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HISTORICAL FRAMING:

A MYTH ABOUT THE CLASSIFICATION OF VISUAL ART

by

TIFFANY SUTTON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York

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Introduction

Like art, theories of art are often best understood in contexts other than the ones in which they originally grew. This theory of art grew, somewhat piecemeal, out of many trips to New York's museums and galleries, as well as a few compelling insights: Wittgenstein's observation that the background does all of the work in explaining why we see pictures as we do, Michael Baxandall's theory and practice of inferential art history, and Marx Wartofsky's challenge to the institutional theory of art.

These insights have all remained crucial, but I now find it helpful to locate them within a somewhat wider framework: the classificatory/evaluatative distinction. One could, of course, pull back by powers of ten until the entire universe of philosophy is exposed, but I dig in my heels only as far back as the classificatory/evaluative distinction, in which Institutionalism is firmly planted.[1]

To take classification as primary is to insist that, before art is special, it is art. Concerns about the value of candidates become an afterthought. To take evaluation as primary is to insist that it is precisely a certain kind of specialness (aura, resonance, or some other property ascribed to an object) that makes an object worthy of art status. Nothing can be art without first possessing the relevant kind of specialness. The theory then revolves

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around determining (how to determine) the relevant kind of specialness.

Neither one of these foundations seems right. The reason is that, on the evaluative side, value is understood as something in excess of art status. The need to attach the prefix *good* to *art*, when it is good, is the giveaway that evaluation is not, in fact, primary. I do not deny that differences in complexity, organizational unity, uniqueness, universality of appeal, function, etc., make some artworks more valuable than others. But these values could be integrated (I would, and will, argue) into the classificatory process. Those who side with classificatory primacy simply argue, usually in order to be as inclusive as possible, that classifying art first does not make art's value, when it has any, less important. But of course it does. And there the two sides sit in stone, their roars frozen.

Ideally, a theory of art would collapse the distinction. What is overlooked is that art may have a specialness all its own that is distinct and separable from many of its undeniable assets. On that score, what should be distinguished are two separable aspects of art's value: classificatory value, or the value something acquires in the process of being classified as an artwork (which, I believe, subsumes such values as uniqueness, etc.); and functional value (usefulness). That will be my approach.

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There remains a viable approach other than collapsing the distinction: to reconceive of it, play with the boundaries, and propose a *not-quite-isomorphically-similar* distinction. Stephen Davies takes this approach in his *Theories of Art* (1991).[2] He translates the classificatory/evaluative distinction into a proceduralist/ functionalist distinction, and takes these two molds to be the (new) binary alternatives for all art theories.

Functionalist theories are primarily evaluative; they explain the existence of art in terms of art's essential purpose(s) - its primary value. If an object or artifact fails to serve the purpose of art, then whatever other non-functional value or status it may have is irrelevant - it is not art.

Procedural theories are primarily classificatory. Regardless of any function, value, or status an object or artifact may possess, its art status is not warranted until certain status-conferring procedures have been followed by the appropriate functionaries - just as one cannot be a knight before taking part in a ceremony in which knighthood is bestowed by the Queen.

However, 'functionalist' cannot be fully mapped onto 'evaluative.' The reason: 'evaluative' is so much more inclusive. The function of art is only one among many kinds of values art has been said to possess (e.g., relieving tension, sharpening perception, creating a feeling of subjective finitude, etc.) - though certainly function has

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traditionally been among the most important. Other kinds of value that an evaluative theory might take to be art's essence (some of which I named above) are uniqueness, complexity of a certain kind, organizational unity, and universal appeal.

The reason why 'proceduralist' and 'classificatory' do not mesh is, likewise, that 'proceduralist' is narrower. Art might be classified by fiat, with no procedures at all (formal or informal) to back it. In fact, philosophers who take the institutional approach to defining art (Dickie, Danto) usually acknowledge that there is no recognized protocol or formal procedure that is universally followed to bestow art status. The path leading from art-candidacy to arthood has to remain informal or it would be flooded. For this reason (presumably), aestheticians who have favored the classificatory approach have steered deliberately clear of proceduralism.

Therefore, the problems that the classificatory/ evaluative distinction present for theories of art do not warrant a rethinking of the dichotomy - they warrant its dissolution. I will argue, in fact, that a procedural approach holds the most promise for dissolving it. Now, proceduralism has long been virtually identified with what has been called the institutional theory by some who have been mistaken about institutionalism. The institutional theory, however, is structurally unsound as it stands. My first step will be to demonstrate this, and then to show

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that the institutional theory is, in fact, classificatory without being procedural.

Institutionalism

I take it as uncontroversial that two of the most important virtues a theory of art can possess are the breadth to encompass a wide variety of what has been called "art" and the flexibility to accommodate new artworks and art forms. The institutional theory was designed with those virtues in mind. Like art, however, it has been declared "dead" many times due to its inadequacies as a theory.

The two earliest forms of the institutional theory have come from Arthur Danto and George Dickie. In "The Artworld" (1964), Danto wrote the much-quoted sentence, "To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry - an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld."[3] He then went on to say that "what in the end makes the difference between a Brillo box and a work of art consisting of a Brillo Box is a certain theory of art. It is the theory that takes it up into the world of art..." The 'theory' he is referring to performs a primarily classificatory function, not an evaluative one.

Danto has been understandably evasive in pointing out that his theory, though classificatory, does not decide the ontology of artworks, insofar as it can only explain why Warhol's Brillo Box *was* taken up into the canon of art history, not whether it should have been.[4] On the other

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hand, in "The Artworld," he also writes, "...nor would these things be artworks without the theories and the histories of the Artworld," which suggests that the artworld's role is a necessary but perhaps not sufficient condition for deciding whether or not something is art. What more there is to it, he never says - but then, to be fair, he has never purported to offer a *definition* of art - merely a *theory*, for which necessary and sufficient conditions are not required.

George Dickie, on the other hand, does offer a definition of art along institutional lines. He credits Danto with patrilineal influence on his 1974 book *Art and the Aesthetic*, but Danto insists that Dickie's theory is the first real institutional theory of art insofar as its ambition is definition.[5] Dickie defines art as "(1) an artifact (2) a set of aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld)." Unfortunately, this definition is at best uninformative (at worst vacuous) and that has been its main criticism.

Institutionalism traffics in variables such as 'artworld public,' which in turn take other variables such as 'artist' as values. When an object's art status becomes nothing more than a bone of contention for historically contingent artworld members x and y - when the two artworlders have nothing beyond their status as artworlders to legitimate their claims - the theory that legitimates

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their claims is at best uninformative (at worst vacuous). It is vacuous because it fails to account for the specialness of artworks; that is, it is classificatory to the exclusion of evaluative criteria. By virtue of what, one wants to know, are member x and member y qualified to make such judgments? Why can they, and nobody else, confer art status on a urinal or deny art status to a child's drawing? If by virtue of holding special kinds of theories (as Danto suggests), the same issue arises for the theories: what makes the theories so special? If by virtue of the special characteristics of the network of institutions that confer 'artworlder' status upon those who occupy the right functional roles, the same issue arises for institutions: what is it about their structure (or whatever) that makes them special enough to be called "art institutions"?

The second problem Institutionalism has faced is its circularity. What is circular about defining art*work* in terms of art*world* I think should be transparent: the concept of *art*, instead of being defined, is presupposed.

In his 1984 book, *The Art Circle*, Dickie came closer to solving the vacuity problem, but at the cost of making his definition circular: he merely widened the circle and made Instituionalism more recognizably complex by introducing more terms into the chain of definition. The first condition that must be met if an artifact is to have art status is that it be accepted as art in an artworld, where artworld is circularly defined thus: "(1) An **artist** is a

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person who participates with understanding in the making of a work of art. (2) A **work of art** is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public. (3) A **public** is a set of persons, members of which are prepared in some degree to understand an object which is presented to them. (4) The **artworld** is the totality of artworld systems. (5) An **artworld system** is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an artworld public." The circularity comes from defining the last term in terms of the terms that were supposed to define *it*.

Dickie goes in the right direction with complexification, but an adequate definition must avoid circularity. It is hard to imagine what an adequate, informative, non-circular definition of art would look like, given the lay of the *modern* landscape, which has been constituted by layer upon layer of overthrown attempts at definition. Danto characterizes Modernism, in *Encounters and Reflections* (1989), as the final moment in the grand narrative of art history (which he believes has come to an end) during which the purpose of art *was* to define itself and thus mark formal boundaries outside of which art *qua* art could not fall; each formal limit which was imposed to legitimate the conferral of art status at a given time in history served as the animus for its own eventual overthrow and the emergence of a new movement. Minimalism, for example, emerged as a movement by overthrowing what young artists like Anne Truitt, Donald Judd, Robert Morris, Frank

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Stella, and Sol LeWitt saw as the autobiographical, gestural excesses of Abstract Expressionism (epitomized by the gestural paintings of Jackson Pollock and Joan Mitchell).

Now, of course, it is possible to take a curmudgeonly stance toward it all and ask why we need the twentieth century when we had the nineteenth.[6] Danto has made the theorizing tough by the sheer range of artworks he has included in his volumes of criticism. But I take inspiration from those who got theorizing when the theorizing got tough.

The institutional theory cannot get overthrown because it does not set any formal limitations upon art objects or art theories, nor on the intentional relation in which the artist must stand to the art object or artworld. Whether Institutionalism can survive under philosophical scrutiny, however, remains to be seen. For the reasons given, the two earliest theories have been too thin and uninformative. There has been a feeling in the contemporary artworld that Institutionalism is no less of a museum piece than the line-up of twentieth century essentialisms. In a review of the 1993 Whitney Biennial Exhibition in *The Nation*, Danto himself called for something more substantial than the institutional theory as he conceives of it. When the Whitney's curators made controversial "political artworks" the theme of the exhibit, and among them, included the raw video footage of the Rodney King beating, Danto wanted to put his foot down, and accordingly, concluded that the King

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tape's inclusion "demonstrates that Institutionalism has its limits, and that the concept of art is not quite as plastic as recent turns in the history of art have led theorists to believe," (*The Nation*, April 19, 1993).

But perhaps all that was really demonstrated was that the institutional theory needs to be somehow made more normative.

Thickening "thin" Institutionalism

In "Art, Artworlds, and Ideology" (1980), Marx Wartofsky criticizes the institutional theory for being ideologically uninformative (a version of the vacuity criticism) - *ideology* meaning "norms that present themselves as descriptions of fact."[7] What institutions in fact do is to set norms that determine what sorts of things can be given a certain kind of status: art status in the case of art institutions; market value in the case of economic institutions. Because the institutional theory lacks this normativity, it is no more than a politics of art, and it could not identify the conditions under which an object gets taken up into the artworld any more than it could give a sample list of what is and what is not an artwork. A can of Ajax not on the list today could be on the list tomorrow, depending upon the process by which it is taken up into the artworld. Then, what is that process?

What Wartofsky's criticism amounts to is an argument for collapsing the classificatory/evaluative distinction.

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An improved institutional theory would state explicitly what it is by virtue of which any given object earns its art status; that is, what normative criteria make an institution's status conferrals correct or incorrect.

To remain an institutional theory, such a theory as Wartofsky calls for would have to state the classificatory criteria or procedures that are used not only by particular artworlders x or y, but by all artworlders *qua* artworlders. As an account that characterizes in this way the "essentials" of artworld activity, idealizing it to an extent, this theory will be a normative account of art. As an account that leaves open the concept of *art* - its formal boundaries to be set in specific contexts - this theory will be a contextualist theory, related in its openness to the institutional theory.

Hegel gave us the idea that art history has progressed by moments in one grand narrative sequence. As difficult as this idea may be to comprehend (given the variety of what is called art) it makes sense of the popular view that there is but one artworld - only one legitimate network of contributors to art history. Neo-Hegelians such as George Fukuyama and Arthur Danto see the postmodern splintering of the artworld as a recent phenomenon which, for certain reasons that have metaphysical underpinnings, could not have happened at any other time in history. To generate an idea of an artworld practice, I prefer an apparatus more

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transparent than the metaphysics of the history of the embodiment of Absolute Spirit; namely, myth-making.

Though myth-making is (because of Plato's allegory of the cave) more typically conceived as a mode of approximating conceptual truth in avoidance of direct definition, myth has another, more modern association. A myth may also be a theory favoring idealization over empirical description of a phenomenon, especially when, as in the case of art, the historical evidence leaves much room for speculation as to foundations of the phenomenon. Myth-making in this second form is a familiar philosophical apparatus that has been used to lay foundations for many modern theories. Notably, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century descriptions of the "state of nature" are myths that motivate the rise of political power and explain why a particular form of social contract is ideal.[8] Nelson Goodman's account of how symbol systems (formalizing pre-systematic domains of knowledge) are constructed from "primitive" extralogical terms plus logic is a myth that explains the rich but inconsistent-seeming character of intuitive conceptual frameworks within natural languages. Richard Wollheim's description of ur-painting is a myth that motivates visual thematization, which serves to explain the rise of pictorial representation. As myths, all of the above generate frameworks for explaining the form taken by a social phenomenon - politics, common sense, and pictorial representation, respectively - but they do so without

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pretending to give a faithful empirical description of either the phenomena for which they account or the provenance of the phenomena.

The myth I will develop in the next chapters will give an idealized account of how art emerges historically. Without some pre-theoretical conception of interpretive activity or at least of what counts as art, no theory of art is possible. A certain pre-theoretical, or intuitive, understanding of interpretive activity as historically informed in nature will therefore be at the root of this myth, though some of it may wash away as the theory is refined.[9]

Also, in any theory of art, the conditions of a thing's being an artwork have to be general enough to apply across diverse instances; but at the same time, while there is a push of generality, there is also the pull of preserving the phenomenon, the phenomenon being the specialness of artworks - their delicate balance of aura and resonance.[10] To be good, a theory must work within this tension.

Interpretive activity intuitively seems, as Arthur Danto has it, to come down to a certain kind of theory-based reason-giving: justifying one's claims not only about a thing's art status, but also about claims as to its meaning (not to mention whatever functional value it may have) as an artwork. Verbal reason-giving is certainly a fixation point for our thoughts about aesthetic communication, but there is more to reason-giving than verbal pronouncements - doling

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out aesthetic predicates and telling stories about what aesthetically is happening in a given object. To see what more there is, consider what goes on in an exhibit. An exhibit is an arranger's justification for (among other things) giving the assembled objects recognition as artworks. Exhibits are (or should be) organized with an eye to convincing us non-verbally of this, as well as to convey to us the most meaningful relations between the objects. This non-verbal part of the justification is so basic, I would argue, that the best exhibits are the ones in which the manner and content of juxtaposition alone, independent of exegetical or critical text, successfully perform the justification. What goes on beyond verbal (including textual) description will be clearer with a description in chapter two.

This starting point is obviously Wittgensteinian, taking root in his insight that it is the background that does the work (in classification). A certain resonance arising from the interplay of works within a viewing context (and often of text, as well) is thought more crucial to art the further one works one's way into the twentieth century. The seventies saw the beginnings of a postmodern reversal of the tendency to keep art "in a box." But, though art no longer has to be exhibited at the Guggenheim to be accepted as art, it has not escaped the need for juxtaposition in a museum-like context of exhibition.

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A theory of art must also account for the more traditional intuition that, when good, an artwork has an aura. Explanations of aura such as singularity and ritual use point, however, toward background conditions that are not adequately illuminating. The Blarney Stone is both singular and has a ritual use, but by no means does this give it an aura (much less make it art).

Any theory of art formulated at this time, to stand a chance of success, must accommodate these intuitions about aura and resonance. It must draw its intuitions, at the very least, from around the present and, furthermore, work backwards. To do otherwise would be to beg the question of one's own normative role.

Because of the need to explain the network of intuitions about art with which I begin, the next chapter will be a historical investigation into the origins of aura and resonance as requirements we put upon art.

Stated even more plainly, my intuition is this: There is something about a group of more than one object that gives the group powers of description possessed neither by words nor by objects considered singly. I want to consider whether and how, when juxtaposed, a set of visual artworks can be sufficient to display to the viewer the features of an object relevant to making it, too, an artwork. What is it that makes a set of pictures "speak" better than a few well-chosen words?

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To perceive is to select. When you look at a painting, for example, you see through a conceptual *framework* (a *frame* from now on) set up in part by the juxtaposition in which it is set. Setting up and seeing from within a frame are the activities that characterize interpretive visual activity (hereafter called *interpretive activity*), since it does what interpretive activity is supposed to do: it foregrounds the features that are relevant to something's being, first, given a description; and second, taken as an artwork. By juxtaposing objects skillfully, the arranger makes certain of their features visible in light of features of those surrounding - she *interprets* them, in other words.[11] When any set of objects is sufficient to make visible a set of features in a given object which is, in turn, sufficient to give the object a fit with the others of the right sort - that is, of the sort that can justify its being called *art* - then it can be said that the set of objects successfully *frames* the object in question.

It is helpful to think of the frame as posing a question to which the candidate may or may not be an answer; it is a question of whether the features under consideration are jointly sufficient to fit the description the object needs in order to be an artwork. If they are, then the object is the answer to that question. If not, then some other object may be the answer. It may be that nothing answering that question has yet been made or found. (So here a new work may find its beginnings.) If, when the

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question is posed, no further features force themselves into view, but instead, all disappear (as Wittgenstein's duck disappears with the appearance of the rabbit), then the juxtaposed objects are jointly sufficient to describe the object in question as an artwork, and the object is thus an answer to the question posed, and is thus an artwork.

But suppose that a painting to be framed is not brought into the room until the framework-setting group of paintings has been absorbed. Could we have known beforehand exactly what painting would fit within that frame, such that, when the painting was finally brought in, we could instantly say either, "It fits" or "It doesn't"? No more than, by studying the faces of a family, one could predict the face of the member missing from the room. Yet I want to claim that ideally, in working back and forth between a painting and a set of paintings, we come to a point where either the painting can be seen completely in terms of the framing set or it cannot.

In the context of literary criticism, Stanley Fish has looked in the same direction for a way to stem the potential tide of relativism in his paper, "Is There a Text in This Class?"

> "It is only if there is a shared basis of agreement at once guiding interpretation and providing a mechanism for deciding between interpretations that a total and debilitating relativism can be avoided."[12]

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The mechanism in the context of visual art will be the process of framing, which will be detailed in chapter two once it has been historically motivated in chapter one.

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Chapter 1

Aura and resonance are conflicting demands we put upon visual art - the demand that the masterpiece be seen as a part of art history. The myth in the next chapter will be offered to negotiate this seemingly paradoxical modern demand. Such a strategy involves juxtaposing objects in a specific way, I will argue.

Now, a myth based upon a pre-analyzed conception of *juxtaposition* could branch off in about as many different directions as a biography about Brian; for there are quite a number of ways of juxtaposing objects with or without other devices, such as text to bring out resonance, and spotlighting to bring out aura. Modes of juxtaposition and their effectiveness for various purposes have been the prioritized topic of debate in the last few decades of museum theory.

Michael Baxandall has set the terms of the debate by suggesting that in any exhibit of artifacts, three cultural terms are involved:

> "First, there are the ideas, values, and purposes of the *culture* from which the object comes. Second, there are the ideas, values, and certainly, purposes of the *arrangers* of the exhibition. These are likely to be laden with theory and otherwise contaminated by a concept of culture that the viewer does not necessarily

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possess or share. Third, there is the *viewer himself*, with all his own cultural baggage of unsystematic ideas, values and, yet again, highly specific purposes," (italics mine).[13]

The myth in the next chapter will parse the terms in this display relation rather differently since it will be concerned with contexts of display centered on art classification, whereas Baxandall's discussion concerns the context of the display of cultural artifacts more generally. This chapter reveals the basis for the myth by demonstrating the variation and development as well as the persistence through time of juxtapositional practices associated with art of the past and present.[14]

Fortunately, one thing should not be contentious. A demonstration of the historical centrality of juxtapositional practice to the reception of objects as art - and ultimately, to all artistic activity - should begin within the institutional context of modern museums. Complications, of course, are added when one considers that museum practices, too, emerged from earlier, distinct practices, and so on, ad hominid (QED). Thus, to begin without too many complications, I begin - in a somewhat Malrauvian way - with discussion of the ways modern museum practice has influenced how visual art has come to be classified and understood.

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Two modes of modern juxtapositional display

It has been suggested by Tony Bennett that the poetics of modern museum display can be reduced to two distinct trends in organization, which began to appear shortly after the French Revolution: the *galleria progressiva* and the period room.[15] Both trends still dominate in conservative and centrist museums, such as New York's Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Museum of Modern Art.[16]

The period-room format, by far the most typical of the two, is just what its name announces it to be: a series of rooms arranged chronologically by stylistic period, though not always arranged chronologically within. Arrows and room numbers by themselves can direct the public wordlessly along a chronological way. The groupings within the rooms, however, normally need supplementation by text and labels. Various explanations for this can be given - the most plausible of which is that it takes more than gentle, non-verbal suggestion to channel the eclectic knowledge which the museum public imports and which would otherwise be the sole source of interpretation.

The *galleria progressiva* was designed to channel the viewer's course independently of all symbolic guidance other than the order the museum's geometrical design gives to the series of artworks along its walls. The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in uptown Manhattan, dominated by a helix structure, is more or less an architectural caricature of

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the *galleria progressiva*'s ideal of a linear progression. Although the building's dominant form is modified by period-room galleries (including an additional wing added nearly forty years after the original structure was built), there are only two ways - up or down - along the spiraling wall of the central rotunda. One thus depends less for guidance upon external cues than is the case in museums with a period room format. Thus, there is a kind of determinism to one's way through the Guggenheim rotunda that is germane to historicist purposes.

The *galleria progressiva* ideal can be realized in any number of forms besides the helix structure - essentially, any geometrical design that gives the public a simple rule for following a series of artifacts progressively: the straight line (vaulted tunnel), concentric squares, concentric hexagons, concentric circles, or any combination of these. As many as the possibilities are, quintessentially the *galleria progressiva* is composed of linked concentric circles, progressing outward.[17] This ideal of linear progression was first proposed not for an art museum, but for a museum of anthropology. In 1888, Henry Pitt Rivers proposed a rotunda structure to the British Association with the idea of giving spatial realization to the relationship between progress and differentiation in human history.[18] The innermost circle was to contain artifacts from the Paleolithic Age; the rest, in succession, were to contain artifacts from the Neolithic Age, Bronze Age, Iron Age,

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Medieval Period, Classical Period, and finally, on the outermost circle, the Modern Period. Though not as typical as the often labyrinthine period-room mode of display, the *galleria progressiva*, with it central rotunda, became the quintessentially modern mode for displaying artifacts (not only art).

The earliest use of the central rotunda structure in a museum, however, *can* be traced to an *art* museum: the Vatican's Museo Pio-Climentino.[19] Built in 1773 and modelled on the baths of ancient Rome (though its use comes closer to the Pantheon of Ancient Greece), it was used to display statues of the major deities. This particular use for the central rotunda came to be widely emulated.

Modern museum structures, of course, come in a richer variety than these; it is only a convenience to reduce them to two basic ones. The reduction highlights the two central purposes museums began to serve as they underwent modernization: the systematic historical relation and display of old and treasured objects and, later, the embodiment of the historicist ideals of historical totality and linear progression.

A developmental look at modern juxtapositional display

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when modernity happened to museums because the transition from private collection to didactic public museum was gradual. As early as 1584, the Medici family opened the Uffizi Gallery in

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Florence in an effort to win popular support for their dynasty. Their object, however, was more to impress the royal tastes upon the people than to educate.[20] The same held true of the curiosity chamber which Peter the Great of Russia made publically available in 1714. Among his collection's more special curiosities, he included a living "monster" named Foma (a peasant with only two digits in each hand and foot).[21]

This princely practice changed gradually. It took most of the eighteenth century for royal collectors - who, for the most part, were the only ones who could afford to collect art - to develop ways of grouping paintings and statues by national school and art-historical period. The period-room mode of organization was the first notable format to emerge from this gestation period - Pevsner refers to it as the "principle of the future."[22] First put into practice in 1755 by Lambert Krahe, the first director of the Dusseldorf Gallery, in collaboration with Christian von Mechel, the "principle of the future" is described as follows in the introduction to Mechel's catalogue:

> "The purpose...was to use this...beautiful building, so suitable because of having many separate rooms, so that the arrangement should be as far as possible a visible history of art. Such a large, public collection intended for instruction more than for fleeting pleasure, is like a rich library in which those eager

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to learn are glad to find works of all kinds and all periods."[23]

Germaine Bazin has argued, to the contrary, that no museum was *fully* public until after the French Revolution.[24] He was thinking of the Louvre, which did not open its doors to the Parisian public until 1793. Even then, however, the Louvre's curators arranged paintings by school, not chronologically within the schools, thus stopping short of fully articulating art historical progression.[25] But, as Napoleon's lootings began to swell the Louvre well beyond the magnitude of other museums, it was not long before the need to justify this practice was felt. It became politic to proclaim, as the nearby Musée des Monuments Francais did in its catalogue, a devotion to "the *progress* of the arts and education" (perhaps following the Dusseldorf example). The Musée, which also went public in 1793, arranged its artworks - mainly funerary statues - chronologically, as well; but in the back, Nikolaus Pevsner reports, it kept "an extensive garden...where works of art were used as picturesque furnishings" in an antiquarian setting, much like the garden of Cosimo de' Medici during the early to mid-Renaissance.[26] Germaine Bazin stresses otherwise, that the Musée was in fact devoted to the *systematic* chronological arrangement of artworks, meaning: "the visitor's route leading from earlier to later periods, with a view to demonstrating both the painterly conventions

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peculiar to each epoch and their historical *development*."[27] But it is not clear from anything more substantial than word of mouth that the Musée or any public art museum before the nineteenth century developed a systematic way of putting into practice the popular sermon of "educating the people" (whether that meant educating them to art history or to French nationalism).

When art museums began to venture beyond the aim of antiquarian entertainment, their reform was modelled on the experiments of other kinds of history museums, which had emerged for the display and, to some extent, justification of the newly emerging historical disciplines - archaeology, geology, biology, anthropology, and history of civilization.

The first serious step in museum systematization that invoked historical *totalities*, according to Stephen Bann, began with Alexandre du Sommerard's period room collections at the Hotel de Cluny (1832-1842).[28] Sommerard aimed at a "strategy of synecdoche," letting an antique stand for an historic milieu - a totality greater than the sum of its parts - of which the antique was, however, a part.[29] Arranging rooms in a "syntagmatic chain" of such artifacts - furnishings, hangings, stained glass, dishes, armour, utensils and jewelry - initially bordered on antique-shop *potpourri*. What Sommerard ultimately achieved, however, by the time his collection was accepted as the responsibility of the French government in 1843 and was renamed *Musée de Cluny*, was an "overall concept of a historically *authentic*

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milieu, in light of which the fragments might achieve overall integration" (italics mine).[30] Through this mode of display, Sommerard conceptualized antiques as *relics*, invested with the aura of a vanished form of life, rather than merely as *specimens*, or representatives of certain natural and cultural kinds.[31]

The way art museums responded to the same challenge to integrate fragments in totalizing systems, given the increasingly historical climate of the times, was to find ways of showing history articulated *progressively*. The geometric logic of the *galleria progressiva* satisfied this demand ideally. Already, the Vatican's Museo Pio-Climentino (1773) existed as a model, but it was only a small room of statuary. Pièrre-Adrien Paris's Musée des Beaux Arts, which he drafted in 1810 on the model of Pio-Clementino (somewhat altered geometrically), offered a grander, more revolutionary scheme. The plan consisted of sixteen radial galleries extending from a central rotunda (the starting point in the progression), from which, in turn, four short arms extended, each arm constituted by a series of square courtyards. His design was never exactly realized. However, only two years later, in 1812, Claude-Jacques Toussaint published *Traité de l'architecture*, in which he proposed a design similar to Paris's, but not strictly as an art museum.[32]

In 1814, almost as soon as Toussaint had published his (and Paris's) forerunner of the *galleria progressiva*, a

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countervailing style drew attention in a competition for a museum-cum-library, sponsored by the Ecole Nationale des Beaux-Arts. The three winning designs all had an ancient Roman (techtonic) style to which Pevsner refers as "Empire" (as opposed to "Revolution").[33]

Shortly thereafter, in 1815, this polarization of trends in monumental architectural style between Revolution and Empire came to be recapitulated in a rivalry between two German museums: Leo von Klenze's Glypothek in Munich and K.F. Schinkel's Altes Museum in Berlin. While the design of the Altes Museum looks like a rectangularized Musée des Beaux Arts (with the central rotunda), the Glypothek's design (submitted in 1815) shows more direct influence by the "Empire" designs of the 1814 French competition.

Out of the static such cross-currents created, the voice of G.W.F. Hegel became audible, but his role in the shaping and conceptualization of museum space was not strongly felt worldwide until after his death in 1831, when his students compiled a book of his lectures in aesthetics. In Germany, on the other hand, these lectures, which he delivered between 1823 and 1829 at the University of Berlin, directly influenced the plans - the internal organization if not the design itself - of the Altes Museum in Berlin.[34] There was much heated debate over whether German museums should remain private, imperial collections or go public (as in France); and furthermore, over whether the collections should be arranged typologically (as Goethe insisted) or

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chronologically. Ultimately, the public and chronological approaches won out, and both the Glypothek and the Altes Museum were opened to the public in 1830.

It is known that Hegel had been developing his aesthetics lectures in Heidelberg before 1817, but no clear (directional) link has been established between Hegel and von Klenze.[35] The Glypothek's design already evidenced a historicist sense of "history on the march," in which Egyptian sculpture formed the principle basis for Greek sculpture, and so on. Such discussion was thus "in the air" at the time, and even the Dusseldorf Gallery (1755), to which Hegel was surely exposed during his early schooling, conveyed in its catalogue ideals of display that were at once chronological, public, and didactic. It is out of such loose strands that, in all likelihood, Hegel was later able to spin his principles of art history.

Thus, though not to any great or even clear extent, Hegel's thought had some impact on the *internal* organization of German museums at the turn of the nineteenth century. It was later in the century, however, that his narrative of the progressive embodiment of Absolute Spirit impacted the most, when it was used in the revival of Paris's ideal of the *galleria progressiva*, as distinct from (unadmixed with) the period-room plan.[36] In the art historical narrative, each chapter - period, turn - is defined by a new relation of material to spirit. And so it is with the geometrical

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progression (concentric, spiralling) of the *galleria progressiva*.

It was in areas other than art that the *galleria progressiva* ideal first informed exhibition practice. With the late nineteenth century's fast-paced urbanization, urban planners began casting about for ideas for ways of managing urban development and suburban sprawl (to the extent that, politically, it *could* be managed). Pitt-Rivers by that time had adapted the *galleria progressiva* ideal to scientific purposes in a proposal for an anthropology museum (1888), and the adaptation could readily be carried over into urban design. Patrick Geddes did so in his 1904 proposal for the reconstruction of a Scottish linen-manufacturing town (Dunfermline), in which he suggested that a series of linked historical sites be built to depict the history of the town from medieval to modern times.[37] The final site in the series was to be a Stair of Spiral Evolution giving way to a Tower of Outlook - a panoptical vantage point from which to regard the past and the future of the town with Hegelian self-exemption.

Art museum design did not follow the example of these proposals until well into the twentieth century. The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum was commissioned in 1943 to be a "temple of spirit, a monument" to non-Objective painting.[38] What eventuated, as already mentioned, was a spiral, or helix structure.

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In the 1950's, as Cold War insecurity began to creep over the United States, the photographer Paul Strand invoked the *galleria progressiva* model for a new social purpose. Along with Cesare Zavattini, an Italian filmmaker, Strand planned a photography project of utterly utopian vision - to photograph the people of a traditional Italian village in the most circumspect of ways: concentric circles around the village. Strand explained, "We should not see the people as a simple, single situation, but in the complexity of living...For I think it is in the total aspect, the total form that one finds the essential character of things and people."[39] The two artists chose as their subject Zavattini's home town of Luzzara. Away from America, they thought it would be possible to reveal a "truth which sees and understands a changing world and in turn is capable of changing it."[40]

So, Strand and Zavattini photographed the coastal outskirts of the village and its inhabitants - fishermen, mainly, and their boats. And, since their business (consciously like Emily Dickinson's) was "circumference," they took photographs at progressive stages inward, toward the town's center. They photographed the woods lying between the coastal waters and the fields, commuter bicycles leaning against the trees, the implements of field work, the tanned faces of field workers, farm houses and their stoic inhabitants, village people in their manicured doorways, shops stocked to the ceiling with hats, pots, tools, and

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finally, the street life at the center of the village. Each photograph is rendered with Strand's characteristic formalism in a way that severs the subjects, be they field sickles hanging in a barn or families gathered on a doorstep, from the surrounding context. That way, within the frame, Strand could fetishize the photographic subject in his characteristic way while yet, through the juxtaposition of pictures, restoring each element to some semblance of context - in effect reconstructing Luzzara in the richness of its capacities for embracing and folding in the new.

The *Luzzara* series was originally published as a book (*Un Paese*, 1955), or what André Malraux might conceptualize as a "museum without walls" (*The Voices of Silence*, 1953).[41] When displayed in a museum *with* walls, the result is initially rather sad. No amount of care in the sequencing and integration of the accompanying text amounts to an adequate embodiment of the project, since it was photographed in concentric circles. Most art museums are built in the period-room format; or, if they are built on the model of the *galleria progressiva*, their geometric form is other than that of concentric circles. *Luzzara* is thus a striking example of an art project that may always detract from its housing or be diminished by its display, simply because its intended shape, while modern, is not a shape that *art* museums have taken.[42]

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The shape that modern museums have taken owes the most, it has been demonstrated, to intellectual currents that began swelling in late eighteenth-century Germany and France. Only then did it occur to anyone to invest the display of art with an ideal of development at once linear, totalizing, and eventually, progressive.

Without distinguishing between period room and *galleria progressiva* trends in development, André Malraux characterizes the poetics of modern museum display more generally as "the practice of pitting works of art against each other, an intellectual activity, [which] is at the opposite pole from the mood of relaxation which alone makes contemplation possible."[43]

In describing the historical development of juxtapositional display thus characterized, Malraux writes,

> "...[f]rom the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, the masterpiece was a work that existed 'in itself,' an absolute...True, this aesthetic was steadily losing ground between the Roman sixteenth and the European nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, until the Romantic movement, it was assumed that the great work of art was something unique, the product of unconditioned genius. History and antecedents counted for nothing; the test was its *success*...[T]his notion lost its cogency once men's sensibility became attuned to different types of

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art, whose affinities they glimpsed, though without being able to reconcile them with each other."[44]

Before the seventeenth century, context had been ignored, but as artworks began to resonate in new relations now thematized and made visible, the palpable result was a gradual loss of aura. Collectors during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries learned to manage the noise of this contrapuntal resonance, it could be said, by developing systematic principles of juxtaposition. And by 1913, unprecedented numbers of a more general public were prepared to accept the need for context in art appreciation when it was forcefully asserted by the organizers of New York's Armory Show. The invention of photography also contributed toward this effort, since even the champions of photography as an artform had to admit that the notion of the context-free masterpiece had lost force and currency; but, photography did not initiate the process.[45]

A developmental look at pre-modern juxtapositional display

Perhaps it is more informative to say that what museums initiated was the complete severance of the context of the display of art with the context of artistic creation, making it unclear where between them to locate the context of classification.[46] Traditionally, the three contexts had been tightly interwoven. Art had been commissioned or made for specific purposes, whether of some use or merely

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display. In late Medieval Italy, however, developments in the technologies of juxtaposition - in contexts of both display and creation - changed all of this irrevocably. In what follows, I will trace the history of juxtaposition in contexts of display and creation separately, noting their interplay.

1. Among the technologies of juxtaposition, I include changes in the shape and purpose of display space, technologies of the reproduction of artworks, and mneumonic systems developed for visual artists and collectors. Technologies of juxtaposition are any implements which help to organize the comparison of one object with another, whether for purposes of artifact production or display. The implements may be physical - walls, pages, charcoals - or conceptual - principles of organization of walls, pages, artworks, line, color.

Understood thus, the scope of a history of juxtapositional technology could include every development in the history of art, and indeed, much more than art. To prevent that eventuality and set the needed limits, I will focus on juxtapositional technology that organizes objects *systematically* - that is, display involving more attention to complex relations between objects than is usually the case with, say, home decoration or stockpiling. Such a focus does not so much fly in the face of traditional wisdom

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about what is an important development in art history as much as it deliberately focuses on an underexamined strand.

As a result of the starting point, the modern museum period is the most periodizable development. Nothing better fits the starting point, after all, than the starting point.

Now immediately, if the focus is aimed on technologies which systematize the comparison of one *object* with another - *object* as opposed to *artwork*, so as to beg the question as little as possible - Foucault's work on the classical ordering of the objects of natural science will come to mind.

Foucault claims that, from the seventeenth and eighteenth century writings of the natural scientists - among them, Jonson, Linnaeus, Buffon, and Tournefort - came the belief that each thing - animal, plant, mineral - had a representative (specimen) of its kind which in turn occupied a space in an endlessly extending grid of knowledge constituting natural history.

> "The documents of this new history are not other words, texts or records, but unencumbered spaces in which things are juxtaposed...the locus of this history is a non-temporal rectangle in which, stripped of all commentary, of all enveloping language, creatures present themselves one beside another, their surfaces visible, grouped according to their common features,

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> and thus already virtually analyzed, and bearers of nothing but their own individual names."[47]

The visible table itself - visible in herbariums, gardens, and private collections - was supposedly systematized by an invisible Platonic order which it took learning to decipher. Linnaeus speculated explicitly about the constitution of this order, claiming that the physical extension of all natural beings could be divided into exactly four units of analysis: the form of the elements, their quantity, their relative magnitude, and the manner in which they are spatially distributed in relation to each other.[48] The end of such analysis, Foucault explains, is a common ground for knowledge, so that, "confronted with the same individual entity, everyone will be able to give the same description; and inversely, given such a description everyone will be able to recognize the individual entities that correspond to it."[49]

Suppose that Linnaeus's systematic division of natural structure is counted among the technologies of juxtaposition in my survey. A problem arises, or seems to. It may be objected: without making assumptions about the ontological status of what I am tracking - that is, by focusing on modes of juxtaposition of objects rather than on objects - I may be counting more than was, in its day, taken *nominally* as art. The objection brings out a further focus of my historiography: what limits my search is *precisely* what has

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been taken nominally as art. This is not meant to identify art ontologically with what has been art nominally. But, in this chapter, to track art by some standard other than a nominal one would be to presuppose some theory or definition of art by which all things that are, in fact, art, can be identified. Since I have as yet no such definition, what I am doing instead is the reverse. Tracing *pre-theoretically* the development of what has been called *art* (*kunst*, *arte*, *poesis*, etc.) reveals trends in the contexts of the display and creation of "art" and in their relation. Such findings can be used as a *starting point* on the way to a complete theory. And so they will be in the next chapter.

In proceeding, I do not assume that art is the only thing with a technology of juxtaposition at its basis (in that case, we would have at the outset a means of identifying art non-nominally). Though this may seem to weaken my claim, I can only ask that judgement be reserved on this point until I present the myth in the next chapter. Once the juxtapositional basis of art has been excavated and reassembled as myth, then some things which were not known nominally as art in the past may be reclassified in the light of later developments. Women were not nominally known as human beings to the Greeks (Aristotle concluded in his *Nichomachean Ethics* that virtue in women is inconclusive), yet we know things now which we say that they, for their ideological blindness, did not.

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2. Technologies of juxtaposition were developed for two primary purposes between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries: classification of natural specimens and display of cultural artifacts. The division that existed can be explained in part economically: princes had the resources as well as the ambition to collect and display everything rare and valuable; whereas private collectors would typically focus their collecting more frugally on a field of research. Thus, because of the academic orientation of their collections, natural philosophers with private collections typically treated their *studi* as file cabinets, whereas princely collectors aimed at totality and organized more often according to what are referred to as "aesthetic" principles of display.[50] Yet none of the spaces or modes of display of the things that at the time were called "artworks" can be distinguished from those of other cultural artifacts or even of natural specimens.

The first *studi*, or display spaces housed in cabinets and private chambers, began to appear in Italy in the early sixteenth century (known as the High Renaissance). However, before it had become, in effect, institutionalized by the spread of such curiosity collecting, this trend, which has been alternately classified as "the Age of Curiosity" (Pomian, 1990)[51] and "the Classical Age" of classification (Foucault, 1970)[52], began earlier.

By the end of the thirteenth century, the banking firms of *Firenze* (Florence) extended all throughout Europe and

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trade routes had been established with Northern Europe and the Orient. Pope Innocent III declared that there must be five elements, because wherever Earth, Air, Fire, and Water were found in combination, one saw also Florentines.[53]

By the second half of the fourteenth century, as the Byzantine Empire was in its final throes before disintegrating in the next century, scholars became thirsty for knowledge of the pagan past and began searching long-neglected nooks of the great libraries of the Mediterranean world for ancient manuscripts.[54] Besides manuscripts, they unearthed ancient inscriptions, medals, and other relics of the ancient world, including paintings and sculptures. Not only relics from libraries, but also from churches - in fact, artifacts long settled in the troves of medieval lordships all over Europe - came loose from the dusty stockpiles and began to circulate, awakening both a demand for the exotic and an accompanying need to know the limits of this vast supply.[55] It is no accidental feature of the sixteenth-century *studi* that they were gridded with latitudes and longitudes.[56]

The gridded technology of the sixteenth century table seemed to offer the most inclusive, expandable, yet ordered space possible for display of the visible features of things, irrespective of the features for which they might originally have been prized.

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3. Interestingly, the history of *studi* begins with an exception to the rule that everyone but princely collectors specialized: a wealthy private collector from Vicenza known as Girolamo Gualdo the Elder. Beginning in the early sixteenth century, he collected encyclopedically and exhibited a fashionably humanistic vision of the cosmos.[57] The four rooms of Gualdo's collection were given over to the juxtaposition of paintings, while the fourth, the *studio* at the heart of the collection, was meant to be microcosmic. An inscription over the door read '*naturae et artis thesaurus*,' which meant that in this room, art and nature coexisted.

Across the ceiling, frescos documented the events of Genesis; below, an array of objects represented Being in its entirety: "paintings and prints, especially portraits; statuettes; glass phials; medals; 'mathematical, geometrical and astrological instruments;' weapons; natural things including petrifications, shells, the horn and claws of assorted animals, ostrich eggs, objects brought back from India by the Jesuits, the skeletons of marine animals and branches of red coral...and a library."[58]

This *studio*, however, was hardly the most striking feature of Gualdo's collection. He scattered and juxtaposed throughout the house an array of holy relics, allegedly including pieces of wood from the Holy Cross, bodily remains of saints, fragments of the sepulchres of Lazarus, Jesus, and the Virgin Mary, and so on.[59] Though strikingly unique,

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Gualdo's collection was far too exhuberantly scattered to count among the cabinets of later princes. Ordered ("aesthetic") arrangement of booty became the exclusive mark of princely *studioli* - for example, that of Francesco de' Medici.[60]

Francesco de' Medici's cabinet of curiosities, designed ofin 1572, is the first well-known princely *studiolo*. It was meant to be a personal space where all things within the prince's dominion were reappropriated in miniature, ordered, and enclosed within cabinets.[61] The Prince could then stand at the center of the room taking stock symbolically of the entire world at his command - either visually, with the objects exposed in systematic juxtaposition, or by memory of their arrangement in the closed cabinets. With the vast reordering of knowledge in the Renaissance, it no doubt reassured the Prince to know that his beliefs about the cosmic order could, by merely opening a door, be confirmed.

By pitting specimens from the natural world against artifacts from the artificial world in his display case, the Prince sparked a competition which he could symbolically referee.[62] In such contexts, we find an example not, as Malraux expresses it, of pitting artworks against one another, but of pitting artworks against natural specimens.

The reverse was true of several private collectors of the late sixteenth century, all of whom specialized in an area of professional research, especially botany, metallurgy, and pharmacy.[63] Ulisse Aldrovandi's celebrated

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collection, which he made available as a research tool for his students at the University of Bologna, lay stress on the natural world in general - animals, plants, fossils, and rocks.[64] Aldrovandi used visual art to illustrate plants and other objects missing from his collection, but he otherwise excluded cultural artifacts. Accordingly, his principles of juxtaposition differed from those of princes in being functional rather than symbolic.[65] Aldrovandi found symbolic organization useless; for what could it do but impose an artificial, abstract scheme upon natural objects?[66] For that reason, he shunned books on the art of memory (mneumonics), so popular among princely collectors.[67]

Along with a more diverse collection, altogether different principles of juxtaposition were developed by Aldrovandi's Bolognese contemporary, Antonio Giganti. In 1563, before the designs for Francesco de' Medici's *studiolo* were ever conceived, Giganti had established a richly enthnographic *studio*.[68] Though a private collector, Giganti, like Gualdo the Elder, had encyclopedic ambitions. His principles of organization were more systematic, however. He avoided juxtaposing objects deemed visually similar, but arranged them thematically, according to deeper structural similarities, in hopes of achieving an overall harmony (rather than competition) between art and nature: "the walls of the *studio* being punctuated rhythmically by *naturalia* and the micro/macrosymmetry, alternating and

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repeating regularly, acting as a unifying framework for the very different categories of material exhibited."[69]

The fate of Francesco de' Medici's *studiolo*, in its intensely private form, was short-lived. Francesco created it in the 1570's only to have it dismantled in 1584 and transferred to a space where it could be viewed publically - a space known as the Uffizi Gallery. It was the first collection ever opened to the general public. Aldrovandi gave access to his, but only to students and those with definite research interests. Francesco's aim, however, was (as mentioned) not to supply a select public with access to an organized body of knowledge, but to win popular support for the Medici dynasty. He evidently found there to be more power in displaying one's conquered territory, and thereby set a precedent which the more ambitious princes and kings were to follow.

In 1650, for example, Frederik III, King of Denmark, founded the first royal Nordic *Kunstkammer*. Frederik's efforts at organization were less than systematic, however, which perhaps explains why the Nordic cabinet of curiosities (later in development) became known alternatively as the *Kunst- und Wunderkammer*.[70] In 1719, Peter the Great opened Russia's first public museum: the St. Petersberg *Kunstkammer*, with its myriad monstrosities.[71] Not all Nordic collections were identified with *kunst* and curiosity, however. There were also private academic collections comparable to Aldrovandi's in Italy. Notably, Olaus Worm's

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private collection in Copenhagen was labelled *Museum Wormianum* when published as a folio volume after his death. Worm's museum was more functionally organized than even Aldrovandi's. His shells, for example, were labelled with their classification and stowed away together in boxes - not individuated within classes.[72]

As to the fate of art in all this, there was little specialization in its display other than what remained of the practice of religious commissioning and display in churches. During the "Age of Curiosity" that captivated Europe for the duration of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, paintings and sculptures in private collections were rarely if ever displayed apart from the monstrous and the marvellous in nature, on the one hand, and the sanctified in culture, on the other (medals, suits of armor, crucifixes). Some princes chose to divide these categories against one another. But, there were drives by others to unite the products of art and nature and of past and present by choosing the most remarkable - rare, valuable - and representative things from each category and juxtaposing them in surprising ways - "eye of newt and toe of frog, wool of bat and tongue of dog" - ways which, yet, sat together harmoniously to represent the creative powers astir in the universe.

Thrown into circulation by a vast capitalist mechanism in which the demand for artifacts seemed to exceed the supply, cultural artifacts came to be widely alienated from

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the contexts of their creation and were given a new context. It has to be recognized, however, that these new contexts of display - princely, academic, and otherwise private - could not at the time be used to shift the categories of art and science. A petrified ostrich egg could not be made into an artwork by any of the "aesthetic" principles of juxtaposition employed at the time. Three such principles can be detected (as distinct) in the literature on *Kunstkammers* and *studi*: 1) ordering according to a system of mneumonics, where everything stands for something else that has a place in a readymade system of classification; 2) juxtaposing each object according to its own symbolic value; and 3) juxtaposing each object according to superficial visual similarity. These principles are somewhat different from the ones used to classify objects of natural science (refer back to Linnaeus, page 37).

From the present, it has become meaningful - in fact, irresistable - to ask why the reordering of objects in this way did *not* have the power to shift the classificatory schemes of objects artistically; and the answer seems to be that the traditional system of patronage held its ground. During the Age of Curiosity, as long before, an artwork would be classified as such only if it fit within an accepted artistic genre and was made with accepted materials and techniques. Thus, while the contexts of creation and display began to come apart during this period, the bond

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between the contexts of creation and classification nevertheless went unchallenged.

The event that effectively ended the Age of Curiosity was Charles Le Brun's founding of the Paris Academy of Art in 1648. It reflected two trends that went hand in glove: specialization in the display of art and the public opening of such exhibits.[73] In 1677, the Academy opened its first salon to the public, ushering in what Jürgen Habermas calls a "golden age" of salons and coffee houses, which lasted until the mid-eighteenth century (Habermas puts it at 1730).[74] During this time in both Great Britain and France, Habermas writes, salons were "centers of criticism - literary at first, then also political - in which began to emerge, between aristocratic society and bourgeois intellectuals, a certain parity of the educated."[75] New principles of juxtaposition were tried - experiments masking and unmasking the contexts of creation and classification. By the time the Dusseldorf Gallery opened its doors in 1755, the world was ready to see artworks juxtaposed according to historical principles, and the reshuffling continued.

4. What Habermas refers to as a "golden age" was the beginning of a period when the classification of art could be securely identified neither with the context of creation nor with the context of display. Certainly, these new viewing contexts spawned new works, but equally, in such lights, the value of old "masterpieces" came into question.

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As already noted, however, it was not the ideal of the masterpiece that was given up. Since the world was not ready to give up on masterpieces, it found a way to bracket the old without eclipsing it: art historical periodization.

Juxtapose Habermas's view of the "golden age" of art with another, older one, where the context of display had not yet come apart from the tightly-knit contexts of creation and classification. Classification of artworks in such times followed from their production on commission from a client - typically popes and cardinals, but also wealthy heads of families.[76] Once finished, a commissioned work had a guarantee of both art status and display (unless it failed to meet the contractual agreement) in a church or in the home of the patron, thus bringing contexts of creation and display close together.

The most perfect balance of this kind ever achieved was short-lived; it came under the conditions of Medici patronage and lasted only a century (the fifteenth).[77] The palazzo of Cosimo de' Medici, uncrowned king of Florence, was a favorite intellectual breeding ground of society's learned and cultivated, and membership, writes K. Dorothea Ewart, was "an unusual honor in an age when the artist was still looked upon as a mere craftsman."[78] A student of Roberto de' Rossi, one of the leading Florentine humanists of the late fourteenth century, Cosimo had the means to acquire classical manuscripts and, between 1410 and 1430, he developed one of the richest private manuscript collections

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in all of Europe.[79] Cosimo's collecting did not neglect visual art, but in this area, he preferred to be midwife rather than collector and, to that end, he boarded several artists - notably, Donatello and Fra Filippo Lippi - admitting them even into his family circle.[80] Under such circumstances, with easy access to artworks in the Medici collection, old and new, these "artists in residence" had an ideal context in which to create: one in which the contexts of creation, classification, and display coincided with perfect transparency. Aura and resonance (one can only imagine) must have come into that rare balance, which is necessarily shifted by the buying and selling of artworks.

Lorenzo de' Medici ("Lorenzo the Magnificent") continued in this tradition after Cosimo's death (1464) until his own death in 1492, at which time the young Michelangelo Buonarroti had been under his patronage for only three years. Of Michelangelo's formative experience in the Medici circle, art historian Frederick Hartt writes,

> "[Michelangelo] was invited into the house of Lorenzo the Magnificent...and worked in a kind of free art school about which we could wish we know more. It was held in the now-vanished Medici gardens, farther up the same street, opposite the Church of San Marco. There he was able to study works of ancient art, especially marble sculpture, as well as the more precious cameos and medals and Renaissance paintings preserved in the

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palace...In his expeditions to Santa Croce and the Carmine, he drew from the frescoes of Giotto and Massacio..."[81]

Michelangelo's training came at the height - the most *innovative* time - of the traditional system of patronage. As a very different style of collecting grew more widespread over the course of the sixteenth century, practices in the context of display rapidly began alienating artworks from their contexts of creation. Francesco de' Medici became the first Medici to institute the source of alienation: the *studiolo*.

Juxtapositional technologies in contexts of creation

It should be very puzzling that the context of classification ever shifted over from its strong association with the context of creation toward the context of display when the two first parted ways (even though, to this day, it remains recalcitrant at dead center). Why, if art has always been associated with one sort of context, would it have come to be associated with a context so utterly different? What could have induced such a shift? After all, it is usually assumed, artistic creation and display have nothing in common, except that artistic display has always been the display of things created artistically. This assumption is simply a mistake.

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1. Consider walls - the background in all of this. Display of visual artworks, whether of paintings or of sculptures, has traditionally occurred along walls (and ceilings), in the juxtaposition of one work with another along the surfaces, around corners. The *creation of* art might seem to be independent of such juxtaposition; but it is *for* such contexts of display that most traditional artworks were created. Walls serve as fields for fresco painting, altarpieces, sculpture, and as the plane from which perspective thinking starts.[82] L.B. Alberti's system of projective geometry asks the painter to assume that he is looking though a window pane, projecting a world into the surface of the wall.[83]

Now, the argument that artworks were created *for* juxtaposition in display may be uncontentious enough, but arguing further that they were created *through* juxtaposition in the context of creation may seem to make an unrelated point. I will argue that the two *are* in fact related.

Certainly during the Middle Ages, the use of stock figures in wall paintings, altarpiece paintings, psalter paintings, and stained glass designs, is well-documented. In E.H. Gombrich's terms, if representational art progresses by a process of schema and correction, the reward for medieval artists (as for most traditional non-Western artists) came not in correction, but in the copying of conventional schema.[84] On the other hand, medieval art cannot be held responsible for the naturalistic aims of the

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periods preceding and following; for to do so would be to miss the advances made during an otherwise stagnant millennium, such as those in color composition (especially in stained glass). As Malraux observes,

> "The reason why the impression that Byzantine art was repetitive and static prevailed so long is, simply, that its drawing was bound up with a convention - whereas its life-force, genius and discoveries were recorded in its color."[85]

My argument, it should be noted, will not be that the context of creation has been constituted completely by juxtapositional practices, but rather that juxtapositional practices have played a significant role in artistic creation.

The "life-force, genius and discoveries" of the early Renaissance *were* bound up with drawing. And, the technologies which developed in the fourteenth century, pushing forward developments in linear perspective, were technologies of juxtaposition. New aspects of line drawing were thematized and, once thematized, systematized - aspects such as *commensurazion*, or composition (profiles and contours set in their proper places in proportion), which Alberti thematized in his treatise, *On Painting* (1438).

Alberti's treatise set down the rules for using projective geometry to draw and paint in linear perspective.

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Foreshadowing Carl von Linnaeus's approach to the natural sciences, Alberti writes, "Since painting strives to represent things seen, let us note in what way things are seen."[86] He proceeds to describe the three structural elements of painting: circumscription (outline of figures), composition (proportion in pictorial depth of the circumscribed figures), and reception of light (shading and coloration). Although painters had been making rapid advances since the late thirteenth century in the use of projective geometry to achieve pictorial depth, Alberti systematized the process, setting a new official standard for what counted as "absolute and perfect painting."[87]

Alberti's system is a "technology of juxtaposition" because it is a schematization which helped painters and sculptors not only to paint and sculpt, but also to better remember the details of other paintings and sculptures, and thus to commensurate them mentally when the works could not be physically juxtasposed (and even when they could). In the absence of public museums, where masterpieces could be physically compared, Alberti's mneumonics gave an efficient order to the expanding filing system of the Renaissance mind, so that emerging genres (and even old ones) could be learned and retained more readily.[88]

It took about a century after Alberti's treatise was published for other publications fulfilling related mneumonic needs to appear. Heinrich Vogtherr's *Heads and Feet* - the first printed patternbook - appeared in 1538.[89]

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Vogtherr's hope was to lift art in Reformation Germany to a higher level by disseminating designs to artists who could not afford the luxury of travelling to see great artworks.[90]

Likewise, Leonardo da Vinci's notebooks, which he compiled toward the end of the fifteenth century, contained anatomic drawings designed to aid in the memory of the human figure. He advised the artist to "hold in readiness a system of classifications" - to divide the human face, for example, into four sections: forehead/eyes, nose, mouth, and chin.[91]

On the training of the painter in youth, Leonardo writes,

> "The young man should first learn perspective, then the proportions of all objects. Next, copy work after the hand of a good master, to gain the habit of drawing parts of the body well; and then work from nature to confirm the lessons learned. View for a time works from the hands of various masters. Then form the habit of putting into practice and working what has been learned." [92]

This is as clear a statement as there is of the importance of juxtaposition for artistic creation. Apprentices learned compositional techniques, as in the Middle Ages, by copying patterns from their master's patternbooks, which typically contained models for standard compositions in different

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genres, drawings of heads and figures, and copies of famous works of art.[93] However, though Leonardo was to this extent traditional, the following passage from his treatise exhibits a set of beliefs more typical of the "Renaissance artist," which held the juxtaposition of art and nature (the better to imitate nature) sacred:

> "I say to the painter that nobody ought ever to imitate another's manner, because he will be called a grandson and not a son of nature, with respect to art. Since natural things exist in such great abundance, we wish and we ought to resort to nature rather than to those masters who have learned from her."[94]

Thus, shortly before Renaissance collectors began to distance display from creation, Renaissance artists were themselves bringing the context of creation increasingly into its own: once again, setting art's relation to nature above its relation to other art.

All things considered, Leonardo stresses a dynamic *mimesis*: imitation of *both* art and nature. By juxtaposing several master works, he writes,

> "...[t]he mind of a painter is stimulated to new discoveries, the composition of battles of animals and men, various compositions of landscapes and monstrous things, such as devils and similar creations, which may

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bring you honor, because the mind is stimulated to new inventions by obscure things."[95]

Beyond drawing, the most technical levels of painting were also driven by juxtapositional technologies. This is somewhat obscured by the way the visual arts were at the time classified technologically.

When artists set up shop (*bottega*) for themselves in fourteenth century Italy and their clients ceased to be exclusively ecclesiastical, it became unclear where their creative practice would fit in with other professions. Painters became members of the *arti* (guild) designated for doctors and pharmacists in 1314 because the production of paintings involved the grinding of color pigments, just as pharmacists ground their own materials into medicine. Sculptors became members of the *Arte di Pietra e Legname*, the guild of workers in stone and wood (but this never became one of the major seven guilds). These two professions came thus to be classed superficially among the Mechanical Arts, rather than among the Liberal Arts, which included grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music.

This technological classification, however, reflected less the context of artistic creation than its overlappings (or lack thereof) with other professions. The practices of both the apprentice and master painter involved, in fact, a great deal more copying than grinding of pigment for paint.

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Cennino Cennini stressed the foundational importance of drawing in his treatise on painting, *The Book of Art* (1400).[96] The study of details from drawings (to be kept next to the painting during the preliminary stages) eliminated the need to paint in full view of original artworks.

Little physical evidence of such drawings exists other than what can be found beneath the surface of paintings themselves in the modern restoration process. What we know of painting techniques, however, whether for frescos on the walls of chapels and ceilings of basilicas or for tempera panels, is that a certain process known as *spolvero* (Italian for "dust off") - and, later, as *cartooning* - involved the transfer of the designs of a drawing onto large sheets of paper and then onto the gesso surface prior to underpainting.[97] The process from start to finish involved usually the transfer of designs from various works of art onto parchment (preparatory studies) and from thence onto large sheets of paper (cartoons) pasted together and rendered compositionally down to the last detail, which were then transferred directly onto the surface to be newly painted.

Thus, in the absence of a facility where works could be brought together for direct comparison, a technology of juxtaposition such as drawing was needed for patternbooks and preparatory studies. Without it, it is safe to say, there could have been no Renaissance.

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2. So far it has been shown only that in the *Renaissance*, as well as in the Middle Ages, technologies of juxtaposition formed the basis for creative progress in visual art. Does this mark a break with the conditions of creativity in earlier times, or were technologies of juxtaposition as much a basis for earlier art?

In Plato's *Sophist* dialogue, a stranger makes what he considers to be the most basic division in the arts: The arts which are brought out of nothing into existence by an artist are the *creative* arts; the arts involving conquering by word or deed, or preventing others from conquering, are called the *acquisitive* arts.[98]

Squirrels acquire nuts, bears acquire fat, humans also acquire fat, food, and supplies and store them away in case of future shortage. But it seems humans alone were able to apply this principle more widely and acquire for the thrill of acquiring. The hording of booty in royal troves has traditionally followed victory in war. On the other hand, the acquisition of things created as *artworks* - much less their display - and less still their ordered display - is far from being a basic human practice. Collection in its modern form took many millennia to develop through mankind's reflection on its many practices, both creative and acquisitive, in various lights. Still, acquisition in some form, however related to creation, has been believed to be a basic human practice, distinct from but equally as basic as

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creation. From Plato to Alberti, up to Gombrich and beyond, philosophers of art have been agreed about this. However, theories differ widely over how the two are related.

In his treatise, *De Statua*, Alberti speculates that the very first picture was created when a caveman on a hunt mistook a splotch on a tree for his intended prey. Upon closer examination, he realized his mistake and eventually it occurred to him that the splotch could, with correction, be made even more to resemble the animal. So runs the myth about how creation of art from non-art (not quite creation *ex nihilo*) works.[99]

Against taking the Platonic distinction to extremes, I want to suggest that acquisitive and creative practices are intertwined as far back as the stage Alberti describes where art first emerges. If Alberti's myth is right, the "schema-correction process" (as Gombrich calls it) was initiated by the juxtaposition of the real animal with the splotch that it resembles. So far, no acquisition is involved. But, with the creation of more pictures, there is more to copy, more features to integrate. This is the point at which creation involves acquisition, the *ur*-moment has passed, and the imitation of art begins.[100]

As it happens, Alberti's myth is consistent with an empirical study, conducted by Max Raphael, of paleolithic cave paintings, twelve to fifteen millennia old, in the region of Altamira, Spain.[101] One painting in particular, Raphael titles "The Battle Scene at Altamira" because, he

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argues, it is distinguished by having a unified composition. Its integration, he further claims, distinguishes it as an artwork.

The painting covers an entire ceiling. Raphael's central claim is that "elements of this conception and composition can be found in earlier paintings at Les Combarelles and Font-de-Gaume [neighboring caves], and the Altamira ceiling is thus the result of a long development which combines elements that were originally separated."[102] The linkage of all elements in a way that can be read as a kind of narrative is new, in other words, but the elements are prior and developed separately in neighboring caves.[103]

> "The history of the composition of the Altamira fresco, insofar as it can be traced on the basis of the existing fragmentary material, leads us to conclude that at Les Combarelles there is a close but vague relation between the contents of the various paintings and no relation between their very different compositional forms; at Font-de-Gaume, inversely, the forms are closely related, but the contents are not. Thus the artists of Altamira combined two originally distinct trends of development. This was not a mechanical connection of heterogeneous ingredients, but the content and form have each become richer and more concrete; and in this process they were adequately

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coordinated with each other in such a way that the form itself became content, and the content form."[104]

The degree of complexity required for the compositional unity Raphael points out would have been too great, it seems, to have sprung *ex nihilo* from imagination. Instead, in order for the first artwork to emerge, fragments existing in external memory (e.g., on cave walls) had to be created first, only to be later copied and integrated. Art could have first emerged only once an adequate number of *ur*-works had been acquired.[105] In that case, Plato's distinction between creation and acquisition holds; there must have been a time when there were only *ur*-works and creation did not involve acquisition.[106]

This assumption of a dependence of art upon creation *ex nihilo* would explain why historically there has been such a strong link between art classification and the context of creation.

Juxtaposition in contemporary contexts of classification

Now, is there any good reason to believe that the reverse holds - that the context of art classification can now be consumed exclusively with acquisitive acts of collecting and juxtaposing, without any regard to the candidate-object's context of creation, or indeed, to its being a human artifact?

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Given the commercial context of much of today's visual art, there is no guarantee of an artwork's remaining in the context of display intended by its creator. Gradually, this has come to imply that the contractual specification of display conditions no longer guarantees an object's remaining an artwork, once it has been recontextualized. This tendency toward recontextualization has made the difference in any classificatory independence that contexts of display might have won from contexts of creation.[107]

But, before conceding to this widely-felt implication, two prior questions must be asked: 1) What counts as a *legitimate* context of display - that is, one which *really has* what it takes to distinguish art from non-art? If the contexts of creation and display have indeed come irreversibly apart, a second question arises: 2) Is there any reason why the context of classification should now have *only* to do with a context of display?

1. New York's Armory Show of 1913 somewhat unintentionally inaugurated discussion of the independence of the contexts of creation and display. Harold Rosenberg observes, in *The Anxious Object: Art Today and Its Audience* (1964),

> "For the public life of painting and sculpture in this country the Show is the equivalent of the storming of the Winter Palace by the Petrograd proletariat less than five years later...The organizers of the Armory

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Show were, as is often the case in genuine revolutions, innocent of radical intentions...Their purpose was merely to mount another of those large amorphous exhibitions of "independents" which since the nineteenth century have served as the mass demonstrations or picket lines by which artists suffering from a sense of neglect or exclusion call themselves to the attention of the public."[108]

As noted earlier, the same year, Marcel Duchamp began placing around his studio - his context of creation - objects which he called "readymades" (ordinary objects not made for artistic display). An inventory list of Duchamp's readymades includes an upstanding bicycle wheel, unnamed (1913); a bottle rack, called (wittily) *Bottle Rack* (1914); a snow shovel, called *In Advance of the Broken Arm* (1914); a metal dog comb, called *Comb* (1914); a dust cover for an Underwood typewriter, unnamed (1917); a hat rack, called *Hat Rack* (1917); and, finally, the urinal, called *Fountain* and signed by "R. Mutt" (1917). In order to avoid the appearance that he was *exhibiting* them, Duchamp limited the number of readymades he displayed each year, and he never sold them (though on occasion he did give them away).[109]

Was Duchamp all the time running a monumental experiment to discover the place of the context of creation in the yet sapling history of modern art? In 1916, he offered up three readymades for exhibition at the Bourgeois

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Gallery in New York, but, Calvin Tomkins notes, Duchamp "insisted that they be hung unceremoniously from a coat rack at the gallery door, where to his unfeigned delight, nobody even noticed them."[110]

Duchamp (alias Mutt) first overtly exhibited a readymade - the urinal he called *Fountain* - in 1917. Although the hanging committee refused to exhibit it as sculpture, Duchamp said of *Fountain*,

> "Whether Mr. Mutt with his own hands made the fountain or not has no importance. He chose it. He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared under a new title and point of view - he created a new thought for that object."[111]

Now, if the context of display *is* somehow doing the classificatory work, wouldn't we like to know how. Theories such as Dickie's and Danto's, which index classification to artworld decisions, are famously vague on this issue. With the aim, then, of making sense of what goes on in contemporary classification - or imagining what might go on if what goes on is to be made sense of - it is crucial, before making the myth in the next chapter, to survey the contemporary debates about what (if anything) is normatively operative in or missing from contemporary contexts of display.

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In the 1960s, after a succession of art movements, each with its own manifesto declaring the formal conditions of art (which they all maintained were to be found in the art object), some minimalist artists took up Duchamp's suggestion that the context of display does most (if not all) of the classificatory work by incorporating site-specificity into their work.[112] The condition for such art was that the manufactured object had to be placed as specified by the artist in an institutionally-authorized exhibition space. In 1968, for example, Richard Serra made his point literally with *Splashing and Prop,* where a piece of molten metal, the casting of which had involved splashing it against a wall, was propped against a wall in a gallery with a metal stick. To remove the prop was to destroy the propped-up work, Serra claimed. He thought he had exposed the material condition for artworks; namely, display in an institutionally authorized exhibition space. But *would* it in fact have destroyed the piece to remove it from its context of creation/display? Serra's piece certainly raised this question, though it did not and in all likelihood could not have foregrounded enough context to answer it. Perhaps *Splashing and Prop* **would** have remained art if recontextualized.

Douglas Crimp (1993) has argued that the museum context of display is entirely dispensable, and indeed, "dissembles" the actual social and material conditions of art's production and reception.[113] Since art generally reaches

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the museum only after screening at other levels, this much is true: that the museum, when buffered from the context of creation by layers of classificatory context, can only be a context for *reclassification*, if any. Crimp's criticism of museums seems to rest on this assumption.

As long as there are contexts of classification that precede art's display in museums, museums can only dissemble and try to impose "idealistic" (i.e., "apolitical," or alternatively, "inauthentic") relations between already-interpreted works.[114] What the *politicized* or *authentic* contexts of classification might be, Crimp takes to be the most challenging question raised in contemporary art. However, such questions, raised only of "outmoded" museums, do not challenge institutionalism, since there are admitted to be artworld institutions other than museums.[115] To uncover what the *politicized* or *authentic* contexts of classification might be, innovative artists have employed a number of different strategies.

In his public sculpture, *Tilted Arc* (1981), Serra proposed a context of at once display and classification, occurring outside of the museum's precincts - in fact, outside all acknowledged artworld precincts - thus challenging institutionalism itself. He was commissioned by the federal government - not widely acknowledged as an artworld institution - to create a sculpture to be placed in the plaza of a federal building in lower Manhattan. In 1985, the work's appropriateness for that space was

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questioned, and in 1986, after political controversy that has become legendary, it was removed. Serra claimed that this act destroyed the artwork, since it was created to be site-specific and therefore could be classified as art only in that context. Certainly, its removal did destroy the artist's conception of the artwork. Whether it destroyed the artwork in any absolute sense, however, remains in question.

Another of Serra's strategies, according to Crimp, was to create a context of display which sat uncomfortably within institutionally accepted exhibition spaces - including both gallery and museum spaces. To that end, he sliced a gallery in half using a continuous curve of steel slabs, thereby creating two non-communicating spaces. These were meant to be coded as "public" and "private" and, so understood, were meant to make the public (or, at any rate, those in the know) "excruciatingly aware of the gallery's limitations, of the stranglehold it exerts on the experience of art."[116] Yet classifying this context as art depended upon at least one institutional condition: the event taking place in a gallery.

Materialist critics such as Crimp hold that the material conditions of art should be self-evident when physically exposed. Until they are exposed, however, art history continues to move forward, since it is fueled by what remains hidden. Crimp takes this hidden condition to have been already uncovered: "The real material condition

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of modern art, masked by its pretense to universality, is that of the specialized luxury commodity."[117] However, even though true of modern art, there are two problems with this claim. First, as the foregoing historical survey has shown, art has been a luxury commodity since early fourteenth century Italy at the very least. Second, art is not the only luxury commodity there is. Whatever its hidden definitive conditions are, even if tied to acquisitional practices, must therefore be more specific than the one Crimp names.

Presumably, in any case, the modern art practices which Crimp takes to be "outmoded" ought to stand corrected by the practices of the so-called "postmodern museum." Crimp therefore takes an extended look at the formation of the original postmodern museum by James Sterling, Michael Wilford, and Associates, Neue Staatsgalerie, Stuttgart, 1977-1982.

> "The idea of art as an uninterrupted historical continuum that can be laid out in a suite of connected rooms is never for a moment interrupted. Whatever disruptions of art as thus conceived and institutionalized there have been, current, postmodern museology will not register them as such."[118]

What instead will register the many art histories that have existed in the one? Parody of the past, Crimp suggests.

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However, can such a practice distinguish between art and non-art, or must it say yes in a trivial way to all candidates, thus avoiding the "exclusions" he criticizes in the modern museum, but at the expense of classification. Crimp avoids this question and ends his book by voicing the need to reconcile the progressive and reactionary aspects of postmodernism in some way that had not at the time been accomplished. The reactionary element, he describes as "the determination to know the meaning of history;"[119] the progressive element, "the reconciliation of classicism and modernism."[120]

So conceived, the postmodern museum will be at best able to suggest alternative art histories. Though an important step beyond modernism, this does not go the full extent of explicating the relation between art histories and art candidates.

Crimp shows where he stands on this issue in discussing Christy Rupp's work of the 1970's. Rupp documented New York City's rat problems and even publicized a discarded photograph from the City Health Department's files. Crimp assesses the artistic status of Rupp's activity, which she called *Rat Patrol*, as situated at a cross-roads, given that

> "*Rat Patrol*...is one of those art practices, now fairly numerous, that makes no concessions to the institutions of exhibition, even deliberately confounds them. As a result, it cannot be understood by most people as art,

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> for only exhibition institutions can, at this historical juncture [1993], fully legitimate any practice as art."[121]

Why practices that confound display should be accepted as art, Crimp does not say.[122] Postmodern museum practice, as it stands, involves display. Is work like Rupp's, then, situated outside of even postmodern practice? Is the problem that the notion of classification, which, after all, involves making a distinction between art and non-art, is simply offensive to the conception of postmodernism, as distinct from modernism? Michel Foucault, to whom Crimp frequently refers, states what may be the problem and its alternative perhaps more explicitly in *Of Other Spaces*:

> "We are in an epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, or the dispersed... To be sure, a certain theoretical desanctification of space has occurred, but we may still not have reached the point of practical desanctification of space. And perhaps our life is still governed by a certain number of oppositions that remain inviolable, that our institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down. These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example between private and public space, between family space and social space, between cultural

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space and useful space, between the space of leisure and that of work. All these are still nurtured by the hidden presence of the sacred."[123]

Foucault takes the solution of the problem to be the re-institutionalization of what he calls *heterotopias*: spaces within which ideas from diverse places and times can mingle (as in parody of the past) such that cultural dissemination takes place and the imagination is stirred to adventure.[124] This certainly motivates the need for a reformulation of the institutional requirements on a context of display if it is also to be one of classification. But, like Crimp, Foucault stops short of specifying what mode(s) of juxtaposition would be operative in such a context.

An implication that seems to have arisen out of the foregoing historical survey is that art out of the context of other artworks does not seem possible - or, not any more. One requirement on contexts of display may therefore be that they involve the juxtaposition of artworks. If so, once again, what mode of juxtaposition does the work? The myth in the next chapter will offer some conditions.

While the concept of *myth-making* might suggest reactionary politics - formulated by Crimp as "the determination to know the meaning of history" - to those who do not wish to distinguish any more between artistic and political practices, or between political theory and

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aesthetics (do they wish to aestheticize politics also?), I can only urge the brash reader to read on.

2. Before a myth can be proposed, the second question raised above needs attention - the question of whether, if the contexts of display and creation have come apart, classification can *only* rest, at this stage in history, with the context of display.

It must be admitted that there are few twentieth century equivalents of Lorenzo the Magnificent's palazzo, where the contexts of creation, display, and classification could merge. Patronage has not disappeared completely, however. During the first (formative) half of the twentieth century, Walter and Louise Arensberg kept a continual flow of artists and intellectuals through their Manhattan apartment, which they systematically lined with paintings and sculptures by major figures in the visual arts (Picasso and Cézanne, for example). Another well-known Manhattan collector from the same period, Henry Clay Frick, collected *traditional* naturalistic works (mainly paintings) and, by giving artists access (though not room and board), became a kind of patron.

In the 1960s, given the utopian climate of the times, artists' collectives sprung up all around. As early as 1948, B.F. Skinner suggested in *Walden Two* (a political science fiction novel), the building of self-sufficient communities devoted to recreating the "golden age" when the

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arts and sciences had the full subsidy of patrons (meaning in this case the community).[125] In 1973, San Francisco's Exploratorium, a museum devoted the intersection of art and science, won NEA (National Endowment for the Arts) support and matching state and private funds for a year-long artist residency program.[126] This program has become a permanent feature of the Exploratorium. An anonymous private funder of women's art, who calls her foundation "Anonymous Was a Woman" (inspired by Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own*), has recently emerged, in the face of declining NEA funding.[127] And finally, the NEA itself has been a kind of patronage system, which has more or less guaranteed art status to whatever emerged from the accepted, protected, and funded context of creation.

Howard Becker has identified four primary types of contemporary patron: the wealthy private individual (Rockefeller, Guggenheim); the wealthy private arts organization (which typically finance the performing arts); other types of private corporation (Goldman-Sachs), and the state. Unlike the ecclesiastical patronage of earlier periods, he argues, contemporary patrons can afford to be the ideal collectors in that "they have the money, and most of them have acquired the esoteric knowledge of contemporary art necessary to be enlightened in how they spend it."[128]

So, the short answer is that, to this extent (at the very least) contexts of creation do still, as ever, count towards classification in contemporary art. However,

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patronage is not such a vital force any more that it is able to keep the context of classification from shifting to the contexts of display that have been multiplying since the early Renaissance.

Acquisitional practice in the context of display has come to *mirror* creative practice in the context of creation in its acquisition of a classificatory capacity. The two *have* come apart, just as art and *ur*-art must have been originally apart, and now we are looking at the other end of a scale of development - I suppose it, too, should be named. (Call it *im*?) At any rate, such a description of the state of art may help explain why such things as urinals and snow shovels find themselves classified this century as artworks.

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Chapter 2

The framing myth

A naive viewer would be one who has never framed, or interpretively classified, an object. In order to begin to do so, he must work from a framing set of juxtaposed objects. The framing set might consist of four sculptures by Constantin Brancusi: *Bird in Space* (BS), *Young Bird* (YB), *Magic Bird* (MB), and *Fish* (F) (see Illustrations 1, 2, 14, 15).* Considering these sculptures juxtaposed, could one begin to see a fifth object aesthetically - that is, in light of features of the others, through the juxtaposition?

To see in light of the features of the surrounding sculptures, some features must first be thematized. There are no limits, in principle, upon what feature categories can be included in frames. So, I choose five simple features: 1) materials (general type), 2) degree of abstractness, given the title of the piece (0=not at all, 5=completely), 3) scale (1=large as life, 5=five times larger than life), 4) number of basic parts, 5) distribution of mass (relatively bulky, dispersed, or in-between).

Next, I construct a matrix:

	materials	abstractness	scale	# of parts	mass
BS	bronze	3	2	3	dispersed
YB	bronze	2	1	1	bulky
MB	marble	2	1	3	in-between
F	marble	3	4	1	dispersed

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To assign the sculptures comparative values in each category, it is convenient to think in terms of overlapping. The standards for overlapping may be as simple as "matching" or as complex as "relatively similar" (given a specified measure of relative similarity). For now, the standard will be matching.[129]

Each sculpture on the list matches another in at least one of the five ways specified. For example, *Fish* and *Magic Bird* are both made of marble; *Fish* and *Bird in Space* are both about midway between abstractness and lifelikeness. What *Fish* looks like more than a fish is a giant piece of flint or an oversized arrowhead, but assuming that the title means what it says (and sometimes it does not or is meaningless), the feature category "abstractness" refers to the relation between the sculpture and the title in terms of the degree to which the sculpture embodies the title's literal meaning (since it has one). This judgement can never be absolute, though, and will have to remain answerable to comparison with others in the juxtaposition.

The process at this point becomes somewhat mechanical. For each sculpture, we add up the number of categories (out of five) in which the sculpture's feature value matches at least one of the others. The object's total number of matches is called the its *weighting*. In this case, each sculpture gets a weighting of '4,' since each has at least one match in four feature categories.

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As it happens, none of the feature categories contain more than two values matching. But suppose that more than two values did match. In, say, the "materials" category, suppose three of the sculptures were made of bronze. Would that count as one match per object, or two or three? It must be *stipulated* - not for the whole frame, but for each feature category separately - that when a feature value overlaps two or more other values, it gets the same weighting as when it overlaps with only one other; otherwise, the weighting process would become unrecognizably complex. (But again, there is no reason why the weighting could not be done differently.)

When the weightings of all objects in a set are equal, the set is *balanced;* but a set need not be balanced to form a frame. A frame consists of a specific set of objects compared along specific lines of analysis (by feature category). A balanced (or stable) frame is *destabilized* whenever a new feature category is introduced, though introducing a new category need not destabilize the frame. For example, the newly introduced feature category could be one in which all objects in the set overlap, thus boosting all of their weightings by equivalent amounts. But this is rare.

Though there are no limits in principle upon what sorts of feature categories can be included, feature categories are generally chosen to fit the frame to a candidate. If, however, a new category were for some reason to be

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introduced for its own sake, and if this were to destabilize the frame, a candidate that fits the frame would have to be made (or found) to return the balance.

For a candidate to *fit* a frame, it must meet two consecutive conditions. First, all weightings must be balanced (I will refer to this as the 'weighting condition'). This both satisfies and gives a fuller meaning to what has been called the requirement of "resonance," which has come to mean something like interplay - better still, the structured interplay between the candidate and its framing members. Second, when the candidate is juxtaposed with the framing members, all features other than the ones thematized must fade into the background, as Wittgenstein's duck fades with the appearance of the rabbit (I will refer to this as the 'gestalt test'). This also satisfies and makes more meaningful the requirement of "aura," or the successful relation within the artwork of all thematized features. Again, aura and resonance are required because of the expectation of their co-presence in art that has been so strong a theme (as demonstrated) in art history. There are other requirements on frames, as well, that are derived from art historical modes of regard that have stood the test of time. These will unfold over the course of the next several sections.

In most cases, introducing a new feature category to fit a candidate into a frame takes some negotiation with the frame. For example, suppose that Brancusi's sculpture *The*

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New Born (NB) is proposed for membership (Illustration 3). The category of "scale" does not apply, since scale is related to degree of abstractness and, when a candidate's abstractness reaches a level greater than three, comparison between the sculpture and the object represented ceases to be meaningful along the lines of scale or any other.

	materials	abstractness	scale	# of parts	mass
BS	bronze	3	2	3	dispersed
YB	bronze	2	1	1	bulky
MB	marble	2	1	3	in-between
F	marble	3	4	1	dispersed
NB	bronze	4	NA	1	bulky

The new sculpture's weighting is only three, compared with four or more for each of the others. If NB is to fit, I have to introduce a new feature category. The weightings need to be brought up to at least five (the heaviest weighting as it stands), so the problem is to select *three* more categories such that each of F, BS, and YB shares one and only one of the new feaures. Otherwise, NB will not fit without discarding a feature category or a member of the set.

A *voyeur sauvage*

If my description of the framing process rings true, it is most likely because I took as a framing set five

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sculptures that are on most people's list of artistic paradigms - paradigms of twentieth century sculpture. The choice was good by way of introducing the framing process, but it is not suitable to show that the framing procedures do most of the work in interpretively classifying objects as artworks. Since the claim here is that it is the framing - more exactly, fitting the frame - that brings into balance the artistic aura and resonance in any candidate, I will have to show that such a balance can be made to emerge from everyday sorts of objects that are juxtaposed but not publically exhibited. I will have to show (to use Arthur Danto's phrasing) the *transfiguration of the commonplace* in action.[130]

To begin, imagine juxtaposing a plain, square sheet of bone-colored vellum, a concrete cube covered with sandpaper and spraypainted red, and an ovoid skein of red silk string - a likely threesome. Suppose that the objects are compared along the simplest lines: for shape, color, and durability.

object	shape	color	durability	weighting
vellum sheet	square	bone	fragile	1
sandpaper cube	square	red	in-between	2
silk skein	ovoid	red	durable	1

The sandpaper cube is the most tightly associated, with each of its thematized features linked to at least one of the

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others (weighting=2). The silk skein and vellum square are linked to the others only once (w=1).

Now, part of whether there is any overlapping depends upon how we group feature values. Here is where evaluative interests enter into the tallying. It is up to the interpretive classifier (the *framer* from now on) not only what the feature categories are to be, but also how fine to make the qualitative distinctions (value scales) within them. Within a "luminosity" category, for example, the values assigned could be as coarse as "dark versus light" or as fine as a sliding scale from dark to light with full gradation, such that no two objects would be said to have the same luminousity if there were so much as a just-noticable difference.

Using the value scales we began with, the set is clearly imbalanced. Thus, if seen juxtaposed under ordinary circumstances using those scales (which I chose for their ordinariness), one would probably not think twice about the objects as a set. But suppose I tweak the value-range in the color category, so that the values of the silk skein and sandpaper are finer-tuned. Rather than lumping the silk and sandpaper under the label 'red,' I instead label them 'lake' and 'magenta,' respectively. These two hues happen to be just-noticably different when juxtaposed, which means that no values fall between them on the color spectrum.

Now, depending upon the overlapping standards employed, the two just-noticably-different values may or may not be

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said to overlap. If the overlapping standard requires an absolute match, they will not. If not, they will.

The same goes for the durability values. Suppose I refine the values for the sandpaper cube ('durable only insofar as it is attached to concrete') and for the silk skein ('durable only insofar as the string is wound around itself in a skein'). Thus formulated, they are different, but comparable. It is up to the framer whether or not to count their comparability as an overlap. If I do not choose to count it as an overlap, and if I require absolute match from the hues in the color category, the weightings even out, the frame becomes balanced.

object	shape	color	durability	weight
vellum sheet	square	bone	fragile	1
sandpaper cube	square	magenta	durable w/concrete	1
silk skein	ovoid	lake	durable as skein	1

Since no object has been proposed for fit, the question of whether a frame in a balance of ones can meaningfully frame an object - i.e., make the candidate's unthematized features fade into the background - does not arise. If it did become a question, it would be an empirical one.

One thing about the previous frame remains troubling: the fact that the 'color' and 'durability' categories with their value ranges as they stand have no overlaps and could therefore both be removed without consequence. A

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justification for leaving them in would be the expectation of their becoming important categories in future frames.

Now suppose that I propose a beige egg for candidacy. In constructing the egg frame, I relax the 'absolute match' requirement in the color category so that just-noticable difference counts as an overlap. Not only do lake and magenta overlap in that case, but also, beige overlaps with bone, since the two are also just-noticably different. Suppose that, accordingly, I relax the 'absolute match' requirement in the 'durability' category, so that the durability of the silk skein and sandpaper cube are taken to be the same with respect to their dependancy.

object	shape	color	durability	weight
vellum sheet	square	bone	fragile	3
sandpaper cube	square	magenta	durable w/concrete	3
silk skein	ovoid	lake	durable as skein	3
egg	ovoid	beige	fragile	3

Since the weightings have come out equal, the egg has met the first fitting condition that all weightings must be balanced. Whether it meets the second condition is an empirical matter of looking and seeing whether all unthematized features of the egg fade into the background. Let's assume that the egg meets this further condition.

When a candidate is proposed, any number of possible adjustments can be made to help it fit - but it must remain

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possible for a candidate to fail despite all adjustments. Suppose I introduce as a candidate the concrete cube that is veiled beneath the sandpaper, thus separating the candidacies of the sandpaper and the concrete.

object	shape	color	durability	weight
vellum sheet	square	bone	fragile	3
sandpaper cube	square	magenta	durable w/concrete	3
silk skein	ovoid	lake	durable as as skein	3
egg	ovoid	beige	fragile	3
concrete cube	square	neutral	durable on its own	2

To even up the weightings, I add 'texture' and set the values simply as 'rough', 'smooth', and 'in-between.' Also, I count the concrete's durability as a match with the durability of the sandpaper and silk skein.

object	shape	color	durability	texture	weight
vellum	square	bone	fragile	smooth	4
sandpaper	square	magenta	durable	rough	4
silk	ovoid	lake	durable	smooth	4
egg	ovoid	beige	fragile	smooth	4
concrete	square	neutral	durable	rough	4

Could the balance be maintained if the frame were *broken* (a feature category or an object subtracted)? To find out, look through each feature list and highlight the

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two objects that need each other for overlapping. If an object is listed, it is needed for overlapping and cannot be removed from the set without throwing the weightings out of balance. So, for example, in "object group one," three objects overlap with respect to their shape: vellum, sandpaper, and concrete.

Feature:	shape	color	durability	texture
Object	vellum	vellum	sandpaper	vellum
group 1:	sandpaper	egg	silk	silk
	concrete	concrete	concrete	egg
Object	silk	sandpaper	vellum	sandpaper
group 2:	egg	silk	egg	concrete

This is an unusual case, because each object overlaps with some other in each feature category. They thus form a thorough-going set of what I will call a *secondary inter-linkages*. A *primary inter-linkage* would be one in which there are only two members involved in the overlap, so that if either were removed, the overlap (link) would dissolve. Obviously, a primary inter-linkage is stronger, not in the sense of durability (having an alternative overlap to fall back on), but in the sense of the mutual need between two members. The following is a list of the frame's primary inter-linkages:

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feature:	shape	color	durability	texture
object	silk	silk	vellum	concrete
group:	egg	sandpaper	egg	sandpaper

Since each of the five objects is on one of the lists at least once - i.e., each is involved in a primary inter-linkage - none can be removed without destabilizing the frame. Each is necessary to each.

Suppose now that I change the frame as follows:

object	color	fragility	weighting
vellum	neutral	very	2
sandpaper	red	somewhat	2
silk	red	somewhat	2
egg	neutral	very	2

The frame is balanced, but notice how the overlapping works. It is as if there were two separate frames: a sandpaper and silk frame and a vellum and egg frame. The sandpaper and silk are entirely co-dependent in their overlapping, as are the vellum and egg. The weightings would come out the same (2) if the two groups were separated. In such cases, regrouping does not mean breaking the frame, because there never was a single frame - only two abutting frames with no primary or secondary inter-linkages.

Despite the complications I have added, the frame I have described has a simplicity to its feature categories,

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overlapping relations, and weighting standards that is commonplace bordering on soporific. And I certainly do not claim that the mode of regard constituted by this framing process has made the egg or any of the other objects special enough to be called *art*. But if you look again carefully at the way you now regard these objects, you cannot deny that you see them in a different light than before. As part of a group and framed as described, each member takes on glimmerings of an aura as well as a resonance that, alone, it did not possess. Perhaps what it takes to bring a frame to a level that makes a candidate more obviously an "artwork" is a further quantity or quality of feature categories, overlapping relations, or weighting standards.

Readymades

Found objects - Marcel Duchamp's readymades in particular - were controversial when proposed at the turn of the century, and they are still near the top of everyone's controversy list - topped only by pure conceptual art (which is not embodied) and performance art (which is not an artifact).

A good way to test the framing machinery outlined above is to find out what it takes, at minimum, for the readymades to come out "art."

Duchamp's justification for their inclusion bears repeating. He said of *Fountain*,

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"Whether Mr. Mutt with his own hands made the fountain or not has no importance. He chose it. He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared under a new title and point of view - [he] created a new thought for that object."[131]

My framing procedures describe what might underlie Duchamp's notion of "placing an object so that its useful significance disappeared under a new title and point of view." The frame, of course, describes the new point of view, and the second condition on fitting determines whether the readymade's "useful significance" - indeed, all features not thematized by the frame - disappear.

When Duchamp came to America in 1913, he encountered much debate over whether to include mechanical reproductions (photographs) in major art exhibitions - specifically, in the Armory Show. Europeans (following Charles Baudelaire's 1859 defiance of photography to enter the realm of the artistic, or imaginative) were not as open to photography as an art form as were American artists, whose political temperament at the time ran to populism. In particular, in 1903, the photographer Alfred Stieglitz founded a journal called *Camera Work*, in which, until 1917, he energetically championed the cause of photography as an imaginative art form. Gradually, he began to include photographs of paintings by a select group of Europeans who shared his mechanistic sensibility (known in Europe as the "machine

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aesthetic") and who were not afraid to explore the architectonics of nature nor to thematize the picture plane. Among this group were Paul Cézanne, Pablo Picasso, and Francis Picabia. Stieglitz also exhibited the paintings themselves in his popular Gallery 291. Duchamp's love of pushing the limits of the acceptable inclined him already in this avant-garde direction, so when he arrived in America, the Stieglitz circle must have seemed to him like family.

This is the context in which to understand the historical reception of Duchamp's readymades. Duchamp was reacting to machine-style paintings and photographs, such as Picabia's fantasy machine paintings (e.g., *A Little Solitude in the Midst of Suns*, 1915), which in turn were reactions to European Cubism and Futurism. Thus, we begin to see criss-crossings. Consider the following group, which represents a cross-section of what might have been seen at Gallery 291 in 1913 New York: a cubist drawing by Picasso, Picabia's *Star Dancer on Board a Transatlantic Steamer*, and Stieglitz's photograph, *Two Towers - New York* (Illustration 4).[132] Consider them as a frame, thematized along the following lines: wide tonal range (contrast) combined with fine gradation, closed form (as opposed to open), geometrical form, and centripetal form. Also, take the value range called for in each case simply as binary (value present or not? - yes or no?).

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	tonal	closed	geometr	centrip	weight
Stieglitz	yes	no	no	no	3
Picasso	yes	no	yes	yes	3
Picabia	yes	yes	yes	no	3

Each object has a weighting of three; thus their frame is balanced. Given the new machine aesthetic and the emerging importance of the above as some of its defining features, it is not hard to imagine how Duchamp might have hit upon the idea of readymades. Rather than reproducing nature mechanically or interpreting natural forms architectonically, he found objects that were - literally - mechanically *produced.*

Suppose Duchamp's 1913 upstanding bicycle wheel (his first readymade) is proposed as a candidate.

	tonal	closed	geometr	centrip	weight
Stieglitz	yes	no	no	no	3
Picasso	yes	no	yes	yes	4
Picabia	yes	yes	yes	no	4
Duchamp	no	yes	yes	yes	3

Including it destabilizes the frame. So, suppose I follow the usual procedure of adding a feature category - say, 'mode of production' ('prod').

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	tonal	closed	geometr	centrip	prod	wt
Stieglitz	yes	no	no	no	machine	4
Picasso	yes	no	yes	yes	drawn	4
Picabia	yes	yes	yes	no	painted	4
Duchamp	no	yes	yes	yes	machine	4

The Stieglitz photo and the Duchamp readymade have in common that they were mechanically produced. Duchamp's readymade thus balances the frame and meets the first condition for fitting (weighting). Again, we will have to assume that it meets the second condition (the *gestalt* test).

Looking back: a readymade and a beige egg both have been framed. The framing is not enough, however - the egg will not pass for art, whereas the readymade will. Two explanations for the difference come to mind: 1) the feature categories framing the readymade are more aesthetically interesting (either a formal or a Kantian difference) and 2) the readymade, but not the egg, was framed by artworks.

The first possibility is one that I will simply avoid. This contextualist theory is offered as an alternative to formalist and Kantian theories of art. I therefore think that the second explanation is the right one, and will explain the implications of it in the next section.

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Art criticism into frame

The point of the egg-frame example was to show the transformation that occurs in one's mode of regard in the right context. Before framing, the egg was potentially regarded in many other connections. Framing it brings dramatic results, even with a frame at its *bare minimum*. (Here, it could be interjected, "If the egg is now so special, why does looking at it make me feel hungry rather than disinterestedly interested?" But the reply then could be - because you are hungry?)

I am only looking for the recognition that, under normal conditions anyway, your mode of regarding the egg has undergone a transformation, however minute. I am not claiming that the transformation is enough (under the conditions sketched above) for the egg to be called *art*. Just *aesthetic*, insofar as it complies with the procedures for art classification - that is to say, insofar as it fits the frame.

There are two major ways to justify this renegotiation of a venerable, yet lately unstable, concept. One is to show that the said mode of regard has more centrally to do with classifying artworks than with classifying objects scientifically, economically, politically, practically, morally, archaeologically, anthropologically, cosmologically, gastronomically, etc. The other is to demonstrate that the said mode of regard has centrally to do with classifying artworks. The first approach is

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impossibly and unnecessarily complicated, so I have chosen the second.

I have shown how framing procedures work in a marginal case of art (the readymade). I have also shown that even at a minimum, frames are contentful enough to evoke a sense of the object that is different from when the object is considered in ordinary connections. My thesis is that framing underlies both everything that is aesthetically regarded and everything that is art, when the thing is considered apart from its context of creation. However, there needs to be further argument that framing process can be this far identified with the aesthetic mode of regard. It will have to be shown that frames account not just for art's specialness in general, but also for art's specialness in more particular cases. Are the framing procedures flexible enough to approximate what goes on when interpretive classifications are made in a wide range of cases - or are they oriented toward paradigms like the Duchamp case? To see, I will translate a range of well-regarded art criticism and art history into framing procedures. I choose art critics because their reasonings are published. What procedures or normative criteria (if any) are actually used by art dealers may remain obscure. In the case of less recent art, I will use the writings of art historians.

To see how well frames can accomodate contextual complexities, compare the Duchamp frame with a possible

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frame for Eva Hesse's *Metronomic Irregularity II* (1966), which Arthur Danto evaluates in *Beyond the Brillo Box* (Illustration 5). Danto's description of the work is as follows:[133]

> "The work is quite wide, consisting of three painted wood panels, each 48 inches square, separated by spaces of about the same dimension. The panels have been drilled at regular half-inch intervals, so they look like industrial pegboards, though "made by hand." And they are connected by coated wire drawn loosely in and out of the holes, so that it looks like a tangle."[134]

Danto refers to a prior reading by Hilton Kramer as a "crushing misreading" of the piece on the basis of what amounts to the frame Kramer had set for it. Kramer dismissed it as a second-hand translation of a Jackson Pollock drip painting into a third-dimensional medium. He was not denying it art status; he was claiming that it was second-rate art. Proceeding from the assumption that Hesse's pegboard squares supporting the tangled wire were merely the base, not part of the artwork (just as the canvas is merely the base for a Pollock drip painting), Kramer set up something like the following frame with Pollock paintings *Number 27, 1950* and *Number 29, 1950* (Illustrations 6 & 7). In his frame:

tension = formal source of tension (elements that

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resist integration)

urgency = formal source of energy and urgency

spontaneity = are the markings traces of the creative process?

	tension	urgency	spontaneity?	w
No. 27	between tangles	layerings of color	yes	3
No. 29	between tangles	layerings of color	yes	3
MIII	tangles & board	none	no	1

Construing 'overlapping' in each category as 'matching,' Hesse's sculpture does not fit the Pollock frame (which would be trivial anyway). On Kramer's reading, it is questionable whether the Hesse work could be art even if one could find a way to balance the frame, since MIII might also fail to satisfy the second condition for fitting the frame: the work might not be see-able in terms of the thematized features alone. Danto writes to that effect, "Kramer's is a failure in what I would call *interpretive seeing*, inasmuch as he was oblivious to half the work and thus interpreting a fragment as the whole." So, Danto suggests another reading of MIII.

Danto proposes that, in fact, the tension in Hesse's work does not arise between the tangles in the wiring, but between the "slack, inept wiring" and the orderly, repetitive, mechanical (metronomic) series of pegboard squares. A more sympathetic, more apt frame, Danto implies,

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would consist of Minimalist works, as well as Hesse's own - for he insists that she be seen at least partly on her own terms. He does not specify exactly what would be in that frame, or what he calls "the work's art world,"[135] though he mentions Sol LeWitt and Mel Bochner as Hesse's Minimalist mentors. Bochner, in fact, lists Hesse as one of the modern artists notable for using what he calls a 'serial methodology.'[136]

Leaving out the complex influences of Yale art school, I have translated only Danto's suggestions into a frame. Danto characterizes his criticism as a form of what Michael Baxandall calls 'inferential art criticism' - one foot in the presentist camp, the other in that of 'high iconography' (another Baxandall term). The frame might consist of Sol LeWitt's *Double Floor Structure* (DFS, 1964), Hesse's *Metronomic Irregularity I* (MII, 1966), and Hesse's *Hang Up* (HU, 1966). (Illustration 8.) These works will be considered in light of the following feature categories:

comp = number of components to the piece/number of pairs of components in tension at different levels

proc = kind of procedures used in construction

expir = expiration (perishability) of the object figured in

form = formal source of tension (elements that resist formal integration)

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In LeWitt's DFS, the piece's two components are two slabs of steel painted black. The two are differently bent. One reclines away from its partner at a 135 degree angle, with nothing on which to lean. It seems to be on the verge of either striking forward or falling flat. This reading is suggested because it is past perpendicular and because of its pairing. While its angle is oblique, its partner's stance is thoroughly square - a direct stare with eyebrows stern across the forehead. The partner's back is perpendicular to its legs and a brief strip of a head folds over at another 90 degree angle. It looks as if it is scoping "her" out shamelessly and "she" is recoiling. The absurdity and source of an almost sexual tension between the two lies in the fact that, irresolvable differences aside, they are both painted slabs, 30" x 48" x 144".

I read it this way to set the stage for what Danto sees as Hesse's tendency to allegorize on the differences between men and women. The standard flatfooted minimalist reading would, of course, be deflationary: the materials are *about* nothing other than what has literally come out of them, by formal procedures. The emphasis would be on the procedural decisions LeWitt made at the outset. Since minimalist objects are so minimal, they slide off the eye like an egg off a stick-free skillet. (Everything is somehow like an egg.) The Minimalist artist must therefore hint in the work's title at what procedures to use to penetrate it, to see its oneness and its wholeness. The title of this work

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(*Double Floor Structure*) suggests duality within a single material - a mirroring effect, perhaps. Which slab is the one in the mirror is not made clear, but it is clear that the mirroring involves an alteration preserving the same basic structure. The 135 degree recline is like the 90 degree stare plus the overhanging piece, which is about half the height of the upright, perpendicular piece and so could pass as the extra 45 (not degrees, however, but inches), which, added to 90, makes 135. No other numerical relation is apparent. The one above is the one most immediately suggested to me just by looking.

Based on the standard, flat-footed analysis, I assign LeWitt's DFS the following values (see frame on page 105):

comp (DFS) = 1/1 = one component (a single black slab, "doubled" by mirroring)/formal level of tension between the slab(s)

proc (DFS) = imitative alteration = the procedure described above

expir (DFS) = enduring, no expiration figured in

form (DFS) = angle oppositions

The second artwork that might be in Danto's frame is Robert Morris's 1965 piece, *Untitled* (Illustration 9). Like DFS, UN consists of one sculptural unit iterated, but transformed procedurally in the iteration. The sculpture in this case consists of two identical L-shaped plywood units 8'x8'x2', each painted white. There is no felt conversation between them, since they are not set up "face to face;" but

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formally, there is a tension in their obverse positioning. Usually in Minimalist works, the title hints at procedures by which the units are to be fit together. In the absence of an informative title, however, juxtaposition with DFS is enough to suggest this procedure: the iteration of one unit, its position transformed in the iteration. The further move in UN is that, once having undergone its short transformation, the piece was destroyed, which suggests that the procedures were aimed not just at transformation, but at evolution unto extinction. UN embodied this procedure to the perfect minimum.

The values assignable to UN are the following:

comp (UN) = 1/1 = one L-shaped unit iterated/tension at formal level

proc (UN) = iterative transformation

expir (UN) = object expired (destroyed)

form (UN) = obverse positioning (angle opposition)

The third framing member is a Hesse piece: *Hang Up* (HU). Hesse regarded it as her first major piece, and, according to Danto, she said it was "the first time my idea of absurdity or extreme feeling came through." Danto describes the piece as follows:

> "...consists of two components - I suppose the source of absurdity entails that there be at least two components whose concepts collide when one seeks to integrate them. One is a very large frame, bandaged

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with wrapped cloth painted gradations of gray, wound round and round as if by a somewhat inept mummifier. The other component is a long metal tube that comes out of the upper left corner and describes a large graceless loop in front of the frame, into which it disappears in the lower right corner. Neither of the components is up to much. The wrapping around the frame is lumpy, and the metal loop just seems on vacation. It looks as though it began with some serious project in mind, got only so far, and retreated to the security of the frame."[137]

Retreating to the security of the frame:

comp (HU) = 2/2 = bandaged frame, bandaging (cloth, metal tube)/formal and metaphorical levels of tension

proc (HU) = wrapping the frame and looping the metal acrobatically, from corner to corner

expir (HU) = the work was made to disintegrate

form (HU) = the frame's crisp 90 degee angles vs. the dampening effect of the painted cloth and metal loop

The final artwork in Danto's frame for MIII is another Hesse piece: *Metronomic Irregularities I* (MII), which he describes as follows:

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"...composed of two pegboard-like shapes, carefully drilled by the artist and smothered in Sculpmetal and joined together by some sort of wrapped cord she has woven in and out of the holes and across the space between the panels. The cord is so comically disordered - so slack, loose, inept, and, to use her word, 'silly' - that it looks as if the task were simply beyond whoever undertook it. The cord, in any case, is clearly not up to the mechanical expectations of the neatly drilled panels: it has done its best, and so it inspires in us a kind of compassion. But it is simply unable to realize its ambition of smart, patterned crisscrossing that the panels seem to demand. The puritanical panels are stuck with a hopeless companion in a relationship clearly not made in heaven. It is like an irregular metronome, utterly useless for the sole function metronomes are cast to discharge - namely, regularity."[138]

The values assignable to Hesse's MII are:

comp (MII) = 2/2 = the coated wire and the pegboard/ formal and metaphorical levels of tension

proc (MII) = deliberately inept weaving, reminding us that the wire is woven ineptly to set it in contrast with the neatly-drilled holes on the pegboard

expir (MII) = enduring, no expiration figured in

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form (MII) = pegboard vs. wiring = tension between the loose wiring and the pegboard's neatness

Now for the frame.[139]

HESSE FRAME:

	UN	DFS	HU	MII
comp	1/1	1/1	2/2	2/2
proc	iterative alteration	imitative alteration	loose looping	inept weaving
expir	expired	enduring	expiring	enduring
form	opposed angles	obverse angles	frame-tubing	pegboard-wire

To simplify, I might have clumped values in the same categories prior to listing; but instead, I have preserved differences to show another way overlapping might be performed other than by matching. In contrast with the Duchamp frame, there are few exact matches between any of the values in any of the feature categories. Compare the Hesse frame above with the Duchamp frame:

DUCHAMP FRAME:

	tonal	closed	geometr	centrip	prod	wt
Stieglitz	yes	no	no	no	machine	4
Picasso	yes	no	yes	yes	drawn	4
Picabia	yes	yes	yes	no	painted	4
Duchamp	no	yes	yes	yes	machine	4

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In the Duchamp frame, the 'tonality' category is binary, whereas in the Hesse frame, the 'formal elements in tension' category has no definite range of values. Moreover, assigning values in that category takes some pictorial (or art critical) competence, unlike the Duchamp category, 'production mode,' which can be applied by anyone to anything.

There are four logically possible kinds of combinations of featured categories and values: 1) The 'tonality' category, with its stipulated binary range of values, is of the *simple category/coarse value range* variety. 2) The 'metaphorical source of absurdity' category and its values is the opposite: *sophisticated/fine*. Finally, at the other extremes are 3) *simple/fine*, and 4) *sophisticated/coarse*. This variability alone, combined with the fact that no feature category is inherently unaesthetic, allows for great variety in feature analysis.

The weighting can be performed now that the objects have been analyzed and the matrix otherwise filled out. To decide what weighting each artwork receives, two standards have to be set: one for overlapping and one for weighting.

As noted earlier, the standards for overlapping can change by category. In the 'components' category, objects may be (but do not happen to be) different on one level and alike on another within the category. Numbers are easy to match up, but in this combination, they present some complications for overlapping. Since the 'components'

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category has two divisions, there should be three weightings possible for overlapping in the three possible ways: first division, second division, and both.

This decision implies that more than one overlap per artwork will be possible in this category. Suppose DFS and HU overlapped in the first division while DFS and MII overlapped in the second. If the first division were the only weighted value, then only one of DFS's overlaps for that category would be weighted. But both divisions are important; so, the overlapping rules should be made such that an object can overlap in more than one division.

In the 'procedure' category, the best basis for overlapping will be formal similarity. This judgment requires some discernment, which shows that the framing process is not all, or even mostly, mechanical bean counting. It is just a way of systematiclly organizing the way of looking evaluatively when we classify things as artworks.

The procedures for MII and HU are formally similar, since looping a metal tube from corner to corner and weaving wire through pegboard holes are similar procedures - more similar to each other, anyway, than to LeWitt's quasi-mathematical procedure of imitative alteration. Therefore, both MII and HU will be said to overlap in this category and accordingly, receive '1' each.

In the 'formal source of tension' category, matching is clearly too loose a standard, as is just-noticable

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difference. Relative similarity, then, seems the best alternative, unless there are to be no overlaps in this category (in which case, why not cancel the category?). Again, it is MII and HU that overlap. Tensions between slabs facing each other at different angles are different from tensions between wires and square bases. It is in the latter respect (source of tension) that MII and HU are similar. They therefore receive a weighting of '1' each in that category. UN and DFS receive '1' each also because differences between opposing and obverse tensions between angles are slight.

	UN	DFS	HU	MII
comp	1/1	1/1	2/2	2/2
proc	iter.trans.	imittv alter.	loose loop.	inept.weav.
expir	expired	enduring	expiring	enduring
form	angle oppos.	obvers. angle.	frame-tube	pgbrd-wire
weighting	5	5	5	5

Will Hesse's *Metronomic Irregularity II* (MIII) fit this frame? Of MIII, Danto writes,

> "...The work consists of two opposed sorts of elements, one mechanical and orderly, the other irregular and disorderly. One is classical, the other romantic; or: one is male and the other female. The work is

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organized around the tensions between them. The hopeless wire strives to unite the separated fragments of its counterpart, but they remain divided as it runs in and out of the openings in pursuit of unity and harmony and visual peace."[140]

With the addition of MIII to the frame, the allegory of war between the sexes becomes a significant category, since now three (and marginally, even four) fall into it. In order to help MIII fit the frame, I introduce as a new feature category:

meta = metaphorical source of tension

The mode of male/female opposition differs for HU, MII, and MIII; but, as Danto shows, it can readily be read in. Accordingly, the values given to each artwork in the 'meta' category are as follows:

meta (UN) = none

meta (DFS) = on the standard reading, none - but on a licentious reading (the first part of my reading of DFS), the opposition is between stereotypical female disorderliness and male orderliness

meta (HU) = the stereotypical opposition between male definiteness and female softness

meta (MII) = the stereotypical opposition between male rationality and female irrationality

meta (MIII) = the stereotypical opposition between male orderliness and female disorderliness

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This translates as follows for MIII:

	UN	DFS	HU	MII	MIII
comp	1/1	1/1	2/2	2/2	2/2
proc	iterative alteration	imititative alteration	loose looping	inept weaving	inept weaving
expir	expired	enduring	expiring	enduring	enduring
form	opposed angles	obverse angles	frame-tubing	pegboard-wiring	wood-wiring
meta	none	none	Mdefinite Fin-	Mrational Firr-	Morderly Fdis-
weighting	6	6	6	6	6

In this case, the addition of the 'meta' category worked well. But in other cases, when categories are added to even up the weightings, they will not always be ones that we really care about. Of course, they should be. The process of testing an object proposed as a candidate is therefore not so simple as it would be if the frame were ready-made. The frame has to be constructed by a strenuous push and pull process of fitting the object to the frame or (in some cases, as the one just shown) fitting the frame to the object. Before that happens, one will sometimes run out of resources and the object's candidacy will have to be rejected. Here is where the evaluative element enters into classification. Our feeling about the object's deservingness to belong to an art history must be weighed

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against the genuine importance of the feature categories it takes to frame it so that it will fit.

For all of these reasons, the common worry that external similarity is always too shallow is unfounded. The 'two dimensional' (2D) category may be simple and the binary value range coarse, but when it is combined with other lines of analysis, the resulting frame can provide a complex justification for why an object like a Duchamp readymade should be taken as art.

Now, on the other hand, in a Duchampian spirit of pushing the logical limits, one might perform the reduction:

	2D	w
Picasso	yes	1
Picabia	yes	1
Stieglitz	yes	1

This undeniably fits the criteria for being a balanced frame. Yet, looking at the Stieglitz photograph in light of just one feature category like this will not likely be enough to suppress all other features. So while frames as scant as the above cannot be ruled out in principle, they can be filtered out by classification condition two.

Juxtaposition

What has been implied all along but not stipulated is that a candidate must be physically juxtaposed with the framing members. How else could one "look and see" whether the frame fits? Memory and reproductions come to mind - and

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of course, much of the time this is what we work from when we appreciate art - but this cannot always be enough. The sociological question of whether art entrepreneurs, collectors, curators, and historians physically juxtapose artworks in practice need not be a concern here. Physical juxtaposition is *normatively* needed in order to rule out over-simplified frames, such as the one above. It also rules out cases such as the idea of a painting before it is painted; and in general, if it makes a difference to "look and see," then the better judgement, without a doubt, falls with the judgement aided by perception. I am arguing that artworks be treated, in a way, humanely; too many rash decisions are made easier from a distance.

With this check in place, art classification is made answerable to something concrete, and thus becomes more intent on being style- and genre-building and less intent on shocking open the limits of the acceptable. Note, however, that the strict juxtaposition condition need not infringe on most art appreciation or art-making - only on the classificatory process; for it is needed to satisfy the second (*gestalt*) condition on fitting a frame.

It will be objected by some that an exception surely ought to be made in the case of readymades. One would hear this kind of objection from Danto: the fact that, of two physically identical bicycle wheels, one is art and the other is not, suggests that what is identified as art transcends anything physically juxtaposable.[141] It is

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theory alone, Danto would claim, that makes one and not the other wheel an embodiment of an historically-indexed meaning and thus an artwork.

Of two points made here, only one holds. The readymade that Duchamp originally labelled *Fountain* has been destroyed since Duchamp first exhibited it in 1917. An identical replacement (1956, signed "R. Mutt" like the original) was recently exhibited at the Whitney Museum's "Da-Da" Exhibit, and it made no difference - the replacement was taken as an artwork. Whether buyers would have paid as high a price for the replacement is another question. If not, the reason is probably that it is not an original. Here is where I must concede the point to Danto that the two identical readymades are separated by a potential difference - a difference in *market value* - and this difference depends more upon what the buyer, informed or uninformed about art, is willing to pay, than upon whether one but not the other readymade is art.

On the theory I put forward, the test of whether "indiscernibles," or "twin artworks" are both art is whether they fit the same frame. For that matter, two artworks could be identical within a frame *without* being perceptual twins (so, the term "twin" is a little bit pregnant).[142]

This addresses Richard Wollheim's concern about Danto's Gallery of Indiscernibles.[143] His objection is to Danto's argument that there is an ontological difference between, for example, two perceptually identical rectangular

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canvases, both with perfectly smooth coats of red paint, when they are interpreted (respectively) as (a) someone's warm-up for a house-painting job, and (b) *Untitled*, painted by an artist who, infuriated that no one will admit (a) to be art, declares (successfully) that his work is an artwork and that his work's art-identity takes (a) up into the artworld, as well. Briefly put, Wollheim's objection is that, if this is all there is to Danto's thought-experiment (setting up a mental juxtaposition, essentially), then what's to decide whether it succeeds or fails? Why should we assume that (b) is an artwork?

All it takes to answer that question on my view is a frame and the two tests for fit. The nine red canvases could fit into one art history (but not through the same frame, as it will turn out later) under description (b) and fail to fit into another. Or, they could fit into two different art histories under two different descriptions. Framing is what makes indiscernibles discernible and discernibles indiscernible. But the test cannot be run without perceiving the nine canvases.

It should be clear by now that framing is not meant to faithfully describe any particular practice of art exhibition in history. It is an idealized account of art - a myth - combining different exhibition practices to preserve in balance the most valued aspects juxtapositional display - the balance of aura and resonance, perceptual

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primacy, and yet more to come - while remaining open about the forms art may take at the object level.

Besides the requirement of physical juxtaposition, a further consideration that would (likely) prevent a frame like the reduced Stieglitz frame from ever being constructed is a set of *evolutionary* stipulations on frames. So far, I have restricted attention to the frame itself. Now, in order to understand frames fully, I will bring the rest of the picture into focus; namely, the art histories out of which frames emerge.

Framing in art historical perspective

The exact relationship between frames and art histories is a complicated one. It would be unacceptable to demand that every juxtaposition of artworks used to frame a candidate include every artwork in an art historical sequence. But once this requirement is relaxed, what will ensure that future framing decisions will bring some kind of continuity?

The best way to approach an answer is to ask: when do histories become discontinuous? Discontinuity is created when the newest event in a historical sequence of events either (a) branches off from the sequence with at least one other event which has equal claims to legitimacy (the problem of multiple causation or choice) or (b) is not a legitimate part of the sequence (is either causally unconnected with the latest event or violates operative

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admission criteria, such as guidelines for similarity); or when (c) an event in the series is revised (removed or its order changed).

Since art history is not ordered by causal sequence as much as by choice between candidates, the causal conditions of discontinuity can be ignored. The remaining conditions can be used to generate four logically possible pictures of art history with respect to its continuity: 1) one all-inclusive history where, once admitted, artworks (events in the history) belong until the end, their sequence is based on the order in which they were classified as art, and this sequence cannot be revised in the process of classification, 2) multiple distinct histories where, once admitted, artworks belong until the end, their sequence is based on the order in which they were classified as art, and this sequence cannot be revised in the process of classification, 3) one all-inclusive history where artworks belong until the end and their sequence is ordered retrospectively by historians (not by those who classified) and, once ordered, is unrevisable, and 4) multiple distinct histories where artworks belong until the end and their sequence is ordered retrospectively by historians and, once ordered, is unrevisable. (Multiple indistinct histories is not a possible form of continuity, because how would they each be distinguished?)

Likewise, there are four possible discontinuous pictures of art history: 5) one all-inclusive history where

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the sequence is based on the order in which the artworks were classified and where classifiers may redescribe the sequence or revoke art status in light of future prospects, 6) multiple distinct histories where the sequence is based on the order in which the artworks were classified and where classifiers may redescribe the sequence or revoke art status in light of future prospects, 7) one all-inclusive history where the sequence is ordered retrospectively by historians (not by those who classified) and is subject to redescription (art status may or may not be revoked) in light of future prospects, 8) multiple distinct histories where the sequence is ordered retrospectively by historians, and is subject to redescription (art status may or may not be revoked) in light of future prospects.[144]

In deciding between versions of art history with an eye to illuminating history's role in classificatory decisions about art, the question of continuity is among the most important. It clearly takes some form of continuity (narrative, for example) to make a series of past events into a history. Several past events may be historical, even serial, without adding up to a history.

It seems clear also that whatever creates continuity between events in a history (this may differ from one *genre* of history to another and even from account to account), revision destroys. Consider the consequence of revision in one case. Historians of the Reconstruction years in America divide into historical camps: the "Revisionists," the

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"Post-revisionists," etc. In revising earlier accounts of race relations in the post-Civil War United States, the revisionists of the 1960s created discontinuity - bringing to light new facts, questioning what had been taken for fact - and thereby wrote *alternative* histories, not merely extensions of the same. Generalization about revision's effects would of course require a formulation of what counts as *significant* revision. Short of that, however, it must be admitted that *any* revision is the exception rather than the rule - rather, the exception *proving* the rule - of continuity. Versions five through eight, then, are less attractive options, since they all allow for revision of the sequence.

The first and only philosopher to seriously champion the fifth version of art history is Lucian Krukowski (1980).[145] The fifth version (like the sixth) holds that an unstable, negotiable present destabilizes the tenure of artworks of the past. Candidates are made artworks depending upon how convincingly they project their novel properties into the future, thus (to personify artworks) persuading the older generation to take on the new properties. In other words, a candidate, to be successful, must propose itself as a "link" between past and future works. This has a consequence for present(ist) interpretations: interpretation not only works in the forward direction - it is also retroactive. With each addition to the art historical class of works, we may (or

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may not, as we choose) reinterpret past artworks in light of the characteristics of new works. Krukowski elaborates,

> "The antecedent works, by accepting these characteristics into their own description (and thereby lending support to the candidate), will be rewarded by a future corroboration that these are, indeed, the consequential characteristics in a temporally extended - historical - scheme of artistic value...In this case, the *concern* of antecedent works would be with status *loss*: What confirmatory strength of accrued values would they risk losing by taking on an identity commensurate with the new characteristics? If the dislocations and the risks are too severe, the candidacy may well be rejected for another, more plausible one."[146]

Though there are checks and balances designed to keep the status of antecedent works secure, a logical outcome of Krukowski's theory is that, as the valued set of characteristics changes, so must interpretations of past works. History must be continually revised in order for it to continue. Eventually, the objects supporting the ghost-works of the art historical past will be oversaturated and lose the capacity to support all of the characteristics required for them to remain artworks. They will be haunted

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out of existence. (For a further, more extensive discussion of Krukowski's theory, see pages 166-170).

Krukowski does not detail the mechanics of this push and pull process; but giving candidates such negotiating power at the expense (albeit gradual) of antecedent works is not, I believe, the best way to approach art history. The grip of presentism will always be as strong as the pressure of the new.[147] Even so, given a way to preserve the integrity of past lines while remaining open (yet strict) about new candidates, that way should be taken.

I find that there is such a way. It begins with the requirement of continuity. The subsequent choices are not as clear. It is not clearly true, for example, that the sequence in art history is best ordered retrospectively - that is, by art historians selecting from among things classified as art by others and arranging them in order of influence. Though this is usually how we think art history is constituted, there is an alternative: constituting it in the forward direction through a sequence of classifications.

No such theory (agreeing with versions one, two, five, and six) has been proposed, much less one detailing guidelines that would distinguish a right from a wrong continuation of the art historical sequence. Most theories have been of the retrospective variety; notably, those of Hegel, Arthur Danto, and Jerrold Levinson.

"Retrospective" is not meant here either in the sense of old works reclassified in new lights or in the sense of

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new works classified in old lights. It refers, rather, to the perspective from which art history is constituted. Retrospective theories such as Danto's draw a firm distinction between the work of art classifiers and that of art historians. Classifiers may look at works only in new lights, while art historians can only select and comment retrospectively on their decisions. Wanting to keep the retrospective eye out of classification (and, relatedly, out of art-making with an eye to successful candidacy), Danto writes,

> "There are options available to artists now that were not available in the past, but there were options earlier that are not available now."[148]

By contrast, in matters of classification, Jerrold Levinson (whose theory is also retrospective about art history) treats Danto's claim as

> "...hyperbolic, as a rhetorical way of saying that works created under the aegis of *certain* past modes of artmaking will be ineffective, bewildering, difficult to take seriously, perhaps futile, because of their cultural isolation or detatchment from currently vital artistic streams."[149]

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Levinson does not see why this should pose a problem, insofar as it is far from the general practice.

But why should it not be the general practice? Given the surer footing frames put us on when approaching candidates, why should throwbacks (works clearly inspired by the past) not be candidates? Why, in other words, should retrospect be kept out of classification, so long as it involves no revision of the past sequence (which would create discontinuity)? Given that we preserve so much of the artistic past in our museums, throwbacks *ought* to be legitimated. When old works are made as accessible to artists as new ones, old works ought to be able to spawn new works - and in fact do, but their offspring are folded into art history in different ways, some of them more awkward, convoluted, and defiant of description than others.[150]

One may accept throwbacks from either of the two positions on the relation between classification and art history (i.e., art history is ordered either by classifiers or historians). Taking art history to be constituted by connected acts of classification (i.e., prospectively rather than retrospectively) does not preclude inviting past artworks to be considered in classificatory decisions. It also does not preclude works that are already part of the sequence being reclassified in new lights. This need not involve revision; for a single object may have more than one place within a sequence by being framed more than once.

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Throwbacks are, if anything, more difficult (though in principle not impossible) to accomodate when art history is taken to be constituted in retrospect. This is simply because of the gap between historical and classificatory decisions. Given the gap, leaving classificatory decisions nebulous, there can be less precision in distinguishing a throwback from a revision.

It remains to be decided from which direction (forward or backward) art history should be constituted. In the absence of theories detailing a classificatory approach, retrospection has always won by default. Prior even to a trial run, however, there is good reason to prefer a classificatory approach. Retrospective approaches, in which historians merely order the results of classificatory decisions already made, fail to make sense of the connection between history and classificatory legitimacy. (Hence, positions three and four can be ruled out.) According to the account of that connection offered in this chapter, the classificatory process of framing involves the use of an historical framework, the mechanics of which will be laid out in the next section.

Positions one and two now remain as open possibilites. Both are what will be called *linear* by virtue of the continuity with which they are formed out of the sequence of classifications. A linear art history need not mean a singular one, however. One can conceive of an art history full of digressions and mergings, with no clear progress or

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"modern" cultural present, and where, thus, the next event (artwork inducted) can branch off from any link in the multi-vectored chain of artworks. Technically, such an art history would not be one, but many, each branch linear in its own right. An art history could thus be years or centuries old, and multi-cultural, regional, or personal. I think there are no ready, entrenched intuitions that would conflict with this (second) version of art history. However, there is a stronger case to be made for the second version.

Conceived as linear, with or without allowance for throwbacks, art history is forced to find in some aspect a source of flexibility in order to accommodate genuine rethinking of the past sequence without rupture. Since revision is disallowed, two possibilities remain open: occasional overhaul and replacement of the canonical history, each *coup* rendering the last history obsolete; or, as suggested above, the continual branching off of alternative lines from any point along a given sequence, such that multiple art histories can co-exist with perfect legitimacy. The latter would not be a single art history like a single tree with many branches because, as the next section will demonstrate, the classificatory procedures used to ensure the continuity of a line apply only to a linear sequence (the branch, not the whole tree). If such a vision of multiplicity could be shown to work, it would be far preferable to the singular line that is in continual need of

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replacement. The intuition here is that classificatory standards should be strong enough to ensure that the decision to admit a candidate into art history will never have to be revoked. An unsuccessful, though legitimate decision would be marked simply by the ending of a line, not by erasure or denial. A successful decision would be marked by the continuation of the line. The most successful lines would be the longest.

In summary, of the eight possible versions of art history (sixteen if you count the issue of whether to accomodate throwbacks) the version with the most promise of preserving the integrity of past lines while remaining open (yet strict) about new candidates is the second version, which I will discuss now more mechanically than has been attempted in any other version.

The mechanics of multiple linear art histories

To find out the basis for an artwork's correct interpretation within an art history is to trace its frame.[151] As one frame leads back to another, a linear art history is recovered, beginning with the very first artworks, or to what Levinson calls the "ur-arts of a tradition." To make frames traceable backwards within a tradition, limits and stipulations must be placed on the use of artworks and feature categories to frame a candidate (in the forward direction).

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The concept of *linearity* in the context of classification as understood above carries the sense of one artwork admitted at a time in the forward direction, though such standards are rarely found empirically. Danto has written, "The artworld, whatever it may be, is not a body that acts as one"; and Dickie, in basic agreement, has written, "Specified procedures and lines of authority are nowhere codified, and the artworld carries on its business at the level of customary practice."[152] Linearity is thus clearly an idealization of the firmly entrenched modern mode of systematizing artworks progressively.

Since stretching the ideal of linearity from retrospect to prospect promises good results, I stipulate the first condition on framing (since this is a myth):

(1) *The newest artwork inducted into an art history must be a member of the next framing set.*

This condition precludes double-dipping - that is, using the same frame to induct more than one new artwork; thus, a frame cannot become a factory for the mass production of artworks.

What happens when, as often seems to be the case, multiple candidates are proposed at once, and juxtaposed not with current members, but with one other? Clearly, none of the candidates stands to gain by such an arrangement, insofar as they are being considered for membership into an already-established art history, and this requires that one be framed and admitted at a time, in some order.

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What could alternatively happen is that this candidate-set could generate its own *ur*-frame and begin inducting its own candidates. Such generating is easier later in the game of art history proliferation because of the availability of models for an art history, as well as interpreters with strong feelings about what features are valuable in an artwork. Working from such intuitions, an *ur*-frame among mature art histories is easier to see as an art history in the making. One also might simply incorporate a member of one art history into an *ur*-frame in order to jump-start the categories. The Brancusi frame and the Hesse frame are good examples of what an *ur*-frame generated from other art histories might look like.

A succession of frames in a linear art history might look as follows: Take lower-case letters of the alphabet to stand for artworks and candidates. A frame will be marked off by brackets. The candidate in each case will be the letter that follows the bracket (to the right), in the succession from left to right. The first bracketed set is the ur-frame and the second is (let's say) the set of first-artworks.

[a,b,c,d].e.[b,d,e].f.[a,d,f].g.[a,d,f,g].h.[f,g,h].i...

The framing history here procedes in a linear series of candidacies from a to i (f is framed and admitted, then g, and so on). But given that the framing sets do not reflect

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this linearity, how linear can it be? Does it preserve a feature geneology? If so, the frame for i (f,g,h), for example, would be composed of every work that framed h (a,d,f,g). Clearly, though, this is not the case or the frame for i would include [a,d,f,g,h]. Nor does the frame for h include what framed g (and so on).

Suppose it were stipulated, then: *Each frame must include the last member framed, in addition to the members that framed it.* If one were to abide by such a stipulation in the forward direction, each successive frame would have to include the entire art history.

[a,b,c,d].e.[a,b,c,d,e].f.[a,b,c,d,e,f].g...

An unacceptable consequence, as already has been noted.

A better way to preserve an artistic line - such that traces of past frames are never lost (except insofar as new features are added), and such that the firmly entrenched modern mode of viewing with an eye to historical totality is preserved - is the following stipulation:

2) *Each artwork g carries with it into a frame all of the feature categories ($i \ldots i_n$) that framed it.*

This mitigates the problems that arise when a small subset of artworks, selected from any point in an art historical sequence, is appointed to make decisions for all new members.

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A problem that will arise regardless in a linear progression is what Nelson Goodman, in *The Structure of Appearance*, calls "the difficulty of imperfect community," but which is better known as a virtue of anti-essentialist definition (a la Wittgenstein and Weitz).[153] The problem (or virtue) is that, as a vector is extended unit by unit, there is potentially a point at which the first set of units (artworks) may not bear any resemblance to the last or most recent. For illustration:

(1) abc

(2) cde

(3) efg

Set (1) overlaps set (2) with respect to quality c, and set (2) overlaps set (3) with respect to quality e, and as long as the three sets are taken in 1-2-3 order or in 3-2-1 order, they form a lineage, family, set (whatever). But, sets (1) and (3) have no qualities in common to bind them. What is "imperfect" about the "family" is that their relationship is intransitive: (1) will bond with (2) without (3), and (2) will bond with (3) without (1), but (1) will not bond with (3) without (2).

Stipulations one and two (that the newest artwork admitted must always be in the next framing set and that each artwork carries its framing features with it into a frame), when combined, ensure that the most exhaustive set of feature categories to date will be present in each successive frame of the art history. What it does not

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ensure is that a candidate will have a weighting in all categories. Thus, as an art history progresses, there is a potential for the artworks to have less and less in common, until finally - nothing other than lineage itself. Given the series of frames: [a,b].c..., the following could happen:

		FEATURES				
		i	ii	iii	iv	weight
FRAME	a	1	1	0	-	2
#1:	b	0	1	1	-	2
FRAME	a	1	1	0	0	2
#2:	b	0	1	1	0	2
	c	0	0	1	1	2

In the second frame, artworks a and c are both compared along lines i-iv, but they have nothing in common. As far as artwork c is concerned, a's feature categories are obsolete. So why should they belong in the same art history, and why should c be allowed to frame a new candidate on behalf of a in a frame such as: [b,c].d...?

The answer is that artwork a may be in any future frame, if it is chosen. For example, the frame [a,c].d... would be just as legitimate, depending upon how strongly the framers wish to admit d and how much a helps in doing this. Thus, again, as mechanical as the framing process seems, it comes down in each case to a judgement call.[154]

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Stipulation number two implies also that all members of the framing set must be artworks framed within the art history in question. This presents no problems until one thinks back to the first artworks within a tradition. How did *they* become artworks? By definition, in order to become artworks, they had to have been framed by artworks (artworks within that art history). So starts the loop: In order for something to be framed by artworks within a tradition, there must already be artworks within the tradition. This apparent circularity presented itself in 1979 to Jerrold Levinson when he first tried to define art historically.[155]

While shying away from fixing the characteristics of aesthetic regard, Levinson argues, along lines that are very plausible, that artworks are not constituted by any exhibited formal features that are ahistorically essential. (He also thinks that there are no essential, ahistorical procedures which define the mode of regard, and this is where we part ways.) He argues that artworks are constituted instead by being correctly related to past artworks through human intentions. It is not clear in Levinson's writings why he thinks that fixing the characteristics of the aesthetic mode of regard would have to be insensitive to historical context and to past modes of aesthetic regard that may appear utterly distinct from one other. His approach will be considered more fully later.

For now, I take up what Levinson refers to as the problem of the *ur*-arts - which are the objects that predate

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the first arts of an art history (treated in the previous chapter). They are not themselves artworks but, according to Levinson, regarding them in a certain way will produce the first artworks, and thus also the first correct mode of aesthetic regard. The isolated groupings of animal figures in the caves near Altamira might be examples of *ur*-art, since they are not themselves regarded as artworks, yet their features were combined to constitute an artwork ("Battle Scene at Altamira"). The mode of regarding the first artwork in relation to its *ur*-works (e.g., the repetition of *ur*-features and their manner of combination) is properly an aesthetic mode of regard.

Levinson thinks there is no mode of aesthetic regard that is *essentially* correct. He has a complicated way of explaining what, in that case, makes *ur*-arts ur-*arts*. (We will turn to that later, as well.) But no such problem arises for *this* theory, since it is explicit about what the *correct* mode of aesthetic regard which the arts and the ur-arts have in common must be; and, of course, it is *framing*. What the arts and *ur*-arts do not have in common is framing sets composed of *artworks*.

The *ur*-problem that arises for my theory, then, is different from the one that arises for Levinson. The challenge here will be to explain why it is that framing, as characterized, should be associated with *aesthetic* regard. As the egg frame made clear, objects that fit a frame are not always recognizably art (and whether it was the frame or

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the egg that came first may never be known). The reason to distinguish between the first arts and the *ur*-arts is that the first arts, while not necessarily being objects that we recognize as *central* cases of art, are art recognizably and uncontentiously. The very first frame had to begin with objects or artifacts that had never, themselves, been framed. Feature categories were not likely to have been sophisticated and value gradations were not likely to have been fine. So although the framing process in the beginning is the same as the one that has produced the greatest artworks, its first products will not look like the central cases we see all too clearly from hindsight. That is the rationale for assigning them a different name (the *ur*-arts). A candidate framed by *ur*-works is the first artwork at whatever point we are willing, from hindsight, to recognize it as art. Thus, the distinction is only an epistemological convenience, and does not belie any metaphysical differences between first-arts and *ur*-arts. Tracing frames back through history, the first artwork is merely the first framed entity that is recognizably art (so, for Raphael, it would be "The Battle at Altamira"), but which has nothing that is recognizably art in its frame.

For example, take the egg frame as an *ur*-frame and the egg as *ur*-art. What would it take to make Brancusi's *New Born* emerge as the first artwork? The subsequent frame might include the egg, the silk skein, the vellum, and (by the second stipulation on frames) all of the feature

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categories that were used to frame them: shape, color, durability, and texture. Adding Brancusi's *New Born* to the list would involve adding some feature categories, such as materials and bulkiness.

feature	egg	skein	vellum	New Born
shape	ovoid	ovoid	square	ovoid
color	beige	lake	bone	bronze
durability	fragile	durable	fragile	durable
texture	smooth	smooth	smooth	smooth
materials	egg	silk	tree	bronze
assoc. use	food	fabric	display	display
symbol for	creation	creation	aging (skin)	creation
abstractness	4	4	4	4
scale	1	2	1	2
weighting	7	7	7	7

If it is still difficult to see *New Born* as an artwork, the above can be taken to be an *ur*-frame and a full frame can be constructed.

Suppose I propose Brancusi's *Young Bird* as a candidate. (Notice how, as the objects in the frame change, feature categories can be added, but not subtracted, in accordance with the second stipulation on framing):

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feature	egg	vellum	NB	YB
shape	ovoid	square	ovoid	ovoid
color	beige	bone	bronze	bronze
durability	fragile	fragile	durable	durable
texture	smooth	smooth	smooth	smooth
materials	egg	tree	bronze	bronze
assoc. use	food	display	display	display
symbol for	creation	aging (skin)	creation	aging
abstractness	4	4	4	3
scale	1	1	2	3
# of parts	1	1	2	1
weighting	8	8	8	8

My strategy for arguing that framing is the *correct* mode of aesthetic regard has been to show in a wide variety of cases that framing is an apt idealization of what is done when art is interpretively classified. If the process were identifiable with any other (known) mode of classification - scientific, for example - it would be apparent.

Framing in the analysis of *genre* and style

As it stands, my argument is inconclusive because I have not shown that framing makes sense of the very most central cases of traditional naturalistic art. I will therefore put my theory to a further test on Piero Della Francesca's *Baptism of Christ* (1440-1450). The frame, I

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base on the "inferential art criticism" Michael Baxandall plies on the painting in his *Patterns of Intention* (Illustration 10).[156]

Baxandall's focus in his book, as the book's title suggests, is the conditions on tracing the artist's possible intentions (what Jerry Fodor might call virtual, as opposed to actual, etiology), which is to assume that the works he is discussing are artworks.[157] His account is not an attempt to prove that Piero's *Baptism* is art (this is reasonably taken for granted). Yet his approach to describing Piero's intentions involves showing how Piero made *Baptism* to "fit" expectations derived from earlier works in the *Baptism of Christ* genre - very much like the framing process I have described, except (perhaps) that Piero's paintings were "framed" in their very construction.

But it is exactly because *Baptism* was in an important sense made to order (typical of paintings of the time period) that it unfolds to the framing process so perfectly. Here, the framing process originates in the painter's mind (in response to commission requirements, or what Baxandall calls the painter's "brief" in response to his "charge"), whereas during the modern period the spectatorial revolution has put that power into the hands of the critic, the curator, the art historian, and, very recently, the lay public - and the artist only insofar as (s)he acts as curator, critic, or art historian.[158]

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In framing modernist works, for the sake of forestalling complexity, I did not let the concepts of *genre* and *style* - the principle categories of art identified by, among others, Heinrich Wolfflin in *Principles of Art History* (1929) and by Kendall Walton in "Categories of Art" (1970) - enter into the analysis. Now that I do, what I mean by *genre* is an art history (in its own right) that is shaped by standards of compliance so that it is readily identifiable by anyone who would participate in or use it. Personal styles, school and period styles, and reactive styles (i.e., non-traditional, reactively-formed and therefore difficult to formulate styles such as Baroque, Gothic, mannerist, *film noire*) make up art histories that tend to be less continuous than genres. Conceived of as linear, art histories are nothing more than groupings of artworks according to genre or style. Genres and styles may overlap in having objects in common; but always, they have distinct framing histories. As I get more into particulars, I will show how this is so.

To schematize the *Baptism of Christ* genre as it stood prior to 1450, it is helpful to use L.B. Alberti's division of the labor of painting, which he published in 1435 in his instruction manual, *On Painting*, and of which Piero was surely aware.[159] Such a schema could be used to order the categories in the framing set for Piero's *Baptism*. It might look as follows:

(1) Decisions as to *circumscription,* or outline of figures with attention to balancing the picture plane's two-

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dimensional surface (*l'attonaire del orlo*), were informed by a tradition extending back to the beginnings of all painting understood as circumscribed within pictorial limits. Such decisions can be made only after the format and dimensions of the painting are known. In Piero's case, he had to do an altarpiece of fixed dimensions. (2) The compositional techniques involved deciding the proportion of figures necessary to represent them relative to one another in pictorial space.[160] Piero's composition was informed by a tradition of mathematically-informed linear perspective - insofar as projective geometry was an advance over the Greeks' mastery of perspectival modelling and foreshortening - the practice of which extended (arguably) back to Giotto in the 13th Century. (3) The reception of light, or the modulation of color so as to model figures as if they were spatially extended, was informed by a tradition that dated back to the Greeks of the 6th Century B.C.

Besides fulfilling expectations for the medium of illusionistic painting, the other key component of Piero's charge was concerned with *genre* - the iconography specific to the *istora*, or story, he was depicting: the Baptism of Jesus. The Biblical narrative could then be shot through with iconographical references to Piero's political world: narrative parallels and simply records of influence.

Stylistic features (Piero's *brief*) are not to be forgotten: the way of doing all of the above that is specific to Piero - Piero's idiom.

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The above help to schematize the feature categories by which paintings in the Baptism genre have been compared. The frame Baxandall implies consists of five paintings from the Baptism genre - all entitled *Baptism of Christ*: Giotto's (1303-13), Giusto de'Menabuoi's (1375), Niccolo di Pietro Gerini's (1387), Masolino's (1435), and Giovanni di Paolo's (mid-fifteenth century). Baxandall juxtaposes reproductions of these five on two facing pages in his glossary (plates 47-51). (See Illustration 11.)

The feature categories I will list are the ones used in Baxandall's pictorial explanations which, he argues, pay the most attention to historical legitimacy, pictorial order, and the critical (problem solving) necessity of the various elements.[161] Since there are no major differences among paintings in this genre in terms of their circumspection or 'reception of light' techniques, these categories will be omitted. The feature categories, then, will be the following:[162]

(1) Composition:

a) Proportions/format

b) Prioritization by foregrounding of:

i) angels

ii) onlookers

Feature category values: foreground/background; diminutive/ obtrusive/same-size relative to Jesus.

c) Prioritization by centrality and division:

i) dove

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ii) sacramental bowl and water

iii) angels

iv) onlookers

v) God (sending dove)

Feature category values: right/left/central; separated from Jesus by circumscription within boundaries of mountain, shoreline, or tree; separated by being placed in a different picture plane.

(2) Narrative significance of features:

a) Departures from the Biblical story of Jesus's Baptism -

Expected features besides Jesus and John the Baptist: God, dove, bowl, bystanders. (Note: the weighting for this category is based on the presence or absence of the four stock features. For each feature absent, one weight out of a possible four is deducted.)

b) Treatment of the water -

Differentiated weightings of feature category values: transparent=2, reflective=1, opaque=0.

c) Onlookers' clothing

d) Number of onlookers

e) Treatment of the landscape

f) Angels' narrative function: holding Jesus' outer garment.

(3) Expressive and stylistic features:

a) Angels' performative function -

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Feature category values: venerating Jesus simply by looking at him, bodies pointing toward him; more complex veneration, with longer chain linking viewer to Jesus (one angel, gazing at viewer, holds hands with another angel, who watches the Baptism).

b) Jesus's facial expression and body language -

Feature category values: downcast eyes; eyes looking out at the viewer; gesture of humility - one hand blessing, one hand inviting the Baptism; hands in prayer symbolizing the Trinity.

Because there are so many feature categories and comparatively few artworks in the frame, I have reversed the axes, so that the artworks appear on the horizontal axis and the feature categories appear on the vertical axis (under the abbreviation 'FC'). The symbol '*' signals that the feature, though present, is cast in the artist's own idiom. This will be true many times of Piero - one reason why Baxandall problematizes the reading of Piero's *Baptism* as a straightforward exercise in comparative feature analysis.

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Frame for the Baptism of Christ genre prior to Piero Della Francesca (1450):

FC	w	Giotto	Menabuoi	Gerini	Masolino	Paolo	Piero
1a	1	wide/fresco	wide/fresco	altarpiece	wide/fresco	wide/panel	altarpiec
1bi	2	fgr, same	absent	fgr, dimin.	fgr, dimin.	fgr, obtr.	fgr, same
1bii	2	fgr, same	fgr, kneeling	absent	fgr, same	absent	bkg, same
1ci	2	central	central	central	central	central	central
1cii	2	absent	central	central	central	central	central
1ciii	2	left, mount.	absent	left, shore	left, shore	lft, shore	lft,tree*
1civ	2	rt, mount.	both*, mount.	absent	rt, shore	absent	rt, plane
1cv	2	central	central	central	absent	central	absent
2a	4	no bowl	all present	no onlookers	no God	no onlookrs	no God
2b	2	reflective	transparent	transparent	opaque	transparent	transpar.
2c	1	2	4	0	4	0	5
2d	1	kingly	kingly	absent	plain	absent	kingly*
2e	1	non-descript	non-descript	non-descript	detailed	non-descrpt	detailed*
2f	1	holding robe	holding robe*	holding robe	holding robe	absent	absent
3a	2	simple	simple*	simple	simple	simp.&comp.	smp & cmp
3b	2	out, humil.	out, humil.	out, humil.	down, humil.	out, humil.	down, tri
Weightings w/o Piero:		21	21	21	21	21	X
Weightings w/ Piero:		22	21	22	22	22	22
Add:							
2g	1	standard	absent	standard	standard	standard	varied
3c	1	absent	absent	absent	absent	present	present
Weightings w/ Piero:		24	X	24	24	24	24

FC=feature category (refers to those previously outlined by number)
w= number of weightings possible
*=signifies that something about the feature is in the artist's own idiom

The five paintings come out equal (=21) when the overlapping and weighting rules are tailored to Baxandall's sense of a feature's importance to the genre. For example, to help decide this, Baxandall appeals to the Tyndale translation of Matthew's Biblical account of the Baptism. He thinks it safe to assume that painters would have referred to the Bible in deciding what should be included and what was incidental to the story - a good example of what he calls "inferential art criticism." It is not safe to assume that painters always looked at all other paintings in a genre before making their own attempt. The question of whether a work did or did not succeed in becoming art was largely a question of whether it met certain minimum requirements, such as mastery of Alberti's three elements of painting in linear perspective (outline, composition, shading), as well as knowing what stock features had to be included in the narrative in question. Expressive style on top of that would add to the value of the painting, but not to its artistic status. Not all of the paintings in the above frame are of equal merit; however, insofar as they have all (presumably) met certain minimum requirements for the Baptism genre (some version of the ones listed), they all qualify as artworks.

When framing Piero's version of the Baptism, it is important to separate the stock features from Piero's idiomatic treatment of them. For example, four kings are usually represented in royal attire - Piero's, too, but he

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has Byzantized them. Their presence in Piero's *Baptism* entitles them to as many weights as the other paintings have in that category; but their innovation should also be somehow noted, because it is not a feature that will fade into the background.

Another example: Piero's expressive angels, insinuating something that is not readily clear. Their subtle looks and linkages, as it turns out, convey in a more complex way (more complex than having them all merely look at Jesus) what angels had always conveyed in pictures of the Baptism: reverence for Jesus. When adding up Piero's weights in the category of the angels' body language, they should be the same as those of Paolo, whose angels also engage us with their body language. However, Piero's angels are still a cut above Paolo's, and any adequate frame will somehow take this into account.

When the overall weightings are tallied, Piero's Baptism creates new overlappings such that, without adding any new feature categories, all weightings come out equal (=22), with the exception of Menabuoi's *Baptism*. Since this prevents Piero's work from fitting, removing Menabuoui from the frame (not from art history) would solve the problem. But that, it seems, would be a bit of ontological book-cooking.

It would have been advisable to leave Menabuoi's painting out of the frame in the first place, but since my purpose was to show that Baxandall's "inferential art

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criticism" can be translated into framing procedures, I left it in, abstaining from what Baxandall himself calls working "with the benefit of hindsight."[163] Here again, the empirical and the normative diverge - in this case, only slightly. Baxandall himself does not make any mention of Menabuoi's painting in his reconstruction of Piero's intentions - other than a reference to a set of which it is a member, within the tradition of the Baptism of Christ: "(Plates 47-51)." He makes reference to all of the plates in his discussion, except for 49 (Menabuoi) and 50 (Gerini). Framing a candidate involves a push and pull process that Baxandall does not exhibit with these works. It is therefore open to question whether Baxandall made much more use of them (in framing Piero's work) than he made of an anonymous but spectacular Baptism painting by a Byzantine artist dated at around 1200.[164]

To continue framing Piero's Baptism will therefore involve diverging from Baxandall's account only where the Menabuoi painting is concerned. With the benefit of hindsight, knowing that Menabuoi's painting will not allow Piero's Baptism to fit under the present categories and weightings, I reconstruct the frame so that it is the same, but without Menabuoi.

Even with this adjustment, such that Piero meets condition one for fitting a frame (weighting), there is much unthematized in Piero's picture that grabs attention, which presents a problem for its meeting fitting condition two

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(the fading of features unthematized). After going through three separate readings of Piero's *Baptism* ("high", "low," and "plain" iconography), Baxandall, dissatisfied, writes,

> "Is there, then, no puzzle in the Angels needing explanation? It seems to me that we have here reached a point where individual response must take over; certainly your feeling about this has quite the same status as mine. My feeling is that there still is something to explain...[namely,] a departure from Piero's normal idiom in three particulars..." (p. 130).

This kind of "look and see" test is gratifyingly close to what I have meant by the second condition on fitting a frame. It is here that Piero's piece fails to fit the frame; for too much that is captivating has been left out of the description. If unity of vision is not achieved - if unframed features continue to grab attention - the frame must be altered, a new one formed, or the object rejected as a candidate. In this case, the frame merely needs to be altered in the usual way: by complexifying the feature categories.

Frames can be expanded in this way only with the consent of all in the frame (continuity condition). The trick is to determine whether all of the unaccounted-for features we care about can be fitted into the frame such that the weightings continue to come out equal. Thus, a

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tension often arises between "fit" conditions one and two: satisfy one and you fail on the other account, and vice-versa. Not in this case, however. The features Baxandall primarily cares about are Piero's translations of other artists' representations of angels - in particular, the hyperactive angels of Donatello's *Cantoria* - into his own stylistic idiom. These can be added on as feature categories '2g' (the symbolic diversity of the angels' costumes) and '3c' (the humanization of the angels' personalities). By adding them to the list, however, the frame loses its balance - Piero's painting actually comes out behind the others (=23).

Another outstanding feature, meanwhile, resists thematization within the Baptism genre: Piero's "local color" - his details. In a number of places, Piero punctures the stock Biblical narrative, filling it with references to Sansepolcral life and local politics where his predecessors in the genre had been sketchy or blank.[165] His landscape, with the two walnut trees, is typically Sansepolcran, as is his costuming of the four kings. These details have nothing to do with the Baptism genre. They also have little to do with Piero's style. Possibly, they had to do with the painting's commissioners.

The problem, restated, is that, because of these features, which have nothing to do with the Baptism genre, Piero's *Baptism* continues to resist the frame. There would be no justification for expanding the feature categories of

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a *genre* to accomodate local politics. But should Piero's painting be rejected as art because it fails to fit on that account? Surely not.

Some paintings are genre-benders. Not Piero's to any great extent, if at all; but perhaps it cannot be framed by one frame only. One possible solution that stops short of multiple framing would be to redefine the value range of the feature categories where the local color flares up so that the detail is taken to mean something more general. Such a move has already been made in feature categories (2d) and (2e). The fact that Piero's four kings are draped differently from the kings in the other paintings can, without consequence to the artistic *status* of Piero's Baptism, be ignored - just so long as the garb is regal, it functions within the genre. Piero's painting therefore gains only one weight (all that is possible) in category (2d). Secondly, the fact that the landscape is more characteristic of Sansepolcro than of Jerusalem can be overlooked if the value range of feature category (2e) is taken as binary: detailed versus non-descript. Finally, in category (1ciii), the walnut tree, instead of being noted for its regionality, could be noted only for its function, which is like that of the mountain and river shore in the other paintings: to divide onlookers from Jesus, making the Baptism the center of focus. The fact that there are no walnut trees in the other paintings ceases to arouse curiousity so long as the walnut tree has a reason for being

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there that functions within genre. Since 'tree' is functionally equivalent to 'shore' and 'mountain' in that category, Piero's Baptism receives one more weighting, which puts its total at 24 along with the others. This reconstrual has thus solved the problem of satisfying both "fitting" conditions, and Piero's work can, with formal justification, be called 'art.'

In a case of greater ambiguity, where a painting could belong to more than one genre or style - the proverbially impossible decision between orientations - duck or rabbit - what sometimes works is multiple frames. This is one of two alternatives to the usual mode of art classification via single frames. (The other alternative is where an art history begins with an *ur*-frame.) In Piero's case, if his stylistic innovations to the Baptism genre were more pervasive, it might be impossible to finesse all of the involved feature categories so that his painting would fit in such a way that was fair to its predecessors. In that case, assuming that Piero's work could fit the Baptism frame under the first fitting condition (balance), an additional frame would be needed, conjointly with the first, to satisfy the second fitting condition. Two frames are conjoint when, looking at the painting through both frames at once, all unthematized features fade into the background.

Suppose that Piero's Baptism had an additional reading that was pure political allegory, such that the narrative action could be thought to stand for some local initiation

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ritual in which the patron or a family member were participants. Although this sounds like an extra-artistic reading, if there were a *political allegory* genre with definite conditions, such that one could see Piero's *Baptism* as fulfilling them, the reading would become aesthetic.

The upshot would be that such a painting could not be admitted into just one (linear) art history at a time. It would either take its place in two histories (two genres) at once or completely fail as an artwork. (Of course, it could also fall into one genre and generate the other, but one would only take that much trouble with a real masterpiece.) The point is: it is framed until, when looked at through several frames simultaneously, it at last passes both tests for fit, or we throw it back to the artist and tell him/her to finish it.

Having straightforwardly presented my contextualist theory of framing, I now turn to meet some of the more serious objections that may have arisen along the way.

Objections considered

1. Since a frame consists essentially of a list of feature categories and compares objects along each line separately, how can a frame possibly distinguish an ordered, (narratively) unified artwork from one that contains all of the features required of a genre or style, but is merely pieced *pele mele* together? Indeed, given the way a frame is organized - as a matrix - the interpretive part of the

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classifying process looks like a mere having and having-not of features essential to a style or genre. But looks in this case are quite deceiving. Order and unity are, at different levels, *built in* to feature categories. For example, in the Baptism frame, feature category (2a) lists all expected figures in the Biblical story of the Baptism. Any departure from this list reduces a candidate's weighting. For each figure listed, there are expectations within the genre governing their compositional treatment and relations to other figures. Together thus, feature categories tend to reward pictorial *organization* that unites thematized features. The ultimate test of *unity* and order, however, is whether the frame fits. Specifying standards of order and unity to any greater extent leaves an account too narrow in its coverage.

2. What is more intimidating is the other side of the coin: frames enforce conformity (though, as demonstrated, conformity of any desired complexity, order, unity, etc.). An ordered, continuous history is the objective of genre construction, but genres have trouble remaining continuous while being open to innovation - especially innovation that occurs through piecemeal, inter-stylistic borrowings. When Piero borrows the diverse poses, expressions, and costuming of Donatello's *Cantoria* cherubs - or, what's more likely, of Della Robia's (same time, same place) - whether or not those features, borrowed and transformed into Piero's own idiom,

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are added to the frame depends upon what the framing members will permit. Here is where the potential source of conformity appears. Yet carefully note that candidacy need not (though it may) be a matter of fitting in, pure and simple. It usually also involves innovating the categories by adding features and redistributing the weightings. Whether an argument for innovation persuades depends entirely upon the whims and interests of those in charge of the framing. There is no absolute standard for a "good" argument in this regard. So, while some degree of conformity is required, there is always just as much if not more room for innovation. There is no reason, for example, why the framers could not choose to add on (for the sake of one candidacy) as many feature categories as consitute the frame already. This would be a rare case, but it is possible.

Again, my claim has not been that artists actually use such framing procedures to decide how much they dare to innovate a style or genre. Artists often absorb a wide variety of artworks, but when it comes to integrating some of what they have absorbed into a work of their own, they do not often use the procedure of physically juxtaposing their influences. They more often procede intuitively, even piecemeal. And the future of art certainly does not depend upon whether artists adopt these framing procedures.

My claim has been, rather, that framing is ideally what art classifiers do when they correctly attribute arthood to

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objects. If they have the artist's collaboration, it is even better; but, as noted in the previous chapter, there is very little today that resembles the patronage practices of (especially the Medici family) in Renaissance Italy.

3. But what is the use of describing a tallying process that may not, after all, describe a deliberate process by which art candidates are, or have been, accepted and rejected? It is the same as when the principles of microeconomics are described in textbooks. Not everyone, when buying, selling, and investing, deliberately follows the principles of rational economic choice. However, the principles of microeconomics describe what happens to the market when individuals do make economic choices aimed at maximizing (or maximinning, or minimaxing) utility. My description of the framing process and its stipulations is similar. It describes what happens to the ontology of objects when people give them a certain mode of regard. I have tried to demonstrate in a sufficient variety of cases that the practices of art history and art criticism are readily translated into the framing process.

But, one might persist, the reasons critics and other artworlders give for their classificatory decisions *never* have anything to do with tallying numbers or with shifting weights around in feature categories just so the weightings come out balanced. Reason-giving may be imprecise, to say the least, but it is at least *qualitative* and, more

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specifically, it involves *narratively* integrating an artwork into an art history.

This, roughly, is Noël Carroll's line of argument. He argues for an approach to art identification that involves story-telling with a beginning, a complication, and an end - a context defined, an end set, a means worked out, and the plan executed - which Carroll understands as the structure of practical reasoning. He writes,

> "The point of the identifying narrative is to establish that a candidate is an artwork by explaining how the work emerged from an artworld context through assessments whose presuppositions about the aims of art are already precedented and through choices that are intelligible."[166]

Carroll thinks that such choices and assessments would be unintelligible if not made by artists - or by someone taking the artist's intentions into account. Interestingly, if an artist were to (as I suggest Piero did somewhat) follow the framing process in producing an artwork, he would be doing, to an extent, what Carroll says is done. This account is just more specific. The "beginning" is finding a candidate and setting a frame, the "complication" is determining whether the candidate fits the frame under the first condition, and the "end" is seeing whether all unthematized features disappear when the candidate is

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considered through that frame. This serves just as well to schematize the artist's intentions as those of any framer.

4. It will be anticipated that if such framing procedures were ever adopted, artists would be forever finding creative ways to subvert them. Suppose, for example, that an art entrepreneur, fancying himself a conceptual artist, were to artify some object without, in the process, appealing to other artworks. He might perform some mental juxtapositions just to hedge his bets, but let's say he does not physically juxtapose them. He might claim that in this way he has disproven my theory. Though violating my framing procedures, he has managed (he claims) to confer art status on an object. Notice that his strategy has been to appeal to his artworld authority. My first impulse would be to ask whether this is how he has always operated - whether this is how he achieved his artworld authority. If not - if he has achieved it by following anything translatable into my framing procedures, he has lost his case. There is also the question of what he has really produced with his experiment. Independent of his aim to subvert my theory, he would have to present his own theory according to which what he now refers to as art really is art. And it would have to be a better theory than mine.

5. On this theory, one can artify anything that is appropriately juxtaposable with acknowledged artworks.

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Human beings have been known to treat one another as mere things to be used or disposed of. So why not as artworks? Take a popular example of human beings juxtaposed and - even in the popular cultural understanding - artified: the Miss America pageant. Women are lined up - voluntarily, I might add - paraded around, and scrutinized according to certain feature categories, which have not changed much since the 1920's. Schematically, the feature category divisions are: swimsuit, evening gown, talent performance, interview, and the unofficial category of popularity with the other candidates. Fifty candidates are tested and tried successively. The women are juxtaposed with one another, but also, more importantly, with the framing set of past winners.

Once their features have been scrutinzed, the contestants are weighed (their weightings are tabulated). Although the weighting scale is presented to the public as absolute (x points out of a fixed number), overlapping with the features of past candidates must have something to do with the tabulation. Insofar as the Miss America pageant is a genre with a history unto itself, it relies for its feature categories and weighting standards upon the examples set by past winners (though the *ur*-winner might have been framed by traditional ideals of female beauty alone.)

It may be convenient to lump all traditional ideals of feminine beauty together, but in an aptly titled article, "Women in Frames" (1988), Patricia Simons has exposed one

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among many traditional beauty genres: the conventions surrounding the pictorial representation of society women in Renaissance Italy. These portraits had a profile format which, Simons argues, removed the possibility of the woman returning the viewer's gaze. This made it safe to scrutinize her without mercy, as if she were an ornament, or a work of art within a work of art. The profile genre actually began with five portraits of men. The genre's inception is thought to have been around 1425-50.[167]

Feature categories included neck, eyes, skin, mouth, hair, size, bearing, and costuming. Indeed, the profile portrait was as good an example as there has ever been of an *artistic* genre. Female beauty was, moreover, itself a genre insofar as it was standardized by expectations surrounding the spectacle of the virtuous female body. The ideal eyes were slightly lowered or averted in subordination, or what was called a "decorous and honest gaze."[168] The head was "kept to the quality of still life, often as objectively characterized and as inanimate as the cloth of the dress."[169] A woman's display of this finely honed set of attributes was a sign of her family pedigree - her dowry combining her mother's purity and her father's wealth.[170]

When I have spoken of genres in painting, I have referred to the importance of preserving a lineage of feature categories. This compares interestingly with the aims of the profile portrait genre in Renaissance Italy. The portraits preserved a twofold lineage: on the one hand,

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it was a genre with categories that transcended family tastes; on the other hand, portraits functioned precisely to preserve a family heritage. A similar tension arises for artists: an artist working within a genre, if (s)he is worth singling out from the genre, maintains a distinctive style (lineage). Piero's *Baptism* fits well here as an example.

All things treated as artworks in the context of display are treated the way society women were treated in Renaissance Italy. It is not a mode of regard that is essentially characteristic of women, but it certainly is one, I would argue, that has become characteristic of artworks. As I demonstrated in the last chapter, this juxtapositional mode of regard began to develop in the Renaissance. Perhaps when Italian men became *aware* of (what happens to be) the *aesthetic* mode of regard, they found it irresistable to attach it to women. Thus, Simons' use of the term 'framing' to refer to this privileged, outdated mode of regarding women has a wider application.

If women (or, for that matter, men) in beauty contests and portraits are framed in my sense of framing, then there is no escaping the conclusion that they are artworks - literally. Insofar as they are human beings, however, and capable of returning a gaze and of having more to their characters than meets the eye, they cease to be artworks the moment they leave the frame, resuming their lives. Moreover, the choice of with whom or what to spend one's

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life juxtaposed (or at least of with whom or what **not** to spend one's life juxtaposed) marks a non-trivial difference between a human being and a mere artwork.

What remains behind Miss America to be juxtaposed with past winners and future candidates, and thus to be used to build the Miss America lineage, is the film or video of her candidacy performance. The artwork then, is not the woman *herself* but her filmic (or electronic) likeness. This suits the purposes of the pageant just as well as her presence.

So, to generalize: because human beings are organic, they can become artworks only temporarily, as performers. Feature categories may possibly be made to accomodate organic change, but I still would insist that, insofar as a human being may, by his/her own choice, withdraw him/herself from a framing history at any time, (s)he cannot count as an artwork in any permanent or stable sense. Should (s)he live in a frame by his/her own choosing, (s)he may thereby make him/herself as permanently into an artwork as any artifact.

Some of Eva Hesse's perishable artworks stand as evidence that artifacts can be impermanent and yet be art.[171] Danto notes that Hesse's *Expanded Expansion* - a defective room divider made of rickity poles and lumpy latex cheesecloth - began to stiffen and discolor the moment it was made. *Expanded Expansion* might have been a symbol for Hesse's own brief, precarious existence (she died of brain cancer at the age of thirty-four), but Danto takes this

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reading back as soon as he suggests it. Protective of her dignity, he writes,

> "...it is difficult to believe she meant it that way, for she wanted to live and believed she would live; her philosophy was that art is short and life is long, and she did whatever she could to ensure both. The fact that her flaking, cracking, stiffening works are among us while she is not is just a further footnote to her absurdism."[172]

Another example of perishable work (contemporary with Hesse's) is Hans Haacke's installation pieces from the 1960's - *Live Airborne Sytem* (1965/68), for example, or *Grass Grows* (1967/9). Haacke meant to show that installation pieces, like human beings, can be organic, open systems. *Grass Grows* consisted of a mound of dirt overrun with grass (though I somehow doubt that the dirt mound ever went on to become anything else).[173] *Live Airborne System* is a photograph of sea gulls diving for the bread that the artist threw into the ocean at Coney Island on November 30, 1968.[174] (Where are those birds today?) Jack Burnham writes of Haacke's intentions,

> "The systemic notion of internal and external boundaries reflects the idea of a 'dialectics of transformation.' In regard to this, he speaks of the

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> 'independence' of his systems as self-sustaining functioning entities. Yet their fine arts context allows them to share the cultural overtones of their environment. According to Haacke, this produces in the viewer's mind a condition of conceptual oscillation. Thus his art may be seen for its active participation with the environment...or it may be construed as 'art' in dialectical conflict with previous art."[175]

Haacke's use of the medium of photography for such purposes could be questioned, but instead I concede: since the museum could not come to the sea gulls, photography brought the sea gulls to the museum. It was the best way to juxtapose *Live Airborne System* with other artworks and thus make it a candidate.

6. If one were to follow the framing procedures I have described without intending thereby to induct a candidate for arthood into an art history, would one nevertheless be doing so? This one is tricky, because art status seems to be something that could only be attributed to something intentionally. What the question comes down to is whether an object could be art without being recognized as such. On my account, this is a meaningless question, because I have tried to take the emphasis off of the status of the things we call 'art' and put it on the process by which it earns its status. The earning is everything on this account, and

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therefore if an object is found to fit a frame but it never occurs to someone to call it 'art,' then the label will not be missed. The thing has been transfigured. (But how likely is it that one would go through a framing process without this end in mind?)

Someone might argue that the having of art status is often part of that transfiguration. But how, before it became art, how could it have been transfigured by its art status?

7. Could a painting be an artwork though exhibited alone? If framed previously, the painting is an artwork within that frame. Exhibited singly, it is still an artwork; but one may never know, since the proof is in the framing. Combined with the fact that anything can be an artwork if framed, this brings with it the unwanted conclusion that anything - a framed bat, even - might *actually be* an artwork. Hard as this may be to accept in the case of art, we accept such conclusions readily in other areas. For example, daily we encounter women who might for all we know be mothers; reasonably, we assume that if a woman is between certain ages, she is fertile and has everything necessary to be a biological mother. And normally, we are not bothered by not knowing. If we want to know (she either is or she isn't), there are ways of finding out. Why should the same not be true of art(?): if we want to know whether something is

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art, we can try to trace one of its (possibly several) framing histories.

8. Finally, a note about an old and intransigent criticism this theory was designed to avoid: the criticism levelled against defining art in terms of family resemblances, with no essential core of aesthetic features. Clearly, I have assigned, not to artworks, but to contexts of art attritution, a common core of properties which can be designated by one word: *framing*. Framing normatively describes the aesthetic mode of regard essential to a thing's being classified as an artwork in the context of display. When correctly regarded in the way I have specified, mere things go from being candidates to being artworks. They then have a framing history and so can remain artworks.

Four alternative historical theories of art

1. As promised earlier, I now take up Jerrold Levinson's intentionalist version of the historical definition of art, which he first published in 1979. He proposed it explicitly as an alternative to, though clearly inspired by, the institutional theory. He shifts the focus away from Dickie's hand-waving ceremony of artworlders in which art status is merely *conferred* for unpinpointable reasons, and places the focus instead on a relation of complicity between artists and artworlders. There must be something by virtue

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of which artworlders wave their hands - and that thing, Levinson thinks, is the *mode of regard* for which artists *intend* the objects they produce (or assemble or find). This mode of regard cannot be specified, however, at all. That is because it varies historically (thence the historicity of Levinson's account).

A definition of art can be pinpointed nevertheless in the interstices between present and past modes of regard. Levinson defines art as: an object of which it is true at t that some person or persons, having the appropriate proprietary right over X, non-passingly intends (or intended) X for regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e., **regard in any way (or ways) in which objects in the extension of 'art work' prior to t are or were correctly (or standardly) regarded.**

For now, I want to focus on the bolded part of the definition, because this is where our accounts diverge the most. Levinson regards it as a virtue of his definition that he avoids essentializing the aesthetic mode of regard. But because he fails to do so, his definition runs into two obstacles which are, it seems to me, insurmountable as his theory (in all three versions: 1979, 1989, 1993) stands.

The first obstacle is the fact that, while his definition requires that there be modes of regard that are "correct," his theory provides no way to determine what *correct* would mean, beyond merely what was "standard" (which can always be empirically determined). What is wrong with

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that? Levinson challenges himself with the following good example:

> "Italian Renaissance portraits are presumably art works. Suppose that they come to be regarded in a new and unprecedented way, *viz.* they begin to be used as thermal insulation, and are found to be quite suitable for this. And suppose, through an amazing decline in taste or an unparalleled need for insulation, this manner of regard becomes the rule. If we omit 'correctly' from our definition...then given the case as described, it follows from our definition that anything subsequently intended by its maker for use as insulation (e.g., a sheet of fiberglass) would be an art work. Why? Because Renaissance portraits are past art works which are regarded, are commonly regarded, and are rewardingly regarded as insulation."[176]

Levinson never returns to this point on *correctness* in his 1979 paper. However, in 1989, he responds explicitly,

> "I still think the question of what are correct - admissable, valid, appropriate - ways of dealing with art at a given time is a difficult, and important, one. But it was not then, nor is it now, my aim to essay a full-scale answer to it...Possibly there is no general analysis to be given of what correct ways of regarding

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art end up being at any given phase in art history, for any specified group of artworks."[177]

And again, in 1993, he deliberately sidesteps the issue:

> "Still, my view stops short of - and pointedly tries to avoid - making determinations of whether someone is producing or offering art at a given time a matter of social procedures, status, or role at that time. What have emerged or are accepted as correct ways to engage with artworks of the past implicates a kind of social dimension to art, at some level. But that doesn't mean there are social rules for *making* art, only that whether one is making art now depends on these socio-historical facts about what was art, and what were validated, at some point, as correct approaches to it."[178]

Thus, in none of his papers does Levinson distinguish the *correct* mode of aesthetic regard from one that is *standard* or *successful* - both are merely socio-empirical facts, not norms at all. And artists are always going to find way to exploit a theory's obscurities.

Levinson might reply that such cases as taking past works of art, finding new and bizarre uses for them (such as insulation), and then applying those uses toward current (validating) modes of regard - such cases are marginal

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enough to be overlooked. Indeed, he has responded to a related criticism with the reply that such cases would be fated to be marginal, so why worry and why resist them?[179]

I could argue that such cases are all too common - especially once the potential is recognized. But instead, I submit: If such cases are not troublesome, then Levinson should remove the word 'correct' from his definition and be happy to replace it with 'standard' or 'successful.'

Now I turn to the intentionalist part of Levinson's definition. Given his insistance that "the making of art is primary - the social frameworks and conventions that grow up around it is not," he uses the intentionalist strategy as a way to incorporate what the artist does when he makes art into what artworld agents do when they classify art.[180] It is the mode of regard that is primary, but if artists did not make art with certain modes of regard in mind, art would never have emerged from the primordial mush of artifact-making. This is one of Levinson's most appealing arguments because it supplies an important motivation for the emergence of art.

For that matter, Marx Wartofsky has defended a much more appealing motivation for the evolution of human modes of regard that made it possible for art to emerge. Beyond mere perception, which has stabilized phylogenetically, Wartofsky proposes that there is a mode of regard which informs one's modes of knowing and acting within an environment - specifically, pictures in art and models in

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science - and which is shaped not biologically but historically by human interaction with the world of human creation. It evolves quickly relative to our biological apparatus, and the evolution takes place at the level of intentional activity. It is rooted in "social praxis" - and by that Wartofsky means anything from work to play - and it is transformed by the solitary imagination, only to be folded once again into work and play, in what Wartofsky calls an endless "feedback loop."[181] Thus, art, along with all other cognitive constructions, evolves historically - a level at which the animals of lesser complexity do not operate.[182]

Motivating art's emergence is not a negotiable option. Every theory of art should be able account for it. Intentions - understood extensionally in terms of juxtaposed objects in framing sets, juxtaposed as the artist thought of them - are often important, and could help account for art's emergence. In fact, they are often the best way to interpret an artwork - I do not rule them out. But they do not explain *everything* that is important about art.

The line between my theory and Levinson's blurs when it comes to readymades. Some artworks are not made, but are merely displayed - here, we agree. Levinson thinks that what makes them art is the artist's intention for them to be seen with a certain mode of regard. But this is not much different from what curators do - and indeed what people often do without ever intending their mode of regard to be

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like or unlike past aesthetic modes of regard. Framing is what humans generally (even martians) and artists would have in common were they to regard things - things made or things found - aesthetically. Art-making is something that transcends intending.

I have one final point of criticism of what I think is the best theory of art going. It is Levinson's notion that unless one has a proprietary right over the art object, one cannot "artify" it. Certainly, not physically possessing an object is an obstacle to artification on my theory because of the physical juxtaposition requirement. But, it seems flimsy reasoning to maintain that illegal possession or borrowing (as when an artwork is on loan from one museum to another) would somehow protect an object from being framed by other framers - even if the object were later taken back. One might retain a reproduction of it which could never be used to frame a new candidate, but which could stand as an art historical place-holder for the reclaimed artwork (much like a video is a place-holder for a former Miss America).

2. In 1980, Lucian Krukowski came out with an alternative historical account of art. He thinks that describing a predicate schemata for identifying art will involve pinpointing a necessary and sufficient set of formal properties for artworks. Rightly viewing this as a hopeless enterprise, not unlike Levinson, he deliberately stops short..

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Krukowski tries to define 'artworks' more loosely, as "aesthetic objects," which he understands to mean "metaphorically exemplifying symbols" - a concept that he derives explicitly from Nelson Goodman. Objects become metaphorically exemplifying symbols by way of being admitted into a "tradition-class."[183] Admission into the tradition-class is gained by partaking in two lines of what Krukowski calls "predicate schemata":

> "...the first ranges over all those objects that metaphorically 'have and show forth' a particular constellation of 'properties'; the second ranges over those objects which satisfy the attributive requirements for the term 'art' as I have outlined them."[184]

The "particular constellation of aesthetic properties" he has in mind, however, is not ahistorically essential, but historically indexed. The password that gains admission today may be different tomorrow, depending upon the value it projects, or anticipates. Constellations of aesthetic properties have value and win art status only on the basis of the anticipation of their continuation in future lines of a tradition-class. Krukowski thus likens art status conferral to a mating ritual - not uninsightfully, I should add - no one has ever come so close to binding together classificatory and evaluative standards.

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All of this goes to show that the "particular constellation of aesthetic properties" that is the basis for a predicate schemata for artworks is nothing in particular. This is not incorrect, but certainly uninformative. As in Levinson's case, Krukowski needs to fall back on a notion of "correctness" - not of a mode of regard, but of constellations of properties. Unlike Goodman, he does not list aesthetic symptoms, or properties, any of which would be sufficient, and which are non-conjointly necessary for artworks to possess. What Krukowski does do is to sketch the "attributive requirements" that let a constellation of properties be a correct one. Here, then, is where the weight of his theory of art attribution falls.

I presented Krukowski's theory of art attribution very briefly in an earlier context (when sketching the four shapes of continuity in art history), but here is a more thorough version: His strategy is to personify artworks, so that art attribution becomes a *transaction* between members of a tradition-class of artworks and candidates for art status. The basis of the transaction, he proposes, is the value the candidate promises to add to the group. Specifically, the kind of value promised is a *link* between current and future members. The candidate has to somehow sell itself in that capacity, which means projecting into the future some set of attributes it has, but that either some members lack or they all possess but have never thematized. This is a risky venture because in many cases,

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some members stand to lose out - certainly they lose their old interpretations, but they may also lose their art status - when a new set of valued attributes is thematized. Because of its dynamism, this is a very attractive - even exciting - theory of art attribution. And indeed, I do not think it is wrong about the way that the case for candidates is made. But I do not think it is the only story going. There are many other reasons why framers might choose to consider one candidate rather than another, or to thematize one set of new features rather than another.

When I presented the case that might have been made for Piero Della Francesca's *Baptism of Christ*, I showed a different mode of persuasion that is frequently used: the appeal to precedent. A painting may just as well be accepted on that basis as on the basis of whether it appealingly projects its novel properties into the future.

Given a significant resemblance (in terms of thematized features) between an object and a set of artworks in an art history, the next step is for the candidate to be juxtaposed with a framing set from that art history. This step defines the boundary between the stage where an object is noticed for its artistic qualities (which Krukowski calls stage 'A') - via mental juxtaposition, perhaps - and the stage where the object is actually proposed for candidacy (stage 'C'). Whether this step is taken depends upon what is proposed to get the candidate's foot in the door. The rhetoric may take any number of forms - from an appeal to the self-interest of

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the current members (Krukowski-style) to an appeal to their sense of justice (Rawls-style) to an appeal to a precendent set in another art history (Piero-style).[185] The boundary between the stage where the object is admitted for consideration as a candidate (C) and the stage where it is admitted as an artwork (which Krukowski calls stage 'W') is expressed in my theory as the point at which the object, having been framed, fits the frame by meeting "fitting" conditions one and two (weighting and fading). Thus, my theory satisfies Krukowski's requirement that the lines between A, C, and W be made clear.

Similarities between our accounts aside, Krukowski's conception of a tradition-class is, I believe, under-specified (though that is the way he intends it to be). As a consequence, our requirements for admission differ at both stages A/C and C/W. The bulk of the difference between our historical accounts of art attribution, however, lies in the ways our conceptions of art history differ, and I will let my earlier discussion of this speak for itself (refer to pages 115-117).

3. Noël Carroll (1988, 1993) takes a third approach to defining art historically, which I have sketched briefly above. It involves seeing art as a social practice which has historically been unified and made coherent by the narratives that have been told about things called "artworks." Narratives fold new members into the (single,

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unified) expanding history and, in general, Carroll says, they do so by "repeating, amplifying, or repudiating" already accepted artworks.[186] The form these narratives take is not specific to the artworld - the aesthetic mode of regard (contra Kant) does not have its own structure. It has the structure, Carroll argues, of practical reasoning: beginning, complication, end (see my discussion, page 151). Thus, art practices are shaped more by art-identifying narratives than by the anticipation of future works. Unlike Krukowski, Carroll leaves the projected future out of the picture.

Like Levinson and Krukowski, Carroll rejects the institutional (that is to say, Dickian) theory. He repudiates it because his theory requires that narratives of art be strategically structured to give the history of art a coherent unity; whereas he sees no hope of empirically finding any coherent, formal institutional structures that could be called an "Artworld."

My main criticism of Carroll is like one that will be levelled against my theory; namely, that he gives no reason to think that the social practice he identifies with art is something unique to the history of art. He not only resists defining art, but his theory is not even obviously a theory of art. To save his theory, Carroll suggests that the narratives of art be identified by tracking the label, "artworks." This gives us the start we need to trace the arts all the way back to the *ur*-arts of a tradition.

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Clearly, as can be seen in the previous chapter, I have found this approach compelling; not as the ultimate method of defining art, however. A further identifying practice or procedure is needed. Ironically, Carroll's theory is centered around the identification of such a practice. But the practice is not informatively enough described.

What is informative, I propose, is the framing process. Nothing other than art is framed in such a way as I have described it. The criticism that I have gone *too* far and have been so specific as to *distort* the historical practices through which art has emerged - a criticism that might be levelled by Kendall Walton - I have tried to answer by showing how readily framing accomodates the features that are important about aesthetic regard in a wide range of historical cases.[187]

4. This myth has been confined to consideration of the visual arts. It is worthwhile, however, to note one or two of the implications that the theory might have if taken into other sensory realms.[188] Lydia Goehr's book, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* (1992), pursues a line of reasoning designed to loosen the our institutionalized, presentist pairing of the concepts of *musical works* and *music-as-art*. The two became so seemingly inextricably associated around 1800, she argues. And several chapters of her book are devoted to describing what musical practice was like before

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it came to be identified with the work-concept, and thus molded to the shape of the visual arts.

Throughout this essay, I have identified visual art and visual art*works*. It is not apparent that this is an institutionalized association that has been very recently imposed upon visual art, since there is not the same modern distinction as there came to be in music between the work (the score) and the performance. In fact, if anything, modernity in visual art brought with it the *loss* of a traditional pairing: that between art classification and artistic creation.

Goehr parses the developments around 1800 somewhat differently, more suited to capturing the developments in music. She observes that theorists and practitioners of art began to idealize the context of the modern museum because it preserved the concept of the *separability* of the inner purposes of art (art for art's sake) and its outer, worldly functions.[189] She writes,

> "Museum curators would take a work of art and by framing it - either literally or metaphorically - strip it of its local, historical, and worldly origins, even its human origins. In the museum, only its aesthetic properties would metaphorically remain. At the very least, museum visitors would have to be taught to identify the properties they were supposed to attend to in their contemplation of fine art."[190]

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The social cost of the way museums have evolved - with the aim of *de*-contextualizing artworks, the better to isolate and make visible their "purely aesthetic" properties - is the most debated issue in museum theory today. Yet, throughout, I have emphasized the *contextualizing* aspect of museums (systematic juxtaposition). Whether museums are taken to contextualize or decontextualize artworks depends upon where one locates the relevant context: within the museum (in the context of display) or without (in the context of creation). It is precisely because the modern museum was the first context of display used to classify art independently of the context of creation that it has been important to note certain of its contextualizing features for the purpose of myth-construction. Once the classificatory (framing) procedures are exposed, however, they transcend the bounds of museum walls and can be applied anywhere.

Thus, from a presentist vantage point, antique objects - even Foucauldian "objects of natural history" (fossils, shells) - can legitimately be reclassified in the context of classification this chapter has identified. The framing procedures I have identified are flexible enough to accomodate more historically remote modes of regarding things as art - more kinds of feature categories and complexity levels of framing - than might be expected of a theory with such brazenly twentieth-century beginnings.

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Overview

In what spirit is this myth offered? Not in any spirit.[191] It is an attempt to expose the ideal procedural conditions of contemporary art's classification. Because no *zeitgeist* is driving this mode of classification, there is no need to deny the continued legitimacy of more traditional modes of classification based, for example, on a contract between artist and patron. My method has been to expose a pattern in the historical development of technologies of juxtaposition. The pattern suggests that a stage has been reached when the context of display of artworks has achieved independence from the context of creation in making its own classificatory decisions about art (via framing).

The condition of objects becoming artworks in the context of display, I have argued, is the juxtaposition of selected members of an art history such that the candidate-object is framed successfully by a set of descriptions derived from the framing members. Successful framing satisfies two conditions. First, the weightings for the framing set of artworks in each category of analysis must come out balanced. Second, all features not included in the framing description must disappear when one looks at the candidate-object through the frame in question. These conditions may seem circular, since art can only be classified as art through other art, but I have tried to

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show how art histories emerge from isolated instances of *ur-art*.

I have tried to show also that framing can make sense of what contemporary art critics and art historians do without the material use of a matrix. There are, on the other hand, contexts of display, such as the ambitious corporate art collection of Goldman-Sachs in downtown New York, where the practice of display does not very coherently meet any classificatory requirements (or if so, then with great difficulty). The walls throughout are hung with heterotopic juxtapositions out of Malraux's *Museum Without Walls*. Paintings and silkscreens by Andy Warhol, Frank Stella, Mel Bochner, Helen Frankenthaler, Jennifer Bartlett, and Sigmar Polke are found juxtaposed with Anasazi Indian pottery (c.1200), an American quilt (c.1900), nineteenth-century Iranian door panels, a nineteenth-century elevator grille by the American architect Louis Sullivan, nineteenth-century Sumatran tapistry, and an eighteenth-century Chinese silk banner. The policy at Goldman-Sachs is to switch artworks around every few months, continually compelling them into new relationships. What this suggests is that no relationship is any more valuable than another. It leads one to question how much care goes into the arrangements. Do these juxtapositions of objects otherwise known as "modern art" with objects otherwise utilitarian or decorative make the objects lose aura to a listless

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resonance that has had no time to settle? (Illustration 12.)

It might be good bookkeeping for those who would classify things as art on the basis of the context of display alone to privately construct a matrix, adding up the weightings in each feature category. I maintain, however, that a well-structured set of juxtapositions, like a well-written piece of art criticism, can convey all information needed for framing without the use of a visible matrix to represent the weighting and balancing. (Cannot a discursive argument be logically sound without being displayed in logical form?) On the other hand, when pressed for *proof* that a thing is an artwork - i.e., that it has been successfully framed under a certain description - an artworlder - who can now be more informatively described as "he or she who frames" - now has a means of giving one.

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Endnotes

* Photocopies of reproductions of most of the artworks I will be discussing follow page 203.

1 The distinction, as old as Aristotle's distinction between tragedy and *good* tragedy, was reintroduced this century by Morris Weitz. See Richard Peltz, "Classification and Evaluation in Aesthetics: Weitz and Aristotle," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 30, 1971.

2 Stephen Davies, *Definitions of Art*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.

3 Arthur Danto, "The Artworld," in *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, ed. Joseph Margolis, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987.

4 Arthur Danto, *Danto and His Critics*, ed. Mark Rollins, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Ltd. 1993, "Responses and Replies," p. 204.

5 Danto, *op.cit.*, "Responses and Replies," p. 203.

6 It's the kind of question to ask over coffee and donuts while your companion stares fixedly at his donut.

7 Marx Wartofsky, "Art, Artworlds, and Ideology," in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 3, Spring 1980, p. 241.

8 For example, in the absence of empirical access to conditions prior to the emergence of human social life, Jean-Jacques Rousseau imagined that human nature would,

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in such a state, be ruled by self-love - a state of self-respect, yet of longing for the regard of others (different from Hobbesian self-interest, which is anti-social). He begins his book,

> "Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains. Those who think themselves the masters of others are indeed greater slaves than they. How did this transformation come about? I do not know. How can it be made legitimate? That question I believe I can answer," (p. 85).

This is a straightforward acknowledgment that what he is setting out to do is not so much to empirically explain as to imaginatively "make legitimate" the emergence of certain social conditions. Rousseau's myth of the formation of the social contract draws upon his idealization of human nature to motivate man's transformation out of the state of nature into a state of voluntary obedience to what he calls the "general will" - a conception of the good common to all which balances the freedom of expression and self-determination needed for self-love with the duty of social cooperation needed for regard by others. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. Maurice Cranston, London: Penguin Books, 1968.

[9] It is fair to say that intuitions about art differ so widely because of diverse starting points, or paradigms. Plato admired Egyptian art; Kant loved flowers, pepper gardens, and other things with natural beauty; Collingwood loved a story well-told; Clive Bell admired the painting, *Paddington Station*; Danto admires Warhol's *Brillo Box*. However, as Morris Weitz has convincingly argued in "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," the fact that we define art thus

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empirically, using paradigms, does not mean that 'art' is a closed concept. However, his argument for the open-texturedness of the concept of 'art' certainly furnishes no grounds for thinking that particular *artworks* are the only source of generalization about art. Why not an entire practice, such as the modern practice of juxtaposing things called 'artworks' according to various principles, thus determining their inclusion and exclusion in the realms of art? See Morris Weitz, "Art as an Open Concept: from *The Opening Mind*" (1977) in George Dickie, Richard Sclafani & Ronald Roblin, ed, *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology* (2nd ed.), New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.

10 Something like this distinction is found in Stephen Greenblatt's essay, "Resonance and Wonder," in *Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display*, ed, Ivan Karp and Steven D. Lavine, 1991. Greenblatt makes the distinction as follows (analytically rather than historically, however):

> "By *resonance* I mean the power of the displayed object to reach out beyond its formal boundaries to a larger world, to evoke in the viewer the complex, dynamic cultural forces from which it has emerged and for which it may be taken by a viewer to stand. By *wonder* I mean the power of the displayed object to stop the viewer in his or her tracks, to convey an arresting sense of uniqueness, to evoke an exalted attention," (p. 42).

It was Walter Benjamin in his essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," (from Benjamin's *Illuminations*, 1955) who first connected art's "aura" with the originality of both the

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masterpiece and the ritual object (such as an African mask). Wonder is an emotion one feels in the presence of something possessing an aura. Aura need not be limited to certain things, however. It may be found whenever one has an experience of complete, inarticulate understanding of an artwork.

11 'Arranger' is used because its coverage is broader than 'curator.

12 Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class?* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 317.

13 Michael Baxandall, "Exhibiting Intention: Some Preconditions of the Visual Display of Culturally Purposeful Objects," in *Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display*, ed. Ivan Karp & Staven D. Lavine, Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991, p. 34.

14 Clearly, I am regarding this standpoint as one among many possible standpoints. I offer evidence, however, to support my claim that this standpoint is not just on a par with any. In his essay, "Is a Developmental History of Art Possible?" Marx Wartofsky offers more possible standpoints from which art history could be viewed as developmental - notably schemas of cognitive development (p. 237). Wartofsky's essay can be found in *Development and the Arts: Critical Perspectives*, ed. Margery B. Franklin and Bernard Kaplan, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1994.

15 Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum*, London: Routelege, 1995, pp. 76, 96. Bennett credits this distinction to Stephen Bann, but it is nowhere to be

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found in the book to which he refers; therefore I give Bennett credit (or responsibility) for the suggestion.

16 Elaine Heumann Gurian, "Noodling Around With Exhibition Opportunities," in Karp & Lavine, *op.cit.*, p. 178.

17 Bennett, *op.cit.*, p. 182.

18 Bennett, *op.cit.*, pp. 182-3.

19 As documented by Nikolaus Pevsner, *A History of Building Types*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 116.

20 Bennett, *op.cit*, p. 27.

21 Oleg Neverov, "'His Magesty's Cabinet' and Peter I's *Kunstkammer*," in *The Origins of Museums: The Cabinet of Curiosities in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe," ed.* Oliver Impey & Arthur MacGregor, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, p. 60.

22 Bennett, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

23 Mechel is quoted in Pevsner, *op.cit.*, p. 121.

24 Bennett, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

25 Pevsner quotes *Decade philosophique*: "Each school had its periods, even each painter has several methods. So one would wish to see the pictures hung according to the various manners of the masters. With what pleasure would one see the gradual ascent!", *op.cit.*, p. 121.

26 Pevsner, *op.cit.*, p. 121.

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[27] Bazin quoted in Bennett, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

[28] Stephen Bann, *The Clothing of Clio: A Study of the Representation of History in Nineteenth Century Britain and France*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

[29] Bann, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

[30] Bann, *op.cit.*, pp. 82, 84.

[31] Bann, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

[32] Nikolaus Pevsner notes that Toussaint's most original idea was to detail the purposes of the individual rooms in his museum. Pevsner, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

[33] Pevsner, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

[34] Douglas Crimp, *On the Museum's Ruins*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, p. 292.

[35] Crimp, *op.cit.*, p. 292.

[36] Pevsner, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

[37] Bennett, *op.cit.*, p. 183.

[38] This was in a letter written by the director, Baroness Hilla Rebay Ehrenwiesen to Frank Lloyd Wright on June 1, 1943. In *Guggenheim Museum: A to Z*, ed. Nancy Spector, New York: The Guggenheim Museum, 1992.

[39] Paul Strand, "Italy and France," in *U.S. Camera Yearbook*, 1955, New York: U.S. Camera Publishing, 1954, p. 15.

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40 Paul Strand & Cesare Zavattini, *Un Paese*, Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1955, p. 32.

41 Strand & Zavattini,*op.cit.*

42 This may be true, however, only if what is in question is realizing Strand's intentions.

43 André Malraux, *The Voices of Silence*, trans. Stuart Gilbert, Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Co., 1953, p. 14.

44 Malraux, *op.cit.,* p. 17.

45 Contrary to Benjamin's thesis; consistent, however, with Malraux's. See endnote 10.

46 I use here a distinction similar to the one Hans Reichenbach made between the contexts of discovery and justification in science.

47 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, trans. R.D. Laing, New York: Random House, 1970, p. 131.

48 Foucault, *op.cit.,* p. 134.

49 Foucault, *op.cit.,* p. 134.

50 H.D. Schepelern, "Natural Philosophers and Princely Collectors: Worm, Paludanus, and the Gottorp and Copenhagen Collections," in *The Origins of Museums: The Cabinet of Curiosities in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe*, ed. Oliver Impey & Arthur MacGregor, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 124, 127.

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[51] Krzysztof Pomian, *Collectors and Curiosities: Paris and Venice, 1500-1800*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, p. 45.

[52] Foucault, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

[53] Frederick Hartt, *History of Italian Renaissance Art*, 3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987, p. 12.

[54] Pomian, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

[55] Pomian, *op.cit.*, pp. 34-5.

[56] Foucault, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

[57] Pomain, *op.cit.*, p. 72-75.

[58] Pomian, *op.cit.*, pp. 72-3.

[59] Pomian, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

[60] Schepelern, *op.cit.*, p. 124.

[61] Giuseppe Olmi, "Science - Honour - Metaphor: Italian Cabinets of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Impey & MacGregor, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

[62] Olmi, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

[63] Olmi, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

[64] Laura Laurencich-Minelli, "Museography and Ethnographical Collections in Bologna during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Impey & MacGregor, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-20.

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[65] Olmi, *op.cit.,* p. 7.

[66] Olmi, *op.cit.,* p. 7.

[67] Olmi, *op.cit.,* p. 7.

[68] Laurencich-Minelli, *op.cit.,* p. 17.

[69] Laurencich-Minelli, *op.cit.,* p. 19.

[70] Schepelern, *op.cit.,* p. 125.

[71] Nemerov, *op.cit.,* p. 55.

[72] Schepelern, *op.cit.,* p. 124.

[73] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989, pp. 32, 40.

[74] Habermas, *op.cit.,* p. 32.

[75] Habermas, *op.cit.,* p. 32.

[76] Becker, *Art Worlds*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

[77] Becker (*op.cit.*) considers Pope Urban VIII to be the ideal patron. The reason: "He paid well and on time; not all patrons did. Being cultivated, familiar with the elaborately coded meanings of the period's painting, he could participate in planning decorative schemes...the iconographic games which marked a man of wit and learning. A good patron also had access to the best places to paint - the most important churches and

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the most important parts of those churches, places where everyone would see one's work," (p. 101). Urban might have been a more "ideal" patron than Medici in one respect: the artist was not so much under his thumb as the "artists in residence" at the palazzo were under Medici's.

78 K. Dorothea Ewart, *Cosimo de' Medici*, London: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 232.

79 Not, however, the sort of ordered collection that was to become the mania of the next several centuries.

80 Ewart, *op.cit.,* p. 236.

81 Hartt, *op.cit.,* p. 461.

82 Hartt, *op.cit.,* p. 27.

83 L.B. Alberti, *On Painting,* trans. John R. Spencer, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1956, p. 51.

84 E.H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation*, Princeton: The Bolligen Series, The A.W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, 1956, p. 77.

85 Malraux, *op.cit.,* p. 30.

86 Alberti, *op.cit.,* p. 68.

87 Alberti, *op.cit.,* p. 98.

88 Alberti's system of organization was not what made genres possible, but it certainly sped up their development.

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[89] Gombrich, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

[90] Gombrich, *op.cit.*, pp. 157-8.

[91] Gombrich, *op.cit.*, p. 347.

[92] Leonardo da Vinci, *Treatise on Painting, Vol. I*, trans. A. Philip McMahon, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956, p. 45.

[93] Hartt, *op.cit.*, p. 19.

[94] da Vinci, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

[95] da Vinci, *op.cit.*, p. 51.

[96] Hartt, *op.cit.*, p. 19

[97] Hartt, op.cit., p. 20.

[98] Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Chicago: William Benton, Publisher.

[99] Gombrich further mythologizes: The visual arts may have emerged out of a schema-correction scenario like the one Alberti describes, but, Gombrich adds, correction was aimed, in the spirit of Pygmalion (and ultimately, perhaps, in the spirit of Dr. Frankenstein), at creating an impression of the presence of life. In some cultures, however, taboos were placed upon graven images - particularly in Jewish and Muslim cultures - and, in Egyptian tomb paintings, there were taboos against completing certain images, such as scorpions, for fear that they would find their way from the interstices into life. In fact, until the profane

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prying of Renaissance artists into techniques for making line express character, the mystique of presence surrounding likeness was awesome. From a mere collection of lines into the impression of life - this, according to Gombrich, is the moment of creativity. See Gombrich, *op.cit.*, pp. 109-112.

100 "*Ur*-art," I take it, is a term coined by Jerrold Levinson, in "Defining Art Historically," *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 19, 1979.

101 Max Raphael, *Prehistoric Cave Paintings*, Washington D.C.: Old Dominion Foundation, The Bollingen Series IV, 1946.

102 Raphael, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

103 Neverthless, Raphael insists that there is strong evidence of such complex copying. He compares the compositionally complete Altamira "fresco" with what he calls its "preliminary stages" at Les Combarelles and Font-de-Gaume, which (respectively) influenced its content and form (Raphael, *op.cit.*, pp. 46, 48):

> "The motivation and explanation present at Altamira are lacking [at Les Combarelles]: the force that makes the bison weak, the struggle which externally connects them with the hind and its magic power, the direct opposition of physical force and spiritual power, are not shown. At Les Combarelles, the conception is presented only as a formally articulate process, while at Altamira the content is unfolded into different stages, for whose diversity a unified compositional equivalent was found. This difference affects all the details. At Les Combarelles, the hind embodies the triumphant calm and serenity after victory; at

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Altamira, it represents the forward-striving and inwardly collected strength for the gauging of the magic powers," (Raphael, *op.cit.,* p. 48).

The indefinitely earlier compositional form at Font-de-Gaume, on the other hand, had an all-important influence on the form, as opposed to the content, of the composition at Altamira.

"...here, too [at Font-des-Gaumes], a triangle standing on its apex is the compositional pattern of the whole," (Raphael, *op.cit.,* p. 48).

104 Raphael, *op.cit.,* p. 49.

105 Raphael's lively discussion of what marks off one composition from another (at an *ur*-level) - and, moreover, of how animal figures which are usually taken to be isolated are more properly related within a united composition - is recommended to anyone who remains unconvinced that the influence of one cave painting (that is, its unitary features) on another can be traced.

106 This explains why it has been so problematic in the 20th century to accept as artworks things which are not human creations (driftwood, for example).

107 One can imagine a scale of development showing how contexts of creation presided over by Popes and male rulers have developed such that contexts of creation presided over by women (in the context of the home, for example) can now legitimately classify its products as art. My *prima facie* concern about that way of parsing developments, however, would be the level of continuity involved. Is the continuity significant enough to warrant a transferrence of authority from one context of creation to the other? If not, why call the latter

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"art"? Why not just be happy with "craft," for example? Clearly because craft has played the inferior in the traditional art/craft binary just as woman has been thought to occupy the inferior position in the male/female binary. If we are to overcome such binaristic thinking while thinking developmentally, it is necessary to find a common ground - much as I have argued that there is significant common ground between traditional contexts of creation and display. More needs to be written along these lines if other scales of development are to be adequately developed.

108 Harold Rosenberg, *The Anxious Object: Art Today and Its Audience*, New York: Collier Books, 1964, p. 187.

109 Quoted in Calvin Tomkins, *The World of Marcel Duchamp, 1887-1968*, New York: Time-Life Books, 1966, pp. 38-9.

110 Tomkins, *op.cit.,* p. 39.

111 Tomkins, *op.cit.,* p. 39.

112 Douglas Crimp gives site-specificity more extended discussion in his recent book, *On the Museum's Ruins*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, in the chapter entitled, "Redefining Site-Specificity."

113 Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 287.

114 Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 287.

115 Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 287.

116 Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 162.

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[117] Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 155. Modern art practice is inherently exploitative insofar as it is based on acquisitive commercialism which exploits the labor force that is frequently involved in art-making.

[118] Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 307.

[119] Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 318.

[120] Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 314.

[121] Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 243.

[122] The most progress toward the postmodern answer Crimp is looking for is a series of questions he asks, which he frames as follows:

> "But what is left out of these descriptions of contemporary art? What is, in fact, suppressed? The hidden agenda of this version of recent history [by Rosenblum and Kramer, Rosenthal and Joachamides, and for Fuchs] is the calculated exclusion of the truly significant developments of the art of the past two decades. By characterizing the art of this period as abstract, geometric, intellective, the real terms of art practice are elided. Where do we read in these texts of the critique of the institutions of power that seek to limit the meaning and function of art to the purely aesthetic? Where is a discussion of the attempted dissolution of the beaux-arts mediums and their replacement with modes of production that could better resist those institutions? Where do we find an analysis of work by feminists and minorities whose marginalization by the art institutions became a significant point of departure for the creation of

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alternative practices? Where do we find mention of those direct interventions by artists in their local social environments? Where, in short, in these essays can we learn of the political critique that has been a major force in recent art? The answer is, or course, Nowhere...Is there only an *art* of exhibition? Is there not also a politics of exhibition?" Crimp, *op.cit.,* p. 256.

123 Michel Foucault, *Of Other Spaces*, trans. Jay Miskowiec, *Diacritics*, Spring 1986, p. 23.

124 Foucault, *op.cit.,* p. 27. Mary Wiseman points out that it was Roland Barthes, in his 1977 Inaugural Lecture on literary criticism, who first tried to conceptualize the institutional crisis symptomatic of postmodernism. The postmodern condition, he wrote, is characterized by the mingling of ideas, past and present, a mingling unrestrainable by institutions, where "the old values are no longer transmitted, no longer circulate, no longer impress" and thus, given our freedom to choose between values, "it is a moment at once decadent and prophetic, a moment of gentle *apocalypse*." See Roland Barthes, "In inauguration of the Chair of Literary Semiology, College de France, January 7, 1977," *October*, 8, (Spring 1980), p. 16. Quoted centrally in Mary Wiseman, *The Ecstacies of Roland Barthes*, New York: Routledge, 1989.

125 B.F. Skinner, *Walden Two*, New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1948.

126 Hilde Hein, *The Exploratorium: The Museum as Laboratory*, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990, pp. 162-3.

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127 Judith H. Dobrizynski, "Anonymous Gifts for Art So Women Creating it Aren't," in *The New York Times*, Sunday, October 12, 1997.

128 Becker, *op.cit.*, p. 104.

129 One could choose a predicate that suggests sensitivity to the most minute difference between two qualia, but for the rough and ready purposes of aesthetic analysis, matching will certainly do. Its predicate form is a two-place relation between a feature value x and a feature value y: 'x matches y' (which, according to common sense, has the same meaning as 'x is the same as y'). On the other hand, if one wanted to choose a predicate that would indicate whether two qualities are more or less similar than some other pair (instead of just whether they are similar), one might consult Nelson Goodman's *Structure of Appearance*, Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1951, pp. 194-203, in which he details how to choose a basic predicate for a phenomenalist system of quality-orders.

130 Danto admits to taking the title of his book, *Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (as a joke) from the title of a book by a fictional character: the envied Miss Jean Brodie, in Muriel Spark's *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie*. See *Embodied Meanings*, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1994, p. 7.

131 Tomkins, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

132 The three artworks are juxtaposed in *Camera Work: A Pictorial Guide*, ed. Marianne Fulton Margolis, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1978, which is a book containing reproductions of all 559 illustrations and plates that appeared in Stieglitz' *Camera Work*, the

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journal, between 1903 and 1917. A photocopy of this page appears after the endnotes, on page 207.

133 I use such long descriptive passages from Danto because I lack (as yet) a reproduction of the work he is describing.

134 Danto, *Beyond the Brillo Box*, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1992, p. 43.

135 Danto, *Beyond the Brillo Box, op.cit.,* p. 41.

136 Mel Bochner, "Serial Art, Systems, Solipsism," in *Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Gregory Battock New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1968, p. 100.

137 Danto, *Embodied Meanings, op.cit.,* pp. 268-9.

138 Danto, *Embodied Meanings*, op. cit., p. 269.

139 Since the number of feature categories equals that of the artworks, I have switched around the axes.

140 Danto, *Beyond the Brillo Box*, op. cit., pp. 43-4.

141 See his argument in *Transfiguration of the Commonplace*.

142 If they cannot be admitted through the same frame, can duplicate artworks be framed one after another? There is no reason why not. A mound of dirt can be framed. Why one would wish to do this is another question.

143 Richard Wollheim, "Danto's Gallery of Indiscernibles," in *Danto and His Critics, op.cit.*

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144 The criteria I am using to generate the logical possibilities can be represented as follows:

CATEGORIES

ordered by:

singular/multiple	classifiers/historians	revisable/not
1. singular	classifiers	not
2. multiple	classifiers	not
3. singular	historians	not
4. multiple	historians	not
5. singular	classifiers	revisable
6. multiple	classifiers	revisable
7. singular	historians	revisable
8. multiple	historians	revisable

The last four cases are discontinuous, marked by un-revisability.

145 Lucian Krukowski, "A Basis For Attributions of Art," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 39, 1980.

146 Krukowski (1980), *op.cit.,* pp. 72-3.

147 'Presentism' meaning looking into the past without correcting for the assumptions we make in the present.

148 Danto quoted by Stecker quoted by Levinson in "Extending Art Historically," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51:3, 1993, p. 415.

149 Levinson (1993), *op.cit.,* p. 415.

150 Mary Wiseman calls for a postmodern rethinking of the shape of biography:

> "Scramble the signs 'past', 'present', and 'future', surrendering origins and ends thereby.

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The postmodern cannot inherit what the modern refuses, namely, what the father hands down. For the father is no more origin than the heir is; the line of descent has lost its direction and its singularity. There are instead lines which go in all directions." Mary Wiseman, *op.cit.*, p. 194.

Mapped onto *art* history, such a picture of history would be best described by the eighth version of art history described above.

151 The notion of *correctness*, or truth in interpretation, is one that I only use analogically. Consider a typical frame (page 102). The way the candidate is juxtaposed with the framing set has the look of a wff being tried for consistency with a set of wffs. But again, I do not take this literally; for though the set-up structures are similar, the procedures for testing a wff for consistency with a set of wffs is entirely different from the procedures for trying a art-candidate for fit.

152 Danto, *Beyond the Brillo Box* op. cit., p. 37; and Dickie, *The Art Circle*, New York: Haven Publications, 1984, p. 55.

153 Nelson Goodman, op. cit., p. 117-119. Morris Weitz, *op.cit.*

154 The implication is that artworks used in multiple frames will have multiple interpretations within an art history.

155 Levinson (1979), *op.cit.*

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[156] Michael Baxandall, *Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 110.

[157] Jerry Fodor, "*Déja Vu* All Over Again: How Danto's Aesthetics Recapitulates the Philosophy of Mind," in *Danto and His Critics, op.cit.*

[158] A 'charge' consists of the material constraints placed on a commissioned work, as well as the body of previous works in the assigned genre which the artist acknowledges as worthy of the term 'art'; whereas a 'brief' consists of the artist's way of meeting the expectations presented by his charge by translating the generic features into his own stylistic idiom Baxandall, op. cit., pp. 46-7.

[159] Alberti, *op.cit.*

[160] Baxandall claims that Piero preferred his own concept of *commensurazione* to Alberti's concept of *composizione*. Baxandall, op.cit., p.111.

[161] Baxandall, op. cit., p. 120.

[162] Drawn from Baxandall, op. cit., pp. 121-35.

[163] Baxandall, op. cit., p. 65.

[164] This, I saw (June 1997) at the Metropolitan Museum's exhibit, "The Glory of Byzantium." The medium is tempera on panel - one of several panels in a series labelled "Deesis and Feast Scenes." The series was on loan from The Holy Monastery of St. Catherine in Sinai, Egypt. Included are the following genre figures: two angel onlookers holding Jesus's outer garment, a dove

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(which looks like more of a scraggly goose falling from the sky), and a John the Baptist who uses his hands rather than a sacramental bowl. There are no other onlookers. Jesus's figure is flacid - chubby, one hand hanging at his side, the other hand blessing with one finger extended. He looks either bored or apprehensive. The water is glassy and the scene is set up in the usual way: the shore outline dividing Jesus from John the Baptist and the onlookers. While the figures and their expressions are primitive compared with the later Baptisms, the color composition in this painting is spectacularly well-preserved. But color is not a category that has been considered important in the Baptism genre. Still, for me, it would not fade into the background - mainly because of my twentieth-century appreciation of color composition in the abstract.

165 Contrast his landscape, for example, with the landscapes of all but Masolino (2e). On the one hand, their blankness serves the function of drawing attention to the (already foregrounded) Baptism. But this treatment - using the techniques of linear perspective only to the extent that it serves to depict the Baptism - does not allow the painter *full* employment of the powers of linear perspective. Baxandall argues that Piero's unusual charge, involving confinement to the dimensions of an altarpiece, justified his exploration of pictorial depth as a means to do much more than straightforwardly tell the story. (There was, of course, an alternative: since Gerini's Baptism had the dimensions of an altarpiece, Piero could have simply modeled his strategy on Gerini's.)

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166 Noël Carroll, "Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51:3, p. 322.

167 Patricia Simons, "Women in Frames," in *The Explanding Discourse: Feminism and Art History*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992, p. 39. Originally published in 1988. It is worth noting that this was the time that was formative for Leonardo da Vinci's analytical (mneumonic) treatment of facial and bodily types.

168 Simons, *op.cit.,* p. 43.

169 Simons, *op.cit.,* p. 43.

170 Simons, *op.cit.,* p. 45.

171 Hesse's *Expanded Expansion* is an example Danto gives in his piece on Hesse in Danto, *Embodied Meanings*, op. cit.

172 Danto, *Embodied Meanings*, op. cit., p. 268.

173 Hans Haacke, *Framing and Being Framed: Works 1970-75*, New York, The Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, Halifax & New York University Press, 1975, p. 130.

174 Haacke, *op.cit.,* p. 130.

175 Haacke, *op.cit.,* , p. 132.

176 Levinson (1979), op. cit., p. 236.

177 Levinson, "Refining Art Historically," in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 47:1, 1989, pp. 25-6.

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[178] Levinson (1993), op. cit., p. 417.

[179] Levinson (1993), *op.cit.*, p. 415.

[180] Levinson, *op.cit.*, p. 247.

[181] Marx Wartofsky, "Perception, Representation, and the Forms of Action: Towards an Historical Epistemology," in *Models: Representation and the Scientific Understanding*, Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979, p. 207. Originally published in 1973.

[182] To see how Wartofsky's view of art historical continuity is positioned in this account, see page 113.

[183] Krukowski (1980), op. cit., p. 73.

[184] Krukowski (1980), op. cit., p. 74.

[185] Mary Wiseman made me aware of the possibility of taking a Rawlsian line when discussing with me her then upcoming paper on women as symbols: "Gendered Symbols," in *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 56:3, 1998. But the appeal to precedent, I would venture, is what is most often used. Piero borrowed from Donatello and Della Robia in designing the figuration for his Christ-revering angels. When adding the corresponding new set of features to the list of feature categories, an appeal was made to this precedent, though, arguably, the *Cantoria* angels do not belong to the art history (narrowly construed my way, as opposed to Krukowski's way) of the Baptism genre.

[186] Noël Carroll, "Art, Practice, and Narrative," in *The Monist* 71, 1988, p. 150.

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187 Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art," in *Philosophical Review* 79, 1970, p. 355.

188 The fact that art is divided into sensory realms, I take to be historically contingent.

189 Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 172-175.

190 Goehr, *op.cit.*, p. 173.

191 This framing theory has no ontological commitments to anything other than the art object, understood as the thing in the frame (as things that frame it). Take away the framing context and the object ceases to be an artwork, but it does not cease to be. Now, here, my grammar sounds as though I am committed to the existence of two things: the artwork and the host object. But it only sounds so because I have, in effect, quantified objectually over the bound variable that takes art objects for values. What I mean by this is as follows. Suppose that I quantify objectually over a variable that takes a painting as its value. If I attribute to it the property of being naturalistic - i.e., I assert, "This painting is naturalistic" - I seem (grammatically) to be making an assertion of the form 'Nxy,' which asserts a relation between two distinct entities: a painting (x) and its naturalism (y). Commitment to the existence of properties may be avoided by using, instead, substitutional quantification - i.e., I assert, "This painting has the property of naturalism" - which (grammatically) is an assertion of the form 'Nx' and commits thereby to only one entity: a painting (x).

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Now, the same thing is true of asserting that the painting is an artwork. The grammatical form of this assertion is 'Axy' if the sentence is objectually quantified. A relation between two entities - the painting and the artwork - is implied. But if I were to assert instead, "This painting has the property of having earned art status," then the grammatical form of the sentence would be 'Ax,' which asserts only one entity: the painting (x).

According to this theory, to have the property of having earned art status is to have the property of having been successfully framed under some complex description. Thus, to say something is an artwork is to say, "This has the property of having been successfully framed under the following description..."

But, it will be objected, even substitutional quantification commits one to the existence of entities called 'properties,' since how can a property be *possessed* if it does not exist? Very well, to say that something is an artwork is to point to that thing and say, "This has been successfully framed under the following description..." An artwork may be defined, then, as that which is framed.

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Illustration 1

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

FISH

Polished bronze. 5" × 16 7/8" 1 × 1/8"
(12.7 × 42.9 × 2.9 cm.). 1924
Inscribed: N.1 C. BRÂNCUSI-PARIS-1924
[printed with punches]
Collection Mr. and Mrs. James W. Alsdorf. Winnetka. Illinois. 1968

Provenance
Private Collection. New York
Mrs. Hilda C. Rodman
Maynard Walker Gallery. New York
Mrs. Meredith Hare
Mrs. Charles Rumsey. acquired from the artist

Exhibitions
New Chenil Galleries. London. 1925. no. 3
Brummer Gallery. New York. 1926. no. 14. pl. 14
Arts Club of Chicago. 1927
Guggenheim Museum. New York. 1955–56
Philadelphia Museum. 1956
Staempfli Gallery. New York. 1960. no. 11

References
Geist no. 147
This Quarter. 1925. pl. 23
Einstein. 1931. pl. 621
Giedion-Welcker. 1959. pl. 66

Of approximately the same height and length as the marble *Fish* from which it derives. the bronze increases in thickness by almost a third. a modification achieved in an intermediate plaster. Brancusi mounts the metal *Fish* on a conventional base abandoning the reflective disk of the original. This spare gleaming object carries the idea of fish to an extreme of abstraction.

Brancusi told the American sculptor Malvina Hoffman that he did not want to do a fish but "the flash of its spirit."

Illustration 2 Page - 205

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Illustration 3

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

UPPER LEFT: *VII. Drawing*, by Picasso. June 1913, SN:53. Halftone. 17.2 x 27.8 cm. UPPER RIGHT: *VIII. Star-Dancer on Board a Transatlantic Steamer*, by Picabia. June 1913, SN:55. Halftone. 21.0 x 15.3 cm. LOWER LEFT: *I. Venice*, by Eduard J. Steichen. Oct. 1913, 44:5 [pub. Mar. 1914]. Original negative; photogravure. 16.5 x 19.9 cm. LOWER RIGHT: *II. Two Towers—New York*, by Alfred Stieglitz. Oct. 1913, 44:7 [pub. Mar. 1914]. Original negative; photogravure. 19.5 x 15.9 cm.

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

Eva Hesse. *Metronomic Irregularity II*

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Illustration 6

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

Number 29, 1950 1950

Illustration 7 Page - 210

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Plate 38 Sol LeWitt, *Double Floor Structure*, 1964
Painted wood (destroyed, remade in painted steel), 30" × 48" × 144"
(The Contemporary Museum, Honolulu; photo courtesy Margo Leavin Gallery, Los Angeles, photo by Douglas M. Parker Studio)

Illustration 8

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Plate 26. Robert Morris. *Untitled*. 1965
Painted plywood, each unit 8' × 8' × 2' (destroyed)
(*Photo by Rudolph Burckhardt. © Robert Morris/V.A.G.A., New York, 1989*)





Plate 27 Robert Morris. *Battered Cubes*. 1965-88
Painted steel, each unit 36" × 36" × 36"
[illegible]

Illustration 9

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49 Giusto de' Menabuoi, *Baptism of Christ*. Fresco, about [illegible] Baptistry of the Cathedral, Padua

[illegible] Ascribed to Niccolò di Pietro Gerini, Detail from the *Baptism of Christ*. Panel [illegible] National Gallery, London

47 (facing page top) Giotto, *Baptism of Christ*. Fresco, about [illegible] Scrovegni Chapel, Padua

48 (facing page bottom) Masolino, *Baptism of Christ*. Fresco, about [illegible] Baptistry, Castiglione d'Olona

51 Giovanni di Paolo, *Baptism of Christ*. Panel, mid fifteenth century. National Gallery, London

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IV. Piero della Francesca, *Baptism of Christ*. Panel, about 1440–50. National Gallery, London.

Illustration 11

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

The Goldman Sachs Art Program Brochure 1987





Illustration 12

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On The Cover

Top Left:
Frank Stella
Illustrations After El Lissitzky's Had Gadva: Front Cover, 1984
Mixed-media relief print
42 1/2" x 33 7/8"
Edition of 60
GS-2047

Middle Left:
Crewelwork, New England
(probably Massachusetts), 1740
Linen and Wool
88" x 84"
GS-0389

Bottom Left:
Olla, Anasazi
(Southwestern United States)
c. 1200
Pottery
12" x 14"
GS-0695

Top Right:
Mel Bochner
Black Out, 1982
Oil on canvas
63" x 53 3/4"
GS-2046

Bottom Right:
Louis Sullivan
Elevator Grille, 139.
Iron and bronze
83 3/4" x 41"
GS-0128

Illustration 13

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Little Bird



1927-31 polished bronze, height 73" (cat. no. 201)

1928 polished bronze, height 15 5/8" (cat. no. 186)

Illustration 15

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






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

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