

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

INELUCTABLE MODALITY OF THE VISIBLE:
JOYCE, BECKETT, AND THE MODERNIST CHALLENGE TO VISION

by

JOHN ROCCO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in English in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York

1998

UMI Number: 9830759

Copyright 1998 by
Rocco, John

All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9830759
Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.


UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

© 1998

JOHN ROCCO

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in English in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

4/24/58 
Date Chair of Examining Committee

4/29/98 
Date Executive Officer

Edmund Epstein

Gerhard Joseph

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

INELUCTABLE MODALITY OF THE VISIBLE:
JOYCE, BECKETT, AND THE MODERNIST CHALLENGE TO VISION

by

John Rocco

Adviser: Professor Louis Menand

Modernism has always been associated with challenging conventional vision. Modernist art has been traditionally depicted as dealing in anti-representation, “personal” vision, the debunking of “normal” perspective, and attacks upon the eye of the spectator. The famous movements of modernism-- Impressionism, Expressionism, Cubism, Dada, Surrealism, Futurism, Imagism, Vorticism, and Bloomsbury-- are all associated with visual experiments and ocular themes. And this preoccupation with the visible was compounded and complicated by the technological advances in photography and film that challenged the nature of mimesis and the role of the artist. From the synthetic collages of the Cubists to the typographical gymnastics of e. e. cummings, modernism is perceived

and written about as obsessed with the visual. This study furthers the analysis of this modernist obsession by proposing a reevaluation of what occurs in modernism's relationship to vision. James Joyce and Samuel Beckett are the key figures in this consideration because their work provokes a discussion of vision that breaks with traditional approaches to the subject. Through an examination of their aesthetics and politics, Joyce and Beckett become the starting points for questioning the hold "pure" seeing has had over meaning since Plato. The challenges to vision embodied in their work provide a map for reading their precursors in the battle against the hegemony of sight (Blake, Wilde, Nietzsche, Yeats). The modernist movement itself is then delineated in terms of visual exploration, visual problems, and visual politics; Ezra Pound, Virginia Woolf, T. S. Eliot, Wyndham Lewis, Gertrude Stein, Pablo Picasso, and Sergei Eisenstein are considered in relation to their probing of modernist seeing. This study ends with an analysis of how Joyce and Beckett's radical experiments with vision lead to a blurring of "clear" meaning that is taken up by thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Hélène Cixous. This reevaluation leads to a reordering of the modernist canon as well as a new "look" into its impact upon poststructuralism and postmodernism.

Acknowledgments

I had the incredible good fortune of having Professor Louis Menand direct this dissertation; he was constantly helpful and supportive. More importantly, he reignited me when my vision became wild and kept me writing when it became blurred. This study would never have come into focus without him.

Professor Gerhard Joseph supported and encouraged me from the first moment I met him until the day I defended this dissertation. I owe him a great deal for his consistent encouragement and kindness.

Professor Edmund Epstein has taught me about Joyce since I was an undergraduate. His teaching has been one of the great rewards of my intellectual life.

I could not have survived this without the support of Brian and Mary Bridget Rocco. Dana Hennefeld did more than help in my survival: she, as always, kept me going and kept me whole. I could not have written this without her help.

I dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Mary Clancy. She gave me everything, including Ireland.

Up the Rebels!

Preface

To *perceive* is one thing; *to judge* is another.

--George Berkeley, "Visual Language Vindicated"

The aim of this study is to reevaluate the relationship between modernism and vision. There is a long history of criticism dealing specifically with this important affiliation. In fact, it would be difficult to find a consideration of modernist art without some kind of appraisal of the modernist fascination with the manipulation of the visual, or, more generally, with the modernist concern with seeing in a "modern" way. From abstraction in painting to Imagism in poetry, modernism has always been taken as obsessed with the visual. Conrad's declaration in the preface to *The Nigger of the "Narcissus"* has been taken as emblematic of the modernist aesthetic: "to make you hear, to make you feel... before all, to make you *see*" (vii). The goal of this study is to revise our thinking about modernist vision by refocusing on what we mean when we think about vision as a process, metaphor, and force in representing reality and consciousness in literature. Vision has become a predominant topic of criticism in the humanities and many thinkers on the subject have discerned a "pictorial turn" in theory reminiscent of the

“linguistic turn” which occurred earlier in the century. This reevaluation of an almost unquestioned relationship provides for a new reading of modernism while also questioning how we construct the modernist canon.

In many ways this study represents a shift in modernist studies. In contrast to the conventional reading of the modernist novel as visual wonderland or modernist poetics as some kind of modernity-driven *ut pictura poesis*, I examine modernist uses of visual tropes, metaphors, and meanings in the light of philosophical considerations of the power vision has had over depictions of reality and knowledge since Plato. Thinkers concerned with the force vision has over meaning have called this “ocularcentrism” and I use this critique to challenge the received understanding of what we think occurs in modernist literature. This new “look” at modernist looking provokes new readings across the subjects that have recently become the focus of modernist studies: “race,” constructions of gender, colonialism, postcolonialism, popular culture, and nationalism.

The work of James Joyce is the main focus throughout this investigation because of his monumental onslaught on Western conceptions of vision, experience, and representation; and I take his *oeuvre* as the influence behind the challenges to conventional seeing in the work of other modernists such as Virginia Woolf, Sergei Eisenstein, Djuna Barnes, William Faulkner, and John Dos Passos. The last section of this study examines how Samuel Beckett takes this modernist challenge into the realm of the postmodern. However, it should not be taken that this revisionary examination of modernist looking is confined to Joyce and the circle of writers and artists that surrounded him-- and it should not be assumed that all of the writers who were influenced

by Joyce followed him down the road of “anti-ocularcentrism” (Pound and Eliot figure as the two most significant cases in this regard). As I suggest throughout, there were modernists-- Gertrude Stein is an important example-- who pursued their own trajectory of revolt against established seeing without the influence of Joyce. In fact, along with its revision of modernism’s link to vision, this study also proposes a reordering of the British, Irish, and American high modernist canon that reflects this concern with the philosophical and ontological background of vision. And because this new approach radically alters what we mean when we speak of modernism and vision, it leads into a new way of “seeing” postmodernism.

This study takes modernism as the first large-scale attack upon ocularcentrism in the arts, but the roots of this challenge run throughout English literature and I discuss its beginnings in chapter two. Joyce and Beckett may hold center stage throughout this examination of the visual, but other writers such as William Blake, Oscar Wilde, and W. B. Yeats are discussed as important predecessors and instigators. And if this study has a decidedly Irish tint-- like light shot through a pint of Guinness-- then it is fitting that the following introduction should begin with the writer who straddled Victorian England and colonial Ireland while pointing the way towards modernism.

A Note on “Visual” Language

As this study demonstrates, the impact of “visual thinking” has had a great impact upon the language we use. Throughout English there exist words, phrases,

and metaphors directly related to the power vision has over meaning and language. I can thus not always avoid words such as “demonstrate,” “highlight,” and “focus” or phrases such as “in the light of” or “point of view.” I have attempted to be aware of such “visual” language throughout and when it occurs I hope the context demonstrates my awareness of its force in our language and over meaning. When this kind of “visual” language occurs without my knowledge-- as it probably does throughout-- then it should be taken as an example of my own unconscious debt to the visual.

Table of Contents

	<u>page</u>
Introduction: Joyce, Vision, and the Modernist Challenge to Ocularcentrism	1
Chapter One: Seeing and Being: Minor Literature and Philosophy at the Turn of the Century	26
Chapter Two: Yeats Looks at Blake: Modernist Seeing	58
Chapter Three: Seeing <i>Dubliners</i> Through Epiphanies: Vision and Joyce's Politics	114
Chapter Four: Narrative and Its Visual Discontents: Seeing Through <i>A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man</i> and Into <i>Ulysses</i>	166
Chapter Five: Drinking <i>Ulysses</i> : "Oxen of the Sun," Bass Ale, and the Typography of Cubism	199
Chapter Six: Shut Your Eyes and See: "Ithaca" and the Question of Cinema	217
Chapter Seven: But Self: Beckett's American <i>Film</i>	276
Chapter Eight: Beckett and the Politics of Nothing: Spectacle/Panopticism/Ocularcentrism	299
Conclusion: Seeing Beyond <i>Finnegans Wake</i>	335
Works Cited	341

Introduction:
Joyce, Vision, and the Modernist Challenge to
the Ocularcentric Tradition

The true mystery of the world is the visible,
not the invisible.
--Oscar Wilde, *The Picture of Dorian Gray*

Wilde About Seeing

When Lord Henry Wotton tells Dorian Gray about the “true” mystery of the world at the beginning of *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, we take the comment as a typical Wildean overstatement. This is especially true when we consider the sentence directly before this formula: “It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances” (32). However, as the novel progresses, we come to see that Lord Henry’s witticism has more behind it than we have realized. What is behind modernist vision is the subject of this study; my concern is with the modernist preoccupation with visual tropes, visual meanings, and the use of vision as a metaphor in representation. As Dorian Gray finds out, the visible has more behind it than what at first meets the eye. The novel is, after all, about a magic representation which trades places with the living face of the protagonist. The “true” visible trades places with the “false” or man-made visible. This trade-- this living ekphrasis-- is emblematic of Wilde’s place within a tradition of depicting the

visual.¹ As with many aspects of Wilde's writing, he stands with one foot in Victorian sensibility and the other in modernist and even postmodernist play. His place within this tradition of seeing supplies us with an entrance into the aim of this study: the reevaluation of the modernist concern, relationship, understanding, and aesthetic manipulation of vision. James Joyce's work is the focus of this investigation into the modernist response to the changes in thinking about vision and reality. But the writer who provides Stephen Dedalus with his optical analogy at the beginning of *Ulysses* ("It is the symbol of Irish art. The cracked lookingglass of a servant" [*U* 1.146]) is a helpful place to look first before examining modernist looking.

As Carol Christ describes it, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* has qualities of the "microscopic eye" cultivated by the Victorians and the novel displays this at dangerous or tension filled moments: "Under extreme emotion, the mind reaches out for some object to occupy it. The strain of emotion produces the intense clarity of what are often trivial visual impressions" (*Finer* 28). Christ's study of the Victorian concentration on the particular as opposed to the eighteenth-century obsession with the universal is an analysis of an optical switch, or what she calls a change to "a new kind of vision" (*Finer* 14). She points to Tennyson as the originator of the new emphasis on the particular.² The famous example of this turn to the minute occurs in Tennyson's *Maud* when the speaker concentrates on the detail of a shell ("See what a lovely shell,/ Small and pure as a pearl" [239]); Christ quotes an example of this kind of seeing from Wilde's novel:

The spray of lilac fell from his hand upon the gravel.
A furry bee came and buzzed round it for a moment.
Then it began to scramble all over the oval stellated
globe of the tiny blossoms. He watched it with that
strange interest in trivial things that we try to develop

when things of high import make us afraid, or when
 we cannot find expression, or when some thought
 that terrifies us lays sudden siege to the brain and
 calls on us to yield. (quoted in Christ, *Finer* 28)

I quote this optical description at length because it illustrates Christ's point as well as situating Wilde in a background of Victorian visual description.³ However, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* is a novel of the 1890's and it is also a work under the spell of Walter Pater. If Wilde's novel is a book about a painting that comes alive, Pater's most famous book is about being alive in front of paintings. Wilde called *The Renaissance* "my golden book," and, as Richard Ellmann describes it, the shadow of Pater's book lingers over the novel to such a degree that "Dorian becomes aestheticism's first martyr" (Wilde 315). *The Renaissance* proposes a new way of looking at things that is in sharp contrast to the microscopic eye of the Victorians. This new way of seeing is given in the most famous section of the book, the "Conclusion":

To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain
 this ecstasy, is success in life. In a sense it might even be
 said that our failure is to form habits: for, after all, habit is
 relative to a stereotyped world, and meantime it is only the
roughness of the eye that makes any two persons, things,
 situations, seem alike. While all melts under our feet,
 we may well grasp at any exquisite passion, or any
 contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon
 to set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the
 senses, strange dyes, strange colours, and curious odours,
 or work of the artist's hands, or the face of one's friend.
 (My emphasis, 219)

This invocation to get behind everyday seeing, to sharpen the "roughness of the eye," is the famous thrust of the "Conclusion." It is an invocation to reexamine "ordinary" experience: "Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end" (219). This was

the doctrine taken up by Wilde and, somewhat later, by the Tragic Generation. In his autobiography, Yeats describes the dangerous effect this had by writing that he and others, such as Lionel Johnson and Ernest Dowson, were attracted intensely and immediately to this new world, only to be “left to keep our feet upon a swaying rope in a storm” (303). Yeats’s relationship to Pater will be discussed in the next chapter, but for now this injunction “to be differently” in the “Conclusion” is important for Wilde’s novel and modernist seeing:

With this sense of the splendour of our experience and its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch. What we have to do is to be forever curiously testing new opinions and courting new impressions, never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy, of Comte, or of Hegel, or of our own.... The theory or idea or system which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some interest into which we have not identified with ourselves, or of what is only conventional, has no real claim upon us. (219-220)

This call for reliance on the personal as opposed to the doctrinaire or conventional is important because it points to a split between the self and the world. Michael Levenson sees Pater’s project as directly linked to a change in thinking about the self; as Matthew Arnold challenged traditional religion, Pater challenged traditional being: “Pater followed relentlessly the logic of immediacy, acknowledging the primacy of the subjective but denying its necessary connection with extrasubjective concerns. The consequence was a bifurcation into a realm of fact and a realm of subjective consciousness” (17-18). This emphasis on the personal, or the *separation* of the personal from everything else, according to Levenson, leads to a revaluation of thinking and experience: “If subjectivity

was indeed the locus of experience, and hedonism the pre-eminent psychological fact. then connections to morality and religion became strained and factitious" (18). Yeats and the Tragic Generation were pushed out on a tightrope over a chasm because Pater's little book proposed the reevaluation of everything they had ever known.⁴

The point I would like to add to Levenson's analysis of Pater's radical move into subjectivity and its concomitant challenge to conventional morality and religion is that Pater does this in a book about *looking*. *The Renaissance* has a very famous beginning which is a direct response to a conventional way of seeing:

"To see the object as in itself it really is," has been justly said to be the aim of all true criticism whatever; and in aesthetic criticism the first step towards seeing one's object as it really is, is to know one's own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realize it distinctly.... What effect does it really produce on me? (71)

This "amendment" to Arnold's definition of the aim of criticism is what I take as Pater's first blow in his challenge to Victorian subjectivity. I take this as the starting point because it explicitly invokes the visual ("To see the object as in itself it really is") alongside the personal. This move is important for my analysis of vision and modernism because it links the personal with what the Victorians took as consistently detached and impersonal: the visible world. But Pater was not alone in this thinking about a new way of seeing. The other celebrated teacher Wilde had at Oxford also called for a new approach to seeing. John Ruskin also called for a new set of Victorian eyes in his defense of Turner, in five volumes about looking at paintings:

The whole technical power of painting depends on our recovery of what may be called the *innocence of the eye*; that is to say, of a sort of childish perception of these flat stains of colour, merely as such, without consciousness of

what they signify,-- as a blind man would see them if suddenly gifted with sight. (Ruskin's emphasis, 27)

I will discuss Ruskin's invocation of the Molyneux problem-- the famous question posed by the empiricists about whether or not a blind person who was suddenly gifted with sight could recognize the objects he had been feeling all of his life instead of seeing-- in chapter one, but for now it is enough to say that, as Jonathan Crary describes it, this injunction for an "*innocence of the eye*" marks the development of a "new kind of observer" (94). This call to see with innocent eyes-- a call echoed by Picasso when he said that his aim as an artist was to draw like a child-- is tied up, for Crary, with the idea of modernity. Crary points to an influential description by Paul De Man of modernity's will-to-forget as a description of the motivating force behind Ruskin's call for virgin eyesight:

Modernity appears in the form of a desire to wipe out whatever came earlier, in the hope of reaching at last a point that could be called a true present, a point of origin that marks a new departure. This combined interplay of deliberate forgetting with an action that is also a new origin reaches the full power of the idea of modernity. (148)

De Man points to Nietzsche, Rimbaud, and Artaud as modern writers who explicitly demand this kind of cutting off of the past. As I will describe it in chapter one, this rejection of the past takes on the form of a rejection of "old seeing" in Nietzsche, a rejection that is summed up from a famous sentence from *The Genealogy of Morals*: "All seeing is essentially perspective, and so is all knowing" (255).

In many ways, *A Picture of Dorian Gray* is about problems in seeing in the new way proposed by Pater and Ruskin. Seeing in this new way, according to the novel, leads

to magic, but it can also lead to dissolution and death. The famous problematic preface to the novel tells us this in its seemingly contradictory stance to the lessons of the novel, or, as Ellmann describes it: “Wilde the preface writer and Wilde the novelist deconstruct each other” (*Wilde* 315). But this very contradiction that has plagued readers-- it was a contradiction brought up in the libel suit against Wilde⁵-- is exactly where I see Wilde pointing to a new way of thinking about seeing that will become important for modernist thinking and aesthetics. The epigraphs to the book create a questioning of the entire novel by their juxtaposition with it. I take this questioning-- what are we to take at face value: the preface’s embrace of pure aestheticism or the novel’s “moral?”-- as indicative of the questions of vision Wilde raises throughout his career.⁶ Many of the epigraphs invoke ocular metaphors, but one in particular points to the turn to questions about experience and seeing that will form the basis of modernist art: “It is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors” (17). This turn against the spectator will become a major aim of modernist art from the Impressionists to Beckett. However, the question now becomes: Why vision? To answer this I will examine what I take as the most pronounced and influential attack upon conventional ways of seeing in high modernism: the writing of James Joyce.

Modernism and Ocularcentrism

Except among heretics, all Western metaphysics has been peephole metaphysics.... As through the crenels of a parapet, the subject gazes upon a black sky in which the star of the idea, or of Being, is said to rise.

--Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*

Shut your eyes and see.
--*Ulysses* (U 3.9)

Before looking at Joyce's challenge to looking I must state the obvious: modernism has always been taken as obsessed with the visual. This is usually pointed to in the modernist manipulation of form and play with self-reflexivity. As Martin Jay puts it in his study of the anti-ocular movement in modern French thought, this is a common critical point: "Modernist aesthetics... has traditionally been construed as the triumph of a pure visuality, concerned solely with formal optical questions" (160). Jay goes on to point out that this was made officially explicit by people like Clive Bell as early as 1913 when he wrote in *Art of Cézanne*: "Everything can be seen as pure form, and behind pure form lurks the mysterious significance that thrills to ecstasy" (140). Bell's description of form in Cézanne's paintings is important because the French artist is taken as one of the earliest modernists on account of his play with perspective and his concentration on the *feelings* of the artist. Huysmans paid him the compliment of calling him an artist "*aux retines malades*" (with diseased retinas) because his work was so subjective as to appear distorted. This play with seeing-- seeing by the artist and the spectator (Wilde: "It is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors")-- is taken as one of the basic qualities of modernism; and the representative modernist movements from Impressionism, Cubism, Dada, and Surrealism to Imagism, Vorticism, and Bloomsbury are all associated with this kind of highlighting of visual forms and ideas. What I want to do here is to question this common critical stance and look at it in a new way. To do this, I begin not with Joyce but with a more obvious attack upon vision: a Surrealist film.

A man plunges through a mirror and ends up in a hallway of the *Hotel des Folies-Dramatiques*. The man is a poet. He moves down the door-lined hallway and pauses at several doors to peep through their keyholes. The poet sees several bizarre sights through the keyholes: a Mexican revolutionary being executed over and over again; shadow hands packing a shadow pipe; an eye looking back at him; a child taking a flying lesson; and the composition of a living statue-painting. At the end of the hallway the poet is handed a revolver which he promptly uses to blow his brains out.

This long scene from Jean Cocteau's *The Blood of a Poet* (1932) is a classic example of Surrealism's attack upon the established conventions and accepted ontology of vision.⁷ To peep through a keyhole is not to see a person undressing, or a couple in bed: to peep through a keyhole for the poet is to peep into the dark side of life and art. To peep through the keyhole is to see past what Adorno in my epigraph calls "peephole metaphysics." Seeing is not believing: seeing is not an innocent process directly connected with "reality." The Surrealists were by no means a unified artistic and philosophical movement-- and Cocteau was never a welcomed member-- but they can be said to have had a common goal when it came to attacking the Western reliance upon vision.⁸ As Jay describes it, the Surrealists had two main targets they believed constituted conventional vision: "speculative reason, bathing in the light of clear and distinct ideas mirrored in the mind's eye, and mimetic observation, trusting in the reflected light of objects apparent to the two physiological eyes" (236). From Georges Bataille's fascination with violence and pornography-- a fascination culminating in *Story of the Eye* (1940)-- to Rene Magritte's paintings of visual puns and visual challenges, the

Surrealist attack upon vision has always been overt and primarily rooted in jarring the viewer/reader out of complacent seeing. They attacked the “easy” connection between the world of things and human sight that was inaugurated with the development of Western metaphysics.

It is this challenge to the foundations of Western ideas about vision and cognition embodied in the Cartesian *cogito* that attracted Michel Foucault to the work of Magritte. In his long essay on the painter, *This is not a Pipe*, Foucault takes Magritte’s paintings as calligrams that provoke readings in opposition to “just looking at something,” or “just looking at a representation of something.” Magritte’s work challenges the “easy” equation between things and their representations, or, in the case of *Ceci n’est pas une pipe* (1926), words and their referents. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault describes the rift between language and objects on the canvas:

[T]he relation of language to painting is an infinite relation. It is not that words are imperfect, or that, when confronted by the visible, they prove insuperably inadequate. Neither can be reduced to the other’s terms: it is in vain that we say what we see: what we see never resides in what we attempt to show, by the use of images, metaphors, similes, what we are saying. (9)

What we see never resides in what we say: this is the classic poststructuralist step beyond Saussure. The importance of Foucault’s work here is that it explicitly foregrounds the problem in the equation between the visual world and the world of discourse. As art historian Michael Ann Holly points out, “the earlier twentieth-century works of Magritte are employed by late twentieth-century thinkers in need of characterizing the ‘hysterical semiology’ of contemporary thought” (85). Magritte questions the power of sight--

questions its relation to cognition and truth-- and no other of his paintings is as emblematic of this as *The False Mirror* (1928): a huge eyeball with a cloud-filled sky coloring its pupil staring out at the viewer. Holly describes this painting as a kind of Foucauldian horror: "The object here viewed-- the eye-- abruptly changes its direction and circles back on its rival the other 'I,' the spectator outside the painting. The object becomes the subject, and then the equation is reversed, only to be undone once again and yet again" (85). We circle back to Wilde: "It is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors."

Saussure's work on language is one of the starting points for structuralism; the work that came out of the nineteenth century that directly challenges the primacy of sight over meaning and pushes Saussure's critique of language into poststructuralism is important here: the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. When Derrida pointed out the influence of Nietzsche he gestured toward the philosopher's role in the development of anti-ocular thinking: "we... would have to cite the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of Being and truth, for which are substituted the concepts of play, interpretation, and sign (sign without present truth)" ("Structure" 280). Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics is grounded in what Alexander Nehamas calls his development of "perspectivism," or, in other words, his emphasis on thinking about truth and meaning as products of perspective.⁹ This is an important step in the challenge to metaphysics because, as Richard Rorty describes it, vision is inextricably bound to thinking:

The notion of "contemplation," of knowledge of universal concepts... makes the Eye of the Mind the inescapable model for the better sort of knowledge. But it is fruitless to ask whether the Greek language, or Greek economic conditions, or the idle fancy of some nameless pre-Socratic, is responsible for viewing this sort of knowledge as *looking* at something (rather than,

say, rubbing up against it, or crushing it underfoot, or having sexual intercourse with it). (Rorty's emphasis, 38-39)

This emphasis on the visible that we have inherited from the Greeks has formed itself into the strongest metaphor for attaining truth, or, as Rorty puts it: "knowledge as *looking* at something." Since the Greeks, the idea of vision has held the primary position in attaining and thinking about knowledge. In a famous essay arguing for an existentialist view of biological and philosophical "facts," Hans Jonas describes the origins of the "nobility of sight":

Since the days of Greek philosophy sight has been hailed as the most excellent of the senses. The noblest activity of the mind, *theoria*, is described in metaphors mostly taken from the visual sphere. Plato, and Western philosophy after him, speaks of the "eye of the soul" and the "light of reason." Aristotle, in the first lines of the *Metaphysics*, relates the desire for knowledge inherent in the nature of all men to the common delight in perception, most of all in vision. Yet neither he nor any other of the Greek thinkers, in the brief treatments of sight we have, seems to have really explained by what properties sight qualifies for these supreme philosophical honors. (135)

It is worth taking a look at the opening of the *Metaphysics* here because, as Jonas describes it, Aristotle explicitly connects knowing and seeing:

All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things. (243)

Seeing "makes us know." To challenge this old equation is not an easy task. To ask why vision is privileged and how this hegemony plays out in our thinking about the world is a

relatively new philosophical inquiry.¹⁰ And the answer that many have proposed to this question reveals the very nature of the problem; to the question of vision's hold over meaning, the immediate answer seems to be: to *see* is to *understand*. What other way is there to know the world? But this answer clearly reveals the problem: thinking has become so entrenched in the metaphor of seeing that to think differently about thinking-- to try to get beyond the visual paradigm-- proves difficult and seems impossible. If all Western philosophy is just footnotes to Plato, then the footnotes are also tied into the hegemony seeing has over knowledge.

To know has always been to see clearly. In fact, vision is taken as the very basis of human civilization. In a famous footnote to *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud describes the rise of culture as intractably linked with the development of vision:

The fateful process of civilization would thus have set in with man's adoption of an erect posture. From that point the chain of events would have proceeded through the devaluation of olfactory stimuli and the isolation of the menstrual period to the time when visual stimuli were paramount and the genitals became visible, thence to the continuity of sexual excitation, the founding of the family and so to the threshold of civilization. (46-47n)

With the concentration on vision over the other senses because of standing erect, man's relationship to the world around him changed and he went about changing the way he lived. The basic posture of standing erect began a relationship to the world that has gone unquestioned. The hegemony of vision has formed what John Dewey has called a "spectator theory of knowledge" (23) and it has dominated our thinking about thinking. Philosophers concerned with this tradition of the Western reliance upon vision have called it ocularcentrism and they have pointed to its force in all areas of human thought,

from the arts to the sciences.¹¹ Ocularcentrism is structured around a powerful metaphor: seeing is truth, seeing is believing, believing is seeing. The power of the metaphor lies in the fact that it has been consistently taken for granted. The title of Rorty's book on the prevalence of the visual alludes to this: *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. The metaphor is everywhere and Rorty describes it as a monstrous intellectual restraint: "The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations" (12). Rorty advocates a questioning of the metaphor's role in our thinking; he argues for a more dynamic approach to knowledge that would do away with the conception of a "Glassy Essence" and lead to a recognition of the need for dialogue. Rorty does not argue for an overthrow of the sense of sight in our conception of knowledge; such a project would be futile. What he does advocate is an approach to thinking that would emphasize dialogue over "blind" acceptance of the power of vision to deliver truth. Derrida made this same point when he remarked that Western philosophy has been founded upon a play between light and dark and that this reliance upon sensual metaphors is entrenched in our very thoughts. But he does make the point that the metaphors the play of light and dark foster can be highlighted, questioned, and deconstructed.¹²

If we trace the source of ocularcentrism all the way back to the Greeks (Heidegger points out, in "Science and Reflection," that the Romans confirmed the Greek reliance upon the visual in thinking by translating the Greek *theoria* into *contemplatio* [164]: thinking became linguistically tied to looking), then we should also point to the two most influential schools of thought that have contributed to the hegemony of sight:

Renaissance perspective and Cartesian rationality (Martin Jay combines both and calls it “Cartesian perspectivalism”¹³). But Rorty’s critique of the “Glassy Essence” is not a shout in the wilderness. Art historians have challenged the hegemony of Renaissance perspective and philosophers since the empiricists have challenged the reliability of the senses. In *Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision* (1709) Berkeley questioned the experience of vision and called for a different way of understanding how we perceive things. Building upon the empiricists, Kant exemplifies the Enlightenment’s attempt to reconcile “Cartesian perspectivalism” and the empiricist challenges to looking at looking; and since Kant a series of thinkers has critiqued the ocularcentric tradition: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Derrida. This collection of writers represents the modern challenge to ocularcentrism, a challenge that can be seen beginning with a modification of empiricism and leading to Ruskin’s call for an “innocence of the eye.” This emphasis on experience became the focus for philosophy around the turn of the century, when thinkers such as Henri Bergson and William James attempted to redefine the human subject’s experience of the world. This philosophical turn had a direct impact on writers we now associate with high modernism.

James Joyce and Modernist Vision

Borges is correct: “Perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors.” Light is only one example of these “several” fundamental “metaphors,” but what an example! Who will ever dominate it, who will ever pronounce its meaning without first being pronounced by it? What language will ever escape it?

—Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Meta-

physics: An Essay on the Thought of
Emmanuel Levinas”

It is my thesis that to investigate Joyce’s relationship to vision is to recast how we think about modernism itself. Joyce has always been taken as the modernist *par excellence*, but my investigation of his use of visual forms, ocular tropes, and challenges to seeing will place him in a different position to modernist literature. This new “look” at Joyce will put British and American high modernism in a different context. In this respect, I take Joyce’s *oeuvre* as not only the greatest prose of the twentieth century, but as provocative works of criticism that recast how we categorize, discuss, teach, and write about modernist art. This is compounded by the fact that Joyce influenced writers and artists from T. S. Eliot and Virginia Woolf to Alain Robbe-Grillet and Jackson Pollock. The kind of pervasive “influence” I want to point out here may be gleaned from a description Stephen Polcari gives of the appreciation the American Abstract Expressionists had for Joyce:

Joyce’s influence was perhaps best stated by James Brooks and Ibram Lassaw who said, that they, Tomlin, and others in the late 1940s were strongly affected by Joyce’s “non-narrative,” or “overall” expansive style that was a continuum without focal points. David Smith also summarized Joyce’s stature when he said he did not need to read French Literature or draw on Breton partially because “I’ve read James Joyce.” (36)

This statement explicitly points to Joyce’s challenge to conventional perspective (“a continuum without focal points”). However, as I hope to show throughout this investigation of Joyce and vision, this influence was not confined to thinking about form and content. The point I wish to stress is that Joyce was important to something like

Pollack's "drip" paintings because he gave the Abstract Expressionists a new way of thinking about *meaning* in their art. Joyce did embody the classic modernist assault upon the representation of external reality in art-- from his dismantling of conventional form and narrative view point to his extended parodies of popular nineteenth-century fiction-- but I take his work as going beyond this challenge to Western mimesis. Joyce's work, to my mind, challenges the very basis of Western meaning. This is not to say that all of the writers and artists "influenced" by Joyce continued this challenge in the same way. As I will demonstrate throughout this study, some modernists were only influenced by Joyce's play with visual meaning (Pound and Eliot) while some went further and incorporated his critique of visual culture and Western metaphysics into their artistic programs (Woolf, Eisenstein, Barnes, and Beckett). Through a description of relationships to Joyce's work a different genealogy of modernism may be seen to emerge.

This reconsideration of modernism and vision will lead into a discussion of the effect Joyce's challenge to ocularcentrism has upon poststructuralism and post-modernism. Jacques Derrida is important here because throughout his work he takes Joyce as the figure who points to new approaches to meaning-- as a writer who questions a "fundamental metaphor" behind Western meaning. Derrida's relationship to Joyce began with his very first book, *Introduction to Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry*, when he made a comparison between Husserl's phenomenology of history and Stephen's view of history as a "nightmare from which I am trying to awake" (U2.377). In *The Post Card*, Derrida points to Joyce as the writer who created a language in *Finnegans Wake* that escapes the metaphors of light and sight: "You were right about Joyce.... After him,

no more starting over, draw the veil and let everything come to pass behind the curtains of language at the end of its rope” (240). After an appreciation of Joyce’s critique of ocularcentric thinking, modernism and postmodernism are given new beginnings, new concerns, and new importance.

Joyce’s Eyes: acheseyeld

The eyes that mock me sign the way
Whereto I pass at eve of day.

Grey way whose violet signals are
The twisting and the twining star.

Ah star of evil! star of pain!
Highhearted youth comes not again

Nor old heart’s wisdom yet to know
The signs that mock me as I go.
--James Joyce, “Bahnhofstrasse”

On a personal level, Joyce’s relationship to his eyes had a direct impact on his work. Joyce called himself an “international eyesore” (*JJ* 412) and his problems with eyesight are legendary. The poem above was inspired by an attack of glaucoma, an ailment he once explained to Sylvia Beach by invoking a goddess: “You know, the grey eyes of Athena” (*JJ* 412n). Joyce was born with myopia and later developments of glaucoma and iritis dangerously imperiled everyday seeing.¹⁴ He had to undergo over ten painful eye operations that often left him for long periods in partial and even complete blindness. During the composition of *Ulysses*, he had to wear a white coat so that the optimum amount of light would be thrown upon the pages in front of him. During the

seventeen years it took him to complete *Finnegans Wake*. Joyce had to write in huge letters, use a magnifying glass, and often put aside the work because of the strain on his weak eyes. Because reading was such a difficulty, he employed a legion of helpers to collect information and read books for his construction of the “monomyth” of the *Wake*. One of these helpers was Samuel Beckett and, as James Knowlson describes it, before the playwright was a playwright he helped Joyce so often and with such enthusiasm that “Sixty years later, he could still remember Joyce’s phone number without a moment’s hesitation: Ségur 95-20” (108).

In his essay in *Our Exagmination Round His Factification For Incamination of Work in Progress*, Robert McAlmon was one of the first readers to suggest that the style of *Finnegans Wake* was powered by Joyce’s glaucoma, or what he described as “the dissolution of the retina” (109). As Ellmann reports, Joyce reacted to this suggestion somewhat half-heartedly: “You maybe right, and do you think it has impaired my intellect?” (*JJ* 613n). Joyce himself always spoke of the book as being written for the ear and not for the eye; he also said that it was a book in contrast to the “day” of *Ulysses*: “It is night. It is dark. You can hardly see. You sense rather” (Mercanton 233). (“It darkles... all this our funnaminal world” [*FW* 244.13].) The overall effect of Joyce’s degenerating vision on the composition of the *Wake* is described in thematic terms by E. L. Epstein:

During months of tedious eye treatments, which frequently involved days of immobility with his eyes closed, Joyce would play a mental cinema on the outside of his closed eyelids, with results that would be manifest in *Finnegans Wake*. A particular aspect of Joyce’s eye trouble showed up in *Finnegans Wake*: Shem the Penman, a partial projection of Joyce, was an “acheseyeld,” an exile with aching eyes, and a possessor

of a “piteous onewinker” (*FW* 148.33, 174.19). Once, Shem is described in Greek as *hemoptysia diadumenos* (“blood-dripping and fillet-begirt”) (*FW* 174.19), two epithets of Apollo, but here applied by Joyce to himself, in reference to a band around his head securing an eye patch from under which blood would sometimes ooze. (“James” 24)¹⁵

As I will describe it throughout this study, vision is an important theme to Joyce and, in the light of his personal struggle with seeing, it can be said to be one of his constant pre-occupations. The name of Joyce’s daughter is emblematic of this interest: Lucia was named after the patron saint of eyesight.

Taking Joyce’s poor eyesight into account when discussing the “blurring” of narrative and meaning in the later parts of *Ulysses* and in *Finnegans Wake* has become a standard critical view. Two recent books have once again resurrected this reliance upon Joyce’s personal vision. Kathleen Ferris has recently given new life to the debate over whether or not Joyce had syphilis-- a disease whose consequences she sees in the overriding theme of guilt in *Ulysses* and Joyce’s eye trouble.¹⁶ And in an even more eye-centered book, Roy Gottfried proposes that Joyce’s weak and diseased eyes are responsible for the reader’s problems with reading the “dis-lexic” text of *Ulysses*:

The text was out of focus for the artist, and he makes it so for the reader. Joyce’s bad eyesight when he was writing and proofreading *Ulysses* is a model and a method for the uncertainties within the work; and consequently, and most important, his illness is a model and a method for the reader’s encounter with the text, an encounter initially and extensively visual.... Only when Joyce’s book has come out to sight, as a product that can have an effect on the reader in its reception by being read, can it enter into the process of meaning by being seen and misseen by the reader. Joyce will bedevil the reader’s view of it, as *Ulysses* appears slightly out of focus for author and reader. (5-6)

This is an interesting approach to the difficulty of the text as “symptomatic” of Joyce’s own problems with seeing, but it ultimately falls back almost exclusively upon a correspondence between the writer’s bad eyes and our reading of a book put together by someone with bad eyes. To put it another way, Gottfried neglects any question of what this kind of “dis-lexic” reading has upon *meaning*.¹⁷ And this is basically what this study aims to do; it is my contention that there is a philosophical and political aim to Joyce’s play with depictions of the visual. This consideration also changes what we think when we bring up the culture of modernism.

In a footnote to his biography of Joyce, Ellmann cautions against the kind of reading of Joyce that takes a “blind” view of his writing-- as pure play with and blurring of the visual-- in relation to the *Wake*:

The theory that Joyce wrote his book for the ear because he could not see is not only an insult to the creative imagination, but an error of fact. Joyce could see; to be for periods half-blind is not at all the same thing as to be permanently blind. The eyes are closed in *Finnegans Wake* because to open them would change the book’s postulate. (716n)

Throughout this study I will be taking the view that Joyce knew very well what he was doing throughout his writing in relation to representations of the visual and his overall challenge to the Western reliance on vision’s equation with truth. His chronic eye problems only highlighted his concern with vision’s hold over meaning. “Joyce could see,” but the question becomes: What lies behind the way he depicts and attacks conventional ideas about vision? As it is described in the next chapter, vision has had a long presence in Western philosophical thinking about reality and Joyce made it one of his aims to challenge this presence and change the way we “see” the world. In contrast to

the conventional notion that Joyce's poor eyesight narrowed the "vision" of his work, Beckett remarked in a letter to Ellmann that "Joyce's most impressive characteristic" was his "ability to contemplate with telescopic eye" and he quoted from Pope's *Essay on Man* to describe what he meant:

Who sees with equal eye, as God of all,
A hero perish, or a sparrow fall,
Atoms of systems into ruin hurled,
And now a bubble burst, and now a world. (*JJ* 709n)

This study is divided into eight chapters. The first two chapters examine the philosophical background of vision and its impact upon modernist art. Chapters three and four discuss Joyce's early fiction and the emergence of the "visual" interior monologue in *Ulysses*. These middle chapters will discuss Joyce's anti-ocularcentrism and the impact it had upon his thinking about "race," colonialism, and nationalism. Chapters five, six and seven examine the relationships *Ulysses* has with synthetic cubism, film, Eisenstein, and World War One. Chapters seven and eight discuss Beckett in relation to Joyce, film, postmodernism, and the tradition of Irish heroic sacrifice. My conclusion is a consideration of the radical demolition *Finnegans Wake* performs on the power vision has over meaning.

Endnotes

¹ For a reading of ekphrasis and textual vision in *The Picture of Dorian Gray* see Garrett Stewart, "Reading Figures: The Legible Image of Victorian Textuality" in *Victorian Literature and the Victorian Visual Imagination*, ed. Carol T. Christ and John O. Jordan

(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 345-361.

² For a reading of Tennyson's blunted vision and his interest in optics see Gerhard Joseph, *Tennyson and the Text* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 47-87.

³ Wilde's relationship to Victorian optics is given an interesting foundation if we take into account the career of his father, Sir William Robert Wilde. As Ellmann describes it in *Oscar Wilde*, Sir William was an authority on eyes:

William Wilde had his detractors, but no one in Ireland, or perhaps even Britain, knew as much about the eye and ear. St. Mark's Hospital, Dublin, which he founded in 1844, was the first in Ireland to treat afflictions of these organs. His books *Aural Surgery* (1853) and *Epidemic Ophthalmia* (1851) were the earliest text-books in their fields, and stood up well for years. Even today surgeons use the terms "Wilde's incision" for mastoid, "Wilde's cone of light," and "Wilde's cords...." When a census in Ireland was undertaken in 1851, Wilde was appointed Census Commissioner to organize the collection of medical information. His statistics on the incidence of deafness and blindness and eye and ear diseases were the first ever compiled in Ireland. He was appointed Surgeon Oculist to the Queen in Ireland in 1863, and the next year was knighted. (10-11)

⁴ Pater knew the dangers of the "Conclusion" and in the second edition of the book he removed it because "it might possibly mislead some of those young men into whose hands it might fall" (217n). For a look at the effect of the "Conclusion" on Yeats and the Tragic Generation see Harold Bloom, *Yeats*, pp. 23-51.

⁵ See Ellmann's *Oscar Wilde* for a description of how *The Picture of Dorian Gray* was used against Wilde in court, pp. 440-49.

⁶ For a discussion of a later Wilde text, "Salome," and the modernist critique of the hegemony of vision, see chapter eight "Beckett and the Politics of Nothing: Spectacle/Panopticism/Ocularcentrism."

⁷ The classic Surrealist film attacking vision is, of course, Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí's *Un Chien andalou* (1928).

⁸ For a general appraisal of Surrealist seeing see Mary Ann Caws, *The Art of Interference: Stressed Readings in Verbal and Visual Texts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 71-156.

⁹ Alexander Nehamas's *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1985) is centered around this thesis.

¹⁰ In *The Life of the Mind: Thinking* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978). Hannah Arendt suggests that Bergson was the first philosopher to challenge the power seeing has over knowledge: "Since Bergson, the use of the sight metaphor in philosophy has kept dwindling, not surprisingly, as emphasis and interest have shifted entirely from contemplation to speech, from *nous* to *logos*" (110-111).

¹¹ The following three books are the founding texts of ocularcentric studies: *Vision and Visuality*, ed. Hal Foster (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988); *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision*, ed. David Michael Levin; and Martin Jay's *Downcast Eyes: the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought*.

¹² Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

¹³ Martin Jay, "Scopic Regimes of Modernity" in *Vision and Visuality*, ed. Hal Foster, p. 4.

¹⁴ Iritis is an acutely painful inflammation of the pupil that causes blurring. Joyce's left eye was first affected by this-- thus the famous pictures of him with an eye patch over the left eye-- but it later spread to his right one too. For a general discussion of Joyce's life-long eye problems, see Ellmann's *James Joyce*, pp. 568-74 *passim*.

¹⁵ For a discussion of the symbolism of Shem and monocular vision, see E. L. Epstein "James Joyce and the Body" in *A Starchamber Quiry: A James Joyce Centennial Volume*, ed. E. L. Epstein (London: Methuen, 1982), pp. 73-106.

¹⁶ See Kathleen Ferris, *James Joyce and the Burden of Disease* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995). Ferris's book has resparked the debate that was supposed to have been settled over two decades ago in J. B. Lyons, *Joyce and Medicine* (Dublin: Dolmen Press, 1973). For a spirited defense of her thesis from often harsh commentary by Lyons and Charles Rossman see Kathleen Ferris, "Ferris Responds to Rossman and Lyons," *The James Joyce Literary Supplement* (Fall 1995): 3-4.

¹⁷ Indicative of Gottfried's avoidance of this question is the fact that throughout his study he makes no reference to two works which, to my mind at least, are essential to any commentary upon the textuality of the modernist text. Allon White's *The Uses of Obscurity: The Fiction of Modernism* provides one of the best summations of the philosophical and cultural background of the obscurity of modernist texts; and, even though it concerns itself solely with modernist poetics, Jerome McGann's *Black Riders: The Visible Language of Modernism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) is important for a consideration of modernist graphic and typographic design. For a

discussion of Joyce's relationship to the typographical experiments of synthetic cubism.
see chapter five below.

Chapter One
Seeing and Being: Minor Literature and Philosophy
at the Turn of the Century

Irish Eyes Are Smiling: Joyce and Minor Literature

We might as well say that minor no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature.

--Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.
Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature

The war is in words and the wood is the world.

--*Finnegans Wake* (FW 98.34-35)

Joyce's *oeuvre* is the predominant challenge to ocularcentrism in high modernism-- and the motivator for other anti-ocularcentric writers and artists-- in part because it belongs to what Deleuze and Guattari provocatively call "minor literature." In the light of Kafka's position as a Jew writing in German in a Czech-speaking area, a subject marginalized by the very culture he participated in, Deleuze and Guattari took his writing as "minor" in the sense that it is outside the hegemonic discourse and founding mythos of the dominant culture while seemingly made from its very fabric.¹ As they

describe it, minor literature subverts the whole idea of a coherent subject, of a subject that has been unquestioned in previous hegemonic literature:

[A]bove all else, because collective or national consciousness is “often inactive in external life and always in the process of breakdown,” literature finds itself positively charged with the role and function of collective, and even revolutionary, enunciation. It is literature that produces an active solidarity in spite of skepticism; and if the writer is in the margins or completely outside his or her fragile community, this situation allows the writer all the more possibility to express another possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility. (17)

This movement toward “another consciousness,” according to Deleuze and Guattari, radically challenges what we think of as accepted canons of literature. And, in what is probably the most famous call for “another consciousness” in the modern novel, Stephen’s penultimate diary entry at the end of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* embodies this quest for a different way of being as it gestures toward the experimentation of Joyce’s later texts: “I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race” (P 252-53).²

As several critics have noted, Joyce has an obvious connection to this idea of “minor literature.”³ As colonized subject and exile, Joyce embodies the “minor” writer’s social conditions and he parodies this in the “Haunted Inkbottle” scene of the *Wake* when Shem the Penman is “self exiled upon his own ego” (FW 184.6-7) and is forced to write “out of his wit’s waste” (FW 185.7). In one of his first books, *Exiles and Émigrés*, Terry Eagleton pointed out the interesting fact that many of the writers making up British high modernism are all outside of mainstream English society. As Eagleton notes, this

provocative genealogy implies “that this unchallenged sway of non-English poets and novelists in contemporary English literature points to certain central flaws and impoverishments in conventional English culture itself” (9). In the famous “tundish” scene from *A Portrait*, Stephen perceives the differences between himself and an English Jesuit when he uses the English word ‘tundish’-- a word the priest does not know. The confrontation over this little word provides Stephen with an insight into their differences which ultimately comments upon his position as a colonial subject:

The little word seemed to have turned a rapier point of his sensitiveness against this courteous and vigilant foe. He felt with a smart of dejection that the man to whom he was speaking was a countryman of Ben Jonson. He thought:
 --The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words *home*, *Christ*, *ale*, *master*, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in the shadow of his language. (Joyce’s emphasis, *P* 189).

The words he uses here to represent English (*home*, *Christ*, *ale*, *master*) are not just empty examples: some have Old English roots and they all have foreign/British connotations. However, even though Stephen feels uncomfortable with the tongue of the colonizer (“I have not made or accepted its words”), he does not go and study Irish. When Joyce himself took Irish lessons from Patrick Pearse he was upset by Pearse’s denunciation of English. As Declan Kiberd describes it, the relationship Joyce had to the language he wrote in was a mixed and contradictory one:

The moment when Joyce wrote in English, he felt himself performing a humiliating translation of a split linguistic choice. In his writings, he seeks to express that sundering; and eventually, in *Finnegans Wake* he would weave the

absent texts in the space between standard Irish and standard English.... No matter how brilliant Joyce's use of English, it would always run the risk of being seen as his way of serving his colonial master: English would be the perceptual prison in which he realized his genius, and the greater his achievements, the greater the glory reflected on the master language. (*Inventing* 332)

Kiberd goes on to discuss how Joyce returns to the Irish lessons he abandoned to construct a kind of "Hiberno-English" in the *Wake*. However, according to Kiberd, this invocation of a new language is still "never confident or final: beneath the pose of disdain lies a real fascination and an even deeper fear" (*Inventing*, 332-33).

It is this kind of "double-consciousness" of nationality and language that is behind the work of writers using the language of their linguistic oppressors to create a "minor" writing. Deleuze and Guattari write that in "minor literature" "[e]xpression must break forms, encourage ruptures and new sproutings" (28). Kiberd sees modern Irish writers such as Joyce and Yeats involved with this concern for "new sproutings" and he sees this in a question they all ask of their writing: "[H]ow to express life which has never yet found full expression in written literature?" (*Inventing* 118). The curve of Joyce's fiction may be pointed to as an answer to this question, as well as emblematic of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the dissolving of the hegemonic subject by the "minor" artist: the paralyzed portraits of representative "minor" subjects in *Dubliners*; the *Bildungsroman* of revolt called *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*; the shattering of traditional narrative conventions and literary perspective in *Ulysses*; and the English language put to sleep in *Finnegans Wake*.

In his study of James Clarence Mangan's links to the beginning of Irish cultural

nationalism, David Lloyd takes the “minor literature” paradigm and describes it in the context of modernism and emerging postcolonial subjects:

Radical modernism has been conceived as the critique by art of the institution of art, a definition that would certainly hold for its extreme manifestations in dada and surrealism. In the general field of modernism, minor literature emerges as writing out the marginalization that afflicts aesthetic culture, and as extending, in writing it out, that condition of marginality. Rather than shore up the notions of subjectivity that underpin canonical aesthetics, and rather than claiming still to prefigure a reconciled domain of human freedom in creativity as even surrealism does, a minor literature pushes further the recognition of the disintegration of the individual subject of the bourgeois state, questioning the principles of originality and autonomy that underwrite that conception of the subject. In doing so, it plays out the contradictions that afflict late capitalist society through its paradoxical modes, refusing to offer the possibility of reconciliation. Minor literature adheres constantly to a *negatively critical attitude*. (My emphasis, 24-25)

This “negatively critical attitude” I take as being embodied, in part, in modernist literature as a negation of past complacency with conceptions of vision and being. It is no accident, to my mind at least, that the rise of minor literature, the world-wide revolt against colonialism, and the modernist challenge to the Western Eye all begin during the same period. Joyce’s writing is an important manifestation of this because his work embodies all three conditions as well as serving as a model for other writers and artists. The recent rise in Joyce criticism-- and modernist studies as a whole-- of considerations of colonialism, postcolonialism, gender, “race,” and popular culture all attest to Joyce’s importance to a wide range of important topics. Joyce’s relationship to these issues arises from his critique of the power vision has over meaning in Western thought.

To understand fully the consequences of ocularcentrism and the modernist

reaction to it, we must step back into Plato's cave. After emerging from the shadows of the cave, we will take a peek at Descartes *Optics* to see how his view of seeing leads to his construction of the *cogito*. With the help of Stephen Dedalus's myopic eyes, we will attempt to "solve" one of the pet visual problems of the British empiricists before taking into account the "inversion" of Platonism which occurs at the turn of the century. This look at the change in thinking about being and experience at the end of the century will lead into a consideration of Joyce's relationship to modernist philosophy and his early formulation of the problem of vision and being.

Plato's Sun

Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most
like the sun?

By far the most like.

--Plato, *The Republic*

John Eglinton, frowning, said, waxing wroth:
--Upon my word it makes my blood boil to hear any-
one compare Aristotle with Plato.
--Which of the two, Stephen asked, would have
banished me from his commonwealth? (*U* 9.79-83)

As my epigraph from *The Republic* suggests, Plato described the process of vision as akin to the illumination of the sun. The sun is a symbol of knowledge throughout Plato in part because it allows vision to be possible: "Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight" (248). The Allegory of the Cave in book seven of *The Republic* is constructed from the premise that light and the clear vision it fosters are the only roads to knowledge. The allegory begins with the chaining of several people inside

a cave since childhood. All they know is the dark cave and the shadows that are cast in front of them from a fire that burns behind them which they never see. The shadows are created by people and things passing between the fire and the back of the chained “viewers.” These chained people are unaware of the light of reason and they only become aware of it when they are brought out of the darkness of the cave and shown the sun. Socrates explains the meaning of the allegory by describing its components and then its general importance:

[T]he prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world.... But whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed. (257)

In “this visible world” man must keep his “eye fixed” on the light of reason.

In an influential essay for those concerned with ocularcentrism, Hans Blumberg describes Plato’s allegory as emblematic of the origins of ocularcentric thinking by the ancient Greeks. Blumberg explicitly focuses on how light was made the link between vision and knowledge, how it was presented as the only “natural” correspondence with truth:

Truth is light upon Being itself, Being as light, i.e., Being as the *self-presentation* of beings. That is why cognition in its highest form bursts out of the inactive, calm contemplation of *theoria*. That is why, in Platonic *anamnesis*, the truth that has already been seen penetrates, again and again, into that which is forgetful of its origin. That is why, in the *Republic*’s allegory of the cave, an original situation is constructed with a perfectly artificial and

forcible screening-off of “natural” light.... The drama of truth is not a cosmic *agon* between light and darkness but rather only a process of man’s withdrawing himself or handing himself over.... Truth is not only present, it is insistent. (Blumberg’s emphasis, 32)

Truth is just as “natural” as light, as seeing. It is as easy as “opening” your eyes.

Blumberg traces this kind of unchallenged view of vision and truth throughout early philosophy from Plato to Cicero and he concludes that the foundation of Western metaphysics comes to rest on the notion that “all certainty continues to be allocated to the *inner light*” (Blumberg’s emphasis, 37).

This all too brief summary of the canonization of light and vision demonstrates the ancient Greek reliance on metaphors of vision to discover truth. However, as Martin Jay points out, Plato’s relationship to vision is more complicated than a cursory view of the Allegory of the Cave gives.⁴ The foundation for Plato’s quest for knowledge was built on a visual metaphor, but his comments on everyday seeing display a kind of mistrust of “normal” everyday vision. The very nature of the allegory demonstrates this: “normal” vision for those who have not reached knowledge is comprised of wavering, unreliable shadows. In this sense, it may be acknowledged that the birth of ocularcentrism coincides with the birth of a suspicious twin, a twin that questions the reliability of vision as it is institutionalized as one of the founding metaphors of Western philosophy. If all philosophy is just footnotes to Plato, then the footnotes are concerned with the force vision has over meaning. This concern usually shows up as a reinforcing of the visual paradigm-- and the next philosopher I will discuss embodies this-- but sometimes the veil drops and “pure” seeing is brought into question.

Descartes's Dead Eye

In the name of Bacon will you chicken me up
that egg.

Shall I swallow cave-phantoms?

--Samuel Beckett, *Whoroscope*

In 1637 René Descartes published a long consideration of vision and optics called *La Dioptrique* (*Optics*). This meditation on vision was motivated by a recent invention that fascinated the philosopher: the telescope. For the originator of rationalism, the perfection of lenses to enhance vision was more than just a better way to look at the stars; as Dalia Judovitz describes it, the invention of the telescope enhanced Descartes's thinking about the quest for knowledge through rationalism:

Descartes's fascination with lenses that expand human vision brings the imperceptible, the previously invisible, within the domain of human perception.... The development of instruments that expand the scope of vision coincides with the instrumentalization of visual perception as a whole, since technology enables a greater and more perfect knowledge of nature. Descartes connects the perfectibility of human knowledge with the extension of human perception through artificial organs. They expand the horizon of perception while erasing its experimental, all-too-human character. (70)⁵

This distancing of the "all-to-human" from perception is indicative of Descartes's celebrated split between the mind and the body. This distancing is also what makes him, in Jay's formulation, "a quintessentially visual philosopher, who tacitly adopted the position of a perspectivalist painter using a camera obscura to reproduce the observed world" (69). This distancing is also what powers Rorty's critique of Descartes in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*: "In Descartes's conception-- the one which became

the basis for 'modern' epistemology-- it is *representations* which are in the mind" (Rorty's emphasis, 45). Descartes's rationalism and its reliance on visual-centered paradigms are some of the founding principles of the ocularcentric tradition in Western thought.

The impact Descartes had on philosophy in terms of its reliance upon visual representations may be judged from one of his notable visual "experiments" in *La*

Dioptrique:

Suppose a chamber is shut up apart from a single hole, and a glass lens is placed in front of this hole with a white sheet stretched at a certain distance behind it so the light coming from objects outside forms images on the sheet. Now it is said that the room represents the eye; the hole the pupil; the lens the crystalline humour. (166)

Descartes then suggests taking either an eye from a recently dead person, or a eye from a recently killed ox and placing it in the hole in the wall. After doing this, he writes that "if you look at the white sheet you will see there, not perhaps without pleasure and wonder, a picture representing in natural perspective all the objects outside" (47). As Jonathan Crary describes it, this experiment represents the construction of a camera obscura, the "dark room" optical experiment used by Renaissance artists to judge and construct "correct" perspective. According to Crary, the camera obscura represents "a vantage point onto the world analogous to the eye of God" and its use in Descartes's thinking about vision is indicative of Cartesian rationality as a whole:

If at the core of Descartes's method was the need to escape uncertainties of mere human vision and the confusions of the senses, the camera obscura is congruent with his quest to found human knowledge on a purely objective view of the world. (48)

Through a distancing of vision from the body-- “pure” seeing as opposed to cloudy individual seeing-- Descartes’s use of the “metaphysical eye” (Crary 48) supplemented his quest for knowledge through rationalism.⁶

What is important about Descartes’s “experiment” and his conclusions reached from it is that this kind of thinking about seeing played a major role in the philosopher’s method. As Paul Ricoeur put it, Descartes’s thought “is contemporaneous with a vision of the world in which the whole of objectivity is spread out like a spectacle on which the *cogito* casts its sovereign gaze” (236). In this respect, Descartes’s famous *Cogito ergo sum* is based upon this “pure” vision paradigm in order to attack skepticism. “I *think* therefore I am” may be taken as meaning “I *see* therefore I am.” And if this is taken as true, if Descartes’s *cogito* is taken as a construct based upon visual proof and visual meaning, then subjectivity and objectivity have been understood in this ocularcentric manner throughout Western metaphysics.

The importance of the Cartesian impact upon philosophy cannot be stressed enough; as Jay and Rorty both note, Descartes’s work is the foundation for modern philosophy and its concomitant reliance upon visual metaphors, meanings, and methods. Heidegger described Descartes’s place in modern epistemology as a double impact: “With Descartes begins the completion and consummation of Western Metaphysics” (“Question” 140). The importance of Descartes in this regard is attested by the fact that he was the starting point of an intellectual and social rift between Foucault and Derrida. I bring up this disagreement over Descartes’s *cogito*-- a disagreement whose lengthy complexities cannot be gone into in these pages-- because, oddly enough (and like

Vladimir and Estragon), Joyce and Beckett stand in the shadows of this “break.”⁷ Derrida began the debate that led to the break--and began his career-- with a lecture he gave at the Sorbonne in 1963. The talk was called “The Cogito and the History of Madness” and Foucault himself was in the audience. Derrida had been a student of Foucault’s and in the published translation of the lecture in *Writing and Difference*, Derrida pays homage to his former teacher: “I retain the consciousness of an admiring and grateful disciple” (31). Derrida then refers to himself as a “disciple” whose “consciousness is an unhappy consciousness” because he feels the need to speak in his own voice (31). He then uses a visual metaphor to describe his intent: “The disciple must break the glass, or better the mirror, the reflection, his infinite speculation on the master. And start to speak” (32). Derrida’s critique of Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization* hinges upon a reading of Descartes’s *Meditations*-- a critique that foreshadows the close reading of texts for “gaps” that will become the trademark of deconstruction. The conclusion of this critique is that Foucault follows a structuralist paradigm and does not, in Heidegger’s formulation, achieve the “overcoming” that Foucault and Derrida both cite as the aim of their thinking.

The way Joyce and Beckett fit into this provocative break between these two representatives of poststructuralist thought is important for a consideration of ocularcentrism. I point this out because as Jay describes it in *Downcast Eyes*, Foucault and Derrida are two of the most prominent challengers to the ocularcentric tradition. In his study of the reaction against the hegemony of vision over thought in French letters, Jay takes Bataille and the Surrealists as influential artists who influenced later thinking about ocularcentrism. However, as this study as a whole is intended to attest, there was a

profound influence on certain French intellectuals by Joyce and Beckett which pointed toward a questioning of ocularcentrism. The influence of Joyce and Beckett on Derrida and Foucault is emblematic of this. I have already suggested the debt Derrida has to Joyce in my introduction, but the early influence the Irish novelist had for Derrida may be gleaned from the very lecture in question here. In the English version of “Cogito and the History of Madness” Derrida used two epigraphs: one from Kierkegaard (“The Instant of Decision is Madness”) and the other a famous remark Joyce made about *Ulysses*: “In any event this book was terribly daring. A transparent sheet separates it from madness” (31). Foucault’s fascination with Beckett began when he saw one of the earliest performances of *Waiting for Godot* in 1953; Foucault described Beckett’s play as an epiphany that pointed toward his future intellectual pursuits.⁸ The impact of Beckett and Joyce on post-structuralist thought will come up throughout this study, but for now a quick look at the novel that began Beckett’s career should highlight this.

Fascinated by Descartes’s attempt to achieve a total system of knowledge and experience, Beckett alludes throughout his work to the French philosopher and places a Cartesian grid over his first published novel, *Murphy*. He once said that the following phrase from the Occasionalist philosopher Arnold Geulincx-- a thinker who followed in Descartes’s footsteps-- should be taken as a key to *Murphy* and, interestingly enough, to his later minimalist plays: “When you are worth nothing, you will wish for nothing” (Knowlson 206). The surface connections between his highly-wrought first novel and the experimentation in the void of the “dramaticules” seems tenuous at best. However, if we

take into account Beckett's life-long interest in painting and the meaning of vision, the relationship becomes somewhat clarified.

The philosophers Beckett seems preoccupied with in *Murphy* are Descartes, Spinoza, and Geulincx. These last two thinkers extend from Descartes's method and they continue along the ocularcentric basis of modern thought that Descartes grew from. The dualism of mind and body that forms the basis of Cartesianism is explicitly tested in the character of Murphy: "Thus Murphy felt himself split in two, a body and a mind" (109). The chapter this sentence appears in is given an epigraph from Spinoza: "*Amor intellectualis quo Murphy se ipsum amat*" ("The intellectual love with which Murphy loved himself") (107). In an essay aimed at reconciling philosophical questions and Beckett, P. J. Murphy (yes, Murphy) has written that this epigraph is indicative of the "faithful" use Beckett makes of Spinoza's *Ethics*.⁹ The problem I have with this reading-- and I think it is correct to an extent-- is that *Murphy*, ultimately, is a comic critique of Spinoza and the rationalist will-to-knowledge. This is epitomized in the moment when Murphy achieves knowledge of the isolation of the self following his chess game with Mr. Endon: he blows himself up while sitting on the toilet. In a review of a study on Beckett and modern philosophy, Christopher Ricks deflected a reading of Beckett that proposes his assumption of philosophic inquiry by quoting from him: "When Heidegger and Sartre speak of a contrast between being and existence, they may be right, I don't know, but their language is too philosophic for me. I am not a philosopher" ("Beckett" 44). Unlike Ricks, I take this comment to mean that Beckett pursues

philosophical questions with his *own* language; this language is colored by philosophical thinking and it runs throughout his work.

If Beckett's early work is preoccupied by the ideas of the rationalists-- his first separately published work, *Whoroscope* (1930), is a kind of monologue "spoken" by Descartes-- and by Kant, who plays a major role in the structure and background of *Watt*-- then his later work may be seen as equally interested in raising philosophical questions, ideas, and paradigms. One of the most obvious instances of this is *Film* which begins by setting up a paradigm from Berkeley:

Esse est percipi.

All extraneous perception suppressed, animal, human,
divine, self-perception maintains in being.

Search of non-being in flight from extraneous perception
breaking down in inescapability of self-perception.

No truth value attaches to above, regarded as of merely
structural and dramatic convenience. (11)

This is an invocation of Berkeley's thinking about vision as it relates to subjectivity:

Esse est percipi means "to be is to be perceived." I will discuss this movie and its framing within an empiricist paradigm in chapter seven, but for now it is sufficient to point to what Beckett describes as his "use" of Berkeley: "No truth value attaches to above, regarded as of merely structural and dramatic convenience." Berkeley's maxim is "convenient" because it helps Beckett to structure his venture into the visual medium of film. As I will describe it below, this is an instance of his "use" of philosophical language that ultimately critiques his own use of it. *Film* is a visual assault upon visual thinking and it highlights Beckett's view of the kind of subject formed by Berkeley's maxim. Throughout his work Beckett rejected the coherent, "visually" constructed

subject implicit in this kind of thinking; his first novel in the post-war trilogy tells us this when Molloy describes his position vis-à-vis the world: “For to know nothing is nothing, not to want to know anything likewise, but to be beyond knowing anything, to know you are beyond knowing anything, that is when peace enters in, to the soul of the incurious seeker” (64).

This critique of the subject and Beckett’s deconstruction of rationalist and empiricist thought throughout his work becomes clearer when we consider Beckett’s interest in painting. This interest points to the visual aspects of thinking that Beckett attacked. As James Knowlson’s recent biography attests, Beckett had a life-long fascination with painting that became associated with his ideas about literature and meaning. Beckett’s reaction to Cézanne is indicative of his feeling about perception and knowledge in art and philosophy:

How far Cézanne had moved from the snapshot puerilities of Manet and Cie when he could understand the dynamic intrusion to be himself and so landscape to be something by definition unapproachably alien, unintelligible arrangements of atoms, not so much as ruffled by the kind attentions of the Reliability Joneses.... What I feel in Cézanne is precisely the absence of a rapport that was all right for Rosa and Ruysdael for whom the animising mode was valid, but would have been fake for him, because he had the sense of his incommensurability not only with life of such a different order as landscape, but even with life of his order, even with life.... operative in himself. (188)

As I will describe it in chapter eight, this reaction Beckett perceives in Cézanne against the conventions of the “Reliability Joneses” is the same kind of attack he wages against the ocularcentric tradition in the late plays *Not I* and *That Time*. These two dramaticules

were inspired by images from classical painting and motivated by a critique of the hegemony of visual paradigms in Western thought.

In the most important section of Knowlson's biography, Beckett's lost "German diaries" are examined. The dairies detail his trip through Germany during 1936-37 when he immersed himself in German museums and studied paintings and art history. During this trip he came upon Caspar David Friedrich's *Two Men Observing the Moon* which he later acknowledged as the inspiration for *Waiting for Godot* (Knowlson 236). Beckett also came into contact with a force he detested and would spend WWII fighting: the Nazis. As he toured Germany, he watched as the Nazis removed art from museums and galleries. This interaction with the world of art and politics helped shape his sense of the entrenched metaphors of vision in thinking and praxis. This experience pointed him toward Benjamin's belief that "All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war" ("Work" 241). (Beckett missed the notorious "Degenerate Art" exhibition by only a few months.) Beckett recorded his impressions during this period and a conversation he had with a German actor named Eggers-Kastner displays his interest in the visual arts as well as his debt to Joyce; I will quote from this conversation at length in chapter eight, but for now it will suffice to just mention Beckett's concluding remark: "perception is opinion" (240). This is a direct attack upon the Cartesian system with its reliance on "pure" perspective and the separation of mind and body. It is also an attack on the kind of thinking this kind of "pure" vision fosters. And this is the link I see between Beckett's overtly philosophic early work and the later minimalist compositions. This link is formed around Beckett's critique of an attempt to "purify" vision of its

arbitrary and entrenched association with knowledge and truth. And Beckett frames his own thinking here with the work of Joyce. If Beckett overtly investigated and employed visual paradigms of vision only to debunk them and “upstage” their reliance on traditional ocularcentric views of the subject and knowledge, then Joyce can be seen as the writer who inaugurated this approach by beginning “Proteus”-- and *Ulysses*-- with a series of visual experiments and problems.

Thought Through My Eyes

A blind man, when first made to see, might perceive...objects, in which there is an endless variety; but he would neither perceive nor imagine any resemblance or connection between these visible objects and those perceived by feeling. Lights, shades, and colours would suggest nothing to him about bodies, hard or soft, rough or smooth....

--George Berkeley, “Visual Language Vindicated”

The above epigraph is Berkeley’s answer to a problem that turns up again and again throughout the eighteenth century in the work of Berkeley, Locke, Condillac, Voltaire, and Diderot, one that goes to the roots of empiricism’s reliance on experience. The problem was named after a Dublin lawyer named William Molyneux who first put the problem in a famous letter to John Locke.¹⁰ Locke took the question as important for empiricism and he gave it a prominent place in *An Essay Concerning Human*

Understanding:

Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt

one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: *quaere*, whether *by his sight before he touched them*, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube? (quoted in Crary 58)

On the surface, this problem seems like an interesting conundrum, but to Locke and his contemporaries, it became paradigmatic of their search for an understanding of how the mind works and how the subject is constructed. In *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault calls the Molyneux problem “one of the two great mythical experiences on which the philosophy of the eighteenth century wishes to base its beginning” (the other “experience” Foucault pointed to was of a foreign visitor to a new country-- a spectator thrown into visual alien surroundings) (65). Taking into account the empiricist claim that all human knowledge comes from lived experience and not from innate ideas or Platonic forms, the empiricist answer to the Molyneux problem can be predicted. Throughout the eighteenth century this question was answered negatively and in 1728 the answer was taken as confirmed when an English doctor removed cataracts from a boy who had been blind since birth. The boy had trouble orienting himself and Voltaire used his case in *Elements of the Philosophy of Newton* to exemplify empirical thought.

What made the Molyneux problem so important is that it became a litmus test for philosophical thinking. The empiricists brought it up again and again because, to their minds at least, it validated their thinking about experience. The fact that this validation was accomplished through a visual problem highlights the importance of the

visual for the empiricists and for the rationalists whom they were challenging. Joyce takes on this puzzle in his writing because he is concerned with the role of meaning in the modern world. The kind of visual experiments and problems Joyce sets up in “Proteus” sets the tone for the visual experiments throughout *Ulysses*.

Twelve chapters and over four hundred pages after Stephen takes his walk on the beach in “Proteus,” the reader is presented with a visual problem that complicates the philosophical questioning of vision presented in the earlier chapter. This issue is usually passed over in Joyce studies as non-existent or just as an interesting tidbit. In Bella Cohen’s brothel, Stephen is drunk and he attempts to light a cigarette:

STEPHEN

(brings match near his eye) Lynx eye. Must get glasses. Broke them yesterday. Sixteen years ago. Distance. The eye sees all flat. *(He draws the match away. It goes out.)* Brain thinks. Near: far. Ineluctable modality of the visible. (*U* 15.3627-631)

Stephen has been without his glasses for the entire day. This fact is never discussed as meaningful-- when it is discussed at all.¹¹ The severely myopic Stephen experiences June 16, 1904 without his glasses: everything he sees and does on this day is filtered through his lack of corrected vision. We know that Stephen’s myopia was so severe that he was unable to write during the “writing lesson” at Clongowes in *A Portrait*:

He had tried to spell out the headline for himself though he knew already what it was for it was the last of the book. *Zeal without prudence is like a ship adrift.* But the lines of the letters were like fine invisible threads and it was only by closing his right eye tight tight and staring out of the left eye that he could make out the full curves of the capital. (*P* 46)

His myopia could have only worsened after sixteen years. However, one of the reasons readers of *Ulysses* seem to be unaware that Stephen is without his glasses is that throughout the day he has no trouble reading; in “Nestor” he checks an answer to one of the questions he asks his class: “--Asculum, Stephen said, glancing at the name and date in the gorescarred book” (*U* 2.12-13). And he later reads portions of Mr. Deasy’s letter without any difficulty. Both instances of reading are given without any description of his problems with seeing, not even the fact that he would have had to hold the writing very close to his eyes to read.

Stephen’s want of glasses and the way this detail is given to us in the text-- after most of the novel is over-- is a visual problem that can only be “solved” by taking into consideration the text as a whole. It would be wrong to take this detail as an under-developed aspect of Stephen’s character that Joyce threw in at the last minute. I take Stephen’s lack of spectacles as a visual challenge on Joyce’s part, a challenge to how we normally read novels and “see” the characters in them. In a novel in which we are given more details about the character’s lives than we are used to-- details ranging from the breakfast Stephen shares with Mulligan and Haines to the contents of Bloom’s bookshelves-- it is somewhat surprising that a seemingly important detail like Stephen’s broken glasses is not mentioned until June 16 is almost over. This is not to say that in earlier parts of the book we are not given hints: in “Proteus” we are given a description of Stephen watching an approaching figure: “A point, live dog, grew into sight running across the sweep of sand” (*U* 3.294). But this hint is not enough and when we consider Stephen’s reading or his perception of the listeners during his talk on *Hamlet* in “Scylla

and Charybdis," he seems to have no trouble at all with the visual world around him. However, if we take into account Joyce's critique of vision and its hold over meaning, this odd detail of Stephen's day begins to take on significance. The key to understanding why Joyce only mentions this important detail after the book is almost over lies in the fact that *Ulysses* is a book that has to be read in a different way from other novels, or, as Joseph Frank once put it in a famous essay: "Joyce cannot be read-- he can only be re-read" (19). And the way Joyce tells us about Stephen's lack of glasses points to how we are supposed to understand this part of his character. When we hear that Stephen has no glasses the text makes specific reference to "Proteus": "Must get glasses. Broke them yesterday.... Distance.... The eye sees all flat.... Ineluctable modality of the visible."

Hélène Cixous points out that "Circe" is an "understage" of *Ulysses*, a dark double of the text where every character, scene, and theme brought up throughout the book is replayed, resurrected, and rewritten.¹² The action of Stephen holding the match up to his eye and the revelation that he is without his glasses is a miniature "Proteus," a tiny replaying of the entire chapter within one gesture. This replaying of the chapter begins with his eyes-- "Lynx eye"¹³-- and ends with the first words of the chapter-- "Ineluctable modality of the visible." The gesture of the raised match to his eye is also a mock visual experiment-- to see if he can see-- and we must turn back to "Proteus" to read this double, this visual replaying of the chapter in which Joyce overtly raises the question of seeing.

"Ineluctable modality of the visible: at least that if no more, thought through my eyes" (*U* 3.1-2). This sentence begins the chapter based upon the theme of the Homeric

shape-changer, the chapter Joyce once said demonstrates that “Everything changes-- sea, sky, man, animals” (Budgen 49). This sentence begins with a phrase that has no direct source, but which alludes to many thinkers who have invoked the visible in discussions of knowledge, reality, and truth. The four paragraphs which follow explicitly bring up philosophical thinking about vision from an esoteric text like *Signatura Rerum* by Jakob Boehme to a famous phrase from Berkeley’s *An Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision* (“coloured signs” [U 3.4]). After referring to Aristotle’s thinking about vision from *De Sensu et Sensibili* and invoking Dr. Johnson’s refutation of Berkeley, Stephen performs a visual experiment/commentary of his own: “Shut your eyes and see” (U 3.9). As many readers of this section have noted, Stephen’s shutting of his eyes is a switch to a reliance upon hearing to make his way across the beach (“Exactly: and this is the ineluctable modality of the audible” [U 3.13]). But I take this and the experience of having his eyes closed (“I am getting along nicely in the dark” [U 3.15]) as a mock Molyneux problem that ends with a very different conclusion from that of Berkeley and the empiricists:

Open your eyes now. I will. One moment. Has all vanished since?
 If I open and am forever in the black adiaphane. *Basta!* I will see
 if I can see.
 See now. There all the time without you: and ever shall be,
 world without end. (U 3.27-28)

After being “blind” Stephen can still recognize the forms, colors, and shapes of the world around him.

Joyce’s mock Molyneux problem cannot be understood without reference to Stephen’s lack of glasses throughout the day. With this knowledge in mind, the question

becomes: If Joyce's mock answer to his mock Molyneux problem is contradictory to empiricist claims, then what are we to make of the fact that Stephen has been perceiving the world throughout the novel with blunted sight? The answer to this question problematizes the entire philosophical reliance upon vision to convey "clear" knowledge and reliable "truths." How Stephen sees throughout *Ulysses* is brought into question only when the book is almost over and long after the mock Molyneux experiment is performed. What this brings into question is how Stephen experiences his day and how we as readers experience the text. Joyce comes up with a different answer to the Molyneux problem not because he believes in innate ideas in our brains or Platonic forms in the heavens; Joyce's mock answer about "thought through my eyes" is different from the empiricists because Joyce approaches *experience* itself in a different way. Joyce, like Beckett after him, embraces the empiricist reliance on experience, but he dispenses with their totalizing systems of knowledge and their quest for unified approaches to experience. The reason "Proteus" begins this way-- and the reason it ends the "Telemachiad" and sets the tone for the rest of the novel-- is that it signals the radical break with the traditional unquestioned reliance on "clear" vision to provide for knowledge and truth. The chapter begins with the famous description of the "ineluctable modality of the visible" because this is the force that Joyce will redefine throughout the novel and attempt to release from entrenched ocularcentric thinking throughout the Western tradition. But Joyce did not begin such a project with the opening of *Ulysses*; in many ways, this assault against the hegemony of the visual over thinking and experience began with one of his early attempts at being a creative writer.

A Portrait of Experience

To *picture* is not to *remember*.

--Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*

I'll make you to see figuratively the
whome of your eternal geometer.

(FW 296-97.31-1)

In 1904-- the same year in which *Ulysses* takes place-- Joyce, then twenty-one, wrote a self-portrait called "A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man" for the Dublin magazine *Dana*. He wrote it in one day. Combining autobiographical elements with stylistic flourishes that pushes the piece somewhere between essay and short story, this first attempt to give some account of his evolution as an artist became the seed for *Stephen Hero* and *A Portrait*. The "essay-story" was rejected by John Eglinton, the magazine's editor, who told Joyce: "I can't print what I can't understand" (JJ 147). What is fascinating about this early piece is that it demonstrates how Joyce's views about experience and consciousness were already challenging traditional views of both. The first paragraph of the rejected piece demonstrates the new perspective on being that confused the editor and pointed toward a new way of depicting consciousness:

The features of infancy are not commonly reproduced in the adolescent portrait for, so capricious are we, that we cannot or will not conceive the past in any other than its iron, memorial aspect. Yet the past assuredly implies a fluid succession of presents, the development of an entity of which our actual present is a phase only. Our world, again, recognizes its acquaintance chiefly by the characters of beard and inches and is, for the most part, estranged from those of its members who seek through some art, by some process of the mind as yet untabulated, to liberate

from the personalized lumps of matter that which is their individualizing rhythm, the first or formal relation of their parts. But for such as these a portrait is not an identificative paper but rather the curve of an emotion. (257-258)

That Joyce in 1904, surrounded by what Hugh Kenner calls “an impoverished city. up-to-date at the time he left only in its tram system” (“Notes” 15), was searching for a way of approaching “some process of the mind yet untabulated” is telling of his career-long quest for a new way of depicting consciousness. This attempt to get beyond thinking about the past in an “iron, memorial aspect” was the same aim of philosophers at the turn of the century who challenged the mechanized view of consciousness. Bergson’s *durée réelle* and William James’s “stream of consciousness” were concepts developed to move away from thinking about consciousness, in the words of James, as “chopped up in bits.” James proposed something like Joyce’s “fluid succession of presents”: “Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe [consciousness] fitly as it presents itself.... It is nothing jointed; it flows. A ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described” (239). It is these metaphors-- the river, the stream-- that Joyce employs in his two most famous depictions of states of consciousness: Molly’s monologue that ends *Ulysses*, and Anna Livia Plurabelle’s famous flow that begins and ends *Finnegans Wake*.

As Sanford Schwartz describes it in his study of early twentieth-century philosophy and modernist poetics, the “inversion of Platonism” that James and Bergson inaugurated provided an intellectual background for modernist experimentation.¹⁴ This attempt to understand immediate experience was compounded by the radical attack upon Western ideas about morality and knowledge embodied in the work of Nietzsche. As I

will describe it throughout this study. Joyce was influenced by many aspects of turn-of-the-century philosophy. This is not taken as a common critical stance in discussions of Joyce. When Joyce and philosophy are mentioned, commentary usually focuses on his reading of classical philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas with “modern” philosophers being represented by Vico and Bruno. Richard Ellmann set the tone for this avoidance of modern thinkers in his biography of Joyce when he dismissed Joyce’s early fascination with Nietzsche: “At heart Joyce can scarcely have been a Nietzschean any more than he was a socialist” (*JJ* 142). (In 1905, while engaged in composing *Stephen Hero*, Joyce wrote to his brother Stanislaus: “It is a mistake for you to imagine that my political opinions are those of a universal lover; but they are those of a socialist artist” [*Letters* II 89].) But, as Joseph Valente describes it, Joyce had a life-long admiration for the German philosopher which turned into an alliance “of spiritual revolution [whose] focal point [was] the individual” (88).¹⁵ Schwartz only mentions Joyce twice in his study, and in Joyce studies the problem of what modern philosophers he read and was influenced by has never been adequately discussed. We do not know if Joyce read William James, but he surely knew of his brother’s work and even “framed” his first novel around the title of *The Portrait of a Lady*. In the case of Bergson, we have the testament of Wyndham Lewis whose 1927 attack upon the “time cult” in *Time and Western Man* proposed that Joyce had read *too much* Bergson. And we know that in Joyce’s library in Trieste he had two of Bergson’s books: *L’Evolution créatrice* and *The Meaning of the War: Life and Matter in Conflict*; he also had an early study of Bergson by Joseph Solomon simply called *Bergson*.¹⁶ It is significant that Joyce had Bergson’s

Creative Evolution, because, according to Martin Jay, it is one of the best examples of Bergson's anti-positivism and of his critique of ocularcentrism.

As with many of the thinkers around the turn of the century-- James. F. H. Bradley, Alfred North Whitehead-- Bergson reacted against the scientific method he felt had a strangle-hold on questions of reality and experience. His famous distinction between scientific analysis and intuition proposed an injection of metaphysics into science; it also proposed the end of the limits inherent in scientific observation-- a type of observation always confined to narrow perspective and only expressed in equally limited symbols. The intuitive approach to knowledge would enable the thinker/perceiver to "enter" the object/idea in question in order to understand/perceive it completely. This emphasis on the limits of scientific inquiry, perspective, and language is demonstrated in a passage from *Creative Evolution* that describes how modern thinking is limited by ocular forms of understanding:

Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic of this becoming itself. Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general.... *The mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.* (Bergson's emphasis, quoted in Jay 198)

As Jay describes it, this passage points to Bergson's belief that "[n]ot only intellection, but *all* perception through whatever sense... is inherently cinematographic in its 'ordinary' cognitive modes" (199). But Bergson did not take this kind of "ocular" way of thinking as being formed by motion picture viewing or even the development of photo-

graphy. Bergson, according to Jay, “believed cinematographic modes of thought antedated the invention of the moving picture. It was already evident... in Greek philosophy-- in particular in the Platonic doctrine of Ideas” (199). Bergson believed that this reliance on ocular ways of thinking is inherent in language itself, and, as Jay describes it, he believed that “[o]nly a prelinguistic grasp of fluid, creative, vital reality will take us beyond the camera eye” (200). Bergson made this same claim eighteen years earlier in *Time and Free Will*:

Now if some bold novelist, tearing aside the cleverly woven curtain of our conventional ego, shows us under this appearance of logic a fundamental absurdity, under this juxtaposition of simple states an infinite permeation of a thousand different impressions which have already ceased to exist the instant they are named, we commend him for having known us better than we knew ourselves. (133)

This “tearing aside” of “the cleverly woven curtain,” this striking through the unreasoning mask of ocularcentric thought, was Joyce’s aim throughout his writing.

Endnotes

¹ In a specific way, the visual similarities of Joyce and Kafka connect them to the conception of minor literature. Both writers portray a world of panopticism wherein their characters are constantly under the policing gaze of the law. This is embodied in the similar image of a “castle” at the center of the occupied state in both bodies of fiction. And this is symbolically depicted in Steven Soderbergh’s *Kafka* (1991) by the image of a giant searching eyeball projected onto the glass roof of the castle standing over Kafka’s constantly-scrutinized Prague. For a discussion of the policing gaze in *Ulysses*, see Kimberly Devlin, “Bloom and the Police: Regulatory Vision and Visions in *Ulysses*,” *Novel*, 29 (Fall 1995): 45-62. And for a consideration of Yeats and Foucault’s ideas about the modern culture of panopticism, see Cheryl Herr, “‘The Strange Reward of all that Discipline’: Yeats and Foucault” in *Yeats and Postmodernism*, ed. Leonard Orr (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991).

² Joyce’s relationship to “minor literature” and its concomitant pull toward new subjects and a new “consciousness” may be gleaned from the interesting fact that when J. T. Farrell describes his meeting with members of the IRA in the thirties in *On Irish Themes* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1982) he tells us that they told him “the only writer they liked was James Joyce, even though Joyce had repudiated everything they stood for. They saw in Joyce a man of lower-middle-class origins like themselves, whose feelings and responses to all sorts of things were like theirs. In this sense he was their writer” (20-21).

³ See Marilyn Reizbaum, “The Minor Work of James Joyce,” in *James Joyce Quarterly*, 30, 2, (1993): 177-189. For a book length study of the concept of minor literature and Irish writing, see David Lloyd, *Nationalism and Minor Literature: James Clarence Mangan and the Emergence of Irish Cultural Nationalism*. In *Inventing Ireland*, Declan Kiberd takes Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation as one of the foundations for his reading of Irish literature:

[The concept of minor literature] explains why in Ireland the cultural renaissance preceded by many years the declaration of political independence (unlike the United States, which waited over sixty years for its literary revival). It would also account for the preponderance of creative over critical texts in every phase of modern Irish literature. (117)

⁴ See *Downcast Eyes*, pp. 24-34.

⁵ It is interesting to note here that the most important follower of Descartes who broke with his line of rationalism, Baruch Spinoza, earned his living by grinding lenses.

⁶ For a feminist reading of Descartes and perspective in the light of what she calls “The Cartesian Masculization of Thought,” see Susan R. Bordo, *The Flight of Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), pp. 97-118.

⁷ For more comprehensive accounts of this “break” see James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, pp. 118-121 and David Macey, *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (Pantheon Books: New York, 1993), pp. 142-145.

⁸ See chapter eight below for an account of this “epiphany” and the effect it had on Foucault’s thinking.

⁹ P. J. Murphy. “Beckett and the Philosophers” in *The Cambridge Companion to Beckett*. ed. John Pilling (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 222-240.

¹⁰ For a study of the Molyneux problem and its widespread influence on eighteenth-century thought, see Michael J. Morgan, *Molyneux’s Question: Vision, Touch, and the Philosophy of Perception* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

¹¹ The note on this passage in Don Gifford and Robert J. Seidman’s “*Ulysses*” *Annotated: Notes for James Joyce’s “Ulysses”* is indicative of the lack of attention paid to Stephen’s lack of glasses. The passage is annotated only to reveal the link between the Stephen of *A Portrait*: “Stephen recalls that sixteen years before, as a child at Clongowes Wood College, he had broken his glasses” (510). The correct point here is that his current lack of glasses parallels his lack of “correct” vision in the earlier novel.

In *Ulysses*, Hugh Kenner has a footnote on Stephen’s lack of glasses that is one of the few remarks that suggests that this fact has meaning for the text as a whole: “Stephen’s eyes apparently focus at about eight inches, and when we eventually learn... that he broke his glasses ‘yesterday’ and so has been without them the whole of Bloomsday we must reassess everything he seems to have seen” (38).

The fact that Stephen is without his glasses is confirmed when Private Carr punches him in the face: there is no description of Stephen’s glasses being broken or knocked from his eyes. Bloom picks up only two objects for the prone Stephen: his ashplant and his hat.

There is the possibility that Stephen is wearing pince-nez but there is no confirmation of this throughout the novel; what we can say for certain is that he has no glasses.

¹² Hélène Cixous, “At Circe’s, or the Self-Opener,” *boundary 2*, 2 (Winter 1975): 387-397.

¹³ Stephen is sarcastic here because the Lynx is commonly thought of as having extremely acute vision. The *OED* tells us that the name is probably related to the Greek for “to see.”

¹⁴ The main subjects of Schwartz’s *The Matrix of Modernism: Pound, Eliot, and Early Twentieth-Century Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) are mentioned in his subtitle. In chapter two I discuss Pound and Eliot’s relationship to modernist seeing.

¹⁵ Valente's reading of Joyce's relationship to Nietzsche and their respective assaults upon the perspectival subject will be brought up in the next chapter during a discussion of Joyce's reaction to the Irish Literary Revival and his place within continental modernism.

¹⁶ We know the contents of Joyce's Trieste library from Ellmann's catalog of it in *The Consciousness of Joyce* (Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 97-134.

Chapter Two

Yeats Looks at Blake: Modernist Seeing

As a man is So he Sees.

--William Blake in a letter to Dr. Trusler

Myself must I remake
Till I am Timon and Lear
Or that William Blake
Who beat upon the wall
Till truth obeyed his call.

--W. B. Yeats, "An Acre of Grass"

Yeats and Blake

In his edition of Blake's poems published in 1893, Yeats made a startling and yet very Yeatsian claim. He asserted that Blake's father, James Blake, had been born James O'Neil and was, in fact, an Irishman. Yeats described the poet as "before all things, an O'Neil" whose writings therefore have "an Irish flavour" (Ellmann, *Yeats* 119-120). As Ellmann describes it, this placement of Blake within an Irish lineage was motivated by Yeats's search for a poetic background, for a "unity" of influence that would help him forge his own conceptions of poetry and life.¹ At the time of the publication of *The Works of William Blake: Poetic, Symbolic and Critical*-- a book he worked on with one of his father's friends from the Brotherhood days, Edwin Ellis-- Yeats was twenty-eight and still following the dictum of his youth: "Hammer your thoughts into unity" (Ellmann, *Yeats* 118). His work on Blake shows that his thoughts were still under extensive

construction. Besides the wish to make Blake a son of the Emerald Isle, the edition of Blake he produced was a considerable construction of a poet Yeats wished himself to be. In Harold Bloom's estimation, the commentary Yeats supplied for the volume "went on to misrepresent the outline of Blake's vision almost totally" (*Yeats* 72). This misrepresentation went so far as to describe Blake as involved with an early form of the Golden Dawn; and the prose Yeats supplied for the volume, according to Bloom, was so obtuse "that we might as well be reading Madame Blavatsky" (*Yeats* 75). It was a book that told as much about one of its co-editors than it did about the poet it hoped to present to the world.

Yeats's work on Blake tells us a great deal about Yeats. If Yeats was anything, he was a poet of stages, of self-conscious poetic phases that give a clear outline to the evolution of his poetics. His edition of Blake was a product of the first stage of his career in which he was still trying to forge in the smithy of his soul the uncreated consciousness of his poetry. This stage occurred in the 1890's and it was marked by his membership in the Rhymers' Club and their opposition to the poetry of the Victorians. This beginning stage provided him with his first mask and he colored it with his interest in the Pre-Raphaelites, Shelley, Blake, Pater, and, towards the end of the century, the French Symbolists.² This is also the period in his life when the poet became officially involved with organized mysticism.³ As I will describe it, this was the beginning of Yeats's fascination with "poetic vision" in two senses of the phrase: the apocalyptic vision of what Bloom calls the "visionary company" of the Romantics and the problems with "modern" vision in relation to meaning, art, and consciousness.

The middle stage of Yeats's career directly approaches the idea of "modern" vision in a reaction to his earlier fascination of Romantic vision. As George Bornstein puts it, this period represented Yeats's self-conscious attempt to become "anti-romantic" (78). This stage in his career is exemplified by Yeats's taking on Ezra Pound as his secretary for three winters at Stone Cottage during the years 1913-1916. Yeats described their relationship not as an old master teaching a new poet, but as an education in modern verse for a older poet stuck in time: "[Pound] helps me to get back to the definite and the concrete away from modern abstractions" (Longenbach, *Stone* 19). However, as James Longenbach describes it in his fascinating study of those three winters in Stone Cottage, Pound was deeply influenced by Yeats and the work he produced in the cottage. In fact, as Longenbach explains it, this period lead directly to the composition and publication of *Three Cantos*. And this is also the period in which Pound makes his first contact with Joyce through Yeats.⁴

It is Yeats's interaction with Pound under the roof of Stone Cottage which provides us with a microcosm of the development of conceptions of vision by the high modernists. In what follows, a discussion of the goings on in Stone Cottage during those three winters will provide background to an overall appreciation of the modernist reaction/adoption of Romantic conceptions of vision and poetic consciousness. To demonstrate how certain Romantic attacks upon ocularcentric thinking were transmitted through Yeats and other high modernists, I must take a step back to discuss Blake's reaction against Locke and the overall Romantic reaction against the scientific rationalization of the universe. This discussion of Romantic anti-ocularcentrism will

provide the background for a discussion of Yeats's approach to vision as well as pointing to the split that takes place in high modernism over the political implications of challenging conventional vision. We must begin by going back to Yeats looking at Blake.

Yeats wrote two essays on Blake several years after his edition of Blake's poetry appeared. Bloom remarks that these later essays demonstrate his uneasiness with the Ellis-Yeats edition and that they provide "fairer grounds for judging his mature relationship to Blake" (*Yeats* 80). Yeats's earlier thinking on the poet, to Bloom's mind, created "a Pre-Raphaelite and Paterian Blake" (74). But these later essays-- written four years later at the cusp of the *fin de siècle*-- moved Blake from "a Pre-Raphaelite to a Symbolist poet" (*Yeats* 81); this was a move directly related to Yeats's own poetic evolution. As Bloom demonstrates throughout his study of Yeats, Pater is important for a consideration of Yeats's thinking about poetic vision. If Yeats can be said to move from being a Pre-Raphaelite to being a Symbolist during this period, he still invokes Pater as a guide for reacting to beauty. This is evident in the two essays Yeats wrote on Blake that were later included in *Ideas of Good and Evil*: "William Blake and the Imagination" and "William Blake and His Illustrations to the *Divine Comedy*."

The first essay is a general treatment of Blake and his aesthetic interests. The heart of the piece provides a definition of the most important and powerful of all the qualities of Blake's art:

[I]magination was the first emanation of divinity.... The reason, and by the reason he meant deductions from the observation of the senses, binds us to mortality because it binds us to the senses, and divides us from each other by showing us our clashing interests; but imagination divides

us from mortality by the immorality of beauty, and binds
 us to each other by opening the secret doors of all hearts.
 He cried again and again that everything that lives is holy,
 and that nothing is unholy except things that do not live--
 lethargies, and cruelties, and timidities, and that denial of
 imagination which is the root they grew from in old times.
 (112-113)

It is the “immortality of beauty” which ultimately leads into the “secret doors” of the heart. But this key into the heart is controlled by the way man perceives and interacts with the world through his senses. And, as Yeats goes on to explain, what Blake’s senses taught him was that “everything that lives is holy” and the most “living” of all things-- passions-- were the most holy and man “shall enter eternity borne upon their wings” (113). However, Blake had a complicated and revolutionary view of man’s perception of his world through his senses. Yeats realized that this view could cause a “scandalous paradox” in the modern reader. This is the kind of scandal Blake provokes in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* through proverbs like “The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom” (35) and “Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires” (38). But this provocative and “scandalous” call to embrace the energy of desire and the danger of passion-- a call made throughout Blake’s poetry-- cannot be understood without taking into account something like the sentence “a mighty Devil” writes at the beginning of his first major work of what Bloom calls “apocalyptic satire” (*Visionary* 64), *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*:

How do you know but ev’ry Bird that cuts the airy way,
 Is an immense world of delight, clos’d by your senses five? (35)

This is a question marking Blake’s interest in thinking about how we come to consciousness and live in the world. If *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* is a work

aimed at confronting the hypocrisy inherent in prominent belief systems, then it is also a work challenging the very nature of experience itself. It was this refutation of conventional perception through visionary experience which attracted Yeats and merged with his interest in Pater. When Pater wrote in the “Conclusion” to *The Renaissance* that “Great passions... give us this quickened sense of life” (220) he provided Yeats with aesthetic criteria by which to judge art and he applied it to Blake: “[W]hen one reads Blake, it is as though the spray of an inexhaustible fountain of beauty was blown into our faces” (113). It was this “immortality of beauty” which opened the secret door to Yeats’s thinking about experience and perception. This is elaborated in his discussion of Blake’s visual art.

At the beginning of his discussion of Blake’s illustrations to Dante, Yeats tells us that “William Blake was the first writer of modern times to preach the indissoluble marriage of all great art with symbol” (116). This is exactly the approach to art Yeats was adapting through his exposure to Symbolism courtesy of Arthur Symonds. Yeats then described Blake’s working methods by quoting the poet: “I am really drunk with intellectual vision whenever I take a pencil or graver into my hand” (119). The invocation of “intellectual vision” will come up again later under the roof of Stone Cottage when Yeats and Pound practice its methods, but for now it is sufficient to describe it as a kind of visionary technique used to transcend the conventional approach to depicting reality. Conventional methods of depicting reality in art-- of subjugating artistic technique to anything else besides the roar of imagination-- was one of Blake’s great targets. Yeats discusses this with extensive quotations from the poet:

To “generalise” forms and shadows, to “smooth out”

spaces and lines in obedience to “laws of composition,” and of painting; founded not upon imagination, which always thirsts for variety and delights in freedom. but upon reasoning from sensation, which is always seeking to reduce everything to a lifeless and slavish uniformity; as the popular art of Blake’s day had done.... “General knowledge is remote knowledge,” he wrote; it is in particulars that wisdom consists, and happiness too. Both in art and life general masses are as much art as a pasteboard man is human. Every man has eyes, nose and mouth; this every idiot knows. But he who enters into and discriminates most minutely the manners and intentions, the characters in all their branches, is the alone wise or sensible man, and on this discrimination all art is founded.” (122)

Every man has eyes, but not all men really *see*. The kind of knowledge expressed in a “general” work is knowledge of nothing, or, as Blake put it: “To Generalize is to be an Idiot” (“Annotations” 641). The kind of knowledge and art that tries to intellectualize sensation-- tries to “reduce everything to a lifeless and slavish uniformity”-- is worthless. For Blake, the content of knowledge relies upon the perception which received it: “As the Eye-- Such the Object” (“Annotations” 645). As Yeats described it, this reevaluation of perception by Blake is essential to his aesthetics and the entire program of Romanticism.

Yeats points to the lineage of “intellectual vision” by noting that Shelley “was the next to take up the cry.” He then invokes a figure who he was only beginning to encounter but who would eventually loom large in his thinking: “Nietzsche, whose thought flows always, though with an even more violent current, in the bed Blake’s thought has worn”(130). Nietzsche’s critique of conventional morality and perception had a powerful influence on Yeats throughout his life.⁵ As R. F. Foster tells us in his recent biography of the poet, Yeats did not read Nietzsche intensively until 1902-1903

(272).⁶ This was five to six years *after* he wrote this essay on Blake. However, Yeats had some exposure to the German philosopher through two sources: an essay by Symonds entitled “Nietzsche and Tragedy” and, more importantly, a series of essays by Havelock Ellis which stressed Nietzsche’s similarities to Blake. The first of Ellis’s essays appeared in the journal the *Savoy* in 1893. Yeats was also a contributor to the *Savoy* at this time and he read Ellis’s account of the challenge to modern conceptions of morality and perception embodied in the work of Blake and Nietzsche (Foster 272). By 1902, Yeats was stressing the same similarities which Ellis had proposed and in a letter to Lady Gregory he made this perfectly clear: “[Nietzsche] completes Blake & has the same roots” (*Collected Letters III*, 284). Nietzsche’s philosophy plays an important role in Yeats’s second “anti-romantic” stage, but it is important to locate his interest in the philosopher through the Romantic vision of Blake.

If Yeats explicitly names Shelley and Nietzsche as figures directly related to Blake’s challenge to conventional seeing, then there is another writer whom Yeats gestures towards as belonging to this lineage. This writer is not named but his presence in Yeats’s thinking about Blake becomes that of a hidden spring drenching his thought and periodically overflowing his words. In a discussion of Dante’s relationship to the material world, this presence breaks through and combines itself with the position of Blake: “Blake... cried scorn upon the whole spectacle of external things, a vision to pass away in a moment, and preached the cultivated life, the internal Church which had no laws but beauty, rapture and labour” (135). The hidden spring breaks through the soggy ground of Yeats’s thought and we recognize the influence of Pater. Yeats’s invocation of

the transience of external things, of the world as “a vision to pass a way in a moment,” is a direct allusion to Pater’s description in the “Conclusion” of life’s propensity to melt away “under our feet” before we can enjoy the “splendour of our experience” (219). (And Yeats’s last law-- “labour”-- hints at Pater’s notion of *ascesis*, a quality of restraint that many of the Tragic Generation ignored to their peril.) As F. C. McGrath describes it in his study of Pater’s importance for modernist literature, Pater embodies “one of the chief conduits” between the philosophic import of Romantic thought and the modernist adaptation to it (5). When Pater tells us in the “Conclusion” that “the service of philosophy, of speculative culture, towards the human spirit, is to rouse, to startle it to a life of constant and eager observation” (219), he is formulating a Romantic ideal that came to serve as a Modernist weapon against Victorian aesthetics. But before getting into the Modernist use of Pater against Victorian vision, we must first look at how the Romantics attempted to overthrow the paradigm Wordsworth describes as being an “absolute dominion” wherein “the eye was master of the heart” (Abrams, *Natural* 369).

Now I a fourfold vision see
 And a fourfold vision is given to me
 Tis fourfold in my supreme delight
 And three fold in soft Beulahs night
 And twofold always. May God us keep
 From Single vision & Newtons sleep
 --William Blake in a letter to Thomas Butts

Romantic Seeing

When Wordsworth called vision the “most despotic of our senses” (127) he was articulating a common Romantic feeling about vision that was a reaction against

its canonization in the eighteenth century. This reaction, according to Jay, was powered by two factors: a Neo-Platonic search for a kind of art that went beyond the superficiality of the visible-- a quest exemplified by Kant and Burke's discussions of the sublime-- and that pivotal event of the late eighteenth century, the French Revolution. When Blake wrote in *A Song of Liberty* that "Empire is no more! and now the lion & and wolf shall cease" (45), he was being as premature as any other early Romantic. In his description of the reaction to the reliance of the visual proposed by the Enlightenment, Jay points out that the French Revolution began as the culmination of the Enlightenment principles of rationality and clarity but then descended into a dark chaos which dissipated its idealism.⁷ Jay points out that the final phase of the Revolution was depicted in Goya's dark canvases and exemplified in *The Third of May 1808*: "[I]t illuminates only the horror on the faces of the Spanish victims, while the French executioners-- the agents of a supposedly Enlightened revolution-- remain shrouded in darkness" (107).

After the failure of the Revolution to live up to their expectations, the Romantics turned inward to search for a different kind of revolution. As M. H. Abrams describes it, the Romantic reaction to vision was a political move; he points out that consistently opposed to the idea of a "perfect" vision is the concept of freedom and he describes this in relation to one of the earliest proponents of the French Revolution:

A central and persistent concern of Wordsworth's *Prelude* is to investigate the cardinal value he calls "genuine freedom," which he opposes to the state of mastery, tyranny, thralldom, and servitude-- a mastery exerted by the physical eye and its material objects, which hold in servitude the perceiving mind. Inquiry into the background and rationale of this Wordsworthian *topos* introduces a prominent aspect of the role of contemporary political concerns in Romantic thought and imagination. (*Natural*

356-57)

These political concerns were channeled into personal revolutions. After the French Revolution turned sour, the Romantics turned inward for a different kind of rebellion of the self from the power of vision. And it is important to remember that throughout the work of the major figures of Romanticism this is spoken of as a revolution of the individual. Shelley's pronouncement of the political power of verse in "A Defence of Poetry"-- "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the World" (508)-- is indicative of the Romantic position, but even more telling is his description of poetry's blinding force: "Poetry is a sword of lightning, ever unsheathed, which consumes the scabbard that would contain it" (491). Shelley's embrace of his poetry as visionary power was very much a Romantic sensibility and the kind of thing that attracted Yeats to his work. Bloom tells us Yeats called Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound* "the first of his sacred books or poetic scriptures" (57). It was Shelley's attempt to tear aside the veil of accepted reality that attracted Yeats to his work. When Shelley had Demogorgon in *Prometheus Unbound* tell us that the secret of the universe "is imageless" (175), he was articulating the Romantic reaction to accepted visual truth that would fascinate and influence the modernists.

As I described it in the previous chapter, the eighteenth century was preoccupied with Descartes's visual paradigm of being and this was exemplified in the Molyneux problem. British Empiricism's reliance upon "Cartesian perspectivalism" continued the visual basis of Western philosophy and helped formulate the great enemy of Romantic thought: the philosophy of John Locke. For the Romantics, Locke became the emblem of

the Enlightenment's reliance on rationality and clarity at the expense of imagination. As Richard Rorty describes it, Locke represents the "scientific" turn in philosophy which has led to the "general theory of representation" behind modern thought:

We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on a theory of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (3-4)

Rorty goes on to note that thinkers such as William James and Nietzsche raised objections to this trend in the nineteenth century, but their work was not enough to stop the turning of philosophy into "a substitute for religion" (4).

But before James and Nietzsche challenged the idea of "knowledge as accurate representation"(6), Locke's vision-based epistemology of the mind as mirror became a great target of the Romantics. Abrams analyzes the Romantic reaction to Locke's description of the mind as a *tabula rasa* by describing the shift in metaphor the Romantics called for: the poet's mind was not a mirror perfectly reflecting the world, but rather a lamp illuminating the individual's inspiration and art. This shift from reflection to expression was a major change in thinking about art and reality. And, as Abrams shows throughout his writing on the period, this shift in metaphors was a political move and its targets included science as well as philosophy. In *Lamia*, Keats demonstrates how, in Abrams's description, science "substitutes a dull, abstract thing for the beauty and mystery of concrete perception":

Do not all charms fly
 At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
 There was an awful rainbow once in heaven:
 We know her woof, her texture; she is given
 In the dull catalogue of common things.
 Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings,
 Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
 Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine--
 Unweave a rainbow, as it erewhile made
 The tender-person'd Lamia melt into a shade. (quoted in
 Abrams, *Mirror* 307)

For Keats there was a choice to be made between “cold philosophy” and the miracle of unexplainable and unclassifiable vision. As Abrams describes it, the Romantics had a clear choice to make: “[I]f Newton describes reality, then the poet's rainbow is an illusion; if science in general is true, then poetry in general is false” (*Mirror* 307). For the Romantics there was no middle road between their personal poetic vision and philosophy's “pure” gaze. Blake makes this perfectly clear throughout his work: the imagination is in direct opposition to the dissection of philosophy's gaze:

The Atoms of Democritus
 And Newtons Particles of light
 Are sands upon the Red sea shore
 Where Israels tents do shine so bright (478)

Blake had two great aims for his poetry: the first was to destroy the world created by Locke's philosophy and the second was to create a new world through the power of his imagination. Stewart Crehan takes Blake's thinking about vision as coming out of “the class struggles and ideological conflicts of the 1780s and 1790s” (41) and manifested in his strong refusal to acknowledge the validity of established philosophy: “Blake's reaction against Lockean empiricism is an assertion of the unlimited powers of the subject over those of the object. Laws of thought established by the recognition of

objective laws are, as it were, overturned” (39). The “laws of thought” Blake aimed at toppling were those held in highest regard as the legacy of the Enlightenment. Blake studied these “laws” and constructed a genealogy based on their historical importance. Northrop Frye tells us that Blake carefully read and annotated Locke’s *Essay on the Human Understanding* and placed the philosopher with the likes of Bacon and Newton as “symbol[s] of every kind of evil, superstition and tyranny” (14). In Blake’s view, Locke embodied the doubting of spiritual and intellectual existence begun by Descartes; he ridicules their pessimism throughout his poetry:

A Riddle or the Crickets Cry
Is to Doubt a fit Reply
The Emmets Inch & Eagles Mile
Make Lam Philosophy to smile
He who doubts from what he sees
Will neer Believe do what you Please
If the Sun & Moon should Doubt
Theyd immediately Go out (492)

But it should not be taken from this that Blake calls for a realist form of perception-- that seeing is believing. On the contrary, what Blake calls for throughout his work is a subjective vision that has been blocked off by the “laws of thought.” This call for a subjective vision is the exact opposite of Locke’s rational withdrawal of the subject from the object. It is vital for Blake’s conception of imagination-- the force behind his life and poetry-- that vision be taken as an active, subjective, and creative force. In his annotations to Reynolds, he makes this perfectly clear: “Every Eye Sees differently. As the Eye, Such the Object” (645).

It was this quality in Blake that most attracted Yeats and provided him with a basis for his own explorations of vision. If Bloom is correct and Yeats never really fully

understood Blake's mythology. it is safe to say that he completely understood and adopted his thoughts on vision. Fyre describes Blake's thoughts on vision as a way to transcend quotidian seeing: "The 'visionary' is the man who has passed through sight into vision, never the man who has avoided seeing, who has not trained himself to see clearly, or who generalizes among his stock of visual memories" (25). But to understand how Yeats passed through sight into "vision" we must examine the period in his career when he consciously tried to purge himself of his Romantic heritage. It was this effort that supplied a younger poet with an example of modernist vision.

Yeats has been doing some new lyrics--
 he has come out of the shadows & has
 declared for life-- of course there is in
 that a tremendous uplift for me-- for he
 and I are now as it were in one movement
 with *aims* very much identical.

--Ezra Pound in a letter from 1910

Yeats and Pound in Stone Cottage

In the spring of 1913, when other young men's fancies were turning to thoughts of love, Ezra Pound was turning to thoughts of warfare. Within the next three years Pound's war would produce his advocacy and dismissal of Imagism; his promotion of the poets Rabindranath Tagore and H. D.; the beginning of his efforts to help James Joyce get published and famous; his first meeting with T. S. Eliot and the promotion of his work; his taking on of the literary editorship of the *Egoist* which in turn began to serialize Joyce's *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*;⁸ his reception of the Fenollosa manuscripts; his promotion of Vorticism and his meeting with Henri Gaudier-Brzeska;

and the beginning of what would eventually turn into *Three Cantos*. And during this period he spent three very profitable winters as the secretary for W. B. Yeats in the small space-- six rooms-- of Stone Cottage in Sussex. Yeats expressed his admiration for Pound during these winters in a letter to Lady Gregory: "He is full of the middle ages and helps me to get back to the definite and the concrete away from modern abstractions. To talk over a poem with him is like getting you to put a sentence into dialect. All becomes clear and natural" (Longenbach, *Stone* 19). This struggle for the "clear and natural" did not come easily: it came at the expense of aesthetic warfare. During their time at Stone Cottage Pound also taught Yeats how to fence.

Pound helped Yeats to purge his writing of what they both came to think of as "soft" '90s qualities. Before meeting Yeats in 1909, Pound had, according to Richard Ellmann, spent years "learning how Yeats did it" (*Eminent* 57). And Pound's first volume of poetry gave evidence of his study: *A Lume Spento* was filled with poems following the "mood" of *The Celtic Twilight*. In 1912, a year before they spent their first winter together, Pound began to edit Yeats's work by "correcting" three poems Yeats gave him for the magazine *Poetry*. Thus began "the battle of the pronouns" and other editing feats by Pound which simultaneously enraged and gratified Yeats. Thus began what Ellmann calls the "uninvited... modernization" of Yeats (*Eminent* 64). But, as Longenbach argues, the modernization of their poetry went both ways. Pound continued to be deeply influenced by the poet he considered to be the chief practitioner in the language. What is fascinating about the Stone Cottage years is that from its small rooms emerged what we now identify as the beginning of high modernism. Yeats and Pound set the tone in

aesthetic and professional matters during these years; Yeats, under the tutelage of Pound, entered his middle “anti-Romantic” period and Pound, under the tutelage of Yeats, became the arbiter of a new poetics. It was also from under the roof of Stone Cottage that Pound came to hear the name of James Joyce. As I will describe it, this modernist transformation in the woods partly gets its impetus from the example of Blake and his struggle with vision. The legacy of Romantic vision was adapted by Yeats and Pound during these three winters into a modernist seeing that powered their verse and influenced a generation of poets.

During the spring of 1913 Pound’s warfare on poetry took a literal form. He challenged a fellow poet by the name of Lascelles Abercrombie to a duel. The reason for Pound’s challenge did not lie in some insult to honor. As Yeats put, Pound’s challenge was purely a matter of poetry:

A few weeks ago he took a great distaste to another poet’s work and sent him a challenge to meet him in France and fight a duel on the ground that such poetry was an affront to the reader. The other poet, poor man, was deeply depressed for many days at the thought of being so disliked. I feel I have a very vigorous sec[retary]. I am careful however to dictate my letters. (quoted in Longenbach, *Stone* 39)

Abercrombie, an older poet and friend of Rupert Brooke, had upset Pound by his mediocre verse and his overall reliance upon “soft” Romantic techniques; J. J. Wilhelm tells us that what Pound ultimately objected to was that Abercrombie went “on record saying that what poetry needed most was a return to the simplicity of Wordsworth” (117). It was exactly the opposite of the “simplicity of Wordsworth” that Pound sought in his own work and which he saw beginning to blossom in the work of Yeats. It was a

movement against “simplicity” of “soft” verse that Pound helped foster with Yeats under the roof of their cottage in what the younger poet called a “secret society” (Longenbach, *Stone* x). This society was secret in the sense that it had only two members; as Longenbach describes it, Pound saw their cohabitation and work together as a kind of aesthetic Brotherhood modeled after the Rhymers’ Club. But, whereas the Rhymers’ turned into the Tragic Generation and fell off the tightrope set up by Pater, the “secret society” of Yeats and Pound became the bedrock of modernism.

Years later, Pound looked back on his years in Stone Cottage and placed an important aspect of it in the *Pisan Cantos*:

There is fatigue deep as the grave.
The Kakemono grows in flat land out of mist
 sun rises lop-sided over the mountain
 so that I recalled the noise in the chimney
as it were the wind in the chimney
 but was in reality Uncle William

downstairs composing
that had made a great Peeeeeacock
 in the proide ov his oiye
 had made a great peeeeeeeacock in the...
made a great peacock
 in the proide of his oyyee (548)

This reminiscence of Yeats performing the famous humming he used to compose his verse is important for two reasons: first, it invokes a poem that Yeats wrote in 1914 called “The Peacock”; and secondly, it brings up the theme of vision that preoccupied the two poets during this period. As Longenbach describes it, Yeats’s “The Peacock” is “itself a justification of poetry made from the intellectual vision of the poet rather than the public

world around him” (*Stone* 51). Following Blake, “The Peacock” is a poem that comes from the poet’s “intellectual vision” at the exclusion of the “mob”:

What’s riches to him
That has made a great peacock
With the pride of his eye?
The wind-beaten, stone-grey,
And desolate Three Rock
Would nourish his whim.
Live he or die
Amid wet rocks and heather,
His ghost will be gay
Adding feather to feather
For the pride of his eye. (quoted in Longenbach, *Stone* 51)

This product of what Blake called “intellectual vision” was intended to create an art unfettered by popular tastes and desires. By concentrating on “intellectual vision” Yeats was performing what he believed was Blake’s method of composition: he was deciphering the private vision in his own imagination and creating poems with their meaning without any consideration for popular approval, understanding, or condemnation. This practice had a two-fold import for Yeats: it emphasized his reliance on a visionary poetics while it cemented an aristocratic method he and Pound were searching for. According to Longenbach, this was exactly the kind of poetics Pound was seeking when he agreed to become Yeats’s secretary: he was able to become a part of something like the Rhymers’ Club with its “sense of a poetic aristocracy, meeting in private, ignoring the demands of a vastly inferior public” (*Stone* 26). They also encountered this kind of aristocratic art in the Noh plays Pound was beginning to translate and which Yeats would use as a model for the first of his Noh-influenced plays, *At the Hawks Well*.

In 1904, three years before the riots caused by the premier of Synge's *The Playboy of the Western World*, Yeats witnessed another public display of what he felt was its ignorance of the world of art. Just before the opening of the Abbey Theatre.

Lady Gregory's nephew Hugh Lane had offered his collection of Impressionist paintings to Dublin with the stipulation that proper housing for the works be constructed.

This offer was met with serious opposition by the Dublin Corporation and Yeats was furious. By 1913 the problem had not been resolved and Yeats chalked it up to the ignorance of the middle class; in the same year he published *Poems Written in*

Discouragement which was made up of five poems about the Hugh Lane controversy.

One of the poems, "To a Wealthy Man who promised a second Subscription to the Dublin Municipal Gallery if it were proved the People wanted Pictures," ridiculed Lord Ardilaun for his reliance upon popular opinion:

You gave, but will not give again
Until enough of Paudeen's pence
By Biddy's halfpennies have lain
To be 'some sort of evidence,'
Before you'll put your guineas down,
That things it were a pride to give
Are what the blind and ignorant town
Imagines best to make it thrive. (107)

For Yeats, the public is "blind." This is an important distinction for a poet who was in the process of transforming his Romantic heritage of vision. Turning inwards, Yeats was performing a Romantic action at the same time he was reacting against it. Pound was there to help and to do so he brought along his own aesthetic baggage.

In a response to Dorothy Shakespear's query about how to suppress a ghost--information she expected him to get from the ghost-obsessed Yeats-- Pound replied:

‘Intellectual vision’ is, acc. Wm Blake & others, the surest cure for ghosts. You’d better begin by seeing fire, or else by doing that visualization of points that I recommended. Fix a point, colour it, or light it as you like, start it moving, multiply it, etc. Make patterns, colours, pictures, whatever you like. You will end as a great magician & prize exorcist. (quoted in Longenbach, *Stone* 50)

Although this answer is half tongue-in-cheek, it tells us a great deal about Pound’s thinking about poetry during this period. And the fact that poetic method is linked with exorcism also tells us from whom it got the idea. Suspicious that he would be bored with Yeats interests in the occult, Pound was surprised to find that he was interested in spiritual matters for the sake of both their work and especially for the spirit-filled world of the Noh plays he was “translating.” As Longenbach describes it, Pound read Yeats on “intellectual vision” in his essays on Blake before he met the older poet; in Stone Cottage the young, expatriate American practiced its method in poems such as “Heather” and “His Vision of a Certain Lady Post Mortem.” What is interesting about Pound’s use of intellectual vision as a method of composition-- and as a goal-- is that it seems to fit perfectly with his description of how to write an Imagist poem:

An “Image” is that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time.... It is the presentation of such a “complex” instantaneously which gives that sense of sudden liberation; that sense of freedom from time and space limits; that sense of sudden growth, which we experience in the presence of the greatest works of art. (“Retrospect” 4)

The important part of this description is Pound’s emphasis on the image’s escape from “time and space limits.” As Peter Nicholls describes it, this quality of breaking with time and space was essential for Pound’s adoption of the Paterian moment-- it moved beyond

the “moment” of experience by putting it into history.⁹ And the entire effort to embody Pater’s “moment” at all implicates Pound in a Paterian sensibility; this was something he received from reading Yeats and the other members of the Rhymers’ Club, especially Lionel Johnson (Pound on Johnson: “[N]o one has written purer Imagisme than he has” [“Lionel” 362]). What happened to this Paterian sensibility was that under the roof of Stone Cottage it was combined with Yeats’s use of intellectual vision and it became hard-edged and pushed Pound toward the Vortex.

But before the Vortex came *Des Imagistes*. Searching for contributors to what would be the first anthology of Imagist poetry-- and a response to the wildly successful *Georgian Poetry*-- Pound asked Yeats if he knew of any Irish poets who might be included. Yeats responded with the name of James Joyce, a writer who at that time had had only one book published, *Chamber Music* (1907). Joyce was also, as Pound later remarked, the only Irish writer Yeats respected who was “not absorbed in the ‘twilight’” (“James” 269). With his interest piqued, Pound wrote Joyce one of the most famous letters in modern literary history, dated December 15, 1913 (the two were not to meet until 1920). The letter began: “Mr Yeats has been speaking to me of your writing” (*Pound* 17). And it ended with a gesture toward placing Joyce into the arms of the “secret society”: “I am bonae voluntatis,-- don’t in the least know that I can be of any use to you-- or you to me. From what W. B. Y. says I imagine we have a hate or two in common-- but thats [*sic*] a very problematical bond on introduction” (*Pound* 18). Pound turned out to be of enormous help to Joyce from his advocacy of *A Portrait* to his help getting *Ulysses* serialized in the *Egoist* and *The Little Review*. He continually helped Joyce receive much

needed money and advice about eye doctors. The poem Pound included in *Des Imagistes* attempted to place Joyce within the *les jeunes* of the new movement. It was a poem that Yeats admired and that Pound thought explicitly invoked intellectual vision:

I hear an army charging upon the land,
 And the thunder of horses plunging, foam about their
 knees:
 Arrogant, in black armour, behind them stand,
 Disdaining the reins, with fluttering whips, the
 charioteers.

They cry unto the night their battle-name:
 I moan in sleep when I hear afar their whirling
 laughter.
 They cleave the gloom of dreams, a blinding flame,
 Clanging, clanging upon the heart as upon an anvil.

They come shaking in triumph their long, green hair:
 They come out of the sea and run shouting by the
 shore.
 My heart, have you no wisdom thus to despair?
 My love, my love, my love, why have you left me
 alone? (CP 44)

In a review of Joyce's work up to 1918 and published in the same year, Pound describes this poem as a "phantom vision" ("Joyce" 138). This is significant because Joyce's work would turn out to haunt Pound to the extent that he would eventually recast the *Cantos* under the influence of the early chapters of *Ulysses*. Pound's relationship to Joyce's work will be brought up below, but for now it is sufficient to point out that Joyce's early work fascinated Pound; Joyce's later experimentations-- and I am speaking here about the radical challenges to mimesis that the middle of *Ulysses* posed-- repelled Pound for reasons that can only be understood by an examination of their different approaches to vision. But to understand how Pound came to diverge from Joyce-- and how a split in

high modernism formed over the political meaning of vision-- we must enter the Vortex and the beginning of the *Cantos*.

In 1914, after wintering with Yeats in the cottage and one year before he would begin work on what would turn into *Three Cantos*, Pound contributed this definition of Vorticism in the first issue of *BLAST*:

The vortex is the point of maximum energy. It represents, in mechanics, the greatest efficiency.... The vorticist relies... on the primary pigment of his art, nothing else. Every conception, every emotion presents itself to the vivid consciousness in some primary form. It is the picture that means a hundred poems, the music that means a hundred pictures, the most highly energized statement, the statement that has not yet SPENT itself in expression, but which is the most capable of expressing THE TURBINE. (quoted in Carpenter 246)

Continuing the visual poetics of what Ellmann called a “general... Polaroid view of the verse line” (*Eminent* 63), Pound was adapting here his Imagist definition to the practice of intellectual vision. Vorticism combines the “primary pigment of his art”-- the experience of the artist embodied in the image-- with the energy of the machine. The metaphor of the machine was picked up from the Futurists and Pound used it throughout his thinking about poetry for the next decade; the next year Pound created one of his most famous descriptions of the artist as machine:

The good artist is perhaps a seismograph, but the difference between man and a machine is that man can in some degree “start his machinery going.” He can, within limits, not only record but create. At least he can move as a force; he can produce “order-giving vibrations”; by which one may mean merely, he can decompartmentalise such part of the life-force as flows through him. (“Affirmations” 376)

After this Blakean call for multiple vision, Pound invokes historical details as memory and sees: “Walls whereon chariots went by four abreast” (*Stone* 237). This historical memory/vision is linked with the energy of the new movement: “Night-blue beyond us, infinite seas and stars./ But starting, always, pointed, the bottom vertex,/ always a vertex” (*Stone* 237). As Longenbach describes it, this early draft represents Pound’s use of intellectual vision to tap into historical consciousness: “Vorticism was a theory of intellectual vision” (*Stone* 237). The voice in the poem becomes one with the past as it speaks in the present. Following Yeats, Pound invokes the *Spiritus Mundi* and enters the Vortex of history: “‘All is within us,’ purgatory and hell.” And to do this Pound employs a Victorian model that was said to “modernize Dante”: Browning’s *Sordello* (Bush 77). What attracted Pound to Browning’s complex dramatic poem was its play with meaning across a historical stage through the voice of a single narrator. Carol Christ tells us that *Sordello* “strikingly anticipated Pound’s technique when it manipulates a parallel between past and present in a historical overlaying unique in Victorian poetry” (*Victorian* 121). It was this overlaying of history that Pound took from Browning and injected with a modernized Romantic vision.

The early version of *Three Cantos* was conceived within this merging of Yeats’s post-Romantic use of intellectual vision and Vorticism. The problem for Pound had been to create out of experience something that embodied that experience and he saw the solution in the work of Jacob Epstein and Henri Gaudier-Brzeska. In her study of the “submerged” influence of Victorian poetics on modernist experimentation, Christ points out that Pater was the first to supply Pound with the problem; Pater “refines experience to

a number of fugitive impressions upon the active sensibility, while he holds forth the dream that these impressions could contain within themselves objectivity and universal resonance without intervening discourse" (*Victorian* 73). In other words, as Pound puts it in his list of "Don'ts": "Use no superfluous word, no adjective which does not reveal something" ("Retrospect" 4). Pound followed Pater's "dream" into Vorticism and into the *Cantos*; it was the same "dream" he edited into *The Waste Land* and attempted to pin down without success in the work of Joyce. The source of Pound's quest is of importance here because it clearly places him within a philosophical background which will ultimately prove to split high modernism down the middle in relation to vision. The source may be traced in the beginnings of Imagism and followed into Vorticism. Pound always credited Ford's Impressionism with inspiring his conception of Imagism, but F. S. Flint put the originating influence elsewhere:

Somewhere in the gloom of the year 1908, Mr. T. E. Hulme proposed to a companion that they should form a poets' club. The thing was done there and then. The Club began to dine and members read their verses. At the end of the year they published a small plaquette on the verses.... On this plaquette was printed one of the first "Imagist" poems by T. E. Hulme: "Autumn." I think that what brought the real nucleus of this group together was a dissatisfaction with English poetry.... In all this Hulme was ringleader. He insisted too on absolutely accurate presentation and no verbiage. There was a lot of talk and practice among us with what we called the "Image." (quoted in Guest 41)

Hulme is the link between Pound and a continental tradition of thinkers who used vision as a trope of power in their philosophical, social, and aesthetic theories.

As Jacob Epstein once put it, Hulme "was capable of kicking a theory as well as a

man downstairs when the occasion demanded” (vii). Faced with Hulme’s writing the historical problem becomes: Which theories did he kick downstairs permanently and which did he only kick into shape? As Michael Levenson has demonstrated, Hulme’s legacy has been difficult to decipher because of the way in which his collected writings were put together by Herbert Read.¹⁰ Levenson’s analysis of the original volume of Hulme’s writing, *Speculations*, is indispensable for a consideration of Hulme. The writing collected in this book is made up of the two periods of Hulme’s thought: his early, avid interest and promotion of Bergson and then the later period of classicism begun with his exposure to the anti-humanist theories of the German aesthetician Wilhelm Worringer. For some reason, Read mixed up the different periods of Hulme’s thought and one is left with the impression that his was a confused and contradictory mind.¹¹ What we can safely say is that Hulme was an ardent early supporter of Bergson and he wrote several important articles introducing him to English audiences in *The New Age* during 1911. In 1913 he published a translation of Bergson’s *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Hulme’s poetic phase immediately followed his exposure to Bergson’s thinking. He described the import Bergson had for his poetry by pointing to the two essential points he discerned in the Frenchman’s philosophy: “(1) the conception of reality as a flux of interpenetrated elements unseizable by the intellect.... and (2) his account of the part played in the development of the ordinary characteristics of the mind by its orientation towards action” (146-147). In his poems he attempted to depict this new conception of reality, or, as he put it in the same essay: “[T]he function of the artist is to pierce through here and there, accidentally as it were, the veil placed between us and

reality by the limitations of our perception engendered by action” (147). His Imagist poems are encapsulations of experience-- snapshots of immediate sensation-- devoid of Romantic descriptions of self or situation. When Pound wrote the preface to *The Complete Poetical Works of T. E. Hulme* he used the following term for the first time in print: *Les Imagistes*.

But Hulme stopped writing poetry in 1912. As Levenson demonstrates, the poems stopped coming because Hulme stopped looking for them; his later thought was “deeply... opposed to Bergson” (81). And it stayed so until his death in the First World War in 1917. What changed Hulme’s thinking was a book called *Le Romantisme français* by Pierre Lasserre, a member of the royalist, anti-romantic, anti-liberal, anti-Semitic Action Française. An attack upon Rousseau and the tradition of Romantic individualism Lasserre saw emerging from him, *Le Romantisme français* preached order, tradition, and classicism to combat Romantic decadence. That this call in the realm of aesthetics was intrinsically tied into the political platform of Charles Maurras’s Action Française was perfectly fine for Hulme who had been searching for this kind of order in the work of Bergson. The fact that the Action Française was opposed to Bergson on every level was the final push Hulme needed to embrace the order their thinking provided in contrast to the relative disorder of Bergsonism. There seemed to be a clear choice for Hulme and he took it; as Levenson describes it, “To reason, the Bergsonians oppose intuition; to classical discipline and constancy, they oppose the *élan vital* and evolutionary progress. To tradition they oppose novelty. The Bergsonian philosophy, concluded Lasserre, “*est la justification métaphysique du refus de penser*” (85-86). This

was all Hulme needed to call for a revival of classicism.

Pound never seemed to have any interest in Bergson; he is reported to have once proclaimed: "DAMN Bergson and frog diarrhea" (Carpenter 114). But Pound was interested in the idea of classicism and, as Louis Menand notes, this provided a point of comradeship with T. S. Eliot. Unlike Hulme, Eliot seemed to encounter Bergson and the Action Française at the same time during a stay in Paris in 1910-1911. Eliot attended some of Bergson's lectures but he quickly shrugged off the philosopher for what Peter Ackroyd tells us he found in Maurras: order, discipline, and tradition (41). Maurras's influence on Eliot would prove to be so important that the leader of the Action Française would be credited with the poet's conversion to the Anglican Church. To Maurras's description of himself as "classique, catholique, monarchique" Eliot responded fifteen years later with a reflective description of himself as : "classicist, royalist, and anglo-catholic" (Ackroyd 41). When Eliot met Pound in 1914, the editor of *Des Imagistes* was busy damning Imagism and searching for the hard-edged poetics of Vorticism. He had also just finished his first winter as Yeats's secretary.

After reading the first poem Eliot gave him-- "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock"-- Pound wrote another of his famous letters to Harriet Monroe, the publisher of *Poetry*:

I was jolly well right about Eliot. He has sent in the best poem I have yet had or seen from an American. PRAY GOD IT NOT BE A SINGLE AND UNIQUE SUCCESS. He has taken it back to get it ready for the press and you shall have it in a few days.

He is the only American I know who has made what I can call adequate preparation for writing. He has actually trained himself *and* modernized himself *on his own*. The rest of the *promising young* have done one or the other but never both

(most of the swine have done neither). It is such a comfort to meet a man and not have to tell him to wash his face, wipe his feet, and remember the date (1914) on the calendar. (Pound's emphasis, *Letters* 40)

The important part of this description is that, with the help of Laforgue, Eliot had “modernized” himself by himself. But Eliot’s modernization was not solely poetic; a part of what made him “modern” to Pound was his admiration of thinkers such as Maurras. In 1909 Eliot had been exposed to the classicism of Irving Babbitt at Harvard who had in turn been influenced by the attack on Romanticism engineered by Lasserre in *Le Romantisme français*. Eliot would later become enamored of other reactionary and anti-democratic thinkers such as Remy de Gourmont, Julian Benda, and Georges Sorel.¹² These were the same writers Hulme, Pound, and Lewis also had in their backgrounds. It is this tradition of reactionary, anti-Semitic, and anti-democratic thought that supplied the representative moderns with their aesthetics and, ultimately, their politics. This tradition may be said to be centered around the notion of an elite vision and it created what we today call high modernism.

In 1927 Wyndham Lewis published *Time and Western Man*. In many ways this attack upon what he called the “Time Cult” is a summation of the ideas passed around by the moderns before and after the war. As Fredric Jameson points out, these ideas formed a “veritable discursive genre” of modernist “culture critique” (*Fables* 128). *Time and Western Man* is a sweeping denunciation of what Lewis calls “a time-keeping, chronologically-real, super historic, Mind” (218) behind the most influential products of modern art and thought. Subjected to this example of “culture critique” are Bergson, Whitehead, Proust, William James, Virginia Woolf, Gertrude Stein, and even his old friend Pound.

Also predominately figured in the book is an assault upon what Lewis calls the great example of the “time-book”: Joyce’s *Ulysses*. I will discuss the specifics of Lewis’s argument against *Ulysses* in chapter four, but for now it is important to touch upon the background of what Jameson calls Lewis’s “hostile anatomy of the time impulse” (*Fables* 123-24). As Lewis himself describes it, his attack upon the “Time Cult” and his overall classicist approach was formed by his thinking about the visual through his role as a painter:

So my philosophical position could almost be called an occupational one, except that my occupation is not one that I have received by accident or mechanically inherited, but is one that I chose as responding to an exceptional instinct or bias.... With as much definiteness as that, whatever I, for my part, say, can be traced back to an organ; but in my case it is the *eye*. It is in the service of things of vision that my ideas are mobilized. (133-34)

The originating organ for Lewis-- the one that gives the seed for his aesthetics-- is the eye. But this should not be taken as a complete admission of his reliance on his individual painter’s eye. His reliance on his eye begins with his need to define the classical as opposed to the Romantic. As he puts it, the two are not difficult to differentiate with the right kind of eye:

At all events, I always think of something very *solid*, and I believe it is a sensation I share with many people, when the term “*classic*” is employed, and of something very disheveled, ethereal and misty, when the term “*romantic*” is made use of.... All compact of common sense, built squarely upon Aristotelian premises that make for permanence-- something of such a public nature that all eyes may see it equally-- something of such a universal nature, that to all time it would appear equal and the same-- such is what the word *classic* conjures up. But at *romantic* all that falls to

pieces. (Lewis's emphasis, "Terms" 153)

His description of the classical as being made of the stuff which "all eyes may see equally" is important because it points to what lies behind his definition of the classical as something "clear" and "distinct." What this points to is what Vincent Sherry describes as "a conservative reaction, launched through a study of art in its most immediate and affective state, against the mainstream culture of liberal, democratic, 'progressive' Europe, as typified by the *la belle époque* in France" (10-11). This reaction was centered around "direct aesthetic sensation" and gets associated with "the activities of the ear and eye and endows this sensory experience with political significance" (11). Thinkers such as Benda and Gourmont called for an "aristocratic vision" to separate the elite from the masses. But this kind of thinking was not confined to Benda and Gourmont or even France; as Sherry demonstrates, this was a wide-spread sentiment propagated throughout pre-War Europe by a variety of right-wing writers. In an essay called "The Dehumanization of Art" Jose Ortega y Gasset defined the platform from which the idea of aristocratic vision sprung:

A time must come in which society, from politics to art, reorganizes itself into two orders or ranks: the illustrious and the vulgar. That chaotic, shapeless, and undifferentiated state without discipline and social structure in which Europe has lived these hundred and fifty years cannot go on. Behind all contemporary life lurks the provoking injustice of the assumption that men are actually equal. (quoted in Sherry 18)

It was from this notion of the inequality of those who live and see that Vorticism grew.

As Sherry describes it, right-wing social thought before WWI often associated

the masses with aural complacency, with “sympathetic identification” primarily demonstrated in their response to popular music.¹³ The thinker/artist who wished to be above the masses, according to Sherry, had to cultivate a certain kind of vision:

Whereas sympathy is the debased habit of the common folk, members of a body swayed to music, detachment is the rank and privilege of an aristocratic class, holding the high ground of the eye. Like aural empathy, this visual distance provided a subject for wide European analysis: its advantage relies on a quasi-physiological examination, one that adduces evidence for the superiority of the eye to the ear. In these terms critics of the visual and literary arts rewrite the social contract of liberal democratic Europe; basing their arguments for a hierarchical society on this two-tiered model of aesthetic sensations. (19)

And this argument for an elite established by the detachment of their eyes may be seen expressed in a book Pound gave Eliot in 1920. The volume was *Belphégor* by Benda and, as Menand tells us, the book’s denunciation of “cultural decadence” was highly praised by Eliot.¹⁴ *Belphégor* is an analysis of the weakening of society by Romantic ideals that Benda saw imported to France by Jews and fostered by the rise of a popular culture created and perpetuated by women. Eliot later called the book “an almost final statement of the attitude of contemporary society to art and the artist” (quoted in Menand, “Eliot” 38). In *Time and Western Man*, Lewis describes *Belphégor* as “a critical study of the democratic post-war society in France: all the mass-democratic vices and weaknesses are exposed in a masterly fashion” (274). And what Benda prescribes as an antidote in *Belphégor* to the decadence of democratic society is an attitude he called *sévérité*, combining what Sherry calls “optical privilege and optical superiority in a single word”

(22). Meaning “severance” and “separation.” *sévérité* conveys the notion that the elite must have a vision distant from the object viewed while cultivating an aristocratic discrimination. Unlike the masses who can only appreciate “decadent” and Romantic art-- “soft” art which plays primarily on the emotions-- the members of the elite must use their eyes to discriminate and clearly “see” art objects and ideas which demand a rigorous and trained intellectual scrutiny.

Lewis started to enunciate these principles of *sévérité* and overall elite perception in his art work as early as 1913. Lewis’s *The Crowd* (1913-1915) is an explicit statement about the differences between the blindness of the masses and the discerning eye of the elite. In Sherry’s description of the painting, Lewis employs the “medieval scheme of proximate vision” (26)-- of a privileged and distinct vision-- to make a political point:

The tiny red stick-men consigned to the upper background merge into an indistinct, aggregate mass; here is the “visual plebs” Ortega saw in the optical hinterlands of the older canvases. Far more finely detailed, the shapes in the lower-left corner clearly occupy the former place of favor in the medieval scheme. These black-capped leaders are privileged with a sequestered place, designated as such by lettering that forms most of the French word ENCLOSURE: enclosure.... The sanctuary of an intelligent ruling class is thrown into jeopardy by the residual anarchy of mass society. (26-27)

This is a visual statement of the social warfare Lewis saw and attempted to define in his writing as well as his paintings; it is also the war he tried to define in *BLAST*. By the time Pound finished his last winter as Yeats’s secretary he set down the same kind of ideas in a letter to John Quinn:

I don’t believe in the “public.” Liberty, equality, fraternity, democracy, all very well. I think there ought to be as much of ‘em as possible. BUT art exists in spite of them-- Any art that matters. Literature is the same as

painting or sculpture. "Aristocracy" (a pink candle-shade stretched over cash) or cash erects a barrier around art and defends it long enough for it [to] come into maturity.

This aristocracy, composed of a few artists, a few people who know, a small amount of money, has to subjugate a certain milieu.... This subjugation is a purely unscrupulous process made possible by both the aspirations and the asininity of the subjected. The rest are a herd of sheep.

However I shall never be thrown into prison without trial as Voltaire was. I shall never be burnt at the stake for heresy as several nice people were in Spain so recently as 1758. so I have no heavy complaint against things in general. (quoted in Longenbach, *Stone* 263-64)

Besides being startling in its prescience, this letter also defines Pound's self-image within an artistic "aristocracy." It also indicates the three forces Pound was struggling with and assimilating during this period: Yeats's legacy of Symbolism compounded by his self-conscious quest to be modern and to be a member of an elite community of artists and thinkers; the European legacy of anti-democratic thought exemplified in the work of Benda and Gourmont; and the work of Lewis and the pull of Vorticism. This letter also indicates the break within high modernism over vision.

I have described at length the philosophical and aesthetic background of Pound, Lewis, Eliot, and Yeats to demonstrate how vision plays an important role in their thinking about life and art. This is a significant background for understanding high modernism and Joyce's relationship to it. To put it bluntly, the anti-democratic and classicist background of high modernism is important to take into account because of Joyce's complete *separation from it*. Throughout his life Joyce never had any tolerance for the reactionary politics of Pound or the tradition from which it sprang. As I will describe it in the next chapter, Joyce's politics were deeply opposed to the ideas

embodied in the anti-humanist tradition of thinkers such as Benda and Gourmont.

Joyce's complete rejection of anti-Semitism becomes the most obvious instance of his rejection of the ideology of European reactionary thought and, as I describe it in chapter four, *Ulysses* embodies Joyce's critique and denunciation of anti-Semitism on political and moral levels.

Joyce's difference from Pound, Lewis, Eliot and even Yeats may be discerned in an obvious way by looking at the social "critiques" each of the latter four produced. The most famous of these are Pound's *Jefferson and/or Mussolini* (1935), Lewis's *Hitler* (1931), Eliot's *After Strange Gods* (1934), and Yeats's *On the Boiler* (1939). Joyce never so much as published a single line of reactionary social commentary or political opinion. But, as John Carey tells us in a book whose title sets up the opposition it describes, *The Intellectuals and the Masses*, it was not the social critiques but the actual literature these writers produced which most pointed to their movement away from the masses.

According to Carey, modernists from Yeats to Lawrence embraced Ortega's idea of "two different castes of men" and saw the rise of mass culture and mass education as detrimental to society as a whole. Carey tells us that Lawrence once said that "[t]he mass of humanity should never learn to read and write" (15); Eliot makes a similar claim in

Christianity and Culture:

There is no doubt that in our headlong rush to educate everybody, we are lowering our standards... destroying our ancient edifices to make ready the ground upon which the barbarian nomads of the future will encamp in their mechanized caravans. (quoted in Carey 15)

In an effort to maintain “our ancient edifices” modern art modernized itself toward the kind of *sévérité* Benda extolled; Carey describes it as an anti-democratic push toward an elite culture:

The intellectuals could not, of course, actually prevent the masses from attaining literacy. But they could prevent them reading literature by making it too difficult for them to understand-- and this is what they did. The early twentieth century saw a determined effort, on the part of the European intelligentsia, to exclude the masses from culture. In England this movement has become known as modernism. In other European countries it was given different names, but the ingredients were essentially similar, and they revolutionized the visual arts as well as literature. Realism of the sort that it was assumed the masses appreciated was abandoned. So was logical coherence. Irrationality and obscurity were cultivated. “Poets in our civilization, as it exists at present, must be difficult,” decreed T. S. Eliot. (16-17)

Out of all the modernists-- and Carey means *all* of the writers we associate with high modernism including Woolf-- only one writer attempted to embrace the idea of “mass man”: “Can we say, then that in *Ulysses* mass man is redeemed? Is Joyce the one intellectual who atones for the Nietzschean contempt of the masses, and raises mass man, or a representative of mass man, to the status of epic hero? To a degree, yes.” (20). But Carey sees a contradiction in this. If *Ulysses* is the sole modernist text embracing “mass man” then how do we justify its seemingly impenetrable difficulty, its reputation of being “for intellectuals only”? (20). Carey sees a “duplicity” built into the text because of this (20). As I will describe it in my discussion of “Oxen of the Sun” in chapter five, Joyce was aware of this contradiction and strove to connect his work to the everyday world of Dublin and the mass culture he saw as intrinsic to modern life.

Joyce's *oeuvre* is in many ways a response to the aesthetics and politics of the high modernists. Joyce never thought of himself as a part of the aesthetic movement started by Pound and he once wrote Harriet Shaw Weaver in 1928 to describe this feeling: "[T]he more I hear of the political, philosophical, ethical zeal and labours of the brilliant members of Pound's big brass band the more I wonder why I was ever let into it 'with my magic flute'" (*Letters* I 277). The music from Joyce's "magic flute" split high modernism down the middle because of its concern with challenging the Western reliance upon ocularcentrism. For all of Pound and company's cultivation of the aristocratic eye to escape popular culture and thought, their aesthetics led them directly into the prison house of the visual.¹⁵

To think of modernism has always been to think of its visual experiments on the canvas and on the page. From Conrad's declaration of his intention to "above all make you *see*" to Woolf's implication that human character changed in 1910 because of a Post-Impressionist exhibit, the artists of modernism always pointed to their visual interests. As Stephen Kern describes it in his study of the thinking about time and space before and during the Great War, the modernists could not help but be interested in the visual because of the explosion of print and electronic media which emphasized and experimented with the image.¹⁶ These years-- 1880-1918-- also marked the rise of a mass culture created and disseminated by the new forms of technology, new forms Benjamin described in political terms in a famous essay.¹⁷ It has become a common critical view that modernism arose out of a need to distance itself from popular culture, from "easy" reading and "clear" meaning-- much in the way painters had to distance

themselves from the “reality” given in photographs.¹⁸ According to Allon White, the will to obscurity embodied in early modernists such as James and Conrad was a reaction against “popular reading” and the Victorian ideal of “Truth as an ultimately pure and unified field” (55). White takes the obscurity of early modernism as a gesture against popular culture and criticism and as the fulfillment of an artistic legacy: “It is manifestly an aesthetic strategy which is taken from Symbolism and Art for Art’s Sake, an ideology of rarity which endeavors to value the art object by placing it beyond the reach of the multitude” (52). Although Pound had definite ideas about the political import of art beyond its existence as “Art for Art’s sake,” this assessment is roughly the way he thought about it in 1914. When Pound said that he did not believe in the “public,” he provided a statement describing the high modernist’s feelings about who could appreciate his work. But to adequately assess the importance of modernist obscurity we must take a step back and survey the field in 1914.

If we accept the modernist will to obscurity as a response to popular culture and advancements in technology, then we must differentiate between the kinds of modernism this dynamic produced. As Levenson puts it, the background for the “Men of 1914” was split between two traditions:

On one side the representative figures have been Pater, Bergson, Stirner, Upward and Ford, who, despite divergences in detail, shared a fundamental outlook: each offered a skeptical critique of traditional beliefs and institutions, and a renewal through retreat to the self-- the existing order criticized from the standpoint of the ego. On the other side stood Worringer, Husserl, Lasserre, Maurras, G. E. Moore, Gaudier-Brzeska and Lewis, all denying the ultimacy of the human subject and insisting on the autonomy of art, logic, politics and ethics, whose values were intrinsic-- the existing order criticized from the standpoint of objective

truth and objective value. (132-33)

The distinction Levenson makes here is between the “radical egoism” of the former and the “extreme formalism” of the latter. It is the latter group of “objective truth and objective value” which provided the background for Pound and Eliot. This is in contrast to Joyce’s position as inheritor of Pater and Bergson’s “skeptical critique of traditional beliefs and institutions.” And this “skeptical critique” may be taken as the basis for a penetrating appraisal of ocularcentrism. The “radical egoism” Levenson ascribes to Bergson is what Jay takes as the starting point for the philosopher’s critique of ocularcentric thought. Bergson links the personal body with personal memory in an effort to dismiss the idea of “pure seeing.”¹⁹ As Jay describes it, Bergson’s concentration on the body’s link with memory is one of the starting points for the modern challenge to ocularcentrism. The fact that Maurras, Lasserre, Pound, and Lewis were explicitly opposed to Bergson highlights their opposition to critiques of the hegemony of vision embodied in Western culture. In fact, what Levenson calls “extreme formalism” may be renamed “extreme ocularcentrism” if we take in the constant desire of these thinkers for a “pure” vision and “clear” images of truth and reality. The denial of Bergson’s critique of ocularcentrism is embodied in their opposition to Romanticism and Romantic vision, democratic thought, and humanism. And a common element of this opposition is also anti-Semitism; and this last point is crystallized in the fact that Maurras protested Bergson’s election to the Académie Française on the grounds that the philosopher was Jewish (Menand “Eliot” 38).

Joyce separates himself from modernists such as Pound and Eliot over two broad

approaches to culture and life: his opposition to their reactionary social critiques and anti-Semitism; and his denial of the Western reliance on vision to supply truth and justice.

This is the fundamental difference between Joyce and the other canonical high modernists; Gertrude Stein provides a similar critique of vision which I describe in chapter four. Yeats is a liminal figure in this regard and I will place him in context below, but for now it is important to understand Joyce as radically opposed to the tradition of “elite” vision championed by the “Men of 1914.” I have described this difference at some length-- and will continue the description in the next chapter with a discussion of Joyce’s politics-- because it has become a critical commonplace to lump Joyce in with the other high modernists in terms of aesthetics and politics. In the below description, Reed Way Dasenbrock makes this kind of error in a way that is emblematic of how Joyce is typically associated with Pound, Lewis, and Eliot:

Pound and Lewis around 1914 are inventors par excellence and only later, in the 1920s and the 1930s, are these new processes combined in the masterpieces of modernism. Pound, of course, was not simply an inventor, as *The Cantos* should be included with *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, *The Waste Land* and *Four Quartets*, and the lyrics of Yeats in the list of those masterpieces. (152)

This is the kind of vague equation often made between Joyce and the “Men of 1914.”²⁰

Although he does not explicitly state it-- and this is endemic of this kind of criticism-- Dasenbrock implies that *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* come from the same aesthetic source as *The Cantos* and *The Waste Land*. All these works are, of course, part of the “obscure” modernist enterprise ultimately tied to social and economic forces in early twentieth-century history, but it is important to dissociate Joyce from the immediate

cultural background of Pound, Lewis, and Eliot.²¹ This is not to say that there was not some kind of influence passed between the moderns; we know that Pound and Eliot were influenced by the innovations Joyce achieved in the early sections of *Ulysses*.²² As I will characterize it throughout my discussions of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce was influenced by the example of Pound, Eliot, and Lewis in a *negative* way. That is, he reacted to their work by writing as differently as he could from it-- by writing works critical of the vision-based paradigms of truth and consciousness inherent in the work of canonical modernism. Instead of modeling his work after the dynamics of Vorticism or the “unity of sensibility” Eliot approved of in the Metaphysical poets, Joyce reacted against them on artistic and ideological levels.²³ As Perry Meisel has described it in his study of modernist doctrine and Pater’s influence therein, Joyce’s work should be seen as a sharp contrast to Eliot’s. In Meisel’s view, “Joyce’s radical exposure of the means of literary production and Eliot’s repression of it” is the key to appreciating the difference between them. Joyce, according to Meisel, is the great inheritor of Pater in contrast to Eliot’s Arnoldian quest for the “ideal” (67). But the embrace of Pater’s critical sensibility is not the only factor which separates Joyce from the “Men of 1914.” The other is Joyce’s embrace of the popular.

In his study of postmodernism, Fredric Jameson defines the relationship of popular culture to modernism in a manner which brings us back to the point about modernism’s obscurity; Jameson points to the development of postmodernism as coming from an

effacement of the older distinction between high and so-called mass culture, a distinction on which modernism depended for its specificity, its Utopian function consisting at least in part in

the securing of a realm of authentic experience over against the surrounding environment of middle- and low-brow commercial culture. (63)

What occurs in Joyce's fiction is the collapse of the "high" and the "low." This is radically different from Pound and Eliot's "use" of popular culture as humorous contrasts to their classicist ideas and idealized forms. Joyce's embrace of popular forms from advertisements to film complicate his work in ways which demonstrate his interest with incorporating the popular into his aesthetics. I will discuss this embrace of the popular throughout this study and in relation to the later chapters of *Ulysses*, but for now it is sufficient to note that in contrast to the ocularcentric reliance on the elite eye of Benda's *sévérité* Joyce used the language and images of popular culture to challenge established forms of vision and their links with ontological investigations of truth. Instead of discriminating between high and low, Joyce embraced their differences and combined Homer with *The Daily Telegraph*, Flaubert with Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, and cubist collages with Bass ale labels.²⁴ As I describe it in chapter six, Joyce also had a direct hand in bringing popular culture to Ireland: he was instrumental in opening the first movie house in Dublin. This bricolage of the popular and the "high" that can be seen throughout Joyce's work goes against the aesthetics of the "Men of 1914" and Jameson's formulation of modernism's self-purgation of mass culture. It is this interest in the popular combined with his critique of vision that Joyce passes on to Beckett and into the postmodern. As I describe it in the second half of this study, Beckett is the inheritor of the Joyce's attack upon ocularcentrism, an attack first waged against the reification of vision propagated by Pound, Lewis, and Eliot. But other writers such as Woolf, Gertrude

Stein, and Djuna Barnes also practiced what I call “anti-ocularcentric modernism.”²⁵ But for now I must close with a quick look at Joyce’s inability to help Yeats see where he was going.

To such a question I can but answer that if sometimes, overwhelmed by miracle as all men must be when in the midst of it, I have taken such periods literally, my reason has soon recovered: and now that the system stands out clearly in my imagination I regard them as stylistic arrangements of experience comparable to the cubes in the drawing of Wyndham Lewis and to the ovoids in the sculpture of Brancusi. They have helped me to hold in a single thought reality and justice.
--W. B. Yeats, *A Vision*

Joyce Looks At Yeats

Yeats wrote the above explanation of how he felt about the final version of *A Vision* in 1928-- the answer to the question about his conception of history-- twelve years after his last winter with Pound. It is an important description because it displays Yeats’s approach to the text he had been working on since 1917-- and the voices who told him that they were visiting “to give you metaphors for poetry” (8). It also depicts Yeats’s thoughts about how his work fit within the realm of modernist form. The incredibly intricate view of history and artistic consciousness he developed over an eleven-year period in *A Vision* is, in the end, taken as “stylistic arrangements of experience comparable to the cubes” of Vorticism or something like Brancusi’s *Bird in Space*. This remark is the closing sentence of a forward to the final version of *A Vision* entitled “A Packet for Ezra Pound.” This forward stands in front of the work that gave order to his

thinking and the ability “to hold in a single thought reality and justice.” And Yeats begins the forward by dissociating himself from the man he spent three winters with in Stone Cottage: “Ezra Pound, whose art is the opposite of mine, whose criticism commends what I most condemn, a man with whom I should quarrel more than anyone else if we were not united by affection, has for years lived in rooms opening on to a flat roof by the sea” (3-4). As a disclaimer of similarity, this is a very telling description of Yeats’s late phase and his overt resumption of Romantic principles. What is also significant is that in a footnote Yeats explicitly aligns himself with Lewis’s attack upon Pound in a book published one year before the final version of *A Vision*:

Mr. Wyndham Lewis, whose criticism sounds true to a man of my generation, attacks his art in *Time and Western Man*. If we reject, he argues, the forms and categories of the intellect there is nothing left but sensation, “eternal flux.” Yet all such rejections stop at the conscious mind, for as Dean Swift says in a meditation on a woman who paints a dying face,

Matter as wise logicians say
Cannot without a form subsist;
And form, say I as well as they,
Must fail, if matter brings no grist. (4)

It is the concentration on stable form versus “fuzzy” inner processes that Yeats agrees with in Lewis’s critique. But it is not just Pound whom Yeats, following Lewis, sees as deficient in form. Yeats tells us that in the *Cantos* Pound

tried to produce that picture Porteous commended to Nicholas Poussin in *Le chef d’oeuvre inconnu* where everything rounds or thrusts itself without edges, without contours-- conventions of the intellect-- from a splash of tints and shades; to achieve a work as characteristic of the art of our time as the paintings of Cézanne, avowedly suggested by Porteous, as *Ulysses* and its dream association of words and images, a poem in which there is nothing that can be taken out

and reasoned over. nothing that is not a part of the poem
itself. (4)

This description of art “without edges” embodied in the work of Pound, Cézanne, and Joyce is exactly the way Lewis described the “time” obsessed work of Joyce and Pound.²⁶ In *Time and Western Man* Lewis took the opportunity to “publicly repudiate my association with Pound” (40). He did this in part by describing the way Pound’s mind could best be summarized: “[B]y thinking of what would happen if you could mix in exactly equal proportions Bergson-Marinetti-Mr. Heuffer (with a few preraphaelite ‘christian names’ thrown in), Edward Fitzgerald and Buffalo Bill” (37). The mention of Bergson completely threw Pound into the arms of the “Time Cult,” but the inclusion of Marinetti undercut the entire Vorticist project started by Pound and Lewis in partial opposition to Futurism.²⁷

I have pointed to Yeats’s movement away from Pound to demonstrate how he saw himself in relation to Lewis’s aesthetics. However, Yeats’s interest in the “hard edged” and elite vision was compromised by his Romantic heritage and his interest in the critiques of objectivity and perspective achieved by Pater and Nietzsche. This split in Yeats’s aesthetics runs throughout his career and is exemplified in *A Vision*. That the very title of this summation of his thought invokes vision tells us about the split in his ideas about art and life. While upholding ocularcentric ideals like that embodied in *Time and Western Man*, Yeats also pursued Romantic vision until his final poems. His politics were often aligned with those of reactionary thinkers and he famously gave early support to Mussolini.²⁸ But this is in contrast to the effect of his poetry that, in the estimation of Edward Said, had the great aims of “restoring a suppressed history and rejoining the

nation” of Ireland (237). For Said, the beginning point of Yeats’s “decolonization” in his verse was the “awareness of European and Western culture *as* imperialism” (224). As I will describe it in chapter four, this critique of imperialism shows up in *Ulysses* and clearly defines Joyce’s debt to Yeats in regard to understanding the ocularcentric basis of the hegemonic British culture which in many ways kept Dublin an economic and cultural backwater.

A Vision is not only a summation of Yeats’s thought, it is also a summation of his contradictions. This is signaled early when he describes the benefit of the work as enabling him to “hold in a single thought reality and justice.” This is the kind or order, form, “hard edge” Yeats admired in Lewis’s thinking but which his own book belies. As Harold Bloom describes it, *A Vision* has its roots in a Romantic tradition Yeats had described thirty-five years earlier in an introduction to *The Works of William Blake: Poetic, Symbolic and Critical*. Bloom tells us that Yeats found the “seed” for *A Vision* in the following description of Blake’s “dialectic of contraries” from the introduction:

The mind or imagination or consciousness of man may be said to have two poles, the personal and the impersonal, or, as Blake preferred to call them, the limit of contraction and the unlimited expansion. When we act from the personal we tend to bind our consciousness down as to a fiery centre. When, on the other hand, we allow our imaginations to expand away from this egotistic mood, we become vehicles for the universal thought and merge in the universal mood. (quoted in Bloom, *Yeats* 216)

This description provides Yeats with his conception of the two forces behind *A Vision*, the antithetical and the primary. It also brings us back to the concept of intellectual vision Yeats and Pound practiced in Stone Cottage.

Intellectual vision was the poetic technique Yeats employed with a renewed vengeance in his late work and this is nowhere better demonstrated than in the volume that came out the same year as the final version of *A Vision*. The title poem of *The Tower* explicitly uses the method of intellectual vision to conjure up images from the past-- and from Yeats's poetry-- to, as Bloom succinctly puts it, ask two questions: "[D]o all humans rage against growing old? and more complexly (because addressed more to himself), is it accomplishment or frustration, the woman won or the woman lost, that most engages the supposedly mature yet still fantastical imagination?" (*Yeats* 350). The second stanza of the poem explicitly does this in the way Pound described intellectual vision working to Dorothy Shakespear:

I pace upon the battlements and stare
On the foundations of a house, or where
Tree, like a sooty finger, starts from the earth;
And send imagination forth
Under the day's declining beam, and call
Images and memories
From ruin or from ancient trees,
For I would ask a question of them all. (194-95)

An answer he reaches after viewing the shades of Mrs. French, Helen, and Hanrahan is a Nietzschean insight into history:

Death and life were not
Till man made up the whole,
Made lock, stock and barrel
Out of his bitter soul,
Aye, sun and moon and star, all,
And further add to that
That, being dead, we rise,
Dream and so create
Translunar Paradise. (198)

This is in many ways the end point of Romantic vision. The mind of man is taken here not only as the illuminating lamp that shines out upon the world, but as the light that *creates* the world. Yeats takes back the rainbow from Newton, shakes off the measurements placed thereon, and colors it with his art.

Just as Yeats had claimed Blake for Ireland, he proposed that his Romantic denial of Newton and Locke also proceeded from an Irish source. In response to Locke, Berkeley had replied “We Irish do not hold with this.” This was all Yeats needed to combine Irish nationalism with a Romantic critique of Locke. As Declan Kiberd describes it, this became a matter of perception:

What had outraged Berkeley was Locke’s repudiation of the primary qualities of weight, mass and so on, as properties objectively belonging to things. Locke held that they were mere sensations produced in us by the physical characteristics of things. His assertion that there was “nothing like” the ideas of secondary qualities (colour, taste and so on) “existing in the bodies themselves” dismayed Berkeley, since it seemed to exclude any room for poetry. Berkeley believed that things exist only in so far as we perceive them. Yeats went further to assert that each man or woman creates a purely personal world, as against Locke who claimed that, under standard conditions, each person would see “the same thing.” (322)

And in the same volume as “The Tower,” Yeats included a poem reminiscent of Blake’s attack upon Newton’s “Particles of light”:

Locke sank into a swoon;
The Garden died:
God took the spinning-jenny
Out of his side. (214)

Building upon Blake and Berkeley’s critique of Locke, Yeats took Romantic vision into

modern poetry and turned empiricism on its head. But long before Yeats wrote “The Tower” or even before he took Berkeley seriously, an unknown writer asked him his age. After Yeats told him that he was thirty-six, the twenty-one year old Joyce replied: “I have thought as much. I have met you too late. You are too old” (*JJ* 103).

Joyce met Yeats in 1902. Yeats had recently published *The Shadowy Waters* and was writing plays in Irish dialect for the Irish Literary Theatre. Joyce had only published one article on Ibsen in the *Fortnightly Review* and had self-published an attack on the Irish Literary Theatre. The latter article was called “The Day of the Rabblement” and it castigated the theater group for giving in to “the popular will” (*CW* 70). What Joyce saw as the capitulation to “commercialism and vulgarity” (*CW* 70) was the Irish Literary Theatre’s intent to perform a play in Irish by Douglas Hyde and a play based on Irish legend by Yeats and Moore. Joyce saw this as a turning away from the culture of Europe, a turning toward a parochialism that would only lead to a further deadening of Irish culture. In the essay, the young unknown writer took the established poet to task for his involvement in the Theatre’s program:

It is equally unsafe at present to say of Mr. Yeats that he has or has not genius. In aim and form *The Wind among the Reeds* is poetry of the highest order, and *The Adoration of the Magi* (a story which one of the great Russians might have written) shows what Mr. Yeats can do when he breaks with the half-gods. But an aesthete has a floating will, and Mr. Yeats’s treacherous instinct of adaptability must be blamed for his recent association with a platform from which even self-respect should have urged him to refrain. (*CW* 71)

As Ellmann describes it, this was the beginning of Joyce’s struggle with a writer who had

an early and lasting influence on him.²⁹ It was also the beginning of Joyce's struggle with a culture he saw frozen in conventional forms and repressive ideals. In Yeats he perceived the contradictions I described above: his embrace of ocularcentric thought in tension with his advocacy of new thinking about experience and art. At the end of his meeting with Yeats, Joyce left him his poems and the short sketches of experience he called epiphanies. Yeats wrote a letter to him later about his writing and confessed that he could not tell whether Joyce's talent lay most in his prose or verse (*JJ* 104). Yeats would later recommend a poem of Joyce's to Pound because it demonstrated the kind of vision the two poets were interested in during their stay in Stone Cottage. But it was the prose-- the condensed impressions of experience called epiphanies-- that would prove to change modernist vision.

Endnotes

¹ In "William Blake and the Imagination," an essay written four years later, Yeats backs away from this claim, but nonetheless posits that Blake would have benefited from the Irish countryside from which he could have

chosen for his symbols the sacred mountains, along whose sides the peasant still sees enchanted fires, and the divinities which have not faded from belief, if they have faded from the prayers, of simple hearts; and have spoken without mixing incongruous things because he spoke of things long steeped in emotion; and have been less obscure because a traditional mythology stood on the threshold of his meaning and on the margin of his sacred darkness. (114)

Yeats himself, of course, took interest in this "sacred darkness" of Irish folklore and made it a part of his lifelong work. That he describes the work of the Irish folk as belonging to a "sacred darkness" points to his evolving interest in ideas and forms outside of the conventional realm of the clearly defined, of the standard "visible" approach to art.

² For an analysis of the influence of the Pre-Raphaelites on Yeats, see Elizabeth Bergmann Loizeaux, *Yeats and the Visual Arts* (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1986), pp. 6-33. The pioneering analysis of Yeats's interest in Symbolism by Edmund Wilson in *Axel's Castle* (pp. 26-63) remains important for considering the early stage of Yeats's aesthetics.

³ See Foster (pp. 101-107 passim) for descriptions of Yeats involvement with Theosophy and the Golden Dawn.

⁴ I will discuss Longenbach's study at some length below, but another valuable examination of the Stone Cottage years occurs in J. J. Wilhelm, *Ezra Pound in London and Paris: 1908-1925*, pp. 133-174.

⁵ For discussions of the influence of Nietzsche on Yeats see Otto Bohlmann, *Yeats and Nietzsche: An Exploration of Major Nietzschean Echoes in the Writings of William Butler Yeats* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1982) and Frances Nesbitt Oppel, *Mask and Tragedy: Yeats and Nietzsche, 1902-10* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987).

⁶ The man who took credit for introducing Yeats to Nietzsche was John Quinn who sent

him his first copy of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* in 1902 (Foster 272).

⁷ In this regard, Jay quotes the French historian Jean Starobinski on the visual metaphors used to describe the Revolution:

The solar myth of the Revolution delighted in the insubstantiality of darkness: Reason had only to appear, supported by will, and darkness disappeared... the myth was an illusion. France experienced the intensest moments of its Revolution in a symbolism by which the light principle merged into the opacity of the physical world and was lost. Goya, at a greater distance from the source of revolutionary light, was in a better position to describe the grimacing face of what absolutely rejected light. (107)

⁸ Besides introducing Joyce's novel to the world, Pound's advocacy of his work also introduced Joyce to Harriet Shaw Weaver, the general editor of the *Egoist*. Weaver would later become Joyce's benefactor supplying him with money and help throughout his life. But before Weaver began to send Joyce money as an anonymous patron, Yeats and Pound secured for Joyce a pension from the Royal Literary Fund in 1915. For details about Joyce's debt to Pound and Yeats see Longenbach, *Stone Cottage* (pp. 181-184) and for the history of Weaver's involvement with Joyce see Ellmann's *James Joyce* (pp. 353-402, pp. 480-81 passim).

⁹ See Peter Nicholls, *Modernisms: A Literary Guide* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 167-174.

¹⁰ In *The Collected Writings of T. E. Hulme* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) Karen Csengeri has collected Hulme's work in a cogent edition which correctly displays the progression of his thought.

¹¹ See Levenson, pp. 37-47 and pp. 80-102.

¹² See Menand, "Eliot and the Jews" for a description of Eliot's reading and intellectual debt to these thinkers.

¹³ This "union" between the people and music was also derogatorily associated with Bergson's notion of intuition through which the participant "achieves a union" with the "flow of time" (Sherry 12). For a description of Vorticism's specific criticisms of Bergson see Dasenbrock, pp. 49-51.

¹⁴ Eliot was so enamored of the book that he recommended that it be serialized in *The Dial* and later had a translation published by Faber and Faber. See Menand, "Eliot and the Jews," pp. 38-39.

¹⁵ Joseph Frank's influential essay, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," is important here. Frank's argument about the turn toward the spatial in modern literature is fundamental for an understanding of the aesthetics of the high modernists; the will to obscurity-- the intent to create a new form for literature-- is described by Frank as a program to create a new way of reading: "Aesthetic form in modern poetry... is based on a space-logic that demands a complete reorientation in the reader's attitude toward language" (13). However, as Sherry notes, Frank seems completely oblivious to the political implications of such a program:

As Frank himself later conceded, he had not read Lewis's *Time and Western Man* at the time of writing his essay on spatial form. Politically, at least, he knew not whereof he spoke.... While Joyce provides the signal exception to this rule, it is obvious that spatialization of Time, when it occurs, tends to give the lie to Progress-- and to the liberal social philosophies that are its fellow travelers. (215 n9)

What is important about Sherry's invocation of the political ends of spatialization is that Frank takes Joyce as its prime progenitor-- an all too common analysis that ends up lumping Joyce together with Eliot and Pound without a consideration of their politics or aesthetic intent.

¹⁶ See Kern, pp. 38-64 passim.

¹⁷ Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction." Also see Benjamin's work on Baudelaire in the middle of self-modernizing Paris in *Charles Baudelaire: Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: New Left Books, 1973). In *After the Great Divide*, Andreas Huyssen gives a valuable analysis of how modernism fed off the advances in technology which radically changed culture on every level (pp. 3-15 passim).

¹⁸ For discussions of modernism's reaction to the popular see Allon White, *The Uses of Obscurity: The Fiction of Early Modernism*, John Carey, *The Intellectuals and the Masses*, and Terry Eagleton, "Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism."

¹⁹ See Jay, pp. 192-209.

²⁰ The most influential study propagating this vague equation between Pound and company and Joyce is Hugh Kenner's *The Pound Era* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971). It is a testament to this book's brilliance that its lumping together of Joyce with Pound and Eliot is rarely contested.

²¹ Kevin J. H. Dettmar has gone so far as to suggest that we should not think of *Ulysses* as a modernist text; see *The Illicit Joyce of Postmodernism*, pp. 137-173.

²² See Bush, pp. 193-197; Menand, *Discovering Modernism*, pp. 192 n; and Robert Adams Day, "Joyce's Waste Land and Eliot's Unknown God," *Wisconsin Literary Monographs*, ed. Eric Rothstein, 4 (Milwaukee and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971).

²³ Eliot's invocation of the "mythical method" in "*Ulysses*, Order, and Myth" was condoned and appreciated by Joyce but, as I will demonstrate in chapter four, taken by Joyce to very different conclusions.

²⁴ Representative studies of Joyce and popular culture include Jennifer Wicke, *Advertising Fictions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); R. B. Kershner, ed. *Joyce and Popular Culture* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996); and Cheryl Herr, *Joyce's Anatomy of Culture* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

²⁵ This is not to say that these are the only anti-ocularcentric modernists. Other writers who may be taken as challengers to the vision-based paradigms of Western "truth" include William Faulkner, John Dos Passos, Thomas Mann, and Antonin Artaud.

²⁶ Yeats seems to have gotten the idea of combining Joyce's "poem" with Cézanne's paintings directly from *Time and Western Man* where Lewis connects Joyce's craftsmanship with

an absence of meaning, an emptiness of philosophic content, a poverty of new and disturbing observation. The school of *nature-morte* painters in Paris, who made a fetish of Cézanne's apples; and indeed the *deadness* that has crept into all painting... is the phenomenon to which this other conventional deadness must be assimilated. (Lewis's emphasis, 100)

²⁷ For a description of the Vorticist reaction to Futurism see Dasenbrock, pp. 13-27 passim. Unlike Joyce who made a point of replying to Lewis in *Finnegans Wake*, Pound was evidently not upset with Lewis's critique and wrote to Agnes Bedford that he preferred "'dear Wyndham's' assaults to praise from imbecile critics" (Carpenter 462).

²⁸ For two very different takes on Yeats's relationship to fascism see Elizabeth Cullingford, *Yeats, Ireland and Fascism* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1981) and Grattan Freyer, *W. B. Yeats and the Anti-Democratic Tradition* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1981). In *Inventing Ireland*, Declan Kiberd proposes that Yeats constructed *A Vision* in reaction to the growing Marxist movement in Ireland started in part by James Connolly: "[Yeats] saw history as endless repetition: Marxists saw it as a straight line" (320).

²⁹ For Ellmann's description of Joyce's debt to Yeats see *Eminent Domain*, pp. 29-56.

Chapter Three

Seeing *Dubliners* Through Epiphanies: Vision and Joyce's Politics

What is wrong with these English writers is that they always keep beating around the bush.

--Joyce in a letter of 1906 (*SL* 137)

What is wrong with all these Irish writers-- what the blazes are they always snivelling about? Isn't it funny to read Roberts' poems about a mother pressing a baby to her breast? O, blind, snivelling, nose-dropping, calumniated Christ wherefore were these young men begotten?

--Joyce in a letter of 1905 (*SL* 51)

In a letter to Grant Richards, Joyce described the harm his reluctant publisher would cause if he continued to refuse to print *Dubliners*:

It is not my fault that the odour of ashpits and old weeds and offal hangs round my stories. I seriously believe that you will retard the course of civilisation in Ireland by preventing the Irish people from having one good look at themselves in my nicely polished looking-glass. (*SL* 89-90)

This is not the sentiment of a man seeking simply to make money from writing. Joyce spent seven years-- the exact time it took to write *Ulysses*-- fighting with Grant Richards over the publication of his collection of short stories. During this time, the printer for his Dublin publisher destroyed "the unpatriotic" proofs for the book (*JJ* 355).¹ Joyce believed that his stories were important for the people who would read them and he

refused to alter or delete what some called their “scandalous” content. He felt he was writing a “moral history of my country” (SL 83) and in so doing would provide for “the first step towards the spiritual liberation of my country” (SL 90). Joyce’s remark about helping along “civilisation” and his belief that his stories would liberate the spirits of his countrymen were sentiments he held throughout his life for all of his work. From early on in his career, Joyce was adamant about the social importance of his writing and he consistently refused to give in to censorship.² As I will describe it, this began with his experiments in depicting the experiences of his characters-- experiments that radically challenged conventional representation and conceptions of vision.

Joyce’s interest in the social importance of his art and the development of his new approach to representation have a gestation period of roughly ten years: from his writing of the “essay-story” “A Portrait of the Artist” and the beginning of *Stephen Hero* in 1904 to 1914 and the publication of *Dubliners*, the serialization of *A Portrait* in the *Egoist*, and the initial work on *Ulysses*. This was also the period in Joyce’s life when he actively followed radical leftist political movements on the continent. As I will describe it below, the development of Joyce’s early fiction went hand in hand with his interaction and advocacy of socialist and anarchist movements. It was during these ten years that Joyce forged a consciousness that would come to be opposed to the reactionary politics and aesthetics of the other high modernists. And this began with his experiments into challenging the Western reliance on vision to supply identity and “truth.”

Joyce signals the importance of the visual in his stories when he refers to *Dubliners* as a “looking-glass.” I will discuss the “reflective” quality of the stories below, but to indicate the nature of my reading I must skip to the first chapter of *Ulysses* where the metaphor is again used:

Laughing again, he brought the mirror away from Stephen's peering eyes.
 --The rage of Caliban at not seeing his face in a mirror, he said.
 If Wilde were only alive to see you!
 Drawing back and pointing, Stephen said with bitterness:
 --It is the symbol of Irish art. The cracked lookingglass of a servant.
 (*U* 1.141-146)

The “cracked lookingglass” is Stephen's response to Mulligan's invocation of Wilde and a response to traditional mimesis. By bringing up Wilde, Mulligan suggests that Stephen would be his negative reflection, his dark side: Wilde the polished dandy would be appalled by Stephen's “dirty crumpled handkerchief” (*U* 1.71). Stephen furthers this sentiment by noting the “crack” in the mirror. But this “cracking” of the mirror is the link between Joyce and Wilde in the respect that it signals the “crack” *Ulysses* causes in the tradition of Western mimesis. The “cracked lookingglass” also indicates Joyce's role in what Gerhard Joseph has called “a native English tributary” of challenges to “a simple view of representation” (4). This “tributary” is “English” in the sense that it begins with Pater's amendment to Arnold's injunction to “see the object as in itself it really is” (237). Wilde furthers Pater's call for “feeling” the object over seeing it-- for solipsistic perception-- by stating in “The Critic as Artist” that “the primary aim of the critic is to see the object as in itself it really is not” (1030). What Wilde's reversal accomplishes is the foregrounding of Arnold's credo *as a metaphor*. To recognize a formulation as a

metaphor is to rupture its power and to move towards a way of speaking about concepts that opens up discussion and leads, ultimately, to the questioning of foundations. The rupture Pater and Wilde participate in is a break in traditional forms of representation--forms founded within the ocularcentric tradition. I would add to Joseph's genealogy of this "tributary" the fact that it takes a decidedly Irish turn in the work of Wilde, Yeats, Joyce, and Beckett. This is signaled by Joyce in his description of Irish art being "the cracked lookingglass of a servant." This is a description he adapts from Wilde's "The Decay of Lying":

CYRIL: I quite understand your objection to art being treated as a mirror. You think it would reduce genius to the position of a cracked looking-glass. But you don't mean to say that you seriously believe that Life imitates Art, that Life in fact is the mirror, and Art the reality?
VIVIAN: Certainly I do. (982)

Wilde brings up the question of the visual in relation to the way life and art are perceived and connected, and, as with his amendment to Pater's amendment of Arnold, he reverses the power structure. Joyce alludes to Wilde's metaphor to convey his own concern with challenging the classic forms of representation. Joyce began this "crack" with the epiphanies he gave Yeats to read.

From 1900-1903 Joyce wrote the short sketches of experience he called epiphanies. Stephen defines these snapshots of experience in *Stephen Hero*:

By an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments. (SH 211)

Forty of these records of “moments” still exist. Many of them found their way into *Stephen Hero*, *A Portrait*, and *Ulysses*. None of them appear in *Dubliners*.³ The concept of the epiphany has become a staple in Joyce criticism and *Dubliners* is commonly taken as a series of stories all climaxing in an epiphany. In an early influential study, Harry Levin set the stage for this kind of critical assessment.⁴ This interpretive stance towards the stories has proved so entrenched that a Marxist critic like Fredric Jameson dismisses *Dubliners* because it “suggests that epiphany or revelation is conceivable as an event within the secularized world of modern capitalism” (“Magical” 146). However, as I will describe it below, Jameson is really dismissing the traditional reading of the stories, a reading that emphasizes the “liberating” and “transcendent” ending of each story. This reading seems to have been pushed into circulation by the publication of *Stephen Hero* in 1944.

The concept of the epiphany is a central element of Stephen’s aesthetics in *Stephen Hero*. Since its publication critics have adopted the term as a central tool in reading Joyce. Even though Robert Scholes questioned the efficacy of using the term as early as 1964, it has proved to be one of the standard ways of approaching *Dubliners* and of thinking about Joyce’s aesthetics.⁵ The reason for this lies in part with the provocative manner in which Stephen defines the term in *Stephen Hero*. In many ways this early appearance of the term looks akin to the concept of intellectual vision Yeats and Pound got from Blake; Stephen describes the epiphany as an end product to a kind of visionary seeing:

He told Cranly that the clock of the Ballast Office was capable of an epiphany. Cranly questioned the inscrutable dial of the Ballast Office with his no less inscrutable

contenance:

--Yes, said Stephen. I will pass it time after time,
allude to it, refer to it, catch a glimpse of it. It is only
an item in the catalogue of Dublin's street furniture. Then
all at once I see it and I know at once what it is: epiphany.
(*SH* 211)

To Cranly's puzzled response, Stephen describes the kind of seeing leading to the revelation of the epiphany: "Imagine my glimpses at that clock as the gropings of a spiritual eye which seeks to adjust its vision to an exact focus. The moment that focus is reached the object is epiphanised" (*SH* 211). Like intellectual vision, the process leading to the object being "epiphanized" is predicated on a special kind of seeing, or the correct functioning of a "spiritual eye." This definition has provided the basis for the critical assessments of the stories as condensed metaphorical dramas which end in a visual burst of meaning. As I will describe it, the epiphanies have an important relationship with the stories but not in the way traditionally described. What is important to keep in mind here is that Joyce never used the term epiphany in any discussion of the stories that make up *Dubliners*. In fact, the only mention of the epiphany as literary form in any of his works published during his lifetime occurs in *Ulysses* in a mocking context:

Remember your epiphanies written on green oval leaves,
deeply deep, copies to be sent if you died to all the great
libraries of the world, including Alexandria? Someone was
to read them there after a few thousand years, a mahamanvantara.
Pico della Mirandola like. (*U* 3.141-44)

Beside the ironic description of them as "deeply deep," Stephen's comparison between himself and the notorious pretensions of Pico gives the epiphanies the feel of youthful folly. As with his invocation of the "cracked looking-glass of a servant," this comment in *Ulysses* highlights the attack on traditional representation that the novel itself undertakes.

It is almost as if Joyce predicted that in the future the epiphany would be held as the critical key to his work. And yet Joyce left a red herring in *Dubliners* that has been taken as a confirmation of the importance of the epiphany for reading the stories: the dinner party in “The Dead” takes place on the Feast of the Epiphany. But it is in the visual themes and problems brought up by the stories themselves that most radically critiques the idea of the epiphany and provides the first published instance of Joyce’s concern with experience and its links with vision.

Joyce never referred to the concept of the epiphany when speaking of *Dubliners*, but he did use another term taken from the church to describe the stories. This term is “epiclesis” and it is the invocation of the Holy Ghost to transform the communion wafer into the body and blood of Christ. During Joyce’s lifetime, the concept of epiclesis had disappeared from the Roman Catholic Church although it still existed in the Eastern Orthodox Church. As Kevin J. H. Dettmar describes it, the concept of epiclesis is crucial for understanding *Dubliners*:

The difference between the Greek and Latin Church on this point is not without consequence. In the Eastern view, the efficacy of the sacrament depends upon God’s response to the prayer of his priest; but in the Roman Catholic service, the elements are transformed as a direct result of the priest’s reciting the words of institution-- and the aspect of divine intervention is easily forgotten. (82)

Dettmar extends this analysis into a reevaluation of the stories as “militantly anti-epiphanic” (83), as structured around the unpredictable and “mysterious” force of epiclesis. For Dettmar, there are no revelations in *Dubliners* for the character or the

readers; there are only mysteries. I will discuss Dettmar and other deconstructive views of the stories below, but a look at the letter in which Joyce mentions his use of the metaphor of epiclesis will provide a context for my reading of *Dubliners* as visual puzzles: "I am writing a series of epicleti-- ten-- for a paper. I have written one. I call the series *Dubliners* to betray the soul of that hemiplegia or paralysis which many consider a city" (SL 22). The stories are "epicleti"-- invocations of transfiguration-- to somehow depict the paralyzed soul of his home city. The paper Joyce was writing for was *The Irish Homestead* whose literary editor, George Russell, had asked Joyce for "anything simple, rural?, livemaking?, pathos?, which could be inserted so as not to shock the readers" (quoted in Dettmar 51). The story Joyce first published in the paper between ads for mineral water and "Dairy Machinery and Appliances of Every Description" was "The Sisters."⁶ The story appeared under the pen name of "Stephen Daedalus." This early version of the story was anything but "simple" and Dettmar calls the story's inclusion in the paper as "roughly analogous to installments of *Naked Lunch* appearing weekly in the pages of the *Saturday Evening Post*" (55). Two more stories appeared in the *Homestead*-- "Eveline" and "After the Race"-- but the publisher put a stop to Joyce's contributions because of the many complaints from readers.⁷

In his biography of Joyce, Ellmann stressed the transformative quality of Joyce's fiction, his use of the metaphor of epiclesis to depict the "reality" of life in Dublin. To this end he quoted a famous letter Joyce wrote to his brother on the early fiction:

Don't you think there is a certain resemblance between the mystery of the Mass and what I am trying to do? I mean that I am trying... to give people some kind of intellectual pleasure or spiritual enjoyment by converting the bread of everyday life into something that has a permanent artistic life of its own... for

their mental, moral, and spiritual uplift. (*JJ* 163)

As with his invocation of the “looking-glass” in his letter to Grant Richards, the metaphor of “the mystery of the Mass” is used to convey the sense that his work has social import. And again there is no mention of a “sudden spiritual manifestation” inherent in the work--no powerful epiphany to move the characters or readers beyond their everyday perspective. What I want to suggest here is that the stories collected in *Dubliners* are constructions of visual puzzles Joyce sets up for the reader for political ends. This is a reading in contrast to the accepted critical approaches to the stories. This is a reading in contrast to that great mis-reader of Joyce, Wyndham Lewis, who described *Dubliners* as belonging to a “small, neat naturalism” (*Time* 98). During the ten years Joyce was writing and trying to get the stories published, he was also experimenting with depicting consciousness in a different way in *Stephen Hero* and, later, *A Portrait*. This is at the center of the stories and it is one of the reasons they have been consistently misread. This misreading leads to a consideration of vision and consciousness in the stories and a brief survey of responses to the work via epiphany-inspired criticism proves useful.⁸

In a recent addition to the “Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism” series--a series specifically created to teach literature in the light of different critical approaches--Daniel R. Schwarz introduces the volume on “The Dead” in a typically epiphany-inspired manner:

Important to *Dubliners* and “The Dead” in particular is Joyce’s concept of epiphany.... In the Greek drama, it refers to the moment when a god appears and imposes order on a chaotic or turbulent situation. While some critics have emphasized only the character’s moment of awareness within the text, Joyce expected the reader to have her or his own revelatory moment of awareness that went beyond the character’s and

to see the plight of the central character from a larger and often ironic perspective.

In many stories... the reader's epiphany is different from the character's epiphany; indeed, the reader's epiphany is an *awareness* of the limitations of the character's epiphany. Thus we understand that the retrospective narrator of "Araby" is reverting to the very Catholic epistemology that inscribed his conscience with guilt and anxiety... and we understand that in "Eveline" Eveline's epiphany is a catatonic moment and really no epiphany at all (Schwarz's emphasis, 65-66).

We need a god from Greek drama or an epiphany to sort this out. To be fair to Schwarz, this kind of ambiguous application of the metaphor has plagued Joyce criticism since the term first came up. And could we not apply this same kind of "revelatory moment of awareness" to the entire genre of the short story and point to its ultimate manifestation in James's "The Beast in the Jungle?" But the stories in *Dubliners* seem to resist an exclusive epiphany-inspired reading and provoke a statement like Schwarz's that "no epiphany at all" is in itself an epiphany.⁹ I will discuss "Eveline" specifically below, but for now it should be noted that part of the problem is that of the fifteen stories making up the collection, only five-- "An Encounter," "Araby," "A Little Cloud," "A Painful Case," and "The Dead"-- are commonly perceived to end with one or more epiphany. In one of the basic texts on Joyce's working materials, *The Workshop of Daedalus*, Robert Scholes and Richard Kain cautioned readers about applying the epiphanies to Joyce's work:

If criticism finds the term useful in this sense, critics will no doubt continue to employ it; but they should do so in full awareness that they are using the term quite differently from the way Joyce himself used it. For him it had reference to life only, not to art. An Epiphany was life observed, caught in a kind of camera eye which reproduced a significant moment without comment. An Epiphany could not be constructed, only recorded. (4)

And Morris Beja, a critic who consistently points to the importance of the epiphanic moment in the stories and who has written one of the classic studies of the epiphany in modern literature,¹⁰ has warned that the term has been overused and that “a tendency upon the part of some critics to find epiphanies everywhere (to such an extent that one wonders what in Joyce is *not* an epiphany), have led a few critics to doubt the whole validity of the literary term itself and its value in Joyce studies” (5). It is to one of these critiques of the metaphor of the epiphany in *Dubliners* that I now turn.

In a discussion of the unanswerable riddles set up by Joyce’s texts, Hélène Cixous takes “The Sisters” as the beginning of his “slipping, turning, and always decentered” approach to representation and meaning (“Joyce” 18). Instead of taking the stories in *Dubliners* as realist dramas ending with a burst of understanding for the characters and/or the reader, Cixous takes Joyce’s early writing as a “subversive force” which puts “a question mark over the subject and the style of the subject” (“Joyce” 15). For Cixous, there is no transcendent epiphany leading to a new understanding of social situation or personal prison in any of the stories. There is no transcendent moment but there is an extremely powerful writing which places the very notion of “*a unified subject*” into contestation (“Joyce” 16). And this contestation is signaled in Joyce by a play with vision. This play begins with the first image of the first story and, according to Cixous, it sets the stage for an investigation of the subject’s reliance on sight for identity and for its fear of “the opaque, the colourless, the nighttime place of mutations” (“Joyce” 25). The gaze of the narrator at the beginning of “The Sisters” is the first manifestation of the concern with vision that runs throughout the stories:

There was no hope for him this time: it was the third stroke.

Night after night I had passed the house (it was vacation time) and studied the lighted square of window: and night after night I found it lighted in the same way, faintly and evenly. If he was dead, I thought, I would see the reflection of candles on the darkened blind for I knew that two candles must be set at the head of a corpse. He had often said to me: *I am not long for this world*, and I had thought his words idle. Now I knew they were true. Every night as I gazed up at the window I said softly to myself the word *paralysis*. (D 9)

For Cixous, this passage indicates a movement in Joyce's writing toward the irrationality and instability of a narrative blindness, a blindness which ultimately affects meaning:

'*Square of Window*': the lighted square speaks of the mirror; the hidden candles; the desirable (annihilation) barred. I would see the candles, says the insistent gaze: the opposition between that eye, which wishes (less) to see than to know, and '*blind*' (window blind, 'jalouise', *sightlessness*) light but also blindness; and immediate symbolic relationship with the life which is fading, the death which is coming; beyond that, with the forbidden, the gaze on death; and beyond again, with the area where blinding and castration come into play. ("Joyce" 26)

It is this movement toward blindness that Cixous takes as behind the narrator's fascination with the word "paralysis." It is the fascination behind the text's loss of meaning and its movement from "word to being, from voice to sin, the disguise of the forbidden... are multiplied, stirring up the desire to *see*" (Cixous' emphasis, "Joyce" 28). It is this desire to *see* that tugs at the characters throughout the stories; it is this emphasis on seeing that makes the stories in *Dubliners* visual problems: How are we to read the vision of the characters in the stories? Cixous takes it as questioning the validity of the concept of the unified subject. This is in direct opposition to traditional reading of the stories which stress the unification of the subject through the "seeing" of epiphanies. But before getting into other deconstructive readings of the stories and how I see them

approaching the question of Joyce's response to ocularcentrism, we must take a look at how seeing is traditionally depicted in the stories.

In one of the classic New Critical readings of "The Dead," Florence L. Walzl points to the sight imagery that appears throughout the stories:

[T]he tales, examined in succession, show a steady decline in the perceptivity of the characters as to the reality of their situations. The youths are painfully aware of their disappointments; the more mature suffer but lack insight; characters in the final stories seem totally insensitive. As a result the epiphanies of these final stories are usually manifestations for the reader rather than the character. In addition, throughout *Dubliners* Joyce uses frequent eye imagery, a practice consistent with his view of the epiphany as enlightenment. At the climatic moment of revelation, lack of insight on the part of the character may be indicated by eyes that are dim, blinded, or unseeing (e.g. "Eveline," "After the Race," or "Clay"). By contrast a sudden view, a flash of light or color, may bring enlightenment (e.g. "A Painful Case"). ("Gabriel" 427-28)

The important part of this description is the equation between "clear" vision and enlightenment-- and the implication that Joyce constructed the stories around the "epiphany as enlightenment." Beja takes the enlightenment provided by the epiphanies as the means of escape for the socially and politically trapped Dubliners:

Gabriel, we are told, has "restless eyes" (*D* 178); again and again, the role of epiphany-- and illumination, vision-- and the theme of escape are connected within this volume through imagery of eyes and sight. It is striking how many of the stories are climaxed by an ending which refers significantly to eyes or the act of seeing. (8)

These critical assessments of the role of vision in the stories seeks to contain what Rosalind Krauss has called "the modernist fetishization of the visible" (147) and concludes that Joyce's "use" of sight must be indicative of his search for "truth" in his fiction and in his reader. This, to my mind, is roughly equivalent to saying that Buñuel's

slicing of the woman's eyeball at the beginning of *Un chien andalou* is an affirmation of Rationalism. Describing the stories in *Dubliners* as vehicles for revelatory "truth" because of Joyce's reliance on the "enlightenment" of the epiphany and his employment of vision as a trope is an ocularcentric approach to understanding his work. This approach implicitly acknowledges that "clear" vision conveys reality, describes consciousness, and equals "truth." This is the kind of reading of the stories that Jameson has swallowed hook, line, and sinker.¹¹ However, the critical disagreement over the epiphanies and their relevance to the stories and the larger debate about the "meaning" behind *Dubliners* belies the accepted view of Joyce's use of vision as a trope throughout his work.

The reason critics disagree to such an extent over the role of the epiphany and the function of visual imagery is that Joyce intended his work to raise questions about the relationship between sight and "truth" and sight and consciousness. The stories are puzzles without solutions, or without the kind of ocularcentric solutions we are used to looking for in art and life. *Dubliners* foregrounds vision in order to question its power over the lives of the people who inhabit the stories and, by extension, by those who read them. Vision is not the key to freedom for the characters in the stories; no vision-- no epiphany-- reveals to them a "truth" or an avenue of escape from the paralyzed city. On the contrary, vision as the holder of "truth" and the keeper of reality is the force behind their imprisonment and the paralyzation of the city. This is the kind of questioning Cixous meant when she described the stories as putting "a question mark over the subject and the style of the subject" ("Joyce" 15). Ocularcentrism is the force behind the Church

and State-- "I am the servant of two masters, Stephen said, an English and an Italian" (*U* 1.638)-- and it controls the lives and thoughts of the subjects in the stories. Joyce called the collection of his stories a "looking-glass" because he meant it to reflect the visual prison holding the citizens of Dublin in its power. However, if Joyce portrays the world of *Dubliners* as a prison he also provides a way out-- a way not tied into the visual "enlightenment" of an epiphany. The way out is embodied in the deep suspicion Joyce holds for the easy equation between vision and truth and it is manifested in his experiments with depicting the consciousness of his characters. It is this investigation of consciousness which leads to an understanding of human thought and action beyond the visual, beyond the traditional equation of "clear" vision and "truth." It is in his experiments in depicting consciousness as opposed to visual "meaning" that Joyce created his most effective critique of ocularcentrism. And Stephen tells us this in "Circe" after tapping his brow: "But in here it is I must kill the priest and the king" (*U* 15.4436-37).

As I have mentioned, Dettmar takes the stories as anti-epiphanic. In his reading, the stories as structured around the mysterious force of epiclesis. Under this analysis, Dettmar breaks with classic periodization and calls *Dubliners* a collection of postmodern detective stories which put the concept of meaning under the magnifying glass.¹² He calls the traditionally accepted epiphanies in the stories-- the endings of "Araby," "A Painful Case," "The Dead"-- "epiphonies," false epiphanies which resist narrative closure and frustrate the search for "meaning." In the light of all the critical debate over what constitutes an epiphany, Dettmar takes the discussion to its seemingly logical conclusion:

If the reader cannot readily discern an epiphany he or she is supposed to experience in contrast/sympathy to the experience of the characters in the stories, then how are we to know what is an epiphany and what is not? It is this question which Dettmar sees as basic to understanding the text and which provides for its overall resistance to a reading based on “seeing” epiphanies: “*Dubliners*, beginning with ‘The Sisters,’ whispers: Give up the flattering project of interpretation; give in to the mystery which is life” (104).

Although his reading of Joyce’s use of epiclerisis is provocative, it is one of his off-hand remarks that leads Dettmar towards what I believe is the force breaking up any epiphany-inspired reading of the stories:

Compared to the peculiar endings of the first three stories, the closing section of “A Little Cloud”-- set off by Joyce from the body of the story with a row of dots-- sounds rather flat. Although this too is a tale of a would-be artist... it is told not by T. Malone Chandler, but rather subtly ventriloquized by him through free indirect discourse. In all the later stories the narrative situation is similarly complicated by Joyce’s use of free indirect discourse-- Flaubert’s *style indirect libre*, in which “the narrator takes on the speech of the character, or, if one prefers, the character speaks through the voice of the narrator, and the two instances are then *merged*.” (94)

The work Dettmar quotes from here is Gérard Genette’s *Narrative Discourse*, a book I will be discussing in the next chapter. But for now it is sufficient to point out that “*merged*” is emphasized in the original to convey the complete convergence of the two narrative voices, of the combination of mimesis and diegesis. As Dettmar points out, this is seen in “A Little Cloud” when Chandler considers his life: “He tried to weigh his soul to see if it was a poet’s soul” (*D* 73). But this is all Dettmar makes of the narrative “complication” of free indirect discourse in the stories. As I will describe it below, it was

Joyce's experiments with free indirect discourse that led to his use of interior monologue and the challenges to visual "truth" embodied in *Ulysses*. But before *Ulysses* Joyce was investigating the primacy of the visual in ways that were not as overt as the interior monologue. Joyce's early work challenged the hegemony of vision by questioning its validity and embracing Wilde's comment that the true mystery of the world is the visible. In this regard, we must take into account another critic who takes *Dubliners* as a mystery.

In an impressive Lacanian reading of *Dubliners*, Garry M. Leonard describes Lacan's admiration for Joyce's ability to question the concept of the subject:

Lacan was fascinated by Joyce precisely because in his fiction the letter so revealingly collapses into litter and leaves the subject (the reader) with the uncertain sense that to be conscious is to be a signifier in relation to other signifiers, ad infinitum, with no genuine signifieds that are not self-generated myths. More specifically, Lacan was intrigued by the way Joyce presented his characters as inhabited by a symptom which answers to an absent Other. (3)

From this analysis of Joyce's challenge to the "identity" of the subject, Leonard believes "that the famous Joycean epiphany achieves *claritas* only by highlighting the fictional construction of the past and, thus, reveals at the same time a disconcerting glimpse of the as yet unconstructed mythology of the future" (3). The epiphany for Leonard is not a transcendent moment of enlightenment-- it is only a "glimpse" into the myth of subjectivity. The conclusions that Leonard reaches about the stories in the light of this analysis is important for understanding the critique of ocularcentrism embodied in the work of Lacan and Joyce.¹³ Leonard tells us that

at the core of my argument is an antiessentialism, influenced by Lacanian theory, that sees reality, gender, personality, and so on, as the reality effects of a subject seeking to deny a lack-in-being that exists alongside of and, thus, undermines the

mythic ideology of unified consciousness. From the first story in *Dubliners*, Joyce's prose attacks this ideology of the "self," thus undermining at the same time the commonplace assumption that consciousness equals "truth." (4)

It is this search for "truth" that is at the bottom of the classic epiphany-inspired readings of the text: "One can only mis-read *Dubliners* as an affirmation of the essential Truth about subjectivity if one imposes a metanarrative on the stories that fills in the unsettling gaps and voids in the body of the text" (4).

As Jay tells us in his study of French anti-ocularcentric thought, Lacan plays an important role in the French turn against the visual. Beginning with his theory of the mirror stage, Lacan's analysis of subjectivity specifically brought up vision. Combining the thoughts of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the gaze with the anti-visual aspects of Freud, Lacan posited a radical critique of "specular identity" (Jay 346).¹⁴ This critique is behind Leonard's reading and it informs his take on the "epiphany" commonly taken to end "Eveline":

What is curious about Eveline's experience at the North Wall is that she is led to a moment of decision and realization like the narrators of "An Encounter" and "Araby." But whereas those masculine epiphanies featured a state of hyper self-reflection on the part of the narrator, the effect of such a moment on Eveline becomes the black "hole" that Frank stares into as his ship pulls away from the dock. The stupendous moment shows a terrified woman mumbling incoherent prayers to the Name-of-the-Father as she is drawn into the fascinating and sickening whirlpool of an experience beyond representation-- a mystical experience of jouissance that Lacan likened to orgasm. (106)

The "black 'hole'" is important here because it is the exact opposite of the revelation--

the enlightenment-- that is supposed to come from a Joycean epiphany. Although Leonard still subscribes to the epiphany as a form of "hyper self-reflection," the fact that he points to "An Encounter" and "Araby" as stories containing these moments is telling. These two stories are told in first person narration; the "black 'hole'" of "Eveline" is the first story in *Dubliners* to use third person narration and free indirect discourse. It also gives us a clue to how we should see the early epiphanies in relation to the stories.

Why all this fuss and bother about the mystery
of the unconscious?... What about the mystery
of the conscious?

--Joyce in conversation (Budgen 356)

"Eveline" first appeared in the *Irish Homestead* on September 10, 1904. This story of a young woman's "paralysis" when faced with a chance to escape a deadening environment may be taken as an autobiographical commentary on Joyce and Nora Barnacle's "escape" from Dublin.¹⁵ It is also, in the incisive description of Hugh Kenner, a "tricky" story (*Joyce's* 80). As with "The Sisters," Joyce extensively revised the *Irish Homestead* version of the story for publication within the collection called *Dubliners*. As Scholes and Litz describe it, the revision was mainly concerned with replacing "words or phrases not quite appropriate for her [Eveline] with more suitable material" (238). This is all well and good, but Eveline does not narrate the story: "Eveline" is a short story-- the first in *Dubliners*-- told by a third-person narrator. We are faced with a narration which employs an intense version of free indirect discourse: it is a narration that seems to take its very diction, syntax, and vocabulary from the subject it seeks to describe/narrate.¹⁶

To demonstrate the peculiar nature of the narration in the story, Scholes and Litz quote two different versions of the same passage from the two versions of the story; the first is from the story that appeared in the *Irish Homestead* and the second from the book version:

Even now-- at her age, she was over nineteen-- she sometimes felt herself in danger of her father's violence. Latterly he had begun to threaten her, saying what he would do if it were not for her dead mother's sake.

Even now, though she was over nineteen, she sometimes felt herself in danger of her father's violence. She knew it was that that had given her the palpitations. When they were growing up he had never gone for her, like he used to go for Harry and Ernest, because she was a girl; but latterly he had begun to threaten her and say what he would do to her only for her dead mother's sake. (239)

In these revisions Joyce seems to be taking Henry James at his word and moves from *telling* to *showing*; as Percy Lubbock puts it in his classic study of James's method, *The Craft of Fiction*: "The art of fiction does not begin until the novelist thinks of his story as a matter to be *shown*, to be so exhibited that it will tell itself" (62). This showing implies the "personal" input of the character in the narrative, an effect Barthes describes as the other side of the impersonal "sign system" of classic narrative.¹⁷ In an effort to depict how Joyce "tells" his story through the personal world of Eveline, Scholes and Litz point to the change in the final clause as enabling the reader to "catch the living rhythm of the father's speech" (239). Here we have a doubling of speech: Eveline narrating her father's words through the third-person narration. But other instances of this-- what Bakhtin calls "double-voiced" discourse, or "dialogism"-- occurs in the revised passage.

“She knew it was that that had given her the palpitations.” Not only is the syntax indicative of Eveline’s way of speaking, but “palpitations” is obviously one of the “medical” words she has picked up in her reading or conversation. And the phrase “gone for her” as idiom for “beat up” or “discipline” is another instance of her consciousness seeping into the “objective” narration.

In fact, the entire story is filled with this kind of seepage of Eveline’s thoughts, idioms, and syntax. As Scholes and Litz describe it, this early transformation of free indirect discourse lay behind the experiments of Joyce’s later work:

Though the account is narrated rather than dramatized and the discourse indirect rather than direct, the narrative takes its color from the idiom of the characters rather than from any narrative personality. Through countless little changes of this kind, Joyce carefully eliminated his own personality from *Dubliners*, as he developed a system whereby the events and characters presented in the narrative rather than any assumed narrative persona determine the diction and syntax of the narrative prose. (239-240)

With this method, Joyce succeeds in following Flaubert into erasing the author from his work, or, as Stephen puts it in *A Portrait*: “The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails” (*P* 215). But the important thing to consider here is that this first manifestation of Joyce’s experiments with narrative voice develops a very different and intensified variant of free indirect discourse. Hugh Kenner has gone as far as to say that this “is apparently something new in fiction, the normally neutral narrative vocabulary pervaded by a little cloud of idioms which a character might use if

he were managing the narrative” (*Joyce’s* 17). Kenner takes this radical approach to traditional authorial “objectivity” as an important aspect of Joyce’s early writing that later reaches its fruition in *Ulysses*. But this kind of experimentation is not confined to the small, “tricky” world of “Eveline.” According to Kenner, it is behind the reason the “quiet little stories in *Dubliners* continue to fascinate;” they continue to fascinate because they question the equation between “truth” and consciousness: “The grammar of twelve of the stories is that of third-person narrative, imparting a deceptive look of impersonal truth. The diction frequently tells a different tale” (*Joyce’s* 16). To name this process of questing “truth” through the play with narrative objectivity, Kenner turns to Wyndham Lewis’s reading of *A Portrait*.

In *Time and Western Man*, Lewis describes *A Portrait* as “not technically swept and tidied to the extent that is *Ulysses*” (106). He points to evidence of this in the opening of chapter two after Simon Dedalus suggests that Uncle Charles smoke his “villainous awful tobacco” in the outhouse: “Every morning, therefore, uncle Charles repaired to his outhouse but not before he had creased and brushed scrupulously his back hair and brushed and put on his tall hat” (*D* 60). To Lewis, this description represents a slip in Joyce’s customary artistic vigilance: “People *repair* to places in works of fiction of the humblest order or in newspaper articles; and *brushed scrupulously*, though harmless certainly, is a conjunction that the fastidious eye would reject” (*Time* 107). But, as Kenner points out, the “normal Joycean vigilance has not faltered here” and Joyce has used words that Uncle Charles himself would have used if he were in charge

of the narrative. Thus Kenner calls this intensified use of free indirect discourse “The Uncle Charles Principle” and it

entails writing about someone much as that someone would choose to be written about. So it requires a knowledge of the character at which no one could arrive by “observation,” and yet its application to the character seems as external as costume. since it does not entail recording spoken words. (21)

It is in Joyce’s “harmless” invocation of Uncle Charles’s consciousness to describe his morning ritual-- scrupulous brushing included-- that we get the beginning of Joyce’s investigation of the equation between consciousness and truth that lies behind the “mystery” of *Dubliners*.

If Lewis was mistaken about Joyce’s use of “The Uncle Charles Principle,” then Ezra Pound may be said to have come closer to understanding it. In a review of *Dubliners* published in the *Egoist* in 1914, Pound pays Joyce a distinctly Poundian compliment: “I can lay down a good piece of French writing and pick up a piece of writing by Mr Joyce without feeling as if my head were being stuffed through a cushion” (“*Dubliners*” 27). By comparing him favorably with “good... French writing” Pound implicitly puts Joyce in the company of writers Pound felt were controlled and “precise.” This last quality was always important to Pound and he sees this in the stories: “He deals with subjective things, but he presents them with such clarity of outline that he might be dealing with locomotives or with builders’ specifications” (“*Dubliners*” 27). This precision, this “clarity of outline” is what Pound sees as the strength behind the work and the reason for its importance:

He is a realist. He does not believe “life” would be all right if we stopped vivisection or if we instituted a new sort of “economics.” He gives the thing as it is. He is not

bound by the tiresome convention that any part of life, to be interesting, must be shaped into the conventional form of a “story.” (“*Dubliners*” 28)

For Pound, the importance here lies in the work’s attempt to depict “life” outside of any worn literary convention. This reading of the stories is important because it is not predicated upon the customary acknowledgment of the power of the epiphany to transform the lives and perspectives of the characters. Pound’s reading is a reading done before the passage on the revelatory nature of the epiphany was unearthed in the surviving section of *Stephen Hero*. Pound’s reading is also a reading stressing the import of Joyce’s experiments with depicting the consciousness of his characters.

With Pound’s comments on “life” as a critical background, *Dubliners* should be taken in the light of Joyce’s experiments with depicting consciousness beginning with the essay-story “A Portrait of the Artist” (“Yet the past assuredly implies a fluid succession of presents”) and the initial work on *Stephen Hero* in 1904. Within three years Joyce completed all the stories in the collection including the last, “The Dead,” and was well underway with the first section of *A Portrait*. This means that the radical portrayal of the consciousness of a character named Stephen Dedalus had been developed from its early version (*Stephen Hero*) to its finished approach during the period of the composition of the stories. There is a direct correlation between the writing of both these projects: both books concentrated on the inner “life” of their respective characters, and, as I will describe it below, they both used tropes and metaphors of vision to question the relationship between sight and “truth.” The close connection between *Dubliners* and *A Portrait* is given to us on the final page of the latter novel:

Dublin 1904

Trieste 1914 (*P* 253)

Within these ten years lies Joyce's attempt to create a fiction that would hold up a mirror to his countrymen. But this mirror is a "cracked looking-glass" and representation itself is challenged. Combining the portraits of Pater with the philosophical attack of Bergson, Joyce constructed stories that attack the conventional notions of consciousness and meaning. And 1914 is also a date to remember-- in this year Joyce began work on *Ulysses*. But before Stephen was pulled back into the nets of the fathers, Eveline tried to escape them. The following reading of "Eveline" will lead this discussion into a reconsideration of the epiphany and vision in relation to the stories. It will also lead into a discussion of the politics behind Joyce's challenge to vision throughout his work.

Perhaps she would never see again those familiar
objects from which she had never dreamed of being
divided.

--"Eveline" (*D* 37)

In contrast to the narrator's frustrated gaze into the priest's window at the beginning of "The Sisters," Eveline begins her story by staring out the window: "She sat at the window watching the evening invade the avenue. Her head was leaned against the window curtains and in her nostrils was the odour of dusty cretonne" (*D* 36). This opening immediately signals Joyce's depiction of Eveline's consciousness in the narrative voice itself: she watches "the evening invade the avenue." This is one of the romantic clichés that litter the text, but it is also immediately contrasted by the description of the "dusty cretonne" in her "nostrils." As with the ending of "The Dead," Eveline's gaze out the window triggers a reverie: "Everything changes. Now she was going to go away like

all the others. to leave her home" (*D* 37). This last clause is important for her and it is repeated in the next paragraph: "She had consented to go away, to leave her home" (*D* 37). She then turns her eyes on the room behind her:

Home! She looked round the room, reviewing all its familiar objects which she had dusted once a week for so many years, wondering where on earth all the dust came from. Perhaps she would never see again those familiar objects from which she had never dreamed of being divided. (*D* 37)

"The Uncle Charles Principle" is in full force here: from the exclamation "Home!" to the melancholy notion of never seeing familiar objects, this passage is soaked in Eveline's consciousness. It also performs a neat trick by turning the opening "impersonal" comment about "dusty cretonne" in her "nostrils" into a personal mediation on something as insignificant as dust: "wondering where on earth all the dust came from." This is the thought of no one else but a duster. The irony here is that, of course, Eveline will never be separated from the dust and familiar objects. It is the process of seeing-- seeing her life, seeing dust-- on which the story is constructed and from which it ultimately gets its questioning of meaning.

The first section of "Eveline" is made up of Eveline at her window thinking of her life and her decision to leave with Frank. Throughout this section the process of seeing is brought up again and again and linked with her thoughts and the "plot" of her escape. There are six main instances of vision in the narrative and the first five may be summed up as follows: 1) her initial gaze out the window; 2) her gaze into the room behind her; 3) her memory of the first time she saw Frank ("How well she remembered the first time she had seen him: he was lodging in a house on the main road where she used to visit" [*D*

38]); 4) her memory of a date with Frank when he “took her to see *The Bohemian Girl* and she felt elated as she sat in an unaccustomed part of the theatre with him” (*D* 39);¹⁸ and 5) her turn back to the window as the “evening deepened in the avenue. The white of two letters in her lap grew indistinct” (*D* 39). Throughout the narrative and these instances of seeing, Eveline’s consciousness pervades from the description of the street outside her window to her thoughts of Frank as “very kind, manly, open-hearted” (*D* 38)--he, after all, had sprung for expensive seats in the theatre. Her thoughts make up the conclusion the narrative gives us about her rescuer: “Frank would take her in his arms, fold her in his arms. He would save her” (*D* 40). The romantic language throughout the story comes from Eveline; as Kenner notes, the very presence of Frank is a romantic situation that Eveline’s consciousness cannot resist:

“He had fallen on his feet in Buenos Ayres (comma) he said (comma) and had come over to the old country just for a holiday.” Great issues may be said to hang on those commas, which stipulate not only that Eveline is quoting Frank, but that Frank has been quoting also: quoting from the kind of fiction Eveline will believe, the fiction in which ready lads “fall on their feet”.... The hidden story of “Eveline” is the story of Frank, a bounder with a glib line, who tried to pick himself up a piece of skirt. She will spend the rest of her life regretting the great refusal. (“Molly’s” 20-21)

In this way “Eveline” is an early version of the “Nausicaa” chapter of *Ulysses*, the chapter in which Gerty MacDowell’s cliché-ridden romantic consciousness pervades the narration to such an extent that Patrick McGee calls it the “incorporation into literature of writing that literature rejects, that falls below the standard of the *mot juste*” (89). But if Frank is the “hidden” story of “Eveline” then we can also point to a play with vision as one of its hidden techniques.

The sixth invocation of vision closes the first section of the story:

As she mused the pitiful vision of her mother's life laid its spell on the very quick of her being-- that life of commonplace sacrifices closing in final craziness. She trembled as she heard again her mother's voice saying constantly with foolish insistence:

--Derevaun Seraun! Derevaun Seraun! (*D* 40)

This vision of her mother's death pushed her towards "Escape!" (*D* 40). This first part of the story gives us the inner world of Eveline combined with her "seeing" but instead of clarity we get her looking at a picture of a priest whose "name she had never found out" (*D* 37), objects collecting "mysterious" dust, and the closing vision of her dying mother in her "final craziness" (*D* 40). Seeing does not provide for any kind of revelation or epiphany. There is no invocation of "truth" through the investigation-- the "narration"-- of Eveline's consciousness. As with the other stories in *Dubliners*, seeing here is used as a trope to depict consciousness, conflict, and, more often than not, confusion. By combining investigations of seeing with "The Uncle Charles Principle," the stories in *Dubliners* provide a critique of traditional methods of depicting reality in literature. As Michael Patrick Gillespie describes it in relation to "Eveline," the use of

free indirect discourse undermines one's sense of a discrete narrative voice, operating outside the influence of the natures of any of the characters in the work. The striking change that results-- the modulation of the narrative-- comes not so much from Joyce's elimination of his own personality from the discourse as from a refusal to give primacy to a single point of view. (22)

It is this denial of a single perspective combined with his experiments in depicting consciousness that gives Joyce's stories their air of "mystery" and their ability to challenge conventional ideas about consciousness and vision. And this is specifically

enunciated in the final section of “Eveline” when no epiphany-- no instant visual revelation-- is manifested.

The last section of the story plunges us into what Leonard calls the “black ‘hole’” of Eveline’s mind. This plunge provides us with one of the most anti-epiphanic moments in all of the stories. When faced with her indecision about whether to leave with Frank or stay in her old life, Eveline actually prays for an epiphany: “She felt her cheek pale and cold and, out of a maze of distress, she prayed to God to direct her, to *show* her what was her duty” (my emphasis. *D* 40). But God does not “show” her anything-- no “sudden spiritual manifestation” takes place. Eveline is paralyzed with indecision and no epiphany comes to save her:

All the seas of the world tumbled around her heart. He was drawing her into them: he would drown her. She gripped with both hands at the iron railing.

--Come!

No! No! No! It was impossible. Her hands clutched the iron in frenzy. Amid the seas she sent a cry of anguish!

--Eveline! Evvy!

He rushed beyond the barrier and called to her to follow. He was shouted at to go on but he still called to her. She set her white face to him, passive, like a helpless animal. Her eyes gave him no sign of love or farewell or recognition. (*D* 41)

As John Paul Riquelme describes it, this ending is split between Eveline’s agitated consciousness complete with romantic clichés (“All the seas of the world tumbled around her heart”) and the final paragraph which gives us the narrator’s “judgment” of Eveline’s mind: “that she has been reduced by her situation and by her own reaction to a helpless,

passive condition” (110). This estimation may be extended to the last line which seems to be even more of a narrative “judgment”: her eyes are empty of any “sign.” Eveline’s eyes give no answer because vision does not supply a key to reading reality or “truth.”

I have descended into Eveline’s vacant eyeballs to challenge the accepted critical view of epiphanies in *Dubliners* and, by extension, throughout Joyce’s *oeuvre*. But this is not to say that I completely discount the early work known as the epiphanies from any kind of relationship to his later work. On the contrary, I take the epiphanies as having an integral relationship to Joyce’s experiments in depicting the inner life of his characters. To understand this relationship we must reconsider the entire concept of the epiphany in Joyce’s work. Instead of taking the epiphany as a “sudden spiritual manifestation” of “truth” we should follow Scholes and Kain’s advice and take the epiphanies as “life observed” (14). The epiphanies Joyce placed in Yeats’s hands are disconnected snapshots of life that Colin MacCabe describes as

lack[ing] any appeal to reality which would define what the writing produces. The conversations and situations which make up these brief ten- or twelve-line sketches, lack any accompanying explanation or context. In place of a discourse which attempts to place and situate everything, we have discourses which are determined in their situation by the reader. (28)

Without context the epiphanies require contemplation and interpretation; for Kenner, they belong to a process akin to “intellectual vision” but no monological, transcendent vision is ultimately attained: “The epiphany is the reward of intense contemplation; not a tranced stare, but precisely the active groping of a spiritual eye seeking to adjust its focus to what is there: precisely like the experience of trying to grasp a poem” (*Dublin’s*

147). As the history of literary criticism demonstrates, grasping a poem takes time and the “grasp” often changes: we read Homer differently since Joyce. And this is the effect of the early epiphanies: they are disconnected snapshots of “life” that need to be interpreted with this in mind. They have no one point of view: perspective is not a solidified stance. The epiphanies do not provide a sudden moment of illumination about life or art; the epiphanies evade any one meaning and they provoke questions.

In this sense, the stories in *Dubliners* should not be read as stories closing with transcendent epiphanies; they should be read as stories *as* epiphanies, as snapshots of life in Dublin without “enlightened” or “spiritual illumination.” As Kenner describes it, Joyce was not only concerned with the “stuff” of “life,” he used the “stuff” in his writing: “He had long known that the way to do his job was to work within the things he saw: Dublin’s draughtiness in prose of ‘scrupulous meanness’ (*Dublin’s* 177). The stories in *Dubliners* are visual puzzles in the sense that they put the subjects of consciousness and vision into the foreground of the narration. “Eveline” is a story without an epiphany precisely because the entire story is an epiphany; it is an epiphany in the sense that it attempts to catch a character’s experience.¹⁹ As an investigation of Eveline’s consciousness, the story is reminiscent of one of the epiphanies Joyce placed in Yeats’s hands:

She stands, her book held lightly at her breast, reading the lesson. Against the dark stuff of her dress her face, mild-featured with downcast eyes, rises softly outlined in light; and from a folded cap, set carelessly forward, a tassel falls along her brown ringletted hair...

What is the lesson that she reads-- of apes, of strange inventions, or the legends of martyrs? Who knows how deeply meditative, how reminiscent is this comeliness of

Raffaello? (Scholes and Kain 49)

This Paterian “portrait” ends with a question. The woman’s “downcast eyes” are the signals of the “mystery” of identity and consciousness behind the portrait of Eveline. Epiphanies lead to questions, not answers. And the questions are about life, subjectivity, and consciousness.

This questioning of life and consciousness has a political purpose. Joyce felt that his work would provide for the “spiritual liberation” of Ireland. To understand this we must briefly examine Joyce’s politics. In a letter to his brother, Joyce violated his rule about not giving his epiphanies a title when he wrote the following epiphany about himself:

Scene: draughty little stone-flagged room, chest of drawers to left, on which are the remains of lunch, in the centre, a small table on which are *writing materials* (He never forgot them) and a saltcellar: in the background, a small-sized bed. A young man with sniveling nose sits at the little table: on the bed sit a madonna and plaintive infant. It is a January day.... Title of above: *The Anarchist*. (SL 142)

It is a mistake for you to imagine that my political opinions are those of a universal lover; but they are those of a socialistic artist.

—Joyce in a letter of 1905 (SL 61)

Although Joyce often called himself a socialist and read deeply in socialist thought, his political opinions were constructed from a mixture of socialism, anarchism, pacifism, and a life-long anti-imperialism that began with his childhood experiences in the home of a vehement Parnellite. Once, when someone asked if Joyce was a socialist

because he saw him reading a socialist newspaper, an acquaintance responded: “*È un po' di tutto.*” “He’s a little bit of everything” (*SL* 122). This comment is accurate in the sense that Joyce immersed himself in a variety of leftist and controversial thought from the anarchist writings of Benjamin Tucker to the extreme ego philosophy of Max Stirner.²⁰ A little bit of everything meant a little bit of everything from the political left. In this respect, Joyce calling himself a “socialistic artist” is probably the best definition of his politics. He did not adhere to any one socialist group and completely rejected Marx. While not a strict socialist for his entire life, his life was filled with writing concerned with depicting, confronting, and changing the “social” world. As Dominic Manganiello describes it in his ground-breaking study of Joyce’s politics, there was one aim in his writing: “Joyce... understood his art to have shared the revolutionary aim of emancipating the masses with the *avant-garde* movements in politics” (69). It is from Joyce’s relationship to politics that his critique of ocularcentrism emerges. And it is this relationship that separates him from the high modernism of Eliot, Pound, Lewis, and even Yeats.

Politics, as a number of studies have shown, was important to how Joyce constructed and thought about his work.²¹ This is in contrast to the belief that Joyce was apolitical, a belief Joyce himself helped instigate with a famous remark to his brother during the turmoil of the First World War: “I’m not interested in politics. The only thing that interests me is style” (*JJ* 710). When he told Grant Richards that he would “retard the course of civilisation in Ireland” by not printing *Dubliners*, Joyce was demonstrating the social import he felt was at the core of his work. And this was the way he thought

about all of his writing. From the descent into the minds of three “ordinary” Dubliners and the overall portrait of what Ellmann calls “the world of the petty Bourgeois” (*JJ* 100) in *Ulysses* to his putting the language to sleep in *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce’s work is an investigation of how political and social forces shape consciousness. As Vincent Cheng describes it in the first book-length study of Joyce and colonialism, to overlook Joyce’s politics and the social import of his texts is to misread him in such a way as to transform his writing into a “safe” group of titles for a course syllabus:

To assume that Joyce is an apolitical (or even regressive), aestheticizing, privileged white male writer in the Great Anglocentric Tradition... is willingly to buy into what the High Modernist academic canonizing processes would have us believe. It is also necessarily and consequently to occlude and ignore the specific nature of Joyce’s texts and the ideological issues contained in such radical texts-- as they were certainly considered then, both ideologically and stylistically-- written by a colonial Irish-Catholic consciousness searching for alternatives to both a stifling nationalism and an oppressive British imperialism, subjected to press censorship in most of the English-speaking world. (3)

It is through a brief analysis of Joyce’s politics in relation to Irish nationalism and “race”²² that we may discern the beginning of his critique of ocularcentrism. And, as with everything with Joyce, a discussion of his politics begins with Ireland.

The problems Joyce felt Ireland suffered from were the problems he saw in his own childhood home. In a letter to Nora, he attempted to explain himself:

My mind rejects the whole present social order and Christianity-- home, the recognized virtues, classes of life, and religious doctrines. How could I like the idea of home? My home was simply a middle-class affair ruined by spendthrift habits which I have inherited. My mother was slowly killed, I think, by my father’s ill-treatment, by years of trouble, and by my cynical frankness of conduct. When I looked on her face as she lay in her coffin-- a face grey and wasted with cancer-- I understood

that I was looking on the face of a victim and I cursed the system which had made her a victim. (*SL* 25)

Part of the “system” Joyce was reacting against was the Roman Catholic Church; in the same letter he declares that all of his activities are against the Church he was brought up in: “Now I make war upon it by what I write and say and do” (*SL* 26). But the Church is only one side of the system, only one of those masters Stephen says he is forced to serve (*U* 1.638). He told Nora about his “war” in 1904, the year they both left Dublin for the continent. In 1907, Joyce delivered a lecture on Irish history and politics to a Triestian audience. As an exile his thoughts on his homeland turn analytic and take on a broad view of the effect of the “system” on the individual:

The economic and intellectual conditions that prevail in his own country [Ireland] do not permit the development of individuality. The soul of the country is weakened by centuries of useless struggle and broken treaties, and individual initiative is paralyzed by the influence and admonitions of the church, while its body is manacled by the police, the tax office, and the garrison. No one who has any self-respect stays in Ireland, but flees afar as though from a country that has undergone the visitation of an angered Jove. (*CW* 171)

Joyce’s use of the word “paralyzed” is important here because it is the exact description he used to depict the world of *Dubliners*. Joyce fled Dublin but not before taking Irish lessons from none other than Patrick Pearse. Joyce gave up the lessons because Pearse “found it necessary to exalt Irish by denigrating English” (*JJ* 61). This concentration on things Irish was one of the reasons Joyce turned away from the common forms of Irish nationalism: by upholding things Irish (language, sports, literature) as the paragons of life and art, the nationalists, according to Joyce, were limiting their perspectives to old

stereotypes of “race” and culture. In a letter of 1906 written to his bother, Joyce made this clear in relation to the teaching of Irish: “If the Irish programme did not insist on the Irish language I suppose I could call myself a nationalist” (*L II* 187). This mixed response was something Joyce held for his entire life.²³

Joyce’s response to Sinn Féin crystallizes the disagreement he had with Irish nationalism and wider European conceptions of nationality and “race.” In *Time and Western Man*, Lewis tells us that Joyce was “against Sinn Fein” (76). This, as with much of Lewis’s reading of Joyce, is a misreading. As Manganiello describes it, Joyce supported much of the program of Sinn Féin, believing “the movement strong because it puts its trust in neither priest nor politician” (126). Joyce believed that the fall of Parnell represented the end of any realistic parliamentary lobbying for Home Rule. This was partly because, as he put it in a lecture called “Fenianism,” in Ireland “just at the right moment, an informer always appears” (190). Started as an Irish self-reliance movement by Arthur Griffith and closely associated with the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Sinn Féin also believed that parliamentary agitation was a worthless process in order to attain freedom for Ireland. And Sinn Féin’s early refusal to take up violence in order to achieve its ends also appealed to Joyce. As James Fairhall describes it, Sinn Féin’s basic ideals were closely akin to Joyce’s:

The Sinn Fein program of working toward independence by means of extra-parliamentary agitation and boycott entailed neither fighting England nor collaborating with her. Moreover, Sinn Fein stressed individual self-reliance and did not depend on a single charismatic leader who, Joyce felt, inevitably would be betrayed.... He also approved of Arthur Griffith’s support of James Connolly and other Labour candidates during the Dublin Corporation elections in 1902 and 1903.

(48-49)

Joyce's backing of Connolly, the founder of the Irish Socialist Party, was one of the first manifestations of his interest in socialism. It is easy to see why Joyce would have supported Connolly given the opposition to the socialist that, in the words of Manganiello, came from the "Irish hierarchy [who] vehemently opposed him, portrayed him as an Anti-Christ, and prohibited any Catholic to vote for him under pain of excommunication" (126).

In the same essay in which he pointed to the perennial informer throughout Irish history, Joyce lists what he takes as the admirable qualities of the Sinn Féin program:

They practice boycotts against English goods; they refuse to become soldiers or take the oath of loyalty to the English crown; they are trying to develop industries throughout the entire island; and instead of paying out a million and a quarter annually for the maintenance of eighty representatives in the English Parliament, they want to inaugurate a consular service in the principal ports of the world for the purpose of selling their industrial products without the intervention of England. (*CW* 191).

Joyce had a personal interest in the last proposition: he attempted to export Irish tweeds from Dublin straight to the continent. And, as I will describe it in chapter six, Joyce imported into Ireland Italian cinema and thus beat British distribution of films in Dublin by several years. But if he agreed with a great deal of Sinn Féin's program, he also had great problems with some of its basic tenets. And this may be gleaned from the organization's name: Sinn Féin means "Ourselves" or "Ourselves Alone" in Gaelic. It was Joyce's great aim to explode the myths surrounding "selves" and the notion of a unitary, sanctified, and pure "race."

While admiring Arthur Griffith's newspapers²⁴ and completely agreeing with the overall economic platform of Sinn Féin, Joyce was consistently repulsed by the racial stereotypes propagated by these manifestations of Irish nationalism. When writing to Stanislaus about Sinn Féin, Joyce made this perfectly clear when he objected to its "educating the people of Ireland on the old pap of racial hatred" (*SL* 111). Joyce perceived that the typical Irish nationalist response to racial prejudice on the part of the British was to use racial stereotypes in defense, or, as the Citizen puts it in *Ulysses*: "-- We'll put force against force" (*U* 12. 1364). Joyce reacted to this in another letter to his brother in specific response to a series of articles Oliver Gogarty had written for *Sinn Féin* called "Ugly England." In the articles Gogarty had described the "venereal excess" of the British (*SL* 108). Joyce took his old rival to task for his partaking of the "old pap":

I am nauseated by their lying drivel about pure men and pure women and spiritual love and love for ever: blatant lying in the face of the truth. I don't know much about the "saince" of the subject but I presume there are very few mortals in Europe who are not in danger of waking some morning to find themselves syphilitic. The Irish consider England a sink: but, if cleanliness be important in this matter, what is Ireland? (*SL* 129)

This rage at the idea of "pure" men and women is at the core of Joyce's fight with Sinn Féin and Irish nationalism as a whole. In a lecture he delivered in Trieste entitled "Ireland, Island of Saints and Sages," Joyce enunciated the conception he had about the Irish "race":

Our civilisation is a vast fabric, in which the most diverse elements are mingled, in which nordic aggressiveness and Roman law, the new bourgeois conventions and the remnant of a Syriac religion are reconciled. In such a fabric, it is useless to look for a thread that may have remained pure and virgin without having undergone the influence of a neighbouring

thread. What race, or what language... can boast of being pure today? And no race has less right to utter such a boast than the race now living in Ireland. (*CW* 165-66)

For Joyce, “race” was a myth that needed to be shattered. And he attempted to do so in his fiction by challenging the visual paradigms of knowledge that provided racism with its foundation.

During the “Cyclops” episode of *Ulysses*, the Citizen interrupts Bloom during one of his misadventures in speech:

--You don't get my point, says Bloom. What I mean is....
 --*Sinn Fein!* says the Citizen. *Sinn fein amhain!* The friends
 we love are by our side and the foes we hate before us. (*U* 12.522-24)

The first part of the Citizen's rebuke is the slogan of the Gaelic League: “Ourselves! Ourselves Alone!” The second part (“The friends we love....”) is from one of Thomas Moore's *Irish Melodies* (Gifford 333). The “friends” of the Citizen are the other members of the pub including the nameless narrator because the Citizen sees them all as “Irish” (although, because of his extreme racism, he may have misgivings about the “Orangeman or presbyterian” Crofton [*U* 12.1634]). The “enemy” before him is the “un-Irish” Bloom. Bloom, of course, thinks of himself as Irish and even explicitly names Ireland as his nation when asked by the Citizen: “--Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here. Ireland” (*U* 12.1431).²⁵ But this is not enough for the Citizen, who is the embodiment of the racial prejudice and cycloptic vision Joyce saw at the heart of Irish nationalist organizations ranging from the Gaelic League to the Irish Literary Theatre. Joyce based the Citizen on Michael Cusack, the founder of the Gaelic Athletic Association. The Gaelic Athletic Association was to sports what the Gaelic League was to language: it

focused exclusively on the cultivation of what it considered “pure” Irish sports (hurling, Gaelic football). Cusack was called “Citizen Cusack” around Dublin and he was notoriously belligerent; he reportedly introduced himself thus: “I’m Citizen Cusack from the Parish of Carron in the Barony of Burren in the County of Clare, you Protestant dog!” (*JJ* 61). Cusack embodied everything that repelled Joyce in Irish nationalism.

As the embodiment of Irish nationalist intolerance, the Citizen’s narrow viewpoints sound throughout the chapter and are constantly focused on Bloom: “--Those are nice things. says the citizen, coming over here to Ireland filling the country with bugs” (*U* 12.1141-42). “--Swindling the peasants, says the citizen, and the poor of Ireland. We want no more strangers in our house” (*U* 12.1150-51). The Citizen’s attacks on Bloom are always focused on his “foreign Jewishness” and on his overall threat to Ireland as a member of an “inferior race.” But the Citizen is not the only one to attack Bloom. The nameless narrator of the chapter colors the entire interaction with Bloom in Barney Kiernan’s with descriptions of “the old dog smelling him all the time I’m told those jewies does have a sort of a queer odour coming off them” (*U* 12.452-53) and “God save Ireland from the likes of that bloody mouseabout” (*U* 12.1579). Ned Lambert asks the question all present want to know: “--Is he a jew or a gentile or a holy Roman or a swaddler or what the hell is he?” (*U* 12.1631-32). This is the question the inhabitants of the pub need to ask because it will supply them with the easy stereotype they need in order to classify Bloom and clearly define their position as cultural and racial superiors. Martin Cunningham, with inside information from the Castle, answers the question in a manner that feeds into their construction of “race” and Irishness: “--He’s a perverted jew”

(*U* 12.1635). To this answer, to this racial classification of Bloom, the Citizen responds with biting sarcasm: “That’s the new Messiah for Ireland!” (*U* 12.1642). The verbal assault of racial epithets Bloom is exposed to throughout “Cyclops” represents the second most threatening force he must face in the novel-- the first being the threat of his own subconscious in rebellion in “Circe” that I will take up in the next chapter. “Cyclops” is a threat to Bloom-- “I’ll brain that bloody jewman for using the holy name. By Jesus, I’ll crucify him so I will” (*U* 12.1811-12)-- because racial and religious intolerance was, according to Joyce, a threat to the success of Sinn Féin and Irish nationalism as a whole. The Gilbert Schema tells us that the “art” of this chapter is “politics” while its “symbol” is “Fenian” (Gilbert 30). “Cyclops” is Joyce’s examination and vivisection of the racial intolerance at the heart of Sinn Féin.

The critique of racist nationalism embodied in “Cyclops” is foregrounded in questions of vision. This is done on three levels. The first is Joyce’s overall use of the Homeric parallel and the equation between the cycloptic vision of Homer’s monster and the one-eyed nationalism of the Citizen. The second level is Joyce’s use of the nameless narrator throughout the chapter, whom he calls in the Gilbert Schema “Noman” (Gilbert 30) and who constantly refers to himself with the pronoun “I.” The last level of Joyce’s play with vision in the chapter is the parodic “interruptions” that break apart Noman’s narration and comment on the goings on in the pub. This last play with vision is important for a consideration of Joyce’s critique of ocularcentrism throughout *Ulysses*. I bring up “Cyclops” here before a discussion of *A Portrait* and *Ulysses* because it provides

for a context in which to read Joyce's reaction to racism and nationalism through his attack upon the hegemony of vision. This is an attack he wages throughout his fiction and it takes on "gigantic" proportions in the twelfth chapter of *Ulysses*.

Joyce's use of the Citizen for the parallel with Homer's Cyclops explicitly brings up the metaphor of vision in relation to ideology. Frank Budgen encapsulates the meaning of this parallel and its use throughout the chapter in one sentence: "Two-eyed Bloom ventures into the cavern of one-eye nationalism" (151). As I have already described it, the Citizen and the other denizens of the pub display their one-eyed nationalism almost exclusively in relation to Bloom. But it is to Noman that we must turn to see how the metaphor becomes a part of the narrative.

The chapter opens with a gesture towards the play with sight that will occur throughout the episode: "I was passing the time of day with old Troy of the D. M. P. at the corner of Arbour hill there and be damned but a bloody sweep came along and he near drove his gear into my eye" (*U* 12.1-3). This "I" is repeated with such frequency throughout the chapter-- it occurs thirteen times on the first page alone in the Gabler edition-- that it becomes a kind of narrative mantra. This "I" is also equated with "eye" in the chapter's opening declaration of vision's relationship to consciousness-- eye see therefore I am. This monocular vision will provide us with the narrative for the entire chapter. As David Hayman notes, this is the first time in the book that "we are deprived both of Bloom's voice and of an objective narrator" (243). Another provocative aspect of Noman is his name. "Noman" is, of course, the name Ulysses gave Polyphemus after the hero had blinded the cyclops in *The Odyssey*. Thus we have a confusing shift in the

Homeric parallel: If Bloom “is” Ulysses than who is this “I” called Noman? The chapter itself provides an answer in its overall style.

Noman’s narration is “interrupted” by thirty-three parodic descriptions ranging from entire legal forms to romantic descriptions of scenes from Irish history including an Emmet-like execution and martyrdom.²⁶ These “interruptions” break apart Noman’s narration and disturb his authority as the teller of the tale of “Cyclops.” A representative example of this occurs when the Citizen inquires about the progress of instituting Gaelic as the national language (*U* 12.1180-82). Immediately after this question the narration leaves the mind of Noman and enters a parodic world of Irish legend:

O’Nolan, clad in shining armour, low bending made obeisance
to the high and mighty chief of all Erin... and there, after due
prayers to the gods who dwell in ether supernal, had taken
solemn counsel whereby they might, if so be it might be,
bring once more into honour among mortal men the winged
speech of the seadivided Gael. (*U* 12.1183-89)

This description has come from nowhere: nobody in the chapter has said it, thought it, or heard it. It specifically undercuts the Citizen’s-- and the Gaelic League’s-- reverence for Gaelic over “the brutal Sassenachs and their *patois*” (*U* 12.1190-91). In addition, as a narrative method throughout the chapter, these thirty-three “interruptions” completely undercut Noman’s narration and place all of his thoughts and reported speech into question. Hayman has described these interruptions as emanating from a disorienting aspect of the novel:

This figure may be thought of as an *arranger*, a nameless
and whimsical-seeming authorial projection whose presence
is first strongly felt in “Aeolus,” where he starts usurping the
prerogatives of the objective narrator by interjecting the
frequently intrusive mock-headlines. To “Scylla and
Charybdis,” “Wandering Rocks,” and “Sirens,” he con-

tributes less obvious but more whimsical effects. Finally in "Cyclops," where his prime effects are juxtaposed as asides to the predictable voice of the outcast narrator, he comes into his own, obliging us to equate his presence with the diminution of lucidity, the assertion of the unconscious and instinctual side of experience, the inexplicable realm of darkness through which light ultimately shines darkly. (265-66)

The "arranger" disrupts Noman's narrative and throws the "clarity" of his narration into darkness. The "arranger" obfuscates the "rational" discourse of Noman and one-eyed nationalism. These "interruptions" undercut Noman's equation between "I" and "eye."

The "arranger's" presence tells us that all that Noman knows and says is not the entire world of "Cyclops." The one-eyed nationalism of Noman is critiqued through the "arranger's" parodies of racial stereotypes, nationalist rhetoric, maleness, and the violence inherent in struggles throughout history. Patrick McGee takes the "arranger's" disruption of the narrative as the creation of a "polyphonic text" which results in

Joyce the parodist organiz[ing] the ahistorical chaos of popular narrative with its multiple truths into an overall configuration that dramatizes the discontinuity of narrative forms and the historical autonomy of the word in relation to ambivalent, overdetermined strategies of power. (84)

Joyce's foregrounding of these power relations through a play with vision on a metaphorical level (the Citizen as Cyclops, one-eyed nationalism) and on a stylistic level (the "arranger's interruptions" as obscuring commentary) points to his understanding of the links between vision and knowledge. In an attempt to crack open the easy equation between "clear" sight and "truth"-- between nationalism and "race"-- Joyce employs a radical visual experiment in narrative. He indicated this to Budgen when he asked him about "Cyclops": "Does the episode strike you as being futuristic?" (156). Budgen's

answer has commonly been taken as an insightful reading of the chapter combined with a correction of Joyce's terminology: "Rather cubist than futurist.... Every event is a many-sided object. You first state one view of it and then you draw it from another angle to another scale, and both aspects lie side by side in the same picture" (156-57).²⁷ But if we accept Joyce's description of "futuristic" his intent behind his attack upon vision and racism in the chapter becomes clear. Of all the futurist art Joyce knew none was as readily available for him to see and hear about-- mainly from Pound-- than Wyndham Lewis's Vorticist paintings. Lewis's paintings were in part a response to futurism and cubism. By linking "Cyclops" with Lewis in his commentary Joyce is implicitly critiquing Lewis's politics through a play with the very form of Lewis's art. Twelve years after *Ulysses* was published and seventeen years after Lewis attacked the novel as a "Time Book" in *Time and Western Man*, Joyce was still complaining about Lewis's politics to Harriet Shaw Weaver: "I am afraid poor Mr Hitler-Missler will soon have few admirers in Europe apart from your nieces and my nephews, Masters W. Lewis and E. Pound" (SL 369). And it is to the issue of anti-Semitism that we must now turn before the next chapter's examination of seeing in *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*.

The racism of Griffith's *Sinn Féin* was not confined to attacks upon the English. Griffith had a personal hatred and he shared it with his many readers and attempted to promote it as an integral part of Sinn Féin. Oliver Gogarty shared this feeling and he made it a part of his second *Sinn Féin* article on "Ugly England" by writing of "England becoming Jewry" (SL 138). Joyce's comment on Gogarty's article sums up his entire life-

long feeling about anti-Semitism: “stupid drivell” (*SL* 138). Later in his life he remarked of anti-Semitism: “It’s one of the easiest and oldest prejudices to prove” (*JJ* 709). Joyce spent much of his writing career “proving” the prejudice behind anti-Semitism. As Neil Davison describes it in his study of Joyce’s relationship to Jewish identity, one of Joyce’s first exposures to full-blown anti-Semitism was in the pages of Griffith’s newspapers. Griffith, in Davison’s reading of the events, first started his anti-Semitic commentary in response to the Dreyfus Affair in an effort to “cast aspersions against Irish Jews” (68). A manifestation of Griffith’s effort may be seen in the 1904 boycott of Jewish merchants in Limerick that resulted in violent attacks upon Irish Jews.²⁸ Joyce followed the Limerick boycott and the Dreyfus Affair in several Irish and English newspapers (Davison 64-82). The kind of reactionary opinion Griffith held about the Affair was abhorrent to Joyce, who was a Dreyfusard as well as an admirer of Zola.²⁹ Griffith’s writing on Dreyfus’s second trial in *The United Irishman* sounds as if it comes from the Guinness-soaked minds of the Citizen and Noman:

For the Jews, of course, it is of supreme importance to secure the whitewashing of a Jew Officer who had been admitted too deeply into the military secrets of France, and they are spending millions to effect their object. No Jew is admitted to any rank in Austria, Germany, or Russia, and so the Jews feel that to be excluded from high rank in France would be a stunning blow to their ambition. And I would insist that the exclusion of Jews in Germany, Russia, and Austria has nothing to do with religious beliefs. It is rather a question of Patriotism. The Jew has at heart no country but the Promised Land. He forms a nation apart wherever he goes... Touch a Jew in Warsaw, and collections will be made to protect him in Moorish Synagogues on the edge of the Sahara and in Chinese Synagogues on the Yellow River. The French Army has sent a Jew to a convict settlement. So, woe to the French Army if the Jews can manage it. (quoted in Davison 69)

This is a common form of paranoid anti-Semitism: a Jewish conspiracy is behind the outcry against the “justice” being meted out to a “guilty” man. And Griffith’s notion that the “Jew has at no heart no country” is the exact conclusion reached by those who persecuted Dreyfus. When the evidence against Dreyfus was proven to be falsified, this argument was still adhered to by writers like Maurras.³⁰ This is also one of the points of attack against Bloom in Barney Kiernan’s.

Joyce creates an ironic critique of Sinn Féin in “Cyclops” that says a great deal about Leopold Bloom as an Irishman. After Noman reenters the pub after relieving himself outside (“Jesus, full up I was” [*U* 12.1569-79]), he walks in on a conversation about the focus of the chapter:

So anyhow when I got back they were at it dingdong, John Wyse saying it was Bloom gave the ideas for Sinn Fein to Griffith to put in his paper all kinds of jerrymandering, packed juries and swindling the taxes off of the government and appointing consuls all over the world to walk about selling Irish industries. Robbing Peter to pay Paul. Gob, that puts the bloody kybosh on it if old sloppy eyes is mucking up the show. Give us a bloody chance. God save Ireland from the likes of that bloody mouseabout. (*U* 12.1573-79)

That Bloom gave the economic ideas of Sinn Féin to Griffith is confirmed by Martin Cunningham who knows that Bloom is “from a place in Hungary and it was he drew up all the plans according to the Hungarian system. We know that in the castle” (*U* 12.1635-37). The great irony here is that the anti-Semitic Griffith was given all the ideas Joyce approved of in Sinn Féin from a Jew. This clearly underscores in fiction what Joyce believed in life: Ireland was a “vast fabric,” a country made up of several different peoples, living, as Bloom puts it, “in the same place” (*U* 12.1422-23). Noman’s worst

fears are realized because “old sloppy eyes” has had a hand in creating the nationalist organization who will in the future help create the Republic of Ireland. It is to the creation of the “sloppy eyes” of Bloom that we now turn.

Endnotes

¹ For a description of Joyce’s problems with getting *Dubliners* into print see Ellmann, *James Joyce*, pp. 219-222 and pp. 322-333.

² Joyce’s refusal to give into censorship or compromise his work in any way was a great model for Beckett in his fight against censorship. See Knowlson, pp. 155-56.

³ See Scholes and Kain for the surviving forty epiphanies, pp. 3-7. Beja acknowledges the fact that none of the epiphanies show up in the stories but emphasizes the similarities between the two by pointing to their shared themes and use of ellipses. See Morris Beja, “One Good Look at Themselves: Epiphanies in *Dubliners*,” pp. 3-5.

⁴ See Harry Levin, *James Joyce*, pp. 28-31.

⁵ See Robert Scholes, “Joyce and the Epiphany: The Key to the Labyrinth” in *In Search of James Joyce* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992).

⁶ For a reproduction of the early version of “The Sisters” surrounded by ads see *James Joyce’s “Dubliners”: An Illustrated Edition*, ed. John Wyse Jackson and Bernard McGinley (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1993), pp. 10-11.

⁷ For a detailed account of Joyce’s interaction with the *Irish Homestead* see Florence L. Walzl, “*Dubliners*” in *A Companion to Joyce Studies*, ed. Zack Bowen and James F. Carens (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 161-178.

⁸ I use the description “epiphany-inspired” throughout in part to convey the sense of the “enlightenment” critics seek in the stories through visual manifestations of “truth.”

⁹ For a more detailed, persuasive, and sensitive approach to the idea of a “subjective epiphany” in *Dubliners* see Zack Bowen, “Joyce and the Epiphany Concept: A New Approach,” *Journal of Modern Literature* 9 (1981-82): 106-7.

¹⁰ See Morris Beja, *Epiphany in the Modern Novel* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971).

¹¹ I have brought up Jameson’s dismissal of *Dubliners* because it strikes me as indicative of the wholesale adoption of the epiphany-reading of the stories. As one of our most influential critics-- as a critic who took the title for his book on film from *Ulysses: Signatures of the Visible*-- Jameson’s view of *Dubliners* says a great deal about how the stories have been cemented into one unquestioned critical understanding.

¹² Although I agree with Dettmar’s questioning of the epiphany in the stories, I think he goes too far by suggesting that *Dubliners* is a postmodern book and that *A Portrait* represents a “lapse” into a “self-important modernism” (108). As I will argue in the next chapter, *A Portrait* represents the development of Joyce’s critique of ocularcentrism begun in *Dubliners* and points to the beginning of postmodernism in *Finnegans Wake*.

¹³ For an analysis of how Joyce anticipated Lacan in relation to perception and critiques of the subject see Sheldon Brivic, *The Veil of Signs: Joyce, Lacan, and Perception* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991).

¹⁴ As Jay points out, Lacan’s attack upon ocularcentrism deeply influenced Althusser who wrote in *Reading Capital*: “We must completely reorganize the idea we have of knowledge, we must abandon the mirror myths of immediate vision and reading, and conceive of knowledge as production” (quoted in Jay 374). For an analysis of Lacan and Althusser’s reaction to ocularcentrism, see Jay, pp. 329-380.

¹⁵ As Hugh Kenner has put it, “He must have been both resignedly and cheerfully aware that numerous readers would share Eveline’s fantasy” (*Joyce’s* 80-81).

¹⁶ As Michael Patrick Gillespie notes, a critic named Charles Bally first identified the technique now known as free indirect discourse in 1912 (215). Gillespie sums up the process this way: “Basically, the method can be defined as a device for integrating linguistic traits associated with the speech and the thinking of specific characters into segments of the narrative” (215). As I will demonstrate below, Joyce’s use of free indirect discourse differs in the important respect that “the thinking of specific characters” takes control of the *entire* narrative.

Free indirect discourse is also known as free indirect style, *erlebte Rede*, and *style indirect libre*. For an analysis of Flaubert’s use of free indirect discourse and its influence on Joyce see Richard K. Cross, *Flaubert and Joyce: The Rite of Fiction* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1971), pp. 77-83. In *Mimesis*, Erich Auerbach gives a classic description of the technique in *Madame Bovary* that deserves to be quoted at length for its relevance to *Dubliners*; after quoting a long passage depicting Emma eating with Charles, Auerbach describes the narration:

Here it is not Emma who speaks, but the writer... Emma sees and feels but she would not be able to sum it all up in this way. *Toute l'amertume de l'existence lui semblait servie sur son assiette*-- she doubtless has such feeling; but if she wanted to express it, it would not come out like that; she has neither the intelligence nor the cold candor of self-accounting necessary for such a formulation. To be sure there is nothing of Flaubert's life in these words, only Emma's; Flaubert does nothing but bestow the power of mature expression upon the material which she affords, in its complete subjectivity. If Emma could do this herself, she would no longer be what she is, she would have outgrown herself and thereby saved herself. (427)

¹⁷ In "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives" Barthes describes how the "personal instance (under more or less disguised forms) has... invaded narrative" (112). He does this famously with a analysis of a James Bond novel: "Thus it is that today many narratives are to be found (and of the most common kinds) which mix together in extremely rapid succession, often with the limits of a single sentence, the personal and the apersonal" (113). He points to this in a sentence from *Goldfinger*:

His eyes,	<i>personal</i>
grey-blue,	<i>apersonal</i>
looked into those of Mr Du Pont who did	
not know what face to put on	<i>personal</i>
for this look held a mixture of candour,	
irony and self-deprecation.	<i>apersonal</i> (113)

This is in effect what occurs in "Eveline" except with the vocabulary and syntax actually taken from Eveline's consciousness.

¹⁸ For a description of *The Bohemian Girl* and its relevance for the story see Kershner, pp. 62-65.

¹⁹ This also applies to the story in *Dubliners* taken to be the most reliant on its closing epiphany: "The Dead." The famous closing of the story is writing with a magisterial use of free indirect discourse; Gabriel's romantic consciousness pervades the description and throws the entire scene into question: Is Gabriel really experiencing an epiphany or is he reacting-- through a romantic stance-- to another rebuff from a woman which he previously experienced with Lily and Miss Ivors? And Dettmar questions the veracity of Gabriel's "epiphany" because of our reading of the fourteen other "epiphonies" before it. See Dettmar, pp. 96-100.

²⁰ Joyce supplied the following list of writers he was interested in during this period to Herbert Gorman, his first biographer:

Among the many whose works he had read may be mentioned Most, Malatesta, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Elisée Reclus, Spencer, and Benjamin Tucker, whose *Instead of a Book* proclaimed the liberty of the non-invasive individual. He never read anything by Karl Marx except the first sentence of *Das Kapital* and he found it so absurd that he immediately returned the book to the lender. (JJ 142)

²¹ For political considerations of Joyce see Paul Delany, "Joyce's Political Development and the Aesthetic of *Dubliners*" *College English* 34 (November 1972): 256-266; Richard Ellmann, *The Consciousness of Joyce* (Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Dominic Manganiello, *Joyce's Politics*; Colin MacCabe, *James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word*; Patrick McGee, *Paperspace: Ideology in Joyce's "Ulysses"*; James Fairhall, *James Joyce and the Question of History*, pp. 40-64; and Vincent J. Cheng, *Joyce, Race, and Empire*.

²² I use quotation marks around the word "race" throughout to indicate its cultural construction and meaning.

²³ For a reading of Joyce's use of Irish themes and myths in *Ulysses*-- of his "translating" Irish myth into modernist text-- see Maria Tymoczko, *The Irish "Ulysses"* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1994).

²⁴ *Sinn Féin* was the only newspaper in Ireland to print in full Joyce's letter on the difficulties he faced in getting *Dubliners* published. See Scholes and Litz, pp. 289-292.

²⁵ As Cheng notes, Joyce's critique of nationalism also attacks the sanctity of the concept of "nation" (192-97). In Benedict Anderson's provocative reading in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), the idea of the "nation" relies upon the concept of the "imagined community" which is "*imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members.... [I]t is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (6-7). Depicting the "imagined" quality of the concept of "nation" is at the heart of "Cyclops."

²⁶ I discuss the Emmet-like execution and Joyce's critique of the Irish cult of sacrifice in chapter eight. The parodies number thirty-three because, to my mind, they represent Christ's age when he was crucified and Bloom is "crucified" in this chapter by the one-eyed nationalism of the denizens of Barney Kiernan's.

²⁷ I discuss Joyce's relationship to the critique of vision embodied in cubism in chapter five.

²⁸ For a description of the Limerick boycott and subsequent riots see Ira B. Nadel, *Joyce and the Jews: Culture and Texts*, pp. 59-61. Joyce's setting of *Ulysses* in 1904 suggest that he was responding to the boycott through his "buying" into a Jewish Dubliner's day.

²⁹ In his support of Dreyfus Joyce displayed the kind of political opinion that distanced him from a modernist he is often closely associated with: T. S. Eliot. Throughout his critical work Eliot consistently showed strong support for one of the leading anti-Dreyfusards, Charles Maurras. When convicted of collaboration with Vichy after the war, Maurras cried out in the courtroom: "*C'est la revanche de Dreyfus!*" (Nolte 85). But besides the virulent anti-Semitism embodied in Maurras's writing, the political organization he founded and led, Action Française, had an important role in the evolution of fascism. As the historian Ernst Nolte describes it, the Action Française "was the first political grouping of any influence or intellectual status to bear unmistakably fascist traits....The practice of the Action Française anticipates, in the clear simplicity of the rudimentary, the characteristic traits of the infinitely cruder and more wholesale methods used in Italy and Germany" (25-26). By admiring Maurras, Eliot admired the kind of reactionary thought that gave birth to Mussolini in Italy and Hitler's National Socialism in Germany. For histories of the Action Française see Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism*, pp. 29-141; Edward R. Tannenbaum, *The Action Française: Die-Hard Reactionaries in Twentieth-Century France* (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.: 1962); and Eugen Weber, *Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

³⁰ For a description of Maurras's invocation of nationalism in the face of the truth about the forgery used to convict Dreyfus, see Nolte, pp. 55-58

Chapter Four
 Narrative and Its Visual Discontents:
 Seeing Through *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*
 and Into *Ulysses*

My work is a whole and cannot be divided by book titles.

--Joyce in conversation (Budgen 42)

...seein as ow his thoughts consisted chiefly of the cheerio, he aptly sketched for our soontobe second parents (sukand see whybe!) the touching seene.

--*Finnegans Wake* (FW 52.34-36)

The “whole” of Joyce’s writing is concerned with several dominating preoccupations; the most famous of these is the country he fled as a young man. The other preoccupations that show up in his work are all connected to Ireland and his self-exile from it: individualism, sexuality, paternity, nationalism, the role of the artist, feminism, popular culture, colonialism, “race,” religion, and language. Each of these subjects show up throughout his work from what I have described as the “visual puzzles” of *Dubliners* to the exploding carnival of language that is *Finnegans Wake*.¹ As diverse as some of these subjects are they may all be placed under the rubric of Joyce’s encounter with modernity. All of these subjects are depicted throughout his *oeuvre* as social and historical forces shot through with the issues and conflicts Joyce faced as an artist during the first half of the century. Joyce was born into a rapidly changing world in which

Ireland was entering the final phase of its colonial position, technology was rapidly transforming the everyday world, and Europe with its “entrenched and marshalled races” (*P* 167) was lurching toward its first “total” war. In Vincent Cheng’s formulation, Joyce’s work represents a way of reading the shift between the world of colonialism embodied in the Victorian epoch to the modern period of postcolonialism and late capitalism:

A writer who opposed anti-Semitism, racism, blind nationalism, male aggression, imperialism; who explored the nature of female consciousness; and who, as an exile and cosmopolite, lived his life in cities with culturally mixed populations (Trieste, Paris, Zurich)-- Joyce repeatedly gave voice in his works to those silenced and exiled to the margins of dominant cultures, in an attempt to universalize the colonial relationship and struggle between an Ireland without Home Rule and the ruling British Empire. In this sense, many of Joyce’s works can be viewed as, in part, attempts to explore the alternatives... available to the silenced voices on the margins of dominant and centralized authorities. (7)

Joyce as a producer of “minor literature” created a body of texts with seemingly endless importance for a discussion of modernity and the aesthetic response to it that became known as modernism. As this chapter describes it, Joyce’s work consistently depicted this encounter with modernity through interactions with the process of vision.

As the preceding chapter demonstrated, Joyce’s early stories bring up the topic of vision in order to question its power over subjectivity and meaning. This is continued throughout his work as a play with vision’s hold over “truth” in a Derridian sense: “Play is a disruption of presence” (“Structure” 292). But my investigation of vision throughout Joyce’s work should not be taken as a positing of one solitary reading of Joyce: it should be taken as the start of a critical appreciation of his work that considers his attack upon

the Western reliance on vision to depict reality and convey “truth.” In this respect, this study takes Joyce’s work as “writerly” texts in Barthes’s formulation from *S/Z*: “To interpret a text is not to give it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to appreciate what *plural* constitutes it” (5). This is exactly my intention behind analyzing Joyce’s critique of ocularcentrism: Joyce’s challenge to vision dispels any notion of singular, unquestioned, and essential meaning. In his discussion of the “writerly” text, Barthes imagines what a “triumphant plural” text embodies and in so doing he conjures up a description of a text that displaces meaning and that also sounds a great deal like *Finnegans Wake*:

In this ideal text, the networks are many and interact, without any one of them being able to surpass the rest; this text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds; it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by several entrances, none of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one; the codes it mobilizes extend *as far as the eye can reach*, they are indeterminable (meaning here is never subject to a principle of determination, unless by throwing dice); the systems of meaning can take over this absolutely plural text, but their number is never closed, based as it is in the infinity of language. (Barthes’s emphasis, 5-6)²

That Barthes uses *and* emphasizes the phrase “*as far as the eye can reach*” tells us something about his idea of the “plural” text: it is “beyond the eye.” And to be “beyond the eye” is to resist the movement toward essentialism and solitary meaning embodied in the Western reliance on vision. Joyce creates his texts that go “beyond the eye” by letting the “eyes” have it. His work consistently brings up the process of vision in order to examine its relationship to consciousness and meaning.

Joyce begins his investigation of vision in the novel with the title of his first one:

A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. The title tells all: this novel is a *Bildungsroman*, a “portrait” of the evolution of an artist concentrating on his youth. Youth is the important concept here because it is the basis of the *Bildungsroman* from Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meister* to Jane Austen to the novel Joyce took his title from, James’s *The Portrait of a Lady*. As a struggle with the past, the *Bildungsroman*, in Franco Moretti’s words, embodies the “symbolic form of modernity” (5). Joyce’s title also tells us that his novel is a “visual” manifestation of this response to modernity, and, by its allusion to James’s novel, a response preoccupied with the inner mind-- the consciousness-- of his main character. The “visual” quality of the novel of education has been remarked upon by Paul de Man as a response to the past:

The human figures that epitomize modernity are defined by experiences such as childhood or convalescence, a freshness of perception that results from a slate wiped clear, from the absence of a past that has not yet had time to tarnish the immediacy of perception (although what is thus freshly discovered prefigures the end of this very freshness). (165)

A Portrait begins with one of Stephen’s first experiences, an infant experience completely “clear” of history. However, as the novel progresses, Stephen acquires a “tarnish” to his perception as he develops a history (“He was for Ireland and Parnell and so was his father” [*P* 37]). He will take these two forces-- a personalized vision and a personal history-- into *Ulysses*. However, Stephen also takes something else with him into June 16, 1904: the interior monologue. This technique has its beginning in “The Uncle Charles Principle” and gets thrown into a new form in the diary entries which end the novel. The interior monologue reaches its maturity in *Ulysses* and is imploded in the word-ocean of *Finnegans Wake*. This chapter traces the evolution of the interior

monologue in Joyce as a response to conventional narrative and its links to Western ideas about clarity and “truth.” And we begin with an infant looking at his father.

It scenes like a landescape from Wildu Picturescu
or some seem on some dimb Arras, dumb as Mum's
mutyness, this mimage of the seventyseventh kusun
of kristansen is odable to os across the wineless Ere
no œdor nor mere eerie nor liss potent of suggestion
than in the tales of the tingmount. (Prigged!)

--*Finnegans Wake* (FW 53.1-6)

Stephen¹

A Portrait opens with a story about the “moocow” and with Stephen opening his eyes: “His father told him that story: his father looked at him through a glass: he had a hairy face” (*P* 7). This description of his sight is the beginning of the construction of Stephen’s consciousness, a construction beginning with the most elemental qualities of his character: his senses. On the first page of the book the sense impressions of the young Stephen are given to us from sight, to hearing (the story of the moocow), to touch (“When you wet the bed first it is warm then it gets cold” [*P* 7]), to taste (lemon platt, a cachou), and finally, to smell (“His mother put on the oilsheet. That had a queer smell” [*P* 7]). Kenner calls this first page of the novel an “Aristotelian catalogue of senses... played against the unfolding of the infant conscience” (*Dublin's* 114). It is also, according to Kenner, a tidy listing of how Joyce uses the senses as symbols throughout his writing:

The audible soothes: the visible disturbs. Throughout Joyce’s work, the senses are symbolically disposed. Smell is the means of discriminating empirical realities... sight corresponds to the phantasms of oppression, hearing to the imaginative life. Touch and taste together are the modes of sex. (*Dublin's* 114)

Vision “disturbs” and “corresponds to the phantasms of oppression” partly because it is first associated with the image of the father. Fathers throughout Joyce’s work symbolize what E. L. Epstein describes as a “bullying...haughty and paralyzing power” (*Ordeal* 41). Ultimately the symbol of the father represents the forces that attempt to hold Stephen back from becoming an artist and a “father” in his own right (“Break my spirit, all of you, if you can! I’ll bring you all to heel!” [*U* 15.4235-36]). This threat of the visible is continued throughout the book but emphasized in a scene on the second page of the novel that originated in one of Joyce’s epiphanies.

The threat of vision-- the threat of a “phantasm of oppression”-- occurs as a threat to Stephen’s organs of sight:

The Vances lived in number seven. They had a different
mother and father. They were Eileen’s father and mother.
When they were grown up he was going to marry Eileen.
He hid under the table. His mother said:
 --O, Stephen will apologise.
Dante said:
 --O, if not, the eagles will come and pull out his eyes.
 Pull out his eyes.
 Apologise.
 Apologise.
 Pull out his eyes.

 Apologise,
 Pull out his eyes,
 Pull out his eyes,
 Apologise. (P 8)

The epiphany this scene is based on is very similar except for one factor: Mr. Vance begins the epiphany: “Mr Vance-- (*comes in with a stick*)... O, you know, he’ll have to apologise, Mrs Joyce” (Scholes and Kain 11). Mr. Vance takes the role of Dante in the epiphany and tells Joyce and his mother about the eagles and their retribution. Mr.

Vance-- with stick in hand-- takes the form of what Epstein describes as a “threatening father,” but in *A Portrait* the force Stephen is hiding from is invisible.³ These threats of vision will become a part of Stephen’s world, so much so that, as R. B. Kershner points out, the “chiasmic structure of the rhyme [“Pull out his eyes,/ Apologise”] will be echoed throughout the remainder of the book, and becomes one of the most easily identifiable patterns of Stephen’s thought” (155).

Stephen’s relationship to vision is demonstrated in the early part of the novel as the young Stephen becomes accustomed to the world and its disappointments. At Clongowes, Stephen has the first of the disruptions of “clear” vision that will mark his childhood and adolescence:

He had been thrown by the fellow’s machine lightly on the cinderpath and his spectacles had been broken in three pieces and some of the grit of the cinders had gone into his mouth.

That was why the fellows seemed to him smaller and farther away and the goalposts so thin and far and the soft grey sky so high up. (*P* 41)

He is panded for not having his glasses and not doing the lesson (“Broke my glasses! An old schoolboy trick!” [*P* 50). Father Conmee tells Stephen that he will correct Father Dolan about the “mistake” he made in panding him but the damage is done: the “fathers” have punished Stephen for not having “clear” vision.

Stephen’s weak eyes and the problems he has with seeing throughout *A Portrait* and *Ulysses* are thrown into an ironic context when we consider his name. His name has been widely discussed as combining the name of the first Christian martyr with that of the ancient Greek artificer-- the latter being emphasized by the epigraph to the novel:

“*Et ignotas animum dimittit in artes*” (*P* 5).⁴ It is in considering his first name that Stephen’s relationship to vision is thrown into a provocative irony. As Epstein describes it, the martyr Stephen was named after was the model of “clearsightedness” because he reportedly was the first man to see Christ in heaven standing next to God (*Ordeal* 197). In Acts, this is described as the action that gets him stoned to death:

But he, being full of the Holy Ghost, looked up steadfastly into heaven, and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God.

And said, Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God.

Then they cried out with a loud voice, and stopped their ears, and ran upon him with one accord. (Acts 7.55-57)

Myopic Stephen is named after a saint who was able to see into heaven. This irony is continually alluded to throughout *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*. Without glasses is how Stephen spends the day in *Ulysses* and the same forces attempt to punish him for his “incorrect” vision. But Joyce’s play with vision in *A Portrait* goes deeper than just the breaking of Stephen’s glasses. It is in Joyce’s depiction of Stephen’s evolving consciousness that we get his critique of conventional representation. It is this portrait of Stephen’s inner world that challenges classic narrative and established thinking on the connections between consciousness and sight. And, as with a great deal of Joyce criticism, this discussion of Stephen’s consciousness begins with a problem.

Joyce’s work should be read as a whole (or “hole affair” [*FW* 535.20]) not only because each book provides insight into the others, but because the books are linked in various ways. This occurs on the level of character (Stephen in *A Portrait* to Stephen in mourning in *Ulysses*, Martin Cunningham in “Grace” and Martin Cunningham providing

the inside information on Bloom in “Cyclops”) and on the level of technique (the epiphanies in *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*; the “Uncle Charles Principle” from *Dubliners* to *A Portrait*). The above epigraph from *Finnegans Wake* works in this way in relation to this discussion of Joyce’s first novel. The quote begins with a reference to Wilde and the most solipsistic portrait in literature: “It scenes like a landscape from Wildu Picturescu.”

What follows is the *Wake* translation of a passage from chapter IV of *A Portrait*:

Like a scene on some vague arras, old as man’s weariness, the
image of the seventh city of christendom was visible to him
across the timeless air, no older nor more weary nor less
patient of subjection than in the days of the thingmote. (*P* 167)

At the end of the *Wake* version of this passage, Joyce tells us that it has been “Prigged!” from his earlier work. What is interesting is that the original version of this passage begins with Stephen looking at this homeland across the water:

A veiled sunlight lit up faintly the grey sheet of water where
the river was embayed. In the distance along the course of the
slowflowing Liffey slender masts flecked the sky and, more
distant still, the dim fabric of the city lay prone in haze. (*P* 167)

Stephen’s gaze triggers here what Yeats and Pound would call “intellectual vision” and he sees “the image” of the city “across the timeless air.” Joyce pokes fun at the seriousness of this scene (“some seem”) in *Finnegans Wake* by linking it with Wilde’s “Picturescu” and by calling it “dumb as Mum’s mutyness, this mimage.” This is a silent image combined with a mirage (“mimage”) shown on a “dimb Arras” or dark movie screen. I will be discussing the “mimage”-- the play with “clear” vision and obscurity-- in the *Wake* but for now we must concentrate on the last word of this *Wake* translation of

a passage from *A Portrait*: “Prigged!” This word means “stolen” but it also can be taken to mean “to be made a prig.” This is a comment on the character called Stephen Dedalus as well as an indication of the problem critics have had in reading Stephen: Is he a prig or a sympathetic character? What kind of distance is there between the narrator and Stephen? Is Stephen an aesthete of an emerging poet? These questions abound because the narration of the novel poses them and refuses to supply easy answers to them.

Joyce’s choice of the word “prig” here is not without reference; as with much of the *Wake*’s revenge upon negative criticism, Joyce turns the sharp edge of this small word back on its user. In *Time and Western Man*, Wyndham Lewis calls *A Portrait* “a rather cold and priggish book” (73). In specific relation to Stephen, Lewis writes: “It would be difficult, I think, to find a more lifeless, irritating, principal figure than the deplorable hero of the *Portrait of the Artist* and of *Ulysses*” (97). With Lewis’s comments in mind, Joyce’s “Prigged!” may be interpreted in two ways: Joyce announcing that he had created an unsympathetic egoist in Stephen who deserved to have his wings clipped in *Ulysses* (an acknowledgment of Lewis’s “correct” reading); or, Joyce announcing in an ironic mode his dismay that critics see Stephen as a prig. There is, of course, a third position of Joyce seeing his character made up of both of these qualities, of Stephen being a prig who we should have sympathy for because of his struggles to become an artist. The debate over how we should read Stephen’s character has not been resolved. Hugh Kenner calls him an “aesthete” who is “priggish [and] humourless [in] the last chapter of the *Portrait*” (*Dublin’s* 112). In *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, Wayne Booth takes *A Portrait* as a text displaying a problem of “distance” between author and character, a problem

leading Booth to ask: “Is Stephen a pompous ass or not?” (332). In a reply to Booth’s reading of the novel as an ironic portrait, Robert Scholes has countered with a discussion of Stephen’s aesthetics and attempts at writing that leads him to conclude that the book gives us a Stephen who “ceases to be an esthete and becomes a poet” (“Stephen” 480). I cannot resolve this debate, although I believe that the answer lies in the *Wake*’s “Prigged!” What the debate does highlight is the experiments in narrative that gives us the consciousness of a character.

Early critical responses to *A Portrait* stressed its relationship to the classic form of the *Bildungsroman*. In one of the earliest essays written on it, Pound made the connection between Joyce’s first novel and Flaubert’s novel of education: “*The Portrait* is very different from *L'Education Sentimentale*, but it would be easier to compare it with that novel of Flaubert’s than with anything else” (“James” 90). H. G. Wells cemented the connection to the classic *Bildungsroman* in an essay in which he described Joyce as having a “cloacal obsession” (330). Wells describes the technique of the novel as a shift in narrative that has interested and distracted critics since the book first appeared:

It is a mosaic of jagged fragments that does altogether render with extreme completeness the growth of a rather secretive, imaginative boy in Dublin. The technique is startling, but on the whole it succeeds. Like so many Irish writers from Sterne to Shaw Mr. Joyce is a bold experimentalist with paragraph and punctuation. He breaks from scene to scene without a hint of the change of time and place; at the end he passes suddenly from the third to the first; he uses no inverted commas to mark off his speeches. (331)

Joyce’s aversion to quotation marks is well known; he preferred the continental form of the dash to mark off dialogue— a convention he saw at work in the pages of Flaubert.

What is interesting about Wells's comments is his mention of Sterne and his analysis of the novel as a "mosaic of jagged fragments" culminating in a final narrative shock: "at the end he passes from the third person to the first." Sterne's *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy* is a deconstruction of the *Bildungsroman* before it became an established convention of the English novel. As Bakhtin describes it, Sterne was able to write such a send up of the novel of education only eleven years after Fielding published *Tom Jones* because Sterne performed "a peculiar transposition of Rabelais's and Cervantes's world concept into the subjective language of the new age" (37). *Tristram Shandy*, as a manifestation of what Bakhtin calls "individual carnival" (37), plays with the reader's expectations of plot and linear narrative; Tristram tells us this as he justifies the novel's endless digressions:

I know there are readers in the world, as well as many other good people in it, who are no readers at all,-- who find themselves ill at ease, unless they are let into the whole secret from first to last, of every thing which concerns you. (3)

But this "every thing which concerns you" turns out to be *everything* the narrator can think of. Sterne's novel is filled with wild digressions and extended discourses on almost every conceivable subject from human gestation to military tactics. These comic complications of the narrative provided Joyce with background for his creation of the comic universes of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. Sterne's name appears several times throughout the *Wake* as a contrast to Swift's role as a "controlled" writer: "one yeastyday he sternely struxk his tete in a tub for to watsch the future of his fates but ere he swiftly stook it out again" (*FW* 4.21-23).⁵ "He" sticks his head (*tête*) in the river Styx to "wash

the features of his face” (McHugh 4). Or, as Stephen puts it in *A Portrait*: “I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race” (*P* 253). In *Invisible Man*, Ralph Ellison performs a reading/writing of this passage which points to Joyce’s overall goal; the narrator of the novel thinks back to his college days and one of his teachers who said: “Stephen’s problem, like ours, was not actually one of creating the uncreated conscience of his race, but of creating the *uncreated features of his face*. Our task is that of making ourselves individuals” (Ellison’s emphasis, 345-46).⁶ It is the “making” of an individual that Joyce describes in his first novel. And he does this through an attack on classic narrative.

Sterne is an important precursor for Joyce because he created a work of fiction that consistently foregrounds the notion of fiction and the act of reading, or, as Booth defines it, “the novel as unmediated reality” (50). As John Paul Riquelme puts it, the work’s “divergences from what Tristram calls the straight line of the narrative encourage the reader to reflect on the various styles and structures of the larger work providing their context” (49). Throughout his story Tristram brings up his inability to stay on the “straight line” of his narrative and even begs “O ye Powers” to help him keep the novel “straight”: “I beg and beseech you... that wherever, in whatever part of your dominions it so falls out, that three several roads meet in one point... that at least you will set up a guide-post, in the center of them, in mere charity to direct an uncertain devil, which of the three he is to take” (151). However, because it lacks the “subjective” consciousness of a first person narrator, *A Portrait* lacks the “grounding” *Tristram Shandy* has in the albeit

experimental voice of its narrator. *A Portrait* is a novel with free indirect discourse or the “Uncle Charles Principle” in evidence on every page. This begins with the first sentence of the novel: “Once upon a time and a very good time it was there was a moocow coming down along the road and this moocow that was coming down along the road met a nicens little boy named baby tuckoo.... (P 7). The questions we must ask here are: Who tells this story? Is it the third person narrator or Stephen’s father or Stephen? These first pages of the novel, as Michael Patrick Gillespie describes it, raise questions that are asked in varying ways for the rest of the book:

By leaving ambiguous the source or sources for significant portions of the passage, *Portrait* confronts the reader with questions of voice and authority: Who is telling the fairy tale? Stephen? His father? The narrator? Does Stephen’s mother sing the original verse of the song or does the narrative voice quote it?.... Who creates the parodic nursery rhyme? While each question may appear banal in isolation, taken together they reflect alternatives that offer several significantly different possibilities for interpretation of the immediate tone of the passage and establish assumptions for comprehension of the succeeding discourse. (85)

Gillespie concludes that these consistent questions keep the text from establishing itself as a voice emanating from a single source. Instead, many voices seem to be speaking/ narrating at once. This takes an extreme form at the beginning of the novel and later, as Stephen’s mind develops, the “voice” in the text grows more and more to resemble Stephen’s.

There is no direct description of it, but the “Pull out his eyes/ Apologize” rhyme is commonly taken as emerging from the word-obsessed mind of young Stephen. This immediate input from Stephen’s mind occurs throughout the novel and is contrasted by

the “omniscient” voice of the narrator and the “Uncle Charles Principle” at work with other characters. This vacillation of narrative viewpoint is what Riquelme points to as the basic form of the novel, a form he describes as based upon an “oscillating perspective” which

Joyce creates... through style... [a] continuing refinement of his techniques for rendering consciousness that he develops during the writing of *Dubliners* and *Stephen Hero*. The subtle intermingling of third- and first-person perspectives that Joyce effects in *A Portrait* is the most significant change in the style of his autobiographical work, one that clearly differentiates it clearly from *Stephen Hero*. The mixing of narrator’s and character’s views in *A Portrait*, which is prepared for by aspects of *Dubliners*, will become the *donnée* of *Ulysses*, the stylistic element the later work starts with, deviates from, then returns to in “Penelope.” It is also an early step toward the radical superimposing of voices in *Finnegans Wake*. (48)

The “mixing” of “views” is what is important in this description. Booth warns us that one of the pitfalls of a shifting narrative is that “any sustained inside view, of whatever depth, temporarily turns the character whose mind is shown into a narrator” (164). This happens throughout *A Portrait* and it emphasizes the fact that throughout the history of literary criticism “view” and “perspective” are used to describe a character’s encounter with and description of reality.⁷ That this encounter is presented in visual terms tells us a great deal about how narration is customarily depicted. In Lukács’s definition of the classic form of the realist novel, the protagonist performs a “journeying towards himself” to achieve a “clear self-recognition” (*Theory* 80). *A Portrait* is constructed around this concept of the “journey” but it avoids any reliance on one “perspective” and ultimately gives an “unclear” recognition of the protagonist. Thus we still have a critical debate over the nature of Stephen’s character. This is a direct attack

upon conventional mimesis and a recognition of the visual basis of narrative (and of criticism of narrative).

The “oscillation” of perspective is turned to one final extreme in the last seven pages of the novel. This turn highlights the “mixing” of voices throughout the text and, as Riquelme notes, leads to the carnival of voices in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. The ending of *A Portrait* is made up of Stephen’s diary entries and they provide for a sharp contrast to the opening of the book. The “story” of the diary is completely Stephen’s: these are his words and they are conveyed in his voice. There is no question who takes over the narrative at this point. The vocabulary and rhythm of this section are from the inner mind of Stephen. Ellmann goes as far as calling the diary entries “Joyce’s first interior monologue” the form of which “makes it seem less extraordinary”:

It had a dramatic justification...in that Stephen could no longer communicate with anyone in Ireland but himself. But it was also a way of relaxing by sentence fragments and seemingly casual connections among thoughts the more formal style of the narrative.... Having gone so far, Joyce in *Ulysses* boldly eliminated the journal, and let thoughts hop, step, jump, and glide without the self-consciousness of a journal to account for their agitation. (JJ 358-59)

In this sense, Stephen has accomplished the “journeying towards himself” Lukács describes in the realist novel. However, this “self-recognition” is very different from that of classic narrative and this may be gleaned from one of the final entries:

16 April: Away! Away!
The spell of arms and voices: the white arms of roads,
their promise of close embraces and the black arms of tall
ships that stand against the moon, their tale of distant
nations. They are held out to say: We are alone. Come.
And the voices say with then: We are your kinsmen. And
the air is thick with their company as they call to me, their
kinsman, making ready to go, shaking the wings of their

exultant and terrible youth. (*P* 252)

The importance of this entry lies in the fact that it is almost an exact transcription of one of Joyce's early epiphanies (Scholes and Kain 40). This provides a direct link between Joyce's early experiments in depicting experience-- what I have called "visual puzzles" in the preceding chapter-- and his development of the interior monologue. It is in *Ulysses* that the interior monologue gets developed and played out in an effort to critique the reliance on vision in narrative and depictions of consciousness.

And this is why any simple philadolphus of a fool you like to dress, an athenisthued lowtownian. exlegged phatrisight, may be awfully green to one side of him and fruitfully blue on the other which will not screen him however from appealing to my gropesarching eyes.... (*FW* 167.8-13)

Joyce... is good. He is a good writer. People like him because he is incomprehensible and anybody can understand him. But who came first, Gertrude Stein or James Joyce? Do not forget that my first great book, *Three Lives*, was published in 1908. That was long before *Ulysses*.

--Gertrude Stein (*JJ* 529)

Stephen²

Gertrude Stein investigated the dynamics of consciousness in her writing "long before *Ulysses*" became the *succès de scandale* of the literary world. Stein had a head start and a distinct advantage over Joyce in this regard. While Joyce skipped classes and defended Ibsen at University College, Dublin (1898-1902), Stein, as she put it in *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, was exposed to one of the most influential minds of

the century: “The important person in Gertrude Stein’s Radcliffe life was William James” (96). Stein attended Radcliffe from 1893-97 and was mesmerized by the teaching of James. As I noted in chapter one, James was one of the guiding forces behind turn-of-the-century philosophy’s “break” with conventional notions of experience and consciousness. With the publication of *The Principles of Psychology* in 1890, James had solidified his “inverted Platonism” by inaugurating American psychology as a discipline. Stein was assigned the condensed version of *The Principles of Psychology* when she first had James as a teacher in 1893 (Ruddick 14). It was in this work that James coined the term that launched a literary revolt against narrative convention: “Consciousness... does not appear to itself chopped up in bits.... It is nothing joined; it flows. A ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described” (239). *The Principles of Psychology* and James’s teaching had a profound effect on Stein, so much so that she followed his advice and went on to medical school to pursue a career in psychology. Stein dropped out of Johns Hopkins, but she continued to follow James’s teaching in her writing.

As Lisa Ruddick describes it, James was Stein’s “intellectual father, the person who contributed most to her first expressions of artistic power but who then became part of the nineteenth century she had to escape” (14). Stein began to demonstrate this influence/struggle in her “first great book,” a work Ruddick calls “so close... to James’s theory of the mind as to approach psychological allegory” (15). Modeled on Flaubert’s *Trois Contes* and the painting of Cézanne, *Three Lives* is the “portrait” of three women

created from the words which fill their worlds. *Three Lives* does not employ what we now would define as interior monologue or stream of consciousness technique-- a technique commonly associated with Joyce, Woolf, and Faulkner. And yet the book follows what James meant by "stream of consciousness" by portraying consciousness and lived experience as a continuous flow uninterrupted by time or "artificial" conceptions of being. The repetitions of "Melanctha" -- the most effective of the "portraits"-- replaces, in the words of Ruddick, "the expected peaks or halting places with a continuous flow of fading and beckoning-- or overlapping-- thoughts" (37). The technique of "Melanctha" relies upon a repetition that places us within the "word world" of Melanctha's mind as it evades the conventional demarcation of time. In Melvin Friedman's summation, Stein "liberated language from its syntactical and logical controls, her repetitions are a kind of word-photograph of the unorganized vicissitudes of the mind" (54).

Melanctha's "portrait" is given to us, as Friedman describes it, "as if it were a direct quotation" from her mind (53). But more to the point, it is a "portrait" constructed from the *movement* of Melanctha's mind:

Melanctha Herbert was all sore and bruised inside her. Melanctha had needed Rose always to believe her, Melanctha needed Rose always to let her cling to her, Melanctha wanted badly to have somebody who could make her always feel a little safe inside her, and now Rose had sent her from her. Melanctha wanted Rose more than she had ever wanted all the others. Rose was always so simple, solid, decent, for her. And now Rose had cast her from her. Melanctha was lost, and all the world went whirling in a mad weary dance around her. (233)

What is interesting about this passage from the end of her "portrait" is that in its repetitions it duplicates Melanctha's problems: she is worried about herself and thus

the paragraph gives us her name six times; she is worried about the loss of Rose's friendship and thus Rose's name is also mentioned exactly six times. That the two names are both mentioned six times combines them in the narration-- a combination Melanctha would like to maintain, but Rose has "cast her from her." As Ruddick points out, "Melanctha" is a testing ground for James's theories about perception and experience and their overall links with consciousness. *Three Lives* is a collection of "portraits" that give different views of their subjects based upon what James called "their habits of attention" (Ruddick 16). But if Stein is correct and she was testing the waters of consciousness in fiction "long before *Ulysses*" then it is also true that other writers had experimented with depicting the inner lives of their characters long before *Three Lives*.

Stream of consciousness as a literary technique has been described as emanating from a number of sources including the dramatic monologues of Tennyson and Browning and the novels of Sterne, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky. The range of opinions over who first developed the technique and even what to call it-- stream of consciousness or interior monologue-- has plagued criticism since the technique was first described.⁸ We know that May Sinclair first used the term "stream of consciousness" in an 1918 essay on the novels of Dorothy Richardson.⁹ And the first of Richardson's *Pilgrimage* novels-- the novels in which Richardson is credited by Sinclair as beginning the stream of consciousness technique in British fiction-- appeared in 1915, six years after *Three Lives* and seven before *Ulysses*. And Proust had published the first part of his investigation into consciousness and memory that made up *A la recherche du temps perdu* in 1912. But with all these literary precursors in front of him, Joyce pointed to an earlier writer as

the influence behind his development of the interior monologue; this acknowledgment placed *Ulysses* in a tradition of writers and artists who explicitly challenged how vision is equated with consciousness and “truth.” It also made “interior monologue” the term Joyce used to describe the technique over the more Anglo-American “stream of consciousness.”

In 1917, while he was in the middle of writing *Ulysses* and Europe was nearing the end of a war, Joyce wrote a letter to Edouard Dujardin to ask him where he could locate his 1887 novel *Les Lauriers sont coupés*. The book was out of print and the copy Joyce had bought and read in 1903 was back in Trieste and lost to him because of the war. The reasons he gave for his request were vague: “I am a sincere admirer of your work, so personal, so independent, and also am a humble labourer in the vineyard of the Lord” (SL 229). These may have been vague reasons but to others Joyce was explicit about the importance of Dujardin’s novel to him. He made this perfectly clear to Frank Budgen when speaking of how he depicted the inner thoughts of his characters in the early chapters of his novel in progress: “I try to give the unspoken, unacted thoughts of people in the way they occur. But I’m not the first one to do it. I took it from Dujardin. You don’t know Dujardin? You should” (94). It seems that nobody knew Dujardin. But *Ulysses* changed that.

At the end of 1921, Valéry Larbaud delivered a lecture-- a *conférence*-- on Joyce’s still unpublished novel at the book shop of Adrienne Monnier. It was an important event because Larbaud was an important barometer of avant-garde literature in English; it was

also the first public discussion of *Ulysses*, a book that would not appear in Shakespeare and Co. for another two months. Larbaud's lecture was important to Joyce and Sylvia Beach because it was a great advertisement for the book the former was busily completing and the latter bravely publishing. In preparing for the lecture, Larbaud spoke with Joyce about the early chapters of the novel that had appeared in the *Little Review*. Their conversation centered around the technique Joyce used in conveying the thoughts of Stephen and Bloom. The inner thoughts of Stephen are given throughout the first two chapters, but the third, "Proteus," concentrated on the inner world of his mind ("Houses of decay, mine, his and all [*U* 3.105]). This emphasis on Stephen's inner thoughts was indicated in the schema Joyce gave to Larbaud which illustrated the technique and Homeric parallel of each chapter. Under "Proteus" Joyce noted that the technique is "Monologue (Male)" (Gilbert 30). According to Ellmann, Larbaud was the first to use the term "*monologue intérieur*" to describe the inner speech given in *Ulysses*. Joyce was quick to accept this term-- "stream of consciousness" does not translate well into French-- but he responded to Larbaud's application of the term with a description of the book in which he saw the technique first used. The novel was Edouard Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés* and Joyce pointed out that in it

the reader finds himself established, from the first lines, in the thought of the principle personage, and the uninterrupted unrolling ('*déroulement ininterrompu*') of that thought, replacing the usual form of narrative, conveys to us what this personage is doing or what is happening to him. (*JJ* 519-520)

However, like Joyce, Larbaud could not find a copy of *Les Lauriers sont coupés*. The novel had disappeared with its author into obscurity. It was long out of print and its

author was forgotten. But Joyce's relentless promotion of Dujardin eventually focused attention on him and got his books reissued and his fame as a late-Symbolist solidified.¹⁰ And, according to Ellmann, Joyce even helped Stuart Gilbert translate *Les Lauriers sont coupés* into English (*JJ* 520).

Les Lauriers sont coupés is the story of six hours in the life of a young man named Daniel Prince. The six hours are overwhelmingly occupied with Prince's thoughts about an amorous encounter he is to have that evening. The main difference between Prince's interior monologue and Stephen's or Bloom's is that the depiction of Prince's thoughts are unmediated by any narrative presence besides his own consciousness. Genette describes the thoughts of Prince as being "mysteriously caught and transcribed by Dujardin" in a way that precludes "any formal determination of the narrating instance which it constitutes" (230). The novel begins with Prince establishing his presence in the world:

In the midst of the confusion of appearances, caught up in time and place immemorial, amid the illusion of things self-engendered and self-begotten, one among them-- the same and yet one more-- from the infinity of possible existences, I arise. And now time and place become clear; it is today; it is the Here and the Now as recorded by the hour which is ringing. And all about me is life: the hour, the place, an April evening, Paris.... (quoted in Friedman, 148)

This description is reminiscent of Stephen walking across the beach in "Proteus" with the world of life and decay all around him ("Dead breaths I living breathe, tread dead dust, devour a urinous offal from all dead" [*U* 3.479-480]).¹¹ The obvious difference between the interior monologue in Dujardin and *Ulysses* is that Joyce allows an outside narrator--

what Hayman calls the “arranger”-- to order events and actions (“Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed” [*U* 1.1-2]). The only place in the novel where this does not occur is during the uninterrupted flow of Molly’s thoughts in “Penelope.” However, “Penelope” is structured in a different way than Dujardin’s interior monologue; this can only be examined by exploring how Joyce uses interior monologue in the early chapters of the book. But before doing this I must bring up the tradition of writing Joyce placed *Ulysses* in when he tied it to Dujardin.

As Friedman describes it, Dujardin “belongs properly to the second generation of Symbolists” (140). Mallarmé himself praised the work of Dujardin: “The author is one of today’s interesting literary figures; a man of culture, who burns with a continuous, pure fire; he is set apart from others” (quoted in Friedman, 140). It is Dujardin’s place within the Symbolist movement that we must examine to understand Joyce’s advocacy of *Les Lauriers sont coupés* and his use of the interior monologue. Joyce and modernist literature in general from Yeats to Eliot has been described by Edmund Wilson as a development of “Symbolism and of its fusion or conflict with Naturalism” (25). It is in Wilson’s description of Symbolism that we can discern its connections with Romanticism and its effect on writers like Pater, Yeats, and Joyce:

The Symbolists themselves, full of the idea of producing with poetry effects like those of music, tended to think of... images as possessing an abstract value like musical notes and chords. But the words of our speech are not musical notation, and what the symbols of Symbolism really were, were metaphors detached from their subjects-- for one cannot, beyond a certain point, in poetry, merely enjoy color and sound for their own sake: one has to guess what the images are being applied to. And Symbolism may be defined as an

attempt by carefully studied means-- a complicated association of ideas represented by a medley of metaphors-- to communicate unique personal feelings. (21-22)

It is this reliance on the "personal" that is important for a consideration of Joyce's aesthetics. *A Portrait* is an autobiographical novel and its use of the "Uncle Charles Principle" emphasizes this: the "detached," Flaubertian narration is colored for the most part by Stephen's consciousness. And the diary entries that end the novel are the breaking through of Stephen's thoughts to such a degree that Hayman's "arranger" is left with only the job of supplying dates to the entries. In *Ulysses*, Joyce goes further and employs interior monologue as he attempts to produce "effects like those of music" ("Sirens") and uses "metaphors detached from their subjects" ("Oxen of the Sun," "Circe," "Ithaca"). In this respect, Joyce follows the Symbolist reaction to "clear" vision that Martin Jay describes at the core of the Symbolist aesthetic. From Mallarmé's "visual" poems to Rimbaud's call for a "derangement of the senses," Symbolism was preoccupied with challenging conventional ways of seeing in art and reality. This movement away from lucid vision, according to Jay, provided the impetus for the modernist preoccupation with vision as well as for the obscurity that became its hallmark:

Verlaine's influential injunction to "take eloquence and wring its neck" meant not only a call to abandon the hackneyed clichés of the past. It also signaled a preference for hermetic obscurity over easy accessibility. Ironically, in their zeal to purify the language the Symbolists separated purity from clarity, and in so doing, helped pave the way for the belief that when a visual dimension of the text was present to consciousness, it could produce meaningless opacity rather than communicative transparency. In fact, for all its emphasis on the musicalization of poetry, Symbolism itself did at times probe the visual dimension of literature in precisely this way. Synesthesia, after all, meant the creative confusion of the senses, not the

overthrowing of one hierarchy in the name of another.
(177-78)

Ulysses “probes” the visual in the respect that it follows the Symbolist paradigm of reliance on the opaque and the overthrowing of the search for “truth.” The early chapters of *Ulysses* are relatively “clear” compared to the second half of the novel. That the technique of the interior monologue dominates the first, “clear” section of the book is important: it is Joyce’s exploration of the mind, a technique he saw at work in other literature. But Joyce dispensed with the interior monologue for most of the “obscure” second half of *Ulysses*. As Ellmann explains it, Joyce “came... to regard the interior monologue as a stylization, rather than a total exposition, of consciousness” (*JJ* 528). This admission on Joyce’s part of the artificiality of his technique provides a key to the novel; denying the “realism” of the interior monologue, Joyce demonstrates that his book is occupied with something besides the depiction of “life”:

From my point of view, it hardly matters whether the technique is “veracious” or not; it has served me as a bridge over which to march my eighteen episodes, and, once I have got my troops across, the opposing forces can for all I care, blow the bridge sky-high. (*JJ* 528)

It is the turn from “clear” consciousness to “obscure” form that lies behind the critique of vision embodied in *Ulysses*. But to examine this we must begin with the cloudy sky of “Telemachus.”

In *Time and Western Man*, Wyndham Lewis tells us that the “stage directions for getting Stephen Dedalus, the irritating hero, about” are “all painfully enlightening” in the respect that they disclose the clichés the book is plagued with (95). He points to an example early on in “Proteus”: “He turned abruptly his grey searching eyes from the sea

to Stephen's face" (*U* 1. 86-87). Lewis's responds to this line thus: "Great searching eyes! Oh, where were the great searching eyes of the author, from whom no verbal cliché may escape, when he wrote that?" (96).¹² But as Kenner tells us, Lewis "draws the wrong conclusions" here as he did when he missed the "Uncle Charles Principle" (*Joyce's* 69). Lewis, according to Kenner, makes the mistake of pointing out Joyce's use of cliché as sloppiness instead of as a purposeful application of worn-out language. As Kenner puts it, Lewis "scored another near-miss in spotting traces of the kind of novel in which Dedalus and Mulligan imagine they are characters" (*Joyce's* 69). The language of the third-person narrator-- the "arranger"-- is colored by the "traces of theater" the two characters bring to the opening of the novel. That this instance of cliché revolves around Mulligan's gaze at the sea and then his turn to Stephen is indicative of how Joyce foregrounds vision throughout the novel. Mulligan looks at Stephen just as we as readers "look" into the minds of the characters throughout the novel. But this "look" is not always "clear" or revelatory. It is often blurred, obscured, and darkened.

Joyce ties questions of vision to problems about identity and meaning throughout *Ulysses*. As Kenner intimates, this is demonstrated in a passage later in the chapter after Mulligan has receded from the "stage" of the chapter and Stephen stares out at the sea:

Woodshadows floated silently by through the morning peace from the stairhead seaward where he gazed. Inshore and farther out the mirror of the water whitened, spurned by the lightshod hurrying feet. White breast of the dim sea. The twining stresses, two by two. A hand plucking the harpstrings, merging their twining chords. Wavewhite wedded words shimmering on the dim tide. (*U* 1.242-47)

This is Stephen's voice inside the third-person narration ("Wavewhite wedded words")

complete with the first instance of his continual reference to Yeats's poem. This is the ultimate end of the "Uncle Charles Principle" because, as Kenner puts it, "the narrative idiom [is] bent by a person's proximity as a star defined by Einstein will bend passing light" (*Joyce's* 71). This is an apt metaphor because it brings up the play with time and space Joyce performs in the very next sentence after this paragraph: "A cloud began to cover the sun slowly, wholly, shadowing the bay in deeper green" (*U* 1.248-49). This is a play with time and space within the novel because the same cloud moves over Bloom in a different space at approximately the same time (several minutes after 8. a.m.): "A cloud began to cover the sun slowly, wholly. Grey. Far" (*U* 4.218). This cloud reminds us that the first three chapters of the novel take place at the exact same time as the next three-- the beginning of *Ulysses* is a double narrative played through the same hours of June 16, 1904 from different perspectives. This play with time brings us to Lewis's critique of the novel as an example of modernist obsession with time.

Lewis's argument is based on the overall attack he wages against the "time-books" of the modernists, books he finds tied up in the "mental" worlds of Bergson and Proust and leading to a distrust of the "physical" world. In Lewis's view, art based on "time-philosophy" ignores the strengths of "true" art:

The inner meaning of the *time-philosophy*... is the doctrine of a mechanistic universe; periodic; timeless, or nothing but "time," whichever you prefer; and, above all, essentially *dead*.... [I]n the exact mixing in the space-timeist scheme of all the "material" and all the "organism" together you get to a sort of vegetable or vermiform *average*. It is very mechanical; and according to our human, aristocratic standards of highly-organized life, it is very dead. (Lewis's emphasis, *Time* 91)

In other words, Lewis objects to the democratic portrayal of the inner workings of the human mind; if everyone “thinks” and everyone experiences “time” then everyone is on the same level of existence. But, as Kenner demonstrates, Lewis can be perceptive about Joyce’s writing at the same time he draws incorrect conclusions about it. And in this case he does not go far enough when considering the extent of Joyce’s attack upon conventional mimesis. There is a reliance on time and human experience in the novel that goes beyond the other modernist experiments with the “time-philosophy.” Jeffrey Segall points out that this is exactly the point the other modernists ignored in Joyce and which T. S. Eliot was blinded to in his touting of the “mythical method”:

Joyce’s major achievement in the novel, one unremarked by Eliot, was the largely sympathetic treatment given to its protagonist, a middle-class Jew named Bloom. Bloom is the object of our affection and laughter, or pity and respect. He does not simply suffer from comparisons with his mythological counterpart but emerges as something of a hero himself. (144)

But Joyce goes even further than this in his project of “humanizing” Bloom. He does this by challenging the entire basis of meaning in traditional narrative and, by extension, traditional approaches to ontology. He does this in the second half of *Ulysses*, the part of the book Lewis does not mention in his portrait of Joyce as a card-carrying member of the “time-cult.” Lewis ignores the second half of the novel because in it Joyce destroys time and space and pushes narrative to its endpoint. And this movement toward the end of narrative revolves around a rejection of “clear” vision at the center of Western conceptions about meaning. When night falls in the second half of *Ulysses*, night falls on meaning.

Ulysses progresses from the reliance on the interior monologue in the first half of the book to the later experiments in narrative that obscures important developments in the plot. But more than plot is obscured. Joyce wrote the first part of *Ulysses* in what he called the “initial style” (*L* 1, 129). Michael Groden has described the composition of the novel as divided between the “initial style” of interior monologue “ordered” by a third-person narrator in the first part of the novel and the experiments with form that begin in “Wandering Rocks” and “Sirens” (15-17). And with “Cyclops” the “initial style” is completely dispensed with: interior monologue fades from the text only to have it played with in “Nausicaa” and returned to with a vengeance in “Penelope.” That the end of the “initial style” is pointed to as beginning with “Cyclops” is important because it underlines the concern with vision the text constantly raises; vision becomes a narrative “problem” in “Cyclops” (“Did you see that bloody chimneysweep near shove my eye out with his brush?” [*U* 12.6-7]) that takes on gigantic proportions and pushes the interior monologue off the stage. As I have already mentioned, Stephen’s lack of glasses becomes a “fact” in “Circe,” the chapter in which time and space are destroyed (“Time’s livid final flame leaps and, in the following darkness, ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry” [*U* 15.4244-45]). In “Circe” the book called *Ulysses* is destroyed and with it the form of the novel; Hélène Cixous writes about the chapter that takes place in Bella Cohen’s in a manner fitting its effect:

This chapter opens like an opera out of gear: you perceive (read-see-hear) that it takes place on a kind of below-stage, a substage, where “the human” no longer means anything, but where things are stirring somehow or other in the quarters of a non-human, of a below. Somewhere, there is still a bit of code, but very little, just barely some points which prick the text on the great back drop of culture....

The immense debacle of representation which bursts all logical chains, divisions, differences, frees a mass of fantasies: as if western imagination, memory banks. cult treasures, the ideological membrane, the great ontological structures had collapsed, then it's the great pell-mell unburdening, ancestors the dead descendants men children insects, walking sticks, the old-fashioned the progressive. located objects, lost beings, sexes. all that mixes interpenetrates lights up changes is diluted, contaminated, permeation without limits. the unconscious communicate, it's the feast day of all the repressed!.... It's the end of metaphors. ("At Circe's" 388-89)

What occurs in "Circe"-- that "immense debacle of representation"-- is far removed from the "initial style" of *Ulysses* and the overall modernist concern with inner experience from Proust to Stein. This is something Lewis missed and Eliot incorrectly associated with "a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history" (177).¹³ Joyce does not attempt to "order" the "messiness" of Western culture and human experience in *Ulysses*; on the contrary, he attempts to explode the basis of the "control" and "order" which has been at the center of Western thought since Plato. The novel returns to the inner thoughts of one of its characters in "Penelope"-- returns to an intensified version of the "initial style"-- but not before it finishes the job of deconstructing the reliance on vision to supply us with "truth" that occurs in "Oxen of the Sun" and "Ithaca," the subjects of the next two chapters.

Endnotes

¹ Throughout this study I have concentrated on Joyce's major work and thus have neglected his poetry and his only play, *Exiles*. The latter is indispensable for a complete discussion of Joyce's ideas about marriage, sexuality, and the "performance" of gender.

² Barthes's comment about meaning being appropriated by "throwing dice" is the exact concentration on "chance" John Cage uses to read/write the *Wake*. For an example of this kind of "throwing dice" reading see John Cage, "Writing for the Second Time Through *Finnegans Wake*" in *Empty Words: Writings '73-79* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1979).

³ Epstein points out that the Biblical passage the whole scene refers to is centered on filial disobedience and the appropriate punishment for it; the passage occurs in Proverbs:

The eye that mocketh at his father and that despiseth the labour of his mother in bearing him, let the raven of the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it. (quoted in Epstein, *Ordeal* 34)

⁴ For a consideration of Stephen's name in the light of Roman and Greek mythology see Ellmann, *The Consciousness of Joyce*, pp. 14-19.

⁵ In *The Books at the Wake* (London: Faber, 1959), James Atherton takes the linking of Sterne and Swift as provoked by Wells's mention of them in his review of *A Portrait*: "Joyce was very sensitive to criticism and Wells's appreciation was one of the first laudatory reviews he ever received. Possibly Swift and Sterne stayed in his mind for ever afterwards" (123).

⁶ Ellison's *Invisible Man* is a text that challenges the visual through its invocation of the "invisible" narrator and its analysis of the construction of "race." Ellison's allusions to Joyce throughout the text-- from direct quotation to veiled plot reference (i.e. the "Cyclops" vision of Brother Jack, the manifestation of the figure Rinehart as "Proteus")-- points to his understanding of Joyce's critique of ocularcentrism.

⁷ Genette describes "perspective" in narrative as traditionally predicated upon "spatial" concerns, upon how "far" the narrator is from the events he sees and seeks to narrate:

Narrative "representation," or, more exactly, narrative information, has its degrees: the narrative can furnish the reader with more or fewer details, and in a more or less direct way, and can thus seem (to adopt a common and convenient spatial metaphor, which is not to be taken literally) to keep at a greater or lesser *distance* from what he tells. The narrative can also choose to regulate

the information it delivers, not with a sort of screening, but according to the capacities of knowledge of one or another participant in the story...with the narrative adopting or seeming to adopt what we ordinarily call the participant's "vision" or "point of view." (162)

Although the "sight" metaphor is not to be taken "literally," its continual use throughout the history of literary criticism emphasizes how narrative is taken as a visual-based process.

⁸ For a description of the differing opinions of the origins of the technique, see Friedman, pp. 1-73. See Genette, pp. 173-75, for a description of the problems with what to call the technique; he believes that the best name for it is "immediate speech" (173), but this term for it has not caught on in critical studies.

⁹ See May Sinclair, "The Novels of Dorothy Richardson," *The Egoist* (April 1918): 57-58.

¹⁰ For a description of Joyce's advocacy of Dujardin and the reevaluation of the French novelist by the literary establishment, see Friedman, pp. 139-177.

¹¹ This kind of evocation of inner consciousness amid the outer world of life and death is also performed in Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*:

In people's eyes, in the swing, tramp, and trudge; in the bellow and the uproar; the carriages, motor cars, omnibuses, vans, sandwich men shuffling and swinging; brass bands; barrel organs; in the triumph and the jingle and the strange high singing of some aeroplane overhead was what she loved; life; London; this moment of June. (4)

¹² Gabler changes "great" which appeared in the first edition to "grey." Either way, the sentence still smacks of the cliché. See Jeri Johnson, ed. *Ulysses: The 1922 Text* (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 5.

¹³ For a description of the radically different approaches to modernity embodied in Joyce and Eliot's "use" of myth, see Meisel, pp. 87-109.

Chapter Five
 Drinking *Ulysses*: “Oxen of the Sun,” Bass Ale, and the Typography of Cubism

...as it gan in the biguinnengs so wound up in a
 bottle of Boss.
 --*Finnegans Wake* (FW 129.10-11)

In 1912, Picasso took an oval canvas and framed it with a length of rope. He painted several objects within this “frame”: a glass, a pipe, a lemon slice, a knife, and a piece of newspaper. He glued some corrugated paper onto the oval canvas to imitate the texture of a cane chair. *Still Life With Chair Caning* was Picasso’s first collage in a series he created in a kind of cultural dialogue with Braque, a dialogue we now call synthetic cubism. This development out of analytic cubism revolved around a shift in materials for the artist-- a shift to materials John Berger said could be found “in any hardware store” (*Picasso* 57).¹ Picasso and Braque broke with what Berger has called “the oil paint in love with itself” (*Picasso* 58). By placing tin, cigarette packages, newspapers, playing cards, dice, calling cards, string, advertisements, and labels in their work, Picasso and Braque “challenged the whole bourgeois concept of art as something precious, valuable, and to be prized like jewelry” (*Picasso* 59). To depict their world-- to depict a world seen through an eye aware of the past reliance on cultural equation of “clear” vision and truth-- the cubists cut up pieces of the everyday world and placed these raw pieces within

frames.²

Hanging in Joyce's apartment in Paris during the writing of *Ulysses* was a picture of the city in which his father was born and raised. This picture of Cork was said to have an unusual frame and when visitors asked about it, Joyce explained "Oh, that's cork, too."³ Just as Picasso's rope frame to *Still Life with Chair Caning* was a comment on the collage, Joyce's cork frame commented on the picture it surrounded. This kind of punning runs throughout the collages of the cubists. Robert Rosenblum was one of the first critics to point out the debt the cubists had for their literary counterparts:

Like his fellow Cubists, Picasso was a member of that literary generation which included the greatest punster in the history of Western literature, James Joyce. And in more personal terms, too, Picasso was an intimate of such Parisian poets as Apollinaire, who, in the *Calligrammes* of 1914, confounded words and images with a new-found typographical freedom; and Max Jacob, who was obsessed with the possibility of endless transmutations of common words. (50-51)

Before getting into the puns in Picasso's collages and their relationship to Joyce, we must go past the "frames" of cork and rope and into the "pictures." The focus of this chapter is a label which appears in many of Picasso's collages between the years 1912 and 1914. The same label also appears in the "Oxen of the Sun" episode of *Ulysses*. The label is on the bottles of Bass Ale which cover the table in the Holles Street Hospital. The same bottles appear on a multitude of tables throughout Picasso's collages.⁴ This meditation upon two of the most famous products of high modernism-- *Ulysses* and synthetic cubism-- leads us into an examination of how they highlight and challenge ocularcentric thinking.

But before taking up the bottles of Bass, a look at one of the most prominent and played with objects of modern life will prove useful. It is an object daily scrutinized by the public eye, and, in turn, it daily shapes the way the public eye “looks.” This object is the newspaper; the newspaper as modernist fetish can be seen throughout modern art-- from Walter Benjamin’s description of the rise of the Parisian newspaper in the nineteenth century⁵ to Alfred Hitchcock’s placement of himself in a newspaper ad for his “appearance” in *Lifeboat* (1944). Besides using the material from “any hardware store” in his *papiers collés*, Picasso used the newspapers which surrounded him wherever he went: in the cafes, on the streets, in the overflowing newsstands by the Seine.

In *Still Life with Chair Caning* three large letters appear on the left: JOU. These letters are a piece of the name of one of the most popular of the Parisian newspapers, *Le Journal*. Pieces of *Le Journal* appear more often in Picasso’s collages than any other newspaper; Robert Rosenblum notes that throughout the collages the entire name of the newspaper never appears. It was Rosenblum, in a famous essay entitled “Picasso and the Typography of Cubism,” who first suggested that fragments like JOU should be understood as puns. In fact, Rosenblum made the ground-breaking assertion that the products of synthetic cubism should “be *read* as well as *seen*” (50). JOU in *Still Life with Chair Caning* is a perfect example of an aspect of synthetic Cubism that must be read. Rosenblum points to the verbal games of the Dadaists as the direct precursor to Picasso’s newspaper puns:

It is exactly this kind of multiple verbal-visual reading of similar sounds and letters (*joie*=joy; *jouer*=to play; *jouir*=to enjoy or in sexual slang, to come) that we can trace in Picasso’s metamorphoses of LE JOURNAL. Freed from the absolute form and meaning by the

Cubist aesthetic of the relative and the ambiguous,
 this prosaic word can take on new guises in new contexts.
 (51)

Liberating the newspaper's name from its "absolute form," Picasso plays in Derrida's realm of affirming freeplay: "*This affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as a loss of center.* It plays without security. For there is a *sure* play: that which is limited to the *substitution of given and existing, present pieces*" (Derrida's emphasis. "Structure" 292). And "pieces"-- affirming substitutions, random fragments-- are the stuff of the cubist collage.⁶

We are given fragments of the newspapers of Dublin throughout *Ulysses*. Bloom is there for the entire chain of signifiers making up the late edition of the *Evening Telegraph*: Dignam's funeral ("--I am just taking the names, Hynes said below his breath. What is your christian name? I'm not sure" [*U* 6.880-81]), the typesetter's work ("Must require some practice that. mangiD kcirtaP" [*U* 7.205-06]), and the "pink edition extra" in the Cabman's shelter ("*L. Boom*" [*U* 16.1260]). Bloom's interaction with the printed word-- his presence during its production-- is what Fredric Jameson has pointed to as an "analogous recurrence of events and characters" throughout the text, a recurrence he suggests leads to a process he calls "dereification" ("History" 132-33). This break down of commodity reification and its assorted effects is achieved through linguistic means. Jameson describes the form it takes:

[The] discourse is called gossip: and from the upper limits of city life-- the world of patronage, machine politics, and the rise and fall of ward leaders-- all the way down to the most minute aberrations of private life, it is by means of gossip and through the form of the anecdote that the dimensions of the city are maintained within humane limits and that the unity of city life is affirmed and celebrated. ("History")

135)⁷

Following but ultimately diverging from Lukács' meditations upon modernism, Jameson points to the commodity fetishism in *Ulysses* as its relief from a world of dour capitalism and dehumanizing representations. The power of commodities-- the power Marx described as "mysterious" in the first volume of *Capital*⁸-- is undermined by Joyce through linguistic means, through the popular voice. Before attempting to describe this Bakhtinian linguistic underworld of gossip, its relationship to the modernist challenge to ocularcentric thinking, and its play across the scarlet field of the Bass triangle, a closer look at some of Picasso's "Bass collages" is in order.

It is the culture of gossip, the culture of the everyday, that Picasso attempted to depict in his collages:

Picasso's selection of commonplace words, like his selection of commonplace objects, belonged to the milieu of the French cafe (whose ambiance provided the richest stimulus for Cubist art) and, in particular, to the inventory of alcoholic drinks available there.... From such cafes Picasso selected the names and labels of aperitifs like Pernod, Anis del Mondo, and Suze, brandies like Hennessy, Vieux Marc, and Francoise, and ales like Bass, all of which turn up with the frequency of the daily newspaper and are subjected to similar metamorphoses. Picasso especially enjoyed a kind of Cubist prestidigitation of these identifying labels, that is, a constant oscillation of their levels of fact and fiction. At times, as in the case of the bottle of Suze, he actually pasted a real label onto a Cubist bottle; elsewhere, at the opposite extreme, he would label a bottle of Bass with his own, irregular hand lettering in typographical contrast to the printed lettering on a calling card and the label of a package of tobacco. (Rosenblum 55-56)

In fact, of the eight collages by Picasso with depictions of a Bass bottle which I have located, all eight feature "Bass" written in the artist's hand.⁹ All eight depict the scarlet

triangle. In his depictions of the bottles, Picasso relies more on the linguistic element of the label (“Bass”) over the pictorial (the triangle). Picasso seems to be commenting here upon the age of mechanical reproduction by becoming the producer of the reified brand name *with his own hand*. This is nowhere better illustrated than in *Still Life with Bottle of Bass* of 1914-- a collage created in the same year that *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* began to be serialized in the *Egoist*, Grant Richards finally began to publish *Dubliners*, and work on *Ulysses* began. This collage is representative of the workaday materials making up many of the collages: dice, bottles, playing cards, calling cards. The introduction of the calling card into Picasso’s collages seems to have begun in 1912 when

Gertrude Stein... and Alice B. Toklas visited Picasso in his new studio on the Rue Ravignan; but finding him not at home, she left her calling card there, only to discover a few days later that Picasso was working on a painting which included the card in the lower right-hand corner of a table. (Rosenblum 68)

The calling card in *Still Life with Bottle of Bass* is Picasso’s own and it performs in the collage as a mock signature because

the artist’s traditional handwritten flourish is transposed to stenciled lettering that seems to be stamped upon the calling card, which is then dropped upon the table with other still life objects. That the card is dog-eared suggests, according to traditional rules of etiquette, that the owner of the card has paid a personal visit, but found no one at home. (Rosenblum 68)

Picasso’s “signature” is a product of mass production, but the “Bas” which takes up the center of the piece is obviously “signed” by the artist: Picasso switches his signature with that of a mass-produced label. In an age Benjamin described as “aura” shattering,

art is transformed: Picasso finds “no one at home” during the age of mechanical reproduction, but he reclaims the Bass bottle from its marketplace plurality. Picasso attempts to detach the “aura” from his collages before they can be reproduced for the masses (and as they are reproduced in the books that I consulted to write this). However, Picasso takes the bottle of Bass as art and attempts to stick an “aura” of “tradition” on to it with his own hand-written label. In this light, the Bass bottle is recast, repositioned within the culture which (re)produced it.

To the collection of puns Rosenblum points to throughout the collages of the cubists, I add the following reading of a pun.¹⁰ Picasso’s use of the bottles of Bass in his collages plays upon the name of the ale: *bas* is a French adjective meaning low, inferior, or even decadent. “Bass” or “Bas” is used as a pun to refer to the very material making up the new art. The affront these collages were (are) to the institutions of art must be stressed; Picasso explicitly comments on “the oil paint in love with itself” in *Glass and Bottle of Bass* of 1914 in which he places a bottle of Bass next to a glass made from newspaper and frames it with an ornate frame. The artist’s name appears in a box on the frame as if the collage were made to hang in a museum. The *bas* is art.

From the Parisian cafes of Picasso we move to Dublin’s National Maternity Hospital. Bloom has dropped in on the carousing medical students in the chapter of stylistic gestation. Hugh Kenner remarks that this progression of styles in “Oxen” “mutates language” (*Ulysses* 108), but our interest lies not with the analogous situation between analytic Cubism and the chapter T. S. Eliot said reveals “the futility of all

English styles” (*JJ* 476).¹¹ The objects of interest to this essay litter the table. objects containing what Frank Budgen called “a most potent mead” (215).

The label to the bottle of Bass Ale becomes important in the De Quincey parody beginning: “The voices blend and fuse in clouded silence: silence that is the infinite of space: and swiftly, silently the soul is wafted over regions of cycles of generations that have lived” (*U* 14. 1078-080). Bloom’s mind wanders as he listens to the students, and in that way the style is appropriate for Bloom’s gazing upon England’s first registered trademark¹²:

And lo, wonder of metempsychosis, it is she, the everlasting
bride, harbinger of the daystar, the bride, ever virgin. It
is she, Martha, thou lost one, Millicent, the young, the
dear, the radiant. How serene does she now arise, a
queen among the Pleiades, the penultimate antelucan
hour, shod in sandals of bright gold, coifed with a
veil of what do you call it gossamer. It floats, it flows
about her starborn flesh and loose it streams, emerald,
sapphire, mauve and heliotrope, sustained on currents
of the cold interstellar wind, winding, coiling, simply
swirling, writhing in the skies a mysterious writing till,
after a myriad metamorphoses of symbol, it blazes, Alpha,
a ruby and triangled sign upon the forehead of Taurus.
(*U* 14. 1099-109)

The Bass triangle, through “a myriad metamorphoses of symbol,” becomes the “symbol” for Bloom’s relationships to the women in his life. Patrick McGee sees this formation of the “symbol” as a concentration of Bloom’s “verbal being” (105). This “look” into Bloom, or, following McGee (and Lacan), this “knotting” together of all the linguistic elements making up Bloom, is indicative of the use of the bottle of Bass throughout “Oxen of the Sun.” Just as the cubist aesthetic aimed at undermining perspective, Joyce undermines the stability of the trademark by giving it to us in *three different voices*.

The perspective of “Oxen” is played with throughout the chapter by the oscillating use of different styles to describe the actions of Bloom and the medical students. This assault on perspective is one of the basic maneuvers of modernism and of anti-ocularcentrism; as John Berger describes it in *Ways of Seeing*,

The convention of perspective, which is unique to European art and which was first developed in the early Renaissance, centers everything on the eye of the beholder. It is like a beam from a lighthouse-- only instead of light traveling outward, appearances travel in. The conventions called those appearances *reality*.... The visible world is arranged for the spectator as the universe was once thought to be arranged for God. (Berger’s emphasis, 16)

The cubists played with how we are supposed to see “reality,” and in “Oxen,” Joyce gives us the “reality” of the meeting of Stephen and Bloom through different stylistic perspectives. However, in the stylistic manipulation of Bloom’s gazing at the bottle of Bass, something else happens that is linked with an attack upon perspective. This is best understood in the light of Martin Jay’s description of the “perspectivalists’ assumption” of the visible world as “a homogeneous, regularly ordered space” (57). As Jay points out, this is the way the modern world “looks”:

It was this uniform, infinite, isotropic space that differentiated the dominant modern world view from its various predecessors, a notion of space congenial not only to modern science, but also, it has been widely argued, to the emerging economic system we call capitalism. (57)

In his attack upon conventional seeing, Picasso used objects that were the very foundations of the old order of seeing in art: he used the commodity to open up the conventional eyes of the modern viewer living under capitalism. In “Oxen,” Joyce performs the same kind of play with perspective to challenge the ocularcentric

assumptions behind representation. And in doing so, he gives us a dialogic perception of the Bass label that leads to a dialogic perception of Bloom.

After the “look” at the Bass bottle through the style of De Quincey, we are given a different look at the bottle through the style of Walter Savage Landor. Buck Mulligan keeps Lenehan from moving the bottle Bloom is staring at:

If I had poor luck with Bass's mare perhaps this draught
of his may serve me more propensely. He was laying his
hand upon a winejar: Malachi saw it and withheld his act,
pointing to the stranger and to the scarlet label. (*U* 14.1161-64)

The bottle is explicitly pointed to as an object of the everyday world that has the power to be transformed: “Any object, intensely regarded, may be a gate of access to the incorruptible eon of the gods” (*U* 14.1166-67). Bloom's gaze is noticed and discussed. Bloom comments on his own gaze, on his “consumption” of the trademark; we are told this through the style of Macaulay:

During the past four minutes or thereabouts he had been
staring hard at a certain amount of number one Bass
bottles by Messers Bass and Co. at Burton on Trent
which happened to be situated amongst a lot of others
right opposite to where he was and which was certainly
calculated to attract anyone's remark on account of its
scarlet appearance. (*U* 14.1181-85)

Bloom is reading the label in this description: “number one Bass bottled by Messers Bass and Co.” We have been reading the label through three different filters: De Quincey, Landor, and Macaulay. This filtering has an obvious connection with the cubist conception of simultaneity and with the disruption of conventional perspective, but the important point for this discussion relates to my thoughts on Picasso's “use” of *bas*. The Bass bottle in “Oxen” is an anchor to the everyday Dublin world of work and drink: it is

the stable product amidst the clamor of English prose. Edmund Wilson once remarked that the importance of this episode-- the meeting of Stephen and Bloom-- is obscured: "The parodies have spoiled the story; and the necessity of telling the story through them has taken most of the life out of the parodies" (215). I would argue that the bottle of Bass that Bloom stares at is the *link* between the "story" and the "parodies": it is the object everything (Bloom, Stephen, medical students, "Oxen," the "story," the "parodies") revolves around. As Picasso puns upon "Bass," Joyce puns upon the scarlet triangle. The triangle is the trademark of a popular commodity, and it is the sign under which "artistic consciousness" arises (Gifford 434). England's first registered trademark becomes the symbol of the Irish artist. The label under the gaze of the modernist eye-- Picasso's manipulation of its form, Joyce's manipulation of the *perception* of its form-- raises the question of vision that is fundamental to modernism and that is challenged in similar ways by Joyce and Picasso. "Oxen" is the cubist collage of *Ulysses*: art and the workaday world are fuse and the artist "uses" the bottle of ale.

I have been writing about the representation of bottles of Bass Ale in Picasso and Joyce to challenge the accepted view of commodity fetishism and its link to the modernist text (collage). The modernist artifact as "isolated fetish" has been described by Terry Eagleton as a contradiction in the uses of obscurity: in its attempt to resist easy appropriation by the marketplace, the self-referential modernist text reifies itself. Eagleton sees this contradiction arising from modernism's displacement of the workaday world; however, he makes one exception to this process: "There is indeed a political modernism-- what else is Bertolt Brecht?" ("Capitalism" 140). My aim here is to place

Joyce within this conception of political modernism. If it has been a traditional view to see modernism as preoccupied with the visual, then this look at the Bass label demonstrates the way certain modernists manipulated and questioned accepted ways of seeing for political ends. Joyce's use of the everyday elements of Dublin life in *Ulysses* remove it from self-reification and moves it toward what Jameson describes as its opposite: dereification. If the modernist work removes itself from the world only to reproduce "the very illusion of aesthetic autonomy which marks the bourgeois humanist order it also protests against" (Eagleton, "Capitalism" 140), then *Ulysses* removes itself only to replace itself squarely within the society which produced it. In this respect, the "plot interruption" that Wilson complained about in "Oxen" may be compared with Brecht's epic theater as Benjamin describes it:

The task of epic theater, according to Brecht, is not so much the development of actions as the representations of conditions. This presentation does not mean reproduction as the theoreticians of Naturalism understood it. Rather, the truly important thing is to discover the conditions of life. (One might say just as well: to alienate [*verfremden*] them.) This discovery (alienation) of conditions takes place through the interruption of happenings. ("What" 150)

Joyce, unwilling to simply narrate the meeting of Bloom and Stephen in, say, the relatively stable narrative voice of "Calypso," chose instead to alienate an object on the table to foreground the conditions of life in Dublin.¹³ By seeing through a Bass label darkly, Joyce places his texts within the lived (living) conditions of city life. Picasso re-signed his Bass bottles to reproduce them as texts of culture; and Joyce, within the mad rush of English prose styles, uses his Bass bottles to produce his text of culture with the everyday conditions of its characters and its aloof, nail-paring author.

The Bass label in the modernist aesthetic is almost a postmodern effect: the text (the collage) explicitly proclaims its role in commodity culture as the artist writes his “style” (writes his signature) all over the commodity.¹⁴ This was primarily Picasso’s aim in the collages he created before WW1, or, as he once said: “Our subjects might be different, as we have introduced into painting objects and forms that were formerly ignored. We have kept our eyes open to our surroundings, and also our brains” (271). By choosing different subjects Picasso and Joyce looked at their surroundings in a new way; the bottle of Bass brings us back to Paris just before the Great War, and to Dublin before and after 1916. Our “consumption” of Bass on the canvas and on the page is the link to the historical forces surrounding the creation, reception, and perpetuation of the modernist artifact. It is also a link to the historical forces surrounding vision itself. The focus on the Bass label interrupts our reading-seeing and makes us think about the nature of painting (“the oil paint in love with itself”); it interrupts the story and makes us think about the nature of representation (“The parodies have spoiled the story”). This is the kind of political modernism Brecht attempted when he woke up his audience and had them actively experience his theater. The minor event-- the Bass bottle-- wakes us up from what Blake called “Single vision” and its “consumption” is a link to our aesthetic and political past. It is also a challenge to our past thinking about representing the visual world and the emphasis put on depicting “reality.” This is all summed up in the answer to Bloom’s “final meditation” after he has left the Bass label and is thinking of sleep:

Of some one sole unique advertisement to cause the
passers to stop in wonder, a poster novelty, with all
extraneous accretions excluded, reduced to its most

efficient terms not exceeding the span of casual vision
and congruous with the velocity of modern life. (*U* 17.1770-
74)

Endnotes

¹ See Alfred H. Barr's classic work on the cubists, *Cubism and Abstract Art* (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1936) for a concise description of the period. Barr sums up the effect of a *papier collé* by writing: "In this way, paradoxically, the Cubists, having destroyed in their paintings the image of the natural world, began to apply to their paintings actual fragments of the natural world" (78).

² Peter Bürger has taken the collages of Picasso and Braque as important artifacts in his *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984):

A theory of the avant-garde must begin with the concept of montage that is suggested by the early cubist collages. What distinguishes them from the techniques of composition developed since the Renaissance is the insertion of reality fragments into the painting, i.e., the insertion of material that has been left unchanged by the artist. But this means the destruction of the unity of the painting as a whole, all of whose parts have been fashioned by the subjectivity of its creator. The selection of a piece of woven basket that Picasso glues on a canvas may very well serve some compositional intent. But as a piece of woven basket, it remains a reality fragment that is inserted into the painting *tel quel*, without substantive modification. A system of representation based on the portrayal of reality, i.e., on the principle that the artistic subject (the artist) must transpose reality, has thus been invalidated. Unlike Duchamp somewhat later, the cubists do not content themselves with merely showing a reality fragment. But they stop short of a total shaping of the pictorial continuum. (77-78)

³ This story is told by Frank O'Connor in "Egotism in Irish Literature," *The Listener*, 31 (June 1944), 603.

⁴ Bottles of Bass have turned up in other works of art. In the year of Joyce's birth, 1882, Manet painted *Bar at the Folies-Bergere*. Like his earlier *Le Dejeuner sur l'herbe* (1836), the realism of *Bar at the Folies-Bergere* provoked a great deal of controversy. I want to point to two bottles on the marble counter in front of the pensive barmaid. One of the bottles we see from the side, but the other bottle is positioned so that we can almost

see the entire label. No words are discernible, but the scarlet triangle of the Bass label is clearly depicted. I bring this up not to connect it to "Oxen," but place it next to a description from "The Dead":

On the closed square piano a pudding in a huge yellow dish lay waiting and behind it were three squads of bottles of stout and ale and minerals, drawn up according to the colours of their uniforms, the first two black, with brown and red labels, the third and smallest squad white, with transverse green sashes" (*D* 196-97)

The stout is, of course, Guinness with its brown label depicting its harp trademark. The ale is Bass with its red label, its red triangle. I bring up Manet's painting and "The Dead" because, to my mind, they represent the modern world of contingency and thus its aesthetic formula-- realism. This depiction of the bottles and their concomitant aesthetic weight in the realm of visual truth will be challenged by the collages of the cubists and by *Ulysses*.

⁵ See *Charles Baudelaire: Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn (London: New Left Books, 1973), pp. 27-30, *passim*.

⁶ Peter Bürger qualifies the "play" of the newspaper clippings within the collages:

There is unquestionably an element of provocation in sticking a piece of newspaper on a painting. But this must not be overestimated, for the reality fragments remain largely subordinate to the aesthetic composition, which seeks to create a balance of individual elements (volume, colors, etc.). The intent can best be defined as tentative: although there is destruction of the organic work that portrays reality, art itself is not being called into question, as it is in the historic avant-garde movements. Instead, the intent to create an aesthetic object is clear, though that object eludes judgment by traditional rules" (*Theory*, p. 74)

As I will describe it, Picasso and Joyce both use the Bass label to do what Bürger sees the newspaper fragments as not accomplishing: the calling into question of art itself.

⁷ Raymond Williams has also pointed to the daily language of Dublin as a "humanizing" force in *Ulysses* in *The English Novel from Dickens to Lawrence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 164-67.

⁸ See *Capital, Volume One* in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978), pp. 319-329.

⁹ My identification of Bass labels in Picasso's collages is by no means exhaustive: I have

chosen the most famous collages as representative of the use of the label. In *Pablo Picasso: A Retrospective*, ed. William Rubin (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1980) I located the following “Bass collages”: *Guitar and Bottle of Bass* (1913) p. 170, *Man with a Guitar* (1913) p. 172, “*Ma Jolie*” (1914) p. 182, *Glass and Bottle of Bass* (1914) p. 184, *Bottle of Bass, Glass, and Newspaper* (1914) p. 185. Rosenblum reproduced three other “Bass collages” in his essay: *Still Life with Bottle of Bass* (1912) p. 56, *Still Life with Bottle of Bass* (1914) p. 68, and *Bottle of Bass, Glass, Package of Tobacco, and Calling Card* (1913-14) p. 71.

¹⁰ Rosenblum points out an interesting “Bass pun” in *Still Life with Bottle of Bass* (1912): “Picasso could also turn a bottle of BASS into a playing card by simply isolating the AS (French for ACE) of BASS on a flat plane and locating it next to a floating symbol of a playing card. The result is an ace of clubs split into verbal and symbolic fragments that, like the evocative JOU of JOURNAL which hovers on this table top, keep changing identities” (p. 56).

¹¹ Several critics have written on Joyce’s relationship(s) to cubism and their work informs this essay: Jo-Anna Isaak, “James Joyce and the Cubist Aesthetic,” *Mosaic*, 14, 61-90; Max Halperen, “Neither Fish nor Flesh: Joyce as Picasso,” in *New Alliances in Joyce Studies*, ed. Bonnie Kime Scott (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1988), pp. 93-101; Robert Scholes, “In the Brothel of Modernism: Picasso and Joyce,” in *In Search of James Joyce* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), pp. 178-207; and Wendy Steiner, “A Renaissance-Modernist Dalliance: Joyce and Picasso,” in *Pictures of Romance: Form Against Context in Painting and Literature* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 121-143.

¹² We are told that the Bass triangle was the first registered trademark in England underneath the scarlet triangle on current bottles of Bass. On the back of the bottle, above the computerized identification stamp, we are given this legend:

In 1777, William Bass established his first Brewery in Burton-on-Trent, famous as a brewing town since the Middle Ages. William Bass built his reputation on the excellence of his Beers, a reputation which is jealously guarded by his successors and which you can appreciate now in this bottle of Bass.

¹³ This “interruption of happenings” may be said to be the overall intent of the modernist force behind *Ulysses* and the collages of the cubists. This kind of montage/interruption came to its full fruition in modernist cinema; Slavoj Žižek in *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1991) reads Hitchcock’s editing as a kind of Brechtian alienation effect: “Hitchcockian montage elevates an everyday, trivial object into a sublime Thing. By purely formal manipulation, it succeeds in bestowing on an ordinary object the aura of anxiety and uneasiness” (117).

¹⁴ The “real” postmodern effect is, of course, the non-signature of Warhol’s silk-screens of Brillo boxes, Campbell’s soup cans, and Coca-Cola bottles.

Chapter Six
 “Shut Your Eyes and See”: “Ithaca” and the Question of Cinema

Sometimes we talked about the cinema; James Joyce was interested in the cinema and asked me to take him two or three times. How can I forget these occasions, painful for me because his poor vision compelled us to sit in the first row?

--Nino Frank, “The Shadow That Had Lost Its Man”

We sometimes forget what we have in our hands--a genuine miracle, a miracle of technical and artistic potentialities, only a fraction of which we have as yet learned to realize.

--Sergei Eisenstein, “Achievement”

A blue French telegram

Sergei Eisenstein’s *Battleship Potemkin* (1925) opens with waves crashing against a breakwater. The raging waves are a persistent and unavoidable force tearing at the stubborn projections of the earth. The rocks seem solid and unmovable, but the waves will eat away at their hold. The waves are given to us in a series of different shots, in what Eisenstein called “intellectual dynamization.” This beginning is a montage of waves depicting their conflict with the shore. The waves rise up, the waves rise up, and fall. It is a conflict with an inevitable conclusion: it will take time, but the rocks will eventually fall into the sea.

These shots at the beginning of Eisenstein's film about the failed revolution of 1905-- a failure Lenin called a "dress rehearsal" for 1917-- is an invocation of montage as a process (how the film will be constructed) and of dialectics as the force behind history (how history will be constructed). The force behind montage and dialectics is implied to be the same; it is the force of conflict (Eisenstein in "A Dialectic Approach to Film Form": "It is art's task to make manifest the contradictions of Being" [46]) that leads to revolution, to the power to create a new world. The aim of Marxist revolution is a new world, and from his first work in the theater to his final abandoned film projects, Eisenstein wanted his work to embody this spirit of revolution.

In the beach scene that ends section four of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Stephen spends much of his time looking above the waves at the clouds:

They were voyaging across the deserts of the sky, a host of nomads on the march, voyaging high over Ireland, westward bound. The Europe they had come from lay out there beyond the Irish Sea, Europe of strange tongues and valleyed and woodbegirt and citadelled and of entrenched and marshalled races. (*P* 167)

The clouds are "voyaging" from the skies of Europe to the atmosphere above the Irish Sea; this is a voyaging Stephen will repeat when he is forced to return to Ireland because of "a blue French telegram, curiosity to show: --Nother dying come home father" (*U*3.197-99).¹ The blue French telegram is a souvenir that Stephen in *A Portrait* does not yet have. To get his souvenir-- he got it in France: *souvenir*, a remembrance, a reminder, *Agenbite of inwit*-- he must fly to the Europe of "marshalled races" and "encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience" (*P* 252-53). It is a world of new experience the artist must go through to get to the "old" experience of his race: "to

forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race" (P 253). Something in the clouds triggers something in his consciousness:

He heard a confused music within him as of memories and names which he was almost conscious of but could not capture even for an instant: then the music seemed to recede, to recede, to recede: and from each receding trail of nebulous music there fell always one longdrawn calling note, piercing like a star the dusk of silence. Again! Again! Again! (P 167).

He follows this call "again" to Europe to free himself from the shackles of church and state. But in part two of the adventures of Stephen, *Ulysses*, the artist is "again" grounded on his island prison. And he is "again" on the beach in "Proteus," but he knows better this time. He spends most of the time looking down at "Buck's castoffs": "His boots trod again damp crackling mast, razorshells, squeaking pebbles, that of the unnumbered pebbles beats, wood sieved by the shipworm, lost Armada" (U3.147-49).

I have combined Joyce's clouds with Eisenstein's waves to raise a question: What is the importance of film to Joyce? I raise this as a question in such a geographical manner-- the clash of Eisenstein's waves, the flight of Joyce's clouds-- because it is a question that has long been taken as answered and I want to bring it back to the solid land of inquiry. The beach wakes Stephen to a new world just as a graffiti writer in Paris during the May '68 revolution saw it: "*SOUS LES PAVES, LA PLAGE!*" (In *The 400 Blows* [1959], François Truffaut portrayed Antoine Doinel's epiphany as a run on the beach in the final scene.) My aim is a kind of Brechtian interruption in the thinking about Joyce and the movies. It is a question that has long been taken as answered. Harry Levin, in one of the first book length studies of Joyce, *James Joyce: A Critical Introduction* (1941), set the stage for what has become a critical commonplace:

In its intimacy and in its continuity, *Ulysses* has more in common with the cinema than with other fiction. The movement of Joyce's style, the thought of his characters, is like unreeling film; his method of construction, the arrangement of his raw material, involves the crucial operation of *montage*. (88)

This view of the impact of film on *Ulysses* has become an unquestioned view; it occurs in writing about Joyce as a common point, as almost necessary background: In *James Joyce's World* (1957), Patricia Hutchins describes his composition of a famous part of the novel as being explicitly influenced by film: "Joyce told Miss Weaver that a film on astronomy, in particular some sequences dealing with the moon, gave him an idea for the rhythm of Molly Bloom's monologue in *Ulysses*" (245); Anthony Burgess describes Joyce as "a film pioneer in that he foresaw the virtues of the form" (15); Stephen Kern, in his study of the shift in thinking about time and space before and during World War I, gives a description of Joyce and film that has almost become generic: "James Joyce was fascinated by the cinema, and in *Ulysses* he attempted to recreate in words the montage techniques used by early film makers" (6); and, more recently, Roy Gottfried in *Joyce's Iritis and the Irritated Text: The Dis-Lexic "Ulysses"* (1995) has amplified this view by concentrating on Joyce's eyes:

The movie, so modern and so potentially powerful as a popular art form, appealed to those concerns of Joyce for a new art that was based, if deceptively, on the "actual" seen world and that was itself a popular cultural artifact, much like the ads and songs within the novel.... The visual aspect of a film, even when Joyce's eyes were so poor as to keep him from seeing it, would be a quality that he would present increasingly when he began to work on his new art form of *Ulysses* some years later. (128)

To think of *Ulysses* has always been to think about the flickering screen. In a comment indicative of how this view has been solidified and transferred into popular opinion, Pauline Kael describes Joyce as a kind of screenwriter: "Joyce wrote *Ulysses* in the form of a movie and that's why so many people, including Joyce himself, thought it should be

made into a movie" (169).

However, there has been at least one writer who has disagreed with this popular view. Alan Spiegel did this by asking the question I have brought up: "Critics have often discussed Joyce's work in conjunction with film, but I could never tell from what they said whether Joyce was actually influenced by film or whether the alliance was simply (or not so simply) metaphorical. At any rate, on what grounds could Joyce and film be related?" (xi). Spiegel takes the influence of film on Joyce as negligible; his argument may be summed up in this way: Joyce was writing "cinematically" before cinema-- in early work that does not exist anymore-- and before he came into full contact with the film world. Joyce, according to Spiegel, belongs to a line of writers who create what he calls "concretized form." This form is preoccupied with the lived, visible world and it

usually promotes experience at the expense of reflection;
we tend to live through a concretized action before we are able
to think about it. Since there is no author present in the
narrative to take us above the action, we tend to experience
the action the way the characters themselves experience it, and
that is with varying degrees of unreflecting immersion in a
living moment. (23)

The epitome of this absent author is Flaubert, the author Joyce learned his authorial detachment from, or, as Stephen's recipe for the same thing describes it: "silence, exile, and cunning" (*P* 247). (Or, as the earlier incarnation of Stephen puts it in *Stephen Hero*: "Isolation is the first principle of artistic economy" [*SH* 33].) Flaubert gave a definition of his method in a famous letter: "Art must rise above personal emotions and nervous susceptibilities. It is time to endow it with a pitiless method, with the exactness of the physical sciences" (quoted in Spiegel, 18). This method relies upon the writer's ability to depict objectively-- "with the exactness of the physical sciences"-- the visual world with what Stephen calls "The cold steel pen" (*U* 1.152-53).

Although I think that Spiegel is right to frame this question to get a specific answer, and I do agree with his tracing of a genealogy of modern writers who were fascinated with depicting the process of vision and the “seen” world-- Flaubert, James, Conrad-- I do think there are holes in his argument about Joyce’s interaction with cinema. We know that Joyce was seeing films as early as 1902. But regardless of the specifics of his argument, I think Spiegel makes a valuable point by asking the question. But I do not think his answer has to be completely negative. If he is right and Joyce was writing cinematically before coming into contact with the movies, does this completely deny later influence? To put it bluntly: Would not later contact with film compound or add to Joyce’s nascent film techniques? This question leads me to my main point about Joyce’s relationship to cinema: in all of the writing on Joyce and movies critics almost always point to Joyce being influenced by filmic montage (Levin again: “The movement of Joyce’s style...is like unreeling film; his method of construction...involves the crucial operation of montage” [88]).² But this is not what Eisenstein, a person who knew something of montage, thought was the important aspect of Joyce’s fiction in relationship to the world of film. Eisenstein’s reading of Joyce has always been taken as a verification of Joyce’s fascination and employment of montage. But this, to my mind, has been a misreading. Reading Eisenstein correctly on Joyce will lead to a better understanding of Joyce’s relationship to film and of the overall modernist fascination with film as a tool to challenge the hegemony of the Western Eye.

In all of the discussions of Joyce and movies there is one primal scene that is invoked as a kind of unquestionable proof of Joyce’s importance for film (and, conversely, with the import of film for Joyce): Eisenstein’s 1930 visit to Joyce in Paris. It is a celebrated scene on the level with Joyce’s attendance at Proust’s funeral and his famous drinking bouts with Hemingway (Hemingway: “We would go out to drink and Joyce

would fall into a fight. He couldn't even see the man so he'd say: 'Deal with him, Hemingway! Deal with him!' [JJ 695]). The meetings with Joyce and his contemporaries have always served as starting points for what Foucault has described as the "moment when the stories of heroes gave way to an author's biography" ("Author" 115). These incidents have become important moments in our construction of the author's life, the whole idea of which Tom Stoppard parodied in *Travesties*. Eisenstein's brief visit with Joyce, a visit he described as a "ghost experience" because of the dim light used to protect Joyce's eyes (JJ 654), has always been taken as proof of the importance of film for Joyce and for thinking about Joyce's impact on film. One of the reasons for this is the fact that Eisenstein showed interest in filming *Ulysses*-- an interest Joyce compounded by stating that only the Soviet director or Walter Ruttmann could do the novel justice in translating it for the screen. But *Ulysses* is also about raising ghosts, and ghosts, as *Hamlet* teaches us ("What may this mean/ that thou, dead corse, again in complete steel,/ Revisits thus the glimpses of the moon" [940]), are always concerned with giving proof. We must call up the ghost to examine its proof.

In his autobiography, Eisenstein describes the meeting by first invoking the impact the Irish novelist had upon his thinking about film: "The year that gave birth to the idea of intellectual cinema was the year that I became acquainted with Joyce's *Ulysses*" (213). Intellectual cinema, according to Eisenstein, was film constructed around ideas instead of purely emotional scenes. His conception of intellectual cinema is made up of the "effective montage of *intellectual attractions*" to "develop a film language capable of making an abstract idea blossom in an emotional way" (*Immoral* 207-08). The great project Eisenstein had in mind for the culmination of intellectual cinema was a film version of Marx's *Capital*. A movie version of *Capital* sounds as possible-- and as entertaining-- as a movie called *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. There is an obvious

problem with such an undertaking: How do you film complex ideas and theories that have no correlation with common film images? But, as James Goodwin describes it in his study of Eisenstein's use of history, the director took *Ulysses* as a kind of guide for his thinking about filming the unfilmable:

In order to give *Capital* "the form of a discursive film," Eisenstein contemplated a "de-anecdotalization principle" that would diminish storyline to a level of *historiettes*, of petty events. Seeking an adequate triviality for the 'spinal' "theme," he identifies an example within literary modernism: "In Joyce's ULYSSES there is a remarkable chapter of this kind, written in the manner of scholastic catechism. Questions are asked and answers given. The subject of the question is how to light a Bunsen burner. The answers, however, are metaphysical." The chapter in question is the seventeenth, identified by Joyce critics as the "Ithaca" section. As in *Ulysses*, in the *Capital* project the methods of representation-- rather than the persons or events represented-- are foregrounded, textual dominants. (122)

Through the example of *Ulysses*, history is made manageable; the processes behind the machine of history-- industrialization, imperialism, class conflict-- are depicted on a level that can be grasped as a petty event. The alienating and impersonal movement of history is made personal through the structure of the storytelling. This is exactly the effect Fredric Jameson describes as "de-reification" throughout the pages of the novel: through this kind of intervention, history and politics are made manageable in the minds of the Dublin citizen and the contemporary reader. The alienation of modern society, according to Jameson, is disrupted and "everything seemingly material and solid in Dublin itself can presumably be dissolved back into the underlying reality of human relations and human praxis" ("History" 136). This movement toward the personal is the aspect of Joyce's work that influenced Eisenstein and helped shape his thinking about the future of film.

On a general level, Eisenstein describes Joyce's novel as text reaching what

Barthes would call writing degree zero:

What is so fascinating in *Ulysses*? There is the inimitable seriousness of the text (surpassing by far the organically felt beauty of my beloved Zola). There is the “asyntaxism” of Joyce’s writing, overheard in the very origins of that internal speech which each of us speaks in his own way, and which only the literary genius of Joyce thought of as a possible foundation for the writing of literature. Indeed, in the linguistic kitchen of literature, Joyce occupies himself with the same thing I rave about in relation to laboratory researches on cinema language. (*Immoral* 213).

It is important to note that the aspect of Joyce’s work that most fascinated and influenced Eisenstein was his development of the interior monologue. It is *not* the “montage feel” of *Ulysses* that interested Eisenstein as most critics have intimated. In a discussion of the methods and future goals of filmmaking (a discussion he begins with an epigraph from the “Circe” chapter), Eisenstein points to Joyce as the literary springboard for cinematic revolution. In describing his failed attempt to film Dreiser’s *An American Tragedy*,³ the director points out that only film can depict “the whole course of thought through a disturbed mind”:

Or, if literature can do it, it is only a literature that breaks through the limits of its orthodox enclosure. Literature’s most brilliant achievement in this field has been the immortal “inner monologues” of Leopold Bloom in *Ulysses*. When Joyce and I met in Paris, he was intensely interested in my plans for the inner film-monologue, with a far broader scope than is afforded to literature. Despite his almost total blindness, Joyce wished to see those parts of *Potemkin* and *October* that, with the expressive means of film culture, move along kindred lines. (“Course” 104).

It is not the montage technique of something like “Wandering Rocks” that impresses the great proponent of montage: it is Joyce’s attempt to depict the inner sensations and

thoughts of a mind. In *Ulysses*, the director felt that Joyce had reached “the limit in reconstructing the reflection and refraction of reality in the consciousness and feelings of man” (“Achievement” 184). Throughout his comments on *Ulysses*-- and Eisenstein’s writings are filled with references to Joyce-- he always comes back to Joyce’s development of the interior monologue as the most important aspect of the novel, and, more importantly, as the aspect of the novel most important for the future of film.

Eisenstein was attracted not to what Levin called Joyce’s “method of construction... the crucial operation of *montage*” but to the inner mumblings of Bloom, the inner struggles of Stephen, and the inner flow of Molly. The reason behind Eisenstein’s interest in the interior monologues of *Ulysses* ties into the lineage of modern thinkers and artists who challenged ocularcentrism. The Soviet director was fascinated by the “immortal ‘inner monologues’” of Bloom because they are a direct challenge to established ideas about thinking about thinking. As I argued in a previous chapter, Joyce’s experiments with internal speech are formal manifestations of his questioning of the validity and stability of conventional ways of seeing. And, however propagandizing Eisenstein’s films are, they are all concerned with the creation of new methods that pushed the optic world into new areas of development and inquiry. Giles Deleuze describes Eisenstein’s revolution in seeing in relation to the montage of Griffith:

In Eisenstein, the insertion of the close-up marks... a formal leap-- an absolute change, that is, the “squaring” of the image. In comparison with Griffith, this is a completely new function of the close up. And if it includes subjectivity, it is in the sense that consciousness is also a passage into a new dimension. (35)

Eisenstein’s use of the montage close-up leads to what Deleuze calls “the dawn of

consciousness.” This is the “development of consciousness itself: it is the leap of the organic which produces an external consciousness of society and its history, of the social organism from one moment to the next” (36). Eisenstein’s development of the close-up may be seen as a cinematic extension of what he saw going on in *Ulysses*, and he described it in a lecture he gave at the State Institute of Cinematography:

What exactly did Joyce do? He took one character, one person, one event and looked at it under an incredible microscope. Ordinarily you could describe a day like that in three or four pages. He began to examine all the details under the microscope, that is, he completely unfurled everything that you see at that moment.... But as a method, this forces art into science, that is, a method which is appropriate to science is applied to art. (“Eisenstein” 133).

In *Ulysses* everyday experience itself is put under the microscope. This is the “science” Eisenstein refers to as Joyce’s method. This challenge to established conceptions of consciousness is directly connected to established ways of thinking about the visible world. Eisenstein points to this in one sword slash and one close-up on the Odessa steps.

Close-up of a woman wearing a pince-nez staring in horror at the massacre being committed all around her on the Odessa steps. Cut to close-up of Cossack with raised saber. Cut back to woman’s face now bleeding from her slashed eye. As Goodwin describes it, this set of shots from the Odessa step sequence is an “almost literalized assault on perception” which “has a counterpart two years later in Salvador Dali and Luis Buñuel’s surrealistic violation of perception in *Un chien andalou* (1928)” (74).

Eisenstein’s slashed eye is also a literal manifestation of his concern with challenging the hegemony of vision. According to Goodwin, this was an attack that challenged the very content of films shown in Soviet theaters: “[*Battleship Potemkin*] intended to do violence to the conventions of story film maintained not only in the features imported from

European and American cinema, but in most Soviet films as well.” In 1925, Soviet theaters were booking six foreign films for every Soviet one (75). Eisenstein’s films are an assault on accepted ways of movie making, accepted ways of seeing film. This challenge was a great shock to cinema language at this point in film history, but it established Eisenstein as the premier Soviet filmmaker and film theoretician. This same challenge to the hegemony of the eye would later get him into trouble; the trouble over the second part of *Ivan the Terrible* is indicative of this: he attempted to investigate Russia’s past through the lens of the Stalinist regime. The visual qualities of the films threatened the order of Stalin’s world view and part two of *Ivan* was banned while part three was burned.⁴

In the winter of 1926-27, almost ten years before “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” was published, Walter Benjamin was in Moscow and he was writing about *Battleship Potemkin*. I mention this writing on Eisenstein’s film because the comments that survive from Benjamin’s thinking about the film seem to be the seeds for his most famous essay-- in the essay, the film he intimates as the culmination of socialist filmmaking is *Battleship Potemkin*, while that of the fascist is Leni Riefenstahl’s *Triumph of the Will*. In his description of Eisenstein, Benjamin makes the same kind of formulation that he will make in the essay that is better known to Anglo-American audiences: “Among the fracture points of artistic formations, one of the most powerful is film. Truly, with film a new *region of consciousness* comes into being” (Benjamin’s emphasis, quoted in Goodwin 76). This is the kind of depiction or evocation of consciousness I have described above in relation to his development of the close-up, but this comment also fits in with Benjamin’s thinking about the importance of film in a provocative description from his most famous essay: “The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses” (“Work” 237).

Martin Jay describes this introduction to “unconscious optics” at its technical level:

The layers of this unconscious were peeled away with new technical advances like artificial illumination in the 1850s and stop-action chronophotography in the 1870s and 1880s. The most celebrated developers of the latter were Eadweard Muybridge in Britain and Etienne-Jules in France. By revealing aspects of movement hitherto undetectable by the unaided eye, they helped to denaturalize conventional visual experience and uncouple vision with static form. (133)

These visual experiments and advancements are only the technical side of the revolution in seeing. But, as Deleuze points out, “Machines are social before being technical” (*Foucault* 13). Before Muybridge captured horses in mid gallop on high speed film-- before he, in Paul Valéry’s words, “laid bare all the mistakes that sculptors and painters had made about in their renderings of the various postures of the horse” (41)-- there were artists and thinkers who challenged the accepted views of seeing and cognition. As I have described it in a chapter two, Blake is one of the starting points in the English lineage of attacks upon ocularcentrism. In his attack upon “Single vision” Blake began in words what Muybridge would continue in photographs and Eisenstein would further in film: the undermining of the accepted thinking about the visible world.

This challenge to how we see is what Eisenstein saw in Joyce. This is an important point because it clearly defines Eisenstein’s relationship to Joyce and Eisenstein’s overall place within modernist responses to ocularcentrism. This is what Eisenstein’s reading of Joyce points to: the director clearly tells us that it is Joyce’s development of the interior monologue that influenced his conception of intellectual cinema and provided for what he saw as the future of sound film. This interest in Joyce’s use of interior speech ties directly into what I have described as one of Joyce’s attacks upon ocularcentrism. As I have mentioned, this attack and its subsequent manifestations in writers such as Woolf, Djuna Barnes, Faulkner and Dos Passos has its beginning in turn-of-the-century thinking

about being and cognition. The philosophical experiments and challenges of Bergson and James paved the way for the artistic experiments in depicting consciousness and language. In the famous ninth chapter of the first volume of *The Principles of Psychology*, “The Stream of Thought,” James coined the term that would become the symbolic goal of modernist aesthetics: the depiction of the “stream of consciousness.” This goal was outlined in my discussion of Joyce’s relationship to the turn in thinking about thinking at the turn of the century. What I want to point to here-- and what I want to describe as a necessary element in any discussion of Joyce and film-- is the way this turn against established ideas about consciousness was associated, provoked, and compounded by the movies. And a good starting point is the man William James brought to Harvard.

Hugo Munsterberg wrote his study of the movies and their effects, *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study*, in 1916, the same year in which Joyce’s *A Portrait* was published in New York. Munsterberg begins his study with a series of questions that are reminiscent of Deleuze’s thinking about the complicated origins of any social “machine”:

It is arbitrary to say where the development of the moving pictures began and it is impossible to foresee where it will lead. What invention marked the beginning? Was it the first device to introduce movement into pictures on the screen? Or did the developing begin with the first photographing of various phases of moving objects? Or did it start with the first presentation of successive pictures at such a speed that the impression of movement resulted? (3)

He goes on to trace “the outer development” of moving pictures by pointing to the invention of such things as the camera obscura, the phenakistoscope, and Edison’s kinescope.⁵ However, Munsterberg’s main interest is in “the means by which the photoplay influences the mind of the spectator” (44). This investigation begins with what Munsterberg takes as the most obvious point about film:

To begin at the beginning, the photoplay consists of a series of flat pictures in contrast to the plastic objects of the real world which surrounds us. But we may stop at once: what does it mean to say that the surroundings appear to the mind plastic and the movies flat? (47)

Munsterberg answers this question by pointing out what we really see when we watch movies: “We feel immediately the depth of things. It is as if we were looking at a small plastic model of the landscape and in spite of our objective knowledge cannot recognize the flat pictures in the solid forms which we perceive” (47). This strange quality of film-- a quality Munsterberg describes in relation to the invention of the stereoscope-- brings up Berkeley’s famous thoughts on perceiving distance: distance cannot be “seen,” it can only be intellectually understood.⁶ Jonathan Crary describes the stereoscope as the instrument that epitomized the nineteenth-century construction of the observer:

The stereoscope signals an eradication of “the point of view” around which, for several centuries, meanings had been assigned reciprocally to an observer and the object of his or her vision. There is no longer the possibility of perspective under such a technique of beholding. The relation of observer to image is no longer to an object quantified in relation to a position in space, but rather to two dissimilar images whose position simulates the anatomical structure of the observer’s body. (128)

This is a movement away from what Nietzsche calls in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* “immaculate perception” (149): the conception of vision as a “pure” action separated from the physical and mental reality of the observer. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault describes the thinking about vision in the eighteenth century as “nothing more than the nomination of the visible. Hence its apparent simplicity, and that air of naiveté it has from a distance, so simple does it appear and so obviously imposed by things themselves” (132). This “apparent simplicity” was the target of thinkers like Bergson, James, and Munsterberg; these turn-of-the-century thinkers turned against conventional

ways of describing consciousness by focusing on the interaction of cognition with lived experience. And this concern with experience was behind Munsterberg's investigation of film.

The Photoplay is concerned with understanding the effect film has upon the minds of the audience. But, as Munsterberg goes on to describe it in a discussion of movement on the movie screen, this effect must be thought of as a two-way street: the minds of the audience have an effect on the film:

With the advance of modern laboratory psychology the experimental investigations frequently turned to the analysis of our perception of movement.... One result of them came quickly into the foreground of the newer view: the perception of movement is an independent experience which cannot be reduced to a simple seeing of a series of different positions. A characteristic content of consciousness must be added to such a series of visual impressions. (60-61)

This, as Joseph and Barbara Anderson note, is an early challenge to what has been come to be enshrined in cinema textbooks everywhere as the persistence of vision. As the Andersons also note, "our understanding of the illusion of movement in the cinema has... progressed little since 1916" (84). They point to Munsterberg's "alternative" as a beginning to overthrowing the myth of persistence of vision. Munsterberg clearly describes a process in direct contrast to conventional ways of thinking about cinematic movement; the "apparent movement is in no way the mere result of an afterimage and that the impression of motion is surely more than the mere perception of successive phases of movement. The movement is in these cases not really seen from without, but is super-added, by the action of the mind, to motionless pictures" (69). Munsterberg goes on to say that there is more work to be done in his Harvard laboratory on how this "filling in" of motion occurs. But he died suddenly at the end of 1916 and did not even get to see Griffith's *Intolerance*.

Munsterberg's description of the mind's interaction with film is an important formulation of turn-of-the-century thinking about human perception and its interaction with technology. It is also a challenge to ocularcentrism: if film must be "super-added... by the action of the [individual] mind" then so must many other-- if not all-- aspects of the visual world. This is a manifestation of the anti-ocularcentrism inaugurated by Kant in the midst of the Enlightenment's reliance on the power of the eye. It is also indicative of how film questions the process of vision. But what I want to point out here is a provocative link between Munsterberg's investigations into the effect of film and a philosopher who used the metaphor of film to describe cognition and perception.

Henri Bergson invokes the flickering screen in a celebrated passage from *Creative Evolution*. I have already quoted this passage in chapter one, but its repetition here is important for a consideration of film's importance for challenging ocularcentrism:

Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic of this becoming itself. Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general.... The *mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind*. (Bergson's emphasis, 322-23)

Martin Jay takes this passage as representative of Bergson's thinking about "the tyranny of the eye" over the universe of thought. Jay points out that Bergson argues that not "only intellection, but *all* perception through whatever sense... is inherently cinematographic in its 'ordinary' cognitive modes" (199). Bergson believed that this kind of cinematographic thinking-- thinking in pictures that are given the power of imaginative movement-- came long before the invention of the movies or even the still photograph. This kind of thinking in pictures was inaugurated with Plato and, as Jay describes it,

Bergson saw it as an inherent quality of language itself:

Indeed, all modes of intellection, based as they are on symbolization, are susceptible to this tendency, for language, rather than being an alternative to visual perceptions, shares with it a weakness for atemporal abstractions. Only a prelinguistic grasp of fluid, creative, vital reality will take us beyond the camera eye. (200)

As I describe it in my conclusion, Joyce took Bergson's description of "ordinary" cinematographic thinking and his injunction for an understanding of a "fluid, creative, vital reality" as a starting point for a development of the night vision and the sleeping language of *Finnegans Wake*. But the important point here is that Bergson's use of the cinema metaphor and Munsterberg's ideas about the "super-added" mental process of viewing film are indicative of the impact film had on the questioning of ocularcentrism that occurred at the turn of the century. The link between modernist art and technology has been noted by critics from Walter Benjamin to Andreas Huyssen, but it should be acknowledged that film had a concomitant effect upon modern thinking about consciousness and vision. Film as the instigator of "unconscious optics" is an obvious challenge to conventional ways of seeing, and many modern philosophers concerned with challenging the hegemony of vision were either influenced or provoked by it.

Munsterberg's interest in the effects of cinema and Bergson's use of it to describe "ordinary" consciousness is reflected in Eisenstein's reading of Joyce. Eisenstein was fascinated by the qualities of *Ulysses* that showed direct ties with modern philosophy's attack upon conventional ways of thinking about consciousness and reality. It was Joyce's investigation into the metaphysics of reality-- what Heidegger would call Being-- that attracted Eisenstein and provoked him into envisioning new forms and goals for film. This circle of influence-- modern philosophical questioning of consciousness and vision (James, Bergson, Munsterberg), modernist exploration of internal reality and

the meaning of “pure” sight (Joyce), and modernist filmmaking (Eisenstein)-- is the first half of my answer to the question of Joyce’s relationship to cinema. It is also half of my answer to Spiegel’s question about Joyce and film. What Spiegel overlooks is Joyce’s debt to the challenge issued by turn-of-the-century philosophy against established ways of viewing being and seeing. Joyce’s interest in challenging ocularcentrism was instigated in part by thinking like Bergson’s. Bergson’s view of film as a representation of the “momentary” aspects of seeing reality is a specific influence, but his thinking as a whole had a profound influence on modernist art in general. Joyce learned what Spiegel describes as “concretized form” from writers like Flaubert and James but, and this is what I take as Spiegel’s mistake, his learning did not stop there. What Joyce learned from one James brother was compounded and highlighted by the other.

Joyce belongs to a lineage of artists and thinkers who challenged ocularcentrism and its associated definitions of perception, consciousness, and reality. Just as Bergson seems to have anticipated the cinema before its birth,⁷ so too was Joyce interested in ideas and forms that questioned vision before he came into full contact with the film world. Joyce’s contact with the film world is the second part of my answer to the question this chapter began with. Before Stephen got his “curiosity to show,” the telegram telling of his mother’s nearing death, Joyce opened the first movie house in Dublin. This interaction with the machine that introduced “unconscious optics” seemed to be motivated by the spirit of an injunction Benjamin once made:

What we require of the photographer is the ability to give his picture the caption that wrenches it from modish commerce and gives it revolutionary useful value. But we shall make this demand most emphatically when we-- the writers-- take up photography. (“Producer” 230)

And roll away the reel world, the reel world,
the reel world!

--*Finnegans Wake* (64.25-26)

The Cinematograph Volta

In 1899, Joyce sat in a theater, but he did not see a movie. He saw the Irish Literary Theatre's first production: Yeats's *The Countess Cathleen*. The Irish Literary Theatre later became the Abbey Theatre and the contemporary reaction to *The Countess Cathleen* foreshadowed the later reaction to the Abbey's most famous production: the 1907 performance of Synge's *The Playboy of the Western World*. The riot over the play in 1907 was reportedly triggered by the mention of a woman's undergarment. Joyce and his family were living in Rome at the time and he followed the riot and its aftermath with relish. As Ellmann points out, Joyce was delighted by the line that supposedly was the catalyst for the riot: "If all the girls in Mayo were standing before me in their shifts." Joyce called it a "wonderful vision" (*JJ* 239). (Later, in "Circe," Joyce takes this vision to its extreme: "Under it lies the womancity, nude, white, still, cool, in luxury" [*U* 15.1327-28].) But what is surprising about Joyce's reaction to the furor over the play-- and what greatly shocked his brother Stanislaus-- is that Joyce took the side of the nationalists against Yeats, Synge, and the Abbey. Joyce called Yeats "a tiresome idiot" and he had only slightly less contempt for Synge (*JJ* 239-240). But, as Ellmann describes it, Joyce's feelings were mostly driven by resentment. He actually appreciated Synge's ability to "set them by the ears" (*JJ* 239) and he was fascinated by the audience's violent reaction to such a degree that he was unable to work on the story he was writing at the time, a story about a dinner party that eventually turned into "The Dead." What Ellmann points to as Joyce's resentment is important here: so back to 1899 when the resentment--

and modern cinema-- were not yet quite born.

Yeats's play about a woman who attempts to sacrifice herself for her townspeople caused a minor uproar and a written protest. Before *The Countess Cathleen* was even performed high church officials suspected it of heresy. During the performance, a large section of the audience booed and hissed at passages they considered anti-Irish and anti-Roman Catholic. At the end of the play, Joyce applauded vigorously (*JJ* 66-67). (His applause would later echo throughout the history of modern literature because he incorporated a poem from the play into the very fabric of Stephen's tortured mind in *Ulysses*: *The Countess Cathleen* was the first time Joyce heard "Who Goes With Fergus?"). After the performance, a group of students including Joyce's friends Francis Skeffington and John Byrne composed a letter objecting to the insults they saw contained in *The Countess Cathleen*. Ellmann describes the letter by imagining what Joyce must have thought of it: "The letter must have sounded like something satirized in an Ibsen play" (*JJ* 67). Joyce refused to sign the letter and it later appeared in the newspaper Bloom places ads in, *The Freeman's Journal*. This gesture is taken as Joyce's first refusal to compromise in the face of public opinion and outrage. The fact that public opinion had been shaped by the church added to Joyce's refusal to sign. The power the church had over the public voice was one of Joyce's great subjects of attack and in *Stephen Hero*, the aborted novel he began two years after seeing *The Countess Cathleen*, he gave his first extended denunciation of it:

The Roman, not the Sassenach, was for him the tyrant of the islanders: and so deeply had the tyranny eaten into all souls that the intelligence, first overborne so arrogantly, was now eager to prove that arrogance its friend. The watchcry was Faith and Fatherland, a sacred word in that world of cleverly inflammable enthusiasms.... The last should be the first, according to the Christian sentiment, and whosoever humbled himself, exalted and in reward for several centuries

in obscure fidelity the Pope's Holiness had presented
a tardy cardinal to an island which was for him, perhaps,
only the afterthought of Europe. (*SH* 53)

Ireland as afterthought of Europe was a description Joyce again used in *A Portrait*. He called the church "the enemy of Ireland" in a letter (*SL* 125) because he believed it saw and treated Ireland as the mental and cultural caboose of the continent.

Joyce followed the *Playboy* riot and its aftermath from Rome, the city that helped to make Stephen "a servant of two masters... an English and an Italian" (*U* 1.638). He had trouble writing "The Dead" in a city he felt was a giant tomb littered with the bones of history. Staying in Rome gave him the same kind of nightmares Stephen has in *Ulysses*:

He was indignant with Henry James for what he called "tea-slop" about Rome, which ignored its funerary reality. Even his dreams were affected. He complained... of "horrible and terrifying dreams: death, corpses, assassinations in which I take an unpleasantly prominent part." (*JJ* 225)

Joyce's nightmares are important because they foreshadow the ghosts in *Ulysses* ("Silently, in a dream she had come to him after her death, her wasted body within its loose brown graveclothes giving off an odour of wax and rosewood, her breath, that had bent upon him, mute, reproachful, a faint odour of wetted ashes" [*U* 1.102-05]) and the financial and emotional difficulties he had in the Italian capital. Two years later Joyce attempted to improve his financial situation by bringing a new kind of "theater" to Dublin. This new theater showed silent Italian movies.

It began with a famous off-hand remark. Joyce's sister Eva accompanied him to Trieste several years after Joyce, Nora, and Stanislaus had settled there. The year was 1909 and Eva Joyce was homesick for Dublin. But, as Ellmann points out, there was one attraction in her new city that pleased her: "She liked... one aspect of Trieste, its cinemas,

and remarked one morning how odd it was that Dublin, a larger city, had not even one” (JJ 300). This set Joyce off on one of the most interesting episodes of his life outside of literature. Prior to 1909, movies could be seen in Dublin but only in traveling shows on portable screens. The Cinematograph Volta was the first permanent location for seeing movies in the whole of Ireland. Joyce got a consortium of Triestian businessmen to back him in a proposal to open theaters in Dublin, Cork, and Belfast. His proposal was quickly accepted and Joyce went back to Dublin. As Ellmann and others have described it, Joyce was involved with every aspect of setting up the theater from finding its location on Mary Street to designing the movie posters.⁸ He hired the staff and had a hand in selecting the films that were to be shown. The Volta opened on Dec. 20 and this notice appeared in the *Evening Telegraph*:

Yesterday at 45 Mary Street a most interesting cinematograph exhibition was opened before a large number of invited visitors. The hall in which the display takes place is most admirably equipped for the purpose, and has been admirably laid out. Indeed, no expense would appear to have been spared in making the entertainment one deserving of the patronage of the public. Perhaps its special feature is that it is of Italian origin, and is in that respect somewhat out of the ordinary and more conventional forms of such displays. For an initial experiment it was remarkably good, remembering how difficult it is to produce with absolute completeness a series of pictures at the first stage of their location in new surroundings the occasion may be described particularly successful. The chief pictures shown were ‘The First Paris Orphanage,’ ‘La Pourponniere,’ and ‘The Tragic Story of Beatrice Cenci.’ The latter, although very excellent, was hardly as exhilarating a subject as one would desire on the eve of the festive season. But it was very much appreciated and applauded. An excellent little string orchestra played charmingly during the afternoon. Mr. James Joyce, who is in charge of the exhibition, has worked apparently indefatigably in its production and deserves to be congratulated on the success of the inaugural exhibition. (JJ 302-03)

The writer's description of the Volta's "Italian origin" is particularly important because all of the films shown at the theater were Italian. Along with the titles listed above-- and Mario Caserini's *Beatrice Cenci* is one of the classics of early Italian cinema even if it is not appropriate to be screened right before Christmas-- all the films shown at the Volta were silent Italian films complete with Italian story boards (film goers were given English translations). The first films shown at the Volta were representative of the films that were regularly run at the theater and of early Italian cinema as a whole. The names of these films tell a great deal about their content: *The Bewitched Castle*, *The Devilled Crab*, *The Waterfalls of Tanfornan*, *The Fascination of Snowy Peaks*, *Little Jules Verne*, *The Interrupted Appointment*, *An Interesting Journey to Marseilles*, *Nero*, and *His Dainty Lordship* (Costello 291). Critics usually deride the viability of showing Italian films to an Irish audience, but Joyce knew an obvious fact: along with France, Italy was the center of early European cinema. And there is another aspect of Italian cinema that critics have consistently overlooked: Italy was the first country to take films as serious works of art to be shown in *permanent* theaters. As Kristen Thompson and David Brodwell describe it, this reliance on the movie house had an important effect upon the films themselves: "Partly because Italian producers catered to permanent film theaters, they were among the first who consistently made films of more than one reel (that is, longer than fifteen minutes)" (29). In this respect, the early Italian silent film was important for the development of the full-length silent film. By 1914, Italian cinema became the first European cinema to influence a major Hollywood production: as Geoffrey O'Brien describes it in *The Phantom Empire*, Griffith saw the "germ" of *Intolerance* in Giovanni Pastrone's *Cabiria*. O'Brien goes so far as to ask: "Was it Hollywood's mirror, or had Hollywood itself all along been only a mirror of a lost European splendor that had secretly survived every catastrophe?" (155). What Joyce

brought to Dublin were the most advanced and sophisticated silent films Europe had to offer.

Before getting into the importance of Joyce's involvement with this early cinema enterprise, I would like to point to a common critical stance that is almost always taken when the Volta is brought up. Following Hugh Kenner's "Uncle Charles Principle" I call my take on this common view the "Ralph Cramden Principle." And it seems that Joyce himself started this trend when he approved of the following description of his interaction with the opening of the first Dublin movie theater in Herbert Gorman's biography: "Joyce the businessman superseded Joyce the artist" (quoted in Hutchins, 79). His experience with the Volta is often attributed to his Ralph Cramden-like interest in get-rich-quick schemes: at the same time he was opening the Volta, Joyce looked into the possibility of importing skyrocketes into Trieste and exporting Irish Tweed out of Dublin. Patricia Hutchins was one of the earliest critics to go into detail about the Volta experience and she began her description by quoting from a popular song of the period: "Today with films/ One can make money/ Become a millionaire/ With the cinema" (78). (Around 1909, 26 million Americans went to the movies *every week* [Hobsbawm 239].) But, to my mind, the "Ralph Cramden Principle," although appropriate for many aspects of Joyce's life, should be avoided in the case of the Volta. Most critics who bring up the theater either shrug it off as a wild scheme that failed-- the Volta did not fail as many commentators intimate: Joyce's partners sold it to a British company and movies were shown there until 1948-- or as an incident that had no impact upon Joyce's writing. The two important New Historicist studies describing Joyce's interactions with popular culture-- Cheryl Herr's *Joyce's Anatomy of Culture* and R. B. Kershner's *Joyce, Bakhtin, and Popular Literature*-- do not even mention the Volta or Joyce's interest in early Italian cinema. The image of Ralph Cramden coming home to Alice with a new kind of

corkscrew should be avoided when considering the Volta because it completely ignores what Andreas Huyssen describes as the “hidden dialectic” of early avant garde movements: “Avantgarde-- Technology-- Mass Culture.” Joyce’s Volta was an explicit manifestation of this dialectic and we as readers of Joyce have fallen into the trap Huyssen points to: “In most academic criticism the avantgarde has been ossified into an elite enterprise beyond politics and beyond everyday life, though their transformation was once a central project of the historical avantgarde” (4). Joyce’s involvement with the Volta was aimed at transforming the everyday life and politics of the people of Dublin. In this light, the establishment of the Volta may be seen as Joyce’s response to the Celtic Revival. If Yeats and the Abbey would not produce European plays, than Joyce would bring Europe to Dublin in the form of the flickering screen. Joyce’s involvement with the cinema was also an explicit political move because, as Raymond Williams describes it, film grew up hand-in-hand with socialism and was seen as the great social equalizer. The cinema also raised the question that occupied Williams throughout his career and that formed one of the foundations of *Ulysses*: “[W]hat is *popular*? The key to understanding the last two hundred years is the contested significance of that word” (107). To ask this question, Joyce brought a movie theater to Dublin; *Ulysses* would be his attempt to answer it.

In the words of the Cyclops narrator the curse of my deaf and dumb arse light sideways on Bloom and all his blooms and blossoms. I’ll break the back of *Ithaca* tomorrow so ‘elp me fucking Chroist. (SL 281)

“Ithaca” and Bloom’s “lowpower magnifying glass”

“Ithaca” is the firm ground that the reader finally reaches after the exploding

carnival of “Circe” and the cliché mine field of “Eumaeus.” It is also the most Joycean-obsessive chapter in the book and, as Frank Budgen tells us, Joyce called it his favorite of all the episodes of *Ulysses* (264). Modeled on a catechism, “Ithaca” gives the reader lists, catalogues, property appraisals, Bloom’s budget for 16 June 1904 (*U* 17.1455-478), the description of products like The Wonderworker (“It heals and soothes while you sleep, in case of breaking wind, assists nature in the most formidable way, insuring instant relief in discharge of gases, keeping parts clean and free natural action” [*U* 17.1826-28]), and, in what is the most quoted passage of the chapter, the movement of something as vital as water into the Bloom household:

Did it flow?
Yes. From Roundwood reservoir in county Wicklow
of a cubic capacity of 2400 million gallons, percolating
through a subterranean aqueduct of filter mains of single and
double pipeage constructed at an initial plant cost of 5 per
linear yard by way of the Dargle, Rathdown, Glen of the Downs
and Callowhill to the 26 acre reservoir at Stillorgan, a distance
of 22 statute miles, and thence, through a system of relieving
tanks, by a gradient of 250 feet to the city boundary at Eustace
bridge.... (*U* 17.163-170)

This is the end point of mimesis: everything is given to the reader as reality becomes not something we are supposed to feel and see, but something we are supposed to understand at every level of operation and production. As Erich Auerbach notes, Joyce is representative of the modernists who break with the established Western reliance on mimesis to “find a method which dissolves reality into multiple and multivalent reflections of consciousness” (487). But “Ithaca” is described as “impersonal” in the famous schema reproduced in Stuart Gilbert’s *James Joyce’s “Ulysses,”* and Hugh Kenner describes the chapter as resembling “the final chapter of a Victorian novel” because it “abounds in detailed revelations that refocus what we had thought we knew and substantiate what we only guessed” (*Ulysses* 141). The position of “Ithaca” in the

history of the Western representations of reality and within the novel of *Ulysses* may be better understood by picking on one word that Kenner uses in his description of how the chapter works: “refocus.” “Ithaca” is a direct response to the stylistic onslaught of the previous chapters against classical novelistic mimesis that reached its climax with Stephen lashing out at the mirror of his mother’s ghost and the lamp in Bella Cohen’s brothel. It is no accident that the two important objects in “Circe” are the mirror (“Stephen and Bloom gaze in the mirror. The face of William Shakespeare, beardless, appears there, rigid in facial paralysis, crowned by the reflection of the reindeer antlered hatrack in the hall” [*U* 15.3821-24]) and the lamp (“He lifts his ashplant high with both hands and smashes the chandelier. Time’s livid final flame leaps and, in the following darkness, ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry” [15.4243-45]). As symbols of representation, the mirror and the lamp become objects of hallucination. Representation in the latter parts of *Ulysses* is no longer imitation or expression. Edmund Wilson called *Ulysses* “the most completely ‘written’ novel since Flaubert” because it took off where Naturalism ended (203). Representation is given new eyes in *Ulysses*; Wilson: “If Flaubert taught Maupassant to look for the definitive adjectives which would distinguish a given cab-driver from every other cab-driver at the Rouen station, so Joyce has set himself the task of finding the precise dialect which will distinguish the thoughts of a given Dubliner from those of every other Dubliner” (203-04). In what is probably the best book on the styles of *Ulysses*, Karen Lawrence succinctly states the problem of the chapter: “Joyce does everything possible in ‘Ithaca’ to destroy our sense of a narrating, human voice” (183-84). To examine this new world of mimesis without a human voice we must use one of the objects in Bloom’s desk: “a lowpower magnifying glass” (*U* 17.1808-09). We must “refocus” on Joyce’s challenge to ocularcentrism.

In 1921, Joyce wrote to Frank Budgen about the chapter he called “the ugly duckling of the book”:

I am writing *Ithaca* in the form of a mathematical catechism. All events are resolved into their cosmic physical, psychical etc. equivalents, e.g. Bloom jumping down the area, drawing water from the tap, the micturition in the garden, the cone of incense, lighted candle and statue so that not only will the reader know everything and know it in the baldest coldest way, but Bloom and Stephen thereby become heavenly bodies, wanderers like the stars at which they gaze. (Budgen 263-64)

To the reader’s surprise we are told “everything” in the “baldest coldest way.” This is the “arranger” in complete control of the text. James Fairhall adds some historical background to the idea of the “arranger” by pointing out that it was influenced by many of the important aspects of early twentieth-century culture (cinema, Saussure, World War I): “The Arranger... represents a collective-- not an individual-- consciousness” (205). In “*Ithaca*,” the “arranger” takes over completely and digests all of the information the book is able to provide in the intestines of a catechism. Joyce called the goal of “*Ithaca*” the “mathematico-astronomico-physico-mechanico-geometrico-chemico sublimation of Bloom and Stephen” (*Letters I*, 164). Bloom and Stephen are sublimated through the questions and the answers and we are given “everything.”

The chapter’s will to sublimation is what fascinated Eisenstein; it was this concern with knowing “everything” that provoked him into thinking about using “*Ithaca*” as the basis for his film version of Marx’s *Capital*. As Goodman describes it, Eisenstein envisioned his film to be structured like the chapter in which Bloom takes Stephen home for hot cocoa: “As in *Ulysses*, in the *Capital* project the methods of representation-- rather than the persons or events represented-- are foregrounded, textual dominants” (122). But this interest in “*Ithaca*” as the structuring force behind his most important and

unmade film is in contrast to what I have characterized as Eisenstein's fascination with Joyce; it was Joyce's development of the interior monologue that provoked the director into writing: "The full embrace of the whole inner world of man... cannot be achieved by [earlier art forms]. The most heroic attempt to achieve this in literature was made by James Joyce in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*" ("Achievement" 184). It was this "embrace" of the consciousness of man that Eisenstein saw as the future for film, so why would he concentrate on a chapter of *Ulysses* that is well known for its complete lack of interior monologue? (Or, as a catechism would ask it: "What is the Soviet Director's interest in a chapter lacking the very element he consistently pointed to as his point of interest?") The answer to this lies in the fact that, as critics from A. Walton Litz to Patrick McGee have pointed out, "Ithaca" is a not a completely "objective" chapter.⁹ The consciousness of Bloom pervades many of the questions and answers and, in a certain sense, "Ithaca" represents the ultimate frontier of the interior monologue. To see this we must open the drawer in Bloom's walnut sideboard.

Bloom's drawer is opened after Stephen leaves to sleep we know not where--this is one of the few pieces of information we are not supplied with because, in Joyce's view, the details of Stephen's life after "Ithaca" are over and he wanders away to become a "heavenly bod[y]" (*JJ* 693). But before Bloom and Stephen take leave of each other, and before they urinate in the garden and see a "star precipitated with great apparent velocity across the firmament" (*U*17.1211), they have to walk outside through Bloom's back door:

What spectacle confronted them when they, first the host,
then the guest, emerged silently, doubly dark, from obscurity
by a passage from the rere of the house into the penumbra of
the garden?

The heaventree of stars hung with humid nightblue fruit. (*U*17.36-39)

As Ellmann points out, this description of the “spectacle” the two characters see as they exit the back door marks an important point in the chapter:

With this the episode divides into two parts, of which the first is primarily a divestment of heroic attributes, the second a resumption of them.... Here the phrasing is totally unscientific: Bloom anatomizes this description of the sky a few pages later and laboriously concludes that it is not really a heaventree. But the comparison has been made.... The sky translates into fluent heavenspeech the awkward, broken accents of earth. (*Liffey* 157).

This marks a turn toward the heroic, but it also marks a turn toward the Bloomian. The questions and answers that follow seem to be infused with Bloom’s character and consciousness. It is significant that this turn is constructed around the final lines of Dante’s *Inferno* which describe Dante and Virgil leaving Hell and seeing the stars of heaven. The emergence of Bloom and Stephen from the back door signals their departure from the detached and impersonal details that the chapter-- and the “arranger”-- are famous for (“What parallel courses did Bloom and Stephen follow returning?” [*U*17.1]). It is important that this occurs after they emerge from the back door because it is a symbolic movement into the “real” world, a world of human products and human needs. When we were introduced to Bloom in the sunlight of “Calypso” he was given to us as a “backdoor man”.

He went out through the backdoor into the garden: stood to listen towards the next garden.... He bent down to regard a lean file of spearmint growing by the wall. Make a summerhouse here. Scarlet runners. Virginia creepers. Want to manure the whole place over, scabby soil. A coat of liver of sulphur. All soil like that without dung. (*U*4.472-78)

After these thoughts on fertilizer (“The hens in the next garden: their droppings are very good top dressing” [*U*4.478-79]) Bloom “kicks open the crazy door of the jakes” (*U*4.494) and defecates. Bloom is of the earth and by taking Stephen through the back

door in “Ithaca” he brings the chapter back to earth. From this point on, the questions and answers become less “scientific” and more Bloomian. The questions and answers become less objectively “clear” and more personally “blurred.”

In this light, and in the light of Kenner’s thinking of “Ithaca” as the end of a Victorian novel, we may see the entire narrative of *Ulysses* as powered by what Peter Brooks calls novelistic ambition:

Ambition provides not only a typical novelistic theme, but also a dominant dynamic of plot: a force that drives the protagonist forward, assuring that no incident or action is final or closed in itself until such a moment as the ends of ambition have been clarified, through success or else renunciation.... The ambitious heroes of the nineteenth century-- those of Balzac, for instance-- may regularly be conceived as “desiring machines” whose presence in the text creates and sustains narrative movement through the forward march of desire, projecting the self onto the world through scenarios of desire imagined and then acted upon. (39-40)

Bloom is a “desiring machine” (but not Deleuze and Guattari’s “desiring-machine” because Bloom is certainly not a body without organs!) whose ambition-- ambition to come to terms with Rudy’s death, ambition to overcome Molly’s suitors, ambition to be accepted as an “Irish” man (“--Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here. Ireland” [U12.1431]), ambition to eat (“Kidneys were in his mind as he moved about the kitchen softly, righting her breakfast things on the humpy tray” [U4.6-7]), ambition to defecate (“He felt heavy, full: then a gentle loosening of his bowels” [U4.460]), ambition to have breakfast served to him in bed on June 17, 1904 (“Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel” [U18.1])-- pushes the narrative forward until his final chapter where the “ends” of his “ambition have been clarified.” As Brooks describes it, the ambitious hero provides a symbolic role for the reader’s reading: “The ambitious hero... stands as a

figure of the reader's efforts to construct meanings in ever-larger wholes, to totalize his experience of human existence in time, to grasp past, present, and future in a significant shape" (39). This need of the reader to "totalize" his experience of reading is a function "Ithaca" takes on with ambitious glee.

After he steps into the garden with Stephen, Bloom's desiring machine kicks in and his consciousness colors the questions and the answers to follow; this may be seen as an extension of Kenner's "Uncle Charles Principle" and instances of Bloom "intruding" in the text include the famous list of those reported to have had sexual relations with Molly:

What preceding series?
Assuming Mulvey to be the first term in the series, Penrose.
Bartell d'Arcy, professor Goodwin, Julius Mastansky, John
Henry Menton. Father Bernard Corrigan, a farmer at the Royal
Dublin Society's Horse Show, Maggot O'Reilly, Matthew Dillon,
Valentine Blake Dillon (Lord Mayor of Dublin), Christopher Callinan,
Lenehan, an Italian organgrinder.... (U17.2132-36)

The list goes on to include "Simon Dedalus," "Dr Francis Brady," and "Hugh E. (Blazes) Boylan" (U17.2138-141). Twenty-five suitors in total are named. Many of the men on this list have had no intimate contact with Molly (Lenehan, Simon Dedalus, John Henry Menton). The list has thrown off many critics because they have taken it as objective truth about the men Molly has slept with.¹⁰ But this list is a Bloomian list-- the closest Dr Francis Brady came to having sex with Molly was when he gave her a gynecological examination-- and it is infused with Bloom's thoughts and fears. Another good example of how Bloom's consciousness permeates the latter section of the chapter is the budget compiled for the day (U17.1455-478). As Kenner points out, the answer we are given omits the eleven shillings Bloom spent in Bella Cohen's brothel; Kenner takes this as indicative of the omissions and Bloomian tamperings throughout the second half of the

chapter:

So there are gaps, there are evasions, many. The very budget-- Objectivity of Objectivities-- is tampered with.... For though "objective" is what we generally hear "Ithaca" called, objective is exactly what it is not. It is incomplete and only intermittently straightforward, it is confined to no one's experience, it does not adhere except whimsically to a chronology of impressions... and it refuses restriction to the experiences of the senses. (*Voices* 96)

This is the point where we can begin to understand Eisenstein's interest in "Ithaca."

"Ithaca" may be seen as the chapter where interior monologue meets history, or where history itself is cracked upon to reveal its inner rumblings. The "objective" facts of the chapter-- facts representing the lived experience of the characters and the very movement of the heavens-- are shot through with Bloom's consciousness and "objectivity" is brought into question. As I will demonstrate, this kind of questioning leads to a human response and a human participation in history. But before opening one of Bloom's drawers to do this, we must become unstuck in time like Vonnegut's Billy Pilgrim and fall into No Man's Land right before the attack on the Somme during the First World War.

Paul Fussell tells us that the Somme affair came to be known among the troops as "the Great Fuck-Up." It was a British offensive that began on the first of July and ended five months later. On the first day of the attack, the British lost over 60,000 men (12). Fussell quotes a description from the beginning of the battle that sums up the early thinking about the war and how modern thinking itself changed:

As the gun-fire died away I saw an infantryman climb onto the parapet into No Man's Land, beckoning others to follow.... As he did so he kicked off a football. A good kick. The ball rose and traveled well towards the German line. That seemed to be the signal to advance. (27)

This is the most famous instance of the British display of bravado in the face of the

enemy (the man who reportedly organized the kicking of four footballs before the offensive, Captain W. P. Nevill, was killed instantaneously). This is an archetypal incident that Fussell points to as possible in the early stages of the war. Something like this was conceivable before the war and during its early stages, but it would appear deluded and insane during the later stages of the conflict. After the war, this kind of thinking-- this kind of romantic bravado and innocent outlook-- was lost to the world and Fussell points to a new kind of consciousness arising from the battlefields: "[T]here seems to be one dominating form of modern understanding [and] it is essentially ironic" (35). As Fussell describes it, the war marked a break in modern thinking about reality and truth. Stephen Kern points to the war as a crucial point during the modern questioning between time as "atomistic or a flux" (289). Kern quotes Gertrude Stein from *Picasso* on how the war looked:

Really the composition of this war, 1914-1918, was not the composition of all previous wars, the composition was not a composition in which there was one man in the center surrounded by a lot of other men but a composition that had neither a beginning nor an end, a composition of which one corner was as important as another corner, in fact the composition of cubism. (288)

This new "composition" was what provided the new way of experiencing modernity that Fussell points to and the questioning about time that Kern describes. For Stein, the war is cubist because it cannot be looked at in any *one* way. The war is cubist because it has no one view, no one perspective, no one controlling idea or motion. The war reflects the state of being that people found themselves in during the second decade of the new century. This loss of meaning and the world at war was what Nietzsche had pointed to and prophesied throughout his writing. In a famous passage from *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche described the prevailing belief in the "ego" and its concomitant influence

over truth: “[F]acts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations.” This was what Nietzsche believed people should understand and the Great War gave them a push in this direction by showing them that if

the word “knowledge” has any meaning, the word is knowable; but it is *interpretable* otherwise. it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings-- “Perspectivism.”

It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm. (Nietzsche’s emphasis. 267)

In 1914, “drives” broke out all over the world.

From the relative safety of exile in Trieste and Zurich, Joyce witnessed and read about these “drives.” A part of this reading came from his reading of Nietzsche, a reading that lasted his entire life and, in the words of Joseph Valente, formed an “alliance... of spiritual revolution” (88). According to Valente, Joyce’s relationship to Nietzsche centered around their concern with perspectivism, a concern that “traces the monologism of Western metaphysics to a misplaced belief in the ego, rather than an illusory sense of objective existence” (89). I would point out here that this interest revolves around their attack upon ocularcentrism-- Nietzsche began his attack upon Western metaphysics in *The Birth of Tragedy* when he described the Dionysian quest to “transcend all seeing” (140)-- and that Joyce took this attack into a different direction by creating a body of work embodying this critique of perspectivism. But Joyce also had a personal interest in reading the “drives” that were tearing the Europe of “entrenched and marshalled races” apart.

In 1916, two of Joyce’s friends from his school days were killed -- one in the uniform of a British officer and the other at the hands of a British officer. Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, the model for MacCann in *A Portrait* and one of the organizers of

the protest against Yeats' *The Countess Cathleen*, was killed during the Easter Rising when he attempted to stop his fellow Dubliners from looting. A British officer caught the pacifist Skeffington in the streets and had him shot without a trial for rioting. Tom Kettle, the model for Robert Hand in *Exiles*, died an even more ironic death and he knew it when he sat in the trenches after the terrible beauty was born: "These men will go down in history as heroes and martyrs and I will go down-- if I go down at all-- as a bloody British officer" (quoted in Cross 41). Kettle was an Irish nationalist-- he disapproved of *Dubliners* because he thought its paralyzed view of his fellow citizens would be harmful to Ireland-- who joined the British army at the beginning of the war because he believed that England would reward Irish participation with Home Rule (this false hope was held by other Irish poets such as Francis Ledwidge and the overall colonial situation is illustrated by the "onelegged sailor" in "Wandering Rocks": "--For England" [U10.232]). Kettle was killed in September during the Somme offensive. The contrast and ironic similarities between these two deaths was highlighted by the fact that Kettle and Skeffington were brothers-in-law. Joyce wrote a letter to Kettle's widow and invoked Skeffington's death in his last sentence: "I am grieved to hear that so many misfortunes have fallen on your family in these evil days" (SL 222).

Joyce wrote "Nestor" during these evil days from November to December 1917. He began writing the chapter almost exactly one year to the day that the Somme offensive was called off. As Fairhall describes it, 1917 was "an especially demoralizing year dominated by the idea that attrition would decide the war" (165). (Is it significant that the chapter I will be pointing to as the most influenced by the war's shattering of conventional "sight"-- "Ithaca"-- is the 17th of the novel?). The reason I bring up the second chapter of *Ulysses* in this discussion of "Ithaca" is that if we are to see "Ithaca" as the chapter where history itself is given an interior monologue, then "Nestor"

must be talked about as the chapter where history first talks. “Nestor’s” “art.” we are told in the Gilbert schema, is “history” (30). E. L. Epstein suggests that because of the concentration on history “many later passages in *Ulysses* depend for their interpretation upon their understanding of ‘Nestor’” (“Nestor” 17). And part of the significance of this chapter is Stephen’s teaching of history and his awareness of the weight of the past. “Nestor’s” relationship to “Ithaca” is particularly important here: “Nestor” is the “Telemachiad” parallel to the “Nostos” positioning of “Ithaca.” The chapters have mirrored positions within the text-- middle chapters in triads at the beginning and ending of the novel. And, as the Gilbert schema tells us, the two chapters are directly related in their forms: the technique of “Nestor” is described as “Catechism (personal)” while “Ithaca” is described as “Catechism (impersonal)” (30). Stephen begins “Nestor” by asking a question: “--You, Cochrane, what city sent for him?” (*U* 2.1); and the chapter ends with the anti-Semitic Mr Deasy asking Stephen a question: “Ireland, they say, has the honour of being the only country which never persecuted the jews. Do you know that? No. Do you know why? (*U* 2.437-39). Stephen begins the chapter by asking about ancient history and Mr Deasy ends it by asking about contemporary history.

History weighs heavily upon Stephen as he attempts to teach his students and as Mr Deasy attempts to teach him: “Mark my words.... England is in the hands of the jews” (*U* 2.346-47). Stephen resists Deasy’s teaching just as Stephen’s own students resist him in the classroom: “In a moment they will laugh more loudly, aware of my lack of rule and of the fees their papas pay” (*U* 2.28-29). Stephen resists Deasy’s anti-Semitism, and, in doing so, he delivers one of the more famous lines in the novel: “--History, Stephen said, is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake” (*U* 2.377). Gifford tells us that this line alludes to Jules Laforgue’s *Melanges posthumes*, but, to my mind, the allusion has more to do with the beginning of Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis*

Bonaparte:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. *The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.* (my italics. 15)

In this light, Stephen's desire to awake from this nightmare is directly linked to his desire to become, in the Nietzschean sense, his own father. The past itself is what Stephen must overthrow to create himself and become an artist. To my mind, this line cannot be understood without reading it in reference to Marx and the Nietzschean quest to father oneself. or, as Wordsworth coined it for the Romantics: "The Child is father to the Man." This is Stephen's Nietzschean quest and obstacles to achieving this are embodied in the "circumstances transmitted from the past." One of these "circumstances" was the First World War, an event ten years in the future for Stephen but very much in the present when Joyce wrote *Ulysses*.

"Nestor" begins with a question to a child, but the quiet and fidgety classroom quickly dissolves into the destruction of war:

Fabled by the daughters of memory. And yet it was in some way if not as memory fabled it. A phrase then, of impatience. a thud of Blake's wings of excess. I hear the ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry, and time one livid final flame. (*U* 2.7-10)

This Blakean mediation on the force, production, and communication of history-- what Fritz Senn points to as the chapter's highlighting of history as something "unfathomable" that for "some reason... escaped oblivion" (767)-- leads to an image of destruction. As E. L. Epstein suggests, the "resemblance of this vision to a scene of the First World War, a building hit by artillery" is due to the events occurring in Europe as Joyce wrote the chapter ("Nestor" 22). In fact, it is hard to imagine that any

reader of the novel in 1922--or a page turner throughout the twenties and thirties-- could read this vision from Stephen's mind without conjuring up their own visions of the Great War. Time and space itself were casualties of the war and they will never be the same again. This blowing up of time and space occurs again after the most famous scene in the book: Stephen's smashing of the lamp in Bella Cohen's: "He lifts his ashplant high with both hands and smashes the chandelier. Time's livid final flame leaps and, in the following darkness, ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry" (U15.4243-45). At this point in the novel, Stephen has finally thrown off the *Agenbite of inwit* associated with his guilt over his mother's death and shrugged off another effort of the "fathers" (church and state) to control him. But this is also a mock heroic-- and drunk-- gesture, and we are reminded again of the beginning of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce" (15). But if the events in "Cicre" border on farce, they also have their tragic side. Right after Stephen "destroys" time and space, he is confronted by the arm of the British military in the form of Privates Carr and Compton. And during this confrontation, the city that gave birth to Stephen becomes involved in the fight:

Brimstone fires spring up. Dense clouds roll past. Heavy
 Gatling guns boom. Pandemonium. Troops deploy. Gallop
 of hoofs. Artillery. Hoarse commands. Bells clang. Backers
 shout. Drunkards bawl. Whores screech. Foghorns hoot.
 Cries of valour. Shrieks of dying. Pikes clash on cuirasses.
 Thieves rob the slain.... (U15.4661-65)

Dublin burns. The imagery invokes the war and 1916 when British warships sailed up the Liffey and turned their guns on the city. As Declan Kiberd argues in *Inventing Ireland*, the myths surrounding 1916 and the war were "almost identical" (247); and, in the light of the deaths of Kettle and Skeffington, they became conflated in *Ulysses*.

However, the vision of the shelling of a building at the beginning of the chapter is not the only invocation of the Great War. War itself is the subject of the history lesson Stephen attempts to give and the imagery of warfare runs throughout the chapter. One of the most provocative instances of this is the field hockey game the students play as Mr Deasy attends to their “little financial settlement” (U2.207). Stephen hears their game and becomes among school children:

Again: a goal. I am among them, among their battling
bodies in a medley, the joust of life. You mean that knock-
kneed mother’s darling who seems to be slightly crawsick?
Jousts. Time shocked rebounds, shock by shock. Jousts,
slush and uproar of battles, the frozen deathspew of the slain,
a shout of spearspikes baited with men’s bloodied guts. (U2.314-
18)

Time itself is “shocked” (shellshocked) and the hockey game becomes trench warfare. This conflation of sport and war brings us back to the beginning of the Somme offensive and the bravado displayed by the British soldiers who kicked footballs into No Man’s Land. As Fussell reports, this act became a part of the British propaganda machine and a poem written right after the attack displays this. It is called “The Game” and it commemorated the East Surrey Regiment for dribbling four footballs “for a mile and a quarter into the enemy trenches”:

On through the hail of slaughter,
Where gallant comrades fall,
Where blood is poured like water,
They drive the trickling ball.
The fear of death before them
Is but an empty name.
True to the land that bore them--
The SURREYS play the game. (27-28)

The war was associated with the idea of a game and the propaganda went so far as to say that the British soldier was superior to the “Potsdammers” because he played the individual-focused game of football. The important point here is that, as Fussell points

out, this kind of act was taken as a pure form of bravery: “If anyone at the time thought Captain Nevill’s act preposterous, no one said so” (28). In Fussell’s view, this kind of act was celebrated in poems like “The Game” because modern irony had yet to be born. In his study of the effect of trench warfare on identity during the war, Eric Leeds makes one sweeping generalization that Fussell’s account of the war in British literature also attests to: “The war experience was nothing if not an experience of radical discontinuity on every level of consciousness” (3). Written a year after the Somme offensive ended, “Nestor” is a reply to the act of Nevill’s men; death is not “an empty name” even on a hockey field in Ireland. Joyce equates the “training” of the boys at sport with the experience of the battlefield and the outcome is not the heroism of “The Game.” The noise Stephen hears on the playing field is “a shout of spearspike baited with men’s bloodied guts.”

The First World War changed language because it changed how we see the world. For the soldier in the trenches, the world looks different; as Fussell describes it, things that were taken for granted before the war become “new” to the “new” eyes of the experienced soldier: “It was the sight of the sky, almost alone, that had the power to persuade a man that he was not already lost in a common grave” (51). In a reaction to a chapter from *Modern Painters*, Max Plowman summed up the experience of the new vision of the soldier: “Was it Ruskin who said that the upper and more glorious half of Nature’s pageant goes unseen by the majority of people?... Well, the trenches have changed all that. Shutting off the landscape, they compel us to observe the sky” (quoted in Fussell 54). As Terry Eagleton points out, *Ulysses* belongs to the “momentous upheaval” of the early twentieth century (the First World War, the Easter Rising, the Russian Revolution, the Irish war of Independence) (*Heathcliff* 257). This upheaval took place all over the Western world and it revolutionized how the world is talked about and

how consciousness is perceived.

The Great War also provided artists and thinkers with a new way of “seeing” reality . And this brings me to my point about “Ithaca” and the war: of all the chapters in the novel, the style of “Ithaca” is the most representative of the “upheaval” of historical events surrounding Joyce as he composed the text. World War I is what Jameson would call the “subtext” of the chapter; even though “Nestor” is filled with imagery from the war, “Ithaca,” partly because it is “Nestor’s” mirror, is more reflective of the war in its very form. In “Nestor” we are given blood-soaked battlefields and buildings blown apart; in “Ithaca” we are given the conventional novel being blown apart. Granted, Joyce pushed the novel to its limits throughout the text, but “Ithaca’s” position in the novel highlights its power in dismantling the traditional form of the novel at the same time that it highlights Joyce’s challenge to ocularcentrism. The language of the novel is changed in “Ithaca” because the Great War changed thinking about language and identity. Fussell describes language and consciousness as being one of the great casualties of the war. In *A Farewell to Arms*, Hemingway gives a description that Fussell says would have been incomprehensible before the war; Frederic Henry tells us that “abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates” (191). This is an important formulation because “concrete names,” “numbers,” “the names of rivers,” and “dates” are the exact things “Ithaca” is constructed upon. The end of *Ulysses*-- “Penelope” being beyond the end in its timelessness and its 8 sentences turned on their side to equal ∞ -- dispenses with traditional form and language because “abstract words” no longer apply. “Ithaca” is the end point of novelistic “truth” and representation; this is depicted in the loss of “innocent” language and the strange large dot at the end of the chapter may be taken as the period after the last sentence of the “last”

novel. The reader will know “everything” after “Ithaca,” but this new knowledge is colored by the post-war reevaluation of everything. And to see this we must (finally) open Bloom’s drawer.

The world had happened to him.

--Dylan Thomas, “Wilfred Owen”

What clashes here of wills gen wonts.
oystergods gaggin fishygods! (*FW* 4.1-2)

...and battle-suns clanged against battle-
moons as the tree tops whipped in war-
winds to show the rushing clouds of
night....

--William T. Vollmann, *The Ice-Shirt*

The Craggy Rocks and the Chinese Puzzle of the Postmodern “Ithaca”

William Vollmann is currently in the middle of writing an ambitious and provocative series of novels called *Seven Dreams*. These novels-- there are three of them as I write this¹¹-- imaginatively reconstruct several important confrontations between Europeans and the New World (Norsemen coming to North America, French Jesuits meeting Iroquois Indians, English explorers bumping into the Inuit). In the first novel of the series, *The Ice-Shirt*, Vollmann describes his intent behind this reconstruction of the clash between the Old and New Worlds: “My aim in *Seven Dreams* has been to create a ‘Symbolic History’-- that is to say, an account of origins and metamorphoses which is often untrue based on the literal facts as we know them, but whose untruths further a deeper sense of truth” (397). As a representative postmodernist, Vollmann has been reading his Nietzsche: “[F]acts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations” (*Will* 267). In his book on postmodernism, Jameson describes this kind of project as “postmodern fantastic historiography” which seeks “to convey the feel of the real past

better than any of the ‘facts’ themselves” (368). The “feel” of the past is what is important to Vollmann and to other postmodern novelists like Don DeLillo (*Libra*, *Underworld*), Martin Amis (the past/future of *London Fields*) and the writer Jameson refers to in his discussion of postmodernist history making, Thomas Pynchon. Pynchon is important for a discussion of postmodernism and *Ulysses* because he is the writer who is most pointed to as Joyce’s postmodern heir. The play with history and the dynamics of warfare in *V* and *Gravity’s Rainbow* (“Something’s stalking through the city of Smoke-- gathering up slender girls, fair and smooth as dolls, by the handful” [53]) is particularly resonant when considering the layering of history in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*.¹²

What I want to point to here is how reading Joyce’s “use” of history in “Ithaca” supplies the background for reading postmodern play with the stuff-- the “facts”-- of history. This investigation into the rising of the ghosts of history in “Ithaca” will lead to a look at the links between high modernist and postmodern challenges to ocularcentrism. To see this we must listen to the interior monologue Joyce gives to history in the penultimate chapter of *Ulysses* and then, in the next chapter, we must consider the only movie Samuel Beckett ever made. This consideration of “Ithaca” and Beckett’s *Film* will lead into a discussion of postmodern vision. But first we must reach back and open Bloom’s drawer.

Before Bloom opens the unlocked “first drawer” we are given a catalog of the items contained in it in one of the longest descriptions in the chapter. Bloom opens it to place in it the most recent of Martha Clifford’s letters and the drawer is opened to us as we become literary archeologists picking through the objects making up Bloom’s life. The “2nd drawer” contains important documents like his birth certificate, his endowment insurance policy, his bank passbook, and the official notice of Rudolph Virag changing his name to Bloom (*U*17.1855-872). But the first drawer contains detritus that is more telling of Bloom’s existence and his desires. The first drawer is packed with stuff and the

catalog of the items is long and detailed:

A Vere Foster's handwriting copybook, property of Milly (Millicent) Bloom, certain pages of which bore diagram drawings, marked *Papli*, which showed a large globular head with 5 hairs erect, 2 eyes in profile, the trunk full front with 3 large buttons, 1 triangular foot: 2 fading photographs of queen Alexandra of England and of Maud Branscombe, actress and professional beauty: a Yuletide card, bearing on it a pictorial representation of a parasitic plant, the legend *Mizpah*, the date Xmas 1892, the name of the senders: from Mr+Mrs M. Comerford, the versicle: *May this Yuletide bring to thee, Joy and peace and welcome glee*: a butt of red partly liquified sealing wax, obtained from the stores department of Messrs Hely's, Ltd., 89, 90, and 91 Dame street.... (U 17.1775-785)

The list goes on to mention things like the letters from Martha Clifford, "a press cutting from an English weekly periodical *Modern Society*, subject corporal chastisement in girls' schools" (U 17.1801-03), condoms, a chart describing Bloom's measurements "compiled before, during and after a months' consecutive use of Sadow-Whiteley's pulley exerciser" (U 17.1815-17), and a tool that is symbolic of our sift through the drawer: "a lowpower magnifying glass" (U 17.1808-09). In all, there are twenty-nine different items in the drawer. I want to point to six things in the drawer: Milly's drawing of her father, "a sealed prophecy" Bloom himself wrote and sealed, two photographs, and two postcards. I have chosen these items because history speaks through them: the juxtaposition creates a strange kind of montage effect that gives voice to the articles as products of consumption and objects from a time long gone. (They were long gone in 1922). Ezra Pound once called *Ulysses* "a summary of pre-war Europe" in which is depicted "the blackness and mess and muddle of a 'civilization.'" Bloom very much *is* the mess" ("Mr. Joyce" 251). Bloom is the pre-war mess under the microscope of the new language given to the world by the Great War. And the drawer is a mess. There are no empty words describing the contents of the drawer that Frederic Henry would object to: there are only lists, dates, addresses, "objective" appraisals. But in the description I am

looking at through Bloom's "lowpower microscope" a new and strange effect is produced: the list of articles is reminiscent of the comic exaggerations of Rabelais, Cervantes, and Sterne but here it has a modern sense and a modern impact. The list of articles in Bloom's drawer creates a montage that leads to a synthesis much like that of Eisenstein's experiments in film montage. The list is a strange and provocative clash of turn-of-the-century products and ideas that has a great deal in common with Walter Benjamin's thoughts on the commodity explosion in nineteenth-century Paris. In her stunning reconstruction/critique of Benjamin's *Passagen-Werk*, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project*, Susan Buck-Morss describes Benjamin's thinking about the montage-effect of the new marketplace:

Crucial is Benjamin's understanding of "montage" as a form which, if already visible in the early twenties, in the kaleidoscopic, fortuitous juxtaposition of shop signs and window displays, was raised by technology during the course of the century to the level of a conscious principle of construction. The kaleidoscope itself is an invention of the nineteenth century. But it was preceded by the Chinese Puzzle which, because its juxtaposed elements were not randomly arranged but cohered around a central idea, was the true ur-phenomenon of the principle of montage as a *constructive* principle. (Buck-Morss's emphasis, 74)

The idea of the "conscious principle of construction" of montage throughout modern culture-- the marketplace, the movies, the artist's studio-- is important for considering the Chinese Puzzles of *Ulysses*, *Tender Buttons*, *The Waste Land*, *The Waves*, and *The Cantos*. This Chinese Puzzle effect is seen throughout *Ulysses*-- from the montage of newspaper headlines in "Aeolus" to what I have described as the montage effect of the Bass Ale label in "Oxen of the Sun"-- but it takes a particularly interesting and important form in "Ithaca." And the inventory of Bloom's drawer is a good example of this because it, in the words Benjamin, aims

to erect the large constructions out of the smallest architectural

segments that have been sharply and cuttingly manufactured. Indeed, to discover the crystal of the total event in the analysis of the small, particular moments. This means breaking with vulgar historical naturalism. To grasp the construction of history as such. In the structure of commentary. (quoted in Buck-Morss, 74)

The whole of “Ithaca” is a commentary in this manner. “Ithaca” as meta-criticism: it takes the world apart and puts it back together again to understand it. But, like the Great War, once the world is taken apart by “Ithaca,” it can never be the same again. Jung felt this in his interesting essay/struggle with the novel:

O *Ulysses*, you are truly a devotional book for the object-besotted, object-ridden white man! You are a spiritual exercise, an ascetic discipline, an agonizing ritual, an arcane procedure, eighteen alchemical alembics piled on top of one another, where amid acids, poisonous fumes, and fire and ice, the homunculus of a new, universal consciousness is distilled! You say nothing and betray nothing, O *Ulysses*, but you give us the works! (25)

This “new consciousness” is what we feel after the catalogs, the questions and answers, and all the facts given to us in “Ithaca.” “Ithaca” gives us “the works” in the form of the objects surrounding Bloom and his family.

Of all the objects in the drawer, Milly’s notebook is the most prominent because of its place as the first item (is it the first thing we see when the drawer is opened?) and because of its metaphorical significance. Picasso once said that his aim as an artist was to draw like a child; to accomplish this, he attempted to break through the barriers imposed by traditional thinking about art and vision. Milly draws her father with the “innocent” eyes of a child. This is a different Bloom, a new Bloom (even the name she calls Bloom, *Papli*, gives us a different side of Bloom). We are given her drawing in a montage-like description made up of five elements: “a large globular head with 5 hairs erect, 2 eyes in profile, the trunk full front with 3 large buttons, 1 triangular foot.”

This is a new Bloom, a Bloom given to us by a little Bloom.

Milly's drawing is also a microcosm of "Ithaca" itself: the chapter is constructed upon a montage of hundreds of details that provokes us into a new vision of the end of the novel itself. This is not only accomplished on the level of form-- Milly's drawing and the "arranger's" description of it-- but also on the level of historical reference-- what Milly draws in. Milly drew her picture of her father in a "Vere Foster's handwriting copybook." Gifford tells us that Vere Foster was an "Anglo-Irish educator and philanthropist" whose handwriting guidebooks were popular in the late nineteenth century (595). The notebook is important-- and Joyce made it important by describing it at the head of the catalog of objects Bloom encounters in his everyday world-- because it is one of those cultural fossils Benjamin was fascinated by; and we should "read" it in the light of one of Benjamin's most notable statements on historical thinking: "A chronicler who recites events without distinguishing between major and minor ones acts in accordance with the following truth: nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost for history" ("Theses" 254). Milly's notebook, her drawing, and the "montage" that it is given to us in is important because it raises up the ghost of the culture that produced all three: the Irish educational system, the position of women in Irish/British society, the colonial position of Ireland, the self-perpetuating force of education that, in the words of one critic of modern educational systems, gives birth to "the extended division between mental and manual labour that characterizes the capitalist mode of production in general" (Poulantzas 252), and the montage that Benjamin saw everywhere in the explosion of the marketplace at the turn of the century.

All of this in one child's drawing. Milly's drawing speaks to us as Pound attempts to speak to us in Canto 1: "Poured we libations unto each the dead" (3). James Longenbach describes this kind of modernist digging into the past as a kind of reflection

of the present that “reveals how historical knowledge is acquired by infusing the ghosts of the past with the life of the present” (*Modernist* 18). This is obviously one of the main concerns of *The Waste Land*: “A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many, \ I had not thought death had undone so many” (55). But, as I have intimated, “Ithaca’s” relationship to history goes beyond the “mythical method” or the overall resurrection spells of the modernists. It is the form of “Ithaca” that is important when considering its content, and following Yeats’s manipulation of Pater’s description of the Mona Lisa, we may read the description of Milly’s drawing thus:

Papli,
which showed a large globular head
with 5 hairs erect,
2 eyes in profile,
the trunk full front with 3 large buttons,
1 triangular foot

It is too long to be a haiku, but it achieves the same effect Eisenstein pointed to as the “unconscious” montage of the Japanese form. Eisenstein pointed to each line of a haiku as “montage phrases” and “shot lists.” He called early haikus the earliest approach to montage because “[t]he simple combination of two or three details of a material kind yields a perfectly finished representation of another kind-- psychological” (“Principle” 32). To sum up, the description of Milly’s drawing works in this way: the “psychology” of Milly is raised (her background, the history of education in Dublin) through the reference to her notebook and the form of the description. The “montage” quality of the description tells us much more than just the details and we are given a glimpse at the interior monologue of history itself. But since history has been talking for a long time, we step in the middle somewhere-- the early twentieth century-- and other objects must be looked at and listened to.

After Milly’s drawing, the next objects in the drawer are “2 fading photographs

of queen Alexandra of England and of Maud Branscombe, actress and professional beauty.” If we take the description of Milly’s drawing as a mini-haiku/montage than the contrast of these next items creates an interesting effect. In contrast to the child’s drawing we are quickly flashed two photographs; they are fading because they are old, but they still have meaning for us. They are a part of Bloom’s past and his present: we know that Milly in 1904 is working in a “photoshop” in Mullingar (“I am getting on swimming in the photo business now” [U 4.400-01]) and Bloom keeps several photos in his drawer including pornographic postcards. The inclusion of photos in Bloom’s drawer is important for two reasons: first, and most obvious, is that photography caused one of the great revolutions in seeing during the Victorian period. Not only did photographs change the aims and questions of art, it also, in Benjamin’s analysis, changed how we see ourselves.¹³ Photography was so disturbingly popular in the second half of the nineteenth century that it provoked Baudelaire into writing a letter to the *Revue française* in which he advised: “We must see that photography is again confined to its real task which consists in being the servant of science and art, but the very humble servant like typography and stenography which have neither created nor improved literature” (quoted in Schwarz, *Art* 110). But no one heeded Baudelaire’s demand and the photograph became the tool behind what Benjamin describes as the “desire of the contemporary masses to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly” (“Work” 223). This movement toward the “human” is what Jameson describes as the overall effect of “Ithaca” because

the whole dead grid of the object world of greater Dublin is, finally, disalienated and by the most subterranean detours traced back... less to its origins in Nature, than to the transformation of Nature by human and collective praxis deconcealed. (“History” 140)

Jameson comes to this conclusion after a consideration of the question of narrative performed by the chapter, and this ties into what I have been describing as the “interior monologue” of history heard in this chapter. And this brings me to the second reason that photographs are in Bloom’s drawer: they are a mass-produced contrast to Milly’s drawing and because of this they raise up the ghost voices of history in a different way for, as Susan Sontag once put it, “To collect photographs is to collect the world” (3).

In *Camera Lucida*, Barthes tells us that “The reading of public photographs is always, at bottom, a private reading” (15). And “private readings” is what I want to end this discussion of “Ithaca” with. For Barthes, there is a direct relation between the public and the private in a photograph, and the link between the two is a third mediating element:

Thus the life of someone whose existence has somewhat preceded our own encloses in its particularity the very tension of History, its division. History is hysterical: it is constituted only if we consider it, only if we look at it--and in order to look at it, we must be excluded from it. As a living soul, I am the very contrary of History, I am what belies it, destroys it for the sake of my own history. (65)

Barthes looks for the “tension of History” throughout the photos of the world and then he looks at pictures that are closer to home: he looks at pictures of his dead mother in an attempt to “see” her again. By “contemplating a photograph in which she is hugging me, a child against her” he is able to feel history and to “waken in myself the rumpled softness of her crepe de Chine and the perfume of her rice powder” (65). This is the kind of function the photographs and the pornographic postcards have on us as readers of Bloom’s drawer. Milly’s drawing spoke to us through Milly’s history and the photos speak to us through European history. Moreover, the juxtaposition of Milly’s drawing with the photos of famous women raises the idea of a merging of the public and

the private through *our* reading of them. The photograph of Queen Alexandra is particularly loaded in this regard: from her marriage to Edward VII will come the king who will sit on the throne of England during the Great War. In a certain sense, this photo is pregnant with history: the generation who will oversee the war to end all wars is just a glint in her eye. (As Barthes puts it, the function of the photo relies on the perception of passed time: “[C]ameras, in short, were clocks for seeing” [15].)

The photo the Queen’s image is paired with, the picture of Maud Branscombe, is a powerful reflection of the same world that produced and consumed pictures of the Queen. As Gifford describes it, Branscombe was an actress who had “an extraordinary reputation as a beauty” and “[i]n 1877 alone over twenty-eight thousand copies of her photograph were sold” (395). This nineteenth-century Marilyn Monroe is coupled here with the Queen to bring up the idyllic world of pre-war England. These photos give us what Barthes refers to as the “tension of History,” a feel for a history that has ceased to “be” for the viewer, a feel for a history that was blown to bits. Septimus Smith in Woolf’s *Mrs. Dalloway* knew this history: “Septimus was one of the first to volunteer. He went to France to save an England which consisted almost entirely of Shakespeare’s plays and Miss Isobel Pole in a green dress walking in a square” (86). But after the war the world changes for Septimus and all he knows is that “he could not feel” (86). Among the things blown up around Septimus in the trenches in France is England itself. During the June day of *Mrs. Dalloway*, England is a shadowland for him where the very trees whisper death. Fussell reproduces a photo in *The Great War and Modern Memory* which has the same feel that Septimus had before the war: “The Central London Recruiting Depot, August 1914.” The frame is packed with row upon row of eager faces looking out into a romantic world for the magic and glory of war. The innocent eagerness in the faces is a quality that is buried with the war.

The pornographic postcards in Bloom's drawer-- they are mentioned late in the catalog so they must be hidden under things-- are linked to the photos of the Queen and the actress in the obvious fact of their relationship as pictures, but they also have a large cultural relationship that can only be seen by "looking" at the postcards:

2 erotic photocards showing a) buccal coition between nude senorita (rere presentation, superior position) and nude torero (fore presentation, inferior position) b) anal violation by male religious (fully clothed, eyes avert) of female religious (partly clothed, eyes direct), purchased by post from Box 32, P. O., Charing Cross, London, W.C. (U 17.1809-813)

These "photocards" are another product from England and the objects cataloged before and after them in the drawer tells us how they are to be seen: right before the postcards is listed "a lowpower magnifying glass" (U 17.1808-09) and right after is "a press cutting of recipe for renovation of old tan boots" (U 17.1813-14). The postcards are to be closely looked at as belonging to a world of mundane objects like a recipe to improve the look of a pair of old boots. The production of erotic postcards was a huge industry at the turn of the century-- Stephen even has some in *A Portrait*-- and in 1910 alone 125 million of them were produced in France.¹⁴ As Jennifer Wicke points out, the consumption of British goods in Ireland around the turn of the century is an interesting instance of "consumption at a double remove" because these products-- and products named throughout *Ulysses* like the pornographic novel *Sweets of Sin* or food products like Plumtree's Potted Meat and Epps' Cocoa-- are "mediated by and through the colonial relation of British dominance over Ireland" (750). As Wicke sums up, when a Dubliner consumes British goods-- and she points out that the only "viable" product Ireland had in 1904 for internal consumption was Guinness-- he or she participates in the "consumption of the colonial status quo" (750). This conception of the consuming colonial subject is particularly important when considering postcards because, as Malek Alloula describes

it in his study of French postcards depicting Algerian women, the postcard was a vital tool of orientalization and propaganda for the postcard-producing empire: “The postcard is everywhere, covering all colonial space, immediately available to the tourist, the soldier, the colonialist” (4). The description of the postcard functioning, in one of Alloula’s provocative phrases, like “the comic strip of colonial morality” is set up for readers of *Ulysses* the chapter before “Ithaca” when that miniature Ulysses, D. B. Murphy, pulls out a postcard for Stephen and Bloom to see:

All focused their attention at the scene exhibited, a group of savage women in striped loincloths, squatted, blinking, sucking, frowning, sleeping amid a swarm of infants (there must have been quite a score of them) outside some primitive shanties of osier.
(*U* 16.475-78)

The caption to the picture reads: “*Choza de Indios. Beni, Boliva*” (*U* 16.474). Murphy’s running commentary on the postcard reveals his complete misreading of the situation depicted and his complete immersion in orientalism: “And I seen maneaters in Peru that eats corpses and the livers of horses....” “Chews coca all day... Cuts off their diddies when they can’t bear no more children. See them sitting there stark ballocknaked eating a dead horses liver raw” (*U* 16.470-481). Bloom doubts Murphy’s story, and he even goes so far as to turn the postcard over, but “There was no message evidently, as he took particular notice” (*U* 16.490).

The pornographic postcards in Bloom’s drawer refers us back to Murphy’s postcard and forward to Bloom as a consumer of pornographic images from Europe. It points to Bloom’s position in “colonial space” and in the form of a consumer of the “colonial status quo.” This is the kind of reading Declan Kiberd comes away with after examining the anti-climax of Bloom bringing Stephen home for cocoa:

“ Joyce concludes that there can be no freedom for his characters within that society: they exist in their interior monologues with

a kind of spacious amplitude which proves impossible in the community itself. So his refusal to provide a “satisfactory” climax in their final meeting is his rejection of the obligation felt by realists to present a coherent, stable, socialized self. (*Inventing* 354)

This reading seems to be in direct contrast to Jameson’s conclusion that the people of Dublin transcend reification in the novel through lived speech and achieve a kind of human world in the face of global contingency. I think both are correct in their thinking because they both approach “Ithaca” as the chapter where this kind of reading is possible; reading “Ithaca” enables Kiberd to conclude that “*Ulysses*... is a prolonged farewell to written literature and a rejection of its attempts to colonize speech and thought” (355); reading “Ithaca” enables Jameson to ask: “Why do we need narrative anyway? What are stories and what is our existential relation to them? Is a non-narrative relationship to the world and to Being possible?” (“History” 140). And the reason these two critics can come to such different conclusions is that the montage quality of the chapter-- the lists, the descriptions, the questions, the answers-- provides for an opening into the interior monologue of history itself. The last object I want to point out in Bloom’s drawer brings together these two interpretations as meditations upon history as well as pointing to the overall influence on the form of the chapter.

The objects we have examined with Bloom’s “lowpower magnifying glass” tell us things about the lived history of Bloom, his family, and his country. The last object I point to gives us Bloom himself telling us about history; we open Bloom’s drawer and find

a sealed prophecy (never unsealed) written by Leopold Bloom in 1886 concerning the consequences of the passing into law of William Ewart Gladstone’s Home Rule bill of 1886 (never passed into law) (*U* 17.1787-790)

This tiny time capsule is not opened for us: we do not know what Bloom’s “prophecy”

describes, but we do know that Bloom was for Home Rule and that the prophesy probably reflects this. The Home Rule bill of 1886 was the first bill to be introduced by Gladstone but it was defeated, as Gifford tells us, on 8 June 1886 (596). This means that *Ulysses* almost takes place-- it misses it by eight days-- on the twentieth anniversary of the first defeat of a Home Rule bill. This, to my mind, is heavily symbolic and, in the context of "Ithaca," it takes on an interesting light. As I have mentioned, the promise of Home Rule was one of the reasons so many Irishmen served in the British army during the First World War. Tom Kettle and others like him fought and died for this post-war reward that never came. In his popular history of the war, Martin Gilbert takes time out of a detailed description of troop movements during the Somme offensive to mention Kettle and the Irish company he led into the captured village of Ginchy:

Before the attack the officers were given pieces of green cloth to be stitched on the back of their uniforms, a symbol of Irish patriotism. Touching his patch, Tom Kettle told his soldier servant: 'Boy, I am proud to die for it!' Leading his men into the village that day, Kettle was killed. His soldier servant, in a letter of condolence to Kettle's wife, wrote: 'He carried his pack for Ireland and Europe. Now pack-carrying is over. He has held the line.' (284)

As I pointed out, Joyce also wrote a letter to Kettle's widow. And in a certain sense, Bloom's sealed prophesy is a letter Joyce attempted to send to Kettle before he put on that British uniform and before he added a patch of green to it. The unsealed prophesy is never unsealed because of the failure of the British parliament to pass Home Rule into law. After the fall of Parnell, Home Rule became an even more elusive goal and Bloom's prophesy lay in his drawer untouched for twenty years. Kettle went to defend "plucky Catholic Belgium" because he saw it as a defense for all small nations (Kiberd, *Inventing* 192). But the war was goodbye to all that. It is as if "Ithaca" is a time machine and Joyce was attempting to send a message back to Kettle: Home Rule will remain a broken

dream. And he sends this message back through the symbolic history of one Dubliner who has been out too late on one June night. The message is never received, but its meaning spreads throughout the entire chapter to follow Frederic Henry's injunction that "abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene besides the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates" (191). The last question in the chapter is a simple one: "Where?" (*U* 17.2327). The last answer is even more simple and concrete: the dot at the end of the chapter is a darkened pupil colored by the revolutions in seeing caused by photography, cinema, and the Great War.

Where?

In the Western Eye.

Endnotes

¹ "Nother" is Gabler's emendation of the "Mother" that appeared in every pervious edition of the novel. Gabler's reason for this change is based on textual evidence and on the text's own admission that the telegram is a "curiosity to show." As Ellmann puts it in his preface to the Gabler edition, "Mother" occurred in the first edition instead of "Nother" because the "typesetters could not believe their eyes" (xi). This may be one of the "dis-lexia" effects Roy Gottfried describes Joyce using throughout the novel to depict "the weak vision of the artist and the weakened one of the reader" (6). It may also be just one of the textual problems that has plagued *Ulysses* and will continue to be a point of heated debate between editors of the novel.

² For a book-length study of the montage techniques in *Ulysses*, see Craig Barrow, *Montage in Joyce's "Ulysses"* (Madrid: Jose Porrua Turanzas, 1980).

³ For discussions of Eisenstein's attempt to bring *An American Tragedy* to the screen, see Seton, pp. 176-182, and Goodwin, pp. 127-134.

⁴ For a discussion of the political critique of Stalinism embodied in the *Ivan* films, see Goodwin, pp. 184-218.

⁵ For an analysis of the “problem” of the modern observer in relation to these inventions, see Crary, pp. 1-24 passim.

⁶ See Berkeley, *A New Theory of Vision* in *Selections from Berkeley*, fifth edition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1899).

⁷ See Jay, pp. 198-203.

⁸ See Ellmann, *James Joyce* pp. 300-311; Hutchins pp. 77-85 and pp. 245-46; and Costello pp. 289-293.

⁹ See A. Walton Litz, “Ithaca” in *James Joyce’s “Ulysses”: Critical Essays*, ed. Clive Hart and David Hayman; and McGee, pp. 159-169.

¹⁰ For an analysis of the “anti-Molly revisionists” and their complete acceptance of Bloom’s thoughts on Molly’s sexuality, see Bonnie Kime Scott, *Joyce and Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 156-183.

¹¹ The first three novel in this series by William T. Vollmann are *The Ice Shirt*; *Fathers and Crows* (New York: Viking, 1992); and *The Rifles* (New York: Viking, 1994).

¹² For a discussion of the connections between Pynchon and Joyce, see Richard Pearse, “What Joyce After Pynchon?” in *James Joyce: The Centennial Symposium*, ed. Morris Beja, Phillip Herring, Maurice Harmon, and David Norris (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

¹³ See Walter Benjamin, “A Short History of Photography,” *Screen*, No. 7 (Spring 1972): 7-16.

¹⁴ See Garry Leonard, “Power, Pornography, and the Problem of Pleasure: The Semerotics of Desire and Commodity Culture in Joyce,” *James Joyce Quarterly*, No. 4 (Summer/Fall 1993): 615-665.

Chapter Seven
But Self: Beckett's American *Film*

Is not the cylinder doomed in a more or less distant future to a state of anarchy given over to fury and violence? To these questions and many more the answers are clear and easy to give. It only remains to dare.

--Samuel Beckett, *The Lost Ones*

Nudge that rock down into the end that's burned blacker. The john knew that much. Don't push it in too hard, or you'll break the mesh which is already almost gone. She'd taught him that. Just tamp it lovingly in with the black-burned hairpin. Lovingly, I said, because crack is the only happiness.

--William T. Vollmann, "The Best Way to Smoke Crack"

Beckett in Shea Stadium

Joyce's attack upon the hold vision has over meaning provided Beckett with a model for his own explorations into challenging the rule of the eye. Beckett's work from *Murphy* to *Waiting for Godot* demonstrates his debt to Joyce and his evolving formation of his own voice. His late work is a concentration of the critique of ocularcentrism that he learned from Joyce at the same time that it exemplifies his move away from the Joycean text. And this final move away from Joyce's formal influence began with Beckett's visit to a country Joyce never saw.

Beckett made his first and only trip to the United States in 1964. He flew

into a hot New York summer to make his only movie, *Film*. The trip was important because it was his first and only look at New York and because he got to work with Buster Keaton, the man who almost played Vladimir to Marlon Brando's Estragon in a famous never-produced *Waiting for Godot*.¹ This trip also provided Beckett with his first viewing of a baseball game. Richard Seaver, his editor at Grove, took Beckett to see a Mets double-header at the newly opened Shea Stadium on July 31. An avid sports fan, Beckett apparently enjoyed the games after Seaver went over the rules. The woeful expansion-team Mets won both games and Beckett remarked that he should make an attempt to watch more of them (Knowlson 466).

The image of Beckett with watered-down beer in hand sitting in the huge open space of Shea Stadium under a Queens sky is striking and borders on the absurd. *The Village Voice* thought so and its sports section reported that Beckett was a "Mets fan" under the headline: "Take Me Out to the Endgame" (133). And yet the image of Beckett attending a Mets game is not so striking if we take into account Beckett's interest in popular culture-- slapstick, film, popular music-- and many of his theatrical concerns-- space, ritualized movement, audience. What his visit to Queens-- the home of the World's Fair in 1964-- and his attendance at a Mets double-header also suggests is Beckett's relationship to postmodernism and what Fredric Jameson calls the "spatial turn" taken by the postmodern. In his discussion of the construction of postmodern space, Jameson suggests that we may need to take a "detour through the modern...in order to grasp what is historically original in the postmodern and its spatialism" (*Postmodernism* 157). This chapter undertakes such a detour to examine the postmodernism

Beckett is usually associated with and, in particular, to discuss the postmodern vision and space of *Film*. This detour takes us through another of Beckett's works and into the connection his work has with that of Joyce. This discussion raises questions about the relationship between modernism and postmodernism and points to a new way of describing their connection. But before taking this detour, going back to Shea with Beckett will illuminate some of the spatial and visual problems under consideration here.

When Shea Stadium was opened in the spring of 1964, it was heralded as the most modern sports arena ever built. *The New York Times* called it "The Taj Mahal of the Marshlands" (Lipsyte 20). Shea is 155 feet high and 900 feet in diameter. It can hold a little over 57,000 people and it cost \$25, 500,00 to build (Koppett 1).² It must have struck Beckett as an example of American architecture and sensibility because surrounding the colossal structure is nothing but parking lots overflowing with cars and the green of Flushing Meadows Park. It was also the largest building in which Beckett had ever seen a sporting event. Before Beckett boarded the plane to fly back to Paris, he turned to the people he had been staying with and said: "This is somehow not the right country for me...the people are too strange" (Knowlson 467).

A year after Beckett saw the Mets double-header, the Beatles played Shea in front of 53, 275 people and Beckett started a long prose piece called *Le Dépeupleur*. He did not complete the novella until 1970 and in 1972 he translated it as *The Lost Ones*. One of his most enigmatic texts, *The Lost Ones* is in many ways unique in Beckett's *oeuvre*. Christopher Ricks calls the book a work which "attends upon the dying of our planet" (*Beckett's* 38). This dying world is populated by two hundred figures "each searching for

its lost one” (7). These figures-- split forever unlike the happy few who find their other halves in the *Symposium*-- also attempt to escape their world. Their world is “a cylinder fifty meters round and eighteen high for the sake of harmony or a total surface of roughly twelve hundred square meters of which eight hundred mural” (16-17). These measurements do not take into account the niches and tunnels located near the top of the cylinder which the inhabitants continually try to reach with ladders. The ladders are raised against the rubber walls and the figures climb or fall and climb or fall again. They search continually for a way out because there is a “time immemorial rumour” (17) that there is a way out.

There are four different kinds of inhabitants of the cylinder, each one reacting to the cylinder in a different way, each searching for a way out in his own way. Only the fourth kind of inhabitant has given up searching altogether for an escape that seems unrealizable:

Fourthly those who do not search or non-searchers sitting for the most part against the wall in the attitude which wrung from Dante one of his rare wan smiles. By non-searchers and despite the abyss to which this leads it is finally impossible to understand other than ex-searchers. (14)

This description of the ex-searchers points to the main literary influence for this vision of a postmodern hell: the inhabitants of the cylinder are doomed to a Dante-like purgatory, an endless existence where even a “kiss makes an indescribable sound” and inhabitants “with a stomach still to copulate strive in vain” (8).³ In the end, each searcher becomes an ex-searcher as all the figures cease looking for a way out and become “dead still where

they stand or sit in abandonment beyond recall” (60). This postmodern hell is influenced by Dante in its endless ritualized actions and its complicated and detailed structure. This postmodern hell resists allegorical interpretation and in many ways ascribes to what Jameson calls the pastiche qualities of the postmodern; and yet *The Lost Ones* is more than just “blank parody” or postmodern play with form. To understand this-- and to understand Beckett’s critique of ocularcentrism-- we must take into consideration the population and dimensions of the cylinder.

What is immediately striking about *The Lost Ones* is the amount of people occupying its Dante-inspired prison. As the master of lessness, Beckett’s name has become synonymous with a sparse setting and few characters. This is true for the stage and the page. Except for *The Lost Ones*, all of Beckett’s late work is conspicuously occupied with a minimum of characters-- usually one or two with the overpopulated *Quad I and II* topping the list with four figures. From *Waiting for Godot* to *Not I*, Beckett’s landscapes have been inhabited by only a few figures-- and only a piece of a figure in the case of *Mouth*-- struggling for existence and voice (or the end of existence and the end of voice). A text he wrote around the time he was finishing *Le Dépeupleur* is emblematic of this: *Breath* is inhabited only by “miscellaneous rubbish” and “faint light” (211).⁴ In contrast to this and other famous late Beckett texts, *The Lost Ones* is an oddity because of its large population of bodies and its huge setting. The vast cylinder imprisoning the lost ones seems to be in direct contrast to the empty spaces and depopulated stages of what Beckett called his “dramaticules.”⁵

And yet, in the most famous of all adaptations of Beckett’s prose for the stage,

the vast cylinder of *The Lost Ones* was adapted for the theater. The 1974 Mabou Mines production of *The Lost Ones* actually adapted the cylinder for the stage-- and the audience. Jonathan Kalb calls this adaptation an “avant-garde legend” (132) and it is easy to see why it has attained this stature. What the director Lee Breuer did was to make the theater itself the cylinder-- the audience was seated in an amphitheater the walls of which were covered in dark rubber. David Warrilow then appeared before the audience within the “cylinder” with a miniature reproduction of the cylinder complete with tiny figures and Lilliputian ladders. Warrilow then went on to narrate the ordeal of the lost ones in an Irish accent. His telling of the tale begins like that of a bored lecturer, but his manner and voice slowly degenerates into that of one of the inhabitants of the cylinder. What begins as a lecture ends with the lost ones becoming the audience.⁶

The Mabou Mines production of the novella interpreted the space Beckett constructed in the cylinder and pointed toward its inspiration. Beckett’s visit to New York in 1964 provided him with a feel for the most advanced in postmodern architecture at the time, architecture Baudrillard has called “Anti-architecture” because it is “the wild inhuman type that is beyond the measure of man” (17). When Beckett walked through the gate on that summer day he must have been struck by the colossal structure of the stadium and its effect upon the large amount of people there. The Mabou Mines production of *The Lost Ones* emphasized this in the form of the miniature cylinder, or tiny stadium where people watch spectacles and then cannot leave. The conversion of the theater space into a cylinder also emphasized the dynamics of spectatorship. As the most modern of stadiums, Shea set a standard for future arenas and its form epitomized mid-

sixties style. The way Shea embodies early postmodern space deeply affected Beckett's sense of imaginative space. If we take into account Jameson's view that the "new space" of the postmodern challenges our senses in a way never achieved before-- a challenge ill met because of our lack of "perceptual equipment to match this new hyperspace" (*Postmodernism* 38)-- then we may take *The Lost Ones* as Beckett's attempt to come to terms with this new kind of spatial universe.⁷ That this takes the form of a vision of hell is indicative of Beckett's overall approach to questions of modern experience and subjectivity. I contrasted Beckett's vision with that of the American novelist William T. Vollmann in my two epigraphs to show that their postmodern landscapes, their perception of postmodern space, is different in scale only: Beckett creates an entire world while Vollmann's hell is contained within the blackened glass of a crack pipe. Beckett's work is usually confined within the smaller spaces of a rocking chair (*Rockaby*) or a collection of urns (*Play*) but his encounter with the postmodern space of New York challenged his sense of the spatial and provoked from him his most expansive canvas.

A subtext of my argument so far has been that we should take Beckett as a postmodernist whose reactions to the postmodern world informed his work. This approach is, of course, somewhat tenuous given the scope of Beckett's career. When Beckett died in 1989, Hugh Kenner lamented his end as the passing of the last modernist; and in many discussions of his work, Beckett is taken as a late modernist. But my intention here is not to label Beckett one way or the other-- although the case can be made that Beckett passed through modernism and into postmodernism with the help of the fire baptism of World War II.⁸ My intention here is actually to blur the distinction between

the modernist and postmodernist Beckett by tracing the concern with vision that shows up throughout his work. The debate over postmodern. to my mind, is side-tracked by discussions of clear demarcations, of clear differences and separations between the two. In this sense, I hesitate to take postmodernism as a complete break with the project of modernity that Jameson and Habermas-- in very different ways-- both describe. A consideration of how they connect or merge, albeit in the relatively small relationship between the work of Joyce and Beckett, proves to tell us more about how we approach modernist and postmodernist works than is usually acknowledged. I take this connection as revolving around questions of vision in Beckett and Joyce and this is provocatively illustrated in the cosmos of *The Lost Ones*.

James Knowlson takes *The Lost Ones* as grounded in Beckett's work in television and film. It is this heightened attention to the visible that gives the novella its marked and idiosyncratic concern with a large structure and many figures: it is as if Beckett had been working through a microscope for his entire career (*Happy Days*, *Eh Joe*, *Nacht und Träume*, *A Piece of Monologue*) and suddenly turned to a telescope. As Knowlson describes it, *The Lost Ones* emphasizes this kind of shift in perspective:

A determined effort is made to "see" the entire structure and organization of the cylinder and to describe the workings of the "abode" as precisely as the "eye of the mind" or the lens of a camera will allow. Beckett's obsession with vision and with problems associated with vision-- an obsession only partly influenced by his own declining sight-- also affects the "seeing" and the describing. He referred himself to one section in an early manuscript as the "une grande myopie"... and deterioration of vision in the cylinder is still stressed in the published version. The whole text could be defined as "myopic." (476)

The Lost Ones was not the first time Beckett turned to questions of vision. To my mind, vision was his great question and it runs throughout his work. *The Lost Ones* is a provocative text to begin this discussion because it brings up questions of seeing as it embodies an articulation and play with/on postmodern space. It is also an indication of the distrust of “clear” vision and its equation with “truth” that Beckett inherited from Joyce.

As I described it in the previous chapter, Joyce was important for Eisenstein because he provided him with a challenge to thinking about seeing. By investigating “inner” space, Joyce opened up a new world for Eisenstein that challenged conventional ways of thinking about vision and its concomitant hold over cognition and experience. This anti-ocularcentric thrust of Joyce’s work also deeply affected Beckett. And this can be seen in a entry from one of Beckett’s dairies that was written before he published *Murphy*. The thoughts Beckett describes here were instigated by a conversation he had with a German actor/director and it demonstrates how he was beginning to see beyond the “inner” space of *Ulysses*:

As I talk and listen realise suddenly how *Work in Progress* is the only [possible] development from *Ulysses*, the heroic attempt to make literature accomplish what belongs to music-- the Miteinander and the simultaneous. *Ulysses* falsifies the unconscious, or the “monologue intérieur,” in so far as it is obliged to express it as a teleology. I provoke loud amusement by description of a man at such a degree of of culture that he cannot have a simple or even a pre-dominating idea. I say how can one in such a case be of any opinion, i.e. how can one see anything “simple and whole,” because perception is opinion.... Could have gone on to say that the attempt to “purify” vision from judgment had only resulted in the crassest naturalism. (Knowlson 240)

“Perception is opinion”: this was one of the great teachings of Nietzsche, a teaching that undercut what Jay labels Cartesian perspectivalism, or the philosophical and cultural reliance upon one defining God-like perspective over Western seeing. Nietzsche’s critique of this stultifying force was taken up by thinkers like Bergson who, in Louis Menand’s words, “proposed to disprove of the mechanistic conclusions of traditional empiricist epistemology, and to do so by elevating the subject... to an equal status in the definition of reality with the world” (*Discovering* 32). This emphasis on the subject-- on what James calls “pure experience”-- was the shift Nietzsche had called for throughout his writing.⁹ I have already brought this up, but it is worth emphasizing here that for Nietzsche all thinking is perspective: “In so far as the word “knowledge” has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings-- ‘Perspectivism’” (*Will* 481).

It was this attack upon perception and “clear” vision that Beckett and Eisenstein learned from Joyce. And in *Film*, Beckett acknowledges this debt as well as going back to the silent film and back to the ghosts of other modernist products-- Buster Keaton’s *Sherlock Jr.*, Buñuel’s *Un chien andalou*, the clash on the Odessa Steps, Hitchcock’s *Vertigo*-- and forward into the new space of the postmodern.

What I think it means is that a man can keep away from everybody, but he can’t get away from himself.

--Buster Keaton on the meaning of
Film

The Eye in *Film*

As Linda Ben-Zvi once put it, *Film* is “a film about film” (31). It is about film and it is about perception, space, and vision’s hold over identity and knowledge. Beckett had a life-long interest in film and he famously incorporated the tramp figure of early comedy into his work from the stone-chewing Molloy to those bums afflicted with intermittent logorrhea, Didi and Gogo. During the time he was struggling with his first novel, Beckett contemplated a career in film under the tutelage of Eisenstein.¹⁰ Around this time he wrote a letter to his friend Thomas McGreevy expressing his interest in silent film, a medium he saw nearing its extinction with the advent of the color sound film: “[A] backwater may be created for the two-dimensional silent film that had barely emerged from its rudiments when it was swamped” (Knowlson 213). With this same idea in mind, Beckett wrote to another Soviet master, Vsevolod Pudovkin, and voiced his desire to “revive the naturalistic, two-dimensional silent film, which he felt had died unjustly before its time” (Bair 204-05). In *Film*, Beckett went back to silent film and to do so he brought back Buster Keaton.

Film opens with the image of a closed eye. The eyelid is wrinkled, old and it slowly opens and focuses at the camera. As Enoch Brater notes, this image immediately recalls the beginning of Buñuel’s 1928 *Un chien andalou* (116). But instead of the violent slashing of the eyeball we get in Buñuel-- the gesture of surrealist impatience with “clear” vision and its equation with “truth”¹¹-- the scene in *Film* ends with the title appearing on the focused pupil. It is Keaton’s eye and it stares at us. The film then cuts to a figure wrapped in a large coat dashing alongside a wall. However, this beginning does not begin and end with a reference to Buñuel. Two other modernist classics are

conjured up here. The first is a classic silent: Eisenstein's *Battleship Potemkin*. We are reminded of the brutal image of the woman wearing a pince-nez who is stuck by a Cossack's saber on the Odessa steps. The notorious shot of her bleeding eye is, in the words of James Goodwin, a "literalized assault on perception" that predates *Un chien andalou* by two years (74). The second film invoked by the opening sequence of the opening eye is a color talkie: Hitchcock's *Vertigo* (1958). This film of consuming obsession opens with a shot of Kim Novak's eye out of which spins the title sequence. The weight of reference here from these three films is centered on the disruptive quality of vision, on its dark side of voyeurism, weakness, and susceptibility to illusion. In Eisenstein this takes the form of a montage sequence that attacks complacent film viewing (like Brecht's plays, Eisenstein's work demands an active intellect¹²). In Buñuel it is an attack upon "rational" vision; and in Hitchcock it is an embodiment of an overwhelming reliance upon a distorted romantic seeing that throws its protagonist off the precipice of obsessional scopophilia.¹³ This opening signals the film's concerns and it is rooted in a modernist critique and play with vision. *Film* is set "sometime in 1929" (12). This date is important: it sets the movie right around the height of silent film and one year after Buñuel used a razor on a woman's eyeball. This placement within the reference system of these films has been commented on before, but there is another silent movie which should also be taken as one of the modernist subtexts for *Film*. But before describing Keaton's *Sherlock Jr.* (1924) and its split subjectivity, a description of *Film* will put it within a context of what Jameson calls the postmodern "nostalgia" film and

what I want to describe as the exploration of postmodern space with the help of modernist tools.

The script for *Film* begins with a maxim from Berkeley: “*Esse est percipi*” (11): to be is to be perceived. Originally called “The Eye” (Schneider 64), *Film* is concerned with the flight of O (Buster Keaton) from E (Buster Keaton). As Beckett describes it in the notes to the script, O and E are a part of the same entity: “[T]he protagonist is sundered into object (O) and eye (E), the former in flight, the latter in pursuit” (11). E becomes the camera and it chases O through the streets, up a stairwell, and into O’s mother’s room.¹⁴ The director of the movie, Alan Schneider, summed up the plot of the movie as a kind of elaborate equation: “The story of this highly visual, if highly unusual, film was simply that O’s attempt to remove all perception ultimately failed because he could not get rid of self-perception. At the end, we would see that $O = E$. Q.E.D.” (65). But before O meets E-- before self-perception sets in-- there occurs what Ben-Zvi describes as “a variation on the old Keystone Kops chase” (30).

Film begins with a close-up of one of Keaton’s eyes but this short sequence is all we get of Keaton’s face until the end of the film. As Beckett described it, there is an “angle of immunity” E must maintain to avoid pushing O into an “anguish of perceivedness” (11). However, “perceivedness” is exactly what Berkeley implied we should all want to feel because of God’s gaze upon us; it is this gaze that provides our existence. This is undercut in Beckett’s “use” of Berkeley:

Esse est percipi.

All extraneous perception suppressed, animal, human,
divine, self-perception maintains in being.

Search of non-being in flight from extraneous perception
breaking down in inescapability of self-perception.

No truth value attaches to above, regarded as of merely
structural and dramatic convenience. (11)

Berkeley's maxim is "convenient" for Beckett because it provides a background for this script about a man trying to escape perceiving himself, or, as S. E. Gontarski puts it, Beckett goes one better than Sartre by positing that "Hell is not only other people.... Hell is also one's self, or being itself" (103). This Hell is only given to the viewer at the end of the film as Beckett describes it: "It will not be clear until the end of film that pursuing perceiver is not extraneous, but self" (11). This "but self" is one of the most horrifying expressions in all of Beckett, and, in many ways, it is *all* of Beckett. But to get to the "but self" we must first go through the "climate" of the film that Beckett describes as "comic and unreal" (12).

Film is divided into three sections: "1. The street (about eight minutes). 2. The stairs (about five minutes). 3. The room (about 17 minutes)" (10). The first section is made up of O's dash through the streets in an effort to avoid E and other people.¹⁵ The main action of this sequence is O in "his blind haste" bumping into an elderly couple (15). This encounter is important for two reasons. The first important action of this scene is when the man "opens his mouth to vituperate" and the woman he is with "checks him with a gesture and a soft 'sssh!'" (16). This "sssh" is the only sound in the film and it reminds us that we are watching a silent film. The film speaks to tell us that it does not speak. The second important aspect of this collision is that because of it we get the first point of view shot from O's perspective: a piece of gauze is used over the lens to convey that O's eyesight is imperfect and hazy. And after this the elderly couple is caught by the gaze of E-- their own E, the overall E of the movie-- and they experience "an agony of

perceivedness” (16). A similar encounter occurs when O bumps into an old woman selling flowers on the stairs to his mother’s apartment.

What these two encounters give us is a sense of the two kinds of vision performed by O and E. O has a blurred, human look while the seeing done by E is controlling and always in pursuit. E’s seeing is also the way we see the film and in this vein Gontarski can describe E’s seeing as “a character in the film” (102). This last quality is only realized after the third part of the movie is over and O is trapped in the room with E and forced to look at him(self). At this climax of both chase and theme, the viewers of the film realize that O and E are one and the same and that what we have been experiencing throughout the film is a kind of double vision; this is a double gaze complicated by the fact that the viewer has been watching the film *through the gaze* of E. This double vision creates a new kind of space between the two gazes, a space best understood by entering O’s mother’s room.

In his mother’s room, O blocks himself off from all perceiving eyes. He covers the window and a mirror; he throws out a dog and cat who look at him; he covers a fish bowl and puts his coat over a bird cage containing a staring parrot; he then takes a picture of “the face of God the Father” (32)-- a reproduction of a Sumerian god with bulging eyes that Avigdor Arikha had suggested (Knowlson 465)-- and tears it up. He sits in a rocking chair and then carefully examines pictures of his past life before destroying them. He then falls asleep.

O has carefully eliminated all perceivers of his identity and thus he ceases to be under scrutiny-- and ceases “to be”-- and can sleep. But he has not eliminated the one

perceiver he cannot tear up or cover with a rug. E slowly moves around the room and looks at all of the objects and animals covered up and slowly his gaze turns and takes in the sleeping O: "E's gaze pierces the sleep, O starts awake, stare up at E. Patch over O's left eye now seen for the first time.... O half starts from chair, then stiffens, staring up at E. Gradually that look" (41-44). The "look" is the only full look at O's face we get in the entire film: it is the first time we realize that he has an eye patch over his left eye-- a symbolic covering to convey the split in his gaze and identity- - and it is a look of intense horror. We are also given our only shot of E from O's perspective at this point of self-realization: a stone-faced, staring Keaton invoking the horror of the visual. It is this moment when O realizes that "perceiver is not extraneous, but self" (11). In many ways this is Beckett's summation of the things he learned from Joyce about the power of vision over truth and identity. Beckett uses the "convenient" maxim of Berkeley to completely undercut the Western reliance on vision to convey truth and meaning. Self-perception is not a confirmation of our existence; self-perception is a horror.

If *Film* encapsulates Beckett's attack upon ocularcentrism via his apprenticeship to Joyce, then it also marks the beginning of his relationship to a country Joyce never visited. The reasons for Beckett's coming to America seemed to be many-- the money for the making of the movie was there along with the man who would direct it, Alan Schneider. But as Knowlson describes it, Beckett worried about the trip because he pictured "New York as a crazy, frenetic city" (455).¹⁶ And before he even flew across the Atlantic, there were problems with the production, not the least of which was the unsettled matter of who would play O. Offers for the role were made to Charlie Chaplin,

Zero Mostel, and Jack MacGowan. When all of them proved to be unavailable, the production was thrown into chaos before Beckett quietly mentioned the name of Buster Keaton and wondered if “he were alive and well and willing” (Knowlson 570). Beckett and the rest of the world wondered if Keaton were still alive: he had been out of the spotlight for almost thirty years. The choice of Keaton made sense if we take into account Beckett’s earlier interest in silent film and his disappointment when Keaton could not star in the first American production of *Waiting for Godot*. And Beckett had been a fan of Keaton’s films since he was exposed to them in 1926 (Knowlson 71). Analysis of Beckett’s choice of Keaton usually stops at this point but, to my mind, a brief look at Keaton’s career and a discussion of one of Old Stone Face’s films will highlight his importance for Beckett as a representative American artist.

By 1960, everybody thought that Buster Keaton was dead. He simply seemed not to exist anymore. Keaton had been one of the giants of early comedy, and some of his films rivaled Chaplin’s in popularity. But by the mid-thirties Keaton’s star was in decline because of new sound production techniques and the rise of the all-powerful studio system.¹⁷ Keaton’s heavy drinking and marital problems did not help matters. From the late thirties on, Keaton spent the rest of his career doing bit parts anywhere he could find them and when he was offered \$5000 for three weeks worth of work making *Film*, he jumped at the chance. As Schneider described it, Keaton viewed the script with puzzlement: “His general attitude was that we were all, Beckett included, nuts.... Yes, he remembered the *Godot* business, but he didn’t understand that one either” (67-68).

Keaton was also puzzled by the script's insistence that his face-- the trademark that had made him famous-- was not to be seen until the very end of the movie.

Keaton was the ideal choice for *Film* because of his influence on Beckett's work and for what David Thompson has described as his "serene capacity for absorbing frustration and turning a blind eye on fear and failure" (389). But Old Stone Face's ability to say to the world "I can't go on, I'll go on" was not the only reason Beckett chose him for the role of O. Keaton was important for Beckett because he was distinctly American; in the words of Thompson, Keaton's films were depictions of America:

Unlike Chaplin, who tended to reinvent the world of Victorian melodrama, and unlike those comics who merely dressed up vaudeville routines, Keaton conceived of films as specifically American. In this, he seems to have had the notion of parodying current American cinema and an awareness of American landscape more usual in the Western. (389)

And this American tint to his films was compounded by what Thompson calls his "extraordinary use of space" (389). *Sherlock Jr.*, a film Beckett saw in 1926 (Knowlson 71), is a good example of Keaton's interest in exploring the space of film and the Americanness of his art.

In many ways, *Sherlock Jr.* may be taken as the precursor to *Film*. Both films investigate the nature of vision in film and the space of cinema. The story of *Sherlock Jr.* revolves around a movie projectionist and his love life. Keaton plays the projectionist who studies detective guidebooks and competes for the affection of his girlfriend against a much bigger and more successful rival. The film opens with Keaton losing a round to his rival and going to his job at the movie theater. While he mans the projector-- the

movie being shown is a melodrama called *Hearts and Pearls*-- Keaton falls asleep. A second Keaton, a ghostly double arises from the sleeping form and walks down into the theater. The dream Keaton sees that the people on the screen are the people from his life-- his girl friend, her father, and his rival. The dream Keaton then enters the screen and the movie-- a cinematic feat not duplicated until Woody Allen's *The Purple Rose of Cairo* (1985). The dream Keaton who enters the film is the opposite of the bumbling real-life projectionist; he is a dashing detective in the manner of Sherlock Holmes and he easily dispatches his rival and solves the case within the world of the film. After the dream Keaton has solved the case and the problems with his romantic life, the real Keaton wakes up to find that the real problems have been solved by his girlfriend-- she discovered that Keaton's rival stole a pocket watch from her father-- and the movie ends with Keaton getting the girl and the "case" of his romantic problems solved.

During his time as the dream Keaton within the film within the film, Keaton goes through a variety of stunts and exploits the likes of which made his physical comedy famous. As he tells us in his autobiography, the physical hazards he put himself through during the making of the film-- and in every silent comedy he ever made-- had real consequences: "I broke my neck while making *Sherlock Jr.* But I did not even know about it until long afterward. One day when my doctor was giving me a physical checkup, he asked me when I'd sustained the fracture which, of course, had completely healed by then" (168-69). But the extreme physical nature of Keaton's films belie their more serious concerns with the nature of film, spectatorship, and vision. As Thompson puts it, the film during which he broke his neck was one of his most cerebral exploits:

“Only an artist aware of the complex appeal to fantasy in cinema could have conceived *Sherlock Jr.*, the most philosophically eloquent of silent comedies” (390). In its own way, *Sherlock Jr.* investigates Berkeley’s dictum by analyzing the film spectator’s role as watcher of movies. The opening image of *Sherlock Jr.* is of Keaton practicing for his future career of detective by looking through a magnifying glass at a fingerprint. The rest of the film takes up the theme of vision by putting the “real” Keaton to sleep-- much like O’s nap in *Film*-- and letting the “film” Keaton enter the movie within the movie. Keaton opened up the space of cinema and entered it with jolt of energy. As an example of a “philosophical” film, *Sherlock Jr.* gave Beckett a model of a screen exploration into the dynamics of spectatorship and vision.

Keaton also gave Beckett his first view of America back in 1926 when he saw his films in Dublin. This view of America carried over into his writing of *Film*. But Beckett’s reactions to America did not stop there. When he actually came to America, the experience of working on *Film* and experiencing New York provided him with a first-hand look at different kind of space and he worked this into *The Lost Ones*. This look at America provided him with a look into the “outer” space of postmodernism. Like Baudrillard’s visit to New York two decades later (“In New York, the mad have been set free” [19]), Beckett was profoundly influenced by the new postmodern space of America. Like Dickens’s *American Notes* and Henry James’s revisit to America in *The American Scene*, *Film* and *The Lost Ones* are Beckett’s observations of a world that provoked him into seeing his own world and his own work differently. And like the dark mirror D. H. Lawrence looked into in *Studies in Classic American Literature*, the experience of

coming to America provided Beckett with a reflection of his art: *But Self*. Beckett's visit to the postmodern space of New York could have been described by the narrator of *The Lost Ones*: "The effect of this climate on the soul is not to be underestimated" (52).

Endnotes

¹ Keaton apparently turned down the role because "he didn't understand it" (Dardis 268). For a description of Beckett's excitement over the prospect of Keaton as Vladimir and his frustration over contract stipulations that effectively killed the project, see Knowlson, pp. 370-74.

² The stadium is now considered to be a '60s relic that cannot compare with the more modern stadiums. There are plans for a new stadium to be built in the same area of Flushing Meadows Park. That Shea was built in the early '60's raises the question whether or not it belongs to the postmodern; it certainly does not play within the postmodern aesthetic of something like the Westin Bonaventure Hotel, or partake of what Mike Davis describes as the "Warholesque transformation" of architecture into an "exhibition" of "the spirit of fictional capital" (82). What the example of Shea does provide for is a piece of early 60's postmodernism coupled with the embodiment of the time period said to begin the postmodern rupture with past cultural forms.

³ For an insightful discussion of Beckett's debt to Dante in the late plays, see Elam.

⁴ The famous production of *Breath* in the premier of *Oh! Calcutta!* drove Beckett into a rage because it included naked bodies among the garbage. See Knowlson, pp. 501-02, for an account of the tampering with the play and Beckett's reaction.

⁵ Beckett began calling his short theater pieces "dramaticules" (playlets) in the subtitle to the 1967 edition of *Come and Go*. Another exception to the "lessness" of the late work is the large rotunda at the center of *Imagination Dead Imagine*. For an examination of *Imagination Dead Imagine* in the context of the late work, see John Pilling, "Shards and Ends and Odds in Prose: From *Fizzles* to *The Lost Ones*" in *On Beckett: Essays and Criticism*, ed. S. E. Gontarski (New York: Grove Press, 1986).

⁶ For details of the production and Beckett's authorization of it, see Kalb, pp. 130-142.

⁷ In this sense, we may take William Carlos Williams's "At the Ball Game" as the archetypal modernist baseball poem because it is not concerned with space but with one of the most famous of modernist preoccupations: the crowd. For discussions of the modernist reaction to the crowd-- to what Williams calls "the power in their faces" (58)-- see Carey, pp. 3-90; and Sherry, pp. 3-42.

⁸ See Knowlson, pp. 273-309, and Gordon, pp. 140-203, for details of Beckett's work within a Resistance cell and his overall experience of the war. For an analysis of what he calls Beckett's place within the "modernist/postmodernist turf war," see H. Porter Abbot, *Beckett Writing Beckett: The Author in the Autograph* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 23-51.

⁹ Gary Shapiro has gone so far as to say that Nietzsche's critique of ocularcentrism posits that there is "no such thing as vision in itself" and that there is only a "perspectival seeing and knowing" (129). See Jay, pp. 189-192, for a description of Nietzsche's influence on French anti-ocularcentric thought.

¹⁰ For a description of Beckett's interest in Eisenstein and the letter he wrote to him that was never answered, see Bair, pp. 204-05.

¹¹ For a description of Buñuel's enunciation as surrealist message, see Mary Ann Caws, "Eye and Film: Buñuel's Act" in *The Art of Interference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

¹² For a discussion of Eisenstein's montage as a form of spectator "interruption," see Goodwin, pp. 74-78.

¹³ The classic treatment of Hitchcock and scopophilia is by Laura Mulvey in "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" in *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989).

¹⁴ The viewer cannot know that the room O visits is his mother's, but in the notes to the script, Beckett makes this clear: "It may be supposed it is his mother's room, which he has not visited for many years and is now to occupy momentarily, to look after the pets, until she comes out of hospital. This has no bearing on the film and need not be elucidated" (59). For commentary on the room's importance, see Gontarski, pp. 107-08.

¹⁵ This section of the film was marred by a strobe effect during shooting and it had to be truncated to include only O's dash along the wall and his collision with the elderly couple. For details about this problem during the making of the film and Beckett's adaptation to it, see Schneider, pp. 73-78. In 1979, David R. Clark made a remake of *Film* that incorporated a complete first section and Schubert's "Der Doppelgänger" (Gontarski 213).

¹⁶ Allen Ginsberg captured the “frenetic” quality of the production of *Film* on the streets of New York in a poem called “Today”: “Tonight I’ll call up Jack tell him Buster Keaton is under the Brooklyn Bridge/ by a vast red-brick wall still dead pan alive in red suspenders” (345).

¹⁷ For a description of the studio system that pushed Keaton’s kind of filmmaking into extinction, see Thomas Schatz, *The Genius of the System* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

Chapter Eight
 Beckett and the Politics of Nothing:
 Spectacle/Panopticism/Ocularcentrism

I

Heroticisms: The Haunting of Robert Emmet

Love me, love my umbrella.
 --James Joyce, *Giacomo Joyce*

Following upon religion, literature is in fact
 religion's heir. A sacrifice is a novel, a story
 illustrated in a bloody fashion.
 --Georges Bataille, *Erotism: Death and
 Sensuality*

The preceding chapter followed Beckett to America. This final chapter returns to Ireland and traces Beckett's politics and his critique of ocularcentrism through his predecessors and the tradition of Irish heroic sacrifice. This return to Ireland places his attack upon the hegemony of vision within the context of social rebellion; and it begins with the modern poet who embodied Ireland's struggle for independence.

In 1934 Yeats had an operation that was supposed to improve his ability to get erections. His doctor cut into Yeats's vas deferens and removed a piece of it; the theory behind the removal was that it would help produce more testosterone and keep more of it in the body. Today we would call the operation a vasectomy, and it did not help Yeats

get more frequent erections (no second coming was at hand). However, the operation seems to have had another great effect upon the poet: he entered his last great period of creativity. He seemed infused with a new kind of energy and he told friends that he had entered his “second puberty” (Ellmann, *Four* 40). Yeats wrote Dorothy Wellesley to express what he was feeling: “If I write more poetry it will be unlike anything I have done” (Ellmann, *Four* 40-41). The products of this second puberty were contained within his extraordinary last volume, *Last Poems and Two Plays* (1939). With the operation, or the idea of the operation, Yeats freed himself to recognize that his poetry was coming to an end and that he had one great last wish: “But O that I were young again/ And held her in my arms” (348).

As Richard Ellmann has described it, *Last Poems* “presents a spectrum of polymorphous sexual possibility” (*Four* 41). One has only to recall the image that ends “News for the Delphi Oracle” to feel this: “Foul goat-head, brutal arm appear./ Belly, shoulder, bum,/ Flash fishlike; nymphs and satyrs/ Copulate in the foam” (338). But only two poems before this is “Three Marching Songs,” and it begins: “Remember all those renowned generations,/ They left their bodies to fatten the wolves” (333). “Three Marching Songs” is a nationalist poem harking back to Yeats’s earlier poems on the same subject, and especially to “Septemeber 1913;” but, whereas “September 1913” told us that “Romantic Ireland’s dead and gone,” “Three Marching Songs” tells us to remember, to bring to life through memory the names that should not be forgotten-- a roll call of heroes that was also used in “September 1913” and “Easter 1916”:

Fail and that history turns into rubbish,
All that great past to a trouble of fools;
Those that come after shall mock O’Connell

Mock at the memory of both O'Neill.
Mock Emmet, mock Parnell,
All the renown that fell. (333)

And adding to this injunction not to forget the heroes and the blood sacrifices is that last section of the poem that gives us "Grandfather" meeting the same fate as the rebel Robert Emmet: "[T]he rope gave a jerk there,/ No more say he, for his throat was too small;/ But he kicked before he died,/ he did it out of pride" (335).

I have brought up "New from the Delphic Oracle" and "Three Marching Songs" not to point to the differences between their themes and symbols-- Yeats' poems throughout his career may be similarly divided-- but to read them in the context of Irish nationalism, its links with conceptions of male sexuality, and a side of Beckett's work that has been consistently overlooked and under appreciated: the political. What I mean here by "political" will become clearer after a discussion of the Irish conception of blood sacrifice and how this shows up in the work of representative moderns like Joyce and Beckett. And in Beckett's case, this reading will center around that aspect of his work that he pointed to as the prime motivator behind his work, behind the "expression" he wanted to convey: "The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express" (quoted in Knowlson 336). To express nothing using the medium of nothing is a political statement, or, as we are told in *Waiting for Godot*: "Nothing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, it's awful" (28). This reading of the political-- of what Terry Eagleton has called "political modernism" ("Modernism" 140)¹-- necessitates seeing Beckett in the context of Irish history. Evoking Irish history

always raises other ghosts, or, as Christopher Ricks describes it: “Just as Beckett was never able to shake the dust of Ireland off his feet (dust not being shakeable off feet), so he was never able to exorcise the religious convictions which had ceased to convince” (*Beckett's* 19).² To read modern Irish writing in the context of Irish history and nationalism is always to invoke the blood sacrifice that, in the words of Malcolm Brown, “recurred in Irish nightmares for three generations” (22): the execution of Robert Emmet (1778-1803).

The description of Emmet’s execution could have been one of Foucault’s examples in *Discipline and Punish* of the execution as spectacle. All Dublin was there on the day the hero was hanged. Emmet, a member of the United Irishmen who once met Napoleon to ask for help against the British, was hanged for leading a short-lived revolt aimed at seizing Dublin Castle. The executioner let the twenty-five year old rebel hang for an hour before taking his body down to cut his head off. The crowd had to be controlled by armed horsemen as the executioner held aloft the head. The British let his blood flow all over Thomas St., and the neighborhood dogs lapped it up, but as legend has it, Dublin ladies pushed the dogs aside to soak their handkerchiefs in the hero’s blood.³

The full wrath of British rule was exercised upon the rebel’s body: so much so that the body itself disappeared after the execution. The British did not want Emmet’s grave to become a shrine of rebellion, and to this day there is no exact place claimed to hold his remains.⁴ The work of the state upon the body of Emmet is exactly what Foucault pointed to as the form of punishment as spectacle: “[B]y breaking the law, the

offender has touched the very person of the prince; and it is the prince-- or at least those to whom he has delegated his force-- who seizes upon the body of the condemned man and displays it marked, beaten, broken" (49). It is the control displayed over the tortured body that is important here: the body is "marked" and "broken" and shown to the crowd; it is then hidden from the crowd so they cannot control it by giving it meaning (martyrdom, sacrifice, heroism, patriotism). But the obliteration of Emmet's body did not succeed in obliterating him as a figure of martyrdom, and this is because of Emmet's own wish for his grave's obliteration. In what would come under Foucault's category of the "scaffold speech," Emmet's speech in court after he was found guilty of treason is probably the most celebrated oration ever delivered in the face of death. It ends with directions for his grave:

Let no man write my epitaph: for as no man who knows my motives dare now vindicate them, let not prejudice or ignorance asperse them. Let them and me repose in obscurity and peace, and my tomb remain uninscribed, until other times, and other men, can do justice to my character; when my country takes her place among the nations of the earth, then, and not till then, let my epitaph be written. I have done. (288)

In a certain sense, the British were only complying with his wishes when they did not give him a grave of his own. In an address delivered in New York on the 126th anniversary of Emmet's birth, Yeats made this point evident: "Emmet's enemies seemed to have wished that his dust might mingle with the earth obscurely; that no pilgrimages might come to his tomb and keep living the cause he served. And by so doing they have unwillingly made all Ireland his tomb" ("Emmet" 319).

Yeats's mixture of homage to the blood sacrifices of Irish history and explorations into eroticism is indicative of a larger cultural dynamic surrounding Emmet's execution. Throughout his poetry, Yeats employed the image of Ireland as mythical mother who demands the lives of her sons for the good of the nation.⁵ Cathleen ni Houlihan grows young and beautiful again on the blood of young *men* who die for her; in Yeats's poetry, this great love is culminated in the embrace of patriotic death. This aspect of his work is compounded by his erotic poems which push his vision of sacrifice into the realm of carnival. The cult of sacrifice typified by Emmet's execution can almost be described as a will to carnival; and Foucault makes the point that the carnivalesque was often an important part of public executions.⁶ In Joyce's *Ulysses*, a novel that refers to Emmet no less than sixteen times,⁷ this will to carnival is explicitly demonstrated and used as the basis of a critique of the cult of sacrifice.

Emmet's execution is played out twice in *Ulysses*, and both times through the lens of carnival. The first execution appears in the "Cyclops" chapter in the form of one of the long interruptions that separate the quotidian pub world from the fantasy-filled parodies of Irish history and folklore. The focus of the parody, of the recycling of the spectacle complete with the figure of Emmet's great love, Sarah Curran,⁸ are the crowd and the executioner. This emphasis follows Foucault's analysis of the dynamics of the execution as spectacle: "The monster audience simply rocked with delight" (*U* 12.650-51); and the executioner is the "worldrenowned headsman" Rumbold (*U* 12.596). While there is no description of the man who is about to be executed-- and he is referred to only as "the

hero martyr" (*U* 12.609)-- there is a great deal of space given over to a description of Rumbold's implements of torture and death:

On a handsome mahogany table near him were neatly arranged the quartering knife, the various finely tempered disembowelling appliances... a terra cotta saucepan for the reception of the duodenum, colon, blind intestine and appendix etc when successfully extracted and two commodious milkjugs destined to receive the most precious blood of the most precious victim. (*U* 12.618-624)

The scene ends before the execution, but the second time the novel plays through the events-- in the phantasmagoria of "Circe"-- the execution is described in vivid detail:

He gives up the ghost. A violent erection of the hanged sends gouts of sperm spouting through his deathclothes on to the cobblestones. Mrs Bellingham, Mrs Yelverton Barry and the Honorable Mrs Mervyn Talboys rush forward with their handkerchiefs to sop it up. (*U* 15.4548-552)

The blood in the Emmet story is transformed into sperm and then, to complete the descent into what Bakhtin calls the lower bodily stratum,⁹ Rumbold "plunges his head into the gaping belly of the hanged and draws out his head again clotted with coiled and smoking entrails" (*U* 15.4555-57) After the martyr-- he is called the Croppy Boy in this incarnation-- dies he experiences the "little death" (or, in this case, a "big little death"), and then Rumbold bursts his body open. Georges Bataille, in his study of the links between eroticism and death, has defined this reaction as intrinsic to eroticism itself: "Underlying eroticism is the feeling of something bursting, of the violence accompanying an explosion" (93). Sacrifice and male sexuality are made one, linked through the death stroke.¹⁰

Joyce's invocation of monstrous ejaculation with death in his portrayal of Emmet's execution is a satirical attack upon the cult of violence that had gripped the Irish imagination since the early days of the Celtic Revival. The cult of violence-- and the equation of poetry with violence-- was cemented under the efforts of the Gaelic League and Sinn Féin during the Revival. There was one great component to this myth, what Declan Kiberd has called the "hyper-masculinity" of the Irish hero and patriot.¹¹ Thus the Revival dug up the most violent and "masculine" of the ancient heroes for canonization in the new temple of violent resistance: Cuchulain. This emphasis on an ultra-masculine hero was a response to a long tradition of denigration of Irish manhood by the British; Declan Kiberd describes Cuchulain as providing "a symbol of masculinity for the Celts, who had been written off as feminine by their masters. A surprising number of militant nationalists accepted this diagnosis and called on the youth of Ireland to purge themselves of their degrading femininity" (*Inventing* 25).¹² This need to build a nation of "men" in response to British rule resulted in an emphasis on Celtic legend and educational reform. From the teaching of Gaelic to the emphasis on Celtic sports like hurling, Irish schools focused on forging new *Irishmen* to lead the nation out of colonial rule. The motto of St. Enda's College-- the Gaelic school Patrick Pearse founded-- was an aphorism of Cuchulain's: "I care not if I live but a day and a night, so long as my deeds live after me." (When a student of St. Enda's won the annual poetry contest he was not given money or a book, he was given a new rifle.) The mighty Cuchulain embodied sacrifice for the members of the Gaelic League and they made sure every Irish student knew his legend: Cuchulain defended the Gap of the North against an overwhelming number and died

when a raven landed on his shoulder and drank the blood from his many wounds.

(Yeats's "Cuchulain Comforted" from *Last Poems* begins with the image of the wounded hero: "A man that had six mortal wounds, a man/ Violent and famous, strode among the dead;/ Eyes stared out of the branches and were gone" [332].) The Oliver Sheppard statue of Cuchulain in the General Post Office depicts this scene and it is one of the reasons the rebels seized the post office during the Easter Rising. It is also one of the reasons many of them died. In a poem called "Renunciation," Pearse clearly embraced the fate of one following the cult of Cuchulain: "I have turned my face/ To this road before me,/ To the deed that I see/ And the death I shall die" (296).¹³

Joyce's problems with the program of the Revival began when he took Gaelic lessons from none other than Pearse himself. He gave the lessons up because he did not like Pearse's denigration of English (*JJ* 61). An exclusive emphasis on Gaelic, according to Joyce, would lead the Irish into a parochialism that would further separate them from the culture of Europe. However, an even more objectionable aspect of the Revival for Joyce was the movement's reliance on heroic sacrifice. Unlike Yeats, Joyce saw the invocation of blood and violence as a hollow myth. In a letter written to his brother eleven years before the Easter Rising, Joyce made this clear: "I am sure however that the whole structure of heroism is, and always was, a damned lie and that there cannot be any substitute for the individual passion as the motive power of everything-- art and philosophy included" (*Letters I* 54). In an essay that appeared in a Trieste newspaper in 1907, Joyce described the growing nationalism in his homeland as a tension between two forces:

Anyone who studies the history of the Irish revolution

during the nineteenth century finds himself faced with a double struggle-- the struggle of the Irish nation against the English government, and the struggle, perhaps no less bitter, between the moderate patriots and the so-called party of physical force. (*CW* 188).

As a "moderate patriot," Joyce was against the violence in deed and language sponsored by those he calls the "party of physical force." And in the same essay he calls Emmet's rebellion a "foolish uprising" (189). This reaction against the cult of sacrifice focuses on Emmet and later culminates in the wild satires of his execution in *Ulysses*. In *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce coins a neologism that displays his insightful reading of the dynamics of the cult of sacrifice in relationship to male sexuality:

Our wholemole millwheeling vicociclometer... autokina-
tonetically preprovided with a clappercoupling smelting-
works exprogressive process... receives through a portal vein
the dialytically separated elements of precedent decomposition
for the verypetpurpose of subsequent recombination so that the
heroticisms, catastrophes and eccentricities transmitted by the
ancient legacy of the past... may be there for you. (my emphasis,
FW 614.27-36- 615.1-8)

In a wild description of the transmission of the past through Vico's cycles and the revolutions of the earth around the sun-- and the revolutions of nations-- Joyce points to one of the things handed down: heroticisms. The erotic hero "transmitted by the legacy of the past." Unwilling to be seduced by the idea of blood sacrifice, Joyce pointed to its reliance upon an exaggerated machismo in an effort to explode the myth.

Emmet's execution became the modern equivalent of the sacrifice of Cuchulain. The death of Emmet shows up throughout Irish literature of the nineteenth century in the work of popular writers like Thomas Moore and Dion Boucicault. But with the coming of the twentieth century and full-fledged revolution in Ireland, the myth came under

attack by writers such as Sean O'Casey, Frank O'Connor, and Brendan Behan. Following Joyce's deconstruction of the myth in *Ulysses*, Samuel Beckett is the writer who most disrupts and questions the meaning and power of the cult of sacrifice. This may come as some surprise because Beckett seems not to have written anything-- poem, short story, essay, novel, play-- "about" Emmet's martyrdom. But, to use a phrase Beckett wrote about *Finnegans Wake*: "The danger is in the neatness of identifications" ("Dante" 3). Beckett wrote two plays I take as extensive critiques of the one-eyed nationalism, the blind violence, and the entrenched "phallogocentricism" inherent in the cult of violence and the martyrdom of Emmet.¹⁴ This attack-- I use this aggressive verb because it accurately describes the onslaught Beckett makes upon perception in the novel and on the stage-- is signaled in Beckett's first novel when Mr. Neary comes upon the statue of Cuchulain in the General Post Office: "Neary had bared his head, as though the holy ground meant something to him. Suddenly he flung aside his hat, sprang forward, seized the dying hero by the thighs and began to dash his head against his buttocks, such as they are" (42).

II

Between the Eye and the Stage: *Esse est percipi*

The spectacle appears at once as society itself,
as a part of society and as a means of unification.
As a part of society, it is that sector where all
attention, all consciousness, converges.

--Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*

Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance.... We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are part of its mechanism.

--Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*

Oliver Sheppard's statue in the General Post Office depicts the moment of Cuchulain's death: the raven on his shoulder, his body in a swoon. It looks a great deal like a crucifixion, or a Virginless *pietà*, and this brings up the figure behind the legacy of martyrdom that I have been tracing. The image of Christ on the cross provided a powerful background and stimulus for the Irish conception of their heroic past. And, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has pointed out, the image of Christ on the cross raises the question of the male body and its influence upon conceptions of religion, masculinity, and eroticism:

[T]he images of Jesus... have... a unique position in modern culture as images of the unclothed male body, often in extremis and/or ecstasy, prescriptively meant to be gazed at and adored. The scandal of such a figure within a homophobic economy of the male gaze doesn't seem to abate: efforts to disembodied this body... by attenuating, Europeanizing, or feminizing it, only entangle it more compromisingly among various modern figurations of the homosexual. (140)

The fetishization and adoration of the tortured body of Christ brings up the links I have been pointing to between the cult of sacrifice the Irish nationalists worshipped and the complex interaction it has with conceptions of male sexuality.¹⁵ What is important for Beckett's role in this Irish lineage of obsession with sacrifice is the dynamic Sedgwick describes between the crucifixion and the worshipper/fetishist: the "unclothable male

body, often in extremis and/or ecstasy, prescriptively meant to be gazed at and adored.” Beckett, in his attempt to undermine the equation of violent sacrifice and “masculinity,” attacks this dynamism of the gaze. He does this by challenging the way we think about seeing and the way we see thinking.

As I noted in the preceding chapter, *Esse est percipi* is from Berkeley: to be is to be perceived. Beckett uses this aphorism as the epigraph to his examination of the relationship between vision, subjectivity, and film in *Film*. This concern with vision and its impact upon consciousness and language is important throughout Beckett’s *oeuvre*. As Donald McMillan has noted, this concern can be seen in Beckett’s fascination with painting.¹⁶ But, whereas McMillan sees this fascination showing up and working itself out most in the fiction, I take Beckett’s work for the stage as his strongest, most prolonged, and most successful series of critiques of Western conceptions of vision and cognition. Beckett’s plays have a provocative slant on challenging ocularcentrism because they raise interesting questions on an exchange in French poststructuralist circles: the “difference” between Foucault and Debord over the dominating form of visual culture and its effect on society.

The epigraph from Foucault at the head of this section seems to be a direct reply to Debord’s 1967 *The Society of the Spectacle*: “Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance” (217). The importance of the difference between how Foucault and Debord think about the visual implications of modern society lies not in their differing opinions, but the very foundation of their “exchange.” The spectacle and the panopticon emerge as controlling metaphors because, since Bergson, modern culture has been talked about as

obsessed with the visual. Debord proposed turning the spectacle back upon itself through *détournement*, while Foucault attempted to describe the panoptic force behind modern discourse. This difference is important for a consideration of Beckett not because he took a side in it, but because he did not choose sides at all: he stood directly in the middle of it.

In 1953 Foucault experienced a spectacle he later called an epiphany: “I belong to that generation who, as students, had before their eyes, and were limited by, a horizon consisting of Marxism, phenomenology, and existentialism. For me the break was first Beckett’s *Waiting for Godot*, a breathtaking performance” (quoted in Miller 65). It is important here that Foucault uses the metaphor “had before their eyes” because the “break” Beckett provides directly changes thinking about what is before our eyes. This “break” helped Foucault distance himself from older ideologies, older philosophies. *Waiting for Godot* brought back for him the war years, the years of occupation, isolation, and oppressive surveillance. Beckett himself experienced the searching eye of the Nazis as an operative in the French Underground; and, as Hugh Kenner has noted, Beckett’s membership in a Resistance cell is “easily connected with one of his obsessive situations, the man talking in the presence of shadowy inquisitors who will only relent when he finally says the right thing” (“Beckett” 290). The man under investigation is the man in the panoptic machine. The man in the panoptic machine is the subject of *Film*: the main character flees from the eye that places him in “an agony of perceivedness” (165). But Beckett conveys this society of panopticism through the spectacle of theater. Content meets form (Beckett on *Finnegans Wake*: “Here form *is* content, content *is* form”

[“Dante” 14]], Debord and Foucault are forced to look at each other, and Beckett devises a theater that challenges the hegemony of vision. There are obvious political implications in Debord and Foucault’s challenges to ocularcentrism. Beckett’s challenge to ocularcentrism-- a challenge embracing both descriptions of the power of the eye-- also has a politics, and this takes us back to that day in 1803 when the executioner cut off Emmet’s head.

Before the head is again chopped from its neck, I must address the most sticky of all questions concerning Beckett: politics. My title points to the crux of the problem. Beckett’s plays seem to be “about” nothing, so how can they have a politics? In a famous critique of Kafka, Georg Lukács linked Beckett with the ahistorical, bourgeois modernists that he felt denied literature its social purpose. But, as numerous critics have intimated and thousands of spectators have felt, there is a great deal more to Beckett’s plays than simple depictions of “withdrawn consciousness” (Sontag, “Against” 99), blatant attacks upon stage protocol, or what Lukács refers to as Beckett’s attempt to empty “everyday life of meaning” (*Meaning* 45). Theodor Adorno felt there was something more to the plays, and he took Beckett’s work as a statement about meaning itself after Auschwitz:

Beckett’s *oeuvre* seems to presuppose the experience of meaninglessness as if it were a completely routine phenomenon. It does more than just abstractly negate meaning, though. What it does is carry the empirical process of the disappearance of meaning into the traditional categories of art, negating them concretely and extrapolating new categories from nothingness.... Beckett’s plays are absurd not for their absence of meaning-- if they had no meaning they would be irrelevant rather than absurd-- but because they put meaning on the agenda, tracing its history. His work is dominated by the obsession with positive nothingness and by an equally obsessive concern with

meaninglessness in its historical genesis. (220)

Beckett pointed out this emphasis on “positive nothingness” by consistently referring to his favorite quote from Democritus: “Nothing is more real than nothing.”¹⁷ This concentration on “nothing” leads to the “new categories” of meaning Adorno saw Beckett establishing, and these new forms are tied directly into his challenge to ocularcentrism. This reading of two of Beckett’s late plays-- *Not I* and *That Time*-- relies upon Fredric Jameson’s injunction in *The Political Unconscious* that “there is nothing that is not social and historical-- indeed, that everything is ‘in the last analysis’ political” (20). And this reading-- this digging up of what Jameson would call the “ideological subtext”-- begins with Beckett standing in front of Caravaggio’s *The Decollation of St. John*.

III

*Not I, That Time, and
Nothing About Wilde*

Right in we went, with soul intent
On Death and Dread and Doom:
The hangman, with his little bag,
Went shuffling through the gloom:
And I trembled as I groped my way
Into my numbered tomb.
--Oscar Wilde, *The Ballad of Reading Gaol*

Beckett saw Carravaggio’s dark depiction of the beheading of St. John in Malta in 1971. As Deirdre Bair describes it, he was deeply affected by what he called the painting’s evocation of “a voice crying in the wilderness” (622). This image of decapitation seemed to haunt him, and it formed an impression that combined with a

spectacle he witnessed in Morocco soon after he saw the painting. He was sitting in a sidewalk cafe when he noticed an Arab woman wearing a jellaba seated at the edge of the sidewalk. Beckett described her as “crouched in an attitude of intense waiting” (Bair 622). The woman peered into the distance and flapped her hands with anxiety. Finally, a school bus arrived and the woman met the child she had been waiting for with such uneasiness. As Bair describes it, Beckett connected this vision with the painting: “Beckett combined the darkness and drama of the Caravaggio painting with the Arab woman’s intensity of waiting and created a mouth, a vivid red gash, the only visible object at the center of an altogether dark stage” (622).¹⁸

This combination of images produced *Not I*, a fifteen-minute onslaught of language from a pair of lips hovering eight feet above the stage. Mouth is what is left of a body after it has been cut away, after it has finished experiencing the physical world: “whole body like gone... just a mouth” (221). Mouth tells the life story (or stories) of a poor Irish woman in a rush-- “stream of words... can’t stop the scream” (220)-- that is often incomprehensible during performance. Fighting against her subjectivity-- Beckett describes it as a “vehement refusal to relinquish third person” (215)-- Mouth refuses to speak of herself in the first person: “... something she--... something she had to--... what?.. who?.. no!.. she!” (221). She tells her story to the dark figure shrouded in a “loose black djellaba” whose sex [is] undeterminable” (216). Auditor stands to one side and makes four movements throughout the stream of words to display what Beckett described as “helpless compassion” (215). Mouth’s steady stream of words is a representation of what Beckett thought of as an old Irish woman crying in the wilderness:

I knew that woman in Ireland... I knew who she was--

not “she” specifically, one single woman, but there were so many of those old crones, stumbling down the lanes, in the ditches, beside the hedgerows. Ireland is full of them. And I heard “her” saying what I wrote in *Not I*. (quoted in Bair 622)

What Beckett “heard” was the voice he associated with the vision of the Caravaggio painting: the “cry in the wilderness” of the beheaded prophet becomes that of an old, anonymous Irish woman. Decapitated Emmet becomes the milk woman from *Ulysses*: “A wandering crone, lowly form of an immortal serving her conqueror and her gay betrayer” (*U* 1.4-5). This gender switch is significant when considering the reaction to the legacy of male sacrifice I have been tracing in the modern Irish writers-- a legacy founded upon phallogentric stereotypes and the cult of violence. Instead of Emmet’s heroic dock speech, Mouth gives us her life of suffering. I would not go as far as to say that Beckett gives voice to a subaltern subject here-- this is a complicated argument over the very nature of modernist language¹⁹-- but he does provide a challenge to the “hyper-masculinity” surrounding the conception of Irish sacrifice. But the switch in the sacrificial figure’s gender is only the most obvious of the play’s import for Beckett’s critique of ocularcentrism.

When Jessica Tandy played Mouth, Beckett told her: “I am not unduly concerned with intelligibility. I hope the piece may work on the nerves of the audience, not on its intellect” (quoted in Bair 625). *Not I* is a play primarily concerned with the visual impact of the play upon the audience, and its title puns upon this: Not Eye. The equation between identity and vision-- Eye = I-- has a long history in Western discourse on consciousness. Mouth’s denial of her subjectivity is also a denial of vision: after all,

she has no eyes (Not I = Not Aye, or No). In a discussion of the nature of ritual, Kenneth Burke describes this kind of denial or change as linked with ideas about vision: "Often one will find the change of identity symbolized by references to blindness, or at least by an intensified reference to phenomena of vision.... We used to grasp ideas, but tend more and more to 'see' them" (211). Mouth has no eyes, but we do; as Enoch Brater notes. *Not I* is structured around a gaze: "Mouth speaks, Auditor hears, and audience *sees*" (19). It is the spectacle, the visual impact upon the audience that is the most important part of the play. Brater points out that the staging of the play resembles "a surrealist painting come to life" (24).²⁰ *Not I* is Debord's spectacle within Foucault's panoptic machine. This has always been the essence of theater, but Beckett highlights and critiques it. Through this "play" with vision, Beckett questions the power of sight as he relies upon it.

That Time, a play written two years after *Not I*, was also inspired by what Beckett saw in Malta and Morocco. Beckett called *That Time* a member of the "*Not I* family" (quoted in Bair 636). The gender of the sacrificial male is switched back to male. As Brater describes it, the stage in the play is closer to the Caravaggio painting: "The curtain rises on stage darkness which slowly fades up to unveil the immaculate clarity of a modernist's John the Baptist, a head without a body" (38). The head is suspended ten feet from the stage and is called Listener; he is bombarded from three sides by three voices from his past telling stories Beckett describes as "taking place at different levels of time" (quoted in Brater 40). The voices relate three different periods in Listener's life in what appears to be Listener's own voice: a memory of visiting ruins as a boy

à la Wordsworth (“that time you went back to look was the ruin still there where you hid as a child” [231]); a sweet memory of a tryst (“on the stone together in the sun on the stone at the edge of the little wood and as far as the eye could see the wheat turning yellow” [228]); and the memory of being alone in the “Portrait Gallery” (“there alone with the portraits of the dead black with dirt and antiquity and the dates on the frames in case you might get the century wrong” [231]). The memories follow one another in a scattered pattern and throughout Listener keeps his eyes closed as if in pain or in an effort to remember (or forget). He opens his eyes only after there is a pause in the rush of memory. *That Time* is a bodiless *Krapp’s Last Tape* with the tape recorder out of control and everywhere. When the German actor Klaus Herm took on the role of Listener, he felt as if *That Time*

isn’t a play. It’s not classifiable. It moves, in a manner of speaking, beyond legality. Thus, for the most part there are no possibilities of play; it’s mind work. You stand on stage, only your head is visible, and you listen to your own voice--which presents a crazy problem: sometimes you hear only your own mistakes! That’s how I imagine purgatory!! (quoted in Kalb 202)

As with *Not I*, *That Time* plays with the process of vision: when Listener closes his eyes, the thoughts come; when the audience opens its eyes (sees the play) the thoughts come.

Christopher Ricks’s remark that, like dust on his feet, Beckett was unable to shake off elements of his Irish heritage proves to extend, in this analysis, to his late plays, or late dramaticules. As Keir Elam has demonstrated, Beckett’s late plays continually bring up the image of the disembodied head. Elam takes this as an extended rewriting, or evocation of a scene from Dante’s *Inferno*, where, in Elam’s words, “Dante encounters

the talking heads of the traitors emerging from the frozen lake of Cocytus, their bodies invisible beneath the ice" (152). Dante was always a strong influence on Beckett-- from *More Pricks Than Kicks* to the dramaticules-- but, as Cheryl Herr has demonstrated, Irish culture itself has a strong strain of what she calls the "head cult" (14). The ancient Celts took the head as "the source of spiritual potency" and they erected stone godheads across Ireland to keep their protective "eyes on the terrain" (14-15). Irish art historian Anne Crookshank described these ancient heads in a personal context that illustrates their symbolic power:

To those of us with an Irish childhood, accustomed from our earliest days to picnics beneath high crosses, by ruined abbeys, or at ancient sites, the idea of the head image is an ingrained part of our visual memory. Like round towers and bogs, it comes as a surprise not to find them everywhere. These grey stone faces look solemnly down at us, the sole inhabitants now of isolated, grass covered places once the centre of religious ceremonies. (quoted in Herr 15)

The heads watch over the land: they are panoptic machines powered by Celtic magic. As Herr points out, the head cult lives on in contemporary Irish art in the work of Louis le Brocquy, a painter obsessed with the image of the head. Herr points out that this obsession is with the "masculine face, the masculine look" (15), and le Brocquy has painted heads of Yeats, Joyce, Beckett, Irish martyrs like Wolfe Tone and, of course, Robert Emmet.²¹

This concentration on the Irish male head leads to an observation by an unlikely source, an Irish descended Londoner: John Lydon, aka Johnny Rotten of the Sex Pistols:

Ireland is not my kind of place to be. It's all right if you want to get drunk. You wake up and there's nothing

to do.... It's no accident that the Irish invented stream-of-consciousness literature. It was out of absolute *necessity*. Poverty and the deprivation of their own language made this very important. (Lydon's emphasis, 9)

This concentration on the goings on inside the skull has obvious connections with Joyce's development of stream of consciousness and Beckett's presentation of mental struggle in plays like *That Time*, *Not I*, *Eh Joe*, and *Rockaby*. And there is another Irish writer who was fascinated and influenced by the story and image of John the Baptist's beheading: Oscar Wilde. (Lydon was bored with Ireland, but he admits it was his Irish side that gave him his thirst for artistic rebellion via punk rock: "My Irish half provided my sense of devilry. Like Oscar Wilde, my philosophy became, Just do it, see what you can cause" [9].) Wilde's *Salomé*, while playing off of his French predecessors (Flaubert, Mallarmé, LaForgue), takes up what I have been describing as the Irish legacy of martyrdom and explicitly foregrounds it in a sexual context. *Salomé* is also a fascinating prism to look through when examining Wilde's career, and what I want to point to as his contribution to the modern challenge to ocularcentrism. In many ways, Wilde started the critique of the cult of sacrifice that was taken up by Joyce and Beckett.

As Richard Ellmann describes it in his biography of the playwright, Wilde was obsessed with the figure of Salomé and her desire for the prophet's head. During the beginning of his composition of the play, Wilde endlessly spoke about Salomé and delved deeply into representations of her in painting, sculpture, and literature.²² Ellmann goes on to note that Wilde "seemed to want to obsess himself with his idea," and when errors in his thinking about Salomé were pointed out to him, he indignantly replied: "I prefer the other truth, my own, which is that of the dream. Between the two truths, the

false is the truer” (343-43).²³ This is a typical Wildean formulation, and it is reminiscent of the famous line in “The Critic as Artist”: “The highest Criticism, then, is more creative than creation, and the primary aim of the critic is to see the object as in itself it really is not” (1030). This is an important formulation because it explicitly links Wilde to a tradition in English letters that challenged ocularcentrism. As I described it in my introduction, Wilde follows Pater in questioning “visual” knowledge. It was Pater’s movement toward feeling-- a movement asking the question “What effect does it really produce on me?” (71)-- that impressed Wilde, and this colors his reaction to thinking about seeing. Seeing is not to be believed, it is to be felt.

As with Beckett’s challenge to ocularcentrism, Wilde’s challenge takes the form of a spectacle: a play. Wilde talked about *Salomé* as spectacle: he originally wanted Salomé to perform the dance of the seven veils naked, and he wanted the most infamous actress of the day, Sarah Bernhardt, to play the lead (Ellmann, *Wilde* 342). Throughout the play, vision is emphasized as an enigmatic force from the spectacle of the dance of the seven veils within the larger spectacle of the play, to the display of power in the gaze of the characters (Salomé gazing at the prophet, Herod gazing at Salomé). The prophet’s eyes are the first things that attract Salomé to him: “It is his eyes above all that are terrible” (558). Jokanaan-- Wilde uses the Greek version of John-- feels this gaze, this interaction with his image, and, in the middle of his “shout in the wilderness” he asks: “Who is this woman who is looking at me?” (558). Salomé’s gaze then carries her from repulsion to desire as she looks from the prophet’s eyes to his body (“Jokanaan, I am

amorous of thy body! Thy body is white like the lilies of a field that the mower hath never mowed" [558]); then to his hair ("Thy body is hideous.... Thy hair is like the cedars of Lebanon" [559]); and then finally to his mouth ("It is thy mouth that I desire, Jokannan.... There is nothing in the world so red as they mouth.... Let me kiss thy mouth" [559]). Salomé vows to kiss his mouth, and, in response, the prophet retreats into his cistern exclaiming: "I do not wish to look at thee" (560). It is his mouth that remains as her object of desire; it is his mouth she focuses on when she is given his head at the end of the play:

Ah! I have kissed thy mouth, Jokannan. I have kissed thy mouth. There was a bitter taste on my lips. Was it the taste of blood....? But perchance it is the taste of love.... They say that love hath a bitter taste. (575)

She cannot tell the difference between the taste of love and the taste of death; eroticism and death meet in the death stroke at the end of the play: "The soldiers rush forward and crush beneath their shields SALOMÉ, daughter of HERODIAS, Princess of Judaea" (575).

Salomé was never performed in Great Britain during Wilde's lifetime. The play was banned by the censor on the grounds that the depiction of Biblical characters on stage was forbidden in an old law-- an excuse that barely covered the censor's real objections over Wilde's public persona and the play's overt sexuality. Wilde was indignant:

If the Censor refuses *Salomé*, I shall leave England to settle in France where I shall take out letters of naturalization. I will not consent to call myself a citizen of a country that shows such narrowness in artistic judgment. I am not English. I am Irish which is quite another thing. (quoted in Ellmann, *Wilde* 372)

This was no empty threat because he had once before exiled himself over a woman he had loved: when Florence Balcombe left him for Bram Stoker, Wilde vowed to leave Ireland for good. When *Salomé* was finally produced in France, Wilde was not living there: he was living in Reading Gaol.

In his famous letter from prison, *De Profundis*, prisoner C. 3. 3. described the great lesson he learned from his punishment by referring to it in his work:

Of course all of this is foreshadowed and prefigured in my art. Some of it is in "The Happy Prince": some of it in "The Young King," notably in the passage where the Bishop says to the kneeling boy, "Is not He who made misery wiser than thou art?" a phrase which when I wrote it seemed to me little more than a phrase: a great deal of it is hidden away in the note of Doom that like a purple thread runs through the gold cloth of *Dorain Gray*.... [I]t is one of the refrains whose recurring motifs make *Salomé* so like a piece of music and bind it together as a ballad.... At every single moment in one's life one is what one is going to be no less than what one has been. Art is a symbol, because man is a symbol. (922)

Man is a symbol. Wilde is a symbol. Joyce read this symbol: he looked back on Wilde's career and downfall and saw a tragic hero from Irish legend: "His name symbolizes him: Oscar, nephew of King Fingal and the only son of Ossian in the amorphous Celtic *Odyssey*, who was treacherously killed by the hand of his host as he sat at table" (*CW* 201). Joyce goes on to point out that one of Wilde's middle names, O'Flahertie, belongs to "a savage Irish tribe whose destiny it was to assail the gates of medieval cities" (*CW* 201). This writer with the highly-charged symbolic name belonged, in Joyce's view, to a line of Irish artists catering to an English audience, a "court jester to the English" (*CW* 202). This need to perform for the English stems from what Kiberd describes as

the “liberating effect” of Wilde’s participation in the world of English letters because “it equipped him with a mask behind which he was able to compose the lineaments of his Irish face” (“Wilde” 15). However, in *Salomé*, Joyce discerned a slipping of the mask: he called the play “a polyphonic variation on the rapport of art and nature, but at the same time a revelation of his own psyche” (*CW* 205). This kind of revelation-- the fall of the mask-- is at the core of *De Profundis*, and this is displayed in Wilde’s acceptance of suffering and his willingness to take the stage one last time:

I remember as I was sitting in the dock on the occasion of my last trial listening to Lockwood’s appalling denunciation of me-- like something out of Tacitus, like a passage in Dante, like one of Savonarola’s indictments of the Popes of Rome-- and being sickened with horror at what I heard. Suddenly it occurred to me, “*How splendid it would be, if I was saying all this about myself!*” (Wilde’s emphasis, 947)

To the last, Wilde wanted the stage. To the last, he said things about himself and the country he came from in his work. He sacrificed himself for his work.

Joyce’s reaction to *Salomé* and to Wilde’s fall is colored by his reading of Wilde in an Irish context that explicitly emphasizes the background of Irish martyrdom (King Fingal) and the cult of Irish violence (O’Flahertie). (Joyce refers to Wilde and his work no less than twenty times in *Ulysses*.) The “revelation of his own psyche” is tied up in Wilde’s rewriting of the Emmet myth under the figure of Salomé’s obsession-- a rewriting grounded in Wilde’s position in two worlds: “I am not English. I am Irish which is quite another thing.” Out of this position came Wilde’s obsession with Salomé’s obsession; and this position is fueled by two backgrounds: Wilde’s interest in

challenging conventional forms of representation and ideas about vision, and his fascination with sacrifice. Joyce points to Wilde's relationship to Irish cultural forms-- the cult of violence, the myth of sacrifice-- while Beckett points to nothing about Wilde.

Not I and *That Time* have nothing to do with Wilde's *Salomé*. And yet, as Ellmann has pointed out, although Beckett and Wilde seem to be very different artists, they have interesting similarities. Wilde's "insouciant boulevardier" is the inverse of Beckett's "anxious alleycrawlers": they share the same interest in doing nothing (*Four* 106). (In *Endgame*, Hamm's parents live in two ashbins, the lids of which Clov attempts to keep closed; in *Play* the three characters occupy grey urns. These receptacles are paralleled by the cistern into which the prophet climbs to avoid Salomé's gaze.) Wilde's play of decay and sacrifice has the same inspiration that fueled Beckett's dramaticules: the symbolic representation of the beheading of John the Baptist. This common inspiration-- an inspiration that conjures up Emmet's execution-- provides common imagery in the plays. The floating head of Listener in *That Time* has an obvious connection with *Salomé*, especially when Aubrey Beardsley's drawings for the play are considered. One of Beardsley's final drawings is particularly provocative: a floating Salomé holding aloft the prophet's head while the background is weighed down in turgid sensuality. The head in *That Time* hovers above the stage as if it were being held by an invisible Salomé (or an invisible executioner). (One of the "memories" Listener "hears" also seems to recall Wilde's last days: "you heard yourself at it again not a curse for the passers pausing to gape at the scandal huddled there in the sun where it has no warrant" [233].) *Not I* is reminiscent of Salomé's fixation with Jokannan's mouth,

the color of which is “redder than the feet of those who tread the wine in the wine press” (559). Jokanaan’s lips speak of the connection between death and sexuality: “They say that love hath a bitter taste.... But what of that? What of that? I have kissed thy mouth, Jokanaan” (559). When the BBC produced *Not I*, Beckett was pleasantly surprised to notice that the red lips of Mouth-- while speaking about desolation, decay, suffering, and the inevitability of death-- looked like a vagina.

Beckett’s late dramaticules have nothing to do with Wilde. Nothing in the sense of Adorno’s reading of Beckett: a nothing bringing on the negation of meaning that strives toward “new categories.” These “new categories” come out of Beckett’s critique of ocularcentrism, a critique grounded in his play with the Emmet myth in plays like *Not I* and *That Time*. And these plays of a floating, disembodied mouth and a hovering head bombarded by its own memories play off of Wilde’s play with the Emmet myth in *Salomé*. Beckett and Wilde play off of the Irish myth of sacrifice in their challenges to the hegemony of vision. The easy equation between truth and the visible is undermined: seeing is not believing. The “hypermasculinity” of the Emmet myth is debunked, is shown as a construction wrapped up in a cultural and political considerations. Adorno’s reading of nothing, of meaninglessness in Beckett has an important litmus test: “The crucial difference is whether the negation of meaning in art works is meaningful or whether it represents an adaptation to the status quo; whether the crisis of meaning is reflected by the work or whether it is immediate and bypasses the subject” (221). The difference is that Beckett’s work foregrounds the “crisis of meaning” as it is represented in his challenge to that entrenched truth-teller of the status quo: ocularcentrism.

Instead of butting his head against the statue of Cuchulain, Beckett pokes the hero's eyes out.

This poking out of Cuchulain's eyes is a part of Beckett's reading of Wilde's *Salomé* and Wilde's fall. This is a reading taking in the sacrifice haunting their work, and the sacrifice haunting their ideas about the country they came from. As Yeats pointed out on more than one occasion, Robert Emmet was representative of the Irish Protestant strain of Irish rebellion and martyrdom. This ties into the solid middle-class upbringing of Wilde and Beckett. Both writers had their own nationalist ties to sever: Wilde had to distance himself from the aggressive nationalism of his mother, and Beckett had to move away from what he called the "antiquarianism" of Irish letters after Yeats and Joyce ("Recent" 235). This acknowledgment of the Irish roots-- the Irish dust they could not shake off their feet-- in Wilde and Beckett reveals a great deal about their work, their challenges to ocularcentrism, and their careers. However, there is a larger critical issue at hand here: the transformation of the modern male Irish writer into hero/martyr.

Richard Ellmann's 1988 biography of Wilde established him as a kind of martyr to the modern, a hero who tried to bring the modernist impulse into literature, but whose effort-- and life-- was denounced by the late Victorian public. (Ellmann's 1959 *James Joyce* rescued Joyce from being seen as an arcane modernist weaver of incomprehensible texts. The biography marked the beginning of the critical wave of Joyce as life-embracing humanist.) Wilde, Yeats, Joyce, and Beckett are taken as emblematic of the modern Irish writer's heroic struggle to achieve art in the face of cultural chaos and economic instability. Joyce is the prime example of this kind of hagiography. In a recent

pamphlet in the Irish Heritage Series (the series profiles only on other writer-- Swift-- and other topics include "Irish Trees," "The Siege of Derry," and "Guinness") David Norris. Joycean and Senator of the Republic, sums up this perception: "The name of James Joyce is linked as inevitably with Dublin in the popular imagination as that of Christopher Columbus is with America" (1). This is a statement that would not have been made fifty years ago.²⁴ The point I wish to make here is how easily the modern male Irish writer fits into this heroic mold; a testament to this is the title Lois Gordon gives the introduction to her recent book on Beckett's early life: "Beckett as Hero" (1). This is an unquestioned critical trend. Foucault pointed to this trend to supplant older archetypal heroes for writers in an essay pointing out "how the author was individualized in a culture such as ours, the status we have given the author... the systems of valorization in which he is included; or the moment when the stories of heroes gave way to an author's biography" ("What" 115). In "What is an Author?" Foucault points again to the writer who provoked him into moving away from established thinking: Beckett in *Texts for Nothing*: "What matter who's speaking, someone said, what matter who's speaking" (16). This question leads Foucault into thinking about the relationship of the modern writer to the text, a relationship he points to in Beckett as an "ongoing practice" (116), as *écriture*. Beckett's question in a collection of texts explicitly about and for "nothing" leads Foucault to the realization of the writer's death via his text, a sacrifice of writing:

Writing is now linked to sacrifice and to the sacrifice of life itself; it is a voluntary obliteration of the self that does not require representation in books because it takes place in the everyday existence of the writer. Where a work had the duty of creating immortality, it now attains the right to kill, to become the murderer of its author.... In addition, we find the link between

writing and death manifested in the total effacement of the individual characteristics of the writer.... If we wish to know the writer in our day, it will be through the singularity of his absence and in his link to death, which has transformed him into a victim of his writing. ("What" 117)

To "know" Beckett is to "know" his link with death, and to read his link with the Irish cult of sacrifice. Beckett's link with sacrificial death-- with the death in/of Irish martyrdom-- reveals his artistic and political commitment to challenging one-eyed nationalism, and the power of "pure" vision. Beckett had nothing to do with Emmet ("No symbols where none intended"), or Wilde, or the explosion of carnival death in Joyce, or politics. Nothing is the point. This is a nothing Foucault saw in *Waiting for Godot*, and a nothing Beckett saw in what he described as an epiphany he had in 1946. He described it in an early version of *Krapp's Last Tape*:

Intellectually a year of profound gloom and indigence until that memorable night in March, at the end of the pier, in the howling wind, never to be forgotten, when suddenly I saw the whole thing. The turning point at last.... What I saw was that the assumption I had been going on all my life, namely... clear to me at last that the dark I have been fighting off all this time is in reality my most... unshatterable association till my dying day of story and night with the light of understanding. (quoted in Bair 351)

The "dark" is the stuff of his art that he will embrace until his "dying day." The dark is nothing, and death, and the courage to question what and how we see. The dark is the other side of vision, and the other side of what we see and believe, the other side of the "light of understanding." The dark is the other side of Emmet's execution, a dark side Beckett and Joyce responded to by becoming sacrificial victims to their own texts. Their

critique of the myth of heroic sacrifice does not mean that they abandoned any desire to see Ireland free from English rule. On the contrary, if we take into account Edward Said's thinking about the rise of modernism and the end of imperialism, then Beckett and Joyce actually contributed to the sense of Ireland as a independent nation; as Said formulates it, many modernists were responding to the collapse of the system of imperialism in their aesthetics: "When you can no longer assume that Britannia will rule the waves forever, you have to reconceive reality as something that can be held together by you the artist, in history rather than geography" (189-190). Beckett and Joyce went back to the "history" of the cult of sacrifice and began their rewriting of it with that day in 1803 when Emmet's head was lopped off and held toward the sun. In a strange haunting, Emmet's final words are fulfilled:

[T]he man dies, but his memory lives.... When my spirit shall be wafted to a more friendly port; when my shade shall have joined the bands of those martyred heroes who have shed their blood on the scaffold and in the field, in defense of their country and of virtue, this is my hope: I wish that my memory and my name shall animate those who survive me. (285)

Endnotes

¹ For political readings of Beckett's plays, see Stephen Watt, "Beckett by Way of Baudrillard" in *Myth and Ritual in the Plays of Samuel Beckett* (Rutherford and Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press: 1987) and Darko Suvin, "Preparing for Godot, or the Purgatory of Individualism," *Tulane Drama Review* 11 (Summer 1967): 23-36. In "Outside the Whale" from *Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism: 1981-1991* (New York and London: Penguin Books, 1991), Salman Rushdie takes the work of Beckett as "political fiction" because of its reevaluation of how we are "radioactive with history and politics" (100).

² The same thing was said about Stephen Dedalus by his harshest critic, Buck Mulligan: "You wouldn't kneel down to pray for your mother on her deathbed when she asked you. Why? Because you have the cursed jesuit strain in you, only it's injected the wrong way" (*U* 1.207-09).

³ As Declan Kiberd notes in *Inventing Ireland*. Emmet became such a powerful romantic figure that he caused English figures "from Southey to Keats to Coleridge... to rebuke themselves for their own failure to live up to such high romantic ideals" (20).

⁴ St. Michan's church in Dublin has a ceremonial grave that is decorated every June 20, the national day for the decoration of patriot graves.

⁵ For a discussion of Yeats's relationship to the cult of sacrifice, see Elizabeth Butler Cullingford, *Gender and History in Yeats's Love Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 55-72. See Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland*, pp. 305-315 for a look at the "revolt" embodied in Yeats's poetics. For a description of Yeats as "decolonizer" see Said, pp. 220-238.

⁶ As Foucault notes in *Discipline and Punish*, executions often got out of hand because of the extreme emotions stirred up in the spectators:

In the ceremonies of the public execution, the main character was the people, whose real and immediate presence was required for the performance.... [T]he people, drawn to the spectacle intended to terrorize it, could express its rejection of the punitive power and sometimes revolt. Preventing an execution that was regarded as unjust, snatching a condemned man from the hands of the executioner, obtaining his pardon by force, possibly pursuing and assaulting the executioners, in any case abusing the judges and causing an uproar against the sentence-- all this formed a part of the popular practices that invested, traversed and often overturned the ritual of the public execution. (57-60)

ejaculates immediately" (76)

¹¹ For a discussion of the "hypermasculinity" of the Celtic Revival and Irish nationalism see Declan Kiberd "Irish Literature and Irish History" in *The Oxford Illustrated History of Ireland*, ed. R. F. Foster (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 275-305. And for a detailed account of modern Irish rebellion and Irish poetics see Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland*, pp. 191-238. See *Gender in Irish Writing*, David Cairns and Toni O'Brien, eds. (Milton Keynes, Eng.: Open University Press, 1991) for different perspectives on conceptions of gender and Irishness.

¹² For an analysis of the British construction of the Irish as feminine, see David Cairns and Shaun Richards, *Writing Ireland: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 42-57.

¹³ The symbolic connection between Pearse and Sheppard's statue of Cuchulain was cemented (or minted) in 1966 when the Irish Free State issued an Easter rising commemorative ten shilling piece that featured a portrait of Pearse on one side and the Cuchulain statue on the other.

¹⁴ Martin Jay creates the neologism "phallogocularcentrism" in a discussion of the phallogocentric history and qualities attributed to Western vision in *Downcast Eyes*, pp. 493-542.

¹⁵ For a discussion of modern Irish "play" with conceptions of male sexuality and its links with reactions to colonialism, see Elizabeth Butler Cullingford "British Romans and Irish Carthaginians: Anticolonial Metaphor in Heaney, Friel, and McGuinness" *PMLA* vol. 111, no. 2 (March 1996): 222-239.

¹⁶ Donald McMillan, "Samuel Beckett and the Visual Arts: The Embarrassment of Allegory" in *On Beckett: Essays and Criticism*, ed. S. E. Gontarski (New York: Grove Press, 1986) pp. 29-45. As McMillan notes, Beckett gestures toward his concern with seeing and identity in *Murphy*: "He saw the clenched fists and rigid upturned face of the Child in a Giovanni Bellini Circumcision, waiting to feel the knife. He saw eyeballs being scarpd, first any eyeballs, then Mr. Endon's" (251). For a description of the importance of painting for Beckett, see Knowlson, pp. 186-88 and pp. 219-225.

¹⁷ Beckett once said that if he were a critic writing about Samuel Beckett he would begin with this quote from Democritus along with another from Geulincx: "Where you are worth nothing, there you should want nothing." See Lawrence Harvey, *Samuel Beckett: Poet and Critic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 267- 68.

¹⁸ For a slightly different account of Beckett's viewing of the painting and the waiting woman, see Knowlson, pp. 520-23. Knowlson points out the Caravaggio painting had added attraction for Beckett because he recently had cataracts removed and thus was seeing the canvas with "new" eyes.

¹⁹ The male modernist giving voice to a woman is one of the great critical points of debate-- Joyce's "Penelope" chapter of *Ulysses* being the most celebrated battlefield. For an analysis of this question in critical circles see Gayatri C. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 271-313. For more specific treatments of Beckett's relationship to the voice of women, see *Women in Beckett: Performance and Critical Perspectives*, ed. Linda Ben-Zvi (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990). In one of the most insightful essays written on Beckett and race, "Staging Whiteness: Beckett, Havel, Maponya" *Theatre Journal* 46 (1994): 45-61, Anthony O'Brien posits that Beckett's "silence" on the issue of race says a great deal about his "use" of the subaltern voice: "Beckett's discussion of power without reference to race underwrites white solipsism in its silence about 'other worlds' even though they are right outside the door of his theatre in the form of French internal colonialism" (49).

²⁰ Jean Cocteau's *The Blood of a Poet* (1932) actually depicts a surrealist painting coming to life. For a discussion of surrealism's challenge to ocularcentrism, see Jay pp. 211-262.

²¹ See Dorothy Walker, *Louis le Brocquy* (Dublin: Ward River Press, 1981).

²² Wilde had many representations of Salomé to look at; as Patrick Bade notes in *Femme Fatale* (New York: Mayflower Books, 1979), "Wherever he went, the exhibition visitor of the 1890s found walls crowded with malefactors of the female sex" (6). Salomé was one of the favorite figures for *fin-de-siecle* artists and famous depictions of her were created by Max Klinger, Edvard Munch, Gustave Moreau, and Lucien Lévy-Dhurmer. For an analysis of sexual stereotypes and their impact upon the art of the period, see Elaine Showalter, *Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the fin de siecle* (New York: Penguin, 1991).

²³ In his biography of Wilde, Ellmann includes a picture of Wilde dressed as Salomé reaching for the severed head of the prophet. Ellmann does not give an explanation of the circumstances surrounding the photo: it appears in the text as a wish fulfilled.

²⁴ When Beckett tried to get Joyce's body moved to Dublin from Switzerland in 1948, he encountered an entrenched resistance: "[Beckett] went to one of Dublin's leading undertakers, who was horrified at the thought of such a great sinner being transported back to Ireland" (Bair 377-78). Now Joyce adorns the Irish ten pound note.

Conclusion
Seeing Beyond *Finnegans Wake*

Produce! Produce!... Work while it is called To-day,
for the Night cometh wherein no man can work.
--Thomas Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*

Turning up fingering over the most dantellising peaches
in the lingerous longerous book of the dark.
--*Finnegans Wake* (FW 251.23-24)

Joyce proved Carlyle wrong by not only writing when darkness fell but by making the night his subject. *Finnegans Wake* appears throughout this study as the most extreme form of Joyce's critique of ocularcentrism. This is an obvious point: *Finnegans Wake* is a "book of the dark" and thus its primary aim is the eradication of the clarity associated with the world of light. The *Wake*'s objective is to do away with "clear" representation and its association with "truth." Joyce always made it a point to declare his intention of writing a "night-piece" (JJ 544) at the expense of conventional narrative. The very process of reading a book is questioned; he told a friend that entering the *Wake* required adjusting one's way of looking at literature: "It is night. It is dark. You can hardly see" (Mercanton 233). He also made it a point to describe where he thought his book came from: "*Je suis au bout de l'anglais*" (JJ 546).

After the “day” book called *Ulysses*, Joyce intensified his critique of ocularcentrism by attacking the vehicle for vision’s hold over meaning: language. In creating the language of *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce not only changed how we think about literature, he changed how we think about words. He was careful to define his impact upon English: “I have put the language to sleep” (*JJ* 546). The *Wake* as “nonday diary” (*FW* 489.35) represents the final blow Joyce gave to the Cartesian equation of sight and knowledge.¹ The strength behind this attack stems from his concentration on language:

In writing of the night. I really could not. I felt I could not. use words in their ordinary connections. Used that way they do not express how things are in the night, in the different stages-- conscious, then semi-conscious, then unconscious. I found that it could not be done with words in their ordinary relations and connections. When morning comes of course everything will be clear again.... I’ll give them back their English language. I’m not destroying it forever. (*JJ* 546)

The book itself gives us back the English language: as it progresses, night fades and the visual world is reconstructed beginning with Book IV: “What was thaas? Fog was whaas? Too mult sleepth” (*FW* 555.1); “Brightening up and tightening down” (*FW* 626.36-627.1). Throughout the *Wake* vision is destroyed so that it can be remade. It is remade after it is shattered, after its power over meaning has been revealed.

In a sense, this entire study of Joyce and Beckett’s challenge to ocularcentrism is just the beginning of a reading of *Finnegans Wake*. The *Wake* was the end of Joyce’s attack upon vision and it provided Beckett with the beginning of his. Beckett met Joyce while he was working on his “nightynovel” (*FW* 54.21) and he helped the older writer

actually compose the text by conducting research and reading books that would contribute to the writing. He also took dictation and worked on the first French translation of “Anna Livia Plurabelle.”² For Beckett, the *Wake* was “the only [possible] development from *Ulysses*” (Knowlson 240) and he spent the early part of his career trying to learn from Joyce as he attempted to forge his own voice.³ In his essay in *Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress*, Beckett describes the initial installments of the *Wake* as the first steps into a new literature:

Here form *is* content, content *is* form. You complain that this stuff is not written in English. It is not written at all. It is not to be read-- or rather it is not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to. His writing is not *about* something; *it is that something itself*.... This writing that you find so obscure is a quintessential extraction of language and painting and gesture, with all the inevitable clarity of the old inarticulation. Here is the savage economy of hieroglyphics. Here words are not the polite contortions of 20th century printer's ink. They are alive. (Beckett's emphasis, 14-16)

It was the *Wake*'s embodiment of what Eugene Jolas called “The Revolution of the Word” that fascinated and influenced Beckett. Combined with his interest in painting, the *Wake* gave Beckett a way of seeing differently, of breaking through the entrenched forms of thinking and art that he found suffocating.

It was the quality of avant-garde exploration on the level of language that attracted poststructuralists to Joyce. Hélène Cixous invoked *Ulysses* in her search for *l'écriture féminine* in “The Laugh of the Medusa”: “The feminine (as the poets suspected) affirms: ‘... And yes,’ says Molly, carrying *Ulysses* off beyond any book and toward the new writing; ‘I said yes, I will Yes’” (1096). J. Hillis Miller believes deconstruction had one of its beginnings in Derrida's reading of *Finnegans Wake* in the fifties at Harvard (4).

Derrida's interest in Joyce's project may be discerned if we go back to his essay on the metaphors of philosophy, metaphors based on the senses that have since become a part of the "signature" of Western thought:

Metaphysics-- the white mythology which resembles and reflects the culture of the West: the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own *logos*, that is, the *mythos* of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must call Reason.... White mythology-- metaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest. ("White" 213)

Joyce, outside of philosophy and *within* language, traces the "invisible design" by using what Beckett calls "the savage economy of hieroglyphics." ("Link of a leadder, dubble in it, slake your thirdst thoughts awake with it" [*FW* 311.16-17].) As Geert Lernout puts it, the reason for Derrida's continual fascination and "use" of Joyce lies in this kind of philosophical impact: "Joyce's project is Hegelian and encyclopedic, and *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* are non-Husserlian attempts to encompass a culture" (65).⁴ As I have described it throughout this study, Joyce's critique of the hegemony of vision is the basis for his influence on poststructuralism and on the evolution of postmodernism. By challenging vision Joyce challenged the history of Western thought and art and provided the tools for their "end."

The link between Joyce and Beckett's critiques of ocularcentrism supplies us with a way of looking at the emergence of postmodernism. As Jean-François Lyotard tells us, modernism and postmodernism "often coexist in the same piece" (80). *Finnegans Wake* leads to postmodernism because it embodies what Lyotard describes as the postmodern

ability to put “forward the unrepresentable in presentation itself” (81). According to Lyotard’s description, Joyce is a postmodern writer because he dismantles an entire cultural paradigm:

A postmodern writer or artist is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgement, by applying familiar categories to the text or the work. Those rules and categories are what the work of art itself is looking for. (81)

What Joyce was “looking” for in *Finnegans Wake* was “meoptics” (*FW* 139.16): his way of seeing outside of the Western reliance on vision to describe reality and provide “truth.”

Toward the end of the *Wake*, the night recedes and sight begins to return:

Gauze off heaven! Vision. Then, O, pluxty suddly, the sight entrancing! Hummels! That crag! Those hullocks! O Sire! So be accident occur is not going to commence! What have you therefore? Fear you the donkers? Of roovers? I fear we have lost ours (non grant it!) respecting these wildy parts. How is hit finister! (*FW* 566.28-33)

How is it dark (*finster* in German)? How is it sinister? How is it finished? Joyce finished *Finnegans Wake* with the closing and then the reopening of the Western Eye.

Endnotes

¹ Although he does not discuss its assault upon meaning, John Bishop gives an essential description of the *Wake*'s optics and its attack upon paradigms of vision in *Joyce's Book of the Dark: "Finnegans Wake"* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), pp. 216-263. For a consideration of gender and vision in the *Wake*, see Kimberly Devlin, *Wandering and Return in "Finnegans Wake"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 111-162.

² See Bair, pp. 69-70; and Knowlson, pp. 129-131.

³ For a consideration of Joyce's influence on Beckett and his struggle with forming his own literary voice, see Knowlson, pp. 104-112. For appraisals of the *Wake*'s impact on other writers and artists and on the emergence of postmodernism, see Robert Adams, *After Joyce* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); David Hayman and Elliot Anderson, eds., *In the Wake of the Wake* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); and Christopher Butler, "Joyce, Modernism, and Postmodernism" in *The Cambridge Companion to James Joyce*, ed. Derek Attridge (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁴ In *The French Joyce*, Geert Lernout provides an indispensable study of Joyce's reception and importance for French poststructuralist thought. For the first full-scale application of poststructuralist thought to the *Wake*, see Margot Norris, *The Decentered Universe of "Finnegans Wake"* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

Works Cited

James Joyce

Collected Poems. New York: Viking Press, 1957.

The Critical Writings of James Joyce. Ed. Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann. New York: Viking Press, 1959.

"Dubliners": Text, Criticism, and Notes. Ed. Robert Scholes and A. Walton Litz. New York: Viking Press, 1969.

Finnegans Wake. New York: Viking Press, 1939.

The Letters of James Joyce. Vol. 1, ed. Stuart Gilbert. New York: Viking Press, 1966.
Vol. II and III, ed. Richard Ellmann. New York: Viking Press, 1966.

"A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man": Text, Criticism, and Notes. Ed. Chester G. Anderson. New York: Viking Press, 1968.

Stephen Hero. Ed. John J. Slocum and Herbert Cahoon. New York: New Directions, 1963.

Selected Letters of James Joyce. Ed. Richard Ellmann. New York: Viking Press, 1975.

Ulysses. Ed. Hans Walter Gabler with Wolfhard Steppe and Claus Melchior. New York: Vintage Books, 1986.

Joyce Criticism

Atherton, James. *The Books at the Wake*. New York: Viking Press, 1960.

Barrow, Craig Wallace. *Montage in James Joyce's "Ulysses."* Madrid: Jose Porrua Turanzas, 1980.

Beckett, Samuel, et al. *Our Exagmination Round His Factification For Incamination of*

- Work in Process*. New York: New Directions, 1972.
- Beja, Morris. "One Good Look at Themselves: Epiphanies in *Dubliners*" in *Work in Progress: Joyce Centenary Essays*. Ed. Richard F. Peterson, Alan M. Cohn, and Edmund L. Epstein. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983.
- Bishop, John. *Joyce's Book of the Dark: "Finnegans Wake."* Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986.
- Budgen, Frank. *James Joyce and the Making of "Ulysses" and Other Writings*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Burgess, Anthony. "The Task of Turning Joyce's Prose to Film Poetry." *The New York Times* 3 January 1988: 15+25.
- Cheng, Vincent. *Joyce, Race, and Empire*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Cixous, Hélène. "At Circe's, or the Self-Opener." Trans. Carol Bove. *Boundary* 2, 3 (1979): 387-97.
- . "Joyce: The (R)use of Writing" in *Post-Structuralist Joyce: Essays From the French*. Trans. Judith Still. Ed. Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Costello, Peter. *James Joyce: The Years of Growth, 1882-1915*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992.
- Davison, Neil R. *James Joyce, "Ulysses," and the Construction of Jewish Identity*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Dettmar, Kevin J. H. *The Illicit Joyce of Postmodernism: Reading Against the Grain*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1996.
- Eliot, T. S. "Ulysses, Order, and Myth" in *Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot*. Ed. Frank Kermode. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975.
- Ellmann, Richard. *The Consciousness of James Joyce*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- . *Four Dubliners*. New York: George Braziller, 1988.
- . *James Joyce*. Revised Edition. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

- , *"Ulysses" on the Liffey*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Epstein, Edmund L. "James Augustine Aloysius Joyce" in *A Companion to Joyce Studies*. Ed. Zack Bowen and James F. Carens. Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1984.
- , "Nestor" in *James Joyce's "Ulysses"*. Ed. Clive Hart and David Hayman. Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1974.
- , *The Ordeal of Stephen Dedalus*. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.
- Fairhall, James. *James Joyce and the Question of History*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Gifford, Don and Robert J. Seidman. *"Ulysses" Annotated: Notes for James Joyce's "Ulysses"*. Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1988.
- Gilbert, Stuart. *James Joyce's "Ulysses"*. New York: Vintage, 1955.
- Gillespie, Michael Patrick. *Reading the Book of Himself: Narrative Strategies in the Works of James Joyce*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989.
- Gottfried, Roy. *Joyce's Iritis and the Irritated Text: The Dis-Lexic "Ulysses"*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1995.
- Groden, Michael. *"Ulysses" in Progress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Hayman, David. *"Ulysses": The Mechanics of Meaning*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970.
- Hutchins, Patricia. *James Joyce's World*. London: Methuen, 1957.
- Jameson, Fredric. "Magical Narratives: Romance as Genre." *New Literary History* 7, No. 3 (Spring 1976): 135-163.
- , "Ulysses in History" in *James Joyce and Modern Literature*. Ed. W. J. McCormack and Alister Stead. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982.
- Jung, Carl. "Ulysses: A Monologue" in *Critical Essays on James Joyce's "Ulysses"*. Ed. Bernard Benstock. Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1989.
- Kael, Pauline. *"Ulysses" in Kiss Kiss, Bang Bang*. Boston and London: Little, Brown and Co., 1968.

- Kenner, Hugh. *Dublin's Joyce*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956.
- . *Joyce's Voices*. Berkeley and Los Angeles. University of California Press. 1978.
- . "Molly's Masterstroke." *James Joyce Quarterly* 10 (Fall 1972): 19-28.
- . "Notes Toward an Anatomy of 'Modernism'" in *A Starchamber Quiry: A James Joyce Centennial Volume 1882-1982*. Ed. E. L. Epstein. London: Methuen, 1982.
- . *Ulysses*. Revised Edition. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
- Kershner, R. B. *Joyce, Bakhtin, and Popular Literature: Chronicles of Disorder*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina press, 1989.
- Lawrence, Karen. *The Odyssey of Style in "Ulysses."* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Leonard, Garry M. *Reading "Dubliners" Again: A Lacanian Perspective*. Syracuse: Syracuse University press, 1993.
- Levin, Harry. *James Joyce*. New York: New Directions, 1941.
- MacCabe, Colin. *James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word*. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.
- Manganiello, Dominic. *Joyce's Politics*. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
- McAlmon, Robert. "Mr. Joyce Directs an Irish Word Ballet" in *Our Exagmination Round His Factification For Incamination of Work in Progress*. New York: New Directions, 1972.
- McGee, Patrick. *Paperspace: Style as Ideology in Joyce's "Ulysses."* Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1988.
- McHugh, Roland. *Annotations to "Finnegans Wake."* Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.
- Mercanton, Jacques. "The Hours of James Joyce" in *Portraits of the Artist in Exile: Recollections of James Joyce by Europeans*. Trans. Lloyd C. Parks. Ed. Willard Potts. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979.

- Miller, J. Hillis. "From Narrative Theory to Joyce; From Joyce to Narrative Theory" in *The Seventh of Joyce*. Ed. Bernard Benstock. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- Norris, David. *Joyce's Dublin*. Dublin: Eason & Son Ltd., 1982.
- Pound, Ezra. "Dubliners and Mr James Joyce" in *Pound/Joyce*. Ed. Forrest Read. New York: New Directions, 1967.
- . "James Joyce: to His Memory" in *Pound/Joyce*. Ed. Forrest Read. New York: New Directions, 1967.
- . "Joyce" in *Pound/Joyce*. Ed. Forrest Read. New York: New Directions, 1967.
- . "Ulysses" in *Pound/Joyce*. Ed. Forrest Read. New York: New Directions, 1967.
- Riquelme, John Paul. *Teller and Tale in Joyce's Fiction: Oscillating Perspectives*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University press, 1983.
- Scholes, Robert. "Stephen Dedalus, Poet or Aesthete?" in *In Search of James Joyce*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992.
- Scholes, Robert and Richard M. Kain, eds. *The Workshop of Daedalus: James Joyce and the Raw Materials for "A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man."* Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965.
- Scholes, Robert and A. Walton Litz. "The Composition and Revision of the Stories" in *"Dubliners": Text, Criticism, and Notes*. Ed. Robert Scholes and A. Walton Litz. New York: Viking Books, 1969.
- Schwarz, Daniel R. "A Critical History of 'The Dead'" in *"The Dead": Case Studies in Contemporary Criticism*. Ed. Daniel R. Schwarz. Boston and New York: Bedford Books, 1994.
- Segal, Jeffrey. *Joyce in America: Cultural Politics and the Trails of "Ulysses."* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993.
- Valente, Joseph. "Beyond Truth and Freedom: The New Faith of Joyce and Nietzsche." *James Joyce Quarterly* 25 (Fall 1987): 87-103.
- Walzl, Florence L. "Dubliners" in *A Companion to Joyce Studies*. Ed. Zack Bowen and James F. Carens. Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1984.

------. "Gabriel and Michael: The Conclusion of 'The Dead'" in "*Dubliners*": *Text, Criticism, and Notes*. Ed. Robert Scholes and A. Walton Litz. New York: Viking Press, 1969.

Wells, H. G. "James Joyce" in "*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*": *Text, Criticism, and Notes*. Ed. Chester G. Anderson. New York: Viking Press, 1968.

Wicke, Jennifer. "Modernity Must Advertise: Aura, Desire, and Decolonization in Joyce." *James Joyce Quarterly* 30 (Summer/ Fall 1993): 593-614.

Samuel Beckett

Breath in Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett. London: Faber and Faber, 1984.

Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett. London: Faber and Faber, 1984.

The Complete Short Prose: 1929-1989. Ed. G. E. Gontarski. New York: Grove Press, 1995.

Film: Complete Scenario/ Illustrations/ Production Shots. New York: Grove Press, 1969.

The Lost Ones. New York: Grove Press, 1972.

Molloy. Trans. Patrick Bowles and Samuel Beckett. New York: Grove Press, 1955.

Murphy. New York: Grove Press, 1957.

Not I in *Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett*. London: Faber and Faber, 1984.

"Recent Irish Poetry." *Bookman* LXXVII (August 1934): 4-7.

Stories and Texts for Nothing. New York: Grove Press, 1967.

That Time in *Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett*. London: Faber and Faber, 1984.

Waiting for Godot. New York: Grove Press, 1954.

Beckett Criticism

- Bair, Deirdre. *Samuel Beckett: A Biography*. New York and London: Summit Books, 1978.
- Ben-Zvi, Linda. "Samuel Beckett's Media Plays." *Modern Drama* 28 (March 1985): 23-37.
- Brater, Enoch. *Beyond Minimalism: Beckett's Late Style in the Theater*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Elam, Keir. "Dead Heads: Damnation-Narration in the 'Dramaticules'" in *The Cambridge Companion to Samuel Beckett*. Ed. John Pilling. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Gontarski, S. E. *The Intent of Undoing in Samuel Beckett's Dramatic Texts*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.
- Gordon, Lois. *The World of Samuel Beckett: 1906-1946*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996.
- Kalb, Jonathan. *Beckett in Performance*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Kenner, Hugh. "Beckett at Eighty" in *Historical Fictions*. San Francisco: North Point Press, 1990.
- Knowlson, James. *Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
- Ricks, Christopher. *Beckett's Dying Words*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- , "Beckett First and Last." *The New York Review of Books* XVI (December 14, 1972): 42-44.
- Schneider, Alan. "On Directing Film" in *Film: Complete Scenario /Illustrations/ Production Shots*. New York: Grove Press, 1969.
- The Village Voice*. "Take Me Out to the Endgame." *The Village Voice* 25 March 1997: 133.

Other Works

Abrams, M. H. *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*.

- London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1953.
- , *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1971.
- Ackroyd, Peter. *T. S. Eliot: A Life*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.
- Adorno, Theodor. *Aesthetic Theory*. Ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. C. Lenhardt. London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984.
- , *Negative Dialectics*. Trans. E. B. Ashton. New York: Seabury Press, 1973.
- Alloula, Malek. *The Colonial Harem*. Trans. Myrna Godzich and Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
- Anderson, Joseph and Barbara Anderson. "Motion Perception in Motion Pictures" in *The Cinematic Apparatus*. Ed. Teresa de Lauretis and Stephen Heath. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.
- Arnold, Matthew. "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time" in *Poetry and Criticism of Matthew Arnold*. Ed. A. Dwight Culler. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961.
- Auerbach, Erich. *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail. *Rabelais and His World*. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965.
- Barthes, Roland. *Camera Lucida*. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981.
- , "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives" in *Image/Music/Text*. Trans. Stephen Heath. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977.
- , *S/Z*. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974.
- Bataille, Georges. *Erotism: Death and Sensuality*. Trans. Mary Dalwood. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1986.
- Baudrillard, Jean. *America*. Trans. Chris Turner. London and New York: Verso, 1988.
- Bell, Clive. *Art*. New York: Henry Holt, 1958.
- Benjamin, Walter. "The Artist as Producer" in *Reflections*. Ed. Peter Demetz. Trans.

- Edmund Jephcott. New York: Schocken Books, 1978.
- . "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in *Illuminations*. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 1969.
- . "What is Epic Theater?" in *Illuminations*. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 1969.
- . "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" in *Illuminations*. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 1969.
- Berger, John. *The Success and Failure of Picasso*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
- . *Ways of Seeing*. London: Penguin, 1972.
- Bergson, Henri. *Creative Evolution*. Trans. Arthur Mitchell. New York: H. Holt and Co., 1928.
- . *Matter and Memory*. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. New York: Zone Books, 1988.
- . *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*. Trans. F. L. Pogson. New York: H. Holt and Co., 1960.
- Berkeley, George. *A New Theory of Vision in Selections from Berkeley*. Ed. Alexander C. Frazer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899.
- . "Visual Language Vindicated" in *Selections from Berkeley*. Ed. Alexander C. Frazer. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899.
- Blake, William. *The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake*. Revised Edition. Ed. David V. Erdman. New York: Doubleday, 1988.
- Bloom, Harold. *The Visionary Company*. New York: Anchor Books, 1963.
- . *Yeats*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.
- Blumberg, Hans. *Legitimacy of the Modern Age*. Trans. Robert M. Wallace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983.
- Booth, Wayne C. *The Rhetoric of Fiction*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
- Bornstein, George. *Transformations of Romanticism in Yeats, Eliot, and Stevens*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

- Brooks, Peter. *Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative*. New York: Knopf, 1984.
- Brown, Malcolm. *The Politics of Irish Literature from Thomas Davis to W. B. Yeats*. Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1972.
- Buck-Morss, Susan. *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993.
- Burke, Kenneth. "General Nature of Ritual" in *Attitudes Toward History*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959.
- Bush, Ronald. *The Genesis of Ezra Pound's "Cantos."* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Carey, John. *The Intellectuals and the Masses*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
- Carpenter, Humphrey. *A Serious Character: The Life of Ezra Pound*. New York: Dell Publishing, 1988.
- Christ, Carol. *The Finer Optic: The Aesthetic of Particularity in Victorian Poetry*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.
- . *Victorian and Modernist Poetics*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984.
- Cixous, Hélène. "The Laugh of the Medusa" in *The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends*. Ed. David H. Richter. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.
- Conrad, Joseph. *The Nigger of the "Narcissus."* Rpt. New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1916.
- Crary, Jonathan. *The Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990.
- Crehan, Stewart. *Blake in Context*. Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1984.
- Cross, Tim, ed. *The Lost Voices of World War I*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1988.
- Dardis, Tom. *Keaton: The Man Who Wouldn't Lie Down*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979.

- Dasenbrock, Reed Way. *The Literary Vorticism of Ezra Pound & Wyndham Lewis: Towards the Condition of Painting*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
- Davis, Mike. "Urban Renaissance and the Spirit of Postmodernism" in *Postmodernism and its Discontents*. Ed. E. Ann Kaplan. London and New York: Verso, 1988.
- De Man, Paul. "Literary History and Literary Modernity" in *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*. Revised Edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983.
- Debord, Guy. *The Society of the Spectacle*. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. New York: Swerve, 1990.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Cinema 1: The Movement Image*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
- , *Foucault*. Trans. Sean Hand. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*. Trans. Dana Polan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
- Descartes, René. *La Dioptrique* in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Derrida, Jacques. "Cogito and the History of Madness" in *Writing and Difference*. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978.
- , *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- , "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in *Writing and Difference*. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978.
- , "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" in *Margins of Philosophy*. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- Dewey, John. *The Quest for Certainty*. Rpt. New York: Putnam, 1960.
- Eagleton, Terry. "Capitalism, Modernism, and Postmodernism" in *Against the Grain: Essays: 1975-1985*. London: Verso, 1986.

- , *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture*. London and New York: Verso, 1995.
- Eisenstein, Sergei. "Achievement" in *Film Form*. Ed. and Trans. Jay Leyda. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
- , "A Course in Film Treatment" in *Film Form*. Ed. and Trans. Jay Leyda. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
- , "A Dialectic Approach to Film Form" in *Film Form*. Ed. and Trans. Jay Leyda. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
- , "Eisenstein on Joyce: Sergei Eisenstein's Lecture on James Joyce at the State Institute of Cinematography, November 1, 1934." Trans. Emily Tall. *James Joyce Quarterly* 24 (Winter 1987): 133-142.
- , *Immoral Memories*. Trans. Herbert Marshall. Boston: Houghton, 1983.
- Eliot, T. S. *The Waste Land* in *Collected Poems: 1909-1962*. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971.
- Ellison, Ralph. *Invisible Man*. New York: Random House, 1952.
- Ellmann, Richard. *Eminent Domain: Yeats Among Wilde, Joyce, Pound, Eliot, and Auden*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- , *Oscar Wilde*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988.
- , *Yeats: The Man and the Masks*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978.
- Emmet, Robert. "Robert Emmet, On Being Found Guilty of Treason" in *A Treasury of Irish Folklore*. Ed. Padraic Colum. New York: Wings Books, 1982.
- Epstein, Jacob. "Forward" to T. E. Hulme, *Speculations*. Rpt. Ed. Herbert Read. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.
- Foster, R. F. *W. B. Yeats: A Life*. Vol. 1: *The Apprentice Mage*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Foucault, Michel. *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon, 1975.
- , *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon, 1977.

- . *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Vintage, 1970.
- . "What Is an Author?" in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- Frank, Joseph. "Spatial Form in Modern Literature" in *The Widening Gyre: Crisis and Mastery in Modern Literature*. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1963.
- Freud, Sigmund. *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Trans. James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1962.
- Friedman, Melvin J. *Stream of Consciousness: A Study in Literary Method*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958.
- Frye, Northrop. *Fearful Symmetry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.
- Fussell, Paul. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Genette, Gérard. *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method*. Trans. Jane E. Lewin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.
- Ginsberg, Allen. "Today" in *Collected Poems: 1947-1980*. New York: Harper and Row, 1984.
- Goodwin, James. *Eisenstein, Cinema, and History*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996.
- Guest, Barbara. *Herself Defined: The Poet H. D. and Her World*. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1984.
- Heidegger, Martin. "The Question Concerning Technology" in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- . "Science and Reflection" in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- Hemingway, Ernest. *A Farewell to Arms*. Rpt. London: Penguin Books, 1970.
- Herr, Cheryl. "The Erotics of Irishness." *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1990): 1-35.
- Hobsbawn, Eric. *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914*. New York: Pantheon, 1987.

- Holly, Michael Ann. "Past Looking" in *Vision and Textuality*. Ed. Stephen Melville and Bill Readings. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.
- Huyssen, Andreas. *Across the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism*. Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986.
- Hulme, T. E. "Romanticism and Classicism" in *Speculations*. Rpt. Ed. Herbert Read. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.
- James, William. *The Principles of Psychology*. Rpt. 2 Vols. New York: Dover, 1950.
- Jameson, Fredric. *Fables of Aggression: The Modernist as Fascist*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
- . *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.
- . *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1991.
- Jay, Martin. *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought*. Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1993.
- Jonas, Hans. "The Nobility of Sight: A Study in the Phenomenology of the Senses" in *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- Joseph, Gerhard. "Framing Wilde." *Victorian Newsletter* 7 (1987): 61-63.
- Judovitz, Dalia. "Vision, Representation, and Technology in Descartes" in *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision*. Ed. David Michael Levin. Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1993.
- Keaton, Buster. *My Wonderful World of Slapstick*. New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960.
- Kern, Stephen. *The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1918*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- Kiberd, Declan. *Inventing Ireland: The Literature of the Modern Nation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- . "Wilde and the English Question." *Times Literary Supplement* (December 16, 1994): 13-15.

Koppet, Leonard. "Shea Stadium Opens With Big Traffic Jam." *The New York Times* 18 April 1964: A1+.

Krauss, Rosalind. "Antivision." *October* 36 (Spring 1986): 142-151.

Leed, J. Eric. *No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I*. Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Levenson, Michael H. *A Genealogy of Modernism*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Lewis, Wyndham. "The Terms 'Classical' and 'Romantic'" in *Men Without Art*. Rpt. Ed. Seamus Cooney. Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press, 1987.

----- . *Time and Western Man*. Rpt. Ed. Paul Edwards. Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press, 1993.

Lipsyte, Robert. "Fabulous Stadium Delights Fans." *The New York Times* 18 April 1964: A20.

Lloyd, David. *Nationalism and Minor Literature: James Clarence Mangan and the Emergence of Irish Cultural Nationalism*. Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1987.

Longenbach, James. *Modernist Poetics of History: Pound, Eliot, and the Sense of the Past*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

----- . *Stone Cottage: Pound, Yeats, and Modernism*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Lubbock, Percy. *The Craft of Fiction*. Rpt. New York: Viking, 1957.

Lukács, Georg. *The Meaning of Contemporary Realism*. Trans. John and Necke Mander. London: Merlin Press, 1962.

----- . *The Theory of the Novel*. Trans. Anna Bostock. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971.

Lydon, John. *Rotten: No Irish, No Blacks, No Dogs*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

Lyotard, Jean-François. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1984.

- Marx, Karl. *Capital*. Vol. 1 in *The Marx-Engels Reader*. Ed. Robert C. Tucker. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978.
- . *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* in *The Marx-Engels Reader*. Ed. Robert C. Tucker. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978.
- McGrath, F. C. *The Sensible Spirit: Walter Pater and the Modernist Paradigm*. Tampa: The University of Florida Press, 1986.
- Meisel, Perry. *The Myth of the Modern: A Study in British Literature and Criticism After 1850*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
- Menand, Louis. *Discovering Modernism: T. S. Eliot in His Context*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- . "Eliot and the Jews." *The New York Review of Books* (June 6, 1996): 34-38.
- Miller, James. *The Passion of Michel Foucault*. New York and London: Anchor Books, 1993.
- Moretti, Franco. *The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture*. London: Verso, 1987.
- Münsterberg, Hugo. *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study*. Rpt. New York: Dover, 1970.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.
- . *The Genealogy of Morals*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Press, 1968.
- . *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books, 1978.
- . *The Will to Power*. Ed. Walter Kaufmann. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.
- O'Brien, Geoffrey. *The Phantom Empire*. New York and London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1993.
- Pater, Walter. *The Renaissance in Walter Pater: Three Major Texts*. Ed. William E. Buckler. New York: New York University Press, 1986.






- Pearse, Patrick. "Renunciation" in *The Penguin Book of Irish Verse*. Ed. Brendan Kennelly. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.
- Picasso, Pablo. "Statement by Picasso: 1923" in *Picasso: Fifty Years of His Art*. Ed. Alfred H. Barr Jr. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946.
- Plato. *The Republic*. Trans. B. Jowett. New York: Vintage Books, 1961.
- Polcari, Stephen. *Abstract Expressionism and the Modern Experience*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Pound, Ezra. "Affirmations-- As for Imagisme" in *Selected Prose 1909-1965*. Ed. William Cookson. New York: New Directions, 1973.
- . *The Cantos of Ezra Pound*. Rpt. New York: New Directions, 1986.
- . *The Letters of Ezra Pound 1907-1941*. Ed. D. D. Paige. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1950.
- . "Lionel Johnson" in *Literary Essays of Ezra Pound*. Ed. T. S. Eliot. New York: New Directions, 1968.
- . "A Retrospect" in *Literary Essays of Ezra Pound*. Ed. T. S. Eliot. New York: New Directions, 1968.
- Pynchon, Thomas. *Gravity's Rainbow*. New York: Penguin Books, 1973.
- Ricoeur, Paul. *The Conflict of Interpretations*. Trans. Don Idhe. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- Rorty, Richard. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Rosenblum, Robert. "Picasso and the Typography of Cubism" in *Picasso 1881/1973*. Ed. Sir Roland Penrose and John Golding. London: Paul Elek Ltd., 1973.
- Ruddick, Lisa. *Reading Gertrude Stein: Body, Text, Gnosis*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990.
- Ruskin, John. *The Works of John Ruskin*. Ed. E. T. Cook. London: George Allen, 1903-1912.
- Said, Edward. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Knopf, 1993.

- Schwarz, Heinrich. *Art and Photography: Forerunners and Influences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. *Epistemology of the Closet*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.
- Shakespeare, William. *Hamlet* in *William Shakespeare: The Complete Works*. Ed. Alfred Harbage. New York: Viking, 1977.
- Shapiro, Gary. "In the Shadows of Philosophy: Nietzsche and the Question of Vision" in *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision*. Ed. David Michael Levin. Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1993.
- Shelley, Percy Bysshe. "A Defence of Poetry" in *Shelley's Poetry and Prose*. Ed. Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1977.
- . *Prometheus Unbound* in *Shelley's Poetry and Prose*. Ed. Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1977.
- Sherry, Vincent. *Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis, and Radical Modernism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Sontag, Susan. *Against Interpretation* in *A Susan Sontag Reader*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1982.
- . *On Photography*. New York: Delta, 1977.
- Spiegel, Alan. *Fiction and the Camera Eye*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976.
- Stein, Gertrude. *Three Lives*. Rpt. New York: Vintage, 1936.
- Thompson, David. "Buster Keaton" in *A Biographical Dictionary of Film*. Third edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994.
- Thompson, Kristin and David Bordwell. *Film History: An Introduction*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1994.
- Tennyson, Alfred. *Maud; A Monodrama* in *Tennyson's Poetry*. Ed. Robert W. Hill Jr. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1971.
- Valéry, Paul. "Degas, Manet, and Morisot" in *Collected Works*. Vol. 12. Trans. Donald Paul. New York: Hafner, 1960.

- Vollmann, William T. *The Ice Shirt*. New York: Penguin Books, 1990.
- White, Allon. *The Uses of Obscurity: The Fiction of Early Modernism*. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.
- Wilde, Oscar. "The Critic as Artist" in *The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
- , "The Decay of Lying" in *The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
- , *The Picture of Dorian Gray and Other Writings*. Ed. Richard Ellmann. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.
- , *De Profundis* in *The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
- , *Salomé* in *The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
- Wilhelm, J. J. *Ezra Pound in London and Paris: 1908-1925*. University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990.
- Williams, Raymond. "Cinema and Socialism" in *The Politics of Modernism*. Ed. Tony Pinkney. London and New York: Verso, 1989.
- Wilson, Edmund. *Axel's Castle*. New York: Scribner's, 1931.
- Woolf, Virginia. *Mrs Dalloway*. Rpt. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1953.
- Wordsworth, William. *The Prelude*. Ed. Ernest de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire. Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959.
- Yeats, W. B. *The Collected Poetry of W. B. Yeats*. Revised edition. Ed. Richard J. Finneran. New York: Collier Books, 1989.
- , "Emmet as the Apostle of Liberty" in *Uncollected Prose of W. B. Yeats*. Vol. 2. Ed. John P. Frayne and Colton Johnson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
- , *A Vision*. Rpt. New York: Collier Books, 1966.
- , "William Blake and His Illustrations to the Divine Comedy" in *Essays and Introductions*. Rpt. New York: Collier Books, 1985.

-----, "William Blake and the Imagination" in *Essays and Introductions*. Rpt.
New York: Collier Books. 1985.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



APPLIED IMAGE, Inc
1653 East Main Street
Rochester, NY 14609 USA
Phone: 716/482-0300
Fax: 716/288-5989

© 1993, Applied Image, Inc., All Rights Reserved

