones. Its growth rate,

higher than for all other industries, also underlines the diversification that had taken place in the region between traditional and modern industries by the 1970s.

All industries, including tile, glass, and cement works became increasingly rural based during the 1960s and 1970s, though this sector did not expand enough to increase the number of jobs available within it. The same is true of the chemical businesses. Therefore, decentralized production, the use by one business of a number of small plants in a variety of locations, affected even the industries which had been most typically urban in the 1950s. Textile and paper producers followed the new logic as well.

Until the end of the 1960s, regional and national decision-makers saw the trend as a sign of the Region's backwardness, a distortion to be corrected through careful economic and political planning. Not until almost 1980 was it realized that the dispersion of industries throughout the Region did not produce the sort of urbanization that they had continued to expect. In the 1980s, the new model of development has gained "status" as an acceptable alternative to the formerly favored urban based model of industrial development. This acknowledgement came at the same time that the large businesses of the Giulian area found themselves involved in a severe crisis in which all the nationally run industries were a part.[3]

The changes detailed above had reduced the differences of the post-World War II era between the Friulan and Giulian

regions, though the demand for labor was concentrated in the central part of Friuli more than in the South and the North. The new development favored only some of the Region's rural areas. For example, the Bassa and Carnia were still marginal to the new growth. The changing dimensions of the plants involved in manufacturing is one reason that the labor force of all of Friuli was not included in the new prosperity. Another reason was the difficulty people from the mountains and the Bassa had commuting to the expanding plants in the center of Friuli from their homes.

The average medium-sized plant in 1971 had 11.2 workers -- almost twice the number of 1951. Many of the previously very small artisan business also grew to have almost as many employees. The shops which had fewer than 9 laborers in 1961 had employed 25.7% of the manufacturing workforce then, whereas in 1971 these small workplaces gave jobs to only 18.8%. This drop was taken up by the next largest plants which hired from 10 to 49 workers. They went from hiring 17.6% of manufacturing workers in 1961 to 19.3% by 1971. Plants which hired from 50 to 499 and those which had more than 500 also grew in number. Small business grew a bit larger and the largest reduced the number of workers they employed.

Within the various sectors, this dual process corresponds to what was happening in the two general types of industries previously outlined. Food businesses, clothing, furniture, machine tool, glass, tile and cement businesses,

all previously characterized by small to medium plants, tended to favor medium large operations and many of the smaller ones were abandoned. Shops even became large plants as in the case of cement works. Textiles, and the chemical industries in turn reduced the size of their plants from large to medium while machine tools, metallurgy and paper businesses reduced the size of their largest and their medium-sized plants. All business, regardless of their origins, began to favor plants within the medium-sized range in the 1970s. This emphasizes the tendency toward a reduced polarization between rural and urban or Friulan as opposed to Giulian industries. The medium to large plant could now be found as often in the older urban centers as in rural areas. It was not just the artisan businesses already located in the countryside that were involved in the new model. Some of the larger operations based in the old urban centers began to change the dimensions of their plants in greater numbers than they had during the 1960s.

The old urban labor market for the manufacturing industries did not change significantly, but the growing towns in rural Friulan areas offered a very different sort of labor market. The countryside within commuting distance from the plants supplied a sufficient pool of labor for their needs.

There was not a large enough demand for labor to draw workers from many of the mountain areas or from the Bassa. A new prosperity came mostly to the villages of Central

Friuli. In areas surrounding the growing plants, however, cities did not develop as they did in older urban centers. The territorial diffusion of medium-sized industries came about where there was already a sufficient supply of labor rather than drawing a work force to it from somewhere else. Comparing the maps of 1951 and 1971 which show the locations of manufacturing employees and their distribution throughout the Region clearly illustrates the dramatic changes which took place in central Friuli especially since the post World War II period. Between the 1970s and the 1980s, however, a shift in production took place that was as significant as the previous one during the 1960s.

By 1971, the number of workers who found jobs in factories with outside financing had increased. Though some of the methods of data collection changed between 1961 and 1971, we can figure that 53,673 jobs were dependent on outside funds, an increase of 125.1% over 1961. The scattering of workplaces throughout the Region, many of which were part of one business, should also be considered. The increase in their number makes it harder to quantify with precision which of the decentralized businesses are funded from outside and which are of local origin, but it is still possible to say that the new trend included a substantial increase from 1961 in funds from outside of Friuli. Extra-territorial funding certainly affected all manufacturing sectors except clothing and furniture, which had already been established as businesses of local origin.

Table 14

Profile of Major Manufacturing Industires in Friuli-Venizia Giulia 1971

Industry	Number	%	Variation 61/71	Urban	Rural	Friulan	Giulan	Size of Business by Number Employed: 1-2	3-5	6-10	11-50	51-100	100-500	501-1000	1000+
Machine tools	54,202	40.1	+47.2	78.0	22.0	61.7	38.3	6.1	6.8	5.6	14.5	7.0	11.8	11.7	37.1
Textiles	12,456	9.2	-4.3	63.8	36.2	62.7	37.3	2.4	1.2	1.8	7.6	6.3	42.7	19.8	18.2
Clothing	8,890	6.6	-22.0	48.4	51.6	77.3	22.7	27.3	8.0	6.3	27.3	11.0	14.2	5.9	-
Lumber and Furniture	22,857	16.9	+52.1	23.7	76.3	91.5	8.5	7.4	7.9	8.1	31.5	21.8	21.0	2.3	-
Food and Tobacco	9,643	7.2	+0.1	63.6	36.4	53.8	46.2	6.8	11.0	7.6	23.1	11.7	32.1	7.7	-
Paper and Other	7,569	5.6	+23.3	64.6	35.4	55.7	44.3	7.3	5.2	5.1	21.3	17.3	25.8	18.0	-
Chemicals	6,640	4.9	+25.8	57.6	42.4	61.1	38.9	1.7	3.2	3.6	17.1	7.2	28.6	16.9	21.7
Tile, Glass and Cement	7,437	5.5	+20.3	49.3	50.7	75.8	24.2	3.3	7.0	7.4	26.8	14.2	15.2	10.1	16.0
Metallurgy	5,346	4.0	+39.3	73.2	26.8	63.3	36.7	0.1	0.4	0.4	12.6	5.7	12.0	37.7	31.1
Totals	135,040	100.0	+25.8	61.0	39.0	67.0	32.2	6.9	6.3	5.6	19.3	11.0	19.6	11.5	19.8

ISTAT, 5° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio


Table 15

Profile of Major Manufacturing Industries in Friuli-Venezia Giula 1961

Industry	Average no. of employees per plant	Percent of employees in artisan businesses in relation to the total number of people employed in a type of manufacturing industry	Percent of employees by position			Percent of women by position			Percent of female workers per sector
			Heads	Foremen	Workers	Heads	Foremen	Workers	
Machine tools	12.6	20.3	9.1	17.4	73.5	0.2	4.0	9.4	13.6
Textiles	30.3	6.2	3.4	9.0	87.6	2.3	3.1	59.5	64.9
Clothing	3.6	48.1	28.7	9.3	62.0	9.1	5.4	46.7	61.2
Lumber and Furniture	9.3	26.1	14.1	9.7	76.2	0.3	3.2	22.9	26.4
Food and Tobacco	10.0	19.2	10.8	21.5	67.7	0.8	9.3	27.0	37.1
Paper and Other	11.2	22.9	9.8	15.5	74.7	1.5	5.6	26.5	33.6
Chemicals	27.4	6.9	4.1	20.2	75.7	0.3	5.1	22.0	27.4
Tile, Glass and Cement	14.7	14.7	7.7	11.0	81.3	0.2	2.8	6.8	9.8
Metallurgy	102.8	1.7	1.2	16.6	82.2	-	2.7	1.6	4.3
Totals		20.2				1.1	4.2	21.1	26.5


ISTAT, 5° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

Percentage of employees in manufacturing in relation to the total number of residents in the communities of Friuli 1971, from Grandinetti, Il caso Friuli, 1979, p. 50.



up to 9%
9% to 14%
14% to 20%
more than 20$
communities of 5,000 to 12,000 inhabitants
communities of more than 12,000 inhabitants

Territorial distribution of manufacturing employees in the communities of Friuli in 1971, from Grandinetti Il caso Friuli, 1979, p. 35.



Percentage of manufacturing employees in the communities of Friuli

- up to 1%
- from 1% to 5%
- from 5% to 20%
- from 20% to 50%
- over 50%
- area of specialized production

Specializations

- s chairs
- m furniture
- c shoes
- cl knives

Communities were more than 30% of the population is in manufacturing.

- o lumber and furniture
- • machine tools,
- o lumber and furniture

Though reduced in importance from earlier years textiles still remained an industry, along with chemicals and metallurgy, favored by non-Friulan financiers. Food, machine tools, cement, glass and tile works, as well as the production of paper goods continued to be industries with both local and non-regional backers.

The furniture business alone continued to grow almost exclusively with local funding between 1961 and 1971, and the decline of the clothing businesses at the same time can be traced to lack of local funding. The growth in metallurgy and chemical works came about almost exclusively from outside financing, while the lack of these was responsible for the decline of employment in the textile mills. With the exception of the food and furniture industries, both growing and declining industries had local and extra-regional backing.

The decade of the 1970s saw changes which could not be attributed solely to local entrepreneurship as could be done for the 1960s. Neither did the new dynamic come about only with extra-regional money. What was invested from elsewhere in the 1970s, however, followed the same rural preference which the local investors had chosen in the earlier period. This is underlined by an examination of the changes which took place in businesses of artisan origin.

From 1961-1971, the number of employees in this type of operation increased only 3.7% -- from 20.2% to 24.5% of the total number of workers in the manufacturing sector. The

number of total businesses which were artisan based diminished 5.5%, a smaller drop than that between 1951 and 1961 but a reduction all the same. The average number of employees in an artisan shop was up to 2.7% by 1971, suggesting that there was a gradual increase in the size of the business although their overall role in the sector was much less important than in earlier years. These data also reflect the fact that the artisan businesses continued to become more technologically advanced where it was possible for new machines to limit the number of workers they had to hire.

The businesses of artisan origin which were the most dynamic in the 1970s were furniture and machine tools, while clothing was a declining sector in this category. In the 1970s, however, it was the small and medium sized businesses regardless of their origin which were growing. Within this category, artisan shops and plants became more and more specialized by concentrating on specific phases of manufacturing a product, at the same time making themselves more essential to local decentralized industrial needs and adjusting to the changing regional structure.

The most vital period for local artisan business was during the industrial transformation of the 1960s. During the 1970s, only some of the businesses in this category transformed themselves into small and medium-sized industries. The others were abandoned as most all industries began to favor rural seats of production, completely

transforming the conditions which had brought the typical artisan business into being during the 1950s.

Differences in industrial production were mirrored by changes in the workforce. There continued to be a decrease in independent workers, especially among the females who were employed. Specialized dependent workers were more in demand than ever. In turn, the organization of the workplace was modified and became more pyramidal, especially with the decline of artisan shops, though the size of the typical Friulan plant hardly brought about a typically, urban-industrial organization of work. Some of the artisan businesses lack of formality and less than rigidly defined roles were retained. The fact that the working class had a particularly strong bargaining position through the unions at the end of the 1960s may have played as important a part in this development as the artisan heritage of many businesses. As many of the older workers have retired, however, younger workers complain of the increasing bureaucratization of the workplace which determines their responsibilities and their possibilities for promotion.

Overall the composition of the workforce has become increasingly male, especially in managerial positions. The percentage of females in the workforce dropped from 28.1% in 1961 to 26.5% in 1971 although in terms of numbers working, there were 19.1% more women and 28.4% more men in jobs by the 1970s. The textile and clothing industries which had been so dependent on female labor were declining industries,

demand than ever. In turn, the organization of the workplace was modified and became more pyramidal, especially with the decline of artisan shops, though the size of the typical Friulan plant hardly brought about a typically, urban-industrial organization of work. Some of the artisan businesses lack of formality and less than rigidly defined roles were retained. The fact that the working class had a particularly strong bargaining position through the unions at the end of the 1960s may have played as important a part in this development as the artisan heritage of many businesses. As many of the older workers have retired, however, younger workers complain of the increasing bureaucratization of the workplace which determines their responsibilities and their possibilities for promotion.

Clothing businesses which expanded from artisan shops to small or medium-sized plants needed inexpensive female manual laborers. This flexible workforce, which could not demand high salaries, was necessary to the survival of many of these businesses which found themselves in a precarious position in the international market. The importance of the clothing sector as a source of part-time employment increases in correlation with the growing importance of women in agriculture in relation to the number of males. It should be noted that agricultural labor is usually not classified as a formal occupational category for women except as braccianti.

During the 1970s, women continued to work in the furniture factories, in the machine tool, metallurgy and chemical industries, all of which were among the most healthy of the manufacturing sectors. They were most often hired as unskilled workers and were found less often than in the 1950s in managerial positions or even as trainees. The only possibilities for career advancement for women during the 1970s was as office employees. It was mostly to the young who had spent more time in school than their mothers that managerial jobs were offered.

In conclusion, the manufacturing sector in Friuli-Venezia Giulia in the 1970s very clearly showed signs of a transformation which would in turn affect the migratory chain. Industrial growth took place in rural areas, not limited to those sectors which had once been exclusively activities of the countryside. The overall industrialization of the Region was affected first by growth based on the past artisan structure but finally, was also based on the decentralization of production of other sorts of business as well. Financial organizations from outside the Region began to take an interest in the new productive model, signalling the start of a reassessment of industrial models on a national level, partly required by changes in the international and national labor markets. On a local level, in Friuli, these changes affected the central part of the region more than any other. The extreme differences between the urban and rural or Giulian and Friulan

manufacturing sectors that were so obvious in the 1950s were disappearing. There were still, however, noticeably different levels of development for Central Friuli, Carnia, and the Bassa. Finally, regional industries, wherever they were growing, tended to be characterized by small to medium sized plants whether they were financed by local or extra-territorial investors.[4]

Two types of decentralized production became important economically. One was dependent on large urban industries. The other was of rural artisan origin. By the 1980s, they bore a striking resemblance to each other and were both reliant on the reproduction of an inexpensive, flexible source of labor with ties to the land.

3. Re-entering Emigrants and the Earthquakes of 1976

The transformation of the labor market in the Region which was noticeable at the start of the 1970s was very much the result of the development of decentralized industries in the rural zones. The population which had diminished through emigration only made the growing job market seem that much more dramatic and, in turn, caused the planners of the Region to initiate policies which would help emigrants return home permanently to fill the growing demand for workers.[5]

In the past, the migratory chain responded slowly to changes in the productive structure of the emigrants' place of origin. However, as early as 1969, it became more

difficult for many of Friuli's workers to continue to make a negative judgement about employment possibilities at home with respect to what other areas had to offer. Temporary reentries became more permanent throughout the 1970s as frequent trips home showed the emigrant what developments were taking place in Friuli. The first to come home permanently were of course those for whom the time to retire had come but these were followed shortly by some of the still employable population.

The demand for labor was quickly filled in the center of the Region, and new imbalances were created between that area and the Bassa and Carnia as the amount of emigrants' salaries declined. In particular, in the mountain regions which remained the most marginal to the development taking place in Friuli, the land was increasingly deserted as families gave up hope and moved closer to work possibilities. Where emigration continued a new figure emerged. The goal of the transfer became not just to save but to gain professional experience which would permit the worker to return home with a better chance of finding a job. A period abroad become increasingly important for the careers of many of the young, though the numbers involved in this sort of emigration were much lower than in the previous transfers. In many cases, some time abroad was preferable to a permanent move within the Region or Italy, as one hoped that upon return, a final transfer would not be necessary.

In the census of 1971, the population of the Region was 1,213,532, an increase of .8% over 1961. By 1979 the population was at 1,243,768, finally exceeding that of 1951. The increase was greater in the Provinces of Udine and Pordenone than in Gorizia and Trieste. However, it was the resident population rather than the active workforce which grew. The workforce itself actually declined by 8.9% from 498,430 in 1961 to 453,887 by 1971. This trend is clearly the result of the continuation of the migratory chain. Many more of the dependent family members remained at home while the most employable went abroad. There was also an increase in non-working residents due to the continuing tendency of many to retire earlier and of students to remain in school for a longer period of time. During the 1970s, many women did not or could not find work outside the family farm and the house, and simply dropped out of the labor market. These shifts in the population, seen mostly in the province of Pordenone during the 1960s with the decline of migration there, were found more widely spread by the 1970s in Udine.

The trend is confirmed in a breakdown of some of the demographic data. The number of employable women who remained in their community grew between 1961 and 1971 from 24.2% to 28.1% while the male percentage diminished 13.4% for the same period. It was mostly young males who continued temporary emigrations, though fewer left in the 1970s because of the diminishing possibility to achieve the same benefits from work abroad as they had in the past. The less

than dynamic increase in the registered female workforce was a result of the fact that what jobs were available in Friuli were more often open to men than to women, and because women stopped looking for work outside of their own home and farm. There was still not nearly enough work to keep all the male population at home. The growth in non-agricultural activities increased everyone's possibilities of finding work in the Region, but the dramatic decrease in agricultural jobs by the 1970s added to the numbers who wanted construction, service or manufacturing jobs.

The reduction of agricultural jobs by 46.7% was a result of males leaving the sector. Farming became increasingly a female activity. Temporary emigration in the past had left the running of the farm to the women, and the trend was broadened as men who had been farmers were able to find secure industrial or service jobs nearer to home. The preference of all labor markets for men in the 1970s left more women than ever before in charge of house and farm. However, some communities such as those around Codroipo and San Vito continued to be dependent on agriculture. Here, as in the mountain and some hill zones, the growth of industry could not possibly have absorbed those who left agricultural jobs.

During the 1970s, some development spread to the North and the hill areas of the East. The Bassa remained relatively unaffected. The stagnation of the nearby older urban industries around Trieste continued, though the

TABLE 16


Distribution of Active Workers in Friuli 1971

Zone/ area	Agriculture %	Industry %	Service %	Total %
Friuli				
Mountains	10.2	49.5	40.3	100.0
Western Foothills	17.7	50.8	31.5	100.0
Central Hills	13.4	57.5	29.1	100.0
Udine and Cividale	10.7	40.8	48.5	100.0
Pordenone and Sacile	12.6	55.9	31.5	100.0
Codroipo and San Vito	22.3	49.2	28.5	100.0
Bassa Friulana	16.2	47.1	36.7	100.0
Giulian area	2.3	36.8	60.9	100.0
Province				
Pordenone	14.6	54.1	31.9	100.0
Udine	12.9	46.8	40.3	100.0
Gorizia	6.7	45.7	47.6	100.0
Trieste	0.8	32.6	66.6	100.0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	9.6	44.9	45.5	100.0

ISTAT, 11° Censimento Generale della Popolazione

ISTAT, 4° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio

Rate of profit for industry, agriculture and average total in Friuli compared to Italian national average for 1951-1963, 1963-1970 and 1970-1976 from Grandinetti, Il caso Friuli, 1979, p. 20.



Giulian zone saw some increase in service jobs. As in other urban areas during the 1970s, the road to professional advancement in industry became increasingly narrow and more rigid in its requirements. The area around Trieste began to show the strains of a "post-industrial" society.

From the post-War era to the present, a remarkable stability of residence has been maintained throughout the Region, whether in the cities or in the countryside, due especially to temporary emigration and the system of survival created in the areas of the greatest exodus. It is the migratory chain which has served the function of keeping the people on the land. Those who remained behind were usually not those who were the formally employed of their communities but, as the emigrants returned, the balance between the "active" and "non-active" groups was gradually restored.

From 1969 to the present, the numbers involved in migration have continued to diminish. Between that year and 1980, 42,849 people left the country and 60,343 returned. Seasonal emigration began to lose importance just as permanent moves had in the previous era. Temporary emigration continued but the kind of people involved as well as their quantity changed. The reentries of the 1970s are the direct result of changes in the local labor market. The flow began in 1969, well before the expulsion of manual labor from "host" countries in the European Economic Community after the international crisis of 1973. Between 1969 and 1979,

about 60,000 people came back to Friuli-Venezia Giulia, though some of this number were certainly the multiple reentries of the new emigrant who left for career advancement and often returned home.

The new emigrant never achieved the numerical importance of those involved in definitive or temporary migrations, but s/he is as much a result of the changed productive structure of the Region as the returnee was. The youths who left for a time usually wanted to gain experience to qualify for a better job at home. Emigration became the first phase in their attempt to gain social mobility, just as it had been for their fathers and grandfathers, but the new emigrant does not usually begin work elsewhere as manual or domestic labor. It is no longer the ex-farmer who chooses to emigrate but a newly graduated student who wishes to perfect a foreign language or a technical skill.

The young, then, were the first to come home. The second group to return permanently were the employable heads of families; these comprised about 55.4% of the returnees as early as the 1960s. Finally, whole families as well as single workers represent 87.2% of the reentries at the beginning of the 1970s, gradually declining in number so that by 1980 they comprised 73.8% of those who returned home. Among these families were a steady flow of pensioners who ended their careers abroad and came home once and for all. In 1969 they were 12.8% of those who returned and by 1980 they represented 26.2%. The change in proportion of

returnees over the years suggests that the workforce abroad was increasingly older and that the supply of those who needed or wanted to leave home diminished with time.

This pattern was not changed by two very important events during the 1970s. The first was the international crisis of 1973 which in itself did not provoke a reentry of Friulan emigrants as it did for those of other parts of Italy. Returns had already begun by 1968 with the growing labor market in Friuli.

The returning migratory flow was not interrupted by the earthquakes in Friuli in 1976. The hardest hit areas were the hills surrounding Udine which had also been the areas of some of the heaviest migrations in the past, and the place where many of the returnees lived. The first fear expressed by the local industrialists as they looked around at the damage was that a new exodus would begin immediately and that they would lose much of an already insufficient workforce. Their prophesies were not fulfilled. There was even a noticeable increase in the numbers who returned.

The Regional government acted quickly and immediately announced that it would favor the reconstruction of the productive infrastructure over all other projects and, in turn, the occasion of the earthquakes was used as an opportunity to improve industrial plants and modernize their technology, a chance to install new machinery that could make up for the lack of manual labor. Thus, reconstruction did not increase the demand for labor, but it did intensify

the need for specialized workers. Many of the rebuilt industries were able to become more competitive than those which had not suffered damage in the earthquakes.

It was also in part, then, a result of the earthquakes that the merits of the old urban areas as an industrial site as opposed to the countryside began to be debated. The population of Friuli was firmly opposed to being concentrated in urban areas and was outspoken about their desire to rebuild things as they had been. The debate was the inspiration for many of the first studies to be done in the Region on the productive structure of past and present, on emigration and reentry, and on the local labor market.

The earthquakes brought about a new awareness of what that had been taking place in Friuli-Venezia Giulia and, in turn, accelerated planning to support further balanced development, not only in the industrial sector but also for agriculture. The events of 1976 pointed out the need for serious research on the state of the Region's farming.[6]

The end of the migratory chain had brought about an enormous increase in part-time farming and changed its function as well. With the existence of a non-agricultural salary in most families, the farm of the contadino no longer needed to serve a purely subsistence function. Instead it was the source of a reduction in the cost of living and where some of the produce entered the market, it also served to increase the total family income. The practice of keeping one cow for family use was eliminated, for instance,


in favor of more profitable and less time-consuming agricultural activities. The researchers noted that the contadino-operaio family had retained its home in the countryside, but that it had also changed. The rural home and agricultural infrastructure had been renovated and improved with the salaries the emigrants had sent home. It had reevaluated priorities and adjusted its agricultural activities to a changing consumer and labor market. After the fact, it was concluded that the contadino-operaio was one of the major reasons why the local industrial structure of small and medium-sized factories of artisan origin had come into being and developed so successfully.

The social mobility that had been gained by the contadino-operaio is illustrated by the rise in per capita income characteristic of the Region in the latest period. Someone in the family inevitably had a job which would characterize that person as a worker, but the values held by the family remained those typical of a small rural town. Income was a source of savings and consumption patterns were still tightly governed by agricultural norms and private property. Life revolved around the family and the parish.

The small to medium-sized industry which needs a flexible labor force is typical of Friuli-Venezia Giulia but it is also a not uncommon in other areas of Italy. The DC supported emigration and the small family farm, but it had little part in the beginnings of early decentralized industry of artisan origins. When political parties

belatedly began to take an interest in the Region's development process and to extend credit for its growth where it had not done so before, many thought the DC was simply looking for another way to buy their vote and their acquiesence in the State's expropriation of what the Region produced. Most had learned to survive very well with the minimum of help from the State. If this is true in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, it may also be true in other parts of Italy where decentralized industry has brought economic change to rural areas, but the situation would need to be examined case by case before any final conclusion may be drawn about the effect of decentralized industry on political behavior. The type of decentralization, whether it is spontaneous or planned, must be considered in an analysis as well as the type of rural society which is involved and the state of its agricultural sector.


GRAPH





Per capita income in Friuli compared to per capita income for Italy from 1951 to 1976 (Italy = 100) from Grandinetti, Il caso Friuli, 1979, p. 14.

MAP

Difference between per capita income in each province and that of the national average shown by percentage for the years 1951, 1963 and 1976. From Grandinetti, Il caso Friuli, 1979, p.16 and 17.










Non-alimentary consumer index and per capita income index per resident in Friuli 1965-1976 shown in relationship to the average for Italy (base = 100), from Grandinetti, Il casa Friuli, 1979, p. 47.

GRAPH



D. The Full-Time Farm in the EEC and the Independence of the Part-Time Farm

Right after World War II we saw that two very distinct sorts of farms were developing in Italy, those of the direct cultivator and those which were used only for family subsistence. By 1980 there are still two very distinct types, the full-time and the part-time farm. What divides them most of all is their use of public funds and other forms of assistance -- their independence from or dependence on the State.

We have seen that in the post-War period, the presumption of the decision-makers was that a push from the market would unblock the backward areas of agriculture and that growing industry would absorb those that left the land. In turn, land would be reorganized and eventually a more modern agricultural sector would take shape. By 1961, however, we saw that many of the "wrong" people were leaving the land. The "polpa," the better farms were being deserted as often as the poor ones, or the "ossa." The census of that year showed that of the more than three-million small farms which covered a total of 8.4 million hectares, only 1 out of 4 was a full-time farm which was run by a direct cultivator. Of the remaining three, one was fully part-time and occupied by a contadino-operaio family where the head of the household had a local job which was not in the agricultural sector. The other two out of four were occupied by a family which used the land as an income supplement, usually with the head of the family working abroad or somewhere else in Italy. Of

all of these farms, 66% were very small and 19% were minute. In both the South and the Northeast 84% were small, 28% of which averaged as much as one or two hectares. The planners still believed that the problem of land reorganization would be resolved through industrial development, but could not decide what a "vital" farm actually was.[7]

No government plan for agriculture had been developed when Italy entered the European Economic Community. Credit was to be supplied for whoever remained on the land. By 1965 the government decided that it was the family farm supplying products for the market which would receive the majority of the help. The gross agricultural product was up only 9% in 1965 and 70 to 75% of those leaving the land were direct cultivators. Something had to be done.[8]

The trouble was that Italy's role as a member of the Community and the state of its agriculture were not compatible with each other. From 1964 on, the EEC used complex formulas to protect itself from competitive goods from the Third World. The "Europa Verde," or Green Europe Plan penalized vegetables, citrus and other fruits, olives and oil which were half of Italy's agricultural production. Supports were favored for milk, butter, meat and grain, none of which are particularly good crops for Italy's terrain or its land tenure structure.[9]

Grain, legumes, potatoes and other products which can be grown using labor saving devices and which are generally defined as fulfilling primary needs have never been grown in

Italy in sufficient quantity to supply more than 30% of the country's needs. Truck farming, citrus and wine production -- not strictly primary needs -- have always had a positive balance of trade but they are labor intensive crops. Finally, by the 1970s animal products were in quantities sufficient to supply only 10% of the nation's needs and constituted a large majority of Italy's trade deficit.

The Mansholt Plan for Europe, proposed in 1969, aimed to reduce some of the imbalances within the Community. The number of agricultural workers was to be reduced by 3.6 million by 1980. Cultivated surfaces should need no more than 30 to 40 hours a week work and the total agricultural surface in Europe was to be reduced to eliminate the possibility of overproduction. Three-million dairy cattle were to be eliminated within the next four years. Farms growing grain should be from 80 to 120 hectares in size and those with dairy cattle should average 40 to 60 cows per farm. The economic objective of the proposal was to bring the farmer's salary closer to parity with that of the average industrial worker and thus, over time, be able to reduce the amount needed for price supports and protective measures.

Italy's Coldiretti agreed with the abstract logic of the plan but felt that such an accelerated restructuring would cost the country too much if it were possible at all. Large amounts of assistance would be needed to create associated structures for direct cultivators. Total

restructuring of land tenure was simply not feasible. It followed too, felt Bonomi, the Coldiretti's head, that price supports would be essential for some time to come. For once, the Left and the Right in Italy came to the same conclusion: the direct cultivator would have to be supported to maintain ownership both individually and in association as a substitute for the reorganization of land for extensive farming. What an "extensive" farm is was still not defined. In October of 1970, the government proposed that the idea of the Mansholt Proposal be supported, but that progress toward its ideals must be very slow, and in the meantime, the State itself must assure some stability of income for its farmers.

However, the politics of the market were conducted by the State Agency for Intervention in the Agricultural Market, or AIMA. Its job was to compensate producers for the prices of olive oil and wheat. It was also to take "excess" products off the market and destroy them if their price went below a set minimum. The agency was not independent but run by the Federconsorzi and partly headed by Bonomi, leader of the Coldiretti, the same group which controlled Italy's grain prices. The only real change made by the Mansholt Proposal in Italy was that beef and dairy herds, already insufficient in quantity, were drastically reduced when they should have been eliminated in Holland. As a result of price supports, the bigger Italian farmers could usually expect a return of 10% or more on their crops.

This prompted small farmers to hire themselves out to larger operations, sometimes continuing to work their own land. Most often the small farmer sought employment in another sector and his became another part-time farm. In 1970 a small farmer earned at best 323 lire an hour, a bracciante 400, while on a construction job a worker could bring home 505 an hour. The small farmer simply could no longer afford to be just a farmer.

When the decision-makers looked at the census for 1971, many of the productive farms were still the ones being deserted. Allocated funds were not being spent for technological or administrative changes. In that year, 214 billion lire were loaned to large farms while only 71 billion went to the smaller ones. The Minister of Agriculture claimed he had not another cent to give out until each regional administration presented him with a plan to reorganize local agricultural production.

The responses of the regions were interrupted by the international crisis of 1973. Exports had to be increased immediately and imports decreased as dramatically as possible. Large farms could be dedicated to producing exports and the small farm used to reduce the need for imports as much as possible. The Christian Democrat-Coldiretti-Federconsorzi administration of agriculture could then continue to give the minimum support to small farmers and the majority of help to the larger farms. Policy was not changed then and it is hardly surprising that throughout

the 1970s, contrast between the state supported direct cultivator farms and the part-time farm increased. The entire agricultural productive base continued to shrink as well, while consumer demand for agricultural goods continued to increase. Italy's trade deficit continued to rise. The country's problems make it a difficult member of the European Economic Community: it cannot supply its own energy nor does the state of its agricultural sector permit it to feed itself.

If the Italian administration had found a way to use more than 16% of the funds available to it every year for agriculture, more dramatic changes could have come about. Bureaucratic channels used to help the farmer function so slowly that even the large farms often cannot count on reimbursements arriving until a year or two after they have been requested. To continue farming, the farmer must have local credit which is available to him only if he has local political connections. The large farms of Friuli are as directly under the influence of the government policy and its links to the EEC as any other large Italian farm, and in each area they are also dependent on the local political leaders. It is a many-layered dependence.

When the price of grain and corn doubled between 1963 and 1972, farm administration by the DC-Coldiretti-Federconsorzi triangle resulted in the strengthening of farms from 10 to 50 hectares in size. The small farmer who was not yet in the part-time category had to depend increasingly

on loans, tax adjustments or pensions to survive. Credit was not given unless one had a letter of recommendation from a "friend" with political influence.

The part-time farmer, however, could use this patronage network if he chose to, but was no longer dependent on it when farming was not the sole source of family income. Various characteristics of the part-time farm in Friuli-Venezia Giulia support this conclusion. First of all, they are all small holdings, from one to five hectares in size. 29.1% are less than one hectare, 13.1% from three to four hectares and 6.1% from four to five hectares. The chart below compares the figures for Italy and those for Friuli as of the 1970 census.[10]

	Friuli-Venezia Giulia		Italy	
Size of Farm in Hectares	No. of Farms%	Average size of holding	% of farms	average size
0-1 hectare	29.1	.61	34.0	.54
1-2 hectare	31.6	1.50	26.1	1.51
2-3 hectare	20.1	2.40	18.6	2.51
3-5 hectare	19.2	3.88	21.3	3.93

Only 17.6% of these small farms in Friuli are all one plot of land. Another 17.6% are on two pieces of land not adjoining each other. 20.7% are on 3 plots, 15.3% on 4. The rest of the farms are made up of 5 or more scattered

plots of land. These farms are not only small but severely fragmented as well.

Out of these farms, 55.1% of the land has been inherited, 17.4% has been brought. 16.8% was acquired after 1965 though the plot was rarely larger than one and a half hectares. 72.5% of the land is owned and 27.5% is rented for cash payments or by some form of crop sharing. 35.3% of these small farms rent some amount of land which makes up their farm, while only 9.2% of them have enough of a holding to rent land to someone else. More than half the plots which are rented are less than one hectare. 33.3% of those who rent land let out plots which are under 2 hectares.

The house and farm building belong to the family in 94.4% of the cases. 80.7% of these structures are over 15 years old. 26% of them are more than 100 years old. 15.8% of them have been totally renovated, and 21% partly so. 80.2% of the money for these changes has come from the family's savings. The rest of the farms have used some form of loan or mortgage to renovate, though only 10.9% of these were supplied by State and Regional financing after the earthquakes of 1976. Of those who asked for help to rebuild 44.9% waited for more than a year, 28.6% between six months and a year, and only 26.5% received funds within six months of their request. Most farms did not consider applying for assistance to be worth the frustration and trouble. Political parties and unions offered help with the application forms but the data show that they had few customers.

The independence of these part-time farms can also be seen in an examination of what they produce in relation to the influences of the market. All of these farms use an average of 90.6% of their holding to produce agricultural goods. An average 8.2% of the farm may be forest. Almost every farm can cook and heat their house with either wood or conventional petroleum fuels. Wood is used as much as possible.

On these small part-time farms 77.2% of the agricultural surface is used to grow corn, even on those which consist of only one or two hectares. Only farms with more than two or three hectares can support cows and provide most of the forage needed for their upkeep. Smaller farms, however, may keep a pig, which requires less than specialized feeding. All farms have some chickens and geese or ducks, and most have rabbits as well. These animals may supply family needs and in some cases also be sold in the local marketplace.

Garden produce is another crop category which is both for family use and for sale. 96.7% of all part-time farms in Friuli have gardens. 71.2% sell some of what they grow locally, though only 2.1% of the farmers agreed that such a sale represented part of the family income for the year of 1978. On the other hand, 44.7% claimed to be able to supply more than 100% of their family's need from their own gardens. The rest supply more than 50% of what the family consumes. The smaller the farm, the larger the percentage

of their land will be used for the family. 41.9% of the farms use only 200 square meters for the family garden. At least 74.7% also have vineyards and 70% of them make their own wine. Only 17% claim to sell some of what their vineyards produce.

In 1972, the family garden on part-time farms was estimated to cover about 2000 hectares of Friuli, so the savings to these families was considerable. Produce and meat were the most expensive items in the weekly food budget in that year and in the present. The estimated worth of the produce per hectare in 1972 was 1,600,000 lire while each hectare planted in corn was worth only 213,000 lire. In terms of production and consumption the family garden on the part-time farm is extremely cost efficient.

Much of the farm's activity is dedicated to what the family needs but the rest is given over to a marketable crop. Tractors are used most often on farms of more than 2 hectares, though they are often rented or loaned for use on the smaller farm. Of the farms that have their own machinery, 44.1% are no more than three years old. 86.9% of new or second-hand machinery is purchased with family savings.

Part-time farms are run by the same logic of market demand and mechanization which governs the running of a full-time farm. What separates the two kinds of farm, among other things, is that, for 93.8% of the part-time farms, the agricultural product represents no more than half of the family's income. On 23.2% of them, pensions are their other

source of income and on 35.7%, a non-agricultural laborer's pay supplemented the farm income. 41.1% can count on both an outside salary and a pension.

The average number of people living on a part-time farm is 3.6, and one of them is usually a retiree. Both the labor and the income of older family members are an essential element of the part-time structure. More than 50% of those receiving agricultural pensions are female; men receive one from their years as industrial workers. Of both men and women who declare themselves part-time farmers, only 6.2% are between 30 and 39, 18.7% between 40 and 49, while 43.8% are between 50 and 59 and 31.3% are over 60. It is mostly the older and female members of the family who are in charge of the part-time farm. These two intersecting groups make up the largest proportion of Italy's contadini.

Of the men who go to work in non-agricultural jobs from Friuli's part-time farms, 8.2% are in administrative positions, 21.7% in construction, 3.2% in the textile mills or leather goods manufacturing, 13.2% in furniture, 24.6% in machine tools, 5.9% in tile, glass or cement works, 2.6% are in other manufacturing industries. 4.4% of them work in the service sector, 5.6% in public transportation, 5.6% in commerce and 5% have found agricultural jobs on farms other than their own.

Almost all of these jobs are the result of the development of decentralized industrial production in Friuli-Venezia Giulia. It is the history of the temporary

migratory chain which the State supported both directly and indirectly and the developments which brought the emigrants home which shaped the evolution of the contadino-operaio family. Few part-time farms have used the assistance offered by either the State or the Region which had been allocated to change Italian agriculture. The dependence structure is used by part-time farms for pensions, health and crop insurance and sometimes for credit. The degree of their independence from the State they feel, is the result of their own efforts.

E. The Politics of the 1980s in Friuli-Venezia Giulia: The Depolarization of the Contadino-Operaio?

There are different attitudes expressed toward the Italian State and political parties in Friuli's agricultural sector. Full-time farmers are worried about the entry of Portugal and Greece into the EEC. When promised funds do not arrive or their source is threatened, towns and highways are blocked by hundreds of tractors. Protests are frequent, and strains between full-time farmers and political parties are evident. Full-time farmers feel the State has not done for them what it could or should have to promote change but also to maintain their salaries and status as agricultural workers.

Part-time farmers in Friuli, the contadino-operaio, are only interested in EEC policy to the extent that it determines the price of the crops they grow for the non-local market. If s/he finds these are no longer profitable s/he will change what s/he produces as s/he has done before. S/he may join the protests of the full-time farmers but s/he is not as dependent on their results. S/he is simply less interested in politics because they have little to offer. S/he feels that politicians are not rural people and that decision making takes place in the towns and is concerned mostly with industry and tourism. In fact, the Regional Plans support this opinion. Even full-time agriculture is usually left as the last topic of discussion.

A major complaint from people is the lack of social services or the inefficiency of those which exist. Whether decentralization is imposed from without or spontaneous, its profitability depends on the lowering of social costs. Inadequate social services, contained individual and social consumption, as well as a large group of students who are overqualified for local jobs, are problems inherent in the model itself. The politicians must deal with the consequences. As intermediaries between society and the center of power, the decentralized model is bound to reduce the image of all parties' effectiveness. In turn, they are dependent on the external demand for certain manufactured products for the Region's well-being, and the maintenance of a labor force in which women and students are at an immediate disadvantage.

Another serious consequence of the model of development in Friuli was noted by a union study of industrial workers.[11] The workforce which is not cut off from the land tends to be more independent of unions. Life is linked to the family nucleus and the life of the village. Both are necessary conditions for the low social cost of production. There is a low adhesion to unions in the small and medium-sized plants, especially in Central Friuli and the hill zones.

The unions practice contradictory politics, in that they are strong in the industries which are weak and failing. In industries which need to be restructured, they

must defend the security of full-time workers. Thus, they can do little for seasonal or cottage labor. The latter are also more rigid and selective about jobs which would force them to move from the land. As a result, where there is more demand for labor than supply, positions have often been filled with labor imported from the South or from Yugoslavia. Returning emigrants in Friuli have strengthened the union of artisans and others that are autonomous, rather than the traditional ones. In other words, the overall economic changes are weakening the older politically oriented unions.

It is ironic, then, that having achieved the goal of weaking union influence after 1968 through the decentralized model, all parties should find themselves less able to command a monopoly of effective power as social intermediaries. The necessity for coalitions to govern and increasing strength for the Left in some areas of Friuli appear in an overview of the Region; however, in each Province, the number of parties which have become legitimate choices in coalitions increases the factionalness of local government.

In the city of Pordenone, the DC and the Church still control the finances of the industrial base and there is little change in local politics or its methods. The PSI has simply become a more active member of the partnership. Their adherence helped hold the coalition's influence, and will even if the DC and Church slip further into the

background. The reoganization of industry with foreign money has kept the area from the financial crises of other zones, which has reinforced the coalition's control over investments.

In Gorizia, both Socialist and Communist support go up as Christian Democratic votes go down. The Socialists are busy trying to hold onto whatever industry exists there, and the PCI is gathering angry support among the increasing numbers of the unemployed.

Udine seems to be a replay of Gorizia on a larger scale. The PCI holds its traditional ground, but its inability to protect large industry and its workers, much less its agricultural militants, will also lead to increased apathy.

Trieste seems to be slipping into a state of atrophy. DC and PCI votes remain stable, MSI has gained at the expense of the local Party. There is a below-zero birth rate and the youth are leaving. It is in stark contrast to the growing youth-oriented city of Udine in which the political parties are vitally interested.

Overall, the support for the DC has gone steadily down since 1968 in Friuli-Venezia Giulia. All parties have given people democratic guarantees except the DC, which cannot separate itself totally from the Church. As these two slip from their former hold, the others seem to have little with which to replace them except the same assistance channels through which come reduced resources.

The Region has been trying to create its own development policy as far as limited financing allows this to be possible. There is a new sensitivity to agriculture, but only insofar as it increases foreign trade. Thus, wines and vineyards have received increasing aid, as have a variety of cooperative efforts through funds from the Special Regional Development Department for Agriculture, called ERSA. The idea is to try to insert Friuli's agriculture directly into the EEC, bypassing Rome as much as possible, to parallel the efforts being made in industry.

The difficulty is that political friends are still essential. Just as the criteria for getting funds in the past were decided by and went through the same old channels, so are the resources to spur new agricultural and industrial growth. The parties involved are more numerous, but agreement between them is also hard to come by, increasing reliance on those same old ways of doing things.

Technical help seems to be introduced externally more often than it is sought after. People are convinced only very slowly of the need for change. Children are prepared for jobs in industries which are not numerous enough in Friuli to absorb them all. The idea still prevails that one must go away from the land to find work. People have adopted new values, often formed as passive recipients of the mass media, but religion upholds the norms of God, family, and land. The passage of life through the Church has become more indirect, but it is still the major cultural

influence in all local social institutions and associations. If political life has become less polarized, it is not because it has become much more secular.

The political life of Friuli, described as a world unto itself, the relationship of local leaders only to their base of support, appears an arena where change takes place exceedingly slowly. Local factions vie with one another for limited resources, and the electorate is sometimes angry and often apathetic. On the other hand, when Friuli's voting pattern is compared to that of Italy as a whole, it appears not to differ sharply from national averages, so what is happening in Italy must be happening in Friuli to some degree as well. What is significant in Friuli is that things are changing more rapidly in the cities than they are in the countryside.

In the elections of 1983, the Christian Democrats hoped for a new edition of the five-party coalition to replace the old one that had become unmanageable.[12] They wanted a definition of sides, part of which would include a clear stand toward the PCI. The latter firmly opposed collaborating with the DC and hoped that a group could be formed which would include the PCI. The Socialists waited until the last possible moment to declare what they would do and until it seemed absolutely sure that the Left could not form a coalition without the Christian Democrats. The smaller parties led the DC and the PCI in the amount they debated the various possibilities.

On platforms, the five-party coalition agreed on the need to drastically reduce inflation and on the desirability of executive, legislative, and judiciary reforms. All supported a continuing role for Italy in NATO and having the responsibility of the missiles installed in Sicily at Cosimo. It was on the ends and means for resolving economic dilemmas that the expected differences came out between the Socialists and the DC. The PCI was against any economic instrument to block inflation which would hurt the working class. They agreed on adherence to NATO, but without the missiles.

During the campaign, the media were less ready to take sides than usual and the accusations of clientelism and corruption in the DC were strangely absent. The Catholic hierarchy reacted simply to a proposal by the Radical Party for a protest vote of abstention. The Church called for every Catholic citizen to do his duty, critically evaluate the candidates and the issues, and to vote. Among Catholic organizations, only the Christian Workers Movement and the Popular Movement declared themselves for the DC. Others tended to follow the proposed pluralist line of the Vatican.

The pre-election polls suggested no surprises, but there was one. The Christian Democrats suffered further reverses, but these were not explainable by the simple losses of another party. Electoral mobility was not one-directional. The Christian Democrats lost about 3.4% of its vote to lay parties, about 1.4% of which went to the MSI

and 1.1% to the PSI. The PSI lost 1.5%, of which the PSDI probably gained about 1.1%. The Republicans lost votes to the Socialists and to the Right. The rest went to white votes, or abstentions. These have risen to 2% -- 2.6% of the vote since 1979. In this case, the Radical party has had some success.

What stands out most about the election is the continuing national depolarization of the Italian voter between the DC and the PCI. In 1976, the two parties had 73% of the vote, in 1979 68.7%, and in 1983 only 62.8%. People seem to have lost faith in both, and support is being divided mostly by the smaller traditional lay parties; the Republicans, the Social Democrats, and the Liberals. A series of local and interest group parties made important gains, such as the Party of Pensioners (Partito dei Pensionati), the Liga Veneta, the Lista del Melone of Trieste, and the Movimento Friulano.

Thus, the collapse of the DC, which has been uninterruptedly in power since the end of World War II, has not meant that the PCI has been on the rise to the same extent. In the absence of conclusive research on the subject, the facts suggest a number of possibilities, one of which is a persistence of the regionalness characteristic in Italian voting behavior.

The DC has suffered losses fairly uniformly in the entire nation except in Molise and Basilicata, where its support rose. Another regional phenomenon is that the

Christian Democrats have directly opposed the Mafia in Sicily, the Camorra Campania, as well as the Masons, who are a national group. The votes these organizations control have certainly been lost to the DC, but they should not be too sorry to see them go. On the other hand, Regional parties in the Veneto and Trieste, as well as that of the pensioners, have lost them areas that have been among their most loyal. In trying to appeal to everyone, many areas and groups have felt neglected by the DC. However, the new parties would not have been formed if it had been perceived that other groups would serve their interest.

Other factors have influenced DC losses in the whole of Italy. There has been widespread dissatisfaction with what is called "partitocrazia," a word which summarizes a wide range of complaints from scandals, inefficient bureaucracy and institutions that function badly, to the politics of "tampone"[13] which are held responsible for inflation and widespread unemployment. The DC takes most of the blame here, since it has been doing the governing, but the opposition PCI takes its share as well. If part of the election campaign helped further legitimize the PCI in the voters' eyes as just another party, it also continued to deflate the DC as an anti-Communist force. The Italian Social Movement has benefitted from the latter force, and blank ballots have probably been symptomatic of the former in Trieste, the city with the highest percentage of old people in Italy. MSI has sometimes grown at the expense of

the Christian Democrats, but also with losses for local parties such as Melone in Trieste, which had been carved out of the strong anti-communist feelings the DC promoted there.

Another more complex factor in the election changes is essential to the rural world. The Christian Democrats have been promoting the renovation of the Party since heavy losses began, and the media have followed them and faithfully reported it all on state-run TV and radio as well as in the newspapers. Their image as a modern party, however, corresponds closely to what other lay parties project. "The old DC of the clientele network, the parocchie, contadino Italy, falsified pensioners, and all the 'old-boy' groups have been shaken up."[14] Without these and without the insistent work of the Catholic organizations and unions such as CISL and the Coldiretti, the DC's De Mita must look elsewhere to replace lost votes. It is not possible "in only a few months, to change from the dusty themes of a decaying Catholic economy to the imperious and subtle schemes of a Chicago school."[15] It may also be true that all of society is not as ready for it to be a secular party as the DC supposes. The secular-clerical conflict is also still an important variable in Italian voting behavior.

Outside of the large cities, much of Italy's countryside is still very closely tied to the Church, and many of the DC's rural supporters have no desire for it to become just another lay party. The Christian Democrat's own Forlani said that, for the Party, "change can become a

boomerang, a suicide, and if we do not quickly make things clear, it will be so for us before it is for others."[16] This is clearly true if one thinks of the history of the DC and its links to all branches of the catholic world in the past. This is especially true of the rural areas, where gains for the traditional lay parties have increased slowly but steadily. If all things between all parties are equal, the DC will lose. It is the difference between rural and urban areas which is still remarkable.

Since 1975, the DC has lost control of the governments of almost every major city: Trieste, Venice, Milan, Turin, Genoa, Florence, Rome, Naples, and Bari. These losses have usually been higher than the 2% or 3% national average. Obviously, the way they have been governing there has not been successful, and if they are losing their image as supporters of the countryside, they have not become the party of the urban world in exchange.

In summary, the trends between 1979 and 1983 in votes for the House and the Senate for Italy and those for Friuli-Venezia Giulia are interesting to compare. In Italy as a whole, the Left has gained about .5%, in Trieste .8%, and in the more rural areas of Udine, Pordenone, and Gorizia, about 1.4%. The center-left vote has risen in Italy about .6%, in Trieste 5.4%, and in the rest of the Region 1.2%. For the full five-party coalition, national support is up 1.5%. In Friuli, it has risen to 2.1% and in Trieste to 6.4%. Polarization between the PCI and the DC continues to decline

in all of Italy, dramatically since 1976; governing now depends on a combination of Socialists, Social Democrats, Republicans, Liberals, and Christian Democrats. In Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the trend is clear in both urban and rural zones, but most markedly in the former.

Finally, in Friuli, the DC and the PCI are still strongest in the countryside, and there are even small increases there for the latter. Growth for the more or less centrist PSDI has also begun in rural areas. Voters of urban areas support the former three, but strong votes for the Republicans, the Liberals, and the PSI are almost exclusively an urban phenomenon. Most striking of all, however, is the persistence of support for the rightist MSI. There have been recent, though small, increases for them in the cities, as well as for the ultra-leftist DP. The lack of extreme votes in the countryside could suggest that rural people are less "conservative" than they are often perceived to be, but it is most likely that rural voters still see the DC and the PCI in the secular-clerical framework of the past, as still more legitimate intermediaries than other parties. In any case, the image the urban voters have of the DC and the PCI has changed more than that of their rural counterparts. The divisions between urban and rural cultures have been bridged somewhat. Polarization is less intense, but fragmentation of the system appears to be its most likely replacement.

It will be sometime before the political behavior of the contadino-operaio will be understood. It is certain that the contadino-operaio is not an urban proletariat and so political attitudes in the countryside will not necessarily be predictable following urban patterns.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER SIX

1. See footnotes 1 and 2 for Chapter 5.

2. ISTAT data for the following section 1951 and 1961, see footnote 3 in Chapter 5 and for 1971 data the ISTAT, 11° Censimento Generale della Popolazione and the 5° Censimento Generale dell' Industria e del Commercio have been used as well as ISTAT, Occupati per attività economica e regione, 1970-1978, Roma 1979.

3. A Parmeggiani, Gli stadi dello sviluppo industriale nella provincia di Udine, (Udine 1966), p. 143.

4. Besides Saraceno's work, also see the study conducted by the Amministrazione Provinciale di Trieste, Provincia di Trieste, Il mercato dei lavoro a Trieste: premessa all'avvio di una politica del lavoro, Trieste, 1979.

5. Data for the 1970s are supplemented by ISTAT, Bollettino Mensile di'Stafistica, various months.

6. See footnote number 6 in Chapter 5. Most of the studies were done after 1976.

7. ISTAT, 2° Censimento Generale dell'Agricoltura, Roma, 1972.

8. Ibid.

9. The best and most concise summary and analysis of Italy's role in the European Economic Community and its effect on Italian agriculture is, in this author's opinion, G. d'Augosto, "L'Italia contro se stessa, ovvero la'disobbedienza communitarià dello stato Italiano," Il Mulino, Anno XXX, no. 220, (March-April, 1972) p. 234-256.

10. The information for this section on the part-time farm is drawn from the ISTAT, 2° Censimento Generale dell'Agricolutra and from the study by Saraceno and Grandinetti, Le aziende agricole part-time in Friuli-Venezia Givlia, Centro Ricerche Economico-Sociali Udine, 1980.

11. Furio Bednarz, "Sinacalizzazione e strutture sindicali. La CGIL in Italia e in regione dopo il 1968," Qualestoria, Anno IX, no. 2. (June, 1981).

12. All figures from the summary are collected in one article by Angelo Macchi, "Elezionie Politiche e Governo Craxi," Aggiornamenti Sociali, no. 9-10, (1983), p. 565-578 and in an analysis by Centro Studi

Politica Comparata dell' Università Bocconi di Milano, "Il Sole - 24 ore", 29 June 1983.

13. See the glossary.

14. D. Bartoli, "Sul ponte sventola scudo crociato," in Il Giornale, 29 June 1983, p. 1.

15. Ibid,

16. Forlani at the National Congress of the Christian Democratic Pary, quoted in Il Popolo, 20 July 1983, p. 5.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

A. THE POLITICS OF CHANGING DEVELOPMENTAL MODELS: FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA AS PART OF ITALY

1. Narrowing Economic Gaps: The Contadino-Operaio and Decentralized Industry in Friuli and Emilia

The beginnings of the Friulan contadino-operaio can be seen in the history of a traditional agricultural society which has been neglected by the State and made to depend on emigration and subsistence strategies for survival. Fascism changed little except to put more pressure on the land by limiting emigration and demanding not only too much, but the wrong crops from the land. Fascism's policies were neither sensitive nor efficient.

With reconstruction after World War II there as a return to emigration as agriculture's future was linked to urban-industrial development. The Christian Democratic Party successfully used the traditional parish structures of the Church to introduce social control for political purposes. The cultural institutions of the Church were to maintain traditional values while the triangle of the Coldiretti-Federconsorzi-DC organized a bureaucratic network on which the family farm would be made to depend. However, political polarization as a means of mobilizing the Italian people and creating social and economic controls is not the

same as promoting a system in which a population participates.

The contadino-operaio improved agriculture's infrastructure with his own savings and became less dependent on the assistance network than the Christian Democrats hoped. The State is viewed as a series of hurdles which must be navigated in order to get what one needs, whether it is credit or a pension. We have shown that political movements from fascism to the present have all tried to create dependence on an inefficiently administered bureaucracy rather than a reciprocal relationship.

In Friuli, much of the industrial world was tied to the local administration through the Church, a partner in maintaining a dual social structure which has supported two quite different developmental models. Urban-rural divisions are still very much in evidence, but where the countryside of Friuli was once marginal to the Italian economy, it has now come to play a central role. The State is attempting to adopt the model for use elsewhere and has had some success in Umbria and Tuscany. The PCI has administered its own model in Emilia.

Industrial development in the central Italian province of Emilia is remarkably comparable to that of Friuli-Venezia Giulia's, but it has been dominated by the PCI since the Second World War. Prosperity came to its contadino-operaio earlier than to Friuli's, because large chemical companies

expanded during the economic miracle, while Trieste's dependence on failing textile mills precluded broad participation in the prosperity of the 1960s. In Friuli, emigration, which was not a major factor in Emilia, brought about the first dynamic development in the region, and large industries followed suit later. In both areas, there has been an urban-industrial sector, a group of small industries which are dependent on larger ones and independently developed artisan businesses. In both, the smaller concerns rely almost exclusively on the contadino-operaio as their labor force.

What is different about the two regions is their ideological history, though their land tenure and social structure are remarkably similar. Emilia has a long history of anti-clericalism, while Friuli has a persistant tradition of ties to the Church. Politically, then, Emilia and Friuli should be polar opposites. A very close comparison of their political development since the Second World War could tell us more about the political behavior of the contadino-operaio than can be surmised through the study of Friuli alone.

A short study done by the region of Emilia suggests that, after 1972, the PCI split into two factions over the course development was to take. The old guard continued to hold that the capitalist system was not susceptible to "rational" development or planning. The new wing of the Party decided capitalism was endlessly flexible and that it

was necessary for the Party to intervene at all levels to direct the economy into more constructive channels. Regional and State planning were necessary and should be used as a vehicle for mass participation in decisions about the ends of development. Thus, the Party attacked the Region's dependence on the export market and on the priority of consumer goods for the national one. Faulty analysis in some areas brought about contradictory tactics. The Party supported small- and medium-sized artisan businesses, but censured their exploitation of employees, even though it was low salaries which permitted their profit.

The PCI of Emilia found that, as productivity rose, eventually so did salaries. Though some workers were better off, the distribution of profits did not change automatically with increased development. Planning industry in a depressed zone involved the Party leaders as bosses and linked them to many businesses which were less than dynamic. Where industries were successful, there was expansion, but with increased size came more dependence on specialized workers and impersonal organization of the workplace. Students and women, whom we have seen are the first to be displaced in favor of skilled men as employees, are as dissatisfied with the PCI in Emilia as they are with the DC in Friuli. More study on youth and the female workforce of all ages will probably show that they are among the most disillusioned and likely to be the most depolarized groups in Italian society.

Thus, as the rural economy becomes more central to the national economy, whether in Emilia or Friuli or elsewhere, it is possible that the experience will further depolarize the contadino-operaio, or at least parts of it. On the other hand, the urban and rural worlds are still pitted against each other and the contadino-operaio is not an urban worker, nor part of the full-time agriculture of an industrial nation. The distance has narrowed between the two worlds, but the political results of this are not yet clear. It is worth exploring further, however, because the social and economic structure of Friuli is comparable not just to Emilia but to much of Italy.

2. Secularism, Cultural Dualism, and Political Fractionalization

During the years of the DC's rule, the mass media and public education, as well as the experiences of Friuli's many emigrants in other cultures, have all helped to secularize society. Products of economic development have influenced traditional norms about work and leisure, for instance, and even made it possible for the question of efficiency to become a national issue. Other experiences in the process of development, however, have reinforced rural values such as the importance of owning one's own home and ethnic and regional pride rather than national patriotism. Emigration has played an important part in the persistence of Italy's dualistic culture. Leaving home to find work has

been a way of life for centuries, not just for the people of Friuli-Venezia Giulia or the South and the Islands, nor is Italy the only nation which has been a major exporter of its labor force.

The Italian State, as part of its plan for industrialization, used a dual agricultural policy. Part was to provide assistance to create modern family farms and, where possible, extensive agriculture. The other side of the plan intended to maintain people on the land in subsistence conditions until industrial growth, either in other parts of the world or in Italy, could absorb them. Such a policy required a flexible workforce which emigration provided. The labor market has been fairly successfully manipulated in Italy, especially with the help of a large number of off-the-books jobs to absorb the unemployed and underemployed. It is not coincidental that both the Church and big business have supported the job black market, or "lavoro nero," as a way the rural world could increase the national rate of savings. All these "policies," however, simply represent government "support" of the ways most of the contadini had found to survive.

The Italian government has been less able to dictate the labor needs of other countries and thus control its own flow of emigrants. Permanent emigration became only temporary, or cyclical, as Italians were sent home from "host" nations which no longer needed them. During the late 1960s, the most-developed members of the European Economic

Community found they needed less manual labor once the job of post-war reconstruction was done, but in the same period it was also "discovered" that permanent migration strengthens neither the economy nor the ideology of the home country of the emigrant to the extent which temporary absences do, whether they are the result of a lack of local economic opportunities or individual choice.

Friuli-Venezia Giulia has been industrialized very much as a result of the former emigrants' savings, but its land tenure patterns and social structure have been little changed in the process. The people have not built large cities in the region. Their decentralized industrial units are mostly based in rural zones and permit them to commute to work and live on their own land. Development has taken place with belief in God-Father-Family strengthening the Friulani's ties to the land. It is more than just property, and home is more than a dwelling. "Folgolar," or hearth, is something to which a Friulan returns no matter how far away s/he has been or for however long s/he has been gone. Destruction from the earthquakes of 1976 gave the region a chance to rebuild in new ways, but the people chose renovation rather than innovation.

Thus, in part through emigration and savings, and in part through government plan and assistance, the material life of the territory has undergone a rapid process of development, especially during the 1970s. The contadino-operaio has been part of, as well as a result of, the

economic changes and the continuity of social and cultural life, and is thus an ideal unit of analysis with which to explore the relationship between economic and political development in Friuli's countryside.

The family consists of pensioners, students, farmers, workers, housewife, and merchants. The importance of the family's integrated income from a variety of sources may only mean a subsistence standard of living in areas that are marginal to industry, but for the newer contadino-operaio, both the family members who have jobs or pensions and the part-time farm on which they live represent savings and a reduced cost of living. The contadino-operaio's situation is quite different from that of a nuclear family in the city.

The values of the contadino-operaio are also not the same as those of urban workers. In the countryside of Friuli, life revolves around the family and the Church or the Party. The activities of the latter take place in the community and coincide or compete with local parish functions. The contadino-operaio is part of a homogeneous society, though the unit itself contains groups which, when analyzed separately in an urban setting, are usually found to have divergent interests. Conflicts between students and farmers in a rural setting are more apt to take place in a heated discussion at the supper table than in a street demonstration. The contadino-operaio family consists of women who have traditionally been supporters of the DC, as

well as pensioners and the unemployed who are known to be disillusioned with all parties, and farmers who may or may not still be loyal. However conflictual family life may be for the contadino-operaio, it works as a socio-economic unit and thus is ideally suited to an analysis of an industrialized society in a rural setting rather than an urban one.

The political results of strong cultural dualism which remain in Friuli can be seen by comparing the votes of the capitol cities in each of the four provinces of the region to the electoral results from the countryside surrounding them. Since 1979, the center parties, the PSI, the PRI, and the PLI, as well as the PSDI, have grown in the cities, as have the extremist MSI and PR, much more than they have in the rural areas. Among the contadino-operaio, votes for the PCI and the DC have declined or increased less often than they have in the cities. The countryside's change to center or extremist parties is noticeably more gradual than it is in the capitols. Local interest groups such as the pensioner's party are also more likely to find their followers in cities than in rural zones. The same trends exist in voting behavior in both urban and rural Friuli-Venezia Giulia, but the change is much slower in the latter than it is in the former.

Clearly, the political polarization of the 1950s has diminished in Friuli, but it is not so obvious that the cultural dualism is diminishing to the same degree. The divisions between city and countryside, between clerical and

secular, between traditional and modern exist. Even if the secular or center parties have grown at the expense of the right socialist or the left clerical tendencies, the core of the DC's and the PCI's followers are still as far apart as they ever were, and there are leftist and rightist factions that exceed them. Italian society has been secularized to some degree, though traditional Christian culture is undergoing a revival and many of the young strengthen the evangelist catholic movements, many of which proclaim their independence from the DC. It has been suggested that the Party has become more secular than many of its traditional followers, or some of its new ones, wish it to be.

We may say, then, that politics is less polarized in Friuli but not necessarily because it is more secular. All Italians still have Church ideology in common, whether they are for or against it. God and Marx have been pitted against each other since 1948. National voting patterns suggest that political polarization has broken down, but old perceptions of one's own party and of one's opponents, acquired in the post-war years, die more slowly, especially if leaders continue to use them to reinforce their base of power. The number of parties which are now acceptable to voters as legitimate representatives of local and personal interests, once served more exclusively by the DC or the PCI, has meant the inclusion of many smaller parties in ruling coalitions. In few areas is any one of them strong enough to govern alone.

There are basically two schools of thought about how government works in Italy. One holds that ruling is done by means of a series of contractual relationships and compromises between elites. Others suggest that clientelistic methods have replaced any semblance of "logical" decision making, as opposed to efficiency criteria for governing. Both analyses are partly true, though the two propositions appear contradictory, unless one supposes that coalition government is inherently irrational. Compromises between elites in Italy most often can be found on a national level, while local interests and personalism are most obvious in local government. There are, of course, provincial and communal coalitions which rarely make "rational" or efficient decisions, and patron-client chains of small towns have parliamentary and high-level party links. The difference intended here is qualitative. Synthetically speaking, local government in Italy emphasizes personalistic methods and interests limited to the area. Depending on the availability of autonomously controlled resources, local government is more or less dependent on "friends" in Rome. The only time national government seems to function at all, however, is when elites are forced by crisis into contracts and compromises.

In Friuli-Venezia Giulia, local leaders have more independence than they might if there had not been dynamic regional economic growth for which they could claim partial responsibility. Friuli's politicians feel less need to

follow the dictates of their national leaders than those from areas where there has been little or no industrial development. The regional interests promoted in Friuli, however, are no more coincidental with national issues and needs than they ever were, though continuing to represent them has helped to preserve traditional political ties. Given Italy's political history, this is likely to be true of other regional governments as well.

Though the experience of decentralization and the shift of the local economy from being marginal to central nationally may be responsible for the depolarization of youth and women and other components of the contadino-operaio, cultural dualism remains strong, and the rural-urban split is still mirrored in the vote in Friuli. Political change is more gradual in the countryside than it is in the cities, partly because the former is less secularized than the latter. In both areas, however, local leaders claim responsibility for the development that has brought prosperity to the region. Whether or not they have done more than follow such progress does not hinder them from using their claims to maintain traditional loyalties. Though many try to gain support through the old ideological appeals of polarization, they cannot do so completely, as the Socialists and the centrist parties share responsibilities for the new well-being and are necessary to form governing coalitions. In some areas, the Left is dominant.

Thus, because of economic development and because of traditional loyalties and the remaining strength of the Church in Friuli, the contadino-operaio's vote is likely to remain moderate, with perhaps an increasing growth for the center-left coalitions, though this is likely to happen faster in the cities than in the countryside. From what we know of the social structure of the contadino-operaio, however, rather than a turn toward the Left, it is most likely that with its attempt to build economic autonomy as completely as possible will also come increasing political apathy or alternative local political movements, adding to the factionalization of of Italian political life.

3. Developing Elites: Accommodation versus Polarization

If Italian elections once told us what people thought about the ideological correctness of their leaders, this is probably still true, at least for their core of followers. The older group is still relatively polarized between Left and Right. These have been most angry and tense during the times of center-left government and at the suggestion that the "historic compromise" was a possibility. It has been suggested but not proven that youth is more issue-oriented, so it is possible that increases for the center-left are to be attributed to these voters.

However, catholic support has bounced back since its low in 1974-75 in the time of the PCI's high, and this too

has been credited partly to younger voters, though the organizational discipline and control Church organizations once had over their membership has slipped. ACLI, CISL, and the Coldiretti cannot be depended on to directly communicate with the base as they did immediately following the war. The wing of the DC led by the populist catholic Zaccagnini has a following which agrees that open opposition is better than conciliation with the Left, but revolt continues to wrack the entire party. It is too weak to guarantee the consensus of the base, and local leaders continue to be free to choose the Party group which they prefer to follow. These are tendencies which reinforce factionalism.

The PCI has its problems as well. Their strong link to the unions ended, but the season of union autonomy is over as well. Union and Party can agree that something must be done now to fight inflation and unemployment, though their ideas of moderation differ sharply. In urban areas, the unions have lost much of their original ability to mobilize workers. As the new model of development is put into practice, unions are likely to become weaker still.

The Communist party can be strong when it wants to be, but not enough to lead its core down the "historic compromise" path. Support has often been highest for them when they were in open opposition to the DC. For leaders, the historic compromise is seen as a long-term strategy. For followers, it is often just the opposite--a tool to accelerate crisis in the DC and shorten the road to a change of

power. The PCI's dilemma, then, is that when it comes closer to the DC, it weakens its tie to its base. When it is in conflict with the DC, it weakens its tie to power. Its core following is more ideologically oriented still than much of the leadership, and this appears to be true for the DC as well.

Thus, neither the DC nor the PCI score particularly well in any of the prerequisites which make accommodation politics more likely. Though leaderships cooperate on the national level during economic emergencies, regional and sub-cultural divisions are still strong, and divisiveness is accentuated when the two leaderships try to come together. The PCI scores a bit better than the DC on the recognition of the dangers of subcultural divisions, but they have also been guilty of using them.

On promoting mutual comprehension, the DC gets the worst grades. It is still firmly tied to values, principles, and ideology which keep differences and divisions alive. The PCI has lost much of its ability to do so, in any case, with its loss of contact to the unions.

Between DC and PCI, there are still no agreed-upon "rules of the game," nor are there any seemingly within the parties themselves. There is generally just enough legislative action to block the reorganization of priorities, and proportional representation brings out the fragmented nature of rule by coalition. A great deal of legislation substitutes for aggregation of a wide range of interests. Elites'

disposability to make reciprocal concessions to each others' interests has concentrated power in their hands. This is not really cooperative decision-making, if when acted upon, the decision is not presumed legitimate for all. The satisfaction of interests is more important than reciprocity or compromise. The price paid for a long period of mobilization on a divisive basis is that power is easily fragmented.

As polarization has decreased, voters have become less susceptible to mobilization on an ideological basis, but parties do not yet seem to be able to replace ideology with issues or to have promoted the idea that they are capable of governing efficiently even if given the chance. Political stability was a priority for the DC after the war and still is. The PCI has been accused of overvaluing participation, but both parties presently need to reassess the importance of a balance between stability and participation.

Italy's leaders have not been able to bridge sub-national loyalties and create a consensus about a "common good" for the nation. There has been little resolution to the conflict between traditional and modern cultures. Parties cling to the base they have established among voters in the days of polarization, and the more devoted followers have not been induced to accept alternatives to loyalty based on those past divisions. Italy has not made as much progress in the areas of social and cultural unification as it has in the economic sphere. The

growth and centralization of the economy has been starkly uneven, very much as a result of the efforts the State has made to maintain a cultural and social status quo. Not only has political development been held back, but the situation could grow more tense under economic pressure. Mass frustration over the lack of growth which Italy is experiencing in the 1980s is vented on those who have been in power. One of the enduring effects, then, of post-war polarization is that there has been little or no consensus formed about who can legitimately govern and for how long. There is no agreed-upon formula for a government stable enough to solve long-term problems and little provision for alternating party rule.

Party loyalty persists, especially among traditional groups, even though over time the "common enemy" theme has lost some of its potency as a unifier. The call for more efficient government can be heard from most all voters, whether they are old partisans or new reformers. In Friuli, at least, autonomy has provided a basis on which to perpetuate myths of the past which politicians continue to use to gain votes. The leader's reliance on ideology rather than efficiency continues to inhibit realistic approaches or negotiated solutions to national problems.

The contadino-operaio's history and experience in the process of industrialization has led to a reinforcement rather than a breakdown of many traditional values, but though much less discernible than the changing votes of the

region's urbanites, the contadino-operaio's political behavior is evolving as well. Polarization has declined and is likely to continue to do so. Italian national unity based on a common secular culture has not been achieved, however, so fragmentation of the political system is apt to increase as long as its parties continue to represent primarily personal and local interests in place of national issues.

This leads to the conclusion, then, that not only does political development not automatically accompany development, but that the latter can actually impede the former, especially when society has not been permitted to make significant structural, ideological, and cultural adjustments to changing material conditions.

There has been a widespread popular will to change in Italy which has been diverted and thwarted by authority. Much of the creative and productive change of the nation has come from the base and required acknowledgement by the government in Rome and by the Vatican. Hopefully, the Italian people will continue to force them to do so.

B. THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FROM FRIULI ON THEIR POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

Friuli-Venezia Giulia is an area where peasant mobilization and organization have taken place without a revolution. The agrarian population has been treated as a source of potential urban workers, but the contadino-operaio is a different character than that which development planners hoped to create.

In Friuli Venezia-Giulia, there is a clear relationship between the migrations, the economy of the zones where the majority of the movement has been, and the social structure of these areas. The urban industrial model of the 1950s caused migration from stagnating rural villages. The fact that there has been little further industrialization of these areas is linked to the State's choice of models. In turn, the local labor force "chose" to go abroad or to other parts of Italy to look for a better way of living, usually involving a search for industrial employment. It seemed the only way to gain social mobility. In turn, the decentralized model has been, among other factors, responsible for the end of emigration and the re-entry of many.

Temporary emigration has been an important factor in the transformation of what was a traditional society at the end of World War II to the different world that it is today. It is in this perspective that the regional study is particularly relevant as a whole, as well as the examination

within Friuli of the imbalance between the eastern Giulian area and the northern and western sections of Udine and Pordenone. The Provinces of Trieste and part of Gorizia were the center of urban industrialization in the 1950s. The Friulan area was later organized around the decentralized model. Their separate histories, which gave them different social and economic traditions, have deeply influenced the roles they have been assigned in earlier and more recent industrial development.

From a comparison of the two, one can draw several conclusions about the functions of the two different models. The urban based industrial development of the 1950s was characterized by small to large-sized units, financed by foreign or extra-regional groups, and placed mostly in the Giulian territory. This was all part of a national industrialization plan which was authored by the State in conjunction with already consolidated private groups. The textile and mechanical industries are good examples of the evolution of the plan. It was meant to use abundant labor at a good price and to reinforce those sectors of the Italian economy which were competitive in foreign markets. Support for the model was clear in the DC's policy of post-World War II funding with a great deal of help from foreign aid.

The model of the 1970s, in contrast, is characterized by small to medium-sized industries which have been dispersed especially in the central part of Friuli. The new

strategy uses a group of local investors as well as foreign money, and a variety of locations, although it too has become part of a national plan. Its role is different from the strictly urban based plan, through the two types of industries coexist in the Region. The older ones, however, are all in crisis and dependent on government funds to pay their workers. Many of the new units are expanding.

This is one proof of the weakness of the former national plan for development. Another is that when the unions grew stronger during the 1960s, the possibilities were reduced for foreign investment to use an abundant labor force at low cost, partly because available workers were less numerous and partly because the cost of labor no longer justified the effort required to take over completely. With the collapse of union solidarity the situation for urban-industrial labor is in the process of reversing itself, mostly at labor's expense. The urban-industrial model has not been good for industry or labor in Italy, but neither may be the decentralized rural one in the long run.

Perhaps most important for the Region of Friuli and ultimately for Italy is that the decentralized industries have begun to develop ties of their own to foreign markets. Regional autonomy, gained in 1964, gave local groups the possibility of formulating plans in which the central government need not involve itself in every stage. External decentralization promoted by the State in Friuli has been able to back up and support local initiatives. Thus, a

different relationship exists between Friuli and foreign markets than can be found in other areas of Italy. Though Friuli's historical ties to Austria and Yugoslavia have played some part in this development, it is mostly among the dynamic new small industries where the tightest links to markets outside Italy have been formed and it is also to these that Friuli will look for its future solvency.

One suggestion for development planners from the situation in Friuli is the importance of continuously reassessing the role of even a local economy in the world market. The terms "core," "semi-peripheral," and "peripheral," as well as "dual," simply relate to the pecking order of the world market, which changes with the need for raw materials and consumption patterns. "Dual" or "marginal" economies are not the result of systemic failures, but are signs of the amazing flexibility and resiliency of the system. Which areas are developing economically or disintegrating are part of the solution to the problems of the world economy, and the agrarian sector, as things stand now, will always be "peripheral" to development. Planners should simply consider this an economic fact of life.

Though the quantity of development may be limited because of geography or demography, the quality of the process and who benefits from it are more within the realm of control by planners. Changes in the regional economy of Friuli have had particular effects on the type of

modernization that has taken place. The process that has accompanied decentralized industrialization has had quite different results than the urban model. Instead of concentrations of the population in the cities, the productive structures throughout the territory have changed the demographic distribution between city and countryside. The two worlds overlap visibly in many areas.

Socially, an entire set of traditional values has been kept intact and made change gradual. Old patterns of saving and consumption, and the importance of having a rural dwelling have not been eliminated as they were during urban industrialization. Social relationships in rural villages are still characterized by exchange and collective forms of behavior. Rural industrialization has required a less bureaucratic and impersonal organization of work and society than the urban model.

Informal structures within companies and factories tend to run paralleled to the social structure. The original homogeneity of the class structure has contributed to these forms as have the conditions under which the new form of development was introduced to the area. The evolution of local social differentiation has been gradual and the amount of emulation between groups kept at a minimum, especially with respect to that which takes place in an urban environment. In turn, traditional forms of consumerism have been reinforced, further slowing the speed of modernization.

In other words, the transformation has not been glaringly introduced from outside and, most important, changes have not been perceived as a threat to or negation of the traditional world. There are contrasts between the artisan shop and the large factory, between the formality of work and the informality of daily life, but the starkest divisions between the two have been diluted and used to reinforce elements of continuity with the traditional society.

In the transformation of the Region's relationship to the outside world, and the particular type of modernization that has resulted, temporary emigration has played a very important part. Because emigration is a major part of the Region's history it also presents us with a particular way to view the territory's economic development and the evolution of its social structure.

If foreign workers are considered a flexible labor supply or unskilled manual labor for a limited period of time, the other side of the coin is that, at home, the same workers are apt to find the jobs which are most marginal to development. The present world economy has increasingly less dependence on the need for migrant labor, as production can be moved more easily to another country than it once was. However, countries which export labor should not expect that capital will be invested in their economies. The reasons why labor was brought to capital have not changed, and capital-to-labor industry is not

particularly profitable for countries with capital to invest.

Planners who expect to use emigration as social and economic controls can expect that, domestically, labor will be drained from productive as well as less-productive agricultural land. Local unemployment will be eased only temporarily, and though the push for land reform may be reduced by the exodus, in time there is likely to be an increase in the overall neglect of agriculture and a growing dependence on imported food.

The type of workforce created by emigration varies considerably with the history and environment of both the "host" and the home country. The ambiguous legal status of a foreign worker can prepare him or her for acceptance of precarious jobs at home. On the other hand, it has often been feared that gains for the Left were due to returning workers. There is little conclusive work on the subject, so development planners must think that the political behavior as well as the quality of the workforce produced by the experience of emigration is presently unpredictable. What can be monitored carefully, however, is the supply and demand for labor, both nationally and internationally.

In the study of Friuli's emigrants, the demand side of the labor market brought to light the particular entrepreneurial behavior of the local artisan group as it began to play an important role in regional economic development. It is this rural-based group which broke down many of the

divisions between contadino and emigrant. In many developing societies an urban-commercial class tends to invest in consumer goods rather than productive investments. This group, responsible for "modernization without development" in other places, has been noticeably lacking in Friuli's social structure, especially in areas where emigration has been heaviest. The place of this class has been filled instead by a commercial artisan layer, many of whom were emigrants, and who in return have invested their savings in local business. Thus, emigration has born the responsibility for lack of economic development in some places and its presence in others, although local dominant classes must bear at least equal responsibility.

This is not to say that the entrepreneurial spirit of rural artisans is solely the cause of the new economic model. External investments later permitted and favored its progress and its present would not be possible without the latter supporting the former.

The supply side of the labor market, especially the contadino-operaio, has fed the migrations. The family's permanence in rural areas through the migratory chain, the investment of its savings, and the maintenance of traditional values has been reinforced precisely by the temporariness as opposed to the permanence of migration. Being excluded as an equal member in the industrial environment where s/he found work, rural property, and part-time agricultural labor became the means to consolidate whatever

was earned at other jobs and a place to return. Out of necessity, but also because of a desire for a better life, the contadino-operaio has acquired social mobility, in turn affecting the flow of emigration, and the family's values.

Following the work of Alejandro Portes, we see that the contadino-operaio has gained a degree of structural and subjective modernity. If the first is a series of social processes; the family has experienced some industrialization, and out of necessity some urbanization which has been in turn rejected.

Communication was felt to be an important part of the traditional rural life; consequently, modern methods are helpful, but also a hindrance to group activities. Experience, and the media in particular, has increased consumer demands but also the sense that the rural person is an equal to many which were once thought to be "padrone."

For the contadino-operaio, subjective modernity does not represent urban values, but a different sort of internal mental flexibility. Ideological orientations now include empathy, ambition, information, limited consumption and geographic mobility, for the sake of expediency. Egalitarianism and democratic participation have been partially sacrificed to bring about social control. Secularism to which the contadino-operaio does not necessarily subscribe is something the mass media suggests is "modern." Individualism is part of a rural heritage and will be the last thing given up. The relative homogeneity and

"traditionalness" of the people of Friuli have been less obstacles to change than stabilizing factors that have helped them adjust to the demands made on them by the elite's plans for development.

Therefore, it is the local entrepreneurial class and the contadino-operaio which are the major actors in decentralized industrial development. The rural environment is their point of reference. This suggests that an urban area is not the only place where the transformation to modernity can take place. Even if it is not the intended result temporary migration has seen to this. It has maintained these groups in a rural environment and along with the State's assistance made decentralized development possible.

The model and its results have also had a healthy influence on some local agriculture, despite the fact that it continues to deteriorate as an economic activity, due more to demographic decomposition than to the form of development taking place. The original type of part-time farm had an essentially subsistence function for the part of the family that did not migrate. This role has been substituted for a dual function, first as an integrator of family income from non-agricultural jobs found in the recently developed local job market, and second, as a way to reduce the family's cost of living.

This change has affected the logic with which the land is worked and agricultural labor organized. While subsistence production favored goods for domestic use only, such

as a barn with one or two cows, a pig, chickens, the rationale for the use of land and labor is more closely tied to the market. In both production and consumption the farms are more closely linked with the prices for both types of commodity. Thus, the elimination of larger animals and their substitution with crops such as corn or grapes makes sense. The latter area more economical in terms of upkeep, labor, time and yield than the former.

Naturally, the new and the old part-time farm rarely appear in a pure form, which is illustrative of the change that is taking place. On the more traditional farms we find a large number of older family members planning for and working the land. These farmers are usually found in areas that are marginal to industrial sites. Much of the mountain territory and the eastern hills have not been included in recent expansion, and daily commuting to jobs is not possible. Where emigration is still necessary to find non-agricultural work, subsistence farming persists and income from the land, minimum though it may be, still represents the most important part of the total family income.

Farms where two or three generations live together tend to be characterized by the coexistence of the two functions. On these, the death of the grandparents may eliminate the subsistence function and accentuate the cost-of-living reduction tasks. Many of the subsistence activities are still practiced on the new part-time farm, such as the vegetable garden, the vineyard and a few courtyard animals

are common to both forms, but all the decisions for the farm no longer depend on, or revolve around the same activities that were essential to subsistence farming. Plans are likely to be made depending on market prices. The new part-time farm is most often found where there are fewer older people and where there is alternative employment to supplement agricultural income.

The subsistence function becomes only a part of the family's total activity for reducing the cost of living. An important element in the overall picture is ownership of the land and house, but the small garden and the courtyard animals are no longer justified by the lack of family income or as a guarantee of survival. The food budget is reduced by what is grown and the family can also enjoy "genuine" food and their own wine, both a source of great pride. The rest of the farm's productive surface, after deducting the small area needed for the family, can then be used with the same logic of a full-time farm. It can also be worked with the same tools since there is still ample opportunity to borrow and exchange. The yields are also much the same.

Thus, though landholding is no more logical or extensive than it ever was, farming production can be as rational on a new part-time farm as it can be on a full-time one. The new organization permits the continuing use of horizontal relationships for the exchange of products, labor and services, along with many of the activities of subsistence

farming. The total of these have a considerable impact on the local economy.

Industrialization then has affected agriculture in a variety of ways. Traditionally, labor was released from the fields for industry and, in turn, to permit more extensive agriculture to develop. This process only occurred in the early stages of industrialization in such countries as England and the United States. As development proceeded, the cost of moving people from the fields to the towns became higher, too high finally for industry or society to support and still have resources to invest in further industrial growth. Redressing this imbalance is certainly the basis of productive decentralization. The new model tends to fix people in the fields, and their permanence there has also produced a rationalization of the agricultural sector in comparison to its subsistence past. The latter was judged insufficient in every way from industry's point of view. In other words, the small farm has transformed the function of subsistence into one which reduces the cost of living, and the function rarely requires more than half a hectare. The rest of the farm, regardless of its size, enters the market through its saleable yield.

Until the middle of the 1960s the part-time farm was considered part of the transition to modern agriculture. Productive decentralization modified this and made it likely that the part-time farm will be a permanent feature of the new model. The old type of part-time farm may be considered

transitional, but the contadino-operaio, more family than individual, is probably not transitional.

The economically viable new type of part-time farm will be found in exactly those areas where decentralized industrial production has been most developed. It is most supportive of the new model precisely because of the way it has adapted, and because it is most able to reduce its own social costs. What emigration once promised for employment and savings has ended with changes in the national and international labor market. The problem must now be dealt with on national and local levels.

Two external variables will greatly affect the future of the contadino-operaio. One is that a rich full-time agriculture must be developed side by side with the diffusion of part-time farms. Second, there must be productive industrial sites which are accessible to the family. A present difficulty for Friuli and for most of Italy is a lack of industrial growth, whether in marginal areas or in those that are exclusively dedicated to agriculture.

The perspectives for full-time agriculture and the future growth of smaller industries, as well as the employment picture for both sectors greatly depend on the way local and national decision makers deal with the possibilities presented to them in a recovering, but still grim, world economic situation. The way Italian planners have acted in the past is illustrative when compared with the more recent criteria for investments and supports --

assistance, in other words. Its use as a method in development has some benefits, but also some high costs.

Italy is a good case in which to reexamine the role of "clientelism" in development. The persistence of patron-client ties is often used as an excuse for lack of development or an explanation of the lack of the system's rationality. To say that a system is run clientelistically throughout is to state that it runs by personalistic rather than efficiency criteria, and that the former has its own rules. Saying that a system runs more or less personalistically ends up in a tautology of what is meant by "functional," but tells us little about what is provided by such a system and less about what is changing within it.

Patronage, clientelism, or assistance exist in all systems. The frequency of its use must be correlated with other social and political characteristics of the system and the implications used to draw conclusions about the nature of conflict resolutions and factions in the society and the political system. On a national level in Italy, patronage was included as a mode of governing when the rural sector was brought into the ruling coalition. The emphasis on vertical and ambiguous relationships is symptomatic of the persistent importance of a rural sector which does not have easily definable ethnic or class distinctions for association. Its goals are more particularistic and heterogeneous than those of groups which are categorical, such as race or class. In other words, most studies of clientelism

and patronage in developing countries simply suggest that there is still a rural or traditional sector of society which is still strong. What makes the network "functional" or not depends on the author's judgement about the legitimacy of the group or groups for whom the system works. Most often, if limited to a group or individual, it is considered less "functional" than if it administers to the needs of the system as a whole.

One frequently overlooked factor about governing through assistance is that it usually is a substitute for mass participation in developmental decision-making. As a method, however, it does nothing to change a population's expectations. The clash in Italy in 1968 was not just the result of the ills of an industrial society, nor was it simply a preindustrial sector in conflict with the developing strategies. Both coexisted in a small social and geographic space. Social, political, economic, and cultural structures had produced desires for the benefits of development while limiting the channels of participation in the decision-making process. The elite exercised power without consensus. The rebellion against them in the late 1960s brought the enforced gap between the two cultural sectors of the country to light. The further maintenance of that gap would require arbitrary authority to maintain what were then publicly recognized as profound and unjust differences between sectors, groups, classes, geographical regions, levels of education, and hosts of other categories.

The government was not perceived to be linked to a well-distributed network of elective assemblies which were capable of governing a complex society which needed and wanted a capillary process which could reconstitute and unify it. It was not seen to be lacking in decisions or unable to govern because it was necessarily weak or unstable, but because there was no cohesive reforming perspective. The nature of the original governing coalition had precluded anything but contradictory and fragmented policy making. A government which continued to rely on cultural divisions became unacceptable to large numbers of Italians during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the 1980s, the issues are still not resolved.

In any such conflict, there are three very basic possible solutions. One is that the people will impose their objective on the leaders, which is the case in a successful revolution, for instance. Or, there can be a complete collapse of the movement and an enforced resolution. Neither is the case in Italy in the post-1968 period. There is a continuing struggle to enforce a compromise between adversaries with some success on both sides. The DC has purged some of its most "backward" supporters, the Mafia and secret societies such as the Masons. The PCI agrees that something must be done about Italy's "looming economic disasters," but accommodation is still at a discussion stage. A major block to cooperation continues to be U.S.

foreign policy, a sensitivity to which has long been required of Italian leaders.

In 1969, election results indicated that De Mita's ideas of a constitutional pact, which would permit agreement of common policies between the DC and the PCI, was possible. President Nixon sent Graham Martin to Italy as U.S. Ambassador. Martin was to change the recipients of American aid. Up until 1972, the DC received financial assistance to support its electoral campaigns. The publication of the Pike Report by the House Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976 showed that the extreme Right, especially the MSI, Italy's Monarcho-fascist party, was to be the new focus for U.S. aid. Martin feared a "world-wide communist conspiracy," and even made provisions for a U.S.-sponsored coup d'etat if the PCI could not be kept out of the government any other way.

John Volpe, U.S. Ambassador to Italy from 1973 to 1976, continued to do everything possible to support anti-communist elements, many of whom were right-wing neo-fascists. Though the CIA was often less than supportive, the Italian Right was incapable of preventing PCI gains. Both the Communists and the DC, however, were forced into continuing sensitivity to American conceptions of internal political dangers because of Italy's dependence on outside economic assistance.

It is ironic that the rightest group supported by the United States in Italy is the least democratic of all

possible anti-communist groups there. The PCI itself is hardly devotedly pro-Soviet. In any case, the MSI of Italy is representative of the last holdouts against social and political change in Italy, the remnants of the old rural sector of the governing coalition, among whom are not just the landed aristocracy, but the Mafia, the Cormorra, and the more "respectable" secret societies, such as the Masons, the most highly placed of which have been indicted in one government scandal or another.

The Left may not be an appealing group for the United States to support in Italy, but a closer examination of what it stands for there is in order. Both socialists and communists play the role of "loyal opposition" more often they they do at revolution. In any case, the continued insensitivity of the U.S. government to the realities of Italian politics puts both the DC and the PCI in a position of having it internationally unacceptable for them to cooperate in national decision making. At the same time, rightist groups who are openly committed to national destabilization are threatening Italian internal order. Here certainly is a major lesson for development planners about economic dependence and their choice of developmental models. For all that foreign aid has done a great deal of good in Italy, it is also the source of a continuing dilemma. The part which ideology plays in a nation's developmental process is as much a part of the culture as the ultimate forms development itself takes, but the

national interpretations of developing ideologies will often be misunderstood by others, where the same ideology has quite a different function.

In considering any model, it will be necessary for planners to be sensitive to the cultural setting in which it is to be applied. Friuli-Venezia Giulia is a particularly good example of a place where history and ideology have deeply influenced the outcome of development. For instance, in this study it has been essential to take into consideration that the Church still plays an important economic role in Italy and culturally, a central one. In the past, the Vatican has not been uncomfortable with an authoritarian government and varying degrees of anti-capitalist economic behavior, nor with social immobility. This is true in much of Europe, some of Asia and Africa and in most of Central and South America. In Italy, at least, the principles behind bourgeois revolutionary models were incompatible with the internalized ethic of Catholicism. Where there was no tradition of popular participation, Marxism was often seen as the liberator when discontent erupted because it was commonly expressed to the rural world in paternalistic and authoritarian terms, less a break with the Catholic ethic than other ideologies. Where democratic traditions of the liberal western variety have not evolved, it should not be surprising that Church and State have found difficulty dividing their spheres of interest. Many Eurocommunists rejected capitalist democracy precisely because they felt it

was incompatible with their society's internalized religious values.

In trying to solve this problem many political minds move between Marxism and Catholicism and many theologians try to bring the two closer together in theory. The solution is nowhere near and the dilemma will continue to affect social evolution in Italy and elsewhere. This problem was underlined in Friuli by a recent study of high school students who were studying Marx with interest and often enthusiastic acceptance. Many returned home to anti-clerical, or at least professedly lay families, but in the afternoon they went off to meetings of scouts, a local parish group, Young Catholic Action, or any number of other clerically dominated activities. Even if they do not go to services regularly, the Church is never far from their lives. Sensitivity to such contradictions will help in research on political parties, communist or not, in countries such as Italy where the society has yet to be secularized, regardless of frequent claims to the contrary.

It is ironic that Italy of the 1980s is promoting an image of Togliatti and De Gasperi as the two great secularizers of post-World War II Italian society. The two men who both came out of fascism are being pictured as devoted to giving Italians the best of liberty, freeing it from conformism, ideology, and clericalism of all kinds. Is this really what the post-World War II years have been like? The Church has been shown in its economic and political roles

in support of the DC. The association of laic parties in the post-war government was principally a cover under which the DC could mask its search for a monopoly of power. De Gasperi was a man of great moral strength and diplomatic acumen, and his centrism had strong overtones of reform, but reform to benefit whom? The reform of Bonomi and the Coldiretti with the division of land into the smallest of pieces to be dependent on the Consorzi Agrari and the credit institutions on the central banking system, all of which were dominated by the Church, can hardly be considered a force for secular government.

Tolerance was not a strong point for Togliatti and the post-war PCI leadership either, if the capacity for tolerance is what is meant by secular. Certainly, opposition within the Party was not permitted, and attempts to keep the Party's ideology pure resulted in policy dilemmas for the PCI and often absurd contradictions. The inability to understand the rural population's needs and tenacious support for the urban worker, however, did not prevent Togliatti from being an important force, not just for the modern nation of Italy, but for political stability in the post-war years when people were inclined to rebellion and often anarchy. It was a very different party from the one that came out of the socialist-communist split in the pre-war years of Livorno, but it was not one dedicated to an Italy without ideology.

To say that either Togliatti or De Gasperi worked for the secularization of Italy is a falsification of history, but its society has been secularized to some degree just as the DC and the PCI have. What is significant is that these two men are being used as symbols of change which is presently observable but for which neither of them actually worked. Part of a sensitivity to the use of ideology in the process of development must also include an awareness of old symbols as they gain new meanings and the type of social change of which they are a signal.

In Friuli, we have seen how traditional values, supported by the Church, have not always been a force promoting "progress," but neither have they been the only ones to hold it back. Perhaps Don Camillo, as a symbol of the local parish, and Peppone, the town's communist mayor, could only be a product of Italy's lack of fundamental social change, but learning to live together has been developed to a fine art here, so much so that one can be both a "believer" and a communist. If there is a positive side it is that the horrors of a Thermidor are unlikely where coexistence, if not accommodation, is more important than theory.

It is the history of the contadino-operaio's struggle to survive and prosper in such a society that is so much a part of what that group is now. As an object in changing developmental plans for Italy, the contadino-operaio has been assigned a variety of social, economic and political roles. The State has often denied its contributions, but

still courted and promoted its economic dependence as a substitute for its participation. The Church has alternately mediated and supported this effort. As a result, the contadino-operaio has developed a way of life which included a combination of traditional and modern values that allow the maximum of immunity to government manipulation at the same time that Rome needs cooperation more than ever before to resolve the variety of crises it faces.

In Friuli we have found unhealthy disequilibrium between agricultural and industrial development, brought about by selective concentration of funds for development by international, national, and local groups. The rest of the Region has often been left to do the best it can. Certainly, agriculture and industry are not equal sectors at any time or in any place, but never more than now the gap between them must be monitored. Urban industrialization has been the focus of development theories in the past and these models have fostered ideas of big agricultural projects such as gigantic dams and massive land reclamation. Perhaps the example of Friuli might suggest a different view of agriculture as a support system for more balance growth. The society which the contadino-operaio has struggled to preserve might also be considered a healthy alternative to many of the problems that urban industrialization has brought about.

The figure has been "created" through emigration and a history of "tampone" politics. With conscious and careful

planning, the contadino-operaio could be used as a model elsewhere. In a fragmented agricultural setting, rural people can still have a future on the land if supportive small and medium-sized industries are promoted. Places need to be made, especially for such structures as cooperatives. These will be more useful if, before being joined by super-highways, roads might first be made to connect a series of villages to a larger market. Agricultural schools are essential and courses could diffused and rotated in rural communities if less emphasis were put on education in impressive universities in far-off cities. If isolated villages get help to build small irrigation projects first, they may later be able to contribute to and benefit from a larger national system. However, the success of such plans will require political and cultural planners and leaders who manipulate national ideology to accept the idea that a rural person can be both as productive and as "modern" as an urban one.

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