INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY: A RUSSIAN CASE STUDY OF SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST-SOVIET CONTEXT

By

Julie Anderson

VOLUME I

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2008

UMI Number: 3303795

Copyright 2008 by
Anderson, Julie

All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 3303795
Copyright 2008 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

©2008

JULIE ANDERSON

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Dr. Irving L. Markovitz

Date	Chair of Examining Committee

Ruth O'Brien

Date	Executive Officer

Dr. Asher Arian

Dr. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner

Dr. Kenneth Erickson

Dr. Yitzak Brudny
Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY: A RUSSIAN CASE STUDY OF SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST-SOVIET CONTEXT

by

Julie Anderson

Advisor: Dr. Irving L. Markovitz

In this dissertation, I construct a general theory of intelligence transformation as an essential aspect of a state's political transition. Filling the vacuum in the literature on the critical secret police transformation *process*, the project's findings are intended to serve as a guide to the political elites of states struggling to make transitions to democracy. I identify the conditions necessary for a secret police transformation into intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms, a necessary condition for a post-communist state's transition to democracy. Theoretically, I argue that a lustration/vetting/de-communization (LVD) policy — a procedure for disallowing former high-ranking communist party and secret police officials and their agents and collaborators from holding high political or public office — implemented in the political arena contributes to the democratization of a post-communist state, and its institution in the intelligence/security sector is a necessary condition for a secret police transformation.

After developing an analytically useful and comparative model to illustrate the secret police transformation and democratic political transition processes, I use the Russian intelligence/security services in the post-Soviet context as a case study. I show that the post-Soviet Russian government's failure to institute LVD is a significant factor

in explaining why the country's transition to political democracy failed, with the secret police unreformed and, in fact, resurgent, and the political and economic sectors, dominated by chekists in partnership with organized crime, deeply criminalized.

Throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century, many Russia scholars, U.S. policymakers, and observers interpreted Russia's transition from communism as one moving toward the establishment of democracy. While those views are no longer widely espoused, my research shows that Russian democratization had serious problems from the beginning, posed most prominently by its failure to institute LVD and transform its secret police. Challenging the argument that post-Soviet Russia was democratizing, this dissertation shows how the state was moving toward authoritarianism, and how its true political direction could have been identified much sooner by an assessment of the nature and activities of the chekists and post-Soviet intelligence/security services in conjunction with the political-intelligence relationship as it evolved over the years.

Acknowledgements

This project was completed with the inspiration and support of a wide range of individuals and organizations, who have forever my deep and heartfelt thanks.

The sources who provided materials and assistance, and helped me gain a better understanding of the nature and activities of the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services were invaluable. Many of those individuals, who shall remain anonymous, were also genuinely enjoyed and appreciated as the truly wonderful people that they are. They have my upmost respect, gratitude, and best wishes. My memories of our interactions always bring great pleasure to the mind and I will never forget the enjoyable times we shared, as well as your contributions at both the personal and professional levels.

This project is also meant to honor the memory of the many freedom-loving people who have sought to bring democracy, openness, and human rights to Russia, but died early deaths as a result of their quest, including in particular the first prominent democratic political activist to be murdered in cold blood since Putin became FSB director, Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova, who originated the law on lustration with the aim of generating a public debate on the issue in hopes of it leading ultimately to the end of secret police repression, abuses, and disrespect for law, freedom, and human rights in Russia. The dream for liberty can never be snuffed out.

I am forever grateful to my dissertation sponsor and academic advisor, Dr. Irving Markovitz, and the other members of my committee, among the best scholars out there, who over the years unrelentingly encouraged and inspired, taught, pushed, supported, motivated, and had full confidence in me to stay the course and complete the project. Their suggestions and advice on the dissertation, and my professional development as well, were priceless. Indeed, if not for their input, this project may still have been a work in progress, nearing page 2000. Special thanks, Dr. Markovitz, for building my intellectual capacity and analytical skills. I've always greatly respected the human decency that continually emanates from you. Dr. Asher Arian, my dissertation reader, thanks for your consistent prodding and teaching me the importance of knowing the right questions to ask; Dr. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, I have much gratitude for your providing me the opportunities and inspiration to expand my research on intelligence and international security issues to the Central American/Caribbean region; Dr. Kenneth Erickson, your interest and wealth of comments and input to this project are deeply appreciated; and Dr. Yitzak Brudny, thanks so much for contributing your expertise on Russia to the project. I am extremely grateful to all of you.

I also thank all those City University of New York (CUNY) professors, administrative staff, President Bill Kelly, who never let me forget the D-word, the provost's office, and others whom have played an important role in my professional growth over the years. The teaching opportunities were splendid, and enriched my intellectual life and skills immensely. It was a very rewarding time in my life and I know that my decision to pursue my doctorate at the Graduate Center-CUNY was the best choice. The opportunities and support provided were first-rate. My gratitude also goes to Ted

Fraumann and Stu Cohen, thanks for your interest in my success. And Jonathan Kranz, special thanks to you for being there always and from the very beginning.

Thanks also go to the Professional Staff Congress (PSC), which provided me the opportunity to engage in and enjoy a variety of experiences dedicated to improving the business of education. As well, I want to extend a big thanks to Helen Keier and Judy Waldman for their assistance in depositing this project.

I want to recognize the contributions of the Association for Intelligence Officers, which has played an influential role in my life, and for awarding me the prestigious Maria Ransburg Scholarship in support of this project. Many members of this organization, Gene Poteat, Elizabeth Bancroft, Jerry Goodwin, David Hunt, yes, tenacity wins, Art Hulnick, Chet Burger, Robert Langworthy, Robert Pringle, Calland Carnes, John Hedley, William Nolte, Jack Devine, and others provided me insights into a complex topic generally difficult to uncover. They also were the inspiration to persevere in my quest on the darkest days, my anchor in the sea. Their understanding and friendship were pivotal. My gratitude to them is beyond mere words. I also thank the Graduate Center-CUNY for awarding me the Randolph Braham Dissertation Fellowship in support of my field work in Russia, and those colleagues at the UN Intellectual History Project who supported and encouraged me as well.

The editor-in-chief of the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Richard Valcourt, will always be remembered for his long-running interest in and contribution to my personal and professional development. His editing and publication of my articles on intelligence have been greatly appreciated, as has his warm friendship.

There are also a number of individuals outside CUNY who had a substantial effect on my life as I pursued academic excellence, physical fitness, mental toughness, and a Ph.D. in preparation for my career. Many officers of the New York Police Department deserve special thanks, especially Curtis Dixon, you will always be dear, and the NYPD Running Club, as well as Austin Isherwood, Al Kulian, and William Dungus. You are all unquestionably the finest. My sincere thanks also to Doug Escher and Judge Scott Fairgrieve in Nassau county for your support and friendship, and Scott/Mary Podolsky and family out in Suffolk county, who never stopped saying, “you can do it.” In addition, Robert Shipsey, you made a difference and know how to always bring a smile to my face.

And I have long been grateful to my former professors and mentors at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), who were my heroes when I found my passion for intelligence. Dr. Eugene Moehring, I persevered, your enduring support was key, and thanks for teaching me how to write; Dina Titus, you are a winner, interested in developing the very best in people, and I’ll always vote for you; Andrew Tuttle, you knew when I got that A in intelligence, thanks for your insights and direction, and know I’m still happy on the range; and Jerry Simich, so did you, your ever-pleasant spirit and incisive legal intellect always impressed me. Thanks to all of you for your interest, inspiration, support, and confidence in my ability to reach my goals, and launching me forward. I have a lot of love for all of you. And Joseph Albini, I’ll always value our

special relationship. You were right, and thanks for mentoring me. It was an honor and a pleasure, and I've got my Ph.D. and career. The endeavor to understand the evolving role and activities of Russian intelligence has been a fascinating and intellectually rewarding one. Thanks for opening those doors, and your close friendship.

I thank my parents for their role and influence in this long-running quest. Mom, you started it and I finished it. You were there to the end. Dad, I followed your example and proved hard work brings great rewards. Thanks to both of you for passing on the character traits necessary to succeed. And I want to thank the U.S. government and taxpayers, for if there had been no Pell Grant Program to support me in the early years of my higher education, the outcome may have been very different. The liberty, the freedom, of being an American helped too! Most of all, I thank my dear son, Steven, who sacrificed and endured right along with me. It is to him and his love for right, choice, and freedom that I dedicate this work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT……iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS……ix
LIST OF FIGURES……xviii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……xx

PART ONE: THEORETICAL ISSUES

INTRODUCTION……1

CHAPTER 1 – INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1: INTRODUCTION……40
1.2: THE NORMS ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY AND DEFINITIONS……42
1.3: THE NEED FOR A ROADMAP……45
1.4: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATIONS……46
1.5: SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AS A GAUGE OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT……49
1.6: THE CONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND THEIR SEQUENCING……51
1.7: DUAL TRANSITIONS AND TRANSITION CLASSIFICATIONS — POST-COMMUNIST STATES HAVE UNEQUAL STARTING POINTS……56
1.7.1: On the Precondition of a History and Culture of Democracy……57
1.7.2: On the Precondition of National Unity and Identity, and Violent Separatism — A Complicating Factor……59
1.8: THE SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL TRANSITION PROCESSES……66
1.8.1: The Precondition of Lustration/Vetting/De-Communization (LVD)……66
1.9: THE CONDITIONS FOR A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL TRANSITION AND THEIR SEQUENCING……68
1.10: THE CONDITIONS FOR A SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AND THEIR SEQUENCING……73
1.11: SPECIFIC CHALLENGES TO AND LEGACIES OF POST-COMMUNIST STATES……80
1.12: THE NEED FOR THE ACADEMIC STUDY OF SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AS A CONDITION FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ……93
1.12.1: Decisions on Intelligence Transformation Play a Pivotal Role in the Political Transition Process……95

1.12.2: The Intelligence/Security Sector is a Unique Element of the Bureaucracy……....116
1.13: CONCLUSION……..118

CHAPTER 2 – THE PIVOTAL PRECONDITION: LVD — ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

2.1: INTRODUCTION……..…..120
2.2: THE COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE SHOWS LVD'S POSITIVE ROLE IN SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION……...120
2.3: DISEMPOWERING OLD NETWORKS AND DEVELOPING USABLE, PROFESSIONAL, AND DEPOLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SERVICES……...…125
2.4: EARLY LUSTRATION AND "STARTING FROM SCRATCH"...……..130
2.5: INCOMPLETE OR DELAYED LUSTRATION SLOWS DEMOCRATIZATION…….……..……...…138
2.6: POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING AN LVD POLICY……...…145
2.6.1: The Importance of the Secret Police Files…….…145
2.6.2: Preemptive Bolstering of Agent Ties and Infiltration of Opposition Groups……...…..151
2.6.3: LVD Must Be Statutory-Based…….…….……152
2.6.4: Antagonists Will Always Exist…….……..157
2.6.5: Stacking the Commission and Inaccurate Files……..…….…...159
2.6.6: A Brief Example: Problems in Poland's LVD Process……..163
2.7: LVD IS A LESS EXTREME OPTION TO EFFECTIVE TRANSFORMATION…….….164
2.8: CONCLUSION……167

CHAPTER 3 – THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS AND SEQUENCING FOR A SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS

3.1: INTRODUCTION…….……..….169
3.2: THE PRECONDITION OF LUSTRATION/VETTING/ DE-COMMUNIZATION (LVD)…….……....169
3.3: THE PRIMARY CONDITION: THE RULE LAW……..…...170
3.4: THE SECONDARY CONDITIONS……172
3.4.1: Intelligence/Security Services Must Be Based on Statutory/Legal Mandates……...…..172
3.4.2: Mandates Must Set Legal Constraints on Intelligence/Security Sector Methods: Respect for Civil Rights and Political Freedoms……179
3.4.3: Political Control and Democratic Accountability Must Be Established...…193
a) A Democratic Culture Factors In……..……..…….…….201

b) The Political-Intelligence Relationship — Intelligence/Security Services Must Be Depoliticized and Professional..……..……...…..205
c) The Secrecy-Accountability Tension...…….....……...…208
d) The Challenges Inherent to Legislative Oversight…….....…..…210
3.4.4: A New Democratic Organizational Culture and Mentality Must Be Promoted……...…..…219
3.5: A BRIEF EXAMPLE: THE ROMANIAN CASE…….…….…..…227
3.6: CONCLUSION…….....234

CHAPTER 4 – INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SERVICE TYPOLOGIES AND MODELS

4.1: INTRODUCTION…….…….....235
4.2: INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SERVICE MODELS AND TYPOLOGIES……..235
4.2.1: The Lack of a Comparative, Dynamic Model of Intelligence/Security Service Transformation Within a Distinct Political Context……...….235
4.2.2: The "Diffuse Definitions" Problem…….....237
4.2.3: On the Factors that Differentiate Intelligence/Security Services……...…238
4.3: THE KELLER MODEL……...240
4.3.1: Oversight as a Variable of Intelligence/Security Service Typology Shift…..257
4.3.2: Political Control as a Variable of Intelligence/Security Service Typology Shift.....259
4.3.3: On the Positive Aspects of Keller's Work…….....262
4.4: THE WILLIAMS AND DELETANT MODEL……...…262
4.5: THE GILL MODEL…….....270
4.6: THE BAR-JOSEPH MODEL……..273
4.7: THE LOS AND ZYBERTOWICZ MODEL……...…277
4.8: A FINAL WORD ON EXISTING MODELS…….282
4.9: STATIC TYPOLOGIES AND A LEAP TO COMPLEX MODELS THAT DEPICT DYNAMIC POLITICAL-INTELLIGENCE CHANGE PROCESSES…283
4.10 A NEW AND COMPARATIVE INTELLIGENCE TRANSFORMATION MODEL……...…….....284
4.11: CONCLUSION…….…..…290

PART TWO: EMPIRICAL REALITIES

CHAPTER 5 – RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SECTOR FUNCTIONS, STRUCTURES, POWERS, AND STATUTORY MANDATES

5.1: INTRODUCTION…….....292
5.2: POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SERVICE STRUCTURES……...…..292
5.2.1: Preliminaries……...……...292
5.2.2: Russian Intelligence/Security Sector Structures (1991-1996), Yeltsin's First Term.....294

5.2.3: Russian Intelligence/Security Sector Structures (1996-2000), Yeltsin's Second Term.....298
5.2.4: Russian Intelligence/Security Sector Structures (2000-2004), Putin's First Term…….…299
a) FSB Structural Changes and Power Increases, 2000……299
b) March 2001 Personnel Changes……....301
c) 2002 Structures at a Glance……...302
d) The March 11, 2003 Reorganization…….303
e) The 2004 FSB Reorganization…….....…..308
5.3: THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL…….…….....312
5.4: RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SECTOR MANDATES…….....316
5.4.1: A Note on Intelligence/Security Service Functions……...318
5.5: THE FSB MANDATE…….…...….320
5.5.1: The 1995-1996 FSB Mandates……...320
5.5.2: The 1997 FSB Mandate……..323
5.5.3: The 1998 FSB Mandate — Putin Is Appointed FSB Director……..…….....324
a) Threat Identification and FSB Functions, Structures, and Powers……325
b) Military Counterintelligence, Still a KGB-FSB Prerogative.……330
c) FSB Structures at the "Centre"……..333
d) Regional FSB Structures…….……..334
e) The FSB Academy…….....337
f) Provisions for Political Control, Parliamentary Oversight/Democratic Accountability Mechanisms…….……..339
g) FSB Active Measures…….....340
h) Ombudsman/Citizen Complaints…….....341
i) FSB Chains-of-Command and Leadership Appointments…..……...…….342
j) FSB Cooperation with the SVR and GRU…….....343
5.5.4: The August 2003 FSB Mandate……..…...345
5.6: THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE (SVR) MANDATE……...…..….349
5.6.1: Identified Threat Perceptions and SVR Functions……...……..352
5.6.2: SVR Structures……...353
5.6.3: The SVR Academy…….……359
5.6.4: Provisions for Political Control, Parliamentary Oversight/Democratic Accountability Mechanisms……..…...……...……..……361
5.6.5: SVR Chains-of-Command and Leadership Appointments…….…...…362
5.7: THE FAPSI MANDATE…….…….……363
5.7.1: FAPSI Functions, Structures, and Powers..…….....364
5.7.2: FAPSI and the CIS…….372
5.7.3: SIGINT/ELINT at External Military Bases…….....373
5.7.4: The FAPSI Academy……..378
5.7.5: Provisions for Political Control, Parliamentary Oversight/Democratic Accountability Mechanisms…….…..……...….379
5.7.6: FAPSI Chains-of-Command and Leadership Appointments…….....379
5.8: THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (GRU) MANDATE…….....380
5.8.1: Identified Threat Perceptions…….380
5.8.2: GRU Functions, Structures, and Powers..…….....382

5.8.3: The GRU Academy……390
5.8.4: Provisions for Political Control, Parliamentary Oversight/Democratic Accountability Mechanisms…….....391
5.8.5: GRU Chains-of-Command and Leadership Appointments……..……392
5.9: THE STATE TECHNICAL COMMISSION (GTK)……..…….....393
5.10: CONCLUSION……..……395

VOLUME II

CHAPTER 6 – CHEKIST POWER AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT: NO LIBERAL CHEKISTY

6.1: INTRODUCTION……....396
6.2: THE ROLE OF THE CHEKISTS IN DOMESTIC POLITICS……..….400
6.2.1: On the Political Policymaking (Rather than Enforcer) Role of the Intelligence/Security Services…….……..…..400
6.2.2: Elections as a Vehicle to Chekist Infiltration of Political and Government Structures…….……..401
6.2.3: Power Relationships Under Putin……..….408
6.2.4: Chekist Political Penetration Goes Nationwide: Both "Vertical" and "Horizontal," the Matrix is Complete…….....416
6.2.5: Chekist Continuity in the Security Sector……..419
6.2.6: The Nature and Development of the Chekist-Ensured Lack of Political Opposition: Chekist Manipulation of the Electoral System and Parties…….425
6.2.7: The Law on Political Parties and Shaping of a Rubber-Stamp Parliament....432
6.2.8: The Law on Government — Top Officials and Bureaucrats as Leading Party Members……...……440
6.2.9: Summaries of the Duma Election Results, 2003 and 1999……444
6.2.10: Chekist Manipulation of Electoral Politics Using the Courts……...447
6.2.11: Chekist-Engineered Negation of Opposition in the Judicial Branch and Legal Process…….451
6.3: POLITICAL MURDER ON THE PUTIN WATCH……...……460
6.3.1: Chekist-Siloviki as the Hired Killers……..461
a) The Murder of Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova……....461
b) The Murder of Duma Deputy Vladimir Golovlev……..469
c) The Murder of Magadan Governor Valentin Tsvetkov……..471
d) The Murder of Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov……..473
e) The Murder of Duma Deputy Yuri Shchekochikhin…….….474
6.3.2: Why Contract Killings Are Rarely Solved…….477
6.3.3: The Use of Violence for Political Objectives is the Norm…….……483
6.4: CONCLUSION……485

CHAPTER 7 – FUNCTIONS AND METHODS: STILL A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STATE

7.1: INTRODUCTION……..….....487

7.2: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE……...…487
7.2.1: Anonymous Tips and an Informer Society……..…492
7.2.2: Repression of Political Opposition and the Serious Decline in Political Participation……...…….493
7.2.3: Political Surveillance of Academic and Research Institutions: Scientists And Scholars……..498
7.3: THE LAW "ON STATE SECRETS" — "SPY MANIA," SHOW TRIALS……..502
7.3.1: The Case of Valentin Danilov……505
7.3.2: The Case of Igor Sutyagin……..509
7.3.3: The Case of Former Navy Captain Alexander Nikitin……...516
7.3.4: The Case of Military Journalist Grigory Pasko……..516
7.3.5: The Case of Diplomat Valentin Moiseyev…….519
7.3.6: The Case of KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin……...…….520
7.4: THE FSB'S "SPY MANIA" IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE AS A TOOL OF THE CHEKIST REGIME……....521
7.5: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND WESTERNERS IN PUTIN'S RUSSIA…….522
7.5.1: The Cases of Businessman Edmond Pope and Professor Anatoly Babkin…523
7.5.2: The Case of Fulbright Scholar/Master's Student John Tobin……527
7.5.3: The Case of the U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers……...528
7.5.4: The Case of AFL-CIO Representative Irene Stevenson……528
7.5.5: The Cases Against Religious Groups……...……..529
7.5.6.: The Case Against the Salvation Army…….….531
7.5.7: NGO Harassment Intensifies as the Chekists Consolidate Their Power……532
7.6: THE WAR IN CHECHNYA……...533
7.6.1: Chechnya as a Useful Spur to Political Power, Democratic Reversal, and FSB Empowerment……..…...535
7.6.2: Political-Military Relations and Chechnya……543
7.7: CONCLUSION……545

CHAPTER 8 – ECONOMIC CHEKISTRY: ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS AND CHEKIST RELATIONS WITH POLITICAL ELITES, OLIGARCHS, AND ORGANIZED CRIME

.
8.1: INTRODUCTION…….....547
8.2: ON THE POST-SOVIET COLLAPSE AND REQUISITE REDUCTION IN SECURITY SECTOR FORCES…….....550
8.3: THE LACK OF LVD AND THE TRANSMOGRIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY…….....555
8.4: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CHALLENGES……..…….561
8.4.1: The Necessity and Challenge of Breaking Up Old Power Networks…….561
8.4.2: The History and Nature of the "New Oligarchy" Linkages……...562
8.4.3: Organized Crime Infiltration of Political Structures……..566
8.4.4: The Nature and Role of Private Security Services in Russia — "Everybody Needs a Roof"……..…...571
8.4.5: Political Intimidation of Rivals Using State Machinery…….574
a) The Khodorkovsky/Yukos Oil Case……...575

b) Putin and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs……..580
c) Putin's Utilization of Power Institutions to Intimidate and Control Political-Economic Opponents: Anticorruption is a Favorite Theme…....581
8.5: ECONOMIC PROCESSES AND PROGRAMS AND THEIR CHALLENGES...586
8.5.1: The Yeltsin Era: Privatization, Political-Business Intimacy, and Economics — the "Semi-Criminal, Oligarchic Capitalist System" of the 1990s……..……..……..586
a) Two Cases in Point: The Privatizations of Sviazinvest and Norilsk Nikkel…….……..591
8.5.2: The Putin Era: Chekist-Driven Asset Confiscation and Renationalization — A Shift From Oligarchic Capitalism To Bureaucratic Authoritarianism……593
8.6: ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION ROUTINELY ARTICULATED AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT……..……..598
8.7: THE SKURATOV AFFAIR AND PUTIN'S RISE TO POWER.....601
8.8: FINAL OUTCOMES: THE UNIVERSAL VULNERABILITY OF THE "CATCH-22" SITUATION — LEGAL AMBIGUITIES AND LIMBO……..…..605
8.9: CONCLUSION……609

CHAPTER 9 – POLITICAL-INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS: POLITICAL CONTROL, OVERSIGHT, AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES

9.1: INTRODUCTION……..……...612
9.2: PRELIMINARIES AND CONCEPTS…….....615
9.2.1: The Intelligence Producer-Consumer Relationship and Intelligence Depoliticization and Professionalism……617
9.2.2: The Establishment of Intelligence Oversight and Democratic Accountability Contributes to Democratization……621
9.3: THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICY RELATIONSHIP AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS……..……624
9.3.1: Intelligence Interference in Politics and Political Interference in Intelligence……625
9.3.2: Depoliticization of the Intelligence/Security Sector Was Never in the Cards.....626
9.3.3: Attempts to Establish Democratic Oversight Defeated by Ancien Regime Elements……..…..634
9.3.4: Intelligence "Failures," or Intelligence Intervention in Politics?.....641
9.3.5: Intelligence "Failures" — The Empirical Evidence, An FSB Hand?.....644
a) Investigations of 1999 Apartment Bombings Lead to Death and Prison...646
9.3.6: The Polonium-210 Killing of Former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko……...656
9.3.7: An Operationally Effective Intelligence Community……659
9.3.8: A Lack of Oversight and Accountability and Ineffective Intelligence/Security Services……...….....663

9.4: THE NATURE AND STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OVER INTELLIGENCE……..666
9.4.1: The End of Communist Party Control……...666
9.4.2: Four Models of Political Control — Still a Political Police in Russia……..668
9.5: POLITICAL CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE UNDER YELTSIN: FIRST MOVES — PARTY COMPETITION AND FRAGMENTED LOYALTIES, THEN EXECUTIVE DECREE…….…….....673
9.6: POLITICAL CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE UNDER PUTIN: FIRST MOVES — THE POWER "VERTICAL" AND "SEVEN SAMURAI," THEN EXECUTIVE PERSUASION……..681
9.6.1: Reining In the Governors……...686
9.6.2: Kremlin Control Established by Design — Centre-Regional Political Control Structures…….....687
9.7: CIVIL SOCIETY IS THWARTED FROM SERVING AS A DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM…..…….697
9.7.1: The Media — Self-Censorship or Death Comes to Investigative Journalists…...…….....698
9.7.2: The Russian Media Thwarted as an Oversight Mechanism — Violence Against and Death of Investigative Journalists Persists……...……..701
a) The Murder of Dmitri Kholodov……702
b) The Murder of Vladimir Sukhomlin…….....704
c) The Murder of Paul Klebnikov……...705
d) The Murder of Anna Politkovskaya ……..707
9.7.3: Investigative Journalists' Deaths Coincide With That of Democracy in Russia……...710
9.7.4: NGOs: "They Must Be Spies, Working to Stir Up a Revolution"…….....….711
9.7.5: Reporting on Human Rights Abuses in Chechnya and Its Consequences..…714
9.8: THE VERDICT IS IN: THE CHEKISTS THEMSELVES CONTROL THE INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SECTOR…….……716
9.9: CONCLUSION……719

CHAPTER 10 – CHEKIST ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND MENTALITY: ACTIVE MEASURES, SYMBOLS, AND IDENTITY

10.1: INTRODUCTION……..721
10.2: PRELIMINARIES AND CONCEPTS……...723
10.3: THE LVD MESSAGE: A NEW MENTALITY……727
10.4: THE STRATEGIC INERTIA OF CHEKIST ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE……...…...729
10.5: RULE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE ARE REQUIRED FOR PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS……...733
10.6: LVD AS A REMEDY TO THE "CULTURE OF CORRUPTION"…….737
10.7: THE MAKING OF A NEW MENTALITY: INTERNALIZATION OF DIFFERENT VALUES…….…….....740

10.8: PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT: "ACTIVE MEASURES" — THE DECEPTION PROGRAMS CONTINUE…….…….....741
10.8.1: A New Spin: FSB and SVR Web Sites and CDs……...753
10.9: THE USE OF SYMBOLS TO PERPETUATE OLD SOVIET AND CHEKIST CULTURE…….....……..760
10.9.1: "Iron Feliks" Dzerzhinsky Lives……760
10.9.2: Stamps Honor Notorious Counterintelligence Officers: A Chekist Tradition…….……766
10.10: ON THE PERPETUATION OF THE CHEKIST MENTALITY……768
10.10.1: The Annual "Chekists' Day" Celebrations…….....772
10.10.2: "I Am First A Chekist"…….…….…….774
10.11: CONCLUSION……779

CONCLUSION – RUSSIA TRANSFORMED, OR RUSSIA BETRAYED?..…….782

BIBLIOGRAPHY..……...…….....796

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: The Conditions for a Democratic Political Transition and Their Sequencing……..…….……..……...……..…..72

Figure 1.2: The Conditions for a Post-Communist Secret Police Transformation and Their Sequencing…….…….....….....79

Figure 4.1: Keller — Autonomy and Insularity of Internal Security Arrangements……...…….....244

Figure 4.2: Keller — Three Models of Internal Security in a Liberal State…….....246

Figure 4.3: Keller — Three Models of Service and Operations…….....….....264

Figure 4.4: Williams and Deletant — Model of Oversight and Control….....…..269

Figure 4.5: Gill — A Typology of Security Intelligence Agencies…….…....272

Figure 4.6: Bar-Joseph — Four Methods of Political Control of Intelligence……....274

Figure 4.7: Bar-Joseph — Separation Between Intelligence and Politics: A Continuum of Four Approaches……...……..…..……..275

Figure 4.8: Bar-Joseph — Intervention as the Outcome of Intelligence-Politics Relations……....……...…...276

Figure 4.9: Bar-Joseph — Intelligence Intervention in Politics: The Critical Conditions……...…….……....277

Figure 4.10: Matrix of Two Spectrums (Intelligence/Security Sector Transformations and Political System Transitions) and Propositions/Hypotheses……...285

Figure 4.11: Model of Political Transition-Intelligence Transformation ……..…288

Figure 5.1: The SVR Structure as depicted on the official Web site of the FIS….....355

Figure 7.1: Participation in Strikes, Pickets, Sit-In Protests, Traffic Obstruction, 1993-2003…..…….…….…….……495

Figure 7.2: Participation in the Work of Public Organizations……...…….……...496

Figure 8.1: Transparency International Corruption Rankings for Russia, 1996-2004…….....…585

Figure 9.1: Bar-Joseph — Matrix of Political Control of Intelligence.....…..669

Figure 9.2: Replacements of Governors, CFIs, FSB and MVD Chiefs by Years, 2000-2004……..…….……...690

Figure 9.3: Petrov's Depiction of Chekist-Siloviki Replacements in Regions by Years……..……...693

Figure 10.1: Commemorative Counterintelligence Stamps Issued…….768

List of Abbreviations and Terms

Centre – KGB/FSB Headquarters, based in Moscow

centre – Moscow political headquarters, the Kremlin

Chekists – secret police officers, name drawn from VChK, the first Bolshevik secret police, the Cheka

Chekisty – the Chekists (plural)

Chekistry – a term coined by this author that refers to the traditional operational methods and approach of the chekisty, carried on through generations and marked by abuse of power and lack of respect for law, political and human rights

FSB – Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti – Federal Security Service

GRU – Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie – Main Intelligence Department, Military Intelligence

GTK – Gosudarstvenii Tekhnologiam Komissiya, GosTekhKomissiya, State Technical Commission

KGB – Komitet Gosudarsvennoy Bezopasnosti, Committee of State Security

Kompromat – compromising information

LVD – lustration, vetting, de-communization

MVD – Ministerstvo Vnutrenikh Del, Ministry of the Interior

RF – Russian Federation

Siloviki – active, reserve, and retired intelligence, military, and security/police officials. The name comes from the Russian word sila, meaning “strength” or “power.”

SVR – Sluzhba Vneshni Razvedki, Foreign Intelligence Service

Vory-v-zakone – thieves-in-law

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation project entails an investigation of the nature of and conditions for a secret police transformation in the context of a post-communist state's political-economic transition to free-market democracy. I use post-Soviet Russia as a case study, and cover both the Yeltsin and Putin eras. I develop a general theory of intelligence transformation, constructing a dynamic model that identifies the conditions necessary for a secret police transformation into democratically accountable and professional intelligence/security services as part of a post-communist state's transition to democracy. The model depicts the political-intelligence relationship and its application reveals the true form of a political regime based on the nature of this relationship as institutionalized over time.

The major theoretical proposition of this dissertation is that a post-communist state with no history or culture of democracy that is making a transition to democracy is more likely to succeed if a lustration/vetting/de-communization (LVD) policy is immediately instituted since, otherwise, the criteria for democratic development may be effectively prevented or significantly delayed by old regime clients antagonistic to the project remaining in power, with the potential for a successful democratic transition thereby reduced or negated. The term "lustration" refers to the process of screening (or "vetting") candidates for and holders of important public offices through a review of secret police files those who had been agents and collaborators for the old regime, and legislatively disqualifying them (usually bar for a certain period) from holding high political or official positions. The term "de-communization" is based on a similar disqualifying principle [as lustration] applied to former Communist Party officials and

those who held *nomenklatura posts* (important positions appointed by the Communist Party). The idea is to disqualify the most repressive elements from leading positions.

I propose that an LVD policy initiated in the political sector contributes to the democratization of a post-communist state, especially one with no history and culture of democracy, and its institution in the intelligence/security sector is a necessary factor for a secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms. I also propose that a secret police transformation is a necessary condition for such a state to make a democratic transition. Each is contingent on the other. That is because such revolutionary change is unquestionably a matter for the political leadership, and if the requisite political will and commitment to institute democracy is lacking, meaningful and enduring reform will not occur. Intelligence reform, in particular, has always been difficult, regardless of the nature of the political system, given the inevitable resistance of powerful and entrenched interests in a generally insular institution based on an operational concept of mandated secrecy. Thus, it is the nature of the leadership that matters most, and makes the difference in instituting transformational change.

As intelligence experts warned in regard to the U.S. intelligence reform process recommended by the 9/11 Commission in its report released in July 2004, and as reported by the *The Washington Times*, "more than words are needed and [that] political leaders must be willing to step in and push through hard decisions for real reform to come, something unlikely to occur during an election year."[1] To increase the likelihood that a post-communist democratic transition succeeds, an LVD policy should be instituted in

[1] Christian Bourge, "Analysis: Major obstacles to intel reform," *The Washington Times*, August 5, 2004, http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040805-012611-2862r.htm.

the political sector at the outset, followed by its institution in the intelligence/security sector. New democratic-minded political elites must be enabled to acquire the political authority to mandate law-based political-economic reform and, most importantly, intelligence reform. Otherwise, the old secret police will be in position to undermine the democratization project, which is inherently antagonistic to their interests. New, democratic-oriented leadership in the political and intelligence sectors is key.

The evidence shows that post-Soviet Russia's failure to institute LVD contributed to its transmogrified democratic transition to the benefit of the new oligarchy (nomenklatura, chekists, organized criminals) during the Yeltsin era, which arrangement, with Yeltsin's support, served to bolster the power organs, setting the stage for the chekists' wholesale capture of the state under career foreign intelligence officer Putin. As a result of Yeltsin's decision to reject LVD and trade political support for empowerment of the old Soviet KGB, albeit under a different name, those partial democratic reforms initiated during the early 1990s were easily reversed in the 2000s, with the chekists coming to power under Putin, subverting what remnants of the democratization process remained. If LVD had been initiated, Russia would have been more likely to build new intelligence/security services from scratch, and, in turn, make a successful democratic transition.

Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky aptly made the point in the conclusion of their comprehensive 1990 book, *KGB: The Inside Story*, "Like every major modern state, Russia needs both a domestic security service and a foreign intelligence agency. For it to possess an intelligence community worthy of its citizens' respect, however, it

will have to close down the KGB and *start afresh* (emphasis added).[2] So, too, in his 1992 book, *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Petersburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*, Anatoly Sobchak noted, "Without drastically revamping the existing power structures, we won't be able to make any headway now, just as we could not without repealing Article 6 of the Constitution some time ago."[3] Further, he observed that, while the repeal of Article 6 (the section of the 1977 Constitution that provided for the leading and monopoly role of the Communist party) depoliticized the state, "the issue of depoliticizing the system's punitive organs — the army, the KGB, the Ministry of the Interior — remained unresolved."[4] Further, he noted,

> The state security service was almost 100 percent communist, and communists remained in the majority in the army and militia. At Supreme Soviet sessions, I had pointed out that this was contrary to our present constitution, a *de facto* continuation of something that had been abolished *de jure*. To the credit of the people's deputies, they proposed including in the Constitution a line about the depoliticization of the army and the police, including the secret police. Sakharov, too, spoke of this on several occasions, and although he was not heeded at the time, the process later got underway. During the summer of 1990, many members of the militia, the judicial system, and the procuracy responded to calls by republic and local sessions of people's deputies by quitting the party. And the process had begun in state security bodies as well.
>
> I would rank the repeal of Article 6 as the most radical event in our country's life since October 1917. History has consigned to the archives the anti-human and anti-popular regime of one-party rule established by the Bolsheviks. Its reign and its death throes were stained with blood; its actual fall was bloodless. But only after the punitive organs have been depoliticized thoroughly will we be able to say over Sakharov's grave: *Andrei Dmitrievich, our life's cause has triumphed.*[5]

---

[2] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story*, HarperPerennial: NY, 1990, p. 646.

[3] Anatoly Sobchak, *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Petersburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*, The Free Press: NY, 1992, p. 162.

[4] Ibid., p. 90.

[5] Ibid.

As shown in this comprehensive case study of Russia's post-Soviet development, the "democratic moment" was short-lived. Sobchak had spoken of a "vertical," but Putin turned the concept of power relations on its head, using his "vertical structure of executive power," or top-down governance approach, to establish political control over every level of government and society in an effort to achieve ultimate manageability of the governing apparatus, effectively concentrating power at the top while weakening every institution outside of the Kremlin, just like everything else that Sobchak had hoped for Russia. Their approaches toward post-Soviet Russia proved to be diametrically opposed, although Putin describes his former boss as "a friend and mentor."[6]

For example, Sobchak lamented, "But our long-suffering economy still struggles with the constraints of the old system, and the punitive organs and the army have not been democratized."[7] Contrarily, Putin ensured the continuation of both, albeit in new forms, with chekists taking ownership control of and operating, and personally profiting from, the state monopolies themselves. For instance, Gazprom, the behemoth oil and gas company that under Putin came under majority control of the state through the chekist-dominated regime's employment of extra-legal measures, continues to consolidate major resources under its control, with the liberal Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref expressing alarm in February 2007 about the proposed merger of the firm with the SUEK coal company, saying, "Gazprom's purchase of SUEK's coal assets is a dangerous extreme in economic policies. We should preserve competition in our country." He observed that, if the firm continued its expansion, the national economy

---

[6] Vladimir Putin, *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*, PublicAffairs: NY, 2000, p. 119.

[7] Op. cit., *For A New Russia,* p. 163.

would turn into "19th-century-style monopolistic state capitalism" that "would leave our country far behind in economic development."[8] The proposal for the merger is just one more example representing the current (old Soviet and chekist) mindset of the post-Soviet regime, whose principals all studied Vladimir Lenin's 1939 book, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*.[9]

In chapter one, I present my theory and research design. I postulate three main propositions: 1) the failure of a post-communist state with no history and culture of democracy to institute an LVD policy reduces the likelihood that it will make a successful transition to democracy; 2) a secret police transformation is a necessary condition for such a state to make a democratic political transition; and, 3) for such a state, there is one precondition, one primary, and four secondary conditions that are necessary for a secret police transformation to professional and democratically-accountable intelligence/security services that operate within the norms of a democratic framework. I put forward three hypotheses/propositions:

1) The transformation of a secret police to [professional and depoliticized] intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms makes it more likely that a post-communist state with no history and culture of democracy will succeed in making a democratic political transition; and, the transformation of a secret police to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms is a necessary condition for a post-communist state with no history and culture of democracy to make a democratic political transition;

2) The institution of an LVD policy in the political arena contributes to the democratization of a post-communist state, especially one with no history and culture of democracy; and,

3) The institution of an LVD policy within the ranks of a post-communist intelligence/security sector makes a secret police transformation to

---

[8] "Gref Calls Coal Merger 'Dangerous,'" *The Moscow Times*, Issue 3599, February 19, 2007, p. 7.

[9] V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, International Publishers, 1939.

> intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms more likely; and, the institution of an LVD policy within the ranks of a post-communist intelligence/security sector is a necessary condition for a secret police transformation intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms.

The institution of LVD benefits democratization in a number of important ways, including its clear denotation of a break with the past and conductivity to the establishment of the rule of law and a legal culture. It sets a new moral standard, gives the newly democratizing regime legitimacy, and limits the influence of those who prefer a non-democratic regime on the democratization process. Essentially, an LVD process puts the focus on secret police transformation, and helps to prevent a regime from reverting back to a non-democratic form. I argue that a post-communist state with no history and culture of democracy struggling to make a democratic transition is more likely to succeed if an LVD policy is instituted within the political leadership structures, as this not only opens up the political system, creating the space for democratic-oriented elites who possess the will to build democratic institutions and implement democratic reform, it also, crucially, enables them to impose LVD on the secret police services. Thereby, the transformation of the secret police to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms, which is a necessary condition for a democratic transition, is significantly eased and facilitated.

On the first point, post-Soviet Russia failed to meet any of the conditions for a secret police transformation. There has been little change and substantial continuity in the old Soviet KGB's personnel, functions, methods, and organizational culture and mentality while a highly politicized political-intelligence relationship has been deliberately nurtured by leading political elites, which the evidence shows contributed significantly to the complete failure of the democratization project that began under

Yeltsin after the August 1991 failed KGB-led coup attempt, was stalled throughout the 1990s, and ultimately reversed under Putin. The old Soviet chekists now control a bureaucratic-authoritarian, chekist-dominated state that quickly eliminates any political opposition, just as had Soviet Russia, systematically employing KGB methods of repression. It is notable that none of the post-communist states with no history and culture of democracy, that is, those states of the former Soviet Union (excepting the subsumed Baltics), have transformed their secret police or progressed toward a successful democratic transition, with the exceptions of Georgia and Ukraine, which test cases could provide further validation of my theory.

Georgia only made real progress toward a democratic transition after it experienced the November 2003 Rose Revolution, launched to remove the corrupt and inept government from power. The country's subsequent democratic-minded leadership under President Mikheil Saakashvili purged the government of old Soviets and, as a key item on the democratization agenda, built a new intelligence/security sector from scratch, substantially reinforcing its political direction and further consolidating the democrats' power. His administration pledged to pass a law on lustration to decisively break with the Soviet past, and that process continues, with the parliament debating an opposition-sponsored draft law on lustration in February 2007.[10] If lustration is implemented, it would be limited in light of the fact that the majority of the country's archives, roughly 80 percent, have been destroyed, and a large portion of the remainder remain under

[10] "Georgian parliamentarians divided by a law on exclusion of former KGB agents from civil service," *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, Axis Information and Analysis, February 19, 2007.

Moscow's control.[11] Still, as MP Kakha Kukava of the Democratic Front parliamentary faction told lawmakers, "But this law is important because it will mean condemnation of the Soviet regime and cutting links with our Soviet legacy."[12] The experiences of other post-communist countries that effectively instituted LVD with limited files show that the process nevertheless contributed to their democratization and made a reversal less likely.

Similarly, democratic-directed change quickened in Ukraine following the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, supported by key segments of its intelligence/security sector, but it, like Georgia, has faced incessant political-intelligence interference from Moscow and continues to struggle against Russian-backed non-democratic forces, having insufficiently purged state institutions, including its Services, of old regime elements. Following the revolution, two versions of a lustration law were registered with the parliament. One proposed lustration for individuals who participated in falsification of the 2004 presidential elections or cooperated with foreign intelligence services, while the other proposed lustration for all individuals who held high-ranking positions in the Communist party or the Komsomol (Communist Youth Organization) during Soviet times. However, President Viktor Yushchenko was of the view that, "The idea of lustration is good, but it lost time dynamics," and the country has since suffered a series of political crises.[13]

---

[11] "Georgia: 'Architect Of German Lustration' Discusses Georgian Archive," *RFE/RL*, March 27, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/4828867c-7adf-4c81-9da7-4d76fba37c49.html.

[12] "Ruling Majority Rejects Draft Law on Lustration," *Caucaz.com*, February 18, 2007, http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/depeches.php?idp=1530&PHPSESSID=f77ca8ff00c0130f0da58af384d7ff8b.

[13] "President Yushchenko states that idea of carrying out lustration of power is not topical," *Ukrainian Radio*, April 12, 2005, http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148&listid=12943.

The evidence has shown that even delayed lustration contributes to and spurs democratic reform. Dr. Pavlo Prokopovych, a senior economist at the Kyiv Economics Institute and assistant professor of economics at the National University "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy" lamented the state's failure to implement LVD earlier when in September 2006 he observed, "It is time to recall that no lustration law has ever passed in Ukraine and a large number of former communist nomenklatura members are still active players in Ukrainian politics. Their personal interests are nowhere close to those of Ukraine, still trying to get rid of its communist legacies."[14] In the event LVD is effectively implemented by Tblisi and/or Kyiv, a detailed test of these cases using my theoretical framework and model would be a useful contribution to the field of intelligence transformation and I encourage intelligence, democratic transitions, and governance scholars to undertake the project.

This intelligence transformation theory is apparently applicable to those post-communist states having a history and culture of democracy as well; that is, the former Soviet bloc states and the Baltics, as shown by the progress they have made in transforming their secret police, only after having instituted LVD or building intelligence/security services from scratch, and thereby enabling the establishment of democracy. While this was not a comparative study and was designed specifically to present a theory of intelligence transformation and test it in one case, the application of the model to other post-communist states, and even to non-post communist states in a refined form, would prove a useful avenue for further validation of the theoretical propositions introduced here.

---

[14] Pavlo Prokopovych, "Considering the Option of Federalism," *The Ukrainian Observer*, Issue 223, September 2006, http://www.ukraine-observer.com/articles/223/913.

In examining post-Soviet Russia as a case study, the evidence shows how in every aspect, on every identified condition of the secret police transformation and democratic transition processes, the chekists intervened to dilute to the point of meaningless or thwart reforms, including the attempt to institute LVD, which, I argue, could have been accomplished, as in the East European states, if the requisite political will had existed. However, Yeltsin rejected the idea, and democracy along with it; instead of taking advantage of the opportunity presented in the wake of the failed KGB-led coup to institute LVD and build new intelligence/security services compatible with a democratic polity, he purged democrats from government, bolstered the KGB successor services as a political support base, and proceeded to rule by decree, in effect giving the corrupt new oligarchy composed of old Soviet nomenklatura-political elite, chekists, and organized criminals free reign throughout the 1990s. From the time he was appointed FSB director in 1998, Putin exploited the situation to the chekists' favor, leading to the consolidation of an endemically corrupt, chekist-dominated state under his subsequent presidency.

In February 2007, the Kremlin's own Public Chamber issued a 27-page report on the growth of corruption in the country, stating that it could threaten political stability unless urgent measures were taken, identifying it as "a national security threat," and noting that, "If in the near future radical measures are not taken to cut the level of corruption in Russia … a consolidated corrupt system will triumph." The aim of that system would be "to form a new social-economic formation order oriented to the enrichment of a tiny part of society at the expense of the majority of Russian citizens."[15] History has shown, however, that anticorruption campaigns in Russia merely amount to

[15] "Corruption Called a Potential Threat," *The Moscow Times*, February 21, 2007, p. 4.

political purges by those in power. Only a democratic regime committed to the rule of law could be expected to take a different approach. It followed the next month that the administration, in old Soviet fashion, was reportedly working on an anticorruption program that included establishing a network of informants throughout the government, only adding another to the many that already exist.[16] Clearly, the decision to not institute LVD contributed to the ability of new oligarchy components, with their access to power unhindered, to subvert the democratic transition project, which was inimical to their interests.

On the second point, the evidence clearly shows that as a consequence of the afore-mentioned and subsequent developments, there was no secret police transformation in post-Soviet Russia. Rather, there was a resurgence. Today's Services are, domestically, more powerful than had been the old Soviet KGB, while externally, bolstered by the state's magnificent oil and gas wealth, their numbers are at or above cold war levels, with a much intensified espionage offensive operating around the globe, and especially against the West. As Joel Brenner, head of the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, observed in March 2007, "The Russians are now back at Cold War levels in their efforts against the United States. They are sending over an increasing and troubling number of intelligence agents [*officers, actually*]."[17] That same month in Britain, Sir Paul Lever, a former member of the Joint Intelligence Committee, noted that, "Russian espionage activity in Britain is very extensive. In scale it's probably pretty much as it was

---

[16] Mark Sweetman, "Corrupt Police Come Under Scrutiny," *The Moscow Times*, March 1, 2007, p. 3.

[17] "Spying at Cold War Levels, U.S. Says," *The Moscow Times*, March 30, 2007, p. 1; and, "Russian Intelligence in Britain Works on Cold War Level — Officials," *MosNews.com*, March 15, 2007.

at the height of the Cold War."[18] Since then, Putin has ordered his intelligence chiefs to further intensify the espionage offensive against the West.[19]

On the third point, an examination of the evidence shows that post-Soviet Russia, in terms of the conditions conducive to or necessary for a *comprehensive* democratic transition, failed to adequately meet the primary precondition, (LVD), the secondary precondition (national unity and identity *in terms of a lack of violent separatism within the country*), the two primary conditions (secret police transformation; constitution based on democratic principles and ideals) or four secondary conditions (national multiparty system, truly competitive elections, independent media, professional and depoliticized military); let alone the final conditions for the deepening of democracy (usable bureaucracy-other than the intelligence/security sector, a robust civil society, economic society, and internalization of democratic norms and values).

Similarly, the state failed to meet the precondition (LVD), primary condition (subject to the rule of law), or four secondary conditions (based on statutory mandates that depoliticize and place legal constraints on the Services; respect for and protection of civil liberties and political freedoms; civilian political control and subject to democratic accountability measures; and, the promotion of an organizational culture and mentality that values democratic principles and ideals) necessary for a secret police transformation.

I illustrate how both the Yeltsin and Putin regimes' responses to nine identified specific challenges faced by post-communist states making a democratic and dual (political and economic) transition, including: 1) the absence of a rule of law; 2) endemic organized crime; 3) lack of democratic political institutions; 4) lack of a legal system

---

[18] Ibid.

[19] "Putin Vows To Increase Spy Activity," *The Moscow Times*, July 26, 2007, p. 3.

appropriate for free-market capitalism; 5) severe lack of resources and reduced state capacity; 6) lack of civil society; 7) lack of protection and respect for human and civil liberties; 8) highly politicized and unprofessional bureaucracies; and, 9) a culture of lawlessness, was one of exploiting these factors to increase their own power and wealth rather than working to overcome them and create a political-economic society based on the rule of law. Clearly, Russia's "revolution from above" failed; what is needed now, given the results of that failure (a chekist-dominated, bureaucratic-authoritarian state), is a "revolution from below," with the institution of LVD in both the political and intelligence/security sectors and the rule of law established.

In chapter two, I examine the issues and challenges in implementing the pivotal precondition, LVD, for a secret police transformation. As shown in this project, early attempts by democratically-minded members of parliament (particularly, Democratic Russia party members) to institute an LVD policy in Russia, along with effective oversight committees, and build new intelligence/security services from scratch were thwarted by the old Soviet chekists, including former SVR Director and Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov. With Yeltsin's lack of support for the effort, it died an early death, as did many of those who investigated the activities of and sought to establish democratic accountability mechanisms over the Services. For comparison, I highlight the LVD efforts, successes, and challenges of a number of East European states to show how its institution contributed to their democratization. Below, I document some of the notable developments in the LVD processes of these states in recent years, along with some of the challenges these regimes still face as their democratic-minded officials, whether political or intelligence/security, strive to oust remaining secret police officers and

collaborators from positions of public authority so as to enable a deepening of democracy.

In chapter three, I present and discuss the issues and challenges in meeting the specific conditions for a secret police transformation and their sequencing, including the precondition of LVD; the primary condition of establishing the rule of law; and the four secondary conditions: 1) based on a statutory mandate (intelligence/security service functions); 2) respect and protection of civil liberties and political freedoms (intelligence/security service methods); 3) political control and democratic accountability mechanisms; and, 4) promotion of an organizational culture and mentality in line with democratic norms. Throughout the project, I demonstrate how there was a complete failure to meet the precondition of instituting LVD and the primary condition of establishing the rule of law. In the chapters subsequent to those presenting the theoretical framework, models, and concepts, I test whether and to what extent the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services met the secondary conditions for a secret police transformation, elaborated on below.

In chapter four, I conduct a literature review of existing theories on the nature of intelligence/security services, and assess their typologies and models. Finding that no useful model exists to denote a *dynamic* intelligence/security service *transformation process*, I develop and present my own model and continuum, which allows for the plotting of political and intelligence/security sector change as it occurs/occurred over time, set at three consecutive presidential terms. The evidence unambiguously shows that the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services and the nascent political system of the early 1990s moved away from a democratic track and toward authoritarianism, with

the diluted and discredited secret police soon being re-empowered as a political support base under Yeltsin, and becoming fully resurgent under career chekist Putin, who completely reversed almost all democratic reforms during his first term in office and consolidated the chekist regime in his second. In line with my Model of Political-Intelligence Transformation, post-Soviet Russia moved from the Communist Totalitarian/Non-Democratic, Independent Security State, Totalitarian typology of Soviet Russia, to an Authoritarian Dictatorial/Independent Security State, Political Police, Non-Democratic Norms typology of post-Soviet Russia during the early 1990s when initial reforms gained some ground, reverting back to an Authoritarian Dictatorial/Independent Security State, Political Police, Non-Democratic Norms typology over Yeltsin's second and Putin's first presidential terms, with a number of indications during Putin's second presidential term that the political system-intelligence/security sector was further reverting back, closer to the typology that existed in the Soviet era.

In chapter five, I review the mandates of each of the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services, with the evidence showing that their functions, structures, and powers preserve the old Soviet secret police model, with continuity rather than change the more prominent feature in every case. Each of the Services is based on a legal mandate that identifies national security threats, delineates their structure, functions, and powers and provides for civilian political control and parliamentary oversight. However, the FSB has arrest and detention powers, and the national security threats are defined broadly, such as in the function of combating "extremism," which label is applied to domestic political opposition groups for means of repression and prosecution. Clear constraints on methods for carrying out these functions to root them in a respect for law,

human rights, and civil liberties are lacking. Further, the language is broad and ambiguous, and while providing a legal basis for operations, it does not place any checks on them. In other words, the mandates are permissive, rather than restrictive. None of the Services are, in practice, subject to the rule of law, as demonstrated in empirical detail in chapters six through ten of the project. The mandates serve to present the Services' activities as law-based, however, that is shown by overwhelming evidence to not be the case. Arguably, the drawing up of the mandates, accomplished by the Services themselves, may have been part of a campaign to deceive the West and their own society about their real nature and intentions, that is, to give the impression that they were rooted in law and secret police reform was underway, when the reality was very different.

In chapter six, I illustrate how, unhindered by LVD, the chekists were able to maintain their linkages with the regime and Services and penetrate the political arena to such a degree that by the end of Putin's first presidential term they were sufficiently in position to effectively reverse all democratic reforms that had been initiated during the early years of Yeltsin's regime. Over that period, the electoral process was routinely manipulated to preclude and exclude any significant competition or party development outside of Kremlin control, with many democratic-oriented officials murdered. So, too, the once-independent media came under the control of the state, with private owners fleeing and numerous critical journalists murdered.[20] All political structures, including the legislative and judicial branches at both the center and regional levels, have come under direct control of the chekist-dominated executive. Civil society has been completely marginalized, as have the citizenry. Few individuals lacking a Kremlin endorsement have access to the political system and no elements except the chekists and

[20] "Russia Elections Blasted As Orchestrated," *The New York Times*, March 11, 2007.

their loyal clients substantially influence it. The oligarchs have been subjugated to the Putin agenda, with those who challenge or oppose it arrested and their assets confiscated and redistributed to the state or chekist-favored individuals and enterprises. The people do not meaningfully participate in the political life of the country, nor do they believe that they can affect it. Dissent is in effect illegal, with opposition elements declared "extremist" and subject to arrest and prosecution. Most elections have been terminated, while those few that do remain are wholly predetermined by the Kremlin, with access to the media, venues, and public rallies by non-Kremlin sanctioned candidates thwarted by force and intimidation. The only question is the level of turnout. Finally, the evidence graphically illustrates how citizens' human rights and political liberties as provided for in the 1993 Constitution are fully abused by the regime with impunity.

In chapter seven, the evidence clearly shows that post-Soviet Russia remains a "counterintelligence state," with the chekists having fabricated numerous cases and staging Stalinist-type "show trials" against dissidents, regime critics, and opposition elements. Many others were the victims of contract murders, never being put through a farce of a trial but simply murdered in the streets or entranceways of their homes. Still others fled and remain hunted by the regime, with some being tracked down and exterminated in foreign lands in Trotsky style. Likewise, foreigners and NGOs are denounced as spies, with many of them, too, being subjected to show trials or murdered and their operations and activities stymied, with the Russian population regularly warned about their "nefarious intentions."

In Chechnya, irrefutable evidence is presented showing that the Services and their agents have perpetrated grave crimes and horrible atrocities against the Chechen people,

and promoted and exploited the war for politically beneficial purposes. As reported in March 2007 by the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture, torture in Chechnya continues to be pervasive and occurs in a climate of impunity.[21] The evidence illustrates that the employment of old Soviet KGB methods of oppression are not limited to this region, but are used against individuals (often falsely) accused of crimes throughout the country,[22] while the Services remain ineffective in protecting the Russian population from terrorism, much of which they, themselves, are believed to be involved in orchestrating, again, for political purposes. For instance, the 1999 apartment bombings and subsequent Chechen excursion into Dagestan worked to launch Putin into the presidency, where he immediately proceeded to accelerate the chekist agenda of creating and consolidating a chekist-dominated state. As a consequence of this turn of events, an atmosphere of fear and hopelessness has descended over Russia once again.

In chapter eight, clear and convincing evidence is presented showing how the chekists, in partnership with organized crime, came to dominate post-Soviet economic structures through force and intimidation. Private security services (PSSs) served as one such tool used by chekists for these purposes, particularly during the Yeltsin era. Once Putin gained the presidency and further bolstered the intelligence/security services' powers, the chekist-dominated state extra-legally seized the assets of the country's richest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who made the "mistake" of funding political parties and seeking to increase transparency in business and government, along with the properties of many others who failed to exhibit sufficient loyalty and subservience to the regime and its agenda. The evidence suggests that a variety of other individuals, including bankers,

[21] "EU Says Torture Pervasive in Chechnya," *The Moscow Times*, March 14, 2007, p. 3.

[22] "FSB, Police Accused of Torture," *The Moscow Times*, March 30, 2007, p. 3.

businessmen, and political officials, have been killed in contract hits for running up against or opposing chekist interests, with cases rarely solved by the corrupt Services, many officers of which are simultaneously involved in pursuing their own commercial interests. It also illuminates how, under Putin, the endemically corrupt chekists gained control of the economy, and used their political power to subjugate the oligarchs and supplant organized crime, redistributing magnificent wealth from targeted oligarchs to themselves, the chekist-dominated state, and their favored clients, only further building their capabilities, power, and influence.

In chapter nine, I provide an abundance of evidence showing that the answer to the 1990s question of who controlled the post-Soviet intelligence/security services is the chekists themselves. No longer serving the Communist party master, they are become their own masters, and operate with impunity. No longer the "state within a state," they control the state. Attempts by democratic-minded legislators in the heady post-collapse days to establish institutions to guide the reform of the Services, a factor shown to be of particular value in transitioning states, and hold them democratically accountable were subverted quickly and conclusively by old Soviet apparatchiks and chekists in parliament who had gained political posts from the start and used their positions to suffocate any attempts to exert control over the Services. So, too, deputies sought to use them for their own personal interests, all of which actions, as noted, were significantly aided by Yeltsin, who reversed the early intelligence reforms made under the direction of Vadim Bakatin and instead bolstered the Services' power as a political support base, in exchange giving them free rein.

Yeltsin's long-time bodyguard, Alexander Korzhakov, writing (perhaps with a hint of resentment in light of Yeltsin's unceremonious firing of this 11-year bodyguard and advisor) in his 1997 memoirs, titled, *Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Sunse*t, noted, "After the 1991 coup, power had fallen into his democratic hands and the whole country was thirsty for change. Yeltsin could have used this marvelous opportunity to carry out reforms, flush out corruption and improve the life of millions of Russians. But Boris Nikolayevich was ruined shockingly quickly by all the attributes of absolute power: flattery, material goods and a complete lack of self-control."[23] Among other reasons, Yeltsin's failure to destroy the "unreformable" KGB followed on the post-August 1991 coup decision of the state commission investigating the activities of the KGB that the secret police should not be disbanded, because, it had concluded, it would not be possible to create a new intelligence/security sector. Instead, the radical reorganization of the existing system was viewed as in the interests of the republics and the Union as a whole and, as reported, one of the reform tasks would be the demonopolization and decentralization of the state security organization, with its powers devolved to the republics.[24] Yet, radical reform never occurred, with the massive KGB only being divided up into different agencies for a time, a period during which they regrouped. Reform was solely cosmetic. Hence, that fateful decision, followed by others, including Yeltsin's rejection of LVD in both the political arena and intelligence/security sectors,

---

[23] "Drunk on Power," *Sunday Times*, August 3, 1997, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/1111.html##3.

[24] "KGB to be reorganized — not disbanded?" *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies*, September 24, 1991, http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?1992.

purging of democrats, and politicized empowerment of the KGB's successors,[25] led to the resurgence of the old KGB, which under Putin was soon reunited into a massive FSB with the exception of the SVR (foreign intelligence), and with the ultimate capture of the state by old Soviet career chekists, who now dominate Putin's Russia. An assessment of Yeltsin's radio address marking Chekists' Day 1997 provides insight into his thinking on the matter. He stated:

> As I look back, I realise that we nearly overdid it when we exposed the crimes committed by the security services, for there were not only dark periods, but also glorious episodes in their history, of which one may really be proud….In 1991 there was a lot of debate about whether the new Russia should have the State Security Committee. Some suggested disbanding the entire organisation. However, it was clear that it was vitally important for this country and that most of its rank-and-file officers would support democratic reforms. That is why we opted for the difficult path of reforming the KGB. To protect the security structures from political interference and prevent them from interfering in politics I made the decision to divide this omnipotent service into several independent structures. It was the only possible solution then. It was the path by which most democratic states came….The Russian Constitution today precludes the possibility of re-emergence of the political police.[26]

In light of the fact that the establishment of the rule of law in post-Soviet Russia has remained elusive, reform of the KGB extended little beyond its division to dilute its power and preserve Yeltsin's — only to be reconstituted by his presidential appointee, career chekist Putin, who as FSB director in 1998-1999 had orchestrated the operation to force out Prosecutor General Yuri Skuratov (who had uncovered extensive corruption at the highest levels of the Kremlin), and in his first move as president extended Yeltsin and his family lifetime immunity — and the fact that the Constitution has been routinely

---

[25] J. Michael Waller, "Russia: Death and Resurrection of the KGB," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Heldref Publications: Washington, DC, Summer 2004, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol12.html.

[26] "President Yeltsin's radio address," From *RIA Novosti, Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, December 20, 1997, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/1448.html##2.

ignored by those in power, one should be skeptical about the depth of Yeltsin's commitment to democracy. Early on, and especially following the events of October 2003, he had instituted a variety of measures deliberately designed to politicize the Services to protect his rule, accepting their corruption in light of his own, and his perceived need for their support to remain in power.

In chapter ten, it is shown by a wide variety of illustrative examples that rather than making a break with the past and starting anew with the promotion of a legal-based culture and mentality in the intelligence/security sector, the chekist organizational culture and mentality have not only been preserved, but promoted, with old Soviet chekist symbols retained and the KGB's history glorified. Rather than rejecting the past, there has been an uninterrupted continuity in not only historical forms, but processes as well. The extensive use of "active measures" to deceive both domestic and foreign audiences about the true nature of the post-Soviet intelligence/security services and the chekist agenda for Russia, significantly realized under Putin, clearly demonstrates the uninterrupted continuity of the secret police, the deception having held long enough for the chekists to construct and consolidate a chekist-dominated state in full control of Russian policy. With the chekists' capture of the state, this mentality is now pervasive throughout government at all levels, while those who criticize and speak out about the corrupt chekist regime and its activities are denounced, discredited, and killed, as in the case of the November 2006 polonium-210 murder of former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko. Numerous investigative journalists and democratic-minded officials have been the victims of contract murders for their opposition to the chekist *political* agenda, none of which have been solved. Meanwhile, hundreds of businessmen and bankers have

been eliminated same for impeding the chekist *economic* agenda.[27] With chekists now in control of both the political and economic arenas, any chance for increased transparency in either has been effectively eliminated.

The chekists now use their political-economic power and control of Russia's vast resources to politically repress citizens, intensify their counterintelligence and espionage activities, and blackmail states abroad that are dependent on Russia's oil and gas.[28] Moscow's use of oil and gas for political leverage is particularly acute among the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), and especially those that seek to move toward the West. Putin's chekist-dominated government uses arms exports to rogue states in Latin America and the Middle East to sow instability and drive up the price of oil, while intelligence-sharing agreements and weapons sales to China and others are designed to counter Western objectives and reduce American influence. Anti-Americanism is a constant theme at home and such sentiment is relentlessly fanned abroad. The use of "active measures" remains a significant activity of the Services to date, under Putin focused increasingly on sowing viral anti-Americanism and seeking to drive a wedge between the U.S. and her allies, just as in Soviet times, when the U.S. was considered the "main enemy." Throughout the Yeltsin and early Putin eras, the Services disseminated an endless stream of propaganda as part of a sophisticated perception management campaign to delude the West and others into believing that Russia was on a democratic path and the Services had been reformed, all of which was a masterfully created illusion, just as

---

[27] "Frenkel Quizzed in New Probe," *The Moscow Times*, March 14, 2007, p. 5; and, "Kozlov killed by mistake," *NEWS.rin.ru*, September 15, 2006, http://news.rin.ru/eng/news///9493/3//.

[28] See Daniel Twining, "Putin's Power Politics: Rebuilding Russian clout, one natural-gas pipeline at a time," *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 11, Issue 17, January 16, 2006.

democracy in Russia was merely a "virtual reality."[29] It is worth emphasizing the remarks of FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, published by the Russian press as part of the 2001 Chekists' Day celebrations, and as observed by GRU defector Col. Stanislav Lunev (the highest-level GRU officer ever to defect to the West).

> Putin and his chekists had no intention of moving the country toward democracy, and quite the contrary. At the 2001 Chekists' Day celebrations, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev (precise speaking being one of his attributes), said the *main threat to Russia was that foreign intelligence services may "uncover the true plans of the new Russian government in what concerns domestic policy" (italics added).*[30]

Indeed, in assessing each of the identified conditions for a secret police transformation (and democratic political transition), the evidence makes clear that over the first three (and into the fourth) post-Soviet presidential terms, the Russian state, a reflection of its intelligence/security sector (and vice-versa), consistently moved further from establishing a democratic polity. Corresponding to the model, initial reforms were reversed as the intelligence/security services' powers were increased. The chekists' penetration of both economic and political structures during the early Yeltsin years increased dramatically in scope and scale during his second presidential term and into Putin's first, thus proceeding according to plan and resulting in their gaining control of the state. During his second presidential term, Putin's chekist-dominated state consolidated and instituted the democratic reversal, with Russia having moved along the spectrum over the three (and into the fourth) presidential terms from a hopeful democracy with tentative reforms but unsuccessful LVD attempt, which I suggest contributed to the project's downfall, to a consolidated bureaucratic-authoritarian state under the control of

---

[29] Andrew Wilson, *Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World*, Yale University Press: New Haven, 2005.

[30] Stanislav Lunev, "Russia's Secret Police: Powerful Tool for Totalitarianism," *The Eurasian Politician* - Issue 3, February 2001, http://www.cc.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/issue3/tsheka.htm.

old Soviet career chekists (and the Kremlin core predominantly from Putin's home town of St. Petersburg), who rule with total disregard to law and with unquestioned impunity.[31] I propose within the framework of this study that three presidential terms may be sufficient to drive the direction of the country in a sustainable fashion toward a successful democratic transition through the institution of an LVD policy and secret police transformation, or away from democracy to the reestablishment of authoritarianism. In post-Soviet Russia, that time period elapsed without the institution of either, and it is clear and unambiguous today which political direction the state has moved and is moving.

In line with my model's depiction of dynamic change processes, as the intelligence/security sector was increasingly politicized and empowered, the state moved further from democracy, clearly illustrating the symbiotic relationship between the two. That is, the nature of the intelligence/intelligence/security sector (role, powers, functions, methods, and organizational culture) reflected the state's political form and vice-versa. Based on the theory presented here, it was predictable that the state was moving away from democracy long before the end of Putin's first presidential term. While my focus is on a secret police transformation in a post-communist state with no history and culture of democracy as a necessary condition for a successful democratic transition, my model delineates the conditions necessary for and is applicable to any state that seeks to transform its intelligence/security services and make a political transition, and has utility in predicting the direction of such change.

---

[31] See Steven Lee Myers, "Post-Putin," *The New York Times*, February 25, 2007.

A consensus exists on the specific criteria and standards that define the activity parameters and methods of intelligence/security services that serve liberal democratic and totalitarian governments and those regime types that can be located between those two extremes. This is because democracy and a secret police are both incompatible and irreconcilable. By marking developments in the nature and role of the intelligence/security services over time, one can plot the progression or digression from the various polity forms. Thus, researchers can expose the true internal political reality that exists within a state and its relations with its society.

In the 2002 book by Elaine Shannon and Ann Blackman titled, *The Spy Next Door: The Extraordinary Secret Life of Robert Philip Hanssen, The Most Damaging FBI Agent in U.S. History*, prominent intelligence scholar, Roy Godson, is cited commenting on the Russian spy:

> I can't think of a case in American history or in the history of espionage in which someone has been at the center of human intelligence gathering and technical intelligence as well as counterintelligence. He taught the Soviets how to beat us, how they could better penetrate and learn our secrets and manipulate them. If you have a human source who's sending you false information, you can check it with a technical source. If you have a compromised technical source, you may be able to find out the truth through a human source. But if your opponent can control both the human and the technical source, he has the ability to decrease in a substantial way your intelligence capability. If you can find out about your opponent's offense and their defense all at the same time, you have the competitive edge.

Continuing, Godson aptly described the situation: "The Russians are in a position to sell, use, or trade that information to help others neutralize U.S. intelligence. It's hard to change the way you do things. The Russians know that, and they have taught or traded their knowledge of us to other countries or to non-state actors, to terrorist groups, to

revolutionary groups."[32] Recognizing the importance of Russia in the war both for and against terrorism, in April 2002 former Defense Secretary William Cohen, testifying before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and calling Russia a potential weapons "bazaar" for terrorists, said that, "Those pursuing these weapons know that the fastest route to obtaining them is to acquire weapons or weapon materials from the enormous stockpiles that still sit in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union."[33] Hence, in an ironic twist, the old Soviet chekists, as the ultimate guardians of these weapons, may have some control over America's fate.

The institution of LVD may be pivotal in the political arena and is imperative in the intelligence/security sector. Otherwise, as post-communist states privatize their economies, the secret police and old Communist party hacks can be expected to exploit the democratic transition process and acquire great wealth, which they then may use to access the political system/government and thwart democratization. As Marius Oprea, president of the Institute of the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism Commission, a Romanian government group, observed in December 2006, "In '89, only Communism was killed, but the former state security and Communist Party chiefs took the economic power."[34] New governments throughout Eastern Europe have recognized the value and importance of rooting out former police agents and collaborators for making real democratic political and economic progress, and some officials may have faced serious

---

[32] Elaine Shannon and Ann Blackman, *The Spy Next door: The Extraordinary Secret Life of Robert Philip Hanssen, The Most Damaging FBI Agent in U.S. History*, Little, Brown and Company: NY, 2002, pp. 223-224.

[33] "Former U.S. defense chief warns aging weapons 'prime source' for terrorists," *The Russia Journal*, April 2002, www.russiajournal.com/weekly/article.shtml?ad=6088.

[34] Craig S. Smith, "Eastern Europe Still Struggles To Purge Its Security Services," *The New York Times*, December 12, 2006.

repercussions for doing so. For instance, in November 2006, Bozhidar Doychev, who was responsible for overseeing Bulgaria's most sensitive secret service archives, was found dead with a bullet in his head at his desk. Given the nature and circumstances surrounding his activities, many believe his death was related to the ongoing LVD effort in that country. In Romania, the Services were reorganized and had new heads appointed. However, the rank and file never went through the LVD process and now these officers have well-established ties with a powerful business elite that has complicated the state's democratization efforts. As reported, "Many of the most powerful businessmen in Romania have links to the Securitate, even if they deny having benefited from such relationships — something that is, by its nature, difficult to prove."[35] Regardless of the challenges in instituting LVD, it is a better option than allowing the repressive elements of the old regime to influence the transition path of the country, and contributes to the democratization efforts of a post-communist state most fundamentally by instituting a break with the past and placing secret police reform at the top of the agenda. It also thwarts the reversal of democratic reforms and promotes the rule of law.

The Romania case demonstrates the importance of LVD in both political and intelligence/security sectors. In 1996, a more democratic-minded government had come to power and passed a law requiring the archives be opened, starting the LVD process. However, the government changed hands, and the process stalled for years. Vladimir Tismaneanu, a political science professor at the University of Maryland who was appointed by Romanian President Traian Basescu to head a commission reviewing the country's communist past, notes that, "there are still institutions, primarily the secret

[35] Ibid.

services, that hold back despite presidential intervention and will not deliver files in their possession….Instead of opening the files in the 1990s, the people in power kept them because they could be used for blackmail."[36]

As further support to my proposition that LVD in the political arena contributes to democratization and its implementation in the intelligence/security sector is necessary for a post-communist state to make a secret police transformation and, in turn, comprehensive democratic political transition, in December 2005 Radek Sikorski, defense minister in the new conservative Polish government, opened the secret communist-era military intelligence files in order to "bring to an end the era of post-communism."[37] In addition to the large range of military intelligence archives, including the martial law suppression of Polish Solidarity and Poland's role in Moscow's crushing of the 1968 "Prague Spring," he is also opening the archives on the Warsaw Pact war games.[38] The author of the news report on the press conference at which Sikorski used to mark the opening of the archives, John O'Sullivan, editor-at-large of the *National Review* and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, eloquently described Sikorski's conclusion of what needed to be done, how LVD succeeds. Sikorski had explained that the main motive in Warsaw's revealing of the Soviet Union's plan to fight nuclear war in Europe was "to bring to an end the era of post-communism." Therefore, the archives on not only the Warsaw Pact war games but also a large range of military intelligence were to be opened, including the martial

---

[36] Ibid.

[37] John O'Sullivan, "Chilling chapter from the past," *The Washington Times*, December 4, 2005.

[38] Ibid.

law suppression of Solidarity and Poland's role in Moscow's crushing of the 1968 "Prague Spring." He also noted that, "Until now knowledge of these and other communist-era crimes has been quietly suppressed throughout Eastern Europe. "Post-communism" has been a transition to democracy in which the truth about communism has been sacrificed in the interests of social peace. As a result, communist-era public figures have survived and even flourished; post-communist networks have exercised a shadowy political influence; and, in response, cynicism about democracy has spread," and stressed that, "This is not a desire for vengeance or even just punishment — though some victims of murder and torture and their families would certainly support the latter — but an admission of past crimes, a cleansing of public life and a fresh democratic start," and that, "For if we refuse to examine the communist past, it will continue to poison the democratic present — not only in Poland and Eastern Europe but also in those Western democracies that looked the other way while millions died."[39]

Since the opening up of the archives, Poland's new conservative-led government (Law and Justice Party) has dismantled the WSI, its military intelligence service, which it had accused of building a "web" of former Communist party members and corrupt businessmen that it said exerted significant influence over the country, having also infiltrated the political party of Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski and his twin brother Lech, Poland's president. Further, it had "recruited leading editors at television stations…and controlled

[39] Ibid. Of note, Polish Army Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski defected to the CIA in August 1972 and worked in place for nine years before being exfiltrated to the U.S., his motivation having been the Soviets' domination of and war plans involving Poland. For an in-depth account of these events, see Benjamin Weiser, *A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid to Save His Country*, PublicAffairs: NY, 2004.

national newspapers" in order to influence politics and public opinion. The government's long-awaited report also noted that Russian spies had significantly influenced the state's military intelligence service since the collapse of communism, with many officers maintaining ties with Russian counterparts and acting against Polish interests. For instance, a colonel on a mission to North Korea, "against instructions, [he] maintained close contacts at the Russian embassy…including numerous intimate contacts with women provided by Russian intelligence." The report noted that, "The WSI was unable to build….a structure that would not be exposed to [Russian] infiltration. They failed to arrest a single Russian spy."[40]

The government followed in March 2007 with a new law requiring all those in positions of authority to state in writing that they did not collaborate with the communist regime that was toppled in 1989. A Law and Justice MP, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, who was instrumental in having public companies covered under the law, charged that, "If someone has nothing to hide they have nothing to worry about. It is a simple declaration: "If you were or were not a secret agent. If you were there is still no problem, as long as you admit what you did." He observed that the more expansive LVD policy was imperative because "communists used their contacts and money to take important positions in corporations" during the country's transition to democracy.[41] The vetting will be carried out by the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), which holds millions of

[40] "Polish Intelligence Retained Ties to Moscow After 1989," *The Moscow Times*, February 19, 2006, p. 5.

[41] "Polish law on outing former secret police agents can lead to a 'business chaos,'" *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, March 15, 2007.

files from the state security apparatus, and false statements are to be published with a ban from public life for up to 10 years.

The new law, designed to once and for all remove from authority any officials who collaborated with the old secret police, replaces a former one that had only focused on senior officials and politicians and is widely viewed as an essential cleansing process to sweep away old communist espionage networks. This one covers all institutions under the jurisdiction of the Financial Supervision Authority (KNF), which is the state's new unified banking, corporate, and financial markets regulator, along with journalists, local and national politicians, lawyers, directors of public and private schools, and university professors born before August 1, 1972.[42] Prime Minister Jaroslow Kaczynski, who had come to power promising to eradicate KGB collaborators from government, observed that, "The network still exists in Poland and is stronger than I had previously thought,"[43] indicating the importance of the ongoing project to enable the Polish regime to secure the country and consolidate democracy. As IPN Chief Janusz Kurtyka states, "Poland needs this law. The country is in the process of leaving the Communist period behind and tackling the long-term social and political effects of the dictatorship."[44]

In the Czech Republic, the state's military intelligence and counterintelligence service (VZ) and counterintelligence service (BIS) may still maintain StB officers among their staffs. Gen. Miroslav Krejcik, former VZ head, reported in a press interview in

---

[42] Ibid.

[43] Chris Johnson, "Polish intelligentsia face post-communist vetting," *Washington Post*, March 13, 2007.

[44] "New Law in Poland Aims to Oust Officials Who Aided Secret Police," *The New York Times*, March 16, 2007. Also, for an in-depth review of events as they transpired in Poland after communism, see Maria Los and Andrzej Zybertowicz, *Privatizing the Police-State: The Case of Poland*, St. Martin's Press, Inc.: U.S.A., 2000.

February 2007 that as late as 2003 the government had been unable to purge the Service, especially its counterintelligence arm, with up to 76%, including the former deputy head of security, still in place. When Krejcik was appointed to head the VZ in 2004, he had immediately begun purging communist collaborators, noting that, "It was a hard fight to make them leave. They abused all possible contacts, including the government office and some deputies."[45] After the 1989 revolution, the Prague government had retained some of the StB officers to train new officers. But, as VZ spokesman Ladislav Sticha reported, "But in fact they stayed there 15 years — they sort of hid there — and many of them even reached higher positions, like the colonel rank."[46] He noted that some former agents gained state government positions that did not mandate LVD, relying on their StB partners to help them make their way through the counterintelligence ranks. He observed that, "They sabotaged their [VZ] activities, and they were also in a way discouraging young and promising officers; many of [these young officers] left."[47] Following Krejcik's interview with the press lamenting the StB penetration, he agreed to leave his post early after newly appointed (January 2007) Czech Defense Minister Vlasta Parkanova expressed her lack of confidence in him for doing so, which she said devalued the agency.[48] Krejcik resigned in May 2007 and was replaced the following month by Brig. Gen. Ing. Ondrej Palenik.[49] Discussions about further intelligence reform continue.

---

[45] Kimberly Ashton, "Former red spies were in key posts: Counter-intelligence agency riddled with ex-StB until 2003," *The Prague Post*, February 28, 2007.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] "Czech minister mistrusts military intelligence head," *Prague Daily Monitor*, March 12, 2007; "Military intelligence chief to be let go," *Radio Prague*, March 12, 2007, http://www.radio.cz/en/news/89248; "Parkanova speaks out against military intelligence chief," Radio Prague, March 10, 2007,

In other developments, in October 2005 some of the archives of the Czech foreign intelligence service (UZSI, or Office for Foreign Relations and Information) were opened for public review. Bohumil Srajer, the Service's spokesman, stated that, "Our office has been analyzing these documents for a long time. We came to the conclusion that a part of these documents has no intelligence value [any longer] and there is no reason why they should be kept secret," adding that, "We think that it is important that people, our citizens, see these documents."[50] Soon after Interior Minister Ivan Langer was appointed in September 2006, he dismissed UZIS head Karel Randak based on the reasoning that it and the BIS would be merged the following month,[51] as would the counterintelligence services, and replaced him with BIS head Jeri Lang. Another contributing factor was Randaks' remarks to the media on his reservations about the security threat to the country and criticism of planned measures to counter the terrorist threat, for which he was berated by Langer and Lang for a lack of professionalism.[52] The merger was ultimately decided against and never took place. Langer also initiated a second lustration screening in an effort to correct any mistakes made in the first, with two Czech ministry officials uncovered as former communist secret police aides in September 2007. The process

---

http://www.radio.cz/en/news/89202; and, "Krejcik to head Czech military intelligence till June," *Prague Daily*, March 15, 2007.

[49] See the Czech Republic Military Intelligence Service's Web site, at http://www.vzcr.cz/?id=lide&cj=en&styl=graphic, and, http://launch.praguemonitor.com/en/45/czech_natural_news/3206/.

[50] "Spy Files Shed Light on Past," *The Prague Post*, October 12, 2005, http://www.uzsi.cz/index.php@lang=2&show=001002006029.html.

[51] "Paroubek says he would reinstall dismissed intelligence head," *Radio Prague*, September 21, 2006, http://www.radio.cz/en/news/83436.

[52] "Dismissed," *Czech Business Weekly*, October 30, 2006, http://www.cbw.cz/phprs/2006103013.html.

continues.[53] As with many other post-communist states, the Czech Republic's ongoing challenges in reforming its intelligence/security sector highlight the difficulties that remain when the LVD process is not implemented comprehensively, that is, in every agency of and closely related to the sector. Lateral movement is extremely common in the intelligence/security sector and enables many to escape the process if not comprehensive. And given the nature of the political-intelligence relationship, the evidence shows that LVD in the political arena positively contributes to the secret police transformation, and democratization process, in numerous ways.

In sum, over a year before the collapse of communism and subsequent demise of the Soviet Union, in a July 23, 1990 interview published in the *Los Angeles Times*, former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin observed, "The KGB is everywhere, in everything, and that itself frustrates democracy."[54] Almost a year later and just three months before the KGB-led August 1991 coup attempt, during a June 1991 conversation with former U.S. President Richard Nixon, then-KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov stated, "We have had as much democratization as we can stomach."[55] By 2000, an old Soviet career KGB officer was the country's president, and political-economic posts were quickly being filled by fellow chekists. Hence, it followed that over a decade and a half since Kalugin's observation and Kryuchkov's statement, in 2007 Russia, the renamed KGB —

---

[53] "Screening uncovers two Czech ministry officials as former communist secret police aides," *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, Axis Information and Analysis, September 12, 2007, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1386.

[54] Oleg Kalugin, interview with Michael Parks, "Ex-Agent Leads Fight Against Powerful KGB," *Los Angeles Times*, July 23, 1990, and cited in J. Michael Waller, "KGB: The Perils of Arbitrary Power," Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy, *Perspective*, Vol. II, No. 1, September 1991, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol2/Waller.html.

[55] See Richard M. Nixon, "Gorbachev's Crisis and America's Opportunity," *Washington Post*, June 2, 1991, p. D1, and cited in "KGB: The Perils of Arbitrary Power," pp. 4-6.

the FSB — is still everywhere, in everything, and the chekists have effectively ended the democratization project half-heartedly begun under Yeltsin's tutelage in the immediate wake of discredited communism's demise.

The historic, notorious, and powerful "state within a state" that was the KGB and on which Yevgenia Albats wrote a 1999 book titled, *The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia — Past, Present, and Future*,[56] is no longer a state within a state; rather, the chekists have taken control of the state. Putin's Russia, an authoritarian state dominated by chekists and of bureaucratic-capitalist form, rather than a democratic-capitalist one that respects human rights and political freedoms, is the resultant reality of a failure to institute LVD and mandate a secret police transformation. In post-Soviet Russia, a "dictatorship of the chekists" has evolved, rather than a "dictatorship of the proletariat" or any other form of government. The Bolsheviks, particularly Feliks Dzerzhinsky, would be delighted. In late April 1991, Yevgenia Albats had written a feature story in *Moskovskiye Novosti*, titled, "The Time Bomb: A Political Portrait of the KGB," in which, 10 years later (2001) she recalled noting, "the Soviet security forces were the most disciplined and organized part of the bureaucracy and would do everything in their power to stop the democratic reforms sweeping the country."[57] Her prediction proved correct when four months later KGB Chief Kryuchkov led the failed (August 1991) coup attempt to brake the democratic reforms being driven by Gorbachev. In April 2001 she reported hearing the recent boasting of a retired KGB general and longtime source who said, "When I see the euphoria of my colleagues now and hear them saying,

---

[56] Yevgenia Albats, *The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia — Past, Present, and Future*, Farrar, Straus Giroux: NY, 1994.

[57] Ibid., p. 15.

'Yes, we are finally back in power.'....I recall those days in August 1991. We were sitting in our offices with wet pants, guessing what was going to happen to us. We expected the worst."[58] In other words, as had happened with many of their counterparts in the former Soviet bloc countries, they expected the files to be opened and they and their agents, informers, and collaborators disqualified from high public office and purged from the new intelligence/security sector through an effective LVD process. However, Albats laments, Russia's administrative structures, rules, and personnel were not revised, observing that, "Empirical studies clearly show the correlation: Those countries that bore the burden of such reforms have much lower levels of corruption and have carried out much speedier liberal and economic restructuring than those that did not."[59] This observation begs the question of why this was the case. I suggest that the decision as to whether to institute LVD and mandate a secret police transformation played a role. If this had been implemented, post-Soviet Russia would have been more likely to succeed in making a transition to democracy and less likely to experience a democratic reversal, as occurred under the chekist-dominated government of Putin. Instead of democratic government, as Albats observed in November 2006, "The country today is run by the KGB — whatever they call themselves."[60]

As the abundance of evidence presented throughout this dissertation shows, post-Soviet Russia's failure to institute an LVD policy and transform its secret police meant that no barriers existed to thwart a chekist resurgence and acquisition of the levers of

---

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Neil Buckley, "Death of an ex-agent puts spotlight on renaissance of Moscow secret services," *Financial Times*, November 25, 2006.

state power. It worked to facilitate their "capture" of the state, in partnership with organized crime and with the support or acceptance of the old Soviet nomenklatura, effectively thwarting the development of democracy and the rule of law in every sphere, and resulting in the corruption and criminalization of the political and economic arenas. From that failure and its subsequent developments, it followed that evolving political-economic circumstances provided the means for leading chekists, bolstered by billions of dollars from oil and gas exports, to continually thwart democratization even as they worked to further consolidate their hold on power.[61] Thus, the combination of failing to transform the old communist-era secret police and erect barriers to prevent their accession to positions of political power, aided by the wholesale corruption of the economy and society, created the potential for a transition outcome of a chekist-dominated state in post-Soviet Russia. No longer subject to Communist party control, they now control the state with the same old repressive and exclusive mentality of their KGB predecessors, and have become a power only unto themselves, free from any constraints. My findings demonstrably show that this is the situational reality that evolved in contemporary Russia; precisely, the consolidation of a bureaucratic authoritarian, chekist-dominated state supported by a resurgent secret police.

[61] For a review of Putin's KGB-FSB role in Soviet-Russian economic affairs since the 1980s, see Chris Treadaway, "Russia2000: The Spy Prime Minister," *Stratfor*, January 2000, http://www.amina.com/article/putino.html.

PART ONE: THEORETICAL ISSUES

CHAPTER ONE

INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1: INTRODUCTION

The persistence of a secret police in a post-Soviet state without a history and culture of democracy poses a grave threat to its political transition to democracy. Russia falls within that category. As Russia specialist Amy Knight concludes, for Russia to become a real democracy, the secret police (whose officers are referred to as "chekists") must be truly dismantled, that is, "the question of when, how, or whether the society will become democratic and civil depends in no small part on the fate of the chekists."[1] Because democracy and a political police are both incompatible and irreconcilable, the role of the post-Soviet intelligence/security services is a key factor in the new Russian state's political development and evolution. However, little analytical research has been conducted that is focused on the secret police transformation as an important element of a post-communist democratic transition, and especially its process. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan note that "the role of the state in the transformation of post-communist economies is a major research vacuum."[2] So, too, is the role of the state in the transformation of post-communist intelligence services.

For a comprehensive assessment of a secret police transformation, one must examine both the intelligence-state relationship and also the intelligence-society

---

[1] Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1996, p. 10; and, J. Michael Waller, *Secret Empire The KGB in Russia Today*, Westview Press, Inc.: CO, 1994, p. 286. Also see *Amy Knight, the KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, Allen & Unwin, Winchester, MA, 1988.

[2] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, p. 253.

relationship. That is, to understand the contemporary role of post-communist intelligence/security services and the extent of their transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms (or, to measure the success of their transformation from a secret police), requires both state-centered and society-centered perspectives. While the intergovernmental relations of intelligence/security services are important for their functioning as a key policy supportive institution, so, too, are their relations with the society for which, in a democracy, they serve to protect.

Whether and under what conditions a secret political police can be transformed into functional intelligence/security services that operate in line with the values and norms of a democratic political system and society is of theoretical interest. As Linz and Stepan note, Moscow's transition path of liberalization without democratization of the central power structures [including the secret police], and the electoral sequence of first republican, followed by all-Union level elections, had severe disintegrative consequences; it eroded the state's ideological, coercive, and economic control capacities and did little to create new democratically legitimated state structures at the center.[3] The choices that followed the Soviet collapse have plagued Russia's (and other FSU states') democratization ever since. More specifically, the new post-Soviet Russian government did not institute a lustration/vetting/de-communization (LVD) policy, purging the political and security ranks of secret police officers and agents. This dissertation examines the bi-directional impact of Russia's political transition path on the state's coercive apparatus, the old Soviet KGB's successors, the contemporary Russian intelligence/security services.

[3] Ibid., p. 367.

This chapter addresses the theoretical issues associated with intelligence and democracy, and the nature of the tension between the two concepts. I conduct a review of the major issues and concepts in the intelligence and democratic political transitions literature and present a theoretical framework that differentiates the post-communist dual transitions of the Eastern European states of the former Soviet bloc from those of the former Soviet Union (FSU), identifies the elements of a post-communist secret police transformation process, and includes a discussion of the specific challenges/legacies faced by FSU states. Finally, I present my research design for the empirical section of the project on the Russian secret police transformation process, and explain why the academic study of secret police transformation as a necessary condition for a democratic political transition is needed, particularly in light of the key role the intelligence/security sector plays in the political transition process.

1.2: THE NORMS ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY AND DEFINITIONS

There are a number of factors that constitute the generally accepted norms for a liberal democratic political form. Most fundamentally, in a democracy, the citizens' political preferences matter, government rules by the people's consent, and thus the concept of popular sovereignty is operative. That is, in a liberal democratic republic, elected officials represent the will of and strive to improve the lot of the citizenry through economic development and increasingly higher living standards while preserving political freedoms, civil liberties, and minority rights. These are the political representatives' main tasks, and they are held accountable to the people through the means of free, fair (meaningfully competitive), and frequent elections. Further, political opposition is legal and protected. Thus, torture and extra-legal killings of political

dissidents are not only illegal, but rarely, if ever, occur. Secret police-type intelligence/security services do not exist in democracies; it would make no sense. In short, if a secret police is operative, democracy is not.

For the purposes of this dissertation, and drawing from Robert Dahl's work, in which he shows that certain rights are among the essential building blocks of a democratic process of government and are required for effective participation,[4] "democracy" is defined as: a process of governing that is inherently also a system of rights, and can be said to exist when these rights are available to citizens (otherwise, the trappings of democracy are merely a facade for non-democratic rule). According to Dahl, "it is when all the rights necessary to democracy become available to citizens that a *transition to democracy* can be said to have occurred."[5] These rights include: the rights to participate and express views on political matters, to discuss political matters with other citizens and to hear others' views, and decide how and what goes on the political agenda.[6] In a democracy, policy alternatives are freely debated and political prisoners do not feature in the system.

Further, democracy entails the codification of procedures to be followed to resolve conflicts of both a public and private nature (e.g., political, economic, social), whether among individuals, organizations, movements, and political parties, or, between the state and these types of entities, including those accused of violating the law. Democratic procedures are designed to limit the power of government and protect the

---

[4] Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 1998, p. 48.

[5] Ibid., p. 49.

[6] Ibid.

rights of citizens, whether individuals or groups, and are codified in law in order to hold government accountable, reduce the potential for arbitrary arrests, and facilitate the rule of law. For example, there are procedures to change the constitution, manage the electoral process, pass laws and regulations, interpret and apply the law, conduct surveillance and wiretapping, and to fairly try the accused through due process in independent courts of law. In terms of post-communist transitions to democracy, what is readily apparent then is the sea change that must occur primarily within political, legal, and intelligence/security sectors for a post-communist state to succeed in making a transition to a democratic polity that is based on the rule of law and respect for political freedoms and civil liberties.

While Dahl points out that "institutions that provide for and protect basic democratic rights and opportunities are an empirically necessary condition for democracy to exist,"[7] he does not identify the secret police-intelligence/security services as one of the core institutions that can facilitate or impede a transition to democracy in that, in their relations with the *state*, they have the capability to either enable or sabotage the democratic political process, and, in their relations with *society*, they are in a position to either protect or repress citizens' exercise of basic democratic and participatory rights gained, at least on paper, as a result of the government's "democratization" project.

This dissertation addresses the critical need to include the transformation of that core institution, the secret police, as a precondition for a post-communist democratic transition that is comprehensive in form and durable in actualization. There exists a consensus on the norms for intelligence/security services operating in what are widely considered to be democracies. Those norms form a key component of the analytical

[7] Ibid.

framework that I have designed for a dynamic assessment of the post-Soviet/Russian secret police transformation, which examination constitutes the main focus of this dissertation. These conditions are identified and discussed later in this chapter.

1.3: THE NEED FOR A ROADMAP

As more and more countries in the world struggle to make the transition to democracy, the need for a concise understanding of the necessary steps to succeed in the endeavor is required in order to construct a viable roadmap. The transitions literature has identified a number of variables, including "stateness," historical, legal, ethnic, political, military, social, cultural, institutional, and economic factors as conducive to a democratic transition and conditional for a democratic consolidation. Yet, as professor of Russian studies, Karen Dawisha, notes, the comparative literature is deeply divided over the relative influence of these factors,[8] and case studies of recent post-communist transitions that investigate their weight and sequencing have been scant and largely inconclusive. This dearth of applied research is particularly evident in the key area of secret police transformations to democratically-accountable intelligence/security services, an oft-neglected but absolutely necessary condition for a post-communist state's successful transition to democracy.

All non-democratic political regimes employ a secret police to support and maintain their rule and suppress dissent. The symbiotic relationship between governing political elites and intelligence/security services in communist regimes exists due to the power nature of their relations, ensuring their continued privileged positions in and

[8] Karen Dawisha, "Democratization and political participation: research concepts and methodologies," *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Authoritarianism and Democratization in Post-Communist Societies, Volume Three, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1997, p. 44.

absolute control over society. Therefore, significant and effective changes in a state's political form will be closely accompanied by changes in the intelligence/security services' role and activities in support of, responsive to, and commensurate with that new political form (and its inherent demands). Of course, it is possible that the intelligence/security services may even capture the state, and thus act as their own political masters. In that case, too, the political system and intelligence/security sector would reflect each other. Thus it is that any political transition process to a different form of regime requires a concomitant intelligence/security sector transformation. In the case of a post-communist transition to a democratic polity, changes are required at the most fundamental levels. As Russian Professor Yuri Fedorov, Deputy Director of the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies, notes, "A democratic transformation of an intelligence/security sector is an attribute and requisite of a successful transition from totalitarianism to democracy."[9]

1.4: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATIONS

At this juncture, I highlight the distinct differences between democratic *transitions* and democratic *consolidations*. In this dissertation, my focus is on a comprehensive democratic transition, rather than a democratic consolidation. The latter implies a political-economic stabilization and cultural internalization of democratic norms and practices, and thus requires a longer period of time. In the interest of clarity and for the purposes of this dissertation, I use Juan Linz's and Alfred Stepan's definition

[9] Yuri E. Fedorov, "Democratic Transformation of the Intelligence/Security Sector in Russia: A Sad Saga of Failure," Paper prepared for the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," held on 5-7 September 2002 in Geneva, Switzerland, and organized by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

of a "consolidated democracy," as "a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become 'the only game in town.'"[10] This means that "with consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in calculations for achieving success."[11]

There are a number of measures suggested in the literature for testing whether in fact a democratic consolidation has occurred. One measure is the two-turnover test, where power is democratically transferred over two election periods. However, Dawisha suggests that it may prove more theoretically informative to treat a measure of a democratic consolidation over time in a given country as a continuum, rather than a two-step process. She notes at least four distinct conceptual aspects of democratic consolidation, each which can be observed by various measures: 1) the two-turnover test; 2) low public support for anti-system parties or groups; 3) high public commitment to the fundamental values and procedural norms of democratic politics; and, 4) elite consensus about the desirability of institutionalizing and legitimizing democratic norms and values.[12]

Notably, Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul, wrote in 2003 that, in Russia, "the people have assimilated democratic values faster than the elite has negotiated democratic institutions."[13] In fact, every successive government squandered that resource for its own selfish goals. Government performance has been poor, the state's political institutions are

---

[10] Op. cit., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* p. 5.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Op. cit., "Democratization and political participation," pp. 43-44.

[13] Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, "Putin and Democratization," *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, Dale R. Herspring, ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, MD and Oxford, UK, 2003, p. 35.

neither representative of the people's will nor responsive to public demands, and the political elite continue to impede democratic reform for the benefit of their own private interests, a fact which gives further credence to the LVD argument made in this dissertation. This situation is largely attributable to the decisions made by the political elite, who have in Russia consistently failed to govern in the interest and betterment of society and, rather, pursued predominantly personal interests, which is unfortunate since, as Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha observe, democratic political institutions can change authoritarian attitudes in a country, often quite quickly.[14] Thus, it is unequivocal that a democratic political transition is enabled or inhibited by the dominant political elites and their will to build democratic institutions; thus, some form of LVD is mandatory for a secret police transformation to succeed.

There is no doubt that the continuum as suggested by Dawisha enables the presentation of a more comprehensive picture of the democratic reality in a country than does what may be in fact a highly ambiguous two-turnover test given the various interpretations that can be and are put forward as to whether elections were truly free, fair, and competitive. Another distinct aspect of democratic consolidation that should be considered as important to any (post-communist) state's being identified as having consolidated democracy is the successful, comprehensive, and well-grounded transformation of the secret police to democratically-accountable intelligence/security services, which change can be observed by various, universally-applicable measures. Indeed, without a secret police transformation, a comprehensive democratic *transition* is not possible, let alone democratic deepening and consolidation. The conditions that

[14] Adeed I. Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, "How to Build a Democratic Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2003, Council of Foreign Relations, Inc., 2003.

enable a secret police transformation process constitute a major focus of this dissertation, and are depicted in the Table on page 79.

1.5: SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AS A GAUGE OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

Unlike the democratic political transitions and intelligence/security service transformations of formerly dictatorial Latin American, East Asian, and other states that entailed only the rebuilding of political institutions since these countries already had established capitalist/mixed economies, albeit to varying degrees, those of formerly communist states have entailed the rebuilding of both political and economic institutions of a drastically different nature, a far more daunting task. As totalitarian/communist governments rely primarily on the secret police to maintain one-party political rule and central-command economies through force and repression (and all political-economic control is exercised/enforced through them), it is a key institution that must be transformed/rebuilt for a successful democratic political transition. Otherwise, the secret police are likely to continually interfere in and strive to exert control over both political and economic spheres and effectively thwart democratic reform, with the result that governing continues to be accomplished through coercion rather than consent.

These "organs" of power play a prominent role in communist/totalitarian systems, serving as a pillar, if not, as former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin notes in the case of the Soviet Union, "the backbone of the regime."[15] Hence, it is that by evaluating the nature, role, and activities of the intelligence/security sector that one can assess whether democratic governments in post-communist states have in fact been established; that is, if the intelligence/security services do not meet certain democratic-oriented criteria, but,

[15] Oleg Kalugin, *The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies*, www.cicentre.com.

rather, continue to operate like and engage in former secret police-type activities, then democracy cannot possibly exist, let alone be consolidated. As Russia scholar Amy Knight notes regarding the post-Soviet Russian intelligence services, the KGB "always played a key role in Soviet politics."... "the power and influence of its successor organization serves as a gauge against which to measure the progress of political reform in Russia."[16]

In short, I argue that an in-depth assessment of the *changing* nature and active role of a *transitioning* state intelligence/security sector can serve as a useful measure of the democratic political transition process evolving in a country. As Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant note in their 2001 book, *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, "the behaviour of such institutions is a litmus test of both the functioning and accountability of the post-communist state."[17] Indeed, such an analysis would shed light on the true nature of any political regime. As the newly-reformed Czech Republic intelligence/security service explained in its *Annual Report 2001*, "The well-known fact that every secret service — including its counter-intelligence component — is a sensitive barometer of the political regime led to the undoubtedly correct decision completely to reconstruct our secret services — or more precisely, to start building them "from scratch" instead of just making them "more democratic" by means of only cosmetic changes."[18] The Report continued: "The task was to make sure that the new services be loyal to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and a high standard of observance of civil rights;

---

[16] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, p. 4.

[17] Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania*, Studies in Russia and East Europe, Palgrave: NY, 2001, p.1.

[18] "Genesis," Annual Report 2001," *Czech Security Information Service*, Czech Republic, http://www.bis.cz.

that they protect our national interests by means of highly professional performance of the exacting intelligence job."[19] In this project, I identify and examine, in Russia's case, the conditions necessary to significantly increase the likelihood that the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services do just that.

1.6: THE CONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND THEIR SEQUENCING

For the purposes of this dissertation, I use the term, "democratization," as defined by Haile K. Asmerom and Elisa P. Reis in their 1996 edited book, *Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality*, to mean "a positive process by which authoritarian and dictatorial regimes are gradually and consciously replaced by multiparty systems of rule, characterized by constitutional opposition and a commitment to both human rights and the rule of law." Further, "it entails the progressive internalization of open power competition as the natural way of doing politics."[20] Thus, uncertainty in electoral outcomes becomes institutionalized and respect for civil liberties the norm. Foremost, the rule of law reigns supreme.

While academics have identified an assortment of factors that enhance the prospects for democratization, there has been no useful sequencing of these variables — preconditions and conditions — to show the more likely paths to successful democratic transitions (based on similar histories, cultures, or regions), with the notable exception of Juan Linz's and Alfred Stepan's "stateness" and pathways,[21] John Waterbury's "modes of

---

[19] Ibid.

[20] Haile K. Asmerom and Elisa P. Reis, eds., *Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality*, Macmillan: London, 1996, pp. 4-5.

[21] Op. cit., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.*

transitions,"[22] and, to a certain extent, Dankwart Rustow's precondition of national unity.[23] (Less useful functional approaches include Seymour Martin Lipset's economic development and high per capita income,[24] and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's "civic culture."[25])

In observing that "as a country moves from a non-democratic to a democratic government, the early democratic *arrangements* gradually become *practices*, which in due time turn into settled *institutions*,"[26] Robert Dahl, in his 1998 book, *On Democracy*, argues that the five criteria that exist in a modern democracy (effective participation; voting equality; enlightened understanding; control of the agenda; and, inclusion of adults) are each necessary to ensure some measure of political equality among citizens and, consequently, for the state to be governed by a democratic process. Further, he identifies five conditions that highly favor the development and stability of democratic institutions in a country, three of which are essential (control of military and police by elected officials; democratic beliefs and political culture; and, no strong foreign control hostile to democracy) and two of which are favorable (a modern market economy and society; weak subcultural pluralism).[27] Thus, some semblance of ordering is apparent.

---

[22] John Waterbury, "Fortuitous Byproducts," *Transitions to Democracy*, Lisa Anderson, ed., Columbia University Press: NY, 1999, pp. 261-283.

[23] Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1970.

[24] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, The Johns Hopkins University Press: MD, 1959, and "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LII, No. 1, March 1959.

[25] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture*, Little, Brown and Co.: Boston, MA, 1965.

[26] Op. cit., *On Democracy*, p. 84.

[27] Ibid., p. 147.

Dahl notes that while the timing and sequencing in which the six institutions (elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and, inclusive citizenship) necessary but not *sufficient* for achieving fully the five (afore-mentioned) democratic criteria for modern, representative democracy, or "polyarchy," have been introduced has varied tremendously, the sequencing of the old, enduring democracies followed a similar pattern: elections to a legislature, gradual expansion of citizens' rights to express themselves on political matters and to seek out and exchange information, the right to form associations with explicit political goals, and, finally, the right of all adults to engage fully in the political life of the country (universal suffrage) were extended.[28] These developments evolved gradually over time, and "in response to demands for inclusion and participation in political life."[29]

Conversely, in post-communist countries, as Michael Waller observes was the case in East European states, "the shift from communist rule to multiparty democracy was rather abrupt;"[30] post-communist political transitions to democracy have been expected to occur much more quickly, and have not in all cases been marked by widespread and continuing demands by citizens for democratic change. As Colton and McFaul note in the case of Russia, by 2000 (when Vladimir Putin gained the RF presidency), the people of Russia had largely given up on Russian democracy and popular support for civil liberties was weak. Their research showed that a slight plurality

---

[28] Ibid., pp. 86-91.

[29] Ibid., p. 91.

[30] G. Parry and M. Moran, eds., "Democratization in Eastern Europe," *Democracy and Democratization*, Routledge: London and New York, 1994, pp. 129-151.

preferred a reformed Soviet system, and "veneration of democracy and the resolve to defend it are in short supply."[31]

With the discrediting of alternative political forms following the cold war's end, it was presumed by many that a move toward democracy was the only path available.[32] However, when newly "democratizing" governments persistently failed to respond to societal needs, popular attitudes continued to support democracy, yet skepticism of whether it could actually work became increasingly widespread. Further, as a reaction to the often inevitable increase in corruption and organized crime that results from a wholesale governmental collapse, societal calls for a "strong" (authoritarian) hand to reduce the criminality, provide security, and restore law and order, even at the cost of individual rights and freedoms, tend to intensify. An unreformed intelligence/security sector tends to exploit this situation, and take full advantage of the political and influence opportunities it provides. In such a context, how is the old secret police to be dismantled, and its anti-democratic methods neutralized? Why are some post-communist governments more responsive to popular hopes, expectations, and demands than others and, further, more successful at "making the transition," and democratizing?

I argue that democratically-minded political leaders in control of the machinery of government can make an extremely valuable contribution to the actualization of democracy by the choices they make in tearing down the ancien regime's institutions, ideology, and other (Communist party) manifestations, and building anew a foundation skewed toward subsequent democratic institutional development. The fact that a state

---

[31] Op. cit., "Putin and Democratization," in *Putin's* Russia, pp. 13-38.

[32] The debate brought on by Francis Fukuyama's "End of History," is instructive. See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest,* Summer 1989.

lacks a history and culture of democracy does not lead to the conclusion that it can not democratize. Eva Bellin shows in her 2004/2005 study titled, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," and citing the cases of post-World War II Germany and Japan, that the culture factor is not near as insurmountable in realizing democracy as has been suggested.[33] Moreover, she highlights the importance of top political leaders in actively supporting the democratic project. Drawing from John Waterbury's 1994 article, "Democracy without Democrats"[34] and Giuseppe di Palma's 1990 book, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*,[35] she notes that, "The commitment of elites is central to successful democratization. Even elites not existentially committed to democratic values can often play a crucial role in this process." Although Russia's post-communist transition did not follow defeat in war followed by occupation (although the Soviets had lost their 10-year war in Afghanistan, only pulling out of the country in 1989, two years before the collapse, a war that certainly had a negative effect on the failing economy), she notes:

> One of the most striking elements in the story of the Japanese occupation was the central role that Emperor Hirohito played in helping along the democratic project in that country. It was his endorsement, his imprimatur, his association and identification with the democratic project that persuaded many conservative Japanese to go along with it, despite their misgivings. Other leaders, such as Yoshida Shigeru, Ashida Hitoshi, and Ishibashi Tanzan, also played key roles in this process. In Germany, leaders with national stature, such as Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher, were central to their country's turn to democracy…Their embrace of the democratic project after the war helped anchor it at home.

---

[33] Eva Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, pp. 600-601.

[34] John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats" Ghassane Salame, ed., *Democracy Without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, I.B. Tauris: NY, 1994.

[35] Giuseppe di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

As a major theme of this dissertation, I propose that based on a post-communist (both political and economic transitions occur concurrently) state's past history (in particular, a lack of a history and culture of democracy, plus a legacy of one-party rule and a pervasive secret police), a particular sequencing can be identified that is more practical in driving a successful democratic transition, presented later in this chapter.[36]

1.7: DUAL TRANSITIONS AND TRANSITION CLASSIFICATIONS — POST-COMMUNIST STATES HAVE UNEQUAL STARTING POINTS

Another analytical hurdle to jump in the democratic transitions literature is the common classification of states into: 1) those of Latin America and Southern Europe; and, 2) the formerly communist countries of the Soviet bloc — the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This bifurcated classification does mark a start from the old practice of applying Western states' transitions (often modernization) models to the transition processes of non-Western states. But as Bruce Parrott notes, "the relevance of the paradigms of democratization (and failed democratization) derived from these [non-communist] countries is far from self-evident. Just as some economists have challenged the applicability of models drawn from non-communist societies to the dilemmas of economic reform in post-communist states, some political scientists have questioned whether paradigms of democratization drawn from non-communist countries are relevant to the study of post-communist political change."[37]

While the bifurcated classification (of transitioning states into non-communist and post-communist categories) denotes progress in refining the theoretical frameworks for

---

[36] Op. cit., "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective."

[37] Bruce Parrott, "Perspectives on post-communist democratization," *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Authoritarianism and Democratization in Post-Communist Societies, Volume Three, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1997, pp. 1-39.

studying the political system change processes of states, it is inadequate for rich, comparative analyses of the process and underlying conditions for successful democratic transitions and consolidations in varying states within, among, and across regions, some of which face dual — political and economic — transitions concurrently, and have significantly variant histories and cultures.

1.7.1: On the Precondition of a History and Culture of Democracy

To enable/facilitate more comparable analyses of states undergoing dual transitions, another key and what should be discriminating issue in the transitions classification scheme should be the latter group's further division between those states with a history and culture of democracy and those without. With such a categorization, analysts could more usefully track and make assessments as to their progress, with the result being more precise and productive comparative analyses, given the more equal starting points, and thus the enhanced ability to identify and explain the specific causes of and contributions to post-communist patterns of political development and the variant outcomes.

For example, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the former Soviet republics now known collectively as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — or in totality, with the exception the subsumed Baltics, the former Soviet Union (FSU) — all of which (excepting the subsumed Baltics) have no history and culture of democracy to speak of, which the literature identifies as an important variable in the likelihood of a successful democratic transition, should constitute one set of (concurrent, dual system) transitions, while the states in Eastern, Central, and parts of Southern Europe (the East European states of the former Soviet bloc), and the FSU-subsumed Baltics, while having spent

decades under communist control, do have histories and cultures of democracy, in some cases ones that are extensive, and should constitute the second set of (concurrent, dual system) transitions. As Samuel Huntington shows in his 1993 study, *The Third Wave*, a democratic political history greatly facilitates a transition to democracy. It is in light of this finding that it is necessary to further divide the classification of (post-communist) transitioning states into those with and those without a history and culture of democracy.

Such a classification system makes possible more truly comparative studies of the dynamics of these states' transitions processes and allows for more fair and evenly-based analyses of their challenges and measures of success since the conditions prior to their democratic transitions are much more similar, for comparative sake! Starting points are more equal. Indeed, the nature of the post-communist state itself — whether it was the "central" state or its satellite — has serious repercussions impacting the transitioning process. The states of the FSU (excepting the subsumed Baltics), unlike those of the remaining former Soviet bloc, have a significantly more deeply-rooted and hence enduring Soviet legacy, both institutionally and culturally, having been under the "direct" (domestic) rather than "indirect" (foreign) control of the Kremlin, part of the sovereign entity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or the Soviet Union), some for not only the seventy years of Bolshevik rule but as part of the Russian empire under tsarist rule (absolutist monarchy) for centuries before then.[38] This historic reality has an

[38] See Ronald Hingley, *The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations*, Simon and Schuster: New York, 1970; Fredric S. Zuckerman, *The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917*, New York University Press: New York, 1996; Sidney Monas, *The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia under Nicholas I*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961; Charles A. Ruud and Sergei A Stepanov, *Fontanka 16: The Tsars' Secret Police*, McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal & Kingston, London, and Ithaca, published simultaneously in the UK, Eire, and Europe by Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1999; P.S. Squire, *The Third Department: The establishment and practices of the political police in the Russia of Nicholas I*, Cambridge University Press:

impact on many of the conditions necessary for a secret police transformation and democratic political transition in those East European and Baltic states (e.g., more available counter-elites, more intense demands to hold former Soviet "occupation" functionaries and their agents/collaborators to account, well-organized and long-running underground resistance movements enjoying Western support over the years (the latter less so in the subsumed Baltics given the access challenges posed by the "Iron Curtain"), and more widespread religious faith, morals, and values in some cases, especially those of Poland and Lithuania).

In comparison, the historical legacies of the post-communist states of the FSU (exacting less impact on the subsumed Baltics), with their rigid and monopolizing party-state rather than state-society structure of social relations, and the fundamental lack of trust among people and toward political institutions that developed out of the informer society (in addition to the lack of a democratic history and culture), compound the dual nature challenge of democratization and contribute to these states' seemingly insurmountable difficulties in making democratic transitions. Conclusively then, defining political regime classifications using the common typology scheme as that in the transitions literature *with the aforementioned modifications* could be well-served and is most appropriate for the comparative analysis of secret police-intelligence/security services and their transformation.

1.7.2: On the Precondition of National Unity and Identity, and Violent Separatism — A Complicating Factor

Dankwart Rustow argues that the precondition of national unity, which "means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental

---

England, 1968; and, George Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police*, Clarendon Press: Oxford and New York, 1981.

reservations as to which political community they belong to," must be met before there can be any real movement toward democracy.[39] However, whether national unity and identity with a common political community is a *precondition* for a democratic transition is a controversial issue. Some theorists argue that, conversely, it may develop as a *result* of democratization rather than as a contributing factor to the process, and may even be deliberately constructed by political elites,[40] as was the case in Nehru's India, where disparate regions and groups agreed on a common political framework with neutral rules that facilitated the state's forging of national unity, or, as in the case of Lebanon, where democracy was "rooted in and dependent on confused identities and national disunity."[41]

If identified as a precondition, then in those states in which domestic groups are actively and violently challenging the states's sovereign claims on portions of land within its formal borders, this requirement can present serious obstacles to the actualization of a *comprehensive* democratic transition in that it seriously complicates a secret police transformation since, as history has repeatedly shown, the human rights and political and civil liberties of not only the combatants but also those citizens residing on contested territory are likely to be gravely violated. Linz and Stepan point out that, "In fact, even in democratic regimes, when faced with a majority or a significant minority that questions the legitimacy of the state, the response of the central democratic government has often been the suppression of democratic process in the territory, the establishment of non-democratic direct rule, and sometimes serious violations of civil liberties and even human

---

[39] Op. cit., "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model."

[40] See Irving Leonard Markovitz, "Constitutions, The Federal Papers, and the Transition to Democracy," pp. 42-71, Sumit Ganguly, "India's Transition," pp. 217-236, and, John Waterbury, pp. 261-283 "Fortuitous Byproducts," all in Op. cit., *Transitions to Democracy.*

[41] Ibid., "India's Transition," and "Fortuitous Byproducts."

rights."[42] Moreover, they note that "if a significant group of people does not accept claims on its obedience as legitimate, because the people do not want to be a part of the political unit, however democratically it is constituted, this presents a serious problem for a democratic transition and even more serious problems for democratic consolidation." They hypothesize that, "the greater the percentage of people in a given territory who feel that they do not want to be members of that territorial unit, however it may be reconstituted, the more difficult it will be to consolidate a single democracy within that unit."[43]

Pertaining to Russia, the case of Chechnya is instructive. Constituting only a small, and declining,[44] due to the wars, percentage of Russia's population, the Chechen people, having historically rejected the Soviet identity, not only also reject a Russian national identity, but rebels have fought two extremely brutal "wars of liberation"[45] against Moscow, with atrocities being committed by both sides, from 1994-1996,[46] and 1999-2003, with separatist Chechens still fighting for independence from Russia to the present. Notably, Russian President Vladimir Putin labels the ongoing conflict an "anti-terrorist operation." While Moscow never denied the Chechen people any more autonomy than other ethnic communities encompassed within the state's borders, a policy

---

[42] Op. cit., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, p. 27, footnote 27.

[43] Ibid., p. 27.

[44] "Russia 'thinning out' Chechens," *BBC News*, July 23, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2146702.stm.

[45] Thomas de Waal, "Analysis: Chechnya's endless war," *BBC News*, April 23, 2001.

[46] Chechen rebels in 1996 succeeded in seizing control of most of Grozny, the Chechnya capital, and surrounding hundreds of Russian troops in isolated checkpoints. Most Russian troops left the republic in 1996. See "Russia's stalemate in Chechyna," *BBC News*, July 31, 2001; and, Thomas de Waal, "Analysis: Chechnya's endless war," *BBC News*, April 23, 2001.

of acute discrimination can be said to exist, which only compounds their alienation and fuels the unrest. As a consequence, Chechen separatism has posed a more intense and lasting challenge to the regime, with the Kremlin expending significant resources fighting it, but for many years rejecting a political solution and using a purely militarily repressive approach.[47]

John Waterbury notes that central authorities' granting of regional autonomy to forces who pose a serious challenge to the state's national unity and identity and thereby extract legal recognition suggests that "creative stalemates may thus result from the absence of a sense of national identity."[48] The stalemate in Chechnya is of a military nature, and the granting of regional autonomy failed to prevent or eradicate rebel activity or lead to peaceful and conclusive political negotiations, for reasons originating from both sides to the conflict. The situation in Chechnya has had the predicted influence in terms of its effect on Russia's secret police transformation and political transition. Having for extended periods shifted the prosecution of the war against the recalcitrant republic from the Defense or Interior Ministries to the FSB (domestic intelligence) and GRU (military intelligence), as it did in early 2001 when command was transferred from the military to the FSB (which agency is also tasked to combat Chechen "terrorism" within Russian borders),[49] and the conflict relabeled as a counterterrorist operation, the entire intelligence/security sector has been effected. For example, hundreds of thousands of veterans have returned to their localities and engaged in serious human rights abuses

---

[47] Stephen Mulvey, "How Russia pays for the war," *BBC News*, March 16, 2000.

[48] Op. cit., "Fortuitous Byproducts," pp. 261-283.

[49] "Russia's stalemate in Chechyna," *BBC News*, July 31, 2001.

against local populations with the same sense of impunity they enjoyed in Chechnya, leading to an increased brutality and criminalization of the intelligence/security and police forces.

A complicating issue, then, in any post-communist secret police transformation and democratic political transition is the contestation of a portion of the state's land by a (usually historically-oppressed) minority ethnic or religious group. As a result, brutality, extreme violence, paramilitarism, "anti-terrorist" operations, and a void as to human rights are typically prevalent in the conflict region, and work to effectively postpone the political development of democracy there, perhaps for decades. The situation tends to lead government and military officials and intelligence/security services to engage in a "dirty war" in an effort to crush the separatists, which effectively suspends if not defeats any democratization-driven plans and moves toward ending the use of secret police-type methods that may have been initiated, as the promotion/practice of democratic norms is perceived by officials as wholly impractical, at least within the contested region. For example, in their 1990 book, *Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community*, Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman observe in the case of Israeli intelligence activities toward Arabs in the newly captured Sinai, West Bank, Golan Heights, and Gaza Strip that, "instead of protecting democracy and domestic tranquility within the borders of Israel, Shin Bet suddenly found itself defending the state from potential enemies in the occupied territories. Shin Bet officers were in daily contact with Arabs who had no democratic rights in Israel. More than ever, part of the intelligence community had to behave as a secret police."[50]

[50] Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community*, Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, MA, 1990, pp. 9-10.

For well over a decade, a situation has existed in the Russian republic of Chechnya in which the Chechen people have no rights and are frequently the victims of the Russian intelligence/security services, along with Russian troops, political officials, entrenched organized criminals, and the Chechen rebels themselves, who are all engaged in and control life in the region through the perpetration of dirty war tactics, atrocities, and highly lucrative organized crime activities.[51]

A question to ask is whether separatist conflicts must always lead to a situation in which government forces operate "democratically" (in line with democratic norms) in the geographical territories not plagued by separatist violence, but suspend democratic rights and civil liberties and prosecute a dirty war in those that are. Under such repressive conditions, lasting political solutions are elusive, and peace processes are plagued by continual setbacks. Pertinent examples of this apparency include conflicts between Russia and Chechnya, Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, England and the Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland, Spain and the Basque ETA, Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, Hindu India and Muslim Kashmir, the Catholic Philippines and (Muslim) Mindanao, and Sinhalese Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). Notably, each of these long-running conflicts has strong ethnic, territorial, and religious aspects.

Pervasive violent conflict, particularly of an ethnic, religious, or separatist nature, always presents a serious challenge to democratization and in a transitioning state puts secret police reform on hold at the very least. Internal violence by non-state groups, as Peter Gill notes, is likely to be of a paramilitary nature and characterized by the state as

[51] Anna Politkovskaya, *A Dirty War*, Thettarvill Press: London, 2001.

terrorism.[52] It follows that, to counter the "terrorist threat," intelligence/security service powers are increased, usually at the expense of civil liberties, and with abuses increasingly common. Both targeted and indiscriminate killing may become widespread, and horrible atrocities committed. Given the implications that derive from a situation in which a daily reality of political violence/separatism and dirty war exists within a country, the secondary precondition of national unity and identity, for the purposes of this dissertation defined as "a lack of active and violent separatism within the country," must be met before a secret police transformation and democratic political transition can be *comprehensively* successful. Thus, this precondition has specificity/flexibility in that in non-contested territory, democracy and the employment of solely democratic methods may be the mode of governance, while a dirty war accompanied by a suspension of respect for human rights and political and civil liberties is the reality for those residing in contested territory, whether combatants or not.

Therefore, Rustow's precondition of national unity could be said to be helpful to a democratic transition, but with the caveat that a lack of national unity, *if defined as active and violent separatism within the country*, may work to only preclude a democratic transition and end the use of secret police methods from being effected *across the entire territory*, and thus may permit the actualization of democracy, preceded by intelligence/security service reform, in uncontested areas. Yet, this scenario is unlikely to develop in post-communist states with no history and culture of democracy undergoing complex post-communist transitions. Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, if it

[52] Peter Gill, *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, Cass Series: Studies in Intelligence, Christopher Andrew and Michael I. Handel, eds., Frank Cass & Co., Ltd.: London, 1994, p. 96.

does not already exist at the time of the transition, the development of national unity and identity sufficiently inclusive to end separatist wars to the satisfaction of all sides to the conflict and unite the country into one consensual political community[53] is considered a secondary precondition for a *comprehensive* democratic transition.

1.8: THE SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL TRANSITION PROCESSES

1.8.1: The Precondition of Lustration/Vetting/De-Communization (LVD)

I argue that a post-communist state with no history and culture of democracy struggling to make a democratic transition is more likely to succeed if an LVD policy is instituted within the political leadership structures, as this not only opens up the political system to the implementation of democratic reform by democratic-oriented elites who possess the will to build democratic institutions, it also enables them to, critically, impose LVD on the secret police services. Thereby, the transformation of the secret police to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms, which is a necessary condition for a democratic transition, is significantly eased and facilitated. (Clearly, for this sequence of events, LVD in the political arena would take place in addition to, yet preceding, the same in the intelligence/security sector.) I argue that if an LVD policy is not implemented in both the political and intelligence/security sectors, the democratic criteria that increase the likelihood of a successful democratic transition, as identified by Dahl, are more likely to be significantly delayed or effectively prevented from developing and, consequently, the likelihood of democratization reduced or negated. More specifically, I argue that an LVD policy to remove the worst abusers,

---

[53] For an interesting article on national unity and consensus in the Northern Ireland situation, see Breandan Morley (from the blanket), "Analysis: The Process of 'Constitutionalisation,'" *Republican News*, RN-040213, February 12-13, 2004.

repressors, and those opposed to democracy from leading/commanding positions in the intelligence/security sector is of primary importance, and constitutes a precondition for the transformation of a secret police to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms, and, in turn, a successful, comprehensive democratic transition.

The term "lustration" was first used by (Czech) archivists before the cold war's end "for the process of verifying that someone was listed in a particular database (such as Gestapo collaborators)..."[54] and is understood as the process of discovering through a review of secret police files those who had been informers for the old regime, and legislatively banning those agents and collaborators from holding high political or official positions. Maria Los defines *lustration* as "the screening (or vetting) of candidates for and holders of important public offices to "eliminate" (usually bar for a certain period) former secret police collaborators."[55] Additionally, Los notes the importance of *decommunization*, and defines it as being "based on a similar exclusionary principle [as lustration] applied to former Communist Party officials and those who held *nomenklatura posts* (important positions appointed by the Communist Party)."[56] These groups differ in that the former operated covertly while the latter exercised power openly. As a side note, it cannot be assumed that informers/collaborators of the ancien regime are no longer controlled by those powers and their representative handlers simply because of a regime change. This is due to the different situations and circumstances that led them to spy in the first place, including *kompromat*, ideological support for the cause, money, ego, sex,

---

[54] Op. cit., *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, p. 5.

[55] Maria Los, "Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe," *Law and Social Inquiry*, Vol. 20, 1995, pp. 117-161.

[56] Ibid.

revenge, etc. and their potential future use in the event of regime change may have been a consideration. In sum, the primary precondition of LVD in post-communist states with no history and culture of democracy applies to the secret police transformation and contributes to the democratic political transition processes.

1.9: THE CONDITIONS FOR A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL TRANSITION AND THEIR SEQUENCING

A major theoretical proposition of this dissertation is that the democratic political transition sequencing process for a post-communist state with no history and culture of democracy is to first institute an LVD policy in the process of formulating the new regime. Otherwise, claims by the "new" political elite that democratization is underway may be unrealistic and perhaps even deceptive. In that case, the real reasons for making such a claim should be carefully probed, as they may simply constitute rhetoric to disguise reality and facilitate the implementation of schemes for the acquisition of huge financial rewards for merely appearing to initiate the process, coming in the form of massive foreign aid (many governments could be rather easily deceived through the orchestration and propagation of sophisticated image-making and propaganda campaigns that are based on the exploitation of their hopes for democratic capitalist change), which funds may then be quickly secreted away in corrupt officials' private bank accounts rather than used for the general improvement and stabilization of the political-economic situation and to further democratization and free market capitalism.[57]

Not only does LVD in the political sector enhance the likelihood of a successful transition to democracy by creating the political space for democrats to implement reforms and legitimize their policies, it significantly facilitates the institution of an

[57] Jack Kelley and Douglas Stanglin, "Bond scam has 'strong' Kremlin ties," *USA Today*, September 13, 1999.

effective LVD process in the secret police that is mandated for the concurrent process of transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms, a necessary yet oft-unrecognized and thus neglected condition that is unarticulated in the democratic transition/post-communist transition literature. The LVD of the secret police takes priority along with its institution within the political arena. This is because the secret police have the capability and are best suited to undermine and thwart a democratic political transition. Moreover, it is only subsequent to the LVD of the top commanding ranks that the transformation of the secret police cadres can proceed, driven by pro-democracy political leaders and intelligence/security officials who support the democratization agenda. That is, once those seeking top political leadership and intelligence/security sector posts undergo LVD, other, less pivotal, sectors can be dealt with as needed, including the mid-level ministries and leadership structures of other key bureaucratic entities. Whether LVD is instituted in both political and security sectors or solely the latter, the imperative remains that the most repressive elements and their collaborators are disqualified from leading positions in either.

With the precondition of LVD effectively implemented, and if national unity and identity exist in terms of a lack of active and violent separatism within the country, the conditions necessary for a comprehensive democratic political transition can subsequently be developed, including the crafting of a constitution based on democratic principles and ideals and recognizing political, human, and minority rights, and civil liberties, an electoral system designed to enhance the development of democratic political institutions[58] (especially a national multiparty system), and the codification of a statutory

[58] Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly, *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm, Sweden, 1997.

body of law appropriate to a democratic polity and free market to itself proceed along with the development of an independent judiciary, all concomitant with and dependent upon the rule of law. These political-institutional-legal developments must coincide with as immediately as possible the enforcement of those laws by the newly established (vetted) intelligence/security sector, adjudicated by an independent judiciary and applicable to all. Through the forging of these developments by the new political leadership, unimpeded by an active secret police, a real commitment to democracy is demonstrated to the citizenry, giving the regime legitimacy. Thus, the government can gradually develop the capacity and become increasingly responsive to societal needs while building sustainable democratic institutions and continuing to weed out those remaining anti-democratic personnel. Thereby, confidence in the regime and its political direction and reform policies grows, thus deepening democracy and leading to its consolidation over time.

As a key part of the democratization project once the core democratic leadership is in control of government, top commanding officers within the intelligence/security sector, including not only the intelligence/security and police services, but also the military/military intelligence and counterintelligence forces, must be replaced, with the institutions reorganized, professionalized and depoliticized, and subordinated to civilian political control. LVD must apply to *all* intelligence/security services; it must be comprehensive to thwart lateral movement of repressive elements seeking to escape the process. In addition, new national security and military doctrines must be drawn up to coincide with the needs and interests of a democratic state in the current world order. These changes increase the likelihood that the armed forces will not pose a threat to the

new democratic regime and organize a coup to overthrow it; the military must be neutralized as a threat to the new political order, and encouraged to support, protect, and further it.

Thus, once the LVD precondition has been satisfied, the conditions identified in the transitions literature are more likely to be met, including the development of a usable bureaucracy (excluding the intelligence/security sector, which takes priority), competitive/meaningful elections (deriving from the development of a new electoral system that promotes multiparty development), a robust civil society (from which to draw political recruits, articulate alternatives, and hold government accountable, and including an independent national media), economic growth and a large middle class, political-economic stability, and, finally, the widespread internalization of democratic norms and values.

It is important to recognize that elections alone do not necessarily bring and cannot be equated with democracy (this notion has been termed the "electoralist fallacy," where elections as a *necessary* condition for democracy are considered a *sufficient* condition for democracy)[59] but, rather, may simply be the means used by political elites to centralize authority and usurp power from other state and societal forces. As Fareed Zakaria notes in his 2003 book, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, "Many illiberal democracies — almost all in Central Asia, for example — have quickly and firmly turned into dictatorships. Elections in these countries merely

[59] Op. cit., p. 4.

legitimized power grabs."[60] As noted earlier, it is highly questionable whether these states can be identified as democracies of any type today.

Finally, if the secondary precondition of national unity and identity has not been met, this can seriously undermine the democratic political transition. A political solution must be found to the conflict that will be satisfactory to all sides and thus will endure. More was said about this earlier and the issue is dealt with in various sections of the project. Reflecting the afore-mentioned points, the sequencing of the contributing and necessary conditions for post-communist states with no history and culture of democracy to make transitions to political democracy is depicted in Figure 1.1 below:

Figure 1.1: The Conditions for a Democratic Political Transition and Their Sequencing

Precondition	a) lustration/de-communization within the political arena (creates the political space for democratically-oriented elites to implement reforms and impose LVD on the intelligence/security sector, and facilitates the creation of a leadership core for a new democratic political society); and, b) lustration/vetting within the intelligence/security sector (enables the transformation of a secret police to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms)
Precondition (Secondary)	national unity and identity *in terms of a lack of active and violent separatism within the country*
Conditions (Primary)	secret police transformed to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms
	a constitution based on democratic principles and ideals and recognizing political, human, and minority rights and civil liberties; electoral system designed to enhance the development of democratic political institutions (including a national multiparty system); statutory laws appropriate for a democratic, capitalist society; an independent judiciary; and, the rule of law

[60] Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, W.W. Norton & Company: New York and London, 2003, p. 99.

Conditions (Secondary)	a national, multiparty system, with clearly articulated party platforms and somewhat predictable voting patterns, and constituencies whose interests are truly represented and who meaningfully participate in the political process, and truly competitive elections [Of note, elections should be held in the center before the regions in a federal system, as national "supremacy" is then more likely to be respected; and, center before or concurrent with regions if a unitary system. Regional elections should not be held first because it increases the likelihood of decentralization and thus regional/subdivisions and conflict with the center, which may respond with authoritarian-type exercise of strict vertical power in order to establish control and institute political authority over regional governments]
	concomitant with above, an independent press with national reach, to: criticize and hold government accountable; inform the citizenry; and, enable truly competitive elections
	reorganized and professionalized/depoliticized military forces subordinate to democratic civilian control, and new national security and military doctrines. This increases the likelihood that the armed forces will not pose a threat to the new regime or organize a coup to overthrow it, in addition to helping to bring the country into the international community of democratic states and enabling its participation in relevant organizations
Final Conditions for the Deepening of Democracy and Democratic Consolidation	subsequent to meeting the afore-noted primary conditions, the final conditions for the deepening of democracy and democratic consolidation develop: a usable bureaucracy; a robust civil society; economic society (laws, regulations); economic growth; a large middle class; political-economic stability; and, widespread internalization of democratic norms and values.

1.10: THE CONDITIONS FOR A POST-COMMUNIST SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AND THEIR SEQUENCING

Once the new political regime has undergone LVD and is functional, the sequencing process for a secret police transformation is to first and foremost institute an LVD policy throughout all units of the intelligence/security sector and remove those holding higher and especially top commanding positions, in addition to the worst human rights abusers. While significantly weakening the intelligence/security services, the "dire" consequences of meeting this precondition are only temporary as new recruits are

trained and gain experience, and, more importantly, it facilitates real change in the new intelligence/security services' activities and methods. For such drastic political change as is required to move from communism to democracy, so too must there be similar and accompanying intelligence/security sector change.

A secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms would in and of itself mean a significant reduction in staff in any case, as the labor-intensive function of maintaining surveillance of the entire population would end, along with many other "secret police" functions, effectively negating any need for the huge numbers of officers necessitated by a police state. LVD applied as part of the political recruitment process could help negate their subsequent transfer from the secret police into political office. Moreover, in regard to the political sector and democratic political transition, the institution of an LVD policy in the intelligence/security sector not only facilitates real change, but a genuine commitment to democracy is further demonstrated by the new, democratic political regime, itself subjected to the process, in endeavoring to ensure the old secret police system is destroyed. Thereby, the new political leadership can legitimately ask for and reasonably expect to receive multiple forms of support and training for the enterprise from the governments of the established democracies, an important factor. This dissertation is also meant to alert policymakers to the importance of stepping in to help early in the process. In the cases of Romania and Bulgaria in particular, the West was too slow in providing assistance to those states that needed it most, planning to aid the effort only after the secret police transformation had taken place, rather than helping to initiate and drive it.

Notably, a post-communist transitioning state demonstrably committed to democratic change is unlikely to be under any real and immediate, overt military threat from other states. Any threat to the new regime would likely arise internally, particularly from members/loyalists of the ancien regime and its secret police forces, who may seek covert assistance from other non-democratic governments. Thus, a transitioning state's democratically-oriented government could, in the event, legitimately expect to receive aid and protection from the established democracies that support the regime change, especially if those governments are already actively training and providing other support to the newly democratizing state's intelligence/security sector. This fact effectively repudiates arguments for personnel continuity in the interests of "national security" and competency.

So, too, in the foreign intelligence sphere, spy networks abroad would be significantly affected/disrupted by these fundamental changes, but that is also justifiable and in fact mandatory if the state is serious about making the transition, for then the nature of its political, foreign, and military relations with those states formerly considered close allies (typically non-democracies also) along with other international relationships, would change. To support the commensurate redirection of foreign and defense policy, new espionage networks, trained and tasked to serve the democratically-transitioning state's interests, could be gradually developed. While intelligence collection would be severely impacted as part of the process, the new intelligence/security services would be in a position to reap the benefits of enhanced liaisons with counterparts in other democratic states while they rebuilt that capability. With the threat of terrorism in the 21st century, the need for cooperation among democracies and their intelligence/security

services to effectively counter it is in much greater demand, just as it was to work against the Soviet threat during the years of the cold war.

In addition to the LVD precondition (and secondary preconditions), there are a number of conditions necessary for a secret police transformation to democratically accountable intelligence/security services that need to be concisely identified. These conditions represent well-established features of the intelligence/security services of democracies, which political systems most fundamentally operate according to the rule of law. It is important to note that these variables are reflective of not only democracy-based intelligence/security services but also mirror the principles on which a liberal democratic political regime is founded. The principles of one overlap with and reinforce those of the other; indeed, to understand the nature of a state and society, it is extremely useful to analyze the nature, role, and activities of the state's intelligence/security sector, particularly of its own citizens. As William Keller notes, "the specific domestic security arrangements that a nation adopts are highly conditioned by the nature of the state in question. As a matter of policy and political tradition, the modern democratic state tends to limit rigorously the range of techniques available to security police and other intelligence officials; for example, acts of torture and assassination...have no counterpart among methods employed by the United States domestic intelligence community."[61]

Because the nature of a state's intelligence/security services significantly reflects the nature of the government/regime it serves, certain conditions have to be met in order for an intelligence/security service to qualify as one operating under democratic rule. As emphasized earlier, the primary precondition necessary to "democratic" transformation of

---

[61] William W. Keller, *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1989, p. 7.

a secret police (and, in turn, political system transition to democracy) is the institution of a statutory-based LVD policy that removes the old guard from top posts. Only after that stage of the process has been completed can the implementation of organizational *and personnel changes*, as opposed to mere reshuffling, take place. Most fundamentally (like the political regime), the new intelligence/security services must operate according to a number of generally accepted democratic norms, including the rule of law, and meet a number of further conditions in order to qualify as befitting an instrument of a truly democratic government.

Thus, once the new political regime, having undergone LVD, is functional, the sequencing process for a secret police transformation is to first and foremost institute an LVD policy. After that key precondition is met, the conditions necessary to effect a secret police transformation to professional and democratically accountable intelligence/security services include one primary and four secondary conditions:

1) subject to the rule of law (constitution, statutes, edicts, decrees, directives);
2) based on a statutory/legal mandate that clearly identifies national security threats, delineates organizational structure, functions (which primary function is to provide elected political leaders with objective intelligence to inform national security, foreign/defense policy, and safeguard state territory and interests), and powers (including strict controls on domestic spying and methods used to accomplish mandated tasks, lack of arrest/police powers), provides for civilian political control, parliamentary oversight/democratic accountability mechanisms, and outlines leadership appointment procedures and chains-of-command;
3) respect for and protection of civil liberties, political freedoms (political associations/organizations, free speech, civil society), and human rights, prohibitions against and do not engage in torture and assassination, and no political prisoners;
4) civilian political control, professional and non-politicized, and subject to effective parliamentary oversight/democratic accountability; and,
5) promotion of an organizational culture and mentality within the active ranks and training academies that values democratic principles and ideals.

Reflecting the afore-mentioned points, the sequencing of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a post-communist secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms is depicted in Figure 1.2 below:

Figure 1.2: The Conditions for a Post-Communist Secret Police Transformation and Their Sequencing

Precondition	Subject to lustration and de-communization within the political sphere, immediate vetting within the intelligence/security sector, LVD applied to intelligence/security and, ideally, political sectors
Condition (Primary)	Subject to the rule of law (constitution, statutes, edicts, decrees, directives)
Conditions (Secondary) (functions)	Based on statutory/legal mandates that clearly identify national security threats, delineate their structure, functions (primary function to provide elected political leaders with objective intelligence to inform national security, foreign/defense policy, and safeguard state territory and interests), and powers (including strict controls on domestic spying and methods used to accomplish mandated tasks, lack of arrest/police powers); provide for civilian political control, parliamentary oversight/democratic accountability mechanisms; and, outline leadership appointment procedures and chains-of-command
(methods)	Operate with respect for and protection of civil liberties, political freedoms (political associations/organizations, free speech, civil society), and human rights; prohibitions against and do not engage in torture and assassination; no political prisoners
(accountability)	Subject to civilian political control; professional and non-politicized; and, subject to effective parliamentary oversight and democratic accountability
(organizational culture and mentality)	The promotion of an organizational culture and mentality (within the active ranks and training academies) that values democratic principles and ideals

It is when all of the above-noted conditions have been met that a post-communist secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with

democratic norms can be said to have occurred. These conditions are inclusive of the universally-identified "democratic" qualifiers for intelligence/security services that, if met, reflect the principles that serve as the operative basis of the then unquestionably democratic political regime they serve. It could be said that if each and all of these conditions are conclusively met by the new intelligence/security services, a comprehensive democratic political transition is more likely to occur (and if met definitively, then a democratic consolidation is more likely).

1.11: SPECIFIC CHALLENGES TO AND LEGACIES OF POST-COMMUNIST STATES

There are specific challenges that post-communist states and societies face and must deal with following cataclysmic systemic collapse, which factors are compounded when a country must make a dual (political and economic) transition, as these systems collapse concurrently. These challenges include:

1) absence of the rule of law;
2) endemic organized crime and corruption;
3) lack of democratic and viable political institutions and a democratic political society (national multiparty system, electoral system/elections, independent judiciary, ideological vision);
4) lack of a legal system appropriate for democracy and free market capitalism (constitution, statutory civil, criminal, and administrative laws, legal/regulatory framework, contract laws, private property rights, bankruptcy, tax, and land title laws);
5) severe lack of resources and extremely reduced capacity of state to provide security, social welfare benefits, and other government services to its citizens, and inability to collect sufficient taxes necessary to pay for these services;
6) lack of a civil society (independent national media, politically independent associations and political organizations);
7) lack of and widespread government resistance to institutional/procedural protections for the accused and respect for civil liberties and human rights;
8) huge, highly politicized and unprofessional bureaucracies; and,
9) a deeply-ingrained culture of lawlessness, political cynicism, corruption, mis- and distrust, and conspirational, secretive mentalities conducive to authoritarianism.

Notably, for the 15 newly independent states of the FSU, which lack a democratic history and culture (with the exception of the subsumed Baltics), have been plagued by ethnic conflict/separatism, and were subject to direct rule from Moscow for over 70 years, the Soviet legacy contributes to the higher extreme and severity of these nine factors than it does in those "satellite" states of the former Soviet bloc. In the empirical sections of this dissertation, I address each of these challenges from an intelligence perspective, that is, as they relate to the changes and continuities of the Russian intelligence/security services within the context of changed political-economic circumstances. I argue that in Russia (as is the case in all of the FSU states), of these nine challenges, each of which are compounded by the enduring Soviet legacy and the lack of all three preconditions (one primary and two secondary) that make a post-communist comprehensive democratic political transition more likely (institution of LVD, history and culture of democracy, and national unity and identity — defined as a lack of active and violent separatism within the country, it is particularly the failure to institute an LVD policy (in either/both political and intelligence/security sectors) that contributed to the country's unsuccessful transition to democracy and its evolution instead into a neo-authoritarian, criminalized, bureaucratic-corporatist, chekist-dominated state with a resurgent secret police that enjoys even greater powers than did its omnipresent KGB predecessor and that is accountable to no one. Finally, the most pervasive and enduring challenge has been the combination of a lack of the rule of law and endemic crime and corruption, which, in addition to Russia's failing to meet any of the three preconditions, has significantly contributed to the discrediting of democracy in the Russia of today that

is controlled by Putin and the chekists. Therefore, the next section is dedicated to a discussion of this issue.

Endemic organized crime and corruption is one of the more serious aggravating features of post-communist societies as it thrives in environments lacking well-developed legal systems and the rule of law. In what appears to have become the norm in many FSU states, political and intelligence officials, both active and former, work with organized crime groups for private/personal interests. It is a well-established fact that organized crime cannot exist without corruption in government. Criminal syndicates have through various means extensively penetrated government institutions, allowing them to work from within the system. And, those criminal elements who operate officially outside the political system simply bribe or intimidate political officials to facilitate the realization of their goals. At the same time, political officials bribe other political officials and economic elites, as the need arises. The corruption extends from top to bottom, and originates from within and outside official structures.

In terms of post-communist change, organized crime and corruption pose grave implications for both the democratic political transition and the security function, as both the politicians and police are either coopted, bought/paid off, ousted, or killed. In many cases, the officials themselves are the chief perpetrators and facilitators of organized crime, thus furthering, rather than mitigating, the problem to the detriment of democratization efforts and the development of a democratic political culture and values. As Caparini and Day observe, “organised crime has a character and durability that makes it qualitatively different than common criminality, and it tends to be both persistent and capable of exponential growth. It can be associated with corruption of both the political

and police systems."[62] Since the Russian system is wholly corrupted, rotten from the top down, as it was when under the control of the Communist party after the 1917 Bolshevik-driven revolution and the tsars before then, for Russia (and other FSU states) to successfully establish the rule of law and democratize requires the institution of an effective LVD policy to eliminate the old guard from top official leadership and commanding positions in both political and intelligence/security sectors, and to start anew, with democratically-oriented individuals who are more likely to submit themselves to and enforce the rule of law.

The historical record of the past 16 years shows that the governments of those formerly communist states that failed to take any measures whatsoever to institute an LVD policy have not only been the most unsuccessful at building democratic institutions and institutionalizing democratic methods and practices, but have also developed the most extensive organized crime problem, with entrenched ties between political and economic elites/government officials, intelligence/security sector officials, and organized criminals becoming firmly cemented. As Stephen Handelman noted in his 1995 book, *Comrade Criminal*,[63] "the Russian mafia has joined the former KGB and the nomenklatura to create Russia's new power structure."[64] This "new oligarchy," its access and influence over government unimpeded by LVD, was the prime impediment to democratic reform (particularly during the Yeltsin era, before chekists gained the

---

[62] Marina Caparini and Graham Day, "Democratic Control of the Police and Police Reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia," Working Paper Series No. 2, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, March 2002, p. 11.

[63] Handelman, Stephen, *Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya*, Yale University Press: CT, 1995.

[64] Cited in Jonathan M. Winer, "International Crime in the New Geopolitics: A Core Threat to Democracy," *Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village*, William F. McDonald, ed., Anderson Publishing Co. and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences: OH and KY, 1997, pp. 41-64.

dominant influence under Putin and deliberately reversed those (albeit, limited) reforms that had taken root. The situation is not unlike that in mid-late 1990s Serbia, where, as Balkan expert James Lyon of the International Crisis Group think tank observes, "the key obstacle [to democratic reform] was this interconnecting network of war criminals, organized criminals and people within the security services."[65] In that country, it was only when newly empowered and more democratically-minded political officials purged a high number of these elements from positions of power and influence that things started to change for the better, and political-economic progress was made. There has recently been discussion of LVD in this country, too.

Studies by Soviet-Russia expert and American University Professor Louise Shelley suggest that to the extent organized crime provides stability and economic security and benefits, the population will be more likely to acquiesce in its existence.[66] The literature also postulates that widespread random criminality predisposes the population to willingly accept organized crime's establishment of the dominant rules and norms over geographic areas. In short, as one MVD official described it to this author, in the interest of stability, "society prefers organized crime over disorganized crime."[67] This preference does not necessarily translate into support for democracy, however, and more often works to reinforce a set of values and patterns of normative culture that are antithetic to democratic and free market ideals. An issue to consider then is how public perceptions of the role of organized crime have affected citizens' attitudes toward the political system.

---

[65] Fredrik Dahl, "Serbia Making Steady Recovery from Assassination," *Reuters*, May 8, 2003.

[66] Op. cit., "Democratization and political participation," p. 53.

[67] Interview with anonymous source in Russia, August 2002.

In the post-cold war era, the main national security threats have been universally identified as organized crime, weapons proliferation, money-laundering, drug-trafficking, illegal immigration, and other transnational issues, which responsibility for combating have since been added to the purview of intelligence/security services worldwide, in addition to the traditional tasks of espionage, counterespionage, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. Consequently, in those cases in which the same forces entrusted with the task of fighting organized crime are deeply involved in perpetrating it, as I show is the reality in Russia, public perceptions of cynicism and distrust of government institutions are only magnified. Clear and highly visible, business-related connections between political officials and organized criminals, buttressed and protected by the intelligence/security sector, over time tend to erode public confidence in the feasibility of so-called democracy and competitive capitalism in a country and lead instead to popular preferences for a strong hand to provide some semblance of security, even if it means a shift back toward authoritarianism and the concomitant loss of recently gained rights and freedoms which have largely existed only on paper and never fully realized in any case. More ominously, the society may feel the strong hand, yet gain no improvement in the security situation, which continues to deteriorates as the corruption deepens.

In assessing a transition process, Dawisha notes the importance of analyzing the political impact of organized crime groups, and the extent to which associations or political parties have become linked with organized crime.[68] She observes that, "central to the understanding of the evolution of societies in transition is the extent to which attempted marketization and privatization have affected the political strength and

[68] Op. cit., "Democratization and political participation," p. 53.

behavior of various economic groups in society."[69] In the FSU states, it was the "oligarchs," nomenklatura-"red managers," chekists, and organized criminals who accumulated economic wealth,[70] often through insider trading and cozy privatization deals, and in the case of the chekists and top Soviet-Communist party (CPSU) hierarchy, after also having gained immediate advantage as the old system collapsed by moving CPSU resources overseas and into private bank accounts.[71] The nature and relationship of Russia's economic elites to the post-Soviet political system, and the differences during the Yeltsin and Putin administrations, are the focus of chapter eight.

One very visible and widely reported on feature of formerly communist party-controlled states was a brutally repressive secret police that succeeded in wiping out practically all opposition, particularly within the former Soviet Union (they were not as successful in the "satellite" states of the former Soviet bloc). Yet, Sovietologists usually either downplayed or ignored the key role played by the secret police in politics and the economic sector, although participants in the second economy, which black market was a necessary component of the faulty central-command economy for the provision of ordinary consumer goods, were often prosecuted for "economic crimes," particularly

---

[69] Ibid., p. 52.

[70] See David E. Hoffman, *The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia*, PublicAffairs: New York, 2002; Paul Klebnikov, *Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia*, Harcourt, Inc.: New York, 2000; Mathew Brzezinski, *Casino Moscow: A Tale of Greed and Adventure on Capitalism's Wildest Frontier*, The Free Press: New York, 2001; Chrystia Freeland, *Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride From Communism to Capitalism*, Crown Business: New York, 2000; Dimitri K. Simes, *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power*, Simon & Schuster: New York, 1999; and, Martin McCauley, *Bandits, Gangsters and The Mafia: Russia, The Baltic States and the CIS since 1992*, Pearson Education: London, 2001.

[71] Julie Anderson, *The Changing Face of the KGB*, Master's Thesis, UMI Press: MI, August 1997. Also see "Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup, The Suppressed Transcripts: Part 3, Hearings 'About the Illegal Financial Activity of the CPSU'," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1996, pp. 271-311.

during periods of political transition;[72] even so, the literature focuses on the repressive aspects and human rights issues, to the neglect of the secret services' significant role in political-economic activities.[73] The chekists were omnipresent; secret police infiltration of *all* segments of the Soviet party-state was complete. However, scholars of post-Soviet Russia and political transitions theorists continued to neglect examination of the significant role the chekists played in both political and economic structures until it became glaringly evident in the latter years of Putin's first presidential term. In that aspect, too, this dissertation serves to rectify a gap in the current literature.

I show that in Russia, as with the other FSU states, the transparency necessary to genuine competition and a level playing field in the economic sphere, and resultant foreign investment and economic growth, is blocked by the same forces who profit from its absence. For example, as Jonathan Winer of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement notes, Russian organized crime syndicates' gaining of substantial control over the banking sector allows them to control a significant amount of available capital and to determine who gets access to it. Since "the expansion of credit to many sectors in Russia remains an essential component of economic development," the situation creates a dilemma wherein if the government cracks down by constraining credit through developing central control of the banking system, the short-term result will be economic stagnation, possibly leading to depression. Yet, if the government fails to gain such control, then criminal organizations will continue to be the ones who determine which individuals and corporations receive credit, creating the conditions for long-term

---

[72] Louise I. Shelley, "The Second Economy in the Soviet Union," *The Second Economy in Marxist States*, Maria Los, ed., St. Martin's Press: NY, 1990, pp. 11-23.

[73] Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States*, Westview Press, Inc.: Boulder, CO, 1984, p. 79.

criminal control of the economy.[74] A November 1998 interview published in *Itogi* is enlightening as to the reality in Yeltsin's Russia, before the chekists supplanted many strictly OC elements in the banking and financial structures. In the interview, well-known Moscow criminal *avtoritet* ("authority," an elite position in the criminal hierarchy)[75] claimed that "over the last two years we [i.e., criminal groups] have been the biggest investors in the Russian economy. One cannot imagine the country's economy without our investments."[76] While his statement may have been, to an extent, self serving and exaggerated, it likely had some truth to it.

Moreover, many traditionally state functions within the security and enforcement spheres were privatized with the acquiescence of the state, which has been and is itself incapable of these tasks. Former and active (and actively moonlighting) intelligence/security officials and organized criminals together operate/control many private security services (PSSs) while working for central and regional political bosses, who utilize their services for their own personal/patronage interests.[77] So, too, the oligarchs overwhelmingly tended to hire former KGB, GRU, and special forces personnel for protection and other tasks, such as intelligence collection and spying out competitors and others, while many smaller businesses afforded organized criminals for the same purposes; hiring a PSS owned and operated by either a group of intelligence/security officials and/or organized crime was imperative in the new Russian economy. These

---

[74] Op. cit., "International Crime in the New Geopolitics."

[75] See Vadim Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*, Cornell University Press: NY, 2002, pp. 60-61, for more on the nature of the *avtoritet*.

[76] Ibid., p. 122; and, see Alexander Ryklin, "Brava na nervakh," *Itog*i, December 8, 1998, p. 16.

[77] Op. cit., *Violent Entrepreneurs*.

security/"muscle" types, as well as many political elites, served as roofs, or "kryshas," for private entities and individuals.[78] ("Krysha"...."is a key term in the contemporary business lexicon, referring to a private enforcement partner, criminal or legal, and signifying a complex of services provided to clients to protect them physically and minimize their business risks." The term "came from the professional vocabulary of the intelligence service, where it signified an official cover-up — diplomatic or journalistic — of a spy."[79]) These (investment capital and private security roles), in addition to the traditional state functions of "taxation" (extortion) and contract enforcement that were also largely privatized during the Yeltsin era, are also discussed in chapter eight.

Karen Dawisha notes that whether the dominant economic groups form or affiliate with political parties, what role they assumed in the financing of elections, and the control of the media are crucial issues. Indeed, under Yeltsin the oligarchs dominated these activities, while under Putin the chekists supplanted them, in each case in partnership with organized crime and in opposition to any efforts to establish the rule of law. As a consequence, the entire system was corrupted, with democratic reforms discredited under Yeltsin and reversed by Putin, and the oligarchs supplanted and the chekists overseeing the redistribution of property to themselves and their clients once they gained control of the state. As Bruce Parrott explains, "deregulation of economic life in the absence of an adequate legal structure and a trustworthy state bureaucracy may lead to the domination of economic activity by predatory business and criminal groups

[78] Ibid., p. 22.

[79] For more on *kryshas*, see *Violent Entrepreneurs*, pp. 139-140.

indifferent or hostile to democracy, especially a democracy which blocks some highly profitable activities through effective laws and institutions."[80]

On a related issue, those individuals in the nascent civil society of such a post-communist state who expose the crime and corruption pose a threat to the powers-that-be. Thus, a criminalized economy has grave implications for democracy in terms of a free press in that investigative journalism is infeasible due to the frequent intimidation and killing of journalists who expose the illegal activities and relations of corrupt officials who partner up with organized criminals and other shady actors for private profit-making deals. In such scenarios, abuses of power and conflicts of interest are routine, while popular participation in politics is reduced/limited to occasional voting, often by a skeptical electorate that increasingly chooses "against all candidates" out of disgust with not only the choice of candidates but also the abysmal and ever-declining performance of the government.

Los and Zybertowicz note that, "While privatization of state property may facilitate democratization by offering members of the old elite a means of personal aggrandizement more lucrative and far less risky than attempting to reinstate an authoritarian order, the insider dealings may also give rise to mass sentiments that equate democracy with social injustice and rampant corruption."[81] More ominously, as they find in the case of Poland, an unintended consequence of the old elites' gaining economic wealth was the conversion of their newly-gained economic power into political power.[82]

---

[80] Op. cit., "Perspectives on post-communist democratization," pp. 25-26.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Maria Los and Andrzej Zyberowicz, *Privatizing the Police State: The Case of Poland*, Foreword by Gary T. Marx, MacMillan Press, Ltd.: London, 2000.

It is just such a process that leads to a deepening and institutionalization of corruption, rather than democracy, with some form of authoritarianism a more likely eventuality. Therefore, their research shows that the justification for "pacification" of the old guard through the provision of easy access to economic riches is faulty.

Through their control of significant segments of the economy, the old networks may (re)gain control of not only the political process, but economic policy, as well. It is most likely that they will hence proceed to use the machinery of government to facilitate their own continued financial and political success while largely excluding mass society from (meaningful) participation in the political process or benefitting from the economic gains of a semi-capitalist economy, and thus diminish popular hopes and expectations that a political-socioeconomic order of democratic capitalism and its accompanying way of life is feasible in their country. In a 2002 paper on the Polish secret services, Andrej Zybertowicz maintains that it is the "undercover community," or "security complex," constituting the military and civilian services, and all the other security-related institutions formally empowered to use covert, operational methods of data collection and action, such as the border and customs services, internal affairs, military information/reconnaissance structures, and tax police, plus former functionaries including those of PSSs and secret collaborators of communist services now active in business, media, and politics that "provides a beneficial environment, a fertile soil, for pursuit of the most influential informal power groups in Poland."[83]

---

[83] Andrzej Zybertowicz, "Transformation of the Polish Secret Services: From Authoritarian To Informal Power Networks," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, p. 3.

Zybertowicz finds that in Poland, "informal elite groups rather than democratic institutions exert real influence on the state decision-making process."[84] He suggests that the undercover community is a major component of "informal power networks which constitute the so-called transfer class," which consists of those who structured and participated in the privatization of the economic process to their own personal benefit. It is in the interest of this class "to prolong the transformative processes, to have institutional arrangements uncompleted as long as possible."[85] He asserts that "the most powerful of the networks in question are still based on resources generated by the institutions of the communist police state before 1989" and "capture of the state" in Poland "is mostly pursued not by firms, but rather by the business-security complex."[86] Finally, he finds that the intelligence/security services appear to be part of an informal system that perpetuates the influence of political, party-centered, client-patron structures over the distribution of resources, and thus concludes that the Polish secret services, while not used for foreign wars or domestic repression, "are rather a lever for pursuit of party politics and informal power networks that managed to capture the Polish state."[87]

In this dissertation, in examining the intelligence/security services' role in the political and economic transition processes in Russia, I show that a similar scenario as in Poland developed there, but on a much grander scale given the country's failure to meet

---

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid., p. 10.

[86] Ibid., p. 11.

[87] Peter Gill, "Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence/Security Services After September 11th," paper presented at the Workshop on Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 103, January 2003, p. 59.

any of the three preconditions, and the indisputable fact that the chekists are the dominant power in the state's political structures today, having managed to capture the state.

1.12: THE NEED FOR THE ACADEMIC STUDY OF SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AS A CONDITION FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Scholarly literature on the secret police transformation process in many states in the world undergoing or having undergone democratization, particularly those of a post-communist nature, is seriously lacking. For a variety of reasons, academic studies have not been compiled on this critically important topic even as increasing numbers of states throughout the world have made and are making democratic transitions. In part, the failure to include the intelligence/security services component in studies of democratic political transitions, even while they play a prominent role in a country's affairs, may be due to a lack of access to sources and materials on the subject. Yet, that reality neither negates nor excuses the need to at least identify and attempt to assess, in the interest of forcing a transformation, their role and activities in the country, its politics and economy, which in the case of non-democratic (and usually one-party) states is always of particular importance and prominence, but is and continues to be ignored, neglected, or unrecognized by academia, including democratic transitions theorists.

While specific information on secret police activities may be difficult to obtain, both deductive and inductive approaches to available sources and materials can be used, to an extent, to assess their role, structure, and functions. Basically, intelligence capabilities, plans, operations, officer identities, and sources and methods tend to be classified and extremely difficult to learn/uncover, yet the intelligence/security institutions' powers and certain other aspects and activities, especially those pertaining to the domestic front, are usually not secret and even quite self-evident in many cases.

Analyses on intelligence/security service transformations of all types, and their evolutionary development in different political-cultural circumstances and contexts, could prove highly valuable in providing guidance to democratizing states' political leaders in their efforts to implement intelligence/security reform as a key element of the endeavor to forge new democratic institutions and practices. Moreover, given the major role that secret police agencies play in non-democratic political systems of all types, the understanding gained from studies on the secret police transformation process would also prove helpful to the governments of established democracies in understanding the measures necessary to the project so that they can provide relevant assistance to transitioning states' political leaders and intelligence/security sector chiefs in setting up new political and security/policing arrangements and building viable democratic institutions without squandering time and resources.

If we narrow the research topic to the secret police transformations that occurred as part of the post-communist political transition processes underway into/in the 21st century, we are faced with an even greater dearth of published works. The burgeoning transitions literature in the wake of the cold war's end and Soviet Union's collapse has failed to fill the vacuum, generally neglecting the issue of intelligence to a most unacceptable degree for such a key aspect of the political relations within and among states. As Peter Gill observes, without serious academic studies on security intelligence, we are left with "a serious gap in our contemporary political analysis of an important aspect of the state's operations since 'security intelligence' or 'political policing' goes to the very heart of the relationship between the state and its people....This concerns the integrity of the democratic process itself; for example, the question of whether the state

can contemplate its own transformation by its people without suppressing them in the name of national security."[88] This dissertation makes an important and certainly greatly needed contribution to filling that vacuum, as it addresses the post-Soviet Russian secret police transformation process within the context of Russia's political-economic transition.

1.12.1: Decisions on Intelligence Transformation Play a Pivotal Role in the Political Transition Process

The literature's suggestion that transitions should be distinguished in terms of the identity of the primary agents of change, or, their "mode of transition," "because they generate fairly durable legacies that affect the posttransitional regime and politics," which, as Gerardo Munck and Carol Leff argue, occur "through its [mode of transition] influence on the pattern of elite competition, on the institutional rules crafted during the transition, and on key actors' acceptance or rejection of the new rules of the game," implies that a connection exists between modes of transition and democratization. They propose that, "a given mode of transition is likely to increase the odds for the emergence of democracy if it generates a more or less balanced pattern of elite competition."[89]

In the case of revolution from above, which is the mode that transpired in Russia, "the former rulers are likely to retain a disproportionate influence within the political system vis-a-vis the still incoherent opposition. A lopsided pattern of elite contestation undermines mutual trust among competing elites and tempts the party in power periodically to abridge the democratic rules of the game. The lack of an effective

---

[88] Op. cit., *Policing Politics*, p. 36.

[89] Gerardo L. Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective," in Op. cit., *Transitions to Democracy*, pp. 193-216.

counterbalance to the elite that oversees the transition impedes routinization of competition and acceptance of the concept of loyal opposition. In comparative terms, revolution from above is probably the mode of transition least likely to sustain steady progress toward the consolidation of democracy."[90] With Russia a historically patriarchal country in which a leading figure exercises predominant influence. Yeltsin had the opportunity to direct the country toward democracy. However, his failure to institute any form of LVD, and to make trade-offs with the Services in exchange for political support worked to undermine the nascent reforms that had briefly taken root. For example, beyond Yeltsin's employment of authoritarian measures against the obstructionist communist opposition, political parties were "created" to present an illusion of democracy, while serious democratic-oriented parties were marginalized, a situation that contributed to the undermining of the democratization project. Yeltsin's primary concern was his own power, maintained at the expense of democratization. The situation was compounded by a lack of LVD. Munck and Leff conclude that, "in sum, an essentially political factor, the process of transition itself, is important in determining the likelihood that the outcome of transition will be a democratic form of government, as well as the distinctive challenges new democracies face when they try to consolidate themselves."[91] Indeed, the pivotal factor may be less the mode of transition and more the *process*, which must include a deliberate secret police transformation (LVD requisite).

Yet, according to Munck's and Leff's theory, it follows that in top-down regime change, the transition may depend not on the ability of opposition elites to set the agenda

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

but, rather, on the "ability of a segment of the incumbent elites to break with the old order and singlehandedly define a transitional agenda from above."[92] This latter scenario has some connotations to what was, albeit failingly, tried first in the late Soviet era when in an effort to strengthen the state's economy while saving the socialist system by preempting and controlling sweeping political changes, then-USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev generated the political opening for new elites to enter the leadership structures through his perestroika and glasnost policies and shape a more functional system. However, his transition agenda was limited, and sought to retain the communist party-state rather than institute a sea change in the country's institutions and move Russia toward democracy. As it happened, in the face of the power and political intrigues of the secret police, the endeavor was cut short, and instead brought a KGB attempt to preempt Gorbachev's decentralizing initiatives via a (failed) coup in August 1991, followed by the country's ultimate collapse and break-up, creating a situation which the chekists, armed with numerous advantages, proceeded to exploit to their own benefit, and to the detriment of democracy. These historical events give much credence to my argument that a secret police transformation is a key element in that process, facilitated through the institution of LVD. With Yeltsin gaining the presidency following Gorbachev's ouster from the Kremlin, the prioritizing of an LVD policy on the transitional agenda never actualized and secret police transformation never materialized. In hindsight, it is clear that this choice exacted a huge price on the development of Russian democracy.

In all fairness, an albeit insufficient attempt was made to institute an LVD policy in Russia soon after communism's collapse. But not by Yeltsin, upon whose support it depended for success; Yeltsin not only viewed the Democratic Russia activists who

[92] Ibid.

promoted it as lacking political or administrative experience (they were excellent protest organizers but poor governors), he claimed to have preferred to avoid the unrest that he believed could result from the wholesale removal of CPSU officials from government. As Michael McFaul observed, "Although some activists within Democratic Russia advocated that CPSU leaders be tried for their crimes in a manner similar to the Nuremberg trials, Yeltsin feared the debilitating effects of lustration."[93] Given the CPSU monopoly on power and one-party history of the country, where to succeed required party membership, and there existed total penetration of all aspects of Soviet life by the Communist party and KGB, few talented people would be available following a comprehensive purge, so the argument went. Yet, the crux of the matter is that Yeltsin failed to oversee the building of democratic institutions, and only focused on maintaining his own power and privilege. In short, real democratization was not in the cards, and so neither was the destruction of the secret police.

Moreover, McFaul notes that Yeltsin was concerned that with a militarily and economically weak state wracked with secessionist violence, and that "a real attempt to challenge the CPSU nomenklatura might trigger a reaction that could topple the Yeltsin regime."[94] Yeltsin's thirst for political power had apparently driven his decision not to institute LVD, as well as the choice to merely dilute, rather than dismantle, the old KGB and build new intelligence/security services from scratch, and subsequently use them to bolster his rule, just as leaders of Russia centuries past had done. As McFaul points out,

---

[93] Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 2001, pp. 156-160.

[94] Ibid.

the Democratic Russia movement had also pushed for a full reorganization of the army, MVD, and KGB, but Yeltsin rejected those reforms as well.[95]

One is hard pressed to believe that Yeltsin did not understand the implications of his decisions on the KGB, although he presented his choice as determined by a concern for widespread instability if LVD was instituted. As he described it in his 1994 biography, *Struggle for Russia*, "The main criticism is that I preserved the system of state security. I did not issue a decree that would have immediately removed from their government posts all former employees of the Communist Party's central committee and regional committees (and some say even the district committees)."[96] Nor did he regret that decision. McFaul notes that in addition to the political sector, Yeltsin extended his preference for cadre continuity to economic policymaking, and within a year after constituting his first government had removed most democratically-oriented individuals from senior government posts.[97]

Given that the post-communist transitions of the FSU states were top-down regime changes, and in light of the paramount role played by the Moscow-directed secret police in each of these republics' regimes historically, plus the KGB's emergence largely unscathed from the wholesale collapse of all other Soviet institutions, it is imperative to assess the intelligence role in the post-Soviet transition process. As noted above in regard to Soviet and post-Soviet studies, one particularly glaring weakness of the current transitions literature is its failure to adequately address the key role of the secret police in

---

[95] Ibid.

[96] Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia*, Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Times Books, Belka Publishing Company, Random House, 1994, pp. 126-130.

[97] Op. cit., *Russia's Unfinished Revolution*, pp. 156-160.

the former regime's political-economic affairs, but in the political transition process itself as well. Not only are the structural-functional, legal, political control, institutional, and culture aspects of the secret police transformation neglected, but so too are these institutions' potentially significant roles in either supporting or opposing those aspects of the political-economic transition necessary for the success of the democratization project itself.

Asmerom and Reis suggest that this disregard for the intelligence/security services may stem from the democratization literature's failure to address "the interplay between democratization and bureaucracy."[98] Bureaucratic relations with other centers of power have been investigated, but scientific research on the key bureaucratic element of intelligence/security services remains sparse,[99] and often lacks both comparability and comprehensiveness. Considering the vast size alone of the secret police bureaucracy in communist states, this sector and its role and relationship with the state/political leadership and society before *and* during (as well as after) the transition cannot be overlooked.

In their comprehensive 1996 book, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*,[100] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan briefly touch on the bureaucratic element of intelligence/security services, but they direct their focus more to the general need for a "usable bureaucracy"

---

[98] Op. cit., *Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality*, p. 3.

[99] See George Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police*, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1981, for a highly comprehensive study on the Cheka and its role in politics and society, and relations with the Soviet leadership for the period December 1917 to February 1922; and, Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States*, Westview Press, Inc.: Boulder, CO, 1984, for a useful account of the role of the Soviet secret police in politics.

[100] Op. cit., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.*

as one of five necessary interacting and reinforcing arenas (civil society, political society, constitutionalism/rule of law, usable bureaucracy, and economic society) for democratic *consolidation*, and limit their brief discussion of the intelligence/security services to their penetration of other bureaucratic structures.[101] In a more specific vein, this dissertation focuses on the intelligence/security services, identified in line with Linz and Stepan's thesis as a primary organization in the bureaucracy that must be made "usable," yet elevates it to a much higher priority, as a pivotal element in democratization efforts, much more important than other bureaucratic units given the nature of its power potential and critical role in state and society. Every government has a need for an intelligence capability to inform its foreign policy and protect and further national interests. Thus, the identification (and examination) of the secret police transformation process necessary to meet this "usability" condition in the context of a post-communist transition process is mandated.

Linz and Stepan note that, "to the extent that the bureaucracy of the previous nondemocratic regime has been recruited by political criteria defined by the old regime and to the extent that the political leadership of the old regime has deeply colonized the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy presents problems of serviceability to a new regime."[102] Beyond the "stateness" problems of the newly independent states of the FSU, these problems include: (1) the historical fact of the party-state, and the post-collapse position of the party disrupting the normal functioning of the bureaucracy; 2) efficacy damaged by the replacement of civil servants with new but incompetent forces (which, I must note,

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid., pp. 250-251.

perhaps mistakenly assumes the previous set of bureaucrats were competent); and, 3) the informer legacy.

Certainly during the Soviet era, the state apparatus was, in total, firmly controlled by Communist party structures, and their main instrument, the secret police — itself part of the state apparatus, was also firmly controlled by party structures, and enjoyed no professional autonomy. Thus, the total politicization of the bureaucracy in FSU states meant that much of the state apparatus would be neither "available" or usable to new democratic forces as they strove to drive the transition to democracy, mitigatable only through the appointment of new administrative heads with the will and capability to implement and manage democratic reforms.

The historic reality of a highly politicized bureaucracy pertains particularly to the secret police as the primary implementers and enforcers of coercive party policies, making it the most politicized of all bureaucratic units, and the force, together with and under the command and control of the Politburo, directly responsible for having turned Soviet society into an informer society *par excellence*. Linz and Stepan note that the informer legacy "presents inevitable problems for the new regime, most prominent of which is the demand on the part of many citizens for "lustration" [purification] of the state apparatus, even if this violates due process and civil rights and creates legitimacy problems. However, in light of these "sensitivities," I propose that LVD is much more passive than the non-democratic alternative, and, most importantly, is likely to have significant consequences for the pace and likelihood of democratization in post-communist states with no history and culture of democracy; the disqualification of the ancient regime's worst abusers from holding high political office or intelligence/security

sector leadership posts not only provides the space and legitimizes the policies and programs of democracy-minded individuals and contributes to the democratization process by enabling the transformation of the secret police, it helps protect against a secret police resurgence and subsequent reversal of democratic reforms.

Further, Linz and Stepan argue that, "if new democracies institute large-scale lustration policies, another consequence might be that those threatened by lustration and their families might turn to vote for the successor, reformed Communist parties as a pressure group for their interests."[103] Yet, this latter consequence would not matter, having no detrimental impact on the democratization project if all parties followed democratic constitutional procedure, including fair electoral competition, and operated according to the rule of law in their governing and activities. Any successor communist party would be just one more party among many, and unlikely to dominate political life after the discrediting of communist ideology and subsequent regime collapse, its monopoly destroyed. The successor communist-turned-socialist parties in East European states did not reverse the democratization project nor thwart the LVD process that was instituted. An LVD policy instituted in the political arena can be expected to work to minimize or negate any attempt by those disqualified to thwart the process. It is the democratic transition's hijacking by non-democratic forces unhindered by an LVD process that must be prevented. In fact, many communist-turned-socialist parties regained the majority in the newly pluralist systems of East European states, albeit under new names and platforms, regardless of LVD policies, without reversing democratic reforms — Poland under leading (former Communist party-renamed) Social Democrats Party President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Leszek Miller is a prime

[103] Ibid.

example. The goal of LVD is not to decimate the country's political-economic capabilities but, rather, to eradicate those structures of the worst repressive elements and preclude them from leadership posts and commanding positions so that they cannot subvert the democratization project.

In making their argument, Linz and Stepan state that large-scale purging of government structures through lustration "would be extremely difficult (and democratically dangerous) in most new democracies," as occurred with the high percentage of West German elite transfers to East Germany.[104] First of all, transitioning states are not "new democracies"; rather, that may be the goal for which LVD has been shown to contribute. Further, they do not define large-scale nor specify to what extent lustration should be applied. The institution of LVD on a sensible scale, that is, the top level (i.e., leading decisionmakers) and commanding posts (i.e., the directors and deputy directors), poses no such threat to the state. LVD can be sequential, beginning with the disqualification of the worst repressive elements (leading Communist party members, KGB generals) from the top echelons and working down to the middle and lower levels over time as the need requires. Leadership structures are key. Yeltsin's thinking was apparently similar to that of Linz and Stepan, for in defending his decision to not support the institution of LVD in any sector, he declared, "It would have been disastrous to destroy the government administration of such an enormous state. Where it was possible to put in experienced 'old' staff, we did."[105] Obviously, he saw a role for the old KGB. While he admitted that there were a number of mistakes made in the choice of such

[104] Op. cit., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, p. 251, footnote 38.

[105] Op. cit., *The Struggle for Russia*, pp. 126-130.

individuals, such as posting of KGB Gen. Alexander Sterligov as a close deputy of Vice-President (1991-93) Alexander Rutskoi, he stood by his decision.

Conversely, I argue that LVD should be applied immediately to the *higher and commanding levels* of the key institutions of government, that is, specifically, the (core executive) political and intelligence/security sectors (the latter comprehensive, that is, including the intelligence/security, military, military intelligence, military counterintelligence, and police structures). Without such a policy immediately implemented during the euphoria of the democratic moment that follows the demise of the old regime, the danger to democratic development is far greater, as old secret police and nomenklatura officials antagonistic to democratic change and historically corrupt throughout all levels regain their footing they are likely to actively oppose and work to sabotage the democratization process from the inside, if LVD is not instituted, in the interest of preserving their positions of power and privilege in society. Moreover, if high level secret police and political officials opposed to democratization are allowed to continue their careers, any "outsider" (established democracies) training of new recruits and personnel in democratic methods based on the rule of law will be rather meaningless and a waste of resources due to the likelihood of unabated pressure to conform to the demands of those leaders and commanders who retain their positions and continue to exert their domineering influence (the effects of "command influence" are widely-recognized in military and paramilitary organizations throughout the world).

In a monograph titled, "Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from Eastern Europe," Ezra Suleiman notes the vacuum in the transitions literature on the state and its capacity to carry out basic functions (security provision, tax collection,

delivery of services).[106] Like Linz and Stepan, he recognizes the essential need for a usable bureaucracy to consolidate democracy, and cites Jacek Kochanowicz's work on transitioning states' bureaucratic challenges, in which he notes that a "revitalized and reoriented state capacity is crucial to the success of both market-oriented reforms and consolidation of democracy." Revitalized" and "Reoriented" through the predominance of democratic-oriented individuals are the key ingredients here. Further, he observes that whether or not the economy is a market economy, a "strong state" is needed to set the norms and regulations that enable (economic) society to function.[107] The "strong state" that Kochanowicz points to is not the same as that conceived by and so often articulated by Putin.[108] Indeed, Putin's "strong state" derives from a nationalistic-militarist desire for absolute control and empire. A "strong" state conducive to democratic development would be one that establishes and governs according to the rule of law.

A requirement for a newly democratizing regime to provide good government to its citizenry, measured in terms of performance, is a professional, non-politicized bureaucracy with the capacity to implement state policies that not only regulate economic activities and social behavior based on codified law but also to provide basic public services, such as welfare, health, education, and the "public goods" that are commonly

---

[106] Ezra Suleiman, "Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from Eastern Europe," in Op. cit., *Transitions to Democracy*, pp. 141-167.

[107] See Jacek Kochanowicz, "Reforming Weak States and Deficient Bureaucracies," Joan Nelson, ed., *Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe*, Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ, 1994, p. 202, cited in Ezra Suleiman, "Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from Eastern Europe," in Op. cit., *Transitions to Democracy*, pp. 152-154.

[108] See Putin's May 7, 2000 Inauguration Speech. Also, see Fred Weir, "Putin pledges reforms," *CNEWS*, http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2004/03/15/382486-ap.html; Dmitry Zaks, "Putin Promises Strong State, Liberal Economics In National Address," *IslamOnline*, http://www.islam-online.net/iol-english/dowalia/news-2000-July-09/topnews8.asp; Otto Luchterhandt, "Putin's 'Strong State'," http://www.dgap.org/english/tip/tip3/luchterhandt_p.html; and, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Putin_address_SDI_policy_memo_7.00.doc.

assumed to be mandatory state/governmental functions, including the provision of security to the populace as they go about their lives. Therefore, the ability of the government to collect taxes to pay for the provision and administration of government services and public goods is also mandatory, and thus an important function of the bureaucracy. Particularly in the post-communist states of the FSU, due to low tax collection, endemic corruption, deteriorating infrastructure, and related problems, government services have been severely underfunded and, hence, quite abysmal. To help remedy the situation, Yeltsin created a Federal Tax Service, however, in practice it functioned as a private political-paramilitary arm of the Kremlin, its operatives wearing balaclavas, camouflage uniforms, and carrying automatic rifles, and directed against politically-selected targets. Tax revenues remained inadequate and the system only became more deeply corrupted.

The bureaucracy must be professionalized in order for it to be functional in a democratic society and serve effectively as a key support to the state, its viability and internal stability. As Ezra Suleiman notes, "The development of a central bureaucratic structure that is built on Weberian principles and that is administered by professional officials requires no negotiations and compromises with international organizations. It would allow the state to avoid the pitfalls of privatization that lead to the excessive power of new "rent seekers," would reduce corruption in the decisionmaking process, and would ultimately strengthen the legitimacy of the state."[109] Yet, in all of the post-communist states, the reform of state bureaucracies was placed low, if at all, on the political agenda,

[109] Op. cit., "Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation," p. 154.

where economic issues dominated, and it was largely excluded from privatization processes.

Complicating the economic transition to a free market and in response to calls by global capitalists for the reduction of state interference in the economy (in many cases followed by a call for increased interference in the economy in order to strengthen the state), state power was too extensively eroded for the task, given the unstable context of stark and dramatic change. As Suleiman observes, "...less state power does not always mean more freedom. On the contrary, a weak state might be a serious obstacle to the success of economic, political, and social reforms. Liberalization cannot succeed under conditions of state collapse or inefficient bureaucracy."[110] He cites Stephen Holmes, who points out that the main problem of post-communism is a crisis of governance, as administratively weak states are incapable of implementing reform.[111] The reality is that there is no way to avoid the weakening of a state following its political-economic collapse. The question is whether LVD tends to lead to a significantly weaker state than exists without it, and whether newly empowered democratic-minded leaders without extensive administrative experience could more successfully manage the process, which could be expected to enjoy the assistance and support of NGOS and foreign government representatives from leading democracies, as well as the nascent civil societies of democratizing states, at instituting democratic reforms, promoting democratic organizational cultures, and mobilizing the bureaucracy to effectively *implement* the changes than old, incompetent bureaucrats from the past regime, who may prove less

[110] Ibid., p. 163.

[111] Ibid.

likely to have or hone the skills necessary to engineer and manage democratic and institutional reform. Finally, it must be noted that corruption is a major cause and contributor to the continued weak status of a state, and perhaps would be much less pervasive if LVD were instituted, which process itself is rooted in law, marking a new, legal-based beginning. It may be intuitive to think that the established Western democracies would prop up a democratically transitioning government and help it to stabilize in the interest of spreading democracy. The evidence has shown that an active and enduring Western commitment to a transitioning state's democratization project has significantly contributed to its success.

Suleiman observes that in many East European states, "Bureaucratic reform has largely been limited to the devolution of power....altering the balance of power between center and periphery sidesteps the need for bureaucratic reform."[112] He notes that no serious efforts at making wholesale changes in bureaucratic personnel or preparing a new bureaucratic elite occurred, suggesting that "the nonviolent nature of the revolutions in Eastern Europe dictated that the settling of scores would be kept to a minimum. The refusal of the regimes to hold accountable the elite of the communist regimes extended to the bureaucracy." The point missed is that LVD was instituted with the intention of disqualifying for the present and future, not punishing for the past. In any event, as to the Soviet Union, the question of whether to go far beyond LVD, and hold to account those responsible for serious human rights violations and mass murder during the brutal rule of the ancien regime was certainly a legitimate consideration, but was generally an external,

[112] Ibid., p. 155.

rather than internal issue,[113] never being much touted by Russia's (and the newly independent republics') new political elites as important to the democratic political agenda.

Finally, Suleiman states, "in none of the countries of Eastern Europe was there a counter-elite ready to assume the reins of power. Those most responsible for fighting the former regime, the dissidents, were immensely influential in bringing down communism. But they were ill prepared to assume the reins of the state."[114] The post-Soviet leadership of Poland may disagree with that assessment. Moreover, to suggest that a lack of "prepared elites" is a legitimate justification for not instituting lustration is mistaken, for large-scale political learning can take place if the will and the leadership are there. LVD tends to proceed sequentially, beginning with the leading positions, and at a pace that compensates in its implementation with the need to maintain stability. Moreover, experienced old communists have questionable advantage over new democrats in governing a democratic society. Surely, LVD is no panacea, and it will always be unsatisfactory, incomplete, and replete with challenges and some abuses for partisan gain. But it is the better option, and has been shown to contribute to democratization. The end result of instituting LVD is likely to pay off over time and bring a higher benefit for the democratization pace and progress than without. With the exception of the German

[113] Former Soviet functionary Alexander Yakovlev was a rare exception. Cataloging the various groups targeted by Soviet political leaders during the 20th century, resulting in approximately 60 million deaths attributable to the Bolsheviks and their associates and followers, he forcefully argued for the absolute necessity of the de-Bolshevization of Russia in order for Russia to join the civilized world. See Alexander N. Yakovlev, *A Century of Violence in Soviet Russia*, Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2002.

[114] Ibid., p. 156.

Democratic Republic,[115] the development of a legally-based and professional bureaucratic structure was not seen by political elites as particularly important, and changes in organization and personnel were kept to a minimum, except at the highest levels. Yet, in many East European countries following communism's collapse, the extensive debate over whether and to what extent to institute LVD proved helpful in highlighting the crimes of the past regime and furthering the employment of democratic methods to resolve controversial issues and create new institutions based on the rule of law and respect for human rights and political freedoms.

It is important to recognize, also, that the East European states, unlike those of the FSU, had a history of democracy, and, hence, held advantages in that all opposition was not completely crushed, making the constitution of a democratic government in the immediate wake of communism's collapse easier. Moreover, they were the occupied, not occupying powers, with Moscow dictating their affairs. This is not an insignificant factor in their decision to institute LVD, and helps to explain why LVD in *both* the political and intelligence/security sectors is so much more important for democratization to succeed in FSU states, especially Russia, with Moscow having been the core of the Soviet bloc.

Suleiman notes that in most countries of the region, "the political elite experienced a far greater renewal than did the bureaucratic elite," and argues that the explanation lies in the availability of replacements. He observes that access to a political career, which requires no particular skills and what is required can be learned on the job,

[115] Notably, the GDR was a special case as it was the only former communist country that had a full-scale, alternative elite immediately available (in the Federal Republic of Germany, FRG) and, furthermore, could integrate its political and economic systems simultaneously into the highly-stable FRG model, in addition to the fact that it was not faced with having to build both systems at once from the abysmal remnants of the old system.

is relatively simple when there are sudden explosions in the number of political parties in a society. (So, in line with this thinking, LVD in the political arena should not be a problem in terms of inexperienced individuals acquiring the capability to effectively govern.) Conversely, to be a bureaucrat "requires skills and a high tolerance for routine, anonymity, and subordination."[116] Thus, while many "new democrats" took up politics, few joined the bureaucracy. A factor that must be considered as part of this discussion is what the available rewards, financial and otherwise, were for those who chose a political career. In post-Soviet Russia, a political post often translates into access to wealth and power, and a bureaucratic post a relatively low-paying job with government wages often months delayed and therefore frequently subsidized by demands for bribes. In 1990s Russia, the bribes progressively increased, however, as did the size of the bureaucracy.

Further, Suleiman notes, "Paradoxically, the instrument of political power (the vast network of bureaucratic institutions) is the object of far more suspicion, mistrust, and derision in the post-communist era than was the locus of power (the party) during the reign of communism. He explains that, in part, this is because of the omnipresence of the bureaucracy, with its multiple police and security forces, in the daily lives of citizens. The reappearance of party politicians also poses less of a threat than that of bureaucrats because the former participate today in the political process without enjoying the monopoly they once possessed."[117] He concludes that, "in short, the regimes can scarcely afford to disturb the only structures that they can use as instruments."[118] And yet it must

---

[116] Op. cit., "Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation," pp. 157-158.

[117] Ibid., p. 163.

[118] Ibid., p. 158.

be pointed out, if they do not, that failure may lead to the undoing of the democratization project, as it did in Russia.

Moreover, “the bureaucracy” can not be simply lumped together as a mammoth whole; it includes a large number of significantly different types of departments/agencies with variant functions, and whether viewed from the perspective of horizontal or vertical intergovernmental relations, each agency and level must be approached differently. I propose that democratically-minded political leaders may find little or no value in the existing bureaucracy’s highly politicized and often incompetent administrative structures that developed out of the ancien regime’s patron-client system, and so LVD of the top bureaucrats would not only work, but make sense. How else can they expect to implement change? The fact remains, old bureaucratic administrative structures are unreliable as partners in a new regime’s democratization efforts (assuming they are genuine); unreformed, they constitute less an instrument than a serious liability.

Further, some bureaucratic entities “matter” more than others in terms of their capability to impede the democratization project. The old Soviet civil service was staffed with what were unquestionably “party political hacks,” along with numerous inept “parasites” as a result of the deeply entrenched patronage system that had been operative for centuries. LVD must be implemented at top levels initially, and followed with the mid- and lower-levels over time and as necessary. A price must be paid to actualize democracy and in the final analysis, LVD permits lower costs for the project. So, too, I suggest that if the old political elite remain the dominant power in government, it follows that they will be unlikely to implement democratic reform in the bureaucracy, particularly the secret police, which it can be assumed they will seek immediately to coopt for their

own private, political purposes. Thus, the democratization process is compromised, as is evident in many, if not all, regions of Russia (and the FSU).

In a similar vein, if new, democratic-minded elites succeed in gaining power dominance, yet fail to reform the intelligence/security services, they may be displaced by non-democratic elites supported by the old political and intelligence/security functionaries and operatives who are then used as instruments against "the opposition" in a most undemocratic fashion. Yet, intelligence/security sector reform may be rejected for fear of losing its support, and is seen as something to be done only at the new regime's presumed political peril. Worst of all, the secret police may be neglected by newly empowered democratic elites, and thus free of political control as a result of the animosity, hatred, and other impractical emotions pent up during the dissident days and remaining prominent in their thinking, paralyzing them from taking bold actions to deal with it, or ignoring the sector as if they can responsibly govern in such a context without establishing their control over it. This latter scenario leaves the secret police completely unleashed and free to act in accordance with their own interests with impunity, and fully unaccountable to the government or people.

In sum, the post-communist democratic transition and reform option requires that the old Soviet secret police be subjected to LVD and the rule of law, depoliticized and professionalized, controlled by elected (civilian) political authorities, and held democratically accountable in order for a conclusive secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms to occur.

Interestingly, Linz and Stepan describe how majoritarian "nationalizing policies" of the polity could diminish the chances of democratic consolidation, affecting all five

arenas.[119] In this dissertation, and drawing from Linz's and Stepan's research on democratization, I show how "chekist policies," most particularly those instituted under the Putin regime, have reversed and significantly reduced the likelihood of a successful democratic transition in Russia in each of the five arenas, specifically: 1) civil society: state control of the mass media and intimidation of "independent-minded" journalists, undermining of independent political associations/organizations, fabricated arrests and show trials of scientists and intellectuals for espionage, tight controls on and spying accusations leveled against NGOs and foreigners; 2) political society: chekists/corrupt nomenklatura/organized criminals (the "new oligarchy") over-represented in elected political offices and governing through extra-judicial measures; 3) usable bureaucracy: services and privileges of the state available to the new oligarchy and their patrons and clients while provision for a social safety net for ordinary folks is largely neglected, along with state infrastructure; 4) rule of law non-existent and the legal system used by authorities for political purposes and selective, extra-legal arrests and prosecutions, prosecutors and other judiciary components coopted by the (executive/chekist authorities)/presidential administration, gubernatorial, and regional government offices; and, 5) economic society: exclusive rights to land redistribution, voucher distribution and privatization to select few insiders (e.g., those with high-level political connections/"administrative resources"). As it is typically the case, it is the political leadership that plays the key and organizing role in the possibilities, giving additional credence to the valuable contribution of LVD for a post-communist state with no history and culture of democracy to make a successful democratic political transition. Rustow

[119] Op. cit., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*.

was prescient in emphasizing the importance of political elites and the choices they make, within structural constraints, of course, in forging democratic transitions.

Another key factor in the reasoning behind imposing LVD on the intelligence/security sector relates to the need to change the organizational culture and mentality of the Services. Change at the individual level is fundamental to bringing about a new outlook and perspective on things political and the role of intelligence/security services in a democracy. The organizational culture and mentality will prove to be the most difficult and resistant to change; thus, the imperative of LVD at the top commanding levels in the ranks, academies, and training institutes. Organizational histories must be written that no longer glorify past repressions. New symbols must replace those representative of the repressive past. This transformational condition is covered in chapter ten of this dissertation.

1.12.2: The Intelligence/Security Sector is a Unique Element of the Bureaucracy

Finally, it must be recognized that intelligence/security services are a unique government agency. Peter Gill, in his 1994 book on the UK's domestic security agencies, *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, points out the particular bureaucratic nature of security intelligence agencies, noting that they differ in important respects to other bureaucratic agencies, especially in regard to secrecy, but can be studied with a view to their organizational structure and information processes.[120] Drawing from Graham Allison's[121] organizational process and bureaucratic politics

[120] There is a 'standard' 'information process' adhered to within most intelligence/security services, as they tend to be large bureaucracies that collect, interpret, manipulate, disseminate, and control information. See Arthur Hulnick, "Controlling Intelligence Estimates," *Controlling Intelligence*, Glenn Hastedt, ed., Frank Cass: London, 1991.

[121] Graham Allison and Philip D. Zelikov, *Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*, Longman: NY, 1999.

models as an alternative to the rational actor model in evaluating bureaucracies, Gill notes that examining aspects of the internal organization and standard operating procedures of security intelligence agencies, including the intelligence process,[122] "are central to understanding their actions."[123]

Further, he observes that ..."the subsequent development of more sophisticated structures of state secrecy during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the product of the attempts of successive governments to maintain control of information in the context of both democratisation and bureaucratisation....A firmer grasp also had to be exerted over the bureaucracy as ministerial responsibility to parliament for decisions led governments to tighten their grip on what information the state released."[124] This historical reality illuminates the critical importance, as part of the democratization process and as a condition for a post-communist secret police transformation, of instituting parliamentary oversight of the intelligence/security services in order to help ensure both their effectiveness and accountability, since government officials will strive to enhance their insularity from public criticism as the system becomes more open and popular elections serve as the primary vehicle to the exercise of legitimate political power.

In contrast to Peter Gill, and taking the bureaucratic-rationality approach, Asmerom and Reis suggest that if pushing administration toward the legal-rational model of bureaucracy is to a large extent necessary for one-party or ruler-dominated

---

[122] See Op. cit., "Controlling Intelligence Estimates."

[123] Op.cit., *Policing Politics,* p. 76.

[124] Op.cit., *Policing Politics,* p. 51.

bureaucracies to move toward democracy, then the rule of law is fundamental to (democratic) bureaucratic reform.[125] I wholeheartedly agree. Given that the nature of the main task of security intelligence agencies is, as Gill observes, the collection and analysis of information, rather than the implementation of executive policies,[126] then from an intelligence perspective, the rule of law is fundamental to protect citizens from arbitrary secret-police type actions, limit the potential for abuses and operational impunity, and gain the public's confidence in the intelligence/security institutions as necessary to the national security of the state and serving solely its interests, and not those of a partisan political or private nature.

Indeed, for post-communist secret police-intelligence/security services, the transition to a democratic political order means a substantial reduction in and limitation of their powers and activities on the domestic front, most particularly a shift of resources away from the policing of what have become under democratic government legitimate political activities. Their focus thus turns toward fighting transnational organized crime, weapons proliferation, money-laundering, drug-trafficking, illegal immigration, and other contemporary transnational threats, in addition to the traditional espionage, counter-espionage, intelligence, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and covert action functions. In light of this factor, the issues of political control and oversight constitute the main focus of chapter nine of this dissertation.

1.13: CONCLUSION

At this juncture of the project, I have argued that if an LVD policy is not instituted in a post-communist transitioning state with no history and culture of

[125] Op. cit., *Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality*, pp. 3-5.

[126] Op. cit., Policing Politics, p. 50.

democracy, then, other things constant, democratic-minded elites will be less likely to and face greater challenges in gaining the sufficient political power necessary to institute sustainable democratic reforms and impose LVD on the secret police in order to transform it into intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms. Consequently, the transition will either be "frozen" or drawn out until the old guard eventually leaves or is more likely purged from government in a revolution of sorts, as occurred in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, and a democratically-oriented political leadership takes charge and imposes some form of LVD on the intelligence/security sector, or it will fail. Moreover, once that is accomplished, the institution of LVD will help secure democratic reforms for the future. These issues are the focus of this dissertation project. It is hoped that an increased understanding of the critical importance of an effective, democratically-minded political leadership, free from the interference of old regime elements and particularly the secret police, its organizational culture and mentality, to drive the state's change processes is conveyed here, in addition to the reality that a supportive intelligence/security sector that operates in line with democratic norms is a primary ingredient necessary for the endeavor to succeed.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PIVOTAL PRECONDITION: LVD — ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

2.1: INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I highlight comparative evidence of the contribution that LVD has made in effecting secret police transformation and democratic political transition in a number of post-communist states and examine the role it plays in disempowering old networks and thus providing impetus to the development of a usable intelligence/security sector, how the timing of LVD affects the pace of secret police transformation and democratic political transition, the various challenges in implementing LVD, and explain why LVD is the best option for effective reform.

2.2: THE COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE SHOWS LVD'S POSITIVE ROLE IN SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

While a history and culture of democracy and national unity and identity make it easier for a post-communist state to democratize, the FSU states (with the exception of the subsumed Baltics) do not meet these preconditions. Therefore, and particularly in these cases, lustration/vetting/de-communization (LVD) is pivotal, for it all comes down to institutions and the people who lead them — those who are and embody the nature of the political leadership and will make the hard choices, with consequences for all of society. Whether they transform the secret police is pivotal for the transition path.

Of significance is the fact that those states that had a history and culture of democracy and immediately after gaining political independence from Moscow instituted, partially instituted, or even unsuccessfully but still seriously tried to institute an LVD policy, particularly in the intelligence/security sector, in the process of forming

their new governments and intelligence/security sectors are the ones that have most succeeded in making the transition to democracy, albeit not without setbacks (the Baltics,[1] Czech Republic, Hungary,[2] Poland); and, those that had a history and culture of democracy but did not attempt to do so have progressed from old Soviet ways, but much more slowly and only at a faster pace after Western-oriented, democratic-thinking political elites gained power and control of government in the latter 1990s/early 21st century and, after recognizing that the country's increasingly abysmal circumstances were directly related to and a result of having no such policy, instituted LVD (of the intelligence/secret sector) to remove old party hacks (Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria); while those that had no history and culture of democracy and made no attempt to institute LVD have failed to complete a democratic transition, and are headed in another political direction altogether (Russia, Georgia until the 2003 Rose Revolution, Ukraine until the 2004 Orange Revolution,[3] Moldova,[4] Belarus, and other former Soviet republics). Of

---

[1] As James Sherr notes, the Baltics and the Czech Republic built their post-communist security services from scratch. For an in-depth examination of Ukraine's security and defense issues, see James Sherr, "Security, Democracy, and 'Civil Democratic Control' of Armed Forces in Ukraine," *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov, eds., Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT and London, 2002, pp. 91-112.

[2] See Laszlo Majtenyi, "Reconciliation and Developing Public Trust: Opening State Security Files to the Public," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

[3] For example, Leonid Polyakov notes that "unlike the military, they [intelligence/security services] remain basically unreformed from the time of their creation in [the] early 1990s." See Leonid Polyakov, "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform: Is Progress Conditioned by the Interest of Society," presented at the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," held in Geneva, Switzerland on 5-7 September 2002, organized by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 100, October 2002, p. 3. Also, for a comprehensive examination of the post-communist Ukrainian intelligence service, see Julie Anderson and Joseph L. Albini, "Ukraine's SBU and the New Oligarchy," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 282-324.

these, Georgia has made the greatest progress, having purged its government of many corrupt leaders from Soviet times, rebuilding its intelligence/security sector from scratch, and thereafter making great strides toward democracy and integration with the West.

These latter states to a higher degree prioritized border issues, the constitutional process, and economic reform, while political and intelligence/security sector reforms were placed much lower on the agenda or largely excluded. And when security was discussed, *reform* of the intelligence/security sector was not the issue; rather, action was focused on the *subordination* of security structures.[5] Thus, *who* would control was much more important than *what* was controlled, leaving the door open to the Services' cooptation by political elites, in their unreformed old Soviet mold. Also, notably, in the FSU states following communism's collapse, in addition to lacking a history and culture of democracy, in many cases national unity and identity were elusive with either separatist wars or ethnic conflicts raging, and the government often backing one of the sides to the conflict and no political solution in sight. In some cases, the possibility of a conflagration continues to threaten in the background, even where the unrest has generally settled, with animosities simmering just below the surface.

What then is apparent is the importance of these three preliminary factors — LVD of political and, especially, intelligence/security sectors, a history and culture of democracy, and national unity and identity, defined as more than a "sense of belonging to a specific political community," and including "a lack of violent separatism within the

---

[4] Democratic-oriented parties in Moldova have been thwarted for years from implementing LVD, its thwarting believed to originate with Russian intelligence and its organized crime partners. See "Georgia, Moldova, and Bulgaria: Dismantling Communist Structures, *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Interview with Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia, Iurie Rosca, and Philip Dimitrov, Spring 2004, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol12.html.

[5] Op. cit., Leonid Polyakov, "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform: Is Progress Conditioned by the Interest of Society," p. 4.

country" — in creating the underlying basis for overcoming the challenges and meeting the conditions necessary to move along the path toward sustainable democracy. Of note, the first, if implemented, helps to compensate for the lack of the others. In any case, when these three ingredients are neither present nor actively promoted/developed, the likely result is the effective thwarting by old Soviet nomenklatura/secret police forces of both the state's transition to democracy and its accompanying secret police transformation to democratically accountable, professional and non-politicized intelligence/security services that both respect and protect the democratic rights and civil liberties that form the basis of a constitutional-liberal democratic form of government. While the past can not be changed, a positive future for the country can be built if the right choices are made by the political leadership, and these decisions are based on genuine intentions and the political will to forge the development of democratic institutions and political-economic freedom and competition.

Short of a revolution (of note, the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively, led to debate and legislative drafts on lustration, the issue currently under consideration by both governments), the institution of an LVD policy facilitates the large-scale entrance onto the political stage of new, democratically-minded elites, and thus the necessary potential for directing democratic reforms, which is otherwise unlikely in post-communist states with no history and culture of democracy. In lamenting the situation in Russia, in a September 15, 1999 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Berezovsky-owned) article, Petr Akopov wrote,

> "The crisis of the regime and of the state is nearing its logical culmination, and if Russia has a future, the restoring (and salvation) of the state itself is possible only through a change of elites. Is there any need to spell out what is involved in a decisive, virtually complete renewal of the ruling layer? Revolution, that was so

> little to our taste in the previous decade, is approaching imperceptibly but unavoidably. The efforts to stop it may be various, the possibilities including 'black colonels' from the security forces and the organizing of pseudo-popular movements in support of one or another of the people who hunger for power. But the absence of a leader cannot be solved by finding some limitation. Unless some state figure appears in the country with abilities that match the challenges, then instead of politicians answering the demands of the time, the people will do so. The spontaneous force of the population will thrust forward new leaders. Will these leaders be able to protect the country? Even if they cannot, this will scarcely be their fault."[6]

I argue that in Russia, Putin and the chekists have in fact hijacked and implemented the scenario option that Akopov alludes to, thereby negating the devising of a 'revolution' by any group but their own, the chekist community. It has become quite apparent today that any potential challengers who seek to arouse the masses and mobilize them to rise up and revolt against the chekist regime will be unceremoniously put down by repressive means if necessary, as well as those individuals who seek major reform or systemic change by pushing a strategy for change from within elite circles.

Of the three primary ingredients for a post-communist democratic transition, the LVD precondition is the only one which can be met through a purely political decision made by and requiring the participation of solely political elites. The latter two preconditions are historic-related and involve mass society or significant segments thereof, in addition to the political elites. What this tells us is that the pivotal one of the three primary ingredients that makes the meeting of the conditions necessary to a democratic political transition more likely, the critically important LVD, is of immediate political applicability and implementation in the wake of a communist government's collapse, and its effective institution thereby enables the primary and secondary conditions for a democratic transition to develop much quicker than they otherwise could.

---

[6] Cited in Boris Kagarlitsky, *Russia Under Yeltsin: Neo-liberal Autocracy*, Pluto Press: London and Sterling, VA, 2002, pp. 281-282.

2.3: DISEMPOWERING OLD NETWORKS AND DEVELOPING A USABLE, PROFESSIONAL, AND DEPOLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SECTOR

Further giving credence to the foregoing proposition on LVD is the recognition that if, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue, a usable state bureaucracy is a necessary condition for a democratic consolidation, then in this arena, too, such a policy in the intelligence/security sector constitutes a precondition since, without it, this development is highly elusive, particularly in regard to this key bureaucratic element. I propose that the institution of an LVD policy for a period of at least three presidential terms is an influential factor in facilitating not only the sustainment of successive, democratically-minded political elites in power, thus creating the political space and time to institutionalize democratic reforms, but also in the development of a usable bureaucracy, specifically, that of the secret police, which transformation is dependent on the institution of an LVD policy and is requisite for a democratic political transition. LVD serves as the primary vehicle for reducing both old secret police personnel numbers and activities, and enabling the creation of intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms.

The LVD imperative is reflective of the vital need to recognize the symbiotic relationship that exists between a communist (or non-democratic) political regime and its secret police bureaucracy, which is always highly politicized, firmly controlled by, and a key instrument of the Party in power for the coercive implementation of its policies. Haile Asmerom and Elisa Reis argue that “the concept of a neutral public bureaucracy, however ideal, is both a precondition and a vital byproduct of a healthy democratic

system of governance."[7] However, they show that while a bureaucracy should be non-politicized and professional, it is unrealistic and even undemocratic for it to be completely neutral and, hence, non-political; in their personal lives, bureaucrats may engage in political activity and exercise their political rights if they so choose.[8]

To depoliticize the bureaucracy, including the secret police (the bureaucratic element that constitutes the main focus of this dissertation), and for real change to occur, the symbiosis between old power networks must be broken and the apparatchiks removed from key decisionmaking structures, an elusive quest when "democratic" regime change is top-down negotiated and LVD left off the transition agenda. As Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs professor Richard Betts notes, "In a bureaucracy reform means reorganization; reorganization means changing relationships of authority; and that means altering checks and balances."[9] Entrenched and outdated interests must be removed and disqualified from positions of power and influence, and power relations manipulated/shifted to benefit democrats. The crisis provided by the collapse of the regime engenders the opportunity. The institution of LVD facilitates immediately the depoliticization process by disqualifying the old nomenklatura and secret police operatives from leading elected and intelligence/security sector posts, which positions in a transitioning state are necessarily involved in more than policy

---

[7] Haile K. Asmerom and Elisa P. Reis, eds., *Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality*, Macmillan: London, 1996, pp. 8-9.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Richard K. Betts, "Fixing Intelligence," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2002.

implementation, and are likely to entail a high level of involvement in the policy formulation process as well.[10]

Within the intelligence/security sector (of the bureaucracy), the imposition of LVD is imperative in order to transform the secret police into professional intelligence/security services. Otherwise, high-ranking (chekists)/senior intelligence officers operating in the new political-economic circumstances of the post-communist state — and at a particular advantage given their foreknowledge of the real political-economic conditions in the country, influential contacts at home (and in the case of foreign and military intelligence officers, both at home and abroad), including high-level connections in political circles and knowledge of, if not continuing access to, secret information and files — are likely to undermine efforts to professionalize and depoliticize the ranks,[11] while those few who may actually strive for professionalism are likely to be ostracized by their colleagues. For instance, career counterintelligence officer Lt. Gen. Olexander Skipalsky openly accused former Ukrainian intelligence/security service (SBU) head Leonid Derkach and former Defense Minister Col. Gen. Olexander Kuzmuk[12] of conspiracy to abolish the Committee for Intelligence Coordination for the specific purpose of getting rid of highly professional officer, Gen. Skybynetsky. In an August 2000 *Vechirniy Kyiv* newspaper interview, Skipalsky said, "Professionalism

---

[10] While in some well-established democratic states the bureaucracy has been largely reduced to solely an administrative unit that implements decisions made at the top political executive level and thus has no policy formulation role, during a democratic transition (and consolidation) process, the top bureaucratic levels, if staffed with democratically-minded individuals, could contribute significantly to the timing and success of democratization.

[11] Julie Anderson and Joseph L. Albini, "Ukraine's SBU and the New Oligarchy," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 282-324.

[12] Defense Minister Kuzmuk was fired by President Kuchma after the October 2001 shooting down of a Russian passenger airliner, a Tu-154, with a missile during Ukrainian military exercises in the Black Sea. See "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," p. 20.

today is not respected, especially national-patriotic. It [professionalism] is just dangerous for those who today is [sic] not building, but is robbing Ukraine..." And he asks, "What kind of rule of law and independence we are building when we, in fact have changed nothing [of Soviet heritage]?"[13] Indeed, the deep and prevalent connections between the corrupt political elite, intelligence/security sector, and organized crime create a situation in which professional and incorruptible officials are sometimes killed for "not playing along with the game" and therefore perceived as posing a threat and/or hindrance to corrupt colleagues.[14]

As in Ukraine, so too, in Russia, professionalism in the intelligence/security ranks remains elusive. Again, I argue that the remedy can only be found in personnel renewal/(replacement), particularly at the top and mid-levels, achieved through the LVD process. Illuminating this reality, for example, in commenting on the Russian security services' report presented by its chiefs to the State Duma Security Committee in April 2003 on the progress with investigations of the highly public crimes of murders of politicians, businessmen, deputies, and journalists, committee member Valeri Ostanin described the report as "simply a formality," and highlighted the main reason for the current situation in Russia as the endemic corruption in the law and enforcement agencies. He noted the "complete lack of professionalism," and stressed that "restructuring will not yield any performance results, if there is no serious shake-out of these structures and serious staff changes. However, the Duma adopted a formal toothless

---

[13] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," p. 19. For interview, see "There are Ukraine's sons capable to defend it," *Vechirniy Kyiv*, August 11, 2000.

[14] Of note, in July 2004, a senior Russian energy official told Assistant U.S. Commerce Secretary William Lash that, "People that don't understand the rules get killed" .... "physically killed." See Maria Levitov, "Rule Breakers Get Killed, U.S. Official Told," *The Moscow Times*, July 15, 2004, p. 1.

resolution that is not binding on anyone. We have only to hope that the head of the state will finally adopt measures and will duly ask those subordinate to him to do their jobs and will make conclusions on whether they are suitable for their jobs or not."[15]

At core, whether leaders/commanders have the political will to demand and reward professionalism and punish those who diverge from it is key to the reform equation. The institution of LVD works to reduce the likelihood that professionalism will be traded for loyalty and politicization. LVD contributes to transparency and accessibility, which are essential elements of accountability, and serve to control state/official behavior to an extent.[16] Polyakov makes the point when he observes of the situation in Ukraine, where "after the heads of power ministries and structures were appointed with reliance not just on the loyalty, but on their professionalism as well, the situation started changing somewhat to the positive side both with regard to transparency and, in parallel, with the level of professionalism." He notes that this change was most evident in the SBU, with accusations of its interference in internal politics decreasing significantly, and its resistant attitude toward media contact becoming reduced as well.[17] That is instructive, in terms of LVD's contributions to democratization.

---

[15] Svetlana Listopadova, "The security services know who ordered the crime and killers, but cannot find them," *Vesti.ru*, April 24, 2003.

[16] Marina Caparini and Graham Day, "Democratic Control of the Police and Police Reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia," Working Paper Series No. 2, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, March 2002, p. 10.

[17] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," p. 20.

2.4: EARLY LUSTRATION AND "STARTING FROM SCRATCH"

In order to prevent or significantly reduce the potential for the political protection, and the development of what Larry Ladutke calls "structural impunity,"[18] in which both individual and institutional impunity exist, if not promotion, of the continuation of secret police-type methods and activities, which are always employed for non-democratic political purposes, an LVD policy must be instituted. It is by instituting LVD in the selection process of candidates for not only the intelligence/security sector, but, ideally, political leadership and other important official posts as well, that the potential for the political imposition of real change is enhanced, by changing and thus transforming the nature of the leadership/command (and senior-level cadres); the systematic rooting out of the old partisan-political guard and worst human rights abusers starts the secret police transformation process.

Such a policy instituted in the construction/(reconstruction) of new intelligence/security services to replace the old secret police also signifies the beginning of the end of the internal promotion, glorification, and application of repressive and non-democratic methods, and the old Soviet chekist organizational culture and mentality that permeates the organization. There must be a real and acknowledged break with the past — a renunciation in word and deed, so to speak. Thus it is that only through the institution of an LVD policy designed to remove staunch loyalists to the old Soviet regime and bring democratically-oriented people into the ranks, especially at the top levels, can there be a true secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms.

---

[18] Larry Ladutke, *Freedom of expression in El Salvador: The struggle for human rights*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004.

In other words, concomitant with LVD within the political sphere, which has been shown in many post-communist countries of East Europe to have contributed to democratization, LVD within the intelligence/security sector is a necessary condition for their concurrent (along with the regime transition) transformation. This means that all officers must pass through a verification process that excludes those who were involved in the worst illegalities, political repression, and human rights abuses, as, for example, the Czechs demanded as part of their intelligence/security institutions' transformation.[19] Basically, the old dogs must go. Some may argue that a few veteran officers be retained for a limited time (and later retired), as the practical need for skills, competency, and a training capability for new recruits during the transformation period is often considered mandatory. However, this could effectively poison the transformation, and facilitate a degree of continuity within secret police structures and networks, with the potential for a number of related complications later, as reforms progressed (if they did under such circumstances). Moreover, without LVD, one must question what this training would entail, and any concurrent indoctrination and other implications, given the nature and competencies of the trainers.

To help the new intelligence/security services break with the past and its traditions following the institution of LVD, officials from the Services of well-established democracies could provide training, inclusive of instruction on the integral democratic norms and practices so necessary for new officers to learn and internalize for a real secret police transformation to occur, in addition to a curriculum designed to develop the knowledge and skills needed to enhance their effectiveness in dealing with the

---

[19] Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania*, Studies in Russia and East Europe, Palgrave: NY, 2001, p. 57.

transnational security threats posed to democratic states in the 21st century. The relationships thus developed could serve as the foundation for future liaisons between their and other democracies' intelligence/security services, which is of high value in today's world of international terrorism, WMD proliferation, and other transnational threats to democracy.[20]

If secret police ranks are not "cleansed," a process overseen by newly empowered democratic-minded political elites and implemented by a partisan-neutral body such as a court or special commission, the record has repeatedly shown that they will actively work, in secret police fashion, to thwart democratic reforms, which by their very nature go against their interests. A legitimate question is whether there exists a chicken-egg relationship here since this proposition may be directionally reversible when the state in question itself is undergoing a "simultaneous" (political/economic) systemic transition and, hence, is weak. Recall that, as Joseph Albini and Julie Anderson note, "The KGB's role in perestroika was multi-faceted,"[21] with senior chekists significantly shaping events.[22] Thus, in the situation of a seriously weakened state, it is possible that the secret

---

[20] For example, the August 12, 2003 arrest of three men in Newark and New York by U.S. law enforcement officials for attempting to supply al-Qaeda terrorists with a Russian-made Igla SA-18 missile to shoot down commercial aircraft was the culmination of a sting operation that resulted from a five months-long investigation involving the U.S. FBI, British MI-5 and MI-6, and the Russian FSB. See "FSB helps FBI arrest buyer of PERK 'Igla,'" *Strana.ru*, August 13, 2003; Andrei Surzhansky, "US, UK, Russian secret services prevent missile smuggling," *ITAR-TASS*, August 13, 2003; "Briton arrested in 'terror missile' sting," *BBC News*, August 13, 2003; "'Old enemies' unite in missile sting," *BBC News*, August 12, 2003; "FBI: Arrests Foil Missile-Smuggling Plot," *The New York Times*, August 13, 2003; David Johnston and Philip Shenon, "U.S. Holds Briton on Missile Charge," *The New York Times*," August 13, 2003; and, Richard Lezin Jones with David Johnston, "Arms Dealer Held Without Bail in Missile Case," *The New York Times*, August 13, 2003.

[21] Joseph L. Albini and Julie Anderson, "Whatever Happened to the KGB?" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 26-56.

[22] Dr. B. Harasymiw, "KGB Glasnost: Soviet Press Interviews with KGB Officials," Commentary No. 2, *Commentary*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 1990, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com02.asp; and, L.A. Ponomarev, "Has Reform Hit Security Organs?" *Perspective*, Vol. II, No. 5, May-June 1992, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/Vol2/Ponomarev.html.

police themselves may become powerful enough to highly structure and condition the outcome and timeline of the political regime's transition. LVD is designed to prevent that.

If a secret police aims to independently thwart radical political change, then the transitioning and thus weak state's (new) government has limited options, and may even be at risk of an outright coup, as happened in Russia when the KGB unsuccessfully attempted a coup to oust Gorbachev in August 1991, and again, albeit on a smaller scale when the FSB, the major KGB successor agency, tried (in what many considered a palace coup) to oust Anatoly Chubais and his team in July 1996.[23] Both attempts failed, however, and with no LVD to thwart them, under Putin's nurturing hand there was a chekist resurgence. The point is, immediately following the failed coup attempt, the secret police was seriously discredited, but that opportune moment, a period marked by overwhelming popular support for democracy and destruction of the hated KGB, was not taken to institute LVD and truly reduce the likelihood of a secret police resurgence.

Finally, with no LVD instituted, the secret police could capture the state, as some informed individuals, including this author, argue has occurred in Putin's Russia.[24] The KGB and its immediate successor agencies became an unharnessed secret police after communism's collapse, and were no longer accountable to any party or political master. Throughout the 1990s, they regrouped, methodically working to gain an influential political role, ultimately reaching the pinnacle of power through Yeltsin's 1999

---

[23] Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, *Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within*, S.P.I. Books: New York, 2002; and, Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 2001, pp. 300-302.

[24] See footnote 8 on p. 339 in Thomas C. Bruneau, "Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 323-341.

appointment of Putin as RF president. During "Chekists' Day" celebrations in 2000 (December 20), Putin reported to his comrades that, "A group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission," announcing that, "There has been "a successful penetration operation" of the Russian government by the security services.[25] And so he was speaking the truth.

One option among the range of choices available to a transitioning state's new political regime is to (make a) compromise with the secret police and only dismember them to dilute their power, thus weakening their ability to effectively intervene in political developments while accepting that many officers retain their positions and control over intelligence matters. Yet, a serious implication here for democratization is that this weakening of the secret police may prove only a temporary measure. Furthermore, of those who remain, with their seniority intact, it is likely they will continue to exercise a dominant influence within the organization, thus jeopardizing its transformation. They may also collaborate with private interests, including those of officers who leave, are fired, or retire from the services and enter the business world (and not on "active service" status, see chapter eight) to influence political and economic policy.[26]

As Maria Los and Andrzej Zybertowicz observe in the case of Poland, the old nomenklatura's and their (former) secret police partners' largely unhampered access to and gaining of economic wealth through privatization and other deals (as part of their

---

[25] "Foreign Intelligence Celebrates Twice...," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 23, December 25, 2000, p. 4; Goble, Paul, "The Days of the Chekists," End Note, *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 32, December 21, 2000, *RFE/RL Security Watch*, December 23, 2000, and, *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 23, December 25, 2000.

[26] "The making of a neo-KGB State," *Economist.com*, August 23, 2007.

"retirement") may serve as the means to an eventual return to full political power, aided and abetted by those officers who were retained in the post-communist intelligence reorganization process.[27] An *effective* and far-reaching LVD policy that encompassed *all* intelligence/security services could have helped significantly to prevent this development.

In many aspects, personnel continuity poses its own set of difficulties, both domestically and in a state's foreign relations. Domestically, it hinders reform, as exemplified, for example, by the case of Bulgaria, which did not institute LVD after communism's collapse, and where endemic corruption and close ties between the intelligence/security and business communities constituted serious challenges to the actualization of a conclusive democratic transition.[28] This scenario became increasingly apparent as the dominant pattern that developed within post-communist states, albeit to varying degrees; notably, the extent of these business-intelligence ties and their influence over (official) government policy and the policy process seemed to correlate to an extent with the degree to and timing in which LVD was debated and/or implemented.

In a state's external relations, secret police personnel continuity/intra-service transfers to merely reorganize/rename (a common tactic of window-dressing that is designed to falsely portray real changes as having taken place) intelligence/security structures is likely to impede the development of serious liaisons with Western intelligence/security services and the state's accession to full and trustworthy

---

[27] Maria Los and Andrzej Zyberowicz, *Privatizing the Police State: The Case of Poland*, Foreword by Gary T. Marx, MacMillan Press, Ltd.: London, 2000.

[28] Nikolai Bozhilov, "Reforming the Intelligence Services in Bulgaria: The Experience from the Last Decade," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

membership in Western international organizations such as NATO, Europol, Interpol, and similar cooperative security/police/military-related organizations because any positive results to a projected foreign policy strategy of Euro-Atlantic integration require a clear and proven commitment to democratic values.

For example, when the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary[29] prepared to join NATO, Western states were necessarily and justifiably concerned that these countries' post-cold war and Warsaw Pact member secret police were penetrated by or maintained undesirable contact with Russian intelligence (which clearly remained unreformed, as this dissertation shows), an issue that was repeatedly addressed by the NATO Special Committee, a grouping of member states' security agency chiefs.[30] So, too, the intelligence services of Bulgaria[31] and Romania have been of NATO concern. As Nikolai Bozhilov, Managing Director of the Centre for South East European Studies in Sofia, noted in October 2002, "The accession of Bulgaria to NATO poses a security risk as Russian penetration and vested interests in the government and the intelligence services cannot be ruled out. Yet, there is no clear positive vetting programme that can satisfy the NATO needs."[32] Similarly, NATO's Office of Security conducted its relations with the Romanian SIE (foreign intelligence) rather than the SRI (domestic security intelligence)

---

[29] Op. cit., "Reconciliation and Developing Public Trust."

[30] Op. cit., *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, p. 19.

[31] Bulgarian intelligence-sharing with NATO began during the Kosovo crisis, and the relationship evolved into increased involvement and cooperation with Western intelligence services and boosted the Bulgarian intelligence reform process. See "Reforming the Intelligence Services in Bulgaria: The Experience from the Last Decade."

[32] Bozhilov also said that "These problems are definitely surmountable as: firstly, NATO information sharing is strictly on need-to-know basis; secondly, for Bulgarian nationals who will receive the highest NATO security clearance, vetting is likely to be carried out by a major western counterintelligence service." See Ibid.

before 1997 due to questions surrounding the agency head's Securitate background and likely continuing relationship with Russian intelligence.[33] As an interesting side note, a problematic during 2002 in the case of Ukraine's possible joining of NATO was the fact that its top intelligence/security service officials "still view all foreigners as spies."[34]

For both internal and external reasons, the paramount importance of an LVD policy to eliminate old Soviet functionaries/operatives from top leadership/commanding positions in the intelligence/security sector in order to make feasible a secret police transformation and enable a comprehensive democratic political transition is clear. The experiences of many post-communist states/governments over the past 16 years show that early compromises with the secret police in the devising of post-communist arrangements, their taking the first option, only delayed the inevitable (and prolonged the misery of the state and society) if and when political leaders decided to develop/make a serious commitment to integration into European Union structures and a democratic trajectory — typically when a major and perhaps the primary source of the country's problems — personnel continuity at the highest levels of the political and intelligence/security sectors — clearly traceable back to the post-communist, succeeding governments' failure to institute effective LVD and its illustriously destructive consequences, became transparent to all.

A second option is to exploit the uncertainty so prevalent in the immediate aftermath of systemic collapse and deplete the secret police's influence over both the political transition and their own transformation by going beyond mere dismemberment

---

[33] Larry L. Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 111, Geneva, Switzerland, February 2003, p. 6.

[34] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," p. 21.

(since a dismembered body may well be reconstituted) and first dissolving and then building them anew — the "starting from scratch" method. With this decisive choice, an LVD policy is immediately instituted by newly-elected/appointed democrats (there remains the issue of the possibility that some of these "democrats" are really agents of the old regime — yet, their discovery/identification, regardless of setbacks, will unequivocally be borne out in time, as long as the democratization process progressively unfolds and they seek to undermine it). As noted earlier, if maintained as policy for at least 12 years (three presidential terms), LVD is likely to prevent the potential for a secret police reconstitution and enable democracy to grow roots and become firmly grounded. This second option, however, has been an unacceptable one for many post-communist, transitioning states due to the perceived need for experienced intelligence officers to provide continuity in protecting national security, maintaining internal order, and an overseas intelligence presence and espionage networks, carrying out other specialized tasks, continuing ongoing operations, and training new recruits. In light of this supposed "practical reality," the pivotal role of an LVD policy to a successful secret police transformation and democratic political transition requires closer examination.

2.5: INCOMPLETE OR DELAYED LUSTRATION SLOWS DEMOCRATIZATION

What the experiences of a number of post-communist states show is that when an LVD policy was not fully instituted or successfully implemented at the time of the initial post-communist regime change, or by successive governments for that matter, the military intelligence, foreign intelligence, and counterintelligence services (notably, the military and foreign intelligence services more often escaped the process, while those of domestic security and counterintelligence usually did not) were and continue to be

plagued by numerous abuses and scandals, and democratization processes significantly slowed, if not froze. Eventually, in some East European states, the necessity of a more extensive and effective LVD policy was, albeit belatedly, recognized, accepted, and implemented, though at this point in time, the comprehensiveness and integrity of the process was not as far-reaching as it could have been if instituted earlier, given that files had had much time in the interim to be manipulated, "lost," and destroyed, and officials with access to them or responsible for their keeping compromised.

For example, in the case of the Czech Republic, in April 2003 the defense ministry leadership "decided to virtually disband and rebuild its secret service from scratch" following several scandals that had led former Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik to order a top-secret investigation into the "intelligence service's past."[35] The preliminary results of the investigation showed that military intelligence service (VZS) officers were extensively abusing their powers by copying top-secret documents, computer files, and NATO materials, and had massively recruited agents within the Czech Republic, rather than only operating externally, as mandated. Further, the military intelligence service was planting its collaborators in Czech companies and public offices, and operating a private spy network. Furthermore, Karel Srba, a former Foreign Ministry General Secretary under Foreign Minister Jan Kavan, was helping the intelligence service to "legalize" its

[35] In June 2003, it was reported that Srba was on trial for allegedly commissioning the murder of a journalist, Sabina Slonkova. See "Former Czech Military Intelligence Chief Advising Opposition Leader," *RFE/RL Newsline*, June 9, 2003; "Lawyer Says Former Czech Foreign Ministry Official Is Innocent...But Girlfriend Says Two Others Were Targeted for Murder," *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 26, 2002; and, "Czech Defense Minister Orders Investigator of VZS Links With Srba...And Announces VZS Head's Departure From Ministry," *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 26, 2002.

collaborators by creating new identities for them and then sending them abroad to Czech foreign missions. Apparently, there were more than 200 operators like Srba.[36]

To deal with the situation and "disperse" the illegal spy network, Tvrdik planned to conduct a purge by invalidating all security clearance certificates for access to classified information and requiring new checks for all defense ministry employees.[37] Two former chiefs of military intelligence, Petr Pelc, assigned to the Czech Mission at the United Nations, and Frantisek Stepanek, appointed as High Representative of the Czech Republic at the NATO Allied Command Europe, were to be punished for issuing "invalid" clearance certificates. Furthermore, cooperation with all agents who had worked for military intelligence was terminated since it could not be determined whether any of them were revealed to the "enemy" due to leaked intelligence, while Gen. Giesl, who had commanded the VZS since fall 2001, was transferred to the post of deputy chairman of the Defense Ministry Intelligence Service Committee, led by Tvrdik's deputy, Jaroslav Skopek. According to a report published in the Prague-based newspaper, *Lidove Noviny*, Giesl was to be replaced by Col. Krejcik, Tvrdik's protege and security director of the Military Defense Intelligence Service (counterintelligence), who had participated in the internal investigation of the Srba affair. Finally, Tvrdik publicized his plans to appoint people who had no experience with espionage matters, no 'spy' credentials whatsoever, to senior positions.[38] In 2002, another former VZS head, Andor

---

[36] Ibid.

[37] As Thomas Bruneau notes on security clearances as the means for intelligence officers to enter the intelligence profession: "Clearances are the control mechanism for entry into and continuance in the profession." See Thomas C. Bruneau, "Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 323-341.

[38] Tomas Horejsi, "Minister Tvrdik To Replace Army Intelligence Chief," *Lidove Noviny*, (Prague), April 8, 2003.

Sandor, had his term ended (on July 31, 2002) when Tvrdik refused to renew his contract over differences between them on the intelligence services' role. At the time, Sandor told Czech television: "I have a different opinion on the future of [the] intelligence services than the current head."[39]

The Bulgarian case is another pertinent example of the importance of effective and comprehensive LVD for success at secret police transformation. As Nikolai Bozhilov, Managing Director of The Centre for South East European Studies, notes, the post-communist history of the Bulgarian intelligence services can be broken into three periods: 1989-1997, 1997-9/11, and post-9/11. During the first period, when the former Communist party-turned-Bulgarian Socialist party controlled government (except for the Philip Dimitrov government period of 1992-1993), "an orchestrated reorganisation, 'depoliticisation' and a renaming programme of all the services" was said to have taken place, yet, "it turned out to be a game of smoke and mirrors for in truth little really changed; the power remained where it had always been."[40] Corporate and vested interests crippled operations, and strong political interference disrupted operational work. He notes that, "The services themselves were used as an instrument to cater for the economic interests of the political establishment inside the country. Whilst outside the country, this political interference damaged the effectiveness of some of the most straightforward and almost routine-type operations."[41]

---

[39] "Czech Defense Minister Orders Investigator of VZS Links With Srba...And Announces VZS Head's Departure From Ministry," *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 26, 2002.

[40] Op. cit., "Reforming the Intelligence Services in Bulgaria," pp. 2-3.

[41] Ibid., p. 3.

Real change began when the Kostov government (1997-2001) adopted a Western orientation and aided NATO during the Kosovo crisis. A number of organizational reforms took place. Reforms continued after 9/11, following a government change in the wake of the 2001 presidential elections. Contacts with Western intelligence intensified, and personnel changes in the leadership of two intelligence agencies, the National Security Service and the Defence Information Service, were instituted. As Bozhilov describes it, there were setbacks. For example, on April 24, 2002 a controversial legislative act relating to vetting of the intelligence services, the Classified Information Act, was passed, which also regulates the issues of what constitutes classified information and who should have access to it. This law also deals with the former secret police files. Bozhilov lamented that, while NATO applauds the law, its application is another story, as "it will be impossible for researchers to establish a clear picture of the State Security's work because it gives the government authorities the right to reclassify documents that otherwise would be open to the public." He notes that, "The main flaw of this law is the lack of any effective control mechanism. The law provides for the formation of a State Commission on Classified Information, whose five members are to be appointed by the Prime Minister." Apparently, Bozhilov alludes, the drafters of the law had advisors "who are interested that not only the archives of the State Security remain out of reach of the society, but also the future actions of the authorities."[42]

Other problems remain. Bozhilov notes that, "recruitment and training are still largely based on the old Warsaw Pact thinking concerning threats to security." Moreover, the recruitment process and pool are hampered by brain-drain, the growth of the private

[42] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

sector, and lack of motivation and career development programmes and prospects. While on paper, recruitment standards have been significantly raised, in practice they have not been adhered to, and vetting and probation procedures remain much the same, with each service having its own procedures. Moreover, "teaching personnel is either from the Cold War era or lacks international experience and training exchange with foreign intelligence agencies...new intelligence priorities require experts in the new security challenges such as anti-terrorism, organised crime, Islamic extremism, non-proliferation of WMD, cyber warfare and so on..." Yet, he continues, "in contrast to the military, very few intelligence experts are sent to training courses in the West but those that are — like the military — are then excluded from advancement in their career. Those who do go, find themselves, on returning to Bulgaria, professionally cold-shouldered and soon become very disillusioned."[43]

In sum, Bozhilov describes the current situation in the Bulgarian political and intelligence/security sector in these terms: "Unfortunately, in recent years the Bulgarian political and administrative establishments have been flooded with exotic political appointments that are lacking any intelligence culture to use, process and file classified materials of sensitive national character. Moreover, it is widely assumed that intelligence should be provided to cater for the corporate interests of political parties and factions, which have an insatiable appetite to control the intelligence agencies."[44] He continues, "In their restructuring the intelligence organisations are facing very serious challenges. Methodology from the Cold War times is part of the daily work. Corruption is a serious

[43] Ibid, p. 8.

[44] Ibid., p. 9.

problem in some agencies. Senior officers outnumber junior officers. Indeed, the whole career 'triangle' is wrong. It is inverted! Due to lack of a career management system and scant financial resources, motivation is often missing. There is an urgent requirement for a new system of documentation of the intelligence personnel files. Operational work needs to be tailored towards better informational security and diminishing corporate and vested interest penetration. It is important to have a modern legal base for strictly need-to-know information access. The psychological barrier for private-partnership and collaboration with NGOs and academia is very high indeed. There is not enough debate and dialogue with outside experts about intelligence and the multitude of threats the modern world faces today. Unlike the military, contacts with Western intelligence organisations have still not resulted in the training of intelligence personnel to work in joint intelligence quarters or in joint intelligence operations. Another important factor in the training of qualified intelligence personnel is the ability for officers to rotate between the different services in order to gain additional valuable experience.[45]" Finally, as to parliamentary oversight, Bozhilov notes that it is "almost nullified by the lack of proper parliamentary organisation, staff and expertise."[46]

Quite obviously, the lack of an LVD policy in Bulgaria resulted in the unabashed continuation of old habits at the highest political and intelligence/security levels. For example, during the 2001 presidential election campaign the popular incumbent president, Petar Stoyanov, publicly presented and used secret intelligence information to discredit his opposition, which, in what was a positive sign for 'popular' democratization,

[45] Ibid., p. 10.

[46] Ibid., p. 5.

contributed to his ultimate electoral defeat given the general public's interpretation of this action as a serious abuse of presidential authority.[47] In the final analysis, the evidence shows that the source of Bulgaria's problems in transforming its secret police and democratizing its political system stems from a failure to institute an LVD policy.

More recently, as Bozhilov points out, the new political leadership's turn to the West in terms of cooperation with NATO and intelligence-sharing to fight terrorism has "boosted the reformation process." He observes that, "This process also brought new knowledge about modern threats and the methods to counteract them efficiently. The cooperation is expected to become very intensive, once Bulgaria is invited to join NATO. Integration and liaison will be powerful elements for the refashioning of the Bulgarian intelligence system in the years to come."[48] Additionally, the cooperation brought a mandated vetting policy.

2.6: POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING AN LVD POLICY

2.6.1: The Importance of the Secret Police Files

Admittedly, there are a number of potential problems in implementing LVD. In order to facilitate the institution of LVD and thus enable the institution of real democratic political change, secret police files must be accessible to the bodies charged with implementing the policy; otherwise, LVD will be incomplete. Los and Zybertowicz note that laws on state secrets are often used by those opposed to the process to thwart disclosures on agents/collaborators of the ancien regime and impede the policy's

[47] Ibid., p. 11.

[48] Ibid.

implementation.[49] Still, the implementation of an LVD policy in the political sector is of importance given the leading role of politicians in engineering the effective transformation of the secret police through the passing of statutory mandates and laws reforming (if not recreating from scratch) these institutions, reworking laws on state secrets, surveillance, and other intelligence activities, and thereafter exercising oversight, while the critical importance of LVD in the intelligence/security sector has already been explained, and demonstrates the regime's seriousness toward democratization. Therefore, LVD, especially in the latter sector, must be placed at the top of the agenda of the new regime (or pushed through as part of the negotiations on the new regime). Otto Kirchheimer made the point when he observes of the close relationship between the domestic security agency and the state that, "one might nearly be tempted to define a revolution by the willingness of a regime to open the archives of its predecessor's political police."[50]

In analyzing the evolution of developments in post-Soviet Russia, Russian journalist and prominent defense analyst Boris Kagarlitsky labels the unfolding of events as "restoration,"[51] rather than revolution, as:

> Revolution involves more than radical changes. Unlike transformations 'from above,' revolutions are made by the masses....For all the incompetence and savagery of the rulers, the political process remained totally controlled and, on the whole, predictable (all that was needed was to understand the goals and interests of the contending elites)." And, 'revolution from above,' as included in historic tradition, cannot be applied to Yeltsin's Russia, since historic tradition, both

[49] Op. cit., *Privatizing the Police State*.

[50] Otto Kirchheimer, *Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure of Political Ends*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1961, p. 204, cited in William W. Keller, *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1989, p. 10.

[51] Boris Kagarlitsky, *Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-liberal Autocracy*, Pluto Press: London and Sterling, VA, 2002.

> positivist and Marxist, makes a close association between the concepts of revolution and progress....To describe the changes in Russia in the late twentieth century as 'progress' is something the tongue simply cannot manage. In the course of ten years the country suffered an unprecedented economic collapse — one of the most profound peacetime declines in all of modern history, matched or exceeded only by the declines in other fragments of the former Soviet Union.[52]

Thus, Kagarlitsky concludes that, "what occurred in Russia between 1990 and 1999 was not 'reform,' still less 'revolution.' It was Restoration. This restoration was the natural continuation of the political cycle begun by the Russian Revolution of 1917....In its own fashion, restoration is a continuation of the development of revolution, creating the preconditions for a new revolutionary cycle," and Russia will be no exception.[53]

Revolution also entails the entrance of a wholly new political elite into positions of power. LVD is one alternative means to full-scale revolution (with its four stages, according to Crane Brinton's (1965) *The Anatomy of Revolution*, including: 1) the actual overthrow of the government; 2) the rule of the moderates; 3) the accession of the extremists and an accompanying reign of terror; and, 4) the thermidor, which constitute his process theory of revolutionary stages[54]), to produce that changed leadership and facilitate the establishment of new power relations that will lead to and structure new social and economic relations, creating the conditions for economic growth and progressive improvements in the standard of living, with a deepening of democracy to follow. This recipe can perhaps be equated with revolution — yet in the American vein, rather than that of the Russian Revolution of 1917, or those in which the first generation

---

[52] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[53] Ibid., pp. 3, 9.

[54] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, Vintage: U.S.A., 1965. Also see Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri, eds., *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*, Westview Press, Inc.: U.S.A., 1991, pp. 12-17.

of leaders who seize power through violence are habituated in its political uses, and tend to perceive a violent threat in the actions of potential challengers that Ted R. Gurr suggests leads to a one-party police state,[55] although both Barrington Moore, Jr. and Samuel P. Huntington argue that the social and economic classes that accompanied the American colonies' separation from Great Britain after 1776 make the term revolution inappropriate, while "J. Franklin Jameson's historical research (which was available to Moore and Huntington) suggested to him that it was indeed a revolution," since it "substantially reduced the prominence, role, and wealth of the colonial upper classes and accelerated the rise of a middle-class gentry, which greatly benefited from the confiscation of Tory estates, the emigration to Canada of British Loyalists, the removal of the Crown's restrictions on land colonization, and the abolition of the primogeniture."[56] Indeed, Jack A. Goldstone's definition of revolution as "the forcible overthrow of a government followed by the reconsolidation of authority by new groups, ruling through new political (and sometimes social) institutions,"[57] prescribes what may be necessary in post-Soviet Russia for the enabling of new, democratic-oriented political elites to gain control of the machinery of government from Putin and his chekists. However, a serious difficulty in realizing a revolution in today's Russia is more the poverty and apathy of the masses, and less the lack of a capable, charismatic leader who could win the support of a sufficient number of disillusioned elites with the will, organization, and resources

---

[55] Jack A. Goldstone, "An Analytical Framework," *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Mashiri, eds., Westview Press: Inc.: U.S.A., 1991, p. 49.

[56] Thomas H. Greene, *Comparative Revolutionary Movements: Search for Theory and Justice*, 3rd ed., Prentice Hall: NJ, 1990, p. 12.

[57] Op. cit., "An Analytical Framework," p. 37.

available to make such a cataclysmic event feasible.[58] In the event revolution does come to Russia, LVD could be expected necessarily in order to sustain the change.

One means used to thwart or sabotage the implementation of LVD, as Los and Zybertowicz note, is the possible pre-transition purging of secret police files of names and information on agents and secret collaborators by functionaries of the soon-to-be-ancien/collapsing and discredited regime in order to deflect lustration's goal through preemption, as happened to varying extents in many East European states as regime collapse/change became imminent. For example, when in December 1989 Czechoslovakia succeeded in gaining the potential to create its first democratic government since before Soviet domination, Oldrich Cerny, Executive Director of Forum 2000 noted that, "StB people still reported for work busily shredding the ongoing files," with Gen. Lorenz, head of the 1st and 2nd Directorates until November 17, 1989, later being sentenced to three years in prison (a sentence never served, as the country broke up and divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia) for playing a prominent role in the destruction of intelligence files.[59] The shredding continued until mid-December, giving old StB officers a chance to cover their tracks, protect secret collaborators, and perhaps manipulate the data.

Meanwhile, as the regime crisis intensified in the German Democratic Republic (DDR), Erich Mielke, head of the Ministry of State Security (MfS), issued a directive to

---

[58] Ibid.

[59] Oldrich Cerny, "Czechoslovak (Czech) Intelligence After the Cold War," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

local units to take all necessary measures to destroy documents or move them to larger district offices. A massive attempt to destroy the Stasi's documentation followed. Only the storming by thousands of demonstrators of the heavily fortified Normannenstrasse central complex in East Berlin put a halt to the shredding of Stasi files (nevertheless, during the chaos surrounding the regime collapse, a number of Stasi documents fell into private hands).[60] Subsequently, the Gauck Authority was created to house the voluminous secret police archives, and process and supervise citizens' requests to view their files on-site.

Given that, as Mielke asserted, "the MfS remained subject to party control until the very end," the SED's Politburo decisions and directives, documented in its archives, are of great value in understanding the significance of many Stasi documents.[61] However, the communist SED-turned-Party of Democratic Socialism held the party records and refused to open them to the public until 1992, when a compromise was worked out with the government giving the Federal Archives the responsibility for the administration of these materials, while retaining much of the party's old staff. In combination with the HVA "Rosewood" records,[62] only in December 1999 discovered among HVA files cached since 1990 by the Gauck Institute, the collection of former East German secret police files, according to DDR expert Jefferson Adams, "should allow a nearly complete reconstruction of HVA activities."[63] Already, extensive research on the MfS is possible,

---

[60] Jefferson Adams, "Probing the East German State Security Archives," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 21-34.

[61] Ibid.

[62] The Rosewood files are expected to reveal the identities of 40,000 agents. See the CI Centre's Web site, *www.cicentre.com*.

[63] Op. cit., "Probing the East German State Security Archives," pp. 21-34.

and every German citizen is entitled to view their MfS file, of which by the spring of 1999, 1,383,036 persons had done so.[64]

In Romania, some 140,000 files were destroyed during and immediately after the revolution, although the SRI retains about 20 linear kilometers of former Securitate archives (with others held by the interior and justice ministries). Political and bureaucratic struggles over their control continue.[65] In 1999, the National Council for the Study of Securitate Files (CNSAS) was created, intended to operate like the Gauck Institute in Germany, except that its guarding and protection was placed under the control of a former Securitate officer, Gheorghe Pasc, who had not only been promoted to head the SRI's "F" division, responsible for storing computer data and managing the agency's archives, but also had set up his own private security service (PSS) and hence proceeded to install microphones and other special equipment at CNSAS headquarters in order to monitor those who view the files.[66] The integrity of the agency has since been called into question.

2.6.2: Preemptive Bolstering Of Agent Ties and Infiltration of Opposition Groups

In addition to destroying, stealing, and manipulating the files, secret police officials of many former communist states preemptively bolstered their ties with agents and collaborators in preparation for the impending political change. For example, in Poland, officers' operational contact with agents continued unabated and even intensified so as to tighten the links and ensure their willingness to follow orders after the regime

---

[64] Ibid., pp. 21-34.

[65] Op. cit., "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," p. 21.

[66] "Romanian Daily Publishes List of Securitate Agents Working in Intelligence," Document Number: FBIS-EEU-2002-0405, March 28, 2002, *Bucharest Ziua*, "Armageddon 7" report: "Armageddon of Securitate People," *http://www.fas.org/irp/world/romania/list.htm*.

change.[67] So, too, infiltration of opposition groups, a sine-qua-non for any non-democratic domestic intelligence/security service, was likely high-prioritized as part of the preparations for regime change. Consequently, as Los and Zybertowicz note, many "veterans of the opposition" who are in reality agents and collaborators were strongly endorsed by the democrats in gaining posts in the refurbished intelligence/police services and, thus, the LVD process was compromised.[68] Only a continuous LVD process extending over a period of years can help to mitigate this sort of subterfuge.

2.6.3: LVD Must Be Statutory-Based

The LVD factor is a major catalyst for success in any post-communist state's endeavor along the democratic trajectory. The process needs to be based on statutory law in order to establish it as a fundamental requirement legitimately passed by the people's representatives and thus not solely an executive branch or committee project (and appearing to be exclusive of and thus failing to truly represent the popular will). Los and Zybertowicz suggest that the reason for Poland's failed attempt at early lustration was due first to its being based on an ad hoc parliamentary resolution rather than a statutory law, which precipitated mobilized groups/political parties then drafting their own laws. Next, following elections, the old communist parties succeeded in re-occupying posts and taking firm control over the legislative process. In the end, the various lustration bills on

---

[67] So, too, in the German Democratic Republic, many documents were destroyed during the regime change, negating the determination of the actual number of informers. While, at a minimum, out of a population of 18 million people, Stasi intelligence files were maintained on six million subjects, four million of which were GDR residents, total informants numbered at least 109,000, most of whom signed written statements of collaboration. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1996, p. 251, footnote 37.

[68] Op. cit., *Privatizing the Police State*, pp. 99-100.

the agenda were voted down and, instead, an anti-lustration bill was passed.[69] This process, however, was only temporarily shelved. As noted later in this project, in 2006 under the conservative Kaczynski government, the WSI (military intelligence) was dissolved and replaced with a new agency after it was found to have infiltrated political parties, the media, state-owned companies up for privatization, the country's flagship airline, foreign ministry, fuels sector, and foreign trade companies, as well as its maintenance of links with Russian intelligence dated from the communist era. Additionally, a new lustration law was drafted in 2007[70] that is significantly more far-reaching than that passed in 2000,[71] consequently causing significant controversy.

Thus, in Poland, Kieran Williams' and Dennis Deletant's second of two necessary and sufficient preconditions for *early* lustration, as identified in (2001) *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania*, that is, "the communists' loss of influence over the policy agenda after failing in competitive elections," was inadequate for the full and effective implementation of the process in Poland, where, as in many East European states, communist parties regained dominance in second term elections after having lost in the first, and were thus able to weaken or thwart the lustration process. (Their first precondition is "the refusal of an orthodox communist regime to relax and bargain until faced with mass protest."[72])

---

[69] Ibid., pp. 145-146.

[70] "Geopolitical Diary: Trying to Redefine Poland," February 20, 2007, *http://www.autentico.org/oa09845.php*.

[71] Paul Goble, "Analysis: Poland's lustration policy and overcoming the past," *RFE/RL Newsline*, and *The Ukrainian Weekly*, No. 38, Vol. LXVIII, September 17, 2000.

[72] Op. cit., *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, p. 19.

The historical events surrounding Poland's efforts to institute LVD support my argument that in order to avoid the potentiality that old communists eventually manage to block its implementation, it must be instituted by legislative statute to remain law for at least three presidential terms. Although Russia never drafted any lustration law, it is difficult to predict whether the outcome would have been similar if it had. One could speculate, however, that the democrats would have fared better over time, and increased their support, rather than being progressively marginalized, purged, and, ultimately, excluded from national government.

As things developed, in the 1993 parliamentary elections, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's neonationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) hit the Russian political scene and surprised many by capturing 22.9% of the seats, with the reformist party of power, Russia's Choice, winning 15.5%, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) close behind, (having regained legality in 1993), with 12.4%.[73] By 1995, the Communist party was the only national political party, and in the parliamentary elections that year, won 22.1% of the vote, compared with 11.4% for the LDPR, 10.3% going to a newly created party of power, Victor Chernomyrdin's Our Home Is Russia, and the vote for Democratic Choice of Russia receiving only a paltry 3.9% of the vote this time around. Thus, by 1995, the communists had regained control of the State Duma, largely displacing the democratic-reformist parties. (It was also during that period that Yeltsin had purged democrats from his administration and substantially increased the powers of the intelligence/security sector.) In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the communists retained their dominance, winning 24.29% of the vote, compared with 23.32% for

[73] Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 2001, pp. 273-288.

another newly created "party" of power, Unity, with Yevgeny Primakov's Fatherland-All Russia receiving 13.33%, the LDPR winning only 5.98%, and only 1.2% for Our Home Is Russia.[74] And by 2003, the Putin-endorsed United Russia party overwhelmingly controlled the Duma and chaired every committee, which had become a rubber-stamp body. The democrats were completely excluded.

The fact remains, those newly democratizing regimes of the "satellite" states of the former Soviet bloc that, to varying extents, negotiated the opening of the old secret police files in order to expose informers and collaborators and implement LVD (with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Romania, where lustration was largely elusive and vetting was only partially implemented and not applied to all intelligence agencies until years later), were most successful in democratizing, and did so at a faster rate. This was in stark contrast to the states of the FSU, where the opportunity was missed during those euphoric months following communism's collapse; LVD was typically only advocated by a few democrats and former political prisoners during the early transition period, and consciously rejected by Yeltsin. In these states, it was never considered by many political elites as important enough to place on the agenda, and, these states have clearly fared the worst in terms of democratization. Yet, widespread support among political elites, most discredited by the collapse of the communist regime, is not necessary for LVD to be successfully instituted; a difference can be made with a powerful executive.

Under the totalitarian rule of the Soviet Union enforced by the KGB, the democratic resistance was always weak; consequently, there were not more than a very few capable democrats available to lead a change in the nature of the government.

---

[74] Ibid., p. 314.

However, as newly elected RF president and enjoying overwhelming support in 1991 in the context of widespread popular support for democracy, Yeltsin quite possibly could have achieved it, as many Russia experts have suggested. However, when the opportunity was presented, it was not taken. Rather, as noted, Yeltsin chose to politicize and re-empower the KGB successor agencies, purging his administration of democrats and building up the various Services as a political support base, which, in partnership with organized crime, only became increasingly corrupt, as did the Kremlin, over the 1990s.

Moreover, the Presidential and KGB files were kept closed,[75] and access to individual files was highly restricted, with very few Russian citizens ever seeing their old KGB files. For instance, the satirical writer Vladimir Voinovich, who was forced into exile for writing hilarious send-ups of Soviet bureaucrats,[76] returned to Russia after having his citizenship restored, inquired with the KGB as to his files, only to be told his documents had been burned. As summarized in commentary on a National Public Radio show, "Voinovich believes Moscow should have followed other former Soviet-bloc nations in passing laws to make public the names of secret police officers and to bar former party bosses from government positions. But many say Russia has other priorities: 'I'm much more concerned about bridges starting to collapse than how people relate to this or that KGB officer,' says former political prisoner Mikhail Kazachkov."[77] Yet, the fact remains, for those states that did institute some form of LVD, although the process was imperfect and the communist secret police interfered in it from the beginning, the

---

[75] Amy Knight, "Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 325-337.

[76] For example, see Vladimir Voinovich, *Vladimir Voinovich: Anthology, Satire, and Humor of 20th Century Russia*, Eksmo-Press: Moscow, 2002.

[77] "Forgetting History's Lessons: Russians combat public apathy to Soviet-era horrors," National Public Radio, July 16-19, 2001, http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2001/jul/010716.russia.html.

results for democratization have been much more positive than for those states that completely rejected it.

2.6.4: Antagonists Will Always Exist

There are always going to be those who vehemently oppose LVD given the numbers of nomenklatura/apparatchiks and secret police operatives who will have to find new livelihoods/careers with the end of the communist regime and democratization. Further, there are large numbers of agents/collaborators who are also likely to feel threatened by the process (albeit, usually for different reasons) and their potential exposure as willful instruments of the old discredited regime, which has its own repercussions. It should be noted that those opposed to LVD often try to defend themselves by giving the morally vacuous argument that employment/collaboration with the secret police should not be held against anyone because, at the time, they were legal agencies of the state. Thus they attempt to shift the terms of the debate from the issue of their contribution to and/or participation in the repressive activities of the secret police to that of the legal status of the paymaster.

Or, they argue that they had to join the party in order to make a career for themselves, that it was a necessary prerequisite for a move into a prominent position or to climb the ranks. This defensive argument poses a complicated dilemma for newly empowered democrats attempting to institute LVD when, given the brutally repressive nature of the ancien regime and its secret police and the place of party ideology in any progressive career path, specifically, the fact that virtually every prominent position required a minimum of a higher education and specialized skills and training and thus required party membership, which was mandated for access to universities and

academies, as generally everyone with the needed skill sets required in public service could technically be disqualified on party membership grounds, leaving few to competently handle the administration of government tasks.

Yet, wholesale, across the board, indiscriminant disqualification of all former communist party members is not the goal. Rather, the practical remedy to this "dilemma," as part of the LVD process, is to disqualify *only* those who either were party bosses/high-level officials or commanders, active agents and collaborators of the secret police, the worst human rights abusers, and those who will not publicly declare that they support democratization, and *only* from leading/commanding positions. Thus, simply having been a communist party member is not grounds for disqualification. Rather, having been responsible for formulating, administering, and implementing repressive government policies or having contributed to the system by informing on others are the factors that disqualify individuals from leadership/commanding posts in the new government. The goal is not to punish, but, rather, to disqualify them from influential positions in the new, democratizing government. By immediately disqualifying these elements from top posts, LVD can proceed, while those types retained at the middle and lower levels and ranks can be gradually weeded out if demonstrably antagonistic to the new, democratic changes being implemented as the transition progresses.

The foregoing outlines the "how to" of implementing LVD in the FSU states, which lack a shadow elite prepared to assume the reins of government. Thus, some expertise is retained, and those who had joined the party for solely practical reasons but did not actively engage in or contribute to the forces of repression can gain or retain positions in government structures, *so long as* they not only demonstrate their support for

democratization, but also formally declare their allegiance to the building of a democratic polity. Indeed, an "I am pro-democracy and swear to support it" declarative policy (similar to an oath of office to uphold the constitution), to be substantive in effect should include a clause mandating that, based on that claim, government officials and employees will, and agree to be, held accountable and removed from office if found (by a court or other authoritative body) to be engaged in activities repugnant to the democratization process. Thus, a measure of substance is added to a basically unsubstantiable pledge, which many political actors will voice (as occurred in Russia[78]) in the interest of gaining power, yet once gained, immediately resort to undemocratic methods and activities to undermine/subvert the new democratic political order. Moreover, the foundation for a real and irreversible change in attitudes, values, and thinking processes could then be said to have been laid. That factor is not insignificant, and chapter ten covers the issues of organizational culture and mentality in detail.

2.6.5: Stacking the Commissions and Inaccurate Files

Additional potential problems in instituting an LVD policy include the staffing of the courts/commissions tasked with its implementation and the questionable accuracy of secret police files. The review boards of those governments that did implement LVD policies usually included former officers and agents/collaborators, which highlights the problem of determining who is to be entrusted with administering the procedure — a special lustration court, administrative court, a security service head (political appointee), interior minister, or what office or body, to keep it honest and prevent it from becoming a

[78] Op. cit., *Russia's Unfinished Revolution*, p. 279.

political witch-hunt. Further, what sort of archival proof is necessary/sufficient for disqualification? Signed agreements to collaborate?

In any number of cases, it has been suggested that records are incomplete, inaccurate, or lack specific evidence of involvement in political repression. Moreover, it has been established that records were often embellished by officers under intense pressure to recruit and who, in the interests of their own self-promotion, sometimes identified casual contacts as agents. This potentiality may vary among the different formerly communist states. For instance, Jefferson Adams's research finds that the Stasi files have proven to be generally historically reliable.[79] Yet, in the Soviet Union, there was allegedly much embellishment and inflation of successful recruitment operations.[80] Without extensive research on the question in each individual case, it may prove too big a leap to assume that the Soviet Union's files in Russia and other FSU states where archives remain closed (or incomplete) were as accurate as those collected in the East German satellite, where spymaster Marcus Wolf meticulously controlled intelligence matters.[81]

---

[79] Jefferson Adams, "Probing the East German State Security Archives," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 21-34.

[80] Further, as Christopher Andrew notes, "It is [also] important to note that, although certain individuals were targeted by the KGB, and may have been given codenames, this does not mean that the persons' names were conscious or witting agents or sources — or even that they were aware that they were being targeted for recruitment or political influence operations. Similarly, the fact that an individual may have endorsed a position that was favorable to the Soviet Union does not necessarily mean that this person was working as an agent, or agent of influence, for the KGB." See the Foreword of Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, Basic Books: New York, 1999.

[81] For an in-depth autobiography on Markus Wolf, see *Markus Wolf, with Anne McElvoy, Man Without A Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster*, Times Books, Random House: USA, 1997. Another useful resource on the Stasi is John O. Koehler, *Stasi: The Untold Story of The East German Secret Police*, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1999; and, David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War*, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 1997.

Furthermore, while there exists a consensus that the LVD process should be non-partisan and applicable to *all* intelligence and counterintelligence services, both civilian and military, questions remain on how to deal with the evasive maneuvers of those opposed to it who attempt to block access to files, dissolve committees working on the task, and instruct collaborators to be re-recruited in order to avoid LVD procedures. These difficulties exist in addition to the political rivalries and manipulative schemes that inevitably enter the process. Some suggestions to improve it include requiring all new MPs to file a declaration and be verified by a lustration court, although procedures for the selection of judges for a lustration court and whether enough qualified judges would even be available also pose challenges.[82]

Nevertheless, those challenges/potential problems are not insurmountable. I argue that, while inconclusive and always unsatisfactory given the limitations and political realities involved in instituting an LVD policy, particularly in states initiating a top-down transition rather than negotiated pacts, its implementation is still highly effective in, first, facilitating democratization by permitting only declared pro-democratic and apparently unblemished individuals into top leadership/commanding positions, and, second, in serving as a major catalyst to a secret police transformation by weeding out those who pose or potentially pose a significant threat to the development of democratic institutions and practices, including their own. Importantly, its implementation represents the new democratic-oriented government's genuine interest in and official recognition of the importance of cleansing the ranks of repressive, anti-democratic forces (particularly the top leadership and commanding posts), and limiting the field to only those individuals who are truly amenable to democratic principles. Crucially, it effectively reduces and

[82] Op. cit., *Privatizing the Police State,* pp. 148-150.

perhaps even neutralizes the real threat posed to democratization by old communist functionaries/operatives, their criminal networks, and repressive methods of operation.

As noted, LVD provides the political space for the election of pro-democracy politicians who can and will impose the process on the intelligence/security sector as part of initial (and, hence, more likely to prove enduring) reorganization/reform, likely supported with the assistance of Western governments in identifying appropriate and applicable legal and procedural methods and providing direction toward institution building and results that will reflect the generally accepted norms/principles of democratic political communities. In this way, the bloated secret police can be effectively reduced in size and activity, with the old ideologues and worst human rights abusers retired/removed, and, as soon as possible, the remainder of the old guard and those actively or admittedly opposed to democratic reform being phased out. It is at this important preliminary stage in the secret police transformation process that the well-established democracies can be of use in providing financial support, training, and other assistance in the interest of instituting democratically acceptable and appropriate methods in the new intelligence/security sectors of democratizing states.

Whether completely successful or not in the implementation phase, the institution of an LVD policy in and of itself demonstrates the new regime's antagonism toward and establishes an active program designed to prevent any continuation of secret police-type activities and the employment/retention of those who have or are likely to use repressive methods, effectively excludes those elements who persist in employing them from political and intelligence/security sector posts, and symbolizes its genuine effort to democratize and adhere to the rule of law. In short, LVD sends a message.

As this dissertation shows, Russia's failure to open the secret police files and implement LVD in the context of the usual challenges facing post-communist states in the wake of systemic collapse, which in Russia's case were compounded by the sheer vastness of the country and, hence, the huge scale of the project there, created the conditions for and led not to democracy and free market capitalism, but, rather, a bureaucratic-authoritarian, chekist-dominated, endemically corrupt state political apparatus, a resurgent and ever more powerful and unreformed secret police, and the wholesale criminalization of the state and society, as well as a seriously reduced capacity for the mass public to meaningfully participate in the political life of the country, a continued disregard for civil liberties, human rights, and the all-important-to-democracy rule of law, and a total lack of accountability and the complete impunity that brings, with a persistent and clearly evident lack of respect for life itself.

2.6.6: A Brief Example: Problems in Poland's LVD Process

Andrej Zybertowicz suggests that Poland's lustration process had a number of flaws, including: the disappearance of SB personnel files, the outsmarting of lustration commission members by better-informed and experienced operatives, many commission members feared acts of revenge from disqualified functionaries while others were targets of blackmail, and the verification requirement did not apply to significant numbers of operatives while those of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence were "indulged."[83] Los and Zybertowicz point to specific secret service influence/interference extending

[83] Andrzej Zybertowicz, "Transformation of the Polish Secret Services: From Authoritarian To Informal Power Networks," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, p. 2. Also see *Privatizing the Police State*, pp. 145-153.

beyond LVD implementation and into other aspects of Poland's transformation process as well, including 'spontaneous' lustrations aimed at public discrediting of political opponents made possible by the private appropriation of a vast number of secret documents and the use of this appropriation of files to secure impunity by causing the near-paralysis of the police, prosecution, and judiciary.

They note that due to the lack of *statutory* lustration, public life became dominated by people of dubious integrity and reputation. And, undoubtedly, they conclude, the resulting situation contributes to the insecurity of hundreds of thousands of people who live in fear of being accused of collaboration, however fleeting, if an eventual LVD process is conducted carelessly or vindictively.[84] What was learned from Poland's experience is that LVD must not only be statutory-based, but those overseeing the process must be ascertained as of high moral ethics, incorruptible, and free of any non-democratic or vindictive political agenda — that is, they too must undergo some form of qualifying examination, and, ideally, have no partisan political role/influence of consequence.

2.7: LVD IS A LESS EXTREME OPTION TO EFFECTIVE TRANSFORMATION

Arguably, one could make a moral judgment on LVD, and advance the notion that it is much less extreme than the non-democratic alternative to transforming the political regime and intelligence/security sector relative to the means typically used by such regimes to construct a government and what is always a supporting secret police force useful for their own politically repressive prerogatives. It is a poignant fact that when a non-democratic regime takes power, they go far beyond the relatively passive LVD

[84] Op. cit., *Privatizing the Police State,* pp. 8-9.

process and carry out a wholesale purge of the political and intelligence/security structures, often killing, but also jailing large numbers of officials and their agents, dissolving the institutions, and rebuilding them from scratch, staffed with their own kind.

It did occur in Russia's past that a nascent democratic government sought to completely destroy the secret police services of the ancien regime. One of the first actions of the liberal democratic Provisional Government led by Aleksandr Fyodorovich Kerensky in February 1917 ("The First 1917 Revolution") was the abolishment of the hated and oppressive Department of Police, gendarmerie, and the entire Okhrana security system, sending many of its agents to jail or the army. However, six weeks later, Social-Democratic Revolutionary, Vladimir Lenin, seized power in the October coup d'etat ("The Second 1917 Revolution"), and, resurrected the political police and their methods, using the personnel of the revolutionary parties, especially the Military Revolutionary Committee (originally an organization of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies), controlled by the Bolshevik party. The Soviet secret police, the VChK, or "Cheka" was created on December 20, 1917, with "Iron Feliks" Dzerzhinsky chosen as it head.[85] Thus, the first Soviet secret police was built from scratch, emerging out of revolution, and events proceeded in line with Ted Robert Gurr's afore-mentioned theoretical framework. Of note, revolution tends to provide the opportunity to institute LVD as a precursor to democratization, as a more humane way to forge radical political change, in line with democratic values.

In his1984 book, *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police*, Jonathan Adelman assesses that, "a significant problem in the creation of the Cheka was

[85] George Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police*, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1981.

the lack of continuity with its corresponding pre-revolutionary ancestor, the Okhrana. In this attribute the Cheka was alone among major Communist institutions." He observes, "....given the harsh repression and infiltration of the Bolsheviks by the Okhrana, it was inadmissible to use more than a handful of men from the Okhrana in the secret police — and in no ways could it be used as a model."[86] Hence, the Cheka was essentially created from scratch, however, evolving to utilize the same repressive methods of its predecessor, as expected, since the Bolshevik government was totalitarian. The point is, starting from scratch is a feasible option, and has been shown to not preclude an intelligence service from becoming highly sophisticated and effective, as was the KGB. The difference lies in its role and methods, always in tune with and mirroring the nature of the political regime.

Ironically, in the wake of communism's collapse, the KGB was the only major communist institution that emerged unscathed and continued on from its revolutionary ancestor, the Cheka. And, remarkably, Yeltsin retained much more than a handful of men from the KGB in its "successor organizations," deviating in no way from the Soviet KGB model, and only dividing the Soviet secret police into a number of smaller organizations in order to dilute it as a threat to his own political power. Over time, he steadily increased the chekists' power and utilized their services just as his Bolshevik predecessors had applied the Cheka instrument to bolster/support their own hold on power. The tradition continues.

The indisputable fact is that LVD is relatively passive, and simply forces the holders of high places in the ancien regime and its secret police to find another career, often sending them packing with a nice retirement package and without penalty for their

---

[86] Jonathan R. Adelman, "The Soviet Secret Police," *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States*," Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., Westview Press: Boulder and London, 1984, p. 79.

past activities nor limits on their associations or opportunities, outside of their disqualification from the official public sphere, in any way. Importantly, because they are then free to make themselves financially wealthy (another plum advantage they take with them given their special skills and knowledge of affairs and, in the foreign intelligence officers' (FIOs) cases, international contacts, banking, and commercial sophistication), and thereby can (potentially) acquire the means of and regain access to political power, it is crucial that an LVD policy remain in effect for a substantial number of years, at least three presidential terms, in order to preclude and disqualify them from direct participation in the policy process long enough for democratic reforms to take root, and negate their ability to sabotage initial/early democratic transition efforts or later transmogrify or reverse the process. Thereby, and consequently, a secret police transformation and successful democratic political transition become more likely.

2.8: CONCLUSION

I have identified and reviewed in-depth the major issues and challenges in implementing LVD in post-communist states. It is noteworthy that those states that effectively implemented early lustration have made the greatest strides toward sustainable democracy, while many of those that failed to institute it early came to recognize its benefits by the 21st century and drafted laws to disqualify, to varying extents, but at least those who had been the worst repressive elements (those either dictating the communist party agenda to extinguish elements of the opposition or working directing for the secret police and enforcing those dictates) from leading/commanding political and intelligence/security sector positions. By instituting LVD, although late, these states not only condemned the communist past, they aimed to ensure that democratic reforms are

not reversed. Conversely, those states that continue to wholly reject LVD have only moved further from democracy. The evidence shows that as LVD proceeds, so, too, does democratization. In the next chapter, I focus exclusively on LVD in the intelligence/security sector and the conditions for a secret police transformation.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS AND SEQUENCING FOR A SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS

3.1: INTRODUCTION

Now that the issues surrounding the necessary precondition of lustration/vetting/de-communization (LVD) have been identified and explained, and the primary and secondary conditions for a democratic transition and secret police transformation presented, in this chapter I explore in greater depth the specific conditions required, and their sequencing, for a secret police to transform into and qualify as intelligence/security services that operate in line with generally accepted democratic norms. It is the application of these conditions to the political-intelligence situation in post-Soviet Russia that provides some measure of whether and to what extent the secret police have been transformed, and which constitutes the empirical focus of this dissertation. Further, given that a secret police transformation is a necessary condition for a comprehensive democratic political transition, the findings, in turn, conclusively determine whether the case study, post-Soviet Russia, is moving toward, or away from, the consolidation of a liberal democratic state that respects and protects human rights and political freedoms.

3.2: AFTER THE PRECONDITION OF LUSTRATION/VETTING/DE-COMMUNIZATION (LVD) — NEXT STEPS

Following the institution of an LVD policy, a number of additional conditions must be met for a secret police transformation. Having covered the LVD precondition in chapter one, in this chapter, then, I discuss in greater detail the one primary condition:

1) subject to the rule of law; and, four secondary conditions: 1) based on a statutory legal charter, functions; 2) methods: respect for and protection of civil liberties and political freedoms; 3) civilian political control and democratic accountability mechanisms; and, 4) promotion of an organizational culture and mentality in line with democratic norms) necessary for a secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms.

3.3: THE PRIMARY CONDITION: THE RULE OF LAW

For a post-communist state to move toward democracy, a new constitution, electoral and legal systems that promote and accommodate multiparty development, meaningful political contestation, and an independent judiciary must first be established as a foundation on which to build new, democratic political and free market economic institutions, processes, and a body of laws. Of immediate and pivotal importance, the rule of law must be instituted, its enforcement applied to all. Naturally, these preliminary aspects of the transition will to an extent coincide with a new, democratically-oriented regime actually taking control of government, and the implementation of an LVD policy in the intelligence/security sector.

Of primary importance to the newly democratizing state's capability to enforce the law and provide domestic security is the construction of a professional, non-politicized police service and independent judiciary, and for national security, intelligence/security services that respect the rule of law and serve the new democratic state's interests, replacing the old repressive secret police and their adjuncts. As demonstrated most recently by the situation in post-Saddam Iraq and as most official and

political leaders agree, following the collapse of a political system, the establishment of police authority and security is the critical issue that precedes all others.[1] Vetting of intelligence/security sector personnel to remove the old guard from commanding positions is of the first order. Otherwise, former secret police officials (along with other ancien regime functionaries) are likely to attempt to poison the democratization process because they perceive it as posing a direct threat to their interests. Plus, the success potential for the undermining of political change by working from within the system is significantly reduced if they are quickly and permanently removed from their posts.

As noted earlier in this project, vetting of the intelligence/security sector is significantly eased if preceded by LVD of the political arena, helping to ensure that pro-democracy elites (which elected officials are in a democracy the intelligence/security sector's political masters), are in position to administer and oversee the process. And once a new parliament is constituted, a statutory/legal mandate for the new intelligence/security services that is in line with democratic norms must be crafted and codified in cooperation with the executive branch.

The initiation and continuation of these fundamental reforms, as part of the state's transformation process, leads to and represents a sea change in structural, functional, and cultural aspects of the political arena and intelligence/security sector and requires significant reeducation of officials and personnel as the law, rather than politics and personal interests, will then, if democratization is to proceed, dictate their activities. As

---

[1] Patrick E. Tyler, "Kurdish Leader Warns U.S. That Iraq Violence Risks Gains," *The New York Times*, May 12, 2003. While a senior American official involved in the October 2002 disarmament/regime change in Iraq said, "Much of the bureaucracy would carry on under new management," the U.S. plan called for the destruction of the secret service. See David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Has A Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report," *The New York Times*, October 11, 2002, pp. 1-3; and, David E. Sanger and James Dao, "U.S. Intelligence Completing Plan to Promote a Democratic Iraq," *The New York Times*, January 6, 2003.

Jim Yardley of *The New York Times* notes in the case of bad and corrupt policing in China, "Part of the problem is the very nature of policing in a nondemocratic country. Historically, experts say, officers have emphasized maintaining government control and serving as the eyes and ears of the state over solving crimes. But as top leaders speak of China becoming a real nation of laws, experts say such an approach must change." He cites Murray Scot Tanner, a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation and specialist of criminal justice in China, who observes that, "If China is going to develop the rule of law, the police are going to have to become better at doing basic, nonpolitical, everyday, investigative police work....It has only been in the past decade that China has really made a genuine effort to impose modern, investigative skills of policing."[2] For instance, in late 2003, China's Ministry of Security issued new rules that bar evidence obtained by torture, threats, or other illegal means from being used in court cases and began a program to crack down on the illegal detention of suspects. One man had been held without charge for 10 years because police were unable to find sufficient evidence to justify a court trial. Indeed, it is remarkable that they did not simply manufacture that evidence.

3.4: THE SECONDARY CONDITIONS

3.4.1: Intelligence/Security Services Must Be Based On Statutory/Legal Mandates

As one aspect of a secret police transformation process, a legislative mandate is of fundamental importance in not only rooting the intelligence/security services in law, but also remodeling the organizations and redirecting their domestic security tasks toward activities subject to the rule of law and respect for political and civil liberties and human

[2] Jim Yardley, "Complaints and Concern Rise Over Poor Policing in China," *The New York Times*, December 8, 2003.

rights. This redirection should be done on the basis of a legal charter that clearly identifies national security threats and delineates the new agencies' structures, functions, powers, and purposes, provides for civilian political control and oversight mechanisms, and stipulates leadership appointment procedures and chains-of-command. An explicit recognition of the Services' role in protecting the specifically democratic form of government, its constitution, and upholding and respecting the civil rights and political freedoms of its citizens, as the post-Soviet Czech Republics' domestic intelligence service does, is also of value.

Indeed, Peter Gill argues that the starting point in reforming intelligence/security services is in their legal mandate, as new statutory mandates establish new legal authority. He notes that whether the legal framework reflects the true nature and activities of the intelligence/security services or not, the codification of its tasks that incorporates a respect for constitutionalism, civil liberties, and other democratic principles is a first step in transforming them, and moving them toward the employment of solely democratic methods.[3] (Note that when the Russian intelligence/security services' mandates were drafted, the West perceived it as a "democratic" move, however, the legislation, in effect, expanded their role, rather than constraining it, and so was misinterpreted, the West having apparently been misled by the fact of the codification of the sector's authorities.)

Naturally, structural changes will reflect the functional demands of the new intelligence/security sector, which tasks must be clearly codified, along with specific powers, in statutory form, and in line with democratic norms. This reduces the potential for arbitrariness in intelligence/security service activity, which is absolutely contrary to

[3] Peter Gill, *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, Cass Series: Studies in Intelligence, Frank Cass: OR, 1994, p. 127.

liberal democracy. As Dr. Hans Born notes, "the general rule is that in a constitutional democracy, no powers can be granted to any government institution without a legal basis for doing so. The laws on intelligence/security services should define the status, the purview, operation, cooperation, tasking, reporting duties and oversight of the intelligence/security services."[4] So, too, Born observes that the use of specific means of acquiring information, record-keeping, and employee status should be arranged by law. That is, powers and procedures of activities such as surveillance, wiretapping, information/data handling, the classification of information/state secrets, and personnel-related issues need to be based on codified law.

Peter Gill stresses the importance of a legal mandate in clearly identifying the potential threats to the nation's security, since "the broader they are defined, the more problematic they are in terms of democratic control."[5] That is, threat definitions are important in setting the parameters of intelligence activity, as ambiguity provides the space for extralegal operations and abuses. As Gill states, "broad definitions of national security can prevent the democratic political process."[6] Thus, before the organizational arrangements for the new intelligence/security sector can be made, threats must be concisely identified, as functions determine structure.

A number of difficulties surround the identification of national security threats due to the fact that the task is an inherently political issue. Given their typically *external* nature, military threats are more easily defined than are political threats, which often

---

[4] Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, Studies in Russia and East Europe*, Palgrave: NY, 2001, pp. 3-4.

[5] Op. cit., *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, p. 127.

[6] Ibid., p. 97.

emanate from *within* the state. In any case, Gill notes that, "armed force against a state from within is likely to be paramilitary rather than military and to be characterized by the state as terrorism."[7] Indeed, the question of whether and which political movements and groups are and should be labeled and treated as threats to national security is highly revealing of the type of state, as is the nature of the methods used to combat the identified threats. It is not uncommon for political surveillance of domestic groups to be conducted on the pretext of (perceived) foreign direction, influence, and control (which may or may not be true).

A problem in threat assessment is the determination of the point at which legal political dissent becomes identified as criminally subversive behavior. History has repeatedly shown that political threats to the government are often portrayed as threats to national security. Thus, newly democratizing post-communist governments must be acutely cognizant of this reality when drafting new intelligence/security service mandates. Needfully explicative to debates over threats is the issue of whether to target a political group that is engaged in non-violent and legal political activity or resorts to violence for political aims as a reaction to government-sanctioned policies that are brutally repressive and discriminatory,[8] and hence repugnant to democracy in the first place.

---

[7] Ibid., p. 96.

[8] For example, in 2003, an Israeli commission of inquiry (the fifth of its type) called for by Ehud Barak and consisting of a three-member panel charged with investigating the deaths of 13 people from police fire in October 2000, when thousands of Israeli Arabs, in solidarity with the Palestinians, clogged streets and threw rocks, found that indeed a pattern of government "prejudice and neglect" toward Israeli Arabs existed, and that the Israeli "establishment" permitted widespread discrimination against them. The report criticized police tactics, including the use of sniper fire to disperse crowds, and called for the end of the use of rubber-coated steel pellets for crowd control. Azmi Bashara, one of 10 Arab legislators in the Israeli parliament commenting on the report's findings, said: "There is a real problem, and it has its roots in the attitude of the police toward the Arab citizens of the state of Israel. It's getting worse, it's not getting

If the former scenario is the case — and political violence is not an issue — then the determination of the threat threshold is usually based on either a "criminal standard," in which in order to open a criminal inquiry the government must have specific evidence that a group or individual is planning a terrorist attack, or, only a "reasonable suspicion" is required (that a group or individual is involved in planning for a terrorist strike), which significantly broadens the (legal) scope for surveillance.[9]

Conversely, if the latter scenario is the case — and political violence is occurring — then a rethink of whether it is liberal democrats who are in control of (what can be truly considered a democratic) government could be said to be required, as a comprehensive consolidated democracy cannot be said to exist. For example, in Russia's case, one perspective taken is that the separatist Chechen resistance engages in political violence against the state in response to Kremlin policies of discrimination and repression, while on the other side, the view persists that Kremlin policy is a response to Chechen political violence grounded in "banditry." In any case, it is certain that the roots of the conflict are (or have become over the years) tremendously complex, with many interrelated causal factors developing over time. And, in line with Gill's point, the Russian government has consistently identified the Chechen separatist movement as a "terrorist threat." Moreover, other organized political opposition movements and parties of potential significance have been identified as posing "security threats." For example, Eduard Litvinov, leader of the Bolshevik Reform party, was declared "extremist" and

---

better." See James Bennet, "Israel Inquiry Finds Pattern of Prejudice Toward Arab Citizens," *The New York Times*, September 1, 2003; and, James Bennet, "Police Used Excessive Force on Israeli Arabs, Panel Says," *The New York Times*, September 1, 2003.

[9] An example is the Patriot Act, passed in the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks. See Don Van Natta Jr., "Six Groups Said to be Monitored in U.S. for Possible Qaeda Links," *The New York Times*, August 22, 2003.

jailed for arms possession, while many additional party members were given long prison sentences for "hooliganism" and other activities. The label of "extremist" was increasingly applied to political opposition groups.

The importance of LVD to the threat identification process can not be overstated. Noting the many political aspects inherent to the design of the intelligence/security service mandates, Gill observes, "the course of political battles over the definition of the core security intelligence mandate provides a good indicator of the relative strengths of the various political forces engaged in the (potential) control and oversight of the agencies concerned."[10] This fact further highlights the importance of instituting an LVD policy as a catalyst to the construction of a democratic polity in the wake of communism, as the leading politicians, with the advice of their intelligence/security sector chiefs, play the key role in not only the identification of national security threats, but also the crafting and institution of the intelligence/security mandate, and the subsequent control and oversight of the Services' activities and operations. The entire process is inherently political. Without question, the new leadership's impact on the nature of the new intelligence/security sector is pivotal in either effectively promoting or impeding a secret police transformation, and thus the likelihood of a successful democratic transition. Therefore, to enable a secret police transformation, pro-democracy elites must dominate the political and intelligence/security sector leadership and command structures, a situation that LVD is meant to actualize.

Stated as unambiguously as possible, intelligence/security service functions are codified in the mandates as well, thus rooting the range of their permitted activities in law. In (liberal) democracies, the primary function of the intelligence/security services, in

[10] Op. cit., *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, p. 91.

both their domestic and foreign activities, is to provide elected political leaders with objective intelligence to inform national security, foreign and defense policy and interests, and safeguard state territory. On the home front, the rule of law and statutory mandate, including a respect for civil liberties (with special exceptions for counterintelligence activities against foreign intelligence services (FISs), foreign agents, select non-citizens, and suspected terrorists and those who aid and support them) dictates the permissible activities of the domestic security intelligence service, while externally, the FIS is tasked to engage in espionage and related, typically illegal, activities in the national interest — *outside* state borders, as mandated by statute.

During the communist era, the Soviet secret police were tasked with a broad repertoire of responsibilities, including criminal and political investigations, arrests and detentions, interrogations, control of prisons, political intelligence, counterintelligence, military counterintelligence, economic intelligence, export control, political surveillance, total population control, espionage, counterespionage, “wet” operations, active measures, SIGINT, ELINT, HUMINT, TECHINT, IMINT, and MASINT, plus they maintained paramilitary contingents. Clearly, a post-communist secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms requires either a significant reduction in or end to many of these activities, particularly domestic political surveillance, and thus, a change in threats/targets and methods, and the establishment of accountability mechanisms. In democracies, the intelligence/security services lack arrest/police powers, which pertain solely to civilian police functions.

In regard to the foreign intelligence sphere, new threats must be identified and espionage networks constituted. When a country democratizes, it tends to join the international community of democratic states, and adjust its threat identifications and foreign and defense policy accordingly. This shift in allies translates into a drastic reduction, if not elimination, of the new democratic state's assistance to and support of rogue states and terrorist groups. In a truly democratizing Russia, for example, it would make no sense to continue to identify the United States as "the main enemy," nor to continue nuclear/arms/military assistance to criminally corrupt, terrorism-sponsoring, and anti-democratic states such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea.

3.4.2: Mandates Must Set Legal Constraints on Intelligence/Security Sector Methods: Respect for Civil Rights and Political Freedoms

The methods used by intelligence/security services on the domestic front in carrying out their tasks have potentially great consequences for the establishment and preservation of democratic principles and norms. It was the counterintelligence services that constituted the largest sector of the intelligence communities of Soviet states, given that they were each tasked to monitor all happenings within their countries and ordered by communist party leaders to keep the entire population under tight control. The political, civil, and human rights of society were routinely violated by state authorities in the most democratically unacceptable of ways, including beatings, torture, and murder for dissident political activities. To redirect and limit these counterintelligence services' activities in line with democratic values and political-legal principles, and establish their control by elected civilian political leaders, it is with extreme sensitivity to civil liberties and political freedoms, the transition/transformation, occurring as it does within the

immediate post-communist, party-collapse context of chaos and confusion over the status of virtually everything, from laws to the authority of institutions, that the design/drafting of the new legal mandates must be accomplished.

The importance of this step in the secret police transformation process cannot be overstated. As Abram Shulsky observes, "counterintelligence is the element of intelligence most fundamentally affected by the democratic nature of the regime it serves; the greatest number of difficulties in the relationship between democracy and intelligence concern counterintelligence. In particular, these difficulties involve defining the circumstances under which a government agency may legitimately conduct surveillance of a citizen and determining the limits, if any, on the amount and kind of such surveillance."[11] Constitutional law may set the general parameters, whereas in cases of national security, special legislation may be adopted. In each case, the legislative branch plays a key role. Needless to say, the importance of the institution of an LVD policy to remove the anti-democratic elements from leading positions is clear.

In a newly democratizing state, national security interests must be removed from a government's political interests, political opposition made legal, and politicization within intelligence/security (and other bureaucratic) structures significantly reduced. To aid these change processes and have a modicum of representativeness of the "democratic" popular will at this early stage, the executive and legislative branches must together identify and codify what forms of activities pose a threat to national security and require domestic intelligence collection and action to suppress, and how that determination is to be made.

---

[11] Abram N. Shulsky, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, 2nd ed., Revised by Gary Schmidtt, Foreword by Roy Godson, Brassey's (USA) Maxwell Macmillan Company: WA, 1993, p. 163.

For example, should legality be the criteria, the "criminal standard" applied, so that domestic intelligence investigations are strictly limited to situations where a legal violation has or is about to occur? (And how would authorities know a legal violation was about to occur?) Or is a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal or terrorist intent sufficient? (How would authorities develop that suspicion?) Is racial/ethnic profiling a legitimate means of targeting (potential criminals and terrorists) particular individuals? In cases of espionage or terrorism, the prevention of an act most always requires intelligence-gathering activities, possibly including electronic surveillance, infiltration of groups, and recruitment of informers. What procedures are to be followed in these instances?

To be in sync with democratic norms, the government must determine which activities truly pose a national security threat (and not merely a threat to a government's political interests) and how that threat is to be determined as such (i.e., legality — the "criminal standard" applied), and refine the legal parameters of domestic intelligence investigative operations in a way that guarantees respect for civil liberties. This is particularly important in the 21st century, when the main threats posed to democratic states generally include terrorism, nuclear and WMD proliferation, organized crime, drug-trafficking, money-laundering, people smuggling, and other transnational threats that, to effectively counter, often require cooperation with law enforcement bodies, whose goals are focused on getting criminal convictions and require legally-acquired evidence and adherence to lawful procedures and the legal process, unlike those of intelligence services, which are directed toward the collection of secret information and

recruiting of agents for that purpose, and often tend to not be constrained as tightly by such legalities.

Increasingly since the 9/11 attacks against the U.S. World Trade Center and Pentagon, the lines between intelligence/security and law enforcement agencies across the globe have become blurred, leading to heightened public and political controversy on the perennial national security/civil liberties debate. Still, in designing the counterintelligence mandates, the line must be clearly drawn between legal political opposition and criminally subversive groups. Referring to the intelligence activities revealed by the mid-1970s Church and Pike Committee investigations in the U.S.,[12] Shulsky observes, "it seems clear that excesses were facilitated by the absence of clear standards for domestic intelligence investigations."[13] Experience has shown that, to balance national security with civil liberties, standards on surveillance and wiretapping should be developed and codified in statutes, with oversight over their legality and propriety a principal task of relevant parliamentary committees.

So, too, the codification of laws on state secrets (as with regulations on wiretapping) is key to ensuring civil liberties are protected and the government is held accountable to democratic standards for its surveillance and other domestic intelligence activities. Given that non-democratic states usually classify all official documents as state secrets so as to block the dissemination of information on government activities to "outsiders" and thwart any public scrutiny or accountability, as part of the democratic

---

[12] These investigations were conducted in the U.S. during the mid-1970s in the wake of allegations of CIA involvement in domestic spying and political assassination (attempts on Cuban President Fidel Castro) by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations chaired by Senator Frank Church and the House Committee on International Relations chaired by Rep. Otis Pike. See Loch K. Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation*, University Press of Kentucky: KY, 1985.

[13] Op. cit., *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, p. 174.

transition process, laws on state secrets, in addition to surveillance and wiretapping standards, should be clear and codified to help prevent their misuse.

Kate Martin, director of George Washington University's Center for National Security Studies, takes note of the democratic consensus that security services should not be involved in domestic political struggles nor collect information about individuals for the purpose of influencing the political life of the country, yet observes that questions on what kind of information should be classified and when the law should permit wiretapping for national security reasons (as opposed to wiretapping for criminal investigations) are unsettled. She suggests that two principals should provide guidance: 1) the security services should not be allowed to decide when national security-grounded wiretapping should be permitted; and, 2) these issues should be publicly debated and decided so that the rules governing the security services are publicly known.[14] In the context of the global war on terrorism, it is worth noting that it is the intelligence/security services that best understand their own technical collection needs, although the task of rooting these in law in order to ensure the Services remain effective in protecting national security should be directed to the legislature, as well as the codification of the specific rules and procedures for wiretapping in both criminal and intelligence investigations in line with constitutional principles. The foregoing (steps) actions are fundamental to the process of effecting a secret police transformation, and revolutionary for a post-communist system, making it very difficult and perhaps even unlikely to get such legal compliance from old functionaries and operatives, giving further credence to the

[14] Hans Born, "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services: Practices and Procedures," presented at the NATO conference on "Intelligence and Security Services in the 21st Century Environment" in April 2002, and published by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): Geneva, in May 2002, Working Paper Series - No. 20, p. 4.

importance of instituting an LVD policy to disqualify them from office and positions of decisionmaking authority.

While LVD contributes to reducing the likelihood of political wiretapping abuses by the post-communist, democratizing government, there still may be some setbacks in the early years of the transition period. However, without LVD, there is an increased likelihood that following the brief period of post-collapse euphoria, secret police interference in political-economic life and political elites' misuse of intelligence will only increase. For example, in 1998, when former SBU head Yevgen Marchuk became an MP, he admitted that, "society control over the law enforcement structures is far from perfect," and that the security services' political role and involvement in the political struggle was growing: "The situation is emerging, when in Ukraine there are already twice as much, than it was in the Soviet time, the number of different structures, which have the right to tap the phone communications, conduct secret surveillance, open and inspect correspondence. Without well-perfected mechanism of civilian control over the security structures this might be use for political purposes....Unfortunately, there are facts, when law enforcement structures in some instances are being involved in [elections competition]."[15] No doubt, to expect the FSU states' intelligence/security services, including those of Russia — all of which can be considered "the KGB's successors" — to refrain from political spying and extensive involvement in politics — to cease "political police" activities, is indeed revolutionary.

---

[15] Leonid Polyakov, "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform: Is Progress Conditioned by the Interest of Society," presented at the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," held in Geneva, Switzerland on 5-7 September 2002, organized by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 100, October 2002, pp. 18-19.

It has been firmly established in the transition literature that *for a democratic transition to succeed*, civil society must be able to develop without crippling interference from state authorities. Democratization scholar Bruce Parrott defines "civil society" as "a form of political society based on a dense network of nongovernmental associations and groups established for the autonomous pursuit of diverse socioeconomic interests and prepared to rebuff state efforts to seize control of these activities."[16] Thus, civil society includes an independent media, religious and charitable organizations, business lobbies, professional organizations, labor unions, universities, non-institutionalized movements for social causes, and other private associations involved in political activities.

A civil society is important to sustainable democratic development in that, as Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott note, the development and preservation of public attitudes supportive of democracy, or a "civic culture,"[17] depend heavily on the existence of a civil society.[18] Additionally, Dawisha notes that "the comparative literature supports the proposition that a strong civil society is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a strong party system."[19] However, the history of one-party communist states is one of secret police penetration and repression of civil society.[20]

---

[16] Bruce Parrott, "Perspectives on post-communist democratization," *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Authoritarianism and Democratization in Post-communist Societies, Volume Three, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1997, pp. 22-23.

[17] Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott note that, "Citizens imbued with a civic culture believe in the government's duty to serve the people, in their own capacity to influence government decisions, and in their obligation to participate in national political life. They also believe in the general trustworthiness of their fellow citizens, in the universal right to engage in political activity, and in the impermissibility of violence as a form of political action." See Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, Cambridge University Press: MA, 1994, p. 124.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Karen Dawisha, "Democratization and political participation: research concepts and methodologies," *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Karen

As St. Petersburg-based Associate Professor of Sociology, Vadim Volkov, notes in his 2002 book, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*, "unlike some Western nations, where the government and the coercive apparatus were made accountable to the class of property-owners and, to some extent, to a larger body of citizens, the Soviet state was exempt from the direct control of civil society."[21] In short, the party-state precluded the development of a civil society that exercised influence over the political agenda, monopolized by the leading members of the Communist party. Moreover, during Soviet times, the secret police repressed, penetrated, and controlled any "civil society" considered a threat to the absolute dominance of the Communist party, and used it as an instrument to control the population. For example, the Eastern Orthodox Church was utilized for this purpose, Patriarch Alexei II, Patriarch Aleksii II (agent code name, "Drozdov") himself recruited by the KGB in February 1958.[22] While overcoming that legacy poses particular challenges to civil society development and democratization in FSU states, one of the more oft-cited significant impediments, particularly the early-mid 1990s, was the lack of economic resources to support it.

Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Authoritarianism and Democratization in Post-communist Societies, Volume Three, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1997, p. 55.

[20] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD, 1996, p. 245.

[21] Vadim Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*, Cornell University Press: NY, 2002, p. 128.

[22] John B. Dunlop, ed., "Orthodoxy and National Identity in Russia," *Identities in Transition: Eastern Europe and Russia After the Collapse of Communism.* University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, Research Series #93, 1996, http://repositories.cdlib.org/uciaspubs/research/93. Former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin also states that Alexei was recruited by the KGB in 1958. Personal interview, October 2006.

Regardless, the chekists' interference in and continuing efforts to control the nascent civil society in post-Soviet Russia clearly contribute to the persistence of this deep-seated legacy and serve to demonstrate the critically important role of a secret police transformation in order to enable the development of the conditions necessary for a civil society to develop, free from the political police-type interference and repression representative of a non-democratic government's interest in controlling all potentially politically significant groups in society. In direct contrast to old Soviet ways, the new democratic government must promote and protect civil liberties, freedoms of expression and association, and (the vehicles/conditions and) environment conducive to the free and non-intimidating exchange of ideas and political alternatives that enable a civil society to take shape. To do so most fundamentally requires a secret police transformation. Without intelligence/security sector reform, overcoming past legacies and nurturing the development and growth of public confidence and competency to participate in independent political organizations may remain insurmountable challenges for the post-communist societies of FSU states. It is a thriving civil society, an independent media inclusive, that functions to promote national debate on key policy issues and holds the government and political leadership accountable for their actions/inactions in democratic polities. Its growth must not be allowed to be stifled by remainder repressive elements in positions of authority.

Civil society is also to an extent (given its limited access to information) important to ensuring a balance between security and liberty, especially during times of crisis, for in liberal democracies it plays a role in the oversight of intelligence/security

services. The nature of this role generally involves the private media and other independent associations/nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)/social movements bringing attention to and publicizing the issues, thus drawing government into a national debate and driving it to respond to public concerns. Civil society facilitates and accomplishes this through the provision of information and public reporting on governmental activities, exposing rights violations and abuses of power, and giving voice to the resultant public demands for accountability.

Civil society organizations based in the well-established democracies can play a role by aiding in the development of a recognition of the need and methods for the expression of public demands for accountability of the intelligence/security sector in post-communist states struggling to democratize. As Thomas Bruneau notes, international NGOs are very willing to assist countries in generating public debate to educate citizens on the value, functions, and nature of democratic control of intelligence.[23] This publicity often gains momentum, pushed forward by the political opposition in the national media, and leading to parliamentary demands for public inquiries since, in a democracy, the parliament not only takes note of public opinion, but also responds to it.

In any case, *for democracy to be consolidated*, civil society must thrive. Significant civil society development, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan note, is a necessary condition for democratic consolidation. However, since the focus of this dissertation is on democratic transition, rather than consolidation, and because Russia can not legitimately

[23] Thomas C. Bruneau, "Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 323-341.

be said to have made even a comprehensive democratic transition, further discussion of this variable in those terms is beyond the scope of this project.

That said, simply having a civil society is insufficient for democratic accountability of government. It must also be informed, which means it must have access to information. An independent national media, in part, takes on this responsibility in a democracy and, itself a key component of a civil society, also plays a pivotal role in providing information to other civil society components and the mass public. There are different types of oversight. For example, Dr. Hans Born distinguishes between democratic and civilian oversight, with the latter constituting a prerequisite but insufficient condition for democratic oversight. He argues that, "an informed civil society is essential for the democratic oversight of the intelligence/security services." This civil society, he says, includes an informed citizenry and investigative journalists.[24]

Indeed, the importance of a free and independent press to serve as a check on government institutions cannot be overstated. As Sanford Ungar of American University notes, "The role of the media in pressing for information about what the government is doing is absolutely critical to the democratic process."[25] The extent to which the state retains control of the media then is a function of the extent of government accountability. Kate Martin states that the respecting of three fundamental principles assures accountability and oversight of the security services in a democracy. The first is freedom of speech and press, since "the effectiveness of all other control mechanisms depends

---

[24] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," p. 14.

[25] Kate Martin, "The Role of Security Services in a Democratic Society: The Human Rights/Civil Liberties Perspective," Center for National Security Studies, United States, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/oversight/kmremarks.html.

upon public access to information." The second is national security must not be used as grounds to violate fundamental individual rights, including the right to privacy. The third is that there must be institutional and procedural controls to assure that the security services operate in accordance with the law.[26]

Of particular importance to post-communist democratizing states is the development of an independent media to serve as a means for citizens to inform each other of government activities, criticize officials, and generate and hold public debates. So, too, a free press is necessary to keep government corruption in check and to facilitate the demand for governmental responsiveness to societal needs. In Ukraine, the limited civil society that exists plays a very marginal role in the intelligence/security sector, and, as Polyakov notes, "one would be hard put to find *any* critical analysis, let alone an equivalent standard of analysis of the MVD [Interior Ministry], SBU [intelligence/security sector] or State Tax Administration." Further, he says, "few journalists dare to 'dig deep' in the law enforcement or special services grounds," as in numerous "instances of media truly exposing 'dirty linen' of law enforcement structures, especially their involvement with corrupt officials or criminal world," led to the journalists' murders.[27]

Given that an independent national media in the contemporary world serves as the primary medium for political information (public debates on controversial issues and political alternatives, and information on government actions/inactions) and thus serves as a major democratic accountability mechanism, whether and to what extent press agents

---

[26] Ibid.

[27] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," pp. 17-18.

and investigative journalists who criticize the government and its policies or expose organized crime activities and official corruption are protected or intimidated by the intelligence/security sector provides a measure of democratic political development and secret police transformation pertaining to the civil society realm.

So, too, given the proclivity of secret police to interfere in the political process, and also to tightly control information dissemination, especially that of a political nature, transparency in media ownership and control is instrumental to democracy, and helps to mitigate the potential for new political elites and transforming intelligence/security services to extra-legally manipulate politics, particularly given the influential role that the media is capable of playing in electoral outcomes. As Karen Dawisha notes, "what is vital to examine is whether control of the media has affected the conduct of elections and other forms of political participation."[28] Certainly if there is no independent national media, it is likely that the political opposition's access to the mass public is being blocked by the party-in-power, and "uncontrolled" and investigative journalists intimidated and/or killed. Consequently, truly competitive elections can not occur, and democratic accountability is practically impossible to obtain. These issues as they pertain to contemporary Russia are discussed in chapter six.

As noted earlier, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also play a role in the oversight of the intelligence/security services, although their information and, hence, influence, too, are limited. Human rights organizations, for example, function as watchdogs, work to expose human rights abuses, and assist abuse victims in gaining justice and compensation through the courts. Yet, as Ferenc Koszeg, an MP in Hungary,

---

[28] Op. cit., "Democratization and political participation," p. 54.

observes, “One of the problems with oversight by NGOs or the courts is that citizens cannot know about the activities of the security services, unlike the activities of the police. This makes it very difficult for civil organizations to control the illegal activities of the security services.”[29] In any case, one of the immediate requirements of a democratically transitioning state entails legal prohibitions on the new intelligence/security services’ interference in the development and functioning of civil society.

While in those FSU states in which NGO activity has focused on the power ministries, it has generally been limited to training and financial assistance in the military realm, especially in regard to NATO, and has played an extremely marginal role in regard to the security services.[30] Should things change, various democratic government-supported NGOs may prove valuable to transforming secret police services by assisting in the education and training of their officers in democratic methods. Regardless, it is imperative that these NGOs be made aware of the reality that close connections often exist among intelligence/security officers, corrupt political and business elites, and organized criminals in democratic and transitioning countries.

Finally, due to the deep corruption of communist state institutions, mechanisms need to be put into place by countries assisting these transitioning states to ensure that

---

[29] Ferenc Koszeg, “The Status, Role and Authority of Security Services in the Central and Eastern European Region,” *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/warsaw/status.html.

[30] Op. cit., “Ukraine’s Intelligence/Security Sector Reform”; and, Nikolai Bozhilov, “Reforming the Intelligence Services in Bulgaria: The Experience from the Last Decade,” Paper presented at the Workshop on “Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services,” held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, October 2002.

any intelligence shared and the training provided to help them effectively combat organized crime and corruption is not compromised. As Jonathan Winer of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement advocates as to the U.S. providing assistance to and cooperating with foreign governments in these realms, "...we need to enhance intelligence directed at foreign criminal organizations to determine where they are being protected by authorities to help ensure that collecting information does not become more difficult as a result."[31]

3.4.3: Political Control and Democratic Accountability Must Be Established

The issue of how to institute democratic control over security intelligence agencies was put on the political agenda of post-communist countries after the cold war's end. Yet, there was no rigid model available for direct application given the unique conditions of each transitioning state, and those of stable/established democratic states did not provide guidance as to the *process* of instituting such change.

Of particular relevance to this dissertation, focusing as it does on secret police transformation and post-communist democratic transition, is Dahl's first essential condition for democratic development, that of control of military and police by elected officials. Dahl states that, "unless the military and police forces are under the full control of democratically elected officials, democratic political institutions are unlikely to develop or endure,"[32] and that [In contrast to the external threat of foreign intervention]

---

[31] Jonathan M. Winer, "International Crime in the New Geopolitics: A Core Threat to Democracy," *Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village*, William F. McDonald, ed., Anderson Publishing Co. and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences: OH and KY, 1997, p. 58; and, Louise Shelley**,** "Transnational crime: The case of Russian organized crime and the role of international cooperation in law enforcement," *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 10, No. 1 Heldref Publications: Washington, DC, Winter 2002, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol10.html.

[32] Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 1998, pp. 148-149.

"perhaps the most dangerous internal threat to democracy comes from leaders who have access to the major means of physical coercion: the military and police. I interject here to point out that, for transitioning post-communist states, LVD is the most effective method for establishing democratic control of the intelligence/security sector. If democratically elected officials are to achieve and maintain effective control over military and police forces, members of the police and military, especially among the officers, must defer to them. And their deference to the control of elected leaders must become too deeply ingrained to cast off."

In the context of this dissertation's theme, Dahl's analysis begs the question of how an unreformed secret police can be expected to defer to a democratic regime; in other words, how else is it possible to realize democracy than to destroy the secret police? He points out that without civilian control of the intelligence/security sector, the prospects for democracy are dim, emphasizing that it is "crucial for elected officials to establish and maintain control over the military and police if democratic institutions are to be established and preserved."[33] Of course, and perhaps to an even greater extent in post-communist countries, where the military was under firm civilian control and the secret police exercised the greater power and influence, the same holds true for the intelligence/security services. Recognizing this fact, the 1994 OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security specifies that the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police is an indispensable element of stability and security.[34]

---

[33] Ibid.

[34] "The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security," *http://www.esteri.it/archivi/documenti/do031294a.htm*.

For transitioning states, civilian control of the intelligence/security sector must be established by the new political elites together with the initial development of democratic institutions and practices and, thus, coincide with the earliest political and economic reforms. Lines of authority must be clearly established from the outset. To illustrate, Leonid Polyakov, Director of Military Programmes at the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, described the ineffective defense and law enforcement budgeting and lack of clarity in political responsibility for the state of security structures in Ukraine as challenges of a systemic nature, which "cannot be resolved in the intelligence/security sector alone, without the reform of the overall country's economic and political sectors."[35] In other words, political, security, and economic reforms must all coincide, and the nature of the political leadership — i.e., whether it is democratically-minded and can harness both the necessary political capability and will to institute the LVD required to forge new institutions staffed with like-minded personnel, even at the cost of a less effective and stable government during the early transition period — has everything to do with whether a democratic transition will succeed and subsequently consolidate.

Yuri Fedorov notes that the general understanding of civilian control over the intelligence/security sector is that "*imprimis*, it means subordination of [the] military and intelligence/security sector as a whole to democratically elected authorities."[36] He explains that *civilian control* "basically excludes the possibility for military or law-enforcement agencies and their commanders to dominate over civil institutions of power

---

[35] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform."

[36] Yuri E. Fedorov, "Democratic Transformation of the Intelligence/Security Sector in Russia: A Sad Saga of Failure," Paper prepared for the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," held in Geneva, Switzerland on 5-7 September 2002, organized by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

despite of the political character of the latter,"[37] and differentiates it from *political control*, which "is aimed at assurance of their loyalty to the existing regime, unconditional subordination to the political leadership, and refusal of attempting to play an independent political role." Because civilian political control, or control by elected political leaders of the intelligence/security, police, and military services, is a prominent feature of democracies, it is imperative that the elected political leaders are truly democrats, or the democratic political transition and secret police transformation processes are likely to be seriously compromised. The institution of an effective LVD policy helps to stave off the interference that can be expected from non-democratic elements who manage to gain or exercise political influence in the newly democratizing state.[38]

In the wake of regime collapse, many aspects of security may become privatized by former intelligence/security service officers who coopt or are coopted by active officers, as occurred to varying extents in a number of post-communist states, and with the result that elected officials not only lacked control over these (private security) institutions, but the state in many instances, its officials complicit in the arrangement through their partnerships and political protection, seemed to have ceded its monopoly on the use of force. Weber's classic definition of the state as the territorial monopoly on legitimate violence, in which the state's existence is conditional on its administrative capacity to uphold the claim to monopolize force and its legitimacy in the enforcement of

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

the state order and public interest,[39] can be interpreted to mean that "stateness" does not exist if it cannot be characterized this way. A "weak" state may or may not be considered to have "stateness." Thus, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's precondition (for democratic consolidation) of "stateness" has not been met in those states that do not exercise a monopoly on the use of force.[40]

So, too, William Keller, in his study on domestic intelligence in the United States,[41] notes that it is the sole authority of the state to use force, and quotes Weber to make his point: "It is absolutely essential for every political association to appeal to the naked violence of coercive means in the face of outsiders as well as in the face of internal enemies. It is only this very appeal to violence that constitutes a political association in our terminology. The state is an association that claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and cannot be defined in any other manner."[42] One can thus question whether Russia had "stateness" and thus qualified as a state during the Yeltsin era, and particularly during the early 1990s, when private security services (PSSs) were regularly employing an apparently legitimate use of force (as commonly defined and understood) given their freedom to operate and authorities' failure to challenge them.

---

[39] Max Weber, "Politics as Vocation," *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., Routledge: London, 1970, p. 78, and cited in Op. cit., *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*, p. 158; and, Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1978, 1:54.

[40] Op. cit., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*.

[41] H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford University Press: NY, 1980, p. 334.

[42] Andrzej Zybertowicz, "Transformation of the Polish Secret Services: From Authoritarian To Informal Power Networks," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, p. 4.

Volkov noted that Russia was then in the process of state formation, as competition existed among providers of protection, who rivaled those forces officially employed by the state.[43] The 1994 Most Bank incident, when privatized (former) KGB officers and official intelligence/security officers engaged in armed combat with each other, is instructive.[44] While it is likely that some of these PSSs were covertly and/or unofficially controlled by the state as they were widely staffed by former KGB and GRU officers, in addition to organized criminals, this control was not exclusive. Thus, it could be argued that in such a context, unless and until a transitioning state exercises a monopoly on the use of force, civilian political control of the intelligence/security sector is only a distant possibility. Consequently, I propose that a post-communist transitioning state's lack of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force increases the likelihood that violence has a role in that state's politics, and, moreover, may be "contracted out" by the state to non-state actors in order to negate the risk of political damage, particularly at the international level, and thus is designed to avoid accountability entirely.

In the event the foregoing scenario unfolds, then until the political leadership makes the necessary policy choices to develop the capability and exercise the political will to regain its monopoly on the use of force, rival groups are likely to combat each other for supremacy in what could be considered a Hobbesian "state of nature." Volkov describes the Russia of the early 1990s in those terms.[45] He argues that, "The creation of a private security industry did not appear on the agenda of those who designed Russian

---

[43] Op. cit., *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*.

[44] Julie Anderson, *The Changing Face of the KGB*, UMI Dissertation Services: MI, 1997, pp. 77-78.

[45] Op. cit., *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism,* p. 126.

reforms. Rather, a combination of short-term political decisions aimed at reducing the power and capacity of the old Soviet state security institutions, adaptive responses of the state security personnel to these policies, and the institutional demands of emerging markets led to the rapid formation of this new business sector."[46] The situation evolved into one in which, rather than moving against these forces, the state coopted them in the interest of personal political ambition and financial enrichment. In time, the chekists, who predominantly owned and operated these PSSs, displaced the political elite who brought them into their power networks.

It is also possible that in the immediate wake of the Soviet collapse, the old secret police deliberately subverted the state's monopoly on the use of force by creating numerous PSSs in league with organized crime in order to weaken the newly democratizing and Western-leaning regime, and/or, the new political regime led by Yeltsin was complaisant as to the development and failed to aggressively or chose not to counter the large-scale transfer of traditionally state security tasks to private entities staffed largely with former secret police/military intelligence officers and organized criminals antagonistic to democratic development. As Yuri Felshtinsky, holding a doctorate in history, and former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko revealed, the KGB/chekist plan was to increase corruption and organized crime to discredit democracy and make control unmanageable, thus providing the opportunity for the Service to expand its role, personnel, funding, and powers to combat it.[47]

---

[46] Ibid., pp. 127-128.

[47] Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, *Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within*, S.P.I. Books: NY, p. 10.

In any case, the result was the widespread penetration of economic institutions, including banks and capital sources, with all the political implications, by former KGB officers (chekists), in cooperation with organized criminals and corrupt political and economic elites, during the Yeltsin era. The PSSs were instrumental in this development. It followed that the chekists widely penetrated the political sector under Putin, giving them the means to gain direct control over the economy, where many loyal chekists were already firmly in place (having established themselves in positions during the Yeltsin era). It is likely that special units within the official intelligence/security structures had and retain close links with some of these PSSs, as they are highly useful for "wet affairs" and other "extralegal" work.

It is indeed interesting how the violent activities of the PSSs have become much reduced since Putin and the chekists gained control of the state and economy. As early as 1998, when Putin was appointed FSB director, into the early years of his presidency, the chekists were, through various means, forcing many of the purely criminal elements out of the lucrative protection business, limiting the field to those which had transformed from solely criminal to "legitimate" business enterprises and contributed to the "public good" (in other words, paid "taxes" to state coffers when called upon to do so by political authorities, a form of extortion by the state as these funds were neither calculated nor enforced according to codified tax laws or in line with legal procedures) to stay in business — as long as they played by the new rules. Thus, *banditry* were displaced by *gosudarstvenniki*, or "state builders."[48] An investigation of these issues as they developed

[48] Op. cit., *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*, p. 191.

in Russia, including the proliferation and role of PSSs and their evolving relations with political and intelligence/security officials, is included in chapter eight.

a) A Democratic Culture Factors In

Beyond the establishment of democratic political control over the intelligence/security services, the identification of and responsibility for their tasking is a related condition for a secret police transformation. While control is generally exercised by the executive, the legislature exercises limited control over intelligence activities through its control over the budget, in addition to its intelligence oversight responsibility as both a check on executive power and a democratic accountability mechanism. Notably, as Marina Caparini observes, it is important to distinguish between "control" and "oversight." Control can be defined as the management and direction of an organization, and can be exercised at different levels.[49] For clarification, Caparini distinguishes "review," which describes an ex post facto process, from "oversight," which describes a process of supervision that might include ongoing activities.[50]

Recognizing not only the differential of these terms, but also their varying and determinative environmental contexts, Dr. Hans Born notes that "oversight," "good governance," and "control" have different connotations and "it must be clear that each

---

[49] Marina Caparini's "Challenges of Control and Oversight of Intelligence/Security Services in a Liberal Democracy," paper from same workshop, cited in Peter Gill, "Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence/Security Services After September 11th," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 103, January 2003, p. 2.

[50] Ibid.

concept represents a specific and particular political system and culture."[51] Their form will vary according to whether the government is authoritarian or democratic, and reflect the political values dominant in a society. As Peter Gill suggests, "the actual structuring of any particular state's security intelligence agencies and the appropriate forms of control, oversight or review will be determined finally by the particular political culture and traditions of that state."[52] History and tradition always play a role in the shaping of a state's government structures, and for the institution of democratic change, highlight the importance of promoting democratic values, which tend to dramatically reshape an authoritarian political landscape. At core, democratic-oriented political leaders and their newly appointed intelligence/security chiefs must consciously push for the development of civic, educational, training, and other learning institutions (within their distinct operating realms) that actively promote a democratic political and legal culture. This would encompass all those government and non-government institutions involved in the policy process, including the executive agencies and intelligence/security services that support and implement political decisions and are responsible for the national security of the state, the legislative branch, which is responsible for codifying the security sector mandates and has an oversight role that thereby becomes more sustainable, as well as among the general populace from which recruits are drawn. In every case, regardless of variant political cultures, for a democratic transition to take place, as with civil-military

---

[51] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," pp. 9-10.

[52] Peter Gill, "Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence/Security Services After September 11th," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 103, January 2003, p. 13.

relations in democratic polities, political-intelligence relations must also be marked by civilian political control. And, further, in democracies, intelligence/security officers have no military ranks, which retain only within police and military (including military intelligence) forces.

Another problematic feature prominent in FSU states is that neither intelligence/security sector leadership appointments, relevant deputy ministerships, or other high ranking posts are subject to parliamentary approval. According to Polyakov, while in Ukraine there is widespread agreement among major political parties and independent experts that parliament should be part of the appointment process as it is an important precondition for a stable democratic state, the general opinion is that the political system is still unprepared for the introduction of the practice, and, moreover, the Constitution provides minister appointment powers solely to the president.[53] He notes that, "appointment of security structures' heads by the Parliament may be assumed justified only in presence of a workable, politically structured Parliament capable of forming a responsible majority united by the community of views as to the strategy of national development. Otherwise, power structures risk becoming hostages of political situations, turning into an instrument of or small change in the political struggle."[54] The Czech Republic is an example of this arrangement in practice.[55]

Disagreement among government officials on the most favorable future plans for the country can also impede democratic progress. In his 2001 book, *Russia's Unfinished*

---

[53] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," pp. 15-16.

[54] Ibid., p. 16.

[55] See "Czech Republic: Intelligence, *Federation of American Scientists*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/czech/index.html.

Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin, Michael McFaul noted the lack of consensus and highly-polarized views among Russian political elites on the country's direction and the best choice of national development strategy, particularly in regard to economic policy, as a major problematic in the country's democratization.[56] That situation likely derived from the intimate commercial links of many politicians (and intelligence/security officers) with private business entities, and from the lack of any LVD, with numerous non-democratic-oriented individuals in influential, policy-making, government positions.

Among its many uses, as noted earlier, a statutory mandate also serves to provide the basis for the exercise of control over and accountability of the secret services. Gill stresses that while a legal mandate is not a sufficient condition for the control of the intelligence/security sector, it is a necessary one for a number of reasons: 1) for any realistic assessment of the Services' effectiveness; 2) for the development of self-restraint among the officers; and, 3) to establish a base upon which effective oversight can be built.[57] Oversight authority must be included in the Services' mandates and specifically identify the oversight bodies, internal and external, and delimit the procedures and tasks they are responsible for (so as to eliminate any confusion or obfuscation of responsibility).

So, too, in order to maintain political control, assign leadership responsibilities, and thus, establish accountability, chains-of-command must be clearly outlined in the mandate, and leadership appointment procedures codified at both the intelligence/security

---

[56] Michael McFaul, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 2001.

[57] Op. cit., *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, p. 127.

service and political levels. Absent clear political responsibility for the Services' activities, there can be no meaningful accountability. As Polyakov notes in the case of Ukraine, "nobody on the high political level bore personal responsibility for intelligence/security sector reforms. Each structure developed concepts and programmes for itself. Government involvement in the process was also minimal."[58]

b) The Political-Intelligence Relationship — Intelligence/Security Services Must Be Depoliticized and Professionalized

It is important to remember that the secret police are by nature, like the bureaucratic components of all (non-democratic and) communist states, highly politicized. Thus, to transform a secret political police to professional intelligence/security services requires the depoliticization of the organization. As Karoly Szabo observes, "the non-involvement of the security services in politics is a measure of democracy."[59] This does not mean the intelligence/security services should be excluded from the political process but, rather, only made politically independent in the interests of professional objectivity. Partisanship has no place in the intelligence/security sector, and officers must serve their political masters, the electoral winners, whatever their political preferences and policies, or resign. Collection operations are designed to gather information on legitimate national security threats and not the political opposition, while on the analytical side, officers' inclusion in the political process ends with their timely provision of objective intelligence products to inform policymaking. The covert action arm undertakes activities to implement the state decisions of the elected political

[58] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform."

[59] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," p. 14.

leadership, in the nation's security interests. There mark the limits on the services' political activities in a democracy.

While information exchange between political and intelligence/security sectors is crucial, the existence of an extremely close relationship between political leaders (consumers) and intelligence/security services (producers) tends to complicate depoliticization matters. Indeed, this potentiality, particularly likely to develop in transitioning post-communist states, highlights the importance of LVD in providing the political space for not only a democratically-minded executive but also for like-minded democrats in parliament responsible for intelligence oversight to aid in the professionalization and depoliticization of the intelligence/security sector. The bureaucracy, intelligence/security and otherwise, must be politically neutral. While Uri Bar-Joseph notes in his 1995 book, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States*, that a fundamental norm of democracies is that "intelligence organizations serve the national interest and should, therefore, be separate from politics,"[60] he observes that the question of how independent of policy intelligence should be is a complicated one. Shulsky notes that the predominant view in both academic and political discussions of intelligence is that, "the most important characteristic of any intelligence-producing organization is its independence from policymakers."[61] This is because of the perception that policymakers will try to politicize intelligence, and only an independent intelligence

[60] Uri Bar-Joseph, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain*, The Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, PA, 1995, p. 3.

[61] Op. cit., *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, p. 152. Shulsky, on page 192, points out that analysts should emphasize those factors that can be manipulated or changed – consumers are interested in how they can affect the situation, on the political situation of a foreign country and how it is likely to evolve, to the extent one can predict the future course of events, whereas academics look at causes of a given situation.

agency, in this view, can resist the political pressures that policymakers place on it to conform analyses to their political preferences. Allegations surrounding the selective use of intelligence by the political leaderships of the U.S. and UK to support the case for war against Iraq are instructive.[62]

And, yet, good intelligence consumer-producer relations are key to sustaining useful intelligence/security services that effectively serve national security interests. Professionalism in the political-intelligence relationship has been particularly elusive in FSU states as not only the executive leadership, but many ministers and deputies of parliament as well, retain and use intelligence/security connections (whether from old networks or newly developed contacts) for mutually beneficial private political and economic pursuits. In Russia, there remains a serious lack of professionalism within intelligence/security structures, which has been noted by a number of politicians. This situation developed because close relationships with those in political posts, a feature of the patron-client system that still operates in (many) post-communist countries, serve as the primary channel and are mandatory for continuing success in any lucrative economic activity.

In post-Soviet Russia, it is well-established that political connections are necessary in order to succeed in the economic arena, with intelligence/security service officers often playing the intermediary role between political and economic elites during the Yeltsin era, and coming to dominate elite structures and in full control of the economy in the Putin years. Consequently, it is likely that many intelligence/security

---

[62] See James Risen and Douglas Jiehl, "Expert Said to Tell Legislators He Was Pressed to Distort Some Evidence," *The New York Times*, June 24, 2003; "Campbell U-Turn on Iraq Grilling," *BBC News*, UK ed., June 23, 2003; "Ex-Ministers Attack Weapons Claims," *BBC News*, June 17, 2003; "Blair Aide Admits Mistake on WMD Report," *The New York Times*, June 25, 2003; "BBC Chief Rejects Campbell Claims," *BBC News*, June 26, 2003.

officials faced complicating loyalty conflicts, in addition to serious conflicts of interest. With their professional relations spread among various official political and economic paymasters, the development, let alone, prevalence of attitudes and activities that engender professionalism proved elusive. To date, a lack of professionalism permeates the ranks, with personal profit-making apparently the primary focus. And declines in professionalism tend to be associated with reduced effectiveness in carrying out intelligence/security functions, as demonstrated on numerous occasions under both administrations, an issue discussed in detail in chapter nine.

c) The Secrecy-Accountability Tension

In democracies, there is an inherent tension between accountability and secrecy that is difficult to reconcile. The oft-debated tension between intelligence and democracy lies in the need for secrecy within the confines of a demand for democratic accountability — the secrecy/accountability issue. The secrecy inherent to intelligence sources, methods, and activities, while legitimate, Shulsky notes, "hinders the management and control mechanisms that are common elsewhere in the government."[63] He observes that because control mechanisms involve dissemination of information, which increases the likelihood of leaks, a tension exists between secrecy and effective control. Further, "in the perfect democratic world an optimal level of transparency limits the chances of the abuse of power, and tends to enhance the responsibility of security authorities and the effectiveness of the security structures they oversee."[64] The difficulty lies in finding the right balance. Excessive accountability leads to risk aversion and undermines

[63] Op. cit., *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, p. 146.

[64] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform."

effectiveness. So, too, as Polyakov points out, "excessive secrecy tends to undermine the effectiveness of security structures," and, furthermore, "too much reliance on secrecy makes their political masters hostages of unpleasant surprises."[65]

At this juncture, it is useful to recognize that secrecy within the realm of (foreign) intelligence operations, and the doctrine of plausible deniability, in which intelligence activities that may cause political embarrassment are planned and executed in a manner that enables, in the event of failure, the top political leadership to plausibly deny having any knowledge of them and which are typically in the realm of covert actions can complicate effective control and oversight. This is because not only is knowledge of covert action programs tightly restricted, there may also be no formal approval procedure or paper trail, allowing for ambiguity as to whether the action was indeed authorized at the highest political levels and, more importantly, making "rogue" operations feasible with no accountability whatsoever and perhaps at cross-purposes to government policy.[66] Yet, in light of the fact that covert action programs are an important tool for transforming presidential foreign policy into reality, as former senior CIA operations officer, William Daugherty, notes,[67] political control and accountability are key to ensuring that the intelligence/security services serve national interests, rather than personal interests.

In their research, Williams and Deletant draw from a study on South Africa's 1990s intelligence transformation that suggests a solution to the dilemma of a democratic state needing secrecy for its intelligence/security services while facilitating accountability

---

[65] Ibid., p. 20.

[66] Op. cit., *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, p. 149.

[67] William J. Daugherty, *Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency*, The University of Kentucky Press: Lexington, 2004.

for their actions is "to conceptualize national security as including, and not taking priority over, the defence of democracy and civil rights; to argue that only a state mindful of liberty deserves security; and to insist on a distinction between irksome but benign heterodoxy and genuine threats to the country's liberal democratic identity."[68] This conceptualization could be included in the mandate or the mission statement, as does that of the newly reformed, post-Soviet Czech intelligence service.[69]

d) The Challenges Inherent to Legislative Oversight

Romanian Senator Karoly Szabo observes that it is in the specialist committees of national legislatures that "the most systematic review or oversight is likely to be provided."[70] Given the legislature's role in appropriating funds to the executive branch, the intelligence budget serves as a parliamentary control mechanism; the need for funds to support their operational and other activities provides another lever of democratic control over intelligence/security services. However, in practice given the nature of "black budgets," it has proven less effective than other mechanisms. As Szabo notes, parliamentary oversight implies at least two aspects: a legal aspect and a budgetary one.[71] Although the financing of intelligence operations is buried in a black budget,[72] the power

---

[68] Kevin O'Brien, "South Africa's New Intelligence Environment," *About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence*, Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, eds., Halfway House: The Institute for Defense Policy, n.d., p. 72.

[69] See "Mission Principles and Credo," *Czech Security Information Service*, http://www.bis.cz/eng/a_poslani.html.

[70] Karoly F. Szabo, "The Role of Security Services in a Democratic Society: The Parliamentary Perspective," *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995.

[71] Op. cit., "The Role of Security Services in a Democratic Society."

[72] Even in the U.S., government spending amounts for intelligence is top-secret, although Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists (see Web site http://www.fas.org), through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit succeeded in forcing DCI George Tenet to release the 1997 CIA budget figure

of the purse is, theoretically, a parliamentary control mechanism and, at least in theory, can be used as leverage for cooperation and information provision needed by parliamentarians as necessary to fulfill intelligence oversight responsibilities.

Dr. Hans Born argues that, "budget control is at the heart of parliamentary control."[73] Parliament exercises this power through the denying, qualifying, or limiting of funds used for intelligence operations, thus possibly effecting a change in priorities. Nevertheless, the Iran-Contra scandal is instructive of the possibility that even in well-established liberal democracies, operatives may circumvent legalities, locate alternate sources of funding, and engage in covert actions regardless of parliamentary control mechanisms.[74] While, in practice, budgetary control over intelligence operations has only a limited effect overall, it may lead to a rethink by the political executive on certain policies and operations. In theory, budgetary control can be used by parliament to reduce specific intelligence activities/operations, however, with the caveat that, in practice, this lever may be unrealistic as a serious control mechanism given that, as Boris Pustintsev

---

total of $26.7 billion, while another suit for the 2002 budget was pending. See Richard Benedetto, "Data sought on secret spending," *USA Today*, February 3, 2004.

[73] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," p. 15.

[74] The Boland Amendment II, passed by Congress on October 12, 1984, was an anti-appropriations measure aimed at U.S. intelligence agencies. Yet, it clearly affected neither the activities of private citizens nor the NSC, and contained no penalties for its violation, nor did it abridge the ability of the intelligence community to collect and share information with the anti-Sandinista fighters. The Iran-Contra affair followed its passing. Secord notes that, "The idea that Contra support was intended to be an illegal "end run" around the Boland Amendments, and not something painstakingly conducted in compliance with them, was a myth created later by the media and repeated so often that it eventually took on the color of truth. In fact, the legislative history shows quite the opposite." See Richard Secord, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: NY, 1992, pp. 203-204. During the mid-1990s, Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists noted that in the U.S., billions of dollars are spent on intelligence activities with accountability only to those government officials involved in spending it. See "The Role of Security Services in a Democratic Society: The Parliamentary Perspective."

notes, ”the key to effective budgeting is transparency and accountability,”[75] and black budgets are by necessity neither transparent or much debated by legislators, even those serving on oversight bodies, and are thus of limited utility in controlling intelligence.

In any case, including the budget lever as a control mechanism has some value in the secret police transformation process in that it provides an additional measure of statutory-based control over intelligence to the legislative branch, however superficial in practice/effect, and represents one more form of democratic oversight. Generally, regardless of political system type, parliaments tend to simply approve intelligence budgets. In Ukraine, parliament's oversight role is limited to formal approval of law enforcement defense budgets and review of bills dealing with the security structures' operations, which are, as Polyakov notes, normally drafted by those structures themselves.[76] Consequently, the Rada serves only as a rubber-stamp parliament, exercising no real budgetary control or oversight.

Remarkably, even in Western democracies, parliamentary oversight of intelligence is a relatively new phenomenon, developing in the mid-to-late 20th century largely in response to scandals involving abuses of power and human rights. These scandals led to legislative or judicial enquiries that, in turn, resulted in the establishment of new legal and oversight structures. In other states, parliamentary oversight of intelligence/security services developed as an aspect of democratization of former

---

[75] Boris Pustintsev, “Individuals and the Security Services,” *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/warsaw/indiv.html.

[76] Op. cit., “Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform.”

authoritarian regimes.[77] It has since become a representative feature of established democracies and shown to be of great importance in aiding the transformation of secret police into democratically accountable intelligence/security services, as demonstrated in the former Soviet bloc states of East Europe.

Peter Gill argues that, in democracies, oversight institutions must exist at each of three levels: 1) internally within the intelligence/security services themselves; 2) the executive branch; and, 3) other state institutions such as assemblies, judiciaries, and bureaucracies, and must report to those responsible for control at each level. He emphasizes that "although internal oversight is a necessary condition for public control, it is not sufficient: it must be backed up by external oversight at 'levels' two and three."[78] Gill argues that oversight at the third level "is the most crucial if public confidence in the security intelligence agencies is to be maintained."[79]

Like Gill, Dr. Hans Born argues that executive oversight is insufficient; as the institution most likely to keep government accountable to the people, it is parliament that plays the key role in safeguarding the democratic element of oversight of intelligence/security services.[80] In a paper titled, "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services: Practices and Procedures," presented at a NATO conference on "Intelligence and Security Services in the 21st Century Environment" held in April 2002, Born focuses on the procedures, laws, best practices

---

[77] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence/Security Services After September 11th," p. 1.

[78] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[79] Ibid., p.13.

[80] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," p. 10.

and organization of parliamentary oversight of intelligence/security services in light of the notion that "parliaments are regarded as the cornerstone of a democracy."[81] He argues that "democratic and parliamentary oversight of the intelligence/security services is important for at least five reasons:

1) a balance between security and liberty is ensured;
2) because citizens tend to mistrust secretive organizations, it is important they believe the Services are subject to the rule of law and pursue democratic objectives;
3) transforming intelligence/security services in democratically-transitioning political systems should be guided in the process by parliamentary oversight;
4) the importance, high level, and costs of human and technical resources employed by intelligence/security services demands that they be subject to democratic oversight; and,
5) in dealing with the new threats of ABC weapons proliferation, terrorism, organized crime, and illegal trafficking of drugs, people, etc., it is important that intelligence/security services make the right choices, that is, under democratic guidance, through, for example, proper tasking.[82]

A potential problem in establishing parliamentary oversight of intelligence/security services in democratically-transitioning states may be a lack of interest by MPs in taking on the responsibility, as well as a shortage of civilians with intelligence expertise outside of intelligence/security structures. For instance, as Polyakov notes in the case of Ukraine, there is a "lack of real non-declarative political interest (and, thus, involvement) in the strengthening of democratic civilian control over [the] military, and the virtual absence of the institute of civilian servants on key positions inside the military establishment."[83] This same lack of civilians employed in military-

[81] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence/Security Services After September 11th," p. 18.

[82] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," pp. 2-3.

[83] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," p. 9.

related positions exists in the intelligence/security structures.[84] At the same time, he states that (in Ukraine), "few parliamentarians deal with security structures without the great need or desire for revenge,"[85] which could be negated with the institution of LVD.

Born suggests that the following principles enhance the democratic oversight of intelligence/security services: 1) legal framework; 2) tasking and reporting; 3) division of labor between the intelligence/security services (intelligence and counterintelligence, foreign and domestic); 4) separation of law enforcement and intelligence (no arrest/police powers); and, 5) professional ethos.[86] Notably, post-9/11, the applicability and wisdom in Born's fourth suggestion, that of separation of law enforcement and intelligence, has again become a widely debated issue in established democracies, and the lines between these functions blurred in the face of the need to counter the pervasive international terrorist threat in a world of WMD.

Contrary to these ideas, the Soviet secret police always had arrest/police powers, and the post-communist services retain them as well, with this aspect of intelligence reform, the removal of these powers and the leaving of civil enforcement matters to the regular police, never seriously considered. A well-known example of the FSB exercising police powers is the October 25, 2003 arrest at gunpoint of Yukos Oil Company owner and billionaire Mikhail Khodorkhovsky on his private jet as it landed in Siberia for a gas

---

[84] Ibid., p. 14.

[85] Op. cit., "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," p. 18.

[86] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," pp. 4-6. So, too, Born notes the pressure on some of these principles in the wake of 9/11, which situation blurs the borders between internal and external security, and the division of labor between law enforcement and intelligence as the demands for increased cooperation and information sharing become imperative.

stop, with his subsequent political persecution and imprisonment.[87] Historically, the country's state security agents often shared the same offices as the police, had full access to police files, and shared informers.[88] However, Marina Caparini and Graham Day argue that "in a democratic country which upholds [the] rule of law, state security police should not be able to access police files without a court order."[89] They observe that in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, the intertwining of state security agents and police led the former to contract out certain criminal activities to organized crime on their behalf, and, "while some 'dirty work' was performed in the quasi-interest of the state, the vast amount of it was for personal profit and power maximisation."[90] The links between them grew, and after the cold war's end, "many state security agencies used their previous knowledge and contacts to become professional organised criminals."

Further, Caparini and Day note that "the links between legitimate state security and organized crime figures and activity have become widely recognised in society. Abuse of power and influence has become routine, hence the growth of a criminal-political class who enjoy immunity from prosecution for routine crimes. The present culture of immunity/impunity has arisen directly from the failed communist institution."[91] As this dissertation shows, a similar situation has developed in Russia, with the nexus

---

[87] "Russian oil tycoon back in court," *BBC News*, July 12, 2004.

[88] Marina Caparini and Graham Day, "Democratic Control of the Police and Police Reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia," Working Paper Series No. 2, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, March 2002, p. 4.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid., p. 9.

[91] Ibid., p. 8.

between the political elite, chekists, and organized crime firmly established. Corruption at all levels only continues to increase.

As Born stresses, to be effective, parliamentary oversight bodies must have expertise, resources, and the political will to hold government and intelligence to account. Yet, effective oversight is often complicated by the parliament's dependence on the intelligence/security services to provide it information. This problematic in the relationship is compounded by the inherent nature of intelligence, its culture of and need for secrecy.[92] However, as Shulsky notes, if parliamentary committees are meant to serve as a check on executive-directed intelligence activities, yet are perfunctory and/or unqualified, then oversight exists only on paper. Indeed, this posed a challenge to post-communist states struggling to democratize. While the development of effective parliamentary oversight may take time as the new political elite learn to govern and relevant committees specialize, it does not negate the need to set the pattern in the beginning, codify the oversight responsibility in law, and go through the motions, thereby establishing the practice. In assessing Romanian intelligence reform, Larry Watts observes that, "The effectiveness of oversight is directly related to the frequency with which oversight bodies meet and the scope of their authority. It is also dependent on the number of administrative and expert staffers that assist them in their work, and on the degree to which committee members must divide their attention among other committees."[93]

---

[92] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," pp. 6-7.

[93] Larry L. Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 111, Geneva, Switzerland, February 2003, p. 11.

Another problematic in the oversight committees established by many post-communist states is that they include former secret police officials, the whole new political arrangement thus compromised by a lack of definitive LVD. Hence, non-democratic elements of the ancient regime are able to subvert the committees' role as a check on the executive. In Russia, while some liberal democratic-minded MPs managed to serve on oversight committees, many of them were killed, apparently for their professional activities, and allegedly by the FSB or their PSS contractees, owned, operated, and staffed by former secret police officials and organized criminals.[94] Moreover, without LVD, the legislature is likely to be composed of old communists and other, non-democratic and corrupt, self-interested individuals, including a number previously under criminal indictment, enjoying the immunity gained from winning (or buying) a post in the legislature. Naturally, this sabotages even any semblance of democratic oversight of intelligence/security services, their officers of which themselves may have been coopted by the MPs, or, conversely, have compromised or "captured" the MPs responsible for intelligence oversight.

The experiences of a number of formerly communist parliamentarians have shown that, particularly when no LVD was implemented, political struggles over control of the intelligence/security services developed in the wake of the ancien regime's collapse as the political class struggled to maximize its own influence while reducing that of new political opponents through various measures, including gaining access to secret police files on opposition elements for use in compromising them or defeating their electoral chances. A more frequent problem, particularly in those states without or with a

[94] Op. cit., *Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within*.

too limited or ineffective LVD process, was that various factions tried to coopt officers of the intelligence/security services for use in private commercial endeavors. It is worth noting, however, that when LVD was implemented, the partisan use of the files was rare in all cases except for Albania (which used the process to disqualify the political opposition) and the occasional random act. Thus, contrary to the LVD critics, this was not a significant or systematic problem.[95] The fact remains that, although examples of the associated challenges to the establishment of effective oversight in post-communist states' parliaments abound, the problems are clearly more pronounced in those states with no LVD, and, typically very limited or no secret police transformation.

3.4.4: A Democratic Organizational Culture and Mentality Must Be Promoted

Beyond LVD, the active depoliticization and professionalism of the ranks is dependent on the nature of the intelligence/security chiefs and the level of professionalism maintained in their relationships with both political leaders and the lower ranks/cadres (in addition to the political nature of the political leaders themselves). The use of intelligence for partisan political purposes is destructive to the independence and, hence, legitimacy, of intelligence/security institutions and products. As Shulsky warns, "Ultimately, as long as the intelligence service is a part of the government, the only safeguards are the backbones of the chiefs of the intelligence services and their willingness and ability to protect analysts from outside pressure."[96]

A necessary condition for the success of a democratic transition (and consolidation) is the development of a democratic political culture, defined by Gabriel

---

[95] Neil J. Kritz, *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes*, Volume II: Country Studies, U.S. Institute of Peace Press Books: Washington, DC, September 1995.

[96] Op. cit., *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, p. 157.

Almond and Sidney Verba as "a people's predominant beliefs, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country and the role of the self in that system,"[97] at, as Jeffrey Hahn notes, both state and societal levels.[98] Being a process, political learning and the internalization of democratic norms takes time, and constitutes one of the biggest challenges to democratic transition processes. Post-communist societies, having been controlled by a secret police, with all the associated implications, are plagued with legacies of mistrust, atmospheres of suspicion and fear, and a culture of lawlessness, while at the state level, secret police officials retain deeply-ingrained conspirational, manipulative, insular, and repressive mentalities.

These mentalities must fundamentally change for stable democracy to actualize. This holds true for any democratic transition to endure, and the end of secret police influence on society is paramount to enabling a democratic culture to develop, within both state structures/institutions and society. Democratization scholar Bruce Parrott points out that, "broadly speaking, a country's political culture reflects the inhabitants' basic attitudes toward such matters as the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens, the legitimacy of other citizens' rights and interests, the fashion in which conflicting interests ought to be reconciled, the ability of citizens to influence government policies, and the legitimacy of existing political institutions."[99] Further, he notes, "A country's political culture and its political society are closely intertwined. Political society denotes non-

---

[97] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1963.

[98] Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Changes in Contemporary Russian Political Culture," *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., The International Politics of Eurasia, Vol. 7, M.E. Sharpe, Inc.: Armonke, NY, 1995, pp. 112-136.

[99] Op. cit., "Perspectives on post-communist democratization," pp. 21-22.

party, non-governmental groups and associations that participate, directly or indirectly, in shaping a country's political life, and include: civic associations, commercial enterprises, extended clans, and criminal organizations. Taken in the aggregate, a country's political society generally reflects its prevailing political culture and significantly affects the operation of its governmental institutions."[100] The nature of a society, then, which is from where political and intelligence/security leaders and commanders are drawn, significantly influences its government (political and intelligence/security) institutions.

It could be argued that if criminal organizations come to dominate political society, it is their norms that become dominant within government institutions and society, and are internalized by the masses and elites alike. Linz and Stepan define political society differently. It is not non-governmental groups and associations, but government itself. For them, "political society crafts the constitution and major laws, manages the state apparatus, and produces the overall regulatory framework for economic society."[101] Consequently, if criminal organizations significantly penetrate political society (and especially so if the development of a new political society is delayed),[102] then government institutions and those it regulates may become wholly corrupted, with the repercussions felt by the entire country, as the regime may thus be incapable of, and perhaps unwilling, to provide security, jobs, health care, education, and other services for its citizenry.[103]

---

[100] Ibid.

[101] Op. cit., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, p. 15.

[102] Ibid., p. 381.

[103] See Oksana Yablokova and Francesca Mereu, "Social Spending Takes a Back Seat," *The Moscow Times*, June 21, 2004, p. 1.

The development of a democratic political culture is necessary for a democratic deepening and consolidation, and applies to the secret police as well. The organizational culture and mentality of the old secret police must be reoriented to support democratic values and norms. As Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman observe, an intelligence community "is a mirror of the society it serves and from which it draws its power and inspiration. Every country has an intelligence structure shaped in its own image. In parallel with the covert work itself, a certain folklore and mythology develop that reflect the individual nation's temperament and the character of its culture."[104] Thus, the nation's character will be reflected in the intelligence/security sector. As Dr. Alessandro Politi notes, "a democratic nation's underlying cultural and ethical values help channel its intelligence organizations in vastly different directions from those of authoritarian states." She notes, for example, "urging a democracy's citizens to exercise caution, and encouraging them to report suspicious behavior can be a valuable self-defense mechanism when used to protect the public, rather than keep it under surveillance for political purposes and social control."[105]

Therefore, it is imperative that old secret police organizational cultures, which tend to glorify their past be redirected toward the inculcation of democratic values and respect for human rights. The secret police transformation process must entail a reinterpretation of the organizational culture that, rather than glorifying, portrays its repressive history as negative, mistaken, and immoral. This constitutes a major challenge

---

[104] Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community*, Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, MA, 1990, p. 12.

[105] Alessandro Politi, "The Citizen as "Intelligence Minuteman," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*," Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 34.

as it gets to the core identity and sense of worth in one's life's work. Yet, for a secret police transformation to succeed, democratic ideals, respect for and adherence to the rule of law — a legal culture, and respect for civil liberties and human rights — new moral standards and an entirely new perspective must be actively promoted and instilled into recruits at the training academies and throughout the commanding echelons of the new intelligence/security services, while non-democratic advocations and actions be devalued and their perpetrators visibly punished.

This key aspect of the change process is much less likely to happen if the old guard remains in command and control of the Services. And it is essential that democratic values and a respect for human rights be internalized by officers. So, too, as Peter Gill observes, "ideas of propriety must be internalised within the culture of agencies,"[106] and that "the task of democratisation and search for efficacy/propriety includes shifting both the legal contexts for intelligence work and the culture of the agencies." That is, "for better control of intelligence, improved legal rules alone will be insufficient."[107] Cultures and mentalities — whole thinking processes — must also change. He notes that "in the post-911 environment it is natural that oversight bodies have been primarily concerned with their agencies' effectiveness," which "is entirely in keeping with overall democratic control of intelligence."[108] Yet, propriety must not be sacrificed in the name of effectiveness. Otherwise, democracy loses. Indeed, it is during severe crises and the

---

[106] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence/Security Services After September 11th," p. 6.

[107] Ibid., p. 2.

[108] Op. cit., "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," p. 1.

realization of serious threats to a state's national survival and territorial integrity that the democratic nature of the intelligence/security services is most tested.

Additionally, old secret police symbols must be replaced with new ones that embody the new democratic thinking and ethos of the organization. New definitions are required, as an equally important condition for a secret police transformation is the changing of the mentality — the mindset, thinking, attitude, values, and identity — of its leadership and cadres, all those individuals who constitute the intelligence/security services. At core, everything reduces to people, their thinking and attitudes, which, in turn, guide their actions. More generally, with new symbols, the political and social order is redefined in line with the new democratic system. In a state making a democratic transition, good judgment and ethical behavior are the necessary, crucial attributes for bureaucratic entities enjoying a wide degree of autonomy and discretionary authority.

The institution of an LVD policy in the intelligence/security sector ranks is extremely valuable to the success of the effort to transform the culture of an intelligence/security sector. Transformational leadership is mandated. Indeed, changing mentalities and instilling democratic values presents one of the most formidable challenges to a secret police transformation. As Caparini and Day note, "changing the police attitude, specifically transforming the police culture from authoritarian and abusive to democratic and accountable, is a long-term proposition. Many senior and long service officers will simply be unable to change. The process of natural attrition will be one of the most reliable tools in the change of police culture, even if it is glacially slow."[109]

[109] Op. cit., "Democratic Control of the Police and Police Reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia," p. 14.

I propose that an LVD policy is a more effective and democratically useful method of driving the intelligence transformation process than is attrition, which due to the time factor, enables the poisoning of new recruits' mentalities and sabotage of the organizational culture reform process by those opposed to democratic change, likely not an insignificant few, who otherwise remain highly-influential. As Williams and Deletant note in their study on East European states' security intelligence transformations, "[In Eastern Europe], the re-engineering of service identity should be regarded as an integral part of the transition to democracy."[110] It is the human element and its character that is at core what defines the nature of an organization. Laws and rules can always be circumvented or ignored. Therefore, the mentality, mindset, thinking, attitude, values, and identity of people must change, as that is what shapes the organization.

It is notable that *early* LVD, regardless of the immediate success of its effective implementation given the plethora of challenges inherent to the process, sends a strong signal that non-democratic attitudes and actions, particularly those repugnant to the rule of law and respect for human rights, will be deemed totally unacceptable and dealt with accordingly in the new political and intelligence/security institutions of government. Thereby, a commitment to democratic intelligence/security methods is demonstrated, the legitimacy of the democratic-oriented political elite is enhanced, and public confidence in the regime is more likely to develop.[111] It is important to recognize that specific corporate identities that develop do so in the specific conditions of the time; it is during a period of positive attitudes toward democracy (the immediate regime collapse euphoria) that pro-

---

[110] Op. cit., *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies,* p.3.

[111] Op. cit., "Democratic Control of the Police and Police Reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia," p. 24.

democracy identities, including within the intelligence/security services, can best be molded. Yet, the successful development of democratic-oriented identities depends upon numerous intertwined factors, discussed below.

Drawing from Angelo Panebianco's work on political parties, Williams and Deletant suggest that, "an institution's genesis deserves careful attention, since 'the crucial political choices made by its founding fathers, the first struggles for organizational control, and the way in which the organization was formed, will leave an indelible mark. Few aspects of an organization's functioning and current tensions appear comprehensible if not traced to its formative phase."[112] In the case of a post-communist secret police, the decision of whether to institute an LVD policy that removes those individuals at the top levels and worst human rights abusers is one of those crucial political choices. Otherwise, the dominant views and approaches of commanding officers are likely to pervade down to the new recruits, who will be more likely to reject democratic values in the interest of their promotion up the ranks. As noted, the factor of "command influence" is widely recognized in hierarchical organizations.

Moreover, personnel continuity and its coinciding feature the pervasiveness of non-democratic attitudes is likely to contribute to the unsustainability and effective undermining of any early reforms made by democratically-minded officials in the immediate and ensuing aftermath of systemic collapse. Without effective LVD of the top commanding ranks, some "reversibility" of democratic reforms is not only likely, but probably inevitable.

---

[112] Angelo Panebianco, *Political parties: organization and power*, Trans. Marc Silver, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. xiii-xiv, cited in *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, p. 49.

3.5: A BRIEF EXAMPLE: THE ROMANIAN CASE

The Romanian case is instructive as to the problems associated with failures to implement LVD, and how incomprehensive or ineffective LVD thwarts democratic progress. While LVD was not implemented in this country in the immediate wake of communism's collapse, there was an effort to identify and punish perpetrators of the revolution's casualties, which numbered over 1000, with 147 Securitate and Interior Ministry officers and party leaders actually being tried in what was a lengthy process.[113] Having undergone wide-ranging reforms in 2001-2002,[114] the Romanian intelligence services as of March 2002 retained about 15% of the SRI (domestic security intelligence) and 18% of the SIE (foreign intelligence). As Larry Watts, of the Office of the National Security Advisor of the Romanian President notes, compared to Poland and Hungary, which overthrew communist dictatorships after long negotiation and consensus-building and, hence, had more continuity in security intelligence structures and personnel, and unlike Czechoslovakia, in Romania, "the violence of its revolution and the perceived negative role played in it by the security apparatus made the severe curtailment of its powers, and the firm control and effective oversight of its successor services central and immediate priorities."[115]

---

[113] By August 1990, charges had been filed against 1456 alleged perpetrators, of which 834 were resolved, and 687 could not be tried due to lack of evidence. As of 2001, 79 trials had been concluded, with 30 ending in prison sentences, 7 acquitted, 15 undergoing further investigation, 1 amnestied, and 69 in the appeal process. See "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," pp. 1, 6.

[114] "Romanian Government to Revamp Intelligence Services Structures," FBIS-EEU-2001-1116, Report by Radu Tudor: "The Country's Supreme Defense Council Has Given the Green Light for a Historic Initiative – Nastase To Control the Intelligence Services," *Bucharest Ziua*, November 16, 2001, p. 3, *http://fas.org/irp/world/romania/revamp.htm.* Also see "Romanian Government Extends Foreign Intelligence Service Powers," FBIS-EEU-2001-1203, Report by Nicoleta Savin and Ondine Ghergut: "SIE Limited" Holiday Gifts From the Government to Spies, *Evenimentul Zilei*, December 3, 2002, p. 6, *http://fas.org/irp/world/romania/emerg.htm*.

[115] Op. cit., "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," p. 2.

On December 26, 1989 the Securitate was transferred from the Interior Ministry to the Defense Ministry, and its powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation voided. Four days later, the old secret police agency was entirely dismantled, with many other intelligence, military intelligence, and security agencies also dissolved within the month. Systematic vetting for the new SRI, which was formally created on March 26, 1990,[116] was carried out by the defense ministry's personnel chief, since the new domestic security intelligence service's personnel status would be governed by the Law on the Status of Military Personnel. Watts notes that the SRI initially relied on former-Securitate officers in order to be as effective as possible, forming 60% of the agency in 1990, and reduced through subsequent vetting to about 36% by 1994, 20% by the end of the decade, and 15% during 2001-2002, with more than two-thirds of SRI central and territorial unit chiefs appointed since spring 2001.[117]

Yet, as Watts notes, "one of the primary obstacles in realizing all of the benefits of extensive personnel renewal was the retention of the SRI's first director, Virgil Magureanu, during 1990-1997. Magureanu concealed his Securitate background from Ion Iliescu when he was named to the post, thereby compromising the new government's effort to fully break with the past and perpetuating the old institutional mentality within the newly-restructured organization. Consequently, the SRI remained isolated internationally until the mid-1990s with NATO's Office of Security preferring to conduct its relations with the SIE rather than the domestic security intelligence SRI before

[116] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[117] Ibid., p. 5.

1997."[118] Opposing Iliescu's candidacy during the 1996 election, Magureanu was dismissed in April 1997, and immediately started his own political party,[119] which ranks swelled with other former Securitate officers. Notably, the obligatory vetting before the 2000 parliamentary elections indicated eight of this party's candidates were either ex-officers or informers.

The removal of Magureanu did not end the politicization of the Romanian secret services. Under the presidency of Emil Constantinescu, 1997-2000, "for the first time since 1989, party politicians were appointed to operational deputy director posts [the most senior position for active service intelligence officers] within all the services (including the STS), resulting in diminished expertise among the leadership and the inflation of non-professional personnel at other levels."[120] However, after the December 2000 elections and with the SRI under the new leadership of Radu Timofte in 2001, personnel cuts of between 10-20% restored the *status quo ante*. To reduce their politicization, the Services were then removed from party-based government control and subordinated to the Supreme Defense Council (CSAT).

Still, while the SRI was substantially reformed following the institution of LVD over more recent years, another organization, the General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI) (formerly known as UM 0215 and then UM 0962, and denoting a military designation), which was originally responsible for criminal

---

[118] Ibid., p. 6.

[119] The party Magureanu started was the National Alliance Party, or ANP. In 2001, the ANP fused with the PD. See "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," p. 7.

[120] Op. cit., "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," p. 8. Watts refers the reader to *Cristescu Radu Constantin, Serviciile Secrete din Romania si Scandalurile de Coruptie: 1989-2001*, Antet XX Press: Bucharest, 2002 for further discussion of non-professional appointments.

intelligence and subordinate to the interior ministry, developed into a political-police type agency. This unit is not subject to any oversight mechanisms (except to the interior minister, who in theory is accountable, in turn, to parliament), and is predominantly staffed with former Securitate officers who were vetted out of other departments due to their unsuitability for the SRI, for example, but freely recruited into the new sub-ministerial security intelligence unit in and after January 1990. As Watts notes, "By recruiting about 400 officers from the political police categories excluded from the SRI by the vetting process (from the Bucharest office — ISMB — and the 4th Directorate for military counterintelligence, primarily), UM 0215 imported the political police mentality and institutional culture of the Securitate virtually unchanged. Allegations that the unit was 'a haven for officers from the notorious political police of the communist era' employing political policing methods similar to those of the pre-1990 security apparatus were largely confirmed throughout the 1990s."[121] By 2002, the unit had grown in strength to 2400 officers, from 1000 in 1991, and 1500 in 1998.[122] So, too, had its de facto powers increased, "often with the encouragement of sitting governments," to include gathering non-criminal intelligence and monitoring of citizens, dual citizens, and foreigners at home and abroad (in the absence of any crime or criminal intent).

Complaints from both the chief of the national police and subsequently the SRI director of an inability to rein in the unit went unanswered, reflecting, as Watts notes, the

---

[121] As Watts notes, "For example, UM 0215 was accused of infiltrating opposition demonstrations in 1990 and of releasing Securitate files to compromise targeted politicians before the May 1990 election. During the miners' march of June 1990 two of its officers were caught breaking into and ransacking the home of one opposition party leader, for which they were finally convicted and imprisoned in February 1994." See "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," p. 23. Also see V. G. Baleanu, *The Enemy Within: The Romanian Intelligence Services in Transition*, Conflict Studies Research Centre: Camberely, January 1995, pp. 11-12, and *Romania Libera*, 26 May 1998.

[122] Op. cit., "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," p. 23.

degree of political protection that the unit enjoyed, emerging unscathed in August 1999 from government declarations of its imminent restructuring and division into intelligence and internal affairs divisions. When in 2001 the head of the Government's Control and Anti-Corruption Department (DCAG) complained that the unit had surveilled and shadowed his department, no action was taken; rather, the DCAG leadership was purged, with its former chief posted to Brazil, and the unit subordinated directly to the Prime Minister's office, from where it had first been formed by Vice-Premier Gelu Voican Voiculescu[123] for Prime Minister Petre Roman (back in January 1990). In March 2001, Prime Minister Adrian Nastase pushed through a government ordinance granting the unit Securitate-like powers,[124] which were greater than those of the SRI or SIE. However, in response to immediate and mass public, executive, and parliamentary reaction against the ordinance, it was withdrawn. Watts notes that parliamentarians characterized the ordinance as "an attempt to legislate a new intelligence service with an extremely broad mandate beyond any sort of control," and observes that a "lack of transparency and persistent scandal continued to characterize the DGIPI throughout 2001-2002."[125] This case provides a prime example of the importance of implementing an LVD policy applicable to all top political leadership and intelligence/security sector commanding posts, and, in the latter, comprehensively — throughout the entire intelligence/security

[123] Watts notes that Voiculescu was a friend of Petre Roman and had been appointed ad interim head of the Securitate on December 26, 1989 by the National Salvation Front Council but was replaced three days later, just prior to the Securitate's dissolution. He then created the UM 0215 intelligence service within the Interior Ministry. See "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," p. 23, footnote 69.

[124] Government Emergency Ordinance (OUG) no. 29 granted broad powers to DGIPI, including national security intelligence collection (article 17), wiretapping, surveillance, search and seizure without a warrant, and stipulated (article 21) that the unit could obtain any information it wanted, and citizens were required to give that information. Also, no oversight was provided for. See "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," p. 25.

[125] Ibid., "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," pp. 25-26.

sector. Thus, the conditions for the successful inculcation of a democratic mentality among officers and transformational change in organizational cultures are created, a condition for a post-communist secret police transformation that contributes substantially to the realization of a democratic political transition.

Notably, in March 2002, a second report, "Armageddon 7 report: Armageddon of Securitate People," was released in Romania by *Bucharest Ziua*, a popular, privately-owned daily that is generally critical of the political establishment. The report gave brief biographies of 1600 Securitate officers who continued to hold key posts in the intelligence services after 1989 (and followed a previously released report, "Armageddon 2"), thus identifying numerous officers currently in intelligence structures, heading intelligence oversight committees, elected as MPs and deputies, appointed as ambassadors, ministers, and ministers' aides, founders and active members of political parties, and involved in cigarette and arms smuggling, financial frauds, and other crimes. As predicted by this analysis, without the implementation of LVD, Romania faced many hurdles to becoming a democracy. These have only been overcome following the institution of LVD; that is, democratic progress has correlated with the pace of LVD implementation.

On a positive note, restructuring and personnel issues continue to be debated in Romania's various intelligence services to date, although there remain significant challenges and setbacks can be expected.[126] For example, the report revealed that SRI directors had consistently lied about the 15% rate of Securitate officer retention in the new services, stating that:

---

[126] Doru Dragomir, "Hurricane in the Army's Secret Services," *Bucharest Ziua*, April 9, 2003, p. 9, *http://fas.org/irp/world/romania/dgia.html*.

> Both [former SRI Directors] Virgil Magureanu and Costin Georgescu and [current SRI Director] Radu Timofte have been misleading us and are continuing to do so, taking turns to assure us that the SRI is becoming a modern intelligence service, in which the number of former Securitate officers is decreasing continuously. Today we find that, on the contrary, the former Communist body in charge of repression and intelligence is still controlling the game at the SRI, as the number of former Securitate officers always prevails at the SRI management level in Bucharest, in the management of local branches, and in all of its compartments. Retired former Securitate officers are also certainly on the offensive, infiltrated in economic structures, in financial institutions, managing public and private money, in the executive and in the legislature. They have been and still are present in state or private funds, in financial investment companies, in the Financial Oversight Body, in the customs system, and, not least in privatization mechanisms. Exactly 54 private security and protection companies are managed by former Securitate officers, and all of them are in permanent conflict with this country's laws. They have been parasites on numerous banks, under the pretext of assuring the internal and external protection of those banks, and the banks protected by them have collapsed, one by one. They established the International Religions Bank [BIR], and they are the ones who led it to bankruptcy when the population's deposits reached a tempting size. Then they got together in all kinds of insurance companies, which have no brilliant future.[127]

The need for LVD was clear. Finally, in September 2006 the Senate approved a draft lustration law, however, in late August 2007 it was still being blocked by the Chamber of Deputies, the decisionmaking body, due to a lack of support among parliamentary parties although that month its Speaker, Liberal Bogdan Olteanu, met with a variety of civil society organizations to discuss a number of amendments it had proposed, announced he wanted debates on the issue, and accepted the possibility of having an entirely new draft, with the issue scheduled to be heard in late September.[128] Speaking to the issue, Romanian President Traian Basescu expressed the opinion that the law's adoption would have the effect of condemning communism, a positive sign of support.

---

[127] "Romanian Daily Publishes List of Securitate Agents Working in Intelligence," Document Number: FBIS-EEU-2002-0405, March 28, 2002, *Bucharest Ziua*, "Armageddon 7" report: "Armageddon of Securitate People," *http://www.fas.org/irp/world/romania/list.htm*.

[128] "Romania: Lustration Law Back Into Debate," *Seeurope.net*, Bulgaria Economic Forum, August 29, 2007, http://www.seeurope.net/?q=node/11784.

3.6: CONCLUSION

In sum, the evidence shows that LVD in the political sector contributes to a successful democratic transition in post-communist states, while LVD in the intelligence/security sector is imperative for a secret police transformation. I propose that it is even more important to those post-communist states that have no history and culture of democracy, and lack national unity and identity, in order to make a successful secret police transformation and, in turn, democratic political transition. The evidence also clearly shows that a necessary condition for a post-communist democratic political transition is a secret police transformation, which has its own set of conditions, beginning with LVD. I have identified the secret police sequential transformation process and shown why it is a necessary adjunct to the other conditions conducive to a democratic transition in post-communist FSU states. Further, I propose that the institution of an LVD policy may be of substantial value in preventing the usurpation of power and sabotage of the democratization process by a discredited, non-democratic elite and their secret police pushing an agenda based on private political and economic interests at the expense and with the goal of reversing democratic reforms. In the next chapter, I examine various models of intelligence/security service and present my own model depicting the secret police transformation and post-communist democratic transition processes.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SERVICE TYPOLOGIES AND MODELS

4.1: INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I conduct a review of the existing models on intelligence/security services, the usefulness of which are limited to the identification of intelligence/security service typologies. Due to serious weaknesses in these models for the analysis of the secret police *transformation process* to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms, a condition for a post-communist state with no history and culture of democracy to make a comprehensive democratic transition, I present my own model, which provides a simplification for understanding the dynamic *process* of intelligence/security service transformation, a process that runs parallel to the political system transition that occurs concurrent with significant intelligence/security change.

4.2: INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SERVICE MODELS AND TYPOLOGIES

4.2.1: The Lack of a Comparative, Dynamic Model of Intelligence/Security Service Transformation Within a Distinct Political Context

Scholars have developed a number of models classifying intelligence/security services in terms of typologies, which schemes fail to provide a practical guide for the identification and analysis of the conditions necessary to such institutions' *transformation* as part of a post-communist (non-democratic) state's systemic political and economic *transition*. Moreover, existing models are static rather than dynamic and thus of no use for simplifying a change *process*. The dynamic and comparative model that I present remedies this vacuum.

It is well-established that every intelligence/security service is custom-tailored to fit its nation-state's specific needs, threats, goals, and circumstances, and reflects its

political culture. Take, for example, 1) the post-communist countries of the former Soviet bloc, which had a history of independence and culture of democracy; and, 2) the states of the former Soviet Union, which did not. After the cold war's end and Soviet Union's breakup, each set of countries had wholly different environments than had existed in any other states in the history of the world. Hence, there was no applicable intelligence/security service model to directly copy; given their unique circumstances, a useful model did not exist. Therefore, as the Czech Security Information Service noted in regard to its effort to transform the StB, "There was only one solution: to make use of foreign experience (including the fact that in a democratic country it takes six to seven years to create a new intelligence/security service), and adopt it to our conditions."[1] Each state's security institutions will conform to its way of life, values, and circumstances. As David Bayley of the U.S. Justice Department observes, "the norms of democratic policing may be achieved by different institutional mechanisms in different countries. Democratic reform cannot be achieved through the mechanistic importation of practices that work elsewhere. Institutions and practices that support democracy in one country may not do so in another."[2] Indeed, the same would apply to intelligence/security service reform, as well as any institutional reform.

While common typology schemes are meant to simplify the general forms of intelligence/security services, scholars' variously inconsistent applications of the common typologies has blurred their distinction and contaminated their individual meanings to the point of negating their comparative utility. More exacting clarity in what

---

[1] "Genesis," from the Annual Report 2001," *Czech Security Information Service*, http://www.bis.cz.

truly distinguishes democracy-based intelligence/security services from "political police" or an "independent security state" — the typical three-tiered typology scheme applied to intelligence/security services — is required. In the context of the present 21st century, what features/attributes of intelligence/security services that make them reflective of either a democratic political regime, a non-democratic one, or one in transition toward or away from democracy, and particularly the identification of the necessary conditions that must be met for a secret police to be transformed into professional and democratically accountable intelligence/security services, are the focus of this project's analysis. It is the identification of these conditions and their development into an analytical framework that constitutes the core theoretical focus of this dissertation project, for subsequent inclusion in the democratic transition literature to which it contributes.

4.2.2: The "Diffuse Definitions" Problem

In reviewing the intelligence literature, one finds that analysts have constructed a number of typology models in an effort to simplify and explain the nature of intelligence/security services. Generally, the typologies consist of three: 1) a "bureau of domestic intelligence," in which the intelligence/security services are subject to democratic controls; 2) a "political police," in which they serve a dominant political party; and, 3) an "independent security state," in which they are in control of and implement their own agenda. However, researchers' inconsistency in the application, definitions, and attributes of these three typologies, often apparently shaped in such a way as to suit their specific research needs, has produced the conceptual confusion that has emerged from the variant applications, which resultant ambiguity creates and leads to

[2] David H. Bayley, "Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do it," *Issues in International Crime*, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, June 2001, NCJ 188742, p.

the continued/persistent presentation of widely-diffuse, and sometimes even diametrically-opposed, interpretations and understandings of each intelligence/security service typology and its appropriate relationship to a particular political system type, thus negating their usefulness and applicability for comparative studies, and limiting them to only one particular case in each instance. I call this the "diffuse definitions" problem.

The following literature review highlights and elaborates on the foregoing points. I note that because so few models of intelligence/security services exist, and finding that none provide for the comparative and dynamic analysis of intelligence/security services as no consistency in their construction or application exists, nor do they incorporate any process of change, I still consider it useful to present them for the sake of underlining their weaknesses, and pointing out their strengths, in order to provide some historiography and the evolution of past scholarly attempts to deal with the analysis of intelligence/security services. It is followed by a section in which I present my own, dynamic model, which goes beyond the mere presentation of static typologies of intelligence/security services, and delineates the dynamic transformation *process*.

4.2.3: On the Factors that Differentiate Intelligence/Security Services

Once an applicable intelligence/security service typology model has been created for comparative analyses, the next step is to construct a spectrum that shows the conditions necessary to an intelligence transformation, enables the delineation of a shift between intelligence service typologies, and permits the placement and tracking of movement along the spectrum as these conditions are met. More specifically, and toward this end, the model is designed to enable an analyst to show where on the political spectrum a transitioning regime lies based on its intelligence/security services'

36.

characteristics (including their nature, roles, legal bases, powers, functions, methods, political control and accountability, and organizational culture and mentality), and, over a period of time, permits the determination of whether the state is moving toward or away from democracy.

A major defining issue distinguishing intelligence/security services (and the political regimes they serve) is how they deal with domestic political opposition. As such, the primary focus is on the domestic intelligence service (or, secret police). This variable and additional factors that differentiate intelligence/security services, include:

- whether and to what extent they are politicized to serve a dominant political party and engage in activities to repress, criminalize, imprison, and destroy political opposition forces; and the methods used to deal with these forces (torture and assassination);

- whether they are subject to the rule of law (rule of law or rule of fear); whether their powers and responsibilities are limited to the realm of national security interests and clearly defined in a legal mandate/charter, how and by whom national security threats are defined; and the nature and extent of their powers (whether they have powers of arrest, detention, etc.);

- whether their primary function is to provide information to decisionmakers in support of national security interests and foreign policy;

- whether they coerce law-abiding citizens to become informers; and whether citizens' civil liberties and human rights are respected;

- whether ambiguous secrecy and surveillance laws are on the books so as to facilitate the selective, politically-motivated or arbitrary arrest of individuals;

- whether and to what extent officials can thwart the democratic process/accountability by blocking the public's access to information on government activities, including the intimidation or control of the media (whether an independent national media exists); and,

- whether a non-democratic and repressive secret police-type organizational culture and mentality is promoted and reinforced through reward/promotion (to the detriment of democratic values).

4.3: THE KELLER MODEL

In his 1989 book, *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State,* William Keller focuses on the nature and role of domestic security services in a liberal state, using the FBI in the United States as his case study. Of intelligence transformations, Keller states that there is a theoretical point at which domestic intelligence activities challenge the basic principles and legal structures upon which liberalism is founded and it is at this juncture that the democratic polity begins to shift toward some other form of state that is less tolerant of individual freedom and political expression.[3] In apparent recognition, then, that political systems and intelligence services reflect each other, Keller accepts that domestic intelligence activities can cross a threshold marking a shift from one form of state to another. However, he does not agree that this was specifically the case in America.

Instead, he states that, "the role of the domestic security apparatus is not static, even within the deliberate limits imposed upon it in the context of constitutional, republican government. In the United States, it varies both with the specific historical and political circumstances in which security policy is forged and with the administrative and legal arrangements under which domestic intelligence programs are conceived and implemented."[4] Thus, rather than the state political form changing, he argues that, "FBI operations became increasingly autonomous and insulated from the Congress, the courts, other units of government, and societal factors generally.....these circumstances suggest that security arrangements in the democratic polity are volatile or elastic at best and that a

[3] William W. Keller, *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State,* Princeton University Press: NJ, 1989, p. 8.

[4] Ibid.

single conception of the nature and role of the FBI in American politics cannot account for changes in the security apparatus over time."[5] Therefore, he applies three different intelligence typologies (bureau of domestic security, political police, independent state within a state) to the FBI, which agency, he implies, drastically changed its character over a period of roughly 20 years.

Keller takes a state-centered approach and draws from Stephen Krasner's work for his definition of the state, noting that, "for Krasner, the key to the analysis of state power in the United States is to disaggregate the policymaking process and to define the state as a unique set of actors in relation to each of several distinct issue areas."[6] Thus, he defines the state in terms of "concentrations of power, that are not mitigated by democratic institutions and legal structures or penetrated by interest groups."[7] It is this choice of definition that permits him to apply each of his three typology models of domestic intelligence services to the FBI over a 20-year time period, while maintaining the notion that all three types of FBI operated in one single and unchanging form of state. Nevertheless, Keller faults Krasner for not conceptualizing insularity as a variable in his analysis of domestic policy,[8] and thus for his own research, refines the concept "to make it applicable to an agency of internal security in a liberal polity. In particular, he asserts, insularity conditions the domestic security activities that can be undertaken in a constitutional republic. It refers to the ability of the agency to carry out programs without interference from societal and state actors that assuredly would exert countervailing force

[5] Ibid., p. 13.

[6] Ibid., p. 20.

[7] Ibid., p. 19.

[8] Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1978.

in its absence. A high degree of insularity enables the exercise of concentrated state powers that otherwise would encounter constitutional, legal, or society-based challenges from the press or other interests not easily resisted in the context of liberal government."[9]

It seems that Keller is making the "rogue elephant" argument, a position that former senior CIA operations officer William Daugherty refutes in his 2004 book, *Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency*, asserting that all CIA covert action programs were carried out by order of the U.S. President, and no "rogue elephant," as suggested by Senator Frank Church during the 1975-1976 congressional investigations of the CIA that he led as chairman of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, existed. In fact, Daugherty begins by explaining that the rejection of and treatment of the (rogue elephant) matter was the raison d'etre for writing the book — to set the facts out as they in reality were. In the preface, he writes, "The primary objective [of the volume] is to show definitively that covert action programs managed by the CIA since its inception in 1947 have been done so at the express direction of the presidents of the United States."[10]

Further, Keller relates insularity to autonomy. In his conceptualization of "autonomy," which utility "also depends on the delineation of different parts of the state," he draws from Theda Skocpol's research on the state,[11] in which she notes that the variation in the capacity of particular segments of the state to formulate policies "are not simply reflective of the demands of interests of social groups, classes, or society," but,

---

[9] Op. cit., *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover*, pp. 20-21.

[10] William J. Daugherty, *Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency*, The University Press of Kentucky: Lexington, KY, 2004.

[11] Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press: MA, 1985.

that the "very *structural potentials* for autonomous state action change over time, as the organizations of coercion and administration undergo transformations, both internally and in their relations to societal groups and to representative parts of government."[12] Thus, Keller argues that in terms of an agency of domestic security in a liberal democracy, "extreme autonomy refers to police activity that is not controlled or regulated by a statute or by any formal executive or judicial policy instrument. The capacity to implement autonomous policies depends particularly on the degree of insularity with which the programs of the agency are protected from other state and non-state actors."[13]

Accordingly, Keller notes, there is a high correlation between the degree of autonomy and insularity for each model of domestic security agency. It follows that for an independent security state, the autonomy of goals and insularity of operations are both very high. Because the activities of this form of agency are incompatible with liberal democracy, they must be conducted with the highest degree of insulation and without ruling elites' knowledge (again, Daugherty refutes this possibility in a democracy) lest they be compelled to curtail them. Conversely, the autonomy and insularity of the domestic security bureau are both low, and this form of agency is comparable to a department of labor or agriculture, with the exception that, being a security agency, it is less permeated by societal interests. Finally, Keller places the political police services on a middle ground in terms of these two variables, noting that executive authority obviates the need for legislative or judicial approval of program goals. Because most aspects of program implementation are secret and hence difficult to bring before the courts, the

---

[12] Op. cit., *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover*, p. 21.

[13] Ibid., p. 21.

degree of insularity is higher than that of the bureau of domestic security, placing it in the middle range. Keller's Autonomy and Insularity of Internal Security Arrangements model is shown in Figure 4.1 below.

Figure 4.1: Keller's Autonomy and Insularity of Internal Security Arrangements[14]

Autonomy of Policy Formation

		High	**Medium**	**Low**
Insularity	**High**	**A** Independent Security State	**B**	**C** X
of Agency	**Medium**	**D**	**E** Political Police	**F**
Operations	**Low**	**G** X	**H**	**I** Domestic Intelligence Bureau

The "X" in cells G and C denotes the incompatibility of these attributes.

In explaining his model, Keller states that "within a given polity, the nature of the agency of internal security can shift along the IEA axis or toward any of the DBFH hybrids."[15] Thus, he uses it to show variation, expressed as increases in autonomy and insularity, in the FBI over the 1950s and 1960s, and argues that "the participation and support of its liberal constituency was a precondition to increases in or maintenance of the autonomy and insularity of FBI domestic security intelligence programming," but led to circumstances that ended the support of the liberal political community. Keller concludes that: "1) in the two decades following 1950, the FBI transformed itself from a bureau of internal security with delimited functions into an agency resembling more a political police and an independent security state within the state; and, 2) the consistent

[14] Ibid., p. 22.

[15] Ibid., p. 23.

support of a liberal constituency was a necessary condition to this transformation."[16] (Thus, he argues that the institution's constituency, rather than the political leadership, drove the transformation.)

To make his case, Keller develops a model with four typologies of internal security agencies in a liberal state, three of which he subscribes to the FBI, that "can be used to describe and calibrate broad variation in the empirical data concerning FBI operations. In addition, they provide an analytical frame of reference to evaluate the claim that in the two decades following 1950 the FBI became increasingly autonomous, insulating its security operations from governmental and societal actors alike, and employing more aggressive modes of domestic intelligence activity."[17] The four typologies are: 1) Domestic Intelligence Bureau; 2) Political Police; 3) Independent Security State; and, 4) Unstable/Transitional. The variables that distinguish the typologies from one another are the Relation to the State (Ministerial, Discretionary) and Mode of Intelligence Activity (Passive Intelligence, Aggressive/Counterintelligence). Keller's matrix of Three Models of Internal Security in a Liberal State is shown in Figure 4.2 below.

[16] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[17] Ibid., p. 13.

Figure 4.2: Three Models of Internal Security in a Liberal State[18]

		RELATION TO THE STATE	
		Ministerial	**Discretionary**
MODE OF	**Passive Intelligence**	(1) Domestic Intelligence Bureau	(4) Unstable/ Transitional
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY	**Aggressive/ Counterintelligence**	(2) Political Police	(3) Independent Security State

The Bureau of Domestic Intelligence, located in cell 1, is conceptualized as one in which all intelligence activities are consistent with established constitutional and legal norms and, like other agencies, it draws limited and specified powers from a charter or authorizing legislation, with the relation of the state largely ministerial. Neither aggressive nor disruptive intelligence operations are conducted against citizens or domestic groups. The intelligence techniques it employs are passive because they do not interfere with the activities of subjects under investigation and are limited to compilation of information for possible future use. Its primary purpose is to gather information related to criminal prosecution of persons and groups that pose a threat to internal security. It is responsive to the legislative process, higher executive authority, and to court decisions.

The Political Police operates with a greater degree of autonomy from the policymaking process of democratic institutions and its activities are more insulated from legislative oversight and judicial scrutiny. It is most responsive to the specific regime in power, and its powers and responsibilities are not precisely specified by statute but, rather, this form of agency draws its authority from inherent or implied executive powers. Aggressive intelligence action is directed against the enemies of the ruling elites and

[18] Ibid., p. 17.

legislatively unauthorized political intelligence is gathered in a manner unrelated to specific legislation. The distinction between criminal and domestic intelligence investigations defines the role of the political police in that "the political police's attention centers on the surveillance of the adversaries of the present regime and, if need be, on foiling their plans of subverting it."[19] Still, he asserts, under a constitutional government, the political police stay within certain norms.

The political police model differs from the others due to its privileged position with respect to ruling elites, which tends to insulate it from review and oversight by other government units. Political control may be weakened but the political police are still responsible to the ruling elites. Aggressive intelligence techniques intended to reduce the effectiveness of a subversive group or political adversary may include: frequent interviews of those under investigation, warrantless electronic surveillance, contact with employers and associates, invasions of privacy, or trespass. Still, in a constitutional republic, Keller says, they are constrained because their mission is defined by the political elites in power, while the opposition can challenge police actions in courts and through public debate.

The Independent Security State is characterized by an absence of outside controls over its activities, and is distinguished from the political police in that its goals and methods may not coincide with those of ruling elites. Its administrators exercise discretionary authority over programs and methods, and its primary function "is to investigate and neutralize ideological enemies of the parent state, as identified by the agency's administrators. Aggressive and hostile intelligence activity against individuals

[19] Ibid., p. 15.

and groups is undertaken without authorization by elected officials, and so this form of agency is incompatible with constitutional forms and basic legal assumptions that a liberal state are founded upon. With a pro forma appropriations process, the specific nature of its programs are unknown to the legislative and judicial branches of government. In short, this form of domestic intelligence service constitutes a security "state within a state."[20]

Keller notes that, "the independent security state model claims the right to define legitimate security interests and to neutralize those who disagree. And precisely because it is embedded in a liberal democratic polity, it circumvents legislative and judicial controls that otherwise would force it to submit to constitutional restraints. Unchecked, it would mean the end of the liberal state."[21] The independent security state, located in cell 3, has sufficient discretion and financial resources to define its own mission, and carries out aggressive or counterintelligence programs on the authority of its own internal administration. Because this form of agency is incompatible with basic legal principles and democratic institutions, "it must therefore attain a very high degree of autonomy and insularity from other sectors of the government, from interested groups, and from the public generally if it is to survive in an otherwise liberal, and therefore hostile, environment."[22]

Cell 4, labeled Unstable/Transitional, represents the mode in which authority is delegated to safeguard the nation's security, but without mechanisms for oversight and

---

[20] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., p. 18.

accountability. Since an agency tends to act on information as its discretion increases and is thus no longer passive, the cell is empty; as Keller notes, "the bureau's aggressive intelligence techniques directed against members of the Communist party resembled the methods of the models in cells 2 and 3."[23] These methods include the use of informants to infiltrate, disrupt, and sow confusion and distrust in the targeted group, which activities, unless circumscribed by procedural, administrative, and legal controls, reflect the political police or independent security state models.

Conceptually, Keller apparently equates counterintelligence, a function, with disruptive, a description of an activity's nature and effect, and, further, he interuses the terms in discussing the variables in his matrices. This contributes to problematic assessments that lack logic, and does a disservice to the key national security function of counterintelligence, whether disruptive in effect or not. In order to show changes in the nature of FBI programs, Keller then constructs Three Models of FBI Domestic Security Intelligence Operations using the variables of Mode of Intelligence Operations (Passive, Aggressive, Disruptive), Autonomy of Policy Formation (Low, Moderate, High), and Insularity of Program Implementation (Low, Moderate, High) as the determinates of Type of Internal Security Apparatus (Bureau of Domestic Intelligence, Political Police, Internal Security State), which he uses to represent a progressive increase in the autonomy of policy formation, insularity in operations, and severity of FBI intelligence methods in terms of counterintelligence activity.[24]

---

[23] Ibid., p. 17.

[24] Ibid., p. 156.

Keller defines the variables within the Mode of Intelligence Operations category as: "passive" meaning that the agency restricts its activities to collecting and analyzing information; "aggressive" meaning that it adds hostile intelligence to the "passive" variable of collecting and analyzing information; and, "disruptive" meaning that it operates covert and formal domestic counterintelligence programs.[25] He defines the variables under the measure of Autonomy of Policy Formation as: "low" meaning that the agency is subject to the democratic policy process; "moderate" meaning that its policies and goals are in common with the political elite; and, "high" meaning that its independent security policies may or may not coincide with goals of other state actors. Finally, he defines the variables under the measure of Insularity of Program Implementation as: "low" (ministerial) meaning that the agency is responsive to legislature, courts, higher executive authority; "moderate" (mixed) meaning that it is penetrated by political elites and selected others with shared goals; and, "high" (discretionary) meaning that its records, methods, and programs are known only to security personnel.[26]

While useful in documenting the evolution of the FBI's domestic intelligence activities during a tumultuous period in U.S. history, Keller's research design is inadequate for comparative analyses of intelligence/security service transformations. First, the nature of the political regime under study never changed from a liberal democratic one, which would have occurred had there been a true intelligence transformation. Second, the basic nature of the FBI did not change, as he asserts, through

---

[25] Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania*, Studies in Russia and East Europe, Palgrave: NY, 2001, p. 4.

[26] Ibid.

his representation of it across the range of typologies — only its *functions* became more insulated and autonomous during a time of intensified threat perceptions and, indeed, threats. But, then, his model of typologies *as defined* certainly can be applied to such a singular case study, which simplifies his depiction of domestic security intelligence activity changes, albeit temporary ones, over a specific time period during which the state faced a serious and insidious, exceedingly pernicious national security threat, as revealed by the 1996 release of the U.S. National Security Agency's Venona translations documenting the extensive Soviet espionage activities in America during 1937-1957,[27] and as revealed by the Mitrokhin archive and other defector-provided information, continuing thereafter as the cold war escalated over the decades.[28]

To assess an intelligence/security service's permanent transformation, as indeed, the term "transformation" implies some permanency, requires a recognition that there are crucially important differences between functions and methods; for example, the former has to do with ends and can tell us why or for what purpose it is done (i.e., to protect national security), and the latter relates to means and alerts us to how it is done (i.e., subject to the rule of law). *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* defines "**function**" as: "the action for which a person or thing is specially fitted or used or for which a thing exists: purpose" or, "any of a group of related actions contributing to a larger action," and "implies a definite end or purpose that the one in question serves or a particular kind of work it is intended to perform." On the other hand, "**method**" is defined as: "a procedure

---

[27] Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, eds., *VENONA: Soviet Espionage and The American Response, 1939-1957*, National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency: Washington, DC, 1996.

[28] Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *Sword and Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, Basic Books: NY, 1999; and, Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story*, HarperPerennial: NY, 1990, 1991.

or process for attaining an object: as **a** (1): a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of inquiry employed by or proper to a particular discipline or art (2): a systematic plan followed in presenting material for instruction **b** (1): a way, technique, or process of or for doing something (2): a body of skills or techniques," and "the means taken or procedure followed in achieving an end."[29]

Another major weakness in Keller's framework is that he uses functional rather than modal definitions for his three modes of intelligence operations. In the functional definition, *Webste*r defines "mode" as: "a particular form or variety of something,"[30] and so Keller confuses modes as functions with modes as methods, and thus fails to develop an appropriate and conceptually clear mode typology. Modes are more usefully defined as methods in the categorization and analysis of intelligence operations — that is, *how* the goals are achieved, and should be clearly distinguished from functions/goals/purposes. Nuances are important. So is operationalization of terms. The more applicable definition then and the one Keller could have unambiguously used is *Webster*'s definition of "mode" as: "a possible, customary, or preferred *way of doing something*."[31] [So, too, the construction of a spectrum of methods would have been useful.]

So it is that while security service *functions* may become more insulated, autonomous, and aggressive during times of intensified threats/threat perceptions, it is the *methods* systematically used over time periods of both increased *and* decreased threats

---

[29] *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th ed., Merriam-Webster, Incorporated: MA, 1997, pp. 472, 732.

[30] Ibid., p. 762.

[31] Ibid.

that signify a real and "permanent" intelligence/security service transformation and, moreover, would reflect a closely paralleling transition of the political regime. That is, while secret service *functions* may change and "varies both with the specific historical and political circumstances" and are not static, as Keller suggests, the basic nature of the intelligence/security service itself — its typology — and the political regime it serves do not necessarily change as a result, in contrast to the results of Keller's analysis.

Beyond the sole functional issue of whether the intelligence service is to have as its primary function the destruction of political opposition, it is *how national security is defined* (i.e., as government/political-security or national security), *how vaguely* (for accountability reasons), and the *methods employed* that matter. So the real question is at what point can it be said that the intelligence/security service's main function *and methods* have changed to the extent that they signify that an intelligence transformation *and* political regime transition have occurred, and have become institutionalized, which, I argue, shows the indisputable fact that intelligence/security services reflect the nature of their political masters.

For the foregoing theoretical, and practical, determination, I have developed a model to simplify and represent the *transformation process* of an intelligence/security service. A measure of time is necessarily built into the formula as a real, "permanent" transformation takes time. I propose that a period of three presidential terms (of either four or five years each) is minimally sufficient to determine/show whether methods were employed temporarily in the face of a serious national security threat, or have become institutionalized regardless. Moreover, it represents a sufficient time frame to allow for at least two different presidents to make changes, given that in contemporary democracies,

presidents rarely serve more than two terms due to constitution-based term limits. It is only through a parallel spectrum/continuum that an ongoing, dual process, i.e., an intelligence transformation and political transition, can be mapped and imaged, while matrices/matrix-type models are useful for analytical modeling of institutional-organizational and some network structures. Thus, where the spectrum and matrix indices intersect is the point at which the subject can be graphically/schematically illustrated at one point in time.

With the general understanding that the label "political police" is usually attached to the sort of secret services that operate in non-democratic states (e.g., those of a communist/totalitarian or authoritarian/dictatorial nature) and engage in large-scale and routine repression, brutal torture, and killings of political opposition forces, wholesale terrorization of domestic populations, and enforce compliance through fear (regardless of, and in contempt of law) Keller takes a huge leap in asserting that, because its *functions* became more insulated and autonomous, the FBI transformed from a "bureau of domestic intelligence," to a "political police," to an "independent security state operating within the state." This is where the "diffuse definitions" problem is readily apparent in Keller's work. In particular, his definition of a "political police" matches neither the standard definition nor understanding of what universally constitutes a political police.

The "political police" label is typically used to denote the intelligence/security services of the type employed by Stalin's NKVD in the USSR, Marcus Wolf's Stasi in East Germany, Saddam Hussein's Mukhabarat in Iraq, the Shah's SAVAK in Iran, or Mao's Ministry of State Security in China, all of which served authoritarian regimes that enforced strict one-party rule, defined national security as government-political security,

and had as their primary purpose the elimination of threats to and opponents of the monopoly party in power. These sorts of states are marked in particular by their severely repressive tactics, many thousands of political prisoners, and criminalization of political opposition/dissent. All political life and social relations are closely monitored and reported on by the secret police, its agents, and informers.

Such secret police states, with their informer networks and coercive, arbitrary, and extra-legal methods, are simply not comparable to the FBI and its activities and operations in America as Keller implies by his use of the term "political police" to identify the agency during the 1960s, or during any other period in U.S. history for that matter. Keller thus does an injustice to the term (and the agency and government) and sabotages its legitimate application to repressive, non-democratic regimes' secret police services; by equating the American FBI with not only a political police but, further, an independent security state, he totally deviates from and destroys the standard definitions of intelligence/security service typologies that have been in use for decades. Consequently, Keller's research design and typology model are useful to his study alone, designed as it is to frame variations in the activities of the FBI, and are not applicable to comparative studies of intelligence/security services and their transformations, whether within regions or for cross-region analyses. As Los and Zybertowicz observe, the political police label is used in democratic political contexts, even while reference is made to the control role played by investigative reporting, parliamentary probes, and independent watchdog organizations, which are "hardly compatible with the pure police-state model," where independent organizations/civil society and democratically-elected oversight bodies do not exist.

In line with Los and Zybertowicz, I reserve the police-state label for a state "characterized by endemic reliance on secret police in the performance of most state functions"[32] and Amy Knight's reference to functional definitions of a "polizeistaat," in which "police functions encompassed not only law and order but a whole range of administrative and welfare tasks," and that "the [Soviet] state has continued to view the role of the police as extending far beyond that of law enforcement."[33] Drawing from the characteristic features of the secret police in historic police states and for the purposes of this dissertation, I stay within the parameters of traditional definitions of "political police," and define it as "a 'higher' police organization that through the use of extra-legal and coercive methods has as its primary purpose the promotion and protection of the prerogatives, and persistence, of the ruling political regime against all potential and real rivals and opposition." The political importance of the police in such a state is primary, as they ensure the regime's survival and negate any growth in the power and organization of opposition through terror and fear. In other words, the primary role of a political police is the protection of the prevailing political order against internal enemies and dissidents. The criminal process is politicized, and thus an informer society is created with political criminals consequently filling the state's prisons as they are deemed to pose the major *threat to the security of the state*, rather than the normal situation in democracies, in

[32] Andrzej Zybertowicz, "Transformation of the Polish Secret Services: From Authoritarian To Informal Power Networks," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, pp. 28-29.

[33] Amy W. Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union,* Allen & Unwin, Inc.: Winchester, MA, 1988, p. 4.

which common criminals constitute the bulk of the prisoner population, and pose the greatest *threat to the security of the society*.

4.3.1: Oversight as a Variable of Intelligence/Security Service Typology Shift

Other problems with Keller's research design exist. These have to do with the issues of intelligence oversight and political control. As to the former, he states that what differentiates a political police from a domestic intelligence bureau is that "its privileged position with respect to governing elites tends to insulate it against review or oversight by other units of government."[34] Yet, he fails to note that intelligence/security services are often so "insulated" simply by the fact of their being executive branch organizations; insulation from "outsiders" does not automatically translate into the politicization of intelligence, or lack of political control, nor does it signify their role in extra-legal activities, all of which Keller implies. Until the mid-20th century, there was no real oversight of intelligence/security services outside of the executive branch anywhere in the world, including in liberal democracies. That fact does not mean they therefore acted or conducted themselves as political police as the term is generally understood.

Keller's third typology (independent security state) is characterized as a security service that enjoys an absence of outside controls over its activities. He distinguishes it from a political police "because its goals and methods may not coincide with those of political elites and central decision makers. Its administrators exercise discretionary authority over its programs and methods."[35] In other words, the intelligence chiefs run their own show, free of political control.

---

[34] Op. cit., p. 2.

[35] Ibid., p. 15.

As with his labeling of the FBI as a "political police," Keller's identification of the FBI as an "independent security state" is unrealistic as it is next to impossible that intelligence/security services in liberal democracies, as a matter of routine, that is, systematically operate free from executive control, setting and implementing their own agenda. To make his claims more credible, perhaps Keller could incorporate the doctrines of "need to know," "plausible deniability," and authorized presidential covert action programs into his conceptual framework.

Keller identifies the primary function of the independent security state as "to investigate and neutralize ideological enemies of the parent state, as identified by administrators within the agency itself." He adds, "Because it undertakes aggressive or hostile intelligence activity against persons and groups, and is not authorized by elected officials, it is largely incompatible with constitutional forms and with the basic legal assumptions that underlie the liberal state.[36] [Further, if it is funded through a pro forma appropriations process, the specific nature of its programs and their existence would remain unknown to the legislative and judicial branches of the government."[37]] Yet, while Keller claims the FBI transformed into an "independent state within a state," in reality such a situation would not endure for long and would mandate a political system transition. Moreover, authorization may well have been made by elected officials, yet the doctrine of need-to-know or plausible deniability was operative, standard for covert action programs in any polity type, including liberal democracies. Therefore, his claim that an intelligence transformation (the FBI's) occurred is unsupportable. Again, the fundamental source of his framework's weakness is his definitions of

[36] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

intelligence/security typologies and his contradiction asserting intelligence services reflect their political systems but that the FBI moved across the typology spectrum without a parallel political transition. Moreover, to the extent covert actions continued, the operative doctrine of plausible deniability would in any case protect the political leadership from blame — no footprints trace back to the chief executive.

As a matter of course, when intelligence operations/activities are politically sensitive or potentially embarrassing, not only secrecy but plausible deniability is mandated to protect the president. That reality does not, however, signify an intelligence transformation. Perhaps Keller confuses the application of this doctrine with high autonomy and insularity, for directors of intelligence/security, as political appointees, rarely deviate from executive direction and retain their positions, whatever the political system type. Indeed, it is when democratic political elites direct, support, or fail to oppose on the domestic front/in their own societies the routinized use of repressive secret police-type methods and operations in contravention to democratic norms and the rule of law that the rubicon is crossed; it marks the beginning of a definitive shift from one intelligence/security service typology to another and a move on the intelligence transformation spectrum, along with a corresponding movement on the political transition spectrum.

4.3.2: Political Control as a Variable of Intelligence/Security Typology Shift

In using the issue of political control as one of the variables that determines a shift in typology, Keller states that, “unless the activity of the agency of internal security is circumscribed by procedural, administrative, and legal controls, the agency begins to

---

[37] Ibid.

resemble more closely the model of a political police or an independent security state."[38] The measures used within the variables in his typology classification scheme to buttress this claim, however, are faulty. For example, in his use of Autonomy, Insularity, and Mode of Intelligence Operations, Keller uses the issue of informants to further distinguish among his typologies. He asserts that: 1) if the FBI's use of informants was ubiquitous; 2) their recruitment, payment, direction, and deployment were solely at the individual agent's discretion; 3) the guidelines regulating informant activity, along with their numbers, names, pay and performance records were internal and classified; 4) First Amendment questions did not come before courts as doing so would expose them; and, 5) their information was used for intelligence purposes rather than criminal prosecutions, then control of informants was discretionary and so the mode of intelligence operations can not be considered "passive."[39]

Keller justifies his use of informants as a measure of political control (and also as leading to a shift in security service typology) in that it is "still possible to make rough distinctions regarding the use of informants, and these can be related to the purpose of the program in which penetration techniques were employed."[40] He thereby reveals his "functional" purpose, rather than "method," definitional interpretation of mode of intelligence operations and, finally, obliterates his own argument by admitting his classification scheme is faulty, saying, "It is, nevertheless, extremely difficult to classify the mode of intelligence when large numbers of informants are used in a program."[41] In

---

[38] Ibid., p. 17.

[39] Ibid., pp. 177-178.

[40] Ibid., p. 178.

[41] Ibid.

his conceptual framework, this weakness is brushed over/covered up by using the ambiguous and hence meaningless classification “passive/aggressive” in the Mode of Intelligence Activity variable.[42]

Throughout his study, Keller uses “purpose” as function, rather than method. Domestic intelligence/security service functions/purposes do not significantly change in a democracy unless there is a particular national security threat that requires countering for a limited period of time, and even then, the activities occur in response to politically-driven requirements. Moreover, if functions do drastically change, so, too, it is likely that the methods employed in carrying them out change as well. If this was the case over an extended period of time, it would signal a political system transition, which would quite closely coincide with an intelligence/security service transformation. Moreover, if one is going to use the issue of informant handling as a measure of political control to distinguish among intelligence/security service typologies, a more legitimate variable than the purposes and discretionary powers of agents and their informant handling would be whether those purposes were to counter legal political opposition and the methods used to recruit citizens as informants, such as whether they are coerced to inform through various extra-legal measures and, further, no legal recourse is available for those who refuse the approach (and whether due process is operative for those falsely accused of breaking some law as a consequence of their refusal to spy for the government), thus providing immunity for the intelligence/security services in their domestic intelligence operations. Indeed, if that reality pervades political-social life/relations, then it is likely that other extra-legal measures are the norm and the intelligence/security services are

[42] Ibid.

operating above the law, while citizens face arbitrary justice, planted evidence, false accusations, show trials, unjust incarceration, and other abuses.

4.3.3: On the Positive Aspects of Keller's Work

On a more positive note, Keller's research does nevertheless highlight the importance of a codified legal mandate that clearly specifies the bases on which domestic intelligence investigations are authorized and operations carried out, given that (as he notes) "in part, the bureau was able to operate at variance with the courts and higher executive and congressional authority because of the nebulous legal structure upon which its internal security activities rested. No statute specifically authorized domestic security intelligence investigations."[43] Rather, during a time when the communist threat was indeed pervasive on the home front, FBI intelligence programs had been conducted within a broad framework of presidential directives and orders. That was the recipe for disaster, resulting in COINTELPRO, from which the FBI, and public trust in the executive institutions of government, is still recovering in the 21st century and with the country facing a pervasive, well-organized and financed terrorist threat.

4.4: THE WILLIAMS AND DELETANT MODEL

In their 2001 book, *Security Intelligence Services and New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania*, Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant seek to determine whether the intelligence/security services of these three states have transformed from "political police" into "domestic intelligence bureaux" or something else. They base their analysis on Keller's model formulation, "Three Models of FBI

[43] Ibid., p. 12.

Domestic Security Intelligence Operations,"[44] and title their own, "Three Models of Services and Operations," using the variables of Mode of Intelligence Operations (Passive, Aggressive, Disruptive), Autonomy of Policy Formulation (Low, Moderate, High), and Insularity of Program Implementation (Low, Moderate, High) to identify which of the three ideal types of security intelligence agencies (Independent Security State, Political Police, Domestic Intelligence Bureau) is operative in each of the three post-communist states.[45] In contrast to Keller's specific definitional terminology, however, Williams and Deletant translate Autonomy of Policy Formulation into "autonomy from executive control," and Insularity of Program Implementation to "insularity from external observation (such as legislative oversight or investigative reporting),[46] thus bringing more clarity to the analysis by precisely defining the control (autonomy) and oversight (insularity) aspects of intelligence in tune with the operative norms of intelligence/security services, rather than presenting operational functions, purposes, and informant-handling practices in control and oversight garb.

The Williams and Deletant model is shown in Figure 4.3 below.

[44] Ibid., p. 156.

[45] Op. cit., *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, pp. 3-4.

[46] Ibid., p. 3.

Figure 4.3: Three Models of Service and Operations[47]

Type of internal security apparatus	Mode of intelligence operations	Autonomy of policy formulation	Insularity of programme implementation
Bureau of domestic intelligence	Passive: collects and analyses information	Low: subject to democratic policy process	Low (ministerial): responsive to legislature, courts, higher exec. Authority
Political police	Aggressive: adds hostile intelligence to above	Moderate: Policies and goals in common with political elite	Moderate (mixed): penetrated by political elites and selected others with shared goals
Independent security state	Disruptive: operates covert and formal domestic counterintelligence programmes	High: independent security policies may or may not coincide with goals of other state actors	High (discretionary): records, methods, and programmes known only to security personnel

Williams and Deletant defend their application of Keller's model to the three post-communist state cases, stating that "while Keller's terms (i.e., high, moderate, and low degrees of autonomy and insularity) are not easy to operationalize," one of the tasks of their book is "to determine whether East European security intelligence/security services have ceased to be the political police of late communism and are now bureaux of domestic intelligence, or whether they should be placed in less cogent categories with admixtures of autonomy and insularity."[48] In applying Keller's "three models of intelligence/security services in liberal democracies" to the Czech, Slovakian, and Romanian cases, Williams and Deletant make the assumption that these three states, for the purposes of their analysis, are consolidated liberal democracies. Doing so contradicts their opening statement, where they highlight the far more exposed, ambiguous roles that intelligence/security services play in a revolutionary situation relative to those in

[47] Ibid., p. 4.

[48] Ibid.

consolidated democracies, and call the Services' behavior "a litmus test of both the functioning and accountability of the post-communist state."[49]

Implicit in Williams's and Deletant's analysis is their failure to recognize that an intelligence/security service and political system mirror each other. There are a number of implications here. First, the assumption that each of these post-communist states are liberal democracies is unwarranted, and they offer no evidence or justification for this assertion; in fact, they do not address the issue of the nature of these states' political regimes any further. Thus, their methodology is as flawed as the assumption these transitioning states are democracies — which term itself is never defined — since their choice of models (Keller's) and research goals (to determine whether the intelligence/security services of the three states have transformed from political police into domestic intelligence bureaux or something else) are contradictory.

Second, whether the features of these states' intelligence/security services match the attributes of any of Keller's three (domestic intelligence service) typologies really tells us nothing since Keller's framework denotes three different intelligence/security service types all operating in a single liberal democracy; all three typologies are alleged, as defined, to characterize the FBI. Further, Williams's and Deletant's analysis has no real bearing on the actual nature of the three states' intelligence/security services, and fails to identify the necessary conditions for, or attempts to explain, the intelligence/security service transformation process.

Third, given the nature of the secret police in these three former Soviet bloc states, directed and trained as they were by and in sync with the methods of the Soviet KGB, unless Williams and Deletant differentiate "the political police of late

[49] Ibid., p. 1.

communism" from Keller's "political police," the results are analytically rather meaningless (especially since, again, all three of Keller's intelligence/security typologies are at some point found to describe the FBI, which unquestionably operated in a liberal democratic political system throughout his study's time frame). Williams's and Deletant's standard definition and understanding of what constitutes a political police does not match that used by Keller, although they use his framework as a template for their analyses, and they fail to clearly conceptualize or operationalize the term in their study, simply applying Keller's model to their case analyses, and thus committing the same error they criticize Keller of making.

Not only is Williams's and Deletant's application of Keller's model definitionally faulty but there are also inherent structural/functional problems; Keller applied (and perhaps tailored) his typologies specifically to the American FBI, a unique agency in the world and one not comparable to the domestic security intelligence/security services found in other (democratic) states. Moreover, the post-communist states in Williams's and Deletant's study did not structure their intelligence/security community like that of the U.S., with agencies similar to the CIA and especially the FBI, the former having no arrest and highly limited domestic intelligence powers and being for the most part (solely) a foreign intelligence agency, and the latter constituting a domestic law enforcement/criminal investigation and foreign counterintelligence agency. The Keller template simply does not fit for the comparative analyses of secret police services and post-communist states making intelligence/security transformations and political transitions, respectively.

Perhaps more useful for Williams's and Deletant's analysis, given their assumption that the three states chosen as their case studies (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania) are liberal democratic states, would have been the application of models used to depict the domestic intelligence/security services of Britain (MI-5), Germany (BfV), or Italy (SISDE). These intelligence/security services could more accurately be classified as security intelligence services (having separate foreign intelligence service components) and operate in West European states universally identified as democracies, although of a more social than liberal type, and have faced not only a communist but also a terrorist threat in the 20th century. In fact, the 21st century debate in the U.S. about whether to create a new and separate MI-5-type domestic intelligence/security service to fight terrorism, or to incorporate counterterrorism intelligence-gathering and analysis into the FBI's existing mandate, illuminates in stark terms the distinctions and contrasts between the two types of agencies.[50] Notably, at least three post-communist, East European states have sought out British (MI-6) rather than U.S. (CIA), intelligence officials to advise them on reforming their intelligence/security services.[51] For instance, the new Czech intelligence service was particularly influenced by the British, who prepared and organized well-structured intelligence courses in both Britain and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s for Czech intelligence recruits, and the Czech Council for Coordination of the Intelligence Services was inspired by and based

[50] Cam Simpson, "FBI director challenges push for new intelligence agency," *Chicago Tribune*, December 19, 2002.

[51] Gordon Logan, "The Secret History of the Moscow Coup of August 1991," *http://cryptome.org/markov-file.htm*, 1999, 2000.

on Britain's Joint Intelligence Council.[52] Even so, the *parallel processes* of secret police transformation and democratic political transition elude Williams's and Deletant's analytic models, a significant weakness in their otherwise interesting study.

Further convoluting/complicating their analysis, Williams and Deletant use Peter Gills's functional definition of security intelligence (which Gill, primarily concerned with "domestic intelligence,"[53] used in a study of British intelligence because "the phrase most accurately conveys the areas of state intelligence activity to be discussed") defined as the "state's gathering of information about and attempts to counter perceived threats to its security deriving from espionage, sabotage, foreign-influenced activities, political violence and subversion."[54] Although they note that the term "security intelligence" first entered parlance in Canada and Australia, where the emphasis lies in collection of information and its refinement into an intelligence product, with direct actions left to the police (and note the absence of "subversion" in the mandates of some Services due to its elasticity and vagueness, and that the definition of (national) security in the post-cold war world is expanding), by using Gill's definition, Williams and Deletant present their study as one that focuses on domestic intelligence/security services that are much more powerful and multi-task than a federal law enforcement/counterintelligence agency such as the FBI, and that engage in significant intelligence-gathering, analysis, and operations

---

[52] Oldnch Cerny, "Czechoslovak (Czech) Intelligence After the Cold War," Paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on 3-5 October 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group on Democratic Control of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Armed Forces (DCAF) Conference Paper, pp. 5, 8.

[53] Peter Gill, *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, Cass Series: Studies in Intelligence, Frank Cass: OR, 1994, p. 6.

[54] Op. cit., *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, p. 1.

of a political nature on the domestic front and in the context of the post-Soviet legacy and environment, with all the implications, while relying on Keller's typology scheme, including its (diffuse) definitions, to assess the East European intelligence/security services that are the focus of their study.

Finally, Williams and Deletant also construct a Model of Oversight and Control, with Institutions of Control (director, cabinet-ranking official, legislature, political parties/issue groups), Forms of Control (guidelines, ministerial directions, statutory footing/mandate, party and group policy statements), and Institutions of Oversight (internal inspector/counsellor, inspector reporting to cabinet, parliamentary committee, media), intersecting with Location of Control/Oversight (internal to the agency, executive branch, assembly, civil society).[55] His model is actually a modified version of Peter Gill's model, and is shown in Figure 4.4 below.

Figure 4.4: Model of Oversight and Control[56]

Location of control/oversight	**Internal to the agency**	**Executive branch**	**Assembly**	**Civil Society**
Institutions of control	Director	Cabinet-ranking official	Legislature	Political parties, issue groups
Form of control	Guidelines	Ministerial directions	Statutory footing/mandate	Party and group policy statements
Institutions of oversight	Internal inspector, counsellor	Inspector reporting to cabinet	Parliamentary committee	Media

As to intelligence oversight in these transitioning states, Williams and Deletant argue that due to the lack of trust so prevalent in post-communist societies and the associated secrecy, cynicism, and related ills, one can "expect to find multilateral,

[55] Ibid., p. 7.

[56] Ibid., p. 58.

constitutional forms of oversight." Moreover, they suggest that one can expect parliamentary debate to be focused largely on economic reform issues, rather than oversight of government bodies.[57]

In their final analysis, Williams and Deletant concluded that while the three countries covered in their book followed very different paths of change since 1989, in the security intelligence realm they had much in common. Specifically, they note that, "There has been a break with the political police of the communist period, even if some of the personnel have been retained and scandals suggest a persistence of habits. New institutions of legislative oversight and executive control have been established. Above all, the services are the frequent object of coverage, commentary and criticism in the mass media of all three countries."[58] Thus, their model serves to highlight four very important factors to the transformation of the intelligence/security sector (personnel renewal, legislative oversight, executive political control, and the media (as a mechanism for democratic accountability), only one of which, executive political control, has been meaningfully instituted in post-Soviet Russia, as the evidence shows in later chapters.

4.5: THE GILL MODEL

In his 1994 book, *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, Peter Gill examines the domestic security intelligence agencies of the UK, particularly the Security Service (MI-5) and police Special Branches. He focuses on two issues: 1) the agencies' effectiveness in achieving their objective of "good" intelligence; and, 2) the extent to which their activities abuse the political rights of

[57] Ibid., p. 18.

[58] Ibid., p. 263.

individuals and organizations. Gill's "problem" as he defines it is that there are indications of "almost total absence of political control, let alone democratic oversight of these agencies."[59]

Recognizing that the nature of political systems and their intelligence services reflect each other, Gill develops a multi-layer "Gore-tex" model of the state as a means of analyzing the relationship between: 1) security intelligence agencies and other state institutions, in which the key concept is autonomy; and, 2) security intelligence agencies and society, in which the key concept is penetration. The result is that different degrees and combinations of autonomy and penetration produce various "types" of agency, which typology model, Gill argues, provides "a means of comparing agencies over time and between states."[60] Hence, Gill constructs a Typology of Security Intelligence Agencies (Independent Security State, Political Police, Domestic Intelligence Bureau) — the same labels Keller used, but definitionally different — using the determinants of Autonomy (High, Medium, Low) and Penetration (High, Medium, Low). However, like Keller then, Gill has created a static model of typologies that does not explain the changes necessary to transform from one type to another, and within what type of political context those conditions may be met. Gill's model is shown in Figure 4.5 below.

[59] Op. cit., *Policing Politics*, p. 2.

[60] Ibid., p. 3.

Figure 4.5: A Typology of Security Intelligence Agencies[61]

		PENETRATION		
		High	**Medium**	**Low**
	High	**A** Independent Security State	**B**	**C**
AUTONOMY	**Medium**	**D**	**E** Political Police	**F**
	Low	**G**	**H**	**I** Domestic Intelligence Bureau

Gill thus provides a model that recognizes the importance of the nature of the intelligence/security services' relationship with the state and also with society, although it is more descriptive than explanatory. He also emphasizes the importance of having security intelligence tasks, targets, and methods defined in their mandates in order to reduce the likelihood of abuses. Further, he explores three main concepts — information, power, and law — which, he states, are logically interrelated and central to the study of security intelligence.[62] To this end, he constructs a Model of Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence Agencies, based on Levels of Control/Oversight (internal to the agency, the executive branch, other state bodies, citizens and groups), Form of Control (guidelines, ministerial directions, statutory mandate, party/group positions), Institutions of Control (director, attorney general, legislative assembly, political parties), and Institutions of Oversight (professional responsibility office (FBI), inspector general (CAN), SIRC (CAN) legislative committees (U.S., AUS), public interest groups).[63]

Finally, given his focus on intelligence abuses of political rights, Gill's research shows that if separatism or paramilitary-type political violence is operative within a

[61] Ibid., p. 82.

[62] Ibid., p. 48.

country, then in democratic states, the intelligence/security services' functions include "counterterrorist" activities, which tend to lead to human rights abuses, discriminatory practices, and dirty war tactics in response to the political challenge posed by the violent, state-challenging forces, although these "counterterrorist" activities are predominantly geographically-based. Thus, Gill highlights some important issues worthy of study and which are addressed in this dissertation as they apply to the Russian case and Chechnya, albeit without the assumption of a democratic polity.

4.6: THE BAR-JOSEPH MODEL

Studies that examine the state-intelligence/security relationship, also known as the intelligence-policy relationship, are useful in providing an understanding of the importance of an objective, non-politicized, and professional intelligence service to a democratic state's national security interests. Moreover, political control by democratically-elected civilians is inherent to the intelligence-policy relationship in a democratic polity. Nevertheless, problems can develop when this professional relationship loses its political objectivity. In his 1995 book, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain*, scholar Uri Bar-Joseph investigates the interference by intelligence agencies and individuals with the politics of their own governments in the modern democratic state. He focuses on three questions: 1) Under what conditions will political considerations dominate intelligence work? 2) What motivates intelligence organizations to interfere with the political

---

[63] Uri Bar-Joseph, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain*, The Pennsylvania State University Press: PA, 1992, p. 1.

decisionmaking process? 3) In what ways and by what means do these organizations intervene in politics?[64]

Bar-Joseph concludes that the essential condition for preventing the corruption of the relationship between intelligence organizations and policymakers is maximal separation between intelligence and politics.[65] He compares intelligence-state relations to civil-military relations and on this basis proposes that two variables, professionalism of the intelligence community at the bureaucratic level, and the effectiveness of the control system at the state level, determine the success of intelligence-politics separation. To illustrate the ranges of political control and professionalism, Bar-Joseph constructs a model of Four Methods of Political Control of Intelligence (unilateral-personal, unilateral-constitutional, multilateral-personal, multilateral-constitutional) with the determinants of Participation (unilateral, multilateral) and Means (personal, constitutional).[66] His model is shown in Figure 4.6 below.

Figure 4.6: Four Methods of Political Control of Intelligence[67]

		PARTICIPATION	
		Unilateral	**Multilateral**
MEANS	**Personal**	Unilateral-personal	Multilateral-personal
	Constitutional	Unilateral-constitutional	Multilateral-constitutional

[64] Ibid., p. 2.

[65] Ibid., p. 62.

[66] Ibid., p. 30.

[67] Ibid., p. 62.

Bar-Joseph then constructs a continuum of Four Approaches on the Separation between Intelligence and Politics, with total separation an idealistic approach, high level of separation a professional approach, lower level of separation a realistic approach, and no separation a totalitarian approach.[68] His continuum is shown in Figure 4.7 below.

Figure 4.7: Separation Between Intelligence and Politics: A Continuum of Four Approaches[69]

Total separation	High level of separation	Lower level of separation	No separation
Idealistic approach	Professional approach	Realist approach	Totalitarian approach

While Bar-Joseph's professionalism continuum is useful in assessing the degree of politicization of the intelligence/security services, it fails to shed light on the nature of the relationship, and only depicts degrees of separation. Consequently, one gets no explanation of why/why not separation exists; thus, his analysis is not explanatory; it is descriptive, much like the previously discussed typology models. In any case, the transition of post-communist regimes without question entails an increase in separation (from no separation) between intelligence and politics and, hence, utilizing a continuum to depict movement in various political directions over time is useful. It is indeed of value to understand the nature of intelligence-policy relations; for in the intelligence business, the consumer-producer relationship is of key importance in that it not only affects the extent of the Services' usefulness and effective contribution to a democratic state's national security needs, but provides valuable insight into the political nature of the regime itself.

[68] Ibid., p. 70.

Bar-Joseph constructs another matrix on Intervention as the Outcome of Intelligence-Politics Relations (cross-secting) with the variables of Tendency of Intelligence to Intervene in Politics (low, high) and Tendency of Politics to Intervene in Intelligence (low, high).[70] Notably, in recognition that the Soviet secret police dutifully served its master, the CPSU and Politburo, he places Stalinist Russia in quadrant two (high politics intervention into intelligence and low intelligence intervention into politics).[71] The situation remains the same today under career chekist Putin, who has established his political control over the Services. However, during the Yeltsin era, Russia was more appropriately placed in quadrant four. Bar-Joseph's matrix is shown in Figure 4.8 below.

Figure 4.8: Intervention as the Outcome of Intelligence-Politics Relations

		Tendency of politics to intervene in intelligence	
		LOW	**HIGH**
Tendency of intelligence to	**LOW**	**(1)** Low intervention: Holland Denmark Switzerland	**(2)** Political intervention in intelligence: Nazi Germany Stalinist Russia
intervene in politics	**HIGH**	**(3)** Intelligence intervention in politics: United States – 1961 Israel – 1954 Britain – 1920s	**(4)** Mutual intervention: Most Third World countries

[69] Ibid., p. 30.

[70] Ibid., p. 70.

[71] Ibid.

A final matrix presented by Bar-Joseph, on Intelligence Intervention in Politics: The Critical Conditions, is shown in Figure 4.9 below.

Figure 4.9: Intelligence Intervention in Politics: The Critical Conditions[72]

Level	Variable	High Likelihood of Intervention	Low Likelihood of Intervention
International	Crisis (catalyst)	Present	Not present
State	Type of political control	Loose unilateral	Tight unilateral or multilateral
	National security value	Above other values	Equal to other values
Bureaucratic	Recruitment system	Old boys net (politically biased)	Open and equal (politically unbiased)
Personal	Intelligence leadership	Operational mode	Analytical mode
	Political leadership	No authority; no interest in intelligence	Authoritative; interested in intelligence

In recognition that the establishment of political control of intelligence and democratic oversight and accountability is a condition for a post-communist secret police transformation and democratic political transition, and thus a significant change in the political-intelligence relationship is mandated, I include an in-depth investigation of these issues as they evolved in post-Soviet Russia in chapter nine of the project.

4.7: THE LOS AND ZYBERTOWICZ MODEL

In their 2000 book, *Privatizing the Police-State: The Case of Poland*, Maria Los and Andrzej Zybertowicz ask "how the changes in Poland involving democratization, privatization, and marketization were affected by, and affected, the party/police-state framework within which they occurred. While democracy and a Soviet-style secret police are mutually inimical, the same cannot be said of economic factors and the secret

[72] Ibid., p. 354.

police."[73] Los and Zybertowicz call attention to the role of the secret police and covert action in not only sustaining the communist regime, but also in undermining it, finding that Poland's transformation "involved a series of covertly negotiated revolutions instituted from on high, initially with the apparent support of the KGB."[74] They conclude that the state security apparatus played a central role in the collapse of communism and in the reconstruction of the new political and economic order.

Los and Zybertowicz point out that the chekists and nomenklatura understood the importance of the material base of power.[75] During Soviet times, the nomenklatura had vigorously taken over the second economy, or "black market" (which could also be considered civil society), which economy, in turn, enabled the first (legitimate, central-command economy) to run, covering the shortages and providing basic consumer needs. "Perestroika" could be said to have entailed a restructuring of the national economy through its transfer of state-owned property to communist party officials, chekists, and their relatives and client networks, including organized crime (OC).[76] Los and Zybertowicz examine the processes of the *privatization of the communist state*, with the 'police-state' encompassing: 1) tangible assets, including the police and security apparatus of highly trained personnel, network of informers, material assets and equipment, and secret archives; and, 2) elusive aspects of distinct types of mentality, relationships, and informal social control. In this context, they focus on the role of the

---

[73] Maria Los and Andrzej Zyberowicz, *Privatizing the Police State: The Case of Poland*, Foreword by Gary T. Marx, MacMillan Press, Ltd.: London, 2000, p. xiii.

[74] Ibid., p. xiii.

[75] Ibid., p. 6.

[76] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

secret services in the process of disintegration and systemic transformation, and on that basis, decipher and interpret the intricate processes of their transformation and reconstitution as an important force in the post-communist state and economy.[77] Thus, they center on the secret police transformation process and the institutions' role in that transformation, along with the political transition, within the context of a post-communist state. As they observe, "The study makes clear the fruitful possibilities for comparative research on the role of the secret services in other democratic transitions."[78]

The central thesis of their work is that the trajectories of the East/Central European transformation cannot be properly understood unless the domain of covert actions undertaken by various domestic and foreign actors is seriously considered. The authors subsume a cluster of these actions under the rubric of the privatizing of the police-state process and postulate that that process — shaped largely by covert actions — has provided an invisible structure to other, more apparent processes that constitute the (East/Central European) transformation, such as democratization (especially the party system formation), privatization of the economy, and development of a free market system. Thus, they argue that "the formal and informal power networks that emerged in (and through) the process of privatization of the police-state made possible the subordination of important aspects of the transformation process to the short- and long-term interests of the old system's political elite."[79]

---

[77] Ibid., p. 9.

[78] Ibid., p. xv., 19-20.

[79] Ibid.

In support of this hypothesis, Los and Zybertowicz point out the often overlooked fact that one of the systematic functions of the communist secret police related to their pivotal role in managing the command economy, with their *everyday* supervision of its operation and close monitoring of economic processes, and with every economic institution having its watcher, whose main task was to recruit and cultivate webs of secret informers within the institutions under their guardianship. It is this domain of secret service operations that most facilitated, first, the "power conversion process" in which the communist nomenklatura became economically endowed, or, in which the conversion of political assets into economic ones transpired. They argue that the same secret service operations can be attributed to the second stage of this process, "whereby the nomenklatura, who had initially traded their political capital for economic gains, used these gains to recapture political power."[80] They identify empirical indicators of the privatization of the police state as including such actions as: 1) converting certain of its functions into private appropriation or selective destruction of the contents of immense secret police archives; 2) the participation of the secret services and their agents in large scale privatization schemes that channel state resources to the former nomenklatura networks; and, 3) the infiltration and manipulation of various agendas of political parties and the state.[81]

Finally, Los and Zybertowicz hypothesize that a top-down "negotiated revolution" occurred in Poland, in which power was transferred peacefully in exchange for unencumbered opportunities for advancement of the old regime's power networks'

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid., p. 20.

interests, with the secret services playing a vital role in the process through their provision of intelligence, international contacts, skills, and protection. They show that the political leadership's creation of institutions supporting the image of democracy signified their effort to portray procedural democracy as the reality, including the appearance of intelligence/security services under democratic political control and depoliticized. Yet, they suggest that the reality is that real political control lies with this new oligarchy consisting of "old networks," with power and political control actually exercised through informal networks and non-official structures, including private security services (PSSs) owned and operated by former secret police officials, and with courts and other legal institutions only of symbolic (illusory) democratic value.[82]

They assess that by forging and shaping such a power-sharing arrangement, and engaging the democratic opposition in a reform process, the old Soviet operatives defused responsibility for the inevitable economic hardship, provided legitimacy to the old guard's retaining of positions of power, and kept Western credit lines open. Political parties continue to be manipulated, and are penetrated at all levels in order to secure operational capability to influence their organization, activities, and politics.[83] While in October 2006 Poland dissolved the WSI (military intelligence) and initiated another, much more far-reaching lustration law that is currently in the process of being finalized and implemented,[84] these new changes followed on the Kaczynski brothers' gaining of

---

[82] Ibid., p. 76.

[83] Ibid., pp. 76, 78, 83, 91, 94, 97.

[84] "Geopolitical Diary: Trying to Redefine Poland," February 20, 2007, *http://www.autentico.org/oa09845.php*. For a copy of the government's 374-page report on the WSI that led to its liquidation, see Antoni Macierewicz, the President of the Verification Commission, "WSI Report," http://www.abcnet.com.pl/?q=node/2602.

the presidency and prime minister positions in 2005 and subsequent move toward the West and deepening of its relationship with NATO, illuminated by Warsaw's significant role in Iraq and in U.S. counterterrorism operations.[85] The evidence provided in this dissertation shows that a similar situation, as described by Los and Zybertowicz, occurred in Russia, although with LVD never instituted, political-economic developments were controlled by the chekists to a far greater degree, with a substantially different outcome — a chekist-dominated state and the total reversal of democratic reforms.

4.8: A FINAL WORD ON EXISTING MODELS

What can be generally drawn from the foregoing models/studies is their consistent identification of political control and oversight as key variables in guiding and facilitating a post-communist secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that function in line with the norms associated with and well serve the national security interests of democratic polities. These are key factors in effecting a sustainable secret police transformation. However, assessing the features of the intelligence/security services of a state — which are always reflective of the political regime of that state — in order simply to place them under one of the three intelligence typologies is inadequate, and useful for nothing more than providing them a typological label. Naturally, as an institution created and tasked specifically as a national security support, intelligence/security service functions are adapted to counter new threats that emerge. Regardless, a poignant fact is that it is the *methods* they employ that matter most in terms of democracy, and so, indeed, the issue and nature of political control of intelligence, whether by democratically-elected civilian political leaders who are held accountable by

[85] In March 2005, the U.S. and Poland launched the first joint U.S.-Central Europe counterterror working group.

the people or not, is key to the analysis of both the services' transformation (if there has been one) and the political regime's transition (if there has been one), and the nature and extent of the power and influence, as well as the role, of the intelligence/security services.[86] In short, political-intelligence relations reveal much about the nature of a state, as well as that of the intelligence/security services, because they always mirror each other.

4.9: STATIC TYPOLOGIES AND A LEAP TO COMPLEX MODELS THAT DEPICT DYNAMIC POLITICAL-INTELLIGENCE CHANGE PROCESSES

For all their weaknesses, the various models reviewed in this chapter identify a range of features that characterize the general nature of a variety of intelligence/security services. Some consensus exists on the specific criteria and standards that define the activity parameters and methods of an intelligence/security service that works for democratic and also totalitarian governments, and those regime types in between those two extremes. In order to identify the post-communist secret police transformation process, however, the necessary criteria in both the political and intelligence/security sectors for movement among the different typologies must be clearly denoted and, thus, a dynamic, rather than static, model incorporating a continuum of sorts must be designed. A comprehensive identification of the criteria that make for an intelligence/security transformation permits one to expand on the analytic possibilities that can be derived from the common typology models to devise a dynamic model that incorporates their key features but also the conditions that denote transition among them. A dynamic model

[86] Perhaps a relevant question in this context is whether, in the event there has been a reversal of roles and "former" intelligence/security officers have come to control the political regime state itself, using their old colleagues in the intelligence/security services as a key instrument to support and further the consolidation of their rule, it is necessary to construct a new typology representing this new system formulation for inclusion in the democratic transitions and intelligence literature.

depicting the multiplicity of conditions that must be met and institutionalized for a secret police transformation to transpire, and the identification of the political context in which those changes can feasibly take place is required in order to map the change processes and allow for the determination of whether the identified conditions have been met, as well as those that must be created. From there, the methods and defining features of an intelligence/security service, which always reflect the state's political form, can be identified. Based on these findings, one can assess the extent of transition toward or away from democracy. Indeed, the value in assessing the intelligence/security services of a transitioning state lies not in labeling them with a typology, but, rather, identifying their nature and that of the political regime they serve, and thus the (extent of and) political direction of change. A dynamic model that depicts the parallel change processes can serve as a guide to states seeking to transform their intelligence/security sector and make a political transition to a new type of country, and is particularly useful for those making democratic transitions, and, hence, secret police transformations.

4.10: A NEW AND COMPARATIVE POLITICAL TRANSITION-INTELLIGENCE TRANSFORMATION MODEL

In recognition of the parallels between the nature of a political system and its intelligence/security services, in designing the model, it was necessary to construct a political system typology spectrum parallel to an intelligence/security service transformation spectrum, illustrating the inherent relationship between the two. Thus, the propositions/hypotheses and the independent, intervening (LVD), and dependent variables are depicted in the matrix of parallel spectrums in Figure 4.10 below:

Figure 4.10: Matrix of Parallel Spectrums (Intelligence/Security Sector Transformations and Political System Transitions) and Propositions/Hypotheses

	Concurrent Changes		**IV**	**Intervening Vs**	**DVa**	**DVb**
A	intelligence/security service transformation		secret police	lustration/vetting-verification policy: disqualifies the worst abusers from commanding positions from which they could thwart fundamental organizational and transformational cultural change in intelligence/security methods and mentality	intelligence /security services that operate in line with democratic norms	democratic political system
B	political system transition		collapsed communist political system	lustration/de-communization policy: disqualifies anti-democratic forces from leading political positions from which they could thwart democratization and reverse democratic reforms		democratic political system

I have designed a Model of Political Transition-Intelligence Transformation that depicts the transformation process of an intelligence/security service, which is always reflective of the changes in the nature of a (transitioning) political system. On the *x-axis*, it thus includes a parallel spectrum of intelligence/security service and state typologies, as the transformation of the former inevitably parallels that of the other. The first (parallel) spectrum in the model depicts a range of state typologies and their attributes in order to account for transitory types. The second (parallel) spectrum depicts a range of intelligence/security service typologies and their attributes in order to account for transitory types. The intelligence/security sector transformation range extends from the type that operate in liberal democracies to those identified in totalitarian system, and transitory types operating in between these two extremes. Thus, the model illustrates the two largely concurrent change processes that in every case are closely related.

On the *y-axis*, the necessary preconditions and conditions for an intelligence/security sector transformation are delineated. Below the parallel spectrum, the model incorporates the necessary steps (preconditions and conditions) for a post-communist political system and its secret police to make the changes necessary for a democratic transition. The inclusion of specific state attributes and intelligence roles and methods employed of the change processes enables the analyst to plot changes over time across the spectrum in one direction or another, thus illuminating whether the state is moving toward, or away, from democracy. Further, the model is designed to determine the direction of a state's political system transition over time, based on the nature of the political-intelligence relationship, and methods employed by its intelligence/security services. The preconditions/conditions that denote change are designated at their proper points along the spectrum. Thus, assessing the annotated/identified variables in any country over a period of three consecutive presidential administrations, one can place the state and its intelligence/security services at a particular point on the spectrum and, further, determine in which political direction they are moving, or whether they are static over time.

The model identifies those conditions that signify an intelligence/security service transformation from a secret political police-type intelligence/security service to one that operates in line with democratic norms. This determination, in turn, serves as an important measure of the extent of the success of the state's transition to democracy. That is, whether the intelligence/security services operate in line with established democratic norms sheds light on the nature of the political regime — democratic, or otherwise. What methods the intelligence/security services employ serve as a core determination of their

nature, and shed light on legal, political control, oversight, and personnel issues. To what extent and in what direction on the political spectrum (toward or away from the institution of democratic norms), that an intelligence/security service has transformed, as measured by its powers, functions, methods, political control, oversight and accountability, and organizational culture and mentality, can be discerned in relation to the transitioning political regime. In short, the nature and features of the political-intelligence relationship reflect the intelligence/security sector and political regime types. My Model of Political Transition-Intelligence Transformation is shown in Figure 4.11 below:

Figure 4.11: Model of Political Transition-Intelligence Transformation

STATE TYPOLOGY AND ATTRI-BUTES		DEMO-CRATIC, NO SEPARA-TISM, NO POLITICAL VIOLENCE	NON-DEMO-CRATIC, PRIVA-TIZED POLICE-STATE	TRANSI-TORY, NO SEPARA-TISM, NO PARA-MILITARY POLITICAL VIOLENCE	TRANSI-TORY, SEPARA-TISM, PARA-MILITARY POLITICAL VIOLENCE	AUTHORI-TARIAN, DICTA-TORIAL	COMMUN-IST, TOTALI-TARIAN	COMMUN-IST, TOTALI-TARIAN
	INTEL/ SEC SERVICES TYPOLOGY	INTEL/SEC SERVICES THAT OPERATE IN LINE WITH DEMO-CRATIC NOMS	INTEL/SEC SERVICES OPERATE ACCORD-ING TO "SEMI-NON-DEMOCRA TIC NORMS"	INTEL/SEC SERVICES OPERATE ACCORD-ING TO "SEMI-DEMOCRA TIC" NORMS	POLITICAL POLICE, NON-DEMO-CRATIC NORMS	INDEP-ENDENT SECURITY STATE POLITICAL POLICE, NON-DEMO-CRATIC NORMS	NON-DEMO-CRATIC, SECRET POLICE	NON-DEMO-CRATIC, INDEP-ENDENT SECURITY STATE, TOTALI-TARIAN
PRECON-DITIONS	ATTRI-BUTES							
LUSTRA-TION, VETTING	VETTING, RECRUIT-MENT, LUSTRA-TION	vetting and recruitment that entails detailed background checks, lustration policy		lustration, vetting	attempts to field out abusers rare, protected in order for use in fight against separatists/ dirty war, resources limited, both patronage and merit-based vetting system	a mix of old guard and new recruits, abuse not condoned, but ignored in many cases	extensive and uncontrolled abuses among members, no lustration, based on political loyalties, profession-alism	extensive and uncontrolled abuses among members, no lustration, based on personal loyalties, partisanship
NATIONAL POLITICAL UNITY	RULE OF LAW, STATU-TORY-BASED	subject to the rule of law, based on a legal mandate that outlines their structure, functions, goals, and purposes			sometimes violations of law punished but for political reasons, charter exists, but ambiguous, selectively adhered to, and terms resisted in some quarters	law ignored, no law, non-effective enforcement, set their own agenda, division, work for different masters, private interests	above the law, no enforcement at all, firm political party control	above the law, impunity, firm political control, no law/ lustration
	CIVIL LIBERTIES, DOMESTIC SPYING ON CITIZENS	respect for civil liberties and political freedoms, controls on domestic spying on citizens, warrants required in all cases			attempts to ensure protection of liberties and freedoms, limited spying on citizens, intelligence not used in court, some controls on dealing with terrorists	recognized, but no real concern for, selectively spy on citizens for political and economic reasons, above-the-law in dealing with terrorists	no civil liberties nor political freedoms, an informer society, population control based on fear, terrorism only by state bodies	no civil liberties nor political freedoms, an informer society, population control by fear, terrorism by security bodies

	ARREST/ DETEN-TION POWERS AND LEGAL/ JUDICIARY /LAW ENFORCE-MENT INFLU-ENCE	**lack domestic arrest powers, no control nor influence over police, courts, prosecutors**			**arrest powers in certain cases, efforts to respect legal aspects of, limited influence over police, courts, prosecutors**	**arrest powers in certain cases, influence over police, courts, prosecution**	**full and supreme arrest powers, control over police, courts, prosecutors**	**arrest powers in certain cases, influence over police, courts, prosecution**
	POLITICAL SURVEIL-LANCE OF OPPOSI-TION IN GOVERN-MENT	**a prohibition on political surveillance of the opposition in government, no surveillance**			**political surveillance, effectively controlled by dominant party in power, selectively used**	**opposition exists, political surveillance by various parties and groups in power**	**no political opposition in government exists, surveillance of all officials**	**opposition exists, political surveillance by party-in-power**
	PRIMARY FUNCTION TO INFORM NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND POLICIES	**primary function to provide elected political leaders with objective intelligence to inform policy-making for the protection and furtherance of national security and economic interests, do not make policy (only inform and implement policy)**			**primary function to provide elected political leaders with intelligence according to their needs, whether official or private political-economic interests, play role in making policy in addition to informing and implement-ing policy**	**primary function to provide patrons with intelligence according to their needs, whether official or private political-economic interests, play role in making policy in addition to informing and implement-ing policy**	**primary function to ensure and further party interests, whatever they may be, do not make policy (only inform and implement policy)**	**primary function to provide patrons with intelligence according to their needs, whether official or private political-economic interests, play role in making policy in addition to informing and implement-ing policy**
	POLITICAL CONTROL AND POLITICAL-INTEL RELA-TIONS, PROFES-SION-ALISM AND DEPOLITI-CIZATION	**political control by center, non-politicized, high level of separation of intelligence and politics, profession-alism**			**dual political control, exercised by center and regions, politicized, low level of separation of intelligence and politics, profession-alism**	**political control by center limited, politicized, various masters served in regions, political control fragmented, low level of separation of intelligence and politics, lack of profession-alism**	**political control by center, politicized in support of one-party rule, no separation of intelligence and politics**	**political control by center, politicized, various masters served in regions, low level of separation of intelligence and politics, lack of profession-alism**

	OVER-SIGHT AND DEMO-CRATIC ACCOUNT-ABILITY	**oversight, both internal to agency, and external within the parliament and the free press/media; account-ability**			**oversight bodies internal to agency and external to parliament but only effective internally, severely limited media checks, limited account-ability**	**no oversight outside of executive branch**	**no oversight outside of core of executive branch leadership**	**no oversight outside of executive branch**
	OC AND CORRUP-TION, INTELLI-GENCE EFFECT-IVENESS	**non-politicized investiga-tions and prosecutions, low level of political corruption**			**selective, politicized investiga-tions and prosecutions, high level of official corruption**	**selective, politicized investiga-tions and prosecutions, high level of official corruption**	**corruption inherent to regime, nature of, OC declared not to exist, or selective accusations with summary execution**	**selective, politicized investiga-tions and prosecutions, high level of official corruption**
	ORGANI-ZATIONAL CULTURE AND MENTAL-ITY	**culture and mentality law-based, actively promoted and encouraged**			**mixed culture and mentality, pressure to conform to law-based side**	**mixed culture/ mentality, pressure to conform to secret political police-based side**	**secret political police culture and mentality, actively promoted and encouraged**	**mixed culture/ mentality, pressure to conform to secret political police-based side**

4.11: CONCLUSION

A comparatively useful and dynamic model is produced in which both political transition and intelligence/security service transformation processes can be depicted and the conditions which must be met for each are clearly identified to show where on the spectrum they can be placed, in terms of their meeting the required conditions for each point. This model which I have designed also identifies the minimum changes/measures that are necessary for an intelligence/security service transformation to occur — that is, the clear and unambiguous steps that must be taken to cross the rubicon from one typology to another. Drawing from existing models, I developed a Model of Political Transition-Intelligence Transformation that provides a framework for assessing the transformation process of the intelligence/security sector and the concomitant political

transition process that incorporates the various criteria that define intelligence/security typologies, and builds on their structural bases, but goes further and shows the interrelationship of the two parallel processes.

This comprehensive study of Russia's intelligence/security and political transition in the post-Soviet context goes beyond a mere assessment of whether a secret police transformation and democratic political transition have occurred, and describes and explains the nature of and conditions for each process, as well as illustrating, using empirical evidence, why and how these change processes evolved in the country. Thus, it is more than a descriptive narrative and has explanatory value, just as my dynamic model and spectrum have predictive value. Having covered the theoretical issues and presented my framework, in the next chapter, the contemporary Russian intelligence/security sector structures, functions, and powers are examined in a review of their relative statutory mandates. Thus, the first among the four secondary conditions for a secret police transformation, that the intelligence/security services are based on statutory legal charters, is addressed.

PART TWO: EMPIRICAL REALITIES

CHAPTER FIVE

RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SECTOR FUNCTIONS, STRUCTURES, POWERS, AND STATUTORY MANDATES

5.1: INTRODUCTION

This chapter identifies the contemporary Russian intelligence/security services and outlines their structure, functions, and powers. In the interest of space, only the main services are covered in detail. I examine the mandates of these services and the major changes in their various aspects during the 1996-2004 period in order to show the apparent priorities of the Yeltsin and Putin administrations, and the nature and extent of each regime's intelligence/security sector reforms in terms of identified threat perceptions, functions and powers, depoliticization, professionalization, lines of command and control, oversight and accountability mechanisms, and respect for civil liberties and human rights, each of which are key to a secret police transformation as part of a democratization endeavor.

5.2: POST-SOVIET RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SERVICE STRUCTURES

5.2.1: Preliminaries

Since the Soviet disintegration, there have been a number of structural-organizational changes in the Russian intelligence/security sector. The impetus for these changes has always had a strong political basis and has often been marked by intrigue. In many cases, the chekists themselves have driven the "reform," with the result tending to entail an increase in powers or expansion of their control over the Russian state and society. Currently, the leadership posts of all the so-called power ministries are

dominated by career chekists, particularly former KGB officials from St. Petersburg, Putin's home town. The lack of a lustration/vetting/de-communization (LVD) policy is readily apparent in the nature of the organizational structures, mandates of the Services, power increases, continued Soviet secret police-type functions (and resultant application of KGB methods), politicization and lack of professionalism, lack of oversight and accountability, and the existence and promotion of the same old chekist organizational culture and persistent mentality, all commensurate with a lack of respect for civil liberties/human rights, political freedoms, and the rule of law. In short, total impunity and chekist continuity are the operative descriptives here.

This chapter begins with a section that identifies and briefly outlines the major agencies of the Russian intelligence/security sector and their legal mandates as they evolved over the post-Soviet period, from Yeltsin's first presidential term (1991-1996) — albeit briefly, as the focus of this project is events occurring during the 1996-2004 time frame, through his second (1996-2000) and through Putin's first term as Russian president (2000-2004). It is followed by a more in-depth review of the mandates of key intelligence/security services (FSB, SVR, GRU, FAPSI, and GTK), identifying their legal bases and tasking as far as information is available and deduction permits. The idea is to not only identify the various structures of the Russian intelligence/security services and their tasking, but also, while recognizing that what is on paper does not necessarily reflect reality, illuminate the political direction of the state through an examination of the changes in their charters over time in order to depict progression or digression from the legal bases of what are universally considered the features of democratic states' intelligence/security services, rather than those that mark the continuation of an

authoritarian regime's secret political police. Thus, to a limited degree, as it is only the legal documentation and not the practice as employed on the ground that is covered here in this chapter, the political direction of the transformation may be illuminated. In short, this chapter presents the structures, functions, leadership, and power aspects of the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security sector in terms of the legal mandates and explains the changes and continuities, and impetuses for them, over time.

5.2.2: Russian Intelligence/Security Sector Structures (1991-1996), Yeltsin's First Term

In her 1996 book, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Amy Knight describes the numerous changes in the organization of the Soviet/Russian intelligence/security services during the period from 1991 to September 1995, including: The KGB's First Chief Directorate (FCD) (foreign intelligence) became the Foreign Intelligence Service, with Yevgeni Primakov appointed its chief. More specifically, as this author notes in (1997) *The Changing Face of the KGB*,[1] in September 1991 the foreign intelligence service (FIS) was made an independent entity in order to ensure the survival of its "federal" or "All-Union" status after the failed August 1991 coup attempt led by KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, and was named the USSR Central Intelligence Service (Tsentralnaya Sluzhba Razvedky, or TsSR), with Yevgeni Primakov in early November 1991 replacing Lt. Gen. Leonid Shebarshin, the FIS's first director, who was in political terms, "problematic" at the time given his ardent anti-reform stance. As Vadim Bakatin, tasked by Yeltsin to dismantle the KGB in late 1991, observed of the separation of the FCD from the KGB, breaking up the FIS or decentralizing its control to

[1] Julie Anderson, *The Changing Face of the KGB*, Master's Thesis, UMI Press: MI, August 1997.

the republics would have, in effect, virtually destroyed it.[2] The new FIS consisted of the KGB FCD, and, further, to handle the new economic situation arising from the transition from a central-command economy, "assumed the former KGB Sixth Directorate's functions of economic counterintelligence and industrial security."[3] In August 1992, the TsSR was renamed the Sluzhba Vneshny Razvedky (SVR), with Yeltsin retaining Primakov as its director. To date, Russia's FIS is known as the SVR, and along with the GRU (military intelligence), has remained remarkably consistent in its functions, structures, leadership, and operations relative to other former KGB directorates.

The KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD) (counterintelligence), Third Chief Directorate (military counterintelligence), Fourth Directorate (transportation security), Directorate for Protecting the Constitution (anti-terrorism, ethnic conflicts, etc.), which directorate was the successor to the notorious dissident-hunting KGB Fifth Directorate, plus the Sixth Directorate (economic crime and corruption), and Seventh Directorate (surveillance) were merged into a Ministry of Security (MB) from January 1992 to December 1993. During that period, the MB was under the directorship of Viktor Barannikov from January 1992 to July 1993 and Nikolai Golushko from July 1993 to December 1993. At that point in time, the MB was renamed the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), remaining under Golushko's control until February 1994, when Sergei Stepashin was appointed to head the agency. In April 1995, the FSK was renamed the Federal Security Service (FSB), remaining under Stepashin's control until July 1995, when GUO Chief Mikhail Barsukov was appointed FSB director, and

---

[2] Michael J. Waller, *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*, Westview Press, Inc., 1994, p. 86.

[3] Ibid., p. 20.

whose transfer also brought the Alfa counterterrorist unit to the FSB.[4] To date, the main domestic intelligence service remains the FSB (albeit with greatly enhanced powers).

The KGB Eighth Chief Directorate (communications) was renamed the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), with Aleksandr Starovoitov appointed its chief. The KGB Ninth Directorate (guards) was divided into two agencies, the Presidential Security Service (SBP) under Aleksandr Korzhakov, and the Main Guard Directorate (GUO), placed under Barsukov's control from January 1992 to July 1995, when Yuri Krapivin replaced him as its chief. Also at that time, in a reversal in the wake of Barsukov's and Alfa's transfer to the FSB, the GUO was made subordinate to the Presidential Security Service (SBP) (which had been subordinate to the GUO until November 1993). Thirteen days before the scheduled July 3, 1996 run-off election between Yeltsin and Zyuganov (Yeltsin had only garnered 35 percent of the vote in the initial June 16, 1996 presidential election), as a result of political struggles and intrigues between Presidential Chief-of-Staff Anatoli Chubais and, on the other side, Barsukov and Korzhakov, Yeltsin fired the latter two after they arrested two of Chubais's campaign aides who were taking $500,000 out of the White House and interrogated them for eleven hours before releasing them. Veteran chekist Nikolai Kovalev was appointed acting FSB director, and the SBP was folded back into the GUO, the latter to which Krapivin was appointed chief.[5] It followed on June 20, 1996 that Yeltsin renamed the GUO the Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrany (FSO), remaining under Krapivin's control while

[4] Ibid., p. 42.

[5] Ibid., p. 43.

also making him acting SBP chief. On July 2, 1996, one day before the run-off election, Yeltsin merged the FSO and SBP, and named the new agency the State Protection Service (GSO).[6]

The old Soviet KGB Fifteenth Directorate (Security of Government Installations) was transformed into the Main Directorate of Special Programs (GUSP). Presidential Edict No. 551 of April 15, 1996 made changes to the organization, and Presidential Edict No. 1025s of August 31, 1998 became the superseding statute on the agency. The GUSP is responsible for peacetime operation, maintenance, and security of a network of leadership bunkers designed for reliable continuity of government operations during wartime and national emergencies.[7]

The KGB Border Guards were renamed the Committee for the Protection of the Russian Border, a designation that changed after the agency's first chief, Ilya Kalinichenko, was replaced by Vladimir Shliakhtin in June 1992. At that time, it was renamed the Border Troops and placed under the MB. In July 1993, Andrei Nikolaev replaced Shliakhtin as chief. Finally, in December 1993, the agency was renamed the Federal Border Service.[8] They would be folded into the FSB in 2003 as part of Putin's reorganization and significant strengthening of the Service in the run-up to the Duma elections and his own reelection campaign, and in preparation for his second term in

---

[6] Ibid., p. 45.

[7] See http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/fbis/GUSP.html and "A Sourcebook on the Russian Federation Main Directorate of Special Programs (GUSP) and its Special Installations Service (SSO), Version of 2006-11-14, located at http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:agAuimSjp8sJ:www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/gusp.pdf+GUSP&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=6&client=firefox-a.

[8] Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1996, p. 35.

office, when the chekist-dominated state he had constructed during his first presidential term would be consolidated.

As the 1991-1996 period is beyond the scope of this project, for an in-depth review of the causes and consequences of the reorganizations taking place during that time, the reader is referred to other works,[9] which cover in detail the changes and continuities of the Soviet/Russian intelligence services from 1991-1996, Yeltsin's first term as Russian Federation (RF) president. The impact of the collapse of communism on the Services and the immediate post-Soviet responses to it are also examined in detail in those sources. In a relevant aside, it is worth pointing out that in September 2005, as reported by independent defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, "Putin again stated that in the mid-90s our military, security and intelligence services were deeply demoralized."[10] As the evidence presented in this dissertation shows, over the period 1996-2004, that situation changed radically.

5.2.3: Russian Intelligence/Security Sector Structures (1996-2000), Yeltsin's Second Term

In light of the foregoing developments in intelligence/security sector structures, functions, and powers, when in June 1996 Yeltsin won reelection as RF president, the Russian intelligence community included a number of Services, including:[11]

- Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), the Federal Security Service (domestic intelligence);
- Sluzhba Vneshni Razvedki (SVR), the Foreign Intelligence Service;
- Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), the Main Intelligence

---

[9] Ibid; and, Julie Anderson, *The Changing Face of the KGB*, Master's Thesis, UMI Press: MI, August 1997.

[10] Pavel Felgenhauer, "No Results, Just Promises," *The Moscow Times*, October 4, 2005, p. 11.

[11] "Soviet/Russian Intelligence Agencies," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/index.html.

Directorate (military intelligence);
- Federalnoya Agentsvo Pravitel Stvennoye Sviazi (FAPSI), the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information, (ELINT, SIGINT);
- State Protection Service (GSO);
- Federalnaya Pogranichnaya Sluzhba (FPS), the Federal Border Service;
- Main Directorate of Special Programs of the Russian President (GUSP);[12] and,
- Ministerstvo Vnutrenikh Del (MVD), the Ministry of the Interior.

5.2.4: Russian Intelligence/Security Sector Structures (2000-2004), Putin's First Term

When Vladimir Putin was appointed acting president on December 31, 1999 following Yeltsin's New Year's Eve resignation, the Russian intelligence/security sector structure consisted of the aforementioned Services, plus the newly created Federal Tax Police and Audit Chamber: [13]

- Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), the Federal Security Service;
- Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR), the Foreign Intelligence Service;
- Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), the Main Intelligence Directorate;
- Federalnoya Agentsvo Pravitel Stvennoye Sviazi (FAPSI), the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information;
- Gosudarstvennoy Sluzhba Okhrani (GSO), the State Protection Service;
- Federalnaya Pogranichnaya Sluzhba (FPS), the Federal Border Service;
- Main Directorate of Special Programs of the Russian President (GUSP);
- Ministerstvo Vnutrenikh Del (MVD), the Ministry of the Interior;
- Federal Tax Police; and,
- The Audit Chamber.

a) FSB Structural Changes and Power Increases, 2000

While still acting RF President, Putin enhanced FSB powers in regard to military counterintelligence, basically returning the KGB's old Third Chief Directorate (military counterintelligence) to the domestic intelligence service. On February 7, 2000, he signed

---

[12] "Intelligence Community Celebrates Its Soviet Origins," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 45, December 2002, p. 5.

[13] Ibid.

Presidential Decree No. 318, "On departments (divisions) of FSB in armed forces," extending the powers of Special divisions in securing the RF Armed Forces, other forces, military formations and bodies (security bodies in forces). The decree provided that Security bodies in forces have the authority to establish confidential relations with informers who consented to cooperation in resolving tasks and gave Army Special divisions responsibility for the drug business, organized crime and corruption, illegal turnover of arms, ammunition, explosive and toxic agents, and the special technical means for the private receipt of information.[14] Further, and reflecting newly elected RF President Putin's focus on the situation in Chechnya, on April 18-20 during meetings of the Council of Leaderships of Security Bodies (SROB) and special services, SNG a decision was made to create an antiterrorist center of the CIS states, with Maj. Gen. Boris Mylnikov, first chief deputy of the FSB's terrorism control department, proposed as the candidate to lead it.[15]

It followed that after six months in office, on June 17, 2000 Putin issued Presidential Decree No. 1109, changing the FSB structure. This reorganization entailed the addition of one first deputy, a new post of state-secretary (FSB Academy Director Vladimir Shultz), one ordinary deputy, and six posts of director deputies in rank of department chief. Reflecting the growing need for positive image purveyance, an assigned responsibility of the new state-secretary post entailed interaction with the external world, including representation of the Service's interests in mass media (propaganda, authorities, etc.). Prior to the issuance of this decree, these tasks had been

---

[14] "History of state security," *agentura.ru*, October 10, 2000.

[15] Ibid.

formally carried out by the director of the former FSB programs promotions directorate.[16]

Nearly one month later, on July 12, 2000 and in light of the FSB responsibility for counterintelligence and criminality control, Putin signed additional decrees creating two more FSB directors' deputies appointments, with Rashid Nurgaliev, a former contraband and drug industry control chief, appointed, as well as Oleg Vladimirovich Syromolotov, a former counterintelligence division chief.[17] Finally, on December 20, 2000 (Chekists' Day), Federal Tax Police Director Vyacheslav Soltaganov said that a newly planned intelligence service would in fact be only an analysis center.[18] No other significant organizational changes in the intelligence/security sector occurred during Putin's first year as president.

b) March 2001 Personnel Changes

Most of the changes made during Putin's second year as president were in appointments, personnel, functions, and powers, rather than structures. After a year in office as RF president, in March 2001, Putin shuffled many of his top security officials who had been retained from the Yeltsin era with close allies hailing from his hometown of St. Petersburg. Sergei Ivanov, of the former KGB FCD, a close Putin ally, and Security Council Secretary replaced Igor Sergeev as Defense Minister; Vladimir Rushailo (a Yeltsin "Family" appointee) replaced Sergei Ivanov as Security Council Secretary; and, Boris Gryzlov (a St. Petersburg politician) replaced Rushailo as Interior Minister. Further, Natural Resources Minister Boris Yatskevich and Nuclear Energy Minister

---

[16] "New Deputies in FSB," *agentura.ru*.

[17] "FSB - Federal Security Service," *agentura.ru.*

[18] "Putin Sees New Role for Secret Services," *RFE/RL Newsline*, December 21, 2000, pp. 1-2.

Yevgeny Adamov (the latter allegedly implicated in shady business surrounding a $12 billion project to import and process spent nuclear fuel and, further, arrested by the Swiss in May 2005[19] on a U.S.-issued extradition request for embezzling $9 million of U.S. aid meant to improve Russian nuclear security during his 1996 to 2001 tenure as nuclear power minister,[20]) were also replaced.[21]

c) 2002 Structures at a Glance

Following all of the preceding changes, in 2002 the Russian intelligence/security services included:[22]

- Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), the Federal Security Service;
- Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR), the Foreign Intelligence Service;
- Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), the Main Intelligence Directorate;
- Federalnoya Agentsvo Pravitel Stvennoye Sviazi (FAPSI), the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information;
- Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrani (FSO), the Federal Protection Service; (Putin renamed, from GSO-State Protection Service);
- Federalnaya Pogranichnaya Sluzhba (FPS), the Federal Border Service;
- Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD), the Ministry of the Interior;
- Federal Tax Police;
- Audit Chamber;
- Main Directorate of Special Programs of the Russian President (GUSP);[23]
- State Committee for Controlling the Turnover of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances; and,
- Federal Investigation Service.

---

[19] Oksana Yablokova, "Adamov Arrested at U.S. Request," *The Moscow Times*, May 5, 2005, p. 1.

[20] "Adamov Hires Bill Clinton's Former Lawyer," *The Moscow Times*, October 5, 2005, Issue 3267, p. 3.

[21] Virginie Coulloudon, "Putin's Anticorruption Reforms," *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*," Dale R. Herspring, ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: USA, 2003, p. 90.

[22] "Intelligence Community Celebrates Its Soviet Origins," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 45, December 2002, p. 5.

[23] Ibid.

d) The March 11, 2003 Reorganization

In a January 31, 2003 annual address to senior FSB officials in Moscow, Putin set out the domestic intelligence service's (FSB) priorities, which remained largely unchanged, including: protecting the state and society from external and internal threats, defending the rights of citizens, and ensuring national security. He said, "In first place stands the fight against terrorism in all its forms." He also called on the Service to do everything within its means to facilitate the upcoming referendum on a new constitution in Chechnya, noting that the FSB has available "uniquely powerful tools," which use must "correspond to the contemporary development of political, economic, and social processes in Russia." Given the historical and current political realities in Russia, one could interpret that request as meaning most fundamentally the manipulation of the electoral process in line with Kremlin preferences. Finally, recognizing a lack of professionalism in the Service, Putin also insisted the FSB take measures to improve that of its officers.[24]

The following day, he held a closed door meeting with top security officials to discuss "current issues of Russia's internal and external policies" that entailed a restructuring of the intelligence/security sector. In attendance were Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, Presidential Administration Head Aleksandr Voloshin, and Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo.[25] Six weeks later, on March 11, 2003 Putin announced the changes at a cabinet meeting, explaining that they were aimed at

---

[24] "President Gives FSB Its 2003 Marching Orders...And Meets With Security Chiefs," *RFE/RL Newsline*, February 3, 2003.

[25] Ibid.

increasing efficiency between government agencies in the fight against terrorism and the growing drug problem, stating, "we can't say that the government structures are acting efficiently enough and duly coordinating their efforts in this very important sphere."[26] The end result of this reorganization was a significant strengthening of the FSB, which pattern of increasing FSB powers in the name of countering terrorism would continue throughout Putin's tenure.

To follow up on his March announcement of the proposed changes, in April 2003 Putin signed a number of decrees and directives formally reorganizing the Russian intelligence/security services, notably done in an election season, only months before the December 2003 State Duma and March 2004 presidential elections. While some of the 2003 changes could be made through presidential decrees, others required amendments to the law, which bills Putin sent to the State Duma along with another package of bills to liberalize the new Criminal Procedure Code. The March 2003 intelligence/security sector changes included the following:

The **Federal Tax Police** was disbanded and its tax crime/fraud and investigation duties/functions transferred to the MVD, while its buildings, funding, and equipment, and 40,000 employees/personnel (infrastructure and staff) were transferred to a new anti-drug agency, the State Committee for Controlling the Turnover of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances (see below). Its former head, Mikhail Fradkov (2001-2003), retained his minister's ranking and was appointed in June 2003 as Russia's envoy (plenipotentiary representative of Russia) to the European Union, in Brussels, Belgium. On March 1, 2004 Putin appointed Fradkov to replace Igor Ivanov as Prime Minister, while Ivanov was

[26] "Russia's Putin Announces Gov't Shakeup," *The New York Times*, March 11, 2003.

moved to the post of Security Council Secretary.[27] On October 6, 2007 Putin appointed Fradkov as SVR director, with Viktor Zubkov, a long-time loyalist who headed the country's financial monitoring service and had served as the president's deputy when he chaired the external relations department in St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak's office during the 1990s, replacing him as prime minister.[28]

The **Federal Border Guards** were transferred to the FSB, to be headed by deputy FSB director and former border guard who was in charge of rescue operations headquarters during the Dubrovka hostage crisis in October 2002, Vladimir Pronichev (he also led the Beslan crisis headquarters).[29] Its former head, Gen. Konstantin Totsky, was appointed as Russia's ambassador to NATO, in Brussels, Belgium.

Part of **FAPSI** was transferred to the FSB, and part went to the Defense Ministry. Its (FAPSI's) former director, Col. Gen. Vladimir Matyukhin, was appointed first deputy defense minister and to head a new committee, the **State Committee for Government-Guaranteed Defense Order**, created under the Defense Ministry, in charge of weapons procurement for the "power agencies," and tasked by Putin to serve as the unified state customer of conventional weapons[30] (in charge of weapons industries). To carry out his responsibilities, Matyukhin would work closely with intelligence/security service chiefs. At this juncture, it is worth noting the relationship that existed between FAPSI and the

---

[27] "Mikhail Fradkov, prime minister," *RFE/RL*, http://www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection/bio/fradkov.asp.

[28] Adrian Blomfield, "Russia stunned by Vladimir Putin's choice," *Telegraph.co.uk*, September 13, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/12/wrussia312.xml.

[29] Simon Saradzhyan, "Putin Lashes Out at the U.S.," *The Moscow Times*, September 8, 2004.

[30] "Putin on reorganizing law-enforcement authorities," *RosBusinessConsulting*, March 11, 2003, and republished in *The Moscow Times*, March 11, 2003.

Central Election Commission (CEC)[31] and its head, Alexander Veshnyakov, who controlled the commission's mainframe computer and is an old FAPSI operative.

As noted, along with the disbanding of the Federal Tax Police, a new federal anti-drug law enforcement agency that Putin had ordered created in September 2002 to fight the growing drug problem, the **State Committee for Controlling the Turnover of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances** was created, with a staff of approximately 40,000 who were transferred from the Federal Tax Police (the Interior Ministry's anti-drug unit is staffed with approximately 7000 people). Career chekist Lt. Gen. Viktor Cherkesov is Putin's personal and loyal friend, a former Leningrad region FSB chief who for most of the 1990s headed the St. Petersburg FSB and under whose watch that agency built the treason case against Alexander Nikitin.[32]

According to Nikolai Petrov, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center, this far-reaching 2003 reorganization presented the leading chekists-siloviki with the opportunity to screen out "unreliable" employees without expending many resources in the process.[33] The powers of the new anti-drug agency encompassed the fight against drug-trafficking and crimes associated with that business, such as money laundering. Further, it has been reported that the unit is to coordinate drug-fighting efforts among various federal and regional law enforcement organizations.[34] With Cherkesov at the service's head, it was expected to expand its responsibilities, which it did over the next

---

[31] See the CEC Web site at http://www.cikrf.ru/m_menu_i.htm.

[32] Oksana Yablokova, "Report: Cherkesov to Move to Moscow," *The Moscow Times*, March 11, 2003, p. 3.

[33] Anatoly Medetsky, "Dissecting Siloviki's Pyramid Of Power," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 24, 2003, p. 1.

[34] Op. cit., "Report: Cherkesov to Move to Moscow."

few years, with it operations reaching across the Central Asian region, especially Tajikistan, and into Afghanistan and surrounding areas.[35]

The new **Federal Investigations Service** was originally intended to be similar to the American FBI, and was to be the only federal agency with investigative powers.[36] However, such drastic change was not forthcoming. Rather, it was sectioned off to the FSB from the MVD in 2004, and made a directorate. **The FSB Investigation Directorate** is currently headed by acting chief, Yury Anisimov, whose appointment marked the end to a bizarre history surrounding the directorate's leadership. Sergei Balashov had headed the directorate during the time of the Edmond Pope case (see chapter seven), supervising it personally. Following his tenure, Viktor Mylnichenko had headed the directorate until FSB personnel officials discovered that he was a Ukrainian passport holder. How he gained the leadership post remains a mystery and certainly an embarrassment to the FSB. Commenting on the changes, Kremlin-connected political analyst Sergei Markov observed that in the immediate aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup attempt the country faced no security threats but did face a threat to democracy from the KGB, "today, the priorities have changed. The main threat now is a security threat. And while we should not disregard any threat to democracy, this should be resolved by making civil society stronger and not by making the security agencies weaker."[37]

---

[35] "Afghan, Tajik Offices for Drug Agency," *The Moscow Times*, February 28, 2007, Issue 3605, p. 3.

[36] Op. cit., "Report: Cherkesov to Move to Moscow."

[37] Andrei Zolotov, Jr., "President Reshuffles the Security Agencies," *The Moscow Times*, March 12, 2003, p. 1.

After these changes took effect, the Russian intelligence/security sector consisted of the aforementioned Services, plus the State Committee for Controlling the Turnover of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, a newly created Service. The planned Federal Investigations Service was folded into the FSB, and no longer were there a separate Federal Tax Police, FAPSI, or FPS. Notably, the SVR was the only former KGB branch that now remained outside FSB control, along with the President's Federal Protective Service (FSO) (the former Ninth (Guards) Directorate of the KGB), the latter soon integrated into the FSB as well. Thus, the intelligence/security sector consisted of:[38]

- Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), the Federal Security Service;
- Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR), the Foreign Intelligence Service;
- Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), the Main Intelligence Directorate;
- Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrani (FSO) the Federal Protection Service;
- Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (MVD), the Ministry of the Interior;
- Audit Chamber;
- Main Directorate of Special Programs of the Russian President (GUSP); and,
- State Committee for Controlling the Turnover of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances.

e) The 2004 FSB Reorganization

In January 2004 Putin gave another speech to the FSB on the Service's priorities. In attendance were Presidential Administration Head, Dmitry Medvedev (who replaced Voloshin after the latter's resignation in the wake of the October 2003 arrest of oligarch and Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky), FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov, SVR Director Sergei Lebedev, Supreme Court Chairman

[38] "Soviet/Russian Intelligence Agencies," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/index.html.

Vyacheslav Lebedev, and Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo.[39] Changes, outlined below, soon followed.

Just days before the presidential election (held on March 14, 2004 with Putin receiving 71.2% of the vote), on March 9, 2004 Putin issued Presidential Edict No. 314, *O sisteme i strukture federalnykh organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti*, subordinating the Russian intelligence services to the Justice Ministry.[340] Given the chekist propensity for requiring total control, and with the Kremlin under chekist control, this action signaled that the judiciary would be completely reined in and controlled by the executive branch, with pertinent legislation (changes in the rules on judicial appointments and removals and reorganization of the court system) following this administrative reform. Clearly, the Justice Ministry was expected to play a key role in supporting and furthering Putin's prerogatives in his second presidential term, particularly that of backstop to the consolidation of a chekist-dominated state.

It followed that four months after winning reelection, on July 11, 2004 Putin issued another decree reorganizing the FSB. This decree mandated that the FSB director was allowed one first deputy (the head of the Border Service with the rank of first deputy) and two deputies. Additionally, FSB departments were abolished and replaced with services, a reduction in status, albeit in name only. As Andrei Soldatov of *Moscow News* reported, many of the provisions only amount to a facelift, with mere changes in

---

[39] Yelena Shishkunova, "Putin puts his faith in security service," G*azeta.ru*, January 16, 2004.

[40] The decree is Presidential Edict No. 314, *O sisteme i strukture federalnykh organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti*, issued on March 9, 2004. See the *Nuclear Threat Initiative*'s Web site, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/ministry.htm#fsb.

titles and all else remaining the same.[41] Thus, to provide some insight on the nature and scope of the contemporary FSB, pivotal as the Service is and has been in Russia's political-economic development, the FSB's leadership and structure at that time are outlined below:

Top Leadership:

- **Director** – **Nikolai Patrushev**
- **First deputy – Viktor Pronichev** (Border Service)
- **First deputy** – **Sergei Smirnov**, widely tipped as next FSB director should Patrushev be appointed deputy prime minister
- **Deputy** – **Vyacheslav Ushakov**, was appointed state-secretary in fall 2003
- **Deputy** – **Vladimir Anisimov**

Services:

- **Counterintelligence Service – Oleg Syromolotov**
- **Service for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight Against Terrorism** – **Aleksandr Bragin**, since June 2003 the deputy head of the Counterterrorism Department, and before that chief of the FSB Chelyabinsk Oblast Directorate – (Has a new subdivision: the **International Terrorism Control Directorate**, for "wiping out militants abroad" as Putin mandated in the wake of Beslan[42] – Maj. Gen. **Yury Sapunov**, status of deputy chief of the service, former chief of FSB Astrakhan Oblast Directorate, former first deputy of Current Operations and Coordination Directorate for the North Caucasus (OKU)
- **Economic Security Service – Aleksandr Bortnikov**, who in 2003 replaced Yury Zaostrovtsev as chief (there is also an FSB **Economic Counterintelligence Directorate**, created in 1997, and possibly still headed by Lt. Gen. **Vladimir Tsekhanov**)
- **Border Service – Viktor Pronichev** (this service is being shaped from a linear Structure of border protection to point/area protection, meaning from 10 regional border directorates to seven, in line with the number of federal districts, with each having two or three territorial directorates
- **Organizational and Personnel Service – Yevgeny Lovyrev** is chief of this structure responsible for FSB personnel policy

---

[41] Andrei Soldatov, "FSB Reform: Changes Are Few and Far Between," *agentura.ru*, special to the *Moscow News*, October 6, 2004, http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/fsbreform/.

[42] In October, FSB Director Patrushev stated that, "Russian special secret services will be given powers to carry out preventive attacks on terrorists' bases not only on Russia's territory, but even abroad." Putin simply followed up on that request. See "Redgrave hit by Russian rent-a-mob," *Security and Intelligence Digest*, Part Six, from Glenmore Trenear-Harvey, January 4, 2005.

- **The Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning Service – Viktor Komogorov** is head of this FSB thinktank

- **Control Service** (formerly the FSB Inspectorate, the FSB internal counterintelligence agency that MVD Chief **Rashid Nurgaliev** formerly headed) **-- Aleksandr Zhdankov**, former head of the Directorate for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight Against Terrorism now under Bragin
- **Science and Technical Service** – **Nikolai Klimashin**

Directorates:

- **Military Counterintelligence – Aleksandr Bezverkhny**, promoted in June 2004 to the rank of colonel general (a three-star general) (was formerly headed by Col. Gen. **Aleksei Molyakov,** who oversaw prosecutions of Grigory Pasko and Aleksandr Nikitin)

- **Investigation Directorate – Yury Anisimov**, Acting Chief (this directorate was formerly headed by **Viktor Milchenko** until it was found he was a Ukrainian passport holder and not a Russian citizen, and before him, **Sergei Balashov** was head, supervising the Edmond Pope case)

Other Directorates also exist, including:

- **FSB Current Operations and Coordination Directorate for the North Caucasus (OKU)**, which comprises a special task service that locals call "death squads," presumably under Bragin's Service for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight Against Terrorism
- **FSB Directorate for Coordination of Counterterrorism Operations**, also presumably under Bragin's Service for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight Against Terrorism
- The **regional (MVD) Antiterrorism Operation Headquarters (ROSh)**, **is under the command of an FSB official**, **Arkady Yedelev** (and previously Rear Admiral **Yury Maltsev** until September 16, 2004, who in 2003 moved from the Directorate for Coordination of Counterterrorism Operations to the MVD with the rank of deputy minister), although formally part of the MVD structure

In sum, over Putin's first presidential term, the FSB, his main support base, became significantly more powerful, regaining those structures and functions that had been divided up with the 1991 dilution of the old Soviet KGB's power, with the exception of the FIS. By 2004, the FSB had become far more powerful than its omnipresent KGB predecessor, with the stage set going into Putin's second presidential

term for the (re)establishment of a modern form of Stalinist state under the full control of the ruling chekists, who had managed to gain control of the state's vast natural resources, their wealth and power bolstered by high oil and gas prices and massive arms sales, the primary Russian exports.

5.3: THE RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Its origin outlined in the March 5, 1992 federal law "On Security,"[43] the Security Council was created to serve as the coordinating body for the Russian intelligence/security sector. It was also made responsible for formulating military doctrine and other strategic doctrines and concepts. The extent to which it has in practice exercised these powers and executed these tasks has varied with its leadership primarily, and then its leading membership.

Most fundamentally, the Security Council is composed of five permanent members, including the Russian President, who serves as its chair and may constitutionally appoint new members, the Security Council Secretary, Prime Minister, Kremlin Chief of Staff, Interior Minister, State Duma Speaker, Federation Council Speaker, and Nuclear Power Minister, plus 16 additional members, including the Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, FSB Director, SVR Director, GRU Chief, and key others, including agency heads.[44] In late May 2000, Putin promised to promote his seven new envoys (five of seven of who were intelligence and military officers) to the Security Council, thus giving them the same level of rank as top government ministers. True to his

[43] See the Russian Security Council Web site at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/history.shtml.

[44] For a current listing, see "Security Council of the Russian Federation (Состав Совета Безопасности Российской Федерации)," http://www.scrf.gov.ru/personnels/members.shtml.

word, a month later, in June 2000 Putin signed a decree appointing the seven envoys to the Security Council.

Before becoming acting president on December 31, 1999, Putin held the post of Security Council Secretary for a brief period in 1999.[45] Before him, and Security Council Secretary from November 1999 to March 2001 when he was appointed defense minister (and thus serving as Putin's first Security Council Secretary), Sergei Ivanov transformed the body from a consultative body to a policy-making one,[46] reflective of Putin's desire to strengthen the Council from its status of a weak, advisory body that it had been under Yeltsin's tenure.[47] Yet, with Ivanov's appointment to defense minister, the Council's political influence progressively declined; it has to an extent become a slot for displaced and removed officials. For example, Putin appointed ex-governor of Primorye, Yevgeni Nazdratenko, an old crony of Korzhakov and an enemy of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, as deputy head of the Security Council, only three months after Kasyanov had suspended him from the post of State Fisheries Committee head.[48] Kasyanov, himself, was dismissed in March 2004. The Security Council has originated a number of doctrines that have been approved by Putin, including the National Security Concept approved in January 2000, the Military Doctrine of the RF approved in April 2000, the Information Security Doctrine (an extension of the National Security Concept) approved in September

---

[45] Anna Badkhen, "Envoys Promoted To Putin's Council," *The Moscow Times*, May 26, 2000. Also, see the Kremlin's Web site, at http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/institut04.shtml.

[46] Simon Saradzhyan, "Ivanov Stars in a Secret Memo," *The Moscow Times*, December 25, 2002, p. 1.

[47] Op. cit., "Envoys Promoted To Putin's Council."

[48] "Putin finds place for Kasyanov's arch-foe," *Johnson's Russia List*, #7167, May 5, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7167-14.cfm.

2000, the Naval Doctrine approved in July 2001, and the Foreign Policy Concept of 2000.

When former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was appointed as Security Council secretary in March 2004, some commentators suggested that the move may indicate a shift in Council functions from domestic to international security issues, thus revitalizing the body, as the following month, on April 26, 2004, Putin approved a new statute on the Security Council administration. While the membership basically remained unchanged, Putin indicated he would like to see the Council's powers increased, more along the lines of the U.S. National Security Council, which new Secretary Ivanov had been studying as a potential model. Security Council tasks include strategic planning, with a focus on national security and economic competitiveness. Ivanov noted that while the roles of the two states' Security Councils were similar, responsible for preparing recommendations on national security considering domestic, foreign, and military factors, he observed that the organization and functioning of the two bodies differ. He stated that the body's permanent members would begin meeting weekly to discuss operative issues, while an expanded session would be held on a quarterly basis, to discuss broader problems of a conceptual nature. In addition, there was a proposal to hold regular strategic planning sessions to prepare decisions on Russian development and security problems. Reportedly, there will also be several interagency commissions.

Finally, some experts have suggested that the Security Council be tasked to coordinate Moscow's anti-terrorist activities. Currently, the Federal Anti-Terrorist Commission (FAK) has that responsibility, while the Russian Cabinet of Ministers sets up federal or regional staffs to counter individual terrorist threats. On July 5, 2004,

Justice Minister Yuri Chaika presented Putin with the draft of new legislation on combating terrorism to replace Russia's 1998 law on terrorism. In the new draft, the Russian president would retain his role at the head of the fight on terror, but the FAK would not only coordinate, but have the power to set up staffs, issue orders, etc. The MVD, FSB, Defense Ministry, and FPS were designated as the lead agencies in the fight against terror, however, the draft continued to undergo changes.[49]

Security Council Secretaries:

- **March 2004 - present, Igor Ivanov**, former Foreign Minister, joined Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1973, spent next decade in Spain. In 1991, appointed ambassador to Madrid, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 11, 1998
- **March 2001 - March 2004, Vladimir Rushailo**, former FIO, spent years in England, retired from SVR in August 1999, retained as Interior Minister by Putin in May 2000 reappointments
- **November 1999 - March 2001, Sergei Ivanov**, former FIO, appointed Defense Minister in March 2001
- **March 1999 - August 1999, Vladimir Putin**, former FIO, spent years in East Germany, retired in 1991 and worked in St. Petersburg city government
- **September 1998 - March 1999, Nikolai Bordyzha**, career chekist, worked for KGB from 1975-91, and later for FAPSI[50]
- **March 1998 - September 1998, Andrei Kokoshin**
- **October 1996 - March 1998, Ivan Rybkin**
- **June 1996 - October 1996, Alexander Lebed**
- **September 1993 - June 1996, Oleg Lobov**
- **June 1993 - September 1993, Yevgeni Shaposhnikov**
- **April 1992 - March 1993, Yuri Skokov**

---

[49] Cristina Chuen, "The 2004 Russian Government Reforms: Security Council Role May Increase, Anti-Terrorism Commission May Receive New Powers," *CNS Research Story*, July 13, 2004, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040713.htm.

[50] See his biography at "Security Council of the Russian Federation (Состав Совета Безопасности Российской Федерации)," http://www.scrf.gov.ru/personnels/biography/Bordjuzha.shtml. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/personnels/biography/Bordjuzha.shtml.

5.4: RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SECTOR MANDATES

Each individual component of the Russian intelligence community has its own mandate, plus presidential directives, legislative statutes, and other regulations governing its structure, functions, powers, responsibilities, leadership appointment methods, chains-of-command, oversight bodies, etc. In all true democracies, intelligence/security services are based on legal frameworks rooted in law, and the rule of law is respected and applies to all. It is this legal basis that provides the foundation for all other matters concerning the agencies. As Peter Gill notes, "it is important that the question of the security intelligence mandate is addressed before questions of organization structure."[51] This is because organizational structures are based on their functions, which functions are outlined in the institutions' legal charters/mandates.

Further, the mandate is of key importance in ascertaining the political regime's expectations for the Services. For example, it reflects threat perceptions and the acceptable means with which to counter them, through an interpretation of the powers and controls therein provided. Peter Gill further notes that to minimize the risks of abuse (of civil liberties, human rights, etc.), the 'threats' to be targeted by security intelligence must be defined *either* in terms of the criminal law, requiring probable cause (the 'criminal standard'), *or* in specific statutory form where (non-criminal) threats are deemed to require surveillance.[52] In both cases, the threats are clearly and unambiguously defined, as are the legal procedures to deal with them.

---

[51] Peter Gill, *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, Cass Series: Studies in Intelligence, Frank Cass: OR, 1994, p. 317.

[52] Ibid., p. 319.

Hence, mandates will include threat identifications and intelligence/security sector powers to counter them, with the arrangement of organizational structures based on functions. The inclusion of mechanisms for political control and democratic oversight in the intelligence/security services' mandates is a mark of the nature and extent of their accountability and is complemented by the identification of where political responsibility and authority for intelligence activities and operations lies. Additionally, the modes of political appointments and chains-of-command need to be codified in statutory mandates in order to permit accountability and ground the agencies in law and legal procedure. In light of these fundamental issues and in order to provide a better understanding of the nature and evolution of the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security sector, the mandates of the main Russian intelligence/security services, the FSB and SVR, are discussed in the next section of this chapter, and include:

FSB:

- April and September 1995 mandates;
- 1997 mandate;
- July 6, 1998 mandate, amended on June 17, 2000, with other presidential edicts on the Service being issued on January 4, 1999, August 28, 1999, and June 11, 2001;
- August 11, 2003 mandate; and,
- July 11, 2004 mandate (and March 9, 2004 subordination to Justice Ministry).

SVR:

- Presidential Edict No. 293, dated December 18, 1991, making the FIS an Independent Agency;
- 1992 "Law on Foreign Intelligence"; and,
- 1996 RF Federal Law No. 5, "On Foreign Intelligence."

Due to the intense secrecy surrounding the GRU, its mandate is unavailable for review. However, based on accessible information, the changing roles, functions, and powers in terms of relevant federal legislation on the Service, along with the FAPSI and

GTK, are discussed to the greatest extent possible in order to provide comprehensive coverage of the most prominent Russian intelligence/security sector structures.

5.4.1: A Note on Intelligence/Security Service Functions

It is universally recognized and accepted that each of every state's intelligence/security services will have certain basic functions, which can be discretely categorized. Intelligence expert and pioneering scholar Roy Godson argues that intelligence consists of four different elements which cannot be separated out from one another. If intelligence is to meet the information needs of government, it must do all four and do them well. These four elements are: 1) clandestine collection; 2) analysis and estimates; 3) covert action; and, 4) counterintelligence.[53] In democracies, the first and third of these activities are only carried out external to state borders and generally only by the foreign and military intelligence services. Domestic intelligence/security services are much more limited in their activities, with arrest, investigative, and other police powers, including control of prisons, left to civil police authorities, domestic surveillance and political spying tightly restricted by law, and torture and summary execution absolutely prohibited in every case.

The Soviet secret police were tasked with a broad repertoire of responsibilities, including policing, political intelligence, economic intelligence (the hunt for "saboteurs," etc.), counterintelligence, military counterintelligence, and supervising export control, plus they had their own paramilitary contingents and employees held the legal status of military servicemen. Of note, this repertoire remains much the same in each and all of the intelligence/security services of FSU states, Russia constituting by far the largest and

---

[53] Glenn Hastedt, "Controlling Intelligence: Defining the Problem," *Controlling Intelligence*, Glenn P. Hastedt, ed., Frank Cass & Co., Ltd.: England, 1991, p. 6.

most significant, and while the Interior Ministries of these states do not have the legal military status that the intelligence services enjoy, the rank (hierarchical) structure and uniform are similar.[54]

As demonstrated in this project, contemporary Russian intelligence/security structures closely mirror, and powers, arguably exceed those of the omnipresent Soviet KGB. Today's FSB is primarily responsible for internal counterintelligence, civil counterespionage, internal security, and combating organized crime and terrorism. The Service has arrest and investigative powers, and its functions include physical and technical surveillance, the cultivation and running of informants, and the monitoring and repression of regime critics, ecologists and others who "pose a threat" to the state, just as during Soviet times. The FSB gathers and analyzes political and economic intelligence, is responsible for military counterintelligence, supervises export control through customs (the SVR controls arms exports), and maintains paramilitary contingents. Employees have legal military active service status. Further, the FSB absorbed the Border Troops and part of FAPSI and controls some prisons, including Lefortovo.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, the mandates and, hence, functions, structures, leadership, powers, political control and oversight features of each of Russia's key intelligence/security services, including the FSB, SVR, GRU, FAPSI and GTK are examined as they evolved over the period 1996-2004.

---

[54] Leonid Polyakov, "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform: Is Progress Conditioned by the Interest of Society," presented at the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," held in Geneva, Switzerland on 5-7 September 2002, organized by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 100, October 2002.

5.5: THE FSB MANDATE

The Federal Security Service (FSB) is Russia's main domestic intelligence service. It replaced the old KGB Second Chief Directorate, responsible primarily for counterintelligence and domestic security. Over the years, the FSB has become progressively more powerful, with a concomitant expansion in its organizational structures through the reabsorption of functional tasks and units divided off from the monolithic KGB in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. There have been five major mandates for the Service over the period 1996-2004. The following section examines these mandates in chronological order, highlighting the major changes inherent to each.

5.5.1: The 1995-1996 FSB Mandates

It is worth noting that approximately fourteen months before Yeltsin's reelection, on April 3, 1995 the Federal Law "On the Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation" renamed the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) the Federal Security Service (FSB), the changes coming into effect on June 23, 1995 with the signing of Presidential Decree No. 633, and making the main domestic intelligence service a much more powerful organization. As Amy Knight notes, the organization was elevated from a counterintelligence agency to a domestic intelligence service, with greatly increased powers and much broader scope, as laid out in a very comprehensive mandate.[55]

The law described the FSB role in the regions, clarified the FSB role in the Armed Forces, gave the FSB director ministerial status and the rank of army general, allowed it to conduct intelligence work and to protect Russian citizens and enterprises abroad,

---

[55] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloaks.*

obliged the FSB to inform the president and the prime minister about national threats, gave the FSB powers of detention and the right to enter any premises or property "if there is sufficient evidence to suppose that a crime is being been perpetrated there" without a warrant, permitted the FSB to set up special units, carry firearms, and train security personnel in private companies, and established the control structures over the FSB.[56]

In totality, it was responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, military counterintelligence, and crime control activity (spying, terrorism, organized crime, corruption, illegal armament and drug turnover, contraband, and other tasks). FSK officers automatically became FSB officers, while the decree provided for eight deputy directors (including two first deputies, five deputies responsible for departments and directorates, and 1 deputy director heading the Moscow City and Moscow regional directorate) and a Collegium of 11 persons. In July 1995, Yeltsin appointed Col. Gen. Mikhail Barsukov as the new director of the FSB.[57] With his appointment, an additional post of first deputy was provided for, with Col. Gen. Viktor M. Zorin appointed to the post, and the Collegium thus increased to 12 persons.[58]

Hence, in 1996, the FSB operated on the legal basis of two RF Presidential Edicts, No. 633, on "Urgent Measures for the Implementation of the Federal Law on FSB Organs in the RF" (the Collection of RF Legislation, 1995, No. 26, p. 2453), signed into law on June 23, 1995; and, No. 937, on the "Insertion of Changes into RF Presidential Edict No. 633," (the Collection of RF Legislation, 1995, No. 38, p. 3666), signed on September 14,

---

[56] "Federal Security Service," *Dictionary.LaborLawTalk.com*, http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Federal_Security_Service.

[57] Ibid.

[58] "History of state security," *agentura.ru*, October 10, 2000.

1995. This latter edict made the tasks of the FSB more specific, gave the FSB substantial rights to conduct cryptographic work, and described the powers of the FSB director. The number of deputy directors was increased to eight, with two first deputies (one to head the counterterrorist center), five deputies responsible for departments and directorates, and one deputy director to head the Moscow City and Moscow regional directorate.[59] Further, during this period, the FSB regained considerable operational and legal authority for controlling state secrets; for example, in September 1995 Gen. Barsukov (promotion to rank of general comes with the appointment), was named deputy chairman of a new State Committee to Control State Secrets and given the authority to define and protect them using "newly countenanced" counterintelligence operations.[60]

As to FSB liaisons with other intelligence community components, the FSB, while primarily a domestic intelligence service, was authorized to operate external to Russia in certain target areas and in cooperation with the SVR, Russia's FIS. This power arose out of the revised law "On Foreign Intelligence" that was signed by Yeltsin in January 1996. In regard to FSB Liaisons with Foreign States' Intelligence/Security Services, the FSB enjoys especially close intelligence relationships with CIS states' intelligence/security services, a consequence of a number of intelligence-sharing and cooperation agreements signed in September 1996. Soon thereafter, an information system was created for improved communication between them, and a central database was established at the FSB to support the fight against organized crime. These agreements followed Yeltsin's firing of Barsukov at the height of election season and in

---

[59] Op. cit., "Federal Security Service," *Dictionary.LaborLawTalk.com*.

[60] "FSB Operations," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fsb.org/irp/world/russia/fsb/ops.htm.

response to various intrigues noted earlier, on June 20, 1996, appointing Nikolai Kovalev to acting director and, later, director of the FSB.[61]

5.5.2: The 1997 FSB Mandate

In May 1997, the FSB was again reorganized following a political power struggle.[62] On May 22, **1997**, RF Presidential Edict No. 515, "On the Structure of the RF FSB" (the Collection of RF Legislation, 1997, No. 21, p. 2468) was issued, amending the previous FSB mandate. This created five departments to replace the existing directorates and services; that is, the former 34 directorates were transformed into departments to enhance manageability.[63] The structure as laid out in the 1997 FSB Statute included five departments and six directorates and is outlined below.

Departments:

- Counterintelligence
- Counterterrorism
- Analysis, Forecasts and Strategic Planning
- Personnel and Management
- Operational Support

Directorates:

- Analysis and Suppression of the Activity of Criminal Organizations
- Investigations
- Operational-Search
- Operational-Technical Measures
- Internal Security
- Administration

---

[61] Op. cit., "Federal Security Service," *Dictionary.LaborLawTalk.com*.

[62] Ibid.

[63] "FSB Organization," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fsb/org.htm.

Other:

- Prisons
- Scientific-Technical Research Centre[64]

Further, the FSB was prohibited from recruiting civilian personnel and the number of places offered by the FSB Academy was cut back.[65] At that time, the Service reportedly had a total of 75,000-80,000 employees, although according to former FSB Director Sergei Kovalev, only 45,000 operatives were serving in the FSB as of mid-1997. The numerical discrepancy is probably resolved by adding some 30,000 support staff to the ranks of the operatives.[66]

5.5.3: The 1998 FSB Mandate — Putin is Appointed FSB Director

On July 6, 1998, Yeltsin signed a new statute invalidating the former three laws governing the FSB (Nos. 633, 937, and 515), which thereafter operated on the basis of Russian Federal Presidential Edict No. 806, "Approval of the Statute on the Russian Federation Federal Security Service and Its Structure." Of note, Putin was appointed FSB director at this time, and may have exercised substantial influence over these changes. The new edict outlined the Service's structural basis and authority,[67] established a Department of Economic Security, and provided for two first deputies, a state-secretary-deputy director, six deputy director posts to coincide with the six FSB departments, a post

---

[64] "On the Structure of the Russian Federation Federal Security Service," Presidential Edict No. 515, May 22, 1997, *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/edict_0515.htm.

[65] Op. cit., "Federal Security Service," *Dictionary.LaborLawTalk.com*.

[66] "FSB Budget and Personnel," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fsb/budget.htm.

[67] "Approval of the Statute on the Russian Federation Federal Security Service and Its Structure," RF Presidential Edict No. 806, signed by RF President Boris Yeltsin, Moscow, July 6, 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/edict_806.htm.

of deputy director to serve as chief of the department over Moscow and Moscow region (Col. Gen. Alexandr Tsarenko was chief of the Moscow FSB at this time), and a Collegium of 17 persons. Further, there were a number of additional changes of note, discussed below. This leadership structure was adjusted on October 5, 1998 with a deputy director over the Saint Petersburg and Leningrad region.

Building on the new Department of Economic Security, on January 4, 1999 Yeltsin signed a decree on the basis of organization-inspection division by the Department on Organization-Personnel work (6th Department), creating the FSB Inspection Department.[68] Another decree followed in April that reorganized the Economic Security Department into two departments with several subdivisions, including the department on counterintelligence provision of industry's enterprises, transport and credit and finance sphere, and contraband and drug business control.[69]

a) Threat Identification and FSB Functions, Structures, and Powers

The main threats identified in the 1998 FSB mandate include organized crime and corruption, terrorism and subversion, drug-trafficking, illegal arms deals, smuggling, and espionage. The FSB was also made responsible for communicating threats to the authorities in Section II of the statute, which outlines the FSB's Basic Tasks, specifying: "to inform the RF president and the chairman of the RF Government and, upon their instructions, federal organs of state authority, as well as RF components' organs of state authority, of threats to RF security."

---

[68] "History of state security," *agentura.ru*, October 10, 2000.

[69] Ibid.

The 1998 FSB mandate includes sections on both Basic Tasks and Functions, which outline the work of the service. The FSB is tasked "to uncover, to warn about, to stop and to solve crimes placed by federal legislation under FSB organs' investigative authority; to uncover, to warn about and to stop terrorist and subversive activities;"[70] "to organize and to implement, in concert with other state organs, a struggle against organized crime, corruption, smuggling and the illegal turnover in weapons, ammunition, explosives, poisonous substances, narcotics, psychotropic substances, and special equipment intended for covert information gathering, and to struggle against the activities of illegal armed formations, criminal societies, criminal groups, individual persons and public associations, which have set as their goal the implementation of armed insurrection, the violent changing of the RF's constitutional system, the violent seizure of power or the violent retention of power."

Further "Basic Functions" are prescribed. In order to combat criminal groups, the FSB is tasked to penetrate and investigate them. The Service itself is responsible for developing the procedures for doing so, rather than the legislature, and also those surrounding detention, for which they are also authorized during investigations. The detainees are typically held at Lefortovo. The FSB statute reads that "it shall organize and implement day-to-day investigative activities to uncover, to stop and to prevent crimes, shall carry out the inquiry and preliminary investigation in cases of crimes placed by federal legislation under FSB organs' investigative authority and shall also determine the procedure for FSB organs to implement the penetration of criminal groups;" and, "it shall establish the procedure for the use of FSB organs' investigative isolation facilities by

[70] Op. cit., "Approval of the Statute on the Russian Federation Federal Security Service and Its Structure."

their inquiry and preliminary investigation organs, as well as by other preliminary investigation organs and courts and shall implement, when need be or upon the instructions of the RF General Procurator's Office, the escorting and holding of detained and arrested persons with respect to criminal cases being investigated by FSB organs' investigative subdivisions," thus providing the FSB police powers.

In 1996, the FSB regained control of the notorious Lefortovo prison and investigation complex, which in 1994 had been transferred to MVD control as a result of the FSB's loss, albeit temporary, of its investigative apparatus in late 1993. The Investigation Directorate was restored in 1995.[71] So, too, the FSB controlled the Matrosskaya Tishina detention center, while the MVD controls the sprawling prison system in general. In late May 2005 it was reported that the Justice Ministry would be made responsible for Lefortovo and other pretrial detention centers under FSB jurisdiction. This change, according to Justice Minister Chaika, was in response to a Putin directive.[72] It made sense in light of the March 2004 subordination of the intelligence/security sector to the Justice Ministry. Finally, in 1998, the FSB revived the Constitutional Security Directorate (Directorate K), with Lt. Gen. Gennady Zotov appointed its head.

On August 28, 1999 the Counterterrorism Department was reorganized to include a Terrorist and Political Extremism Directorate (which in practice works against the political opposition). The Moscow Directorate also incorporated a Service for Combating

---

[71] See "More Spies to Bring Order to the Country," *agentura.com* at http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/spions.

[72] "Lefortovo, other FSB prisons to be handed to Justice Ministry," *agentura.ru*, May 26, 2005, http://www.agentura.ru/english/Right?id=20050526134600.

Terrorism and Protecting the Constitutional System.[73] To meet its responsibilities specifically in counterterrorism, the FSB has a number of units, including Directorate T, which is responsible for counterterrorism activities, and the elite counterterrorist Alfa and special forces Vympel units, the former created in 1974 under KGB-FCD and now FSB control and the latter formed as a dedicated Osnaz unit in 1981 and under FSB Special Operations Center control since 1995. The FSB Antiterrorist Center is a special entity formed in 1995 that encompasses FSB combat and operational counterterrorist units. It was soon engaged in a high level of activity, reportedly responding in 1996 to 420 alerts that terrorist acts were being prepared, including 35 alerts of possible terrorist acts against foreign citizens. Also in 1996, the Antiterrorist Center carried out more than 200 special and combat-operation operations, including actions directed against 11 organized crime groups engaged in illegally supplying arms to Central Russia from the North Caucasus republics and the Baltic countries.

Group A, or Alfa, the elite counterterrorist unit, is currently subordinate to the FSB and is utilized in special operations. Alfa was assigned to the FSB after changes in subordination and status following the unit's ambiguous role in the failed August 1991 Soviet coup. Alfa comprises a main group of 250 personnel as well as smaller detachments in Yekaterinburg, Krasnodar, and Khabarovsk. It took part in the rescue operations at Budennovsk in 1995, Dubrovka in 2002, and Beslan in 2004, among other operations. Before the fighting started in Chechnya, it was not intended for Russian armed forces to resort to a full scale intervention; instead, low-intensity warfare was waged against the separatists. For example, a 1994 FSK-led operation under the directorship of Stepashin was secretly supported by Russian Army contingents enlisted

[73] "History of state security," *agentura.ru*, October 10, 2000.

from divisions near Moscow, who aided opposition forces operating in Chechnya. These forces, led by opposition Provisional Council leader Umar Avturkhanov, fought Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev's forces with the intent to either defeat or at least weaken him in order to take Grozny. However, the November 26-27, 1994 attack on the city was a catastrophe, and by December 1 it was clear that they would be unable to oust Dudayev. Subsequently, Alfa's mid-June 1995 attempt to storm the Budennovsk hospital and free hundreds of hostages seized by Chechen guerrillas (led by Shamil Basaev) ended unsuccessfully.[74]

On October 23, 2002, Alfa was deployed to eliminate the 40+ Chechen terrorists who took over the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow during a performance of the musical Nord Ost, which operation resulted in the deaths of all the terrorists and 129 hostages, all but two of the latter dying from the effects of the gas employed to end the raid. More recently, on September 1, 2004 Alfa was used in Beslan when 1,100 schoolchildren, parents, and teachers were taken hostage by terrorists at Chechen rebel commander Shamil Basayev's direction, which attack ended with 334 deaths, 186 of them children, as the situation got out of control. Over the years, the unit has been deployed in a number of operations against Chechen separatists. Finally, Vympel is a special detachment of OSNZ formerly known as Department V, and is believed to be responsible for carrying out assassinations abroad. Very little is known about its operations or activities except that it may have been involved in counterterrorist operations in Chechnya and the surrounding

[74] "FSB Organization," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fsb/org.htm.

region.[75] The unit is also involved in the security of nuclear sites in Russia. Its main function is to serve as a rapid reaction group to counter nuclear theft and terrorism.[76]

b) Military Counterintelligence, Still a KGB-FSB Prerogative

Reminiscent of the old KGB Third Chief Directorate, the FSB also continues its military counterintelligence role, in old Soviet KGB tradition. FSB Col. Gen. Aleksey Molyakov is chief of the Military Counterintelligence Directorate, a component of the FSB Counterintelligence Department with about 6,000 staffers. Thus, along with the security organs in the troops, military counterintelligence is directly subordinate to the FSB. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), directorate staff have been directly involved in the investigation of about a third of the Russian citizens who have been marked for investigation by Russian counterintelligence in recent years.[77] This Directorate is also responsible for the counterintelligence of the Border Guards, FAPSI, OMON, Railroad, Civil Defense troops and administrative organs, and of internal officers, tax police, and customs bodies. The 1998 statute reads: "it shall organize and implement the ensuring of security in the RF Armed Forces, in the RF Federal Border Service and the system of organs and troops headed by it, in the RF Presidential Federal Government Communications and Information Agency and the system of organs and troops headed by it, in the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs' internal troops, in the RF Railroad Troops, in the civil defense troops, in other military formations and in their

---

[75] "Beslan – Two Years After," *Russian Analytic Digest*, No. 5, August 29, 2006, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=E67E3A84-38C3-0150-C8FA-CF144BE3AE7F&lng=en.

[76] "Russians Sources Say Department V Spetsnaz Unit May Have Carried Out Litvinenko Poisoning," *Weekly Intelligence Notes*, #50-06, AFIO, McLean, VA, December 18, 2006.

[77] Op. cit., "FSB Organization."

administrative organs, as well as in RF internal affairs organs, in the tax police's federal organs and in RF customs organs." By 2004, these entities had for the most part been incorporated into FSB structures, making the FSB Third Directorate's expansive counterintelligence role more logical, in any case.

The FSB's Military Counterintelligence Directorate works in the Russian Armed Forces to counter the efforts of FISs to acquire Russian state and military secrets. So, too, under authority of the statute on military counterintelligence organs, the Directorate is permitted to conduct intelligence activities against threats to the security of Russia and its Armed Forces by operating networks of agents in foreign countries. To compliment its military counterintelligence activities, the FSB also, "shall direct the Russian FSB's military missions;" and "it shall implement, on a contract basis, personnel training for federal organs of executive authority, foreign states' special services and the security services of enterprises, institutions and organizations, regardless of the form of ownership." Of note, on December 7, 1998 Yeltsin signed a decree, "Points of military and technical RF cooperation with foreign states," which allotted the State Technical Commission (GTK) relevant control coordination and provision concerning the provision of security in the fulfillment of military and technical cooperation with foreign states.[78] In addition, the Military Counterintelligence Directorate, in collaboration with other agencies, is involved in work against organized crime, corruption, smuggling, and illegal trafficking in weapons and drugs.

Bringing the chekists directly into the economic sphere, the 1998 FSB Mandate also established that the Service "shall render, on a contract basis, assistance to

---

[78] "History of state security," *agentura.ru*, October 10, 2000.

enterprises, institutions and organizations, regardless of the form of ownership, in the development of measures to protect commercial secrets;" thus, it could be said to have a role in hardening economic targets, yet this task has been shown to have often been turned on its head, and in practice exploited by officers to glean an entities' financial condition and use that information to determine whether it would subsequently take control of the enterprise, typically accomplished through hostile, extra-legal means with the participation of corrupt government authorities.

In Chechnya, beyond running operations, the Directorate is involved in establishing the whereabouts of Russian servicemen and civilians seized by gunmen and securing their release.[79] Of note, there have been numerous reports over the years of FSB officers themselves being behind a number of the kidnappings, usually with the aim of reaping hefty ransoms, which given the extensive brutality involved are usually paid and typically leave the targeted owners without legal recourse in the event.[80]

Finally, beyond assuring the regime's political security, a top priority of military counterintelligence staffers is to ensure nuclear security in the Russian armed forces. That is, military counterintelligence units work in the armed forces troops to counter and avert extremist or other dangerous tendencies to ensure that, in the event of a deterioration in the political situation in the country, there would be no loss of controllability of the Russian armed forces and any attempts to involve the army in a political confrontation could be neutralized.

---

[79] Op. cit., "FSB Organization."

[80] "Chechnya's Pro-Moscow President Says Few Abductions Registered This Year," *MosNews.com*, December 27, 2006, http://mosnews.com/news/2006/12/27/fewerabduct.shtml.

c) FSB Structures at the "Centre"

The FSB headquarters (the Centre) is based at the infamous Lubyanka building located in central Moscow's Lubyanka Square, near to Iron Felix's 1920s communications base and numerous other security service buildings. The domestic intelligence service's reach extends across the vast country, covering eleven time zones, with regional FSB offices located in all major cities throughout Russia. According to the 1998 FSB Statute, the organizational structure of the Centre includes:

Leadership Structure:

- (Central Staff) The Leadership; (aka Collegium, consisting of 17 persons)
- FSB Director
- Two Deputy Directors
- State-Secretary - Deputy Director
- Six deputy chiefs representing each of the six FSB departments
- Chief of the Moscow FSB
- Chief of the St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region FSB

Departments:

- Counterintelligence (1st Department)
- Counterterrorism (2nd Department)
- Economic Security (4th Department)
- Analysis, Forecasting and Strategic Planning (5th Department)
- Organizational and Personnel Work (6th Department), after 1999 decree
- Inspection Department[81]
- Activity Support (7th Department)

Administrations:

- Military Counterintelligence (3rd Administration)
- Constitutional Security (8th Administration, the old Soviet KGB Directorate K)
- Investigation
- Internal Security (9th Administration)
- Affairs
- Contract and Legal

[81] Op. cit., "History of state security."

Department:

- Military Mobilization Department [Otdel] (10th Department) (with the rights of an administration)[82]

Directorate:

- Records and Archives (maintains FSB records, including files on personnel, as well as assets and targets)[83]

d) Regional FSB Structures

The FSB is one of the few Russian government institutions that retained the vertical structure of federal control, with Administrations at the Oblast level, despite the efforts of local leaders to subordinate these territorial directorates to their own interests. To varying degrees, local "capture" occurred in consequence of regional governments' control of resources combined with the delay or lack of federal provision for officers' needs, a situation that plagued all federal government agencies throughout the 1990s and accelerated the pace of centrifugal forces, leading to the extensive decentralization of state functions and powers.

Once Putin gained the presidency in 2000, he created seven federal districts and appointed envoys to head each, a restructuring that was instrumental in recentralizing the command and control of the intelligence/security sector, which had eluded central control to a significant degree in many regions of the country during the Yeltsin years as officers branched out into rival commercial enterprises (business-government ties are intimate) and competition increased exponentially, while the provision of funding and resources from Moscow was consistently unreliable and often not forthcoming.

---

[82] Op. cit., "Approval of the Statute on the Russian Federation Federal Security Service and Its Structure."

[83] Op. cit., "FSB Organization."

While specific details on regional FSB organizations are quite limited, some aspects have been revealed. For example, the Voronezh FSB maintains a Web site posting some information on its organization and activities, located at http://fsb.vrn.ru/3_2.htm. Also, the Web site, http://www.agentura.ru.dossier/russia/regions/ufsb, provides a listing of the FSB regional offices, with varying amounts of information posted in Russian, much of it historical. Some of the information posted relates to structural-organizational aspects. For example, the Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration of the FSB is reported to have a staff of slightly more than 300 officers working in the entire oblast. Previously, the Administration had a counterintelligence division, which was transformed into a Counterintelligence Operations Division and given a broader range of responsibilities. The (former) counterintelligence division had been based on functions of defense, but the Counterintelligence Operations Division presupposes not only the defense of the state against the actions of FISs, but also the carrying out of operations to exert an effect on those services. In other words, they not only protect their secrets and operations, identify moles in their ranks, and disrupt FIS operations, but also work to turn FIS officers into double agents; the Division is both defensive and offensive.

Further, the Administration's former economic counterintelligence division was transformed into the Division for Counterintelligence at Strategic Objectives, which includes responsibility for closed cities and other objectives, such as the provision of security of objectives in the defense complex, the protection of secrets, and the prevention of diversionary and sabotage activities.[84] In a duplication of tasks with other

[84] Ibid.

Russian intelligence community components, these forces are also tasked to protect nuclear materials and weapons from unauthorized acquisition, and are likely to work in league with defense and interior ministry officials in that realm. Of note, the local FSB continues to work with the Centre to block all attempts by Russian environmental experts to study the safety of the closed cities' nuclear installations, and subjects them to constant provocations. For instance, they thwarted a sociological study and environmental monitoring project, accusing well-known ecologist and head of the Planeta Nadezhal (Planet of Hopes) organization of meeting with a CIA operative posing as an environmentalist, and discussing plutonium handling procedures at the Mayak plant.[85]

In January 2003, Nikolai Petrov, of the Moscow-based Center for Political-Geographic Research, provided some insight on the relationship between the FSB and the envoy in the Central Federal District, from which it can be expected that the other federal districts have similar structures:

> Judging by the career backgrounds of his top assistants, working with Russia's power ministries is Presidential Envoy Georgii Poltavchenko's main priority. Unfortunately for outside observers, however, most of this work goes on behind closed doors and it is possible to judge the measures taken only through small bits and pieces of evidence. It is well known, for example, that the okrug has a Collegium on Cooperation with Law Enforcement Agencies and Power Ministries. Its members include Chairman of the Council of FSB regional branches in the Central Federal Okrug V. Zakharov (who was appointed head of the Moscow city and oblast FSB after the beginning of Putin's federal reforms), okrug MVD head Sergei Shchadrin, okrug Deputy General Procurator N. Makarov, and Justice Ministry okrug branch head I. Ivanov. The media has mentioned the council only a few times, but otherwise there is little publicly-available information about its work. In the summer of 2002, the okrug organized an anti-terrorism commission, which, in addition to representatives of these federal agencies, includes deputy governors representing the regions.[86]

---

[85] Marina Latysheva, "Russia's Nuclear Sites Worry Ecologists, FSB," *CDI Russia, Weekly*, No. 14, RW 3-11-05, http://www.cdi.org/russia/345-14.cfm.

[86] Nikolai Petrov, "Police, FSB Reforms in the Central Federal District," *Russian Regional Report*, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 16, 2003.

What becomes apparent is the numerous interlocking networks of political and intelligence/security sector officials loyal to the Putin agenda, linked through various types of councils and commissions, all directly subordinate to the centre and under strict supervision of the Kremlin's leading chekists. They are all marked by high levels of secrecy with little, if any, interaction with the media or civil society institutions, thereby excluding the public from their activities and enabling them to operate with impunity. Those targeted by the Services have limited legal recourse to fairly contest the accusations against them. In many cases, they serve as a private clique, available solely to those with the right connections. The FSB is the chief arbitrator.

As evidenced by a number of cases reminiscent of the "spy mania" of the Stalinist era, it is known that all local FSB directorates have their own investigations departments. A special subdivision of the Centre, the Fourth Department, monitors their performance. Ultimately, Centre FSB officers Gen. Nikolai Oleshko (who as deputy chief of the FSB Investigative Directorate had been in charge of the Valentin Danilov, Valentin Moiseyev, Igor Sutyagin, and Anatoly Babkin cases,[87] which are covered in chapter seven) and an investigator by the name of Petukhov had this responsibility transferred to the First Department (espionage), though details remain sketchy.

e) The FSB Academy

The FSB Academy (the old Higher KGB School), headed by Vladimir Shults, is located near Moscow and is the main training facility for recruits. The Academy maintains a Web site at www.academy.fsb.ru. The students are taught by old spies, both

[87] "Something Personal in FSB Convictions," *MosNews.com*, August 12, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/interview/2004/12/08/danilov.shtml.

Russian and foreign, including former SVR Director Yevgeni Primakov and other notables, who guest lecture along with MI-6 spy/defector George Blake.[88] Courses cover the usual gambit of skills and knowledge relevant to intelligence and counterintelligence work, including sports and physical fitness. The FSB Academy houses an Institute of Cryptography, which offers courses on mathematics, computer science, information security, and cryptography, among others.[89]

Andrei Trishin, associate professor at the Academy's Institute of Cryptography,[90] Communications and Information Technology, points out that "special disciplines" (SD), all related to mathematics and cryptography, are taught at the Institute. Students study the history of ciphers and the modern principles of encryption, with teachers setting ciphers for which students must find the key. Additionally, they must also create their own ciphers. Further, students study different countries' national encryption standards and analyze encryption algorithms, and commercial encryption systems, identifying their weaknesses. [91] Competitions are held in the interest of developing increasingly sophisticated ciphers. Given his position, it is interesting that Trishin said that competition is tougher at Moscow State University than at the FSB Academy.[92]

---

[88] For the story of George Blake's escape from the British prison, see Sean Bourke, *The Springing of George Blake*, Pinnacle Books: NY, 1970.

[89] See the Cryptography Institute's listing of courses at its Web site located at http://academy.fsb.ru/icccs/1251/information_for_future_students.html.

[90] See the FSB's Web site at http://www.academy.fsb.ru./icccs/1251/information_for_future_students.html.

[91] Yelena Slavina, "How to Reduce Noise and Break a Cipher," *Moscow News*, No. 37, October 4, 2005, http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2005-14-26.

f) Provisions for Political Control, Parliamentary Oversight/Democratic Accountability Mechanisms

While the FSB mandate calls for the domestic security intelligence service to operate according to the rule of law and with a respect for human rights and individual freedoms, in practice its activities rarely fall within this rubric. Specifically, the 1998 FSB mandate delineates chains-of-command for political control and accountability within the framework of the nation's law, and the rule of law and respect for human rights and constitutional freedoms, reading: "The RF president shall direct the Russian FSB's activities in accordance with the RF Constitution, federal constitutional laws and federal laws; The RF Government shall coordinate the Russian FSB's activities with respect to the Russian FSB's interaction with RF organs of state authority in accordance with the RF Constitution, federal constitutional laws and RF presidential edicts and directives; The Russian FSB's activities shall be carried out on the basis of the principles of legality, respect for and observance of the rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen, humanism, secrecy, a combination of overt and covert methods and means for its activities, and centralization of the administration of FSB organs."[93]

However, written mandates alone do not make for a true secret police transformation. Mentalities do not change overnight. To date, widespread violations of and a lack of respect for the rule of law and human rights emanate from the very top of the regime, and reach deeply into the intelligence/security sector as well, as discussed in detail in chapters six and ten of this project. While the Constitution and federal law make the Security and Defense Committees in the State Duma responsible for oversight of the

---

[92] Ibid.

[93] Op. cit., "Approval of the Statute on the Russian Federation Federal Security Service and Its Structure."

intelligence/security sector, nowhere in the 1998 FSB Mandate is there any mention of legislative oversight, except for the vague, "shall inform the RF president and the chairman of the RF Government about matters which have been placed under the jurisdiction of FSB organs," providing no procedures or time tables for doing so.[94] In practice, it is essentially meaningless.

In regard to FSB budgetary matters, the Service's statute mandates that the director "shall be the manager of credits allocated from the federal budget for the funding of FSB organs, including currency assets;" and, "he shall determine the standards and the procedure for spending financial assets to carry out operational measures associated with FSB organs' implementation of counterintelligence, operational, investigative and intelligence activities."[95] As a matter of routine, the parliament passes the intelligence budget.

g) FSB Active Measures

As is shown in chapter six, the FSB relationship with the media is one-sided — state control and utilization as a vehicle for positive image-making and active measures, and intimidation, arrest, and possibly even murder of independent journalists. The Soviet Politburo had always used the KGB to exercise control over the press; thereby, the authorities ensured their own protection against exposure of their deeds. Active measures had always been and continue to be an important element of the intelligence officer's responsibility. It followed that after communism's collapse and the associated discrediting of Soviet era ideology and institutions, the secret services prioritized image-

[94] See the mandate, posted at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/edict_806.htm.

[95] Op. cit., "Approval of the Statute on the Russian Federation Federal Security Service and Its Structure."

making. In recognition of the potential value of the media, the FSB mandate instructs that, "it shall organize and implement cooperation with the mass media and providing information to the public about FSB organs' activities and shall also implement editorial and publishing activities." What the mandate does not say is that the FSB will meet this task by taking control of the media and silencing dissenters and eliminating criticism of the regime and its policies through the media vehicle.

h) Ombudsman/Citizen Complaints

An interesting facet of the 1998 FSB mandate is its inclusion of an ombudsman role in security issues, stating, "it shall implement receiving citizens and shall examine their suggestions, statements and complaints regarding matters which have been placed under the jurisdiction of FSB organs."[96] While the ombudsman may indeed look into citizens' complaints, the authorities' actions are not reversed or altered in any way. For example, co-founder and co-leader of the oppositionist Yabloko party and former ambassador to the U.S., Vladimir Lukin, who was appointed to the post in February 2004, promised to look into charges that the FSB had prevented scholars from entering the closed Chelyabinsk Oblast city of Ozersk, harassment of NGOs has only intensified. In this case, the scholars had been invited to conduct sociological research, yet the NGO that sponsored them reported that an FSB official had informed them that they would be arrested if they attempted to enter the city and possibly charged with espionage. The FSB official was aware that the NGO received grant funding from a U.S. foundation and mentioned the case of researcher Igor Sutyagin, who was convicted of spying in

[96] Ibid.

connection with research he did for a U.S. organization. Lukin reportedly said that he would travel to Ozersk himself to look into the matter, but no positive results followed.[97]

i) FSB Chains-of-Command and Leadership Appointments

The FSB Director

The FSB Statute mandates the Service is headed by a Director, who is appointed and removed by the RF president. This position is not subject to parliamentary approval, and thus is solely a presidential prerogative. This situation contributes to the lack of accountability and the impotence of the legislative branch in exercising any meaningful oversight over the Service.

Past and Present Directors of the FSB

- **Nikolai Patrushev (August 1999 - present)**
- **Vladimir Putin (July 1998 - August 1999)**
- **Nikolai Kovalev (July 1996 - July 1998)**
- **Mikhail Barsukov (July 1995 - June 1996)**
- **Sergei Stepashin (March 1994 - July 1995)**
- **Nikolai Golushko (September 1993 - March 1994)**
- **Viktor Barannikov (December 1991 - July 1993)**
- **Vadim Bakatin (August 1991 - November 1991)**

The FSB Collegium

The 1998 FSB Statute also mandates a Collegium, its size and composition (15 persons), except for persons who are part of it by virtue of their positions, subject to the RF president's approval, which at the time consisted of the director of the RF FSB who serves as its chairman, the first deputy director, the state-secretary, RF FSB deputy director, six deputy directors, RF FSB department heads and deputy director, chief of the RF FSB Administration for the City of Moscow and Moscow Oblast, as well as FSB

---

[97] Robert Coalson, "Analysis: Russia's Ombudsman Speaks Out," *RFE/RL*, June 20, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/06/00d97e5f-dc14-4a35-ae9b-a791f9106124.html.

organs' leading officials. The mandate states that, functionally, the Collegium is to "examine at its meetings the most important matters of FSB organs' activities and shall make decisions on them," which, "decisions shall be made by a majority vote of its members and shall be formalized as Russian FSB orders."[98] Additionally, provision was made in the mandate for a military personnel staff size of 4,000 individuals for the RF FSB Central Staff to be approved as of January 1, 1999."[99]

j) FSB Cooperation with the SVR and GRU

In order to not preclude FSB operational options and to mitigate inter-service conflict and rivalry, also included in the FSB mandate is a section on modes of cooperation with the SVR and GRU for joint intelligence/espionage work, both internally and externally, stating precisely that the FSB is "to obtain and to process intelligence information within the limits of its authority and in concert with RF foreign intelligence organs, as well as to render assistance in the implementation of measures being carried out by the state in the interests of ensuring RF security and enhancing its economic, scientific, technical and defense potentials; to carry out measures in concert with the RF Foreign Intelligence Service to ensure the security of RF institutions and citizens outside its borders;"[100] and, "it shall organize and implement, within the limits of its authority and in concert with RF foreign intelligence organs, the obtaining of information about real and potential capabilities and actions which touch upon vitally important RF interests and about plans and intentions of foreign states, organizations and persons; it shall

---

[98] Op. cit., "Approval of the Statute on the Russian Federation Federal Security Service and Its Structure."

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid.

establish the procedure for conducting intelligence-gathering measures, as well as the procedure for using covert methods and means during the implementation of intelligence activities by FSB organs;" and, "it shall implement, within the limits of its authority, the obtaining, processing, analysis and use of information about threats to RF security, as well as the prediction of these threats."

Thus, the Service was authorized to determine for itself the procedures to be used in intelligence as opposed to the idea that the (democratically-accountable) legislature should be responsible for this delineation in the interests of protecting the civil liberties and human rights of citizens from intelligence/security abuses and extralegal surveillance activities. As things developed in post-Soviet Russia, this latter idea is completely unrealistic; the unreformed chekists could hardly be expected to permit intelligence collection procedure to be drawn up in legal terms and overseen by a legislature composed predominantly of corrupt politicos and others representing predominantly private economic interests, albeit many of them in partnership with chekists and organized crime in wholly illicit activities, yet protected by their own immunity, a reason motivating some to seek the posts in the first place. Nor have most Duma deputies been armed with the necessary knowledge base needed to competently draft such legislation, especially in a democratic framework. For the most part, the issues of civil liberties, human rights, and other democratic niceties remain elusive as major topics of debate in the Duma, and of little apparent concern. Economic issues, as with the debates in other post-communist states' legislatures, dominated as officials focused on political matters to

further and protect their own private business interests, with corruption simply expected as part of the game.[101]

5.5.4: The August 2003 FSB Mandate

On August 11, 2003, Putin signed Presidential Edict **No. 960**, a new FSB mandate that superseded all others, including:

- Russian Federation Presidential Edict **No. 806** of 6 July 1998 "On the Approval of the Statute on the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and Its Structure" (Collected Laws of the Russian Federation, 1998, No. 28, Sec. 3320);

- Russian Federation Presidential Edict **No. 14** of 4 January 1999 on "Questions Connected with the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation" (Collected Laws of the Russian Federation, 1999, No. 2, Sec. 267);

- Russian Federation Presidential Edict **No. 1131** of 28 August 1999 on "Questions Connected with the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation" (Collected Laws of the Russian Federation, 1999, No. 35, Sec. 4305);

- Russian Federation Presidential Edict **No. 1109** of 17 June 2000 "On Amendments to Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 806 of 6 July 1998 "On the Approval of the Statute on the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and Its Structure" (Collected Laws of the Russian Federation, 2000, No. 25, Sec. 2677); and,

- Russian Federation Presidential Edict **No. 694** of 11 June 2001 on "Questions Connected with the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation" (Collected Laws of the Russian Federation, 2001, No. 24, Sec. 2422);

The August 2003 FSB mandate made changes to the Service's leadership, with provisions for two first deputy directors of the FSB, a first deputy director of the FSB in charge of the Border Service, a state-secretary and deputy director of the FSB, a deputy director of the FSB, six deputy directors heading FSB departments, a deputy director heading the Inspections Directorate of the FSB, and to form an FSB collegium of 19 members, thus expanding the body by four additional members. The Border Guards were

[101] Op. cit., "FSB Organization."

newly incorporated into the Service and chains-of-command were outlined. Overall, the new mandate, like those past, further increased the scope and extent of FSB powers, arguably making the Service far more powerful than had been its KGB predecessor, excluding the area of foreign intelligence.

The General Provisions of the August 2003 mandate provided the Service with the authority to safeguard the security of the RF, defend and protect the state borders, protect internal waterways, the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf and their natural resources, safeguard information security and the main areas of activities of FSB agencies, and coordinate the counterintelligence operations of federal agencies authorized to conduct them.

As with previous statutes, the new mandate states that the Service shall operate according to the rule of law: "The Russian FSB will be guided in its work by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, edicts and directives of the President of the Russian Federation, decrees and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation, international treaties of the Russian Federation, and this Statute." As to rights and liberties, the statute reads: "The work of the Russian FSB will be based on the principles of legality, the centralized management of Federal Security Service agencies and the border troops (hereafter referred to as subsidiary agencies and troops), respect for human and civil rights and liberties and the observance of these rights and liberties, humanism, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders, the peaceful resolution of border disputes...." Nevertheless, the fact remains, the rule of law is not recognized in practice, nor are human rights protected.

Fundamental Objectives outlined in the new statute include: command and control, and organization of the activities of subsidiary agencies and troops; notification of the RF president of threats to national security; counterintelligence against FISs, organizations, and individuals who jeopardize national security; coordination of counterintelligence operations and measures to safeguard their security; combat organized crime and corruption, contraband, money laundering, illegal migration, and illegal trafficking in arms, ammunition, explosives, toxic agents, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and special technical devices for covert collection of information; counter extremist and militant group activity, including crime syndicates and gangs, individuals and public associations working toward armed rebellion, violent alteration of the constitutional order, the violent seizure or retention of power; support the struggle against terrorist and subversive activity; perform intelligence operations; organize the collection and processing of intelligence within its own authority and in conjunction with RF foreign intelligence services; defend and protect state borders; protect state secrets and suppress technical surveillance conducted by foreign organizations; support proceedings in cases of administrative offenses that fall under the RF Code of Administrative Offenses; organize and assist in operations to safeguard RF security and enhance its economic, scientific-technical, and defensive potential; plan and implement state and scientific-technical policy in the information security sphere; and organize support for the cryptographic and technical engineering security of information and telecommunications systems, as well as systems of encrypted, classified, and other special types of communications in the RF and its institutions abroad. In light of the

FSB's incorporation of part of FAPSI by presidential decree in March 2003, the statute states that the Institute of Cryptography will operate as an arm of the Service.

As to Functions, the mandate specifies that the FSB do what is necessary to meet the afore-mentioned objectives, an extremely vague and ambiguous directive. Clearly, the Service is mandated to carry out an extensive, all-encompassing set of tasks, further including, beyond those already noted, the following: organize undercover operations and define procedures for infiltrating targeted organizations and groups, in addition to defining procedures for meeting its other tasks, including the countering of terrorism, subversion, espionage, organized crime and corruption, extremism, arms, drug, migrant and special technical collection device trafficking and money laundering, handling of agents and informants, protecting state secrets, providing security clearances, monitoring and handling encrypted and classified communications, securing installations and their communications from leakage, protecting borders, waterways, natural resources, animal and plant life, military counterintelligence and security for special troops and military formations and their administrative agencies, as well as the internal affairs, drug trafficking, and customs agencies, securing the defense complex, atomic industry, nuclear power engineering, transportation and communications, vital services in large urban and industrial centers, and other strategic facilities, and space research and scientific development projects.

Furthermore, the FSB is tasked to coordinate a wide range of activities, including counterintelligence operations, in addition to many activities that take into consideration (part of) FAPSI's incorporation into the FSB, such as communications and information security, relevant issues surrounding special technical devices, communications

networks, early warning systems, and audio signal boosters, i.e., their design, production, purchase, import, export, regulation, certification and licensing, in addition to measures and handling of encrypted and secure communications for subsidiary agencies and troops, and to develop a system of official communication (currently known as the "vertyushka," an ATS-2 government line), encryption keys, and means to detect electronic surveillance devices and radio frequency emissions of electronic transmitters. Moreover, the FSB is tasked to define procedures for the provision of security clearances and access to undercover investigative operations and information, and provide operational security to counterintelligence operations. Clearly, the 2003 mandate significantly increased the range of activities for which the FSB was empowered to handle and control, far beyond that of the Soviet KGB. Given the concomitant move of numerous chekists into official political positions, dominating the government at all levels, chekist capture and effective control of the Russian state was complete by the end of Putin's first presidential term.

5.6: THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE (SVR) MANDATE

The Russian FIS and main civil espionage agency is known as the Sluzba Vneshniy Razvedky, or SVR. The SVR is the successor to the First Chief Directorate (FCD) of the Soviet Komitet Gosudarsvennoy Bezopasnosti, or KGB. The FIS has been relatively consistent in its structure, functions, and leadership, with a limited number of changes made in order to make it an effective FIS in the changed world of the 21st century. From the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse to the present, there have been less than a handful of laws/mandates on the FIS, at least those that have been unclassified and posted in the public domain, including:

- Presidential Edict No. 293, issued on December 18, 1991;
- 1992 "Law on Foreign Intelligence"; and,
- 1996 RF Federal Law No. 5, "On Foreign Intelligence."

Immediately following the August 1991 KGB-led coup attempt, the KGB FCD was renamed the Central Intelligence Service, TsSR, ultimately being renamed the SVR two months later. The SVR's original legal basis was outlined in **Presidential Edict No. 293**, issued on December 18, 1991, which directive made the FIS an independent state body.[102] Its functions included the usual FIS repertoire of foreign intelligence collection (including agent recruitment and handling and building of espionage networks) and analysis and dissemination within the national government in support of foreign policy, detailed further below.

The **1992 "Law on Foreign Intelligence**," written by the SVR leadership itself, a tradition that continues to date across the Russian intelligence community, was passed in August of that year, and, for the first time, provided a legal basis for intelligence operations. Importantly, it eliminated any chance of LVD, and set the stage for the wholesale penetration by chekists of all levels of the government and economy during the Putin administration. The law provided that, "career personnel may occupy positions in ministries, departments, establishments, enterprises and organizations in accordance with the requirements of this law without compromising their association with foreign intelligence agencies." Further, "career personnel of foreign intelligence agencies may not occupy other salaried positions unless this is a professional necessity." In other

[102] The SVR is the direct successor to the Central Intelligence Service (TsSR), a name that lasted for only two months following the August 1991 failed coup attempt and resultant restructuring of the intelligence services.

words, those under non-official cover or enjoying "active reserve" status can hold multiple positions.

Since the Soviet Union was a closed state until its 1991 collapse, it had been mainly foreign intelligence officers (FIOs) who had traveled internationally and gained familiarity with the workings of capitalism and global markets. This knowledge gave them a significant advantage in acquiring wealth in the post-Soviet era, an advantage only enhanced by their possession of political information and state secrets, in addition to an understanding of the real situation in the country, which enabled them to more easily manipulate developments following the Soviet demise.

Another provision of the law addressed cooperation between the SVR and other government bodies, reading "Ministries and departments of the Russian Federation will assist the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation in their intelligence activities."[103] Not limited to the SVR, the law also referred to coordination with the GRU and FAPSI. In regard to tasking, the law made the collection of economic and scientific-technological information from the West a top priority.[104] While the SVR and GRU predominantly handled the HUMINT, FAPSI collected TECHINT and was responsible for code and cipher tasks.

It is odd that the SVR mandate stipulated the principle of respect for individual rights and freedoms in relation to the conduct of intelligence activities, given that they are conducted overseas.[105] Perhaps it was only meant as an image-enhancing measure

---

[103] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloaks,* p. 119.

[104] Ibid., pp. 119-20.

[105] Ibid., pp. 120-21.

designed to reassure and mislead the West. In continuation of the 1990s trend, legislation was drawn up to provide an illusion of democratic reform, yet state officials remained above the law in carrying out their activities, just as in Soviet times when the only meaningful law was the orders issued by the Central Committee of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leadership. Once the new 1993 Russian Constitution was ratified, its Articles 71, 72, 76, and 80 were interpreted as providing the constitutional basis for the SVR, thus laying the legal foundation upon which subsequent presidential edicts and federal laws on the FIS were based.[106]

On December 8, 1995 **RF Federal Law No. 5**, **"On Foreign Intelligence,"** was passed by the State Duma and signed by Yeltsin a month later, on January 10, 1996. This law further defined the FIS's status, organization, functions, and procedures for monitoring and overseeing its activity. Additionally, it authorized the FSB to work outside Russia in certain target areas in cooperation with the FIS. When Yeltsin was reelected in June 1996, this law was in effect and remains the SVR's legal basis to date.[107] Of note, at the time this law was passed, the Duma Committees on Security and International Affairs both created subcommittees to deal with intelligence matters.

5.6.1: Identified Threat Perceptions and SVR Functions

As identified in the SVR's 1996 mandate, the functions of the FIS include industrial, economic, military, and political espionage; recruitment of FIS officers and

---

[106] "Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)," *Wikipedia*, accessed in December 2006, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Service_(Russia).

[107] "SVR - Russian Intelligence Service," *agentura.ru*, 2000-2001, pp. 1-21. The GRU was tasked with gathering "military, military-politico, military-technical, military-economic, and ecological information"; gather HUMINT through military attaches and foreign agents, maintains SIGINT and IMINT (image recon and SAT imagery) capabilities, and engages in military-related economic and technological espionage. Also, see "FSB Operations," *GlobalSecurity.org*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/fsb-ops.htm.

others with access to secrets as agents; run counterintelligence in foreign lands; disinformation (active measures); covert and wet (assassinations) operations; personnel security for government personnel and their families overseas; research and analysis of collected information and other raw intelligence and its dissemination to inform and support government policy and operations; conduct of liaison activities with FISs; and, establish and operate information systems and communications networks pertaining to foreign intelligence administration. The SVR also maintains spy communications and satellites. In Putin's further consolidation of information control by the Russian intelligence services, in 2000 the SVR gained control of Moscow-based spying installations used to maintain communications with SVR *rezidents* and stations abroad. The stations had previously been under FAPSI control; after FAPSI was reorganized, the SVR assumed control, even renting some of the antennas to commercial organizations,[108] including banks and other financial enterprises, which gave it access to their communications while also providing a market for agency encryption hardware and software[109] until Putin prohibited the practice as part of his move to establish firm Kremlin control over all intelligence/security sector assets.

5.6.2: SVR Structures

The SVR is based in Yasenovo, a suburb in southeastern Moscow. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the SVR is divided into three principal groups of directorates (Directorate S, responsible for illegal agents — those under deep

---

[108] "Even Weather Works Against Russian Spying," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 8, September 11, 2000, p. 2.

[109] Gordon Bennett, "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information," *Conflict Studies Research Centre*, Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst: England, August 2000.

cover throughout the world; Directorate T, responsible for the collection of scientific and technological intelligence; and, Directorate K, carries out infiltration of foreign intelligence and security services and exercises surveillance over Russian citizens abroad), and three services (Service I, which analyzes and disseminates intelligence collected by SVR officers and agents, publishes a daily current events summary for the president, and make assessments of future world developments; Service A, responsible for planning and implementing active measures; and, Service R, evaluates SVR operations abroad), and maintains 11 geographical departments, which serve as the operational core of the SVR.[110] Similarly, according to *www.agentura.ru*, the SVR is divided into eight directorates, three services (Service A: Designated Secret Operations, Service R: Radio, and Service I: Information), and 17 geographical departments. These two sets of structures are very similar to those of the SVR's predecessor, the KGB-FCD. However, while FISs tend to maintain relative continuity in their functions regardless of political change, it is likely that the SVR's structure, as other states' FISs, was adapted to new, post-cold war global realities. Hence, as a suitable alternative, it makes sense to draw from the SVR's official Web site to glean a picture of the service's contemporary structure, posted at http://svr.gov.ru/ and depicted in graphic form in Figure 5.1 below:

[110] "SVR Organization," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/svr/org.htm.

Figure 5.1: The SVR Structure as depicted on the official Web site of the FIS:



Finally, and for the sake of comparison given that the above graphic has been posted on the SVR Web site but remained unchanged for a number of years now, a site that has not provided an abundant amount of information on developments regarding the Service, in any case, another version of the Service's structure, as posted on the *Wikipedia* Web

site,[111] which accuracy is also unestablished, but given the dearth of information available, is outlined below:

Executive Directorate (Office of the Director)

- Protocol Office
- Power Structure Liaison Office
- Legal Counsel
- Public, Media and Press Relations Office
- SVR Historian
- Inspector General

Directorates

- Personnel (primary)
- Analysis and Information (primary)
- Science (primary)
- Operations (primary)
- Operational Logistics & Support (primary)
- Foreign Counterintelligence (ordinary)
- Economic Intelligence (ordinary)

According to *Wikipedia*, the Executive Directorate serves as a sort of strategic advisory team. In the absence or leave of the director, the principal deputy director of the SVR serves as the acting director and can be assigned duties analogous to a chief operating officer. Each of the seven directorates is headed by a deputy director, appointed by and reporting directly to the SVR director. The Inspector General (IG) is apparently a new post, obtained through appointment by the SVR director with the approval of the RF president. The IG is believed to serve as the overseer of operational readiness inspections, financial audits, and internal affairs/professional responsibility investigations on behalf of the SVR director. The IG staff consists of accountants and highly experienced FIOs who

[111] See *Wikipedia* at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Service_(Russia), accessed on March 3, 2007.

have received additional training in criminal investigation through the FSB. Finally, the SVR is believed to consist of an estimated 14,500 full time equivalents (FTEs).[112]

The SVR maintains offices in the UN and in Russian embassies, consulates, and trade representation offices throughout the world from which its officers operate under legal-official cover, enjoying diplomatic status. The SVR also maintains illegal residencies, established parallel with the legal *rezidenturas*, or residencies. Illegals have no direct links with the official establishment and operate under business, journalistic, student, NGO, or other cover, and have no diplomatic status. If they are caught engaged in espionage activities, rather than being deported persona-non-grata (PNG), they can be arrested and sentenced to long prison terms and/or traded for another spy. As with any global FIS, officers with official cover are preferred for recruitment operations, while illegals, given their relative invisibility, are better suited to handle recruited agents, especially in hostile environments.

The officers, or *rezidenty*, engage in agent recruitment and handling, intelligence collection, espionage, active measures, and other operational tasks. Although SVR personnel often use diplomatic cover when assigned abroad, the FIS frequently uses journalists for cadre work, and many SVR officers consider it one of the best covers. For example, Col. Gen. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, who was appointed SVR director in 1996, graduated from the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Affairs (MGIMO) with a specialization in Asian countries. He spent his entire career in the KGB, living for 15 years in South Asia, working under the cover of journalist.[113] Former SVR Director

---

[112] Ibid.

[113] See "Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), *GlobalSecurity.org*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/svr.htm.

Yevgeni Primakov also practiced journalism, as did former KGB-FCD Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin, who studied journalism as his cover while on his first assignment as a young KGB officer to the U.S., at the prestigious Columbia University in New York.[114] The Kremlin has long-relied on illegals as exemplified by Rudolph Abel, Reino Gitkin (the Felix Bloch case),[115] and, most recently, Paul William Hampel.[116] The practice is expected to continue well into the 21st century, as the opportunities and benefits of operating under commercial cover in a globalized economy and information age are self-evident.

As to SVR analysts, they are assigned to either a geographic or functional division within the Operations Directorate in order to interact with operational personnel. The Analysis and Information Directorate has core analysts who collate and analyze information and write necessary documents, briefing materials, and papers to inform policymakers.[117] *Wikipedia* notes that, "Unlike intelligence analysts in other FISs, SVR analysts are not shy about adding their opinions and providing recommended courses of action (with projected outcomes analyses) as addenda to their products; in fact, Presidents Yeltsin and Putin and their administrations have encouraged this practice. Many of the SVR's analytic products have been disseminated to other governments (especially since the events of 9/11) and have gained the SVR greater stature and respect as a premier

---

[114] Author interview with Oleg Kalugin, September 7, 2006.

[115] Bill Gertz, "Canada arrests 'illegal' spy from Russian intelligence," *The Washington Times*, November 25, 2006, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20061124-105912-7400r.htm.

[116] "Accused Spy Deported by Canada," *The Moscow Times*, Issue 3569, December 28, 2006, p. 3, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/12/28/014.html.

[117] See *Wikipedia* at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Service_(Russia), accessed on March 3, 2007.

global intelligence organization."[118] Given that the quality of these reports is classified, as are the reports, that statement is difficult to verify. In any case it is of interest that in 2006 the SVR made a historical series available to the public, in both paper and CD-ROM forms.[119]

5.6.3: The SVR Academy

The SVR's academy, its main training institute located in the Moscow suburb of Yasenovo, is the former Andropov Red Banner Institute, renamed the Foreign Intelligence Institute in the 1990s, and under Putin becoming the SVR Academy. *Wikipedia* notes that the SVR's Science Directorate organizationally houses the SVR Academy.[120] It is said to provide world-class training, education, and facilities to officer candidates and other students. Academy professors are highly experienced intelligence practitioners, many holding advanced degrees from Russian, British, American, Canadian, and other universities. Yevgeni Primakov has lectured there on occasion, along with many other former spies, including British intelligence defectors George Blake and Kim Philby of the Cambridge Five spy ring. To support its mission, the SVR has a "publishing house" where professors, students, and SVR executives can publish books, training manuals, research compendiums, and in-house journals. The SVR Academy coordinates all training and education needs (in-service and external) for the FIS's global workforce, including basic and advanced operations curricula, counterterrorism courses, and even some doctoral courses.

---

[118] Ibid.

[119] Viktor Yasmann, 'Russia: Nostalgia For USSR Increases," *RFE/RL*, December 23, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/12/133fdd19-7078-4be8-92c2-85c566275229.html.

[120] Op. cit., *Wikipedia* at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Service_(Russia).

Changes in the FIS curricula have corresponded with the regime's mandate for change in the nature of intelligence analysis. *Wikipedia* notes that on the analytical side of the FIS and since its inception, "the SVR has departed from past precedent analysis methodologies of the KGB FCD. No longer are the analytical products (assessments, estimates, white papers, and strategic studies) geared toward a preconceived or political agenda or rife with Communist era political correctness, but are geared with a mandate of objectivity from analysis of both open source and collected information." The site posts the observation that, "This is a major change because under the U.S.S.R., the political leaders wanted the raw intelligence and would perform the 'analysis' themselves — whereas the RF's leaders want professional, scholarly, in-depth analyses and briefings provided for them."[121] In his study on the FIS, Gordon Bennett notes that students are required to study the following: operational work; languages; philosophy; sociology; economics; psychology; information, operational and technical analysis; literature and art, Russian and foreign, relevant to their future work; basics of unarmed combat; driving various types of vehicles; and, basic firearms practice.[122]

Moreover, *Wikipedia* notes that SVR analysts today tend to be paid far higher salaries and benefits than their counterparts in academia or think tanks and represent some of the best minds in the country. Many of them hold a Ph.D. or master's degree in their field or discipline, primarily international relations, area studies, economics, political science, history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and law. Under Putin and SVR Director Gen. Sergei Lebedev's leadership, the salaries and benefits paid to SVR

---

[121] Ibid.

officers dramatically improved. For example, in 2002 all SVR officers received an across-the-board 50% raise (in addition to the ordinary salary adjustments for state employees) and new (tax-free) allowances to afford a home, condominium, or apartment in the RF (and while stationed overseas). Thus, SVR officers now receive competitive salaries with the Russian and CIS private economic sectors and special tax advantages.

As a consequence of the increased status and privileges provided to SVR (and FSB) officers, recruitment is up significantly (as is Russian espionage against the West) and has become extremely competitive. The requirements for the job are similar to the U.S. CIA in that candidates must be citizens between 22 and 35 years old (although age waivers may be granted on a case-by-case basis by the director), have good mental and physical health, no criminal record (felonies), and a bachelor's degree, with a graduate degree in law, international relations, foreign languages, public administration, economics, criminal justice, business, geographic area studies, engineering, computer science, or history highly desired. Prior military and overseas experience are also considered desirable. Finally, all personnel, just as in any other RF ministry, serve at the pleasure of the ministry head (in this case, the SVR director).

5.6.4: Provisions for Political Control, Parliamentary Oversight/Democratic Accountability Mechanisms

The SVR is subordinate and answers directly to the RF president. The FIS is represented on both the Security and Defense Councils, of which its director is a statutory member. The power of the RF president to exercise executive direction and control of the SVR is based on Articles 80, 83, 86, 87, and 90 of the Russian Constitution. Further,

---

[122] Gordon Bennett, "The SVR: Russia's Intelligence Service," The Conflict Studies Research Centre, Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, March 2000, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/svr/c103-gb.htm.

pursuant to Articles 2, 4, 5, 10, 12, and 14 of the 1996 law, "On Foreign Intelligence," the RF president exercises executive oversight and supervision of the SVR. Further, the president has the prerogative of special administrative privilege to issue special orders, instructions, and decrees concerning foreign intelligence (on behalf of the Duma and Federation Council). At solely his discretion, these can remain secret or be made public. Pursuant to Article 25, the Procurator General has the authority to investigate and assess whether the SVR is in compliance with Russian law, and pursuant to Article 24, the legislative branch monitors the FIS's financial and staffing issues. Most appropriations bills for the SVR start in the Federation Council rather than in the Duma. According to Russian law, the RF Comptroller's Office has the right to audit the intelligence expenditure estimate,[123] although the SVR budget is classified and is not made public. SVR officials provide regular briefings to members of the Federation Council and the Duma, which both conduct parliamentary hearings and investigations, with both chambers' deputies enjoying the right to put deputies' questions to SVR leaders.[124]

5.6.5: SVR Chains-of-Command and Leadership Appointments

As noted above, the SVR's chain-of-command runs from the residents up through the various directorates' deputy directors to the deputy director, director, and the RF President. As compared with the FSB, the SVR leadership has changed much less often, remaining relatively stable, just as have its structures and functions since the break-up of the FSU. This is to be expected given that the operations of FISs do not generally change substantially regardless of the type of political regime, while the domestic

[123] Ibid.

intelligence/security services by their very nature change significantly in correspondence with regime type.

Past and Present Directors of the SVR[125]

- **Lt. Gen. Sergei Lebedev (May 20, 2000 – present),** a career chekist,[126] with Trubnikov being appointed as ambassador to India in July 2004.[127]
- **Vyacheslav Trubnikov (January 1996 - May 2000)**
- **Yevgeny Primakov (September 1991 - January 1996)**, with deputy-chief Trubnikov

5.7: THE FAPSI MANDATE

The Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) replaced the KGB's Eighth Chief Directorate (communications), and following debates on legislation creating the new agency in December 1992, was established on February 19, 1993 by a Presidential Decree, "On the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency."[128] This decree provided four areas of jurisdiction to the new agency: 1) special communications (including government communications); 2) cryptographic and engineering technical security of encrypted communications; 3) intelligence gathering activities in the sphere of special communications; and, 4) provision of special information to higher bodies of authority.[129]

---

[124] See Op. cit., "Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)."

[125] See "Лебедев Сергей Николаевич," at the SVR Web site, http://svr.gov.ru/history/leb.html.

[126] "Смена директора Службы внешней разведки," *agentura.ru*, http://www.agentura.ru/timeline/2000/lebedev/.

[127] Roman Kirrilov, "Russian ambassador in India is in danger," *Pravda*, September 9, 2005, http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/09-09-2005/8893-ambassador-0.

[128] Op. cit., "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information."

[129] "FAPSI Operations," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/ops.htm.

In 1994, Yeltsin approved the Statute on FAPSI, which remained secret.[130] Further, FAPSI's legal basis stemmed from a number of RF laws, including, "On the Federal Organs of Government Communications and Information," "On State Secrets," "On the Certification of Products and Services," On the Legal Protection of Programs for Computers and Data Bases," and federal laws, "On Information, Information Technology, and Protection of Information," "On Participation in the International Exchange of Information," "On Communications," the 1996 law "On Foreign Intelligence" (responsibilities under this law include collection of information pertaining to "political, economic, military, science and technology through use of electronic means"), and, other laws, edicts, and normative legal acts of the president and the RF government.[131]

5.7.1: FAPSI Functions, Structures, and Powers

The main functions of FAPSI were to conduct intelligence involving coded communication, provide cipher clerks for the SVR and other foreign intelligence components, intercept and decipher other countries' communications, develop cryptographic hardware and codes, ensure information security, develop holograms, conduct information warfare against enemies' communications and computer systems and defend Russian ministries, agencies, and services against same, develop the technological basis of the country's administrative system and the command and control of the Russian Armed Forces in peacetime, wartime, and emergency situations, provide communications for the defense minister, his first deputies and the command of Armed

---

[130] Ibid.

[131] "FAPSI Legislative Authority," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/legis.htm.

Forces' large strategic formations during staff and command-staff exercises and military games, and exercises involving troops on a strategic, operational-strategic and operational scale, and provide the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces with communications, channels, and a cryptographic elements.[132]

The agency was also responsible for providing secure communications for all higher state authorities, as well as various (unspecified) organisations and enterprises both in Russia and abroad, and coordinating and organizing all federal organs of government communications and information.[133] FAPSI also controlled the communications systems of large, strategically important companies and banks, giving it the ability to monitor financial market operations. With the authority and capability to penetrate all government and private information services in Russia, FAPSI was responsible for communications security, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT). However, the agency had no powers of investigation, arrest, or detention and its counterintelligence work was conducted by the FSB. Regardless, with control over all communications networks in Russia, including government and special communications and all commercial encoded communications, FAPSI wielded significant power on its own.[134]

According to former FAPSI General Director Col. Gen. Aleksandr Starovoytov (1991-1998), SIGINT accounts for about 80% of the Russian intelligence services' most valuable and objective information obtained worldwide. He elaborated: "We are engaged

---

[132] Ibid. Also see Gordon Bennett, "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information," *Conflict Studies Research Centre*, Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst: England, August 2000.

[133] Op. cit., "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information."

[134] Ibid.

in global electronic intelligence...The main feature distinguishing our reports from those that come via the covert agent networks of other special services is that ours is documented. We have access to a vast number of sources. We have a round-the-clock flow of decoded information which can produce fundamentally diverse viewpoints."[135] FAPSI operates a HF/satellite network for SIGINT and transmission of government and intelligence traffic in cooperation with the SVR and GRU (such as agent communications), and cooperates with the FISs, both civilian and military, at SIGINT facilities around the world, including those in embassies and consulates.

FAPSI was responsible for maintaining government and presidential communication system and telecommunication lines (the "vertyushka"), and controlled Russia's physical communications systems, including government telephone lines, high-frequency communications, and cryptography services, and maintains communications lines for the Russian President and security services (which responsibilities were re-assigned to the GUO as the Government Communications Administration from 1992 to 1996, only to be transferred back to FAPSI following the June 1996 reorganization of the GUO and its renaming to the FSO), including: 1) *ATS-1 ("Kremlin")* telephone communications for senior leaders in the offices of heads of RF ministries and departments (first deputy ministers upward), and also some other organs of authority; 2) *ATS-2 ("Hotline")* is similar, and is used by deputy ministers, heads of departments, and main administrations in important ministries and departments, and a number of other officials at similar levels of responsibility; 3) *High Frequency* is an intercity coded telephone communications used mainly by regional leaders and for conversations with them; and, 4) *Special switchboard* includes telephone communications for the most

[135] Op. cit., "FAPSI Operations."

senior leaders, including the president and his assistants, the prime minister and his deputies, and the heads of the power structures.[136]

FAPSI developed the protected, *Special-Purpose Federal Information and Telecommunications System (SFITS or ITCS)* for state administrative agency communications. SFITS/ITCS links most federal agencies, and includes technical and administrative documents, government directives, and legal information from both the executive and legislative branches of government. The new digital telecommunications system was reportedly referred to at FAPSI as *"Area 98"* since all its numbers begin with 98. Yeltsin's **Presidential Edict No. 334** of April 3, 1995 gave the development of ITCS the status of a presidential program. The new system was being funded with money from the Hermes German Government credit, using Siemens-manufactured communications equipment and Russian encryption equipment. Operating on fiber optic cables, the new system is laid in existing tunnels, with one such cable replacing hundreds of heavily armored communication cables. The system is not confined to a narrow circle as were previous systems. Rather, it was designed with plans for large numbers of subscribers. (When the GUO was reorganized in 1996 and the Government Communications Administration was returned to FAPSI control, the system could only handle about 300 subscribers. In November 1997, it was reported that over 2000 were supported.[137]) Base stations of this system have been installed in government houses, the State Duma, the Federation Council, and the Presidential Staff building on Staraya Ploshchad. Most of the Russian regions were connected to the system during the second phase of implementation.

---

[136] Op. cit., "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information."

The information component of SFITS/ITCS was being developed as a system of situation centers, with the highest element the RF president's situation center; followed by departmental and regional information analysis centers and focal points in organizations and institutions, together with mobile multi-functional complexes for use in wartime and in emergency situations. Finally, the telecommunications component of the SFITS/ITCS is the *Russian Integrated State System of Confidential Communications (RISSCC)*. The *Atlas* protected data transmission network was developed as a matter of priority and is now functioning with the aim of forming the nucleus of the RISSCC. A transport component was developed during the deployment of the Atlas packet switching data network (PSDN), ensuring the transmission of documentary information between the administrative centers of the RF components. Terminals set up in the supreme state organs ensure the exchange of classified information, and the technical questions involved in ensuring the interaction of this network with other communications networks, including Infotel, Relcom, and Rosnet, were resolved.

As to cryptologic support, although it was not authorized to monitor domestic voice traffic, FAPSI by no means abandoned the Russian tradition of government monitoring of communications. FAPSI was empowered to monitor and register all electronic financial and securities transactions and to monitor other electronic communications, including private Internet access. In 1995 the Russian Duma refused to approve a proposed law banning all encryption systems that were not approved by FAPSI. However, in a circumvention of that challenge, the provisions of the law were instead implemented by **Presidential Decree No. 334**, issued on April 3, 1995. The

---

[137] "FAPSI History," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/history.htm.

decree stated that FAPSI's expanded role is aimed at "intensifying the struggle against organized crime," and tasked the agency to establish a country-wide telecommunications system to register operations, including securities transactions, on the financial market. The decree required commercial banks' compliance in their dealings with the Central Bank of Russia. Further, FAPSI was authorized to monitor, register, and record all electronic financial transactions in the country, and to require banks and other financial institutions themselves to pay for the service. The money FAPSI thus raised was to be divided between FAPSI and a special fund of the president's programs.

FAPSI was a major investor in the Relcom Joint-Stock Company, which operates the network popularly called the "Russian Internet" (the name Relcom, the "k" represents the Russian transliteration of "c," comes from "Reliable Communications"). The Relcom network is important for understanding the development of computer networks and the Internet in Russia. It was the forerunner of Internet connectivity, when it linked the FSU with the global Internet in 1991. Since then, the Relcom developed into the primary provider of Internet access in Russia.[138] The firm controls Russia's largest electronic mail network handling telecommunications projects for the Russian Central Bank, the Finance Ministry, and the Defense Ministry. This participation apparently consisted both of an effort to ensure control over major forms of communications, along with some profit-seeking interest as well. As noted, the 1995 decree restricted the use of encryption software to only those programs approved by FAPSI. In order for a company in Russia to use encryption, it was required to first be pre-registered with FAPSI. To register with

[138] Bob Travica and Blaise Cronin, "The Business Web in Russia: Usability for the Western User," Paper presented at ASIS'96 Annual Conference, February 1996, http://www.asis.org/annual-96/ElectronicProceedings/travica.html.

FAPSI, users were required to assess the degree of confidentiality needed. The decree provided no indication as to what methods of encryption (if any) were authorized by FAPSI, and users had to consult the encryption providers, who could only discuss encryption upon gaining clearance from the FAPSI registration authorities. The decree also instructed the RF Customs Committee to ban the import of any "encryption facilities" that lacked a FAPSI-approved license.

In April 1995 Yeltsin ordered the creation of a new Federal Centre for Protection of Economic Information, to be supervised by FAPSI. To further tap into the communications among the banks, PSSs, commercial firms, and their links abroad, he also issued Edict No. 334, "On Measures Relevant to the Observance of Legality in the Field of the Development, Production, Sale and Operation of Encryption Systems, as Well as the Provision of Services in the Field of the Encryption of Data." Following that, he ordered the construction of the secure Special Purpose Federal Information and Telecommunications Systems (ITKS) for the state administrative agencies, and gave it presidential status, a move that was subsequently approved as a federal action program by RF Government Decree No. 97-4. The ITKS was to be based on the Presidential Information Analysis Centre, and its main contributors were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Ministry of Defense, FSB, SVR, MVD, Emergencies Ministry (MChS), FAPSI, and other unspecified bodies.

Located across Russia in 28 regions, FAPSI also ran the Regional Information Analysis Centres (RIATs), which serve as the Kremlin's information gathering outposts, analyzing over 1200 regional publications and transmitting their analyses to Moscow, along with other information. Finally, in April 1996, Yeltsin signed Presidential Directive

No. 171 creating the RF Situation Centre, a 24-hour crisis center probably similar to the U.S. President's Situation Room, and entrusted its development to FAPSI. With the agency controlling all electronic communication links of both parliamentary chambers, a databank of several integrated databases, plus the commercial communication channels in Russia, the president could task FAPSI to provide a comprehensive and substantive report on both the public and private aspects of the political-economic situation in Russia.[139]

Operating both at home and abroad, FAPSI collected intelligence on foreign business ventures, including confidential bank transactions. It was authorized to engage in commercial operations and lease radio frequency bands and government communications lines to both domestic and foreign companies. FAPSI participated in the founding of the commercial enterprises, the Simaco and Roskomtekh, two commercial enterprises headed by Valeriy Monastyretskiy, who was appointed chief of the FAPSI Financial and Economic Administration in March 1994.[140] Roughly two years later, on April 12, 1996 the FSB arrested Monastyretskiy on charges of misappropriating property and abuse of position, and alleged that he was working for the BND (German intelligence). These allegations were likely to have been yet another political intrigue as, at the time, GUO Chief Anatoly Barsukov and SPB Chief Alexander Korzhakov were attempting to usurp FAPSI powers under their own security services. Monastyretskiy defended himself by claiming he had learned that Barsukov's GUO had purchased special eavesdropping equipment from CIA-connected companies to be installed in Russian

---

[139] Op. cit., "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information."

[140] Op. cit., "FAPSI Operations."

government offices, and that when he attempted to prevent the pervasive surveillance of the Russian bureaucracy, he found himself an FSB military intelligence target.

As corroborative evidence that it was a Barsukov-Korzhakov political intrigue, shortly after Monastyretskiy's arrest, stories of financial irregularities and improprieties by FAPSI leaders, as opposed to the rank and file, began surfacing in the media in what appeared to be a well-orchestrated campaign by Barsukov and Korzhakov to discredit the agency's leadership. Given the enormous power of FAPSI, political struggles over its management and, hence, control of information, surveillance, and counter-surveillance technologies were quite likely to occur. This political battle ended, however, both Barsukov and Korzhakov lost their positions as a result of another scandal (related to campaign financing for Yeltsin's 1996 reelection) and FAPSI regained the Government Communications Administration assets.[141]

5.7.2: FAPSI and the CIS

Early in his tenure as head of FAPSI, Starovoytov sought to create an interrepublican coordination Committee for Government Communications. On May 15, 1992 the 10 CIS heads of state met in Tashkent and signed an agreement on ensuring the security of the means of encryption and set up the Government Communications Co-ordinating Council. Officially established on June 23, 1993, the Council would control and coordinate the operations of all government communications services within the CIS. In the mid-1990s, Russia developed a new generation of encoders and provided codes to many of these CIS states. On May 13, 1998 the Council held its eighth meeting, discussing the improvement of cooperation on security of means of encryption and their

[141] Op. cit., "FAPSI History."

use in the government and state communications systems. It followed in September that the CIS member states Government Communications Organs and Troops held joint exercises, "Commonwealth-98." Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia took part. Indicative of the Council's success, a smaller-scale exercise in October 1996 had included only Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.[142] FAPSI also maintained a number of bilateral and intergovernmental agreements with CIS member states on information protection and was also considering its commercial market.[143]

5.7.3: SIGNINT/ELINT at External Military Bases

Moscow has a number of agreements with foreign countries on SIGINT cooperation. For example, in 1994, Russia and Latvia signed an agreement giving the Russians the use of the Skrunda SIGINT site until 1998. Other (publicized) agreements have been made with Azerbaijan, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and Yemen. The partnership with Cuba regarding the Lourdes listening post is decades old. Most of the (radio teletype) RTTY and numbers transmissions heard in North America (short wave radio) originate from various transmitter sites in Cuba.[144] Between 1996 and 2002, the Russian intelligence services operated at least four major SIGINT stations: 1) Lourdes, in Cuba; 2) Cam Ranh Bay, in Vietnam; 3) Ramona, in North Korea; and, 4) Ras Karma, on Socotra Island, Yemen. In late 2001, Putin announced the closures of the first two, and in

[142] Op. cit., "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information."

[143] Ibid.

[144] Op. cit., "FAPSI Operations."

1997, the North Korean station was closed, although it is believed to have been reopened since then, while the Socota site remains active.

It was during a Defense Ministry meeting held on October 17, 2001 that Putin announced the Lourdes listening post, in Torrens, Cuba, a 28-square mile facility located 13 miles south of Havana (and created in 1964 after the Cuban Missile Crisis[145]), would be shut down. The GRU, FAPSI, and Cuban intelligence (DGI/DI), and the SVR, which has a communications center there for its agent network in North and South America,[146] jointly operated the SIGINT/ELINT base known as Lourdes, which also supplied feed to the Soviet SOUD information system — the Integrated Information Assessment System.[147] Although the Lourdes facility was ordered closed, the GRU still maintains a special communications brigade of approximately 1600 men based there. This brigade strives to intercept hundreds of millions of radio, telephone and other electronic communications, government and private, from the U.S., but with technology evolving from microwave to fiber optic, its take is quite limited relative to the cold war years.[148]

In 1979 the Soviet Union had signed a 25-year lease with Vietnam for use of the base at Cam Ranh Bay (Vietnam), (a base for the Pacific Fleet's operations in Southeast Asia and around Australia).[149] As at Lourdes, the bases were run jointly by FAPSI's

---

[145] "Cuban spy facility to become Spy Museum?" Security and Intelligence Digests from Aleksey Shcherbakov, November 16, 2001, *agentura.ru*.

[146] "Lourdes [Cuba] Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Facility 23° 00' 01'N 82° 286' W", *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/c80_04.htm.

[147] Op. cit., "Cuban spy facility to become Spy Museum?"

[148] Dave Emery, "Russian Sigint," February 16, 1997, http://www.jya.com/rusigint.htm.

[149] "Russian Defense Minister Promotes Military Space Center in Plesetsk...And Says He Has No Regrets About Lourdes," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 8, March 1, 2002.

Third Directorate and the GRU's Sixth Directorate.[150] Cam Ranh Bay subsequently became the largest Soviet naval base outside the Soviet Union. However by the early 1990s, the Russian military was in dire straits. With the original lease coming to its end, Vietnam demanded $200 million in annual rent for the continued operation of the base. The Kremlin decided to pull out, with the move expected to begin on January 1, 2002.[151] Russia had proposed to Hanoi the possibility of joint exploitation of the base in a peaceful way until 2004, while the terms of agreement remained valid.[152] Regardless, in March 2002 Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told the Duma that Russia had begun dismantling the naval base, that it "did not meet Russia's demands," and that the decision "to dismantle the facility" was taken together with the Vietnamese government.[153] The Russian flag was lowered for the last time on May 2, 2002.[154]

In a February 12, 2002 interview to the *Wall Street Journal*, Putin had defended his pullout decisions, saying that the closure of the military base in Vietnam was "an absolutely correct decision "because the Russian Navy hadn't used it for almost nine years, and that a similar justification existed for closing the Lourdes site. Further, he stated that, "at the same time, we have reached an understanding with Azerbaijan and signed a long-term agreement on maintaining our military presence there in one of the

---

[150] Aleksey Shcherbakov, "Major Loss of Intelligence Gathering Capability," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/shcherbakov.htm.

[151] "Russia cuts back intelligence gathering, Russia cuts back military installation abroad," The Security and Intelligence Digests from Aleksey Shcherbakov, October 18, 2001, *agentura.ru*.

[152] "Russia Offers Vietnam Joint Exploitation of Kamrahn Base," *Gazeta.ru,* March 14, 2002.

[153] "Russia Begins Dismantling Base in Vietnam," *RFE/RL Newsline*, March 13, 2002, p. 3.

[154] "Russia's Strategic Retrenchment Continues," *Monitor*, Vol. 8, Issue 90, The Jamestown Foundation, May 8, 2002, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=25&&issue_id=2255.

key areas in the Qabala radar center."[155] On January 25, 2002 Russia and Azerbaijan reached a new agreement[156] on the status of the Qabala radar station, which had been built in 1985 to monitor ballistic missile launches of the Soviet Union's southern neighbors; the station has a maximum tracking range of 7200 kilometers, or 4464 miles, collects intelligence information about space in the Western sector, and tracks ballistic missile launches in Russia and Central Asia. The information analysis center at the site constantly transmits data on the missile-space situation to the Russian missile attack warning system. During the 1991 Desert Storm operation, Qabala also provided valuable information to Moscow.[157]

As to the Ramona station in North Korea, it was reportedly established in 1985 and staffed by 80 GRU and FAPSI personnel. In 1997, it was closed, but not dismantled, when North Korea abrogated the 1985 treaty that set it up. FAS reports that the existence of facility was revealed by the judge trying the career Russian diplomat, Valentin Moiseev, for allegedly spying for South Korea. When he passed the verdict, the judge said that, "the Court had established that Moiseev had informed the South Korean Intelligence Services that the agreement between the Russian Federation and PRNK for the operations of the ELINT facility at RAMONA in North Korea had ended in 1997."

---

[155] "The Oligarchic Way Is Not the Best for Russia: President Putin gives an interview to Wall Street Journal," *TheRussianIssues.com*, February 12, 2002, www.therussianissues.com/headlines/2002/02/12/1013507407.html.

[156] The terms of its lease and payments: 1) determined to be within the framework of Russia's missile and space defense system, to be leased to Russia for a term of 10 years at a rate of $7 million per year. It will be operated by 1500 Russian servicemen. Plus, Moscow agreed to pay $31 million in overdue electricity supplies payments to the radar over the 1997-2001 timespan. Baku also urged the Kremlin to share intelligence gleaned from the site. The new deal reflects this, allowing for Azeri troops on site and ensured that data is shared. Baku was to provide air defense for the radar installation, while Moscow was to modernize the air defense system and provide new components for it.

[157] David Johnson, ed., "Russian radar in Azerbaijan seen as response to US ABM withdrawal," *ITAR-TASS*, published in *Johnson's Russia List*, January 27, 2002, www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6043-3.cfm.

This was the first time that the site's existence had been revealed in public.[158] While presently unknown, it is certainly possible that the Russian intelligence services are again utilizing the facility as a valuable platform, particularly in light of the ongoing concerns about Pyongyang and the search for a solution to the nuclear proliferation issue.

In any case, FAPSI (in 2003 folded into the FSB and Defense Ministry) and the SVR still retain another overseas SIGINT/ELINT facility at (The People's Democratic Republic of) Yemen's Ras Karma Military Airbase, near QaDub on Socotra Island, which lies opposite the Somalia coast at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean. Of note, the U.S. also maintains a SIGINT facility on the island. The post-9/11 high-level of activity there by U.S., British, and other states' military forces in the war against terrorism highlights the importance of this surveillance facility to the Russians[159] in their military espionage pursuits. Further, Russian ELINT ships often trawl the waters in the area in an effort to collect intelligence.[160] This SIGINT base is of key importance to Russia's intelligence collection on a variety of states' warships in the gulf and region and activities in the fight against terrorism, as well as developments in the violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Of course, Russian SIGINT extends to the numerous listening units on naval vessels and aircraft, and those operating from its foreign embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic missions, which platforms are not covered here, but the point must be made that they do indeed exist. No doubt, for any country, a complete listing of SIGINT sites would be highly classified.

---

[158] Aleksey Shcherbakov, "Major Loss of Intelligence Gathering Capability," *Federation of American Scientists*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/shcherbakov.htm.

[159] "Socotra Island," *The Security and Intelligence Digests from Aleksey Shcherbakov*, November 16, 2001, *agentura.ru*.

5.7.4: The FAPSI Academy

Since 1992 the primary higher education establishment for the agency was The Military Institute of Government Communications of the Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), based in Orel and with a five-year curriculum. Prior to that year, it had been called the Higher Military Command Signals School (VIPS), had had the status of a military unit, and a four-year curriculum. The VIPS renaming was part of a fundamental reform to improve its level of training, and also brought its relocation to Orel. Preceding that, the primary higher education establishment devoted to communications and cryptology had been the KGB Military Technical College, opening in 1966 with a three-year curriculum and located in Bagratinovsk.

FAPSI's Military Institute of Government Communications trained specialists in communications networks and systems, multichannel telecommunication system, radio and TV broadcasting, automatic systems of information processing and control, and protection of telecommunication systems. The Institute also worked closely with the FSB Academy's Institute of Cryptography, Communications and Information Technology, and apparently runs only advanced cryptographic courses for those who have already graduated from the FSB Institute. FAPSI recruited from not only its own and the FSB Academy, but other specialized and top tier schools around Russia as well, including The Cryptographic Academy, Moscow State University, Moscow Physicotechnical Institute,

---

[160] "India-Russia Naval Relations," *India Defense Consultants*, May 14, 2003, http://www.indiadefence.com/IN_RUS_naval.htm.

Moscow Institute of Engineering and Physics, and the Military University and Communications Schools of the Russian Ministry of Defense.[161]

5.7.5: Provisions for Political Control, Parliamentary Oversight/Democratic Accountability Mechanisms

Outside the Kremlin, there is no meaningful oversight of intelligence in Russia, with periodic (and selective) reporting consisting of non-informative presentations to the Duma and typically devoid of any intelligence information the extent of it. Gordon Bennett noted in his examination of FAPSI that, "On paper the controlling bodies of FAPSI were the Security Committee of the State Duma, the Control Directorate of the Presidential Administration and the Auditing Chamber of the Ministry of Finances. In reality the sole master of the new organization was Boris Yeltsin."[162] The same held true under Putin, a life-long chekist with an even greater penchant for secrecy.

5.7.6: FAPSI Chains-of-Command and Leadership Appointments

FAPSI is directly subordinate to the RF president and is based in the executive branch of government.[163] Appointments are made by the RF president.

FAPSI Past and Present Directors[164]

- **Lt. Gen. Vladimir Matyukhin (May 1999 - March 2003)**
- **Col. Gen. Vladislav Sherstyuk (December 1998 – May 1999)**
- **Col. Gen. Alexandr Starovoytov (August 1991 – December 1998)**

---

[161] Op. cit., "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information."

[162] Ibid.

[163] "FAPSI Legislative Authority," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/legis.htm.

[164] Op. cit., "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information."

5.8: THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (GRU) MANDATE

The Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), or Main Intelligence Directorate, is Russia's military intelligence service; created in 1918, it is the foreign intelligence arm of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and it carries out the functions of the central organ of military intelligence within the General Staff. In December 2005 a magnificent new GRU headquarters was opened with much fanfare, in the lot next to the previous GRU headquarters, known as the "Aquarium," located at Khodynka Airfield near Moscow and easily accessible by metro. Information and pictures of this new building are available at http://cryptome.org/gru/gru-eyeball.htm and http://militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=96692&page=2. The new headquarters is impressive, and denotes the importance Putin places on the Service, with oil and gas and arms exports funding its tremendous growth over the past few years as the state recovered from the financial challenges of the early 1990s. As he told his GRU audience on opening day of the new headquarters, "The state will continue to pay heightened attention to strengthening the service."[165]

5.8.1: Identified Threat Perceptions

At a November 5, 2001 ceremony marking the GRU's anniversary day of celebration (National Military Intelligence Day), Putin had stated that the GRU's role "will greatly increase, not only as a tool of foreign policy but also as an element of military policy and defense." In this context, Putin continued, clarifying that the GRU constituted an important part of Russian military efforts in the Caucasus and, especially,

---

[165] "[Putin] Speech at the New Headquarters of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff," *Johnson's Russia List*, #24, JRL 2006-252, November 8, 2006, and also published at www.kremlin.ru.

in Chechnya, where, he lamented, 421 GRU officers had died in the past two years alone. Putin's timely visit to GRU headquarters was highly symbolic — although the Russian military intelligence service was first created in 1810 by Tsar Aleksandr I, the GRU celebrates its anniversary on the date that Leon Trotsky signed a 1918 directive establishing the agency.[166] Like the FSB, SVR, and Soviet KGB, the GRU most closely identifies with the Bolsheviks and traces its lineage to the old Soviet regime.

When in November 2006 he returned to again mark the GRU anniversary and speak on current threats, Putin unambiguously insinuated in speech reminiscent of cold war rhetoric that U.S. preponderance, unilateralism, and policy must be countered, intelligence operations designed to glean America's secrets surrounding her strategic missile, space weaponry, and new nuclear weapons modernization and warheads programs must be devised and run, and efforts continued in the counterterrorism and counterproliferation realms to protect the country.[167] Clearly, the U.S. was the primary espionage target, and cooperation on the latter fronts less likely as the chekist regime consolidated its position and hardened its stance against the West as it sought high oil and gas prices through the fomenting of instability and increasing of arms sales to America's antagonists. GRU defector Col. Stanislav Lunev states in his 1998 book, *Through the Eyes of the Enemy*, that Yeltsin had "ordered the GRU and the rest of the intelligence apparatus to make commercial and industrial espionage its primary mission," and that "Today, American business is the chief target of the GRU, the SVR, and the entire network of Russian spies. Their paymaster is the Russian mafia. Their goal is to make

---

[166] "Putin Speaks at GRU Celebration," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 44, 21 November 2001.

[167] Op. cit., "[Putin] Speech at the New Headquarters of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff."

Russian mobsters rich. Compared to the military operations we used to run," he says, "the work is easy."[168] Indeed, the people of Russia, too, see the regime as the most dangerous mafia.[169] Former DCI Woolsey observed back in 1997 that one could not tell the difference between a Russian intelligence officer, businessman, and organized criminal. Under Putin, corruption has only deepened. Further, and especially since the 2003 arrest of Yukos Oil Company owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky and state sale of his assets, there has been a rapid redistribution of resources under Putin, with leading chekists and their clients the dominant beneficiaries, today exercising control over the state, its economy, and the intelligence tasking, presumed to support chekist-owned enterprises.

5.8.2: GRU Functions, Structures, and Powers

The GRU mandate and other directives on its precise functions and structure are classified. Drawing from information that is publicly available, GRU operations are regulated primarily by the Federal Laws "On Foreign Intelligence," "On Defense," and "On Security."[170] Hence, some aspects of the military intelligence service's legal bases may be derived from this legislation. For example, the 1996 law "On Foreign Intelligence" tasked the GRU with gathering "military, military-politico, military-technical, military-economic, and ecological information." Although this law does not provide for the GRU to operate inside Russia, GRU "territorial intelligence" is conducted by the intelligence organs of the military districts and fleets, and by other military units

---

[168] Stanislav Lunev with Ira Winkler, *Through the Eyes of the Enemy*, Regnery Publishing, Inc.: Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 12.

[169] In addition to general reading of media on Russia, many straw surveys by this author over the years in the U.S. and in Russia have consistently led to this conclusion.

[170] "Documents: GRU," *agentura.ru*, http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/gru/docs/.

and large units under GRU jurisdiction.[171] As indicated by Putin and documented in a small number of Russian language sources,[172] the GRU is also heavily involved in the Chechen conflict, its activities in Chechnya authorized by presidential edict and a directive from the defense minister giving the GRU the authority to perform a fundamentally new role in resolving the Chechnya conflict, that of organizing and conducting intelligence activity to support the operation to disarm the Chechen armed formations.[173] GRU Director Valentin Korabelnikov himself has been credited with orchestrating the April 1996 assassination of Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev. While running GRU intelligence and special forces operations in the republic, the general traced Dudayev's cellular telephone with a surveillance aircraft and helped guide a missile to his location, killing him instantly.[174] Two books in the Russian language that extensively document GRU activities in both Afghanistan and Chechnya include C. Kozlov's 2002 books, *Spetsnaz GRU* and *Spetsnaz GRU-2*.[175] In addition, Gen. Gennadi Troshev's 2002 book, *My War: A General's Diary of Chechnya* , and 2003 book, *Chechen Repeat: Memoirs of a Commander*, are useful memoirs for gaining a view of the Russian side of the conflict.[176]

---

[171] "Legislative Authority, Main Intelligence Administration (GRU)," Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/gru/legis.htm.

[172] See C. Kozlov, *Spetsnaz GRU*, Russian Panorama: Moscow, 2002; and C. Kozlov, *Spetsnaz GRU-2*, Russian Panorama: Moscow, 2002.

[173] Op. cit., "Legislative Authority, Main Intelligence Administration (GRU)."

[174] Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "GRU Chief Visits," Inside the Ring, *Washington Post*, February 15, 2002, http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring021502.html.

[175] Op. cit., *Spetsnaz GRU* and *Spetsnaz GRU-2*.

[176] Gennadi Troshev, *My War: Diary of Chechnya*, Vagrius: Moscow, 2002; and, Gennadi Troshev, *Chechen Repeat: Memoirs of a Commander*, Vagrius: Moscow, 2003.

The GRU also has a Space Intelligence Directorate located in Vatutinki, 50 kilometers southwest of Moscow, that is responsible for managing the space reconnaissance program in coordination with the Fleet Intelligence Direction of the Fifth Directorate, which is responsible for space systems that provide intelligence supporting naval forces. Further, the Space Intelligence Directorate is responsible for the development, manufacture, launch, and operation of Russian space-based reconnaissance systems. It operates its own cosmodromes, several research institutes, supporting mission ground centers, and a centralized computer processing facility.[177]

The GRU is responsible for a wide range of activities. It gathers HUMINT through military attaches and foreign agents, recruiting and running its own spy networks, and controls its own spy communications. It also maintains Russia's signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery reconnaissance and satellite imagery (IMINT), communication intelligence (COMINT), electromagnetic intelligence (ELINT), radar intelligence (RADINT), television intelligence (TELINT) and infrared sets reconnaissance capabilities.[178] The military intelligence service maintains it own analytical and scientific-research centres, with analysts evaluating intelligence, researching military-technical issues, forecasting political and military developments, analyzing trends in technological and economic competition, and preparing reports to support national security policy.

Until Gen. Korabelnikov's appointment as GRU chief in 1997, the Service was headed by Gen. Fedor Ladygin, who had stated that the GRU was increasingly focused

---

[177] "Vatutinki," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/facilities/vatutinki.htm.

[178] "What is GRU?" *Venik's Aviation*, March 21, 2003, www.aeronautics.ru.

on target areas in which civil and military interests intersect. In a November 5, 1996 interview published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* Ladygin said that one of the GRU's main priorities was military-related economic and technical espionage, to prevent Russia from sinking "to the status of a third world country."[179] With arms exports, along with oil and gas, the leading sources of government revenue to date, the GRU is expected to be highly active in the top weapons/weapons technology producing countries for espionage purposes, and in client/potential client states to market or gain market share from competitors (as well as recruiting agents everywhere). With this intersecting focus on arms development and exports, the traditional animosity that existed between the KGB and GRU, and now SVR and GRU overseas, may have, particularly under Putin, become less of a complicating issue in an operational context, yet conflicts most certainly exist over profit-sharing. With the chekist-dominated state under Putin's leadership taking control of many strategic resources and assets, including much of the arms business, a sector directly overseen by SVR Director Sergei Lebedev, cooperation between the two rivals is mandated to more efficiently fulfill missions in line with Kremlin aims.

The lucrative oil and gas business, also controlled by Kremlin-based chekists, is another area in which civil and military interests intersect. For example, in February 2005 Russia agreed to sell sophisticated MiG jet fighters[180] and 100,000 Russian-made Kalashnikov assault rifles (AK-103s)[181] to Venezuela (which presents a direct threat to the stability in the region with the potential for many of the arms to be transferred to

---

[179] "Operations of the Main Intelligence Administration," *GlobalSecurity.org,* http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/gru-ops.htm.

[180] "U.S. 'Troubled' by Venezuela Deals," *The Moscow Times*, February 14, 2005, p. 3.

[181] "Venezuela to Purchase 100,000 Kalashnikovs From Russia," *MosNews.com*, May 18, 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/05/18/venezuelarifles.shtml.

FARC and ELN forces in Colombia, where Washington has injected billions of dollars of foreign aid to help Bogota combat the drug trafficking that feeds the guerrillas operating in the country).[182] The Kalashnikov deal, formally signed in May 2005, includes a commercial offer by Moscow to help build a factory to produce the automatic rifles in Venezuela, while it was also planned that 45 Venezuelan arms experts will undergo training in Russia on the production process.[183] Further, in June 2005, a top military officer in Caracas, Gen. Wilfredo Silva, reported that "a numerous group" of employees of Venezuela's state-run oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, had joined the army reserve, would join with soldiers from other branches of the military to train in the use of anti-aircraft rocket launchers and anti-tank combat, and were already in the process of repairing military weapons systems.[184] Indicative of long-range plans to continue the arms flow to Caracas, state-owned arms export agency Rosoboronexport planned on and subsequently opened offices in Venezuela, in addition to Belgium, Italy, and Myanmar.[185] The GRU is believed to be deeply involved in the region as it seeks to expand its arms markets to former clients of the United States.

Given that GRU structures are a state secret, information on them is sketchy. Some reports suggest that the GRU consists of 12 primary directorates (departments) and nine auxiliary departments. The primary directorates, which are responsible for military intelligence collection and operations, include: First Directorate (Europe); Second Directorate (North and South America, UK, Australia and New Zealand; Third

---

[182] Op. cit., "U.S. 'Troubled' by Venezuela Deals."

[183] Op. cit., "Venezuela to Purchase 100,000 Kalashnikovs From Russia."

[184] "Oil Workers Getting Arms Training," *The Moscow Times*, June 7, 2005, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/06/07/258-print.html.

Directorate (Asia); Fourth Directorate (Arica); Fifth Directorate (tactical reconnaissance); Sixth Directorate (radio electronic reconnaissance, shares satellite reconnaissance responsibilities with the auxiliary satellite reconnaissance department); Seventh Directorate (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)); Eighth Directorate (states of particular interest at any given time); Ninth Directorate (military technologies); Tenth Directorate (military finances); Eleventh Directorate (matters relevant to military doctrines and weapon types of foreign armies); Twelfth Directorate (counterintelligence).

This organizational structure is remarkably similar to that identified in the 1984 book, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*, written by GRU defector Vladimir Rezun, who uses the pseudonym of Viktor Suvorov, which, although dated, does provide the reader some general understanding of the GRU's organization (although reoriented toward the post-cold war political context), expected to be much like any mature military intelligence service operating today, but in the Russian case, probably responsible for and engaged in considerably more activities, as has historically been the case with its intelligence/security services. Suvorov noted that there were four directions, including the First Direction (agent intelligence in the Moscow region); Second Direction (agent intelligence in Berlin), Third Direction (national liberation movements); and, the Fourth Direction (agent operations from Cuban territory) directly subordinated to the first deputy director. Plus, there were six geographic directorates, which were further divided into directions focused on intelligence collection and illegals (Europe, excluding the UK but including Morocco; North and South America, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand; Asia; Africa; Operational Intelligence; and, Electronic Intelligence); a Cosmic Intelligence Directorate; Fleet Intelligence; Chief of Information; Seventh Directorate

---

[185] "Beijing Preparing Major Arms Deal," *The Moscow Times*, December 28, 2004.

(NATO); Eighth Directorate (individual countries plus NATO); Ninth Directorate (Foreign Military Technology); Tenth Directorate (Military Economics); Eleventh Directorate (Strategic Nuclear Issues); Twelfth Directorate (unknown); a Political Department; Personnel Directorate; Administrative/Technical Directorate; Financial Directorate; Operational Technical Directorate; First GRU Department (replication of foreign identity documents); Eighth GRU Department (internal communications security); Archives Department; and, Spetsnaz, noted earlier.[186]

It is likely that this structure has changed to some extent in the wake of the Soviet collapse and in order to effectively deal with new political-military realities, such as dissolving the direction for national liberation movements and adding counterterrorism and counterproliferation directorates. Indicating that this may indeed be the case, and responding to the question put by an *Izvestia* journalist, "What are the shares of "militarized" and "intellectual" operations in the GRU presently? And how much this proportion has changed from the Soviet times?" in a rare interview in July 2003, GRU Director Korabelnikov stated that, "The world is not the same as 20, 30, and 60 years ago. To a significant extent, the conditions, structure, nature, and geography of threats have changed. It is quite clear that this has also required a certain extent of reorganization of those structures that make up the military intelligence and close on the GRU. There is also a new reality — international terrorism. The topic has become one of the most urgent for many states and naturally, for intelligence agencies. In these circumstances, depending on the situation, the proportion of the militarized and the intellectual elements

[186] Viktor Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*, Macmillan Publishing Co.: NY, 1984.

as you put it, changes. In definite conditions, the intellectual element of intelligence is used; and the militarized one, where required."[187]

Like their civilian (SVR) counterparts, the GRU maintains legal and illegal residencies overseas. On the official cover side, intelligence officers are based in embassies, consulates, and trade representation offices and pose as military attachés, diplomats, and trade representatives. The illegals, ensconcing themselves deep within foreign societies, often pose as businessmen, scientists, or whatever cover is operationally most sensible for the particular task at hand.

The GRU also has special units, Spetsnaz, for special tasks, including high-end counterterrorism operations and assassination abroad, including the December 1979 assassination of Afghanistan President Hafizullah Amin under the direction of the KGB, and February 2004 assassination of former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev in Qatar. GRU special units are specially equipped and trained for liquidating specified targets of the Kremlin. According to *Venik's Aviation*, the GRU possesses the largest and the most elite group of special operations forces, consisting of 24 assault units numbering up to 25,000 troops and forming the core of the Russian Army. To serve in these units, one must have already served at least five years with other special forces and hold a rank of captain.[188] Based on historical data, the Spetsnaz regiments are subordinate to the GRU Fifth Directorate, having had a peacetime force during the 1980s, excluding agents, of 27,000-30,000 men. The state's top professional athletes tend to be recruited into these

---

[187] Svetlana Babaeva, "Valentin Korabelnikov: Smart and Well-Trained People Work With Us," *Izvestia*, July 17, 2003, posted at http://www.cdi.org/russia/265-17.cfm.

[188] Op. cit., "What is GRU?"

forces, as do others of significant physical and mental prowess and endurance.[189] They are typically excellent marksmen and capable of sophisticated operations.

5.8.3: The GRU Academy

The Military Diplomatic Academy has long been the acknowledged training school for intelligence officers (they take a three-year course), of which most graduates are posted to the GRU,[190] while army intelligence sought recruits at the Higher Military Counterintelligence School.[191] Of note, there are a number of military academies in Russia from which the GRU could draw recruits, the most familiar being the Frunze Military Academy, which in 1998 combined with the Malinovsky Military Academy of Armored Forces to become the Combined Arms Academy, and the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy, in 1997 renamed the Peter the Great Military Academy of the Strategic Missile Forces. GRU defector Viktor Suvorov notes in his 1987 book, *Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces*, that officers were trained at the Military Diplomatic Academy, particularly the 3rd faculty (operational intelligence). He notes that training for the very best Spetsnaz officers took place at a special faculty of the Lenin Komsomol Higher Airborne Command School in Ryazan, entailing four years of grueling training.[192]

---

[189] Viktor Suvorov, *Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces*, Macmillan Publishing Co.: NY, 1987.

[190] Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Birds: Soviet Postwar Defectors*, Henry Holt and Company: NY, 1989, p. 172.

[191] Ibid., p. 283.

[192] Op. cit., *Spetsnaz*, pp. 74, 200-201.

To date, the Military Diplomatic Academy is the primary training school for GRU officers, with GRU Director Korabelnikov (1997-present) himself an alumni.[193]

5.8.4: Provisions for Political Control, Parliamentary Oversight/Democratic Accountability Mechanisms

The GRU is marked by a high degree of secrecy and information on it is extremely difficult to come by, with few defectors, a dearth of publications, and little media coverage on the service over the years. With its mandate classified, exact specifications on control and accountability are unclear. *Venik's Aviation* suggests that the GRU is subordinated only to the chief of general staff and defense minister, and does not report directly to Russia's political leadership. Moreover, the intelligence reporting structure denies Russian civilian leadership direct access to the intelligence produced by the GRU, and they can get access to the reporting only through the defense minister or the chief of general staff.[194] This information squares with that provided in Suvorov's 1986 book, *Inside the Aquarium: The Making of a Top Soviet Spy*,[195] in which he states that the GRU is directly subordinate to the General Staff,[196] with authority presumed to flow up the chain to the defense minister and, ultimately, the RF president. Outside of the direct chain-of-command, the only "oversight" that exists actually comes in the form of justice, which the Military Prosecutor's Office and Military Courts prosecuting, convicting, and meting out punishment for those transferred to these authorities.

---

[193] J. Michael Waller, "Echoes of Russia in USAID Privatization Aid For Kazakhstan; House Majority Whip Junkets with Chernomyrdin Influence Peddlers," *Russia Reform Monitor*, No. 302, American Foreign Policy Council: Washington, D.C.: August 25, 1997, http://www.afpc.org/rrm/rrm302.htm.

[194] Op. cit., "What is GRU?"

[195] Viktor Suvorov, *Inside the Aquarium: The Making of a Top Soviet Spy*, Macmillan Publishing Co.: NY, 1986.

[196] Ibid.

5.8.5: GRU Chains-of-Command and Leadership Appointments

The GRU director, which post is held by a general, is appointed by the RF president and reports directly to the Chief of the General Staff. The first deputy director, which post is held by an officer with the rank of colonel general, is responsible for all intelligence procurement operations except those performed by the other main directorates (see above) outside of his four departments, and reports to the director. Of interest, prior to current GRU Director Korabelnikov's 1997 appointment by Yeltsin, he had served as first deputy director, participating directly in operations. As noted above, he served in Chechnya, where he was wounded, and where he directed Spetsnaz operations, including the afore-mentioned operation in which he is believed to have masterminded and supervised the April 1996 assassination of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev.[197]

The Past and Present Directors of the GRU

Like that of the SVR, the GRU leadership has been rather stable since the Soviet Union's collapse, providing for its relatively uninterrupted activities and operations at home and abroad. Past leaders are shown below:

- **Gen. Valentin Korabelnikov (1997 – present)**
- **Gen. Fedor Ladygin[198] (1992 – 1997)**
- **Lt. Gen. Yevgenii Timokin[199] (1991 – 1992)**

---

[197] J. Michael Waller, "Russia's Security Services: A Checklist for Reform," *Perspective*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, American Foreign Policy Council, September-October 1997, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol8/Waller.html.

[198] "Operations of the Main Intelligence Administration (GRU)," Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/gru/ops.htm.

[199] "Chiefs of Military Intelligence," *agentura.ru*, http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/gru/shefs/.

5.9: THE STATE TECHNICAL COMMISSION (GOSUDARSTVENII TEKHNOLOGIAM KOMISSIYA, GosTekhKomissiya, GTK)

The State Technical Commission (GTK) is not an intelligence service per se, yet is tasked with important intelligence functions and so is included in this study. The GTK is responsible for protecting state secrets, which it has been tasked for the past 25 years, and official information, preventing its loss through technical channels and counteracting FIS operations in Russia. The GTK is composed of 23 members from 19 principal agencies concerned with state secrets, including ministers, state committee chairmen, and first deputies of these leaders. It is subordinate directly to the RF President. As such, its decisions constitute orders that must be followed by all government units (agencies, enterprises, organizations, institutions) that have information that is classified as a state or official secret.

The GTK and FAPSI have coordinated their activities in some cases, including on holograms and passports, and the licensing and certification of some telecommunications systems. In the mid-1990s, the GTK and FAPSI signed a joint resolution on "State Licensing of Activity in the Information Security Field," authorizing the latter to monitor the market for information security systems other than cryptographic. In 1996 the Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets was set up to enforce the licensing system.[200] The GTK has been tasked to implement the functions of the Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets, as required by the law, "On State Secrets," and the State Program for Guaranteeing the Protection of State Secrets in the Russian Federation. At the request of the State Duma Committee on Security, the GTK drafted the law "On Information Protection From Loss Through Technical Channels and

[200] Op. cit., "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information."

Counteracting Technical Intelligence Services," which clarifies the GTK's goals, tasks, and organizational basis of information protection counteracting the technical operations of FISs.

Furthermore, regarding state secrets, the "Information Security Act," was designed to provide legal protection to a variety of secrets, including the operations of state, military, commerce, and banks, as well as personal data, microcircuits, and digital signatures. It includes: 1) Administrative and Physical Protection; 2) Protection against unauthorized access to information in single systems (comparable to COMPSEC; 3) Protection of information and availability in networks (comparable to COMSEC); 4) Protection of Electronic Document Interchange, including regulation of digital signatures; 5) Protection from compromising secrecy by detection of signals and electromagnetic radiation (TEMPEST-like); 6) Protection from malicious software (viruses, etc.); and, 7) Protection against threats to Intellectual Property, illegal copying, etc.[201]

The Commission created a specialist training system for the protection of state secrets and information, and established standards for licensing enterprises and organizations that provide information protection services, as well as standards for the certification of technical information protection systems. The GTK systematically monitors information protection systems throughout government entities, and analyzes and evaluates the effectiveness of the adopted protection measures in order to determine weaknesses and possible improvements to the systems.

Furthermore, and as noted previously FAPSI, the Service had closed information protection cooperation agreements with Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and possibly Belarus,

---

[201]"State Technical Commission [GosTekhKomissiya] Gosudarstvennii Tekhnologiam Komissiya," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/gtk/index.html.

and aimed further to develop cooperation with CIS countries on coordinating national laws in the information sphere based on the "Recommended Legislative Act On the Principles of Lawful Regulation of Information Relations in the Interparliamentary Assembly Member-States."[202] With FAPSI's folding into the FSB and Defense Ministry in 2003, these functions and responsibilities were absorbed accordingly.

5.10: CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have shown how the wide range of tasks historically carried out by the Soviet secret services continue to be included within the repertoire of the unreformed post-Soviet intelligence/service sector. The difference lies in the domestic and international contexts, which mandate changes, such as the new focus on counterterrorism domestically in light of the situation in Chechnya, and, with the transition of the state's economic system to a bureaucratic corporatist model, internationally, economic espionage is a top priority, as well as the work to uncover foreign political, industrial, and science and technology secrets. Finally, it was shown that while the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services' functions, structures, and powers are rooted in legal mandates, they are broad and vague, providing for no constraints on their activities. Moreover, provision to carry out old secret police activities can be deduced from the ambiguous language used in the mandates, and the contemporary Services' powers remain extensive, today exceeding those of the KGB at its zenith. How these developments came about in the context of the political transition is the topic of the next chapter.

[202] Ibid.

INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY: A RUSSIAN CASE STUDY OF SECRET POLICE TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST-SOVIET CONTEXT

By

Julie Anderson

VOLUME II

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2008

CHAPTER SIX

CHEKIST POWER AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT: NO LIBERAL CHEKISTY

6.1: INTRODUCTION

This chapter consists of an analysis of the political adjustments made by the chekists in response to changed domestic circumstances and also in the context of the changed international environment, including an examination of the phenomenon and implications of numerous former intelligence/security officials, unchallenged by LVD, gaining *political* leadership positions (through elections and appointments) and also retaining key command posts within the intelligence/security sector. Totally contrary to the idea of lustration/vetting/de-communization (LVD), with its design to remove old repressive forces from power and thus enable democracy to develop, it is precisely old Soviet KGB officers who have gained control of the machinery of government in post-Soviet Russia and use the unreformed secret police to bolster and support their rule. I show that rather than being excluded from leading positions, as an LVD policy is intended to do, thereby allowing for democratic-minded political leaders to gain control of the political agenda and institute a secret police transformation that facilitates a successful democratic political transition, the chekists have come to completely dominate the political sector to the exclusion of democratic-oriented individuals and groups and reestablishing an exclusive, authoritarian government.

Thus, in this chapter, I focus on chekist political activities and influence on the domestic front and explain how they thwarted Russia's democratic transition under Yeltsin and reversed it under Putin. During the Yeltsin era, the oligarchs exercised the primary influence on the Russian state, using their political connections to gain access to

and control Russia's vast wealth, which further bolstered their power. Under Putin, however, that situation reversed, with the state coming under control of the chekists, who subordinated the oligarchs to their political agenda and used their newly-gained power to seize control of the value-added wealth of select oligarchs. I argue that in the immediate wake of the Soviet Union's demise and the discredited Communist party's collapse, Russia's failure to institute an LVD policy enabled old Soviet functionaries, particularly the chekists and their nomenklatura patrons, in partnership with organized criminals, to shape developments, a process that continued throughout the Yeltsin era, and facilitated the chekists' ultimate gaining of control of the state under career chekist RF President Vladimir Putin. By the fourth year of Putin's first presidential term, chekists had supplanted not only democratic elements, but also the purely organized crime elements in political posts and private security services (PSSs) and gained political control of the military and interior ministry (already controlling their own intelligence/security services), achieving the unquestionable domination of and control over all the coercive instruments of state power.

This process of political change was accompanied by a gradual forcing out of those democratic forces and individuals who had acquired political posts, thus minimizing and eventually negating in total (by December 2003) their effective influence on the political transition and policy process. Thereby, non-democratic elites — that is, in particular, the chekists and their patrons and clients (including members of the old Soviet nomenklatura and organized criminals) were able to thwart democratic reforms directly, including those measures geared toward transforming the secret police into

democratically accountable intelligence/security services that respect the rule of law and human rights.

By 2000, when Putin gained the Russian presidency, the nexus between political elites/nomenklatura, chekists-siloviki, and organized crime (OC) that developed and evolved during Yeltsin's tenure had become firmly cemented, with numerous implications for the Russian intelligence/security services. Personnel continuity in the intelligence/security sector and chekist and organized crime infiltration into policy-making posts at all levels of government, the chekist penetration facilitated in large part by a lack of LVD, negated not only democratization in Russia but also movement toward meeting the conditions necessary for a secret police transformation, itself a precondition for a successful democratic political transition.

Instead of democracy taking hold, and with numerous chekists having moved into political posts, the unreformed intelligence/security services gained a much enhanced political acceptability both within and outside government, and thus, a legitimacy that eased their ability to not only regain substantial powers lost in the immediate post-Soviet collapse, but also to continue practicing old Soviet methods of intimidation, coercion, and control without severe criticism from within the political power structures. As many individuals from across the social spectrum have expressed, the old Soviet enforcers were better than no (state) control of the rampant crime situation sweeping the country at all. Commensurate with the chekists' emergence as the arbiters of power, political surveillance and counterintelligence activities directed against both citizens and foreigners progressively intensified. Far beyond the atrocities perpetuated in the Chechnya region, the intelligence/security sector's treatment of civilians throughout the

vast Russian country is indicative of a complete lack of its reform, with political surveillance and intimidation, extra-legal arrests, show trials, and political murder perpetrated with total impunity, just as in Soviet times.

In line with the definition of democratization provided by Asmerom and Reis and used in this dissertation — when in fact the institution of multiparty systems of rule, characterized by constitutional opposition and a commitment to both human rights and the rule of law, has taken place, democratization can be said to have taken place — in this chapter, I trace the evolution of political developments and show how a lack of LVD enabled the chekists to thwart thwart democratic institutionalization in Russia. For example, in a review of the 1999 and 2003 State Duma elections, I illustrate how Russia came full circle, with chekist creation, surveillance, penetration, and manipulation of political parties, chekist-designed and implemented laws on political parties and government, and chekist-orchestrated political murders leading to the negation of any serious political opposition and the complete exclusion of democratic influence from every branch of the national, and to a lesser but still significant and increasing degree, regional and local governments.

In sum, I illuminate how the lack of LVD has, in terms of the various foregoing issues, both hindered and inhibited democratic progress and served to block any serious effort to transform the secret police to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms (subject to the rule of law and respectful of human rights, civil liberties, and political freedoms) from taking root in Russia.

6.2: THE ROLE OF THE CHEKISTS IN DOMESTIC POLITICS

In the next section, I examine the phenomenon and implications of chekists gaining political posts and expanding their presence in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, thereby enabling them to manipulate the electoral system and political parties, tighten their hold on the management of the increasingly bloated bureaucracy — and exercise significant control over Russian political life.

6.2.1: On the Political Policymaking (Rather than Enforcer) Role of the Intelligence/Security Services

Being a political police, the Soviet-Russian intelligence services have always played a prominent political role, albeit during Soviet times they were subordinate to the Communist party leadership and before then, they took their orders from the tsars. In his 1984 examination of the Soviet secret police, Jonathan Adelman notes how the KGB has been the most studied police force in communist countries, yet observes that, "there still remains a dearth of works which try to analyze the secret police in the broader framework of Soviet politics."[1] This lack of focus on what was (and is) a major role of the KGB (and its successor agencies) in the politics of the country has been most puzzling, for as Amy Knight notes in her 1996 book, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, the KGB "always played a key role in Soviet politics." She notes that, in assessing the post-communist state's political evolution, "The power and influence of its successor organization serves as a gauge against which to measure the progress of political reform in Russia."[2]

---

[1] Jonathan R. Adelman, "Soviet Secret Police," *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States*, Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., Westview Press Inc.: Boulder and London, 1984, pp. 79-133.

[2] Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 4.

Before I discuss the process of the phenomenal growth in the power and influence of the post-Soviet intelligence/security services and large-scale penetration of chekists into both the political and economic arenas of post-Soviet Russia, it is crucial to make clear a major vehicle to that reality. Specifically, I argue that the failure to institute an LVD policy provided the opportunity for thousands of chekists over the past two administrations, and particularly that of Putin's, to move en masse into both elected and appointed political posts at all levels of government, thus gaining strategic positions from which to acquire and exercise direct power and influence and control over Russia's political-economic life and the political direction of the country largely unchecked by any opposing political, social, or military forces. The implications of this failure for democratic political and free-market economic reform in Russia today are hugely significant in that the democratic experiment begun in the immediate wake of communism's collapse has been unceremoniously brought to a decisive end as a result of so many chekists gaining high level political positions, and with the consolidation of a highly-corrupt, chekist-dominated state of a bureaucratic-corporatist nature.

6.2.2: Elections as a Vehicle to Chekist Infiltration of Political and Government Structures

Since 1990 and the advent of elections as part of Gorbachev's political reforms, yet with no LVD policy enacted, once communism was completely discredited and the Soviet Union collapsed, (former) KGB operatives progressively moved into (increasing numbers of) electoral posts throughout Russia's political system. In 1990, of 2756 known KGB officers who ran in republican federal, regional, and local parliamentary races, 86% won in the first round in what was still then the USSR. In the Russian Federation (RF)

alone, 57% of 630 chekist candidates won in the first round. This pattern, established during the late Gorbachev/early Yeltsin years, continued at a much more frenetic pace under Putin and has, in fact, become the trend.

And despite numerous chekists gaining political leadership posts, political spying continues unabated. In her 1996 book, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Amy Knight notes that, "the security services have extensive files on all members of the political leadership."[3] These are an invaluable resource for any politician, especially since the KGB/FSB systematically collects kompromat for use at the appropriate time, should the need arise. With high levels of corruption and contacts with organized criminals prevalent throughout all levels of government and elite circles, a significant number of those in positions of political power or having accumulated economic wealth have "dirty hands" and are vulnerable to compromise, including those chekists who have gained political office. Thus, the potential for chekist-chekist power struggles has intensified. Despite the influx of chekists into the political arena, corruption remains a primary focus of the intelligence/security services to date, albeit for reasons of a different shade than in the past; that is, personal-political interests have displaced what had been, however pernicious, policy goals in the "public interest" (in other words, party-state interests) during Soviet times. What makes the situation particularly ironic is the fact that with the mass movement of chekists into positions of political power, internecine warfare among them has increasingly been the result as they compete for power and position in Putin's

[3] Ibid., p. 5.

favor, with the Kremlin's leading chekists exercising overall control. They are the puppet masters.[4]

Russia scholar Amy Knight notes that the security services survived the Soviet Union's collapse because this was "a time of political struggle and civil disorder, when Russian leaders have depended more than ever on their ability to employ secret police methods."[5] In every political crisis or challenge that has occurred in Russia since the evolving state's perestroika program began,[6] the security services have played a decisive role or are widely believed to have participated in some way, whether it was a political power struggle, terrorist attack, organized crime activity, political corruption, weapons proliferation, domestic spying, political murder, extra-legal arrest and prosecution, electoral fraud, political intrigue, or atrocities in Chechnya.

Preceding Putin, Yeltsin, too, staffed his presidential administration with chekists. Of particular prominence were Aleksandr Korzhakov, his chief bodyguard, and Mikhail Barsukov, who ran both his security detail and the FSB, with both men enjoying daily access to the president and always at his side. In the immediate aftermath of his 1996 re-electoral win, on June 20, Yeltsin fired Korzhakov and Barsukov,[7] a political victory for oligarch Anatoly Chubais. The old Soviet chekists and "new rich" oligarchs had been

---

[4] Andrew E. Kramer, "The Kremlin Flexes, and a Tycoon Reels," and "Putin Pulls the Strings," *The New York Times*, July 8, 2007.

[5] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloaks*, p. 8.

[6] Yevgenia Albats, *The State Within the State: The KGB And Its Hold on Russia: Past, Present and Future*, Farrar, Straus, Giroux: NY, 1994. Albats is not the only author who suggests the KGB was the driver of perestroika. Also see Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story*, HarperPerennial: NY, 1990.

[7] "FSB History," *Globalsecurity.org*, July 15, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/fsb.htm.

rivals for years, and this battle between the two groups for power and influence continued into Putin's term. In regard to the 1996 presidential election, Korzhakov had wanted Yeltsin to postpone the contest due to his abysmally low approval rating, under 5 percent, but Chubais had convinced him otherwise. Their rivalry was as deeply rooted as their divergent Soviet mentalities, with Korzhakov a political conservative and policeman, and Chubais a political progressive and economist. As David Hoffman notes in his 2002 book, *The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia*, "Korzhakov said he saw himself as a champion of 'Russia and the state,' and his rivals as 'a camp of those who wanted to sell and rob this Russia.' The Chubais group saw the opposite: Korzhakov as a power-crazed reactionary who did not understand democracy or capitalism."[8]

The rivalry continued between the statists Korzhakov, Barsukov, and Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, who had served briefly as Yeltsin's reelection campaign director (until being replaced by Chubais) and not only continually interfered in the political process but also sought to change the state's economic policy, and Chubais and Victor Chernomyrdin, the former antagonizing the latter with constant attacks on privatization and advocacy of renationalization. The rivalry lessened for a period with the former's 1996 defeat, when Yeltsin fired them (Korzhakov, Barsukov, and Soskovets). Shortly thereafter, oligarch Mikhail Friedman told journalist Chrystia Freeland, as noted in her 2000 book, *Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride From Communism to Capitalism,* that Korzhakov had played one very important function: "He was the enforcer. People feared him, and that fear, which is part of the Russian political tradition, in many ways anchored the vertical power structure of the state. Korzhakov collected

[8] David E. Hoffman, *The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia*, PublicAffairs: NY, 2002, p. 352.

dirt. Further, she notes, "he knew who every governor was sleeping with, who was paying him bribes, and so forth. Maybe this was a stupid, pigheaded way of influencing the regional authorities, but it worked. If some governor tried to do something against the Kremlin, Korzhakov would just say, 'Look, I'm just going to throw you in jail and only then will we start worrying about whether it was legal or not.'"[9]

During this period, the chekist threat, however, did not extend to the most wealthy oligarchs, who competed with the chekists for Yeltsin's favor, and often won. Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski note in their 2001 book, *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy*, that, "It was during the years 1994 to 1996 that the emergence of oligarchical government in Russia became widely acknowledged."[10] For the majority of the Yeltsin era, Chubais dominated foreign economic policymaking along with a handful of oligarchs who played the major role in governmental decisionmaking and freely walked the halls of the Kremlin, having effectively sidelined the chekist bureaucracy. As Reddaway and Glinski explain, they had managed to redistribute political power by economic means to impact the political process.[11] Thus, for a period, the oligarchs significantly controlled political-economic developments in Russia, with the chekists playing a supporting, enforcement, and/or partnership role to oligarch interests as they prepared for their own accession to (the pinnacle) of power.

The symbiotic relationship between Chubais and the bankers and oligarchs enabled Yeltsin to also benefit from the significant influence of the oligarch-owned

---

[9] Chrystia Freeland, *Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride From Communism to Capitalism*, Crown Business: NY, 2000, p. 236.

[10] Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 2001, pp. 477-479.

[11] Ibid., pp. 477-479.

media, which control had been solidified by the time of the 1996 presidential election. (This arrangement, too, was reversed under Putin, with the developing chekist state taking control of the private-owned and independent national media from the oligarchs.) Hoffman notes that, "With the election victory, the tycoons and the president forged a bond — their wealth was grafted to his power. Neither they nor Yeltsin could let go of each other. As their power grew, the tycoons became known as simply the oligarchs, the men who owned and ruled the new Russia."[12] Through their vast wealth and control of a number of major media outlets, they had played the role of kingmakers, with Yeltsin, despite his low poll ratings, winning the election with 53.82% of the vote, leaving Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) leader Gennadi Zyuganov trailing with 40.31 percent. The enormous value of the media instrument was not lost on Russia's elites, and these leading oligarchs bought up all remaining major media resources in the country, purging editors and journalists who resisted their strict guidelines. The levers of power were effectively being concentrated under the control of whichever clan ruled the Kremlin, and throughout the 1990s, even in the face of numerous economic challenges and political-economic crises, the oligarchs succeeded in dominating the scene, in cooperation with "The Family" — Yeltsin and his entourage.

By March 1998, Hoffman writes, to ensure the continuity of "oligarchic capitalism" in light of Yeltsin's seriously deteriorating health (if the president steps down, the prime minister becomes president), the oligarchs, led by Boris Berezovsky, finally managed to engineer the ouster of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in order

[12] Op. cit., *The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia*, p. 2.

to replace him with someone more amenable to their interests.[13] As he had fired Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, and Anatoly Kulikov (aka the "Chubais clan") in November 1997, without explanation, on March 23, 1998 Yeltsin fired Chernomyrdin, replacing him with Sergei Kiriyenko, the 35-year old fuel and energy minister and Nemtsov protégé who had replaced his patron in that post upon Yeltsin's firing of the Chubais clan. (Interestingly, Kiriyenko would be appointed by Putin, first as one of seven presidential envoys, and then to the post of Atomic Energy Minister following the reorganization of the nuclear ministry into Rosatom in November 2005.[14]) Additionally, Yeltsin appointed Berezovsky as executive director of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Chubais to chairman of the board of the electricity monopoly, United Energy Systems (RAO UES).[15]

Once the oligarchs gained prominence in the Kremlin, armed with both tremendous political and economic capital, they exerted the greater influence among the new oligarchy components. Yet significant political power was also exercised by prime ministers Sergei Stepashin (chekist), Viktor Chernomyrdin, Sergei Kiriyenko, Yevgeni Primakov (chekist), and Vladimir Putin (chekist). The two clans, Yeltsin's "Family" and the oligarchs, and the chekists, competed for power, with the former coming out on top. Yet, as RF president, Putin reversed this situation, orchestrating the movement of chekists en masse to their former place — minus the Communist Party of the Russian

---

[13] Ibid., pp. 2-3, 404-410.

[14] Victor Yasmann, "Profile: Sergei Kiriyenko - - Russia's 'Kinder Surprise,'" *RFE/RL* February 16, 2006; and, Charles Digges and Rashid Alimov, "Rumyantsev sacked as Rosatom head and replaced by Presidential envoy Sergei Kiriyenko," *Bellona*, November 15, 2005, http:///www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/waste-mngment/40781.html.

[15] See the RAO UES Web site at http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/.

Federation (KPRF) — at the top of the pecking order, and short-leashing the oligarchs, just as he had promised during his campaign, ordering the FSB, which he had headed in 1998 and overseen as prime minister in 1999, to arrest and prosecute any who would not be brought to heal or dared to challenge him.

6.2.3: Power Relationships Under Putin

Power relations began to change immediately upon Putin's gaining of the Russian presidency. In his 2000 inauguration speech, Putin aptly observed, "the establishment of a democratic state is a process still far from completion." He also warned, "Don't deceive us. I can assure you that in my work I will be guided only by the interests of the state."[16] Always the pragmatic, Putin strategically placed his loyal chekist comrades into positions of power, typically through the employment of undemocratic methods, while actively using the intelligence/security services, his primary support base, to bolster his power. An old Soviet chekist at core, one should not have expected otherwise.

Mapping who controls the political process in Russia is of key importance for grasping some understanding of the thinking behind the decisions made. The top political decisionmakers in Russia today are almost exclusively people with an intelligence/security or military background — the so-called chekist-siloviki clan. After his formal election as RF president in March 2000, Putin immediately began staffing his administration with chekists. Of particular prominence were FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev; SVR Director Sergei Lebedev; Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov (FIS/SVR officer); two deputy heads of the administration, career chekists Viktor Ivanov and Igor

[16] "Text of Vladimir Putin's Inauguration Speech," *The New York Times*, May 7, 2000.

Sechin, the latter also chairman of the board of state-owned oil company, Rosneft,[17] and Yury Zaostrovtsev, former deputy FSB director and head of the FSB Economic Security Department and current deputy board chairman at Vneshekonombank.[18] All but Zaostrovtsev, now at the bank, continue to hold these top political posts to date and effectively control Putin's Russia.

In fall 2001 *Obshchaya Gazeta* and *Novaya Gazeta* reported that (then-deputy FSB director) Zaostrovtsev was involved in a scandal in which millions of dollars in bribes were demanded by Customs in exchange for the non-payment of import duties by the largest chain of furniture stores in Moscow, Tri Kita (Three Whales) and Grand, which imported Italian furniture and were run by Zaostrovtsev, who had also been a member of the Security Council commission that drafted an Economic Security Concept (that considered revisions of customs practices, among other topics) in August 2001.[19] In the months before his unsolved and suspicious murder, Duma deputy and deputy editor of *Novaya Gazeta*, Yuri Shchekochikhin, was deeply into an investigation of the furniture store, Tri Kita, which he had revealed was controlled by high-ranking FSB generals who used the chain to launder tens of millions of dollars, a scandal that led authorities to also investigate the Bank of New York. The bank was found to have been used by a Russian

---

[17] Boris Berezovsky, using media outlets he controls, speculated on a Kremlin-instigated plan to purge the government of Yeltsin-era holdovers, and claimed based on unnamed government ources that Putin's long-time associate and deputy chief of staff Igor Sechin runs a "shadow task force" charged with a creeping reshuffle of the government by means of corruption exposures. See Valeria Korchagina and Andrei Zolotov Jr., "Corruption Probes Stir Up Kremlin," *The St. Petersburg Times*, #718, November 2, 2001.

[18] Andrei Soldatov, "FSB Reform: Changes Are Few and Far between," *agentura.ru*, http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/fsbreform/; and, "Vneshekonombank Given A Fright," *Kommersant*, April 11, 2005.

[19] Roustam Kaliyev, "Can 'Power Ministries' Be Reformed?" *Perspective*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, September - October 2002, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol13/kaliyev.html.

organized-crime syndicate to launder up to $10 billion via two employees in its East European division, Natasha Gurfinkel Kagalovsky and Lucy Edwards, both of whom were married to Russian businessmen.[20] Shchekochikhin's murder, one of many linked to the operation, is discussed below. It was the furniture store investigation, ultimately closed by Yeltsin holdover and coopted Putin loyalist Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov only to reopen in June 2006,[21] that led Zaostrovtsev to transfer from the FSB's Economic Security Department to the post of deputy head of Vneshekonombank, which handles Russia's foreign trade.[22] This affair is reflective of the high-level corruption plaguing all agencies of the intelligence/security sector. Indeed, a March 2001 inspection commissioned by then-Interior Minister Gryzlov had found that not only did the MVD's Main Directorate for Fighting Organized Crime (GUBOP); the Main Directorate for Fighting Economic Crime (GUBEP), and Directorate R, tasked to combat criminality in the high technology sphere, not fight crime, but were involved precisely in those illegal business activities in which they were tasked to exercise control.[23]

Early in his term, on May 15, 2000 Putin reappointed the heads of the power ministries, retaining Col. Gen. Igor Rodionov as defense minister; Igor Ivanov as foreign minister;[24] Vladimir Rushailo as interior minister; Yuri Chaika as justice minister; Sergei

---

[20] BNY in $10B Russian scam, *Reuters*, August 19, 1999, http://money.cnn.com/1999/08/19/worldbiz/crime_a/.

[21] Simon Saradzhyan and Nabi Abdullaev, "Tri Kita Owner Zuyev Arrested," *The Moscow Times*, June 15, 2006.

[22] Andrei Piontkovsky, "Commentary: A Possible Link Between the Klebnikov and Shchekochikin Murders?" *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, Issue 51, July 14, 2004.

[23] Op. cit., "Can 'Power Ministries' Be Reformed?"

[24] For Ivanov's description of the evolution of Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union, see his book, Igor S. Ivanov, *The New Russian Diplomacy*, The Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2002.

Shoigu as emergency situations minister (he also headed the Unity Party); Nikolai Patrushev as FSB director;[25] Valentin Korabelnikov as GRU director; and, appointing two new faces: Alexei Kudrin as finance minister and German Gref as economic development and trade minister — both viewed as liberal economists and hailing from Putin's hometown of St. Petersburg.[26] These latter two appointments may have reflected Putin's drive to get further foreign aid monies and investment from the West, as well as benefit from their expertise on the workings of capitalist economic systems. Also in May 2000, Putin replaced Vyacheslav Trubnikov as SVR director with Sergei Lebedev, who had since 1998 (when Putin was FSB director) served as the RF's official SVR representative to the United States.[27] Almost a year later, in March 2001, Putin replaced Yeltsin holdover Igor Sergeev (who had held the post since replacing Rodionov in May 1997) as defense minister with career chekist Sergei Ivanov, a former foreign intelligence officer (FIO) who spent years in England and retired from the SVR in August 1999, becoming Security Council secretary three months later.[28]

The wholesale staffing of the top political posts with chekists that took place throughout Putin's first presidential term and continued at all levels into the second may have been planned, as suggested by an August 2001 report described by *Obshchaya Gazeta* political columnist Elena Dikun and published by the Washington, DC-based Jamestown Foundation. She noted a presentation made by FSB staff officer and director

---

[25] "Russia's Putin Moves to Assert Authority," *The New York Times*, May 18, 2000.

[26] "Putin to Boost Hold on Russian Regions," *The New York Times*, May 19, 2000.

[27] "Russian SVR Boss Lebedev Quizzed on Service Intelligence Work," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta.com*, December 20, 2002, pp, 6, 7, 20, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/svr/rg122002.html.

[28] Simon Saradzhyan, "Ivanov Stars in a Secret Memo," *The Moscow Times*, December 25, 2002, p. 1.

of the Institute of Economic Security, Yury Ovchenko, to a narrow circle of journalists in Moscow on the chekists' plan to gain control of the Russian state and reverse the political-economic reforms that had been initiated under Yeltsin. Ovchenko said that the plan entailed a transition "from an oligarchic system to a national system"…."eliminating the catastrophic consequences of the so-called reforms of 1992-1999" and "reviewing the results of illegal privatization." To that end, the plan stated that the president must bring in people from the security structures who "have huge administrative experience, know how to operate efficiently and, crucially, have a sense of corporatism."[29] The suggestion was also made that inexperienced chekists could initially serve as deputies with a view to subsequently taking over. Further, Dikun wrote,

> The security services are convinced that it will be possible to stop the leaking of capital to the West simply by bringing the Central Bank and the State Customs Committee under their control. "The management of these bodies should include people responsible for economic security, who possess detailed information on the resources which have already been exported, and who know how to talk to the oligarchs in a language they understand." It is proposed to abolish the Property Ministry (Minimushchestvo) altogether, and carry out a wholesale review of the results of privatization — to redistribute what was acquired illegally, and punish those responsible. At the same time the "function of monitoring the results of privatization should be transferred to the Security Council, whose secretary should come from the FSB system."[30]

As it happened, the leadership changes first took place with the Central Bank, then Customs, followed by the Security Council being headed by an FSB officer. Ovchenko also stated that FSB Director Patrushev was aware and approved of the plan, and that the chekists had sympathizers among the governors, presidential envoys, and

---

[29] Elena Dikun, "The Security Services Have Designs on the Kremlin," *Prism*, Vol. 7, Issue 8, The Jamestown Foundation, August 29, 2001.

[30] Ibid.

business elite, and identified Rosneft President Sergei Bogdanchikov as one. State-owned Rosneft, controlled by Igor Sechin, the company board's chairman and a career chekist and deputy head of Putin's administration was, among others, a major beneficiary of Khodordovsky's Yukos assets, including Yuganskneftegaz, seized by the Kremlin in payment for billions of dollars of unpaid backtaxes. The plan's call for a review of privatizations did indeed eventually take place, with Khodorkovsky among the first to be "punished." So, too, while beyond the time frame of this project, in May 2006 the Federal Customs Service (FCS) came under the direct control of career chekist and former head of Rosoboronexport, Andrei Belyaninov, directly responsible to Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, an old Soviet apparatchik. In his introduction of Belyaninov as the new Customs Service chief, Fradkov stated that, "By combining legislative and law-enforcement powers, the FCS, we believe, will become more efficient."[31] Finally, and also beyond this project's time frame, in September 2006 first deputy chairman of the Central Bank, Andrei Kozlov, was killed in a contract hit. He had pushed for many reforms and overseen the institution of a Russian form of FDIC and the closing of 77 banks for money-laundering and other illegal activities.

Thus, in due course, the plan was implemented. Concurrent with Putin's placing of chekists in government posts, the oligarchs were increasingly moved from the Kremlin halls and, in some cases, to the cells of the notorious KGB detention and investigative center, Lefortovo. As Lilia Shevtsova, a senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, observed, that shift signified the ongoing political struggle between two clans: 1) the "Family," consisting of the Yeltsin circle, the oligarchs and economists; and, 2) the

---

[31] "Heads roll in Russian customs service as prosecutors probe abuse," *RIA Novosti: Russian News and Information Service*, May 12, 2005, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060512/48051544.html.

"chekists," "siloviki," or "St. Petersburgers," denoting the security service personnel deriving from Putin's home town and their military and intelligence colleagues. The two clans, Shevtsova noted, have divergent views on what the role of the state should be in business and politics, with the former supporting more liberal economic reforms and the latter preferring stronger state control over both spheres.[32] As Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski noted in 2001, "...all the leading politicians and spokesmen for major sociopolitical currents — Yeltsin, Zyuganov, Luzhkov, Primakov, Yavlinsky, Glaziev, Zhirinovsky, Chubais, Gorbachev, Solzhenitsyn — argue for change in some form. They differ about the direction of reform, its targets and priorities, and what exactly in the national experience must be overcome or transformed, and what should serve as the foundation for future development."[33] This disagreement over the strategic direction of the state explained Russia's ad hoc policymaking, which Putin ultimately resolved through his construction of a chekist-dominated state.

While Shevtsova sees two, other Russia researchers and journalists identify three clans: 1) the Family, including the Yeltsinites (and most oligarchs); 2) the chekists-siloviki; including the intelligence/security/military officers; and, 3) the liberal St. Petersburgers, including Putin's economic ministers, Kudrin and Gref. Of the three, by 2004 the chekists-siloviki were clearly the most powerful and politically influential, and had extended their influence deep into the economic sector as well. More to the point,

---

[32] Steven Lee Myers, "Old Kremlin, New Kremlin: It's Still a Big Secret," *The New York Times*, August 27, 2003.

[33] Op. cit., *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms*, pp. 350-351.

whatever their categorization, Reddaway and Glinski explain that, "...all of them have had a congenital affinity for the Soviet and post-Soviet intelligence agencies."[34]

In sum, the significant political groups in Russian political and economic life since communism's collapse have been these two or three clans, however one prefers to group them; power relations in Russia center on and derive from these clans, their patrons and clients. This type of situation is nothing new; politics in Russia have historically been limited to and marked exclusively by intra-elite conflicts. For all meaningful purposes, the masses remain outside the political process, influencing neither the political agenda nor electoral outcomes, and are rarely able to voluntarily participate in any substantive way in governmental affairs. Since the Soviet Union's demise, other politically active but increasingly less significant groups include:1) young reformers (no real political base, politically isolated); and, 2) communists (especially the old pensioners, a highly-organized base but increasingly isolated from exercising political influence, which under Putin has been coopted or progressively negated).

Since Putin's gaining of the Russian presidency and installation of numerous chekists at all levels, the intelligence/security services, constantly nurtured by the regime, have acquired greatly increased powers. With chekists exercising the significant and increasingly exclusive influence over Russia's political-economic processes as Putin's chekist-dominated state consolidates, the Services constitute the party-in-power's primary support base and have been substantially bolstered and entrenched in post-Soviet society. Strengthened at base as a consequence, the chekist regime only increases its own power, shaping the state in tune with the old Soviet mentality of total control. Prominent

[34] Ibid., p. 352.

Russian journalist and defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer noted in September 2003 that these forces "seem to be in the process of taking over Russia's domestic and foreign-policy decision-making completely."[35] That same month, and just over two months before the Duma elections that resulted in all democratic-oriented parties failing to make the threshold, Kremlin political spin doctor and head of the Foundation of Effective Policy, Gleb Pavlovsky, too, acknowledged that the chekists-siloviki were close to taking power in Russia.[36] In the next section, I cover the development of numerous chekists gaining high-level political posts under Putin, beginning with his presidential administration and five of the seven envoys, and progressively extending to political structures at all levels. Putin's "vertical" ultimately became "horizontal" as well, encapsulating not only all of Russia's regions, but also the legislative and judicial branches at the centre and regional levels.

6.2.4: Chekist Political Penetration Goes Nationwide: Both "Vertical" and "Horizontal," the Matrix is Complete

In Putin's Russia, chekist infiltration of political structures is not limited to the major cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg; they have also gained electoral and appointed posts throughout the country's regions. Chekists have been installed into senior federal and regional posts, and the "siloviki clan" has built a pyramid of power that, as Nikolai Petrov, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center noted in December 2003, was reshaping Russian politics. He observed that, "The strength of the clan is in its pyramid-

[35] Pavel Felgenhauer, "Bleak Outlook 2 Years On," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, September 11, 2003, p. 9.

[36] Ibid.

like structure. It is a very powerful hierarchy."[37] According to Nikolai Petrov and Vladimir Pribylovsky, head of the Panorama Information and Research Center, Igor Sechin and Viktor Ivanov, deputy heads of the Putin administration in charge of the secretariat and personnel issues, respectively, sit at the top of the pyramid. Further, Sechin is chairman of the board of state-owned oil company Rosneft,[38] and Ivanov, a former head of internal security in the Moscow FSB (1998) and deputy FSB head in charge of economic security (1999-2000), is on the board of directors of Aeroflot, along with Aleksey Fedorov, another FSB officer.[39] Other top brass include FSB Director Patrushev and Defense Minister Ivanov. Of note, Petrov observed at the time that ambitious KGB veterans had begun working tediously over four years prior to expand their influence, installing former colleagues and loyalists as deputy heads at "virtually all" federal agencies. Making up the middle tier of the power pyramid, he wrote in 2003, they are in position to supervise Yeltsin-era officials while gaining valuable experience in preparation for taking over top posts. For example, he suggested that Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov and his Office had been coopted from "the Family" clan to that of the siloviki, as evidenced by the Yukos case. He referred to other examples, including Nikolai Negodov, a former KGB officer (1977-2000) who held the post of deputy transportation minister until he became general director of the state unitary enterprise Rosmorport (manages Russia's seaports) in October 2003,[40] and Vladimir Yakunin, also

---

[37] Anatoly Medetsky, "Dissecting Siloviki's Pyramid Of Power," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 24, 2003, p. 1.

[38] "Нефтяная Компания," http://www.rosneft.ru/company/management.html.

[39] "Board of Directors," http://www.aeroflot.com/eng/company.asp?ob_no=2046.

[40] "Руководство Компании," http://www.rosmorport.ru/content.php?id=397.

believed to be former KGB, who was appointed first deputy president of the OAO Russian Railways (RZhD), a newly formed state railroad monopoly,[41] becoming its president and CEO in June 2005.[42]

According to Petrov, sitting at the base of the pyramid are the siloviki who control regional affairs through the presidential envoys of the seven federal districts (four of seven are siloviki and 70% of presidential envoy staff have military or security backgrounds, according to Russian Academy of Sciences sociologist, Olga Kryshtanovskaya,)[43] governors, and the chiefs of regional law enforcement agencies, with loyalty ensured through the reshuffling of the heads of local police, defense, and security agencies. In August 2003, *Novaya Gazeta* published a report that over 2000 former security service employees had been appointed or elected nationwide with Kremlin support over the first three years of Putin's presidential term. Security and military officers held a quarter of all senior government posts and the governors of Smolensk, Ingushetia, and Voronezh are former KGB generals.[44] Another example is that of Ingush President Murat Zyazikov, a former FSB general who on October 7, 2002 won the Ingushetia presidency with strong Kremlin support.[45] Given the geostrategic location of his post in light of the war in Chechnya, Zyazikov could prove quite useful to the FSB

---

[41] Op. cit., "Dissecting Siloviki's Pyramid Of Power."

[42] Ilya Arkhipov, "Through an Insider's Eyes: A Senior Railway Official's Take on the Kremlin's Route," *Johnson's Russia List*, No. 6 - JRL 9180, June 16, 2005, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9180-6.cfm; and, "The Railwayman," *Kommersant*, June 16, 2005, http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=585323. Also see "Russia: Could Yakunin Be 'First-Called' As Putin's Successor?" *RFE/RL Newsline*, June 21, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=06&y=2006&id=1B21919A-FAF5-4D77-9B84-4A195BBFF915.

[43] Op. cit., "Dissecting Siloviki's Pyramid Of Power."

[44] Ibid.

[45] "Street Named Putin," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, October 10, 2002, p. 4.

and Russian military, Interior Ministry, and other government/security forces in the fight against Chechen separatists.[46] To express his appreciation and loyalty, that same month for Putin's 50th birthday Zyazikov named a street in an Ingush village after him.[47]

6.2.5: Chekist Continuity in the Intelligence/Security Sector

Not only do old Soviet chekists retain the leadership and commanding posts of the intelligence/security services, the FSB has absorbed the former KGB structures, or directorates, that had been split off by Yeltsin in 1991, with the sole exception of the foreign intelligence service (KGB FCD-SVR), becoming even more powerful than had been the otherwise similarly constituted KGB. In the same vein, the chekists have gained formal control over the military via (SVR officer) Defense Minister Ivanov and reinstituted (FSB-directed) military counterintelligence, and the Interior Ministry (MVD) has seen a number of key leadership posts staffed with career FSB officers. For example, by 2001, the chekists had gained some control of the notoriously corrupt MVD through Putin's appointment of FSB officer Lt. Gen. Konstantin Romodanovsky as chief of the ministry's internal security. He immediately emphasized he was going after the

---

[46] See Johanna Nichols, "The Ingush (with notes on the Chechen): Background information," University of California, Berkeley, February 1997, http://ingush.berkeley.edu:7012/ingush_people.html, where she notes that, "During the Chechen war in 1994 Moscow (or the Russian military) made numerous attempts to draw the Ingush into the war: Ingush villages close to Chechnya were shelled and roads mined; Ingushetia was accused of harboring Chechen fugitives and otherwise supporting Chechen war efforts, evident pretexts for invasion; Ingushetia was kept in a desperate position, Surrounded by Interior Ministry troops and the heavily armed Ossetians to the west; "filtration camps" set up in the Chechen lowlands to detain and torture Chechen young men were most brutal with Ingush residents of Grozny. Ingushetia kept out of the war by determined non-violence. The motives for drawing Ingushetia into the war were unclear to all commentators." Further, "The recent war in Chechnya originated in a Russian invasion ostensibly designed to prevent secession and probably also to secure the oil pipeline running through the Chechen lowlands, accompanied by much political rhetoric about ending organized crime. The war entailed great human suffering for all residents of Chechnya, many of whom are Russians, but only the Chechens were threatened with ethnic cleansing, wholesale economic ruin, and loss of linguistic and cultural heritage." Also, see Alan Ch. Kasaev, "Ossetia-Ingushetia," and Emil A. Payin and Arkady A. Popov, "Chechnya," in *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*, Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., RAND, CF-129-CRES, Santa Monica, California, 1996, http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF129.

[47] Op. cit., "Street Named Putin."

"werewolves in epaulets," or corrupt officers making money on the side through extortion and bribes.[48] Responding to questions surrounding his FSB career, in September 2003 Romodanovsky told *Izvestia* that although the FSB had assigned him to the MVD, he reported to Interior Minister Gryzlov,[49] a staunch Putin loyalist. It is worth noting that such appointments have nothing to do with fighting corruption; they are intended specifically to establish chekist control. Corruption in the ranks only increased, and exponentially.

Other postings of FSB personnel to the MVD further strengthened chekist control of the police. Reform was not the motive. On June 30, 2002 Putin signed a decree appointing Maj. Gen. Rashid Nurgaliev to head the MVD's Criminal Police Service. Like his predecessor, long-standing Putin associate Nikolai Bobrovskii, who was transferred to another unspecified job, Nurgaliev is a cadre officer of the FSB. He had recently headed the SVR's Directorate for Combating Drug Trafficking and Contraband.[50] Thus, Nurgaliev was promoted to colonel general and made first deputy interior minister.[51] Prior to his work at the federal drug agency, Nurgaliev had headed the FSB Inspectorate (now renamed the FSB Control Service[52]), the FSB's internal counterintelligence agency. Obviously, having held such a sensitive post, he has the confidence of and is trusted by Putin and leading chekists to promote and protect FSB interests as MVD chief.

---

[48] Op. cit., "Dissecting Siloviki's Pyramid Of Power."

[49] Ibid.

[50] "Yet Another Chekist General Joins Ranks of Interior Ministry," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 25, July 11, 2002.

[51] "Biography: Minister of Interior of Russian Federation," Ministry of the Interior Web site, January 14, 2005, http://eng.mvdrf.ru/index.php?docid=2.

The MVD, under the control of Boris Gryzlov during most of Putin's first presidential term, was further coopted by the Kremlin through his appointment to head the "United Russia" (Yedinaya Rossiya) party, the new "party-of-power" publicly endorsed by Putin in the weeks leading up to the December 7, 2003 State Duma elections. It had evolved from the 2001 merger of "Unity" (Yedinstvo), led by Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu; Fatherland (Otechestvo), led by Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov; and, All-Russia (Vsya Rossiya), led by Republic of Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev. Also enlightening is the fact that Gryzlov's relationship with FSB Director Patrushev began in St. Petersburg in the mid-1980s, along with that of Dmitri Kozak, a former GRU officer[53] and also hailing from St. Petersburg, who served as a deputy head of Putin's presidential administration until September 13, 2004 when he was named Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Southern Federal District, responsible for the economic development of the North Caucasus region,[54] and the individual who actively promoted Gryzlov to higher posts over the years.[55]

To date securing Kremlin-backed (United Russia) interests in the State Duma, Gryzlov currently leads a 300-seat majority, sufficient for the two-thirds vote necessary to amend the constitution. While United Russia had won 246 seats in the December 2003 elections of 450 possible, its leadership was able to persuade 54 independents to join,

---

[52] Andrei Soldatov, "FSB Reform: Changes Are Few and Far Between," www.agentura.ru, special to the *Moscow News*, October 6, 2004, http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/fsbreform/.

[53] "Presidential Aides' Pasts Made Public," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, November 14, 2006.

[54] "Economic Development is Priority for New Presidential Envoy in Southern Federal District," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 14, 2004.

[55] For a biography on Boris Gryzlov, see "Boris Gryzlov: Interior Minister and United Russia party leader," *RFE/RL*, http://www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection/bio/gryzlov.asp.

giving a total of 300 seats to the "party," while the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDP), led by Vladimir Zhrinovsky, and Rodina, led by Dmitri Rogozin, gained 36 seats each, and the KPRF, led by Gennadi Zyuganov, gained 52.[56] United Russia was so successful that its members gained overwhelming control of the Duma, to the extent that its leadership determined the head of every single committee, with Gryzlov subsequently resigning from his MVD post to become Duma Speaker. Beholden to Putin, it is a rubber-stamp parliament. Although numerous chekists had penetrated the MVD, Petrov noted that internal power struggles continued to pervade the ministry as Putin's newcomers battled the old guard for influence, nothing particularly unexpected given that the various Services have always plotted intrigues against each other.[57]

Nevertheless, the chekists have gained formal authoritative control of the institution. Following Gryzlov's Duma successes, on December 29, 2003 his resignation from his police post was finalized by presidential decree and Nurgaliev became acting Interior Minister until an official appointment was made, legally required to take place within two months. Along with Nurgaliev, other candidates for the position included Vladimir Vasilyev (Duma deputy and chairman of the State Committee on Security), Viktor Cherkesov (career chekist and member of the State Committee for Combating Drug Trafficking, Gosnarkokontrol) and Sergei Shadrin (deputy interior minister).[58] Ending widespread speculation over whether Putin would appoint a professional or a

[56] Ibid.

[57] Op. cit., "Dissecting Siloviki's Pyramid Of Power."

[58] "New interior minister may be appointed within days," *Gazeta.ru*, January 1, 2004.

politician, Nurgaliev was named to the post on March 9, 2004,[59] the very same day that Putin issued Presidential Edict No. 314, *O sisteme i strukture federalnykh organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti*, formally subordinating the Russian intelligence/security services to the Justice Ministry.[60] Hence, by the end of Putin's first presidential term, career chekists, all hailing from the old Soviet KGB and, for the most part, Putin's home town of St. Petersburg, had come to control all of the state's security organs — the military, FSB, SVR, and MVD. *Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose*; intelligence/security sector reform was clearly out of the question. Chekist control would only be consolidated in his second term.

Early on, many observers in Russia expressed concern about the significant increase in chekists-siloviki moving into positions of political power under Putin. Aware of that sentiment, on Chekists' Day (December 20) 2000,[61] FSB Director Patrushev condemned the "demonizing" of former security and intelligence officers moving into Russia's political power structures, insisting that the entrance of former KGB cadres into government reflected the vital need to inject "fresh blood" into the political system. Constituting Putin's primary support base, chekists were launched into political positions and "parachuted" into economic posts by the thousands. By 2003, as a comprehensive study by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a scholar at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences found, one in four officials in Putin's government came from the

---

[59] "Biography: Minister of Interior of Russian Federation," Ministry of the Interior Web site, January 14, 2005, http://eng.mvdrf.ru/index.php?docid=2.

[60] See the Nuclear Threat Initiative's Web site, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/ministry.htm#fsb.

[61] "Security Community Celebrates Chekist Jubilee," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 23, December 25, 2000, p. 4.

ranks of the military or secret services, and almost 35 percent of officials appointed to the deputy-minister level between 2000-2002 were former military or intelligence officials.[62] This pattern has continued, with ever increasing chekist penetration of political-economic ranks. Kryshtanovskaya notes that this transfer of chekists into high political office has occurred in not only the security ministries, but increasingly in the economic and trade ministries as well. She labels it "the Sovietization of power."[63] Naturally, those chekists who win electoral posts with strong Kremlin backing not only bolster Putin's political support base but undoubtedly seek to strengthen chekist controlling interests overall.

As noted, chekist-siloviki penetration has not been limited to the political sphere, and has also increasingly extended to the economic arena. For example, Kryshtanovskaya found that there were four former military officials currently working as deputy ministers at the Economic Development and Trade Ministry, three at the Communications Ministry, and two each at the Transport, Media, Property Relations, Justice, and Tax ministries.[64] (Note that these numbers do not include those chekists who remain unidentified as such, or those officials who had been coopted by the intelligence/security services.[65]) Early in Yeltsin's first presidential term, it was widely reported that chekists were involved in at least 80% of all joint ventures (JVs) and held top positions in the stock and mercantile exchanges and most banks and financial institutions. Thus, along

---

[62] "Women, Intellectuals Lose Under Putin....As Power 'Horizontal' Formed at Lower Levels of Federal Ministries," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 19, 2003.

[63] Steven Lee Myers, "Old Kremlin, New Kremlin: It's Still a Big Secret," *The New York Times*, August 27, 2003.

[64] "Women, Intellectuals Lose Under Putin....As Power 'Horizontal' Formed at Lower Levels of Federal Ministries," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 19, 2003.

[65] J. Michael Waller, "The KGB and Its 'Successors,'" *Perspective*, Vol. IV, No. 4, April-May 1994, pp. 1-9.

with organized criminals, chekists have played a significant role in Russia's political-economic scene for well over a decade. With no LVD policy, the prominence of chekists in the economic life of the country and the preliminary loading of political posts with chekists, accompanied by a lack of LVD and reform of the secret police, set the stage for their assumption of ultimate control over economy policy through control of the political system. The extra-legal seizure of major commercial enterprises from leading oligarchs, beginning with Vladimir Gusinsky (Media-Most), and Boris Berezovsky (AvtoVAZ and Aeroflot), followed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Yukos), worked to bring the others to heel; indeed, in the interest of retaining their economic wealth, they quickly learned the importance of loyalty and subservience to the Kremlin.

6.2.6: The Nature and Development of the Chekist-Ensured Lack of Political Opposition: Chekist Manipulation of the Electoral System and Parties

In Russia, chekists have historically been used as instruments of the regime to infiltrate, manipulate, control, and subvert political groups. In the wake of the Soviet Union's demise, an event which Putin identified in his April 25, 2005 state of the nation address as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,"[66] the chekists proceeded to create controlled "opposition" parties. For example, the late St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak said that as a member of Gorbachev's Presidential Council (an unworkable body he proposed be dissolved in November 1990),[67] he was present when the order was issued to "find" a controlled individual who would set up an opposition party, an interesting revelation in light of the fact that Sobchak writes in the preface of his

---

[66] "Putin: Soviet collapse a 'genuine tragedy,'" *MSNBC*, April 25, 2005.

[67] Anatoly Sobchak, *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Petersburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*, The Free Press: NY, 1992, pp. 130-31.

1992 book, *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Petersburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy,* that "....the KPSU was to me above all not a political party but a state structure permeating every cell of the country's social organism. This knowledge led me to believe that reforms in our society could begin only through party reform and the engendering of democratic politics."[68] As it happened, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who created the LDP, was their man, registering the new party before even the KPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) was registered[69] (after having been made illegal following the demise of the Soviet Union). The idea was to present the illusion of a multiparty system and the crafting of a democratic Russia, useful in attracting the badly needed cash infusions from the West as the country regrouped after communism's collapse.

Democracy theorist Robert Dahl suggests that, "probably no political institutions shape the political landscape of a democratic country more than its electoral system and its political parties."[70] Given that "the meaningfulness of elections is determined by how powerful the elected parliament actually is,"[71] and Russia has a presidential (rather than parliamentary) system in which the president is 'above party politics' and, hence, not a member of any political party, the only national government institution of power in which political parties can exert any influence is the State Duma. Yet, beginning with Gorbachev, the electoral system was designed to thwart genuine democratic party

---

[68] Ibid., pp. x-xi.

[69] Op. cit., "The KGB and Its 'Successors,'" pp. 1-9, footnote 20.

[70] Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 1998, p. 130.

[71] Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly, *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm, Sweden, 1997, p. 10.

development. As Sobchak notes of the electoral system at the time, "Only much later did I realize why Gorbachev manufactured such a complex and utterly undemocratic, but ingenious electoral system. The apparat, firmly and reliably entrenched after generations of party selection, wouldn't allow democrats a single chance to win direct and justly weighted elections carried out by secret ballot."[72] Consequently, during the Yeltsin era, the Duma was dominated by oppositional communists but exercised no real influence over policy as the executive ruled the country by presidential decree, the only way to further political-economic reform. As Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski note,

> "...as compared with 1993 and 1995, when relatively free elections were held for a relatively inconsequential parliament, Russia in 1996 passed a more stringent test regarding minimal democratic legitimacy. This miraculous achievement predictably obscured the fact that the presidential campaign was widely seen in Russia (though not in the West) as neither free nor fair, and therefore did little to reinvigorate the much-discredited notion of democracy, or to bolster the already shaky legitimacy of the political system."[73]

Democratic legitimacy was even more elusive under Putin, with a new party (United Russia), albeit, in label only, coming to dominate in what was a reversal from the Yeltsin era. A rubber-stamp parliament was constituted, and political stability was brought through authoritarian measures, cooptation, and Putin's construction of his "vertical," and subsequent "horizontal." To that end, Putin initiated the institution of extensive changes in the electoral system (eliminated the election of governors, who constitute the upper house of parliament) and the rules surrounding political party organization (substantially reducing the potential to compete with the regime's preferences).

---

[72] Op. cit., *For A New Russia*, p. 16.

[73] Op. cit., *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms*, p. 514.

At this juncture, it is instructive to note that in May 2000 Berezovsky-owned *Kommersant* published allegations of the existence of a draft proposal to create a presidential political directorate that would control political parties and candidates, collect compromising information on opponents, and manipulate the press, using the FSB as the primary vehicle to accomplish these tasks. The leaked document "defines as a strategic necessity the inclusion of the FSB and other intelligence agencies in the activity of the political directorate of the president."[74] Aptly, Moscow-based Heritage Foundation director and political analyst Yevgeny Volk's interpretation of the *Kommersant* series was that Berezovsky "is signaling the oligarch's concern that Putin may favor his spy agency associates/colleagues over the oligarchs, even at the expense of the oligarchs."[75] Indeed, future events proved that the oligarchs had justified cause for concern, as the chekists would indeed capture the state, while Berezovsky would flee into self-exile.

Further, *Kommersant* reported, a document being reviewed by the Kremlin suggested uniting the FSB with the presidential administration into a powerful team that would silence opposition parties, critics, and the free press. *Kommersant* published parts of what it claimed was a Kremlin reform program to gain firm control over Russian political life. The newspaper quoted the report, "The intellectual, personnel, and professional potential in the hands of the FSB should be brought in to work for controlling the political process." The Kremlin admitted that the report had been approved. Given Putin's nature and past, the plan made sense. As Volk observed," For Putin, this process is natural. It's in his logic to depend on those he sees as loyal to him.

---

[74] "Report: Putin Plans Greater Control," *The New York Times*, May 5, 2000.

[75] Ibid.

...Putin spent his whole life in the secret services. He understands these people better than oligarchs or businessmen."[76]

At the time the report became public, it was clear that each of the plan's aspects had already been initiated. A law on political parties had been passed, kompromat was routinely being collected, a number of Kremlin opponents were in the dock, and the press was being manipulated and coming under increasing Kremlin control via enforcement of the new information security doctrine[77] and intimidation of independent-minded journalists. The FSB had played the dominant role in bringing each element of the plan into fruition. Under Putin's direction, the chekists intensified their work of penetrating and marginalizing political opposition parties, with FSB surveillance of political opposition elements carried out in KGB tradition. A case in point occurred in May 2000 when the FSB tried to recruit two Baltic State Technical University students to spy on the Yabloko party, of which they were members. The students' refusal of the approach led to their subsequent ejection from the university. Following public outcry, however, the two were reinstated. As evidenced by the tactics used by the FSB in this case, the Service

---

[76] Catherine Belton, "Report: Kremlin, FSB May Unite," *The Moscow News*, May 5, 2000, pp. 1-3.

[77] On September 14, 2000 Putin signed a new "information security doctrine" developed by the Security Council (with career chekist Sergei Ivanov then serving as Security Council Secretary) and former KGB officers, which he had earlier approved in June 2000, greatly strengthening the Kremlin's control over information flows and the monitoring of all communications. The doctrine identifies both internal and external media enemies (a reflection of the KGB Fifth Chief Directorate's focus on ideological dissidents), and in direct opposition to democratic norms, perceives "threats emanating from such as people with opinions contrary to government policy, reporting on government activity, and foreign journalists. See "Information security doctrine threatens press freedoms," *Russia Reform Monitor*, No. 794, October 2, 2000, American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, D.C.; "More Criticism of Information Security Doctrine Voiced...," *RFE/RL*, September 15, 2000; "The Kremlin's Top Secret Budget for Information War," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 8, September 11, 2000, p. 1; and, Victor Yasmann, "The Roots of Putin's Attack on Media Freedom," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 3, August 7, 2000, p. 3.

continues to actively work to recruit spies for political surveillance purposes using intimidation and blackmail, just as had their KGB predecessors.[78]

Once Putin became president, it became increasingly apparent that no significant political opposition would be allowed to organize in Russia. Thus, using traditional chekist methods, particularly toward the end of Putin's first presidential term when he had consolidated his power, the Services intimidated, constrained, harassed, marginalized, and neutralized any genuine opposition forces that developed. Meanwhile, in a practice carrying over from the Yeltsin era, another "opposition" was continually contrived and shaped by the old Soviet functionaries to suit their own non-democratic political purposes. These activities were designed to present the illusion of formative democracy with the aim of gaining Western aid monies, while concurrently manipulating perceptions to deceive the West into complacency toward Russia even as the chekists engaged in obscure, behind-the-scenes engineering of subtle changes conducive to their ultimate "capture" of the state.

In 1991, the leading chekist-controlled party was the Vladimir Zhirinovsky's LDP. Unity was only formed in October 1999, to counter the Kremlin-perceived threat posed by the Fatherland-All Russia alliance. The new party, led by Sergey Shoigu, the Minister for Emergency Situations, who was responsible for dealing with the aftermath of the 1999 apartment bombings that left over 300 dead, also supported the military operation in Chechnya. It would subsequently evolve into United Russia, and become the

[78] Michael Wines, "Accusations That Moscow Spies on Party Gain???" *The New York Times*, June 21, 2000.

predominant party by the end of Putin's first presidential term.[79] By January 2004, as Konstantin Simonov, director of the Center for Current Politics in Russia, noted, the situation had changed; he observed that before the recent State Duma elections, the People's Party, led by Gennady Raikov, was the siloviki's main political arm, but [now] that "the main thing is control over United Russia, and the fight for it is still going on."[80] In fact, United Russia had been evolving since 2003 into the new party-of-power in post-Soviet Russia, which was progressively developing once again into a one-party state, one that kow-towed to the chekists (as opposed to the Communist party) this time around. During Putin's second presidential term, the party's role and growth, with Putin's spur, was accelerated. A May 2006 article published by *The Washington Times* noted that United Russia was growing twice as fast as had the Communist party under the Bolsheviks, and had "become the surest path to success in Russian society," with over two-thirds of the state's federal and regional parliamentarians, and 70 of 89 regional governors members. The party includes thousands of civil servants, celebrities, and leading business people. By the start of 2006, the party registered its millionth member, with plans to double the membership in time for the 2007 Duma and 2008 presidential elections. To put these numbers into perspective, United Russia's nearest rival, the Communist party, has about 180,000 members (many pensioners), the nationalist Rodina (Motherland) party has 105,000 members, while the Yabloko and Union of Right Forces parties barely have 50,000 members. As *Kommersant* reported earlier in the year, joining United Russia was becoming essential for anyone dealing with the government, noting

---

[79] "Sudden rise of the Unity party," *BBC News*, December 20, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/572646.stm.

[80] Op. cit., "Siloviki's Pyramid Of Power Revealed."

that, “Like membership in the Communist Party once was, membership in United Russia is now a way of making it easier to solve all sorts of problems, from getting promotions for state officials to settling conflicts with the police and tax structures for businessmen.”[81]

Commensurate with United Russia’s (and its precursor, Unity’s) rise, the process of marginalizing the opposition greatly accelerated after Putin gained the Russian presidency, with the construction of multiple barriers to any real oppositional party organization and activity. Toward the end of Yeltsin’s tenure, Russia had approximately 200 political parties, of which 26 contested the 1999 parliamentary elections, down from 45 in 1995 (yet possibly 51 in 2003, although only a handful of them met or exceeded the then-required threshold of 5%, which in 2004 was increased to 7%). Over the years, the number of parties of any significance whatsoever has been dramatically reduced. In short, once chekists nurtured under Putin’s direction gained power en masse, the establishment of central political control over all institutions, including political parties, began in earnest. Naturally, one method entailed reducing their numbers, which would ease the task of controlling them — and limit the expending of intelligence resources necessary to surveil and control Russian political life.

6.2.7: The Law on Political Parties and Shaping of a Rubber-stamp Parliament

In January 2001 (after a year in power), claiming that he was promoting the creation of effective political parties, Putin changed the political system by eliminating regional parties and introducing state funding for registered political parties. The Kremlin-submitted bill required that, to be officially registered and eligible for funding,

---

[81] Michael Mainville, “Putin group races past Soviet party,” *The Washington Times*, May 26, 2006.

parties must have 10,000+ members overall and 100 in each of half of the RF's 89 territorial provinces. Parties receiving more than 3% of the vote would receive state financing. Further, party officials would be required to submit regular financial reports to the Federal Tax Service, and private donations would be allowed, but their amounts and who could give them, especially foreign contributors, would be limited. In effect, estimates were that the plan would reduce the number of parties from approximately 180 to 12. At the time, only the KPRF would have qualified for funding under the draft legislation.[82] Yet, support and promotion of KPRF was not the law's design. Rather, United Russia was fast becoming the party-in-power, adopting the official platform of, "We must together make Russia a strong, united country," in tune with Putin's December 1, 2001 call for national unity, with the communists effectively sidelined.[83]

It is worth noting that at a February 2006 United Russia meeting, Vladislav Surkov, a former GRU officer[84] and now Putin's deputy chief of staff and chief political strategist, delivered a speech detailing the party's new ideology and platform of "social conservatism," later termed "sovereign democracy," which he formulated in preparation for the 2007 and 2008 elections.[85] United Russia's Web site, *http://edinros.ru/* posted Surkov's outline of the ideology, which noted that it centered on the state's right to restrict the impact of international law, global economic bodies, and world opinion on its

---

[82] "Putin Plans Restructuring of Political Arena," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 24, January 2, 2001, pp. 3-4.

[83] "United Russia," *MosNews.com*, http://www.mosnews.com/mn-files/unitedrussia.shtml. Also, see the United Russia Web site at http://www.edinros.ru/.

[84] "Presidential Aides' Pasts Made Public," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, November 14, 2006.

[85] "Vladislav Surkov's Secret Speech: How Russia Should Fight International Conspiracies," *MosNews.com*, July 122, 2005; and, "United Russia Backs Sovereign Democracy," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, Issue 3510, October 3, 2006, p. 3.

domestic policies. He suggested that Russia could materialize its sovereign democracy in the economic sphere by putting "such vital sectors of the national economy as strategic communications, pipelines, the national electricity grid, railroads and federal highways, the financial system, and broadcast television" under state control or dominance. As for foreign policy, "sovereign democracy" calls for Russia's restoration of its global influence, for reasons of geopolitics and as an outgrowth of its imperial tradition.[86]

Critics argued that the new legislation would make parties dependent on the government, while supporters believed it would prevent organized crime (OC) from financing parties and that it showed that Russia's party system was growing stronger.[87] As it happened, the latter situations did not play out. A prime example of organized crime financing of political parties is the case involving Konstantin Yakovlev, aka Kostya Mogila, covered later. Given the ongoing prominence of organized crime and corruption in Russian politics and business at all levels, it is highly likely that illicit funds continue to be channeled to favored candidates and parties, which by Putin's second presidential term extended little further than United Russia, the only "party" for the most part of any real significance, and the smaller, "Kremlin-approved" parties led by old Soviets who cooperated with Putin's agenda for the country and siphoned off votes from smaller parties. As always in Russia, just because a law is on the books does not mean it will be enforced; more commonly, its application is made selectively and in line with the personal-power interests of officials against rivals.

---

[86] See *http://edinros.ru/* and "Ideological Doctrine Paves Kremlin Course," *RFE/RL Reports*, Vol. 6, No. 14, August 7, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/reports/rpw/2006/08/14-070806.asp.

[87] "Tough Bill On Parties Set To Pass," *St. Petersburg Times*, #643, February 9, 2001.

On February 7, 2001 the Duma passed the bill on its first reading (280-109). To become law, the bill had to pass two more readings in the Duma, a vote in the Federation Council, and be signed by Putin. As a notable adjunct, then-Central Elections Commission (CEC) Chairman Alexander Veshnyakov submitted a bill to increase state regulation of the functioning of political parties by the Justice Ministry and the Audit Chamber; only political parties registered by the state could nominate someone for public office, and regional political associations would be abolished.[88] The intentions of the new regime, as reflected in this legislation, were directed toward the effective abolishment of political competition, the establishment of authoritarian government, and the reversal of democratic reforms begun under Yeltsin's tenure.

The 2001 Law on Parties was only one of a number of legislative enactments, discussed below, designed to change the electoral system and create a party structure amenable to central control and, for the West, the illusion of a democratic multiparty system, which would in fact, given its true nature, be easily manageable by the developing chekist-dominated state.[89] The potential for opposition elements to effectively organize, raise funds, gain media access, even get on the ballot, let alone meaningfully compete in elections, would be eliminated. For example, The Russian Union of Journalists and the Social Expertise Institute reports that in its monitoring of news coverage on national television networks, during the 2000 presidential election campaign Putin got about 30% of airtime; for the 2004 contest, that indicator climbed to 47%; and

---

[88] "CEC Drafts Bill on Political Parties," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 17, November 13, 2000, p. 2.

[89] Alexander Ryklin, "The Kremlin has failed to cleanse Russian politics of big business," *Yezhenedelny Zhurnal*, No. 2, January 2003, and re-published in *Johnson's Russia List*, #7030, January 23, 2003.

in 2006, with the next presidential election two years away, Putin and his team have received almost double that proportion, with almost 90% of the coverage.[90]

The chekists thus guaranteed that uncertainty would play no role in the future leadership of the country, a situation that is fast becoming the reality at every level. To ensure this outcome, pervasive political surveillance continues unabated, focused particularly on any potentially threatening or problematic opposition elements that strive to organize, with harassment, intimidation, or jail the consequence for antagonistic political activity. For example, in December 2004, Andrei Skovorodnikov, a National Bolshevik Party (NBP) member, was sentenced to six months in prison for political speech. Earlier, in February 2004 and just one month before Putin's reelection, FSB officers had appeared at his apartment the very day that he created a Web site lampooning and criticizing the president and his policies, arresting him, and confiscating his computer. The FSB's timeliness provided the evidence that he was under close electronic surveillance. The prosecution's case relied on content posted on the site — a collage of Putin's head atop a naked woman's body, with the caption "Putin is a fag," and articles found on the hard drive.[91] This case, just one among many, shows how basic political freedoms are suppressed in Putin's Russia.[92]

---

[90] Sergei Mulin, "Money Joins The United Russia Party," *Novaya Gazeta*, No. 40-41, June 1, 2006.

[91] Masha Gessen, "Muzzled in Moscow: Fear and self-censorship in Putin's Russia," *Boston Globe*, January 2, 2005, and cited in *Security and Intelligence Digest*, Part Four, from Glenmore Trenear-Harvey, January 3, 2005.

[92] In another case of muffling the National Bolshevik Party, the FSB caused a radio program, "Young Russia," run by journalist Dmitry Gorbachev to be shut down after it aired a program dedicated to an FSB provocation against the party that led to the May 12, 2005 arrest in Novosibirsk of two members, known as N. Baluev and V. Rusakov. "Novosibirsk: Censorship Roams the Country," *www.nbp-info.org*, May 28, 2005, http://www.nbp-info.org/archive/2005/05/28052005_novosib.htm. See the NBP's Web site at http://www.nbp-info.org/ for additional information.

Without question, the challenges in organizing a national political party of any consequence to compete with the party-in-power had become formidable by the end of Putin's first presidential term. Building on the 2001 Law on Parties, just eight months after his (March 14, 2004) reelection, in November 2004 the Duma passed in its first reading a bill mandating that a party must have 50,000 members in order to register with the CEC and take part in parliamentary elections, a five times increase over that codified in the 2001 law.

Next, also following on the Beslan tragedy of September 1, 2004 (when terrorists took over a school, leading to the deaths of at least 331 people, most of them children),[93] and as part of his political reforms carried out under the auspices of fighting terror, Putin also proposed converting the Duma from a mixed to a purely proportional representation system, with national party lists replacing the Duma's single-member districts (half of the 450 seats), ending the practice where half of the deputies competed individually in local constituencies,[94] with state financing to be increased substantially for leading parties.[95] These proposals, which had the effect of encouraging, in fact, almost mandating, given the new rules, that candidates adopt the United Russia label, was easily passed by the rubber-stamp parliament, further and dramatically reducing competition for the new party-in-power. Prior to these changes, the candidates in Duma elections ran (predominantly) as independents, or on party lists of "parties" that had no substantial

---

[93] "Russian CounterTerrorism: Shifting Responsibility," Gazeta.ru, October 12, 2004, and cited at *Security and Intelligence Digest*, Part Three, from Glenmore Trenear-Harvey, January 6, 2005; "Beslan still a raw nerve for Russia," *BBC News*, September 1, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5302448.stm.

[94] "Russian Parliament Approves Limits for Political Parties at First Reading," *MosNews.com*, November 10, 2004.

[95] "Putin Proposes Stringent New Electoral Rules," *MosNews.com*, April 14, 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/04/14/electlaw.shtml.

constituency, with the exception of the KPRF. As discussed earlier, in the 2003 elections, the Putin-endorsed Unity/United Russia managed to gain overwhelming control of the Duma under Gryzlov's leadership. Other parties, especially those with democratic leanings (Yabloko, SPS), were effectively sidelined, shut out of important political debates, denied a voice by the state-controlled press, unable to attract a significant following, and excluded from national politics. The new legislation effectively sealed their fate.

It followed that in December 2004, asserting that the Beslan tragedy necessitated strengthening the federal government in the face of deadly terrorist attacks, the direct election of governors and independent selection of judges were also eliminated, again regardless of constitutional law,[96] with these posts to be made by presidential appointment and subsequent ratification by the regional assemblies. The bill had been easily passed (in its third reading by a vote of 358-62, with two deputies abstaining), giving it the stamp of legitimacy. This legislation effectively destroyed any separation between the branches, placing both the legislature and judiciary (see below) under Putin's direct control, as he now had exclusive political appointment powers for all three branches of government. In typical chekist-authoritarian fashion, the changes were enacted regardless of the will of a significant portion of the Russian citizenry, with 48 percent of those surveyed registering opposition to the bill in an autumn 2004 poll

[96] See *Konstitytsia Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Ofitzialnii Tekst*, Prinyata Bcenarodnim Golocovaniem, 12 December 1993, Airic Press: Moskva, 2003.

conducted by Russia's Center for Public Opinion Studies (VTSIOM).[97] With these changes accomplished, the democratic experiment in Russia, without question, was over.

In a move that only reaffirmed that fact, in July 2005 the Federation Council passed a package of bills (142-1) that further strengthened United Russia at all other parties' expense, with provisions that ended elections of independent deputies, raised the threshold for seats, barred parties from uniting into election blocs ahead of votes, and allowed officials to bar foreign election observers, among other changes.[98] The stage was set for the 2007 elections to ensure a United Russia landslide, followed perhaps by a change in the constitution and Putin's "election" to a third term. The minimum threshold was also raised from 5% to 7%, creating yet another hurdle for opposition parties. The "plan" was being fulfilled quite splendidly.

Today, with United Russia in control of the Duma and numerous other regional and local government institutions, accountability, political responsibility, and government responsiveness remain elusive. Moreover, with Putin's endorsement and promotion of the so-called party to the exclusion of all others, no real significant political competition or opposition exists in government. Unlike the combativeness and strongly persistent opposition of communists in the State Duma to Yeltsin and his decrees and policies, under Putin, the Duma is merely an impotent, rubber-stamp parliament. In short, Russia is moving toward once again becoming a one-party state, with United Russia, a "party" of chekists and corrupt bureaucrats, having supplanted the old communist party as the dominant power. The only parties of any significance whatsoever in Russian national

---

[97] "Russian Parliament Gives Final Approval to Putin's Bill on Governors," *MosNews.com*, December 3, 2004.

[98] "Electoral Reform Approved," *The Moscow Times*, July 14, 2005, p. 3.

politics today, and the only ones expected to cross the seven percent threshold in the December 2007 parliamentary elections, are United Russia (Putin-endorsed, pro-Kremlin), Just Russia (a pro-Kremlin party created to draw votes away from the Communist Party and Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic party),[99] the Communist party, and Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic party (Zhirinovsky is believed by many to have long-running links with the KGB).[100]

6.2.8: The Law on Government — Top Officials and Bureaucrats as Leading Party Members

Back in 1997, the Law on Government was passed by the Yeltsin administration in an effort to disassociate the government from its Soviet past, when only (communist) party leaders could hold senior government positions. While the Law did not explicitly prohibit government officials from joining parties, it banned them from holding senior party positions. However, under Putin, this Law was circumvented by United Russia when it formed a higher council, which de jure served only as a consultative body but de facto played a leadership role. It has developed into a sort of Politburo for the United Russia party, which rather quickly supplanted all others, including the KPRF. Thus, Boris Gryzlov, former Unity party leader and currently the State Duma Speaker, served in 2003 as one of four co-chairman of the higher council while he was Interior Minister, a position he held in tandem with his party leader post for a time. As of August 2004, higher council members included Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu,

---

[99] Claire Bigg, "Russia: Parties Unite Into Nominal Opposition Force," *RFE/RL*, October 31, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/10/fa4c5ca1-6d0f-4403-a2f8-2e3e38987feb.html.

[100] "Landslide Predicted To United Russia," *Kommersant*, September 1, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p800443/VCIOM_published_prognosis_for_the_State_Duma/.

Agriculture Minister Alexei Gordeyev, Mayor Yury Luzhkov, Tatar President Mintimer Shaimiyev, and Saratov Governor Dmitry Ayatskov.[101]

Ever since the Law on Government was passed, moves to overturn it proceeded forthwith. By the end of Putin's first presidential term, with chekists dominating all levels of government, these efforts came to fruition. In August 2004 and after consultations with the chekist presidential administration, as United Russia deputy and chair of the Duma Management Committee, Oleg Kovalyov, reported, United Russia deputies drew up and submitted for a vote amending legislation to the Law that allows senior government officials to hold top posts in political parties. Enjoying strong Kremlin backing, the bill, as expected, was passed. On October 13, 2004 the Duma voted in favor of the bill allowing ministers to lead political parties at its third reading by a vote of 344-69, with 13 abstentions. In an ironic turn of history, only the KPRF argued against the bill. The legislation was expected to also sail through the Federation Council.[102]

After the bill was drawn up, critics noted that unlike the Western model where one joins a party and then runs for office, with these changes, it works the other way around. Former deputy with the liberal Yabloko party and analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center, Alexei Arbatov, observed, "This is a situation similar to that in the Soviet Union, when it was impossible to have a leadership job without being a member of the Communist Party. In the same way, from now on it would be impossible to get a leadership job if you are not a member of United Russia....This is another step away from democracy, a step toward the past....In Russia, people at the beginning get a senior

---

[101] See the United Russia Web site at http://www.edinros.ru/; and, Kevin Fedarko, "Rising Czar?" *Time*, July 11, 1994, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,981080,00.html.

[102] "Duma Votes to Send Russia Back to 'Old Days' of One-Party Rule," *MosNews.com*, October 13, 2004.

government post and then become leaders of a party that is usually created to serve the interests of the bureaucratic system. Bureaucrats who hold a good post will guarantee the party's good performance in any election — federal or regional." The way Rodina Deputy Oleg Shein viewed the initiative was, "The bill allows everyone to understand that United Russia is a party of bureaucrats. It puts an end to this ambiguous situation."[103]

United Russia, having been strongly endorsed by Putin, has become the label that chekists seeking or already holding political posts overwhelmingly adopt, although some holdouts remain with Rodina and the LDP, the latter well-known as a KGB creation and the former believed to have been a Kremlin-directed project to draw votes away from the KPRF, including a number of chekists in its membership, also, as noted above.[104] In tune with the afore-mentioned plan publicized by *Kommersant*, these latter parties served the purpose of presenting the illusion of a multiparty system as operative in "democratic" Russia, albeit in appearances and for Western consumption only, as the people of Russia knew differently. They recognized long ago that democracy in Russia was dead. With United Russia primarily a "party of bureaucrats," a new party-state and accompanying Politburo, in the form of the United Russia Higher Council, is apparently developing in Putin's Russia, with the chekists the unquestioned masters — both party and state — rather than, as during Soviet times, serving merely as the loyal servants of a behemoth party controlled by solely state political officials.

As far back as December 2001, two years into Putin's presidency, then-governor of the central Chuvashia [Chuvassistan] region, Nikolai Fedorov, presciently observed,

---

[103] Author interview with anonymous source in Russia during the 2003 Duma campaign season.

[104] Natalya Krainova, David Nowak and Alexander Osipovich, "Great Russia Refused Registration," *The Moscow Times*, Issue 3706, p. 1, July 25, 2007.

"We are now on a receding wave taking us back in time ... Some people might not realize it but we are returning to the 1950s or '30s ... instead of a democratic Russia, over the past months we have been building a bureaucratic Russia. It is obvious that instead of a federative Russia, a strongly centralized Bolshevik Russia is being built."[105] By mid-2004, only 10 political parties of any significance remained, along with 20 smaller parties also registered with the CEC.

Of note, the amendments to the Law on Government do not address the political activities of the intelligence/security sector, and only affect the political-bureaucratic arena. It remains the case that active serving intelligence/security, police, and military officers are prohibited from joining political parties, albeit exclusive of the minister and deputy minister leadership posts of these power ministries. Only the cadres are banned from political party membership and activities.[106] However, as is often the case, theory and practice diverge on the issue. To be sure, as a matter of self-interest, not only does the intelligence/security sector actively support the party leadership (United Russia), but they know precisely which candidates to vote for. For example, literally tens of thousands of military troops knew who to vote for in the October 2003 Chechen elections — just as they had in the 2000 presidential elections,[107] significantly affecting the outcome given their high numbers relative to the indigenous Chechen population, and in consonance

---

[105] Stanislav Lunev, "Russia's Secret Police: Powerful Tool for Totalitarianism," *The Eurasian Politician* - Issue 3, February 2001, http://www.cc.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/issue3/tsheka.htm.

[106] For example, a clause in Article 17 of the law "On Foreign Intelligence," reads: "Staff employees of and military servicemen with the Russian Federation foreign intelligence organs cannot belong to public associations pursuing political goals." See an English version of the law at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/law_960110.htm.

[107] Anna Politkovskaya, *Putin's Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy*, Metropolitan Books, 2004, p. 2.

with any election fraud, a constant in post-Soviet Russia.[108] In a patron-client state, cadres synchronize with their leaders.

In sum, by the end of 2004 and eight months into Putin's second presidential term, chekist interference in and dominance of every sphere of politics was complete. They had gained elected and appointed political posts at all levels of the federal and regional governments, held deputy ministerships (to learn on the job in preparation for takeover) at the majority of ministries and numerous ministerships, had coopted the remainder, and had gained control over the Central Election Commission, Constitutional Court, Arbitration and Criminal Courts, Duma and Federation Council, Prosecutor General's Office, MVD, prisons, and the bureaucracy. They had effectively sidelined and rendered impotent democratically-oriented individuals and parties in the years leading up to the December 2003 State Duma elections, overseeing their ouster from national politics entirely in that "contest." Also during this period, the FSB, Putin's main support base, absorbed all the former KGB directorates with the exception of the SVR (foreign intelligence), once more becoming a chekist behemoth, but this time, under the political control of fellow chekists and in business for itself.

6.2.9: Summaries of the 2003 and 1999 Duma Election Results

Following on the preceding discussion, in reviewing the election data and outcome summaries shown below, it is clear that there was a gradual eradication of democratically-oriented parties and individuals in Russian politics.

---

[108] Ahto Lobjakas, "Russia: EU Issues Cautious Assessment Of Chechen Elections," *RFE/RL*, October 6, 2003, www.rferl.org.

Summary of the 7 December 2003 Russian Duma election results[109]

Parties and coalitions	Votes	%	Seats (450)
United Russia	22,529,459	38.0	223
KPRF	7,622,568	12.8	52
LDP	6,923,444	11.7	36
Rodina	5,443,053	9.2	37
Yabloko	2,601,549	4.4	4
Union of Right Forces	2,390,868	4.0	3
Agrarian Party of Russia	2,201,806	3.7	2
Coalition: Russian Pensioners' Party and Russian Social Justice Party	1,869,729	3.1	0
Coalition: Party of Russia's Rebirth and Russian Party of Life	1,137,193	1.9	3
People's Party of the RF	707,434	1.2	17
Unity		1.2	
Others and non-partisans			70
Seats not filled			3
Total (turnout 54.7%)	59,297,970		450
Registered voters	108,404,870		

Summary of the December 1999 Russian Duma election results[110]

Parties and coalitions	Votes	%	Seats (450)
KPRF		24.29	90
Unity		23.32	82
Fatherland-All Russia		13.33	45
Union of Right Forces		8.52	32
LDP		5.98	17
Yabloko		5.93	21
Against all		3.3	
People's Deputy faction			57
Russia's Regions			42
Agro-industrial faction			39
independents			16
* repeat election required			8
* vacant			1
Total			450

[109] These figures are from the Russian Election Commission and appear to be the final data. "Elections in Russia," *Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Russia. Also note that 5% was the threshold a party must achieve in order to gain seats in parliament until 2003, when it was raised to 7%.

[110] Ibid.

The evidence shows that Putin has, through the judicious use of the intelligence/security services, refined the long-running practice of infiltrating and controlling, if not destroying, oppositional political parties and groups in Russia, with the active assistance of chekists both inside and outside of government. He has been able to push through his own preferences, gradually thwart and purge the government ranks of those individuals opposed to or unsupportive of his plans, eliminating virtually all real opposition or challengers. As Michael McFaul noted in November 2001, "still, the most troubling thing to me is that there are no really serious political opponents — not as a party, not as an alternate political figure. That, to me, is a scary thing."[111] Almost two years later, in September 2003, Boris Kagarlitsky made the same point when he observed that, "The opposition in Russia doesn't make a move without the Kremlin's permission,"[112] implying that the opposition had been effectively stifled. Further illuminating the reality, Yabloko party leader Grigory Yavlinsky also lamented in September 2003 during an interview with a reporter from *Moskovsky Komsomolets* that, "It is impossible to create a real, 'classical' opposition in Russia now. We do not have independent court in Russia. All the national media are in the hands of the government, and do not reflect public opinion at all. Elections are controlled and managed by the federal government and the local authorities. There is no civil control over secret services and law enforcement agencies. The law enforcement system is corrupt and has been transformed into an instrument of revenge and the grabbing of property. The artificially-

---

[111] Michael Wines, "Putin Grows in Job, Raising the Question: For Good or Ill?" *The New York Time*, November 6, 2001, pp. 1-4.

[112] Boris Kagarlitsky, "Glazyev Opts for Hara-Kiri," *The Moscow Times*, September 2, 2003, p. 13.

formed parliamentary majority is kept by the authorities."[113] By the time of Putin's reelection in March 2004, the democratic experiment in Russia, without question, was over.

6.2.10: Chekist Manipulation of Electoral Politics Using the Courts

The chekists have worked continuously to control political developments in Russia, using tried and trusted techniques of the past, as well as new tactics that reflected the changed times and system, to decapitate the opposition. The judicious use of the courts was one means that the Kremlin used to install Putin supporters in regional and local governments. Many governors were challenged in court on financial-related grounds, often on charges of submitting false property statements, with corruption and abuse of office later added to the array of charges and the candidate being disqualified from the ballot, enabling Putin-endorsed candidates to win. Reflecting on the situation, Yevgeny Volk suggested that "Besides, the Central Elections Commission is totally loyal to the Kremlin."[114] For his part, then-CEC head Alexander Veshnyakov stated that the Court would ask the Prosecutor General's Office and Interior Minister to ensure that campaigns are conducted according to the rules. Note that the Interior Minister, Boris Gryzlov, was wearing two hats leading up to and during the 2003 elections, those of Interior Minister and Unity/United Russia party leader. One could argue that, naturally, United Russia emerged the clear electoral winner, surprising no one. According to Volk,

---

[113] Grigory Yavlinsky, "Grigory Yavlinsky: It is impossible to create a real opposition in Russia today," *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, September 2, 2003, and posted at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/9/030902_mosk_koms.html.

[114] Ana Uzelac, "Governors Playing by New Rules," *The Moscow Times*, December 2, 2000 p. 3.

the only two criteria the Kremlin mandated in placing its people in regional positions was "loyalty to the Kremlin and as little involvement in corruption scandals as possible."[115]

During the early months of Putin's tenure, the prosecutorial authorities were tasked to investigate officials under the auspices of an anticorruption drive as the president sought to reshape the centre-regional political relationship. By July 2000, federal investigators were looking into political corruption in two-thirds of the regions.[116] The early 2001 case of then-Governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko and his allies in Primorye Region, who controlled "everything from the courts to the Vladivostok mayor's office," is instructive. In the face of a deep energy and fuel crisis in the region, Putin urging the governor to resign, and following a meeting with Putin's then-envoy for the Far Eastern Federal District, Konstantin Pulikovsky,[117] the entire Primorye Administration (except acting administration head, Valentin Dubinin) resigned, the governor, for "health reasons." First Deputy Governor Konstantin Tolstoshein replaced Nazdratenko, and soon thereafter, in February 2001, Putin offered to appoint the former governor to the post of head of the State Fisheries Committee.[118] Remarkably, back in 1997 the FSB had accused Tolstoshein of employing gangsters to neutralize business rivals. In its report to Yeltsin, the Service had noted that, "officials use both law enforcement agencies and the opportunities of working with organized crime leaders for their profit-seeking

---

[115] Ibid., p. 4.

[116] "Vote in Parliament Adds to Putin Power," *The New York Times*, July 1, 2000.

[117] "Primoreye Government To Resign," February 12, 2001, *ALLNEWS.ru*.

[118] "Nazdratenko To Head State Fisheries Committee," February 15, 2002, *ALLNEWS.ru*.

interests."[119] However, Yeltsin ignored the report, just as Primorsky region officials (during the Yeltsin era) ignored the Kremlin. Putin would reestablish centre control.

By 2003, it had become the norm for the chekists-siloviki, if not Putin himself, to blatantly interfere in the electoral process, an activity reflective of their enhanced status in Putin's Russia. Events surrounding the September 27 and October 5, 2003 gubernatorial elections in St. Petersburg, in which Putin-backed candidate and former envoy for the Northwest Federal District, Valentina Matviyenko, was ensured an electoral win, are instructive. A second election was mandated as Matviyenko only received 48.69% of the vote in the first round, just missing the mandatory 50% required to avoid a run-off. She ultimately defeated her challenger, Anna Markova, by a wide margin in the second.[120]

As it happened, local militia from the main police directorate of St. Petersburg assisted the city electoral authorities in checking the authenticity of signature lists submitted by candidates to the city electoral commission, probing 20 percent of the names. The law mandated that 37,000 electoral signatures must be submitted for an individual to be officially registered as a gubernatorial candidate, and the lists could not contain more than 25 percent invalid signatures. While the electoral commission found only minor errors, the police invalidated 35 percent of the signatures on Yabloko candidate and deputy of the city's Legislative Assembly Mikhail Amosov's list, saying discrepancies between voter's identity documents, dates of birth, home addresses and other personal data had been detected. Such minor errors, committed by officials

---

[119] Russell Working, "Can We Root Out the Mob?" *The Moscow News*, February 12, 2001, p. 1.

[120] "Valentina Matviyenko: Governor of St. Petersburg, elected on October 5, 2003," *Rusnet*, October 6, 2003, www.rusnet.nl.

themselves in recording the data in the documents, is nevertheless often used to disqualify candidates. Further, they only forwarded the results to the electoral commission on August 3, when August 5 was the last day candidates could obtain registration, leaving Amosov one day to refute the police check's results. Still, in the process of doing so, Amosov showed that the police directorate's reported information totally deviated from that of the signatories, and the truth. For instance, police insisted that the address of Amosov's sister did not even exist. Furthermore, all signatures from military servicemen and those of people with new Russian passports issued in 2003 (rather than the old Soviet ones) were invalidated. On a positive note, Amosov in the end convinced the electoral commission that the conclusions of the police were unsubstantiated, succeeded in reducing the invalid signature percentage from 35 to 19 percent, and thus became eligible for registration.[121]

Similarly, candidate and vice-governor Anna Markova had to refute the police's report, which had invalidated 28 percent of the signatures on her list. So, too, deputy of the city legislature, Alexei Timofeyev, managed to "restore" half of the 2500 invalidated signatures on his list. Regardless, the outcome was not in their favor; Matviyenko won by a large margin, with over 63% of the vote. Afterward, deputy head of Yabloko and State Duma deputy Sergei Mitrokhin spoke of the need to consider the "rapid process of politicisation of the power structures, first and foremost, of the police authorities," observing that, "Maybe this is connected to the fact that the Interior Ministry is headed by a political figure," in reference to MVD chief and United Russia party leader, Boris

[121] Ilya Zhegulev, "Gryzlov paves way for Matvieynko landslide," *Gazeta.ru*, August 6, 2003, and posted at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/8/gzt6_060803.html.

Gryzlov.[122] Indeed, it is through these types of methods, if raw intimidation fails to work and other means are not politically feasible, that the chekists thwart democratic-minded liberals, along with other opposition candidates, from gaining politically influential positions. The so-called use of "administrative resources" — police harassment of challengers to the Kremlin supported/endorsed candidates and saturation of the airwaves with their name and image to shape electoral outcomes — is standard operating procedure in contemporary Russia. With the total exclusion of democratically-oriented parties from the parliament finally achieved in the 2003 elections, a new epoch in Russian politics had been reached. The country had come full circle.

6.2.11: Chekist-Engineered Negation of Opposition in the Judicial Branch and Legal Process

In making a transition from communism to democratic-capitalism, a new legal framework must be drawn up that provides for property rights, political freedoms, civil liberties and human rights protections, along with a new constitution. For the intelligence/security sector, specifically, new mandates for the Services, along with new criminal and civil procedure and other codes must be legislated. Complicating legal-related matters, Yeltsin ruled Russia under the old 1977 Brezhnev Constitution until the October events of 1993, after which a new constitution was drawn up to better suit post-communist Russia. In 1992 and 1997, new criminal procedure codes were considered but failed to materialize due to fundamental disagreements among parliamentary factions, while administrative, arbitration, and civil codes, property, and other law constantly underwent drafting and consideration by the Duma, often in conflicting, extremely vague, or inadequate versions, with the outcome the passing of many laws that only served to

[122] Ibid.

create widespread confusion and disillusion as they were open to multiple interpretations, apparently designed primarily to enrich corrupt government officials, bureaucrats, and police through the extortion of bribes. Inherent conflicts of interest in both law and process abounded.

Thus, when Putin gained the presidency, the legal-judicial system was in a shambles, suffering from a dire lack of resources, faced with conflicting and confusing laws, and rampant with corruption. Certainly part of the problem was rooted in the fact that until 2002, Russian police forces operated under the old Soviet criminal procedure code, which in most key aspects was inapplicable to a free-market economy or democratic political system. There is no doubt that Putin was fully aware of the problems, as he had held the posts of FSB director, Security Council secretary, and prime minister in the years immediately preceding his gaining of the presidency. Now as president, efforts to "remedy" the situation would proceed forthwith; in January 2000, acting RF President Putin declared that a "dictatorship of law" and a "strong state" would be established. He repeated the phrase on February 25, 2000 at the funeral of former St Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, saying, "The stronger the government, the stronger personal freedom...." "Democracy is a dictatorship of law."[123] The move from a "dictatorship of the proletariat" to a "dictatorship of law," however, was not necessarily directed toward progressing Russian democratization. As Harvard Professor, former National Security Council member, and Russia scholar Richard Pipes observed after noting a number of Kremlin violations of law for reasons of political expediency:

---

[123] Robert Coalson, "Civil society or 'dictatorship of law'?" *Asia Times*, March 15, 2000, http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/BC15Ag02.html.\; and, Robert Coalson, "Babitsky's Crime and Punishment," *cpj.org*, Committee to Protect Journalists, February 28, 2000, http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2000/Babitsky/main.html.

> The trouble is that Vladimir Putin, although a graduate of Saint Petersburg University Law School, served many years in the KGB and surrounds himself with veterans of the KGB, an institution whose main domestic function was repressing dissent. The mind-set of these people is geared to achieving their objectives without regard to legal niceties. Such a background is difficult to overcome, especially if the new mission is the establishment of a "strong state." It bodes ill for Russia which has yet to learn that political strength derives not from riding roughshod over the civil rights of the citizenry but from creating, through strict observance of the law, a sense of shared interest between government and people.[124]

A point in case is that of Andrei Babitsky, a *Radio Liberty* correspondent who disappeared while reporting on Chechnya in early 2000, not the only incidence in which he had serious difficulties with the FSB, whose story is instructive of the Kremlin's interpretation of a "dictatorship of law." The Russian federal authorities detained him without charge once he was freed, stating that they were looking into "his alleged support for Chechen rebels," although Russian forces may have been complicit in his kidnapping. As Robert Coalson, program director for the St. Petersburg-based National Press Institute of Russia, observed:

> [The case] demonstrates that Putin's "dictatorship of law" is really a dictatorship of the executive branch. By detaining Babitsky without charging him with any crime, the security forces usurped the prerogatives of the legislative and judicial branches, continuing the dangerous pattern of executive-branch domination that characterized the administration of former President Boris Yeltsin.[125]

> Putin has made it quite clear that his priority is to create a strong state, not an open society. As he told *Komsomolskaya Pravda* earlier last month, the Chechen operation 'is only the beginning of the restoration of the state, of the strengthening of the state.' Likewise, he stresses that 'change must be based on Russia's long-standing traditions of justice and legality.'

---

[124] Richard Pipes, "Putin's Dicatorship of Law Begins Lawlessly," *Project Syndicate*, accessed June 8, 2006, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pip1.

[125] Op. cit., "Civil society or 'dictatorship of law'?"

> Such words, coming from a lifelong KGB agent [Putin], make it clear what sort of "dictatorship of law" we can expect.[126]

It was not until July 1, 2002 that a new RF Criminal Procedure Code took effect.[127] It was depicted by Moscow as a means to "reform" the criminal justice/legal system, and make it more democratic and respectful of rights of the accused. Most fundamentally, the aim of the new Code was declared to provide fairer trials, reduce abuses and corruption, ease the widespread problems in the prison system, and grant the accused more rights. However, it is viewed by officials as "hampering" investigations. For instance, in September 2003 then-Interior Minister and current Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov expressed his opinion of the new Code, complaining that it "has shifted substantially towards the accused, while the victims have less scope to protect themselves."[128] With corruption rampant, victims have few options, in any case. Other officials have expressed reservations about the new code, complaining that it hinders them from doing their jobs.[129] Hence, in practice, the law continues to be used by the authorities to bring their preferred outcomes, and to date regularly fails to achieve its declared aims. In practice, just as during Soviet times, law is whatever the Kremlin and other political-security authorities decide it is, regardless of what has been codified.

In a carryover from Soviet times, corruption rules, rather than law. The research of Albini et al. shows that soon after the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 much of the Russian economy was already criminalized, with some forces, the *vory-v-zakone*

---

[126] Ibid.

[127] See YPK: Ygolovno-Protzessyalnii Kodekc Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Prospect: Moskva, 2002; and, *Kommentarii k Ygolovno-protzessyalnomy kodekcy Rossciickoi Federatsii*, Ekzamen: Moskva, 2002.

[128] Ilya Zhegulev, "United Russia leader wants curbs on human rights," *Gazeta.ru*, September 24, 2003.

("thieves-in-law")[130] for example, who had previously operated solely in the underground economy and whose activities worked to, in effect, keep the command economy afloat for a much longer period than it would have been otherwise, moving visibly into public circles of power, with the secret services playing a major role.[131] Under Putin, the chekists-siloviki would, through their political control, substantially supersede many of the purely criminal forces operating at the highest levels.

In their 1999 book, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, a comprehensive study of communism's crimes, Courtois et al demonstrate that the communist regimes of the Soviet Union were "criminal regimes."[132] It is clearly apparent that criminality pervades the post-Soviet Russian regimes as well. Many journalists and a few academics have documented the organized crime and corruption so prevalent in Russian government and society,[133] albeit one with a newly codified criminal procedure

---

[129] Author interviews with anonymous sources in Russia, 2002, 2003.

[130] Joseph L. Albini, Roy E. Rogers, Victor Shabalin, Valery Kutushev, Vladimir Moiseev, and Julie Anderson, "Russian Organized Crime: Its History, Structure, and Function," *The Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1995; reprinted in *Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader*, Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, eds., Sage Publications, Inc., 1997, and *Trends in Organized Crime*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Fall 1997.

[131] Ibid., pp 213-243.

[132] Stephane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek, and Jean-Louis Margolin, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer, Harvard University Press: MA, 1999, pp. 17, 727.

[133] Journalistic accounts include: Chrystia Freeland, *Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride From Communism to Capitalism*, Crown Publishers: NY, 2000; Paul Klebnikov, *Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia*, Harcourt, Inc.: NY, 2000; Matthew Brzezinski, *Casino Moscow: A Tale of Greed and Adventure on Capitalism's Wildest Frontier*, The Free Press: NY, 2001; Robert L. Friedman, *Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America*, Little, Brown & Company: NY, 2000; Stephen Handelman, *Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya*, Yale University Press: CT, 1995; Yevgenia Albats, *The State Within the State: The KGB And Its Hold on Russia: Past, Present and Future*, Farrar, Straus, Giroux: NY, 1994; while Academic accounts include: James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring, *Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture, and Crime*, Northeastern University Press: MA, 1998; Phil Williams, ed., *Russian Organized Crime: The New Threat?* Frank Cass: OR, 1997; *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, Highlighting Organized Crime IV: "The Russian Connection," Vol. 11, No. 4, California State University, December 1995; Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, *The Tragedy of*

code and constitution. In reality, while new legal rules and procedures have been promulgated and enacted, little in practice has changed.

During Soviet times, the communist party-state had codified a criminal procedure code. Yet, this law was turned on its head and used to prosecute political "criminals" and dissidents, while real criminals were condemned to much lighter punishments. Thus, the regime itself, and its KGB enforcers, had made a mockery of the criminal procedure code, violating it routinely in order to crush any dissent that materialized. It is instructive to understanding the contemporary authorities' failure to adhere to and apply the Code as written. Moreover, spurious charges and severe abuses were commonly applied to "enemies of the state."[134] The conviction rate remains at more than 99 percent to date. According to a report presented to Putin in May 2004 by the Council of Europe's commissioner for human rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles, in the first half of the year, of 389,080 people sentenced, only 3797 had been acquitted.[135]

Putin's political restructuring was not limited to the legislative branch and regional governments, but extended to the judicial branch as well. In December 2004 the Duma passed a bill that allows the Russian President to appoint half of the members of the Supreme Qualification Collegium, with the Federation Council — composed of Putin-appointed governors from all of the country's regions as a result of related

---

Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy, United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, D.C., 2001; "Corruption and Its Costs in Russia and Ukraine," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 6, No.4, Heldref Publications, Fall 1998; and, *Russian Organized Crime and Corruption: Putin's Challenge*, (2000), A Report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies Global Organized Crime Project; *Russian Organized Crime* (1997), and *Global Organized Crime: The New Empire of Evil* (1994), all three studies published by The CSIS Press: Washington, D.C.

[134] For a compelling read on the Soviet labor camps, see Slavomir Rawicz, *The Long Walk: The True Story of a Trek to Freedom*, The Lyons Press: CT, 1956, 1984, 1997. Also see Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, Harper & Row: NY, 1973 and HarperPerennial: NY, 1991.

legislation replacing their election with Putin appointment — choosing the rest. The Collegium is the only authority in Russia with the power to fire judges. It is also empowered to appoint judges to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Arbitration Court. In effect, the bill allows the president to hire and fire the judges on the Collegium, erasing any separation of powers that existed before its enactment. Judges, like the president and members of parliament, are immune from prosecution. By federal law, investigation of judges is forbidden; they can only be stripped of their immunity by a peer review board, which is made up mostly of judges who rarely authorize an investigation and follow Kremlin dictates.[136]

The independence of the judiciary was already highly questionable, given that chief judges are appointed by presidential decree after being nominated by members of the presidential administration, serve six-year terms with their reappointment dependent on the approval of same, and decide which cases a judge will hear. Chief judges have on a number of occasions summoned lower judges into their offices to inform them what ruling was expected and apply pressure to tow the line. If they refuse, they find themselves facing disqualification for "violating rules of courtroom conduct" or "discrediting the judiciary"[137] and the case, in clear violation of law, is given to another judge. For instance, as Peter Roudik, Senior Foreign Law Expert at the Congressional Research Service and specialist in Russian law, among others, notes, the Moscow City Court (considered among the most non-independent courts in the country) under Chief

---

[135] Neil Buckley, "Justice is matter of conviction for Russian judges," *Financial Times*, October 22, 2005.

[136] Op. cit., "What Justice If Crooked Judges Above the Law?"

[137] Jeremy Page,"Judges take stand against Putin," *TimesOnline.co.uk*, March 19, 2005.

Judge Olga Yegorova, the wife of an FSB general who was appointed to the court as one of Putin's first acts in 2000, is particularly notorious in this regard.[138] Implementing FSB orders without question, she oversaw Yukos owner and oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky's trial.[139] This court also conducted the Stalin-era type show trial of Igor Sutyagin. Additionally, in 2003 Judge Olga Kudeshkina was fired from this court after refusing to follow Yegorova's order to issue a guilty verdict against the plaintiff in a case involving the Tri Kita furniture store, a case in which high-level FSB officers are deeply implicated.[140] And in July 2005, a jury in this same court acquitted the notorious Russian mafia boss, Vyacheslav Ivankov aka "Yaponchik," or Little Japanese,[141] widely believed to have long-running connections with Russian intelligence and their organized crime partners, of a 1992 double slaying that took place in Moscow. Shortly after the killings, he had been arrested in New York on June 8, 1995 for attempting to extort $3.5 million from the owners of Summit International, an investment firm that targeted Russian émigrés. Found guilty of extortion and arranging a fraudulent marriage to prevent him from being deported, he was sentenced to 9¾ years in prison in January 1997 and then deported to Russia after serving his sentence, in July 2005. To date, he remains highly

---

[138] "Briefing: The 'Yukos Affair" and its Implications for Politics and Business in Russia," United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), July 13, 2005; "Yegorova Rejects Criticism of Her Court," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, June 21, 2005, p. 3; and, "Judges take stand against Putin," *Times Online*, March 19, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1531756,00.html.

[139] See Jason Bush, "Russian Trials: What Justice?" *Business Week*, May 27, 2005, http://yahoo.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2005/nf20050527_0666_db046.htm; and, Peter Finn, "Judges Who Acquit Forced Off Bench," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, February 27, 2005, p. A-1, http://www.okkaone.com/detail-343059.html.

[140] "Yegorova Rejects Criticism of Her Court," *The Moscow Times*, June 21, 2005; and, Jeremy Page, "Judges take stand against Putin," *Times Online*, March 19, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article431586.ece.

[141] "Court of Jury Acquits Russian Mafia Boss Ivankov," *MosNews.com*, July 18, 2005.

popular in Russian circles.[142] The courts are not only plagued by FSB interference, but corruption as well. In January 2003, the *Moscow Times* published a report citing a Rostov law enforcement official's statement that, "Our judges have fixed prices. If you want to cut a year off your sentence, it's $1000. If you want your case closed, or you want a suspended sentence, it'll cost you $1,500 for every year you would have served. If you're in for anything involving a corpse, you're looking at five figures. The most profitable cases are rape cases, because the judge can milk the attacker as well as the victim."[143]

The lack of independence is not limited to the criminal courts, but extends to the civil courts as well. In mid-July 2005, Anton Ivanov, a Putin loyalist and graduate of the juridical department of Leningrad State University who since 1997 headed the justice administration in St. Petersburg and also is a former first deputy of the general director of Gazprom, yet is described as enjoying a "complete absence of judicial experience," having spent not one day adjudicating in a court, was appointed and subsequently confirmed by the Federation Council to head the Supreme Arbitration Court, which has jurisdiction over the country's major civil cases involving economic disputes (property, commercial, and tax, etc.).[144] Interestingly, Ivanov's predecessor, Veniamin Yakovlev, described the arbitration practice as the "mirror of Russian economy." Quickly perceiving the implications of Ivanov's and others' similarly loyalty-to-Putin-based appointments to the Supreme Arbitration Court, astute political observer and writer, Sergey Gorshkov,

---

[142] Carl Schreck and Antonio Lupher, "Jury Acquits Yaponchik of Murder," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, July 19, 2005, p. 1, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/07/19/001-print.html.

[143] Igor Gamayunov, "What Justice If Crooked Judges Above the Law?" *The Moscow Times*, January 29, 2003, p. 11.

[144] Sergey Gorshkov, "Devoted Independence," *Compromat.ru*, July 27, 2005, http://www.compromat.ru/main/sud/ivanov_a.htm. Also see http://www.arbitr.ru/eng/.

made the point when he asked, "What, for example, American will want to entrust the protection of his investments and property not to a transparent and authoritative judicial system under the leadership of a respected judge, but to officials, specially assigned for strengthening the role of the state in the system of arbitration?"[145] To date, the courts serve more as a political institution than a legal institution, implementing Kremlin orders just as has been done for centuries in Russia. And judicial corruption is widespread. A study released in May 2002 found that Russians spend $274 million a year in bribes to court officials, equal to an astounding $2 per capita.[146]

6.3: POLITICAL MURDER ON THE PUTIN WATCH

In addition to the foregoing measures used by chekists to gain and consolidate control of political life in post-Soviet Russia, many of those individuals who could be considered independent and/or oppositional in their statements or actions have been murdered. This reality has also aided in the work to effectively negate the political influence and, hence, destroy the potential for democratization in Russia, with a number of leaders and co-founders of liberal-democratic political parties being eliminated. In those cases in which "suspects" were arrested and charged with the killings, widespread skepticism remains over whether they had anything to do with the crimes and are merely innocents being scapegoated in order to close the cases and provide cover for the real culprits, who many believe to be political and/or intelligence/security service officials.

A wide assortment of individuals has been killed by apparent contract hits, including leading bankers, businessmen, politicians, organized criminals, sportsmen,

---

[145] Op. cit., "Devoted Independence."

[146] "Global News Roundup: Russia," *Money Laundering & Business Crime Newsletter*, Issue 13, Proximal Consulting, July 2002, p. 4.

artists, scientists, and former secret police officials and others have also been killed in contract hits. A few of the more prominent of these murders, particularly those of a political nature, are discussed in the section below in order to demonstrate that old Soviet KGB tactics continue to be employed in post-Soviet Russia, in Stalinist fashion. Of note, the killings covered here have transpired since Putin was appointed to head the FSB, then prime minister, and, finally, gained the RF presidency.

6.3.1: Chekists-Siloviki as the Hired Killers

At this juncture, it is useful to note that it is often the case that the authorities suggest or make official determinations that the intimate connections between politics and business and, often, organized crime ties are the most likely reason for the contract murders, although it has been suggested by a number of individuals (typically liberals, democrats, human rights advocates, independent/investigative journalists, opposition elements, and others) that a certain and large number of contract killings were specifically political killings carried out with the assistance or acquiescence of the FSB at the direction of the Kremlin. After all, as one security official observed, "kompromat does not work anymore because corruption is so widespread; killing is much more effective and simpler."[147]

a) The Murder of Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova

While a number of unsolved political murders have occurred on Putin's presidential watch, they also occurred during the Yeltsin era when Putin was FSB director, including the November 20, 1998[148] murder of 52-year old State Duma deputy

---

[147] Author interview with anonymous source in Russia, 2003.

[148] Vladimir Kovalyev, "Novosyolov Case To Go To Court," *The St. Petersburg Times*, #640, January 30, 2001, pp. 1-2.

and co-chair of the Democratic Russia party, Galina Starovoitova[149] — murdered in her St. Petersburg apartment stairwell, shot three times in the head. Starovoitova was also a fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, a member of the *Demokratizatsiya* editorial board,[150] a close associate of Yuri Shchekochikhin, whose July 2003 death by poisoning, also at age 52, is detailed below, and, notably, had recently declared her candidacy for governor of the region around St. Petersburg. Perhaps as important, she had been the original author and proponent of lustration legislation, having analyzed the lustration laws of a number of East European states in drafting the law, and working to provoke a public debate on the issue. While she doubted that her Law on Lustration would pass given many political reasons, for example, as J. Michael Waller notes as to her efforts, "apart from a short-lived "certification commission" to screen 200-250 senior officers, it went nowhere,"[151] she sought to generate debate, believing that a discussion might heal some of the country's wounds. Excerpts of a February 1994 interview with *Democratizatsiya* founder Fredo Arias-King are provided below to highlight her stance on the issue:

> ***Starovoitova*:** In my draft law there were no restrictions on the perpetrators of the totalitarian regime to participate in private enterprises or even some state enterprises, or even have positions in the state or government—but only when they are directly elected. Yeltsin, for example, was a candidate member of the Politburo, and the people chose to elect him on the basis of his transformation. Alexander Yakovlev was also a member of the Politburo, but was also the

---

[149] Yelena Roudneva and Boris Sapozhnikov, "Duma mocks hapless prosecutor general," *Gazeta.ru*, April 27, 2003.

[150] In early February 1994, *Demokratizatsiya* founder Fredo Arias-King interviewed Starovoitova. See Arias-King, Fredo, "Yeltsin Misread the Elections," Interview with Galina Starovoitova, February 1994, http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:79gWRNcbzHkJ:www.demokratizatsiya.org/Dem%2520Archives/DEM%252002-02%2520starovoitova.pdf+Starovoitova+lustration&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=6&gl=uk&client=firefox-a.

[151] J. Michael Waller, "Death and Resurrection of the KGB," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 2004, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol12.html.

architect and promoter of perestroika and other reforms. So when people vote, they know these individuals' biographies.

Arias-King: But what about KGB agents?

***Starovoitova*:** The law is much stricter on them. And for those who committed the crimes, the Law and other laws should be applied. But then there are the KGB agents who repented, such as Oleg Kalugin—you have to make exceptions in their cases. But you have to put the whole thing in front of the population—that these KGB people made a dirty and bad job. So the new generations, which are becoming even more cynical than the last ones, will by example see what is good and what is bad. In my draft Law on Lustration there are even stricter restrictions placed on secret agents, active KGB officers, staff. The Law of course does not place restrictions on technical personnel, such as the old ladies that clean the floors of the KGB cafeteria, for example. One very thorny question is that of the KGB archives. This was included in the list of proposals I sent to my colleagues in the Duma recently. The proposal included to take away the control of these archives from the KGB, even if that means physically taking them out of Lubyanka and taking them to the archives institute headed by Rudolf Pikhoya. Whether the files will or will not be made public as in Germany will be left to decide in the future. The immediate step would be to wrest control of these files from the KGB and place them under civil control. The KGB can still make alterations in these files, as was done in Germany and Czechoslovakia, or even destroy files, as was done to those pertaining to Sakharov. I still hope that Sakharov's file is not destroyed, but hidden somewhere. When I requested the files on Sakharov from former KGB chiefs Chebrikov and Kryuchkov, they both looked at me straight in the eye and told me that the KGB held no files on Sakharov. But it was later revealed that more than 500 volumes of Sakharov's files existed and were taken somewhere after the failed putsch. We are still looking for them. I am disappointed that President Yeltsin has not demanded these files.

Arias-King: Some say that Yeltsin made a pact with the devil, so to speak—made a pact with the army and the KGB in order to secure his presidency. This was demonstrated by the lack of enthusiasm in dismantling the KGB after the coup, by his firing of the able reformer Vadim Bakatin after only three months at the helm of the organization, by his tolerance of all the KGB-written laws which govern the "civil oversight" of the very organization. What do you think of this idea?

Starovoitova: That is yet another of the recommendations to my colleagues, to reconsider the laws pertaining to the Ministry of Security, especially the amendments to these laws passed by the Supreme Soviet on 6 August 1993, which give the KGB the right to search private homes and individuals without a warrant. Also, all those laws on so-called state secrets, the Law on Operational Investigative Activities, as well as the rest of the body of laws on the KGB and

> army, including the military doctrine adopted by the Security Council, should be scrapped or at least reformed, and the agencies placed under strict civilian oversight and control.[152]

Of further interest, Starovoitova stated in the interview that, "In the beginning of 1992, in a session of the Presidential Council, I told Yeltsin that the KGB was skillfully taking back all of its previous powers and authorities. I had some informers inside Lubyanka who told me this, and even they said it was a real danger."[153] Yet, Yeltsin harshly cut her off, and she notes that the incident permanently damaged their relationship. Even so, Starovoitova recognized the implications of chekist resurgence in Russia. In an interview posted on the UNLV Center for Democratic Culture Web site, she explains why a lustration bill was vital for the country after 70 years of communist rule, as well as the intense opposition to her legislative initiative and the round-the-clock FSB surveillance she had been subjected to. Asked what she would do if served with an arrest warrant, Starovoitova (presciently) responded: "What are you talking about? You don't know our opposition — this time they will be shooting on the spot."[154] Perhaps her history against the KGB, combined with her candidacy for governor of the region around St. Petersburg, posed too great a threat to Putin's rise to the presidency. There have been a number of allegations of his extensive involvement in corrupt schemes while deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, responsible for foreign property relations. As the editor of the *Russia Reform*

---

[152] "Yeltsin Misread the Elections," Interview with Galina Starovoitova, *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 2, No., 2, Winter, 1994, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol2.html.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Dmitri Shalin, "Vladimir Putin: Firm grip on power not near an end," *Las Vegas Review-Journal*, October 24, 2007, http://www.lvrj.com/opinion/10761276.html#; and, also see the UNLV Center for Democratic Culture Web site at http://www.unlv.edu/centers/cdclv/index.html.

Monitor, a publication of the American Foreign Policy Council, noted in December 1998 of the Starovoitova murder investigation:

> Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Vladimir Putin is in an especially delicate position during the high-profile investigation of the murder of State Duma deputy Galina Starovoitova. In his previous position as a deputy mayor of St. Petersburg responsible for foreign trade, the veteran KGB man was responsible for handling large amounts of hard currency, and did not build a reputation as a crime-fighter in that notoriously corrupt area. At the time of her murder, Starovoitova was investigating the gangland-style killing last year of the St. Petersburg privatization chief, who had run afoul of a large import company that allegedly had been benefiting from the fraudulent privatization of choice real estate in the city. Starovoitova also had directed much of her fire at the continued existence of the old KGB secret police apparatus and had called for those responsible for human rights abuses during the Soviet period to face justice. She authored a law on lustration to screen certain former KGB officers and collaborators from holding positions of public trust. In this writer's opinion, FSB Director Putin is not above suspicion.[155]

Indeed, Russia scholar Dmitri Shalin notes that, "It is doubtful Putin personally commissioned the murder, but there is no doubt as to what he thought about the critics of the security agencies. He made this clear in his interviews, where he railed against those who 'proposed opening up the lists of agents and declassifying (KGB) files.'"[156]

In light of the above-noted historical facts, it was not surprising that the Starovoitova case remained inconclusive for years. Exactly three years after her murder, on November 20, 2001 *Ekho Moskvy* reported that the Prosecutor General's Office had again extended its investigation, with the new deadline scheduled for May 20, 2002. The FSB's directorate for St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast reported that the investigation

---

[155] "Did Russia's Security Chief Have Role in Starovoitova Murder?" *Russia Reform Monitor*, No. 561, American Foreign Policy Council: Washington, DC, December 9, 1998, http://www.afpc.org/rrm/rrm561.htm.

[156] Op. cit., "Vladimir Putin: Firm grip on power not near an end," *Las Vegas Review-Journal*, October 24, 2007, http://www.lvrj.com/opinion/10761276.html#.

had recently focused on more specific persons, although no charges had been filed.[157] It followed that almost exactly a year later, on November 19, 2002 the head of the MVD's Criminal Police, Gen. Mikhail Nikoforov, announced the names of two suspects, Russian citizens identified only as Stekhnovsky and Musin, wanted in connection with the Starovoitova murder, and two more, Kolyagin and Maksimov, for another prominent killing, that of Mikhail Manevich, a St. Petersburg deputy governor and City Property Committee chief, which had occurred in August 1997.[158] The situation surrounding the Starovoitova murder investigation remained highly suspicious. For instance, during the attack, her aide, Ruslan Linkov, had been seriously wounded but survived to report seeing a man and a woman, not two men. Also worthy of note is the fact that leading authorities had assigned the investigation at that time first, to then-Interior Minister and former FSB director (February 1994-June 1995), Sergei Stepashin, and, second, to then-FSB Director Putin (July 1998-August 1999), both career chekists who also had been prime ministers in 1999.[159] In its initial months, Linkov accused the FSB and police investigators of being more interested in smearing Starovoitova than solving the murder, and in spring 2002 pointed out that they had neither discussed the case with him nor conducted any interrogations for two years.[160]

---

[157] "Investigation of Starovoitova Murder Extended Again," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 21 November 2001.

[158] Op. cit., "Duma mocks hapless prosecutor general; and, Op. cit., "Novosyolov Case To Go To Court."

[159] Stepashin was prime minister from May 1999-August 1999, with Putin vacating the FSB director post to replace him, holding the post from August 1999-December 1999, when he gained the presidency. Putin subsequently appointed Stepashin to head the Audit Chamber, in April 2000. Nikolai Patrushev replaced Putin as FSB director in August 1999 and has held the post ever since.

[160] Roman Kupchinsky, "Suspects Named In Starovoitova, Manevich Murders," *RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 34, September 26, 2002.

The case carried over into the Putin presidential era. In 2003, six individuals, all from the Bryansk region, were arrested for carrying it out, including, Anatoly Voronin, who was accused of tapping Starovoitova's phone calls for the organizers of the killing and disposing of the killers' clothing in a river; Yury Ionov, who was accused of driving Vitaly (Valery) Akishin and Oleg Fedosov (the latter who along with three other suspects remained at large), whom prosecutors claimed were the killers, from the crime scene; Igor Krasnov; Yury Kolchin, who stood accused of being the point man; and one other individual at time unidentified.[161] Still, the case dragged on.

On December 22, 2003 a St. Petersburg court rejected a motion filed by the defendants for a jury trial and scheduled the trial for December 29, 2003. Other motions, including requests to quash the case, release the defendants on bail, and withdraw certain evidence were also rejected. Defense lawyers said they planned on appealing the local court's decision to the Supreme Court.[162] On January 5, 2004 the court rejected a motion by Kolchin to replace Judge Valentina Kudreshova as lacking "any credible proof," with only Voronin pleading guilty. While three of the suspects maintained their innocence, the other three admitted their guilt to investigators "with certain reservations" in that they admitted to having committed the acts for which they were charged, but claimed to know nothing of any plan to kill her. Questions remained. Were they set up? Duped? Unwitting participants? The next hearing in the case was scheduled for February 24, 2004. Of poignant interest, investigators identified Kolchin as a former intelligence officer who

[161] Vladimir Kovalev, "Lawyer: 3 Confess in '98 Murder," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, January 9, 2004, p. 3.

[162] "No jury trial for Starovoitova murder suspects," *The Russia Journal*, December 22, 2003.

worked as a driver for a Tambov (organized) crime group leader at the time of the killing, while the other five suspects were members of the chekist-created ultranationalist LDPR.

Later (in July 2004) in the investigation, which took almost eight years before it was concluded, while the trial itself took over three-and-a-half years, Linkov suggested that former LDPR deputy Mikhail Glushchenko and his counterpart Vyacheslav Shevchenko, who is thought to be a Tambov crime group leader, were linked with the assassination, but the prosecution was never able to prove any such connection. In March 2004 Shevchenko's body was found wrapped in a plastic bag in a villa in Cyprus,[163] while Glushchenko's whereabouts remain unknown. By mid-2004, Stekhnovsky and Musin where known to be Pavel Steknovsky and Sergei Musin, and Kolchin was alleged to have passed the order to tap her phones to the latter, who was also suspected of selecting an attic in a building facing her apartment for a sniper to hide.[164] Musin's whereabouts also remain unknown.

In the end, in 2005 Akishin and Kolchin were convicted and sentenced to 23½ and 20 years in prison, respectively,[165] while in September 2006 Vyacheslav Lelyavin was found guilty by a jury for organizing the murder and sentenced to 11 years in prison, and Stekhnovsky, who had been accused of facilitating the crime by buying an Agran-200 SMG, tapping Starovoitova's phones, and providing the transportation used in the

---

[163] Galina Stolyarova, "Verdict In Starovoitova Case Given," *The St. Petersburg Times*, Issue #1207(73), September 26, 2006.

[164] Vladimir Kovalev, "Suspect: Glushchenko Ordered Starovoitova's Killing," *The Moscow Times*, July 9, 2004, http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2004/PAPERS/07/040709_2_mt.html.

[165] Ibid.

killing, was convicted and sentenced to four years for the illegal acquisition and possession of firearms.[166] Regardless, questions remain about who ordered the murder.

b) The Murder of Duma Deputy Vladimir Golovlev

In the third year of Putin's first presidential term, on August 21, 2002 Moscow Duma Deputy Vladimir Golovlev, 45, was shot dead, twice in the head, while walking his dog at eight o'clock in the morning in a park in the Mitino district of Moscow. Notably, he was a member of the political opposition: Golovlev was elected to the Duma as a Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) member, a party led by Boris Nemtsov, but left SPS in 2001 and soon became a co-chairman of Liberal Russia, a party founded in 2002 by self-exiled (to London), Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky. At the time, another co-chairman of Liberal Russia, Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov, surmised that the killing was political: "The murder of one of the five co-chairmen of Liberal Russia is undoubtedly of a political nature," he told a reporter for the Web site www.regions.ru.[167] Golovlev was the seventh Duma member to be murdered since 1994 and the first during Putin's presidency. Also suggesting a political motive, Berezovsky said of the killing: "The criminal case against Golovlev was started the day after he joined Liberal Russia. This [murder] is very simple: it is a message to the political classes of Russia that anyone who crosses the red flags of the existing powers will be killed."[168] It is fitting to interject here with a note on the reports by British intelligence that they had received intelligence that a political order believed to have originated in the Kremlin had been put out on oligarch

---

[166] "Verdict Expected in Starovoitova Case," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, Issue 3507, September 28, 2006, p. 3, http://www.themloscowtimes.com/stories/2006/09/27/014.html.

[167] Roman Kupchinsky, "Spotlight: Moscow Duma Deputy Shot Dead In Probably Contract Killing," *RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 30, August 30, 2002, pp. 1- 2.

[168] Ibid.

and Putin regime opponent, Boris Berezovsky, in London. The hitman would be someone he knew and had done business with in the past, and the assassin would claim that he killed the oligarch over a business deal to obscure its political nature.[169] Ahmed Zakaev, former deputy prime minister in the Chechen government in 1997, who, like Berezovsky, was granted asylum by the British government in 2003, is also likely a Kremlin target.[170]

As to Golovlev, of interest is the fact that back in October 2001, the Prosecutor General's Office had asked the Duma to strip him of his immunity due to an ongoing investigation of his past activities in Chelyabinsk, about the same time he joined Liberal Russia. While SPS party leader Nemtsov speculated that Golovlev's murder was linked to corruption during his tenure as head of the Chelyabinsk Oblast State Property Committee, the acting head of the pro-Kremlin Unity faction, Oleg Kovalev, suggested that he was killed for giving evidence of wrongdoing by high-ranking officials to prosecutors during questioning. Another Duma deputy, Mikhail Grishankov (People's Deputy), a former head of the Chelyabinsk FSB's organized crime department, said the case focused on the sale of 22 billion rubles worth of shares in the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Plant. Authorities apparently suspected Golovlev of transferring 89 packets of shares to a public social security fund that was allegedly illegally privatized, plus

---

[169] "British Secret Services Rescued Berezovsky from Death Trap," *Kommersant*, July 18, 2007; "Man Arrested in Russian Tycoon Case," *The Washington Post*, July 18, 2007; Sarah Lyall and Andrew E. Kramer, "British Police Deport Suspect in Berezovsky Plot," *The New York Times*, July 18, 2007; "Russia Isn't Involved, Ambassador to the UK Said," *Kommersant*, July 19, 2007; "FSB Was Behind the Death Plot, Berezovsky Said," *Kommersant*, July 19, 2007.

[170] Ahmed Zakaev, "Our dead and injured children," *The Guardian*, September 7, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1298703,00.html; and, Brett Murphy, "Russia asks UK to remove asylum status for billionaire accused of coup plot," *Jurist*, April 16, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/04/russia-asks-uk-to-remove-asylum-status.php.

shares in several other large Chelyabinsk enterprises were also involved.[171] Chelyabinsk prosecutors reportedly unearthed all sorts of information about Golovlev's involvement in embezzlements and money laundering, and suggested that they were the primary motive for his murder.[172]

c) The Murder of Magadan Governor Valentin Tsvetkov

Magadan Governor Valentin Tsvetkov, 54, was gunned down as he was leaving the Angara restaurant on the Novy Arbat on October 18, 2002 by a lone gunman aged 30-35 armed with a silenced Makarov pistol who escaped in a Zhiguli automobile in which a getaway driver awaited him. The entire incident was caught on videotape by cameras installed on a nearby building housing offices associated with the Federation Council. While Tsvetkov was accompanied by his wife, an aide, and a bodyguard when he was killed, they were not injured in the incident. A number of Duma deputies speculated that the killing was related to the lucrative fish business and, perhaps more likely, gold-mining in the region.

Commenting on Tsvetkov's murder, State Duma speaker and leader of the Party of Russia's Rebirth, Gennadii Seleznev, observed that although the legislature provided increased funding for law enforcement every year, the results had been increasingly disappointing, lamenting that, "The criminal world feels completely invulnerable in Russia, and I cannot remember a case in which the murder of a politician has been investigated and the killers sentenced in a court." [173] Yet, the possibility exists that

---

[171] Op. cit., "Spotlight: Moscow Duma Deputy Shot Dead In Probably Contract Killing."

[172] "Golovlev's Skeletons," *RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 31, September 2002, pp. 2-3.

[173] Yevgeny Trifonov, "The Kolyma Tragedy," *New Times*, September 2006, http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=625.

corrupt officials from the Interior Ministry were behind the killing given the fact that Tsvetkov's relations with them throughout the region were particularly tense due to his efforts to reduce the theft of natural resources and gain control of the situation, which had previously led to the ministry's 1998 confiscation of more than 170kg of gold he had placed in reserve for the region contrary to the law. Perhaps corrupt officials succeeded in displacing the "thugs" from the North Caucasus in controlling the gold business in the region, taking it over for themselves. Tsvetkov, at a loss as to how to stop the rampant official corruption, may have traveled to Moscow to ask Putin for help with the new situation, and was therefore killed.[174] Organized crime penetration of the state structures contributes to the complexity of solving contract murders, and part of the problem stems from the use of bribes to gain appointments to the MVD, which complicates any effort to solve them, especially in context of their own impunity.[175]

While some displacement of criminal elements by intelligence/security officers has occurred across Russia since the latter 1990s and into Putin's term, the chekists are as deeply corrupt, and maintain their ties with organized crime. While Tsvetkov was the first governor to be murdered in post-Soviet Russia, three first deputy governors (Manevich in St. Petersburg, Kotlyar in Kamchatka, and Prokhorov in the Smolensk Region) have been killed, as well as eight Duma deputies and numerous other regional political figures.[176] In July 2006, Spanish police arrested two individuals in Marbella who

---

[174] Ibid.

[175] "Russian Duma Deputy Ostanin on Political Murders, Corruption," *Trud*, April 26, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7164.htm.

[176] "Magadan Oblast Governor gunned down in Moscow ...as associates speculate on the motives...and Duma Speaker says crime situation continues to worsen," http://www.templetonthorp.com/en/news159.

were allegedly carrying fake documents for the Tsvetkov murder,[177] but many questions remain. While some say he was a man of strong principle, others claim that he misused his office for financial gain.[178]

d) The Murder of Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov

Next, about eight months later, on April 17, 2003 Sergei Yushenkov, too, was killed, shot dead in Moscow on the same day that the Liberal Russia party was officially registered by the Ministry of Justice for participation in the December 2003 State Duma elections, in what his colleagues assert was a political assassination. There are suspicions that he was killed because of his opposition to the commission chaired by Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalyov on which he also served that was tasked to look into the 1999 apartment bombings and the FSB's Ryazan "exercise,"[179] discussed below. Notably, following his release from prison, in February 2003, investigative journalist Grigori Pasko had been hired on as Yushenkov's aide. After his murder, Pasko mentioned an incident in which during the recording of a television show, "Poedinok" (Sparring), shown on TVS, FSB Maj. Gen. Alexander Mikhailov had threatened Yushenkov with physical reprisal for his public investigation of the apartment bombings, saying, "We'll pay you back, Yushenkov, later."[180]

---

[177] "Suspects Arrested For 2002 Killing of Russian Governor," *RFE/RL*, July 12, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=07&y=2006&id=E70FAD29-D2C0-439C-BD01-4EBC045E9CCB.

[178] Catherine Belton, "Tsvetkov Assassination: Tongues Start to Wag in Magadan," *The Moscow Times*, March 31, 2005, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/indexes/2003/01/31/01.html.

[179] Robin Munro, "Book Sees Kremlin's Hand in 2nd Chechen War," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, September 18, 2003, p. 3.

[180] Rashid Alimov, "Grigory Pasko: My work with Yushenkov had just started, when he was killed," *Bellona Foundation*, April 23, 2003, http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/envirorights/info_access/29375.html.

Giving further credence to the theory that the FSB killed Yushenkov, after the murder, the British Home Office made public a letter he had written in defense of a Russian asylum seeker and lambasting the deeds of the FSB, including its persecution of Pasko.[181] As with the Starovoitova case, six individuals were initially charged with the killing, including Mikhail Kodanev, the chairman of a rival branch of the Liberal Russia party (the party had earlier split, with Kodanev gaining the support of Boris Berezovsky, who also accuses Russian authorities of organizing the killing), who prosecutors accuse of organizing the killing with the other five accomplices. They were to be tried by a jury, with the trial scheduled to begin on January 26, 2004.[182] On March 18, 2004, the court of jury found Kodanev and three associates guilty of organizing and carrying out the killing. On March 30, Kodanev and Aleksander Kulachinsky were sentenced to 20 years each, Aleksander Vinnik was sentenced to 10 years, and Igor Kiselev, to 11 years.[183]

e) The Murder of Duma Deputy Yuri Shchekochikhin

Next in line was 52-year old Yabloko party member and, since 1995, State Duma Security Committee Deputy Chairman, Yuri Shchekochikhin, who died in a Moscow hospital after suffering a "severe allergic reaction" in July 2003. Shchekochikhin had zealously investigated human rights abuses in Chechnya as part of his committee obligations, and was also a leading anticorruption journalist and deputy editor for *Novaya Gazeta* since 1997. Also of note, he had revealed high-level FSB involvement in the Tri

---

[181] Ibid.

[182] "Yushenkov Trial Will Be by Jury," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 29, 2003, p. 3.

[183] "Main Suspect in Yushenkov Murder Case Sentenced to 20 Years," *MosNews.com*, March 30, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/03/30/yushenkov.shtml.

Kita affair.[184] And in December 2002, he had conveyed to journalist colleagues his impression that Russia had returned to the Andropov period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, saying, "now in Russia a like-mindedness is observable absolutely everywhere...a constant fear and the strengthening of the position of the first committee for state security. For any society, the KGB-ization of the government is an abnormal occurrence."[185] He also observed that, "Our secret agents are the last children of the cold war. Of course the state must protect its secrets. But it's time for our special services to grow up and stop trying to divide the world into black and white, them and us. That time is gone forever."[186]

In September 2003, the investigation into Shchekochikhin's death showed "very alarming" results that indicated that he had been killed, according to Yabloko party leader Grigory Yavlinsky, who explained that tissue samples taken during his autopsy were hugely suspect and being examined at several laboratories, with final results expected in October, but never released.[187] It was later reported by people who saw his body that his hair had fallen out, a symptom consistent with thallium poisoning.[188] Although there was overwhelming indirect evidence suggesting that Shchekochikhin had died from a dose of experimental lethal chemicals available only at top-secret laboratories, the question went unanswered, as authorities refused to launch an investigation and, instead, officially

---

[184] "The Chronology of Three Whales," *Novaya Gazeta*, No. 45, June 19, 2006.

[185] "Duma Deputy Laments KGB-ization of the Government," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 45, December 24, 2002, p. 6.

[186] Fred Weir, "Spies keep busy as ever, quietly," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 2, 2003.

[187] "'Alarming' Findings in Death Probe," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, September 23, 2003, p. 2.

[188] Carl Schreck, "Contract Murders Are on the Rise," *The Moscow Times*, August 4, 2004, p. 1.

sealed all materials related to the case.[189] Subsequent high-profile killings and attempted killings of regime rivals using poisons unavailable to the general public demonstrate a pattern of eliminating people through continued refinements of this method, with the cases going unsolved and the poisons becoming increasingly difficult to specifically identify in time to save the lives. Biological and chemical warfare agents are increasingly becoming a preferred method of killing, as evidenced by the gas used in the Dubrovka theatre hostage situation and in the murders or attempted murders of a number of prominent individuals who spoke out against the regime's crimes and corruption.

In a period of two months in 2006, three prominent individuals, each working for a more democratic or free-market Russia, were killed in contract hits, followed by a fourth in November 2006.

- The first (September 14) was first deputy chairman of the Central Bank, Andrei Kozlov, 41, who was shot dead by gunmen with automatic weapons outside a Moscow sports stadium after a soccer match, along with his driver, Alexander Semyonov. He had led an aggressive drive to shut down banks involved in money laundering and other crimes, had initiated a FDIC program for Russian banking and had closed 77 banks engaged in fraudulent activities.[190]

- The second (September 30) was Enver Ziganshin, a senior official at TNK-BP's unit exploring the giant Kovykta natural gas field in eastern Siberia and the first deputy general director and chief engineer of Rusia Petroleum, who was in the banya when shot dead (two bullets in the back and one in the head), outside Irkutsk. Five days prior, the firm had received a warning from the Prosecutor General's Office regarding purported operational and environment violations, and Natural Resources Minister Yury Trutnev said the ministry had planned to review the firm's compliance with its license and with environmental laws. The company had previously received threats from the government that it would revoke its licenses unless it coordinated the field's

---

[189] Andrei Piontkovsky, "Commentary: A Possible Link Between the Klebnikov and Shchekochikin Murders?" *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, Issue 51, July 14, 2004.

[190] "Top Central Bank Official Killed in Moscow," *MosNews.com*, September 14, 2006, http://mosnews.com/news/2006/09/14/bankerattacked.shtml; and, Tariz Panja, "British Police Probe Ex-Spy's Poisoning," *Washington Post*, November 19, 2006.

development with Gazprom, which firm is controlled by the chekist-dominated state.[191]

The latter two, below, have been further detailed in other sections of the project but are included here to highlight the timing of their deaths, well enough ahead of the 2007/2008 parliamentary and presidential elections to prevent any related complications. It should be noted that a number of additional high-profile killings in the banking and financial sectors followed these.

- The third (October 7, Putin's birthday) was Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist for *Novaya Gazeta* who had written a number of books critical of Putin's Russia and official activities and human rights abuses in Chechnya. Like Galina Starovoitova before her (as alleged by her aide, Linkov), she was apparently killed by a male-female hit team, shot four times (one in the heart, three in the head) in her apartment building.

- Then, the fourth, former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko, 43, was poisoned with polonium-210 (ultimately dying on November 23), in what is believed to have been a contract hit by fellow former FSB officers at the Kremlin's direction for his relentless investigations and exposures of major crimes and corruption in the Putin government, including the FSB order to kill Berezovsky, the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, and the jailing of Yukos owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky.[192]

6.3.2: Why Contract Killings Are Rarely Solved

While contract killings have been carried out with much frequency in post-Soviet Russia,[193] and represent a complete lack of any respect for life, the number of specifically political contract killings occurring in Russia since Putin became FSB director is staggering. It is also notable that as the number of murders has increased, the media

---

[191] "TNK-BP Engineer Ziganshin Shot Dead," *The St. Petersburg Times*, Issue #1209, October 3, 2006; and, "Official at TNK-BP's Kovykta Shot Dead," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, October 3, 2006.

[192] "Former Russian Spy, Putin Critic Poisoned in London --- Report," *MosNews.com*, November 19, 2006, http://mosnews.com/news/2006/11/19/spypoisoned.shtml.

[193] For a more comprehensive listing of contract killings in Russia over the past 12 years, see "Russia: High-Profile Killings, Attempted Killings In The Post-Soviet Period," *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, October 19, 2006, file:///F:/NEWS%20articles%202/DISS/Russia-%20High-Profile%20Killings,%20Attempted%20Killings%20In%20The%20Post-Soviet%20Period.htm.

coverage of them has decreased, certainly a result of official intimidation, harassment, and killing of non-compliant journalists who insist on investigating and publishing stories on organized crime, official corruption, or human rights abuses, in opposition to the chekist authorities, their agenda, and interests. Following hundreds of contract killings every year, in 2003 fewer than 100 contract killings were registered in Russia. However, the numbers would be back up again in 2004.[194] As top crime expert at the Interior Ministry's Scientific Research Institute, Leonid Kondratyuk, noted in 2004, "We're seeing somewhere between 500 and 700 such killings annually. But those are just the murders we know for sure were contract killings. In reality, it's probably two to three times higher."[195] Yet even that number is low. At a January 2004 conference held by the World Community Against the Globalization of Crime and Terror held in Moscow, Valentin Stepankov, Russia's first post-Soviet prosecutor general and a former deputy secretary of the Security Council and deputy natural resources minister, said that organized crime groups were responsible for 26,000 crimes in 2003, around 5000 of which were contract murders.

In clear contradiction to the latter number, the Interior Ministry's Main Criminal Investigations Department reported that fewer than 100 contract murders were registered in 2003, a substantially lesser number. However, MVD spokesman, Denis Strukov, explains the discrepancy, stating that, "But those are cases where we can say for sure it was a contract murder and where a criminal case has been initiated against a known

[194] Op. cit., "Contract Murders Are on the Rise."

[195] Ibid.

suspect. Those are the only objective numbers we have." [196] With few individuals willing to initiate a case or testify against a violent perpetrator out of fear of direct reprisal by the accused and/or potential exposure resulting from collusion between organized crime and security/police forces, cases typically go unsolved. Additionally, investigators often lack adequate resources or sufficient data and may institute varying classification schemes designed to alter the statistics or distort the results, a practice not uncommon among police forces worldwide. As Strukov points out, "Who's to say that someone who gets knocked over the head and his briefcase stolen wasn't the target of a contract murder?"[197]

According to Andrei Konstantinov, head of the Agency of Journalistic Investigations in St. Petersburg, known as the most knowledgeable chronicler of the Russian criminal underworld and author of the book, *Banditsky Peterburg*, a contract hit costs anywhere from a couple hundred dollars to a couple hundred thousand dollars, depending on the nature of the target, etc. For instance, in an October 2003 case in Zhukovsky, near Moscow, two Ukrainian nationals were arrested on suspicion of knifing to death a 23-year old man a month earlier. They claimed that the victim's mother had paid them $300 for the job. Or, as Lt. Mikhail Voronin of the Interior Ministry's Scientific Research Institute points out, "For a bottle of vodka, some homeless guys find they can get the job done with a kitchen knife." Of course, as organized crime specialist, Yakov Kostyukovsky, of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, observes, "A contract murder arranged to look like an accident or a coincidence is going to be a lot more expensive than a standard shooting." Interestingly, he cited the case of Duma

---

[196] Ibid.

[197] Ibid.

Deputy Yuri Shchekochikhin, discussed earlier, as one such case, adding that, "He was obviously a very dangerous journalist for someone."[198]

At the time, Konstantinov believed that the 1998 contract murder of Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova was the most expensive he had come across, costing around $150,000 due to the number of people required for the job of killing the high-value target. He notes that the number of middlemen obscure such deals, with the hitman and the contractor rarely knowing each other, observing that, "It's the hitman who usually ends up getting caught, and only he knows how much money he got. A killing might have been ordered for $20,000, and the hitman only got $5,000. All of the middlemen in between took their cut."[199] As noted, at least six to eight people, all from the Bryansk region, were alleged to have been involved in her murder. As discussed, one of the accused claimed that former Duma deputy, LDP member, and reputed leader of the Tambov group (the most notorious organized crime syndicate in St. Petersburg when she was killed), Mikhail Glushchenko, whose whereabouts are unknown, ordered the hit. Konstantinov observes that it is common for killers to come in from the regions, do the job, and go home. For example, he states that, "You can hire someone from Kazan to come in, kill someone and leave quickly, and you're paying them based on Kazan prices."[200] One of the suspects in the trial, Alexei Voronin, testified in 2004 that about

[198] Ibid.

[199] Ibid.

[200] Ibid.

$10,000 had been spent organizing Starovoitova's murder, money he believed had been provided by co-conspirator Yury Kolchin.[201]

The weak and deeply corrupt judicial system and consequent low probability of being caught, in addition to the wide range of perpetrators, from drug addicts to former military/intelligence men, means many cases go unsolved. As Kondratyuk observes, "Often a court case will be more expensive than just killing someone. Especially since rampant corruption in the justice system means no one can be sure they would win in court." Further, Kostyukovsky notes, "Usually there's nothing personal about it. Unfortunately it's still a typical instrument in dealing with the competition. Al Capone-style."[202] Moreover, finding a hired killer is easy. Alluding to a chekist role in contract killings, he observes that most every successful businessman knows someone in the security services who can find someone to do the job, implying that the typical organizers, if not perpetrators, of the hits are indeed intelligence/security service officers, as is commonly believed.

According to Konstantinov, "In many cases police investigators find out, or already know, who organized the hit. But they can't gather quite enough information for a conviction." In a similar vein, Kostyukovsky differentiates between "official" and "unofficial" levels, noting that the former, in which prosecutors receive enough evidence to try a suspect, are low, while many more are solved unofficially. He states, "If one group of criminals orders a hit on a member of another criminal group, the police might

---

[201] Vladimir Kovalev, "Suspect: Glushchenko Ordered Starovoitova's Killing," *The Moscow Times*, July 9, 2004 and republished at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2004/PAPERS/07/04079_2_mt.html.

[202] Op. cit., "Contract Murders Are on the Rise."

pass on information to the victim's cohorts about who was behind the killing. If rival bandits are killing each other off, it might be advantageous for the police."[203]

At this juncture, it is worth noting the value this method would have to the chekists as a means to supplant organized criminals, take over their activities, and become the dominant players in the protection and other rackets, thus manipulating them in order to control who gains the upper hand in the rivalry with competing groups, including the Chechens, long known as particularly accomplished in black market operations. Such a power shift appears to have succeeded dramatically during the Putin era. The chekists have always manipulated the criminal elements in Russia, with the penetration of the *vory-v-zakone* in the prisons during Soviet times the most oft-cited example. It is certainly plausible that the chekists played the grandmaster role in these post-Soviet developments, playing off the different groups even as they penetrated them, manipulated their agents up the ranks, and controlled them just as the KGB had done.

As one retired chief detective of the St. Petersburg police who requested anonymity confirms, "It happens very often. It's called 'realization of operational information.' In most cases everyone understands that if the case is turned over to the courts, it will take them three years to get to it, and in the end decide no one is guilty of anything. But if you give the information to a rival group, the issue will be solved very quickly and radically. It's rarely done out of 'noble intentions.' Almost always it's out of hatred." Moreover, he added, "If an owner of a small store has another owner of a small store knocked off, no journalists are going to write about it. But if someone like Starovoitova is murdered, the media coverage is enormous, and if the killers aren't found,

[203] Ibid.

the impression is that no contract killings are ever solved. It's definitely harder to solve a contract killing than a drunken domestic killing, but things aren't as bad as the press makes it out to be."[204] The point is, the most prominent killings, often political and believed to have been carried out by the regime, tend to remain unsolved. Clearly, with no rule of law and endemic corruption at the highest levels, the murder of rivals, political, business, or otherwise, is the norm, easier for both government authorities and criminals as a means to solve problems and settle disputes than a protracted court battle where payoffs are routinely demanded and justice is served according to the connections one has or the price one can pay.

6.3.3: The Use of Violence for Political Objectives is the Norm

Violence is in fact a long-established way of life in Russia. The history of the state is replete with examples of state-sanctioned mass killings. Organized criminality, official corruption, and violence from government and now many other quarters is the norm, including murder on a grand scale. In more recent times, as Oleg Mironov, Presidential Ombudsman for Human Rights, noted in May 2001, more than 150,000 people had been killed or seriously wounded as a result of criminal activity, and the problem only worsened with each passing year. In 2001 alone, more than 38 million Russians suffered as a result of crimes, in a population that year of 144 million, or almost 38 percent of the total population.[205]

A 400-page World Health Organization (WHO) study published in October 2002 found that a person in Russia was more likely to have a violent death than any other

---

[204] Ibid.

[205] "Crime Problem Continues to Worsen," *RFE/RL Security & Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 17, May 15, 2002.

country except Colombia and El Salvador; Russia had the third highest rate of death by intentional injuries — homicide and suicide — in the world, with kitchen knives and empty bottles the usual weapons. According to the report, 85,511 Russians died violently in 1998, or 53.7 per 100,000, of which 21.6 people per 100,000 were killed — three times the U.S. rate, 43 times that of France, 31 times that of Germany, and 27 times that of Britain, with most victims males between 30-44 years. By 2001, according to the MVD, the murder rate was 34,000 or 24.2 per 100,000 people. In 1990, the rate had been only 16,000. Noting discrepancies with reality in the reported statistics, Duma Security Council Chair Lt. Gen. Alexander Gurov said the WHO statistics were seriously underestimated as they only included people who died on the spot and excluded those who died after attack (40,000 people), those whose cause of death was undetermined (19,000, approximately 70% of which were murders), and also excluded were those thousands of people who disappear every year and may have been killed. Thus, he argued, the numbers are more than 100,000 murders per year. Interestingly, Gurov stated that, "wealth in Russia is almost always obtained through criminal activities, and this stirs up a violent hatred in the poor, who feel deceived." He blamed lax law enforcement and the widening gap between rich and poor as the main causes for the high death rate. Moreover, he said that 40% of homicides were business-related, adding that, "People who plot murders no longer fear the police. They believe they can avoid punishment by either outwitting or bribing the police."[206]

[206] Nabi Abdullaev, "Russia Ranked Third in Violent Deaths," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, October 9, 2002, pp. 1-2.

6.8: CONCLUSION

I have gone into great depth in this chapter to illustrate how the chekists, uninhibited by LVD and having thwarted it from the very beginning, managed to gain substantial control of the state's political machinery. Under Yeltsin, Russia's originator of a law on lustration, Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova, was thwarted from generating serious public debate on the issue from the beginning, with many of those who sought to expose the KGB's crimes and continuing power routinely suffering severe beatings and worse. Four months after Putin was appointed FSB director, in November 1998, Starovoitova was shot dead at her apartment building as she prepared to run for governor of the region surrounding St. Petersburg. The idea of lustration died with her. It followed that under Putin's administration, the chekists succeeded in both vertical and horizontal penetration of all political institutions of import in the country, constructing a chekist-dominated state and expanding their power while erecting mechanisms to effectively control political-economic society and dictate the agenda, which state is being consolidated in Putin's second presidential term. A contrived opposition has consistently been created as needed to present the illusion of democracy, while genuine opposition elements and rivals are eliminated with impunity in old Soviet KGB fashion. A series of political murders of democratic-oriented officials, beginning with Starovoitova's, and widely believed by many to have Kremlin/FSB origins, have been carried out in a pattern that continued throughout Putin's rise to and retention of the RF presidency. Further, with the chekists manipulating the electoral system and intimidating and impeding democratic rivals, a political opposition in Russia was never able to develop. Today, the Putin-endorsed United Russia is the only national party of any significance. Violence to achieve

political objectives remains an important element in the chekists' repertoire, and is the norm. Political competition in Putin's Russia extends little further than the factional fighting among the members of the chekist-siloviki clan. Indeed, in the interest of ensuring their political-economic dominance, another form of counterintelligence state has taken root in Russia, one that brooks no criticism, is designed to empower and enrich leading chekists, and demands the expenditure of significantly fewer resources than had the Soviet arrangement to maintain the political submission of the people. These are the topics covered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

FUNCTIONS AND METHODS: STILL A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STATE

7.1: INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I examine the Russian intelligence/security sector's counterintelligence activities at home to demonstrate that the regime continues to task the Services to carry out secret police functions of political surveillance and repression. In the process, the use of old Soviet KGB methods continues unabated, the evidence showing that little has changed in post-Soviet Russia in terms of its domestic intelligence functions and methods. The routine violation of human rights and political freedoms, contrary to constitutional principles and federal law, is the norm. In reviewing a number of spurious cases, it is shown how an atmosphere of suspicion and conspiracy is actively promoted by the Services, with foreigners frequently labeled as spies. So, too, the employment of brutal methods against the state's citizens, in Chechnya and across the country, continues with impunity, as is covered in the second half of the chapter.

7.2: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE

Counterintelligence (CI) can be active or passive, offensive or defensive. The former refers to activities ranging from running double agent operations to thwart and manipulate foreign intelligence activities (FIS) activities,[1] to disrupting operations and weakening the capabilities of FISs, and uncovering and rooting out spies in your own ranks, while the latter refers basically to operational support and hardening of targets. The KGB excelled at both approaches. Moreover, the KGB through its Second Chief

[1] John MacGaffin, "Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert Action," *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*, Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Georgetown University Press: Washington, D.C., 2005, pp. 79-95.

Directorate (SCD) not only conducted CI against FISs, but also against its own citizens, through its Fifth Chief Directorate, to root out any dissent against the communist regime. Within the scope of this dissertation project, with its focus on intelligence transformation, and given the scope of counterintelligence activity by the KGB Fifth Chief Directorate during the Soviet era, an examination of the changes and continuities within this particular sphere provide strong indications of the nature and extent of any reform in the post-Soviet intelligence/security sector. In turn, light is shed on the direction of the political change in the country.

Indeed, their pervasiveness unmatched anywhere in the world, the Soviet secret police and their satellite services systematically spied on virtually all state and societal institutions, whether of a political, religious, social, or economic nature; any public organization permitted to exist was heavily infiltrated by secret police agents. There was no personal privacy and no rule of law; Communist party (CP) interests pervaded and dominated all life, both public and private. In short, the CP and Soviet secret police together succeeded in creating the informer society *par excellence*. There was no privacy and no meaningful civil society; communist party interests dominated every aspect of life, public and private. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, this pervasive surveillance of the population was reduced, but certainly did not cease. Those who engage in political activity, to date, are monitored, and despite the fact that numerous chekists have gained political posts and are active in party politics and government, political surveillance continues unabated. As one knowledgeable source told this author in 1997,[2] since communism's collapse and the legal development of a multiparty system, the role of the

[2] Author interview with anonymous source, 1997.

FSB in terms of political surveillance only increased, as "now there are many more political parties to watch."[3] Not only are political officials monitored in contemporary Russia, but the FSB's domestic spying has evolved over the past decade to extend once again to every important institution in the country.

The methods by which the KGB's successors spy on the citizenry do not significantly differ from those of the Soviet era. Organized opposition, protests, and other activities are watched closely, tightly controlled, and under Putin much more frequently put down by force, with expressions of political opposition less frequent as a result.[4] In continuity with the Okhrana of times past,[5] the FSB serves as the eyes and ears of first, the Putin administration and, second, the (Putin-endorsed, United Russia) party leadership, for which it is increasingly the sword and shield. Since the mid-1990s, chekist powers have been progressively increased and now exceed those of the Soviet KGB, and their activities in practice often directly contradict the Russian Constitution and federal law. Until 1993, Russia operated under the old 1977 Brezhnev constitution. While the new constitution provides for a wide array of civil liberties, human rights, and due process (including rights for the accused), the reality of life is very different. As Mark Cichok observes in his 2003 book titled, *Russian and Eurasian Politics: A Comparative Approach*, "In many respects neither the constitution nor the federal laws may prove to be much more than theoretical guidelines for the construction of the new political order."[6]

---

[3] Author interview with anonymous source, 2002.

[4] Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 6.

[5] Charles A. Ruud and Sergei A. Stepanov, *Fontanka 16: The Tsars' Secret Police*, McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca, 1999.

[6] Mark A. Cichock, *Russian and Eurasian Politics: A Comparative Approach*, Longman Publishers: USA, 2003, p. 128.

In Russia, they have just as often been used by authorities against political-economic rivals or ignored.

In terms of domestic spying, Russia scholar Amy Knight notes that the KGB relied on an extensive network of collaborators who spied on colleagues and neighbors and reported periodically to case officers.[7] Thus, just as foreigners/agents are handled by case officers overseas for espionage purposes, so, too, case officers use informers at home, not for espionage per se, but for population control and the reduction/eradication of political dissent. While less overt and somewhat more subtle than had been the reality during the Soviet era, the practice of employing agents and informers for the purpose of domestic spying, whether on citizens or foreigners in Russia, specifically those from the West, in old Soviet tradition, continues to be practiced today, with Russians, more particularly in the regions, choosing to avoid foreigners for fear of being accused of disclosing state secrets. This is the case in part due to the atmosphere of suspicion fanned by the state, as well as its penetration of all political, as well as significant economic and other organizations. As GRU defector Col. Stanislav Lunev observed almost two years into Putin's presidential term, in December 2001, "As the Russian press has been reporting, Russia's secret police, just as in the Soviet era, are now recruiting people in every governmental institution, in political parties, public organizations, and in all other entities, mainly in an effort to keep total control over the population. In the framework of this system every other person has to report about another, and a second one has to report

[7] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, p. 6.

about the first one."[8] Finally, it is also the result of a series of Stalin-era type show trials held in the modern era.

Since the immediate post-collapse period when the KGB-FSB was temporarily weakened, its powers diluted and loyalties fragmented, the domestic service's counterintelligence powers have been progressively increased, with the FSB's power by the time of Yeltsin's 1996 reelection having become far greater in both a bureaucratic and substantive sense. Following Putin's 1998 appointment as FSB director, they only increased. Concomitantly, chekists acquired increasing numbers of key political and economic posts across the country and at every level, a process that unfolded as democratic-minded and oppositional elements were being excluded. This displacement extended to the supplanting of many purely organized crime elements who had not made the (albeit chameleon) change to include some legal front for their illicit activities in cooperation with the new Russian political elite, e.g., chekists, thus providing them a measure of legitimacy (for reasons of appearance, making it easier to have them in government posts or in public association with officials), while also leashing the oligarchs, who had enjoyed their positions of excessive power and influence over state policy during the Yeltsin era.

I propose that the lack of LVD had the effect of enabling unprecedented and tremendous increases in not only the intelligence/security services' staffing and functions, but also in the scope of chekist powers and influence over post-Soviet political life. This growth in chekist authority, accomplished in a relatively compressed time period, has been accompanied by widespread abuses of powers ranging from illegal

---

[8] Stanislav Lunev, "Russia's Secret Police: Powerful Tool for Totalitarianism," *The Eurasian Politician* - Issue 3, February 2001, http://www.cc.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/issue3/tsheka.htm.

wiretapping and domestic spying to the employment of a variety of repressive measures, perhaps including political murder, to recreate the environment of fear that dictated and controlled political behavior during the Soviet era.

7.2.1: Anonymous Tips and an Informer Society

The auspices under which CI activities against the domestic population have been justified by the Kremlin have evolved from rooting out "enemies of the people," to countering organized crime, to fighting terrorism. It was on that plane that, following on the Beslan tragedy, that FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev advocated the institution of informers as a crucial aid in the fight against terrorism, saying in an NTV interview that, "all of society should have an interest in getting rid of terrorism, and anyone who receives information about it should oppose terrorism. Not everyone can do things in reality, but he can certainly pass on information to security or law-enforcement agencies. And if this person does this all the time, he does it for society, and I do not think the attitude to him should be any different," adding that, "all special services use informers in their work."[9] Patrushev thus articulated the regime's goal of reconstituting an informer society, a process that is well underway.

The Russian people have been encouraged to spy on their fellow citizens for decades. Just a year into Putin's first term, the FSB had gained the authority to open criminal cases against individuals based solely on anonymous telephone calls and other unsubstantiated reports, which the Service actively promotes.[10] At that time, the FSB

---

[9] "FSB Director Patrushev Advocates Re-Introducing Institution of Informers in Russia," *agentura.ru*, October 8, 2004, http://www.agentura.ru/english/Right?id=20041008001400.

[10] Stanislav Lunev, "FSB Influence Increases, Influence of Russia's Special Services Increases," *NewsMax*, July 16, 2001.

gave notice that it would be investigating anonymous accusations (anonimki) of crimes against Russian citizens, an old Soviet KGB practice that was banned in 1988 as part of Gorbachev's glasnost policy. The FSB had the decision published in early February 2001, although it amounted to only a footnote in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, the government's daily newspaper of record. It was reprinted in *Segodnya* on February 13, 2001 and the *Wall Street Journal* the following day.[11] Hence, a regulation was enacted allowing the FSB to register and store, by recording anonymously, any allegations about planned and committed crimes, and the use of these anonymous tips to open investigations. This power was upheld by Russia's Supreme Court on April 24, 2001 in response to a complaint filed by activists from the group, For Human Rights. Although, as noted, it had been outlawed under Gorbachev in 1988, ever since 1994 under rules that had been drawn up at that time, the FSB had been permitted to engage in the practice. The 2005 actions only indicated that the FSB had placed new emphasis on its use, while the Court ruling renewed concerns that not only would the use of anonymous tips deprive citizens of their constitutional rights, but would be used as a weapon against business competitors,[12] and to resolve personal rivalries.

7.2.2: Repression of Political Opposition and the Serious Decline in Political Participation

The difficulties of organizing politically can be traced directly to the activities of the highly politicized intelligence/security sector, which assiduously enforces the dictates of the regime, just as in Soviet times. By late 2003, all democratic-oriented parties had been excluded from national government and both the number of chekists in political

[11] "News --- World-Wide," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 14, 2001, p. A1.

[12] "Court Safeguards FSB's Use of Tips," *The Moscow Times*, April 25, 2001, p. 3.

positions and official corruption had significantly increased, while popular political participation, which bodes well for democracy, had markedly declined. In the months preceding the elections, it was clear that they would fare poorly as a result. While the parties are self-sufficient and lack incentives to draw widespread support, other forms of political activity, such as protests, rallies, strikes, and other "people power" methods are few and attract only small numbers of individuals.

For example, in October 2003, the Moscow-based Institute for Election Systems Development (IESD) and Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI) conducted a survey, with disturbing results. They found that "two thirds of the country population belong to the silent majority that's the people who never are involved in any form of collective political participation."[13] They determined that, "The highest level of activities is found in the pre-reform period. The pique of social activities falls on the first half of the 90s, i.e., on the beginning of social economic changes in Russia; then the activity reduced considerably. In the last year (2003), only 9% of the polled Russians took part in some forms of collective publicly useful activity (27% in all the years of reforms)." Data on this activity is shown in Figure 7.1 below:

[13] "Future of Democracy in Russia in the Hands of Silent Majority," Institute for Election Systems Development (IESD) and Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI), Moscow, Russia, October 31, 2003.

Figure 7.1: Participation in Strikes, Pickets, Sit-In Protests, Traffic Obstruction, 1993-2003

Periods	Population
2003	7%
1998-2002	13%
1993-1998	71%
Before 1993	3%
TOTAL	**100%**

The most widespread form of political participation was voting, but even then the population saw participation in elections as a way to express their support or protest to authorities and politicians, and not as a channel for influencing public policy or communicating its interests. In recent years, the voting for "against all candidates" reached such epic proportions that it threatened the legitimacy of elections, those that were still permitted, leading the Kremlin to push for changes in the electoral law to eliminate that choice, which was accomplished in 2006.[14] The survey showed that, "The other widespread form of political participation is participation in election campaigns (11% of respondents for the last 10 years); those who signed collective letters, appeals to the mass media and authorities account for 8%, those who donated money for the benefit of some project or organization of public importance make up 7%."[15] Most tellingly, the

[14] "Q&A with the Russian Election Commission Chairman Alexander Veshnyakov," *IFIS*, December 1, 2006, http://www.ifes.org/features.html?title=Q%25A%20with%20the%20Russian%20Election%20Commission%20Chairman%20Alexander%20Veshnyakov.

[15] Op. cit., "Future of Democracy in Russia in the Hands of Silent Majority."

percentage of political participation dropped precipitously after 1998, the year that Putin was appointed FSB director, dropping from 71 percent to only 13 over a short period.

As to Russian participation in NGOs, in 2003 only 1 in 9 took part (either formal or informal) in the activity of these public organizations. The data are shown in Figure 7.2 below:

Figure 7.2: Participation in the Work of Public Organizations

Public Organizations	Population
Ecological	2% (7 times less)
Youth	14% (2.5 times less)
Veterans Unions	2% (8 times less)
Local self-governing bodies	5% (5 times less)
Charity organizations	2% (14 times less)
Other public organizations	3% (11 times less)
Religious organizations	3% (5 times less)
Clubs by interest	7% (2.5 times less)

There is a widespread sense among the populace that participation in political activities will make no difference, and as this author's research found, could result in "things becoming worse for an individual" if authorities chose to retaliate, perceived as a real possibility.[16] It is apparent that intimidation and fear accompanied by a sense of hopelessness have had a significant effect on the likelihood that Russians become

[16] Drawing from numerous interviews and straw polls, the consensus was that there was no point in issuing a complaint or taking other action to make government responsive as the response, if any, was more likely to be negative than positive, and so people simply accept things as they are.

involved or take part in politically active opposition groups, resulting in widespread and deepening apathy. The IESD/CESSI survey supports that proposition, finding that, "confidence in the efficiency of various forms of public participation is rather low among Russians. Only a small share of respondents (from 3% to 9%) is quite sure that any of the forms of public and political participation may be efficient in the solution of problems." Interestingly, the poll suggested that, "The major reasons for impossibility to participate in various forms of collective action are the absence of leaders, organizers of collective action; people's perceptions that they have no other people sharing their views and they do not know where to appeal to. At present there is less than 1% of those who act as organizers of collective action or participates actively."[17]

Clearly, the authorities, well-versed in political repression techniques, have recognized that through the constant harassment and persecution of leading activists they can efficiently suppress unwanted political activity among the apathetic masses, who therefore see no value in challenging government officials to govern effectively, fulfill their responsibilities, and respond to society's ills and concerns, let alone open up the political system. It has been shown that the general population has only been willing to rise up in mass protest when their livelihoods have been seriously threatened and they feared they had nothing to lose. For example, the IESD/CESSI pollsters found that, "For the last 10 years, only 6% of respondents resorted to protest forms of participation (rallies, demonstrations, strikes and individual forms of protest)," and explained that, "An upsurge of participation in these forms of protest with the population is found at the peak

[17] Op. cit., "Future of Democracy in Russia in the Hands of Silent Majority."

of nonpayment of salaries, and then drops sharply."[18] Another example was the massive protests that erupted across the country in January 2005 when a new law took effect that (very inadequately) monetized many privileges and in-kind benefits (such as free transportation) for pensioners, war veterans, the disabled, and other underprivileged groups.[19] Individuals from all walks of life participated in those protests.

7.2.3: Political Surveillance of Academic and Research Institutions: Scientists and Scholars

In addition to widespread chekist penetration of political and economic structures, and in line with Stanislav Lunev's statement on the Services' efforts to reobtain the level of population control they had historically maintained, there is widespread FSB penetration of state, educational, research, and religious institutions, which continue to be kept under close surveillance, as in Soviet times; just as certain political, business, and other groups in the general population are monitored, so, too, are scientists and intellectuals. For example, in July 2001 Lunev (who had earlier noted the security services' new authority to open criminal cases against individuals solely on the basis of anonymous phone calls), next observed the revival of the rule that Russian scholars submit reports on their contact with foreigners, which practice had been stopped with the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse but was revived with the issuance of a May 24, 2001 directive titled, "The Academy of Sciences Action Plan to Prevent Damage to the Russian State in the Spheres of Economic and Scientific Cooperation." The directive

---

[18] Ibid. See http://www.democracy.ru/english/about/, and Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI), Moscow, Russia, October 31, 2003, http://www.cessi.ru/index.php?id=1&L=1.

[19] "Russians Continue to Protest Social Reforms," *RFE/RL*, January 16, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/01/35748f47-5554-4c5a-8abe-fac8aa8e4883.html; and, "Russian Officials Lash Out at a Human Rights Report," *Kommersant*, and reposted at *Freedom House*, February 2, 2007, http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/freedom020207.htm.

requires over one million Russian scholars and scientists of the Russian Academy of Sciences to submit regular reports to authorities on their foreign travel, conferences, and laboratory visits by foreigners, articles in foreign publications, international cooperation agreements, and acceptance of foreign grants. Further, the order mandated that they ensure strict security measures in their Internet and other international computer network use.[20]

These types of controls have only stifled the intellectual life of the country. Christian Gianella and William Tompson noted in January 2007 that "Russian scientists publish only 2.7% of the total volume of publications in the world's leading scientific journals."[21] Many of them, particularly those in their 20s and 30s, have left the country in search of better work conditions and opportunities, a situation that bodes poorly for Russia's future under the chekist regime. Furthermore, a number of scientists and scholars have been arrested on trumped up charges of espionage, instilling fear and uncertainty among those who engage in or would participate in collaborative studies and maintain regular contact with foreign counterparts, the most prominent of these cases discussed later in this chapter.

Similarly, with clear prescience of the evolving situation in the country, Lunev observed that the FSB had fabricated a number of espionage cases against foreigners, including that of John Tobin, accused of espionage but arrested in January 2001 on charges of obtaining, possessing, and distributing marijuana.[22] Lunev's forecast of the

---

[20] Op. cit., "FSB Influence Increases, Influence of Russia's Special Services Increases."

[21] Christian Gianella and William Tompson, "Stimulating Innovation in Russia: The Role of Institutions and Policies," Economics Department Working Papers No. 539, *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*, ECO/WKP(2006)67, January 15, 2007.

[22] Op. cit., "FSB Influence Increases, Influence of Russia's Special Services Increases."

continuation of old Soviet KGB domestic spying practices, perpetrated against Russian citizens and foreigners alike, has been borne out, as the next section illustrates. The fact that there was no secret police transformation in post-Soviet Russia, with the old chekists retaining their control of the Services and using their commanding posts to perpetuate chekist traditions, including the regular dissemination of propaganda that foreigners are spies, has meant that visitors to the country, and particularly those from the West, and those Russian citizens who have or maintain contacts with them, continue to be treated with the utmost suspicion by the authorities.

The following cases show a trend that has continued throughout the latter 1990s and accelerated in the 21st century, with the spy mania showing no indication of slowing. Numerous Russian citizens have been arrested for spying on spurious bases and many foreign nationals expelled without justification. So, too, many foreign organizations and NGOs have been labeled subversive and targeted by the security services, particularly those organizations engaged in "humanitarian," "religious-charitable," or election-monitoring activities. The chekist mentality that views all foreigners as "spies" and seeks out *potential* "enemies of the state" remains prominent and poses a major obstacle to the Russian intelligence/security services' transformation from a secret police, which, in turn, effectively thwarts a Russian transition to democracy. For instance, the former commander of the federal forces in Chechnya (he also was involved in coordinating the October 2002 botched rescue attempt during the hostage situation at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow) and from May 2000-September 2004 (when he was replaced by Dmitri

Kozak) presidential envoy to the Southern Federal District, Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, said in December 2002 that "you know very well who works for the Red Cross — spies."[23]

Such thinking extends throughout Russia's political and intelligence/security institutions. That same month, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Bulavin, head of the FSB's Nizhnii Novgorod directorate, reported that his officers had uncovered 19 foreign intelligence officers (FIOs) seeking information on defense objects in the region, with the prime targets the Federal Nuclear Center in Sarov and local defense enterprises working on advanced weapons development.[24] The following year, on the eve of Chekists' Day (Security Service Workers' Day) 2003, Patrushev praised the chekists' work and noted that the FSB had caught five foreign spies during the year, and "Espionage and other subversive activities of 14 other career spies and of 37 agents of foreign governments, including two Russian citizens, had also been stopped."[25] The two Russians were Anatoly Babkin, a university professor given a suspended eight-year sentence for working with American businessman Edmond Pope, and SVR Col. Alexander Zaporozhsky, a former deputy head of the First Department of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the FIS who had retired in 1997 and emigrated to the U.S., who was detained in Russia in November 2001 after being enticed to return to the country and ultimately sentenced to

---

[23] "Intelligence Community Celebrates Its Soviet Origins...As Foreign-Intelligence Director Outlines Priorities...FSB Goes After Spies in the Regions...And Presidential Envoy Accuses Red Cross of Spying," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 45, December 24, 2002, pp. 5-6.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Alla Startseva, "FSB: 5 Foreign Spies Caught This Year," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 22, 2003, p. 5.

18 years in prison for allegedly working with the FBI and CIA.[26] The Babkin and Pope case is discussed in detail below.

In 2004, Patrushev reported that, "In 2004 the activities of 18 staff members of foreign spy agencies were ended. Six of these were caught red-handed, two of these were convicted and four of them were expelled from Russian territory." He added that, "The active espionage activities of a number of foreign spy agencies against Russia presents a real and serious danger to the national interests and security of our state." It was also reported that 17 criminal cases on charges of revealing state secrets had been opened and 13 people had been convicted.[27] The theme continued into Putin's second term.

7.3: THE LAW "ON STATE SECRETS" — "SPY MANIA," SHOW TRIALS

As discussed in chapter three, the powers and procedures of activities such as surveillance, wiretapping, information/data handling, the classification of information and state secrets, and personnel-related issues need to be based on codified law. Six months prior to the ratification of Russia's new, post-Soviet constitution, on July 21, 1993 Russian Federation Law No. 5485-1, "On State Secrets" was signed by Yeltsin. This was the first law to provide a specific definition of "state secret," which was further clarified in the new constitution ratified in December. The law mandated that what

---

[26] Zaporozhsky was suspected of revealing the identities of over Russian spies based in the U.S. See "Russian colonel jailed for spying," *BBC News*, June 11, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2981176.stm; Alla Startseva, "FSB: 5 Foreign Spies Caught This Year," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 22, 2003, p. 5; and, "Moscow Court Sentences Former Foreign Intelligence Officer to 18 Years in Prison," *Pravda*, June 11, 2003, http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/crimes/11-06-2003/3045-zaporozhsky-0.

[27] "Russia's FSB Detained 18 Foreign Spies in 2004 — Director," *MosNews.com*, December 16, 2004.

constituted a state secret must be codified in law (as opposed to regulations),[28] and stipulated that the president must elaborate on and approve the list of information classified as a state secret by publicly issuing a decree. So, too, the various ministries were required, based on the president's list, to compile their own publicly available lists of the specific types of information classified as state secrets. Yet, as with many laws in post-Soviet Russia, this one, too, left room for ambiguity; the result was the continuation of a practice carried over from Soviet times when shifting, broad, or vague definitions on what was a state secret were used to prosecute dissidents on shaky legal grounds.[29]

First, an extensive period elapsed before Yeltsin issued the mandated decree, Presidential Edict No. 1203, "Approving List of Information Classified as State Secrets," dated December 27, 1995 and signed by the president on December 30, 1995.[30] The decree lists 87 categories of data subject to classification. And the actual list of what information comprised a state secret was not issued until October 6, 1997, when amendments to the "Law on State Secrets" were passed.[31] During this period, the FSB brought cases against a number of individuals for disclosing state secrets, based on regulations and orders of various ministries that were classified, in clear violation of the federal law mandating that they be publicly available. In fact, the lists did not even exist for some periods, and the authorities sought to retroactively apply the law in court.

---

[28] Ivan Pavlov, "Freedom of Information and State Secrets," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4, New York University School of Law, Fall 2000, http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol9num4/features/nikitinarticle4.html.

[29] Ibid.

[30] "Presidential Edict No. 1203, Approving List of Information Classified as State Secrets, December 30, 1995," posted at http://www.fas.org/sgp/russedict.html.

The practice continued into the Putin era. In late November 2000, the Russian media reported that the intelligence services were using a list of state secrets falling under over 700 rubrics prepared by the Ministry of Defense even though the presidentially-approved list included only 22 of them. Such a lack of clarity works to compound the ambiguity and adds to the complexity with which the courts must deal in rendering verdicts,[32] although it has been shown that the FSB controls the courts in any case. The situation not only enables the Services to fabricate cases against innocent individuals, it also has the effect of suppressing free speech. Government ministries and federal agencies continue to have the right to issue their own lists, which continue to expand in their coverage of what is classified and remain outside the public realm, contrary to the law requiring codification. Thus, Valentin Danilov was tried on the basis of a list produced by the Education Ministry, which he and his lawyer saw for the first time in court as part of the evidence presented against him. Alexander Nikitin successfully challenged the Defense Ministry after being charged with violating classified orders specifying extremely broad categories of state secrets, but only after five years of fighting the charges.[33] Clearly, the process is designed to ensure conviction, which only mandates the FSB construct a case, just as during Soviet times.

---

[31] This law was all-encompassing, and made all information on military installations a state secret. See Thomas Nilsen, "All information on Northern Fleet radwaste and subs now secret," *Bellona*, October 11, 1997, http://www.bellona.no/bellona.org/english_import_area/12171.

[32] "Russia Lacks Clear Definition of 'State Secrets,'" *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 21, December 11, 2000.

[33] "Complaint by the defense team," To The Criminal Collegiate of the Supreme Court of Russian Federation, From defense attorneys Yu. Shmidt and I. Pavlov of the International Attorney Collegiate "St. Petersburg," 191187, St. Petersburg, Ul. Gagarinskaya 6-A, 3 Floor, tel.: 275 4209, 275 1071, November 5, 1998, regarding the case of the St. Petersburg City Court in defense of the defendant, Alexander Nikitin, http://bellona.org/english_import_area/casefile/international/russia/envirorights/nikitin/c-court1998/1140457648.66. Also see Ivan Pavlov, "Freedom of Information and State Secrets," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4, New York University School of Law, Fall 2000,

7.3.1: The Case of Valentin Danilov

As a consequence of Putin's judicial reforms, rather than a fairer application of the rule of law, one can only expect to see a continuing parade of FSB-instigated cases brought on spurious charges against targeted individuals, especially those who challenge or criticize the regime, and following the same drawn-out legal process as have those of numerous other prominent figures over the course of Putin's administration. FSB/court machinations led to the spy-trial conviction of 53-year old physicist Valentin Danilov, director of the Thermo-Physics Centre at Krasnoyarsk State Technical University in Siberia[34] and a specialist in plasma physics in the industrial city of Krasnoyarsk, Siberia, which remains a bastion of Soviet-era secrecy with its several restricted-access production facilities and two closed-off satellite cities. He was arrested on February 16, 2001, accused of passing classified space technology to China while working on a commercial contract.[35] In a fantastic indictment harking back to the mid-late 1930s, it was alleged that he met with Chinese intelligence officers five times, passing them information on air-to-air missiles, the MIG-29 SMT fighter jet, plans for Russia's strategic nuclear forces up to 2007, the Defense Ministry's work in 1998 to implement plans to develop permanent readiness units, information on the structure and condition of Russia's early warning system,[36] and sensitive information about the influence of

---

http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol9num4/features/nikitinarticle4.html; and, Anna Badkhen, "Aleksandr Nikitin," Trapped in the FSB's Dante-esque Circle," *Prism*, Vol. 5, Issue 14, The Jamestown Foundation, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=6&issue_id=382&article_id=3673.

[34] "Court of Jury Says Scientist Sutyagin Guilty of Espionage," *MosNews.com*, April 5, 2004, http://*MosNews.com.com*/news/2004/04/05/sutyagin.shtml.

[35] Natalia Yefimova, "Scientist Trapped in State Secrets Maze," *The Moscow Times*, November 9, 2001, pp. 1-4.

[36] Op. cit., "Russia's FSB Detained 18 Foreign Spies in 2004 — Director."

electromagnetic waves on satellites.[37] Yet, he and other scientists insisted that this information was not classified; the data he was accused of revealing had been widely available for nearly 10 years. Still, he was convicted of selling state secrets — in fact, his wholly unclassified research — in a case fellow scientists said reminded them of Stalin-era purges.

The charges against Danilov stemmed from a contract he signed in March 1999 on behalf of his employer. The $366,000 deal with the state-run All-China Import-Export Precision Machine-Building Company involved the sale of a device designed by Danilov and his colleagues for testing the effects of electromagnetic activity on space satellites. Despite protests from scientists working in the field, the FSB insisted this technology could help a foreign country save time and money in developing spacecraft that could potentially harm Russia's "external security."[38] The FSB reportedly had opened its investigation in May 2000 after the Chinese transferred a $70,000 payment to the university's account. Travel restrictions were imposed on Danilov as the authorities planned on charging him with revealing state secrets, which they asserted were included in the technical outline accompanying the contract. Nine months later, in February 2001, the Krasnoyarsk FSB changed the charge to a more severe one — treason in the form of espionage under Article 275 of the Criminal Code, for, specifically, selling top secret satellite information to a Chinese company and receiving $36,000 from the Chinese in exchange. Danilov was jailed.[39] He spent 19 months in jail before he was finally released

---

[37] "Danilov Loses Last Appeal in Spy Case," *The Moscow Times*, June 30, 2005, p. 1.

[38] Op. cit., "Scientist Trapped in State Secrets Maze."

[39] "Physicist found not guilty of spying," *The Russia Journal*, December 30, 2003.

in September 2003 under a travel ban and on his own recognizance as the investigation and trial continued.

A day before the one-year deadline for the investigation, the FSB unexpectedly added another charge of embezzlement/misappropriating university funds (or fraud, Article 159), although his attorney, Yelena Yevmenova, pointed out that the graft case was outside the service's jurisdiction. On this charge, the university sided with the FSB, accusing Danilov of misappropriating 466,000 rubles he had allegedly received from the Chinese firm.[40] Earlier in 2001, 17 leading physicists/scientists, including Vitaly Ginzburg, a 2003 Nobel Prize winner from the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, wrote an open letter to the Krasnoyarsk prosecutor, confirming that the data Danilov passed was not secret, had been declassified in 1992, and could be found in the public domain. Nevertheless, a jury trial closed to the public was scheduled, and began on October 3, 2003.[41] During the trial, Judge Alexander (Andrei) Kulyabov refused the introduction of some evidence and prevented a number of the defense witnesses from testifying, including academics from the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.[42]

Then, only 10 days after former intelligence officer Alexander Zaporozhsky's 18-year prison sentence for spying for the United States was upheld by a military court,[43] and in what the media labeled a "major and unusual setback for the security services," on

---

[40] Ibid.

[41] Anatoly Medetsky, *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 30, 2003, p. 1.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Seth Mydans, "Russian Jury Acquits Physicist Accused of Selling Secrets," *The New York Times*, December 29, 2003.

December 29, 2003 a jury at the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court acquitted Danilov.[44] Following the ruling, Yevmenova, Danilov's attorney, reported that, "After a four-hour long discussion, 8 out of 12 jurors declared him innocent on all counts, after which the judge acquitted him." Prosecutor Sergei Kharin said he would appeal the ruling to the Supreme Court on procedural grounds, declaring on NTV that, "The evidence that the prosecution has collected over these four years is sufficient for the jurors to have made the opposite decision.[45]

Human rights groups attributed the acquittal to the fact that it was a jury trial and thus not one in which judges could be susceptible to state pressure. As Danilov himself told Ekho Moskvy radio, "The not-guilty verdict was largely thanks to a jury. When it was only a judge, it was difficult for him to reach such a verdict. There are very few judges who can make such brave decision. I think we may be getting hints of justice."[46] Also commenting on the outcome, Grigory Pasko (the military journalist previously and similarly charged with treason over the transfer of unclassified data), told the radio station that the security services were continuing a policy of fabricating spy cases and predicted that, "This will continue until there is a precedent, when an investigator who falsifies and fabricates such cases is tried."[47] And, Ernst Chyorny, a Moscow Helsinki Group activist, said that the FSB will continue filing similar cases because "the higher-

---

[44] Ibid; Op. cit., Anatoly Medetsky, *TheMoscowTimes.com,*; and, "Physicist found not guilty of spying," *The Russia Journal*, December 30, 2003.

[45] Op. cit., Anatoly Medetsky, *TheMoscowTimes.com.*

[46] Op. cit., "Russian Jury Acquits Physicist Accused of Selling Secrets."

[47] Ibid.

ups want to hype the [espionage] situation to obtain funding, while lower-ranking officers want to get promotions and awards."[48] Yet, the case was not over after all.

In November 2004, following the FSB's appeal alleging that the defense had pressured the jury,[49] he was found guilty and sentenced to 14 years in prison for espionage. Putting the case to rest, on June 29, 2005 the Supreme Court reduced his sentenced by one year, to 13, in his final appeal, allowing him to be sent to a maximum-security prison.[50] In regard to this final appeal, Danilov's lawyers had demanded a retrial, arguing that, among other things, four of the 12 jurors may have been biased because they held jobs that gave them access to state secrets, thus depriving him of a jury trial.[51] It made little difference. Many scientists and human rights organizations around the world charged that his sentence was ridiculous because the information he passed to China had, in fact, been declassified in 1992. Nevertheless, all 12 members of the court of jury found him guilty.[52]

7.3.2: The Case of Igor Sutyagin

On October 27, 1999 Igor Sutyagin, a researcher on arms control and security issues at the Department for Military-Political Studies of the prestigious Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada was arrested by the FSB Kaluga Oblast Directorate on October 27, 1999 and charged under the provisions of Article 275 of the RF Criminal Law Code —

---

[48] Op. cit., Anatoly Medetsky, *TheMoscowTimes.com.*

[49] Op. cit., "Russia's FSB Detained 18 Foreign Spies in 2004 — Director."

[50] Op. cit., "Danilov Loses Last Appeal in Spy Case."

[51] Ibid.

[52] "Court of Jury Finds Russian Scientist Danilov Guilty of Espionage," *MosNews.com*, November 5, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/11/05/scientistguilty.shtml.

high treason in the form of espionage for passing state secrets on nuclear submarines and other military and political secrets to two employees of London-based Alternative Futures, Sean Kidd and Nadio Lokk, while visiting Britain, in exchange for $20,000. At the time, Putin headed the FSB. [53] The Service alleged that the British firm was a front for a Western intelligence service and that Sutyagin had passed secrets to Joshua Handler, a U.S. nuclear specialist employed there. Sutyagin's defense lawyers, as with those in the other cases, pointed out that the information he supplied was freely available, and that his research was based on unclassified sources such as newspaper articles, publicly available government documents, and reference books. As a civilian researcher with no security clearance, he had no access to any classified materials. Moreover, Sutyagin had no reason to believe the British company he was doing consulting work for was an intelligence cover,[54] all his contacts with foreigners were professional in nature, and he only exchanged openly available information with colleagues.[55] Observers expressed the belief that the FSB was trying to revive Soviet-era restrictions on contacts with foreigners,[56] which did in fact occur, as noted earlier, in May 2001. The FSB, however, insisted the accuracy of the research indicated Sutyagin must have used classified documents to draw his conclusions.

---

[53] "Scientists Sentence for Espionage Condemned by Liberals," *MosNews.com*, April 9, 2004, http://*MosNews.com.com*/news/2004/04/09/scientist.shtml.

[54] "Sutyagin Rebuffed," *The Moscow Times*, October 7, 2002, p. 4.

[55] "Secret Services Supreme Court Reinstates Military-Secrets Order.....As Authorities Continue To Hold Scientist Accused of Espionage...And FSB Counterintelligence Warns About Foreign-Intelligence Activity," *RFE/RL Security & Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 17, May 15, 2002.

[56] Op. cit., "Russia's FSB Detained 18 Foreign Spies in 2004 — Director."

His trial opened on December 26, 2000, only to resume on February 26, 2001. As the defense had done in many other spying cases initiated against researchers, journalists, diplomats, and businessmen, Sutyagin's lawyers argued that he never had access to classified information,[57] and only passed on information that was publicly available.[58] The way the case was described in a November 2001 *Washington Post* editorial was enlightening: "If [Sutyagin's case] sounds like a bad parody of Kafka, that's precisely the intention: The FSB wants Russians to know that it has the ability to jail anyone who somehow displeases the authorities, regardless of evidence or law."[59] On December 27, 2001 the Kaluga Oblast Court sent the Sutyagin case back for further examination, ruling that the FSB had failed to provide sufficient evidence and had "committed substantial violations of legal procedures, which deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to defend himself."[60] Hence, like many of the other cases, Sutyagin's case, too, dragged on for years. On May 7, 2002 the press office of the Kaluga Territorial FSB Directorate announced that the Prosecutor General's Office had extended until June 30 the term for preparing Sutyagin's case.[61]

In June 2002 the case and investigation were transferred from the regional court to Moscow, where the courts have passed guilty verdicts in similar "spy trials" in which the government alleged treachery, even with the security services failing to provide

---

[57] "Another Spy Trial Begins," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 24, January 2, 2001, pp. 2-3.

[58] "Minister, top brass to be called to testify in Russian spy trial," *Agence France Presse*, February 7, 2001.

[59] "Editorial," *Washington Post*, November 12, 2001.

[60] Michael Flynn, "Russia: Spy mania," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 58, No. 5, September/October 2002, pp. 15-16.

[61] Op. cit., "Secret Services Supreme Court Reinstates Military-Secrets Order....."

compelling evidence.[62] On July 2, 2002 the Supreme Court upheld Sutyagin's detention and the Prosecutor General's Office again extended the investigation, mandating that he remain in prison at least until September 8, 2002,[63] although his lawyer, Vladimir Vasiltsov, argued that his detention was illegal since his guilt had not been proven.[64] Regardless, on October 4, 2002 a Moscow court extended Sutyagin's pretrial detention so that he could finish reading the case materials, announcing that once he finished, a trial date would be set. Vasiltsov responded that Sutyagin's defense team would appeal the Moscow City Court's extension to the Supreme Court, and that he expected Sutyagin to take more than a month to finish familiarizing himself with the case against him.[65] It was odd indeed when five months later (in November) his case was transferred to a different judge, while a jury just formed was dismissed. Of note, the new Criminal Procedure Code that took effect in July 2002 and provides for juries, among other provisions designed to protect defendants against arbitrary justice, has often been ignored or outright corrupted in practice, conviction rates remain at the high Soviet-era levels, and judicial cooptation and corruption remain common features of the system.

Finally, on November 3, 2003 the new jury's hearing of the case began at Moscow City Court, chaired by Judge Petr Shtunder, but was repeatedly postponed. Before long, the hearing was adjourned, and in February 2004 Shtunder announced that he would not proceed with the case. Therefore, on March 15, 2004 a new trial was begun, chaired by Judge Komarova. The old jury was dismissed and a new panel formed. On

---

[62] Op. cit., "Court of Jury Says Scientist Sutyagin Guilty of Espionage."

[63] "Trial for Accused Spy Postponed Again," *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 11, 2002.

[64] "Espionage Conviction, Sentence Upheld," *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 2, 2002.

[65] Op. cit., "Sutyagin Rebuffed."

April 4, the jury passed a unanimous guilty verdict, finding Sutyagin guilty of high treason, with eight of the 12 jurors saying he deserved no leniency. The prosecutor demanded a 17-year sentence. On April 7, the Moscow City Court sentenced him to 15 years of hard-labor, and on August 17, 2004 the RF Supreme Court upheld the verdict.[66] Two days later, a spokesman for the Russian intelligence services told the media that, "Among all the special services involved in intelligence activity against Russia over the last five years, the most active has been U.S. intelligence."[67]

Surely when the Social Committee 2008: Free Choice, co-chaired by world chess champion Garry Kasparov, former co-leader of the liberal Union of Right Forces Boris Nemtsov, and journalist Sergei Parkhomenko,[68] described Sutyagin's guilty verdict as "evidence of a direct offensive by the authorities against the very foundation of a democratic constitutional system in Russia," they were right on target. Perhaps that is why Kasparov was so effectively thwarted and harassed by the authorities on a subsequent trip to visit various cities in Russia.[69] Indeed, there is much more to the Sutyagin case. A former KGB/SVR officer served on the jury. Soon after the verdict was handed down, the defense found among the jurors a person who was on a list of candidate jurors for another court — the Moscow District Military Court. It was a mystery how this person had landed at the Moscow City Court. In August 2004, Sutyagin's defense counsel, Boris Kuznetsov, identified this juror as Grigory Yakimishen. Subsequently,

---

[66] "Scientist Sutyagin Gets 15 Years for Espionage," April 7, 2004, *Gazeta.ru*, http://www.gazeta.ru/2004/04/07/oa_117138.shtml.

[67] Victor Yasmann, "Spymania Returns To Russia," *RFE/RL Newsline*, April 13, 2004.

[68] Op. cit., "Scientist's Sentence for Espionage Condemned by Liberals."

[69] Masha Gessen, "Russians Can't Afford an Opposition," *MosNews.com*, July 18, 2005, http://mosnews.com/commentary/2005/07/18/kasparoveggs.shtml.

investigative journalists learned that he had been involved in a spy scandal, and remarkably, had been suspected of collaborating with the Polish intelligence services. Yakimishen was an SVR colonel who had finished intelligence officer training school in 1979-84 while working at the *Novosti Press Agency* bureau in Gdansk.

In 1992, Yakimishen had replaced SVR officer Vladimir Alganov as first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw (1981-1992), then becoming embassy press secretary in 1994, a post he held through 1996. When Alganov retired, Yakimishen took over the handling of Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, who had been recruited by the KGB in 1982 and given the code-name, "Olin." While on vacation in Majorca in July 1995, Alganov had met in a hotel with Marian Zacharski, a Polish intelligence officer, to discuss a number of issues, among them agent Olin. However, unbeknownst to Alganov, Zacharski secretly taped the conversation, later presenting it to Polish Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski.

Jerzy Jachowicz, a prominent Polish journalist for *Gazeta Wyborcza* reported that he knew Yakimishen was a Russian intelligence officer, and that he may have been recruited by Polish intelligence, as the Russian had gotten drunk on vodka with a Polish intelligence officer, Marian Zacharski, and revealed to him that Olin was Oleksy. Yakimishen left Poland in January 1996, the same month that the Military Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation into Oleksy's Soviet-Russian intelligence contacts. Interestingly, Yakimishen was never prosecuted for working on behalf of Polish intelligence. As the journalists discovered, until recently he had been employed by Parma Trading Company.[70]

---

[70] Irina Borodan and Andrei Soldatov, "Spy Scare - from Oleksy to Sutyagin," *agentura.ru*, September 16, 2004, http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/sutyagin/.

The Sutyagin case, in particular, is instructive of the variations of intrigue in which the Russian intelligence services are regularly engaged in their efforts to "spy out the enemy." Regardless of the truth about the FSB subversion of Sutyagin's trial, he, like so many others, remains jailed with little chance of successfully appealing his case, the revelations surrounding the authorities' machinations in getting him unfairly convicted making no difference in bringing "justice." Indeed, there have been numerous constructed cases preceding his, and with the chekists in control, many more can be expected to follow.

These two cases, of Valentin Danilov and Igor Sutyagin, both resulted in 2004 convictions, Putin's presidential reelection year. There are others as well, including that of Mikhail Trepashkin, covered in chapter nine. They have been presented, with that of Sutyagin examined in detail, in order to illustrate the anatomy of a modern day spy trial, Putin style. As shown, and as observed by the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, spy cases in Russia follow a familiar pattern: "the FSB protests the ruling; the defendant remains in prison while prosecutors track down new evidence; the case goes back to court, often with a new judge presiding; and the FSB wins the appeal."[71] For the sake of clarity, below are brief discussions of some of the other prominent cases that occurred as the FSB increasingly gained power, accelerated its activity against innocent individuals who opposed the regime, and spread anti-foreigner propaganda to fan the spy mania and create a climate conducive to the Putin political agenda.

[71] Op. cit., "Russia: Spy mania."

7.3.3: The Case of Former Navy Captain Alexander Nikitin

Alexander Nikitin, a former navy captain, was arrested by the FSB in 1996 and held for 10 months in an FSB jail in St. Petersburg. He was accused of sharing secret information with foreigners, charged with espionage and high treason, and prosecuted on the basis of a 1995 report he co-authored for his employer Bellona, a Norway-based environmental group, that he prepared on the decaying Russian nuclear submarine fleet. The report exposed unsafe storage of nuclear waste by the Russian navy. In December 1999, a St. Petersburg City Court acquitted him, ruling that the information was not classified as secret at the time. The Supreme Court upheld that ruling in April 2000 but the Prosecutor General's Office appealed the decision, saying further investigation was needed. On September 13, 2000, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, the Court's highest body, rejected the prosecutor's appeal, acquitting Nikitin and closing the case.[72] The Supreme Court rejected prosecution requests to reopen the charges and upheld the lower municipal court (the St. Petersburg City Court) ruling that the laws Nikitin had been charged under had been applied retroactively, and that the prosecutor had failed to show a list of state secrets allegedly revealed in the report.[73] Nevertheless, Nikitin suffered for five years as the government prosecuted him.[74]

7.3.4: The Case of Military Journalist Grigory Pasko

The case of ecologist and military journalist for a naval newspaper in Russia's Pacific Fleet, Grigory Pasko, is also instructive. He was arrested by the FSB in 1997 for

---

[72] "Russian Whistle Blower Acquitted," *The New York Times*, September 13, 2000.

[73] "Russian High Court Clears Researcher," *The New York Times*, April 17, 2000.

[74] Boris Solomatin, "What Makes Pope Better Than Ames?" *The Moscow News*, No. 40, October 11-17, 2000, p. 3.

treason, charges brought after allegedly discussing the fleet's environmental and financial policies with Japanese journalists. Although he was acquitted in 1999, prosecutors reopened the case. Pasko's lawyers had argued that military censors had cleared all the information he had discussed with the Japanese.[75] Nevertheless, Pasko was convicted four years later, on December 25, 2001, by a military court, the Pacific Fleet Court, for passing "classified" information, including footage of the Russian Navy dumping nuclear waste, to Japanese journalists, and sentenced to four years in a high-security prison.[76] The Vladivostok military court imposed the sentence on Pasko for attending a meeting of naval commanders and taking notes, which the court said he intended on passing to Japanese media representatives with whom he worked. Thus, in fact, the government alleged he was part of a conspiracy to commit espionage, and jailed him on the basis of their own interpretations of his intentions, albeit without any such confession by the accused.

In March 2002, Pasko was offered a pardon in exchange for an admission of guilt, but refused it. On May 7, 2002 the appeals board of the Supreme Court reinstated a military secrets order that had served as the basis for Pasko's espionage conviction. In February, the court's military collegium had overturned the 1996 Defense Ministry order in response to Pasko's appeal, issued while serving his four-year prison term in Vladivostok. In response to the ruling, Pasko's lawyer, Yury Shmidt, said, "This is a bad day for freedom of speech and of law. The court came under intense pressure from the

---

[75] Michael Wines, "Russia Loses Its Treason Case Over Nuclear Whistle Blower," *The New York Times*, September 14, 2000.

[76] "Merciful Release: A brave man walks to freedom, and Russia gains hope," *Times Online*, January 24, 2003.

Defense Ministry and the FSB. They got what they wanted."[77] The appeals court also rejected a Defense Ministry appeal of a February ruling that a 1990 order forbidding service personnel from having contacts with foreigners while off-duty was illegal.

In June 2002 the Military Board of the Russian Supreme Court upheld his sentence. The following month, the Yabloko party organized an appeal to the presidium of the Supreme Court, its highest body, against the ruling upholding the treason conviction by the Supreme Court's military wing, the Military Board. However, amid intense international outcry and calls for his release, Pasko was found not to be in violation of any penitentiary regulations, and on January 23, 2003 was released from prison on parole for "good behavior" by the Ussurisk City Court.[78] Commenting on the release, Justice Minister Yuri Chaika said that "the law is the law, and it gives Pasko the right to parole," but the court had to think about Pasko's getting paroled since "Grigory Pasko has still not admitted his guilt, although all judicial instances confirmed that he is guilty of spying."[79] Thinking along the same lines, Russian security officials insist on his guilt.[80] While Pasko was to spend the next 16 months under police surveillance, prosecutors were infuriated with his release and had to be blocked from contesting it by the Prosecutor General himself, shedding light on the political tensions surrounding the case.[81]

---

[77] Op. cit., "Secret Services Supreme Court Reinstates Military-Secrets Order....."

[78] "Convicted spy released on parole," *Interfax*, January 23, 2003.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Author interview with anonymous source in Russia, October 2002.

[81] Op. cit., "Merciful Release: A brave man walks to freedom, and Russia gains hope."

7.3.5: The Case of Diplomat Valentin Moiseyev

In July 1998 Valentin Moiseyev, a (former) diplomat and deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's First Asian Department, was arrested by the FSB and charged with revealing state secrets to a South Korean diplomat, who was also accused as a spy. As with the Sutyagin arrest, Putin was FSB director at the time. Notably, before a verdict had been reached, he told *Komsomolskaya Pravda* that Moiseyev's guilt was proven without a doubt. Subsequently, in July 1999 the Moscow City Court convicted him of spying from 1992-1998, specifically, providing state secrets to the South Korean intelligence service, and sentenced him to 14 years in prison. A key piece of evidence used against him was a "classified" document found in the possession of the South Korean diplomat, which Moiseyev's lawyers said was the text of a public speech.

As the case progressed, in July 2000 and harking back to the situation faced by Nikitin, the vagueness of the state secrets law, his conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court based on violations of the law by investigators and a lack of evidence, specifically, the lower court had been too vague on what secrets Moiseyev had betrayed. Numerous procedures had been violated throughout the case. For instance, Moiseyev was tried by a military prosecutor although he was not in the military.[82] Moreover, his lawyer had argued that the FSB had violated the law in their detention of the South Korean diplomat implicated in the case and, further, the Moscow City Court had sentenced Moiseyev in accordance with the 1997 Criminal Code, although the crime had been committed in 1992. The Supreme Court returned the case to the lower court, ordering a reopening of the trial with different judges. In the meantime, Moiseyev remained in

[82] Sarah Karush, "Moiseyev's Spying Trial To Start All Over Again," *The Moscow Times*, November 30, 2000, pp. 1-2.

Lefortovo Prison, as he continued to face trial in Moscow.[83] In August 2001 the Moscow court convicted him, and his attorneys filed an appeal with the European Court of Human Rights. Regardless, and to the consternation of many academics and officials who sought collaborative work with foreigners, in January 2001 the Supreme Court upheld Moiseyev's conviction.[84]

7.3.6: The Case of KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin

In yet another treason case lacking evidence, the Supreme Court upheld a Moscow court's sentencing of KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin *in absentia* to 15 years in prison in June 2002 for revealing secrets in his 1994 book, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West*.[85] The FSB alleged that Kalugin unmasked Robert Lipka, a U.S. National Security Agency spy for Russia who was actually exposed by former senior archivist in the KGB FCD, Vasily Mitrokhin, who defected to Britain in 1992 and wrote (1999) *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB,* and (2005) *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* with British Professor Christopher Andrew.[86] The two books provide encyclopedic knowledge of KGB operations

[83] "Russia Court Overturns Treason Case," *The New York Times*, July 25, 2000.

[84] Op. cit., "Russia: Spy mania."

[85] Oleg Kalugin, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West*, St. Martin's Press: NY, 1994.

[86] Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, Basic Books: NY, 1999; and, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*, Basic Books: NY, 2005.

throughout the 20th century. As to Kalugin, although not a defector, he went on to become a U.S. citizen and is "happily serving his sentence in America."[87]

7.4: THE FSB'S "SPY MANIA" IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE AS A TOOL OF THE CHEKIST REGIME

In sum, these cases illuminate the continuing political support, if not direction, at the highest levels of the Russian government for the intelligence/security services to extra-legally arrest prominent Russian citizens on spurious and fabricated spy charges, which only serves to further the retention of the old Soviet KGB mindset prevalent in not only the intelligence/security sector but the political, as well, with the state captured as it is by former chekists under Putin. It should be remembered that Putin was head of the FSB (July 1998-August 1999) when Galina Strarovoitova was killed and treason charges were brought against Igor Sutyagin and Valentin Moiseyev. So, too, a number of other prominent individuals' cases made their way through the FSB courts during that time and since then, along with a number of other incidents, including subterfuge and murder, which were utilized by the chekists to establish their prominence in all quarters. Information shared with foreign colleagues, or, as the FSB alleged, the sharing of "classified, national defense information" by these afore-mentioned arrested and convicted scientists and intellectuals was unclassified and its research and publication posed no threat to Russian national security. Yet, their successful prosecution ensures a continuation of same in tune with the KGB culture and its persistence, which emanates directly from the very top. For instance, and hinting at what was to come in terms of spy trials and crackdowns on foreigners in Russia, in 1999 when Putin was FSB director, he told a *Komsomolskaya Pravda* reporter that environmental agencies should be viewed as

[87] Author interview with Oleg Kalugin, November 2006.

a tool of foreign intelligence.[88] State-sanctioned, extra-legal actions concurrent with harassment and false spy accusations against these groups, too, have proceeded forth ever since, the directive clearly understood, even if not formally written.

7.5: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND WESTERNERS IN PUTIN'S RUSSIA

Western organizations and foreigners in Russia continue to be counterintelligence targets of the Russian secret services. There have been a number of cases in which the FSB made allegations against foreign individuals and organizations of spying on Russia, which, like those leveled at Russian citizens, were based on questionable grounds; the information alleged to have been illegally passed to/obtained by foreign nationals was in fact unclassified and publicly available. Numerous NGOs and religious organizations have been harassed by the authorities, with many affiliated individuals either being deported on the same baseless accusations of spying, prevented from entering the country after arriving at the airport, or banned outright from entering Russian territory in the first place through visa denials. Some of the more prominent of these cases are discussed below in order to illuminate the post-Soviet chekist approach toward Westerners in Russia. Notably, spurious spy accusations permeate most every case brought, just as in Soviet times, when all foreigners and, particularly, Westerners were viewed with acute suspicion. Finally, it is worth noting that the intensification of counterintelligence activity against (both citizens and) foreigners in Russia coincided with Putin's rise to head the FSB in 1998 and later consolidation of power as RF President, with a support base consisting of chiefly the intelligence/security sector. It was precisely this arrangement that led to the Russian intelligence/security services' full-scale resurgence.

---

[88] Anna Badkhen, "Defining Spying Is Murky Business," *The Moscow Times*, October 25, 2000, pp. 1-4.

Many experts agree that the trend of harassment of Western organizations in Russia during Putin's tenure was yet another sign of the steadily growing influence of the Services under Putin. A senior foreign diplomat with nearly 20 years of involvement with Russia observed that the state's intelligence services got a boost from the West's post-9/11 tolerance for old KGB methods and the concurrent weakness of other institutions, including an anemic nongovernmental sector, unfair and overburdened court system, and passive diplomatic corps.[89] Old Soviet thinking toward foreigners, as well as the chekist mentality that "all foreigners are spies," still deeply pervades both state and society, in part due to the regime's tight control of and use of the media toward that end.

7.5.1: The Cases of Businessman Edmond Pope and Professor Anatoly Babkin

The April 3, 2000 (roughly three months after Putin gained the presidency) arrest and subsequent trial and conviction for spying of U.S. citizen, retired Navy intelligence officer, and American businessman, Edmond Pope, detailed in his 2001 book, *Torpedoed: An American Businessman's True Story of Secrets, Betrayal, Imprisonment in Russia, and the Battle to Set Him Free*,[90] was the first case of an American being convicted of spying in Russia since a Soviet court convicted U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers of espionage.[91] As such, it was widely interpreted as representing a hardening of chekist resolve to thwart Western business activities in the country through intimidation and the employment of old KGB tactics that had come to prevail once again after the

---

[89] Ibid.

[90] Edmond D. Pope and Tom Shachtman, *Torpedoed: An American Businessman's True Story of Secrets, Betrayal, Imprisonment in Russia, and the Battle to Set Him Free*, Little, Brown and Company: USA, 2001.

[91] "Pope Sentenced for 20 Years," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 11, 2000.

period of relative quiet that existed during (particularly) the early years of the Yeltsin era, before Putin became FSB director in 1998, when the situation really started to change.

Pope had traveled to the country to acquire Russian marine and naval technologies in line with preplanned, cooperative, yet, private, business arrangements. Also arrested for espionage was Russian Professor Anatoly Babkin, a senior scientist at Bauman State Technical University, who was carrying $30,000 for trading unclassified information about torpedo technology. Although both sides had agreed in writing beforehand that all technical reports acquired by Pope had to be unclassified, the FSB alleged that documents in the two men's possession at the time of their arrest included classified information about the Shkval (Squall) torpedo system, and that plans for Russia's latest submarine missiles had been found in Pope's office. Babkin had been arrested after leaving this office.[92]

The debate over whether Pope's transactions entailed attempted acquisition of not only unclassified but also classified materials on the Squall propulsion system continued at the trial.[93] Among confiscated items were "technical drawings of various equipment, recordings of his conversations with Russian citizens relating to their work in the Russian defense industry, and receipts for American dollars received by them."[94] Pope denied seeking any information that was not on public record and many witnesses supported that

---

[92] Celestine Bohlen, "An American and A Russian Held as Spies in Moscow," *The New York Times*, April 6, 2000, pp. 1-3.

[93] Patrick E. Tyler, "American in Moscow Spy Trial Claims Victory on Key Evidence," *The New York Times*, November 28, 2000, pp. 1-3.

[94] "American in Moscow Arrested," *The New York Times*, April 5, 2000, pp. 1-2.

assertion.[95] Nevertheless, it was and remains common practice for the FSB to allege otherwise in espionage cases they decide to initiate.

On December 6, 2000 a Moscow court found Pope guilty of espionage and sentenced him to 20 years in a strict regime prison.[96] The day after Pope's conviction, Gen. Alexander Zdanovich, the Director of the FSB Programs Promotion Directorate, told the media that he was "satisfied" with the verdict, and that it proves that Moscow is "decisive" in protecting "state secrets from any encroachments."[97] Zdanovich also announced that once the verdict went into force, the FSB would make a film on "certain facts" about foreign intelligence activity in Russia. He said that this (the film) was necessary for the public to "make a principled assessment of (the facts) and become aware of the fact that there is something to protect and there will be something to protect in Russia and the Federal Security Service will do its utmost to protect state secrets."[98]

In the end, following international publicity and appeals from Pope's wife and the U.S. government for clemency,[99] on December 10, 2000 Putin pardoned Pope, who was suffering health problems during his 253 days in Lefortovo,[100] and put him on a plane to the United States. Shortly thereafter, speaking to FSB colleagues on Chekists' Day, on December 20, 2000 former FCD Chief (1989-1991) and KGB Chairman Gen. Leonid

---

[95] Op. cit., "Pope Sentenced for 20 Years."

[96] "Russian Special Services to make film on Pope case," December 7, 2000, *www.strana.ru*.

[97] Op. cit., "Pope Sentenced for 20 Years."

[98] Op. cit., "Russian Special Services to make film on Pope case."

[99] Op. cit., "Pope Sentenced for 20 Years."

[100] Op. cit., *Torpedoed*; and, see *http://www.edmondpope.com.*

Shebarshin described the Pope case as a "warning" to the U.S.[101] Nevertheless, former deputy chief of the KGB FCD, Gen. Boris Solomatin, admitted that any comparison of Pope's ("honest businessman") activities with those of CIA officer and spy for Russia, Aldrich Ames, and Navy warrant officer and spy for Russia, John Walker, was a big leap.[102] Given the Russian intelligence services' history of using poison to eliminate their enemies, it is worth adding that Pope later reported that he had been poisoned by the authorities while held in detention.[103]

Babkin, for his part, was convicted of revealing state secrets, specifically, transferring (supposedly) classified information on the Shkval torpedo to Pope, but released for "humanitarian reasons."[104] However, his case was revived in December 2002 by prosecutors who argued that Babkin not only revealed state secrets but was guilty of "high treason."[105] It followed that on February 19, 2003 the 73-year old professor was convicted of treason and sentenced to an eight-year suspended sentence and five years probation. Babkin maintained his innocence, stating, "I am not guilty of treason. This is absolutely a political case and I will definitely appeal to be acquitted," during an interview with the daily *Kommersant* four days prior. He insisted that he had only sent reports to the University of Pennsylvania according to the terms of a $28,000 agreement

---

[101] "Putin Sees New Role for Secret Services," *RFE/RL Newsline*, December 21, 2000, pp. 1-2.

[102] Op. cit., "What Makes Pope Better Than Ames?"

[103] See the CI Centre Web site at *www.cicentre.com*.

[104] "Moscow Resumes Old Espionage Case," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 45, December 24, 2002, p. 6.

[105] Ibid.

on scientific exchanges signed between the two universities, a deal which he says two FSB officers visited him about in 1995, a meeting at which they told him to continue.[106]

7.5.2: The Case of Fulbright Scholar/Master's Student John Tobin

In April 2001, Army Reservist and American Fulbright scholar John Tobin, 24, conducting political research in Voronezh for his Master's degree, was sentenced to 37 months in prison on a "drug conviction" after being arrested by the local FSB in January. Tobin reported that the charge had been fabricated following his refusal to spy for Russian intelligence during an approach in which they pitched him, subsequently accusing him, upon his refusal, of being an American spy-in-training and interrogation expert.[107] Tobin argued that Russian police had planted the marijuana found in his apartment in order to support the charge that he was a member of a drug-dealing ring. While the FSB admitted there were no legal grounds to prosecute him for espionage, they insisted he was engaged in training to be a spy. Commenting on the case, a spokesman for the regional FSB in Voronezh, Pavel Bolshunov, told the media, "It has been revealed that he has appeared several times in the vicinity of the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant. He cannot provide a coherent explanation for this. Neither can he explain why he covertly made digital recordings of his conversations with politicians, political analysts and lecturers in Voronezh. This case is raising more and more questions."[108] Although Tobin's lawyer had asked the Supreme Court to throw out the verdict for lack of

---

[106] Vladimir Kovalev, "Russia Sentences 73-Year Old Academic for Spying," *Transitions Online*, February 24, 2003, http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/I-NET/transition_260203.html.

[107] Op. cit., "FSB Influence Increases, Influence of Russia's Special Services Increases,"; and, Irving Levine, "Be My Spy ---- or Else, *The New York Times*, August 14, 2001, p. A17.

[108] "Russia Tries U.S. Student for Drugs, Amid Spy Hints," *Voronezh*, (Reuters), April 24, 2001.

evidence, the court upheld the marijuana conviction and he served over six months of a one-year sentence in prison before being released on parole and returned to the U.S.[109]

7.5.3: The Case of the U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers

In late December 2002, the U.S. Peace Corps was told to pull its operations out of the country. Twenty-seven volunteers, including its head in Primorskii Krai, who were assigned to teach English and business courses in Russia's provinces, had earlier been denied visas to continue their work. While the Foreign Ministry explained that the country no longer had any need for the volunteers,[110] FSB Director Patrushev told Russian news reporters that the volunteers could be spies "collecting information about the socio-political and economic situation in Russia's regions, about government employees and administrators, and the course of elections."[111] He accused one of them of having a CIA background and searching for information on the Russian military industry.[112] At year's end, when reporting on his agency's work in 2002, Patrushev noted that the FSB had succeeded in preventing serious harm to Russia's national interests, citing its role in denying visas to the U.S. Peace Corps volunteers.[113]

7.5.4: The Case of AFL-CIO Representative Irene Stevenson

A year later, on December 30, 2003 Russian authorities refused, citing vague national security concerns, to permit AFL-CIO representative and Moscow office director

---

[109] "Russia: Footnote to Student's Trial," *The New York Times*, September 20, 2001.

[110] Natalia Yefimova, "Foreigners Wonder Who Will Be Next," *The Moscow Times*, January 13, 2003, p.1; and, "Freed U.S. student home from Russia," *CNN.com*, August 8, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/08/08/russia.tobin/.

[111] Paul Starobin, "Mother Russia at War with Herself," *BusinessWeek Online*, February 3, 2003.

[112] Natalia Yefimova, "Foreigners Wonder Who Will Be Next," *The Moscow Times*, January 13, 2003, p.1.

[113] Op. cit., "Intelligence Community Celebrates Its Soviet Origins...."

of the U.S. AID-funded Solidarity Center, Irene Stevenson, back into the country, her place of residence since 1989, because she had consulted with Russia's air traffic control union about a threatened strike[114] and helped provide legal aid to the strike, which created havoc at a number of regional airports and forced a sizable wage increase.[115] *The Washington Post* reported that this was just another case of recent Russian government mistreatment of foreigners who were working explicitly to promote liberal democratic values in the country.[116] According to the report, the FSB had started questioning and surveiling human right activists in Moscow and the provinces, and sometimes there was a beating.[117]

7.5.5: The Cases Against Religious Groups

Religious organizations and their envoys have also been harassed, discriminated against, and denied entry to the country. For example, members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, an NGO founded in 1998 under the International Religious Freedom Act, spent a week in Russia during January 2003 to investigate religious freedom violations in Russia. According to Felice Gaer, the Commission head, the visit was prompted by a December 2002 draft report co-authored by Nationalities Minister Valentin Zorin and Moscow-based Chechen leader Akhmad Kadyrov that described Roman Catholics, Protestants, new religious movements, and Muslims as threats to national security. Gaer observed that, "it reflects a disturbing trend in Russia

---

[114] Op. cit., "Mother Russia at War with Herself."

[115] Op. cit., "Foreigners Wonder Who Will Be Next."

[116] "Deportation Is Cause for Concern," editorial published in *The Washington Post*, republished in *The Moscow Times*, January 13, 2003, p. 10.

[117] Ibid.

that includes the exclusion of representatives of the Catholic Church, restrictions on the rights of new and minority religious movements, recurrent anti-Semitic incidents, as well as the equation of Islam with terrorism."[118] The way the Putin administration, in support of the Russian Orthodox Church's dominance, apparently sees it, poaching souls will not be permitted.

According to a 2006 *Forum 18 News Service* report, since 1998, eight foreign Catholic clergy (including a bishop) have been barred, with only one of them, Fr Janusz Blaut, managing to return in autumn 2005. Five had their visas revoked or applications denied in high profile cases soon after the Catholic Church in Russia upgraded its apostolic administrations to dioceses — in early 2002 to the chagrin of the Russian Orthodox Church. As reported, "one, Slovak citizen Fr Stanislav Krajnak, reportedly received a visa in 2004 but was summoned back to the Russian embassy within hours for it to be cancelled." [119]

Further, the report notes that, "Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists and a Jew are also among the 55 known religious workers barred since 1998, though a handful have been allowed to return." Clearly, all religions (excepting the Russian Orthodox Church) are perceived as threats. For example, a Pentecostal pastor in Rostov-on-Don observed that far fewer foreign Protestant missionaries were now working locally than in the 1990s, and they had to keep a low profile. He also brought to light two previously unreported cases of visa denials. As noted in the report, "If a reason is given by the authorities for

---

[118] Andrei Zolotov Jr., "Religious Freedom Called 'Fragile,'" *The Moscow Times*, January 27, 2003, p. 5.

[119] Geraldine Fagan, "Russia: Religious Work Visa Respite?" *Forum 18*, May 3, 2006, and posted on *World Wide Religious News (WWRN)*, http://www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=21390&sec=59&con=42.

barring a foreign religious worker, it is normally 'in the interests of state security' under Article 27, Part 1 of the federal law on entry to and exit from Russia."[120]

The fact is, the Russian Orthodox Church has a long history of KGB penetration, with Patriarch Aleksei II having been recruited as an agent in February 1958, as have many others priests and bishops of the institution.[121] A symbiotic relationship could be expected. Moreover, with the post-Soviet revival of religion in Russia, marked by the mushrooming of new churches across the country, the chekists may take a historical view and see the institution as one more tool of the regime for monitoring and controlling the population. And with its growth overseas following the post-collapse opening of the borders, it is likely valued as a vehicle for recruiting agents and collecting information of use to the intelligence services, much like in Soviet times.

7.5.6: The Case Against the Salvation Army

So, too, the Salvation Army has been accused of being a spy nest. In 1999, Moscow authorities refused to register a Moscow branch of the charity organization on the grounds that its founders were foreign nationals. In response, the Salvation Army took their case to the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that Russia had violated the religious organization's rights to freedom of religion and association under Europe's human rights convention, saying that the Moscow authorities "did not act in good faith," and awarded the organization €10,000 in damages.[122] In September 2000, a Canadian representative of the Salvation Army branches in the Rotov-on-Don and

---

[120] Ibid.

[121] Author interview with Oleg Kalugin, 2006.

[122] "Murderous Russia's Ban On Salvation Army Ruled Illegal By European Court," *Kavkaz Center*, October 6, 2006, http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2006/10/06/5857.shtml.

neighboring Kalmykia, Geoff Ryan, was denied a visa without explanation and has been unable to return. By 2002, the local press in Kalmykia was describing the Salvation Army as "Western spies" and "one of the most powerful totalitarian sects in the world."[123]

7.5.7: NGO Harassment Intensifies as the Chekists Consolidate Their Power

Toward the end of Putin's first presidential term, many experts agreed that the trend of harassment of foreigners was yet another sign of the steadily growing influence of the intelligence services under the old KGB spy. As Nikolai Petrov described it, "it is like a gas that expands, filling up all the available space" and reflects traditional chekist thinking: "no information, no problems."[124] He contrasted the current situation with that during Yeltsin's tenure, when "they felt this was impossible, unacceptable...now they believe they have carte blanche inside the country to do whatever is convenient for them."[125] Even former KGB officer, Col. Konstantin Preobrazhensky, criticized the regime, stating that, "All reforms are coming to an end and we are returning to the past. The same bitter and vengeful people are in charge, and they feel their chance to return has arrived." Similarly, Otto Latsis, of the liberal daily *Novoye Izvestiya* observed that, "We see a lot of dubious accusations against journalists, environmentalists, human rights workers and scientists. This has nothing to do with ensuring national security, and a lot to do with intimidating people who commit themselves to political causes that are inconvenient for the state, or who associate too much with foreigners."[126]

---

[123] Op. cit., "Russia: Religious Work Visa Respite?"

[124] Natalia Yefimova, "Foreigners Wonder Who Will Be Next," *The Moscow Times*, January 13, 2003, p.1.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Fred Weir, "Spies keep busy as ever, quietly," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 2, 2003.

7.6: THE WAR IN CHECHNYA

As noted in the theoretical section of this project, one of the conditions for a comprehensive democratic consolidation is a lack of violent separatism in a country, as such conflict situations are always characterized by the government as wars against terrorists, and by their very nature are governed not by the rule of law and respect for human rights, but rather are marked by lawlessness and the committing of atrocities by both sides, locked as they are in a battle of capabilities and wills, within the context of a situation and living circumstances that are anything but governable. The nature and history of separatist (and often ethnic and/or religious) conflicts is one which tends to eventually lead to efforts at a peace process between the warring groups, especially if a military stalemate is reached and persists. Yet, political stalemates may follow military stalemates, with an eventual end to cease-fire agreements.

If a post-communist country is making a transition to democracy, which democratization process includes the necessary condition of a secret police transformation, violent separatism on a portion of state territory absolutely thwarts a comprehensive democratic transition. In particular, this is due to the fact that the secret police transformation to one operating in line with democratic norms will be aggressively reversed in order to "deal with the terrorists." As Dankwart Rustow suggests, national unity is a precondition for a democratic transition. Indeed, if national unity is lacking in a post-communist, democratizing state in the form of violent separatism, the challenge to the state and its intelligence/security services to "democratize" and "operate within democratic norms of respect for human rights and law" in the treatment of the situation is likely insurmountable. In short, the existence of violent separatism in a post-communist

state undergoing a transition to democracy will make it unable to actualize a comprehensive democratic transition until after the violent separatism ends. This is because the already significant challenge of reforming the secret police will be perceived as infeasible in the context of a sizable violent separatist group challenging the state.

The First and Second Wars in Chechnya, from 1994-1996 and 1999-2003, respectively, demanded the resources of many units of the Russian military and intelligence/security services, including the FSB, GRU, SVR, Border Troops, OMON, and MVD (Interior Ministry) forces. These forces have been used to varying degrees, yet the key military/intelligence units involved in and running the "counterterrorist operation" have been the GRU and FSB. Ultimately, intelligence has played the key role, as it does in any separatist conflict, with both sides running operations. As the atrocities continued, it became increasingly difficult for journalists or NGOs to gain access to the area as the Kremlin closed it off to thwart investigative reporting on government activities there. In January 2003, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) began pulling out of Chechnya following a request by the Russian government, despite the fact that they had helped broker a cease-fire there.[127] Most other organizations followed.

On January 23, 2004 Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reiterated the Kremlin view that the military conflict in Chechnya was an anti-terrorist operation, asserting that, "There is no war in the Chechen republic, there is a fight against international terrorism. A very complicated process of political settlement is being conducted against the

[127] Op. cit., "Deportation Is Cause for Concern."

background of fighting international terrorism."[128] Putin thus has consistently sought ways to present the conflict as one consisting of a battle between Russian government forces and an al-Qaeda-penetrated terrorist movement marked by Wahhabism and funded by Saudi Arabia, rather than one pitting Moscow against Chechen separatists. However, his success at this effort has been limited. The point is, in the process of prosecuting this war against the "terrorists," any potential for the transformation of the secret police was severely challenged; moreover, with the Services interested in continuing the conflict as it presented opportunities for promotion and various perks, the potential for their transformation and, hence, Russian democratization, was gravely reduced.

7.6.1: Chechnya as a Useful Spur to Political Power, Democratic Reversal, and FSB Empowerment

While the Russian intelligence services have always played a role in fighting the separatists, it has for the most part been a military operation with strong MVD support. However, a year into office and having to a degree consolidated his power and strengthened his chekist support base, in January 2001 Putin issued a decree transferring control from the Defense Ministry to the FSB as part of its responsibility for anti-terrorism, giving FSB Director Patrushev full authority over the effort, which would last into his second presidential term. Putin emphasized that the transfer was only a tactical change, not a reduction in pressure or an end to military operations, saying, "This doesn't mean the counterterrorism operation will end. It will continue no less intensively, but with an accent on different forces and means."[129] He apparently was advocating smaller operations aimed at wiping out Chechen commanders, and thus a renewed focus on

---

[128] "France Calls for End to Chechen War," *The Moscow Times*, January 26, 2004, p. 3.

[129] "Putin Transfers Chechen War Command," *The New York Times*," January 22, 2001, pp. 1-2.

special operations and searches for rebel forces, only supplemented by traditional military operations. Gen. Aleksandr Zdanovich explained, "The current existing means will not be done away with ...all the plans will be coordinated within the framework of a single design, and special services activity will be concentrated on eliminating individual bandit formations and their leaders." Special Forces activities were to include guerrilla-type attacks, bombings, nighttime sniping, and reduction/elimination of civilian support to militants.[130] The so-called "sweep operations," in which young males were rounded up in house-to-house searches and later found tortured and killed, along with abductions, continued to escalate.

Signaling that the FSB would remain highly involved in the Chechnya region, in his annual address to top security service chiefs at Lubyanka on January 16, 2004, Putin, among other things, stressed that the situation in Chechnya and the North Caucasus should remain "under the special control" of the FSB and other power-wielding structures, yet remarked that, "now people in the region ought to have all the opportunities to implement their constitutional rights and economic liberties."[131] Given the history, the two scenarios are completely contradictory. To date, the latter prospect remains elusive.[132] And only four months after the speech, in May 2004, Chechen president Akhmed Kadyrov was assassinated at Dynamo Stadium while viewing the

---

[130] Michael Wines, "Putin Scaling Down Chechen War Despite New Fighting," *The New York Times*, January 23, 2001, pp. 1-3.

[131] Yelena Shishkunova, "Putin puts his faith in security service," *Gazeta.ru*, January 16, 2004.

[132] "Chechnya: Research Shows Widespread and Systematic Use of Torture," *hrw.org*, November 13, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/13/russia14557.htm; and, "Russia Condemned for Chechnya Killings," *hrw.org*, October 12, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/13/russia14384.htm.

Army Day celebrations.[133] A vote for a new president took place in August, with Kadyrov's notorious son, Ramzan, eventually replacing the winner, Kremlin pick and career MVD officer, Alu Alkhanov, who held the post from August 2004 to February 2007. The younger Kadyrov, an illiterate known for his roaming death squads and brutal tortures, was believed to be the real power behind the nominal Alkhanov, and replaced him as Chechen president once he turned the legally required 30-years old.[134] In a show of support for Ramzan, Putin dismissed Alkhanov and appointed him as a deputy justice minister, subsequently nominating the former for the Chechen presidency.[135]

Numerous observes have noted how the brutality of Russian forces in prosecuting the war in Chechnya intensified the violence perpetrated by Chechens. For instance, in February 2005, a Putin adviser on the North Caucasus region, ethnic Chechen Aslambek Aslakhanov (a career MVD official who taught criminal policy and law at the Russian Interior Ministry Academy from 1993 to 2000, a former MP from Chechnya, and a candidate for Chechen president until he withdrew from the race in October 2003 to take up the Kremlin post) observed that, "The excessive cruelty of certain police and military structures in the country, especially the abduction of people, their torture and execution and disappearance without a trace ... has an impact on the terrorist situation."[136] Elaborating on the Chechen rebels' motivations for carrying out attacks against Russian

---

[133] "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61671.htm.

[134] Anna Politkovskaya, *A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia*, Random House: NY, pp. 158, 167-168.

[135] "Regions and Territories: Chechnya," *BBC News*, June 4, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm.

forces, he suggested that, "Terrorist attacks aren't always politically motivated, sometimes they're carried out for revenge against the corruption of authorities, the lawlessness of police and military structures, mass unemployment and the inability to feed one's family," adding, "They try to do something (to improve their lot) and are not allowed to, and it's the bureaucrats who are to blame."[137] It is interesting that the first suicide attack in Chechnya involving a woman occurred early in Putin's tenure. Additional attacks by the so-called "black widows" followed, including an attack involving two women, who drove an explosives-laden truck into a Russian military compound in mid-2003.[138] Both the phenomena of suicide bombings in Chechnya and black widows had begun on Putin's watch.

The Putin regime has exploited the Chechen war as a means of further empowering the intelligence/security services and reversing Yeltsin-era democratic reforms, such as elections and erecting new institutions that enhance the capacity of the state to control the population if necessary. For example, in the event an emergency situation is declared, the chekist-dominated state has prepared itself structurally to counter unrest across the country. Of particular significance and in line with Putin's "power vertical," in February 2006 Putin issued a decree establishing the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) and appointing FSB Director Patrushev as its chairman.[139]

---

[136] "Putin's Aide Says Kremlin Policy Leads to Growth of Terrorism in Russia," *MosNews.com*, February 17, 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/02/17/aslakhanov.shtml.

[137] Ibid.

[138] Fred Weir, "Chechen Women Join Terror's Ranks," *Peace Women*, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, June 12, 2003, http://www.peacewomen.org/news/Chechnya/newsarchive03/ranks.html; and, "Islam and the Caucasus: A Look at Chechnya," Russia and Eurasia Program, Islam in Eurasia and the "War on Terror" Series, Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 10, 2004, p. 2, http://www.csis.org/ruseura/wot/040510.pdf.

The NAC includes most senior officials from all intelligence/security services, key ministries, and both houses of parliament. Its powers are unprecedented, with NAC decisions binding on all federal government bodies represented by its members. In the regions, directives from anti-terrorist commissions and operations headquarters (part of the NAC structure, whose head is appointed by the FSB director) are binding on local government bodies. The FSB's leading role is emphasized in almost every one of the decree's 11 articles, including authorization for 300 extra staff for the FSB head office, amounting to that of a department. The heads of the Interior, Defense, and Emergency Situations Ministries are subordinate to the operations headquarters chief. The regional commissions are chaired by regional leaders but headed by the chiefs of the FSB regional directorates, who have authority over regional leaders. In short, the decree provides that the FSB director oversees all federal and regional government bodies. Commenting on the new arrangement, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Security Committee, Viktor Ilyukhin, observed, "It turns the FSB into a state within a state, and that's very dangerous. The fact that the interior minister will be subordinate to the FSB chief, and even to his deputy, indicates that the FSB is taking on the dominant role in state administration. This decree mixes up all kinds of state functions. Not even the federal government will have authority over the new body."[140]

The new NAC arrangements are not to be confused with the already existing but largely inactive anti-terrorist commissions in the federal center and across the country,

---

[139] "FSB Director: terrorists seek nuclear weapons in Russia," *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, Axis Information and Analysis, June 5, 2007, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1320.

[140] Alek Akhundov, Syuzanna Farizova, Viktor Khamrayev, and Diana Dadasheva, "FSB Director Patrushev Will Lead the Anti-Terrorism Effort," *WPS Agency*, #110, February 17, 2006, http://www.wps.ru/en/pp/story/2006/02/17.html.

subordinate to the interagency Federal Antiterrorist Commission (FAK), that were created by Government Decree No. 1302 on November 6, 1998 when Putin was FSB director, in accordance with the federal law, "On the Struggle with Terrorism.[141] The FAK is also, through its placement of FSB officers in leadership positions, controlled and staffed by the domestic intelligence service,[142] and its decrees binding upon regional commissions. The FAK's tasks include the "collection and analysis of information on the development of terrorist tendencies," and "preparing proposals on key principles of state policy in counteracting terrorism," among others. The regional commissions, however, are officially headed by governors (who are now appointed by Putin in line with his political reforms), while the federal commission is led by the prime minister. As chief of the FAK structures, the prime minister was made responsible for ordering the introduction of certain regimes — de facto emergency situations. This provision conflicted with the Constitution, which provides only the president, an elected official, with that power. The 1998 decree creating the FAKs was followed up with another, Government Decree No. 1040, *O merakh po protivodeystviyu terrorizmu*, issued in September 1999 creating an Interagency Operational Staff. The decree charged this entity with the coordination of federal and regional executive bodies in the fight against

---

[141] The FAK's main tasks include the preparation of state policies and laws, collection and analysis of information, coordination of the actions of executive bodies, and participation in the preparation of international agreements relating to terrorism. The commission's organizational and information needs are an FSB responsibility. See "FAK," at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/execcomm.htm#E11E6.

[142] According to the *Nuclear Threat Initiative*'s (NTI) Web site's information on the Federal Antiterrorist Commission (FAK), "On 6 November 1998, Government Decree No. 1302, in accordance with the federal law *On the Struggle with Terrorism*, established the Federal Antiterrorist Commission. The commission's main tasks include the preparation of state policies and laws, the collection and analysis of information, the coordination of the actions of executive bodies, and participation in the preparation of international agreements relating to terrorism. The commission's organizational and information needs are taken care of by the Federal Security Service. [Russian Government Decree No. 1302, *O Federalnoy antiterroriticheskoy komissii*, 6 November 1998; in The Legislation in Russia, http://law.optima.ru.] {entered 12/10/99 CC}," See http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/execcomm.htm.

terrorism, and gave the FSB the authority to provide for the organizational and technical needs of the institution.[143]

As a relevant side note, just a month after Kadyrov's assassination and following the Chechen incursion into Ingushetia in June 2004, Operational Command and Control Groups (GrOUs) were set up in each of the 12 Southern District's regions as permanent structures that use combined forces (including a motorized rifle company, about 70 special-purpose police detachment troops, a sapper team, subunits from the Emergencies Ministry and the Internal Troops, and Spetsnaz forces from the local FSB directorates), with colonels from the Internal Troops appointed to head the new sub-units, with the status of deputy leader of the republic's regional anti-terrorist commission (and thus becoming the number two for counterterrorism in the region, after the governor).[144] The GrOU commanding officer becomes chief of the operations headquarters in the event of an incident. For purposes of anonymity, the names of these colonels are secret, yet since they represent their own local districts, the residents of the war-torn republic know who they are.[145] As a result of the creation of these sub-units, the interior ministry forces were bolstered to staff them and carry out their additional functions, further militarizing the chekist-dominated state. Still, through FSB Director Patrushev's chairmanship of the

---

[143] "Russia: Commissions, Committees, and Agencies," *Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 27, 2004, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/execcomm.htm.

[144] For an in-depth review of the multifarious and constantly changing organizations and units set up to coordinate and fight the separatists in Chechnya, see Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, "Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year after Beslan," Report of *Agentura.ru* Studies and Research Centre, *ASRC*, http://studies.agentura.ru, September 2005.

[145] Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, "FSB Does Not Descend to Terror," Special report for *Moskovskiye Novosti*, September 16, 2004, and posted at http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/terror/.

NAC, the Service oversees strategic operations in not only the Chechen Republic, but the whole of Russia.[146]

With the FAK arrangement, the FSB maintained a key role but avoided responsibility if things did not go well. The creation of the NAC changed that, however, with the FSB director responsible for all counterterrorism activities in Russia. On a more general political level, as noted, the new structures facilitate the implementation of a coordinated strategy designed to ensure the chekist-dominated state, in the event of widespread unrest, whether of a terrorist or non-terrorist nature, can effectively control the country through force. In short, structures have been put in place to protect the regime against revolution, a continuing concern of Putin administration despite his high poll ratings, a rather striking paradox that perhaps demands deeper investigation. Without question, the regime is increasingly isolated from the people, who have played a progressively lesser role in the political life of the country since Putin was appointed FSB director, and extending from that time throughout his tenure as president. Adhering to the same chekist culture as their comrades in the Services, and as Deputy Director of the Institute for USA-Canada Studies in Moscow, Viktor Kremeniuk, observed of the chekists exercising direct political power, beyond their common professional backgrounds and training, "They bring a mafia-like approach to government....They will deal only with their own in other branches of government. They have a sense of being selected; they are absolutely certain of their right to be in power."[147]

---

[146] "Russia's Federal Security Service Head: Insurgents' Activities spread to Ingushetia and North Ossetia," *Regnum News Agency*, August 25, 2006, http://www.regnum.ru/english/694579.html?forprint.

[147] Fred Weir, "KGB influence still felt in Russia," *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 30, 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1230/p06s01-woeu.html.

7.6.2: Political-Military Relations and Chechnya

Although it was the case that many military officers favored the war in Chechnya in light of the fact that it enabled them to quickly gain promotions to higher ranks, one could speculate that, in addition to the Kremlin's exploitation of the conflict and its audacious use as cause for democratic reversals in the electoral system, the political leadership kept the military bogged down in Chechnya in order to mitigate the threat the officer corps may pose to the Kremlin, keep the generals focused on the conflict, and also simply to maintain a fighting military force. The armed forces are in a state of serious deterioration and so long as the war in Chechnya continues, an endless supply of drafted cadres (contrary to the perennial claims by the Defense Ministry that it would make the military an all-volunteer force in the near future) is mandated. The results are spread across society as well. In May 2004, Dr. Fiona Hill, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, pointed out that "at least 500,000 Russian conscripts have been circulated through this conflict over the past ten years and then returned to their homes without any real assistance or help in reintegrating into society."[148]

During the 1990s and into the Putin era, the situation in the military threatened to deteriorate to the point the military could pose a danger to the regime. As Seth Mydans of *The New York Times* noted, "The military, which has the final say in any undemocratic shift in power, becomes more dangerous."[149] Under Yeltsin, numerous high-level military officers were implicated in massive corruption, acting with an apparent lack of concern about any future prosecution, which may have alleviated any threat they could have

---

[148] Op. cit., "Islam and the Caucasus: A Look at Chechnya."

[149] Seth Mydans, "A Letter From Asia: A Burst of Raw Democracy: Anything Wrong With That?" *The New York Times*, January 7, 2004.

posed to the Kremlin. With significant numbers of generals and colonels focused on self-enrichment and/or aggrandizement, and Kremlin leaders, themselves deeply corrupt and pursuing their own wealth, failing to provide the necessary funding, military reform was neglected. Back in June 1997 and following Yeltsin's public dressing down and firing of Defense Minister Rodionov for his failure to speedily institute substantial, and perhaps unrealistic, reforms given the lack of funding provided by the government,[150] unhappiness in the military had been registered in a letter to the Kremlin by Lt. Gen. Lev Rokhlin, the chairman of the Duma Defense Committee and many others. Reportedly, the letter was so quickly and widely disseminated throughout army units that, harking back to old Soviet ways, military counterintelligence was ordered to conduct a special investigation to identify informal opposition cells in the armed forces. Further, Rokhlin created a Movement in Support of the Army and the Defense Industries (MSADI), which founding session included a broad range of well-known individuals, including August 1991 coup plotters Valentin Varennikov, KGB Chief Vladimir Kyruchkov, and the former foreign intelligence chief, Leonid Shebarshin, among others. Yet, relentlessly organizing and calling for Yeltsin's ouster, Rokhlin found his fate, being murdered in the fall of 1998 in "mysterious circumstances that aroused suspicions of government involvement."[151] His movement died with him. Twenty-three days later, Putin had been appointed FSB director.

---

[150] "Yeltsin fired defense minister over stalled reforms," *CNN.com*, May 27, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9705/22/russia/.

[151] Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 570-573.

By the time Putin gained the presidency, he clearly was aware of existing political tensions between the political leadership and top brass, which would carry over into his own term. Sensing the need to establish firmer political control of the Russian armed forces, while still acting president, on February 7, 2000 Putin issued Presidential Decree No. 318, "On Departments (Divisions) of FSB in Armed Forces," extending the powers of Special divisions in securing the RF Armed Forces, other forces, military formations and bodies (security bodies in forces), and thus reconstituting military counterintelligence as an FSB function. The move was reminiscent of Soviet times, when the Third Chief Directorate of the KGB had been responsible for military counterintelligence.[152] Roughly a year later, in March 2001 he appointed career chekist Sergei Ivanov, who had been his deputy throughout his tenure as FSB director (July 1998-August 1999) as defense minister, replacing Marshall Igor Sergeyev. Even so, the corruption continued under Putin. Yet, under Putin many more officers gained posts throughout the political sector to pursue their interests, perhaps mitigating political-military tensions to a degree, as they came to support the Putin agenda and become part of the chekist-siloviki clan.

7.7: CONCLUSION

The continuity in old Soviet secret police functions and methods illustrated by the events covered in this chapter, whether domestic spying and intimidation of political opposition elements or employment of serious human rights violations, provides clear and unambiguous evidence that a secret police transformation in post-Soviet Russia has not occurred, and the state remains a "counterintelligence state," staging Stalin-type show trials, repressing political activities, and abusing citizens' rights with impunity. Having thus managed to establish their control of the political system, the redistribution of the

[152] Simon Saradzhyan, "FSB Units to Keep Eye on Army," *The Moscow Times*, February 19, 2000.

state’s massive wealth to the chekists would follow, serving to support and further their activities at home and abroad. The chekists’ role in post-Soviet Russia’s economic transition, and how they established their control over the economy are covered next.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ECONOMIC CHEKISTRY: ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS AND CHEKIST RELATIONS WITH POLITICAL ELITES, OLIGARCHS, AND ORGANIZED CRIME

8.1: INTRODUCTION

To illustrate how the chekists contributed to the transmogrification of the nascent capitalist economy of the early Yeltsin era, a malformed system subsequently built on by Putin and his chekist clan, this chapter focuses on the economic role, activities, and relationships of the chekists with political elites/nomenklatura, oligarchs, "red managers," and organized crime (OC). I discuss the changes and continuities in these relationships during the Yeltsin and Putin eras, highlighting the economic adjustments that were made as the central-planned economy of the Soviet era collapsed and property relations were transformed, initially with reforms directed toward the creation of a free-market, capitalist economy, to one that that was oligarchic capitalist under Yeltsin by his second presidential term, to one that is endemically-corrupt and bureaucratic-corporatist under Putin's chekist-dominated state.

Associate Director of Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies Marshall Goldman observed in his 2003 book, *The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry*, that, "the intermingling of the Mafia with a partially-privatized KGB and government bureaucracy complicates any effort to control Russia's crime and corruption scene." He assessed that unless Putin acted decisively against his former comrades, who were deeply implicated in this scenario, "economic reform will continue to be handicapped and distorted."[1] Since then, not only have Putin and his

[1] Marshall I. Goldman, *The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry*, Routledge: NY, 2003, pp. 194-95.

former KGB comrades used their control of the political system to extra-legally seize private property from regime rivals and redistribute the national wealth to themselves, they have used it to consolidate their power and fund and expand their activities abroad. And corruption has increased exponentially.

In this chapter, I focus on the role of the chekists in each key aspect of the post-Soviet economic transition. The collapse of the Soviet state brought a substantial reduction in the number of personnel employed in the domestic intelligence services, with many of these chekists-siloviki (active, reserve, and retired intelligence, military, and security/police officials) moving into the newly developing private sector, often in partnership with the political elite/nomenklatura and organized crime (OC), which three elements constituted the "new oligarchy" network. I examine how the new oligarchy managed to maintain its networks, retain its access to the political system unchallenged by any LVD process. They were thus in position to acquire great wealth as the state privatized its vast resources, and the methods and designs they proceeded to employ in order to enrich themselves worked to transmogrify the development of free-market capitalism.

I assess the economic institutions created in the wake of communism's collapse and the challenges they posed to the democratization project. In particular, I highlight how many former intelligence/security officers, in partnership with organized crime, established private security services (PSSs) that proliferated throughout the country. These PSSs unduly supplanted state functions of property rights protection and dispute resolution, extorting businesses with the cooperation of corrupt officials, who provided political protection for the schemes in exchange for a slice of the profits. During the

Yeltsin era, the chekists, in partnership with OC, used PSSs to generate substantial profits by taking over major businesses, which provided them the means to influence corrupt political officials and gain access to political power. I elaborate on the numerous and typically unsolved contract killings, many connected with these firms, playing a prominent role in shaping the unfolding political-economic processes. It followed that under Putin, with chekists moving en masse from the private sector into political positions, the chekist (and OC) practice of extra-legally taking over businesses continued, but by using the institutions and full resources of the state, such as the Audit Chamber and Federal Tax Police, in cooperation with the FSB, Prosecutor's Office, and courts. The corruption of the state and "power organs" proceeded forthwith, spreading and deepening over time. As part of that discussion, I review the Mikhail Khodorkovsky/Yukos Oil Company case that began with his FSB arrest in October 1993 and resulted with the transfer of his assets to Kremlin-based chekist control. I also illustrate the continuing nature of anticorruption campaigns, used not to combat corruption but, rather, to purge rivals, just as has been the case since KGB Chairman (and General Secretary) Yuri Andropov's time.

In the latter section, I examine the economic processes and programs, including privatization, shock therapy, and loans-for-shares, and how they worked to discredit democracy in the eyes of the Russian people during the Yeltsin era. Privatization was exploited by the "oligarchs" through their close ties with the Kremlin to hijack economic policy and establish "oligarchic capitalism" in Russia, which entailed no-bid, insider deals to transfer state assets to private control at far below market prices. It followed that under Putin, the Yeltsin era "oligarchic capitalism" was superseded by "bureaucratic-

authoritarianism," with corruption only increasing as the chekists redistributed the privatized national wealth to themselves in the name of the state, which worked to substantially bolster their power and aid in the consolidation of a chekist-dominated regime. Because of its significance for Yeltsin's turnover of power to Putin on New Year's Eve 2000, I include a review of the FSB set-up of Yeltsin's Prosecutor General, Yury Skuratov, which was orchestrated under FSB Director Putin's tenure, to shed light on the debt the rapacious and deeply corrupt Yeltsin owed to the chekist for providing he and his "family" lifetime immunity from prosecution.

Finally, I illustrate how by the end of Putin's first presidential term, private wealth had been and continued into his second term to be extra-legally confiscated from rivals and redistributed to the chekist-dominated regime and its clients. The Kremlin turned the legally-ambiguous process of privatization against targeted oligarchs, bankers, and businessmen, levying exorbitant back taxes designed to bankrupt and force the sale of select properties to the state, often using an intermediary, or by finding any variety of regulatory violations against incompliant owners, applying these takeover tactics with impunity, as the old Soviet chekists led by Putin and now in control of the state and economic policy are free to exercise immense power in their own interests, having never been disqualified from leading positions through an LVD process.

8.2: ON THE POST-SOVIET COLLAPSE AND REQUISITE REDUCTION IN INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SECTOR FORCES

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the KGB was divided into a number of different agencies, given the changed circumstances it was also mandated that the personnel numbers of the huge secret police organization be reduced, particularly in light

of the substantial but unavailable financial resources required to retain them. That was an *economically practical* reason for reducing intelligence/security sector forces. *Politically*, given the context of the "euphoric" times in the wake of the collapse, with the symbolic and emotional pulling down by "drunken" mobs of the statue of Cheka creator "Iron Feliks" Dzerzhinsky in Lubyanka Square[2] (and subsequent erection of a small monument in the area to the secret police's millions of victims), the division of the KGB into a number of smaller units and its renaming was the politically necessary thing for Yeltsin to do.

However, as a result of the personnel reductions, many KGB officers moved into the business world on "active reserve" status, whereby they retain their pay and benefits as intelligence officers and can also participate in commercial activities. This status change ensured them a strong foothold in the evolving economy as they gained an unfair advantage through their continued access to intelligence resources. It also worked to corrupt the system as they partnered with OC to operate PSSs, banks, and other key firms. The nexus between them was well established by the time the next major (chekist) personnel shift occurred, this time transpiring on a grand scale under Putin's direction as they moved into leading political positions, as well as onto the boards of state-owned enterprises.

The "active reserve" had been created in 1992 when Yeltsin accommodated KGB desires to go into business by authorizing the new service status permitting a state security officer to maintain his profession and privileges while joining the private sector.

---

[2] Kevin O'Flynn, "City Rejects Return of Dzerzhinsky," *The Moscow Times*, January 22, 2003, p. 3.

Thus, business-intelligence distinctions were significantly blurred,[3] as were those of business-government following the wholesale chekist penetration of the political arena under Putin. Although the business-government relationship was intimate under Yeltsin, the degree of chekist/intelligence-business-government ties was less as the oligarchs had exerted the greater influence on the Kremlin during the 1990s. As a related development, the use of business cover became much more common and quite advantageous for Russian foreign intelligence officers (FIOs) operating overseas. To date, serious conflicts of interest abound as chekists in partnership with OC use government and intelligence resources to increase the profits of their private enterprises and interests in the commercial sector. Commenting on the chekist-organized crime alliance in December 2006, former KGB officer, Yuri Shvets,[4] observed that, "I see it getting worse, and I see it getting more sophisticated. These type of individuals, who 10 years ago were considered criminals, are now becoming public figures."[5]

A year into Putin's first presidential term, on Chekists' Day (December 20) 2000, former KGB Chairman Vladimir Semichastny (1963-1967) had expressed regret about divisions in Russia's security operations and the departure to the private sector of so many intelligence officers.[6] Yet, to an undeterminable degree, that may have been part disinformation, with many of these officers simply enjoying "active reserve" status, unbeknownst to the public. Many of them, knowledgeable about international business

---

[3] J. Michael Waller, "The KGB & Its 'Successors,'" *Perspective*, Vol. IV, No. 4, April-May 1994, pp. 1-9.

[4] For insight into Shvets' life as a KGB officer, see Yuri B. Shvets, *Washington Station: My Life As A KGB Spy In America*, Simon & Schuster: NY, 1994.

[5] Colin Freeman and Helen Womack, "Spy was killed 'on orders of Kremlin Stalin,'" *Telegraph.co.uk*, December 17, 2006.

[6] "Putin Sees New Role for Secret Services," *RFE/RL Newsline*, December 21, 2000, pp. 1-2.

practices and armed with a veritable assortment of contacts and access to foreign officials, firms, and individuals, established joint ventures in Russia and overseas, and could be expected to exploit these relationships as (potential) channels to economic and industrial secrets and technology, as well as providing them a platform from which to engage in espionage and other illegal activities, such as money laundering.

Additionally, some KGB officers had a significant advantage in light of their participation in the "Great CCCP-SU Robbery," covered in-depth in journalist and associate fellow at the Harriman Institute of Post-Soviet Affairs at Columbia University Stephen Handelman's 1995 book, *Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya*,[7] when in the wake of the Soviet collapse the KGB channeled money abroad for party bosses to be stored in secret accounts,[8] which worked to cement the new oligarchy that has shaped political-economic developments in post-Soviet Russia.

Its existence unknown to many but certainly utilized by the KGB, the Soviet Union had established an effective network of multinational corporations and banks strategically placed throughout the world, ostensibly to facilitate the country's foreign trade. Many of these foreign operations were run by KGB FCD and GRU officers operating under Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) cover (a common cover for Soviet/Russian intelligence officers) as a number of them were arrested for espionage over the years.[9] While these corporations were owned by the MFT, itself a challenge to discover, as Marshall Goldman notes, "It was even harder to identify the branches of the

---

[7] For a detailed account, see Stephen Handelman, *Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya*, Yale University Press: CT, 1995.

[8] Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 6.

[9] Op. cit., *The Piratization of Russia*, p. 159.

overseas Soviet-era banking network."[10] This explains why it has been so difficult to locate the hundreds of billions of dollars of laundered Soviet-Russian money since then. And not only were the individuals associated with these entities engaged in espionage; they also took bribes and skimmed off profits in order to fund communist parties in Europe, using recruited agents as bagmen.[11] Thus, the new oligarchy had cooperative, extensive experience in money laundering and other such illicit operations long before economic crisis and political instability ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

During the early 1990s, not only did the chekists, in league with OC, gain control of banks and other financial entities — for the purpose of not only profit-making but also to launder money, fund intelligence operations, and use as a base for espionage, influence operations, and organized crime activity — they also structured a key role for themselves in the domestic economy by creating and operating PSSs, as noted earlier, which services of became an absolute business necessity in post-Soviet Russia as protection schemes and extortions rackets flourished. Together with OC, these chekist-run firms usurped state power and authority to tax, police, and protect the economic sector. Virtually all businesses thus paid tribute, either to chekists, OC, or both. As a result of the intertwining of these developments, the nature and operations of which are discussed below, old power networks were never destroyed; rather, they were able to reconstitute themselves and/or strengthen, a process that became clear during Yeltsin's second presidential term and continued throughout Putin's first and into his second terms. Most fundamentally, these developments served to prevent the rule of law and free-market capitalism from taking root in the country during the Yeltsin era, with political favoritism and cronyism

[10] Ibid., p. 160.

remaining the key to success in the patron-client state, which translated into unquestioned loyalty or subservience to the Kremlin agenda of democratic reversal and political-economic favor toward chekists under the Putin regime.

8.3: THE LACK OF LVD AND THE TRANSMOGRIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY

The evidence suggests that the lack of an LVD policy in the political sector, even if one is instituted in the security sector, nevertheless increases the likelihood that non-democratic-oriented elements of the ancien regime will disproportionately, and negatively, influence the evolution of post-communist economic life, with the outcome that the process is corrupted and the transition to free-market capitalism transmogrified. Without LVD (in the political sector), and the informal networks of the old system therefore hardly interrupted from exercising their influence over policy, democratic-capitalist change tends to be distorted as elites use their positions to thwart the rule of law and legislation of property rights, economic laws, and a regulatory framework conducive to free-market exchange, and partner with former secret police officers, who have special skills and access to information, to engage in insider-deals and rent-seeking, create monopolies, and eliminate competition through various, often extra-legal, measures. That is, even when LVD is instituted in the security sector, if the political sector escapes the process, then those secret police officers and collaborators who are disqualified from high public office are still likely to retain unfettered access to and exploit political elites and utilize old networks to redirect political-economic reforms in favor of their own, symbiotic private interests. In Russia, the criminally corrupt political elite/nomenklatura, chekists-siloviki, and organized criminals were thus able to gain and maintain positions

---

[11] Ibid., p. 162.

of political influence and provide political protection for their partners and clients outside government. During Soviet times, they together had functioned to keep the unworkable (official) command economy afloat through the maintenance of a parallel (unofficial) economy, that is, a thriving black market that provided consumer goods, channeled through survival networks that were based on personal relationships and family ties. As Handelman notes, "Over the last twenty years of Soviet power, organized crime had become a silent partner in the black-market economy. The Russian mob, working with corrupt officials, developed the underground channels of trade which helped that economy prosper."[12] Given their ubiquitous role in monitoring developments in the country and enforcing regime dictates, it is only logical that the chekists were fully complicit in this state of affairs.

Trade policy analyst Aaron Lukas and Cato Institute foreign policy analyst Gary Dempsey illustrate how the underground economy evolved to the benefit of today's chekists:

> The underground markets that emerged under communism are another source of Russia's organized crime problem. Shortages of consumer and producer goods in the Soviet era provided the opportunity for additional income at all stages of commerce. Goods arriving at retail stores were often set aside for preferred customers who paid extra. Those who controlled the distribution of goods, housing, etc. were often in a position to extract additional payments from consumers. "Illegal private economic activities," reports Berkeley economist Gregory Grossman, were "a major and extremely widespread phenomenon," and for a large part of the Russian population, "a regular, almost daily, experience."
>
> It is no accident, then, that many members of today's criminal class are current or former Soviet officials. The 1960s saw forged in Russia crime networks based on the ability of the criminal underground to provide Soviet officials with consumer goods and services unavailable under the Communist regime. As Gorbachev liberalized in the early 1990s, Russian organized crime retained its links to government officials, and many former police and intelligence agents joined the

[12] Op. cit., *Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya*, p. 9.

> Russian mafia after the collapse of communism. Several recent books published inside Russia support this view. *Mafia: Unannounced Visit* by Interior Ministry official Vladimir Ovchinsky describes the intertwining of the corrupt state bureaucracy and the criminal underworld, especially during the last years of communist rule. In *Thieves In Law*, Georgy Podlesskikh and Andrei Tereshonok expose how organized crime and the Russian government are tied to each other. Based on internal KGB documents, they show that Soviet officials influenced and sometimes supervised organized criminal activities.[13]

Patron-clientism was the predominant feature of Soviet life and continues to be the key mode of political-economic relations in post-Soviet life. In such a context, the establishment of the rule of law was in practice infeasible and, in fact, disruptive to the oligarchic capitalist and, in turn, bureaucratic corporatist interests of each regime and their clients. With little elite renewal, the old network system continued to operate, albeit with the Soviet state managers and functionaries, in partnership with chekists and OC elements, becoming new private owners. Regardless of any laws on the books, the relationship between corrupt officials and organized crime thrives, albeit in evolving forms, and remains the norm to date. In authoritarian Russia, as Marshall Goldman notes, rigid laws and controls are established that are so all-encompassing that they open the door for bribes and, hence, "while it may look like there is the rule of law, the exceptions for favorites and bribe payers makes it anything but."[14] By extension, society is corrupted as well; among the populace, the preference is not on complying with the law, but, rather, to pay the bribe and avoid have to negotiate the bureaucratic morass.[15]

---

[13] Aaron Lukas and Gary Dempsey, "Mafia Capitalism or Red Legacy?" *Cato Institute*, March 4, 2000, file:///C:/Data%20Files/Dissertation%202007/DISS%20APRIL%2007/diss/Interior%20Ministry%20In%202000%20--%20there%20are%20now%20more%20than%209,000%20criminal%20organizations.htm.

[14] Op. cit., *The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry*, pp. 41-42.

[15] See Georgy Bovt, "A Corrupt Way of Life," *The Moscow Times*, July 12, 2007, p. 8.

Over time, democratic-oriented officials who sought to establish the rule of law and those who pushed for greater transparency in business affairs were increasingly marginalized or excluded. During the Yeltsin era, those new oligarchy elements outside government, particularly the oligarchs and PSSs, exercised significant influence over political-economic affairs through their political connections, accumulated wealth and access to resources, and brutal ruthlessness. As Marshall Goldman notes, "....whether it be President Boris Yeltsin, his daughter, their staff, Vladimir Putin or local governors, each oligarch needed to cultivate a good relationship with a senior government official or his relatives. Intrigue, connections and payoffs count for more than talent. This was especially true in the early years of the transition period."[16] More recent reporting, in July 2007, finds that the situation persists, with connections to and favor with the Kremlin still mandated for economic success.[17]

Thus, it followed that under career chekist RF President Putin, the chekists managed to consolidate their control of the political sector and thus secure their hold on the economy, extra-legally checking the oligarchs' influence — Putin had often insisted he would "eliminate them [oligarchs] as a class" [18] — by using tax evasion charges and the court-ordered payment of billions of dollars in back taxes to bankrupt those who interfered in the chekist political-economic agenda, which entailed yet another redistribution of strategic resources. The chekist-dominated Putin administration thus gained control over and consolidated the oil and gas industry (and other strategic

---

[16] Op. cit., *The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry*, p. 154.

[17] Andrew Kramer, "The Kremlin Flexes, and a Tycoon Reels," *The New York Times*, July 8, 2007.

[18] Sabrina Tavernise, "Police for Hire in Russia's Business Jungle," *The New York Times*, July 28, 2002, pp. 1-3.

resources), becoming the second-largest oil exporter in the world (behind Saudi Arabia), with a daily take of $500 million from crude oil exports.[19] The same pressures were applied to facilitate the state's gaining of control over the arms, media, and auto manufacturing sectors, while the process is well underway in the (remaining) natural resources and telecommunications sectors. As a result, Putin's chekist-dominated regime has gained the capacity to exert much greater influence abroad given the industrialized world's dependence on oil and gas to drive its economies. As part of that process, the democratization project was reversed almost as abruptly as it started. As Martin Wolf writes in the *Financial Times*, "huge natural resource rents cement autocracies, particularly when in the hands of the state. Elites have much to lose from equal sharing of the wealth, while the masses can impose few costs upon them."[20]

So, too, as part of this process, the oligarchs who had so thrived during the Yeltsin era were brought to heel. As Goldman observes, "As long as an oligarch keeps a low political profile, he is allowed to function."[21] Oligarchs are forced to "pay taxes" (in other words, contribute money to Kremlin causes and dictates), as occurred 10 days after Putin's February 2001 meeting with the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, where he suggested they might want to contribute to a Putin-created fund for families of military personnel killed in conflicts, especially Chechnya, and subsequently collected $52.7 million in "voluntary contributions."[22] They are required to

---

[19] Andrew Kramer, "Awash in Petrodollars, Russia Frets About the Paradoxes of Bounty," *The New York Times*, November 15, 2005.

[20] Martin Wolf, "Martin Wolf: Democracy and the future," *Financial Times*, January 24, 2006.

[21] Op. cit., p. 216.

[22] Op. cit., p. 217.

stay out of politics or face extra-legal arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment, accompanied by forfeiture of assets, as happened with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his company, OAO Yukos Oil Company, the classic case demonstrating the Putin regime's application of such tactics to take down rivals, a procedural method that continues to be employed by the Kremlin to date.

Through selective investigations led by General Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov, who personally oversaw Khodorkovsky's prosecution and whose son is married to the daughter of Putin's first deputy and career chekist Igor Sechin,[23] the chairman of Rosneft, the state-owned oil firm that directly benefited from the Yukos takeover through its Kremlin-assisted absorption of the firm's lucrative assets, an environment of fear and uncertainty was created that facilitates and ensures Kremlin control of economic elites and oligarchs.[24] Regime manipulations associated with implementing this grand strategy to redistribute wealth to the chekists intensified over Putin's first presidential term. Even former counterintelligence chief of the Soviet embassy in Washington, KGB Col. Victor Cherkashin, who helped recruit and handle both CIA officer and spy for Russia, Aldrich Ames, and FBI agent and spy for Russia, Robert Hanssen, agreed that the chekists were taking over lucrative property interests from the oligarchs, stating in a January 2005 interview with *Newsweek* that, "Putin and his men are driving the oligarchs out, but they're moving to take over the property themselves. Everything remains the same. Things must change from the top. When the president and government and bureaucrats

---

[23] Sechin is a fluent French, Spanish, and Portuguese speaker, and has a GRU background, including past work in Angola. See Victor Yasmann, "Analysis: Russia's Pipelines Of Power," *RFE/RL Feature Article*, August 8, 2004, www.rferl.org.

[24] Pavel K. Baev, "Ustinov's Firing Reveals Clan Maneuvering Inside Kremlin," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 3, No. 108, June 5, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371148.

are free from corruption, only then will the situation change."[25] Indeed, it sounds like yet another call for lustration, and from a long-serving, unreformed, and loyal KGB-SVR foreign intelligence officer, although Cherkashin remains firmly opposed to any opening up of the KGB archives,[26] an essential requirement for the effective implementation of an LVD policy in Russia, core as the state was to the old Soviet project. Instead, the lack of LVD represented an opportunity lost under Yeltsin and a situation exploited by Putin.

8.4: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CHALLENGES

8.4.1: The Necessity and Challenge of Breaking Up Old Power Networks

For a successful post-communist democratic transition and secret police transformation, a first priority in the reorganization of governmental structures is the breaking up and dispersal of old power networks and the disempowerment of key leaders of the ancien regime and its support bases. As Polish Senator Anna Bogucka-Skowronska observes on the need to dissolve the architectural legacy of the police-state and its informal mafias in Poland's case: "If such a structure is not completely crushed, it has a natural tendency to re-create itself through mutual interpersonal contacts, habits, [and] the entire mentality of these people...It is necessary to shatter the family clans of functionaries, which dominate all police posts,...to destroy the whole bureaucracy, to smash what I have called the mafia networks based on personal ties, various interests and their not-always-legitimate political [agendas]."[27]

---

[25] "The Last Word: Viktor Cherkashin: Making Sense Of Spying," *Newsweek*, January 10, 2005.

[26] Victor Cherkashin, *Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer*, Basic Books: NY, 2005, p. 285.

[27] Maria Los and Andrzej Zyberowicz, *Privatizing the Police State: The Case of Poland*, Foreword by Gary T. Marx, MacMillan Press, Ltd.: London, 2000, p. 9.

8.4.2: The History and Nature of the "New Oligarchy" Linkages

Organized crime in Russia is not a new phenomenon. The history of the infamous *vory-v-zakone* (thieves-in-law)[28] has been extensively documented. During the Brezhnev era, corruption became endemic and the black market thrived as theft from the state could only be described as prolific. After all, so it went, the theft of state resources was not stealing since, if no one owned them, then everybody did. The vory-v-zakone, under the watchful eye of the chekists, operated in the underground economy and, in effect, helped keep the inefficient, regular economy afloat. As Virginie Coulloudon, associate at the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University and Director of the Project on Elites and Patronage in Russia notes:

> Soviet organized crime was, from the outset, inextricably enmeshed in the system of power. It operated in full compliance with the official pattern of political and economic incentives. The root of this cooperative relationship lay in the way the political apparatus was judged by the success of the economy. In the Soviet period, party control over the economy, the judicial system, and the police spawned a system of generalized corruption. Those in political power soon needed an extra-state organization close to the party to threaten those who had not paid their debts and to maintain the system in place. In this context, government

[28] According to "The Thieves' Code," a thief is bound to: 1) Forsake his relatives — mother, father, brothers, sisters...; 2) Not have a family of his own — no wife, no children; this does not however, preclude him from having a lover; 3) Never, under any circumstances work, no matter how much difficulty this brings — live only on means gleaned from thievery; 4) Help other thieves — both by moral and material support, utilizing the commune of thieves; 5) Keep secret information about the whereabouts of accomplices (i.e., dens, districts, hideouts, safe apartments, etc.); 6) In unavoidable situations (if a thief is under investigation) to take the blame for someone else's crime; this buys the other person time of freedom; 7) Demand a convocation of inquiry for the purpose of resolving disputes in the event of a conflict between oneself and other thieves, or between thieves; 8) If necessary, participate in such inquiries; 9) Carry out the punishment of the offending thief as decided by the convocation; 10) Not resist carrying out the decision of punishing the offending thief who is found guilty, with punishment determined by the convocation; 11) Have good command of the thieves' jargon ("Fehnay"); 12) Not gamble without being able to cover losses; 13) Teach the trade to young beginners; 14) Have, if possible, informants from the rank and file of thieves; 15) Not lose your reasoning ability when using alcohol; 16) Have nothing to do with the authorities (particularly with the ITU [Correctional Labor Authority]), not participate in public activities, nor join any community organizations; 17) Not take weapons from the hands of authorities; not serve in the military; and, 18) Make good on promises given to other thieves. See Dantsik Sergeyevich Baldaev, Vladimir Kuz'mich Belko, and Igor Mikhailovich Isupov, Authors-compilers, *Dictionary: Prison, Camp, Blotnoi, Jargon (Speech and Graphic Portraits of Soviet Prisons)*, cited at "Russian Organized Crime," http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/rusorg3.htm.

> officials employed gangsters to impose their rules. For fifty years, they nourished in this way a mutually beneficial alliance. So organized crime appeared in its contemporary Russian version as a full-grown alliance between three worlds (the political, the economic, and the criminal).[29]

A manifest result of this arrangement was evident by the 1970s: few any longer truly believed in the communist ideology, with much pretending and kowtowing to its discredited ideas the norm. Meanwhile, as people sought ways to compensate for the inadequacies inherent to a central command economy, corruption only grew worse. And, the KGB's role in containing it was highly politicized. Although largely neglected in the literature, the KGB leadership played a key role in the political aspects of Soviet economics. As Handelman notes:

> In the 1970s, Yuri Andropov, then chairman of the KGB, launched an anticorruption crusade that put many senior Party officials in prison. No one believed for a moment that the KGB had suddenly uncovered a vast new pool of lawbreakers, or even that the unlucky *apparatchiki* caught in the sweep were more culpable than the majority of their grafting comrades. It was a campaign motivated purely by political considerations. The ambitious Andropov was determined to frighten his rivals and persuade his Politburo colleagues of his leadership credentials. The KGB's manipulation of politics and anti-crime activity left a useful legacy to its senior officers. In the post-Communist era, KGB resentment at being sidelined was channeled into political opposition. The agency's secret network of informers and its well-stocked clandestine treasury, which was invested in numerous front organizations, banks, and commercial enterprises, continued to make it a power player in the New Russia. And its special position at the nexus of the black market and officialdom during the 1980s made its activities particularly ambiguous.[30]

The extensive, deeply-rooted corruption and its associated networks set the stage for the substantial growth of corruption and OC activity not only inside but also outside the government once the Communist party (CP) no longer maintained a monopoly on

---

[29] Virginie Coulloudon, "Crime and Corruption after Communism: The Criminalization of Russia's Political Elite," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Fall 1997, http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/criminalization.html.

[30] Op. cit., *Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya*, p. 294.

power.[31] Coulloudon notes that, "In the years between 1988 and 1990, when the Soviet state gave the green light to the creation of a free market, available assets belonged either to the party, the KGB, or to OC. After seventy years of a controlled economy, these were the only organizations with capital available for investment in 'newly transformed' enterprises."[32] And with such a foundation well-embedded in Soviet Russia, private interests could be freely pursued following the 1991 Soviet collapse, after which the wholesale criminalization of Russian society progressed quickly. With the CP monopoly broken, the "new oligarchy" quickly superseded it, gaining control of political-economic policy and thwarting democratization in order to pursue and protect their own private interests.

By the mid-1990s, the chekists had stabilized from the chaos and uncertainty following the Soviet Union's collapse and regained some initiative in controlling and directing the change processes occurring in the country. By April 1995, the FSK (Federal Counterintelligence Service) had become the renamed FSB (Federal Security Service) and gained a tremendous growth in powers, which continued to increase throughout Yeltsin's second term and over Putin's tenure as well. The chekists were able to accelerate change in the country consonant with their own power increases and in line with their agenda of gaining control of the state. Under Putin, they achieved that objective, with many observers labeling the existing state of affairs in Russia as

---

[31] Thomas C. Muldoon, "Russian Intelligence and Security Services: An Indicator of Democratic Reform," United States Navy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 1999, p. 59, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/ADA366081.pdf.

[32] Op. cit., "Crime and Corruption after Communism."

"Putinism,"[33] described by Cliff Kupchan, Vice-President and Senior Fellow at the Nixon Center, as the structure of Putin's regime: "Putinism is comprised by a strong Russian bureaucracy, a United Russia-led parliament, a leaning towards statism, and a merging of interests between the state and the Siloviki, which consists of former Federal Security Service (FSB) officers." He explained that a significant feature of Putinism is more state control of the commanding heights of the economy. Other features include the absence of checks and balances and the clash between the state and some oligarchs, leading to a questioning of property rights in Russia."[34]

During the early-to-mid-1990s, the chekists' role in the economy and economic policymaking had been subordinate to the increasing power and influence of the oligarchs, who had worked to quickly concentrate and expand their huge wealth before a proper legal context (including property rights) could be created to frustrate the rampant insider trading and widespread manipulation of the economic-financial system that was occurring throughout the country at society's expense. Throughout the Yeltsin era, the economy was largely controlled by the so-called "Family" of politicians and businessmen with close links to the president and his immediate family, who rose to power and prominence under the Kremlin's patronage.[35] However, the Yeltsin "Family" clan was eased out of the Kremlin early in Putin's presidency. And as the chekist-dominated

---

[33] See Graeme P. Herd, "Russia and the Politics of 'Putinism'," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 107-112.

[34] "Russia After the Elections," A Luncheon with Cliff Kupchan, Chris Marsh, James Warhola, and Grigorii Klujtcharer, Program Brief, *The Nixon Center*, Vol. 10, No. 11, Washington, DC, March 24, 2004.

[35] Andrei Zolotov, Jr., "President Reshuffles the Security Agencies," *The Moscow Times*, March 12, 2003, p. 1.

regime consolidated its power, the establishment of the rule of law and property rights remained elusive.

8.4.3: Organized Crime Infiltration of Political Structures

As had the oligarchs, organized crime elements, too, managed to gain some influence over policy due to their concentration of great wealth, acquired through the commensurate development of close ties and partnerships with corrupt political and state security officials who provided them political protection in an environment that, it can not be overemphasized, operates as a patron-client network system based on personal relationships. James Finckenaur, professor of criminal justice and Director of the International Center of the National Institute of Justice, and Yuri Voronin, law professor and Director of the Organized Crime Study Center at the Urals State Law Academy, noted in 2001 that, "Organized crime in Russia is an institutionalized part of the political and economic environment"….pointing out that, "the historical symbiosis with the state makes Russian organized crime virtually an inalienable part of the state. As this has continued into the present, some would say it has become an engine of the state that works at all levels of the Russian government." They note that one of the peculiarities of Russian organized crime is that "criminals have been able to directly influence the state's domestic and foreign policy to promote the interests of organized crime, either by attaining public office or by buying political officials."[36]

[36] James O. Finckenauer and Yuri A. Voronin, "The Threat of Organized Crime," Issues in International Crime, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, DC, June 2001. For an in-depth study of the history of Russian organized crime in Russia and the U.S., see James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring, *Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture, and Crime*, Northeastern University Press: Boston, 1998.

An example of the close ties between the political elite and OC is the case of Konstantin Yakovlev, aka Kostya Mogila (Mogila means "grave," as he was once a gravedigger), a reputed organized crime boss and member of the St. Petersburg business elite believed to have had commercial ties to Governor Vladimir Yakovlev. Mogila was murdered in Moscow on the eve of St. Petersburg's 300th anniversary, in June 2003. That same evening, the Speaker of the St. Petersburg Duma announced that the governor would resign immediately following the festivities. Apparently, in 1999 Mogila had bankrolled a congress held by the Fatherland-All Russia party in St. Petersburg when it was striving to become the "party of power" by funneling money through the VMTs company, which had been registered using forged documents. City Council member Viktor Novosyolov, who had business ties with the Tambov organized crime group, exposed the fact of the forged documents and in October 1999 ended up getting his head blown off while stopped at a red light when a bomb was placed on his car's roof. The killers were later found by an investigative journalism firm to have been working for close friends of Mogila.[37]

It is worth noting that Yakovlev ran as a candidate in the St. Petersburg gubernatorial elections against incumbent Anatoly Sobchak,[38] who Putin had worked for as an aide, and won, splitting the bureaucracy into two opposing camps. Once Putin became president, it was widely believed that Yakovlev was able to survive for a time as governor due in large part to the fact that he had many accomplices who were also close

---

[37] Novosyolov was known to maintain ties with organized crime figures, including Vladimir Kumarin, crime boss of the notorious Tambov organization, feeding speculation that his was a gangland war killing. While four men were arrested for the deed, those who ordered it remain free.

[38] Anatoly Sobchak, *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Petersburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*, The Free Press: NY, 1992.

friends of the president. Perhaps the Tambov crime gang killed Mogila; they had tried twice before. As op-ed writer for *The Moscow Times* and host of "Yest Mneniye" on TVS, Yulia Latynina, described it: "St. Petersburg is not unique because people get shot there so often but because the city's criminal elite does triple duty as its political and business elite. Mogila controlled the city's television stations, which have now become the object of a power struggle. He figured along with the governor in a number of criminal investigations. But most importantly, he was the grandmaster of St. Petersburg's political chess games. Last week he lost to a worthy opponent. That's the kind of city St. Petersburg is. Deputy governors are killed over money, and crime bosses are killed over politics."[39]

The interest of OC elements in winning a seat in the Duma is driven not only by a desire for access to the platform for pursuing economic gain that it provides, but also by the fact that they thereby gain immunity from prosecution. The problem of penetration of the political system by criminals was not limited to Moscow and St. Petersburg, but extended to the regional governments as well. For example, and illustrating the nexus between the political and criminal worlds that persisted in Russia's regions many months after Putin gained the presidency and declared that he would establish a "dictatorship of law," 59 of those who registered as candidates in the 2001 elections to the local legislative bodies of Khabarovsk, the Maritime Territories, and the Kamchatka region were reportedly known by authorities to maintain close ties with organized criminals.

In November 2001, deputy presidential envoy to the Far Eastern federal district, Aleksandr Drozdov, said that "according to thoroughly checked information, cases of

---

[39] Yulia Latynina, "St. Pete's Criminal-Business-Political Elite," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, June 4, 2003, p. 10.

infiltration of the political structures by criminal groups have been observed in almost all the constituent entities of the federation within the Far Eastern federal district," adding that "we must not allow a single representative of the criminal world to enter the political structures."[40] Yet, it followed that, for all practical purposes, the constant interference of federal prosecutors in regional elections apparently had more to do with ensuring pro-Putin winners than thwarting corruption, as Putin and the chekists worked to consolidate their power throughout Russia.[41] In the early months of Putin's presidency, in July 2000, former deputy prime minister for the economy, Anatoly Chubais, had observed the extent of independence in the General Prosecutors Office, saying, "Never has been, is not, and won't be for some time."[42]

Under Putin, with chekists-siloviki having extensively filled the ranks of the political elite and organized crime syndicates, conflicts of interest have only more deeply pervaded the expanding areas of governmental and bureaucratic interests. Russia scholar Karen Dawisha observed in September 2003 that, "the existence of connections between elected officials and organized crime would erode public confidence in democracy and increase public support for a 'strong hand' to end corruption, even if democracy is put on

---

[40] "Criminal, Political Circles Merge In Russian Far East," *RFE/RL Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 6, December 6, 2001, p. 4.

[41] "Prosecutors Accused of Interfering In Regional Elections," *RFE/RL Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 6, December 6, 2001, p. 5.

[42] Michael Wines, "Russia Drops Criminal Inquiry Into Troublesome Press Tycoon," *The New York Times*, July 28, 2000.

hold for a time."[43] Ironically, as Russia moved into the 21st century, Putin and the FSB represented that strong hand, however, corruption only worsened significantly.

In 1999, the Kremlin reported that Russian OC controlled four out of every 10 businesses and 60% of state-owned companies, with foreign companies paying up to 20% of their profits to OC protection rackets. By March 2000, when Putin was elected RF president, the MVD reported that there were more than 9,000 criminal organizations operating inside the country, employing nearly 100,000 people (the same number as cited in 1993 with 5000 groups), and The Analytical Center for Social and Economic Policies, a government-sponsored thinktank that reports directly to Putin, estimated that four out of five Russian businesses paid protection money.[44]

Although OC activity and corruption continued to increase under Putin, by the end of his first presidential term in 2004, the situation had changed form. As Vsevolod Sokolov, research associate at the Washington, DC-based Center for Defense Information, observed, "Although organized crime remains a significant factor in Russian business life, its influence has waned relative to that exercised by rent-seeking oligarchs, large corporations, and the state security services."[45] In other words, with the chekists gaining political power under Putin, the oligarchs and OC were subordinated to the chekist regime's economic agenda.

---

[43] Karen Dawisha, "Democratization and political participation: research concepts and methodologies," *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Cambridge University Press: MA, 1997, p. 54.

[44] Aaron Lukas and Gary Dempsey, "Mafia Capitalism or Red Legacy?" *Cato Institute*, March 4, 2000, file:///C:/Data%20Files/Dissertation%202007/DISS%20APRIL%2007/diss/Interior%20Ministry%20In%202000%20--%20there%20are%20now%20more%20than%209,000%20criminal%20organizations.htm.

[45] Vsevolod Sokolov, "From Guns to Briefcases: The Evolution of Russian Organized Crime," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Spring 2004, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj04-1/sokolov.htm.

Even so, contract killings continue with impunity, still for the most part remaining unsolved. Their targets include bankers, businessmen, politicians, journalists, hoteliers, and others. Sokolov notes that, "contract killings of prominent politicians and businessmen remain a major problem. This suggests that the struggle for control of criminal enterprises has become largely confined to the higher echelons of power."[46] In a final analysis of the post-Soviet economic evolution to date, one sees that, in fact, the relationship was inverted; while oligarch and OC acquisition of vast wealth brought them political influence under Yeltsin, the chekists' gaining of political power brought them great wealth under Putin.

8.4.4: The Nature and Role of Private Security Services in Russia — "Everyone Needs a Roof"

At this juncture, it is important to note the role of the ubiquitous private security services (PSSs) that mushroomed all over Russia in the wake of the Soviet collapse, their staffing by intelligence/security sector officers and organized criminals, relationship to oligarchs, role in the Russian economy, intelligence collection, and involvement in contract murders. Following the Soviet Union's collapse, as sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky notes, "every agency of government felt the need to create its own armed security organization. It became a status symbol....former KGB officers opened a host of private security agencies, most of which then formed their own close ties with various parts of the state structure."[47] Any significant business in Russia, particularly banks and large financial firms, employed its own PSS to engage in not only enforcement matters but also intelligence activities, in the interests of the business against its competitors. Typically,

---

[46] Ibid.

[47] Paul Goble, "The Days of the Chekists," End Note, *RFE/RL Security Watch*, December 23, 2000.

the PSSs were staffed by KGB and GRU types or organized criminals, who joined forces to establish these firms. They used them as fronts to extort protection money from businesses and investigate, surveil, and sometimes prepare contract killings on selected targets in exchange for money and political favors.

According to the head of the Interior Ministry's Main Administration for Public Order, Nikolai Pershutkin, half of the 11 largest PSSs in Russia, employing approximately 200,000 men (some consisted of brigades of approximately 500-600 men), served as fronts for organized crime. In November 2001, Pershutkin reported that his agency had recently canceled 2000 licenses for PSSs, confiscated 20,000 weapons, 300 kilograms of explosives, and cracked down on illegal wiretapping by these entities.[48] Many have access to high-tech surveillance equipment. For instance, in October 2000 the Interior Ministry's Department R, for Combating High Tech Crimes, arrested a group of secret defense institute scientists for supplying a group with a device that allowed them to monitor hundreds of cell phones at once.[49]

The more sophisticated of these firms — those with former elite intelligence/military officers on their staff — primarily worked for political and economic elites (including oligarchs) and wealthy organized criminals, who were in the best position to obtain or afford their specialized services. A plethora of others, those with a larger ratio of OC to intelligence/security officers, tended to be hired or paid by smaller firms, all the way down to the kiosk level. The PSSs were also used by public

---

[48] "Security Services Said To Front For Organized Crime," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 16, November 6, 2000.

[49] "High Tech Defense Workers Aid Criminals," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 16, November 6, 2000, p. 3.

authorities to extort bribes and kickbacks from businesses. Organized crime activity, with the full collaboration and often participation of former intelligence/security officers, in some cases at the behest of political authorities who by virtue of their position enjoyed immunity from prosecution and therefore more easily operated as "roofs," proliferated.

Many political and intelligence/security officials served as *kryshas*, or roofs, to businesses. A *krysha* refers to a private enforcement partner, criminal or legal, for private entities and individuals,[50] and signifies a complex of services provided to clients to protect them physically and minimize their business risks. The term "came from the professional vocabulary of the intelligence service, where it signified an official cover — diplomatic or journalistic — of a spy."[51] The MVD's GUBOP was among the first of government agencies to start providing protection in the form of kryshas to businesses — as opposed to official, state protection — becoming one of the largest rackets in Moscow.[52] The networks are fluid, flexible, but enduring. Thus, political protection became well-established for both organized criminals and their intelligence/security partners who, consequently, could operate with impunity, as did their *kryshas.* The associative link effectively prevented prosecution, an unlikelihood in any case given the extensive participation of the legal/enforcement authorities themselves in the protection rackets. Highlighting the extent of the problem, for example, a March 2001 inspection commissioned by then-Interior Minister Gryzlov had found that not only did GUBOP (Main Directorate for the Fight Against Organized Crime), GUBEP (Main Anti-

---

[50] Vadim Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*, Cornell University Press: NY, 2002, p. 22.

[51] For more on "kryshas," see Ibid., pp. 139-140.

[52] Roustam Kaliyev, "Can 'Power Ministries' Be Reformed?" *Perspective*, Vol., XIII, No. 1, September - October 2002.

Economic Crime Department), and Directorate R (High-Tech Crime) not fight crime, but were involved precisely in those illegal business activities over which they were tasked to exercise control.[53]

This displacement of state functions of property rights protection and contract enforcement in the initial post-Soviet decade seriously weakened the democratization project, as legislators precluded the development of a free-market-based body of law to regulate property through their consistent failure to develop adequate legislation to facilitate the transition, instead working assiduously to protect their own private interests that so profited from this arrangement. Over time, the displacement of security and contract enforcement through the operation of PSSs, in combination with recurring legislative actions such as the codification of confusing and conflicting laws designed to provide officials new opportunities to demand bribes, thwarted the development of a capitalist economy and worked to discredit democracy in the eyes of the people, which not only effectively precluded the further development, but delegitimized the early democratic reforms initiated under Yeltsin, leading to their wholesale reversal with limited public outcry and, rather, public support for Putin's moves once he came into power. In short, the evolving situation favored a chekist resurgence.

8.4.5: Political Intimidation of Rivals Using State Machinery

In the following sections, I examine the Kremlin's use of state institutions and resources to intimidate political rivals, stifle dissent, and take over their privately held economic assets. The chekist-dominated regime's power and wealth were thus substantially increased, at the expense of democratization.

---

[53] Ibid.

a) The Khodorkovsky/Yukos Oil Case

The FSB's October 25, 2003 arrest of Yukos major shareholder, billionaire and perhaps Russia's wealthiest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, at gunpoint as he landed at the Novosibirsk airport on a charter flight that had stopped for refueling en route to Irkutsk,[54] and subsequent questioning and charging by prosecutors of seven counts, including large-scale corporate tax evasion and large-scale embezzlement, marked a significant and unambiguous shift in the Kremlin's approach to the oligarchs. This shift entailed an extra-legal redistribution of the wealth from targeted oligarchs to leading chekists-siloviki, a major economic grab that followed on the heels of their successful power grab. As Mikhail Delyagin, director of the Institute of Globalization and former adviser to former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov observed in the wake of the Khodorkovsky arrest, "The state can no longer curtail the appetite of the state security bureaucracy which, according to the Prosecutor General's Office's own statistics, has opened 3,000 privatization-related cases this year."[55] The undoubtedly political decision was made at the highest levels, and executed by the Prosecutor General's Office and Courts, to keep Khodorkovsky jailed until at least mid-March 2004 (he remains in jail to date, having been convicted of fraud and tax evasion in May 2005 and sentenced to eight years in prison),[56] after the scheduled March 14, 2004 presidential election in which it was widely

---

[54] "FSB Arrests Yukos Head," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 4, No. 43, October 30, 2003.

[55] "Government Insider Says Yukos Affair Will Harm Economy...," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 4, No. 43, October 30, 2003.

[56] Chris Noon, "Khodorkovsky May See Longer Jail Sentence," *Forbes*, February 5, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/facesinthenews/2007/02/05/mikhail-khodorkovsky-yukos-cx_cn_0205autofacescan04.html; and, Chris Noon, "Khodorkovsky Plans Study at Siberian Labor Camp," *Forbes*, October 24, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/facesinthenews/2005/10/24/khodorkovsky-russia-billionaires_cx_cn_1024autofacescan02.html.

believed he sought to run. The billionaire oligarch also sought greater transparency and provided substantial funding to the democratically-oriented opposition party, Yabloko, further leading the Kremlin to perceive him as posing a threat to the Putin-led chekist agenda of consolidating a chekist-dominated state and all that that meant for Russian affairs.

The Yukos case actually began with the FSB's June 2003 arrest of Alexei Pichugin, a former MVD and KGB officer who headed the firm's internal economic security department, for attempted murder and arranging other murders. In 2005, Pichugin was convicted for double murder and sentenced to 20 years, which was increased to 24 years a month later after new charges were filed.[57] There were a number of interesting twists and turns as the case progressed. For example, it had been during Soviet times that the KGB used psychotropic agents against dissidents to glean information on their activities and associates. Apparently, the practice has returned. According to Pugachev's lawyers, FSB officers injected Pichugin with psychotropic agents during a July 14, 2003 visit at the FSB-controlled prison, Lefortovo, where he and many other detainees were being held. Yabloko member and State Duma deputy, Alexei Melnikov, together with four other Duma deputies, sent an inquiry to FSB Director Patrushev on July 17, 2003 posing specific questions about the allegations. However, Patrushev's deputy, Viktor Komogorov, responded instead, writing that, "some deterioration in Pichugin's health may be attributable to psychological and emotional tension, as well as a number of his illnesses." Melnikov also forwarded an inquiry to

[57] Grigory Pasko, "Political Prisoners in Today's Russia – Alexey Piguchin," *Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Russian, Europe, and International Affairs*, February 1, 2007.

Prosecutor General Ustinov, but failed to learn anything, subsequently describing the Office's inertness as "criminal."

In conducting his own investigation, Melnikov explained that, "I got involved into this case as a defender of human rights. But when information appeared in the press that psychotropic agents had been administered to Pichugin, I began insisting on an investigation. If we don't succeed here now, the forces that are emerging in the law and enforcement agencies will decide that they can do anything. My task is to open the curtain and demonstrate to society what is going on behind its back."[58] According to Melnikov, "an attempt was made using these agents to obtain information from Pichugin that would compromise the leadership of Yukos."[59] As Grigory Pasko, himself a victim of a chekist frame-up observed in February 2007, "experience shows that former officers of the KGB-FSB receive much longer sentences than those who did not serve in these organs. This is revenge of sorts from their colleagues at the firm. Shop-floor revenge that Alexander Litvinenko (an FSB defector who died of polonium-210 poisoning on November 23, 2006) was sent to kingdom come for."[60]

Others also recognized how the chekists had established their position as the unquestionable controllers of Russian economic affairs at home and abroad, a role that reached far beyond that of simply running the state machinery. In a July 22, 2003 interview with the Italian newspaper, *La Stampa*, Grigory Yavlinsky described the Yukos

---

[58] Nikolai Morozov, "'We will investigate this case as long as necessary,': Deputy of the Duma Alexei Melnikov conducts his own investigation into the Pichugin case," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, August 27, 2003, and posted at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/9/030827_koms_pravda.html.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Op. cit., "Political Prisoners in Today's Russia."

case as: “It is a warning to a company which became the flagship of the economy. In this way the state demonstrates to the company and all other companies that any attempt to become independent of the authorities will be punished.” Further, he said, “the frontal attack against Khodorkovsky presents a warning to the nascent civil society, a lesson that many have already learned.”[61] That lesson is that the chekist-dominated Kremlin’s program must be adhered to or a severe price paid. In response to the question: “What is the way out?” Yavlinsky said: “You cannot stop the economy and then turn a new page. Some system has already developed and we have to deal with it through gradual transformation rather than a complete break with the existing inefficient, but functioning mechanisms. It is impossible to overcome periphery capitalism without fundamental institutional transformation that would guarantee first of all the priority of human rights, including property rights, and protect them from encroachment by the authorities and the state. Liberalisation of society, justice and the mass media, the transparency of business and bureaucracy is required. Police, prosecutors and courts should not be used for economic and political blackmail and pressure.”[62] Yet, transparency of business is exactly what Khodorkovsky had sought. Indeed, contrary to Yavlinsky’s solution, the likelihood of the chekist-dominated state undergoing a gradual transformation to one that builds liberal institutions is highly unlikely. Fundamental institutional transformation is only possible with revolutionary change.

---

[61] “War Between the State and Oligarchs Is Destructive for Russia: Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky,” *La Stampa*, July 22, 2003, and posted at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/7/stampa_220703.html.

[62] Ibid.

Two months after Khodorkovsky's arrest and one day after Audit Chamber head and career chekist Sergei Stepashin met with Putin to discuss reviewing privatizations, on December 29, 2003 an Audit Chamber spokesman announced that the agency, "will examine the sell-offs of state assets over the past decade as well as evaluate the taxes levied on oil majors Yukos, LUKoil and Sibneft."[63] Earlier in the week, Putin had demanded that big businesses share more of their wealth, and said that a new tax on oil profits was in the works. Boris Kagarlitsky, director of the Institute of Globalization Problems, described the Kremlin's plan on privatizations and taxes as, "pure blackmail," observing that its position was not to institute a wholesale reversal of past sell-offs but, rather, only selected, unspecified deals would be targeted, an approach that would nevertheless provide the authorities with a lever to use against all businesses.[64] Analysts agree that a condition levied by the Kremlin against the oligarchs to continue operating free from prosecution was to not only stay out of politics, as directed by the Kremlin, but also for those in control of the oil and gas sector and other highly valuable assets to skim profits and use the money to prop up other sectors in order to diversify the economy.[65] The (potential) government take is significant for, as Roland Nash, chief strategist at Renaissance Capital notes, oil, gas, and metal constitute 70 percent of all traded assets in Russia.[66]

---

[63] Alex Fak, "Audit Chamber To Review Sell-Offs," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 29, 2003, p. 1.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

b) Putin and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs

While campaigning for the presidency in early 2000, Putin had, as noted earlier, promised to go after the oligarchs. It followed that on July 28, 2000 Putin held a roundtable with the oligarchs in his first meeting with the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the business lobby nicknamed "the oligarchs' union," where he set down the new rules of the political-economic game, Putin had summoned 21 prominent businessmen to the Kremlin for that infamous meeting and made a famous bargain: pay taxes, abide by the law, and stay out of politics, and you can keep your dubiously acquired empires.[67] In other words, as long as the oligarchs stayed out of politics, the Kremlin would not interfere in their business nor favor one over the other. As Tom Adshead, a Moscow-based political analyst observed, "The main thrust of the agreement reached at their meeting last year was to take the oligarchs out of politics," adding, "I think that agreement, which [Boris] Berezovsky and [Vladimir] Gusinsky didn't want to observe, was that the oligarchs would keep out of government and in return their wealth would be left alone."[68] It had been at that 2002 meeting that Putin and Khodorkovsky exchanged sharp words, the harbinger for his 2003 arrest, conviction, sentence to prison, and confiscation of assets by Kremlin-based chekists.

In addition to staying out of politics, the oligarchs are expected to contribute monies in support of the Kremlin's economic plan and policies to build Russia into a "strong state." Thus, the regime extorts "taxes" from them for use in realizing its economic agenda, whilst requiring they remain apolitical. As Chris Weafer, chief

---

[67] Neil Buckley, "Putin finds room for oligarchs who prove loyal," *Financial Times*, February 8, 2007.

[68] "Putin Meets Industrialists," *Johnson's Russia List*, #5051, January 26, 2001.

strategist at Alfa Bank, observed in February 2007, today's oligarchs are largely safe provided they observe Putin's 2000 commandments, plus two added later: use some of your wealth to help the country, and, for those in strategic sectors such as energy, operate in line with state objectives.[69] At the annual meeting in 2007, a day after new money-laundering charges had been brought against Khodorkovsky, Putin had an ominous reminder for the participants. He warned, "I hope you now appreciate the benefits of following strict rules and tax discipline."[70] By then, the program was clear. If the Kremlin wanted your property, you cut a deal. Weafer illustrated the reality in the wake of yet another case, observing, "As everybody in the world knows, you don't fight city hall, and in Russia you don't fight the Kremlin. When the Kremlin comes calling and says 'we want to buy your business,' the only talk is about price and terms," and those terms are always far below market price.[71]

c) Putin's Utilization of Power Institutions to Intimidate and Control Political and Economic Opponents: Anticorruption is a Favorite Theme

In Putin's Russia, corruption continues to be an issue of high political importance. The post-Soviet prosecution of individuals of the business class has always been selective and initiated for political reasons, rather than in tune with any legal-moral code or rule of law. In contemporary history, the practice goes back to Andropov's time; a comparison between the anticorruption drives of Andropov and Putin (and Yeltsin's) can be made.

---

[69] Op. cit., "Putin finds room for oligarchs who prove loyal."

[70] Ibid.

[71] The latest takeover was that of Russneft, one of Russia's largest private oil companies, whose owner, Mikhail Gutseriev, was forced to sell to the government over trumped-up tax claims. See Andrew E. Kramer, "Russian Oil Magnate Forced to Sell to Putin Loyalist, He Says," *The New York Times*, July 31, 2007; "Gutseriev Says Goodbye to It All," *Kommersant*, July 31, 2007; and, Yulia Latynina, "Billion-Dollar Principles," *The Moscow Times*, August 1, 2007, p. 7.

Andropov's anticorruption campaign was politically motivated, designed and implemented to discredit adversaries. As Thomas Muldoon, studying at the U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School, noted, "As long as corruption was carried out within the norms of the system, it was allowed and even condoned."[72] Following the tradition, Yeltsin used selective prosecution on corruption charges to discredit and take down his political opponents. In turn, other government/security officials on down the hierarchy used it against their political and economic rivals. Thus, rather than rooting anticorruption campaigns in law and the judiciary process, Yeltsin perpetuated the practice of using the power organs to investigate, arrest, and prosecute selectively targeted political rivals. As Muldoon observed in 1999, "This kind of partisan political attitude toward law enforcement ruins any chance of indoctrinating the Services in the rule of law."[73]

During Yeltsin's second presidential term, Putin was appointed FSB director and then prime minister. Hence, long before he gained the presidency, Putin was using corruption investigations as a political means of control, initially at the behest of higher political authorities. As Virginie Coulloudon observed, "during his tenure as head of the FSB, Putin made the struggle against corruption one of his favorite themes."[74] To handle the task, the FSB Economic Security Department was upgraded, with new subdepartments created and made responsible for industrial and transport facility security, the banking sector, and the fight against smuggling and drug-trafficking. These units were used in politically-instrumental anticorruption drives designed to discredit the

---

[72] Op. cit., "Russian Intelligence and Security Services."

[73] Ibid.

[74] Virginie Coulloudon, "Putin's Anticorruption Reforms," *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, Dale R. Herspring, ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: USA, 2003, p. 90.

opposition and present an image of incorruptibility in the Yeltsin regime itself, an old technique that did not necessarily succeed in its propaganda mission but which Putin carried over into his own presidential era.

The Russian fight against corruption remains completely politicized. Opportunist anticorruption campaigns are routinely used during the election season for their political capital, and at other times simply to take down rivals. The targets of the day, as were General Prosecutor Skuratov, who was investigating corruption in the Yeltsin administration, oligarchs Berezovsky and Gusinsky, whose media empires were criticizing the regime, and then Khodorkovsky,[75] to name a few of the most prominent, are paraded as examples to others to toe the Kremlin line or risk losing personal riches, position, and often, freedom, as well. The major difference between the administrations was the targets; Putin went after the very oligarchs whose rise to control magnificent wealth and exact undue influence on economic policy Yeltsin facilitated.

Contrary to expectations that Putin would truly crack down on corruption during his presidency, it only increased, and the fight to combat it was, as in the past, directed toward selectively targeted political and economic rivals, particularly those who criticized or challenged the Kremlin's policy agenda. As Moscow Globalization Institute

---

[75] The October 25, 2003 extra-judicial arrest of Khodorkovsky, just weeks before the Duma elections, for "interfering" in politics by funding opposition parties, specifically, the democratically-oriented Yabloko, with the (alleged) intention of influencing legislation in favor of his business interests, and (allegedly) striving to forge an independent foreign policy based on private, non-state sanctioned oil deals such as the sale of a major stake in his Yukos oil company to ExxonMobile, which would have ceded substantial control of a strategic national resource to the Americans, was a pivotal event in the chekist takeover of the economic arena. Khodorkovsky was also accused of independently seeking to close a deal with China to build an oil pipeline to that country,[75] which would have effectively shifted control over additional, highly lucrative oil exports from the Kremlin, thus further disrupting Putin's plans to reestablish state control over Russia's oil sector. Thus, the oligarch challenged Putin both economically and politically.[75] See Timothy O'Brien and Erin E. Arvedlund, "Putin vs. the Jailed Tycoon: Defining Russia's New Rules," *The New York Times*, January 2, 2004; and, Catherine Belton, "Kremlin Playing Oil Game For Keeps," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 29, 2003, p. 1.

Director Mikhail Delyagin observed in a November 2001 interview published in *Obshchaya gazeta*, the anticorruption campaign launched by prosecutors looked more and more like a struggle among political clans, with the new St. Petersburg clan around Putin struggling to take property away from the groups that prospered under former President Yeltsin.

Surveys and studies have consistently recorded a progressive increase in corruption in Russia over the Putin era. Nine months into his first presidential term, in September 2000, Transparency International (TI) released its annual Corruption Perception Index, which results are based on surveys of business people, the general public, and country analysts. The only states rated more corrupt than Russia that year were Cameroon, Angola, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, and Nigeria.[76] By the end of his term, corruption had increased significantly. In 2004 TI ranked Russia the 90th most corrupt country out of 146 listed, with a CPI score of 2.8. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). For the sake of comparison, Russia's rankings over the years 1996-2004, covering Yeltsin's first administration and Putin's second, are shown in the table in Figure 8.1 below.[77]

[76] "Russia Less Corrupt Than Ukraine, More Corrupt Than Belarus," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 15, 2000.

[77] *Transparency International*, http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi.

Figure 8.1: Transparency International Corruption Rankings for Russia, 1996-2004

YEAR	RANKING	CPI
2004	90th of 146	2.8
2003	86th of 133	2.7
2002	74th of 102	2.7
2001	81st of 91	2.3
2000	83rd of 90	2.1
1999	83rd of 99	2.4
1998	76th of 85	2.4
1997	49th of 52	2.27
1996	47th of 54	2.58

The numbers show the level of corruption in Russia over those periods has continued to be significant, reducing by a small measure the first year after Yeltsin's (1996) reelection, but then increasing again for the remainder of his second presidential term with the exception of the final year. It followed that corruption only increased every year throughout Putin's presidency (2000-) as he constructed and consolidated a chekist-dominated state. In a related rating measuring the extent to which specific national institutions and sectors were perceived as corrupt or clean, TI's Global Corruption Barometer 2004, with its scoring ranging between 1 (not at all corrupt) and 5 (extremely corrupt), showed the institution/sector in Russia with the highest rating for corruption the Police, with a score of 4.0, and Political Parties (3.8), Parliament/Legislature (3.7), Legal Sector/Judiciary (3.7),[78] and the Business/Private Sector (3.6) close behind.[79] Finally, TI

[78] Bribery remains the primary way to influence Russia's judicial process. A study released in May 2002 found that Russians spend $274M a year in bribes to court officials, equal to an astounding $2 per capita. See "Global News Roundup: Russia," *Money Laundering & Business Crime Newsletter*, Issue 13, Proximal

notes that in 2002, on the Bribe Payers Index score Russia rated 3.2, and 21st out of 21 countries.[80]

8.5: ECONOMIC PROCESSES AND PROGRAMS AND THEIR CHALLENGES

In this second half of the chapter, I review the processes and programs associated with the Yeltsin and Putin administrations and illustrate how the system evolved from the oligarchic capitalism under Yeltsin to the bureaucratic corporatism under Putin. I discuss the privatization and renationalization programs, and examine the key economic issues of capital flight, tax collection, and anticorruption drives and their impact on the economy.

8.5.1: The Yeltsin Era: Privatization, Political-Business Intimacy, and Economics — The "Semi-Criminal, Oligarchic Capitalist System" of the 1990s

The post-Soviet privatization process in Russia created a new economic system of oligarchic capitalism under Yeltsin (which was replaced with bureaucratic corporatism under Putin). Before the rule of law and political and economic institutions with the capacity and will to protect property rights had been established, state property was distributed through corrupt privatization practices based on insider deals and political favoritism. Quantity, rather than quality, was the measure of success in privatizing state resources. As democratic-leaning Yabloko party leader Grigory Yavlinsky observed, "The prevailing conviction among the reformers was that it was unimportant how and to whom property was distributed, as long as it passed from the state into private hands. The

---

Consulting, July 2002, p. 4; and, Igor Gamayunov, "What Justice If Crooked Above the Law?" *The Moscow Times*, January 29, 2003, p. 1.

[79] See Transparency International's reports at http://www.transparency.org/surveys/barometer/dnld/barometer_report_8_12_2004.pdf, p.18.

[80] See Transparency International's *Global Corruption Report*, Country Reports, Russia, at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org.

market would readjust everything. They were wrong. The institutions necessary for the development of an effective market economy do not evolve by themselves."[81]

In other words, in the interest of moving from a command to a market economy, irreversibility of the privatization of state property was perceived as the overriding priority. Yet, the only way for a free-market economy to grow roots, foster innovation, and become sustainable as a system based on fair competition is to have legally-based capitalist institutional development. A substantial amount of empirical work has confirmed the importance of innovation for long-term growth. Yet, without the rule of law, which enables widespread and high-value transactional exchanges to be made on a basis of predictability and justice, a high level economy cannot develop and successfully compete in a globalized economy. Scholar Howard Abadinsky notes that, "Under an irrational legal system a modern capitalist economy cannot develop," and cites Weber: "'for modern rational capitalism has need, not only of the technical means of production, but of a calculable legal system and of administration in terms of formal rules.'" Abadinsky continues, "Modern rational capitalism requires a legal order that is both prompt and predictable, one that is calculable in accordance with rational rules and guaranteed by the strongest coercive power."[82] Otherwise, as U.S. Senior Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and legal scholar John Noonan

---

[81] Grigory Yavlinsky, "Reforms that corrupted Russia," *Financial Times* (UK), September 3, 2003, and republished at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/9/030903_ft.html.

[82] Howard Abadinsky, *Law & Justice: An Introduction to the American Legal System*, 5th ed., Prentice Hall: NJ, 2003, pp. 10-11.

observes, an economy can only remain on the primitive level of barter or under control of the state.[83]

This was precisely the situation in Russia throughout the 1990s, where not only was there no rule of law, but bartering continued to be the method of closing a substantial number of economic transactions, including those of the state itself. As Anders Aslund, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, observed, "Another major problem was the continued rise of barter, which peaked at 54 percent of all transactions between industrial enterprises in August 1998."[84] The practice continued under Putin as he sought to expand Russian influence around the globe through favorable arms deals to old Soviet clients indebted in the billions of dollars to Moscow, such as Syria and Algeria.[85]

Further complicating the development of a free-market economy is the intimate business-government relationship, which makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve substantial economic success without political connections. As Yavlinsky observes, "The mid-1990s reforms also produced one of the other peculiarities of Russian public life: the coalescence of business and government. There are regular payments by companies to officials placed by them in various parts of the state apparatus."[86] Yavlinsky made the point, noting, "there is a big difference between business and

---

[83] See John Noonan, Jr., "Persons and Masks of the Law," Farrar, Straus and Grioux: NY, 1976, cited in Ibid, p. 11.

[84] Anders Aslund, "Revolutionary Change in the Russian Economy," *Russia Business Watch*, Vol. 10, No. 4, U.S.-Russia Business Council, http://www.usrbc.org/pdfs/rbw_specialedition_singles.pdf.

[85] "Syrian Deal Highlights Russian Arms Sale Surge," *The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs*, July 29, 1999, http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/167/documentid/596/history/3,2360,656,167,596; and, "Putin knows how to 'close a deal,'" *World Tribune*, April 7, 2006.

economics. Business is the ability to make money. And economics is a science on how to create the well-being of a country. Certainly it is impossible to achieve prosperity without business. Moreover, the task of economics is to create the most favourable conditions for the development of business. And parties should focus on the economy, rather than business. Unfortunately one can engage in business without any public benefit. But this is another type of work that can be compared with the 'werewolves' case."[87] Further, he lamented, "...the reforms led to the formation of a semi-criminal oligarchic capitalist system, which has poisoned Russian business and political life. Business and politics are intertwined to protect the interests of those in power. If a businessman tries to become independent or proclaim his own political ambitions, the authorities use an obedient law enforcement system to fish for wrongdoings related to the 1990s privatisations."[88]

Before covering the main economic programs and processes that occurred in Russia 1996-2004, it is necessary to provide a brief history of those that preceded, set the stage for, and shaped them, beginning with the Soviet collapse. The 1991-1996 period was marked by IMF propping up of the regime in the interest of political and economic stability and democratization following a period of irreversible privatization, the so-called "shock therapy" guided by Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais, a loans-for-shares program that created the oligarchs and enabled them to get even richer through the use of

---

[86] Grigory Yavlinsky, "Reforms that corrupted Russia," *Financial Times* (UK), September 3, 2003, and republished at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/9/030903_ft.html.

[87] Grigory Yavlinsky, "Grigory Yavlinsky: 'It is impossible to create a real opposition in Russia today,'" *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, September 2, 2003, and republished at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/9/030902_most_koms.html. The term, "werewolves in epaulettes" refers to officers who moonlight providing security for commercial entities as a means to supplement their meager salaries.

[88] Op. cit., "Reforms that corrupted Russia."

government funds for their own private investments, and the rise of the "seven bankers" (individuals whom oligarch Berezovsky boasted to the *Financial Times* controlled half of Russia's economy),[89] who succeeded by brilliantly manipulating these various mechanisms using GKOs (high-interest, short-term government bonds), insider trading, and closing lucrative economic deals via their connections and good relations with the Yeltsin "Family." Representative of the corruption, and duplicity, that marked that period, it is worth highlighting that former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski estimated that 65 percent ($78 billion) of the $120 billion in Western funds and loans provided to Russia in support of its democratization project was transferred to private offshore accounts, according to a 2000 study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[90]

Many economists have divided the post-Soviet economic period into 1988-1992, the time of late Soviet "foreign economic trade" and the formation of the first connections "between what was still a Soviet bureaucracy, criminal organizations, and the first entrepreneurs," and 1992-1997, the "privatization period." These connections still have a role in present-day business, but unlike later ones, they are never flaunted."[91]

---

[89] Op. cit., "Revolutionary Change in the Russian Economy."

[90] "Return of the Czar: Examining the Failures of U.S. Policy & Boris Yeltsin's Leadership During Russia's Tumultuous 1990s Post-Soviet Transformation," *Frontline*, PBS, May 9, 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/yeltsin/; and, Piotr Przychodzki, "Economic Invasion," *Central Europe Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 10, 2000, http://www.ce-review.org/00/1/przychodzki1.html. Also see "Foreign Funds Diverted in Monster Money Laundering? The Mafia, Oligarchs, and Russia's Torment," *Beyond Transition*, The World Bank Group, 2001, http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/julaug99/pgs11-13.htm; and, Timothy O'Brien, "Russian Industrialist in Money Laundering Inquiry Accuses Moscow Aides," *The New York Times*, August 28, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/082899russia-bank.html?_r=5&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=login.

[91] "It's Not the Place That Makes the Person – Mikhail Fradkov: A Career Profile," *Kommersant*, March 4, 2004.

Following Yeltsin's June 1996 electoral win, which had basically been purchased through the dispensing of bribes and political favors using the state treasury and aided by extensive and favorable media coverage by the then-oligarch-owned media, the country, suffering from a chronic lack of tax revenue, was broke and in severe economic crisis. To remedy the situation, the Kremlin put together a "Dream Team," consisting of Yegor Gaidar (unofficially), Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, and Victor Chernomyrdin, who in 1997 initiated a second "shock therapy" program. Further, unlike during his first term, Yeltsin engaged in extensive nepotism and cronyism in his second, placing his daughter, sons-in-law, and other close family and friends into positions of official authority. Hence, the Yeltsin clan label became "The Family."

a) Two Cases in Point: The Privatizations of Sviazinvest and Norilsk Nikkel

Two of the particularly notable deals that occurred during this period include the (partial) privatization of Sviazinvest and Norilsk Nickel, with both companies handsomely benefiting nomenklatura son and oligarch, Vladimir Potanin, who had strong and family ties with the old Soviet intelligence services[92] and continues to work closely with the Kremlin. Under Yeltsin, he was one of the principal authors of the controversial loans-for-shares program. More recently, and in a demonstration of his financial self-interest and political astuteness in the context of Putin's Russia, he awarded 50 of 200 final contest participants, MVD cadets — future security officers — a Vladimir Potanin Foundation scholarship for the next academic year. The awards ceremony, held at the RF Interior Ministry Moscow University, was attended by senior staff members of the

[92] Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 559.

RF Interior Ministry and Interior Ministry Moscow Region Division, as well as leading faculty members of the University.[93]

Potanin was allied with Chubais under Yeltsin, and both continue to thrive financially in Putin's Russia. However, another clan, led by oligarch Berezovsky, who had played a key role in Putin's 2000 presidential election win by using his media empire and heavy financing to promote Putin, with the expectation that he would continue to enjoy political protection for his business activities, was disappointed. He became antagonistic to Putin's anti-oligarch, pro-chekist and state power agenda for Russia and subsequently felt compelled to self-exile to London in 2000 as a result of their deteriorated relationship. During Yeltsin's tenure, the battles between the Chubais and Berezovsky clans had been vicious, with Chubais's group coming out on top and ensuring no change in economic policy, regardless of any "reformist" window dressing. In fact, "reform" only further solidified the economic holdings of the oligarchs at the expense of the masses, who had lost all confidence in the post-Soviet government.[94]

By October 1997, the Asian financial flu had spread to Russia, leading to a severe stock market crisis, with foreign investors pulling $5 billion out of the country's markets, a development that led the Central Bank to issue a stern warning against Russian investors against doing same. Regardless, capital flight continued on a massive scale. Ultimately, Yeltsin decided that the Chubais clan had become too much of a political liability, and the team was fired, although economic policy remained relatively unchanged. And despite the fact that Chubais lost his Finance Minister post under the

---

[93] "50 Best Cadets Got Vladimir Potanin Foundation Scholarship," Vladimir Potanin Foundation, May 30, 2006, http://eng.fund.potanin.ru/news/last/may3006.htm.

[94] Op. cit., *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms*, p. 574.

pretext of a book-signing scandal, the door was left open for a later reappointment. Ultimately, the Asian flu led to the August 1998 ruble crash (which occurred just a month after Putin had been appointed FSB director), and Russia's complete default on its loans, creating yet another setback for the oligarchs, who had always been especially concerned with the lack of budget revenues to support the state, although their activities did little to remedy the situation.

8.5.2: The Putin Era: Chekist-Driven Asset Confiscation and Renationalization: A Shift From Oligarchic Capitalism To Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

Since I have already elaborated on the nature and process of the development of bureaucratic authoritarianism under Putin, in this section I highlight additional economic factors and issues of relevance. When Putin became acting RF president in January 2000, he inherited a deeply corrupt state in poor financial condition, plagued as it was by inadequate tax collection and the loss of billions of dollars in capital flight, both problems of which he sought to remedy. Many economists have consistently estimated annual capital flight outflow to be between $15-25 billion. During the Yeltsin era, massive capital flight had contributed to concerns about the financial viability of the state, with the annual rate reaching a peak in 1998 at an estimated $25 billion,[95] the year of the "August 1998 ruble crash." The Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) estimated that Russia's capital flight was equivalent to about three percent of GDP in 1995-96, rising to nine percent in 1998, 13 percent in 1999, and 18 percent in the first half of 2000,

[95] "Return of the Czar: Examining the Failures of U.S. Policy & Boris Yeltsin's Leadership During Russia's Tumultuous 1990s Post-Soviet Transformation," *Frontline*, *PBS*, May 9, 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/yeltsin/.

"imposing a very high burden on an already fragile economic system."[96] In August 1999, *U.S. News and World Report* cited U.S. intelligence sources as reporting an estimate of approximately $350 billion in capital flight since the Soviet Union's collapse, with nearly a third of it landing in the United States.[97]

Under Putin, the level of capital flight remained substantial, but somewhat abated toward the end of his first presidential term. In January 2001, Federation Council Chairman Yegor Stroev said that Russia's capital flight amounted to $25 billion in 2000, a 10 percent increase from 1999,[98] when (in both 1999 and 2002, it was by some estimates totaling as much as 10 percent of the country's gross domestic product). In January 2002, Federal Tax Police Chief Mikhail Fradkov said that it amounted to $1 billion to $1.5 billion per month,[99] and estimates for 2002 placed it at $15.2 billion. According to Deputy Finance Minister Andrey Petrov, in the first 10 months of 2002, capital outflow amounted to $3 billion. Western sources reported it at $8.3 billion for 2002, down from $15.2 billion in 2001, at $2.7 billion for a volatile 2003, and by the end of 2003, recorded it at $8.3 billion. In 2003, Russia recorded legal capital flight of $1.9 billion, while other estimates placed it at $2.7 billion.[100] By January 2004, the Russian

---

[96] Marcella Mulino, "On the determinants of capital flight from Russia," *Atlantic Economic Journal*, June 1, 2002, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0199-1799715_ITM.

[97] David E. Kaplan, "When the Russian Mob Feels the Need to Wash," *U.S. News and World Report*," August 22, 1999, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/990830/archive_001735.htm.

[98] "Stroev Puts Capital Flight at $25 billion in 2000," *RFE/RL Newsline*, January 12, 2001.

[99] "Illegal capital flight put at up to $1.5 bln per month," *Johnson's Russia List*, # 6035, 6036, January 23, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6036-4.cfm.

[100] "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – 2003, Part I: Drug and Chemical Control," Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2004, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, U.S. Department of State, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/bilateral/bilateral.php?record_id=report_narcotics.

Central Bank reported that legal capital flight from Russia had almost quadrupled as compared to the previous year and amounted to $7.9 billion, while the volume of money that illegally left the country via shadowy business transactions jumped by more than 50 percent, altogether representing about two percent of GDP, a percentage that, in comparison with 1999/2000 figures, obscured the substantial growth in state oil and gas and weapons exports revenues over Putin's first presidential term.[101] The EIU estimated that capital flight had declined to $11.5 billion in 2004 from an average of $15 billion in 2002-2003.[102] The World Bank reported a figure of $17.4 billion for 2004, and noted an almost 50 percent year-on-year decline in capital flight from Russia in January-September 2005, from $23.3 billion to $12 billion.[103]

In the tax collection realm, in December 1998, just four months after the August 1998 ruble crash, the Federal Tax Police (FSNP) had been placed directly under the authority of the president. As a rule, it had been staffed by former KGB and GRU officers. However, newly-appointed Tax Police head (March 1999) MVD Lt. Gen. Vyacheslav Soltaganov conducted a major purge, replacing many of them with police in an effort to make its investigations more effective. Yet, successful tax investigations remained rare. In 2000, Vladimir Makarov, a Soltaganov colleague, cited figures showing that GUBEP (the MVD unit charged with combating Economic Crime), reportedly uncovered over 88% of tax offenses in 2000, whereas the FNSP only uncovered

---

[101] "Capital Flight From Russia Quadrupled in 2004," *MosNews.com*, January 14, 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/01/14/capitalflight.shtml.

[102] Laza Kekic, "Slowdown Is Not the Product of Politics," January 25, 2005, *The Moscow Times*, and *Johnson's Russia List*, #19, JRL 9033, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9033-19.cfm.

[103] "Summary: World Bank issues report on Russian economy," *Newsletter on health issues in Russia and Belarus*, The East Europe Committee of the Swedish Health Care Community (SEEC), http://www.oek.se/Admin/FileSender.aspx?file=Documents/Dokument/newsletter051111.pdf.

approximately 6.9%, with the FSB and State Customs Committee (GTK) uncovering the remainder.[104]

In 2000, when the tax rate was still a high 30%, tax collection had amounted to $21.5 billion, an increase from 1999 of 1.8 times, which Tax Minister Gennady Bukayev attributed to better economic conditions.[105] The new flat tax rate of 13% that took effect in January 2001 was a significant contributing factor in increasing the government's revenues. As reported in the May 2003 issue of *Business Week*, "Since it was introduced, there has been a marked increase in both payment rates and revenue. Official statistics show that income tax revenue rose 28% between 2000 and 2001, and a further 21% by last year, after adjustment for inflation. Total government revenue from personal income taxes shot up from an unadjusted $6.2 billion in 2000 to almost $12 billion in 2002."[106] Hoover Institute Senior Fellow Alvin Rabushka noted that, "In 2005, the ministry collected 707 billion rubles ($1 = R27) in personal income tax receipts, an increase of 23.1 percent over 2004. After adjusting for annualized consumer price inflation of 10.95% in 2004, real personal income tax revenue rose 10.9%. This builds on real ruble revenue increases of 25.2% in 2001, 24.6% in 2002, 15.2% in 2003, and 14.4% in 2004. Total real ruble revenue has increased 128 percent (more than doubled) in the five years since the 13% flat tax was implemented." Further, he noted, "In real ruble terms, after adjusting for inflation, corporate profits taxes rose 38.4%, value added taxes, 24%, taxes,

---

[104] Op. cit., "It's Not the Place That Makes the Person – Mikhail Fradkov: A Career Profile."

[105] Sergei Kochetov, "Minister: New Tax Code Won't Stop Collection," *The Moscow News*, February 7, 2001.

[106] "A Flat Tax Is Taking Root in, of All Places, Russia," *BusinessWeekOnline*, May 26, 2003, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_21/b3834174_mz034.htm.

dues and regular payments for the use of natural resources (severance tax), 44.4%, and taxes on external trade and foreign economic operations, 78.3%."[107]

Only two months after the 13% flat tax law took effect, in March 2001, Putin replaced Soltaganov, placing the Service under the directorship of Mikhail Fradkov to increase its effectiveness. Yet, in 2002, while the FSNP "uncovered" 24,000 tax crimes, it only won 40 convictions. As noted earlier, in March 2003 the Service was disbanded and its functions folded into the MVD. Fradkov was made Russia's ambassador to the EU, and appointed as prime minister a year later, on March 1, 2004. Of note, when asked what his plans for the future were after being confirmed, he responded with, "I have just come out of the shadow into the light."[108] On October 6, 2007 Putin appointed him as SVR director, a post he currently holds.[109]

Apparently, the Federal Tax Service, an agency of 180,000 under the leadership of Anatoly Serdiukov, a protégé of career chekist and deputy head of the Presidential Administration, Viktor Ivanov, since July 2004, picked up the slack. According to its statistics, in 2000 the courts sided with taxpayers in relation to 64 percent of the sum of disputed tax payments, while in the fist half of 2006 that figure had shrunk to 17 percent.

---

[107] Alvin Rabushka, "The Flat Tax at Work in Russia: Year Five, 2005," *Hoover Institution*, May 11, 2006, http://www.hoover.org/research/russianecon/essays/5805616.html#.

[108] Fradkov was the head of the Federal Tax Police before the June 2003 transfer of its tax fraud and investigation functions to the MVD, and the transfer of its buildings, funding, equipment, and 40,000 employees (infrastructure and staff) to the new anti-drug agency, the State Committee for Controlling the Turnover of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, with former envoy to the Northwest Federal District, Viktor Cherkesov, a former Leningrad region FSB chief who for most of the 1990s headed the St. Petersburg FSB and under whose watch that agency built the treason case against scientist Aleksander Nikitin,[108] appointed its chief. Anna Politkovskaya, *A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia*, Random House: NY, pp. 105-106.

[109] Fabian Adami, "In brief: SVR under new leadership—Is Fradkov himself ex-KGB?" *The ISCIP Analyst*, Vol. XIV, No, 3, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, Boston University, October 18, 2007, http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news/?dept=732&id=47218.

While the Service claimed the results reflected improvement in the quality of its work, law firms noted that after the Yukos case, the courts began siding with taxpayers significantly less frequently. Under Serdiukov, who would be appointed Defense Minister in February 2007,[110] the Tax Service became a much more secretive organization, and decided key issues in consultation with Viktor Ivanov rather than the liberal Finance Minister Alexey Kudrin, to which he was formally subordinate.[111]

8.6: ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION ROUTINELY ARTICULATED AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT

Throughout the 1990s, numerous leading officials had made statements identifying corruption as a major, if not the primary, national security threat. Indeed, throughout his presidency, Yeltsin had oft-described organized crime and corruption as the primary national security threat, declaring in a February 1993 speech, for example, that, "Organized crime has become the number one threat to Russia's strategic interests and national security. Corruption in the organs of government and administration is literally corroding the state body of Russia from top to bottom."[112]

By December 1996, then-director of the FSB, Nikolai Kovalev, was complaining that organized crime's tentacles reached into the highest echelons of power, as criminal groups lobbied government agencies to protect their shady business interests.[113] The case against former Yeltsin administration official Pavel Borodin is instructive. Borodin was

---

[110] Serdiukov's deputy, Mikhail Mokretsov (2001-2004) was appointed as his replacement, and is expected to continue his predecessor's policies. See Taj Adelaja, "New Chief Tax Official Appointed," *The Moscow Times*, February 22, 2007, p. 5.

[111] "Civilian Economist Heads Defense Ministry," *Kommersant*, February 16, 2007.

[112] Op. cit., *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms*, p. 482.

[113] Gareth Jones, "Foreign espionage booming in Russia – spy chief," *Infowar.com*, December 17, 1996.

accused of accepting $25 million in bribes from the Lugano, Switzerland-based construction firms, Mabetex and Mercata Trading, which were contracted to renovate the Kremlin and pay the kickbacks, respectively. On January 20, 2000, just three weeks into Acting RF President Putin's term, Swiss prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for Borodin on money laundering charges in connection with the Mabatex affair, and requested that he be detained by Interpol. Moscow proved consistently uncooperative with Swiss prosecutors in their investigation, refusing to provide any information, with Russian Prosecutor General Ustinov asserting that, "At the moment we do not have the evidence to show that Mr. Borodin broke the law."[114] It is worth remembering that on his first day in office as acting president, Putin had pardoned Yeltsin for any possible misdeeds and granted him total immunity from prosecution (or even from being searched and questioned) for any and all actions committed while in office.[115] In December 2000, the Russian Procuracy closed the Mabatex case, with senior investigator Ruslan Tamayev citing lack of evidence as the reason.[116] So, too, Tamayev had used the same reasoning, lack of evidence, for dropping bribery accusations against Yeltsin, his wife and daughters. Interestingly, these case closures coincided with Tamayev's promotion to head one of the most prestigious procuracy departments,[117] perhaps as a reward for his loyalty to the Kremlin.

---

[114] "Russia Could Reopen Enquiry Into Borodin Case," *Russia Today*, February 12, 2001.

[115] David Winston, "From Yeltsin to Putin," *Policy Review*, April/May 2000, Hoover Institution, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3492176.html.

[116] "Procuracy Closes 'Mabetex' Case," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 22, December 18, 2000.

[117] Ibid.

It followed that Borodin was lured to the U.S. under the (false) assumption he was going to attend the inauguration of U.S. President George Bush; instead, he was arrested on January 17, 2001 when he arrived at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport. The Swiss asked the U.S. to extradite him,[118] which they did. However, after a three-year inquiry, Swiss prosecutors recognized that a guilty verdict was impossible without the Kremlin's cooperation on the case and allowed him to post bail,[119] which the Russian government promptly paid in the amount of $2.92 million dollars, after which Borodin returned to Russia.[120] Ultimately, he was found guilty of money laundering and ordered to pay a $177,000 fine,[121] however, his lawyer reported that he refused to pay the fine,[122] which the Swiss then deducted from the bail payment.[123] Representative of the Kremlin's view of Borodin's activities, he is currently the state secretary of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. After all, Borodin is a Putin loyalist, and was responsible for bringing Putin to Moscow from St. Petersburg in 1996.[124] Therefore, any consideration of the rule of law may be considered irrelevant.

Foregoing the rhetoric for a realistic assessment of the root of the corruption problem, Sobchak had made the point early on when he noted that, "to get crime under

---

[118] "Pavel Borodin Arrested at New York's Kennedy Airport," *The Jamestown Foundation*, Vol. 7, Issue 12, January 18, 2001.

[119] John Tagliabue, "Extradited Russian Suddenly Free After 3-Year Inquiry," *The New York Times*, April 13, 2001.

[120] "Russia Pays Bail for Borodin, Lawyer Says," *People's Daily*, April 13, 2001.

[121] "Ex-Kremlin Aide Convicted," *The New York Times*, March 7, 2002.

[122] Op. cit., "Russia Pays Bail for Borodin, Lawyer Says."

[123] Roman Kupchinsky, "Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Chernomyrdin, and corruption," *RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch*, and posted in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, April 28, 2002, No. 17, Vol. LXX.

[124] Gregory Feifer, "East and West: Face to Face," *The Moscow Times*, March 2, 2001.

control, we must first establish the rule of law."[125] The problem is that when corruption is endemic at the highest levels, the feasibility of doing so is severely limited. Indeed, the corruption is now so extensive that to receive even basic government services requires the payment of a bribe.[126] The chekist-dominated regime and its highly politicized and equally corrupt intelligence/security services have wholly failed to reduce crime and corruption in the country, it only increasing, and exponentially, as Putin consolidated his and their power.

8.7: THE SKURATOV AFFAIR AND PUTIN'S RISE TO POWER

In the midst of his second presidential term, Yeltsin had tasked his Prosecutor General, Yury Skuratov, to investigate the corruption so rampant in government. However, Skuratov was too successful, discovering evidence that led directly to the Kremlin, which, in turn, led the authorities, under Kremlin orders, to manufacture a corruption case against him to drive him out. Yet, Skuratov refused to resign. Hence, in April 1999 he was suspended by Yeltsin in the face of an alleged sex scandal in which he was framed and photographed with prostitutes, with the film making its way to Russian television screens (a subsequent investigation found that Culture Minister Mikhail Shwydkoy had received an order to televise it).[127] The entire episode, including the filming, had been orchestrated by Putin's FSB.

---

[125] Op. cit., *For A New Russia*, p. 157.

[126] Steven Eke, "Corruption 'skyrockets' in Russia," *BBC News*, July 20, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4701633.stm.

[127] "Ex-Public Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov tells to PRAVDA.Ru correspondent about circumstances of the action brought in connection with Moscow Kremlin's restoration," *Pravda.ru*, March 25, 2002, http://english.pravda.ru/society/2002/03/25/27159.html.

Skuratov's mistake had been his bold investigation of corruption in the highest echelons of the Yeltsin government, particularly surrounding the Borodin case and the Mabatex affair, the latter which tied into the BONY money laundering scheme that was publicly exposed in 1999. The FSB-produced tape was meant to publicly disgrace and discredit Skuratov since he refused to resign. The scheme worked, and Skuratov resigned. Yeltsin had entrusted the operation to Putin, who as FSB director had overseen the operation, the significance of which must not be lost; Putin had thereby gained Yeltsin's trust, which served to propel him into the presidency in 2000, with Yeltsin receiving a presidential pardon from Putin in exchange. This sequence of events shows how preposterous it is for Putin to assert the moral authority to fight corruption. The audience is fully aware of the empty rhetoric and its real, substantive purpose — to systematically take down rivals in the old Andropov tradition.[128]

Despite the well-established pattern of intermittent expressions of heightened concern about the worsening situation, it is important to remember that organized crime cannot thrive without widespread official corruption. Following on the previous administration's exhortations that something must be done, the Putin regime continued the theme in its declarations that the country was struggling toward democracy but faced many challenges. In January 2001, the beginning of Putin's second year as president, Duma Security Committee Deputy Chairman, Aleksandr Kulikov, said that organized crime and corruption cost the Russian economy approximately $15 billion per year.[129] A month later he announced that the level of criminal business seriously undermined the

[128] Op. cit., "Crime and Corruption after Communism."

[129] "Corruption Costs Russia $15 Billion A Year," *RFE/RL Newsline*, January 30, 2001, pp. 4-5.

state's economic security.[130] The "consternation" continued; shortly after the 9/11 attacks, in October 2001 Prosecutor General Ustinov declared that bribes and other forms of corruption threatened Russian security at least as much as terrorism did, adding that corrupt links between business and the state bureaucracy represented a "fifth column" that could undermine the state from within,[131] and posed a continuing threat to Russian democracy. In February 2002 in statements that accurately reflected the continuing state of affairs, Putin chastised the leaders and members of the country's law enforcement structures, complaining that grave crimes were on the increase, three million crimes were registered in 2001, including 7000 murderers roaming free, each year bringing 30,000 more missing people that law enforcement could not locate, and, notably, organized crime still controlled most of Russia's economy, extending, he lamented, to almost all walks of life and all of Russia's regions.[132]

Months later, on May 31, 2002 at a conference on crime-fighting, Putin blasted the Interior Ministry for ineffectiveness, complaining that Russian citizens still sought protection not from the state and law, but behind metal doors and window grids, all major business structures in the country created their own security systems, and people often preferred to address private companies rather than the state, while the crime situation had shown no sign of improving.[133] Recognizing that the intelligence/security sector itself

---

[130] "Criminal Business Undermines Economic Security in Russia," *Johnson's Russia List*, Issue 5080, February 8, 2001.

[131] "Corruption Said To Threaten Russian National Security," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 42, October 29, 2001, p. 5.

[132] "Putin Rebukes Russian Law Enforcement...And Calls On Prosecutor-General's Office To Assume Larger Role," *RFE/RL Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism Watch Report*, Vol. 2, No. 7, Compiled by Roman Kupchinsky, February 21, 2002.

[133] "Putin blasts Interior Ministry at anti-crime conference," *Gazeta.ru*, June 2, 2002.

was corrupt, he suggested introducing a rotation system to keep professionals in the services and yet "tear them away from years-old connections and commitments that tend to obstruct their work," which could have been interpreted as a desire, or even intention, to break up the informal networks that perpetuated the rotten system. But that was not in the plan. As always, the changes were not geared toward reducing corruption, but establishing political control and expanding one's own power and agenda.

Widespread corruption makes blackmail a useful tool for persuasion, a fact not lost on Russian officialdom. Putin displayed great skill in confusing the West about his intentions and purposes, speaking the rhetoric of democracy but doing the opposite in action and only using the talk as cover. He is a master dissembler. Indeed, a rotation would provide the means for Putin to establish political control over the intelligence/security services throughout the country's vast regions and manipulate the electoral process through the exploitation of these authorities' powers and connections, as they would then owe their careers, along with the potential for advancement, to Putin, thus ensuring their loyalty to his agenda. Moreover, a rotation could have only a limited effect in controlling corruption, as, over time, new contacts would be made among corrupt officials and the network of criminality only expanded.

And, indeed, the rotation that ultimately did occur was in line with Putin's agenda to expand chekist power and his control. It entailed the movement of career chekists into positions of power, supplanting, rather than rotating, non-cooperative political elites and organized criminals, in tune with his agenda of constructing and consolidating a bureaucratic-authoritarian, chekist-dominated state. So, too, the horizontal rotation overseen by Defense Minister Serdiukov, then-head of the Federal Tax Service (July

2004-February 2007) is instructive. He first replaced the former management with his colleagues from St. Petersburg. Next, he split up the managers by changing the places of the leaders of the inspectorates for oil, natural gas, transport, and alcohol and tobacco. Additionally, he appointed officials from the central office to head tax service departments in the regions in order to deal with the provincial "clan" elites. The overall effect of these personnel changes was the transformation of the Service into, as noted, a much more secretive and powerful agency, one that granted not one interview to the media and operated closely in tune with Kremlin dictates. For the taxpayers, it became much harder for them to defend their rights in disputes with the Service.[134] And still the exhortations that something must be done about OC and corruption continue (as do the OC and corruption.

8.8: FINAL OUTCOMES: THE UNIVERSAL VULNERABILITY OF THE "CATCH-22" SITUATION — LEGAL AMBIGUITIES AND LIMBO

In post-communist societies that undergo massive privatization, free-market reform before and subsequently without the establishment of rule of law and a legal-institutional infrastructure to ensure property rights ensures that entrepreneuring individuals will find themselves in a catch-22 legal quandary and thus open to extortion/selectively targeted arrest by state authorities for their transactional relations. Such a business environment plays unequivocally into the hands of those in power. Moreover, it limits the playing field to the same old oligarchy of nomenklatura-political elite, chekists-siloviki, and organized criminals who managed the old central-command economy. With the renationalization through confiscation of Yukos assets and other extra-legal takeovers, the structure for an extractive economy marked by exclusivity was

[134] "Civilian Economist Heads Defense Ministry," *Kommersant*, February 16, 2007.

instituted in place of an investment economy rooted in law. Writing in April 2002, Lilia Shevtsova, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace made the point when she observed, "But neither the bureaucracy nor the oligarchy is objectively interested in increasing the number of economic actors and their independence, spurring competition or making political and economic relations transparent. These measures would undermine the very foundation of their privileged existence, which is based on shady, personal networks and under-the-carpet sweet deals."[135] The result of the choices made by succeeding governments in post-Soviet Russia was an unrestrained official thuggery and the complete criminalization and transmogrification of the nascent free-market economy in a short few years. Back in 1997, when oligarchic capitalism and the chekist/OC-operated PSSs were thriving, Christian Lucky of the New York University School of Law illustrated the scenario that had worked to discredit democracy in the eyes of most Russians and set the stage for the chekists' ascension to power:

> Behind the façade of Russian constitutionalism lies the politics of extraction. Unlike the politics of investment, where political elites have an interest in the success of others, including ordinary consumers, the clans in Russia who control natural resources have scant interest in the well-being of others. Oil, diamonds, and gas are sold on the international market. Average national income and living standards, unemployment, mortality and morbidity, and even inflation or the current account deficit, have little impact on the elites who control the resources. Similarly, the absence of confiscatory policies or the efficient resolution of disputes for a wide number of people is unimportant to the most influential clans. Well-paid private security forces are a more efficient and reliable mechanism to secure natural resource claims than are the courts. There is no strong reason for the clans in Russia to take an especial interest in property and contract rights or in the physical well-being of ordinary Russians with which they have no immediate involvement.
>
> Economies of extraction give rise to two subsidiary economies: extortion and expatriation of profits. If large sectors of the elite have little interest in the

[135] Lilia Shevtsova, "The Political Dimension of Economic Reform under Vladimir Putin: Obstacles, Pitfalls, and Opportunities," *NBR Analysis*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 2002, http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol13no2.pdf.

> physical or commercial well-being of their compatriots, they will invest very little time and energy trying to protect the latter from extortionists. The clans do not care if shopkeepers make a profit because the spoils of the clans are not dependent on the shopkeeper staying in business. But the clans are very interested in a well-functioning banking system that enables them to quickly expatriate their profits. The banking sector is the most developed sector of the Russian legal-economic system.[136]

Through their operation of PSSs and partnerships with OC in banking and other business, the chekists played a key role in pushing these developments during the Yeltsin era, and gained the upper hand under Putin through their acquisition of political power, taking control of the system and subordinating the oligarchs. With chekists so prominent in government, the dynamic with the PSSs has changed. Igor Goloshchapov, a former KGB counterintelligence officer who now heads the League of Security Structures, a lobby for the PSSs, said in December 2006 that there were 4,200 of them licensed in Moscow alone, as well as many others that operated less openly and were available for hire for illicit purposes. He noted, "The security and detective business is a regular part of life in any society. The peculiarity of Russia's security business is that in our country our whole way of life was changing. Where this kind of business starts, the truth ends." KGB defector Col. Oleg Gordievsky, now living the UK, observed that the PSSs often had close ties to Russian authorities, and that, "Most of them are immediately recruited as secret collaborators, that is, members of the public who have promised to help. And they help very seriously. They do their job protecting the companies and they report everything back" to the FSB.[137] They have also been shown to be involved in contract

---

[136] Christian Lucky, "Crime and Corruption after Communism: Public Theft in Early America and Contemporary Russia," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Fall 1997, http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/criminalization.html.

[137] Steven Lee Myers and Mark Landler, "Intrigue over spy's death spreads to Germany," *International Herald Tribune*, December 11, 2006, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=3852662.

murders. It is worth noting that Andrei Lugovoi, the former FSB officer accused by the British of the polonium-210 poisoning of Litvinenko, owns and operates a PSS.

Further, meaningful legal reform and competent, effective law enforcement remain seriously lacking to date, as does the political will to change the existing reality. In addition to overlapping jurisdictions that benefit the corrupt political officials and intelligence/security bureaucracy with their numerous and lucrative conflicts of interest, vague and ambiguous laws continue to be passed, designed to extract bribes of financial benefit to the authorities, reducing the likelihood that the "intolerable" situation will improve,[138] especially as the bureaucracy continues to grow right along with the corruption.[139]

Consequently, the future does not bode well for most Russians, and the gap continues to widen, particularly between the workers in the state bureaucracy and those in the private sector. And even with increases in the average salary of executive branch employees rising 37 percent year-on-year (27.9 percent with inflation, compared to 29 percent and 17.1 percent with inflation in 2006), corruption continues to increase.[140] Life

---

[138] Vladimir Pastukhov, "Law under Administrative Pressure in Post-Soviet Russia," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Summer 2002.

[139] Complicating matters further, many old Soviet laws remain on the books. For instance, the Russian Railways Company (RZD), a state-owned monopoly, was in January 2004 pushing the government to amend a 1937 law that required the railways to carry 30 percent of all passengers for free, and another 30 percent at a 50 percent discount. See Alla Startseva, "RZD Plans to Sell Bonds and Shares," *The Moscow Times*, January 26, 2004, p. 7. A problem is that the masses, due to the general political-economic context, can not afford to pay market prices for goods and services and with the corruption and cronyism as extensive as it is, are likely to revolt if the government does not provide some modicum of a safety net. This reality was best demonstrated in January 2005, when legislation doing away with subsidized transportation and other services went into effect and, society, literally masses of people and spreading across all stratifications, protested until the Kremlin reversed it.

[140] In a 2004 study, Blackwell Synergy conducted a study on these wage differentials and estimated the gap to be 14.3 percent for men and 18.3 percent for women. See Branko Jovanovic and Michael M. Lokshin, "Wage Differentials between the State and Private Sectors in Moscow," *The Review of Income and Wealth*, Vol. 50, Issue 1, March 2004, pp. 107-123, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0034-

expectancy for men, based on *CIA World Factbook* July 2007 estimates,[141] is only 59.12 years (for women it is 73.03). The birth rate is a low 10.92 births/1,000 population, the death rate is 16.04 deaths/1,000 population, and the overall population is estimated at 141,377,752 and expected to continue its precipitous decline, forecast to drop to between 80 and 100 million by 2050.[142] Additionally, with health care continuing to deteriorate, neither an adequate future work nor military force can be expected to materialize in coming years, seriously threatening the state's survival as an entity constituting its present borders. The implications for the state's viability are clear, yet the regime has done little to remedy the demographic problem, and has few options regardless. Their apparent primary focus is self- aggrandizement. Meanwhile, brain-drain and emigration continue to increase, with the remainder of society, especially those living outside the major urban population centers and unable to leave, left to fend for themselves.

8.9: CONCLUSION

In sum, a major factor in post-Soviet Russia's failure to transition to a free-market democracy has been the country's continuity of leadership, in both political and intelligence/security sectors, from the discredited old Soviet system. Under Putin, the regime is predominantly composed of individuals from the old Soviet secret police who completely reject democratic reform and a level playing field in the economic realm. This reality is most manifest at the highest levels, although by his second term as president, it had become pronounced at the middle levels of the regime as well, in both the centre and

---

6586.2004.00114.x; and, "State Employees' Wages Rise Fast," *Kommersant*, September 17, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p805133/r_500/income/.

[141] See *the CIA World Factbook*, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html#People.

[142] Steven Eke, "Russia faces demographic disaster," *BBC News*, June 7, 2006.

periphery, and extended to the boardrooms of all major enterprises. As in Soviet times, the chekists are once again omnipresent, but this time with a focus on their own private interests and the preservation of the corrupt, chekist-dominated, authoritarian state that will ensure their continued positions and privileges.

In the wake of the Soviet collapse, Sobchak had suggested that, "If we overcome the system's resistance and build a market economy, powerful democratic forces capable of preventing any relapse into the past will appear."[143] As Sobchak's aide for external affairs, responsible for promoting investment, and running his (unsuccessful) reelection campaign in July 1996,[144] Putin clearly understood what was required to prevent that eventuality, working tirelessly to construct and consolidate a wealthy and powerful, chekist-dominated state. As one expert who did not want to be identified commented in the wake of banker Andrey Kozlov's September 2006 murder: "Do you see, the murder of Kozlov, for those who understand what is going on, is a sign. It's a hint to everyone who is trying to build an economy in Russia that is not a bandit economy, or an economy of the intelligence services or a "family" economy: Keep going and we will do this to you too. The saddest thing is that the hint is already understood."[145] Just before his February 2000 death, Sobchak had lamented that, "We have not achieved a democratic, but rather a police state over the past ten years."[146] He would have been gravely disappointed if he

---

[143] Op. cit., *For A New Russia*, p. 158.

[144] Jill Dougherty, "Who is Vladimir Putin?" *CNN.com*, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/russia/story/analysis/putin2/.

[145] "A Season for Settling Scores," *Kommersant*, October 3, 2006. Also see "Central Bank Deputy Chairman Andrey Kozlov Murdered," *Kommersant*, September 15, 2006.

[146] "Anatoly Alexandrovich Sobchak," Encyclopedia of Russian History, posted at *Answers.com*, http://www.answers.com/topic/anatoly-sobchak.

had lived to witness his former aide, KGB-officer-cum-RF President Putin, only endeavor to consolidate it. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

CHAPTER NINE

POLITICAL-INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS: POLITICAL CONTROL, OVERSIGHT, AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES

9.1: INTRODUCTION

Civilian political control, oversight, and democratic accountability of the intelligence/security sector are prominent features of modern democracies and important conditions for a secret police transformation (and democratic political transition). This is the case particularly in the early phases of the transition in that the institution of these mechanisms helps in guiding and conditioning new intelligence/security services to operate in line with democratic norms. Moreover, it gives the process legitimacy in that those in the executive branch exercising political control over the Services, appointing their leaders, tasking, and holding them to account, and those in the legislature responsible for democratic oversight and accountability — in each case, elected political officials — themselves have been vetted through the LVD process. Not only will the people's trust that their new leaders will not employ the intelligence/security services as a secret police be thereby gained, but the new leaders, individuals vested with a democratic vision for the country, are more likely to strive to provide the necessary political guidance in constructing and shaping the new intelligence/security sector to act based on and within the law. Counterparts in established democracies would welcome the opportunity to aid in the endeavor, with the intention of forming close liaisons with the new, democratic-transitioning regime and its intelligence/security sector, and to help engineer its [the state's] entry into Western and international organizations founded on law and widely recognized legal norms.

In this chapter, I examine the issues of political control, oversight, and democratic accountability as they relate to post-Soviet Russia's secret police transformation. After reviewing the literature on the importance of civilian political control, oversight, and democratic accountability of the intelligence/security sector to a post-communist transitioning state, I examine how with the collapse of the communist party monopoly on power following the failed KGB-led coup, political control of the intelligence/security services loosened, proving relatively elusive throughout the 1990s as Yeltsin gave free rein to the chekists to engage in political-economic affairs for personal gain in exchange for political support, a recipe for total corruption. Under career chekist Putin the Services were brought under tighter control but continued to act with seeming impunity, and more often in a politically repressive manner, emboldened by the capture of the state by chekists and its acquiescence in their criminally-corrupt activities in apparent exchange for their role in the concurrent reversal of democratic reforms in support of Putin's agenda. Early efforts to establish meaningful democratic oversight and accountability measures were thwarted by old regime elements, which ultimately led to the regular exhibit of a perfunctory approach by a rubber-stamp legislature in subsequent years as the whole system became corrupted.

In other words, under Yeltsin, the political control exercised by the Kremlin, albeit tenuous, in the mid to late 1990s had only been gained by empowering the intelligence/security services as a political support base in the early to mid 1990s, purchased with the commensurate death of democratic institution building and acceptance of widespread corruption and chekist participation in economic activities in partnership with organized crime. The stage was thus set for the chekists' ultimate

capture of the state under Putin, making the issues of oversight and democratic accountability moot, and executive political control established by trading favors and position for loyalty. Rather than place any constraints on the Services, Putin oversaw the redistribution of assets to a select cabal of chekists, oligarchs, bureaucrats, and organized criminals who pushed, supported, or enabled his agenda, and ensured state protection to those "in the circle," while completely reversing all democratic reforms. Thus, I show how the lack of an LVD policy in the political arena and, especially, intelligence/security sector, was a factor enabling old regime elements to thwart the institution of meaningful oversight and accountability mechanisms from the beginning, and led to a situation in which the chekists exercise political control over themselves, and carry out their activities, both official and private, with impunity.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first, I assess the post-Soviet intelligence-state relationship under the two presidents within intelligence scholar Uri Bar-Joseph's framework of political control of intelligence in democracies with its two demands, political non-intervention in intelligence and intelligence non-intervention in politics, and operational effectiveness of intelligence. In the second section, I examine the nature of and struggle for political control over intelligence and oversight matters under Yeltsin and Putin. In the third, I review the evolution of the increasingly limited role of civil society as a democratic oversight and accountability mechanism, focusing on the media and NGOs, and highlight the harassment and contract killings of many prominent journalists who investigated Kremlin and intelligence/security sector activities.

9.2: PRELIMINARIES AND CONCEPTS

Political control of intelligence is facilitated through clear chains-of-command and has as its adjunct the ability to place responsibility for the Services' activities. Responsibility implies being subject to some established rules of behavior and is not irrespective of law, for if there is no law with which to tie behavior, then there is a lack of democratic accountability, which provides an environment ripe for impunity of action. In examining the evolution of post-Soviet Russian forms of law application using a variety of examples, I show that in Russia under both Yeltsin and Putin the existence of formal chains-of-command did not translate into responsibility for either actions or respect for law; old chekists have, with rare exception of short duration, gained and retained their leadership and commanding positions solely in exchange for their loyalty to the president, irrespective of any legal and human rights violations or serious intelligence failures directly attributable to corruption, incompetence, or lack of professionalism.

As a result, today's intelligence/security sector enjoys greatly enhanced powers without any corresponding controls on their exercise; the chekists in Putin's Russia enjoy immunity for their activities so long as they remain loyal to the president's agenda. As long as they play according to the Kremlin rules and do not unduly complicate affairs or embarrass the regime, they are free to operate, irrespective of law, in pursuit of their own personal, usually financial, interests, as well as professional activities. Under these conditions, the KGB's successors in post-Soviet Russia operate exclusive of democratic or legal proprieties and without penalty whatsoever.

Ideally, in democracies, political control and oversight operate in tandem; the executive exercises political control cognizant of the legislature's responsibility for oversight, holding the former accountable to the people and law. Ultimately, through the procedure of electoral contests, the people hold (the executive and) legislature accountable. Yet, during the Yeltsin era the president ruled by decree and the parliament neglected its oversight responsibilities, focusing on economic affairs and personal enrichment instead, while civil society, and especially the people, played a negligible role. In Putin's Russia, the lines between branches became much more blurred, with a rubber-stamp parliament kowtowing to the president's agenda and posing no serious challenge to Service activities, thus acquiescing in their abuses. Many of those few deputies who investigated the Services' activities were subsequently murdered in contract hits.

Also under Putin, civil society was to a far greater degree rendered impotent and any meaningful oversight or accountability, as with political control, resides solely within the domain of the executive. Noting that reality, during a March 25, 2003 *Gazeta* interview, Yabloko party leader Grigory Yavlinsky responded to a question on how he assessed the recent reshuffles in and strengthening of the security services. He answered that, "Staff changes in our Government continue the Byzantium tradition of performing tasks without explaining the reason for dismissals and changes. The second is quite serious: we have to introduce civil control over the security services, either the FSB, the interior ministry or the tax police...While this problem is not resolved, the crux of the matter does not change, as you can be sure that any unlawful act could be performed

under both the previous and present system..."[1] The correspondent then asked about under the next [political] system, to which Yavlinsky offered, "Exactly, if organized without civil control. For one person alone — the President — cannot control everything in the Russian Federation, which means they all go unpunished."[2]

9.2.1: The Intelligence Producer-Consumer Relationship and Intelligence Depoliticization and Professionalism

A consensus exists that in democracies the intelligence-state relationship is one in which the role of intelligence "producers" (the Services) is primarily one of providing timely, accurate, and objective information, assessments, and analyses in accordance with the requirements set out by intelligence "consumers" (the political leadership), including early warning and support to foreign policy decisionmaking.[3] Other major functions of the intelligence/security services include counterintelligence (CI) and covert action (CA). To clarify, counterintelligence activities are limited to tasks directed toward the protection of the state's secrets and security of the nation, largely against foreign-based threats and not the political activity of the citizenry, including operations to penetrate foreign intelligence services (FISs) and double FIS officers to enhance those functions; in democracies, the domestic intelligence service is not focused on suppressing non-violent political expression opposition, as in police states. Further, intelligence and politics are generally separate and the intelligence/security sector is not used as an active political support base by those in power; that is, intelligence/security services serve national

---

[1] "Grigory Yavlinsky: "The President Alone Cannot Control Everything," Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky, *Gazeta.ru*, March 25, 2003, http://www.eng.yaboloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/3/gazeta_250303.html.

[2] "Ibid.

[3] Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 2nd ed., CQ Press: Washington, DC, 2003, p. 245.

security (state) interests and not party interests. Thus, professionalism and non-politicization of intelligence are key features of and the prescribed norm in democracies. They speak to non-interference of intelligence in politics and non-interference of politics in intelligence, and contribute to intelligence effectiveness as a national security support tool. And intelligence professionalism and non-politicization are directly related to issues of political control, oversight, and accountability.

In post-communist states transitioning to democracy, then, and, ideally, following the institution of an LVD policy, specific laws and deliberate policies should be established to ensure that the new intelligence/security sector is depoliticized and professional. This means a sea change in their nature, functions, and methods, and is fundamental to a secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that have as their primary function the provision of timely, objective intelligence in support of national security interests. As noted earlier in the project, civilian political control of the intelligence/security sector in democracies is exercised by executive branch officials and provided for in the intelligence/security services' mandates in order to root them in law and formally subordinate them to elected political authorities. The intent is to legally prescribe in their charters that they respect the constitution, law, political freedoms, and human rights, and are tasked solely to serve national security interests based on the requirements of authorized and legitimate intelligence consumers.

In democracies, to protect against government agencies, including secret services, from becoming politicized, a legal prohibition on partisan political activity while in active service (that is, while on the job or using government resources) by all government officials except select positions based specifically on partisanship is codified in

legislative statutes (and not limited solely to the intelligence/security sector). The idea is that career bureaucrats, including the intelligence, counterintelligence, investigatory, and enforcement arms of government do not serve legitimately as political tools of the party in power, subverting democratic governance and public service provision. For example, in the United States the Hatch Act of 1939 prohibits partisan activities, including: endorsing political candidates; listing or raising money for political action committees; participating in partisan voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives; distributing campaign material on behalf of candidates; serving as a delegate to a political convention; making campaign speeches; and, seeking public office in partisan elections.[4] So as to ensure that the legitimate rights of government workers to express and exercise private political views as individuals are not suppressed, significant changes were made in 1993 amendments to the law, with prohibitions on political activities while functioning in an official capacity strengthened, while expanded when off-duty.[5] In any case, the intelligence/security sector is strictly held to its legal mandate to serve elected officials regardless of partisanship, and without fear for their jobs or politicization of their work, which helps to ensure that members of the political opposition seeking or holding positions in the public sector are legally protected from partisan-based exclusion or retribution over election cycles.

In Russia, legal prohibitions on intelligence/security officers engaging in political activities are, in practice, extremely limited. As shown throughout this dissertation, the various Services and their leaderships are highly politicized and routinely engage in

---

[4] Robert B. Denhardt and Janet V. Denhardt, *Public Administration: An Action Orientation*, 5th ed., ThomsonWadsworth: U.S.A., 2006, p. 150.

[5] Ibid.

political activities beyond the limits of their mandates, often in response to political leaders' requests yet antagonistic to democratic norms, and much like as in Soviet times. The difference lies in the fact that today's political leadership is dominated by (fellow) chekists. Thus, political control of intelligence takes on new meaning. Law is merely cosmetic. Intelligence officers are precluded from joining political parties, however, their participation in supporting the activities of the Putin-endorsed, pro-Kremlin United Russia party and suppressing those of pro-democracy or anti-Putin parties has been well-documented. At the top, Boris Gryzlov served as interior minister while also heading United Russia, in clear violation of the law. In the 2003 parliamentary elections, FSB Lt. Gen. Andrei Przhezdomsky monitored the electoral process as the head of a department, "Elections 2003," within the Central Electoral Commission.[6]

It was of interest, then, when in January 2007 the Duma passed in the third reading amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Act prohibiting officers from having dual citizenship, which makes sense, and to the point under discussion here, being members of parties or any other political associations.[7] The legislation states that they will "not be allowed to join public associations pursuing political goals" or set up such organizations themselves.[8] Further, they would be fingerprinted. It is expected that the Federal Council will pass the amendments, with Putin subsequently signing the legislation. It is worth noting that with foreign intelligence officers (FIOs) spending the majority of their careers overseas, the law seems insignificant. It is primarily FSB and MVD officers who are

---

[6] Robert Orttung, "Russia: Country Report – 2004," *Freedom House*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=342&year=2004.

[7] "Russia's Spies Not To Have Dual Citizenship," *Kommersant*, January 24, 2007.

[8] "News in Brief," *Interfax Russia & CIS Business Law Weekly*, January 30, 2007, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-29825795_ITM.

actively engaged in the political life of the country, although an active duty military officer may run for election merely by requesting from his commanders a temporary leave of absence that extends to the end of his electoral term.[9] Hence, the so-called chekist-siloviki clan, composed primarily of FSB and military officers. In any case, as United Russia is well on the road to becoming the only party of significance in the evolving reconstruction of a one-party state dominated by chekists, the nature of the role of domestic intelligence officers in regard to political activities can be expected to evolve as well, in sync with the developing form of authoritarian political system.

9.2.2: The Establishment of Intelligence Oversight and Democratic Accountability Contributes to Democratization

In democracies, the rule of law is operative and effective oversight and democratic accountability mechanisms are institutionalized to ensure that 1) civilian political control of the Services is not being abused (by any political parties, agencies, groups, or individuals, whether consumers or producers); and, 2) the secret services are operating according to law and not violating the rights of citizens. It follows that in transitioning post-communist states, in addition to the institution of civilian political control of the intelligence/security sector, the establishment and extent in practice of effective oversight and democratic accountability mechanisms are measures of the state's democratization. Both internal and external oversight structures and measures provide the bases for democratic accountability to work. *Internally*, these may include clear chains-of-command (which both facilitate political control and establish responsibility), inspectors general, and rules and procedures inclusive of codified directives to discipline

[9] Jacob Kipp and Timothy L. Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Parliamentary Elections: A Primer," *Foreign Military Studies Office*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 5, 1995, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/ruselec.htm.

their violators (the will to do so is another matter). *Externally*, parliamentary oversight committees, independent commissions, the (independent) media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the general public serve as mechanisms to hold the intelligence/security sector accountable, albeit to more limited and varied degrees than those operating internally given the secrecy imperative in terms of personnel, sources, methods, and operations.

Whether internal or external, the approach of oversight structures will reflect the value preferences of the individuals who comprise them, which, again highlights the contribution of LVD in holding the intelligence/security services of a former secret police state accountable to the law. This is an essential government function for democratization to work. In the preceding chapters of this project, I have related how in contemporary Russia, "new oligarchy" linkages have been cemented among its components — the political elite/nomenklatura, chekists-siloviki, and organized crime — and these comprise the significant power relationships that influence the state's political-economic process, albeit to varying and changing degrees over time. For example, I illustrated how following Putin's ascension to the presidency the chekists widely penetrated and displaced the ranks of the oligarchs and OC in influencing policy, the latter set having exercised the greater influence during the Yeltsin era. Under both regimes, policy work and governance in the "public" interest were shown in practice to amount to little more than the protection and furtherance of private interests. First the oligarchs and then the chekists controlled the political-economic resources of the state, always in partnership with OC, and with conflicts of interest pervading the government and bureaucracy regardless of which component effectively ruled. These forces are and have been lining

their pockets at the expense of society, the bulk of which standard of living, health, and education continue to decline even as the state produces the third largest number of billionaires in the world, behind the U.S. and Germany, with a total of 53 in March 2007, 19 more than in the previous year.[10] Neither leading political officials nor the intelligence/security services are held accountable to law, merely using it to take down rivals and those targeted by patrons.

In the next section, I examine how old regime functionaries, unlike their "encumbered" counterparts in East European countries who were thwarted in directing the transition away from democracy by the implementation of varying degrees of LVD, were in position to effectively neutralize the development of any mechanisms for establishing democratic accountability of the intelligence/security sector in the early Yeltsin era. Under the Putin regime that followed, with old Soviet KGB officers constituting the Kremlin core and dominating the ranks of the political elite, the intelligence/security services have fellow chekists as their political masters. The leading chekists in the Kremlin ultimately direct and control their activities, as represented most vividly by RF President Putin, himself an old Soviet career chekist and FIO.

Because of the major differences in intelligence-state relations between the Yeltsin and Putin presidential eras, in assessing them I not only differentiate relevant developments surrounding the producer-consumer relationship under each and examine the nature of political control, oversight, and accountability mechanisms at the centre, but also review centre-regional control, oversight, and accountability mechanisms, and the progress and problems associated with establishing the more local aspects under each

---

[10] "Russian billionaire numbers grow," *BBC News*, March 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6433939.stm.

administration. The Yeltsin administration's failure to institute LVD meant that professionalism in the ranks was not required and its absence only compounded by the deliberate politicization of the Services that intensified under Putin. This same approach by the two regimes worked to significantly contribute to the ability of the old Soviet KGB to not only survive as an institution under Yeltsin, albeit under a plethora of different agencies, but to resurge even more powerful than the KGB had been at its zenith, with the exception of the SVR reunited under the FSB label and under the command of a Putin-led, chekist-constructed state "the likes of which the world has never seen that is today controlling Russia," as described by former chess champion and political activist Gary Kasparov.[11] In the following sections, I review the theoretical literature on political control of intelligence, oversight, and democratic accountability and examine how they evolved in practice in post-Soviet Russia and, in turn, contributed to the current reality.

9.3: THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICY RELATIONSHIP AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

In his 1995 book, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain*, scholar Uri Bar-Joseph argues that, "political control over intelligence in democracies must meet two demands: 1) preventing intelligence from interfering with politics and politicians from intervening in professional intelligence work; and, 2) enabling the intelligence community to maintain a high level of

[11] Garry Kasparov, "Don Putin," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 26, 2007, p. A13.

operational effectiveness."[12] These concepts are covered below, and analyzed in the post-Soviet context.

9.3.1: Intelligence Interference in Politics and Political Interference in Intelligence

As to Bar-Joseph's first requirement for democratic political control of intelligence (preventing intelligence from interfering with politics and politicians from intervening in professional intelligence work), Russia under both Yeltsin and Putin has failed miserably. The Services have been used by officials in the centre and regions as a political tool to undermine rivals and discredit and remove, often through corruption or tax evasion charges, any significant challengers. They have been used to manipulate and subvert electoral politics by disqualifying democratic-minded challengers and other targeted candidates from the ballot, blocking their access to media and other channels to convey political messages, as well as altering the actual vote count, a task ultimately overseen by the Central Elections Commission (CEC) head.[13] Further, to prevent democratic-minded candidates from gaining political power or influence, chekists have resorted to extra-legal arrest and perhaps even, as is widely believed, murder. Incumbent political officials and parties use their so-called "administrative resources," defined by the Open Society Justice Initiative as "the use of state and public sector powers and resources (including coercive capacities, personnel, financial, material, and other resources, or, *Institutional resources*: the personnel, property and infrastructural resources of the state and public sector; *Financial resources*: public funds from state and other public budgets, and organizations financed from those budgets; and, *Media*

---

[12] Uri Bar-Joseph, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain*, The Pennsylvania University Press: PA, 1995, p. 60.

[13] See the Central Elections Commission Web site at http://www.cikrf.ru/cikrf/.

resources: the resources of media controlled directly or indirectly by the state) to further their own prospects of election, in violation of legal and/or other norms and responsibilities governing the exercise of public office."[14] The practice is widespread in Russia, tends to include the extensive use of the highly politicized intelligence/security services, and effectively subverts the democratic electoral process. Under Yeltsin, the oligarchs had played the key role, to the greater benefit of they and their clients, while under Putin, the chekists gained the greater influence over policy, working to support the president's construction of a chekist-dominated state that disproportionately benefits leading chekists and their select partners in the patron-client system. In short, the "chekist-siloviki" clan supplanted the "Family."

9.3.2: Depoliticization of the Intelligence/Security Sector Was Never in the Cards

A core element of the democratic control of the intelligence/security sector is its political neutrality and non-involvement in domestic politics and foreign policy decisionmaking.[15] Yet, the post-Soviet Russian state has deliberately politicized the sector, involving it in politics and punishing neutrality, as Yeltsin had done when he fired MB Chief Viktor Barannikov in 1993 for insufficient support in his battle with the communists at the White House in October. Some elite units sought to stay out of the political struggle, with Yeltsin subsequently and deliberately bolstering the Services in exchange for loyalty, thus increasing their political reliability in the event another

---

[14] "The Use and Misuse of Administrative Resources in Russia," *Open Society Justice Initiative*, http://www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ac/cfm/russia. See the full report, "Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during the Campaign for the December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections," *Open Society Justice Initiative*, at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102522.

[15] Yuri E. Fedorov, "Democratic Transformation of the Intelligence/Security Sector in Russia: A Sad Saga of Failure," Paper prepared for the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," held in Geneva, Switzerland on 5-7 September 2002, organized by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

conflagration with the conservative opposition developed. Hence, October 1993 was a watershed, a turning point in the intelligence-state relationship. Loyalty became the clear and leading imperative, with politicization only progressively intensifying during Yeltsin's second term and into the Putin era.

The Kremlin nurtured the politicization of the entire security sector. In 2002 Putin appointed MVD-chief Boris Gryzlov as head of the "party of power," Unity/United Russia. This was the case even though the MVD's mandate, as with all other security service mandates, forbids officer participation in politics, including political parties. Control of the "power ministries" is always sought by authoritarian leaders as a major political support base and resource. In June 2000 a militia law had been passed that gave the centre the power to terminate regional MVD officials without the consent of provincial leaders, thus taking control of the police out of their and big city mayors' hands and into those of the Kremlin. Thus, even powerful Moscow Mayor Luzhkov's court challenge of the Kremlin's dismissal of the Moscow City MVD chief became moot.[16]

In his 1992 book, *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Peterburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*, former St. Petersburg Mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, speaking to the situation in 1990 and the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution (which had provided for the Communist party's monopoly on political power), noted,

> The issue of depoliticizing the system's punitive organs — the army, the KGB, the Ministry of the Interior — remained unresolved. The state security service was almost 100 percent communist, and communists remained in the majority in the army and militia. At Supreme Soviet sessions, I had pointed out that this was contrary to our present

[16] "Moscow Retakes Control of Regional Law Enforcement," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 24, 2000, p. 2.

> constitution, a *de facto* continuation of something that had been abolished *de jure*. To the credit of the people's deputies, they proposed including in the Constitution a line about the depoliticization of the army and the police, including the secret police. [Andrei] Sakharov, too, spoke of this on several occasions, and although he was not heeded at the time, the process later got underway. During the summer of 1990, many members of the militia, the judicial system, and the procuracy responded to calls by republic and local sessions of people's deputies by quitting the party. And this process had begun in state security bodies as well.
>
> I would rank the repeal of Article 6 as the most radical event in our country's life since October 1917. History has consigned to the archives the anti-human and anti-popular regime of one-party rule established by the Bolsheviks. Its reign and its death throes were stained with blood; its actual fall was bloodless. But only after the punitive organs have been depoliticized thoroughly will be able to say over Sakharov's grave: *Andrei Dmitrievich, your life's cause has triumphed*.[17]

Having served under Sobchak as deputy mayor in St. Petersburg and acting as one his closest associates in the years before his death, Putin certainly had read the former mayor's work, and surely recognized that, as Sobchak had so eloquently articulated, the recipe for democratic change in Russia was most fundamentally the putting of an end to the KGB-FSB (and old Soviet control methods) through the institution of an LVD policy. It followed that Putin took every step thereafter to ensure his beloved Service survived, and not only survived, but prospered, constructing a chekist-controlled state to ensure the institution's survival — both the chekisty[18] and its "chekistry."[19] In accomplishing this, state and FSB interests were integrated; those of the chekist-siloviki clan of the political sector were closely interwoven with those of the intelligence/security sector.

---

[17] Anatoly Sobchak, *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Peterburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*, The Free Press: NY, 1992, p. 90.

[18] A term denoting the chekist population. See John J. Dziak, *Chekisty: A History of the KGB*, Ivy Books: NY, 1988.

[19] A term coined by this author that refers to the traditional operational methods and approach of the chekisty, carried on through generations and marked by abuse of power and lack of respect for law, political and human rights.

Putin called for a strong state of "law and order," yet it was one designed to survive against and defeat any democratization efforts. Thus, he proceeded to eliminate the "threat" posed by democratic forces that would, if given the chance, insist on bringing the old secret police's unceremonious end. In the battle between the chekists and democracy that intensified under his direction, the former would emerge the victor to the tune of "democracy is dead in Russia and the FSB chekists have arisen like a phoenix." Putin would have it no other way. Looking back to the days of the impending Soviet collapse and perestroika, the (phoenix) analogy may be appropriate. *The Feng Shui Handbook*, written by feng shui Master Lam Kam Chuen, describes the phoenix: "A mythical bird that never dies, the phoenix flies far ahead to the front, always scanning the landscape and distant space. It represents our capacity for vision, for collecting sensory information about our environment and the events unfolding within it."[20] The chekists had continually monitored developments and exploited every opportunity to their advantage.

In terms of Bar-Joseph's study on the non-democratic results of political intervention in intelligence and intelligence intervention in politics, the pattern had been distinctly set under Yeltsin. A glaring example, the FSB's compromise of Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov, covered earlier, was demonstrative of the results of independent action, and the benefits of cooperation in post-Soviet Russia.[21] It is important to recall that Putin was FSB director at the time and directed the scheme, his reward, the RF

---

[20] The quote and cite were drawn from the Web site, http://www.mythicalrealm.com/creatures/phoenix.html.

[21] "Skuratov scandal escalates," *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies*, March 22, 1999, http://www.nupi.no/cgi-2-win/Russland/krono.exe?4065; and, Oksana Yablokova, "Skuratov: Entire 'Family' Is Guilty," *The St. Petersburg Times*, February 4, 2000, http://www.sptimes.ru/archive/times/539/news/n_skuratov.htm.

presidency. Amy Knight notes in her 1996 book, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, that the Prosecutor still took orders from the KGB (instead of the other way around).[22] So, too, Chubais had articulated on the lack of independence of the prosecutor general's office, declaring in July 2002 that it, "Never has been, is not, and won't be for some time."[23] The point was only confirmed by the events surrounding the Yukos case initiated in 2003. Indeed, as FSB director in 1998, then prime minister, and, finally, RF president, Putin has long exercised influence over the General Prosecutor's Office,[24] with Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov having entered office as acting prosecutor general in the summer of 1999, presiding over the 1999 apartment bombings investigation and playing an instrumental role in Putin's rise to the presidency. He was confirmed by parliament in 2000, and subsequently oversaw a number of additional, sensitive cases, including the "Kursk" nuclear submarine disaster in 2000, the Dubrovka theater attack in 2002, and the Beslan tragedy in 2004. Moreover, he effectively forced oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky into exile and started the case against Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The way Duma deputy and investigative journalist, Aleksandr Khinshtein, who maintains connections with the MVD community, described the Putin-Ustinov relationship, "Ustinov is prepared to perform, to the best of his abilities, absolutely any task given to him by the Kremlin."[25]

---

[22] Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1996, p. 42.

[23] Michael Wines, "Russia Drops Criminal Inquiry Into Troublesome Press Tycoon," *The New York Times*, July 28, 2000.

[24] See "Yukos Lawyers Say Prosecution is Weak and Illegal," *Moscow News*, August 26, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/08/26/yukos.shtml.

[25] Victor Yasmann, "Russia: Prosecutor's Removal A Clue To Putin's Exit Strategy?" *RFE/RL*, June 6, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/891c0779-93da-4dc8-8402-60acbf6d19c3.html.

In June 2006 Ustinov resigned, which *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)* analyst Victor Yasmann observed, "was surprising because of his notorious loyalty to Putin and because of the special role the Prosecutor General's Office has played under Putin, periodically targeting the president's political opponents."[26] Highlighting the lack of any parliamentary oversight over executive branch activity, including that of the intelligence/security sector, Khinshtein noted that the Federation Council "voted for Ustinov's retirement without asking questions just as it will approve any candidate for this office that Putin proposes, even if it would be his Labrador, Koni."[27] In fact, Ustinov resigned only to trade places with Putin loyalist and Justice Minister Yuri Chaika, who had served for four years as deputy prosecutor general before becoming justice minister in 1999, and was appointed to the prosecutor general post (and confirmed by the Federation Council (147-1)) days later, in a rotation that appeared to be related to strengthening Kremlin control over the intelligence/security sector while expanding the capacities of the two loyal ministers, and as part of the preparations for the 2008 presidential election, a campaign for which some expect the fight against corruption to be a major theme.[28]

The post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services have a history of intervening in politics, routinely used to manipulate election outcomes and undermine the opposition. So, too, beginning in Yeltsin's and continuing into Putin's second term, the

---

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] "Putin Names Justice Minister As Chief Prosecutor," *RFE/RL*, June 19, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/fd35a1a4-4f88-413e-8871-15a8eebe94cb.html; and, "Russia swaps its justice minister, prosecutor general," *Taipei Times*, June 24, 2006, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2006/06/24/2003315388.

Services have exerted a growing influence on policy, reflecting the chekists' growing role in shaping the Kremlin view and directing the state's transition away from a democratic path. As KGB Col. Victor Cherkashin, an SCD (1957-1963) and later FCD/SVR Line KR officer (1964-1991) who served as head of counterintelligence (1979-1991) in Washington, DC, noted, the KGB had no role in driving policy during the Soviet era,[29] however, under both the Yeltsin and Putin regimes, the chekists have played a major role in the political process, not only implementing but formulating policy as well. For the FIS, this political policy intervention began during Yeltsin's first presidential term, and extended from the foreign policy sphere to the drafting of their own Service mandate. For example, active service SVR officers designed their own legal mandate, codified in the 1992 Law on Foreign Intelligence.[30] Touting the Law as a success in that it was the first legislation providing a legal basis to intelligence operations, Valerii Kantorov, chief of the FIS legal department and one of its authors explained, "The need for such a law is obvious. Intelligence is too sharp a tool of the state to be allowed free rein. Earlier, when there was no such law, upon what basis did intelligence operate? On the basis of arbitrary decisions…. There were no guarantees that some government figure would not use intelligence for personal aims. With the passage of this law, such guarantees now exist."[31]

---

[29] Victor Cherkashin with Gregory Feifer, *Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer, The True Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen & Aldrich Ames*, Basic Books: NY, 2005, p. 307.

[30] J. Michael Waller, "KGB: The Perils of Arbitrary Power," *Perspective*, Vol. II, No. 1, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy, September 1991, p. 2. Also, see Julie Anderson, "HUMINT: A 21st Century Offensive From Putin's Chekist State," March 2006, and published in *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 20, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 258-316.

[31] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, pp. 120-121. The 1996 Law on Foreign Intelligence (Articles 2, 4, 5, 10, 12, and 14) provided for presidential supervision of the SVR. It is also this law (Article 24) that provides for parliament's monitoring of its financial and staffing issues, with most appropriations bills starting in the upper house, while (Article 25) gives the Prosecutor General the authority to investigate and assess whether the Service is in compliance with Russian law. The 1998 FSB-

By 1993-1994, the SVR had become an overt and active participant in public policy debates, publishing and disseminating a number of reports on major political issues, including nuclear weapons proliferation, the consequences of NATO expansion into East Europe, and Western attitudes toward Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) integration. As SVR director, Yevgeni Primakov authored a number of policy reports that were publicly distributed.[32] Many of the themes presented were echoed in Yeltsin's decrees soon thereafter, implying a direct chekist role in policy formulation on key issues.[33] For example, in September 1994, in the prelude to the FSK's intensification of covert operations in Chechnya, he issued a major address from the Foreign Ministry Press Center titled, "Russia-CIS: Does the West's Position Need Modification?" announcing Russia's intent to consolidate its control over the CIS, and stating that, "it is hopeless to resist the centripetal tendencies within the CIS," and "counterproductive at the same time."[34] As Foreign Policy Council senior fellow J. Michael Waller noted on the novelty of the event, "Thus the head of the intelligence service who is not a part of the government was making a government policy statement about a function out of his jurisdiction from a forum that was not his, to a primarily foreign audience — a very unusual circumstance."[35] Under Primakov's command, the FIS had heavily seeded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with intelligence officers, influencing its work and the

---

orchestrated scandal, under Putin's direction, surrounding former Prosecutor General Yuri Skuratov, ensured that the chekists would dominate the relationship.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Neil Malcolm, "Foreign Policy Making," in *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press: NY, 1996, pp. 125-26.

[34] J. Michael Waller, "Who is Making Foreign Policy?" *Perspective*, Vol. V, No. 3, American Foreign Policy Council, January-February 1995, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol5/Waller.html.

Kremlin's approach to foreign affairs. Before Putin managed to formally take charge of the country, Waller had observed the FIS's playing of a defining role in supporting post-Soviet Russia's revanchist constituencies and shaping the transitioning state's economic development, noting that, "The SVR is part of the Russian control structure."[36] Indeed, the FIS's role in moving CPSU money into overseas banking accounts and handling many aspects of the Kremlin's financial and money laundering activities has been well-documented.

9.3.3: Attempts to Establish Democratic Oversight Defeated by Ancien Regime Elements

As SVR director, notably, a KGB successor agency that retained its old Soviet power structure, evaded purges and reforms, and continued to operate without disruption as evidenced most vividly by the Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen cases, Primakov was in position to exert substantial influence over many intelligence-related aspects of the transition. In its early months, a small number of democratic-minded reformers had managed to access the corridors of power and sought to exert their influence over political developments and institution building. However, without an LVD policy instituted, the old KGB and its networks of supporters were free to forcefully counter and defeat the democrats' initiatives. The interference of Primakov and old regime elements in Democratic Russia's efforts to establish some controls over the Services in the early 1990s illuminated how the lack of LVD contributed to the failure of the post-Soviet regime to establish any meaningful oversight mechanisms, attributable also to Yeltsin's failure to exercise the necessary political will to institute secret police reform when he

---

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

had the opportunity to do so. Scholar Eva Bellen shows that the commitment of leaders of national stature capable of sponsoring democracy "is central to democratization." She cites the central role of Emperor Hirohito in occupied Japan and Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher to make the point.[37] In short, Yeltsin's commitment to democracy was inadequate, as evidenced by his failure to mandate secret police reform or LVD in the ranks. Specifically in regard to the establishment of legislative oversight, the lack of LVD in the political sector made it more likely that anti-democratic old Soviet nomenklatura members and, as it happened, criminal elements, many seeking profit-seeking partnerships with former and active members of the intelligence/security sector, would constitute the large majority in parliament, precluding the establishment of any meaningful oversight in any case.

So, too, Primakov effectively countered Andrei Sakharov's demand for a parliamentary committee with strict oversight of the state security organs. Waller notes that he "coopted the reformers' rhetoric" and "announced the creation of such a committee, but revealed that it would be packed with representatives of the military, military-industrial complex, and KGB." And perhaps setting precedent for a mode that continues to dominate to the present, "He (Primakov) refused to answer deputies' questions, and used parliamentary maneuvers to silence debate."[38]

The increasing policy role of the Services outside their own domain gained ground about the same time that intelligence producers were providing distorted intelligence information to consumers. Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Jack Matlock

---

[37] Eva Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, pp. 600-01.

[38] Op. cit., "Who is Making Foreign Policy?"

notes in his 1995 book, *Autopsy On An Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, that the KGB had often reported fabrications to Gorbachev.[39] The chekists' provision of distorted information continued into Yeltsin's tenure; former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar stated in 1995 that information antagonistic to Yeltsin's preferences was routinely not passed on to him, asserting that, in what today appears a particularly prescient statement, "the servants [were] secretly taking over the regime."[40]

The SVR's policy-making role toward foreign policy and the CIS was duplicated by the FSB on the domestic front, and extended to the situation in Chechnya. Even the Czech Security Intelligence Service had observed in 2001, that the Russian intelligence/security services "have become the most important power structure in Russia, exercising immense unofficial influence on the political decision-making process."[41] In Chechnya, it was readily apparent that the Kremlin lacked firm control of the commanders prosecuting the war there. Intelligence was routinely politicized to gel with the Kremlin line, providing justification for the war and legitimizing the massive human rights abuses perpetrated against Chechen civilians. For every attack that occurred in Russia, the pattern was to immediately blame the Chechen rebels. As discussed below, the 1999 apartment bombings are widely believed to have been orchestrated by the chekists for political purposes, just as the rebel incursion into Dagestan was allegedly

---

[39] Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Autopsy On An Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Random House: NY, 1995, pp. 530-531.

[40] Op. cit., "Foreign Policy Making," p. 147.

[41] "Section 10: Intelligence Services regarding Operation of Intelligence Services of foreign powers in Czech Republic, Intelligence Services of the Russian Federation" excerpt from the Annual Report 2001 of the Czech Security Information Service, *www.bis.cz*.

directed by the FSB, the latter operation oft-cited by Kremlin officials as justification for the reintroduction of troops into the "recalcitrant" republic that was believed to have been planned in March of that year [by the Kremlin], as stated but later retracted by then-MVD Director (March 1998-May 1999) Stepashin,[42] one of the principal architects of the war in Chechnya as FSB director (February 1994-June 1995), both operations designed to propel Putin into the presidency. The loyal Stepashin has continued to hold top positions in Putin's government to date, a clear sign that he enjoys Putin's trust and confidence.

As events unfolded, problems for the Services operating in the North Caucasus escalated, and were directly related to widespread corruption, which led to Stepashin's ultimate firing as FSB director following the botched attempt to free hundreds of hostages seized by Chechen fighters in the southern Russia town of Budennovsk in 1995.[43] Throughout his tenure as FSB director the policy formulating role of the Services operating in Chechnya had been prevalent, with officers frequently distorting the reporting to the political tune of local commanders' objectives and in line with the hopes of political consumers in Moscow. As the old saying goes, "the first fatality of war is truth," and although that is not supposed to apply to the Services, who are responsible for "speaking truth to power," during the late 1980s and 1990s, it often did.

Other problems plagued the prosecution of the war. For example, before media access to Chechnya was largely cut off, numerous authoritative reports had surfaced exposing not only widespread corruption, but also indicating internecine warfare among

---

[42] Jamie Dettmer, "Stepashin Joins Putin's Bandwagon – Sergei Stepashin Supports Vladimir Putin," *Insight on the News*, March 20, 2000, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_11_16/ai_61361628/print.

[43] "Stepashin: A reluctant prime minister," *BBC News*, August 9, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/341867.stm.

the FSB, GRU, and MVD as they competed for agents in the region, sabotaged each others' operations, and battled for resources, all within the context of a thriving black market and endemic corruption.

The Russian Armed Forces and GRU, as well as the FSB and MVD Internal Troops, operated with limited centre political control in Chechnya and the surrounding area, each running their own show, yet cooperating, together with organized crime, when it suited their purposes or was required in order to maximize profits in yet another scheme.[44] The continued failed operations and conflicts among the various Services and their leaderships ultimately threatened the Kremlin's control of the military and other operations in the region, particularly as Putin sought to consolidate FSB dominance over all "power organs," much as it had been with the KGB during Soviet times. This endeavor in regard to the military was represented by his choice of career chekist and former FIO Sergei Ivanov as Defense Minister, as well as Putin's establishment of the FSB's Military Intelligence Directorate in 2000, reminiscent of the old Soviet KGB Third Chief Directorate.

Nevertheless, effective political control of the military remained a challenge. A case in point was that of Gen. Gennadi Troshev, commander of Russian troops in Chechnya, who in December 2002 was offered a transfer to Siberia by Defense Minister Ivanov. Troshev publicly rejected the offer, saying it would be a betrayal of the military and the people in Chechnya. As a result, Putin subsequently fired him, saying he could not allow such a conflict between a general and the defense minister.[45] Fully aware of the

---

[44] Zaira Abdullaeva, "Remembering Basayev's Raid Five Years On," *The Moscow Times*, August 26, 2004.

[45] "Russia/Putin/Chechnya," *Globalsecurity.org*, December 19, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2002/russia-021219-2a5ef399.htm; and, "Kadyrov

growing problems in the military, Putin followed through by taking a number of additional measures in an effort to gain tighter control, including the firing of Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin as Chief of the General Staff in July 2004, along with three top generals: Gen. Vyachelsav Tikhomirov, the head of the (MVD) Internal Troops; Col. Gen. Anatoly Yezhov, Deputy Director of the FSB; and, Col. Gen. Vladimir Boldyrev, Commander of the North Caucasus Military District.[46] Defense analyst Boris Kagarlitsky suggested that, "There is no question that the Kremlin had become concerned with the situation in the military — heads would not have rolled otherwise — but the Kremlin was concerned with the state of the military in a purely bureaucratic, not a professional sense."[47]

The tension that persisted between the Defense Ministry and General Staff was well known. The RF law "On Defense" provided that the Defense Ministry and General Staff should exercise command and control of the armed forces, with the latter as the "main organ for operational control of the armed forces." As *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Senior Research Associate Roger McDermott noted, "Essentially both structures had equal status and could therefore compete for decisionmaking power. In practice, the General Staff stood closer to the army in command and control issues (inspections, commissions, examinations)."[48] Prior to Kvashnin's firing, Putin signed amendments to

---

Fends off Babich," *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol. 4, Issue 2, The Jamestown Foundation, January 31, 2003, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=13&issue_id=549&article_id=3913.

[46] Anatoly Medetsky, "Kvashnin Fired in Military Shakeup," *The Moscow Times*, July 20, 2004, p. 1.

[47] Boris Kagarlitsky, "'Power' Bureaucracy Chaos," *The Moscow Times*, July 29, 2004, p. 9.

[48] Roger McDermott, "Ivanov's Victory Over Kvashnin May Open Pandora's Box," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, Issue 40, The Jamestown Foundation, June 28, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3000&article_id=2368161.

the law, which deprived the General Staff, called the brains of the army, of its function as "the main agency of operational control of the armed forces," and, furthermore, Kvashnin lost the right to appeal to the Supreme Commander-President directly, bypassing the defense minister, and was degraded to the post of first deputy of the defense minister (then-Sergei Ivanov).[49] The chekists had won the battle, and tightened their hold on the military. Putin appointed Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to replace Kvashnin, with the post now subordinate to the defense minister in administrative and operational command and control of the army.[50]

The Kremlin's political control of the military has faced additional challenges. For example, when Putin appointed Ivanov to defense minister in 2000, he presented the appointment as one establishing civilian political control over the military, with Ivanov switching his epaulettes for a suit. To the extent that Ivanov was a career chekist and not a military officer, civilian control had been established. However, the idea was to establish chekist control over the armed forces, which created tension between some senior military officers and the regime. Moreover, as *Stratfor* analysts note, "The generals in charge of the military have never seen Ivanov, Russia's first civilian defense minister, as one of their own because he comes from the intelligence services and not the

---

[49] "Kvashnin Has Left: What Will the Army Gain?" *RIA Novosti*, July 19, 2004, http://npc.sarov.ru/english/digest/152005/section2p1.html.

[50] Roger McDermott, "Putin Fires Chief of General Staff Kvashnin," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, Issue 55, The Jamestown Foundation, July 20, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3021&article_id=2368270. In February 2007, Putin promoted Ivanov to first deputy prime minister and replaced him as defense minister with Anatoly Serdiukov, who headed the Federal Tax Service for the past three years. Addressing a Defense Ministry board session, Putin said that, "The role of the military component, of the General Staff, will certainly become even greater than it is now." Given Serdiukov's lack of experience in things military, it is likely that Baluyevsky will become the real power over the military. See "Wrap: Putin promotes Ivanov, reshuffles govt., changes Chechnya pres.," *RIA Novosti*, February 16, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070216/60837987.html.

army, and because he is seen as more of an intellectual than a military man."[51] And while Ivanov tentatively exercised political control, he never managed to gain financial control. The military remained "a bastion of graft and corruption,"[52] and its capabilities continued to deteriorate. It is worth noting that in February 2007 Putin replaced Ivanov as defense minister with Anatoly Serdiukov, a relatively unknown furniture store owner who had served as head of the Office of Tax Inspection (first in St. Petersburg and then Moscow), presumably to gain some control over military finances. Of relative political inconsequence and with minimal military background, in addition to his St. Petersburg roots and personal ties to Putin, he posed no threat to the regime, while highly-respected and seasoned military professional and Chief of the General Staff, Baluyevsky, who had been expected to be appointed defense minister, may have been less trusted to further chekist interests.[53] Amidst much speculation about the motivation behind the appointment, Putin claimed he had appointed Serdiukov to the post because a sweeping arms modernization program planned through 2015 required an appointee with strong economic and financial experience.[54]

9.3.4: Intelligence "Failures," or Intelligence Intervention in Politics?

Bar-Joseph's first demand for democratic political control of intelligence, that intelligence and politics are prevented from interfering with each other, in Russia this has

---

[51] "Geopolitical Diary: Putin's Strategic Reshuffle," *Stratfor*, February 16, 2007, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=284437.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Serdiukov as a Unique Defense Minister in Russian" *Russia Profile*, April 1, 2007; and, Pavel Felgengauer, "Approve it, but check before," *Novaya Gazeta*, October 2, 2007, http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/74/03.html.

[54] Steve Gutterman, "Putin Promotes Defense Minister," *The Washington Post*, February 15, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/15/AR2007021500632_pf.html.

not been met. The intelligence/security sector's harassment of opposition political candidates, their disqualification from the ballots, the use of administrative resources to shape electoral outcomes, the prosecution of authorities who investigate high-level corruption, and the harassment of civil society, including both the media and NGOs, the intimidation of journalists, and tight controls on public rallies and other popular political participation, are clear examples of intelligence-political intervention.

As to Bar-Joseph's second demand for democratic political control of intelligence, that political leaders enable the intelligence community to maintain a high level of operational effectiveness, has been degraded in Russia due to elites' use of the Services as political tools and as instruments in their private commercial pursuits, the latter activity constituting one that intelligence/security officers themselves are also independently engaged. The problem is that when the intelligence community loses its operational effectiveness, there are intelligence failures. To elaborate, a number of intelligence failures in Russia have been associated with intelligence/security sector corruption, which has enabled terrorists and organized criminals to conduct their operations and activities rather successfully. Some of the more galling include the 1999 apartment bombings, 2002 Dubrovka theatre attack, and 2004 Beslan tragedy, the continuing exponential growth in OC and corruption, and the failure to solve the hundreds of contract murders of prominent, democratic-oriented political officials, business executives, and investigative journalists.

It is possible that some of these intelligence "failures" are really incidences of political-intelligence intervention, merely presented as failures. That is, the reality may be that these "failures" do not represent ineffective intelligence capability at all. Rather, they

have indications of and may, as many observers believe, actually represent political-intelligence interventions. Thus, although when the dominant political elites are chekists, the differences between political intervention in intelligence and intelligence intervention in politics become blurred, all the more so when the interests of the two sectors coincide in what is a symbiotic relationship among former and current members of the Russian secret police, an insular organization whose nature has not changed. A question to ask is how to differentiate a political-intelligence intervention from an incident of intelligence ineffectiveness and failure? The 1999 apartment bombings, which evidence strongly alludes to FSB involvement, launched career chekist Putin into the Russian presidency, where he immediately proceeded to create his chekist-dominated state, which has significantly empowered the Services. The political killings of numerous individuals who sought to take Russia on a democratization path or expose the corruption of the regime and Services, are also widely believed to have been organized by the FSB.[55]

The proposition that these incidents were deliberate political-intelligence interventions and not intelligence "failures" helps explain why there has been no substantive investigation by independent authorities permitted, nor demotions or other measures taken against the FSB officers believed responsible, while those officials who did investigate, for instance, Duma Committee on Defense and Security Deputy

[55] There have been numerous instances in which Russia has been shown to be transferring weapons to Middle Eastern states in violation of international law, especially in the use of Belarus as a transshipment point for the arms en route to Iraq, Iran, Syria, and other parts of the region. In March 2007, *Kommersant* journalist Ivan Safronov fell to his death from his residence building in what is believed to have been a murder by the FSB, which had repeatedly warned him against investigating and reporting on Russia's illicit arms transfers to the Middle East. Days before Safronov's untimely "suicide," he had acquired concrete evidence of Russia's plan to transfer arms in precisely this manner. See "Ivan Safronov Was Killed," *Kommersant*, March 6, 2007; Simon Saradzhyan, "Reporter Planned Story on Arms Deal," *The Moscow Times*, March 7, 2007, p. 3; and, Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russian writer faced threats before death," *Washington Times*, March 7, 2007.

Chairman Yuri Shchekochikhin, have been killed in contract hits (or died in mysterious circumstances) widely believed to have been carried out by the chekists or their agents. It is worth adding that many of those former FSB officers who were in command or active service and involved in some way with these interventions now hold leading political positions, which further explains why the investigations have gone nowhere, with their positions perhaps representing their reward.

In any case, without question, the issues of intelligence depoliticization and professionalism relate directly to the intervention and effectiveness factors, and are highlighted in the following empirical sections to provide evidence that post-Soviet Russia fails dramatically on both of Bar-Joseph's counts. It is shown that the political elite have frequently intervened in intelligence for their own private interests, as well as apparently condoned the illicit activities of chekists in exchange for political support, thereby degrading their effectiveness and professionalism while intensifying their politicization, while the Services have a record of effectiveness in intervening in politics but have repeatedly proven ineffective in protecting the constitutionally protected political and economic activities of the people of Russia from organized crime, corruption, and terrorism.

9.3.5: Intelligence "Failures" — The Empirical Evidence, An FSB Hand?

The September 1999 apartment bombings that led to a renewed crackdown on Chechnya and brought Putin significant electoral support in his bid for the presidency, with his campaign team advocating a hard-line policy against the Chechen separatists on who the attacks were soundly blamed, were instrumental in creating a high level of

popular support for the second Chechen military campaign.[56] More importantly, they served to launch Putin into the presidency. A year into his first term, he transferred command of the operations against Chechen rebel forces from the defense ministry to the FSB, tasking a deputy director of the FSB, Rear-Admiral German Ugryumov, to assess the military situation. It was soon thereafter announced that the Russian troop presence would be reduced from 80,000 to 40,000 to begin in mid-February 2001.[57] To compensate for the reduced troop levels, it followed that throughout the remainder of Putin's first presidential term the fighting escalated, as did the atrocities exacted against the population.

While there is no doubt that atrocities were being committed by both sides of the conflict, enduring questions remain surrounding the identification of the perpetrators of the September 1999 apartment bombings, quickly blamed by the authorities on Chechen "terrorists." Serious allegations and significant circumstantial evidence suggesting FSB complicity persist. The widespread belief that the FSB had a role derives not only from the circumstances surrounding events in the city of Ryazan, where another apartment bombing was thwarted and the FSB, caught in the act, claimed it was conducting a "training exercise,"[58] but also from the fact that it was Putin and the chekists who most benefited. Means, motive, and opportunity are often key in identifying the perpetrator(s) of criminal activity. As noted, the prior August 1999 Chechen venture into neighboring Dagestan, which the Kremlin had ultimately used as justification for a reinvasion of

---

[56] "Muscovites Mark Apartment Bombing," *The New York Times*, September 13, 2000.

[57] "Russian Troop Withdrawal From Chechnya On Hold?" *RFE/RL Newsline*, January 26, 2001.

[58] Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, *Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within*, S.P.I. Books: NY, 2002.

Chechnya,[59] may also have been an FSB provocation. And it, too, had been of significant political benefit to Putin and the chekists, adding further credence to the theory that the FSB played a role in these events.

a) Investigation of the 1999 Apartment Bombings Leads to Death and Prison

Many individuals who made public allegations that the FSB was behind the attacks and suggested that they were motivated by Putin in his bid for the RF presidency have been removed from influential positions and silenced, jailed, and/or killed. All attempts to independently and conclusively investigate the bombings have been unsuccessful. For example, every member of the independent State Duma Kovalev Commission (named after its chairman, Sergei Kovalev) investigating the bombings suffered repercussions, including then-Duma deputies Yury Rybakov, Sergei Yushenkov, Sergei Kovalev, and Yury Shchekochikhin. Rybakov and Kovalev failed to win reelection in December 2003, thus preventing them from using the Duma as a platform to investigate and make inquiries into FSB activities, including events surrounding the 1999 apartment bombings, while Yushenkov and Shchekochikhin were murdered.

Rybakov's story is additionally revealing for what it says about the electoral process in Russia. As journalist Douglas Birch noted, "In the weeks leading up to Sunday's elections, Rybakov's political foes tried to strike his name from the ballot on technical grounds seven times. He was falsely accused of receiving aid from Osama Bin Laden. The St. Petersburg city administration, he says, donated office space and telephones to his main opponent, a Kremlin ally. 'Four hundred students of a military

[59] Andrei Smirnov, "Dagestan's Insurgents Regroup As New 'Sharia Jamaat' Organization," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 2, Issue 13, The Jamestown Foundation, January 19, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=3202&article_id=2369112.

academy were marched to one polling station, and an officer checked every ballot paper' to make sure they had been marked for another candidate, Rybakov alleged. He lost by about 400 votes — a single percentage point."[60] Prior to the election, Rybakov had been confronted by Customs officials at the St. Petersburg airport, who seized his 100 copies of the Berezovsky-financed film, "Attack on Russia," asserting that he had failed to complete the proper paperwork. The film, made by French journalists and suggesting that the 1999 apartment bombings were staged by the FSB as justification for Russian troops being returned to Chechnya, had been banned in various regions of Russia as "provocative." Rybakov had reportedly planned to give the tapes to fellow parliamentarians.[61]

As for Yushenkov, as noted earlier in the project, he was killed near his apartment building entrance in April 2003, shot several times in the chest at close range as he got out of his chauffer-driven car, while Shchekochikhin, who had written the 1999 book, *Slaves of State Security: 20th Century*,[62] died in hospital of thallium poisoning in July, just three months later. Not only had he sought to free prisoners-of-war and investigate human rights violations in Chechnya, a month before his death he had written an article published in *Novaya Gazeta* about the Kremlin's response to his request to intervene in the Three Whales (Tri Kita) case, complaining about the administration's failure to do anything about it, stating, "Do not tell me fairytales about the independence of judges.

---

[60] Douglas Birch, "Putin critic loses post, platform for inquiry," *The Baltimore Sun*, December 11, 2003, http://eng.terror99.ru/publications/107.htm.

[61] "Russia: Annual Report 2003," *Reporters Without Borders*, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=6529.

[62] **"**Distinguished author and journalist Shchekochikhin dies," *Gazeta.ru*, July 3, 2003, http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/07/03/Distinguishe.shtml.

Until we will see a fair trial [in this case], the documents of the case will be eliminated, witnesses intimidated or killed, and investigators themselves prosecuted."[63]

Yushenkov had launched a parliamentary inquiry into the Tri Kita case, in which a number of high-level intelligence/security officials were allegedly involved, in March 2002. However, the original investigation had been initiated by MVD Cpt. Pavel Zaitsev in October 2000. By the time Prosecutor General Ustinov ordered the case closed just months later, much evidence had been collected implicating top officers from almost every Russian intelligence/security service in either the illegal activity itself or its cover-up. As *RFE/RL* analyst Victor Yasmann noted, "The reaction to Zaitsev's investigation came almost immediately. At the end of November 2000, the Prosecutor General's Office ordered Zaitsev to halt the investigation and confiscated files relating to the case. Before the investigation was closed, however, Zaitsev and his Interior Ministry colleagues tapped phone conversations between Sergei Zuev, owner of the Three Whales (Tri Kita) showrooms, and high-ranking FSB officers. They learned that those under investigation had paid two million dollars to Prosecutor General's Office officials to have the investigation stopped, which had been reported by *Novaya Gazeta* in November 2002. Indeed, in May 2001, Yury Buryukov, a first deputy prosecutor general, signed a directive stopping the Three Whales investigation citing a "lack of criminal evidence." At the same time, the Customs Service investigation led by Volkov and Faizulinn was also halted. To complicate matters further, the Prosecutor General Office's filed criminal

[63] Victor Yasmann, "Russia: Corruption Scandal Could Shake Kremlin," *RFE/RL*, September 26, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/09/33cc2719-2ad5-4a45-a326-72828b9baf64.html. \

cases against Zaitsev, Volkov, and Faizulinn accusing them of "abuse of office" and "violating the human rights of those under suspicion."[64]

Both the nature of the case and the way it was handled by top officials in Putin's government provide a classic example of the manner in which leading authorities treat investigations into the illegal activities of high ranking intelligence/security sector officers in Russia today, the extent of the corruption, and the glaring lack of any oversight or accountability to hold them responsible. Clearly, not only are there a few bad apples, the entire barrel is corrupt. The case resurfaced during his second term, and Putin ultimately dismissed a number of FSB officers involved at the same time that he rotated Prosecutor General Ustinov and Justice Minister Chaika (each took the other's position), but only after the case had gained prominent headlines in the international news. A number of potential witnesses were killed, the individuals who had investigated the case were charged with various abuses of office and human rights violations, and the judges who acquitted them of these charges were fired, just as Shchekochikhin had predicted, but the Kremlin had gone further, in a demonstration of its control.[65] Among those who Putin dismissed were previously "untouchable" senior officers of the FSB, including Sergei Shishin and Vladimir Anisimov, both colonel generals and former heads of the FSB's Department of Internal Security. Its then-current head, FSB Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Kupryazhkin, was also fired. Additionally, an unnamed senior official within the Putin administration who had been responsible for personnel issues, and his counterpart in the cabinet staff, were terminated along with several deputies of former Prosecutor General

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

Ustinov, including leading figures Dmitry Shokhin and Kamil Kashaev, who were state prosecutors in the case against Yukos.[66]

Of note, during his second presidential term and reflecting an increased sense of security about his power, Putin took decisive action against chekists and other elites in a variety of cases once they became a public embarrassment to the state, that is, when they became hot media items around the globe. However, that was not his response to former KGB-FSB officer and Moscow-based millionaire Andrei Lugovoi, who is British intelligence's prime suspect in the polonium-210 killing of former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006,[67] leading many to suspect that the Putin regime ordered the operation. It is interesting how during the 1990s (and before Putin was appointed FSB director), the period when the oligarchs and OC were the dominant components in the new oligarchy, many investigative reporters were killed, *allegedly by organized criminals*, for investigating *organized crime* activity and identifying individuals involved therein. Under Putin, with the chekists the dominant power (having subordinated and supplanted the oligarchs and OC), a situation exists in which journalists and other investigators, including government officials, are murdered, *allegedly by the FSB*, for investigating illegal *regime/FSB activities*. And, over time, the killings got increasingly bolder, as shown by that of Litvinenko in the wake of Anna Politkovskaya's death, also in 2006, both further detailed below. There remain few individuals who dare speak out on the Kremlin's/FSB's crimes. The silence is representative of the fear and

---

[66] Ibid.

[67] Tariq Panja, "Litvinenko's Lawyers Fight On, A Year On," *The Washington Post*, November 23, 2007; and, Frank Gardner, "Litvinenko Death Fuels UK-Russia Spy War," *BBC News*, November 23, 2007.

hopelessness that have taken over.[68] As Russian-American journalist Masha Gessen of the *Boston Globe* notes on the fear felt by the few remaining independent journalists in contemporary Russian society, "One can be afraid of the FSB, organized crime, the police. And one can also be afraid of the fears of others — companies who will pull their ads, for example, or investors who will pull their money because they fear the association with a risk-taking publication will cost them dearly....the penalties for not being mindful, for refusing to play by the rules, are too grave."[69] Shchekochikhin's investigative activities into the apartment bombings, Tri Kita, and Chechnya had proved too threatening, and those who followed in his footsteps, as had others prior, paid just as dearly.

Former FSB officer and practicing lawyer, Mikhail Trepashkin, spent four years in a penal colony following his investigations into FSB complicity in illegal activities. He had cooperated with civilian activists investigating the FSB's suspected involvement in the 1999 apartment bombings,[70] claimed to have evidence of the Service's participation in those, as well as the Dubrovka theatre incident (he had told his wife, "this could not have happened without their knowledge"), however, he never got the chance to deeply investigate that affair,[71] and announced his plan to present some of the evidence at the Moscow City Court where he was to represent the sisters Alyona and Tatyana Morozov

---

[68] Viktor Erofeyev, "What killed Politkovskaya?" *International Herald Tribune*, October 11, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/11/opinion/ederofeyev.php.

[69] Masha Gessen, "Muzzled in Moscow: Fear and self-censorship in Putin's Russia."

[70] "Russia's FSB Detained 18 Foreign Spies in 2004 — Director," *MosNews.com*, December 16, 2004, http://MosNews.com.com/news/2004/12/16/spiesrus.shtml.

[71] Anatoly Medetsky, "For Trepashkin, Bomb Trail Leads to Jail," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, January 14, 2004, p. 1.

in the bombings trial. However, on October 22, 2003, roughly a week before the trial against the two men was scheduled to begin, Trepashkin was arrested on charges of illegal arms possession. Authorities claimed to have discovered a gun in the trunk of his car after stopping him, while Trepashkin insisted it was planted.[72]

On December 15, 2003 (of note, less than two months after oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky had been arrested, a pivotal moment in the chekist regime's rule as it established its unquestioned authority), Trepashkin was transferred to Matrosskaya Tishina prison and charged with divulging state secrets and illegally possessing ammunition, in a separate case going back to 2002 that prosecutors had just finished investigating. Those charges had been based on a January 2002 search of his apartment in which investigators claimed to have found 30 classified copies of FSB documents that Trepashkin had allegedly made copies of and stored at his home during his 1984-1997 employment with the Service, along with 22 cartridges. Prosecutors accused Trepashkin of showing some of the documents to advice-seeking FSB officer Viktor Shebalin, and revealing state secrets about the way the Service operated in the process. While Trepashkin admitted that he showed some documents to Shebalin that were unclassified, he maintained that the remainder of the documents and the cartridges had been planted. The Foundation for Civil Liberties maintains a Web site, http://eng.trepashkin.ru, dedicated to covering issues associated with Trepashkin's legal troubles. As to the origin of the order to search his apartment, it notes:

---

[72] An interesting parallel is the case of Viktor Orekhov, a former KGB captain who was a political prisoner from 1978-1986 after he began calling dissidents to tell them when the KGB was coming to search their apartments. In 1995 he was sentenced to three years in prison on a trumped-up gun charge. It was believed his arrest was motivated by his outspoken criticism of a Yeltsin appointee to the Moscow police force. After an enormous public outcry, Orekhov was released after serving 10 months. See Jonathan Weiler, "Human rights in post-Soviet Russia," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 2002, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol10.html.

> The search occurred soon after Mr. Trepashkin had received a phone call from a former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko who was granted asylum in Britain. At the time, Mr. Litvinenko was working on a book about the 1999 bombings, *Blowing Up Russia – Terror From Within*. The case against Trepashkin was initiated on the basis of an affidavit signed by an officer from FSB's Internal Security Directorate, dated January 11, 2002 alleging that Mr. Trepashkin was collecting information on the apartment bombings for the British secret service MI-5, and that the request to do so came from Mr. Litvinenko and the oligarch Boris Berezovsky. According to the affidavit, the objective of the British intelligence was to "discredit the FSB." In reality, Mr. Trepashkin's interest in the bombings was spurred by Sergei Yushenkov, a Duma member who at the time was setting up a public commission to investigate the bombings.[73]

It followed that Trepashkin communicated with both the Duma (Kovalev) Commission, which had asked him to investigate the bombings in summer 2002, and Litvinenko, with whom he spent hours on the phone, probably tapped, discussing his findings. Clearly, his investigation into the bombings made him an FSB target. As his cooperation with the Commission progressed and he publicly disseminated his findings, so, too, did his problems with the Service and legal authorities. By late 2002 the Military Prosecutor's Office, acting on a number of anonymous complaints, had opened a formal investigation into his activities and called him in for questioning.[74]

As to the evidence in the bombings, Trepashkin told the weekly *Moskovskiye Novosti* that it suggested a man named Vladimir Romanovich rented the basements in the Moscow apartment buildings where the explosives had been stored. Romanovich was an intelligence officer he knew from his FSB days who had (conveniently) died after being hit by a car in Cyprus a few months after the bombings. Conversely, the FSB asserted that another man, Achemiz Gochiyayev, rented the basements and planted the explosives. He remains at large. Further, Trepashkin said that Gochiyayev and Romanovich were

---

[73] See the Web site, "The Trepashkin Case," Foundation for Civil Liberties, http://eng.trepashkin.ru.

[74] Op. cit., "For Trepashkin, Bomb Trail Leads to Jail."

business partners and knew of the basement locations but had no role in planting the explosives. In fact, it had been Gochiyayev who had alerted police about two basements rented by Romanovich in Moscow so that they could defuse the bombs found there.[75]

Trepashkin's trial on the state secrets charge took place from December 2003 to May 19, 2004. Although the FSB had accused him of spying for British intelligence in a plot entailing his transfer of FSB documents to Litvinenko, who then allegedly passed them to oligarch Boris Berezovsky, who, in turn, would give them to MI-5, calling the plan a "project of misinformation,"[76] ultimately, the MI-5 allegation was dropped, and Trepashkin was sentenced to four years in a non-prison penal settlement for revealing state secrets without elements of treason,[77] which verdict the military board of the Russian Supreme Court upheld in September. He was convicted on the separate weapons charges in December 2004. However, on July 21, 2005, responding to an appeal by Trepashkin's lawyers, the Moscow Regional Court reversed those charges in light of the revelation that his fingerprints were not found on the gun.[78] He still served the four years for divulging state secrets, and was released in November 2007.[79]

---

[75] Ibid.

[76] Nick Paton Walsh, "Former Russian officer accused of being MI5 spy," *The Guardian*, January 16, 2004.

[77] "Supreme Court Upholds Sentence Against Former FSB Officer," *MosNews.com*, September 13, 2004, http://MosNews.com.com/news/2004/09/13/security.shtml.

[78] "Moscow Court Reduces Prison Term for Ex-KGB Officer Jailed for Treachery," *MosNews.com*, July 1, 2005, http:///MosNews.com.com/news/2005/07/01/trepashkin.shtml.

[79] "Former Russian FSB officer released from prison," *GlobalSecurity.org*, November 30, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2007/intell-071130-rianovosti01.htm; "Former KGB agent Mikhail Trepashkin released from Russian prison," *Pravda*, November 30, 2007; and, "Former Russian FSB Colonel Trepashkin released," *Eurasian Security Services Daily Review*, AxisGlobe.com, December 2, 2007, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1441.

In the wake of Litvinenko's untimely death, Trepashkin had written a letter from prison stating that the FSB had offered him a chance in 2002 to join a group targeting him, but he had rejected it. Further, he wrote that the FSB had created a hit squad to take out enemies of the Kremlin, and quoted the officer as saying that, "Litvinenko won't escape Trotsky's ice pick," referring to the 1940 murder of Leon Trotsky by Soviet agent Ramon Mercader.[80] When Trepashkin's lawyers announced that he had information on the Litvinenko investigation that he wanted to report to investigators, Alexander Sidorov, a spokesman for the Russian prison service, responded that, "Russia's prison service will not allow somebody sentenced for disclosing state secrets to continue to be a source of information for representatives of the special services of foreign states."[81]

In addition to those individuals already mentioned, others investigating the apartment bombings have also been killed. One of the earliest was Artyom Borovik, founder of the journal *Sovershenno Sekretno*, who died in March 2000 in a mysterious plane crash in Moscow. Investigative journalist Dmitry Filomonov suspected that it could have been a murder.[82] The subsequent attacks and murders also remain unsolved. Potential presidential candidate, Irina Khakamada, the only female who ran in 2004, joined the chorus of voices suggesting that the Putin regime and FSB were deeply involved in both the 1999 apartment bombings and 2002 Dubrovka attack, the latter event begging the question of whether the FSB had agents among the perpetrators since the

---

[80] "Russia to help U.K. in Poisoned Spy Case," *USA Today*, December 4, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-12-04-russian-spy_x.htm.

[81] "Russia: No Litvinenko extraditions," *CNN.com*, December 5, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/12/05/uk.spywrap/index.html.

[82] "Journalists Continue To Investigate Borovik's Death," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 18, November 20, 2000, p. 3.

Service apparently knew they would not detonate their explosives. Confident with that knowledge, authorities therefore proceeded to use a mysterious nerve gas to end the debacle, with a man named Terkibaev, one of the suspected double agents, dying soon thereafter in an ostensible accident.[83]

9.3.6: The Polonium-210 Killing of Former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko

The ongoing diplomatic row between the UK and Russia over the case of former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko, who died of polonium-210 poisoning in November 2006, allegedly killed by former KGB-FSB officers and perhaps on the Putin regime's order,[84] may qualify as a form of political-intelligence intervention, and surely sheds light on the nature of the political control that does exist. While the suspects are former career chekists, it is generally accepted that, for the most part, there is no such thing as "former" when it comes to Russian intelligence officers. Following his 1998 revelation that the FSB had ordered him to assassinate billionaire oligarch Boris Berezovsky, Litvinenko had fled Russia in 2001 and was granted asylum in Britain only to be convicted in absentia in 2003 by a Moscow court of abuse of office and stealing explosives and sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison. Residing in London, he authored two books in 2002 alleging FSB involvement in the September 1999 apartment bombings (*Blowing*

---

[83] Lawrence Uzzel, "Candidates Seek to Focus Spotlight on Controversies," *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol. 5, Issue 3, The Jamestown Foundation, January 21, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/print_friendly.php?volume_id=396&issue_id=2902&article_id=23486. Also see *The NIS Observed: An Analytic Review*, Vol. IX, No. 2, February 6, 2004, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol9/ed0902.html.

[84] For comprehensive coverage of Alexander Litvinenko's life and death, see Alex Goldfarb and Marina Litvinenko, *Death of a Dissident: The Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the Return of the KGB*, Free Press: New York, 2007.

Up Russia: Terror From Within and *LCG: Lubyanka Criminal Grouping*),[85] the latter which provides an in-depth examination of FSB corruption and a detailed narrative on events surround his decision to leave the Service, including the tasking to kill oligarch Boris Berezovsky.[86]

Documenting in detail the circumstances surrounding the bombings and accusing the FSB of complicity, he noted how the attacks led to greatly increased public support for the launching of the so-called Second Chechen War.[87] Litvinenko concluded that the bombings, along with supporting media campaigns, significantly aided Putin in winning the 2000 presidential election, noting that, "In Russia today, Vladimir Putin, the security apparatus and the Ministry of Media are the real mafia."[88]

From London, Litvinenko also continued to publicly comment on the illegal activities of the Putin regime and FSB, including the order to murder Berezovsky, which had led him to resign from the Service and go public in the first place. In 2000, Berezovsky had been forced into self-exile and was granted asylum in Britain in 2003, with Moscow unsuccessfully trying to extradite him ever since. As noted, Berezovsky bankrolled a film on the FSB's possible role in the bombings, and also consistently criticized the regime on public channels.[89] Before he finally succumbed to the polonium-210 poisoning, Litvinenko publicly disclosed information about Putin's affiliations with

---

[85] Op. cit., *Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within*; and, Alexander Litvinenko, *LCG: Lubyanka Criminal Grouping* (in Russian, LPG, Lubyanka Prestypnaya Gryppinrovka), Grani: NY, 2002.

[86] Ibid., *LCG: Lubyanka Criminal Group*.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Jack Aubry and Jim Bronskill, "Russia increases spying in North America," *The Ottawa Citizen*, December 11, 2002, Canada.com.

[89] Op. cit, "For Trepashkin, Bomb Trail Leads to Jail."

corrupt FSB officers and Uzbek mobsters engaged in the lucrative drug trade. The group was trafficking Afghan opium through St. Petersburg, an activity he alleged that Putin was fully involved in as Deputy for Economic Affairs to St. Petersburg Mayor Sobchak during the early 1990s, a position that gave him the responsibility for export licensing and thus brought him into direct contact with the numerous mobsters who controlled the metals and other business. One of Litvinenko's informants, a presidential aide who was providing him information on the president's ties with the Uzbek group, was seen by surveillance with Litvinenko and fell to an assassin's bullet three weeks later when he was killed by a hitman on a bicycle who pedaled by and shot him in the face at close range, killing him.[90] It is worthwhile to read Litvinenko's account, published in *The Mail* in an article titled, "Why I believe Putin wanted me dead…," which provides exquisite detail on Putin's corrupt ties with mobsters that go back over 15 years and are covered up through the murder of those who dare expose it.[91] As for the FSB officers suspected of killing Litvinenko, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitri Kovtun, both remain free in Russia, with the former having won a seat in the Duma in the December 2007 elections, effectively negating any chance that, in the unlikely event a trial was held in the country, he would be prosecuted.[92]

---

[90] Alexander Litvinenko, "Why I believe Putin wanted me dead…," *The Mail*, November 25, 2006, http://www.mailonsunday.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=418652&in_page_id=1770.

[91] Ibid.

[92] "Suspect in Litvinenko murder wins parliamentary immunity," *RIA Novosti*, December 3, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071203/90739394.html. It is worth noting that prominent others who conflicted with or were closely associated with Putin have been killed as well, including SVR Col. Igor Klimov, who was killed in June 2003 soon after being appointed to serve as acting general director of defense contractor, Almaz-Antei, one of the state's largest producers of air-defense systems. It was suspected he was killed due to his efforts to end the embezzlement of millions of dollars from the firm. Of note, in 2002, Viktor Ivanov, career chekist and deputy head of the presidential administration (responsible for personnel), had been appointed chairman of the firms board of directors. Roman Tsepov, the director of the elite, St. Petersburg-

9.3.7: An Operationally Effective Intelligence Community

As to Bar-Joseph's second requirement (enabling the intelligence community to maintain a high level of operational effectiveness), it is particularly the endemic corruption within both the Russian political regime's and Services' focus on personal enrichment that has undermined their ability to maintain a high level of operational effectiveness. As a direct result of the political elites' (in recent years, predominantly chekists) use of the Services to bolster their own power and resources, their operational effectiveness and the professionalism associated with it have not been a priority. Further, the chekists' use of intelligence for private financial interests has been well-established for over a decade. As they have moved into leading political positions, the practice has only become widespread. In his 1994 book, *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*,[93] Waller noted that in order to keep talented personnel, Moscow had to look the other way when intelligence officers engaged in illegal business dealings on the side.[94] He suggested that neither the executive nor legislative branches of government exercised control over the organs after the failed 1991 coup, asserting that "given the lack of meaningful controls over them, the security organs may be considered Russia's fourth

---

based PSS, Baltik-Eskort, which had provided protection for the family of Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, and his then-deputy, Putin, died of severe radiation sickness after ingesting some unidentified substance reported to be an experimental poison containing heavy metals in September 2004. It is remarkable how many individuals associated with or investigating the FSB in some way have been killed by radiation-type poisonings in recent years. Finally, Anatoly Trofimov, a retired FSB Col. Gen., was killed in April 2005. He had specialized in fighting corruption, and Litvinenko had described him as a behind-the-scenes critic of Kremlin policies in Chechnya who had opposed Putin's 1998 appointment as FSB director. See Victor Yasmann, "Russia: The KGB's Post-Soviet 'Commercialization'," *RFE/RL*, December 20, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/12/888236cc-139d-4212-a28d-88451fdaccab.html.

[93] J. Michael Waller, *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*, Westview Press: U.S.A., 1994.

[94] Juanita Darling, "Rude Russians Raised Red Flag in Andes," *The Los Angeles Times*, reprinted in *The Moscow Times*, November 14, 2000, pp. 1-4.

branch of government, if not its core."[95] And as Litvinenko had noted, "the KGB had formerly been under the political control of the Communist Party, which served to some extent as a brake on the activities of the special agencies, since no significant operations were possible without the sanction of the Politburo. After 1991, however, the MB-FSK-FSB began operating on Russian territory absolutely independently and totally unchecked, apart from the control exercised by the FSB over its own operatives. This all-pervading predatory structure was now unrestrained by either ideology or law."[96] So, too, GRU defector Col. Stanislav Lunev, author of the 1998 book, *Through the Eyes of the Enemy*, noted in July 2001 that under Putin, Russia's special services had gained much greater powers and influence. Plus, their personnel numbers had increased and were at least two times as large as the KGB, comprising a total of two dozen different services, including the FSB, FAPSI, FPS, GUO, PSB, and SVR, among others. Yet, he observed that they "are not capable of fighting against corruption and organized crime in Russia, where special services officials are cooperating with Mafia-type criminal syndicates, which have their own people in the leadership of law enforcement agencies as well as at the top level of the country's political and government establishment."[97] He lamented that they were weak against WMD protection and fighting terrorism, especially protecting the Russian people, yet strong in their maintenance of control over the population, "where democracy does not exist and major freedoms and civil rights are totally ignored."[98]

---

[95] Op. cit., *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*, pp. 256, 281.

[96] Op. cit., *Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within*, p. 8.

[97] Stanislav Lunev, "FSB Influence Increases, Influence of Russia's Special Services Increases," *NewsMax*, July 16, 2001.

[98] Ibid.

The corruption is not limited to the political regime and intelligence/security services, but extends throughout the military as well. In an enlightening statement on the developing state of affairs in this realm, then-Director of the Moscow-based Institute for Globalization Studies (IPROG), Boris Kagarlitsky, commented on the July 2004 military restructuring, noting that,

> Now command of the military has been unified. Next up — army intelligence, which until recently existed in a world of its own. The mutual hostility between military and civilian intelligence is well-known, and first emerged in the Soviet era. Now commercial rivalries have been added to the mix. Serving ideology or the interests of the state is a thing of the past. Only dim memories remain of corporate ethics in the security services, which are increasingly dominated by a free-market spirit. Agents trained in surveillance now offer their services to private clients. Those trained in munitions make their money blowing things up. The closed system in these agencies makes it very easy for agents to launder money from their questionable moonlighting work through reliable people and mysterious companies both here and abroad.
>
> As one military expert put it recently, army intelligence is gradually becoming a disorganized, badly managed confederation of various gangs and companies. The arrival of the Kremlin's team will mean a renewed struggle for spheres of influence. We have a pretty good idea how this sort of thing happens in the mafia, but how will it play out in the security services and the many related organizations? We won't see all-out battles and the use of heavy artillery, of course. And increasingly dubious reports will be filed up the chain of command as before. But control will be lost entirely.[99]

With corruption endemic throughout the highest levels, funding and training to improve the Services' capabilities to fight it and organized crime have not been forthcoming; rather, the focus has been on the political repression of opposition forces. Loyalty to the regime is valued above all, often to the exclusion of any relevant skill set, meaning incompetence is of no overriding concern. The regime has been more focused on fighting those who challenge or oppose the chekist political-economic agenda at

---

[99] Boris Kagarlitsky, "'Power' Bureaucracy Chaos," *The Moscow Times*, July 29, 2004, p. 9.

home, and intensifying its espionage offensive against the West abroad. By 2006, Putin was commending the Services on their professionalism, "tellingly," in the sphere of counterintelligence and in operations in Chechnya,[100] the two areas most representative of secret police work. At the annual January 2007 FSB Collegium meeting, Putin stated that, "Another key priority for the FSB is to make its counterintelligence operations more effective." He also spoke to the Service's operational effectiveness in fighting crime, saying, "I can only say once again that the public measures the effectiveness of your work in large part by the results obtained by your investigations departments. It would be unwise to get carried away with boosting the numbers through insignificant criminal cases. It is important to concentrate your efforts on thorough investigation of crimes that represent a direct threat to our country's security."[101] However, the problem is that organized crime and corruption is rampant at the highest levels. Putin concluded his speech by stating that, "Overall, these measures should provide a big incentive to raising effectiveness and ensuring the professional growth of personnel."[102]

It is worth noting that, in his second term, having overseen the complete marginalization of democratic forces in political life, the subordination of the oligarchs, and the regaining of Kremlin control over a majority of Russia's strategic resources, especially oil and gas, which has, together with arms exports, generated fantastic profits, Putin significantly increased the Services' funding, with a budget increase of 27% for the

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

FSB in 2006, to be repeated for 2007.[103] Increased funding has not reduced corruption in the ranks.

Of note, during a July 2007 meeting with his senior military and intelligence/security chiefs Putin stressed the importance of intensifying the espionage offensive, calling for a "comprehensive strengthening of the armed forces" and an intensification of its foreign intelligence activities, stating that, "The Foreign Intelligence Service scrupulously carries out its tasks. Its employees help identify external threats to national security and participate in strengthening the international position of our country. But the situation in the world requires that the Foreign Intelligence Service continually enhance its possibilities."[104] He also said, "The situation in the world and internal political interests require the Foreign Intelligence Service to increase its capabilities permanently, primarily in the field of information and analytical support for the country's leadership."[105] With so many leading chekists having financial stakes in the major strategic firms and holding corporate board positions at state-controlled companies, the espionage offensive is of personal financial, as well as political, interest to them, as it is to their organized crime partners.

9.3.8: A Lack of Oversight and Accountability and Ineffective Intelligence/Security Services

While intelligence failures will always occur when dealing with incomplete information, the reasons for them matter and, in democracies, are reviewed with the aim

---

[103] "Putin Praises FSB for Exposing Spies," *RFE/RL*, February 7, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/9f73bb82-e54e-48ae-9507-f7c25ae88867.html; and, "[Putin] Speech at Enlarged Collegium of the Russian Federal Security Service," *Johnson's Russia List*, #27, JRL 2007-24, January 31, 2007, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-24-27.cfm.

[104] "The West Doesn't Change Its Brains," *Kommersant*, July 27, 2007.

[105] "Putin Vows to Increase Spy Activity," *The Moscow Times*, July 26, 2007, p. 3.

of instituting corrective action and prevention of a repeat. And if an intelligence failure is directly traceable to corruption, malfeasance, or incompetence, as opposed to a lack of resources or limited information, then demands that heads roll are heard far and wide. Commensurately, if resources were determined to have been inadequate, the parliament is expected to take immediate action to remedy that problem through emergency budget increases for the Services. In either case, calls tend to be made by elected representatives and the public for executive branch political officials and leading intelligence authorities to make an accounting for what went wrong, followed by a prescription of steps that will be taken to remedy the weaknesses associated with the failure.

In the wake of intelligence failures in post-Soviet Russia, as with every other major aspect of intelligence, decisions over how to respond have resided solely with the executive. Parliament has played no meaningful role, and civil society has been censored, suppressed, or excluded. For example, Patrushev reports to Putin, [106] however, his reporting to the legislature lacks detail, and parliamentary committee members are precluded from asking questions on organizational issues and operational matters and have limited power over the intelligence budgets, making the oversight process quite superficial in practice. After the October 2002 Dubrovka attack, in which 129 hostages died from gas that security forces released into the building, although Putin had declared, "The main goal of our law-enforcement departments and secret services in operational planning is the maximum safe release of the hostages,"[107] even talk of an inquiry into the intelligence failure went nowhere, disappearing internally into the heart of the FSB. In

---

[106] "FSB Director Reports to President," *RosBusiness Consulting*, in *The Moscow Times*, July 23, 2002.

[107] "Moscow Terrorist Act Planned Abroad – Putin," *Russia & FSU General News*, October 24, 2002, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-26472749_ITM.

2005, Moscow police chief Vladimir Pronin, who was among those directing the raid,[108] blamed the security forces' problems at Dubrovka on the journalists covering the event, who he suggested made a successful rescue operation impossible.[109]

Parliamentary investigations and presidential or independent commissions remain rare, and when constituted, their findings inconclusive, with symbolic and sanitized citations of the numbers dead made along with a promise to find the guilty parties. For example, there were two official investigations of the events at Beslan, one by prosecutors and the other by a parliamentary commission chaired by Deputy Federation Council Speaker Aleksandr Torshin, with both concluding that contrary to the evidence and eye-witnesses, the hostage-takers, not security forces, triggered the firefight that led to the deaths of hundreds of children. There was only one dissenting member of the commission, Duma Deputy Yury Savelyev, who released an independent report in 2006 stating that the security forces had fired rocket-propelled grenades into the building, leading to the ensuing firefight. Regardless, prosecutors stuck to their official version of events. Susanna Dudiyeva, head of the Beslan Mothers' Committee, in possession of a videotape of the botched raid obtained by the group and distributed to the prosecutors' task force investigating the attack, observed, "If prosecutors were interested in an objective investigation, they should have looked at this." She lamented that, "To this day, not a single FSB agent has been questioned." As usual, the FSB has stonewalled and the

---

[108] L. Burban, S. Gubareva, T. Karpova, N. Karpov, V. Kurbatov, D. Mildovidov, and P. Finogenov, "*Nord-Ost": Investigation Unfinished…* published with assistance from "Terrorism Victims Support Fund" Non-Commercial Organization, Moscow, April 26, 2006, http://www.pravdabeslana.ru/nordost/dokleng.doc.

[109] "Beslan and Dubrovka Victims' Relatives Join Forces," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 6, No. 41, November 3, 2005.

prosecutors' office maintained the government version.[110] Its reporting remains extremely limited and superficial. As to SVR or GRU reporting to parliament, it has never been up for discussion or debate, leading to or signifying the understanding that it is solely an internal and executive matter. The direct line to Putin is the only one that has any substance; there lies the sole accountability.

9.4: THE NATURE AND STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OVER INTELLIGENCE

9.4.1: The End of Communist Party Control

During the Soviet era, political control of the intelligence/security sector was tightly held by the Communist party. The KGB always took orders from the central political leadership. Amy Knight made the point in her 1996 book, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, when she wrote, "As we know now, the security police, however ruthless and evil, were never independent actors in the Soviet system, although they were often portrayed as such. Then, as now, they took their cues from the politicians." Further, she observed, the KGB had "always been an instrument of the party leadership, from the CCCP down to the regional party committees." For instance, she quotes a Russian news article written by a former KGB counterintelligence officer explaining that, "the supervisors [of the KGB] were the 'number-one people,' that is, the first secretaries of the party organizations....it was to there and not to anyone else that the KGB reported important information. And it was they who gave orders and who approved or disapproved the operations of KGB organs." [111]

---

[110] Alexander Osipovich, "New Evidence Raises More Beslan Doubts," *The Moscow Times*, July 30, 2007, p. 3.

[111] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloak: The KGB's Successorss*, pp. 28, 38.

So, too, as Milt Bearden and James Risen describe in their 2003 book, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB*, the KGB and GRU were always at the whim of their Communist party master, with many officers recalled or punished for various deeds or allegations, sometimes amounting to no more than interpersonal rivalries, power struggles, or disagreements.[112] Similarly, in his 2005 memoir titled, *Spy Handler: The True Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen & Aldrich Ames*, KGB Col. Victor Cherkashin, who retired shortly after the failed August 1991, wrote, "However, far from helping drive policy, as some thought, the KGB was utterly loyal to the political administration — the Party's Central Committee. That perception remained true in 1991 and shouldn't be diminished by Kryuchkov's part in the coup. Ideological faithfulness to the Party underpinned the very foundation of that main pillar of communist rule."[113]

In terms of political control of intelligence, Bar-Joseph observes that the Soviet-era secret police services tended to operate with "medium degrees of autonomy," and enjoyed no prolonged periods free from Communist Party control, which was exercised by rigorous institutions and significant bureaucratic capacity.[114] Notably, with the exception of Knight, none of these authors suggest that any political control continued *after* 1991; they accurately depicted the past, but the present needs to be qualified. The recurring question throughout the 1990s was who exercised political control over the intelligence/security services. No one could authoritatively answer that question since

---

[112] Milt Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB*, Random House: NY, 2003.

[113] Victor Cherkashin with Gregory Feifer, *Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer, The True Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen & Aldrich Ames*, Basic Books: NY, 2005, p. 307.

[114] Op. cit., *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States.*

there were few discernable lines of control in practice as chekist loyalties fragmented in the chaos of the state's political-economic collapse. A key question addressed in the following sections is how the political control of the Services evolved following the Soviet party-state demise.

Of note, with old Soviet KGB officers dominating the Russian government at all levels in Putin's Russia, the intelligence/security services take their orders and are tasked by a chekist political elite. Given the extent of chekist political-economic penetration, it is a unique situation. Indeed, the political control of intelligence thus takes on new meaning, and runs counter to the conventional understanding of the relationship. How is one to define, interpret, and gauge political control of intelligence when it functions largely in terms of chekists to chekists? More to the point, what does the resulting nature of the producer-consumer relationship mean for democracy in Russia? Given the prevalence of the chekist identity and mentality among this fraternity-like, insular, militaristic, and historically lawless community and its predilection toward authoritarian and conspirational ways, now in control of Russia's enormous wealth, a democratic outcome is wholly unlikely, with the Services becoming ever more politicized.

9.4.2: Four Models of Political Control — Still a Political Police in Russia

In his study on intelligence intervention in the politics of democratic states,[115] Bar-Joseph develops a model of four methods of political control. He suggests that the difference in control systems is principally a function of two variables, *participation* — which of the state's political institutions participate in controlling intelligence; and *means* — which way this control is maintained. He notes that two methods of participation are

[115] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

possible: *unilateral*, meaning when a single institution controls intelligence, and *multilateral*, meaning when at least two state institutions are responsible for this task. A unilateral method is one in which the executive branch exercises exclusive control over the Services and, in more extreme forms of this system, control is maintained by a single or very small group within that branch. Conversely, a multilateral method is one in which control is maintained by both the executive and legislative branches, as well as a variety of informal groups such as the media, interest groups, and public opinion.

Additionally, Bar-Joseph suggests that the means of control may also be divided into two types*: personal*, in which individuals who are trusted to represent the interests of politicians are put in managerial positions in intelligence institutions in order to ensure that the agencies act in accordance with the policies outlined by these politicians; and *constitutional*, in which the regulation of control is maintained by state law. The interaction between these variables yields four possible types of political control systems, shown in the matrix in Figure 9.1 below:[116]

Figure 9.1: Matrix of Political Control of Intelligence

		PARTICIPATION	
		Unilateral	**Multilateral**
MEANS	**Personal**	Unilateral-personal	Multilateral-personal
	Constitutional	Unilateral-constitutional	Multilateral-constitutional

[116] Ibid.

Bar-Joseph found that the Soviet Union partially resembled a multilateral-personal method in the wake of Stalin's death, when "the selection of senior officials in the intelligence system involved a bargaining process between various opposing groups of the ruling Politburo. This bargaining process usually ended in a compromise that reflected the balance of forces within the Politburo," thus falling in the second quadrant.[117] By extrapolating from the data descriptives presented in this project, the evidence shows that in post-Soviet Russia the method of political control has in practice been, under both Yeltsin and Putin, one representing the unilateral-personal method (although the degree of control varied significantly between the two executives), thus placing the state firmly in the first quadrant, which of the four modes is the most conducive to the development of a secret political police. As Bar-Joseph illustrated:

> The unilateral-personal method is the least likely to prevent the corruption of state-intelligence relations. Basically this system uses individuals selected by the executive branch for senior positions in the intelligence community as a means to ensure that the services act in accordance with the government's policy. Even if initially no abuse of this monopoly takes place, the fact that this method is regulated by persons rather than by law and does not allow the legislative branch formal access to intelligence makes its corruption unavoidable in the long run.
>
> Although such a method can ensure intelligence loyalty to the government in power, it cannot prevent the use of the intelligence community for parochial political interests, and it opens the way for parochial alliance between intelligence and politicians. Under such conditions it is impossible to establish a trustful relationship between the government and the opposition regarding intelligence policies. As for the intelligence community itself, even a very strong and highly professional service can fall victim to the deficiencies of this system, and if it lacks in professionalism, it is sure to become a partisan rather than a state instrument.[118]

---

[117] Ibid., pp. 62-64. Note that Bar-Joseph does not utilize the Cartesian coordinate system to identify quadrants. In this matrix, the first quadrant is the top left cell, and from there the cells are numbered clockwise.

[118] Ibid.

As shown, Yeltsin chose to employ the unilateral-personal mode of political control in order to bolster his power and counter the opposition in the legislature. So, too, did Putin. Under both regimes, loyalty was demanded above all, with politicization increasing and professionalism decreasing. As a result, the sector became totally politicized, and with the chekists' resurgence, thwarted any effort to establish the rule of law. Russian culture may also have been a factor in this train of events. Bar-Joseph notes that, "The unilateral-personal control model is the most widely used method to supervise intelligence organizations in countries with a low level of political culture. In such societies, where distribution of power does not exist, the most important factor in selecting heads of intelligence services is their loyalty to the single leader or junta in power."[119] In post-Soviet Russia, loyalty to the president is the primary requirement for not only an appointment to a Service leadership post, but to sustain a position in any leading position whatsoever. Highlighting a point that illuminates the implications of this mode of political control for Russian democratization, Bar-Joseph explains that, "unilateral-personal control systems in their pure form are almost never found in democracies, where distribution of power is the foundation of political life."[120] Rather than being conducive to democratic development, the unilateral-personal mode is antagonistic. Hence, the nature of political control of intelligence as it evolved following communism's collapse provides yet another clear signal of the political direction of the country since Yeltsin's fateful decision to dismiss Gen. Vadim Bakatin as intelligence chief (August 1991-January 1992), reverse his reforms, and bolster the chekists as a key

[119] Ibid.

[120] Ibid.

support to his power, a decision which consequences were built and greatly expanded on by Putin.

Bar-Joseph concluded with four major points:

> 1) An effective control system is a necessary condition to prevent the degradation of intelligence-state relations. Without it even a strong and highly professional organization is likely to lose its integrity in the long run;
>
> 2) Political control systems reflect the societies they serve, their security needs, dominant societal values, political systems, and political cultures. Hence, different societies develop different control systems, and a system that is suitable to one society cannot always be constructed in another;
>
> 3) In democratic regimes, control systems — whether they are unilateral or multilateral — are maintained by law. The multi-constitutional system offers a better equilibrium of effective control and intelligence performance than the unilateral system; and,
>
> 4) Even the combination of a highly professional intelligence organization and an effective political control system cannot fully prevent the corruption of the system. It makes such a development far less likely, but ultimately whether such corruption occurs depends also on individuals and the level of their professional integrity and political ambitions."[121]

Putin clearly recognized the need to tighten political control of the Services following the Yeltsin era, in line with Bar-Joseph's first point. His second point illuminates why Putin managed to establish his control without great difficulty. Bar-Joseph's third and fourth points are irrelevant as Russia is a non-democracy, bereft of any rule of law, and the highly politicized and deeply corrupt intelligence/security sector lack professionalism.

[121] Ibid., p. 67.

9.5: POLITICAL CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE UNDER YELTSIN: FIRST MOVES — PARTY COMPETITION AND FRAGMENTED LOYALTIES, THEN EXECUTIVE DECREE

Once the discredited party-state that was the Soviet Union collapsed, the KGB lost its long-time political master, while the inevitable democratic euphoria that followed ignited the energies of many a political entrepreneur. With new political-economic structures forming and no LVD to sift the entrants, the old Soviet conservatives managed to dominate the new institutions in increasing numbers over the years. Initially, numerous political parties, many closely tied with oligarchic and OC interests, presented candidates who contested government posts specifically in order to gain immunity from prosecution and subsequently use their positions to further their commercial interests, as it had rapidly become clear that proximity to the political centres of power translated into economic success under the Yeltsin regime. In the ruthless competition for private gain during the large-scale privatization of state assets following the Soviet Union's collaspe, KGB loyalties quickly became fragmented.

As noted earlier, Yeltsin had divided up the KGB in order to dilute its power and mitigate any threat it posed to his rule, appointing Bakatin to oversee the task of "reforming" the Services. However, just over four months later, Yeltsin had a change of heart and removed him in order to sabotage the effort to destroy the secret police, having made the decision instead to use the Services to bolster his own power. Indeed, it had been "political exigencies," or the retention of power, that had served as his primary motivation for "reforming" the KGB through its division rather than destroying the old secret police in the first place, and building new intelligence/security services from scratch. In any case, it soon became clear that far from reforming the intelligence/security

sector, Yeltsin planned to use it as his own political power tool. As Waller observed, "While he limited the former KGB's potential to act against him personally by dividing it into separate organizations, he enhanced their power as independent institutions by dismissing his democratic allies' demands that they be purged and reformed, and by providing them with material means to sustain themselves free of institutional checks and balances."[122] It followed that the "democratic allies" were themselves purged.

Thus, Yeltsin had in the Soviet-Russian tradition strengthened the Services in order to use them to protect his political power, although he less successfully managed to exercise direct political control over their activities, an administrative function he expended much less effort on.[123] That was his trade-off. It followed that many battles between and particularly within the executive and legislative branches over control of "the organs" were fought as political elites sought to coopt them for their skills, contacts, and access to secret information, all valuable political-economic resources in the new Russia, just as they partnered with economic elites and the private security services (PSSs) that were mushrooming across the country as chekists left government service to go into business for themselves. In the competition for control that ensued, only the few democrat-minded deputies in parliament saw a real need to establish oversight over the Services, while the rest (consisting primarily of old communists) viewed the function of parliamentary oversight as a means to further their political-economic interests, and had no intention of exercising oversight in the traditional sense.

---

[122] Op. cit., "Who is Making Foreign Policy*?*"

[123] Vladimir Voronov, "The Reincarnation of the KGB," *New Times*, March 2004, http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=763.

Meanwhile, over in the executive branch, Yeltsin perceived a need to use the KGB successor agencies to counter the political opposition in the legislature, enforce his decrees, hold the volatile country together, and ensure his continued rule. Hence, once the initial anti-Communist party/KGB euphoria following the Soviet collapse had dissipated, he reversed the early reform measures designed to weaken the Services and instead proceeded to bolster their power.[124] As part of that process, democratic-minded reformers were progressively eased out of both the Services and the administration. However tenuous Yeltsin's control of the Services may have been at the time, and it was indeed tenuous as demonstrated, for instance, by the events of October 1993 when he dissolved the (communist-dominated) parliament and many security units refused to get involved in the political dispute, leading to MB (FSK-FSB predecessor) Director Barannikov's firing, he did manage to enjoy two rapacious terms in office. The relevant problem for democratization is highlighted by the fact that, as Amy Knight notes, Yeltsin's priority was to use them to counter political threats first, and carry out the usual intelligence and counterintelligence functions second.[125] Clearly, the establishment of democratic oversight was not on the agenda. Nor was the Services' transformation from a secret police apparently an issue of import or concern to the political leadership.

Further credence to the importance of instituting LVD in the *political* sector (as well as the *intelligence/security* sector) is provided by the events surrounding the battle for parliamentary control over the Services. The strength of the communists in the parliament, many seeking alliances with the chekists for political, as well as financial

---

[124] Op. cit., "Who is Making Foreign Policy?"

[125] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, p. 39.

reasons during a period of economic upheaval, massive theft of state resources, ambiguous legality, and, generally, great uncertainty served to minimize the influence of the democrats, who were seeking to establish the rule of law, impose constraints on the Services to protect political freedoms, civil and human rights, and further the democratization agenda. Successfully countering their ideas with the aid and support of the chekists, the more numerous conservative elements pushed an entirely different agenda. Thus, more than for purposed of self-aggrandizement, they sought influence over the Services in order to use them to counter Yeltsin and implement their own political platform while negating and manipulating those of their rivals through the use of kompromat and other intelligence.

Still, and importantly, while the various parliamentary factions struggled for independent control over the Services in the months following the Soviet collapse, they were united in the aim of imposing *parliamentary* control, rather than accepting exclusively *executive* control.[126] It is useful to recall that the former communists (many operating under new labels) routinely opposed Yeltsin throughout his tenure, leading to a certain regularity of insurmountable gridlock on issues of import. Yeltsin soon resolved the issue of political control over the Services by issuing a presidential decree (in what had become the pattern), giving himself direct control over intelligence matters, including the appointment of the Services' leadership, and delegating operational control to his deputy prime minister, Sergei Shakhrai, who acted as his senior legal advisor and had written the presidential decree banning the Communist party. Thus, in December 1991 Yeltsin appointed 34-year old Shakhrai as RSFSR Deputy Prime Minister in charge of

[126] Ibid., pp. 39-41.

supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Committee for Defense, and the Federal Security Agency (the domestic intelligence service). Shakhrai had previously worked as RSFSR State Counsellor for legal affairs, and now would also supervise the Ministry of Justice and the newly created State Committee for Nationalities Policies.[127] Obviously, the challenges of the position were formidable. Further complicating his task, centrifugal forces were diminishing Kremlin control across all sectors and posing a real threat to the territorial integrity of the multinational state. Given these circumstances, it is likely that operational control in practice remained with the Service chiefs, while political control existed more in form than substance.

Indeed, the crisis situation was in no small part due to the activities of the intelligence/security sector, which was playing a major role in fueling the ethnic conflicts that raged across the FSU and in a number of Russian republics as the communist monolith crumbled. Compounding his troubles in his early tenure, and like Stalin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev before him, Yeltsin had turned against the security chiefs, blaming them for repressions that were in fact ordered by the Kremlin leadership; such was not without precedent in Soviet history, although the situation in the republics reflected the heated political struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin as the Communist party lost its legitimacy and the Soviet Union was breaking up.[128] Initially, it had been these revelations that motivated the democrats to call for intelligence reform, which, in turn, ignited the political struggles over control of the Services. For Yeltsin, dependence on the Services' support for his continuation in power was a clear facet of what had been

---

[127] Alexander Rahr, "Shakhray appointed Yeltsin's deputy," *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies*, December 14, 1991, http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?2285.

[128] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, p. 28.

a centuries-old intelligence-state relationship in Russia, one which would continue, as always, to work to thwart any democratic opening.

Until the ratification of the 1993 RF Constitution on December 12, 1993,[129] the Russian legal system was based on the old Soviet "Brezhnev Constitution" of 1977, which had no provisions for any parliamentary oversight of the intelligence/security services. Political control had been exercised exclusively by the CPSU preceding the ratification of the new constitution. In the summer of 1993 a delegation representing the small democratic faction in the Duma led by Lev Ponomarev traveled to Washington, DC at U.S. Information Agency expense for the precise purpose of studying the American intelligence oversight system in hopes of establishing effective parliamentary oversight over the Services, developing legislation to safeguard citizens' rights against acts of government, and to find ways to prevent the Services from violating individual rights. They hoped to create a select committee, much like the Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence in each house of the U.S. Congress, to exercise oversight of the security services. As it happened, this Supreme Soviet Committee on Human Rights was thwarted in the effort by the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security, which, as Amy Knight notes, "was not interested in *democratic* controls over the security services." Rather, "it turned out to be little more than a cheering block for the interests of the MB (KGB successor and FSK-FSB predecessor) and the other security agencies."[130]

---

[129] Vladimir V. Belyakov and Walter J. Raymond, eds., *Constitution of The Russian Federation: With Commentaries and Interpretation by American and Russian Scholars*, Brunswick Publishing Corporation: U.S.A. and Russia's Information Agency – Novosti: Moscow, Russia, 1994.

[130] Op. cit., *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, p. 40.

Following Yeltsin's October 1993 dissolution of the parliament, the ratification of the new constitution in December created a new, bicameral parliamentary structure consisting of a Federation Council and State Duma. Committees on Defense and Security were established in each house, with the Duma committee tasked with most intelligence oversight functions. The Federation Council Committee met only one day every two weeks and with the upper house responsible for initiating the intelligence budget process, oversaw its routine approval. The Duma Committee consists of a chairman and 14 deputies, for a total of 15 members. From the beginning, at least four were simultaneously security service officials, and its chairman was career chekist Sergei Stepashin, thus negating any substantive oversight and making impartiality extremely unlikely[131] in the event that the Services provided any meaningful information to the committees in the first place, which could not be realistically expected.[132] Amy Knight notes that she found little evidence of legislative oversight either before or after the December 1993 elections. The Law merely required that the Service chiefs report on their activities and expenditures to standing commissions. She observed that it had only been in July 1993, when for the first time, the Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on International Security and Intelligence visited Yasenovo to inquire on the budget and operations, a "perfunctory" visit that apparently resulted in nothing more than a brief report to the Supreme Soviet Presidium.[133] Little changed over the mid-late 1990s and into the 21st century, with the Services in practice held accountable solely by the executive, where the

---

[131] Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[132] Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, "Legislatures and Defense: The Comparative Experience," The Center For Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Occasional Paper #8, June 2001.

[133] Op. cit,. *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, p. 120.

matter was approached through a political lens. The pattern had been set. Without LVD to help preclude the politicization of the intelligence/security sector, the executive branch was unrestrained in using it as a political support base, and soon bolstered its power, with oversight sacrificed for loyalty.

When Yeltsin won reelection in 1996, the committee was chaired by Lt. Gen. Rokhlin (January 1996-May 1998). However, his days were numbered when in September 1997 he left the Our Home is Russia faction, openly declaring his opposition to Yeltsin's military reform policies, and moved to form his own Movement to Support the Army, which set as its main goal Yeltsin's ouster.[134] He was replaced by Roman Popkovich, who was appointed to head the committee on May 20, 1998. Weeks later, on July 3, 1998 Rokhlin was shot dead at his dacha outside Moscow, just 23 days before Putin was appointed FSB director,[135] as noted in chapter seven. Once Putin became acting president (January 2000), he appointed Gen. Andrey Nikolayev, a member of the People's Deputy faction, as chairman. Of note, all three chairmen were retired officers, and Nikolayev had served as head of the Federal Border Service from 1994 to 1997.[136] Thus, parliamentary oversight of intelligence in Russia was effectively neutered, with the respective committees ultimately developing into another Kremlin political tool, serving merely to further the convenient (at the time) illusion of democratic development in Russia.

---

[134] "Lev Rokhlin killed by his wife?" *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies*, July 3, 1998, http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?2513.

[135] Ibid.

[136] See the *Nuclear Threat Initiative* Web site at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/legislat.htm#E11E9, and also the Duma's Web site, at http://www.duma.gov.ru/.

9.6: POLITICAL CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE UNDER PUTIN: FIRST MOVES — THE POWER "VERTICAL" AND "SEVEN SAMURAI," THEN EXECUTIVE PERSUASION

Once Putin gained the RF presidency, he proceeded immediately to concentrate and consolidate his power and establish centre control over the vast state and its many far-flung regions by devising his "vertical" and, subsequently, "horizontal" power structures. Hence, in order to construct the "strong state" as articulated in his May 7, 2000 inauguration address (his oath to "protect and respect the rights and freedoms" of the people apparently forgotten),[137] the first structural changes Putin imposed constituted the means for establishing the "power vertical." To that end, and exactly one week later, Putin issued a 10-page decree that organized Russia into seven federal administrative districts overlaying the country's 89 administrative regions, with each to be overseen by a presidential envoy responsible directly to the president (and with Putin, himself, having the sole power to appoint and dismiss). The decree prescribed that the envoys' main task was "the realization by the organs of state power of the main directions of domestic and foreign policy of the state, as determined by the president of the Russian Federation."[138] The powers given to the envoys were substantial, and included "the right to enter any organizations on the territory of this federal district." Other responsibilities included implementing all federal orders and presidential dictates, coordinating executive agencies, monitoring law enforcement, supervising all federal hiring, "giving rewards and delivering thanks from the press,"[139] controlling local compliance with decisions of

---

[137] "Putin inaugurated as Russian president; chooses a prime minister," *CNN.com*, May 7, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/05/07/russia.putin.02/.

[138] Michael Wines, "Putin Decrees New Controls and Envoys for Provinces," *The New York Times*, May 14, 2000.

[139] Ibid.

federal authorities, ensuring that regional laws conform to federal legislation, and overseeing the work of governors and heads of the country's constituent representatives.[140]

In a break with the past and to help ensure loyalty to the Kremlin, envoys were charged to finance the centre's regional operations and determine how patronage was dispensed. The responsibility for housing and supporting budgets and offices for presidential representatives lied with the President's office, rather than with local officials, as had become the practice for Kremlin representatives under Yeltsin. His 89 envoys (one for each administrative region) had been dependent on local officials/governors for everything from office space and telephones to jobs and summer camp for the kids,[141] leading to misplaced loyalties. This administrative change was designed to reduce or eliminate the resultant symbiotic ties of the former pecuniary relationship that had contributed to the negation of Kremlin policy, and thus shift the relationship from one of cooptation (a result of local patronage through the provision of jobs and other favors for envoys in what were mutually beneficial exchanges, predominantly in the private business sector and focused on regional officials' prerogatives, rather than those of the centre), to one of loyalty to the Kremlin and its agenda. Over two years after instituting this structure, in July 2002, Putin had admitted that relations between elected regional leaders and his seven envoys were tense, and

[140] "Kremlin loosens control over president's plenipotentiary envoys," February 16, 2001, *www.strana.ru*.

[141] Michael Wines, "Putin's Move on Governors Would Bolster His Role," *The New York Times*, May 22, 2000.

called for talks to improve cooperation among them.[142] Ultimately, in October 2004 Putin would eliminate the election of governors, as discussed in a later section of this chapter.

The seven federal districts are: Central; Northwest; Volga; Southern; Urals; Siberian; and, Far East.[143] At least five of seven envoys hailed from the ranks of the FSB, military, or police. That is, two (Georgy Poltavchenko, Central Federal District and Viktor Cherkesov, Northwest Federal District) were clearly from the security services; two (Viktor Kazantsev, Southern Federal District and Konstantin Pulikovsky, Far East Federal District) were military; one (Pyotr Latyshev, Urals Federal District), was from the police; one (Leonid Drachevsky, Siberian Federal District) was a diplomat and, thus, possibly a spy; and, one (Sergei Kiriyenko) was a politician (parliamentary deputy and prime minister) who may have links with the GRU.

From May 2000 when the decree creating the seven federal districts was issued to the end of Putin's first presidential term, there were changes in two of them, the Northwest and Southern Federal Districts. Pertaining to the first, the Northwest Federal District, as part of the March 11, 2003 intelligence reorganization, Cherkesov was appointed to head the newly created State Committee for Controlling the Turnover of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, and Valentina Matviyenko was transferred from her position as deputy prime minister and appointed as the new presidential envoy of the Northwest Federal District.[144] Some analysts interpreted the move as designed to launch

---

[142] "Putin Calls for improving regional ties," *The Russia Journal*, July 11, 2002.

[143] February 16, 2001, *www.strana.ru*.

[144] "Ex-Deputy PM on her new appointment," *RosBusinessConsulting*, March 11, 2003, republished in *The Moscow Times*, March 11, 2003.

her bid to the St. Petersburg governorship,[145] which gubernatorial election she won with 63.17% of the vote in a runoff election held on October 5, 2003, having enjoyed Putin's endorsement and strong support.[146] Upon her electoral win, Putin replaced her as envoy in November 2003 with Ilya Klebanov, who, in a review of his biography, may be from the GRU. Pertaining to the second, the Southern Federal District, in March 2004 replacing Viktor Kazantsev, Putin appointed Vladimir Yakovlev.[147] He was born in Yakutia in 1944, a former two-term governor of St. Petersburg (1996-2003) who had served from 1993 as a deputy mayor, along with deputy mayors Alexei Kudrin and Putin, under Anatoly Sobchak,[148] the latter defeated by Yakovlev in 1996, as described in detail in his [Sobchak's] 1996 book, *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Peterburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*,[149] and also Putin's 2000 autobiography, *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*,[150] in which the latter records his version of events while working in St. Petersburg for Sobchak.

---

[145] Oksana Yablokova, "Report: Cherkesov to Move to Moscow," *The Moscow Times*, March 11, 2003, p. 3. Also, see "Moscow: Reshuffle To Strengthen Putin's Power," *Stratfor: Predictive, Insightful Global Intelligence*, March 11, 2003, Strategic Forecasting, LLC, www.stratfor.com.

[146] Vladimir Kovalev, "Matviyenko Offers Higher City Profile, Rents," *TheMoscowTimes*, October 6, 2003, p. 3.

[147] "Former Deputy DM and St. Petersburg Mayor Appointed Presidential Envoy," *MosNews.com*, March 9, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/03/09/yakovlev.shtml.

[148] Sergei Shelin, "Vladimir Yakovlev: St. Petersburg Mysteries and the Governor's Revelations," *New Times*, March 2004, http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=217. For Sobchak's story in his own words, see Op. cit., *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Peterburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*.

[149] Ibid., *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Peterburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*.

[150] Vladimir Putin, *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*, PublicAffairs: NY, 2000.

It is worth recalling that from the outset, 70 percent of the seven envoys' staff were chekists-siloviki, providing further support to the implementation of Putin's agenda. In late May 2000 and shortly after issuing the decree creating the seven districts, Putin had promised to promote his seven new envoys to the Security Council, thus giving them the same level of rank as top government ministers, and in June 2000 signed a decree thus appointing them. Notably, *Segodnya* reported on January 11, 2000 that Putin's seven presidential envoys were the highest paid federal officials in Russia, with an annual cost to the budget of $14.1 million, including their staff. The envoys earned $3280 per month, or 4.6 times that of Putin and 5.3 times that of the Prosecutor General, while the Prime Minister was paid $1650 per month, which was $300 less than head of Presidential Administration (chief of staff) deputies earned.[151]

To institute a formal chain-of-command, on January 30, 2001 Putin decreed his chief of staff, Alexander Voloshin, control over his "seven samurai." He was thus tasked to coordinate cooperation between the representatives and the remainder of the presidential administration, Following Putin's construction of this vertical line of control from the Kremlin to the regions, and reflecting the widespread concern about developments in Russia under the career chekist, *The New York Times* reported that, "Many of the envoys are linked to the army and some of the new administrative areas coincide with the boundaries of military command zones. This sparked speculation of a rise in the role of the security forces in running Russia, which Putin's past as FSB head has already caused."[152] The writing was on the wall. Of note, when Putin had created the

[151] "Least Seniority, Highest Pay," *RFE/RL Newsline*, January 12, 2001, p. 5.

[152] "Putin to Boost Hold on Russian Regions," *The New York Times*, May 19, 2000.

seven federal districts in May 2000, a less publicized structural change was also established. The Prosecutor General's Office announced that it would set up offices in the new federal districts, giving the Kremlin another powerful tool in the regions."[153]

9.6.1: Reining In the Governors

In restructuring power relationships, and further establishing his "power vertical," Putin aimed to rein in the governors, many of whom were corrupt and running their own "fiefdoms." Early in his administration, Putin had gained a good measure of control over the Duma. However, establishing control over the Federation Council was a challenge, as this body was composed of well-rooted regional governors and their representatives who often ignored the Kremlin during the Yeltsin era and exercised substantial independence. Early in Putin's early tenure, on July 1, 2000 the Duma voted (399-9) on a bill strengthening centre control by giving Putin the right to fire governors, thereby ending their immunity from prosecution, and dissolve provincial legislatures if they violated the federal Constitution, as long as a federal court approved the act.[154] Not unexpectedly, the upper house vetoed the bill. It followed that on July 20, 2000 the Duma overrode (365-35) with eight abstentions the Federation Council's veto.[155]

In a separate measure, the Duma voted (308-88) with five abstentions for a compromise version of another bill that provided for regional leaders to be removed from their Federation Council posts and replaced by legislators appointed by the governors with local legislature approval. The compromise extended current council members'

---

[153] Anna Badkhen, "Envoys Promoted To Putin's Council," *The Moscow Times*, May 26, 2000.

[154] "Vote in Parliament Adds to Putin Power," *The New York Times*, July 1, 2000.

[155] It was on the eve of this vote that oligarch Boris Berezovsky officially resigned his Duma seat in protest of Putin's moves to reign in the regions. "Putin's Plan To Increase Central Power Wins Support," *The New York Times*, July 20, 2000.

terms from February 1, 2001 to the end of the year. Ultimately, on July 27, 2000 the governors bowed under pressure, and voted (119-18) to end the automatic right of governors and their legislative appointees to sit in Parliament.[156] By 2004, the election of governors had been abolished. Following the September 1, 2004 Beslan tragedy, the rubber-stamp Duma passed a Kremlin-endorsed bill making these presidentially-nominated positions, with their subsequent confirmation by provincial legislatures.[157] Thus, by the end of his first presidential term and into his second, Putin's endeavor to reduce the power of regional authorities and establish tight centre political control had succeeded.

9.6.2: Kremlin Control Established by Design — Centre-Regional Political Control Structures

Nikolai Petrov, scholar-in-residence at the Moscow Carnegie Centre, conducted an in-depth study of centre-regional leadership structure changes within the intelligence/security sector during Putin's first term.[158] In the following section, I draw from his work to illuminate how efforts to establish this control evolved and its nature.

Internally, each of the Services has its director and deputy directors based in the Centre, who constitute a collegium that makes leading decisions for the agency at the national level. The regional service heads are subordinate to the Centre. For the domestic services, control is exercised through a complicated vertical consisting of the seven

---

[156] Michael Wines, "Rusisa's Powerful Regional Chiefs Yield Meekly to Putin," *The New York Times*, July 27, 2000.

[157] "Russian Duma backs Putin reforms," *BBC News*, October 29, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3965845.stm.

[158] Nikolai Petrov, "Siloviki in Russian Regions: New Dogs, Old Tricks," Issue 2 - 2005 - Reflections on Policing in Post-Communist Europe, *The Journal of Power Institutions In Post-Soviet Societies*, http://www.pipss.org/document331.html.

presidential envoys, chief federal inspectors, collegiums, and commissions. In addition to their already noted responsibilities, the official description of the envoys' functions includes (political) control of the armed forces in their respective districts (which overlap the military districts), as well as control over budgetary items and the activities of the chief federal inspectors (CFIs), who replaced the former presidential representatives.[159] These CFIs cover the whole territory of the country currently, while there had been "troubled" areas not covered under the previous system.[160] Of note, roughly 75 percent of federal inspectors come from the intelligence/security and military services.[161] Unlike the MVD and FSB heads who are appointed by the president, the CFIs are appointed by the presidential administration, probably with career chekist Viktor Ivanov, the presidential aide responsible for personnel matters, playing a key role, in coordination with Putin. The Presidential Personnel and State Decorations Directorate may also provide input into the process. To further establish federal control in the regions, as already noted, special departments of the General Prosecutor's Office had also been created in each of the seven districts,[162] with these prosecutors appointed by the Prosecutor General with local authorities' approval. Although this latter structure has experienced the least amount of renewal, the prosecutors' offices are expected to be brought under tighter control during Putin's second term. The 2006 switching of positions of General Prosecutor Ustinov and Justice Minister Chaika may have had some connection to the endeavor.

---

[159] Vladimir Volkov, "Russian President Putin moves toward authoritarian rule," *World Socialist Web Site*, International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), June 3, 2000, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/jun2000/put-j03.shtml.

[160] Op. cit., "Siloviki in Russian Regions."

[161] Ibid.

[162] Op. cit., "Russian President Putin moves toward authoritarian rule."

To gain control over the MVD, which had maintained much closer ties to regional elites than the FSB, main departments (GUVD) were created in each of the seven federal *okrugs*, with their heads appointed by the president. In June 2001, Putin issued a decree creating the *okrug* police administrations, whose chiefs, holding ranks up to colonel general, are appointed by presidential decree and report directly to the MVD chief. Each *okrug*'s regional police chiefs, Petrov notes, report to them. The *okrug* chiefs have staffs of up to 150 personnel, and their responsibilities include coordinating the MVD's work within their *okrugs*, collecting and analyzing information and passing it to the envoys, and combating organized crime. Finally, each *okrug* chief is the commanding officer for all MVD units in the *okrug*. The FSB's territorial departments remained unchanged, maintaining the same unified units, including: Moscow and the Moscow region, Petersburg and the Leningrad region, and the Arkhangelsk, Irkutsk, Kamchatka, Magadan, Perm, Tyumen, and Krasnoyarsk regions together with their autonomous ethnic districts, and the FSB, like the MVD and prosecutors' offices, maintains offices in each of the country's regions.[163]

Petrov notes that federal okrug administrations were created to break existing ties between the regional and federal levels and establish firm Kremlin control through the creation of a complex vertical and frequent horizontal renewal extending to the centre. At a meeting of the Security Council in May 2002 Putin had declared that the system of rotation would be restored. It followed that there was a significant renewal of regional MVD and FSB heads, with Putin loyalists being appointed to the posts. For example, Petrov reports that of the 71 regional FSB chiefs (there are 89 regions in Russia) for

[163] Op. cit., "Siloviki in Russian Regions: New Dogs, Old Tricks."

whom information was managed to be collected on, 22 were appointed before 2000 and 49 since then.[164]

Of note, Petrov found that the replacements of CFI, FSB, and MVD chiefs, and prosecutors took place in coordination with "a regional political calendar — gubernatorial elections." And, as noted, having accomplished his goals, and to further lock the structure in place and further consolidate his power, the election of governors was abolished in October 2004, with Putin controlling the appointments for those posts directly as well. Petrov's graph depicting these dynamics is shown in Figure 9.2 below:

Figure 9.2: Replacements of Governors, CFIs, FSB and MVD Chiefs, by Years, 2000-2004

Years	Governors	CFI	FSB	MVD	Prosecutors
2000	15	-	12	16	20
2001	8	12	14	12	17
2002	7	19	18	15	20
2003	6	13	16	27	14
2004	7	11	17	11	18

Petrov also discovered what he called "another curious regularity." Specifically, "in one third of all cases of governors' replacements they were preceded by prosecutors' replacements on the eve of elections (within half a year). One can suppose that the Center [centre], when replacing prosecutor just before gubernatorial elections was making usage of an administrative resource by incumbent much harder."[165] Thus, in the process of

[164] Ibid.

[165] Ibid.

building his vertical-horizontal control mechanism, Putin was also skillfully manipulating the electoral process to significantly increase the chances that his preferred candidate won. And if a preferred candidate appeared unlikely to be able to win the vote, the authorities in the region, owing their careers to Putin, were in position to engineer the win. As Petrov aptly observes, there is "the use of law instead of the rule of law." [166]

Petrov provided another interesting insight into regional dynamics, noting that, "It would be logical to expect that a new governor coming to power would not work well together with *siloviki* inherited by him from his predecessor and would try to replace them. To test this hypothesis we made a so-called ruler of replacements with a new governor coming taken as a zero point. Analysis of about a third of governors' changes in 2000-2002 showed that, following a governor, CFI and UVD chief have been changed with a probability of 2/3, and prosecutor and FSB chief with a probability of 2/5. All *siloviki* replacements are taking place in average during the second year after the governor's arrival with the following logic: militia chief is the first to be replaced at the beginning of the governor's second year (in 14 months after election); prosecutor's turn comes in the middle of the second year (16 months), FSB representative follows (17) with CFI being replaced in the last turn."[167]

With analysis of this data, combined with that drawn from a 2004 study on the most influential regional elites in politics and the economy conducted by the Institute of Situational Analysis and of New Technologies (ISANT),[168] one can gain a better

---

[166] Ibid.

[167] Ibid.

[168] *Samie vliiate'nie liudi Rossii* – 2003 (The most influential persons of Russia), Moscow: ISANT, 2004, 696 p.

understanding of not only the mechanisms for political control extant in Russia today, but also how the Kremlin manipulated the system to construct them. Of note, ISANT found that CFIs, again, at least 75 percent of whom come from the intelligence/security sector, were most influential (in about two-thirds of regions), and in both political and economic terms. UVD chiefs were twice less commonly considered as most influential, prosecutors were included in about half of the regions, and UFSB heads, "the most secretive actors on the regional political scene," were included in a third of the regions. The foregoing were rated as representatives of the political establishment. Petrov observed that, "In republics, UFSB just like prosecutor is a rare bird among elites." Regardless, along with the CFIs, regional heads of the various services were considered among the most influential persons. In the final analysis, it follows logically that Petrov sees an "approach toward politics including elections as toward a special operation."[169] In the graph in Figure 9.3 below, Petrov's depiction of the chekist-siloviki replacements in regions by years is shown:

[169] Op. cit., "Siloviki in Russian Regions: New Dogs, Old Tricks."

Figure 9.3: Petrov's Depiction of Chekist-Siloviki Replacements in Regions by Years



Presented here, Petrov summed up the nature of Putin's centre-regional political control mechanism:

> Administrative-power skeleton was constructed or perhaps restored during Putin's first presidential term. It consists of mighty verticals going from the top to the very bottom, and horizontals. Verticals are doubled — administrative and power — to be stronger. Administrative verticals are inherited from the Soviet-Communist past, they never disappeared, although regions were more independent for a while especially when electing governors. Power verticals are being constructed all over again, being connected at the regional level to a solid slab. They are connected between different agencies both within the region (by means of collegium under chief federal inspector, law enforcement collegium with prosecutor at the head, antiterrorist commission headed by deputy governor, and regional security council headed by governor) and between regions, including different district collegiums and councils as well as cadres' horizontal rotation.[170]

Finally, Petrov concluded that Putin's political control may not be as firm as he would like to present it, observing that, "It appears now that the administrative-power slab built up by the Kremlin only looks monolithic. There are growing contradictions between structures and agencies, which constitute it. Partly they are inspired by the Center [centre] itself, which acts by the principle 'divide and rule'; partly they are inevitable consequences of the fight for power at regional level." In tune with other assessments, he finds that the "Major pairs in conflict are: FSB and MVD, FSB and administrations, MVD and prosecutor's office," and notes that, "FSB plays a special role in these conflicts: it is it who controls partly the whole cadre sphere, that is doing cleansings and that delegates if necessary its representatives to other power structures and administration. The problem is that such a system of surrogate division of power is closed from society even for mere observation, not to speak about control; it does not obey to strict rules and is not self-sufficient — it needs a constant interference from above to

[170] Ibid.

keep the balance."[171] Thus, political interference in intelligence is mandated, and works against the establishment of democracy.

Speaking specifically to the political control of the FSB in operational terms, it may run from the individual directorate chiefs to the regional FSB directors up to the territorial FSB heads, and on to Patrushev's deputies at Lubyanka, to the director himself and, ultimately, Putin. That is, given the closed environment in which control is exercised, it is unclear whether and to what extent the regional and territorial FSB heads seek approval for or report operational activity through an intermediary such as the presidential envoys. Although the majority of the envoys come from the power organs and enjoy Putin's confidence, investigative-operational information is usually held very close, particularly in the Byzantine world that is Russia, with intelligence "outsiders" generally excluded automatically by virtue of their place. Thus, the political representatives' intermediary role may be limited to administrative and coordination matters. Then, too, they may play some role in deconfliction of operations, but this is unknown, and may as well be handled by FSB officials at the Centre, perhaps by the FSB Collegium. Others in the loop may include the Security Council (presidential envoys are members), as well as deputy chief of the presidential administration Igor Sechin and presidential aide Viktor Ivankov, both career chekists, however, those lines are unclear as well.

As to the political control of foreign intelligence and military intelligence officers (SVR and GRU), in operational terms the lines travel up from the individual lines to the *rezidents* (chiefs of station) based in embassies and consulates (*rezidenturas*), both legal and illegal, around the world, to Yasenovo (SVR deputy directors and director) and

[171] Ibid.

Khodynka (GRU deputy directors and director), respectively, and the latter on up to the chief of the general staff and defense minister, and on to Putin. Beyond these, no control mechanisms are apparent. It is certain that the FSB's counterintelligence directorate monitors officers and staff of all services, as do the internal security directorates, on which there is limited information available. The FSB also has its military counterintelligence directorate, which reports up the line through the FSB director to Putin. In addition to a number of classified presidential decrees governing the Services, there also exist many internal departmental orders, instructions, and other documents, as then-SVR first deputy director Vyacheslav Trubnikov confirmed in August 1993,[172] but which remain classified as well.

In the final analysis to date, the Kremlin-endorsed, pro-Putin United Russia party does not yet play the role that the Communist party had during Soviet times, although its growth in and the still-evolving (precisely in that direction) nature of political-economic change in the country as described in this project, that does remain a real possibility as the Kremlin chekists continue to consolidate their political control of the state. With parliamentary elections scheduled for December 2007 and presidential elections in 2008, the question of whether Putin will remain in power for a third presidential term is still open; 2008 will be an enlightening year.

In this chapter's final section, the role of civil society, specifically, the media and NGOS, as democratic oversight and accountability mechanisms is examined, with a focus on the regime's means of suppressing these individuals and organizations, including a review of some of the more prominent contract murders and untimely deaths of those

---

[172] Gordon Bennett, "The SVR: Russia's Intelligence Service," *The Conflict Studies Research Centre*, UK Ministry of Defense, March 2000, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/svr/c103-gb.htm.

who investigated the 1999 apartment bombings, the situation in Chechnya, and Kremlin/FSB abuses.

9.7: CIVIL SOCIETY IS THWARTED FROM SERVING AS A DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM

Kate Martin, director of George Washington University's Center for National Security Studies, states that the respecting of three fundamental principles assures accountability and oversight of the security services in a democracy. The first is freedom of speech and press, since "the effectiveness of all other control mechanisms depends upon public access to information." The second is national security must not be used as grounds to violate fundamental individual rights, including the right to privacy. The third is that there must be institutional and procedural controls to assure that the security services operate in accordance with the law. Yet, as Boris Pustintsev, of Citizens Control, a St. Petersburg-based NGO, noted in 1995:

> In the countries of the former Soviet Union, citizens are denied the right to obtain information from the government, even though the right is set forth in Article 29 of the Russian constitution. In fact, the executive has usurped this right. For example, last year President Yeltsin in his memoirs revealed some facts concerning the systematic provision of money and arms by the KGB to the IRA. Yet I, as a Russian citizen, would not be able to obtain this information, on the ground that it is classified. From this, it is apparent that the president can point his finger to an item of classified information and order that it be declassified. But of course information should be declassified or remain secret in the interest of the public; that is, the state
>
> should act on the citizens' behalf, not in the interest of individuals holding positions of authority.[173]
>
> In Russia, officials consider information to be their personal property. Under these conditions, any attempt at controlling the security services should be preceded by the adoption of a law on freedom of information.

[173] Boris Pustintsev, "Individuals and the Security Services," *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/warsaw/indiv.html.

> Such a law would make it possible to eliminate the government's monopoly on information.[174]

In subsequent years, the accessibility of information on the activities of government only progressively narrowed as the intimidation and attacks on investigative reporters intensified, with their murders becoming increasingly common under Putin and the clamps being put on NGO activity as well.

9.7.1: The Media — Self-Censorship or Death Comes to Investigative Journalists

In democracies, an important role of the media is to not only inform the citizenry on government activities but also to hold government accountable, to serve as another independent check on elected (and appointed) representatives, including the intelligence/security sector, to help ensure their activities stay within the law. However, in post-Soviet Russia numerous journalists have been killed in direct relation to their professional activities. During the Yeltsin years, those investigative reporters looking into organized crime, and in the Putin era, political and intelligence/security sector corruption and human rights abuses in connection with the war in Chechnya, have predominantly been the victims. Consequently, the journalism profession in Russia has been subverted, with, for the most part, only "acceptable" stories being publicized. Self-censorship, false stories, and presentation of the Kremlin line have become the rule.[175]

---

[174] Sanford Ungar, "Individuals and the Security Services," *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/warsaw/indiv.html.

[175] Further, the publication of outright lies is prevalent in news coverage. Admitting as such, during an October 2002 meeting between Georgian and Russian journalists, the Georgians asked why the Russian press published so much blatant disinformation. The Russians did not deny the allegation, simply replying that no other information was available. "The Resurgence of Lies and Disinformation," *The Moscow Times*, October 17, 2002, p. 8.

During the Yeltsin era, there had been a measure of press freedom in Russia; censorship existed but was not as prevalent or as brutally enforced as in Putin's Russia. In October 2002, Oleg Panfilov, director of the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, noted that upon Putin's gaining of the presidency, government control of the press was instituted, with the September 2000 information security doctrine the cornerstone of the Kremlin's new information policy. The Services exercised control over the flow of information by means of their command of the communications sector once then-Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov appointed Col. Gen. Aleksei Shcherbakov, a career chekist and former first deputy in the SVR, as first deputy communications minister, responsible for controlling Russia's telecommunications infrastructure.

Control over the press progressively tightened during the early years of Putin's presidency, with the state ultimately controlling all three national television stations. They employed coercive means when deemed necessary to suppress stories, as evidenced, for example, by the serious food poisoning of *Novaya Gazeta* journalist Anna Politkovskaya, whose tea was spiked while she was on a flight en route to cover the Beslan tragedy (apparently this method of eliminating opposition elements or critics was refined over the next couple of years), as shown by the successful killing of Litvinenko, whose tea was apparently sprayed with polonium-210),[176] and the FSB instigation of an "altercation" embroiling *RFE/RL* reporter Andrei Babitsky (who in 2000 had been abducted and held for 40 days in an effort to prevent him from reporting on the Chechen War[177]), at the Vnukovo airport, also en route to Beslan but which incident led instead to

[176] Jennifer Quinn, "Litvinenko Waiter Tells Poisonous Story," *The Moscow Times*, July 16, 2007, p. 3.

[177] "Media Watchdog Concerned About Russian Journalists," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 4, 2004.

his facing "hooliganism" charges and a sentence of five days confinement, both situations orchestrated to prevent them from covering unfolding events at the school.[178] Clearly, the Kremlin sought to ensure that the earlier media episodes covering the Dubrovka siege, which presented the authorities as incompetent and irresponsible and was broadcast around the world, would not be repeated in Beslan, a tragedy that had many similarities with the theatre attack, but involved hundreds more young children.

Soon after the special operation at Moscow's Dubrovka theater, where 41 Chechen terrorists had taken 800 people hostage on October 23, 2002 in what became a three-day siege that ended with the gassing and deaths of all the terrorists and 129 of the hostages, Putin met with media executives to discuss how to cover such events in the future. U.S. citizen and NTV head since spring 2001 after Gazprom's ouster of Putin-critic Vladimir Gusinsky, Boris Jordan, whose coverage of the crisis seriously perturbed the Kremlin, was not invited. Not long after, on January 17, 2003 NTV's owner, state-owned Gazprom-Media, fired Jordan, replacing him with a native Russian, Gazprom-Media chairman Alexander Dybal.[179] A few days later, on January 22, 2003 Nikolai Senkevich, one of Dybal's deputies, was named acting director of the independent TV station, thus placing it within the Kremlin camp.[180] The significance of these changes for not only the investigative reporting and coverage of terrorist incidents but also the upcoming fall 2003 parliamentary and 2004 presidential elections was not lost on Russia

---

[178] Ibid. Also see "Prominent Journalist Reportedly Poisoned on Way to School Siege," *The Moscow News*, September 3, 2004; and, "Radio Liberty Reporter Babitsky Detained in Moscow Airport," *The Moscow News*, September 2, 2004.

[179] Paul Starobin, "Mother Russia at War with Herself," *BusinessWeek Online*, February 3, 2003.

[180] Paul Starobin, "Reality TV in a Russian Boardroom: Was the American chief of station NTV doomed to expulsion?" *BusinessWeek Online*, February 3, 2003.

observers, nor was the fact that once again the regime had successfully exploited a terrorist event in which the FSB was suspected of playing a role to crack down on civil society and establish further controls on the press. Years later, questions remain as to why the perpetrators were all executed on the spot and not arrested since the gas had effectively removed any threat they may have posed. The special units who handled the operation were apparently confident that the terrorists would not explode their bombs, suggesting they had an agent among them. And then there is the issue of how 41 terrorists managed to drive with their load into central Moscow in the evening when police roadblocks are everywhere (bribe-seeking), enabling them to carry out the attack in the first place.

9.7.2: The Russian Media Thwarted as an Oversight Mechanism — Violence Against and Death of Investigative Journalists Persists

The number of journalists killed in Russia continued to increase as the state grew ever more deeply corrupt and the chekists tightened their control. The murders are always associated with investigative reporting on organized crime, political corruption and economic competition, and/or intelligence/security sector activity. Over Putin's first presidential term alone, at least 14 have been murdered, including 11 contract and four violent killings, with no one being brought to justice in any of them.[181] They are often boldly perpetrated, with little concern about getting arrested and prosecuted. Other times, there is plausible deniability. Sometimes, an ominous warning is sufficient to bring silence, as when an FSB officer told a journalist covering the Chechen war who had been summoned for "an informal chat": "When you go and do your professional duty, never

[181] Alex Lupis, "CPJ Calls on Putin To Ensure Editors' Killers Are Brought To Justice," August 8, 2004, and letter to Putin from CPJ dated August 9, 2004, *Johnson's Russia List*, #8321, August 9, 2004, www.cdi.org.

lose sight of the fact that you are a Russian citizen. Always remember that." That instance serves to highlight the use of intimidation and fear to control journalists' professional activities.[182]

Sometime the courts are used to muffle the press. Before he was poisoned to death in July 2003, Duma Deputy Yury Shchekochikhin had lamented the ease with which officials won court-ordered compensations of huge sums against newspapers that could shut the publications down.[183] He had also observed that Russia ranked second after Algeria in numbers of journalists killed. Midway into Putin's second presidential term, the country still ranked second, behind Iraq. Between January 1996 and June 2006, 88 journalists were killed in Russia.[184] Just as the FSB is suspected of involvement in the contract killings of political opposition elements and rival businessmen, so, too, the power organs have been accused of organizing the murders of "troublesome" journalists. Some of the most notorious cases, which many believe were orchestrated by the regime and FSB, are detailed below.

a) The Murder of Dmitri Kholodov

In November 2000, court hearings were held against five former military intelligence officers, including Col. Pavel Popovshikh, former intelligence chief in the airborne troops, Maj. Alexander Soroka, former commander of the airborne troops' special squad, his deputies Maj. Vladimir Morozov and Maj. Konstantin Mirzayants,

---

[182] Erik Batuev, "A War Reporter Fighting The Enemy Within," *The Moscow Times*, January 31, 2001, pp. 1-3.

[183] "Duma Deputy Laments KGB-ization of the Government," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 45, December 24, 2002, p. 6.

[184] "Journalism in Russia Becomes as Dangerous as War," *Kommersant*, March 7, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p748098/r_500/Journalism_as_War/; and, "Russia Trails Only Iraq in Journalist Murders," *Kommersant*, March 7, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p-10258/r_500/killed_journalists/.

businessman Konstantin Barkovsky, retired from the airborne troops a year before the killing, and Alexander Kapuntsov, deputy head of a private security service[185] (and the head of a border guard agent who was charged with complicity), all arrested in 1998 for organizing the October 1994 murder of 27-year old *Moskovsky Komsomolets* journalist Dmitri Kholodov. He had been investigating military corruption involving embezzlement and illegal arms trading by Russian army officers in East Germany during the 1992-1994 troop pullout[186] when an anonymous caller tipped him off that he could find evidence in a briefcase stored at a train station, which he retrieved and which blew up in his face in his office where he opened it. The indictment is classified "top secret."[187]

On June 26, 2002 a military court acquitted the five paratroopers and one businessman for lack of evidence in the killing. A lawyer for one of the defendants, Vladimir Levin, had suggested that the decision to prosecute the case was made based on political reasons, specifically to discredit Defense Minister Pavel Grachev (1992-1996). Levin argued, "the case was trumped up in order to abuse former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev...only real professionals could commit such a murder." Grachev was expected to testify along with 300 other witnesses, including top Russian military officers. While Grachev told the court he had only told his subordinates to "sort things out" with journalists, Alexander Soroka, one of the defendants, argued, in sync with his attorney, Levin, that the prosecution had a political origin. The story worked. After the acquittal, Soroka said, "someone just wanted to use us to compromise some other higher-

---

[185] Andrei Zolotov, "Army Men Go On Trial For Murder," *The Moscow Times*, November 10, 2000, pp. 1-3.

[186] "Officers Go On Trial For 1994 Journalist's Murder," *RFE/RL Newsline*, November 10, 2000.

[187] Op. cit., "Army Men Go On Trial For Murder."

rank officials." The trial lasted 19 months and cost the paratroopers four years in jail. Questioning the outcome, Elena Andrianova, Kholodov's parents' lawyer, noted discrepancies between evidence presented in court and the verdict, observing that three of the defendants had confessed to some aspects of the crime but "the court didn't find their confessions provable. Hence, all were acquitted and the charges against Grachev never proven."[188] Such has been the pattern in Russia.

b) The Murder of Vladimir Sukhomlin

The January 4, 2003 contract killing (the execution style smashing of his head with a baseball bat after a beating) of 23-year old Internet journalist, Web developer, and political activist, Vladimir Sukhomlin, whose body was discovered by police at an abandoned building lot in the southwestern Moscow suburb of Solntsevo three days later, was carried out by police. After receiving a call from a potential client, a business meeting had been set up at a movie theater coffee house located on Leninsky Prospekt. It was there that plain-clothes police officers had approached and arrested Sukhomlin for reasons unknown, dragging him into a Lada on the pretext of checking his documents.[189] A day after the body was discovered, two police lieutenants identified only as Goncharov and Vorotnikov from the Balashikha Police Department were arrested while at work at the station as suspects in the killing.[190] They admitted to investigators that they had been paid $1200 for the hit. During interrogation, a third accomplice, a security firm employee, was implicated and arrested. Knowing it was a contract hit, investigators then

---

[188] "Six Acquitted in Russian Murder Case," *The New York Times*, June 26, 2002; "Court Acquits Army Officers of Killing Journalist," *MosNews.com*, June 10, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/06/10/journalistmurder.shtml.

[189] Andrei Zolotov Jr., "Contract Murder Linked to Police," *The Moscow Times*, January 13, 2003.

[190] Ibid.

sought the alleged payor, arresting Dmitry Ivanychev, the managing director of a St. Petersburg company registered in Moscow, Plastorg Ltd., along with a private guard.[191] (Sukhomlin's father speculated that the ACRUS chemical company, which had a contract with his son's place of work, Jera Systems, may have played a role in the killing, while Jera Systems general director, Viktor Denisov, believed he had found out something he should not have and was therefore killed by the secret services.[192])

According to *Izvestia*, both police officers arrested had fathers who were high-ranking officers: one was an FSB general and the other a colonel in the FPS (Federal Customs Service).[193] Thus it would seem that due to their connections they expected to get away with the murder. And so they may, as Sukhomlin's family and friends believe the case is far from solved.[194] Sukhomlin's father, Vladimir, a Moscow State University professor, said, "He was killed by the criminal structure that our police have turned into. He received a martyr's death. They turned his head into a mess. And these are police officers, who are supposed to be protecting us. That's what's horrible. They are a criminal organization."[195]

c) The Murder of Paul Klebnikov

In June 2004 American journalist, editor of the Moscow branch of *Forbes* magazine, and author of the 2000 book titled, *Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris*

---

[191] Ibid.

[192] Ibid.

[193] Ibid.

[194] Op. cit., "Contract Murder Linked to Police."

[195] Ibid.

Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia,[196] Paul Klebnikov, was killed in an apparent contract hit as he left his office on a Friday evening. In August 2004 the Committee to Protect Journalists sent an open letter to Putin citing the Klebnikov murder and those of 14 other journalists who had been killed during his tenure, and noting the lack of any prosecutions and slack law enforcement efforts in solving the crimes.[197] The truth of the matter is, in the interest of presenting Russia in a positive light to the world, an articulated goal of the regime,[198] the Kremlin has little interest in journalists publicizing official corruption and FSB abuse, especially those not fitting the Kremlin's frame of the situation in Chechnya. They are perceived as an unacceptable threat to the regime, and so apparently considered legitimate targets. The chekist regime by its very nature has a strong interest in controlling information and thwarting any investigation into its activities or negative publicity, especially in the international community, where it may have implications for the state's foreign policy goals and foreign direct investment in Russian enterprises.

In a 600-page indictment, Russian investigators accused a group of Chechens operating as a hit squad, including Kazbek Dukuzov, his brother Magomed Dukuzov, Musa Vakhayev, Magomed Edilsultanov, Moscow notary Fail Sadretdinov, and others of killing Klebnikov, and alleged that Khozh-Akhmed Nukhayev, also Chechen, ordered it. Klebnikov had written a book titled, *Interview with a Barbarian*, that was based on

---

[196] Paul Klebnikov, *Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia*, Harcourt, Inc.: NY, 2000.

[197] Op. cit., "CPJ Calls on Putin To Ensure Editors' Killers Are Brought To Justice."

[198] Tom Parfitt, "Kremlin takes steps to polish Russia's image abroad," *The Boston Globe*, April 11, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2006/04/11/kremlin_takes_steps_to_polish_russias_image_abroad/.

interviews with the latter. When the case was to be heard in January 2006, the whereabouts of Nukhayev, Edilsultanov, and Magomed Dukuzov were unknown.[199] It followed that in May 2006, the three present for trial, Kazbek Dukuzov, Vakhaev, and Fail Sadretdinov, were acquitted and released.[200] On prosecutors' appeal, the Supreme Court cancelled the verdict and ordered a new trial, scheduled for March 14, 2007, however, only Vakhaev and Fail Sadretdinov showed up, with Kazbek Dukuzov having gone missing.[201] The Moscow City Court therefore postponed the trial and issued an arrest warrant for the latter.[202]

d) The Murder of Anna Politkovskaya

In rare cases, threats, such as those of a police officer who threatened to kill Anna Politkovskaya, are actually investigated,[203] but with questionable results, and with the murder still occurring, albeit years later. Politkovskaya was shot dead on Putin's October 7, 2006 birthday. Gauging from video surveillance film, it was a male-female team that carried out the hit, just as had been the case in Duma deputy and co-chair of the Democratic Russia party, Galina Starovoitova's, November 1998 murder, according to a witness. Politkovskaya's harassment by government authorities had gone on for years.

---

[199] "Moscow City Court Sets to Hearing Paul Klebnikov's Murder Case," *Kommersant*, January 10, 2006, http://kommersant.com/p-7925/Moscow_City_Court_Sets_to_Hearing_Paul_Klebnikov%92s_Murder_Case/.

[200] "Jury Decides Klebnikov Murder Case," *Kommersant*, May 6, 2006, http://kommersant.com/p671611/Jury_Decides_Klebnikov_Murder_Case/.

[201] "Prime Suspects Ignored Trial of Klebnikov's Killing," *Kommersant*, February 15, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p-10123/Klebnikov_trial/; and, "Chief Suspect of Klebinikov's Murder Fled Away," *Kommersant*, March 15, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p750032/Klebnikov_trial/.

[202] Ibid.

[203] Anna Politkovskaya, *A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya*, Translated from the Russian, John Crowfoot, ed., with an Introduction by Thomas de Waal, The Harvill Press: London, 1999.

Back on October 10, 2002 *RFE/RL*'s Moscow bureau reported that a criminal case had been launched against MVD officer Sergei Lapin for threatening her life and well-being. In October 2001 Politkovskaya had fled to Western Europe because of death threats allegedly received in connection with an article she wrote about the disappearance of Chechnya resident Zelimkhan Murdalov, who had been arrested in January 2001 by OMON officers in Khanty-Mansii Autonomous Okrug on suspicion of possessing narcotics.[204] He had been jailed for a period and then disappeared without a trace. Lapin was charged in connection with both the threats made against Politkovskaya and Murdalov's disappearance,[205] and ultimately sentenced to 12 years in prison for kidnapping Murdalov.[206]

As to Politkovskaya, she had written a 2004 book titled, *Putin's Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy*, in which she noted that Putin was unable to erase his Soviet secret service past, writing, "He has failed to transcend his origins and stop behaving like a KGB officer….Putin has, by chance, gotten his hands on enormous power and has used it to catastrophic effect. I dislike him because he does not like people. He despises us."[207] Obviously, she drew Putin's wrath. Comments made at events organized in her honor following her murder illuminated the deep sense of helplessness that permeates Russia today. For example, following a rally in Moscow held to commemorate her life, Miklos Haraszti, a representative on media freedom for the Organization for Security and

---

[204] See *RFE/RL Newsline*, October 26, 2001.

[205] See *RFE/RL Newsline*, October 11, 2002.

[206] "Journalist Gives Her Life for Her Profession," *Kommersant*, October 9, 2006, http://kommersant.com/p711307/Murder_reporter_Politkovskaya/.

[207] Ben Bolton, "Why Are Putin's Enemies Dying?" *Newsmax.com*, March 5, 2007, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/3/5/131411.shtml?s=lh.

Cooperation in Europe, issued a statement saying, "It is extremely important to break the circle of inconclusive investigations . . . of the recent murders of journalists in Russia. The violent death of any member of the media stifles the free spirit of journalism. But in this case, the expediency of action is extremely important also because Anna Politkovskaya was an outspoken critic of government policies."[208] After her funeral service, Yuri Chernichenko, deputy chairman of the Moscow Union of Writers, queried, "Who is next? This is the question asked today by thousands of journalists, human rights activists, liberal politicians and progressive people in general. The answer is we don't know. But we know that this is not the first and not the last funeral after which we will be asking that question." Moscow State University chemistry professor, Lyudmila Kucherina, said that she found the killing and the public's muted response disturbing, stating, "It's big trouble the country losing such people, while being silent at the same time. I wanted to express the pain that I share along with others who couldn't come today."[209]

Conversely, the way Putin saw her death, that of Klebnikov, and also Litvinenko's, was clear when he declared, "We have information, and it is reliable, that many people hiding from Russian justice have long been nurturing the idea of sacrificing somebody in order to create a wave of anti-Russia feeling in the world," insinuating that the murders, widely believed by many to have been ordered by the Kremlin and organized by the intelligence/security services, were carried out to make his regime and its activities — the specific focus of all those killed — look bad, in a twisted distortion of

---

[208] Peter Finn, "Moscow Rally Memorializes Slain Reporter," *Washington Post*, October 9, 2006, p. A12, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/08/AR2006100800358.html.

[209] Ibid.

the real situation.[210] While in Germany on an official visit, he minimized her importance, telling the press, "Her influence on political life within Russia was very minimal. She was too radical."[211]

9.7.3: Investigative Journalists' Deaths Coincide With That of Democracy in Russia

With her death, followed by Litvinenko's, covered earlier in the section including Shchekochikhin's death, and then Ivan Safranov's, the latter a military affairs journalist and government critic who died in a "suicide" after hurling himself out of a fifth floor window after buying a bag of oranges in March 2007 shortly before he planned to publish a sensitive story on Russian arms sales to Iran and Syria,[212] the idea of an independent media serving as a democratic accountability and oversight mechanism in Russia also died. Safranov was at least the fourteenth journalist in Russia dying an untimely death and in suspicious circumstances since Putin took office. The regime's tactics against journalists and oppositional elements has resulted in a deepening of apathy as hopes for democracy in Russia have largely faded among the bulk of the population. Putin's ratings remain consistently high, regardless of popular exclusion from Russian political life. The conditions for revolution are much less extant than the regime portends. As Masha Lipman, editor of the Carnegie Moscow Center's *Pro et Contra* journal, noted in March 2007:

> "Autonomous political activism and direct challenges to the president, no matter how marginal the challenger, are not allowed. Such actions have come to be regarded as illegitimate and are deemed disloyal to the state.

---

[210] "Putin Has Blunt Words for Killers and Victim," *Los Angeles Times*, October 11, 2006.

[211] Op. cit., "Why Are Putin's Enemies Dying?" Also see "Putin Accuses Fugitive Millionaires of Attempting to Cause Damage to Russia," *Kommersant*, February 1, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p-10001/News_conference_oligarch_/.

[212] "Week's War Activities Recounted," *CNN.com*, March 10, 2007.

> While individuals may still exercise verbal dissent — and smaller media outlets still pursue independent editorial positions, though they have been increasingly marginalized — federal legislation has been repeatedly amended to broaden the government's authority to ban political gatherings….The relative permissiveness regarding verbal expression may be explained by the fact that the remaining media freedom exists at the mercy of the government. The Kremlin has ensured that most media outlets that are not state-owned are controlled by owners who are loyal to it. If the government decides that certain outlets are dangerously influencing public opinion, it has leverage to temper the editorial line.
>
> The Kremlin has been sending persistent signals that autonomous political activism will not be tolerated. As a result, political action on the streets has become highly risky in Russia, and those venturing to participate in events unwelcome by the government should be prepared to get in trouble."[213]

The situation is reminiscent of Soviet times, yet, as Lipman observes, "the Russian public remains largely apathetic and indifferent to infringements of its political rights and freedoms."[214] As he illustrates, the Russian reality today is one with no meaningful channels available to serve as oversight or accountability mechanisms on government, let alone the intelligence/security sector, which continues at the direction of and in coordination with the chekist-dominated regime, to take Russia back to an era of one-party (now United Russia) rule and political repression And in a Bolshevik-type Russia, foreigners from the West, in particular, are routinely accused as spies.

9.7.4: NGOs: "They Must Be Spies, Working to Stir Up a Revolution"

A year before Yeltsin's reelection, at a 1995 conference on oversight and accountability of security services, human rights activist Sergei Grigoriants of the Glasnost Foundation, a Russia-based NGO observed:

> In recent years, the Glasnost Foundation has held five conferences on the KGB and six roundtables on legislation. Both this and other kinds of human rights activity constantly cause sharp resistance from the security services. Recently, there have been a number of assassinations of

[213] Masha Lipman, "Breaking Putin's Cordon," *Washington Post*, March 10, 2007.

[214] Ibid.

> democracy-oriented activists. These assassinations were organized by the security services. I submit to you a paper entitled "Political Assassinations." It is also important to note that in the latest order of the Russian President concerning the federal security service [FSB], its foremost function is described not as protection of the national security, but informing the President (and other persons at his order) about threats to national security. So we might call it a personal Presidential service. It has nothing in common with the interests of the state. It openly serves political purposes. Tens of thousands of people were killed in Chechnya on the basis of decisions made at the highest level, with the active participation of the security services. This is a crime against humanity and requires international attention. The security services in Russia are criminal organizations to which the principles developed in the Nuremberg trials apply.[215]

A notable factor is the lack of an independent judiciary, without which the effectiveness of NGOs in assisting individuals who have suffered abuses by the intelligence/security sector to get justice has been severely limited. Grigoriants also pointed out that, "Our American colleagues are doing a serious job helping citizens undertake court proceedings against security services. This is impossible in Russia now because the security services control the courts."[216] As a consequence, cases are taken by plaintiffs as a last resort to the European Court of Human Rights. By June 2007 *Washington Post* reporter, Peter Finn, observed that, "The European Court, which hears appeals of decisions by national courts, is one of the few remaining legal checks on authorities here. Russia, which has more plaintiffs appealing cases at the court than any other European country, consistently loses in Strasbourg — a fact that infuriates political

---

[215] Sergei Grigoriants, "The Status, Role and Authority of Security Services in the Central and Eastern European Region," *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/warsaw/status.html.

[216] Ibid.

leaders. They have accused the court of bias."[217] And not only are opposition elements harassed by the secret services, so, too, are their lawyers, with the Prosecutor General's Office seeking to disbar them.[218]

Independent voices and groups, especially those promoting democracy and transparency, continued to be marginalized throughout the Putin era. A pattern developed in which the activities of NGOs were progressively reduced, with the authorities using a variety of measures, including the refusal of entry visas to NGO representatives, blocking of access to property to establish offices, registration requirements with the authorities that were only possible by meeting strict limits on their entities' management, including detailed financial disclosures, the blocking of access to sites and information/sources that could inform them on government activities, levying of spying accusations against NGOs and their representatives, and the expulsion of NGO representatives. Harassment became the rule, and ideas about establishing oversight and accountability mechanisms to regulate the activities of the intelligence/security sector became less a matter for discussion and debate and, ultimately, discarded as unrealistic.

The regime's harassment of NGOs was covered in earlier sections of this project and so not expanded on further here, the point made in this chapter, limited to discussion of how the hope that and efforts for NGOs to play a role in holding the political and intelligence/security sectors democratically accountable, as occurs in all modern

---

[217] Peter Finn, "Russia's Champion of Hopeless Cases Is Targeted For Disbarment," *Washington Post*, June 3, 2007, p. A16, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060201135_pf.html.

[218] Ibid.

democracies, was extinguished in Russia through a series of actions taken by the authorities.

9.7.5: Reporting on Human Rights Abuses in Chechnya and Its Consequences

Soviet dissident and journalist Sergei Grigoryants[219] had oft-publicized the intelligence/security sector's serious human rights abuses, the mass graves and genocide, and the exploding of bodies in order to destroy evidence in Chechnya. There is and has been little accountability for the military and FSB counterterrorist operations there. Former Chechen president, Akhmad Kadyrov (October 2003-May 2004, until he was killed by a bomb planted under his seat in the stadium)[220] had his own military formation in the republic for years, which systematically engaged in apprehending not only Chechen militants but innocent civilians as well, who were then taken to his personal jail in his home village of Tsentoroi for "trial and sentencing" at the hands of Kadyrov's youngest son, Ramzan (who became acting president in February 2007 and thereafter,

---

[219] Sergei Grigorants led a group of dissidents in organizing a series of conferences titled, "KGB: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," held in Moscow from 1993-1995 that aimed to expose KGB crimes, highlight its continued influence in Russia, and assess its possible future role in the country. It aimed to encourage public debate on the unreformed KGB. Galina Starovoitova, the original author and proponent of lustration legislation in Russia who was murdered early in Putin's tenure as FSB director, was also a member of the organizing committee. In its final resolution, the conference concluded that, "state security bodies of the Russian Federation should cease to exist in their present form, and with their current composition of executive officers….We believe that the development of a democratic process in the country is impossible while state security services continue to perform functions of state management." The resolution also noted that attempts to reorganize the KGB "in order to bring its activities in line with the law, have failed," and called for an "effective mechanism of parliamentary and judicial control over the activity of security services." As a consequence of his participation, in August 1994 Grigorants, as well as many others, suffered a severe beating, losing an eye. See Martin Ebon, *KGB: Death and Rebirth*, Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT, 1994. Moreover, when he planned a campaign to hold officials accountable for war crimes in Chechnya, he received a telephone warning (in Janurary 1995) that his son, Timofei, would be murdered. Three days later, Timofei was struck and killed by a hit-and-run automobile in the driveway of the family's apartment building. Also see J. Michael Waller, "Russia's Security Services: A Checklist for Reform," *Perspective*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, September-October 1997, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol8/Waller.html.

[220] "Bomb kills Chechen president," *CNN.com*, May 9, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/05/09/grozy.blast/index.html. Also see, "Obituary: Akhmad Kadyrov," *BBC News*, May 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3160962.stm.

most tellingly, was nominated by Putin for the Chechen presidency[221]) according to an article written by Politkovskaya and published in *Novaya Gazeta* on September 16, 2002. The victims were reportedly then taken to a former dairy farm some 20 kilometers west of Grozny, from which no one is known to have emerged alive. According to Politkovskaya, the Chechen Prosecutor General's Office was aware of the activities of Kadyrov's armed thugs, but powerless to take any action against them.[222]

In fact, the reality may be very different, as suggested by the Putin administration's approach to its human rights envoy in Chechnya, apparently condoning abuses so long as Moscow's interests were being served in the republic. For example, on January 21, 2004 Putin dismissed envoy Abdul-Khakim Sulygov based on his determination that the pro-Kremlin Akhmad Kadyrov, who had gained the Chechen presidency in October 2003 in a widely criticized election, was responsible for human rights issues in the republic.[223] Moscow had concluded that it made little sense for Sulygov to stay when Kadyrov enjoyed the Kremlin's support. While Sulygov had attracted publicity by accusing human rights NGOs of committing "moral terror" and advocated their investigation for ties to international terrorist groups,[224] just days later, on January 23, 2004, the mutilated body of Aslan Davletukaev, a human rights activist working for the Society of Russian-Chechen Friendship, a group toward which the Kremlin is hostile, who was collecting information on the human rights situation in the

---

[221] "Putin nominates feared Ramzan Kadyrov president of Chechnya," *Pravda*, March 1, 2007, http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/01-03-2007/87900-putin-0.

[222] "Chechen Leader Implicated in Abductions," *RFE/RL Newsline*, Sept 17, 2002.

[223] "Chechen Envoy Fired," *The Moscow Times*, January 22, 2004, p. 4.

[224] Ibid.

republic, was found near the eastern city of Gudermes. He was believed to have been kidnapped two weeks prior from his home in the southern village of Avtury by approximately 50 Russian soldiers who arrived in armored personnel carriers,[225] reportedly a common occurrence. Further revealing the Kremlin's view, upon (Akhmad) Kadyrov's untimely death (in March 2004), Putin lauded his life, saying, "Kadyrov passed away on the day of our national holiday and he passed away undefeated. He was a truly heroic person. By his activities he convincingly proved that the bandits and the people cannot be put on the same footing."[226] As noted earlier, his response to Politkovskaya's killing was very different. And, today, Ramzan Kadyrov rules Chechnya — with strong Kremlin support.

9.8: THE VERDICT IS IN: THE CHEKISTS THEMSELVES CONTROL THE INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SECTOR

In democracies, intelligence/security service officers are paid a salary, do not privately sell their services, and assiduously avoid conflicts of interest. Moscow-based journalist Yevgenia Albats, a long-time KGB observer, noted that many Russian intelligence officers are members of the "active reserve," which means they operate using a cover profession or job and can use their intelligence skills, contacts, and knowledge for personal profit-making.[227] The provision for this status, established as the collapse of the Soviet Union loomed, helped set the stage for chekist capture of the state. Under Yeltsin, the chekists enhanced their economic status, working under the oligarchs as they

---

[225] "Rights Activist Killed," *The Moscow Times*, January 26, 2004, p. 4.

[226] Op. cit., "Bomb kills Chechen president," and Op. cit., "Obituary: Akhmad Kadyrov."

[227] Yevgenia Albats, *The State Within A State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia - Past, Present and Future*, Farrar, Straus, Giroux: NY, 1994, pp. 56-57. In December 1991, the active service status category was dissolved, but nothing in the officers' activities changed; they were simply thereafter referred to as being on "special assignment."

exploited the collapsed state and plundered its resources, while closely monitoring and carefully shaping the evolving political-economic system as they honed their skills and prepared for the political takeover that ultimately transpired under Putin, who was ushered into power by Yeltsin in exchange for immunity from prosecution and, for public consumption, on campaign promises to take a hard line against the Chechens amidst the surge of popular outrage that followed the 1999 apartment bombings that killed hundreds of innocent Russians as they slept.

A major difference between the Soviet and the post-Soviet chekists is their use of their professional knowledge, skills, and contacts to enrichen themselves, often illegally or extra-legally. A second is the chekists' gaining of control over the political-economic system, with their deep and wide penetration of government at all levels. Yet, there exist many continuities. Most vividly, the intelligence/security services continue to serve as a political support to the regime in power in the historic, symbiotic relationship between the Kremlin and the secret police in exchange for impunity themselves. In contemporary times, their scope for personal enrichment is far greater than it has ever been — Russia is a vast, rich country blessed with abundant natural resources. And in their pursuit of ever greater profits, today's chekists, whether in government, the Services, or private business, operate relatively free of any controls or constraints on their activities, the two former categories with no meaningful oversight or accountability to the Russian people. They routinely abuse their power for self-gain, and are wholly ineffective in securing the country against organized crime, corruption, and terrorism, all in which they have been shown to be complicit.

The Services remain highly politicized and unprofessional. They partner with, rather than fight, organized crime. They use their increased powers to spy on and intimidate the opposition so as to negate its influence, exclude it from political life, and ensure that democracy, which gravely threatens their interests, does not gain a foothold. They fabricate espionage cases against independent scientists and foreigners, just as they plant evidence and prosecute those individuals who dare criticize the regime or speak out publicly against its abuses. And then there is the matter of all the unsolved killings of regime critics. It is for the reader to judge whether they indicate political-intelligence intervention, or merely represent the operational ineffectiveness of the Services, deeply corrupt from within, and incapable of reducing or solving major crimes.

Putin, being an unrepentant old Soviet career chekist himself, knows well the usefulness and capabilities, the strengths and weaknesses, of the Russian intelligence/security services. Certainly from the beginning of his term as RF president, in working assiduously to meet his stated goal of making Russia a strong state, he sought to preserve the power of the intelligence/security sector and harness it in support of his goals. Hence, he conducted a substantial political restructuring to strengthen the centre (dominated by loyal chekists) vis-a-vis the regions and reunite the fractionalized KGB-FSB. As a consequence, a consolidated, chekist-dominated political-economic structure is now firmly in place, the political police of today are only growing stronger, and democracy is no longer even a topic for discussion.

Putin had a clear advantage in the endeavor to tighten Kremlin control over the Services as he had come from them. During the Yeltsin years, their loyalties had diverged, with officers answering to different masters as they pursued their interests and

place in the evolving state. In the years following the Soviet collapse, Yeltsin exercised tenuous control over the Services in his trade-off for their political support in the face of a rigid and uncompromising (CP) opposition and weakened and transitioning state. Democratic reform measures to establish effective oversight and democratic accountability of the Services in hopes to prevent their resurgence and continued abuse of citizens' political and human rights died an early death, as did many of their initiators, along with critics of the chekist regime that had managed to gain control of the state under Putin and redistribute its wealth from the oligarchs to the chekists. The reasons for Sobchak's joy did not last much longer than he. Perhaps they began to die with him and all those who followed in the name of and hope for a democratic Russia.

9.8: CONCLUSION

Yevgenia Albats observed in her 1994 book, *The State Within A State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia — Past, Present, and Future*, as the title suggests, that the KGB was a "state within a state." Today, they control the state, its resources and policy. During Soviet times, the Communist party-state exercised firm political control of intelligence. In post-Soviet Russia, Yeltsin initiated meaningful reforms, but as he increasingly faced serious political-economic challenges, he reversed course and, as previous regimes before him and going back to the time of the czars, reempowered the Services and used them to bolster his autocratic and corrupt rule. Subsequently, the old Soviet chekists regrouped, and prepared for their takeover of the state, which transpired under Putin's tenure post-haste, with the reconcentration of power at the centre, and the consolidation of rule by Kremlin-based chekists. A career in the Services and a hometown of St. Petersburg are the apparent required criteria for special access to and favor from the regime, and often

for reaching the higher echelons of power. The perennial question of the 1990s has been answered: the chekists themselves exercise political control over intelligence, which translates into total immunity and impunity for their actions so long as they do not create significant problems for the Putin-led chekist regime's agenda for Russia, which can be expected to entail, if things remain constant, the continued accumulation of massive wealth by leading chekists and their patrons, the total elimination of opposition, and the deeper consolidation of chekist rule.

CHAPTER TEN

CHEKIST ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND MENTALITY: ACTIVE MEASURES, SYMBOLS, AND IDENTITY

10.1: INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I examine the organizational culture and mentality of the post-Soviet intelligence/security services. I draw from the literature to explain why a change in mindset is so essential to institutional change, and show how Russia's failure to institute LVD precluded the making of any break with the past, with the old Soviet chekist organizational culture marked by continuity, with its pride and active promotion of the chekist legacy. To date, in both the political and intelligence/security sectors, much about the old Soviet way of life is viewed with nostalgia, and representations of the past have been embedded in new national symbols. Old Soviet symbolism is visible everywhere and the chekist leaders of those times, particularly "Iron Feliks" (founder of the VChK, or Cheka) and Yuri Andropov (former KGB Chairman and General Secretary of the CPSU), are heralded in intelligence/security sector institutions across the country, decorating offices and courtyards as if nothing had changed over these past 16 years. Within the intelligence/security sector institutions, the perpetuation of symbols from the repressive past only serves to socialize new recruits in chekist ways.

By deliberately perpetuating the chekist legacy, the leaderships of the intelligence/security sector have been shaping their institutions to support authoritarian rule and shun democratic values, including respect for human rights and political freedoms. From the academies to the various institutions, the chekist legacy is glorified, VChK founder Feliks Dzerzhinsky revered. In this chapter, I review the debate and developments surrounding the preservation and promotion of the chekist legacy to date,

and illustrate how the lack of LVD in the intelligence/security sector worked to perpetuate the glorification of the Soviet era repression, effectively thwarting a change in perspective.

In light of the importance of this last critical condition for a secret police transformation, this chapter entails an examination of changes and continuities in the organizational culture and mentality within post-Soviet Russia's intelligence/security service structures, surveys the nature and purposes of the sector's image-making and public relations campaigns to affect perceptions externally and institutional culture and memory internally, and includes a discussion on the continued celebration and use of symbols associated with and glorifying the chekist past and identity. I show that far from seeking to promote a new, democratic-oriented mindset, the leaderships of the post-Soviet intelligence/security services, with the explicit support of the regime during the Putin era, only worked to glorify and reinforce the old Soviet chekist identity, with expected results.

The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, I review the literature and explain the importance of the promotion of a democratic organizational culture and mentality for a secret police transformation and subsequent democratic transition and consolidation, along with the establishment of the rule of law. I highlight the challenges posed to these endeavors, and stress the importance of LVD to enabling transformational leaders to change the culture from the top down. In the second section, I examine the image-making and perception management programs designed and disseminated to deceive Russian citizens and the world about what was really happening in the country as the chekists managed the transition to eventually capture the state, while presenting the

illusion that democratization was under way. I show how the Services' Web sites glorify past Soviet era methods and operations and serve to perpetuate the chekist legacy, depicting an uninterrupted continuity with their chekist/Bolshevik pasts. Books and CDs, also glorifying the past and linking today's Services with those of Soviet times, have been produced and, like the Web sites, directly contradict the messages of reform embedded in the "active measures" campaigns. In the third section, I examine the use of symbols to perpetuate chekist culture, including statues of Iron Feliks and the public release of stamps depicting six of the most notorious counterintelligence officers of Stalin's time. Finally, I conclude with a review of the annual Chekists' Day celebrations and show how the chekist identity continues to be promoted and worn as a label of great pride and accomplishment, the chekist mentality as unchanged as ever.

10.2: PRELIMINARIES AND CONCEPTS

An important condition for a secret police transformation and probably the most challenging is a change in the organizational culture and mentality of intelligence/security sector institutions and officers. Meeting this condition entails the aggressive promotion of democratic values, principles, and ideals including, most fundamentally, a respect for human rights, political freedoms, and the rule of law. Transformational leaders who have undergone the LVD process are necessitated as the appropriate change agents. Commensurate with the building of new security institutions is the inculcation of a "corporate mindset" that is in sync with democratic values. Thus, training is expected to incorporate this respect into the procedures used and adhered to in carrying out investigative-operational activities (on the home front). The emphasis on a

respect for the dignity of the person must be implicit, if not explicit, in all aspects of the curriculum.

Along the same lines, the explicit recognition of human rights and freedoms in the constitution and Service mandates is wholly insufficient. The security academies of post-communist states need to completely reorient their curriculum in line with not only the new threats and methods to counter them, but within a framework of democratic norms, so they are in sync with the new intelligence/security institutions. The documentation of a respect for law and human rights and civil liberties is only preliminary. The leadership must actively promulgate the new organizational culture and mentality from the very beginning. This instruction must be accompanied by the continuing articulation of a wholesale rejection of the repressive functions and methods employed in the past by predecessor organizations; in effect, the understanding has to be transmitted in the first place that there has been a real break from the past, and in the second, that the new approach is the only one acceptable.

A new thinking that encompasses democratic values must be inculcated throughout the ranks, designed to lead over time to not only the adoption, but the habituation, of new mentalities and behaviors, while deviations from the new rules are proven unacceptable through effective disciplinary measures and punishments geared toward deterring others and permanently ending the activity. Only then can a “new beginning” be marked, from which a progressive and positive approach, a “law and human dignity-focused” organizational culture and mentality can become instituted in line with the values of a democratic polity, and which can then be built upon, reinforced, and thus deepen over time.

LVD plays a key factor in this process as it sends a strong message that secret police ways are no longer acceptable, and, in fact, wholly rejected. In regard to this condition for a secret police transformation, as with the others, LVD is of essential importance for a number of reasons. In the *political* arena, these include the fact that political leaders: 1) exercise political control of the intelligence/security sector; 2) appoint the intelligence/security sector leaders; 3) task the intelligence/security services; 4) are responsible for oversight of the intelligence/security sector; 5) may politicize the intelligence/security services; and, 6) as the ultimate leaders in the state, they design and enforce the laws and set the tone of the country (and serve as the primary public example, through their "revolutionary," or, "transformational" leadership).

In the *intelligence/security sector*, the reasons for LVD include the fact that commanders: 1) train, lead, and set the example to cadres; 2) give orders that must be followed by cadres; and, 3) are responsible for enforcing the rules and levying the penalties. The commanders' influence (so-called "command influence") in hierarchical organizations is so great that cadres — who serve as the operational core and thus are the ones most likely to actively employ secret police tactics, that if there is direction (tacit or real) support, and protection from superiors to carry out abuses of law and human rights, and management — correspondingly fails to apply corrective measures and/or impose penalties on violators, impunity spreads and an organizational culture of lawlessness and mentality prevail, perhaps even being rewarded, a situation completely incompatible with the inculcation of democratic values. It is critically important that the will exists and a serious effort is made by those who control the information and the guns to themselves respect the rule of law. To make it work, to fundamentally change the culture, leaders and

commanders must endeavor to incorporate a "legal way of thinking," with the intent to pervade old mindsets that naturally resist change. The goal of LVD is to disqualify those individuals who are not amenable to the new approach and willing to accept constraints on their operational behavior in accordance with democratic norms.

By disqualifying those who do not meet these requisite criteria, new leaders mitigate the potential for an insider subversion of the effort since, by mere association, people have the ability to influence others. This is especially the case when a power differential exists; with their rigid hierarchical structure, the effect in power ministries is only amplified. Moreover, due to their unique and special role, the Services' approach to the democratic transition, as well as that of the political regime, together have a significant impact on the population's support or lack thereof for democratic political change and can affect whether public trust and confidence in newly emerging institutions and processes increase or erode within a few short years, the opportunity lost. It is crucial to also keep sight of the fact that, as Cheryl King and Lisa Zanetti, observe in their 2005 book, *Transformational Public Service: Portraits of Theory in Practice*, about transforming institutions, "While individual transformation is essential, without the concomitant organizational work, transformation is temporary and is attached to the people practicing it."[1] In other words, the culture change that is promulgated must work at both individual and organizational levels in order to become institutionalized and thus sustainable.

[1] Cheryl Simrell King and Lisa A. Zanetti, *Transformational Public Service: Portraits of Theory in Practice*, M.E. Sharpe: NY, 2005, p. 89.

10.3: THE LVD MESSAGE: A NEW MENTALITY

In order to enable and promote fundamental change in organizational culture and mentality, it is necessary to have effective leaders dedicated to that cause. Thus, the requirement for LVD of the intelligence/security services' leadership structures, beginning with top posts, if instituted as a priority, substantially eases the transformation process. The continued maintenance of old Soviet repressive elements at the helm (and the mid-level cadres, as well) of the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services only meant continuity in the chekist organizational culture and mentality and the stifling of any reform measures.

The old Soviet chekist mindset that dominates and pervades the existing Services' thinking precludes any change; by these officers' mere association with new recruits, they transmit expectations and organizational values, with the selection process having already filtered out those who failed to display the appropriate corporate line, in any case. If the old guard is not vetted out in the initial stage of the transformation process, they contaminate the environment and are likely to use their positions to poison the minds of new recruits, subverting the change process from the inside. Hence, the introduction of new leaders committed to democratic values and the rule of law was mandated to change the decades-old Bolshevik tradition of "chekistry" that prevails as a mindset throughout Russia's intelligence/security sector, long propagated as the time-honored core identity and theme of the Soviet secret police.

Both leadership change and transformational leadership at the top are pivotal to the success of the value shift required for a real secret police transformation (and democratic political transition). In cooperation with top political leaders,

intelligence/security sector commanders must both lead and manage that value change as a key part of the new Services' development. Thus, the choice of leadership for the new intelligence/security services is of fundamental importance. In his 2003 book, *Organizational Development in the Public Sector*, public administration professor David Carnevale notes that, "Organizational Development (OD) is fundamentally about changing the dynamics of social systems." He observes that,

> It all starts at the top...The change agent might have the notion to create an organizational culture where everyone is a leader. That is fine, but getting the support of top leadership is a threshold problem in any cultural change design." Further, he argues, "Leaders can influence change in organizations, even bureaucratic ones....Of the various methods, the one that is most compatible with the ideals of OD is Transformational Leadership, which is a process where 'leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of morality and motivation'....More than anything, the transformational leader commits people to action, to change, to transforming how organizations work, and what they represent. The powerful relationship between the leader and the followers is transformed into action.[2]

Finally, he explains that, "The ideal transformational leader represents the core values of OD: optimism about what employees can accomplish if given a chance, encouragement of democratic values like the right to participate and the entitlement to effective voice, and nurturing the ideals of humanism, a philosophy where the worth and development of the individual is honored."[3]

While Carnevale's view is not directed specifically toward an intelligence/security service per se, it holds value for this discussion in that he highlights critical factors necessary for organizational change, and, not unimportantly, conveys the sense that individual dignity and democratic values must be a key focus. The point made,

---

[2] David G. Carnevale, *Organizational Development in the Public Sector*, Westview Press: USA, 2003, pp. 99, 117-118.

[3] Ibid.

it is through the institution of LVD that transformational leaders are more likely to drive OD in the intelligence/security sector and forge a secret police transformation that is ultimately complete and sustainable. Thus, it is imperative that transformational leaders be placed in leading and commanding posts to direct the state's intelligence/security services toward the institution of fundamental organizational culture and mentality changes, perhaps with representatives from those of the established democracies providing training and guidance to the effort. As shown in chapters two and three of this project, the positive experiences of many East European and Baltic states that worked with Western counterparts to transform their secret police in line with their new democratic political systems have evidenced the value in this approach.

10.4: THE STRATEGIC INERTIA OF CHECKIST ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

The organizational culture of an institution goes far in affecting the attitudes and behaviors of its members. New recruits are brought in and shaped, expected and pressured to conform to the "institutional ethos." As Linda Miller and Karen Hess point out, the organizational culture of law enforcement agencies — the police culture — consists of informal values, beliefs, and expectations that are passed on to newcomers in the department.[4] Moreover, once established, the organizational culture is highly resistant to change. That is another reason why this key aspect of a secret police transformation is the most difficult one to realize, and eased substantially by building new intelligence/security services from scratch. Even then, old cultural mores dominant in the transitioning society, from which officers will be drawn, make organizational culture

[4] Linda S. Miller & Karen M. Hess, *The Police In The Community: Strategies For The 21st Century*, 3rd ed., Wadsworth Group, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning: USA, 2002, p. 34.

transformation a particular challenge as value change takes time. Yet, if the leaderships of the state's political institutions are concomitantly promoting organizational cultures and values that are in sync with a democratic polity, such change in approach in the intelligence/security services is not only thereby validated, but facilitated as well. That is why LVD most effectively contributes to democratization if instituted in both political and intelligence/security sectors — they work in tandem. The *will* to change is of primary importance and, in aggregate, a necessary condition for success. As William Goodbody notes of police bureaucracies:

> A bureaucracy takes on a life of its own, and will, along with the people who have a vested interest in it, resist and undermine all attempts at reform. This is especially true if the reform entails a complete reorganization of existing practices and procedures...Police bureaucracies differ in two essential ways from more conventional bureaucracies. First, supervision is based on a military system of rank that vests police supervisors with significantly more authority than their counterparts in the civilian sector. The quasi-military organization of policing, with uniforms and ranks as a visible component of every interaction, tends to make the police among the more rigid and authoritarian of bureaucracies. Second, police bureaucracies rely heavily on punishment to enforce rules.[5]

The Soviet secret police had always been a highly militarized political police. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, the KGB did not. Nor did the security sector adapt or conform to democratic norms in the early, euphoric weeks of Yeltsin's rule. This strategic inertia of chekist organizational culture followed on from the deeply-ingrained checklist mentality that is inherently opposed to democratic values such as respect for political freedoms and human rights. With only a few rare and temporary exceptions, there was continuity in leadership and command (conservative, career KGB officers) across all post-Soviet intelligence/security services, impeding the promotion or imposition of any organizational culture change. Rather than adapt to a new democratic

society, the chekists ultimately managed to force society to adapt to it. Without LVD, and with Yeltsin having quickly reversed his intelligence/security sector reforms and instead pushing for the Services' politicization, making political loyalty the key criterion for a leading post, any serious change in chekist organizational culture and mentality was precluded. It soon became evident that reform-minded individuals would be quickly ousted from the executive branch, and in the significantly more insulated and conservative intelligence/security sector institutions, that was even more so the case. One hundred percent of Soviet intelligence/security officers had been Communist party members, and given their specific indoctrination and role in the police state, could be expected on the whole to be more set in their views, in particular, in their approach to fighting crime and "political crime," that is, not by law, but by party-state directive and using the most intrusive and abusive methods. With Yeltsin's trade-off, the traditional political-intelligence relationship was thus (re)affirmed and only more deeply reinforced over time.

The post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services have retained their strong paramilitary features, are extremely hierarchical, and as politicized, if not more so (especially under Putin), than they had been during the Soviet era. Speaking to the politicization of the Russian armed forces, Jacob Kipp and Timothy Thomas observed in their October 1995 report, "The Russian Military in the 1995 Parliamentary Elections: A Primer," that, "Post-Communist Russia has a deeply divided military that also has been drawn into domestic politics as a protector of corporate interests of the officer corps. Military professionalism has pushed part of the officer corps toward an apolitical stance.

---

[5] William L. Goodbody, "A Square Peg in Bureaucracy's Round Hole," *Law Enforcement News*, June 30, 1995, pp. 12, 14, and cited in Ibid., p. 29.

But the crisis of the officer corps has also moved another portion towards deeper, partisan political involvement."[6] They noted that in late September of that year, then-Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, arguing that the Duma had not done enough for the military, announced that the army would nominate 123 officers, 23 of them generals, to run for a seat. As noted in chapter nine, there are specific rules on military participation in politics. However, the majority of those rules are dealt with internally, making them rather easily circumvented. Moreover, the officer can simply take a leave of absence from the military for the duration of his campaign and election term. It is notable that military personnel accounted for 40 of the 110 million total possible votes in the 1995 parliamentary elections, constituting a significant voting block, and thus were extremely important, as Kipp and Thomas note, for the political regime.[7]

As do all bureaucracies, each of the Services of the Russian intelligence/security sector, including the military, has its own distinct culture. As a result of the huge influx of officers into political posts over the years, the sector has become highly politicized once again, while professionalism has declined, with serious implications for the security of the people, who live in an environment of rotting infrastructure, stifling but ineffective government regulation, and a lack of respect for life, it is one marked by rapacious greed and corruption, where public safety and welfare is almost always traded for money, with

---

[6] Jacob Kipp and Timothy L. Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Elections: A Primer," Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 5, 1995, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/ruselec.htm.

[7] For a breakdown of the multiple parties that ran in the centre and regions, and the percentages of the votes they each received, see the *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies* Web site at http://www.nupi.no/russland/elections/1995_state_duma_elections_Russia.htm; and, Op. cit., "The Russian Military and the 1995 Elections: A Primer."

either official neglect or complicity in the interest of personal profit usually shown to have contributed to the poor state of affairs.[8]

In light of Goodbody's observations, and given the necessarily secretive nature of intelligence/security services, it would seem that internal mechanisms would prove the most effective in institutionalizing new cultural norms in the organization. Thus, effectively vetted, transformational leadership at that level is deemed crucial. Indeed, the internal security department leadership is the first line of oversight, and whether oversight exists *externally* or not, it *always* exists *internally*. Hence, its role in monitoring officers, enforcing the rules, and penalizing violators is key to setting the boundaries of what types of behaviors (and attitudes) are acceptable. However, how and whether it uses its oversight authority is determinant. As noted in the last chapter, three different heads of the FSB's internal security department were involved in the Three Whales (Tri Kita) case and were only years later ultimately fired. Logically, one could expect the corruption ran deep among the remainder of the organization.

10.5: RULE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE ARE REQUIRED FOR PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS

It is essential that the top leadership of the organization supports and promotes change in the organizational culture and mentality, just as it is crucial that top management promulgates rules that they both intend and have the capacity to enforce. Even so, as in all public sector agencies, holding employees to a higher ethical standard beyond the overt observance of law, codes of ethics, and rules is key to earning public

[8] Specifically in the service industries, this includes air and rail transportation, and hospital and health care. For an example of this reality in the air transport sector, see "Russian Flight Safety Said to Nosedive," *The New York Times*, July 29, 2007; and, for the railways sector, see "Post-Soviet Railways Lack Funds For Ambitious Projects," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 4, Issue 148, July 31, 2007.

trust and confidence in government bodies and administrative agencies, whatever their nature or mission.[9] The professionalism of the officers is relevant here, and it ties in with professional codes of ethics, which principles guide the profession. Ultimately, however, as Harvard University scholar John Gaus concluded, a public servant's reliance on his "inner check" was the best hope for administrative responsibility.[10]

Thus, given the nature and secrecy of intelligence/security service work, this higher standard of compliance with both the spirit and letter of the law must be internalized by the leadership and management. This inculcation of ethical values must then be transmitted down the chain to the cadres and permeate throughout the organization (and the wider bureaucracy, as well), given its authority to make judgments and use discretion outside of strict controls in some situations. Again, the focus is on professionalism, and not mere codes. So, too, theorist Carl Friedrich argued, "administrative responsibility can be ensured only internally, through professionalism or professional standards or codes, because the increasing complexities of modern policies require extensive policy expertise and specialized ability on the part of bureaucrats."[11] Thus, codes are necessary, but insufficient. All potential dilemmas simply cannot be conceivably included in codified form, in addition to the fact that role conflicts arise, and the "right" choices need to be made. For that, the rule of law is imperative to guide behavior, with the active promotion of a legal culture accompanying it.

---

[9] Dennis L. Dresang, *Public Personnel Management and Public Policy*, 4th ed., Longman: NY, pp. 51-52.

[10] Dennis D. Riley, *Public Personnel Administration*, 2nd ed., Longman: NY, 2002, p. 110.

[11] Jay M. Shafritz and E.W. Russell, *Introducing Public Administration*, 5th ed., Pearson Education, Inc.: NY, 2005, pp. 191-192. See Carl J. Friedrich, "The Nature of Administrative Responsibility," Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Public Policy*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1940.

In democracies, all government administrative procedures are codified in law to guide decisionmaking, including those having to do with secrecy. As David Rosenbloom, professor of public administration at American University in Washington DC, notes in his 2003 book, *Administrative Law for Public Managers*, not only are provisions for national government secrecy written into the Constitution, but "American constitutional democracy relies heavily on administrative law to determine what should be open, what should be secret, and how decisions regarding governmental transparency should be made, challenged, and reviewed."[12] In post-Soviet Russia, while laws on state secrets exist, they are deliberately ambiguous and often used by the authorities to prosecute individuals who have fallen out of favor or are somehow perceived as a threat to the regime. The continued chekist promotion of a "spy mania" atmosphere and periodic holding of Stalin-type show trials of citizens and foreigners alike reflects an unchanged mentality that insists "spies" and "enemies of the people" (labels most often reserved for Westerners and those who associate with them, just as in Soviet times), lurk everywhere among the populace, just as does the use of extra-legal means to prosecute targeted individuals regardless of the laws on the books.

Indeed, the argument that the rule of law is a precondition to a democratic transition (and secret police transformation) is most valid. As Jay M. Shafritz and E.W. Russell note in their 2005 book, *Introducing Public Administration*, "Under the totalitarian communism of the former Soviet Union, the Russians had a word for people who served the apparatus of state without question. They were called apparatchiks — a term implying that the individual mindlessly follows orders." They ask, "What stops us

[12] David H. Rosenbloom, *Administrative Law for Public Managers*, Westview Press: U.S.A., 2003, p. 117.

from being apparatchiks in all but name? The answer to this question," they continue, "is that public administrators in a democracy work within the rule of law — a governing system in which the highest authority is a body of law that applies equally to all (as opposed to the rule of men, within which the personal whims of those in power can decide any issue)."[13]

In observance that, "The rule of law and the concomitant notion that no one is above the law have been continuously critical concepts,"[14] Shafritz and Russell ask, "What legal and institutional arrangements, conventions, and ethical values essentially distinguish democratic from despotic public administration? In truly democratic societies — as opposed to those that are democratic in name only — there is a framework of constitutional, legal, and procedural requirements that subject public administrators to rigorous monitoring and oversight by a democratic legislature, independent courts, and other institutions at arm's length from the government."[15] Therein lies the problem for Russia; no such framework exists, as shown in preceding chapters. While extensive legislation exists in every sphere, the rule of law does not apply. Law is designed by officials for bribe extraction purposes. It is permissive, rather than constraining their activities. Further, the parliament exercises no effective oversight, and courts are not independent. The whole system has been corrupted from the inside out, and highlights why LVD is most effective in promoting a legal culture if applied in both political and security arenas. As noted earlier, the Russian intelligence/security services are not

---

[13] Op. cit, *Introducing Public Administration*, pp. 192-193.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

meaningfully subject to any oversight institutions beyond their own commanders and the chekist-dominated political administration, which apparently condones their lawless activities; Russia's parliament is not democratically accountable in practice, its courts are not independent, and no institutions of any significance operate at "an arm's length from the government." All are subject to tight Kremlin control and answerable only to Putin, including the intelligence/security services, which are directed by and under the control of fellow, like-minded chekists, that is, politically and operationally speaking, Putin and his closest advisors, all old Soviet career KGB officers.

10.6: LVD AS A REMEDY TO THE "CULTURE OF CORRUPTION"

LVD of the intelligence/security sector is imperative not only in order to drive this organizational culture and mentality change aspect of the secret police transformation (as part of the change in political system) to one that operates within democratic norms, it is also useful for reducing rampant corruption in the ranks in that it disrupts the old informal networks that seek to refine their extraction and distribution channels in the patron-client state, and reduces their ability to use the Services toward that end. The initial purge brought about through LVD is only a temporary measure to reduce corruption, however, forcing a reliance on legal-judicial instruments to control it in later periods. Hence, the importance of new leaders to establish the rule of law and hold themselves to it as the transition progresses. Corruption will always be a problem; the goal is to mitigate its prevalence through the design of procedures that enable the identification and effective removal of commanders engaged in corrupt activities, since the top layers, if corrupt, inevitably lead to the corruption of the lower levels. Criminal Justice Professor Bryan Byers notes the "venerable 'rotten barrel theory' of police

corruption," which suggests that unethical, illegal behavior is pervasive throughout a department and can be traced to top management.[16] So, too, Ross Swope suggests that the problem is perhaps not in "bad apples" but, rather, "bad barrels" in that, "It is the barrel, the culture of the police organization, that can cause the root-shaking scandals that periodically face some police organizations."[17]

With political and intelligence/security sectors endemically corrupt, it can only be expected that the corruption will spread throughout the entire bureaucracy and society as well. When that happens, the democratization project is likely to lose its legitimacy as the people come to equate the new system with the old, that is, corrupt and ineffective, yet with a most meaningful difference — the loss of the social safety net and sense of security brought about by the order that existed under communism. In October 2006, Deputy Prosecutor General Alexander Buksman estimated that corrupt bureaucrats were taking in bribes worth $240 billion a year, almost as must as the government's revenues. He observed that, "We are confronting mass disrespect for the law. The scale of bribes has reached such a level that within a year a midranking corrupt bureaucrat can buy himself a 200-square-meter (2,150-square-foot) apartment."[18] (Market rates priced such an apartment in Moscow at $800,000, while the average salary was a tenth of that, at $800 per month.) In short, a job in government translates into a license to steal. Hence, if government expands, so too does the corruption. Putin's centralization of state power

---

[16] Bryan Byers, "Ethics and Criminal Justice: Some Observations on Police Misconduct," *ACJS Today*, Vol. XXI, Issue 3, September/October 2000, pp. 1, 4-8, and cited in Op. cit., p. 48.

[17] Ross Swope, "Bad Apples or Bad Barrel?" *Law and Order*, Vol. 49, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 80-85, and cited in Op. cit., *The Police In The Community: Strategies For The 21st Century*.

[18] Michael Mainville, "Bribery thrives as big business in Putin's Russia," *SFgate.com*, January 2, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/01/02/MNG8QNBCTN1.DTL&type=printable.

demanded an increase in public employees, with the bureaucracy growing from 1.1 million to 1.5 million since 2002, according to Elena Panfilova, the head of Transparency International's Russia office. She noted that, "There is a lot of money floating around, and there are a lot more people looking for kickbacks." The situation has evolved such that, as Buksman observed, so much money could be made in government now that department heads were demanding large sums for a job. For example, a high-ranking position in the economic development department costs $50,000, while a traffic police job costs about $3000.[19] The independent Russian thinktank INDEM estimated that firms paid an average of $146,000 in business-related bribes, and spent seven percent of their budgets on bribes. Clearly, the corruption is rampant at the highest levels and permeates on down to the street level. In Putin's Russia, to speak in Byer's and Swope's terms, the culture of corruption extends throughout society, and "bad barrels" are manifest in all government institutions.

To reduce corruption, then, mandates change at the top, accompanied with the promulgation of a "culture of legality," rather than a "culture of corruption." However, in Russia, as noted earlier, the removal of top officials for corruption is rarely anything more than a political purge, and only reinforces the culture of corruption. To date, as MVD Col. Gen. Oleg Safonov laments, there is no legal definition of corruption, which complicates the fight against it.[20] The events surrounding the removal of General Prosecutor Yury Skuratov illuminate the approach to the problem in Russia, which is

---

[19] Ibid.

[20] See the February 2, 2007 "Interview of the Deputy Minister of MOI of the Russian Federation Militia Col. Gen. Safonov to *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*," posted on the MVD Web site at http://eng.mvdrf.ru/index.php?docid=431.

turned on its head, with those who investigate high-level corruption themselves charged with corruption in retaliation. That's how the system works. Indeed, it is important to recognize that a secret police is always notoriously corrupt in light of the fact it is not held to any rule of law but, instead, officers are imbued with a sense of impunity deriving from the arbitrary nature of the regime. This is another reason why the institution of an LVD policy is correlated (along with other factors conducive to democratization) with the transformation of a post-communist state and its secret police to a political democracy and intelligence/security services that operate according to democratic norms. For democratization to succeed, all institutions must be based on the rule of law.

10.7: THE MAKING OF A NEW MENTALITY: INTERNALIZATION OF DIFFERENT VALUES

A fundamental change in values at the individual level is mandated to realize cultural change. As Carnevale observes, "Organizations cannot change unless individuals change….It is in people's heads that real change occurs, if organizations are to be transformed."[21] Once LVD is accomplished, putting the focus on secret police transformation, not only must a new organizational culture be introduced and actively promoted at all levels, an associated (democratic-oriented) mentality needs to be regularly communicated, as does a professional ethic, all of which must be internalized by both the commanding leadership and cadres in order to become institutionalized and endure over time.[22] As Will and Ariel Durant observe in their 1968 book, *Lessons of*

[21] Op. cit., *Organizational Development in the Public Sector*, p. 39.

[22] See Francis J. Monahan, "Investigative Commissions Implemented Reforms Prove Ephemeral," *The Police Chief*, Vol. LXVII, No. 10, October 2000, pp. 79-84, and cited in Op. cit., pp. 48-49.

History, transformation happens only in the mind, and not in the bureaucracy.[23] In other words, as CEO of OSS.net, Inc., Robert David Steele Vivas, notes, the bureaucracy will not produce transformation.[24] Top management levels are the source of culture change initiation. Whether the top leadership chooses to actively work toward changing the organizational thinking, or, conversely, decides to carry on but remake its image and create the illusion of reform for public consumption, which can only be a temporary deception, strongly affects and tends to determine future directions of other institutional changes as well.

10.8: PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT: "ACTIVE MEASURES" — THE DECEPTION PROGRAMS CONTINUE

From the earliest days after the failed KGB-led coup that preceded the Soviet Union's collapse, the successive organizations of the KGB have sought to preserve their institutions by presenting them as reformed, benign, and necessary to fight the new threats of the post-cold war, such as transnational organized crime, drug-trafficking, money-laundering, and terrorism. With the cold war over, all the major intelligence/security services of the world shifted their focus to counter these transnational threats as borders opened, the Internet and global communications spread, and criminal elements became more sophisticated. To accord with the new dynamic, and help ensure a constant flow of resources, the unreformed post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security services orchestrated a massive new image-making campaign.

---

[23] Will and Ariel Durant, *The Lessons of History*, Simon and Schuster: NY, 1968.

[24] Robert David Steele Vivas, "OSS CEO Reviews Lessons Learned From Open Source Intelligence, Global War on Terrorism, and National Security Transformation - America at Risk," *OSS.net, Inc.*, July 30, 2004, OSS.NET.

The Soviet tradition of running extensive propaganda campaigns is well-documented, and had as its grand theme anti-Americanism. As Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin noted in their 1999 book, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, "In addition to collecting intelligence and producing politically correct assessments of it, the KGB also sought to influence the course of world events by a variety of 'active measures' (aktivinyye meropriatia) ranging from media manipulation to 'special actions' involving various degrees of violence." They observed that "Throughout the Cold War the United States was the main target for KGB active measures as well as for intelligence collection."[25] Moreover, Andrew and Mitrohkin note in their 2005 book, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*, that, "The Centre had no doubt that its 'active measures' to influence operations had made a major contribution to turning most Third World opinion against the United States."[26] Not limited to a foreign audience, "KGB active measures were also intended to serve a domestic political agenda by encouraging the support of the Soviet leadership for a forward policy in the Third World. The Centre supplied the Kremlin with regular reports designed to demonstrate its success in influencing Third World politicians and public opinion."[27] During Soviet times, roughly 25 percent of an intelligence officer's time was spent on active measures, indicating their importance to the regime.

---

[25] Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, Basic Books, NY, 1999, p. 224.

[26] Ibid., p. 19.

[27] Ibid.

With that history and with the KGB (albeit divided into a number of organizations early on) the only institution emerging from the state's collapse unscathed, in addition to its great success in manipulating a diverse range of perceptions over the decades, it was a given that the deception and propaganda dissemination would continue on a grand scale. Since the early 1990s, the Services used active measures with the aim of convincing both foreign and domestic audiences that the KGB's successors, especially the MB-FSK-FSB, had been "reformed," and were comparable with the domestic security intelligence services of the West. They were quite successful. As J. Michael Waller documented in his 1994 book, *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*, the early themes emphasizing the Services' new anticrime, antitrafficking, and antiterrorism functions were strongly endorsed by the Russian public. He observed that these attempts by the Services to distance themselves (publicly) from the old KGB "were intended to mask the continuum of the chekist legacy," and "were remarkable in their similarities to those waged by the KGB between 1988 and 1991."[28]

Waller identified a number of themes designed and disseminated for domestic consumption, including: 1) Break from the Discredited Past; 2) Decrease in Power; 3) Internal Security Apparatus; 4) Useful Role for Society; 5) Strict Civil Control; 6) Protection of Individual Rights; 7) A Force for Stability; 8) Repudiation of Old Methods; 9) Openness; 10) Mutual Cooperation with Western Services; and, 11) Revival of Paranoia. He also identified the themes disseminated to foreign audiences, including: 1) Break From Discredited Past; 2) Reduction in Personnel; 3) Useful Role for Society; 4) Strict Civil Control; 5) A Force for Stability; 6) Repudiation of Old Methods; 7)

[28] J. Michael Waller, *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*, Westview Press: NY, 1994, p. 248.

Openness; 8) Mutual Cooperation with Western Services; 9) Curtailment of Spying Activity; and, 10) Personalization of Leadership.[29] Such themes trumpeting the "reform" of the Services continued to be disseminated in various versions throughout the Yeltsin era. Once Putin gained the presidency, they were interwoven with new narratives in tune with Putin's "dictatorship of law," "strong state," "managed democracy," and other constructs, all designed with the intent to mask Moscow's true intentions, presented as benign while Putin meticulously constructed his chekist-dominated state, combining the rhetoric of democratic change with the reality of democratic reversal. The illusion needed maintaining for only a few, short years as the chekists bolstered their political-economic power and established their position as the unquestioned masters of the new, 21st century Russia.

The nature and reach of information technology in the post-cold war world, which more easily enables the cross-checking and validation of sources (national and international) if the capacity to sort through the massive amounts of data exists, necessitated that the image purveyance applied to both the internal and external environments with some degree of coordination. As Waller noted in regard to the various themes, "Most of the internal security image-making campaign themes were identical for internal and foreign audiences, with the exception of an internal theme stressing protection against foreign intrigues."[30] That latter point alone signaled that things were not as they seemed, for if the state was truly democratizing, it would not make sense to warn the public to beware of "foreigners" (most commonly referring to Westerners),

[29] Ibid., pp. 247-276.

[30] Ibid., p. 249.

"who must be spies." In any case, the Services launched an intensive public relations campaign directed toward foreign audiences, who needed to be disarmed to a greater extent after having witnessed events of the cold war years, and persuaded that free-market democracy was indeed a major facet of the Russian transition plan.

By suppressing critical reports and purveying an endless series of false images, primarily for foreign consumption, about the benign, even cooperative, nature of the post-Soviet intelligence/security services, Moscow sought to deceive the West into thinking that democratization was underway in Russia, which perception brought hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid to the government, money that corrupt officials then quickly stashed away in foreign bank accounts. If LVD had been instituted, and real reform measures implemented, the grand deception campaign would have been wholly unnecessary. The institution of the process itself would have quite literally demonstrated that a serious endeavor of secret police transformation and democratic transition was underway.

The institution of LVD publicly conveys that the new regime perceived past activities and methods as not only morally wrong and unacceptable in the present, but completely repugnant to democratic forms of political life, thus affirming their full and unwavering support for real secret police (and political) transformation that is meant to be sustainable. In response to such a move, it could be expected that established democracies would support the endeavor and provide any needed assistance.

Since his July 1998 appointment to head the FSB, Putin has worked to kill the image of the KGB's successors as unreformed and "unreformable," as Yeltsin had

described the secret police in a December 21, 1993 decree.[31] Once he gained the presidency, following on his tenure as FSB director, active measures continued to be prepared in the old Soviet tradition, an effort that took on renewed importance as the project of building the chekist-dominated state — cloaked in the rhetoric of democratic reform — took precedence. As a supporting framework for the new campaign, the National Information Security Concept, drafted by former KGB officers and approved by Putin in June 2000, identified both external and internal media enemies, much in the vein of the former KGB Fifth Chief Directorate that had been tasked to work against "ideological diversions."[32] By suppressing negative and critical media reporting on government corruption, incompetence, intelligence failures, and human right abuses, as well as activities designed to promote and facilitate the chekists' resurgence, the Kremlin sought to minimize the recognition of the extent and depth of the problems plaguing society and win popular support at home, united the Russian people against a common enemy — Western intrigues designed to extract the country's vast oil and gas and other natural resources and control the political regime under the cloak of "democratic reform." Thus, the new Concept provided the basis for running deception campaigns to deceive the world about domestic political developments in the country, particularly the redirection away from democracy. Slogans and sound bites about democratic and legal-judicial reform saturated the electronic and published media while chekists moved into political positions en masse, took extra-legal control of strategic resources privatized under

---

[31] Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1996, p. 79.

[32] The SVR-FSB cooperative in electronic eavesdropping: in July 1998, the FSB issued a regulation on SORM-2 (internal spying), mandating ISPs install, at their own expense, technology to link their computers to those at FSB HQ, allowing the agency to monitor select electronic transmissions, from private e-mails to e-commerce purchases, in real time. See Jen Tracy, "FSB Now Wired to Read Your E-Mail," *The Moscow Times*, December 7, 1999.

Yeltsin, undermined the electoral process by eliminating most elections under the auspices of fighting terrorism and manipulating outcomes of those that remained, and eventually reoriented foreign policy to explicitly condemn U.S. policy and support Western antagonists.

During the early years of his first presidential term, Putin continued the program to remake the chekist image and counter perceptions, both domestic and foreign, that the KGB was resurgent and the reestablishment of a police state was underway in Russia, while he assiduously constructed exactly that reality. In order to realize the goal, Putin instituted a far-reaching public relations campaign to promote a positive image of the Services. One common theme that synchronized with the rhetoric of a "dictatorship of law," supported by the institution of new criminal, civil, and administrative codes, presented them as "leashed" and subject to law.

These programs were significantly eased by the state's taking control of the media. As called for in the FSB mandate, the media had become a tool of the state, and Kremlin mouthpiece.[33] So, too, the new information security doctrine provided for state/FSB control over are all modes of communication in Russia, including all information dissemination within and emanating from the state,[34] and eased the

---

[33] Victor Yasmann, "The Roots of Putin's Attack on Media Freedom," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 3, August 7, 2000, p. 3.

[34] In July 2000, Communications Minister Leonid Reiman formally authorized the introduction of government monitoring of communications, a project/technology known as SORM, the acronym for "system for ensuring operational-investigative activity," and allowed the FSB anonymous access to its users' files. Of note, the project first surfaced in 1998 (when Putin was appointed FSB director). On July 25, 2000 a Russian Communications Ministry Directive was issued requiring all state and private operators of telephone, cellular, paging communications, and ISPs to open their lines to FSB monitoring, which snooping mandated no search warrant/probable cause. All communication companies were required to design and install monitoring and eavesdropping equipment configured for their networks, obtain FSB approval for the SORM system, and reveal to the FSB all access keys to their networks. In short, operators were required to integrate SORM into their networks, get FSB certification of the equipment, and train FSB officers in its use. The Directive emphasized that all information on SORM must remain secret and the FSB

organization of the regime's perception management programs, designed and disseminated by the intelligence/security services.

Traditionally, "active measures" had been an important component of intelligence work, and this is even more the case in the "information age." While the new FSB mandate tasked the Service to provide information to the public about its activities and implement editorial and publishing activities, the task was apparently interpreted by the Service as providing "disinformation" and controlling editorial and media content, which is effectively managed by state representatives, who regularly monitor and intervene in broadcasts and communications.[35]

---

should use the SORM technology without the knowledge of the network clients. Moreover, providers were required to bear the cost of the equipment's installation. In response to the storm of outrage, on September 25, 2000 the Supreme Court ruled that the section of the Directive requiring ISPs and telephone/paging companies to install eavesdropping equipment for the FSB was invalid, ruling that ISPs of cellular service providers would have to inform clients that they were being monitored. Consequently, the SORM2 system in use today currently requires that security authorities obtain a warrant prior to checking users' electronic traffic, although to what degree they comply is unknown. See "Russian secret police want to monitor Internet," *NandoTimes.com*, July 22, 1998; "Telecommunications Put Under Chekist," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 17, November 13, 2000, pp. 1-2; Victor Yasmann "FSB Legalized Monitoring of Internet," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 6, August 28, 2000, p. 3; "Court Overrules Part Of Law Allowing FSB to Eavesdrop," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 27, 2000; Charles Fenyvesi, "Russian FSB Surveillance of Internet Challenged," *RFE/RL Watchlist*, Vol. 1, No. 7, February 25, 1999, http://www.hrea.org/lists/huridocs-tech/markup/msg00132.html; Floriana Fossato, "Russia: Media Decree Targets Internet, Digital TV," *RFE/RL*, March 28, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/4911ddac-919d-43c7-8b5f-c158ca5ef33b.html; and, Marcus Alexander, "The Internet in Putin's Russia: Reinventing a Technology of Authoritarianism," Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, April 2003, Presented at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, University of Leicester, UK, April 15-17, 2003, http://www.henryfarrell.net/internet/alexander.pdf.

[35] When *Kommersant* was purchased by a new owner with ties to the Kremlin in 2006, it brought immediate concern that the editorial content would be drastically reoriented. See "Russia: 'Kommersant' Journalist Discusses Paper's New Owner," *RFE/RL*, September 14, 2006; and, "A Russian Journalist's View from Washington," *Washington Profile*, March 15, 2007, http://www.washprofile.org/en/node/6534. Moreover, in response to the substantially increased prominence of the Internet and cell phone networks in Russia, the regime has taken measures to establish its control. On March 12, 2007 Putin signed a decree merging the Federal Service for Media Law Compliance and Cultural Heritage (Rosookhrankultura) and the Federal Information Technologies Agency (Rossvyaznadzor). Prior to that, the former, which was part of the Culture and Mass Communications Ministry and headed by St. Petersburg chekist Boris Boyarskov, had been responsible for issuing and revoking broadcasting licenses. Putin appointed Boyarskov, who is also close to career chekist Igor Sechin, first deputy head of the presidential administration and chairman of the board of state-owned oil company, Rosneft, to head the new agency. New regulations concerning media legislation and the functions and powers of the Information Technology and Communications Ministry are

During Putin's early months as president, there was widespread concern about his KGB past and what that meant for Russia's democratization. Questions were increasingly raised about the likelihood for a resurgence of the KGB (specifically, KGB's successors) in light of some of his early moves, including the appointment of many chekists to political posts and the creation of his "vertical." In an effort to mollify them and true to chekist tradition, Putin told aides in September 2000 that image enhancement was a top priority.[36] Apparently to that end, in an interview broadcast on *CNN*'s Larry King show that month he performed in what could only be described as a quality lesson in propaganda presentation to the West.[37] As indicated by the subsequent news commentary, hopes that Russia was on the democratization path were rejuvenated.

On the home front, however, results of the image-making campaign were mixed. For example, on the eve of the December 20, 2000 Chekists' Day celebrations, the Russian Public Opinion Foundation conducted a poll on the public's attitude toward the security services, with 49% of respondents viewing service in the state security organs as attractive, 32% responding negatively, and 19% undecided. In regard to the activity of the security services, 46% were positive, while 25% did not consider themselves experts on the question. Further, and of great interest in hindsight, 40% viewed the recent tendency

---

under consideration by the Duma. Observers interpret the merger as an attempt to control the Internet, the only sphere of media and communications remaining that is unregulated. The FSB has repeatedly called for controlling the Internet as a means to police "extremist" communications. For example, in April 2005, Dmitry Frolov, spokesman for the FSB information security center, told the Federation Council that the secret services needed an extension of their authority to control communication networks, and suggested developing new rules for ISPs that would prevent the spread of extremist ideas on the Internet, register Internet activity, give the FSB access to user databases of telephone companies with information on all Internet addresses of users, both static and mobile, and also to mandate registration of all cell phone users since they can also use the Internet. See Op. cit., "Russia: Media Decree Targets Internet, Digital TV,"; and, "Russia's FSB Demands Control Over Internet," *MosNews.com*, April 24, 2005.

[36] "Putin Seeks to 'Kill' Chekist Image," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 8, September 11, 2000, p.1.

[37] Ibid.

of leading posts to be occupied by security service officers as positive, 19% negative, 28% indifferent, and 13% of respondents were unable to express a definite opinion. Reflecting an awareness of new developments in the political leadership of the country, the poll showed that 50% of respondents considered that the security services were playing a greater role in running the country, while 22% thought otherwise. Finally, a point worth illuminating in terms of the nature of existing political control of the Services and their relative impunity to act contrary to law, 77% thought that tighter control over the security services was needed, while only 10% maintained there was no such need.[38]

The results indicated that the image-making effort had, to an extent, paid off on the home front, where not only an abundance of cynics reside but the population also confronted the reality of the intelligence/security sector in their daily lives (e.g., stringent controls on organized political activity, widespread police corruption and abuse). Although Kremlin and Putin-endorsed United Russia party member officials continued to insist that Russia was moving toward democracy, few could agree by the end of Putin's first presidential term. By 2007, even leading Communist party officials were completely flustered at the lack of access to the political system. For instance, in St. Petersburg, where the party was having difficulty winning any seats to the city's 50-member legislature, Vladimir Fyodorov asked a reporter, "Democracy?" "I would not call the process underway in our country democracy."[39]

By mid-2007, domestic perceptions had clearly shifted toward a preference for the regime's authoritarian approaches, with Putin's popularity ratings consistently at over 70

---

[38] "Russians view security services positively but demand tighter control," December 20, 2000, *strana.ru*.

[39] Steven Lee Myers, "Russians to Vote, but Some Parties Lose in Advance," *The New York Times*, February 15, 2007.

percent approval. The public is fully aware of the chekist nature of the regime, with a July 13-16, 2007 Levada Center survey on the most influential forces in the country finding that on a 5-score scale in 16 state, private, and public institutions, Putin and the FSB ranked highest, garnering ratings of 4.22 and 3.65, respectively, while oligarchs, bankers, and financiers placed third, with 3.64. The fourth went to the media with 3.53, followed by the Army and government, rating 3.47 and 3.45, respectively. Prosecutors beat out the courts, 3.28 to 3.11, as did governors, at 3.26, and the Federation Council rated higher than the Duma, 3.09 to 2.89, respectively. The church rated 3.00. Not surprisingly, political parties, 2.64, intellectuals, 2.43, and trade unions at 1.93, received the lowest ratings, with respondents saying the intellectuals had lost their influence while the trade unions never had it.[40]

Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note that as Putin has reversed democratic reforms, consolidated his chekist-dominated state, and countered the West's democratization and other objectives around the globe, the Kremlin has used its control of the media to constantly barrage the Russia people with anti-American propaganda, just as it had during the cold war. As Dmitry Sidorov, Washington correspondent for *Kommersant Daily* observed in a March 2007 interview for *Washington Profile*, of the situation:

> I basically see two things happening. First of all, there is internal censorship in Russia, which occurs as a result of what is told to journalists by their editors-in-chief, and what the editors-in-chief are told by the Kremlin. This is reminiscent of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, when there was a secretary of ideology, and above him sat Mikhail Suslov, and the two of them together controlled the informational sphere. Of course there were Soviet citizens

[40] "President, FSB Rule the Country, the Nation Says," *Kommersant*, July 27, 2007; and, Emilia Kazumova, Alena Sagdeyeva; and, Alexander Yelisov, "Who Is The Boss Around Here," *Russia Profile*, July 27, 2007. For detailed survey results on the question from 2001 to 2007, see the *Levada Center* Web site at http://www.levada.ru/press/2007072601.html.

> listening to Voice of America or Radio Liberty, but most people did not have access to these sources of information.
>
> Today, the Russian press is making the United States out to be an enemy. The United States is portrayed as a country seeking to suppress, in any way possible, the great nation of Russia, and to return her to the state that she was in during the nineties. I have a few friends who are Russian journalists, and they tell me that they have very clear orders to solely write about all things negative concerning the United States. For example, that something somewhere was blown up or someone somewhere died in a tragic accident. They have to show what a sad state the U.S. is in, and that Russia is not the only place where these kinds of things happen. I would say that only about 15-20 percent of the stories about the United States are true to life: the rest are just plain made up.
>
> Unlike in the West, there are too few journalists and two few newspapers in Russia that are governed by the principle of responsible journalism. Here I can quote one Russian journalist who said, "It doesn't matter what we print. We are not going to be held accountable for it anyway." If you think about it, he is right: is the United States going to take a Russian newspaper to court?

The propaganda comes in both print and electronic forms. As Sidorov added, "A typical Russian sits in his apartment and watches television, on which there is talk 24 hours a day about how Russia is being encircled and has to urgently defend itself against the United States."[41] With a chekist-dominated regime, the old Soviet chekist mentality extends itself to all spheres of Russian life and, once the democratic illusion was no longer necessitated, was representative in the state's foreign policy and relations as well.

Overseas, the intelligence/security services' deception campaigns had been very successful, probably in part as a result of the seemingly undying hope (of many Western investors and liberals) that Russia was truly moving down the democratic path, ferociously struggling to overcome the inevitable setbacks and institute the rule of law and free-market democracy. The reality could not have been further from the truth. Perceptions appear to have been strongly affected by the public relations campaigns and

---

[41] "A Russian Journalist's View from Washington," *Washington Profile*, March 15, 2007, http://www.washprofile.org/en/node/6534.

relentless rhetoric (as opposed to reality) of democratic change (never forthcoming in concrete terms). Early on, Waller observed that the SVR's sophisticated active measures campaigns had been "rather successful" in influencing the opinion of the Western public and elites.[42] Of note, the West has traditionally been more receptive to deception by foreign leaders and sources, exhibiting a bit of naiveté, which may be due to its tendency to engage in wishful thinking and wistful displays of hope based on the profit drive, as demonstrated by the seemingly endless belief, even insistence, that democratic reform in Russia was indeed progressing, rather than regressing, with all the benefits of economic trade and with profits reaped from oil revenues and the provision of financial services declared visible on the Russian horizon.

10.8.1: A New Spin: FSB and SVR Web Sites and CDs

In an interesting contradiction in that they can not be considered as part of the image-making campaign to present the post-Soviet intelligence/security services as reformed along the lines of those of democratic states, Web sites were established by the FSB and SVR. These preceded the 2003 government order requiring all federal agencies to maintain Web sites informing the public about their activities, having been created in 2000, the year Putin became president.[43] Much unlike the official Web sites of the new intelligence/security services of East European states that immediately and effectively instituted LVD and were most successful in transitioning to democracy, there is no reference whatsoever to the institution of a democratic form of government, a reorientation of the Services, respect for law, political freedoms, and human rights, let

---

[42] Op. cit., *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*, p. 276.

[43] "Russia Country Report: 2006 Edition," *Freedom House*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=406&year=2006.

alone a rejection of the past. Nor is the end of the Soviet Union acknowledged. Rather, continuity is the theme throughout. The sites glorify past chekist traditions, leaders, and operations, and provide historiographies of each, their evolutions traced back to their chekist (VChK) and Bolshevik lineages, on December 20, 1917 and December 20, 1920, respectively.

By perusing the sites, one can quickly infer that the old chekist organizational culture and mentality are energetically promoted within intelligence/security service structures. The dedication to old Soviet ways and chekist institutions is glaring. The FSB's site is located at http://fsb.ru/ and includes a variety of information, but it lacks any substantive detail and, again, indicates no change in approach from the past. It provides basic structural, functional, leadership, and legal mandate information along with a brief news and announcement section. Information for recruits is posted, including required candidate qualifications and information on the FSB Academy, as well as contact information. Links to central headquarters and regional FSBs are also posted. Adding an American flair, the FSB site maintains a "Most Wanted" page.

The content is mostly focused on old Soviet operations and propaganda themes, although there is substantial anti-Chechen propaganda posted as well. A number of books glorifying past operations of the Soviet secret police are advertised and songs and poetry honoring life in the Service presented. The site includes pictures and biographies of secret service leaders past and present, videos of interviews, including a video-tour of Lefortovo prison and others at Lubyanka, a photo album with numerous graphic pictures of beheadings and other brutally violent acts and terrorist activities apparently carried out by Chechen separatists, and videos of Russian forces fighting the rebels, which can all be

considered the propagandization of the war effort. Indicating FSB-State media collaboration, throughout and following the 2002 Dubrovka theatre siege Russian national television continuously broadcast footage presenting the Kremlin's version of the Chechen conflict. The propaganda included graphic documentaries depicting Chechen rebels inflicting terrible cruelties on Russians, which dominated the television screen, many photo images mirroring those posted on the official FSB Web site,[44] a practice that was likely instituted for other such tragedies. The implicit message that all Chechens are bandits and terrorists and must be destroyed was not lost on viewers.

Not to be outdone by its domestic intelligence (FSB) colleagues, and as part of its 80th anniversary Chekists' Day (Security Service Workers' Day) celebrations in 2000, the SVR created and opened its own Web site, located at www.svr.gov.ru, which briefly notes current activities but is, like the FSB site, largely dedicated to glorifying its KGB past.[45] Further, the foreign intelligence service (FIS) created a 22-track compilation of songs, some written and performed by intelligence and political officials, and distributed it on a limited edition CD/audio cassette titled, "It's Tough To Be An Intelligence Agent," to intelligence veterans in honor of the jubilee. Some of the songs included are, "Spy's Motto" (It's that kind of job....or, to put it more correctly, it's that kind of fate"), "This Difficult Job Called Spying," "Profession: Espionage," "Hope," "Completing a Task," "Here Goes Your Friend Off On A Mission," "A Replacement," "Intelligence, Motherland and Honor," and, "Birds of Passage Fly" ("I have seen plenty of countries, as

---

[44] This author was in Russia during the Dubrovka tragedy and witnessed this coverage.

[45] "Foreign Intelligence Celebrates Twice...And Goes Online," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 23, December 25, 2000; and, "Russia's sing-song spies," *BBC News*, December 20, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1079982.stm.

I walked on with a rifle in hand, but there wasn't a greater sadness than to live apart from you"), performed by singer/State Duma Deputy Iosif Kobzon.[46] To cap off the Yasenovo celebrations, SVR Director Sergei Lebedev bragged that, during the 20th century, "there has not been any place on the planet where a KGB officer has not been."[47]

It is notable that no official Russian Web site exists for the GRU, nor is the military intelligence service even acknowledged on any official government site, including the Ministry of Defense at http://www.mil.ru/eng/, although a number of books on past GRU operations are available in local bookstores.[48] Even so, there was much media fanfare and coverage on the November 2006 opening of the new GRU headquarters, which display can thus only be considered to have been designed in order to present the Service as well-funded, modern, sophisticated, highly-skilled, and capable for the purpose of attracting agents, that is, spies for Russia. It surely proved a substantial morale booster for the military/military intelligence establishment and its officers.

The new GRU headquarters was designed and built on the magnitude of those of the U.S. CIA and British MI-6 — world-class, massive, contemporary buildings with all the modern amenities. One gets the sense it was meant to convey an equal status with the military/military intelligence might and capability of the U.S. and UK. For the GRU, the primary task of recruiting spies is of huge import to the Kremlin as it strives to acquire science and technology on weapons, electronics, and other military applications, areas in

---

[46] Anna Badkhen, "SVR Releases Greatest Hits," *St. Petersburg Times*, #631, December 22, 2000, pp. 1-2.

[47] "Security Community Celebrates Chekist Jubilee," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 23, December 25, 2000, p. 4.

[48] See C. Kozlov, Spetsnaz *GRU: Fifteen Year History of a Twenty Year War*, Russian Panorama: Moscow, 2002; and, C. Kozlov, *Spetsnaz GRU: The Unending War, History of Its Continuation*, Russian Panorama: Moscow, 2002.

which it is comparably lacking, in light of the fact that its primary exports are oil and gas and weapons, having overtaken the U.S. as the number one arms dealer in the developing world and only third overall, behind the U.S. and France in 2005. In 2006, Russia had $6.5 billion in sales and planned to increase that amount in 2007 to $8 billion, according to Mikhail Dmitriev, head of the Federal Service of Military and Technical Cooperation.[49] With new developments and markets in mind, in March 2007 Putin solicited foreign partners to cooperate in new ventures, announcing that, "Our primary objective is to find new forms of cooperation. The priority here is certainly joint weapon development and their subsequent serial production both for the domestic and export markets." He added that, "Another goal is to set up joint service ventures," and cited a joint post-Soviet venture, UZROSAVIA, which services helicopters, as an example.[50] Over the past few years, Russia has increasingly diversified its arms markets, particularly in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, with China and India only accounting for 62% in 2006, as compared with 74% in 2005. Hence, the construction and very public presentation of the new GRU headquarters can only be viewed with these regime goals in mind (with an emphasis on the acquisition of weapons-related technology and espionage), particularly given the historical and continued extreme secrecy surrounding the military intelligence service.

In the former sections of this project, I have shown that the organizational cultures of the post-Soviet intelligence/security services have in no way shed their old Soviet chekist identities, and, quite the contrary. To date, photos and plagues of Iron Feliks and

---

[49] "Russian 2006 arms exports reach a record $6.5 bln," *BBJ.hu*, February 27, 2007, http://www.bbj.hu/news/news_23313.html.

Yury Andropov decorate many office walls and desks. In short, with old Soviet career chekists in leading and commanding posts, there has been no redirection of organizational culture or mentality toward democratic values and ideals, the rule of law, or respect for political freedoms and human rights. In the early months following the Soviet collapse and discrediting of the KGB, little effort was directed toward promoting the chekist identity. In the early-mid years of the Yeltsin era, as Waller showed, the image-making as a rule focused on presenting the post-Soviet Services as relatively benign and "much like those of other democratic countries," such as the U.S. CIA and British MI-6, while any promotion of the old chekist identity was conducted behind closed doors. By the late Yeltsin era, the general picture presented was that the system was plagued by organized crime and corruption, but the Services were fighting heroically to counter it as part of the government's endeavor to institute democracy.

Into Putin's first term, as he brought chekists en masse into the presidential administration and constructed his "vertical," the "democratic" theme continued to be propagated. Moreover, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had brought a news means of "cooperation" with the West, providing another avenue of access into the thinking, plans, and activities of senior defense and intelligence officers from the U.S. and its allies, and perhaps a simplified road to these governments' classified information and technology. Historically, whenever Western cooperation with Moscow increased, so too did the latter's espionage activity against the former. In either case, whether in the fight against transnational organized crime or terrorism, the Russian contribution has been limited in effect, with operations compromised and U.S. military documents falling into the hands

---

[50] "Putin Calls on Russia to Develop Weapons in Cooperation with Foreign Partners," *MosNew.com*, March 20, 2007, http://mosnews.com/money/2007/03/20/putinweapons.shtml.

of enemies via Russian channels. Furthermore, with many Western governments distracted by and pouring their resources into the so-called Global War on Terror, Russia's espionage offensive has intensified to a level above that of the cold war.

By 2003, with the chekist-dominated state consolidating, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky serving an eight-year jail sentence, his assets confiscated, concerns about the direction of Russian democracy were being raised more often, requiring further deception campaigns. Into Putin's second presidential term, it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the democratic illusion as reforms were reversed and the regime took a decidedly anti-Western approach. But that mattered much less by then, the chekists having entrenched themselves in positions throughout the political and economic arenas. Moreover, the Services were presenting themselves less as organized crime fighters and more focused on the mission of counterterrorism, specifically, Chechen terrorism.

By 2006, the West had come to realize that the Kremlin had reversed democratic reforms and was on a wholly different trajectory altogether, a realization only reinforced by the November killing of Alexander Litvinenko in London. By then, the chekist-dominated state was secure in its power and had accumulated massive oil and gas wealth. The regime could adopt a different tact now. Yet, the reality had apparently still not been fully digested until Putin's anti-Western vitriol exploded on the world stage in Munich in 2007, surprising many.[51] This train of events demonstrates the value in and effectiveness of well-designed perception management programs.

While under Putin the "democratic" theme begun in the wake of the Soviet Union's demise had continued to be disseminated, increasingly, there was a concomitant

---

[51] Andrew Tully, "Russia: Washington Reacts To Putin's Munich Speech," *RFE/RL*, February 13, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/5c61fc99-83fe-49c9-8bd7-49c5bee24f80.html.

and overt promotion of the chekist organizational culture, which only intensified into his second term. Early on, Putin had set the new tone, expressing pride in the chekists' role in the country's Soviet past, asserting that chekist credentials were something to be proud of, and using its associated symbols to forge continuity in the old corporate identity in a campaign implemented consonant with the construction of the chekist-dominated state that was underway.

10.9: THE USE OF SYMBOLS TO PERPETUATE THE OLD SOVIET CHEKIST CULTURE AND MENTALITY

10.9.1: "Iron Feliks" Dzerzhinsky Lives

For decades, a monumental 16-ton statue of Soviet secret police founder, "Iron Feliks" Dzerzhinsky, the father of Lenin's first secret police, the VChK, from which the term "chekist" and its associated chekist identity derive, stood outside the KGB's (and its predecessors) Lubyanka Square headquarters in central Moscow. In dramatic footage shown around the world, this statue, widely recognized as a symbol of Soviet secret police repression, was pulled down by masses of protesters demonstrating for democracy in the wake of the failed, KGB-led August 1991 coup. Eight years later to the day the statue had been brought down, following an August 22, 1999 decision by the Moscow City Council, on which Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov held the post of deputy chairman, the statue was dismantled and taken to the local cemetery for statues and repaired. To date, veteran KGB forces guard it."[52] At the time of the city's decision, Luzhkov had

[52] "Dzerzhinsky Won't Rise Immediately," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, July 24, 2000, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-2.

been aware of the political controversy surrounding the issue and energetically resisted Communist party proposals to restore the statue to FSB headquarters.[53]

Throughout the Yeltsin era, the statue of Iron Feliks, along with many others from the Soviet era that had been brought down with communism, remained in this cemetery. However, once career chekist Putin became RF president, moves to resurrect Iron Feliks quickly gained momentum, leading to a July 2000 vote on a resolution in the Duma to restore the statue to Lubyanka Square. However, it ultimately failed to pass (193-91).[54] The fact that the issue actually went to a vote in the national legislature, and the outcome of the vote itself, showed the thinking of close to a third of the country's leading politicians in Putin's first few months as president, many of whom were described as political opportunists, and clearly still locked into the old Soviet police state mindset. Not surprisingly, that failed resolution did not end the issue.

The question of whether to return the statue of Iron Feliks to Lubyanka Square again erupted in political circles on September 13, 2002 when Luzhkov, in a profound reversal, called for its restoration as a 50th birthday present to Putin (his birthday is October 7) in an effort perceived by many as pandering to Putin and his chekist cohorts, who were busily consolidating their power.[55] Speaking to a meeting of the municipal

---

[53] *Izvestiya* reported the interview on September 16, 2002, as cited in "Moscow Mayor Confirms Wish to Restore Dzerzhinskii Statue....As Dzerzhinskii Debate Heats Up," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 17, 2002, which also notes that Luzhkov describes events surrounding the Moscow City Council decision to dismantle the statue in his memoirs. See Yuri Luzhkov, *Мер и о мере: Рассказу, Закону Лузхкова*, OLMA-Press: Moscow, 2003, full reference information available at http://www.eastview.com/xq/ASP/sku=A2051162/f_locale=/Luzhkov/IUrii/Mikhailovich/Moskva/Russia/Russian/qx/russian/books/product.asp.

[54] "Dzerzhinsky Won't Rise Immediately," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, July 24, 2000, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-2.

[55] For instance, Arsenii Raginskii, chairman of the human rights organization Memorial, told reporters on September 17, 2002 that Luzhkov's turnabout could derive from his desire to fawn on Putin and other chekists who had come to power in recent years. See Op. cit., "Moscow Mayor Confirms Wish to Restore Dzerzhinskii Statue....."

architectural council, Luzhkov described the statue as an "impeccable sculptural composition," and an "excellent" monument that had been "the highlight of Lubyanskaya Ploshchad." In an effort to justify his reversal, he selectively focused on some of Dzerzhinsky's so-called achievements, declaring, "We should remember that he solved the problem of homeless children and that he bailed out the railroads in a period of devastation," while downplaying the chekists' prominent role in the "excesses" of the Red Terror. Further, he told journalists that his proposal was a "well thought-out and considered" statement.[56]

Reacting to Luzhkov's reversal, during a September 16, 2002 interview with *Izvestia*, Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) leader and Duma Deputy Boris Nemtsov described the proposal to restore Iron Feliks to Lubyanka Square as part of what was a clear trend toward increasing authoritarianism.[57] He said the SPS would attempt to gather one million signatures in protest against Luzhkov's proposal. Nemtsov also pointed out that on September 13, 2002 (the same day Luzhkov had called for restoring the statue) the presidential administration had approved a site on Kremlin property for a monument to Tsar Aleksandr II, whose achievements included the implementation of a series of liberal reforms in the mid-19th century, including the liberation of the serfs, news of which he claimed to have received only hours after hearing of Luzhkov's proposal and to which in response it was reported he quipped, "Perhaps this is the essence of Russian

---

[56] "Moscow Mayor Advocates Restoration of Dzerzhinskii Monument....As Liberals Vow to Oppose the Move....And Monument to Aleksandr II Is Approved," *RFE/RL Newsline*, Sept 16, 2002.

[57] *Izvestiya* reported the interview on September 16, 2002, and Yavlinsky's statement was reported by *RosBalt* on September 16, 2002, as cited in Op. cit., "Moscow Mayor Confirms Wish to Restore Dzerzhinskii Statue...."

centrism."[58] In fact, it represented yet another display of the Kremlin's "studied ambiguity," designed to confuse and deceive the West about its intentions.

In tune with the SPS party, the democratically-oriented Yabloko party led by Grigory Yavlinsky also registered opposition to the statue's restoration, issuing a statement saying that, "The personality of Dzerzhinskii is inseparably linked to the creation of the system of concentration camps and the destruction of millions of people, including the best representatives of the intelligentsia, the clergy, the Cossack community, the working class, and the peasantry during the period of the Red Terror,"[59] and urged the city to place a monument to the victims of political repression on the spot where the Dzerzhinsky monument had stood. Eventually, a memorial was constructed near the site, and remains there to this day, where people annually congregate to hold a rally and pay homage to Lubyanka's victims on the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repressions.[60] As Valerii Abramkin, a former Soviet political prisoner turned leading human rights advocate, pointed out, a stone from the Solovetskii Island concentration camp had been placed on Lubyanka Square to commemorate the millions of victims of Soviet-era terror, noting that, "To erect the Dzerzhinskii monument nearby is ridiculous and to put it in place [of the Solovetskii stone] would be blasphemous."[61]

---

[58] Ibid. Luzhkov describes this event in his memoirs, Op. cit., *Мер и о мере: Рассказу, Закону Лузхкова*.

[59] Ibid.

[60] This author visited the site on each visit to Moscow to research this project. Also, see "Russia: Speakers at Moscow Rally Say Survivors of Soviet Terror Neglected," *Johnson's Russia List*, #16 - JRL 9283, October 30, 2005; and, "Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of Repression," posted at the Web site of *Memorial*, a human rights organization based in Russia, at http://www.memo.ru/eng/memory/intro.htm.

[61] See "Moscow Mayor Advocates Restoration of Dzerzhinskii Monument....As Liberals Vow to Oppose the Move....And Monument to Aleksandr II Is Approved," *RFE/RL Newsline*, Sept 16, 2002; and, Op. cit., "Moscow Mayor Confirms Wish to Restore Dzerzhinskii Statue...." Molyakov reportedly made his statements to *Komsomolskaya pravda* reporters, as cited by *RFE/RL Newsline*.

Another perspective was offered by former KGB colonel general and head of FSB military counterintelligence, Aleksei Molyakov, who said that as an individual who was educated in the chekist tradition he was pained by the demolition of the monument in 1991, yet, added, "But I am not sure that today we should return to the past," and quoted the Greek philosopher Heraclitus's observation that "One cannot step twice into the same river."[62]

The way Yelena Bonner, widow of Nobel Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov and father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb[63] saw it, the statue's restoration would mean "the complete revision of 12 years of the new Russia,"[64] while Nobel Prize laureate Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, author of *The Gulag Archipelago* volumes, viewed a restoration as an outrage to the millions who perished in the Gulag, saying that "[Dzerzhinskii] was a Red henchman, and his figure is a symbol of the punitive organs of the USSR."[65]

In the Duma at its plenary session on September 18, 2002 a proposal was put forward by Deputy Aleksei Mitrofanov (Liberal Democratic Party) to instead erect a monument to (former KGB Chairman and General Secretary of the CPSU) Yury

---

[62] Ibid.

[63] For a comprehensive biography of his life, see Richard Lourie, *Sakharov: A Biography*, Brandeis University Press: Hanover and London, 2002.

[64] Op. cit., "Moscow Mayor Confirms Wish to Restore Dzerzhinskii Statue...." Bonner reportedly made her statements to *Komsomolskaya pravda* reporters, as cited by *RFE/RL Newsline*.

[65] "Writers Oppose Dzerzhinskii Restoration....As Deputy Proposes a Monument to Andropov," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 18, 2002. Also see *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 16 and 17, 2002. Further, *RFE/RL Newsline* reports that, "'Another well-known writer, Fazil Iskander, said that he opposes the proposal because 'this measure does not frighten embezzlers of public funds, brings nothing to ordinary people, and gives intellectuals reason for gloomy thoughts about the future of the country,'" and "Aleksandr Gelman told the daily that playing with symbols begets false fears in some and false hopes in others. He said that if the proposal was made in order to please President Putin then it is mistaken, because the move would simply prove to the world that the president is a creature of the secret services." Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn is the author of numerous works, including *The Gulag Archipelago (1918-1956)*, An Experiment in Literary Investigation I-II, HarperPerennial, 1973.

Andropov, arguing that Andropov was much less controversial than Dzerzhinskii and pointing out that many individuals in Putin's government and security organs began their careers under Andropov's leadership. His proposal was rejected, with only 23 deputies voting in favor of the initiative.[66]

Finally, following an appeal by Irkutsk-based Communist party members who called the monument a "symbol of the fight against crime" and described its toppling by protesters after the failed August 1991 coup as "a blind act of vandalism by a drunken crowd,"[67] the issue was put to rest when the Moscow City Duma's Monuments Committee on January 21, 2003 ruled against Feliks's return, citing the move as likely to sow discord in society, and also, citing the same reasons, rejected the placement of a monument to Tsar Nicholas II and his family at the site.[68]

This debate that carried on among the top echelons of Russian society was illuminating, and showed the deep impact and living memory of the Soviet secret police on the country's people and conscience. It highlighted a general skepticism still among portions of society about erecting a repressive symbol of a past a way of life that would have precluded such a debate and perhaps denied many of the voting deputies a chance to hold a post in a national parliament in the first place. Contrary to those who argue that the Russian culture is fundamentally antithetical to democracy, these responses suggest that with a law-abiding and effective leadership, democracy would be embraced by Russian society. Russia is not consigned to an authoritarian future. Eva Bellin observes that, "the

---

[66] Ibid, "Writers Oppose Dzerzhinskii Restoration...."

[67] Kevin O'Flynn, "City Rejects Return of Dzerzhinsky," *The Moscow Times*, January 22, 2003, p. 3.

[68] Ibid.

cases of Japan and Germany suggest that indigenous 'authoritarian' culture, or perhaps our misinformed perceptions of it, need not be an insurmountable obstacle to implanting democracy. With democracy so firmly established in Germany and Japan today, we tend to forget that in the post-war period, the conventional wisdom was that both Japanese and German societies were culturally inhospitable to democracy." She adds, "The point is, these presumed cultural sensibilities, whether accurately described or not, did not pose an insurmountable barrier to building democracy in Germany and Japan."[69] In short, culture should not be seen as a determining factor to democratization, and that would apply to Russia as well. To date, the statue remains in the graveyard, however, chekist symbolism continues to manifest itself in intelligence/security sector institutions. For example, there remain busts of Dzerzhinksky and Andropov in many intelligence/security service offices, their pictures adorn many walls, the brass door handles at Lubyanka's rear entrance retain the chekist crest,[70] and there is a life-size statue of Iron Feliks in the FSB's café near the Kremlin, along with an assortment of paraphernalia commemorating chekist history and portraying an uninterrupted and proud continuity with the Cheka.[71]

10.9.2: Stamps Honor Notorious Counterintelligence Officers: A Chekist Tradition

On April 30, 2002, in a representation and glorification of old Soviet secret police activity disseminated for public consumption, a set of postage stamps highlighting the 80th anniversary of the state's foreign counterintelligence arm and bearing the portraits of six notorious officers of the Service, including Vladimir Styrne, known for his

---

[69] Eva Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, pp. 605-606.

[70] Op. cit., *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*, p. 249.

[71] This author visited these sites firsthand to verify this in 2002 and 2003.

ruthlessness and allegedly having had his own parents murdered, were released for sale. Each of the officers had played key roles in the Service's early days, and all but one of them had been killed in Stalin's 1937 purges. Interestingly, the specific officers chosen to be honored on the new stamps were allegedly selected on the basis of their success in catching foreign spies. The message was clear. The stamps were available at post offices across the country, from Moscow to the Far East, and included pictures of the old Cheka and new FSB secret police badges and Lubyanka, thereby depicting the uninterrupted continuity of the Services, an explicit and unambiguous message that nothing had changed in the thinking (methods or operations) of the organization and its leadership. Also implicit was a warning that foreign spies were in their midst, and the counterintelligence service was watching and working against that threat, as well as alerting the public against being recruited as foreign agents. The dissemination of these stamps made clear that the old Soviet-Stalinist method of counterintelligence activity remained highly prized.[72] A Kremlin spokesman said that the stamps were dedicated to "the outstanding patriotic counterintelligence agents of the years 1922-37."[73] The six agents include: Sergei Puzitsky (1895-1937), responsible for the deportations of thousands of peasants during the 1930s; Vladimir Styrne (1897-1937), head of a local branch of the secret police who instigated widespread repression; A. X. Artyzov (1891-1937); H. I. Demidenko (1896-1934); Y. K. Olskii (1898-1937); and, G. C. Siroezhkin (1900-1937).[74] The stamps are shown in Figure 10.1 below:

---

[72] This author purchased a number of sets of the stamps during visits to Moscow and Khabarovsk in 2002 and 2003.

[73] "KGB's rehabilitation becomes an issue," Ian Traynor, *The Guardian*, May 1, 2002.

[74] Steve Rosenberg, "Stalin's spy stamps stir fears," *BBC News*, April 30, 2002.

Figure 10.1: Commemorative Counterintelligence Stamps Issued

10.10: ON THE PERPETUATION OF THE CHEKIST MENTALITY

The persisting chekist legacy and mentality of Russia's intelligence/security sector officers remains a formidable obstacle to the realization of a change in the organizational culture, undermining reform to a far greater extent than any lack of resources to carry outs its anti-crime and counterterrorism responsibilities, which are apparently secondary to the counterintelligence function against political activists, as in Soviet times. Jeffrey Kahn notes that, "mentalities and legacies aren't mere academic abstractions. They are as powerful as any law legislators can put on the books." Furthermore, he observes, "old habits die hard. Changing the law as written is a step forward (i.e., the new Criminal Procedure Code), but changing the mentality of officials

who are the living legacy of the Soviet "justice" system remains a huge hurdle."[75] In short, while resource inadequacies, incompetence, and malfeasance arising from the continued politicization, lack of professionalism, and endemic corruption pose significant challenges to the effective implementation of intelligence/security sector reform, changing attitudes — the chekist culture and mentality is at core the problem. Thinking guides action. For progress in meeting this aspect of a secret police transformation within any reasonable timeframe, such as over three presidential terms, immediate LVD of the leading and commanding ranks is an imperative.

Yet, in post-Soviet Russia, with the old Soviet chekists, including career chekist Putin and Nikolai Patrushev at the top of the political and FSB hierarchies, the chekist legacy is aggressively perpetuated, its values inculcated during the training of new recruits, who are indoctrinated with old Soviet secret police traditions, culture, and mentality, along with the continuation of the same old techniques of political repression, today, to fight "extremists."[76] Regardless of the early Yeltsin-era reforms and other political changes since then, the leadership and bureaucracy saw no personnel shift, with old Soviets continuing to dominate all structures. Most holding conservative views, they remain highly resistant to change. In his 2004 book, *Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism*, Janusz Bugajski noted that, "Few young people have entered the foreign and intelligence services and the bureaucracy only selects people holding similar precepts." He observes that, "This is particularly evident in the Defense Ministry, where young

---

[75] Jeffrey Kahn, "Opening the Floodgates," *The Moscow Times*, July 18, 2002, p. 8.

[76] Paul Goble, "Eye on Eurasia: Russia's Rising Extremists," *United Press International*, November 27, 2005, http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?StoryID=20051127-083046-5597r. Also see Richard Weitz, "Citing Cyber-Terrorism Threat, Russia Explores Internet Threat," *World Politics Watch Exclusive*, December 14, 2006, http://www.worldpoliticswatch.com/article.aspx?id=416.

officers, similarly to the old generals, are distrustful of the West and view the world in Cold War terms."[77] The 2005 Kremlin creation of the pro-Putin youth group, Nashi,[78] and its continued support of the 100,000 strong organization, reminiscent of the old Komsomol, the youth wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, may have an impact, as membership in the group is, similarly, viewed as a stepping stone to jobs in government and state corporations, but it is unlikely to be a positive one in terms of promoting democratic change and values. Nashi's ideology is contained in a manifesto[79] based on the writings of Putin's chief political adviser, Vladislav Surkov, which are unambiguously anti-democratic and anti-Western. Surkov wrote the Kremlin's "sovereign democracy" vision, a critique of Western-promoted democratization, and the manifesto reflects similar concepts. As a former senior British diplomat observed, "The worrying thing is that whereas 15 years ago young Russians embraced the West with great enthusiasm, now more and more look to us with deep-seated mistrust. It would not matter, were it not for the fact that they are Russia's next generation of political leaders."[80]

Another factor has worked against democratization in Russia. That is, the endemic corruption that permeates government institutions seriously complicates any development of a democratic political culture in broader society, from which

---

[77] Janusz Bagajski, *Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism*, Praeger: Westport, CT, 2004, p. 23.

[78] Steven Lee Myers, "Youth Groups Created by Kremlin Serve Putin's Cause," *The New York Times*, July 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/world/europe/08moscow.html?ei=5088&en=2f5f839008ad6bb3&ex=1341547200&pagewanted=all.

[79] See the manifesto at Nashi's Web site, "Манифест," http://www.nashi.su/ideology.

[80] Mark Franchetti, "Putin's fanatical youth brigade targets Britain," *Times of London*, September 2, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2368176.ece.

intelligence/security sector recruits are drawn, and has undermined attempts to change basic attitudes, a precursor to behavioral modification. The rampant OC and corruption at the highest levels of the political regime and pervading throughout the Services, a progression that evolved over the years since the Soviet collapse, in parallel with the construction and consolidation of a chekist-dominated state, only affirms the value of LVD in facilitating real change. The Soviet-era networks that have controlled post-Soviet Russian political-economic life to date have worked avidly to corrupt the idea of democracy in Russia. Their activities, fueled by anti-Americanism and engaged in under the banner of "managed democracy," have had the effect, if not been designed, to turn the Russian populace against democracy, with the masses having experienced it only in a malformed sense, in any case. The effect has been felt in all post-Soviet institutions.

At base, chekist continuity in all its aspects has effectively prevented a democratic-oriented organizational culture and mentality to take root in post-Soviet intelligence/security sector institutions. As *Business Week*'s Moscow correspondent, Paul Starobin, observes, "Unlike most Eastern European societies, Russia never truly reformed its Soviet-era security agencies, so their mindset and habits persist."[81] Indeed, while this author was in Russia conducting interview research for this project in 2002, it was conveyed by a number of high-level intelligence/security sector officials that the old Soviet chekist mentality was a persistent, if not the most challenging, barrier to reform in the Services.[82] With Putin's chekist-dominated regime driving Russia's post-Soviet trajectory, the requisite political will for democratization simple does not exist.

---

[81] Paul Starobin, "Mother Russia at War with Herself," *BusinessWeek Online*, February 3, 2003.

[82] Author interviews conducted on two separate trips to Russia, both in the fall of 2002.

10.10.1: The Annual "Chekists' Day" Celebrations

The annual "Chekists' Day" celebrations, always held on December 20 to commemorate the day of the Services' (Bolshevik) creation, have become one more way of renewing the present day intelligence/security services with the traditions of those of the Soviet past. Putin, himself a career KGB foreign intelligence officer (FIO) and as president relying on the Services as his primary base of support, most particularly those officers and apparatchiks with whom he had known and worked in St. Petersburg and/or East Germany, greatly elevated the importance of the celebrations relative to those marked during the Yeltsin era. In 1995, Yeltsin had issued a decree renaming Chekists' to Security Service Worker's Day,[83] in line with the mood at the time.

For example, on December 20, 2000 the SVR celebrated two anniversaries, that of the VChK's creation (its 83rd anniversary) and that of the foreign department of the OGPU, created in 1920 (its 80th anniversary). In his first year as RF president, Putin participated in the SVR's commemorations at Yasenovo, as did former KGB chiefs Vladimir Kryuchkov, Leonid Shebarshin, Yevgenii Primakov, and Vyacheslav Trubnikov, as well as a number of spies for Moscow, including British MI-6 defector George Blake.[84] Russia security specialist Paul Goble suggested in an article titled, "The Days of the Chekists," that, "How Moscow celebrates that event may provide important clues as to the direction the Russian government is heading."[85] He noted that in the years following the Soviet collapse, "officials did little or nothing to mark that anniversary" —

---

[83] "Russian security services observe professional holiday," December 20, 2000, *strana.ru*.

[84] Op. cit., "Foreign Intelligence Celebrates Twice...And Goes Online."

[85] Paul Goble, "The Days of the Chekists," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 23, December 25, 2000.

until 1999, when then-Prime Minister Putin participated, telling chekists they should be proud of their work, and adding that no government could get along without secret agents. By the next year's event, he was RF president.

At the 2000 event, Putin, returning from a trip to Canada, gave a speech to his FSB (former) colleagues that included strong encouragement to put the skills they had learned in the past to work to "defend democracy," and congratulated them on the Services' reduction of the price Russia had had to pay in Chechnya, thus condoning the brutal methods used against the republic's population. In traditional form, then-FSB Director Vladimir Shults reported that the Service had prevented 13 explosions, arrested 11 spies, and tracked another 400 foreign agents.[86] Also, that day, the FSB promoted State Duma deputy and leader of the parliament's agro-industrial group, Nikolai Kharitonov, to the rank of full colonel in the FSB.[87]

Possessing an intimate familiarity and understanding of the chekist culture and mentality, GRU defector Col. Stanislav Lunev commented on the day's events, observing that, "For the first time in the history of Russia's secret police a Russian president personally attended this celebration. Moreover, President Vladimir Putin urged his former colleagues to learn from the repressive past of Soviet special services and to apply their skills toward defending democracy. But of course, his own interpretation of this advice means less democracy and more totalitarianism." Lunev noted that Putin told his audience, "We remember the history of the security agencies. It is ambiguous, we know

---

[86] It is customary for the FSB director to stress the threat that FISs pose to the state, especially the West. For example, at the 2001 event, and sounding much like an old KGB chief, Patrushev also noted that Western intelligence had turned former Soviet bloc allies into "a platform for intelligence operations against Russia." See Stanislav Lunev, "Russia's Secret Police: Powerful Tool for Totalitarianism," *The Eurasian Politician* - Issue 3, February 2001, http://www.cc.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/issue3/tsheka.htm.

[87] "Putin Sees New Role for Secret Services," *RFE/RL Newsline*, December 21, 2000, pp. 1-2.

that. The easiest thing would be to reject our past. It is more important, in my view, to learn its lessons, regardless of how bitter they are, and along with the harshest criticism, to preserve the valuable aspects."[88]

10.10.2: "I Am First A Chekist"

In keeping with chekist tradition, on December 20, 2002 the Services celebrated the 85th anniversary of their creation.[89] Two years into Putin's first presidential term, Chekists' Day (Security Service Workers' Day) continued to be marked by the promotion of a seamless continuity with the old Soviet secret police and its associated traditions and mentality.[90] It was also on this occasion that *Kostromskiye vedomosti* published an interview with Kostroma Region FSB Chief Gen. Vladimir Smirnov. In the interview, and most enlightening in his bold expression of chekist pride, Smirnov insisted that he was not an FSB officer but a Chekist. Regarding chekists, Smirnov said, "It is a special comradeship of people knowing about each other that they have devoted their best years to protecting the Motherland's security. And it was for that reason that these years were in fact the best," adding, "Once a Chekist always a Chekist; Chekists cannot be former or corrupt."[91]

In response to the Smirnov interview and writing for *The Moscow News*, Sergei Sossinsky, asserted that (today) there were three frightening things about the FSB: 1) the total secrecy in which its activities are shrouded; 2) its all-pervasive nature; and, 3) the

---

[88] Op. cit., "Russia's Secret Police: Powerful Tool for Totalitarianism."

[89] "Intelligence Community Celebrates Its Soviet Origins...As Foreign-Intelligence Director Outlines Priorities...FSB Goes After Spies in the Regions...And Presidential Envoy Accuses Red Cross of Spying," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 45, December 24, 2002, pp. 5-6.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Sergei Sossinsky, "Secret Police Opening Up?" *The Moscow News*, January 13, 2002.

mentality of the Chekists that perpetuates throughout the organization.[92] With government and state corporations dominated by chekists today, this mentality now perpetuates throughout the regime. A small core of old Soviet career chekists makes the final decisions for the contemporary Russian state. As Olga Kryshtanovskaya, head of the Elite Studies Center at the Sociology Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, observed in March 2007, "Essentially, all the major decisions in Russia are made by five people: Vladimir Putin, Viktor Ivanov, Sergei Ivanov, Igor Sechin, and Nikolai Patrushev."[93] Clearly, Chekist Smirnov's assertion was false; a chekist can indeed be corrupt, as has been so repeatedly demonstrated during the 1990s, and only deepening in the 21st century under Putin. As TI documented in December 2006, since 2001 corruption in Russia has increased sevenfold.[94] A Gallup poll of 101 countries released the same month showed Russia was perceived as the third most corrupt nation, after Morocco and Romania.[95] Even Russia's National Anti-Corruption Committee Chairman, Kirill Kabanov, has joined the chorus, saying that, "Russia is more corrupt now than at any time in the last 10 years. It's part of the system and it's one of most profitable businesses in the country."[96]

In December 2004, career chekist, former envoy of the Northwest Federal District, and current director of the State Committee for Controlling the Turnover of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, Col. Gen. Viktor Cherkesov, wrote a long,

---

[92] Ibid.

[93] Viktor Khamrayev, "The Putin era: an interview with sociologist Olga Krystanovskaya," *Kommersant-Vlast*, No. 10, March 19-25, 2007, and posted at "The Power Of The Chekists Is Incredibly Stable," *RussiaProfile.org*, http://www.russiaprofile.org/cdi/article.wbp?article-id=0D1CFF5B-DCFA-4F87-A303-7676169F8385.

[94] Michael Mainville, "Bribery thrives as big business in Putin's Russia," *SFgate.com*, January 2, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/01/02/MNG8QNBCTN1.DTL&type=printable.

[95] Ibid.

programmatic article published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, labeled a "Chekist manifesto" by journalists. Addressing the fact of the chekist-dominated government that replaced Yeltsin's "Family" and the challenges it faced, he illuminated the chekist mentality when he wrote, "We should understand that we are one single entity. None of us strove for power or wanted to gain the role of the dominant estate in Russia. But history turned out such that the burden of maintaining the Russian state has been laid on our shoulders." He claimed that Russia's enemies threatened the country's territorial integrity, that the state faced a real threat of disintegration, and suggested that even the chekists had failed to appreciate the dangers, asserting that, "Even very recently it seemed as if all danger was behind us. It seemed as if we were entering a period of relative stability. I am not shirking responsibility for mistakes that were made." [97]

More to the point of his particular identity as a chekist and its perceived immutability and permanency, much like Smirnov, he wrote, "And in admitting this, I remain loyal to the main thing, the purpose of my work and fate as a chekist. No matter what the name of the agency I am heading is and regardless of my rank and status, I have been and remain a chekist." In the article, he condemned the entrenched nomenklatura, stating that, "Clinging to power that they were unable to wield, cut off from responsibility, and having lost a sense of reality, this arrogant and helpless caste dragged the state, society, their own ideology, and their own historical mission to their graves." As if to give hope for the future under a chekist-dominated state with its associated

---

[96] Ibid.

[97] Victor Yasmann, "Analysis: 'The Burden Of Maintaining the State Has Fallen On Our Shoulders,'" *RFE/RL*, February 9, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/02/2764bce7-6621-4b38-ad5a-ae277a6612ed.html.

legacy and mentality intact, he insists that today's chekisty will not leave the scene so easily or "repeat the shameful fate of the degenerate Soviet nomenklatura," adding that, "I believe in our community, in our caste that supports the state, in our ability to appreciate threats, to discard petty concerns, in our ability to remain true to our oath."[98]

Generally, and throughout Russian society since communism's collapse, the quest for a new national identity, in which the use of symbols always plays a significant role, remained a continual process; in the face of significant political-economic change, the search for a post-Soviet identity was marked initially by deep division and controversy among elites over which direction the nation should go. The question of whether to leave the past behind in its entirety, as some, including this author, argue must occur for a new beginning, or whether it should be glorified, with a renewed focus on regaining Russia's "greatness" and employing the same old politically repressive methods, was an immediate one that persisted throughout the Yeltsin era. As Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of *Russia in Global Affairs*, observes, "Russia's task of forming a new national identity reveals a never-ending road of pitfalls, ranging from its search for a place in the world, to its attitude to neighboring countries, to exacerbated interethnic and inter-cultural problems in Russian society."[99]

For chekists, questions of identity are not problematic, as they are indoctrinated with a particular mindset in which they first identify themselves as chekists. It follows logically (for them) that, their role, based on chekist historiography and greatly enhanced under Putin, is clear. To drive their activities and ensure that chekists and the chekist

---

[98] Ibid.

[99] Fyodor Lukyanov, "From Nationalim to Nation," *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 4, October-December 2006, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/region-snt/numbers/17/1060.html.

entity thrive in post-Soviet Russia, this identity has been promoted and perpetuated. Commensurately, yet speaking directly to organizational culture change issues in the intelligence/security sector, the evidence shows that since communism's collapse, no efforts have been directed toward instituting a new value system. Rather, perception management and image-making campaigns were launched to deceive the Russian citizenry and world about the real direction of political developments in the country and, particularly, the unchanged nature of the intelligence/security services and lack of secret police reform, a condition for democratic transition. While propaganda was disseminated presenting the Services as reformed and much like those of Western nations, indeed, continuity with the past was stressed, with celebrations of the secret police lineage marked annually, especially in the 21st century by the chekist political elite, designed to keep the memory and traditions alive, the old Soviet heritage unbroken.

The prevailing culture is one of corruption and lawlessness, led by a chekist regime that meticulously shapes the state's affairs. The tightest unity that exists today in Russia is that among the chekists, along with their small group of select oligarchs, bankers, and bureaucrats who help to manage the state and its resources. The chekists in Putin's state act with impunity. Rather than making a break with the past, Yeltsin chose to rapaciously rule, and Putin encouraged the chekists to learn from their history and carry on. Every Service of the post-Soviet intelligence/security sector views its lineage as continuing directly from its Bolshevik origins. The chekist identity, organizational culture and mentality, along with its associated icons and symbols, remain unchanged and promoted throughout not only intelligence/security sector institutions, but with the chekists in power today, perpetuate throughout leading political institutions as well.

10.11: CONCLUSION

In sum, the foregoing review clearly shows that the chekist organizational culture and mentality remain prevalent within the post-Soviet intelligence/security services and have been actively promoted by the Service chiefs from the earliest months of the transition from communism, with the Putin administration actively supporting the perpetuation of the chekist legacy as well. There has been no progress toward meeting this condition for a successful post-communist secret police transformation — of developing and fostering a new "democracy-oriented" organizational culture and mentality within the intelligence/security sector. Rather, internally (within the Services), the seeds continue to be sown for chekist continuity, accompanied by the promotion and persistence of great pride in the chekist identity, disseminated from the top and then transmitted down to commanding officers and cadres, while, externally (within society), the image of the Services as "unreformable" increasingly loses its negative traction as society, increasingly apathetic to the political world, struggles to survive in what is a completely corrupted system. Following Yeltsin's tenure, the chekists increasingly came to be perceived as the only hope for any security, law and order, an image adroitly propagated by the Putin administration and Services through their acquisition of state control of the media. This image had been helped along by the reality of complete lawlessness across society, a situation deliberately promoted early on by the chekists as a means to thwart democratization, according to Yuri Felshtinsky and former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko, the latter who specialized in counterterrorism and anti-organized crime (and was killed with polonium-210, as noted earlier). They noted that:

> Following Yeltsin's destruction in 1993 of the pro-communist parliament, which sought to halt liberal reform in Russia, the leaders of the former KGB, who had

> gone on to head Yeltsin's MB and FSK, decided to destabilize and compromise Yeltsin's regime and his reforms by deliberately exacerbating the criminal situation in Russia and fomenting national conflicts, first and foremost in the North Caucasus, the weakest link in the multinational Russian state.
>
> At the same time, an energetic campaign was launched in the mass media to promote the message that impoverishment of the general public and an increase in criminal and nationalist activity were the results of political democratization, and the only way to avoid such excesses was for Russia to reject democratic reforms and Western models, and follow its own Russian path of development, which should be based on public order and general prosperity.[100]

The early propaganda themes presenting the Services as reformed, their honorable, patriotic, and dutiful officers out fighting the crime and other problems plaguing Russian society, no longer succeeds in creating that illusion.[101] The continued politicization, lack of professionalism, and resultant ineffectiveness of the security sector in combating the real threats to Russian society, particularly organized crime and corruption and terrorism, perpetuate society's insecurities, while the endemically corrupt chekist regime and its ineffective bureaucracy consistently fail to provide adequate public services to the politically impotent masses. Rather than remedy society's ills with its hundreds of billions of dollars, the Kremlin creates groups like Nashi in hopes of preventing a "people power" revolution to remove the chekists from power. Yet, with oil and gas profits secreted away behind Kremlin walls, and corruption only increasing, the people of Russia may eventually unite in opposition to the regime and bring another Russian revolution, this time followed up immediately with an effective LVD policy to ensure that "chekism" is finally brought to a decisive end. Writing a piece addressing chekist rule, infighting, and corruption, published in *Kommersant* in October 2007, Col.

---

[100] Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, *Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within*, S.P.I. Books: New York, 2002, p.10.

[101] Op.cit., *Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today*, p. 259.

Gen. Viktor Cherkesov elaborated precisely on that possibility, of another systemic collapse, this time bringing an end to chekism. It is one of three potential future scenarios he predicts for the country, and the one that he sees as "just way too unacceptable." Hence, he calls for an end to the internecine fighting among chekist factions, as well as corruption within the services, declaring that, "No matter what the chekists might want to be — a force that leads the country out to new wide-open horizons, or a system that provides for some kind of variant of social stabilization through closedness, we must safeguard norms in our milieu. And those who discover that his true vocation is business must leave and go into another milieu. Not attempting to remain concurrently both a trader and a warrior. It doesn't work that way. It's either-or. You can not call for overcoming this same war of "everybody against everybody" and at the same time be a participant in it."[102] The problem is, and remains, that corruption reaches the highest levels of the Russian government, this time chekist-dominated, as well as those of the post-Soviet intelligence/security sector.

Writing back in 1994, Waller concluded that, "when the personnel, culture, missions, and structural continuities of the Services are taken into account, the image-making themes and methods of 1992 through 1994 strengthen the conclusion that Russia's security and intelligence organs today are merely extensions of the Soviet KGB."[103] Since then, many have lost hope in the possibility of a truly democratic Russia. Hit with a constant barrage of anti-Western propaganda and the extensive criminalization of state and society early in the transition and continuing to date, a democratic culture has

---

[102] Viktor Cherkesov, **"**We must not allow warriors to turn into traders." *Kommersant*, October 9, 2007, available at http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/10/viktor_cherkesov_on_the_spy_wa.htm.

[103] Ibid.

been unable to take root; over time, Russian mentalities seem to have resigned themselves to another authoritarian master, conditioned to prefer the "law and order" as represented by the chekist regime that rules Putin's Russia, with the result, within the framework of this dissertation, that Russia has moved further away from a successful democratic transition in this regard also, as it has on the other conditions required for a secret police transformation (and democratic transition), with the chekists, unchecked by LVD, "rescuing the country."

CONCLUSION

RUSSIA TRANSFORMED, OR RUSSIA BETRAYED?

At the beginning of this comprehensive project on secret police transformation in the post-Soviet context, I put forward a number of hypotheses/ propositions on the necessity of a secret police transformation for a post-communist state's successful democratic transition, and the importance of LVD in realizing those endeavors through its disqualification of those individuals who had played any contributing role in the communist regime's repression from holding leading/commanding positions in the post-communist, democratizing regime. Post-Soviet Russia never instituted any form of LVD, and the evidence strongly indicates that that factor played a significant role in the state's failure to transform its secret police, which was able to thwart its reform from the inside, and today is resurgent. Having retained their positions and, further, extensively penetrated the political (and economic) systems, old Soviet KGB officers also managed to thwart democratization from taking root, ultimately gaining control of the state and reversing early democratic reforms as they consolidated their control.

I also developed a model to depict the preconditions/conditions for a post-communist secret police transformation to intelligence/security services that operate in line with democratic norms (which itself is a condition for a post-communist democratic political transition), including, one pivotal precondition: 1) LVD; one primary condition: 1) subject to the rule of law; and, four secondary conditions: 1) based on a statutory legal charter, functions; 2) methods: respect for and protection of civil liberties and political freedoms; 3) civilian political control and democratic accountability mechanisms; and, 4) promotion of an organizational culture and mentality in line with democratic norms).

Given that intelligence/security services and political systems always reflect each other, the model includes a parallel spectrum of intelligence/security sector and state typologies, and denotes each of the required conditions for a secret police transformation. Thus, one can trace its movement along the spectrum among intelligence/security sector and state political system types over time. Assessments on the degree to which the rule of law has been established, and whether LVD was instituted in either the political or intelligence/security sectors, provide indications about the likelihood of success of a post-communist democratization project. Yet, a much more revealing means to discover the political direction of the transitioning state is an assessment of the results of an investigation into the personnel, role, functions, methods, political control, accountability mechanisms, and organizational culture and mentality of the intelligence/security sector over time. By applying the model, the analyst can clearly ascertain whether the state is moving toward or away from democracy based on its meeting of the required conditions for a secret police transformation, requisite, in turn, for a successful democratic transition. This is in part due to the reality of the nature of the political-intelligence relationship. It is key. Political and intelligence/security sectors change in close tandem.

In presenting the empirical evidence on post-Soviet Russia's secret police transformation process, I showed how the state has failed to meet any precondition/condition for a secret police transformation and, further, that uninhibited by LVD, it was officers of the Soviet secret police, the KGB, who thwarted the process every step of the way, in effect clearing the path for their capture of the state, ultimately achieved under career chekist Putin. The FSB, under Putin's direction in 1998-1999, had played a significant role in engineering his rise to the presidency in 2000, with its

orchestration of a sex scandal to discredit and force the resignation of Prosecutor General Yuri Skuratov, who had been investigating high level corruption in the Kremlin, a scheme that had brought Yeltsin's trust and appointment of the career chekist to the RF presidency in exchange for lifetime immunity for he and his family. Putin and his leading chekists are now consolidating that state, bolstered by the magnificent wealth provided by high oil and gas prices over the past few years, as well as arms deals to its old Soviet allies, particularly those antagonistic to U.S. goals to spread democracy around the world in the interest of peace.

Over the Yeltsin years and into the Putin era, post-Soviet Russia, for many, appeared to be on a democratization trajectory, struggling to build new institutions in the wake of the communist collapse. The rhetoric of democracy could be frequently heard emanating from the Kremlin, multiple parties were competing in the elections, the media was independently owned and operated, a nascent civil society had developed with many NGOs actively supporting the furtherance of democratic institution building. However, many parties were artificial constructs, created to present the illusion of a multiparty system. The media was controlled by oligarchs who had exploited the lack of a proper legal context for economic transactions and enriched themselves through Kremlin connections and insider deals. It did not serve as an effective check on government. Corruption and organized crime spread. Many investigative journalists were killed, their cases rarely solved. And perhaps most importantly, many of the old Soviet secret police moved into the private sector to start private security services (PSSs), often in partnership with organized crime. From there, they proceeded to take over businesses and widely

penetrated the economy. Others gained political office and worked to further their interests and, once Putin was in the Kremlin, pushed the chekist agenda.

The secret police itself underwent no reforms whatsoever. In chapter five, the various legal mandates on which they are based were presented. Unlike the mandates of the services of those post-communist states that instituted LVD, which included direct reference to the rule of law and democratization of the regime, with a pointed reference to the importance of protecting and respecting political and human rights,[1] there is no mention of any break with the communist past and move toward democracy, nor any explicit recognition of democratic values. And, clearly, the Soviet-Russian state's secret political police's multifarious functions were not reduced; rather, they were expanded, with the wording throughout written in ambiguous terms, designed to ensure they were a catch-all, permitting them to carry out any task. Over time, the routine became widely recognized. Law did not rule, it was to be used — against political and economic rivals. The progression of new laws only served to increase the powers of the Services, which today far exceed those of the KGB, even as other laws reversed democratic reforms.

---

[1] For example, the Czech Republic's domestic intelligence service notes on its Web site: "The jurisdiction of BIS is defined by Act No. 153/1994 Coll., on the Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic. The findings made by it are passed to the Government and the President of the Czech Republic. As an institution, BIS is strictly apolitical and has no repressive powers – it can neither detain, nor arrest and interrogate suspects. In its activities it consistently observes human rights and freedoms, and in case of their inevitable breach always acts in compliance with the respective legislation." It also assures that, "In spite of the secret nature of its work, which is necessary for the fulfillment of the tasks with which it has been entrusted, BIS is a service of a democratic state and is funded through the collection of taxes. Therefore the tax payers have the right to know what it does and how it works." It also includes a mission, principles, creed statement: "The mission and goal of BIS work is to anticipate, reduce and eliminate the most serious threats to our civilization, our state and in their ultimate effect the lives and wellbeing of all its citizens. In the extraordinary instances when the Service is compelled to infringe upon human rights and liberties, it invariable does so in compliance with the rules set by law. For example, no phone is ever tapped without the consent of the President of a High Court Senate. The Service has no authority to detain, arrest or interrogate any individual. Its creed is faithfulness to democratic values, the Constitution and the laws of the Czech Republic. It attaches extraordinary importance to communicating with the public, as it could hardly fulfill its mission without its support, and highly appreciates any help with which it is provided in protecting democracy, freedom and national security." See "Who We Are," Security Information Service: Counter-intelligence service of the Czech Republic, http://www.bis.cz/who-we-are.html.

The abundance of evidence presented in chapters six, seven, and eight on the activities of the post-Soviet intelligence/security services shows unambiguously how they retain and employ the same old functions and methods of their secret police predecessors. Hence, while the Services are based on legal mandates, there is no rule of law, they function as a secret police, and there is no respect or protection of civil liberties and political freedoms. Rather, the methods they employ routinely abuse and repress these rights, contrary to constitutional provisions and federal law.

The evidence presented in chapter six illuminates how the chekists-siloviki penetrated the political system so extensively that by 2007, as Olga Kryshtanovskaya observes, they held 26 percent of Russia's senior political and commercial leadership posts. Further, if those individuals with connections to the chekists-siloviki are factored in, that estimate rises to 78 percent of the elite.[2] As this widespread penetration transpired, engineered by the chekists themselves, early democratic reforms were progressively reversed in order to consolidate the structure of chekist power that extended from the centre to the regions that was erected over Putin's first presidential term. By 2003, democratic-oriented parties were completely excluded from national government. Moreover, the Kremlin-based chekists had established their control over the judiciary, and through changes in the electoral system created a rubber-stamp parliament to solidify Moscow's control of the regions, and hence, ensure their support of the Putin agenda. Finally, the bulk of the independent media had moved into state hands.

Within the Services themselves, there was personnel continuity, with their role entailing the manipulation of electoral outcomes, intimidation of the media, and

---

[2] "Russia: Why the chekist mind-set matters," *KavkazCenter.com*, October 15, 2007, http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/eng/content/2007/10/15/8973.shtml.

repression of the political-economic opposition. A case in point was that of Russia's richest man, Yukos Oil Company owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who, to date, languishes in prison, with many principals of the company prosecuted and its assets confiscated by the state and distributed to leading chekists and their clients. Violence against opposition forces is regularly perpetrated by the authorities, and many others have been intimidated, imprisoned, and murdered, especially those who pushed for democracy or investigated the activities of the regime or FSB.

As shown by the evidence presented in chapter seven, post-Soviet Russia remains a counterintelligence state. Political spying and repression of the opposition are routine, and have been, as was demonstrated in detail, from the very beginning. Both citizens and foreigners alike have been accused as spies and prosecuted based on faulty evidence, with the FSB manipulating the judicial process to assure convictions. So, too, human rights abuses are carried out with impunity, and not only in Chechnya. Over time, the methods became progressively more brutal and uncompromising, in tune with the pace of the reversal of democratic reforms and also as the veterans of that dirty war returned to their localities. As noted in the theoretical section of this project, for a comprehensive democratic transition, there must be national unity, defined as "a lack of active and violent separatism within the country." The violence and atrocities that took place in the North Caucasus region, occurring as they did from the early years of the post-communist collapse extending into the 21st century, and involving the intelligence/security services, military, and police, made a secret police transformation that much more difficult.

Indeed, Putin's use of the Chechen conflict to serve his political purposes is remarkable. The killings of many prominent individuals and human rights activists

occurred following their investigations into the situation in Chechnya. So, too, the worst of the terrorist attacks carried out by the separatists were of the most value to the Putin clan of chekists. Numerous democratic-minded political officials who investigated the situation in Chechnya were killed, the investigative journalists who reported on it were killed, and the former FSB officer who exposed the contradictions in the official investigation and publicly accused the Service of complicity was killed with polonium-210, allegedly by other former FSB officers. The main suspect owns and operates a PSS in Russia and recently won a seat in the Duma, where he enjoys immunity from prosecution. Moreover, the September 1999 apartment bombings, which followed the Chechen incursion into Dagestan, believed to have been instigated by the FSB, served to launch Putin into the presidency. The October 2002 Dubrovka theatre attack led to a permanent crackdown on the independent media, and the September 2004 Beslan tragedy was used by the Kremlin to eliminate elections in the country and institute further restrictions on the media.

It's very interesting how, with the democratic façade no longer necessary by 2003, when the chekists had sufficiently penetrated the political and economic systems to establish their unquestioned dominance and reverse democratic reforms to the extent that no force could muster the strength to pose a threat, the propaganda about how the country was on a path to democracy largely ceased to be disseminated, replaced by a new cold war-type rhetoric, and the conflict in Chechnya subsided substantially. For many years, observers had noted how it was the excessively brutal activities of the Services against the republic's population that fueled the conflict. With media access severely restricted, it has been extremely difficult to document developments there, and to determine to what

extent they were provoked in order to serve the afore-mentioned chekist interests. All serious attempts to uncover events in Chechnya have been thwarted, including the Kovalev Commission's investigation into the September 1999 apartment bombings, which ended when its members started getting killed and arrested. With the chekists now consolidating their power, there is much less need for the conflict in Chechnya and the fighting has been substantially deescalated. Their purposes have been served and provocations are a lot less necessary, as is the rhetoric of democracy, which no longer emanates from the Kremlin.

The (democracy) game was clearly over by mid-late 2003. By 2004, the reality was being recognized by a growing number of Russia watchers. For instance, on Chekists' Day, 2004 (December 20), Freedom House downgraded Russia to "not free" status, the only country which the organization rated that had become less democratic.[3] In classifying Russia "not free," the organization cited the state's lack of a free media (a handful of independent print publications that rarely reach outside of Moscow cannot compete with the state television monopoly); free elections (starting in 2005, Russians would no longer be able to directly elect local governors or independent members of parliament); or an independent judiciary (in essence, judges at all levels now serve at the pleasure of the president).[4] The FSB, nurtured and bolstered by both Yeltsin and especially Putin as a political support base, managed to discredit democracy in the eyes

[3] See the "Freedom in the World Survey 2004," at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/specreports/ar2004.pdf, and, "Freedom in the World Survey 2005: Civic Power and Electoral Politics," *Freedom House*, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2005.htm.

[4] Ibid.

of the people during the 1990s, and played a pivotal role in implementing Putin's chekist agenda of democratic reversal in the 21st century.

The chekists had always played a key role in the Soviet economy. In chapter eight, it was illustrated how the chekists used old Soviet KGB methods to establish their economic dominance. Many of those who left the Service in the early 1990s started PSSs in partnership with organized crime and maintained their contacts with those who remained active. Utilizing their intelligence skills and employing old tactics of intimidation and force, they penetrated and took over numerous businesses, establishing a strong foothold in the economic sector and transmogrifying the development of a free-market economy. In conjunction with those activities, and retaining their police powers of arrest, the Services supported these schemes. Most notably, on orders of the Kremlin-based chekists, the FSB organized the arrest and prosecution of billionaire Khodorkovsky, as noted, which brought the redistribution of his assets to Putin and his clan, giving them the further means with which to expand their influence, and forced the self-exile of oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, who had also publicly opposed the Putin agenda. Many others have been subjugated, and critics have been intimidated into silence. These actions represent the methods and functions of a secret police operating in consonance with an authoritarian government, in Russia, one dominated by old Soviet chekists. It can not be overemphasized, the political-intelligence relationship is extremely revealing as to the nature and political direction of a transitioning state.

In chapter nine, the evolution of efforts to establish civilian political control of intelligence and democratic oversight and accountability were examined. The evidence

indicated that Putin has established political control of the Services, but what does that mean? Developments have shown that new meanings may be necessary given the novel nature of the political-intelligence relationship that exists in Russia, with both political and intelligence/security sectors spheres under the control of secret police officers. Apparently, the type of political control of intelligence that exists in Putin's Russia is one in which chekists, whether in or out of active service, operate with impunity and relatively free of control in the traditional sense so long as they do not cause major problems or international embarrassment for the regime. A case in point is the Tri Kita case, in which high-level FSB officers were deeply implicated. Yet, representative of Putin's control, they were ultimately removed from their posts as the internecine conflict among the chekist-siloviki became a matter of public and international discussion.

Further conflicts among chekist factions led Federal Antinarcotics Service head, Viktor Cherkesov, to write an article published October 9, 2007 in *Kommersant* about the risks that these battles posed to the stability of chekist rule, and stating that unity was required in order to further Russia's evolution into a corporatist state ruled by chekists.[5] It followed that on October 27, Konstantin Druzenko, an officer with Cherkesov's service and Sergei Lomako, a former colleague there, were found dead in St. Petersburg. Police said both were poisoned, and there is speculation that the murders were connected with the ongoing chekist-siloviki competition for influence as the presidential election nears.[6]

The evidence presented throughout the project shows unequivocally that the Services remain highly politicized and have not been professionalized. Their

---

[5] Brian Whitmore, "Russia: Uncertainty Over Putin's Succession Fuels 'Siloviki War'," *RFE/RL*, November 9, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/11/b087e127-13c7-41fb-ac48-e1a89cd11b23.html.

[6] Ibid.

effectiveness in politically repressive activities was shown to be high, while their capability, and perhaps will, to protect the population from organized crime, corruption, and terrorism has been found seriously lacking. They themselves are regularly implicated in these types of activities as they seek first and foremost their own enrichment and power, which has been enhanced in direct correlation to the reversal of democratic reforms and reduction of economic competition. The nature of the political-intelligence relationship in Russia, and Putin's control over the Services, suggests that the FSB's suspected role in the numerous contract murders of democratic-oriented political officials and investigative journalists who criticized and publicly exposed the corrupt regime and Services, as well as the September 1999 apartment bombings and other terrorist attacks, may have been ordered by the Kremlin. The evidence indicates that very real possibility, and the fact that Putin and his chekists have been the prime benefactors of these events is noteworthy. To be sure, the chekists thwarted the institution of any democratic oversight mechanisms over their activities and remain unaccountable, and a power solely unto themselves.

During the 1990s, as the chekist numbers in leading political and economic institutions progressively increased, the Services continually designed and disseminated disinformation as part of their extensive and sophisticated active measures campaigns, to deceive both domestic and foreign populations about the real changes taking place in the country, the process of chekist resurgence and penetration of all key government institutions. These perception management programs were quite successful, as measured by the wide range of people, both in and out of government, who were totally deceived as to the path Russia was truly on. The deceptions were not extended to the many CDs and

books glorifying chekist historiography and continuity that were published, however. The contrast in dissemination of information in media outlets and public forums portraying the Services as reformed with that posted on their own Web sites was striking. At least, it indicated that reform was not actually underway, a factor that the sites of the other post-communist services, those that instituted some form of LVD in the sector, specifically addressed. So, too, the chekist identity is worn with pride, and the mentality promoted.

In the final analysis, the evidence clearly shows that absolutely no reforms have been instituted in the post-Soviet Russian intelligence/security sector to make it compatible with a democratic polity. Not one precondition/condition for a secret police transformation has been met. The Services routinely operate above the law, retain the same personnel, carry out the functions of domestic surveillance and repression, and employ old Soviet KGB methods of repression, staging show trials and committing terrible human rights abuses against not only the Chechens, but local populations across the vast country, as well. The old Soviet chekist symbols were never removed from the offices of the intelligence/security institutions. On the inside, continuity, rather than change, has been and remains the theme. The chekist identity and mentality persist, and are celebrated every year on Chekists' Day, with the full support of the regime. There was never any attempt to change the culture, to inculcate democratic values, to reject the past. Quite the contrary, the past has been glorified. Not quite a month after the polonium-210 killing of former FSB Lt. Col. Alexander Litvinenko, at the Chekists' Day (December 20) 2006 celebrations, Putin heaped praise on his "dear comrades," lauding the audience with, "There are many glorious pages, bright examples of true heroism and courage in the history of national state security organizations," and reserved his "very

warmest words of gratitude" for KGB veterans whose efforts, he said, had laid the foundations for Russia's modern secret services.[7] A year later, on Chekists' Day 2007, the 90th anniversary celebration of the FSB was held at Lubyanka. As has been the tradition, the old chekist past was glorified, with Putin stating that Chekists' Day was a time "to remember the heroic pages in the history of the country's special services."[8]

At the conclusion of this project, it is appropriate to once again highlight FSB Director Patrushev's words at the 2001 Chekists' Day celebrations as noted by GRU defector Col. Stanislav Lunev. Patrushev said: the *main threat to Russia was that foreign intelligence services may "uncover the true plans of the new Russian government in what concerns domestic policy" (italics added).*[9] Lunev thus aptly questioned the nature of official government statements and the Kremlin's real intentions, asking, "Why would it be necessary to cover up Moscow's 'true plans' in domestic policy if they rest on the principles of democratic reform and free-market economy?"[10] The Russia case illustrates the critical importance of assessing the role and activities of the intelligence/security sector and the nature of political-intelligence relations as part of any post-communist transition process in order to ascertain the true political direction of the country over time, regardless of the regime's democratic rhetoric and reforms, which were shown to be superficial and temporary, while the substantial and institutionalized changes that laid the

---

[7] Tony Halpin, "Putin toasts spies' return to power," *The Times Online*, December 22, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,13509-2515215,00.html.

[8] "Putin praises security services, says they must follow law," *International Herald Tribune*, December 20, 2007, http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=8851646.

[9] Stanislav Lunev, "Russia's Secret Police: Powerful Tool for Totalitarianism," *The Eurasian Politician* - Issue 3, February 2001, http://www.cc.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/issue3/tsheka.htm.

[10] Op. cit., "Russia's Secret Police: Powerful Tool for Totalitarianism."

groundwork for the construction and consolidation of a chekist-dominated state were quietly being implemented. Subsequent generations of the originators of the Potemkin village, the Russian political elite, continue to master the creation of illusion, and thus managed to run another charade whilst a chekist-dominated state was constructed.

As a final note, researchers are encouraged to apply the theoretical framework and model presented in this study to other post-communist states. Many continue to struggle to overcome the legacy of Soviet and secret police rule. They continue to face challenges in implementing LVD, and identifying and removing old secret police officers and repressive elements from positions of influence in order to reduce the corruption and further democratization. A number of post-communist states are excellent candidates for such study. Having instituted LVD at different points in time, to varying extents, and not always in both political and security sectors, if either, they have had notable successes and failures at instituting lustration, transforming their secret police, and transitioning to democracy that are worthy of comparative research in order to better understand these change processes. A comparative analysis of their secret police transformation processes, in parallel with an examination of their political transition processes, could prove of value in better understanding the relationship between intelligence/security service transformation and political transition. The model may be adapted and applied to non-post-communist states as well. Finally, such research could contribute to filling the gap in the literature on the importance of secret police transformation to democratic transition.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Abadinsky, Howard, *Law & Justice: An Introduction to the American Legal System*, 5th ed., Prentice Hall: NJ, 2003.

Adelman, Jonathan R., *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States*, Westview Press, Inc.: Boulder, CO, 1984.

_____, "The Soviet Secret Police," *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States*, Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., Westview Press: Boulder and London, 1984.

Albats, Yevgenia, *The State Within the State: The KGB And Its Hold on Russia: Past, Present and Future*, Farrar, Straus, Giroux: NY, 1994.

Allison, Graham and Philip D. Zelikov, *Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis*, Longman: NY, 1999.

Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba, *Civic Culture*, Little, Brown and Co.: Boston, MA, 1965.

Anderson, Julie, *The Changing Face of the KGB*, Master's Thesis, UMI Press: MI, August 1997.

Andrew, Christopher and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story*, HarperPerennial: NY, 1990.

_____ and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*, Basic Books: New York, 1999.

_____ and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*, Basic Books: NY, 2005.

Asmerom, Haile K and Elisa P. Reis, eds., *Democratization and Bureaucratic Neutrality*, Macmillan: London, 1996.

Baldaev, Dantsik Sergeyevich, Vladimir Kuz'mich Belko, and Igor Mikhailovich Isupov, Authors-compilers, *Dictionary: Prison, Camp, Blotnoi, Jargon (Speech and Graphic Portraits of Soviet Prisons)*, cited at "Russian Organized Crime," http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/rusorg3.htm.

Baleanu, V. G., *The Enemy Within: The Romanian Intelligence Services in Transition*, Conflict Studies Research Centre: Camberely, January 1995, and *Romania Libera*, 26 May 1998.

Bar-Joseph, Uri, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain*, The Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, PA, 1995.

Bearden, Milt and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB*, Random House: NY, 2003.

Belyakov, Vladimir V. and Walter J. Raymond, eds., *Constitution of The Russian Federation: With Commentaries and Interpretation by American and Russian Scholars*, Brunswick Publishing Corporation: U.S.A. and Russia's Information Agency – Novosti: Moscow, Russia, 1994.

Benson, Robert Louis and Michael Warner, eds., *VENONA: Soviet Espionage and The American Response, 1939-1957*, National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency: Washington, DC, 1996.

Bourke, Sean, *The Springing of George Blake*, Pinnacle Books: NY, 1970.

Brook-Shepherd, Gordon, *The Storm Birds: Soviet Postwar Defectors*, Henry Holt and Company: NY, 1989.

Brinton, Crane, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, Vintage: U.S.A., 1965.

Brzezinski, Mathew, *Casino Moscow: A Tale of Greed and Adventure on Capitalism's Wildest Frontier*, The Free Press: New York, 2001.

Carnevale, David G., *Organizational Development in the Public Sector*, Westview Press: USA, 2003.

Cherkashin, Victor with Gregory Feifer, *Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer, The True Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen & Aldrich Ames*, Basic Books: NY, 2005.

Cristescu Radu Constantin, *Serviciile Secrete din Romania si Scandalurile de Coruptie: 1989-2001*, Antet XX Press: Bucharest, 2002.

CIA World Factbook, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.

Cichock, Mark A., *Russian and Eurasian Politics: A Comparative Approach*, Longman Publishers: USA, 2003.

Colton, Timothy J. and Michael McFaul, "Putin and Democratization," *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, Dale R. Herspring, ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: Lanham, MD and Oxford, UK, 2003.

Coulloudon, Virginie, "Putin's Anticorruption Reforms," *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*," Dale R. Herspring, ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: USA, 2003.

Courtois, Stephane, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panne, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartosek, and Jean-Louis Margolin, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer, Harvard University Press: MA, 1999.

Dahl, Robert A., *On Democracy*, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 1998.

Daugherty, William J., *Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency*, The University of Kentucky Press: Lexington, 2004.

Dawisha, Karen, "Democratization and political participation: research concepts and methodologies," *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Authoritarianism and Democratization in Post-Communist Societies, Volume Three, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1997.

_____ and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, Cambridge University Press: MA, 1994.

Denhardt, Robert B. and Janet V. Denhardt, *Public Administration: An Action Orientation*, 5th ed., ThomsonWadsworth: U.S.A., 2006.

Di Palma, Giuseppe, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1990.

Dresang, Dennis L., *Public Personnel Management and Public Policy*, 4th ed., Longman: NY.

Dunlop, John B., ed., "Orthodoxy and National Identity in Russia," *Identities in Transition: Eastern Europe and Russia After the Collapse of Communism*, University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, Research Series #93, 1996, http://repositories.cdlib.org/uciaspubs/research/93.

Durant, Will and Ariel, *The Lessons of History*, Simon and Schuster: NY, 1968.

Dziak, John J., *Chekisty: A History of the KGB*, Ivy Books: NY, 1988.

Ebon, Martin, *KGB: Death and Rebirth*, Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT, 1994.

Felshtinsky, Yuri and Alexander Litvinenko, *Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within*, S.P.I. Books: New York, 2002.

Finckenauer, James O. and Elin J. Waring, *Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture, and Crime*, Northeastern University Press: MA, 1998.

Freeland, Chrystia, *Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride From Communism to Capitalism*, Crown Business: New York, 2000.

Friedman, Robert L., *Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America*, Little, Brown & Company: NY, 2000.

Friedrich, Carl J., "The Nature of Administrative Responsibility," Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Public Policy*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1940.

Garth, H. H. and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford University Press: NY, 1980.

Gill, Peter, *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State*, Cass Series: Studies in Intelligence, Christopher Andrew and Michael I. Handel, eds., Frank Cass & Co., Ltd.: London, 1994.

Global Organized Crime: The New Empire of Evil, CSIS Press: Washington, DC, 1994.

Goldfarb, Alex and Marina Litvinenko*, Death of a Dissident: The Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the Return of the KGB*, Free Press: New York, 2007.

Goldman, Marshall I., *The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry*, Routledge: NY, 2003.

Goldstone, Jack A., "An Analytical Framework," *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Mashiri, eds., Westview Press: Inc.: U.S.A., 1991.

Greene, Thomas H., *Comparative Revolutionary Movements: Search for Theory and Justice*, 3rd ed., Prentice Hall: NJ, 1990.

Gurr, Robert, and Farrokh Moshiri, eds., *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*, Westview Press, Inc.: U.S.A., 1991.

Hahn, Jeffrey W., "Changes in Contemporary Russian Political Culture," *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., The International Politics of Eurasia, Vol. 7, M.E. Sharpe, Inc.: Armonke, NY, 1995.

Handelman, Stephen, *Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya*, Yale University Press: CT, 1995.

Hastedt, Glenn, "Controlling Intelligence: Defining the Problem," *Controlling Intelligence*, Glenn P. Hastedt, ed., Frank Cass & Co., Ltd.: England, 1991.

Hingley, Ronald, *The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations*, Simon and Schuster: New York, 1970.

Hoffman, David E., *The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia*, PublicAffairs: New York, 2002.

Hulnick, Arthur, "Controlling Intelligence Estimates," *Controlling Intelligence*, Glenn Hastedt, ed., Frank Cass: London, 1991.

Ivanov, Igor S., *The New Russian Diplomacy*, The Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2002.

Johnson, Loch K., *A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation*, University Press of Kentucky: KY, 1985.

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Highlighting Organized Crime IV: "The Russian Connection," Vol. 11, No. 4, California State University, December 1995.

Kagarlitsky, Boris, *Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-liberal Autocracy,* Pluto Press: London and Sterling, VA, 2002.

Kalugin, Oleg, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West*, St. Martin's Press: NY, 1994.

Keller, William W., *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1989.

King, Cheryl Simrell and Lisa A. Zanetti, *Transformational Public Service: Portraits of Theory in Practice*, M.E. Sharpe: NY, 2005.

Kirchheimer, Otto, *Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure of Political Ends*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1961.

Klebnikov, Paul, *Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia*, Harcourt, Inc.: New York, 2000.

Knight, Amy, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1996.

_____, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, Allen & Unwin: Winchester, MA, 1988.

Kochanowicz, Jacek, "Reforming Weak States and Deficient Bureaucracies," Joan Nelson, ed., *Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe*, Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ, 1994.

Koehler, John O., *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police*, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1999.

Kommentarii k Ygolovno-protzessyalnomy kodekcy Rossciickoi Federatsii, Ekzamen: Moskva, 2002.

Konstitytsia Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Ofitzialnii Tekst, Prinyata Bcenarodnim Golocovaniem, 12 December 1993, Airic Press: Moskva, 2003.

Kozlov, C., Spetsnaz *GRU: Fifteen Year History of a Twenty Year War*, Russian Panorama: Moscow, 2002.

_____, *Spetsnaz GRU-2: The Unending War, History of Its Continuation*, Russian Panorama: Moscow, 2002.

Krasner, Stephen D., *Defending the National Interest*, Princeton University Press: NJ, 1978.

Kritz, Neil J., *Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes*, Volume II: Country Studies, U.S. Institute of Peace Press Books: Washington, DC, September 1995.

Ladutke, Larry, *Freedom of expression in El Salvador: The struggle for human rights,* Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004.

Latysheva, Marina, "Russia's Nuclear Sites Worry Ecologists, FSB," *CDI Russia, Weekly*, No. 14, RW 3-11-05, http://www.cdi.org/russia/345-14.cfm.

Leggett, George, *The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police*, Clarendon Press: Oxford and New York, 1981.

Lenin, V.I., *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, International Publishers, 1939.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, *Political Man*, The Johns Hopkins University Press: MD, 1959.

Litvinenko, Alexander, *LCG: Lubyanka Criminal Group*, Grani: NY, 2002.

Los, Maria and Andrzej Zyberowicz, *Privatizing the Police State: The Case of Poland*, Foreword by Gary T. Marx, MacMillan Press, Ltd.: London, 2000.

Lourie, Richard, *Sakharov: A Biography*, Brandeis University Press: Hanover and London, 2002.

Lowenthal, Mark M., *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 2nd ed., CQ Press: Washington, DC, 2003.

Lunev, Stanislav with Ira Winkler, *Through the Eyes of the Enemy*, Regnery Publishing, Inc.: Washington, DC, 1998.

Luzhkov, Yuri, *Мер и о мере: Рассказу, Закону Лузхкова*, OLMA-Press: Moscow, 2003, full reference information available at http://www.eastview.com/xq/ASP/sku=A2051162/f_locale=/Luzhkov/IUrii/Mikhailovich/Moskva/Russia/Russian/qx/russian/books/product.asp.

MacGaffin, John, "Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert Action," *Transforming U.S. Intelligence*, Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Georgetown University Press: Washington, DC, 2005.

Malcolm, Neil, "Foreign Policy Making," *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press: NY, 1996.

Markovitz, Irving Leonard, "Constitutions, The Federal Papers, and the Transition to Democracy," *Transitions to Democracy*, Lisa Anderson, ed., Columbia University Press: NY, 1999.

Matlock, Jack F., Jr., *Autopsy On An Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Random House: NY, 1995.

McCauley, Martin, *Bandits, Gangsters and The Mafia: Russia, The Baltic States and the CIS since 1992*, Pearson Education: London, 2001.

McFaul, Michael, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 2001.

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., Merriam-Webster, Incorporated: MA, 1997.

Miller, Linda S. and Karen M. Hess, *The Police In The Community: Strategies For The 21st Century*, 3rd ed., Wadsworth Group, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning: USA, 2002.

Monas, Sidney, *The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia under Nicholas I*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961.

Munck, Gerardo L. and Carol Skalnik Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective," *Transitions to Democracy*, Lisa Anderson, ed., Columbia University Press: NY, 1999.

Murphy, David E., Sergei A. Kondrashev, George Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War*, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 1997.

Noonan, John, Jr., *Persons and Masks of the Law: Cardozo, Holmes, Jefferson and Wythe as Makers of the Masks*, Farrar, Straus and Grioux: NY, 1976.

O'Brien, Kevin, "South Africa's New Intelligence Environment," *About Turn: The Transformation of the South African Military and Intelligence*, Jakkie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, eds., Halfway House: The Institute for Defense Policy, n.d.

Panebianco, Angelo, *Political parties: organization and power*, Trans. Marc Silver, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Parrott, Bruce, "Perspectives on post-communist democratization," *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova*, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Authoritarianism and Democratization in Post-Communist Societies, Volume Three, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1997.

Parry, G. and M. Moran, eds., "Democratization in Eastern Europe," *Democracy and Democratization*, Routledge: London and New York, 1994.

Politkovskaya, Anna, *A Dirty War*, Thettarvill Press: London, 2001.

_____, *A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia*, Random House: NY.

_____, *Putin's Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy*, Metropolitan Books, 2004.

Pope, Edmond D. and Tom Shachtman, *Torpedoed: An American Businessman's True Story of Secrets, Betrayal, Imprisonment in Russia, and the Battle to Set Him Free*, Little, Brown and Company: USA, 2001.

Putin, Vladimir, *First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*, PublicAffairs: NY, 2000.

Raviv, Dan and Yossi Melman, *Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community*, Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, MA, 1990.

Rawicz, Slavomir, *The Long Walk: The True Story of a Trek to Freedom*, The Lyons Press: CT, 1956, 1984, 1997.

Reddaway, Peter and Dmitri Glinski, *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2001.

Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly, *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm, Sweden, 1997.

Riley, Dennis D., *Public Personnel Administration*, 2nd ed., Longman: NY, 2002.

Rosenbloom, David H., *Administrative Law for Public Managers*, Westview Press: U.S.A., 2003.

Russian Organized Crime and Corruption: Putin's Challenge, A Report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies Global Organized Crime Project, The CSIS Press: Washington, DC, 2000.

Russian Organized Crime, The CSIS Press: Washington, DC, 1997.

Ruud, Charles A. and Sergei A Stepanov, *Fontanka 16: The Tsars' Secret Police*, McGill-Queen's University Press: Montreal & Kingston, London, and Ithaca, published simultaneously in the UK, Eire, and Europe by Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1999.

Samie vliiate'nie liudi Rossii – 2003 (The most influential persons of Russia), Moscow: ISANT, 2004, 696 p.

Secord, Richard, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: NY, 1992.

Shafritz, Jay M. and E.W. Russell, *Introducing Public Administration*, 5th ed., Pearson Education, Inc.: NY, 2005.

Shannon, Elaine and Ann Blackman, *The Spy Next Door: The Extraordinary Secret Life of Robert Philip Hanssen, The Most Damaging FBI Agent in U.S. History*, Little, Brown and Company: NY, 2002.

Shelley, Louise I., "The Second Economy in the Soviet Union," *The Second Economy in Marxist States*, Maria Los, ed., St. Martin's Press: NY, 1990.

Sherr, James, "Security, Democracy, and 'Civil Democratic Control' of Armed Forces in Ukraine," *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov, eds., Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT and London.

Shulsky, Abram N., *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, 2nd ed., Revised by Gary Schmidtt, Foreword by Roy Godson, Brassey's (USA) Maxwell Macmillan Company: WA, 1993.

Shvets, Yuri B., *Washington Station: My Life As A KGB Spy In America*, Simon & Schuster: NY, 1994.

Simes, Dimitri K., *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power*, Simon & Schuster: New York, 1999.

Skocpol, Theda, *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press: MA, 1985.

Sobchak, Anatoly, *For A New Russia: The Mayor of St. Petersburg's Own Story of the Struggle for Justice and Democracy*, The Free Press: NY, 1992.

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., *The Gulag Archipelago (1918-1956)*, An Experiment in Literary Investigation I-II, HarperPerennial, 1973.

_____, *The Gulag Archipelago*, Harper & Row: NY, 1973 and HarperPerennial: NY, 1991.

Squire, P.S., *The Third Department: The establishment and practices of the political police in the Russia of Nicholas I*, Cambridge University Press: England, 1968.

Suleiman, Ezra, "Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from Eastern Europe," *Transitions to Democracy*, Lisa Anderson, ed., Columbia University Press: New York, 1999.

Suvorov, Viktor, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*, Macmillan Publishing Co.: NY, 1984.

_____, *Inside the Aquarium: The Making of a Top Soviet Spy*, Macmillan Publishing Co.: NY, 1986.

_____, *Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces*, Macmillan Publishing Co.: NY, 1987.

Swope, Ross, "Bad Apples or Bad Barrel?" *Law and Order*, Vol. 49, No. 1, January 2001.

Troshev, Gennadi, *Chechen Repeat: Memoirs of a Commander*, Vagrius: Moscow, 2003.

_____, *My War: Diary of Chechnya*, Vagrius: Moscow, 2002.

Voinovich, Vladimir, *Vladimir Voinovich: Anthology, Satire, and Humor of 20th Century Russia*, Eksmo-Press: Moscow, 2002.

Volkov, Vadim, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*, Cornell University Press: NY, 2002.

Waller, J. Michael, *Secret Empire The KGB in Russia Today*, Westview Press, Inc.: CO, 1994.

Waterbury, John, "Democracy without Democrats" Ghassane Salame, ed., *Democracy Without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, I.B. Tauris: NY, 1994.

_____, "Fortuitous Byproducts," *Transitions to Democracy*, Lisa Anderson, ed., Columbia University Press: NY, 1999.

Weber, Max, *Economy and Society*, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1978, 1:54.

Weber, Max, "Politics as Vocation," *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., Routledge: London, 1970.

Weiser, Benjamin, *A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid to Save His Country*, PublicAffairs: NY, 2004.

Williams, Phil, ed., *Russian Organized Crime: The New Threat?* Frank Cass: OR, 1997.

Williams, Kieran and Dennis Deletant, *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania*, Studies in Russia and East Europe, Palgrave: NY, 2001.

Wilson, Andrew, *Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World*, Yale University Press: New Haven, 2005.

Winer, Jonathan M., "International Crime in the New Geopolitics: A Core Threat to Democracy," *Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village*, William F. McDonald, ed., Anderson Publishing Co. and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences: OH and KY, 1997.

Wolf, Markus, with Anne McElvoy, *Man Without A Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster*, Times Books, Random House: USA, 1997.

YPK: Ygolovno-Protzessyalnii Kodekc Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Prospect: Moskva, 2002.

Yakovlev, Alexander N., *A Century of Violence in Soviet Russia*, Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2002.

Yeltsin, Boris, *The Struggle for Russia*, Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Times Books, Belka Publishing Company, Random House, 1994.

Zakaria, Fareed, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, W.W. Norton & Company: New York and London, 2003.

Zuckerman, Fredric S., *The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917*, New York University Press: New York, 1996.

ARTICLES

"50 Best Cadets Got Vladimir Potanin Foundation Scholarship," *Vladimir Potanin Foundation*, May 30, 2006, http://eng.fund.potanin.ru/news/last/may3006.htm.

"1995 State Duma Elections," *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies*, http://www.nupi.no/russland/elections/1995_state_duma_elections_Russia.htm.

"A Flat Tax Is Taking Root in, of All Places, Russia," *BusinessWeekOnline*, May 26, 2003, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_21/b3834174_mz034.htm.

"A Russian Journalist's View from Washington," *Washington Profile*, March 15, 2007, http://www.washprofile.org/en/node/6534.

"A Season for Settling Scores," *Kommersant*, October 3, 2006.

"A Sourcebook on the Russian Federation Main Directorate of Special Programs (GUSP) and its Special Installations Service (SSO), Version of 2006-11-14," *Federation of American Scientists*, http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:agAuimSjp8sJ:www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/gusp.pdf+GUSP&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=6&client=firefox-a.

Abdullaev, Nabi, "Russia Ranked Third in Violent Deaths," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, October 9, 2002.

Abdullaeva, Zaira, "Remembering Basayev's Raid Five Years On," *The Moscow Times*, August 26, 2004.

Academy of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, http://www.academy.fsb.ru./icccs/1251/information_for_future_students.html.

"Accused Spy Deported by Canada," *The Moscow Times*, Issue 3569, December 28, 2006, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/12/28/014.html.

Adami, Fabian, "In brief: SVR under new leadership—Is Fradkov himself ex-KGB?" *The ISCIP Analyst*, Vol. XIV, No, 3, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, Boston University, October 18, 2007, http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news/?dept=732&id=47218.

"Adamov Hires Bill Clinton's Former Lawyer," *The Moscow Times*, October 5, 2005, Issue 3267.

Adams, Jefferson, "Probing the East German State Security Archives," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 2000.

Adelaja, Taj, "New Chief Tax Official Appointed," *The Moscow Times*, February 22, 2007.

"Afghan, Tajik Offices for Drug Agency," *The Moscow Times*, February 28, 2007, Issue 3605.

Akhundov, Alek, Syuzanna Farizova, Viktor Khamrayev, and Diana Dadasheva, "FSB Director Patrushev Will Lead the Anti-Terrorism Effort," *WPS Agency*, #110, February 17, 2006, http://www.wps.ru/en/pp/story/2006/02/17.html.

"'Alarming' Findings in Death Probe," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, September 23, 2003.

Albini, Joseph L. and Julie Anderson, "Whatever Happened to the KGB?" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 1998.

_____, Roy E. Rogers, Victor Shabalin, Valery Kutushev, Vladimir Moiseev, and Julie Anderson, "Russian Organized Crime: Its History, Structure, and Function," *The Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1995; reprinted in *Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader*, Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, eds., Sage Publications, Inc., 1997, and *Trends in Organized Crime*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Fall 1997.

Alexander, Marcus, "The Internet in Putin's Russia: Reinventing a Technology of Authoritarianism," Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, April 2003, Presented at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, University of Leicester, UK, April 15-17, 2003, http://www.henryfarrell.net/internet/alexander.pdf.

Alimov, Rashid, "Grigory Pasko: My work with Yushenkov had just started, when he was killed," *Bellona Foundation*, April 23, 2003, http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/envirorights/info_access/29375.html.

"American in Moscow Arrested," *The New York Times*, April 5, 2000.

"Anatoly Alexandrovich Sobchak," Encyclopedia of Russian History, posted at *Answers.com*, http://www.answers.com/topic/anatoly-sobchak.

Anderson, Julie, "HUMINT: A 21st Century Offensive From Putin's Chekist State," March 2006, and published in *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 20, No. 2, Summer 2007.

_____ and Joseph L. Albini, "Ukraine's SBU and the New Oligarchy," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Fall 1999.

"Another Spy Trial Begins," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 24, January 2, 2001.

"Approval of the Statute on the Russian Federation Federal Security Service and Its Structure," Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 806, signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, Moscow, July 6, 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/edict_806.htm.

"Arbitration Courts in the Russian Federation," http://www.arbitr.ru/eng/.

Arkhipov, Ilya, "Through an Insider's Eyes: A Senior Railway Official's Take on the Kremlin's Route," *Johnson's Russia List*, No. 6 - JRL 9180, June 16, 2005, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9180-6.cfm.

Ashton, Kimberly, "Former red spies were in key posts: Counter-intelligence agency riddled with ex-StB until 2003," *The Prague Post*, February 28, 2007.

Aslund, Anders, "Revolutionary Change in the Russian Economy," *Russia Business Watch*, Vol. 10, No. 4, U.S.-Russia Business Council, http://www.usrbc.org/pdfs/rbw_specialedition_singles.pdf.

Aubry, Jack and Jim Bronskill, "Russia increases spying in North America," *The Ottawa Citizen*, December 11, 2002, Canada.com.

Babaeva, Svetlana, "Valentin Korabelnikov: Smart and Well-Trained People Work With Us," *Izvestia*, July 17, 2003, posted at http://www.cdi.org/russia/265-17.cfm.

Badkhen, Anna, "Aleksandr Nikitin," Trapped in the FSB's Dante-esque Circle," *Prism*, Vol. 5, Issue 14, The Jamestown Foundation, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=6&issue_id=382&article_id=3673.

_____, "Defining Spying Is Murky Business," *The Moscow Times*, October 25, 2000.

_____, "Envoys Promoted To Putin's Council," *The Moscow Times*, May 26, 2000.

_____, "SVR Releases Greatest Hits," *St. Petersburg Times*, #631, December 22, 2000.

Baev, Pavel K., "Ustinov's Firing Reveals Clan Maneuvering Inside Kremlin," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 3, No. 108, June 5, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371148.

Bagajski, Janusz, *Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism*, Praeger: Westport, CT, 2004.

Batuev, Erik, "A War Reporter Fighting The Enemy Within," *The Moscow Times*, January 31, 2001.

Bayley, David H., "Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do it," *Issues in International Crime*, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, June 2001, NCJ 188742.

"BBC Chief Rejects Campbell Claims," *BBC News*, June 26, 2003.

"Beijing Preparing Major Arms Deal," *The Moscow Times*, December 28, 2004.

Bellin, Eva, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No. 4, 2004-05, pp. 595-608.

Belton, Catherine, "Report: Kremlin, FSB May Unite," *The Moscow News*, May 5, 2000.

_____, "Kremlin Playing Oil Game For Keeps," *TheMoscowTimes.com,* December 29, 2003.

_____, "Tsvetkov Assassination: Tongues Start to Wag in Magadan," *The Moscow Times*, March 31, 2005, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/indexes/2003/01/31/01.html.

Benedetto, Richard, "Data sought on secret spending," *USA Today*, February 3, 2004.

Bennet, James, "Israel Inquiry Finds Pattern of Prejudice Toward Arab Citizens," *The New York Times*, September 1, 2003.

_____, "Police Used Excessive Force on Israeli Arabs, Panel Says," *The New York Times*, September 1, 2003.

Bennett, Gordon, "The Federal Agency of Government Communications & Information," *Conflict Studies Research Centre*, Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst: England, August 2000.

_____, "The SVR: Russia's Intelligence Service," *The Conflict Studies Research Centre*, Directorate General Development and Doctrine, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst: England, March 2000, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/svr/c103-gb.htm.

"Beslan and Dubrovka Victims' Relatives Join Forces," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 6, No. 41, November 3, 2005.

"Beslan still a raw nerve for Russia," *BBC News*, September 1, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5302448.stm.

"Beslan – Two Years After," *Russian Analytic Digest*, No. 5, August 29, 2006, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=E67E3A84-38C3-0150-C8FA-CF144BE3AE7F&lng=en.

Betts, Richard K., "Fixing Intelligence," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2002.

Bigg, Claire, "Russia: Parties Unite Into Nominal Opposition Force," *RFE/RL*, October 31, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/10/fa4c5ca1-6d0f-4403-a2f8-2e3e38987feb.html.

"Biography: Minister of Interior of Russian Federation," *RF Ministry of the Interior*, January 14, 2005, http://eng.mvdrf.ru/index.php?docid=2.

Birch, Douglas, "Putin critic loses post, platform for inquiry," *The Baltimore Sun*, December 11, 2003, http://eng.terror99.ru/publications/107.htm.

"Blair Aide Admits Mistake on WMD Report," *The New York Times*, June 25, 2003.

Blomfield, Adrian, "Russia stunned by Vladimir Putin's choice," *Telegraph.co.uk*, September 13, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/12/wrussia312.xml.

"BNY in $10B Russian scam," *Reuters*, August 19, 1999, http://money.cnn.com/1999/08/19/worldbiz/crime_a/.

"Board of Directors," http://www.aeroflot.com/eng/company.asp?ob_no=2046.

Bohlen, Celestine, "An American and A Russian Held as Spies in Moscow," *The New York Times*, April 6, 2000.

Bolton, Ben, "Why Are Putin's Enemies Dying?" *Newsmax.com*, March 5, 2007, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/3/5/131411.shtml?s=lh.

"Bomb kills Chechen president," *CNN.com*, May 9, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/05/09/grozy.blast/index.html.

"Boris Gryzlov: Interior Minister and United Russia party leader," *RFE/RL*, http://www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection/bio/gryzlov.asp.

Born, Hans, "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services: Practices and Procedures," presented at the NATO conference on "Intelligence and Security Services in the 21st Century Environment" in April 2002, and published by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): Geneva, in May 2002, Working Paper Series - No. 20.

Borodan, Irina and Andrei Soldatov, "Spy Scare - from Oleksy to Sutyagin," *agentura.ru*, September 16, 2004, http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/sutyagin/.

Bourge, Christian, "Analysis: Major obstacles to intel reform," *The Washington Times*, August 5, 2004, http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040805-012611-2862r.htm.

Bovt, Georgy, "A Corrupt Way of Life," *The Moscow Times*, July 12, 2007.

Bozhilov, Nikolai, "Reforming the Intelligence Services in Bulgaria: The Experience from the Last Decade," Paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, October 2002.

"Briefing: The 'Yukos Affair" and its Implications for Politics and Business in Russia," United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), July 13, 2005.

"British Secret Services Rescued Berezovsky from Death Trap," *Kommersant*, July 18, 2007.
"Briton arrested in 'terror missile' sting," *BBC News*, August 13, 2003.

Bruneau, Thomas C., "Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2001.

Buckley, Neil, "Death of an ex-agent puts spotlight on renaissance of Moscow secret services," *Financial Times*, November 25, 2006.

_____, "Justice is matter of conviction for Russian judges," *Financial Times*, October 22, 2005.

_____, "Putin finds room for oligarchs who prove loyal," *Financial Times*, February 8, 2007.

Burban, L., S. Gubareva, T. Karpova, N. Karpov, V. Kurbatov, D. Mildovidov, and P. Finogenov, *"Nord-Ost: Investigation Unfinished…"* published with assistance from "Terrorism Victims Support Fund" Non-Commercial Organization, Moscow, April 26, 2006, http://www.pravdabeslana.ru/nordost/dokleng.doc.

Bush, Jason, "Russian Trials: What Justice?" *Business Week*, May 27, 2005, http://yahoo.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2005/nf20050527_0666_db046.htm.

Byers, Bryan, "Ethics and Criminal Justice: Some Observations on Police Misconduct," *ACJS Today*, Vol. XXI, Issue 3, September/October 2000.

"Campbell U-Turn on Iraq Grilling," *BBC News*, UK ed., June 23, 2003.

Caparini, Marina, "Challenges of Control and Oversight of Intelligence/Security Services in a Liberal Democracy," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

_____, and Graham Day, "Democratic Control of the Police and Police Reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia," Working Paper Series No. 2, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, March 2002.

"Capital Flight From Russia Quadrupled in 2004," *MosNews.com*, January 14, 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/01/14/capitalflight.shtml.

"CEC Drafts Bill on Political Parties," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 17, November 13, 2000.

"Central Bank Deputy Chairman Andrey Kozlov Murdered," *Kommersant*, September 15, 2006.

"Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation," http://www.cikrf.ru/cikrf/.

Cerny, Oldrich, "Czechoslovak (Czech) Intelligence After the Cold War," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

"Chechen Envoy Fired," *The Moscow Times*, January 22, 2004.

"Chechen Leader Implicated in Abductions," *RFE/RL Newsline*, Sept 17, 2002.

"Chechnya: Research Shows Widespread and Systematic Use of Torture," *hrw.org*, November 13, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/13/russia14557.htm.

"Chechnya's Pro-Moscow President Says Few Abductions Registered This Year," *MosNews.com*, December 27, 2006, http://mosnews.com/news/2006/12/27/fewerabduct.shtml.

Cherkesov, Viktor, **"**We must not allow warriors to turn into traders." *Kommersant*, October 9, 2007, available at http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/10/viktor_cherkesov_on_the_spy_wa.htm.

"Chief Suspect of Klebinikov's Murder Fled Away," *Kommersant*, March 15, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p750032/Klebnikov_trial/.

"Chiefs of Military Intelligence," *agentura.ru*, http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/gru/shefs/.

Chuen, Cristina, "The 2004 Russian Government Reforms: Security Council Role May Increase, Anti-Terrorism Commission May Receive New Powers," *CNS Research Story*, July 13, 2004, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040713.htm.

"Civilian Economist Heads Defense Ministry," *Kommersant*, February 16, 2007.

Coalson, Robert, "Analysis: Russia's Ombudsman Speaks Out," *RFE/RL*, June 20, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/06/00d97e5f-dc14-4a35-ae9b-a791f9106124.html.

_____, "Babitsky's Crime and Punishment," *cpj.org*, Committee to Protect Journalists, February 28, 2000, http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2000/Babitsky/main.html.

_____, "Civil society or 'dictatorship of law'?" *Asia Times*, March 15, 2000, http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/BC15Ag02.html.\.

"Company Management (Руководство Компании)," http://www.rosmorport.ru/content.php?id=397.

"Complaint by the defense team," To The Criminal Collegiate of the Supreme Court of Russian Federation, From defense attorneys Yu. Shmidt and I. Pavlov of the International Attorney Collegiate "St. Petersburg," 191187, St. Petersburg, Ul. Gagarinskaya 6-A, 3 Floor, tel.: 275 4209, 275 1071, November 5, 1998, regarding the case of the St. Petersburg City Court in defense of the defendant, Alexander Nikitin, http://bellona.org/english_import_area/casefile/international/russia/envirorights/nikitin/c-court1998/1140457648.66.

"Convicted spy released on parole," *Interfax*, January 23, 2003.

"Corruption Called a Potential Threat," *The Moscow Times*, February 21, 2007, p. 4.

"Corruption Costs Russia $15 Billion A Year," *RFE/RL Newsline*, January 30, 2001.

"Corruption and Its Costs in Russia and Ukraine," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 6, No.4, Heldref Publications, Fall 1998.

"Corruption Said To Threaten Russian National Security," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 42, October 29, 2001.

Coulloudon, Virginie, "Crime and Corruption after Communism: The Criminalization of Russia's Political Elite," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Fall 1997, http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/criminalization.html.

"Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005," Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61671.htm.

"Court Acquits Army Officers of Killing Journalist," *MosNews.com*, June 10, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/06/10/journalistmurder.shtml.

"Court of Jury Acquits Russian Mafia Boss Ivankov," *MosNews.com*, July 18, 2005.

"Court of Jury Finds Russian Scientist Danilov Guilty of Espionage," *MosNews.com*, November 5, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/11/05/scientistguilty.shtml.

"Court of Jury Says Scientist Sutyagin Guilty of Espionage," *MosNews.com*, April 5, 2004, http://*MosNews.com.com*/news/2004/04/05/sutyagin.shtml.

"Court Overrules Part Of Law Allowing FSB to Eavesdrop," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 27, 2000.

"Court Safeguards FSB's Use of Tips," *The Moscow Times*, April 25, 2001.

"Crime Problem Continues to Worsen," *RFE/RL Security & Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 17, May 15, 2002.

"Criminal Business Undermines Economic Security in Russia," *Johnson's Russia List*, Issue 5080, February 8, 2001.

"Criminal, Political Circles Merge In Russian Far East," *RFE/RL Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 6, December 6, 2001.

"Cuban spy facility to become Spy Museum?" *Security and Intelligence Digests from Aleksey Shcherbakov*, November 16, 2001, *agentura.ru*.

"Czech Defense Minister Orders Investigator of VZS Links With Srba...And Announces VZS Head's Departure From Ministry," *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 26, 2002.

"Czech Republic: Intelligence," *Federation of American Scientists*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/czech/index.html.

"Czech Republic Military Intelligence Service," http://www.vzcr.cz/?id=lide&cj=en&styl=graphic, and, http://launch.praguemonitor.com/en/45/czech_natural_news/3206/.

"Czech minister mistrusts military intelligence head," *Prague Daily Monitor*, March 12, 2007.

Dahl, Fredrik, "Serbia Making Steady Recovery from Assassination," *Reuters*, May 8, 2003.

"Danilov Loses Last Appeal in Spy Case," *The Moscow Times*, June 30, 2005.

Darling, Juanita, "Rude Russians Raised Red Flag in Andes," *The Los Angeles Times*, reprinted in *The Moscow Times*, November 14, 2000.

Dawisha, Adeed I. and Karen Dawisha, "How to Build a Democratic Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2003, Council of Foreign Relations, Inc., 2003.

"Deportation Is Cause for Concern," editorial published in *The Washington Post*, republished in *The Moscow Times*, January 13, 2003.

Dettmer, Jamie, "Stepashin Joins Putin's Bandwagon – Sergei Stepashin Supports Vladimir Putin," *Insight on the News*, March 20, 2000, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_11_16/ai_61361628/print.

de Waal, Thomas, "Analysis: Chechnya's endless war," *BBC News*, April 23, 2001.

"Did Russia's Security Chief Have Role in Starovoitova Murder?" *Russia Reform Monitor*, No. 561, American Foreign Policy Council: Washington, DC, December 9, 1998, http://www.afpc.org/rrm/rrm561.htm.

Digges, Charles and Rashid Alimov, "Rumyantsev sacked as Rosatom head and replaced by Presidential envoy Sergei Kiriyenko," *Bellona*, November 15, 2005, http:///www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/waste-mngment/40781.html.

Dikun, Elena, "The Security Services Have Designs on the Kremlin," *Prism*, Vol. 7, Issue 8, The Jamestown Foundation, August 29, 2001.

"Dismissed," *Czech Business Weekly*, October 30, 2006, http://www.cbw.cz/phprs/2006103013.html.

"Distinguished author and journalist Shchekochikhin dies," *Gazeta.ru*, July 3, 2003, http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/07/03/Distinguishe.shtml.

"Documents: GRU," *agentura.ru,* http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/gru/docs/.

Dougherty, Jill, "Who is Vladimir Putin?" *CNN.com*, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/russia/story/analysis/putin2/.

Dragomir, Doru, "Hurricane in the Army's Secret Services, *Bucharest Ziua,* April 9, 2003, *http://fas.org/irp/world/romania/dgia.html.*

"Drunk on Power," *Sunday Times*, August 3, 1997, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/1111.html##3.

"Duma Deputy Laments KGB-ization of the Government," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 45, December 24, 2002.

"Duma Votes to Send Russia Back to 'Old Days' of One-Party Rule," *MosNews.com*, October 13, 2004.

"Dzerzhinsky Won't Rise Immediately," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, July 24, 2000, Vol. 1, No. 1.

"Economic Development is Priority for New Presidential Envoy in Southern Federal District," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 14, 2004.

"Editorial," *Washington Post*, November 12, 2001.

Eke, Steven, "Corruption 'skyrockets' in Russia," *BBC News*, July 20, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4701633.stm.

_____, "Russia faces demographic disaster," *BBC News*, June 7, 2006.

"Elections in Russia," *Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Russia.

"Electoral Reform Approved," *The Moscow Times*, July 14, 2005.

Emery, Dave, "Russian Sigint," February 16, 1997, http://www.jya.com/rusigint.htm.

Erofeyev, Viktor, "What killed Politkovskaya?" *International Herald Tribune*, October 11, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/11/opinion/ederofeyev.php.

"Espionage Conviction, Sentence Upheld," *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 2, 2002.

"EU Says Torture Pervasive in Chechnya," *The Moscow Times*, March 14, 2007, p. 3.

"Ex-Deputy PM on her new appointment," *RosBusinessConsulting*, March 11, 2003, republished in *The Moscow Times*, March 11, 2003.

"Ex-Kremlin Aide Convicted," *The New York Times*, March 7, 2002.

"Ex-Ministers Attack Weapons Claims," *BBC News*, June 17, 2003.

"Ex-Public Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov tells to PRAVDA.Ru correspondent about circumstances of the action brought in connection with Moscow Kremlin's restoration," *Pravda.ru*, March 25, 2002, http://english.pravda.ru/society/2002/03/25/27159.html.

"Even Weather Works Against Russian Spying," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 8, September 11, 2000.

Fagan, Geraldine, "Russia: Religious Work Visa Respite?" *Forum 18*, May 3, 2006, and posted on *World Wide Religious News (WWRN),* http://www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=21390&sec=59&con=42.

"FAK," *Nuclear Threat Inititative*, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/execcomm.htm#E11E6.

Fak, Alex, "Audit Chamber To Review Sell-Offs," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 29, 2003.

"FAPSI History," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/history.htm.

"FAPSI Legislative Authority," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/legis.htm.

"FAPSI Operations," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/ops.htm.

"FBI: Arrests Foil Missile-Smuggling Plot," *The New York Times*, August 13, 2003.

Fedark, Kevin, "Rising Czar?" *Time*, July 11, 1994, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,981080,00.html.

"Federal Antiterrorist Commission," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/execcomm.htm.

"Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: State Duma," http://www.duma.gov.ru/.

"Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)," *Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Service_(Russia), accessed on March 3, 2007.

"Federal Security Service," *Dictionary.LaborLawTalk.com*, http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Federal_Security_Service.

"Federal Security Service (FSB)," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/ministry.htm#fsb.

Fedorov, Yuri E., "Democratic Transformation of the Intelligence/Security Sector in Russia: A Sad Saga of Failure," Paper prepared for the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," held in Geneva, Switzerland on 5-7 September 2002, organized by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).

Feifer, Gregory, "East and West: Face to Face," *The Moscow Times*, March 2, 2001.

Felgengauer, Pavel, "Approve it, but check before," *Novaya Gazeta*, October 2, 2007, http://en.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/74/03.html.

_____, "Bleak Outlook 2 Years On," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, September 11, 2003.

_____, "No Results, Just Promises," *The Moscow Times*, October 4, 2005.

Fenyvesi, Charles, "Russian FSB Surveillance of Internet Challenged," *RFE/RL Watchlist*, Vol. 1, No. 7, February 25, 1999, http://www.hrea.org/lists/huridocs-tech/markup/msg00132.html.

Finckenauer, James O. and Yuri A. Voronin, "The Threat of Organized Crime," Issues in International Crime, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, DC, June 2001.

_____, and Elin J. Waring, *Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture, and Crime*, Northeastern University Press: Boston, 1998.

Finn, Peter, "Judges Who Acquit Forced Off Bench," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, February 27, 2005, http://www.okkaone.com/detail-343059.html.

_____, "Moscow Rally Memorializes Slain Reporter," *Washington Post*, October 9, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/08/AR2006100800358.html.

_____, "Russia's Champion of Hopeless Cases Is Targeted For Disbarment," *Washington Post*, June 3, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060201135_pf.html.

Flynn, Michael, "Russia: Spy mania," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 58, No. 5, September/October 2002.

"Foreign Funds Diverted in Monster Money Laundering? The Mafia, Oligarchs, and Russia's Torment," *Beyond Transition*, The World Bank Group, 2001, http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/julaug99/pgs11-13.htm.

"Foreign Intelligence Celebrates Twice...And Goes Online," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 23, December 25, 2000.

"Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)," *Wikipedia*, accessed in December 2006, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Service_(Russia).

"Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)," *GlobalSecurity.org,* *http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/svr.htm*.

"Forgetting History's Lessons: Russians combat public apathy to Soviet-era horrors," *National Public Radio*, July 16-19, 2001, http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2001/jul/010716.russia.html.

"Former Czech Military Intelligence Chief Advising Opposition Leader," *RFE/RL Newsline*, June 9, 2003.

"Former Deputy DM and St. Petersburg Mayor Appointed Presidential Envoy," *MosNew.coms*, March 9, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/03/09/yakovlev.shtml.

"Former KGB agent Mikhail Trepashkin released from Russian prison, *Pravda*, November 30, 2007.

"Former Russian FSB Colonel Trepashkin released," *Eurasian Security Services Daily Review*, AxisGlobe.com, December 2, 2007, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1441.

"Former Russian FSB officer released from prison," *GlobalSecurity.org*, November 30, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2007/intell-071130-rianovosti01.htm.

"Former Russian Spy, Putin Critic Poisoned in London --- Report," *Mosnews.com*, November 19, 2006, http://mosnews.com/news/2006/11/19/spypoisoned.shtml.

"Former U.S. defense chief warns aging weapons 'prime source' for terrorists," *The Russia Journal*, April 2002, www.russiajournal.com/weekly/article.shtml?ad=6088.

Fossato, Floriana, "Russia: Media Decree Targets Internet, Digital TV," *RFE/RL*, March 28, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/4911ddac-919d-43c7-8b5f-c158ca5ef33b.html.

"France Calls for End to Chechen War," *The Moscow Times*, January 26, 2004.

Franchetti, Mark, "Putin's fanatical youth brigade targets Britain," *Times of London*, September 2, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2368176.ece.

"Freed U.S. student home from Russia," *CNN.com*, August 8, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/08/08/russia.tobin/.

"Freedom in the World Survey 2004," http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/specreports/ar2004.pdf.

"Freedom in the World Survey 2005: Civic Power and Electoral Politics," *Freedom House*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2005.htm.

Freeman, Colin and Helen Womack, "Spy was killed 'on orders of Kremlin Stalin,'" *Telegraph.co.uk*, December 17, 2006.

"Frenkel Quizzed in New Probe," *The Moscow Times*, March 14, 2007, p. 5.

"FSB, Police Accused of Torture," *The Moscow Times*, March 30, 2007, p. 3.

"FSB Arrests Yukos Head," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 4, No. 43, October 30, 2003.

"FSB Budget and Personnel," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fsb/budget.htm.

"FSB Director Patrushev Advocates Re-Introducing Institution of Informers in Russia," *agentura.ru*, October 8, 2004, http://www.agentura.ru/english/Right?id=20041008001400.

"FSB Director Reports to President," *RosBusiness Consulting*, in *The Moscow Times*, July 23, 2002.

"FSB Director: terrorists seek nuclear weapons in Russia," *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, Axis Information and Analysis, June 5, 2007, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1320.

"FSB - Federal Security Service," *agentura.ru.*

"FSB helps FBI arrest buyer of PERK 'Igla,'" *Strana.ru*, August 13, 2003.

"FSB History," *Globalsecurity.org*, July 15, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/fsb.htm.

"FSB Operations," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fsb.org/irp/world/russia/fsb/ops.htm.

"FSB Operations," *GlobalSecurity.org*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/fsb-ops.htm.

"FSB Organization," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fsb/org.htm.

"FSB Was Behind the Death Plot, Berezovsky Said," *Kommersant*, July 19, 2007.

Fukuyama, Francis, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer 1989.

"Future of Democracy in Russia in the Hands of Silent Majority," Institute for Election Systems Development (IESD), http://www.democracy.ru/english/about/, and Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI), Moscow, Russia, October 31, 2003, http://www.cessi.ru/index.php?id=1&L=1.

Gamayunov, Igor, "What Justice If Crooked Above the Law?" *The Moscow Times*, January 29, 2003.

Ganguly, Sumit, "India's Transition," *Transitions to Democracy*, Lisa Anderson, ed., Columbia University Press: NY, 1999.

Gardner, Frank, "Litvinenko Death Fuels UK-Russia Spy War," *BBC News*, November 23, 2007.

"Geopolitical Diary: Trying to Redefine Poland," February 20, 2007, *http://www.autentico.org/oa09845.php*.

"Georgia: 'Architect Of German Lustration' Discusses Georgian Archive," *RFE/RL*, March 27, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/4828867c-7adf-4c81-9da7-4d76fba37c49.html.

"Georgia, Moldova, and Bulgaria: Dismantling Communist Structures," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Interview with Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia, Iurie Rosca, and Philip Dimitrov, Spring 2004, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol12.html.

"Georgian parliamentarians divided by a law on exclusion of former KGB agents from civil service," *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, Axis Information and Analysis, February 19, 2007.

"Genesis," Annual Report 2001," *Czech Security Information Service*, Czech Republic, http://www.bis.cz.

"Geopolitical Diary: Putin's Strategic Reshuffle," *Stratfor*, February 16, 2007, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=284437.

Gertz, Bill, "Canada arrests 'illegal' spy from Russian intelligence," *The Washington Times*, November 25, 2006, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20061124-105912-7400r.htm.

_____, and Rowan Scarborough, "GRU Chief Visits," Inside the Ring, *Washington Post*, February 15, 2002, http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring021502.html.

Gessen, Masha, "Muzzled in Moscow: Fear and self-censorship in Putin's Russia," *Boston Globe*, January 2, 2005, and cited in *Security and Intelligence Digest*, Part Four, from Glenmore Trenear-Harvey, January 3, 2005.

_____, "Russians Can't Afford an Opposition," *MosNews.com*, July 18, 2005, http://mosnews.com/commentary/2005/07/18/kasparoveggs.shtml.

Gianella, Christian and William Tompson, "Stimulating Innovation in Russia: The Role of Institutions and Policies," Economics Department Working Papers No. 539, *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*, ECO/WKP(2006)67, January 15, 2007.

Gill, Peter, "Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence/Security Services After September 11th," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 103, January 2003.

Giraldo, Jeanne Kinney, "Legislatures and Defense: The Comparative Experience," The Center For Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Occasional Paper #8, June 2001.

"Global News Roundup: Russia," *Money Laundering & Business Crime Newsletter*, Issue 13, Proximal Consulting, July 2002.

Goble, Paul, "Analysis: Poland's lustration policy and overcoming the past," *RFE/RL Newsline* , posted at *The Ukrainian Weekly*, September 17, 2000, No. 38, Vol. LXVIII, http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2000/380005.shtml.

_____, "Eye on Eurasia: Russia's Rising Extremists," *United Press International*, November 27, 2005, http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?StoryID=20051127-083046-5597r.

_____, "The Days of the Chekists," End Note, *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 32, December 21, 2000, *RFE/RL Security Watch*, December 23, 2000, and *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 23, December 25, 2000.

Goodbody, William L., "A Square Peg in Bureaucracy's Round Hole," *Law Enforcement News*, June 30, 1995.

"Golovlev's Skeletons," *RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 31, September 2002. "Government Insider Says Yukos Affair Will Harm Economy...," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 4, No. 43, October 30, 2003.

Gorshkov, Sergey, "Devoted Independence," *Compromat.ru*, July 27, 2005, http://www.compromat.ru/main/sud/ivanov_a.htm.

"Gref Calls Coal Merger 'Dangerous,'" *The Moscow Times*, Issue 3599, February 19, 2007.

Grigoriants, Sergei, "The Status, Role and Authority of Security Services in the Central and Eastern European Region," *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/warsaw/status.html.

"Grigory Yavlinsky: "The President Alone Cannot Control Everything," Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky, *Gazeta.ru*, March 25, 2003, http://www.eng.yaboloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/3/gazeta_250303.html.

"Gutseriev Says Goodbye to It All," *Kommersant*, July 31, 2007.

Gutterman, Steve, "Putin Promotes Defense Minister," *The Washington Post*, February 15, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/15/AR2007021500632_pf.html.

Halpin, Tony, "Putin toasts spies' return to power," *The Times Online*, December 22, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,13509-2515215,00.html.

Harasymiw, Dr. B., "KGB Glasnost: Soviet Press Interviews with KGB Officials," Commentary No. 2, *Commentary*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 1990, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/commentary/com02.asp.

"Heads roll in Russian customs service as prosecutors probe abuse," *RIA Novosti: Russian News and Information Service*, May 12, 2005, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060512/48051544.html.

Herd, Graeme P., "Russia and the Politics of 'Putinism'," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 2001.

"High Tech Defense Workers Aid Criminals," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 16, November 6, 2000.

"History of state security," *agentura.ru*, October 10, 2000.

Horejsi, Tomas, "Minister Tvrdik To Replace Army Intelligence Chief," *Lidove Noviny*, (Prague), April 8, 2003.

"Ideological Doctrine Paves Kremlin Course," *RFE/RL Reports*, Vol. 6, No. 14, August 7, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/reports/rpw/2006/08/14-070806.asp.

"Illegal capital flight put at up to $1.5 bln per month," *Johnson's Russia List*, # 6035, 6036, January 23, 2002, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6036-4.cfm.

"India-Russia Naval Relations," *India Defense Consultants*, May 14, 2003, http://www.indiadefence.com/IN_RUS_naval.htm.

"Information security doctrine threatens press freedoms," *Russia Reform Monitor*, No. 794, American Foreign Policy Council, Washington, DC, October 2, 2000.

"Intelligence Community Celebrates Its Soviet Origins...As Foreign-Intelligence Director Outlines Priorities...FSB Goes After Spies in the Regions...And Presidential Envoy Accuses Red Cross of Spying," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 45, December 24, 2002.

"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – 2003, Part I: Drug and Chemical Control," Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2004, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, U.S. Department of State, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/bilateral/bilateral.php?record_id=report_narcotics.

"Interview of the Deputy Minister of MOI of the Russian Federation Militia Col. Gen. Safonov to *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*," February 2, 2007, posted on the MVD Web site at http://eng.mvdrf.ru/index.php?docid=431.

"Investigation of Starovoitova Murder Extended Again," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 21 November 2001.
Isachenkov, Vladimir, "Russian writer faced threats before death," *Washington Times*, March 7, 2007.

"Islam and the Caucasus: A Look at Chechnya," Transcript of a panel hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies/ Russia and Eurasia Program and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 20004, http://www.csis.org/ruseura/wot/040510.pdf.

"It's Not the Place That Makes the Person – Mikhail Fradkov: A Career Profile," *Kommersant*, March 4, 2004.

"Ivan Safronov Was Killed," *Kommersant*, March 6, 2007.
Johnson, Chris, "Polish intelligentsia face post-communist vetting," *Washington Post*, March 13, 2007.

Johnson, David, ed., "Russian radar in Azerbaijan seen as response to US ABM withdrawal," *ITAR-TASS*, published in *Johnson's Russia List*, January 27, 2002, www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6043-3.cfm.

_____, and Philip Shenon, "U.S. Holds Briton on Missile Charge," *The New York Times*," August 13, 2003.

Jones, Gareth, "Foreign espionage booming in Russia – spy chief," *Infowar.com*, December 17, 1996.

Jones, Richard Lezin with David Johnston, "Arms Dealer Held Without Bail in Missile Case," *The New York Times*, August 13, 2003.

"Journalism in Russia Becomes as Dangerous as War," *Kommersant*, March 7, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p748098/r_500/Journalism_as_War/.

"Journalist Gives Her Life for Her Profession," *Kommersant*, October 9, 2006.

"Journalists Continue To Investigate Borovik's Death," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 18, November 20, 2000.

Jovanovic, Branko and Michael M. Lokshin, "Wage Differentials between the State and Private Sectors in Moscow," *The Review of Income and Wealth*, Vol. 50, Issue 1, March 2004, http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0034-6586.2004.00114.x.

"Judges take stand against Putin," *Times Online*, March 19, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1531756,00.html.

"Jury Decides Klebnikov Murder Case," *Kommersant*, May 6, 2006, http://kommersant.com/p671611/Jury_Decides_Klebnikov_Murder_Case/.

"Kadyrov Fends off Babich," *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol. 4, Issue 2, The Jamestown Foundation, January 31, 2003, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=13&issue_id=549&article_id=3913.

Kagarlitsky, Boris, "Glazyev Opts for Hara-Kiri," *The Moscow Times*, September 2, 2003.

_____, "'Power' Bureaucracy Chaos," *The Moscow Times*, July 29, 2004.

Kahn, Jeffrey, "Opening the Floodgates," *The Moscow Times*, July 18, 2002.

Kaliyev, Roustam, "Can 'Power Ministries' Be Reformed?" *Perspective*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, September - October 2002, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol13/kaliyev.html.

Kalugin, Oleg, interview with Michael Parks, "Ex-Agent Leads Fight Against Powerful KGB," *Los Angeles Times*, July 23, 1990.

Kaplan, David E., "When the Russian Mob Feels the Need to Wash," *U.S. News and World Report*," August 22, 1999, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/990830/archive_001735.htm.

Karush, Sarah, "Moiseyev's Spying Trial To Start All Over Again," *The Moscow Times*, November 30, 2000.

Kasaev, Alan Ch., "Ossetia-Ingushetia," *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*, Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., RAND, CF-129-CRES, Santa Monica, California, 1996, http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF129.

Kasparov, Garry, "Don Putin," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 26, 2007.

Kazumova, Emilia, Alena Sagdeyeva, and Alexander Yelisov, "Who Is The Boss Around Here," *Russia Profile*, July 27, 2007.

Kekic, Laza, "Slowdown Is Not the Product of Politics," January 25, 2005, *The Moscow Times* and *Johnson's Russia List*, #19, JRL 9033, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9033-19.cfm.

Kelley, Jack and Douglas Stanglin, "Bond scam has 'strong' Kremlin ties," *USA Today*, September 13, 1999.

"KGB to be reorganized — not disbanded?" *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies*, September 24, 1991, http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?1992.

"KGB's rehabilitation becomes an issue," Ian Traynor, *The Guardian*, May 1, 2002.

Khamrayev, Viktor, "The Putin era: an interview with sociologist Olga Krystanovskaya," *Kommersant-Vlast*, No. 10, March 19-25, 2007.

Kipp, Jacob and Timothy L. Thomas, "The Russian Military and the 1995 Elections: A Primer," Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 5, 1995, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/ruselec.htm.

Kirrilov, Roman, "Russian ambassador in India is in danger," *Pravda*, September 9, 2005, http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/09-09-2005/8893-ambassador-0.

Knight, Amy, "Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Fall 1999.

Kochetov, Sergei, "Minister: New Tax Code Won't Stop Collection," *The Moscow News*, February 7, 2001.

Korchagina, Valeria and Andrei Zolotov Jr., "Corruption Probes Stir Up Kremlin," *The St. Petersburg Times*, #718, November 2, 2001.

Koszeg, Ferenc, "The Status, Role and Authority of Security Services in the Central and Eastern European Region," *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/warsaw/status.html.

Kovalev, Vladimir, "Lawyer: 3 Confess in '98 Murder," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, January 9, 2004.

_____, "Matviyenko Offers Higher City Profile, Rents," *TheMoscowTimes*, October 6, 2003.

_____, "Novosyolov Case To Go To Court," *The St. Petersburg Times*, #640, January 30, 2001.

_____, "Russia Sentences 73-Year Old Academic for Spying," *Transitions Online*, February 24, 2003, http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/I-NET/transition_260203.html.

_____, "Suspect: Glushchenko Ordered Starovoitova's Killing," *The Moscow Times*, July 9, 2004 and republished at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2004/PAPERS/07/04079_2_mt.html.

"Kozlov killed by mistake," *NEWS.rin.ru*, September 15, 2006, http://news.rin.ru/eng/news///9493/3//.

Krainova, Natalya, David Nowak and Alexander Osipovich, "Great Russia Refused Registration," *The Moscow Times*, Issue 3706, July 25, 2007.

Kramer, Andrew, "Awash in Petrodollars, Russia Frets About the Paradoxes of Bounty," *The New York Times*, November 15, 2005.

_____, "Putin Pulls the Strings," *The New York Times*, July 8, 2007.

_____, "Russian Oil Magnate Forced to Sell to Putin Loyalist, He Says," *The New York Times*, July 31, 2007.

_____, "The Kremlin Flexes, and a Tycoon Reels," *The New York Times*, July 8, 2007.
"Krejcik to head Czech military intelligence till June," *Prague Daily*, March 15, 2007

"Kremlin loosens control over president's plenipotentiary envoys," February 16, 2001, *www.strana.ru*.

Kupchinsky, Roman, "Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Chernomyrdin, and corruption," *RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch*, and posted in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, April 28, 2002, No. 17, Vol. LXX.

_____, "Spotlight: Moscow Duma Deputy Shot Dead In Probably Contract Killing," *RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 30, August 30, 2002.

_____, "Suspects Named In Starovoitova, Manevich Murders," *RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 34, September 26, 2002.

"Kvashnin Has Left: What Will the Army Gain?" *RIA Novosti*, July 19, 2004, http://npc.sarov.ru/english/digest/152005/section2p1.html.

"Landslide Predicted To United Russia," *Kommersant*, September 1, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p800443/VCIOM_published_prognosis_for_the_State_Duma/.

Latynina, Yulia, "Billion-Dollar Principles," *The Moscow Times*, August 1, 2007.

_____, "St. Pete's Criminal-Business-Political Elite," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, June 4, 2003.

"Lawyer Says Former Czech Foreign Ministry Official Is Innocent...But Girlfriend Says Two Others Were Targeted for Murder," *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 26, 2002.

"Least Seniority, Highest Pay," *RFE/RL Newsline*, January 12, 2001.

"Лебедев Сергей Николаевич," SVR Web site, at http://svr.gov.ru/history/leb.html.

"Lefortovo, other FSB prisons to be handed to Justice Ministry," *agentura.ru*, May 26, 2005, http://www.agentura.ru/english/Right?id=20050526134600.

"Legislative Authority, Main Intelligence Administration (GRU), Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU)," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/gru/legis.htm.

"Lev Rokhlin killed by his wife?" *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies*, July 3, 1998, http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?2513.
*Levada Center (*Левада-Центр), http://www.levada.ru/press/2007072601.html.

Levine, Irving, "Be My Spy ---- or Else," *The New York Times*, August 14, 2001.

Levitov, Maria, "Rule Breakers Get Killed, U.S. Official Told," *The Moscow Times*, July 15, 2004.

Lipman, Masha, "Breaking Putin's Cordon," *Washington Post*, March 10, 2007.

Listopadova, Svetlana, "The security services know who ordered the crime and killers, but cannot find them," *Vesti.ru*, April 24, 2003.

Litvinenko, Alexander, "Why I believe Putin wanted me dead…," *The Mail*, November 25, 2006, http://www.mailonsunday.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=418652&in_page_id=1770.

Lobjakas, Ahto, "Russia: EU Issues Cautious Assessment Of Chechen Elections," *RFE/RL*, October 6, 2003, www.rferl.org.

Logan, Gordon, "The Secret History of the Moscow Coup of August 1991," *http://cryptome.org/markov-file.htm*, 1999, 2000.

"Lourdes [Cuba] Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Facility 23° 00' 01'N 82° 286' W", *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/c80_04.htm.

Los, Maria, "Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe," *Law and Social Inquiry*, Vol. 20, 1995.

Luchterhandt, Otto, "Putin's 'Strong State'," http://www.dgap.org/english/tip/tip3/luchterhandt_p.html; and, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Putin_address_SDI_policy_memo_7.00.doc.

Lucky, Christian, "Crime and Corruption after Communism: Public Theft in Early America and Contemporary Russia," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Fall 1997, http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/criminalization.html.

Lukas, Aaron and Gary Dempsey, "Mafia Capitalism or Red Legacy?" *Cato Institute*, March 4, 2000, file:///C:/Data%20Files/Dissertation%202007/DISS%20APRIL%2007/diss/Interior%20Ministry%20In%202000%20--%20there%20are%20now%20more%20than%209,000%20criminal%20organizations.htm.

Lukyanov, Fyodor, "From Nationalim to Nation," *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 4, October-December 2006, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/region-snt/numbers/17/1060.html.

Lunev, Stanislav, "FSB Influence Increases, Influence of Russia's Special Services Increases," *NewsMax*, July 16, 2001.

_____, "Russia's Secret Police: Powerful Tool for Totalitarianism," *The Eurasian Politician,* Issue 3, February 2001, http://www.cc.jyu.fi/~aphamala/pe/issue3/tsheka.htm.

Lupis, Alex, "CPJ Calls on Putin To Ensure Editors' Killers Are Brought To Justice," August 8, 2004, and letter to Putin from CPJ dated August 9, 2004, *Johnson's Russia List*, #8321, August 9, 2004, www.cdi.org.

Lyall, Sarah and Andrew E. Kramer, "British Police Deport Suspect in Berezovsky Plot," *The New York Times*, July 18, 2007.

Macierewicz, Antoni, the President of the Verification Commission, "WSI Report," http://www.abcnet.com.pl/?q=node/2602.

"Magadan Oblast Governor gunned down in Moscow ...as associates speculate on the motives...and Duma Speaker says crime situation continues to worsen," http://www.templetonthorp.com/en/news159.

"Main Directorate for Special Programs (Главное управление специальных программов, GUSP)," http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/fbis/GUSP.html

"Main Suspect in Yushenkov Murder Case Sentenced to 20 Years," *MosNews.com*, March 30, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/03/30/yushenkov.shtml.

Mainville, Michael, "Bribery thrives as big business in Putin's Russia," *SFgate.com*, January 2, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/01/02/MNG8QNBCTN1.DTL&type=printable.

_____, "Putin group races past Soviet party," *The Washington Times*, May 26, 2006.

Majtenyi, Laszlo, "Reconciliation and Developing Public Trust: Opening State Security Files to the Public," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

"Man Arrested in Russian Tycoon Case," *The Washington Post*, July 18, 2007.

Martin, Kate, "The Role of Security Services in a Democratic Society: The Human Rights/Civil Liberties Perspective," *Center for National Security Studies*, George Washington University, United States, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/oversight/kmremarks.html.

"Manifest," Nashi Web site, http://www.nashi.su/ideology.

McDermott, Roger, "Ivanov's Victory Over Kvashnin May Open Pandora's Box," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, Issue 40, The Jamestown Foundation, June 28, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3000&article_id=2368161.

_____, "Putin Fires Chief of General Staff Kvashnin," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, Issue 55, The Jamestown Foundation, July 20, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3021&article_id=2368270.

Medetsky, Anatoly, "Dissecting Siloviki's Pyramid Of Power," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 24, 2003.

_____, "For Trepashkin, Bomb Trail Leads to Jail," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, January 14, 2004.

_____, "Kvashnin Fired in Military Shakeup," *The Moscow Times*, July 20, 2004.

_____, *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 30, 2003.

"Media Watchdog Concerned About Russian Journalists," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 4, 2004.

"Merciful Release: A brave man walks to freedom, and Russia gains hope," *Times Online*, January 24, 2003.

"Mikhail Fradkov, prime minister," *RFE/RL*, http://www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection/bio/fradkov.asp.

"Military intelligence chief to be let go," *Radio Prague*, March 12, 2007, http://www.radio.cz/en/news/89248.

"Minister, top brass to be called to testify in Russian spy trial," *Agence France Presse*, February 7, 2001.

"Mission Principles and Credo," *Czech Security Information Service*, http://www.bis.cz/eng/a_poslani.html.

Monahan, Francis J., "Investigative Commissions Implemented Reforms Prove Ephemeral," *The Police Chief*, Vol. LXVII, No. 10, October 2000, pp. 79-84.

"Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources during the Campaign for the December 2003 Russian Federal State Duma Elections," *Open Society Justice Initiative*, http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102522.

"More Criticism of Information Security Doctrine Voiced...," *RFE/RL*, September 15, 2000.

"More Spies to Bring Order to the Country," *agentura.com*, http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/spions.

Morley, Breandan (from the blanket), "Analysis: The Process of 'Constitutionalisation,'" *Republican News*, RN-040213, February 12-13, 2004.

Morozov, Nikolai, "'We will investigate this case as long as necessary,': Deputy of the Duma Alexei Melnikov conducts his own investigation into the Pichugin case," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, August 27, 2003, http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/9/030827_koms_pravda.html.

"Moscow City Court Sets to Hearing Paul Klebnikov's Murder Case," *Kommersant*, January 10, 2006, http://kommersant.com/p-7925/Moscow_City_Court_Sets_to_Hearing_Paul_Klebnikov%92s_Murder_Case/.

"Moscow Court Reduces Prison Term for Ex-KGB Officer Jailed for Treachery," *MosNews.com*, July 1, 2005, http:///MosNews.com.com/news/2005/07/01/trepashkin.shtml.

"Moscow Court Sentences Former Foreign Intelligence Officer to 18 Years in Prison," *Pravda*, June 11, 2003, http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/crimes/11-06-2003/3045-zaporozhsky-0.

"Moscow Mayor Advocates Restoration of Dzerzhinskii Monument....As Liberals Vow to Oppose the Move....And Monument to Aleksandr II Is Approved," *RFE/RL Newsline*, Sept 16, 2002.

"Moscow Mayor Confirms Wish to Restore Dzerzhinskii Statue....As Dzerzhinskii Debate Heats Up," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 17, 2002.

"Moscow: Reshuffle To Strengthen Putin's Power," *Stratfor: Predictive, Insightful Global Intelligence*, March 11, 2003, Strategic Forecasting, LLC, www.stratfor.com.

"Moscow Resumes Old Espionage Case," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 45, December 24, 2002.

"Moscow Retakes Control of Regional Law Enforcement," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 24, 2000.

"Moscow Terrorist Act Planned Abroad – Putin," *Russia & FSU General News*, October 24, 2002, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-26472749_ITM.

Muldoon, Thomas C., "Russian Intelligence and Security Services: An Indicator of Democratic Reform," United States Navy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 1999, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/ADA366081.pdf.

Mulin, Sergei, "Money Joins The United Russia Party," *Novaya Gazeta*, No. 40-41, June 1, 2006.

Mulino, Marcella, "On the determinants of capital flight from Russia," *Atlantic Economic Journal*, June 1, 2002, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0199-1799715_ITM.

Mulvey, Stephen, "How Russia pays for the war," *BBC News*, March 16, 2000.

Munro, Robin, "Book Sees Kremlin's Hand in 2nd Chechen War," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, September 18, 2003.

"Murderous Russia's Ban On Salvation Army Ruled Illegal By European Court," *Kavkaz Center*, October 6, 2006, http://kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2006/10/06/5857.shtml.

Murphy, Brett, "Russia asks UK to remove asylum status for billionaire accused of coup plot," *Jurist*, April 16, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/04/russia-asks-uk-to-remove-asylum-status.php.

"Muscovites Mark Apartment Bombing," *The New York Times*, September 13, 2000.

Mydans, Seth, "A Letter From Asia: A Burst of Raw Democracy: Anything Wrong With That?" *The New York Times*, January 7, 2004.

_____, "Russian Jury Acquits Physicist Accused of Selling Secrets," *The New York Times*, December 29, 2003.

Myers, Steven Lee, "Old Kremlin, New Kremlin: It's Still a Big Secret," *The New York Times*, August 27, 2003.

_____, "Post-Putin," *The New York Times*, February 25, 2007.

_____, "Russians to Vote, but Some Parties Lose in Advance," *The New York Times*, February 15, 2007.

_____, "Youth Groups Created by Kremlin Serve Putin's Cause," *The New York Times*, July 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/world/europe/08moscow.html?ei=5088&en=2f5f839008ad6bb3&ex=1341547200&pagewanted=all.

_____, and Mark Landler, "Intrigue over spy's death spreads to Germany," *International Herald Tribune*, December 11, 2006, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=3852662.

Natta, Don Van Jr., "Six Groups Said to be Monitored in U.S. for Possible Qaeda Links," *The New York Times*, August 22, 2003.

"Nazdratenko To Head State Fisheries Committee," February 15, 2002, *ALLNEWS.ru*.

"Нефтяная Компания," http://www.rosneft.ru/company/management.html.

"New Deputies in FSB," *agentura.ru*.

"New interior minister may be appointed within days," *Gazeta.ru*, January 1, 2004.

"News in Brief," *Interfax Russia & CIS Business Law Weekly*, January 30, 2007, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-29825795_ITM.

"New Law in Poland Aims to Oust Officials Who Aided Secret Police," *The New York Times*, March 16, 2007.

"News --- World-Wide," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 14, 2001.
Nichols, Johanna, "The Ingush (with notes on the Chechen): Background information," University of California, Berkeley, February 1997, http://ingush.berkeley.edu:7012/ingush_people.html,

Nilsen, Thomas, "All information on Northern Fleet radwaste and subs now secret," *Bellona*, October 11, 1997, http://www.bellona.no/bellona.org/english_import_area/12171.

Nixon, Richard M., "Gorbachev's Crisis and America's Opportunity," *Washington Post*, June 2, 1991.

"No jury trial for Starovoitova murder suspects," *The Russia Journal*, December 22, 2003.

Noon, Chris, "Khodorkovsky May See Longer Jail Sentence," *Forbes*, February 5, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/facesinthenews/2007/02/05/mikhail-khodorkovsky-yukos-cx_cn_0205autofacescan04.html.

_____, "Khodorkovsky Plans Study at Siberian Labor Camp," *Forbes*, October 24, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/facesinthenews/2005/10/24/khodorkovsky-russia-billionaires_cx_cn_1024autofacescan02.html.

"Novosibirsk: Censorship Roams the Country," *www.nbp-info.org*, May 28, 2005, http://www.nbp-info.org/archive/2005/05/28052005_novosib.htm.

"Obituary: Akhmad Kadyrov," *BBC News*, May 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3160962.stm.

O'Brien, Timothy, "Russian Industrialist in Money Laundering Inquiry Accuses Moscow Aides," *The New York Times*, August 28, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/global/082899russia-bank.html?_r=5&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&oref=login.

_____ and Erin E. Arvedlund, "Putin vs. the Jailed Tycoon: Defining Russia's New Rules," *The New York Times*, January 2, 2004.

"Officers Go On Trial For 1994 Journalist's Murder," *RFE/RL Newsline*, November 10, 2000.

"Official at TNK-BP's Kovykta Shot Dead," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, October 3, 2006.

O'Flynn, Kevin, "City Rejects Return of Dzerzhinsky," *The Moscow Times*, January 22, 2003.

"Oil Workers Getting Arms Training," *The Moscow Times*, June 7, 2005, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/06/07/258-print.html.

"'Old enemies' unite in missile sting," *BBC News*, August 12, 2003.

"On Foreign Intelligence," http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/law_960110.htm.

"On the Structure of the Russian Federation Federal Security Service," Presidential Edict No. 515, May 22, 1997, *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/edict_0515.htm.

"Operations of the Main Intelligence Administration (GRU), Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU)," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/gru/ops.htm.

"Operations of the Main Intelligence Administration (GRU)," *GlobalSecurity.org,* http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/gru-ops.htm.

Orttung, Robert, "Russia: Country Report – 2004," *Freedom House*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=342&year=2004.

Osipovich, Alexander, "New Evidence Raises More Beslan Doubts," *The Moscow Times*, July 30, 2007.

O'Sullivan, John, "Chilling chapter from the past," *The Washington Times*, December 4, 2005.

Jeremy Page, "Judges take stand against Putin," *Times Online*, March 19, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article431586.ece.

Panja, Tariq, "Litvinenko's Lawyers Fight On, A Year On," *The Washington Post*, November 23, 2007.

Parfitt, Tom, "Kremlin takes steps to polish Russia's image abroad," *The Boston Globe*, April 11, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2006/04/11/kremlin_takes_steps_to_polish_russias_image_abroad/.

"Parkanova speaks out against military intelligence chief," *Radio Prague*, March 10, 2007, http://www.radio.cz/en/news/89202.

"Paroubek says he would reinstall dismissed intelligence head," *Radio Prague*, September 21, 2006, http://www.radio.cz/en/news/83436.

Pasko, Grigory, "Political Prisoners in Today's Russia – Alexey Piguchin," *Robert Amsterdam: Perspectives on Russian, Europe, and International Affairs*, February 1, 2007.

Pastukhov, Vladimir, "Law under Administrative Pressure in Post-Soviet Russia," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Summer 2002.

"Pavel Borodin Arrested at New York's Kennedy Airport," *The Jamestown Foundation*, Vol. 7, Issue 12, January 18, 2001.

Pavlov, Ivan, "Freedom of Information and State Secrets," *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4, New York University School of Law, Fall 2000, http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol9num4/features/nikitinarticle4.html.

Payin, Emil A. and Arkady A. Popov, "Chechnya," *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*, Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., RAND, CF-129-CRES, Santa Monica, California, 1996, http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF129.

"Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of Repression," posted at the Web site of *Memorial*, a human rights organization based in Russia, at http://www.memo.ru/eng/memory/intro.htm.

Petrov, Nikolai, "Police, FSB Reforms in the Central Federal District," *Russian Regional Report*, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 16, 2003.

_____, "Siloviki in Russian Regions: New Dogs, Old Tricks," Issue 2 - 2005 - Reflections on Policing in Post-Communist Europe, *The Journal of Power Institutions In Post-Soviet Societies*, http://www.pipss.org/document331.html.

"Physicist found not guilty of spying," *The Russia Journal*, December 30, 2003.

Piontkovsky, Andrei, "Commentary: A Possible Link Between the Klebnikov and Shchekochikin Murders?" *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 1, Issue 51, July 14, 2004.

Pipes, Richard, "Putin's Dicatorship of Law Begins Lawlessly," *Project Syndicate*, accessed June 8, 2006, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pip1.

"Polish Intelligence Retained Ties to Moscow After 1989," *The Moscow Times*, February 19, 2006, p. 5.

"Polish law on outing former secret police agents can lead to a 'business chaos,'" *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, March 15, 2007.

Politi, Alessandro, "The Citizen as "Intelligence Minuteman," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*," Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 2003.

Polyakov, Leonid, "Ukraine's Intelligence/Security Sector Reform: Is Progress Conditioned by the Interest of Society," presented at the Workshop "Criteria for Success and Failure in Intelligence/Security Sector Reform," held in Geneva, Switzerland on 5-7 September 2002, organized by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 100, October 2002.

Ponomarev, L.A., "Has Reform Hit Security Organs?" *Perspective*, Vol. II, No. 5, May-June 1992, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/Vol2/Ponomarev.html.

"Pope Sentenced for 20 Years," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 11, 2000.

"Post-Soviet Railways Lack Funds For Ambitious Projects," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 4, Issue 148, July 31, 2007.

"President, FSB Rule the Country, the Nation Says," *Kommersant*, July 27, 2007.

"President Gives FSB Its 2003 Marching Orders...And Meets With Security Chiefs," *RFE/RL Newsline*, February 3, 2003.

"President Yeltsin's radio address," From *RIA Novosti, Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, December 20, 1997, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/1448.html##2.

"President Yushchenko states that idea of carrying out lustration of power is not topical," *Ukrainian Radio*, April 12, 2005, http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148&listid=12943.

"Presidential Aides' Pasts Made Public," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, November 14, 2006.

"Presidential Edict No. 1203, Approving List of Information Classified as State Secrets, December 30, 1995," http://www.fas.org/sgp/russedict.html.

"Prime Suspects Ignored Trial of Klebnikov's Killing," *Kommersant*, February 15, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p-10123/Klebnikov_trial/.

"Primoreye Government To Resign," February 12, 2001, *ALLNEWS.ru*.

"Procuracy Closes 'Mabetex' Case," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 22, December 18, 2000.

Prokopovych, Pavlo, "Considering the Option of Federalism," *The Ukrainian Observer*, Issue 223, September 2006, http://www.ukraine-observer.com/articles/223/913.

"Prominent Journalist Reportedly Poisoned on Way to School Siege," *The Moscow News*, September 3, 2004.

"Prosecutors Accused of Interfering In Regional Elections," *RFE/RL Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 6, December 6, 2001.

Przychodzki, Piotr, "Economic Invasion," *Central Europe Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 10, 2000, http://www.ce-review.org/00/1/przychodzki1.html.

Pustintsev, Boris, "Individuals and the Security Services," *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/warsaw/indiv.html.

"Putin Accuses Fugitive Millionaires of Attempting to Cause Damage to Russia," *Kommersant*, February 1, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p-10001/News_conference_oligarch_/.

"Putin blasts Interior Ministry at anti-crime conference," *Gazeta.ru*, June 2, 2002.

"Putin Calls for improving regional ties," *The Russia Journal*, July 11, 2002.

"Putin Calls on Russia to Develop Weapons in Cooperation with Foreign Partners," *MosNew.com*, March 20, 2007, http://mosnews.com/money/2007/03/20/putinweapons.shtml.

"Putin finds place for Kasyanov's arch-foe," *Johnson's Russia List*, #7167, May 5, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7167-14.cfm.

"Putin Has Blunt Words for Killers and Victim," *Los Angeles Times*, October 11, 2006.

"Putin inaugurated as Russian president; chooses a prime minister," *CNN.com*, May 7, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/05/07/russia.putin.02/.

"Putin knows how to 'close a deal,'" *World Tribune*, April 7, 2006.

"Putin Meets Industrialists," *Johnson's Russia List*, #5051, January 26, 2001.

"Putin Names Justice Minister As Chief Prosecutor," *RFE/RL*, June 19, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/fd35a1a4-4f88-413e-8871-15a8eebe94cb.html.

"Putin nominates feared Ramzan Kadyrov president of Chechnya," *Pravda*, March 1, 2007, http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/01-03-2007/87900-putin-0.

"Putin on reorganizing law-enforcement authorities," *RosBusinessConsulting*, March 11, 2003, and republished in *The Moscow Times*, March 11, 2003.

"Putin Plans Restructuring of Political Arena," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 24, January 2, 2001.

"Putin Praises FSB for Exposing Spies," *RFE/RL*, February 7, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/9f73bb82-e54e-48ae-9507-f7c25ae88867.html.

"Putin praises security services, says they must follow law," *International Herald Tribune*, December 20, 2007, http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=8851646.

"Putin Proposes Stringent New Electoral Rules," *MosNews.com*, April 14, 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/04/14/electlaw.shtml.

"Putin Rebukes Russian Law Enforcement...And Calls On Prosecutor-General's Office To Assume Larger Role," *RFE/RL Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism Watch Report*, Vol. 2, No. 7, Compiled by Roman Kupchinsky, February 21, 2002.

"Putin Seeks to 'Kill' Chekist Image," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 8, September 11, 2000.

"Putin Sees New Role for Secret Services," *RFE/RL Newsline*, December 21, 2000.

"Putin: Soviet collapse a 'genuine tragedy,'" *MSNBC*, April 25, 2005.

"Putin Speaks at GRU Celebration," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 2, No. 44, 21 November 2001.

"[Putin] Speech at Enlarged Collegium of the Russian Federal Security Service," *Johnson's Russia List*, #27, JRL 2007-24, January 31, 2007, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-24-27.cfm.

"[Putin] Speech at the New Headquarters of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff," *Johnson's Russia List*, #24, JRL 2006-252, November 8, 2006, and also published at www.kremlin.ru.

"Putin to Boost Hold on Russian Regions," *The New York Times*, May 19, 2000.

"Putin Transfers Chechen War Command," *The New York Times*," January 22, 2001.

"Putin Vows to Increase Spy Activity," *The Moscow Times*, July 26, 2007.

"Putin's Aide Says Kremlin Policy Leads to Growth of Terrorism in Russia," *MosNews.com*, February 17, 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/02/17/aslakhanov.shtml.

"Putin's Plan To Increase Central Power Wins Support," *The New York Times*, July 20, 2000.

"Q&A with the Russian Election Commission Chairman Alexander Veshnyakov," *IFIS*, December 1, 2006, http://www.ifes.org/features.html?title=Q%25A%20with%20the%20Russian%20Election%20Commission%20Chairman%20Alexander%20Veshnyakov.

Quinn, Jennifer, "Litvinenko Waiter Tells Poisonous Story," *The Moscow Times*, July 16, 2007.

Rabushka, Alvin, "The Flat Tax at Work in Russia: Year Five, 2005," *Hoover Institution*, May 11, 2006, http://www.hoover.org/research/russianecon/essays/5805616.html#.

"Radio Liberty Reporter Babitsky Detained in Moscow Airport," *The Moscow News*, September 2, 2004.

Rahr, Alexander, "Shakhray appointed Yeltsin's deputy," *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies*, December 14, 1991, http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?2285.

"RAO UES of Russia," http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/.

"Redgrave hit by Russian rent-a-mob," *Security and Intelligence Digest*, Part Six, from Glenmore Trenear-Harvey, January 4, 2005.

"Regions and Territories: Chechnya," *BBC News*, June 4, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm.

"Report: Putin Plans Greater Control," *The New York Times*, May 5, 2000.

"Return of the Czar: Examining the Failures of U.S. Policy & Boris Yeltsin's Leadership During Russia's Tumultuous 1990s Post-Soviet Transformation," *Frontline*, *PBS*, May 9, 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/yeltsin/.

"Rights Activist Killed," *The Moscow Times*, January 26, 2004.

"Rise of the Phoenix," http://www.mythicalrealm.com/creatures/phoenix.html.

Risen, James and Douglas Jiehl, "Expert Said to Tell Legislators He Was Pressed to Distort Some Evidence," *The New York Times*, June 24, 2003.

"Romania: Lustration Law Back Into Debate," *Seeurope.net*, Bulgaria Economic Forum, August 29, 2007, http://www.seeurope.net/?q=node/11784

"Romanian Daily Publishes List of Securitate Agents Working in Intelligence," Document Number: FBIS-EEU-2002-0405, March 28, 2002, *Bucharest Ziua*, "Armageddon 7" report: "Armageddon of Securitate People," *http://www.fas.org/irp/world/romania/list.htm*.

"Romanian Government Extends Foreign Intelligence Service Powers," FBIS-EEU-2001-1203, Report by Nicoleta Savin and Ondine Ghergut: "SIE Limited" Holiday Gifts From the Government to Spies, *Evenimentul Zilei*, December 3, 2002, *http://fas.org/irp/world/romania/emerg.htm*.

"Romanian Government to Revamp Intelligence Services Structures," FBIS-EEU-2001-1116, Report by Radu Tudor: "The Country's Supreme Defense Council Has Given the Green Light for a Historic Initiative – Nastase To Control the Intelligence Services," *Bucharest Ziua*, November 16, 2001, *http://fas.org/irp/world/romania/revamp.htm.*

Rosenberg, Steve, "Stalin's spy stamps stir fears," *BBC News*, April 30, 2002.

Roudneva, Yelena and Boris Sapozhnikov, "Duma mocks hapless prosecutor general," *Gazeta.ru*, April 27, 2003.

"Ruling Majority Rejects Draft Law on Lustration," *Caucaz.com*, February 18, 2007, http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/depeches.php?idp=1530&PHPSESSID=f77ca8ff00c0130f0da58af384d7ff8b.

"Russia After the Elections," A Luncheon with Cliff Kupchan, Chris Marsh, James Warhola, and Grigorii Klujtcharer, Program Brief, *The Nixon Center*, Vol. 10, No. 11, Washington, DC, March 24, 2004.

"Russia: Annual Report 2003," *Reporters Without Borders*, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=6529.

"Russia Begins Dismantling Base in Vietnam," *RFE/RL Newsline*, March 13, 2002.

"Russia: Commissions, Committees, and Agencies," *Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 27, 2004, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/execcomm.htm.

"Russia Condemned for Chechnya Killings," *hrw.org*, October 12, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/13/russia14384.htm.

"Russia Could Reopen Enquiry Into Borodin Case," *Russia Today*, February 12, 2001.

"Russia: Could Yakunin Be 'First-Called' As Putin's Successor?" *RFE/RL Newsline*, June 21, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=06&y=2006&id=1B21919A-FAF5-4D77-9B84-4A195BBFF915.

"Russia Country Report: 2006 Edition," *Freedom House*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=406&year=2006.

"Russia Court Overturns Treason Case," *The New York Times*, July 25, 2000.

"Russia cuts back intelligence gathering, Russia cuts back military installation abroad," *The Security and Intelligence Digests from Aleksey Shcherbakov*, October 18, 2001, *agentura.ru*.

"Russia Elections Blasted As Orchestrated," *The New York Times*, March 11, 2007.

"Russia: Footnote to Student's Trial," *The New York Times*, September 20, 2001.

"Russia: High-Profile Killings, Attempted Killings In The Post-Soviet Period," *RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly*, October 19, 2006, file:///F:/NEWS%20articles%202/DISS/Russia-%20High-Profile%20Killings,%20Attempted%20Killings%20In%20The%20Post-Soviet%20Period.htm.

"Russia Isn't Involved, Ambassador to the UK Said," *Kommersant*, July 19, 2007.

"Russia: 'Kommersant' Journalist Discusses Paper's New Owner," *RFE/RL*, September 14, 2006

"Russia Lacks Clear Definition of 'State Secrets,'" *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 21, December 11, 2000.

"Russia Less Corrupt Than Ukraine, More Corrupt Than Belarus," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 15, 2000.

"Russia: No Litvinenko extraditions," *CNN.com*, December 5, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/12/05/uk.spywrap/index.html.

"Russia Offers Vietnam Joint Exploitation of Kamrahn Base," *Gazeta.ru,* March 14, 2002.

"Russia Pays Bail for Borodin, Lawyer Says," *People's Daily*, April 13, 2001.

"Russia/Putin/Chechnya," *Globalsecurity.org*, December 19, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2002/russia-021219-2a5ef399.htm.

"Russia: Speakers at Moscow Rally Say Survivors of Soviet Terror Neglected," *Johnson's Russia List*, #16 - JRL 9283, October 30, 2005.

"Russia swaps its justice minister, prosecutor general," *Taipei Times*, June 24, 2006, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2006/06/24/2003315388.

"Russia 'thinning out' Chechens," *BBC News*, July 23, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2146702.stm.

"Russia to help U.K. in Poisoned Spy Case," *USA Today*, December 4, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-12-04-russian-spy_x.htm.

"Russia Trails Only Iraq in Journalist Murders," *Kommersant*, March 7, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p-10258/r_500/killed_journalists/.

"Russia Tries U.S. Student for Drugs, Amid Spy Hints," *Voronezh*, (Reuters), April 24, 2001.

"Russia: Why the chekist mind-set matters," *KavkazCenter.com*, October 15, 2007, http://www.kavkaz.org.uk/eng/content/2007/10/15/8973.shtml.

"Russian 2006 arms exports reach a record $6.5 bln," *BBJ.hu*, February 27, 2007, http://www.bbj.hu/news/news_23313.html.

"Russian billionaire numbers grow," *BBC News*, March 9, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6433939.stm.

"Russian colonel jailed for spying," *BBC News*, June 11, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2981176.stm.

"Russian CounterTerrorism: Shifting Responsibility," *Gazeta.ru*, October 12, 2004, and cited at *Security and Intelligence Digest*, Part Three, from Glenmore Trenear-Harvey, January 6, 2005.

"Russian Defense Minister Promotes Military Space Center in Plesetsk...And Says He Has No Regrets About Lourdes," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 8, March 1, 2002.

"Russian Duma backs Putin reforms," *BBC News*, October 29, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3965845.stm.

"Russian Duma Deputy Ostanin on Political Murders, Corruption," *Trud*, April 26, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7164.htm.

"Russian Flight Safety Said to Nosedive," *The New York Times*, July 29, 2007.

"Russian High Court Clears Researcher," *The New York Times*, April 17, 2000.

"Russian Intelligence in Britain Works on Cold War Level — Officials," *MosNews.com*, March 15, 2007.

"Russian Officials Lash Out at a Human Rights Report," *Kommersant*, and reposted at *Freedom House*, February 2, 2007, http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/freedom020207.htm.

"Russian oil tycoon back in court," *BBC News*, July 12, 2004.

"Russian Organized Crime," http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/rusorg3.htm.

"Russian Parliament Approves Limits for Political Parties at First Reading," *MosNews.com*, November 10, 2004.

"Russian Parliament Gives Final Approval to Putin's Bill on Governors," *MosNews.com*, December 3, 2004.

"Russian secret police want to monitor Internet," *NandoTimes.com*, July 22, 1998.

"Russian security services observe professional holiday," December 20, 2000, *strana.ru*.

"Russian Sources Say Department V Spetsnaz Unit May Have Carried Out Litvinenko Poisoning," *Weekly Intelligence Notes*, #50-06, AFIO, McLean, VA, December 18, 2006.

"Russian Special Services to make film on Pope case," December 7, 2000, *www.strana.ru*.

"Russian SVR Boss Lebedev Quizzed on Service Intelligence Work," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta.com,* December 20, 2002, pp, 6, 7, 20, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/svr/rg122002.html.

"Russian Troop Withdrawal From Chechnya On Hold?" *RFE/RL Newsline*, January 26, 2001.

"Russian Whistle Blower Acquitted," *The New York Times*, September 13, 2000.

"Russians Continue to Protest Social Reforms," *RFE/RL*, January 16, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/01/35748f47-5554-4c5a-8abe-fac8aa8e4883.html.

"Russians view security services positively but demand tighter control," December 20, 2000, *strana.ru*.

"Russia's FSB Demands Control Over Internet," *MosNews.com*, April 24, 2005.

"Russia's FSB Detained 18 Foreign Spies in 2004 — Director," *MosNews.com*, December 16, 2004, http://MosNews.com.com/news/2004/12/16/spiesrus.shtml.

"Russia's Federal Security Service Head: Insurgents' Activities spread to Ingushetia and North Ossetia," *Regnum News Agency*, August 25, 2006, http://www.regnum.ru/english/694579.html?forprint.

"Russia's Putin Announces Gov't Shakeup," *The New York Times*, March 11, 2003.

"Russia's Putin Moves to Assert Authority," *The New York Times*, May 18, 2000.

"Russia's sing-song spies," *BBC News*, December 20, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1079982.stm.

"Russia's Spies Not To Have Dual Citizenship," *Kommersant*, January 24, 2007.

"Russia's stalemate in Chechyna," *BBC News*, July 31, 2001.

"Russia's Strategic Retrenchment Continues," *Monitor*, Vol. 8, Issue 90, The Jamestown Foundation, May 8, 2002, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=25&&issue_id=2255.

Rustow, Dankwart A., "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1970.

Ryklin, Alexander, "Brava na nervakh," *Itog*i, December 8, 1998.

_____, "The Kremlin has failed to cleanse Russian politics of big business," *Yezhenedelny Zhurnal,* No. 2, January 2003, and re-published in *Johnson's Russia List*, #7030, January 23, 2003.

Sanger, David E. and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Has A Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report," *The New York Times*, October 11, 2002.

_____ and James Dao, "U.S. Intelligence Completing Plan to Promote a Democratic Iraq," *The New York Times*, January 6, 2003.

Saradzhyan, Simon, "FSB Units to Keep Eye on Army," *The Moscow Times*, February 19, 2000.

_____, "Ivanov Stars in a Secret Memo," *The Moscow Times*, December 25, 2002.

_____, "Putin Lashes Out at the U.S., *The Moscow Times*, September 8, 2004.

_____, "Reporter Planned Story on Arms Deal," *The Moscow Times*, March 7, 2007.

_____, and Nabi Abdullaev, "Tri Kita Owner Zuyev Arrested," *The Moscow Times*, June 15, 2006.

Schreck, Carl, "Contract Murders Are on the Rise," *The Moscow Times*, August 4, 2004.

_____, "'Iron Felix' Back at Petrovka 38," *The Moscow Times*, November 9, 2005.

_____, and Antonio Lupher, "Jury Acquits Yaponchik of Murder," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, July 19, 2005, p. 1, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/07/19/001-print.html.

"Scientist Sutyagin Gets 15 Years for Espionage," April 7, 2004, *Gazeta.ru*, http://www.gazeta.ru/2004/04/07/oa_117138.shtml.

"Scientist's Sentence for Espionage Condemned by Liberals," *MosNews.com*, April 9, 2004, http://MosNews.com.com/news/2004/04/09/scientist.shtml.

"Screening uncovers two Czech ministry officials as former communist secret police aides," *Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review*, Axis Information and Analysis, September 12, 2007, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1386.

"Secret Services - Supreme Court Reinstates Military-Secrets Order.....As Authorities Continue To Hold Scientist Accused of Espionage...And FSB Counterintelligence Warns About Foreign-Intelligence Activity," *RFE/RL Security & Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 17, May 15, 2002.

"Section 10: Intelligence Services regarding Operation of Intelligence Services of foreign powers in Czech Republic, Intelligence Services of the Russian Federation" excerpt from the Annual Report 2001 of the Czech Security Information Service, *www.bis.cz*.

"Security Community Celebrates Chekist Jubilee," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 23, December 25, 2000.

"Security Council of the Russian Federation (Состав Совета Безопасности Российской Федерации)," http://www.scrf.gov.ru/personnels/biography/Bordjuzha.shtml.

"Security Services Said To Front For Organized Crime," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 16, November 6, 2000.

Shalin, Dmitri, "Vladimir Putin: Firm grip on power not near an end," *Las Vegas Review-Journal*, October 24, 2007, http://www.lvrj.com/opinion/10761276.html#.

Shcherbakov, Aleksey, "Major Loss of Intelligence Gathering Capability," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/fapsi/shcherbakov.htm.

Shelin, Sergei, "Vladimir Yakovlev: St. Petersburg Mysteries and the Governor's Revelations," *New Times*, March 2004, http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=217.

Shelley, Louise**,** "Transnational crime: The case of Russian organized crime and the role of international cooperation in law enforcement," *Demokratizatsiya: The Post-Soviet Journal of Democratization*, Vol. 10, No. 1 Heldref Publications: Washington, DC, Winter 2002, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol10.html.

Shevtsova, Lilia, "The Political Dimension of Economic Reform under Vladimir Putin: Obstacles, Pitfalls, and Opportunities," *NBR Analysis*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 2002, http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol13no2.pdf.

Shishkunova, Yelena, "Putin puts his faith in security service," *Gazeta.ru*, January 16, 2004.

Shlapentokh, Vladimir, "Serdiukov as a Unique Defense Minister in Russian" *Russia Profile*, April 1, 2007.

Simpson, Cam, "FBI director challenges push for new intelligence agency," *Chicago Tribune*, December 19, 2002.

"Six Acquitted in Russian Murder Case," *The New York Times*, June 26, 2002.

"Skuratov scandal escalates," *NUPI Centre for Russian Studies*, March 22, 1999, http://www.nupi.no/cgi-2-win/Russland/krono.exe?4065.

Slavina, Yelena, "How to Reduce Noise and Break a Cipher," *Moscow News*, No. 37, October 4, 2005, http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2005-14-26.

"Смена директора Службы внешней разведки," *agentura.ru*, http://www.agentura.ru/timeline/2000/lebedev/.

Smirnov, Andrei, "Dagestan's Insurgents Regroup As New 'Sharia Jamaat' Organization," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 2, Issue 13, The Jamestown Foundation, January 19, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=3202&article_id=2369112.

Smith, Craig S., "Eastern Europe Still Struggles To Purge Its Security Services," *The New York Times*, December 12, 2006.

"Socotra Island," *The Security and Intelligence Digests from Aleksey Shcherbakov*, November 16, 2001, *agentura.ru*.

Sokolov, Vsevolod, "From Guns to Briefcases: The Evolution of Russian Organized Crime," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Spring 2004, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj04-1/sokolov.htm.

Soldatov, Andrei, "FSB Reform: Changes Are Few and Far Between," *agentura.ru,* special to the *Moscow News*, October 6, 2004, http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/fsbreform/.

_____ and Irina Borogan, "FSB Does Not Descend to Terror," Special report for *Moskovskiye Novosti*, September 16, 2004, http://www.agentura.ru/english/press/about/jointprojects/mn/terror/.

_____ and Irina Borogan, "Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year after Beslan," Report of *Agentura.ru* Studies and Research Centre, *ASRC*, http://studies.agentura.ru, September 2005.

Solomatin, Boris, "What Makes Pope Better Than Ames?" *The Moscow News*, No. 40, October 11-17, 2000.

"Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LII, No. 1, March 1959.

"Something Personal in FSB Convictions," *MosNews.com*, August 12, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/interview/2004/12/08/danilov.shtml.

Sossinsky, Sergei, "Secret Police Opening Up?" *The Moscow News*, January 13, 2002.

"Soviet/Russian Intelligence Agencies," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/index.html.

"Spy Files Shed Light on Past," *The Prague Post*, October 12, 2005, http://www.uzsi.cz/index.php@lang=2&show=001002006029.html.

"Spying at Cold War Levels, U.S. Says," *The Moscow Times*, March 30, 2007, p. 1.
Starobin, Paul, "Mother Russia at War with Herself," *BusinessWeek Online*, February 3, 2003.

_____, "Reality TV in a Russian Boardroom: Was the American chief of station NTV doomed to expulsion?" *BusinessWeek Online*, February 3, 2003.

Startseva, Alla, "FSB: 5 Foreign Spies Caught This Year," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 22, 2003.

_____, "RZD Plans to Sell Bonds and Shares," *The Moscow Times*, January 26, 2004.

"State Duma (Lower House)," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/legislat.htm#E11E9.

"State Employees' Wages Rise Fast," *Kommersant*, September 17, 2007, http://kommersant.com/p805133/r_500/income/.

"State Technical Commission [GosTekhKomissiya] Gosudarstvennii Tekhnologiam Komissiya," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/gtk/index.html.

"Stepashin: A reluctant prime minister," *BBC News*, August 9, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/341867.stm.

Stolyarova, Galina, "Verdict In Starovoitova Case Given," *The St. Petersburg Times*, Issue #1207(73), September 26, 2006.

"Street Named Putin," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, October 10, 2002.

"Stroev Puts Capital Flight at $25 billion in 2000," *RFE/RL Newsline*, January 12, 2001.

"Sudden rise of the Unity party," *BBC News*, December 20, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/572646.stm.

"Summary: World Bank issues report on Russian economy," *Newsletter on health issues in Russia and Belarus*, The East Europe Committee of the Swedish Health Care Community (SEEC), http://www.oek.se/Admin/FileSender.aspx?file=Documents/Dokument/newsletter051111.pdf.

"Supreme Court Upholds Sentence Against Former FSB Officer," *MosNews.com*, September 13, 2004, http://MosNews.com.com/news/2004/09/13/security.shtml.

"Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup, The Suppressed Transcripts: Part 3, Hearings 'About the Illegal Financial Activity of the CPSU'," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1996.

Surzhansky, Andrei, "US, UK, Russian secret services prevent missile smuggling," *ITAR-TASS*, August 13, 2003.

"Suspect in Litvinenko murder wins parliamentary immunity," *RIA Novosti*, December 3, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071203/90739394.html.

"Suspects Arrested For 2002 Killing of Russian Governor," *RFE/RL*, July 12, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=07&y=2006&id=E70FAD29-D2C0-439C-BD01-4EBC045E9CCB.

"Sutyagin Rebuffed," *The Moscow Times*, October 7, 2002.

"SVR Organization," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://fas.org/irp/world/russia/svr/org.htm.

"SVR Organization," *GlobalSecurity.org*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/svr-org.htm.

"SVR - Russian Intelligence Service," *agentura.ru,* 2000-2001.

Sweetman, Mark, "Corrupt Police Come Under Scrutiny," *The Moscow Times*, March 1, 2007, p. 3.

"Syrian Deal Highlights Russian Arms Sale Surge," *The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs*, July 29, 1999, http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/167/documentid/596/history/3,2360,656,167,596.

Szabo, Karoly F., "The Role of Security Services in a Democratic Society: The Parliamentary Perspective," *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995.

Tagliabue, John, "Extradited Russian Suddenly Free After 3-Year Inquiry," *The New York Times*, April 13, 2001.

Tariz Panja, "British Police Probe Ex-Spy's Poisoning," *Washington Post*, November 19, 2006.

Tavernise, Sabrina, "Police for Hire in Russia's Business Jungle," *The New York Times*, July 28, 2002.

"Telecommunications Put Under Chekist," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 17, November 13, 2000.

"Text of Vladimir Putin's Inauguration Speech," *The New York Times*, May 7, 2000.

"The Chronology of Three Whales," *Novaya Gazeta*, No. 45, June 19, 2006.

"The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security," http://www.esteri.it/archivi/documenti/do031294a.htm.

"The Kremlin's Top Secret Budget for Information War," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 8, September 11, 2000, p. 1.

"The Last Word: Viktor Cherkashin: Making Sense Of Spying," *Newsweek*, January 10, 2005.

"The making of a neo-KGB State," *Economist.com*, August 23, 2007.

The NIS Observed: An Analytic Review, Vol. IX, No. 2, February 6, 2004, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol9/ed0902.html.

"The Oligarchic Way Is Not the Best for Russia: President Putin gives an interview to Wall Street Journal," *TheRussianIssues.com*, February 12, 2002, www.therussianissues.com/headlines/2002/02/12/1013507407.html.

"The Power Of The Chekists Is Incredibly Stable," *RussiaProfile.org*, http://www.russiaprofile.org/cdi/article.wbp?article-id=0D1CFF5B-DCFA-4F87-A303-7676169F8385.

"The Railwayman," *Kommersant*, June 16, 2005, http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=585323.

The Resurgence of Lies and Disinformation," *The Moscow Times*, October 17, 2002.

"The Security Council," http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/articles/institut04.shtml.

"The Trepashkin Case," Foundation for Civil Liberties, http://eng.trepashkin.ru.

The Ukrainian Weekly, No. 38, Vol. LXVIII, September 17, 2000.

"The Use and Misuse of Administrative Resources in Russia," *Open Society Justice Initiative*, http://www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ac/cfm/russia.

"The West Doesn't Change Its Brains," *Kommersant*, July 27, 2007.

"TNK-BP Engineer Ziganshin Shot Dead," *The St. Petersburg Times*, Issue #1209, October 3, 2006.

"Top Central Bank Official Killed in Moscow," *Mosnews.com*, September 14, 2006, http://mosnews.com/news/2006/09/14/bankerattacked.shtml

"Tough Bill On Parties Set To Pass," *St. Petersburg Times*, #643, February 9, 2001.

Tracy, Jen, "FSB Now Wired to Read Your E-Mail," *The Moscow Times*, December 7, 1999.
Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi.

Transparency International's *Global Corruption Report*, Country Reports, Russia, http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org.

Transparency International's reports at http://www.transparency.org/surveys/barometer/dnld/barometer_report_8_12_2004.pdf.

Travica, Bob and Blaise Cronin, "The Business Web in Russia: Usability for the Western User," Paper presented at ASIS'96 Annual Conference, February 1996, http://www.asis.org/annual-96/ElectronicProceedings/travica.html.

Treadaway, Chris, "Russia2000: The Spy Prime Minister," *Stratfor*, January 2000, http://www.amina.com/article/putino.html.

"Trial for Accused Spy Postponed Again," *RFE/RL Newsline*, July 11, 2002.

Trifonov, Yevgeny, "The Kolyma Tragedy," *New Times*, September 2006, http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=625.

Tully, Andrew, "Russia: Washington Reacts To Putin's Munich Speech," *RFE/RL*, February 13, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/5c61fc99-83fe-49c9-8bd7-49c5bee24f80.html.

Twining, Daniel, "Putin's Power Politics: Rebuilding Russian clout, one natural-gas pipeline at a time," *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 11, Issue 17, January 16, 2006.

Tyler, Patrick E., "American in Moscow Spy Trial Claims Victory on Key Evidence," *The New York Times*, November 28, 2000.

_____, "Kurdish Leader Warns U.S. That Iraq Violence Risks Gains," *The New York Times*, May 12, 2003.

Ungar, Sanford, "Individuals and the Security Services," *Conference Report of International Conference on Security Services in Civil Society: Oversight and Accountability*, Warsaw, Poland, June 30 - July 2, 1995, http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/warsaw/indiv.html.

"United Russia (Единая Россия)," http://www.edinros.ru/.

"United Russia," *MosNews.com*, http://www.mosnews.com/mn-files/unitedrussia.shtml.

"United Russia Backs Sovereign Democracy," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, Issue 3510, October 3, 2006, p. 3.

UNLV Center for Democratic Culture, http://www.unlv.edu/centers/cdclv/index.html.

"U.S. 'Troubled' by Venezuela Deals," *The Moscow Times*, February 14, 2005.

Uzelac, Ana, "Governors Playing by New Rules," *The Moscow Times*, December 2, 2000.

Uzzel, Lawrence, "Candidates Seek to Focus Spotlight on Controversies," *Chechnya Weekly*, Vol. 5, Issue 3, The Jamestown Foundation, January 21, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/print_friendly.php?volume_id=396&issue_id=2902&article_id=23486.

"Valentina, Matviyenko: Governor of St. Petersburg, elected on October 5, 2003," *Rusnet*, October 6, 2003, www.rusnet.nl.

"Vatutinki," *FAS Intelligence Resource Program*, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/facilities/vatutinki.htm.

"Venezuela to Purchase 100,000 Kalashnikovs From Russia," *MosNews.com*, May 18, 2005, http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/05/18/venezuelarifles.shtml.

"Verdict Expected in Starovoitova Case," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, Issue 3507, September 28, 2006, http://www.themloscowtimes.com/stories/2006/09/27/014.html.

Vivas, Robert David Steele, "OSS CEO Reviews Lessons Learned From Open Source Intelligence, Global War on Terrorism, and National Security Transformation - America at Risk," *OSS.net, Inc.*, July 30, 2004, OSS.NET.

"Vladislav Surkov's Secret Speech: How Russia Should Fight International Conspiracies," *Mosnews.com*, July 122, 2005.

"Vneshekonombank Given A Fright," *Kommersant*, April 11, 2005.

Volkov, Vladimir, "Russian President Putin moves toward authoritarian rule," *World Socialist Web Site*, International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), June 3, 2000, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/jun2000/put-j03.shtml.

Voronov, Vladimir, "The Reincarnation of the KGB," *New Times*, March 2004, http;//www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=763.

"Vote in Parliament Adds to Putin Power," *The New York Times*, July 1, 2000.

Waller, J. Michael, "Echoes of Russia in USAID Privatization Aid For Kazakhstan; House Majority Whip Junkets with Chernomyrdin Influence Peddlers," *Russia Reform Monitor*, No. 302, American Foreign Policy Council: Washington, DC, August 25, 1997, http://www.afpc.org/rrm/rrm302.htm.

_____, "KGB: The Perils of Arbitrary Power," *Perspective*, Vol. II, No. 1, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy, September 1991.

_____, "Russia: Death and Resurrection of the KGB," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 2004, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol12.html.

_____, "Russia's Security Services: A Checklist for Reform," *Perspective*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, September-October 1997, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol8/Waller.html.

_____, "The KGB and Its 'Successors,'" *Perspective*, Vol. IV, No. 4, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, April-May 1994.

_____, "Who is Making Foreign Policy?" *Perspective*, Vol. V, No. 3, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, January-February 1995, http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol5/Waller.html.

Walsh, Nick Paton, "Former Russian officer accused of being MI-5 spy," *The Guardian*, January 16, 2004.

"War Between the State and Oligarchs Is Destructive for Russia: Interview with Grigory Yavlinsky," *La Stampa*, July 22, 2003, http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/7/stampa_220703.html.

"War on Terror" Series, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 10, 2004, http://www.csis.org/ruseura/wot/040510.pdf.

Watts, Larry L., "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 111, Geneva, Switzerland, February 2003.

"Week's War Activities Recounted," *CNN.com*, March 10, 2007.

Weiler, Jonathan, "Human rights in post-Soviet Russia," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 2002, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol10.html.

Weir, Fred, "Chechen Women Join Terror's Ranks," *Peace Women*, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, June 12, 2003, http://www.peacewomen.org/news/Chechnya/newsarchive03/ranks.html.

_____, "KGB influence still felt in Russia," *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 30, 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1230/p06s01-woeu.html.

_____, "Putin pledges reforms," *CNEWS*, http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2004/03/15/382486-ap.html.

_____, "Spies keep busy as ever, quietly," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 2, 2003.

Weitz, Richard, "Citing Cyber-Terrorism Threat, Russia Explores Internet Threat," *World Politics Watch Exclusive*, December 14, 2006, http://www.worldpoliticswatch.com/article.aspx?id=416.

"What is GRU?" *Venik's Aviation*, March 21, 2003, www.aeronautics.ru.

Whitmore, Brian, "Russia: Uncertainty Over Putin's Succession Fuels 'Siloviki War'," *RFE/RL*, November 9, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/11/b087e127-13c7-41fb-ac48-e1a89cd11b23.html.

"Who We Are," Security Information Service: Counter-intelligence service of the Czech Republic, http://www.bis.cz/who-we-are.html.

Winer, Jonathan M., "International Crime in the New Geopolitics: A Core Threat to Democracy," *Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village*, William F. McDonald, ed., Anderson Publishing Co. and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences: OH and KY, 1997.

Wines, Michael, "Accusations That Moscow Spies on Party Gain???" *The New York Times*, June 21, 2000.

_____, "Putin Decrees New Controls and Envoys for Provinces," *The New York Times*, May 14, 2000.

_____, "Putin Grows in Job, Raising the Question: For Good or Ill?" *The New York Time*, November 6, 2001.

_____, "Putin Scaling Down Chechen War Despite New Fighting," *The New York Times*, January 23, 2001.

_____, "Putin's Move on Governors Would Bolster His Role," *The New York Times*, May 22, 2000.

_____, "Russia Drops Criminal Inquiry Into Troublesome Press Tycoon," *The New York Times*, July 28, 2000.

_____, "Russia Loses Its Treason Case Over Nuclear Whistle Blower," *The New York Times*, September 14, 2000.

_____, "Russia's Powerful Regional Chiefs Yield Meekly to Putin," *The New York Times*, July 27, 2000.

Winston, David, "From Yeltsin to Putin," Policy Review, April/May 2000, *Hoover Institution*, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3492176.html.

Wolf, Martin, "Martin Wolf: Democracy and the future," *Financial Times*, January 24, 2006.

"Women, Intellectuals Lose Under Putin....As Power 'Horizontal' Formed at Lower Levels of Federal Ministries," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 19, 2003.

Working, Russell, "Can We Root Out the Mob?" *The Moscow News*, February 12, 2001.

"Wrap: Putin promotes Ivanov, reshuffles govt., changes Chechnya pres.," *RIA Novosti*, February 16, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070216/60837987.html.

"Writers Oppose Dzerzhinskii Restoration....As Deputy Proposes a Monument to Andropov," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 18, 2002, *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 16 and 17, 2002.

Yablokova, Oksana, "Adamov Arrested at U.S. Request," *The Moscow Times*, May 5, 2005.

_____, "Report: Cherkesov to Move to Moscow," *The Moscow Times*, March 11, 2003.

_____, "Skuratov: Entire 'Family' Is Guilty," *The St. Petersburg Times*, February 4, 2000, http://www.sptimes.ru/archive/times/539/news/n_skuratov.htm.

_____, and Francesca Mereu, "Social Spending Takes a Back Seat," *The Moscow Times*, June 21, 2004.

Yardley, Jim, "Complaints and Concern Rise Over Poor Policing in China," *The New York Times*, December 8, 2003.

Yasmann, Victor, "Analysis: Russia's Pipelines Of Power," *RFE/RL Feature Article*, August 8, 2004, www.rferl.org.

_____, "Analysis: 'The Burden Of Maintaining the State Has Fallen On Our Shoulders,'" *RFE/RL*, February 9, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/02/2764bce7-6621-4b38-ad5a-ae277a6612ed.html.

_____, "FSB Legalized Monitoring of Internet," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 6, August 28, 2000.

_____, "Profile: Sergei Kiriyenko - - Russia's 'Kinder Surprise,'" *RFE/RL* February 16, 2006.

_____, "Russia: Corruption Scandal Could Shake Kremlin," *RFE/RL*, September 26, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/09/33cc2719-2ad5-4a45-a326-72828b9baf64.html. \.

_____, 'Russia: Nostalgia For USSR Increases," *RFE/RL*, December 23, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/12/133fdd19-7078-4be8-92c2-85c566275229.html.

_____, "Russia: Prosecutor's Removal A Clue To Putin's Exit Strategy?" *RFE/RL*, June 6, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/891c0779-93da-4dc8-8402-60acbf6d19c3.html.

_____, "Russia: The KGB's Post-Soviet 'Commercialization'," *RFE/RL*, December 20, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/12/888236cc-139d-4212-a28d-88451fdaccab.html.

_____, "Spymania Returns To Russia," *RFE/RL Newsline*, April 13, 2004.

_____, "The Roots of Putin's Attack on Media Freedom," *RFE/RL Security Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 3, August 7, 2000.

Yavlinsky, Grigory, "Grigory Yavlinsky: 'It is impossible to create a real opposition in Russia today,'" *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, September 2, 2003, and posted at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/9/030902_most_koms.html.

Yavlinsky, Grigory, "Reforms that corrupted Russia," *Financial Times* (UK), September 3, 2003, and posted at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/9/030903_ft.html.

Yefimova, Natalia, "Foreigners Wonder Who Will Be Next," *The Moscow Times*, January 13, 2003.

_____, "Scientist Trapped in State Secrets Maze," *The Moscow Times*, November 9, 2001.

"Yegorova Rejects Criticism of Her Court," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, June 21, 2005.

"Yeltsin fired defense minister over stalled reforms," *CNN.com*, May 27, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9705/22/russia/.

"Yeltsin Misread the Elections," Interview with Galina Starovoitova, *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 2, No., 2, Winter, 1994, http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/Vol2.html.

"Yet Another Chekist General Joins Ranks of Interior Ministry," *RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch*, Vol. 3, No. 25, July 11, 2002.

"Yukos Lawyers Say Prosecution is Weak and Illegal," *Moscow News*, August 26, 2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/08/26/yukos.shtml.

"Yushenkov Trial Will Be by Jury," *TheMoscowTimes.com*, December 29, 2003.

Zakaev, Ahmed, "Our dead and injured children," *The Guardian*, September 7, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1298703,00.html.

Zaks, Dmitry, "Putin Promises Strong State, Liberal Economics In National Address," *IslamOnline*, http://www.islam-online.net/iol-english/dowalia/news-2000-July-09/topnews8.asp;

Zhegulev, Ilya, "Gryzlov paves way for Matvieynko landslide," *Gazeta.ru*, August 6, 2003, and posted at http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/PAPERS/8/gzt6_060803.html.

_____, "United Russia leader wants curbs on human rights," *Gazeta.ru*, September 24, 2003.

Zolotov, Andrei, "Army Men Go On Trial For Murder," *The Moscow Times*, November 10, 2000.

_____, "Contract Murder Linked to Police," *The Moscow Times*, January 13, 2003.

_____, "President Reshuffles the Security Agencies," *The Moscow Times*, March 12, 2003.

_____, "Religious Freedom Called 'Fragile,'" *The Moscow Times*, January 27, 2003.

Zybertowicz, Andrzej, "Transformation of the Polish Secret Services: From Authoritarian To Informal Power Networks," paper presented at the Workshop on "Democratic and Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence/Security Services," held in Geneva, Switzerland on October 3-5, 2002, organized by the Working Group on the Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces (PCAF) and the Working Group On Democratic Control Of Internal Security Services (DCOIS) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.