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1977

THE IMAGE OF THE PRESIDENT: COMPONENTS
OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ROLE

by

JUDITH A. WATERS

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfill-
ment of the requirements for the degree
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1977

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Abstract

The image of the President
components of the political leadership role.

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Public opinion surveys using Osgood's Semantic Differential technique were conducted before and after the 1972 Presidential election in the New York area to assess voter attitudes towards four concepts. The concepts were "Myself," "Ideal President," "McGovern," and "Nixon." Voter groups were categorized according to party affiliation and candidate preference. The five main categories were Democrats supporting McGovern, Republicans supporting Nixon, two cross-over groups and an undecided group. An important finding is that it was easier to distinguish between the people supporting the candidates than between the party members.

The main hypothesis was that the profile of the preferred candidate would be more congruent with an abstract image of the "Ideal president" generated by each voter group than with the group's composite self image. It was also predicted that the groups would differ on a crucial scale which is really more descriptive than evaluative, "Idealistic-realistic."

Comparisons of the concept profile by D score analysis and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients indicated that there was a closer relationship between self image and candidate profile for the traditional party group than between "Ideal President" and candidate profile. The reverse was true using the correlational analysis only for the cross-over groups. Ample evidence was also provided in support of the hypothesis that the alternative candidate would be denigrated. The trend toward negative voting was demonstrated by the fact that even some of the preferred candidates in recent elections were rated lower on certain scales than the opposition candidates in the 1952 election.

Since a search of the recent literature has indicated that Osgood's three factor structure may not appear when data from different concept domains are factor analyzed, it was expected that the Evaluation factor would split for the self concept and the EPA structure would collapse into one or two factors for the political concepts. Since this hypothesis was supported, the comparison of the concepts from different domains through the use of factor scores alone does not seem justified.

Due to the gravity of the events surrounding the Watergate scandal, the surveys were continued until the week prior to Nixon's resignation. It is interesting to note that those voters who would acknowledge that they had voted for Nixon continued to hold opinions similar to those of his supporters in early samplings.

Acknowledgments

When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things.

For now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part; but then shall I know even also I am known.

The First Epistle to the
Corinthians.

Render to all their due; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor.

The Epistle of Paul to the
Romans.

To those who have been an essential part of the socialization process.

Ronald	Katherine	Sigrid
Barbara	Sandra	Elizabeth
Robert	Mitchell	Harold
Michael	Florence	Stanley
Bernard	James	Toni

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Elections, especially on the national level, are complexly determined events influenced by a multiplicity of variables that fluctuate in saliency from situation to situation. Voting patterns, for example, may be influenced by the age, sex, religious affiliation, party identification, socio-economic status, educational level, rural versus urban residency, and local and national issue orientations of the public as well as the personal characteristics of each candidate (Larzarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948). While, on occasion, the whole process may be simplified due to the centrality of one particular issue on which the contenders for office hold distinct and disparate positions, the more common situation involves a multitude of focal and conflicting factors.

Professional politicians and political scientists have questioned the ability of social or personality psychology to provide meaningful input into the study of such unique events as Presidential elections (Greenstein, 1969). Some campaign managers, while occasionally acknowledging that polls and attitude surveys have their uses, prefer to emphasize the less scientific and more artistic aspects of their trade.

Political scientists are also critical of the general state of theory development in psychology. There are a

vast number of formulations that provide conflicting explanations of man's mental dispositions and behavior and the methodologies appropriate for observation and measurement. Thus, professional political analysts feel that the sophisticated explanations necessary for successful prediction of election outcomes are not possible in the terms of the present state of theory constructions (Littman, 1961).

Another criticism directed toward psychology concerns its focus when studying political activity. Most researchers, it is felt, direct their energies toward the search for universal principles which are the basis for similar types of social activity while ignoring those aspects of the situation which are specific to any one event. The political decision making process, for example does not occur in a vacuum, but in relatively unique locations such as caucus rooms and covention halls. Furthermore, the predictions of the results of gubernatorial, senatorial, district or Presidential campaigns depend on a number of variables such as district gerrymandering, the electoral college distribution, or voter registration which are generally of less interest to the behavioral researcher than voter perceptions of prominent issues or antecedents of party affiliations. Therefore, in the past at least, there was some truth to the contention that the goals of the political practitioner

and the social psychologist have differed fundamentally. Reliance on the then current state of theory development in political psychology would not have been particularly fruitful for predicting specific political events.

While partisan identification and other demographic characteristics have been found to contribute to a major portion of the variance in voting behavior, the influence of mass media appeals cannot be ignored. The volume of material from newspapers, magazines, radio and television broadcasts as well as private mailings can easily be compared to a stimulus overload situation in which the flow of inputs must be reduced to a level that can be efficiently processed by the individual (Milgram, 1973). In 1922, Walter Lippman pointed out that people who function in complex environments attempt to reconstruct the world on a simpler model than is provided by external reality. According to Lazarsfeld and Merton (1960), the vast number of messages from the mass media tends to produce a somewhat "narcotizing effect" on the average person so that he no longer attends to most of them. Thus, the stimulus overload concept or the narcotizing effect may be used to explain the reliance on party identification or perception of the personal image of the candidate as a primary basis for voting. If one votes the straight party ticket, there are

fewer conflicts to resolve. If one chooses a candidate according to some overall evaluation of his personality as opposed to those of the other nominees, careful consideration of the issues may be dismissed. Thus, as Wills (1976) writes, "the real test of a candidate is not his views, but his personal goodness" (p. 9).

The emphasis on only one or two aspects of the decision making process may be justified by resorting to the stimulus overload concept or the narcotizing effect plus the added influences of a sort of "depression effect." Let us suppose that a person has been subjected to ten messages from a variety of sources about a particular object, X. He can easily receive, decode and store all the information. Then the number of inputs is increased to fifty or one hundred, each of which is perceived as relatively important to the hypothetical person's individual welfare. No longer able to cope with the level of bombardment, he does not simply attempt to reduce the input to its original or manageable number, but further limits reception until one or two of the most salient factors (probably those needing the least amount of energy expenditure) are considered.

In recent elections there has been an increasing tendency toward not voting at all or toward negative voting, that is picking the least objectionable candidate. Accord-

ing to Ralph K. White (1970), the opposition candidate is portrayed as an outgroup member and is projected to have a "diabolical enemy image."

The perception of the traits possessed by a candidate is derived from an analysis by the potential voter of the past actions of the candidate filtered through the observer's own belief system and influenced by the attitudes of others in his environment toward those actions. Thus, objective appraisal functions in the following manner. The political figure is said to possess Characteristic X since he is known to have committed Act Y (and other similar acts) which have been interpreted as acts that could only have been committed by a person with Characteristic X (or a cluster of determining traits). The possession of a particular list of traits is important since we use these qualities, which we theorize are inherent in the individual in question, because they enable us to predict how he will act in situations of the same or a similar nature in the future. Traits allow us to write hypothetical scenarios for role enactment. Sometimes the candidate will provide his own script by informing us of how he stands on a particular issue and what proposals he has for programs to support his viewpoint. At other times, he is less clear about the course of action he will take once in office.

It is one thing to state that abortion, for example, is an unfortunate problem and that it should not occur and quite another to propose anti-abortion legislation.

Even if a candidate has had experience on the national level of government functioning, it is difficult to predict from past performance exactly how he will function in office. A man who has been President doesn't always know himself how he will meet each new crisis. It can only be supposed that if he was calm and has displayed what turned out, after the fact, to be the appropriate judgment in one situation he will make correct choices in the future. What is "correct," of course, depends on the perspective of the observer. It was assumed by many people that if Franklin Roosevelt had led the country out of the Depression, if he was capable of dealing with an economic crisis, then he would be prepared to lead the nation to victory during a war. Since most of us cannot predict what events may or may not precipitate a national disaster or even a lower level problem, we cannot select the appropriate task leader in advance. Even if we possessed a crystal ball and could predict the types of major decisions that would face our Presidents, there is often no candidate available who has had exactly the same experience. For example, it would be valuable to know what learning process or genetic heri-

tage (if one is so inclined) prepared Harry Truman to be able to cope with the decision to drop the first atomic bomb. We can only search for certain traits which we rightly or wrongly believe will influence the behavior of the person who will be faced with a particular situation. If we subscribe to the theory that a trait or combination of traits will give rise to a script for action by an incumbent of a position, then when we elect one candidate above another, it may be that we feel one script, one set of role playing behaviors is safer or more progressive than another.

If it is assumed that the traits of political candidates play a central part in influencing individual voting decisions, then it is essential to determine the nature of the relationship.

Predictions based on the formulations of Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957) assume that in making major life choices, the individual experiences a compelling need for internal consistency between his attitude structures and his attitude and behavior. Whether the selection process involves an automobile, spouse or political candidate, the person attempts to choose from among the given alternatives those which generate the least amount of dissonance. Using Osgood's Congruity Theory (Osgood, Tannenbaum,

and Suci, 1957), a theory closely related to Cognitive Dissonance Theory, one might hypothesize that in supporting a party or a candidate, the voter would support the nominee whose public image most closely approximated the self image of the subject.

It is also possible to conceive of the position of the President of the United States as a job which has certain role expectations and trait requirements that may differ in some respects from voter self image. Using the role model (Sarbin and Allen, 1969; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959), one can postulate a compartmentalization of the "Self Image" of the voter from a hypothetical "Ideal Image" of a political leader, each role requiring different skills, aptitudes and experiences. The voter would then choose the candidate whose public profile was more congruent with the "Ideal" for the position in question.

Because of the lessening of the ties to political parties, it should be possible to find voters who acknowledge a party affiliation but whose "Self Image" and whose concept of the "Ideal President" does not coincide with the choice of their original party. One would then expect these voters to cross party lines to vote for another candidate.

If each of the major political parties has selected a candidate to run for office who reflects the political

philosophy of that party, then there should be some congruence between party members' "Self Image," the "Ideal Image of the President" and party candidate image on most traits. There may be differences "in degree" and not "in kind" on certain characteristics. For example, in times of crisis, the President may be seen as more tense than the average citizen as he has the responsibility for leadership decisions.

The influence of the public image and media oriented characteristics of the candidate on voting behavior has been decried in many quarters (Hiebert et al, 1975). However, there are almost as many, if not more problems with voting based on issue orientation. According to Polsby and Wildavsky (1971), there are three preconditions that must be met for the voter's behavior to be modified by an issue. The first precondition is that the voter must be aware of the issue; the second is that he must be interested in the matter and any possible outcomes; and the last is that he must be able to distinguish the party's or the candidate's position on that issue. Most polls indicate that the public is not well informed on most issues or other informational matters in the political sphere. Therefore, all but the major issues are essentially ruled out as a basis for voting. Even what the political analyst considers

a cutting issue may only enter the consciousness of most people on a very shallow level. In this funnel model of the decision making process, fewer people are interested in an issue than those who are aware of its existence. The truly passionate advocates of one viewpoint or another comprise a still smaller group. The last precondition, finding a candidate whose views match one's own may be the hardest to do. Actual party differences may be minimal. It would, for the ecologist, be very difficult to find a candidate who openly espoused a "dirty air" policy. This particular issue may be glossed over with cosmic promises that cannot be realistically kept. If the candidate promoted industrial interests and full employment that may mean deferring the installation of pollution devices. The voter who wants to see his environment protected also wants to keep his job and the prosperity of his neighborhood at a high level. These positions may be impossible to reconcile immediately. In the end, even the most concerned voter may be forced to ignore all but the most pressing issues and place his trust in a candidate who appears able to solve many problems not just one or two.

Issue orientations may, however, shape party affiliation which in turn has had a great impact on voter behavior. Debates on the merits of most issues has done less to sway

the allegiance of large numbers of people than major crises such as wars or depressions. Whatever party is held responsible for the disaster even if the blame is unmerited finds erosion from the ranks of the faithful inevitable.

The discussion of voting by issue has implied that the individual voter becomes interested in a perceived issue, thinks through his position after careful consideration of the facts available, and comes to an independent conclusion. He then attempts to find a candidate whose own logical processes have led him to the same point. Most voters seem to espouse the issue orientations of their own parties. Even the war in Vietnam as an issue did not have the influence on the voting public that party identification had (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1971). The war issue was very complex and did not actually touch every citizen in the same way that most domestic issues do.

In summary, political issues are usually too complex for most citizens, do not involve large numbers of voters and often the viewpoints of the candidates cannot realistically be distinguished one from another.

In the past, party identification with its traditional and stereotyped structure of major issue orientations simplifies political decision making for most voters. At the present time the conflicts within the parties, the

tendency for more independent voting or realignment on the conservative-liberal continuum instead of the Republican-Democratic classification has tended to emphasize a pattern of voting by personality. Mass media and advertising techniques and the introduction of more television exposure for the candidate has made the public facade of the candidate a salient aspect in the race to win elections.

The political parties themselves may have problems dealing with the "new politics" (Perry, 1968). On the one hand the major goal of any political group is to win elections and gain power. If charisma wins elections, then so be it. A candidate who feels that he only owes allegiance to his image makers and his immediate organization will be difficult to influence from the viewpoint of the party leaders. He, in turn, may find that getting legislation through Congress will not be an easy matter since he cannot rely on the party machinery.

Not only does the voting public tend to make decisions based on personality variables, but the close supporters of a candidate have been known to follow the same pattern (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1971). In interviews held with Goldwater delegates to the Republican Convention of 1964, it was found that the delegates not only agreed with Goldwater's philosophy of government, but were highly committed to his

whole style of operation. While policy issues such as states' rights were mentioned, the most frequent discussion of Goldwater referred to his "consistency, honesty, integrity and willingness to stick by principles" (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1971, p. 37). Comments such as "He can be trusted," "He is straightforward," "He doesn't pander to the public; he's against expediency," "He has courage," "He doesn't go along with the crowd," reflect the concern with trusting the man himself, not just his policies, that seems to be the single most important variable in voting behavior at the present time (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1971, p. 37).

McCarthy's main attraction also seemed to be his approach to politics. He too, like Goldwater was not perceived as a politician who "played to the crowd." His image, a currently popular one at the time, was of a man who was not enmeshed in the political structure or machinations of the "backroom boys," the Machiavellian manipulators. Sincerity was also considered to be his most salient trait (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1971).

The most feared and discussed aspect of mass media projections of events is that there is a tendency to exaggerate or distort. According to Polsby and Wildavsky (1971), "They are always after sensational stories: if

conflict and controversy is not inherent in a situation, they will seek to create it" (p. 231). Despite the shaping of events in television presentations, the ultimate impact on the viewer is still open to question. The weight of evidence from survey research is that mass media communications reinforce rather than alter viewer attitudes and opinions concerning political events and candidates (Rand, 1975). The conclusion of Lazarsfeld in The people's choice (Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948) and Berelson in Voting (Berelson, et al, 1954) was that campaigns in the media appear to be only slightly influential in determining voter choice and that the small influence was filtered through "opinion makers" in the community. A recent study of the relationship of television to politics completed in Great Britain found that "the measurable contribution of television to the shaping of leader images falls short of popular expectation" and that "impressions of politicians are no more susceptible to media influence than are attitudes towards the parties" (Blumer and McQuail, 1968, p. 262). Voter predispositions toward campaign messages is considered more important than the content of the messages. The viewer, thus, selects those messages or aspects of messages that are consonant with his existing attitude structure and avoids or ignores information which produces dissonance.

Those messages which he cannot avoid may be discredited, misinterpreted, distorted and finally reshaped until they fit his way of constructing the world.

This view of television may apply more to attitudes toward obvious campaign commercials and not to televised news events. Television coverage is considered highly credible as a source of objective news reporting (Parris, 1964). Furthermore, it is difficult to practice selective viewing of partisan events if one watches nightly news summaries.

One of the goals of this research is to demonstrate that, whatever the source, national political figures are perceived by a sample of potential voters to have cohesive trait profiles, that is, public images that can be measured. Candidates may be selected by each party because the particular party feels that the nominee, more than his competitors, reflects the ideal image of that party for President and that he will be acceptable to the small but influential number of uncommitted voters who decide many elections. The aim of pre-election speeches and appearances on the part of the candidate and his supporters is to reinforce positive aspects of his image and most important, to avoid making mistakes.

While it is acknowledged that attitudes, especially

political affiliations, are difficult, if not impossible to change, perceptions of the ability of candidates can be influenced. Many of the candidates are not well known and do not elicit the emotional attachment that Dwight Eisenhower, Franklin D. Roosevelt, or John F. Kennedy aroused in some of their supporters.

Attitudes and opinions

Research in political science attempts to tap predispositions toward objects and actions. The measuring instruments are variously called "attitude questionnaires" and "opinion surveys." Operationally then, the terms are employed interchangeably. On a theoretical level, however, many scholars have made and continue to make distinctions between "attitude" and "opinion."

Attitudes are sometimes considered to be more or less general orientations, while opinions are specific manifestations of the broader category of attitudes (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953). Thurstone (1929) felt that opinions were overt expressions derived from attitudes which were, almost by definition, covert. For Osgood, Tannenbaum, and Suci (1957), opinions and attitudes differ in being empirically testable (opinions) or nonverifiable (attitudes).

In Singer's estimation (1965), "opinion" and "attitude" are not interchangeable terms, opinions being considerably more specific than attitudes, decidedly more transitory and much more susceptible to systematic observation and measurement. Attitudes, since formed by the interaction of personality traits and experiential factors, tend to remain rather stable. Personality characteristics influence

both the structuring and durability of attitudes and opinions, minimizing the informational component until environmental input rises above the threshold for awareness and can no longer be ignored. Singer points out, however, that certain personality types can tolerate more dissonance or incongruence in their attitudinal structures than others.

Since attitude theory may already be overburdened with conceptual elaboration beyond its actual level of sophistication, the fine distinctions made between attitude and opinion may not be completely necessary. Some researchers do, indeed, use the terms interchangeably.

If attitudes are not directly observable phenomena, but must be inferred from behavior such as voting patterns or public opinion surveys, it is easy to acknowledge that "pure" attitudes, free from the influence of the observational situation, can never be assessed. M. Brewster Smith's concept of attitudes is that they are dispositions that are brought to any situation which represent intergrations of cognitive, emotional, or conative tendencies around a psychological object such as a political figure or issue. The cognitive tendencies include beliefs and stereotypes, the emotional tendencies are comprised of affective dispositions, while the conative tendencies are the action or

policy orientations. It is the perception of the situation that is of central importance, according to Smith, for predicting actual behavior. The stronger the influence of attitudinal predispositions, the less emphasis on the situational stimuli. The reverse also obtains. In 1968, many people were strong supporters of George Wallace, but voted for Nixon since they perceived that Wallace could not possibly win the election. Other Wallace backers, of course, did vote for him despite similar perceptions of the eventual outcome. In their case the explanation given was that even though their candidate seemed destined to lose, they wanted the conservative vote to be acknowledged in the future policy making of the winner. The most logical way, in their estimation, to have an impact on proposed legislation was to demonstrate a significant minority vote. Thus, similar positive predispositions toward Wallace, a general belief that Wallace could not be elected, but slightly different feelings about the impact of a vote for Wallace led to two distinctly different behavioral patterns. People with similar underlying personality characteristics are perfectly capable of holding different political attitudes. On the other hand, similar opinions or behavior can be derived from different underlying orientations. Accurate prediction of human behavior based on psychological factors solely is

generally an unsuccessful process. In certain situations individual behavior may even be the reverse of that expected from an assessment of the previous attitudes. Only by correctly locating the actor in the situational context can one make logical predictions as to future action.

The Sherifs (Sherif and Sherif, 1967) approach to attitude formation is both cognitive and motivational-affective since attitudes can scarcely be considered neutral. "The data from which attitudes are inferred, therefore, are the person's consistent and characteristic categorizations, over a time span, of relevant objects, persons, groups, or communicators into acceptable or objectionable categories. Change is inferred from the alteration of the individual's acceptance-rejection pattern" (p. 115).

Sherif and Sherif have established five criteria for attitudes:

1. "Attitudes are not innate...."

It is assumed that the appearance of an attitude is dependent on learning."

2. "Attitudes are not temporary states, but are more or less enduring once they are formed."

3. "Attitudes always imply a relationship between the person and objects. In other words, attitudes are not self generated psychologically.

They are learned in relation to identifiable referents...."

4. "The relationship between person and object is not neutral but has motivational-affective components."

5. "The subject-object relationship is accomplished through the formation of categories both differentiating between the objects and between the person's positive or negative relation to objects in the various categories."

(Sherif and Sherif, 1967, p. 112)

The concept that individuals do not have a random, disjointed collection of attitudes, but complex interrelated systems of beliefs has been the basis of a number of theories in psychology: Balance Theory (Heider, 1958), Congruity Theory (Osgood et al, 1957) and Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957). Bem (1970) points out, however, that attributing consistency to human behavior is not the same as saying that man is logical or rational. Bem's explanations for this apparent paradox are that a person's inductive generalizations based on his past experience may be faulty, that even the most impeccable deductive reasoning will lead to the wrong conclusions if the basic premises are false, and, finally, that the person's existing attitudes

and motivations can influence the process so that the logic itself loses its validity.

Most of the theorists concerned with cognitive consistency have investigated the process of attitude formation and change. The basic assumption behind their studies is that people possess a drive toward cognitive consistency. Therefore, conditions which produce inconsistencies are negative stimuli to individuals motivating them toward one or more means of reducing tension.

An individual who experiences dissonance may react in a variety of ways (Festinger, 1957). He may, of course, change his attitude to coincide with that of the persuasive message or he may solicit social support for his original position or he may, when possible, derogate the source of the communication. People who are highly committed to a certain position will not change their attitudes even when exposed to extremely discrepant information.

Sherif and Hovland (1961) postulated that the person's own position acts as an anchor for his perceptions of other viewpoints. If the position presented is close to the subject's stand, he will tend to perceive it as being even closer than it is. This process is called "assimilation." If, on the other hand, the new message is substantially discrepant, then the subject will perceive the position

presented as being more distant than would be judged by an outside observer. The latter process has been termed "contrast." Furthermore, the subject's own stand influences his judgment of other positions in that some sources (probably the discrepant ones) are considered biased and propagandistic while others (similar to his own) are treated as fair and objective (Whittaker, 1967).

In Whittaker's opinion (1967), the investigators who have found a great deal of attitude change associated with highly discrepant messages have either been working with issues that were not ego involving or have neglected to use adequate parameters in their research design or some combination of these two factors. In cases of high involvement and attitude discrepant messages, it is probable that a nonmonotonic relationship obtains.

One of the problems with studying cognitive consistency is that inconsistencies may only be in the eye of the beholder who is not aware of the actual premises underlying the behavior. If it were possible to know and understand the person's entire belief system, these apparent inconsistencies might disappear.

Selective processes and resistance to discrepant messages can be accounted for by four somewhat related theories: field theory, homeostasis and wisdom of the body, cortical

stimulation, and maintenance of self and a system of meaning (Harvey, 1967).

The assumption derived from field theory that most closely relates to arousal of discomfort from dissonant messages involves the concept that all systems are inherently endowed with organizational tendencies and are composed of stable parts in a state of equilibrium. Impingement of incongruent information from external sources or internal disruption upsets that equilibrium producing tension and a consequent attempt to restore balance.

The homeostatic explanation is based on Cannon's theory that all human beings and animals attempt to maintain a constant internal environment. The essential problem with this reasoning is that the facts do not always support the theory. Animals do not always act in ways most compatible with their own welfare and survival. Furthermore, on a psychological as well as physiological level "wisdom of the body" does not always provide the appropriate cues for action.

In the case of the cortical stimulation theory of need for dissonance reduction, it has been found that either too much or too little stimulation (any deviation from a hypothetical optimal level for each organism) does result in avoidance of the conditions leading to that effect.

The potential damage from threats to the maintenance of the self concept and to ego involving attitude structures will be discussed in some detail.

In keeping with many of the theoretical distinctions made between the terms "attitude" and "opinion," one may come to the conclusion that most political surveys deal with opinions. The phenomena under consideration are overt, specific, and relatively malleable given a significant level of environmental input. It is a basic assumption behind most such research that, despite many seeming inconsistencies within individual attitudinal-motivational structures, a certain amount of stability exists especially among members of reference groups with common perceptions and goal orientations. Those individuals who belong to the same political party, minority group, religious sect or socio-economic group should manifest similar dispositions toward classes of objects or issues. These opinions or attitudes, in turn, should be subject to alteration by factors which are salient to the group as a whole. For example, if a candidate takes a particular position on abortion or governmental aid to parochial education, the act will be of more interest to religious groups than to other factions in the society.

When a candidate is selected, whether in the primaries, in party caucus or in convention, that person usually pro-

jects an image which reflects notions about what traits most of his potential constituents want or will tolerate. Liberal Democrats may have one view of the type of individual that they would like to see in office, Conservative Republicans another. However, in order to win elections, most politicians are astute enough to realize that the nominee must fall within the "latitude of acceptance" (Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, 1957) of more voters than the limited number of those who identify with one wing of a party or another. While many analysts are pointing to the divisive influences within both major parties in the United States which may eventually lead to a four party system (Liberal Democrat, Conservative Democrat, Liberal Republican, Conservative Republican), the label of Republican or Democrat alone is probably sufficient, at the moment, to define two ideologically cohesive groups. A study of differences in perception and attitudes between voter groups based on party identification and candidate preference should yield distinctly different patterns of concept formation that are readily measurable.

Almost every, if not every, group to which we claim membership has its own set of beliefs and behaviors which are considered appropriate or correct. Should a member deviate from the given range of norms, he will generally

encounter negative reinforcement designed to compel him to conform to the prescribed rules of the group or to leave the group. Sometimes loyalties to different reference groups and influences from those groups are conflicting. Thus, alternative ideologies, which might previously have been below the threshold of consciousness, are brought into consideration possibly leading to changes in orientation. For example, seventy percent of college sophomores, juniors and seniors reported significant changes in their political beliefs after entering school, two thirds of these changes in a direction opposite to their pre-college beliefs (Bem, 1970). However, in many cases, all or most all of one's socializing groups agree on appropriate behavior. The result is a "nonconscious ideology," a set of beliefs and attitudes that are accepted implicitly, but which remain outside the person's threshold of awareness because alternative conceptions of the world are not even imagined (Sandra Bem, 1970). Thus, it is expected that voter groups will evidence a high level of consistency in their attitudes toward classes of objects and that there will be significant differences between groups in their attitude structures.

Person perception

The process of perceiving another person or object depends not only on the stimulus variables, but also on the perceiver's characteristics and their interaction. The judgments that people make about each other are heavily influenced by the state of perceiver and the situation in which the judgment is being made. In other words, the current life experiences of the judge as well as the context can bias impression formation. Feshbach and Singer (1957) demonstrated that subjects who are expecting electric shock and thus were in an apprehensive state perceived other people as being more fearful than did those subjects who were not expecting to be shocked.

While transient states may influence perception there are several related factors of a more permanent nature which have a strong effect on judgment. People tend to simplify their ratings of subjects on several traits into an overall label of "good" or "bad." When the positive aspects are emphasized, the term used is the "halo effect." The person defined as "good" will tend to have constellations of good qualities assigned to him. Similarly, the "negative halo" or "forked-tail" effect, according to Freedman, Carlsmith and Sears (1974), will result in the

attribution of bad qualities. Dion (1972) showed subjects pictures of children who were considered either attractive or unattractive. Attached to each child's picture was a description of some sort of behavior pattern. Disruptive behavior was seen as being typical of unattractive children, but not representative of the behavior of attractive children. In a somewhat related experiment, elementary school teachers were given photographs of unattractive and attractive boys and girls with report cards which were matched for grades. Actual elementary school teachers considered the attractive children to be more intelligent, better adjusted and with better prospects for future achievement. These results are counter to a prediction which might have been made that unattractive children would probably compensate for their deficiencies in the social sphere by increased attention to academic achievement, and that that behavior would be so perceived and appreciated by teachers. The halo effect is, in essence, a tendency on the part of the perceiver to ignore certain characteristics of the subject and to concentrate on one relevant or irrelevant aspect of his being, allowing the rating on that trait to influence all other judgments. If a political candidate were evaluated as "good," he would probably be considered as "fair" and "valuable" as well.

There is also a tendency on the part of judges to

assume from the existence of one particular trait in an individual's makeup the possession of various other characteristics. If the observer feels a person is aggressive, for example, he may also attribute a high level of energy to him, but scarcely any warmth or consideration. Bruner, Shapiro, and Taguiri (1958) note that such influences are not always derived in a logical manner from the given trait, but depend on the perceiver's implicit theories of the organization of personality traits. This tendency to relate certain characteristics has been called "logical error" (Freedman, Carlsmith, and Sears, 1974) and influences our perceptions of both public and private personalities.

Most people categorize those they meet into a limited number of personality types often based on a minimum of input. Once a person is stereotyped he is usually considered to have all the traits associated with members of his group. "All blacks are musical," "The Irish drink heavily," "The French are good lovers," are typical phrases linked to popular stereotypes. While many individuals and groups have expended considerable energy fighting their images, the concept of stereotype has received more negative publicity than it deserves. First of all, it does not follow logically that such categorization must have detrimental behavioral consequences or that they are always

damaging (most Frenchmen don't fight their national image). Second, the tendency to conceptualize based on limited information probably results in a somewhat (but, of course, not always) smoother social interactions. If one behaves in the presence of a person of authority according to his role stereotype and not according to his individual characteristics one will usually be fairly safe. Gage (1952) found that judgments formed without actual contact with the stimulus persons, based only on the information that the individual was either male or female and a typical undergraduate at the University of Illinois, were more accurate than those based on real (but limited) interaction with the stimulus persons.

Somewhat egocentrically, most people assume that others are similar to themselves. That is, they are inclined, in certain conditions, to attribute the responses of others to the same antecedents as their own. This tendency is even stronger when the others are of a similar background, age, race, and socio-economic status as the perceiver. The result of this set is that the judge, rating his subject as more similar to himself than he actually is, distorts the object's personality profile. The distortion may, in fact, be so large that "his rating of the other person corresponds more to his own personality (as the other sees it)"

(Freedman, Carlsmith, and Sears, 1974, p. 43).

Judges infer, on the basis of prior experience with similar situations, the potential outcomes of the interaction process. The similarities (constancies) or variations of the person's behavior in a situation with which the judge has had considerable experience will lead to different attributions of intention. Since, despite the cogent arguments of the advocates of deterministic viewpoints in psychology, most people see others as causal agents of their own actions, the observer of behavior which is considerably different from that which was expected will react to the deviancy as purposeful and reflective of the subject's "character."

Each situation provides major and minor norms that are used in forming impressions. However, the norms to which the observer attends vary from culture to culture. Their meanings are also culturally defined. Even within the same society certain situations give rise to different references for judgment. If one is in an occupational context, then the level of task performance becomes salient for positive or negative evaluations if in a social situation then the warmth and friendliness of the actor becomes important. Thus, the stimulus variables cannot be logically separated from those of the perceiver or the context

within which the observation takes place. Let us examine a few examples. Suppose a coach wanted to judge the speed of the high school runner, a seemingly objective situation. The first step would be to take the student to the track, set the stop watch and measure the length of time it took him to complete the fifty yard dash. The result would be an accurate measurement of time and distance. The question still remains as to whether the student is a fast runner. "Fast" is a relative term depending on whether the runner is a thirteen year old girl who is five feet tall or a seventeen year old member of the track team. It also depends on the past experiences of the coach.

In order to ascertain whether or not a specific politician would make (1) a triumphant candidate, and (2) a successful incumbent, it is necessary to find relevant criteria for judgment. The ratings, implicit or explicit, are always made relative to a list of comparison groups: current available alternatives, past candidates, past incumbents, contemporary world leaders, idealized concepts of role performers. The perceptions of the potential nominee may not come up to expectations for the "Ideal President," nor match the mythology surrounding George Washington, but he may be perceived as the best possible alternative by a sufficient number of voters to allow him a chance

to prove his worth.

To attain the position of President of the United States, a person must compete first to win the party's nomination and backing and second to win the election. Sometimes the former is more difficult and crucial. However, the qualities necessary to accomplish these feats may not be irrelevant to playing the role of President.

Since the personality of the candidate, especially at the present time, may be more important to winning elections than the party platform, the public relations expert's task is to build positive perceptions and affect toward the nominee and play down defects. For example, dull Calvin Coolidge had to be humanized, while patrician Franklin Roosevelt needed to be presented as a more warm and pleasing person than he had appeared to the public prior to his nomination. When the so-called "image makers" have completed their tasks, it is feared that the product may be nine parts myth to one part reality or that the traits emphasized in the successful candidate may not relate to statesmanlike performance in the White House. Boss Penrose once said, however, that "Always after a man is nominated, they bring out the royal robe and put it on him, and that covers up all the cracks and nailholes" (Burns and Peltason, 1955, p. 399).

The self concept

The primary reference for many major life decisions is the perception of a construct usually designated as "the self." An important goal in making individual choices is the enhancement of the self structure. Thus, open support for a candidate for President can easily be related to one's self image and welfare.

The "self" as a concept ranks just ahead of "attitude" as a term which has been operationalized in a number of ways that often lead to confusion rather than to clarification. A cursory examination of the myriad definitions of "self" and related terms is staggering. The "self" or "ego" has been defined as the inner nature or the essential nature of man (Fromm, 1941; 1947; Maslow, 1954), as "the content of self awareness" (Chein, 1944), as "a constellation of attitudes having reference to I or me" (James, 1950), as "the individual as known to the individual" (Murphy, 1947), as an attitude or cluster of attitudes toward an object (Rosenberg, 1967), as a set of mental processes operating to satisfy the primal drives of the organism (Freud, 1933).

The concept of "the self" has been used to refer to a variety of constructs which have sometimes been operationalized through techniques which reflect different definitions.

Gordon and Gergen (1968) note that there are over 2,000 publications concerning aspects of "the self" from its basic nature and properties to its relationship to behavioral phenomena. According to these authors, the most useful description of the "self" concerns the person's "subjective cognitions and evaluations of himself." The assumption is made that the individual will act in a manner that is consistent with his self conceptions. "Where this is not found to be the case," they state, "we may simply modify or restrain our assumptions, and we can explore those factors related to consistent behavior as opposed to behavior that is inconsistent with self conception" (Gordon and Gergen, 1968, p. 3). Behavior which is actually internally consistent may not appear so to the casual observer who is not privy to all of the salient input into the situation.

The "self" may also be thought of as a single entity, a "total package," the end result of multiple influences, but a gestalt none the less (Mead, 1968; Backman and Secord, 1968; Lecky, 1968; Fromm, 1947; Rogers, 1971). Predictions of behavior based on single measures of personality such as locus-of-control (Rotter, 1966; Lefcourt, 1966) would seem to support such a viewpoint. This concept of the "self" implies that the person has a basic view of himself

and that this view will affect his behavior in different situations. In contrast to "the self" as single entity there is the view of "the self" as multiple in nature. The variability of a single person's behavior across situations as well as the seeming inconsistencies of many acts would seem to support the idea of multiple compartmentalized selves (Baldwin, 1968; Goffman, 1968; Sullivan, 1953; Jourard, 1964).

Gordon Allport's (1968) definition of "self image" concerns a phenomenal awareness of present attributes and future aspirations whether reasonable or illusory. For him the criteria for maturity would be the extent of one's self involvement with abstract ideals. The development of an abstract political concept such as the "Ideal President" could easily be related to self image.

In the Freudian analysis of the "self" as a rational process, the Ego has the function of keeping the organism in touch with the objective aspects of the environment. The Ego acts to mediate between the unconscious needs of the Id and the often irrational demands of the Superego and the reality of the outer world full of threats and punishments as well as rewards. Consequently, the rational Ego is often reduced to the invention and use of defense mechanisms to deal with anxiety. A rational Ego could

theoretically "forget" it had voted for a losing candidate.

For many of the self theorists (Hartmann, 1956; Erikson, 1950), the rational nature of the personality is its most positive and distinctive aspect. The self is capable of adapting to new and novel situations, planning for future contingencies, and otherwise dealing with the problems of life.

According to Sorokin (1947), the individual has no "general self," no single entity, but a separate concept relating to each membership group. The self structures of large numbers of group members should evidence common profiles. Social roles provide the reference for self conception. For example, vocations, religious affiliations, age, sex, ethnic group and racial group membership all contribute to a person's assessment of himself. Political orientation, for many people, is a major component in self identity.

The "self," like other attitudinal concepts, is subject to social comparisons. Rating scales themselves implicitly invoke social comparisons. When a person is checking a place on a seven point scale which ranges from low to high he must be comparing his performance or his possession of a certain trait to a perceived standard. How "nervous," for example, should one be before taking a test? The student gazes around the examination room. Everyone else

appears calm. There is even some mild joking among other students. A quick self appraisal follows: sweating palms, perspiration, uneasy stomach. The conclusion is that the subject of this internal scrutiny must be extremely anxious indeed. If one is to be honest (no social desirability influences here), then the appropriate response to the questionnaire seems to be "very nervous." If only the poor subject knew the true state of his fellows, he would probably check "average."

While not all behavior can be explained or predicted according to the individual's view of himself, there is considerable utility for the "self" concept in relationship to theories based on congruency or consistency striving. In terms of role selection, the person would select those roles which would allow him to behave in ways consonant with his individual self theory. Sometimes, in order to maintain self-behavior congruency, the person may be forced to resort to forms of misperception or reinterpretation of either his own action or those of the other players. These acts may include cognitive restructuring, selective interaction, or selective evaluation of others (Gordon and Gergen, 1968).

Thus, self esteem is an all pervasive variable which directs our thoughts, consequent behavior, selection of

values, even our memory processes, our interpretation of information, our goals, our choice of friends, marital partners, associations, occupations, and environments when there is a range of available options. In other words, "self regard" which McDougall (1932) termed a "master sentiment" or "self love" (Allport, 1961) is a phenomenon of vast influence in making life decisions.

Voting behavior

"Politics is sometimes called 'the great American game.' Thousands of politicians take part in it; millions of people follow the election fights and they decide the winners and losers. Yet the real nature of the game remains a mystery."

Burns and Peltason (1955, p. 322)

For political practitioners, political scientists, psychologists and sociologists the focus of interest in political behavior may shift from the outcomes of specific events to general principles of behavior. However, all are concerned with understanding why particular candidates win or lose, why some people vote and others do not, and why voting patterns change in some areas and are more stable in others.

Voting behavior has certainly been extensively studied. Most of the research has been conducted in order to gather data and analyze patterns related to Presidential elections. It is difficult to generalize the results across elections since each one differs in some critical respect from the others. In addition, incomplete archival records of past elections often makes this type of comparison difficult. However, while individual parameters may vary, there are probably several principles which may be applied to a number of campaigns.

Analyses of elections are based on survey data and

are not the result of experimental manipulations unless one considers elections to be the largest experiments ever designed. The usual method of interpretation is correlational, the attribution of causality being based on the use of partial correlational or other controls. The tools by which attitudes and opinions are assessed include questionnaires, polls, interviews, and intensive studies of particular campaigns. The results of these inquiries are often related to actual voting statistics.

The most frequent questions asked about political activity in the United States involve the antecedent conditions that determine voting behavior. Considerations of voting behavior is important for two main reasons. First, for the average citizen to vote constitutes the main or only form of political participation. Second, outside of assassination, elections lead to the most dramatic changes in government personnel.

There are millions of eligible voters in the United States who do not exercise their rights at the polls. The proportion of Americans who vote is considerably lower than that of voters in other countries such as Britain, France, Italy or Russia (Burns and Peltason, 1955). The extent of nonvoting is an important factor in any election whose outcome often reflects voter turnout.

There are two general explanations for voter apathy: simple lack of interest or inertia and disgust with the state of politics. Many citizens feel that a single vote will have no impact on the system. Others cannot find a candidate from among the alternatives provided by the political parties who reflects their viewpoints adequately.

Political researchers regularly find that there is a portion of the population which knows absolutely nothing about public affairs. They do not follow campaigns in the newspapers, nor do they join political organizations and most importantly, they do not vote.

The level of apathy is not the same for all voter groups. For example, men vote more than women, persons in higher income brackets vote more than those in the lower levels, and more people vote in national elections than in state or local contests. Voting patterns also vary by geographic region. Industrial and urban areas in the East generally have high voter rates as do the Rocky Mountain states and the Midwest. In sections where one party has dominated the political scene for a period of time lower voter turnout is the rule (Maine, Vermont and Oregon).

Patterns of voting

There are certain patterns of voting which politicians

must take into account in planning their campaigns.

1. State voting: Each party has certain states which are considered "safe" for their own candidates. Vermont, Maine, Mississippi and South Carolina are among the more secure party strongholds. Most states, however, fall into the "doubtful" category, while some are consistent only in that they are perpetually inconsistent.

2. Sectional voting: White voters in the South tend to follow a similar ideology whether it is espoused by the Democrats or Republicans.

3. National voting: Presidential mid-term elections generally reflect a tendency to vote in the opposition party, whatever it happens to be at the particular time.

4. Party tickets: The Presidential nominee, especially if popular, can usually help to elect other candidates of his party since many voters select a straight party ticket. Some voters, however, take pride in independently splitting their tickets.

Voting by party ticket is more than just a habit. Even when party candidates are mediocre at best or when important events are taking place which ought to elicit

voter interest and perhaps change of allegiance, many voters in both parties can be counted on to elect a straight party ticket. Traditional voting is not, however, an irrational act. In many cases such patterns reflect the viewpoint that the party itself represents the person's best interests. Many workers believe that the Democratic party has the welfare of the "small man" at heart, while business men often identify as Republicans because they feel that that party is concerned with promoting their economic needs.

The first, and perhaps the best known election study was conducted in 1940. A team of researchers carried on an extensive panel survey in Erie County, Ohio (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948). They studied attitudes toward the campaign waged between Franklin Roosevelt and Wendell Wilkie by interviewing some 600 respondents seven different times between May and November of 1940. Their main interest was in attempting to account for any changes at the time of occurrence not retrospectively as is often the case. Very little attitude change actually took place during the survey period. Sixty-nine percent of the respondents indicated the same preference in October as they had in May. Approximately 26% started with no preference, either acquiring one later or remaining undecided. Only 5% actually

changed their initial position.

While of some interest, mass media effects in 1940 were of small consequence. Only about half of the respondents reported exposure to campaign propoganda even in the last days of the contest. Of those who were exposed, the majority tended to be the least vulnerable to counterattitudinal messages since they were the most committed partisans. Due to the process of selective exposure, the usual flood of campaign literature and speeches could only have had reinforcing effect on already existing attitudes or an activating effect on latent dispositions. At the present time, given the dramatic attention getting power of current events, selective exposure is less of a possibility. The selective processes must operate, if they operate at all, on the perceptual level or on the processing level.

In 1966, Rossi postulated that campaign issues were not an important factor in electoral choice, since voters tended to adjust their views on important questions to their party affiliations and candidate loyalties. Those voters who did change preferences tended to be the least knowledgeable, not the most. Party affiliation consistently correlated with membership in certain reference groups. For example, religious conviction, social class and urban versus rural residency were excellent predictors of partisan

identification. The maximum pro-Republican stand was taken by Protestant, middleclass rural residents while the strongest Democrats tended to be Catholic, working class and urban dwellers (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948; Greenstein, 1967; Klapper, 1960; Janowitz and Miller, 1952; Campbell, 1960; Key, 1955; Converse, 1963; Thompson, 1967; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954).

The psychohistory of voting behavior has placed little emphasis on the influence of the mass media in choosing a candidate. The election of 1940 as studied by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet discovered that person to person interaction especially between opinion leaders and more passive members of the population was more important than the media contact. During the forties and fifties it was difficult to demonstrate any attitude change at all toward any of the candidates despite the monetary expenditures during the campaigns. There are several explanations that support continued campaign activity despite the apparent waste of effort and financial resources.

1. Campaign propoganda is generally directed at the less than ten percent of the population that declares itself "undecided" following the party conventions. Attitude formation, as opposed to change, is often sufficient to effect a victory

for one or another of the contenders in a close election.

2. While it is generally true that most decisions are made directly after the candidates are nominated, partisan propoganda serves the purpose of preventing erosion of support due to counter-arguments.

3. While party identification was once the main determinant of voting behavior the perception of the individual qualities of tne candidates has taken on considerable importance. Thus, the public image of the candidate must be continually reinforced through media exposure and personal appearances.

If one subscribes to the model of man as a rational being who maximizes outcomes and minimizes risks, then one would suppose that, in order to select from among the nominees the candidate most likely to perform the duties of the President effectively, the voter should understand the political structure, the role of the office and positions on contemporary issues. However, despite rising educational levels and an increase in the quantity and quality of news coverage, the level of factual knowledge about political problems remains relatively low (Graber, 1974). Voting

decisions are therefore being made based on little information much in the same way as person perception impressions are formed (Freedman, Carlsmith and Sears, 1974).

Besides level of knowledge, personal interest or motivation influence voting patterns. Voters may feel general apathy which is expressed in low turnouts at the polls. A little antagonism toward all the candidates may also be indicated by a refusal to vote.

The act of voting itself does not always reflect enthusiastic support for a particular candidate. If a segment of the voting public perceives that the viewpoints expressed by one or more of the nominees are antithetical to its own welfare, it may vote for the least objectionable alternative (Waters, 1968).

Recent elections have shown an increase in this pattern of negative voting. During the Eisenhower years both major candidates were positively valued for both parties, each party, however, favoring its own selection more than the others (Osgood et al, 1957). In the 1968 and 1972 elections the general evaluation of the main contenders was well below previous campaigns, the chosen candidate sometimes appearing just above the neutral point on the scale (Waters, 1968; 1973). Since the eligible voters have little direct influence on the candidate selection

process, except for the party primary elections, it is not surprising that there has been a tendency toward apathy or toward negative voting. It has been hypothesized that at one time, when more people voted according to party affiliation, the party leadership in an attempt to ensure its survival tried to keep the "worst of the dregs off the ballot" (Baker, 1974). Recently, according to Baker (1974), since the electorate seems less party oriented than previously, the nominees reflect the search for individuals based on media generated criteria. Professional politicians and campaign managers promote candidates who have "some quixotic appeal to the massively uninformed, such as a name easy to remember, a cool look on television or good dental caps, and count themselves lucky if one or two of them turn out to be competent, honest and bright enough to tell the courthouse from the State Capitol" (p. 6).

Negative voting, as a phenomenon, may arise from a style of campaign rhetoric. In Graber's study of newspaper items about the Presidential candidates during the 1968 election, she reported that since most comments in the press were unfavorable, the nonselective reader would probably come to the conclusion that all the candidates were deficient in many traits relevant to the role of President (Graber, 1974). One explanation offered was that the major

candidates placed heavy emphasis in their public statements on the negative aspects of the opposition rather than their own positive qualities. If each candidate's comments are only discussions of the shortcomings of his rivals, the electorate is left with little else as a basis for decision. Those people who feel it is their civic duty to vote may find themselves in an avoidance-avoidance-avoidance situation in which not voting at all leaves negative consequences in loss of self esteem, voting for Candidate A is unappealing and voting for Candidate B is an equally unattractive choice. A decision can only be reached when one of the alternatives rises above the comparison level for the other possibilities.

If recent voting trends persist, then the patterns of 1972, 1976, 1980 and so on will reflect an ever increasing emphasis on the public image of the candidate in relation to the other alternatives and a tendency to reject negatively valued nominees instead support positively selected candidates.

Voting behavior depends not only on attitudes towards a particular candidate which do not exist in isolation, but also on attitudes toward the given alternatives, toward the parties and toward the campaign issues (Campbell et al, 1960). Even attitudes concerning potential nominees who

were eliminated before the election can influence the decision making process.

The determinants of any course of action include the salient social norms (one did not vote for a divorced person in the past elections) the competitive versus cooperative relations that obtain with other participants (one should, if a blue collar worker, support the party of the unionists against that of management), the degree of urgency with which a decision is required (impeachment is a serious event and should not be hastily initiated), the contingencies of cost and benefit which are operative (supporting impeachment may lower our prestige abroad).

The concepts of cost and benefit (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) are particularly relevant to the study of voting behavior. If the most favored candidate holds viewpoints on several issues which conflict with those of the voter, the difficulty may be resolved by weighing the relative costs (risks, threats to welfare) of each issue and the benefits and comparing the net worth of the lot.

While the thrust of the last analysis has been that people do not always exhibit behavior which uniformly corresponds to their attitudes even on central issues, one can support the contention that attitudes of any sort are acquired and maintained to the degree that they are in "some

way useful to the inner economy of adjustment and the outer economy of adaptation" (Greenstein, 1968). For example, suppose a voter favors a candidate whose stands on certain basic issues are congruent to his own, but that candidate is unlikely to win, or to be attended to once in office, then the voter must select the candidate with the greatest probability of effectively meeting the needs of the voter.

The undecided voter

It is possible that the trend toward proclaiming indecision as to choice of candidate or toward avoiding any contact with the political arena has become almost fashionable in recent years. In his own eyes the undecided or non-voter can lay claim to a higher level of perceptive sensitivity and astute judgment than the voter. Then, too, he becomes the center of attention from his partisan friends, and the focus of campaign propaganda political surveys. Everyone is concerned with his group's final decision.

Alienation from the political process has been attributed to other influences. At one time alienation was attributed to the lower classes. Presently, that is no longer the case (Schwartz, 1973; Boyd, 1974; Miller, 1974a; Citrin, McClosky, Shanks, and Sniderman, 1975). Politics in the United States can easily appear to be a disorderly,

unintelligible, and covert process, producing conflict and disorder. The voter may, indeed, feel ineffectual in attempting to have meaningful input into a system whose game plan and rules are partially covert and appear to change according to the option of the players. Elections sometimes appear to be based on a decision between Scylla and Charybdis.

The uninformed or alienated voter, if he exercises his right to vote at all may tend to make decisions on what has been termed trivial or irrational grounds (Flanigan, 1972), or at least what appears on the surface to be without logic to the researcher. It has been hypothesized that uninformed individuals are the most susceptible to mass media campaigns which emphasize personal style rather than political expertise. If the marginally committed voter is the one who determines the outcome of major elections, then the essential fear about the emphasis or fascination with public images and clever campaign techniques over real differences in philosophical approaches to government may be justified.

Issues

It is probable that no election battle has ever been waged over a single issue, although there are usually one or two which seem more central than others during the campaign. Economic crises such as depressions and conditions of war come closest to qualifying as cutting issues. In less hectic times, crucial topics vary according to local geographic interests. The successful candidate who would emphasize the importance of issues must appeal not only to sectional factions, but also to such conflicting interest groups as management and labor and isolationists and internationalists simultaneously. For these reasons politicians sometimes appear vague on some questions.

Even in retrospect, it is often difficult to ascertain the basis for the election of a particular candidate. For example, can one state that in 1952 Eisenhower was elected because of his stand on tax reduction at home, his promise to support Korea with military aid, his backing of state ownership of off-shore oil leases, his firm relationship with the business community, his style of speech delivery or his popularity as a general in World War II. It is possible that we have a national pattern of rewarding wartime leaders with political positions. The sentiment seems to

be that a successful military leader should make a good peacetime leader. The Romans treated their generals in the same manner.

While issue orientation and party platform can be important factors in attitude formation, many citizens realize that politicians cannot always maintain the same post-election as pre-election postures. Unforeseen situations arise which require responses that may not have been anticipated during the campaign. Confidence in the sincerity, trustworthiness and general competence of a future leader may be a more stable, realistic and actually more relevant factor than support for a particular issue. This is especially true if the issue does not have a permanent place in the future functioning of the group.

The political leadership role

The rather ambiguous statement, "All politicians are alike" refers to an opinion that may be held by a sizable segment of the American public. This sentiment contributes to the apathy evidenced in low voting turnouts and other types of political participation. It may be that the perceived variety among candidates is considerably less than among automobile types, for example, leading to a feeling on the part of the voter that he is choosing between Tweedle-Dum and Tweedle-Dee. According to Inkeles (1963), "there is a great deal of evidence to indicate that particular statures often attract, or recruit preponderantly for, one or another personality characteristic and that fact has substantial effect on individual adjustment to roles and the general quality of institutional functioning" (p. 354). While most social scientists would not go as far as Berman (1974) in asserting that politicians are "born," not socialized into their roles, the propensity of certain personality types to seek roles which would seem to fulfill their psychological needs would probably receive considerable support.

The importance of specific behavioral characteristics depends of course on situational variables. If the op-

portunity for action does not present itself, the observer may never see heroic or villanous traits. Certain circumstances thus may elicit behavior which would otherwise have remained dormant.

It seems to be true for political events, at least, that particularly well placed individuals can have considerable influence on the system of government. Given the rather ambiguous specifications in the Constitution for the position of President of the United States, it follows that the incumbent's conception of the role will help to shape that role for future Presidents.

In an analysis of the contents of newspaper articles appraising the personalities and capabilities of the 1968 Presidential candidates, it was found that 57% of the informational items dealt with the personal characteristics of the nominee not the professional qualifications or the issues of the campaign (Graber, 1974). Personality traits were separated into three general categories: personal attributes, style and image.

Personal attributes, which accounted for 37% of the references, included such traits as "integrity," "ability to inspire confidence," "compassion," and "the ability to project leadership." These qualities indicate a general fitness for a high executive position, but they do not in-

dicade aptitude for specific responsibilities.

"Style" (22% of the items) pertains to the ability of the candidate to "command trust and confidence in others." Manner of operation, forthrightness in approach, restraint and evidence of intellectualism are all factors contributing to perceptions of style of performance.

The category "image," deals with the candidates ability to project "the psychologically reassuring image that the candidate would be able to unify the nation and could cope with crucial problems like race relations." Image qualities, which accounted for 18% of the news items, seemed more directly related to the actual duties of the office.

Only 19% of all information items pertained to the professional capabilities of Nixon, Humphrey, or Wallace. Ability to cope with foreign affairs, to maintain law and order and to sustain good relations with the public (especially the young and blacks) were among the skills mentioned.

The probability that an individual will have personal impact on a situation may vary with "the degree to which the actions take place in an environment which admits restructuring" (Greenstein, 1969). In unstable situations small interventions seem to produce extreme results. In situations which resist restructuring most of the variables seem to be pressing in the same direction so that the out-

come appears to be inevitable. In order to determine whether or not the political phenomenon was more dependent on situational factors or variations in the characteristics of the leading actors (skill, power, and even location), one must seek an answer to the question of whether or not events would or could have been altered by a change in personnel. Can it be argued that any actor given the position of minority party incumbent in the White House in the year 1972 would have acted in the same manner as Richard Nixon. If persons of different dispositions can be found to behave in more or less similar ways, then we can conclude that situational variables contribute to the major portion of the variance.

Classifications of categories or personality types related to political behavior may involve individual case studies, particularly of famous leaders in history, typological (multicase) analyses or aggregate analyses concerning the collective effects of both individual actors and types on the functioning of political institutions (Greenstein, 1969).

The usual criticisms of single case analysis in constructing psychological theories applies to investigations of political phenomena as well. The absence of standards for making valid and reliable judgments is apparent.

Another problem, the overemphasis on the more pathological aspects in the study of famous leaders, may only be an artifact of the need to be somewhat sensational in order to be published. In Georges' study of Woodrow Wilson in the book Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House is an example of the more effective use of clinical analysis on a historical leader (1956).

While the best known of the typological studies involve "authoritarianism," "dogmatism," and "Machiavellianism" political actors have also been classified into certain categories based on style of action. Lasswell (1951) has identified three basic types of politician: the agitator, the administrator and the theorist." Barber (1965) divides legislators into spectators, advertisers, and reluctant lawmakers.

The major criticisms of typological studies involve the validity and reliability of measures and the weakness of the correlations between personality and political orientation. "Phenomena of considerable complexity and subtlety were being studied via overly crude indices of both the independent and dependent variables. Underlying all these problems is a serious lack of clear conceptualization in many typological studies" (Greenstein, 1969, p. 17).

Aggregate studies are most widely attacked on the basis that they tend to be reductionist when the full range of possible psychological and non psychological determinants of behavior must be taken into account when investigating complex behavior.

Krech and Crutchfield (1948) have listed fourteen functions of the leadership role which, if required simultaneously, are good support for a team concept in government:

1. Executive
2. Planner
3. Policy maker
4. Expert
5. External group representative
6. Controller of internal relationships
7. Purveyor of rewards and punishments
8. Arbitrator
9. Exemplar
10. Group symbol
11. Surrogate for individual responsibility
12. Ideologist
13. Father figure
14. Scapegoat

No leader is called upon to be responsible for all

fourteen functions since in most organizations there are separate offices to assume at least partial responsibility for specific tasks such as military decisions or agricultural problems in the federal government.

When tasks change, different types of behavior may be required. With increasing trends to specialization of skills, it is possible and probable that the leader will not be able to perform efficiently. In large organizations such as governments, industrial corporations and universities, the need may not be for experts in the major administrative positions but for generalists who can organize the experts.

There are two primary functions in these larger organizations which are categorized under the titles of "consideration" and "initiating structure" (Cartwright and Zander, 1968). Consideration includes friendship, mutual trust, respect, warmth and social sensitivity, while initiating structure involves establishing patterns of organization and channels of communication. Many administrators have trouble balancing the two functions since maintaining the hierarchical arrangements of an organization often preclude friendships with subordinates.

Managers at different levels of an organization are required to use a different combination of administrative, technical and social skills. Cartwright and Zander report

that employees were more satisfied with a high status manager if he seemed to be skilled in performing his administrative functions, "but not if he was rated favorably in technical or human relations activities."

When the occupant of one office or position is responsible for the performance of several important functions there is usually considerable power associated with that office. One could scarcely expect efficient task performance if insufficient resources or power were provided.

The increasing complexity of organizational problems and the pressure of short time limits for decision making and the importance of the outcomes for the maintenance of the group all conspire to accelerate the trend toward authoritarian leadership. This same trend magnifies the powers of executive office and consequently the real or imagined heroic traits of the incumbents.

In a New York Times editorial (Dec. 3, 1974) criticizing President Ford, the writer discusses the requirements of responsible leadership. "Effective leadership requires a readiness to present a credible plan for reaching desirable goals, coupled with willingness to confront the people with unpleasant facts, whatever the political risks involved" (p. 8). The author continues, "Leadership in difficult times cannot afford to keep an eye on the opinion polls

nor to seek public support based on assurance that things are better than they seem." In wartime or during economic crises responsible leaders must often display traits which are almost completely at variance with those characteristics that enabled him to reach the office he holds.

Machiavelli, while primarily concerned with the powerful political elite, did espouse a view of man which enabled him to advise the men in leadership positions. His model of human nature allowed that people were "ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers anxious to avoid danger." Politics for him was a game of rewards and penalties, performance being judged on the perception of current achievements the expectation of future accomplishments. In Discourses, he wrote, "The great majority of mankind are satisfied with appearances as though, they were realities and are often even more influenced by the things that seem than by those that are" (1971, p.47). Of course, one must be privy to all available factual information before one can assess any situation as to whether it is truly or falsely presented.

In his advice to monarchs, Machiavelli said that, "a ruler must not be governed by conventional ethical standards... but he must be skillful at using the language and symbols of conventional morality for he will find them a powerful technique." Writing in The Prince, he continued, "It is

well to seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, religious and also to be so; but you must have the mind so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change to the opposite qualities" (1971, p.21).

A more recent political analyst, H. D. Lasswell, (1951) reiterated that the study of politics is "the study of influence and the influential" making the population at large seem to be passive subjects in a gigantic experiment. The necessary skill manipulating people by means of significant symbols ("The Great Society," for example) involves the use of "oration, the polemical article, the newstory, the legal brief, the theological argument, the novel with a purpose and the philosophical system."

The successful political personality not only has skill in manipulation and a demand for deference which motivates him, but the good fortune to have a timely set of circumstances to further his career (Lasswell, 1951). It is difficult to appear as a wise and heroic leader in quiet times of prosperity.

An ideal study of public perceptions of political leaders would include questions on task capabilities, personality traits, concepts of the role expectations for the office in question, as well as issue orientations. On a more workable level one might focus on a single research

area such as the public image of the candidate, while not ignoring the contributions of the other factors to election outcomes.

Only a few personal qualities have been found to be common to most conceptualizations of leadership: a high rate of energy output, alertness, originality of thought, personal integrity, self confidence, decisiveness, knowledge and fluency of speech (Gibb, 1969; Stogdill, 1974). Not all the acknowledged great leaders in history have themselves possessed all of these traits. Of the traits listed, only some will be able to be assessed during the campaigning by viewing campaign commercials. For example, in a filmed advertisement, the candidate may appear self confident, knowledgeable and fluent. The sequence can, of course, be prepared and rehearsed until these qualities are clearly projected. In unrehearsed press conferences, debates and personal appearances, the candidate is more dependent on his actual ability than on media manipulation. In the recent New York State primary campaign for Senatorial nomination, one of the candidates used television advertisements which featured his actions but did not use his own voice. Instead, an announcer in what is called in advertising jargon, "a voice-over," explained the achievements of the candidate and his proposals for future programs. The

candidate had a heavy accent which was considered unacceptable to many potential voters.

Since candidates must subject themselves to close scrutiny, the traits which enhance public appearances may be considered more important than those which contribute to good leadership once in office.

A major fear in contemporary election campaigns is that media experts will be able to hide major flaws in the candidate's personality from the public. It has been suggested that candidates submit to psychological examinations before running for office. It is assumed that mental health specialists will be more perceptive and better able to assess personal traits than the general public. It is also assumed that they can come to a clear consensus of opinion concerning the candidate's state of mental health.

In a highly criticized study, Fact magazine sent out questionnaires to every psychiatrist in the United States (Elms, 1976). Only one fifth (2,417) of those contacted responded. The question asked was "Do you believe Barry Goldwater is psychologically fit to serve as President of the United States?" Interestingly enough, no comparable inquiry was made concerning the eligibility of Lyndon Johnson. Some of the psychiatrists who did reply to the question labelled Goldwater everything from a "compensated

schizophrenic" and a "megalomaniac" to merely "immature." Others praised him for being a "thoughtful, capable person." Obviously, there was a lack of consensus and unbiased objective analysis. The report does not state the political affiliation of the psychiatrists who responded. In the present study, perceptions of the candidates are considered to be closely associated with partisan allegiance. It should be noted, however facetiously, that one "democratic" psychiatrist in the Fact survey commented that no matter which candidate won, "It is certain that we will have an immature, unstable, exhibitionist, unpredictable and probably dangerous man for President for the next four years" (Elms, 1976, p. 88).

While mental health specialists may be prevented on ethical grounds from making public statements concerning the traits of candidates, there are a sufficient number of verbal amateurs who are bound by no such rules and who are ready and willing to analyze every fresh statement, every gesture, every act of each candidate and present their opinions to the public. The newscasters, the political commentators may have usurped the role of Lazarsfeld's local opinion makers in the "two step" flow of political influence.

The cult of the President

Significant social symbols in the United States include not only the concept of the "President," but also "Wall Street," "The Military," "Conservatives" and "Liberals" among others. Each of these is associated with a stereotype of considerable clarity, complexity, and a high level of public consensus. No other political concept, however, seems to have the level of affect connected to it that the term "President" evokes.

The first political figure about whom children develop some attitudinal structure is the President (Greenstein, 1961; 1965; Hess and Easton, 1960). By the age of nine, most children can name the incumbent and are vaguely aware of his role. At that point they have acquired no other political information such as the knowledge of the functions of Congress. Elementary school students describe the President as an overwhelmingly positive figure, "kindly and benevolent." However, there is usually some decline with age in the idealization of the President. Greenstein reports that children of other countries also seem to have the same propensity to perceive their own national leaders in a positive fashion although the absolute levels of idealization differ between nations.

The early and deep socialization of positive attitudes toward the concept of the President may influence future orientations toward the political system in general and the importance of the Presidency in particular. While adult attitudes toward the performance of each succeeding incumbent may be responsive to temporal factors, the overall response to most Presidents has been positive. The Gallup Poll regularly asks the question, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President X is handling his job?" Public approval of Roosevelt's performance in office reached a high of 84 percent and never fell below 50 percent. Eisenhower's performance was rated in a similar range (49% to 79% approval). John Kennedy, while not as highly rated (59% approval), did not descend as far as the others (57% approval). The public approval of Truman reached 87 percent just after he entered office, but the appraised level of his performance did sink to 23 percent at one point, an unusually low score for any Chief Executive.

While there is some evidence that certain subgroups of the population (Blacks, poor people, etc.) do not demonstrate the same tendency to construct idealized versions of the President (Jaros, Hirsch, and Fleron, 1968), the President remains the symbol of the nation for many people in this country. In our search for heroes, for other types

of figures that are larger than life, we have tended to create myths around our national leaders, becoming concerned with their daily lives, the clothing that they and their family wear, and other private matters that do not necessarily relate to efficient functioning in office. In some cases this concern has risen to the level of a cult.

According to Rubin (1967), no other man exemplifies the concept of the cult of the President better than John F. Kennedy. Television was complementary to him. He appeared to be a capable and forthright leader. A substantial number of people placed John Kennedy and his family in a category formerly reserved for movie stars and military heroes. The interest in the Kennedy's has scarcely abated since his death. Rubin, who seems particularly impressed by Kennedy's presence, wrote that the nation's image of Kennedy was as a vigorous, aggressively dynamic man who was at the same time deeply introspective. Most commentators agree that he respected his office and tried to preserve its dignity. Because his major strength seemed to be his forceful personality, there was a danger that a personality cult would develop around him even during his lifetime. Mansfield's book, Death of the President (1967), treats Kennedy like a Greek hero even to the point of writing in pseudo Homeric style (e.g., use of catalogues

of names).

Lyndon Johnson, on the other hand, while attracting a great deal of attention, was not subjected to the kind of hero worship that had been the fate of John Kennedy. In part, his ascendancy to office after Kennedy's death may explain the more critical attitudes towards him. However, his own personal style and manner of fulfilling the requirements of his role as national leader may be responsible for the attitudes toward him. "It is futile to try and put political and ideological tags on Lyndon Johnson because he took this or that position in the past... It is necessary to observe how he was shaped by the events of his life" (Rubin, 1967, p. 111). Many of the labels attached to Lyndon Johnson before and after he attained the Presidency have a pejorative tone. He was variously called a "wheeler-dealer," a "persuader," a "professional politician," and a "non-intellect." His image was that of the older man from the rural and agricultural southwest, a man who emphasized the traditional frontier aspects of American life, certainly a much different style from the urbane and Harvard educated Kennedy. In 1964, when he ran against Goldwater and won a stunning victory, it could scarcely be ascertained whether it was due to his own qualities or to the fact that he presented the only reasonable alternative

to a Republican who did not represent the majority of his own party at the time.

There are many world leaders who can be compared to our Presidents in order to demonstrate that the cult of the national hero is not exclusively American and that it often is perceived and cultivated by the leaders themselves.

Charles De Gaulle was leader of a nation barely larger than some states of the United States and yet he kept France in the forefront of world politics, a position perhaps not warranted by her economic situation. He was greatly concerned with his personal image and carefully staged his television appearances and press conferences (Edinger, 1967). He attempted to reinforce his reputation of being the brave and conquering hero, the savior of his country, by acting boldly. He was always dignified and aloof, a pose he felt reflective of the true leader. Because he was convinced of his own greatness and that a great man owed his power to none but himself he began to rely on conspiratorial plots when the French people did not return him to power (Edinger, 1967).

Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy are all representative examples of the idea that political style is important. While different in many respects, they all shared the gift of a fine sense of timing for the

appropriate action and the ability to use inspiring oratory to elicit confidence in their audiences.

There may be some danger in a system that promotes disproportionate attribution of wisdom, authority and power to a national or world leader. There are at least three, if not more, threats involved in the hero worship of the President (Rubin, 1967).

1. The amassing by the President of vast personal power and the potential for using it or protect or promote personal interests.
2. The suppression of important news in the service of the Executive.
3. The identification of the President with the nation as a whole leading to confusion of personal acts of the incumbent with the welfare of the nation by both the American public and peoples of other nations.

Whatever the consequences of the inordinate attention paid to the office of the President and its incumbent, it is clear that the concepts of the President and the public images of major nominees are important ones for the electorate.

The office of the President and the personality of its incumbent have been the object of unparalleled atten-

tion by the press and public alike. According to Wise (1976) "A President's image, in considerable measure is shaped not only by... public acts, but by his personal, informal contacts with the press corps, particularly the 'White House Regulars'" (p. 480). Many politicians have blamed their rise or fall on the influence of the press in general or specific journalists (Reston, 1976). Eventually, the overall impression created by the President must filter out to the public. The style of the incumbent will set the tone for the political climate of the country. For example, he may be blunt or obfuscate, he may operate behind a shield of official secrecy claiming national security is at stake, he may consult with other officials or he may retreat into the White House to make solitary decisions, he may propose to conduct his term of office in the "sunshine" or he may limit communication. The public may react in several ways to Presidential style. A cloistered Chief Executive may be perceived as "minding the store" or as being secretive.

Complaints about the effects of advocacy journalism on public figures are not recent phenomena. In fact, George Washington wrote that he was tired of being "buffeted in the public prints by a set of infamous scribbles" (Wise, 1976, p. 458).

Role of the President as a candidate

An incumbent President has several advantages and problems when running for reelection. Let us examine the positive aspects first.

1. The President is usually given attention by the media above that accorded to his rival.
2. The President qua President carries more weight in an argument than his opponent. Knowledge and understanding of all the facts of an issue are attributed to him even when not so.
3. The incumbent has experience in a very unique position. All other experience whether in the Senate or as a governor while valuable, are not equivalent.

The role of being President has certain drawbacks during the campaign.

1. The responsibilities of acting as President may conflict with carrying on a campaign. The question of "Who's minding the store?" is a legitimate one.
2. The President cannot always debate issues of national security and thus may appear to be avoiding a confrontation.

3. The President cannot seem too partisan in his approach. He must appear to be the leader of the whole nation.

A person who is running for the position of Chief Executive must demonstrate that he has better plans for the future of the nation than his opponent. He must also have the political skills to persuade men "to do what they ought to do without persuasion" (Rubin, 1967). Clinton Rossiter (Rubin, 1967) compiled a short list of the qualities necessary in a President: honest, clean, kind, manly, industrious, sincere, frugal, reverent, loyal, intelligent, dignified, eloquent but not slick, affable, courageous, efficient, high principled with a sense of history. He also added "sense of humor" (which the candidate would need if he read the rest of the list.

When the President speaks to the entire nation, preempting prime time television programming, there is an expectation that it will be a political event of note. Two of our past Presidents have made some comments about the public aspects of the office (Barber, 1968). Calvin Coolidge wrote that one of the most appalling trials which can confront a President is the perpetual demand for public utterances. Herbert Hoover thought that the office of the President was more than an executive responsibility, it was

an inspiring symbol of all that is highest in American purpose and ideals. He complained, however, that the public was credulous, and destructive, but never constructive. When some of our Presidents speak it seems as if they are not directing their comments to the audience at hand, but to future readers who will judge them for posterity.

The actual contents of political campaigns which are largely opportunistic, depend upon the nature of contemporary events (war, actual or impending), the party affiliation of the candidate (the Republican image or the Democratic one), the personal attributes of the nominee (age, sex, marital status, state of health, educational background plus personal style), whether or not the party is in or out of office and various audience factors (labor or management interests). The most important prescription in campaigning seems to be the skill to avoid potentially damaging acts since they are more crucial than all the positive and successful ones.

Many of the traits considered necessary to the success of the current candidates appear to be rather ordinary, at best, and irrelevant, at worst, as qualifications for the most extraordinary office in the country. Happy marital relationships are considered mandatory in a politician running for the office of President. Despite the fact that

this stereotype of "goodness" is beyond most mortal men, candidates with the aid of campaign managers and public relations experts attempt to conform to an idealized concept of the Presidency. Much effort is expended on polishing the candidate's speaking style and on trying to counter any negative impressions. Kennedy who worried about the accusations concerning his youth and immaturity tried to appear serious during his debates with Nixon, while Nixon who was said to be rather stiff and frightening beamed with friendliness (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1967). Since physical appearance is a factor in making personal judgments (Berscheid and Walster, 1972), Kennedy had his hair restyled and Nixon had his eyebrows thinned to look less intimidating (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1967).

In 1922, Walter Lippman wrote that "great men, even during their lifetime are usually known to the public only through a fictitious personality" (p. 5). He refers to royalty as the prime example of "constructed personalities" who he considers to be "stage managed." Lippman further differentiates between the "public and regal" image and the "private and human" self. It is probably a common assumption, however, among the members of the American public that extensive mass media coverage and the exigencies of intensive political campaigning prevent the private self of a

candidate from being completely and falsely covered by a manufactured facade.

While many social scientists emphasize the situational aspects of leadership, taking the view that single individuals rarely influence the course of human events, politicians operate as if the political superstar, the exceptional man who has all the right answers, will step in and save the world from impending destruction (brought about by his predecessor from the opposition party). It only remains to convince the public of the merits of the modern day Pericles.

Both professional and amateur politicians are fond of comparing contemporary candidates with the larger than life legends of the earlier years of the Republic. Men like Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, the Adamses, Tome Paine, Madison, John Marshall, Jackson, Lincoln, Calhoun, and others have become myths that seemed scarcely open to challenge except by fanatics. Recently, however, it seems to be a popular parlor game to see how much gossip one can dredge up about our heroes. Perhaps it is necessary to find fault with those who seem too perfect, to reduce them to the size of ordinary people. This strange ambivalence is puzzling. On one hand, there appears to be a constant search for the messianic leader who can find solutions to

monumental problems beyond the ken of most people and on the other hand, there seems to be a need to destroy anything with superior attributes.

There have been two antithetical patterns in the search for leaders. Marx (1964) saw the common people as needing and wanting strong inspirational leadership especially during times of crisis. Weber (1946) also wrote of the demand for the charismatic type of leader, who he considered to be a rather recent model of the absolutist monarch, somewhat in the style of the enlightened despots of the preindustrial period in Europe. In contradistinction to these viewpoints, Dean Acheson felt that we are presently in a historical period when the leaders are essentially mediocre men created in the image of the masses who had only opinions, but not knowledge (Sulzberger, 1973). Acheson's statement may reflect the public reaction to Kennedy's assassination and perhaps even further back to Franklin Roosevelt's death in office. Perhaps we are afraid that the extraordinary man will be punished by malevolent gods. Or perhaps, in a more rational trend, we have discovered that the attractive charismatic leader cannot always solve our problems and so we search for the pragmatic organization man.

The functioning of government is so complex, requiring myriad specialized skills that leaders are constrained

from freely exercising power and initiative. Edinger (1967) writes, "Most political leaders appear nowadays to have neither the will or ability to rise spectacularly above their fellow men and perform great deeds. In politics as elsewhere, collegial leadership by interchangeable and indistinct, if not invisible, managers with relatively little individual decision has become the norm.... leading political actors find that the rules of party government require them to play more or less similar roles if they want to remain on stage. For the audience it has become increasingly difficult to tell leading from supporting players and to know who, if anyone is running the show" (p. 255).

Mass communication

Klapper (1967), citing numerous studies on the influences of mass communication concludes that the "most basic and widely confirmed... finding (is) that mass communication ordinarily serves as an agent of reinforcement for such attitudes, opinions and behavioral tendencies as the individual audience members already possess" (p. 297). Klapper, as well as other theorists (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954), conclude that attitudinal change of direction due to the effects of mass media input are rare events which occur only under highly specific conditions. If change in attitude takes place at all, it is more often considered to be a modification of an already existing position than a complete conversion. While mass communication has not been found to be a potent influence in producing attitude change it has been an effective force in the establishment of new opinions concerning topics about which the audience has no previous discernable viewpoint.

Mass communication research until the late 1950's was based on the assumption that there was a direct relationship between the stimulus and the response. The "hypodermic model" though later modified by the inclusion of audience

variables did not produce clear predictions of possible outcomes of mass media inputs (Klapper, 1967). The current orientation toward the study of the influence of mass media on social events is that of a complex interactive situation where the components have fluctuating weights which are multidirectional. Klapper (1960) has proposed three possible directions for the influence of mass communications.

1. Mass communications while not ordinarily a "necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects," usually functions as the link for a combination of mediating factors.
2. The mediating factors themselves function in a manner that renders "mass communication a contributing agent, but not the sole cause, in a process of reinforcing existing conditions." The influence of the media will more probably result in reinforcement of already existing patterns than in change.
3. In situations where mass communications do change attitudes one of two possible conditions is likely to obtain
 - a. the mediating factors will be found to be inoperative and the effect of the media will be found to be direct; or

b. the mediating factors, which normally favor reinforcement, will be found to be themselves conducive to change.

Before proceeding to a further discussion of the effects of mass media on attitude change, the mediating factors should be discussed.

One of the factors which accounts for a considerable portion of the variance in an attitude change study is the predisposition of the subjects. These predispositions are manifested in a variety of selective processes: selective exposure, selective retention, and selective perception.

Selective exposure refers to the propensity of people, given freedom of choice, to attend to mass communications which reflect their own interests and viewpoints rather than those of opposing schools of thought. There is evidence, for example that political broadcasts, especially those of a partisan nature, attract loyal supporters rather than those that might be converted (Schramm and Carter, 1959).

Selective retention has been well documented by studies in which subjects were better able to recall material which was close to their own viewpoints than that which was contradictory (Levine and Murphy, 1943; Zimmerman and Bauer,

1956). Not only is the effect of selective retention immediately observable, but it increases over a period of time.

Selective perception, or as Klapper (1960) calls the process, "reinforcive interpretation," involves the tendency of subjects to misperceive, misinterpret or distort material in a manner which changes the content from non-supportive of a particular viewpoint to reinforcing. The classic study by Allport and Postman (1945) of spread of rumor documents the influences of social attitudes on perception. The stimulus object was drawing of several people including a white man and a black man having a discussion which could easily be interpreted as an argument. The white man is shown holding an open straight razor. The instructions to the subjects are to describe the situation depicted to each member of a chain of persons in turn. Only the first person on the line, however, has actually perceived the stimulus. The result which most often obtains is that the razor is reported to be in the hand of the black man by the time the story reaches the last person.

The process of selective exposure, selective retention and selective perception are inherent in the audience and not in the communication itself. The communication becomes modified so that it becomes a means of reinforcing existing attitudes rather than converting them.

Other mediating influences affect the relationship between the stimulus (in the form of the mass communication) and the response. The relationship of the individual to various reference groups, some which may be salient to the issue being studied, and the influence of significant others such as opinion leaders are two important factors which affect attitude formation and change.

The family, peer groups, religious organizations and political parties have been demonstrated to be related to voting choices. Group norms, goals, and common interests also influence attitude formation and behavior.

Opinion leadership, the process of personal influence, has been extensively studied in reference to voting, to marketing questions, and to views on important public issues. The main result of all these investigations is that personal influence has been found to be either as important as or more important than the direct effects of mass communications in determining attitudes. The opinion leader, however, is often the link between the media and the public. Opinion leaders, perhaps due to a higher level of interest, have been more exposed to mass communications than the population at large. Since opinion leaders are free to sift and pass on certain bits of information and their own opinions, they act in the capacity of

filters, thus the concept of the "two-step flow" of communication (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948).

The function of the opinion leader, according to Klapper (1960) is less directed toward change than toward the maintenance of group norms. This would serve to make the opinion leader predominantly another agent of reinforcement.

Most of the research to date has demonstrated the reinforcing function of mass communications. The conditions under which conversion of opinion occur are considered to be rare and more dependent on the influence of mediating factors. When change in attitude has been documented, it has been explained, not as a direct result of the influence of the mass media, but as the outcome of a predisposition to accept the message (Klapper, 1966). In the studies already cited, the investigators are essentially discussing the effects of political campaign propoganda and not news items. The influence of the viewing correct events directly may produce other results.

Attitudes are based on cognitive and affective components. Changes in the cognitive factors do not always result in attitude change since discrepant information may be misperceived or misinterpreted to fit existing structures. There are occasions, albeit rare ones, when it is difficult to adjust conditions, when the source of information is

not, and cannot be easily as biased, when the input from one's senses may not be ignored. It seems logical to assume that previous studies have dealt with messages from explicitly partisan sources, on topics or about individuals for which the subjects had existing opinions or at least predispositions. The information in the messages has often been vulnerable to several interpretations, thus leaving the way open for the mediating influences of opinion leaders who are often seen as more knowledgeable than the average citizen, if not exactly an expert. A topic probably does not exist which cannot be analyzed from a variety of viewpoints, some, of course, more legitimate than others.

The selective processes are not free, however, to operate under all conditions. For example, selective exposure can only occur when events are prelabelled as partisan communications. News broadcasts are usually not so designated. Selective retention is difficult when a topic is under discussion daily by almost the entire listening population of the nation, if not the world. Selective interpretation, while possible when there is little information or when the issues are ambiguous, becomes increasingly more difficult with the addition of new and consistent bits of information. Some issues provide very little latitude for the operation of mediating influences.

The personal characteristics and past experiences of the individual are important determinants of how he will respond to a persuasive communication. These factors will influence his tendency to trust the message and its source, his ability to supply counterarguments and his motivation either to change or not to change from his original position. More intelligent subjects respond better to two sided arguments in which the conclusions have not been explicitly stated than to one sided attempts at attitude change in which everything is spelled out for them.

The background, training, occupation, socio-economic status and particular prejudices of people make them interested in and susceptible to various kinds of appeals. The general environment such as the economic conditions of the nation and world also influence the impact of persuasive messages. The proponents of the slogans "A chicken in every pot" or "law and order" have specific target audiences in mind as well as specific situations and issues which are salient.

Most people probably feel that they are immune to the obvious attempts to persuade them to purchase one or another product (candidate) because of their natural scepticism. However, persuasion does not always lose its effect because of the bias or negative appeal of the source (Hovland and

Weiss, 1959). On the other hand, the rather Orwellian view that the mass media is almost hypnotic in its influence on attitudes and behavior is also not supported. Indeed, the results of studies of mass media influence tends to be clearly mixed!

Watson (1966) studied an intensive image building campaign conducted for the oil industry. The results showed thirteen percent of the sample more favorable and nine percent less favorable than before the campaign.

In 1944, Mott reported that newspapers could as easily be for or against the winner or loser during the campaign. Thus, there was no apparent consistent pattern of newspaper influence.

In order to account for past failures to demonstrate measurable effects of persuasive appeals via the mass media there are several possible explanations:

1. The effects of one campaign cancel out the effects of the other and simply prevent erosion from the ranks.
2. With sufficient warning, selective exposure may be operative.
3. It is possible that subtle effects cannot yet be assessed by our current psychological techniques.

4. Most studies are concerned with the short term results. Conceivably, it is the cumulative influence that is important.

5. Many of these studies were conducted before the mass media reached its current level of sophistication and before a sufficient proportion of the population had either radios or more important, television sets.

The major influence on people's attitudes in past studies has been personal influence (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948). Opinion leaders who may, because of a higher level of interest, have been initially influenced by campaign material, were found to be the prime source of attitude formation and/or change. Opinion leaders function not only as transmitters of information and orientation, but they also serve to perpetuate the social norms of the community. They act as models who demonstrate appropriate behavior and "correct" attitudes. One would not argue that in the 1940's such leaders were members of the community to which people had personal access. Currently, however, the opinion leader may just as easily be a television personality like Walter Cronkite as a close neighbor.

The effects of mass media communications especially in field surveys cannot be easily separated from the totality

of influences on the public. There are the aforementioned factors which mediate between the message and the response such as selective exposure, perception, retention, and interpretation. Group membership, the modeling effects of opinion leaders, the situational context, all influence an already complex process leading to results which may be manifested in ways that the researcher is not measuring at the moment. Voting behavior may not be the only dependent variable. Indeed, the attitude change may be latent. Most short term studies of the effects of mass media communications have produced negative results (Trenaman and McQuail, 1961). It may be that what was needed was a more long range view.

Rubin (1967) feels that elections in general, and the office of the Presidency in particular, have been greatly affected by the mass media, especially by television which brings contemporary events home to the viewer as they are happening. The influence of television and the other mass media sources on Presidential politics has often been denigrated or over-emphasized, usually by the losing candidate (Rubin, 1967). The problem is that in 1940, 1944, and even in 1948 when Truman ran against Dewey, television was still a novelty so that results of studies of those elections can scarcely be compared to the impact of television at

the present time or in the future.

Television can be used in several ways. In its educational function it can report news events through on-the-spot coverage leaving little to the imagination. It can also have a powerful editorial effect by selectively presenting material in such a manner as to appear favorable or unfavorable to a specific candidate. By allotting time to candidates differentially, it can make one seem more important than another. There is an "equal time" commitment by the networks to each of the major contenders for coverage of political speeches. However, if one of the candidates is an incumbent, by virtue of the office he holds, he receives attention for non-partisan events. The President has the power to preempt regular programming for a national appearance on major issues. Minority party nominees often complain that they are given insufficient time to present their positions on issues and that whatever time they are allotted is not scheduled when most people are interested in watching television.

National television coverage has created new problems for the candidates. Since the same program is delivered to the entire country simultaneously, it is very difficult for politicians to deliver messages tailored to different target groups such as labor and management. For this reason

television is now considered the most believable source of information. It is also the most widely used medium, having replaced newspapers in that position in 1964 (Rubin, 1967).

Another important problem with the intimate quality of a television presentation is that while it can help to create a public image for a relatively unknown political figure, it can also destroy a long and carefully nurtured persona by instantly magnifying and projecting minor behavioral acts such as a muscle twitch or nervous perspiration to millions of people. Seemingly trivial and irrelevant behaviors grow out of proportion when filtered through the television camera lens.

Many political analysts feel that the outcome of the 1960 Presidential election was profoundly influenced by the series of televised debates between Richard Nixon and John Kennedy. White (1960) considered that Nixon would have been the winner of the election if he had not met Kennedy in the much advertised confrontations which revealed both men to the public in a very personal manner. The debates damaged Nixon's established image of cool composure, superior experience and greater maturity, Kennedy, on the other hand emerged as a self assured, knowledgeable, and well prepared candidate, very much in command of the situation. A question raised by political scientists is whether

or not the successful television debater possesses qualities that are related to capable performance in the White House. The ability to think logically, quickly and intelligently, to produce good workable solutions based on knowledge of the situation may very well appear to be the traits needed in a President. Thus, debating skills in public confrontations may be a reflection of relevant leadership traits or simply an indication that the candidate is not nervous on television.

The efforts of the main candidates in the 1960 election, as in other recent political battles, were directed towards convincing the public not of their own abilities but of the incompetence of the other candidate. Nixon as Vice President has projected the public image of a dignified, forceful character who was already an important political leader. He was portrayed as the type of man who did not back away from difficult problems. He had already displayed a talent for conciliation and accommodation which was considered very impressive (White, 1960). He was seen as a blunt, independent politician with a preference for action over the waiting game. Though a debater in college, it was said that he preferred intimate spontaneous broadcasts better than formal speeches. Kennedy's list of positive traits was also long. According to Rubin (1967), he was

self disciplined, intelligent and knowledgeable, willing to listen to advice he trusted, ambitious, willing to take risks, self confident, energetic and good looking. He has a sense of humor, was a war hero, a historian, and had style, grace and vigor. With all those qualities plus the efforts of his family, it is a wonder that Nixon came as close in the popular vote (if not the electoral college) as he did. How much effect the issue of Kennedy's religion had is very difficult to estimate.

Because another of the issues of the campaign had been his youth and relative inexperience, Kennedy made a distinct effort to appear mature and serious at his inauguration. He spoke in a straightforward, yet eloquent manner. His speech was considered to be inspiring, but not pretentious (Rubin, 1967). Whether or not the personality projected through the mass media actually represented Kennedy's "private self," the public as a whole was proud of his way of conducting himself as a symbol of the United States. He attracted a loyal following from all segments of the population. He was not, of course, without enemies.

Politics has been described by McWilliams (1961) as tantamount to the merchandising of men and measures under combat conditions with an enemy in the form of the political opposition, a time limit and a decisive outcome in terms

of the election. He further points out that if there is no real enemy to attack, political managers must invent one.

In order to promote a particular kind of image, the professional politicians must have a philosophy about the type of person that voters will support. There is the question which was previously raised as to whether or not the qualities that contribute to the success of the nominee actually correlate closely with those necessary to the performance of the tasks of the job of President. Hyman (1961) lists a few of the characteristics which have been considered essential or at least related to successful candidacy in past elections. The following compilation is a combination of Hyman's characteristics and those of the author.

1. A happy home life is one of the primary factors related to being selected as a political candidate. The philosophy behind the apparent necessity for a loving spouse and cherubic children may be that a person who is not capable of maintaining a stable homelife could not possibly manage a whole nation's problems. The family image also reflects the candidate's obvious heterosexual orientation.
2. Proven political talent is a second important

characteristic. Past experience both in actual functioning in a government leadership role and in winning elections is seen as a valid indicator of future performance. Thus the appointed official is not considered as good a candidate as the elected one. The governor of a large state, for example, has an excellent background.

3. The nominee should have multiple areas of political concern so that he can appeal to various segments of the population. Being a "one issue" candidate is to be vulnerable, especially if that issue is resolved before the election.

4. Certain demographic variables such as residency in one of the "big swing states," small town origins, Anglo-Saxon heritage, identification with a Protestant religion are also helpful since they mean that the candidate will be acceptable to a large proportion of the population.

In past elections these rules have not been applied simultaneously not with equal weight to all candidates. In the future, Presidential candidates may reflect the increasing urbanization of the United States and a deemphasis of the religious issue. Marital status as a factor may also be of diminishing importance. In fact, it may be a positive

virtue to be divorced since an increasingly larger portion of the electorate belongs to that group.

The success with which techniques of persuasion (mass communications or others) alter attitude structures also varies with the location of the experimental manipulation. In the more easily controlled environment of the laboratory, it is often relatively easy to change expressed attitudes, while in the so-called "real world," reformations of attitudes seem rather more difficult (Hovland, 1959). It has been noted that, on occasion, a candidate who was relatively unknown at the beginning of the campaign actually won the election. Ostensibly, this positive outcome was based on an extensive advertising program with intensive media coverage and face to face contacts. The observer must, however, consider the merits of the other nominees who may have had negative characteristics that enabled the "dark horse" to "carry the field."

Most Americans decide on a candidate directly after the nominating convention. Thus, the subsequent campaigns are directed toward protecting the nominee against loss of committed supporters and toward attracting the seven to ten percent of the electorate who remain undecided. Since it seems easier to establish new attitudes than to change stable ones, few politicians hope for a swarm of converts

from the opposition party during the campaign.

Political propoganda usually has little effect on the public because of the relatively low levels of exposure to most political events. The amount of interest expressed by the average citizen with regard to political speeches is very low. However, a phenomenon of the magnitude of the Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960 drew an audience of an estimated eighty million people (Freedman, Carlsmith, and Sears, 1974).

Even when new information exists concerning a political issue, it is generally interpreted in terms of existing attitude structures rather than on its own merits. "Merits," of course, are in the eyes of the beholder. This is the explanation usually proffered for the relatively low impact, in the past, at least, of the mass media on attitudes (Klapper, 1960).

Selective exposure and favorable reception of material which fit the already established belief systems provides the needed cognitive consistency to keep the whole structure in balance. Those ideas which do not fit the structure easily are less readily accepted. Should an individual be faced with equally balanced information concerning two sides of an important issue, he is more likely to accept the input which more closely coincides with his

already established beliefs.

The ego defense mechanisms function primarily to protect the person from damage to his self attitude. Selectively in exposure to unfavorable material, in perception, and interpretation enables a person to defend, maintain and even enhance his ego.

In the Erie County election study of 1940 (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948), the local newspapers were reported to favor the Republicans while the radio was generally considered impartial except for President Roosevelt's broadcasts. One of the findings showed that Republicans tended to read the newspapers and Democrats listened to the radio. Selective exposure is relatively common in regard to political speeches, newspaper articles and television or radio broadcasts that are previously labelled as partisan.

It should be noted that while only twenty percent of the public have stable and consistent attitudes concerning areas of governmental policy, the concepts of "nation," "authority," and certain prominent political leaders are quite stable (Sears, 1969). Party identification which was once, if not at the present, taken quite seriously, strongly determined voting preferences (Wolfinger and Page, 1972), so that knowledge of the issues was not crucial to the decision making process. Thus, the voter may not have

felt the need to listen to campaign speeches.

Some attitude structures (e.g., the President), are products of early, deep and generally positive socialization. It seems logical to assume a rather high level of commitment on the part of the public towards them. Attitudes which are well established and are associated with this high level of commitment are rarely shaken. Thus, the candidate who can more closely associate himself with the Presidency has an advantage.

One explanation for the difficulty in changing high commitment and/or long term attitudes through mass media presentations besides selective exposure and favorable reception is based on the fact that a real perceived challenge to these deep entrenched concepts is rare. The usual propaganda techniques often amount to very insignificant attacks by one political contender (with an obvious bias) on another, not negative information from an unbiased source. Attitudes toward objects based on lower levels of commitment should be easier to alter once the message can penetrate the barriers of lack of interest, low exposure and selectivity. As has been noted, it is possible to define the terms "attitude" and "opinion" according to level of commitment. "Attitudes" would be those structures which elicit high degrees of affect, are deeply imbedded in the

total belief system and are relatively impervious to normal types of propoganda attacks, while "opinions," generally transient in nature, involve less affect, are not completely intergrated into the system and are therefore more malleable. One could then hold an attitude toward an office or a position and/or a person occupying it about whom one had extensive knowledge, past experience and for whom one had made some kind of a commitment. An "opinion," on the other hand, would be held about less central and ego involving issues. To change an attitude, the communication would have to rise above an extremely high threshold of tolerance. Opinions would be more easily influenced since they require less environmental input for change to occur. The main problem, of course, with this type of definition is that it operates in an ex post facto manner. A cognitive-affective structure that is difficult to change becomes an attitude; one that is easily influenced must, of course, become an opinion.

It has been stated that the advertising treatment used to promote political candidates is not dissimilar to those used in standard cereal and soap compaigns (White, 1960). The methods employed to sell products such as planned repetition and endorsement by known and respected sponsors are standard to both functions. Commercial announcers and

politicians must have good diction, mature sounding voices and be able to face a television audience with sincerity. According to Hughes (1976), speechwriters are selected not for their ability to write what the politician wants to convey, but they are hired for their talent in making the politician "sound as he would like to sound" (p. 58).

Candidates, in their desire to project a positive and dynamic image in the media tend to encourage network coverage of the less boring aspects of conventions and campaigns. Network executives themselves tend to emphasize action scenes more than quiet discussions of issues (Patterson and McClure, 1976).

In a rather disparaging view of political campaigns, Huxley (1958) reports that carefully selected samples of the electorate are given extended interviews in order to determine the unconscious motivation operant in the general population at the time of the election. Both he and the campaign managers seem to have more faith in the power of psychological political warfare than seems warranted on the basis of evidence from mass media research. Patterson and McClure (1976) indicate that a vast majority of Americans may be immune to advertising propoganda. Even people without very much information on political issues may not be fooled by messages that strain their credibility (Osgood

et al, 1957) or that fall outside of their boundaries for acceptance. People test propoganda against old beliefs and attitudes, common sense ideas and embrace or reject material based on whether or not it fits the structure. It may be, according to Patterson and McClure, that candidates are projecting an "empty image." Politicians believe that their staged or even spontaneous television appearances project an image to the audience. They think that the viewer perceives the candidate's leadership qualities in relationship to the enthusiasm of campaign crowds. Nevertheless, the authors found that voter images of the candidates were influenced only marginally by the style and appearance of the candidate in television news coverage. Among those voters who are supporting a candidate because of party affiliation or issue orientation, propoganda appeals fail at image making because they usually cannot overcome prior commitment. In a sense then, image making is an attempt to persuade the already persuaded and may be doomed to failure. Whether or not commercial techniques in mass media communications are successful or not, is really still a topic for empirical study.

It is a basic assumption of this study that, despite selective processes which filter out some media messages and interpersonal communications, clearly defined, cohesive

images of political candidates are formed by the general public. Further, these images can be related to decision making processes in national elections.

Public opinion polls

The term "public opinion" is generally used in the singular implying one homogeneous attitude on a particular subject. The public, however, is many-faceted in its composition some members are constant and steadfast almost to the point of rigidity while others are more flexible in their views. Actually, in a country of millions of people there are thousands of publics who rearrange themselves into partisan groups on each issue. Despite this diversity of interests, public opinion does manifest some recurring patterns. Consistency in attitudes are determined by the fact that many Americans are subjected to common socializing influences and have some mutual goals. However, public opinion on certain issues is often "extremely fluid and changeable" (Burns and Petlason, 1955). This statement applies to some of the most basic, deeply rooted attitudes. The Gallup poll, for instance, asks the question "What do you regard as the most important problem before the American people today?" Between the crucial years of 1935 and 1948 the percentage of people who felt that foreign policy was of great importance varied from 7% to 81% (Almond, 1950).

Not only does the proportion of the population holding an attitude fluctuate, but the actual makeup of the interested

public also changes. Obviously, a variety of issues will be salient to differing segments of the population at the same time, but the same issue may also attract a changing public over a period of time. People holding the same opinion may also vary in the intensity of their beliefs, some being rather passive while others verge on the fanatic. Attitudes which are passively held are more subject to influence than those which are deeply entrenched and ego involving. Public opinion may also be latent. The successful politician is the one able to assess latent or potential public attitudes and help to crystallize those ideas which will benefit his campaign (Doob, 1948).

Public opinion is shaped by the overall cultural beliefs and values and the economic and social foundations of our society especially as transmitted through the agency of the family. While some people rebel against their family backgrounds, a great many conform. (MacIver, 1947; Newcomb, Koenig, Flacko, and Warwick, 1967). Other socializing agencies include the school system, religious institutions, peer groups and mass media outlets, especially television. While early studies deemphasized the direct influence of television on attitude change (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948) there is recent evidence that "pictures are often the most effective means of communication and persuasion" (Burns and

Peltason, 1955). By providing the public with particular conceptions of the world the influence of the newspapers, magazines, radio and television may both directly or indirectly influence political behavior. The view of a frustrated politician shedding tears at a personal injustice bespeaks the image of a weak person who cannot control his emotions. In only a few minutes a carefully planned campaign can be destroyed when an audience of millions is privy to incidents which would have reached only a few hundred people at the turn of the century.

In recognition of the influence of the media on attitude formation, society has created a new skill group composed of public relations experts or propogandists or "media men." These are essentially advertising experts who help to shape the public images of politicians as well as business firms with products to sell. While they are devoting time to polishing the personal charm of their clients they are also interested in denegrating the attributes of the opposition. A sample of typical techniques involves a manipulation of symbols through name calling, the use of glittering generalities, transfer of identification, testimonials by famous supporters, card stacking, the "band wagon" effect. In order for propoganda appeals to be successful, the public must perceive that the intent is to

give objective information instead of influencing opinion or the result of the message may be to foster resistance instead of support.

Public opinion polls are over a century old. The accuracy of their findings depends largely on the representativeness of the sample. It must be drawn from a cross section of the population based on relevant factors such as geographic locality and respondent characteristics of sex, age, education level and socio-economic status. While truly random selection of the sample is not generally practical, the results of recent surveys have usually reflected the attitude of the voting population. The Gallup Poll may use a sample ranging from 1500 to 60,000 people depending on the question being asked (Burns and Peltason, 1955).

Two important problems in polling are construction of the questions so as not to predetermine answers and training interviewers to eliminate further bias. Interviewing is a difficult and delicate task. The results can often be contaminated by the interviewers appearance and clothes (Schuman, 1974), or language and manner of asking questions (Sherfey, 1974). Respondents may be suspicious of the interviewers motives. They may give either false or confused responses or in order to cover their ignorance

on some subject they may give either neutral answers or appear undecided. Finally, they may give the answers they think the interviewer wants to hear (Rosenthal, 1966).

Polls do not always accurately predict events, not only for the reasons given above such as inaccurate sampling or interviewer bias, but also because intentions as expressed in a poll do not always lead directly to the expected behavior. First, the respondent may change his mind about the candidate and second, he may not vote at all. Polls probably influence the organization of the campaign and the political writers more than they actually influence the voter. It is possible that the undecided voter may be affected by polling information especially in the final weeks of the campaign. The decision to vote, at that point, may be tipped in the direction of the leading contender. The fear of the "band wagon" effect on the West coast was so strong, that early election tabulations from the more easterly regions are no longer reported.

Roll and Cantril (1972) claim that most politicians, newspapermen and voters are not sufficiently familiar with polling techniques or analysis to be able to distinguish between a well designed and executed poll and a poorly conducted one. Furthermore, most people cannot differentiate between a significant finding and one that could be mislead-

ing in its implications.

Field surveys

The differences in results between laboratory studies and field research reflect the influence of variables besides level of control. These differences may be due, at least partially, to the selection of topics used in either setting and to the constraint of limited time on most manipulations occurring in academic laboratory situations. In general, experimenters select conditions that are expected, on the basis of some theory, to be conducive to attitude change. Experimenters also attempt to find issues involving attitudes which will be susceptible to manipulation through various persuasive techniques. Surveys, on the other hand, usually deal with more socially significant issues than laboratory studies. These are deeply entrenched, ego involving structures for which people have often made public commitments as to their viewpoints (Cohen, 1964), and are thus rather impervious to most counter-attitudinal attacks.

The differences in topic selection may help to illuminate some of the problems involved in attitude change manipulations. For example, in a laboratory experiment which deals with a relatively uninvolved issue, orientations may be easily shaped by persuasive communications from an

acknowledged expert. In this case, advocacy of a position that is widely discrepant from that of the target may lead to a substantial shift in initial attitude. There is considerable evidence concerning the effects of the credibility of the source to support this concept. Survey studies utilizing basic issues have demonstrated little or no attitude change. The more discrepant the message, the more resistance the target displays, even to the point of actually strengthening the original position.

Personal involvement with any issue makes a significant difference both in the direction or intensity of change (Sherif and Hovland, 1963). Moderate to large discrepancies either produce a shift in attitude or a boomerang effect depending on level of personal involvement which usually (but not necessarily) differs in laboratory and field situations.

The reason most deeply embedded or ego involving attitudes are not easily influenced, is that they have a history of withstanding all but the most major challenges. The environment does not often provide negative input of that magnitude. Low level attacks may be ignored or reinterpreted especially when the message is somewhat ambiguous. Even given irrefutable environmental input which cannot be easily avoided, some subjects remain totally resistant

(Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 1950). In order to feel free to change a publically expressed viewpoint, the individual must have some face saving, ego defensive tactic to explain his behavior both to the world and to himself.

Another of the major limitations on conducting attitude change research in the laboratory is that the setting itself tends to elicit compliance in the subjects rather than independence (Orne, 1962; Weick, 1967). The atmosphere in the laboratory which produces acquiescence is based on the following sources.

1. The presumed credibility of the source, given the prestige of the usual laboratory situation, a university psychology department.
2. The role of the experimenter qua experimenter as an expert.
3. The uncertainty and ambivalence with which subjects approach experiments.
 - a. The desire of the subjects to help "science."
 - b. The further desire of the subjects to cooperate with a friendly or popular professor.
 - c. The fact that university experiments are closely associated with classroom

work because of course requirements.

4. The hierarchical arrangement in the laboratory due to age differential or traditional sex role responses when the experimenter is male and the subject is female.

5. The anxiety of the subject due to lack of knowledge of "correct" behavior in the experiment.

6. Lack of perception on the part of many subjects of viable alternatives to compliant behavior due to socialization toward obedience.

The work of Orne (1961), Rosenthal (1966), Kelman (1958), Asch (1952) and Milgram (1963) leads us to believe that the laboratory interaction, especially in the university setting is conducive to producing some form of cooperation. The subject, having been exposed to a persuasive and discrepant communication, is aware that some response is expected, probably not his original one. If experiments were not conducted in laboratory settings, it is possible that the levels of change would be reduced, that responses based on extreme manipulation would be reversed or that no change at all would occur.

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as related to source variables, one can hypothesize that field survey responses will be affected because the respondent finds something attractive (unattractive) about the interviewer with which he identifies.

Another problem involved in many laboratory experiments is the artificial time limit placed on the manipulation. If the setting is the university, the whole procedure may have to be compressed into the normal class period of 50 minutes. Even voluntary subjects are not willing or able to spend limitless amounts of time attending to "devastatingly interesting persuasive communications," as defined by the experimenter who composed them. While subjects may not feel free to leave an overly long experiment, they may consciously or unconsciously resort to tactics of passive resistance.

If the general public objected to being interviewed, the threat would not only be to national polling procedures, but also to psychological research projects which would be reduced to sampling the opinions of college students. Fortunately, while some subjects consider responding to surveys a waste of time or an imposition, others are flattered and pleased to respond. When objections are voiced, they usually relate to the invasion of privacy (Hartmann, Isaacson, and Gurgell, 1974). Sixty two percent of the sample that

expressed resentment toward some aspect of the interview procedure cited income questions as particularly offensive, seven percent mentioned that they did not like to be asked their age and only one percent objected to questions concerning educational level. Eleven percent felt that the questions in general were too personal.

Social desirability. The influence on the "social desirability" component on subject's responses to self evaluative questions has been of concern to many researchers (Butler and Haigh, 1954; Zuckerman and Monashkin, 1957) conclude that subjects who are unwilling to attribute undesirable characteristics to themselves should be considered, almost by definition, maladjusted. While there may be some validity to that statement in a clinical context, the concept of maladjustment probably does not always generalize to other situations. It is possible then to view socially desirable responses in terms of the subjects perception of the payoff matrix. The person, for example, who voluntarily submits to testing procedures, would not deny functional problems or symptoms since that would be disadvantageous to the goal of receiving optimal treatment. If the individual, however, is seeking an employment position, admittance to graduate school or simply replying to a questionnaire in a classroom

situation, the self protective aspect becomes the most salient variable and should not be construed as an indication of neurotic tendencies. Most sophisticated students and job hunters are aware that it seems more "normal" or "human" to mention a few faults especially those that might even be turned into advantages. This "modest" and "truthful" approach is generally designed to convince the listener of the veridicality of the rest of one's statements.

People who are highly committed to an issue or an object tend to give extreme responses, perhaps due to their high level of interest or due to a desire to convince the other of the importance of the issue.

Conceptions of the type of responses that would be considered socially desirable differ between cultural groups, individual respondents and even psychologists. Within certain subgroups there may, in fact, be a positive need to perform in a socially undesirable manner as compared to the general explicit population norms.

Crowne and Stephens (1961) suggest four hypotheses to account for the impact of social desirability as a variable in research results:

1. Social desirability has no effect at all on test results. This assumption is basic to the use of self report data since it states that what the

subject says about himself is essentially a valid and direct indication of his perceived state at that time.

2. Social desirability factors account for equal variance in all subjects' test scores. Thus the researcher may discount its influence.

3. Social desirability, while it may or may not be an important factor for all subjects, accounts for more of the variance in the responding of some subjects than others.

4. Differences in social desirability reflect differences in conception of what is socially desirably. According to Crowne and Stephens Hypothesis 4 does not conflict with Hypothesis 3, while Hypotheses 3 and 4 are definitely incompatible with Hypotheses 1 and 2.

It is possible to add a fifth hypothesis to Crowne and Stephen's list: Certain cues within a questionnaire or concepts in a procedure such as the Semantic Differential elicit responses influenced by the social desirability variable, while others do not. Thus, social desirability may not be an all pervasive variable affecting all responses, but may have a selective effect. To be more specific, in a study of political attitudes, desirability probably in-

fluences the self concept and the Ideal President concept more than the concept involving one's own candidate and even more than that of the opposition candidate. On the other hand, it could also be considered social desirable to express extremely negative comments about the opposition candidate.

The Leniency effect. The "leniency effect" (Tagiuri, 1968) or "positivity bias" (Sears and Whitney, 1973) is the tendency to rate oneself and others higher on the more favorable or positive traits and lower on the unfavorable or negative traits. Generally, in attitude change studies the direction of change tends to be towards the positive end of the continuum. In laboratory studies, ratings of stimulus persons, whether or not previously known by the judge also tend to be positive. Public opinion polls in the past have shown that political leaders are given positive evaluations more often than negative even by members of opposing parties (Osgood, Tannenbaum, and Suci, 1957). It is important to note, however, that there is some evidence for a recent negative trend in attitudes toward politicians. Sears and Whitney (1973) found that college educated subjects did not evaluate political leaders as highly as people with less education. Leniency in judgement,

the assumption that most people are probably "good," may be a cultural or even temporal phenomenon responsive to external influence. Thus, one would expect less upward bias at the present time than has been demonstrated in past research.

The Semantic Differential

The concept of attitude has been widely used to predict behavioral outcomes. The degree to which attitudes can be used for this purpose depends upon two assumptions: first, that the attitude being measured is related to an ego-involving issue and thus could be a major determinant of the behavior in question; second, that the procedures used to measure attitudes are valid and reliable (Diab, 1967). If either of these assumptions is not met the accuracy of the predictions would be questionable.

An individual's attitude is represented on most conventional attitude scales by a single preference score or a "most acceptable" position marked somewhere on a continuum of positions ranging from "highly favorable" to "highly unfavorable" (Diab, 1967). Attitude questionnaires and scales typically do not involve deception. Subjects are fully cognizant of the fact that their orientations towards objects or issues are being measured. The Semantic Differential (Osgood, Tannenbaum, and Suci, 1957), as a measuring instrument, is somewhat less open to analysis by the respondents and thus, supposedly less influenced by conscious biasing.

The Semantic Differential is assumed to measure a

particular person's reaction to a given stimulus at a given time. The variations due to perceptions of the stimuli or to differences in subject samples or to changes over time or any interaction of the three may be the foci of the investigation. The instrument itself is usually composed of a number of concepts that are rated on lists of bi-polar scales. Respondents are requested to check one point on each continuum of seven spaces ranging from a positive to negative pole. The order of the scales are rearranged and the poles are changed for each concept studied in order to prevent biasing of results due to response set. The Semantic Differential is thus an efficient technique for gathering large amounts of data which can easily be quantified not only as to direction but also as to intensity of opinion with a minimum of response set biasing (Mindak, 1969).

The connotative meaning of a concept can be located on the dimensions of semantic space by the use of judgments on several continua. The assumption of equivalency among many such continua is made so that several may be represented by a single dimension. A limited number of these dimensions (Evaluation, Potency and Activity) have been used to define a multidimensional semantic space within which the meaning of any concept can be determined.

Attitudes have been said to be comprised of three

components: the cognitive, the affective and the conative. In a Semantic Differential analysis of connotative meaning, the Evaluative factor can be considered a measure of the affective component (Osgood et al, 1957). Osgood theorizes that the affective component, that is, the "liking" or "disliking" of a concept is the most central component of the structure of an attitude and often equates the two. In most of his studies, Osgood found that the evaluative dimension accounted for the largest portion of the total variance. He included a number of scales representing other factors in part to disguise the purpose of the measurement procedure and in part to provide additional information.

Osgood has generally emphasized the independence of the three major factors. However, it is possible that different people may rate a concept the same way on the evaluative scales and still have totally different meanings for the concept as reflected in the profiles as wholes or in clusters of scales. For example, one subject may rate an object as "bad," "strong," and "active," while another may rate the same object as "bad," "weak," and "passive." Obviously, the first conceptualization can be categorized as more dangerous and negative than the second. Unfortunately, the literature concerning political and other concepts often reports only the evaluative scale score making total com-

parisons difficult.

In studies dealing with a variety of scales concepts and subjects, factor analyses have demonstrated that the Semantic Differential consistently generated similar Evaluation Potency and Activity (EPA) structures (Heise, 1969). While a significant portion of the variance in human judgment may often be accounted for in terms of Osgood's three basic dimensions which he considered to be orthogonal most of the time, political concepts seem to elicit different patterns. When researchers utilize Osgood's adjectival bi-polar scales for the analysis of political concepts such as "The Federal Government," "The President," and "Congress" to measure either positive support or antagonism, it is often the case that factor analysis does not yield the three usual dimensions (Watts, 1974). Osgood, Tannenbaum, and Suci (1957) discovered early in their research program that certain political structures tended to produce a single composite dimension which ranged in interpretation from "benevolent dynamism" to "malevolent insipidness." DiVesta (1966) also found that the potency and activity factors merge into a dynamism factor. The conclusion was drawn that such concepts might be best investigated using a single "characteristic attribute" approach in which the three dimensions might be collapsed into one overall de-

scriptor.

Occasionally, just to complicate the situation, the Evaluative, Potency and Activity dimensions have been found to expand into more than three components instead of compressing into a single unit. Komorita and Bass (1967) demonstrated that attitudes towards American policy in Vietnam and towards the draft varied along three separate evaluative dimensions alone. Borgatta (1964) and Norman (1963) have found that when subjects employ the adjectival ratings to assess person concepts, a five factor structure may be more descriptive. Smith (1961) has also demonstrated that the Evaluative factor may break down into subdivisions. Wiggins and Fishbein (1966), who found a similar split in the Evaluative factor, postulate that the dimensionality of semantic space may be influenced by subject variables.

Individual differences have also been noted in the protocols of different subjects so that some respondents produce the familiar EPA pattern while others simplified to two dimensions or elaborated into four or even more. Therefore, it is evident that Osgood's EPA dimensions are not inviolate. Since research by political scientists indicates that compressions or expansion is a frequent finding, a factor analysis of each sample is probably necessary (Weissberg, 1972).

Factor analysis may be important since the compression phenomenon may not be a methodological artifact but more likely a meaningful discovery about the nature of political attitudes. Convergence may reflect the attribution of meaning, the connotative definition of certain political concepts. For example, attitudinal expectations for the "good" leader (Evaluative dimensions) involve strength and activity as well as trustworthiness and various other inter-related factors. These joint expectations are probably acquired simultaneously during the process of political socialization. A person who occupies the position of President of the United States, for example, must be healthy and tireless as well as wise. Great precautions have been taken on various occasions to protect the public as well as friends and opponents from even the suspicion that the Executive-in-Chief was ill or over-tired. The stock market has often been influenced by the state of health of the President.

Heise (1969) considers that scale-concept interactions are more frequently methodological artifacts than true research findings. Accordingly, if studies are properly designed, they should not occur. If real scale-concept interactions do exist then the instrument should be tailored to the stimulus domain. A generalized Semantic Differential

using the standard scales such as "good-bad" and "fast-slow" may be useful for "rough and ready" measurements, but, writes Heise, precise measurements can only be obtained from specifically designed instruments. The obvious problems with studies designed for specific stimuli at specific points in time are first, that comparisons with between classes of concepts at the same time, or second, between similar concepts over time become very difficult. It also presupposes that the scale-concept interactions are a function of a common frame of reference and not due to a particular group's perceptions.

Many factor analyses do not consider "concept" as a separate variable. It is possible that the finding that some scales do not appear in their usual places in the EPA structure is due, at least in part, to the influence of the concept category. The difficulty with concept-scale interactions is not whether they can be demonstrated empirically, but rather how these results should be explained. The phenomenon may be due, as Heise postulates, to methodological artifacts or to the influence of the concept. Scales also take on different meanings in clusters when related to a specific concept. "Sharp," for example, which usually means potent may take on a colloquial connotation when linked with "wise" and "realistic" for a political candidate,

or it may mean not "dull" when attributed to a "warm," "fair," "pleasant" and "wise" self concept.

Friedman and Gladden (1969) using the Semantic Differential technique have found some justification for distinguishing between two concepts which they label "role" and "position." "Position" is the term applied to "a standard or ideal series of behaviors which the role play may approximate in varying degrees, while "role" may vary according to the individual occupying it" (p. 491). Accordingly it should be possible to establish the ideal traits of the position of the President of the United States and compare the qualities of the incumbents, the aspirants, and the self concepts of the voting population to establish whether or not there is a relationship between characteristics valued in political leadership roles and the distribution of these same traits in the electorate or in the candidates. If there is a significant difference between these profiles, then there is some support for the contention that differentiation of roles and/or position does take place.

The Semantic Differential is open to some of the criticisms that have directed toward other attitude measures. Since the Semantic Differential also employs scales marked by a single reference point, the possibility exists that the same ratings on one or a number of scales may represent

different orientations, particularly in the case of "neutral" or "central" ratings. When a subject marks the middle or neutral point on all scales it may mean that he has no real attitude toward the concept or that he defines the concept as neither "good" nor "bad," in other words "meaningless." The subject may also judge the concept to be equally "good" or "bad." This implies ambivalency not lack of feeling. Finally, the subject could believe in the social desirability of a "middle of the road" approach, even while he is consciously or unconsciously committed to more extreme stands for or against the issue. This kind of response style has been called the "norm of liberal moderation" (Diab, 1967). Thus, the problem becomes one of distinguishing between subjects who give identical ratings of a concept but who may have different anchors or motivations. Hopefully, with a sufficiently large sample in each respondent category such biases will be balanced in the end.

Heise (1969) in his review of the methodological research concerning the Semantic Differential, raises the problem of biasing in terms of another particular response style, the tendency toward checking the extremes of each scale. It is usually assumed that group data will be less influenced by this difficulty than individual protocols. There may, however, be a tendency for one group to engage

in this response style more than others. The issue has already been raised in connection with research using subjects with authoritarian personalities (Mogar, 1960). If the same group is also influenced by the need to respond in a way that is perceived to be socially desirable, the differences generated by comparisons of group profiles may reflect personality traits in responding more than actual differences in attitude toward the concept involved. Let us hypothesize for the moment that there may be more "authoritarians" in the Republican party. If they feel the necessity to respond very favorably to the party's candidate despite some personal misgivings and, if they have a tendency toward responding to rating scales by checking to extremes of the continua that exceeds that of the other groups, then differences between group profiles may be immensely magnified due to systematic biasing error.

The essential question is whether or not the true variance is derived from real differences in attitude structures or from random error or systematic bias. The biasing problem due to response style may influence one concept category more than another or one factor more than another. Evaluation scales, which are often the most salient elements in an attitude survey are probably more affected by social desirability than Potency or Activity scales. The scale

interaction with a concept such as "Myself" which is heavily evaluative by nature, would be more open to the influence of this source of error than a concept like "Wood."

In order to use the Semantic Differential to measure the connotative meanings of various concepts one must make several assumptions about the metric properties of the individual bi-polar scales (Messick, 1969). The first such assumption is that when one assigns an integer score to a scale position on any one particular scale, equality of intervals within the scale should exist. The second assumption is that there are equal intervals between scales. The use of factor analysis with the Semantic Differential scales also implies that the "zero point" or origin of each scale should fall at the same place if the scale intervals are actually the same length. If these assumptions are not met then a distorted picture of the basic structure would result from the factor analysis. Since recent research has established "the quality of corresponding interval lengths from scale to scale and similar placement or origins across scales," one can draw the conclusion that the scaling properties postulated by Osgood et al (1957) have a sound basis (Messick, 1969).

The main goal of Osgood's original study of attitudes toward political actors and issues was to describe, using

the Semantic Differential, the "meanings" of political concepts to various groups subjects. These groups were expected to hold differing opinions with respect to the concepts relevant to the Presidential election of 1952. The various voter groups generated almost identical patterns of characteristic attributes. Osgood interpreted this finding to indicate that despite different political orientations and large differences in the meanings of particular concepts (the individual candidates), these groups employed basically the same frame of reference in making political judgments. Thus, the voter groups were assumed to be members of the same population, holding a common set of values and making the same relevant discriminations with respect to candidates and issues.

Whether or not voter groups do use the same frame of reference is a question that should be answered with each succeeding study. It is always possible that the 1952 election was a unique event.

While the Semantic Differential has a certain amount of face validity in studying attitudes, it suffers from the problem of all scales in that it loses in-depth material which can only be gained from interviews (Mindak, 1969). There is also the question as to whether or not the most appropriate scales have been selected to describe the con-

cepts under investigation. However, the overall validity of the technique, based on scores of already established scales such as those of Thurstone, Likert and Guttman, appears to be high (Brinton, 1969).

Since the Semantic Differential as a measuring technique seems particularly responsive to what are generally termed "situational factors" (Friedman and Gladden, 1969), it should be particularly useful in measuring change in political attitudes over time.

The usual statistical measures used to test differences between Semantic Differential profiles are the \bar{D} score and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Differences between scale means for groups are assessed by the t test. The profiles are plotted for individuals by single scores or for groups by mean scores. However, the standard deviations for the group scores also provide information about the cohesiveness of group attitudes. In a study of unlimited resources, one may test these differences to see how clearly defined the perceptions of a given concept may be.

In order to test whether or not various groups use the same frame of reference, a variety of factor analytical procedures may also be employed. However, the decisions made as to the similarity or difference between factor structures is often reduced to the subjective judgment of the

researcher.

In sum, there are a great many ways to analyze the data derived from check marks placed on scales by respondents with varying levels of interest, response style biases, and capacity to comprehend exactly what they are doing. At times it seems as if the level of sophistication of the statistical analyses far outweigh the sophistication of the original data. Perhaps one should plot group data in terms of whole profiles using normal curves at each scale mean.

Summary and hypotheses

Although it has been established that the relationship between attitudes and behavior is strongly influenced by situational factors and reinforcement contingencies, the importance of studying predispositions toward objects is not negated. When decisions are not overwhelmingly affected by the payoff-risk matrix, attitudes have a directive quality which contributes to the selection of one alternative from a set of possible choices (McGuire, 1968).

In the area of political behavior, the voting population may perceive not only that events are complexly determined, but also that sufficient relevant information may not be available on which to make rational decisions. The lack of pertinent facts is not due to a paucity of campaign literature, but to an inability on the part of the public to distinguish clearly between objective material and biased presentations. The public is bombarded with campaign speeches, promises, and predictions of imminent doom to the nation as a whole if the speaker's opponent wins. Even if all the salient facts were freely accessible, differential weighting of the various issues would only augment the difficulty in information processing. In order to reduce the number of stimulus inputs to a workable level and to

simplify the decision making process, the potential voter may come to rely on partisan affiliation and/or perception of the personal characteristics of the nominees. A major argument concerning reliance on the perceived traits of the candidates is that media exposure distorts the "real" qualities of the individual. The essential fear about the emphasis on or fascination with public images and clever campaign techniques is that differences in philosophical approaches to government or relevant skills will become obscured behind a media manufactured facade.

The situation is further complicated due to the lack of specificity and clarity in both group goals and means to attain these goals in many organizations including the federal government. It is often difficult to predict exactly what specific task oriented skills will be relevant to high executive status. At the lower levels of any organizational hierarchy, positions usually entail roles which are clearly specified allowing of little individual variation. At the upper levels where the goals are often vague, much more discretionary behavior is the norm. Personality characteristics are more closely related to discretionary action than to programmed functions. The general leadership qualities or personal traits of candidates for high office may indeed be more relevant to the decision

making process than their level of professional expertise. Thus, if the public bases its voting choices on the public images of the candidates, the decisions may be better related to the performance of the Presidential role than one based on specific task skills or current issue orientation. The position of Chief Executive covers so many different areas that reliance on advisors, each knowledgeable in his own field, seems a sensible approach to government. This view of the role of the President equates the job with those of executives in industry or other complex organizations. Leadership strength may lie in being a good administrator who is responsive to the needs of the organization.

The part played by mass media sources in past elections has sometimes been relegated to a secondary position (Lazarsfeld et al, 1944). However, in recent years the influence of instant viewing of important events has superceded the role of the family or the local opinion leader on determining the voter's intentions (Rubin, 1967; Burns and Peltason, 1955). Television projects personal qualities in a way that no other medium can match. Distances are narrowed until they become uncomfortably intimate. Theatrical showmanship can be used to illuminate or to confuse the issues. The emphasis often seems to be on how the candidate looks, especially on television, and what kind of public personality

he projects. No reasonable political analyst would argue, however, against the fact that positions in certain "cutting" issues may at times become more salient than the personalities of the contenders or more reflective of their "true" natures than a love of dogs or small children. While election results also depend on other factors such as the number of loyal and active members each group can muster at the proper time, the moment has passed when one could ignore the direct effects of the mass media on public sentiment.

Rogersian theory supports the contention that an individual will attempt to maximize the congruence between awareness, experience and behavior in making his decisions. A person, therefore, will tend to express his self concept through his real life choices. Cognitive Dissonance theory predicts that in making such decisions, the individual experiences a compelling need for internal consistency between his established attitude structures and between his attitudes and his behavior. Using Congruity theory, a relative of Cognitive Dissonance theory, it is possible to stipulate that in supporting a political candidate, the voter selects one from the given alternatives whose public image most nearly approximates the self concept of the subject.

A somewhat, but not totally different, viewpoint might be taken using role theory as a basis. It is possible that

the voter compartmentalizes his own self image from the ideal role image or position of the political leader since each requires different skills, aptitudes and experiences. *Ceteris paribus*, the nominee, whose personality profile would be most congruent with some conceptualized standards for the position of President for specific voter groups, but not necessarily with the composite self image of the voter groups, would then be selected. The trait standards for the President of course, could be related to voter group self image. It is possible that there really is no difference in the distribution of personality traits in individuals, even between leaders and followers, but only a difference in intensity. The politician is, thus, expected to possess the same traits as the average citizen but to a higher level. He would be expected to be not only honest, but more honest.

It has been said that the study of personality is essentially the study of attitudes towards oneself and towards others (Bieri, 1967). Sherif and Sherif (1967) consider that the development of attitude structures is an intergral part of the process of forming one's self concept. The self concept becomes differentiated through the establishment of constellations of subject-object relationships. The increase in consistency between children's attitudes as they grow

older is related to an increase in the stability of the self image (Campbell, 1967). One's self concept usually remains stable when other attitudes change. Since information concerning the self such as changes in appearance is fed into the system over long periods of time there may be a lag before self concept catches up, if it ever does. Thus, self concept should remain stable even while other attitudes change. Attitudes concerning less ego involving areas than self concept would be expected to be more influenced by contemporary factors. Depending on the depth of the voter's commitment to a candidate, one could expect to see some changes over short time spans.

In the past, despite the expenditure of millions of dollars in campaign funds and the use of the best talent in the country available, political propoganda served mainly to reinforce already existing convictions and to establish new attitudes in that marginal group of voters, the "undecided." Opinions were rarely changed after the party conventions. One of the functions of the campaigns was to activate the public, to arouse interest in the election, and to expose people to particular candidates and issues with the eventual goal of stimulating the voter turnout on election day. Since many elections have depended on a small increase in voting behavior, this is not an insigni-

ficant aim. The independent voter often decided the close election (McWilliams, 1961). If this fact of political life still obtains, then there should be little change in partisan attitudes between the convention and election day.

Based on predictions from role theory, the consistency theories, self theory, and research on persuasive techniques in attitude formation and change the following statements seem to obtain:

1. Political events, such as national elections, are complexly determined phenomena involving series of conflicting issues and candidates who can be known to the voters mostly through public pronouncements and media presentations.
2. The individual voter probably seeks to reduce the vast number of confusing informational inputs from the mass media and other sources concerning the issues and the traits of the candidates to the lowest functional level.
3. In past years, the voter has relied on his partisan identification to determine his voting choice. With a decrease in commitment to current established parties, the individual may give his support to leaders based on a perception of their personal characteristics as projected through a

"public image."

4. Due to a certain amount of ambiguity in goal orientation and task specificity along with an emphasis on the discretionary aspects of the role of President of the United States, the informal or personality of correlates of the candidates public image may be as salient or more so than such task skills as expertise in economics.

5. Attitudes, based on perception of the personal traits of leaders, have directive qualities which influence voter behavior. While long established attitude structures are impervious to most persuasive messages, even deep seated attitudes can be influenced when the persuasive input rises above a critical point where it can no longer be selectively distorted. When the individual perceives that his attitude structure and his life choices don't coincide, he may attempt to reduce the attendant discomfort in one or more of several ways open to him. Some people resort to defensive measures to bolster their faith, while others will change attitudes based on a change in beliefs.

6. The concept of "self" is, a deeply rooted stable structure to which life decisions are

generally closely related, given the options of free choice. Some level of ego maintenance or enhancement is evident in the decision making process.

7. Perceptions of the preferred candidate should be related to the self image of the supporter or to his expectations for a person who is to become the President of the United States. The selection of a candidate may also reflect a negative attitude toward the alternative.

8. While there may be some similarity in self perception between voter groups in evaluation, certain descriptive labels may differ. For example, women may rate themselves as less "strong" than men. Thus the frame of reference (factor structure) may differ according to voter group on the same concept such as self image. The same group of voters may also evaluate concepts from different stimulus categories using a different frame of reference.

Drawing on the previous assumptions it is possible to suggest the following hypotheses:

1. Each voter group, as defined by party affiliation and candidate preference, will generate a

different Semantic Differential factor structure depending on the concept domain (within group comparison). Thus, the same subjects may demonstrate a tendency to split the Evaluative component of the concept "Myself" while compressing the EPA structure into one or two main factors on the political concepts.

2. Different voter groups are expected to generate different factor structures on the same concepts (between group comparisons). For example, the concept of "Ideal President" may have more social evaluative components for Democrats than for Republicans.

3. The subjective meaning of a scale may depend on the stimulus environment (i.e., the clustering with other scales according to concept).

4. The voter groups will generate profiles for the concepts of "Myself" and "Ideal President" which will be fairly cohesive and vary along predictable lines. Those groups supporting McGovern will rate themselves, the "Ideal President" and their candidate as more "idealistic" than voters supporting Nixon who will check the "realistic" side of the continuum. As an idealized concept, "Ideal Presi-

dent" was expected to elicit more extreme responses than the other concepts including "Myself."

5. The concept of the preferred candidate will be more congruent with the "Ideal President" concept than with the self concept for those people supporting the nominee.

6. Despite differences in attitudes toward each opposing candidate, there will be some consensus toward the candidates by all groups on certain scales. Both Democrats and Republicans for example, will perceive Nixon as more "realistic" than McGovern.

7. All groups will evaluate the opposition candidate in a rather negative fashion thus supporting the "diabolical enemy image."

8. The preferred candidate in the 1972 election will not be rated as positively as have candidates in past elections. This phenomena, if it obtains, may represent a trend toward negative voting or selecting the "least objectionable alternative."

Method

In order to assess public opinion toward the nominees for President of the United States during and after the 1972 election campaign, a series of surveys was conducted using the Semantic Differential technique. The data were collected beginning immediately after the party conventions until the week following the resignation of Richard Nixon. The dates of the surveys and the number of subjects per group per survey appear in Table 1 and 2.

Insert Table 1

Insert Table 2

Subjects

The subjects for this study were interviewed in such public places as shipping centers, airline terminals, bus stations, railroad and subway stations in New York City. It is acknowledged that this manner of selecting subjects does not approximate the ideal procedure based on concepts of randomized or stratified sampling. Thus, the results must be viewed with the obvious restrictions that such subject groups as home bound persons or people who use the

automobile for transportation are underrepresented.

The interviewers were asked to approach every third person in the areas to which they were assigned in an effort to reduce the potential bias of approaching only people who looked cooperative or friendly by some subjective standard. The interviews were conducted beginning at 8:00 A.M. and continued throughout the day until 9:00 P.M. so as to reach people who travel at times other than business rush hours and who may, therefore, belong to groups other than office or factory workers.

Respondents were categorized according to a number of demographic variables such as age, sex, and political party identification. They were also asked to indicate their voting preferences. An attempt was made to equalize the partisan groups. However, it was found that this was not possible during the data collection period since some groups seemed to "disappear" after the first survey.

Procedure

A Semantic Differential instrument was designed to include the ten scales that Osgood had used in the study of the 1952 election (Osgood et al, 1957). Five additional scales were added that were deemed relevant to this particular election by an independent group of subjects asked to

rank twenty scales that might be used in a survey of political concepts. The ten scales originally used by Osgood were: wise-foolish, clean-dirty, fair-unfair, safe-dangerous, strong-weak, deep-shallow, active-passive, warm-cool, relaxed-tense and idealistic-realistic. The five scales pre-tested for this study were dull-sharp, valuable-worthless, fast-slow, light-heavy and pleasant-unpleasant. The order of the scales for each concept was randomized as was the location of the positive and negative poles of each scale.

Four concepts were considered: Myself, Ideal President, Nixon and McGovern. Each concept was rated on all fifteen bipolar scales. The order of presentation of the concepts was also randomized.

All forms were identified by a code number in order to guarantee anonymity to the respondents, the name of the interviewer, the location of the interview and the date the interview was conducted. The last identification proved to be a fortuitous decision. A survey which was meant to tap opinions at one point in time was able to be subdivided to provide data on attitudes prior to the so-called "Saturday Night Massacre" and immediately after it.

The instructions to the subjects which follow Osgood's standard instructions as well as the instructions to the interviewers and a sample of the instrument appear in

Appendix 1.

Analysis

In order to analyze the data a number of statistical procedures were employed.

1. The data for Survey 1 for Democrats for McGovern and Republicans for Nixon were factor analyzed to establish the factor structures for these groups. Only two groups were considered large enough for this procedure.
2. Mean scores were computed for each scale on each concept for the voter groups as previously defined. The mean scores were used to construct the profile graphs, to compute the D scores and the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients.
3. Congruency between whole profiles (mean scores on fifteen scales per concept) for voter groups was assessed by the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. The comparisons were made between the four concepts for each group and between the groups a concept at a time. Since a correlation of ± 1.00 would indicate a perfect fit between profiles despite some distance between profiles, it was necessary to analyze the data using

the D score.

4. The distance between profiles (again using mean scores on the fifteen scales per concept) for the voter groups was measured by the D score. (Osgood et al, 1957; Kerlinger, 1973). The same comparisons were made as those listed for the correlational analyses. The D score indicates total distance between profiles. That distance, of course, can reflect small but general differences between concepts on many scales or a large difference generated by only a few scales. The significance of the distance between profiles for independent groups was tested by the Median Test (Siegel, 1956). The significance of the distance between profiles within the same voter group was tested by the Wilcoxin matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Siegel, 1956).

5. Differences between mean scores on single factors (Evaluation, Potency and Activity) and on crucial scales (Safe-dangerous and Idealistic-realistic) were tested using t tests.

Results and discussion

Hypotheses 1 and 2.

It was predicted that each voter group (as defined by party affiliation and candidate preference) would use a different frame of reference for rating the four concepts depending on the concept domain. That is, the scales deemed relevant to self concept would not necessarily be the same ones which would load heavily on the factor structure derived from the ratings of the candidates or the concept of Ideal President. Differences between voter groups on the same concept were also hypothesized. In Osgood's original study of the 1952 Presidential election (Osgood et al, 1957), he found that the two major voting groups, Democrats and Republicans, used the same frame of reference in assessing the candidate and issue concepts that he presented. The same three orthogonal factors (Evaluation, Potency, and Activity) appeared in the same order for both parties when the data from the survey were factor analyzed. However, more recent studies, especially those pertaining to political concepts, have demonstrated two distinct tendencies which both differ from Osgood's factor structures. The literature indicates that either all three factors collapse into one overall factor which may be labelled Evaluation or

the Evaluative factor is fractioned into a series of components. The first tendency occurs most frequently when the concepts are political in nature, while the second tendency appears when the concept is highly evaluative or ego involving. The data from the two largest voting groups in the first survey for each of the four concepts were factor analyzed (Varimax rotation) to see if Osgood's factors would appear again orthogonal or if there might be a difference in factor structures which would reflect voter group frame of reference or the influence of the stimulus domain. As already noted, most factor analyses do not usually consider "concept" as a separate category (Heise, 1969).

Not as an apologia, but as a preface to the presentation of the factor analysis results and the discussion of the factor structures, it must be pointed out that the interpretation of factor analysis results often depends on the specific method used and on the eye of the beholder. As far as this author has been able to ascertain, no test of significance for the difference between factor structures exists. The Wrigley-Neuhaus method of relating factor structures, which is the closest approximation of a way of determining the similarity of factors, may produce results which are as open to subjective interpretation as the original analyses. With these qualifica-

tions in mind, the discussion of the factor analyses may be viewed in a more realistic framework.

In order to clarify the results, summary tables omitting the factor loadings have been used. For more detailed information, the reader may refer to the original tables in Appendix 3.

It is fairly apparent from a perusal of the summary table of the varimax rotated matrices for Republicans who supported Nixon that there are both similarities and differences in the factor structures (See Table 3). The rela-

Insert Table 3

tionship between the first and second factors of each concept structure was only somewhat higher than the relationship with the other factors as tested by the Wrigley-Neuhauser method. The most important difference is between the factor structure of the concept "Nixon" and the other three concepts. Primarily, the Evaluation and Potency factors for Nixon are collapsed into a single factor which accounts for more than forty percent of the variance, the highest percentage of any factor for a concept in either group. The second factor for "Nixon" combines the Potency and Activity factors for approximately thirty percent of the variance. Thus, the

factor structure for Nixon based on the ratings of the Republican group is a strong combination of all three factors. This finding supports the contention, at least for the Republicans, that political candidates must be strong and active as well as positive for their supporters.

The first factor on the self concept for Republicans for Nixon combines the scales of "Wise," "Sharp" and "Realistic" (the negative pole of the "Idealistic-realistic" scale), a clearly Evaluative factor. The second factor combines "Safe," "Clean," and "Fair" (the usual pivotal scale for the Evaluative factor), again an Evaluative factor. The third factor, while having an element of the Activity factor ("Fast"), is also Evaluative in nature, as are the fourth and fifth factors. The Potency factor is not represented in the factor structure except for the "Sharp" scale. However, in the cluster of scales that appears in the first factor, the term seems to have lost its traditional meaning in Osgood's sense and taken on a rather colloquial connotation. "Sharp" in this context seems to mean "clever." "Sharp" is also related to "Realistic" for the concept of "Ideal President."

Each of the five factors of the concept of "Ideal President" for the Republican group has an Evaluative influence. However, a Potency scale is a component of the

second factor, while the pivotal Activity scale has the highest loading on the third factor. The overall image seems to indicate a rather paternalistic view of the Chief Executive who, however, is perceived to possess a realistic view of the world.

The first factor for Republicans for Nixon rating "McGovern" emphasizes the more Social Evaluative scales such as "Pleasant," "Clean" and "Warm." The second factor which accounts for almost as much of the variance as the first one, is based on the traditional scales which load heavily on the Evaluation and Potency factors in Osgood's studies. The third factor is a distinct Activity factor. The fourth and fifth factors are also Evaluative in nature. One can begin to see that there may be a distinction made between the structures of the self concept and the political concepts.

The differences in factor structures are not quite as clear cut for Democrats voting for McGovern. In fact, when looking at the fifteen scales as individual factors, it was noted that Republicans generally took fewer scales to account for a larger portion of the variance than did Democrats. This finding may reflect a less complicated or confused view of the concepts on the part of the Republicans. It may also indicate a general response style that is more

representative of one group than the other and is not dependent on the circumstances surrounding the 1972 Presidential election (See Table 4).

Insert Table 4

The structure of the self concept for Democrats for McGovern contains factors which may be clearly defined as Potency and Activity factors. These factors are also distinct from the Evaluation component. Thus, the factor structure for self concept the Democratic group is close to Osgood's original factor structure and differs somewhat from the Republicans view of the self concept.

The closest relationship in factor structures between the groups appears to be between the first two factors of the concept of "Ideal President" for both the Republican group and the Democrats. The fourth factors for both groups are also related. At a later point in the discussion of the results, the comparison of the profiles will provide more evidence in support of the finding of similarity between attitude structures toward this concept. This similarity holds throughout the profile except for differences in attitudes on one scale (Idealistic-realistic). The independence of this scale can also be seen in the factor

structure.

A difference in attitudes between the voter groups toward the concept of "McGovern" can also be found in the factor analysis. The first factor for Republicans emphasizes the Social Evaluative scales, while the first factor for Democrats is a combination of the Evaluation and Potency factors. However, if the first three factors are combined for each group, there is more similarity in the frame of reference.

The Democrats view of Nixon is basically the same as the structure postulated by Osgood for political concepts. That is, the first factor is highly Evaluative and the second factor is the combination of Activity and Potency which Osgood labelled "Dynamism."

The weight of the evidence derived from the factor analyses seems to support the hypotheses, but only to a limited extent. The self concept contained different components for the Democratic and Republican groups. The breakdown of the other concepts demonstrated some differences in factor structure while also exhibiting some basic similarities especially on the concept "Nixon."

Only one of the scales which Osgood (Osgood et al, 1961), labelled as a pivotal scale (one that could be used to represent a factor) consistently named a factor. That scale

was "Active." Of the Evaluative scales, "Fair," also called a pivotal scale, was sometimes far below the other Evaluative scales in factor loadings. "Valuable" and "Safe" were more often the highest scales on the first or second factor in the factor structures.

Not only does the data from this study indicate that Osgood's factor structure is not inviolate, but also that population subgroups do not always view concepts from the same domain in a similar manner. Since there are differences for each group on the factor structures for each concept as well as differences between groups, comparisons using factor scores alone do not seem to be practical. The two groups, Democrats for McGovern and Republicans for Nixon, while exhibiting some similarity in perception, varied sufficiently in emphasis so that the most efficient approach to future analyses would seem to be to study the profiles generated by the scales as wholes or to select those scales which are relevant to the individual project.

Hypothesis 3.

The prediction was made that the subjective meaning of a scale would depend on its stimulus environment. Even clusters of scales may change meaning due to the influence of one scale as Asch has noted (1946). The evidence for

the support of this hypothesis is itself more qualitative than quantitative.

The scale "Sharp" sometimes loads on the Potency factor and sometimes on the Evaluative factor. Once, it stood alone loading heavily on a factor which accounted for 13.8 percent of the variance for the concept of "Ideal President" for the Democratic group. In combination with other Potency and Activity scales, it seems to have its usually connotative meaning of Potency. When combined with "wise" and/or "Realistic," the meaning is more related to being worldly or astute.

One of the main reasons for not deriving a mean concept score for each profile is that the scale scores are not additive. For example, the score obtained by adding negative ratings (Dangerous) on the "Safe-dangerous" scale with negative ratings (Passive) on the "Active-passive" scale does not have the same meaning as the score obtained when "Dangerous" is combined with "Active." The former score appears more negative than the latter in the scoring system, but certainly less fearful in the real world. It reflects what Osgood would call "Malevolent dynamism" over "malevolent insipidness."

While the factor analyses may not lead to unambiguous results and interpretations, the similarity between profiles

may also be judged by either the \underline{D} score or the correlational analyses. According to Osgood (Osgood et al, 1961), \underline{D} scores between concept profiles for the same groups or between groups on the same concepts should yield data which would be analogous to that generated by the factor analyses. The \underline{D} score as used by Osgood is not unrelated to \underline{r} . Therefore, the discussion related to the other hypotheses may provide more useful information in relationship to the similarity in viewpoint between voter groups.

Hypothesis 4.

The voter groups were predicted to generate scale profiles on the Semantic Differential for self concept and "Ideal President" which would be fairly cohesive and vary along predictable lines. The self concept for all voter groups was assumed to be fairly similar except for one scale ("Idealistic-realistic). Those groups (both Democrats and Republicans) who supported McGovern were hypothesized to view themselves as more "Idealistic" than voters (again both Democrats and Republicans) who supported Nixon. The conceptualization of the "Ideal President" was also expected to follow a similar pattern emphasizing the distinctions on the "Idealistic-realistic" continuum. Since "Ideal President" was considered to be a rather abstract

concept, more extreme scale ratings were also anticipated.

The relationship between the self concepts of each voter group for the first survey were compared by means of the D score (Osgood et al, 1957; Kerlinger, 1973), Pearson product moment correlation coefficients and t tests for five of the most important scales ("Strong-weak," "Active-passive," "Safe-dangerous," "Fair-unfair" and "Idealistic-realistic"). The clearest and most dramatic method of demonstrating the congruity between the profiles for the five voter groups on the concept "Myself" is by representing the mean scale scores graphically (See Figure 1). Each scale is numbered from 1 to 15. The corresponding list of scales appears in

Insert Figure 1

Appendix 1. The analysis of the distance between profiles demonstrates that the groups who were supporting the same candidate are closer in self image than those voters who have the same party affiliation. Moreover, the Undecided group is found to be closer in both instances to McGovern supporters than to Nixon supporters, at least in terms of self concept. This finding would seem to indicate some philosophical kinship between the groups. It remains to be seen why the Undecided voters remain uncommitted (See Table 5).

Insert Table 5

The distances between each group except the Undecided group and McGovern supporters were statistically significant as tested by the Median test and Chi Square analysis (Osgood et al, 1957; Siegel, 1956). However, it should be noted that the scores for each were clustered very close together, thus generating a significant difference since there was a difference in the median split. The most information is to be gained by comparing the size of the D scores between groups. Even though significant, these D scores are small in relationship to those generated by later concept comparisons.

The correlations between self concept profiles for each group in the first survey although extremely high for all groups also reflect the congruity between groups supporting the same candidate (See Table 6). Referring back

Insert Table 6

to the factor analyses, one may imply that the correlations between groups on the concept "Myself" and the D scores in-

dicade both similarity in structure as well as some differences.

Osgood often uses the t test to measure the differences between concepts on his three main factors, Evaluation, Potency and Activity. Originally, Osgood obtained mean factor scores which he tested. Eventually he relied on what he called "pivotal scales." He wrote that "since the preliminary correlation analysis showed that the relationship among the concepts based on only three of these scales... were nearly identical with those obtained with all ten scales, the data from only these scales were used for the subsequent analyses" (Osgood et al, 1961, p. 106). The scales were "Fair-unfair," "Strong-weak" and "Active-passive." In order to compare the results of this study with some of Osgood's results it was decided to continue to use these scales. In addition, the "Idealistic-realistic" scale was tested as a trait descriptive of a philosophic orientation of each voter group. The "Safe-dangerous" scale was also included, not because it was originally expected to differentiate between self concepts but because it would be used later to provide data based on the candidate concepts for the "diabolic enemy image" or at least for negative voting patterns (See Table 7).

Insert Table 7

None of the differences between mean scores reached statistical significance on the "Active-passive" scale. However, on the "Fair-unfair" scale both Democratic groups perceive themselves as more fair than the Republicans for McGovern.

The most interesting comparison is on the "Idealistic-realistic" scale. The differences are in the expected direction with Nixon supporters rating themselves on the realistic side of the scale while McGovern supporters remain on the idealistic side, but just above the midpoint.

The differences that do appear on the "Safe-dangerous" scale reflect the extremely high self ratings (mean scale score = 6.476) of one group, Democrats for Nixon. This group's self ratings were also the highest on "Clean," "Fair," "Wise," and "Safe" as well as "Pleasant." One might almost postulate a rather defensive reaction for a group of voters who are crossing party lines.

There were no significant differences on the Potency factor scale.

The concept of "Ideal President" generated even more cohesive profiles than that of the self concept. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the only scales which reflect major

Insert Figure 2

differences are "Warm-cool" and "Idealistic-realistic." The requirements for being "Warm" or the emphasis on being "Cool," depending on ones viewpoint, are somewhat different for Democrats for McGovern and the Undecided group as opposed to the other three groups. The difference on the "Idealistic-realistic" scale follows the same pattern as the self concept results.

Another scale that is interesting to examine is the "Relaxed-tense" scale. All groups rated the Ideal President as just above the midpoint, not tense, but certainly not relaxed. Otherwise most of the ratings were higher than those given for the scales under the self concept.

Note that "Light-heavy" is also rated at the midpoint. This is a consistent finding over concepts, groups and time. One explanation is that the scale may be irrelevant to these stimuli. Another possible explanation is that several confusing meanings may be attributed to both terms. "Heavy," for example, may refer to a villain or to something important as in a "heavy" scene according to the current colloquialisms. "Light" may mean "not fat," or "light weight" and therefore not formidable.

The distance scores reflect the same voter group pattern as the self concept (See Table 8). The larger

Insert Table 8

scores are probably based on the distances on the "Idealistic-realistic" scale.

The correlation matrix for the concept of "Ideal President" supports the findings from the D score analysis (See Table 6). The relationship between the profiles of Democrats and Republicans voting for Nixon is almost perfect. The undecided group also has a definite concept of the "Ideal President" which is very closely related to those of McGovern's supporters. The differences between supporter groups again reflects large differences on the "Idealistic-realistic" scale. The Democrats for McGovern rate "idealistic" high (5.409). However, the Republicans for McGovern and the Undecided group are closer to the midpoint of the scale. It is Nixon's supporters who rate the "Realistic" pole strongly. The mean for Republicans voting for Nixon was 1.72, while for Democrats for Nixon it was exactly 2.00.

The t test results indicate some scale differences which reach significance. The comparisons involving Republicans for Nixon with either Democrats for McGovern, Demo-

crats for Nixon, or Republicans for McGovern indicate that the first group has somewhat lower requirements on the Activity continuum than the other voters (See Table 9).

Insert Table 9

The only difference which reached significance on the "Fair-unfair" scale involved Democrats and Republicans for McGovern, the latter having a somewhat less inflated rating on the scale. Some of the differences also reflect the small deviations in attitude within each group on certain concepts and scales.

The differences on the "Idealistic-realistic" scale again demonstrate the difference in orientation between the groups.

The differences on the "Safe-dangerous" scale and the "Strong-weak" scale for the Undecided group and Republicans for Nixon indicate that both groups were cohesive in attitude on those scales. The actual differences between the means which were all well over the scale rating of 6.00 were not great.

Hypothesis 5.

A major hypothesis underlying this investigation was

that the preferred candidate would more closely approximate some conceptualization of an ideal President rather than voter group self image. In order to assess the relative congruency of the profiles for the candidates, the composite self image of each voter group, and the concept of Ideal President, D scores and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed as well as t tests for the five scales already listed.

Beginning with the group Democrats for McGovern, using the D score analysis, it is obvious that the distance between profiles is greater between the concepts of "McGovern" and the "Ideal President" than it is between "McGovern" and the self concept (See Table 10).

Insert Table 10

The same pattern holds true for the view of Nixon in relationship to self image and "Ideal President" for Republicans for Nixon (See Table 11) and for Democrats who sup-

Insert Table 11

ported Nixon (See Table 12). The D score analysis the data

Insert Table 12

from Republicans for McGovern also demonstrated that the candidate was closer to self image than to a hypothesized "Ideal President" (See Table 13). To this point, all indi-

Insert Table 13

cations are that the candidate profiles are closer to the self concept profiles than to voter group conceptualizations of the Ideal President.

The Undecided group provided some data that might tentatively be considered to support the hypothesis. While McGovern's profile was close to that of the self concept it fell far short of the concept of "Ideal President." Nixon's profile was even farther away. It seems as if both candidates did not fulfill whatever expectations this group had for President of the United States (See Table 14).

Insert Table 14

Using the data from the D score analysis, it is evident that the hypothesis is not supported. The reason for this result may be that the profile for the Ideal President is too idealized to be matched using a distance score. It is also possible that some congruency does exist between the profiles of each candidate and the concept of "Ideal Presi-

dent" for supporter groups. The analysis of the correlations between profiles may provide some evidence in support of the hypothesis (See Table 15).

Insert Table 15

The relationship between the self concept and "Ideal President" is considerably higher for Democrats for McGovern than between "Myself" and "McGovern" or "Ideal President" and "McGovern" which are virtually the same. However, the correlation between "Ideal President" and "Nixon" is higher for both groups supporting Nixon than the self concept and "Nixon." It is also higher than the relationship between the self concept and "Ideal President," although in the case of the Republicans the difference is minimal. The relationship between "McGovern" and "Ideal President" is somewhat lower than "McGovern" and "Myself" for Republicans for McGovern. In summary, it seems as if the groups supporting Nixon see his profile as more congruent with that of the "Ideal President" than groups supporting McGovern do. One might say, at this point, that the hypothesis is supported depending on the candidate and the statistical analysis employed!

The data from the Undecided group does, indeed, reflect

their inability to make a decision. The low positive correlations of McGovern with either "Myself" or "Ideal President" are just slightly better than the low negative correlations of Nixon with the same concepts.

The t tests results comparing concepts on the five scales for each group may help to establish a basis for voter preference. For example, for Democrats voting for McGovern, only four comparisons did not reach significance (See Table 16). On the Activity factor, the comparison of

Insert Table 16

mean scores for "Myself" versus "Nixon" demonstrated little difference. On the Evaluation factor, the comparison of "Myself" versus "McGovern" was not significant. "Myself" versus "McGovern" was also not significant on the Potency factor. On the "Idealistic-realistic" scale there was no difference between "Ideal President" and "McGovern." It is possible that this was the most crucial scale for Democrats supporting him. There is also no difference between the self concept and "McGovern" on the "Safe-dangerous" scale. Thus, McGovern is viewed as more "active" than the average Democrat in the group supporting him, but less "active" than the "Ideal President." He is seen as just as "fair" as his

supporters, but less so than the "Ideal President" and just as "strong" as his supporters, but less so again than he might be as a perfect President. He is considered to be as "safe" as his backers and as "idealistic" or "realistic" as the "Ideal President." It may be that McGovern meets the minimum criteria for supporting a candidate or that level of idealism is the most salient variable. Of course, traditional Democrats may support the party choice no matter how they feel about him. Perhaps it would be more fruitful to look at data from Republicans who crossed party lines to support McGovern, especially as he was not expected to win the election (See Table 17).

Insert Table 17

On the Activity factor scale comparisons for Republicans voting for McGovern, all of the differences were statistically significant except between self concept and either candidate. Thus, both candidates were rated close to the activity level of the average group member. However, although the difference was not significant, "McGovern" was perceived as more active than the concept of "Myself." The differences between self concept and "McGovern" were also small on the other four scales. The greatest difference on the "Idealis-

tic-realistic" scale is between the two candidates, but not between the candidates and the concepts of either "Ideal President" or "Myself." For this group, the negative perceptions of Nixon may be the crucial factor underlying the voting decision.

The pattern of attitudes toward candidates exhibited by the McGovern supporters was almost duplicate in reverse by Republicans voting for Nixon. Both Nixon and McGovern were rated as close to the self concept on the Activity factor with Nixon considered as more active than the mean self rating and nearer to the level of the Ideal President. So far, all three groups seem to perceive both candidates as active, sometimes as active as they are themselves, sometimes more so (See Table 18).

Insert Table 18

Democrats voting for Nixon tend to view him in much the same way as the Republicans did, except that he actually comes closer to their view of the "Ideal President" than he did for the Republicans. They also see themselves as closer to the "Ideal President" on the "Evaluative" factor and on the "Safe-dangerous" scale (See Table 19). Interestingly

Insert Table 19

enough they find little difference between the concepts of "McGovern" and "Nixon" on either the Activity factor or the Evaluative scale although the tendency is to rate Nixon more positively.

The data from the ratings of the concepts by the Undecided group are somewhat difficult to explain. None of the differences between self concept and "McGovern" on the five scales reach an acceptable level of significance (See Table 20). In fact, the differences between the concept of

Insert Table 20

"McGovern" and the "Ideal President" considering only Osgood's three main factor scales are also not statistically significant. It is only by comparing the differences on the "Safe-dangerous" scale that one can begin to see that perhaps both candidates are perceived as potentially harmful to the country. While McGovern is rated as less dangerous than Nixon, the difference between them just reaches significance. Perhaps the correlations between the profiles constitute the best evidence for the lack of enthusiasm for McGovern and thus the indecision as to candidate preference.

Hypothesis 6.

It was proposed that, despite the differences in attitudes towards each of the candidates by opposing groups, there would be a certain amount of consensus concerning some traits. For example, it was predicted that all groups would perceive McGovern as more idealistic than Nixon (See Figure 3).

Insert Figure 3

While all groups did seem to agree that McGovern was somewhat more idealistic than Nixon, the general view of McGovern held by his supporters and opposition alike was less cohesive than the perceptions of Nixon. The two groups supporting Nixon present clear images of the candidate which are quite similar. Those who oppose him also demonstrate agreement, albeit negative (See Figure 4). The clarity of

Insert Figure 4

perception concerning Nixon probably indicates that as the President and as a national political figure, his public image was well established. The lack of cohesion in McGovern's profile may be due to the fact that he was less well known

or to the events surrounding his nomination. The emphasis placed on the war in Vietnam as a central issue at the expense of other important questions, the need to retract some statements may also have contributed to the variability in his ratings.

Hypothesis 7.

It was predicted that both sets of groups supporting each candidate would view the other candidate negatively, thus supporting the notion that the "diabolical enemy" image of the alternative candidate influenced the 1972 election. If one examines the graphs of the profiles for the four concepts for each of the voter groups, it is apparent that the clearest image is at times the negative profile of the opposition candidate (See Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9).

Insert Figure 5

Insert Figure 6

Insert Figure 7

Insert Figure 8

Insert Figure 9

The data from the t test results for the Evaluative scale and the "Safe-dangerous" scale for the voter groups on the candidates and the D score analysis reinforces the perception that the theory of negative voting may indeed be veridical (See Tables 21, 22, 23, and 24).

Insert Table 21

Insert Table 22

Insert Table 23

Insert Table 24

Hypothesis 8.

The last hypothesis stated that even the preferred candidate in the 1972 election would not be rated as positively

as have candidates in past elections. This phenomenon supposedly represents a general denigration of politicians which is reflected in negative voting or selecting the "least objectionable alternative."

Alienation from the social system, political cynicism and general disaffection with political process are terms that have been used to explain the increasing low turnout of voters in each succeeding election in recent years. Among people who do vote, it has been postulated that they generally lack enthusiasm for the candidate for whom they plan to cast their ballot. It has been suggested that their essential motivation is based on an attempt to avoid the lesser of two evils or select the less (of two) objectionable alternatives.

In order to provide some evidence in support of this hypothesis, data from three Presidential elections (1952, 1968, 1972) were examined. Osgood's study of the 1952 election (Osgood et al, 1961) includes a table of mean scores on his three main factors. The data were collected sometime before the national conventions as can be noted from the fact that Taft was included as a viable candidate. The data reported from the 1968 and 1972 election campaigns were gathered directly after the conventions so that they are not strictly comparable (ratings done after the candi-

dates have been selected should theoretically be higher than those given before the conventions). However, even if the data are not totally comparable, it should be interesting to follow the trend in attitudes toward Presidential candidates over the years.

No attempt was made to test the differences between these scores. Their function is only to demonstrate that there might be some evidence for a downward trend in evaluating politicians. Whether these low scores reflect a change in the qualities inherent in objects of appraisal or the perceptions of the observers would be difficult to ascertain.

The 1952 election may not have been the best selection for determining whether or not there is a tendency to devalue political figures. Even in past elections, when party affiliation was stronger than it is at the present time, certain candidates were so well received that they were able to appeal to voters across party lines. Dwight D. Eisenhower was a prime example of a candidate whose personal attributes were positively valued by a majority of the population regardless of party affiliation. In addition Democrats did not consider Eisenhower to be a politician in the traditional sense, so that they felt free to vote for him. However, his personal popularity did not extend to other Republicans on the ticket. Thus, it is possible that

the 1952 election represented a unique high point in attitudes toward politicians that was scarcely matched before or since. If that is so, then the low ratings of current political personages may reflect a chronically low opinion toward politicians (even Presidential candidates) not a downward trend.

Before examining the data it should be noted that Osgood did not use the scoring procedure employed elsewhere in this study (labelling the ratings from 1 to 7), but changed the method so that the negative scores would be more obvious. The scores ranged from -3 through 0 (the midpoint) to +3.

The data in Table 25 represent the mean scores on each of Osgood's three factors for each of the potential candidates in the 1952 Presidential election. While each voter group tended to favor its own candidate, every one of the ratings of the opposition candidates was above the midpoint of each scale (See Table 25). All candidates were highly rated on

Insert Table 25

the Activity factor. Whether a candidate was preferred or not seemed to be perceived as "active." The largest differences are on the Evaluative factor. However, the lowest of these ratings, while almost neutral, is still positive.

None of the candidates in the 1968 Presidential election were very positively rated on the Evaluation factor even by their own supporters. The highest ratings were on the Potency and Activity factors for Wallace by Wallace backers. Several of the factors reflect a tendency to view the opposition candidate in a very negative light. For example, Democrats rated Wallace almost as far to the negative extreme on the Evaluative factor as possible. At the same time, Humphrey was only rated slightly above the midpoint on that factor by those same Democrats. Both Nixon and Wallace were rated as "active" by both their own supporters and the opposition while Humphrey was rated slightly above the midpoint on the Activity factor by Wallace and Nixon supporters. Looking at the scores, candidate by candidate for each group, one can see that Republicans did not rate Nixon as high on either the Potency or Activity factors as they rated Wallace. However, Wallace was perceived as negative on the Evaluation factor. Humphrey was not viewed as high either on the Activity or Evaluation factors and he was rated low negative on the Potency factor. Democrats viewed both Wallace and Nixon as negative on Evaluation, Nixon negative on Potency and low positive on Activity. The combination of extremely high Activity and extremely low Evaluation scores projects a dangerous image for Wallace

in the eyes of Humphrey supporters. Wallace supporters gave low scores to Nixon and Humphrey on Evaluation and Potency and fairly high scores on Activity, but rated their own man extremely high on Potency and Activity despite a low rating on Evaluation. As has been noted, key scale on the Evaluation factor which Osgood labelled the "pivotal" scale and later used instead of mean factor scores was the "Fair-unfair" scale. It looks as if Wallace supporters did not rate their candidate as very fair, but approved of his strength and activity (See Table 26).

Insert Table 26

In 1972, there were only two major candidates to compare but more voter groups since the voter groups which showed some tendency for party cross-over voting were included as well as the Undecided voters (See Table 27).

Insert Table 27

Nixon, as the incumbent, received higher ratings from his supporters than he had in the previous election, but not nearly as high as the candidates in the 1952 election. Republicans for Nixon saw McGovern as somewhat "unfair," moderately "weak" and only slightly "active," in other words, a

weak candidate. Democrats for Nixon tended to see McGovern as slightly "fair," on the "weak" side and more "active" than the Republicans had. Democrats for McGovern viewed their own candidate as "fair" (the highest mean score on the entire table) and moderately "strong" and "active." Republicans for McGovern rated McGovern as "fair," but not as high a score as the Democratic group, but somewhat stronger and more active. Both groups of McGovern supporters, however, perceived Nixon as negative on the Evaluative factor.

The Undecided group, while not enthusiastic about McGovern (low positive ratings on all three factors), rated Nixon as low negative on the three factors. For them Nixon is not as objectionable as he seems to be to the McGovern supporters, but then McGovern is not valued highly either. Undecided is the perfect appellation for this group.

Without some tests of significance, one cannot really support the hypothesis. However, there does appear to be a more intense dislike of the opposition candidates in the 1968 and 1972 Presidential elections than in 1952.

In a recent article in the New York Times (November 16, 1976), Robert Reinhold reported the results of a survey conducted concerning the motivations to vote in the 1976 election. A significant finding relating to this hypothesis

was that a major difference between voters and non voters was the attitude toward voting for the least objectionable candidate. In response to the question, "If people don't like any of the candidates running for an office, should they vote for the one who is the less 'evil' or not vote at all?" the people who actually voted reported that it was better to vote for the lesser evil than to remain away from the polls. Non voters, on the other hand, felt that it was better not to vote.

There are many reasons why people fail to participate in the voting process, several of which have already been mentioned. Others include failure to register and the desire to avoid jury duty. However, the negative feelings engendered by the opposition candidate(s) may act as a stimulus not a deterrent. The voter may come to the realization, especially as the campaign draws to a close that, while he may not love Candidate A, he will have to live with Candidate B for at least four years if he and others like him don't vote at all.

Other results

The original focus of this study was to establish the relationship between self concept, a hypothesized concept of the "Ideal President" and the candidate concepts for voter

groups prior to the 1972 election. As the events surrounding the Watergate incident began to occupy an increasingly prominent place in the national news, it was possible to make certain predictions concerning the modification of attitudes toward the public images of the candidates. Therefore, the surveys were continued up until the week following the resignation of Richard Nixon as President of the United States.

First of all, it would be presumptuous at this point to insert all the post hoc hypotheses that a more omniscient observer might have constructed prior to conducting these surveys. The most honest statement that can be made was that the author felt the events that were occurring were going to have some influence on the attitudes of the voting and non voting public and that a continuation of the research would be more than worth the effort. However, certain rather gross predictions did guide the investigation.

1. Despite the mounting number of revelations concerning the covert operations of various public officials, a segment of the population would continue to support the President throughout his term of office. Whether the best explanation for this behavior was a rather naive desire to believe that any President of the

United States would be above the activities being ascribed to him or a more sophisticated attitude based on the belief that as President Richard Nixon would not have involved himself personally with the "dirty tricks" of the campaign, etc., or, simply, post decision dissonance reduction through distortion of the events, this entrenched attitude structure was expected.

Even Woodward and Bernstein (1975), the Washington Post reporters who followed the Watergate story so tenaciously, had trouble accepting all the information they uncovered concerning Nixon's activities.

2. It was difficult to predict just what effect the events would have on the perception of all politicians not directly involved on the attitudes toward George McGovern in particular. It was, however, hypothesized that there would be a general denigration of public officials but that McGovern's image would not suffer very much. It would also have been easy to think that, in fact, attitudes towards him might even improve in comparison to Nixon. However, upon reflection it was felt that he had lost the 1972 election as much,

if not more, through his own mistakes as through the pre-election machinations of Nixon's campaign committee.

3. It has been found in the past that political attitudes are difficult to change. That finding is probably due to the fact that most input into the situation does not have the impact of the events under investigation. Many Presidential candidates have elicited deep loyalty on the part of their supporters based on personal characteristics or strong partisan identification. Nixon, however, had not inspired the type of enthusiasm even among Republicans that was generated by Roosevelt or Kennedy. While these men had numerous enemies, personal and political, they also had a charismatic quality that Nixon seemed to lack. Thus, it would seem probable that attitudes toward Nixon would fluctuate broadly in the majority of voters (all but the most loyal) in response to each new bit of information taken in context. For example, as the Congressional committee continued its activities related to the impeachment proceedings, disclosures would be evaluated by the public according to the reactions of the committee members.

The long deliberations in all likelihood indicated to some people that impeachment would not really occur. In that case, one might rationalize that the best policy would be to ignore negative information about the President. On the other hand, if the committee seemed to be about to complete its task, the smallest negative input which would have not made an impact at an earlier date might be perceived as more damaging.

Since it was not possible to contact the original respondents and follow their pattern of attitude change over time, the same sampling techniques as had been used in conducting the first survey were employed in later surveys. The results of these surveys must be viewed not only with the original qualifications on their generalizability to a broader population, but must also be restricted by specific sampling problems that arose due to the nature of the topic.

The first problem involved the difficulty in obtaining any interviews at all. Many respondents were reluctant to rate the concepts. Second, some of the respondents who were willing to fill out the forms, were unwilling to acknowledge either party affiliation or the name of the candidate for whom they voted. Still other interviewees said that they could not remember if they had voted at all. Alternatively,

a small group of Nixon supporters were so vehement in their praise of the President up to and including those last days in August, 1974 that the interviewers felt almost intimidated. Despite the sampling problems, the results of these survey analyses, having been placed in the proper perspective, are still of considerable interest.

The first comparisons to be examined will be between three small surveys. The data were collected one week prior to the so-called "Saturday Night Massacre," the week directly following the event and the next week, after it became apparent that no immediate action would be taken on the impeachment proceedings. The analysis was restricted to the two main voter groups, Democrats for McGovern and Republicans for Nixon. It focused on the concepts of the candidates over the three week period. The mean scale scores for Republicans for Nixon on the concept of "Nixon" are plotted in Figure 10. By examination, it is possible to suggest

Insert Figure 10

that the three profiles are somewhat congruent and that most mean scale scores were already below the midpoint on Osgood's continua when the first of the series was conducted. There appear to be some differences on the "Active-passive,"

"Fast-slow," and "Strong-weak" scales. However, the t test values between the surveys for the five scales that were used in Survey I only reached an acceptable level of significance in one case (See Table 28, 29, and 30). There was

Insert Table 28

Insert Table 29

Insert Table 30

a change on the "Fair-unfair" scale between Surveys VI and VII. While the mean scores seem to indicate that there were changes in attitude on the Activity and Potency factors by Survey VII the size of the standard deviations prevented the differences from being statistically significant. It is possible to hypothesize that these trends actually reflected a positive change in perception of Nixon's "strength" and "activity" due to the firing of Cox, especially when negative consequences in the form of impeachment did not seem to follow on the act.

Attitudes of Democrats for McGovern about Nixon tended to show more ambiguity than those of the Republicans (See

Figure 11). While there appeared to be some significant

Insert Figure 11

differences on a few scales, the only t test result which was significant involved the "Safe-dangerous" scale (See Tables 31, 32, and 33). It seems that the Democrats saw

Insert Table 31

Insert Table 32

Insert Table 33

Nixon as less "dangerous" by Survey VII. Perhaps they felt that impeachment was inevitable at that point. This opinion had been expressed gratuitously a number of times by many respondents.

A visual comparison of four other surveys (Survey I, II, IV and X) for the two major voting groups demonstrates some rather interesting patterns. The profiles derived from the first two surveys indicate a certain consensus for Democrats for McGovern on the concept of "McGovern." By the time the fourth survey was conducted, there was a general decline in

ratings on all scales except "Fair-unfair" and "Clean-dirty" on which there were small improvements. When the data for the tenth survey was collected (just prior to President Nixon's resignation), McGovern's profile, while more positive than Nixon's, demonstrated that the fallout from the events of the preceding two years had also generalized to him. While there was a trend toward perceiving him as "idealistic," it was negated by the low ratings on the "Safe-dangerous scale (See Figure 12).

Insert Figure 12

It appears as if the Republican group was relatively more generous to McGovern than the Democrats. There were definite improvements on the mean ratings on several scales over time. The most obvious change for the better occurred on the "Active-passive," "Clean-dirty," "Fair-unfair," and "Warm-cool" scales. Initially, McGovern had been viewed as somewhat "idealistic" by both Republicans and Democrats alike. That perception remained constant throughout the surveys (See Figure 13).

Insert Figure 13

The Democrats for McGovern exhibited a level of disap-

proval for Nixon which was fairly stable over the two years of data collection. However, the profile from the second survey is generally more positive than the profiles from the other surveys. This finding may reflect the perception that Nixon would win the election in a landslide and may mark the beginning of the "honeymoon" period typical of most post-election surveys (See Figure 14).

Insert Figure 14

If one examines the profile patterns for Survey I, II, IV and X for the Republicans for Nixon group on the concept of "Nixon," it is possible to draw the conclusion that there was little overall change in attitude toward Nixon from the first post convention survey up to the days just preceding his resignation by his own supporters (See Figure 15). The

Insert Figure 15

only differences seem to be an acknowledgement that he was more "tense" and that, by implication his tactics had been "dirty." A comparison of these four profiles with the ones generated around the time of the firing of the Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, however, makes one rather suspicious that accumulated events could have had as little impact on

attitudes as Survey X results indicate. The most logical explanation seems to be that the final sample might not have been truly representative. Thus, the subjects who acknowledged their continued support of Richard Nixon were not those who would have given us negative opinions. Another explanation might also obtain. Possibly the events surrounding the "Saturday Night Massacre" led to a temporary, negative evaluation of Nixon which improved as it appeared that he might not be impeached and as he continued to maintain his innocence. If we could have watched the pattern of attitude change in the same respondents over time, we might have found that when it seemed that Nixon would not resign and that impeachment proceedings were not imminent, support for the President was really the only or best alternative, at least for traditional Republicans.

Final remarks

"The play's the thing...."

In a science-fiction novel, The Barons of Behavior, Purdom (1972) constructs a political environment in an area of New Jersey some thirty years hence in which a United States Representative wins elections and controls his district through the use of "psychotechnicians." These experts create psychological messages that are designed to motivate virtually everyone within his district to vote for him. One of the reasons, probably the main one, that these appeals can be successful is that the community is a residential development inhabited by people with "oral tendencies." Those people who exhibited anal or phallic orientations having been prescreened were denied occupancy in the development. In an effort to defeat "Martin Boyd" (the name of the character), a well known psychologist, fearing a gradual national plot to extend mind control to the rest of the country, selects the most appropriate psychological appeal that he can devise to overthrow Boyd's regime. As the plot continues, the psychologist-hero creates incidents that will eventually give rise to a demand for a "law and order" candidate. The psychologist uses propoganda techniques and entertainment ploys guaranteed to draw large crowds for his

own candidate. He even uses synthetic odors (such as the smell of a woman's breast) to calm a crowd which appears ready to turn into an antagonistic mob. He also hires people to play roles in the audience to influence responses. Telemetry devices which feed information on crowd behavior provide data for future appeals. The message of the book, which is labelled science-fiction, is that this is how elections will be influenced in the future.

At the moment, advertising firms sound much more confident than political scientists of the potential for manipulating public opinion. It is true that computers can be used to plot campaign routes, to generate voter profiles which make local appeals more specific and to help prepare commercial advertisements for the candidate (Elms, 1976). Polling techniques are much more sophisticated. Books concerning Presidential elections (McGuinness, 1969), imply that behavioral techniques already play a large part in modern campaign strategies.

In a nation of the size and diversity of population of the United States, appeals to specific groups, especially through the mass media, would be bound to seem contradictory. Probably the best advice that a psychologist could give a candidate would be to project an image of expertise on a wide range of subjects and to appear trustworthy. In this era of

the television debate and open press conference these traits would have to be not only apparent, but real.

In retrospect, with our knowledge of the use throughout the primaries and the Presidential campaign of 1972, of political subversion by the Nixon organization, we may come to the conclusion that "dirty tricks" alone influence the behavior of the voting public. We cannot, however, ignore the assistance that the Nixon Campaign received from the best of all possible sources, the Democratic candidate himself. There were several errors that George McGovern made that contributed to his image as a poor leader:

1. The incidents surrounding the selection of the Vice-Presidential candidate.

- a. Several prominent Democrats rather publically refused the invitation to run for Vice-President. The implication was that they either disapproved of McGovern as a candidate because of his political philosophy or that it was best for their political careers not to be associated with him. A more skilled leader would have conducted his negotiations in a less public manner and thus avoided the negative connotations of

these refusals which contributed to his image as a potential "loser."

b. Thomas Eagleton was McGovern's personal choice for Vice-President. The most damaging aspect of the so-called "Eagleton affair" was not his history of mental illness, but McGovern's ignorance of that fact. His lack of knowledge implied a lack of organization and a basic deficiency in those qualities needed in an efficient administrator and trustworthy leader. In this case, ineptness as a candidate was a trait which could be used to predict ineptness as a President.

2. Economic issues. McGovern made statements that easily antagonized the majority of the taxpayers and people who actually vote in this country. Furthermore, he was forced to retract or modify statements just as he had had to retract his support of Eagleton. Since his behavior seemed to generalize over situations it contributed to his growing image as a poor leader.

3. The convention. While McGovern won the Demo-

cratic nomination in the convention, the victory was viewed by many regular Democrats who are the backbone of the working organization as Machiavellian and an insult to the party. McGovern made no real attempt to heal the wounds. He misperceived the tactics necessary to restore party unity and win the election especially against an incumbent.

4. The war. While McGovern did deal with other issues, he emphasized his views on the war in Vietnam above the rest. In some sense, McGovern and the rest of the anti-war segments of the population may have won a greater battle than the Presidency, but a one issue candidate is always taking a great risk especially if his issue disappears.

Post-Watergate Morality

We may question whether or not one of the essential functions served by any national leader is to provide a model of moral behavior for its own population and for other nations that meets standards which are much more stringent and Puritanical than those we impose upon ourselves. In discussions of the Post-Watergate era, there is an implication

that new rules of morality, a pendulum swing from previously accepted behavior, have been instituted. It is assumed that the American public would have, and, indeed, did tolerate certain political practices prior to the events of 1972 that are no longer tolerated. The disclosure surrounding the extent of the extra-legal acts by Nixon and his staff on his and their own behalf are supposed to have sensitized a complacent electorate to the danger of potential immorality in government. It is not that the activities of Nixon or Agnew suddenly became illegal, but that the repercussions from their activities on the nation as a whole and on individuals rose above the normal threshold for governmental machinations. At the moment, the suspension of disbelief for public statements by government representatives has been replaced by an attempt to dissect every remark and act on the part of political actors in a search for defects of character. The press, who may have ignored what seemed to them to be irrelevant bits of information about politicians are publicizing the drinking and sexual proclivities of well known public figures living or dead with the seeming relish of witch hunters. Truly responsible men and women may be turned from selecting careers in government because they fear that innocent acts may be distorted out of proportion. The response to the hypocrisy of officials who preached to

others about immorality and the need for "law and order," the anger of a population struggling with the effects of inflation and a high rate of unemployment may have made salient rules of morality for government officials that are not realistic. Even though most citizens will admit that they have themselves broken some social rules in the past, and, if pressed, will also acknowledge that they may do so in the future, they will also state that there are degrees of immorality and differential standards for various groups in the population. The famous "double standard" in sexual behavior may be applied to men and women or to average people and political leaders. Since the acts of most citizens do not affect the very lives of large numbers of people, the public also feels free to set standards for officials that are well above most personal codes of honor. One of the comparisons in this study was between the image of the Ideal President and self concept, not Ideal Self, so that the distance between the profiles may be accounted for by the difference between an abstract and idealized concept and a preception of a real and imperfect self. However, it is also possible to propose that in a study comparing the concept of Ideal President with Ideal Self, that the former would be rated closer to the positive poles on all scales than the latter.

The search for a hero (heroine).

On Tuesday, November 7th, 1972, forty-five percent of the American public of voting age stayed away from the polls. This was the lowest percentage of voters since the 1948 election between Harry S. Truman and Thomas E. Dewey. Voter apathy seemed an insufficient explanation in view of the issues and the individuals involved. In a New York Times/Yankelovich survey, respondents were asked which candidate was more attractive. Thirty-three percent of the sample favored Mr. Nixon, twenty-three percent said Mr. McGovern, seven percent were unsure, and thirty-seven percent said "neither" (Ayres, 1972). Typical statements about both candidates did not imply that lack of interest or motivation kept people away from the polls, but a real inability to decide who was the more dangerous prospect in the White House.

It has been stated often that we have been an immature nation, in search of heroes unable to cope with the realities of the political world (Lipsyte, 1974). In a world where everything has been devalued, certain segments of the public clung to the concept that even if a man had had faults before assuming office, "there was the mystical power of the Presidency to make any man - if only for four years - as honest and altruistic and sincere as we needed him to be" (Lipsyte,

1974, p. 41). The earliest political socialization of children was built on the legends of the first leaders of this country depicting them in heroic proportions. In recent years, other Presidents took on larger than life qualities. The Watergate era may have done more than destroy the myth surrounding the office of President, it has awakened our critical powers toward a more objective view of authority figures, and freed us from a blinding reverence for the incumbents of other positions, but it has also changed our expectations toward these offices. Perhaps we have matured so that some of us will no longer await saviors, the demand for idealism over the pragmatic approach to government will be paramount.

The new ideal of leadership which may emerge may be based on controlled judgment. According to Hutschnecker (1972), "In today's world, a leader's greatness seems to lie less in a dramatic display of might than in a less spectacular policy of patient negotiation and of resisting the urge of acting out of inner aggression to back up a political philosophy of military might" (p. 31).

It may be that our future leaders will be less charismatic and more workmanlike in their approaches to governmental leadership. However, the late Walter Lippman once wrote,

"Those in high places are more than the

administrators of government bureaus. They are more than the writers of laws. They are the custodians of the nation's ideals, of the beliefs it cherishes, of its permanent hopes, of the faith which makes a nation out of a mere aggregation of individuals. They are unfaithful to that trust when by word and example they promote a spirit that is complacent, evasive and acquisitive....

"The people are looking for...men who are truthful, and resolute and eloquent in the conviction that the American destiny is to be free and magnanimous... who will talk to the people about their duty, and about the sacrifices they must make, and about the discipline they must impose upon themselves...about all those things which make a people self-respecting, serene and confident" (Lippman, 19

Future surveys should indicate whether or not the events of the past few years have changed the components of the Ideal Image of the President toward the pragmatic administrator or the idealistic leader that Lippman feels we want and need.

With each succeeding election, we tend to idealize the leaders of the early years of the Republic. We bemoan the lack of meaningful choice in contemporary politicians. To our small sample, the nominees did not appear to meet the standards for an ideal President. Years from now, with the wisdom of retrospective analysis, we may find that these candidates, even the now infamous, were larger than life and that the politicians of the future are mediocre at best,

having a tendency to avoid confrontations on issues and to rely on media mediated personality characteristics to get elected.

Tables

Table I

Presidential attitude surveys: dates conducted.

Survey	Date
I	September 1972
II	October 1972
III*	December 1972
IV	May 1973
V	Week of October 12, 1973
VI	Week of October 21, 1973
VII	Week of October 28, 1973
VIII*	December 1973
IX*	May 1974
X	July 1974
XI*	August 1974

* Note: These surveys were not analyzed for this study.

Table 2

Presidential attitude surveys:
the number of subjects in each voter group for each survey.

Voter Groups

Survey	Dem- McG.	Rep- Nix.	Dem- Nix.	Rep- McG.	Undecided	NT Survey
I	66	50	21	22	15	174
II	53	31	14	--	--	98
IV	37	28	20	--	--	85
V	24	34	16	--	--	74
VI	57	46	14	--	--	117
VII	30	39	12	--	--	81
VIII	49	35	17	--	--	101
X	43	32	15	--	--	90
XI	36	31	12	--	--	79
NT Group	395	326	141	22	15	899

Table 3

Summary of factor analysis matrices for
Republicans for Nixon for four concepts (Survey I).

<u>Factor</u>	Myself				
	1	2	3	4	5
	Wise*	Safe	Deep	Pleasant	Valuable
	Sharp	Clean	Fast	Relaxed	
	-Ideal.	Fair	Warm		
<u>% of var.</u>	24.4	23.6	21.0	16.7	14.2

Ideal President					
	Clean	Safe	Active	Sharp	Wise
	Valuable	Strong	Relaxed	-Ideal.	Fair
	Wise	Warm	Warm		
	Fair				
	Deep				
<u>% of var.</u>	29.9	24.6	21.5	14.4	9.5

McGovern					
	Pleasant	Deep	Active	Valuable	Relaxed
	Clean	Fair	Fast	Wise	
	Sharp	Strong			
	Warm	Safe			
	Fair	Wise			
<u>% of var.</u>	29.5	24.8	17.4	15.7	12.5

Nixon					
	Valuable	Relaxed	-Ideal.	Light	Active
	Safe	Strong			
	Clean	Active			
	Deep	Fast			
	Pleasant				
	Strong				
	Wise				
	Fair				
	Sharp				
<u>% of var.</u>	43.1	30.7	10.4	8.7	7.1

* The positive pole of the scales which had factor loadings greater than 0.5 are listed. The scales appear in descending rank order.

Table 4

Summary of factor analysis matrices for
Democrats for McGovern on four concepts (Survey I).

<u>Factor</u>	Myself				
	1	2	3	4	5
	Safe*	Sharp	Relaxed	Active	Warm
	Fair	Deep	-Ideal.		
	Clean	Strong			
	Wise				
	Pleasant				
	Valuable				
<u>% of var.</u>	32.0	26.3	13.9	13.9	13.9

Ideal President				
Valuable	Safe	Pleasant	-Ideal.	Sharp
Clean	Strong	Deep	Relaxed	
Fair				
<u>% of var.</u>	26.2	25.3	19.3	15.4

McGovern				
Deep	Fair	Active	Warm	Light
Wise	Valuable	Fast	Pleasant	
Strong				
Sharp				
<u>% of var.</u>	31.1	26.7	20.6	11.8

Nixon				
Clean	Active	-Ideal.	Wise	Relaxed
Pleasant	Fast	Light		
Fair	Sharp			
Safe	Strong			
<u>% of var.</u>	32.5	25.6	16.1	15.8

* The positive pole of the scales which had factor loadings greater than 0.5 are listed. The scales appear in descending rank order.

Table 5

D score matrix

Survey I, All groups

Concept: Myself

	Dem-McG.	Rep-Nix.	Dem-Nix.	Rep-McG.	Undecided
Dem-McG.					
Rep-Nix.	2.112				
Dem-Nix.	2.079	1.610			
Rep-McG.	1.631	2.145	2.324		
Undecided	0.867*	1.887	2.243	1.228*	

Note: All D scores except those marked by a star were significant as tested by the Median Test and Chi Square analysis (Siegel, 1956; Osgood et al, 1957).

Table 6

Correlation matrix for five voter groups on four concepts (Survey I)

Concept	Group	Dem-McG.	Rep-Nix.	Dem-Nix.	Rep-McG.
Myself	Rep.N.	.79			
	Dem.N.	.83	.91		
	Rep.M.	.88	.72		
	Und.	.95	.78	.77	.81
Ideal Pres.	Rep.N.	.72			
	Dem.N.	.76	.98		
	Rep.M.	.84	.88	.88	
	Und.	.91	.83	.87	.92
McGovern	Rep.N.	.08			
	Dem.N.	.17	.91		
	Rep.M.	.96	.06	.01	
	Und.	.85	.59	.21	.64
Nixon	Rep.N.	.17			
	Dem.N.	.09	.98		
	Rep.M.	.78	.20	-.24	
	Und.	.66	-.04	-.05	.96

Table 7

t test results

Survey I: Between group analysis for five scales on a concept

Concept: Myself

Groups

Scales	DM×DN	DM×RM	DM×RN	DM×U	DN×RM	DN×RN	DN×U	RM×RN	RM×U	RN×U
1. Active	0.30	-0.16	-0.61	0.58	-0.34	-0.67	0.31	-0.29	0.60	0.78
2. Fair	-0.86	2.79 ^{***}	1.50	0.81	2.64 ^{**}	1.70	0.96	-1.28	-0.49	0.14
3. Idealistic	2.74 ^{***}	0.21	5.14 ^{***}	-0.78	2.11 [*]	0.82	-2.05 [*]	3.85 ^{***}	-0.91	-3.22 ^{**}
4. Safe	-2.50 ^{**}	0.34	-0.75	0.64	3.47 ^{***}	2.25 [*]	2.56 [*]	-1.07	0.67	1.10
5. Strong	0.69	-0.76	-0.88	0.07	-1.14	-1.28	-0.24	0.06	0.49	0.44

* $p \leq .05$
 ** $p \leq .01$
 *** $p \leq .001$

DM = Democrats for McGovern
 RM = Republicans for McGovern
 RN = Republicans for Nixon
 DN = Democrats for Nixon
 U = Undecided

Table 8

D score matrix

Survey I, All groups

Concept: Ideal President

	Dem-McG.	Rep-Nix.	Dem-Nix.	Rep-McG.	Undecided
Dem-McG.					
Rep-Nix.	3.849				
Dem-Nix.	3.611	1.010*			
Rep-McG.	1.641	2.960	2.654		
Undecided	0.999*	3.261	3.021	1.431*	

Note: All D scores except those marked by a star were significant as tested by the Median Test and Chi Square analysis (Siegel, 1956; Osgood et al, 1957).

Table 9

t test results

Survey I: Between group analysis for five scales on a concept

Concept: Ideal President

Groups

Scales	DM×DN	DM×RM	DM×RN	DM×U	DN×RM	DN×RN	DN×U	RM×RN	RM×U	RN×U
1. Active	-0.98	-1.52	2.30*	1.10	-0.33	2.16*	1.21	2.64**	1.53	0.03
2. Fair	-0.02	2.14*	0.09	-0.13	1.44	0.07	-0.10	-1.70	-0.89	-0.13
3. Idealistic	7.05***	1.80	10.92***	0.20	-4.38***	0.77	-4.34***	6.53***	-0.69	-4.58**
4. Safe	0.67	2.08*	1.60	-1.75	0.72	0.31	-1.24	-0.77	-2.41*	-7.14***
5. Strong	0.48	0.19	0.74	-1.69	-0.25	0.08	-1.86	0.37	-1.73	-5.76***

* p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001

DM = Democrats for McGovern
 RM = Republicans for McGovern
 RN = Republicans for Nixon
 DN = Democrats for Nixon
 U = Undecided

Table 10

D score matrix

Survey I, Within group comparison of concepts

Democrats for McGovern

	Myself	Ideal Pres.	McGovern	Nixon
Myself				
Ideal Pres.	3.211			
McGov.	2.063	3.345		
Nixon	9.976	12.455	10.052	

Note: All D scores were significant as tested by the Wilcoxin matched pairs signed-ranks test (Siegel, 1956).

Table 11

D score matrix

Survey I, Within group comparison of concepts

Republicans for Nixon

	Myself	Ideal Pres.	McGovern	Nixon
Myself				
Ideal Pres.	3.090			
McGov.	8.321	11.119		
Nixon	2.128	3.214	8.474	

Note: All D scores were significant as tested by the Wilcoxin matched paired signed-ranks test (Siegel, 1956).

Table 12

D score matrix

Survey I, Within group comparison of concepts

Democrats for Nixon

	Myself	Ideal Pres.	McGovern	Nixon
Myself				
Ideal Pres.	3.275			
McGov.	7.453	9.552		
Nixon	2.702	3.321	7.007	

Note: All D scores were significant as tested by the Wilcoxin matched pairs signed-ranks test (Siegel, 1956).

Table 13

D score matrix

Survey I, Within group comparisons of concepts
 Republicans for McGovern

	Myself	Ideal Pres.	McGovern	Nixon
Myself				
Ideal Pres.	3.785			
McGov.	1.869	2.280		
Nixon	8.847	11.437	9.909	

Note: All D scores were significant as tested by the Wilcoxin matched pairs signed-ranks test (Siegel, 1956).

Table 14

D score matrix

Survey I, within group comparison of concepts

Undecided

	Myself	Ideal Pres.	McGovern	Nixon
Myself				
Ideal Pres.	3.972			
McGov.	3.353	6.609		
Nixon	7.963	11.350	5.305	

Note: All D scores were significant as tested by the Wilcoxin matched pairs signed-ranks test (Siegel, 1956).

Table 15

Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients

Survey I, All voter groups on four concepts

Concepts	Dem-McG. (N=66)	Rep-Nix. (N=50)	Dem-Nix. (N=21)	Rep-McG. (N=22)	Undecided (N=15)
Myself x Ideal Pr.	.88***	.93***	.79***	.70***	.85***
Myself x McGovern	.70***	-.57**	-.26	.88**	.26
Myself x Nixon	-.26	.88***	.78***	-.47*	-.28
Ideal Pr. x McGov.	.68**	-.70***	-.40	.80***	.11
Ideal Pr. x Nixon	.06	.96***	.93***	-.12	-.12
McGov. x Nixon	-.22	-.63***	-.31	-.25	.36

p values

*** p \leq .001** p \leq .01* p \leq .05

Table 16

Summary of t test results (correlated samples) for each voter group between concepts on five scales (Survey I).

Group: Democrats for McGovern ($N = 66$)

Concepts

Scales	MyxIP	MyxMc	MyxN	IPxMc	IPxN	McxN
Active	-6.54***	-2.76**	0.44	3.29*	6.33*	2.87*
Fair	-4.20***	0.59	16.45*	3.52*	21.44*	15.64*
Strong	-8.96***	-1.60	4.30*	8.84*	10.39*	5.50*
Idealistic	-3.58***	-2.93**	5.19*	0.01	7.59*	7.96*
Safe	-5.76***	0.29	15.10*	6.42*	27.05*	14.30*

p values (two tailed test)

* $p \leq .05$
 ** $p \leq .01$
 *** $p \leq .001$

Code

My = Myself
 IP = Ideal President
 Mc = McGovern
 N = Nixon

Table 17

Summary of t test results (correlated samples) for each voter group between concepts on five scales (Survey I).

Group: Republicans for McGovern (N = 22)

Concepts

Scales	MyxIP	MyxMc	MyxN	IPxMc	IPxN	McxN
Active	-3.87*	-1.86	0.22	2.33*	3.74**	2.26*
Fair	-4.71**	0.18	9.89**	3.76**	13.43**	11.44**
Strong	-5.35**	-0.87	4.73**	5.16**	11.27**	6.94**
Idealistic	-0.17	-0.69	1.50	-0.75	1.40	2.56*
Safe	-4.72**	-0.95	10.38**	2.41**	12.47**	10.00**

p values (two tailed test)

* $p \leq .05$
 ** $p \leq .01$
 *** $p \leq .001$

Code

My = Myself
 IP = Ideal President
 Mc = McGovern
 N = Nixon

Table 18

Summary of t test results (correlated samples) for each voter group between concepts on five scales (Survey I).

Group: Republicans for Nixon (N = 50)

Concepts

Scales	MyxIP	MyxMc	MyxN	IPxMc	IPxN	McxN
Active	-3.67***	1.83	-1.36	5.25***	1.54	-2.92**
Fair	-4.54***	9.06***	1.94	13.29***	5.51***	-5.90***
Strong	-6.68***	8.76***	-1.68	14.46***	3.28**	-8.71**
Idealistic	3.85***	-8.03***	2.07*	-12.32***	-2.19*	10.70***
Safe	-3.77***	15.30***	0.32	21.88***	3.87***	-13.59***

p values (two tailed test)

* $p \leq .05$
 ** $p \leq .01$
 *** $p \leq .001$

Code

My = Myself
 IP = Ideal President
 Mc = McGovern
 N = Nixon

Table 19

Summary of t test results (correlated samples) for each voter group between concepts on five scales (Survey I).

Group: Democrats for Nixon (N = 21)

Concepts

Scales	MyxIP	MyxMc	MyxN	IPxMc	IPxN	McxN
Active	-3.42**	-1.15	-1.57	2.12*	1.77	-0.16
Fair	-0.85	3.38**	1.87	4.29***	3.07**	-1.36
Strong	-3.99***	4.01**	-1.45	7.64***	2.79**	-4.99***
Idealistic	2.32*	-3.39**	0.99	-4.99***	-1.16	4.08**
Safe	0.01	10.91***	1.57	10.41***	1.48	-9.35***

p values (two tailed test)

* $p \leq .05$
 ** $p \leq .01$
 *** $p \leq .001$

Code

My = Myself
 IP = Ideal President
 Mc = McGovern
 N = Nixon

Table 20

Summary of t test results (correlated samples) for each voter group between concepts on five scales (Survey I).

Group: Undecided (N = 15)

Concepts

Scales	MyxIP	MyxMc	MyxN	IPxMc	IPxN	McxN
Active	-3.58**	-0.26	1.24	1.43	4.22***	2.64*
Fair	-2.70*	1.68	3.25**	1.57	7.96***	4.39***
Strong	-4.58***	1.86	3.34**	1.31	7.97***	4.84***
Idealistic	-1.14	-1.51	1.21	3.64**	2.13*	-1.01
Safe	-3.45**	1.61	4.34***	5.51***	8.51***	2.59*

p values (two tailed test)

* $p \leq .05$
 ** $p \leq .01$
 *** $p \leq .001$

Code

My = Myself
 IP = Ideal President
 Mc = McGovern
 N = Nixon

Table 21

t test results

Survey I: Between group analysis for five scales on a concept

Concept: McGovern

Groups

Scales	DM×DN	DM×RM	DM×RN	DM×U	DN×RM	DN×RN	DN×U	RM×RN	RM×U	RN×U
1. Active	0.13	-0.85	3.88 ^{***}	2.00 [*]	-0.74	2.40 ^{**}	1.45	3.70 ^{***}	2.94 ^{**}	0.27
2. Fair	4.17 ^{***}	2.64 ^{**}	11.07 ^{***}	3.19 ^{**}	-1.75	2.51 ^{**}	0.20	6.05 ^{***}	1.94	-1.24
3. Idealistic	0.69	1.94 [*]	-0.46	0.27	0.78	-0.93	-0.10	-2.17 [*]	-0.71	0.43
4. Safe	9.95 ^{***}	-0.72	13.83 ^{***}	0.69	-9.52	0.25 ^{***}	-4.01	11.56 ^{***}	1.47	-4.74 ^{***}
5. Strong	6.90 ^{***}	-0.81	10.07 ^{***}	1.91	-5.75 ^{***}	0.40	-1.27	7.77 ^{***}	2.29 [*]	-1.88

* p \leq .05
 ** p \leq .01
 *** p \leq .001

DM = Democrats for McGovern
 RM = Republicans for McGovern
 RN = Republicans for Nixon
 DN = Democrats for Nixon
 U = Undecided

Table 22

t test results

Survey I: Between group analysis for five scales on a concept

Concept: Nixon

Groups

Scales	DMxDN	DMxRM	DMxRN	DMxU	DNxRM	DNxRN	DNxU	RMxRN	RMxU	RNxU
1. Active	-1.75	-0.10	-2.29*	1.63	1.34	0.15	2.22*	-1.64	1.53	2.73**
2. Fair	-8.88**	-1.35	-11.58***	-0.82	7.05	0.32	3.46**	-7.97***	-0.19	3.77***
3. Idealistic	0.75	-2.54**	2.36*	-1.23	-2.93**	0.93	-1.44	5.61***	-0.03	-2.77**
4. Safe	-13.35***	-0.64	-15.93***	02.80**	10.24***	0.98	3.81	-10.86***	-2.00	3.32**
5. Strong	-3.70***	0.71	-5.45***	0.23	5.00***	0.21	2.52*	-6.07***	-0.14	2.90**

* p $\leq .05$
 ** p $\leq .01$
 *** p $\leq .001$

DM = Democrats for McGovern
 RM = Republicans for McGovern
 RN = Republicans for Nixon
 DN = Democrats for Nixon
 U = Undecided

Table 23

D score matrix

Survey I, All groups

Concept: McGovern

	Dem-McG.	Rep-Nix.	Dem-Nix.	Rep-McG.	Undecided
Dem-McG.					
Rep-Nix.	7.942				
Dem-Nix.	6.399	2.690			
Rep-McG.	1.573	8.342	6.878		
Undecided	3.601	4.741	4.057	3.877	

Note: All D scores were significant as tested by the Median Test and Chi Square analysis (Siegel, 1956; Osgood et al, 1957).

Table 24
D score matrix
 Survey I, All groups
 Concept: Nixon

	Dem-McG.	Rep-Nix.	Dem-Nix.	Rep-McG.	Undecided
Dem-McG.					
Rep-Nix.	8.870				
Dem-Nix.	8.977	0.985			
Rep-McG.	1.804	9.105	9.087		
Undecided	2.573	7.794	7.736	2.346	

Note: All D scores were significant as tested by the Median Test and Chi Square analysis (Siegel, 1956; Osgood et al, 1957).

Table 25

Mean ratings of candidates on EPA factors:

The Presidential election, 1952.

Voter Groups	Republican-Taft			Republican-Eisenhower			Democrat-Stevenson		
	E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A
Taft	2.28	2.25	2.37	1.17	1.26	1.67	0.09	1.14	2.18
Stevenson	0.84	1.00	1.34	0.95	0.68	1.22	2.27	2.22	2.24
Eisenhower	2.02	2.01	2.01	2.05	2.17	2.13	1.16	1.41	2.02

The data in this table are from Osgood et al, 1961.

Table 26

Mean ratings of candidates on EPA factors:
The Presidential election, 1968.

Voter Groups	Republican-Nixon			Democrats-Humphrey			Wallace Supporters		
	E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A
Nixon	1.12	1.18	1.20	-0.60	-0.10	0.50	0.10	-0.10	1.20
Humphrey	0	-0.25	0.38	0.65	1.05	1.55	-0.40	-0.80	1.40
Wallace	-1.31	1.31	1.94	-2.40	0.95	2.35	0.70	2.30	2.50

The data in this table are from Waters, 1968.

Table 27

Mean ratings of candidates on EPA factors:

The Presidential election, 1972.

Voter Group	Rep-Nixon			Dem-McGovern			Rep-McGovern			Dem-Nixon			Undecided		
	E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A	E	P	A
Nixon	1.40	1.84	1.47	-1.73	0.01	0.71	-1.31	-.30	0.78	1.52	1.76	1.52	-.50	-.63	-.07
McGovern	-.52	-1.20	0.40	2.09	1.50	1.50	1.48	1.70	1.73	0.63	-.95	1.43	0.63	0.44	0.88

Table 28

t test results

Survey V and VI: Between survey comparison of Republicans
for Nixon on Concept Nixon (5 scales).

Scale	<u>t</u> value	df	p*
Active	-0.20	83	.840
Fair	-1.17	83	.252
Strong	-0.23	83	.820
Idealistic	-0.45	83	.658
Safe	-0.36	83	.720

* Two tailed test

Table 29

t test results

Survey V and VII: Between survey comparison of Republicans
for Nixon on Concept Nixon (5 scales).

Scale	<u>t</u> value	df	p*
Active	-0.25	71	.808
Fair	1.98	71	.060
Strong	0.71	71	.483
Idealistic	0.62	71	.540
Safe	-0.32	71	.750

* Two tailed test

Table 30

t test results

Survey VI and VII: Between survey comparison of Republicans
for Nixon on Concept Nixon (5 scales).

Scale	<u>t</u> value	df	p*
Active	-0.07	83	.942
Fair	3.30	83	.003
Strong	0.84	83	.411
Idealistic	1.26	83	.219
Safe	-0.32	83	.750

* Two tailed test

Table 31

t test results

Survey V and VI: Between survey comparison of Democrats
for McGovern on Concept Nixon (5 scales).

Scale	<u>t</u> value	df	p*
Active	0.44	79	.662
Fair	0.18	79	.859
Strong	-0.25	79	.806
Idealistic	-1.00	79	.323
Safe	-0.68	79	.500

* Two tailed test

Table 32

t test results

Surveys V and VII: Between survey comparison of Democrats
for McGovern on Concept Nixon (5 scales).

Scale	<u>t</u> value	df	p*
Active	-0.08	52	.940
Fair	0.62	52	.542
Strong	-0.36	52	.617
Idealistic	-0.51	52	.720
Safe	2.07	52	.050

* Two tailed test

Table 33

t test results

Survey VI and VII: Between survey comparison of Democrats
for McGovern on Concept Nixon (5 scales).

Scale	<u>t</u> value	df	p*
Active	-0.52	85	.609
Fair	0.54	85	.590
Strong	-0.20	85	.842
Idealistic	0.30	85	.764
Safe	2.92	85	.008

* Two tailed test

Figures




Figure 1. Survey I

Mean scores for five voter groups
on concept "Myself."




Figure 2. Survey I

Mean scores for five voter groups
on concept "Ideal President."




Figure 3. Survey I

Mean scores for five voter groups
on concept "McGovern."




Figure 4. Survey I

Mean scores for five voter groups
on concept "Nixon."




Figure 5. Survey I

Mean scores for Democrats for McGovern on four concepts ("Myself," "Ideal President," "McGovern," "Nixon").




Figure 6. Survey I

Mean scores for Republicans for Nixon on four concepts ("Myself," "Ideal President," "McGovern," "Nixon").




Figure 7. Survey I

Mean scores for Democrats for Nixon on four concepts ("Myself," "Ideal President," "McGovern," "Nixon").




Figure 8. Survey I

Mean scores for Republicans for McGovern on four concepts ("Myself," "Ideal President," "McGovern," "Nixon").




Figure 9. Survey I

Mean scores for the Undecided group on four concepts ("Myself," "Ideal President," "McGovern," "Nixon").




Figure 10. Surveys V, VI and VII

Mean scores for Republicans for Nixon on concept "Nixon."




Figure 11. Surveys V, VI and VII

Mean scores for Democrats for McGovern on
concept "Nixon."




Figure 12. Survey I, Survey II, Survey IV, Survey X

Mean scores for Democrats for McGovern on concept "McGovern."




Figure 13. Survey I, Survey II, Survey IV, Survey X

Mean scores for Republicans for Nixon on
concept "McGovern."




Figure 14. Survey I, Survey II, Survey IV, Survey X

Mean scores for Democrats for McGovern on concept "Nixon."




Figure 15. Survey I, Survey II, Survey IV, Survey X

Mean score for Republicans for Nixon on
concept "Nixon."

Appendices

Appendix 1: The Semantic Differential form.
The instructions to the interviewers.
The interviewers script.
The list of scale titles.

Interviewer _____ Date _____

The City University of New York

Public Opinion Survey

1972 Presidential Election

Name _____

Sex _____ Age _____

Party Preference _____

Voting Preference 1 _____

2 _____

Instructions: Rate each person on each scale. Please do not omit any scales.

Sample

Summer

DARK _____ LIGHT

MYSELF

LIGHT	_____	HEAVY
PASSIVE	_____	ACTIVE
DIRTY	_____	CLEAN
VALUABLE	_____	WORTHLESS
SHALLOW	_____	DEEP
SLOW	_____	FAST
TENSE	_____	RELAXED
FAIR	_____	UNFAIR
FOOLISH	_____	WISE
WARM	_____	COOL
DULL	_____	SHARP
IDEALISTIC	_____	REALISTIC
DANGEROUS	_____	SAFE
STRONG	_____	WEAK
PLEASANT	_____	UNPLEASANT

Instructions to the interviewers

While I am aware that this study will not be based on the principles of random sampling, I would like to eliminate as many sources of bias as possible. Therefore we will conduct the interviews in a variety of public places where we can tap as many people of different backgrounds and socio-economic levels as possible. We would also like as wide an age range as is practical. Since we are restricted in our resources and cannot tap the homebound population or people who do not use public transportation the sample will certainly be unrepresentative in that area.

As an interviewer of experience, I know that there is a tendency to approach people who look friendly or, by some subjective judgment, at least willing to cooperate. Please try and pick your respondents by speaking to every third person you meet. If you can get an equal number of men and women in your group that would be important, too. I also know there may be a tendency for the male interviewers to approach men or the female interviewers to approach women, but I would like you to interview both sexes. Of course, I could be wrong. The bias might be in the other direction.

You will find that your schedules send you to different places at different hours of the day. There was a reason

for this plan. You will find older people traveling at different hours of the day. You will find more women (or men) in certain locations. The list of locations is as follows:

1. Grand Central Station.
2. The Long Island Railroad Station.
3. The Greyhound Bus Terminal.
4. La Guardia Airport.
5. Local shopping centers in Brooklyn, the Bronx, Queens, and Staten Island.
6. The corner of 42nd Street and Fifth Avenue.
7. Washington Square Park.
8. Lexington Avenue and 59th Street.

There is one final topic that I must mention even though I find some difficulty in emphasizing its importance. The subject is appropriate attire. As interviewers, you want to elicit the most cooperation from your respondents. You want them to take the survey seriously. In order to do so you must represent yourselves in what is probably a very stereotypic way. I know there is no direct line from jeans and sandals to the brain, but the general public, at least, will be more willing to help you and to find you credible if you dress as if you were trying to get a job on Wall

Street. I think while one might anticipate a difference in the response to attire depending on the location, I would like to propose that even the denisons of Washington Square Park will take the study more seriously if you dress on the conservative side.

Another point that I would like to emphasize is that the instructions to the respondent should be uniform. Therefore you will find a script attached to your Semantic Differential forms. Please memorize it carefully so that you don't sound stilted and so that you don't omit any of the instructions. A friendly, but serious demeanor will also set the tone for the attitudes of the respondents toward the study.

My last request to you involves keeping a log of the interviewing experience. There is much to be gained from a record of the ease or difficulty in getting respondents, of their apparent interest in the study and of any questions or comments they may have made. Booklets for your log are also included with the rest of your materials.

Thank you very much for your cooperation. It should be very exciting to see the results of this study. I plan to be able to have at least a preliminary data analysis to you by December.

Interviewer's script

Good morning (afternoon, evening). I'm from the City University of New York. We are conducting a survey of attitudes of voters in the City of New York. We would appreciate your help very much.

The purpose of this study is to measure attitudes toward the candidates in this (1972) Presidential election. We would also like you to rate yourself and your idea of the "Ideal President" on a series of scales. In taking this test, please make your judgments on the basis of what these things mean to you.

First, we would like you to give us a little information about yourself so that we can compare how men and women look at these concepts or how Republicans, Democrats or Independents, for example, look at them. (At this point, interviewers are to show the subjects the cover sheet.) Please note that we do not need to know your name. This study is absolutely anonymous. (Interviewers are to wait until information is completed.) Please fill in all the spaces so that we will be able to compare the groups. Thank you.

Now, if you will look at the bottom of the page you will see a sample of the type of scale we are using. The

concept is "summer." If you feel that "summer" is very closely related to one end of the scale, you should place your check mark there (indicate the extreme positions). If you feel that the concept is close to the end of the scale, but not at the very end, you should check one of these positions (indicate position 2 or 6). If the concept seems only slightly related to one side or the other, but that it is not really 'neutral' (the interviewer should use the term "in the middle," if that seems more appropriate), then check here or here (indicate position 3 or 5). The side of the scale that you check depends on which of the two ends of the scale seem most like the concept that you are judging. If you think that the concept is either in the middle of the scale, or that the scale is really not related to what you are rating, then you should place your check here (indicate position 4). Some of the scales may at first glance seem unrelated to the concept, but when you think about it a moment you may find you do know where you wish to place the check.

Before we begin, may I ask you to place your check marks on each space (indicate the point). Next, make sure that you check every scale for each page. Please do not omit any. Also, please do not put more than one check-mark on a single scale.

Sometimes you may feel as though you've had the same item before on the test. Please do not look back to check the items or try to remember what you checked before. Please make each item a separate judgment of how you feel.

Respondent completes procedure

Thank you again for your cooperation. If there are any questions you would like to ask me about the survey, I will be happy to tell you what I can.

Table 1

The list of scales for the analyses and figures.

1. Light-heavy
2. Active-passive
3. Clean-dirty
4. Valuable-worthless
5. Deep-shallow
6. Fast-slow
7. Relaxed-tense
8. Fair-unfair
9. Wise-foolish
10. Warm-cool
11. Sharp-dull
12. Idealistic-realistic
13. Safe-dangerous
14. Strong-weak
15. Pleasant-unpleasant

Appendix 2: Mean scores for each voter group on fifteen Semantic Differential scales on four concepts.

Table 1

Survey I

Concept Myself: Mean scores for voter groups (5) on
Semantic Differential Scales (15).

Scale	Voter Groups				
	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>	<u>Rep-McG.</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
1	3.606	3.820	4.429	3.870	3.625
2	4.848	5.040	4.714	4.913	4.750
3	5.924	6.000	6.238	5.826	5.813
4	5.833	5.880	5.952	5.696	5.625
5	5.818	4.540	5.333	5.087	5.750
6	5.439	5.260	5.190	4.565	5.125
7	4.045	4.640	4.238	3.913	4.188
8	6.167	5.880	6.381	5.522	5.563
9	5.212	4.960	5.571	5.304	4.938
10	5.727	5.300	5.524	5.174	5.563
11	5.818	5.460	5.714	5.174	5.688
12	4.530	2.700	3.095	4.391	4.375
13	5.652	5.820	6.476	5.522	5.625
14	5.242	5.460	5.000	5.478	5.375
15	5.939	5.780	6.333	5.870	5.750

Table 2

Survey I

Concept Ideal President: Mean scores for voter groups (5)
on Semantic Differential scales
(15).

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Voter Groups</u>				
	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>	<u>Rep-McG.</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
1	4.091	3.980	4.000	4.304	4.000
2	6.106	5.800	6.238	6.304	5.938
3	6.485	6.660	6.333	6.087	6.250
4	6.515	6.760	6.476	6.522	6.625
5	6.455	6.420	6.476	6.348	6.625
6	6.197	5.820	6.429	6.130	6.625
7	4.758	4.820	4.476	5.130	5.000
8	6.561	6.560	6.571	6.261	6.688
9	6.652	6.680	6.619	6.435	6.688
10	6.045	5.240	5.000	5.087	5.688
11	6.561	6.360	6.381	6.217	6.625
12	5.409	1.720	2.000	4.478	4.750
13	6.576	6.420	6.476	6.304	6.813
14	6.621	6.560	6.571	6.609	6.938
15	6.121	5.740	5.810	5.696	6.375

Table 3

Survey I

Concept McGovern: Mean scores for voter groups (5) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Voter Groups</u>				
	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>	<u>Rep-McG.</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
1	3.939	3.880	4.286	4.348	4.125
2	5.500	4.400	5.429	5.739	4.875
3	6.106	4.420	5.619	5.957	5.000
4	5.909	3.180	3.619	5.783	4.500
5	5.500	2.680	2.952	5.565	4.563
6	5.015	3.780	3.905	5.652	4.625
7	5.030	3.720	4.905	4.609	3.875
8	6.091	3.480	4.619	5.478	4.625
9	5.379	2.680	3.000	5.652	4.625
10	4.773	3.620	3.905	5.304	4.625
11	5.076	3.500	4.143	5.565	4.313
12	5.409	5.540	5.095	4.652	5.438
13	5.591	2.240	2.333	5.783	4.688
14	5.500	2.860	3.048	5.696	4.438
15	6.242	4.180	5.048	6.304	4.938

Table 4

Survey I

Concept Nixon: Mean scores for voter groups (5) on
Semantic Differential scales (15).

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Voter Groups</u>				
	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>	<u>Rep-McG.</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
1	3.409	3.240	3.524	3.609	3.813
2	4.712	5.460	5.524	4.783	3.938
3	2.909	5.540	5.667	3.217	3.688
4	2.727	6.080	5.952	2.609	3.500
5	2.697	5.220	4.952	2.609	2.563
6	3.939	5.260	5.143	4.087	3.875
7	2.167	4.000	4.571	2.957	2.625
8	2.273	5.400	5.524	2.696	3.500
9	3.500	5.820	5.762	2.478	3.438
10	2.258	4.020	4.000	2.565	2.688
11	3.318	5.580	5.143	3.130	2.938
12	2.848	2.180	2.524	3.783	3.563
13	2.167	5.760	6.048	2.348	3.250
14	4.015	5.840	5.762	3.696	3.375
15	2.424	5.320	5.476	2.130	3.125

Table 5

Survey II

Concept Myself: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential Scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	3.405	3.871	4.625
2	4.703	5.226	4.563
3	5.297	5.903	6.250
4	5.568	5.839	5.875
5	5.135	5.613	5.250
6	4.459	5.387	5.250
7	4.514	4.581	3.938
8	5.405	5.677	6.063
9	5.054	5.000	5.688
10	4.757	5.419	5.188
11	4.919	5.452	5.875
12	4.405	2.710	3.063
13	5.270	5.935	6.500
14	4.946	5.516	4.938
15	5.784	5.742	6.375

Table 6

Survey II

Concept Ideal President: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential Scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	4.243	4.290	4.813
2	6.081	6.065	5.875
3	6.243	6.452	6.438
4	6.649	6.452	6.438
5	6.378	6.097	6.125
6	5.432	5.710	5.938
7	4.730	4.613	4.375
8	5.892	6.226	6.438
9	6.405	6.126	6.500
10	4.838	5.258	5.688
11	5.703	5.839	6.313
12	6.405	2.032	2.000
13	6.162	6.290	6.375
14	6.135	6.161	6.313
15	5.568	5.613	5.938

Table 7

Survey II

Concept McGovern: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on
Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	4.297	4.161	4.625
2	5.811	4.065	5.438
3	5.757	4.000	5.750
4	6.027	2.968	3.313
5	5.784	2.355	2.875
6	5.351	3.516	3.563
7	4.459	3.774	4.625
8	5.432	3.097	4.375
9	5.784	2.645	2.875
10	4.973	3.290	3.688
11	5.432	2.774	3.875
12	5.946	5.226	4.938
13	5.676	2.194	2.875
14	5.595	2.806	2.625
15	6.108	3.645	5.125

Table 8

Survey II

Concept Nixon: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	4.081	3.323	4.125
2	4.162	5.548	5.375
3	3.270	5.613	5.625
4	3.351	6.097	5.688
5	3.703	5.194	4.750
6	4.541	5.097	5.375
7	3.541	4.065	5.000
8	3.297	5.419	5.563
9	3.324	5.742	5.938
10	3.351	4.065	3.625
11	4.189	5.548	5.188
12	2.135	2.419	2.250
13	2.243	6.000	5.688
14	4.595	5.710	5.375
15	2.946	5.581	5.438

Table 9

Survey IV

Concept Myself: Mean scores for voter groups (4) on
Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups				
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
1	4.167	3.083	5.125	4.200
2	5.433	5.083	5.000	4.600
3	6.333	6.500	6.875	5.800
4	6.300	5.917	6.625	6.200
5	5.533	6.000	5.875	6.400
6	5.633	5.750	5.625	5.200
7	4.533	3.750	2.750	3.600
8	6.267	6.333	7.000	6.000
9	5.567	5.583	5.750	5.800
10	5.567	5.500	6.250	4.200
11	5.767	5.417	6.125	5.600
12	3.533	4.333	3.375	4.000
13	6.133	5.667	6.500	6.200
14	5.433	5.750	5.000	4.800
15	6.167	5.667	6.875	6.600

Table 10

Survey IV

Concept Ideal President: Mean scores for voter groups (4) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

<u>Scales</u>	<u>Voter Groups</u>			
	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
1	3.933	2.333	3.750	4.800
2	6.533	6.417	6.750	6.800
3	6.667	6.417	6.750	6.200
4	6.700	7.000	7.000	7.000
5	6.200	6.417	5.750	5.600
6	6.067	5.583	6.375	6.200
7	5.667	5.917	6.250	5.800
8	6.833	6.583	6.875	6.400
9	6.867	6.917	7.000	7.000
10	5.233	5.000	4.875	4.600
11	6.767	6.833	7.000	7.000
12	3.733	3.000	3.500	2.400
13	6.233	5.917	6.375	5.000
14	6.700	7.000	6.875	7.000
15	6.367	6.417	7.000	6.200

Table 11

Survey IV

Concept McGovern: Mean scores for voter groups (4) on
Semantic Differential scales (15).

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Voter Groups</u>			
	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
1	4.567	4.000	5.000	3.400
2	5.167	5.583	3.875	6.000
3	6.300	6.083	5.500	5.200
4	4.800	3.750	4.500	4.400
5	4.333	3.250	2.875	4.400
6	4.467	3.583	3.875	4.800
7	4.300	3.250	3.375	3.800
8	5.833	5.333	5.250	5.000
9	4.200	2.250	3.500	5.200
10	4.600	5.917	4.250	4.200
11	4.700	3.250	4.750	5.000
12	5.533	5.583	4.750	4.600
13	4.767	2.250	4.375	4.400
14	4.867	3.833	2.875	4.800
15	6.067	5.000	5.625	5.800

Table 12

Survey IV

Concept Nixon: Mean scores for voter groups (4) on
Semantic Differential scales (15).

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Voter Groups</u>			
	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
1	3.700	3.083	3.500	4.200
2	4.700	6.250	5.750	4.400
3	3.000	3.667	5.500	3.000
4	2.667	5.333	4.500	3.200
5	2.800	4.458	5.250	2.400
6	4.133	6.083	5.500	4.600
7	2.667	2.917	4.500	2.200
8	2.333	4.167	2.625	3.200
9	2.967	5.500	4.750	3.000
10	2.067	3.500	5.250	3.000
11	3.633	4.917	6.250	3.000
12	3.500	2.667	4.500	4.000
13	1.867	4.500	4.375	2.200
14	4.067	5.883	6.000	3.800
15	2.667	4.417	6.375	2.200

Table 13

Survey V

Concept Myself: Mean scores for voter groups (2) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups		
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>
1	4.200	4.067
2	4.600	4.600
3	5.800	5.933
4	6.200	6.267
5	6.400	5.267
6	5.200	5.467
7	3.600	4.867
8	6.000	5.733
9	5.800	5.000
10	4.200	5.133
11	5.600	5.933
12	4.000	3.733
13	6.200	5.800
14	4.800	5.200
15	6.600	6.133

Table 14

Survey V

Concept Ideal President: Mean scores for voter groups (2) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups		
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>
1	4.800	3.333
2	6.800	6.533
3	6.200	6.333
4	7.000	6.533
5	5.600	6.133
6	6.200	5.733
7	5.800	5.667
8	6.400	6.667
9	7.000	6.800
10	4.600	5.533
11	7.000	6.667
12	2.400	4.067
13	5.000	6.267
14	7.000	6.400
15	6.200	6.333

Table 15

Survey V

Concept McGovern: Mean scores for voter groups (2) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups		
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>
1	3.400	4.533
2	6.000	5.533
3	5.200	6.267
4	4.400	5.133
5	4.400	5.200
6	4.800	4.933
7	3.800	4.333
8	5.000	6.200
9	5.200	4.933
10	4.200	5.000
11	5.000	5.667
12	4.600	5.200
13	4.400	5.067
14	4.800	5.067
15	5.800	6.267

Table 16

Survey V

Concept Nixon: Mean scores for voter groups (2) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups		
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>
1	4.200	3.467
2	4.400	4.933
3.	3.000	1.667
4	3.200	2.000
5	2.400	2.467
6	4.600	3.533
7	2.200	2.533
8	3.200	2.267
9	3.000	3.267
10	3.000	2.600
11	3.000	4.267
12	4.000	2.933
13	2.200	1.800
14	3.800	4.267
15	2.200	1.867

Table 17

Survey VI

Concept Myself: Mean scores of voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	3.917	4.111	4.364
2	4.667	4.556	4.182
3	6.333	5.778	5.591
4	6.083	5.556	5.864
5	5.667	6.222	5.136
6	5.333	5.111	5.227
7	3.583	4.000	4.227
8	6.417	6.444	6.091
9	5.500	5.778	5.136
10	5.583	6.111	5.182
11	5.583	5.556	5.318
12	3.667	2.333	3.818
13	6.250	6.333	5.773
14	5.000	5.222	4.727
15	5.917	6.111	6.000

Table 18

Survey VI

Concept Ideal President: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	3.750	2.889	4.136
2	5.500	6.000	5.818
3	6.500	6.667	6.182
4	6.750	6.111	6.318
5	6.250	5.889	6.045
6	5.417	5.556	5.682
7	5.500	5.222	5.955
8	6.583	5.778	6.318
9	6.750	6.222	6.500
10	5.417	5.111	5.227
11	6.833	5.667	6.455
12	3.333	2.889	2.818
13	6.583	5.889	6.227
14	6.583	6.111	6.591
15	6.000	6.000	6.364

Table 19

Survey VI

Concept McGovern: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	4.750	4.889	3.909
2	3.667	3.000	4.682
3	3.833	5.222	5.182
4	3.000	2.556	5.045
5	2.833	3.333	4.682
6	4.583	5.111	4.545
7	4.583	3.667	4.591
8	4.417	3.778	5.364
9	3.000	2.444	4.545
10	2.833	3.778	4.364
11	3.167	3.000	4.636
12	5.667	5.778	4.818
13	2.833	2.556	4.909
14	3.167	2.111	4.818
15	5.167	3.885	5.955

Table 20

Survey VI

Concept Nixon: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	3.667	2.778	3.591
2	5.000	5.111	4.636
3	3.333	2.222	2.045
4	3.833	2.667	2.318
5	3.917	2.000	3.364
6	3.917	5.111	4.409
7	3.917	2.000	2.182
8	3.250	2.333	2.182
9	3.500	2.778	2.909
10	3.000	2.111	2.455
11	4.250	3.667	3.318
12	3.333	3.333	3.591
13	3.417	2.000	1.955
14	4.417	3.333	4.555
15	4.167	3.111	2.409

Table 21

Survey VII

Concept Myself: Mean scores for voter groups (2) on
Semantic Differential scales (15).

	Voter Groups	
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>
1	4.400	4.500
2	4.467	4.125
3	6.000	5.500
4	5.600	6.250
5	5.933	5.125
6	5.267	5.375
7	4.333	4.250
8	5.600	6.375
9	5.133	5.250
10	5.000	6.125
11	5.600	5.875
12	3.200	3.375
14	6.067	4.750
15	5.733	6.500

Table 22

Survey VII

Concept Ideal President: Mean scores for voter groups (2) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Voter Groups</u>	
	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>
1	4.533	4.250
2	6.333	6.375
3	6.733	6.000
4	6.667	6.625
5	5.933	5.875
6	5.800	6.125
7	5.400	6.125
8	6.400	6.250
9	6.733	6.500
10	4.733	5.375
11	6.333	6.375
12	2.400	3.000
13	6.267	6.000
14	6.733	6.375
15	6.333	6.375

Table 23

Survey VII

Concept McGovern: Mean scores for voter groups (2) on Semantic Differential Scales (15).

Voter Groups		
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>
1	4.400	4.000
2	5.133	5.000
3	5.067	5.750
4	4.200	5.000
5	2.933	5.125
6	4.000	4.500
7	4.667	4.875
8	4.400	5.500
9	3.733	4.875
10	5.000	4.000
11	3.867	5.250
12	5.533	4.875
13	4.533	5.000
14	4.400	4.750
15	4.933	6.250

Table 24

Survey VII

Concept Nixon: Mean scores for voter groups (2) on
Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups		
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>
1	3.067	3.875
2	5.133	5.000
3	4.400	1.625
4	4.000	2.250
5	4.133	2.375
6	4.000	5.000
7	2.867	2.000
8	4.000	1.875
9	4.533	3.000
10	2.467	2.500
11	4.133	3.000
12	3.667	3.375
13	3.933	2.000
14	4.600	4.625
15	4.133	2.375

Table 25

Survey X

Concept Myself: Mean scores of voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	4.545	3.533	3.278
2	4.364	4.667	4.556
3	6.273	6.400	6.333
4	6.000	6.133	5.444
5	6.273	5.600	6.111
6	5.727	5.400	5.000
7	4.364	3.400	4.000
8	5.909	6.000	6.333
9	5.545	5.400	5.222
10	6.000	5.400	5.333
11	5.818	5.333	5.389
12	2.455	4.533	4.944
13	6.182	5.867	5.611
14	5.818	5.867	5.167
15	5.818	5.933	5.500

Table 26

Survey X

Concept Ideal President: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Voter Groups</u>		
	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	3.545	2.533	3.444
2	6.273	5.933	6.611
3	6.818	6.267	6.556
4	6.636	6.867	6.833
5	5.909	6.267	6.667
6	6.455	6.200	6.278
7	5.091	4.400	4.833
8	6.364	6.333	6.833
9	6.636	6.533	6.883
10	5.273	3.467	5.667
11	6.455	6.533	6.722
12	1.909	2.600	4.333
13	6.273	6.000	5.778
14	6.818	6.600	6.389
15	6.182	5.733	6.500

Table 27

Survey X

Concept McGovern: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on
Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	4.091	4.467	3.722
2	3.000	5.200	5.667
3	5.182	5.933	6.056
4	3.364	2.867	5.722
5	3.545	3.000	5.722
6	4.091	3.000	4.944
7	3.636	2.533	4.444
8	4.000	4.333	5.556
9	3.091	2.467	5.167
10	4.264	5.867	5.111
11	3.364	2.867	5.333
12	6.364	6.067	5.944
13	2.636	2.733	5.222
14	3.273	3.667	5.278
15	5.091	4.200	5.889

Table 28

Survey X

Concept Nixon: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	3.00	3.400	3.056
2	5.182	6.000	5.500
3	2.636	3.867	2.444
4	3.091	5.733	2.389
5	2.455	5.000	2.833
6	4.545	5.033	4.056
7	2.273	2.533	1.667
8	2.000	4.267	2.611
9	2.364	5.400	3.500
10	2.000	4.067	2.167
11	3.818	4.933	3.722
12	2.818	1.867	2.611
13	2.091	5.067	1.944
14	3.818	5.867	4.556
15	3.182	4.667	2.778

Table 29

Survey XI

Concept Myself: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	3.737	3.750	5.000
2	5.368	4.650	5.143
3	6.421	6.200	6.143
4	6.000	5.900	5.714
5	5.526	6.000	5.000
6	5.474	5.350	5.286
7	3.632	3.950	5.000
8	6.105	6.300	5.000
9	5.526	5.600	4.714
10	5.211	5.650	4.714
11	5.368	5.800	5.571
12	4.263	3.300	3.000
13	5.474	6.000	5.286
14	5.737	5.850	5.429
15	5.526	6.300	4.857

Table 30

Survey XI

Concept Ideal President: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups			
<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	3.211	4.150	4.714
2	5.842	6.050	6.429
3	6.474	6.600	6.714
4	6.737	6.850	6.286
5	6.263	6.200	5.571
6	5.842	5.650	5.286
7	4.947	5.750	6.000
8	6.263	6.700	5.857
9	6.526	6.850	6.000
10	4.895	4.850	5.857
11	6.579	6.750	6.000
12	2.842	2.750	3.429
13	5.842	6.550	5.857
14	6.789	6.900	6.429
15	6.053	6.400	5.857

Table 31

Survey XI

Concept McGovern: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	4.053	4.500	5.000
2	4.895	4.250	5.143
3	5.947	4.300	5.429
4	3.789	3.650	4.143
5	3.000	3.200	1.714
6	3.842	4.250	4.000
7	3.368	4.850	4.000
8	4.474	4.500	4.429
9	2.474	3.400	3.857
10	5.579	4.000	4.000
11	3.474	3.800	3.490
12	5.579	5.450	5.714
13	2.263	3.650	4.714
14	3.632	4.000	4.286
15	4.684	5.150	4.429

Table 32

Survey XI

Concept Nixon: Mean scores for voter groups (3) on Semantic Differential scales (15).

Voter Groups

<u>Scale</u>	<u>Dem-McG.</u>	<u>Rep-Nix.</u>	<u>Dem-Nix.</u>
1	3.000	3.200	3.143
2	5.789	5.150	5.429
3	4.053	3.850	5.000
4	5.368	4.300	4.000
5	4.632	4.090	4.571
6	5.474	3.800	4.571
7	2.789	3.050	4.571
8	4.150	3.800	4.429
9	4.947	3.850	5.286
10	3.368	2.800	2.857
11	5.216	4.000	5.571
12	2.105	3.450	4.143
13	4.684	3.700	3.571
14	5.737	4.350	5.286
15	4.368	4.200	4.857

Appendix 3

Table 1

Varimax rotated factor matrix
for Democrats for McGovern on concept
"Myself" (Survey I).

Scale	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Light	.147	-.321	.145	-.123	-.206
2. Active	.005	.283	.040	.904*	.279
3. Clean	.589*	-.049	.063	-.112	.104
4. Valuable	.521*	.372	.166	.135	.293
5. Deep	.236	.634*	-.177	.179	.043
6. Fast	.024	.429	-.056	.156	.480
7. Relaxed	.060	.011	.788*	.117	-.005
8. Fair	.669*	.319	.022	.171	.021
9. Wise	.570*	.112	.353	.221	.091
10. Warm	.252	.119	-.018	.143	.787*
11. Sharp	.056	.690*	.107	.033	.104
12. Idealistic	.148	.025	-.501*	.075	.039
13. Safe	.777*	.032	.101	-.038	-.036
14. Strong	.371	.568*	.095	.282	.125
15. Pleasant	.563*	.551*	.122	-.177	.149
% of variance	32.0	26.3	13.9	13.9	13.9

Table 2

Varimax rotated factor matrix
for Democrats for McGovern on concept
"Ideal President" (Survey I).

Scale	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Light	.229	-.053	.046	.241	.004
2. Active	.365	-.005	-.023	.276	.280
3. Clean	.753*	.246	.211	.085	-.004
4. Valuable	.840*	.187	.233	.026	.038
5. Deep	.252	.294	.546*	-.064	.268
6. Fast	.076	.128	.368	.104	.389
7. Relaxed	.207	.017	.167	.501*	.125
8. Fair	.575*	.434	.145	.184	.197
9. Wise	.474	.479	.014	.148	.258
10. Warm	.202	.180	.493	.196	.320
11. Sharp	.079	.493	.113	.004	.754*
12. Idealistic	.041	-.011	.011	-.878*	.181
13. Safe	.179	.803*	.286	-.067	.144
14. Strong	.160	.776*	.202	.024	.155
15. Pleasant	.111	.150	.830*	.205	-.093
% of variance	26.2	25.3	19.3	15.4	13.8

Table 3

Varimax rotated factor matrix
for Democrats for McGovern on concept
"McGovern" (Survey I).

Scale	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Light	.014	.020	-.164	-.095	.642*
2. Active	.057	.025	.809*	.131	-.004
3. Clean	.088	.583*	.185	.088	-.053
4. Valuable	.364	.628*	.170	.159	-.009
5. Deep	.784*	.275	-.030	.068	-.045
6. Fast	.230	.166	.630*	-.019	.120
7. Relaxed	.004	.340	.385	.312	.282
8. Fair	.335	.788*	-.006	-.002	-.184
9. Wise	.776*	.339	.042	-.028	.056
10. Warm	.053	.008	.289	.609*	-.048
11. Sharp	.515*	.030	.296	.168	-.166
12. Idealistic	.113	.053	-.048	-.061	-.317
13. Safe	.294	.486	-.151	.289	.224
14. Strong	.734*	.175	.246	.111	-.192
15. Pleasant	.122	.303	-.100	.534*	.039
% of variance	31.1	26.7	20.6	11.8	9.6

Table 4

Varimax rotated factor matrix
for Democrats for McGovern on concept
"Nixon" (Survey I).

Scale	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Light	.161	-.268	.666*	-.002	.124
2. Active	.019	.829*	-.204	.001	-.018
3. Clean	.872*	.130	.033	.266	-.065
4. Valuable	.540*	.078	-.107	.463	-.055
5. Deep	.291	.296	-.140	.468	.163
6. Fast	.061	.688*	-.129	.266	.114
7. Relaxed	.132	.016	.123	-.020	.757*
8. Fair	.658*	-.089	-.035	.173	.079
9. Wise	.090	.347	-.115	.643*	-.050
10. Warm	.434	.114	.118	.094	.252
11. Sharp	.221	.587*	.012	.360	-.100
12. Idealistic	.045	-.027	.668*	-.105	.097
13. Safe	.589*	-.252	.120	.310	.186
14. Strong	.030	.502*	-.522*	.202	.297
15. Pleasant	.738*	.145	.236	.189	.070
% of variance	32.5	25.6	16.1	15.8	10.1

Table 5

Varimax rotated factor matrix
for Republicans for Nixon on concept
"Myself" (Survey I).

Scale	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Light	-.177	-.234	-.393	.118	.029
2. Active	.256	.334	.434	-.072	.355
3. Clean	.266	.543*	.360	.056	.142
4. Valuable	.140	.153	.296	.040	.868*
5. Deep	.159	.030	.620*	.000	.329
6. Fast	.468	.106	.598*	-.034	.300
7. Relaxed	.073	.014	-.066	.604*	.029
8. Fair	-.015	.523*	.061	.248	.070
9. Wise	.734*	.060	.018	.005	.208
10. Warm	-.166	.128	.507*	.450	.115
11. Sharp	.700*	.052	.291	.237	.278
12. Idealistic	.604*	.101	+.190	.115	.133
13. Safe	.096	.977*	.091	.042	.064
14. Strong	.485	.406	.407	.147	.027
15. Pleasant	.267	.285	.020	.858*	-.075
% of variance	24.4	23.6	21.0	16.7	14.2

Table 6

Varimax rotated factor matrix
for Republicans for Nixon on concept
"Ideal President" (Survey I).

Scale	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Light	.331	-.024	.023	.043	-.006
2. Active	.155	.124	.643*	-.091	-.017
3. Clean	.933*	.153	.131	-.014	.103
4. Valuable	.792*	.225	.084	-.062	.235
5. Deep	.604*	.336	.352	.072	-.015
6. Fast	.103	.377	.481	.259	-.123
7. Relaxed	.180	.237	.605*	-.296	.201
8. Fair	.626*	.160	.186	.050	.528*
9. Wise	.629*	.157	.001	.326	.686*
10. Warm	.005	.634*	.537*	.013	.096
11. Sharp	.142	.097	.074	.693*	.076
12. Idealistic	.041	.083	.078	-.688*	-.023
13. Safe	.243	.895*	.277	-.027	-.034
14. Strong	.177	.797*	.206	.008	.205
15. Pleasant	.051	.329	.702*	.417	.092
% of variance	29.9	24.6	21.5	14.4	9.5

Table 7

Varimax rotated factor matrix
for Republicans for Nixon on concept
"McGovern" (Survey I).

Scale	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Light	.145	.027	-.428	.065	.042
2. Active	.208	.291	.797*	.183	.028
3. Clean	.708*	.303	-.198	.070	-.071
4. Valuable	.219	.383	.193	.750*	-.113
5. Deep	.140	.583*	.020	.104	.176
6. Fast	.070	.180	.688*	.177	.171
7. Relaxed	.081	.102	-.048	.265	.750*
8. Fair	.579*	.562*	-.025	.105	.208
9. Wise	.166	.517*	.147	.585*	.363
10. Warm	.613*	-.160	-.009	.446	.174
11. Sharp	.676*	.328	.181	.144	.096
12. Idealistic	.090	.088	.087	-.135	.420
13. Safe	.212	.550*	.176	.041	-.001
14. Strong	.168	.553*	.182	.172	.066
15. Pleasant	.794*	.339	.072	.029	.236
% of variance	29.5	24.8	17.4	15.7	12.5

Table 8

Varimax rotated factor matrix
For Republicans for Nixon on concept
"Nixon" (Survey I).

Scale	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
1. Light	.059	.025	-.098	.558*	.021
2. Active	.268	.559*	.122	.452	.560*
3. Clean	.741*	.210	.139	.208	.065
4. Valuable	.781*	.034	.283	.015	.221
5. Deep	.704*	.383	-.032	-.203	.291
6. Fast	.123	.548*	.115	-.042	.089
7. Relaxed	.221	.754*	.152	.284	-.254
8. Fair	.534*	.199	.041	.092	.128
9. Wise	.569*	.528*	.124	-.148	.253
10. Warm	.177	.670*	.018	.109	.152
11. Sharp	.510*	.496	.132	-.113	-.030
12. Idealistic	-.217	-.246	-.866*	.163	-.029
13. Safe	.778*	.114	.027	.146	-.126
14. Strong	.579*	.598*	.208	-.218	.126
15. Pleasant	.669*	.345	.076	.044	-.136
% of variance	43.1	30.7	10.4	8.7	7.1

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